University of Alberta

States of Unrest: Critiquing Liberal Peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform in
Post-Conflict Sierra Leone (2001-2012) and Liberia (2003-2013)

by

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Abstract

Drawing from original interviews, archival work and extended fieldwork (2011-2012), this doctoral dissertation comparatively examines the theory and practice of United Kingdom, United States and United Nations-led post-conflict peacebuilding and security sector reforms in Sierra Leone (2001-2011) and Liberia (2003-2013). Through an examination of specific post-conflict practices—disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or "DDR" and security sector and military reform (SSR)—I demonstrate that these interventions were embedded within a macro-peacebuilding approach that was oriented for short-term problem-solving in support of an expedient rush to reconsolidate state authority followed by a statebuilding and capacity building process broadly in the mold of a "liberal peace". The central argument presented in the dissertation is that external actors aimed to reconsolidate state authority during the immediate phase of post-war "peacebuilding" without problematising the nature of the African state in both societies and thereby undermining the long-term effectiveness of these interventions. Despite considerable western involvement over the past decade, the structural causes that led to these conflicts have been unaddressed and continue to persist in the so-called "post-conflict" period. The long-term effects of this strategy are explored in relation to the functioning of state power and its relations with civil society.

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List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
BMATT	British Military Assistance Training Team
BTC	Barclay's Training Center
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (US)
DfID	Department for International Development
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRC	Human Rights Commission (Government of Sierra Leone)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Team
INGOs	International Non-governmental Organizations
ISAT	International Security Advisory Team
LNGOs	Local non-government organizations

JDITF	Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
JDAC	Joint Defense Advisory Committee
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs (Liberia)
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (Liberia)
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (Sierra Leone)
NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (Liberia)
NCRRR	National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction (Sierra Leone)
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia (2003-2005)
NPFL	National Patriotic Forces of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisionary Revolutionary Council
PAC	Project Approval Committee
PRC	People's Redemption Council
RRR	Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconciliation
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency (UK)
SILSEP	Security Sector Assistance Programme
SLP	Sierra Leone Police

SRSG	Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General
TCCs	Technical Coordinating Committees
ULIMO-K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia Under Alhaji Kromah
ULIMO-J	United Liberation Movement of Liberia Under Roosevelt Johnson
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United National Children's Fund
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UNPBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WACI	West African Coast Initiative
WFP	World Food Programme

Introduction:
The Road from Conflict to Peacebuilding in Mano River Basin, West Africa

Introduction

The upsurge in armed conflicts in the first decade of the post-Cold War era[1] led to a redefinition of armed violence, wars and intrastate conflicts in Africa as something that needed to be controlled by Western countries through a variety of instruments aimed at social reconstruction and conflict transformation in the global South. However, by the mid-2000s, we saw a reverse in that trend as half of the number of conflicts ended.[2] The reduction in the number of armed conflicts has been explained in terms of the proliferation in the number of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions around the globe.[3] While these interventions may be credited for reducing the number of armed conflicts, it is less apparent whether these approaches have addressed the driving sources of violent conflict in these societies or simply contained or suppressed them temporarily.

The Mano River basin subregion, which encompasses four West Africa countries—Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Conakry and Côte d'Ivoire (since

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[1] See statistics provided by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which indicates a marked shift in occurrence and severity from interstate to intrastate conflict (see http://www.sipri.org/yearbook). See, as well, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: "The most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of armed conflicts with states" (ICISS 2001, 4).

[2] Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and peace in the 21st Century, Vancouver: Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, 2005

[3] Strategy Unit, 'Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response', A Strategy Unit Report to the Government, London: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, 2005, 21); Andrew Mack, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline', in Volker and Martina Fischer Rittberger (eds), *Strategies for Peace. Contributions of International Organisations, States, and Non-State Actors*, Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2008, 75-107.

2003), experienced more than a decade of armed violence on its borders from 1990-2003.[4] Today, the wars that consumed the Mano River are over and Sierra Leone and Liberia have become something of a post-conflict laboratory for western peacebuilding practices.[5] Sierra Leone and Liberia embarked on extensive post-war peace-building and reconstruction programmes, led respectively by lead-states Great Britain and the United States and backed by robust UN peacekeeping forces (which at the time were among the largest and most expensive UN peace support missions in the world).

To date, most of the literature on peacebuilding has examined the ideological motivations of western powers intervening in post-war societies.[6] This dissertation instead is concerned with the international strategy and its relationship with the local context and the domestic-level effects of international intervention in the affairs of African states to discern what this can tell us about the post-cold war, post-9/11 interventions in Africa. To date, no studies have assessed peacebuilding efforts over a period of ten years after the conflict.

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[4] The Liberian civil war ended through a military ceasefire and political negotiations in Accra, Ghana signed in July/August 2003. The civil war occurred over two main phases (from 1989-1996, 1999-2003) and involved at least eight different warring factions. Approximately 75,000 Liberians were killed and about 300,000 were displaced as refugees in neighbouring countries, Europe and the United States or internally displaced. For Sierra Leone, see Chapter 4.

[5] I use the term 'external', 'outside' and international actors interchangeably to encompass international organizations (United Nations), sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS, individual UN member states (especially the UK and US governments), neighbouring hegemones in West Africa (Nigeria in particular) and NGOs.

[6] Duffield 2001; Susanna Campbell, David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam (eds), 'A Liberal Peace?', London: Zed Books, 2011; Oliver Richmond, 'Understanding the Liberal pPace; David Chandler, 'The Uncritical Critique of the Liberal Peace', *Review of International Studies,* Pugh 2005

Research Questions and Thesis Statement

In the dissertation, I am concerned primarily with *how* external actors went about formulating peacebuilding strategies and implementing them in practice to understand the extent to which a transformational approach was adopted. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will critically examine one sector of peacebuilding as state-building activity—rebuilding security forces in Africa. A close investigation of international disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia reveals that peacebuilding was underpinned by a macro state-building approach that aimed to reconsolidate central state authority without problematising the nature of that state and its relationship with society. My working hypothesis for the dissertation is as follows: When peacebuilding, DDR and SSR practices rely on existing state structures will result in the failure to transform the political space.

This thesis addresses the following central questions:

1) *What overall peace strategy guided international 'peacebuilding' in Sierra Leone and Liberia?*

2) *How did external actors implement that strategy?*

3) *What effect have these interventions had on the underlying causes of violence in these societies?*

4) *What effect have these interventions had on the state-society relations in these post-war societies after ten-years of peacebuilding?*

Several secondary questions follow from the primary questions raised above*:*
1) *What peace and security strategy underpinned British, American and United Nations Peacebuilding, security and military reform processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone?*

2) What role has military reform played in the post-conflict peacebuilding process?

What Constitutes "Success" in Peacebuilding?

The most common indications of "success" during Sierra Leone's war-peace transition are 1) the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) was able to withdraw from Sierra Leone in less than five years after the civil war ended as opposed to more than ten years in Liberia; 2) Success is often measured by the ability of a postwar country to conduct multiparty democratic elections. The democratic transfer of power from the SLPP to the opposition APC through the ballot box in 2007 (without resort to violence) and two successive elections in Liberia (2005 and 2011) are noteworthy. However, these are arguably superficial indications of the depth of peace established.[7]

My definition of "transformation" represents a complete break from past state practices. It is not enough to stop physical harm; we need to understand the causes of political violence and recognise that its fundamental logic is intimately connected to attaining state power in these societies, Transformation of society requires addressing the marginalisation and exclusion of the majority of citizens (including women and youth) and creating an "equal playing field" by preventing abuse of power by the entrenched political and economic class.

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[7] The election involved substantial financial subsidy from the international community, however. The estimated cost was US$26 million. The government of Sierra Leone intended to provide on third of this amount (US$8.5 million) with the balance coming from donor-pooled funds in a UNDP-managed basket fund (UNIOSIL, April 2006, 6). The UNDP procured US$15 million worth of registration and electoral materials alone (UNIOSIL report, 28 November 2006, 9)

Research Setting

West Africa has been perceived as one of the more volatile regions in sub-Saharan Africa.[8] In the early 1990s, the Mano River conflicts centered in the Parrot's Beak region, encompassing southern Guinea, Lofa Country in Liberia, Kono and Kailahun in the eastern border region of Sierra Leone, as well as the shared border in eastern Liberia and western Côte d'Ivoire.[9] The character of the irregular factions and their propensity to rely on extreme violence against civilians was an important feature in the West African conflicts of the 1990s.[10]

Sierra Leone and Liberia adopted slightly different transitional strategies: First, Sierra Leone's war ended in 2002 as a result of a negotiated ceasefire and was maintained with robust British military and development assistance for the first decade of post-war peacebuilding. Liberia's civil conflict, which ended in July 2003, involved a two-year transitional power-sharing arrangement between the main warring factions, followed by the rise to power of an internationally popular President. Sierra Leone has conducted three post-conflict elections without any major return to large-scale violence (May 2002, August 2007 and November 2012). Following the 2007 elections, Ernest Bai Koroma, a former insurance broker and pro-business politician came to power and has since become something of a US and UK 'darling'.[11] In the lead-up to Koroma's re-election in

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[8] Jane's Sentinel (2007, ix) describes West Africa as "among the world's poorest and most conflict-afflicted regions, home to several 'failed' states, four UN peacekeeping or peace-building missions..."

[9] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/mano-river.htm (Accessed 8 January 2012)

[10] Paul Richards 1996; Abdullah 1997; Mats Utas. "Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War." Uppsala University, Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, 2003.

[11] Koroma had run in the 2002 elections against Kabbah and finished second with 22.3% of the votes casted.

2012, there were several incidents of violence (in which the government was implicated), which tested the durability of Sierra Leone's peace.[12]

Liberia has concluded two elections in the first ten-years of its post-war transition (2005-2006 and 2011-2012). Liberia's post-war security (and I would suggest, its false sense of stability) has come largely on the back of two main factors: a robust and sustained UN peacekeeping presence and the internationally popular President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a 74-year old Harvard J.F. Kennedy School of Government graduate in 1971 and former World Bank official, who was elected in 2005 and subsequently re-elected in late 2011.

Why revisit Sierra Leone and Liberia as "successful" peacebuilding cases?
From an international policy perspective, Sierra Leone and Liberia have been touted as "success stories" for post-conflict peacebuilding. The United Nations Security Council recently portrayed Sierra Leone's "exceptional successes" in advance of the November 2012 elections.[13] There are mixed views about Liberia's peacebuilding process. While it is true that both countries are sufficiently "post-conflict" and neither has experienced a recurrence of large-scale war since 2002 and 2003 respectively, we should be careful not to prejudge the cases as "success stories" from which we should emulate. There are profound reasons to question

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[12] Koroma decisively won the Presidential elections for the ruling APC party, securing 59% of the votes casted (out of 2.6 million voters, 87% voted). SLPP candidate Julius Maada Bio received 37% of the votes. Koroma's inauguration was held on 22 February 2013. The ruling APC won the majority of seats in Parliament (68), while the SLPP secured 42. The ruling party also secured 10 out of 19 local council seats and the SLPP won the remaining 9 (UNIPSIL report, 13 February 2013, 2). According to the UN, "there were no major incidents of political violence on polling day and overall, the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of calm and in an orderly manner" (UNIPSIL report, 13 February 2013, 2)
[13] "Sierra Leone must pass 'crucial test' of November elections to consolidate exceptional success achieved since civil war, security council told," UN Security Council, New York, 2012, https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10589.doc.htm;

whether the underlying causes of conflict embedded within the state have been effectively addressed let alone recognized by external actors involved in the peacebuilding process. I will argue that many of the structural causes of violence remain within the state, which potentiate violence in society and in everyday life.

A number of academics agree that the Sierra Leonean state lacked effectiveness and legitimacy in the country's post-colonial period.[14] Scholars have debated whether it a failure of the central state in the post-colonial period to provide public services. In Sierra Leone, the foundation of this state was laid during colonial administration and historically tied to the colonial indirect rule. The post-colonial leadership—first under President Stevens and then Momoh, relied on the continuation of this system of rule though they made minor adjustments by tweaking the state security apparatus to suit their personal survival. Or was it the failure of the political class that consolidated their authority in the post-colonial era?[15] Richards interprets the failure of the Sierra Leonean state in terms of the crisis of a 'patriomonial state' where national resources were redistributed as personal favours. Reno observes that despite the gradual socio-economic decline, the rule of Stevens and then Momoh illustrated how the executive leadership can insulate itself from coups and uprisings.[16] However, as the crisis was deepened, the collapse of this patriomonal system was inevitable. A thorough understanding of the nature of the post-colonial state is a necessary starting point for peacebuilding.

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[14] Keen 2005; Gberie 2005; Pham 2006; Fanthrope 2006
[15] Reno 1995; Keen 2005; Peters 2006; Fanthrope 2001
[16] Reno 1995, 148

Second, both countries pose the problem of experiencing a "crisis of the youth".[17] Sierra Leone and Liberia have been unable to effectively "reintegrate" the majority of young fighters into alternative livelihoods with meaningful socio-economic opportunities. Sierra Leone's civil conflict involved between 50,000-70,000 fighters, the majority of which were youth under the age of 35. At least 101,000 Liberians fought in their country's civil conflicts and many remain as unskilled and under-educated for productive civilian life.

Additionally, reintegrating the general youth cohort in Liberia and Sierra Leone into meaningful socio-economic opportunities has also been troublingly elusive. Today, many youth live on the margins of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian state and face grim educational and employment opportunities. While youth unemployment is not unique to Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is arguably more problematic in a region like the Mano River basin due to the fact that youth (under the age of 35) constitute approximately 60-65 percent of the total population.[18] Many of these youth are former child or youth combatants with concrete combat experience and in some cases are more skilled in operating small arms than postwar state security personnel. While some ex-combatants participated in the conflict to seek revenge for local grievances or to access to economic spoils, my interpretation for why many young people participated in the Mano River conflicts as a way to intervene on their own behalf to alter a system

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[17] Peters 2006

[18] Wai (2007, 53) notes that 65% of Sierra Leone's total population are youth and that 56% of the 2.6 million registered voters for the 2007 elections were below the age of 32 years. See also Ismail Rashid, Ibrahim Abdullah and Joseph Goakai, 'Youth vulnerability and exclusion in West Africa: Sierra Leone country report, No. 28, London: University of Kings College London's Conflict, Security and Development Group, 2009

that had failed them. In a large number of cases, youth wanted to usurp unjust local power structures that inflicted structural violence against them in everyday life.[19] Sierra Leonean and Liberian youth became products of a state-society complex that has failed to guarantee basic human rights such as access to food, decent shelter, clean water, affordable healthcare, education and socio-economic opportunities. Therefore, the political conditions of the state and its relationship with society become an important puzzle to solve during peacebuilding. Additionally, the socio-economic conditions that created and potentiated violence in society and everyday life also requires attention during peacebuilding.[20]

Peacebuilding, liberal peace and liberal interventionism

Post-conflict peacebuilding operations (or peace support operations) now involve a shifting constellation of international and regional organisations, individual UN member states and NGOs, all of whom define their activities, goals and purpose in variety of different and often competing ways.[21] Over the past two decades, peacebuilding has evolved as a "post-war" activity during war-peace transitions aimed to establish conditions to prevent large-scale violence and to buid structures in society to resolve conflicts peacefully.[22] Over the past two decades, most United Nations peace support operations had explicit "peacebuilding" mandates.[23]

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[19] Peter 2006; Richards 1996, 2005;

[20] David Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 2005; Richards 1996; Fanthrope 2005; Richards 2005

[21] Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, Laura Sitea, 'Peacebuilding: What's in a Name? *Global Governance*, 13:1, 2007, 35-58; Henning Haugerudbraaten, 'Peacebuilding: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts' *African Security Review*, 7:6, 1998, 17-26

[22] Boutros-Ghali 1994; Keating and Knight 2004

[23] Boutros Ghali 1992; Paris 2002; Mats Berdal 2011

In the 1990s and 2000s, there was a widespread perception that underdevelopment, endemic poverty and inequality in Africa was a dangerous disease affecting regional and global security and that deprivation and impoverishment was creating vicious cycles of self-perpetuating conflict within these societies. This prompted many observers to claim that countries at the margins of the UNDP's human development index should not be left to their own devices since "failed states" created for opportunities for criminals and terrorist groups to exploit.[24]

This has led some scholars to claim that global peace can only be realised through the spread of liberal democracy in the "failed" and "fragile" states in the global South.[25] Peacebuilding has become a dominant framework for the global expression and application of the "liberal peace" thesis, a theory that posits that democratisation through the transfer of western models of governance in the "least developed" countries is not only the surest path to building peace but also the most effective framework to bring non-western societies in compliance with internationally-accepted standards.[26]

Liberal peace represents a merging of international security and development policy that is based on the idiom: "Without development, there is no security; without security, there is no development". One of the defining characteristics in the "liberal peace" literature is its emphasis on the political and

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[24] DfID, The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An information document, London: DfID, 2004, iii; United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, New York: United Nations, 2004.

[25] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992; Paris 2002; Duffield, *Global Governance,* 2001

[26] Paris, *Peacebuilding* 2002; Duffield, *Global Governance* 2001

economic dimensions of liberalisation, defined in terms of the adoption of free-market economic reforms, and democratisation of the polity (defined as free and regular competitive electoral politics).[27] The peacebuilding and "liberal peace" literature views war-torn societies as transmission belts for promoting global neo-liberal economic principles.[28] This has become the dominant paradigm for war-peace transitions.[29] Less attention has been focused on how the security sector relates to the liberal peace paradigm in African states. The liberal peace project seeks to reconstitute the state in the western/Weberian sense.[30] Scholars have critiqued peacebuilding as being neo-colonial or neo-imperialist project in support of western hegemonic interests.[31] This dominant global agenda called "liberal peacebuilding" involves building effective state institutions to abide by and enforce neoliberal practices to provide basic services.[32]

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[27] Zubairu Wai, 'Elections as a Strategy for Democratization and Conflict Transformation? Liberal Peace and the 1996 Elections in Sierra Leone', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 5:4, 2012, 229-244

[28] Robert Cox, 'Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in Robert W. Cox with Timothy Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1996, 154; See also Michael Pugh, 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective', *International Journal of Peace Studies,* 10:2, 2005, 23-42; Michael Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilising States after War', *International Security*, 30:4, 2006, 87-112. According to Pugh, peacebuilding practices and policies are dominated by ideas from western liberal internationalism. These ideas are shaped by particular visions for the state and its role in development. These views have been criticized for supporting status quo as part of the "hegemonic project" whose "ideological" goal is to "spread the values and norms of dominant power brokers" (Pugh 2008, 2005 and 2006). From this critical perspective, one must understand relations between the northern and southern elite in the context of global governance, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

[29] Paris 2004; Pugh 2005; Duffield 2001

[30] Michael Barnett argues that the explicit goal of peacebuilding is to "create a state defined by the rule of law, markets and democracy" (Barnett 2006, 88).

[31] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance*, 2001; David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding*, London: Pluto Press, 2006; Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the Mission Civilisatrice', *Review of International Studies*, 28:4, 2002, 637-656; Michael Pugh, 'The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10: 2, 2005, 23-42.

[32] Cox, 239

Roland Paris explains that one of the general aims of internationally supported peacebuilding efforts has been to "bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance."[33] As a subfield of peacebuilding, security sector reform agenda emerged in the late 1990s to emphasise not only the need to rebuild the coercive arm of the state (the military, police and intelligence agencies) to maintain a monopoly on violence but also to improve the management and oversight of the security sector as a whole to prevent military and security officials from interfering in the political process and to develop mechanisms to subordinate security institutions to democratic structures and practices in line with international standards.[34] The "SSR" discourse since the late 1990s focuses on shoring up the legitimacy and functionality of the state's security sector by empowering civilian authorities and democratically elected institutions to manage the sector to ensure the military's subordination to civil leadership. The contemporary practice of SSR during peacebuilding is a social engineering experiment that entails bringing outsiders in to shape, "restructure" and in some cases, manage the armed forces, police, prisons and intelligence bodies in countries where the state is dysfunctional (and where military officials have a history of interfering in politics).

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[33] Roland Paris 2002, 638

[34] Nicole Ball, 'The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies', in Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall Chester Crocker, (eds), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, , Washington: USIP Press, 2001; A Bryden and H Hänggi, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2004; A Bryden and Hänggi 2005; A Schnabel and HG Ehrhart, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005; Heather Marquette and Danielle Beswick, 'Statebuilding, Security and Development: Statebuilding as a New Development Paradigm', *Third World Quarterly,* 32:10, 2011, 1703-1714;

SSR practice is informed by a number of problematic assumptions, which are reviewed extensively in Chapter Two. The top-down dimension of SSR involves extensive institutional engineering, focused on reform of the administrative-technical aspects of the state, and selecting appropriate interlocutors to assume high-level staff positions within leadership positions. From a bottom-up perspective, external actors focus on "partnering" with local actors to develop recruitment, vetting/screening, training programmes and retention policies that are aligned with international standards and best practices. Roland Paris describes these as the globalisation of ideas about how states should look and act in global terms.

Military restructuring programs have become a popular component in Western peace-building strategy.[35] The African military is often viewed as a 'black box', assuming that inputs such as training and provison of equipment will lead to enhanced and effective capability. The view that the Sierra Leone and Liberian military required substantive restructuring after their civil wars ended is widely shared in the literature.[36] The concentration on military institutions in West Africa raises important implications for peacebuilding and democratic development. It is assumed that military institutions in West Africa are often

[35] SIDDR, 'Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration Final Report.' Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005. Approximately one-third of all peace processes since 1990 have relied on this strategy (Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, 'Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination', *Journal of Peace Research*, 45:3, 2008, 365-384).

[36] Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake, 'United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone', *Civil Wars,* 8, 2, 2006, 109–23; Patrick Coker, Jeremy Ginifer, Mark Malan, and Sarah Meek (eds), 'Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery', Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 80, March 2003); Osman Gbla, 'Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone', *International Peacekeeping*, 13, 1, 2006, 78–93; Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Geneva, 2009.

among the most developed and best-resourced state institutions and attract better-educated elites. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, this assumption is problematic: half of the successful coup d'états in post-colonial Sierra Leone were executed by low-ranking soldiers (1968 and 1997).[37] To date, there has been only one successful military coup in Liberia and it too was executed by low-ranking soldiers (12 April 1980). Therefore, these particular countries do not fit easily into the traditional model of a African military coups that is led by senior military officials. This suggests the need to rethink military restructuring programmes from the point of view of the rank-and-file and the need to develop approaches that go beyond top-down institutional/managerial "reform" and training.

Additionally, external actors assumed a key policymaking role in capacity-building and institutional building in Sierra Leone and Liberia working in partnership with local actors. What is unknown is how external actors went about formulating strategies and what methods and modalities were used to implement those strategies in practice. Examining certain DDR and SSR practices allows one to understand how the state was reconstituted. Answering these questions throughout the dissertation will then open up an opportunity to assess the effects of these approaches on macro and micro-levels in Sierra Leone and Liberia's state and society relations.

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[37] The 1968 and 1997 coups were executed by privates and corporals. The 1967 coup was executed by senior officers while the 1992 mutiny turned coup was organized by junior officers (mostly Second-Lieutenants and captains).

Problem-solving and Critical Theory Approaches

The normative starting point for most UN interventions draws from universal templates and previous practice. The modus operandi derives from western experience, expertise and institutions—which is assumed to have universal applicability in Africa. As Ole Jacob Sending argues, the mainstream peacebuilding literature problematically assumes that the advancement of allegedly universal principles of governance and social organization is a global public good for import on the African continent. Since peacebuilders often view themselves as advancing "the right objectives", and possess the "know-how" to do it, the practices appear to be already settled or taken for granted. Therefore, there is no need to problematize dominant strategies and methods and no need for developing systems of elaborate checks and balances to ensure accountability or transparency over the process.[38] This arrogance and ignorance leads to ineffective outcomes not least because local knowledge is ignored and alternative visions are foreclosed or marginalised. External actors over-write the specificities within these particular societies and impose a universalising logic of the ideal-type Weberian state on the political foundations and socio-economic realities.

By arguing that peacebuilding practice failed to problematise the nature of the state and its relationship with society, I am to disrupt these practices that are taken for granted as universal public goods. The presence of external actors and how the material and discursive resources brought to bear on the war-peace transition conditions the options available for peacebuilding is often taken for granted or rarely called into question. The question of "local ownership" and

"participation have become integral concepts in an effort to develop peacebuilding strategies that are more attentive to local conditions and needs.[39] However, these concepts remain poorly understood, especially in relation to local practices. Often, local participation means "buy-in" from a limited and narrow group of elite or powerbrokers with access to the means of violence. These pacts are hardly foundations for which participatory, inclusive and sustainable peace can be built. The large UN peacekeeping presence underpinned by a "stabilisation" and state security is aimed at addressing the symptoms of malgovernance and state corruption. This is why statebuilding practices have become integral to contemporary peacebuilding operations. Based on the assumption that western formal institutions need to be built to mediate conflicts in society and within the state. Interventions need to focus specifically on creating an equal playing field to prevent the entrenched political class from drawing on and reproducing earlier forms of power relations and domination.

The willingness to engage in broader-based national consensus on what the "root causes" of violence are in that society (let alone how to address them) becomes a sideline issue in favour of an externally conditioned political process that emphasises settling the question of executive political authority. A problem-solving approach involves reconsolidating central state authority immediately after the crisis. This strategy is informed by a problematic assumption that the status quo if resumed will not reproduce preexisting forms of state authority that were perceived as illegitimate before the conflict and sustain inequalities of

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[39] Chopra 2004

opportunity between state officials and those living on the margins of the state and society.

The problem-solving orientation inherent in peacebuilding also tends to emphasise short-term reactionary considerations such as disarming irregular factions in exchange for financial capital while diverting attention and resources from long-term challenges of disbanding these armed groups command structures and reintegrating ex-fighters and the war-affected populations into productive and alternative livelihood opportunities.

Peacebuilders did not pay sufficient attention during the immediate phases to underlying structures of conflict that sustain systemic violence in these societies. The core problem within these societies is structural violence embedded within the state and the conditions created by the state to potential violence within society and everyday life. In both countries, local actors failed to conceptualise a broader national recovery strategy underpinned by a social transformation approach. Peace and security was conceptualised narrowly as hurriedly consolidating central state authority and legitimated through post-war Presidential and Legislative elections (within six-months to the first two years following cessation of large-scale violence). Fine-grained analysis of the problems associated with DDR and SSR exposes the many "cracks" and problems in this statebuilding approach.

A second challenge of peacebuilding is how to connect macro-level statebuilding reforms with the deeper and more problematic socio-economic

development.[40] The Mano River basin countries in West Africa are among the poorest countries in the world. For example, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire rank among the bottom margins of the least developed countries in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI). Five years after the war ended (2007), Sierra Leone ranked last out of 177 countries on the UNDP HDI. There has been very little observable improvement in the socio-economic conditions after more than a decade of post-conflict "reforms" in Liberia.[41] Unemployment rates in these countries stood at between 65-80% while approximately 60% of the population survived on a daily basis below the poverty line in a context where life expectancy is 42 years.[42] These figures do not necessarily mean anything in and of themselves, however, they do raise concerns about Sierra Leone and Liberia's current state of permanent transition and the need to rethink the peacebuilding model and redefine what constitutes "successful" "peacebuilding". The so-called "peace dividend" has

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[40] For an introduction to the literature on the development-security nexus, see Mark Duffield 2001; Tschirgi 2004; and various contributions from the journal *Conflict, Development and Security*; See Malinda S. Smith, "The Constitution of Africa as a Security Threat," *Review of Constitutional Studies*, 10, nos. 1 and 2 (2005), 192-205; Smith, Chaps. 1 and 11 in Smith, ed., *Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism,* Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.

[41] Liberia's per capita income in 2006 stood at 1/6th the value than it was in 1979.

[42] Sierra Leone's Gross National Income (GNI) has only increased by a marginal percentage from 2000 to 2010. For instance, GNI per capita increased from $222 in 2000 to $279 in 2005 to $352 in 2010 (UN data on Sierra Leone, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=SIERRA%20LEONE, accessed 17 July 2013). This equates to between .61 cents to .96 cents per day or the 2010 local equivalent of Le 121,454 per month, which barely pays for a 100 kilogram bag of rice. A household survey conducted by DfID in 2003/2004 (see footnote 16) set the poverty line at Le 2,111 per day (about 70 cents). The majority (at least 70% of the population) were living below this poverty line while 26% of the total population lived in "extreme poverty" well below basic caloric standards (set at 2,700 calories per day). In mid 2007, only 59% of the population had access to "safe" drinking water (UNIOSIL report, 7 May 2007, 8). In 2012, continued to rank at the margins of the UNDP HDI (177 out of 186 countries). Liberia's GNI per capita ranged from $250, $271, $316, $341 from 2005-2008 to just over $1/day in 2009 to $452 in 2011 and $480 IN 2012. In 2012, Liberia ranked 173 out of 186 countries from the UNDP's HDI.

proven largely elusive for the majority of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. The socio-economic benefits of the "peace dividend" have been disproportionally realised by a minority elite. In Sierra Leone, the top 20% income earners account for 46% of total consumption of goods in the country while the lowest 20% account for only 7%.[43] The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) estimates that only 40% of the population is "economically active".[44] Most marginalised populations like women and youth survive precariously in an uncertain informal economy.

The UN cannot label Sierra Leone as a "success story" in peacebuilding when the majority of youth (who constitute 60% of the population) cannot realise any meaningful change in the livelihood opportunities. Meaningful transformation can only take place if there is a radical improvement in the economy: decent livelihood for all and guaranteed employment for those with skills. Ten years after the war ended, Sierra Leone and Liberia are still posting conflict, socio-economic underdevelopment and donor dependency. The youth are told that economic growth within the neoliberal framework will bring livelihood opportunities. However, ten years removed from war, when a country is still posting socio-economic indicators similar to before the war, and youth will soon realise that the much anticipated "new dawn" is not coming, and will, as they did in the past, intervene on their own behalf.[45]

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[43] Citing DfID Integrated Household Study, conducted in 2004; Derek Poate et al, Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone, London: DfID, 2008,,5.

[44] Poate et al 2008, 6

[45] Author's confidential email correspondence, 6 March 2012

The Sierra Leonean and Liberian states (and their international donors) are deeply complicit in potentiating inequality, human insecurity and structural violence against citizens by drawing on and reproducing old patterns of exclusion and nepotism to determine the distribution of socio-economic opportunities in these society.[46] The bleak future for youth has "led to a growing frustration and resentment towards the political and ruling elites, who are perceived as corrupt and indifferent to the problems plaguing the country".[47]

After ten-years of peacebuilding efforts, it is critical to question the strategies implemented and lack of attention focused on addressing the underlying causes of violence in these particular societies. Most peacebuilding studies assessing the peace are limited to empirical intensive description with little substantive theoretical depth, which leaves the reader without a clear sense of the relevance of their case studies to similar processes elsewhere.[48] Also missing from the debate on the effectiveness of SSR and peacebuilding is discussion on the role of structure and agency in the relationship between internal and external actors during the design and implementation phases. Additionally, SSR analysis tends to be written by consultants and academics that have a propensity to hide their ideological biases and lack of critical theoretical reflection.

This dissertation draws on original primary data obtained from national archival records, personal interviews and material from United Nations, Ministry of Defense and government data, and augmented with extended field research in

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[46] Structural violence is very distinct from physical or political violence—the former being measured by the number of deaths caused by bodily harm by group conflict or war. See Chapter 2 for more discussion on "structural violence" embedded within the state of Sierra Leone.

[47] Wai 2007, 56

[48] See for instance, the early 1990s research on peacebuilding (William Durch and others).

both Sierra Leone and Liberia. I demonstrate through a case study of DDR and SSR that the UN, US and the UK adopted an ultra conservative, problem-solving blueprint aimed at stabilising a "negative peace". In practice, the peacebuilding strategy failed to problematise the nature of the African state in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Instead, the peacebuilding process led to a superficial restructuring of the political space. Missing in the strategy was a transformational epistemological logic that could alter the political practice and behavior of actors operating in that space. The inability of external actors to create an "equal playing field" allowed the country's political and economic elite to draw on and reproduce earlier forms of power relations and domination to consolidate their security within the state apparatus and disproportionately benefit from the security created by a large external presence. The range of external actors that dictated the nature of the transition and influenced its outcome lacked appreciation for these underlying dynamics. At best, these external actors were complicit in supporting a status quo.

Additionally, the concepts such as "local ownership", "participation" that have become integral to peacebuilding discourse need to be problematised when applied to concrete peacebuilding sites such as Sierra Leone and Liberia to understand who participates (and who does not), and how certain ideas, practices, procedures and actions get legitimised and naturalised during peacebuilding transitions.

The comparative methodology
This study is a comparative examination of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and

Liberia carried out within the qualitative methodological framework in political science. The study draws on George and Bennett's guidelines for conducting structured, focused comparative analysis.[49] George and Bennett's framework stresses the need to set clear parameters on the scope of the study and developing a well-defined theoretical focus. A clear research objective is critical for comparative case studies as it constrains and guides the data collection (phase 2) and writing process (phase 3). A comparative focus that is overly ambitious or lacks sufficient clarity leads to defective results in the study.[50] The more specific and narrowly defined the focus, the better.

The study is a heuristic effort at 'building block' theory building with its emphasis on particular aspects of a phenomenon in order to identify common patterns.[51] First, regarding the research puzzle, the investigator should identify only one phenomenon—in my case post-conflict security reform—and then identify key class or sub-class events within this (military reform and DDR). Second, involves a well-defined research objective and appropriate research strategy that guides the selection and analysis of the case studies. In my study, cases were chosen because of their regional proximity and closeness in time. Third, case studies should focus on identifying variables within the cases that provide some leverage that can be useful for policy makers to influence outcomes in cases with similar characteristics.

This project, following the George and Bennett framework, unfolded in

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[49] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Boston: The MIT Press, 2005.

[50] George and Bennett, *Case Studies*, 77

[51] Harry Eckstein, 'Case Studies and Theory in Political Science', In *Case Study Method*, Martyn Hammersley and Peter Foster Roger Gomm (eds), London: Sage, 2009

three phases: The first phase of the project was conducted during the candidacy phase of my doctoral programme. During this phase, I devised the objectives, design and structure of the study. With a field research grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), I developed and refined the methods and practical requirements of the data collection phase. Phase Two involved field research in West Africa in accordance with the design of the project. In the third phase, I began by writing up the findings of my fieldwork.

Case study researchers often start at a more general level and then "move down the ladder" towards specific, circumscribed phenomenon.[52] In my study, the "ladder of generality" started with an analysis of the general peace process and framework, then shifted to specific phenomenon within the security sector reform. The comparative focus on military reform offers useful material for developing theories on the power relations and social, political and economic dynamics in African state-society complexes.

The "building block" procedure involves studying subtypes of a larger phenomenon, in my case, DDR and military reform as components of peacebuilding and security sector reform, to investigate specific practices that were implemented under the rubric of the 'liberal peace'. There are several different blocks, each of which "fills a space" in the overall theory. George and Bennett further explain that "the component provided by each building block is itself a contribution to theory; though its scope is limited, it addresses the important problem or puzzle associated with the type of intervention that led to

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[52] George and Bennett, *Case Studies*, 77

the selection and formulation of the research objective."[53] The focus was on explaining the outcome of each case—how strategy was devised, the methods for implementing that strategy and the effects on state-society relations during the war-peace transition.

Case selection is an integral part of a good research strategy as far as class of phenomenon is defined.[54] The selection of Sierra Leone was chosen because it was the recipient of a lead-state model of international peacebuilding.[55] Additionally, I was familiar with the setting and people (I had completed previous M.A work there). In Roland Paris's seminal study on liberal peacebuilding, he posited that there was preliminary evidence of his "institutionalisation-before-liberalisation" approach having been implemented in that country.[56] Given Liberia's close proximity to Sierra Leone—both geographically and culturally—I set out at the beginning of my fieldwork to collect data in an orderly and systemic fashion. The initial phase of my fieldwork focused on collecting data on Sierra Leone. Once I had access to the NCDDR archives, my emphasis was on building up and refining the structure for examining the DDR process that strove to offer more fine-grained insights into the mechanisms and modalities of the DDR that went beyond existing studies.[57]

Field research in the social sciences often encounters difficulty assessing archival materials, government documents and interviewees. These difficulties are

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[53] Ibid, 78

[54] Ibid, 83

[55] Horn, Olonisakin and Peake 2006

[56] Paris, *At War's End*

[57] See Macartan Humphreys and "Demobilisation and Reintegraton." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 4 (2005): 531-67 ; Ball et al 2006

often compounded in "developing" and especially post-conflict societies. During difficulties experienced in accessing materials and interviewees in Freetown in October 2011, I traveled to Monrovia prior to commencement of the first round of the Presidential elections. I had secured support from Dr. Guannu at Cuttington University and used my visit to Monrovia on 10-15 October 2011 as an opportunity to lay groundwork for a subsequent visit once I had achieved sufficient contacts in Sierra Leone.[58]

Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of nine chapters and proceeds in the following order. Chapter 2 provides a conceptual backdrop for critiquing strategies and practices of external intervention in post-conflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa. The emphasis of this chapter is on the 'liberal peace' and its relationship with international statebuilding. International actors sought to shape the content and nature of the major elements of the peacebuilding strategy by either drafting large sections in the comprehensive peace agreements, legislation and policy documents, offering "expert" advice during implementation phases, the alteration of local balances of power through selection of specific state interlocutors that supported western interests and the imposition of economic conditionalities to encourage desired actions and behaviour. The peacebuilding literature is framed within three conceptual frameworks: social justice, conservative/problem-solving and critical theory. This chapter also explores how the literature on security sector reform literature attempts to conceptualise "transformation". Several 'cracks' in

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[58] Unfortunately, I contracted malaria during this initial visit and had to cut this trip short and return to Freetown to seek medical treatment.

the SSR literature highlight the problem-solving nature of SSR approaches in the interventions

Chapter 3 traces macro-level peacebuilding ideas and strategies that were formulated during Sierra Leone and Liberia's post-conflict planning process, specifically how tensions and conflict were manifested through the expression of competing visions (both from outside and within) and how, ultimately, certain ideas came to fruition while others were discarded during the peacebuilding negotiation process. I demonstrate how external actors sought to influence, shape and manage core aspects of the peacebuilding policies and priorities. Through an in-depth discussion of the international approach to macro-level peacebuilding, we can learn more about the dynamics of how peacebuilding 'works', the relationship between external and internal actors, and *how internal* and *external* actors went about formulating post-conflict policies and priorities. The major implication being that this approach reconsolidated the status quo politics in Sierra Leone since the question of political governance at the executive level was resolved without meaningful national dialogue before the elections took place.

Chapter Four on the Political Economy of DDR provided insights into how the issue of "participation" and local "buy-in" was pursued by the United Nations in a highly volatile and insecure environment. DDR is an interesting type of intervention for balancing of internal-external responsibilities and power dynamics. International (UN) actors took the lead during the 'D-D' phases (to the extent that demobilisation is a component in practice) by linking disarmament as a condition for conducting elections in 2002. The "D-D" phases were intimately

tied to political strategies of senior commanders in their pursuit of short-term strategies that could buttress their positions of power. The reintegration component was afforded extremely minimal importance and relegated as a "local issue". Senior commanders positioned themselves in influential roles in order to determine who was a combatant for the 'reintegration' component. The "reintegration" component was wholly dependent on external funding, and held hostage to donor bureaucratic pressures and imperatives, which resulted in delayed assistance due to late disbursements. Additionally, in the case of Liberia, UN technical experts drafted the UNDP reintegration strategy, while local leaders—such as religious leaders—were left out of the design and implementation processes. Ultimately, Chapter Four argues that the international community's macro-peacebuilding approach was underpinned by a general stabilisation approach that was out of sync with local conditions and power dynamics.

Part II of the dissertation focuses on the historical, social and political factors affecting military and security sector reform in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Among the structural sources of conflict embedded within the military forces are unequal power relations, structural and systemic allocation of resources among different groups, distorted distribution of wealth leading to enrichment of a minority elite at the expense of the majority; lack of interest by the elite to manage resources in the interest of society, weak rule of law, decrepit infrastructure, corruption etc. In Chapters Five and Six, I examine how the British and American government approached peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and Liberia

through a case study of Security Sector Reforms (SSR). These approaches were generally informed by a state-centric security-first and stabilisation imperatives and objectives. This trend reflected a global preference since at least 1999-2000 to focus peacebuilding interventions on state-building aspects and, particularly, on formal security institutions.[59] Sierra Leone and Liberia were no exception.

Chapter 5 examines specific practices in Sierra Leone's police and military reform process. In Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) implemented ambitious donor programmes to support government capacity building and sought to balance development-security into their policy formulation. However, their approach in practice was balanced in favour of security at the expense of socio-economic and political development. Through an examination of DfID's approach to military reform in Sierra Leone, it is shown that security versions of statebuilding was part of a broader trend in development assistance in the late 1990s that favoured statebuilding over project-specific interventions. It assesses one of the peacebuilding strategies employed in Sierra Leone—the integration of former combatants from the irregular forces by looking at impact that the military reintegration program (MRP), (devised by British military and civilian advisors) had on the social character of the RSLAF. Through examination of another specific case study—the *Operation Pebu* project—it is illustrated how the lack of

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[59] Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, 'Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding', in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, London: Routledge, 2009; Charles T. Call and Elisabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Wars and Building Peace*, New York: International Peace Academy, 2007, 7

local involvement during important decision-making processes impacts on governmental project implementation and final outcomes.

Chapter 6 traces the process of police and military restructuring in Liberia's war-peace transition (2003-2013) to provide a more critical understanding of how specific practices were envisioned and implemented. The aim of this chapter seeks to understand power relations between Liberian and external actors during the initial decision-making processes and compare with post-war Sierra Leone's security sector reform programme. The chapter demonstrates that there was no mutually agreed plan for handling the police and military reform components in the peacebuilding process. Americans and Liberians differed significantly in their overarching vision on handling police and military reform.

Chapter 7 assesses the British-led military reform process in Sierra Leone. The chapter identifies the important points of leverage the UK employed with the government of Sierra Leone and security institutions. A central aim of this chapter is to illustrate how SSR practices were part of a highly charged political process as opposed to being a benign technical/administrative set of arrangements as often portrayed in academic literature. It is argued that rather than building a "positive peace" focused on addressing structural violence, Sierra Leone has experienced a "negative peace" defined as the cessation of physical violence.

Chapter 8 assesses the process of external-internal negotiation during Liberia's military restructuring process, which involved international (mostly American) and regional actors (mostly Nigeria through the Economic Community

of West African states). The UN's conceptual point of departure for Liberia's war-peace transition (as in Sierra Leone) has been the Weberian ideal-type state based in Monrovia. The UN and US has therefore focused on "capacity building" of the state's primary security institutions both in terms of domestic/empirical dimensions and bases its conception of the state on its ability to protect the Liberian territory, including through border patrols in remote and precarious areas along the shared Ivorian border. The nature of American involvement in Liberia's postwar environment is key to understanding how SSR was conducted in Liberia. The American government preferred an "arms-length", less expensive approach by working through UNMIL and assuming leadership positions in the UN mission (UNMIL), in conjunction with a "behind the scenes" role by dictating terms of the peace through its US Embassy and Office of Security and Defence, and through proxy US-based private security companies.

Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation in terms of peacebuilding implications for what kind of state is being "rebuilt" and wider state-society relations. The chapter concludes that capacity-building and institutional building in Sierra Leone was facilitated by external actors in a more entrenched role, working in partnership with local actors. The so-called peace dividend has not been shared equally or even fairly throughout Sierra Leone and Liberia. The state security framework that informed British foreign policy in post-war Sierra Leone has resulted in rebuilding the colonial state in its previous form and has led to the continuation of colonial practices that serves mutual interests among a narrow group of elites mainly based in London, Freetown and local power structures.

American policy in Liberia has been less extensive and far less entrenched as that of Britain's role in Sierra Leone. Despite over ten years of peacebuilding and security sector reforms in Liberia, external efforts have not been effective as measured by the fact that UNMIL maintains an extensive peacekeeping presence throughout the country and state security institutions have not assumed full sovereignty over national security responsibilities.

Chapter 2
Peacebuilding: A Review and Analysis of the Literature

Introduction

This chapter seeks to clarify the conceptual terrain of contemporary peace and security issues in Africa and sketches out a conceptual framework for studying post-conflict transitions. It provides the backdrop for rethinking peace and security in the study of post-conflict transitions in Africa in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world and broadens the scope and timeframe for peacebuilding with a view toward critiquing dominant liberal peace practices. Under consideration in this chapter is how peacebuilding is both conceptualised and conducted within the global context. In doing so, we can understand power relations between external and internal actors involved in such processes and the likely effects that such interventions have on African state-society complexes.

Studying conflicts in Africa requires one to distinguish between "root causes" and the proximate causes, or what Edward Newman refers to as *conditions that lead to a permissive enabling environment for violence.*[1] It is common for western diplomats and scholars to naively assume that the Mano River wars were fought over control of mineral resources (diamonds) by greedy "warlords".[2] Some scholars focus on the transnational, regional[3], and global

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[1] Edward Newman, 'Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29: 8, 2006, 772-749

[2] See for instance, former US Ambassador to Sierra Leone, John Hirsch writes "underneath the political issues on the surface of the conflict are the economic factors that drove the war from the outset. Sierra Leone offers a prime example of an internal conflict where economic aspirations for control of valuable mineral resources, especially diamonds, have been largely responsible for its inception" (John Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 15).

actors implicated in sustaining insecurity in the region (including transnational criminal networks or even unemployed youth mercenaries)—and their complex web of pacts between governments and foreign insurgents. However, these issues constitute proximate causes of armed conflicts and by failing to question the particular socio-economic and political conditions within societies that potentiates violent conflict. While there are also important global and historical causes of violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia, a discussion on these factors cannot be examined in this dissertation.[4] Instead, I focus on the "root causes" stemming from relations in the *form of state* and "state-society complex" in Sierra Leone and Liberia.[5] We therefore need to grasp the character of state formation from the colonial to the post-colonial period.

Section One of the chapter reviews academic literature from "Critical Security Studies" and "peacebuilding" more specifically. Critical Security Studies broaden the scope of security beyond structural realist/statist approaches and is distinct in its commitment to emancipatory theory.[6] Peacebuilding is a new form of international intervention originating in international policy circles

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[3] Williams argues that most African wars start because of internal grievances against the incumbent regime rather than external threats from expansionist neighbours. (Paul Williams, 'Thinking About Security in Africa', *International Affairs,* 83:6, 2007, 1029; See also Jeffrey Herbst, 'Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa', *Journal of African Economies,* 9:3, 2000, 270-294; Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn, 'African Guerrilla Politics', in Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn, eds, African Guerrillas, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2007, 9-38.

[4] Tasier Ali and Robert Matthews, Introduction, in Taiser Ali and Robert Matthews (eds.), *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999, 4.

[5] Borrowing from Gramci's definition, Robert Cox defines that "state-society complex" as "an enlarged state which includes its own social basis". This view of the state "sets aside a narrow or superficial view of the state, which reduces it…to the foreign policy bureaucracy or the state's military capabilities" (Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', in Robert W. Cox with Timothy Sinclair (eds), *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1996, 134).

[6] See Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1997; Paul Williams, Critical Security Studies in Alex Bellamy (ed.), *International Society and its Critics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005;

in the immediate post-Cold War period. Peacebuilding as it was conceived originally drew on Galtungian conceptions of "positive peace" going beyond the achievement of "negative peace" or the absence of large-scale organized violence. Since then, there have been numerous attempts to clarify peacebuilding's aims, scope, approach and activities, which forms the basis for this review in section One. Some key debates in peacebuilding are highlighted from both mainstream and critical perspectives to underscore the contested nature of peacebuilding and to identify various schools of thought. I also focus on locating the "liberal peace" within three dominant peacebuilding frameworks: the conservative/problem-solving, social justice/cosmopolitanism and critical theoretical approaches to "peacebuilding". Ultimately, a case is made for utilising a critical theory framework for analyzing the theory and practice of Sierra Leone and Liberia's respective post-conflict transitions (through two specific practices—DDR and SSR) from 2001-2011 and 2003-2012 respectively.

Part I: Non-conventional conflicts in West Africa:

Beyond traditional approaches to peace and security

Mainstream political science and security studies literature are dominated by traditional state-centric definitions of security. The non-conventional nature of intrastate and regional conflicts necessitates the broadening of both "security" and "peace" beyond inter-state conflict. Contemporary conflicts in Africa and the so-called "new-wars" emerged in the post-Cold War period that emphasised "failed" or "fragile" states that are unable to command allegiances of its people

and warfare that involves irregular factions rooted in societal divisions and competing local loyalties that blur traditional distinctions between militaries and civilians.[7] These conflicts are complex not least because local grievances and animosities become entangled with a complicated number of state, non-state, regional[8] and transnational actors and dimensions.[9] Policy-related literature on the "new wars" often frame violent conflict and wars in Africa and the Global South as a false dichotomy between economic "greed" or political "grievances".[10] This policy research (led by dominant international institutions like the World Bank) emphasises economic factors shaping armed groups and often overlooks the socio-economic conditions and political structures that makes violent conflict possible in particular societies and marginalises political agency of various groups of actors. At the same time, the economic reductionism inherent in UN and World Bank policy research leaves little room for understanding that African conflicts on their own terms as fundamentally

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[7] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006; Mark Duffield, 'War as Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications', *Cultural Values,* 6:1&2, 2002, 153-165.

[8] See Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (2nd ed.), New York: New York University, 2003; David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Charles Taylor's Verdict, May 2012; UN Panel of Experts Report on Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, 35-36

[9] Mary Kaldor, New Wars; Duffield 2001

[10] For an excellent discussion on this debate, see Wai 2012; For overviews of the literature, see Karen Ballentine, 'Final Report: Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Principle Research Findings and Policy Recommendations, New York: International Peace Academy, 2004; Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed*, Washington and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and John Hopkins University Press, 2005, 234-255; Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003; David Keen, 'The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War', Adelphi Paper 320, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998; Paul Collier, 'Doing Well out of War', in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000;

political struggles for control of the state.[11] Additionally, the World Bank over-writes the structural and systemic causes of violence embedded within the nature of the African state as well as the violence exerted by the current global political and economic order, in which Sierra Leone and Liberia hold a marginal position because these institutions are complicit in creating and sustaining that order.

My focus throughout the dissertation is on the internal dimensions of state formation and the logic of violence that is embedded in Sierra Leonean and Liberian society and the exercise of power by the state in its relationship with society.[12] This emphasis on the internal dynamics of the state is not intended to hold African states solely responsible for political disorder and conflict while excusing global and historical factors. As Neil Cooper writes, focusing on the state as the cause of the problem "essentially absolves (by simply taking them as given) the broader structures of the global economy and the role of hegemonic power in creating conditions of underdevelopment, 'state failure' and conflict".[13] I agree with critical scholars like Neil Cooper that restructuring the global political economy is an essential aspect of "sustainable peace" in countries on

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[11] Wai, *Epistemologies,* 2012

[12] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995

[13] Neil Cooper, "Picking Up the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implication for Policy", *Security and Dialogue*, 36:4, 467. As Duffield (2001, 28) observes, the west's strategy redefine underdevelopment as dangerous in the early post-Cold War era was a deliberate effort to suppress "those aspects of Third Worldism and international socialism that argued the existence of inequalities within the global system, and importantly, that the way in which wealth is created has a direct bearing on the extent and nature of poverty".For some scholars, this requires addressing the unfair terms of trade and the economic conditions attached to the Global South's integration in the global economy. For more on this issue, see Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

the margins of the global economy (and Human Development Index).[14] The "bracketing" of global political economy structures that are implicated in producing and sustaining violence is also an important aspect of the peacebuilding puzzle on the African continent and requires greater attention in peacebuilding literature (which should be to be taken up in a subsequent study).[15]

My argument is that African security challenges need to be addressed at the level of the deficiencies of the post-colonial state, the structures of violence that were constitutive of the state of Sierra Leone from its inception during the colonial project, (and in Liberia during the period of Americo-Liberian domination), and how state security forces were implicated in these structures and practices in the pursuit and exercise of power.[16] As Zubairu Wai notes with reference to the establishment of Freetown, the "province of Freedom" has "always been a site of violence, oppression and unfreedom" since the group of freed slaves settled from Nova Scotia on the shores of Sierra Leone in 1792.[17]

Rebuilding a state and society requires taking seriously the implications of Mamdani's analysis that the nature and character of violence in West Africa derives from the structure of power constitutive of the state and that structural violence embedded within the state extends in the everyday realm of social

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[15] It is equally critical to acknowledge the ideological motives that inform external peacebuilding practices and their relationship with global hegemony pursuits of US Empire. However, these issues cannot be addressed in the scope of this dissertation.
[16] Wai, Epistemologies of African Conflicts, 170; Mamdani 1996; Arthur Abraham, Mende *Government and Politics Under Colonial Rule: A Historical Study of Political Change in Sierra Leone, 1890-1937*, Freetown: University of Sierra Leone Press, 1978
[17] Wai, 'Elections as a Strategy for Democratisation', 236

relations between the state and its citisens. Therefore, the starting point for "building sustainable peace" necessarily begins with a focus on "transforming" the "state".

The discourse from peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform (SSR) on building effective/professional security forces (formal police and military) fails to problematize the nature of the state and interrogate structures of power and violence embedded with the African state. The "Security Sector Reform" discourse takes for granted re-establishing the post-conflict state is a public "good" in and of itself. SSR is not a solution on its own; it must be complemented with wider governance reforms. To date, the SSR literature has seen few critical treatments of external statebuilding efforts and the effects on state-society relations in post-war African societies. What needs to be clarified is how external actors are approaching the practice of "statebuilding" and the impact these "reform" efforts have on the long-term prospects for "sustainable peace".

Studying African conflicts requires confronting the legacies of colonial state formation and recognising that the nature and patterns of contemporary violence are rooted in external socio-historical structures and these processes do not necessarily end during or after civil wars. Nor does the so-called "post-conflict" state emerge as an apolitical actor born out of the peace process. It is equally critical that we recognise that military institutions as the coercive instruments of (post) colonial states have a particular history shaped by internal patterns of state violence and embedded forms of power relations. Additionally,

military institutions often have a unique relationship with external "donors" (patrons) and dependence on external resources and ideas for their operational viability.[18]

International Peacebuilding and the Liberal Peace: Two Visions

Peacebuilding is a new type of international intervention initially coined as a UN post-Cold War response to unconventional armed violence in a variety of conflict zones in the South from sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia (Cambodia and Afghanistan), Latin America (El Salvador, Guatemala) and Eastern Europe (Bosnia). Senior UN officials and Security Council members called for the UN to take account of changes in the international system and recognize the need for international approaches to not only end armed conflicts but also prevent wars from relapsing into violence. "Peacebuilding" was mainstreamed in international policy circles in 1992 in the United Nations' *Agenda for Peace,* which was originally defined as a UN activity conducted during the implementation of peace agreements between antagonistic groups *within* states or in post-civil war contexts.

UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali viewed peacebuilding as having three main features: first, what he called "the deepest causes" of violence needed to be addressed through sustained UN involvement.[19] Second, peacebuilding was conceptualised in terms of a cycle of conflict that moved from pre-conflict

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[18] Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarisation, *Review of International Studies,* 19:1, 1993, 321-347; Crocker 1972

[19] Andy Knight, 'Evaluating Recent Trends in Peacebuilding Research', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 3:2, 2003, 241-264

preventive diplomacy to peacemaking and peacekeeping to *post-conflict peacebuilding.* Peacebuilding interventions was viewed as an activity conducted after civil wars end and aimed to prevent a relapse into large-scale violence. Therefore, "peacebuilding" was viewed as a fourth tool in the international toolkit of conflict management.[20] Third, the *Agenda's* conception focused on the need to "build structures that will tend to solidify peace" in the aftermath of war.[21]

Two broad visions of the "liberal peace" can be identified, namely, the pre-9/11 focus on "development as poverty reduction" and post-9/11 fixation on "security" and counter-terrorism. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to think anew about a different international relations based on more democratic, just and peaceful global order and promoted a radical shift in international security logic that called for revisiting the concerns about global poverty and conflict transformation. As Duffield and Tschirgi have pointed out in separate projects, development discourse in the immediate post-cold war era was able to articulate a greater concern for alleviating poverty, democratization and conflict transformation.[22] To a large extent, we see the application of this version of the "liberal peace" through the integration of international

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[20] Later in 1995, in the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, the definition was expanded to include activist preventive action during the course of civil or regional wars or in the midst of large-scale violence.

[21] The *Agenda* defined "peacebuilding" as activities that involved "sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems" and any "action to identify and support *structures* which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations, para. 21.)

[22] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Necla Tchirgi, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges', prepared for the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, New York: International Peace Academy, 2004

development and security policy prescriptions and humanitarian wars in the early 1990s.[23]

According to Duffield, the global architecture of the "liberal peace"[24] in the early post-Cold War period emerged during the conjectural shifts that took place in the global political economy and was influenced by the perceived triumph of western democracy and global capitalism. Critics of this perspective viewed the intention of the liberal peace as a strategy to create a liberal world order to secure western hegemonic order in the global political economy. However, this order and the application of control was, according to Duffield, distinct from imperialism or direct occupation of territories. Duffield describes the "liberal peace" aims not to directly occupy territories in the South only to manage and regulate economic, political and social processes in the South by shaping outcomes on the ground and in certain circumstsances, altering local balances of power through non-territorial systems of 'governance' led by complex transnational elite networks or "strategic complexes".[25] As Duffield describes, "the liberal peace reflects a radical development agenda of social transformation" with the aim "to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and,

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[23] Duffield, *Global Governance*

[24] The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005 (including the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Fund) has furthered the institutionalisation of "peacebuilding" within the UN but is still a "work in progress" and is largely unproven. See www.unpbf.org/index.shtml; Alex J. Bellamy, 'The institutionalisation of Peacebuilding: What Role for the UN Peacebuilding Commission' in Oliver Richmond, ed., *Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Advances and Approaches*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 193-212.

[25] Duffield, *Global Governance*, 2001

especially, stable entities".[26] I interpret the greater advocacy and activism for addressing global poverty and military intervention to prevent genocides expressed in international policy statements such as the *Responsibility to Protect* (and *Rebuild)* principle and the human security agenda that was prominent in the early 1990s and early 2000s.[27]

Post-9/11 security policy

A second vision—a more pessimistic and reactionary one—has become particularly pronounced in the post-9/11 era. Some analysts have observed that since the tragic events of 9/11, international policy discourse and practice has become reoriented as a traditional militarised or "hard" security intervention to pacify and suppress armed violence and disorder in the global South. This version of the 'liberal peace' is epitomized in US "Global War on Terror" and the rise of counter-terrorism approaches to global security.[28] In this context, there is a propensity to view development and statebuilding problems through a traditional security-military lens and problem-solving framework (explained below). Some scholars see this as nothing more than Band-Aid solutions in the

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[26] Ibid., 11

[27] The R2P principle is contested. Following conflicts in Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1999), brainstorming sessions in 2000-2001 occurred by international statesmen and academics to institutionalise a new international security framework through the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Its purpose was to answer the "question on when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive and in particular military action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state" (ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: ICISS, 2001, vii). The human security agenda emphasises the well-being and dignity of individuals as the main referent of security as opposed to of nation-states (see Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?' *International Security*, 26:2, 2001,, 87-102).

[28] Tchirigi, 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding'; Jeremy Keenan, *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press 2013

form of "global riot control" to "contain" the problems of underdevelopment in the South. Others view this phenomenon as a concerted US attempt to maintain its (neo)-imperialist posturing in Africa and that discourses on "democratization" and "peacebuilding" are merely smokescreens for increased counter-terrorism training of African militaries and other securitized interventions.[29] The militarized approaches characterizing some "post-conflict" settings in the post-9/11 era tend to gloss over local conditions and knowledge and often exacerbate social tensions between and within groups in these particular societies. The militarization of security is part and parcel of problem-solving, traditional security approach that involves working with key local powerbrokers and affording them local legitimacy against rivals which impacts on local balance of power. Adopting this narrow framework ignores socio-historical and political economy structures—both global and local—that privilege elites and state-centric modes of economic accumulation. Additionally, traditional frameworks fail to interrogate the power of international actors and their propensity to restore old orders and downplays their capacities to alter balance of powers at the local level (See Chapter 4).[30] The narrow "security as stabilisation of the status quo" approach ignores the broader relationship between security forces and the socio-

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[29] For the former arguments, see Duffield, *Global Governance,* 2001; Robert Cox, Critical Political Economy, in Bjorn Hettne (ed.) *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, London: Zed Books, 1995, 31-45; Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century*, London: Pluto Press, 3rd Edition, 2010. For the latter view, see Zubairu Wai, 'Elections as a Strategy for Democratization', 2011; Jeremy Keenan, *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*, London: Pluto Press, 2009; Keenan, *The Dying Sahara*; See also Chapter 8.

[30] Mats Utas (ed.), *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*, London and New York: Nordiska Afrikainstitet and Zed Books, 2012; Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument*, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998.

political context and the state-society complex.[31] More generally, critical scholars have pointed out the ways that hard versions of security assistance reinforce weak statehood.[32] With these two "visions" in mind, I turn to reviewing and analyzing the existing literature on Peacebuilding and Critical Security Studies.

Literature Review

The peacebuilding literature has identified five integrated sectors of peacebuilding: security, building legitimate political institutions, economic progress, justice and reconciliation.[33] Discursively within the United Nations, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction emerged as a post-Cold War intervention in countries plagued by civil (intrastate) conflict and was used to describe all efforts aimed at reducing the risk of resumption of large-scale conflict.[34]

In general, theories and approaches to peacebuilding have focused narrowly on symptoms that may provide stability while the "root causes" that led to violence re-emerge unscathed from the crisis.[35] Additional critiques about

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[31] Mats Berdal, *Building Peace after War*, London: Routledge, 2010

[32] Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, 'The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood', In *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, edited by Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk. London: Routledge, 2009

[33] Taiser M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds.,), *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

[34] Berdal, *Building Peace After War*; David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding*, London: Pluto Press, 2006; Tom Keating and Andy W. Knight, ed. *Building Sustainable Peace*. Edmonton: University of Alberta, 2004; Taiser Taiser and Robert Matthews, ed. *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

[35] ICISS 2001; Lund 2003

peacebuilding interventions have focused on its "top-down" logic, the inability of outside actors to craft approaches that give sufficient attention to determining local needs and for the lack of broad-based local "participation". In post-conflict contexts plagued by decades of violent conflict, attention needs to be paid to ensure that structural conditions create the conditions for violence are not reproduced and that "business-as-usual" political practices are not simply ignored or glossed over.

There are many different approaches taken to critique peacebuilding and the liberal peace. Next, for heuristic purposes, I classify peacebuilding theory as social justice, problem-solving and critical theory to locate some of the central debates in peacebuilding and how particular approaches envision solutions for these challenges. I will then review the literature on "peacebuilding" generally, and "Security Sector Reform" in particular in Africa in relations to these various theoretical frameworks.

Classifying "peacebuilding" theories

In recent years, scholars from a broad range of social science disciplines have tackled the challenges of building a durable peace in societies emerging from violent conflict.[36] For the purpose of this discussion, I have classified existing peacebuilding literature into three broad theoretical approaches to highlight the competing visions of, and approaches to peacebuilding.

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[36] Keating and Knight, *Building Sustainable Peace*; Ali and Matthews, *Durable Peace*;

Peacebuilding as Social Justice

The social justice oriented "peacebuilding" literature dates back to the pioneering work of Johan Galtung, who is widely recognized as the father of modern peace studies.[37] The social justice approach to peacebuilding draws on Galtung's pioneering work on "positive peace" and his definition of structural justice.[38] He defines negative peace as the absence of physical violence, while positive peace is a stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes do not escalate into violence or war.[39] Galtung argues that "negative peace" is a necessary but insufficient condition for sustainable peace.

Galtung coined "structural violence"[40] as a concept that refers to latent, invisible forms of violence that are embedded in societies. He defines structural violence as present "when human beings are being influenced so that their actual *somatic* and *mental* realisations are below their potential realisations" [my emphasis added].[41] While Galtung's definition remains vague and abstract, it calls attention to the need to move away from superficial factors such as

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[37] Johan Galtung, 'After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution—Coping With Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence', In *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*, edited by Muhammad Abu Nimr. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001.

[38] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', in *Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research*, edited by Johan Galtung. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975

[39] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict. Development and Civilisation*, Sage: London, 1996, 1-3

[40] Some further qualification on Galtung's structural violence term is necessary. Sometimes, he uses the term social injustice interchangeably. Structural violence is very distinct from physical violence—the former being measured by the number of deaths caused by bodily harm by group conflict or war. Cited by Galtung, physical violence is when a 'husband beats his wife', in contrast to structural violence, which is when husbands keep their wives in ignorance' (cited from Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.' *Journal of Peace Research* 6: 3,, 1969, 171). Also, he cautions against using the word exploitation as a replacement for structural violence for apparent reasons that the former is less politically charged and more amendable to facilitating communication than the word exploitation.

[41] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', 168

transnational criminal networks or "Blood Diamonds" or child soldiers. The concept encourages us to think beyond the proximate causes and to theorize what structures underlie the violent mobilisation of child soldiers and the militarisation of society.

Galtung argues that peacebuilding should aim to attain positive peace and ameliorate the root causes of poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of resources in order to bring about sustainable peace. From this perspective, the primary aim of contemporary peacebuilding or UN peace support operations is to advance an emancipatory project that empowers indigenous capacities. The *Agenda* in 1992 refers to "social peace", as distinct from, but as important as political or strategic peace attained through ceasefires and political negotiations. A social justice framework attempts to correct injustices at the global and local levels through, for instance identifying local actors, structures and processes that can contribute to inclusive peace agreements.

Among the social justice advocates are Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Richmond, and Roger MacGuinty to name a few. One way of distinguishing a social justice approach to peacebuilding is through its deliberate ethical and people-centered view of justice. The aim is to make peacebuilding more responsive to the needs of communities that are the targets of such interventions.[42] Oliver Richmond argues that emancipatory projects should integrate and infuse Galtung's negative peace (freedom from fear) and positive

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[42] Tim Murithi and Nigel Dower, *The Ethics of Peacebuilding*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008.

peace (freedom from want and the development of a higher human potential). The social justice frameworks are informed by an optimistic liberal assumption that human nature is either inherently "good" or that individuals can evolve to a more enlightened consciousness that looks after the least-developed nations and people around the world.

For instance, Richmond advocates for a more reflective, emancipatory and bottom-up approach to liberal peace by calling attention to the hegemonic structures of domination embedded in peacebuilding practice and discourse.[43] According to Richmond and his colleague Roger MacGuinty, peacebuilding as a practice has not yielded an "emancipatory" peace but rather has imposed a particular version (a hegemonic neo-liberal peace) that is informed by liberal assumptions of the political community, which ignore local concerns, identitarian issues and culture.[44] Woodhouse advances a normative framework (called *cosmopolitan peacebuilding*) that balances negative and positive conceptions of "peace" and emphasises local agency, civil society, human rights, democracy and rule of law. His definition privileges local capacity building and the pursuit of human security (positive peace) over top-down concerns such as national security and state-centrism.[45] In essence, I interpret the social justice approaches as "bottom-up" and beginning from the individual and community-level. Richmond uses a concept "peace formation" to capture bottom-up, local

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[43] Oliver Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, London: Routledge, 2008,163.

[44] Ibid; Oliver Richmond and Roger MacGinty, 'Special issue: The Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction', *Global Society*, 21:4, 2004, 491-497

[45] David Curran and Tom Woodhouse, 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: What Can Africa Contribute?' *International Affairs*, 83:6, 2007, 1055-1070; Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalisation of Security', *International Peacekeeping*, 12:2, 2005,139-156.

agential responses that "need to be understood, accommodated and mediated" in post-conflict transitions. He defines peace formation processes as follows:

> ...ones where indigenous or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, development or in customary, religious, cultural, social or local political or local government settings find ways of establishing peace processes and the dynamics local forms of peace, which are also constitutive of state, regional and global hybrids.[46]

Interestingly, Richmond also calls attention to the need for top-down institutional reforms to operate concurrently with bottom-up empowerment of individuals and communities. His "peace formation" concept describes a process where "mediated forms of identity, custom, culture, political rights and economic needs emerge at an institutional level, shaping the state and making it both representative, resonate and providing sufficient support and legitimacy from its citizens to enable a plausible and self-sustaining peace".[47] These approaches highlight the possibility for "hybrid" forms of peacebuilding, which result from the negotiation of external and internal dynamics (see below).

In sum, the Galtungian social justice framework addresses the "bottom-up" concerns of transforming societies plagued by violent conflict including addressing grievances, horizontal inequalities and the amelioration of structural violence. This goal is, at least in principle, what Boutros-Ghali and Johan Galtung meant when they call for building "structures" capable of sustaining the peace over the long-term and addressing the "root causes" of the violet

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[46] Oliver Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation*, Yale: Yale University Press, forthcoming 2014, 14 (draft theoretical framework chapter), available at http://www.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350602_conf-2011-richmond.pdf

[47] Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding*, 18

conflict.[48] Few observers would dispute that peacebuilding requires long-term efforts by local actors to build a "positive peace" –a more equitable society free from want remains troublingly elusive. However, the social justice approach is informed by several problematic assumptions that I want to raise related to the feasibility this perspective. First, one must confront the challenge of identifying what constitutes "root causes" of "structural violence" in a given society. As Andy Knight, "since there is very little inter-subjective agreement on what constitutes the root causes of violent conflict, it is difficult, according to the critics of the "positive peace" approach, to develop appropriate programmatic strategies for addressing this problem".[49] This dissertation will hopefully contribute to that debate about the underlying structural sources of conflict in Africa—as rooted in the nature of the African state. Second, in my view, "positive peace" is laudable to strive towards these maximalist goals of peace, practitioners are faced with numerous immediate challenges that make it difficult, if not possible, to think beyond the short-term problems.

Additionally, there will always be deeply rooted grievances and inequalities in a given society, especially one emerging from decades of violent conflict. Galtung's "positive peace" may be a useful as broad goal for any society to strive to achieve but this ambitious goal sets peacebuilding up to fail. While it is necessary to go beyond minimalist benchmarks, maximialist goals are too ambitious to be realistically achievable. In my view, a more realistic

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[48] Boutros Boutros Ghali, *Agenda for Development*, New York: United Nations, 1995; Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*; Keating and Knight, *Building Sustainable Peace*; UN, *Report on Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Report), New York: United Nations, 2000

[49] Knight, 'Evaluating Trends', 247

benchmark for defining "success" draws from Professors Charles Call and Elisabeth Cousens' a middle-ground perspective or what they call "the development of capacities and institutions to manage conflict peacefully". Specifically, Call and Cousens define "success" as the attainment of "negative peace" (the absence of large-scale violence) with minimally defined "decent" governance in the domestic affairs of "post-conflict" societies.[50] For the purposes of this thesis, I use this benchmark within the context of state-society relations, broadly defined.

Third, I disagree with the starting point of analysis and prescriptions advocated by the social justice advocates. The "social justice" approach does not pay sufficient attention to the study of power in African politics. As I describe below, the starting point for analyzing the "root causes" of African conflicts begins with an analysis of power, both within the state as well as the external-local power dynamics that are fundamentally important to shaping outcomes on the ground. With regards to the former—state power—social justice scholars underestimate the fact that sovereignty is a material resource in Africa—perhaps *the most important* and *best-tapped* resource for local elite to secure their interests because sovereign control of the state so often translates into domestic

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[50] If one examines recent definitions of "peacebuilding" within the UN, one finds the adoption of this middle-ground benchmark with its current focus on "capacity-building" and "governance" In May 2007 the UN adopted this middle-ground definition as "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening *national capacities* at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore relatively *narrow set of activities* aimed at achieving the above objectives." United Nations peacebuilding support office, Peacebuilding and the United Nations: What is Peacebuilding?', http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/faq.shtml#q1 (Accessed 11 January 2013)

monopoly over the primary modes of economic accumulation in African societies.[51] Therefore, scholars that focus on justice oriented projects can overlook the state as the starting point for analyzing "post-conflict" outcomes and trajectories.

Fourth, the social justice approaches, in my view, under-estimates the degree of external influence of western power on the African continent and Africa's structural position within that global order. Is it realistic for peacebuilding to confront unjust global terms of trade or the legacies of the global slave trade, imperialism or colonialisation? There is an inherent assumption within the social justice literature that the west will willingless alter unequal power relations with the South—without discussing in concrete terms how to get from point A to point B.

There raises an important discussion related to the relationship between external and internal actors. Conventional statebuilding approaches view the liberal peace as a top-down, elite-driven process, which implies working with the right mixture of individuals from the political class who are capable of exercising hegemonic control over subordinate populations. This view of peacebuilding assumes non-elite "local actors" to be passive recipients of externally-imposed measures. While the majority of funding for post-conflict interventions comes from international donors, this should not be an excuse for external actors to rely on their own models and problematic assumptions of ascribing value and significance to certain actions, situations, events and

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[51] Pierre Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, 95

practices that suit their own interests above the recipient's. "Peacebuilding" is best viewed as a negotiation process between what is a heterogeneous group of external actors (all with competing interests) attempting to dictate what they believe is best in an attempt to impose "order" on the "disorderliness" of phenomenon. The external donor's policies, objectives and approaches are therefore important. However, one needs to recognise these actions as political and subjective acts and pay attention to how certain practices and processes are give more significance over others. This can cause certain flawed and problematic ideas, practices and procedures to become legitimised and naturalised while local needs, visions and interests are deligitimised and precluded.[52]

Richmond and MacGuinty have advanced the term "hybrid peacebuilding" to denote a middle ground definition of peacebuilding as deriving from a negotiation process between top-down hegemonic liberal peace practices and more bottom-up discourses, actors and practices. Their conception of "peacebuilding" draws on "bottom-up" conceptions of peace, through the incorporation of local actors, structures and processes during the conception phase of "peacebuilding". Importantly, their emphasis on "negotiation" of external and local "inputs" shifts our framework of analysis from outcomes that

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[52] Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohn, 'Participatory Peacebuilding', in Tom Keating and Andy Knight (eds), *Building Sustainable Peace*, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004; Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating, 'Outside Agents and the Politics of Peacebuilding and Reconciliation', *International Journal*, 55, 1, 1999/2000, 80-106.

are purely structural to forms of local agency and resistance to hegemonic practices.[53]

Problem-Solving Approaches

Where social justice approaches that advocate for maximalist transformation is often too abstract and idealistic in relation to global and state structures that produce violence (and are of little use to practitioners), problem-solving approaches are the conservative and reactionary framework that strives for system-maintenance. To understand distinctions between stabilisation and transformative approaches, it is useful to frame peacebuilding within Robert Cox's distinction of "problem-solving" and critical approaches. Problem-solving theory takes the prevailing social, economic, political structures and power relations as fixed or as ontological givens and seeks only to manage social problems that occur within this broader system in order to promote stability. Problem-solving approaches place power at the centre of their analysis but adopt a pessimistic attitude towards the possibilities of broad-based inclusive transformation. A problem-solving approach to peacebuilding attempts to resolve conflicts within the dominant political and economic structures in order to smoothen the inner-workings in its larger totality. Therefore, problem-solving theories support a system-maintenance/status quo through a power-sharing agreement involving the established elite and other powerbrokers that hold the balance of power after civil war come to an end.

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[53] Roger Mac Ginty, 'Indigenous Peacemaking Versus the Liberal Peace', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43: 2, 2008, 139-63; Roger MacGinty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2011.

Indeed, peacebuilding practice evolved as mostly a "problem-solving" endeavor in the early 1990s. The first–generation UN approach was informed by humanitarian impulses, "quick-impact" mentality and problem-solving measures aimed to disarm irregular factions, provide humanitarian aid to refugees and internally displaced people's, reconsolidate state authority immediately and prepare the ground for post-conflict elections—all within a relatively short-time frame of six to 24 months.[54] Accompanying this expansion in peacebuilding was a proliferation of activities by multilateral actors including support for the following initiatives:[55]

- Expedite the electoral process and prepare the ground for elections immediately;
- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of irregular factions;
- Strengthening physical security and rule of law through UN peacekeepers;
- Rudimentary Security sector reforms including basic police and military training;
- Governance reforms including ad-hoc democratisation attempts;
- Refugee return and reintegration;
- Restoration of basic service provision;
- Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure including schools and health centers;
- Support for economic recovery;

While this approach may sometimes be credited for preventing escalation of conflict, there are as many examples where this "stabilisation" approach exacerbated tensions in the conflict leading to a large-scale violence resumption of violence. "Stabilisation" approaches paper over the driving sources of violent

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[54] Charles T Call and Elisabeth M. Cousens. 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies.' *International Studies Perspectives* 9:1, 2007, 1-21.

[55] See Security Council statements and resolutions from the 1990s; High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change; See the founding resolutions of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645 (2005); UN Secretary-General Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, 2009

conflict because the priority is ending the conflict and distributing state power between the most powerful factions involved in the war.

In addition, the current stabilisation approach has several defining features:

- Deployment of a peacekeeping force to act as a neutral third-party between the adversaries;
- Integration of top leaders of the warring factions into a power-sharing or transitional government;
- Disarmament of the rank-and-file combatants;
- Re-establishing/reconsolidating state authority;
- And preparing the local context for competitive elections within the first one or two years following cessation of the war.

By far, the majority of peacebuilding scholars adopt "problem-solving" tendencies in their theoretical orientation on transitions from war to peace. The key proponents of problem-solving peacebuilding approaches are Robert Muggah, Roland Paris, Nicole Ball and Mats Berdal.[56] For instance, contributions in Mats Berdal and David Ucko's *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict* adopt underlying problem-solving assumptions in their analysis.[57] Most of the "DDR", "police-keeping" and "interim-stabilisation" literature— especially since September 11, 2001—supports a system-maintenance approach

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[56] See for instance, Robert Muggah (ed.), *Stabilisation Operations, Security and Development*, London: Routledge, forthcoming 2013; Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, 'Context Matters: Interim Stabilisation and Second-Generation Approaches to Security Promotion', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 9:4, 2009, 425-453; Mark Downes and Robert Muggah, 'Breathing Room: Interim Stabilisation and Security Sector Reform in the Post-War Period', in Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, Waterloo: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010, 136-153

[57] Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko (eds.), *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition*, London: Routledge, 2009; Robert Muggah (ed.), *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing With Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, London: Routledge, 2009. The contributions of Berdal and Ucko focus on "political reintegration" of armed factions into viable political parties and socio-economic reintegration of fighters into society without questioning the socio-economic structures and underlying conditions that former fighters are "reintegrating" into.

and gives minimal attention to locating the problems of "peacebuilding" within the broader socio-economic, historical and political structures and practices that sustain long-standing conditions of violent conflict in these societies.

Roland Paris

One of the most important problem-solving studies was Roland Paris' comparative study of fourteen UN post-conflict peacebuilding operations implemented from 1989-1999.[58] Although Sierra Leone and Liberia (from 2003) were excluded from his analysis, three general observations from this study are noteworthy for this current research and the broader peace-building debate. First, Paris persuasively argues that the 1990s peacebuilding practice was naively informed by the assumption that liberalisation would automatically foster peace in war-shattered societies. Paris argues that this falsely assumed the existence of *functioning domestic state institutions* to manage the "destabilising effects of the liberalisation process". Paris does not problematize the overall desirability of "the liberal peace"—the assumption that global peace and prosperity can only be attained through the spread of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism—or the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of exporting the "liberal peace" in non-western societies.[59] Rather, he calls into question the methods that external actors rely on to "democratise" postwar countries in the global South. In 2004, Paris offered an alternative method to implement the "liberal peace" in non-

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[58] Paris' volume relied on case studies including Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique.

[59] For instance, failing to problematize whether democracy is a system that can be imposed from outside and is normatively good for all societies.

western societies. He called for delaying competitive multiparty elections until institutions can be built to sustain that progress.[60]

Second, Paris demonstrates that liberalisation policies in the 1990's operations were implemented in haste, in a quick-and-dirty or "shock therapy" manner within the first two or three years after conflicts ended. Kenneth Bush uses a "bungee-cord" metaphor to describe the logistics of international peacebuilding practice *ad hoc,* based on *short-term* calculations and requiring considerable *external input* and *minimal time commitments*.[61] This approach problematically overlooks local considerations including systemic structures of violence underpinning a particular post-war society.[62]. This insight suggests the need for more gradual approaches to post-war interventions.[63]

Third, the first-generation peacebuilding operations (Mozambique, Angola, and El Salvador to name a few examples) were implemented with a lack of consideration for formal "statebuilding". Paris believes all roads of the "liberal peace" lead to the construction of modern western states to regulate conflict in societies. Paris called for the need to "bring the state in" to peacebuilding practice. Once again, the state is viewed as central to sustainable peace and development in the global South and must be capable of performing basic government functions including maintaining a monopoly over security and

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[60] Paris' strategy involves "delaying the introduction of democratic and market-oriented reforms until a rudimentary network of domestic institutions, capable of managing the strains of liberalisation, have been established."

[61] Kenneth D. Bush, 'Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Developmental Agenda for Peacebuilding,' *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Special Issue on Governance, Democracy and Human Rights, 1996, 75-92

[62] Ibid, 86.

[63] Paris calls for "managing a [liberalisation] process as a series of incremental and deliberate steps"(Paris, *At Wars End*, 7).

should be the primary vehicle for addressing poverty.[64] In doing so, his interpretation of the "liberal peace" is similar to that of the "Washington Consensus'" emphasises on the centrality of the state as a vehicle for economic development and sustainable peace in the Global South.[65]

Second-generation peacebuilding emerged with a deliberate focus on state-building and improving "institutional capacity" in key governance sectors (civil service, ministry of finance, ministry of defence, police, military and public service more generally).[66] However, second-generation approaches take the world as it is and fails to problematise dominant power structures embedded within global political economy or within African state structures. Instead, the statebuilding version of the liberal peace adopts similar problem-solving biases that renders peacebuilding policies as technical reforms that operate outside of and above local politics.[67] Thus, according to Paris, liberalisation policies in mainstream UN peacebuilding practices should be delayed for a two or three-year period while state and institution building measures can be implemented. The main tenets of this strategy include:

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[64] Heather Marquette and Danielle Beswick, Statebuilding, Security and Development: Statebuilding as a New Development Paradigm', *Third World Quarterly,* 32:10, 2011, 1703-1714; Joseph Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm for Development, 9th Raul Prebish Lecture, October 1998; Henry Veltmeyer, talk at the 2013 Canadian Association for the Study in International Development (CASID), Victoria, B.C: University of Victoria, 5 June 2013

[65] On the "Washington Consensus" and its critiques as practiced by the International Financial Institutions, see Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalisation and its Discontents*, New York/London: W.W Norton, 2002.

[66] Michael Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilising States after War', *International Security*, 30:4, 2006, 87-112

[67] As Call and Cousens noted in 2007 in reference to statebuilding agenda, "peacebuilding programs...prefer technical solutions over culturally specific approaches" and "assume that international standards will always be applicable." (Call and Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', 14)

Postponing elections until moderate political parties have been created; designing electoral rules that reward moderation instead of extremism; encouraging the development of civil society organizations; regulating 'hate speech'; promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions; and developing effective security institutions and a profession, neutral bureaucracy.[68]

Paris' call for attention to the flaws in the peacebuilding strategy is warranted but is informed by several problematic assumptions that is likely to reinforce and reproduce conflict in post-war societies. First, Paris adopts a mainstream measurement for evaluating these peacebuilding interventions, one that goes beyond the achievement of "negative peace", but not as far as Galtungian maximalist conceptions of "positive peace". Paris borrows from Boutros-Ghali's definition, building structures "that will endure long after the peacebuilders depart from the country". According to Paris, peacebuilding should aim not only to prevent a recurrence of large-scale armed violence. Second, Paris' mainstream "problem-solving" paradigm views the holding of multiparty elections (supervised by international observers) as the *sin quo non* of legitimate political authority during peacebuilding.[69] We have learned from other post-conflict contexts that competitive elections may exacerbate the conflicts

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[68] Paris, *At Wars End*, 188

[69] Paris outlines briefly the UN and UK's peacebuilding approach to Sierra Leone as evidence of his 'institutionalisation before liberalistation' strategy, arguing that there was a focus on rebuilding formal state security institutions—the police and army. However, the overall aim, according to Paris, was not necessarily to build sustainable security institutions, but to make the police and military "more effective in order to deter and suppress violent challenges to the electoral process or its results" (Paris, *At Wars End*, 223). This demonstrates Paris' focus on the procedural aspects of competitive elections and fails to critique the legitimacy of elections and whether they translate into meaningful change of the structures that reinforce or reproduce violence in these societies.

they were intended to solve.[70] Even if elections are successful, "success" may be limited to attaining "negative peace" followed with a superficial restructuring of the political executive aspects of the state with minimal alteration in the practices of the state's exercise of power. Paris also defines "sustainable peace" narrowly in terms of the ability of local institutions to survive after peacebuilders depart, without problematizing what kind of institutions were established during peacebuilding and who benefits from "security" created in particular post-crisis environments. Additionally, Paris fails to call attention to the need for addressing structural causes of violence in these societies. Instead, his starting point is building (top-down) institutions in their formal western sense, instead of beginning from a bottom-up examination of local institutions and practices that may exacerbate tensions in a society. Ultimately, Paris calls for preserving the "liberal peace" but seeks to "tweak" its methods. His mainstream analysis suffers from the same "problem-solving", system-maintenance bais he criticised first-generation peacebuilding interventions of practicing. Paris fails to critique the nature of the state and problematically assumes that state authority is broadly legitimate (beyond holding multiparty elections).

This study defines political legitimacy in a Coxian critical lens in defining the relationship of government to the governed. As Robert Cox contends, "the relationship is legitimate when people in general accept the institutions and procedures of authority and the decisions which emerge, even if

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[70] The failed peace process in Rwanda and the desire of external actors to push electoral competition in 1992-1993 is the most obvious example of such disastrous decisions.

they do not like them".[71] In Coxian terminology, the relationship becomes illegitimate when citizens lack trust and acceptance in how the political class arrives at decisions without any transparency or accountability. Political authority erodes and individuals no longer have a stake in the persistence of the system. This definition of political authority takes us beyond the conduct of internationally-supervised multiparty elections.

Statebuilding as Peacebuilding

In recent years, numerous academic studies have focused on understanding the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in second-generation approaches.[72] The discourse of statebuilding revolves around the need to build capacity of various dimensions of the state (security, justice, economic, social) so that basic services can be delivered through the state apparatus.[73] Statebuilding perspectives emphasise the need for strengthening the institutional foundations of formal state functions (see below, 'Liberal Peace'). It is worth mentioning that much greater

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[71] Robert W. Cox, 'Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order', *New Political Economy,* 9:3, 2004, 310

[72] Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds.), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, London: Routledge, 2009, 1-20; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,' *International Security*, 28: 4, 2004, 5-43

[73] Francis Fukuyama, 'The Imperative of Statebuilding', *Journal of Democracy*, 15:2, 2004,,17-31; Simon Chesterman, 'Transitional Administration, State-building and the United Nations', in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governanc*e, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005, 339-358; Charles T. Call, 'Ending Wars, Building States', in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), *Building States to Build Peace*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, 1-22; Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning, 'Practical Approaches to Building State Institutions', in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), *Building States to Build Peace*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008; Paris Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*

emphasis in both theory and practice has focused on statebuilding, as opposed to building civil societies.

This thesis adopts Charles Call and Elisabeth Cousen's definition of statebuilding in the formal sense, defined as "rebuilding or establishing *at least minimally* functioning state institutions"… with a "focus on institutions to ensure law, order, and repression of resurgent violence".[74] At the same time, my definition of the state goes beyond the formal apparatus by identifying opportunities for genuine citizen engagement in the context of the "state-society complex". In other words, peacebuilding's focus on the state should underscore both the internal causes of disorder as well as the practices of violence and exercise of power between the state and its citizens. This emphasis on the state and its relationship with society is discursively recognized as critical in western "statebuilding" efforts according to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): "the evolution of a state's relationship with society is at the heart of statebuilding".[75] The World Bank's 2011 *World Development Report* reaches similar conclusions in stating the need for "inclusive-enough coalitions" during internationally-supported reforms in the global South.[76]

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[74] Call and Cousens, *Ending Wars and Building Peace*, 7

[75] OECD, 'Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict'. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011, 13

[76] The report also recognizes the need for making targeted investments in security, justice and employment at the community level as a means to break cycles of violence (World Bank, 2011 *World Development Report-2011*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011, 11-13).

British scholar Mats Berdal argues that peacebuilding's lack of success has been in part from external actors' unwillingness to engage post-conflict societies on their own terms and is linked to a lack of understanding of local conditions, cultural and historical specificities, and politics.[77] I agree with Berdal's argument that the UN propensity is to work from general templates does not take seriously the dynamic and complex ways that conditions of war affect societies and how they generate distinct political, economic and development challenges.[78] Blueprint approaches assume local actors to be passive victims with fixed and static interests in times of "anarchy" and "lawlessness".[79] As Berdal astutely observers, the range of local actors display great creativity and survival skills that are overshadowed by outsider perceptions of humanitarian assistance and trauma healing. These are important insights for peacebuilding theory and practice. However, Berdal's analysis privileges economic motivations of warring factions and assumes that underdevelopment, poverty and greed are the primary causal explanation for wars in the developing world.[80] Berdal's emphasis on problem-solving and political economy

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[77] Mats Berdal, Introduction, in Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann (eds*.), Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 2010, 7-13

[78] Ibid 7

[79] For instance, in *Building Peace after War*, Mats Berdal provides insights into how mainstream scholars are expanding conventional peacekeeping and stabilisation activities to make them more responsive to the needs of post-conflict societies. First, Berdal views international actors dictating the terms of peacebuilding within a framework that emphasises 1) political context; 2) regional context; 3) historical and psychological factors; 4) country-specific patterns of violence, crime and insecurity. Berdal argues that peacebuilding policies must be sensitive to the particular domestic and regional political circumstances, country-specific historical and psychological factors and societal patterns of violence. While these insights make sense on paper, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support his claim that these four general considerations are important in all "peacebuilding" contexts.

[80] See David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War*.London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998; Paul Collier, Doing Well out of War." In *Greed and*

peacebuilding strategies fail to give sufficient attention to the nature of African states, the history and evolution of "state formation" in post-war societies how these processes are intimately linked with state-sanctioned violence against citizens.

Finally, Berdal's temporal focus is on the immediate post-crisis environment and adopts a narrow security framework that emphasises activities such as removing weapons from armed actors and is fixated on limiting their "greedy" pursuits. Berdal therefore fails to recognize and distinguish between short-term crisis-oriented peacekeeping and long-term "peacebuilding" and how one reconciles these two in the context of a post-war society in Africa. Additionally, Berdal's framework fails to problematise the history of state-society relations in particular societies emerging from violent conflict and how violence was constituted when African states were founded. Berdal's economic reductionist framework, therefore emphasises a "stabilisation", problem-solving approach aimed at pacifying or appeasing the most powerful actors. Berdal preserve the traditional peacekeeping model but seems willing to stretch its activities to include non-traditional tasks such as elections monitoring or security sector reform. What Berdal does not recognise that peacebuilding requires an entirely different modus operandi than "peacekeeping", if the original intention of addressing underlying structural problems within particular conflict-prone countries is ever to be achievable.

Critical Theory

Critical scholars have called into question a range of concerns related to peacebuilding theory and practice.[81] Critical theory lends some useful frameworks to problematize the nature of the African state, the relationship between dominant external actors intervening in post-conflict contexts in the global South and structural violence potentiated within the global political economy. Critical theory, defined in terms of Robert Cox, steps outside prevailing frameworks to analyze the origins of structures of social, political and economic problems and attempts to theorize possibilities for change and possible alternative trajectories within a context-specific realm of possibility. Robert Cox would argue that problem-solving scholars are hardly "neutral" observers; rather they serve elite interests within the intervener and intervened societies and prefer solutions that lead to stability in the crisis period in order to reconsolidate the status quo once fighting stops.

Critics of international statebuilding efforts have persuasively argued that security and justice sector reforms have achieved very little of their stated objectives.[82] Critical theory calls into question how power is exercised in a given

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[81] See Michael Pugh, Peacekeeping and Critical Theory, *International Peacekeeping*, 11:1,2004; David Chandler, *Empire in Denial*; Alex Costy 2003; Michael Lund, 'What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions', Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, January 2003; Bendema 2003.

[82] Call and Cousens (2007, 8-9) admit that efforts to build security institutions has not been "especially encouraging". (Englebert, Pierre and Denis M. Tull. 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas About Failed States.'*International Security* 32: 4, 2009, 106) argue that the results of UN peace operations in Africa have "been paltry, particularly as regards to the establishment of self-sustaining institutions". The World Bank admits that "the numerous rule of law assistance programs in post-conflict or fragile countries have so far resulted in few lasting consequences" (Kirsti Samuels,*Rule of Law Reform in Post-conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt*, Washington: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, World Bank, 2006, 15)

context and the basis for the prevailing order in order to discern possibilities for social transformation. Some critical theory scholars have approached the subject of peacebuilding from a neo-Marxist perspective by calling attention to how specific neoliberal practices reproduce inequalities within societies and in global order.[83] These perspectives generally view peacebuilding as a problem-solving intervention implemented in non-western societies and is informed by western ideas, values and material interests while precluding local alternatives for addressing the conflict.

The appeal of a critical peace/security perspective is, first and foremost, found in its commitment to critically reflect on socio-historical structures—their origins, evolutions and possible historical trajectories to determine possibilities for progressive change. In this regard, critical theory opens up the "state" for interrogation and problematizes its formation and recognises that this process is closely related to political violence. Coxian critical theory also problematises state formation in relation with with external actors and the society in which it is embedded. Problem-solving theory takes for granted questions about who benefits from state stability and is based on problematic assumptions a Liberal Weberian state form is desired within the Westphalian "unified" nation-state framework.[84] Bringing Cox's critical theory to bear in the study of post-conflict transitions allows students to analyze the prevailing discourse and mainstream

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[83] Pugh 2005; See also Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*, London: Zed Books, 2000; Julien Barbara, 'Re-Thinking Neo-Liberal Statebuilding: Building Post-Conflict Development States', *Development in Practice*, 18:3, 2008, 307-18; Tim Jacoby, 'Hegemony, Modernization and the Post-War Reconstruction', *Global Society*, 21:4, 2007, 521-37; Christopher Cramer, *Why Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries*, London: Hurst & Co., 2006)
[84] Roland Paris, *At War's End*, 2004

order of things and critically examine historical structures (including forms of states) and power relations in a society, for the purpose of theorizing possibilities and potentials for change. In the context of peacebuilding in West Africa, this involves providing a historical account of factors leading up to war and theorizing possible sources of conflict.

A useful conception to describe the superficiality of peacebuilding reforms is offered by Ian Taylor. Taylor argues that the internal conditions for facilitating a liberal peace are simply absent in most African states.[85] As well, he observes that the logic of local political practices in Africa (which he claims are informed by neo-patrimonialism and 'big-man' logic) are fundamentally at odds with the liberal values imported from outside. He therefore argues that the reforms instituted through the liberal peace are nothing more than symbolic: "generally satisfactory to donors and external actors, and also to the connected domestic elites, but not broadly sustainable nor able to enjoy [internal] hegemonic support".[86] In other words, the political elite willingly adopt the ceremonial aspects of the "liberal peace" and learn "what the donors want to hear" but "below the surface" maintain their old structures and practices that reinforce zero-sum politics, corruption and nepotism, and unequal distribution of socio-economic opportunities outside of the existing power structures, which are rooted in state authority.

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[85] Ian Taylor, 'What Fit for the Liberal Peace in Africa?' *Global Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007, 553-66
[86] Ibid

Engaging in the reorganisation of politics relates to fundamental questions about governance and power relations. This partially explains why engaging in peacebuilding in inherently problematic and full of potential minefields and paradoxes that can potentially sow the seeds for future conflict down the road or can lead to a persistence of underlying structures that cause violence. It is therefore critical that peacebuilders understand local political and social conditions and relations of power through support of robust political and empirical analysis prior to interventions.[87]

International Security Sector Reform Agenda

Having already outlined the distinction between "problem-solving" and critical peacebuilding frameworks and after the need an approach that problematises the nature of the state and central state authority, I will discuss how the international "security sector reform" agenda has become inextricably linked with, and central to, the interrelated processes of "peacebuilding", "statebuilding" and the liberal peace. While the dominant focus of liberal peacebuilding has been on the political and economic liberalisation of non-western societies emerging from violent conflict, less academic attention has focused on the relationship between liberal peace, security sector reform, statebuilding and the role of African militaries for long-term "peacebuilding". The security dimensions of the "liberal peace" are at the heart of the relationships between "state-building", wealth creation and state-society relations in the South. It should raise the questions

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[87] During the 1990s, the UN lacked sufficient number of analysts in the Political Affairs department. See author's confidential interview a former UN Peacebuilding Support Office advisor, New York, August 2009.

about whose well-being is being "secured" during peacebuilding interventions and what role and impact international assistance has on local balances of power.[88] A problem-solving approach to statebuilding (read: stabilisation) reduces underlying political and development problems to state security without calling into question the nature of the state authority and the fails to recognize that problems within the state run much deeper than settling the question of executive power.

The international SSR agenda is often contrasted with the earlier "train and equip" form of security assistance from the Cold War that was influenced by ideological politics between the US/Western countries and Africa. The shift from Cold War technocratic military assitsance to the post-Cold War emphasis on security system governance was reflected in a general recognition to downsize military institutions and place them under greater scrutiny for transparency. In this sense, the post-Cold War SSR agenda is considerably more intrusive than earlier "train and equip" approaches. However, the SSR discourse really only emerged in 2000-2005 based on on-the-ground experiences from postwar reconstruction experiments, as reflected in policy statements by the British government and multilateral institutions included the OECD.

Nicole Ball traces the emergence of the international "SSR" agenda to the immediate post-Cold War and the dissolution of the apartheid regime in South Africa.[89] Ball explains,

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[88] Duffield, *Global Governance*; Reno, *Warlord Politics*

[89] South Africa's post-Apartheid experience in SSR is often drawn upon the most in lessons learned and best practice literature.

The concept of SSR was also influenced by the broader 'human security' agenda, which is based on two key ideas: first, that the protection of individuals is critical to both national and international security; and second, that the security conditions required by people for their development are not limited to traditional matters such as national defence and law and order, but rather incorporate broader political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and ill-being.[90]

However, the 1990's SSR agenda focused exclusively on the military and intelligence apparatus of the state, as opposed to the entire police, juridicial and security system as a whole. The SSR concept evolved from a focus on governance of traditional security institutions to an apparent comment to democratize the governance of a state's security sector to manage internal and external security.

The governance dimensions embedded in the international security sector reform agenda are demonstrated in the propensity to export "best practices" and international standards of the state into African countries.[91] The SSR discourse recognizes the need to address conflicts between and within the state-society complex. According to the OECD's definition, statebuilding goes beyond institution building and relates to the development of robust state-society relations.[92] However, it is unclear the extent to which principle is strictly adhered to in practice.

Following the election of the Labour Party in 1997, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) became integral to the development of the

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[90] Nicole Ball, 'The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda'. In Mark Sedra (ed), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, Waterloo: CIGI, 2010, 32

[91] Rocky Williams, 'African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Transformation', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 3: 2, 2007, 7. For example, the US Government funds the African Centre for Strategic Studies, which is designed to inculcate African military officers with US military values and systems on civil-military relations.

[92] OECD 2007

international "SSR" agenda. Funded primarily through the UK government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the African Conflict Prevention Pool (combined in 2008 into the Conflict Prevention Pool), DfID's agenda-setting foray into security sector management in the late 1990s under the leadership of its minister Clare Short began to pioneer an approach to support a number of African countries attempting to transition from war to peace.[93] Sierra Leone became one of DfID's primary experiments in applying the "SSR" agenda. [94] The UK view came to focus on strengthening the military and intelligence apparatus of of the *state* and ensuring its appropriate size and effective civilian management.[95] The SSR discourse argued that the security sector was critical to the international policy goals of preventing violent conflict and reducing poverty.[96]

The UK experience in SSR can be contrasted with United States Government "SSR" practices since 9/11. The tragic attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 led to a major revision of US national security strategy

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[93] By the mid-2000s, one scholar noted "an overwhelming [international] agreement that the UK is the leader in the field of SSR", the so-called "Godfather" of SSR. Jennifer Sugden, 'Security Sector Reform: The Role of Epistemic Communities in the UK', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 4:4, 2006, 12)

[94] The UK devised strategy from Sierra Leone has largely shaped OECD's guidelines on SSR/statebuilding according to one UK government official formerly a civilian advisor in Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defense (Aldo Gaeta, *The British Experience: Building Sierra Leone's Security Sector*, from notes taken by author during the Cooperative Engagement for Partnership Capacity: Africa as a Model for Whole of Government conference in Monterey, California, 06/15/2011, cited in Thomas Joseph Gale, The Shotgun or the Schoolhouse? Optimal strategy to achieve Canadian policy objectives in Sierra Leone, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate school, Monterey, California, 2011, 17).

[95] Clare Short initially excluded police and wider justice systems in her conception of SSR. See Clare Short, Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London 9 March 1999, http://www.clareshort.co.uk/speeches/DFID/9%20March%201999.pdf

[96] Ibid; Rocky Williams, 'African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Transformation', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 3: 2, 2005

and policy not seen since World War II. Additionally, the US national security architecture was fundamentally altered to give more expansive powers to the executive branch of the government. The effects of 9/11 on US National Security led to a hyper-militarisation of US foreign aid in countries in the global South that were strategically important to the US 'Global War on Terror".[97] The US has pursued a narrow and largely technical (read: train and equip) approach to security assistance in Africa and elsewhere since September 2001.[98] The emphasis has been on improving the effectiveness of security institutions to combat threats deemed as potentially harmful to US global and regional interests. Less attention has been focused on addressing the root causes of terrorism, how power and socio-economic resources are distributed or the underlying sources of insecurity in a given society. This assistance is therefore not about helping to build an effective states or societies; instead, the US has misdirected its assistance on the symptoms of insecurity, violence and disorder.

The SSR agenda seeks to distinguish itself from these narrow 'train and equip' approaches. The general aim of international statebuilding and SSR agenda is to enhance the capacities of core[99] security institutions to control,

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[97] According to Albrecht (2012, 92), the US Department of Defence's budget dwarfted that of the budgets of the State Department and USAID by a factor of 350:1. In comparison, other western governments had a ratio of 10:1. See also Mark Malan 2008

[98] Africa has become a major arena for SSR programmes in recent years (see Nicole Ball Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baille and 'Funmi Olonisakin. "Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa." London: Department for International Development Working paper 23, 2007; Willams 2005

[99] 'Core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia) (Organization for Economic

regulate, and implement primary functions of statehood, namely internal security forces (police, paramilitary, presidential bodyguards), provision of basic services, rule of law, and legitimacy of government and external defence (militaries).[100] Some scholars have argued that the narrow 'train and equip' form of security assistance often undermines principles of democratic governance and reinforces repression and domination.[101]

The liberal/Weberian nature of the SSR agenda is observed in the following ways: 1) Efforts to limit or control the powers of the state through the promotion of rule or law and democratic accountability; 2) viewing the state as the sole provider or security and justice for citizens within its territorial boundaries; 3) Efforts to reform police and other security forces flow from the logic that conflicts in the public realm should be mediated peacefully without resort to violence. The role of the state is to maintain a monopoly over the "legitimate" means of violence, to provide basic services and provide an enabling environment for sustainable development and an inclusive peace.[102] The SSR agenda addresses the most basic building blocks for building a "modern" state capable of juggling "the quintessential Weberian task of

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Cooperation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 2007 edition. Online at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf, 7)

[100] Bruce Baker, Sierra Leone Police: the role of the UK government, GRIPS Policy Research Centre discussion paper prepared for the GRIPS Statebuilding Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in Post-Conflict Peace Support Operations, 27-28 January 2010, 10

[101] Jake Sherman, "The 'Global War on Terrorism" and its Implications for US Security Sector Reform Support, in Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform,* Waterloo, CIGI, 2010, 59

[102] One of the OCED's first blueprint documents on SSR *Security System Reform and Governance* (2005) states the overall objective of SSR is "to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy" (OECD, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005, 16)

balancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of security forces".[103]

Controling and properly regulating the coervice arms of the state (including military-building) has become an important component in this emerging statebuilding approach in post-conflict states in Africa.[104] However, SSR discourse involves more than simply restoring a government's monopoly over the use of coercive force. According to Mark Sedra,

> The main innovation of the SSR model as compared to previous forms of security assistance in the Cold War and before is its *focus on governance*. The professionalism and effectiveness of the security sector is not just measured by the capacity of the security forces, but *how well they are managed, monitored and held accountable*. Moreover, the SSR model conceives of the security sector as more than its blunt, hard security instruments, recognizing that the security forces cannot perform their duties effectively in the absence of *competent legal frameworks* and *judicial bodies* as well as *correctional institutions and government oversight bodies* (my emphasis added).[105]

Statebuilding also involves building capacity to deliver basic public services. For instance, the OECD states that the central aim is to build "effective and legitimate states able to fulfill key international responsibilities and to provide core public goods and services, including security".[106]

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[103] Paris and Sisk, *Confronting the Contradictions*, 16; see also OECD 2005 which states that the overall aim of SSR is to assist countries develop a security sector capable of meeting the security needs of its state and its people within the norms of democracy, good governance and the rule of law.

[104] OECD 2008, 7; Rocky Williams, 'African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Transformation', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 3: 2, 2005,

[105] Mark Sedra, 'Introduction' in *The Future of Security Sector Reform,* (ed.), Mark Sedra, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2012,
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/The Future of Security
Sector Reform.pdf) Ideologically, the global environment during the Cold War limited the involvement of western actors in more hands-on social and/or institutional engineering of military and security institutions in Africa. Instead, this engagement was defined more by transfer of weapons and the provision of training that was conditional on lending ideological support to the donor state. (See Ball, 'The Evolution of SSR')

[106] OECD 2008, 3

For the most part, those tasked with designing and implementing SSR have been predominantly military and security officials approaching the subject from the traditional or Cold War mentality of military security perspective. Therefore, the SSR agenda has become a primarily military and security endeavor; therefore, reforms are often theorized and practiced through a traditional state-centric security framework.[107] It is ironic that those "experts" engaged in "SSR" are typically military and security personnel who are not known to be judicious and respectful consumers of history nor well-informed observers of socio-political and economic realities in the contexts that they are being deployed. However, western perspectives on African SSR have been informed by some problematic assumptions.

Critiques

The SSR agenda is informed by several problematic assumptions: First, it is assumed that outside interventions are necessary to bring about this ambitious kind of transformation in a relatively short-period of time (when African states have been "independent", on average for only fifty years) when state formation processes had unfolded in western countries (US, Britain and France) spanning many centuries without considerable hand-on external influence.[108] Second,

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[107] The publication "Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments" argues that SSR practice has favoured a more security-oriented ("train and equip") approach rather than promoting what the original intentions of SSR were-creating an enabling environment for development. See Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, Munster, LIT Verlag, 2009.

[108] Charles Tilley, 'War-Making and the State-Making as Organized Crime', In *Bringing the State Back In*, in Dietrich Rueschemeyer Peter Evans, and Theda Skocpol, (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

there is perhaps a more critical irony in the liberal statebuilding project: liberal interventions in post-conflict contexts use "Eurocentric unilinear evolutionist lenses to understand African state forms" and "apply the historical lessons they hold to have universal relevance for understanding the nature of states on the continent".[109] The mainstream "liberal peace" literature seems to ignore the historical relationship between civil wars and state formation, which have always been part of the same processes throughout the west.[110] The "liberal" statebuilding project portrays states in the global South as "failed" in order to justify western interventionism under the pretense of rectifying these inadequacies while obscuring the real intentions of political and social engineering in the name of the liberal peace.[111]

Sierra Leonean Political Scientist Zubairu Wai focuses on how particular interpretations of African political disorder and conflict reproduces dominant narratives of Africa dating back to the *mission civilisatrice* as being a "place for the absurd, the aberrant, or inadequate". Additionally, Wai demonstrates how the "state failure" discourse denies the existence of independent conceptual frameworks that take into account Africa's far more complex and grounded social, political and historical realities. The liberal statebuilding literature additionally assumes that African state formation has evolved independent of

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[109] Wai, *Epistemologies*, 135
[110] Ibid; Tilley, 'War-Making'
[111] Wai *Epistemologies* 2012

earlier European conquests on the continent and a "historical expression of the universal that offers prescriptions for all to emulate".[112]

Furthermore, the internal nature of insecurity in Africa should raise doubt about the role and importance of traditional military institutions in the Western/Weberian form in Africa.[113] As Bruce Baker points out an important fallacy in the design of SSR programs, that interventions begin with the concept of a "fragile state" and assume that formal security forces are "weak". As a result, there is a tendency to build formal institutions in the mold of the western Liberal state while overlooking informal non-state security actors and organizations that could perhaps form the basis for a more locally legitimate institution.[114]

Fundamentally, the SSR literature fails to interrogate the structures of violence embedded within the African state and wrongly assumes the presence of legitimate state authority. An SSR project that restores state authority without first understanding the structures of violence and the multiple ways in which the state reproduces violence in its relationships with citizens can reproduce violence in societies where there is a close historical connection between statebuilding and political violence.

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[112] Wai, *Epistemologies*, 134

[113] DfID's view is that the core national security threats in Sierra Leone are developmental problems—low living standards, poor (public) services and unemployment (Derek Poate, Paul Balogun, Ines Rothmann, Mark Knight, Fatmata Sesay, Evaluation of DfiD Country Programmes: Sierra Leone, 2008, 19. Available, http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.dfid.gov.uk/ContentPages/25287310.pdf (Accessed 14 May 2012)

[114] Bruce Baker, 'Sierra Leone Police'; Ken Menkhaus, 'State Failure and Ungoverned Space', in Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann (eds.), *Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives,* London: Routledge, 2010,171-188

Liberal peace, African militaries and security forces

The history of statebuilding and security forces is closely connected with political violence in Africa in general and the particular cases under review in this study. Military institutions as extensions of state authority are contested sites for political struggles and need to be viewed as constituting a heightened sense of political positioning in a post-war context. It is also critical to recognize the important role security sector plays in the social and political fabric within African societies and the fundamental link between political power, identity and the broader socio-economic context in which they are embedded. Because of their training and close proximity to the means of coercion, military and armed security forces personnel in Africa are both mediators and perpetrators of violence. This underscores the fact that the "liberal peace" literature had underestimated and underappreciates both the security sector as a site for peacebuilding and the need for attention to be focused on the security forces as an agent of peace and violent conflict. The obvious starting point for external "statebuilding" efforts focus on removing weapons from irregular (non-state) factions, enabling security forces to maintain a monopoly over legitimate means of coercion and addressing their "reintegration" into civil society or the state. The view that Sierra Leone's post-independent police and military forces were "corrupt", "nepotistic" and "repressive" is widely shared.[115] Security institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia have historically been part and parcel of the power

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[115] See Ero 2000; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010; Osman Gbla, 'Security sector reform under international tutelage in Sierra Leone', *International Peacekeeping* 13, 1, 2006, 78–93; Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake, 'United Kingdom-led security sector reform in Sierra Leone', *Civil Wars* 8, 2, 2006,109–23.

struggles between politicians for control the state. This diagnosis suggests the need for not only a critical discussion on the most appropriate model and strategy for reform relating to the composition, size, but also its connection with deeper seated problems internal to the African state. How should one engage in building effective security institutions in Africa when these forces have, historically, been manipulated by political class to serve their narrow interests? Low-ranking soldiers and police officers replicate their superior's indiscipline and self-aggrandizement practices and adopt similar behavior and attitudes to gain what they believe to be their share of power and resources.[116] What conditions are likely to increase the likelihood that rank-and-file soldiers and officers will remain loyal and subordinate to the state's interests? Also under consideration is the relationship between security actors and civilians on one hand, and security actors and political elite. Another issue in many African contexts, is the fact that "reform" implies tinkering on the margins, instead of the long and arduous task of "transformation". How can the "Security Sector Reform" agenda support a vision of "peacebuilding" that is more broad-based and transformational in nature?

The SSR literature on Africa has elevated the Western liberal state to the position of normative model of state form, rendering local knowledge on the nature of state forms and practices as unimportant or irrelevant. The privileging of western idealised models of the state and blueprints over locally understood forms of governance is one of the central critiques of the general/UN

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[116] Jimmy Kandeh, *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

peacebuilding approach. Additionally, the SSR literature approaches the subject matter as a challenge involving the transfer of "best practices" and international standards.

Additionally, the SSR literature is dominated by policy oriented/problem-solving biases without problematizing the continent's historical experience with Western/Europe or questioning the socio-historical structures created during colonialism (or in Liberia's case during the period of Americo-Liberian domination). In the contemporary period, we also need to better understand how local and international actors interface with one another during specific peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions. Are principles consistently stressed in SSR literature and policy discourse such as "local ownership" and "legitimacy" translated into concrete implementation in practice?

Problematising the African State

Traditional security studies scholars take the character and representative of the state for granted, problematically assuming that the political class's rule is based on broad-based domestic legitimacy or a national "social contract" between government and governed. Post-colonial states were maintained with little modification to the pre-existing structures created by the colonial state. Therefore particular forms of marginalisation and exclusion that had been embedded in the central state during the colonial project continued to persist in

the post-colonial period.[117] In the post-colonial order, despotic elites exploited local ethnic identities to reinforce their political position and this created deep divisions within these societies. The so-called "social contract" was limited to politico-legal arrangements agreed between a narrow group of post-colonial elites that relied on the state as the primary means of economic accumulation and power and the external (and sometimes former colonial masters) patrons that helped secure a continuation of past colonial practices to maintain the status quo.[118]

As Mandani argues, the contemporary African state resembles that of the colonial state left behind after African countries were granted independence in perseverance of the status quo.[119] The international recognition of African sovereignty (juridical) that is granted regardless of domestic (empirical) sovereignty is fundamentally at odds with broader developmental aspirations and interests of citizens in Africa.[120] One needs to consider each country's particular tumultuous history of "statebuilding" and "state formation", with particular attention on the structures of violence within and exercised by the "state" that were constituted from its moment of inception during colonialism and how that

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[117] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 62-108

[118] Robert Jackson, 'The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Changes in International Relations', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, 123; David Booth, 'Country Ownership' When There is no Social Contract: Towards a Realistic Perspective, Lecture titled, 'Global Values in a changing World: Synergy of State and Society in a Globalised World', Amsterdam, 13 December 2010, http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110104-third-lecture-in-this-year-s-series-organised-by-the-netherlands-chapter-of-the-society-for-international-development-sid-by-david-booth-odi (Accessed 2 October 2012).

[119] Mahmood Mandani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

[120] Jimmy Kandeh, Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone, Review of African Political Economy, 78, 1999, 349-366.

violence continues to structure everyday power relations and the exercise of power.[121] Equally critical is the need to interrogate the role of external actors in this process of "state formation" and the degree of influence and control in supporting particular forms of internal politics and their role in undermining more participatory and broad-based approaches to development, beyond the narrow statist/traditional approaches of ensuring order and security domestically within African states.

To understand Sierra Leone and Liberia's post-war reform, one needs a grasp of the colonial state formation process, the lack of democratic foundations of statehood and the relationship between state violence and ethnic identity in state-society relations.[122] This framework provides clues into explanations behind the lack of broad based democratic foundations in Sierra Leone and the ethno-politicization of the state, which led to one-Party rule in 1971. Liberia's history of state formation is somewhat different to the extent that colonial order was organized and maintained by a group of freed Black slaves/mulattos that founded the Liberian state in 1847 upon their settlement on the West African coastal region that was called Cape Mesurado (present day Mamba Point in Monrovia). As will be demonstrated below, the Americo-Liberian elite replicated colonial practices of the British in Sierra Leone, by for example,

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[121] Wai 2012, 170

[122] See Jimmy Kandeh, Dynamics of State, Class and Political Ethnicity: A Comparative Study of State-Society Relations in Colonial and Post-Colonial Sierra Leone, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1987.

pursuing a "civilising" mission of indigenous groups in the hinterland and

relying on the British "In-direct" form of rule at the local level.[123]

Problematising the Sierra Leonean State: A Brief History of State-Society

Relations

The Sierra Leonean state was founded after the establishment of Freetown in

1787 as a settlement for freed slaves returning to Africa from Nova Scotia,

Jamaica and the former southern colonies. The western area (Freetown) was

administered as a British Crown Colony under British-based regimes of law and

local government while the rest of the country was later administered under the

colonial yoke in 1896 when the British Protectorate created and governed under

regimes of chieftaincy and customary law.[124] Thus, the British colonial

administrators saw chiefs as the main medium through which they could

implement their colonial policy (a system known as "in-direct rule"). The British

assisted in consolidating the authority of selected chieftain interlocutors and

provided them support in suppressing local rivals through colonial military

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[123] Mamdani 1996, 87

[124]   As Sierra Leonean historian Christopher Fyfe writes, "In August 1895 an Order-in-Council
was issued in Britain, authorising the Colony to make laws for the territory around it, extending
out to the agreed-upon boundary, which corresponds closely to that of present-day Sierra Leone.
On 3 August 1896, a Proclamation was issued in the Colony declaring that territory to be a
British 'Protectorate'. The Colony remained a distinct political entity and the Protectorate was
governed from it. Most of the Chiefs whose territories the Protectorate subsumed did not enter
into it voluntarily. Many had signed treaties of friendship with Britain, but these were expressed
as between sovereign powers contracting with each other, i.e., chiefs were not subordinate to
colonialists. Only a handful of Chiefs had signed treaties of cession and in remote areas no
treaties had been obtained at all. Strictly speaking, a protectorate does not exist unless the people
in it have agreed be protected. The Sierra Leone Protectorate was more in the nature of a
unilateral acquisition of territory by Britain" (Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone*,
Oxford: Oxford University,1962, 541).

forces and bureaucratic means. [125] Throughout the 19th century, paramount chiefs in rural Sierra Leone were managed by colonial administrators. British administration was largely confined to Freetown and its immediate environs, known as the Colony, while the Paramount chiefs governed most of rural Sierra Leone, known as the Protectorate.[126] The colonial state relied on local interlocutors, namely alliances with chiefdoms and local authorities to pacify the population and keep territories under the control of the central colonial state (at a minimal cost). Thus, local political authorities, such as chief (and sub-section chiefs) and district administrators became central intermediaries extending authority of the colonial state to the provinces/rural communities. Between 1896 and 1921, Sierra Leone's population of 1.2 million people was governed by only five District Commissioners and one circuit court.[127] The country's first unitary Constitution was written in 1951 that unified the Old Colony and the Protectorate of Sierra Leone. It is clear the British never had a "strong" state in mind for Sierra Leone.

Post-colonial Sierra Leone

The transition to independence in 1961 from a colony to an independent state was effectively an elite affair led by Sir Milton Margai and the Sierra Leone People's Party, which won the 1962 general elections.[128] The SLPP's base

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[125] William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 45; Martin Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernisation Process in Sierra Leone*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1966; John Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone*, 1947-1970, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970

[126] Sesay 1995, 166; Hirsch 2001, 23

[127] Kilson 1966, 24-25

[128] Barrows 1976, 98

came from chiefdom authorities, especially in the south and east. These local authorities played an integral role in continuing to strengthening central state authority and control of local communities.[129] The main opposition party, the All People's Congress, developed its base from workers unions and from northern ethnic groups. These politics led to the regionalisation of national politics divided the country along regional blocs—the south and east dominated by the SLPP and the northern communities gave their support to the APC.[130]

When Sierra Leone attained independence from Britain in April 1961, the political foundations of the colonial state were retained including a central state in Freetown and local political authorities such as chiefs and local legislative councils to secure centralised political authority and privilege for the emerging political elite. The military and police institutions tended to reflect their "traditional" colonial role in symbolically guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity with little modification.[131] This was largely a reflection of the lack of desire among post-independence political leaders to radically depart from the colonial state to adapt the political system to reflect the needs of their liberated people. The post-colonial state emerged unscathed from the British

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[129] V. Minikin, Indirect Political Participation in Two Sierra Leone Chiefdoms', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11:1, 1973, 126-135.

[130] Sierra Leone has two main political parties, the Sierra Leone's People Party and the All People's Congress (APC). The SLPP was founded in 1951 by provincial elites to contest Creole hegemony during the terminal colonial period. According to Kandeh, the APC's origins are found in the determination of northern politicians and cultural entrepreneurs to counter Mende domination in the SLPP (Kandeh 2003, 196). The APC was founded in 1960 by Pa Mucktarru Kallay, Allieu Badarr Koroma, Alhaji Sheik Gibril Sesay C A Kamara-Taylor, S A T Koroma and Abu Bakarr S Bangura.

[131] Rocky Williams, 'African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Transformation', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 3: 2, 2005

tradition that emphasised strong executives and a relatively weak legislature.[132] This accompanied an uneven distribution of education and social provisions according to regional politics.[133] For instance, the education system disproportionately favoured urban elite and southeastern powerbrokers connected to the colonial administration and local chieftaincies. [134] Although this trend changed in the late 1960s and 1970s, there was no corresponding expansion in employment opportunities for those disconnected from the political class.[135] British anthropologist Paul Richards has demonstrated in his book *Fighting for the Rainforest* that these local structures were responsible for marginalising the majority of Sierra Leoneans especially youth who bore the brunt of the structure violence inflicted by the state during the mid-1960s, 1970s and 1980s before the war. Their participation during the war was at least partially influenced by the desire to usurp local chief's privileges and the local political structures that were perceived to be responsible for their structural marginalisation and exclusion.[136] Reno demonstrates that the post-colonial state

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[132] Mamdani 1996; Rocky Williams 2005, 19

[133] The literacy rate at independence was between 3-10% at independence. The Creole population, which represented 2% out of 2 million were disproportionate more educated (80%) than the indigenous Sierra Leones (3%).

[134] In 1961, there were 86, 224 pupils in primary schools, 7,512 in secondary, 1,183 students in vocational/technical training, 629 in teacher training and 300 in higher education institutions including universities (Joe D. Alie, A New History of Sierra Leone, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 203). A year later, primary school enrolment had increased to 100,000 pupils and 9,111 students in secondary schools respectively (Lansana Gberie, 'War and State Collapse: The Case of Sierra Leone', Unpublished MA thesis, University of Wilfred Laurier, 1998, 41)

[135] For example, between 1960 and 1969, there were 948 primary schools throughout Sierra Leone with 126,438 pupils; these figures grew to 1,806 primary schools in 1990 with 391,152 pupils enrolled. From 1960-69, there were 16,414 pupils for 62 secondary schools and 6 vocational institutes for 949 pupils. By 1970-1990, there were 270 secondary schools with 96,709 pupils and 23 vocational skills with 5,425 pupils (Abdul Karim Koroma, The Agony of a Nation, 123). In 1985, there were only 60,000 out of an estimated 2,000,000 people in paid employment in the country (Gberie, 1998, 41, citing CIA factbook figures)

[136] Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, 1996

maintained a monopoly over diamond concessions for exclusive benefit of the President, his clients and a cadre of loyal chiefs but also and how youth resisted these practices through illicit mining, sometimes backed by rival chiefs.[137] The lack of broad-based development led to chronic inequality and deprivation.[138] President Stevens (1968-1985) and his group of advisors continued to monopolise control over the local political economy and used state security forces to establish ethno-hegemony in Sierra Leone.[139]

Published in 2004, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Report is conclusive about where blame should be directed for Sierra Leone's disintegration: the failure of its post-colonial political elite.

> Successive political elites plundered the nation's assets, including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national 'good'. Government accountability was non-existent. Institutions meant to uphold human rights, such as the courts and civil society, were thoroughly co-opted by the executive. This context provided ripe breeding grounds for opportunists who unleashed a wave of violence and mayhem that was to sweep through the country...The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.[140]

My analysis recognises the failure of Sierra Leone's political class but goes beyond the elite to understand the disintegration of Sierra Leone as a consequence of a number of structural problems embedded in the colonial and post-colonial state. The ethno-politicisation of the state was an important consequence of the failure of the post-colonial state in Sierra Leone. Sierra

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[137] Reno 1995, 49-54, 106-107, 113

[138] Reno 1995

[139] William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[140] TRC 'findings', in *The Final Report of the TRC Commission of Sierra Leone*, Vol. 2, 2004, paragraphs 13-18

Leone's national politics after 1964 became divided not along ideological lines but ethno-regional identities.[141] The All People's Congress (APC), which ruled Sierra Leone from 1968-1991 is deeply complicit in accentuating the crisis of state authority in Sierra Leone. The All People's Congress (APC) party manipulated social identities and tensions in Sierra Leone and transformed the state into one-party instrument based on a particular and narrow conception of ethno-regional identitarian factors to consolidate a monopoly over economic and political power.[142]

Socio-Economic Context (1970s-1980s) and the Decline of the State
    The emergence of a cadre of militarised youth from below cannot be understood in the absence of a discussion of deep socio-economic problems characterizing Sierra Leone's economy during the 1970s and 1980s. I have demonstrated above that Sierra Leone had little time to mature before its transition from 164 years of colonial rule.[143] The British government failed to provide Sierra Leone with a solid political-social foundation for self-governance. Indeed, social and physical infrastructure was severely lacking when independence was granted to Sierra Leone in 1961. The literacy rate in the country was between 3.0- 9.0% in 1961.[144] Sierra Leone had 52 doctors and not

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[141] Jimmy Kandeh 2003, 196

[142] The ethnic base of the APC has been unquestionably Temne and Limba and a loose coalition of northern ethnic groups (for example, Koranko, Susu and Yalunka) since at least the mid-1960s. (Jimmy D. Kandeh, 'Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone', *African Studies Review*, 35:1, 1992, 92)

[143] Koroma 1996

[144] Beckley, S. M. 1993, "State Sponsored Educational Services in Sierra Leone", in C. M. Fyle (ed.), The State and the Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone Since Independence, 1961-91. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series.

more than 1,000 hospital beds for a population of 2 million.[145] Most basic public utilities were centralised in Freetown. Sierra Leone had registered moderate growth during its first ten to fifteen years after Independence. The per capita GDP grew by 2.5% in the 1960s. Sierra Leone also had the beginnings of a burgeoning multi-party democracy.[146]

The state's security forces were instruments to maintain a culture of fear among the population and to pacify dissent through direct force and state-sanctioned violence. For instance, President Stevens disarmed the military and created a paramilitary police unit under his direct supervision called the Special Security Division (SSD) and the Internal Security Unit (ISU) (trained by Israel and Cuba) as the main security forces that enforced control through physical violence. The SSD and ISU were directly accountable to the State House and were relied on to quell any civilian and student opposition protests. Additionally, Stevens banned the country's main opposition, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) from participating in parliamentary elections in 1973 and 1977 through both the threat and use of direct violence. By the 1970s, there was little or no formal opposition to Stevens' rule.

Under Stevens' despotic rule, the military's senior leadership became decidedly politicised and was then subsequently "disarmed" after a few notable attempts to oppose Stevens' anti-democratic practices. The military and state security institutions are intimately connected to issues of identity politics, the socio-political and economic context and the social fabric in Sierra Leone. With

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[145] Fyle 1993

[146] As mentioned, in 1967, Sierra Leone became the first post-colonial African state to change government through the ballot box (until Brigadier Lansana's intervention).

no formidable opposition—from civil society, parliament and the military—President Stevens pushed through legislation in Sierra Leone's Parliament in 1973 to abandon the British Westminster model in favour of a republican constitutional model that was popular in Nigeria, Ghana and throughout Africa. By 1978, Stevens's administration passed legislation to formalise Sierra Leone's polity into a one-party system.[147] Stevens' authoritarian style of rule was not that different from the "decentralised despotism" characterising the colonial state in Sierra Leone.

However, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a rapid deterioration in the formal political economy of Sierra Leone under Stevens despotic rule. In the 1970s, GDP per capita declined significantly. 1977 to 1979 marked a difficult economic environment. Inflation rose considerably as balance of payments deficit for 1978 was $50 million. Based on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, the government agreed to liberalise its economy: the local currency, the Leone was delinked from the British sterling and pegged it to the IMF unit of account the Special Drawing Right (SDR) in October 1978. A rate of exchange was established and a 5% devaluation was instituted. After the extravagant costs incurred from hosting of the OAU summit in 1979, the economy sunk into further decline. Foreign debt mounted to unsustainable levels. As the formal economy degenerated, informalisation, smuggling and illegal economy expanded in the capital city Freetown. The 1980-1985 saw a steady decline in Sierra Leone's productivity and economy. Social services,

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[147]Abdul Karim Koroma, *Agony of a Nation*, 1996.

health and educational infrastructure were deteriorating rapidly.[148] During this period, 65% of the population relied on agriculture for their sustenance. Teachers salaries could not even be paid.

By the early 1980s, GDP per capita had turned negative 0.9%. The 1980s saw the value of the Leone depreciate dramatically and inflation spiked substantially. State salaries lost their value and could not even be paid on time. 1987 expenditures for education were reduced by 50%.[149] Primary and secondary school teachers and nurses moved from the middle class to an ever-growing ranks of the underclass. Schools and hospital infrastructure were neglected and decaying; class sizes expanded; and standards of teaching instruction and delivery of health services collapsed.[150] Inflation in 1983/84 was an alarming 73%.[151]

In the late 1980s, liberalisation policies were pursued through an IMF template programme aimed to prevent Sierra Leone's fast disintegration. Reforms included removal of controls on internal and external trade, ensuring a market- determined exchange and lending rates for commercial banks. Additionally, deposit ranks were set at 'realistic' levels (determined by the IMF) and other fiscal management measures were imposed to strengthen revenue collection and control state expenditure. What the IMF failed to realise is that the bulk of Sierra Leone's economy was based in informal sector. Meanwhile, prices

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[148] Koroma 1996
[149] Ibid.
[150] Bangura 1997
[151] 1985 Sub-Saharan Africa, The Military Balance, 85:1, 89-110

of most commodities increased during this time.[152] Government subsidies on rice and fuel were removed as a result of these austerity measures. By 1989/90, the price of petrol increased by 300% and the price of rice by 180%.[153] As Abdul Karim Koroma explains, "the collateral social effects were enormous, largely impacting on the ordinary citizen who could hardly understand or appreciate IMF prescriptions."[154] GDP per capita deteriorated further to -8% in the 1990s. By 1990-1991, life expediency was only 40 years of age, among the worst in the world.[155]

The effects of socio-economic disintegration impacted heavily on the country's majority youthful population. The 1985 National Census estimated that the youth population (aged 14-35 years) represented 35% of Freetown's population (168,763 out of 469,776). An estimated 29.4% of Sierra Leone's population was between the ages of 14 and 35 years old (1,028,590 out of 3,518,378).[156] Considering that in 1989 over 80% of the total population was living on US$1 or less a day,[157] these deteriorating conditions not only created the conditions for Sierra Leoneans to leave Freetown in search of employment

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[152] Koroma 1997, 161. Initially, after the Leone was floating on the global currency market, the currency exchange rate went from Le 5.34 cents to US$1 in 1985; to Le 23.12 cents to $US 1 in 1988; to LE 39.20 cents to US$1 in 1989. 'From then on, it was in a free fall reaching LE 545 to US$1 by April 1992.' (Ibid).

[153] Magbaily-Fyle, C. 1993. *The Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone since Independence 1961-1991*. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa); Reno, Williams. 1995. *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[154] Koroma 1997, 161

[155] UNDP 1994

[156] I. Rashid, 'Student Radicals, Lumpen Youth, and the Origins of Revolutionary Groups, 73.

[157] Victor A.B Davis, War, Poverty and Growth in Africa: Lessons from Sierra Leone, Paper prepared for Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) 5th Annual Conference *Understanding Poverty and Growth in Africa*, St Catherineís College, Oxford University, 18-19 March 2002. Note: there are no comparative statistics for social conditions in Sierra Leone prior to this period.

opportunities in West African capitals— Monrovia, Ghana, Abidjan and Conakry. Freetown was a ticking timebomb waiting to explode.

There were obviously few opportunities for those occupying the 'subaltern' in Sierra Leonean society. The youth population outside of the patron-client relations were forced to drop out of primary school as prospects for democratic social change were bleak. Meanwhile, one cannot overstate the significant profits many elite (political and especially business) had accumulated during this period of corruption and socio-economic decline.

State social spending declined as the army of unemployment rose in urban centers. While government expenditure on education was 15.6% in 1974-75, spending was reduced to 8.5% in 1988/89. This marked an alarmingly rate of high dropout rates among primary school students.[158] Meanwhile, state spending on health care and housing dropped from 6.6% and 4.8% in the same period to 2.9% and 0.3% by 1988/89.[159] This socio-economic collapse defined the material conditions that opened up a fervent desire for radical change of the corrupt APC dictatorship. Critically, discourse in the urban youth hangouts (*potes)* became to revolve around armed insurgency as the only mechanism to bring about political change and topple the one-party regime.

The desire for change in Sierra Leone was rooted in what Abdullah describes as the 'period of acute economic and political crisis in the 1980s and

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[158] Wright Wright, Cream (1997) Reflections on Sierra Leone: a case study, for workshop on educational destruction and reconstruction in disrupted societies, International Bureau of Education and University of Geneva, 15–16 May 1997; in Skelt, Joanna (1997) Rethinking Peace Education in War-Torn Societies: A theoretical and empirical investigation with special reference to Sierra Leone, International Extension College, Cambridge, 22

[159] Ibrahim Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction, 211.

1990s', which has continued to the present day. The Sierra Leonean state went from relative prosperity in the immediate post-independence period to a period of mass poverty in the 1980s.[160] These processes of socio-economic decline unfolded during a time when IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) in the 1980s, which made matters worse by drastically reducing state funding to education, social services and public sector jobs. The next section links these conditions with the social composition of the armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s.

The failure of the state to distribute resources equitably and the rapid decline in social and economic conditions created large groups of unemployed and unemployable urban male youth, who became primary actors in Sierra Leone's brutal eleven year civil war, as either "foot soldiers" in the main rebel faction, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) or it's bloated and poorly trained and undisciplined state security forces.[161] Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation report (which was mandated to write an impartial history of the conflict and identify its "root causes") explains,

> Many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, lost all sense of hope in the future. Youths became easy prey for unscrupulous forces who exploited their disenchantment to wreak vengeance against the ruling elite.[162]

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[160] Ibrahim Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction; see also 'Africans do not live by bread alone: Against Greed, not Grievance, African Review of Books, 2, 1, 2006.

[161] Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL), 1998.

[162] TRC 'findings', in *The Final Report of the TRC Commission of Sierra Leone*, Vol. 2 (2004), paragraphs 13-18

History of Sierra Leone's Military

The history of the Sierra Leone military is interlinked with colonial and post-colonial state formation in Sierra Leone. The precursor to the modern Sierra Leone military was the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The WAFF's role was to act as a purely colonial instrument to serve the commercial and political interests of Imperial Britain. In 1901, following protests by local chiefs about its irresponsible and repressive action, the police force was disbanded in 1901 and the West African Frontier Force was established, comprising 600 members from the former frontier police. Prior to World War I, these regional military organizations had a predominately internal outlook.[163] The Sierra Leone battalion served under the WAFF umbrella that included constabularies in Nigeria (three battalions), the Gold Coast Regiment, Lagos, and the Gambia Company (formed from elements of the Sierra Leone Battalion).[164] The force totaled about 6,400 officers and men and was placed under an Inspector-General with the rank of Brigadier with headquarters at the Colonial Office in London.[165] Similar to most British colonies in Africa, expatriate officers commanded the battalion in Sierra Leone while Africans served in the rank-and-file. Administrative and operational control of the force (including control over size,

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[163] In 1898, the force was deployed to contain a violent rebellion, during the 'Hut Tax War' led by Temne chief Bai Bureh. The aim of the battalion in Sierra Leone was to enforce imperial law and order in the colony and maintain effective control over the borders in light of potential aggression from French expansionism throughout West Africa.

[164] Chester Crocker, 'The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in the British and French Systems of Order', unpublished PhD dissertation, The John Hopkins University, Political Science, 1972, 124; Austin Haywood and F.A.S Clarke, *The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force*, Aldershot: Gale and Polden, Ltd, 1964, 53

[165] The Inspector-General's role was to advise the Colonial Office on West African military matters, carry out annual inspections of WAFF units and submit recommendations through the governor of the territory concerned to the Colonial Secretary; in case of hostilities he was to take actual command of the force (Crocker 1969, 124)

pay and internal regulations) remained with a local governor (Sir Charles King Harman in Sierra Leone) of the territory in which each unit was raised and was responsible for affirming civilian control of the force. Each governor could appoint officers to the unit in his territory but the general principle was that all officers were appointed from regiments of Britain's regular army for finite tours of duty.[166] The effectiveness of the Sierra Leone battalion of the WAFF was hindered by serious logistical and communication problems between the British officers and the African subordinates. For instance, over 90% of the Sierra Leonean soldiers could not read or write English.[167] To allay this communication gap, Governor Sir Charles King Harman approved the establishment of an Army Education Services (AES) center in June 1902. The purpose of the AES center was to teach soldiers basic literacy, numbers and oral communication in English.[168]

African armed forces played an important role in extending and effectively implementing colonial authority throughout Africa. Two major functions of the WAFF in Sierra Leone battalion was to act defend British resources in the "French sea" of West Africa, safeguard British Royal Navy coal installations in the Sierra Leone colony based in Freetown and when necessary, quell internal unrest in individual British territories. Like most of sub-Saharan Africa, Sierra Leone did not play a central role in British planning during World

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[166] Crocker 1969, 124

[167] 'Background and activities of AFEC', in *The Torch*, February 2003, 4

[168] The first learning center was established in Nigeria, later in Ghana and finally in Sierra Leone (which also served the Gambia). As the armed forces expanded, the center was upgraded to an autonomous unit in the military.

War I.[169] The Royal Navy's garrison in western Freetown was guarded by a battalion of local troops from artillery, engineer supply, medical and ordnance units.[170] Totaling about 6,400 officers and men, the WAFF was governed by an Inspector-General with the rank of a Brigadier with headquarters at the Colonial Office in London.[171]

Following World War I, Africa's strategic interest for Britain declined as colonies became economically difficult to maintain. Britain reduced the number of its imperial positions in Africa. After the War, the RWAFF strength was cut from 25,000 to only six battalions.[172] The strikes and riots in Freetown in 1919 arose as a direct consequence of these economic factors.[173] The riots spread into the hinterland with the exception of Koinadugu in the north. The colonial government called in the WAFF and the Riot Act was proclaimed to disperse the rioters. According to a police report in 1919, 'a section of the Creole population' was responsible for the riot, but was 'ably assisted by the native element who

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[169] Sierra Leone sent a carrier corps to assist the British forces and the King's African Rifles (KAR) in East Africa to fight the Germans in 1916 (Crocker 1972, 116)

[170] Colonel Austin Haywood and Brigadier Clark, *The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force*, Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1964, 104

[171] Crocker 1972, 124

[172] Contributing factors like the rising costs of living due to rice scarcity, the dominant role of Syrian merchant traders and non-payment of war bonuses to demobilised soldiers exacerbated the internal strife within the Sierra Leonean colony (Haywood and Clark, 319-320). According to Sierra Leonean historian Ibrahim Abdullah, the strikers were mainly working-class from urban poor and unemployed background, including demobilised soldiers residing in eastern Freetown (Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riots in Sierra Leone', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 28: 2, 1994. The price or rice had increased from 1d a cup in 1914 to 5d in 1919, 'very expensive for workers receiving pre-war wages' (200).

[173] According to Sierra Leonean historian Ibrahim Abdullah, the strikers were mainly working-class from urban poor and unemployed background, including demobilised soldiers residing in eastern Freetown (Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and Riots in Sierra Leone', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 28: 2, 1994. The price or rice had increased from 1d a cup in 1914 to 5d in 1919, 'very expensive for workers receiving pre-war wages' (200).

were out to loot'.[174] The British felt that their imperial position in Freetown was sufficiently secure to permit the disbanding of the imperial unit, the West Africa Regiment in 1928. The old force became the Royal West African Frontier Force in 1928 and took over responsibility for safeguarding British installations in the Sierra Leone colony based in Freetown as well as throughout the protectorate. The WAFF's use during the interwar period was for 'internal security', "to provide a striking force to deal with inter-tribal trouble or insurrection", and "to supply a small reserve, should it be required, to assist in case of trouble in any of the neighbouring West Africa colonies".[175]

Just prior to World War II, the RWAFF recruited heavily in the protectorate (under British supervision) and reached the strength of three battalions. Africa proved to be a central theatre in war. A further 9,000 RWAFF troops (two brigades) were deployed in British East Africa to fight off the Italians in Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea.[176] The RWAFF expanded to 23 battalions by 1941. London felt the Freetown port was exposed and sent two British battalions, artillery and anti-aircraft units to guard it until RWAFF strength was built up sufficiently enough to replace them.[177] In early 1943, the 81st and 82nd West African divisions (consisting of a Nigerian brigade, 1,500 men from the Gold Coast, a carrier corps from Sierra Leone and one rifle company from Gambia) assisted the Allied Forces against the Japanese forces in

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[174] Ibid, 210

[175] Crocker 1969, 126 citing United Kingdom War Office, 'Notes on the Land Forces of British Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates' 1923.

[176] Crocker 1969, 163

[177] Previously, UK personnel were kept to a minimum of support, which included a training and staff support role (Cocker 1969, 162; Haywood and Clarke, 364-366).

Burma's Kabaw Valley and the Arakan (called the Myohaung battle).[178]

Operating under General Wingate, the RWAFF played a limited but commendable role in the war against the fascists from 1943-1945.[179] From 1939 to 1945, the RWAFF grew from 8,000 men to 146,000, while the total British/European officers totaled about 11,000 out of an imperial force totaling about 14.7 million men.[180]

After World War II, Britain began to proclaim the goal of self-government for some of its colonies. By 1949, British policy stressed economic retrenchment and demobilisation in most of its periphery colonies including Sierra Leone, while in the strategic Middle East and North Africa, policy shifted towards decolonisation.[181] The British kept a small repair facility in Freetown as an alternative communication system in case of hostilities in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, RWAFF security considerations remained focused on UK defence while also prompted into intervening in internal policing duties. By 1 May 1946, about 67,000 West Africans had been demobilised and each colonial administration developed vocational and technical training programs to facilitate absorption of the veterans.[182] The fear was that demobilised soldiers with broadened horizons would create political disorder back home if alternative

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[178] Cox 1976, 26. Sierra Leone's government continues to celebrate 'Myohaung Day' in commemoration of fallen Sierra Leonean troops during the Myohaung battle. Gun carriers during World War II were paid nine pence to one shilling a day for carrying weapons, ammunition and other items upcountry along non-motorable roads. While in Freetown, carriers were paid from one shilling and three pence to one shilling and nine pence.

[179] See 'West Africa in the War', parts I, II, and II, *West Africa*, 22 September, 1 and 15 December 1951; Haywood and Clarke, 373

[180] Crocker 1972, 166

[181] Chester Crocker, 'The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in the British and French Systems of Order', Ph.D dissertation, The John Hopkins University, 1972, 177

[182] Crocker 1969, 183

livelihoods were not forthcoming. The RWAFF was cut to just over seven battalions plus supporting units—four in Nigeria, two in the Gold Coast, one in Sierra Leone and one company in the Gambia. Following the war, the British War Office retained administrative and financial responsibility over local African colonial forces. The RWAFF was controlled through the West African command structure. British officers were posted to African units on War Office orders, as opposed to being seconded and paid by local budgets.[183] British doctrine and methods of training were applied more rigorously across the West African region to keep options open for a future role for African forces.[184] Underneath the General Officer commander were four district commanders in the territory of the forces raised. These military officers were therefore in a better position to exercise control over administrative, equipment, operations and deployment. Control over recruitment and size of force remained divided between territorial, regional and central levels of authority, both military and civilian.

While the focus of the RWAFF remained primarily focused on 'imperial defence' with its regional security command based in Accra, local security could not be taken for granted. The RWAFF had to be deployed alongside the police

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[183] In 1948, the RWAFF cost five times as much to maintain as in 1939 and therefore required the War Office to help support and administer it. In 1947-1948, total recurrent costs including capital expenditures of the RWAFF were about £2.5 million and the four West African colonial governments contributed £563,740, leaving the British to pay the remainder. The breakdown of each government's contribution was not available until the late 1950s (see below) (Crocker 1969, 192)

[184] Crocker 1969, 185-186. A wartime training school was maintained at Teshie (Gold Coast) 'to ensure common doctrine and methods of training in the units of the four territories' (Ibid, 193)

force to quell riots in Freetown in 1955.[185] The colonial government called on the RWAFF to disperse the rioters, this time, armed with more sophisticated automatic weapons. Eighteen people were killed and about one hundred were injured during the violence.[186] The RWAFF quelled internal riots in November 1955 and March 1956 against local chiefdoms.[187] Suppressing these internal insurrections in Freetown and in the hinterland broke up the more mundane and monotonous pattern of military life in an army that had for the most part kept to guard duties in the barracks and 'trooping the colours'.[188] These attacks illustrated the growing number of internal insurrections and 'nationalist' resentment in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and throughout British West Africa. Initially, the British viewed their military forces in West and East Africa as assets worth holding onto in the immediate postwar period. However, by 1955, while the Mau Mau uprising plagued British military in Kenya, there was a very limited number of British troops based in West Africa. In sum, Britain lacked a strategic vision for Sierra Leone in West Africa.[189] Recruitment of the rank-and-file was the exclusive preserve of British army prior to Sierra Leone's independence in 1961. While the officer corps was exclusively British or

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[185] Two governance bodies were set up to manage the UK defence interests in West Africa: the Overseas Defence Council as a sub-committee of the cabinet's defence council was re-established in early 1947 and the West African Council was created in 1945 to keep lines of communication open between London and Accra, Lagos, Freetown and Bathurst and to coordinate West African policy between Headquarters, West African command and the four West African governments (Crocker 1972, 194).

[186] Cox, 1976, 76

[187] Youth targeted property belonging to chiefs, who were symbols of colonial rule. Over seven thousand youths were involved in a protest in Port Loko, which later spread to other neighbouring chiefdoms. The army was again sent in to pacify the rioters; when all was said and done, 23 people were killed. Government officials blamed youth illicit miners for the incident (Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, 67, 69)

[188] Cox 1976, 42

[189] West Africa, February 11, 1950, 98

Europeans, the social composition of the army in the 1930s was comprised of mostly of men from the southeastern tribes. Kono, Kissi and Mende tribes comprised almost 80% of the rank and file.[190] This composition was partially influenced with British perceptions of warrior tribes (martial races) in Sierra Leone.[191] Recruitment under British direction resulted in a relatively well-balanced army rank-and-file with representation from all ethnic tribes with the exception of the Creoles.[192] The Creoles, representing about 2% of Sierra Leone's total population, were uninterested in the army, and were preoccupied by their urban and middle-class tendencies. In keeping with British indirect rule, British military officers in command of RWAFF relied on town or village chiefs as intermediaries for military recruitment. For example, when on recruitment drives in villages, the British soldiers would request certain quotas from the traditional chiefs. Given the language and cultural barriers between expatriates and indigenous populations, the British were accustomed to in-direct form of colonial rule, whereby chiefs became an important intermediary for recruitment and other objectives in the interests of the British colony. During the colonial period, the army was perceived as a dumping ground for the illiterate and uneducated indigenes. The Creoles held most mid-level positions in the civil service of the colonial government, serving alongside but below the level of

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[190] Under British colonial rule, ethnic Mendes were the most educated of the indigenous groups due to their geographical proximity to the coast and its social connections with Christian missionary and elite schools based in the southeast (including Bo Government Secondary School founded in 1906). Mende's were believed to be suitable for the more intellectual roles such as bandsmen and signalers.

[191] The 'martial races' in Sierra Leone included illiterate (Muslim) Korankos from the isolated north.

[192] Cox 1976, 102.

British expatriates.[193] Enlisting in the military was generally overlooked by the Creoles due to their aspirations for secondary school and tertiary education.[194] It was extremely rare for secondary school graduates to opt for military service despite the fact that salaries for a degree holding second lieutenant was more lucrative than what a fresh college graduate could earn by entering the civil service.[195]As such, while the Creoles preferred to pursue education and enter law, medicine, ministry or teaching,[196] ethnic Korankos became the dominant tribe in the army due to less than rigorous educational standards required for enlistment.[197]

Few educated Sierra Leoneans were interested in army service. The common and widespread perception was that the military was a career for the uneducated and illiterate and was used when necessary as an instrument to ensure colonial order. Until 1960, the pay structure of the rank-and-file was less than that of a police officer. On 1 April 1960, a new African Other Ranks' Pay Code was introduced, bringing salaries of the rank and file in line with the police salaries.[198] The salary of a second lieutenant in the RSLMF could earn £720 (as opposed to £684 for a recent graduate entering the civil service).[199] This was considerable salary considering Sierra Leone's annual per capita income was

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[193] Cox 1976

[194] Although the Creoles represented only 2% of Sierra Leone's population, the British considered them within general social and political elite in Freetown.

[195] Ibid, 102

[196] Ibid.

[197] Author's personal interview with retired senior RSLAF officer, 8 February 2012

[198] Turay & Abraham, 93

[199] Cox 1976, 46

about $100.[200] The 1,300-man Sierra Leone military battalion was financed by the British Colonial government for about £800,000 a year, while the 2,400-man police force cost about £700,000.[201]

Sierra Leone was relatively isolated from British strategic concern in the postwar years. Africanising the RWAFF was never really an urgent priority for the British until around the early 1950s, after which financial considerations were determining the timetable for transferring authority to Africans. By 1949, while the principle of African access to all ranks in the RWAFF had been granted, this did not have any significant impact on Sierra Leone.[202] In 1950 and 1953, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, respectively, gained a significant measure of self-government under new constitutions. Promotions of Africans to higher ranks in the civil service were stepped up after this time. Access to officer training facilities, such as the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst were not made available to African cadets until 1951.[203] Only a handful of selected African NCOs and warrant officers within the RWAFF were chosen for further training at the Command Training School in Teshie, near Accra before being sent to Britain for short training courses at the Eaton Hall Officer Cadet Training Unit, Chester or the Mons Officer Cadet school in Aldershot. By mid-1952, 14 places were reserved for West Africans and the first 14 West Africans were commissioned —7 from Gold Coast, six from Nigeria, and one from Sierra

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[200] Ibid.
[201] Turay & Abraham; Cox 1976
[202] Crocker 1969, 270
[203] Crocker 1972 270

Leone (David Lansana, see below).[204] In 1953, the allotments for West Africans going to Sandhurst was increased to 20. This signaled that the military transfer of power had begun in these colonies.[205] A West African Forces Conference was organized to lay the groundwork for decolonization and to adopt measures to devolve financial responsibility on the territories and to limit regional and centralised control of individual territorial units.[206] In 1955, the West African Army Advisory Council produced recommendations for disbanding the West African Command and establishing three territorial units, one each for the Gold Coast and Nigeria and one for Sierra Leone and the Gambia.

To account for gradual decolonisation in other territories, the British modified its security architecture in Sierra Leone in 1952. The Sierra Leone police force was increased to a size of 2,600 in 1952 (double the size of the army) and held primacy over internal security duties. The police were equipped with rifles and other non-lethal weapons such as tear gas. Police training also emphasised riot control and in 1954 was stationed upcountry for the first time.[207] Meanwhile, it was unclear what role the military would play in a post-colonial Sierra Leone. Britain remained indecisive in terms of articulating a vision for the force. The Sierra Leone army continued to rely on British military doctrine—the Queen's Regulations and the Manual of Military law. Sierra Leone remained

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[204] Ample evidence of the power of Great Powers conferring legitimacy on African soldiers through prestigious training abroad is found in the fact that this group included many first-generation military leaders in West Africa, including Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (Nigeria), Joseph Ankrah, Joe Michel, SJA Otu (Ghana) and David Lansana (Sierra Leone) For more on Lansana, see below.

[205] Crocker 1972, 240

[206] West Africa, July 17 1954, 649

[207] Cox 1976, 31

dependent on Great Britain in terms of its defense and internal law enforcement capability. In 1953, Sierra Leone offered to increase the cost of its contribution to pay for the military force from £66,000 to £100,000. This represented only 2% of total costs to maintain the RWAFF, which totaled £5,000,000.[208] A cost-sharing agreement was negotiated where territories were to be responsible for their own internal security and contribute 125% of its 1939 defence expenditure, but this proved wholly unrealistic. It was clear that internal security would bear the majority of the costs of RWAFF.

Significant restructuring occurred within Great Britain's West African when the West Africa Command, Britain's regional security establishment was dismantled on 1 July 1956, on Nigeria's insistence. The West African command was divided into three separate commands: Sierra Leone and the Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria but with regional coordination on technical and political matters. Command for the Gold Coast's army would be under the territory's Governor until independence while the two other commands would be attached to the War Office for the time being. British policy stated that these forces would be under the responsibility of local governance authorities and would consist of infantry and signal units with a limited internal orientation.[209] When the West Africa Command was disbanded, a British officer was appointed Military Advisor to the West African government of Ghana while plans were underway for handling over control to the other commands. Starting 1 July 1956, Ghana assumed full responsibility over its own armed forces. The Gold Coast became Ghana in

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[208] Cox 1976, 27. By comparison, the Gold Coast and Nigeria increased their contributions from £500,000 to £1 million and £750,000 to £1,380,000 respectively.
[209] Crocker 1969, 254

March 1957 and assumed full control of three infantry battalions, an artillery battery, engineer troops, supply, transport and medical units and recruitment and training organization, totaling about 5,000 men. The officer corps remained predominately filled by seconded British officers and could withdraw at any pointed deemed necessary by Her Majesty's Government, effectively giving Britain veto control over the Ghanaian army's operational viability.[210]

In 1957, the Gambia Regiment was disbanded. The decision to disband its 170-man company and recruit half of the men for a mobile gendarmerie force put to practice what had been decided in 1953 and 1955: the end of the 'imperial role' for the African forces and the need 'localisation', which led to the disbanding of the West Africa Command in 1956. The decision by Gambia to disband its armed forces illustrated an important trend occurring in West Africa where African armed forces began to assume a primary internal security role. As Crocker observes, there were no reasons to think that this internal security role armed forces would not continue after independence.[211] Responsibility for the military was transferred to Sierra Leone authorities on 1 January 1959, over two years before independence was granted.[212] The Royal Sierra Leone Military replaced the old Sierra Leone battalion that same year. On 2 August 1960, the RWAFF was officially disbanded. In practice, little would change in the overall relationship with the British. Great Britain remained in command of the RSLM in Sierra Leone. In 1958, there were only three Sierra Leonean captains in the

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[210] Crocker 1969, 256

[211] Crocker 1972, 348

[212] The decision was made at a conference on financial matters in London in August 1958. The government agreed 'in principle' to take over responsibility for the forces, with British assistance.

officer establishment of about sixty.[213] The British remained in control of the military in command and served in training roles.[214] This continued reliance on expatriates in the military was similar to the civil service. Sierra Leone's first independence Prime Minister, Sir Milton pursued a gradualist policy to Africanising the state in Sierra Leone. In 1960, Sierra Leone offered an attractive financial package to British civil servants to encourage them to remain in the role following independence.[215] Additionally, according to Eliphas Mukonoweshuro, Sir Milton relied heavily on two British civil servants as advisors.[216]

Moreover, Britain continued to cover between 71-81% of the Sierra Leone military's budget throughout 1959.[217] Britain and its West African territories agreed that local defence would remain a colonial responsibility until

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[213] Cox 1976, 30

[214] In comparison, Britain had 150 officers still serving in Ghana's army in 1960, which represented 90% of the officer corps. British officers served as battalion adjutants, quartermasters, signals and workshop officers and they commanded one company in each battalion. They also served in headquarters staff in military hospitals and training depots. Alexander submitted a plan to Nkrumah for complete Africanisation of the officer corps by 1 January 1963. Alexander was dismissed as Chief of Staff on 21 September 1961 (Crocker 1969, 371). All British officers withdrew from executive posts between September 1961 and May 1962. Ghanaians were promoted to head all three services and all command positions were allocated to Ghanaians while the expat personnel were shifted to a military mission. Canadians had already expressed their desire to supply instructors to assist with training before Alexander's dismissal and on 1 May 1962, Britain and Ghana signed an agreement on a British joint service training team to work alongside the Canadians (pp. 372). Canadians trained the army, while the Brits focused on training the navy and air force and would advise on the overall development and training of the armed forces. The mission was about 120 British and Canadian officers. The Nigerian army had lower percentage of indigenous officers than Ghana during this time. By late 1960, Nigeria had about 80 officers or slightly more than 25% of the officer corps (Crocker 396). Nigerian commander Johnson Aguiyyi-Ironsi took over from a British officer in February 1965 and six months later, the last seconded officer left the force. The British left behind a training mission and a few contract officers. At independence, Nigeria inherited a force 5 times as large as Sierra Leone.

[215] Eliphas G. Mukonoweshuro, *Colonialism, Class Formation and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone*, New York: University Press of America, 1993, 176

[216] Ibid.

[217] Cox 1976, 41. Crocker claims Britain provided 650,000 out of 800,000 (pounds) in 1959-60 and 520,00 (pounds) in 1960-61 (381)

such time that the colonies could take over, while West Africans would assume the cost of any new capital projects up to £500,000 annually, including certain construction projects and maintenance of facilities deemed in the interests of the Commonwealth. In return, the War Office would continue to fund recurrent costs of each force by £200,000 annually.[218] Both capital and maintenance costs rose and pay and other conditions of service improved. The War Office found it difficult to maintain the rising expenditures towards African armies and wanted territorial governments to pay their share of internal security through their budgets.

Nigeria and Ghana were called upon to enact legislature to consolidate their regiments into a single military organization. These developments were gradually implemented Sierra Leone, albeit more slowly and on a smaller scale. During the spring of 1960 (one year before independence) British colonial secretary Alex Lennox Boyd visited Freetown to commence 'negotiations' with Sierra Leonean authorities to discuss the timing and terms of transfer of authority from UK to a post-colonial state in Sierra Leone. According to Michael Kargbo, these negotiations culminated in a number of draft proposals and roundtable conferences involving the Sierra Leone's People's Party (led by Sir Milton) and the People's National Party (led by Siaka Stevens). Stevens voiced his displeasure with the unequal power relations, as Sierra Leoneans lacked expert advisors to assist in the technical aspects of the negotiations. Additionally, Stevens was concerned that Milton Margai had negotiated a secret

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[218] Crocker 1972, 246

defence agreement with Britain.[219] This defence agreement would presumably have involved British training and equipment aid in return for continued access to port facilities. However, taking its cue from Nigeria's Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement, Sierra Leone decided not to proceed with a formal agreement. Both governments agreed to continue to afford the other "at all times such assistance and facilities in defence matters" as and when needed "as are appropriate between partners in the Commonwealth".[220] The Royal Navy handed title to its assets in Freetown to the nascent government led by Milton Margai but retained those it still needed under long-term low-cost lease arrangements.

From July 1960, the Sierra Leonean contingent of six British officers and 240 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men (two contingents of 122 men) served in the United Nations peacekeeping mission (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC). Sierra Leonean participation in the mission was extended for fourteen months in 1962-1963, which involved light peacekeeping duties attached to the fifth Nigerian battalion. Their role entailed performing guard duties at the Lovanuim University and ceremonial parades at Leopoldville Airport and received some military training and recreational opportunities at Kitona military base.[221] During this mission, two British majors, K.W.B Sutton and A.E. Carter served in command positions for the contingent. Sierra Leonean

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[219] Karbo, British Foreign Policy and the conflict in Sierra Leone, 58

[220] House of Common debates, 5th series, volume 663 (July 27 1962), cited in Crocker 1972, 312

[221] Cox 1976, 43, 247

politicians saw a role for the military in international peacekeeping under Commonwealth or UN auspices.[222]

Sierra Leone and more generally West Africa lost its strategic value in the early 1960s. While Freetown had served as a naval command headquarters for the South Atlantic and had sheltered a large naval force guarding British shipping in the trade routes around Vichy-controlled Africa.[223] But after the war, the British Royal Navy made only limited use of the repair and storage facilities near Waterloo in the east of Freetown and instead concentrated on its existing infrastructure in South Africa.

Similar to its other former colonies, the British continued to devote money and manpower to send Sierra Leoneans on training overseas, especially in UK military academies such as the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst or Mons. The course content focused on exporting western theories of civil-military relations that had little relevance to the local African setting.[224] In 1961, for instance, there were between 90 and 100 African army cadets from West Africa enrolled at Mons and Sandhurst.[225] This form of assistance was overstated by Western observers and produced largely cosmetic changes when these officers returned to their African armed forces. This policy was motivated by a desire to influence selected African officers deemed worthy of holding leadership positions in independent military establishments. Additionally, this training aimed to continue the Commonwealth link through military training programs

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[222] Haywood and Clarke, 481
[223] Crocker 1972, 311-312
[224] Rocky Williams 2005, 25
[225] Crocker 1969, 368

and hence the influence of western intellectual and political traditions and dependence on their former colonial master.[226] This training assistance provisions continued well after independence.

Post-Colonial Army: 1961-1964 – Military under Sir Milton

The Sierra Leone battalion of the former Royal West African Frontier Force became the nucleus of the country's new army. Immediately following independence, there was a rush of optimism in Sierra Leone from 1961-1963, followed by a long relentless decline. When Sierra Leone gained its independence in April 1961, the total size of the military was 1,850 personnel, which included about two 700-man battalions (1,400 soldiers) and a small contingent of personnel in the coast guard operating a small craft and small administrative and supply services. According to Crocker, Britain was determined to build military forces that could be sustained by the local budgets.[227] The military's budget never exceeded £800,000 under Sir. Milton Margai, Sierra Leone's first post-independence Prime Minister. There was continued dependence on Britain for officers, equipment, training and funding. The Sierra Leone government was responsible for covering £120,000 (or 15%) of its defence budget.[228] Since the British did not provide subsidies to cover the cost of their officers serving with African forces, a large percentage of the government of Sierra Leone's budget went to paying the salaries of British officers and NCOs. This funding was partially offset by £1.5 million and £1

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[226] Williams 2005, 26
[227] Crocker 1972, 411
[228] Turay and Abraham, 1987, 89.

million grants in aid of administration.[229] Out of 57 officers in the new army, 48 were British, plus about 50 British non-commissioned officers still serving in Sierra Leone.[230] The highest-ranking Sierra Leonean officer was a Major in 1961. Britain continued to provide Sierra Leone military training, 'technical assistance' and the provision of training facilities through the auspices of the Commonwealth.[231] Both the UK and Nigerian governments were implementing an accelerated officer training programme. Some select African cadets were trained in British military institutions and subsidized by the UK government.[232]

However, as Crocker points out, the available training in British military schools for officer training was inadequate to effectively serve its former colonies' military needs. As such "cram courses" were arranged on an ad hoc basis for cadets in Africa and at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. As Crocker explains, there was little effort to organize training programs on the basis of what was needed by the Africans. Instead "Britain's own training needs and financial considerations dictated policy".[233]

At the time of independence, there were 54 British officers seconded from the British army. This was a role that Britain was content to play in its former colonies. Through the Commonwealth, Britain offered training and officers in an effort to continue the British military standard, preserve British

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[229] Crocker 1972, 381

[230] Cox 1976, 45; see also Kristen Angela Harkness, 'The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps', Princeton University unpublished PhD dissertation, 2012, 128

[231] Crocker 1969, 352-353. As Crocker points out, Britain provided aid and training functions for most Commonwealth African States, without any need for formal defence agreements (361).

[232] For instance, a Commonwealth cadet was charged £860 for the two-year course at Sandhurst, whose total cost was £3,400 (Crocker 1972, 367-368).

[233] Crocker 1972, 366

heritage and continue reliance on its military doctrine. Ever conscious of the negative connotations as former colonial power, Britain sometimes requested the help of the Canadians, Indians, Australians and Pakistani to assist in training West African military forces.[234] The British government maintained fiduciary control over the finances of the Sierra Leone military until 1964-1965.[235] Seconded British officers and those on contract held executive positions in the military until this time.[236] British Officer Brigadier R.D Blackie served as Force Commander of the Sierra Leone Regiment until 1964 when British assistance was finally phased out. Under such arrangements, the British held primacy over military planning and procurement decisions and held 'a veto power on the operational viability of African forces for a substantial period during which they formed the bulk of the officer corps and skilled technicians', since Britain could, at its own discretion, withdraw them at any time.[237]

This gradual transfer of authority from British to Sierra Leoneans occurred in a local political context where power struggles within the SLPP resulted in an appointment of Sir Milton's brother Albert. The result was serious divisions within the SLPP. After Albert assumed the Prime Ministerial role in 1963, he attempted to rapidly Africanise the officer corps in the army. This is when we see ethnic politics beginning to excessively shape recruitment and patterns of upward mobility in the military. In 1964, the officer corps was

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[234] Crocker 1972, 356

[235] Turay and Abraham, 100.

[236] As mentioned, Sierra Leone's government bore the cost of the salaries of these British officers. In 1962-1963, the British government decided to extend this assistance to its former colonies. Officers were loaned and their salary was subsidized by the British government up to 50% of the cost (Crocker 1972, 369)

[237] Crocker 1972, 369

dominated by northern-based ethnic groups: 12% Temne and 62% from northern tribes, notably Limba and Koranko.[238] Margai's ethnic group, the Mende comprised only 26% of the officer establishment. This illustrates that identity politics had not influenced recruitment and promotional decisions during his brother Milton's rein. However, beginning under Albert Margai's rule, a state-based patronage system was implemented that spanned many state institutions including the military, as salary increments, promotions and other benefits were provided to supporters in exchange for their loyalty. Suspicions soon surfaced that Albert was building a Mende-dominated army. The year 1964 saw a dramatic reduction in British commanders seconded to the Regiment. As such, only fifteen out of the fifty officer establishment were British.[239] Their role was limited to commanding and training some junior officers to prepare them for independence. By 1965, 54 of the 59 officer cadets were Sierra Leoneans. And by 1967, only three British officers remained in the Regiment with ethnic Mende's filling the majority of the officer corps.[240]

An important signal that identity politics were influencing military promotions under Albert was his decision to promote David Lansana as Brigadier of the First Regimental Battalion in July 1963.[241] Lansana's promotion as Force Commander was controversial because many viewed this as a

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[238] Mac Dixon-Fyle, 'Reflections on the Role of the Military in Civilian Politics: The Case of Sierra Leone', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 35: 2, 1989, footnote 11.

[239] Britain still had 1,450 officers serving in Commonwealth forces, particularly in Africa in 1964 (Crocker 1972, 355)

[240] Jimmy D. Kandeh, 'Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone', *African Studies Review*, 35:1, 1992, 93.

[241] Cox 1976, 248, footnote 30

calculated decision on the part of Margai to build up a Mende-dominated army in Sierra Leone.

David Lansana emerged as a controversial figure in Sierra Leone's post-colonial civil-military relations. Born in 1922, Lansana was the son of a Mende farmer/trader from Mandu chiefdom in the eastern province. According to Timothy Cox, Lansana was a functional illiterate, attaining only primary school education. Lansana enlisted in the RWAFF in August 1947. Perhaps surprisingly, Lansana became the first Sierra Leonean soldier to be commissioned by the British. He received training at Eaton Hall Officer Cadet School in the UK and was promoted as Second Lieutenant in February 1952. This was a significant achievement for Lansana as he was one of only 14 West African soldiers to become commissioned officers in 1952. Much has been made about Lansana's political connections to established rural elite from the colonial period, through his wife, who was a sister to the prominent Paramount Chief Madam Ella Koblo Gulama.[242] Lansana became a close ally of Albert Margai behind the scenes after Sierra Leone's independence. When Albert Margai succeeded his brother as Prime Minister in 1964, Lansana was appointed to head the army. Meanwhile junior officers from the north, including John Amadu Bangura—a competent yet politically detached officer—were overlooked. Bangura was a Loko from northern Sierra Leone, educated in the prestigious Bo Government School and was Sierra Leone's first graduate from the prestigious

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[242] Cox 1976,29

UK military academy in Sandhurst.[243] Bangura was commissioned as the 27th West African in the RWAFF; therefore, in the local "pecking order", Bangura was considered junior to Lansana. The British were open about their desire to see Bangura become the first head of the Sierra Leone army. Bangura had received acclaim from his British military counterparts after leading the Sierra Leone contingent during the UN mission in Congo in 1960. The British were vocally opposed to the appointment of Lansana, viewing him as a illiterate and unable to command respect of the enlisted soldiers.[244] The implications of Albert Margai's decision to appoint Lansana over Bangura became more significant in the years following.

Lansana was promoted to the rank of Brigadier in the short period of three years (1961-1964). Suddenly, he found himself in charge of the newly independent coercisive arm of the Sierra Leonean state without the requiste level of independence and professionalism of more seasoned officers. Lansana was inexperienced in professionally managing his new role and dealing with the newly acquired power that came with the position. Additionally, Lansana lacked credibility of the British, who viewed his expedited evaluation to Force Commander as illegitimate. Commenting on the relationship between British officers running in the Ghana army and the Ghanaian officers that received accelerated promotions, British Major General Henry Alexander, the former

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[243] The minimal academic qualifications for entry into Sandhurst was attainment of the General Certificate of Education (completion of secondary school). Lansana was therefore unqualified to attend Sandhurst. At the time of Lansana's commissioning in 1951, there were only about 2 allotments for West Africans.

[244] Sir Milton despised Lansana because of his lack of education and social status (Turay et al, 103; Cox 1976)

Chief of Defence Staff of the Ghana forces said "the instinct and training of the British officers makes them rebel against any Brigadiers being created after three years' service".[245] Alexander wrote that he was "really staggered" by the acceleration of an already accelerated timetable to see British officers out of executive roles, which was driven by Africans.

Throughout the Sierra Leone's immediate post-colonial period, the SLPP demonstrated a lack of desire to radically structure the army to reflect the base of a newly independent people. For instance, improving the military's academic standing was never a significant priority. Academic standards among officers were extremely poor in the 1950s; with the exception of Andrew T. Juxon-Smith, who received "reasonably good record" in secondary school, few officers had prospects to go to university.[246] As mentioned, in the 1950s, it was rare for high-school graduates to opt for military service despite the lucrative salary. "The military, in the eyes of educated Africans, especially the Creole elite of Freetown, was [that it was a] place for those who could not make the grade".[247] Short-Service Commissions were granted to Sierra Leoneans who had obtained primary school education in the 1950s. It was not until late 1958 that the army began granting Short-Service Commissions to secondary school graduates.[248] The educated class (including the Creoles who dominated the civil service, judicial, bureaucratic and politics), "viewed the army with contempt—a necessary institution to keep handy in case the mob riot[s], but [was] hardly a

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[245] Major General H.T. Alexander, *African Tightrope*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1965, 11, 78, 98
[246] Cox 1976, 28
[247] Turay and Abraham, 87
[248] Cox 1976,47

suitable place for a young man with ambition".[249] Rank-and-file soldiers were perceived as "menaces to education" and higher learning.

Her Majesty's Government transferred the last of authority over the military to Sierra Leonean authorities in April 1961. An Independence Pact signed in London in 1960, ensured that the UK government would continue to fund the military after 1961. The agreement stipulated that funding would gradually tapered off within five or six years after Independence. Seconded British military officers served key leadership positions in the Brigade Headquarters up to the mid 1960s, including the strategically important Paymaster role. This was partially a reflection of the disinterestedness of Milton Margai towards the military.[250] Milton Margai was content with allowing British officers to maintain executive control over the small Sierra Leonean Regiment of 1,850 soldiers.

Turay and Abraham suggest Milton Margai took a cautionary attitude towards the Sierra Leone Army, since the military's budget was heavily dependent on British aid. This aid came as a quid pro quo for continued access to British facilities in Sierra Leone. In theory, Sierra Leone had gained independence. In practice, defense and policy matters were still heavily influenced by the British Governor in Freetown and the British Brigadier as Force Commander. However, Britain made no attempt to supervise or centralise the process of military institution-building after independence.[251]

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[249] Cox 1976, 28-29
[250] Cox 1976, 51
[251] Other security forces at the time of independence were a 2,000 police force, including a 600-man special constabulary while each chiefdom retained a small police force.

According to Chester Crocker, the retention of British officers in executive posts was symbolic of "a former colonial order based on racial specialisation of military roles, a continued assumption of British leadership in African affairs, assumptions about the relevance of British criteria of military officer standards, and even fears that to be reliable, African troops *needed white leadership*."[252] These practices reflected limitations on the capability of African sovereign behavior. However, this did not prevent Sierra Leonean politicians from exercising their own responses to the continuation of British military control in the army. For instance, following Nigeria's lead, Milton Margai decided against signing a defense pact with Great Britain in June 1962.[253] As Crocker observed, "African leaders were left very much to their own devices, heeding or ignoring the advice of their British officers".[254]

There is no evidence of Sir Milton politicising the army's ranks by recruiting and promoting his own ethic group (Mendes) or southeasterners into the officer establishment. Although the number of pensionable expatriates dropped from 250 to 115 in 1961, the social infrastructure (training institutes and education system) in the country was unable to keep pace with the openings in the civil service of the state. British expatriates retained high-level key policy positions in the government during the transition. Milton Margai generally continued to rely on British expatriates in his government. In 1962, the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary, the Commissioner of Police, the Establishment

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[252] Crocker 1972, 371
[253] Cox 1976, 247, footnote 6
[254] Crocker 1969, 366

Secretary, three district officers and two provincial secretaries were all British citizens.[255] A transfer of authority eventually took place in 1963 when the above positions were handed to Sierra Leoneans.[256] The last of the executive positions that were handed over to Sierra Leonean authorities were the Provincial Secretaries, who left in April 1966.[257] While expatriates held five out of thirty-seven key policy positions in the government in 1964, Sierra Leone was completely administered by Africans by spring 1966.[258] British assistance phase out was complete and the Sierra Leonean government bore the majority of the cost of their armed force, including specialist training in Britain.[259] In 1966, according to official data, Britain paid £150,000 towards the cost of military training for African cadets, officers and NCOs in Britain and £1,340,000 toward the cost of British service personnel serving in Commonwealth African forces and in training teams in Africa.[260] After Brigadier Lansana assumed authority as Force Commander, British Brigadier R.D Blackie remained in Sierra Leone and served as Lansana's special advisor.[261] Britain maintained a small training team of about twenty training instructors (junior officers and NCOs) in Sierra Leone until the country's first military in March 1967 (described below).[262]

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[255] Henry Gaffney, Administration and the administrative service in Sierra Leone, Ph.D Thesis, Columbia University, 1967, 106-107

[256] The British handpicked Mr. L.W. Leigh became the first Sierra Leone Commissioner of Police in 1963 and served in the above position until 1969 (Sierra Leone Police, 'Historical background of the Sierra Leone Police, http://www.police.gov.sl/content.php?p=10&pn=History)

[257] Gaffney, 107

[258] Gaffney, 107

[259] Crocker 1972, 367

[260] Crocker 1972, 375

[261] Turay and Abraham, 104; Blackie was no longer in the country by the time of the military take-over in March 1967 (Cox 1976, 248, footnote 4.)

[262] 'The Anglophone countries, The Adelphi Papers, 6:27, 1966, 17

Elite Corruption and nepotism and it's impact on command
As mentioned, under Albert Margai and David Lansana's leadership, ethnic Mendes were promoted to serve the highest ranking senior officer positions in the military. Most senior officers—namely Augustine C. Blake, B.I. Kai-Samba, and S.B Jumu among others—were related by birth to the entrenched SLPP elite.[263] The opposition All People's Congress party were deeply concerned that identity politics was infiltrating the officer establishment. In the mid-1960s, only one major officer, John Amadu Bangura, who was Second in command, lacked strong political connections with the SLPP elite.[264] Without British oversight over promotional decisions, and a lack of attention focused on gradual build-up of the social infrastructure to ensure state formation on solid foundations, identity politics influenced promotions in the Officer Corps. The major casualty that occurred under these circumstances was indiscipline infiltrating within the lower-ranks. By 1965, the army was "riddled with nepotism and favourtism and its efficiency is threatened by wide scale tribalism", warned one local journalist.[265]

During the mid-1964 to 1967 period, the SLPP faction of Albert Margai reinforced its patron-client relationship with Mende-based senior military officers. In exchange for their loyalty, senior officers were given similar perks as those provided to the political elite, including access to capital, loans, military vehicles and house/errand boys. In April 1967, 13 of the 17 graduates from an Officer Cadet school were Mendes. The politicisation of the army must be seen

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[263] Turay and Abraham, 106
[264] Turay and Abraham
[265] Ibid., 107

in the wider political context, in which politicians in the opposition All People's Congress (APC), including Siaka Stevens felt that Albert Margai was building a Mende-dominated army and further "Mendenising" the civil service, which had historically been the exclusive preserve of the established Creole elite.[266] Although the social and ethnic composition of the army changed, the rank structure, doctrine, and institutional culture of the RSLMF were still manifestly British.

The military's budget during the fiscal year 1966-67 (Albert's final year in power) was Le 1,500,000.[267] The country's Parliamentary elections in March 1967 were widely reported as peaceful. When results were announced, it was discovered that the main opposition party, the All People's Congress (APC) held 32 seats and the SLPP 28. The SLPP could not successfully convince four independent MPs that had won their seats to rejoin the SLPP, (they were former members of the SLPP that had left the party out of disgust of Albert Margai's leadership).[268] On 21 March 1967, Governor-General Lightfoot Boston was to appoint APC leader Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister. However, Force Commander David Lansana instigated a military coup to prevent the APC from assuming power. Lansana ordered aide-de-camp to the Governor General army Lieutenant Hinga Norman to arrest Lightfoot Boston and Stevens fled into exile in Conakry, Guinea. Two subsequent counter-coups followed shortly after: in 1967, one led by three northern-based senior officers (holding the rank of

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[266] Abraham, 12
[267] Cox 1976, 207
[268] Abdul Karim Koroma, Agony of a Nation, 1996; The Norman Factor, *West Africa,* 20-26 October 1997, 1672

Major). These officers established the National Reformation Council (NRC), led by Juxon-Smith. The NRC was a purely military junta established with no civilian authorities in its ranks. A growing disconnect between senior officers and ordinary soldiers widened under the NRC. Soldiers complained of a gross neglect on the military government, which exceeded even the previous civilian regimes. According to Kamara, "soldiers had lived in poorly furnished and inadequate one-bed room apartments, toilet facilities had been hopelessly inadequate and unhygienic. Uniforms supplies had been also inadequate. Very old and obsolete Mark IV rifles were up to that time and even thereafter the main individual infantry weapons. All of these aspects constituted a great morale problems for the men".[269] To add further insult to the rank-and-file, the NRC rejected a proposal for a general pay increase of only 20 cents per day for the other ranks.

Dissatisfied by their senior military colleagues lavish lifestyles and the NRC's neglect of the rank-and-file, the country's second successful military coup was executed in April 1968 by a group of low-ranking sergeants and privates.[270] According to Cox, the logistics for the mutiny came from private Morlai Kamara, a Temne based in Daru barracks.[271] It is widely accepted that the coup was supported by opposition politicians, namely Siaka Stevens his main military supporter Colonel John Amadu Bangura, both of whom were in exile in

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[269] Abdul R. Kamara, The Sierra Leone Army Since World War II: A Political History (1945-1980), Bachelor thesis, Department of History, Fourah Bay College, 1981, 98
[270] Cox 1976, 197-198
[271] Cox 1976, 198

Conakry, Guinea following the 1967 coup.[272] After installing themselves in the State House, the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) declared that it had no intention of remaining in power.[273] Senior military officers from the previous NRC regime were detained in the country's main prison on Pandema Road. The ACRM chairman addressed the nation noting that "little did we realise that the people we had chosen to direct our Nation's affairs were more corrupt and selfish than the ousted Civilian Regime". He added that "the rank and file of the army and police had been ignored" and that the NRC had failed to "fulfill their boastful promise to both civilians and members of the armed forces". Immediately after, Colonel Bangura was called from Guinea and Colonel Ambrose Genda flew to Freetown from Liberia to assume command of the military.[274] Bangura was appointed acting Governor-General from 18-22 April 1968. The ACRM transferred of power to the All People's Congress later in April after promises were made to improve the social conditions in the army.[275] Bangura handed power over to Stevens and on 26 April 1968, Stevens was sworn in as Prime Minister with the full backing of the military under the leadership of Brigadier John Bangura.

Within the next two years, tensions mounted between Bangura and Stevens, over Stevens' attempt to usurp democratic principles. Stevens had

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[272] Author's personal interview with retired Brigadier in the RSLAF, Freetown, November 2011. Bangura had been retired in 1967 and sent abroad as head Chancellor in Sierra Leone's embassy in Washington, D.C.

[273] The ACRM consisted of Patrick Conteh, a warrant officer before the coup, with ten other warrant officers and two sub-inspectors of the police.

[274] Cox 1976, 199

[275] Ibid. Cox claims 'as part of the terms for handing over to the APC, the army rank and file received promises of a substantial boost in pay, see 263, footnote 69.

learned from Albert Margai's approach to politics: that the state is an instrument to establish ethno-political hegemony and only through brute force and intimidation can democratic opposition be removed from the political equation. Two controversial by-elections were held in the next two years, giving APC a majority in Parliament. Stevens felt out with some eminent northern politicians, including John Karefa-Smart, the Taqi brothers and his Finance Minister Dr. Mohammed Sorie Forna. When Stevens failed to appoint Sorie Forna as Prime Minister during a trip abroad, the politicians formed the United Democratic Party led by Karefa-Smart. Stevens immediately banned the UDP. Within the next two years, Stevens attempted to usurp democratic principles in the constitution. This created considerable disagreement within the APC between Bangura (a democrat) and Stevens. Bangura was arrested in January 1970, charged with conspiracy and executed on 29 March 1970. On 23 March 1971, two apparent attempts within the military were made to assassinate Stevens and take power. Later that afternoon, Brigadier Bangura announced over national radio that the "army was compelled to take control of the situation until further notice." From 23-27 March, internal power struggles within the senior ranks of the army ensued. Within days, Lieutenant Colonel Sam King and Major Sam Caulker both affirmed the military's support for Prime Minister Stevens. Senior officers arrested Bangura and on 28 March 1971, Stevens signed a defence agreement with Guinea to deploy Guinean troops to Sierra Leone as his personal bodyguards.[276] With no opposition to speak of, Stevens and his longtime stalwart

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[276] Strange Happenings, *West Africa*, 11-17 May 1992, 791-791

Soloman J. Pratt declared Sierra Leone a Republic on 19 April 1971. Stevens used the same constitution that had been tabled before Parliament in 1967 by Albert Margai (which called for a ceremonial President and a Prime Minister with executive powers) to transform the country's political system from British Westminster Parliamentary system to a Republic model. Stevens appointed acting Governor-General Christopher Okoro Cole as the ceremonial President on 19 April 1971 in order to fulfill the constitutional requirement while Cole appointed Stevens as Prime Minister. Barely twenty-four hours later, Stevens amended the constitution and appointed himself executive President on 21 April 1971.[277] Senior military officers that were loyal to Bangura including Major Abu Noah and S.E Momoh and other rank-and-file (including a corporal, Foday Sankoh, who would later become rebel leader of the Revolutionary United Front) were detained long-term for their involvement in the coup plot in 1971. In May 1973, general elections were held but the main opposition party, SLPP boycotted the election amid widespread intimidation and procedural obstruction. Stevens was reelected in March 1976 without opposition for a second five-year term as President. On 19 July 1975, 14 senior military officers, including David Lansana, William Leigh, Bockarie Kai-Samba, Charles Blake, Captain Sahr James Foyah, Captain Mboma and several opposition members in detention Ibrahim Bash-Taqi, M.S Forna, were executed for treason while Karefa-Smart went into exile. Lieutenant Samuel Norman remained remanded in Pandema along with other civilian figures involved in the 23 March 1971 coup. Lansana,

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[277] Cole reverted to his role as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on 21 April 1971

Blake, Leigh, Kai-Samba and Hinga Norman were charged with conspiring to overthrow the government. National parliamentary elections were held in May 1977; the elections, however, were marked by violence in which the APC won 74 seats and the SLPP won 15. The SLPP condemned the elections for vote-rigging and voter intimidation. The APC-dominated Parliament declared a one-party state during a bogus referendum in 1977 making the APC the only legal political party in Sierra Leone in 1978.

In the context of APC's quest for hegemony and one-party state, Stevens appointed the Head of Police and Force Commander of the Military in cabinet-level political decision-making in Sierra Leone. On 28 October 1974, President Stevens announced the appointment of Brigadier Momoh and the Commissioner of Police Keutu-Smith as Members of Parliament. Momoh and Keutu-Smith became unelected Ministers of State in Stevens' cabinet on 5 November 1974. A revised constitution that Stevens enacted during his *de facto* one-party rule granted the President authority to appoint up to seven unelected members into his cabinet.[278]

The military lacked communications, logistics and even arms and ammunition. At the outbreak of 1991 civil war, the military was forced to

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[278] According to retired Major-General Tom Carew: "Things became so bad that the Sierra Leone Military completely lost all semblances of command and control. The appointment of the Army Commander to parliament, for example, was enough inducement to selfish, greedy and disgruntled soldiers dreaming to become president or ministers overnight instead of aspiring to become generals by rising through the ranks systematically and by merit. Some elite members of the society who sought to use the military to further their own personal ambitions and interests were also responsible for the decay of the institution. The decay of the institution was further compounded by other vices such as tribalism, sectionalism, lip service, indiscipline, loss of command and control and the lack of respect for the chain of command within the military" (Major General Tom Carew, Submission to the TRC. May 2003. See also submission to the TRC by Major Abu Noah (Rtd.) May 2003, TRC report, Vol. 3A Chapter 4, 539)

request arms and ammunition from the Special Security Division (SSD).[279] The military lacked vehicles to post to border areas. The size of the military—approximately 1,500 deployable troops—was too small in number to deploy to any missions. Training programs were cut for budgetary reasons. According to Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, 'it seemed a deliberate strategy to make the Army a non-effective fighting force.'[280] Colonel Bashiru Conteh explained during the country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings (TRC): "In my opinion because our Army was very small at the time, it was more or less a ceremonial army not really fit for combat… the few officers who were there were not competent officers".[281]

The military had not participated or engaged in any battalion-level training or practice operations for at least a decade before the country's civil war started (1979-1989).[282] For instance, troops did not practice their shooting skills at the range due to the general neglect of the army. The state of the military was summed up by retired Brig. Kellie Conteh: "In 1989, the army had less than three infantry battalions (about 1,500 men) many of whom needed training; less

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[279] Author's confidential interview with RSLAF senior officer, Freetown, November 2011

[280] Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Coordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

[281] Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Training in the Sierra Leone Army, erstwhile Battalion Commander and one-time Secretary of State for the Eastern Province under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003, TRC report, Vol. 3A, Chapter 3, 146.

[282] According to the TRC report: Loyalty, respect and obedience did not obtain along the lines of conventional command structure; they depended much more on arbitrary considerations such as where you were from, which ethnic group you belonged to and whether you might be amenable to engaging in or turning a blind eye to someone else's malpractice. Quite apart from feeling that the politicization and stigma attached to their collective identity was unjustified, many soldiers confessed to disillusionment with the ways in which personnel were treated within the military hierarchy (TRC report, Vol. 3A, 148)

than 30% of its transportation needs, less than 20% of support weapons and many more essential equipment in drastically short supply or non-existent.[283]

> The TRC report sums up the degeneration of the army as follows:
>
> From the testimonies of soldiers who filled both the senior and junior ranks at the outbreak of the conflict, it is clear to the Commission that personal, familial and tribal disharmonies had eaten away at the sense of common purpose that is supposed to be the very essence of a national army. At every level, right to the core of the institution, morale was pathetic. In place of pride and professionalism, the soldiers – particularly senior officers – had indulged in vices such as embezzlement of public funds and favouritism along nepotistic or tribal lines. These were abuses of power that had been learnt and were copied from counterparts among the political elite. Their practice in the military meant that most of the officer class was corrupt while junior ranks harboured unhealthy levels of resentment towards their seniors.[284]

During the first year of the war, Momoh expanded the number of troops in the SLA, recruiting unemployed and criminal/lumpen youth, mostly urban males. According to Gberie, this batch of hastily recruited drifters aided the NPRC coup and were responsible for looting Freetown after the coup.[285] By the end of 1991, the army expanded to approximately 7,000 troops.[286] After the 1992 coup, Strasser's NPRC also initiated a recruitment drive that focused mainly on urban-based youth including youth from the ghettos. In January 1994, head of NPRC Strasser launched an army recruitment drive, drawing poorly educated urban youth including orphans and street children as young as 12 years old. In early

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[283] Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Coordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.
[284] TRC report, Vol. 3A, 147
[285] Gberie 2005, 105
[286] Keen 2005, 87

1994, the army swelled to about 12,000.[287] In December 1994, the defense headquarters shockingly admitted that only 80% of the soldiers in the army were loyal to the state. According to Focus on Africa analysis at the time, "a more realistic assessment" was that the military 'probably only had effective control over 50-60% of their men'.[288]

Sierra Leone's military ranks were filled with criminals and social misfits. In 1997 before the AFRC coup, President Kabbah commissioned a report titled *Socio-Economic profile of the armed forces of the republic of Sierra Leone*, written by Prof. Bob Kandeh and John Pemagbi. This report aimed to become a blueprint for subsequent downsizing and demobilisation after the signing of the Abidjan peace accord in November 1996. The report found that the military consisted mostly males (98.1%), with nearly 60% of them under the age of 30 years. Nearly 30% were stark illiterates who had never been to school. The majority were high-school dropouts.[289] Interestingly, 60% had served for less than six years. This profiled the large core that had been recruited after the war—the criminalised, undisciplined.

In 1996, a headcount was authorized by President Kabbah, conducted by the Armed Forces Personnel Center revealed that the military had grown to a size of 17,500 soldiers and about 3,000 civilian workers (civilian clerks, batman,

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[287] Author's confidential interview with RSLAF officer, Freetown, 7 February 2012

288 Military rule, popular expectations, the way forward, *Focus on Sierra Leone*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 12 December 1994, http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk/Vol1_1.htm (Accessed 12 May 2012)

[289] Lansana Gberie, A Dirty West African War, 2005,104. Only 2% were university graduates or had advanced degrees.

storeman).[290] There were about 9,500 old SLAs/AFRC soldiers about 3,700 'new SLAs' that were recruited during Kabbah's government and trained by British soldiers between 1999 and August 2000 (see Chapter 5). Three battalions were formed out of the 3,000 plus soldiers to assist ECOMOG fight the AFRC soldiers upon their return to Freetown in January 1999. In turn, this group became the initial core that new Sierra Leonean army could be formed from. About 1,500 disarmed during Phase I of DDR (before January 1999) and were discharged from Lungi.[291] Thus, there were a total of 13,300 SLA soldiers. December 1999 pay (overseen by the SILSEP team led by Mike Dent and Robert Foot) was 3,340.[292] Under British direction, Sierra Leone military conducted a nominal roll call (headcount) in January 2000.[293] It was believed that 3,720 soldiers had remained with the military, allegedly loyal to the state.[294] The military in early 2000 was led by fifteen main senior officers: Col. M.K

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[290] Author's personal interview with a retired senior officer responsible for the headcount in 1996, Freetown, 8 February 2012

[291] USAID/OTI, Sierra Leone: Report on DDR, 8 February 2000, 4 (NCDDR archives, in author's possession)

[292] Sierra Leone Security Sector Program, A Paper on Handling of the ex-SLA, 8 January 2000, 1 (Ministry of Defence report, in author's possession)

[293] DDR data from a registration exercise at Camp Lungi provides a snap shot of the social composition of the Sierra Leone military in 1999-2000. This sample is based on a total number of 2,199. It is a safe assumption that the majority of this sample was former Sierra Leone military. Lungi demobilisation camp targeted former Sierra Leone military and their dependents. Only 2% had formal education up to secondary level, while 98% had mostly primary education or none. A more nuanced reading of the data indicates that 595 or 27.3% were stark 'illiterates'. For instance, this category had never gone to school; 20 provided no information. There were 350 respondents (16%) that dropped out of primary school at grade 7. Moreover, 809 (37%) ex-combatants went as far as Form 3 secondary school level before dropping out. This means that almost 81% of the respondents fit the category as illiterate to semi-literate. Only 15% of the sample had a high-school education (309 or 14.2% obtained 'O' level while 17 (less than 1%) obtained an 'A' advanced level. Only 18 had college degrees (less than 1%). From this sample, 49% were from the northern regions. This leads me to believe they had been recruited during President Momoh's era. Roughly 30% of the sample originally came from the south and the east. It is likely that this group was recruited while the NPRC was in power. (NCDDR reintegration strategy: design framework, processes and approach (draft), 14)

[294] Minutes of a meeting on military reintegration held on 20 January 2000 [Ministry of Defence archives, in author's possession]

Dumbuya (now retired Brigadier) (Chairman), Brigadier Gabriel S. Mani, Lt. Col. E. Sam-Mbomah, Lt. Col. AB Mansaray, Lt. Col. T.M Momodu, Lt. Col. Daniel Yapo Sesay[295], Lt. Col. M Koroma, Lt. Col. A. Kamara-Will, Lt. Col. Jah Tucker, Major AC Benjamin, Major A. Sankoh, Major S.P. Bangura, Major E. Dumbuya, Captain A. Idim, Lt. Col. AC Kenny. On 28 August 2000, the British military conducted a second nominal call.

At the end of the war, there were effectively three categories of Sierra Leone Army soldiers remaining: a core group of SLA soldiers that claim to have remained to have remained loyal to the state through the war and during the 1992 and 1997 military coups. A good number of these soldiers were recruited during President Momoh's era in the late 1980s. This category totaled less than 3,100 soldiers, and included Tom Carew (who was appointed by the British to serve as the first post-war CDS). The second category of soldiers had been recruited in 1999 under the direction of Military Chief of Defense Staff, late Brig. General Maxwell Khobe (the Nigerian credited for defending Freetown after the 1999 invasion). These new cadets were recruited from all over the country. Most were high-school graduates and claimed not to have fought with any of the fighting forces. The third group were ex-SLA/AFRC soldiers that were reintegrated back into the RSLAF (See Chapter 5).

Liberia: A Brief History of State-Society Relations

How the Liberian State was Founded: Made in America?

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[295] Now Brigadier serving as Joint Forces Commander Headquarters in Cockerill

In 1820, the first group of 88 freed black slaves sailed on the ship *Elisabeth Compact* from New York accompanied by American Colonization Society (ACS) agents and the US government on route to Sierra Leone. Four years earlier, in 1818, ACS agents Samuel J. Mills and Ebenezer Burgess had sailed to West Africa in search for a suitable settlement location. Mills and Burgess first identified Sherbro Island, a British slave post since 1787 off the coast of Sierra Leone as a suitable location. Sherbro Island was, however, a death trap; not only was the terrain swampy and hence malaria-ridden, but also the island lacked its own source of drinking water. Within two weeks, 22 of the 88 former slaves and 3 of the ACS agents died due to malaria and other diseases.

A year later, a second group of US government representatives and ACS agents returned to West Africa, picking up those remaining survivors on mainland Sierra Leone, and proceeded to Sherbro Island. Once again, due to unhealthy conditions on Sherbro Island, all but one of the leaders died. The naval vessel *U.S.S Alligator,* which had accompanied the ACS, transported the remaining lot to Cape Mesurado.[296] Finally on 7 January 1822, US navy and ACS carried another group of freed slaves on Cape Mesurado.

Prior to the landing of *Elisabeth*, six key local leaders (referred to as Kings) maintained political control over vast areas between Lofa and St. Paul's River. Cape Mesurado (where Monrovia is located today) was a key trade center,

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[296] During this time, both British Royal and US navies had been deployed along Africa's Atlantic Coast to intercept slave ships. Slaves that were recaptured by British navy were sent to Freetown, while American navy ships took recaptured slaves to Monrovia.

most notably for slaves as well as various goods and foodstuffs.[297] Three different groups resided in the area. Along the coast were the Dei people. There was no centralised government in Dei territory, but as Holsoe explains "each chief was autonomous, but loosely confederated with other chiefs, and they often met in council to discuss common problems".[298] At the time of *Elisabeth* arrival in Cape Mesurado, their chief, was Gola ruler Zolu Duma, whom the European traders referred to as King Peter.[299] King Peter's town was Gawulun, located in the middle of modern day Bushrod Island; his personal control extended to the east where present day New Georgia (Montserrado County) is located. Zolu Duma was the local leader that the agents of the ACS first dealt with in 1821.

The land lying between St. Paul and Mesurado rivers, also occupied by the Dei, had been used for slave transit area during the height of the slave trade. By 1821, this area was thinly populated, but nevertheless under Dei control. To the south, at the foot of Cape Mesurado itself, was a small village where chief Bah Gwogro or King George lived. He claimed authority over the cape (Mamba territory) and the two islands in the bay. He was living at the cape when the ACS agents first arrived in 1821.

To the interior were the Gola. Very little is known about the Gola people during his period. The Gola people had gained political authority in this region previously held by Zolu Duma's state, at both the expense of the coastal Dei and

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[297] Traded goods included camwood, gold, ivory, rice, water, though slaves were 'probably the most important item purchased by Europeans during this time'. The slave trade reached its height in the 17th century (S. Holsoe, 'A Study of Relations Between Settlers and Indigenous Peoples in Western Liberia', 1821-1847, *African Historical Studies*, IV, 2, 1971, 331

[298] Holsoe 1971, 334

[299] Ibid.

the interior Condo people.[300] Perhaps the most powerful group was the Condo people, which seemed to be the more effective political force among the chiefs. The Condo area had diverse ethnic groups residing in its area. The capital was Bopolo and was led by Sao Boso, or whom the Europeans called Boatswain, a Mandingo. Sao Boso was a notorious Mandingo slave trader, infamous for profiting from, and holding considerable control over local structures that facilitated the purchase of slaves in Cape Mesurado area. Boso also had a powerful militia of young 'war boys'.[301] The Condo confederation successfully dominated the main trading routes from the far interior to the coastal area between the Lofa River and Cape Mesurado. Besides Sao Boso, the other clear dominant chief was Zolu Duma, (notably both were on friendly terms with each other).

This was the general political situation just prior to the landing of ACS headed by Dr. Eli Ayres. Negotiations between six kings on and Dr. Eli Ayres/ Captain Robert Field Stockton took place. Upon their arrival in 1818, Ayres pleaded with local chiefs that these freed slaves were being reunited in their homeland. Ayres led negotiations with at least six of the Bassa kings on 15 December 1821. After some hostile bargaining, allegedly at gunpoint at certain points in time, Ayres and Stockton convinced King Peter and the Dei official to cede the cape (Mamba point) and Darzoe Island. The agreement was further legitimized through signatures from other Dei's chiefs. There was clearly a misunderstanding about this agreement, due to different interpretations of land

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[300] Holsoe 1971, 335

[301] Evidence of Sao's strength is also found it records that indicated that before 1821, Sao quelled a revolt by a Dei chief at Cape Mesurdo, (Holsoe 1971, 335-6).

ownership. In Africa, land was not for sale. According to Liberian historians, the chiefs believed they were not 'selling' the land; not transferring ownership but rather allowing the colonists to occupy the land temporarily.[302]

When the American colonists returned to Cape Mesurado in March 1822, they intended to take possession of the land. However, King Peter refused to acknowledge the terms of the treaty. While the first settlement was established in April 1822 near present-day Monrovia, the local Dei chiefs, clearly upset with King Peter's decision to give up the cape, decided to impeach Peter. This settlement exercise would have failed if not for the arrival of Ashmun, a white Methodist American missionary (on US navy brig 'Strong'). According to Rainey, 'Ashmun found the settlement in a miserable state; the settlers suffered from disease and despair and were on the verge of annihilation from constant attacks by hostile indigenous peoples.'[303] Ashmun ordered the establishment of a self-defense militia to defend the settlement against hostile Africans (which were being armed and encouraged by Spanish and French slave traders). The militia was trained and received assistance from both the US Navy and British Royal Navy. The attack by the Dei militia was thwarted and a peaceful resolution was negotiated with the help of Sao Boso, the local strongman. On account of this peace broker, Holsoe notes that, 'Sao Boso listened to the whole discussion and after all sides had been heard…ruled that the Dei had sold their land by signing

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[302] Author's personal interviews with Professor Guannu, Monrovia, March 2012;
[303] Timothy Rainey, Buffalo Soldiers in Africa: The Liberian Frontier Force and the United States Army, 1912-1927, PhD dissertation, John Hopkins University, 2001,23

the treaty and had to accept the consequences. His decision was final and the Dei chiefs agreed to it for the time being'.[304]

The conflict was not resolved in the minds of the chiefs. Boso returned home and settlers resumed construction on the cape (Mamba). Feeling unsettled, the colonists started building up a strong self-defense force in anticipation of a large-scale attack by the Africans. Meanwhile, Ashmun sought to consolidate the settler oligarchy by assisting in the establishment of a constitution in Liberia that enabled settlers to hold government positions (unlike in Sierra Leone which was governed by British colonial administration and governors).

The Dei chiefs had become deeply suspicious about the intentions of the black settlers and sought to remove them with force. Transient strangers had been frequent in the area, and most received a welcome from the local authorities. But, as Holsoe describes, King Peter and two other chiefs were against an attack, fearing military strength (both local with support from 'white men'). The remaining chiefs reasoned that since the 'strangers' had decided to rely on white men for their personal protection instead of protection under the custody of chiefs, (as strangers traditionally do), the new settlers could not be trusted. As Holsoe adds, 'they also feared the expansion and destruction of their way of life by the colony, and as proof of this, they pointed to King George's

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[304] Holsoe 1971, 337

removal from the cape.'[305] What is clear from this exchange was a misunderstanding over the concept of land ownership.[306]

The supporting chiefs organized a combined militia comprising of warriors from King Bromley, Todo, Governor, Konko, Jimmy, Gray, Long Peter, George, Willey and Ben, as well as all of King Peter's and King Bristol's warriors and some of Ba Cai's. The combined Dei force, led by Elijah Johnson, attacked settlements on 11 November 1822 (called the 'Battle of Crown Hill'). Holspe describes in his own words what happened next:

> The night of the tenth, the Dei forces, which had assembled on Bushrod Island, crossed the Mesurado upstream in boats, then advanced up the peninsula, assembling at a point less than half a mile west of the fort. They made their surprise attack the next morning on the west side of the settlement, but instead of following up their advantage after the first onslaught, they stopped to plunder the abandoned houses outside the fort. In this moment of hesitation, the colonists rallied and with the aid of a cannon fired upon the enemy while a small group of colonists led by Elijah Johnson flanked the main attacking body. Within twenty minutes the attack had been repulsed and the attackers slowly began to withdraw. Many Dei were killed. Four among the colonists were killed.[307]

Afterwards, King Peter became allied with the settlers. The colonists proceeded to continue building settlements on the cape with more robust fortification. Meanwhile, the Dei Kings prepared for a second attack. This time, they hired mercenaries from more distant tribes, namely Gola and Condo mercenaries. Fighting continued. By December 1822, a peace settlement was signed and trade resumed in the area. The local Dei chiefs were not satisfied and

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[305] Holsoe 1971, 338

[306] In Liberia, as elsewhere in Africa, land is owned by three generations: the dead, the living and those unborn. Therefore, according to tradition and custom, land cannot be 'sold' in the same sense of the privatisation of land in the West.

[307] Holsoe 1971, 339

resented the colonists, not least of which because the colony was located on an area that was formally a religious shrine.[308] From 1823-1824, relations between the settlers and the indigenous chiefs remained precarious. In April 1824, the situation escalated: the chiefs attempted to impose a trade embargo on all goods from the interior destined for the colony. All trade was to cease until September. The Dei chiefs withdrew the embargo (except canwood and ivory).

With assistance from Ashmun, additional land was purchased through the treaty of Gourah, signed by Kings Peter, Long Peter, Govenor, Todo and Jimmy. On 25 May 1824, a decision was made to sell land to the colony reaching territory to the north of St. Paul's River and on the west of Stockton creek, including King Governor's and Ba Konka's town and the entire area claimed by King Peter.[309] Ashmud sweetened the deal by offering to provide education to children in their communities. Those chiefs that protested were later pacified. In November 1825, a new settlement was established at the junction of St. Paul and the Stockton—called St. Paul's Settlement and later Caldwell, named after the secretary of the ACS.[310]

> The combined Dei militia was effectively neutralised and the autonomy of the Dei (though influence by Zolu Duma and Sao Boso) was 'extinguished'. Land was effectively 'owned' and 'occupied' by the settler population. This was the start of internal conflicts between the settlers and indigenes. From 1824-1840, there were at least five more internal wars in Liberia, in which the Liberian militia was actively involved (see Chapter for more).

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[308] Holsoe 1971, 340
[309] Holsoe 1971, 341
[310] Ibid, 342

Liberia became both an independent and republican state on the same day in 1847. The Americo-Liberian's, which comprised 5% of the total population in Liberia, entrenched itself in nation-state and developed a Republican-style constitution modeled after that of the US. The settler population never consolidated an inclusive state with a nationalist outlook. There were no symbols of nationalism that could unite tribal and ethnic identities.[311] The Americo-Liberian class instituted a hierarchical order where lighter skinned mullatos exercised hegemonic control over indigenous Africans in the Liberian territory.[312] The country's only political party, the True Whig Party (TWP), (created in 1869) dominated the political space.[313]

In 1909-10, President Barclay actively sought to implement his central government's interior policy through two mechanisms: locally appointed administrators and the Liberian Frontier Force. Indigenous groups in the Southeast regularly challenged the Liberian central government's attempt to extend state authority in their territory. Following the end of the 1910 Grebo war, Barclay instituted a new policy requiring all local leaders to be appointed by the President. These indigenous political elite owed its allegiance to the Liberian state and implemented government control over local political structures and the interior population.[314] This was the beginning of 'indirect rule' (a duplicate of the British system in Sierra Leone) whereby the power of

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[311] Author's personal interviews with Dr. Guannu, Monrovia, March-April 2012

[312] Yekutiel Gershoni, *Black Colonialism: Liberian Struggle for the Hinterland* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985; Monday B. Akpan, 'Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule over the African People of Liberia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 7:2, 1973, pp. 226-229

[313] Jimmy Kandeh, 'Coups from Below' 2006

[314] Jeremy Levitt, *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From 'Paternaltariansim' to State Collapse*, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 2005, 162.

paramount chiefs was drastically curtailed and governance structures were imposed on the hinterland to reinforce America-Liberian centralised sovereign authority.[315] In other words, chiefdoms were incorporated in political authority from the framework of central government and the unified nation-state framework. District commissioners, which commanded the Frontier Force detachments in their local territories, were responsible for forced conscription of indigenous labour and were deeply complicit in the slave trade. Additionally, in return for their loyalty, local administrators received a share of the profits of taxes that were collected on behalf of the Liberian state. These powers provided the district commissioners considerable autonomy to abuse their authority for personal gain, including utilising the LFF in force labour practices among the indigenous inhabitants.[316] Chiefs and country administrators monopolised political power and denied youth opportunities for social and economic opportunities and advancement.[317] True Whig Party (TWP) rule was underpinned by the use of force and structural violence, under this order was overthrown on 12 April 1980.

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[315] The government appointed the Secretary of the Interior, provincial commissioners, district commissions and paramount chiefs, extending down to clan chiefs. The chiefs became "mere mouthpieces and the executioners of the wishes of the America-Liberian commissioners" (Akingbade 1977, pp. 215). The Vice President of Liberia usually passed orders to the district commissioners; the commissioners in turn gave orders to paramount chiefs and the paramount chiefs gave orders to village heads (Ibid, pp. 226-227). On how this governance system functioned to recruit labour in the hinterland, see Ibid, pages 228-225)

[316] Akingbade 1977, pp. 216-222

[317] Paul Richards, Steven Archibald, Bruce Beverlee, Watta Modad, Edward Mulbah, Tonorlah Varpilah and James Vincent, 'Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment', World Bank, Social Development Paper, No. 21, Washington, World Bank, 2005

The founding of the Liberian state, according to Liberia's TRC report, is at the root of Liberia's historical and contemporary political and socio-economic problems. As the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation report notes,

> Central to understanding elitism, inequality, underdevelopment and armed conflict in Liberia from 1979 to 2003, is the decision to establish the Liberian state and the psychology of that establishment that maintained a divided nation from independence in 1847 till present. The early founders of the state had a choice to build a united Liberia of all its peoples involved in the building and development of the emergent nation or to form a separate 'civilised' state with the mission to civilise and Christianise the 'savage and barbaric' indigenous population as a precondition for citizenship and land ownership in the land of their birth and nativity. The American-borne early leadership chose the latter option of building a separatist state as a political direction and philosophy. This choice of the latter is at the root of Liberia's as yet unresolved historical problem of political identity and legitimacy.[318]

Under Liberia's first President, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, the one-party TWP government restricted voting rights to the indigenous population. Citisenship to indigenous Liberians was not granted until 1904.[319] The Americo-Liberian elite were held to a higher standard of law where as the indigenous population mostly relied on subsistence farming and low wage or forced labour. As the TRC report described, the Americo-Liberian elite perceived themselves as not only superior but also they had an obligation to 'civilise' the backward indigenous. This was, in the words of one scholar, 'black-on-black' colonialism. Politics remained centralised in Monrovia, where most infrastructure and basic services were concentrated. In sum, power was concentrated in a few hands, which fueled

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[318] TRC report 2009
[319] TRC report 2009

corruption, minimized participation in decision-making and hampered any sense of national development.[320]

After the Second World War, President Tubman (1944-1971) sought to give the appearance of instituting liberal reforms in an effort to appease the United States and other international stakeholders. Tubman sought to integrate indigenous Liberians in the political, socio-economic and cultural life of Liberia through his policies of 'Unification', 'Open door' and 'Integration'. Meanwhile, he continued to run Liberia as his own personal fiefdom. The effectiveness of these policies was limited, however. In the early 1960s and mid-1970s, Liberia's economy experienced one of the best growth rates in the world, owing to its mineral resources such as iron ore, gold and rubber. However, the revenues derived from exports in iron ore and rubber exports were rarely invested in the public assets such as agricultural, roads, schools, infrastructure and social services. Liberia's growth rate went from 9% annual growth in the late 1960s to a mere 1% in 1978. Wealth creation system was skewed in favour of the minority elite while rural populations were largely excluded from skilled and semi-skilled jobs and educational opportunities. Moreover, an entrenched system of patronage characterized leader and follower dynamics. In 1979, despite a $700 million national budget, contrasts between the top layers of Liberian society and the lower strata were widening. For instance, it was common for a senior government employee to earn a monthly wage of $1,000 while the

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[320] TRC Report: Liberia 2009

average monthly wage for an average labourer was about $100.[321] During Tubman's era, cracks in the Americo-Liberian hegemony started revealing themselves. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions, especially for the majority of Liberians started becoming more evident. In 1971, Tubman's successor, William Tolbert bowed to increased dissatisfaction in the one-party rule by attempting to liberalise political and economic system. Tolbert promised a 'policy government' to replace the old system of patronage, promoted agriculture, expanded infrastructure, sought to encourage young Liberian indigenous professional and decentralise the polity.[322] However, Tolbert also continued the same patrimonial system, appointing family members and relatives as senior officials in his administration. In the 1970s, the poor, marginalised underclass converged with the elite to make public claims for radical social change.[323] Unemployment grew, as did the cost of living and food security became a pressing issue for the masses. When the government tried to increase the price of rice in 1979, protests ensued leading the Tolbert to call on the military to suppress riots. By 1980 when Tolbert was overthrown, Liberia's GDP per capita was US$419.[324]

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[321] Brahima D. Kaba, On Some Aspects of the Current State of the Liberian Economy: A Tentative Diagnostic and Assessment, *The Perspective*, 28 April 2006, http://www.theperspective.org/articles/0427200602.html (Accessed 14 June 2012)

[322] TRC report 2009

[323] Throughout Liberia's recent history, Klay Jr. concludes, the majority of Liberians have been disconnected and disenfranchised with the "state" due to its inability to deliver basic provisions and guarantee human security to its citizens (George Klay Kieh, Jr. 'Combatants, Patrons, Peacekeepers, and the Liberian Civil War', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 15:2, 1992)

[324] Sanford J. Ungar, 'Liberia: A Revolution, or Just Another Coup?' *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1981

It was within this context that Charles Taylor, himself an Americo-Liberian, emerged. Although Taylor identified himself part of this elite structure, he sought to challenge its hegemony from outside. Taylor was the third of 15 children born in an Americo-Liberian family. Seeking to follow in the footsteps of his father, Taylor went to the US in 1972 to train to become a teacher. He obtained a degree in Economics and became involved in student politics in the US. Taylor's student activism got him noticed by President Tolbert, who decided to invite Taylor to observe liberal reforms taking place in Liberia. The seeds of dissent for the Americo-Liberian hegemonic order had already been planted in the early 1970s well before the 1979 Rice Riots. Those who sought to form a count-hegemonic movement, such as members of the Progressive People's Party (PPP) were imprisoned on charges of treason. Among those arrested were Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, George Boley among others in 1979.

Two urban social movements that endured Liberia's repressive political and social environment were MOJA and Progressive Alliance of Liberia. MOJA was organized in 1973 by a group of students and professors at the University of Liberia namely Amos Sawyer, Ti Poteh, Amos Sawyer, Boima Fahnbulleh among others. According to Sawyer, it was initially "a liberation support group and was dedicated to enlightening the public and mobilising material support for the wars of liberation against Portuguese colonial forces and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. As membership in the movement expanded, the

movement was motivated to concern itself with local issues like civil liberties, equality of opportunity, urban and rural poverty."[325]

PAL was organized in 1975 in the United States as a pressure group with political aspirations. In 1978, PAL established an office in Monrovia. The April 1979 rice riot was organized by PAL to protest the planned increase in the price of rice. The government's response was to use military force to prevent a demonstration. Late 1979, PAL registered as an official political party—The People's Progressive Party (the first legal opposition party in Liberia in 25 years).[326]

Mystery still surrounds the events leading up to the 1980 military coup. On 12 April 1980, 17 non-commissioned soldiers (most of whom were executive mansion bodyguards to President Tolbert) allegedly supported by outside covert military assistance executed the military coup to oust Tolbert from power.[327] All of these non-commissioned soldiers were 'indigenous' Liberians. The core mission, however, involved killing Tolbert and capturing the state. This entailed installing a military government made up of indigenous Liberian military soldiers to replace the oligarchy rule.

According to Liberian historian Joseph Guannu, the coup was organised by members of the military because one of the PPP members, Dr. George Boley,

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[325] Sawyer, 1992, 289

[326] Ibid.

[327] Although unsubstantiated, many Liberians believe the CIA was behind the coup. The Americans were believed to have plotted the coup with a Liberian Major William Jarbo, a U.S. trained soldier in the AFL. The Liberian TRC report notes that the CIA and Pentegon 'were…prospecting for leadership change' following Tolbert's refusal to allow the U.S. to bunker its Rapid Deployment Force at Roberts International airport in 1979 (TRC 2008, 111). Jarbo tried to escape following the coup but was hunted down and killed by the PRC government (Ellis 2003, 53)

was rumoured to be on death row. Boley and the political prisoners were to be executed on the anniversary of the Rice Riot.[328] Boley at the time was the only PhD Krahn in the country. The highest-ranking soldier among the junta members was Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. Doe had been promoted first in 1975 as first sergeant and assigned as Service Support Battalion First Sergeant. In 1979, Doe was again promoted by Tolbert as Master Sergeant and assigned as an administrative officer in the same battalion. Other senior military officers were Major Edward Sackor, Major Douglas, Colonel Tugbeh, and Captain Brooks, and John Rancy. Baccus Matthews was among the civilian politicians who suggested the 17 soldiers organize themselves into a Council called the People's Redemption Council (PRC).[329] According to local military protocol, Doe being was the most senior and eldest in the group would assume Head of State.[330] Those not satisfied with this decision of Doe's appointment were Weh-Syen (Kru), Nelson Toe (Gio), Harris Johnson (Gio), and Henry Zuo (Gio). But in an attempt to appease this opposition, Weh-Syen was given the position of co-chair in the PRC.

As time went on, the PRC under Doe's 'leadership' became more overtly violent and corrupt than even any of its predecessors. Many of Tolbert's top cabinet officials were put on trial at a bogus court and executed on 22 April 1980

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[328] Author's personal interview with Professor Guannu, Monrovia, March 2012
[329] Original members of the PRC were Thomas Weh-Syen, Thomas Quiwonkpa, Nicholas Podier, Fallah Varney, Jeffrey Gbatu, Nelson Toe, Henry Zuo, Harris Johnson, Robert Sumo, Harrison Pennoh, Joseph Tubman, Jacob Swen, Abraham Kollie, Joseph Sampson, David Kimah, Robert Nowoko, Stanely Tarwo, Larry Borteh, Albert Toe, William Gould, Kolonseh Gonyon, Yelleh Kebbeh, Jerry Friday, John Nyuma, Robert Zuo, Alfred Zeh, Jerry Gban, John Nuahn, Charles Gbenyon, Lt. Finnah, Robert G. Saye, and James Nuahn.
[330] Quiwonkpa suggested that Samuel Doe assume leader and spokesperson of the Council.

at Barclay Training Center in Monrovia. Only four of Tolbert's cabinet ministers survived, among them former Minister of Finance and now current President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.[331] Taylor was connected with this broad group of young and political ambitious Americo-Liberians. Taylor was still in Liberia when the coup occurred, serving as chairman of the delegation of the Union of Liberian Association in Americas (an organization he founded in the U.S.) observing Tolbert's liberal reforms.[332]

History of the Liberian Military

The Armed Forces of Liberia has a controversial history. Military history can be categorized into four broad periods: 1822 to 1936 can be described as "Conquest and Pacification" of the hinterland. A militia force was established by the settler population to pacify indigenous populations in Liberia's hinterland and establish hegemony and central government authority. The second stage, 1936-1955, the army (Liberian Frontier Force) was trained to carry out Monrovia's central government policies, namely tax collection, forced labour for the government, and guarding elite (in Monrovia and upcountry). The third stage, from 1955 to the 1980 military coup, we began to see some semblance of an army capable of defending the interests of the state, albeit the particular ethno-political hegemony of the established Americo-Liberian families in control of the central state. During this time, the name was changed to the Liberian National Guard. The

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[331] Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, *This Child Will be Great: Memoir of Remarkable Life by Africa's First Woman President*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009, 103

[332] After the PRC coup, Taylor basically self-appointed himself as *de facto* head of the government's procurement agency, General Services Authority (GSA) with support from Doe

country was in turmoil following the People's Redemption Council's April 1980 coup. However, signs that things were falling apart in the military were evident during the 15 April 1979 'Rice Riots', when many of Liberia's civil society activists were arrested. Soldiers engaged in looting and violence following their clampdown on protesters.

1822-1847: Conquest and Pacification
The initial origins of the Armed Forces of Liberia are the militia force established in early 1822. The settler population established a militia of fifty-three volunteers to quell attacks from the indigenous population. The purpose of the colonial militia was to defend the interests of the settlers (Americo-Liberians and Congos[333]) from the indigenous Liberians who were challenging their efforts to consolidate power. The militia force was successful in protecting the Republic. Though it was a volunteer force, all 'able-bodied men' could be required to enlist. Its composition was diverse, and included among its ranks settlers, indigenous Liberians and recaptured African slaves (Congos).[334] The force was armed with collection of guns, ranging from double-barrel shotguns and air guns.[335] The militia was the nascent central government's primary armed instrument to exercise control over indigenous people. The settler population

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[333] The term *Congo* originally referred exclusively to Liberians of settler background whose ancestry could be traced to re-captives who were resettled in Liberia upon their inception on the high-seas by American and British naval ships while being taken to American and European slave markets. In more recent times, the term is used to reference all individuals with settler backgrounds. Joseph Guannu, Liberian History Up to 1847, Smithtown, New York: Exposition, 1983.
[334] Rainey, 29
[335] Rainey, Buffalo Soldiers, 30.

faced severe resistance from indigenous groups, which at times required US naval vessel appearances to discourage restive locals.[336]

Liberia remained reliant on US and foreign partners in its attempt to exercise its statehood functions. When the French and British sought to enlarge their imperial territory at Liberia's expense, US warships periodically showed up off Liberia's coast to discourage encroachment. However, successive American administrations rejected appeals from the Government of Liberia to intervene more robustly.[337] As Liebenow states, successive US administrations rejected appeals from Monrovia for more forceful support.[338]

The main mechanism for European foreign control over the Liberian state was through loan agreements, which date back to 1871. Since this period, European private interests were in control of the Liberian economic management of the state. The 1871 loan-agreement negotiated by President E.J. Roye and a London-based private bank at £100,000 ($500,000) netted Liberia less than £30,000 after discounts and advance interest payments. The private banking firm made repayment inevitable through direct administration of its customs and revenues.[339] In 1906, Liberia's precarious financial stability necessitated further entrenchment of foreign private interests in its economic management. A second loan agreement was signed in 1906, this time a $500,000 loan made through Sir Harry Johnson. One condition for the agreement was that part of the loan had to

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[336] The case in point was the 'sudden appearance of the USS John Adams' in 1852, which had a 'noticeably quieting effect on the chiefs at Grand Bassa', the coastal region in the south (Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, The United States and Africa, New York: Cambridge University Press and Hoover Institute, 1984).

[337] Liebenow 1987

[338] Kramer 1995

[339] Hlophe 1979, 257

be turned over to the Liberian Development Company, a rubber plantation owned by Sir Harry Johnson.

It was not until the last few decades of the 19th century that the Americo-Liberian settlers began using the militia to assert claims over Liberia's territory in the hinterland. The militia was ineffective in preventing European encroachment on Liberian territory. The British and French sought to exploit the relative weakness of Liberia's colonial militia. French and British imperialist governments sought to expand their territory and influence in the new colonies of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. British annexed the Gallinas territory west of the Mano River and formally incorporated it into Sierra Leone in 1883. Over the next fifteen years, Britain assumed territory on Sierra Leone's eastern district—including Kailahun, while France demonstrated its willingness to use military force to obtain territory that was long occupied by Liberia in the east. Liberia was forced to cede territory along the Cavallary River to San Pedro to French occupied Cote d'Ivoire.[340] In the north, Kissidougo and Kérouané, which were previously in the Liberian northern territory, was also taken from French military forces.[341]

At the turn of the nineteen-century, the militia was incapable of maintaining Liberia's territory. The militia force consisted of only 2,500 men and was structured into two Brigades:

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[340] Guannu, PhD thesis, pp. 40

[341] An 1892 treaty was signed between Liberia and France, which demarcated Liberia's northern flank (and Guinea's southern border) between the forested and savannah area running roughly between Kissidougou and Kerouane in present day Guinea. ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 48, 13 January 2009, 2

The first [was] commanded by a Brigade General consisting of two regiments, the first and the fifth. Headquarters of the first regiment [was based] in Monrovia with a strength of nine hundred men. Headquarters of the fifth regiment, Crozierville, St. Paul's River, with a strength of six hundred men.

The second, third and forth regiments constitute the second brigade with headquarters at Cape-Palmas, the strength of the second regiment is three hundred and eighty men with headquarters at Buchanan, Grand Bassa County. The strength of the third regiment [was] two hundred men, with headquarters at Greenville, Sinoe County. The strength of the fourth regiment is four hundred men with headquarters at Cape Palmas; these constitute the second brigade. The two brigades when brought together are commanded by a Major General.[342]

Internal unrest tested the Liberian militia in 1906 in the volatile regions of Sinoe county, where inter-Kru conflicts were common.[343] Ethnic Krus challenged Americo-Liberian state attempts to pacify them with force; Kru militia forces met the LFF with violent resistance. The militia was grossly undisciplined when deployed to Nana Kru in Sinoe. Several militiamen reportedly stole cattle, foodstuffs and other items valued at US$2,000 from various villages.[344] Soon after, President Barclay ostracised the militia and provided reparations to the Nana Kru for damages. During this period, the government considered proposals to establish a training institute for the military. However, the government lacked financial resources to pay salaries to the men. The precarious government in Monrovia, lacking sufficient resources to implement its interior policy,

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[342] Davis Report: 'The military forces of Liberia' to War Department, 31 December 1910, Benjamin O. Davis, Snr, Box 1: Early Years-1937, US army Military History Institute, cited in Timothy Rainey, Buffalo Soldiers in Africa: The Liberian Frontier Force and the United States Army, 1912-1927, PhD dissertation, John Hopkins University, 2001, 29-30.
[343] Jeremy Levitt, *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From 'Paternaltariansim' to State Collapse*, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 2005, 140.
[344] Ibid.

abandoned the proposal to improve the militia's effectiveness through proper training.

Towards the end of the century, Liberian President Arthur Barclay was under immense pressure to maintain "effective occupation" over Liberia's vast interior. The militia force was woefully incapable of preventing territorial encroachment by the Europeans. Barclay unveiled his "Barclay Plan of 1904", which called for the establishment of the Liberian Frontier Force that replaced the volunteer militia force. One of the principal aims of the plan were to create "a standing army that would serve as a bulwark against European expansionism and indigenous resistance".[345] The Frontier Force Act passed in the national legislature on 6 February 1908 provided the legal and financial means to establish a rudimentary military force. The LFF was established to operate alongside the militia to perform internal police law enforcement duties, assist in collecting taxes from traders, assess government fines and supervise government mandated compulsory labour projects.[346] The LFF's role became a principle enforcement mechanism of violent suppression during "the expansionist agenda of the Liberian state" in the Liberian hinterland.[347]

In January 1908, the government met with British officials to resolve the long-standing border disputes between British-occupied Sierra Leone and "independent" Liberia. Given its precarious financial position, the Liberian government actively sought support from Britain in the form of external

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[345] George Klay Kieh Jr. The Military and post-civil war Liberia', cited in Rainey, Buffalo Soldiers, 31
[346] Rainey, 95.
[347] Dunn and Tarr 1992, 89

guarantees on its statehood. As part of an agreement that provided a loan from a British bank, the British government demanded certain that internal reforms be initiated 'before it would discuss a final settlement of either the Mano River or Kanre-Lahun territories'.[348] As part of the agreement, three British authorities assumed leadership over the Liberian customs body.[349] The agreement appointed a financial expert to advise the secretary of the treasury in Monrovia on financial matters. Another condition was the establishment of a "well-armed and well-disciplined" police force that would operate under the command of British officers. The British also insisted on other reforms in the Department of Treasury and the judiciary.[350] The loan also required Liberia to accept a British officer to assume the role of Inspector General of Customs—a cabinet-level position with veto authority over central government expenditures.[351] According to Amos Sawyer, "the presence of foreign receivers was a major irritant to Liberian sensibilities, and violence was directed at Europeans and Americans in some parts of the country."[352]

British Major Robert MacKay Caldwell assumed command of the Frontier Force in 1908 backed by two British military officers and ten sergeants.[353] Meanwhile, the Americo-Liberian elite kept the militia at an arms length under its own authority. While the social composition of the LFF under

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[348] Fredrick Starr, Liberia: Description, History, Problems, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1913, 118.

[349] Amos Sawyer, Autocracy, 1992, 178

[350] Jeremy Levitt 2005, 142

[351] If these conditions were not met within six months, British would withdrawal its financial assistance.

[352] Sawyer 1992

[353] ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 48, 13 January 2009, 2

settler Liberian command was comprised of mostly indigenous Liberians, Caldwell recruited about two hundred and fifty Sierra Leoneans (mostly ethnic Mendes) into the LFF such that by October 1909, about one quarter of the LFF were Sierra Leonean.[354] The majority of these soldiers were British subjects that serve in the Sierra Leone Police Force.[355] Shortly after assuming command of LFF, Caldwell and his team set up barracks in Monrovia and began recruiting indigenous Liberians into the LFF's rank-and-file.

For a short period of time, France loaned a medical officer to serve in the LFF, as per one of its political conditions of the loan agreement. Within a year, however, the Liberian government became suspicious of Caldwell's intentions. In January 1909, the Liberian Legislature demanded Caldwell's resignation; he resigned on 1 February 1909. Ten days after his resignation, Caldwell organized a mutiny involving about seventy of his Mende soldiers and demanded payment for their salary arrears.[356] With support of the Liberian legislature, Barclay's government organized 400 members of the militia force to purge the frontier force of all British subjects, and authorized Liberian officers to take command over the force and all military barracks.[357] The British General-Consul reluctantly urged Caldwell to cooperate with the Liberian government.[358]

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[354] Levitt observes that approximately 71 out of 250 troops were British subjects from Sierra Leone, but this did not include 'numerous men of Mende origin who came from the British side of the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border' (2005, 143).

[355] Rainey, 61

[356] Levitt 2005, 144

[357] Ibid.

[358] Caldwell and his officers returned to Great Britain, apparently leaving the government with "enormous bills for goods purchased without its consent" (Levitt 2005, 144). This day is remembered in Liberian history as Armed Forces Day, ironic given that it was the militia force that defeated the army on that day.

When Liberians assumed control over the Frontier Force, most new officers were settler Americo-Liberians and Congos, while enlisted ranks were recruited among interior tribes loyal to the government from the center and northwest of the country. The Lorma and Kpelle were predominately represented in the rank-and-file.[359] The Frontier Force had a reputation for recruiting unlettered and undisciplined settler Liberians into its officer establishment. As H.O Akingbade explains, "the Liberian military was itself a patrimonial organization linked to both the Monrovia-based oligarchy as well as the indigenous social order".[360] The officer corps was made up of less-accomplished members of the Americo-Liberian and Monrovia-based elite.[361]

These recruitment patterns of the rank-and-file were in keeping with long-held colonial views that natives from the hinterland were "warriors tribes" but more importantly, had never challenged or resisted against central government authority in Monrovia.[362] The coastal tribes on the other hand (the Kru, Grebo, Gola, Vai and Dei and Bassa) were scarcely represented in the military, and were generally uninterested in the army because these coastal ethnic groups long resisted Monrovia's state authority and had borne the brunt of violence inflicted against their communities by the Frontier Force. Additionally,

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[359] The Lormas and Gbandi were among the first tribal groups to react favourably to central authority, according to Roberts et al 1964, 391.

[360] H.O. Akingbade, "The role of the military in the history of Liberia 1822-1947", unpublished PhD dissertation, Howard University, 1977. As one former Liberian Presidential advisor noted during an interview with International NGO International Crisis Group, 'in the past, its officer corps was seen as the dumping ground for the wayward sons of the elite. It was a form of punishment for those who did not do well in school'.

[361] ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress…2

[362] William Gutteridge, The Armed Forces in New States, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 9.

the coastal tribes had the most exposure to European traders.[363] According to

Klay Kieh, Jr:

> The indigenes were primarily recruited from the hinterland because the Liberian government believed they were physically robust, and politically naïve, and thus easily controlled. On the other hand, the Liberian government deliberately avoided the recruitment of soldiers from among the coastal ethnic groups [the Krus, Grebos], reasoning that their contacts with Europeans made them too politicized and hence difficult to manipulate and control.[364]

The system of recruitment adopted by the LFF depended on provincial officials

and chiefs (allies of Monrovia), whom were rewarded with positions in the

hinterland administration. According to Akingbade,

> The LFF was irregularly paid and therefore lived on the land to sustain itself. The Liberian system of indirect rule bore the stamp of the military means used to establish it in the early twentieth century. It was first established by the Liberian army, which had a reputation for brutality and for looting, since its troops largely lived off the land. In 1910 some chiefs in the south east of the country complained of the activities of the Liberian Frontier Force, which they termed 'this execrable force', and said was, 'entirely demoralised, and wherever they have been sent throughout the country – whether to River Cess or in the hinterland– their custom has been to plunder the towns through which they pass and rape their women.[365]

There are many instances of soldiers demonstrating a lack of professionalism

when interacting with indigenous Africans. Alhaji Kromah, who became

minister for information in Tolbert's government and later emerged as leader of

the ULIMO-K faction during Liberia's first civil war described his own personal

experiences with AFL soldiers while growing up in Lofa country, observing,

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[363] H.O. Akingbade, "The Role of the Military in the History of Liberia 1822-1947",
unpublished PhD dissertation, Howard University, 1977, 142.
[364] Ibid.
[365] H.O. Akingbade, The Role of the Military in the History of Liberia 1822-1947, unpublished
PhD dissertation, Howard University, 1977, 209.

There was hardly a month we did not hear about the arrival of a soldier who had arrived [in Lofa] and was demanding he be given any number of domestic animals, bags of rice and even fruit from the townspeople. This was totally strange to me as our residence in Monrovia was on Camp Johnson Road, near the BTC military barracks. In Monrovia, we saw soldiers everyday with and without sergeant and corporal stripes go about their business without harassing people. I could not understand why the soldiers coming to places like Sevalahun even without stripes presented themselves as the epitome of government authority. Town Chief Boakai Nehma was usually courteous to the soldiers and fed them, as any visitor would be treated. The chief, a father in law to my uncle, however never allowed the rogue soldiers to abscond with people's properties. The Sevalahun spirit took time to spread in other areas, but together with urbanisation, it eventually inspired a rebellion against soldier exploitation of rural dwellers.[366]

One of the reasons for indiscipline was that soldiers were outside of direct control of officers that were based in Monrovia. Soldiers were directly accountable to civilian/administrative bureaucrats posted in the interior (who reported directly to the President).[367] The force lacked communications and logistical support, which made it difficult to control and discipline soldiers. It was common to find some soldiers drunk on alcohol and power. Other common acts of indiscipline included extortion from chiefs and communities in the interior, refusal to pay taxis rides, bus fares and other goods from businesses.[368] According to Liebenow, "it has apparently long been the custom of the military to live off the local community as much as traffic will bear."[369] According to Kieh Jr, the military "served as an employment entity mainly for those who

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[366] Kromah
[367] Rainey
[368] George Klay Kieh, Jr. Military Rule in Liberia, 330.
[369] Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 54.

could not pursue competitive careers".[370] After the militia was transformed into the Liberian frontier force, the rank-and-file were recruited from both Congos and indigenous Liberians lumpen elements, mostly from rural areas.[371]

Between 1909 and 1915, Jeremy Levitt counts at least half a dozen conflicts that occurred between the coastal tribes and the central government.[372] These settler-indigenous conflicts were caused by government attempts to pacify the coastal communities and impose an indirect system of rule and mobilise resources to support its hegemonic 'state-building' efforts.[373] These efforts were underscored by the United States' involvement in the defence and protection of Liberian sovereignty and constitutional authority. Several scholars have highlighted how this system impacted the sociopolitical fabric of Liberian coastal and hinterland.[374] The indirect rule system, which was implemented in 1908, undermined traditional structures of authority by making their kings subservient to government agents (i.e. superintendents, district commissioners and frontier force soldiers). The government's imposition of head and customs taxes provoked hostile reactions from the Kru and Grebo. This is understandable given the government's refusal to grant basic civil and political rights (including

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[370] George Klay Kieh, Jr. Military Rule in Liberia, 330.

[371] Kieh, 117, in Rainey, Buffalo Soldiers, 32

[372] It is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss all of the significant conflicts in Liberian history that transpired between 1908 and 1931. For a comprehensive review of the dynamics of these coastal conflicts, including the role of Britain, America and Germany, see Levitt 2005, 147-180.

[373] It is important to note that American and British government/military and missionaries had made regular contact with these coastal communities for trade and many Kru and Bassa peoples were hired as deckhands on European and American ships (Akingbade 1977, 188)

[374] See Amos Sawyer 1992; Jeremy Levitt 2005; George Boley; Hlophe 1979, 269

the right to vote) and denied proposals to build schools, houses and open trade routes to the interior in exchange for taxes.[375]

In 1909-10, the Americo-Liberian government was deeply involved in the Grebo war. The Frontier Force lacked effective command and control and resources to conduct a successful military campaign. The Liberian government called for American aid to quell the Grebo revolt. Soon after, in 1910, the government divided the coastal settlements into counties (Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, Grand Cape Mount and Maryland), using the same approach of dividing the interior into three provinces (Western, Central and Eastern). President Barclay actively sought to implement his central government's interior policy through two mechanisms: locally appointed administrators and the frontier force. Following the end of the 1910 war, Barclay instituted a new policy requiring all local leaders to be appointed by the President, thereby ensuring greater government control over local political structures and the interior population.[376] This was the beginning of 'indirect rule' (a duplicate of the British system in Sierra Leone) whereby the power of paramount chiefs was drastically curtailed and governance structures were imposed on the hinterland to reinforce Americo-Liberian centralised sovereign authority.[377] District commissioners commanded the Frontier Force detachments in their local

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[375] Levitt 2005, 159

[376] Levitt 2005, 162.

[377] The government appointed the Secretary of the Interior, provincial commissioners, district commissions and paramount chiefs, extending down to clan chiefs. The chiefs became "mere mouthpieces and the executioners of the wishes of the Americo-Liberian commissioners" (Akingbade 1977, 215). The Vice President of Liberia usually passed orders to the district commissioners; the commissioners in turn gave orders to paramount chiefs and the paramount chiefs gave orders to village heads (Ibid, 226-227). On how this governance system functioned to recruit labour in the hinterland, see Ibid, 228-225)

territories. These powers provided the district commissioners considerable autonomy to abuse their authority for personal gain, including utilising the LFF in force labour practices among the indigenous inhabitants.[378] Chiefs used their monopoly of control over local socio-economic opportunities including access to land and marriage rights to deny social mobility to particular youth.[379]

Facing grave financial difficulties, the government took another foreign loan in 1912. The 1912 loan of $1.7 million—which was refunded by a group of New York bankers, including the Rockefeller interests—was secured by the customs revenues, import and export revenues, head tax revenues and rubber tax revenues and was used to pay off the 1906 British debt.[380] During this period, Liberia became an important reserve for raw material export to European-centered capitalist development.[381] Liberia's national fiscal system became wholly under the control of a multinational consortium customs receivership of American, British, French and German financiers. As per the agreement, the Liberian government was obligated to appoint four outsiders (American, German, British and French) as customs agents in charge of controlling customs receipts and taxes, which were earmarked for loan repayment.[382] An American receiver held the most senior position. This agreement paved the way for the

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[378] Akingbade 1977, 216-222

[379] Paul Richards et al, 'Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment', Washington: World Bank, Social Development Paper No. 21, 2005

[380] Hlophe 1979, 258. The loan's consortium of transnational capitalist interests meant that revenues of the Liberian state were directly under the control of J.P. Morgan and Co., Kuhr Loeb and Co., the National City Bank of New York, Robert Fleming and Co. of London, Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas of Paris, M.M. Warburg and Co., of Hamburg, and Hope and Co., of Amsterdam (see Raymond L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. II, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928, 865-880).

[381] Hlophe 1979, 260-267

[382] Kramer 1995

American military to restructure the Liberian frontier force. The U.S. policy was to make threats to Americo-Liberian rule by indigenous Liberians less ominous by the US military presence in Liberia.[383] US military presence was, however, not extensive. A total of fifteen African-American US military officers from the US army were assigned to reorganize and train the LFF from 1912-1922 as part of the 1912 loan agreement. Initially under the command of American Major Ballard and later Colonel Elwood Davis (1932)[384] the LFF continued to quell threats from the hinterland, maintain 'effective control' and order on Liberian territory and the frontiers. Fifteen different indigenous wars, including the Kru revolt of 1915, in which the Kru people declared their loyalty to Great Britain and preferred to be under the political tutelage of the British as opposed to the Americo-Liberians.[385] The U.S.S. Chester was diverted to the Liberian coast on route home from Turkey to help quash the uprising during the Kru War of 1915-1916.[386] The US Chester provided arms, ammunition, food and supplies to the Frontier Force and transported Frontier Force and American soldiers to Sinoe, which forestalled British support to the Kru.[387] Liberian authorities appealed to the United States for aid to deal with the Kru revolt. The US promised aid if the Liberian government reformed the interior administration that was perceived as a

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[383] Stephen S. Hlophe, *Class, Ethnicity and Politics in Liberia: A Class Analysis of Power Struggles in The Tubman and Tolbert Administrations from 1944-1975*, Washington, D.C,: University Press of America, 1979, 270

[384] Davis had fought under General Pershing in Mexico and later in the Philippines. He later emigrated to Liberia where he led the LFF's campaign to 'pacify' the Kru coast in the southeast. His nickname was 'Dictator of Grand Bassa'

[385] Buell, 'Liberia: A Century of Survival', 25

[386] Kramer 1995

[387] Akingbade 1977

corrupt and mistreating the indigenous people.[388] Since 1917, the Grebo began

their rebellion against the government in Cape Palmas. President Howard sent

Major H. Anderson, the American commander of the Frontier Force to restore

order.[389] The last of these coastal wars occurred in 1939.[390] The Liberian

Frontier Force, totaling about 1,500-1,600 soldiers, served primarily to enforce

Liberian President Edwin Barclay's policy of 'Divide and Rule' through the

interior administration. Backed by the American policy of separation of the

hinterland from the Americo-Liberian coastal settlements, the Liberian Frontier

Force was the country's only internal security force until 1924 when the Liberian

National Police Force was established.

During World War I, Liberia supported their American Allies by

providing a limited number of Liberian soldiers who were dispatched to France

in 1919 (as labourers) but saw no active combat duty.[391] The American

government provided armaments and ammunition to the Frontier Force. For

financial reasons, the Frontier Force was reduced to only six hundred soldiers

and military expenditures declined after the war.[392]

American Influence Deepens
In 1918 to the early 1920s, Liberia's financial crisis had worsened. The US

Senate had refused to approve a loan to Liberia of $5,000,000 in 1918. The US

played an important role in supporting the Liberian state both economically and

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[388] Akingbade 1977, 187
[389] Akingbade 1977, 204
[390] Jeremy Levitt 2005, 164-180.
[391] Roberts et al 1964, 387
[392] Akingbade 1977, 201

militarily. The US government appointed Colonel Charles Young as military attaché in Monrovia in on 4 November 1919.[393] Over the next four years, Colonel Young established the first officer cadet school for training Liberian officers.[394] The American government sought to find alternative sources of rubber production in response to the British Colonial Office raising the price and restricting production and supply. American rubber corporations decided to finance the independent production of rubber and Liberia became their answer after other regions were tested and found unsuitable.[395] Harvey Firestone began to investigate Liberia as an alternative location for a possible rubber plantation in 1924. Liberia was already heavily committed in debts to the British, French, German and Dutch consortium. The Harding Administration of the American government proposed another $5 million loan from the Finance Corporation of America (a trust company created by Firestone for this purpose) to replace the 1912 loan agreement as an exclusive American source. Under financial pressure, and despite its policy not to accept a loan from an individual, the Liberian government signed a third long-term agreement with US private company Firestone, strongly backed by the US Department of State in 1926.[396] This agreement constituted one of the integral mechanisms to deepen in a more exclusive manner US private entrenchment through control the internal management of the economic aspects of Liberia's state apparatus. The Liberian

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[393] Akingbade 1977, 210

[394] Ibid.

[395] Hlophe 1979, 265. At the time, the U.S. produced about 80% of the automobiles in the world and therefore was most affected by the rubber shortage.

[396] The agreement granted the Firestone Tire and Rubber the right to grow rubber on a maximum of one million acres of land for ninety-nine years at a fixed rental of five cents per acres during the first years of operation, after which ten cents was to be paid per acre (Hlophe 1979, 266)

government was required by the US government to appoint and pay a salary of a financial advisor, five officials to organize the customs and the internal revenue administration of Liberia.[397] Most pertinent for this chapter, Article XII, Section 3 of the loan agreement required Liberia to maintain the Frontier Force "for the security of the revenues and receipts" through expansions of activities including sea patrol and internal security in support of domestic revenue generation schemes. According to Akingbade, the American Financial Advisor had "much power in the selection of officers to serve in the Frontier Force".[398] The agreement also provided the Financial Advisor the authority to determine the size of the frontier force and stipulated that the Government of Liberia's War Department should provide oversight. A provision stipulated the appointment of four black American military officers to assume command of the Frontier Force, appointed by the President of the United States and recommended to the President of Liberia.[399] The agreement's emphasis on the Frontier Force was buttressed by the need to extend effective Liberian control of the hinterland chiefdoms in order to ensure the interest of Firestone Corporation could be adequately protected. Liberia became a *de facto* neo-colony of the United States that served primarily American corporate interests. The Liberian Frontier Force was trained and led by American senior officers. The LFF was tasked to ensure

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[397] Frank Chalk, The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia, *The Canadian Journal of African Studies,* 1:1, 12-32.

[398] Akingbade 1977, 207

[399] Rainey, 113. The collective salary of these officers was not to exceed US$16,000 per year. The agreement spelled out the duties of the officers: "Such officers shall serve in the frontier service during the term of said Bonds, and among their duties shall be to prepare a plan of reorganization of the force which shall be based on the idea of creating an efficient constabulary and for the purposes of aforesaid and which plan shall include the qualification and disciplining of all commissioned and non-commissioned officers and the training for the men in accordance with the best practice now obtaining in similar organizations (Akingbade 1977, 207-208)

stabilisation of the Liberian hinterland. However, following the embarrassing scandal in which LFF soldiers were accused of assisting Liberian government authorities of forcefully conscripting indigenous Liberian labourers (mostly Kru and Grebo in Sinoe and Maryland counties) in the 1927 Fernando Po and Gabon incident, American government withdrew from its commander role and restricted itself to a training role only.[400] On 26 May 1927, command over the army was transferred back to Liberian authorities. However, the US continued to hold considerable influence over its neo-colony Liberia. The Firestone agreement opened an expansive role for the American military in Liberia through its military attaché mission, to protect America's military and commercial interests in Africa during World War II.

Other mechanisms were put in place to exert influence in Liberia. For instance, a defence pact was signed between the US and Liberia on 31 March 1942 largely as a result of the Second World War effort. The "defence areas agreement" enabled the US to obtain some territory within Liberia to construct military bases.[401] The U.S. commenced road building and other construction activities including port facilities in Monrovia's harbour that would assist in the war efforts against the Axis powers.[402] The US built Robertsfield international airport in 1942 with a runway long enough for US air bombers to land for

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[400] For more on the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the question of slavery and forced labour, see Joseph S. Guannu, Liberia and the League of Nations, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1972, 66-67

[401] The U.S. government was granted "the right to construct, control, operate, and defend the airport at the sole cost and expense of the latter and without charge to the Republic of Liberia". In exchange, the U.S. would "assist in the protection and defence of any part of the Republic which might be liable to attack during the present war" (Akingbade 1977, 246-7)

[402] Construction of the harbor (called Free Port) was the largest U.S. Navy project ever in West Africa and cost the American public $18 million (Akingbade 1977, 255)

refueling.[403] The Firestone agreement and defence pact mandated the American military to utilise these facilities in exchange for training assistance to the LFF. As many as 500 American soldiers (mostly African-American) assisted in building roads in 1942 that opened up the interior and concentrated on reorganizing and training the Frontier Force.[404] According to Akingbade, under a US training leadership, the Frontier Force's discipline improved.[405] Following a visit to Liberia by President Roosevelt in 1943, the US extended full diplomatic relations with Liberia (the last major power to recognize Liberia diplomatically).[406] It was not until 1956 when the Firestone debt was amortized did Liberia gain control back of the internal economic management of the state apparatus.[407]

Additionally, since the Frontier Force lacked a strong military organization, some Liberian citizens enlisted in the US Army during World War II and were attached to African American units.[408] During the Second World War, the United States provided funding to the LFF to expand its force from 600

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[403] Firestone and Pan-American Airways operated the airfield facilities. According to C.L. Simpson, the airfield's strategic position was useful to the U.S. following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, as Australian and New Zealand planes from America had to fly east towards Liberia and the Middle East instead of flying West (as Wake Island was captured and air communication across the Pacific were cut) (C.L. Simpson, 227).

[404] The American personnel introduced a payroll system so that Liberian soldiers would receive their salaries on time during this time. The Americans also introduced physical baseball and basketball to encourage physical development in the military.

[405] Akingbade 1977, 253. Akingbade emphasises the positive effect of American troops on the Frontier Force: "The influence of the Black American soldiers on the soldiers of the Frontier Force were great; it changed the image of the force from that of a band of corrupt savages to a symbol of national defence. The Liberian soldiers were no longer looked upon by the indigenous people as an instrument of Americo-Liberian suppression. For the first time, the Force was seen as a unit serving the interests of both the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous people".

[406] Hlophe 1979, 270

[407] Hlophe 1979, 256

[408] Akingbade 1977, 252

men to about 2,500.[409] The force was wholly dependent on American assistance for training and support.[410] Toward the end of 1942, an estimated 5,000 American troops had been stationed in Liberia.[411] American military bases in Liberia were used to assist in the war effort. Around the latter part of World War II, and after, the US played a more dominant role in Liberian affairs. During this time, American iron ore companies were awarded generous contracts. The American dollar replaced the British sterling as the main form of currency. While the bulk of the US military personnel based in Liberia withdrew following the end of the war, American diplomatic and commerical officials stayed behind to enhance US interests in the country. US facilities (Freeport, Robertsfield) were handed over to Liberian authorities in compliance with the Defence Area Agreement. The US established an Officer Candidate training school based in Monrovia, staffed by American trainers. In the Cadet School's first year two officer courses were conducted, about 300 new officers graduated, which represented nearly half of the core officer establishment by 1964.[412]

In sum, the 1871, 1906, 1912 and 1927 loan agreements assured dependence of the Liberian state on foreign interests and permitted the formation of a neo-colonial elite amongst the Americo-Liberian families who manipulated the state apparatus for commercial advantage.[413] The American government closely monitored their alliance with the Americo-Liberian elite to preclude

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[409] Akingbade 1977, 252

[410] This expansion in the size of the force was made possible by a one million dollar credit to the republic by the United States. Of this amount, $150,000 was earmarked for the needs of the Frontier Force (Akingbade 1972, 252).

[411] Akingbade 1977, 250

[412] Roberts, 1964, 389

[413] Hlophe 1979, 258

them from "developing into a powerful political force which might have threatened French and British interests in the West-Atlantic region of West Africa, which partly explained British and French threats to Liberian sovereignty throughout this period".[414] However, the American government demonstrated ambivalence towards Liberia and hesitancy to develop Liberia into a formal colony modeled after British and French West Africa. The Government preferred to facilitate US private companies that served American economic interests. In other words, the US government was comparatively less entrenched in their neo-colony as compared to British West Africa. For instance, the British colonial policies were comparatively better planned and established and received considerable financial and administrative servicing.[415]

The military under Tubman (1944-1971)
President William Tubman (an Americo-Liberian elite) took office on 1 January 1944.[416] Tubman maintained a strong relationship with the United States and assumed a hard-line anti-communist policy in the context of the Cold War.[417] The small team of Americans sought to rationalise the armed forces and security architecture in Liberia to a limited extent. Under the Liberian Constitution, the President assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and is

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[414] Hlophe 1979, 259

[415] Between 1870 and 1936, British West Africa received £116.7 million in public and private capital while Belgium Congo received foreign investment totaling £143.3 million of which £107.5 million was private. Liberia received less than $10 million for that same period. (Hlophe 1979, 257)

[416] Peter Pham sees Tubman as an "outsider" to the politically entrenched Americo-Liberian family because he was from Maryland county and did not come from any of the main political families that formed the aristocracy in the True Whig Party (Pham, Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State, 18)

[417] Elwood Dunn, Liberia and the United States During the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

empowered with the authority to appoint all military officers whose assignments are otherwise not outlined in the constitution. The authority to declare war is the purgative of the legislature. The President, however, maintained the right to call on the militia when the legislature was not in session to safeguard the security of the country. The American government became more entrenched in Liberia's economic sector after 1944 under Tubman's "Open Door Policy".[418] Between 1944 and 1951, United States assistance to Liberia totaled $28 million, while between 1951 and 1961, this figured jumped to $79 million. During the 1951-1961 period, the U.S. Aid program spent $37 million in loans to private enterprises in Liberia. American private investment firms owned about $106 million (or 24%) of total foreign private investment in Liberia that totaled more than $437 million in 1960.[419] While the American presence was more entrenched in the economic sector in Liberia, the American government was less so in the military-political sectors of the state apparatus. With the Americo-Liberian elite firmly in control of the state and little or no opposition to speak of, extensive American economic assistance and limited military involvement helped to preserve Americo-Liberian hegemony.

One mechanism of doing so was assisting in rationalising the national security architecture during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961, the supreme policy-making body for internal security issues was created called the Liberian Joint Security Committee (LJSC). It was composed of the Secretary of National

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[418] Hlophe 1979, 270. On Tubman's 'Open Door Policy', see Fred P.M. van der Kraaj, 'The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia, Im Selbstverlag des Museums, 1983
[419] Hlophe 1979, 270

Defense, the Attorney General, the Directors of National Police and National Bureau of Investigation and the high-ranking military officers and Chief of Staff of the Army. It also included the chief of the United States Military Mission and United States Police Advisor on security matters.[420] The most senior military officer is the Chief of Staff, who normally holds the rank of Major General and commands the National Guard.

In the immediate post-WWII years, Liberia's postwar economic boom enhanced Liberia's independence from foreign powers and allowed President Tubman to build an extensive patronage-based economic system to consolidate his personal hegemonic control over the state. As a Republic President with far-reaching centralised power, Tubman was dependent on concessions from private foreign companies. This allowed Tubman to monopolise state decision-making within the executive branch of government. Tubman provided resources to his loyal patrons and used instruments of the state, including the police and military, to exclude others who challenged his authority. Tubman's primary economic strategy was to provide concessions to foreign companies in Liberia's rent-based economy.[421] This system freed the Presidency from having to develop a modern state based on a domestic tax-system. Under Tubman, political patronage became an entrenched practice within the system. Most Liberians were disconnected from the central government. There was no 'social contract' developed between the central state and indigenous Liberian and Tubman's 'Open Door Policy' and his Unification and Integrationist policies did little to

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[420] Roberts, 1964, 388

[421] Amos Sawyer, *The Emergence of Autocracy*, 1992

extend educational, occupational and social opportunities to indigenous Liberians.[422] According to Akingbade, the Americo-Liberian elite "realised that their interest could be served by the ignorance and illiteracy of the mass of the people, they wittingly, and sometimes, unwittingly, and through deliberate nonaction made it difficult for the hinterland people to receive education".[423]

During the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, rural-urban linked patrimonial order heavily influenced army recruitment. During Tubman's rule, recruitment of officers was dependent on Americo-Liberian patronage networks and politics of loyalty.[424] Most officers came from loyal Americo-Liberian families and a small minority of loyal tribes that had not challenged central government authority in the early twentieth century (Lorma and Kpelles). Henry Koboi Johnson, a Lorma from Lofa County who rose to the rank of Lieutenant General and served as AFL Chief of Staff in 1979. Indigenous Liberian formed the majority of the rank-and-file. Chiefs and elders were an influential mechanism for selection of recruits for the rank-and-file. The majority of soldiers came from rural, agricultural backgrounds from regions that were traditionally loyal to Monrovia.[425] These soldiers grew up in the traditions of their indigenous societies and experienced the local rites of passages required of them by chiefs

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[422] Hlophe 1979, 271

[423] Akingbade, 269

[424] Hlophe explains that any political aspirants, particularly from the indigenous Liberian population had to demonstrate their loyalty and commitment to Americo-Liberian family paramountcy through active and faithful participation in the Accepted and Free Masons of Liberian before gaining the confidence of the Americo-Liberian family stratum (1979, 272). Hlophe continues, 'Tubman tolerated no other political person or institution in his drive for power and influence in the Liberian political arena. He was careful not to allow elite family cliques, the Party, the Government, the Church, the Hinterland and the Masonry to become more powerful or more influential than himself. Loyalty to his administration guaranteed promotion and survival in the political system (Ibid, 206).

[425] Author's personal interview with head of Veterans bureau, Monrovia, March 2012

and elders in their communities.[426] The Lorma and other tribes in the northwestern region dominated the army's rank-and-file and militia force.[427] Enlisting in the military had real material benefits for rural peasants from Liberia's hinterland. Becoming a soldier was a way to increase one's status for the *lumpen*-class, especially those without skills or academic credentials. The military allowed rural male youth to acquire a higher status in local communities. According to Amos Sawyer, joining for the rural-youth was a means to avoid paying duties and provided a place within the official hierarchy of government, especially at the local level. Soldiers often assisted district commissioners, paramount chiefs and clan leaders in the collection of taxes and duties. After their service in the military, many returned to their hometowns and villages to become chiefs.[428] In urban areas, soldiers had privileged access to political elite and diplomatic officials, serving as bodyguards, houseboys or escorts.[429] Those that served as bodyguards or escorts were often recruited based in lineage and patron-client networks in Americo-Liberian religious, associational groups or government-controlled institutions.

The military provided an opportunity for indigenous Liberians to be "employed" by the state as rank-and-file soldiers. The economy in the 1950s and

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[426] Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, 24.

[427] According to Stephen Hlophe, soldiers were recruited based on their loyalty to Monrovia as opposed to their warrior attributes. In Liberian history, the Gola, Grebo and Kru were known for their warrior attributes as evidence by the wars between these groups and against Americo-Liberian pacification in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century.

[428] Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, 24.

[429] Amos Sawyer, Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin, workshop paper in political theory and policy analysis, 2003, 14-15.

1960s grew rapidly under Tubman due largely to a burgeoning mining sector (iron ore). The rate of growth (almost 10%) was better than most prosperous countries in the West with the exception of Japan.[430] This growth, however, was achieved under exploitative conditions and forced labour of indigenous Liberians in the hinterland. The army recruited modestly but regularly in the early 1960s, again, mostly indigenes from interior, especially Lofa County.[431] According to estimates, ethnic Lormas from Lofa County comprised approximately 30-40% of the army's rank-and-file.[432] This was interesting, since ethnic Lormas represented no more than 5% of the total population in 1962.[433] However, a US country study in 1964 remarked that "tribal affiliations has not created any significant problems and an effort was made to draw recruits from all of the various groups" in the country.[434] Roughly 95% of the rank-and-file came from indigenous Liberian backgrounds. According to Alhaji Kromah, the army was "attractive to young indigenous people who saw their grandparents suffer at the hands of their indigenous brethren from Monrovia. The Lorma, Krahn, Kru, Gio, and Kpelle ethnic groups accounted for the largest enlistment in that order".[435] According to 1962 census data, the Krahn made up 5% of the total population, while the Kru (8%), Gio (8%) while the Kpelle tribe, the largest group in Liberia accounted for 21% of the census population.[436] The enlisted soldiers were

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[430] Amos Sawyer, *The Emergence of Autocracy,* 1992

[431] Amos Sawyer, *The Emergence of Autocracy*, 287, footnote 52.

[432] Author's personal interview with Dr. Joseph Saye Guannu, Monrovia, Liberia

[433] Ministry of Planning, 1972, 35.

[434] Roberts et al 1964, 391

[435] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: Legacy of an American Dilemma

[436] Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, The Population of Liberia, 1974, 35.

recruited based on local patronage networks associated with the central government through local chiefs and district. As Amos Sawyer states, recruitment was not based on merit and soldiers required "very little in the way of military skill." A lack of traditional defence missions in Liberia meant that most soldiers served as valets, messengers, and guards for government officials. In sum, the military was viewed as a career option for lower classes. The upper-middle class preferred to focus on educational opportunities in North America, Europe or in Monrovia.

The officer corps, however, was comparatively better educated than the enlisted soldiers. For instance, between 1945-1964, nearly all of the officers promoted were college graduates.[437] The majority of the officer establishment were Americo-Liberians, although a minority number of indigenous Liberians were recruited into the officer corps. Around 1964, about 10% of the officer establishment were indigenous Liberians.[438] The rank-and-file recruits were mostly illiterates.

United States Military Assistance
By 1951, the United States established a more military mission in Liberia charged with providing training to the Liberian military.[439] Among the mission's primary objectives was to train and advise the Armed Forces. The US military

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[437] T.D. Roberts et al, US Army Area Handbook, 1964, 389-90.

[438] Roberts et al 1964, 389

[439] The governments of Liberia and the United States signed a treaty agreement to establish the United States Military Mission to Liberia, which was signed and entered into force on 11 January 1951. The agreement was subsequently renewed every three-years. The U.S Military Mission was authorized by the European Command, the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and had 10 staff positions, six military personnel based out of the US embassy and a further five positions assigned to the Ministry of National Defense in 1983.

mission concentrated on training for the officer corps. The mission established a Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) in 1956 run out of the Ministry of National Defense and modeled after the United States ROTC programme.[440] ROTC partnered with the University of Liberia and the Booker Washington Institute. Like similar US ROTC-type programs in Africa (like Nigeria's in 1963), the program was geared towards developing professional military officers. A US country study noted that the armed forces non-commissioned officers constituted "the mainstay of the regular establishment and provide most of the professionalism to be found in the armed forces".[441]

Other cosmetic reforms included changing the force's name from Liberian Frontier Force to Armed Forces of Liberia under the amended National Defence Law of 1956. In 1959, the United States government signed another defence pact with the Liberian government.[442] The AFL adopted all US military laws where local Liberian law was absent including the US Code of Military Justice.[443] Under the terms of the agreement, the US pledged to consult with the Liberian Government on appropriate defence matters "in the event of agression or threat of agression against Liberia". A second article reaffirmed that the United States would "continue to furnish the Government of Liberia such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon…in order to assist Liberia…in the

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[440] Roberts et al 1964, 390

[441] Ibid.

[442] Up to the mid-1960s, Liberia was the only African country that had concluded a defense pact with the United States. The agreement committed the governments of Liberia and United States to mutual support in the event of aggression from an external power.

[443] Josef Teboho Ansorge and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge, 'Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia', in Melanie A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic (eds.,) Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2010, 268

effective promotion of its economic development and in the preservation of its national independence and integrity".[444] Up to 1963, cumulative US technical military assistance totaled US$4,645,000. A 15-man US Military Assistance Advisory Group began its work in Liberia in 1959. In 1961, the US government expanded its military assistance program (MAP).[445] Several Liberian officers were sent to the US to receive officer cadet training in US military training programs. From this period onward, Liberia practiced US military doctrine. Training, acquistion of arms, ammunition and equipment was almost entirely dependent on US assistance.[446]

Several key developments occurred in 1961, which lead to a transformation of the force. In an attempt to restructure the army under President Tubman, the LFF became the Liberian National Guard in 1962 and began its defense posture.[447] The AFL consisted of a National Guard (core land force), and a small Coast Guard[448] and the militia force.[449] The recruitment practices in the

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[444] Cited from 'France's Military Role in Africa', Africa Report, January 1964, 12

[445] E. Elwood Dunn, Amos J Beyan, Carl Patrick Burrowes, Historical Dictionary Of Liberia, 2nd edition, African Historical Dictionaries, No 83. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2001, 24-25.

[446] T.D. Roberts et al, US Army Area Handbook, Department of Army, American University Foreign Area Studies, Washington: D.C: Department of Army, 1964, pp. 392-3. The handbook notes that Liberian training tended to be "brief and uninspired [with little] accomplished other than some desultory close-order drill".

[447] Roberts et al 1964, 387

[448] The Coast Guard was established in 1959 was charged with "maintaining surveillance over shipping and shore activities and with defending the country's sea approaches". The Coast Guard was a top priority of the US military. The coast guard has comparatively higher literacy rates than other units in the armed forces and the national average (Roberts et al 1964, 391).

[449] During this period, the militia in theory remained an active reserve to be called upon in emergencies. All-able bodied male citizens from 16-to 45 years of age were eligible to receive quarterly training. In practice, there was no enforcement law and enlistment was, in effect, voluntary.

army relied on voluntary enlistment. However, a milita force of approximately 20,000 volunteers remained as a standby reserve force.[450]

However, lacking a major military mission in the 1950s and 1960s, AFL soldiers in Liberia were mostly used as personal security guards for key dignitaries or as "errand dispatchers" in the service of top government officials.[451] Soldiers lived in deplorable living conditions in barracks and received "meager and scarcely paid salaries", which induced feelings of relative deprivation which contrasted with their superior officers' (especially those close with the elite) extravagant lifestyles.[452] Retired General Henry Dubar commented that when joined the army in November 1961, most of the soldiers he met in the army could neither read nor write.[453] This poor literacy levels reflected poor national education standards. According to Dubar, the batch of 365 recruits that were recruited in November 1961 were the first group of new recruits in the AFL that could read and write.[454]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, two major domestic factors began to shape the need to reform AFL in Liberia. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the industrial (extractive) industry, in particular, the mining sector increased demands for a modern military force capable of providing more effective security in the country.[455] Despite a burgeoning economy (from iron ore mining),

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[450] Any able-bodied male between the ages of 16 and 45 was expected to enlist (Roberts et al 1964, 385).

[451] Author's personal interview with former Chief of Staff, AFL, Monrovia, 28 February 2012

[452] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: Legacy of an American Dilemma

[453] Author's personal interview with former Chief of Staff, AFL, Monrovia, 28 February 2012

[454] Author's personal interview with former Chief of Staff, AFL, Monrovia, 28 February 2012

[455] Amos Sawyer 1992

the government failed to extend educational opportunities to the interior.[456] Second, participation in African peacekeeping missions in the early 1960s also became an obligation for the Liberian government. Thus, the need to demonstrate military efficacy externally became a priority of the Liberian government. In 1960, Liberia sent a 240-man company contingent (ostensibly called Reinforced Security Company) (approximately 482 in total) to assist in peacekeeping duties for the United Nations mission in Congo (ONUC).[457] In the late 1960s, recruitment patterns began to change drastically under the leadership of Tubman.

Prior to its opening, the armed forces was almost exclusively dependent on American assitance in training matters. The United States Military Mission supervised all troop training programs and sponsored United States mobile training teams (MTT) to provide tactical and specialised training to individual battalions, coast guard, band and medical units. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) consisted of about 12 officers and men. Seven teams were deployed in Liberia in 1961, 13 in 1962 and 9 in 1963.[458] An important component of the United States Military Mission was providing funds through the MAP to send as many as 30 officers a year to receive professional and technical training from United States schools. The majority of the US military mission's efforts were concentrated on training and improving the capacity of the First Battalion.

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[456] Amos Sawyer, TRC testimony

[457] (See West Africa, 18 February 1961, 171) The 1964 US Army Area Handbook described the company's actions as "...After a poor start, the performance of the contingent improved steadily; the last company, which returned home in May 1963, had performed credibly and, by its conduct and appearance, gave the impression of being a well-trained and disciplined military organization." (Roberts et al 1964, 394).

[458] Roberts et al 1964, 392

According to the US army handbook in 1964, "this unit…maintains a standard in morale and performance that marks it as an elite organisation".[459] The remaining battalions were, however, rarely used and poorly maintained in comparison. The United States maintained two advisors to the president in the department of national defense. Both held ranks of Lieutenant-Generals (a higher rank than any Liberian senior officer at the time).

The Tubman Military Academy was established in Todee, Montserrado County, in November 1965 as an initial training facility for cadets recruited through the Army Student Training Program as well as new enlisted recruits.[460] The establishment of Tubman Military Academy was a first-class Liberian initiative funded by the Government of Liberia to improve the professionalism of the military. The training academy focused on both advanced individual training (tactical and leadership courses, basic combat training, in-service training for NCOs and officers at the company level) and initial entry training and limited continuous training at the brigade, battalion or unit levels. However, the institute required considerable external assistance. Recruitment through lineage and rural patrimonial networks was, to some extent, reduced following the establishment of Tubman academy. There was also an attempt under Tubman's leadership to begin recruiting literate and semi-literate youth of the urban and peri-urban areas. The military academy was, however, poorly

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[459] Roberts et al 1964, 392

[460] US Army Area Handbook 1964, 389–90; Samukai 2004

maintained, (as most public infrastructure was), which was a reflection of the government's lack of financial and technical resources for the armed forces.[461]

With respect to social conditions in the AFL, throughout much its history, soldiers lived in "deplorable mud huts". Yet the military was "one of the sources of massive government employment that did not require educational standards".[462] This trend began to improve during the 1960s and 1970s, when President Tubman sought to modernise the military by recruiting soldiers from University campuses, notably from the University of Liberia.[463] President Tubman also initiated a recruitment campaign upcountry to integrate new soldiers with higher academic achievements. In 1969, Tubman sent a five-man committee of recruiters to all fifteen counties in Liberia in his nation-wide recruitment campaign. In his effort to modernize the military, Tubman also initiated a recruitment campaign at the University of Liberia. He wanted to recruit more educated Liberians into the military's commissioned officer ranks. During this time, the Army Scholarship Training Program (ASTP) was used as a 'carrot' to recruit bright young Liberians. Recruits were provided a scholarship to attend college. After their graduation from University, they were inducted into the army, normally at the rank of captain.[464] According to Retired General Henry

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[461] By the late 1960s, funding from the national budget for defense was in a steady decline. Maintaining a military has always been burdensome on the Liberian government. A lack of financial and technical resources meant that the armed forces had not been provided sufficient means to maintain maximum effectiveness. Military allocations in 1963 were the highest of any point in the country's history. The national budget was $50,500,000 of which $2,585,213 or 5.1% was spent on defense.

[462] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: American Dilemma, 2008.

[463] Author's confidential interview with former Government minister, April 2012, Monrovia

[464] Author's personal interview with former Chief of Defence Staff, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia

Duba, who was involved in the recruitment at the time as a young officer serving as Personnel Officer, it was from this recruitment campaign that most of the members who would stage the 1980 coup, including Samuel Doe, were brought into the military as enlisted soldiers.[465]

The National Guard totaled about 3,582 troops strong with a headquarters company, Executive Mansion Guard Battalion[466], three infantry battalions and one engineer battalion founded in 1962 at Camp Naama and a 80-man coast guard equipped with at least two US Coast Guard cutters and two patrol boats.[467] The First Infantry Battalion was based at Camp Sheffelin; the 2nd infantry battalion at Headquarters at Barclay Training Center (BTC) and the Third Infantry Battalion headquarters was based at Baworobo, Maryland county, southwestern Liberia. Additionally, the loosely organized national militia was retained, consisting of 20,000 troops to keep order in the interior.[468] The rank and file of the military, however, lacked qualities required of a professional force. Its orientation resembled those of the *lumpen* youth in Sierra Leone as described by Abdullah.[469]

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[465] Ibid. Doe (born 1951) would have been 18 in 1969. He was born in 29 years old at the time of the coup. See also TRC testimony, Henry S. Dubar, part 1, Montserrado county, 12 August 2008.

[466] The 805-man Executive Mansion Guard battalion was established during Tubman's era (see MoD report for details on its duties). The EMG took military commands directly from the President, as opposed to from MoD, but administratively, received administrative direction from the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Author's interview with former Chief of Staff, 28 February 2012.

[467] Roberts 1964, 394; 'France's military role in Africa', Africa Report, 9:1, January 1964, 12

[468] The police force consisted of 700 men, which had received some American training ('France's military role in Africa')

[469] Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, 24.

The Politics of the Military under Tolbert

William Tolbert Jr. succeeded President Tubman in accordance with constitutional provisions in July 1971. Tolbert was the son of a slave descendent and a member of the Americo-Liberian elite. Tolbert sought to diversify Liberia's international relations by bringing Liberia closer to their neighbors (through the Mano River Union in 1973 and ECOWAS). Tolbert sought to 'break the child-like relationship' Liberia had with the United States.[470] This had an important impact on US assistance to the AFL in the early 1970s until about 1978. During the 1970s, global financial "shocks" like the decline in price of rubber and the 1973 oil crisis negatively effected Liberia's economy. By 1979, unemployment rose to 23%. In Monrovia, unemployment had reached 39%. The cost of living was mounting in urban areas: Food prices rose in 1976 by 15%, and a further 15% by 1978. It was estimated in 1974 that three quarters of the households in Liberia earned less than $50 per month. Just how exploitative the economy was in Liberia is highlighted by the fact that an estimated 50% of the household's income was earned by only 5% of the families.[471] These socio-economic factors contributed to disintegration of the AFL, some directly and others more obliquely.

It was in this economic context that pressure for change from below was beginning to mount and resistance to change was being felt within the TWP. Tolbert's administration relied on nepotism—appointing his sons, daughters,

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[470] Amos Sawyer, TRC testimony 2008

[471] Amos Sawyer, TRC testimony 2008

cousins and nephews into government positions.[472] Pressures for democratisation led to the ascendency of political movements (Movement for Justice in Africa-MOJA, PAL, Revelation). University campuses and student unions were important stakeholders advocating for change in the country's governance. Meanwhile, there was considerable resistance to these changes coming from the echelons of the True Whig Party political establishment.

President Tolbert turned to some of the United States' key enemies, notably Cuba, Soviet Union and China, severed its relations with Israel and supported the Palestinian cause in international and regional multilateral forums.

Tolbert made some steps to modernise the AFL. He recruited high school and university graduates into the army and sought to remove many of the Tubman-era soldiers that could not read or write.[473] To a large extent, these changes were contradictory and cosmetic since government coffers were insufficient to carry out let alone sustain modernisation reforms. Lormas continued to hold majority representation in the army's rank-and-file. The main functions of the army continued to focus primarily on conducting light bodyguard duties of political elite and visiting foreign dignitaries in official state ceremonies.[474] In 1973, Tolbert retired more than four hundred aging soldiers.[475]

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[472] Paul Gifford, *Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 16-18

[473] Author's personal interview with former PRC minister, Monrovia, 16 April 2012. According to this former government cabinet minister, only one university graduate was enrolled in the military when Tolbert took control of Liberian government in 1971.

[474] Up to 1980, Liberia did not have private security companies in the country to perform security duties. Soldiers were also instructed to perform tasks on behalf of the government, such as burials of state officials (Author's personal interview with a former Chief of Staff, AFL, 28 February 2012).

[475] Amos Sawyer, *The Emergency of Autocracy*, 287

Tolbert's contradictory actions were highlighted when he recruited from the growing underclass of unemployed men in Monrovia in an attempt to address the youth unemployment problem in urban centers. This strategy proved disastrous, as many of these urban lumpen youth became the core leaders that executed the 1980 coup.[476] These youth grew up under harsh conditions of urban poverty, did not possess property and lacked robust attachments to their former indigenous communities.[477] Many of these new recruits were also poorly trained at Tubman military academy. This crop of new recruits in the early 1970s had a dramatic role in changing the social composition of the enlisted ranks (see below).[478] Under American direction, very few changes in modernizing the military and improving education and training could be instituted except for cosmetic reforms. In 1978, the ROTC program was changed to Army Student Training Program (ASTP) and based at the University of Liberia and the Booker Washington Institute in Kakata among other loal institutons.

Although Tolbert actively sought to modernise the military by initiating recruitment campaigns on national university campuses and offering incentives for young educated Liberians to join.[479] There was, however, a direct link between lack of interest in the army and the deplorable social conditions that most of the rank-and-file soldiers. Officers lived in comparatively better conditions than rank-and-file in Liberia's armed forces in the 1970s. Living

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[476] Amos Sawyer, The Emergency of Autocracy, 287, footnote 53. This included Samuel Doe.

[477] Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder, 24.

[478] Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy, 287.

[479] The professional and educated ethnic groups included the Vai, the Grebo, and Kru, who had come into contact with European explorers, slavers and missionaries earlier than other ethnic groups in Liberia's interior (Hlophe 1979, 277).

conditions within Monrovia's main military barracks was similar to that of an urban slum. One long-time observer of Liberian history describes military slum-like conditions as 'deplorable mud huts'.[480] AFL rank-and-file soldiers lived in makeshift corrugated shack buildings in a separate area in the Barclay Training Center (BTC) barracks. Some soldiers lived outside the barracks in ordinary slums in civilian-occupied areas in Monrovia. This impacted negatively on the military's discipline and command-and-control as 'other-rank' soldiers including then Master Sergeant Doe would regularly go on extended AWOLs to attend to personal/non-military duties like diamond mining in the late 1970s. It was not surprising that, after the PRC coup in 1980, Doe and his followers cited these deplorable living conditions as a root cause of their coup.[481]

Tolbert made an attempt to reform social conditions in the military in 1974. Under a military 'self-help' program, Tolbert initiated a military construction project at Camp Sheffelin. The program focused primarily on housing construction to improve the living conditions of soldiers and officers at Camp Sheffelin. Additionally, a component of the program focused on rice production in an attempt to encourage self-help policies related to food security in the army. Twenty-five nine family unit apartments were erected and foundation was laid for six additional buildings as part of the program. The 'self-help' program, however, was abolished by Tolbert in 1977 due to logistical and financial constraints. In 1979, Tolbert asked for US assistance to assist with funding a nationwide military housing project. This request was a result of the

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[480] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: Legacy of an American Dilemma
[481] Author's confidential interview with a former PRC official, Monrovia, 28 February 2012

Liberian investigation into the causes of the Rice Riot. Members of the AFL that participated in the riots stated poor living conditions as the reason why they joined the rioters.[482] The assistance program was derailed by the subsequent coup that occurred in 1980.

By 1978, other cosmetic reforms in the army were occurring. The National Guard was established as a Brigade based at Barclay's Training Centre headquarters. The LNG also consisted of the Executive Mansion Guard Battalion, the engineer battalion and First Artillery Battalion (based at Camp Jackson in Naama, Bomi county), two tactical infantry combat battalions (1st infantry battalion at Camp Sheffelin and 2nd infantry battalion, which moved to Camp Tolbert in Todee) and three non-tactical battalions tasked with providing guard duty services, where soldiers served as policemen, customs and immigration officials, and tax collectors.[483] These included the Third Infantry Battalion based at the BTC, the Fourth Infantry Battalion at Zwedru in Grand Gedeh County, and the Fifth Infantry Battalion at Gbarnga in Bong County, serving mostly as auxiliary personnel. The Support Battalion, also based at the BTC, was composed of the Medical Company, the LNG Brigade Band, the Brigade Special Unit (a parade formation), and the Military Police. The Sixth Infantry Battalion (Bomi county) and the Second Infantry Battalion (Camp Todee based at Careysburg, in Todee district) were considered to be the best

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[482] Ministry of Defense annual report 1982, 87

[483] Annual Report of the Ministry of National Defense to the Fourth Session of the Forty-Eighth Legislature of the Republic of Liberia, Year Ending December 31, 1978. Monrovia: Government of Liberia, 10–13 (Accessed 15 September 2012). Many Third Infantry Battalion soldiers in the Monrovia area guarded installations or performed non-military duties, serving as cooks, drivers, or aides to officers and other officials.

fighting units in the army, each operating with about 200 to 300 men.[484] The total strength of the LNG in 1979 was 4,673.[485]

In 1978-79, U.S. military mission had an authorized staff of six personnel (5 US army and 1 U.S. navy) including a US Chief of Mission, holding a rank of a US army Colonel. U.S. Security Assistance to the AFL totaled US$7.7 million (loans) mainly for modernization of the force.[486] The Army Chief of Staff was General Henry Korboi Johnson, an ethnic Lorma trained in the United States at the US General Staff College.

Analysis of the Social Character of the Liberia National Guard
Thus far, this chapter demonstrates that at no point in Liberia's history has the National Guard attracted the brightest minds in the country. There had never been a system of recruitment and promotion based on merit. Accessed depended on ethnicity and loyalty to the President as opposed to an objective criteria of qualifications and experience.[487] Prior to the 1980s, the army attracted mostly illiterates from the interior. During this time, illiteracy was between 65-87% depending on which source one uses.[488] According to the current defense minister, from the period spanning 1956 to 1980, the military experienced a

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[484] This report draws from Liberia country study, 1985,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/liberia_5_organdstrength.htm
[485] Annual Report of the Ministry of National Defense to the Fourth Session of the Forty-Eighth Legislature of the Republic of Liberia, Year Ending December 31, 1978, Monrovia: Government of Liberia
[486] Annual Report of the Ministry of National Defence, 1978
[487] Hlophe 1979, 277
[488] Annual Report of the Ministry of National Defence, 1978; Willie A. Givens and Samuel K. Doe, *Liberia, The Road to Democracy: Under the Leadership of Samuel Kanyon Doe, the Policies and Public Statements of Dr. Samuel K. Doe*, Kensal Press, 1986

severe decline in recruitment practices. During this period, the military attracted the "lower strata of society":

> It was a skeleton brigade of soldiers who were predominantly from the lower economic and social stratum of society. They were poorly paid, and had less than decent facilities for accommodation and care'.[489]

The army lacking a clear defence mission in practice was commonly deployed to perform ceremonial and guard duties. According to current defence minister Brownie Samukai, soldiers in the Liberian National Guard durig the 1950s were localled referred to as '*Nokos'*, a local nomenclature used to describe a soldier without a rank…"the least of the crop of professionals, uneducated, among other meanings".[490] *Nokos* also referred to soldiers as "hunting dogs for the ruling elite".

The officer corps in the LNG was comparatively more advanced, however. Most of the officers were trained at the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program at the Booker Washington Institute in Kakata (set up by the Americans).[491] But the training module and regiment was wholly dependent on American aid. The primary mission of the ROTC program was "to train college and high-school cadets in the Republic of Liberia in basic military science and subjects, who in the event of an emergency may be called upon for active duty with the AFL for a minimum amount of additional training."[492]

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[489] Brownie J. Samukai, Armed Forces Of Liberia: Reality Check For A New Military With A Redefined Constitutional Mission, The Perspective, February 17, 2004, http://www.theperspective.org/2004/feb/afl.html (Accessed 20 January 2012)

[490] Ibid.

[491] Samukai 2004

[492] 1982 Ministry of Defense report, 34

ROTC was abolished by Tolbert administration and eventually revived following the 1980 military coup.[493]

In the late 1970s, the police and military were "dump sites" for the illiterate, uneducated and lower strata of Liberian society.[494] However, the national police forces had attained a comparatively higher status in terms of law enforcement during the Tolbert regime. As other socio-economic options for career or educational advancement were cut off from young rural dwelling Liberians, a suitable option was to join either the police or the army. The police had higher recruitment criteria than the military during this time. According to a former AFL Chief of Staff,

> Police recruits at least had to be able to read and write. Police were responsible for writing reports. However, the army brought in many illiterates—in general, the army's rank-and-file was mostly unlettered. The minimal requirements for the officer corps was attaining high-school certificate.[495]

As Samukai explains, during the 1970s, the AFL… "represented how those from the lower strata of society were responding to economic hardships, escaping the destitution of subsistence living in the rural area, taste for urban migration,

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[493] Was this when current defense minister Brownie Samukai and Fumba Sirleaf participated in the programme? Additionally, Liberia Opportunities Industrialisation Center (LOIC) offered technical training to army personnel at no cost to Liberian ministry of defence.

[494] Author's personal interview with Rtd. General Duba, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia. According to Hlophe, the lower ranks of the occupational positions (domestics, laboureres, farm hands, logger, tappers, causual workers were the Kpelle and the Bassa, the largest ethnic group numerically in Liberia (Hlophe 1979, 277)

[495] Author's personal interview with former Chief of National Defence, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia

avenue for education, training and employment, entity for class recognition, and indirectly acquiring thrust of political power through the AFL".[496]

In sum, the AFL lacked an ability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate means of force. The Liberian state did not exist independency of ethnicity. The state existed as an exclusive apparatus underscored by ethnicity to consolidate Americo-Liberian hegemonic interests. Cracks within command structure were beginning to show in the late 1970s. Soldiers could not be accounted for or counted on to protect the interests of state that failed to provide basic social standards to its army personnel. Promptly after the 1979 Rice Riot, Tolbert replaced Colonel Henry Koboi Johnson with Americo-Liberian Colonel Franklin Smith, a cousin of Tolbert, who had formerly headed the AFL aviation unit.[497]

According to Kromah, by the late 1970s and early 1980 (before the coup), "the morale of the Liberian army was simply at its lowest ebb in history. The men could no longer match their active and feared predecessors that operated at different historical periods."[498] According to one western journalist, rank-and-file soldiers lived in "squalid conditions and were even required to give ten percent of their salaries to their officers".[499] According to Kromah,

> Soldiers in Liberia were living below the nadir of the economic ladder, and were among the most illiterate in the society. The absence of external

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[496] Samukai 2004

[497] Author's personal interview with former Chief of National Defence, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia

[498] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: Legacy of an American Dilemma, Narratives of the Reigns of President Tolbert and Doe, 2008, http://www.alhajikromahpage.org/alhajilibusdilemma.htm (Accessed 13 March 2012)

[499] Sanford J. Ungar, Liberia: A Revolution or Just Another Coup? *The Atlantic Monthly,* June 1981

and internal war and the proliferation of civilian security agencies drastically reduced the usefulness of the military.[500]

Prior to the coup, the AFL's rank-and-file was dominated by Liberian ethnic groups originating from rural areas (especially from Lofa County) and agriculture backgrounds.[501] These soldiers were recruited from urban lumpen backgrounds and lacked loyalty to both state and regime. One must view military recruitment in a broader historical context of abusive social relations between elite and rank-and-file, characterized by structural violence against Liberian indigenes. Liberia's political and economic elite has historically relied on military force to pacify and control the hinterland. Violence was a means to quell social unrest and limit revolt against the Americo-Liberian hegemony. Therefore, many ordinary Liberians had a negative perception about security institutions, viewing the military and police as an extension of politics by force. According to Kromah, this history of state-sponsored structural violence was also an influencing factor for Liberian indigenes to join the AFL in the pre-coup years.

Under harsh conditions of neglect, general unemployment of indigenous youth and general disgruntlement with the deteriorating social conditions lead to the 1979 Rice Riots. During the Rice Riots in April 1979, the military responded in an unprofessional and undisciplined manner.[502] Following the mass uprising,

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[500] Alhaji Kromah, Liberia: Legacy of an American Dilemma, 2008

[501] Liberian national census data indicates that in 1962, 81.5% of the total population engaged in agriculture (forestry, hunting and fishing). Liberian office of national planning, 1965, table 25. In 1971, 72.4% of the Liberian population lived in rural abodes. Ministry of Planning, 1972, 29.

[502] April 14 1979 Rice Riots exposed the widening socio-economic gap between the ruling elite and the indigenous masses. The Riots also revealed the cracks of a one-party political system that

soldiers joined the rioters and looted businesses and houses in downtown Monrovia.[503] A Liberian government investigation into the root causes of the riots in 1979 revealed that members of the AFL that participated in the riots cited their poor living conditions as the reason why they joined the rioters to cause havoc on the streets of Monrovia. According to the report, one of the prime reasons for the coup was the "poor housing conditions of the soldiers".[504] The military in Liberia has historically been seen as an institution for the ne'er do well. The relationship between the military and the civilian population was antagonistic due to acts of extortion and exploitation. Soldiers often took advantage of their positions to extort goats or chickens from residents in the interior.

Military under Doe (1980-1990)
Prior to the April 1980 military coup, the army was relatively absolved from politics.[505] On 12 April 1980, seventeen enlisted soldiers attached to President Tolbert's Executive Mansion Guard pulled off a successful coup, which resulted in the assassination of Tolbert. Following the April 1980 coup, soldiers and unemployed youth engaged in looting and random violence. An estimated two

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was about to collapse. During this time, there were intensifying economic hardship for the majority of Liberians, President Tolbert announced an increase in the price of a 100-pound bag of rice from $22 to $30. When it became apparent that Tolbert's family stood to benefit from the price increases, thousands of Liberians protested in downtown Monrovia. Tolbert ordered the police to fire on unarmed demonstrators. The rice riots left at least 40 dead and hundreds injured followed by looting and arson (Youboty 2005, 17; see also TRC report 2008).

[503] George Klay Kieh, Jr. Military Rule in Liberia, 330

[504] Ministry of Defense annual report 1982, 87

[505] An exception was in February 1963 when the Liberian National Guard commander, Colonel David Thompson was arrested for allegedly trying to instigate a coup plot against the government after he reportedly said, 'if only 250 Togolese soldiers could overthrow their government, a Liberian army of 5,000 could seize power easily' ('France's military involvement in Africa', 12)

hundred people were killed within three days of the coup.[506] Those who executed the coup formed the People's Redemption Council (PRC). Samuel K. Doe, a Master Sergeant was the highest-ranking soldier among the putschists became Head of State and Commander-in-Chief while Thomas Weh Sen, an ethnic Sapo from the southeast, became Doe's deputy chairman. The PRC suspended the constitution, dissolved the executive and legislative branches of government, and eliminated the right of habeas corpus. Marital law was declared and political activity was banned. A Supreme Military Tribunal composed of five military officers was appointed to hear cases in which treason was by decree, to establish an institutional framework to oppress opposition social forces and maintain domestic order from 1980-1985. Accounts of the coup have been explained elsewhere, and although this history remains debatable and marred with controversy, I will not summarizing this history here.[507] For the purpose of this section, the primary emphasis will focus on 'social transformations' in the AFL's military structure, social composition, its external relations with the United States and social conditions in the general rank-and-file. These issues will be reviewed below.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline all of the events that lead to the eventual collapse of Doe's dictatorial regime.[508] It is important to make mention of some of the notable developments that impacted on the social

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[506] Liberia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies, 1984, 250-1

[507] The history of the 1980 coup is controversial as none of the 17 enlisted soldiers ever revealed the true motivations behind their action or whether outside forces were assisting them.

[508] Doe was a lumpen-proletariat to the core. Deeply insecure and politically unstable, Doe purged many of the original 17 soldiers on suspicion of alleged coups. On 12 June 1981, 13 enlisted men were arrested and executed for allegedly plotting to overthrow the PRC including Vice-Chair Weh Syn.

character of the military. Following Kandeh's definition, the coup is best characterised as a 'coup from below'. The 1980 coup immediately altered the social composition of the AFL's rank-and-file in two fundamental ways: First, it was led by a group of 17 low ranking enlisted soldiers and a few junior non-commissioned officers.[509] One of Doe's first orders as Head of State to instruct all enlisted men to arrest and detain senior officers and cease taking orders former their former commanding officers.[510] Many officers were rounded-up throughout the country, jailed and detained in the post stockade in Monrovia and its parent Belleh Yellah maximum-security prison in northeastern Liberia. Poorly educated privates and corporals became captains and generals overnight.[511] Thus, the early casualty of the coup was complete breakdown of the command and control structure of the AFL. Army discipline was another initial casualty of the coup and remained a serious problem throughout the 1980s. Despite an immediate announcement by Head of State Doe to increase the minimum salary of enlisted soldiers to US$250 a month and US$200 per month for "ordinary government employee",[512] looting, extortion, public drunkenness and petty thievery were commonly attributed to soldiers in the army. Another coup leader, Thomas Quiwonkpa was previously a corporal was

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[509] The only soldier among the 17 that had a high-school education was Quiwonkpa. Many of the 17 soldiers had been working as illicit diamond miners upcountry to supplement their poor salaries (TRC report 2008, 111).

[510] Author's personal interview with former Chief of National Defence, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia; James Youboty, A Nation in Terror: The True Story of the Liberian Civil War; Liberia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies, 1984, 247

[511] Liberia: A Country Study, American University Foreign Area Studies, 1984, 273. The Ministry of National Defense report in 1980 sheds light on these self-promotions.

[512] James Youboty, A Nation in Terror: The True Story of the Liberian Civil War, Philadelphia: Parkside Impressions Enterprises, 2004, 31

promoted as Commander General (this position was created after the coup).[513]

Quiwonkpa held the post for three and a-half years until the conflict between

himself and Doe escalated between 1983-1984 (see below).

Within in the broader military regime, the People's Redemption Council

(PRC) initially declared its enemy as the corrupt True Whig Party establishment.

Although it pledged its commitment to end corruption, Williams argues that 'his

regime goes down as one of the worst examples of the culture of nepotism and

cronyism that helped to keep Liberia unproductive and backwards.[514] By 1982,

Doe began purging members of the junta including Weh Sen for his

disagreement for prolonging PRC's stay in power and his alleged links to

progressive domestic opposition groups and Libya.[515] According to Brownie

Samukai, ethnic groups from Grand Gedeh (25.3%), Lofa (13.4%) and Bong

countries (11.2%) had the highest percentage of personnel in the AFL in the

early 1980s.[516] Collectively, ethnic groups from the southeast region represented

nearly 60% of the AFL's composition.

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[513] Quiwonkpa (born in 1955) was 25 years old at the time of the coup. Quiwonkpa entered the army at the age of 16—that would make it 1971; he finished high school in 1978. Quiwonkpa was appointed Commanding General of the army in May 1980. Nicholas Podier was a Grebo. Weh Syn was a Kru became deputy head of state. Manos and Gios made up 15% of the Liberian population. Col. Jerry G. Friday, Brig. Gen. David MT Kimeh, Lt. Col. William S. Gould, Harrison Pennue, Albert Toe, Gen. Abrahm Kollie, Col. Joseph K Sampson, Col. Larry Wleh Borteh, Lt. Stanely Chunyee Tarwuo, Capt. Joseph V Tubman, Mj Swen N Dixon, Lt. Col. Kolonseh Gonyor, Mj, Yelleh Kebbah, Jeffery Gbatu, Robert Nowoku, John Sumo Nyuma, Jacob Swen, Lt. Col. Toe (Kru)

[514] Gabriel Williams, *Liberia: Heart of Darkness*, 68

[515] Samukai 2004

[516] Brownie Samukai, Armed Forces of Liberia: Reality Check for a New Military with a Redefined Constitutional Mission, *The Perspective*, 17 February 2004

The AFL's internal military structure consisted of six infantry battalions including an 805-man strong Executive Mansion Guard.[517] The United States provided American-made M-16s to equip the army. Additionally, the AFL consisted of a small Coast Guard, Air Reconnaissance Unit, Engineer battalion, combat support unit (artillery support) and a newly established agricultural battalion, but the majority of these support units were skeletons. The social composition of the military changed drastically following the coup. The minister of national defense was Major General Gray D. Allison, a career military officer and graduate of the US Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Major General Allison, an ethnic Grebo, from the southeast of the country was close to Mr. Doe. Almost all of the key uniformed leaders of the military are Krahn, beginning with his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Henry S. Dubar. Krahn soldiers were dominant in the two most important units within Doe's army—the Executive Mansion Guard and the First Infantry battalion. Krahn soldiers also headed the military intelligence and two additional tactical infantry battalions.[518]

In the post-coup period, the army was dominated by three ethnic groups—Krahn, represented by President Samuel K. Doe, Gios, represented by Thomas Quiwonkpa and Kru, represented by Thomas Weh Syn, a Kru who served as deputy head of state. According to the former Chief of Staff, Krahns

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[517] The EMG's institutional purpose is the protection of the Head of State; in practice, by all accounts, it served as President Doe's personal militia comprised predominately of ethnic Krahns. It was headed by an ethnic Krahn (Brigadier General Edward Smith) in 1986. The EMG had a detachment in Monrovia and an auxiliary detachment in Tuzon, the President's hometown.
[518] Chapter III, in Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 33.

became disproportionately represented in the army. While ethnic Krahns comprised about 5% of the total population in Liberia, their representation in the AFL was out of proportion to its size in the country, as approximately 15-20% of the total army was ethnic Krahns.[519] In 1980, total strength of AFL was 5,668 troops with 4,059 soldiers in ground forces contingent.[520]

The First Infantry Battalion, based at Camp Sheffelin located approximately 35 miles east of Monrovia on the airport road, consisted of about 2,000 troops was predominately Krahn, who were focused on the protection of Doe's presidency. It's commanding officer was Colonel Moses Wright, an ethnic Krahn and a brother-in-law of the President. According to a human rights group in the US, the bulk of US Military assistance to Liberia went to supporting the first battalion. The second, forth and sixth battalions also are headed by Krahn officers. The fourth battalion, based in Zwedru, filled with foot soldiers from Doe's hometown in Tuzon, was implicated in widespread brutal reprisals against ethnic Gios/Manos and Grebos following the failed November 12 1985 invasion led by Quiwonkpa. The fourth battalion was lead by Colonel Arthur Joloka, who is believed to be a relative of Doe.[521]

From 1981-1983, Doe instructed his Chief of Staff to secretly recruit large numbers of Krahns into the military.[522] An internal power struggle between Doe and Quiwonkpa must be viewed in the context of a political conflict

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[519] Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986

[520] Ministry of National Defense annual report 1980.

[521] Chapter III, in Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 36

[522] Author's personal interview with former Chief of National Defence, 28 February 2012, Monrovia, Liberia

between the PAL and MOJA camps within the PRC.[523] In 1983, Doe assigned Quiwonkpa to the Secretary-General's position within the PRC and subsequently 'dishonorably discharged' him.[524] Quiwonkpa fled into exile in late 1983 along with his aide-de-camp Prince Johnson.[525]

In 1983, Quiwonkpa and some loyal of his troops staged the "Nimba Raid", which further militarized the political conflict between the Krahns and Gios. After the invasion failed, many Gios were purged and executed on the orders of Doe's Krahn-dominated military. Recognizing Doe's brutal tactics and his desire to marginalise his rivals within the PRC, Quiwonkpa sought political exile in the United States in 1984.[526]

On 22 August 1984, about 200 soldiers from the Executive Mansion Guard (EMG) Unit acting on direct orders from President Doe were accused of rape, particularly during attacks on the University of Liberia.[527] This event, along with the 12 November 1984 invasion, exposed serious problems of

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[523] The Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) was formed in 1973 with the intention of challenging the Americo-Liberian hegemony. It was led by Togba-Nah Tipoteh, a Kru, Amos Sawyer, an Americo-Liberian and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Henry Boima Fahnbulleh, a Vai Political Scientist. According to Gbla, MOJA advocated mainly for the nationalisation of major economic enterprises, the confiscation of the illegal landholdings of the Whig aristocracy and the punishment for government corruption. Its membership was largely drawn from the middle-class. It's major tactics, as a pressure group, was the calling for strikes and work slow downs'. Osman Gbla, 2007. ECOWAS and West African Security: Case Studies of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Conflicts (1989-2004), Unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Fourah Bay College, 186.

[524] Ministry of National Defense annual report, 1985

[525] Stephen Ellis 2003, 57-58

[526] Ibid.

[527] Recalling the event, a human rights organization stated, 'The soldiers fired indiscriminately into the crown of unarmed demonstrators, stripped students naked, flogged with rattan (rattans are long switches made from palm vines), beat them with riffle butts, extorted money from them and…dragged female students out of hiding in offices and lavatories, stripped them naked and raped them' (Liberia: A Promise Betrayed, 40).

indiscipline within the army ranks.[528] The lumpen-base of recruits were seen drunk and smoking marijuana while on patrols in Monrovia.[529]

External Relations with the United States
One cannot downplay the enabling role of the United States—both overtly and covertly—in destabilising the Liberian military and society throughout the 1980s. Relations between Doe's government and the United States military were complex. After seizing power, Mr. Doe initially flirted with the idea of aligning with the Libyans. However, Doe used the Libyan card as a bargaining chip to get U.S military assistance to support and legitimize his regime. In late May 1980, a United States delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose, Pennsylvania Congressman William Gray, and Jerry Funk of the National Security Council from the White House visited Monrovia. One of the purposes of the meeting was to encourage Head of State Doe to commit to a deadline for handing over power to civilian authorities. The terms for this handover were agreed: a new constitution would be drafted before democratic elections would be held in four years.[530] According to Retired General Henry Dubar, the junta's Chief of Staff in the early 1980s (until he sought exile in the United States), Doe promised to hand power over to a civilian government in exchange for American aid to refurbish military barracks throughout the country (including upcountry). As a show of support for Doe's

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[528] The EMG also was the unit responsible for the attack on the UL campus on August 22 1984 (Liberia: A Promise Betrayed 34).
[529] Chapter III, in Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 32.
[530] Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 16; Kramer 1995

regime, U.S. military sponsored an airshow in Monrovia on the first anniversary of the coup. The Americans fulfilled their end of the bargain. The United States Government pledged approximately $38 million for a multi-year housing project for military barracks.[531] The barracks reconstruction was completed by 1986.[532]

However, Doe reneged on his promise to step down before the 1985 elections. He set up an interim commission (with himself as President), changed the elections schedule and his date of birth to meet the age requirement as stipulated in the revised constitution (1984), established his own political party and declared his candidacy. Before the vote, he barred two leading opposition parties from running. Doe received 50.9% of the vote, barely enough votes to meet the required margin and despite ample evidence that he had been defeated. Following the election, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate both passed nonbinding resolutions calling for an end to U.S assistance but the administration continued to provide Doe's regime financial aid to keep his administration from collapsing.[533]

Quiwonkpa's coup attempt became "Plan B" in the event that Doe won or refused to step down. Quiwonkpa plotted his return by traveling to Sierra Leone to overthrow Doe. He enlisted the support of prominent Liberian politicians and business elites including Boima Fahnbulleh, Ellen Johnson-

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[531] United States General Accounting Office, Report to the honourable Edward M. Kennedy, US Senate, Liberia, Need to improve accountability and control over US assistance, July 1987, pp. 6, http://gao.justia.com/agency-for-international-development/1987/7/liberia-nsiad-87-173/NSIAD-87-173-full-report.pdf (Accessed 18 May 2012)

[532] Author's confidential interview, Monrovia, 28 February 2012; see also interview with Bill Berkeley, March 1983, cited Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 17

[533] Kramer 1995

Sirleaf, James Holder, Robert Phillips and Harry Greaves.[534] Mr. Fahnbulleh had been in France received a call from Quiwonkpa, whom he later in met in Sierra Leone. Mr. Fahnbulleh enlisted support from President of Sierra Leone Siaka Stevens (given his close personal ties with the President). On 12 November 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa's forces invaded Liberia from Sierra Leone with support from President Stevens' government.[535] Although Stevens had already handed power to his army General Joseph Momoh, the decision to support Quiwonkpa was Stevens'. Sierra Leone provided arms and some demobilised men from the state paramilitary force, the Special Security Division to assist Quiwonkpa's forces.[536] Doe's Krahn-dominated military were able to successfully counter the invasion attack at the radio station in Monrovia after a few tactical mistakes and Quiwonkpa was executed.[537]

Following the failed 1985 invasion, an estimated number of reprisals in Nimba county and Monrovia that followed the 1985 invasion were in the range of between 400-500 to as many as 2,000.[538] There was a massive breakdown in discipline and authority in both the government and AFL following the 12 November 1985 coup attempt.[539] Krahn soldiers headed all of the most important

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[534] Joe Wylie, TRC testimony, 22 August 2008.

[535] Notable power brokers behind the scenes of an increasingly senile Stevens was Police Inspector General Bambay Kamara, My thanks to Prof. Ibrahim Abdullah for point this out to me.

[536] Author's confidential interview with current Government of Liberia national security official

[537] For useful accounts on this failed invasion in 1985, see Joe Wylie, TRC testimony, 22 August 2008; TRC report 2008.

[538] *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights*, New York, 1986, 21

[539] At the time of the November coup attempt, Krahn men headed 5 of the 16 government ministries. The governor of the national bank was Khan. Numerous deputy ministers and assistant ministers were Krahn. Even though Krahn made up barely 4% of the population. (*Liberia: A Promise Betrayed, 1986*, 21)

uniformed divisions within the army, including the vital Executive Mansion Guard (EMG), military intelligence and all three mobile infantry battalions that made up the 23rd Infantry Brigade. The Army's Chief of Staff was an ethnic Krahn to ensure robust loyalty to the Doe regime.[540] According to a report, 892 loyal soldiers and officers received promotions following the 1985 coup attempt as a reward for their defeat of Quiwonkpa's forces.[541]

The US-Liberian diplomatic and military relationship was complex. U.S. involvement in the affairs of Liberia is obscured by the important role that the American Ambassador plays in influencing strategic policy in Liberia and U.S. military presence is opaque. According to journalist Bob Woodward, William J. Casey (President Reagan's key advisor) selected Doe as one of 12 Heads of State to receive special security assistance. In 1982, the CIA task force was using Liberia as a key operational area for its heightened clandestine campaign against Libya. Liberia was useful for clandestine CIA operations in support of Chadian leader Hissene Habre, who successfully ousted Libyan-backed rival Goukoni Oueddei in June 1982. In 1985, Liberia was used as a staging post to airlift arms and ammunition to UNITA in Angola after the Clark Amendment barred covert U.S security assistance to any factions in Angola.[542] As one former intelligence officer with on-the-ground experience in West Africa told Reed Kramer in 1995, 'We were prepared to use every lever against Tripoli, and Monrovia had an

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[540] *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed*

[541] Chapter III, in Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 31-44

[542] Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*, New York: Simons and Schuster, 1987)

important part'. Kramer concluded from this that the CIA and White House had 'huge stake in keeping the Liberian regime in place'.[543]

United States financial aid to Liberia increased steadily from 1980-1985. There was a marked increase in US military support to Liberia after the April 1980 coup. Military assistance in 1979 reached a low of $20 million but rose to $95 million by 1984.[544] By 1986, the USG had provided a total of $434 million to Liberian government, of which $66 million was directed to military assistance.[545] By comparison, U.S foreign aid to Liberia from 1946 to 1961 totaled $41 million (the fourth highest in sub-Saharan Africa). Between 1962 and 1980, economic and military aid totaled $278 million.[546]

Throughout the 1980s, the United States maintained a small International Military Education Training programme in Liberia. There were 318 Liberian mid-level career officers trained in US-based military staff colleges, which represented only six percent of the African military students and approximately five percent of the AFL.[547] The Americans preferred to deploy US Army Mobile Training Teams to improve AFL training capacity and maintain its influence during the 1980s.[548]

Meanwhile, the US military mission continued to provide training and subsidize travel costs for Liberian officers to study in the United States through the 1980s. In 1984, the U.S. Military's International Military and Education and

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[543] Kramer 1995

[544] Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, *This Child Will be Great*, 108

[545] PBS, Liberia and the United States

[546] Kramer 1995

[547] William H. McCoy, Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in U.S. IMET training and its role in internal defence and development, RAND's National Defence Research Institute, 1994, 21, 25.

[548] Over 20 teams were deployed during the 1980s, see above note 144

Training program (IMET) funded a total of 56 Liberian officers and enlisted soldiers in ninety-nine professional courses in the United States. Five US mobile training teams were sent to Liberia at a cost of US$800,000 that same year.[549] During the summer of 1984, about 350 Liberian soldiers received special training by US military officers; most of these officers were from Grand Gedeh, Doe's home county. About one hundred and fifty of these loyal officers were subsequently assigned to the First battalion of the AFL, the unit that Doe relied upon for his personal security.[550] This is evidence of the United States' complicacy in supporting local practices that are detrimental to 'sustainable peace' in Liberia.

During Doe's rein in power, most of the military programmes were structured in the benefit of ethnic Krahns. Doe had little desire to ensure inclusive development throughout the country. Additionally, Doe's administration failed to alter the hierarchy where Americo-Liberians dominated the social, economic and political sectors of Liberia for more than a century.[551] By all indicators, Liberia disintegrated into complete collapse during the 1980s. The objective of US military assistance was to serve American national interests as opposed to effectively modern or improve the professionalism and discipline of the AFL. US deployed Mobile Training Teams in Liberia to maintain a degree of influence over the situation. According to a RAND assessment, "MTT team

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[549] 1984 Annual report, 75

[550] Chapter III, in Liberia: A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: New York, 1986, 35.

[551] George Kieh, The First Liberian War: The Crisis of Underdevelopment, New York: Peter Lang, 2009, 124-145

chiefs were struck by the necessity to 'start from ground zero' every time a new team went to Liberia".[552]

After a Liberian General Accounting Office audit revealed that most of the US economic assistance had been mismanaged and an $800,000 arrearage, Doe's administration was forced to hand over supervision of the government's internal financial decision-making structure to a 17-person team American experts from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for a period of two-years. Before the first year of the contract was complete, Doe had stonewalled the team's work and the experts returned to the United States without any meaningful impact on Liberia's economic governance.[553]

Problematising African Security Forces

On a superficial level, it seems to make common sense that peacebuilders should focus on those armed individuals and groups to disincentivise the use of violence in pursuit of political or economic objectives. However, there are much deeper reasons why peacebuilding should focus on the security sector in the immediate war-peace transition. One of the major problems facing many African states (especially those on the margins of the UNDP Human Development Index) is that security institutions have not been able to establish a position that is above or independent of the broader social and political ills in their respective societies. The security sector has come to represent the "bad" features in these societies. For example, military forces during the colonial period were both instruments

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[552] McCoy 1994, 26
[553] Kramer 1995

and symbols of external occupation. This explains why few educated Sierra Leonean and Liberians chose to enlist in the military and police as a prospective career in the post-colonial period. Post-colonial elites in most West African countries retained their colonial state security structuresin the post-colonial period with little modificiation to reflect the needs of their societies.[554] Since the military and police forces' role was not been substantially redefined after independence, senior military perrsonnel either became pivotal political actors interfering in politics (through coup d'états in the mid-1960s). Later, once the threat of military coups became widespread, these institutions were in many cases disarmed by the political class in favour of other informal security/paramilitary forces.

More generally, the security sector reinforced structures and practices in the post-colonial state that sustained inequalities, discrimination and unequal power dynamics between state and society.[555] Therefore, the security sector is not separate from the dominant structures and practices that sustain long-standing social and economic conditions of violence in these societies. This is why emphasis must be placed on security sector transformation—without fully addressing structures and practices within the state that impact on the everyday realm of social relations in society, then equitable economic development and justice cannot ever be fully realised. It is critical to recognize that the security

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[554] The main exception is probably The Gambia, which disbanded their military following independence and established a larger state police force (Crocker 1972)

[555] Kandeh, *Coups from Below*, 2006

sector (particularly the military) is intimately connected with the social fabric and the political economy context of African societies.[556]

To illustrate connections between the security sector and the social fabric in Sierra Leone, I draw on the existing literature on military and security institutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in particular and West Africa more generally.[557] Thomas Cox's study of civil-military relations in post-independent Sierra Leone highlights the power dynamics and political relations between the senior ranks of the army and the civilian political elite.[558] Senior military officers became enmeshed within the functioning of internal politics of the state in a problematic way. This eventually led to a breakdown of authority between military leaders and civilians.[559]

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[556] Yusuf Bangura, 'Security Sector Reform Needs Inclusive Politics and Jobs for the Poor', *Open Democracy*, 19 March 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/yusuf-bangura/rebuilding-cote-d%E2%80%99ivoire-lessons-from-sierra-leone (Accessed 20 March 2012)

[557] On the history of the RSLAF, I drew upon Timothy Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976. 1976; Turay, Eddie E.A and Arthur Abraham. *The Sierra Leone Army: A Century of History*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers, 1978; See also select chapters from various volumes including Kandeh, *Coups from Below*; Ismail Rashid, 'Serving the Nation?' the Disintegration and Reconstituton of the Sierra Leone Army, 1961-2007." In *Rescuing a Failed State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008*, edited by Lansana Gberie. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2009;AAlbrecht, Peter and Paul Jackson, ed. *Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone*. London: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and International Alert, 2009.

[558] Ibid, 78

[559] As Cox explains, senior officers "simply would not submit to the 'authority of their commanders' or support 'the kind of political role the latter played'. Once army disintegration had become a reality of civil-military relations, the only course remaining to the civilians was to give the SLPP loyalists virtually all the top posts in the army and to have unreliable officers either spied upon, cashiered or arrested. The breakdown of authority patterns in the Sierra Leone army ultimately coalesced with increased praetorianism in politics generally. All of these developments eventually helped to initiate a military-in-politics syndrome in Sierra Leone" (Cox 1976, 78).

"Structural Violence" and Socio-Economic Conditions

I draw on the discussion led by Sierra Leonean scholars mostly from the diaspora on the social background of the main combatants in the civil conflict.[560] Fundamental to my understanding of violence in Sierra Leone was the fact that the "foot soldiers" in the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) faction and those fighting on behalf of the Sierra Leone military (during the counterinsurgency efforts) were products of the same social context, in which state violence was perpetrated in the everyday realm of social relations in Sierra Leone. According to Ibrahim Abdullah, youth fighters on all sides of the civil conflict came from "marginal or socially disconnected" backgrounds that "straddle both urban and rural areas".[561] Before and during the war, the RSLAF recruited heavily from among the urban slums the so-called social misfits of society. In late 1991-1992, President Momoh's administration recruited criminals and delinquent youth from the urban ghettos in Freetown. For these particular youth, war was a survival strategy and presented an opportunity to intervene (with the means of violence) on their own behalf for a collpased state that had failed them.[562] Some participated in the war to seek revenge for past misdeeds committed by local state authorities.

During the National Provisional Redemption Council (NPRC) military coup in 1992, junior military officers and soldiers came from a more enlightened

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[560] See Ibrahim Abdullah et al, Lumpen youth culture and political violence: Sierra Leoneans debate the RUF and the Civil War, *Africa Development*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3/4, 1997

[561] Ibrahim Abdullah et al, Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: Sierra Leoneans Debate the RUF and the Civil War, *Africa Development*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3/4, 1997; Abdullah, Ibrahim, ed. *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*. Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004.

[562] Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Youth Culture', 172

group, revolutionary consciousness. [563] Contrast this group with the low-ranking soldiers that led the 25 May 1997 coup (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council).[564] These soldiers were essentially products of the same generation and culture of youth that grew up in poverty in urban ghettos, including the surroundings of Wilberforce, Freetown's larges military barracks. They had grown up in a social context in which state violence had potentiated all aspects of social relations within society.

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[563] According to testimonies in the TRC report, the army introduced a recruiting standard called the Progressive Qualification Scheme in the late 1980s. The PQS had two levels, PQS 1 and PQS 2. This initiative from the Operations Department sought to ensure that decisions about rank and promotion within the Army ranks was based on merit rather than politics. While this new initiatives was laudable, only two rounds of PQS 1 & 2 officers had graduated before the war broke out in 1991 (TRC report, Vol. 3A, 147). These two rounds of recruitment lead to an increase in young Mende officers joining the RSLAF. The batch of officers deployed in the Tigers Unit—in the Fourth battalion were based in Kenema. The southeasterners were aggrieved about the deterioration of the military. Included in these younger junior officers were southeasterners like Second Lieutenant Julius Maada Bio, Second Lieutenant Idrissa Kamara, Second Lieutenant Tom Nyuma. Nyuma had connections with the radical pan-African students groups at Fourah Bay College.

[564] On the morning of 25 May 1997, another coup was executed, this time by low-ranking enlisted soldiers. The nucleus of the coup leaders consisted of seventeen enlisted soldiers who played on the military's football team. The footballers numbered 17 and were billeted at the Wilberforce Barracks (TRC report 2004). The 17 soldiers were: Sgt. Alex Tamba Brima; Lance Corporal Tamba Gborie; Corporal George Adams; Warrant Officer 11 Franklyn Conteh; Warrant Officer 11 Samuel Kargbo; Sgt. Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara; Sgt. Brima Kamara; Sgt. Moses Kabia alias Rambo; Sgt. Sullay Turay; Corporal Mohammed Kanu alias 55; Corporal Momoh Bangura; Lance Corporal Foday Kallay; Lance Corporal papa Bangura alias Batuta;Ex SSD Officer Hector Lahai; Civilian Bioh Sisay; Abdul Sesay, a civilian staff of the army; Sgt. Abu Sankoh (alias 'Zagallo'). TRC report highlights the deep resentment towards the Kamajors by the enlisted ranks of the military. As the TRC report states: Many SLA men, whom soldiers referred to in testimony as their 'brothers,' had been killed at the hands of the Kamajors. Soldiers perceived the Kamajors as a body created purposely to undermine them: after all, senior Ministers had publicly spoken out in support of the Kamajors and to the belittlement of the SLA. They also suspected that their reduced rations were attributable to the Government's favouritism of the Kamajors in terms of financial and moral support (TRC report 2004) 'Zagallo' one of the SLA Sergeants who spearheaded the coup, later explained this to the Sierra Leone Police: 'The issue of the Kamajors was another thing that finally discouraged us the soldiers under the regime of the SLPP. It reached a stage when the Kamajors turned their guns against us and soldiers were now being killed by Kamajors. The reason behind this was simply because the Kamajors as a Civil Defence Unit tried to equate their standing in the Government to ours and [they] now treated us as if they thought we were no more the Constitutional Army of Sierra Leone. It came to a time that when a Kamajor killed a soldier no action would be taken by the authorities; but when a soldier killed a Kamajor that soldier will definitely be taken to Pademba Road Prisons.' TRC report 2004.

While it is true that many of these soldiers were illiterate or semi-illiterate and lacked political consciousness, the common thread amongst the RUF, AFRC, NPRC in Sierra Leone and the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia was that these factions committed similar types of atrocities because they were products of similar social context that was characterized by patterns of power and physical violence that had been constitutive of the structures of the state and that become embedded in everyday social relations.[565] Soldiers and citizens experienced violence as practiced against them by the state and these power relations at least partially informed the violence that these irregular armed groups committed.[566] This explains why both rebel factions and state militaries failed to develop professional command and control structures and were characterised by indiscipline and self-aggrandisement objectives.[567] This also explains why military regimes in Sierra Leone (NPRC and AFRC) and Liberia's People's Redemption Council (PRC)—which initially touted themselves as "reformers" or "redeemers" representing the worse social ills in their societies and practiced the same violence against its citizens as the regimes they replaced had committed previously.[568]

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[565] Wai *Epistemologies*, 170

[566] Ibid., 222

[567] Ismail Rashid, in Abdullah 2004, 198-199

[568] See Jimmy Kandeh, Liberia: "No Doe, No Liberia", in *Coups from Below*, London: Palgrave, 2006, 97-118 and Chapter 7 "Sierra Leone: "Sobels" and "Foot of State", 143-178

The fact that many youth lack viable alternative livelihoods to soldiering is not the only problematic issue in "youth reintegration" studies.[569] While the socio-economic developmental dimensions of "reintegration" are critical, the political science literature on DDR treats violence committed against these youth combatants before and during the war as either irrelevant or unknown variables to the "reintegration" process. The DDR literature brackets the variable of "violence" and assumes that youth emerge out of conflict as "blank pages" for which skills and education can be written (learned) without properly considering let alone addressing the psychological impacts that structural violence (committed by the state before the war and by individuals and groups during the war) had on prospects for assuming a "normal" mainstream life after war. The question of youth participation is particularly salient in the West African sub-region of Mano River basin during the first ten years after conflict ended in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire (more recently). Despite UN's attempts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, reintegration assistance to the general youth cohort and ex-combatants paid insufficient attention to the "rehabilitation" components of "DDR" (examined in Chapter 4). Reintegration was implemented in the absence of a thorough understanding of the wider socio-economic context in a poor post-conflict country. Next, I outline four "transmission mechanisms" that external actors rely on to transfer liberal ideas in post-conflict societies in the SSR agenda.

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[569] The political science "DDR" literature tends to focus on the socio-economic aspects of reintegration, emphasising skills training and economic opportunities and employment (see Berdal and Ucko 2009; Berdal 2009).

Transmission Mechanisms or Modalities of the Liberal Peace

In this section, I outline the key mechanisms utilised in liberal peace interventions to influence, shape and manage outcomes on the ground.[570] First, peacebuilders assist in shaping the content of peace agreements during their drafting stage. The terms of Liberia and Sierra Leone's political settlements involved a wide range of international and regional actors assisting in the drafting of large sections of the peace agreements (Sierra Leone's Lomé in 1999 and Liberia's Accra Accord in 2003). In the security sector, peacebuilders have provided guidance and expertise in the process of democratizing governance (broadly defined) in the security sector by, for example, assisting in the drafting of constitutions, national security policies and strategies, and poverty reduction papers, and security sector reviews. Second, peacebuilders provide "expert" advice during the implementation of these settlements. In the particular cases of West Africa, outside advisors stepped in to teach security forces how to conduct themselves in a liberal democratic society where armed forces have a duty to serve the interests of the state and provide security to its citizens and not a specific group within the state. Third, international peacebuilding actors selected particular state interlocutors among the pro-reform elite (though not always of their own choosing[571]) to push the liberal agenda and placed them in key

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[570] See Paris 2002, 'International Peacebuilding and the Mission…', 642-5; I also draw on Mark Duffield and Graham Harrison's research on the 'technologies of development' or governance (see Mark Duffield, 'Liberal Interventionism and the Fragile State', in Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt (eds.), *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, Woodbridge: James Currey, 2009, 116-129; Mark Duffield, *Development, Security and the Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, London: Polity*, 2007, 159-183; Graham Harrison, *The World Bank and Africa: The Constitution of Governance States*, London: Routledge, 2004.

[571] Sending 2009

positions in the post-conflict government. External actors rely on a combination of 'carrots' and 'sticks' to socialise interlocutors and where necessary, impose economic "conditionalities" on aid to ensure compliance with specific reforms (political, economic, security, justice) broadly in accordance with the liberal peace. The IMF and World Bank required aid recipients to undertake market-oriented economic reforms including privatization of state-owned enterprises. This modality of governance took another form within the security sector. Fourth, in some rare instances, outside actors stepped in to quasi-governmental functionary roles, or assumed *de facto* government control over key state institutions where local authorities were "unable or unwilling to perform the needed administrative tasks themselves".[572]

According to Roland Paris, external actors provide assistance in drafting peace agreements, deploying "experts" to guide and implement the peace process, and rely on imposing conditionalities to incentivise certain behavior. In extreme cases, external actors take over "proxy governance" over central government functions (for instance, in Kosovo and East Timor). These mechanisms constitute the primary method for transmitting liberal norms into post-conflict states.[573]

The determination to select the "right type" of state interlocutor to work with in the state is also critical to the application of liberal peacebuilding. In West Africa, translating "ownership" into concrete practices involved identifying

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[572] Fen Olser Hampson, 'Can Peacebuilding Work?' *Cornell International Law Journal,* 30:3, 1997, 707-8

[573] Paris, Roland. "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture." *European Journal of International Relations* 9:3, 2003, 449

a small circle of established elite to assume executive political authority—all of whom happen to be former high-level United Nations or World Bank managers/administrators with decades of experience abroad. The "transnational elite" from these countries are best described as enmeshed within networks in the global political economy and who possess knowledge and skills to navigate the bureaucracies of the international institutions and western political institutions.[574] They share more in common with western elite than they do with citizens in their own countries and posses a common education background (having been educated in British or American universities), and have additionally spent the better part of their adult life in Europe or the United States. As Mark Duffield observes, these selected elite are "socialised in the same professional culture and share a conceptual vocabulary and understanding of authoritative knowledge".[575] Elite interlocutors traverse the internal and external dimensions of the state in the Global South and are, in some sense, more accountable to the external donors than they are to the citizens they govern. As Duffield notes "while this post-interventionary elite is small, its power and

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[574] I am using the term "transnational elite" as a modern version of the elite comprador. Sierra Leone's President Tejan Kabbah (1996-1997, 1998-2002, 2002-2007) was a former UNDP bureaucrat for more than twenty years before he became head of state. Previously, Kabbah served as deputy chief of West Africa in UNDP and in Lesotho (1973), Tanzania/Uganda (1976). He was promoted to chief of East and Southern Africa Division in UNDP in 1979. In 1981, he was deputy personnel director and later head of the division of administration and management. When he became a Presidential candidate in 1996, he was favoured by the Americans and British. Liberia's current President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf had been a favourite of American officials well before the 1979 Rice Riots. A cable released from the *Wikileaks'* "Kissinger Cables" notes that the State Department considered Ms. Johnson-Sirleaf as "probably the most effective civil servant" in the government. "She has played a major role in making the Ministry of Finance a relatively effective organization. There is no one apparent on the horizon who could begin to take her place" (http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MONROV03364_b.html). Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf worked as an administrator in the World Bank for most of her professional career. Additionally, Ivorian President Alasane Ouattara has had a long and close relationship with the French before he became President in 2011 and previously served in the World Bank.
[575] Duffield, *Development, Security and the Unending War,* 167

capacity is substantially bolstered by the presence and activity of external actors in the aid programme".[576] Since post-war economies are typically resting on precarious foundations, the polity and state is usually dependent on external aid for at least the first five or six years in the war-peace transition. Extending state authority to the peripheries is practiced, but the degree to which it is successful is conditional on legitimacy, resource capacity and past government practices at the local level. During the first ten years after war ends, the state is less dependent on taxing their citizens (and their citizens cannot therefore hold their leaders accountable) then they are at imposing tax rates for multinational corporations and customs revenue.[577]

There is evidence that UK's DfID recognized the importance of the finding the right kind of state interlocutor within the state security sector in Sierra Leone was consequential to long-term peacebuilding. One of the implicit objectives of DfID's approach to SSR is gaining political leverage over key decision-makers in the security sector. As a DfID strategy paper on SSR states, "In many countries, the military is either in power or—together with other security and intelligence actors—propping up civilian regimes that do not have a popular mandate to govern".[578] As demonstrated in Chapter 5, British advisors reorganised senior personnel (Lieutenant Colonel and above) within the Ministry of Defence and RSLAF in order to select appropriate interlocutors to work with that were broadly supportive of Britain's postwar agenda. The UK also

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[576] Ibid.

[577] Sierra Leone did not establish a domestic income tax base until about 2010-2011. The tax system was beginning to be implemented when I conducted my fieldwork in 2011-2012. Similarly, Liberia's income tax base was negligible in 2011-2012.

[578] DfID Understanding and Supporting SSR, 13

recognized the economic significance of the defence sector, noting that "large standing armies provide a livelihood for many people…senior officers and politicians may derive considerable benefit from illicit activities such as diamond mining, or corruption in military procurement." Therefore, "it is important to understand how reform will affect the distribution of resources and power, and to identify likely winners and losers and the likely strength of the latter's opposition".[579] DfID recognized the importance of identifying the moderates/pro-reform local actors: "understanding the interests and perspectives of the key stakeholders [is] essential to identify "both champions and opponents of reform".[580]

According to Paris, international peacebuilding aims to "bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance."[581] The modalities of "post-conflict" international intervention are manifest in a number of other interesting ways.

First, donors self-appoint "advisors" and "experts" as *de facto* administrators in key state institutions in postconflict Africa states. Harrison describes these as the "governance state" based on the degree to which external advisors are entrenched in the state's functions.[582] Duffield sums up these post-interventionary "technologies of governance" in the following way: "rather than thinking of the international community [is] somehow acting externally on such states, it would be more useful to conceive of donors as *part of the state itself*.

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[579] Ibid.

[580] Ibid.,14

[581] Roland Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice', *Review of International Studies*, 28, 2002, 638.

[582] Harrison 2004

The ministry of finance often emerges as one of the key institutions within "governance states". Applied to the "post-conflict governance state", Duffield describes how committees comprising of donors and international NGOs are established to shadow the activities of key service ministries. In some rare instances, donors assume *de facto* executive authority over key institutions. In more subtle forms, donors place themselves in key decision-making committees (usually chaired by donors with a relevant specialist interest and other government officials make up the rest of the committee). It is also takes the form of donors placing their representatives within the state institutions as embedded "advisors". This enables donors to maintain control over the way that funds are disbursed and secondarily to ensure fiduciary responsibility and to prevent corruption. As I will demonstrate in Chapters 5-8, this approach extended core security institutions (police and military). The British in Sierra Leone relied on a newly created Office of National Security (ONS) and the Ministry of Defence (institutions that they were instrumental in establishing) to control and dictate the reform process and influence its outcome. The British-led Commonwealth supported International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) engaged in 'SSR' in Sierra Leone for more than ten-years to improve the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces' (RSLAF) level of professionalism and effectiveness in accordance with regional and international standards.[583]

A question that needs to be asked is why the focus on state security t peacebuilding as opposed to other social and economic priorities? Contemporary

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[583] Author's personal interview with IMATT commander, Freetown, December 2011.

SSR practice can be criticised for implementing institutional engineering to conform to western standards of *good (enough)* governance.[584] Among the components emphasised by military reform practitioners are improving recruitment policies and practices, improving standards of vetting and screening of potential recruits, improving training and putting appropriate retention policies in place to ensure soldiers' loyalty to the state rather than military superiors or politicians. However, without addressing the underlying structures within the state, these 'reforms' will lead to a superficial restructuring of that political space and a minimal alteration of the behavior of actors operating within that space.

In Liberia, the US Embassy in Monrovia remained highly influential in shaping outcomes in the military reform process and used a number of US proxy actors (including US private security companies, the US Office for Security Cooperation and UNMIL's senior leadership) as key conduits for maintaining policy leverage in efforts to shape the reform process. Mark Duffield notes that these domestic state institutions (ministries of defence etc.) are "the main point of donor entry into the state, regardless of the service ministry with which they may be dealing". These institutions are often top-heavy focused and have robust ties with donor representatives and are "usually equipped with the most modern technologies and infrastructure" to enable it to "ensure fiscal prudence throughout most of the state".[585]

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[584] Department for International Development, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, London: DfID, 2005; Merilee Grindle, Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries, *Governance*, 17:4, 2004, 525-548
[585] Harrison 2004, 84

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the British influence in Sierra Leone was directed in part through the integration of DfID-funded economists and accountants in the Government of Sierra Leone's Ministry of Finance and other government bodies (National Commission for Social Action and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) where the majority of international resources were channeled from 2003-2007. These "experts" had specialised knowledge in theories of economic growth, macroeconomics and public administration, but no expertise in Sierra Leone's political history or its connection with state-sponsored political violence. This led to the imposition of western concepts and categories on the local socio-political and economic realities of Sierra Leone. A clear indication that the problems internal to the Liberian state was illustrated when United States government authorities insisted on imposing an economic governance framework (the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme or GEMAP), which transferred authority for making high-level financial decisions to seven expatriates from the World Bank and IMF (see Chapter 3). The GEMAP framework represents a radical example of contracting state functions to international policymakers where local capacity (or political will) is absent. At best, however, this represents a "quick-fix" and does not address the underlying causes of malgovernance.

Another mechanism that external actors rely on to shape post-conflict governance reforms is through the development of national "visioning" documents such as poverty reduction strategy papers, national security strategies,

security sector reviews and other associated "country-led approaches". A dominant mechanism for attempting to strengthen governance is the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP). PRSPs are the second-generation version of the World Bank sponsored "Structural Adjustment Policies" (SAPs) of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.[586] The PRSPs are apparently supposed to be products of a long national consensus/consultation/negotiation process; however, PRSPs are often viewed by African technocrats as a necessary means to demonstrate compliance to international donors' standards but not necessarily a reflection of the internal needs of country. Duffield argues that within governance states, the conditionalites attached to such "reviews" have lost most of their leverage. The PRSP's link with efforts to engineer state institutions (as opposed to project-based development) also signals that the core problem is core state functioning.[587] The state must be capable of managing public and international resources in accordance with generally-accepted international standards. Donors insist on this because PRSP funding is usually channeled through state budgets as opposed to through NGOs to "allow donors to harmonize" and align "behind country-led development as the preferred funding mechanism in governance states".[588] The UK practiced this approach in Sierra Leone by engaging in "cross-departmental" committees that involved DfID, the FCO, and UK MoD and the World Bank and IMF.[589]

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[586] Duffield 2007
[587] Duffield 2007
[588] Ibid, 168; Harrison 2004, 90
[589] DfID Understanding and Supporting SSR, 13

These issues underscore the methods and strategy for rebuilding the central state. In order to better understand the process of post-conflict statebuilding in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the role of external actors and their relationship with internal actors, I have identified four core concepts that have become integral to statebuilding practices. These concepts derive from existing academic literature and are identified as critical to the overall process of "statebuilding". These concepts are used as more of an aid to in understanding the "nitty gritty" of statebuilding as opposed to their utilisation as framework for a systematic comparison between proceses in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Additionally, these concepts were used as heuristic devises to better understand the power relations and dynamics between external and internal actors during the course of Sierra Leone and Liberia's post-war statebuilding and peacebuilding process.

Integral concepts in statebuilding practices

Based on a review of academic literature and UN/UK/US policy discourse, broad-based "peacebuilding" (of the more inclusive kind) and security sector reform (SSR) can be conceptualised and operationalised through these three inter-related concepts:

- Participation
- Ownership;
- Legitimacy

As will be demonstrated below and throughout the dissertation, these concepts are all interlinked and mutually reinforcing. These concepts need to be fleshed out and further clarified before proceeding to the empirical research.

What is "local ownership"?

Borrowed from the "development" field—and sometimes used interchangeably with *empowerment*, and *participation*—"ownership" has been integrated into the "SSR" policy discourse by a range of international organizations throughout 1990s to explain how a lack of attention to local involvement will negatively impact on peacebuilding efforts.[590] Some scholars critiquing the liberal "peacebuilding consensus" in the late 1990s use "ownership" as the central focus of their inquiry to judge whether peacebuilding has been successful or not.[591] Local ownership was formally recognized by the OCED's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1996-1997 as critical to international development.[592] The DAC stated that sustainable development "must be locally owned" and donor approaches must focus on "locally owned development strategies", and "respect and encourage strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership".[593] Since then, the concepts have become something of a buzzword laced in international policy documents. The concept was also endorsed by the United Nations when UN Secretary-General Kofi

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[590] Doyle and Sambanis 2006

[591] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*; Timothy Donais, 'Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict Consensus-Building', Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2012; Chopra and Hohe, 'Participatory Peacebuilding',

[592] OECD/DAC, 'Shaping the 21st Century: The Role of Development Cooperation,', OECD 1996, 9

[593] Ibid, 14

Annan stated that "sustainable development" can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely facilitative.[594] In a similar tone, the World Bank wrote in 2005 that "developing countries must be in the driver's seat and set the course" for their own development.[595] Clearly these statements are nothing more than rhetoric and window-dressing.[596] According to these *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*,, "a durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people." The "Capstone Doctrine" on principles and guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations lists the promotion of national and local ownership as one of the success factors in its operations: "national and local ownership is critical to the successful implementations of a peace process".[597]

According to Timothy Donais, ownership raises important theoretical and practical questions about the role of structure and agency in determining peacebuilding outcomes: *Who decides, who controls, who implements, and who evaluates*.[598] In the SSR literature, Laurie Nathan has define ownership as "the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country" that…"must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather

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[594] Kofi Annan, "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa." New York: United Nations, 2001.

[595] World Bank, Building Effective States—Forging Engaged Societies, Task Force on Capacity Development in Africa, Washington: World Bank 2005

[596] Other international statements include the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness that took place in Accra, Ghana in September 2008. The Accra Declaration stressed again that aid effectiveness principles "apply equally to development cooperation in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from conflict, but that these principles need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership or capacity"(OECD 2008, 5)

[597] "UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine." New York: United Nations, 2008.

[598] Donais, 'Empowerment or Imposition?' 3

than external actors".[599] Despite prominence of the concept in policy documents and the rhetorical support given by donors, it is necessary to clarify what these concepts mean especially when they are translated into concrete practices on the ground. Critics have problematised peacebuilding practice as an externally driven and imposed activity, carefully controlled by outside actors to ensure maximum autonomy over the process.[600] Put differently, when we talk of local ownership, whom are we referring to and what exactly are these actors supposed to "own"? By definition, local ownership is ambiguous, unresolved and lacks a universally-accepted definitions.

Donais notes that in SSR practice local ownership has come to be less about respecting local decision-making processes and more about imposing pre-existing (and externally-defined) set of policy prescriptions.[601] Astri Surkhe sums up this tendency, observing international engagement in Afghanistan as "their ownership of our ideas".[602] Richmond claims that the rhetoric of local ownership, participation and consent is often a disguise for non-consensual intervention, for dependency and conditionality, "where such approaches leave little room for empathy, emancipation or indigeneity within the liberal peace framework".[603]

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[599] Laurie Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2007.19
[600] Timothy Donais, 'Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes' *Peace and Change* 34:1. 2009, 3-26
[601] Donais, 'Empowerment or Imposition?' 7
[602] Astri Surkhe, 'Reconstruction as Modernisation: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan'. *Third World Quarterly* 28,:7 ,2007, 1292
[603] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations,* 150

Ole Jacob Sending argues that the central factor accounting for the lack of sustainability over time of peacebuilding has been the inability of peacebuilders to secure and respect local ownership and build bottom-up legitimacy for the reforms of liberal peacebuilding.[604] In theory, the locals are supposed to lead the design and implementation of reforms, while outsiders act as "facilitators" and "advisors". However, the distribution of labour is more complicated in practice. The reality is that local ownership is usually an afterthought after design and management issues are settled. According to Nicole Ball, "for security sector reform to take root it must be compatible with each country's particular circumstances and traditions".[605] In 2002-2005 in Sierra Leone, there was also the perception among donors were imposing an international agenda and minimizing their own priorities. This external agenda conflicted with the government's own agenda, which wanted to focus on priorities that perceived would consolidate their own position in power, i.e. extending basic services such as electricity and education. Additionally, the concept of "local ownership" obscures asymmetric power relations between internationals and local actors and can often create tensions and divisions within local government institutions. To date, this power dynamics between external and internal actors has been understudied and underappreciated as a determining factor of peacebuilding efficacy.

It surprising that despite a plethora of literature on security sector reform, few studies have studied the process and modalities for selecting senior

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[604] Chandler 2006; Richmond 2007; Paris and Sisk 2008; Suhrke 2007

[605] Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government, 1998, (www.saferworld.co.uk/pubspread.htm)

interlocutors and have yet to adequately interrogate the practice of local participation. What does "local participation" mean when it is translated into concrete practices on the ground?. The United Nations and regional organizations often vitiate prospects for an "equal playing field" by making calculations about the "division of the post-war spoils" based on what actors or groups hold the balance of military, economic or political power. The desire for "negative peace" without radically altering the political space that these actors operate in allows local powerbrokers to entrench themselves in the political and economic system to their personal or class-based interests.

SSR is a profoundly political activity. Engagement of the senior officials is critical in the immediate post-conflict situation but how this is conducted has consequential implications for the overall process. There are a number of methods that external peacebuilders have relied on to deal with entrenched members of the former regimes senior military officers. In Iraq in 2003, for example, senior US executive and political authorities in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) igonored the advice of US military and intelligence officials not to disband Sadam Hussein's old army. The first two CPA orders called for implementeing a "de-Bathification" programme to purge all members of Sadam Hussein's old army, which created enormous insecurity in Baghdad and escalated violence in surrounding areas.[606] In a less strategic country such as Sierra Leone or Liberia, it is assumed that external actors select local interlocutors that they can work with and that support their ontological

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[606] James P. Pfiffner, 'US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army', *Intelligence and National Security*, 25:1, 2010, 76-85; James Dobbins et al, *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority*, RAND Corporation, 2008

framework and ideological objectives[607] However, it is interesting that while Britain pursued the former option in Sierra Leone, the US chose the latter—to disband the old Armed Forces of Liberia. What explains the difference in approaches and what impact and implications did this have on internal command in RSLAF and AFL respectively?

A more serious discussion on the role of international donors in SSR needs to go beyond elite or military-political bargains. More serious attention must be paid to finding opportunities to forge more inclusive bargains than merely relying on elite-accommodations and top-down bargains. In West Africa, it is critical to begin to take seriously the demands being mounted by youth (who comprise 60% of the population) for becoming active and healthy citizens. One cannot talk of meaningful social transformation without including the youth cohort in all phases of peacebuilding.

Legitimacy and Participation

The concept of legitimacy can get at the heart of the statebuilding-peacebuilding nexus. Legitimacy is strongly connected with "ownership" and "participation" The first understanding is based on the term "participation" in the design of policies and strategies that are rooted in local views, knowledge, history and

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[607] Axel Auge, Patrick Klausen (eds), Réformer les Armées Africaines: En Quête d'une Nouvelle Stratégie, Paris: Karthala, 2010. For a review of these arguments, see Stephen F. Burgess, 'Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict', *African Security*, 1:2, 2008, 69-91; Florence Gaub, Military Integration After Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, London: Routledge, 2010; Michael Brzoska, 'Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, 13:1, 2006, 1-13; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Building 'National' Armies—Building Nations? Determinants for Post-Intervention Integration Efforts', *Armed Forces and Society*, 33:4, 2007, 571-590

political culture.[608] How legitimacy can be obtained, sustained or squandered depends on the particularities within the post-conflict society, both in terms of what local actors view as requirements of peacebuilding, their degree of influence over the priorities and design of policies, the extent to which institutions created are outcomes of external impositions or locally determined. As Michael Barnett has noted, "legitimacy is not defined by liberalism per se but rather by societal agreement regarding the proper procedures for deciding and pursuing collectively acceptable goals".[609]

For the purpose of assessing the degree of participation in security sector reform, it is useful to distinquish between three types of "participation": *symbolic, active and effectual*. Symbolic participation indicates superficial local involvement, giving the appearance that local actors are involved in making decisions and shaping outcomes, while minimally altering (if at all) the political space or restricting the reliance on earlier forms of power relations and domination by the political elite.. Put differently, we need to distinquish what adopting the myths and ceremonies of the "liberal peace" looks like and understand the underlying structures and practices that appear "underneath the surface" that reproduce elite exercise of power and domination of the political landscape (including nepotistic politics, domanint power relations between "masters" and subordinates/ "slaves", exploitation of marginalised youth for

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[608] Oliver Roy, 'Development and Political Legitimacy: The Cases of Iraq and Afghanistan', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 4: 2, 2004, 175-185
[609] Michael Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilising States after War', *International Security*, 30:4, 2006, 87-112

political ends).[610] In contrast, *active participation* means genuine and authentic contributions to the organizing of events, debates and policy-making that can have a meaningful influencet on processes and outcomes. Third, *effectual participation* means examing whether the outcomes of reforms (such as consultations, defence reviews, particular institutions) reflect the views, sensibilities and needs of a broad range of local actors.

Assessing legitimacy includes international presence/engagement in post-conflict settings but also the extent to which those reforms are perceived as legitimate by the recipient society. Ole Jacob Sending argues that international actors often take for granted the degree of local legitimacy, while taking for granted that international action will led to domestic legitimacy.[611] This leads peacebuilders to become both "blind" and "arrogant" of local considerations.

Having reviewed some central issues in the peacebuilding literature, I will conclude by positioning myself as a scholar interested in broad-based social transformation during war to peace transitions.

What the literature says about post-conflict Sierra Leone

To date, assessments of Sierra Leone and Liberia's peacebuilding processes have focused on on a narrow timeframe of 2-5 years after the conflict ends.[612]

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[610] Barnett and Zurcher 2009; Utas 2003

[611] Ole Jacob Sending, Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI working paper 755, 2009

[612] Berdal and Ero claim that UK's presence "had a positive impact on the security situation and enhanced the restoration of essential public safety" (Adedeji Ebo, The Challenges and Lessons of SSR in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6:4, 2006, 497. See also

According to existing accounts, Sierra Leone's perceived success has much to do with how SSR was approached by Britain after the war. However, some scholars such as Joseph Hanlon have been critical of international actors' support for reifying the position of the country's exploitative elite in Freetown and the periphery.[613]

Roland Paris' adopts problem-solving assumptions in observing that Sierra Leone's problems can be addressed by improving management and training of the police force. According to Paris, "at the heart of the problem [in Sierra Leone] is a lack of resources and training. Most districts are understaffed; some lack even such vital equipment as vehicles and radios and few personnel have managerial skills or the capacity to train new recruits". It is already recognised from police reform efforts in El Salvador and Hait during the 1990s that security of individuals will not improve in the absence of the wider security/judicial system and the transformation of the country's political space and soci-economic context.[614] Paris thinks he sees evidence of his "institutionalisation before liberalisation" strategy implemented in Sierra Leone. In 2001-2004 by British efforts to rebuild the Sierra Leone army and police before elections were held in 2002.[615] Paris focuses narrowly on deterring threats to the electoral process and ignores questions about the effectiveness of these

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Al Hassan Kondeh, Sierra Leone, in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, Funmi Olonisakin (eds), Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, Zurich, LIT Verlag GmbH & Co., 2008.)

[613] Joseph Hanlon, 'Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Conditions for War in Sierra Leone?' *Round Table*, 94: 381, 2005, 459-472

[614] Ball, 'Spreading Good Practices in SSR' 1998, 15

[615] Roland Paris, *At War's End,* 223

security forces to protect civilians.[616]   Paris falsely assumes legitimate state authority throughout Sierra Leone. As demonstrated above, the problems in Sierra Leone are much deeper and structural in nature than simply retraining police or military units and providing logistics. We need to open up the state and examine the structural problems embedded within the nature of state authority. The International Crisis Group noted similar conclusions in 2003, observing that "in a very real sense, the conditions that spawned the war and inflicted gruesome casualties on Sierra Leone's citisens have not disappeared".[617]

Conclusion

In subsequent chapters, I argue that "peace" was operationalised in peacebuilding missions too narrowly in Sierra Leone and Liberia—as negative peace—by operationalising a generic blueprint macro-approach that put more emphasis on problem-solving, short-to-medium term mode and concentrated on realising the absence of large scale violence.

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[616] Ibid, 223

[617] ICG, 'Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance', Africa report No. 76, 2003

Chapter 3
Drawing up Post-war Plans:
International Macro-Level Peacebuilding Blueprints

Introduction and Argument

This chapter argues that the macro-level international strategy in both Sierra Leone and Liberia had three main components: 1) attaining security in the region by containing Taylor; 2) consolidating central state authority in Sierra Leone by shoring up Tejan Kabbah's government to combat the RUF rebel force; 3) legitimising the executive branch through holding multiparty elections. The chapter traces Sierra Leone's post-conflict planning process evolved, specifically how tensions and conflict were manifested through the expression of competing visions (both from outside and within) and how, ultimately, certain ideas came to fruition while others were discarded during the peacebuilding negotiation process.

The major implication of the UN, UK and US desire to conduct elections within six months after the conflict ended was that this strategy relied on reconsolidating existing state structures and previous political practices as opposed to creating new institutions and altering the political space. The question of political legitimacy was viewed narrowly as holding Presidential elections to settle the political leadership in top-echelons of the state (the Executive). One year leading up to the May 2002 elections, the international community focused on shoring up the authority of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) (which later won the elections) to significantly shape the national dialogue and response to the immediate postwar environment.

I make this argument by first identifying the key peacebuilding modalities or "transmission mechanisms" used to shape the war-peace transition. For instance, the Government of Sierra Leone and its key international partners were able to shape the content and nature of the major elements of the peacebuilding strategy by either drafting large sections in the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), by offering "expert" advice during implementation phases, by selecting specific state interlocutors that supported the external agenda and by imposing specific aid conditionalities to encourage the political class to conform to specific (desired) forms of behavior. Through an in-depth discussion of the international approach to macro-level peacebuilding, we can learn more about the dynamics of how peacebuilding "works", the relationship between external and internal actors during war-peace transitions, and *how internal* and *external* actors went about formulating post-conflict policies and priorities. The international strategy adopted in Sierra Leone had several key "transmission mechanisms", reviewed below:

- A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to guide peacebuilding efforts
- Creating security in the region by deploying a large (17,000+) UN peacekeeping mission (dominated by military personnel, a small police contingency and civil affairs staff)
- Disarming the irregular factions
- Consolidating central state authority to exercise control over territory
- Conducting post-conflict elections to legitimize a Sierra Leonean interlocutor as President
- A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
- And, top-down administrative-legal state-building components in "security sector reform"

Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to account for the key facts about the civil conflicts and the factors that led to the liberal peacebuilding projects in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Background

The main actors in the Mano River conflicts, which lasted from December 1989 until 2003, were Charles Taylor (rebel leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia), Foday Sankoh[1] (rebel leader of the Revolutionary United Front for Sierra Leone). The Mano River wars began on Christmas Eve 1989 when 158 Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Burkinabe mercenaries calling themselves the National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the northeastern Liberian town of Butuo, Nimba County.[2] The multi-national group of Libyan-trained forces comprised of former Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers and civilians led by a 41-year old Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from Danané, Côte d'Ivoire's northwestern (where had been NPFL was based) to wage a civil war to overthrow then President of Liberia Samuel K. Doe.[3] The NPFL's rank-and-file were dominated by ethnic Gio and Manos from Nimba county. Those that fought

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[1] Foday Sankoh, was a functional illiterate and drifter: once a soldier in the Sierra Leone army, obtaining the rank of corporal. He was a Temne from Tonkolili district; enlisted in the army in 1957 at Moa barracks, Daru. He completed six months of basic military training and was posted to the Royal Signals Squadron, Tower Hill barracks, Freetown as a radio operator. He was arrested and cashiered from the army in March 1971 after the unsuccessful coup led by Brigadier Bangura. Sankoh was detained for six years and was released in 1977. He subsequently became a photographer in Bo and Segbwema in Kailahun.

[2] The Mano River basin sub-region encompasses four West Africa countries—Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Conakry and counts Ivory Coast as a member state as of 2003. The Mano River basin includes the Parrot's Beak region that encompasses southern Guinea, Lofa Country in Liberia, Kono and Kailahun in the eastern border region of Sierra Leone.

[3] Libyan leader Colonel Gadhafi supported the NPFL and RUF rebellions in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

as 'foot soldiers' came from poor rural backgrounds with little formal education.[4] Taylor found support from a large group of Gio and Mano refugees from Nimba county, including former AFL soldiers that fled after Quiwonkpa's failed invasion in 1985.[5]

At the outset of the RUF incursion into Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991, the social basis of the RUF consisted of three main groups: those urban lumpens that had received training in Libya and who saw action in Liberia with NPFL—including Sankoh. A second group of lumpen Sierra Leoneans who had been recruited from Liberia—including Sam Bockerie[6] and Captain Papa Kamara.[7] The third group was a hard-core group of Liberian NFPL fighters on loan from Charles Taylor—including Dennis Mingo (Rambo). After the student leaders pulled out of the movement, the RUF relied on its lumpen base to control and direct its actions.

The rank-and-file in both movements were comprised mainly of poorly educated rural youth under the age of 30. According to Sierra Leone's TRC

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[4] Many Gio and Mano civilians had also fled when Doe's security forces massacred Gios and Manos thought to be loyal to Quiwonkpa in 1985. Ellis 2003, 139; George Klay Kieh, Jr. 'Combatants, Patrons, Peacekeepers, and the Liberian Civil War', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 15:2, 129

[5] Bill Berkely, *The Graves are not yet full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa*, New York: Basic Books, 48

[6] Bockerie became a RUF's number two commander after 1994. The TRC report suggests that Bockerie voluntarily joined the RUF during the later stage of training. According to Issa Sesay, Bockerie joined the movement 'two or three weeks' before the attack on Sierra Leone in March 1991 (Sesay's Special Court testimony, 5 July 2010, 43605, 43614). Bockerie was the RUF battle group commander between 1992 to April 1997 and then served as commander of RUF until November or December 1999. At the time of his recruitment, he was struggling hairdresser and disco dancer living in Monrovia. Prior to the conflict, Bockerie attempted without success to obtain sufficient entry qualifications to enter a Liberian technical school to become an electrician (Sierra Leone TRC report, Vol. 3A, 107).

[7] Bockerie was 28 years old at the time he was recruited from Monrovia. He had dropped out of highschool after form three and drifted to Monrovia after working as an illicit diamond miner in Kono and later disco dancer in Abidjan. Papa Kamara was a high-school dropout. Abdullah, 222

report, the bulk of the operations carried out between March 1991 and September 1992 were directed and commanded by Liberian vanguards like Sam Tuah, Benjamin Yeaton[8], Charles Timba, Dupoe Mekazohn ('General Dupoe'), James Wolonfa, John Wuseh, Action Jackson and Anthony Mekunagbe.[9]

Taylor relied on junior commanders that had been trained as special forces in Libya notably Roland Duo, Jack the Rebel (George Duana, an ethnic Gbandi and Liberian) and Benjamin Yeaton.[10] Taylor subsequently relied on his junior commanders by placing them in key positions in his government—these commanders included Benjamin D. Yeaton (his former bodyguard), Adolphus Dolo, Roland Duo, Coco Dennis, General Fassu, among others.[11]

There were two broad actors involved the war-peace transitions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. As former colonial master, Britain led the UN Security Council's action on Sierra Leone during the transition. Additionally, the United Nations and World Bank assisted by providing "technical advice" to the

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[8] Following the war, Benjamin Yeaton fled to Liberia's neighbouring states, traveling between Togo, Ivory Coast and Calabar, Nigeria where Taylor was in exile. Currently, he is believed to be living in Togo where he is working in the Togolese president's security detail.

[9] Sierra Leone TRC 2004, 121

[10] Dwanah oversaw Liberian mercenaries on loan from Taylor who fought for MPIGO and MJP in Cote D'Ivoire in 2002 (Usual Suspects, 12.)

[11] Roland Duo (a.k.a. amphibian father) climbed the ranks as a ordinary foot-soldier in 1990 and remained with Taylor until 2003 as one of his most trusted frontline commanders. Duo was recruited in February 1990 in Nimba county and trained at an NPFL base in Bompele (is located about 10km to the Liberian/Ivorian border, on the Sannequille/Loguatu road) (TRC testimony, 10 December 2008). Duo, an ethnic Gio, was seventeen years old at the time of his recruitment (Duo (reluctantly) stated at the TRC that he was born on 24 September 1973). He finished high-school just prior to the war. He claims that he joined the NFPL because his uncle's house and property in Kamplay, Nimba was destroyed (TRC testimony, 10 December 2008). Duo started as an 'ordinary fighter' NPFL foot soldier in 1990 and was later promoted in 1995 as chief of staff of the Navy Division (Navy Rangers) (Ibid). After Taylor became president of Liberia, Duo became director of security at the National Port Authority. Taylor also gave him access to several lucrative private security contracts including with Oriental Timber Company (OTC) during this time.11 Navy Rangers-originally called the Bush Marines, wore yellow shirts with 'Navy Ranger' printed on the front (The Usual Suspects, 15)

Government of Sierra Leone. Britain entered Sierra Leone militarily on 6 May 2000 (called "Operation Palliser") to evacuate British and EU citizens from Freetown and to provide short-term training assistance to the Sierra Leone army. The original British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) mission deployed a substantive number of British military troops on 10 June 2000. Two Royal Anglican British Military training teams (BMATT) arrived in Freetown and expanded its direct support to the Government of Sierra Leone and to prevent the AFRC/RUF joint forces from entering the eastern district of Freetown.

As an extension of the British short-term training mission, "Operation Barras" was launched from 10 September to 13 October 2000 to rescue Irish soldiers taken hostage by renege former SLA soldiers called West Side Boys. The British remobilised remenants of the old Sierra Leone army consisting of just over 3,000 soldiers and about thirty-eight senior military officers (most of whom distanced themselves from the AFRC junta after its coup in May 1997) to fight the AFRC/RUF forces.[12] Once the West Side Boys/RUF were defeated, Britain supported the Abuja ceasefire negotations in November 2000 and the Abuja II accord of May 2001, which finally brough the conflict to a standstill.

Initially, external actors had a considerable degree of control over determining priorities during the transition. The World Bank funded technical experts to envision a DDR programme to disarm the RUF faction. The UK's

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[12] Author's notes from figures obtained from NCDDR and Ministry of Defence records. These soldiers and officers received short-term (six weeks) training from the British Short-Term Training Teams (STTT).

Department for International Development (DfID) funded several of its personnel to assume key policymaking functions in Sierra Leone's government institutions including the Ministry of Finance, Defence and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. While each of the main international actors (Britain, the US, World Bank and the United Nations) had their own interests they brought to bear during their interventions, their overall agenda seemed to overlap in terms of their collective focus on high-level political issues (i.e. reconsolidating state authority and legitimacy, disarming and transforming the RUF into a political party and preparing for general elections within six-months).

The trusteeship model was proposed by International NGO International Crisis Group as a solution to Sierra Leone's "failed state" but lacked support from both Britain and the United States[13] At the time, the Sierra Leone government was unable to raise the necessary funds to support its own state functions.[14] Western countries instead preferred to adopt the standard UN peacekeeping model drawing from various elements of the UN's blueprint peace support operations model. Britain could not afford to engage in a neo-*mission civilistrice*. As a result, Britain supported the idea of the UN assuming primary responsibility over Sierra Leone's internal security to enable Britain to take the "Lead State" role in rebuilding state institutions in Sierra Leone (the focus of

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[13] ICG, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, ICG: Brussels, 2004, 1-35; ICG, Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy, ICG: Brussels 2001

[14] ICG, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, ICG: Brussels, 2004, 3. The ICG suggested that the "international community" should manage the economic affairs of the Sierra Leone state "for a considerable time" including its customs revenue body, ports, airports and state treasury (a proposal that was implemented in Liberia)

Chapter 5).

Civil society organizations in Sierra Leone had been sidelined from the international strategy decision-making process. Several civil society groups in Sierra Leone had pushed for delaying the elections until a broader version of "negative peace" was achieved. Their popular slogan was "peace before elections".[15] Civil society's actors called for postponing elections "for at least a year or two" to "stabilise the situation" and ensure that full disarmament and reintegration could be completed successfully. Civil society organisations called for the commencement of reconciliation to be fostered (through establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the transformation of civil defence forces, return of refugees and IDPs, reconstruction of infrastructure) before the elections.

Sierra Leone: Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)

The comprehensive peace accord signed in the capital of Togo in Lomé in July 1999 was intended as a "powersharing" agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which shored up the legitimacy of the Government of Sierra Leone provided the general framework for peace and security in Sierra Leone's war-peace transition. International and regional peacebuilding actors helped shape the content of the peace agreement during its drafting stage. The United States and Britain, along with regional partners including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), ECOWAS and the United Nations supervised a power-sharing agreement. The

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[15] Email correspondence between former World Bank Programme Advisor to NCDDR Executive Secretary, 'Strategy for Peace, Role of DDR' (obtained from NCDDR archives), 3.

Government of Sierra Leone's (under Kabbah and Soloman Berewa[16]) position was strengthened from its support from the West (Britain and the US). The SLPP had been elected in 1996 and had its mandate disrupted following the May 1997 military coup. Its term was to last until late 2001. Therefore, according to the UN, Kabbah's government was democratically legitimate. Britain's financial aid focused on shoring up Kabbah's government. This was quite different than the political conditions in Liberia's immediate postwar transition, where conditions leading to Taylor's abdication created a power vacuum that had to be filled during the 2003 peace talks in Accra (discussed below).

As hosts of the negotiations, Togo's President (Gnassingbé Eyadéma) and his foreign minister (Joseph Kokou Koffigoh) were the principle facilitators.[17] However, the United States, Britain and Nigeria held considerable influence in shaping the accord behind the scenes.[18] Although the agreement had

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[16] The SLPP was represented by President Kabbah and his right hand deputy, Soloman Berewa. Berewa is a long-term SLPP stalwart, led the government's negotiation team. Berewa was a barrister and very knowledgeable on constitutional matters. Also on the government side was Colonel Tom Carew, a senior army officer and one of the loyal soldiers to Kabbah. Kabbah's team was also headed by Sheka Mansaray, his national security advisor. Also on the government side was Sahr Matturi, the deputy foreign minister, Sylvester Rowe, Sierra Leone's permanent representative to the UN.

[17] The Togolese Government and the United Nations bore the majority of the costs during the peace talks (Interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011)

[18] Following the attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999, the United States strongly pushed the Government of Sierra Leone to engage in dialogue with the RUF, at the behest of the Sierra Leone government (David Keen, 2005, 245-50). British Labour Party politician Peter Hain, speaking in front of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs select committee stated that Britain was supporting an African solution. In Hain's view, Lomé was "a West African agreement" which Britain was backing. Hain explained that it "was a myth that Britain and the US foisted [the Lomé Accord] on the people of Sierra Leone; on the contrary, it was negotiated by President Kabbah…and supported by various African organizations involved" FAC *Minutes of Evidence*, response to question 13, cited in Williams 2001, 149 ft. 53). Similarly on the US side, US envoy for Africa Jesse Jackson flew to West Africa to encourage Kabbah to negotiate with the rebels. As US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice said at the time, "there will never be peace and security and an opportunity for development and recovery in Sierra Leone unless there is a solution to the source of the conflict. And that entails, by necessity—whether we like it or not—a peace agreement dealing with the rebels" (Mufson, Steven, US Backed Amnesty

many faults, it provided a framework to divide up political power, disarm combatants and reform the military and police.

RUF leader Foday Sankoh refused to negotiate directly with the Government, instead preferring to send his lead negotiator Solomon Y.B. Rogers (chairman of the "People's War Council") and his deputy Pallo Bangura.[19] Sankoh was adamant that Nigerian-led military force ECOMOG was siding with the Government of Sierra Leone and insisted that the regional military force be withdrawn from Sierra Leone.[20] The political aspects of the power-sharing agreement and the amnesty accord were interlinked. Due to the fact that the RUF had achieved considerable battlefield gains against the Government of Sierra Leone prior to negotiation, the Lomé agreement provided far-reaching political concessions to the RUF.[21] During political negotiations, the RUF demanded a large number of political/diplomatic appointments and high-level cabinet positions in Government. In the end, the accord granted only four cabinet posts and four deputy ministerial posts to the RUF/AFRC alliance for the remainder of the SLPP's tenure in office (until late 2001). Additionally, a proposal backed by

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in Sierra Leone, Washington Post, Monday October 18, 1999, A13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/oct99/leone18.htm (Assessed 14 June 2010). In September 1999, US Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice discussed the US role in brokering the agreement. Rice explained, "the US role in Sierra Leone … has been instrumental. With hands-on efforts by the president's special envoy Jesse Jackson, Ambassador Joe Melrose, and many others, the United States brokered the ceasefire and helped steer Sierra Leone's rebels, the Kabbah government, and regional leaders to the negotiating table." (Lizza, 'Sierra Leone: The Last Clinton Betrayal'). Interestingly, when the post-Lomé peace process collapsed, the US distanced itself from the process (Keen 2005,,251, ft. 10)

[19] Author's personal interview with Mr. Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011; According to Rashid, although Rogers was an abductee, he was "fiercely loyal to Sankoh". Omrie Golley was the RUF's legal adviser and Idrissa Hamid Kamara (aka Leatherboot), and Sahr T. Kaibanja were also there (Ismail Rashid, 'The Lomé peace negotiations', http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/lome-negotiations.php).

[20] Interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011

[21] Author's confidential interview with former Government of Sierra Leone official, Freetown, 25 October 2011

the United States Ambassador John Melrose[22] lifted the death sentence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh and granted him the chairmanship of a newly established Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development[23] and provided Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) leader Johnny Paul Koroma chairmanship of the new Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP).[24] In essence, the Lomé followed the standard formula that "powersharing" agreements often do: buying off the key leaders and giving them political power.

The American delegation was adamant that Sankoh and Koroma be given these political positions to ensure their buy-in to the political transitional process.[25] What the Government of Sierra Leone intended, however, was to ensure that these positions were nothing more than ceremonial. The government

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[22] The AFRC was not recognized as a distinct armed group in the context of the Lomé negotiations; instead RUF/AFRC were seen as the same group.

[23] Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone in late 1999 until the time he resumed hostilities in May 2000, he had access to diamond revenues. He used this money to purchase vehicles, satellite phones and equipment (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1132/pdf/sclet11951e.pdf (Assessed 17 June 2011). Sankoh signed several international agreements with diamond mining companies in the name of his commission. From 1999 to 2000, he met with several companies including Integrated Group of Companies (he met with the President Chudi Izebu) and US-based Lazare Kaplan International (LKI). There were also deals in the pipeline with US based Trading and Investment Company for a deal that would give them authority to broker rights to all of Sierra Leone's diamond and gold resources for a 10-year period (UN sanctions report, p. 20).

[24] US Ambassador John Melrose insisted on appointing Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma in symbolic political positions after Lomé. This was an American idea, according to former RUF member Pallo Bangura (Author's personal interview, Freetown, October 28, 2011). On American pressure on the Government of Sierra Leone to pursue negotiations with the RUF, see Ryan Lizza, 'Where Angels Fear to Tread', *The New Republic*, 13 July 2000;Gberie 2005, 157

[25] At Lomé, the United Kingdom disagreed strongly with this American idea, arguing instead that that a limited but robust external military force could weaken the RUF's military position on the battlefield that would make negotiations conferring legitimacy to the RUF redundant. Britain's position was to avoid conferring political legitimacy to the RUF and sought to marginalise the movement to prevent it from playing a role in the country's post-war political system. However, the American vision was eventually adopted.

would ensure that these commissions could not yield any power or influence by deliberately starving them of resources.

This policy of accommodation influenced other important policy issues, namely the amnesty provision that was negotiated. Britain also spoke out against the blanket amnesty, but eventually compromised their position after being pressured by the US Ambassador Melrose.[26]

Scholars that emphasise the formal processes of negotiations and mediation tend to overlook the informal aspects of the discussions at Lomé. According to one of the behind-the-scenes negotiators for the RUF, Sylvia Fletcher from USAID was "very instrumental behind the scenes". He stated, "I remember she called myself and Sheka Mansaray, who was secretary to the president. She came to us to ask both of us to prevail on our [respective] sides to push this process. And frankly, that intervention was very helpful".[27] Moreover, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone played an informal role, outside of the formal meetings these members would meet with individually with delegations to make appeals and contact with both sides.[28] Given the role that

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[26] Mr. Eldon, UK representative to the UN stated, "The Lomé Agreement is not perfect. The inclusion of a blanket amnesty for those who have committed appalling atrocities has rightly caused concern. But this was one of many hard choices that the Government and the people of Sierra Leone had to make in the interests of securing a workable agreement." Hain continued, "Together with the international community, we felt it necessary to support a very imperfect Lomé Agreement in which that was provided for … because *there was literally no alternative …* We were in a situation where the RUF had again attacked … Freetown. The elected government had no army … The Nigerian troops which had been supported and had previously repelled the rebel forces were about to pull out, so he [Kabbah] felt the only option he had … was to strike the best deal that he could" (cited Williams 2001, 151).

[27] Author's interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011

[28] The Inter-Religious Council was created in 1997 to serve as an umbrella organisation to represent the views of all religious groups and press upon the leaders of the warring factions to end the war. The IRCSL consisted of the Supreme Islamic Council, the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress, the Federation of Muslim Women in Sierra Leone, the Council of Imams, the Sierra Leone Islamic Missionary Union, the Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Churches Council

these informal actors played during the political negotiations, it is surprising that religious institutions did not play a larger role during the subsequent peacebuilding efforts.

Power-sharing and Amnesties
The question of what scope to give ex-combatants was a major challenge facing peacebuilders during the political negotiations and had profound implications for subsequent peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. This is the same challenge faced in balancing short-term imperatives of "negative peace" and the pursuit of long-term reconciliation and "positive peace". To what extent do you sacrifice justice in the pursuit of peace? That this dilemma is not easy to reconcile is not unique to Sierra Leone. Two controversial provisions negotiated in Lomé were the power-sharing arrangements and the blanket amnesty. The amnesty granted "absolute and free pardon" to all ex-combatants and collaborators for violence committed from 30 November 1996 (when the Abidjan Accord was signed). There was, however, considerable disagreement over whether to grant blanket amnesty to the RUF. Kabbah's cabinet ministers and civil society representatives strongly condemned the amnesty on the grounds that it reinforced a culture of impunity.[29] The United Nations adamantly disagreed with the terms of the amnesty, believing that violators of international crimes against humanity should be prosecuted. Indeed, the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General Francis Okello added a disclaimer on the agreement below his signature that

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and the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone (see Mark Turay, 'Paying the Price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process, Counciliation Resources, 2000, http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/civil-society-and-peacebuilding-role-inter-religious-council-sierra-leone
[29] Francis 2000, 365-366; Yusuf Bangura 2004; Abraham 2004; Rashid 2000, 30

individuals responsible for crimes against humanity and violations against international humanitarian law could be prosecuted in the future.[30] The Americans believed that the amnesty was crucial for sending a signal of confidence to the rank-and-file combatants and junior commanders that they could disarm without fear of prosecution following their disarmament.[31] The Government of Sierra Leone was prepared to trade-off the amnesty provision in favour of granting less political concessions to the RUF. According to an insider involved in the negotiations, the amnesty provision came from the Government in exchange for the rebels dropping demands for key political cabinet positions.[32] According to a former RUF insider, Soloman Berewa and some of the Togolese facilitators including Koffigoh flew overnight to Freetown and returned before daybreak on the day before the agreement was signed to consult Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean politicians about the power-sharing arrangement.[33]

It was very difficult to sell the idea of reintegration in a post-amnesty context in Sierra Leone due to the animosity many Sierra Leoneans felt towards combatants and the perception that these individuals were being rewarded for their destruction and violence during the war. According to a former RUFP

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[30] The UN provision opened possibilities of trying those leaders who "bore the greatest responsibility" for war crimes, including Foday Sankoh, Issa Sessay, Sam Bockerie, Morris Kallon, Jonny Paul Koroma, Alex Tamba Brima. All of the combatants were granted amnesty except for those 13 individuals that were indicted by the Special Court. Of the 13, 11 have been detained by the court. Some of the key leaders were never tried: Sam Bockerie (died 5 May 2003), Jonny Paul Koroma (whereabouts unknown), Samuel Norman (died 22 February 2007), Foday Sankoh (died 29 July 2003)

[31] Author's confidential interviews with former NCDDR official, 23 December 2011, Freetown

[32] Author's personal interview with former Sierra Leonean politician, 25 October 2011, Freetown

[33] Author's personal interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011

official negotiator, "This is a country of reject. When Sierra Leoneans reject, they reject. They will say 'we have reconciled and all, but believe me, most of the reconciliation has not taken place."[34] Perhaps his position is partially influenced by the fact that he was subject to ostracisation by Sierra Leoneans due to his support for the RUF. However, what is noteworthy is the major contrast with Liberia, where despite widespread condemnation of Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) for its violent attacks on civilians during the first phase of the civil war (1989-1997), Liberians willingly voted for Charles Taylor as President during the 1997 elections. Power-sharing with rebel leaders was less controversial in Liberia as it was in Sierra Leone, where the RUF was completely delegitimised and marginalised after the war. Liberians on the other hand took a pragmatic approach, believing that since Taylor controlled vast territory in Liberia, he could not be marginalised in Liberia's violent political space.[35] The intention of the amnesty and powersharing provisions was to create conditions for security and the absence of violence to push through the other modalities, including deploying UN peacekeepers, expediting disarmament and holding multiparty elections.

Implementation the Strategy

Once the Lomé Accord was in place, external actors ratcheted up pressure to begin its effective implementation. The overarching aim of the first two "transmission mechanisms" in the international strategy on Sierra Leone was to

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[34] Author's confidential interview with a former RUFP official, Freetown, 12 November 2011

[35] David Harris, "From 'Warlord' to 'Democratic' President: How Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian Elections", *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 37:3, 1999, 431-455; Mary Moran, *Liberia: The Violence of Democracy*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2006, 106

consolidate state authority and create security conditions that would enable Presidential elections to remain on course in early 2002.[36] This strategy had three main interlinked components to implement: deploying a UN peacekeeping force; the disarmament of irregular factions; and laying the ground (i.e. registration and logistics) for post-conflict elections. Holding post-conflict elections in the Spring of 2002 therefore became one of *the* key elements in the UK/US/UN exit strategy from Sierra Leone.[37] The US/Britain had been pushing for keeping to the original elections schedule for mid-2001—which were postponed until early 2002 and then May of that year—well before disarmament had even completed. Britain wanted to reduce its military presence in Sierra Leone in a phased, but rapid manner, while the US wanted to downsize the peacekeeping contingents of UNAMSIL in anticipation of a future UN deployment to Liberia and because of military demands in Afghanistan. In November 2001, British diplomat Allan Doss, who served as the Special Representative to the United Nations Secretary-General began drawing up plans to re-establish state authority in the provinces, notably through the deployment of Sierra Leone police, traditional leaders and district councilors.[38] Key to the implementation of Lomé Accord was deployment of a 17,000 strong UN peacekeeping mission. There were, however, important disconnects between the international peacebuilding strategy in Sierra Leone and the various components, as will be addressed below. The desire to

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[36] General elections were held in 1996 and were supposed to be held in 2001 but were postponed because of the fighting. Following the Abuja II accord, attention shifted to organizing elections for early 2002.

[37] ICG, Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? 19 December 2001, 2.

[38] NCDDR archives notes, in author's possession

quickly reconsolidate the state by drawing on existing local state institutions foreclosed other alternatives to "statebuilding".

The role of sanctions in the International Peace Strategy
In March 2001, the US held the rotating chair on the UN Security Council. As former colonial power, Britain was obvious lead in the UN Security Council on Sierra Leone matters. The US and the UK diplomats shaped the "security first" UN strategy on Sierra Leone by also containing Charles Taylor's and other key rebel leaders' influence in the region. The Security Council sought to prevent Charles Taylor from maintaining ties with the RUF high command. RUF rebel leader Sam Bockerie was seen as a regional spoiler that had to be contained since he had more to gain by continuing to fight. On 7 March 2001, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Liberia. The UN Security Council sanctions committee alleged that the Liberian government had failed to meet its obligations to end its support to the RUF. The sanctions aimed to prevent Liberia from exporting diamonds and enforced international travel restrictions on senior Liberian officials associated with Taylor's regime.[39] The embargo on Liberian diamond sales was imposed in March 2001, but the international travel ban component was postponed for two months at the request of the ECOWAS ministerial delegation to give Liberia a chance to comply with the UN resolution.[40] After ECOWAS failed to convince Taylor's government to comply with a number of demands, full UN sanctions came into effect on 7 May 2001.

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[39] These targeted travel sanctions were only gradually removed between 2004-2012
[40] Sierra Leone web, May 2001

These sanctions included the grounding of all Liberian-registered aircraft until Liberia complied with international aviation standards and provided a list of all registered aircraft to the Council. Liberia was also required to stop funding RUF and other rebel groups, to freeze RUF assets, and to expel RUF members from its territory. The Liberian government was to stop selling diamonds unless accompanied by a certificate of origin. The arms ban would expire after 14 months while travel restrictions would last for 12 months. The latest draft dropped the proposal to impose a ban on the sale of Liberian timber at the insistence of the French and Singaporean governments (both of which have strong commercial interests in Liberia throughout the war).

Acting US Ambassador to the UN James Cunningham stated: "The sanctions are intended to encourage performance, and to achieve the goal of the resolution, which is to have the Government of Liberia break its links with the RUF and to end its support for it. The Council has no desire to impact the situation on the people of Liberia".[41] Meanwhile the Sierra Leonean government had requested to the Government of Liberia to account for the whereabouts of Sam Bockerie and other RUF members in Liberia. According to Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, Chairman of the UN sanctions committee on Liberia, "the general perception in the region was that the Liberian government had not cooperated enough in terms of meeting the requirements of Resolution 1343. These sanctions are not aimed at Liberia for anything that Liberian has done

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[41] Sierra Leone web, May 2001

inside Liberia. These sanctions are intended to cut off the support that Liberia provides to the RUF in Sierra Leone".[42]

UNAMSIL
The UN Secretary-General only recommended to the Security Council to replace the unarmed UN observer mission with a fully-fledged UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) on 23 September 1999—about two months after Lomé negotiations had completed. However, it took four months for the peacekeeping force to arrive in Sierra Leone.[43] As a result, the UN and lead Western states (US and UK) sent a contradictory statement about their lack of serious commitment to finding an immediate and durable solution. The UN force, with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, (including 260 military observers) needed to be robust enough to implement key provisions stipulated in the Lomé Accord. This decision was made in the context of an impending decision by Nigeria to hastily withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from ECOMOG in late April 2000. In February the force was strengthened to 11,100 and by the end of April 2000, the number of UN soldiers was 8,700.[44] In March 2000, the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping force of 17,500. However, the UN force lacked the necessary equipment and training and was severely underfunded.[45]

The US believed that a larger, better-trained UNAMSIL peacekeeping force was key to achieving the security conditions for holding elections in Sierra

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[42] Sierra Leone web, May 2001

[43] Keen 2005, 261

[44] Ibid

[45] UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the French daily newspaper Le Monde in an interview published on Friday. "Our soldiers are badly trained and badly equipped. You know that countries which supplied us with soldiers were supposed to equip them fully and train them well. That was not entirely the case here. Some soldiers arrived without even a uniform."

Leone.[46] The US trained Nigerian and Senegalese military battalions prior to their deployment to Sierra Leone. As US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice told a US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs on October 11 2000, "UNAMSIL also must have 'freedom of movement' as it assists government in gradually establishing authority throughout the country".[47] Despite some initial difficulties, its operations "went extremely well with no major incidents reported" after the rules of engagement were clarified and peace was declared in January 2002.[48] At its peak in mid-2002, UNAMSIL became the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in the world at annual cost of almost $700 million.[49]

The bulk of UN/external assistance went towards funding the military component of the UNAMSIL mission, however, and can hardly be considered as "peacebuilding". The emphasis on "security first" is clearly demonstrated in UNAMSIL's total spent on its military component. US$3-4 billion was spent to achieve short-term stabilisation and security, while even US$135 million was difficult to obtain for long-term social, political and economic development.[50] It is clear that the security-first strategy foreclosed other important priorities such as generating economic development, jobs and reintegrating local

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[46] US State Department, 'Susan Rice outlines US policy on Sierra Leone'

[47] Susan Rice outlines US policy on Sierra Leone, report from the US Department of State, 11 October 2000, http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/susan-rice-outlines-us-policy-sierra-leone (Accessed 12 July 2010)

[48] Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html

[49] United Nations Secretariat, 'Assessment of member states' contributions for the financing of the United Nations observer mission (UNOMSIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from 13 July 1998 to 30 June 2005, ST/Adm/ser.b/537, 30 November 2004,, 3

[50] Simon Arthy, 'Ex-combatant reintegration', Consultant to DfID, August 2003

communities.[51] The mission brought some notable successes, for instance, through its civilian outreach programmes (Radio UNAMSIL), and community projects (primarily the Pakistani military contingents that built schools, libraries, community centers, bridges from UN funds), but these interventions were all of the short-term "quick-impact" nature.[52]

The group that benefited the most from UNAMSIL's security presence was Sierra Leone's entrenched political class—both the ruling SLPP and as well as the opposition party members.[53] UNAMSIL created a stable, secure environment that allowed President Tejan Kabbah to consolidate his political agenda with minimal internal security concerns.[54] As a former UN bureaucrat, Kabbah had a stake in preserving the UN's "good image" in Sierra Leone since their presence sustained his domestic authority. Indeed, Kabbah preferred a longer-term presence for UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. Kabbah said at the close of the UNAMSIL mandate in Sierra Leone, "although we would have preferred our friends in UNAMSIL to remain in the country, unfortunately, we had to agree to this departure because prospective investors may construe this continued presence in Sierra Leone as an indication that Sierra Leone is unsafe and thereby refrain from investing in Sierra Leone with adverse repercussions on the

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[51] Lansana Gberie, The public relations deficit, *West Africa,* April 2005, 12

[52] For positive accounts of these programs, see Olonisakin 2008, 105-108

[53] It is important that a 2006 Wikileaks cable notes that "extreme poverty, inadequate resources and continuing governance and corruption issues with *their traditional political class in both ruling and opposition parties* underlies the country's fragility (Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html)

[54] As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the presence of British IMATT officers embedded within RSLAF and MoD was also a deterrent for military coups (see also Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html)

economy and lack of employment possibilities."[55] Upon their departure, Kabbah said in January 2006, "No one can deny that UNAMSIL has turned out to be among the most successful United Nations peacekeeping operations undertaken in an internal conflict over the past three decades."[56]

The role of "DDR" in the international strategy

Core aspects of Sierra Leone's DDR framework were designed in 1998 after Tejan Kabbah's government was restored to power by the regional military force ECOMOG.[57] The general plan for "DDR" was devised by World Bank consultants and was endorsed by the UN and other international donors at a Special UN conference held in New York in July 1998 and subsequently approved by the Government of Sierra Leone.[58] However, since the political context remained unstable, progress on DDR was contingent upon either a decisive military victory over the rebel RUF force or a durable political 'buy-in' by its main leaders.[59]

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[55] Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html

[56] Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html

[57] The international consultants included Ted Morse (a senior USAID official who had previously consulted in the Balkans-Macedonia and Albania in which he coordinated humanitarian assistance for Kosovar refugees) and Forian Fichtl (a German citizen, who joined the World Bank in 1994 as a consultant in the Western Africa Department, Populations and Human Resources division). Both individuals were hired as World Bank consultants. Fichtl later became a Senior Social Protection Specialist for the World Bank and coordinated the Bank's financial aspects in Sierra Leone's DDR programme in the late 1990s.

[58] Following the special UN conference in July 1998, a Technical Coordinating Meeting was organized by the UN to discuss planning modalities for DDR (NCDDR archival notes 18 November 2011)

[59] The failed Abidjan Peace Accord (1996) was a problematic agreement in that mediators failed to secure the necessary political buy-in from the RUF. In Abidjan, no senior government (ministerial) positions were offered to Foday Sankoh or the RUF. As Wai (2011, 241) notes, Kabbah's government, "buoyed by its recent victory at the polls, did not see the need to share

Sierra Leone's re-launched DDR programme in 1999 was a first-generation UN approach in that material incentives were combatant-centered (ex-combatants received cash in exchange for their weapons), and disarmament was linked with broader politics and social reintegration was given emphemal attention. Additionally, senior commanders were emphasised during the negotiated 'buy-in' process.[60] The controversial decision to offer material benefits (specifically a short-term reinsertion assistance package of approximately the equivalent of US$300) to ex-combatants was a Government of Sierra Leone policy decision and was criticized by some international donors and local civil society members. However, this decision was perceived by the Government of Sierra Leone as a necessary evil to secure peace with the RUF.[61]

After the Lomé Accord was signed in July 1999, attention focused on its implementation during the late summer. UNAMSIL devised a roadmap for disarmament in collaboration with World Bank officials embedded in the NCDDR (see annex 2). The Lomé Accord set an unrealistic and an overly ambitious start date for "DDR", stipulating that disarmament should commence ninety-days after its signing. As a result, the RUF leaders did not return to Sierra

power with a rebel movement that had refused to participate in the (1996) elections". Sankoh did not even sign the agreement. UK development minister Clare Short described the causes for the failed DDR process in 1998 and 1999 as "largely due to political considerations. The DDR process failed because some parties did not want the programme to succeed". (Letter from Clare Short to President Kabbah, 23 July 2000). Some elements in the UK government (namely the military) believed that the RUF could be defeated militarily if the Sierra Leone military was properly equipped and trained.

[60] Second-generation DDR approaches emerged around 2006 to try to develop more coherent, community-based approaches that engage commanders but also communities beyond the exclusive focus on ex-combatants. (Second generation DDR, 2011; IDDRS 2006)

[61] Testfamichael et al 2004. Some international donors including UK development minister Clare Short wanted to avoid paying combatants for arms, since many feared being perceived as rewarding fighters. Members of Sierra Leone's civil and political society were equally concerned that such provisions rewarded perpetrators over victims, including displaced peoples and refugees.

Leone for three months after the accord was signed.[62] Since the Lomé Accord was set up to fail, the peace process subsequently collapsed in May 2000.[63] The presence of British military troops in Freetown in May 2000 sent a strong signal to the RUF that resumption of fighting would be met by decisive military action on the part of the several hundred UK paratroopers based in Freetown and surrounding areas. This allowed the government of Sierra Leone (under Tejan Kabbah) to alter its political positioning and dictate certain terms related to the RUF's disarmament process.

After a failed RUF incursion into Guinea in September 2000, the RUF leadership had no choice but lay down their arms to the UN peacekeepers. In October 2000, UNAMSIL was able to deploy to Lungi, Port Loko, Freetown, Goderich, Masiaka, Mile 91, Kenema and Daru, Bo and Moyamba but was unable to deploy to the RUF strongholds of Kambia, Bombali, Tonkolili and Kono until nearly a year later.[64] The Abuja I ceasefire was negotiated in

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[62] Togo's President helped Sankoh travel to Algiers for the OAU conference from 12-14 July 1999. In Algiers, he met with Libya's president Muammar Gadhafi, who promised to send a plane to take Sankoh to Tripoli and later to Mecca, Saudi Arabia (Author's personal interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011).

[63] The external donors believed that disarmament should be completed by 15 December 1999. This deadline was overly ambitious, considering that the UN Secretary-General had only recommended to the Security Council the replacement of the unarmed UN observer mission (UNOMSIL) with a fully-fledged UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) on 23 September 1999. The disconnect between political negotiations and the UN military component was evident in the fact that while the UN lead Western states (US and UK) were trying to arrange an agreement and shaping the content of the comprehensive peace accord, these same states were slow to push through resolutions to deploy robust military forces to secure peace on the ground. The UN Security Council approved—rather late—a military force of only 6,000 military personnel, (including 260 military observers) to implement the Lomé Accord. This decision was made in the context of an impending decision by Nigeria to hastily withdraw its peacekeeping force in late April 2000. DDR in Sierra Leone began in October 1999. Meanwhile, the Government was signaling its own commitment towards peace by inviting RUF members to a workshop on National Security on 22-22 March 2000 and meetings of the Ministers of Security, Justice, Internal Affairs on 16-17 April 2000 (NCDDR archival notes)

[64] UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 October 2000

November 2000 recommitting the warring factions to ending the war and implementing the DDR process. Appointed RUF interim leader Issa Sesay became more amenable to peaceful negotiations and agreed to the ceasefire.[65] Within a week, Sesay instructed his combatants to join the DDR process.[66]

On 15 May 2001, the second Abuja Accord, signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, was seen by the UN and the NCDDR as an opportunity to expedite disarmament within the general framework set out by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR). The forces agreed to disarm one RUF and one CDF stronghold region at a time. The NCDDR also changed its policy from individual to group disarmament in an attempt to accelerate the process. This shift required combatants to disarm with their respective commander(s).[67]

World Bank officials working on Sierra Leone at the time viewed disarmament and post-conflict elections as fundamentally linked and integral to the international macro-peacebuilding strategy. The World Bank and the UN's strategy focused on using DDR as a tool to create minimal security conditions to hold "post-conflict" (defined as the absence of large-scale violence or "negative peace") elections. According to Raja Jandhayla, the Programme Advisor who was embedded in the World Bank-sponsored National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), the "focus should

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[65] David Keen 2005, 273; Olonisakin 2008, 102.

[66] Jackson and Albercht 2009, 62.

[67] An independent evaluation of Sierra Leone's DDR programme noted that "the criteria for group disarmament were essentially that units present themselves with all their members, weapons and ammunition…group disarmament based in a percentage of weapons presented provided commanders with an opportunity to include in the programme all of the people under their control".(Testfamichael et al 2004,11 and 39)

be on constitutional extensions to buy time necessary to create conditions/environment for broad-based participation in the elections".[68] In this respect, the World Bank strategy was in accordance with the British and Americans were proposing: DDR was viewed as one component in the overall strategy to create conditions for conducting elections as soon as possible in order to confer legitimacy on the international/UN's favoured candidate: Tejan Kabbah. The British were heavily invested in Kabbah since their support was important during the 1996 elections and their continued policy of bankrolling Kabbah's government while he was in exile in Conakry, Guinea.[69] Prior to the 1999 invasion of Freetown, Britain had been effectively running key national institutions in Sierra Leone through proxy "advisors", including the National Commission for DDR, the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration (NCRRR), the Sierra Leone Police, Ministry of Defense, and the Anti-Corruption Commission. This practice continued from 1999-2000. British citizens employed as DfID "advisors" were initially embedded in implementation roles in the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration before 1999.[70] Subsequently, World Bank officials were embedded in the NCDDR to push the international agenda in practice. Outlining the World Bank's view, Jandhayla explained, "deadlines provide unique opportunities by establishing a recognizable goal

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[68] Email correspondence between former World Bank Programme Advisor to NCDDR Executive Secretary, 'Strategy for Peace, Role of DDR' (obtained from NCDDR archives), 1, NCDDR archives, in author's possession (Accessed 18 November 2011)

[69] According to David Keen, the British government had already invested some 30 million (pounds) in propping up Kabbah's government (Keen 2005, 250).

[70] NCDDR archives, see NCDDR meeting minutes

(elections) and by placing time pressure, which strengthens focus and priorities".[71] Thus, "a timetable should be created by the Executive Secretariat [of NCDDR], World Bank and Government of Sierra Leone to work backwards [to] establishing an implementation schedule for actions required to meet the deadline (it could be tentative) to undertake elections within 12 months. DDR will remain a precondition for elections".[72] Accordingly, elections "provide the US, UK, ECOWAS and UN a common goal and elevates the discussion to the peace process beyond operational issues, if proposed and accepted". It provides UNAMSIL with a focus "and could be the basis [to] guide the US, UK, and Security Council decisions justifying extension of their mandate and their request for increas[ing] logistics as well as provide[s] them with a timeframe deadline for deployment".[73]

Formal Governance Structures of DDR in Sierra Leone
In order to implement countrywide disarmament in Sierra Leone, the United Nations and the Sierra Leonean Government established three governance structures—the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), the Tripartite (or Joint Operations) and the Technical Coordinator Committee (TCC). These structures were established to incorporate and socialise the primary warring factions into abiding by internationally acceptable modes of behavior. Mostly material incentives were utilised to "induce" and pacify elements in the RUF to support disarmament.

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[71] Email correspondence between former World Bank Programme Advisor to NCDDR Executive Secretary, 'Strategy for Peace, Role of DDR', (NCDDR archives obtained in National Archives)
[72] Ibid.
[73] Email correspondence between former World Bank Programme Advisor to NCDDR Executive Secretary, 'Strategy for Peace, Role of DDR' (obtained from NCDDR archives)

National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

The primary institution—the NCDDR was the highest policymaking body for handling high-level political and security issues related to the DDR process in Sierra Leone.[74] The NCDDR was controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone authorities and was strongly supported by the United Nations, World Bank and UK and US governments.[75] Initially the President of Sierra Leone was the "head" of NCDDR until the government's position as consolidated enough that the President could withdrawal and appoint a bureaucrat to serve as the Executive Secretary to manage and implement policy decisions made by the executive body, and to mediate demands placed on the Government of Sierra Leone by key donors (notably, the United Kingdom, United Nations, the World Bank and the United States).[76] The NCDDR integrated top leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and Civil Defence Forces.[77]

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[74] There were political factors exogenous to the functioning of NCDDR that shaped the DDR programme. For instance, several bilateral meetings occurred outside of the framework of NCDDR, between for instance, various bilateral stakeholders (including UK High Commissioner or the US Ambassador) and the President. It is noteworthy that, in the context of Tripartite talks, the US ambassador and UK High Commissioner held opposing views regarding how to engage the RUF. US emphasised power sharing and giving legitimacy to the RUF, while the UK favoured supporting the Government of Sierra Leone and was reluctant to share power with the RUF. (Author's confidential interview with former NCDDR official, 23 December 2011)

[75] The United Nations political authorities involved in the process were the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, and UN Development Programme Country Head. The majority of NCDDR's funding came from voluntary contributions from western governments and was pooled in a World Bank administered Multi-donor Trust Fund.

[76] Author's confidential interview with former NCDDR official, 23 December 2011

[77] The lack of strong political and military leadership within the RUF meant that international and regional actors agreed to recognize Issa Sesay as interim leader of the RUF in mid-2000 and pursued a "political buy-in" strategy with him, Kallon and Gbao. (Author's confidential interview with former NCDDR official, 23 December 2011)

Integration of Senior Commanders

Participation and "buy-in" from leaders of the RUF and CDF were critical to overall success of the NCDDR. The CDF's disarmament process depended on formal authorization from their governmental representative, Deputy Minister of Defence Samuel Hinga Norman (for more, see Chapter 4). Regarding the RUF's leadership and hierarchy, Foday Sankoh and most of the RUF leadership were in detention since May 2000, which left Issa Sesay, Dennis Mingo, Morris Kallon, Eldred Collins and Augustine Gbao in command of the RUF.[78] UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Oluyemi Adenjji negotiated a "reintegration package" for Sesay to encourage RUF support for the DDR and broader peace process.[79] Thereafter, Sesay became an influential and constructive interim leader of the RUF.[80] In exchange for their participation, top-level factional leaders were provided special "inducements" from the UN and NCDDR. For instance, in 2002-2003, Issa Sesay received a grant from NCDDR to initiate a fisheries and agricultural project, which he led with some of his

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[78] There were no core members of the RUF high command that were capable of assuming high-level military or political appointments. The RUF lacked internal political coherence or institutionalisation. Its leaders came from either "lumpen" or poorly educated backgrounds. Interim leader, Issa Sesay was too young to contest as the Revolutionary United Front Party's candidate in the 2002 elections. Based in Buedu, Kailahun, Bockerie refused to abide by Lomé provisions to disarm RUF rank-and-file soldiers under his command. DDR was in a holding pattern until Bockerie's permanent departure from Sierra Leone in November 1999. (According to an ECOWAS press release, Bockerie left Sierra Leone in November 1999. NCDDR archives in author's possession.)

[79] Issa Sesay had received material benefits from the UN and was also promised a scholarship to study abroad (in China or Europe) from Adenjji, according to a confidential interview conducted by the author of Special Court staff member, 20 January 2012. See also footnote 40 below.

[80] As mentioned, when Sesay gave orders for his commanders to disarm the rank-and-file soldiers, the UN's disarmament process progressed rapidly. In June 2000, Sesay demonstrated his commitment by assisting (facilitated by Charles Taylor) in the release of UNAMSIL personnel taken hostage by the RUF in May. (David Keen 2005, 274)

former combatants.[81] Additionally, Augustine Gbao, Eldred Collins, Morris Kallon and Gibril Massaquoi were provided special grants from NCDDR to enable them to start up their own micro-businesses.[82] NCDDR also reviewed agricultural project proposals for several senior CDF commanders. These benefits were in addition to any cash benefit assistance package provided to combatants as part of the formal DDR process.

Integration of Junior Commanders

In additional to the integration of RUF and CDF leaders in the NCDDR, three "liaison officers" (one from each faction) were incorporated into the NCDDR Executive Secretariat and received monthly salaries.[83] Moreover, six junior commanders from each of the three warring factions were integrated as "liaison

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[81] At the time of their indictments from the Special Court, Kallon and Sesay had been approved for NCDDR/Government of Sierra Leone to initiate fisheries projects with about 15 ex-fighters. NCDDR reintegration officers worked with these commanders to develop a project proposal. The grant was worth 20 million Leones. The NCDDR kept this information discreet because the public was opposed to power-sharing or other incentives to RUF commanders. (Author's confidential interview with former NCDDR official, Freetown, 23 December 2011).

[82] Two Special Court indictees, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon were promised "agricultural scholarships" to study in Nigeria by SGSR Adeniji, with whom he was allegedly close with. Special Court prosecutor David M. Crane viewed this as "blatantly trying to undercut the work of the Special Court" since it was done one month before the Special Court launched its operation to detain those leaders it deemed necessary to prosecute. Crane describes how he was briefed of "this scam" by a "very senior deputy". Crane explained, "I sent a note that simply stated that if he did what he was contemplating, I would have him arrested for obstruction of justice. This was passed on to senior officials at the United Nations. The agriculture packages were withdrawn and Sesay and Kallon never left the country". (See David M. Crane, 'The Bright Red Thread: The Politics of International Criminal Law—Do We Want Peace or Justice? The West African Experience, in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed.), *Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 70). Additionally, one other Special Court indictee, Augustine Gbao was in an "advanced stage" of an agricultural project in his home-town village of Kenema at the time of his Special Court indictment and arrest in March 2003. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao were both convicted of crimes against humanity by the Special Court and had their judgements upheld in October 2009. They were subsequently transferred to Mpanga prison in Rwanda to serve the remainder of their sentences (UNIPSIL 15 March 2010, 10)

[83] The three individuals were Abdulai Salaam Williams (AFRC), James Bayoh (RUF) and Baimba Zorokong (CDF) (NCDDR archival notes in author's possession, 18 November 2011)

officers" in the NCDDR's regional offices in May 2001 and also received

monthly salaries from the World Bank administered fund.[84] Their role included

verification and validity of demobilised combatants during reintegration phase

and facilitated communication with rank-and-file combatants in remote areas.[85]

Tripartite Structure
Established in May 2001, the Tripartite was another high-level forum that

brought together leaders and outside mediators to discuss political and technical

aspects effecting the implementation of DDR as well as broader policy issues

such as ceasefire violations, the release of prisoners of war, and donor issues

among others. The Tripartite integrated the views of senior leaders of the

warring factions and was used as forum to test each other's level of commitment

towards the peace process. The composition of this committee included

Government of Sierra Leone representatives, the rebel RUF, CDF, and

UNAMSIL, while key international donors (such as the United Kingdom's High

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[84] Author's confidential interviews with former NCDDR official, Freetown, February 2012; Testfamichael et al 2004; the author's review of NCDDR archives reveal that Issa Sesay nominated six members of the RUF to serve as staff in NCDDR on 15 June 2001. These RUF were subsequently integrated into NCDDR on 19 June 2001 and staffed in regional offices in Bo, Kenema, Port Loko, and Freetown at NCDDR headquarters. Their role was to verify demobilised combatants that had been previously screened by the faction's High Command for subsequent reintegration assistance. The six RUF members were Prince Taylor (Western), Tamba T. Karimu (Western), Dennis Lansana (Western), J.K. Bangali (South), Alfred Jimmy (North) and Mohamed Ben Kenneh (East).

[85] There were mixed perceptions about whether this was an effective strategy or not. Independent consultants claim that their integration in the governance system was 'limited' (Testfamichael et al 2004). In the opinion of the NCDDR Executive Secretary, "We are very pleased with their respective performances. Apart from participating in planning and implementing the operations of the DDR programme, they provide the very vital liaison and communication link required between the Executive Secretary-NCDDR and their [former warring factions] leadership". (Executive Secretary report for the third tripartite meeting held in Bo, 17 July 2001, 3.). We have also consulted with national and district CDF administrators and commanders and planning our operations in all the relevant areas. The operational meetings helped to further clarify existing communication problems and ensured that the CDF and RUF view DDR operations and assistance as neutral in their applications. (Ibid).

Commissioner and US Ambassador) served in an "advisory" capacity.[86] The UN

Special Representative to the Secretary-General chaired the Tripartite meetings

and the Executive Secretariat of NCDDR served as the Secretary.[87] From May

2001 to January 2002, eight tripartite meetings were held on bi-weekly basis.[88]

However, the UN, US and UK's decision to include the RUF leaders in

the Tripartite structure was controversial among civil society and political

leaders in Sierra Leone mostly because it afforded legitimacy to an armed group

that was widely perceived as politically illegitimate. According to opposition

politician John Benjamin from the National Unity Party, integrating the RUF

leaders into the Tripartite granted unwarranted legitimacy to the RUF as a

political movement. In Benjamin's words:

> They are creating the people they talk to. They've created Colonel Issa
> [Sesay] as leader for RUF. They've now created an Omrie Golley, who
> has his own political party, and they are talking to him. What do you get
> out of these people that you create? The leadership of RUF is in the
> hands of government. They're a defeated group. So I don't really see
> where the negotiation comes in.[89]

Technical Coordinating Committees (TCCs)
Finally, Technical Coordinating Committees (TCC) were field-based committees

led by UNAMSIL Military Observers that negotiated technical and logistical

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[86] The government delegation, most often led by Attorney General/Minister of Justice Berewa included then Minister of Interior Charles Margai, National Security Advisor Brig. Kellie Conteh, Colonel Tom Carew (CDS), MS Dumbuya, head of the CDF. RUF's delegation, often led by Omrie Golley, Chairman of the Peace Council included (self-styled) Brigadier Mike Lamin, Gibril Massaquoi, Jonathan Kposowa, Eldred Collins, Augustine Gbao, Andrew Kanu and Ms. Anges Manie.

[87] Notable UN authorities were Adenjii (SRSG), Allan Doss (DSRSG), UNAMSIL force commander General Opandi, deputy force commander Martin Agwai, Michael Ononaiye, special assistant to the SRSG; Kenjii Isezaki, Chief of DDR coordination for UNAMSIL; Lt. Col. Thomas Lovgren, DDR cell; Mr. Mitonga Zongwe, DDR coordinator.

[88] Meetings were held on 15 May 2001 in Freetown, 2 June in Magburaka, 17 July in Bo, 10 August in Kenema, 18 September in Makeni (note this meeting was scheduled two weeks prior but the RUF delegation failed to show up), 11 October in Freetown.

[89] Sierra Leone web, May 2001.

aspects of DDR.[90] The principal objectives of the TCCs were to liaison and negotiate with the irregular forces' commanders on the ground to release their combatants for DDR. TCCs received orders from the tripartite on issues relating to scheduling and logistics.[91] For instance, one of the issues that was dealt with in the context of the TCC was destruction of small arms and weapons that had been collected by UNAMSIL.[92] These NCDDR structures highlight how the DDR process emphasised integration of the main leaders of the irregular factions. The UN's substantial material and discursive resources altered local political dynamics in favour of Kabbah's government, while also at the same time legitimising the faction's senior leadership with material benefits.

Another aspect of this wider peacebuilding strategy involved deploying resources at the disposal of the NCDDR to provide material assistance to ex-combatants in support of "reintegration" in the months leading up to the elections "so that ex-combatants are not used for political purposes to destabilise the situation".[93] The international strategy focused almost exclusively on high-level rebel leaders and regional spoilers; all of the elements of the strategy aimed

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[90] One of the issues that the TCC dealt with was destruction of weapons collected. Since UNAMSIL did not have the technical expertise to perform this task, DfID provided a weapons disposal expert to advise on the handling of weapons and ammunition collected since 20 October 1999. These stockpiles were held in containers in Masiaka, Port Loko, Goderich and Kenema. (NCDDR 'Policy Issues for DDR', 30 April 1999)

[91] Its composition also included United National Children's Fund (UNICEF), National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction (NCRRR), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), European Union (EU), Department for International Development (DfID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and local Non-Government Organizations (LNGOs).

[92] Since UNAMSIL did not have the technical expertise to perform this task, DfID provided a weapons disposal expert to advise on the handling of weapons and ammunition collected since 20 October 1999. These stockpiles were held in containers in Masiaka, Port Loko, Goderich and Kenema (NCDDR 'Policy Issues for DDR', 30 April 1999)

[93] Email correspondence between former World Bank Programme Advisor to NCDDR Executive Secretary, 'Strategy for Peace, Role of DDR' (obtained from NCDDR archives)

at creating the conditions for holding elections and reconsolidating central government authority. The paradox of this approach was that these efforts hurridly aimed to re-establish the old system without radically restructuring it before Executive political legitimacy was restored. Meanwhile, although the CPA made provisions for dealing with the irregular factions' rank and file combatants, very little consideration was given to the irregular factions' rank-and-file combatants and what "structures" these individuals would be "reintegrated" into or how to create jobs and employment opportunities for the general youth cohort.

Reconsolidation of State Authority

The next pillar of the International Contact Group's strategy on Sierra Leone was to hurriedly reconsolidating state authority throughout the provinces. The initial phases of this process required dismantling the civil-military chieftaincy administration structures that the RUF had set up in the north and east. The aim was to replace the RUF local governance structures with formal state administrators and local government authorities in all of Sierra Leone's 149 chiefdoms. The British were highly supportive of Kabbah's 1998 proposal to reinstate the previous chieftaincy institution in the rural provinces before the 2002 election too place.[94] Many international observers were surprised about this decision, considering that local chiefs had been a constitutive pillar in British indirect rule during colonialism and had a controversial legacy in the exercise of

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[94] Richard Fanthorpe, 'On the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 105: 418, 2006, 27-49

authority on behalf of the colonial and post-colonial state.[95] Mamdani argued

that the colonial state structures survived unscathed during the transition to

independence to serve the interest of the post-colonial political elite (SLPP) as

well as British/foreign interests following their departure from Sierra Leone

around 1967.[96] After the war ended in 2001, Britain brought back a former

colonial administrator to advise DfID on its chieftaincy restoration programme.

Approximately 54% of all elected chiefs returned to their former positions.[97]

DfID also provided support in the form of imported building materials to

construct new residents for these chiefs.[98] In effect, governance structures from

pre-war were rebuilt in their former colonial mold.[99] This decision was

problematic, considering that these same local state governance institutions had

been a primary reason why thousands of youth participated in the war as front-

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[95] The British established an indirect system of colonial administration for the hinterlands based on British Governors and Provincial and District Commissioners for the twelve districts, who supervised approximately one hundred and fifty paramount chiefs. For an analysis of indirect rule as a form of the colonial state, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996

[96] Mamdani 1996

[97] DfID, '*Identifying Options',* cited in Jackson, 109

[98] The contract called for the Government of Sierra Leone and the people in the respective chiefdoms to provide communal labour. As former President Kabbah observes, the British failed to fully implement their part of the agreement and the project ran into difficulties. DfID conducted a review and failed to share its findings wtth Kabbah's governemnt (Kabbah, Back from the Brink, 313)

[99] Paul Richards has criticized the re-establishment of chiefs in his research on Sierra Leonean youth and local governance. He notes that before the war, many youth resented chiefs for their human rights abuses, including 'forced labour' for unpaid 'community work' and monopoly control over the customary marriage system. Additionally, Richards argues the civil war is best understood as a struggle of the subordinate classes against the customary authority dating back to the nineteenth century and reinforced under colonial 'indirect rule'. (Paul Richards, 'To Fight or to Farm', 525)

line combatants. Many of these youth wanted to overturn the unjust forms of local control and authority and to settle old scores.[100]

Some academics claim that restoring traditional chiefs to their previous positions in local power structures was tantamount to "re-creating the pre-conditions for war".[101] There were divergent opinions within the donor community as well as to whether or not to resuscitate the chieftaincy institution in Sierra Leone.[102] According to a DfID document,

> There appears to be very little support or interest in developing the chiefdom system among other potential donors. This is partly because 'the British are doing it' and mainly because negative views of the chiefdom system prevail. The Americans, for example, are said to believe in total abolition. Several agencies (the [World] Bank, UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] and EU [European Union]) are keen to support the reestablishment of elected local government.[103]

Additionally, Kabbah supported the idea of deploying the newly British trained Sierra Leone police to the government-controlled areas as soon as possible to augment UN peacekeeping forces in the provinces and to demonstrate the

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[100] Richards, 'To Fight or to Farm?'; Krijn Peters, 'Footpaths to Reintegration: Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone, unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology: Wageningen University, 2007; Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Additionally, as Peters notes, the 1955-56 riots were over abuses of power and allegations of corruption by chiefs.

[101] Hanlon 2005; see also ICG, 'Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States', 2004, 23-24; Jackson, 'Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding Local Government in Sierra Leone', *Public Administration and Development*, 25, 2005, 49–58; E. Sawyer, 'Remove or Reform? A Case for (Restructuring) Chiefdom Governance in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 107:428, 2008, 387-403

[102] Subsequently, after the Government passed the 2004 Local Government Act, DfID carried out training and sensitization efforts with joint DfID/World Bank teams under the Decentralisation Secretariat to extend legitimacy to local chiefs and to support the establishment of local districts.

[103] Garth Glentworth, Non-Project Concept Note: Sierra Leone Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, Phase 2, DfID: London, 2003, cited in Richard Fanthrope, 'On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-war Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 105: 418, 2006, 27-49. International donors believed that over-centralisation was a cause of the conflict. As Jackson points out, the World Bank, UNDP and DfID placed 'strong emphasis on decentralisation as part of their post-war reconstruction efforts'.

symbolic dimensions of Sierra Leonean state authority. These steps were followed up by reinstating the local district councils that had been dismantled in 1972 during President Stevens' rule.[104] The implication of adopting this approach meant preservation of the status quo and simply redistributing an "old deck of cards".[105] As Sierra Leonean-American political scientist Jimmy Kandeh argues, these old local governance institutions were implicated in corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power before the war.[106] As Jackson notes, "many chiefs have political patrons at the national level and are part of wider patronage networks, including those extracting diamonds".[107] Youth on the margins of these patronage networks are excluded from meaningful work opportunities and basic livelihoods and therefore have little stake in the existing order. Kandeh explains "reviving these councils has in many cases resulted not in an

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[104] A review of decentralisation is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some basic points need to be made. Kabbah's government strongly supported the 2004 Local Government Act, passed by parliament in March 2004, which reconfirms chiefdoms' status and local councils as the basic institutional pillar, which can delegate functions to chiefs. Local councils provide services to local people and raise local taxes to pay for them. Fanthrope (2006) discusses how the re-establishment of local councils reflected previous arrangements and how some politicians and bureaucrats appointed their clients into positions of authority in order to "milk local resources". Local elections were held in Sierra Leone on 22 May 2004. For a more comprehensive study, see Paul Jackson, 'Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 106:422, 2007, 95-111; R. Fanthorpe, 'Neither Citizen Nor Subject? 'Lumpen' Agency and the Legacy of Native Administration in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs*, 100, 2001, 363–386. UN statements on the local district councils are contradictory, claiming on one hand that local councils "receive inadequate financial resources and insufficient qualified personnel to carry out planning and implementation of programmes", but also that the government needs to "sensitize local communities regarding their obligation to pay taxes and levies" (see UNIOSIL report, 4 December 2007, 10). For the 5 July 2008 local council elections, out of an estimated cost of US$24.8 million (according to the UN), the Government pledged to cover only $3.2 million (UNIOSIL report 29 April 2008, 4)

[105] Paul Jackson, 'Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 106:422, 2007, 95-111

[106] Kandeh 2012, 110

[107] Jackson 2007, 101; see also Jackson, 'Chiefs, Money and Politicians'. The World Bank reports widespread mismanagement, abuse of power by chiefs and the failure to deliver basic services for their subjects (Sierra Leone: Strategic Options for public sector reform, report 25110, 2003; DfID, *Identifying Options*

improvement of local governance but in the decentralisation of bureaucratic expropriation rent-seeking opportunities" for the urban-local elites.[108]

Post-conflict Elections (2002)
As disarmament was picking up momentum following the Abuja II Accord (see Chapter 4 on the "DDR" program), the ground was being prepared for holding elections throughout the country by the United Nations. From May 5-19 and subsequently from August 18-29th 2001, a UN technical team conducted an electoral needs assessment in Sierra Leone. With international backing from the International Contact Group (led by Britain and the US), a national consultation conference was held in Freetown between November 13-15th 2001 to organize elections. Local reports in Freetown viewed the conference as a manufactured stage show for Britain and the US to help consolidate support for their preferred candidate Kabbah.[109] Under the chairmanship of Walter Nicol, a former inspector-general of police, equipped with staff and bankrolled by external funds, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) commenced its registration process in late January 2002 once formal disarmament had completed, registering a total of 2,309,338 voters.[110] Additionally, the Electoral Laws Act (2002) was quickly drafted by Sierra Leonean laywers and supervised by the UN and passed by the Sierra Leonean Parliament and signed into law by President Kabbah in January 2002.

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[108] Jimmy Kandeh, 'Intervention and Peacebuilding: A Critical Perspective', 2012, 110
[109] Abdul Kuyateh, Sierra Leone: Election 2002…ICG query donor confidence, *Standard Times*, 9 January 2002.
[110] Kandeh 2003, 194

Opposition political parties formed into a coalition, the All Political Parties Association (APPA) to declare its members were not prepared for the elections and proposed instead to establish a two-year interim government of national unity. The rebel RUF-turned political party used this as an opportunity to resume its call for establishing an interim government, which it wanted to be a part of.

Regarding the Government's financial committment to the elections, Kabbah's budget could not meet its financial contribution of 6.5 billion Leones out of an estimated cost of US$11.5 million. In the end, the Government of Sierra Leone was only able to contribute 500 million Leones, which it provided in several tranches.[111] Britain re-configured UNAMSIL's mandate through Security Council deliberations in late 2001 and early 2002 to enable UNAMSIL to assist in non-conventional peacekeeping tasks, notably providing assistance during the internationally-observed (by the EU and Commonwealth) elections on 14 May 2002 to ensure "Sierra Leone would be able to maintain its own internal order as well as protect its borders from external aggression" (tasks included setting up regional offices to monitor the process, and during elections themselves, distributing ballot boxes, retrieving the boxes after the votes and providing logistics and security in high-risk areas).[112]

Britain was hesitant in allowing the UN to be perceived as leading the conduct of elections. The British wanted a respected Sierra Leonean to be the

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[111] ICG, Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? 19 December 2001, 8.

[112] Olonisakin 2008, 113. A new election unit was established in UNAMSIL and peacekeepers were provided a mandate to assist the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) (which had been undergoing police reform since 1999) in providing security in over 5,000 polling stations throughout the country.

figurehead of a national electoral commission. International NGO International Crisis Group noted that donors were hesitant to allow the UN to assume a lead role in elections because of its "desire to minimize the risk of too close an association with a process that many officials privately acknowledge will be far from perfect. Their preference [was] to keep a low profile. But the donor community cannot afford another disastrous electoral process in Sierra Leone, and the best way to avoid that is to get involved more deeply".[113]

Despite a lack of capacity in the NEC, the path to elections in 2002 was maintained despite warnings that the security was precarious and state-soceity complex was vulnerable. The International Crisis Group (ICG) warned:

> The obvious gaps in NEC capacity and public perception of electoral fraud and irregularities suggest that the UN and donor community should not sustain their preferred option of maintaining a substantially invisible presence. The success of the whole venture ultimately depends on deep and aggressive UN and donor involvement. There is no substitute for this if old mistakes and a new tragedy are to be avoided.[114]

Aside from wanting to limit UN resources and its wider presence in Sierra Leone in the early post-war period, the rush for elections in 2002 was also justified to stonewall the RUF's call for establishing an interim government or power-sharing deal.[115] Elections were held despite severe logistical problems, lack of voter education, poor training of polling station administrators and general lack of understanding about the voting process.[116] Political campaigning consisted of providing rice and money to persuade voters to support them. As the

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[113] ICG, Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? 19 December 2001, 8-9

[114] ICG, Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? 19 December 2001, 11

[115] ICG, Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? 19 December 2001, 2

[116] ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as usual? Africa Report No. 49, ICG: Brussels, 12 July 2002, 5.

International Crisis Group reported, "most parties lack the organizational structure, political vision, skills, training, knowledge, and financing to survive let alone influence policy day-to-day."[117] According to the International Crisis Group, old patterns of "politics as usual" re-emerged to define the 2002 elections.[118] On 14 May 2002, Sierra Leoneans voted at the polls to elect a new president and parliament in violence-free elections. With more than 70% of the vote, President Kabbah's SLPP won by a landside, while the SLPP also won the majority of seats in Parliament.[119] According to Sierra Leonean political scientist Jimmy Kandeh, Kabbah's electoral victory was primarily attributed to the widespread belief among voters that the SLPP ended the war and brought peace to Sierra Leone.[120] However, one cannot underestimate the role that British/US/UN support played in altering the balance of power in favour of Kabbah.

The circumstances surrounding the detention of the RUF leader Foday Sankoh is noteworthy. When the Lomé accord collapsed in early May 2000 after RUF rebels took UN peacekeepers hostage in Makeni, many believed the RUF was undermining the peace process. At the same time, on 8 May, groups of Sierra Leoneans protested at Sankoh's residence on Signal Hill in Freetown. The demonstration resulted in the Government detaining Sankoh. This illustrates how the Government was able to dictate the transition by capitalising on its

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[117] ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual? 2002,7
[118] ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual? 2002,7,.
[119] Olonisakin 2008, 13. Kabbah's SLPP won 83 seats out of 112 seats in parliament.
[120] Jimmy Kandeh 2003

privledged position to "squeeze out" the RUF to almost complete irrelevance in the political space.[121]

The desire to hurridly conduct elections foreclosed opportunities to engage in any substantive "institution-building" before liberalisation. This was primarily attributed to the fact that the World Bank and UN officials were remarkably unaware of the fact that Sierra Leone's violent political history was rooted in the perpetual struggle for state power between the SLPP and APC parties and that elections always heighten the intensity of this conflict. International observers were most interested in the cosmetic act of conducting elections as opposed to breaking old political habits within and between the two dominant parties. Additionally, international "expats" were confused about the nature of the RUF's political ambitions. The UN insisted that the former rebel-turned-political party RUFP field a candidate in the hopes that its political incarnation would be de-legitimized through the democratic process. On the other hand, it was clear that the Government would not support his release from prison to run in the elections.[122] With no alternative frontrunner candidate to run in Sankoh's place, the RUFP missed the political party registration date.[123]

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[121] Sankoh was not the only former RUF members to be detained after the 8 May 2000 incident. 57 members of the RUF, including the four cabinet members in Government were detained and subsequently charged by the Government on charges of conspiracy to murder and shooting with intent to kill. By April 2006, 47 of them had been acquitted and discharged. Three were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment each. Additionally, 32 "West Side Boys" (a splinter group associated with the former AFRC junta) were detained in Pandema Road prison and had been charged with conspiracy to murder and shooting with intent to kill. 26 of them were acquitted and discharged while six were sentenced to long-term prison terms (UNIOSIL, April 2006, 6).

[122] Sankoh had considerable support not only from the RUF supporters but had, somewhat ironically, drummed up followers by his intrigue (Author's personal interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011).

[123] The RUFP had decided internally to field candidates within each of the constituencies for the parliamentary elections but would not field a presidential candidate. However, an RUF

However, the UN was insistent that the RUFP field a candidate for the elections. According to RUFP candidate Pallo Bangura observed, "that was a major condition of the international community for the validity and credibility of the elections".[124] During the elections, the RUFP was a complete non-factor, receiving a paltry 2.1% of the vote, while the political party representing the interests of the former AFRC junta received 3.6% of the popular vote.[125]

During the elections, Sierra Leone was also dependent on external security arrangements with the United Nations peacekeeping troops and, on a bilateral level, with Britain through to the end of at least 2005. The considerable UN presence and the international assistance during the elections was critical, without which elections could not have taken place.[126] After 2002, UNAMSIL wanted to shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding (focusing social, economic and agricultural programs, rebuilding primary institutions such as health and education). UN officials were concerned that the government would remain dependent on donor assistance and will not take responsibility for its sovereignty.[127]

After Kabbah was elected in May 2002, he built his government's strategy around carrying out neo-liberal reforms of the state as dictated by the

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delegation from Kailahun insisted that decision be reversed on the grounds that their region had suffered the most during the war. The Kailahun delegation proposed that the RUFP's secretary-general Pallo Bangura run as the presidential candidate. Bangura accepted after being persuaded by Nigeria's President Obasanjo during a trip to Nigeria. Bangura's campaigning was exclusively focused on Freetown though. (Author's interview with RUFP candidate Pallo Bangura, 28 October 2011, Freetown)

[124] Author's interview with Pallo Bangura, Freetown, 28 October 2011

[125] Kandeh 2003, 190

[126] Kandeh 2003, 193

[127] ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as usual? 2002, 15.

World Bank, IMF and the British and American governments within the liberal peace framework.[128] Kabbah was keen to exert his influence on conditions for peace and limit British/external involvement in state reforms later in the process (See below).[129]

To illustrate how the International Contact Group's insistence on conducting elections promptly after the war foreclosed alternative strategies and state forms, one can briefly examine Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) process that occurred from 2002-2003. The TRC was an initiative agreed upon by the factions during the 1999 Lomé peace agreement. It was decided that a TRC should be established within ninety days after the signing of the agreement. The creation of a TRC was approved through an act of Parliament on 10 February 2000 (TRC act 2000) and was only established in practice on 5 July 2002.[130] The purpose of the TRC was to produce "an impartial and historical record on human rights and international humanitarian law violations related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone" from 1991-1999. Its mandate included investigating the causes, the nature and extent of human rights violations and to determine whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorization by any government, individual or group. The second purpose of

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[128] Fanthrope 2005; Wai 2011; Duffield 2001

[129] ICG, 'Rebuilding Failed States' 2004; David Tam-Baryoh, 'The British and our Mistakes', *Concord Times*, 20 February 2001

[130] The testimony taking phase occurred from 4-20 December 2002 collecting 1371 testimonies. Phase two of the testimony-taking occurred in February 2003 until 31 March 2003. Hearings from victims, witnesses and perpetrators were held throughout the country between 14 April -18 July 2003. The final report was published in March 2004, consisting of about 5,000 witness testimonies, the main report is 1,500 pages, the transcripts are more than 3,500 pages, totaling 5,000 pages in 12 chapters. The following topics are covered: historical context, governance, political and military history, the nature of the conflict, the impact of natural resources on the conflict, women, children, youth, relations between the commission and the tribunal, reconciliation, reparation and the national vision of the country.

the commission was to respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses that occurred. The Commission was also to pay special attention to the experiences of victims of sexual abuse and of children. The fact that the elections preceded the establishment of the Commission allowed the Kabbah government to "pick and choose" which TRC recommendations were in its own best interests to implement above the nation's.[131] As such, the conduct of elections before a national dialogue was detrimental for the country's long-term reconciliation.

Sierra Leone: Summary

As the "Lead state" on Sierra Leone in the UN Security Council, British peacebuilding was more informed by a problematic understanding of Sierra Leone based on a continuation of colonial frameworks of the state that had been complicit in the post-conflict disintegration. While a large UN peacekeeping force filled the security vacuum by assuming primary role over national defence duties on behalf of the Sierra Leonean state and international community, Britain could dictate the nature of the transition and engage in "institution-building" by influencing provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, embedding "advisors" in the Weberian ideal-type governmental institutions (Ministries of Finance, Defence, Internal Affairs, the civil service, police, judiary and armed

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[131] IRIN, Sierra Leone: Civil society criticizes 'vague' government plan for post-war reform, IRIN, 13 July 2005. It took almost seven years after the end of the war for the reparations programme as recommended in the TRC to be implemented. This required considerable financial and administrative support from the International Migration Organization (IOM) and the Peacebuilding Fund. "Very limited funds" were procured so "only some of the immediate needs of victims" were addressed (basic health care, shelter) (UNIPSIL 22 May 2009, 7). In Liberia, TRC hearings did not commence until 2007-2008, almost five years after the war ended, and only gained momentum following the election of a democratic government in late 2005.

forces etc) in a much more entrenched role to restructure Sierra Leone's security and economic sector reform (reviewed in Chapter 5). Additionally, Britain's strategy aimed to shore up central state authority by re-establishing local governance institutions (Chiefdoms) in the periphery. Alongside these traditional, formal state institutions, Britain created modern state institutions to function within the national political landscape, including most notably the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) (see Chapter 5). The insistence on measuring success based on procedural processes, such as holding elections in 2002 and 2007 focused too narrowly on resolving the question of macro-political power and foreclosed discussions on alternative visions to resolve the systemic crisis of governance entrenched in the central government authority. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, there has been only limited alteration of the political space, which continues to be dominated by an elite ruling and political class obsessed with obtaining and exercising power in a "zero-sum" struggle for control over Sierra Leone's post-colonial state. Next, I review the international approach in post-conflict Liberia in order to draw out relevant comparisons with Sierra Leone and to demonstrate the differences in the overarching approach.

Liberia: Comprehensive Peace Accord and the International Strategy

The International Contact Group on Liberia was launched in late 2002 (comprising Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Britain, France, the USA, African Union, Economic Community of West African States, European Union and UN) to

oversee the design and implementation of the Liberian peacebuilding strategy.[132]

The US and British strategy focused on promoting stability through three main elements: 1) Limiting Charles Taylor's influence in the sub-region by tightening existing UN sanctions.[133] 2) Following Taylor's abdication from power in July 2003, the international strategy shifted to create an interim power-sharing government from the three main warring factions; 3) Following the establishment of the National Transitional Government, the International Contact Group aimed to create the conditions for holding post-conflict elections within two-years.[134]

Prior to the deployment of a 32-member US military assessment team to Monrovia on 6 July 2003 to act as liaisons with the ECOWAS troops, the United States government's official policy was non-intervention in Liberia's civil conflict.[135] The US government was hesitant to involve itself too deeply in

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[132] The International Contact Group appointed Nigerian as mediator General Abdulsalmi Abubakar around early May 2003.

[133] Britain sponsored UNSC resolution 1478 (2003) of 6 May 2003—which imposed sanctions on arms imports, diamond exports and travel restrictions on Taylor's associates. The US wanted to introduce sanctions on the timber trade, but France stonewalled these efforts. The US struck a deal with France to extend UN sanctions to Liberia's timber industry. Paris supported the US proposal in exchange for more UN support on Côte d'Ivoire (which had felt the bitterness of Taylor's regional influence) to establish a UN mission there. (Africa Confidential, Horse-Trading, Arms Trading, Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003; Panel of Experts report 2000, 8). France was observing the conflict in Liberia more closely than in Sierra Leone. France had close commercial ties with Taylor. France was Taylor's main customer for timber exportation (Reno 1992b, 212). Neighbouring Guinea-Conakry was also entangled in the Liberian conflict. Taylor supported the RUF's invasion into Guinea, which forced President Lansana Conté to back the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy forces. Following a closed Security Council consultation on 5 May 2003, British UN Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock revealed that Guinea had received a "mild warning" for supporting the rebel LURD force who were leading the fight against Taylor's forces.

[134] Mike McGovern, 'Liberia: The Risks of Rebuilding a Shadow State', in Charles T. Call (with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), *Building States to Build Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, 335-361

[135] After the Somalia debacle, non-intervention became official US policy under the terms of the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of 1994 (Hirsch 2001, 63). The United States Government, however, was deeply involved in providing covert military support to LURD (via

Liberia at the end of May 2003, and initially downplayed calls to assume a similar lead-state, entrenched role as Britain had assumed in Sierra Leone and France had agreed to play in Côte d'Ivoire after September 2002.[136] The United States saw an opening for resolution of Liberia's second civil war after Liberian Minister of Defence signed a military ceasefire agreement in Accra, Ghana on 17 June 2003 with LURD's military leadership.[137] The West Africa regional body Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) held an extraordinary summit in Accra to deal with the Liberian crisis on 31 July 2003. ECOWAS passed a political resolution to deploy peacekeeping force to Liberia by 4 August 2003.

The military ceasefire essentially ended fourteen years of on-and-off armed violence in the country and initiated political negotiations that would begin over the next two and a half months, from mid-June until early August 2003. The three major warring factions—Taylor former NPFL's forces,[138]LURD[139] and MODEL[140]—along with representatives from civil society, Liberian political parties and Liberian religious groups participated in

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the Guinean armed forces) to remove Charles Taylor from power during the latter phases of the war (1999-2003). See International Crisis Group, 'Liberia: Unraveling', Brussels/Freetown: ICG, 19 August 2002; Author's confidential interview with former LURD official, Monrovia, March 2012; James Brabazon, 'Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy', London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs Africa Programme, Briefing Paper 1, 2003

[136] Africa Confidential, Horse-trading, arms trading, Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003

[137] Author's personal interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2012

[138] At the political negotiations, each faction was represented by a ten-person delegation. Taylor's forces, referred to as the GoL (former Government of Liberia) delegation was led by Lewis Brown, Blamo Nelson, Theophilus C. Gould (became deputy minister/solicitor-general, Ministry of Justice) and Thomas Nimely (now deceased) (Author's personal interview with a high-ranking GoL delegate, 15 March 2012).

[139] LURD's 10-person delegation was headed by Kabineh Janneh (Appointed as Minister of Justice and subsequently appointed to the supreme court in 2006)

[140] MODEL's 10-person delegation was headed by Thomas Yaya Nimely (later appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs)

political negotiations. Taylor had taken part in the initial round of negotiations, but flew back to Monrovia in the middle of the talks when the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued an indictment for his arrest.[141] On 10 August 2003, Taylor confirmed from his Executive Mansion in Monrovia that he would step down and accept asylum in Nigeria on invitation from Nigerian President Obsanajo and handed power to his Vice President Moses Blah. Negotiations were concluded on 18 August 2003.[142] The anti-Taylor rebel movements LURD and MODEL both got what they had strongly insisted on before the onset of negotiation: President Taylor's abdication from power.

The International Contact Group for Liberia and ECOWAS took the lead in mediation efforts and shaped the content of the CPA.[143] According to Dr. Amos Sawyer, "in many respects, the [International Contact Group] ICGL exercised sovereign authority and was in the driver seat of the transition process".[144] More specifically, the US played a major role in dictating the peace agreement behind the scenes during negotiations in Accra. It was mutually agreed among the warring factions that the American government was "the only external partner with the sustained interest to oversee the implementation of the

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[141] David M. Crane, 'The Bright Red Threat: The Politics of International Criminal Law—Do We Want Peace or Justice? The West African Experience', in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed.) *Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 59-77. On 26 April 2012, Taylor was found guilty for "aiding and abetting" the RUF's crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone from 30 November 1996 to 18 January 2002. At the hearing on 30 May, Taylor was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. At the hearing, Taylor indicated he would appeal the judgment, which was subsequently scheduled for September 2013.

[142] Civil society and religious groups included Mano River Women Peace Network, Liberian Bar Association and Inter-religious Council for Liberians.

[143] The international contact group included the United States, UK, and other West African governments including Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Morocco.

[144] Amos Sawyer, 'Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics: Observations from the 2005 elections', *African Affairs*, 107:427, 2008, 180.

peace agreement".[145] The Americans saw African regional and continental bodies like ECOWAS and AU to be in the front-seat of the mediation efforts. However, since the Americans and European Union funded the bulk of security and humanitarian operations, their opinions represented the final say. Former Nigerian General, Abdulsalami Abubakar took the lead mediator role and helped the parties to agree on a formula for sharing political power.

In post-war Liberia, there was no recognized political authority that could militarily defeat and impose its will on the other armed and militia groups after the war. Therefore, power was divided equally between the armed groups and included political parties and civil society members. However, as we'll see below, these groups represented the entrenched political authority.

3Ps: Peace Agreement, Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping

The CPA called for the establishment of a transitional government until elections could be held in October 2005. The NTGL consisted of an executive, a legislative assembly, a judiciary, and a number of commissions headed by senior officials as selected by the power-sharing agreement. A National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) was also established as part of the peace agreement. Officials were selected through a similar formula that involved allocating twelve (12) seats each to the former Government of Liberia (Taylor's faction), LURD, and MODEL. An additional eighteen (18) seats were given to political parties, seven (7) seats to civil society and one seat allocating to one

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[145] Author's personal interview with members of the LURD negotiating team, Monrovia, March 2012

member from each of the fifteen counties.[146] After Taylor's future was sealed with the Special Court, both LURD and MODEL turned their attention towards obtaining maximum political power. Their leaders wanted the Presidency. Several rules were established for dividing up political positions. First, the chairman of a new interim government and the vice-chairman had to come from political parties or civil society groups rather than the armed factions. Second, LURD and MODEL had final say in the selection of these two positions. Third, any individuals holding positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman or any of the principle cabinet positions, including speaker, deputy speaker of the transitional legislative assembly, the chief justice and all associate judges of the transitional judiciary, were not permitted to contest in the 2005 elections.[147] This is best seen as an attempt on the part of the mediators to appease leaders of the factions, permit their inclusion in a transitional government with some regulations on their behavior within rules-based decision-making process. This decision was informed by a problem-solving concern for distributing power equitably among the warring factions' leaders and underpinned by a liberal preference for non-combatant civil society and political leaders.

With these rules in place, mediators put in place a process for selecting an interim Chair and Vice-Chair of the transitional government. Each of the eighteen political parties and members of civil society nominated their top three choices for these positions. Names of the three individuals with the most votes were submitted to leaders of the armed factions who had final say in appointing

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[146] CPA 2003, Article XXIV, Part 4.
[147] CPA 2003, article XXIV, XXV

the chair and vice-chair. After the first round, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Rudolph Sherman were selected while Gyude Bryant, Prof. Togba-Nah Tipoteh and Dr. Harry Mobiba received the same number of votes. In the second round, the political parties and civil society groups selected Gyude Bryant. Thus, Bryant, Sirleaf and Sherman's names were submitted to the three irregular armed factions for final consideration and approval.[148] Initially, the armed factions rejected all three individuals. However, after long negotiations and compromise, the factions settled on Bryant. Bryant had previously served as the chair of the Liberian Action Party (LAP), while his vice-chair, Wesley Johnson, was a member of the United People's Party (UPP).[149]

With the selection of a Chair and Vice-Chair, next on the table was deciding on the allocation of political positions between the three warring factions, political parties and civil society members. The CPA outlined the formula for dividing up twenty-one ministerial positions and forty-two deputy ministerial and assistant ministerial positions, and over dozens of directorships of state agencies, commissions, public corporations and state-owned enterprises.[150] As stipulated in the CPA, each warring faction was allocated five strategic ministerial positions (15) with the remaining six positions going to political and civil society members. According to the rules, one faction was given a ministerial head position, while the two deputy positions (for

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[148] Jaye 2003

[149] Jaye 2003, 644.

[150] Strategic posts included national port authority, Liberia Telecommunications Corporation; Liberia Petroleum Refinery Corporation; National Investment Commission (NIC).

administration and operations) were given to the two other factions.[151] The six strategic posts were divided up equally among the factions (defense, finance[152], foreign affairs[153], justice[154], internal affairs[155] and the central bank, though with the exception of the central bank).

The transitional government was established on 7 January 2004. The transitional government had a limited mandate: to create the conditions to prepare the country for senate, legislative and presidential elections (that took place on 11 October 2005 and a second round of presidential elections on 8 November 2005). Additionally, the NTGL mandated included disarming irregular fighters and demobilising the armed forces. However, by the end of its first year in existence, the NTGL was imploding from within.

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[151] The minister of defence was allocated to the former Government of Liberia (Daniel Chea), while LURD's representative (Joe Wylie) became deputy minister for administration and MODEL (Brown Chaynee Parjebo) assumed deputy operations. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia (a ceremonial role) was given to LURD's former military chief of staff, Aliyu Mohammed Sheriff (Cobra) during the transitional period. This was largely a ceremonial position. Within one month of the establishment of NTGL, there was an in-fight between Sheriff (LURD) and Konneh (MODEL) as to who the AFL Chief of Staff should be. However, the accord made no specific provision for the allocation of government jobs immediately below these levels. This later became a contentious issue in late November 2003 when leaders of the factions refused to disarm their forces until assistant minister posts were allocated equitably among the three factions (US envoy asked to intervene in disarmament dispute, IRIN, 28 November 2003)

[152] The Ministry of Finance went to LURD (Lusine Kamara). LURD leader Sekou Conneh sold the position of Ministry of Finance to his brother-in-law, Kamara. This angered Conneh's wife, Aisha Conneh, a very powerful leader in LURD, which contributed to their split. Also IMF officials were disturbed by the fact that Conneh was selling LURD's allotments to the highest bidders. See Bøas 2009, 1340, footnote 32. That is reportedly how the former GOL attained the Minister of Defence position.

[153] Ministry of Foreign Affairs was allocated to MODEL (Thomas Yaya Nimely). Nimely was chairman of MODEL. Born in Pleebo in Maryland County on 5 November 1956, Nimely was a trained psychologist and lived in the United States for a long time. He holds dual American-Liberian citizenship.

[154] Ministry of Justice went to LURD (Kabineh Janneh). An ethnic Mandingo, Janneh was LURD's head of delegation at the Accra peace talks.

[155] The ministerial post went to the former NPFL (H. Dan Morias)

The decision to establish a transitional government was informed by several problematic liberal assumptions: First, the naïve liberal assumption that the country's businessmen and civil society representatives were any different from the entrenched political establishment was flawed. In the context of the powersharing during the immediate war-peace transition, there was very little room for the emergence of broad-based participation of Liberians or realignment of the political space to replace the country's established political class. Fourteen of the eighteen political parties that attended the negotiations in Accra originated from the True Whig Party (TWP) tradition.[156] As Thomas Jaye stated in December 2003, "the leaders of these parties are recycled TWP elements" that have organized themselves into splinter groups to "ensure that the old status quo is maintained by making believe that they represent different political traditions". Additionally, despite the inclusion of non-political associations in the CPA negotiations, Jaye noted that the TWP elite were shaping civil society's agenda due to the "relative weaknesses" and the inability to act as a "counterhegemonic force".[157] Contrary to the notion that NTGL chairman Gyude Bryant was a "neutral" business person, he had served as chair of the Liberian Action Party (LAP) and his vice-chair Wesley Johnson was a member of the United People's Party (UPP). This problematic assumption allowed for the continuation of entrenched political practices within the state to re-emerge, which became a central concern for Liberian youth. As Morten Bøas sums up the

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[156] Thomas Jaye, 'An Analysis of Post-Taylor Politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30:98, 2003, 644

[157] Jaye 2003, 645. Jaye states in December 2003, "the sad reality in Liberia is that some elements of these civil society groups are inept, corrupt, and civil society has bred its own kleptocrats and dictators (647).

NTGL's main agenda: "the main priority of the NTGL was not to oversee the transition and serve the Liberian people, but to secure positions and resources for themselves. Their interest was to continue to milk the traditional cash cows of the Liberian state such as the ports, the airports and the customs".[158]

Second, the power-sharing agreement problematically assumed a functioning judicial system was in place when nothing could be further from the truth. A number of high profile corruption cases of NTGL officials were initiated towards the end of the two-year transitional period. However, the judicial system was too weak to try these individuals. Therefore, the liberal assumption of checks and balances within government was grossly absent.[159] Transitional government officials justified turning a blind eye to the problem of state corruption claiming that eradicating theft of funds derived from the state was beyond the narrow scope of their mandate.[160] The power-sharing arrangement did not alter in any meaningful way the political space nor the behavior of actors operating in that space.[161]

Third, the International Contact Group preference for adopting the same failed strategy of integrating the most militarily powerful leaders in a transitional government resulted in a precarious and untenable power-sharing arrangement

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[158] Morten Bøas, Making Plans for Liberia—A Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance? *Third World Quarterly*, 30:7, 2009, 1335.

[159] By the end of March 2007, Chairman Bryant was indicted for corruption charges. Speaker of the National Transitional Assembly and former leader of LURD George Dweh was accused to embezzling $92,000 in state funds.

[160] Author's confidential interviews with former transitional government officials, Monrovia, March 2012

[161] Morten Bøas, 'Making Plans for Liberia',1335.

(some call it a "warlords' peace") and a perpetuation in the use of violence and control of territory as a strategy to attain political power.[162]

Meanwhile, the US government supported targeted travel restrictions within the context of the UN Security Council to remain in place for most of Taylor's associates (with some notable exceptions, including Taylor's former wife, who was elected a senator) to restrict their travels abroad and place their economic assets under careful monitoring.[163]

UNMIL

International intervention in Liberia took place against the backdrop of the UN's mission, which included a 15,000 strong peacekeeping force (UNMIL). The UN mandated operation followed a standard peacekeeping model with a few notable novel aspects. UNMIL's mandate (2003) was to support the NTGL, assist with elections, develop an action plan for DDR, carry out voluntary disarmament, support SSR particularly reform of police, and monitor Liberia's borders and flow of arms. UNMIL was mandated to arrest Taylor if he came back to Liberia and hand him over to the Special Court. UNMIL's exit strategy was to begin in June 2006 and was tied to specific benchmarks related to DDR and SSR provisions and full implementation of the CPA.[164] The Security Council took a

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[162] Amos Sawyer, 'Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42: 4, 2004, 451; Adekeye Adebayo, 'Liberia: A Warlord Peace' in Stedman et al (eds), Ending Civil Wars, 599-630; Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, The Hidden Costs of Power-sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa, *African Affairs*, 104: 416, 2005, 375-398.

[163] Travel sanctions were renewed in Dec 2005 including arms embargo, travel restrictions on Taylor's supporters for another 12 months. And six-month timeframe for diamonds and timber.

[164] The June 2006 UNSG report indicated the key benchmarks for assessing drawdown

cautious approach to UNMIL withdraw, particularly in light of recent events in Timor-Leste. In 2006, the US and African countries believed that withdrawal should not be contemplated for at least two or three years, fearing the long-term ramification of a premature wind-down of UNMIL. UN Secretary General reports from 2003-2009 consistently called for supporting the status quo and maintenance of a strong and robust peacekeeping presence throughout Liberia. France and Japan were initially anxious to discuss a withdrawal plan and shift UNMIL resources to other conflicts (including Côte d'Ivoire) but stopped pushing for an accelerated phase-down from Liberia around mid-2006. It became widely accepted that Liberia would host a large UN peacekeeping presence for longer than the initially expected 3 or 4 years.

On 12 July 2006, the Council authorized an increase to UNMIL's police component by 125 and a corresponding decrease in its military component by 125, reflecting the idea that police resources would better suited to respond to Liberia's internal security needs. Military personnel dominated the initial composition of UNMIL. In late 2006, UNMIL consisted of 14,875 troops and 1,240 UN Civilian Police.[165]

The International Contact Group's peacebuilding strategy involved initiating a disarmament programme within a month's notice. On 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council agreed to establish UNMIL for an initial period

including progress in SSR, reintegration of ex-combatants and consolidation of state authority. By June 2007, the Secretary-General report noted slow progress in the UN-assisted 3,500 trained police deployment. Only 39,000 out of 101,000 ex-combatants had received reintegration assistance by March 2007. The SG report in March 2007 underlined the lack of progress in meeting UNMIL downsizing benchmarks including: reconstitution of security forces; adoption of a national security strategy; completion of the reintegration; and consolidation of state authority.

[165] In November 2006, UNMIL was downsized by one battalion (rehatting as troops for UNOCI)

of 12 months (UNSCR 1509 2003). On 29 October 2003, UNMIL budget was prepared and approved. The budget allocated provisions for a phased deployment of 14,785 military personnel, 215 military observers, 1,115 civilian police, 893 international civilian personnel (including 286 UN volunteers) and hired 768 national staff. The UN assessed funds covered costs associated with setting up a UNMIL mission headquarters in Monrovia, as well as supporting administrative and logistical provisions for military personnel for deployment to four sectors in 15 different counties in Liberia.

UNMIL's DDR Plan

The Strategic and Implementation framework that formed the basis for the UN DDR plan in Liberia was developed by a New York by a DDR Task Force in early October 2003 (based on a request given to it by the UN Security Council). Two plans were presented within the UN system: one Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), designed by an exclusive group of UNMIL and DPKO personnel based in New York with some consultation from Jacques Klein's inner circle of advisors and a UNDP plan which had a greater focus on reintegration and development.[166] The former plan drew from a disarmament-centered blueprint model that had been devised in 1999.[167] One month before it

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[166] UNDP, Liberia's DDRR programme final report, UNDP: Monrovia, 2009; Ball and Hendrickson 2005, 18. The interim secretariat consisted of UNDP, UNMIL, World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, and World Vision (Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' Phase 2 report to the SIDDR working group, 2005, 15.

[167] The guiding policy framework within the UN was the small 119 page handbook titled *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants In a Peacekeeping Environment,* published by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1999 (Author's interview with UN official, New York, August 2009). The document was the UN's

was to be implemented, consultations were conducted with donors between October and November 2003.[168] None of the warring factions were consulted. The UNDP framework was finalised on 31 October 2003.[169] In the end, the UNMIL plan prioritised over the UNDP framework. Unfortunately, neither plan consulted any of the warring factions. The plan had several problematic elements. First, terms such as "rehabilitation", "reintegration", "peace", and "national security" were never defined, nor were these concepts given clear benchmarks to achieve.[170] UNMIL failed to incorporate local knowledge or even the views of military commanders in the warring factions. UNMIL staff generally lacked expertise and knowledge on Liberia.[171] The UN was also unable to make the right contacts among the factions, or obtain accurate information on their troop strength and military capacity.[172] The UN authorities assumed that a "one size fits all" model could be "cut and pasted" from Sierra Leone into

first attempt to develop a coherent approach to DDR based on a compilation of best practices from 14 different first generation peacekeeping contexts from Mozambique, El Salvador to Namibia. The booklet was prepared by two consultants, General Emmanuel Erskine, a former Force Commander for the UN interim force in Lebanon and Ambassador Peggy Mason, who at the time was Director of Council Development, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security. The framework offered a set of guidelines and principles but little in the way of concrete strategies for dealing with non-conventional peacekeeping environments nor did it offer insights on how theory might meet practice. The manual focused more on procedural aspects and not second-generation concerns such as 'local ownership', political buy-in from senior and junior commanders, ethical and transnational issues reviewed below.

[168] UNDP/JIU, 'Reintegration briefs: Justification for providing reintegration subsistence allowance for ex-combatants, 26 January 2005

[169] Liberian disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme: strategy and implementation framework, prepared by the Draft Interim Secretariat, Monrovia, 31 October 2003.

[170] Christian Bugnion et al, External mid-term evaluation report of the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, UNDP: New York, 2006, 8

[171] Jaye 2009, 13

[172] According to recent Best Practice documents in the UN, DDR requires "adequate in-house expertise, preparation and consultation with national, UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, and the commitment of the parties to the peace agreement."

Liberia.[173] Evidence that the Sierra Leone's model was transferred to UNMIL in 2003 is found in the number of high-level UN authorities from Sierra Leone's process transferred to Liberia in 2003. [174]

Governance Structure of "DDRR"
Similar to Sierra Leone's experiences, the UN established a set of governance structures to implement DDR in Liberia.[175] Emphasis was placed on the formal processes. The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) was established comprised of representatives from the transitional government, UN, ECOWAS and representatives from the European Community and United States. NCDDRR was to serve as both a policy (through the Policy Committee[176]) and managerial/supervisory body. The UN SRSG Jacques Klein (a former US Army General with experience in Bosnia) and the US Ambassador held considerable influence on policy decisions in the NCDDRR. The National Commission,

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[173] Author's confidential interview with former NCDDRR senior official, Monrovia, March 2012

[174] For instance, UNAMSIL's former Force Commander Lt. General Daniel Opande (from Kenya) assumed commanding role (Force Commander) over UNMIL from 2003-2005. Opandi's Deputy, Major-General Joseph Owonibi, from Nigeria was appointed UNMIL's Force Commander effective 1 December 2005. As Force Commander, Opande had a key role to play in deciding how to engage both RUF and Liberia's High Command leaders. Additionally, some key NCDDR officials transferred to Liberia after Sierra Leone's DDR programme was concluding, for instance, Charles Achodo—who served in several roles in Sierra Leone's NCDDR including reintegration—assumed the role of Policy and Programme manager in Liberia's DDRR programme.

[175] According to one key official involved in the Liberian DDRR programme, the UN used a 'cut-and-paste' model in Liberia. (Interview with former Special Assistant to the former Executive Director of NCDDRR, Monrovia, 17 February 2012).

[176] NCDDRR policy committee met to discuss specific concerns of the parties and endorsed specific policy issues and adopted the Joint Operation Plan

headed by an Executive Director[177], was staffed with approximately four hundred staff, mostly Liberians.[178] However, key positions were held by international UNDP staff. UNMIL's political head Jacques Klein was well known in Monrovia for his abrupt and often disrespectful attitude towards national transitional government authorities and in particular, leaders of the three irregular warring factions.

Within the UNDP, a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) was established. The JIU comprised of government officials and only later counted junior leaders of the warring factions as members of the unit. The JIU was primarily responsible for day-to-day implementation of the DDRR programme. It was headed by a programme and policy advisor (a non-Liberian UNDP staff member transferred from Sierra Leone's NCDDR), to control the process, dictate policy and report to UNDP Country Director. The Joint Implementation Unit structure consisted of four units. The primary actors are below:

- Disarmament and demobilisation—UNMIL lead[179]
- Rehabilitation and reintegration—JIU/UNDP lead[180]
- Monitoring and evaluation—JIU/UNDP lead
- Information and sensitization—JIU/OCHA lead[181]

Technical Coordinating Committees were established to address policy issues as needed.[182] Coordination and implementation support for the DDR

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[177] The three warring factions agreed in Accra during political negotiations to appoint Jarbo as the Executive Director of NCDDRR. (Author's personal interview with former NCDDRR official, Monrovia, February 2012)

[178] NCDDRR archives

[179] Staffed by military peacekeepers, observers and experts

[180] Staffed mostly by UNDP reintegration experts

[181] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

programme was provided by UNDP, which reported to the Project Board. Additionally, a Technical Working Group (chaired by NCDDRR, comprising specialists from UNMIL/RRR, UNDP and ILO and Liberian authorities from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), as well as the Ministries of Commerce, Agriculture, Labour, Lands, Mines and Energy, Education, and members from private sector (chamber of commerce). The Project Approval Committee (PAC-NCDDRR) comprised representatives from UNMIL, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, and key donors (US, UK, Sweden, and European Commission) met to review and approve projects for reintegration funded by UNDP Trust Fund.

Responsibility for DDRR in UNMIL subsequently was shifted to the Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Affairs (Abou Moussa) after the "DD" phase was terminated. This created greater space for local input by Liberian actors in reintegration, specifically, which projects to support. The Executive Director served in key decision-making bodies in the process, sitting on the policy committee and co-chairing the Project Approval Committee and Technical Coordinating Committee.[183] (See Chapter 4 on the limitations)

The inclusion of leaders from all three warring factions perpetuated long-standing entrenched cultural perceptions in Liberia that the state is a means to obtain wealth. As Jaye states, "it is wealth (ill-gotten wealth) that decides most things…the sad situation…is that money talks in Liberia and money did the talk

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[182] Technical Coordinating Committees (TCCs) were comprised of UN agencies such as WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO as well as Liberian Ministry of Defence.
[183] Ball and Hendrickson 2005, 19

in Accra".[184]   UN officials and relief workers viewed the key ministries as essentially "high-jacked" by the three warring factions, and complained that transitional officials were "helping themselves to the little money that flows into government coffers".[185] Jacques Klein, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary-General observed that the NTGL officials "showed more interest in squabbling over the spoils of peace than genuine national reconstruction" and described the widespread perception of complacency on the part of the NTGL leadership: "We have here the coalition of the unwilling, that is a government that is quite often not interested in what we are. We're supposed to have an election in October 2005 and some people are thinking, 'Why next year? I like being in my government job - what's the rush?"[186]

From Power-sharing to International Economic Regulation
In mid-2005, the International Contact Group reconsidered its strategy for Liberia's transition in light of the limited degree of leverage external actors had over the NTGL officials.[187] The UN and American officials concluded that the NTGL was a dysfunctional organisation that was harmful to Liberia's economic

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[184] Thomas Jaye, 'An Analysis of Post-Taylor Politics', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30:98, 2003, 645

[185] IRIN, Liberia: A shattered nation on a long road to recovery, IRIN, 17 August 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/51052/LIBERIA-A-shattered-nation-on-a-long-road-to-recovery (Accessed 24 March 2011)

[186] IRIN, Liberia: A shattered nation on a long road to recovery, IRIN, 17 August 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/51052/LIBERIA-A-shattered-nation-on-a-long-road-to-recovery (Accessed 24 March 2011)[187] The most important donors of the ICG on Liberia were the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and United States.

[187] The most important donors of the ICG on Liberia were the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and United States.

recovery.[188] The International Contact Group (ICG) sought to maintain as much control over finances as possible. The Central Bank was already under the authority of external agents (as an exclusion from the NTGL's power-sharing arrangement), but the US, World Bank and IMF began drawing up plans to transfer economic functions of the deeply problematic Liberian state to international authorities.[189]

The UNMIL SRSG, the European Union, the World Bank and the United States drafted a report titled *Liberia Economic Governance and Action Plan* (LEGAP), which aimed to address Liberia's systemic corruption. The LEGAP aimed to place limits on the "Liberian government's authority to grant contracts, ring-fence key sources of revenue, place international supervisors in key ministries and bring judges from abroad."[190] LEGAP evolved into the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP).[191] The programme originally targeted Liberia's key financial ministries and state enterprises, including the Ministry of Finance, the National Port Authority of Monrovia, Roberts International Airport, the state-owned fuel refinery (Liberian Petroleum Refining Company) and the Forestry Development Authority.[192] GEMAP's primary purpose was to create and institutionalise "effective financial

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[188] Stephen Ellis, 'How to Rebuild Africa', in P.N Lyman & P. Dorff (eds.), *Beyond Humanitarianism*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.

[189] Philip Bartholomew, Reconstructing Central Banking in War-torn Liberia, in Charles Enoch, Karl Friedrich Habermeier, Marta de Castello Branco (eds), Building Monetary and Financial Systems: Case Studies in Technical Assistance, Washington, D.C: IMF, 68

[190] Bøas 2009, 1336.

[191] International partners involved in the establishment of GEMAP include the USA, the European Union, the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations.

[192] The programme also targeted the Bureau of the Budget (BOB); the Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy (MLME); the General Services Administration (GSA). The Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Monrovia City Corporation were added later.

and asset management policies and procedures, contain corruption and improve overall economic governance"[193]. Despite widespread criticism by members of NTGL and other prominent members of the Liberian political class,[194] the transitional government was obligated to sign the agreement on 9 September 2005.[195] The agreement placed internationally recruited financial controllers from the International Monetary Finance (IMF) with co-signatory authority over operational and financial matters in the state ministries and enterprises that collected significant state revenues from May 2006-September/October 2009.[196] This strategy of co-signatory powers of external experts was also extended for all major financial decisions in all of the integral government agencies.[197] The GEMAP programme has produced positive results.[198] However, the programme was criticised for not transferring skills to Liberians through on-the-job

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[193] Neal P. Cohen et al, 'An Evaluation of USAID/Liberia's GEMAP Activities', Final Evaluation of USAID GEMAP Activities, Washington: USAID, June 2010, i

[194] Members of Liberia's political class, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (current president) and Amos Sawyer both objected to the LEGAP/GEMAP plan (Bøas 2009, 1337)

[195] According to Bøas, "after a lengthy and heated debate that included the African Union, the EU and the World Bank, the plan …was signed by Gyude Bryant on behalf of the NTGL. The only thing that was changed from the original proposal were the plans for the judiciary." (2009, 1337). Moreover, the agreement lasted for 36 months, which implied that the 2005 elected government (Johnson-Sirleaf) was obligated to abide by the terms of GEMAP for at least the first three years in office.

[196] Morten Bøas, 'Making Plans for Liberia—a Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance?', *Third World Quarterly*, 30, 7, 2009, 1330; USAID 2010, iii

[197] The National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, the Cash Management Committee (Ministry of Finance), Bureau of the Budget, General Services Agency, the Liberian Petroleum Refining Company, Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, Forestry Development Agency, the Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy, General Auditors Commission, and the Bureau of Customs and Excise. In short, all the traditional cash cows of the Liberian state, Boas 2009, note 25.

[198] Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal, Understanding State-building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions, and Lessons for International Engagement, a report for DfID's Effective and Failed States Teams, Overseas Development Institute, 2007, 35

training.[199] NTGL chairman Gyude Bryant and US Ambassador Donald Booth served as Chair and Deputy Chairman of the Economic Governance Steering Committee of GEMAP. The balance of power remained in the US Embassy, while the transitional Liberian government's role and participation on the committee was largely symbolic.

The GEMAP was an alternative to the neo-trusteeship model that the International Contact Group (led by US, UK, Nigeria and Ghana) had considered for Liberia, especially in the economic sector. The United Nations disagreed, preferring to invest in capacity building. UNMIL's political head Abou Moussa stated in 2005 that "trusteeship is not the solution to Liberia's problems. What we should do is invest in capacity building and help the government to correct those things that are undermining the development of the country". GEMAP was less expensive than the neo-trusteeship option, costing about US$500 million over three years.[200] The UNMIL mission had cost US$2.9 billion for its first four years in operation. During this period (2003-2007), US bilateral aid to Liberia

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[199] Raymond Gilpin and Emily Hsu, 'Is Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program a 'Necessary Intrusion?', United States Institute of Peace brief, 2008, http://www.usip.org/publications/liberia-s-governance-and-economic-management-assistance-program-necessary-intrusion (Accessed 20 September 2012); for more information, see Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey, 'Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP): A Joint Review by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations', Best Peacekeeping Practices Section and the World Bank's Fragile States Group, May 2006, http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/DPKO-WB%20joint%20review%20of%20GEMAP%20FINAL.pdf

[200] Reno 2008, 397

was about US$600 million.[201] The GEMAP brought short-term success by increasing Government revenues sharply from 2004-2008.[202]

However, the GEMAP programme was merely a Band-aid solution. Although it created meaningful short-term results, it could not restructure the political space and change the rules for which the country's elite leadership operates in. When political campaigning for the country's October 2005 Presidential elections commenced on 15 August, and candidates relied on vague statements and did not articular a clear agenda for putting the country on a successful development trajectory. The UNDP Resident Representative Steven Ursino criticised Liberia's political class for lacking vision and a national transformation plan.[203] The transfer of leadership from the NTGL to Johnson-Sirleaf's administration did not lead to any meaningful change in the political practicing of the inept political elite. A UN Panel of Experts report noted one year after Johnson-Sirleaf's government was elected that politicians continued to steal state funds, resist reforms and relied on wartime networks to influence demobilised combatants for their parochial political/economic interests.[204]

Despite the intervention of GEMAP, members of the transitional government were still able to influence numerous concession agreements for timber and diamond mining that were in violatation of UN Security Council

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[201] Ibid. Additionally, the US, Germany and UK canceled part of Liberia's external debt of US$3.7 billion at the Liberia Partner's Forum on 13 Feb 2007.

[202] Revenues rose from about US$80 million in 2004/2005 to US$142 million in 2006/2007 and were forecasted to reach US$180 million in 2007/2008.

[203] Quote cited from *Daily Observer*, 6 July 2005, 10 (author's archival notes made on 23 March 2012)

[204] UN Security Council, 'Report of the panel of experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1689 (2006) concerning Liberia', 15 December 2006, 8

sanctions.[205] Near the end UN SRSG Klein's tenure in Liberia, he admitted his regret for supporting a more intrusive neo-trusteeship led by a UN "executive mandate". He was vague about what exact policy decisions he would have led to meaningful restructuring. The UN regreted the problematic power-sharing agreement that brought the corrupt and useless NTGL authorities in government, which delayed transformation and enabled members of the government to divide up the spoils of the transitional state. GEMAP's may have produced short-term results, but was nothing more than a half-hearted attempt that did little to alter the Liberian political landscape .[206]

While dominant external actors supported the creation of a transitional national legislature in the context of the power-sharing agreement, the UN and US authorities deliberately sidelined the legislature and prevented it from playing a meaningful role during the security sector reform planning process. The committee on national security in Legislature complained in a letter to Jacques Klein that UNMIL was "sidelining" the police and intelligence officers "who know our terrain", which could "jeopardize the entire peace process and bring about another war in the absence of UNMIL in the future".[207] Additionally, the letter stated that "senior staff of the Liberian National Police ha[d] officially complained to the NTLA Security committee that the UNMIL newly trained Liberian Police Officers are not under their direct supervision but rather take

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[205] William Reno, 'Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are They Aimed at the Right Targets?' *International Peacekeeping*, 15:3, 2008, 389

[206] Quote from Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia', in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klass van Walraven (eds.), Africa Yearbook, 2005, Leiden: Brill, 2006,109

[207] NCDDRR archives, Letter dated 16 December 2004, 2, see *IMG_0292-5,* in author's possession

orders from Commission Mark Kreoker and his able lieutenants in UNMIL, thereby impeding the entire function of the LNP". Members of the transitional legislature's national security committee and heads of all security agencies frequently complained of being sidelined in favour UNMIL. The committee's frustration culminated in an official letter of complaint to UNMIL's political and military leadership. They complained that the UN "does not create room for teamwork to brainstorm and put into practice a proper security mechanism that could vet, avert and unearth unscrupulous acts that could derail the entire peace process or bring about another war".[208] The national security committee requested UNMIL "to provide the necessary logistics to the Liberian National Police and other paramilitary personnel" to lead UNMIL in the process of combating crimes and "covertly verifying the disarmament exercise in both urban and rural areas as our local officers are knowledgeable of our terrain".[209] At the same time, the committee warned that any changes (in this case, in the name of the Liberian National Police to the Liberian Police Service) should be done by the government through normal legislative enactment to be in accordance with Liberia's constitution. In an effort to foster more meaningful Liberian participation, the Liberian Minister of Justice Kabineh Ja'aneh organized the first national dialogue on SSR in Monrovia on 3-4 August 2005), but this involved mostly European experts holding "consultative" workshops.[210]

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[208] NCDDR archives Letter dated 16 December 2004, 2, see *IMG_0292-5,* in author's possession
[209] Ibid, 3
[210] The consultation involved Ministry of Justice, UNMIL, CSDG, DCAF, CDD, ASSN sought ways of promoting local ownership. (Jaye 2009, 7). A second meeting was held on 3-4 April

During the country's Presidential elections in October 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected following a second-round of voting.[211] Her government policy since has been supportive of the neo-liberal model of economic growth advanced by the United States, World Bank and IMF. Johnson-Sirleaf was critical of the GEMAP initiative, but broadly in agreement for a large UN peacekeeping presence in Liberia.

Johnson-Sirleaf's election in 2005 was controversial give her past relationship with Charles Taylor during the initial years of the Liberian civil conflict. Johnson-Sirleaf has consistently refused to take measures to enforce the UN asset freeze on targeted members of Taylor's former allies from the war. Additionally, she has refused to respect the Truth and Reconciliation report's recommendations barring her from holding public office and restricting her from running for office for a second term. Third, she also has denied the establishment of a local war crimes tribunal to try those responsible for the conflict, claiming that this would involve "looking back" instead of into the future. I interpret these decisions as evidence of her intransience towards prosecuting members of the entrenched elite establishment while she is in power in order to protect her own self and class interests after she steps down in 2017.

It is ironic that Johnson-Sirleaf was initially critical of GEMAP's intrusion on Liberian sovereignty yet many of the national strategies and priority-setting documents in the post-conflict transition were outscorced to

2006 under the auspices of the Governance Commission involving all heads of security institutions and members of parliamentary committees on defence and security.

[211] Estimates of voter turnout during the first round was about 74%. Turnout for the second round was about 60% (Sawyer 2008, 181, footnote 16).

international policymakers and consultants during Johnson-Sirleaf's first term. For instance, there was little Liberian involvement in the drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper, which was linked with SSR in Liberia. A British security expert was responsible for writing the second strategic paper for the security pillar of the poverty reduction paper.[212] This meant that much of the key policymaking functions were contracted out to international actors, rather than relying on Liberian political actors and build up domestic institutional and policymaking capacities.

Analysis of Liberia's post-Taylor politics
Integration of the warring factions' leaders

The post-civil war political environment in Liberia is complex, fluid and characterised by many ambiguities. The country's 1980 military coup disrupted the long-entrenched political oligarghical rule based on elite-driven dynamics. in Liberia that was dominated by Americo-Liberians at the top, then "Congos" and Lebanese, and Liberian indigenes ("kwi"). Integration into the elite structures of power in Liberia is achieved at several levels in society: born into or foster parentage into established families, masonic/secret societies, education status and state employment.[213] Liberia's postwar political space is dominated by a small group of politicians serving in the ruling Unity Party who are former politicans associated with the True Whig Party under Tolbert's regime during the

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[212] Wikileaks, 20 June 2008, 'Liberia's PRS: Peace and Security Pillar: A Security Strategy is slowing emerging, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08MONROVIA476.html (Assessed 21 November 2011)

[213] Stephen S. Hlophe, *Class, Ethnicity and Politics in Liberia: A Class Analysis of Power Struggles in the Tubman and the Tolbert Administrations from 1944-1975*, Washington: University Press of America, 1979

late 1970s and some former members of MOJA and PAL that served in the PRC military junta in the early 1980s. Some consider Johnson-Sirleaf's government as an incarceration of Liberia's pre-1980 Americo-Liberian oligarchy.[214] Others view Johnson-Sirleaf's appointments of a new generation of politicians—some of whom were former student leaders and civil society activists—as evidence of a more professional, democratic political elite.

Some of the country's new postwar elite owe much of their wealth and status to the war. Some former associates of Charles Taylor from his National Patriotic Party (NPFL/NPP) found positions in the new governments under the NTGL and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's rule.[215] Some of the key personalities from the NPP were appointed as ministers in Johnson-Sirleaf's government. Lewis Brown, Benoi Urey and Edwin Snowe are less eminent Americo-Liberians that accumulated considerable wealth during the war and have since become politically connected with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's government.[216] Lewis Brown was Taylor's former National Security advisor has become a staunch supporter of the Unity Party; Brown was appointed as the new Minister of Information, Cultural Affairs and Tourism on 24 January 2012. The underlying rationale behind the political appointments of some of Taylor's former associates can be best understood as "alliances of convienence" based on overlapping economic interests between the economic and the ruling elite. Benoi Urey served as head

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[214] Felix Gerdes, 'Liberia's Post-War Elite: A New Era of Inclusive Ownership or Old Wine in New Bottles', University of Hamburg, Research Unit of Wars, Armaments and Development, 2011

[215] See Chapter 8

[216] All three individuals were able to accumulate considerable wealth during the first Liberian war and subsequently when Taylor was President from 1997-2003.

of the Maritime Agency during Taylor's rule and personally accumulated considerable wealth.

During the 2005 elections, a handful of former relatives and allies of Taylor's emerged as democratically elected politicians in the national legislature, among them include Senator Jewel Howard-Taylor (Charles Taylor's former 'first lady') in Bong. Prominent businessman, Edwin Snowe, Taylor's son-in-law was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Fifth district of Montserrado county in 2005 and was subsequently re-elected (in district #6) in 2011.[217] Senator Prince Johnson, the former leader of the INPFL that broke away from Taylor's faction, was elected Senior Senator from Nimba country for the National Union for Democratic Progress since 2005. Sandol Johnson is now a Senator for the NPP in Bomi County and John Morais is a senator in Maryland for NPP. Oscar A. Cooper, Taylor's main point man for timber exports is a senator in Margibi county in Johnson-Sirleaf's Unity Party. Adolphus Saye Dolo (a General from the former NPFL) was a junior senator in Nimba county from 2005-2011.[218]

The NPP as a political party is more or less irrelevant in Liberian politics, hence many of its supporters have transferred their "loyalty" to either the ruling Unity Pary or the main opposition, Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) party. The new postwar elite associated with Taylor's regime (symbolised by Lewis Brown) now seek to advance their political and business interests through

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[217] Reno 2008, 396. Under Taylor's rule, Snowe was head of the Liberian Petroleum Refinery Company and amassed large wealth during this time.

[218] Dolo lost his seat in the 2011 election and now runs a printing press and private security company in Monrovia.

the Johnson-Sirleaf's government or by funding political party opposition to her rule.[219] The old elements of the True Whig Party remain highly influential in national politics through their control over economic resources and ethnic connections with individuals close to the corridors of state power.[220]

Liberian national politics continues to revolve around the power in the presidency and the executive branch. While it is no longer fashionable in Liberian politics to tout one's Americo-Liberian background, the entrenched political and economic elite remain as powerful and influential as before the 1980 military coup.[221] However, a small group of indigenous Liberians have also elevated into the status of the economic elite due in part to the accumulation of wealth from the 1980s and during the civil war. During campaigning for the 2005 election, Ellen-Johnson Sirleaf countered perceptions that she was part of the Americo-Liberian elite. She downplayed her elitist background and stressed her indigenous (Gola and Kru) roots instead.[222] While the political landscape in Monrovia is never static, one emerging pattern is the placement of Americo-Liberians into the economically strategic government commissions and authorities (such as the National Oil Company of Liberia [NOCAL], the National Port Authority, and the Liberian Telecommunications Corporation),

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[219] Brown and Snowe both became members of Sirleaf's Unity Party in the context of the lead up to the 2011 elections.

[220] According to a long-time Liberian journalist, the "Americo-Liberian remain very powerful, because of their ethnic connections to the current leaders in government. But also because they amassed a lot of money [during the war]." (Author's personal interview with Liberian journalist, Monrovia, 24 February 2012); See also Gredes 2011

[221] Americo-Liberians retained most of their privately owned lucrative properties in the Mamba Point area of Monrovia. A number of these locations continue to be leased by the Government of Liberia (Author's personal interview with Liberian civil society activists, Monrovia, February 2012)

[222] Sawyer 2008, 187

while the public face of her key government ministries (such as Ministry of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice) are filled by upper-middle class (US university educated) indigenous Liberians that are personally close with the President.[223] The President's cabinet members are not always given decision-making powers to influence policymaking within their respective ministries. Johnson-Sirleaf instead relies on her closest advisors from Tolbert's administration from the 1970s and Doe's regime in the 1980s.[224] Johnson-Sirleaf also allegedly depends on her son Robert as one of her closest advisors.

The Executive Presidency in Liberia is extremely influential in all public appointments. For instance, the president appoints all senior/top positions in her government all the way down to Public Relations and human resources staff and middle management in key ministries.[225] Additionally, the concentration of power in the Presidency affords the head of state an oversight role over (and micro-manage) state funding and expenses on behalf of the government. While the Legislature is supposed to act as the main regulatory board, in practice, an executive committee in the Legislature reports to the President through a liaison appointed by the President.

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[223] Amara Konneh has been brought up by Johnson-Sirleaf in her first administration as her deputy chief of staff in the Office of the President (2006-2007) and has served in public cabinet positions (Foreign Affairs and Finance and Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs). He studied public administration at Harvard University and holds a graduate degree in Management Information Systems from Penn State University. Johnson-Sirleaf's former Finance minister and now current minister of foreign affairs Augustine Kpehe Ngafuan and Samuel Kofi Woods are other examples of this particular type of politician. Ngafuan holds a MBA in Finance and Accounting from Rochester University in the US.

[224] See Chapter 8

[225] Author's personal interviews with Liberian civil society activists, Monrovia, February-March 2012

The continuation of "status quo" politics has perpetuated political practices that concentrate on entrenching oneself in power and using the state apparatus to distribute favours to allies and implement punitive measures against rivals to the dominant order. Amos Sawyer identifies one of the core structural causes of conflict in Liberia: "the Liberian political class will have to shift its political orientation from zero-sum politics to one that embraces tolerance, accommodation, and coalition-building".[226] The power in the Presidency undermines the agency of local actors including youth and disincentises the advancement of broad-based vision for national development or the forging of a constructive "social contract" between state and citizens. Handing over control of the state provided the established political and economic elite in Monrovia to pursue the "spoils logic" that has long been the tradition in the exercise of state power in Liberia. According to Thomas Jaye, "they have always been interested in getting rich quick, building mansions, lavishing money on concubines, traveling abroad, sending their children and families abroad on vacation while the other 'half dies' slowly in abject poverty."[227]

The situation remains bleak for the majority of young Liberians who live on the margins of the state and who lack personal connections to the minority elite managing state power. These issues directly affect subaltern youth, former child combatants who emerged from the civil conflicts with a heightened political consciousness and a demystified sense of death.[228] As Jaye states, "in

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[226] Sawyer 2008, 184

[227] Jaye 2003

[228] Reflections from the author's personal interviews and informal discussions with youth and ex-child and youth combatants in Sierra Leone and Liberia revealed a much greater interest in

the long run, this is a recipe for renewed fighting and this means that the issues of governance, distributive justice and security need to be taken seriously within the context of building a secure post-conflict society". The presence of UNMIL and aid from the US/EU/World Bank has greatly assisted in aiding and abetting the elite/political class in Liberia's postwar political environment to perpetuate entrenched political practices and consolidate "business as usual" in Liberia. Very little has changed in altering the political space occupied by established elite families in monopolising social and economic opportunities in the country.

Conclusion: Towards Rethinking the Strategy

With the reliance on dominant external actors, Sierra Leone and Liberia have both undertaken significant measures to consolidate state security during the immediate transition period. In the particular cases examined, international actors adopted the same general peacebuilding approach that involved reconsolidating state authority, legitimizing the state through multiparty elections, and deploying a large UN peacekeepers presence. While this approach can be credited for preventing escalation of conflict, the blueprint 'stabilisation' approach neither understood the driving sources of conflict and ignored the deep-seated crisis of state authority. This is perhaps a consequence of the expedient approach adopted with a lack of attention given to the implications of reconsolidating state authority before substantive national dialogue took place. The major impact this had was forclosing other avenues for alternative

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following politics in their country. Additionally, after witnessing brutality of violence during the civil conflicts, many youth (especially those who fought or witnessed extreme violence) no longer have an idealised fear of death).

approaches that may suit the unique dynamics of Sierra Leone and Liberian society.

A similar characteristic among the two case studies examined here was that the post-war framework advanced by international actors (UN, US and UK) emphasised a particular form of "peace", defined as the absence of large-scale conflict (or "negative peace"). However, the strategy for establishing that "peace" focused narrowly on resolving the question of executive political power (i.e. who controls the state) through legitimizing an executive order through competitive elections within six-months after Sierra Leone's war ended or two years after large-scale conflict ended in Liberia. In Sierra Leone, the overriding immediate concern focused on preparing the ground for elections six-months after the end of the war. In Liberia, an unstable power-sharing arrangement was negotiated that ended the conflict and divided political positions among the main warring factions. Resolving the question of executive political power without problematizing the nature of that state authority and the structural sources of conflict in society puts the metaphorical cart before the horse.

Two central issues flow from this critique. First, the standard UN peacekeeping model fails to problematize the nature of the state in post-conflict African societies. There is an acute lack of awareness of those implementing "peacebuilding" of the structures embedded within the state and the violence it inflicts in the everyday realm of social relations between the state and its citizens. Second, the peacebuilding literature fails to underscore the political nature of these interventions.

A major difference between Sierra Leone and Liberia was that the politics of post-war transition were more effectively worked out in Sierra Leone, which allowed the UNAMSIL to hand over primary security responsibility to the Sierra Leone police in September 2004 and withdraw completely from the country at the end of 2005. In contrast, at the time of this writing, Liberia has not yet worked out the post-war politics. The Government of Liberia is unable to manage its own affairs without significant international policy-making and financial support and as a result, UNMIL remains in the country with a large peacekeeping presence.

Next, I examine the how the UN's excessive focus on disarmament and conducting elections led to a superficial understanding of local considerations, including the political economy, local power dynamics and agency of senior and junior-level factional leaders resulted in limited success in disarming the irregular factions only to reintegrate ex-combatants and the general youth cohort into the same socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

Chapter 4
The Political Economy of "DDR" in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the DDR in Sierra Leone (2001-2003) and Liberia

(2003-2009) as case studies for understanding connections between

peacebuilding and local political economies. "DDR" programmes have become

an important aspect of the process of the United Nations' peace support and

consolidation efforts around the world and a dominant way of dealing with ex-

combatants after conflicts end.[1] DDR programmes are also seen as an instrument

to support implementation of peace agreements and a building block for

sustainable peace.[2] Intended as a link between the UN's peacekeeping and

peacebuilding activities, "DDR" was touted as a vehicle not only for disarming

the irregular factions, but also the primary mechanism for integrating ex-

combatants back into communities.

My interest in this chapter is informed by three main concerns:

a) To understand how in the absence of an economic transformation

framework local actors—specifically commanders, combatants and non-

combatants interacted with and perceived the DDR programme. Existing

literature on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration ('DDR')

tends to focus on how international or external consultants understand

their work during planning and implementation phases while neglecting

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[1] Robert Muggah, 'Introduction: The Emperor's clothes?' in Robert Muggah (ed.), *Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, London: Routledge, 2009, 6. Muggah observes that more than 60 documented "DDR" programmes have been launched since the late 1980s and some 18 were running concurrently in 2007 and 2008.
[2] IDDRS 2006

to consider how recipients and commanders perceive these programmes and their outcomes.[3]

b) To examine DDR in relation to the peacebuilding process and to understand how the DDR programmes functioned in the local contexts of Sierra Leone and Liberia

The chapter argues that the UN and World Bank's blueprint "DDR" interventions were embedded within this macro-peacebuilding approach that was oriented for short-term problem-solving in support of this expedient rush to conduct elections and reconsolidate state authority to legitimize an Executive authority broadly supportive of external intervention, followed by a statebuilding process broadly in the mold of a "liberal peace". The excessive focus on disarmament and conducting elections led to a superficial understanding of local considerations, including the political economy, local power dynamics and the agency and networks of senior and junior-level factional leaders and their relationship with politicians. In the absence of an economic transformation, the material benefits associated with the DDR programme became an idealised solution to address socio-economic problems, placing too much weight on what DDR can realistically achieve. The material benefits provided to ex-combatants were out of proportion with the assistance that was provided to war victims and the general youth cohort. The more problematic socio-economic developmental challenges associated with reintegrating youth and ex-combatants into

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[3] Exceptions include Jennings 2007; Pugal 2005

communities received marginal attention from the UN and the excessive focus on "disarmament" by the external actors diverted attention and resources from immediate needs of war-affected populations.

This chapter assesses "DDR" from a different lens and sketches a different story.[4] This chapter aims to place local agency in the equation of external-internal dynamics during UN peacebuilding interventions. It demonstrates on one hand how external actors sought to maintain control over different aspects of the "DDR" process, and how local actors ultimately shaped certain outcomes on the ground based on local socio-political rules. In doing so, the chapter interrogates a central assumption in UN peacebuilding literature, namely that the UN is a neutral bystander during "DDR" practices. Fundamental to UN peacebuilding practices and the achievement of certain outcomes are the power relations between different groups in society emerging from conflict. By examining the Sierra Leone and Liberian experience, I seek to problematise DDR as a mechanism for peacebuilding.

I see the DDR programme as a short-term stopgap measure that was connected to the international strategy to hurriedly consolidate central state authority as quickly as possible (see Chapter 3). The UN implemented DDR as a national blueprint strategy without consideration for the local specificities in each of Sierra Leone's seven provincial districts or Liberia's fifteen counties. After the programme's completion, the UN and international donors touted DDR

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[4] An extensive review of archives from National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the UNDP and interviews conducted with Liberian and Sierra Leonean policy implementation team members during the course of the author's extended field research shed additional light on how ideas on "DDR" were translated into practice and how the programme functioned in the local context.

in West Africa as "successes", going as far as to claim that Sierra Leone's was one of the most successful UN programmes in the world. [5] "Success" was defined in terms of the number of combatants disarmed, the number of weapons collected and the amount of financial assistance provided to ex-fighters. According to Sierra Leone's NCDDR final report, over 72,000 ex-combatants were disarmed and approximately 30,000 weapons were collected during the formal DDR process.[6] However, the actual number of ex-combatants was likely closer to 45,000.[7] The DDR program, which ended in 2002, was followed by an UNDP-sponsored 'Arms for Development' grassroots initiative that involved voluntary surrender of weapons in exchange for community development funding.[8] Over US$133.0 million was spent on Liberia's DDRR programme, almost completely funded by external actors.[9] According to NCDDRR sources, Liberia's DDRR programme disarmed and demobilised 102,193 ex-

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[5] The World Bank considers Sierra Leone's DDR programme as "the best practice example throughout the world of a successful disarmament, demobilisation [and] reintegration programme". UNAMSIL claims that disarmament of ex-combatants and their subsequent demobilisation and integration into society was one of UNAMSIL's "most outstanding features of Sierra Leone's peace process". (Sierra Leone Completes Five-Year Disarmament Programme", UN Wire, February 5, 2004); On Liberia, see Pugal (2005) and Ernest Harsch, Reintegration of Ex-combatants: When War Ends: Transforming Africa's Fighters into Builders, *Africa Renewal* 19: 3, 2005; HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal legacy of West Africa's regional warriors, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17, No. 5(a), 2005, 51

[6] NCDDR Final Report (2002); United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Fact Sheet 1: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration claims that 42,330 weapons and more than 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were collected and destroyed.

[7] An explanation for the inflated numbers is found in corruption by senior commanders from CDF and RUF forces and some corruption by NCDDR. Cheating was reported in several studies whereby non-combatants acquired weapons and ammunition from former commanders in order to access DDR benefits. See, Paes Eyewitness: The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 12:2, 2005; Dufka, Youth, Poverty and Blood; Jennings 2007.

[8] From 2003-2005, 6,165 'licensable' and non-licensable weapons were collected as part of the programme. ('Arms for Development final report' 2008, 6)

[9] The transitional government's contribution was approximately US$2.173 million.. NTGL contribution to the DDRR programme: April 2004-October 2005 (NCDDRR archives 'IMG_0157').

combatants.[10] This included 12,246 former AFL soldiers, almost 33,485 LURD fighters and over 15,589 MODEL fighters and 43,313 ex-GoL/militia forces.[11] However, only 28,314 serviceable weapons were collected by UNMIL by July 2005, along with approximately 10,000 unserviceable weapons.[12] The weapons-to-combatants ratio of 3.6 is a substandard for the UN. IDDRS (2006) indicates that a 2:1 ratio should be attained, whereas Liberia's was closer to 4:1.[13] Nicols estimates that approximately 64% of the weapons that were shipped to Liberia during the war were collected during DDRR.[14]

Immediate "Problem-solving" Considerations

The "problem-solving" literature on DDR and peacebuilding assumes that certain powerful local actors need to be "bought off" or co-opted to prevent them

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[10] The total number in Liberia inflated after the '48-Generals' were integrated into the NCDDRR's planning and execution of the disarmament phase. See more below.

[11] Ryan Nichols, Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls, in Armed and Aimless, Small Arms Survey, 116. The GoL militia forces were, according to General Francis Dolo, a special bodyguard unit attached to the President of Liberia (Taylor) and commanded by General Coco Dennis. The MoD militia fought in "various locations" (UNMIL minutes [restricted] from a meeting on MoD militia held at the Liberian Ministry of Defence Conference Room, Benson Street, 22 June 2004, 3 in author's possession)

[12] The weapons include 21,189 assault rifles (such as AK47), 715 machine guns, 665 pistols, 1,841 RPGs, 133 mortars and approximately 5,310 shotguns (mainly used for hunting and self-defence). UN panel of experts report on Liberia, S/2005/360, 13 June 2005, 17.

[13] Initial UN estimated that the total number of combatants from all of the fighting forces was closer to between 38,000 to 50,000. UN sources indicated that there were 38,000 combatants in Liberia in 2003 and this number increased to 50,000. The Government of Liberia estimated about 45,000. See Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Programme: Strategy and Implementation Framework/, prepared by the Draft Interim Secretariat, Monrovia, October 31, 2003, 38.

[14] Ryan Nichols, Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls, in Armed and Aimless, Small Arms Survey, 124. According to the 2004 UN Panel of Experts, about 60% of the weapons from Liberia were collected (UN Panel of Experts report, 2004 Letter dated 6 December 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2004/955 of 6 December)

from undermining or delaying peace.[15] Virginia Fortna, for example, emphasises that the strategic aims of armed groups are critical for disarmament due to their reliance on violence as politics by other means. Violent actors are primarily concerned with their immediate and future gains that are likely to result from peace agreements and are more likely to resume fighting when their perceptions of the peace dividend is unfavourable relative to their opponent's interests.[16] Stephen Stedman emphasises the engagement of potential "spoilers" and advocates for providing them with material inducements (read: buy-offs) and disregards what their alleged grievances may be as irrelevant. The common feature in these perspectives is the need to confront powerful actors that control the means of violence in a post-war society.

There is evidence of the UN adopting similar approaches in their practice and approach. "Special incentives" are used by the UN to encourage commanders and local leaders to "cooperate with the UN and/or national government; such incentives include: money, access to credit for micro-start-up businesses, travel and health care, professional and business training, study trips, political (deputy ministerial positions) or administrative positions".[17] DDR, from the point of view of local actors should be viewed as a set of material and ideational incentives and bargaining chips to influence leaders and commanders

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[15] Stedman 1998;

[16] Fortna 2004, 19

[17] Second Generation DDR, 38. See also The UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS 2006). The IDDRS refers to bargaining tools such as "special packages" and the UN "Second-Generation DDR" (2010) describes them as "commander incentive programmes" (CIP).

who act as "gatekeepers" for the rank-and-file combatants.[18] Such considerations highlight the important role that senior, junior (and mid-level) commanders assume during DDR programmes considering their authority and ability to remobilise combatants in the short to medium term.[19]

Conceptual Framework: DDR in the African 'marketplace'

To understand how "DDR" "worked" in Sierra Leone and Liberia, this section draws on Alex de Waal's concept of the African "political marketplace". Relying on DDR as a tool for peacebuilding requires attentiveness to how DDR is defined and perceived by local actors in their own context on their own terms. An often-overlooked dimension in DDR studies is how its modalities become enmeshed in (informal) forms of local power and wider social relations in a particular society. These issues are rarely acknowledged in UN policy and academic literature, with only a few exceptions.[20] In Sierra Leone and Liberia, most commanders viewed DDR as a "money-making" scheme and sought to maximize their authority and positioning (based on their power and knowledge of the context and war) in order to access material and ideational incentives linked with the UN's "DDR" programme. Alex de Waal observes how external actors are more often than not completely unaware of their own distorting role within the national and sub-national politics of post-conflict sub-Saharan African

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[18] Themnér 2012

[19] Second generation DDR, 2011, 25

[20] See Kathleen Jennings, 'The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 14:2, 2007, 204-218; Christopher Clapham, 'Being Peacekept', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate 1998.

countries.[21] In spite of the alleged humanitarian impulses embedded in the UN's desire to "do something", the UN rarely acknowledges its distorting role in the local power dynamics and how their presence impacts on the political calculations of local political actors. As de Waal writes, "the more that [external actors] are driven by good intentions, moral values and assumptions that a peace agreement is a binding commitment on the parties, the less likely they are to see how national and local politics operate and the distorting role they are playing".[22]

It is important that international actors understand sub-national politics and the local political economy in the peacebuilding context.[23] International actors must be cognisant of how their positionality alters social reality and be tuned into social relations that lie beneath the veneer of their liberal statebuilding efforts.[24] However, doing so complicates the process and raises several problematic issues for the UN and outsiders involved in peacebuilding. First, how should external actors engage with local powerbrokers: through subversion or engagement? National and sub-national politics in Africa dictate that those individuals who control resources, command large followings and compete for

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[21] For a recent account that argues that there is increasing evidence of the UN being more attentive to these local considerations, see Niels Nagelhus Schia and John Karlsrud, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road': Friction Sites and Local-Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan, *International Peacekeeping*, 20:2, 2013, 233-248

[22] de Waal 2009, 111

[23] Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann argue in their book *Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, 9)*,* "the failure to grasp the underlying political economy of a conflict zone, relying instead on crude, value-laden and simplistic labeling of complex problems, has served to perpetuate and stimulate renewed violence."

[24] Scholars emphasis the patrimonial political networks operating within and outside of the nation-state that function to contribute or undermine formal statebuilding efforts. See Ole Jacob Sending's new book "The Field of Peacebuilding: Archimedes in Africa, Oslo: NUPI, forthcoming.

resources from external actors and must be directly confronted. Additionally, there are 'big men' that "pull strings" from behind the scenes who understand how to navigate successfully through NGO/UN bureaucracies in the international aid industry. Whether one challenges or usurps the powerful local actors, these strategies must be seen as short-term solutions that espouse a minimal alteration of the political space with likely long-term implications for peacebuilding. Fundamentally, sustainable solutions require the inclusion of a broad range actors beyond elite and factional leaders.

Alex de Waal identifies two principles to effectively negotiate assistance within the political marketplace: first, elite 'buy-in' and, second, finding "equilibrium" among elite actors. According to de Waal, in the "buy-in" logic works as follows: "the most powerful purchaser of loyalty" (either the national government or its international donors) deploys sufficient resources "to enable all elites to take a share".[25] However, "in a country marked by violent political competition, the buy-in needs to be more decisive".[26]

An examination of the role and impact of international donors on the local Sierra Leonean political economy has received only marginal attention in existing literature to date. DDR "assessments" far too often analyze the actions and ideas of international actors without acknowledging the substantial ideational and material resources brought to bear on the process by external actors and how this impacts on local actors and sub-national politics.[27] In both

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[25] de Waal 2009, 106

[26] Ibid, 107

[27] A review of DDR practitioner's accounts of DDR give the impression that that DDR is a technical process above the level of local politics. These so-called "experts" give the impression

Sierra Leone and Liberia, the large international presence enabled the UN to shape local "peacebuilding" scenarios with its large presence and reserve of financial capital it could use to alter preferences and the behavior of a range of local actors. In fact, the UN and international presence was so extensive in post-war Sierra Leone that "relative to the small size and even tinier economy…[international actors] became the principle source of patronage".[28] Given Sierra Leone's deprived socio-economic context during the war-peace transition, it is fair to say that the United Nations, Britain's Department for International Development (DfID), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became the "monopolistic purchaser of loyalty" in post-war Sierra Leone.[29] The UNAMSIL and UNMIL peacekeeping missions provided "reinsertion" packages to ex-fighters entering the DDR programme. The UN missions hired local staff and had access to funds that could be distributed to local NGOs for reintegration projects. Additionally, UNAMSIL and UNMIL had access to significant logistical resources to bring government authorities and senior military commanders to the periphery.

that effective DDR relies on more UN integration/ coordination, improving standardization and professionalism of international DDR programs with proper links established between DDR and security sector reform (SSR). (See for instance, Verheul 2010; Klein and Civic 2010; McFate 2010 all in Monopoly of Force). For a contrasting view, see Hannah Neumann, 'Taking a Micro-Social Perspective of Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions on Rural Citizens: Case Study of a Liberian Community', *Peace, Conflict & Development*, 18, 2011, 47–67.

[28] de Waal 2009, 107

[29] UNAMSIL was one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world at the time, peaking at 17,455 peacekeepers at the end of March 2002 (Patel 2002). The UN spent US$2.775 billion on its operations from 1998 until end of December 2005 (Assessment of Member States' contributions for the financing of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from 13 July 1998 to 30 June 2005, see ST/ADM/SER.B/537. See also Middlebrook et al 2006, 1, footnote 7). Additionally, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the Government of Sierra Leone's budget was almost entirely dependent on foreign aid initially after the war (2000-2001). From 2001-2006, aid dependency reduced slightly from about 80% to 60%. The World Bank provided US$1.3 billion for Sierra Leone's first three-year Poverty Reduction Strategy paper.

The UN presence in both countries was so extensive that most politically active and educated Sierra Leoneans and Liberia within the countries at the time, as well as a broad range of established leaders and armed commanders—including the most notable irregular groups, the Civil Defence Forces and the RUF—positioned themselves vis-à-vis outsiders (governments, NGOs, international organizations) for access to the large reserves or promises of foreign assistance. In this sense, the UN became a primary powerbroker to mediate local conflicts between rival local actors, all of whom competed for access to the international aid.[30] Below, I explain how these dynamics played out themselves out—prior to, and during the DDR process. The UN's role as a key "mediator" altered the political calculations of elite and wartime commanders in such fundamental ways that their presence structurally conditions their appetite for new forms of patronage—often in a way that undermines sustainable solutions.[31] As de Waal states, "the very act of outside engagement alters the price of loyalty for the duration of the engagement and so makes any solution even less durable than it would have been had the parties bargained only among themselves".[32]

The second principle is the balancing of interests or *equilibrium*, where external actors ensure that "centers of patronage control comparable levels of

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[30] The local leaders that are more adept at maneuvering the complexities of international bureaucracy are better positioned to generate funds to enhance their local power and legitimacy. Seen from this perspective, peacekeeping forces (and international actors) become 'players' rather than referees in this political marketplace. (de Waal, 108)

[31] Christopher Clapham, 'Being Peacekept', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate 1998, 308

[32] Ibid, 110

resources and are able to deter one another".[33] If the UN is truly a "neutral" bystander as the policy and problem-solving literature implies, then the UN should redistribute its material and ideational incentives in a prudent manner so as not to upset local balances of power. However, the UN is hardly "neutral" if one considers who is included and excluded during post-war bargaining.[34] Such questions related to the selection of local actors certainly complicates the UN's activities during peacebuilding.

According to de Waal's framework, failing to follow the socio-culturally defined rules of the "political marketplace" results in unsustainable outcomes, which he defines as war relapse or "bargains that stick for as long as it suits the interests of both parties".[35]

It is clear that war-time commanders are key to the implementation of disarmament programs. But in the absence of sound political and intelligence analysis within the UN system of the various competing stakeholders and their interests, it is unlikely that the UN will be capable of engaging in these more nuanced discussions on local ownership to understand at what point does it become problematic to integrate certain local actors over others and how to prevent other actors from undermining peacebuilding.[36]

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[33] Ibid, 107

[34] Christopher Clapham, 'Being Peacekept', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate 1998, 306

[35] de Waal 2009,108

[36] Dr. Charles Calls spent most of 2004 at the UN department of political affairs as their peacebuilding consultant wrote a report titled "*Institutionalising Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA", report for the UN Department of Political Affairs, New York, 2005,* in which he underscores the lack of personnel and capacity of the DPA to monitor and conduct robust political analysis on countries in which the UN serves.

Next, I argue that a local/micro-level framework is important for peacebuilders and the UN must understand how DDR becomes embedded in social relations between and within armed groups, how commanders manipulate material benefits for their patron-client relations and how both essentially involve "complex nexus of transactional links" beyond normal military command structures between commanders (leaders) and combatants (clientelistic constituencies).[37] The next section locates DDR within this political marketplace in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. Two issues are highlighted: first, how commander-combatants dynamics play out in practice and how this reinforced old patterns of "leadership" that were detrimental to long-term peace; and second, how the excessive focus on "disarmament" and the material inducements associated with UN DDR programmes diverted attention from long-term reintegration.

It is important to note that the NCDDR, Tripartite and the TCCs pursued its "negotiations" with high-level political leaders and top-commanders (see previous Chapter). In other words, negotiations were mostly confined to the United Nations SRSG, President Tejan Kabbah, the RUF interim leader Sesay and the Kamajor's National Coordinator, Chief Sam Hinga Norman. The role and significance of dealing with the senior military and political officials is illustrated by highlighting the vital role that the CDF-*Kamajor* Force Commander Hinga Norman played in conditioning the local peace process.

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[37] c.f. Chabol and Daloz 1999

Disarming the Civil Defence Forces

Only a brief history of the *Kamajors* civil defence force is necessary for our purposes. This group traces their history to the "mobilisations of specialised local hunters, experts in occult protections capable of hunting large game and of protecting villages from the threats of the forest".[38] Local leaders (such as paramount chiefs) were initially responsible for forming and mobilising young men into civil defence militias to protect their local communities during the war in the mid-1990s when it became clear that members of the Sierra Leone military were colluding with the RUF in the illegal trade of diamonds and weapons.[39] An ethnic Mende with so-called "big man" tendencies, Hinga Norman was a master dealmaker/power-broker with a history of extensive and opaque international commercial and diplomatic networks.[40]

A critical element for creating the conditions for disarmament to occur in Bo district (the *Kamajor* stronghold) was establishing communication with the CDF's War Council.[41] Within the Council, Hinga Norman was a powerful decision-maker and took command from President Kabbah. Norman had the local authority to control the CDF junior commanders in the field, who would

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[38] Hoffman 2005; Joe A.D. Alie, 'The Kamajor militia in Sierra Leone: Liberators or Nihilists? In David Francis (ed.), *Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace?* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, 51-70

[39] Keen 2005; Gberie 2005. The civil defence phenomenon expanded in Sierra Leone just before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council coup on 25 May 1997 led by low-ranking soldiers. In May 1997, Hinga Norman became deputy defence minister in Kabbah's government. To illustrate the CDF's economy in mid-2000, Hoffman describes how during the mass remobilisation initiation became essentially a money-making scheme for new recruits to acquire occult status that would make bulletproof anyone going through the normal procedures of being selected by local chiefs and other elite members of society. (Hoffman 2011, 113-114). The high cost of initiation lead many CDF combatants to extort tariffs from civilians at their checkpoints along the highways near Bo. (Hoffman 2011, 114)

[40] Fifthen 1999, 246-247

[41] The vast majority of combatants that were to be disarmed in Bo were Mende *Kamajors*, the pro-Government/SLPP militia (Danny Hoffman 2005, 335)

pass on orders to the rank-and-file soldiers to enter UN disarmament camps.[42] An estimated 14,500 *Kamajors* registered for pre-disarmament in Bo town.[43] At a town-hall meeting scheduled in Bo town on 31 August 2001, Norman met with *Kamajors* commanders and rank-and-file combatants and their families to order them to "disarm to UNAMSIL tomorrow or face criminal charges in court". According to the BBC Bo correspondent Richard Margao who reported the event, Norman "reminded them of the May 15th agreement (Abuja II) between UNAMSIL, CDF and RUF, that anybody caught with arms and ammunition or causing mayhem after disarmament will be regarded as an enemy".[44]

A fine-grained analysis disarmament reveals broader social context of networks and social relations that structure and condition DDR programmes.[45] As such, one must know socio-cultural rules that shape local politics and relations of patronage.[46] DDR requires a deep understanding local actors' interests and when selecting local interlocutors.[47] According to anthropologist Danny Hoffman, the CDF's "principle organizational logic was one that organizes many spheres of social, political and economic life throughout sub-

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[42] Next in line were the CDF's regional commanders who received their orders from Norman. In the northern districts of Bombali and Koinadugu, for instance, M.S Dumbuya, a civil defence force official controlling the Temne civilian militia (known as the *Tamaboros*) commanded authority over local units.

[43] Peter Goma, Kamajors angry over Kabbah's gift, *Standard Times*, 30 May 2002. However, only a small percentage of this group participated in DDR. One reason for this was hunting rifles (which the *Kamajors* relied on) were not accepted by UNAMSIL for entry into DDR.

[44] Sierra Leone news, 31 August 2001, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0801.html (Accessed 21 September 2005)

[45] Utas 2012

[46] de Waal 2009

[47] Berdal 2010, 11

Saharan Africa: relations of patronage".[48] Hoffman explains that the CDF hierarchy functioned as a patron-client system involving "a patron, a commander would be responsible for his 'clients' in ways not defined by military necessity or protocol".[49] The *Kamajors* operated according to the rules defined within the broader Sierra Leonean marketplace, a context that is structured around elite patronage networks and a gerontocratic order.[50]

During the DDR process, rank-and-file CDF combatants complained that Hinga Norman and other CDF leaders were seen as "hoarding the contributions of donors and distributing them only through their personal patronage networks".[51] As Deputy Defence Minister with close access to the corridors of power in Freetown as well as British military and diplomatic officials in the defence sector and DDR programme, Norman could buy himself loyalties in Sierra Leone's post-conflict marketplace. Some CDF commanders wanted to break Norman's hold over the movement but had little autonomy or agency or simply lacked awareness of how international NGOs and donors operate.[52] In this particular case, the ability to generate revenue principally derives from how

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[48] Danny Hoffman 2007, 651

[49] Ibid, 652.

[50] Danny Hoffman 2011; Paul Richards 1996. I use this term in reference to the anthropological research on Sierra Leone and Liberia that view political hierarchies as elitist, urban based leadership who show little concern for young people. For instance, Bellman studied the Kpelle people, secret societies and other Poro societies (see Beryl Bellman, The Language of Secrecy: Symbols & Metaphors in Poro Ritual, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984; see also William Murphy, Secret Knowledge as Property and Power in Kpelle Society: Elders Versus Youth', *Africa*, 50, 1980. 193-207.)

[51] Hoffman 2011

[52] For instance, Mamma Munda, an illiterate CDF's female commander was unaware of the political maneuverings required to access foreign aid in the post-war period. When the wife of M.S Dumbuya established an NGO called Wives, Widows and Orphans to compensate ex-CDF members, she applied and received international funding while Madam Munda could only generate meager funds locally for her LNGO. (Hoffman 2011, 116)

connected patrons are to foreign donor sources and their ability to navigate through the international politics of aid. As a result, the majority of rank-and-file were excluded from receiving the material and ideational benefits provided during DDR and became marginalised within Sierra Leone's post-war society.[53]

The change in DDR policy (to group disarmament noted above) reinforced the authority of junior and senior commanders and enabled them to define who was a combatant (and thus who could access the financial benefits associated with "reinsertion" benefits).[54] Some CDF commanders reportedly accepted bribes or cut deals with their subordinates to shave a percentage of expected benefits off from the reinsertion benefit. Additionally, senior commanders used their position to allow non-combatants who were relatives or friends to join the programme, taking the place of legitimate combatants.[55] These strategies were widespread among both the RUF and CDF factions. As demonstrated below, similar practices were widely reported during Liberia's DDR process as well.[56] World Bank and Sierra Leonean authorities in NCDDR claimed that a large majority of CDF rank-and-file combatants self-reintegrated to their former communities without formal DDR assistance,[57] however, in many cases, the process was susceptible to fraudulent practices that occurred

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[53] Hoffman 2011, 116

[54] The reinsertion benefit came in cash form in the equivalent of US$300, a considerable amount of money in a poor post-conflict economy.

[55] Tesfamichael et al 2004, 39. Deals were cut where the commander would receive two-thirds of the cash benefit while their personal friend or family relative would receive the remaining third (Author's interview with a former child soldier, Freetown, 7 December 2011).

[56] UNDP 2006, 26; Dufka 2005, 50. It is a faulty assumption that commanders have access to only one weapon. In Sierra Leone, many senior commanders possessed as many as five. (Author's interview with former child soldier, Freetown, 7 December 2011).

[57] Kai-Kai 2000, 113-128

underneath the eyes of programme implementers. These practices alienated the rank-and-file combatants and created resentment among other CDF combatants who saw their former commanders as being disproportionately rewarded at their own expense.

Additionally, the international community—the United Nations, UK's DfID and World Bank—became the monopolistic purchaser of loyalty in Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL became one of, if not *the* main employer in post-conflict Sierra Leone for the first few years of 'peace'. The majority of funds for Sierra Leone's DDR process was procured from external donors. Sierra Leone's DDR program cost over US$100 million with the government of Sierra Leone contributing US$6.3 million and international donors provided the remaining amount.[58] Some educated Sierra Leoneans were hired in administrative and field-based projects funded through the UNAMSIL and the DDR program. These jobs were quite lucrative as compared to what was offered in the broader post-war political economy. At the time, the post-war economy was conditioned by a large UN presence and a growing proliferation of post-crisis international NGOs.

Quasi-NGOs and 'Brief-Case' NGOs
To illustrate how international actors (UN, NGOs etc.) conditioned the local political economy, it is worth mentioning that there was a proliferation of

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[58] Gebreselassie Testfamichael, Nicole Ball and Julie Nenon, Peace in Sierra Leone: Evaluating the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process. The Final Evaluation of DDR and the Multi-donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR, August 2004, 70. The World Bank retained majority control over the Trust Fund and decisions related to how funds were distributed. The financial management of Sierra Leone's program was handled by the World Bank and TD Waterhouse in a separate unit created in the NCDDR, called the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) aimed to assure donors proper accountability and to minimize fraudulent practices.

numerous local community organizations (or "community-based organizations) that were established specifically in response to the UN's desire for local training institutions that could cater for ex-combatants' reintegration needs. There were literally hundreds of local NGOs (LNGOs) that were established in the post-conflict period for the sole purpose of deriving funds from the international DDR programme.[59] The majority of these local institutions lacked credibility due in part to the fact the UN failed to place stringent measures for standardizing assistance attached to funding considerations to ensure these NGOs provided quality training to ex-combatants.[60] As a result, the quality of training that ex-combatants received fell well below locally-acceptable standards.[61] This contributed to considerable fraud and undermined the legitimacy of the DDR's training programmes. Those local organizations that were credible could not survive on their own after the formal DDR programme concluded.[62]

Working with established political leaders did not bode well for the majority of ex-combatants that were marginalised by their previous commanders during "DDR".[63] Additionally, the excessive focus on disarmament and the

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[59] Similar practices occurred in post-conflict Liberia (see Alexander Loden, Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train Without Brushes', *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, Vol. 1, 2007, 304)

[60] Simon Arthy 2003

[61] Author's interviews with various former combatants in Freetown, Kono and Bo, November 2011-February 2012

[62] For instance, my sample of local NGOs that provided reintegration training revealed that no more than 10-15% of the NGOs survived the immediate post-DDR

[63] The Government of Sierra Leone's 2010 White Paper states, "in the haste to secure peace and take the process forward some people through no fault of their own missed the opportunity to

assumption that material incentives were required structured the program was a "money-making" scheme that could be manipulated by power local leaders and in doing so, diverted resources from the war-affected populations in Sierra Leone (particularly, the disabled and those who had no part in the fighting).[64]

From the Sierra Leone experience, we learn that UN conditioned the local peacebuilding context through deployments of financial aid, the integration of particular leaders and the hiring of local Sierra Leoneans. The UN approach was informed by a problematic assumption that distributing money to combatants would contribute to peace. One of the RUF's leader Eldred Collins explained that the DDR was purely a UN export and the idea of providing cash to combatants was made with no consideration of Sierra Leone's local context. It is worth quoting Mr. Collins at length:

> They did not consult us. There was no meeting on how disarmament was supposed to go with any of the fighting forces. They [The UN] just sat down and did it. That is the reason why it was a failure. They said they [could] train someone to become a carpenter in six months. How can you become a carpenter in six months? It is not possible. They are trying to

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participate in the programme. There are many reasons for this, some ex-combatants did not benefit from the process because they failed to meet the qualification criteria, despite the fact that they participated actively in the war. To add to the problem many also failed to secure the training opportunities afforded to those that were included in the programme. This left a number of ex-combatants feeling disgruntled and understandably unhappy. The Government of Sierra Leone recognises that many of these ex-combatants because of their age and through no fault of their own have lost out on schooling, skill development and the employment opportunities that come from education. Disaffected people are likely to pose a threat to the wider society. Without gainful employment there may be the temptation to resort to crime, particularly with the current proliferation of small arms. It is this government's intention to address these anomalies by seeking ways to successfully resettle all ex-combatants into the community and where possible provide training and educational skills in order to improve their life chances, thereby improving the opportunity for them to be gainfully employed." (Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper: Informing the People (03 November 2010 DRAFT)*, 6)

[64] Many children and youth relied on a variety of hard and 'soft' drugs during the conflict. Marijuana (or *djamba)*, cocaine and heroin (brown-brown) were used as a 'moral boaster' by commanders to small boys units.

fool us. They should have consulted with the forces to know what is supposed to be given to the ex-combatants from the fighting forces.

Collins explained that a cash incentive was not a necessary pre-condition for RUF disarmament. Whether or not this is true is debatable, however, he explained "for the RUF…money or no money, we would have disarmed. Other programs would have been set up to encompass these combatants". Without specifying what programmes the RUF would have recommended that were different from the UN, Collins' main argument was that the DDR programme was imported from outside with no consultation about the social background of combatants.[65]

Next, I will examine Liberia's DDR process to illustrate how the UN conceptualised and implemented disarmament in Liberia. In Liberia, the UN attempted to implement a blueprint DDR plan without considering the local context and initially tried to circumvent the authority of factional leaders and junior commanders from the three warring factions. As shown, this decision led to negative outcomes and nearly reversed the peace process. Subsequently, the UN integrated forty-eight senior and junior commanders (16 from each faction) to assist in the disarmament and reintegration process. However, Liberia's DDR model was informed by a flawed conceptual framework and several problematic assumptions..

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[65] Author's personal interview with RUF leader Eldred Collins, Freetown, 28 October 2011

Liberia: 'DDRR' in the Liberian post-war 'marketplace'

To illustrate how the UN's preoccupation with its own bureaucratic demands conditioned the process, I review the lead-up to the commencement of DDR in Monrovia. Instead of consulting the leaders of the three warring factions before initiating Liberia's DDR programme, UN authorities wanted to maintain a monopoly over the decision-making process and perceived the warring factions as obstructionists to the process of peacebuilding. Klein made the controversial decision to exclude senior and junior leaders from the factions from the process by circumventing their authority and underestimating their control over the rank-and-file fighters.[66] This nearly led to a catastrophic collapse and resumption of large-scale fighting in the country. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement indicated an unrealistic start date for disarmament (within 60 days after the signing of the ceasefire), which was out of sequence with the deployment of UNMIL.[67] UNMIL peacekeeping troops were unable to deploy in sufficient numbers to Camp Sheffelin (a military base near Roberts International Airport) before DDR commenced; as a result, only one out of three planned cantonment sites were ready for the start of DDR in early December 2003. However, despite warnings from the warring factions' leaders, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary General Jacques Klein insisted on maintaining the original start-date despite the absence of a robust third party military force to to build confidence that the factions could disarm without being surprised with an attack by a rival force.

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[66] Author's personal interview with former NTGL official, 13 March 2012, Monrovia

[67] This was overly ambitious considering that cantonment sites had not been constructed during this period.

As an illustration of how little knowledge the UN and US had about the Liberian context, the UN SRSG Klein organized a symbolic disarmament on 1 December 2003 in an effort to "kick-off" the start of DDR. Attended by leaders of the warring factions, the NTGL Chairman and his deputy, and witnessed by the US Ambassador to Liberia (William S. Blainey) and UK High Commission to Sierra Leone (non-resident Ambassador to Liberia) John Mitchiner, essentially sent a signal to the combatants that the international community would be supporting Liberia and the DDR was their first priority.[68] However, with only 5,000 peacekeeping troops deployed in Monrovia to implement the DDR programme (out of its planned 15,000), and the several thousands of combatants making their way to the capital city, the United Nations decided to announce over UNMIL Radio that the first phase of Liberia's DDRR programme would commence on 7 December 2003 in Monrovia. There was basic knowledge disseminated about the intention of "DDR". As a result, general combatants developed an inflated expectation about how DDR could benefit them.[69] Fearing that the process was too rushed and lacked proper sensitisation about the goals and benefits off the programme, leaders of the warring factions demanded that an executive meeting be held with the International Contact Group, UNMIL and the NTGL authorities on Friday 5 December 2003. The factions warned Jacques Klein that the UNMIL plan was flawed and needed to be postponed in order to develop a overarching structure to control the disarmament process. Despite

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[68] UNMIL stages a symbolic destruction of weapons and formally launches the DDRR programme in Liberia, UNMIL report, 1 December 2003, (http://reliefweb.int/node/138461 (Accessed 19 May 2012)
[69] Author's personal interview with former NTGL official, 13 March 2012, Monrovia

these numerous warnings (from NCDDR head Dr. Moses Jarbo and the NTGL leaders), SRSG Klein insisted on keeping to the original timeline of beginning the disarmament process in Monrovia on 7 December.[70] His decision to remain on course was partially motivated by the desire to "do something" to secure "negative peace" and also to demonstrate to his UN colleagues that progress was being achieved ahead of the United Nations donor's conference on Liberia scheduled later that month.[71]

The UN's strategy to work outside of the "socio-political" rules in Liberia instead of engaging *with* local powerbrokers was viewed as a costly mistake by the Liberian authorities in the NTGL and the NCDDR. The UN initially dismissed the idea of integrating the factions' leadership into the NCDDRR, a proposal brought forth by Dr. Moses Jarbo, the head of the NCDDRR, among others. Senior and junior commanders were puzzled that Jacques Klein believed he could disarm the factions without their involvement.[72]

On 7 December 2003, with a peacekeeping presence of 5,000 troops, as many as14,000 armed combatants (mostly male youth from Taylor's militia

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[70] Christian Bugnion et al, External Mid-term Evaluation Report of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme in Liberia, 2 October 2006, 23. Klein later explained that "New York said, 'We want the disarmament process to start now.' Why? Weapons kill people. And the sooner we got those weapons out of their hands, the sooner the killing stopped. And the sooner the exploitation stopped. And the sooner the political factions no longer had the muscle and the firepower to do the threatening. So regardless of what people say – and I'll say it on camera, I have the record; I was at every meeting and so were my people ...My philosophy has always been lead, follow or get the hell out of my way. Because my goal was to save Liberia." (PBS Frontline, Liberia-No More War, 'The United Nations Mission: Interview with Jacques Klein', May 2005, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/liberia/klein.html)

[71] Christian Bugnion et al, External Mid-term Evaluation Report of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme in Liberia, 2006, 9

[72] According to three high-level NCDDRR officials from the "48 Generals" interviewed by the author who were deeply involved in the process,

forces), showed up in Camp Sheffelin based on an inflated expectation that they would receive US$300 cash in exchange for giving up their weapons. There was no order, structure or procedure in place to control control the process. The insufficient number of peacekeepers in camp made it impossible to guarantee security. Additionally, basic provisions such as water, shelter and food were not available. Some of the combatants became restive and frustrated with the process. One combatant fired into the air, resulting in an eruption of violence and chaos.[73] The thousands of battled-hardened combatants (many of whom could only understand Liberia's pigeon English) exited the camp in mass numbers, rioting in the streets in protest once they learned they would only receive half of the US$300 US cash promised to them over UNMIL Radio.[74]

After UN and NTGL authorities were able to escape the mayhem, Jacques Klein consulted NTGL officials Vice President Moses Blah and Defence Minister Daniel Chea for advice on what went wrong and how to reconceptualise the disarmament strategy. Chea suggested that a militia force be organised comprising of approximately 30-40 armed men (led by his senior commanders Cocco Dennis and Roland Duo) to forcefully disarm (if necessary) "the armed criminals" roaming the streets of Monrovia. Klein reluctantly agreed and Denis and Duo relied on their status as high-level senior commanders from Taylor's old forces to implement a Liberian-led compulsory disarmament process. This "informal" disarmament ended around 27 December 2003 and resulted in the

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[73] Jennings 2007, 208; Author's personal interview with former NTGL official, 13 March 2012, Monrovia

[74] The UN's policy is to provide $150 immediately upon disarmament and the additional $150 after completing the reintegration component. This information was not communicated well to the combatants.

deaths of nine people.[75] During this period, the combatatants engaged in wanton looting and destruction in Monrovia, but these risks were borne by the Liberians themselves as opposed to the UN.[76] This period coincided with an expedited deployment of UNMIL military troops to Monrovia; by 31 December 2003, 14,824 UNMIL personnel had arrived in Liberia to back up the approximately 3,600 military troops from the Nigerian-led regional peacekeeping force (ECOMIL).[77]

The DDR model was subsequently re-designed in January 2004 with input and consultation from junior commanders of the three factions. UNMIL's leadership agreed to integrate twelve leaders from each of the factions into the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (NCDDRR).[78] The senior and junior commanders of the warring factions felt that Klein distrusted them and was trying to usurp their authority with their rank-and-file combatants in order to maintain autonomy and control

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[75] Some combatants were forcefully disarmed while others were bribed by the UN to give up their arms. (Author's personal interview with former NTGL official, Monrovia, 17 April 2012). This exercise yielded the highest weapon in-take of the entire disarmament exercise, with 10,312 weapons collected from 12,770 combatants. The ratio of 0.81 weapon per person is well above UN standards.

[76] The UN paid US$75 in crisp new US bills that had been flown specifically to Monrovia in exchange for each weapon collected as the first installment of a total demobilisation allowance of $300. (Author's personal interview with DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2013); see also 'UN warns Liberian rebel grouping', BBC, 27 December 2003.

[77] These troops (from Nigeria, Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo) were then reassigned to UNMIL. On 23 December 2003, the Advisory Committee of the UN Security Council appropriated to a Special Account for UNMIL $564, 494, 300 retroactively for the period 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004 from the UN assessed funds to pay for costs associated with the nearly collapsed peacebuilding efforts (Financial performance report for the period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004 and the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/311/90/PDF/N0531190.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 29 April 2011)

[78] While senior political and military leaders from the three factions were concentrated on political positioning within the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), junior commanders from the factions insisted on being integrated into DDRR's governance structure.

over the DDR programme.[79] After weeks of negotiating and putting a plan together for resuming DDR, the United Nations (Jacques Klein) and NCDDRR Executive Director Moses Jarbo agreed to include 16 former 'Generals' from each of the three factions in NCDDRR's governance and decision-making structure.[80] At this point, the UN was forced to concede its monopoly over the DDR process and UNMIL began to take the views of the warring factions more seriously.[81] However, the UN still insisted on controlling DDR funds themselves instead of challenging it through the NTGL or the NCDDR; as a result, Liberian authorities felt excluded.[82] The UN justified its need to control the process because of its concern that Jarbo's interests were skewed in favour of the LURD faction give his political links with them. During this initial "DD" phase, control over the process was clearly revolving within the UNDP Secretariat.[83]

Part of the new plan was to initiate a four-month sensitization campaign on 15 January 2004, which involved deploying the ex-"Generals" to their

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[79] On Jarbo being sidelined, see Moses Jarbo, 'Case study on Liberia DDRR- Who sets the agenda? paper presented at the Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 21-23 June 2005.

[80] NCDDRR archives.

[81] The rationale for this idea came from the geopolitics in Liberia. There are fifteen countries in Liberia, and the plan called for deploying one 'General' from each faction to each of the fifteen countries. There would remain three additional 'Generals' on standby in Monrovia should a replacement be needed. Additionally, each faction selected a 'coordinator'. Thus, in addition to sixteen 'Generals', each faction was organized by a senior coordinator. Roland Duo served as the former Government of Liberia coordinator. George Tarley served as senior coordinator for MODEL and Philip Kamara was LURD's senior coordinator. (Author's personal interview with former GoL commander, Monrovia, 16 April 2012).

[82] Author's confidential interviews with former high-level NCDDRR official, Monrovia, March 2012; Confirmed by Ball and Hendrickson 2005, 34. The UNDP maintained control over NCDDR funds by channeling funds through a UNDP Trust Fund as opposed to allowing the money to go through NTGL coffers.

[83] Ball and Hendrickson 2005, 19

respective strongholds in Liberia's periperhy.[84] During this period, cantonment sites were constructed throughout the country and 'Generals' from each of the three factions were transported (by UNMIL helicopters or 4x4 Landcruisers) to all 15 of Liberia's counties to communicate the benefits of disarmament to their rank-and-file.[85] Given the hierarchical command and control structure that the warring factions relied on, the presence of their 'Generals' became an absolutely necessity in order to convince the ordinary combatants to disarm. According to one of the leaders of the '48-Generals',

> The men in the field saw that their commander was telling them it was necessary to give up [their] arms; 'it is now time for peace'. If they see Roland Duo from GoL, or they see Philip Kamah from LURD, or George Tarley from MODEL, coming to you from LURD-controlled area and telling [you] 'you must disarm'. That is the system we had in place.[86]

The UN and the 48 "Generals" negotiated a salary, duration of contract and other compensation, which was not made public until now.[87] This allowed

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[84] Leaders of the factions were integrated in NCDDRR on 20 January 2004. According to the ex-Generals interviewed for this study, they were told by the UN that their services would be required for an initial three years. Their primary tasks, from mid-January-April 2004, involved deployment upcountry to their faction's regular strongholds to speak with rank-and-file combatants and sensitize them about the benefits of disarmament.

[85] For instance, Nimba is a large county so several generals from each of the factions were deployed in different parts of Nimba county (Author's confidential interview with a former 48 General Leader, 16 April 2012, Monrovia); NCDDRR archives revealed that in 2004, 3 LURD representatives and one GOL and MODEL each were deployed to Gbarnga; one representative from each of the factions was deployed to Buchanan and VOA, and four LURD, one GOL and one MODEL were deployed to Tubmanburg (see Memo from BG David Brompleh dated 21 April 2004).

[86] Author's personal interview with former GoL commander, Monrovia, 16 April 2012

[87] It was agreed that each of the Generals would be paid US$100 monthly stipend plus other material benefits, including housing provisions and access to UN vehicles. Additionally, each of the Generals were promised 3 bundles of zinc (which was not handed out until after 2008). According to an independent audit of the NCDDRR in 2006, at least 6 new Toyota pick-ups and one jeep were purchased for use of the Generals (costing $86,500US) in 2005 (see NCDDRR archives in author's possession,'IMG_0132').

the "Generals" and the Executive Director of NCDDRR to collude in numerous informal deals apparently unbeknownst to UNDP.[88]

The countrywide disarmament process resumed on 15 April 2004 and ended 14 September 2004 and a third phase commenced on 17 August 2004 after four additional cantonment sites were constructed in the southeast. The final disarmament phase ended in late November 2004 (lasting 15 months including the stop-start in December 2003).[89] Despite the initial rough start, Liberia's DD phase lasted under twelve months compared to the average length of about 16 months.[90]

Following completion of the disarmament phase, seven "former Generals" were hired as 'Reintegration and Rehabilitation Facilitators' from

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[88] As an illustration, the Executive Director of NCDDRR used line budgets as "inducement incentives", "contribution and gratuity" and "sensitization" to personally profit and maintain personal loyalties and networks. Unlike in Sierra Leone, where the World Bank created an independent and externally monitored Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU), the UNDP did not create a proper financial regulation or accountability system until later on in the process. According to an independent audit of the NCDDRR in 2006, payments totaling almost US$1 million were given to ex-generals and government officials "based on the verbal instruction from the executive director" and were "not signed by the recipients to provide evidence that these payments were made to third parties for the benefit of the commission". Out of this total, $697,554 was paid out as 'inducement incentives' and 'contribution & gratuity' and 'sensitization'. $202,620, and $100,000 was paid directly to the ED under 'administrative expenses'. These corrupt practices were conducted by the Executive Director and replicated through most of the NCDDRR bureaucracy. (Author's notes from the NCDDRR archives, see notably 'IMG_0132').

[89] The UN Advisory Committee confirmed that the DD component completed by 4 November 2004 (Teresa Krafft and Andrea Tamagnini, 'Strategic Approaches to Reintegration: Lessons Learned from Liberia', *Global Governance*, 16:1, 2010, 14)

[90] Barcelona School of Peace, ECP, Barcelona, Analysis of DDR Programmes Existing in the World in 2005, February 2006, Albert Caramés et al., 9

January 2006 until 31 December 2006.[91] Other inducements were provided to the "Generals" in the form of financial compensation and other benefits. [92]

Liberia's border regions required much greater attention than was given by UNMIL during the design and implementation phases.[93] The UN approach problematically assumed the existence of a functioning government capable of extending state authority and enforcing laws to the border regions.[94] For instance, DDR only extended to the border regions in Lofa county (a stronghold of the LURD) and Maryland in Grand Kru (held by MODEL) during the last phase of the programme.[95] These border regions are extremely isolated and challenging terrain with minimal government/UN presence.[96] The DDR process was largely ineffective in these regions due largely to the porosity of the borders

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[91] Roland Duo, George Tarley, Philip Kamara, Patrick Bowah and Jason Weni were 'senior RR facilitators' and Edward Teah and P. Abednego Zweh were 'RR facilitators' (NCDDRR archives, 'IMG_0149' in author's possession)

[92] Each "General" received financial compensation and 3 bundles of zinc. In July 2008 the NCDDRR Executive Director wrote UNDP Country Director Dominic Sam to request procurement of "3 bundles of zinc to each of the 52 former generals who facilitated the disarmament process during the early phase of the DDRR programme in October 2004".The response from UNDP was that the "issue is receiving attention and action is on course to procure the zinc for the 52 generals'. UNDP File reference ORG/DDRR/04012 dated 17 July 2008, written by Dominic Sam, Country Director to Jervis A. Witherspoon, Executive Director of NCDDRR. However, as the DD phases winded down in October 2004, their contracts with terminated by 15 December 2004, allegedly without any prior written notice. Moreover, the '48 ex-Generals' formally complained that NCDDRR/UNDP had not paid their salaries for October, November, and December 2004.

[93] Jacques Klein admitted at the time that due to Lofa and Maryland's 'impassable dirt roads', peacekeepers were unable to reach these areas until the latter stages of the DDR process.

[94] For example, on the issue of irregular combatants to be "escorted out of the country should be subject to the same disarmament requirements as nationals bearing arms" (UN 1999, 53). What if there the laws are archaic, unknown and unenforceable?

[95] UNMIL troops were supposed to be deployed to Zwedru, Maryland, River Gee, Grand Kru and parts of Sinoe County in mid-January 2004, however, this was not done until late 2004.

[96] The Lofa County/Kailahun axis in Vahun (a major trans-shipment point for weapons being sent from the RUF to Liberia). UNMIL's military presence did not extend here until about May 2005 (S/2001/1015, paras 117)

and lack of customs regulation. The UN officials that designed the DDR programme did so without a full understanding of the transnational social dynamics as well.[97]

As a result, two important implications resulted. The failure to extend DDR authority to the border regions led to an insufficient weapons collected in in the remote northwest and southeast of Liberia. Small arms and light weapons were shipped across the border into Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. For instance, only 5,000 soldiers were disarmed in Lofa County, a substandard number of weapons were collected. Participants were allowed to hand in 800,000 rounds of ammunition in exchange for a DDR identification card.[98] During the final phase of DDR in the southeast (Harper) and northwest (Lofa), disarmament numbers were very low.[99] Although the interim Liberian government (through NCDDRR) began a feeding programme for combatants in the southeast from January-April 2004 (to appease fighters), these regions were largely cut off from the rest of the country as a result of an extremely poor road network.[100] Armed members from

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[97] The Manos and the Gio's sought refuge on the Ivorian side from their close relatives, the Yacubas. The Gios/Manos and the Yacubas speak the same language, engage in daily cross-border trade and indeed also practice inter-marriage across the border. (Alhaji G.V. Kromah, 2008. Peacekeeping becomes Peace Enforcement: Geopolitical Dynamics of West African Mediation in the Liberian Civil War, 1990-1997, http://alhajikromahpage.org/alhajiecowas.htm (Accessed 26 December 2011); Svend E. Holsoe and Joseph J. Lauer, Who Are the Kran/Guere and the Gio/Yacouba? Ethnic Identifications along the Liberia-Ivory Coast Border, *African Studies Review,* 19, 1, 1976, 39-149

[98] S/2001/1015, paras 117

[99] For example, only 120 weapons were surrendered in Harper, a large area controlled by MODEL. This suggests that MODEL's weaponry was transferred across the border in western Côte d'Ivoire. (UN panel of experts report on Liberia, S/2005/360, 13 June 2005, 19) The UN panel of experts assessment in June 2005 expressed that while no arms caches were found, UN was deeply concerned about hidden arms caches and incomplete DDRR. This was one of the three benchmarks for deciding what course to take for UN sanctions, which were to be expire 21 Dec 2005.

[100] The Government and UN could have used this feeding programme to get something in exchange from the fighting forces. For instance, in exchange for the food, the leaders of the

MODEL were left largely on their own to harass civilians in urban areas such as Barclayville, Karweaken and other inaccessible rural areas.[101] Only one DDR camp was constructed in Zwedru, a large and vast territory.[102]

Conceptual Flaws
After the fact, and based on the UN's mistake of allowing "group disarmament" in Sierra Leone, the UN tried to limit commander influence. For example, about 22,000 male youths were allowed to disarm (and receive DDR benefits) as "other" combatants, despite the fact that they did not indicate an affiliation with an irregular faction. Additionally, the UN sought to encourage females who were not even combatants to "participate" in the programme to rectify what it saw as a gender imbalance in Sierra Leone's DDR programme.[103] Many unarmed combatants were accepted into the DDR by UNMIL military observers.[104]

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warring factions should have been required to provide accurate information on the number of combatants and their demographic profiles in order to start reintegration planning. Unfortunately, this opportunity was missed.

[101] One MODEL commander, General Tailey Glaydior was allegedly responsible for the harassment and required the intervention of its chairman Thomas Yaya Nimely, who had assumed the position of minister of foreign affairs in the transitional government. The reach of the DDR programme in the southeast region was extremely limited. [Letter from Moses Jarbo to UNMIL force commander General Opandi, dated 24 May 2004 (NCDDRR archives, in author's possession, *IMG_0302*)]; see also letter from Jarbo to Opandi dated 23 April 2004 (NCDDRR archives in author's possession, *IMG_0304*)

[102] Ryan Nichols, Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls, 2005, 138. The 11 sites were: Buchanan, Ganta, Gbarnga, Harper, Kakata, Scheiffelin Barracks, Tappita, Tubmanburg, VOA, Voinjama, and Zwedru.

[103] Author's interview with former NCDDRR official, Monrovia, February 2012. Sierra Leone's DDR process was criticized for excluding many women and children that did not possess a weapon but nonetheless were associated with the irregular armed groups. Many self-reintegrated with little or no assistance. This factored in to UNMIL's interpretation/definition for its eligibility criteria in a most liberal way but allowing woman and children to join the DDRR program, many of whom were non-combatants (but relatives of the commanders). Given Sierra Leone's failure to implement an inclusive eligibility criteria in practice, UNMIL (military observers) erred on the side of an overly liberal definition of who was a combatant.

[104] On 9 November 2004, the NCDDRR policy body agreed to accommodate 3,201 unarmed combatants from the former GoL, 1,367 unarmed combatants from former MODEL and 619 combatants from LURD. (NDDRR archives, NCDDRR/MCTJ/591/'04 and NCDDRR/MCTJ/593/'04 and NCDDRR/MCTJ/594/'04. According to Charles Achodo,

Cheating during the disarmament phase had knock on effects for demobilization and reintegration phases.[105] As a result of the inconsistencies applied by UNMIL military observers (MILOBS) during the screening process, the number of participants entering the disarmament was inflated significantly resulting in an overspending during the initial phase. For example, while the UN initially budgeted for 38,000 combatants, this estimate grew to 54,000 in early 2004. When the DD phase completed in late 2004, over 103, 000 "ex-combatants" disarmed. As a direct result of the overspending of disarmament, the demobilization phase was shortened from an anticipated twenty-one days to only three or four days, and the amount budgeted for each combatant was decreased from US$1400.00 to US$800.00.[106] The lack of understanding of what "demobilisation" meant in the local Liberian context led to *ad-hoc* provisions for demobilization and ultimately did not contribute to overall "reintegration".

It is clear that the UNDP dictated the key aspects of the DDR process in Liberia with only minimal consideration for the local Liberian "political marketplace".[107] The lack of sensitivity to the local context is illustrated in the UNDP's decision to provide no more than US$800 to cover youth ex-

Programme and Policy Advisor in the joint implementation unit of the UNDP, UNMIL peacekeepers applied a very loose criterion for accepting individuals ex-combatants into the programme. The Liberian DDR programme accepted anyone that disarmed with only 150 rounds of ammunition, and female and children were admitted without either.

[105] Jennings 2007

[106] HRW 2005, 53.

[107] Some studies suggest that Liberia's reintegration was successful. See Pugal (2005) and Ernest Harsch, Reintegration of ex-combatants: When war ends: transforming Africa's fighters into builders, Africa Renewal 19 (3) (2005); see also Dufka, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal legacy of West Africa's regional warriors, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17, No. 5(a), 2005, 51.

combatant's tuition fees and subsistence allowance.[108] This funding could only be provided for maximum of three years. For some former child soldiers without family support networks, returning to school would offer little strategic advantage as it was structured (since three year assistance could not even allow obtaining a high-school education). Instead, many former child combatants chose to sell their reintegration packages for cash. In other words, the real beneficiaries sold their 'reintegration' scholarships to non-combatants who wanted to acquire the means to return to school.[109] The UN was fully aware this was happening and only required the "proxies" to provide proof that the benefits were legitimately transferred with full authorization from the seller.[110]

The UN's focus on disarmament diverted attention from dismantling command structures in the former factions. One former "48 Generals" asked, "how can you expect to demobilise former combatants in seven days encampment? It's not long enough".[111] There is evidence that command structure of the factions were not dismantled during or after DDRP completed in 2009. The RAND Corporation security report, which developed the national security framework for Liberia underscores this concern in 2008 noting: "Rebel

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[108] From the archives that could be accessed, a sample of this funding demonstrates that the UNDP provided US$304,320 to fund 282 students enrolled in Cuttington University for 2005-2006 academic year; in 2006-2007, UNDP provided US$355,465 to cover 355 students. The average cost for other colleges and universities was US$550 according to UNDP figures.

[109] One informant who was a refugee in Ivory Coast explained how he benefited from the DDR 'scholarship programme' described here.

[110] There is evidence of the UN's awareness of this happening in Buchanan. According to one former government official, "the ones that were supposed to be rehabilitated never did; they sold their rights to other people."' (Author's interview with Emmanuel Bowier, Monrovia, 16 April 2012)

[111] Author's confidential Interview, Monrovia, March 2012

group structures and command chains have not been eradicated and remain a concern".[112] Additionally, a 2009 *Wikileaks* cable noted:

> The reintegration of the ex-combatants is far from complete. Former NPFL commanders Roland Duo (the only senior Taylor supporter to have testified before the TRC), Christopher 'General Mosquito' Vambo and Melvin Sogbandi (none of whom are on the sanctions lists) remain in contact with the ex-combatants, and would have the capability to organise an uprising or even criminal activity.[113]

Breaking the command and control structures proved difficult in a deplorable socio-economic context in Monrovia where ex-combatants were seen as "lumpens" and "criminals" by political leaders and civil society members.[114]

Reintegration

The UN's attention span on the reintegration component was ineffective as a result of the lack of consideration for finding meaningful opportunities for ex-combatants to "reintegrate" into. The ephemeral attitude shown to reintegration is showed by the fact that, as in Sierra Leone, the "reintegration" and "rehabilitation" elements were given token consideration by international actors. Participants over the age of 18 years of age were considered as 'adults' and were largely left on their own after they were discharged from cantonment sites.[115]

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[112] Daniel Gompert et al, Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector, Santa Monica, CA: National Defence Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2008 11.

[113] Ibid.

[114] HRW 2005; Christian Bugnion et al 2006, 12

[115] An 18-year old at the end of the war would likely have been 8 or 9 years old when they joined the war. Many children between the age of 10-15 participated in the Sierra Leonean conflict, as fighters, spies, cooks or porters throughout Sierra Leone's 11-year civil conflict. The RUF relied on Small Boys Units (SBU) for reconnaissance (investigations and surveillance), and often performed carrier (carrying luggage) and guard duties at checkpoints. SBUs were normally structured with 40 children, commanded under a more "mature" child soldier (Author's personal interview with former Liberian and Sierra Leonean child soldiers, Waterloo, 4 April 2012)

Few did consider what ten or more years of fighting might have done to the child's psychological well-being. The "rehabilitation" component of DDR was integrated on paper but never properly defined or developed in practiced.[116] Reintegration projects underway in June 2004 (when DD was still in operation) focused narrowly on economic dimensions without addressing social and psychological aspects.[117] Most alarming, the DDR programme failed to engage community and religious leaders in the process.[118] This could have made a difference in developing more robust rehabilitation assistance for children and youth.

Additionally, the skills training component was of an extremely poor quality and was executed over too short of a period. Social infrastructure was lacking and the poor economic conditions hindered the ability of the local job markets to absorb the large number of ex-fighters into meaningful livelihoods in both urban and regional peri-urban areas likes Zwedru, Voinjama and Ganta.[119] The Progress report of the Secretary-General on UNMIL stated,

> the reintegration programme has failed to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. The majority of ex-combatants are still unemployed, and thousands have regrouped for the purpose of illegally exploiting natural resources in diamond and gold mining areas, as well as on rubber plantations.[120]

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[116] Kathleen Jennings, 'The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 14:2, 2007, 204-218; UNDP final report 2009 (in author's possession)

[117] For instance, psycho-social counseling and reconciliation was not given sufficient attention and support (Christian Bugnion et al 2006, 9)

[118] Sawyer 2005, 19

[119] On a positive note, many thousands of youth in Liberia and Sierra Leone found an alternative source of employment as motorbike taxis (*Okada men* in Sierra Leone and *Pen Pen* in Liberia). Some of these *Okada men* served as "private security or as violent thugs" for Sierra Leone's two main political parties, the SLPP and APC during the 2007 elections.

[120] UNSC, *Fifteenth Progress Report*, 7

One of the major gaps of the reintegration process was the failure to break the hierarchical command structures between elite politicians and the Liberian subaltern youth. There is evidence that former warlords-turned-politicians relied on their previous wartime networks with former fighters to pursue their own political side projects. Some of the politicians in the national legislature "employed" their networks of ex-combatants to secure new administrative posts.[121] Politicians also maintained their links with militia members and local strongmen to develop commercial opportunities in Monrovia's retail and trade (such as chicken and pork production).[122] According to William Reno,

> These former wartime commanders use their businesses and influence over parts of the state bureaucracy to provide for their former fighters and manage their illicit economic networks within Liberia and to other states in West Africa and further afield as the real basis of their power.[123]

This highlights the need to not only dismand military command and control structures but also latent structures of authority between elite/politicans and subaltern ex-combatants. In Sierra Leone, the link between elite and subaltern male youth has long been a prominent feature in Sierra Leone's colonial and post-colonial politics.[124] Politicians in both Sierra Leone and Liberia have used

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[121] William Reno, 'Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are They Aimed at the Right Targets?', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:3, 2008, 396

[122] W Reno 2008, 392

[123] Ibid., 397

[124] Jimmy Kandeh 1999, 358-361; Victor Minkin, 'Indirect Political Participation in Two Sierra Leone Chiefdoms', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11: 1, 1973, 29-135; Roger Tangri, 'Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone Chiefdoms', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:2, 1976, 311-321.

ex-combatants as electioneering "assets" during the respective elections in 2007

and 2011.[125] According to Maya Christensen and Mats Utas,

> For hundreds of ex-combatants who decided to remobilise, their future expectations proved to be the most significant motivating factor. . . . When deciding whether to join politicians' campaigns, it was the promise of jobs, further education[,] and other long-term benefits that had the most powerful appeal. At initial meetings, both presidential candidates promised ex-combatants that they would give them work after the election.[126]

UNMIL 'purchasing loyalty'

Similar to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the United Nations mission (UNMIL)

was the main employer for the first few years of "peace" in "post-conflict"

Liberia. Educated and skilled professionals along with a handful of astute former

irregular commanders[127] were hired in administrative and field-based projects

funded through the DDRR programme. For example, many of the Liberian

NCDDRR staff were on UNDP's payroll, receiving salaries ranging from

US$3,500 to $1,680 a month for the Executive Director to US$1,480 per month

paid to the deputy executive director (operations) and deputy executive director

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[125] Mariam Persson, 'The Logic of Staying Mobilised—Liberian Ex-combatants and the 2011 Elections'*, Guest post on Mats Utas' online blog*, 10 September 2012, http://matsutas.wordpress.com/2012/09/10/the-logic-of-staying-mobil…ex-combatants-and-the-2011-elections-guest-post-by-mariam-persson/; Maya M. Christensen and Mats Utas, 'Mercenaries of Democracy: The 'Politricks' of Remobilised Combatants in the 2007 Elections, Sierra Leone', *African Affairs*, 107: 429, 2008, 515-539; Mats Utas, 'The Rewards of Political Violence: Remobilising Ex-Combatants in Post-war Sierra Leone*,* in Small Arms Survey, in *Gangs, Groups and Guns,* Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010, 266

[126] Christensen and Utas 2008, 528

[127] For instance, David Brompleh, who had fought in Sierra Leone for years (initially as a senior commander in ULIMO, then Special Task Force, then LURD) was brought on by Moses Jarbo to assist with reintegration efforts. He was later hired as a regional officer in NCDDR and received a monthly salary of $500 from UNDP payroll.

(Administration).[128] Additionally, many Liberians were hired as county field officers or field officers (paid between US$300-$250/month). These salaries were far in excess of what the Government of Liberia could pay its civil servants.[129] While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider all of the economic benefits of hiring national staff by the UN, it is important to recognize that UN injection of funds had positive and negative effects on the local economy. What is important is to acknowledge how the UN alters economic conditions in the local context through its presence and deployment of financial capital. This consideration rarely is acknowledged until the last moment when UN peacekeepers are about to withdraw from the country.[130]

As far as DDR is concerned in the particular cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, an excessive focus on disarmament as rapidly as possible diverted attention and resources away to help meet the immediate needs of the disabled and war-wounded.[131] The UN's own bureaucratic imperatives and its excessive

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[128] A mid-level project secretary received a monthly salary of US$800. A senior project manager was paid $3,500 a month, while a Director received US$1,680 monthly. A project financier made US$3,000 per month. At the lower-end of the scale, an NCDDRR drivers made between US$125-$150 per month. (UNMIL archives, see IMG_0126 in author's possession)

[129] For instance, a civil service employee in the Liberian government made about $15/month during this time.

[130] Some scholars argue that hiring local staff is an effective way to inject funds into the local economy, while others argue that peacekeeping missions drain the best administrative staff from the public sector at rates far in excess of what the national government or private sector can afford. For a naively positive account, see Michael Carnahan, William Durch and Scott Gilmore, 'Economic Impact of Peacekeeping', Final Report, Peace Dividend Trust and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006, 28-38. The negative contributions of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa are understudied. For such a study, one should focus on a balanced perspective assessing the economic and social costs and benefits, factoring in things like increases in the inflated cost of living and inflation as a direct consequence of UN presence as well as the social costs such as prostitution and aid dependency.

[131] Funds were rarely forthcoming to these groups unless they made "noise". For instance, a group of 233 handicapped ex-combatants from Charles Taylor's former 'faction' occupied the headquarters of the National Patriotic Party (NPP) office on 3rd street Sinkor from May 2006 to October 2006. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to appease this group, the NCDDRR

reliance on generalised blueprints (manuals and procedures) foreclosed other avenues to integrate local knowledge into the process in search of alternative approaches that could suit the unique dynamics of Sierra Leonean and Liberian societies. In the absence of a radical turnaround of the economic, DDR programmes are unlikely to make a meaningful impact on improving the livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants. No amount of short-term, labor-intensive work projects will compensate for a comprehensive economic recovery programme that can guarantee jobs for those with skills.[132] At the same time, an exclusive focus on ex-fighters disadvantages the general youth cohort by allocating a disproportionate amount of assistance on the participants of war as opposed to the non-participants. Additionally, the UN needs to ensure that sufficient resources and attention be focused on "reintegration" component and

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stepped in and provided a 1,800LD (approx. US$25) reinsertion benefit for 'rental assistance' for a period of six months to help them resettle. However, these funds were required to be transferred into a local bank account, which few of the disabled ex-fighters had.

[132] A UK House of Commons report noted in 2006 "our experience in Sierra Leone presents a good example of how this reintegration aspect of DDR is often neglected by donors. Apart from a one-off payment in cash or kind, there is not much emphasis on long-term projects to create employment for those who might otherwise pick up or return to arms. In Sierra Leone we saw first hand the large number of unemployed young men with few job prospects. Much of what we heard during our visit convinced us that one of the most significant issues facing Sierra Leone, one with the potential to contribute to future conflict, is youth unemployment. We heard that donors had invested in skills-building programmes for young people (carpentry, brick- laying etc.) without giving sufficient thought to the availability of jobs for those who have undertaken such training. It seems clear that donors in Sierra Leone now need to give priority to employment-generation initiatives, including agricultural schemes, to provide an incentive for rural-urban migrants to return to rural areas. This will mean simultaneously tackling some of the local governance grievances that have led to discontent in rural areas. At present a substantial proportion of unemployed young men are tempted to try their luck in the diamond mines, rather than invest their energies in gaining more secure, longer-term employment. It may not be appropriate for DFID to engage in this area directly, but as the largest donor in Sierra Leone, the Department ought to provide a lead for other agencies by highlighting the issue and encouraging others to increase their focus on the issue." (UK House of Commons International Development Committee, Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, sixth report of session 2005-2006, Vol. 1, 2006, 43)

guarantee better quality training and greater access to self-help opportunities are incorporated in DDR.[133]

DDR in Sierra Leone and Liberia were half-measures that succeeded in collecting a sub-standard percentage of the weapons only to reintegrate the youth cohort, collectively as a whole, into the same socio-economic conditions that created grievances for insurgency in the first place. To effectively conduct DDR requires an understanding of the rebel groups' command structure, and the social background of its rank-and-file (provision for different categories of 'combatants').[134] Reintegration planning was made difficult because it was based on flawed information from the start.[135] Reintegration programmes must also take into greater consideration the African political marketplace, hierarchies and command and control structures in irregular armed groups and the social background of fighters,

Post-war DDR planners should separate the political from the social dimensions and ensure sufficient and sustained investment in the job creation

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[133] A UNDP evaluation assessment concludes that "the reintegration phase was done largely on the basis of ad hoc decisions, looking essentially at economic reintegration as a quick intermediary transitional measure, designed to buy peace, rather than as a comprehensive reintegration measure."(Bugnion et al 2006, 10-11)

[134] In Liberia, planning figures were based on Sierra Leone's DDR process as well as the country's failed disarmament process from 1994-1997.(James Pugel, Measuring Reintegrating in Liberia: Assessing the Gap Between Outputs and Outcomes, in Robert Muggah (ed.) *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, London: Routledge 2009)

[135] For instance, subsequent social research on ex-combatants in Liberia revealed that 29% of fighters were women, 4% were children (under 18 years). In terms of regional affiliations, 52% of ex-fighters were from Monrovia area, while 12% were from Lofa County, 9% from Nimba, 7% from Bomi, 6% from Bong and 1-3% from the remaining counties. About 40% of fighters had never gone to school. Out of those fighters with some education, 28% had been in elementary school before the war, while 17% were in junior highschool, 11% in senior highschool, and 1% were in university. Based on a survey of post-war activities, 41% wanted to be trained in a vocational trade, while 28% opted to further their education after the war. Surprisingly, 23% did not opt for any specific type of assistance.

and social reintegration. Addressing some of the root causes of insecurity—lack of socio-economic opportunities for the majority of youth by targeted investments in local job markets outside of the neoliberal economic framework—could have eliminated the need for robust long-term UN peacekeeping presence throughout Liberia. Directing the nearly $1 billion in resources from UN peacekeeping towards generating jobs in the local economy could have perhaps gone a long way in addressing Liberia's insecurity. Marginalising input and participation especially religious leaders and local leaders severely hindered the reintegration of thousands of youth combatants.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show the disconnections between the macro UN blueprints and micro-level problems associated with using "DDR" as an instrument for peacebuilding. Examining specific United Nations "DDR" practices in Liberia and Sierra Leone reveals that these interventions were embedded within this macro-peacebuilding approach that was oriented for short-term problem-solving to rush through disarmament and a superficial engagement with more problematic socio-economic developmental challenges such as reintegrating youth and ex-combatants into communities. The UN blueprint approach fails to understand local considerations, including the political economy, power dynamics and underestimates the role of agency of senior and junior-level factional leaders in shaping local implementation.

The vision for DDR was largely shaped and conditioned by dominant external actors from the UN and World Bank. However, this chapter has demonstrated how local agency played an important role during implementation, a consideration that is often overlooked in UN assessment studies. The UN and World Bank focused on material incentives to incentivise "negative peace" among factional leaders without considering what impact this would have on the desparately poor socio-economically space.[136] The cash incentive provided to ex-fighters equated to little more than a "buy-off" and created a perception that the UN blueprint could be manipulated for local personal gain. The short-term materialist and economically reductionist underpinnings of the UN DDR blueprint approach failed to consider the deeper meanings and reasons why marginalised individuals take up arms and ignored the fact that these individuals were the victims of a social system that had inflicted structural violence on them before the war. The assumption that these fighters can be "bought off" with short-term cash reduces the causes of violence to narrow economic self-interest without recognising that these youth were victims of structural violence that has become embedded within society by the post-colonial state. The power-sharing provisions in the CPA and the integration of senior and junior commanders empowered military leaders to redistribute resources to benefit particular groups over others. Many Liberian and Sierra Leoneans (including commanders and the political and economic elite) viewed the DDR programme as a short-term "money-making" scheme that could be manipulated by UN authorities with

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[136] The World Bank and UN are not the only actors to blame. ECOMOG also operated in this socio-economic space as well.

extremely limited knowledge of the local context.[137] This exercise of local authority extended not only to commanders but also members of the political elite who allegedly used UNDP DDR funds to send their children or relatives to study in tertiary institutions abroad.[138]

The obsessive focus on disarmament within the context of the broader international strategy diverted attention away from the general youth cohort's demands for citizenship and access to socio-economic opportuntiies. Taking youth's claims for citizenship seriously would have required the opening of possibilities and social interventions that emphasise and seek to sustain "rehabilitation" and psycho-social healing upstream at the origins of the transition. The question of what "structures" the youth would "reintegrate" into after war was not given sufficient consideration. Many of the youth combatants that received tools and other forms of short-term and poor quality training were "reintegrated" into the very structures of violence and material conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

In terms of contemporary DDR programmes within the context of the UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), it is not clear how the standardisation or "professionalisation" of UN blueprint DDR models moves beyond the "New York Consensus" and heavily

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[137] Jennings's (2009) research on ex-combatants confirms that DDR was perceived as "free benefits for the willing".

[138] Additionally, some local teachers and school principals were siphoning funds from ex-combatants' monthly stipends. Participants registered in a reintegration component were to receive a monthly stipend of US$30 in the first year, US$15 per month in the second-year and nothing in the third year. Jennings (2007, 210) identifies this as an allegation. This was confirmed during my archival research. For instance, the principal of W.V.S. Tubman High School was accused of skimming of US$2 from each of the student's US$30 monthly subsistence allowance by the UNDP in May 2005 (NCDDRR archives in author's possession).

bureacratised contraints imposed upon DDR and how so-called "second generation" approaches will lead to more effective approaches on the ground that meet the immediate needs of war affected societies. The UN DDR models developed in New York tend to over-write local input and preclude the possibility of alternatives. The "professionalisation" of UN DDR programmess has taken for granted the need for more localised and context-specific approaches that ensure appropriate contacts are made by local parties commited to broad-based development instead of relying on failed practices and superficial "buy-in" arrangements that privilege certain local power-brokers and preserve elitist politics. The point I am making is the UN system must be capable of identifying a process for integrating and engaging local authorities (such as local political and religious leaders) and youth into their programming to build more inclusive power-sharing arrangements beyond powerful and violent actors.

Additional assumptions informing the UN's approach to DDR during peacebuilding are problematic. Such problematic assumptions lead the UN to develop plans based on idealised notions of foreign capital as a solution to the complicated problems of ex-fighter reintegration. More attention should be made to question how granting legitimacy to certain leaders and commanders impact on the quality of these programmes and which groups are disadvantaged and marginalised (including the general youth cohort and other war-affected and non-combatant populations).

Finally, DDR should not an excuse for African governments to outscore the provisioning of social assistance to ex-combatants and demobilised soldiers.

Greater attention and investment needs to be made in terms of socio-economic development and bottom-up social programmes including quality vocational training, informal education and literacy training to help facilitate reintegration for the general youth cohort as opposed to "ex-combatants" and those controlling the means of violence.

Next, I examine Britain's return to Sierra Leone and its entrenched "statebuilding" role Sierra Leone's security forces.

Chapter 5
Sierra Leone: Post-war Security Sector and Military Reform (2001-2012)

Introduction

This chapter examines Britain's role as the "lead state" in Sierra Leone's security sector reform practices during the war-peace transition (1999-2012) to understand how specific police and military reforms were envisioned and implemented.[1] Britain's police and military reform approach can be characterized as incremental, experimental and ad-hoc during the initial phases (1998-2001). Britain's approach evolved into a more entrenched role from 2002-2012. The objective was to rebuild security forces capable of providing security to citizens. However, the outcome was a superficial restructuring and reconsolidating an institutional status quo.

Previous studies have researched how the UK pioneered SSR work in Sierra Leone, highlighting how DfID adopted a traditional security framework based on improvised reforms and "post-hoc rationalisations" and concludes that the UK's commitment to SSR was "extremely weak".[2] However, Jackson and Albrecht's rich empirical study leaves the reader without a clear sense of the relevance of the Sierra Leonean experience to similar processes elsewhere. What is missing in the debate about the effectiveness of SSR in Sierra Leone is a comparison across cases and a theoretical perspective that views local agency as central to the debate on peacebuilding.

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[1] There are other areas in SSR that are not discussed in this dissertation, but that are nonetheless relevant and crucial to broader issues of African post-conflict security. These areas relate to judicial and justice sector reform, intelligence, immigration, and penal reform.

[2] Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht, *Reconstructing Security After Conflict: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011

Britain's SSR approach in Sierra Leone focused on the executive and administrative-bureaucratic dimensions of the state's political and military infrastructure while also relying on the support of traditional chieftain authorities to assist the British to re-establish a modern state that was broadly legitimate.

This chapter highlights how SSR practices in Sierra Leone were part of a complex political process as opposed to a set of technical/administrative arrangements as the statebuilding reform literature implies. The British-led reform process involved several transmission mechanisms to influence, shape and manage Sierra Leone's postwar military reform process. The British were able to set the tempo of the relationship by holding executive authority over far-reaching decisions related to dismissals, promotions and budgetary issues.

Additionally, specific practices are examined to shed light on dynamics and power relations between external and internal actors, and the role of structure and agency during peacebuilding processes. In particular, Sierra Leone's military reintegration, demobilization, and *Operation Pebu* are used to illustrate how structure and agency impact on the effectiveness of specific projects on the ground.

In my view, the focus on "top-down" peacebuilding foreclosed alternative approaches and limited opportunities for broad-based social transformation of the Sierra Leone army. The "liberal peace"—as expressed

through the OECD's SSR principles—became a "disguise for non-consensual intervention" and created a military that is dependent on external actors.[3]

British "led state" role in Sierra Leone: 2002-2007

This section introduces Britain's lead role in post-conflict Sierra Leone (see also Chapter 5 and 7). Once the question of Executive political leadership was addressed in the 2002 elections, Britain intensified its efforts to influence the statebuilding process through capacity building programmes in partnership with local actors.

One of the key differences between post-war military reforms in Sierra Leone and Liberia was the degree of "lead state" entrenchment in the domestic institutions of the "post-conflict" state. At the end of 2002, the British government and the Government of Sierra Leone had signed an unprecedented 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) committing both parties to a series of reforms up to 2012. This sustained commitment helps to explain why Sierra Leonean security forces were able to take primary responsibility for security from UNAMSIL in September 2004. Additionally, the reformed security institutions were able to provide security during July 2007 elections held throughout the country. Key to understanding the support provided to Sierra Leone's security sector reform process was the United Kingdom's understanding of the root causes of the collapse of Sierra Leone's peace processes (from 1996-1999) and the fact that the international community's (primarily Britain) had failed to address systemic problems within Sierra Leone's security sector, in

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[3] Richmond 2008, 150; Jackson and Albrecht 2011

particular, the military's role in sustaining violent conflict throughout the late 1990s.[4]

There were mixed views about Britain returning to Sierra Leone to assist in the post-war reform process. Some academic analysts viewed Britain's role as a return to its former colonial role as *mission civilisatrice*.[5] Others observers suggest that Sierra Leoneans embraced Britain's return was indicative of the lack of legitimacy of the political class and the need for sustained external oversight and regulation.[6] Britain would have preferred that Nigerian-led ECOMOG play the role as guardian of the peace process.[7] However, as former colonial power and lead state in the International Contact Group, President Kabbah and Sierra Leoneans unexpectedly turned to Britain to play a leadership role after the civil war ended.[8]

UK Policy –from piecemeal projects to statebuilding
The UK's development policy underwent some significant shifts during the Labour Party's initial years in office from 1997-2000. First of all, the Overseas

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[4] Hendrickson, Reframing the SSR debate, 2009, 8 (available at ssrnetwork.net)

[5] BBC Newsnight, 'Can Britain lift Sierra Leone Out Of Poverty?'; John Pilger, 'Britain is Recolonising Sierra Leone in an Attempt to get its hands on the country's diamonds' *New Statesman*, 18 September 2000; Chukwu-Emeka PF Chikezie, 'The ICG's ropey Solution for Sierra Leone' *Focus on Sierra Leone,* ND, http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk/Ropey_ICG_Report.htm

[6] When asked about the irony that Sierra Leoneans were keen to have Britain return to their former colony after the war, Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair explained 'what they [Sierra Leoneans] are prepared to do…is to acknowledge, that in order to make their country what they want it to be, they are at a point in their history where they need help. And they're smart enough to realise that and to get that help'. (Allan Little, Can Britain lift Sierra Leone out of poverty? BBC News Night, 23 June 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8754659.stm)

[7] Paul D. Williams, 'Fighting for Freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone', *Contemporary Security Policy,* 22:3, 2001, 154

[8] Paul Williams citing a press statement on 'Britain's role in Sierra Leone', broadcast on 19 May 2000, Blair argued that as the former colonial power Britain had 'historic responsibilities' to Sierra Leone (ft. 70).

Development Agency was transformed into a separate ministry (from the Foreign Commonwealth Office) and named the Department for International Development (DfID). At the time, British experts were in the process of reconsidering their foreign assistance in light of the development-security nexus. Previously, US development assistance was project-based. In the late 1990s, DfID began to articular a development-security approach with an explicit statebuilding and institution-building mandate in an effort to deal with the challenges of peace and conflict in Africa. This approach was informed by an emphasis on on state security, rule of law, and as a precondition for justice and economic development.[9] This shift in policy aimed to move from piecemeal project aid to support local and international NGOs to a re-directed approach aimed to improve state capacity functions in select countries in the global South.[10] Paul D. Williams points out that Minister Short argued that short-term projects in the past were ineffective and would continue to be in the future in the absence of competent states to manage and mediate the development process.[11] This decision was also partially informed by long-standing concerns for human rights and democracy in British foreign policy and an effort to rectify what DfID viewed as Africa's "democratic deficit". The basic underlying assumption was

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[9] DfID policy paper 2009, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON64.pdf (Assessed 30 June 2011).

[10] In its recent past, British foreign aid policy towards Africa had focused on assisting specific projects—such as building schools or hospitals—and partnered with international and local NGOs. Secretary of State Short was known for frequently criticizing NGOs as being "unelected and economically illiterate whingers" (Short Change, *The Economist,* 31 October 2002 (http://www.economist.com/node/1416473)

[11] Clare Short argued that "it is pointless, pouring money into a local project in a state that is going the wrong way…Let's stop using aid for nice well-meaning projects and let's use it to create a competent state" (Cited in Paul Williams 2005, 88).

that without security and democratic governance, sustainable economic development and social justice would never be acheivable.

In Sierra Leone, the Labour Party's new DfID minister, Clare Short, wanted to focus a "few years" on rebuilding capacities of the state, supporting progress in security through reform of state security institutions. In 1999, Clare Short made a strong case for improving professionalization of formal security institutions as the bulwarks for conflict prevention in Africa:

> There was a whole issue of conflict in Africa. We were in that phase after the Cold War where there was a massive growth in conflict within and between countries, causing enormous suffering and preventing development.[12]

Clare Short recalls how this new UK position on statebuilding informed DfID's approach to post-conflict Sierra Leone in the late 1990s: "We are trying to build the state and it doesn't have any armed forces, so that was the obvious role for the British then, to help train the new Sierra Leonean army".[13] Critics within DfID viewed this approach as risky and could potentially exacerbate the dysfunctionality of the African state.[14]

British aid policy hifted towards helping to build "competent states" through a range of mechanisms including channeling funds directly through African treasuries and finance ministries.[15] British academic Paul D. Williams, who reviewed Labour foreign policy during Tony Blair's rule (1997-2005)

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[12] Jackson et al 2009, 81

[13] Clare Short interview, cited Jackson et al 2009, p. 80.

[14] Two DfID workers in Africa were quoted as saying, "A very high proportion of aid budgets is now going to an instrument that is not yet proven…" and "You're putting your money into a very leaky bucket." (Short Change, 20002).

[15] Short Change, The Economist, 31 October 2002. http://www.economist.com/node/1416473 (Assessed 28 June 2011).

argues that the shift in development policy to statebuilding was influenced largely by Clare Short herself, her vision and the numerous personal initiatives she engaged in, particularly in Africa.[16] Short promoted a "different approach to foreign aid" that was "part of the process of building modern, effective states".[17] The Labour government effectively increased its allocation of aid to Africa in the late 1990s.[18] The British government also sought to create long-term developmental assistance agreements with several allied African states (some though not exclusively their former colonies)—and provided direct budgetary support to strengthen their state capacity to deliver poverty reduction programmes.[19] Under the British Labour government, the bulk of its development assistance was directed towards statebuilding initiatives.[20]

In practice, this meant that international donors provided the bulk of aid to support the Government of Sierra Leone to conduct its internal affairs.[21] This assistance came with notable strings attached. For instance, aid was to be conditional upon meeting certain benchmarks on "progress";, financial aid to the Government of Sierra Leone came with mandatory "advisors" that would be

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[16] Paul D. Williams, *British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2005*, London: Palgrave, 2005

[17] Ibid

[18] In 1996-97, for example, £4.5m of DFID's Africa budget was unallocated. In 2000-01, that rose to £18m (Ibid).

[19] These include Uganda, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Ghana, with Rwanda being an exception. In 2002, for instance, the British government financed nearly half of President Yoweri Museveni's Government of Uganda. the British government (DfID) had bankrolled about a quarter of Mozambican Government's budget in 2002

[20] Limited finanicla assistance was provided NGOs with only short-term emergency projects, however.

[21] In 2005, 45% of the government's budget came from foreign aid. According to other sources, the dependency on aid was much higher. According to J. Andrew Grant, over 70% of Sierra Leone's budget came from foreign sources in 2005. By 2009, external donors still provided 12% of GDP and about 45% of the government's budget according to one estimate (More Power in Sierra Leone, Africa Confidential, 9 October 2009, Vol. 50, No. 2, 4)

embedded within a range of formal government ministries and institutions in order to monitor finances and work in "partnership" with local technocrats and authorities. The British government could assume a more entrenched role in assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to execute policymaking functions in collaboration with African partners. Similar to other African countries deemed strategic in DfID's new agenda, the UK government signed a long-term development agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone following the democractic election of President Tejan Kabbah in May 2002. This "Memorandum of Understanding" outlined the basic framework for the UK's development and security assistance to Sierra Leone for the early war-peace transition phase.

MoU (2002-2012): A Framework for Peacebuilding?
The memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in November 2002 but came into effect in January 2003. From a UK perspective, the MoU became a guiding framework to organize British development-security assistance to post-conflict Sierra Leone.[22] The MoU was unprecedented for its radical departure from the UK government's traditional three-year development funding cycles.[23]

The MoU was a UK-led initiative. The initial idea originated during an inter-ministerial meeting in London in June 2002. The agreement was structured around a set of priorities and theoretically based on the Government of Sierra Leone' performance in addressing the alleged "causes of conflict". The key priorities outlined in the MoU were reducing poverty, improving governance of

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[22] Paul Balogun and Lansana Gberie, Assessing the performance of the long-term partnership agreement (MoU) between the Governments of Sierra Leone and UK, August 2005
[23] Nicole Ball 1998

the central and local government (primarily public expenditure management, effective regulation of the diamond industry and implementing international macro-economic management practices), encouraging media reform, rebuilding police and armed forces and combating state corruption.[24] The UK government agreed to commit £120 million per annum for the initial three-year period (2003-2006).[25] The original MoU stated:

> So long as the Government of Sierra Leone remains on track in implementing its strategy to reduce the causes of conflict and poverty, and improve standards of governance, the UK Government will commit itself to maintaining a substantial direct development programme to Sierra Leone over the next ten years. This will be maintained at least at the level of current expenditure, thereby providing a total of at least £120 million of assistance over the next three years.[26]

The bulk of the funding would be in the form of direct budgetary support, in order to provide "the Government of Sierra Leone flexibility to allocate funds in line with its own set priorities." The relationship between the UK Government and Tejan Kabbah's administration was facilitated from the top-down at the executive level in both countries, in particular, between the Vice President of Sierra Leone and the Financial Secretary within the Government of Sierra Leone and DfID's Head in Sierra Leone and the Secretary of State.

Below the level of executive branch, the MoU framework provided political access for Britain to assume *de facto* advisory roles directly with the Executive Branch of the Government of Sierra Leone. For instance, the British

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[24] Jimmy Kandeh, 'Intervention and Peacebuilding: A Critical Perspective', in Tunde Zack-Williams (ed.) When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 98

[25] Michael Kargbo, 'International Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: The Case of the United Kingdom,' in Tunde Zack-Williams (ed.) When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 69.

[26] MoU, paragraph 3.2

military officer responsible for commanding the British Miltiary Assistance Training Team (BMATT, later IMATT) served as the *Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone* (MAGOSL). This ensured that Britain could dictate national security policy and sidestep all senior Sierra Leonean security officials.

The UK could also shape local governance by restoring traditional institutions (to extended central authority in the periphery) within the ideal-type nation-state framework. Britain contracted a former colonial administrator responsible for setting up relations between the colonial state and local chiefdom authorities to this end. An additional level below enabled Britain to embed "advisors" in various post-war state security and economic institutions (see below).

UK support was coordinated through a "joined-up" approach that involved development, military, police and diplomatic activities conducted by four Governmental departments. These activities have been coordinated through the Cabinet Office and were funded through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (later Global Conflict Prevention Pool). DfID funded activities on civilian control of the security sector, demobilization packages for ex-soldiers, and the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT).

The British perceived Sierra Leone as ripe ground for developing and experimenting the New Labour's "new doctrine" for international intervention and its nascent "cross-departmental" and "jointed-up" approaches to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and SSR.[27] Sierra Leone in particular was

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[27] Jennifer Sugden, 'Security Sector Reform: The Role of Epistemic Communities in the UK', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 4:4, 2006, Chris Smith, 'Security Sector Reform:

chosen as a "test case" because the stakes were less than in more strategic areas for British policy and since its policymaking in the country was comparatively less controversial than in other parts of the world.[28] Measures were initially ad hoc and experimental in nature, which involved applying the "security-first" approach to peacebuilding.[29] The intervention evolved in 2002 to a more entrenched "liberal peace" statebuilding approach, which combined development, diplomacy and defence.[30] The African Conflict Prevention Pool was created in 2001, which aimed to coordinate a joint initiative involving the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) and DfID to enhance cross-departmental coordination.[31] The funding pool was created as a result of the British government's inter-department assessment on the causes of violence and strategies for conflict prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa.[32] The UK's first strategy on conflict prevention in Africa was devised in

Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?; *Conflict, Security and Development*, 1:1, 11; Comfort Ero, 'A Critical Assessment of Britain's Africa Policy', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 1:2, 2001, 51-71

[28] Comfort Ero, 'A Critical Assessment of Britain's Africa Policy', 2001, 55

[29] The 'security-first' approach emphasised attaining physical security through SSR initatives as a precondition for stability and future development efforts. See ICG 2002; Ero 2001, 56)

[30] DfID worked with FCO, MoD and the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit sought to develop an integrated approach that "combines development programs with diplomatic engagement and security interventions. The common goal is to reduce the risk of state crises" (Hiliary Benn, The development challenge in crisis states, Speech by the Right Honourable Hilary Benn, MP, London School of Economics, 2004, 3).

[31] The ACPP has "principally been seen as a catalyst to ensure coherence and effectiveness of UK intervention" (DfID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, 2). The UK's Defense Advisory Team (DAC) is the lead for devising strategy for the GCPP and ACPP. The DAT includes a DfID governance advisor, a police and justice advisor and an intelligence reform advisor. The UK has funded research and policy on SSR, including its Global Facilitation Network SSR (www.gfn-ssr.org)- funded by the SSR strategy (Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), Security Sector Reform Strategy, 2004-2005, UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DfID, 2004, 7)

[32] UK 'Causes of Conflict in Africa', October 2001.

October 2001, which sought to address "long-term structural causes of conflict and the management of regional and national tension and violence".[33]

The ACPP had three principle objectives:
• Support the building of African conflict management capacity; • Conflict prevention, management and support of post-conflict reconstruction in a number of priority sub-regions and country conflicts; • Support pan-African efforts at security sector reform, small arms control and address the economic and financial causes of conflict;

Despite Sierra Leone's relative lack of importance to Britain's global strategic interests, Britain's Labour Party believed its international credibility was intimately tied to achieving "success" in Sierra Leone.[34] Sierra Leone therefore received the bulk of attention and funding from the ACPP's from 2001-2004. However, the "hands-on", face-to-face relationship was hindered by the fact that DfID did not establish its country offices in Freetown until 2005. This adversely affected DfID's ability to develop "partnerships" and foster "local ownership" during the MoU's first three years of implementation (See below *Operation Pebu* case study*)*.

The foundation for President Kabbah's government policy (from 2002-2007) was built embracing neoliberal state reforms advocated by the International Financial Institutions (IFI's), the British and US Governments. Sierra Leone's post-conflict transition was linked with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) blueprint. PRSP "consultations" were carried out "countrywide" in Sierra Leone and the Government developed the final

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[33] Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, The UK Sub-Saharan Sstrategy for Conflict Prevention, October 2001, 1. A revised strategy was published in 2004
[34] Ero 2001, 56

document in May 2005.[35] The World Bank and IMF were particularly concerned about the impact of high-level corruption on state reforms and prioritised public management of state resources (particularly in its mineral sector). In the context of the PRSP, security was conceptualised as both a public good and as a developmental issue – thus reinforcing the link between the security sector and the country's developmental aspirations.[36] The UK invested heavily in the "Security and Governance" pillar of the PRSP through its bilateral aid programme with Sierra Leone.[37] However, the report was considered an "adequate framework" for addressing poverty and mitigating corruption according to the World Bank.[38]

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[35] The draft document was developed by various Sierra Leonean government ministry technocrats, mostly in the Ministry of Finance in partnership with the World Bank and IMF. Subsequent drafts were then circulated through the chains of command in international and domestic arenas (Author's personal interview with a senior Ministry of Finance authority involved in the process, Freetown, December 2011).

[36] Sierra Leone's Poverty Reduction Strategy outlined three major pillars. The PRSP's first pillar states "good governance, consolidated peace and a strengthened security sector are key elements of the enabling environment for delivery of services for attainment of food security, creation of employment opportunities, human development and economic growth". Pillar II focused on "pro-poor, sustainable economic growth, food security and job creation"; pillar III emphasised human resource development. The first three years of the programme cost US$1.7 billion.

[37] DfID defines 'governance' as "how institutions, rules and systems of the state—executive, legislative, judiciary and military—operate at central and local levels and how the state relates to individual citizens, civil society and the private sector" (DfID, Making Government Work for the Poor: Building State Capability, London: DfID, 2001, 11). UNDP, which has been assisting UK efforts in post-war Sierra Leone defines governance as "the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels" (UNDP, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, New York: UNDP, 1997)

[38] World Bank, Sierra Leone: Joint IDA-IMF Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 13 April 2005

Wider Governance Reforms: British Efforts to Migitate Corruption in Sierra Leone

The mitigation of high-level corruption in the Sierra Leonean state was a major priority of British policy in postwar Sierra Leone. The British government was instrumental in establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 1999-2000. Funded primarily by DfID and staffed initially by a British deputy Commission and DfID experts, British involvement in fighting state corruption was largely ineffective during Kabbah's second term (2002-2007). From 2000 to June 2005, a total of £5.54 million was allocated from the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) to support Sierra Leone's Anti-Corruption Commission efforts.

However, during this period (until mid-2006), the ACC had not conducted a single high-level prosecution.[39] Kabbah's Government was astute in adopting partial reform measures and "delivering just enough in order to give the illusion of compliance".[40] One clear example was the Government's lack of will to keep its commitments to mitigate elite corruption in the state administration.[41] The reason for this was the Anti-Corruption Commission Act lacked robust powers to effectively combat and deter high-level state officials. The root cause was the constitutional powers conferred on the President allowed him to appoint

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[39] UNIOSIL, April 2006, 6. By November 2006, a few higher-profile cases involving senior civil servants and parliamentarians' cases were forward to the Attorney General for prosecution (UNIOSIL report, 28 November 2006, 3)

[40] Ian Taylor, 'What Fit for the Liberal Peace', 2006, 562

[41] In 2007, DfID refused to renew its funding for the Anti-Corruption Commission after the government failed to pursue investigation of high-level government officials. UK funding for the ACC dropped significantly in 2007 (Le 1, 419,542,037 in 2005, Le 1,174,333,108 in 2006 and only Le 600,000,000 in 2007 and Le 215,299,950 in 2008; all figures in Leones). (Kargbo 2012, 84). British experts pulled their experts from the ACC in 2007.

the Attorney General, who was the authority responsible for making recommendations on individuals to prosecute.[42] The UK problematically assumed that Executive branch would have an interest in implementing expansive anti-corruption measures. On later did Britain and the Sierra Leonean government agree to substitute the constitutional powers of the Attorney General with a DfID 3-person fiat, comprising two DfID prosecutors and one representative from the Attorney General's Office to decide on which corruption cases should be sent to trial.[43] This agreement was a half-measure to position a British citizen to head the Anti-Corruption Commission as ACC Commissioner. This was a hard pill to swallow for the Executive leadership as well as the Sierra Leone Parliament. According to Tejan Kabbah,

> Relations between the ACC and the local DfID office deteriorated significantly after the Sierra Leone parliament refused to approve the extension of the appointment of the ACC Commissioner for a second term. A new Commission was subsequently appointed. The new Chief, who had been a University Law Professor and a renowed Supreme Court Judge, adopted a more independent stance from that of his predecessor in terms of reporting to DfID, or even to my government. DfID immediately challenged the new Commissioner's strategy for the ACC.[44]

Kabbah's lack of commitment to weed out corruption from the start was responsible for his administrations' soured relations with the British. According to Sorie Fofana, a former Information Attaché at the Sierra Leone embassy in London observed,

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[42] The Act (2000) required all anti-corruption cases to be forwarded to the Attorney General's Office; the Attorney General, however, is appointed by the President (subject to rubber stamping of the Parliament) and serves concurrently as Minister of Justice, has ultimate authority to determine whether a particular case warranted prosecution or not (Michael Kargbo 2012, 83)

[43] Kabbah, "Coming Back from the Brink", 310

[44] Ibid, 310

During Kabbah's era, the British government, the main backers of the Anti-Corruption Commission insisted that the ACC must be given a free hand to prosecute persons accused of corrupt practices even without the Attorney General's fiat. Kabbah insisted that he would not surrender the powers of the Attorney General to the ACC. A tug of war broke out between Kabbah and the British government. After a private meeting between President Kabbah and Prime Minister, Tony Blair at No. 10 Downing Street, it became very clear to some of us who spoke to Kabbah in London after that meeting that relationship between Britain and Sierra Leone had become strained.[45]

By all international donor accounts, under Kabbah's watch, the ACC was relegated to an ineffective institution that was created to "appease foreign donors".[46] According to a DfID evaluation assessing DfID's efforts in the ACC up to 2007, the ACC had "little effect" in mitigating or discouraging high-level graft.[47] DfID's 2006 annual report on Sierra Leone noted a "lack of progress on the overall project goal of reducing corruption in Sierra Leone and more importantly the deterioration in the institutional capacity of the Anti-Corruption Commission to lead the fight against corruption".[48] The failure of the ACC to prosecute high profile cases reinforced the lack of robust policy leverage of the UK over the Government of Sierra Leone.[49] In an attempt to appease DfID

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[45] Sorie Fofana, 'Collateral Damage', *Global Times*, http://www.globaltimes-sl.org/manjoroka113.htm (Accessed 23 December 2013)

[46] Sahr Kpundeh, Process Intervention Versus Structural Reforms: Institutionalising Anti-Corruption Reforms in Africa, in Brian Levy and Sahr John Kpundeh (eds.), *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons*, Washington: World Bank Publications, 2004, 270-271.

[47] Nicole Ball, Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baille and 'Funmi Olonisakin, Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa, DfiD evaluation working paper 23, April 2007, 85

[48] J. Cutting and G. Otieno, The Annual Review of DfID support to the Anti-Corruption Commission, Phase Two in Sierra Leone, 25 January 2007, cited in Kargbo 2012, 83.

[49] After the All People's Congress lead by Koroma was elected in 2007 (with 54.6% of the popular vote in a second-round of voting), the government pushed for the amendment to the ACC Act and prevailed on parliament to pass the ACC act in 2008. This act gives the ACC prosecutorial powers, provided for the declaration of assets by government officials and

authorities, the Government of Sierra Leone attempted to demonstrate its superficial compliance with the British measures by sacking ACC Commissioner Valentine Collier in November 2005.[50] Meanwhile the Government attempted to target anti-corruption efforts at lower-level civil servants and teachers.[51] The ACC had made "little or no impact" on high-level prosecutions in 2005 and 2006 and secured only 12 low and mid-ranking convictions. As the frustratration set in for the British, it was only in 2007 that DfID decided to cut its direct budgetary support to the Governemnt from £15 m to £12.5m on the grounds that none of the anti-corruption benchmarks had been met.[52] According to an Africa Confidential report in 2007, "an April DfID report recommended that Whitehall stop funding Sierra Leone's Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) altogether.[53] Additionally, Sierra Leonean ACC senior management refused to grant access to its staff to the DfID team during its enquiry. The British anti-corruption measures was informed by two major problematic assumptions: First, Britain naively assumed that Kabbah's run government could emerge as a somewhat disinterested and apolitical. Second, Britain underestimated the executive branch's constitutional ability and its political agency in successfully maneuvering outside of the imposed standards of conduct and practices. The lack of robust oversight and inability to alter the behaviour of senior bureacrats

functionaries and widened the ACC's investigative mandate to include family members and friends of government officials (Kargbo 2012, 84)

[50] 'Let the dishonorable members exit', *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 April 2007

[51] Ibid

[52] 'Post-war hopes hit trouble', Africa Confidential, Vol. 48, No. 13, 22 June 2007.

[53] Ibid

and technocrats in the state enables these actors to draw on and reproduce old entrenched political practices.

In 2006, UK donors were particularly concerned about the lack of progress in producing any meaningful impact to prevent high-level government corruption.[54] The majority of funding that was channeled as direct budgetary support found its way in the private pockets of politicians that were more interested in building their personal properties, maintaining their investment portfolios and securing their retirement "savings". Following the August 2007 Presidential elections, a United Nations report revealed that by the time the All People's Congress (APC) came into government, the new regime had "inherited an empty treasury as a result of corruption and mismanagement of resources" and was "currently seeking donor assistance to fund up to 80% of its national budget".[55] When APC leader President Ernest Bai Koroma became president, he granted ACC direct arrest and prosecutorial powers in early 2008.[56] Ironically, by this time, Britain had withdrawn itself completely from the ACC and Germany's Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) stepped in as the primary donor. Germany still insists on mitigating high-level graft, however, there is evidence to suggest that Koroma's inner circle of

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[54] Brian Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform, Chatham House Report, June 2007, 30

[55] UNIPSIL, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2007/704, 4 December 2007, 13. The APC government launched an investigation into SLPP management of state funds, but the findings were not made public as far as I am aware.

[56] For instance, Koroma appointed Abdul Tejan-Cole, a London-based lawyer who had no known previous partisan leanings as ACC Commissioner in December 2007. Tejan-Cole served this role from 2008 until his resignation in 2010.

ministers and advisors remain deeply involved in continuing the "spoils logic" of state practices in Sierra Leone.

The UK should have secured more robust and genuine commitment and from Sierra Leone's political class during the reform process. The international strategy should have aimed to radically restructure the political space and political practice and behaviour of politicians in that space. According to Michael Kargbo, the SLPP government (the first post-war government) took a "half-hearted approach to reforms".[57] The general discontent and frustration with the SLPP was to a large extent resulting from the government's lack of willingness to combat corruption and the widespread perception that politicians in the SLPP showed were disinterested in improving the socio-economic conditions (and quality of life) for the majority of the population. This partially explains why the SLPP lost the August 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections.[58] There was, however, no substantive change in how political parties operated in the lead up to electoral campaigning. There was little ideological or

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[57] Michael Kargbo 2012

[58] Seven political parties contested the elections but only three parties (the ruling SLPP), the opposition APC and a newly formed People's Movement for Democracy and Change (PMDC) were real contenders. The Presidential race was mainly between Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC, Vice President Soloman Berewa of the SLPP and Charles Margai of the PMDC. Since no candidate received the 55% of the vote required to win, a run-off was held on 8 September 2007 between Berewa and Koroma. Koroma won 54.6% and Berewa won 45.4% of the total number of valid votes cast according to the UN (UNIOSIL report 4 December 2007, 2). The seven parties fielded over 500 candidates for 112 seats in the single chamber Parliament. The APC won 59 seats (up from 27 in 2002), followed by the SLPP with 43 (down from 83 in 2002) and PMDC won 10 seats. Historically, there is very little substantive ideological or policy differences between the SLPP and APC. Instead, the parties are seen as representing the views of particular regional or ethnic interests. For instance, the SLPP's traditional base is in the South and the East, while the APC traditionally draws it support from the North of the country. The PMDC (an off-shoot of the SLPP) has the same support base in the South and East (see Zubairu Wai, 'The Role of Youth and the Sierra Leone Diaspora in Democratic Wakening', in A.B. Zack-Williams (ed.), *The Search for Sustainable Democracy, Development and Peace: The Sierra Leone 2007 Election*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afirkaininstitutet, 2008, 37-63)

political difference in the parties' platforms, especially between the two main

rivals (SLPP and APC).[59] When the APC government came to power, President

Koroma demonstrated a greater willingness to tackle anti-corruption efforts than

his predecessor Tejan Kabbah.[60] However, this commitment was superficial and

ingenuine since there is widespread evidence of APC government continuing the

"predatory mode of governance" and the "spoils logic" that has long

characterised state practices in Sierra Leone.[61] For instance, President Koroma

continues to appoint his relatives into informal government positions and awards

high-level state contracts to his friends and family, thus reproducing the

historically entrenched problem of ethnic nepotistic practices. Numerous reports

of high-level graft within Koroma's administration have plagued his

government.[62] There are also numerous allegations that mining companies hold

considerable influence over Koroma and his government.[63]

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[59] Prior to the 2007 elections, a UNIOSIL commented "none of the parties has articulated a clear political platform" (UNIOSIL report August 2007, 2)

[60] The two vision documents for the APC government are the *Agenda for Change* and the Joint vision of the United Nations Family for Sierra Leone, both released in December 2008. The *Agenda* identifies the Government's main priorities as enhancing the supply of reliable electricity; promoting economic growth, in particular through agriculture and the exploitation of fisheries; improving the country's infrastructure; and accelerating human development through improved health education and other vital social services. (see UNIPSIL 30 January 2009, 10-11). The funding to achieve the objectives of the *Agenda* was estimated at US$1.2 billion and donors made commitments to provide the funding within the medium-term expenditure framework. In mid-2010, almost US$10 million was allocated to implement the Joint Vision (UNIPSIL report 17 September 2010, 6). The cost of delivering the *Vision* for 2009-2010 was US$360 million, but the funding gap at the end of 2010 was US$155 million (UNIPSIL report 9 March 2011, 10).

[61] Jimmy Kandeh, 'Transition Without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Elections of 1996', *African Studies Review*, 41:2 1998; See also Kandeh 1999

[62] A contract for paving the road linking Kailahun to Kenema was awarded to President Koroma's brother Sylvanus Koroma. (Africa Confidential, Votes, Mines, and Money, Vol. 53, No. 1, 6 January 2012). According to Africa Confidential, after Koroma took office in 2007, "over 200 qualified and competent south easterners have been fired from public services and replaced by his kinsmen, cronies, and party stalwarts with little regard for their competence, experience or qualification". Koroma hired many of his own tribes people—Limbas and their

There are deeper reasons why the SLPP government lacked commitment to restructure the political space immediately after the war. The elite exercise of power and domination of the political space has long been an entrenched practice in Sierra Leone's political culture.[64] However, in terms of whether the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) could be a model framework applicable for other peacebuilding contexts, the answer is no. Clearly, the British had no desire to engage in anything that resembles a participatory and inclusive peacebuilding. The framework's logic was flawed: priorities and benchmarks were designed without consultation of Sierra Leoneans, objectives were not defined clearly and as a result, few individuals where even aware of the MoU's content. The MoU led to a superficial restructuring of the political space within the Sierra Leonean state and, according to an assessment of the MoU, did not lead to "significantly…greater [levels] of accountability and transparency". An early assessment of the MoU concluded in 2005:

> there is little evidence that the MoU and benchmarks have fostered a more open and explicit joint understanding about [Her Majesty's

Temne and Krio allies— and other party loyalists in his administration after he assumed office. His elder sister Admire became a big government contractor post-2007. His first cousin, Edmund Koroma was made head of Ministry of Finance. His younger brother Slyvanus also enjoys an overdraft facility of over one million dollars at the state-owned Sierra Leone Commercial Bank and is a main importer of rice (More Power in Sierra Leone, Africa Confidential, 9 October 2009, Vol. 50, No. 2, 5).

[63] Shortly after Koroma came to power in 2007, African Minerals owner Frank Timis spent close to $2 million to refurbish the Presidential Lodge in Freetown. The contract was awarded to one of Koroma's close friends Siray Timbo. These nepotistic deals are a quintessentially Sierra Leonean mix of politics and private business. Shortly afterwards, Timbo became chairman of the Board of the National Telecommunications Commission (NATCOM) (which regulates the country's telecoms). In 2010, AML provided "tens of thousands of dollars" to the government for the 49th Independence Day celebrations and Timis flew Akon in for the celebrations. Timis also made his own personal jet available to Koroma to fly to the UN summit in New York in September 2010. (Africa Confidential, Feast Iron Ore, Vol. 52, No. 13, 24 June 2011).

[64] Wai 2012; Reno 1995; Richards 1996; Keen 2005

Government] HMG's expectations of [Government of Sierra Leone] GoSL or the level of progress anticipated across GoSL more generally.[65]

The international strategy focused narrowly on the top-level Executive-administrative apparatus of the Sierra Leonean state informed by idealised notions that the entrenched elite would implement the liberal peace willingly and in non-partisan fashion. Part of this strategy also attempted to re-establish local power structures in the periphery that dated back to the colonial period. The strategy was based on problematic problem-solving assumptions that a new Sierra Leonean state would emerge out of the peace process and would be willing to implement broad-based development in the interests of its citzens.

Post-conflict Security Sector Reforms in Sierra Leone
SSR was integrated in the country's broader recovery and reconstruction frameworks, including a National Security Strategy, two defence white papers (2002 and 2006), a Security Sector Reform Review (2003-2005) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Sierra Leone's SSR is an example of an international experiment involving the application of "liberal peace" through the linking of poverty reduction strategies to security sector governance—one of the first of its kind in a war-peace transition. The initial SSR concept focused on defence and security institutions and civil institutions overseeing their management, in particular, Ministry of Defense and Parliament.

Sierra Leone's "security sector" was modeled after the British system, with an army oriented for defence missions, an unarmed constabulary, supported

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[65] Balogun and Gberie, vii.

by a small tightly-controlled armed police unit (Operation Support Division) as well as a justice sector, judicial system, prisons and firefighting units.[66] The UK model rests on establishing security for the state, whose legitimacy rests on its capacity to provide physical security to its citizens within the rule of law. The Sierra Leonean state security apparatus (modeled on the UK model) is composed of the RSLAF, which is responsible for external security/defence and the Sierra Leone Police, which is responsible for "internal security".[67] The British approach to military reform in Sierra Leone was informed by a misunderstanding of the country's history of military coups and a problematic assumption that the problems in the military were matters solely related to management and

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[66] Police forces hold primary responsibility for internal security while military forces should be oriented towards defence missions and maintaining its government's territorial integrity (Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, 'The globalisation of private security: Country report on Sierra Leone, The Globalisation of Private Security project, Aberystwyth: University of Wales' Department of International Politics, 2003, 17), http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/privatesecurity/country%20report-sierra%20leone.pdf

[67] It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the relationship between the police (SLP) and military (RSLAF) in post-war Sierra Leone. One of the areas where the UK provided advice was clarifying responsibilities between the police and military. Historically, some ambiguity in their respective roles had created conflict between the two primary security institutions. There have been instances of clashes between RSLAF and the Sierra Leone police personnel. The Security Sector Review (2005) stipulated that the Sierra Leone Police was mandated with primary responsibility over internal threats. With UK input, legislators revised and modified the Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) law (based on UK practices) through a memorandum of understanding to identify appropriate mechanisms and process for allowing the RSLAF to assist the SLP in the event of an internal threat. The MoU stipulates that if the SLP requires assistance, a formal request must be made to the RSLAF through the respective heads of the ministries (Albrecht and Jackson, 151-152; Nelson-Williams 2008, 6; Le Grys 2008, 8). The 2006 National Security Council Directive reaffirmed this mechanism. It was invoked in response to a spike in armed robberies in the second half of 2009, officially on 10 October 2009, which reduced the robberies in early 2010 (UNIPSIL report, 15 March 2010, 3). With regard to the relationship between the SLP and RSLAF, there continues to be animosity and jealousies among the country's security forces personnel. Clashes between the police and army took place in 2010. In May 2012, just seven months prior to the November 2012 elections, the Government issued rice rations to the police to bring them on par with the army's monthly dry ration, an apparent attempt to appease the police ranks before the elections. (President Koroma Brings Back SLP Ration, *Salone Reporter, 25 May 2012*. A quantity of at least 13,193 bags of 100kg of rice is required for each month).

training.[68] This assumption was reflected in DfID policy strategy that both "competent personnel" to manage the security sector and liberal structures of governance are crucial to prevent military interference in politics.[69]

As I demonstrate below, Britain's approach to RSLAF reform was informed by a lack of confidence in most senior army officers, and deliberately "engineered" change from above.[70] The British wanted to shore up central government authority in Freetown. According to ONS officials, the overarching approach to security aimed at stabilizing the post-conflict state.[71] One current ONS official defined the approach adopted from 2002-2007:

> Stability means that people were fighting and killing. So we wanted all of those things to cease. Then we wanted to enforce *legitimate authority* because during the war, we did not have any *centralised authority*. In fact, in many parts of the country where the war was going on, state security was absent. We firstly wanted to ensure that there was an amount of stability that was capable of *establishing legitimate state authority or central authority* over these areas. So that is what it was intended for. The second thing we focused on was to present a new picture of security. Before the war, the kind of security that was being offered was focused on the *state-centric kind* whereby we thought that physical security, combat skills, policing were ultimate. During the war, we learned that many of our problems were as a result of the dissatisfaction of people. We were going to need to invite a new contemporary approach to security, pro-people to ensure that we cater for the well-being of people (my emphasis).[72]

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[68] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 28

[69] As the DfID strategy document in 2004-2005 notes, "security forces may usurp power…an effective security sector therefore requires well-managed and competent personnel operating within an effective institutional framework, defined by law" (Global Conflict Prevention Pool, 'Security Sector Reform Strategy', London: DfID, FCO and MoD, 2004-2005, 4)

[70] Britain's approach was informed by the idiom that the RSLAF "is not a bad army; it just has bad officers" (Author's confidential interview with former RSLAF officer, Freetown, December 2011)

[71] Author's confidential interviews with ONS officials, 3 November 2011, Freetown

[72] Author's confidential interviews with ONS officials, 3 November 2011, Freetown

UK Bureaucratic Priorities and Politics

There were many turf battles within the UK government over the direction that SSR should take in Sierra Leone.[73] The UK Ministry of Defence assisted the Government in formulating the National Security Policy and reorganizing the Ministry of Defence and developing its management capacity. DfID provided the bulk of funding for military reform while the UK Ministry of Defence led the Commonwealth-executed International Military Assistance Training Team to restructure and train the Sierra Leone army (RSLAF).[74] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was involved at the diplomatic level and funded a military education programme (including the adult literacy programme for RSLAF). These activities were coordinated through the Cabinet Office and were funded through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (later Global Conflict Prevention Pool).

The bulk of attention and funding from the ACPP's in 2001-04 focused on the development of the armed forces and police, rule of law, governance and ex-combatant reintegration. Funding was subsequently channeled through DfID's country framework in 2003-2005.[75] It was not until 2004-2005 that the UK outlined its overall security sector reform strategy (2004-2005).[76] According to

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[73] Paul D. Williams Williams, Who's making UK foreign policy?, *International Affairs*, 80, 2004. 909-929; see also Ashington-Pickett 2010, 32)

[74] UK MoD supported RSLAF in terms of education of the armed forces, conduct of national reviews, development of defence policies, strengthening of defence resource management, increasing accountability in defence procurement, strengthening military personnel management systems, training on human rights/democratic accountability (DfID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, 10)

[75] Ball 2007

[76] Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), Security Sector Reform Strategy, 2004-2005, UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DfiD, 2004.

the strategy, the overall objective of the SSR is: "to help governments of developing and transitional countries fulfill their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict".[77]

As noted, pre-2001, the UK had not devised a comprehensive blueprint for SSR for Sierra Leone and the SSR concept was still in the embryonic stage in the UK government.[78] One of the primary documents referring to military and police reform was the 1999 Comprehensive Peace Accord. The UK's initiatives had been shaped as ad-hoc responses to consecutive crises. IMATT's focus on training the armed forces was initially informed by the need to combat the RUF threat in mid-2000. As one British expatriate noted, "the general state of emergency in Sierra Leone at the time left no space for sitting back and developing a strategy; the country was in urgent need of support".[79] This quote highlights the fixation on the immediate crisis and the natural inclination to adopt of "problem-solving" frameworks and ad-hoc responses.

The conceptual phase of Sierra Leone's SSR began at the later stages of its civil war. Reform of both the SLP and RSLAF were singled out as crucial part of the war-peace transition and the country's peacebuilding process. The

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[77] Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), Security Sector Reform Strategy, 2004-2005, UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DfiD, 2004, 10. For a view into UK's strategy on SSR in Africa, see 'UK SSR Policy Brief', 'Understanding and Supporting SSR', SSR in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean', 'Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone', 'UK survey of SSR Activities', 'Survey on Regional Networks', 'Providing Security for the People-SSR in Africa'.

[78] Nicole Ball, 'Spreading Good Practices in SSR', 1998

[79] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 81

UK faced several choices about what kind of police and military to build in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone Police Reform
This central state approach to SSR extended to reform of the Sierra Leone police. When Kabbah was restored to power in March 1998, Britain supported Kabbah's vision to concentrate on police reform efforts to maintain internal law and order.[80] The national police force (Sierra Leone Police or SLP) had gone from a prewar strength of 9,317 to a disorganized and essentially collapsed force comprising about 6,600 officers in 1998.[81] Most officers were poorly trained and unqualified. An estimated 40% could not read or write.[82] The armed constabulary police unit (Operational Support Division) lacked modern training and discipline. In August 1998, President Kabbah solicited foreign assistance from the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CDPTF) to help restructure the force. The Commonwealth Task Force helped develop a new Policing Charter, built on a UK police doctrine called Local Needs Policing. According to one of the British designers, this "system of policing…meets the needs and expectations of the local community, delivered within a national

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[80] British Ambassador Peter Penfold was a staunch supporter of Tejan Kabbah since his election in 1996, and was viewed as a close ally of the West and the UN. While Kabbah was exiled in Conakry for nine months, the UK and the US bankrolled his government. The UK provided Kabbah $10 million throughout the war but this amount was never made public until 2006 when Brigadier General David Richards revealed this in 2006 (See Philip Neville, Sierra Leone: Exposing the President, *The Standard Times,* 18 July 2006). Kabbah was restored as President in March 1998 after the AFRC junta was kicked out of power in February 1998 by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention.

[81] Nearly 900 officers were killed directly as a result of the war. Baker 2006

[82] Jonathan Friedman, 'Building Strategic Capacity in the Police: Sierra Leone 1998-2008, Princeton University's *Innovation for Successful Societies* policy note, 2008, 2 (http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/policy_note/PN_id181/Policy_Note_ID181.pdf Accessed 21 December 2012)

framework of standards and guidelines".[83] It is ironic that Sierra Leonean authorities willingly embraced this policy stretching from the UK to Sierra Leone as an appropriate model given its previous colonial experience and the legacies of British colonial policing in the West African region.[84] Keith Biddle believed that the colonial structures put in place for the police were effective and that Sierra Leone's problem was rooted in its deviation from these former practices:

> The Sierra Leone police enjoyed a tremendous reputation in its colonial past…[It] was well-equipped, professionally trained and received many glowing reports when inspected by the colonial authorities…the Force went into terminal decline in the early seventies. There has been a lack of adequate finance, a failure to update procedures and essential equipment was hardly ever acquired. Most disastrously, the Force became highly politicised with the inspector general of police becoming a politically active cabinet member. This had the effect of transforming an excellent police force into a repressive arm of government rather than a friendly service for all Sierra Leoneans.[85]

The Commonwealth Police Development Task Force deployed "advisors" (funded by the Commonwealth) to assist Kabbah's government develop proposals for reform the police during the latter half of 1998. Keith Biddle and Adrian Horn, two British citizens with years of experience policing in the UK led the efforts; their reforms were adopted and applied to Sierra

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[83] Cited Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 29.

[84] James Opolot, 'The resilience of the British colonial police legacies in East Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa', *Police Studies* 15, 2, 1992, 90-9. Late colonial reform policy in Sierra Leone suggested an emphasis on strengthening the regime as opposed to the state (see Erlend Groner Korgstad, 'Security, development, and force: Revisiting police reform in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 111: 443, 2012, 268.

[85] 'Speech to be delivered by the Inspector General of Police on Tuesday 28 March 2000 to the Commonwealth Institute', cited in Korgstad 2012, 269)

Leone.[86] Their "consultations" were limited to Freetown and London due to the precarious security environment throughout the country at the time. The consultation process relied on "expert advice" from other West African countries (notably Nigeria and Ghana) and South Africa. As Horn states,

> Everybody who we met and talked to from outside Sierra Leone all had different experiences of policing and worked with different models. Often these were called 'Community Policing,' but there were as many models and concepts of 'Community Policing' as there were people. What was needed was a model that encapsulated all the good things that were suitable to the needs of Sierra Leone – not a model from outside that may not work. We were also conscious that, despite Sierra Leone being a relatively small country, there were great variations in the style of policing required in particular areas and at different times. The policing requirements in Kono were very different to those required in Freetown or Bo. The style of policing would have to respond to changing circumstances and needs as time went on.[87]

The Local Needs Policing model was new to Sierra Leone. Five years after independence, the SLP's bureaucratic/administrative structures came to function as a partisan institution that served the particular interests of the President and

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[86] Biddle's expertise derived from his experience in post-Apartheid South Africa, where he had served as an advisor to the South African police for the Commonwealth since the 1994 elections. According to the UK experts involved in the police planning process, t reform was based on several principles. "First, stripping it all back to basics, and applying KISS (Keep It Simple) principles, a system of policing was required that met the needs and expectations of the local community. However, there had to be standards and compliance with policy, systems and procedures. The second key element was that such a system of policing had to be delivered within national standards. The third element was to determine the most efficient and effective management structure and working practices that delivered this model of policing. "What shall we call it? This was important. The name would be an important marketing tool, and move everyone away from his or her own pre-conceived ideas about community policing. It would help ensure that a model was developed that was based on what Sierra Leone required, not what a 'foreign' model dictated. Applying KISS, the name was obvious – Local Needs Policing, with the simple acronym LNP. Putting these elements together, we can define LNP as: 'A system of policing that meets the needs and expectations of the local community, delivered within a national framework of standards and guidelines. The basic organizational structure was the Local Command Unit (LCU): A body of people, effectively and efficiently managed, accountable and with devolved authority, and designed to deliver the policing needs of the local community'. "Within these two simple definitions were all the elements required to rebuild the Sierra Leone Police and address the many concerns that had been expressed". (Jackson et al 31-2)

[87] Ibid

his party. Adrian Horn described the new model that would function as a local institution within the framework of a nation-state model:

> We needed some simple, key statements on what the Government and the police wanted and valued, and a policing model for the future. We knew that future policing in Sierra Leone had to be based in the community and work within the community. It had to address a number of fundamental issues. There was a need for a complete restructuring of the police service in Sierra Leone. Restructuring necessitates not merely the drawing up of a new organisational structure. To achieve sustainable change, there has to be alteration in the attitudes and behaviour of all police officers, together with a critical shift in the management culture of the organization.[88]

Attacks on Freetown set back reform process in January 1999. The CDPTF personnel were evacuated from the country and the programme was canceled. After the Lomé accord was signed in July 1999, Britain used this stability as an opportunity to resume its efforts in leading security sector reform efforts, particularly in the police and a limited role for the military. By August 1999, the Commonwealth mission (CDPTF) was returned to Freetown to resume its work with the SLP. President Kabbah saw this as an opportunity for a more entrenched UK role and presence in his security institutions. Around October 1999, President Kabbah appointed one of the CDPTF advisors, Keith Biddle, to serve as Sierra Leone's Inspector-General of Police (IGP). Biddle became the brainchild of Sierra Leone's police reform efforts. Biddle was appointed for a two-year term (which was later extended until May 2003), and approved by the

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[88] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 31-32

Sierra Leonean parliament.[89] Under Biddle's tenure as head of the Sierra Leone Police (1999-2003), reform efforts accelerated significantly.

Biddle's role as head of police in Sierra Leone was hardly controversial within Sierra Leone despite Britain's past controversial role as former colonial master.[90] Many people believed that the presence of a qualified expatriate was a necessary temporary measure to depoliticise the organization's administrative structure and practices in order to institute a new institutional culture. According to a Sierra Leone police official, "if outsiders had not come [here], there would have been a lot of political pressure on the Inspector-General".[91] Kabbah's former national security advisor Sheka Mansaray explained, "the public wanted us to clear them [the bad senior officer] out. One of the ways to re-establish confidence with the local people was to get somebody neutral because nobody in the system could command the kind of respect and trust that the public was looking for".[92] Albrecht and Jackson concur, observing that "Biddle played a crucial role in developing confidence in the rebuilding of the SLP, since all

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[89] Biddle's salary was paid for by the Commonwealth. For more on Biddle, see
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/focusareas/PL/oralhistories/view.xml?id=112

[90] Not since 1963 was the top position of the police (then Commissioner of Police) filled by a British expatriates. In 1962, several top positions in the post-colonial state bureaucracy remained under the leadership of British expatriates, most notably the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary, the Commissioner of Police, the Military Force Commander, the Establishment Secretary, three District Officers and two Provincial Secretaries (Henry Gaffney, Administration and the Administrative Service in Sierra Leone, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1967, 106-7). The British handpicked Mr. L.W. Leigh as the first Sierra Leone Commissioner of Police in 1963 and served in the above position until 1969 (Sierra Leone Police, 'Historical Background of the Sierra Leone Police, http://www.police.gov.sl/content.php?p=10&pn=History).

[91] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 36

[92] Friedman, 3

parties viewed him as not a subject of political interference and loyalties, which a Sierra Leonean candidate inevitably would have been".[93]

One of broader challenges that the SLP faced as a state security institution was it had lost all credibility and confidence of the population by being perceived as corrupt, impotent against the rebels and generally aggressive prior to the war.[94] According to a senior Sierra Leonean police official, the police were known for "blatant disregard for human rights…the SLP was considered a spent force at the time, with little or no logistical support to enhance its capability".[95]

Biddle relied on his position to leverage, influence and shape high-level restructuring of the SLP. He served as a member of both the National Security Council (the Government's highest policymaking body pertaining to security issues) and the President's War Council, working closely with about ten different Sierra Leonean assistant inspector generals, most of whom had received police training in the UK.[96] Biddle exercised considerable autonomy in dismissing senior police officers that did not fit into his conception of a "new police culture" and whom had reputations as "ineffective" or corrupt officers.[97] Biddle concentrated on developing a new organisational structure for the SLP. He created an Executive Management Board to develop strategic policy and make operational decisions. He also reduced the number of ranked officer

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[93] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 36

[94] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 33, 35. The Truth and Reconciliation final report describes the police force as "incompetent", "corrupt" and "agents of destabilisation".

[95] Kadi Fakondo, cited Jackson et al 2009, 35.

[96] Friedman, 3

[97] White 2009

positions from 22 to 10. The ranks of Sub-Inspector and Corporal were completely removed from the police hierarchy and those affected were demoted to Sergeants and Constables, respectively, which disrupted the previous "military-style rank-conscious" police culture.[98] This controversial decision continues to be felt within the organization today.[99] Biddle created new units, including Family Support Units, and established separate bureaus to deal with gender violence and domestic abuse and Local Policing Partnership Boards, a local forum for police and community members to develop collaborative responses. A Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID) was created to investigate public grievances and police misconduct. These units reflected an attempt to transform the police service into a community-oriented focus.

Biddle initiated a recruitment drive in 2001. He dismantled the old recruitment system that was based on patronage and ethnic loyalty. About 1,000 new cadets were hired per year. The aim was to build a force of 9,500 by 2008, a target set by the Commonwealth and then later increased to 12,000 based on security needs. On the issue of integration, UN officials wanted to permit the inclusion of former combatants in the police force as a way to employ and rehabilitate those individuals who had fought during the war. However, Biddle

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[98] Peter Alexander Albrecht, 'Transforming internal security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone police and broader justice reform', DISS report 2010, 47 (see http://www.diis.dk/graphics/publications/reports2010/rp2010-07_transforming_sierra_leone_web.pdf)

[99] Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, report commissioned by the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and International Alert, 2009, 37 (http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SierraLeoneBook/Security%20System%20Transformation%20in%20Sierra%20Leone,%201997-2007.pdf)

took a strong position of opposition to this idea, arguing that this policy would undermine the new ethos he was trying to establish in the force. Biddle convinced President Kabbah to prevent ex-combatants from joining the force unless otherwise competing for a position through merit-based qualifications.[100]

Police officers were paid meager salaries before the war. This low wage is blamed for many police officers colluding with criminals in order to supplement their income.[101] In 2000, under Biddle's recommendation, the Government supplemented standard police salaries with an additional Le 41,000/month. By 2006, average monthly income was about 130,000 Leones (worth about £26 or US$35), however, this was barely above the poverty line (for instance, the lowest cost of a bag of rice was half this amount, approximately 60,000 Le).[102]

DfID assumed lead role in provision of funds for the police reform to reconstitute the force, for training and advice, procuring basic supplies (uniforms), communications equipment and vehicles.[103] The UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) civil police units (CivPol) played a supportive role offering advice, technical and training for the SLP. The CDPTF transitioned to the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) (funded

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[100] Jonathan Friedman, Building strategic capacity in the police: Sierra Leone, 1998-2008, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University's Innovations for Successful Societies, 2008, 5 (http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/focusareas/PL/policynotes/view.xml?id=181)

[101] Ero 2000, 57

[102] Bruce Baker, 'Who do people turn to for policing in Sierra Leone'? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 2006; Bruce Baker and Roy May, A Sustainable Peace? Sierra Leone, in in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace, Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006.

[103] Kandeh 2012, 102

by DfID) in 2000 and operated on an annual budget of £22 million that covered all aspects of the program including the salaries of the British Inspector General, international advisors, recruitment, purchasing equipment and the training provisions for 9,000 police officers.[104] Within the first year of the UN peacekeeping mission's (UNAMSIL) deployment, the SLP was deployed to rural areas to Port Loko, Moyamba, Kenema, and Pujehun and Bonthe (areas that were relatively stable) to extend state authority into the interior. Deployment of local police to unstable territories and RUF strongholds (Kono, Kailahun and Makeni) could only be extended following successful implementation of "DDR" (see Chapter 4). In Kono, for example, the SLP deployed following the implementation of disarmament in the district in November 2001.

DfID provided vehicles and communication equipment to help the police overcome logistical constraints. In 2003-2003, Britain also restored and restructured the Operational Support Division (OSD)—the former Special Security Division—the armed wing of the police with a long record of excessive use of force against opposition groups. In 2002, Britain purchased £1 million worth of weapons, a quantity that Britain later regretted as being excessive for Sierra Leone's needs.[105]

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[104] Marcella Macauley, 'International actors and democracy promotion in post-conflict Sierra Leone: Time for stock-taking', in Tunde Zack-Williams (ed.), When the state fails: Studies on intervention in the Sierra Leone civil war, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 39

[105] As UK-based Africa Confidential observed, policing experts consulted by their staff "declared that the UK arms were more than enough and the latest shipment was way beyond anything the OSD would normally require". (Africa Confidential, Personal, not business, Vol. 53, No. 6, 16 March 2012); see also Erlend Groner Korgstad, 'Security, development, and force: Revisiting police reform in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 111: 443, 2012, 261-280.

A total of £2.3 million had been spent on equipment and communication, vehicles through two different projects.[106] After 2001, the program was funded by the UK's Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP).[107] From 2000-2006, the SLP received more than £27 million from the UK (with £17 million more earmarked for 2007-2012), most of which was spent on equipment and training.[108] When the CCSSP police reform project came to an end in 2007, the UK had spent more than US$40 million.

The UK expanded its programme in 2007 to include the broader justice sector, including the ministry of internal affairs, prisons, the judiciary, and state and non-state justice systems.[109] This was one of the major weaknesses in the previous CCSS programme, in that is approach was informed by the problematic assumption that police reform could be implemented in the absence of building capacity in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to manage the SLP and the Judicial system and Parliament to provide support and oversight.[110] Following Biddle's departure in 2003, the relationship between the CCSSP and the SLP became

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[106] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 35

[107] The UK Home Office provided personnel and experts to help build capacity and reform of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP).

[108] Baker 2006; DfID assistance to the police from 2000-2005 was £27,148,000 (Ball, N., P. Biesheuvel, T. Hamilton-Baillie, and F. Olonisakin. Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa. London and Glasgow: DFID, 2007, 82)

[109] Mark White, 'Security and Development in Sierra Leone: DfID's Approach', in Lansana Gberie (ed.), Rescuing a fragile state: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2009, 111; The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for oversight of police and prisons, and is housed in a "small, cramped building, suffers from inadequate funding, and operates with a tiny staff." (William Reno, "Sierra Leone", in S. Tatic, C. Walker (eds.), Countries at a crossroads, Washington, DC: Freedom House & Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 8).

[110] Peter Alexander Albrecht, 'Transforming internal security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone police and broader justice reform', DISS report 2010,, 47

disjointed and poorly managed and had adverse effects on the SLP reform.[111]

Due in part to the delay in appointing a successor to the project manager (Adrian

Horn), DfID-funded consultants left newly appointed (in June 2003) Sierra

Leonean Inspector General of Police Brima Acha Kamara out of discussions on

the terms of references for their contracts and out of important planning

discussions.[112] The transfer of authority to a Sierra Leonean IGP also had

negative effects in terms of the SLP's effectiveness in soliciting donor funds.[113]

The former Police Council was revived as the highest decision-making body of

the police. The Council is chaired by the Vice-President (as proscribed by the

1991, pre-war Constitution), which meant that the Executive branch of

government had firm control over key SLP decisions.[114]

There are regular concerns about the Government of Sierra Leone's

ability to sustain its own police force with its own state funds. It is clear that

financial sustainability was not a consideration of DfID's during the early stages

of the CCSSP's police reform efforts. DfID provided £3.5 million for 155 land

rovers, 158 motor vehicles, 47 medium carriers, 24 large carriers, 10 ambulances

and 10 cars.[115] However, DfID only realised in 2003 that its short-term

stabilisation approach was creating a Sierra Leone police force that could not be

sustained without considerable UK financial assistance.[116] For instance, in 2006,

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[111] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 93

[112] Ibid, 93

[113] Albrecht 2010, 27; Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 89

[114] Albrecht 2010, 47.

[115] Michael Kargbo, 'International peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: The case of the United Kingdom', in Tunde Zack-Williams (ed.), When the state fails: Studies on intervention in the Sierra Leone civil war, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 80

[116] Albercht 2010, 38

the SLP needed to replace 100 of its 800-vehicle fleet and the government could not afford to replace more than 10 of them with its own state budget.[117] In late September 2007, the Government had not provided promised funds to purchase fuel and rations and only 37% of the $US6.6 million allocated to the SLP in the 2007 national budget had been disbursed.[118]

In September 2004, UNAMSIL handed responsibility for security to the Government of Sierra Leone and the SLP started to assume the lead for ensuring Sierra Leone's internal security under UN support. However, as the International Crisis Group warned about the SLP's limited capacity: "There are serious questions about the capacity of Sierra Leone's police to manage internal security and its military to secure borders in a context of potential regional conflict…nor have the security forces yet earned civilian confidence".[119] By 31 of December 2005, the last of the UN peacekeepers from UNAMSIL departed Sierra Leone's shores. In early 2006, the UN transitioned to a UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) under the directorship of former UNAMSIL Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General Victor Angelo. DfID and the UN Integrated mission continued to shape SLP reform efforts through workshops, conferences, training and advising.[120] Twenty police liaison officers remained in

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[117] White 2009, 111

[118] UNOISIL report, 4 December 2007, 4

[119] Before the war, police officers were paid only Leones 41,000 per month (approximately US$15) (ICG 2004, 13)

[120] For instance, on 30-31 August 2006, UNIOSIL and the UNDP organized a national conference in Freetown on the role of the SLP in the 2007 elections (UNIOSIL 28 November 2006 report, 3). Effective 1 October 2008, the UNOISIL transitioned to the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to carry on UN peacebuilding activities under the leadership of Executive Representative Michael von der Schulenburg. It comprised 73 international and national staff in five sub-units (Political Affairs and Peace Consolidation; Human Rights and Rule of Law; Democratic Institutions; Police and Security and

Freetown to provide advice and training to the Sierra Leone Police and six UN police personnel were deployed in the four provincial centers (Freetown, Makeni, Bo, and Kenema) as embedded officers in joint UN/SLP provincial teams.[121] A UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone report in 2006 commended the "developing professionalism of the Sierra Leone armed forces and police" despite being a young and relatively inexperienced force.[122] The UNIOSIL report also noted that the top management of the force is professional, however, middle-management "suffers from low skills and low motivation".[123] A 2006 Wikileaks cable noted immediately after UNAMSIL's withdraw that "the RSLAF and SLP have clearly improved in recent years, many Sierra Leoneans are apprehensive about the ability of their security forces to manage a violent crisis."[124] Three violent incidents in 2005 alone were "not well managed" by the

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Joint-Strategic Planning (UNIPSIL report, 30 January 2009, 1). UNIPSIL provided input in the development of policing standards for the SLP in 2009 and helped strengthen local police partnership boards, provided specialised training in airport and border security and the control of illicit drugs. In order to develop these areas, the SLP required considerable donor assistance (UNIPSIL report, 30 January 2009, 6). Around May 2009, UNIPSIL helped the SLP revive the Chiefdom police (about 974 chiefdom police were trained). In early 2010, the PBF procured US$909, 606 worth of vehicles, helmets, batons, shields, handcuffs, and protective clothing for the police and trained 2,423 officers in public order management. The PBF also funded the refurbishment of Mafanta prison (UNIPSIL report, 15 March 2010, 8-9).

[121] Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html; UN Secretary General report on UNIOSIL, 28 April 2006, 2. Ten military liaison officers worked with the RSLAF "focusing on supporting the ongoing reform of the security sector, collecting information on the security situation, developing recommendations concerning external and internal threats, providing early warning on potential threats to stability, and liaising with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the national security agencies"

[122] UNIOSL report, 26 April 2006, 4. The report notes that 40% of the force had served for three years.

[123] Ibid, 4

[124] Wikileaks, 'UN peacekeepers leave Sierra Leone, but fragility remains', 11 January 2006, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06FREETOWN25.html

police.[125] The SLP (backed by RSLAF mostly in Freetown) provided overall security for the 2007 elections without any major incidents.[126] When the stakes are high and when the international microscope is on Sierra Leone (for instance during the 2007 elections or during the July 2008 seizure and capture of drug smugglers) the SLP has performed relatively professionally.[127] However, in everyday police practice, police officers have responded violently during a number of youth protests. In September 2009, the police shot two youths dead in Rotifunk, near Lungi airport during protests against police corruption. On 17 December 2012, the SLP shot two rioters dead in Koidu holdings diamond operations in Kono.[128] The British-introduced internal mechanisms for disciplining officers have helped to root out some general indiscipline within the police force, however, at the level of everyday practices, police solicitation and bribes and collusion with criminals are widespread and continue to inflict violence against ordinary Sierra Leoneans.[129] Sierra Leone has yet to address its

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[125] Ibid

[126] DfID provided an additional £2.5 million to help the police prepare for the elections and provided training in riot control, crowd control and public order management (UNIOSIL report April 2006, 7; UNIOSIL report 7 May 2007, 3).

[127] Drug traffickers attempted to transit 700 kilo of cocaine from South America to Europe via Lungi international airport in Sierra Leone in July 2008. On 20-21 April 2009, 18 individuals were convicted for unlawful importation of cocaine from the High Court in Freetown (8 foreigners) in accordance with "international standards". Three foreign convicts were immediately transferred to the custody of US government officials to face further criminal charges in the US (UNIPSIL report, 22 May 2009, 5).

[128] UNIPSIL report 13 February 2013, 4

[129] For instance, from December 2007 to June 2008, 94 police officers were dismissed for misconduct (Claire Castillejo, Building Accountable Justice in Sierra Leone, Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, January 1, 2009, 15). The Police Complaints Commission and the Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department received 1,273 citizens' complaints in 2008, leading to "at least 176 officers either being dismissed, demoted, suspended or officially warned" (US State Department, 'Sierra Leone 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices', Washington, DC: US State Department, 25 February 2009); Assessment from the author's observations during fieldwork in 2011-2012 and numerous discussions with informed insiders.

widespread illiteracy; this adversely affects the quality of recruits, especially the rank-and-file officers.[130] Police effectiveness also greatly depends on its relationship with the Sierra Leonean state and the impartiality of senior administrators in relation to the polity and the central state. There have been concerns in recent years—and especially so during heightened periods of political conflict prior to the country's November 2012 elections—that political considerations within the ruling All People's Congress party that the armed paramilitary force, the OSD was recruiting heavily from northern-based ethnic groups.[131]

Early Military Reform Efforts (1996-2001)

The context surrounding previous military reform efforts have been outlined in previous studies; only a brief discussion is necessary.[132] The RSLAF had not undergone any substantive reforms since 1961 and most "old soldiers" were poorly trained (the last major training exercising was held in 1980) before the war. As far back as 1996, President Kabbah requested assistance from the UK government to resurrect the central government's capacity to enforce domestic

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[130] Ismael Dumbuya, 'Police to conduct literacy tests for recruits', *Standard Times*, 14 June 2006. Sierra Leone's literacy rate is between 35-40%, which ranks it near the bottom in the world and well below the average on the African continent.

[131] Africa Confidential, 'Personal, not business', Vol. 53, No. 6, 16 March 2012. Before the 2007 elections, the OSD totaled 3,500 personnel. Recruitment before the August 2007 election involved at least 350 additional officers prior to the August 2007 elections (Africa Confidential, 'A Rare Soldering Success', Vol. 48, No. 5, 2 March 2007). During the author's fieldwork in 2011-2012, the OSD had conducted additional recruitment drives for the OSD. The recruitment process lacked transparency and therefore it is unclear whether the ethnic composition of the OSD has changed significantly in the post-conflict period. There are rumours that since the APC came to power in 2007, the majority of new recruits have been northern-based ethnic groups (Limbas). Additional research on the sociological composition of the OSD would help answer these questions.

[132] See Ero 2000; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010; Osman Gbla, 'Security sector reform under international tutelage in Sierra Leone', *International Peacekeeping* 13, 1, 2006, 78–93; Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, and Gordon Peake, 'United Kingdom-led security sector reform in Sierra Leone', *Civil Wars* 8, 2, 2006, 109–23

order in the country.[133] Improving the management of the security sector was not initially on Britain's agenda in early 1998. Britain had seconded at least one civil servant in the Ministry of Finance (funded by the EU), this soon grew through DfID's governance programme, seconded UK MoD civilians in Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defence in 1998-1999 and the British Military Training Team's deployment in 2002.[134] Since President Kabbah's election in 1996, it was an open secret that Kabbah and his closest advisors wanted to disband the military and rely on the Civil Defence Forces for his regime's security.[135] When Tejan Kabbah's government was restored in March 1998 by regional military force ECOMOG, his dependence on Nigeria as an alternative security provider deepened.[136] Kabbah promptly requested the Nigerian government to conceptualise a plan for military restructuring, downsizing of the RSLAF and a review models for improving the civilian management of the armed forces.[137] Civilian management of the security sector was initially not a high priority of the British government. The British government deployed two joint DfID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) missions in 1998 to conduct military needs assessments and to designed an initial security sector assistance programme (SILSEP) from a £1.6 million

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[133] Albrecht 2009, 4; 2010, 17

[134] Ball 1998, 37

[135] Abdel-Fatau Musah refers to a report written after 1996 by one of Kabbah's closest advisors, Soloman Berewa, who was Minister of Justice and Attorney General, in which he outlined a plan to downsize the army from 18,000 to 3,000 troops and to use CDFs in conjunction with the retained military personnel ('A country under siege: State decay and corporate military intervention in Sierra Leone', in Abdel-Fatau Musah and J.K. Fayemi (eds.), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, London: Pluto Press, 2000, 93-95)

[136] Ero 2000, 47

[137] The British government also promptly provided £65 million to shore up the authority of Kabbah's government and to support the peace process (Ero 2000, 36).

(US$1.55 million) grant allocated from DfID.[138] The British military advisers developed a plan for rebuilding an army at a strength of 6,000 personnel. During this period, the central government was entirely dependent on foreign military forces for its survival.[139]

At the time, the general perception among British diplomats and military experts was that the root cause of the RSLAF's collapse was the lack of competent senior personnel. British Ambassador Peter Penfold observed, "although the police force was becoming moribund, there were enough good people around. In the military, there were none."[140] One British military officer in charge of retraining the Sierra Leonean troops stated, "the RSLAF is not a bad army, it just has bad officers".[141]

Disband the Army? Start from scratch or start with scraps?
Nigeria's role was instrumental in shaping early RSLAF reform efforts before the May 2000 UK intervention. Kabbah appointed a Nigerian senior military officer, Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe as his Chief of Defence Staff. President Kabbah served in three roles as President, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (as per constitutional provisions in the 1991 Constitution), and appointed retired Captain Sam Hinga Norman as

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[138] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 28. The British government had secured about £10 million (approximately US$9.7 million) to restructure the military prior to 1999. Ero (2000, 23) observes that £10 million had been secured from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for designing the first security sector reform programme (SILSEP1). Out of this total, the British government spent £5 million to equip ECOMOG with military hardware and £4.5 million to train and equip the Sierra Leone Army. Additionally, DfID allocated £1.5 million to assist SSR and further £20 million for its implementation from 1999-2002.

[139] Nigeria and CDF

[140] Cited in Peter Albrecht, 'Foundational Hybridity and its Reproduction: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone', unpublished PhD Dissertation, Copenhagen Business School, School of Organisation and Management Studies, 2012, 98

[141] Author's confidential interview with former British officer, March 2012, Freetown

Deputy Defence Minister in 1996.[142] Khobe's role as an intermediary between the politicians and the RSLAF senior military officers was critical during this period. British, Nigerian and Sierra Leonean authorities considered their own proposals to disband or restructure the RSLAF and the Civil Defence Forces.

Kabbah initially considered the "Costa Rica option" of disbanding the military and establishing a larger, well-equipped police force.[143] Additionally, Kabbah's appointed Deputy Defence Minister, Hinga Norman, was the national head of an irregular people's militia that forged together various territorially-based civil defence forces (CDF) throughout the southeast and northern regions of Sierra Leone. The *Kamajors*—the most visible CDF in the civil war after 1997 was approximately 20,000 strong in 1997.[144] A critical dilemma was what to do with these non-statutory forces. The CDF represented an alternative state security type: they were not constitutionally established but fell under the command of the deputy defence minister. The *Kamajors* in particular had served in a loyal role protecting Kabbah's survival and assisted ECOMOG conduct security duties on behalf of the Sierra Leonean state. The CDF's role was controversial because some had described them as a pro-SLPP militia or paramilitary force.

President Kabbah initially considered a plan for security sector reform involving an emphasis on police reform, the full demobilization of elements of

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[142] Ero 2000, 22

[143] Ero 2000, 39; Albrecht and Jackson, 23

[144] Ero 2000, 22

the old military[145], and the formation of a small territorial defence force comprised of former CDF members from the *Kamajors*.[146] Norman had a long history with the military and made his views known in publish about his distaste for the army. The British Ambassador to Sierra Leone Peter Penfold explained "there was a strong feeling from people around Kabbah to do away with the army. The argument was that if you looked at history, military coups had prevailed. We came back [to Freetown] with those ideas still going around" in 1998-1999.[147] Haiti and Costa Rica were cited as models to consider for disbanding military forces in the context of foreign assistance.[148]

However, the Nigerians under General Khobe opposed the idea of disbanding the military and disagreed with the British proposal of creating a territorial defence force after the war.[149] According to Alfred Nelson-Williams (a senior RSLAF officer), Khobe advised Kabbah not to "disband a body of men who were battle tested".[150] Additional concerns by the British regarding the subregion's precarious security from both Liberia and Guinea, it was determined

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[145] The Armed Forces totaled between 14,000-18,000 soldiers (8,000 of which were active), but most of which went rogue.

[146] See Tejan Kabbah's speech to Parliament 1998

[147] Penfold Peter, Interview, March 2008, cited in Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 23

[148] Disbanding the military came up during a UNDP sponsored conference in Arusha, Tanzania in 1998. The Sierra Leonean delegation led by Internal Affairs minister Albert Maragi had expressed the government's consideration of disbanding the military and called Kabbah to discuss the so-called *Aris* plan based on Costa Rica's experience. Kabbah had apparently spoken with Costa Rican president Oscar Arias about how his country disbanded and transitioned from its military. (Fayemi 2004, 148)

[149] Peter Penfold in Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 23; Ero 2000, 39

[150] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 5

that some kind of externally-oriented military force was needed to protect Sierra Leone's territorial integrity.[151]

The Government of Sierra Leone requested Khobe to design a restructuring plan for the armed forces in 1998. Khobe presented two options for consideration: The first was to establish a force of 5,000 troops consisting of one Brigade Headquarters including a Presidential guard, three Infantry Battalions, one Light Tank/Recce Battalion, one Artillery Regiment and one Rapid Deployment force (to be a paratrooper Battalion, a Coastguard and an Airwing). The second option was a 10,000 strong force with a similar structure.[152]

The Government and ECOWAS favoured the 5,000 troop force with some modifications. According to Comfort Ero, the plan called for re-officering the loyal elements of the old AFSL and recruiting a fresh batch of officers, "who would be selected on an equal chiefdom/district quota basis".[153] Ero suggests that there was also a strong determination within both the SLPP and Nigerian officers to prevent regional or tribal imbalances from affecting the officer establishment and rank-and-file.[154]

When Kabbah traveled to the New York to attend a UN conference on Sierra Leone in late July 1998, Kabbah introduced his "strategy for future security", which involved establishing a new military with fresh recruits. At the

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[151] Ero 2000, 39

[152] See Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, Restructuring the Security Forces in Sierra Leone, in Olonisakin (ed), Engaging in Sierra Leone: Report of a Round Table Conference on Reconciliation and Statebuilding, Abuja: Center for Democracy and Development, 1999

[153] Comfort Ero, 40

[154] Ibid.

conference, Kabbah requested external assistance for his military restructuring plan:

> [The plan is] to initiate a fresh recruitment process to put in place a new military. In this exercise we shall ensure that recruitment is based on competence, professional integrity, loyalty to our democratic institutions and patriotism. Equally important is that we shall take into account ethnic and regional considerations and ensure that the new security force truly reflects the diversity of our nation. As to the size of the new military, many Sierra Leoneans have expressed concern about the percentage of the old army, which should be retained. The Government has, however, decided to keep its options open.[155]

In 1999, Britain was considering its own proposals to help build a new army. The UK had been providing advice to the Government on the design of a National Defence Policy, which had not existed previously.[156] The British proposal outlined recruitment of new soldiers that would be screened and approved by local chiefdom authorities.[157] The British and Sierra Leonean government agreed on a ceiling of 5,000 soldiers in 1999.[158]

UK policy recognized the importance of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone when UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short launched DfID's programme on SSR at King's College London in March 1999.[159] In June 1999, the UK deployed a team of three UK MoD personnel

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[155] Statement by his Excellency Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, at the Special United Nations Conference on Sierra Leone, held at the United Nations, New York, 30 July 1998.

[156] Ero 2000, 39

[157] Reuters, 'Disband Military, Sierra Leone president urges', 31 July 1998, http://reliefweb.int/node/38381 (Assessed 25 June 2011)

[158] Ero 2000

[159] See DfID White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, London: DfID, November 1997.

sponsored by DfID's SILSEP to travel to Freetown for "produce a study of the level of defense and security management needs of the Government of Sierra Leone".[160] According to Comfort Ero, "British aid policy at the time was premised on the assumption that uncontrolled military expenditure and ill-disciplined militaries can damage the interests of the civilian population, particularly the poor and the disadvantaged".[161] According the DfID's embryonic interpretation of Sierra Leone's SSR needs, the following issues needed to be tackled:

- Establish civil control over the armed forces and military expenditure;
- Make contributions to the costs of demobilisation and to the resettlement of combatants of various groups;
- Provide legal input into the legal and constitutional reforms required to define and to control the role of armed forces;
- Offer assistance to ensure civil control and the coordination of intelligence-gathering activities; and
- Train military personnel in order to strengthen their civic awareness and to improve discipline in their relations with the general public.[162]

In June 1999, the British commenced the refurbishment of a new Ministry of Defence (MoD) Headquarters as a first step in its effort to subordinate the military to civilian oversight and control.[163] The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was reorganized on the UK model of joint civil-military management with the creation of a new civilian deputy minister and director general as well as a National Security Council, headed by the National Security

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[160] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 28

[161] Ero 2000, 35

[162] Ero 2000, 36

[163] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 28

Coordinator, who is appointed by the President.[164] Other systems were put in place in MoD including a grading system for officers for determining rank and salary allocations for civilian and military staff.[165]

The British were concerned about Nigeria's miltiary (and Ghana and Guinea) withdraw from ECOMOG in January to April 2000, in particular the security implications this would pose for Kabbah's Freetown-based central government. The British military deployment in May 2000 (under Colonel— now General—David Richards) through Operation Palliser signaled what eventually became a greater willingness on the part of the British government to to fight the RUF militarily and to expedite military reform efforts. A few weeks prior, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG regional force had withdrawn from Sierra Leone and the UNAMSIL peacekeeping force was unable to coordinate security duties on behalf of the Sierra Leonean state. The UK Ministry of Defence engaged in training of platoon commanders and sergeants from the 3,000 troops remaining loyal to the government under its Short-Term Training Team (STTT) initiative.[166] Under Brigadier Richard's direction, a 90 member British Military Advisory Team (BMATT) revived the original military reform concept (SILSEP) that had been devised previously by British military advisors (in 1998), kicking off the start of the implementation of military reform efforts.

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[164] This was problematic challenge for as Comfort Ero states, "The British army has a long tradition of civil control, accountability to an elected civil authority and the rule of law. By contrast, African armies have tended both to reflect regimes [the interests (my emphasis)] in power and to adapt to different political circumstances. In essence, they do not easily ascribe to the concept of impartiality. Emphasis on restructuring or 'professionalising' African militaries has often given way to personal loyalty to the leadership and patron allegiance, rather than guaranteeing the physical security of the state and its people" (Ero 2000, 46).

[165] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 100

[166] Ero 2000, 46

Following the January 1999 attacks on Freetown, there is evidence of the beginnings of creating a new RSLAF in mid-1999. Under the leadership of his Deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman, and supported by Nigerian military commanders, the SLPP government initiated a countrywide recruitment process for army officers based on an equal chiefdom/district quota basis. These junior cadets would form the foundations for building a new army. The Nigerians and Kabbah's government sought to develop a fair and unbiased recruitment process that was rigorous, apolitical and recruited cadets from strong educational backgrounds. Each recruit seeking entry into the officer corps had to possess a high-school degree.[167] All five of Sierra Leone's provincial districts were allocated equal representation during the officer cadet recruitment campaign.[168] The two rounds of recruitment totaled about 189 officers on an equal 30-31% Mende and Temne basis. After selection, one hundred and eighty-nine cadets were sent to Nigeria for Officer Cadet training. In the first round, 81 new officer cadets traveled to Nigeria for basic cadet training (short-service course) from March-May 1999. Out of this total, 31% were Mende and 30% were Temne.[169] According to RSLAF senior officers, it is from this batch of officers that junior officers (mostly captains and majors) that make up the backbone junior officers in the army.[170] This recruitment selection was based mostly on merit and transparency. However, during the second round, when 100 cadets were

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[167] The minimal requirement for officer cadets recruitment became obtainment of at least 5 credits in the general certificate of education- ordinary level including a credit in English

[168] The southeast received 20% of the allocations, while the north and the west each received 20%. Ten percent of the slots were allocated to the west.

[169] Author's interview with one cadet, now junior officer, Liberia, 5 April, 2012

[170] Author's confidential interviews with senior defence officials, Freetown and Liberia, March-April 2013

recruited, Kabbah's Deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman exercised his authority to influence the final outcome on the decision and many of his ethnic Mende/Kamajors were incorporated into the army.[171]

In 1999-2001, the SLPP government (supported by President Kabbah, Vice President Berewa, and Deputy Defence Minister Norman) and the British government were broadly supportive of the idea of creating a Territorial Defense Force out of the former Civil Defence Force. This unit would serve as a reserve security force of approximately 7,500 men to defend Sierra Leone's border regions with Guinea and Liberia and to back-up the police forces (and eventually the military once it was retrained and restructured). The proposal represented an alternative model to the convention military model in Africa, most notably in terms of designating specialised border tasks to the territorial force as opposed to the standing army. The idea was modeled after the British Territorial Army.[172] The British military proposed that the territorial defence force operate alongside and in conjunction with a reformed RSLAF. However, these plans were postponed and eventually abandoned by the government after Nigerian senior Nigerian military officers in charge of Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defence persuaded President Kabbah to disregard the proposal in 2000-2001.[173] There were also concerns expressed by the international community that integrating former CDF into a territorial force would simply re-brand the *Kamajors* as the

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[171] Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown and Monrovia, April 2012

[172] See UK army, 'Territorial and Reserves', https://www.army.mod.uk/territorial/143.aspx (Accessed 7 April 2013)

[173] Author's confidential email correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013

private militia of the SLPP.[174] Nigeria's argument against this idea was informed by their own failed experience attempting to develop a reserve force and the consistent tensions this created with its traditional military.[175]

When the Lomé Accord was negotiated in July 1999, additional guidelines for handling military reform in Sierra Leone were discussed. The CPA provided an inclusive provision for military reform, stipulating that members of the warring factions should be integrated into a restructured military. The international and regional mediators at Lomé attempted to shape the security-military provisions in the agreement but the parties could not agree on a quota for each faction in the context of the negotiations. Therefore, the military provisions remained unresolved at Lomé and were kept deliberately vague in order to flesh them out in the context of the SSR implementation phase. This became an important pillar of the country's peacebuilding and reconstruction strategy (Reviewed below in the final section).

How State Structures Were Supported

Following British military intervention in May 2000, however, the UK government viewed the stability as an opportunity to develop more long-term planning strategies for "transforming" Sierra Leone. The UK concluded a ten-year development-security partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone to govern the post-war government-to-government assistance.[176] The partnership agreement was unprecedented at the time and operated outside of the traditional

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[174] International Crisis Group 2002, 11–12. See also Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 61–62

[175] Author's confidential email correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013

[176] DfID minister Clare Short signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of Sierra Leone in 2002.

three-year development aid cycles. The MoU outlined a role for UK to lead military reform. As a former colony with long and controversial history in the country, the post-war moment provided the UK with an opportunity to refine the practice of developing "coordinated" and "joined up" peacebuilding assistance to Sierra Leone.

The style of advising adopted by the UK, according to one intelligence advisor was the so-called "driving instructor" approach. This approach "allowed a certain amount of advisor intervention to avoid a serious crash and allowed our Sierra Leonean colleagues to maintain full control of organization and operations".[177] These governance structures included a national security agency, improving national laws related to security provision and updating national visions for security. The focus of these reforms efforts was on the administrative-bureaucratic-political level of the state.

National Security Architecture
A new national security architecture was established with support from Britain to provide the country's security and intelligence institutions with a clear understanding their specific roles and to provide a transparent and non-partisan system for making decisions on state resource allocations to the security sector. One of the first priorities of the UK in 1999 was to create a national (centralised) security institution that could perform a coordinating role among Sierra Leone's security and intelligence institutions to support the President's Office (State House). In Sierra Leone, the closest antecedent to the Office of National Security

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[177] Robert Ashington-Pickett, National Security and Intelligence Reform in Sierra Leone-2000-2003, in Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, Working paper 10, 2008, 10.

was the Office of National Security advisor; however, it was prevented from playing any meaningful role in terms of democratic oversight.[178] Historically, intelligence had been "stove-piped", meaning that the State House would receive local intelligence "reports" from either loyal interlocutors or sycophants.[179] In 1999, the UK advisory team also began work on developing the legislative laws to reshape and regulate the security sector. The National Security and Central Intelligence Act was drafted in 2000-2001 with help from the UK MoD and was passed in 2002, which established by law two new post-conflict security institutions—the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) (see below). The ONS became "responsible for ensuring joint, sector-wide assessments on a regular basis and coordinating the activities of the security agencies" from which it makes recommendations to government.[180] The ONS in-turn serves as the Secretariat to the National Security Council (NSC) (the highest policymaking security body in the country), chaired by the President. Other members on the NSC include the heads of the police (Inspector General) and military (Chief of Defence Staff), cabinet ministers from relevant ministries and ONS officials. The Secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC) is the Office of National Security headed by the National Security Coordinator appointed by the President (serving as the

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[178] An interal UK Government report noted in September 1999, "Sierra Leone does not have a Security or Intelligence Service. Responsibility for security (counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, and counter-subversion) and public order rests with the Special Branch of the Sierra Leone Police (UK Government, *Visit Report, Sierra Leone Security and Intelligence Reform*, September 1999, *unpublished report)*; see also Ball 1998, 42.

[179] Stove-piping here refers to where raw intelligence remains within a small group of individuals close to the President. The raw data does not go through proper channels to screening the intelligence to determine its validity to prevent inaccurate information from reaching decision-makers.

[180] Albrecht and Jackson 2009

President's main security advisor) under subsections (I) and (II) of Section 154 of the 1991 Constitution. The ONS has five divisions: Secretariat to the NSC, Joint Intelligence Committee,[181] Joint Assessment Team, Monitoring and Oversight and Security Coordination.[182]

The SSR process established new structures of security governance that had never existed throughout Sierra Leone's history. These structures remain relatively nascent at the time of the study, however some general insights can be derived from the SSR post-war practice. The oversight of Sierra Leone's security sector can be seen as a triangle model consisting of the National Security Council (chaired by the President and assisted by the Office of National Security, led by the National Security Coordinator). The National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) is the highest state-level forum for considering and deliberating on national security matters.[183] The Parliamentary Oversight Committee and the Defence Policy Committees were established to perform oversight and regulatory functions for the entire security sector. Additionally, District and Provincial Security Committees were established to decentralise intelligence gathering through the chain of command in ONS

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[181] The Joint Intelligence Committee consists of senior representatives of the RSLAF, police and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), coordinating their inputs and intelligence requirements. The Joint Assessment Team makes security and intelligence assessments.

[182] Osman Gbla, External Actors in Sierra Leone's Security Reform, 138

[183] Members include the President, Vice President, who is Deputy-Chairman, Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, Information Broadcasting, Justice, all heads of the security institutions, the ONS, SLP and RSLAF and other international stakeholders (currently the commander of IMATT and the head of the UN peacebuilding office (UNIPSIL). In 2002, it included UK and UN representatives on the National Security committee. Depending on the circumstances, the national security and intelligence act of 2002 allows membership to be expanded to include other stakeholders depending on security considerations. For instance, prior to the November 2012 elections, the chair of the National Elections Commission was invited to attend NSCCG meetings (Author's interview with ONS official, 3 November 2011).

Headquarters.[184] Within the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Council (chaired by the president and the minister) sets policy and makes high-level decisions relating to promotions and appointments of senior personnel in RSLAF/MoD. Additionally, civil society institutions and the office of the Ombudsman can sometimes provide limited oversight duties of the security sector (see Appendix 4).

Internally within the Ministry of Defence, several policy committees, such as the defence policy committee are designed to deliberate on national security and ratify defence policies as they relate to the RSLAF. The committee is structured to prevent decisions from being made by an exclusive group of senior officials.[185] Externally, the Parliamentary Oversight Committee for Defence provides oversight responsibilities for the RSLAF. However, the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) serve as co-chairs for the committee and hold considerable influence over decisions while the elected members of parliament serving on this committee are generally more peripheral.[186]

The President of Sierra Leone has executive authority over the security sector. Below the president is the National Security Council Coordinating

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[184] These committees were introduced by Sierra Leonean authorities and are intimately connected with relations of power in Chiefdoms at the local level. They, however, suffer from political manipulation and suffer from severe capacity constraints. The committees were "working well" under UNAMSIL oversight, but there was a "serious decline" in their functionality and operations after they worked under ONS (UNIOSIL report April 2006, 5).

[185] Membership in the defence policy committee includes the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, all programme mangers, the Director-General of the Ministry of Defence. The CDS is a political appointee (appointed by the President). The director-general comes from the civil service and carries the same status as the Chief of Defence Staff.

[186] Currently, in late 2011, about three quarters of the committee members were former (retired) military personnel (Author's personal interview with MoD officials and MPs on the committee, Freetown, February 2012)

Group, which is chaired by the National Security Coordinator (a political appointee by the President). The National Security Coordinator serves as the head of the Office of National Security (ONS). Regarding the issue of democratic oversight, the National Security Coordinator oversees both the Parliamentary Committees as well as the Ministry of Defence. This means, in practice, that the parliament oversight committee does not play a meaningful role in providing oversight of the security sector. In practice, the National Security Coordinator performs this role, since he/she is given greater access to strategic-level security intelligence from the ONS, CISU, RSLAF, MoD, Minister of Internal Affairs and the Sierra Leone Police.

The ONS plays the lead coordinating role among the country's state security institutions. Currently, the ONS is governed directly under the Office of the President (as opposed to falling under a ministry). An ONS official stated, "if we had gone under a ministry, there would have been an opportunity for a lot of political interference. So we would not have had the kind of leverage that we wanted to have."[187] According to an external review assessment conducted in 2007, the ONS "has established itself as one of the most effective government agencies in Sierra Leone and is now capable of performing the core requirements originally envisioned for it: preparing joint intelligence assessments; acting as a secretariat for national, provincial and district security committees; and providing strategic security advice to the President".[188] The ONS was robustly supported by the British government after the war ended. The office originally

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[187] Author's personal interview with ONS official, 3 November 2011, Freetown
[188] Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie & Peter Wilson, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, Output to Purpose Review, 28 May 2007, 6.

hosted between six or seven UK embedded advisors during the transitional period from 2001-2006. In 2007, the number of advisors in the ONS was reduced to only one or two UK advisors. The ONS was encouraged to adopt a broad human security approach for its national security framework.[189]

An inter-related post-war institution created with substantial UK material and ideational support was the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), as promulgated in the National Security Act of 2002.[190] CISU is responsible for gathering and analyzing internal and external threats to Sierra Leone's national security and coordinating with other state security institutions. The CISU and the ONS are, in the words of a UK intelligence advisor involved in setting up the CISU, essentially "scaled-down replicas of the UK intelligence machinery".[191] Both CISU and ONS are plagued by a lack of capacity to deal with the large scope of the activities that impact on Sierra Leone's national security.

However, the ONS and the CISU function in contradictory ways. The ONS remains directly accountable to the President of Sierra Leone and to date, there is no effective ministerial or Parliamentary oversight.[192] As both institutions continue to demonstrate their effectiveness at coordinating Sierra Leone's security institutions and centralizing security issues through robust policy research and intelligence-gathering, there is a risk that ONS will be

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[189] Ibid. 6

[190] The National Security and Central Intelligence Act was passed in Sierra Leone's Parliament 2002, leading to the establishment of the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU). The fact that this act was approved and passed so quickly speaks volumes about the degree of importance afforded to regulating the National Security architecture in the immediate post-conflict period.

[191] Robert Ashington-Pickett, National Security and Intelligence Reform in Sierra Leone-2000-2003, in Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, Working paper 10, 2008, 3.

[192] Biesheuvel et al 2007, 7

subject to political inference by an all too powerful President's Office. The ONS also requires considerable financial resources to maintain, and the government's inability to properly resource the ONS raises questions about the sustainability of the institution.[193] There is evidence of insufficient allocation of funding for personnel and facilities and the ONS has had some difficulty retaining qualified staff.[194] Additionally, both the ONS and CISU are structured to be a top-heavy, administratively-focused institution that have yet to embed meritocratic principles in the functioning of the institution. For instance, the President appoints junior and senior staff members in the ONS, which adversely affects the quality of its senior leadership positions. Additionally, according to a 2008 Wikileaks cable, low-paid officers in ONS are frequently at the receiving end of bribes by state officials and transnational smuggling networks, which hampers the overall professionalism of the institution and undermines other Anti-Corruption efforts.[195]

There is a constant tug-of-war going on between Sierra Leonean security and intelligence officials that stress the importance of addressing Sierra Leone's internal developmental challenges (poverty, inequality, corruption, youth unemployment and so on) and the international stakeholders that tend to fund

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[193] SSR Review Implementation Plan 2005. One senior MoD official in Sierra Leone told me, "if the British/Commonwealth pulls out, then those structures will crumble" (Author's interview, Freetown, 2 December 2011).

[194] Conteh 7. IMATT created procedures for recruiting personnel for intelligence gathering and analysis.

[195] 'Senator Nelson talks drugs, sofa, with President Koroma', dated 18 December 2008 http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08FREETOWN594

programmes related to transnational crime, anti-smuggling and drug and human trafficking, and maritime security.[196]

For instance, there is a perception among Sierra Leonean security officials that British and US government dictate certain policies and priorities to serve their own national and global interests.[197] The UK's Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has influenced the mandate of Sierra Leone's Serious Organised Crime Committee (SOCC) to focus on drug and human trafficking, and money laundering, which are questionable priorities in a context where socio-economic underdevelopment and poverty are systemic. The UK's funding comes with strings attached, based on UK priorities and conditions. Instead of an ONS that focuses on internal security—the ONS is examining threats external to

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[196] For instance, the US and UK governments want to capacitate the ONS and CISU to conduct surveillance of its maritime boundaries to prevent narcotics trafficking. The President therefore requested for additional assistance to improve their surveillance capacities given the lucrativeness of such initiatives. Around 2008, western governments (namely the UK's Serious Organised Crime Agency and the US' Drug Enforcement Administration) supported the establishment of a Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force (JDITF) in Sierra Leone. Chaired by Sierra Leone's Assistant Inspector General of Police (Director of Crime Services) Mr. Morie Lengor, the JDITF was established to fight drug trafficking. In 2009, the German government donated US$500,000 through the UN to provide equipment and three vehicles to assist the JDITF. On 30 November 2009, the UK SOCA provided three vehicles to the ONS/CISU for surveillance work with requests for three more. This has also created the need to seize home-grown cannabis production (see "Operation Green Hay") in order to demonstrate relevance. Following the 13 July 2008 plane bust, drug trafficking through Sierra Leone came to a halt. The JDITF redirected its efforts to supporting operations implemented in Guinea. Western governments have also supported a West African Coast Initiative (WACI) in 2009, which will involve coordination between transnational crime units in the governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. See for instance, 'Senator Nelson talks drugs, sofa, with President Koroma', dated 18 December 2008 (http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08FREETOWN594) and http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09FREETOWN462.html.

[197] Comfort Ero, Sierra Leone: The Legacies of Authoritarianism and Political Violence, in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.) Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, London: Zed Books, 2003, 232-252. For example, the UK's SOCA remained active in Sierra Leone through 2009 by attending the Government of Sierra Leone's Integrated Intelligence Group meetings, providing operational support to the JDITF survellience and busts and conducted its own investigations outside of the ONS/CISU on British nationals (for example Mohib Shamel) involved in mining activities and narco-trafficking from Columbia to Guinea to Europe (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09FREETOWN462.html)

Sierra Leone that will solicit more support from British and American international security budgets. According to ONS officials, "we would like to direct funds to our internal problems such as public order, law and order and corruption [mitigation]".[198]

National Security and Defence Policy
A UK intelligence advisor from Sierra Leone Security Sector Program (SILSEP), Robert Ashington-Pickett drafted the outline of the National Security Act and National Security Policy between 1999 and 2000.[199] The National Security Policy was finalised by the Office of National Security, with assistance provided by UK advisors in February 2000.[200] According to one external review, the ONS was unable to secure input from other security ministries during the formulation and vetting of draft national security policies.[201] The role of UK advisors was also "critical" to supporting the process. Their strategy also involved marginalizing some political appointees to security institutions that were unsupportive of transparent and professional security institution building.[202]

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[198] Author's confidential interview with Office of National Security Official 16 December 2011, Freetown

[199] Robert Ashington-Pickett, National Security and Intelligence Reform in Sierra Leone-2000-2003, in Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, Working Paper 10, 2008, 2. Ashington-Pickett served as the lone Intelligence and Security Advisor to the Office of National Security and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) in Sierra Leone on behalf of the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 2000-2003 (Ibid, 2)

[200] Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie & Peter Wilson, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, Output to Purpose Review, 28 May 2007, 9; Osman Gbla, The Role of External Actors in Sierra Leone's Security Reform, in Tunde Zack-Williams, When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in the Sierra Leonean Civil War, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 126

[201] Ibid.

[202] Ashington-Pickett 2008, 3.

The Defence White Paper outlines three defence missions for the new RSLAF: to defend the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone; to provide military aid to civil power (internal security agencies) when required and activities in the wider national interest, notably peace support operations abroad (peacekeeping). The Defence Paper identifies corruption as one of the major threats to Sierra Leone's national security. The 2002 Defence White Paper notes, "corruption is endemic throughout Sierra Leone and remains the single most destructive force to the country's future well-being…preventing the rich natural resources of the country being developed to their full potential for the benefit of all".[203] What is missing here is a discussion of the structures, actors and processes that cause the "spoils logic" in the Sierra Leonean state.

The UK SILSEP team contributed to the final draft of the Defence White Paper, in terms of content, style and presentation.[204] However, there was considerable tension between authorities in London and Freetown over the nature and scope of the National Defence Paper (2003). During initial consultations with Sierra Leoneans stakeholders, Sierra Leoneans wanted to focus on the troop conditions and welfare.[205] However, the Joint Support Commander of IMATT disagreed with the Sierra Leonean input. According to the former Deputy Secretary of Policy and Procurement in Sierra Leone's

[203] Government of Sierra Leone, Defence White Paper: Informing the People, Director of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, July 2003, 6.

[204] Al-Hassan Kharamoh Kondeh, Formulating Sierra Leone's Defence White Paper, in Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (eds.), Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, 2008, 4.

[205] For example, during consultations in Kono and Kabala, Sierra Leonean parliamentarians stressed the importance of improving the living conditions of army personnel and also asked for a review of the design and structure of the *Operation Pebu*. They also requested increased government and international support for improving logistics and communication in RSLAF. See Ibid.

Ministry of Defence, IMATT accused the Sierra Leonean authors of the report of making up "imaginary" problems "aimed at 'discrediting' the efforts of the military high-command" (then under executive trusteeship by IMATT).[206] Following the first draft of the report, completed by the Defence Policy and Operations Committee, the report was circulated to the SILSEP team in London for input. The report went through a second draft following these consultations and was eventually approved after significant input from UK officials.

Sierra Leone's Security Sector Reform Process (2003-2005)
The UK supported a Sierra Leonean consultative process to brainstorm new approaches for post-war security provision. Security Sector Reform consultations were organized by the ONS and included civil society groups (mostly academic experts from Fourah Bay College and Campaign for Good Governance) as well as traditional authorities. Fully funded by the UK, Sierra Leonean ONS officials led the process and viewed the SSR Review consultations as a "shopping list" to give to the UK to receive the maximum amount of funding from Britain and the Government of Sierra Leone. As a result of adopting this approach, there was no clear sense of priorities and which issue should be tackled in what order.[207] The Sierra Leonean SSR Implementation follow-up Plan called for a total cost for planned activities of US$93.1 million (73 of the 148 security related activities were considered to be high priority issues).[208] When time came to fund the Security Sector Implementation Plan,

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[206] Al-Hassan Kharamoh Kondeh 2009, 4.
[207] White 2009, 115
[208] Author's confidential interview with ONS official, Freetown, 12 December 2011.
Additionally, a second SSR review was launched on 8 September 2011 by President Koroma in

approximately £2 million (US$1.65 million) was allocated from funds, which were procured solely from DfID.[209] The funding was administered through the newly built Office of National Security (ONS). However, the funds were channeled through UK advisors that embedded in the ONS at the time.[210] Additionally, DfID introduced the guidelines for how Sierra Leone's executive leadership should distribute and access the funds.[211]

Memorandum of Understanding

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, one component that guided the British post-war macro-blueprint for Sierra Leone and provided the general framework for managing the relationship between governments. The MoU was written by UK legal and governance experts in DfID's headquarters in London. The benchmarks embedded in the MoU were created without local involvement and were very vague and generic. With respect to the RSLAF and MoD, the MoU

Freetown (UNIPSIL report, 14 March 2012, 5). However, the financial costs associated with conducting the review were procured from external sources (the Commonwealth). The financial assistance provided was substantial that some Sierra Leonean security experts left their positions to work on the Review because it paid more (Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, 2 December 2011).

[209] The Government of Sierra Leone did not contribute any of this funding. Once the funds were transferred to the ONS bank account, decisions were made by the National Security Council Coordinating Committee on how to allocate the funds (Author's confidential interview with ONS official, Freetown, 3 November 2011

[210] Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie & Peter Wilson, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, Output to Purpose Review, 28 May 2007, 8; Author's personal interview with ONS official, Freetown, 3 November 2011. At this level, only the National Security Coordinator (Kellie Conteh) had authority to manage these funds once they were disbursed from UK advisors.

[211] Each security institution was required to prepare proposals to the NSCCG to access the funds. This allowed Britain to maintain oversight over the funds. According to one ONS official involved in the process, about 70% of the initial funding from 2005 went to building the capacity of the Sierra Leone police, with the remaining allocated to firefighting, military and the ministries of internal affairs and defence. (Author's personal interview with ONS official, Freetown, 3 November 2011)

stated that "HMG has stated as one of its core aims the building up of a restructured and professional Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) which is able to protect the external security and the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone, and which would be accountable to the Government of Sierra Leone and to the people of Sierra Leone."[212] Unfortunately, very little was actually known about the MoU within senior and junior ranks of Sierra Leone's the military and ministry of defence. There were no clear guidelines in place (and those that were there were not well communicated) to govern relationships at the senior and junior level positions in RSLAF and IMATT commanders and DfID advisors embedded in Sierra Leone's nascent security institutions. Additionally, there were no organized programmes to prepare IMATT officers for their tours of duty in Sierra Leone or to provide them with basic courses in *Krio,* Sierra Leone's *lingua franca.*[213] This led to confusion and cultural tensions throughout the relationship, and created resentment among Sierra Leonean senior officers in the Ministry of Defence.[214]

RSLAF Benchmarks from MoU

Adapted from Paul Balogun and Lansana Gberie, Assessing the performance of the long-term partnership agreement (MoU) between the Governments of Sierra Leone and UK, August 2005

2003	2004	2005
RSLAF legislation in place by June 2003. *Had not been met in 2003*	Government agrees plan of action for implementation of MOD functional review, by mid	Government publishes strategy for continued reduction in RSLAF numbers, in line with

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[212] Balogun and Gberie, 62

[213] Author's confidential interview with IMATT officer, Freetown, March 2012

[214] Author's confidential interviews with RSLAF officers, Freetown, November 2011 See also Chapter 7 "Assessments".

Detailed plan for right-sizing the RSLAF in place by end 2003. *Not met. Eventually met in 2005*	year. *Not met. Slow progress on implementation.*	Security Sector Review. *Delayed but later met*

These tensions highlight an often tense relationship between the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence and IMATT and the fact that Britain was perceived as driving the reform process. During interviews conducted by the author with Defence officials and senior RSLAF officers, it was confirmed that there was "little substantive engagement with Government of Sierra Leone in the drafting and content of the MoU".[215] Few political and military officials in Sierra Leone had any knowledge about the contents of the MoU. Despite rhetorical recognition for "local ownership" embedded in the agreement, the most problematic aspect of the MoU was the lack of buy-in and translation into inclusive participation in both the design and implementation phases.[216]

The benchmarks for the MoU were devised in November 2002 were written by DfID officials based in London; these benchmarks were adopted and approved without any substantive consultation from Sierra Leonean

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[215] Paul Balogun and Lansana Gberie, Assessing the performance of the long-term partnership agreement (MoU) between the Governments of Sierra Leone and UK, August 2005, 3. The assessment notes: 'Rather the document reflected HMG's then existing strategy under its Conflict Prevention Pool Strategy and DFID senior management's assessment of what was needed'

[216] A senior MoD official told me, "the standard operating procedures were supposed to be there to guide the relationship [between Government and IMATT] but none of these were made know to the military. That is why the crafting of the MoU became a problem. That MoU did not go through the [national] processes in the country. I wanted to look at the content. The fact that we were in dire need, we had to let the British come in the way they wanted. If you could bring the same MoU in the country today, I will tell you that it will go through a lot of pruning. So many things happened behind the scenes as far as the international community was concerned" (Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011).

authorities.[217] In particular, none of the defence related benchmarks for RSLAF had involved consultation with Sierra Leone's own MoD before their approval. Indeed, this explains why very few senior and junior officials in Sierra Leone's Defence Ministry understood, let alone knew much about the content and principles outlined in the MoU. Discursively, the MoU had stressed "national ownership", but in practice little effort was made to translate these ideals into meaningful engagement and practical application in Sierra Leone.[218]

Transmission Mechanisms
As Chapter Two outlined, liberal peace interventions aim to influence, shape and manage outcomes on the ground by shaping key policy documents, providing "experts" to implement these policies, selecting specific state interlocutors and placing them in positions of leadership and stepping in to *de facto* executive government roles when and as needed. Before discussing each mechanism, it is necessary to provide the background and context behind the British-led

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[217] Paul Balogun and Lansana Gberie, Assessing the performance of the long-term partnership agreement (MoU) between the Governments of Sierra Leone and UK, August 2005, vi.

[218] In 2006, international practices on "good aid practices" were being reformulated and the benchmarks changed as well in support of a multi-donor coordination strategy for aid policy. After extensive negotiations, an Improve Governance and Accountability Pact was negotiated and agreed in July 2006 between the Government, African Development Bank, DfID, the European Commission, and the World Bank to re-define and coordinate western benchmarks on aid. Amendments to the agreement were made in July 2006 when the UK and international donors decided to amalgamate their conditionalities under one multi-donor arrangement called the *Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP)* for *Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in Sierra Leone.* Essentially, the Pact coordinated donor's aid around an agreed number of required governance reforms in corruption, transparency, financial management, civil service, service delivery and elections. On paper, the Sierra Leoneans government made commitments to meet "ten critical governance and accountability reforms" over the following year and donors pledged to "improve aid effectiveness and strengthen harmonization and coordination in support of these reforms" and "to implement the provisions of the Paris Declaration, especially those related to flexibility, ownership and harmonization"(DfiD, Improved Governance and Accountability Pact, 2006, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sierra-leone-igap.pdf). Eventually, the Pact was supplemented by a joint DFID/European Community's Country Strategy for Sierra Leone (2007-2012), which supported Pillar I of the PRSP, focusing on the promotion of good governance, peace and security. (Michael Kargbo 2012, 69)

International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) as the main implementer of SSR military reforms.

International Military Assistance Training Team
The International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) was initially mandated to restructure and train the RSLAF for a three-year contract with a budget of about £30 million. IMATT's "end goal" being to "create an affordable, accountable, responsible, meritocratic and admired military force that is led, manned, trained and equipped to maintain territorial integrity of Sierra Leone".[219] IMATT's approach was informed by a problematic overarching assumption that the problems of RSLAF could be addressed by an overhaul of management and the provision of western training. However, the tasks ranged from "reducing the army's size, making it more military proficient and better trained; overhauling its command and control structures and staffing; introducing new training; making it democratically accountable both to the government and improving its civil relations; and delineating its roles and responsibilities".[220]

In 2000-2001, discussions were underway to transition "BMATT" to "IMATT", which would remain British-led with international military personnel provided from Commonwealth member states. Freetown was relatively stable in late 2000, and an additional 1,000 Sierra Leonean soldiers were trained in late December 2000.[221] In May 2000, British military commander Brigadier David

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[219] IMATT website, 2006

[220] Jeremy Ginifer, 'The challenges of security sector reform processes in democratic transitions: the case of Sierra Leone', *Democratization*, 13:5, 2006, 799

[221] These soldiers were detained by Nigerians ECOMOG peacekeepers after the AFRC/RUF were booted out of Freetown. ECOMOG was suspicious of their loyalty, so they detained them in Pandema (which was already overcrowded) and the National Stadium pool. It is fair to say that

Richards began to significantly shape and influence the senior command of RSLAF.

The deployment of international staff serving in IMATT personnel followed such that by 2001, there were about 130 military personnel in Sierra Leone serving in IMATT (80% of whom were British military personnel). "Operation Silkman" commenced on 31 July 2002, which represented the commencement of IMATT's transition to a more entrenched role in tactical training at the company and battalion levels in RSLAF.

As IMATT evolved into a more entrenched role in RSLAF, the British military began to shape policy and approaches for military restructuring. According to UK Ministry of Defence, IMATT's mission expanded "to assist with the transformation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) into a self-sustaining, democratically accountable and affordable force in order that it can meet Sierra Leone's defence missions and tasks and to facilitate the phased disengagement and withdrawal of IMATT."[222]

De Facto Executive Authority

One of the more controversial aspects of IMATT's mission was the designation of the British IMATT commander as "Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone" (MAGOSL). In essence, this role afforded the IMATT

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the majority were Mende and Southeasterners, though there were northern based tribes in the mix as well (Colonel Tom Carew was the most senior Sierra Leonean officer at the time). The training included basic Infantry, Specialist and Staff and Leadership Training (Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000).

[222] IMATT website 2006, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.operations.mod.uk/africa/imattsl.htm

commander with *de facto* executive authority over many, if not all of the key decisions related to the RSLAF during the initial transition period (during the first four years of its mission (2000-2004), including policy issues related to personnel matters, senior promotions, procurement and defence policy. Although Brigadier Carew was theoretically Chief of Defence Staff, his rank was, in practice, subordinate to the MAGOSL.

Additionally, senior and some junior British IMATT personnel were embedded as commanders in the five most senior positions in RSLAF at the Brigade and Battalion levels. The *de facto* executive authority afforded British officers the opportunity to marginalise any senior Sierra Leonean officers that stepped out of line with UK's vision. Although Carew was promoted to Major-General in 2002 and served as the CDS until November 2003, his role was mostly symbolic.[223] Initially, a British IMATT commander (Brigadier Richards) who headed the Joint Force Command and British Colonel heading the Joint Support Command (Mike Dent) were key decision-makers for dictating RSLAF policy.[224]

IMATT's role as "Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone" (MAGOSL) was controversial within the RSLAF military hierarchy because the IMATT Commander was given a near *carte de blache,* which allowed him to

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[223] It is also important to note that from 2002-2007, President Kabbah served as Minister of Defence. Therefore, IMATT commander/Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone dealt directly with President Kabbah. Joe C. Blell, a former diplomat who served in the Nigerian High Commission served as Kabbah's deputy defence minister, presumably to aid the relationship with the Nigerians who were playing a large role militarily in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and early 2000.

[224] During the initial phase, it was clear that Dent had considerable influence within the ministry of defence. He designed key post-war policies including the MRP, reviewed below.

influence senior and junior appointments in Sierra Leone's MoD.[225] This role allowed the British to shape military-building efforts in Sierra Leone with a large degree of autonomy. There were limits to this authority. IMATT had greater difficulty influencing dismissals of senior officers that had the support of the President of Sierra Leone.[226]

Meanwhile, a handful of junior officers and a few senior officers that were loyal to IMATT's vision or to specific personnel were fast-tracked promoted.[227] For instance, three captains were promoted to the junior rank of Major in November 2001. In June 2002, the three majors were then promoted to

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[225] For instance, in the early days of IMATT, Major R.B Harleston became one of IMATT's so-called "blue-eyed-boys". It was widely believed that Major Harleston was providing information about his colleagues to IMATT to gain an advantage against them and to earn an early promotion. Harleston was eventually promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 2005. He was delayed promotion by the SLPP government on the grounds that he was involved in the extra-judicial killing of six soldiers accused of robbery during the AFRC rule (Author's confidential email correspondence with MoD official, March 2013). Lieutenant Colonel Harleston was subsequently promoted to full Colonel on 30 April 2012 ('Promulgate promotion in RSLAF', *Awoko*, 7 May 2012, http://awoko.org/2012/05/07/promulgate-promotion-in-rslaf/ (Accessed 30 May 2012)

[226] For instance, Brigadier Robert Yira Koroma (Assistant CDS Logistics and Support and Commander of Joint Force Command) was an outspoken critic of IMATT policy, particularly Operation Pebu (see below). However, he had the support of then President Kabbah, and therefore IMATT could not marginalise him. Koroma was appointed only later as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in 2010. Another case in point was General Sam-Mbomah, who was Lieutenant Colonel when President Kabbah was reinstated in 1998. Mbomah was close to Kabbah because he had an elder brother who was a friend of Kabbah's. Mbomah is an ethnic Mende who was not involved in any previous coup attempts. Since the SLPP wanted a Mende to head the postwar army, Mbomah was Kabbah's first choice. When Mbomah returned to Sierra Leone in 1999, he was replaced by a Nigerian Colonel as Colonel Adjutant and Quartermaster. Therefore Mbomah was third in line to Brigadier General Khobe. In December 2000, Mbomah and two others were promoted as Colonels and Carew to Brigadier. In June 2002, he was promoted as Brigadier-General and appointed Commander Joint Force, which took effect in November 2002. In December 2003, he replaced General Carew as CDS and was promoted to Major-General. IMATT had made initial moves to try to replace Mbomah with Brigadier Alfred Nelson-Williams, but this was impossible due to his support among the Sierra Leone executive. Instead, Nelson-Williams, who was an IMATT favourite, was appointed as deputy CDS until he was later appointed CDS in 2010 (author's confidential interviews)

[227] According to Ministry of Defence figures in 1999, there were 37 senior military officers in RSLAF in 1999. (NCDDR archives, 'AFSL Strength Summary 1996-1999', obtained and accessed 12 February 2012).

the rank of Lieutenant Colonels.[228] The embedded British commanders in the ministry and RSLAF brigade levels deliberately encouraged Sierra Leonean junior officers to provide intelligence on senior personnel. These junior officers became known as considered "IMATT's blue-eyed-boys" by the rest of the senior leadership for their sycophantism.[229]

The British IMATT commander had executive control over personnel matters and could sideline senior officers thought to be "corrupt" or "ineffective" during the reform process. From 2003-2004, IMATT commander Brigadier Adrian Freer served as "Military Advisor" advised President Kabbah on key strategic military operational planning, resource management, personnel policy and helped produce key policy documents (including the defense white papers and vision documents like the RSLAF Road Map 2010).[230] Brigadier Freer could (and often did) go directly to the President to provide advice on national security policy, long-term planning or personnel strategy and bypassed RSLAF's senior leadership including the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).[231] The commander of

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[228] One of these officers, Lieutenant Colonel Yanka was described as a "blue-eyed boy" of the British. In early 2002, at the behest of most senior RSLAF officers, was interviewed over British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) on a UK warship in Sierra Leonean water announcing that RSLAF lacked competent officers to command the military. Another, Lieutenant Colonel S.E.T. Marah (now 5th Infantry Brigade Commander) and a third senior officer Lieutenant Colonel B.T. Massaquoi (4th Infantry Brigade Commander), were very close with British IMATT officers which enabled these officers to climb the hierarchy more swiftly than what is traditionally the norm in the RSLAF. Lieutenant Colonel Marah led Sierra Leone's contingent of 53 peacekeepers in the UNAMID in South Darfur in late December 2009. In May 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Marah and Lieutenant Colonel Massaquoi were among a number of senior officers promoted to full Colonel. http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/printer_200520205.shtml (Accessed 5 November 2012).

[229] Author's confidential interviews with senior RSLAF officers, Freetown, December 2011

[230] IMATT developed an RSLAF 'development plan' or 'road map' that goes as far as 2010. This included a three-year plan to downsize and right-size to an affordable size. Almost all funding for this phase came from the Africa Conflict Prevention pool.

[231] Don Saunders, 'Taming a Tiger: Developing a Professional Army in Post-War Sierra Leone', in Rescuing a Failed State, 2008, 105

IMATT had an unprecedented amount of influence in dictating CDS promotional decisions in Sierra Leone's post-colonial history. It was evident to most within the MoD that the CDS position was mainly symbolic whilst real power to influence and shape RSLAF policy was in IMATT Headquarters on Leicester Peak, Freetown.[232]

The fact that the IMATT Commander could circumvent Sierra Leonean Defence authorities and their internal chain of command caused resentment among senior Sierra Leonean military officials.[233] In late December 2005, 77 senior officers that fell out of favour with IMATT and were compulsory discharged without broad-based consultation in MoD, which created disaffection within the armed forces.[234] Additionally, IMATT officials could decide on procurement on their own without RSLAF input or consultation.[235]

British soldiers also occupied executive and advisory posts within the RSLAF's Joint Force Command, and Joint Support Command, including nine advisory posts in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Six IMATT advisors, from the rank captain to lieutenant colonel, were deployed with each RSLAF brigade to assist with training, planning, personnel and operations.[236] Other executive positions included the J3 (Operations) and J7 (Joint Training) advisors at Headquarters Joint Force Command (located at Cockerill) and J1 advisor

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[232] Confidential email correspondence with senior RSLAF officer, March 2013. Leicester Hill where IMATT headquarters is located (and surrounding area where the US Embassy and the EU Office are also located) became known as "IMATT" by local Sierra Leoneans.

[233] Al-Hassan Kharamoh Kondeh, Formulating Sierra Leone's Defence White Paper, in Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (eds.), Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, 2008, 7.

[234] UNIOSIL report 2006, 5

[235] Kondeh, 6

[236] Mark Malan, Security and Military Reform, Chapter 5, 97-98

(Personnel and Administration) at the Defence Ministry (located in downtown Freetown).[237] The officers wielded considerable autonomy to influence the policy formation in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Sierra Leonean leadership staff in the Ministry of Defence were subordinate to IMATT personnel embedded in the Ministry's headquarters. According to one MoD official, "the advisors were really 'pulling the strings' and even directing on promotions, operations, deployment, and the location, structure and material design of Operation Pebu" (see below on how this played out).[238]

Under British leadership, the IMATT commander had executive authority to determine policies related to size, composition, down-sizing and right-sizing of the RSLAF. One of the first policies that IMATT instituted was a compulsory retirement age at 55 years of age.[239] In the 2004 "Core Review", IMATT proposed a further reduction from 10,600 in 2005 to 8,500 troops by 2007. Although the Government delayed the approval of the proposal as long as they could, Sierra Leone's executive and parliamentary leaders were pressured to

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[237] Additionally, legal and medical advisors were involved up to 2004-2005.

[238] Author's confidential correspondence with senior MoD official, Freetown, March 2013

[239] This policy continues to be applied. In June 2013, four of the RSLAF's six Brigadier Generals were forced into retirement on attainment of age 55 and replaced by four Colonels promoted to Brigadier. Retirees include the army's second-in-command deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Ali Sesay, Brigadier Daniel Y. Sesay (Assistant Chief of Staff Support and Logistics).Brigadier J.A.O. Tucker, (Assistant Chief of Staff Personnel and Training) and Brigadier General Komba Mondeh (former assistant chief of staff for planning and operations). Officers replacing them are Brigadier Mamadi M. Keita (new assistant chief of staff Operation and Plan), Brigadier Brima Sesay (new Joint Force Command), Colonel D.T. Taluva and Commodore M.B. Miller (Navy) (Augustine Samba, 'Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces explains military retirements', *Awareness Times*, 4 June 2013). Other senior officers promoted to Brigadier include Moses Bayemi Miller and new colonels are Henry Sigsmond Jomo, M.O Mansaray, A.Y Kargbo, Salieu Kanu, P.K. Lavahun, A.M Koroma and Dr. S. Sahr. Several junior officers (Majors) were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (see Dennis Jones, 'RSLAF: From mass retirement to mass promotion, *Sierra Express*, 23 June 2013, http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/58223 (Accessed 1 July 2013)

approve the decision in mid-2006.[240] The "down-sizing" was again set into motion after the All People's Congress (APC) won the August 2007 elections.[241] In late 2007, the government approved the IMATT plan to "rightsize" to 8,500 troops.[242] Senior members in Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defence believed in the prudence of setting limits on the number of troops, but with additional considerations on improving mobile capabilities and defence technology.[243]

During the tenure of its executive role in RSLAF, the British instituted an appraisal system in RSLAF to introduce more accountability, professionalism and discipline in the force—a mechanism that had been absent throughout most of RSLAF's history.[244] The kind of system introduced required commanders to assess their subordinates on a yearly basis and report their evaluations in military personnel files stored at the Armed Forces Personnel Center. The appraisal

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[240] Government of Sierra Leone(led by ONS) signaled intentions "rightsize" the RSLAF in its Security Sector Review (2005) notes that an accountable and affordable defence system calls for "a smaller, more flexible RSLAF (which has an external focus), about 10,500 by 2007, a larger SLP of about 9,500…and the principal work of these forces need to be both intelligence-led and intelligence-supported by a well-developed and better equipped intelligence apparatus to ensure the appropriate focus of scarce resources." In February 2006, the RSLAF's size remained at 10,600 military personnel in accordance with the Sierra Leone plan, and IMATT's plan to reduce the force to 8,500 was "under consideration by the Government" through April 2006 (UNIOSIL report, 26 April 2006, 5).

[241] First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2006/269, April 28, 2006, 5) "The Ministry of Defence, with the support of the United Kingdom-led International Military Advisory and Training Team, was conducting a review of the overall structures of the armed forces to achieve cost effectiveness and sustainability, without compromising the capacity to carry out its constitutionally mandated tasks and responsibilities" (S/2006/695, August 29, 2006, 5).

[242] Report of the Secretary general on UNAMSIL, S/2007/704, December 4, 2007

[243] According to a senior defence official "If numbers were reduced to the size of Ghana's armed forces, other force multiplies would be required, such as air mobility, sophisticated communication" (Author's personal interview with MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011; see also Balogun and Gberie 2005, 63).

[244] I have yet to find any evidence of the UK introducing internal system of this kind in the five previous attempts at military-building in Sierra Leone. The Literature on RSLAF's history does not mention anything about an internal appraisal system created either by the British or Sierra Leoneans. There was a poor record-keeping practice in the RSLMF/RSLAF throughout most of its post-colonial history (see Cox 1976; Turay and Abraham 1978)

system was to be used when making decisions on promotions and dismissals in the RSLAF.[245] Additionally, the Board of Inquiry rules and Court-Martial procedure and rules were written by IMATT advisors and approved by President Kabbah in 2002 (and later implemented in 2005-2006).[246]

By 2007, executive powers were beginning to be handed over to Sierra Leonean authorities.[247] The advisory positions were limited to top-level senior staff positions (i.e. advisors to Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense, Commander Joint Force Command) and technical advisors (i.e. Joint Operations Cell advisors). IMATT retained considerable influence over the RSLAF in 2008 despite operating on a budget of less than $1 million (about £1.46 million). As described in a leaked US diplomatic cable in 2008, "The IMATT is pulling back from authority and control over all decision making in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, promoting Republic of Sierra Leone armed forces senior leaders to assume more control and authority over decision making on personnel, missions, budget, etc. IMATT Brigadier General Powe highlighted that IMATT members are working more closely at the Brigade level on operational and strategic planning, personnel, and finance and [are] pulling away from tactics training at the company and battalion levels".[248]

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[245] For the rank-and-file, decisions on promotions are still made based on nepotistic considerations as opposed to merit (Author's confidential email correspondence with a senior MoD official, March 2013).

[246] The RSLAF now has internal accountability mechanisms to deal with justice related issues in the army.

[247] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 145.

[248] On 20 April 2006, outgoing British High Commissioner John Mitchener announced that IMATT would remain "to 2010 and beyond" (Wikileaks, US Ambassador and IMATT commander meet, 10 September, 2008, http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08FREETOWN447/)

IMATT's presence went from its all-time high 130 personnel in 2001 to 115 in 2003 to 110 in 2006 to a steady decline of 45 officers in December 2011 (9 of whom were Canadian Forces Personnel). There was never a clear timetable for the phasing IMATT out of Sierra Leone. IMATT and DfID were working on a joint Work Plan in early 2006, which aimed to develop an exit strategy. However, the IMATT commander did not support the plan and an exit strategy was never developed.[249]

While the direct influence of the British on the RSLAF as a whole waned from 2007 as IMATT funding decreased, the British remained highly influential in shaping policy and high-level and junior-level promotions and rank designations in RSLAF and MoD. The IMATT commander, who remained as Military Advisor to the Government, became an *ex-officio* member on the Number One Board that adjudicates on promotions for Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel and above.[250] Additionally, the IMATT commander retained considerable influence over all high-level appointments.[251] Additionally, major decisions were still being drafted by IMATT throughout 2010-12. For instance,

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[249] UNIOSIL first report, 28 April 2006;

[250] Author's personal interview with a senior RSLAF officer, Freetown, 26 February 2013

[251] For instance, the promotion and appointment of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Milton, a Sandhurst trained cadet to Brigadier General and from commander of infantry brigade in Makeni to Commander Joint Forces in July 2012 was influenced by the British. The Commander-in-Chief (President Koroma) wanted to appoint an officer who had operational experience to that post but this decision was not approved by the British. The British went through the Minister of Defence (a loyal interlocutor) to convince the President to appoint Milton (which he was able to do successfully). Brigadier General Milton was subsequently promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff on 3 June 2013 (Augustine Samba, 'Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces explains military retirements', *Awareness Times*, 4 June 2013). Therefore Brigadier Milton is second-in-command of RSLAF and owes at least partial loyalty to the British for their intervention with the President. Another case in point was the February 2013 promotions. Three officers were approved by the President to be promoted to Colonel. But IMATT complained to the President that one of them had an altercation with IMATT in 2006 and that officer was not fit to be a Colonel (Author's confidential email interview with MoD official, March 2012)

the RSLAF "Road Map" (2002) and Core Review (2004) was written and championed by British IMATT officers with no substantive role for RSLAF/MoD despite being publically heralded as "locally developed and owned".[252] IMATT continued to shape important policies from 2007-20013, including the revised version of the Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS), which was initially revised in late 2007, and at the time of this writing was under consideration by the Minister of Defence.[253] The TACOS version advanced by senior RSLAF officers in 2008 provided more generous retirement benefits to current and retired servicemen while the IMATT Commander insisted that a more conservative interpretation of "provisions" be applied on the grounds that the Government budget could not afford extensive retirement packages.[254] Senior Sierra Leonean staff officials viewed the change as external interference and micro-management by IMATT.

As of the end of 2012, IMATT continued to hold a veto over training decisions as the primary funding agencies for the Horton Academy and to some extent for opportunities abroad.[255] Additionally, since RSLAF is dependent on British and American military for transportation/logistics to move troops from Sierra Leone to other war theatres being deployed on UN or AU peacekeeping missions (see below), these Western continues hold a veto power on the

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[252] The Core Review dealt with RSLAF's troop number, logistics, personnel and equipment. For instance, the Review called for a reduction in size of the RSLAF to 8,500 while the Sierra Leonean authorities had advanced an initial figure of 10,500 (Author's confidential interview with MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011)

[253] The RSLAF's terms and conditions of service remain woefully outdated, dating back to 1965. After approval from the minister, a new bill was under consideration in parliament in 2013-2014.

[254] Author's confidential email correspondence with RSLAF officer, March 2013

[255] IMATT recently decided to cut funding for staff courses by 20% (author's confidential correspondence with RSLAF officer, March 2013)

operational viability of RSLAF. A post-2012 exit strategy was devised for IMATT around 2010 as peaceful November 2012 Presidential, Parliamentary and local government elections became one of the significant benchmarks for finalizing IMATT's exit strategy.

State Interlocutors

Before the inception of IMATT, President Tejan Kabbah had appointed a Nigerian military officer Brigadier Maxwell Khobe as RSLAF's Chief of Defence Staff. The small group of officers that remained loyal to Kabbah reported directly to Brigadier Khobe as head of the army. One of Sierra Leone's most senior military officers, Colonel Tom Carew had been sent on a Defence and Strategic course in China earlier and returned to Sierra Leone in April 2000 to assist Khobe in running the RSLAF. When Brigadier Khobe fell ill suddenly, he requested for Colonel Carew to act in his behalf as interim CDS. However, after Khobe died suddenly in late April, Carew was appointed acting Chief of Defence Staff by Kabbah. In December 2000, Colonel Carew was promoted Brigadier-General and his appointment was substantiated by President Kabbah based on advice given to him by Brigadier Richards.[256]

According to an informed RSLAF military official, who at the time was among the junior officers in Sierra Leone's Ministry of Defence, "all policies or decisions taken by Carew had originated from IMATT and were given to him [Carew] for his signature. There is a story that Carew kept signing documents

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[256] Author's confidential correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013

without proof-reading them until he signed his own retirement."[257] Later in 2003, Major-General Carew began to question IMATT's policies; IMATT subsequently labeled Carew as a "corrupt officer" and persuaded President Kabbah to compulsory retire him.[258]

A considerable number of senior officers were deemed either as "untrustworthy" or perceived as "corrupt, unprofessional, poorly trained and illiterate" and therefore were viewed under suspicion by President Kabbah dating back to his conflict with the military and eventual military coup that ousted him in May 1997.[259] For example, senior officer, Gabriel Mani who served as Director of Intelligence at the former Defence Headquarters in 1997 had been promoted to Brigadier General under the AFRC. Mani wanted to retain that rank after the war ended. In 1999-2000, as per the Lomé accord, Mani was offered a position in the Ministry of Defence's Training and Plans department.[260] In 2000, Brigadier Richards informed Mani that he could retain his appointment as long as he reverted back to his previous rank of Colonel.[261] Colonel Mani refusal to be "demoted" put him at odds with the British. Subsequently, Mani was a vocal critic of British policies in 2000-20001. IMATT saw Mani as a threat and engineered a story that Mani was unlawfully building up a large cache of arms and ammunition at his private residence and had intent to organize a

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[257] Author's confidential correspondence with a senior defence official in Freetown, November 2011

[258] The government had no choice but to give in to the British demand. To show his gratitude to Carew, President Kabbah appointed him Deputy High Commissioner to Nigeria.

[259] 'IMATT connives with local crooks to commit fraud', *The Standard Times*, 1 October 2003

[260] IRIN, 'Ex-AFRC/SLA offered army posts, 21 July 2000, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=3509 (Assessed 4 December 2011)

[261] Author's confidential email correspondence with senior RSLAF officer, March 2013

military coup, thus setting the pretext for the Government of Sierra Leone to issue a warrant for his arrest.[262]

Britain used its executive authority to align with junior officers they deemed to be reliable interlocutors and sought to bring them into conformity with Britain's vision during the restructuring process. According to former Chief of Defence Staff Alfred Nelson-Williams, the British viewed these junior officers:

> …as the best chance of consolidating reform efforts to wash away the stains left by their predecessors, believing that the new officers had the flexibility, open-mindedness and idealism of young officers everywhere. However, these young officers viewed senior officers with contempt, as they mistakenly believed their only reason for joining the army was to rid the Sierra Leone army of the legacy of such officers.[263]

Additionally, at the end of December 2005, seventy-seven senior officers were compulsory discharged. This decision was made by IMATT as an Executive order. British Officers claim that these officers were discharged based on age, performance and rank, but unofficially, most of them had fallen out of step with IMATT's policies and were deemed as "ineffective" or as obstructivists.[264] One example was Brigadier-General Mustapha M.K Dumbuya, who served as Brigade Commander of 1st Infantry Battalion in Port Loko in early to mid-2000. Immediately after the arrival of the British, Colonel Dent

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[262] Author's confidential interview with senior RSLAF officer, Freetown, December 2011
According to the BBC, Mani was arrested in 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1381323.stm (Assessed 30 July 2011). Gabriel Mani was appointed by the APC government in 2007 as Director of the CISU.

[263] Nelson-Williams 2009, 8

[264] According to a senior officer, "those that were in disagreement with the British policies were compulsorily retired on the grounds that they were "ineffective" (Author's confidential correspondence with current MoD official, March 2013)

elevated Brigadier-General Dumbuya to Director of Land Operations at Joint Force Command. However, after being was investigated for embezzlement and fraud, he was demoted to Director of Research in the Ministry of Defence and was kept under a close watch by the British until he could be retired.[265] The British government is able to continue to shape RSLAF policy decisions through its interlocutors positioned in within Sierra Leone's cabinet.[266]

British Funding and Economic Conditionalities
Britain resumed its former colonial role as Sierra Leone's largest bilateral donor and became viewed as a "UK aid darling" among UN member states.[267] In the context of the MoU (2002-12) the UK agreed to provide £40 million a year. A large percentage of those funds have been allocated to the security sector.[268] From 2001-2005, a total of at least £68.5 million was spent on SSR through the

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[265] Brigadier Dumbuya was appointed National Security Coordinator in 2012 when Kellie Conteh resigned to assume an appointment with the UN in Sudan.

[266] The British High Commissioner or the IMATT commander often pressed upon the Minister of Defence Pallo Conteh to influence policy and strategic decisions in the cabinet. Although the exact relationship is unclear, some inferences can be drawn that suggest that Conteh is a close friend to the British government. Defence minister Conteh, an ethnic Limba and nephew of former President J.S Momoh was appointed Minister of Defence under the newly elected APC government in 2007. Conteh's appointment was controversial because Koroma's decision to select him over a number of other more senior politicians and retired officers caused some animosity within the APC party. Conteh is relatively young, in his late 40s and retired from the military at a junior rank of Major (Wikileaks, Sierra Leone 'Dream Team' airs grievances). Conteh is apparently close with the British not least because he has British roots. He went to law school in the UK in 1986 and obtained a Bachelors of Laws degree (LLB) from the University of London in 1990. He was called to the bar of England and Wales in 1992. He obtained a Masters of Laws (LLM) from the Holborn School of Law at the University of East London in 2006 and subsequently practiced law in London. (Patrick Hassan-Morlai, 'Profile of new Minister of Defence and National Security', *The Patriotic Vanguard,* 24 October 2007 (Accessed 12 December 2011).

[267] A Sierra Leone consultative group meeting in London on 30 November 2005, Britain pledged £100 m (US$173million).

[268] A 2006 DfID sponsored Security Sector Expenditure Review found that security is the highest single spending sector in Sierra Leone, amounting to 18.1% of the national budget (US$180 million) from 2003 to 2006 (Le Grys 4). 61% went to the MoD/RSLAF and 24% to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA/SLP) (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).

African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP).[269] From 2004-07 Britain provided Sierra Leone an additional £91 million. The annual budget for DfID's funding to Sierra Leone rose from £40 million in 2006-07[270] to £55 million in 2007-08. Of the £55 million provided in 2007-08, the £15 million direct budgetary support remained static regardless of government performance. Therefore, the conditionalities' effectiveness was hindered by the fact that only £5 million was earmarked as the performance tranche—which DfID officials later revealed as a mistake on their part.[271] In 2008, DfID requested £115.1 million. In total, the UK has spent approximately US$70-$80 million a year in Sierra Leone since 2000.[272] Between 33-39% of DfID funding goes into budget support while only about 12% goes to NGOs.

One of the central components of UK assistance was the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), funded from ACPP funds (with the exception of military personnel salaries) from 2001-2005 at an annual average budget of about £13 million.[273] In 2006, IMATT's funding (through

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[269] Mark White, 'UK briefing on Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone', roundtable presentation at the United Nations' Role in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform, New York, 3 November 2006; Compare with Ball et al 2007 (89) who count £74,799,100 total expenditure on SSR between 2000-2006. A DfiD ACPP evaluation report states that Sierra Leone received £107 million from the ACP from 2001-2005 (DfID, Reducing conflict in Africa: Progress and Challenges, Africa conflict prevention pool programme report, 2001-2005, September 2006, London: DfID, 8).

[270] By comparison, total inflow from international donors in 2006 totaled an estimated US$351.4 million (UNIOSIL report, 7 May 2007, 8

[271] Mark White 2008, 111

[272] Kandeh 2012, 98. As per the MoU, DfID channeled £50m (US$79.53m) of aid per year to Sierra Leone, which including £15 million of direct budgetary support. Of this direct budgetary support, only £5 million was performance based, meaning that benchmarks were used to assess Sierra Leonean government compliance.

[273] IMATT insists that none of the funding has gone towards paying for ammunition for RSLAF. From 2004-2005, cost was £13,664,000. From 2005-2006 IMATT cost £13,177,000 (Ball et al 2007, 86).

ACPP) was substantially cut to £2,781,700.[274] Funding for training of RSLAF

and West Africa military officers was therefore reduced in 2006-2009.[275]

British assistance to Sierra Leone (US$) – 2002-2006

	2002/3	**2003/4**	**2004/5**	**2005/6**
Military assistance	14 165	14 801	17 139	63 350
Other Assistance	33 044	33 000	40 000	146 044
Total	47 209	47 801	57 139	209 394

Source: **Military assistance**: British Ministry of Defence, Policy and Defence Relations (South), as of 28 January 2005.[276]

Embedded Advisors

IMATT DfID embedded advisors in Sierra Leone's nascent security institutions to "teach, coach and advise" Sierra Leonean security personnel how to conduct themselves and build capacity in accordance with liberal standards.[277] Advisors from DfID, UK MoD, IMATT supported the development of the RSLAF, the Ministry of Defence, and the ONS to improve control and democratic accountability of armed forces and security sector.[278] In 2005-2006, IMATT's role evolved from executive authority to providing training tactics at the company and battalion levels to "advising" on operational and strategic issues at the brigade level. By the end of 2006, IMATT officers in Sierra Leone totaled 100 international personnel, the majority (80%) of which were from the UK, followed by Canada (10%) and then the United States, Nigeria and

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[274] Ball et al 2007, 87

[275] IMATT/ACPP spent £695,000 for courses in Ghana, UK and Sierra Leone in 2005-2006. This amount was reduced in subsequent years.

[276] Elisabeth Skons, Wuyi Omitoogun, Catalina Perdoma, Petter Stalenheim, Chapter 8, Military Expenditure, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,. 338.

[277] United States, Security Force Assistance, FM 3-07.1, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2-9

[278] Nelson-Williams 2009, 8

Jamaica.[279] The UK, Nigeria and Jamaica contributed personnel for year-long tours, while Canada and the United States rotated their personnel every six months.[280] Canada's role was initially focused on providing refresher training to rank-and-file soldiers in 2000-2001 and shifted to more unique roles including mentoring and providing specialised training to junior and senior staff courses at the British-funded Horton Training Academy based in IMATT Headquarters.[281] Sierra Leonean officers appreciated the mentorship role that Canadian IMATT personnel played and distinguished themselves from their British counterparts.[282]

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[279] (Le Grys 2009, 42; Don Saunders, Taming a Tiger: Developing a Professional Army in Post-war Sierra Leone, in Lansana Gberie (ed.) Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone, 2002-2008, Waterloo: KCNSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 2009, 105). Since 2001, US Department of Defence assigned at least three US military personnel to serve as a liaison for IMATT. Starting around 2007, the United States was in negotiations with the Government of Sierra Leone regarding a 'status of forces agreement' to ensure privileges and immunities were afforded to US military personnel serving in IMATT and in other capacities. (http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06FREETOWN876)

[280] Canadian Forces first deployed to Sierra Leone for "Operation Sculpture" in November 2000. Canada's financial contribution to Operation Sculpture during the fiscal year 2002-2003 was Cnd $4.0 million in "full costs" and Cnd $400,000 in "incremental costs", representing less than 1% of the Department of Defence's total peacekeeping expenses for that year. Canadian Department of National Defence; The Department of National Defence (DND) defines peacekeeping expenditure under the terms "full cost" and "incremental cost." The full cost is the cost to DND for the operation. Included in this cost are civilian and military wages, overtime, and allowances, full costs for petroleum, oils and lubricants, spares, contracted repair and overhaul as well as depreciation and attrition for all equipment involved. The incremental cost is the cost to DND, which is over and above the amount that would have been spent for personnel and equipment if they had not been deployed on the task. It is derived from "Full DND Cost" by subtracting wages, equipment depreciation, attrition, and other costs that otherwise would have been spent on exercises or absorbed as part of normal activities' (Ross Fetterly, The Cost of Peacekeeping: Canada, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2006, 47).

[281] In 2007, Canada's contribution to IMATT totaled eleven personnel. In October 2012, Canada was on its 22nd rotation in IMATT. Canadian Forces in IMATT was in rotation 23 in October 2012; rotation 23 focused on planning and coordinating the construction of a complex known as 'FIBUA' used as a forward operating base located at the Peace Mission Training Centre in Hastings, Freetown, a facility constructed with funding from Britain. It used RSLAF engineers and local contractors (according to Western Sentinel October 2012). The Canadian Forces completed its 24th rotation in March 2013, marking the end of the IMATT mission (William Beaudoin, 'Op Sculpture in Sierra Leone ceases operations after thirteen years', National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 20 February 2013, http://www.cjoc-coic.forces.gc.ca/fs-ev/2013/02/20-eng.asp)

[282] Anecdotally, two senior military officers told me "The Canadians help without talking much. They are mentoring" (Interview, senior MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011). Another officer commented that the Canadians were more sensitive to the economic conditions of service

Embedded IMATT personnel throughout the RSLAF command structures aimed to train effective leaders and build capacity. Up to 2005-2006, IMATT forces were generally structured into two main groups: Field Training Groups (FTG) and Brigade Advisory and Support Teams (BAST). Both groups supported RSLAF units deployed in military barracks throughout the country. According to Major Don Saunders, a Canadian Forces engineer who was deployed as a Desk Officer for Operation Sculpture in Ottawa during the summer of 2007, each BAST was "affiliated with a specific RSLAF brigade and is responsible for not only mentoring the Brigade and battalion commanders and their principal staff, but also for monitoring and mentoring training and operations."[283] The Field Training Group Advisors were focused on operational and strategic-level issues, and responsible for mentoring and advising the Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Defence, Joint Forces Command and the Freetown-based units.

Next, three case studies on "Military Reintegration", "downsizing and rightsizing" and the *Operation Pebu*, illustrate the serious shortcomings of the SSR approach, the nature of the external-internal dynamics and how they played out in practice in the framework of the post-war armed forces.

Military Integration in Sierra Leone

The general agreements outlined in Article XVII called for rebuilding the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. The agreement explicitly stated that all members from the

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in the RSLAF and were more humble towards their RSLAF counterparts (Author's confidential interview with RSLAF commander, Daru, March 2012)

[283] Don Saunders, Taming a Tiger: Developing a Professional Army in Post-war Sierra Leone, in Lansana Gberie (ed.) Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone, 2002-2008, Waterloo: KCNSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 2009, 106

RUF, CDF and AFRC were eligible to be integrated in the military provided so long as they met an "established criteria". The Lomé Accord stipulated that the armed forces shall be reconstructed "with a view to creating a truly national armed forces" and should "reflect the geopolitical structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength."[284]

The Lomé accord also mentioned that a single national army would be established and that the various irregular armed forces in Sierra Leone, including rebel RUF, civil defense militias and rogue army soldiers should be integrated. This provision was controversial in Sierra Leone, as civil society groups (such as NGO Campaign for Good Governance) and international human rights groups voiced their opposition to this idea.

The British oversaw the reintegration of large numbers of former AFRC personnel with dubious human rights records.[285] Following the end of the military reintegration program (MRP, see below) numbers within RSLAF swelled to about 12,500-13,000 Sierra Leonean soldiers (including thousands of ex-AFRC soldiers) who received refresher-training courses from IMATT.[286] Sierra Leone had a long history of recruiting unlettered soldiers from rural backgrounds. As illiterates with a primary school or junior high-school education, these individuals arguably would have difficulty finding alternative employment and livelihood options as civilians and joined the military.

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[284] See article XVII of the CPA

[285] David Keen, 2005, 284

[286] David Keen, 2005,284; After the war, RSLAF's payroll indicated a total strength of over 14,000 troops. One of the British military's first acts after May 2000 was to conduct a head count, which found that about 11,000 soldiers were actually active (Author's notes from NCDDR and MRP archives).

The Military Reintegration Programme (MRP) was originally conceptualised by two British MoD Advisory Team (MODAT) advisors (Mike Dent and Robert Foot) in April 2000.[287] A request for the programme came from President Kabbah to the MODAT.[288] The Ministry of Defense Advisory Team (MODAT) produced a framework for integrating ex-combatants from the warring factions into the army, but the progamme was implemented by a British Colonel (Fraar) in partnership with Sierra Leonean junior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).[289]

This section attempts to outline the origins and evolution of the MRP concept in Sierra Leone, the broader relations of power between external and internal actors involved in the implementation process and overall assessment of Sierra Leone's MRP process.

Generally, there were three central goals of military reintegration programs (MRPs) in SSR contexts, which exist at different periods of time.

(1) MRPs are seen as a partial solution to the immediate problems of engaging battle-ready combatants after wars end. Without effective disarmament and demobilization, large swaths of armed and battle-tested combatants present an immediate security threat to building peace. Their armed presence increases the risk of war resumption if they are not

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[287] Foot died of malaria during the mission. Both individuals came as civads (civil advisors) (Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011).

[288] Joint Support Command, The Military Reintegration Plan—Summary Report- interim version as of 19 March 2002, D/DHQ/ACOS SP/1014/2 dated 30 July 2001 (Restricted document)

[289] One of the trainers, for example, was Colonel Sheriff, now a senior officer in MoD holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. At the time, Colonel Sheriff was one of the instructors for the programme. Sherrif was a loyal interlocutor for the British, partially because he had been previously trained at Oxford University and maintained close ties with England. Another notable Sierra Leonean officers was Jao Tucker.

engaged and integrated in post-war peace-building. MRPs provide a short-term respite, offering opportunities to build confidence among demobilised ex-combatants through encampment and basic training before the broader SSR takes place.

(2) In the medium term, their integration of military and police forces may provide a meaningful form of employment for some demobilised ex-combatants. However, only a small percentage of former rebels are integrated since most post-war countries need to reduce the overall size of their military. Indeed many countries emerging from a decade or more of armed conflict go through serious national debates over the necessity for armed forces at all. MRP programs play a crucial role in screening and vetting new recruits selected for integration into security institutional reform processes.

(3) A long-term challenge involves establishing professional security forces out of these competing former factions. This entails creating a force that is loyal to the state and capable of performing its constitutional duties for the state. This also requires not only supporting the state's attempt to monopolise the legitimate means of violence, but also institutionalizing the application of violence under legitimate/legal structures aimed at abiding by the law and enforcing that rule of law.

One of the dilemmas of the MRP was to decide whether to integrate former AFRC junta soldiers into the army.[290] Following the resignation of AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma on 28 January 2000, some of his loyal soldiers surrendered to the ECOMOG military force, while others fled Freetown to avoid capture.[291] During the summer of 2000, following British military deployment in Freetown, thousands of ex-AFRC were integrated into the army to counter RUF attack on Freetown.[292]

Annex 2: Ethnic and Educational composition of ex-AFRC members

- Majority (38.46%) were Mende
- 15.38% were Temne
- 19.23% were Limba
- 27% of those sampled had never gone to school
- The average education level obtained is Form 2 (Grade 10)

The military reintegration programme lasted for about one-year (June 2001-May 2002). The MRP was fully funded by UK's DfID SSR implementation funds and was designed to complement the civilian reintegration program as part of the overall DDR program (see Chapter 4).[293] While the aim of DDR was to "provide a mechanism that ensures the successful transition from combatant to civilian, advocating acceptance into the local society whilst

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[290] There were thousands of ex-AFRC soldiers encamped in Lungi and Port Loko seeking reinstatement in the military in 2000. (Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, March 7, 2000)

[291] "On 28 January 2000, Mr. Koroma submitted his resignation to President Kabbah from the Sierra Leone Army. While he would remain the leader of the AFRC, his faction would be dissolved with the impeding reinstatement of ex-Sierra Leone Army elements into the current armed forces" (Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, 7 March 2000, 1-2).

[292] While it is difficult to trace the former AFRC soldiers that are currently in the army, my sample of 26 enlisted soldiers who are ex-AFRC revealed the following social characteristics.

[293] IMATT executed the MRP on a district-by-district basis. For instance, MRP2 consisted of ex-combatants from central districts (Tonkolili, Kono, Bo, Moyamba and northern parts of Kenema), while MRP3 covered Pujehun, Kenema, Kailahun (the last districts to disarm). The reintegration plan was carried out in six phases (See Annex 7).

maintaining full cooperation of all sectors of the civilian community",[294] the aim

of the MRP was "to implement an RSLAF recruit selection process from the

various ex-combatant factions. It was to provide a credible alternative to the

civilian reintegration programme (CRP) and establish an apolitical, professional

Armed Forces for the Government and the people of Sierra Leone".[295] All ex-

combatants participating in the DDR programme were briefed about the MRP

and given an option to enter the new armed forces.[296] Out of the 72,500

registered combatants from the UN DDR process, only about 3,000 expressed

interest in enlisting in RSLAF through the MRP.[297] Out of this total, just over

2,400 were integrated into the military after completing the screening process

and training, representing a failure rate of only 20%.[298] Roughly two thirds

(67%) of these recruits came from the RUF while the rest were ex-Civil Defence

Forces (CDF).[299] The majority were integrated as low-ranking private or

corporals.[300] About forty ex-combatants were made officers (mostly former

Kamajors) and about two hundred were elevated as non-commissioned officers

(see Annex 5 for a table breakdown).[301]

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[294] UNAMSIL report, 7 March 2000, 1

[295] Ibid, 2

[296] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 65, Box 9

297 The total number of disarmed RUF soldiers was 24, 352 and CDF was 37, 377 (Thusi & Meek 2003, 33)

[298] In Liberia, approximately 80% of those who sought to enlist failed to meet minimum selection criteria. 98% of the 3,000 former combatants that went through the MRP after being screened were enlisted in the new RSLAF.

[299] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 66, table 2. Overall ration –RUF/CDF was 65:35.

[300] MRP soldiers were provided with ranks no higher than corporal regardless of one's previous experience and training before or during the war. This was justified so as not to create resentment among the rank and file for the newly trained soldiers. (Author's confidential interview with senior defence official involved in the process, Freetown, 2 December 2011).

[301] Compare with Williams who says that at the close of the program, about 150 NCOs and junior officers were integrated into RSLAF through the MRP. (Alfred-Nelson Williams,

However, the screening process during the MRP was generally ineffective. The British policy on MRP was informed by a problematic assumption that it was better to integrate combatants into the army where they could be controlled (short-term) under the assumption that "bad apples" could be weeded out after their initial one-year contract completed.[302] UK scholars Peter Albercht and Paul Jackson claim that police and army intelligence agencies conducted background checks on potential recruits to prevent individuals with a criminal record from joining the army.[303] However, given the lack of capacity of the Criminal Investigative Unit (CID) in the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and RSLAF at the time, and the state of military records remaining after the war, there was very little of a screening process implemented.[304] Paramount chiefs from the recruits' home region were consulted, but only later in the process (around 2002 after the MRP).[305] As a result, the main criterion for entrance in the RSLAF was based on physical fitness test and an extremely basic reading and writing test.[306] Despite expressed concerns from civil society representatives and the public at large that integrating "rebels" into the RSLAF would

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Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, 2009, 7)

[302] ICG 2001, 12

[303] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 65, box 9

[304] The MRP screening process had two questions: if they had a criminal record or went to prison.

[305] There were limitations with respect to Paramount Chiefs having access to criminal records and human rights complaints (Author's personal interview with a Paramount Chief in Kono, Koidu, 8 November 2011); Author's personal interview with senior MoD officials, Freetown, dated 2 December 2011

[306] Author's Focus Group with Paramount Chiefs in Kono, 8 November 2011. The education test asked 10 mathematical questions, basic adding, subtraction, division and multiplying. Questions were asked about their knowledge of the war: when did it start, from what province, the name of the river that divides SL and Liberia; what year the Abidjan peace accord was signed; two types of materials in Sierra Leone; name of the last ceasefire (see author's personal notes from MRP files)

undermine the institution's credibility, the British screeners applied a loose criteria during the implementation of MRP. Civil society leaders claimed that the screening process developed by the British resulted in the integration of human rights abusers and did not properly examine each recruit's psychological health, literacy level or willingness to abide by democratic subordination.[307] International Crisis Group reported in October 2001 that the British-sponsored screening process contributed to a culture of impunity and lax human rights practices within the army. International Crisis Group wrote that "virtually no one was turned away on human rights grounds".[308] Private conversations conducted by British scholar David Keen with British soldiers involved in the process acknowledged that the screening process focused on whether recruits had been discharged from the military in the past, and not whether recruits had a previous criminal record.[309]

Due to the lax qualifying requirements for entrance in the RSLAF, the military's size swelled to about 14,400 troops following the integration of both ex-AFRC solider and the subsequent three rounds of MRP. According to the British view at the time, it was better to have these individuals in the army where they can be monitored rather than roaming idle in the streets where they could disrupt the "peace".[310] The majority of the new officers were sent to Ghana for officer cadet training.[311]

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[307] Keen 2005, 284; Albercht and Jackson 2009, 66

[308] ICG, Managing Uncertainty, 2001, 12

[309] Keen 2005, 284

[310] ICG 2001, 12

[311] Some of these cadets failed woefully during their training and were later discharged during the first phase of the downsizing. One of the safeguards built into the program was MRP recruits

How reconciliation was fostered internally within the RSLAF After the MRP
Reconciliation within the RSLAF relied on a number of deliberative and informal mechanisms envisioned by both IMATT and RSLAF senior staff. Laura Strovel's argues that many Sierra Leoneans adopted a "rational reconciliation" approach in the sense that Sierra Leoneans were generally ready for peace and decided to "forgive but not forget" in order to live with one another instead of harboring animosity.[312] This informal "rational reconciliation" approach also extended to the RSLAF.

Several initiatives and strategies were developed in the context of the RSLAF to facilitate "reconciliation". First, a deliberate strategy to break up former ex-combatants into different units and sub-units was implemented to prevent the formation of distinct ex-RUF, ex-CDF or ex-SLA units in the new RSLAF.[313] Second, new post-MRP recruits were restricted from being deployed to border regions to prevent them from possibly defecting or supporting irregular armed groups in Liberia or Guinea.[314] Third, at the level of rank-and-file, the majority of MRP participants were inducted with military ranks of private, corporal and lance corporal. None of the former combatant-turned soldiers received a rank higher than lieutenant.[315] Soldiers and officers were required to undergo additional military training after the MRP ended. Moreover, at the informal level, some former RUF, CDF and RSLAF soldiers discussed the war

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were only given one-year contract, thus enabling the RSLAF an option of buying out their clause.

[312] Laura Strovel, 'There's No Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child: 'Traditional'-Inspired Reintegration in Post-war Sierra Leone', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46: 2, 2008, 311.

[313] Albercht and Jackson 2009, 67, Malan 2003, 99; confirmed in author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011)

[314] Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011

[315] Ibid.

informally and made light of certain sensitive events through humour.[316] After the integration of ex-combatants, there were no reported incidents of violence occurring between the former RUF/CDF soldiers quarrelling with ex-SLA or ex-AFRC.[317] The combination of strategies contributed to reconciliation with RSLAF and the no signal unit can be identified as exclusively as ex-combatant units.[318]

The RSLAF's rank-and-file is composed of former ex-combatants and ex-army/AFRC soldiers.[319] There were reports of jealousies and animosities between former Sierra Leone army soldiers (from previous iterations of the RSLAF) and former members of the RUF faction, due to the fact that new recruits had received better training (sponsored by Britain) than their senior counterparts from the MRP. Those receiving short-term training (from the Short-Term Training Teams) from the British and Canadians through the MRP faced greater career prospects within RSLAF.[320] Many of the former RUF combatants that were integrated in the RSLAF were comparatively better educated and possessed better combat skills than the CDF combatants.[321] However, these were relatively minor rivalries in the post-war RSLAF.

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[316] According to one junior officer at the time (now senior), the reconciliation process in RSLAF was "like magic when the former factions embraced each other" (Author's interview with RSLAF senior officer)

[317] Malan 2003, 99

[318] Author's personal interview with senior MoD officials, Freetown, dated 2 December 2011

[319] Author's personal interviews with Ministry of Defence officials, Freetown, December 2011.

[320] ICG, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual? 2002, 10

[321] This was confirmed during interviews with senior RSLAF officers in Ministry of Defense. (Author's personal interviews with ministry of defence officials, Freetown)

The Political Economy of Downsizing & Rightsizing

IMATT played a central role in the downsizing and rightsizing process for the RSLAF. In this section, three characteristics of British involvement during this process are highlighted. First, the degree of British control over the process; 2) the lack of local input and the selection of participants needs to be examined; 3) The impact this restructuring effort had in terms of morale among senior and demobilised officers.

The process of downsizing and rightsizing during post-conflict military reform refers to the reduction of existing forces down to peacetime needs based on identified threats and the government's affordability.[322] Downsizing considerations are a politically sensitive topic in Sierra Leone since at least the country's first military coup in 1967. In late 2002, the MoD's Defence Council approved an IMATT policy recommendation to downsize the RSLAF from its approximate post-war strength of 14,500 to 10,500 over a four-year period.[323] The first two rounds would target lower-ranking soldiers and rely on voluntary retirement. The first downsizing phase kicked off in late January 2004.[324] Due to funding shortages within DfID, however, the demobilization exercise was delayed.[325]

Under British IMATT Commander Brigadier David Santa-Ollala, IMATT implemented a three-year downsizing process that targeted 1,000

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[322] Alix Julia Boucher, 'Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice, Stimson's Future of Peace Operations Programme, 2009, 4

[323] UN Secretary General's Report on UNAMSIL (S/2003/321, March 17, 2003)

[324] S/2003/1201, 23 December 2003. 784 personnel were retired (Nelson-Williams 2009, 8)

[325] There was "no funding available for the next phase of the restructuring exercise, under which some 1,000 soldiers are expected to go into voluntary retirement after receiving a financial and training package" (S/2004/228, March 19, 2004, 4).

soldiers per year from 2005-06. IMATT policy was influenced by Article 16 of the Lomé accord, which stipulated that demobilised military personnel would receive gratuities and pensions in accordance with their military terms of service. IMATT and DfID developed an attractive financial retirement package in the hopes that many enlisted soldiers would voluntarily discharge.[326] These pensions and gratuities were far in excess of the entitlement package provided by the DDR programme or what the Government of Sierra Leone could afford.[327] In addition to the lucrative package offered by DfID, senior officers that had served for more than ten years received a years' salary with allowances in the form of a lump-sum resettlement grant of approximately US$850.[328] These conditions were considerably more attractive than any standard RSLAF retirement package offered by the local government. A second round of downsizing occurred of 2,500 low-ranking soldiers were compulsorily discharged. On 1 January 2005, another round of voluntary discharges occurred, demobilizing 2,500 low-ranking (privates, corporals and lance corporals) and a fourth phase, involving the demobilization and retirement of 1,092 personnel took place in January 2006 reducing RSLAF's strength to about 10,500.[329]

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[326] S/2005/777, December 12, 2005

[327] Government of Sierra Leone, Policy Clarification on combatant participation in the DDR programme vis-à-vis the restructured army, 27 September 1999, 2; Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 155

[328] The British offered Le 8 million for low-ranking soldiers (privates, corporals) plus Le 500,000 for three months vocational training of the ex-soldier's choice. A high-ranking officer received up to Le 20 million from the British plus the normal retirement package offered by the government (Author's personal interviews with senior Ministry of Defence official, 1 December 2011, Freetown)

[329] (Report of the Secretary General on UNAMSIL, S/2004/724, September 9, 2004, pp 6-7). 1000 personnel were retired during this phase (Nelson-Williams 2009, 8)

IMATT played an important role in implementing the downsizing and rightsizing exercise.[330] The British initiated a controversial remuneration programme to compensate soldiers killed-in-action (KIA) and wounded-in-action (WIA) from 2003-2005. The British military officers adopted a new Killed-in-Action policy of compensating family members of the deceased with a lump-sum cash amount.[331] Approximately 1,533 received KIA payments in mid-October 2003.[332] In 2004, the families of 3,029 KIA personnel were paid the remuneration.[333] DfID paid the KIA payments in full from its SILSEPII. Additionally, the four rounds of Wounded-in-Action (WIA) payments were implemented.[334] DfID's funding of direct budgetary support to the Ministry of Defence was delayed in 2004, resulting in to the delayed payment of WIA and KIA.[335] While the first three batches of WIA payments went smoothly,[336] the

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[330] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 109-10

[331] RSLAF's traditional policy was to keep soldiers on payroll after their death in order to allocate funds to the deceased soldiers' family.

[332] Major General Carew Address Killed in Action Beneficiaries, *Standard Times*, 20 October 2003

[333] Alfred Nelson-Williams, Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, in Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (eds.), Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, 2008, 10

[334] The British and RSLAF senior officers jointly defined what was meant as "wounded in war" in the context of Sierra Leone. The definition was based on whether a soldier had a physical disability directly resulting from the war or if one had a mental disability (Their definition included individuals demonstrating "mentally unstable" characteristics). A medial board was set up by the British and a British medical doctor was represented on the military panel. (Author's confidential interview with Ministry of Defence officials, Freetown, November 2011).

[335] MoD requested Le 58.8 billion for the 2004 Fiscal Year and received Le 42.7 billion, leaving MoD with a shortfall of Le 16.1 billion. This funding shortfall resulted in failure to pay retired personnel under the restructuring programme as well as subsidies to WIA and KIA. Funding for improving living conditions in the barracks was also affected as was mobility and communication equipment. (Al-Hassan Kharamoh Kondeh, Formulating Sierra Leone's Defence White Paper, in Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (eds.), Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, 2008, 6)

[336] The first phase of WIA 290 personnel were paid terminal and disability payments in 2005; during phase two, 345 personnel were certified as medically disabled. Alfred Nelson-Williams,

British discovered that the system was being manipulated. DfID decided to cancel the programme in before its fourth phase could commence in 2008.[337]

After the completion of the MRP, it became a common practice to involve local chiefs and authorities to serve as "consultants" for screening potential recruits.[338] RSLAF's first post-war recruitment exercise was conducted in December 2002 to January 2003 when the military leaders organized a countrywide consultation to consult traditional leaders and civil leaders on entry

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Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, in Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht (eds.), Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, 2008, 10

[337] This resulted in the alleged late payment of 235 soldiers who claimed that they had registered for wounded-in-action payments but had yet to receive their benefits. Since the British could not proceed with the fourth phase, British officers labeled them as "chronically ill and mentally imbalanced", which allowed them to subsequently discharge. This group of soldiers protested at Wilberforce barracks in 2009-2010 claiming they were "mad" and subsequently removed all their clothes while protesting in an effort to fit the description of someone that was 'chronically ill' so they would be compensated. Their military ID cards were stamped as chronically ill as a result. Later they realised that they would be permanently identified as chronically ill and sought to remove this status from their record. Labeled as "mad" the 235 demobilised soldiers received fewer benefits. The soldiers protested and subsequently took their case to the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission (HRC) on 23 April 2009. A public hearing was held in 2010 in Freetown at the HRC. On 27 June 2011, the Human Rights Council ruled in favour of the 235 ex-soldiers for wrongful dismissal. The government had twenty-one (21) days to respond to the verdict. The government did not appeal the decision. The Commission recommended that the ex-soldiers be paid their full benefits—the same as the first two rounds of wound-in-action 1 and 2 received. The payment should also include the DfID supported package and entitlement to the enhanced disability pension. The tribunal also recommended that RSLAF/MOD reissue revised discharge books that removes the "chronically ill and mentally unstable" label. (Saidu Bah, 18 ex-soldiers dead, over 200 still suffering in limbo, Awoko, 28 November 2011, http://www.awoko.org/2011/11/28/18-ex-soldiers-dead-over-200-still-suffering-in-limbo/). At least eighteen of the soldiers have since died due to poor health related issues. This has created a general sense of resentment towards IMATT among the ex-servicemen who felt they were unfairly treated. (UNIOSIL report 28 April 2006).

[338] All recruits are required to seek support from their traditional chief during the application process. According to one policy-maker involved in the process in Ministry of Defence, "it also aimed at making sure that our recruits came from all parts of this country. We did not want to recruit people based on partisan politics. We wanted to recruit people based on representativeness. We want military personnel to come from all parts of this country". (Author's personal interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, 2 December 2011, Freetown)

requirements.[339] The MODAT helped establish a policy that set the minimum age of enlistment into the Army at 18 years. The Recruitment Act (2006) Section I, paragraph 76 of the Revised Version of the Extant Terms of Service for All Ranks in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (16 February, 2006), has established the age range for enlistment into the Army at between 18 and 25 years.

There was also an attempt by IMATT to increase the educational standards of RSLAF's new recruits. The minimal academic requirements for officer cadets was obtainment of a minimum five (5) subjects with credits including English Language and Mathematics at WASSCE, in not more than two sittings. In other words, the minimal education requirement for officers is a university degree. For enlisted soldiers, applicants must have a minimum of Five (5) subjects with aggregate of 30 at Basic Examination Certificate Examination (BECE)[340] or with a minimum of (three) credit at West African Senior School Certificate Examination (WASSCE)/London General Certificate of Education (GCE) 'O' Level (in one sitting)—a basic education certificate.[341] Preference is sometimes given to candidates with skilled qualifications such as Auto Electricians, Mechanics, Mechanical Engineers, Surveyors, Tailors, Carpenters,

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[339] On 17 April 2003, 95 potential soldiers and 30 potential officers from each province were nominated for further screening. From this group, 12 candidates were accepted as officer cadets and about 100 soldiers. (Elongima Masuba, 'Defence brief the press on recruitment process', *Standard Times*, 16 June 2003)

[340] In Sierra Leone, the first nine years of schooling is free and universal for all children normally aged between 6 and 15 years is described as *basic education*.

[341] In Sierra Leone's public education system, after completing three years of secondary school, the basic education certificate exam is taken.

Caterers and interested persons in farming including Tractor Drivers. Age bracket for recruit tradesmen will be between 18-30 years.[342]

IMATT funded the construction of the Armed Forces Education Center (AFEC) in Wilberforce barracks. The grand opening was held on 12 August 2003. The Center was created as a British idea and lacked sufficient Sierra Leonean participation in all levels. At the opening of the Centre Brigadier Freer stated, "It is important that the officers and soldiers of the RSLAF are educated to a standard which allows them to take the army's development forward and upwards".[343] Since 2007, IMATT has funded an adult literacy program in the RSLAF at an annual cost of £20,000.[344] Since 2009, IMATT has relied on Partners in Adult Education Coordinating Office (PADECO), a local consortium of NGOs that works with the Ministry of Education, to implement the program. The program has been criticized by IMATT as lacking sufficient "return on investment" and for dependence on British aid.[345] There were concerns that the program has been plagued by corruption and inefficiency.[346]

Next, this chapter shifts to a case study that connects the British executive role to another concrete project implemented in Sierra Leone from 2002-2006 called *Operation Pebu*. The case study demonstrates the lack of

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[342] Applicants "must not have a criminal record" and "be physically and medically fit". Applicants usually report to one of the three Brigade Headquarters (3rd Brigade, Murray Town barracks, 4th Brigade, Teko Barracks, Makeni; 5th Brigade, Gondama barracks near Bo), http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/28198 (Accessed 24 June 2012)

[343] 'RSLAF top class', Standard Times, 22 August 2003

[344] Author's email correspondence with IMATT commander, June 2012

[345] Author's personal interview with IMATT officer, Freetown, March 2012

[346] IMATT funded the program until June 2013 and has given RSLAF an ultimatum that it must take ownership of the programme by funding it (Author's personal email correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013).

appropriate input and participation from Sierra Leonean authorities during the early conception and implementation phases. Through a case study of specific practices in *Operation Pebu*, this section demonstrates the limits of external control over local peacebuilding projects and practices.

Operation Pebu: A Case Study on Local Ownership
The *Operation Pebu* was envisioned as a project to improve living conditions and to rectify the accommodation shortage in the military after the war. The project was conceived in 2002 by British soldiers with extremely limited participation from Sierra Leones and implemented from 2003-2006. The debacle of *Operation Pebu* illustrates the difficulty of international institutional engineering from above during peacebuilding projects where insufficient local input, support and trust has been secured between external and internal actors.

At the conclusion of Sierra Leone's war, the decision to integrate over 14,000 soldiers into the RSLAF was made without consideration for the space in military barracks throughout Sierra Leone. Many existing personnel from the AFRC period occupied makeshift houses made of tin shacks on military bases. The persistent problem of inadequate accommodation for RSLAF's personnel had been identified as a serious security challenge by Sierra Leonean intelligence and security officials, IMATT commanders and various stakeholders in the United Nations.[347] As a UN Integrated Office report on Sierra Leone noted:

> The main barracks in Freetown are overcrowded, with some families living in stores and armories with no access to safe drinking water or

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[347] As noted above, ONS identified the inadequate barracks facilities as a priority in their SSR implementation plan in 2006; United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office, Fourth report of the Secretary General on UNIOSIL, 7 May 2007, 4

proper sanitation. Similar unsatisfactory conditions exist in the military barracks in the provinces.[348]

The initiative sought to consolidate over 50 Headquarters (HQs)/company/platoon sites to nine battalion barracks and three brigade Headquarters.[349] Specifically, according to the British, *Operation Pebu* aimed to "facilitate better control, direction and maintenance of RSLAF units and improve the morale and welfare of soldiers and their dependents by providing a better standard of living accommodation".[350] The project aimed to refurbish Teko barracks (one of the best barracks pre-war built during Steven's era in the 1970s), build seven additional battalion barracks and two Brigade Headquarters. This was all to occur in one year! British military officers engaged in consultations with paramount chiefs within these districts where construction would take place (Simbakoro in Kono, Moyamba, Yele in Kambia, Kambia, Pujehun, and Kailahun).[351] It was decided that the Brigade Headquarters would be built at Kenema and Bo.[352] Administrative infrastructure and family units

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[348] UNIPSIL, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2007/704, 4 December 2007, 5

[349] Aldo Gaeta, Operation Pebu and the Ministry of Defense, in Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson (eds), Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007: Views from the Field, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (GCAF), 2009, 59.

[350] Aldo Gaeta, Operation Pebu and the Ministry of Defense, in Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson (eds), Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007: Views from the Field, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (GCAF), 2009, 60.

[351] New sites were to be built from scratch in Kambia for 11th battalion, Kabala for 12th battalion, Yele for 3rd battalion, Bo for 6th battalion and Jagbwema for 9th battalion.

[352] The original British plan did not include Brigade Headquarters in Kenema. However, Sierra Leonean military officers pleaded with the British to revise the plan in June 2003 to include Kenema (Gaeta 2009). However, this plan was later scrapped, which has been a lasting effect of the failed Pebu project. The Government developed an alternative vision in two main respects: the government wanted to develop four zones for military headquarters: West (Freetown), East (Kenema), South (Bo) and North (Makeni). However, IMATT insisted that the government could only afford three district headquarters, and the Kenema base was scrapped. Additionally, the government had wanted to maintain a force of 10,500, but IMATT officials insisted of reducing

were to be constructed on each site, along with dug wells and deep trench latrines.

From the outset, Sierra Leonean military personnel differed on the plan's original conception. Senior and junior Sierra Leonean officers based in MoD had thought best to focus on refurbishing some of the country's existing infrastructure and start with one or two sites at a time. The British military officers in IMATT wanted to build new barracks and to develop three new Brigade Headquarters from scratch. Initial cost estimates for the project were in excess of US$200 million. International donors were reluctant to finance the project during a 2002 international donor's conference on Sierra Leone in Paris and the project was tabled. Following the conference, IMATT took the lead in Sierra Leone to find an alternative funding mechanism. IMATT leadership organised a series of meetings with RSLAF senior personnel and Ministry of Defense officials to conceptualise a future project and to brainstorm avenues to solicit funding. IMATT officers approached DfID to provide funding to initiate the project.

The selection of Sierra Leonean interlocutors and the nature of asymmetrical relations of power shaped the quality of local input during the initial phases. IMATT assumed supervisory responsibility over the entire project; as a result, Sierra Leonean MoD officials viewed *Pebu* as a British project (despite the adoption of *Pebu,* which means "in house" in Mende).[353] A MoU agreement was drafted and later signed between the British High

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the size of the army to 8,500 in 2006-2007. The IMATT vision was adopted after IMATT commander yielded influence in the SLPP government before the elections in 2007.
[353] Ibid

Commissioner and the President of Sierra Leone in May 2003, which called for sharing the financial burden of the project.[354] British authorities problematically assumed that this would "trickle down" into "local ownership".

The project kicked off with a speech from the President on 24 January 2003, who prophetically said "I believe the resulting improvement in stability and infrastructure will allow the Republic of Sierra Leone's armed forces to develop further, growing it to its potential whilst allowing substantial enhancement in family living and working conditions".[355] But the project did not get off the ground due to disagreements between the British and some Sierra Leoneans over flawed aspects in the concept and design. In June 2003, IMATT went back to the "drawing board" to reconsider its initial plan, specifically, the design of the family quarters. The concerns came from senior RSLAF officers who complained about the standard and quality of the proposed accommodation.

The initial plan called for construction one-bedroom family quarters, with a small parlour made of clay bricks and zinc roof without enclosed cooking facilities and with outdoor pit latrines. British soldiers viewed the plan as satisfactory in the short-term (3-4 years) until more funding could be procured to build more complete structures with additional space and higher quality (more durable) cement bricks.[356] However, Sierra Leoneans took this as evidence that the British were forcing the military to live in "twentieth century" conditions i.e.

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[354] According to the initial agreement, the UK would provide £1.9million while the government of Sierra Leone's financial responsibility would be £1.1million.

[355] 'Operation Pebu', *The Torch*, February 2003, 4.

[356] A British civil advisor in the Defence Ministry involved in the project claims that the British had always viewed *Operation Pebu* as a three-to-five year short-term measure (Gaeta 2009)

without flushing toilets and running water.[357] Sierra Leonean officers were insulted by the original plan of building accommodation facilities similar to a temporary refugee camp. After considerable disagreement over the concept, the design was subsequently changed to a three-room structure with a veranda using a new innovative "hydrofoam" block technology imported from South Africa.[358] After the concept was revised, financing for the project was renegotiated. DfID agreed to provide another £1.7 million and Government of Sierra Leone promised to add £0.9 million

The project was re-launched in October 2003. British IMATT officers naïvely overlooked other aspects in the flawed design. IMATT commanders organized RSLAF soldiers into construction companies, with specialist support coming from the engineers regiment. This decision was informed by a problematic assumption that these units would volunteer to carry out the construction and refurbishment of the barracks.[359] The British thinking was that "this will reduce the cost to, the exchequer and give ownership to those involved."[360] On top of constructing barracks—sometimes from scratch— RSLAF soldiers were to reconstruct bridges and roads in close proximity to barracks. The construction for the 11th battalion barracks in Kambia commenced

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[357] Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, December 2011

[358] There is a lack of documentary evidence to help understand why this technology was introduced or by whom.

[359] Soldiers were already economically vulnerable and earning a meager salary. The project's budget did not make provisions for compensating soldiers for their time. Instead the project took for granted that commanding officers could effectively pass down orders to soldiers to do the work without individual compensation. There were consistent complaints from soldiers that the voluntary labour was unprovoked punishment. This led some soldiers in Moyamba to go AWOL. (Saidu Kamara, 'Sierra Leone: For Hard Labour'…*Standard Times*, 7 June 2004 (Accessed 8 May 2012)

[360] Gaeta 2009

in early 2004. The project seemed to be building momentum in late 2004 and early 2005 as sites at Kailahun and Pujehun were the first to be constructed throughout 2004-2005 and the construction of living quarters and offices were completed in the 6th Battalion in Moyamba in February 2005. It was decided that Daru (Moa Barracks), Teko and Makeni barracks would retain its existing infrastructure with only minor refurbishment to cut down on time and costs while some new buildings would be constructed.[361] By March 2004, however, the UN Secretary General report on UNAMSIL noted that the project was hampered by construction problems, an overambitious plan and a funding shortfall of US$2.5 million.[362]

Governance and Planning Problems
A British civilian advisor embedded in the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence retrospectively admitted that *Pebu* was poorly conceived, but this recognition came too late.[363] The two most important actors carrying responsibility for the project was the Project Director, the RSLAF Joint Support Commander and the

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[361] In Daru, for example IMATT built new structures to accommodate their officers for when they were deployed at Moa Barracks, and constructed a new education center with classrooms but kept existing accommodation for rank-and-file and their dependents in its existing (current) form. Daru's infrastructure suffered significantly during the war partially because there was a point in time that RUF was living out of Daru barracks during the war. The author had an opportunity to visit Moa barracks during the fieldwork. There was no electricity or clean water available in the barracks. The Commander had access to a generator that his soldiers had purchased with their own funds, which was used a few hours a day when needed (Author's interview with the Commanding Officer at Daru barracks, Daru, March 2012 and personal observations from the visit). In June 2013 during a visit to Moa barracks, soldiers requested the Minister of Defence Alfred Paulo Conteh to provide beds, mats, solar lights, vehicles, health facilities and better conditions of service including fringe benefits. Soldiers complained of having no electricity or light in the barracks. The Minister's response was to "continue exercising patience" (Sulaman Julden Bah, Daru Barracks Soldiers Cry for Help, *MySierraLeonewebonline*, 9 June 2013, http://mysierraleoneonline.com/sl_portal/site/news/detail/1129)

[362] UN Secretary-General Report, 21st report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 19 March 2004, 4

[363] Gaeta 2009

Commanding Officer of the Engineer Regiment. At the start of the project, a British IMATT Officer filled these leadership positions. IMATT Engineer Officers embedded in the Company Engineer Regiment "supervised and advised" the implementation of the failed project. The Project Director, a British IMATT officer, chaired the *Op Pebu* Steering Committee and an "*Op Pebu* Cell" that oversaw its implementation.[364] Julius Remie Hindowa Metzger (a junior officer who had a close relationship to IMATT's leadership) was appointed as the Sierra Leonean project manager on Operation Pebu (from 2003-2006). However, it was clear to all local Sierra Leoneans that the project was a British-run project.[365] DfID primarily funded the project despite having no established or permanent presence in Sierra Leone at the time (until after 2005).[366]

To illustrate the effects that problematic assumptions have on the quality of the project, one needs to interrogate several key decisions approved by an uninformed external "expert". For instance, the decision to change to the hydrofoam technology was problematic because the materials were expensive and had to be imported from South Africa.[367] Additionally, had there been sufficient research conducted on this technology before it was purchased, one

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[364] There were no senior officials of the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence were members of the Steering Committee or "Op Pebu Cell" within the Joint Force Headquarters. According to Gaeta, "this lack of senior management 'buy-in' was responsible for the lack of commitment and control witnessed throughout the project, but notably in the early stages".

[365] If you ask any senior Sierra Leonean officer about the project, they all agree with this assessment. However, the British would dispute this and downplay the significance of the project's failure. According to the British civilian advisor Gaeta, the fact that a British officer was leading the project "did not make *Op Pebu* an IMATT project, since all IMATT officers were on loan service to RSLAF" (Gaeta 2009)

[366] There was no DfID country office in Freetown, only a small administrative office set up with authority to deal with policy and to oversee fund vested in DfID's West Africa Department in London. DfID's main link in *Pebu* were DfID-funded civil and financial advisors embedded in the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence (Gaeta 2009)

[367] The hydrofoam technology is used to produce construction blocks out of soil and cement.

would have realised that the type of sand that is required for the technology to work is not found in West Africa.[368] This fact was only brought to the attention of the IMATT advisors after six hydrofoam machines had been purchased in July 2003.[369]

In May 2004, the project managers revised the plan once again. Sierra Leonean Engineers involved in the construction had no previous experience with the technology. A decision was made to transfer of responsibility for block-making to private local labourers, which increased the cost of the project by an additional £3.8 million. Additionally, DfID insisted on using its own internal procurement processes for buying supplies for the construction process.[370] The project was running out of money and a request was sent to DfID for additional funds; however, this request, was rejected due to the lack of progress made on the project. At the time, no single site had more than 10-12% of the quarters constructed. DfID then contracted an UK-based international housing consultancy firm to conduct an independent review of *Op Pebu*. London-based consultant firm Levitt Bernstein was hired to review the project in August 2004. The Levitt Bernstein final report was highly critical of the project, stating that the "project was ill-defined, poorly managed" and that there was a danger that "it could result in the creation of new slums".[371] In response, IMATT organized a meeting with the Deputy Defence Minister (Hinga Norman), and proposed to

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[368] Author's confidential interviews with Sierra Leone MoD officials, Freetown and Kailahun, April 2012

[369] Gaeta 2009. Another nine machines were purchased in February 2004

[370] This meant that materials for the project were procured internationally, instead of supporting local businesses, which caused resentment among senior MoD/RSLAF officials. (Gaeta 2009)

[371] Gaeta 2009. According to Kabbah "DfID never shared the project audit" with his government (Kabbah 2012, 313).

concentrate on two sites deemed most strategic—Kailahun and Pujehun.[372] The

proposal was accepted and modalities were implemented to complete the two

sites by the end of 2005.[373] However, the Kailahun site was developed based on

strategically problematic location.

The Kailahun and Pujehun site
The construction of both sites could not completed by the end of 2005. The

flaws in the Kailahun construction site amplify the lack of senior RSLAF input.

The location of the Kailahun site was strategically flawed because the barracks

were constructed on high ground on the outskirts of Kailahun town along the

River Moa, which demarcates the shared border between Guinea and Sierra

Leone.[374] Many Sierra Leonean officers pointed this out to IMATT, but the

project proceeded without considering the defence implications of the Kailahun

barracks location. In the event of a rebel invasion into Sierra Leonean territory

from Guinea, the Kailahun barracks would likely be the first strategic target

given its close proximity to the River Moa. Sierra Leone's military leadership

viewed the barracks as extremely vulnerable. This strategic blunder illustrates

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[372] According to former President Kabbah, "DfID, without reference to us, decided to reduce the construction to only two locations" (Kabbah 2012, 313)

[373] According to the plan, construction at Pujehun and Kailahun was carried out between late 2004-early 2006. DfID contributed £3.9 million towards *Operation Pebu* from March 2003-February 2005. (Elisabeth Skons, Wuyi Omitoogun, Catalina Perdoma, Petter Stalenheim, Chapter 8, Military Expenditure, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 340); According to Ball et al (2007), £3,265,825 was spent at the end of 2006, all funds coming from the ACPP (Ball, N., P. Biesheuvel, T. Hamilton-Baillie, and F. Olonisakin. Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming in Africa. London and Glasgow: DFID, 2007, 82); In 2005-6, £1,765,000 was allocated from DfID's budget to cover the costs of construction of barracks/routine maintenance of existing facilities.

[374] The Moa River arises in the highlands of Guinea and flows southwest, forming parts of the Guinea-Liberia-Sierra Leone borders. It flows into the Southern province of Sierra Leone. It is located approximately 8.28° North Latitude and 10.57° West Longitude. In invasion of the barracks from Guinea would be roughly equivalent to coming back from the rear.

the lack of local input and underscores the wasteful spending consumed by the project.[375]

An additional problem in both Pujehun and Kailahun were the inadequate structures built by the hydrofoam technology. Sand for the project was collected from Freetown's coastal beaches and transported by truck to the various sites, which defied local logic. Sierra Leoneans involved in the project's execution could not understand why sand could not be used from Kailahun. In the end, the type of sand did not meet the specifications of the hydrofoam technology. There were persistent reports that IMATT personnel were involved in allegedly stealing funds during this phase.[376] The structures in both Kailahun and Pujehun eventually broke down within months after construction. For the reason of the strategic blunder and the dilapidating structures, both Kailahun and Pujehun barracks were left vacant by the military.[377] In October 2008, the project was finally shut down and is now widely recognized in Sierra Leone as an abysmal failure. The failed project has far-reaching effects on troop morale (this issue is explored in Chapter 7 assessments). The failure of *Operation Pebu* has left a

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[375] Senior military officers and paramount chiefs that were interviewed by the author explained that they had not been consulted property by the British. If they had, the site probably would not have been chosen for constructing a barracks from scratch.

[376] Local media reports and security officials accused IMATT of transporting sand from Freetown to the Kailahun district, (a district that has tremendous amounts of sand it could have procured locally).

[377] The structures at the Kailahun site are collapsing and dilapidated and have not being used by RSLAF. The military instead occupies the old Daru barracks as the regional headquarters. There is a small company (less than 10 soldiers and one commanding officer) that remains based on Kailahun (as of March 2012) to ensure that civilians do not take up residence in these dilapidated structures and to protect any assets that remain (author's field visit to the Kailahun site, March/April 2012). In May 2013, RLSAF leadership handed over the Kailahun barracks to the local communities and is controlled by the Chief Administrator, Paramount Chief MK Banya and Chairman of Kailahun District (same with the Yele barracks) (Yaya Brima, 'In Sierra Leone, RSLAF hands over military barracks to local communities', *Awareness Times,* 20 May 2013, http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_200522749.shtml).. The same conditions resulted in Pujehun. The local police detachment may be using some of the usable structures currently.

lasting legacy in Sierra Leone among senior RSLAF personnel. Most RSLAF personnel consider the project as a "British-led White Elephant project".[378]

In summary, it is important to recognize asymmetrical relations of power between external "experts" and local actors in the context of post-war SSR. Most senior defence officials in Sierra Leone's MoD were cautious about offering advice to British officers because they perceived *Pebu* as UK-led project and feared losing their job if they offered their opinion or disagreed with decisions or policies.[379] This led to the development of a plan that was too ambitious, completely out of touch with local conditions and based on several problematic assumptions.[380]

Conclusion
This chapter examined specific practices in the British-led security sector reform process (2000-2013). This chapter highlights some of the inherent challenges of developing "nationally owned" peacebuilding when external actors have real and perceived control over the process. "Local ownership" was a problem during the design and implementation phases of the MRP and *Operation Pebu* project. Senior RSLAF officers were sidelined during the core "visioning" phase of the restructuring process and were left out during the "rightsizing" exercise. This raises questions about the external selection of local interlocutors and their

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[378] During a speech on Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation on 5 September 2010, Minister of Defence Paolo Conteh noted that *Operation Pebu* was one of the acknowledged failures within the RSLAF restructuring process. (Abdul Rahman Kamara, '36-month turn-around in the army-defence minister', *The Torch Light*, 8 September 2010)

[379] Author's personal interviews with senior MoD officials, Freetown, December 2011-March 2012

[380] Author's interviews with current and retired senior RSLAF officers, Freetown, March 2012. It was believed that the seven sites, plus two brigade headquarters could be built in just over one year.

reliance on western models, the role of the international "expert" and what aspects of the process get obscured in the name of "technical assistance".[381]

Since the 2012 elections, IMATT ceased its formal programme on 31 March 2013.[382] However, a small-training team was left behind at the British-funded Horton Academy in the former IMATT Headquarters on Leicester in Freetown under the auspices of a new programme, the International Security Advisory Team (ISAT) and under a new civilian Foreign and Commonwealth Office Head in May 2013 to continue to provide on-going support, training and monitoring to the RSLAF.[383] What IMATT's departure and the transition to ISAT means for the allocation of resources to Sierra Leone's security remains unclear at the time of this writing.

Next, In Chapter 6, I review Liberia's security sector and military reform process. It shows some of the key similarities and differences in external SSR practices and approaches and highlights the primary.

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[381] Christine Cubitt, 'Responsible reconstruction after war: Meeting local needs for building peace', *Review of International Studies*, 39:1, 2013, 102-3; Thomson 2007

[382] Author's interviews with IMATT personnel, Freetown, December-March 2012

[383] ISAT's role involves a broader range of security assistance to Sierra Leone's security sector. It will continue to advise and support the RSLAF, but will also provide advice to help other agencies including the SLP, the ONS, the National Fire Service, the Prison's department, the Immigration Office, and the Joint Maritime Commission among others. ISAT will work closely with DfID and the UNDP to support the Justice Sector Reform programme initiatives (No author, All Changes in Freetown as UN Closes Office and IMATT Becomes ISAT, *The Sierra Leone Telegraph*, 29 March 2013, http://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/?p=3724); UN Security Council, Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone, 15-20 February 2013; Tilly Barrie, 'IMATT Folds Up', *Politico*, March 2013, http://politicosl.com/2013/03/imatt-folds-up/ (Accessed 23 May 2013)

Chapter 6
Liberia: Post-war Security Sector and Military Reform

Introduction

This chapter traces the process of police and military restructuring in Liberia's war-peace transition (2003-2013) to provide a fuller understanding of the SSR practices that were envisioned and implemented. The aim of this chapter seeks to understand power relations between Liberian and external actors during the initial decision-making processes and compare with post-war Sierra Leone's security sector reform programme.

Under consideration in this chapter is the US-lead state role in Liberia. The United States was never a former colonial power in Liberia. The US role in postwar Liberia was hands-off, behind the scenes, preferring to work through proxies (UNMIL and private security companies). The appointment of an American as the Secretary-General's Special Representation was interpreted as a way for the US to keep an eye on its interest in Liberia.[1] The US also seconded nine military officers to UNMIL (two headquarters staffers and seven military observers).

The Liberian National Police (LNP) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) restructuring processes involved four stages: dissolution, the disbursement of pensions and severance for qualified ex-security personnel, the recruitment and vetting of new personnel and finally, the training phase. Each aspect had varied degrees of involvement of external actors. An examination of specific security sector practices provides clues into this relationship and reveals insights into the

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[1] International Crisis Group, 'Liberia: Security Challenges', Africa Report No. 71, Brussels: ICG, 3 November 2003, 13

degree of "participation" and "ownership" for Liberians during the process and forms the basis for a preliminary assessment of the sustainability and legitimacy of police and military reform during the first decade of postwar peacebuilding.

Liberia's military restructuring process involved international (mostly American) and regional (mostly Nigeria through the auspices of ECOWAS) actors. Reforming the police and military faced numerous challenges, not least due to their roles in perpetuating human rights abuses before and during the Liberian civil conflicts. The military, for example, had a horrendous record of abuse against civilians, and essentially factionalised into ethno-political groups during Samuel Doe's rule and was oriented towards regime survival as opposed to state and human security.

The chapter demonstrates that there was no mutually agreed plan for handling the police and military reform components in the peacebuilding process. Americans and Liberians differed significantly in their overarching visions on how to handle police and military reform. For the police, a decision was made during the immediate war-peace transition to retain a core group of ex-police officers from the old LNP. For the military, some Liberian transitional authorities from the ministry of defence wanted to retain a core group of offices from the previous army, while Americans and leaders in the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) pushed for a "start from scratch" proposal, supported by the US, to remove senior elements of an army that were perceived as "corrupt".

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) process was envisioned as one of the important components in the international strategy to prevent a resumption of large-scale conflict and to build a lasting peace. Liberians believed the emphasis on the security sector—in particular, the police and military—was warranted because these institutions had disintegrated during the war and had become factionalised to serve particular groups' interests.

US plans for Liberia's transition started being drawn up in late 2003 when the Department of Defence and the State Department created an *inter-agency Working Group on Liberia.* US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Synder described Liberia as a "totally failed state".[2] During this time, the Defence and State Departments were coordinating their efforts with the UN Special Representative Jacques Klein to deploy 8,700 UN peacekeepers.[3] Klein was clearly leading the US rebuilding efforts. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Synder observed, "clearly, Klein is very much an activist and he has a rational plan, which is what we were hoping for. He is talking about re-establishing the rule of law as the UN forces move out".[4]

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[2] James Fisher-Thompson, 'Improved security in Liberia heralds more support for development funding', US Embassy IIP Digital file, 13 January 2004, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2004/01/20040113172943nospmoht0.0973627.html#axzz2ZY30QhWF

[3] The American government has been the primary funder of UNMIL, contributing about 26% of UNMIL's total assessed budget.

[4] Ibid.

In January 2004 a US assessment team was sent to Monrovia to survey the situation and make recommendations to Congress.[5] The US government also sent two Treasury Department advisors to advise the Central Bank on economic policy.

Americans adopted a "liberal peace" informed by a particular version of the development-security nexus. The decision to invest heavily in security sector reform was a primary priority because it was believed that investments in the economy or humanitarian assistance would be squandered in the absence of physical security in Monrovia and the main urban areas surrounding the capital. Colonel Victor Nelson, director for West Africa in the Defense Department Office of International Security Affairs outlined the American approach in January 2004:

> In Congress, there were differing opinions about whether more money should go to 'security sector reform' or be spent on more humanitarian-related things. Our position right now in the Inter-agency [Working Group on Liberia] is that if you don't have security, all the money you spend on humanitarian efforts will go down the drain if fighting is renewed.[6]

A fine-grained analysis of police military reforms will allow for a comprehensive understanding about how peacebuilding practices were conceived, conducted and practiced within the security sector by the main

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[5] Improved security in Liberia heralds more support for development funding, US State Department report, 13 January 2004, http://reliefweb.int/node/140944 (Accessed 21 May 2012); Sean McFate, 'Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent', *Review of African Political Economy*, 35:118, 2008, 645-654.

[6] Improved security in Liberia heralds more support for development funding, US department of state report, 13 January 2004, http://reliefweb.int/node/140944 (Accessed 21 May 2012)

players during the war-peace transition in Liberia: the United Nations, Americans and West African governments (mostly Nigeria).

Post-conflict security sector reforms: Overview of the Liberian programme
Internal Security Forces

As the Comprehensive Peace Accord was negotiated in Accra, Ghana's capital, the three warring factions (Taylor's NPFL/Government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL) attempted to position themselves for a new post-war political configuration. Mediated by the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU), The United States, and the International Contact Group[7], attention focused on handling the strategic institutions of the Ministry of Justice, Liberian Police, Ministry of Defence, and the AFL. Article VII of the CPA (2003) referred to the reform of Liberia's security sector, including the Liberia National Police and other security services such as the Immigration service, Special Security Services (SSS)[8], custom security guards and other statutory security units. The peace agreement called for the disarmament and restructuring of the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Operations Division (SOD) (the paramilitary forces loyal to Taylor's former government).[9] While the ATU, SOD and other the paramilitary groups were

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[7] The international contact group for Liberia included the United States, UK, and other West African governments including Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Morocco.

[8] The Special Security Service served as Taylor's bodyguard unit and was commanded by the notorious Benjamin Yeaton. During Taylor's Presidency, he also created the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (EMSSU), which was a branch of the SSS.

[9] Referring the ATU and SSD as "legalised death squads", one Liberian journalist compared these paramilitary units to Duvalier's notorious Tontons Macoutes (Abraham M. Williams, 'A Crisis of National Security', *The Perspective,* (http://www.theperspective.org/security.html).The CPA called for the full disarmament and disbanding of the "…Special Security Units including paramilitary groups that operate within organizations such as the National Port Authority (NPA), the Liberian Telecommunications Corporation (LTC), the Liberian [Petroleum] Refining Corporation and the Airports". Article VIII Section 2 of the CPA, 2003, 16

notorious for human rights abuses during the civil conflict, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) report describes the Liberian National Police's role during the conflict as ambiguous. The former National Police Chief, Joe Tate, (a powerful cousin of Taylor's) was accused of leading gangs of death squads and looters.[10] The police had essentially become defunct and distrusted by the local population.[11] The UN managed to initially de-activate 2,351 members of the old LNP and 870 members of the former Special Security Services (SSS) who served as presidential bodyguards for Taylor. Each demobilised officer received a one-time severance pay of US$1,200.[12] UNMIL was unable to provide the necessary US$4 million to pay severance packages and the British government eventually provided the money. The most problematic internal security agencies were the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) headed by Charles Taylor's son "Chucky" and Special Operations Division (SOD).[13] Former NPFL members commanded considerable influence in the ATU, SOD and Police in 2003.[14]

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[10] Malan 2008, 9

[11] Many had not been paid for more than two years. Most had survived on extortion and bribes from the public.

[12] Malan, 2008, 51

[13] For a profile on "Chucky Taylor", see Jonny Dwyer, 'American Warlord', *Rolling Stones*, 15 September 2008

[14] Taylor created an alternative security architecture during his Presidency (1997-2003). The Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) was built from the key NPFL units in 1997 by Daniel Chea. The ATU comprised of about 6,000 irregular combatants including 2,500 based in Monrovia (under the command of General Winnie and Taylor's son Chucky); the Navy division (commanded by Roland Duo), Artillery division, Army division (V Sheriff was deputy chief of staff) Special Strike Force division (commanded by Adolphus Dolo), Marine division (commanded by General Fassu) and Wild Geese (commanded by Matthew Cheaplay). Each commander in each individual unit reported directly to Taylor. While commanders were often kept in the dark about the activities of other units, each commander had direct command over rank-and-file foot soldiers under them. Under Taylor's security command, there was, according to ICG, no attempt to develop an integrated structure of command and control.

The UN supported both CPA and the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 to provide UNMIL with a specific mandate to lead the restructuring and training of the Liberian Police. The UN SCR specifically stated that the UNMIL should assist

> the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing…to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States.

Restructuring the Liberian National Police: An Overview
From 2003 until June 2007, the American role in LNP reform organized through the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL). Operating on an annual budget of nearly a billion dollars, UNMIL's priorities focused on "rule of law" and internal security and capacity building in the Liberian police.

To achieve this mandate, the UN Security Council authorized a military strength for UNMIL 15,000 military personnel and 1,240 civil police officers from 35 countries.[15] The UN police contingent (UN CivPol) included five formed and armed police units totaling about 600 officers specialised in civil disturbances and internal order. When the UN civil police (CivPol) began its mission on 3 December 2003, twenty former Liberian police officers that had been selected and screened by the UN CivPol were retained and received training from the UN trainers for the duration of three days in order to conduct joint patrols with UNMIL.[16]

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[15] Malan 2008, 47

[16] IRIN, Liberia: UNMIL retrains first batch of Liberian police, IRIN, 3 December 2003

There was considerable disagreement over certain key decisions within UNMIL's top hierarchy. One of the first considerations was whether to disband the old LNP. Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), a retired American diplomat and former Major General in the US Air Force Mr. Jacques Klein[17] wanted to disband the old police force and start from scratch. An American police chief from Los Angeles Mark Kroeker served as UN Civpol's commander. Kroeker decided to integrate former LNP officers into the new force.

UN CivPOL initially registered 5,000 Liberians who claimed to be former LNP.[18] The United States provided an initial US$500,000 to begin training, recruitment and vetting of a LNP.[19] By early January 2004, approximately 5,000 former LNP officers were registered in the new force and immediately commenced a two-week training course.[20] The decision to retain these officers was controversial because most of these officers were from Charles Taylor's former government. Christopher Massaquoi, Liberian police director played a figurehead role while Mark Kroeker began to organize the old remnants of the force. The old officers retained from Taylor's defunct

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[17] Jacques Klein was appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (by American influence) in July 2003, was previously a senior Foreign Service officer for the State Department. He served as Principal Deputy High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Office of the High Representative. In August 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the selection of Mr. Klein as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the rank of Under-Secretary-General.

[18] Malan 2008, 48

[19] Malan 2008, 49. Other partners came into the fold, including Norway and the Netherlands who provided funds to build a permanent barracks at the Police Academy in Paynesville, Monrovia. Belgium also provided sidearms and ammunition for training and vetting officers.

[20] Malan, 2008, 48; IRIN, Liberia: UN provides crash training for 400 police officers, 12 January 2004

government were registered and re-trained to work alongside the UN Civpol force to maintain law and order (especially in Monrovia). Since UNMIL lacked the authority and mandate to arrests criminals, the 400 retained officers, called the LNP "interim police" conducted joint patrols alongside UNPOL.[21] However, the majority of old police and intelligence officers were sidelined from playing any meaningful role in the immediate post-war security environment.

Due to the absence of a Liberian national security strategy, the US government commissioned the RAND Corporation (mentioned below) envisioned the role for the post-war police force as falling under the authority of the Ministry of Justice:

> The primary missions of the LNP are a) to prevent and fight crime and b) to maintain public security. These missions call for a light but sizable, community-friendly police force that can earn the confidence and cooperation of the Liberian people. Anticipating occasional civil disorder, the LNP should also have a branch capable of riot control —e.g. the police support unit (PSU).[22]

With no particular expertise in internal security matters, the National Transitional Government of Liberia estimated that only 3,500 new police recruits would be required. This projection was grossly underestimated and was subsequently increased to 6,000 when the democratically elected government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came to in 2005. UNMIL and Government of Liberia collaborated to set a vetting and screening program for incoming recruits. UNMIL/CivPol set minimum requirements for new recruits in line with African standards: Liberian citizenship; between the ages of 18-35 years; and be a high-

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[21] Ibid., 9

[22] RAND Corporation Report 2008, 25-26

school graduate. Recruits had to be "mentally and physically fit" as defined by a basic aptitude test. Additionally, all candidates had to relinquish any formal positions held in a political party.

The UN was unable to maintain a strict recruitment criterion to vet only high-school graduates. While the UN wanted to screen criminal and individuals with poor human rights records from the war, this requirement was much harder to achieve in practice. Under the leadership of Kroeker, the UN CivPol Restructuring and Recruiting section assumed the lead role in restructuring and recruitment during this phase. All new officers were required to serve a two-year probation period during which they would be subject to reviews by superior officers. There were several adequacies associated with the vetting process.

Insufficient resources were allocated to the UN to fulfill its duties. As such, UNMIL was unable to conduct extensive background checks on LNP recruits and interviews were limited to only NGOs and community based organizations as opposed to the screening team making visits to candidate's previous communities.[23] Therefore, UNMIL's recruitment and vetting process resulted in a low rejection rate of only 10%, considerably less than the 3 out of 4 rejection rate for the new Armed Forces of Liberia.[24] Many high-school dropouts entered the new police force as a result.

Officers lacked uniforms, weapons and logistics due to years of mismanagement and neglect. Based on advice from UN CivPol, NTGL leadership increased the salary for an average LNP officer in 2004 from US$17

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[23] Malan, 2008, 50-51
[24] McFate, 84-85; Malan 2008, 32

per month to $92.[25] The UN introduced performance appraisals for officers and created a Professional Standards Division to foster professional development of officers. Security forces in general continued entrenched local practices during Americo-Liberian colonial rule of extorting money from rural communities to supplement their meager government salaries.

Assessments of the Police: "the weak link"
UNMIL's role in building capacity of the LNP has produced limited results. The Liberian National Police force increased from 3,986 officers in 2010 to 4,279 in 2011 to 4,417 as of 1 February 2013. Liberia's current police force of less than 5,000 officers is inadequate for a country of 3.7 million residents. This represents a police: civilian ratio of 1:740, far less than the UN standard of between 1:400-500.[26] There are revealing signs of deeply seated indiscipline among the ranks of the Liberian police.[27] Numerous reports indicate that police misbehavior, corruption among bribe-seeking officers and also public intoxication are widespread especially in rural areas.[28] Corruption still plagues the force from top to bottom. Senior police officials, including the former Chief

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[25] Malan, 2008, 51

[26] Elijah Dickens Mushemeza, 'Policing in Post-Conflict Environments: Implications for Police Reform in Uganda', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 6:3, 2008.1-18.

[27] Kennedy L. Yangian, 'Too much complaints against (Liberian) police': LNP ready to tackle indiscipline, FrontPage Africa, 22 May 2012, http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3192:too-much-complaints-against-liberia-police-lnp-ready-to-tackle-indiscipline&catid=67:news&Itemid=144 (Accessed 29 May 2012); Liberia: Police disrobe 304 officers, *The New Dawn*, 17 May 2012; US department of state, Liberia 2012 Human Rights Report, 2012 Country reports on human rights practices.

[28] See, for instance, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: A case of the Liberian national police force and its capacity to respond to internal threat in the wake of UNMIL drawdown in 2012, Search for Common Ground/SIPRI: Monrovia, March 2011, 25, 33; 'Several police officers dismissed', *Heritage*, 24 May 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201305240936.html (Accessed 26 May 2013); ICG, "Liberia: How Sustainable is the Recovery?', 2011, 12

of Police have been involved in a high profile corruption case.[29] Very few senior officers could be relied upon as interlocutors for UN CivPOL's senior leadership. The lower-ranking police officers have been complicit in crime and armed robbery in urban areas. A deep sense of insecurity prevails in Monrovia, in particular armed robberies, aggravated assaults and rape.[30] The police force has been hampered by a lack logistics for operational effectiveness.[31] The Government of Liberia can barely afford to maintain its 2009 force strength of 3,800 officers.[32]

Developing an effective police force in Liberia would have required a much more extensive and entrenched US government role in Liberia's security institutions to engage in the necessary reform, not only in the police but also the justice ministry.[33] A US state department official acknowledges the lack of effectiveness in the "new" LNP:

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[29] Former Commissioner of Police and Commandant of the Police Academy James D. Hallowanger (appointed by Johnson-Sirleaf in 2007) was accused of corruption. Police Chief Beatrice Munah Sieh-Brown, former head of the police was accused of stealing $US199, 800 intended for the purchase of police uniforms.

[30] See Small Arms Survey, 'Reading Between the Lines: Crime and Victimization in Liberia, *Policy brief No. 2*, September 2011, 3

[31] Wikileaks, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MONROVIA318_a.html. "Across Liberia police officers, government representatives, and citizens widely agree that the LNP has funding and logistical problems. It is not uncommon to walk into a police depot and find that there are no radios, computers, office supplies, toilets, or electricity. Officers do not have batons, gas, or handcuffs, and many use their personal mobile phones to communicate with each other and with police headquarters. Vehicles are scarce, as is fuel" (Ana Kantor and Mariam Persson, 'Understanding Vigilantism: Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform', Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010, 16); Andreas Mehler, 'Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence From Liberia and the Central African Republic', *Armed Forces & Society*, 19, 2010. In 2007, the Government of Liberia could allocate $269,000 from a meager national budget of US$129 million to purchase police vehicles.

[32] Malan 2008, 86 footnote 92.

[33] President Johnson-Sirleaf preferred the adoption of a US-led state approach in the police reform efforts. However, this would have required significantly more resources allocated by the US government, a factor that prevented a more active and entrenched role. Instead, the US adopted a lead-state approach with respect to the formation of two specialised (and armed) police

> The LNP, as it current stands, is a disaster. Aside from weaknesses in selection, training and equipment, there is no connection between the LNP and the prosecution personnel within the Ministry of Justice.[34]

A Wikileaks cable describes the LNP as the "weak link" in Liberia's post-war security efforts. At a fundament level, the reason for such indiscipline relates to two factors: the lack of disciplined leadership at the top (command and control) and the social background of the police corps in the lower-ranks.[35] The UN was unable to maintain the basic education standard (high-school graduate); the minimal entry-requirement was dropped to junior highschool and grade 10 drop-outs. Additionally, discipline dropped when the UN insisted on maintaining a goal of 20% women in the force's composition. An eight-month accelerated training program was hastily implemented, which resulted in the integration of poorly educated and ill-trained women officers into the police ranks. Additionally, the police force was unable to attract quality recruits with its meager monthly salary ($90).

Engaging in police reform in a post-conflict context without substantively building a properly functioning judicial/legal system was based on a problem-solving Band-Aid solution approach. Without taking into consideration the wider socio-historical and political economy context, the police reform efforts would fail in the absence of a capable state. The US State

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units, the Special Security Services (SSS, the President's protective service) and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), set up in 2008 to combat armed robberies and to address the need for a quick reaction force. The US provided armaments for both units.

[34] Malan 2008, 87, footnote 103

[35] A Wikileaks report dated in 2008 emphasises the top leadership factor, noting that all international partners agree "that the basic problem is command and control and in tasking in the field". (https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MONROVIA476_a.html)

Department's Human Rights Reports on Liberia consistently reported that police

reforms were ineffective in absence of justice sector transformation:

> the most serious human rights abuses were those tied to justice: judicial inefficiency and corruption, lengthy pretrial detention, denial of due process, and harsh prison conditions…Judges and magistrates were subject to influence and corruption. Uneven application of the law and the unequal distribution of personnel and resources remained problems throughout the judicial system.[36]

Military-building in post-war Liberia (2003-2011)

The mandate for leading the military (AFL) reform efforts was given to the US

Government, as outlined in the Accra CPA. The AFL SSR programme was

implemented from 2003 to December 2009. As demonstrated below, the

Americans sought to ensure maximum autonomy over its decisions during the

reform process. Before discussing the 2003 interventions, some historical

context is necessary to understand why earlier reform efforts from 1990-1998

failed.

Context for AFL 'restructuring' efforts, 1990-1998

Previous proposals for restructuring the army were considered in Liberia in

1990-1991 under the Interim Government for National Unity (IGNU) of

President Amos Sawyer and Dr. Edward Kesselly (Minister of National

Defence).[37] The interim government recognized the need to rewrite the

constitutional authority of the AFL to take into account "the historical failure of

the constitutional mandate…as constituted and amended in 1956"and to shift the

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[36] US department of state, '2011 Human Rights Reports: Liberia, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 24 May 2012; See also US State Department 2010

[37] Dr. Amos Sawyer is a former exiled head of the Liberian People's Party and founder of the Movement for Justice in Africa.

AFL's focus to a "civic-oriented" mandate with rapid deployment capabilities.[38]

It was believed that the AFL was in a crisis and required more than a "restructuring" process. The government under Sawyer's interim Presidency recommended demobilization and restructuring of the AFL with leadership provided by the United States Military Mission and Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and a mission to train and develop a new professional officer corps.[39] Proposals of this nature considered in the context of the 1990 peace negotiations held in Banjul. During political negotiations, the AFL had been considered one of the warring factions following its complete disintegration and factionalization in 1990.[40] Through the failed peace processes in the 1990-1996, (from the Banjul conference in 1990 to the Abuja II accord in 1996), the Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was strongly considered for leading in the restructuring of Liberia's armed forces. Following the completion of the Abuja II accord in 1996, ECOMOG would restructure the AFL for a period of six months after the May 1997 elections.

The 1995 Abuja II agreement stipulated that the Armed Forces of Liberia should be restructured with a core group of officers retained to form the basis of the new army. Reconstructing the armed forces was complicated due to the "splintered, almost non-existent", command structure of the army and the fact that many former soldiers and officers had defected to one the warring

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[38] Samukai 2004
[39] Samukai 2004
[40] Amos Sawyer, TRC testimony, 2008

factions—the Liberian Peace Council, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).[41] Before the elections in 1997, combatants were neither encamped nor properly demobilised; command and control structures within the irregular armed groups remained intact.[42] Following Charles Taylor election as President in July 1997, the Nigerian military officers in the ECOMOG mission were stonewalled from initiating AFL reform and tensions came to a head between Taylor and ECOMOG's force commander General Malu. Taylor had distrusted the Nigerians for covertly supporting his main rival, ULIMO. Additionally, Taylor viewed the restructuring plan as an infringement on his constitutional authority. A frustrated ECOMOG commander General Malu outlined his plan in 1998 before he left the country: "Prior to the elections, we had eight factions and they were transformed into political parties. The idea was to form an army acceptable to all the people and not just a section, a clan, or tribe. This is necessary to ensure confidence in the elected government."[43]

Charles Taylor wanted to maintain his sovereign control to shape the AFL reform process. He set up a government commission in 1998 to brainstorm proposals for restructuring the army without external interference from Nigeria or the Americans. He established a 28-person Commission, and appointed co-chairs Blamo Nelson (a civilian politician and close associate of Charles

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[41] The LPC was led by former ULIMO political committee chairman George Boley and was primarily comprised of Krahn refugees from Côte d'Ivoire and former members of Doe's AFL and, like ULIMO, it enjoyed covert support from ECOMOG.

[42] Carter Center, *Observing the 1997 Special Elections Process in Liberia,* Atlanta GA, 1997, 17.

[43] Tepitapia Sannah, 'Malu Regrets Leaving Without Restructuring Liberian Army', *PANA*, 9 January 1998

Taylor's dating back to his days at the General Services Agency) and Liberian Minister of National Defence Daniel Chea. Taylor sought to legitimize the commission by appointing a range of military and civilian officials thatincluded Nathaniel Davis and Lieutenant General Sande Ware among others.[44] However, to non-Taylor loyalists, the committee lacked broad based legitimacy and one member who never participated in the committee, Brownie Samukai claimed that its members were "evidentially interested in only very big payoffs by the Government".[45] The plan lacked legitimacy of key international and regional backing from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union, United Nations, United States or European Union. The Commission's final report made several notable recommendations: First, retention of remnants of the old officer establishment (many of whom were members of the commission). Second, downsizing would be implemented from 11,000 troops to and 6,000 personnel (5,150 in the army, 600 in the navy and 240 in the air force).[46]

In accordance with these recommendations, the AFL Chief of Staff was demobilised and 2,250 personnel were retired on 1 January 1998. The restructuring process was subsequently derailed as a result of renewed violence during the "Camp Johnson Road violence". However, some aspects of the 1998

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[44] See composition of the committee here; current Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai is listed as a member but did not participate in the commission's work.

[45] Samukai 2004

[46] Taylor was obviously unserious about the AFL. He only allocated about US$1 million from his 2000 budget to implement the plan.

military reform roadmap were later incorporated into the subsequent reform efforts after 2003 (see below).[47]

Following the end of the second Liberian civil war (in June 2003), the military was factionalised, comprised mainly of three broad groups of soldiers: Krahn soldiers and Doe loyalists, Taylor's recruits (mostly former rebels he integrated into the security forces) and a small group of pre-1980 soldiers.[48]

Comprehensive Peace Accord

The CPA (2003) contained several provisions relevant to military reform.[49] Articles VII and VIII of Part Four of the CPA, under Article VII section 1 (b), stipulated that "the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces *may be drawn* from the ranks of the present GOL forces, the LURD and the MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience".[50] This provision provided flexibility for the reformers to decide whether to retain former officers and soldiers from the old AFL.

The CPA also outlines a key role for the international and regional actors that were mandated to provide advice and support throughout the reform process. "The Parties request that ECOWAS, the UN, African Union, and the

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[47] Author's interview with former NTGL official, Monrovia, March 2012

[48] Boi Bleuju Boi TRC testimony, Montserrado County, 9 October 2008

[49] The peace agreement was signed by Daniel Chea (Minister of National Defence), Mr. Kabineh Janneh, LURD and Mr. Tiah, JD Slanger of MODEL; Mr. Abou Moussa, head of the UN peacebuilding support office in Liberia; Ambassador Giancarlo Izzo, Representative of Mr. Hans Dahlgren, The European Union Co-Chair of the International Contact Group on Liberia; AU chairman, Hon. Nana, Akufo Addo Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana and Co-Chair of the International Contact Group of Liberia; ECOWAS chairman

[50] CPA Article VII section 1 (b)

International Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL) provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform effort". The negotiators requested that the United States of America "play a lead role in organizing this restructuring program".[51] Among the issues negotiated between the warring factions in Accra, the provision outlining US lead role in military reform efforts was the least controversial. Despite US hegemonic interests in Liberia, the three warring factions believed that the United States was the only global power that could provide the sustained support to lead Liberia's military efforts. It is surprising that the factions did not highlight this as a controversial issue, given the past involvement of US military support, particularly its detrimental effects of American involvement and military assistance during Doe's era in power.

The restructuring process of AFL was to take into account the following principles.[52]

a. Incoming service personnel shall be screened with respect to educational, professional, medical and fitness qualifications as well as prior history with regard to human rights abuses;

b. The restructured force shall take into account the country's national balance. It shall be composed without any political bias to ensure that it represents the national character of Liberia;

c. The Mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be to defend the national sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters;

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[51] CPA Article VII Section 1 (b) of the CPA, 2003, 15
[52] CPA Article VII Section 1 (b) of the CPA, 2003, 15

d. All Parties shall cooperate with ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, the ICGL and the United States of America.

Degree of External Influence

The American government retained considerable influence within the context of UNMIL to shape conditions related to the reconstruction process. The American government preferred proxy governance through the UNMIL and other American government-affiliated and funded private and non-profit institutions. With respect to the development of national security architecture, dominant external actors were able to shape the design of Liberia's security sector reform plans. There was no Liberian security strategy in place during the NTGL that could offer guidance for police and security reform efforts for the first two years of peacebuilding. This delay in the writing of a national security framework meant that the bulk of the military, police and security sector reforms being implemented from 2005 through 2008 were implemented in the absence of a national vision or strategy. By the time that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's election in 2005, she preferred to outscore security design responsibilities to US and EU authorities. For instance, President Sirleaf sent a request to the United States Government contracted RAND Corporation to write the country's national security strategy that would form the basis for the Liberian Government's framework despite concerns expressed from more than eighty Liberian civil society groups that petitioned her government to set up an

independent technical advisory committee on SSR to undertake a review of the reform process and allow for greater Liberian input.[53]

The Liberian National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA) set up a civil society working group to advocate for certain security sector reform recommendation in 2006. The group included five institutions representing human rights, democracy, women, youth, and media and it received support from the International Center for Transitional Justice. LINLEA was comprised of about five hundred serving and retired police officers that had begun advocating for human rights during Taylor's regime and had received funding from the US Embassy during the war.[54] Unfortunately, however, LINLEA was sidelined in favour of external "advice". The RAND Corporation consultancy did not include a single Liberian on its consultant team. LINLEA was well positioned to play a role during the country's post-war process.

External-Internal Relationship
UNMIL and NTGL

An important consideration was working out a relationship between UNMIL and the Transitional Government. The American and UNMIL perceived the transitional government (executive and House) as corrupt and untrustworthy (see Chapter 3). To deal with specific policy matters related to this relationship, for instance, recruitment and training, UNMIL established a joint NTGL-UNMIL Rule of Law Implementation Committee to coordinate with the transitional

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[53] RAND Corporation, Making Liberia Safe, 2008; Jaye, 200, 15

[54] Alexander Loden, Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train Without Brushes', *The International Journal of Transitinal Justice*, 1:1, 2007, 303

government.[55] Since the CPA contained provisions that allowed for the suspension of parts of the Liberian constitution deemed as "obstructions" to peace implementation. To circumvent the Liberian law, (which according to the constitution, specifies that, for example, dissolution of the military can only be done by a national referendum), legal experts cited *Article XXXV c* of the CPA, which stated "For the avoidance of doubt, relevant provisions of the Constitution, status, and other laws of Liberia, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, are also hereby suspended". The provision stated, "all suspended provisions of the Constitution, Statutes and other laws of Liberia, affected as a result of this agreement, shall be deemed to be restored with the inauguration of the elected Government by January 2006".[56] Therefore, UNMIL and the mission's senior Civil Police leadership could bypass Liberian laws and local political institutions (such as the transitional legislature and judicial branches) when international policies conflicted with or contradicted local laws. The CPA provision provided dominant actors (the Americans and the UN) with a *carte blanche* to shape and manage most key decisions in the early transition period. In the case of the Liberian police, the US could exercise control over the reform process through its *de facto* authority in senior leadership within both the UN's political mission as well as the civilian police body.[57] Subsequently

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[55] Malan 2008, 49

[56] See: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/58/constitutional_changes

[57] Article XXXV, section 1(b) stated "the provisions of the present constitution of the Republic of Liberia, the Statutes and all other Liberian laws, which relate to the establishment, composition and powers of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judicial branches of government, are hereby suspended".

following President Sirleaf's inauguration in January 2006, her administration reasserted the powers of her executive authority and the constitution of Liberia.[58]

For instance, the committee on national security in the interim legislature in 2004-2005 complained to Jacques Klein in writing that UNMIL was "sidelining" the police and intelligence officers "who know our terrain", which could "jeopardize the entire peace process and bring about another war in the absence of UNMIL in the future".[59] It is worth quoting verbatim a letter written by Liberian House of Representatives complaining of the intrusiveness of the peacebuilding approach:

> Senior staff of the Liberian National Police has officially complained to the NTLA Security committee that the UNMIL newly trained Liberian Police Officers are not under their direct supervision but rather take orders from Commission Mark Kreoker and his able lieutenants in UNMIL, thereby impeding the entire function of the LNP. Complaining of deliberate sidelining of the security committee of the NTLA, and heads of all security agencies by UNMIL does not create a room for teamwork to brainstorm and put into practice a proper security mechanism that could vet, avert and unearth unscrupulous acts that could derail the entire peace process or bring about another war in the absence of UNMIL.[60]

The Liberian national security committee in the Legislature requested that UNMIL "provide the necessary logistics to the LNP and other paramilitary personnel" to lead UNMIL in the process of combating crimes and "covertly verifying the disarmament exercise in both urban and rural areas as our local officers are knowledgeable of our terrain".[61] Additionally warnings were made

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[58] Malan 2008, 19

[59] Letter dated 16 December 2004, in author's possession, *IMG_0292-5*

[60] Letter dated 16 December 2004, in author's possession, 2

[61] Ibid, p. 3

that any changes to security institutions must be done through Legislative

structures and processes in accordance with Liberia's constitution.[62] However,

while attempts were made to rectify this later on after January 2006, (with

limited success), the important point was that under American senior leadership,

UNMIL retained considerable control over decisions and local security forces

and were given autonomy to sideline structures deemed to be obstructions to the

process.[63]

Internal and External Visions for Rebuilding the Armed Forces of Liberia

As highlighted above, two controversial aspects of the restructuring process must

be highlighted. This section uncovers the rationale for "disbanding" and

demobilizing the entire army—a decision that many Liberians viewed as a

deviation from the original spirit of the peace accord. The CPA never mentioned

"disbanding" or "dissolution" of the AFL (and instead used the term

"restructure"). However, external and internal actors interpreted the CPA in a

way that they could justify the demobilization of the AFL based on their reading

of the provision that stated that the new army *may be* drawn from the ranks of

warring factions. In the context of the CPA negotiations, the three factions

(Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Liberians United

Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) wanted some agreement on a quota for

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[62] Ibid

[63] On 28 July-1 August 2004, European-based research institutions (African Security Sector Network, Conflict, Security and Development Group at King's College) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces conducted an exploratory consultancy to explore ways of facilitating civil society and parliamentary oversight of the security sector; the group provided training to parliamentarians and security agency personnel through policy seminars held in Monrovia, Ghana and England (Jaye, 2009, 7).

integrating their combatants into the new army.[64] This section explains how the AFL came to be demobilised. Understanding these aspects of military reform enables a more comprehensive assessment to the mindsets and practices that informed the SSR process. It outlines the key players (Liberian, US and West African) involved in this decision and their respective underlying rationale.

Enter the United States: A Lead-State Approach?
Since the United States Department of Defence (DoD) was preoccupied with engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the State Department coordinated early US government efforts in Liberia's military reform process.

At the end of the war in 2003, Liberia's armed forces totaled approximately 14-15,000 personnel. The AFL was divided into several different units, some comprised of former NPFL combatants and other units led by mostly ethnic Krahns. Shortly after assuming office, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) set up a Defence Advisory Committee comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the former government forces, LURD and MODEL under the authority of the Ministry of Defence to develop proposals for the reform and restructuring of Liberia's armed forces to address issues of demobilization and restructuring.[65] In the Ministry of Defence, Taylor's loyalists held the balance of power with Daniel Chea, Taylor's former Minister of Defence as Minister and Kpenkpah Y.

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[64] Author's confidential interview with former LURD official, Monrovia, 17 March 2012

[65] The DAMC comprises representatives of the office of the Chairman, NTGL; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Finance; Central Bank of Liberia; Ministry of Information; Ministry of Planning; United Stated Embassy; the United Nations; Economic Community of West African States; the African Union, and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) (Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2003/117, 15)

Konah serving as the ceremonial Chief of Staff. LURD, represented by Joe Wylie (as deputy minister for administration), and MODEL represented by Brown Parjebo (deputy minister of operations)[66] jockeyed for political relevance within the ministry. Due to the nature of the precarious power-sharing arrangement within the NTGL (see Chapter 3), power struggles between LURD, MODEL and former Government of Liberia factional leaders within the Ministry of Defence and DAC threatened to slow down the process. According to a defense official,

> The first challenge we had [to settle] was infighting [in the Ministry]; the two generals [from LURD and MODEL] said they had been chosen to be Chief of Staff (CoS). In fact, they sat at the Ministry of Defence; we went back to the UN, to the Germany Embassy; the same day that MODEL Chief of Staff also wanted that position [of Minister of Defence]. So we said, we are going to get rid of them and restructure the army anyway, so why don't we create what I called the Defense Advisory Committee. We'll put all of the Chief of Staff on it and they will report directly to the Minister of Defense (Chea); that is how we created the DAC.[67]

Meanwhile in early 2004, discussions were underway between the National Transitional Government (NTGL) and the United States Government on how to handle proposals for military reform. Defence Ministry Daniel Chea visited the Pentagon shortly after the transitional government was inaugurated in January 2004. The Liberian delegation, which included Bryant and interim defense minister Daniel Chea, presented the "Liberian proposal" that called for demobilizing the army while retaining a core group of between 50-100 senior officers to form the foundation for the new force. The Liberian plan was justified

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[66] Brown was recently appointed as County/Regional coordinator in May 2013

[67] Author's personal interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2013

on the grounds that a military cannot be rebuilt from scratch and must draw on its own history, regardless of whether that history was marred in controversy.[68] Pentagon officials informed the Liberian delegation that the US government was legally barred from covering the costs of retiring soldiers in foreign militaries that had not been democratically elected. The American government offered to retrain and re-equip the army and provide assistance to cover *severance packages* but made this assistance conditional on the Liberian authorities assuming full responsibility over an effective and comprehensive demobilization process.[69] Secondary issues under consideration were developing a local recruitment criteria and proposals for an appropriate size of the new army.[70]

From 22-24 March 2004, the Defense Advisory Committee (DAC) in the Minister of National Defense conducted a one-day workshop at the University of Liberia campus in Monrovia to brainstorm ideas for what to do with the AFL.[71] The purpose of the workshop was to devise a plan to reform the AFL and update the 1998 AFL Restructuring Plan. The workshop concluded that a four-phase implementation plan that would involve: re-documentation; downsizing through demobilization; downsizing through retirement and discharge; and recruitment for a new army.[72] The DAC drafted report envisioned a new force consisting of 6,500 troops called the "Liberian National Defense Force" (LNDF). The plan also called for building an Army infantry brigade, the Air Reconnaissance Unit

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[68] Author's personal interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2013

[69] Sean McFate, 'Outsourcing', 648; Author's interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2013

[70] Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2004/430, 8

[71] 'Role of the military in post-conflict reconstruction of Liberia' – 1 day workshop organized by Liberian History, Education and Development (LIHEDE)

[72] Ebo, 'The Role of Security Sector', 17.

(ARU), a Liberian National Coast Guard and the Reserve Unit. This plan formed the basis of the "Liberian plan".

Senior UNMIL officials expressed their concern for re-establishing the military in Liberia. UN Special Representative Jacques Klein was among the key proponents calling for full dissolution of the army. Klein had made his views clear during a November 2003 public statement, in which he advised that transitional government to permanently dissolve the AFL.[73] Klein's approach called for the full dissolution of the military and the establishment of a "decent police force and a border security force of about 600 to 700 men", arguing,

> If I had to give advice to the government of Liberia, I would say you do not need an army. Armies sit around playing cards and plotting coups. What Liberia needs is a strong state border service (recruited from scratch) to guard its borders against smuggling, illegal migration and cross-border combatants.[74]

Meanwhile, the United States military initiated its own plan for the AFL. A so-called "expert assessment team" was sent to Liberia from 19-29 May 2004 to conduct a ten-day assessment and analyze options for Liberia's post-war military. The team consisted of personnel from the US department of defense, and officials from two private security contractors, DynCorp (owned by private equity firm Veritas Capital) and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) (both had previously won preferred access to non-bidding state department contracts).[75] It is noteworthy that twenty-one out of twenty three personnel on

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[73] IRIN, Liberia: Klein urges new government to abolish army, 5 November 2003, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=47067 (Accessed 9 August 2010)
[74] Ibid.
[75] PAE had been awarded a contract to provide ECOMOG with logistical support in Sierra Leone since mid-1998.

the team were retired US Army personnel.[76] However, there were two important and related limitations for DynCorp. First, their knowledge of the local Liberian context was extremely limited; second, the DynCorp officials lacked local contacts in Liberia. According to one American insider involved in the process, "the majority of officers who served on the assessment mission had never set foot in Africa before".[77] Interestingly, as evidence of a lack of awareness and knowledge about the Liberian context, the May 2004 assessment team ignored the previous DAC Liberian plan that called for creating a 6,500 strong army and proposed their own option, to create a 4,020-person AFL force, including a 412-strong combat engineer battalion that would conduct tasks such as mine laying, constructing field fortifications, and digging tank traps.[78] The fact that their assessment lead them to recommend units that could "dig tank traps" in an environment where no tanks existed illustrated the lack of understanding of the Liberian post-war context. It is obvious that these recommendations were informed by US perceptions about what they thought was needed in Liberia. There were no Liberian officials on the assessment team and nor did the US "experts" consult Liberian security and civil society stakeholders.

At the time, the State Department was examining its options for outsourcing its responsibilities for military restructuring in Liberia. Clearly these processes had already been set in motion well before late October 2004, when London-based Africa Confidential reported that California-based private military

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[76] Sean McFate, 'Outsourcing The Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent', *Review of African Political Economy*, 35:118, 2008, 646
[77] Ibid, 646.
[78] McFate, 'Outsourcing The Making of Militaries, 652

company DynCorp were about to be awarded a contract for restructuring the Liberian military.[79] At the time, DynCorp project manager Sean McFate had already secured a headquarters for DynCorp in downtown Monrovia.[80] There were several deliberations prior to this decision, which included US Ambassador Donald Booth, US Chief Office of Defence Cooperation Lieutenant Colonel Chris Wyatt, Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General for UNMIL Allan Doss (a British diplomat who previously had served as former Deputy SRSG in Sierra Leone), UNMIL Force Commander General Owonibi, Liberian Defence Minister Daniel Chea and a handful of other senior members of the AFL that were generally close with the US and UN.[81]

The Defence Advisory Committee initiated a re-documentation process by drawing on the 1998 plan that Mr. Blamo Nelson and Mr. Chea had devised. At this stage, the process was still controlled by Liberia's transitional National Defence ministry. The DAC reform committee relied on what records remained at the old Ministry of National Defense headquarters, which was negligible at best. Two resources were utilised: rudimentary records of pay stubs and whatever files that could be recovered from the G1 section of Ministry of Defense.[82] The DAC classified soldiers into two categories: those destined for

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[79] As Ebo points out, DynCorp's role in Liberia marked the first time in history of West Africa that a private military company had been contracted to restructure and train a national army (Ebo, 'The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges', *Conflict, Security and Development,* 7:1, 2007, 37

[80] New Model Army, Africa Confidential, Vol. 45, No. 21, 22 October 2004.

[81] 'AFL to be Dissolved, Restructured, Rebuilt', The Inquirer, 24 October 2005, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200510240792.html (**7** December 2011)

[82] The AFL is structured similarly to the US army. The G1 is responsible for personnel matters including manning, discipline and personnel services. G2 Branch is responsible for intelligence and security; G3 is responsible for operations, including exercise planning, training, operational

demobilization (those recruited in 1990 onwards) and those pre-1980 soldiers to be "honourably retired".[83]

Liberian-led Re-documentation – 2004-2005

The transitional government through DAC commenced re-documentation of former AFL personnel according to the DAC plan in early 2004. One aspect that complicated the process was the lack of documentation that could be used to verify the validity of the soldier's identities. There was a proliferation of ranks after the 1980 coup and during the war. Many Liberians claimed to be officers in an effort to maximize their retirement payout and demand payment of salary arrears.

Liberian officials also had to confront the thorny issue of absent without official leave (AWOL). Without proper documentation, this proved extremely difficult to define. The issue had important implications for eligibility considerations when retirement packages would be determined. The truth is that many soldiers abandoned the AFL during the war to fight for one of the warring factions. Some had disengaged themselves entirely from the military and sought exile in a neighbouring country. Dealing with the AWOL issue was difficult and sensitive to verify as the process was highly political. Since there was no credible information about how long soldiers had served/ and the degree of loyalty of individual soldiers, Liberian DAC members (as well as Mr. Blamo Nelson who was intimately involved) made the decision to "treat all soldiers as if

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requirements, combat development, and tactical doctrine; the G4 branch deals with logistics and quartering; G5 civil and military cooperation

[83] Author's interview with former DAC official, 13 March 2012

they were neutral actors in the conflict".[84] In other words, sensitive questions like "where were you and what was your role during the war" were left out of the consideration during the classification process. The DAC officials attempted to navigate this sensitive issue by basically ignoring it. Believing that their dismissal from the army was imminent, elements of the old AFL within the defence ministry inflated the number of "soldiers" on payroll to increase assessments costs of reform including their family members and friends on the list.

Once the re-documentation phase was complete around February 2004, Daniel Chea and Blamo Nelson devised the criteria for determining demobilization payouts. Soldiers were classified into two general groups: "war recruits" and "pre-war soldiers". Critieria one, based on age, sought to identify all soldiers and officers that were too old and could be compulsory retired. This phase of the process became dependent on US. Where local Liberian military law was absent, US doctrine was applied. For instance, the US military doctrine of mandatory retirement at age 65 was applied to the demobilization phase. All personnel sixty-five years old or over were automatically retired. As such, the army would be reduced to about 3,000 personnel. Criteria two, based on seniority, identified all soldiers that had served for an accumulated length of twenty-five years. Accordingly, about 1,000 soldiers and officers remained "eligible". Third, education qualifications were considered. The DAC officials set a minimal education requirement of high-school graduation. In the end, about

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[84] Author's interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2012

300 soldiers were "eligible" for reinstatement in a new army, according to the criteria set by DAC. In sum, the "Liberian Plan" called for the retention of these 300 officers and soldiers that would form the core basis for a new restructured post-war military.[85]

From Liberian-led to American-led

How did the process go from Liberian to American-led? Eventually the Americans stepped in and overrode the DAC/Liberian plan. It is a safe assumption that the US authorities were not impressed with the lack of vision within Liberia and in particular the DAC about the question of the AFL's post-war role and composition. The American Government concluded that full demobilization of the military (including senior officers and junior commanders) was necessary to "wipe the slate clean" and "start from scratch". The decision to demobilise the entire AFL was partially influenced by the fact that senior officers in the defence ministry who responsible for leading the re-documentation office in the ministry of defence decided to manipulate the "re-documentation" process by "padding" the list with names of their own kin. According to a former Ministry of Defence official in the DAC, this signaled to the Americans that the old officers were "unprepared to fall in sync with what we wanted to do. They wanted to operate the old way".[86]

Out-sourcing the reconstruction: Enter DynCorp - 2004-2009

In May 2005, the United States Ambassador (Booth) and the Chairman of the Liberian transitional government (Byrant) concluded a "Memorandum of

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[85] Author's interview with former DAC official, Monrovia, 13 March 2012

[86] Author's personal interview with former GoL official, Monrovia, 13 March 2012

Understanding" with the United States to lead Liberia's military reform efforts. According to US Army (retired) Colonel Thomas Dempsey (a former US military attaché to Liberia, 1998-2000), the MoU committed the US to "assist" in demobilizing the existing Liberian military, followed by a rigorous recruitment and vetting process after which assistance would concentrate on training, equipping and sustaining the new force until it was operational.[87] However, the contract also stipulated that demobilizing the old AFL was the primary responsibility of the National Transitional Government of Liberia.[88] In addition, the demobilization of the old remnants of the AFL had to be complete before the US could initiate its assistance. Dempsey notes that the SSR process in Liberia followed similar practices and the same model that US-led reform programmes had undertaken undertaken in other African countries transitioning from periods of conflict. "There was [also] a provision in the MoU for a Liberian-US "Joint Defense Advisory Committee" (JDAC) to establish policy for the SSR program and to (jointly) oversee its administration. The JDAC included two statutory members: Liberian Minister of National Defense and a "US senior military representative" normally the Chief of the US Office of Defense Cooperation in Liberia (at the time, this post was filled by Ryan

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[87] Colonel Thomas Dempsey, who is now at the African Center for Strategic Studies, formally directed the reconstruction and training of the Liberian ministry of defense as part of the joint U.S-Liberian security sector reform process. http://africacenter.org/security/experts/thomas-a-dempsey/

[88] Welken 2010, 23. The Leahy Amendment requires that all foreign troops trained by US military be pre-screened by the US state department for human rights violations allegations. Moreover, the Leahy Amendment requires that part of the military instruction that US military troops provide include training in human rights and law of land warfare. US military troops are also required to report any evidence of human rights violations as per the Leahy Amendment.

McMullin).[89] Essentially, the JDAC functioned as the primary operational link between during the military-building process, while the US embassy (through its Ambassador) also maintained an active role with the political leadership in Liberia. However, as will be shown below, in practice, the US maintained maximum autonomy over decision-making processes, and in many cases, sidelined Liberian National Defence officials from administration and oversight roles.

Aspects that were left out of the MoU a specification about who would implement a rigorous vetting, recruitment and training plan that was being set out for the AFL. Following an assessment mission sent to Liberia from the US department of defense (DoD), US authorities concluded that "due to resource constraints, and driven in part by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan", it was unable to conduct SSR program and decided to "contract out" the tasks of reconstituting the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of Defence to the private sector.[90]

One other initial problem was the absence of discussion on who would be responsible for conducting officer and NCO training.[91] This oversight was later rectified when the department of state awarded an additional contract to a second US private security firm (Pacific Architect Engineers) to provide officer and NCO training to new cadets.[92]

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89 Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia, *Defence & Arms*, 16 December 2006
90 McFate, 'Outsourcing The Making of Militaries, 646.
91 ICG, 'Liberia: Uneven progress in security sector reform', 2008, 34
92 Ibid, 9

Contracts were rewarded and approved to US-based private security firms, DynCorp and Pacific Engineers and Architects (PAE) by the State Department. DynCorp was responsible for assisting in the demobilization of the old AFL as well as recruitment, vetting and training of new AFL soldiers and new Ministry of National Defence civilian recruits.[93] PAE became responsible for fielding the AFL, training the officers and NCO and providing mentorship. Both agencies engaged in reconstruction of military barracks and other facilities. DynCorp and PAE reported directly to US Department of State (DoS) through the US embassy in Monrovia. DynCorp was originally hired on a three year, US$210 million contract.[94] PAE's first task was to refurbish the Ministry of Defense and brigade headquarters and four battalion barracks.[95] The second and third priorities were to restructure and professionalise the Ministry of Defence and restructure the armed forces. DynCorp devised a comprehensive recruitment and vetting process to screen human rights abusers from joining the AFL/MoD between February and March 2005.

The interim Chairman of the transitional government, Charles Gyude Bryant proceeded with the formal disbanding of the AFL by signing into law Special Executive Order #5, explaining that "Following the April 12, 1980 coup d'état, the merit system in the AFL was compromised and there was a distortion

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[93] DynCorp (initial recruiting, vetting and entry-level training) employed approximately 100 non-Liberians and 120 Liberians (Welken 2010, 4). In 2008, Malan observers that DynCorp staff included 82 international staff and 239 Liberian staff (Malan 2008, 42)

[94] Liberia; U.S. Govt. Offers $200M for Security Sector Reform. *Africa News*, 3 February 2005; Malan 2008, 28

[95] The refurbishment of MoD HQ, brigade and battalion headquarters in four locations in the country, including Camp Sheffelin (EBK) was scheduled to commence at the start of 2005. (Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2005/177), 6-7)

in the table of organization and equipment of the army".[96] However, from a legal point of view, the army was never dissolved or disbanded; however, members of the former AFL that were verified as soldiers or officers would be demobilised and entitled to a "severance package".

Published on 15 May 2005, a Government of Liberia (NTGL) Executive Order #5 established a joint Demobilization Advisory Monitoring Committee (DAMC) in charge of implementing the order to disband the AFL.[97] Throughout Monrovia, the decision to disband the AFL was extremely controversial especially for soldiers and senior officers that felt blindsided by this decision. Senior Liberian officers protested the order, viewing it as unconstitutional and illegal.[98] Between May-October, senior AFL officers pleaded with the Executive Mansion (Chairman Bryant) and with US Ambassador Donald Booth, UN SRSG Alan Doss, UNMIL Force Commander General Owonibi and Defence Minister Daniel Chea. As deputy defence minister for administration in the NTGL Joe Wylie explained, "You cannot dissolve the army. I kept telling Bryant 'don't dissolve'. And if we have a small retained strength of 1000 men, that will resolve the problem. Nobody listened to us."[99]

When DynCorp trainers arrived in Monrovia in mid-2005, its personnel were surprised that demobilization had not been completed. DynCorp was forced

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[96] 'Dissolve or not to Dissolve, AFL Gives the Dying Horse's Kick', *The Analyst,* 4 January 2006.

[97] The DAMC comprised of the Chairman of the NTGL, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Finance; Central Bank of Liberia, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the US Embassy, the United Nations; Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL)

[98] Joe Wylie, Truth and Reconciliation testimony, Monsterrado county, 22 August 2008

[99] Ibid.

to step in and complete the bulk of the demobilization of nearly 13,000 soldiers and officers and about 400 defence ministry staff.[100] In early June 2005, as the country was preparing for Presidential and legislative elections scheduled for October, US defence attaché Major Ryan McMullen met with defence minister Daniel Chea to discuss the demobilization process in the hopes of encouraging Liberian defence officials to persuade the old leadership to accept the decision or risk withdrawal of American aid and assistance.[101]

There are multiple reasons that account for why the US proposal to disband the old AFL was implemented over other Liberian plans. The executive leadership in the transitional government harboured their own animosity towards the AFL and supported the US decision to "wipe the slate clean". Chairman Bryant, head of the corrupt National Transitional Government of Liberia was close to the Tolbert family before President Tolbert was killed by members of the PRC on the day of the April 1980 coup. It was believed that Bryant (a family relative of Tolbert's sister) held a personal grudge against the Krahns who dominated the AFL. Additionally, Daniel Chea, a former AFL Sergeant in the Coast Guard, who had fought against the Krahn-based AFL on the side of the NPFL during the civil war, also supported the "start from scratch" option.[102]

Verification and Demobilisation Process
There were discrepancies in the number of Liberian soldiers to disarm. Based on the Liberian re-documentation exercise (noted above), 14,684 total soldiers were

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[100] Boucher, 'Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice, 17
[101] 'Daniel Chea and US defence attaché discuss AFL demobilisation', *The News*, 21 June 2005
[102] Author's personal interview with former LURD official, Monrovia, 17 March 2012

to be disarmed (see Table 1). According to DynCorp, the AFL strength was closer to 13,770 soldiers.[103] These numbers were based on an approximately pre-war strength of about 4,000 troops and an additional 9,000 "war-recruits". The first phase of the demobilisation process, which kicked off in May 2005, focused on rank-and-file "war recruits" that had been mostly recruited under Samuel Doe's government in early 1990.[104] After an initial "test" period, demobilisation was carried out from 31 May and ended 10 September 2005. During this period, 9,400 irregular personnel that "had been recruited into the army after the outbreak of the war" were demobilised.[105] DynCorp brought its own procedures with them, including computerised identification system. DynCorp worked with a number of senior AFL staff to establish Committees to verify individual soldiers' identity. Individuals were quizzed about their biographical information as well as details about life in the AFL (such as names of cooks at certain training centers or their commander's name). Their personal information was documented and ID cards were issued along with a standard demobilisation cash payment amounting to US$540.[106] The AFL military personnel totaled about 6,000 troops (approximately the size of the pre-war AFL).

The second phase commenced on 17 October 2005, one week after the General Elections (held on October 11th) for "pre-war soldiers and officers". Approximately 4,273 regular armed forces personnel were demobilised,

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[103] McFate 2008

[104] AFL demobilisation begins, *Daily Observer,* 1 July 2005 (author's archival notes made 23 March 2012)

[105] Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2005/764, 7

[106] These "war recruits" were provided the same amount ($540) regardless of the rank they obtained during the war.

including senior officers who had joined the AFL before the war.[107] Among this total, approximately 2,179 were junior and senior officers of all different ethnic groups, but primarily Krahn, Gio and Mano.[108] The severance amount for senior officers (Lieutenant Colonel and above) received between US$3,500 and almost $4,500, which varied depending on one's length of service.[109] However, since DynCorp was unexpectedly required to conduct demobilisation, it was forced to draw on funds that had been allocated for training. This significantly delayed the subsequent recruitment, vetting and training efforts (more on this below).[110] Instructors that were deployed to Liberia for basic training sat by idle while the demobilisation process was ongoing.

The demobilisation process was extremely controversial for the 2,147 senior AFL officers that were demobilised and unemployed. Protests organized by groups of soldiers and officers were regularly organized on the streets of Monrovia and outside the Ministry of National Defence headquarters from late 2005-early 2006. The soldiers threated to disrupt the elections in October. About 100 demobilised "war-recruits" protested pay arrears and severance in June and July 2005 at the Ministry of Defense and blocked traffic in downtown Monrovia.[111] As one of the ringleaders stated,

> we need our money now or else we will continue to cause disturbance in the city. This government is spending a lot of money on expensive vehicles and leaving out our salary payments and if they do not pay us within five days, we will attack all government vehicles.

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[107] According to SG report (S/2005/764, 7), 4,273 were actually demobilised.

[108] Author's interviews with NTGL authorities, February-March 2012

[109] IRIN, Soldiers loot their own barracks to protest at pay arrears, 15 June 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=54926 (Accessed 20 February 2012)

[110] Welken 2010, 24

[111] IRIN, Soldiers loot their own barracks to protest at pay arrears, 15 June 2005

One of the outspoken critics of the decision to disband the AFL came from former AFL Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Kpenkpah Y. Konah. Konah challenged the disbanding of the AFL on legal grounds, insisting that the CPA had called for "restructuring" and not full demobilisation. Fortunately, despite fears that demobilised soldiers would disrupt the Presidential elections held on 11 October and the subsequent run-off in November, votes were conducted without any major incidents. A deal was concluded on 24 October 2005 and announced publically in Liberia that the army would be "dissolved, restructured and rebuilt".[112] The State Department saw this as a sign of good faith and officially initiated the SSR programme through the release of funds to DynCorp.

The security context was made more challenging by significant funding shortages. Therefore, the payment of the "severance packages" was delayed before the elections. For instance, on 1 December 2005, only 2,227 regular armed forces personnel had been retired and paid their "demobilisation packages". Due to delays in the decommissioning process, and the fact that US-led recruitment and vetting process could not commence until full demobilization was complete, DynCorp instructors sat idle in Monrovia (while receiving their full salary) for the latter half of 2005 and for most of 2006.[113]

Some of the funding for demobilisation had been procured from the South African and Nigerian governments (about US$5 million and US$2 million respectfully), while the bulk was paid by the US government. However, in late

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[112] 'AFL to be dissolved, restructured and rebuilt', *The Inquirer,* 24 October 2005

[113] Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2005/764, 7 December 2005. As a consequence of the delays their jobs did not start until 2007.

2005 there was still a funding shortage of US$3 million.[114] The total AFL

funding provided for "severance packages" amounted to approximately US$18

million. The Liberian government (NTGL) contributed a small percentage of

funds.[115]

Table 1: 'The Liberian Plan': Summary and cost of severance of personnel (by rank)

Rank	Strength	Total cost (USD)	Average payment/soldier (USD)
Cadets	3	2,143	714.33
Private	354	340,421	961.64
Private First Class	31	37,543	1,208.16
Corporal	77	106,914	1,388.49
Sergeant	164	235,386	1,435.28
Staff Sergeant	901	1,478,600	1,641.07
First Sergeant	235	442,671	1,883.71
Master Sergeant	710	1,486,864	2,094.19
Warrant Officer - 1	187	434,007	2,320.89
Warrant Officer-2	381	2,679,000	
Second Lieutenant	367	983,893	2,680.91
First Lieutenant	514	1,443,023	2,807.44
Captain	808	2,424,300	3,000.31
Major	268	431,311	1,609.37
Lieutenant Colonel	93	320,664	3,448.00
Colonel	96	352,543	3,672.32
Brigadier General	22	87,857	3,993.50

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[114] Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2005/764, 8

[115] The Liberian transitional government contributed almost 21% of the total spending on retirement/severance packages, amounting to about $4.5 million. The Liberian contribution was used on demobilising the "war recruits". South Africa and the United States paid the remaining amount (total estimates were approximately US$17.5 million). This figure does not include severance packages provided to other security personnel. For instance, the US government funded the deactivation of between 900-1000 Special Security Services (S.S.S) personnel led by Colonel Edward Thomas deputy police director for operation. The British government provided US$3.1 million for demobilising (or severance packages) of the Liberian National Police. According to Liberian defence figures, the total severance package for the entire security sector cost about US$25.56 million (Armed Forces Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, 26 July 2007, 7).

Major General	5	20,893	4,178.60
Lieutenant General	5	21,429	4,285.80
General	1	4,464	4,464.00
Sub-total: Professional Soldiers	5,222	10,657,606	
War recruits	9,462	7,689,689	
Total cost	14,864	18,347,286	

Source: AFL restructuring programme, information obtained from Blamo Nelson, former NTGL official

As one can see from Table 1 (above), the DynCorp-supervised demobilisation package amounted to significantly less than the previous figure agreed upon by the transitional defence ministry committee on restructuring.[116] For instance, war-recruits were supposed to be provided over US$900 under the Liberian plan, while the US plan called for a standard rate of US$540 for every "war recruit". The Liberian state relied on external funding and could meet its commitment to funding the entire demobilisation programme. Without external funding, the process would never have succeeded.

After Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected, she appointed Brownie Samukai as her National Defence Minister. Both Johnson-Sirleaf and Samukai had strong anti-AFL sentiments and wanted to speed up the demobilisation process.[117] Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's governmental was generally antagonistic towards ex-

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[116] On 12 December 2005 DynCorp contacted the Joint Implementation Unit in the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (JIU/NCDDRR) to request access of their electronic lists from the DDR database – to verify former AFL and members of irregular forces (UNDP Monrovia DDRR archives, digital copy in author's possession).

[117] Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was hostile towards the AFL, dating back to her time as an outspoken opposition figure against Doe's government (and was subsequent detained at Barclays Training Center jail following the 1985 Presidential elections). Samukai was a leading member of the Guinean-trained "Black Berets", a paramilitary organization set up by Amos Sawyer's interim government in 1990-1991 (and whose precise war during the war is undocumented) that fought elements of Doe's loyalists during the struggle over Monrovia.

combatants from the irregular security forces.[118] Soldiers protested against the previously issued NTGL executive notice of eviction from the country's main military barracks outside of Monrovia (then Camp Sheffelin, now called Edward Binyah Kesselly or "EBK") in early 2006. In 2006, there were about 2,000 AFL soldiers along with their families residing in EBK.[119] A group of 400-500 ex-AFL soldiers claimed non-payment of salaries and retirement benefits and protested at the Ministry of National Defence headquarters, clashing with UN peacekeeping troops on 26 April 2006.[120] The entire civil war-era Ministry of National Defence civilian staff was let go in July 2006 and the formal demobilization process came to an end in late 2006.[121]

From 2006-2007, several hundreds of former "war recruits" (from either Doe's or Taylor's defunct forces) threatened to destabilise peace efforts, claiming a range of grievances about their forced dismissal in order to reap more material benefits from the process.[122] In April 2006, demobilised soldiers armed with machetes and Molotov cocktails attacked the National Defense

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[118] Alusula 2008, 19

[119] IRIN, Soldiers refuse to quit camp need for new army, 4 January 2006

[120] As 70-year old Master Sergent Yapkawolo Gbellee stated: "I am not leaving this barracks to go anywhere. I have spent 44 years in the Liberian army and have lived at Camp Schiefflin for a decade". He insisted that his 22 months salary arrears, pension rights and official decoration for his military service be paid before he would consider leaving the camp. First Sergeant Richard Brikrah said "the government owes us salaries. If they do not pay us but try to force us out of here, the government will surely run into trouble...We are soldiers and we know what to do." The Liberian government demonstrated its inability to deal with the issue, therefore the International Contact Group for Liberia had to intervene (Nicholas Cook, 'Liberia's post-war recovery: key issues and developments', Congressional research service report RL33185, 2008, 16). According to local press accounts, these were AFL "late comers" who claimed they were present during the re-documentation phase. They stormed the ministry armed with rocks, petro bombs, and UNMIL soldiers had to open fire on the crowd to dispel the demonstrators.

[121] Thomas Dempsey, 'Security Sector Reform in Liberia', *Defence & Arms*, 16 December 2006, http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive=106&num=27136&printer=1

[122] See J. Nathaniel Daygbor, 'Demobilised Soldiers Threaten Recruitment, Issue 72 hour ultimatum', *The Analyst*, 24 January 2006, (Accessed 27 February 2012)

headquarters and demanded payment of salary arrears.[123] The demobilised soldiers threw stones and metal missiles at the building and prevented Defence Minister Daniel Chea and other officials from leaving the premises for more than two hours. While protests eventually ceased, the government refused to acknowledge that Liberia's security situation remains precarious with the number of disenfranchised demobilised security personnel on the streets without work and without formal skills and the means to earn a basic livelihood. Local politicians and security analysts believe that ex-soldiers can be mobilised to engage in violence should there be an outbreak in Monrovia. The CIA Fact Book lists "demobilised former military officers" as a "political pressure group" in post-conflict Liberia probably due to the leverage they demonstrated before the 2005 elections to disrupt the outcome.

The 'Veteran legacy'

On 24 July 2007, over 5,000 AFL soldiers and officers were officially retired during a ceremony held at Antoinnet Tubman football stadium in Monrovia. These retired officers were paid salary arrears for two months to the tune of US$5.5 million. The AFL's most senior officers were honorably retired including General Sandee Ware, in whose honor the VOA military barracks has been renamed, General Kpenkpah Y. Konah, Lieutenant General Henry Dubar; Lieutenant General Hezekiah Bowen, Major-General Philip Kemah, Colonel

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[123] Michael M. Phillips, In Liberia, an army unsullied by its past, Wall Street Journal, 14 August 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118703899075796334-_s116GbyvQ_1_yklnMDN_yk4uTw_20070820.html?mod=regionallinks (Accessed 15 February 2012)

Arthur Bedell.[124] The 2008 Defence Act had not been approved at the time of their retirement.[125]

However, disbanding most of the security institutions has left more than 17,000 demobilised personnel on the streets with no viable alternative livelihood. Most ex-combatants were not integrated into the new army. Although eligible former AFL soldiers were allowed to re-apply to join, only 5% were re-enlisted. According to Alusula, the old AFL soldiers were deliberately excluded from decision-making circles. Alusula argues:

> The failure to consider the ex-military personnel for remobilization into the new defense force has led to the ex-soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and other retired members of the deactivated outfits to form what they call "Combined Forces," with the option of agitating for their benefits which range from salary arrears as well as retirement benefits.[126]

There are approximately 28,000 demobilised security personnel in post-conflict Liberia from all of the various former factions, including the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), Special Security Services (SSS), former Liberian police, and former AFL.[127] With as many as 103,000 ex-combatants from the irregular factions rooming the streets in urban areas (majority of whom have no job and are not high-school educated), Liberia faces a significant challenge of empowering

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[124] Most of these senior officers were appointed to political positions in Johnson-Sirleaf's administration. General Dubar serves as an advisor on national security in the Ministry of Defence; General Konah initially was an outspoken critic of disbanding the army, was appointed to a position in the new National Bureau of Veteran Affairs, as was Lieutenant General Hezekiah Bowen in 2008

[125] The 2008 Defence Act, promulgated on 3 September 2008 (which repealed the 1956 Defence Act) entitles all retirees to receive 40% of their current earnings including a comprehensive package while their placement in civil positions would be considered.

[126] Alusula 2008, 20

[127] This includes 17,000 former soldiers and officers that are members of the Bureau of Veteran Affairs (Author's interview with BNVA chairman, 2012; see Joe Wylie's TRC testimony; see also Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2006,18)

demobilised soldiers, police and security personnel to find meaningful opportunities for decent livelihoods and to live in dignity (where they can provide for their families). The Government has ignored the issue, relying on "buy-offs" as if to falsely believe that the issue will miraculously solve itself. Some ex-soldiers have been successful in securing employment in Liberia's expanding private security sector, including private companies engaged in Liberia's mining sector. Some former officers have returned to their original communities in the hinterland to take up farming. However, there is ample reason over the short, medium and long-term to be concerned about the sheer lack opportunities and prospects for alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. The government has dismissed their concerns for additional assistance, claiming that they have fulfilled their promises during the DDR and SSR process. Unfortunately, there has been no government-led follow-up programme post-DDR for these individuals. The government of Johnson-Sirleaf refuses to recognize the dignity of these ex-combatants and downplays the (in)security role they could play after the war.[128]

Recruitment, Screening and Vetting Practices
In the context of the transitional Defence Advisory Council, comprised of the former warring factions (LURD, MODEL and former Government of Liberia

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[128] The established political class were also those involved in mobilizing these youth during the war. For instance, the links between Charles Taylor and EJS are established. EJS provided material support to Taylor's initial NPFL movement but later distanced herself. During an address on African security sector reform at Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Arlington, Virginia on 26 June 2012, Liberian defence minister downplayed their significance, stating that "Veterans [of the civil war] that are not integrated in the army are a concern, but not a threat." (Defence minister Samukai: Liberia is a good example of security sector transformation, 28 June 2012 (http://
africacenter.org/2012/06/defense-minister-samukai-liberia-is-a-good-example-of-security-sector-transformation/)

under Taylor), each of their representatives wanted to secure an equal stake in the formation of a post-war AFL. In this respect, each former warring faction wanted to discuss a quota for determining how many of their men would be integrated into the army. Closely observing the politics in the general peacebuilding process, the Americans felt that a military integration programme structured similar to Sierra Leone's would not produce credible results in Liberia. The Americans were unsupportive of the political accommodation strategy and felt that the new army should develop a stringent vetting and screening process for all recruits. It was not that former AFL officers or soldiers or even former members of irregular armed groups would be barred from joining, but that all individuals should have to apply through the same process, undergo the same vetting and qualifying tests in order to standardize the process and ensure credibility.

A countrywide recruitment process initiated through DynCorp's resources and personnel officially kicked off on 18 January 2006, two days after President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was inaugurated. The Government relied on "an extensive news media campaign" broadcasted regularly on local radio stations to inform citizens across the country about the recruitment campaign.[129] DynCorp together with selected civilian interlocutors from the Liberian National Defence Headquarters traveled the length of the country in order to recruit. Additionally, extensive recruitment was conducted in urban areas, on university and college campuses in Monrovia (University of Liberia, African Methodist Episcopal Zion

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[129] Malan 2008, 30

University) and in Suacoco, Bong County (Cuttington University). Candidates were later called to Monrovia and housed in temporary accommodations for two days in order to undergo initial screening.

The interim government, under the leadership of the Defence Advisory Council established the initial guidelines for basic entry requirements. The minimal education requirement stipulated by the interim Government was to be at least obtainment of 9th Grade.[130] The US Embassy (Office of Defence Cooperation), DynCorp, and the Minister of Defence increased this entrance requirement to recipients of high-school degrees.[131]

According to Liberian defence ministry figures, 12,100 potential recruits sought to join the new AFL under DynCorp's restructuring process. Pre-screening tests were conducted at Barclay's Training Center (BTC) in Monrovia. To gain admittance into BTC, applicants were required to read a placard outside held by an SSR official inside the Ministry of Defence compound, to test whether candidates could read the short phrase. About 52% of these candidates could not read or write and were rejected immediately.[132] Once admitted into BTC, potential recruits were required to prove their Liberian citizenship and age (restricted to between 18-35 years old), be able to pass a high-school equivalency test, an initial physical test (one-mile run, sit-ups and push-ups), and be screened for HIV, tuberculosis and illegal drug use and be able to pass basic

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[130] Malan 2008, 31; The Liberian plan would have set the minimal age requirement as "at least grade nine", according to Joe Wylie (Government ready to form new army, 19 May 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54524 (Accessed 20 February 2012)

[131] Liberia; Army launches recruitment drive in central, southeast regions. BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, 1 May 2008.

[132] ICG, 'Uneven Progress', 11

knowledge and fitness tests. About 75% of the initial 12,100 were rejected outright because they were high-school dropouts or could not pass the basic qualification exams.[133] The majority of those who failed were members of Charles Taylor's former security personnel (ATU, NPFL, and members of various militias associated with Taylor's security forces).[134]

Regarding the new officer establishment, Ministry of Defense and US Embassy officials established a policy that candidates considered for commissioning would be were required to hold at least a bachelor's degree from a recognised university institution.[135] Candidates in possession of a college or university degree were automatically considered for officer candidate's school.[136] All soldiers entered at the rank of private first class and cadet candidates received the same initial entry training. Cadets slept in segregated barracks, but received the same training.[137] According to both junior officers and private soldiers interviewed by the author, this decision was out of line for Liberian military culture and created awkward relations between officers and soldiers.[138]

According to the Brussels-based international NGO, International Crisis Group, the initial benchmark of recruiting only high-school-level graduates was

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[133] The rejection rate was said to be slightly higher (82%), according to International Crisis Group

[134] Author's interviews with Ministry of Defense officials, Monrovia, February 2012

[135] Malan 2008, 30

[136] Typically, a recruit with a university degree was automatically considered for the rank of second lieutenant.

(Author's interview with AFL captain, EBK Monrovia, 2 March 2012)

[138] Some private soldiers I interviewed felt that they had not earned the respect of their superior officers despite undergoing the same training as they did. Some of the officers I interviewed told me that this decision was flawed created an awkward dynamic when these same officers were expected to command their troops.

not met in the end.[139] It was difficult to find university degree holders in the first place and those that did were not necessarily interested in joining the AFL. The fact that private soldiers required at least a high-school degree made it virtually inevitable that most of the recruits were urban-based and mostly from Monrovia. Moreover, DynCorp was unable to reach remote areas in all of Liberia's fifteen counties during its mobile recruitment strategy.[140] Traveling was made difficult by poor road networks in the interior, which increased costs of travel and recruitment outside of urban areas.[141] As a result, according to an International Crisis Group report, about 90% of the recruits came from Monrovia. The mass displacement during war had recruitment large number of young people to settle in Monrovia. Large numbers of coastal communities in Liberia (which were historically uninterested in the AFL) joined the new post-war army (more on the current AFL's social composition follows). The average age of a recruit was 26 years old.[142] As mentioned, demobilised soldiers from the disbanded AFL were provided an opportunity to re-apply during the recruitment process. However, less than 5% of those who applied were integrated into the new army.[143]

Once the initial phase of the screening process was completed, a vetting council was established, called the Joint Personnel Board (JPB) chaired by the Liberian Minister of Defense (Samukai), the US Chief of the Office of Defense

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[139] ICG, 'Uneven Progress',11, footnote 51.
[140] The mobile recruitment program is said to have cost DynCorp US$200,000 alone (Ibid.)
[141] Ibid.
[142] ICG, 'Uneven Progress',12
[143] United Nations Security Council S/2007/689, 2007:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/documents.shtml

Cooperation (ODS),[144] and one civil society representative, (Counselor David Jallah, the Dean of the University of Liberia Law School).[145] Additionally, the JPB consisted of advisors from UNMIL, UN Police (UNPOL) and other Liberian governmental departments. Each candidate was assessed based on their physical fitness and literacy levels, health and whether recruits had a previous human rights record.[146] While the JPB had the final say in rejecting and approving candidates, it is clear that the head of the US military mission's opinion was very important to final decisions. On 11 June 2008, the JPB debated difficult cases and the need to recruit from areas outside of Monrovia. As reported by the International Crisis Group,

> DynCorp staff circulated the dossiers of recruits who had both passed and not passed the vetting process. An example of the latter involved a man who had been demobilised with a combatant group from the 1999-2003 war, had handed in an AK-47 rifle but was unwilling to discuss his recruitment into the group or his responsibilities and activities in it.[147]

After the JBP interviewed each candidate in person, investigative teams comprised of international expats (US, UK, Australian, Gambian nations) as well as a few Liberian nationals visited each recruits' home in order to confirm facts, inquire into the suitability for security tasks, conduct character references and "access the public's trust of the candidate".[148] Since most records had been destroyed during the war, the vetting team relied on some local NGOs for some character references and high-school achievement tests from the West African

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[144] US Army Major Chris Wyatt, chief of the office of defense cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia

[145] These three members were the only individuals who had voting rights on the board.

[146] As in Sierra Leone, it was difficult to prove that a soldier had a criminal record or had a poor human rights record. Reliable documentation on such matters is difficult to come by in both countries since such records were deliberately destroyed during their respective civil wars.

[147] ICG, 'Uneven Progress' 12

[148] Malan 2008, 32

Examination Council.[149] Additionally, headshot photos of all recruits were printed in newspapers and flyers or posted in community halls, markets, churches and public areas. The public was encouraged to contact DynCorp Investigative teams through anonymous "hot-lines" to report human rights violators among the recruited soldiers. According to DynCorp, this "public vetting" was innovative because the records of all recruits' names and physical appearance were made visible in the public domain and ordinary Liberians could "participate" in the screening process under the presumption that human rights abusers would be reported.

In practice, however, the vetting teams could only visit the individual's home residence. While interviews were conducted with family members, neighbors, teachers and employers, this plan was not foolproof since many recruits had been displaced in numerous communities throughout the war and not all of these abodes could be visited.[150] According to international experts, the vetting process was "a notable success—the best…they had witnessed anywhere in the world".[151] Following this vetting stage, successful candidates were inducted into the AFL and preceded to the training phase.

Within six months after recruitment commenced, the first batch of recruits (106 in total) began their basic training on 22 July 2006. About four months later, this group graduated from initial entry training on 4 November 2006. Out of this first batch, nine recruits were selected for officer training and

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[149] Sean McFate, 'I Built an African Army', *Foreign Policy online*, 7 January 2010
[150] Author's interviews with AFL soldiers, Monrovia, March 2013
[151] ICG 'Uneven progress', i

subsequently elevated to the rank of lieutenant (5 were later sent to the US for officer's training).[152] Forty-four soldiers received their basic non-commissioned officer course (BNOC), 23 underwent specialised medical training and another 38 soldiers were selected for other specialised training courses.[153] An additional 500 new recruits were selected to begin the second round of initial entry training before the end of 2006.[154] US military doctrine was taught in all facets of the course, as had been the tradition within the armed forces dating back to 1908.

The initial entry training for the third batch of trainees was delayed until July 2007 due to funding delays, which created additional constraints on the programme. US officials blamed the delays on the "politically delicate obstacles

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[152] These officers form the basis for the junior officers likely to lead the AFL in the future. It is obvious that those officers selected to receive US training are considered a class above the rest. This group is significant because the first batch of 106 soldiers had been trained at an exorbitant cost of $100 million. The 9 officers were Sergeant Theophilus A. Dana Jr., (promoted to Captain 23 September 2010), Davidson F. Forleh (promoted to captain on 23 September 2010), Geraldine J. George, Oyango M. Kole and Danicious Kwia, Benefit K. Mason, Quincy P. Tenny, Jorel S. Toe and Daniel Doe Ziankahn, Jr (subsequently promoted to Captain on 23 September 2010). Geraldine George was the first woman in Liberian history to be commissioned as a Liberian officer (2nd lieutenant). Those promoted from 1st Lieutenant to Captain on 23 September 2010 were Prince Charles Johnson, III and Eric Wamu Dennis, Toe Shelldrick Jorel; during the same period, forty-six 2nd Lieutenants were promotd to the rank of 1st Lieutenants, twenty-six Sergeants were promoted to Staff Sergeants, fifty-one Privates were promoted to Corporal and 980 Privates were promoted to the rank of Private 1st Class (see Samuka V. Konneh and Fidel Marshall, By special order #29, AFL decorates 7 officers as 'captains', public agenda online, http://www.publicagendanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2689:by-special-order-29-afl-decorates-7-officers-as-captain&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=2 (Accessed 27 July 2012)
[153] Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2007/151, 6
[154] IET was an eight-week course and advanced initial train (AIT) was conducted over a 4-week span. These two courses aimed to provide the foundations for transforming (or socialising) civilians into military soldiers. These courses were taught by ex-US drill sergeants. Cadets that were considered leadership or officer material (with a university degree) entered basic non-commissioned officer (BNOC) for four-weeks. Officer candidate school followed for a period of 6-weeks. IET training took place at Camp Ware in Careysburg. Some recruits simply could not "cut it" during the training and were dismissed. For instance, during the third round of AIT, 484 soldiers graduated on 8 February 2008 while 37 recruits were discharged. According to Chris Wyatt, 'the 484 graduates were among the finest to go through the program thus far. Their attitude, behavior and test scores exceed the last class across the board' (Chris Wyatt's blog, AIT class 08-02 Graduation, 17 February 2008, http://monroviamonitor.blogspot.ca/search?updated-max=2008-04-27T14:41:00-07:00&max-results=9&reverse-paginate=true). On May 23rd 2008, 506 soldiers graduate from the AIT program bringing the total strength at the time to 1,634.

and indecisiveness" of the Liberian government. On the other hand, Liberians involved in the process noted that the delay was a result of a delayed disbursement of US funds that was slowing the reform progress down throughout 2006-2007. Unfortunately, the funding delays had a detrimental effect on the type of training was provided. For instance, the civics component, rule of law, law of war, and human rights training, as well as the instruction on Liberian history were cut from the initial training programme in 2006.[155] While the third batch of 502 soldiers graduated from their basic training on 7 September 2007, these soldiers (and all subsequent ones) passed without receiving any requisite training in human rights, laws of war and the like..[156]

These problems in funding related to the delayed disbursement of funds from the State Department to the Government of Liberia. According to Mark Malan, a former US military officer and now with Washington, DC-based NGO Refugees International, "the SSR program was never fully funded, that funding to date has fallen short of this figure, and the money, even when forthcoming, ha[d] been disbursed in dribs and drabs."[157] By July 2007, roughly US$120

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[155] Chris Wyatt, US military mission stated "sadly, we were forced to remove much of the wonderful civics, rule of law, human rights and Liberian history instruction after the initial cohort of recruits. We tried to reincorporate it after the completion of initial entry training but our success was limited." (cited in Chris Wyatt comment section on *foreign policy online*, 9 January 2010)

[156] According to Sean McFate, one of the American SSR officials involved in the process, 630 recruits graduated from IET in September 2007. Their course was shortened from 11 weeks to 8. Three of those weeks were supposed to be dedicated to human rights, civics and laws of war training (2008, 650)

[157] According to Malan (2008, 41), only $13 million had been appropriated by the United States Government in the FY 07/08 budget. In June 2007, a further $11 million was transferred from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and in the July 2007 supplemental budget, another transfer amounting to $35 million was done. The latter transfer apparently came just in time to prevent the collapse of the recruitment and basic training programme (Liberia: Key Facts on the Armed Forces of Liberia, 18 September 2007), http://www.refintl.org/content/liberia-key-facts-armed-forces-liberia (Accessed 7 February 2012).

million had been received, with US$100 million being spent on paying salaries for the SSR instructors during the delayed demobilization and for training the first 106 recruits.[158] As a result of these funding shortfalls, the SSR process was suspended for seven months from December 2007-July 2008.[159] This meant that, according to Chris Wyatt, US Chief of the Military Mission in Liberia at the time, "the only tangible thing the uniformed [personnel] could point to after nearly a three year effort was an AFL with just 102 soldiers".[160] Up to this period, total spending was about US$140 million; almost all of this funding went towards salaries for SSR personnel and individual training.[161] In 2007, a second private security company—Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)—entered the picture in Liberia to rectify the initial oversight in the original MoU contract and offer specialised training to officer cadets and non-commissioned officers.[162] A close advisors involved in the process remarked,

> SSR is expensive. It incurs very high startup costs, and sustained funding at high levels is an essential component of successful programs. The relatively lavish funding provided by the US Government for the AFL has not been sufficient to support the comprehensive reconstitution of the Liberian defense sector, even at a modest force level of only 2,000 soldiers. The Liberian AFL and MOD experience suggests that 'lead

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[158] Malan 2008; Alusula 2008

[159] Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform, Perspectives on Peace and Stability Operations, 2008, 1

[160] Chris Wyatt, blog comment on foreign policy, 9 January 2010 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/07/i_built_an_african_army)

[161] Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform, Perspectives on Peace and Stability Operations, 2008, 4.

[162] As mentioned, DynCorp handled basic training and recruitment. PAE was tasked with mentoring, providing logistical support, advanced and sustainment training as well as construction duties. It hired 90 non-Liberians and 110 Liberians (Welken 2010); Liberia: Key Facts on the Armed Forces of Liberia, refugee International, September 18, 2007, http://www.refintl.org/content/liberia-key-facts-armed-forces-liberia (Accessed 7 February 2012)

nation funding' may not be an adequate approach to resourcing comprehensive SSR programs.[163]

During this time, about 130 mid-level recruits were undergoing 17-weeks of training funded by the United States government for preparation in their new positions in the Ministry of Defence.[164] A fourth batch of recruits graduated from their basic training on 11 January 2008, immediately followed by commencement of the infantry training school. The fifth batch entered training on 8 March 2008 and a sixth group (comprising of 500 recruits plus 29 officer candidates) began their training in June 2008. By August 2008, the objective of creating a new military consisting of 2,000 soldiers was achieved. Between 2005 and 31 December 2009, approximately US$285 million had been spent on the SSR reform programme for the new AFL.[165]

Role of Regional Partners

President Johnson-Sirleaf sought to diversify Liberia's international and regional support for the AFL.[166] As such, the Government of Liberia has relied on multiple regional partners to assist in post-war military-building. The Liberian government adopted a "hedge your bets" approach with multiple partners in

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[163] Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform, Perspectives on Peace and Stability Operations, 2008, 5

[164] UNMIL report, 13th Progress Report, 5. It is not clear to the author whether these civilian officials were selected by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's administration and whether they received the vetting and screening process as military recruits did.

[165] Kenneth Fidler, 'US military assistance in Liberia progresses', *AFRICOM public affairs*, 27 October 2011, http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/7819/us-military-security-assistance-in-liberia-progres (Accessed 25 May 2013)

[166] Samukai is a former director of the Liberian National Police a Retired Colonel in AFL and a former Fulbright scholar in the US where he studied for a Master in Applied Economics at American University in New York.

order to maximize its foreign aid.[167] Several strategic partnership agreements were signed with international and regional actors after 2006. Liberia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the governments of Nigeria (August 2007) and Ghana (on 25 July 2008) to commence formal military-to-military assistance. Among several benefits, the Government of Nigeria agreed to sponsor advanced infantry training for 200 soldiers from March to September 2008, five senior military officers' tuition at the Command and General Staff College in Nigeria, as well as 15 cadets at Nigeria Defense Academy. Eight other cadets in 2008 were sent to the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) to undergo a four-year undergraduate combatant degree courses.[168] Nigeria also agreed to provide at least five military advisors to help train the rank-and-file.[169] The MoU with Ghana outlined military training assistance from the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) sponsored by the Ghanaian government. Ghanaian officers were seconded to the Ministry of Defence to provide mentorship to young and inexperienced Liberian officers through the auspices of ECOWAS as part of the

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[167] President Tubman relied heavily on the Americans for economic aid because he was essentially groomed by the US. However, President Tolbert and Doe saw the need to balance its relations with US, Libyan, China and Soviet Union to ensure a robust stream of aid (Elwood Dunn, *Liberia and the United States During the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

[168] Robert C. Carey, 'Liberia's postwar armed forces strength reaches 601', *New Liberia*, 4 November 2007, http://newliberian.com/?p=40 (Accessed 30 May 2012); Seven were in the army, three in the Coast Guard, 2 in the airwing (Armed Forces Today, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2010. According to AFRICOM, a total of seven sailors received advanced Coast Guard's training in the US (http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/7819/us-military-security-assistance-in-liberia-progres)

[169] Military reform, Peace Accords Matrix, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/58/military_reform>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, (Assessed12/07/2011),

agreement.[170] Additionally, in February 2008, the Liberian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Rwandan government to train AFL officers at the Rwandan Defence Academy. Formal military-to-military agreements were signed with China in 2007. Some officer cadets received leadership training courses in China. These scholarships tenable in China were in addition to what the United States had already promised and provided.[171] The Chinese government funded the reconstruction of new barracks (Camp Tubman Military Barracks) in Gbanaga, Bong County. The project was one of the tangible outcomes of a MoU signed between the Government of Liberia and China through the People's Liberation Army on 21 July 2007. The barracks opened on 30 April 2009.[172]

One of the most significant and controversial aspect of the Nigerian relationship was the appointment of Nigerian military officers to serve as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberian since 2006.[173] Justifying her

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[170] Robert C. Carey, 'Liberia, Ghana sign MoU to train AFL', *New Liberian*, 30 July 2008, http://newliberian.com/?p=444 (Accessed 30 May 2012).

[171] Since 2006, Nigeria has provided 30 scholarships each year to help train Liberian army officers (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Liberia, 22 May 2012). Since 2004, China has provided approximately $10 million in military assistance. In 2012-13, China provided funding for 35 AFL officers to study in Chinese military academies. China also sent more than 13 batches of peacekeepers to UNMIL since 2006, totaling over 7,000 troops and 152 police officers (China assures Liberia of more support, Liberian ministry of information, cultural affairs and tourism, 3 August 2012, http://www.micatliberia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=811:china-assures-liberia-of-more-support&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=111)

[172] Liberia: China Again! –Turns over US$5.5M barracks, *The Informer,* 30 April 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200904300911.html (Accessed 28 May 2012)

[173] Major-General Furajalao Suraj Abourrahman succeeded Major-General Luka Nyeh Yusuf [former Sector 1 Commander in UNMIL] in early June 2007. Minister of Defence Brownie Samukai announced in July 2012 that the Government of Liberia has no plans to appoint a Liberian Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia until 2014 "because no Liberian in the ranks of the AFL is best qualified to occupy the post" (Charles Dennis, No Qualified Liberian for Chief of Staff, *Public Agenda News*, 25 July 2012, http://www.publicagendanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4000:no-

appointment of the Nigerian military commander (former commander of ECOMOG in Liberia) in February 2006, President Johnson-Sirleaf stated, "our country currently lacks the technical and tactical capacities and proficiency to provide for its own defense and national security".[174] The decision was also partially influenced by the desire to avoid perceptions offavouring one ethnic group over another. Since there is no provision in the Liberian constitution for a foreigner to assume this role, and given the fact that the President is technically the Commander-in-Chief, an informal title was given to the Nigerian officer, that of Commanding-Officer-in-Charge. The leadership of a Nigerian as the head of the AFL has been a serious point of contention among Liberian citizens.[175] It created enormous challenges within the AFL command structure. According to Chris Wyatt, former head of the US military mission in Liberia:

> We had immense challenges, with the absence of experienced leadership undermining our efforts being a chief contributing factor. The ministry of defence and I worked out a deal that brought ECOWAS officers to serve as company commanders but that was only a stopgap measure and did nothing to resolve the most important issue: [the need for] seasoned, proper, professional Liberians directing and leading Liberians. Additionally it did not resolve the issue of manning the battalion and brigade staffs. We made a plan (based on the existing constraints) and got the junior officers and NCO exposure to the staff process and mentors to show them the way (as it were).[176]

qualified-liberian-for-chief-of-staff&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=2 (Accessed 12 August 2012). The year 2014 was likely chosen based on the projected date that AFL will officially become an operational force (and assume security responsibilities from the UN peacekeeping force.

[174] *Agence France-Presse*, 'Liberia leader names Nigerian to head military', 13 February 2006; Alphonso Toweh, 'Liberian leader gets flak for hiring Nigerian General, *Reuters*, 14 February 2006.

[175] See Joe Wylie's Truth and Reconciliation testimony, Monsterrado county, 22 August 2008

[176] Chris Wyatt, comments on *Foreign Policy* online blog, 10 January 2010, accessed http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/07/i_built_an_african_army?wp_login_redirect=0

In an attempt to address the lack of Liberian involvement in leadership positions in the AFL, in May 2007, the Government of Liberia announced that retired senior AFL officers would be screened for consideration for the Deputy Chief of Staff (or Deputy Commander).[177] Senior officers from the old AFL served in other senior posts including Brigade commander positions, as Battalion commanders and executive officers. Five of these former senior AFL officers were rehired and received refresher training from the US SSR team. However, these officers were absent during the initial "buy-in" phase when key decisions were made. Additionally, there was resentment among new recruits, who viewed senior officers from the old AFL in contempt.[178] As Chris Wyatt explained, "this in itself created additional problems since it was done nearly four years into the program and irritated many of the new soldiers who wanted nothing to do with the previous culture of failure and corruption."[179] From 2008-2013, five retired senior AFL officers were serving in leadership roles at the Ministry of National Defense Headquarters in Camp Sheffelin.[180] The American government has

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[177] According to one of the senior Liberian ministry of defence authorities involved, about 300 senior officers were initially selected. After a screening process, 6 or 7 were selected to work for the Ministry of National Defence in leadership positions (Author's personal interview, 27 February 2012). According to Defence Minister Samukai, about 200 officers from the old AFL were initially screened and after a second screening process, 11 were retained. All of these officers were subsequently enrolled in Command Staff Colleges (Nigeria, US or China) because none had the requisite training (Brownie Samukai, A Discussion with the Liberian Defence Minister, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 29 March 2011, http://csis.org/multimedia/video-discussion-liberian-defense-minister (Accessed 20 February 2012); see also Melissa Chea-Annan, 'Liberia: Go out and Perform', *The Inquirer*, 9 May 2007.

[178] Author's confidential interview with private soldier, Monrovia; also confirmed by Welken's interviews with U.S. military officials, cited in Welken 2010, 38.

[179] See Chris Wyatt's comments on *Foreign Policy* online blog, 10 January 2010

[180] Thomas Dempsey, 'Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform, Perspectives on Peace and Stability Operations', 2008, 5. On 30 April 2013, at least two of these officers were retired and one has been promoted to Brigadier General and deputy chief of staff (Daniel K. Moore) ('AFL promotes into retirement and nominates senior officer', *FrontpageAfrica*, 25 April 2013)

shifted to defence sector reform in 2010, which emphasises mentorship as opposed to training. Currently, US Marine Corps officers and at least one UK military advisor is embedded in the Liberian Ministry of National Defence and serve as "advisors".[181]

Sociological Composition of the AFL

Ethnic balance was important to both Liberia and the United States. The American government developed a national with the intention of removing factional disputes and war criminals in the new AFL. Regarding the issue of rebel reintegration, no verifiable data exists on precisely how many former combatants were integrated into police and military forces in Liberia.[182] The factions' leaders and the political class that supported them refused to take their share of the blame for the crisis. However, it is an open secret that some former rebels were integrated after going through the screening and vetting process overseen by external actors.[183] In a public statement, Liberian National Defence Minister Samukai admitted that some former rebels had been integrated in the AFL and justified this decision as "the most realistic, practical and objective course of action to produce a professional military force for Liberia. They are highly motivated to serve their country".[184] Additionally, a Wikileaks cable revealed that some former elements from the controversial Black Berets (in

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[181] The Liberian Coast Guard was activated in February 2010 and hosts a full-time US Coast Guard mentor.

[182] Despite numerous attempts while I was in Liberia, I was unable to access this information from the Ministry of Defence.

[183] G Borteh, 'No Prejudice in New AFL Restructure', *The Analyst*, 1 December 2006

[184] Ibid.

which Samukai was a member) from the early 1990s "are sprinkled throughout the security sector".[185]

One of the priorities of the military was to ensure no domination of one tribe.[186] According to official statements, the Liberian army has become a regionally and ethnically balanced force. Comparing statistics I obtained from the AFL Ministry of National Defense[187] several key observations can be discerned.

Key Observations
First, I analyzed the social composition of the new AFL by comparing the contemporary ethnic composition with that of its historical trends. Considerable attention from the United States focused on ensuring geographical and regional balance in the new post-war army. Some prominent Liberians initially downplayed the significance of ethnic balance and spoke out against a quota system allotted to each county in Liberia.[188] Interestingly, the most represented tribes in the new army are coastal tribes that were traditionally uninterested in the army (Liberian Frontier Force). The indigenous coastal groups—Bassa

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[185] Wikileaks: who will succeed Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 09Monrovia160; the cable is likely referring to Fomba Sirleaf, recruited into the AFL along with Samukai through the army recruitment programme in the late 1970s. Sirleaf is the step-son of the President. He earned a BSc degree in Systems Engineering from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York and an M.Sc in Organizational Development from the University of Pennsylvania. Additionally, Fomba Sirleaf served in the Black Beret in 1992 under Samukai's leadership, a paramilitary unit created to provide protection to former interim president Dr. Amos Sawyer.

[186] Author's personal interview with MoD official, Monrovia, March-April 2012

[187] With current data available, it is impossible to disaggregate rank-and-file soldiers from the officer corps, in terms of ethnic composition.

[188] Samukai (2004) stated "nearly the entire population of Liberia have been displaced and have shifted during the last fourteen years. As such, on what basis would appropriation be made—on the basis of size, or the last census over 25 years ago? Remember, it is proportional representation that has brought this political mess of lack of accountability since elections in 1997".

(13.8%), Grebo (11.3%) and Kru (10.7%) and Vai (5.8%) now comprise 41.6% of the total strength of the AFL. (See table 2 for a breakdown of the ethnic composition). These ethnic groups had traditionally stayed out of the army (and LFF) as they were more exposed to western education and challenged Americo-Liberian rule.[189] Historically, interior indigenous groups such as the Kissi, Gbandi, Mende, Lorma and Mano/Gio were predominantly represented in the rank-and-file. In 2012, these groups have only limited representation in the contemporary AFL, comprising just under- 30% of the total force.[190] One interesting fact is that the Kpelle are the most represented (13.9%). During Samuel Doe's era, Krahns and Mandingos made up the majority of officers and rank-and-file. In 2012, these indigenous/ethnic groups comprise only 3.6% and 4.5% respectively.

- Almost 98% of the total force claim to have no prior military experience before recruitment;

- 92.7% of soldiers were recruited from Montserrado County (Monrovia area). This fact explains does not necessarily meant that a shift has taken place from rural to urban preference, rather that that mass displacement during the war forced populations to converge in Monrovia;

- The army is not only inexperienced but also extremely young: the average age is 27 years; 76.8% of soldiers (enlisted) are between the ages

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[189] Akingbabe, *The Role of the Military in the History of Liberia*,142; Jeremy Levitt, *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From 'Paternaltarianism' to State Collapse*, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005, 146.
[190] Kissi (4.4%), Gbandi (3.3%), Mende (1.3%), Lorma (11.8%), Mano (3.9%), and Gio (5.1%)

of 18-30; 44.1% of the total strength (officers and soldiers) are between the ages of 18-25.

- From an academic point of view, only 5% of the AFL has earned a college or university degree. This fact demonstrates that the Liberian officer establishment remains extremely small. 28.8% of Liberian military personnel have obtained a vocational certificate;

- The majority of rank-and-file soldiers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) possess a high-school certificate, as stipulated in the new AFL's recruitment norms. My representative sample of the rank-and-file revealed that about 93% of enlisted soldiers have completed their high-school education.

- Upon assuming Presidency, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf developed a new recruitment norm that at least 20% of the army's composition should be women.[191] By 1 August 2009, only 58 female soldiers had been recruited. By March 2012, this total increased slightly to 75; however, this represents only 3.4% of the AFL's total strength.

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[191] Malan 2008

Table 2: AFL Ethnic Composition (2012)

Ethnic Groups	Percent (MoD)[192]	Percent [193]
Bassa	13.8%	3.45%
Bella	0.4%	>1%
Congo	1.6%	>1%
Dei	0.3%	>1%
Gbandi	3.3%	3.4%
Gio	5.1%	6.9%
Gola	3.1%	3.4%
Grebo	11.3%	13.79%
Kissi	4.4%	6.9%
Kpelleh	13.9%	10.34%
Krahn	3.6%	3.45%
Kru	10.7%	13.79%
Loma	11.8%	17.24%
Mandingo	4.5%	6.9%
Mano	3.9%	6.9%
Mende	1.3%	>1%
Sarpo	1.2%	>1%
Vai	5.8%	3.45%
No tribe selected	0.1%	>1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100%**

Conclusion

The AFL is not yet fully operational as of 2013. The expected date continues

operational commencement continues to be postponed and extended in the

future. The latest reports suggest that the AFL will not be operational until at

least 2014.[194] On 31 July 2009, the American military handed back 'authority' to

the Minister of Defense, and in doing so, also provided the Barclay Training

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[192] These Ministry of Defense totals include all officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers (N=2204)

[193] I gained permission to access the AFL pay roster for March 2012 and totaled the number of enlisted soldiers in each unit. Using a simple random sampling technique, I selected a sample of 50 soldiers. However, only 28 (over 50%) were available for the interview process because some were engaged in training (in Liberia or overseas). For my sample, I utilised a simple random sample technique, employing Ministry of Defense payroll for March 2012 to select enlisted soldiers randomly. I randomly selected and disaggregated these figures to include only enlisted soldiers. I found that just under 2,000 soldiers were on the March 2012 payroll. For comparison, the AFL strength as of 10 December 2012 is 1,909, according to President Sirleaf's year-end speech 2012)

[194] UN SG report (23rd Report) anticipated that the AFL's full operational status would be ready by 2014 (7); see also UNSG report (25th report) dated 28 February 2013, 11

Center to the Liberian military. However, US military—through PAE and DynCorp remained in charge of EBK barracks until 31 December 2009. On 1 January 2010, the US handed operational control of Liberian Government/Ministry of Defence. However, for the duration of the next two years, DynCorp maintained control over the AFL's supply of weapons and ammunition until 12 May 2012.[195]

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[195] In December 2011, the US Ambassador and Liberia's minister of defence signed a transition handover plan for transferring responsibility to the Armed Forces of Liberia. As part of the transfer plan, the AFL gradually took responsibility for monitoring the armoury from DynCorp. The US handed over all responsibility for weapons and ammunition to the AFL on 10 May 2012 (UN Peacebuilding Commission-Liberian Configuration report of the Chair's visit to Washington, D.C, 10 & 11 February 2011, 1 (http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/lib/pbc_visits/stmt_lbr_csc_chair_2_2011_dc.pdf); UN panel of experts report on Liberia, dated 31 May 2013, 5; UN panel of experts report, 20 June 2012, S/2012/448 (note 47), paras 44-45)

Chapter 7
Sierra Leone: Assessments

Introduction

Leading from Chapter 5, this chapter assesses the security sector and military reform process in the context of Sierra Leone's ongoing peacebuilding process. It is argued that rather than building a "positive peace" focused on addressing structural violence, Sierra Leone has experienced a "negative peace" defined as the cessation of physical violence.

In Chapters 3 and 5, it was demonstrated that during Sierra Leone's war-peace transition (2000-2012), the security sector restructuring process was heavily dependent on Britain; Sierra Leone's former colonial master returned to Sierra Leone to assume an "entrenched" role to influence, shape and manage the statebuilding and capacity building functions in the Sierra Leonean state. Britain signaled its interest to "secure peace" in Sierra Leone, (however limited) within the context of negotiated ten-year memorandum of understanding (MoU) and an "over the horizon" guarantee promising sustained development assistance and military assistance.[1]

Early peace consolidation and stabilisation efforts were guaranteed based on the deployment of a 17,000-strong UN peacekeeping force tasked with temporarily assuming primary authority over domestic security, conducting elections within six-months, and implementing a national disarmament programme. These efforts were underpinned by an aim to reconsolidate central

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[1] British assistance included a promise to intervene militarily within a period of 48-72 hours in the event of a security crisis occurred in Sierra Leone after the war. (Sierra Leone: Belated International Engagement Ends a War, Helps Consolidate a Fragile Democracy, *Diplomatic Handbook*, 2006, 9)

state authority without questioning the structures and practices within the Sierra Leonean state. Additionally, the British government focused on explicit statebuilding tasks once that state was consolidated, notably military and police-building in the security sector, integration of former rebels and combatants in the RSLAF, and a range of restructuring programmes to "rightsize" and build capacity of security forces. The large-scale presence of British and United Nations military troops in Freetown and in the periphery created an enabling environment for physical security during the immediate war-peace transition. At the time, no one questioned the short-term impact that the large international footprint would have on the local political economy. The capacity building efforts empowered Sierra Leone's security forces to assume primary responsibility over internal security and allowed for UNAMSIL to withdraw from Sierra Leone within less than four years after the conflict ended. Within this period, total spending from the main international partners (UN, DfID, USAID and the EU) was US$2.81 billion.[2] However, despite considerable international attention over the past decade, the structural causes of violence remain within the Sierra Leonean state.

This chapter is structured into four parts: First, it assesses the impact of SSR and peacebuilding on the nature of the Sierra Leonean state. Second, I assess Britain's "Lead State" approach in Sierra Leone and its implications for aid effectiveness. Third, an assessment of the state-society relations will be presented. Finally, it concludes with an analysis for UN peacebuilding.

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[2] Mike McGovern, 'Liberia: The risks of rebuilding a shadow state', in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), Building States to Build Peace, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, 340, footnote 8

Implications for the British "Lead State" Model

Despite what some believe in Africa, greater international attention and resources focused on post-conflict statebuilding will not necessarily lead to better outcomes. One Sierra Leonean academic told me that if her country had received even a fraction of what NATO was spending on "SSR" in Afghanistan or Iraq, then the problems embedded within Sierra Leone's security sector could have been more adequately addressed.[3] It is not about spending more money or even greater UN Security Council focus on African countries on the margins of the global community's attention. It is more important to focus on developing better interventions within the limited resources available and concentrating on developing more endogenous frameworks that integrate local knowledge and broad-based national dialogue before statebuilding reforms are implemented. The UN/US/UK's propensity to consolidate state authority and "build state capacity" (to "reduce state fragility") in the way that is outlined in this dissertation obscures the political nature of these interventions, the biases towards their western models and the lack of problematisation the nature of that state authority, which serves to support a status quo and perpetuates political structures and practices in the state that inflicts violence against its citizens and in the everyday realm.

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[3] We were talking about the IMATT mission in Sierra Leone and comparing it to the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. The NATO training mission has 2,700 trainers and in 2012 operated on a budget of $11.2 billion. In comparison, IMATT's ten-year expenditure in Sierra Leone was about $105 million—not even 1% of expenditures and less than 1% of the total manpower for the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. The American-led military reform efforts of the Armed Forces of Liberia cost about 2% of what the NATO's mission and less than 1% of total manpower in Afghanistan. She had made the point that if Sierra Leone or Liberia received even a fraction of what NATO provides Afghanistan, there would be a qualitative difference in the outcomes on the ground, without interrogating whether how external military assistance is envisioned and how it is implemented.

According to a US Defence Sector Policy note, in advising and partnering situations, embedded personnel should work in the same conditions as their hosts.[4] The advisors brought their own frameworks, vocabulary, specialised vernacular and knowledge to the job and sought to impart British military doctrine and practices to the postwar RSLAF. Some of the UK advisors, especially those were making six figure salaries during their posts to Sierra Leone, were perceived by their Sierra Leonean counterparts as "buying time" for a six-month vacation.[5]

The UK's attempt to gain policy leverage over Sierra Leone's political class during the immediate transition was disjointed and lacked robust sanctions, as made obvious in Chapter 5.[6] One of DfID's Security and Justice programme officers in Sierra Leone (2004-2006), Mark White questions the wisdom of consolidating security at the expense of socio-economic development priorities (poverty reduction, inequality of opportunity) during the immediate transitional

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[4] Boucher 2009, 11

[5] Gary Horlacher, a UK retired police officer earned a salary of £152,159 as a consultant on SSR for DfID and then UN advisor to ONS. One can only assume he was not the only UK advisor receiving a six figure salary (Andrew Gilligan, 'Revealed: taxpayer-funded aid consultants on six figures a year, *Telegraph*, 30 September 2012 (Accessed 1 November 2012); Author's personal interviews with ONS staff, Freetown, 3 November 2011

[6] My focus was not on the institutional aspects/challenges embedded within the UK approach. As general background, however, (as stated in Chapter 5), the UK established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and African Conflict Prevention Pools in 2001 to pool funding for the UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. This mechanism brought together expertise in defence, development and diplomacy. According to Ann-Fitzgerald, there were "different departmental motivations" embedded within this framework, which may have limited its approach in Sierra Leone. (Ann-Fitzgerald, 'Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone', in Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector reform, GFN-SSR: Shrivenham, 2004, 117). Alice Hills also questions the level of cooperation that existed between ministries due to the "hierarchical and adversarial" nature of the policy-making bodies in these institutions. (Alice Hills, 'Defence Diplomacy and SSR', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 21:1, 2000, 5)

period.[7] White admits that "securitizing" the poverty reduction strategy may have discouraged some donors to contribute to the initial shortfall in the PRSP budget in 2003-2004.[8] The UK's experiment linking development with security was ineffective in balancing the demands of both. For example, since UK was perceived as driving the post-war reform process and international donors viewed Sierra Leone as a "UK aid darling", the Sierra Leone's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper donor consultations was largely externally driven and once the strategy was published, it became a "dead document". Mark White shows that despite embedded UK advisors in state institutions in Sierra Leone, little or no action was taken by the Sierra Leonean authorities to implement the reforms outlined in the PRSP.[9] He contends that the "stable secure environment lessened the immediate imperatives" for the Government of Sierra Leone "to lead" and concludes that "some members of the government instead opted to use that security for their own ends".[10] Sierra Leone's entrenched political and economic elite (associated with the Sierra Leone People's Party) capitalised on "security" created by the UN and UK presence to resume its "back to business as usual" political orientation. After nearly eight years of "peacebuilding", Mark White recognized an important insight that one cannot develop "a competent

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[7] White 2009, 109

[8] Albrecht and Jackson 2009, 119. A donor's meeting was organized to raise funds for the PRSP in November 2005, which resulted in a funding shortfall between the required budget of US$2 billion and the amount pledged. Donors were particularly concerned about the lack of progress in fighting high-level government corruption by Kabbah's government (Brian Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform, Chatham House Report, June 2007, 30)

[9] White 2009, 116

[10] Mark White, Security and Development in Sierra Leone: DFID's Approach in Lansana Gberie, (ed.), *Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008*, 2009.

security sector in a vacuum". White's recognition that "the work undertaken in the security sector […] created opportunities for work in trade, diamonds, health, education and local government, but the funding was not there to take advantage of the opportunities" illustrates that intimate connections between SSR interventions and broader socio-economic challenges.[11]

Sierra Leonean State: Politics as Usual?

Horn and Olanisakin state, "The UK government policy sees SSR as a fundamental pre-requisite for the achievement of broader development goals, yet the evidence from Sierra Leone is that one does not necessarily lead to the other."[12] However, I argue that UK SSR policy as well as the SSR literature failed to appreciate and understand the intimate connections between the security sector in Africa and the problems embedded within the state in Sierra Leone. The UK spent nearly £70 million to rebuild Sierra Leone's security forces, the UK effort has had little impact in restructuring the political space or changing the political practise and behavior of the political actors in that space. Sierra Leone's political and business elite reaped an unequal share of the benefits of a post-conflict peace dividend. The elite have demonstrated their willingness to use that security for their own ends and to practice the "spoils logic" inherent in the functioning of the Sierra Leonean state. The UK government recognizes its limits in influencing outcomes in Sierra Leone. As a UK House of Commons

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[11] White 2009, 115

[12] United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, in P.E Gordon and A. Hills (eds.), Managing Insecurity: Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform, London: Routledge, 2008, 32

report on Sierra Leone noted in 2006, "The situation in Sierra Leone demonstrates that DfID exerted limited leverage on the Government to make the changes needed to reduce corruption, facilitate effective governance and promote development in Sierra Leone."[13]

The immediate concern for establishing physical security (read: stability) helped to consolidate Kabbah's political power during the initial years and reinforced Sierra Leone's entrenched political class that benefited disproportionately from the peace dividend.[14] The considerable financial assistance provided to Kabbah's government in the security sector reduced his regime's vulnerability from internal dissent and the entrenched presence of the UK and the development, defence and diplomacy assistance provided guaranteed that any threat to the security of the state could be successfully mounted. This alternative security mechanism—first from ECOMOG and then from the UN and UK—allowed President Kabbah and other entrenched economic elite to resist certain governance reforms in the state, that had been linked, at least in theory, with the broader SSR package (as per the MoU), including mitigating state corruption and alleviating poverty. Donors became increasingly frustrated with Kabbah's administration due to slow progress achieved in these broader governance reforms.[15] According to a Chatham House analyst, despite "the fundamental problem" that prevented UK assistance from having a more

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[13] UK House of Commons International Development Committee, Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-conflict reconstruction, sixth report of session 2005-2006, Vol. 1, 2006, 17.

[14] Lansana Gberie, 'Rescuing a Failed State", 2008, 10

[15] Thomson notes that donors were particularly frustrated over lack of progress in corruption, public financial management and service delivery (Thomson 2007, 30)

meaningful impact than it did, "weak capacity and weak ownership of some of the reforms" was to blame for the paralysis. Based on my analysis of the particular case, I argue that the UK's intrusive role foreclosed deep and broad-based local involvement and foreclosed opportunities for re-writing a new "social contract" between Sierra Leone's state and its citizens. Aid provided to Kabbah reduced the imperative for him to look beyond his traditional power base. In other words, Britain's approach—informed by rebuilding the central government and extending state authority to the provinces through traditional leaders (chiefs) within the framework of the nation-state aligned well with what Kabbah had proposed in 1998. What a UK analyst argues is "weak capacity" is, in my view, "lack of capacity or will" to implement externally-driven deeper state reforms.

Donors were increasingly frustrated with Kabbah's lack of interest in implementing state reforms.[16] Relations between Kabbah's administration and the UK changed substantially by 2005-06. By late 2006 until the August 2007 elections, the relationship had soured. Additionally, when Sierra Leone was selected to access financial assistance from the UN Peacebuilding Fund in 2006, Kabbah's government focused on accessing this "new money" as opposed to its existing policy commitments from the PRSP.[17] The new UN PBF funding was

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[16] Commenting about the frustration she observed while working in Sierra Leone from 2001-2004, Comfort Ero "observed frustrations among several donors, most notably the European Commission and the World Bank" (Comfort Ero, 'Peacebuilding through Statebuilding in West Africa? The Cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia', in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power and Politics in Africa*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012, 251, footnote 22

[17] White 2009, 116. Sierra Leone became eligible to access financial support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund on 11-12 October 2006. In February 2007, the Peacebuilding Support Office sent a technical mission to Sierra Leone to assist the Government and key stakeholders in

never linked to robust conditionalities that required the political class to reach broad-based dialogue with potential recipients or even demonstrate that they had secured input projects were implemented.[18] The SLPP had secured its position within the post-war state, the Government could pass the burden of social provisioning and development onto foreign agencies while continuing long entrenched state practices of nepotism, theft of state funds and the monopolization of control for dictating the distribution of socio-economic opportunities.[19]

The powers of the President as conferred in Sierra Leone's Constitution provides expansive powers to the Executive branch, which undermines the agency of local actors and civil society in Sierra Leone. The Lomé Accord and TRC's Final Report recommended to the Government of Sierra Leone the need to revisit the country's Constitution (promulgated during the war in 1991). On 24 October 2006, Kabbah's government announced the creation of a Constitutional Review Committee to review and update the country's 1991 Constitution. The committee completed its preliminary work in April 2007, recommending predominantely cosmetic changes and left the issue of executive

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"finalising" Sierra Leone's priority plan for the PBF. Subsequently, on 1 March 2007, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) approved a country envelope of US$35 million from the PBF.

[18] Action Aid, CAFOD and Care International, 'Consolidating the Peace', 12-15; see also Street, Smith and Mollet, 'Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone', 36, 38-39.

[19] ONS had engaged in broad consultations with the public, to build legitimacy but ultimately required political will from the government. The ONS security sector implementation plan of 2005 requested that the Government of Sierra Leone contribute an estimated US$69 million in non-recurrent costs in 2006 to pursue modernization including adequate accommodation for RSLAF. This was recognized and reported as a serious problem by the British IMATT force commander Brigadier Le Grys. However, the Government has refused to take ownership over addressing this critical problem, instead preferring to rely on external actors and resources. According to the implementation report, 42% of RSLAF soldiers lived in inadequate housing of make-shift/self-made shelters.

power in the President's office unscathed.[20] Following his re-election in 2013, President Koroma announced that a constitutional review committee would conduct national consultations at the end of 2013.[21] The government requested assistance from UNDP to draft a revised constituton to occur in 2013-2014.

There was also evidence of the state relying on police forces to intimidate opposition parties, a practice that dates back to APC rule under former President Stevens. Kabbah's government put Charles Margai on trial in 2005-2006, which was seen as a political heavily-handed measure in response to Margai leaving the ruling SLPP party to form his own party, the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC). The Government also arrested RUP spokesman Omrie Golley in January 2006 for political reasons. The government also relied on police forces to break up political meetings of the opposition parties.[22]

In 2007 before the elections, Britain and the World Bank funded between 30-60% of the government of Sierra Leone's national budget. The UK could not access any of the audited accounts that detailed how this funding was being spent since Kabbah's re-election in May 2002. The EU and Britain halted its direct budgetary support around 2007 until the audited accounts were shared,

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[20] Recommendations included a broadening of the criteria for citizenship; protection for the environment; the right to collective bargaining; the removal of provisions relating to gender discrimination; legal proceedings in cases of human rights violations; and the creation of a separate chamber of paramount chiefs in the Parliament (UNIOSIL report, 7 May 2007, 6)

[21] In May 2013, Koroma stated "We must also revisit the constitution... the present 1991 constitution is a creation of the APC; we must also be the leaders of the re-enactment of a constitution that is informed by the best principles of governance in the modern era. I seek your approval for these initiatives; I seek for continued support for the transformation; I seek your eternal vigilance." The review of the constitution will last 24 months. The Government has set aside US$9.6 million for the project (Africa Confidential "Shadowy Third-term Plan for Koroma", 23 July 2013

[22] UNIOSIL report, April 2006, 5

which left the government with a deficit of about $50 million.[23] Not only was the Sierra Leonean state made dependent on foreign aid for its survival, but more problematically, the external security and financial guarantee played an important role in emboldening the political establishment to continue orienting its activities in the interest of its own interests as well as the superficial appearance of conformance to Britain's foreign aid policy priorities. In this sense, one must question who the political leadership was accountable to: donors or Sierra Leonean citizens?

State-Society Complex

The top-down, institutionalised nature of the statebuilding process for RSLAF ignored important social and non-state dimensions of Sierra Leone's social-political environment during the war-peace transition. Not only was civil society was not engaged sufficiently as part of the security sector reform process, the blueprint "wrote-over" indigenous specificities that could be considered as local state-making processes, by for instance, disbanding the local civil-defense groups and informal youth groups that provided security for their communities during the war, albeit sometimes under controversial circumstances.[24] As Mac Guinty states, the preference for statist institutionalism and technocratic approaches that ignore legitimacy of local agencies "risks excluding creativity, innovation, dissent, resistance and pluralism" and restricts agency of local

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[23] Africa Confidential, The first-round fight, Vol. 48, No. 16, 3 August 2007

[24] Baker, Sierra Leone Police 2006

actors.[25] Peacebuilding blueprints and directives received from New York, London or Washington do not intersect well with imperatives of building a peace that is "indigenous, customary" or draws in traditional decision-making practices.[26]

The funding and qualitative gains achieved in the security sector have not extended to broader social transformation in post-war Sierra Leone. While the security sector reforms were linked with poverty reduction, very limited gains have been achieved in terms of social development in the balancing the so-called "development-security" nexus during the first decade of "peacebuilding".[27] In 2007-08, approximately 70% of Sierra Leoneans were living on less than US$1 a day. Sierra Leone ranked 180 out of 182 countries in the UNDP human development index in 2007. Life expectancy was 47.3 years of age and adult literacy was only 38.1%. Sierra Leone's apparent success in SSR did not extend to alleviating poverty or reducing inequality of opportunities—one of DfID primary goals in its SSR efforts. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) report in 2009 noted: "The former rebel forces no longer pose a threat to the stability of the country. However, many of the underlying causes of social deprivation and isolation remain and need to be addressed".[28]

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[25] Mac Gunity 2012, 27

[26] Roger Mac Guinty, 'Indigenous peacemaking versus the Liberal peace', *Cooperation and Conflict,* 43:2, 2008, 139-163

[27] DfID's 2006 white paper, "Making Governance Work for the Poor" makes the explicit claim that effective states are necessary to provide security for its citizens.

[28] UNIPSIL report, 30 January 2009, 10. UNIPSIL is focused on political dialogue between the main politicial parties and supporting constitutional reform and youth unemployment.

*Implications for state-society relation*s

Chapter Two highlighted the problematic relationship between state and society

in the post-independence period in Sierra Leone. One can witness a continuation

of these practices in the post-conflict state. The state-society relationship is

enmeshed with systemic and structural power and political webs that span elite

and marginalised groups. The standard statebuilding model fails to consider the

non-state dimensions of state authority. In doing so, these models fail to

recognize the structural violence embedded in the relationship between

politicians and marginalised/subaltern youth who are relied upon to advance

politicians' political and economic interests.[29] Additionally, politicians have a

history of exploiting divisions within military and police institutions to inflict

violence and advance their parochial self-interests.

Given the "spoils logic" embedded in the Sierra Leonean state,

statebuilding practices must go beyond the state to support building an active

and engaged citizenry, whose responsibility it is to balance state power.

However, the UK focus on statebuilding in Sierra Leone lacked sufficient

attention on developing creative ways to engage non-state actors outside of the

dominant political webs of networks.[30] The UK approach was informed by an

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[29] See Mats Utas, 'The Rewards of Political Violence: Remobilising Ex-Combatants in Postwar Sierra Leone', in Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Maya Christensen and Mats Utas, 'Mercenaries of Democracy: The 'Politricks of Remobilised Combatants in the 2007 General Elections in Sierra Leone', *African Affairs,* 107:429, 2008, 515-539; Lisa Denney, 'Sierra Leone: Wave of Violence or Wake up call?' *Afriko,* 18 June 2009

[30] Social groups include women's market associations, youth associations and groups, farmer associations, causal labourers, motorbike and taxi association, student groups etc. On the role of informal motorbike rider associations in post-conflict Sierra Leone, see Paul Richards, K. Bah and J. Vincent, 'Social capital and Survival: Prospects for Community-Driven Development in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone', Social Development papers, Community Driven Development/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, 12, Washington, DC: The World Bank,

assumption that "development" should be channeled first through the state. The imposition of a universalizing logic on the political, social and cultural foundations overwrites or minimizes everyday forms of citizen activism and engagement.[31] The result has been an uneven balance between state and society that has been perpetuated by external assistance. It is worth noting that DfID experimented with a project to address this gap from 2004 to the end of March 2011 with joint-development initiative involving Sierra Leone's Ministry of Finance (mostly bureaucrats) and civil society groups.[32] The initiative aimed to foster "constructive engagement between citizens and the state that enable poor people to achieve positive and sustained changes in the quality of their lives." However, the project underscores how difficult it is for outsiders to engage civil society in Sierra Leone in meaningful ways. The project was a colossal failure because of the relative weakness of civil society (in terms of resources and unequal power relations) and their inability to distinguish itself from the state actors' agenda.[33] According to a Ministry of Finance official, "the issues that you want them to engage government in, they don't have the capacity in. What ended up happening was DfID fed them [civil society] the information they needed to engage government in and in turn [donors] are the one doing the

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2004; Krijn Peters, 'From Weapons to Wheels: Young Sierra Leonean Ex-combatants Become Motorbike Taxi-Riders', *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development,* 10, 2007, 1-23

[31] In particular, for Sierra Leone, I wish to call attention to the importance of religion as an everyday source of inspiration and will for citizens. The dominant peacebuilding and statebuilding paradigms fails to recognize how these everyday specificities could play a role in "development"

[32] See DfID, 'Enhancing the interaction and interface between civil society and the state to improve poor people's lives (ENCISS), http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=104605

[33] Author's confidential interview with Ministry of Finance authority, Freetown, 15 December 2011

engagement through civil society."[34] It is interesting that this project was implemented as an after-thought to broader "peacebuilding" reforms that focused explicitly on statebuilding. Since a Ministry of Finance official chaired the steering committee, the project essentially became a state project instead of fostering "capacity" in civil society to perform its Liberal role as a counter-balance to government authority. In total, DfID spent over £8.5 million (about US$11.7 million) and the project was considered "led by the host country/organization" and "complete" in 2010 with little critical assessment of the project's nature and outcomes. However, assessments by Sierra Leonean Ministry of Finance officials were more critical of the DfID approach of engaging civil society:

> A lot of money was spent, five years down the road, there is no tangible evidence that this project has been beneficial. You come with a good idea but it comes with a fundamental flaw that you consider civil society in a developing world is the same as civil society in a developed world in our situation, especially coming from war. It is not the same. If you come to Sierra Leone and the public sector is weak, you can be sure that the capacity of the private sector is weaker. You can be assured that the parliamentary capacity is weaker than government. You can also be assured that the capacity of civil society is even weaker than those two.[35]

Recent donor rhetoric suggests that civil society should play a central role in public oversight and state opposition.[36] However, if lessons on past errors are not learned (and factored into future planning), statebuilding practices will continue to produce ineffective results and will further entrench bad practices within state institutions in Sierra Leone. It is questionable whether external donors can even

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[34] Author's confidential interview with Ministry of Finance official, Freetown, 15 December 2011
[35] Ibid.
[36] DfID, Evaluation of DfID country programmes: Sierra Leone, 2007; EU Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013

engage civil society in meaningful ways within the dominant statebuilding framework that emphasise constructing a unified nation-state before re-writing a new "social contract" and informed by the universalizing logic of western normative models. Practical tasks resembling building so-called "social contracts" between state and citizens ignores or minimizes historical specificities of violence that has been enmeshed in this relationship. We learn from statebuilding models implemented in Sierra Leone that privileging state authority perpetuates the structural power imbalance between state and civil society.[37]

Lack of Attention to "Structural Causes of Conflict"

The transfer of security responsibility from UNAMSIL to the 9,267 strong Sierra Leone police force marked an important transitional moment in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The UN folded up its peacekeeping mission and left behind a UN "Integrated" office (UNIOSIL) and subsequently an "Integrated Peacebuilding Office" (UNIPSIL).[38] However, the deeply entrenched socio-economic conditions created widespread insecurity among Sierra Leoneans. A UNIOSIL report in April 2006 noted,

> Currently, the most immediate threat to stability in Sierra Leone is the worsening youth employment situation. As a result of the continuing dire economic situation in the country, there has been an increasing number of violent student and labour protests, as well as an upsurge in criminality throughout the country. There has been no improvement in

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[37] See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988; Migdal et al (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; *Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[38] During a UNSC visit to West Africa, Sierra Leonean interlocteurs noted their desire to see UNIPSIL transition out of Sierra Leone, expected in March 2014.

water and power supplies since the war ended. The cost of basic commodities, including the staple food, rice, is beyond the reach of most households. Persistent fuel shortages are also adding to the hardships. There is a general perception that the Government's inability to deliver basic services or respond to the needs of the population is due to corruption and mismanagement of public resources, and this has become a source of tension.[39]

Additionally, the "stable secure environment" created by the external intervention failed to effective recognise the changing landscape in Sierra Leone, in particular, the need to change its emphasis on physical security and prevention of military coups to broad-based socio-economic transformation. According to Sierra Leoneans intelligence and defence officials, around 2007, there was a noticeable shift in the transition from security threats emanating from physical harm (or freedom from fear) to insecurities in communities (freedom from want). A retired military officer commented that security threats immediately after the war were noticeably different from the threats Sierra Leone faced from 2007-2012. Most of the focus of SSR efforts immediately after the war was directed at preventing military coups and addressing what was perceived as a problem of management and training deficiencies.[40] From 2007, Sierra Leone had shifted from state security to human insecurity:

> The threat of military coups is minimal as are external threats such as Yenga. The key security threat is human insecurities—such as food insecurity, job security, right to education, right to legal fairness and redress, right to exercise one's right to vote to select the leader, access to affordable healthcare, clean drinking water. These are the key issues that you have to focus on—at the systemic level—that cause violence.[41]

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[39] UN Secretary General report on UNIOSIL, 28 April 2006, 3

[40] Government of Sierra Leone, Security Sector Reform Report 2005; Author's confidential interview with retired senior officer, 16 December 2011, Freetown

[41] Author's personal interview with a retired Colonel from the Sierra Leone military, 5 October 2011, Freetown

Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces

With respect to the security sector, Britain's intervention was comparatively more effective in influencing reforms from the top-down, by relying on a complex range of measures to influence and shape the police and military reform process, including (in order of importance), executive authority over key state institutions for a limited period, embedding "advisors" within these same institutions to control finances and "mentor" local counterparts, drafting important post-war agreements,[42] and imposing conditionalities on its foreign aid. Britain also relied on its past colonial framework of focusing on creating a unified state within a nation-state and extended state authority to the provinces through the restoration of traditional leaders and then Sierra Leone Police. This extension of nation state authority aimed to consolidate the political authority of the executive leadership in the state.

Through the Commonwealth, Britain led an International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) in reforming and retraining the RSLAF. With the support of IMATT, RSLAF has refocused its defence missions. The IMATT military reforms ensured the continued reliance on British military doctrine on the restructured RSLAF—specifically, the Queen's Regulations and the Manual of Military law.[43] Britain and Canada offered training through the

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[42] The UK assisted in developing an integrated national security strategy and governance framework with some limited deliberate input from Sierra Leonean civil society organizations (mostly academic) and from local leads (chiefdom authorities). This was part of the impetus behind establishing local district and provincial security committees (and later chiefdom committees) to decentralise the security system and promote intelligence and security analysis linkages from the grassroots to the capital in Freetown.

[43] The Queen's Regulations are adapted to Sierra Leone in name only. For instance, "Queen" is replaced by "President" on 19 April 1971 when the polity became a Republic and the name was subsequently changed from the Royal Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) to Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Force (RSLAF)

Horton Academy in an effort to continue the British military standard and in doing so, to preserve British heritage in Sierra Leone.

Although some of these components created problems in the relationship[44], after the initial 5-7 years of police and military-building, one can conclude that British reform efforts were successful in establishing minimal conditions for building effective institutions to provide physical security to citizens.[45] However, this chapter demonstrates that we should not prejudge Sierra Leone since "cracks" within the security sector are numerous.

The internal problems within the military run much deeper than just management and training problems. Approximately 60% of the army's rank-and-file soldiers are completely redundant and are basically non-operational for ECOWAS or AU/UN peacekeeping operations. The majority soldiers that fit within this category cannot read or write and could not be relied upon to step in as a platoon commander if operational requirements dictated this as a necessity.[46] Command and control is limited because the majority of RLSAF's soldiers are not properly billeted in formal barracks.[47] About half of the soldiers

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[44] For instance, the appointment of British commanders as a *de facto* executive advisors (i.e. "Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone") and high-level advisory positions in RSLAF created resentment among senior Sierra Leoneans in the ministry of defence. Since British funding was challenged through its "advisors" embedded in the Office of National Security (ONS), Sierra Leonean staff felt their authority was subordinated.

[45] Sierra Leone's security sector reform process has received international and regional praise as a result of considerable international support provided by Britain, USAMSIL and ECOWAS. Sierra Leonean security officials who travel the West African region regularly told me that Sierra Leone is perceived as a "successful" case in SSR among their peers in other African countries.

[46] Author's interviews with IMATT and senior RSLAF personnel, Freetown, October-December 2011.

[47] According to senior defence officials, RSLAF never experienced this problem before the war. He estimated that 97% of military personnel were billeted and therefore officers had a "firm grip" on soldiers (Author's interviews in the ministry of defence, Freetown). A UNIOSIL report

that do live in military barracks complain of the severe lack of adequate and basic facilities (such as clean drinking water and toilets are the biggest issues).[48] These substandard living conditions in the barracks, and the lack of government will to remedy it, have negatively impacted not only on the morale of the troops but also the public opinion of the RSLAF as an legitimate form of livelihood.

The decision to maintain an 8,500 troop RSLAF was made under problematic conditions related to the overly ambitious and flawed *Operation Pebu* project. IMATT initiated the military restructuring exercise without a clear strategy in place from the onset. The strategy of integrating was justified on the grounds that demobilizing the entire army would undermine stability in Freetown. The end result was ad-hoc interventions that foreclosed more radical and comprehensive transformation of the rank-and-file.[49] As one assessment team noted, although IMATT held executive mandate over the restructuring process, "no one was willing to make the politically sensitive decision of a complete overhaul of the armed forces".[50] The current ceiling has been set at 8,500 troops, which has remained constant since 2007. There are rumors that the Government of Sierra Leone wishes to increase the size for an expected growth

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dated 7 May 2007 noted that 55% of the RSLAF personnel and their families are "housed in substandard conditions" (4).

[48] Author's interview with senior defence official, Freetown, 2 December 2011. According to this officer, three-quarters of RSLAF personnel is "not adequately housed".

[49] Despite minimal education qualifications, that of obtainment of BECE, many illiterates joined the RSLAF during the MRP program.

[50] According to a confidential senior MoD official in December 2011, the military leadership has proposed to increase the size of RSLAF to about 9,000 troops. However, the Government did not support this idea (Author's confidential interview with MoD official, Freetown, 2 December 2011. IMATT has consistently kicked against the proposal as well (Author's confidential email correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013).

and interest in peacekeeping activities in Africa. However, IMATT has consistently kicked against this proposal.[51]

The Need to Radically Restructure the RSLAF's Rank-and-File
To understand whether the army's social composition has changed in the post-war period as a result of the MRP, the author collected a sample of 88 soldiers that passed through the programme.[52] The intention was to understand the social background of those recruits who entered the army through the MRP—particularly, to find out which former faction they had come from, details about their personal backgrounds, in terms of whether they had come from urban or rural backgrounds, their highest level of education obtained, and their family. The sample is broken down as follows:

The social background of MRP entrants:

- The average age of the MRP recruit was 24 years old
- Over 60% of MRP intakes were illiterates (i.e. they could not write their name during the tests)
- Among those with an education, the majority were high-school dropouts (Form three and form 4). This confirms what one RSLAF senior officer who was one of the instructors at the literacy training component: "the majority were individuals not able to make it in school".[53]
- Over 50% of the MRP recruits were ethnic Mendes
- 23% were ethnic Temnes while 45% of MRP recruits were northern-based ethnic groups
- 79% of the MRP recruits came from rural backgrounds
- The vast majority of recruits had fathers who were either farmers or soldiers

The MPR's impact on norms in RSLAF
Three significant impacts of the MRP on the local norms in the RSLAF are identifiable. First, decisions to increase the size of the RSLAF was made without

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[52] CDF (30); RUF (32); AFRC/ex-SLA (26)

[53] Author's interview with RSLAF officer, Freetown, 2 December 2011

consideration of space within RSLAF's military barracks. There was a series

housing shortage in Freetown after the war and the MRP aggravated this

problem significantly.[54]

The MRP negatively impacted on internal social norms in the RSLAF.

For instance, the MRP's negative impact on regimentation and discipline within

the rank-and-file after the war cannot be overstated. Since the military was

unable to accommodate the large number of soldiers after the war, the majority

of the rank-and-file soldiers were forced to live outside of the barracks. This

undermined a long-standing (pre-war) tradition in the military that new recruits

were to live in barracks for the first two years to ensure "recruits fully inculcate

what the military is, in terms of discipline".[55] According to a retired RSLAF

officer, "they came to work in the barracks on a daily basis and then went back

to their various homes in the evening. So out of 24 hours, they are only soldiers

for eight hours a day! We called them 'half-soldiers'".[56] These problems have

only exacerbated in the first ten years of "peacebuilding" in Sierra Leone.

According to various estimates, between 45-65% of the rank-and-file is not

officially accommodated in barrack conditions throughout the country.[57] A large

number of personnel (and their families) live in squatter-like-conditions in Sierra

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[54] For instance, of the 50 MRP recruits posted to the Maritime Wing of RSLAF, forty-three were sleeping on the floor of the classroom that was used for their basic Maritime Training. (MRP Memo, 'Single Soldier Accommodation in Freetown', dated 5 February 2002).

[55] Author's interview with retired RSLAF officer, Freetown, 20 January 2012

[56] Ibid.

[57] Author's interview with retired RSLAF commanding officer and former chair of the housing committee, 8 February 2012; confirmed by author's interview with a senior MoD Staff; see also Sierra Leone's "SSR implementation plan", 2006

Leone's military barracks.[58] This is one of the most serious security concerns facing the RSLAF: the lack of suitable accommodation to house its soldiers.

Second, the MRP participants received a sub-standard amount of training as compared to normative considerations that existed before the war. Before 1972, new recruits were trained for nine months and a strict policy was implemented that newly inducted personnel would live in military barracks during the first two years after their induction. In 1972, this tradition changed to six months training, after which successful inductees were allowed to live outside of the barracks. The MRP training consisted of only six-months of training without any comprehensive literacy, human rights or "rehabilitation" components. Speaking about the quality of training and its expedient nature from the MRP, one senior RSLAF officer (now retired) who was previously head of personnel matters stated,

> The MRP [provided] just brief military training. They carried their own social background into the military without a substantive rehabilitation process. Discipline dropped as a result. And regimentation suffered as well. It was different from what we knew before.[59]

IMATT's role in improving the character and professionalism of RSLAF has been partially effective for the officer corps. According to one former British advisor in IMATT, "most of the officers at the battalion command level are competent and motivated".[60] However, the army lacks competent non-

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[58] The Government is currently providing a living allowance of Le 35,000 (about $8.00) per soldier per month for those living outside of the barracks. (Author's interview with Sierra Leone's Senior MoD official, Freetown, 8 February 2012)

[59] Author's interview with retired RSLAF officer, 20 January 2012, Freetown

[60] Former IMATT commander Brigadier Barry J. Le Grys served as in the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone up to 2001 and subsequently served as IMATT commander and Military Advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone from late 2005-2007. See Le Grys 2009, 56.

commissioned officers (NCOs) and other middle ranks and lower rank soldiers. I wanted to understand whether the social background of NCOs and lower-ranks had changed substantially since the end of the war as a result of IMATT's intervention. As of March 2012, during the period of fieldwork, RSLAF was comprised of 8,800 troops, including just over 8,500 army personnel, an Air Force of 30, and a navy of 270.[61] There were 7,522 soldiers in the enlisted ranks and about 1,000 total officers (Senior NCOs, junior and senior officers). The enlisted soldiers are broken down as a percentage of total soldiers as follows:[62]

- Privates   37.39%
- Lance Corporal   24.17%
- Corporal   20.94%
- Sergeant   9.5%
- Staff Sergeant   4.77%
- Warrant Officer 2   2.59%
- Warrant Officer 1   0.6%

Mendes hold a slight majority in the army's rank-and-file, comprising 40.91% of the total enlisted soldiers. This fact confirms suspicion within the army that the

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[61] According to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-West Africa: Sierra Leone 2012, The Air Wing of the Force has one Mi 24 helicopter gunship whilst the maritime wing has one medium-sized, Chinese-built vessel that is patrols Sierra Leone's coast. Three Canadian Forces members were embedded in the maritime unit in 2011. According to Lt. Col. Mike Vernon, former Canadian commander in the CF unit in IMATT, "their navy is comprised of a Chinese patrol boat which is unsuitable for patrolling on a river. Although the RSLAF tries to take it to sea to monitor the fisheries, the boat is not seaworthy. It's the wrong craft for that purpose and it consumes an enormous amount of fuel", adding that it consumes the equivalent of one brigade's fuel for three months on a five-day patrol. The vessel rarely leaves the dock and has never gone to sea while Lt. Col. Vernon served in Sierra Leone ('CF in Sierra Leone', Western Sentinel, 8 December 2011, 21)

[62] Based on a simple random sample (N=44) of the total enlisted RSLAF soldiers, the following data was collected.

southeast dominates the rank-and-file.[63] Temnes comprise 31.82% of the total army rank-and-file.

The army continues to recruit predominantly from rural backgrounds. For instance, 81.82% of the rank-and-file are originally from a rural abode in Sierra Leone. This is significant as it demonstrates that the military is still connected to traditional society in Sierra Leone. Approximately 16% of the total rank-and-file are ex-combatants from either the former RUF or CDF forces. 47.73% of the rank-and-file were recruited during the war while only 13.64% of the current rank-and-file were recruited before the war (1991). 41% of the rank-and-file were recruited after the war ended. The median education among the enlisted ranks is Form 3 (which is approximately equivalent to obtaining 11th grade according to the Canadian education standards). Only 34% of enlisted soldiers have obtained a grade eleven education or higher. More alarming, only 18% have obtained high-school graduation (O Level). This means that although the army is "new" in terms of "fresh recruits", the social character has not changed substantially, especially in terms of improving quality of recruits with higher educational standards. It is noteworthy that in 2010, only approximately 300 women were serving in the RSLAF, which represented less than 1% of Sierra Leone's total female population.[64]

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[63] Author's confidential interview with Ministry of Defence official, 2 December 2011, Freetown; Author's personal data collected from the Ministry of Defence's Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Cockerill, Freetown, February-April 2012

[64] Mohamed Fofanah, 'A Place for Women in Sierra Leone's military', Inter-Press Service, 23 September 2010, http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/a-place-for-women-in-sierra-leones-military/ (Accessed 13 March 2013)

Another alarming social characteristic of the army is the fact that the average age of enlisted soldiers in 2012 is 38 years of age. This means that the army is quite old and will require extensive recruitment campaign(s) to ensure sustenance in the future.[65] Currently, there are a lot of "dead wood" in the army, as one IMATT commander called soldiers that were too old and unable to deploy for regional or international peacekeeping missions.

The Neglect of Bottom-up Social Provisioning in the RSLAF: A Future Threat to National Security?

The Government of Sierra Leone (both SLPP from 2002-2007 and APC from 2007-) has largely ignored the social conditions of their military and police. This is not the only problem facing the operational viability of the RSLAF, but negatively impacts on the morale of troops. The government of Sierra Leone does not take seriously the need to address illiteracy within its ranks. The British IMATT attempted to integrate an adult literacy component in its restructuring efforts, but without sufficient Sierra Leonean "ownership" in terms of financial support. Chronic poverty and systemic illiteracy (65%) within society severely conditions the quality of recruits entering Sierra Leone's security sector. The standardization of the recruitment policies sounds good on paper. However, there is a major difference between abstract intention and what is implemented in practice. If the Government of Sierra Leone does not address its poor living conditions in military barracks, soldiers will have little or not incentive to remain loyal to the government that does not look after their family's needs.

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[65] There were proposals for increasing the size of RSLAF to accommodate plans for future international peacekeeping missions. A British IMATT officer had developed a proposal called the Man-Control Points in 2010-2011 but this plan had been shelved by Sierra Leonean authorities (Author's confidential email interview with MoD official, February 2012)

The military is historically poorly managed and inefficient. Once soldiers are enlisted, there are few, if any robust mechanisms to monitor progress of soldiers. After low-ranking soldiers complete basic infantry and some specialised training, the training that is offered to soldiers once they are integrated in the system comes few and far between. There is a need to focus efforts on improving development of the rank-and-file beyond the attempts to improve literacy rates. How do commanders control their troops that do not have proper billets? Poorly-policed and uncontrolled soldiers in the rank-and-file are the most problematic type of soldiers in Africa. One cannot "re-monopolise" the legitimate means of violence if officers cannot account for their men. Concentrating on the officer corps and neglecting to radically restructure the rank and file constitutes one of the principle cracks in the SSR practice.

The embarrassing failure of *Operation Pebu* has had a lasting legacy on the current social conditions in military barracks throughout Sierra Leone. In the post-war period, some military personnel have faced extended AWOL, drug and alcohol abuse, and some reported incidents of rape and theft by soldiers attributed at least in part to the poor living standards in military barracks.[66] Most of the barracks conditions throughout Sierra Leone are similar to those of a refugee camp. Wilberforce Barracks, located on the hills above Freetown has degenerated into a ghetto barracks and has not been substantially refurbished since the war ended. At the end of the war, soldiers that could not be officially accommodated constructed makeshift buildings in the barracks to accommodate

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[66] Abu Whyte Fofana, 'Soldiers complain over poor conditions', *Standard Times*, 12 October 2004.

themselves and some of their extended family. RSLAF leadership has allowed, or at least acquiesced to most of an informalization of barracks accommodations in Wilberforce. One retired RSLAF officer, who was a former chair of the RSLAF Housing Committee describes Wilberforce as a "slum settlement".[67] A May 2007 UNIOSIL report noted that Wilberforce was "overcrowded, with some families living in stores and armories, with no access to safe drinking water or proper sanitation. Similar unacceptable conditions exist in the military barracks in the provinces".[68] Another historical norm in RSLAF that has been overridden is the fact that accommodation was supposed to be organized according to rank and grade. However, if you go to Wilberforce, corporals and privates are occupying shelter in close proximity to senior NCOs (sergeants and staff sergeants).

In 2004-2005, the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone with assistance from officers of the Pakistani Engineering battalion (PakBatt 4) attempted to refurbish the water and water storage facilities, constructed a track road, rehabilitated the toilet facilities as well as the barrack's school, and the football and volleyball fields. Prior to this project, the water system had not been updated nor rehabilitated since the colonial era and there was no water supply in the barracks.[69] Infrastructure was dilapidated. The barracks suffered from extremely degrading sanitary standards. There is currently an extreme shortage

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[67] Author's interview with retired RSLAF officer, former chair of AFPC housing committee, 8 February 2012
[68] UNIOSIL report, 7 May 2007, 4
[69] IRIN: UNAMSIL's SRSG inspects rehabilitation work at Wilberforce barracks, 7 July 2005

of toilets.[70] Informal "toilets" are located close to the community's drinking and bathing water source. Some soldiers live with their immediate and extended family, often in makeshift zinc houses constructed on government land. It is much akin to an urban slum, despite some investment in improving housing, schooling and sanitation conditions, the problems of poor sanitation and inadequate quality of life in the barracks persists in 2011-12. Some funding from the UN Peacebuilding Fund was allocated to improving three barracks in Freetown.[71] The government (both SLPP and APC) has demonstrated a generally neglectful attitude towards the welfare of security personnel and prefers to allow international donors to subsidize its social provisioning. Ultimately, is it the responsibility of Sierra Leone's political class to guarantee its soldiers and their families can earn sufficient wage to achieve basic living standards (decent housing, access to health care, food security).

Key questions flow from these observations: How do you subordinate your men to the dictates of democratic principles and practices if they collectively remained unlettered? There are no mechanisms within the framework of the armed forces to ensure that soldiers are constantly being trained and retrained. How can a military commander ensure effective command and control when over 50% of them are not billeted in barracks? These are key questions that SSR discourse is silent on; these shortcomings amplify the

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[70] The author had an opportunity to visit the Wilberforce barracks on several occasions. Best described as a death trap, the Wilberforce barracks are the oldest in the country and it shows.
[71] UNOISIL report, 4 December 2007, 5. Additionally, India supported the construction of 200 housing units (UNIPSIL report 30 January 2009, 7)

fragility of the state in the so-called post-conflict era and underline the need to rethink SSR from the point of view of the rank-and-file.

Sustainability

Force funding is a major burden on the government of Sierra Leone. There is only modest support coming from the Government in terms of running and maintenance of vehicles. According to Brigadier Barry Le Grys, a former UN commander and subsequent military adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone under for IMATT from 2005-2007 (after the elections) stated that Sierra Leone's security institutions were unsustainable. In 2008, he observed that "the Government is unable to sustain, or indeed, develop, the security sector without external assistance. If assistance were withdrawn, security may no longer be given and vicious infighting could reappear. The Government has to build the 'virtue' of sustaining its own security and prevent sectorial infighting".[72]

Although Egypt provided in-kind training to RSLAF to assist the RSLAF's air and ground crews in 2006, and in doing so, Egypt helped to make one of the RSLAF helicopters useable. However, sustaining the fuel and maintenance of the transport helicopter was "well beyond" what the RSLAF budget could afford.[73]

A DfID commissioned report called "Security Sector expenditure review" revealed an important revelation: the vast majority of defence sector funding went towards recurrent costs (operating costs) and less than 1% was spent on sector development, capital expenditures, training or long-term

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[72] Barry LeGrys 4
[73] Le Grys 5

planning needs.[74] At a macro-level, the majority of the Government's budget (at least 90%) is spent on recurrent costs, mostly government employees and civil servant's salaries.[75] This problem was highlighted during interviews with senior Ministry of Defence officials: There is no funding for continued training, improving infrastructure and military development. In the event that complete or even partial funding is withdrawn, there is the likelihood that the Government will be unable to sustain the costs of salaries to its personnel. The greatest difficulty will be sustaining the level of competence after British and international funding moves on.

The Government has demonstrated its unwillingness to plan in the long-term and develop an affordable military within its budgetary constraints. Before the 2007 elections, there were proposals to reduce the size of the army to 5,500, which would have represented a savings of US$7.3 million per year by 2010.[76] However, this plan was abandoned after the APC came to power in 2007. Unfortunately, these considerations have been based on political struggles with the SLPP rather than a non-partisan assessment of military security needs and objective threat assessments.

It is widely acknowledged that most of the support for maintaining operational effectiveness comes from external sources.[77] As noted in a UNIOSIL report dated 4 December 2007, the Sierra Leone Police and the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone receive "inadequate funding from the Government, which is still

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[74] Le Grys 2009, 44

[75] White 2009, 115

[76] Middlebrook et al 2006, vi.

[77] Osman Gbla 2012, 143

unable to sustain, on its own, the professional army and police force that the international community has helped to build".[78]

The Sierra Leone military authorities have become dependent on foreign assistance, such that nationally derived sources of income are insufficient for maintaining basic military maintenance and development (including training).[79] The government had demonstrated its unwillingness to do engage in planning and long-term budgeting that is necessary for executing such large-scale endeavors. Months before the November 2012 elections, IMATT officials continued to "hold their hand" and were consistently frustrated with Sierra Leonean authorities' intransigence towards planning and maintenance of "their" army.[80]This demonstrated lack of interest in long-term government planning is illustrated through a discussion on RSLAF's recent venture into international peacekeeping missions.

Future Missions in the 'National Interest': African Peacekeeping
The effects of IMATT's mission in Sierra Leone will be seen in how RSLAF performs in current and future United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somalia. It is a notable success (at least on the surface) that RSLAF has sent its own military personnel on African peacekeeping missions to Darfur and Somalia in less than ten-years after its own conflict

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[78] UNIPSIL, Fifth progress report of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2007/704, 4 December 2007, 13

[79] Donor aid accounts for approximately 19% of Sierra Leone's Gross National Income (GNI) and even more towards its national budget. Sierra Leone has one of the lowest revenue bases in sub-Saharan Africa, currently standing at 12% of GNI, compared to Liberia (in excess of 20%) (DfID, Operation Plan 2011-2015 Sierra Leone DfID: London, 2012, 2)

[80] Author's confidential interview with IMATT personnel, IMATT Headquarters, Freetown, March 2012. There are, of course, individual exceptions to this claim. The IMATT officer was speaking in more general terms regarding the armed forces.

formally ended.[81] Sierra Leone's first contingent of security personnel involved 20 police officers serving in the UN/AU mission in Darfur in early 2008.[82] Discussions occurred in September 2009 between IMATT, the US Embassy and RSLAF to send peacekeepers to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).[83] In late December 2009, Sierra Leone sent a 53-strong contingent sector reconnaissance company (SRC) (including 4 women) to South Darfur to assist the hybrid African Union-UN force (UNAMID) in Darfur.[84] In March 2010, Sierra Leone contributed about 160 soldiers to assist 22,000-strong UNAMID peacekeeping force. Two additional continents of 130 troops were sent to Darfur in 2011.[85] By October 2012, RSLAF had sent five rotations.[86] Despite a few embarrassing events that raised concerns about RSLAF's readiness to conduct international peacekeeping,

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[81] Over 90% of the African Union's peace and security efforts are funded by external actors (The African Union at Ten: Problems, progress and prospects, International Colloquium report 30-31 August 2012, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2012, 1

[82] UNIOSIL report, 29 April 2008, 3

[83] UNIPSIL report, 1 September 2009, 3

[84] The contingent was initially led by Lieutenant Colonel S.E.T Marah (now full Colonel) and included 30 personnel from the engineering unit. The Sierra Leonean company conducts security and confidence-building patrols while the engineering unit worked on construction of the contingent's base in Nyala, Sudan. At the time, there were approximately 15,000 military personnel from 38 countries deployed in South Darfur.

[85] Lieutenant Colonel Sheku Salami Sillah served as contingent commander for Sierra Leone's third phase from April to November 2011. Following Sillah's return to Freetown after completing his tour in Somalia, several allegations were levied against him by members of his contingent ranging from embezzlement of contingent funds to fraternization with a female soldier. RSLAF ordered an investigation and placed Sillah under Mess arrest. Sillah escaped from detention and was on the run in March 2012. See Defence ministry reacts to publication, *The Patriotic Vanguard*, 2 March 2012, http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article6406 (Accessed 21 May 2012); In June 2013, the Board of Inquiry recommended his discharge (Augustine Samba, 'Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces explains military retirements', *Awareness Times*, 4 June 2013). Sillah has seen been discharged on AWOL.

[86] The fifth rotation left Sierra Leone for Darfur in June 2012, led by contingent commander Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Sulay Sesay. The contingent included 130 RSLAF personnel.

IMATT is generally satisfied with RSLAF's performance in Darfur to date.[87]

With the backing of the US State Department, the Africa Contingency

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme,[88] the government of

Sierra Leone signed a Memorandum of Understanding in late 2011 with the

United Nations and African Union to send battalion-sized contingents to

Mogadishu, Somalia to assist the hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping mission there.[89]

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[87] Margaret Campbell, Task Force Freetown works in all aspects of RSLAF development, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 9 October 2012, http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/fs-ev/2012/10/09-eng.asp. Of course, IMATT has a stake in touting RSLAF's limited role in international peacekeeping as a "success" mostly because it played a major role in training the personnel (alongside the American ACOTA programme)

[88] ACOTA is coordinated by the US military attaché's office at the US embassy in Freetown. It links up with RSLAF through its Peacekeeping Director, Lt. Col. Albert Kargbo. ACOTA's funding grew from $15 million in 1997 to over $81 in 2008 and $49 million in 2009, spread across 24 countries and trains about 20 battalions every year ('More money for the military', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 5 February 2010)

[89] The US first sent its AFRICOM Commander (General William E. Ward) on its first visit to Sierra Leone on 15 September 2009 to shore up support for Sierra Leone to engage in international peacekeeping missions in Africa (UNIPSIL report 15 March 2010, 4). High on the priority was the US-funded African Union Mission in Somalia, which had been launched by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in partnership with the United Nations on 19 January 2007. The initial 6-month mandate has been extended several times. In its UN Security Council resolution 2010 (2011) of 30 September 2011, the UN decided unanimously to extend the AMISOM mandate until 31 October 2012. At the end of 2011, AMISOM consisted of about 9,800 troops mainly from Kenya Defence Forces, Ethiopian military units, Uganda's UPDF and Burundi, deployed in Mogadishu. The principle objective of AMISOM is to provide support to the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their stabilisation efforts. AMISOM is mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create the conditions for reconstruction, reconciliation and peace in Somalia. From their deployment up to 31 December 2011, the European Union has provided EUR 258.4 million from its African Peace Facility. Other bilateral contributions include $14 million from the United States' ACOTA program (US embassy press release, 'Top military general makes first visit to Sierra Leone', 7 September 2012 (http://photos.state.gov/libraries/sierraleone/452467/Press%20Releases-2012/09102012_PR_US%20GeneralVisitsSierraLeone.pdf). The costs for the mission include troop allowances, salaries for police officers and civilian staff, operational costs such as logistical support and equipment. The EU contributed EUR 115.9 for the costs of AMISOM in 2011. In June-July 2008, the Minister of Defence for Sierra Leone approached the United States government for peacekeeping and training assistance from the ACOTA programme. In July 2008, the GoSL MoD chief of staff contacted the U.S ambassador with this request after raising the issue on several previous occasions. According to a Wikileaks cable, the Government of Sierra Leone intends to provide one peacekeeping company to the ECOWAS standby force and three companies for UN missions. IMATT had completed peacekeeping training for five light infantry companies for peacekeeping but lacked funds for continuous training. According to Wikileaks, IMATT strongly supports ACOTA's role in training RSLAF for peacekeeping (http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08FREETOWN533)

The agreement commits the government for an initial three-year period to send RSLAF personnel to Somali for the mission. On 26 June 2012, selected RSLAF personnel completed training for the imminent deployment of a battalion-sized contingent (about 850, called Leobatt1) to assist African Union peacekeeping efforts (AMISOM) in Somalia.[90] Given the nature of the operation in Somalia, armored vehicles are an absolute priority for the mission. In February 2012, American-led African Contingent Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme, along with the Dutch government and the US Bureau of African Affairs donated three "Casper MK II Armored Personnel Carriers" (APCs) to the RSLAF.[91] The establishment of the Peace Mission Training Center (PMTC) in Hastings (eastern Freetown) has also added support to enhance RSLAF's peacekeeping capacity. AMISOM's Sierra Leone contingent (LeoBat) is funded with US, EU, British and Canadian assistance.[92]

Somalia is RSLAF's first expeditionary unit to operate under Sierra Leonean command. The future growth of the RSLAF is largely dependent upon its involvement in international peacekeeping activities in Africa (through the

[90] Richard Bartell, Sierra Leone troops complete AMISOM deployment training, defense video and imagery distribution system (dvids), 27 June 2012, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/90652/sierra-leone-troops-complete-amisom-deployment-training#.UBaxu45S0Ux (Accessed 30 July 2012); Commenting on the training provided by IMATT before their departure, Lt. Col. Paul Pickell said 'we developed tactical courses, provided advice for the pre-deployment reconnaissance and ensured that the brigade group was trained, ready and acting as a cohesive group' ('Task Force Freedom update', Western Sentinel, 25 October 2012, 9). During the early phases of the pre-deployment, Task Force Freetown in IMATT provided a six-week course to bring RSLAF up to the level required for the ACOTA program. FIBUA training prepares soldiers to fight in urban warfare, crucial for troops deploying on peace missions. FIBUA training is supposed to simulate the conditions, terrain, and operational difficulty that soldiers will encounter in Somalia.

[91] Edward Tommy, In Sierra Leone, big boost for RSLAF Somalia deployment battalion, *Awareness Times*, 9 February 2012, http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_200519667.shtml (Accessed 10 February 2012).

[92] Margaret Campbell, Task Force Freetown works in all aspects of RSLAF development, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 9 October 2012

African Union, Economic Community of West African States and United Nations). However, there are signals to demonstrate that the government is unwilling to take ownership over this endeavor. For instance, the central government in Freetown does not have a budget to sustain the capital-intensive start-up costs of engaging in peacekeeping missions abroad. Therefore, RSLAF is dependent upon external donors to carry the bulk of the financial and planning burden, both in terms of economic budgeting, training as well as long-term planning.

The government views engagement in international peacekeeping as a means to improve its international image, as a tool for regional diplomacy and as a strategy to supplement its national income. Senior Sierra Leonean political and military officials rely on the long-entrenched practice of relying on the Americans and British to carry the bulk of the economic burden for RSLAF's operational viability in regional or international theatres.[93] This raises the concern not only of economic and military dependency, but also problematically strengthens the coercive arm of the state at the expensive of democratization within the state and investments in social development assistance.

There are two related aspects of Sierra Leone's participation in UN/African Union peacekeeping missions that are worth mentioning that relate to internal rivalries in the RSLAF. The first issue concerns the UN remuneration for troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The Sierra Leonean government

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[93] For instance, the estimated US$6.5 million bill for training and salary remuneration to 160 soldiers in South Darfur in March 2010 was paid by Britain, Canada, and the United States of America (From Butchers to Peacekeepers: What used to be one of Africa's worst armies turns over a new leaf, *The Economist*, 31 March 2010).

receives US$1,028 for each soldier it sends on United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. This initiative was initially viewed by the Government of Sierra Leone as a somewhat lucrative scheme to earn Sierra Leone's consolidated revenue fund approximately US$2 million a year.[94]

The government of Sierra Leone has not demonstrated a willingness to assume any leadership role over the financing of RSLAF's capacity building for peacekeeping. The government is wholly dependent on external actors, which should raise questions about the long-term viability of this policy.

The second related controversial issue relates to how the UN stipend of US$1,028 is allocated to RSLAF personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. The government believed that the current policy of US$450 salary allocated to each soldier per month is sufficient compensation for the risks incurred in the battlefront in Darfur.[95] The US$450 is extremely lucrative for a low-ranking soldier in the RSLAF, equating roughly equivalent to a 500% increase in pay from their normal salary. As a result, there is an enormous economic interest for RSLAF soldiers to participate in UN/AU peacekeeping missions abroad.[96] The Government of Sierra Leone collects 61% of the US$1,028 allegedly earmarked for Sierra Leone's peacekeeping fund to pay for operations and training costs, equipment repairs etc. For the Somalia mission (AMISOM), the Africa Union established a policy that soldiers deployed in the theatre should receive at least 60% of the remuneration amount, meaning that each soldier should be paid

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[94] From Butchers to Peacekeepers

[95] See the official government justification ministry of defence press release D/MoD/8318, March 2012, cited http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article6406

[96] This may be good for competition in so far as decisions on who participates and deploys is based on merit and not "who you know".

US$828 per month, while the government collects \$200/month/soldier.[97]

There have been suspicions that money earmarked for improving RSLAF's peacekeeping capacity has been stolen/mismanaged by the government authorities.

Corruption and Nepotism
The superficial restructuring of the political space in the context of the RSLAF's SSR process created opportunities for senior military leaders to engage in "corruption" and nepotistic practices in the government.

In Sierra Leone, there is an intimate connection between military and politics in Sierra Leone to how peacebuilding efforts have been limited to a superficial alteration of the political space in the RSLAF's senior leadership structures. At the end of the war, the MRP integrated many south-easterners into the RSLAF partly because this region was the main theatre of the conflict and the CDF units formed to defend their communities needed a place in the post-war military restructuring process. After the MRP, southeasterns outnumbered northerners in both the officer corps and the rank-and-file. During the first five years after the war under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) rule, the issue of regional politics affecting the army was relatively quieted. However, since the 2007 election that brought the All People's Congress (APC), there have been concerns among the Southern and Eastern military and political leaders that high-level RSLAF decisions have been shaped by ethno-political calculations led

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[97] Staff officers are paid US\$90 per day as compared to other missions that receive US\$150. Sierra Leonean staff officers are required to pay 10% of their total earnings to the Government upon their return. The decision to provide nearly 80% of the US\$1,028 was informed by other contingents and to improve morale. (Author's confidential correspondence with senior Sierra Leone defence official deployed to Somalia)

by the President and the Minister of Defence (who are both ethnic Limbas from the North), especially in relation to recruitment, officer appointments and rank promotion decisions. The allegation is that the APC is covertly perpetuating divisions between country's South-Eastern and Northern ethnic groups within the Armed Forces in an effort to rectify the perceived imbalance within the RSLAF that Mendes hold a dominant presence in the officer corps and rank-and-file. These allegations (real and perceived) reinforce long-standing tensions and political conflict between the Mendes and the Temnes/Limbas in the country. Noting that the emerging trend of political interference in the RSLAF, a senior Defence staff official told me about one-year before the November 2012 elections:

> based on the political climate, I will assure you that if the SLPP party wins [the 2012 elections] then the trend [of Mende dominance] will remain the same; it will stay the same, with the south carrying more people. However, if the present regime [APC] continues [in power], then I assure you that in the next five years that ratio will change. You can see how politics is linked with the military, which is what we do not want. This is threatening our efforts in security sector reform.[98]

Since 2007, there is some revealing evidence of political interference by the Minister of Defence over promotions and training abroad programs. For instance, "a network of over 850 officers and men in all bases of the armed forces cutting across tribal and political party lines" under the name "Dream Team"[99] complained publically (through local newspapers and western embassies in Freetown) that the Minister of Defence was favouring his own

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[98] Author's confidential interview with senior ministry of defence official, 2 December 2011, Freetown
[99] Dream Team stands for Detective Reconnaissance Emergency Action Mission

Limba ethnic group and sending a disproportion number of Limba cadet officers to Uganda for officer training while over-looking Mende officers for promotions. The "Dream Team" statement alleged that the President's mother was also interfering in high-level military decisions and claimed that the Chief of Defence Staff (Major General Sam M'boma) was stealing 80 million Leones (about US$270,000)[100] per month for his own personal use. The "Dream Team" accused the APC military and political leadership that senior RSLAF personnel were stealing government resources, conducting illegal sales and procurement deals and siphoning off and embezzling funds that were to be distributed for the welfare of rank-and-file soldiers. When the "Dream Team's" accusations were made public, the Minister of Defence promptly organized a special press conference in Freetown on 2 February 2009 to refute the allegations. The soldiers' claims have not been substantiated with corroborating evidence and the issue died down considerably shortly afterwards. However, the issue caught the attention of the US Embassy in Freetown, as revealed in a leaked 2009 State Department cable that noted that "some of the allegations may have merit and appear to be well-documented".[101] The fact that promotions for other ranks are not based on merit but rather by one's relationship with superior officers illustrates the "cracks" within the British-instituted internal appraisal system

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[100] Leone-$US conversion rate of 2960/US$1 based on UN conversion rates (see http://treasury.un.org/operationalrates/Details.aspx?code=SLL&currency=Sierra+Leone+Leone&country=Sierra+Leone)

[101] Wikileaks: 'Sierra Leone army "Dream Team" airs grievances, 4 February 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09FREETOWN42.html (Accessed 23 December 2011)

(created in 2001, see Chapter 5).[102] These issues reinforce the need for more democratic oversight over the RSLAF.

"Cracks" in the Democratic Structures

One of the alleged innovations of the SSR agenda, according to the OECD-DAC handbook, is that these interventions aim to ensure that security forces adhere to rule of law, democratic norms and "basic principles underlying public sector reforms such as transparency and accountability".[103] In an evaluation of the RSLAF's development in 2007, Nicole Ball's blames "slow capacity building" to explain the RSLAF's operational inefficiencies. I would argue that the problems run much deeper and structural. Military disengagement from politics is an important step towards its subordination to democratic control. However, much of this success can be attributed to the presence of British and Canadian and IMATT military personnel embedded within RLSAF and the Ministry of Defence to deter threats and rumours of military coups—a strategy that was common among military and political elite as a strategy of politics by other means.

However, there are revealing "cracks" within the Ministry of Defence's ability to ensure professional and impartial oversight over the RSLAF. The RSLAF has had limited success in establishing non-partisan mechanisms for disciplining senior officers that have committed criminal or indecent acts. There is evidence of political calculations influencing disciplinary measures in the

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[102] Author's confidential email correspondence with senior MoD official, March 2013
[103] OECD 2007, 22

officer establishment. For instance, Brigadier General Daniel Yapo Sesay Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Support and Logistics was suspended from duty in 2012 after he was allegedly involved in a sexual abuse incident. The incident became a national topic and an internal Board of Inquiry was opened on the matter. However, due to his close relationship with the President, the Minister of Defence was able to influence the board's decision to prevent punitive measures from being taken. The Minister of Defence instead sent him on a military seminar course in the US for a month.[104] Another case in point was the lack of disciplinary action taken after two senior officers (Lieutenant Colonel Yanka and Colonel David T.O Taluva) were the commanding officers at Benguema Training Centre (BTM) when two weapons to be smuggled out by trainees in July 2012.[105] The Minister of Defence would not allow the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to take disciplinary action against the senior officers and instead sent Colonel Taluva on a Defence and Strategic Course in Nigeria.[106]

According to former British IMATT commander Brigadier General Jonathan Powe, the RSLAF was making "slow but steady progress in their professionalization" in 2008, noting that the military had "better discipline". [107] When asked what IMATT's greatest accomplishment was in 2008, Brigadier

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[104] Brigadier-General Sesay's aunt is the late mother of the President of Sierra Leone and they hail from the same village (Kamabai). Additionally, the minister of agriculture and forestry is a brother-in-law to Brigadier-General Sesay. On 3 June 2013, Brigadier Daniel Y. Sesay was retired on attainment of age 55 (Augustine Samba, 'Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces explains military retirements', *Awareness Times*, 4 June 2013).)

[105] Colonel David Taluva was promoted to Brigadier General in the RSLAF in June 2013

[106] Author's confidential email with senior MoD official, March 2013

[107] Wikileaks, US Ambassador and IMATT commander meet, 10 September 2008, http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08FREETOWN447/

General Powe cited the establishment of a Courts-Martial system and the training and professionalization of the Maritime Wing as IMATT's greatest imprint on RSLAF.[108] However, Brigadier Powe sees the major challenges facing the RSLAF were "corruption, cronyism and patronage…with many leaders feeling they were owed something for their sacrifices during years of fighting during the civil war".[109] Brigadier General Powe also noted that the military was "challenged by a culture that ignored preventative maintenance, resulting in most of their equipment being non-operable, or the practice of using their equipment until it is no longer operable and hoping for donor largesse for replacements".[110] Additionally, there were additional concerns about the real and perceived politics of corruption and nepotism among the senior officials. However, one needs to distinguish between different types of "corruption". One needs to distinguish between theft of state resources by economically insecure officers and corruption by "greedy" politicians. For instance, the UK Daily Telegraph cited Wikileaks reported that from August 2009 "deep corruption" within the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence "primarily through pocketing of enlisted members' salaries".[111] These issues underscore grievances among the

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[108] Previously, RSLAF lacked an internal disciplinary and justice mechanism for personnel who committed serious crimes. In the past, such personnel were either discharged or turned over to police only to have them avoid prosecution because of the poor civilian judiciary system (Wikileaks, US Ambassador and IMATT commander meet, 10 September 2008)

[109] Ibid.

[110] He cited hundreds of military vehicles contributed by the UK over the past several years that have in fact been non-operational due to neglect.

[111] The source of the Wikileaks cable was then US Ambassador June Carter Perry claimed that British authorities had revealed to her that an official request had been sent from Sierra Leone to the British government for US$4 million dollars (£2.46 million) to the Ministry of Defence to support peacekeeping. June Carter Perry served as US Ambassador to Sierra Leone from 27 August 2007 to 28 August 2009. The Obama administration recalled her in March 2009 after allegations of political interference in Sierra Leone.

soldiers that the Government and Minister of Defence are under-resourcing social welfare of its troops and military training.

The connection between corruption and British aid is also important. The cable revealed that after an internal audit the British DfID discovered that half of the £1.2 million (approximately US$860,000) was spent on the "personal use of the minister (Paolo Conteh) and top brass. Items such as 36 plasma TVs and hunting rifles for the minister's own use were included".[112] The UK's DfID was said to be fully aware of the theft but regarded the losses as "within reason".[113] Therefore, one needs to question the complicit role that British authorities play in supporting corrupt structures and practices in Sierra Leone.

On the other hand, one needs to distinguish between lower-level corruption and the relationship between economic insecurity in Sierra Leone. According to a senior officer, corruption in RSLAF/MoD is not some entrenched cultural practice in Sierra Leone (or Africa in general) but is rooted in the lack of economic security and retirement provisions (benefits and pension) within the military and the demands that are placed on state officials by their extended family who view them as a personal social safety net.[114]

British officers had mixed feelings about their departure from Sierra Leone because of their uncertainty about whether the Government of Sierra

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[112] Gordon Rayner and Steven Swinfold, Wikileaks cables: millions in overseas aid to Africa was embezzled, *The Daily Telegraph*, 5 February 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8304640/WikiLeaks-cables-millions-in-overseas-aid-to-Africa-was-embezzled.html (Accessed 20 December 2012)

[113] Ibid. The Minister of Defence denied the allegations only after the Daily Telegraph article was published at a press statement in Freetown.

[114] Author's confidential interview with senior MoD official, Freetown, 17 November 2011

Leone would take full responsibility over the RSLAF.[115] The government has not allocated funding from its own budget to pay for training and military development for the better part of the past ten-years.[116] All of the financial burdens for training costs had been passed onto IMATT until 2009 and since then, to the American government through its African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) especially related to peacekeeping.[117] RSLAF's shortage of qualified non-commissioned officers (NCOs)—some suggest, the backbone of a modern military—combined with the large number of poorly trained, unlettered and un-policed enlisted soldiers are the most glaring "cracks" that significantly limit RSLAF's level of professionalism.[118] This has partially contributed to what one IMATT officer called "a major divide" between officers and non-commissioned officers.[119]

Concluding remarks

After more than ten years of restructuring and training, the British-led International Military Assistance and Training Team has developed a new RSLAF capable of engaging international peacekeeping operations (albeit in a limited role) in conflict zones in sub-Saharan Africa. Qualitative surveys show

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[115] IMATT personnel complain that senior Sierra Leonean military officers refuse to engage in long-term planning for the RSLAF. (Author's email correspondence with senior Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence official). IMATT left a small training team at Horton Academy after March 2013.

[116] Author's confidential interview with IMATT personnel, Cockerill, 13 December 2011

[117] According to Wikileaks, IMATT strongly supports ACOTA's role in training RSLAF for peacekeeping since 2008-2009
(http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08FREETOWN533)

[118] Author's interview with IMATT officer, Freetown

[119] Author's confidential interview with IMATT personnel, Freetown, author's field research notes dated 29 November 2011

that after a decade of reconstruction, RSLAF is no longer considered a security threat and has gained the trust of the populace.[120] The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (along with the Office of National Security) has evolved into core state institutions in post-war Sierra Leone. However, several "cracks" remain within that structure, namely, the state of dependency in key aspects of military development (officer training, fuel and logistics, military maintenance, doctrine, weapons including armoured vehicles for peacekeeping theatres, even high-level political appointments).[121] It is concerning that senior RSLAF and MoD officials are still incapable of assuming full responsibility for meeting their own training needs.[122]

The role of the British in IMATT has been controversial due to the entrenched role assumed by IMATT and the "embedded" advisors in Sierra Leone's security institutions (ONS). Sierra Leonean political leaders and bureaucrats viewed this aspect as intrusive and infringing on their independence, especially during the first seven to eight years of post-war military-building process. The embedded advisors insulated themselves within the local institutions to retain autonomy over resource management and distribution. This SSR model adopted has not established the necessary "capacity-building" since Sierra Leone's government lost most of its autonomy over the decision-making

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[120] Judy Smith-Hohn, Rebuilding the security sector in post-conflict societies: Perceptions from urban Liberia and Sierra Leone, London: Transaction Publishers, 2010.

[121] One British IMATT officer told me at the end of December 2011, "there is not a hope in hell that the military can stand on its own two feet if the British pulled out today" (Author's confidential discussion with IMATT personnel in Armed Forces Personnel Centre (AFPC), Cockerill, Freetown, 13 December 2011).

[122] Author's confidential interview with IMATT commander, IMATT Headquarters, Freetown, 23 March 2012

processes. Politicians in Kabbah's administration were able to blame external meddling of DfID (i.e. *Operation Pebu*, discussed below) for some of the poor results. In doing so, Sierra Leonean leaders could pass on the burden of military provisioning and training development to Commonwealth member states (mostly British), while they (and their commercial partners) shielded themselves from being held accountable to resources accrued from its own resources. Former President Kabbah explained DfID's role as follows,

> The large numbers of foreign consultants DfID recruited and the frequency of their visits to Sierra Leone to undertake assignemnts that local public and other officials could have either performed or trained to execute seriously undermined the development of local capacity and knowledge transfer from the West. Specific projects such as the Governance Reform Programme, the Justice Sector Reform Project and the Sierra Leone Sector Reform Programme had their [DfID] project implementation units detached from the public service and DfID-recruited experts attached to them. The fees for foreign consultants and the cost of sustaining the programme implementation units took an inordinate share of the funding for the projects. Yet, my government was often blamed for implementation problems stemming from such arrangements. Worse still little to no capacity seems to have been transferred.[123]

The deliberate sidelining senior personnel during the dismissal of RSLAF personnel and the general approach adopted by British IMATT personnel created animosity among some factions in the RSLAF towards the British. There remains a core group of interlocutors that remain broadly supportive of the British efforts. However, as one senior defence official summed up IMATT's role in Sierra Leone:

> IMATT has improved the knowledge of RSLAF personnel but has contributed greatly to the low morale of the RSLAF. All benefits and personnel emoluments due to personnel have been cut down based on

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[123] Tejan Kabbah, Coming Back From the Brink in Sierra Leone: A Case of Selective Amnesia, San Francisco: Excellent Publishing and Printing and Worldreader, 2012, 312

IMATT advice. The quality of life of RSLAF personnel has seriously below standard as compared to any military in Africa. No better housing facilities, no better medical facilities, no equipment or uniforms and so on. IMATT has not gifted us any equipment but frowns at any equipment the Chinese will donate to the RSLAF.[124] They are considered by many personnel as 'canker worms' who are in Sierra Leone to make money.[125]

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[124] China's military assistance to Sierra Leone dates back to 1987 when two offshore vessel boats were donated to equip the small Sierra Leone Navy. China also funded the construction of the Cockerill headquarters and refurbished its infrastructure in the late 1990s. On 10 March 2006, China donated a maritime patrol boat (which is inefficient to operate due to its high fuel consumption). Subsequently, the Americans donated a small maritime boat and had at least one US advisor embedded in the maritime wing. The People's Republic of China donated artillery equipment including AK-47 rifles, rocket grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns and mortar and a large quantity of ammunition to help RSLAF establish an artillery battalion. In November 2010, China also provided a 'gift' of six 122 millimeter howitzer guns. (Alhaji Manika Kamara, China Sierra Leone: Artillery weapons and ammunition for RSLAF, *Africa Defence Journal*, 3 May 2010, http://africadefensejournal.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/china-sierra-leoneartillery-weapons-and-ammunition-for-rslaf/ (Accessed 21 November 2012))

[125] Author's email correspondence with senior RSLAF officer, March 2013

Chapter 8
Liberia: Assessments

Introduction

This chapter assesses Liberia's post-war security sector and military reform within the context of its broader peacebuilding process. Four main issues are highlighted: First, the UN's conceptual point of departure for Liberia's war-peace transition (as in Sierra Leone) was the Weberian ideal-typical state based in Monrovia. The UN and US has therefore focused on "capacity building" of the state's primary security institutions both in terms of domestic/empirical dimensions and based its conception of the state on its ability to protect the Liberian territory, including through border patrols in remote and precarious areas along the shared Ivorian border.

Second, the nature of American involvement is key to understanding how SSR was conducted in Liberia. The American government preferred an "arms-length", proxy-governance approach led by the US Embassy working through UNMIL and assuming leadership positions in the UN mission (UNMIL) and US-based private security companies.

Third, American involvement preferred to maximize its autonomy and control over decision-making and implementation phases in the SSR process. Therefore, the US relied on only limited conditionalities which did not led to robust leverage over the transitional authorities. Additionally, the US government supported the creation of transitional political structures (Legislature, for example) in 2003-2005 only to later sideline these political actors to maximize its control over the process. This resulted in a limited "buy-

in" among Liberian authorities.

Fourth, in the absence of local state institutions (and local contacts) the American approach supported the reconsolidation of centralised state authority based in Monrovia and major urban areas. This hindered the ability of the central government to extend its authority to all of Liberia's fifteen counties, including its border regions.[1]

Three central impacts of the SSR were:
- An unaccountable security architecture created based on limited local participation and involvement and driven by external considerations;

- The SSR process has not empowered the Liberian state to assume responsibility for its own internal security. The long-term impact of this security capacity is explored below;

- The decision to disband the entire Armed Forces of Liberia resulted in a lack of senior officers to command the "post-war" military. As a result, a

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[1] The progress made in extending state authority has been extremely limited up to 2012. A UN technical assessment report dated 16 April 2012 noted that despite the establishment of administrative buildings in all county capitals and officials running them receiving salaries, the "overall capacity of the state to deliver services to rural communities remains extremely limited." The report notes that outside of the capital regions of each county, government is "not present" and there is a "sense of mistrust" between government administrators and the local population (UN, S/2012/230, 11, paras. 43). As of February 2013, the government and international partners (namely US, EU and World Bank) were involved in consultations in the drafting of a new Local Governance Act. In her January 2013 Annual Message, President Johnson-Sirleaf outlined the challenges of implementing a decentralisation policy: "The challenges of the decentralisation policy are many: the present local governance structure is bloated and difficult to manage. For example, there are more than 149 cities—33 in Sinoe, I think; 93 Administrative Districts; 251 Paramount Chiefdom Chiefs; more than 689 Clan Chiefs; 1,410 General Towns Chiefs; and 250 Township Commissioners. Moreover, the government has to deliver services to more than 16,000 towns and village. As if these statistics were not daunting enough, the boundaries of all these localities overlap, leading to confusion over jurisdiction and administrative authority in the system"
(http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/2013o128_President_2013_Annual_Message_FINAL.pdf).
According to the UN (S/2012/230), USAID is now currently funding a five-year $44.5 million programme which aims to support the strengthening of concession monitoring and management, the development of electronic payment system for the central bank and the management systems to support country administrators.

foreign military officer currently serves in the role of Chief of Staff; additionally, a skeleton brigade of under 2,000 troops has yet to become operational as of 2013.

United Nations (UNMIL)

As per UNMIL's drawdown plans from 2007-2010, the military component of UNMIL was reduced from 15,200 soldiers to 7,952 as of September 2012, including six infantry battalions, a battalion-sized quick reaction force based in Monrovia and two forward operating bases near routes to the borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea.[2] The UN invested in the physical security pillar for more than a decade in Liberia. From late 2003 until 7 March 2012, UNMIL's total budget for the nine-year period exceeded US$5.4 billion.[3] This amount dwarfed the amount of financial assistance that targeted socio-economic development in postwar Liberia. The military-centric modus operandi of UNMIL failed to acknowledge that the systemic insecurity characterising Liberia's fragility stemmed from a lack of economic security for the majority of its citizens, including its large youthful population and former child combatants. More than US$500 million annually over the past decade has been diverted towards a

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[2] UNSG report (25th report) dated 28 February 2013, 16. As of 18 February 2013, UNMIL's military strength was 6,822 military personnel and was based at Rivercess County, Robertsport in Grand Cape Mount, and Foya in Lofa County. As of 18 February 2013, UNMIL's police contingent stood at 1,340 police personnel out of an authorized ceiling of 1,795, including 498 police advisors (16 of whom are immigration advisors), 1,265 personnel in 10 formed police units and 32 correction officers. UNMIL had three formed police units deployed in Monrovia, and one each in Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, and Lofa Counties. According to a 2012 UN technical assessment report, the UN plans to reduce its military strength by 4,200 troops in three phases from August 2012 and July 2015, which would leave behind a military strength of approximately 3,750 troops. The UNMIL police component (which has remained frozen since 2008) would remain the same or be increased up to three more units (in addition to the current 7 units, comprising 845 officers and 498 advisors) so they can "prioritize the mentoring of the national security services, especially the police and immigration services, to expedite their readiness to assume security responsibilities (S/2012/230, 13, paras. 49 and 52).
[3] Figure is calculated from Security Council quarterly reports on UNMIL

UNMIL mission that has created a false sense of security in urban centers and at best, was targeted at the symptoms of Liberia's problems.[4]

While, the UN has real institutional, bureaucratic, political and material constraints that shapes options for Liberia, there is a remarkable inability for UN officials to think beyond the traditional Cold War peacekeeping models (read: stabilization) that aim to engage leaders of armed groups and cordon off combatants to prevent them from fighting, without fully understanding the particular structural causes of intrastate conflict in underdeveloped countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This tendency to adopt blueprint models underscores the inherently conservative and problem-solving nature of the UN peace support operations and the preference for short-term stabilization, narrowly focusing on symptoms, and supporting the consolidation of the Westphalian nation-state. The UN model was based on problem-solving assumptions that reconsolidating state authority in Monrovia was integral to sustainable peacebuilding. UNMIL is implementing a limited number of "quick impact" projects through 2012 towards this end.[5] Few UN officials consider how peacekeeping operations serve a narrow problem-solving purpose and sustain a particular domestic order under the guise of liberal peace.[6] With its emphasis on attaining "negative peace", peacekeeping glosses over structures of violence embedded within that old order

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[4] This was roughly equivalent to total government expenditure in 2012

[5] The UN is cautious about "mission creep" in their peacekeeping operations, i.e. engaging in traditional "development" projects that other UN agencies already engage in. That being said, a US Wikileaks cable notes that major investors would probably not have invested in Buchanan (Liberia's second largest port city) without the presence of UNMIL and "even the US embassy would not be able to function effectively without UNMIL cooperation" (http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MONROVIA318_a.html)

[6] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding'. In Johan *Galtung (ed.) Peace, War, and Defense: Essays in Peace Research* Vol. II. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976, 282-304.

it seeks to restore (during the immediate war-peace transition); as such, the UN peacekeeping is complicit in sustaining economic inequalities within societies. This is problematic in post-civil war contexts where the roots of the conflict stem from conflict emanating from the relationship between the state and its citizens and in particular structural violence inflicted in everyday life by the state apparatus. Working within this dominant problem-solving framework constrains the scope of field activities that the UN can meaningfully engage in during war-peace transitions and at best is focused on addressing the symptoms as opposed to the root causes of violent conflict.

The United Nations Security Council has referred to Liberia since 2006 as "stable but fragile".[7] The UN believed that Liberians would fight each other again if UNMIL pulled out prematurely. Therefore, the United States and other African allies have insisted that UNMIL maintain a robust peacekeeping presence in Liberia throughout the past ten years. However, investing in local industries and improving skills would have reduced the sources of internal insecurity, allowing for an earlier downsizing of UNMIL's military component as early as possible.[8]

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[7] See UN Secretary-General reports on UNMIL (2004-2013). The UN SG report of 10 June 2009 notes an "extremely fragile security situation" in Liberia mainly due to "limited capacity of the country's security and judicial institutions" and "destabilising factors like corruption, land disputes, high youth unemployment" that are exacerbated by the global economic crisis; large numbers of ex-combatants who have retained their old command and control structures; political tensions likely to rise as presidential and legislative elections in 2011 approach and TRC work; the instability in the sub-region.

[8] WDR 2011; Christine Cubitt, 'Employment in Sierra Leone: What Happened to Post-Conflict Job Creation?' *African Security Review* 20:1, 2011. The replacement of a larger but less expensive CivPol presence (UNMIL military troops totaled 14,785 and represented 43% of UNMIL's budget for that year) could have reduced costs towards the mission.

UNMIL continues to perform the primary role as national security provider in Liberia after more than a decade of "peacebuilding" efforts. Additionally, the incapacity of the Liberian police and negligible police presence in rural Liberia also hindered the ability to extend state authority outside of Montserrado County.[9] UNMIL's primary security role extended to maintaining security during the October 2011 Presidential elections and the subsequent run-off in November and illustrates the lack of preparedness of Liberia's security institutions.[10] The Liberian National Police lacked self-constraint during opposition demonstrations the day before the run-off in November. Some police officers fired live bullets into the crowds, killing one protester and injuring several others. The incident required the intervention of UN Civilian Police members and Nigerian UNMIL military contingent. During the elections in 2011, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were not yet operational and remained confined to their barracks to a large extent. Additionally, the President of Liberia remains dependent on UNMIL peacekeepers for her personal security and calls upon the UN and US as her first line of defence in the event of a security breach.[11] Despite these short-term roles, the long-term impact of UNMIL on Liberia's security remains unclear.

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[9] 60-75% of LNP presence is confined to Monrovia (UN SG report June 2013). UN Civilian Police continues to play a large role of conducting important policing responsibilities in the capital and in some county capitals.

[10] Author's personal observations during the first round of elections in Monrovia; Author's personal interviews in Monrovia, 11 October 2011; see also Wikileaks cable dated 8 May 2009, which notes "it is our assessment that the elections will not succeed without UNMIL's help in carrying out the elections. The [UN Technical Assessment Mission told us in their outbrief they agree". (http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MONROVIA318_a.html)

[11] The UN police contingent comprising 12 female Indian police officers has been guarding the President's office near Capitol Building since 2006 and maintains these responsibilities up to

American Foreign Policy in Liberia

The American "SSR" approach adopted in Liberia had different characteristics than the UK's in Sierra Leone. The American government assistance came in the form of financial assistance (about US$285 million) and preferred to "outsource" its responsibilities to private/proxy security companies. With respect to the Liberian police reform, the US preferred to shape police reforms through multilateral institutions, namely, the UN and provided American citizens to head the UNMIL mission (Klein) and lead the initial police reforms (Kroeker). In this respect, the American presence was far less entrenched in Liberia's police and military institutions than the British were in Sierra Leone. The State Department and Department of Defence's decision to contract military reform responsibilities to DynCorp and PAE partially symbolises the qualitative difference in commitment between the British and American Governments. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, DynCorp and PAE's military reform practices were shaped by a problematic modus operandi of "train-and-equip" and state securitization. DynCorp and PAE's presence can be described as operating at an arms-length from the US government. Liberian authorities were required to deal with the US embassy to lodge complaints against either company. These private security companies proved themselves incapable of thinking beyond the traditional-military-security framework embedded in conservative problem-solving approaches.[12] Additionally, SSR officials were deeply insensitive to the

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today at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Monrovia where the President's office is headquartered.

[12] The total number of SSR personnel involved in AFL reform was between 190 and 200 expats, most of whom were retired US military personnel.

local conditions in Liberia. Many of the SSR implementers were ex-Marines with no prior experience in Africa. It seems hardly possible for these individuals not to come into the Liberian situation without their own stereotypes and biased perceptions of what "Liberia needed".

The American military played a more limited role, embedding a small number of advisors in the Liberian defence ministry and offering mentorship and training assistance to ensure application of US military doctrine and practices. Compared to the British role assumed in leadership positions through the Ministry of Defence and at the battalion and brigade levels in Sierra Leone's military, American military personnel sought to advise from behind the scenes.

Once it became clear that the power-sharing arrangement had failed to produce lasting peace, the Americans (and World Bank) changed to a more entrenched economic oversight role that focused on Liberia's key economic state institutions through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), which was implemented from 2004-2007. Both the NTGL and the Government of Johnson-Sirleaf were forced to accept this mechanism because the political actors running the economic institutions were replicating entrenched corrupt practices of using the state for private gain (outlined in Chapter 3). This became the most obtrusive aspect in the external statebuilding efforts in Liberia required Liberian authorities to obtain the signature of a designated international expat (selected by the International Monetary Fund) before approving all operational and financial matters related to the Liberian state. The Liberian political officials in each of the government agencies,

ministries and corporations had their decision-making authority curtailed.[13] The power-sharing arrangement was established based on a flawed assumption that leaders of warring factions and the political elite can look beyond their narrow interests and pursue an inclusive form of politics.

As Chapter 7 makes clear, most of the policies that were implemented derived from instructions from the US embassy (through its Military Mission) while any opportunity to sideline a Liberian authority or idea was implemented. The basis of US SSR efforts in Liberia was to impose the universalising logic of the ideal-type Weberian state on the political foundations and socio-economic realities that are specific to Liberia's historical state formation processes.[14] In doing so, external SSR actors minimised or (tried to) write over specificities within the historical context of "Liberia", believing that it was best to "start from scratch" but without a fuller understanding of the systemic and structural power enmeshed within state and security institutions in that country.

The Liberian State and Implications for State-Society Relations

One of the potentially important long-term impacts of UNMIL's presence is found in the nature of the central government in Monrovia. The ten-year presence of UNMIL has enabled centralised authority to re-establish itself as the dominant political institution for ambitious Liberian to pursue to attain political and economic power. Realising control over the central government remains the

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[13] Boas, 'Making Plans for Liberia', 2009

[14] For Young, liberal peace is a project of domination that has failed to take hold in Africa because liberal notions of the state, justice, human rights and civil society do not 'fit' easily with African conceptions (Tom Young, 'A Project to be Realised: Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24:3, 1995, 527-546)

primary aspiration of the nation's political class because executive political authority provides such far-reaching power and authority to dictate social relations in society and monopolise control over economic affairs.[15] Centralised state legitimacy is derived from a limited consensus-building process among a handful of established families and the political and economic elite. The President's task is to forge coalitions with rivals and where necessary, co-opt economically powerful elite in between election cycles.[16] This thin veneer of domestic legitimacy is in turn secured externally from international aid.[17] Since the international consensus assumes that working through the centralised state is the primary path to security and stability, aid is concentrated in building a form of state that is manifest in official state ministries (defence, foreign affairs, finance) with minimal conditions placed on developing or securing domestic legitimacy of those institutions (by for example, ensuring greater transparency and accountability and fostering meritocratic practices as opposed to nepotism). The over-emphasis on the procedural aspects that confer domestic legitimacy such national elections as confined to executive, legislative and senatorial

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[15] All aspects of the country's economic affairs must go through the central government in terms of natural resource concessions for example.

[16] Johnson-Sirleaf 'co-opted' some prominent Liberians from Taylor's old political networks like Benoni Urey, appointing him as mayor of the town of Careysburg in October 2009. Johnson-Sirleaf was close to the Americo-Liberian elite Urey family and she knew Urey since childhood (Johnson-Sirleaf 2009, 9). Urey is a cousin of Johnson-Sirleaf's "old friend" (Ibid, 246) Willis Knuckles (Africa Confidential 20 January 2006)

[17] According to a Wikileaks cable, the reality of Liberia's political and economic elite is more complicated than the assumption that the established elite returning to Liberia from the US after the war. According to a cable dated 8 May 2009, "the reality is far more complex: a delicate balance of power has emerged between the established families and the warlords who created their power bases during the war and whose representatives now serve in the legislature and even in Cabinet." The cable continues, "Samuel Doe's 1980 coup and the civil war that began in 1990 ripped the oligarchy from power, but the former families are back, they still have power (and land), and many have mixed feelings about sharing access to resources with fellow Liberians". (http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MONROVIA318_a.html).

political authority becomes the primary calculation for the international community.[18] Liberia falls victim to the US attention deficit disorder that signals more concern with settling the question of executive political authority than addressing structures of violence that are embedded within the Liberian central state.

The Americans believed that President Johnson-Sirleaf was an appropriate type of state leader that Liberia needed to publically recover from 14-years of brutal armed violence in a post-Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor Liberia. Members of Johnson-Sirleaf's own administration have her of replicating similar corrupt and nepotistic norms that she herself criticised former Presidents Tubman and Tolbert of practicing during the 1970s.[19] These practices are not specific to Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's rule but have long been a dominant political practice in the functioning of the central government. Settling the question of executive political power without addressing the deeper socio-

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[18] In 2011, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's domestic legitimacy is extremely thin. On 11 October 2011, Presidential elections were held, based on sixteen candidates, none of whom received the necessary 50% plus one of the total vote to win the Presidency. Johnson-Sirleaf received 43.9%, while the main opposition CDC leader Winston Tubman received 32.7%, while turnout was 71.6% (124,422). Citing irregularities in the conduct of the vote, 9 opposition parties issued a joint statement on 15 October accusing the national elections commission of rigging the elections in favour of the incumbent. On the first day of campaigning for the run-off (4 November), CDC leader Winston Tubman announced his withdraw from the run-off scheduled for 8 November, despite the fact that the chair of the NEC resigned at the end of October. On the day before the run-off, 1,000 CDC supporters gathered at their party headquarters and attempted to march along the main street in Monrovia. The group had been denied a permit to demonstrate because the campaign period had ended the day before. The demonstrators clashed with LNP, who opened fire with live ammunition and tear gas, killing at least one protester and injuring several more. The incident also resulted in the detention of at least 80 CDC supporters. The run-off was held, with turnout extremely low due (38.6% of eligible voters participated) to the opposition's boycott. On 15 November, the NEC announced that Sirleaf had received 607,618 votes or 90.7% of the total votes and was re-elected for a second six-year term. Tubman received only 9.3% of the votes in the run-off.

[19] Ahead of the 2017 Presidential elections, there are revealing cracks within the Unity Party. See Edwin G. Genoway, Jr, 'Liberia: Ellen Under Pressure', *The New Dawn*, 19 February 2013 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201302190814.html)

historical structures and practices embedded in the Liberian state that sustain nepotism and theft of state finance is a "statebuilding" strategy that serves the interests of the elite and few others. Specifically, starting from the position of restoring central government authority disguises the political webs of family networks that underlie state power in Liberia.

Despite the relative weakness in the empirical aspects of Liberia's state security capacity, President Johnson-Sirleaf is keen to showcase Liberia's external dimensions of statehood. Evidence of this pattern of behaviour is found in her decision to adopt market-oriented economic reforms to advance Liberia's integration in the global political economy. President Johnson-Sirleaf proudly boasts of Liberia's economic growth of more than seven percent since 2006 and the expansion in the national budget from US$84 million in 2005-2006 to US$516 million in 2011-2012 to US$672 million in 2012-2013. Johnson-Sirleaf also takes credit for "settling" Liberia's external debt (US$4.9 billion).[20] Additionally, President Johnson-Sirleaf seeks to signal her country's integration into global security responsibilities by offering to send a platoon of AFL soldiers to support of the regional peacekeeping force AFISMA in Mali in 2013. These issues demonstrate the external (outward) orientation of the Liberian state under Johnson-Sirleaf and the perception that state stability depends on realising the superficial/ judicial aspects of sovereignty as opposed to demonstrating the empirical dimensions of statehood.

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[20] In 2010, Liberia reached the completion point of the heavily indebted poor countries initiative, qualifying it to receive at least $4.6 billion in debt relief.

The international community's over-emphasis on statism in Monrovia has contributed to the restoration of a Liberian state that is extremely over-centralised. The over-centralisation of the state allows the President and her closest advisors to appoint all high-level political positions in the state all the way down to public relations and human resources in low-middle management.[21] Whilst the focus on the Liberian state and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is often seen through the prism of the international/US/EU "aid darling", her global notoriety aids her ability to negotiate around internationally-imposed structures of accountability and even circumvent Liberian law when it suits her elitist/class interests.[22] President Johnson-Sirleaf's nepotistic and patronage political appointments suggest that she is concerned about her personal economic interests above the nation's.[23]

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[21] Author's personal interviews with Liberian civil society activists, Monrovia; see also UNSG report 16 April 2012, S/2012/230, 6, paras 22

[22] One example is the circumvention of Liberian laws in government-awarded natural resource concessions. In May 2013, The Liberia Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative released its final report on audits for natural resource concessions between 2009-2011. The audit found that during this period, Liberia circumvented its own laws in awarding 60 out of 68 contracts in the mining and timber sectors. (See the final report: http://www.leiti.org.lr/doc/LEITI%20Post%20Award%20Process%20Audit%20Final%20Report.pdf); See also Richard Valdmanis, 'Resource deals audit overshadows Liberia anti-graft push', *Reuters*, 1 May 2013

[23] According to the NOCAL Act, the President of Liberia shall appoint the Chairman and seven members of the board of directors as well as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation. Board members receive a salary which has not been taxed (Liberian General Auditing Commission Report on the National Oil Company of Liberia, for the fiscal years 2006-07 and 2007-08, http://gacliberia.com/doc/nocal.pdf) Johnson-Sirleaf appointed her son Robert as chairman of NOCAL, the board of the national oil company; Robert (who is a former Wall Street executive) also serves as one of her most senior advisors; her other son, Charles, was formerly director of finance, and now deputy governor of the central bank; Her step-son, Fomba Sirleaf is currently director of national security agency; Carnie Johnson is a representative for mining interests dealing with the government); her sister-in-law, Jennie Bernard is a key person behind the scene advising the President on policy decisions and appointments; Her brother-in-law, Estrada Bernard (Jennie's husband) is one of her primary legal advisors and a long-time associate from her days in Tolbert's administration in the 1970s; her nephew (related by marriage), Varney Sirleaf is a deputy minister for administration in internal affairs; Ambulai B. Johnson Jr. (a cousin of President Johnson-Sirleaf) is a former minister of internal affairs until a

Similar to Sierra Leone and many other African countries, the Executive presidency yields too much power. The UN seems unwilling to ask critical questions as to what extent has the narrow emphasis on stability allowed a political and economic elite to reconfigure their political base and benefit from the security provided by the presence of UNMIL. Few peacebuilding scholars want to question the international donor's complicity in supporting a state-system that is inherently dysfunctional and inefficient. The over-centralisation of state authority in Monrovia is evident in the fact that the President can appoint low-ranking bureaucrats in the state machinery as political favours.

The lack of domestic opposition is illustrated in the fact that the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) was completely bankrupt following the 2011 elections. Some members of the CDC were "begging for jobs" in the government following their defeat.[24] President Johnson-Sirleaf appointed CDC's leaders George Weah (former international footballer), as Peace and Reconciliation ambassador after the Nobel peace prize winner Leymah Gbowee stepped down from that role following her vocal criticism of Johnson-Sirleaf's nepotistic practices.[25] Following her resignation, Ms. Gbowee stated,

> Her sons are on the board of oil companies and one is the deputy governor of the central bank. The gap between the rich and poor is

2010 scandal involving spending for a community development fund; As Minister of Internal Affairs, Johnson had control over the state funds provided to County Superintendents. Her cousin, Frances-Johnson-Morris headed the Anti-Corruption Commission.

[24] Members of the CDC were requesting jobs in Johnson-Sirleaf's government (Author's confidential interviews with government authorities, Monrovia).

[25] Following the resignation of Nobel laureate Leymah Gbowee as head of the Liberian Reconciliation Initiative in October 2012, President Johnson-Sirleaf appointed CDC Vice-Standard Bearer (in 2011) as peace ambassador overseeing national reconciliation efforts. (see Nobel laureate Leymah Gbowee disowns fellow winner EJS, *The Telegraph*, 8 October 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/liberia/9594017/Nobel-laureate-Leymah-Gbowee-disowns-fellow-winner-Ellen-Johnson-Sirleaf.html)

growing. You are either rich or dirt poor, there's no middle class. Development in a land of hungry, angry people is nothing. When they get angry, they will burn it down because it is not connected to a large section of the population.[26]

Ms. Gbowee emphasises the structural nature of the nation-state in Liberia and the exercise of power that benefits the political class while individual Liberians outside of the political webs of the elite are afforded no advantages or opportunities or worse are vanquished as illiterates or un-skilled 'youth'.

The Secretary-General's report dated 16 April 2012 outlines a UN department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) technical assessment team's findings after its visit to Liberia on 20 February 2012.[27] The report notes that peace in Liberia is "fragile" and that despite "significant economic and political gains" made Liberia was "vulnerable to disruption", due to the "enormous risk" posed by the "large population of unskilled, unemployed, war-affected youths, many of whom are former combatants, lacking livelihood opportunities." The report also noted the problem of land disputes, "which remain a serious conflict trigger, exacerbated in many instances by long-standing divides between ethnic groups and communities". The report also notes that Liberia's security agencies are "incapable of maintaining stability without the support of UNMIL." The UN technical assessment report notes that the 4,200 strong national police force

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[26] Nobel laureate Leymah Gbowee disowns fellow winner EJS 2012

[27] UN Secretary General Report, S/2012/230, 16 April 2012. The technical assessment mission was led by DPKO and comprised participants from the department of field support, DPA, the department for safety and security, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Peacebuilding Support Office, UNDP, UNHCR, World Bank, UNMIL and the UN Country Team. The mission in Liberia lasted from 20 February to 2 March 2012. Members visited Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, Lofa, Maryland, River Cess counties, while some participated in an assessment of border areas in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and spoke to a broad range of high-level government interlocutors, elites and diplomatic officials.

should be expanded to 8,000 officers before UNMIL withdraws, but improving the very poor conditions of service for the force was urgently necessary before this is possible.[28] However, a joint World Bank/UNMIL review of public expenditure in Liberia's security sector notes that Liberia's security budget was "facing a shortfall of $86 million over the next three years" (2012-2015) at the current national budget allocation of 5% of gross domestic product. The report notes that an increase of one percent point would bring the deficit down to $25 million.[29]

Liberia demonstrates the limitations of the UN in extending state authority to remote areas in the absence of a state capable of performing basic Weberian tasks during and post-DDR. The state has failed to keep its responsibilities of maintaining law and order functions, let alone extend social provisioning of basic services outside of Monrovia. Additionally, Johnson-Sirleaf's government has made no significant steps (despite her rhetorical commitment) to govern the 700km border shared with Côte d'Ivoire through 2011-2012. The high-level political rhetoric from President Johnson-Sirleaf (and President Ouattara) has not been matched by concrete action.[30]

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[28] Ibid, 9, paras. 35. Among the challenges identified were "poor conditions of service, which limit the ability to attract, recruit and retain qualified personnel; difficulties in building the institutional and management framework of the police; and inadequate transport, communications equipment and infrastructure, which were common to all security agencies." The Government supports the goal of having 8,000 well-trained police officers and 3,000 immigration officers by 2015 (President Johnson-Sirleaf's January 2013 Annual message, http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/2013o128_President_2013_Annual_Message_FINAL.pdf)

[29] Ibid, 8, paras. 32.

[30] The AFL executed a border patrol operation in September 2012 called "Operation Restore Hope"; this exercise was heavily reliant on US military support and mentorship. The UN assessment report on the AFL in 2012 recognized that the force is too small to be deployed effectively in expeditionary operations in border regions. Given that the AFL will not be deployed to protect the border and territorial integrity, its post-conflict role remains undefined and ambiguous. There were early proposals calling for a rapid reaction capability in the AFL, but these were eventually discarded. In its current form, the AFL is incapable of ensuring

The last seven years in office had demonstrated Johnson-Sirleaf's failure to address national reconciliation or the country's deeper socio-economic challenges. Despite achieving some impressive growth rates, Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Gross National Income is only US$200. Liberia's socio-economic progress remains static as the 182nd ranked country (out of 189 countries on the UNDP's human development index (2010-2012). Youth unemployment remains a daunting challenge and there is a dearth of opportunities for the country's youthful population (under 35 category that is unskilled and poorly educated) to obtain basic livelihoods. This is one of the reasons why President Johnson-Sirleaf invests significant amounts of state funding in maintaining a good "public relations" image in the US.[31]

What does the outsourcing of state policymaking to external agents mean for the transfer of ownership to Liberian government authorities? Liberia's political class has failed to articulate an alternative vision from that advanced by the UN and the US. At the same time, the Liberian political and bureaucratic elite complain of their "powerlessness" in determining the priorities and approaches to its own post-conflict recovery.[32] At the same time, the centralised state undermines local agency of Liberian outside the dominant webs of power. On a positive note, there is evidence of the UN's growing frustration with Ellen

territorial integrity (a Weberian task), given its small troop strength especially along its 700 km shared border with Côte d'Ivoire. Without "force multipliers" like aircraft or aviation capabilities, the AFL will need to enhance its border infrastructure.

[32] A Wikileaks report revealed US Ambassador Donald Booth's personal interpretation of "Liberian ownership": "The Liberians naturally look to partners for assistance in building their security apparatus. They then naturally complain of the powerlessness of their position. The Poverty reduction strategy and the national security strategy processes, though slow and with less than perfect results, is pushing the Liberians to think out their own destiny. We must continue to encourage this".
(https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MONROVIA476_a.html)

Johnson-Sirleaf's corrupt state structures that sustain inequality, unfair distribution of resources and resources. The International Crisis Group's June 2012 report cited nepotism, impunity and unemployment as underlying problems jeopardising Liberia's "fragile peace".

Armed Forces of Liberia

The American approach to military reform was supply-driven and deeply insensitive to the local Liberian context and needs. American-led reforms lacked accountability and transparency, buttressing David Chandler's argument that external actors have limited their accountability over practices vis-à-vis the local population.[33] During the transitional period, the United States preferred to support the transitional government structure, and then elected to sideline it in practice. This decision led to the marginalisation of local security and intelligence officers and the interim Legislative body, which could have been utilised as assets during the initial phase DDR phase.[34] The Department of State and the US contractors preferred an extremely limited buy-in from Liberians to maximize its autonomy and control over decision-making processes related to military reform. The Liberian Government Reform Commission accused the American SSR team of "muscling out" the Liberian stakeholders.[35] This enabled the US contractors to compromise on its original concept when local conditions

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[33] For similar arguments regarding external involvement in Bosnia, see Chandler 2006

[34] Some members corrupt National Interim Government were sidelined. For more on this, see Chapter 3 on GEMAP.

[35] Malan 2008, 23

were unsuitable (for instance, eliminating the civics/human rights component to cover funding delays and overspending).

The US agents over-wrote elements of the "Liberian plan" and ultimately influenced the disbandment the army in 2004-2005. Chapter 6 illustrated that two "Liberian plans"—involving retention of approximately 300 senior officers for the new army and building a force of over 4,000 troops—was discarded in favour of a US proposal. The US decision to fully disband contradicted the Liberian constitution, which specifies that dissolution of the military can only be done through a national referendum. There was great insensitivity shown towards the demobilisation process when senior officers in the former AFL were demobilised in 2005, only to bring a handful of former senior officers in 2007-2008 to assume leadership positions in the ministry of defence.

Decisions about AFL's Size and Composition
The decision to build the 2,000 strong military had more to say about US perceptions about what Liberia could afford given Liberia's meager national budget. Plans relating to the size of the military were made by US defence officials based on their understanding of what Liberia's government could likely afford, as opposed to what the threat assessments might suggest.[36] The Liberian

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[36] Jaye, An Assessment report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia, report submitted to the Governance Commission of Liberia, 23 September 2006; A Ebo, The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005, 19; A 2009 Wikileaks cable notes "the 2,000 figure was chosen only for budgetary reasons, without regard to a threat assessment. A more reasonable number based on likely threats would be closer to 5,000, but the GoL has not yet demonstrated that it can sustain even the present number. For that reason, it appears most practical to leave the number as it is, and grow the number when the GoL can afford it. The other alternative, adding 3,000 ill-trained, ill-equipped and under-paid soldiers of the AFL would create more problems than it would solve. We understand that President Sirleaf and the [UN

plan (2004) had called for building a new AFL with a total strength of 4,000 soldiers and officers. According to Adedeji, the AFL strength was scaled back to 2,000 soldiers following the Pentagon-conducted technical review that assessed what the Liberian government could afford and sustain on its own. These reviews were conducted without broad consultation of Liberian authorities.[37] In January 2011, President Johnson-Sirleaf publically stated that the 2,000 troops was inadequate and announced her administration's intention to recruit at least 300 more soldiers.[38]

During the course of AFL military-building, DynCorp held considerable autonomy over decision-making on the structure and type of training in the 23rd Brigade of the AFL.[39] DynCorp's plan involved developing a new AFL brigade that would consist of two infantry battalions, an engineering unit, a military police unit and a military band, medical personnel and a small coast guard.

The blueprint for the AFL focused on a "bottom-up" approach, emphasising recruitment of NCOs and enlisted soldiers. As Welken perceptively notes, since "contractors focused on small unit training requirements, the contractors were not required to incorporate the more difficult collective training tasks that are required for the 'top-down' approach" [that focuses on unit

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Technical Assessment Mission] have come to the same conclusion."
(http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MONROVIA318_a.html)

[37] Adedeji Ebo, "Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies," in Laurie Nathan, (ed.), *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform,* p.80; According to Thomas Jaye, "no serious national debate about the future task of the different elements of Liberia's security sector was conducted" (Jaye, Liberia: Parliamentary Oversight and Lessons Learned from Internationalised Security Sector, 3)

38 ICG, 'Liberia: How Sustainable is the Recovery?, Africa report No. 177, ICG: Brussels, 19 August 2011, 11

[39] ICG, 'Liberia: Uneven progress…', 34

leadership first].[40] This represented an alternative bottom-up approach to the military reform process in Liberia. Since all of the old senior military officers were decommissioned and retired, the new AFL had no leadership to lead the army Officers were recruited on an on-going basis based on educational qualifications, leaving the army with a deficit of officers that can "take over" from the ECOWAS and ensure basic human security for the AFL's rank-and-file (see below).

Strengthening the state to provide security, justice, reconciliation is bound to fail if the ideas and material resources are exported and imposed on the post-conflict context, especially when policies are implemented under ambitious timelines and compressed within a period of a few years. The domestically weak states are enabled by their international legal status. In Liberia's postwar period, has been enabled through its external partners (the US and Nigeria) to exercise some degree of domestic empirical sovereignty while ensuring its juridical (legal) sovereignty is upheld. Ten years of extensive peacebuilding efforts and over US$5 billion invested in terms of UN peacekeeping has not been enough. The United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) exercises primary responsibility over national security after ten years of post-conflict peacebuilding. Efforts on rebuilding Liberian security institutions has not been effective in allowing full transfer of responsibility for security to Liberian authorities, despite the fact that it took less than five years for this process to

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[40] Welken cites the USMC Small Wars Manual (which can be accessed at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/ch01.pdf) on page 29-30.

occur in Sierra Leone.[41] The reformed Armed Forces of Liberia has been rebuilt as a symbolic dimension of domestic sovereignty with the aid the Nigerian government, which currently has a senior Military Commander serving as Liberia's Commanding-Officer-in-Charge (COIC). After almost ten-years of UNMIL presence in Liberia, the Liberian government has not yet assumed *de jure* control over its Armed Forces of Liberia.

Some of the main reasons why the Liberian government has thus far been unable to assume full sovereign control its Armed Forces. Six years after a transitional government was established, the US government handed partial control of the AFL to Liberian authorities on 1 January 2010. However, the US maintained its executive control over the operational viability of the AFL by retaining exclusive control over the management of AFL's armaments depot through to mid-May 2012. The AFL remains dependent on the US for training, logistics (the AFL does not have functioning military vehicles) and other important military developments including monthly provisioning for fuel to upkeep the limited number of trucks used by defence ministry officials. There was a glaring lack of "ownership" and participation from a broad-range of Liberian authorities as a result of the conduct of US private security companies leading the SSR efforts. The view of the UN towards "progress" in the Armed Forces of Liberia indicates a "bleak" record thus far. A 2011 UN report cited "lack of experienced officers as problematic" for the short-term operational viability of the AFL. Violent clashes between the army and police in recent years

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[41] September 1999 until 31 December 2005

(2009-2011) has heightened tensions between the two primary security forces in the country.

Assessment of External Control
Military reform in Liberia's SSR process has been controversial due to the considerable degree of external control over planning and decisions relating to composition, size, and doctrine. One of the controversial issues related to the management of the AFL was the US decision to model Liberia's chain of command after the US system, where the field commander reports to the President through the Minister of Defence. Liberian defence minister Samukai objected to this agreement because Liberian presidents have historically bypassed the Minister of Defence. The chain of command was later modified such that the President interfaces with the AFL through the Minister of Defence, who deals directly with the AFL Chief of Staff down to the field commanders.

Second, as a result of the United States' decision to sideline the transitional legislation (2004-2005) and the elected House of Representatives and Senate after 2006, there was little local oversight over the SSR process. Additionally, civil society groups were excluded from playing a meaningful role in the oversight and design of SSR program. All of these factors contributed in undermining local input, knowledge, and ownership throughout the transition process. A third problem relates to the fact that the police and military restructuring plans were drawn up without extensive Liberian input about the nature of security threats both internally and within the wider Mano River sub-region.

DynCorp's role in military-building was implemented under a cloud of secrecy in Liberia and lacked transparency. The US preferred to marginalise high-level Liberian defence ministry officials (including the Minister) to maintain maximum autonomy and control over the process. The US Chief at Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) explained the causes and reasons for this lack of transparency:

> a) The details of the contracts with DynCorp and PAE may not be revealed, not even to the Government of Liberia, as it is against US Federal Acquisition Regulations;
> b) The US is providing *gratis* assistance to Liberia for the restructuring of its armed forces through an assistance package that the Liberian government has approved and accepted;
> c) The Government of Liberia is entitled to query and get information on the design of the new AFL (which it has agreed to) and on progress made in implementing agreed plans and on the quality of equipment and training provided to the AFL; and
> d) *The US Government, in turn, accepts its responsibility to deliver promised and agreed assistance though the SSR program, and to effectively oversee the services of the contractors that it hires to do the job.*[42]

The Minister of Defense Brownie Samuaki had publically criticized DynCorp and the US State Department in 2006-2007 for refusing to share the DynCorp contact with him.[43] Samukai commented, "we don't know what the terms of the contract are, so there's no way I can evaluate how they're performing. I'm tired of asking" [for a copy of the contract].[44] For complaints or inquiries into the nature of DynCorp' behaviour in Liberia, the Minister of Defense (and defence officials) were required to communicate their concerns directly to US Embassy

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[42] Malan, 'US Civil Military Imbalance for Global Engagement', 24

[43] Michael M. Phillips, 'In Liberia, An Army Unsullied by its Past', *Wall Street Journal*, 14 August 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118703899075796334-_s116GbyvQ_1_yklnMDN_yk4uTw_20070820.html?mod=regionallinks (Accessed 15 February 2012)

[44] Ibid.

officials or its US military mission as opposed to direct contact with DynCorp officials.[45]

The decision to appoint a Nigerian as Force Commander of the AFL has negatively impacted on morale within the army's ranks and Ministry of Defence and feeds into perceptions that Liberia remains dependent on external actors. Although no public statements have been made concerning who is currently under consideration for the top job in the AFL (assumed to commence in 2014), previous potential candidates were former Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Aaron T. Johnson (recently promoted to Brigadier General in April 2013 and then demoted to Deputy Director for Administration in the National Bureau of Veteran Affairs) and current deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Daniel K. Moore, two officers from the former AFL that were recalled to serve following the disbandment of the army in 2004.[46]

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[45] According to Dan Honken, who served as ODC chief in the US military mission in Liberia from August 2005-July 2007, the U.S hierarchy of accountability was as follows: DynCorp officials reported to the ODC Chief; the ODC Chief reported to the US Ambassador. Dan Honken, 'Liberian SSR', comments on Foreign Policy, 18 January 2010; Malan notes that the ODC chief liaised with the Liberian MoD and supervised DynCorp and PAE activities in Liberia. The ODC chief reported to the Contracting Officer in the State department's Office of Acquisitions Management through the Contracting Officer's Representative in the State department's Africa Bureau (Malan, SSR in Liberia: Mixed results from humble beginnings, 2008, 40

[46] Five senior officers reinstated received one year training Lieutenant Colonel's Sekou Sheriff, Boakai B. Kamara, Aaron T. Johnson (who formerly held rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy G3 in 1998), Daniel K. Moore and Major Andrew J. Wleh at Nigeria's Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Jaji, Nigeria. (Robert C. Carey, Five reinstated AFL officers complete senior leadership training in Nigeria, *New Liberian*, 16 July 2008, http://newliberian.com/?p=438 Accessed 28 March 2012). Lt. Col. Moore (OF-2007-176654, previously commander of EBK) was promoted to Brigadier-General and deputy Chief of Staff in April/May 2013. Colonel Johnson (OF-2007-717954) was promoted to Brigadier General after serving as deputy Chief of Staff and transferred to the National Bureau of Veteran Affairs. Major Wleh (OF-2007-622413) was elevated to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and prompted to Assistant Chief of Staff, J7. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Darwo (OF-2007-236735) was evaluated to the rank of full Colonel in late April 2013 and retired effective 30 April 2013. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony F. Norpah (OF-2008-798551), Commandant, Armed Forces Training Command, was promoted to Colonel as well. ('New Liberian deputy chief of staff named', *New Democrat*, 25 April 2013,

The involvement of ECOWAS member states has raised some unintended negative consequences on command and control authority in the AFL. First, owing to the lack of Liberian leadership, US contractors performed most the AFL Headquarters (HQ) staff responsibilities during the immediate transition—including planning, budgeting, and execution operations.[47] Second, ECOWAS officers reportedly showed little interest in implementing US systems and doctrine and often encouraged Liberian defence officials to plan along different lines from those proposed by the SSRP.[48] US doctrine and operational systems was far too complicated for Liberian and ECOWAS officers to understand and execute.[49] Third, enlisted soldiers reported confusion between the British-modeled system adopted by most ECOWAS officers and US system and doctrine being emphasised by the SSRP contractors.[50]

These factors have resulted in a lack of democratic oversight of Liberian institutions over the security sector. Following consultations in Washington, D.C., with Department of Defence and AFRICOM officials from 11-12 February 2012, the Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission's Liberian configuration noted "a critical limitation concerns weak civilian oversight with the reform of the AFL having outpaced that of the Ministry of Defence".[51] The report notes

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http://www.african-defense.com/?p=1633 (Assessed 25 May 2013); 'AFL promotes into retirement and nominates senior officer', *FrontpageAfrica*, 25 April 2013

[47] Welken 2010, 26

[48] Welken 2010, 25

[49] Welken 2010, 34, citing interviews with US military officers

[50] Most of the English-speaking ECOWAS countries adopt British doctrine in their military institutions and this created some confusion in the AFL command structure. (Author's personal interviews with enlisted AFL personnel, EBK, Monrovia)

[51] UN Peacebuilding Commission-Liberian configuration Chair report on the visit to Washington, D.C., 10 & 11 February 2011, 1

that defence experts (funded through the Defence Institution Reform Initiative) have been working in the Liberian defence ministry in 2011 to finalise the defence strategy.[52]

The lack of mechanisms built into the security architecture to ensure subordination of military to democratic civil authority and the rule of law is problematic. There is an absence of a democratic and civic consciousness embedded within state institutions in Liberia, and the over-centralisation of power in the Executive Presidency continues to present a serious challenge for democratization in the security sector and of the public sector more generally. Over-centralisation of powers in the Executive structure and Presidency, combined with the lack of independent judiciary and legislature are central challenges impeding democratic oversight of Liberia's security institutions.[53] The most current constitution of 1986 (written during one-party rule under President Doe) designated all oversight responsibilities to a heavily centralised and powerful executive branch presided over by the President. As Jaye explains, "the governance of the security sector was skewed in favour of the Executive branch through the offices of the Ministers of Justice, National Security and Defence and ultimately, the President. Although Article 34 of the Constitution spells out the role of the national Legislature, the various legislative Acts strips them of any role; these Acts say nothing about the role of the national legislature. On the contrary, these Acts mandate the agencies to report to the

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[52] A draft national defence strategy was developed and was expected to be approved in February 2013 (UN SG report, S/2013/124, 28 February 2013, 11, paras 52. The National Security and Intelligence Act was adopted in August 2011

[53] Thomas Jaye, 'An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia', Monrovia: Governance Reform Commission, 2006, 12.

President either directly or through the Minister of Justice (security agencies) and Defence (army)."[54] Security reforms have not been implemented in a vacuum, and have only emboldened the political classes' power in the Executive and has contributed to the perpetuation of status quo politics in Liberia, characterized as winner-takes-all politics at the expense of building legitimate democratic participation and effective civil society oversight.[55]

AFL's Officer Establishment
The consequence of demobilising the entire former AFL means that the officer establishment is grossly inexperienced in the short-to-medium-term horizon. According to Chris Wyatt (former US chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in Monrovia), 500 NCOs had graduated their basic NCO course and 87 second-lieutenants were commissioned when he departed around August 2007. However, only 14 of these officers were "field-grade", meaning they had been vetted and approved by the US SSR officials. Officer training was expedited throughout 2008 such that 45 Liberian commissioned officers were in service by August 2008.[56] At year's end in 2008 and early 2009, there were 98 Liberian officers, many of whom were inexperienced lieutenants and only eight holding the rank of captain or above.[57] Currently, there are approximately 18 junior officers (8 of which were recently promoted) that will form the bulk of the new AFL officer establishment. However, recent assessments in 2010 revealed

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[54] Jaye 2006, 12

[55] Ebo 2007; Jaye 2006; Sawyer 2005; Malan 2008

[56] UN S/2009/299

[57] ICG, 'Liberia: Uneven Progress', 13. At the time, there were 12 officers seconded from ECOWAS.

an inability among these officers to lead the new AFL effectively.[58] The lack of

trained and qualified officers has been a primary reason for the delayed

operationalising of the new AFL. The AFL junior officers – especially those

who received military training in the US, show significant potential in grasping

US military standards. Since the US provides the bulk of military assistance in

Liberia, the US Embassy and its military advisors will confer legitimacy on

junior officers capable of assuming leadership roles throughout the AFL.

Seconded military officers from ECOWAS member states (mostly Ghana and

Nigeria) fill over half of the key posts in the AFL's command positions at the

Brigade and Company levels and senior staff positions in the Ministry of

Defence (similar to embedded UK support in Sierra Leone) until junior officers

are able to assume leadership.[59] According to the UN, the AFL needs 146 well-

trained officers to be functional and fully operational.[60]

Over-writing Local Ownership
According to Bryden, the SSR processes suffer from "fragmented approaches by

different actors coupled with a lack of transparency, oversight and democratic

control inherent in the outsourcing of significant aspects of the process".[61] The

sidelining of the Liberian legislature and civil society groups raises important

questions about accountability and transparency and the over-writing of genuine

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[58] AFRICOM Working Paper 2009, 11, cited in Welken 2010, 25

[59] AFL Annual Reports, 2008-2010, digital copies in author's possession; Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council, S/2008/553, 15 August 2006; The command positions include the AFL commanding general (COIC), J-3, J-5, J-7, Brigade Executive Officer and Brigade S-3.

[60] UN Secretary General Report 19th progress report, 6 (S/2009/299).

[61] Ebo 2007, 15

Liberian oversight over the reform process.[62] Thomas Jaye sums up the democratic deficit of the entire SSR process:

> There was an overwhelming concern about the lack of local ownership of the SSR process in the country. For example, the Legislative Committees on Defence and Security see themselves on the periphery; ex-senior servicemen argue that they were left out of the SSR debate and process; and some [security] agencies were not even aware of the review carried out by RAND Corporation. Civil society groups feel completely marginalised and argued that most of the policies and decisions about SSR are made by external experts and others like DynCorp and UNMIL.[63]

The US SSR staff assisted Liberian officials from the Ministry of National Defence to draft a new Liberian National Defence Act in consultation with Defence Minister Samukai and Minister of Justice Frances Johnson-Morris in early 2006. The draft Act drew heavily from the US Code Title X and was completed in December 2006 and sent to the Liberian legislature for debate and vetting.[64] The legislature delayed the approval of the draft Act, believing the drafting of such legislation was its own job. A revised National Defence Act was eventually passed in the Liberian legislature in August 2008; however, some provisions in the new Act added some confusion to the role for the new AFL. The legislation states that the primary mission of the Armed Forces of Liberia is to combat external aggression but mentions a role for counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism as well, a condition that was placed on Liberia for receiving

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[62] Ebo, A. 'Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies', in Nathan , *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007, 78-85.

[63] Jaye 2006, 13

[64] Malan 2008, 23

US military assistance. The National Security Strategy that was published in 2008 does not mention counter-terrorism as a major priority.[65]

Dr. Amos Sawyer, former head of the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) sought to address some of the perceived deficiencies in the US-led SSR process and the apparent lack of democratic accountability and transparency over Liberian defence and security institutions. In September 2007, the GRC produced an assessment of security sector reform and in January 2007 drafted a national security strategy.[66] However, the UN brought in a British security expert to draft a security strategy, which combined with the RAND report and the security section of the poverty reduction strategy became the basis for national security strategy approved by the National Security Council in January 2008.[67] The National Security Strategy outlined three key missions for the Armed Forces of Liberia as: counterinsurgency, African peacekeeping and military aid to civil authorities missions.[68]

Engaging ordinary Liberians and civil society organisations during SSR development was hampered by the fact that external actors preferred to maintain a high degree of autonomy and control in making key decisions. For instance, some Liberian government ministries responsible for security issues and the

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[65] See National Security Strategy 2008, 15

[66] Thomas Jaye, 'Liberia: Parliamentary Oversight and Lessons Learned from Internationalised Security Sector Reform, 8; Malan 2008, 24. According to a Wikileaks cable, the writing of the Governance Commission's national security strategy was months delayed and was an "essentially unusable document".
(https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MONROVIA476_a.html)

[67] Wikileaks: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MONROVIA476_a.html. According to the cable, the British expert worked with a Liberian technical team, the US ambassador and the UN SRSG Allan Doss. The final outcome was a merging of the two drafts "using much of the text of the GC draft, but keeping the actual strategy of the team's draft".

[68] Author's interview with Nigerian commanding officer at EBK, Monrovia, 8 March 2012.

American SSR team rejected the Governance Commission's consultations on the grounds that it would take too long to produce a strategy document.[69] There is also an entrenched culture of secrecy and history of "stove-piping" among the executive branch of the Liberian government on all security matters.[70] These factors contributed to a long delay in the completion of a national security strategy framework. External pressure from donors involved in the completion of poverty reduction strategy paper was a major impetus behind finalisation of the document in 2008. However, the legitimacy of these reforms is questionable in the absence of local ownership, transparency and democratic subordination of the army. According to Liberian security experts, the AFL will not engage in protection of territorial integrity, as stipulated in the constitution—since the immigration and police agencies will be mandated and capacitated to handle this responsibility in practice.[71]

The SSR program did not create structures, rules and procedures for disciplining soldiers in the AFL. Such a mechanism was only created in 2010 as a component of the Defence Sector reform (i.e. the courts martial system which is now in place prompted by a number of soldiers that broke the law) and was wholly dependent on US "experts" and resources.

Assessment of DynCorp and PAE
American officials had the final decision regarding the strength of the new AFL, and overrode the Liberian constitution (1986), which stipulates in Article 34,

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[69] Jaye 2006, 8

[70] Author's confidential interview with an advisor to the Government of Liberia security, Monrovia, February 2012.

[71] Author's interview with ECOWAS officer, Monrovia, 8 March 2012; Author's interview with Government of Liberia Advisor to the President, Monrovia, March 2013

"The Legislature shall have the power to raise and support the Armed Forces of the Republic and to make rules for the governance of the Armed Forces of Liberia." About 90% of the US trainers were retired US Army and US Marine Corps senior non-commissioned officers with Drill Instructor experience.[72] Liberian soldiers and Ministry of Defense officials preferred to have active-duty US military personnel conduct the training and expressed this demand several times to US authorities.[73] Wikileaks cables confirmed that Minister of Defence Samukai "reiterated several times that he would appreciate if all future projects was done by active-duty US military personnel".[74]

As Thomas Dempsey warns:
> Private contractors lack the legitimacy and the evidence of national political commitment that accompany uniformed military trainers. In Africa in particular, the role of mercenaries in past African conflicts, combined with the discrediting of state security forces that has typically accompanied the failure of African states, raise questions about the advisability of privatizing core military functions like military initial entry and collective tactical training.[75]

Not only did these retired drill sergeants bring their own experiences and worldviews to Liberia, but they were guilty of exporting US systems and doctrine to Liberia, but also their style of training and demeanor was not necessarily appropriate for Liberia. Many recruits could not speak American-English and instead relied on the local Liberian version. US SSR trainers

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[72] According to Dan Honken who served as Office of Defence Cooperation (ODC) chief in the US Military Mission in Liberia from August 2005-July 2007, 'The DynCorp and PAE contractors were 90% US military retirees. All the contractors were unarmed except during range training.

[73] Samukai, Klein discuss Liberia's SSR program, *The Inquirer*, 19 June 2007

[74] http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MONROVIA701

[75] Thomas Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform, Perspectives on Peace and Stability Operations, 2008, 6

restricted the recruits from speaking in their local dialects during training. Trainers were unable to teach at a level that their audience can understand. Samukai was critical that DynCorp personnel were really only interested in making money while in Liberia. Additionally, DynCorp trainers were dressed in khaki pants and polo shirts (with SSR on the crest), which, according to Liberian military officials undermined their credibility since they were not active military personnel. Liberian soldiers complained that they had difficulty saluting the SSR's civilian staff.[76] The program was developed and overseen by retired US military officers and NCOs at the senior Colonel and Command Sergeant Major levels, including retired US Army Colonel Thomas Dempsey.[77]

It was questionable whether a private security company with a record of human rights violations in Bosnia/Kosovo and Columbia was an appropriate decision for training a national army that had emerged as a fourteen-year civil conflict in Liberia. Many Liberians and NTGL defence ministry officials complained of DynCorp's presence in post-war Liberia.[78]

It raises questions whether perhaps another military could have been contracted that was more attuned to Liberia's local context and concerns.[79] Private contractors lack the legitimacy and the evidence of national political commitment that accompany uniformed military trainers. In Africa in particular,

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[76] Author's interviews with MoD official; Author's interviews with AFL soldiers, EBK barracks, Monrovia, March 2012

[77] A US Defence Attaché to Liberia in the late 1990s

[78] Author's personal interview with former LURD commander, Monrovia, February 2012; see Kelly Patricia O'Meara, 'DynCorp Disgrace, Insight Magazine', 14 January 2002, (http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11119)

[79] Malan's research found that US oversight of the SSR program has been 'lax' and according to a former senior DynCorp employee, the United States Government has been 'reluctant to go to the Hill for money for the program' (Malan 2008, 41).

the role of mercenaries in past African conflicts, combined with the discrediting of state security forces that has typically accompanied the failure of African states, raise questions about the whether it is appropriate for core military functions like military initial entry and collective tactical training should be outscored to private security companies. Additionally, Liberian officials accused DynCorp of wasting money throughout the process.[80] Liberia's defense minister Brownie Samukai criticized DynCorp for spending US$660,000 to renovate a rented building that was utilised for only short-term purposes to house DynCorp's office and residence.[81]

Participation

As Chapter Six indicates, Liberian officials have had little influence in determining the type of training that was provided to the AFL by US contractors. This raises two issues: First, external actors prefer to place limits on what local actors can participate in policymaking in order to maintain the maximum degree of autonomy over the restructuring process. This practice also serves to cushion their actions from local accountability structures in the post-conflict context. Second, external actors have proven that they can exercise considerable degrees of influence over high-level political decisions relating to placing "their guys" into senior government positions. However, this space is contested by the President, who has expansive constitutional powers to appoint loyal supporters

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[80] As of 2007/2008, DynCorp employed 82 international staff in Liberia plus 239 Liberian staff (Malan 2008, 42). This is very costly. DynCorp has a fixed fee for every month that it is physically retained in Liberia.

[81] Michael M. Phillips, In Liberia, an army unsullied by its past, Wall Street Journal, 14 August 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118703899075796334-_s116GbyvQ_1_yklnMDN_yk4uTw_20070820.html?mod=regionallinks (Accessed 15 February 2012)

to high-level positions. This political system depends largely on self-regulation and self-policing. One cannot assume that the established political class has an interest in broad based development in their countries. Political leaders lack vision and align their policies with neoliberal agendas promoted by the IFIs and the OECD countries. International donors should attempt a critical assessment of the performance of African (and elsewhere) governments and heads of state. By "critical", this means asking if the leader or the institution in question is doing its best given its circumstances and to critically question whose interests are being served by their dominant agenda. This would be better than throwing money at the symptoms of malgovernance and corruption.

The relationship between the Government of Liberia and the Department of State—governed by a confidential memorandum of understanding that was not made public or available to Liberian ministry of defence authorities illustrates the one-sided affair and how local ownership was a marginal concern of US authorities.[82] As Samukai noted, "the government of Liberia was not consulted as the original contracts were being drafted or the Ministry of Defence would have pushed to have done things differently".[83] Additionally, Liberian Senators and Representatives expressed frustration to US officials that Minister Samuaki had not consulted them on a number of military and security issues

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[82] Interim Deputy Minister of Defence (Administration) Joe Wylie in 2004 states, "they didn't even allow me to see it as deputy minister of administration. I raised an issue with that. And, the DynCorp guys said they were only answerable to the USG. The USG is answerable to the Liberian government not to the ministerial staff" (Author's confidential interview, Monrovia, 12 March 2012); see also Wikileaks cable: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MONROVIA701

[83] http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MONROVIA701

related to AFRICOM's role in Liberia.[84] DynCorp reported directly to the United States embassy/Department of State, which directly shielded them from being held accountable by the Liberian government.[85] Moreover, Liberians were not consulted with respect to the formation of a national security policy. As a result, there was no Liberian national security framework in place to offer guidance to military and police restructuring. According to one commentator, there was a hope that "the pieces of the puzzle would all fit together once reforms have been accomplished".[86] Not surprisingly, there is a perception among citizens of Liberia, including ex-rebel commanders and demobilised soldiers, that outsiders "owned" and led the reform process. As a result, the institutions created lack local legitimacy. This perception has important consequences going forward. This may become a source of resentment and hostilities if the current army fails to deliver security for its citizens in the years ahead.

Moreover, according to interviews conducted by Welken, outgoing members of the private security companies misled US military mentors during the Onward Liberty exercise on the AFL officer's ability to plan for operations and to support and execute basic military operations.[87] The private security model was inappropriate for a country emerging from more than a decade of

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[84] Wikileaks cable, 'Liberia: Legislators keen on Liberia hosting AFRICOM', http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MONROVIA1393, (Assessed 25 May 2013

[85] Defence minister Samukai stated about DynCorp, "They received their funding and orders from Washington, channeled through the Embassy," (Samukai, Klein discuss Liberia's SSR program, *The Inquirer,* 19 June 2007 (assessed 18 June 2012)

[86] 'A Challenging exercise', *West Africa*, May 2006, 14

[87] Ryan Welken, Rebuilding the Armed Forces of Liberia: An Assessment of the Liberian Security Sector Reform Program, unpublished M.A dissertation from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2010, 17, 20

violent civil war. In fact, the model contradicts the notion of duty to one's to country or loyalty to democracy and one's government.[88]

Additionally, the training approach adopted by the Americans favoured a "train-and-equip", technical process has not translated into enhanced professionalism or operational readiness.[89] Since foreign trainers insisted on maximum autonomy, opportunities were missed to develop a civic consciousness and human rights culture within the new recruits. As demonstrated in the chapter, these components were eliminated during initial entry training when budgetary constraints affected the SSR process. DynCorp subsequently abandoned its "human security" approach, which was purportedly a main reason why it was awarded the US state department contract in the first place. DynCorp's human security approach was in name only. In practice, a traditional-military-centered approach based on the western model of a modern military institution was adopted.[90] Reformers missed an opportunity to embed good human rights practices into the attitudes of new Liberian recruits. In contexts like Liberia and Sierra Leone, this fosters a perception that civic and human rights training was important in name only.

These practices also disguise the imbalance of power between US trainers and Liberian counterparts in the defence ministry. For instance, US contractors received salaries far in excess of any high-level Liberian

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[88] Malan 2008, 69

[89] Cold War military assistance to Liberia is an example of perverse consequences of the short-term US military assistance.

[90] ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, 10

government.[91] It is impossible for American drill-sergeants to relate to Liberia's socio-economic context who are completely unaware of the struggles and daily challenges that recruits face in the everyday realm. Perhaps it is impossible to reconcile this power imbalance, however, one might envision the Nigerian or Indian militaries conducting training to Liberians in a more effective manner.

For these reasons, the AFL has been unable to redefine its role in the war-peace transitions by assisting with "nation-building" or reconstruction tasks. The government does not have an alternative vision to that produced by donors and to a certain extent, does not seem to be willing to develop one. The long-term presence of UNMIL meant that peacekeepers engaged in road and bridge-building and maintenance. Since the AFL is not yet officially operational, the army has not been encouraged to develop reconstruction projects in concert with UNMIL.

Absence of Local Considerations
Liberia remains wholly dependent on the US for its military doctrine. The decision to train the AFL to MTOE (US) standards was made with little to no adaptation to the local context. US contractors trained the AFL according to US army standards without fully considering whether these standards could be sustained by the Government of Liberia after the US draws back. An example was the heightened expectations created by DynCorp during its feeding program that provided three meals a day, seven days a week to all soldiers during initial entry training, during field deployments or operations outside of the barracks. In

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[91] Contractors were paid "two to three times the salary they would make for doing the same job in the (US) military", ICG, Liberia: Uneven progress, 32

early 2007, the Ministry of Defence approached the US about its concern in sustaining the program after the US funded SSR programme.

After problems arising from indiscipline among new soldiers, the Liberian defence ministry requested the US government to pay for the provision of two meals per day to soldiers assigned to EBK in March 2008. According to Wyatt, "complicated and intense diplomatic discussions" followed. The US government agreed to fund the feeding program for a period of 17 months (from June 2008 until 30 April 2009) until facilities for cooking could be constructed at EBK. From May until end of November 2008, the US agreed to provide one meal per day. The program ended in December 2009. It is positive sign that the Liberian government showed prudence in foreseeing the difficulty in sustaining the cost of paying for the feeding program after the US departs.

The Government of Liberia also decided to provide 50-kilogram bags of rice to each soldier on a monthly basis to replace the previous US-funded feeding program. According to Samukai, the US did not approve of this decision, instead preferring the government would provide a subsidy of $10-$15/month to each soldier. Samukai explained, "We said no! It is the Government of Liberia's money so we chose to give you a dry ration, a bag of rice every month because that is what we are capable of affording".[92]

A third example was the false expectation that 24-hour electricity could be provided once US contracts ended.[93] While DynCorp and PAE were in

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[92] 'U.S Gov't blamed for soldiers' plight', *New Democrat*, 12 February 2013

[93] Their Contracts expired on 31 December 2009. In 2010, DynCorp kept about sixty mentors in Liberia. In the last year, there were about 15 US military personnel serving as mentors while

command of military barracks, regular and consistent electricity and running water was provided in the barracks. There was a subsequent decline in standards once the US contractors departed, which reduced morale within the ranks, particularly lower enlisted soldiers who were without regular electricity and clean drinking water in the EBK barracks.[94]

Human Security in the Armed Forces of Liberia?
Since 2008, there are reports of soldiers dissatisfied with the standards of wellbeing in the armed forces, leading to a high attrition rate in the AFL. On 24 September 2008, several hundred enlisted soldiers residing at Edward Beyan Kessely barracks (EBK) protested over poor living conditions in the barracks and a lack of access to medical care.[95] American journalist Rebecca Murray reported rumors that DynCorp was planning to transfer another 500 new recruits in already cramped living conditions at EBK. Other grievances included failed promises for soldiers accessing educational opportunities, and the fact that soldiers' families could not reside with them in the barracks. As former Private Patrick Fayia, identified as one of the ringleaders who was dismissed from the military afterwards explained, "nobody responded, [so] the soldiers remained indoors. Because if we left for physical training, the sergeants would come and lock our doors, and when the new soldiers came, they would plug them in. Four

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senior British and American officers served as advisors in MoD. In Dec 2009, there was two U.S marines Corps officers (one O-6 and one O-6) and one British army O-5 (Welken 2010).

[94] Author's interviews with enlisted AFL, Monrovia conducted in February and March 2012

[95] Melissa Chea-Anna, Liberia: Several New Soldiers Protest, *The Inquirer*, 25 September 2008

to a room, that's how it was going to be."[96] Their demonstration, which resulted in seventeen soldiers being "dishonorably discharged" for "indiscipline and insubordination", highlights one of the AFL's most pressing challenges in the post-SSR era in Monrovia. The EBK barracks is a deplorable site for professional soldiers to reside in. EBK was initially built for about 800 residents. PAE refurbished the living quarters (essentially dividing each family quarter into two by adding a wall) and improved pipped water in the bathrooms. Currently, about 2,000 soldiers reside in the EBK barracks. As many as four privates were sharing half the space that was previously allocated to a soldier's family. From my sample of enlisted soldiers, over 90% were sharing a small cramped quarters (no larger than 10 feet by 10 feet) with at least one other private soldier.[97]

Accommodation facilities in the military are determined by rank. For instance, in March 2012, officer establishment lived in separate barracks less than a mile from EBK. Third class officers (captains or majors) occupy three-bedroom flats with their families, while second and first class officers (lieutenants) occupy two-bedroom flats. As mentioned, the majority of enlisted soldiers share one bedroom flat with at least one other soldier.[98] Improving these conditions is critical and requires immediate political support by the Liberian authorities. Low-ranking soldiers are humiliated for not only having to share a cramped living quarter with another fellow soldier, but are equally frustrated for not being able to live with their immediate family (their spouse and children)

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[96] Rebecca Murray, Liberia: New army faces greatest challenge, Inter Press Service, 26 December 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/12/liberia-new-army-faces-greatest-challenge/ (Accessed 16 February 2012)

[97] Author's interviews with AFL enlisted personnel, Location, March 2012

[98] Author's personal interview with AFL captain, EBK Monrovia, 2 March 2012

inside the barracks. As a result, the majority of soldiers reside in the barracks

from Sunday night until Friday afternoon. At least 60% of the AFL personnel

"go home" on the weekends to visit their families in central Monrovia and

surrounding communities. This raises important questions about troop morale

but also operational viability if soldiers are unreachable in case of an

emergency.[99]

Defense Minister Brownie Samukai blamed PAE and DynCorp for their lack of
consideration for building new units in the EBK barracks:
> It is clear that EBK was built for 800-plus persons. When they
> [DynCorp/PAE] started the programme they put 2,000 persons in there.
> Where is the logic, the common sense? I think in 2005, when it was
> expected that US$200 million would be expended for the training,
> redevelopment and construction of facilities. And if the contractors were
> not shortcutting the process, we would have got the best accommodation
> for those individuals. So someone didn't do their homework. And so we
> have a congested situation at EBK.[100]

Both US contractors and Liberian government authorities are to blame for the

paralysis. Some Liberian state authorities (MoD) believed they should have

control over how resources were spent during the SSR process. In practice,

Liberian MoD officials were unable to exercise much autonomy to make choices

in the SSR programme. Minister of Defence Samukai made a public scene

during a speech to celebrate "Armed Forces Day" in Monrovia on 11 February

2013, blaming the United States for the "congestions and sufferings" of the men

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[99] Anytime soldiers are deployed in emergencies, there is an expectation that the government
must pay soldiers additional allowances. For instance, soldiers that were deployed upcountry for
exercises (like operation restore hope on 6 June 2012) were fed three times a day and received a
token of LD$1000 per day (about US$14)

[100] Rebecca Murray, Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge, *Inter Press Service*, 26
December 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/12/liberia-new-army-faces-greatest-challenge/
(Accessed 16 February 2012)

and women of the Armed Forces.[101] The problematic conditions has negatively impacted on morale among troops and is one of the main reasons why the AFL has a high attrition rate.[102]

In February 2012, the Liberian government publically announced the AFL was facing morale challenges leading to an attrition rate of 10.42%. The majority (8.67%) were absent without leave (AWOL).[103] At "Armed Forces Day" in February 2012, President Sirleaf recognised the AWOL problem was becoming more serious due to a lack of adequate facilities, accommodations, and social constraints placed on military personnel that were separated from their families as root causes for the high AWOL rate. President Sirleaf did not specify when accommodation facilities would be improved other than stating that her government will address the problem "very soon".[104]

President Johnson-Sirleaf made an official visit to Bong County on 21 February 2012 and stopped briefly to visit Camp Tubman military barracks. Liberian journalist Jimmy C. Fahngon reported that the soldiers' wives complained of their appalling living conditions in the Camp Tubman barracks, in particular the insufficient salaries of their husbands and their inability to maintain their basic welfare. Soldiers of the Camp Tubman Barracks in Bong

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[101] 'U.S gov't blamed for soldiers' plight', *New Democrat*, 12 February 2013

[102] It is concerning that this has not been addressed before the 2013 recruitment campaign started in April 2013.According to the New Democrat, thousands of applicants turned out for the third phase of the recruitment campaign, which kicked off on 22 April 2013 at Antoinette Tubman Stadium and the Barclay Training Center (BTC) ('New Liberian deputy chief of staff named', *New Democrat*, 25 April 2013)

[103] C.Y. Kwanue, Over 200 soldiers desert AFL, *The Liberian Observer*, 13 February 2012, http://liberianobserver.com/index.php/news/item/455-over-200-soldiers-desert-afl (Accessed 18 February 2012)

[104] She claimed, "We are treating this with urgency as a matter of priority. Greater emphasis will continue to be placed on the welfare of our military personnel and their families in the years ahead." (C.Y. Kwanue, Over 200 soldiers desert AFL)

County are going to bed hungry due to the lack of funding. The wives of the soldiers were also complaining that they are being forced to beg community members for food.[105] The families of the soldiers expressed their disaffection to President Johnson-Sirleaf about the continuous delays in receiving supplies, fuel and rations and the lack of safe drinking water, electricity and schools for their children in the barracks. The President praised the soldiers and their families for their patience and sacrifices and promised to bring up their concerns with Defense Ministry authorities in Monrovia.[106] Then, in an attempt to "buy them off", Johnson-Sirleaf provided a gift of 30 bags of rice and US$1,500 for the soldiers.[107]

In an attempt to address the chronic housing problem in the AFL, Defence Minister Samukai solicited help from the Chinese after the Americans refused to offer more assistance. The Chinese government contracted a Chinese to refurbish Camp Tubman in 2007. Samukai explained these actions on Armed Forces Day in 2013, "when we talked about Camp Tubman, they [the US] chose not to renovate Tubman. We had to ask another partner to help us renovate Camp Tubman. Because we did that, they [the US] said they will never go to Camp Tubman".[108] Additionally, Samukai announced in Sept 2012 that the government would allocate US$2.4 million for the housing, US$2 million of

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[105] Author's interview with civil society activist, Monrovia, 23 March 2012
[106] Radio Programme: Truth FM, February 22, 2012
[107] 'President Sirleaf in a region vision consultation, http://micatliberia.com/index.php/
[108] "US gov't blamed for soldiers' plight", *New Democrat*, 12 February 2013

which would be spent on building housing units at Camp Todee.[109] According to

recent reports, US$1.4m has been allocated for the first phase of renovating

Todee.[110]

There is a general lack of accountability for the slow progress of the

AFL. Liberian authorities blame the United States for the state of the army,

including its "pains and suffering" and "deplorable living conditions". Both

sides are equally culpable. Revealing his bitterness towards the U.S during an

Armed Forces Day event held at Monrovia's city hall on 12 February 2013,

defence minister Samukai blamed the US for disorganizing the AFL battalions:

> Today, they tell you that we are trying to confuse (the army). We did not.
> We are now trying to correct that. That is why you see some of your
> colleagues who are engineers; we are trying to bring them back (to the
> engineering unit). It is unfair of them [the US] to accuse us today when
> we started the process and we are now trying to correct the situation.[111]

Samukai continued, "they [the US government] took some of you from the

engineering unit and sent you to the infantry unit. They took some of you and

sent you to a different unit. We came back trying to correct that". On the same

day, Samukai also blamed the US for the congestion at Edward B.Kessely

barracks:

> The barracks that you are in currently; the EBK barracks was built for
> each soldier having an apartment. It was built so that each of you can be
> able to live there with your family [including your wife and children]. In
> 2006, a US sponsored DynCorp, in spite of our advice, in spite of the

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[109] Alva Wolokolie, 'US$2.4 million allocated for army dwellings…minister Samukai says all is well at Ivorian borders', *The Inquirer*, 7 September 2012, http://www.theinquirer.com.lr/content1.php?main=news&news_id=1000

[110] Varney Kamara, 'Armed Forces to deploy to Mali in March', *New Democrat*, 15 February 2013

[111] 'Who messes up soldiers?' *New Democrat*, 15 February 2013

insistence of government, went and partitioned your rooms and your apartments that put you [two and three of you] soldiers into one room. We didn't have the funds, they had the funds. Today, they [the US] come and tell you that we put you two and three into a room. I wanna tell you that we did not.[112]

These factors play a major role on morale, discipline and impact on the military's capacity to raise a professional military force. The appalling social conditions undermine professionalism from the bottom-up. The general approach employed in Liberia is perhaps best summed up as "short-term pain *for possible long-term gain*". However, if the social conditions in the army do not improve, soldiers will see little value in sacrificing their personal and families' short-term well-being for the military and government. By in large, the majority of young enlisted soldiers have an intrinsic desire to serve their country (US trainers emphasised this during basic training), but this sense of a greater public good will dissipate if soldiers are unable to realise better working and living conditions within the context of the armed forces that at least satisfy their (family's) basic short-term needs. Basic insecurity in the army will undermine the social basis of the new AFL.. It is the responsibility of the Liberian state authorities to address this issue. However, the Government has proven incapable of looking after its military on its own and appears determined to pass the burden of social provisioning on to foreign donors as opposed to looking inwardly and developing self-help solutions in the face of Liberians socio-economic realities. A high attrition rate in 2010-2011 mentioned above is evidence of the impatience that is settling in among the rank-and-file. In the context of appalling

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[112] 'Who messes up soldiers?'

living condition for the majority of enlisted soldiers, the needs of the officer establishment is comparatively better taken care and catered for. The government and senior military leaders must go beyond rhetoric and false promises and incentivize demonstrated loyalty to the state.

Samukai's statement in February 2013 illustrates the frustration over the US preferring to maintain maximum autonomy over decisions relating to budget and soldier welfare. Samukai complained "they [the US government] spent US$16 million at Camp Ware, when we told them to take that money and build the [new] barracks. They took US$16 million and they bought peak farmhouses. Today they are seated here and blaming us for not having a place for you [and your family] to stay. I have to bring that to your attention because I find it very interesting that today it is the minister of defence who is 'responsible' for that."[113] Samukai continued: "that today, [the Americans embassy claims] it is the minister of defence who made those choices. It was not the government of Liberia. When we decided to make sure that we can provide the things that we are providing for you, we were very realistic. When we were taking over, we said we didn't have the money to provide 24-hour electricity; we didn't lie to you. We told you that we could do ten hours, eight hours when the money is available, and that was all we could do".[114]

Changing US Security Policy in Africa
American military assistance to Africa countries and regions in the Horn and the Sahel looks set to expand under the auspices of the Department of Defence's

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[113] 'Who messes up soldiers?'
[114] 'Who messes up soldiers?'

Africa Command (AFRICOM). Launched in 2007 and established on 1 October 2008, AFRICOM is the first US overseas regional military command established in the post-Cold War period.[115] AFRICOM's main focus in Africa is Somalia (and the Horn of Africa), the Sahel, and Libya (Libya being its first operation during the 2011 civil war). In Liberia, AFRICOM's program is coordinated through the Office of Security Cooperation at the US Embassy in Monrovia and involves a Chief, more than a dozen US Army NCOs, a team of US Marines and civilian mentors in support of AFRICOM.[116] The forces are supplied through US Army Africa (USARAF) and through the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.[117] The Marine

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[115] USAFRICOM, created by former secretary of defence Donald H. Rumsfield, is responsible for US military relations with 54 African countries including the islands of Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, along with the Indian Ocean islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. U.S. Central Command maintains its traditional relationship with Egypt, though USAFRICOM coordinates with Egypt on issues relating to Africa security through U.S Central Command (established in 1983). AFRICOM is a sub-unified command under European Command (See web page of the US Africa Command, http://www.africom.mil/AfricomFAQs.asp); Daniel Volman, 'US to create new regional military command for Africa: AFRICOM', *Review of African Political Economy*, 34:114, 2007, 737-744; US National Security Strategy in Africa, unveiled by the White House on 14 June 2012. Four priorities are mentioned: strengthen democratic institutions; spur economic growth, trade and investment; advance peace and security; and promote opportunity and development. A second document that guides American military/security policy in Africa is the January 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance. This document provides priorities for the military and what armed forces are expected to do; the US ACOTA program is officially designed to provide training to African military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

[116] In 2010, the Chief of US AFRICOM's Office of Security Cooperation at the US embassy in Liberia was Colonel Al Rumphrey. Approximately 50 US military personnel currently serve up to one-year tours in Liberia as mentors to the AFL soldiers (UN Secretary General report, 23rd progress report in August 2011; Kenneth Fidler, 'US military security assistance in Liberia Progresses, *AFRICOM*, 27 October 2010). President Sirleaf indicated in January 2010 that 64 US military advisors were present in Liberia during her annual message to the Fifth session of the 52nd National legislature of the republic of Liberia, 25 January 2010 (http://temp.supportliberia.com/assets/114/2010_annual_message_detailed_version.pdf), 10.

[117] Camp Lemonier was long a major French military base, which has been taken over by the US military under a five-year agreement signed by the Djiboutian government in 2007. The CJTF-HOA hosts between 1, 400-19,000 US military personnel and civilian staff, primarily sailors, Marines and Special Forces that work with a multinational naval force composed of American naval vessels with ships from the navies of France, Italy, Germany and other NATO allies. AFRICOM also has three permanent contingency operating locations, one at the Kenyan naval

contingent was initially comprised of members from the 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment attached to CJTF-HOA. US Army Africa, headquartered in Vicenza, Italy, is the Army Service Component Command for US Africa Command and "enables full-spectrum operations while conducting sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote security, stability and peace".[118]

AFRICOM's presence in Africa has been highly controversial. First, there are legitimate concerns of America's militarised approach to Liberia's reconstruction aid.[119] Pentagon officials want to establish a base AFRICOM somewhere in Africa when conditions are favourable. However, in the past the continent's two largest governments, Nigeria and South Africa have consistently opposed this plan (recently in November 2007), stating that their governments

base at Manda Bay and at Hurso and Bilate in Ethiopia, which have been used during attacks on Somalia ('More money for the military', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 5 February 2010); Volman, 21)

[118] US Army Defence Talk, 'Malian Defence soldiers learn logistics with US Army Special Forces, 12 December 2011, http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-malian-defense-soldiers-learn-logistics-with-us-army-special-forces-92128180.html (Accessed 16 March 2013)

[119] The US department of defence budget dwarfed the state department's by a factor of approximately 17:1 in 2008 (Mark Malan, 'US Civil Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa', Washington, D.C: Refugees International, 2008', I-II. Control of development assistance is also another critical element of US security policy towards Africa. For instance, between 2002-2005, the Pentagon increased its control of development assistance six-fold, from 5.6% to 21.7%, while the percentage controlled by USAID shrunk from 65% to 40%. For critics of US militarization of Africa, see Jeremy Keenan, 'How the US Has Been Sponsoring Terrorism in the Sahara', *New Internationalist*, December 2012, 33-37; Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara, London: Pluto Press, 2013; Jeremy Keenan, 'The Dark Sahara', London: Pluto Press, 2009; David Wiley, 'Militarising Africa and African Studies and the US Africanist Response', *African Studies Review*, 24:2, 2012; see also Elisabeth Dickinson, 'Internal state department report criticizes Africa bureau*, Foreign Policy* journal, 12 August 2009, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/12/internal_state_department_report_criticizes_africa_bureau (Accessed 25 May 2013); Office of the Inspector General US Department of State, Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs, report number ISP-I-09-63, August 2009, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/127270.pdf; A. Sarjoh Bah, and Kwesi Aning. "US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM." *International Peacekeeping*, 2008, 118-132.

reject AFRICOM in their countries but also in their respective neighbourhoods in South and West Africa.[120] Liberia was the only country to publically welcome AFRICOM on the continent.[121] President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is a staunch supporter of AFRICOM and would support the hosting of its African headquarters in Liberia.[122] The US military had previously considered four different African countries hosting AFRICOM headquarters (Liberia, Botswana, Senegal and Djibouti)[123], with Liberia being the only country that was willing to allow AFRICOM personnel to be permanently based in the country.[124] However, given Liberia's lack of training facilities, it is unlikely that US will establish a headquarters in Monrovia in the near future.[125] In September 2012, the US

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[120] 'US shifts on AFRICOM base plans', *BBC*, 18 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7251648.stm (Accessed 25 May 2013)

[121] 'More money for the military', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 5 February 2010

[122] According to US diplomatic cables, Liberian legislators, including Senator Prince Johnson were also keen to support the initiative (Wikileaks cable, 'Liberia: Legislators keen on Liberia hosting AFRICOM', http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MONROVIA1393, (Assessed 25 May 2013); see also 'Report reveals why Ellen wants Africom in Liberia', *Heritage*, 11 October 2012, AllAfrica.com (accessed 23 December 2012); Daniel Volman, Why America wants military HQ in Africa, *New African*, January 2008, 40; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, 'Africa: AFRICOM can help governments willing to help themselves', Allafrica.com, 25 June 2007.

[123] According to Daniel Volman, the US military conducted consultations with various African countries, including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, and Kenya but none of these countries were willing to commit to hosting the AFRICOM. Journalist Peter Tinti however points out in a recent article that the United States military already has bases in Burkina Faso (code named 'Creek Sand'), Mauritania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Peter Tinti, 'US debates framework for counter-terror operations in Africa', *World Politics Review*, 2 January 2013).

[124] African countries have generally opposed increased US militarization on the continent. The two most outspoken critics are sub-Saharan Africa's two largest countries: South Africa and Nigeria. Outgoing US AFRICOM head General Carter Ham noted that he had visited 42 African countries and the remaining 13 "don't want me to come visit…" while "others my government doesn't want me to go" (cited in Horace G. Campbell, Dismantle AFRICOM! General Ham Makes the Case?, Pambazuka, 13 December 2012 (Accessed 7 January 2013)

[125] The Liberian government is seeking to rehabilitate Todee military barracks as a possible training facility. The Government announced at the end of 2012 that US$2.4 million would be allocated to rehabilitating Camp Todee.

military decided to maintain AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany where it has an established military base for European Command.[126]

Liberia's security sector reform program officially ended in December 2009. The US has since replaced the SSR programme with a Defense Sector Reform (DSR) program that focuses on mentoring and military maintenance (as opposed to SSR tasks like recruitment and basic training). The US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program currently sends about 40 AFL and Liberian Coast Guard personnel to the US for training annually.[127] In January 2010, AFRICOM initiated "Operation Onward Liberty" in Liberia, led by US Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF).[128] The training and exercises suggest that American approaches have been excessively focused on improving and testing the AFL's operational readiness. A post-operational review conducted in 2010 revealed "a tremendous knowledge gap on training planning, execution and logistics support" and an inability on the part of AFL senior

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126 Senator Iroegbu, US Forecloses setting up AFRICOM headquarters in Africa, *This Day*, 7 September 2012, allafrica.com (Accessed 23 December 2012)

127 Department of Defence, US Embassy in Liberia, http://monrovia.usembassy.gov/defense.html

128 Liberia's Security Sector Reform Programme, Global Security, 23 April 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/lssr.htm (Accessed 29 May 2012). Liberty is a US Marine Corps Forces Africa-led operation comprised of joint US service members who "mentor and advise the AFL in order to develop a national military that is responsible, operationally capable and respectful of civilian authority and the rule of law". (Capt. Bryon McGarry, 'Armed Forces of Liberia completes annual weapons qualification', *DVIDS*, 11 April 2013, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/104994/armed-forces-liberia-completes-annual-weapons-qualification#.UbyZQ-COJn8). It is expected that Onward Liberty will remain operational in Liberia for a minimum of five years. There are up to 50 personnel assigned to the operation including 24 Michigan National Guard personnel conducting training in Liberia in support of Operation Onward Liberty and Liberia's defence sector reform (Carter Ham's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2012, 18); see also Operation Onward Liberty, AFRICOM, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/operations/ool (Accessed 21 December 2012)

officials to engage in long-term planning beyond one-week intervals.[129] Unfortunately, civics, human rights, conflict resolution and civil-military training have not been included as components in the training.

If the previous SSR program is any indication, the Defence Sector Reform—its follow-on program—is likely to be structured primarily in accordance with US security interests in the region as opposed to particular Liberian needs. The US views Liberia as an ideal-African surrogate given its current willingness to defend and advance American political and economic interests in exchange for economic and military assistance. US interests in Liberia appear to be informed by the desire to find new sources of oil reserves in West Africa and in Liberia in particular.[130] American firm Chevron has made inroads into Liberia's oil sector since September 2010, although no significant discovery has been made in any of the country's four concession plots at this time.[131] US defence assistance to Liberia is likely to continue as a defence sector reform follow-on programme.[132]

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[129] Onward Liberty Situation report, 21 February 2010 and 14 March 2010, cited in Welken 2010, 18

[130] For more information on the significance of Africa's oil for US strategic interests in the post-9/11 world, see Daniel Volman, 'The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30: 98, 2003, 573-584; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, 'Africa's oil and American National Security', *Current History*, 103: 673, 2004, 226-231; Daniel Volman, 'The African 'Oil Rush' and the Scramble for Africa's Oil', *Third World Quarterly*, 27:4, 2006, 609-628; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, 'America, China and the Scramble for Africa's Oil' *Review of African Political Economy*, 33:108, 2006, 297-309.. On doubts over Liberia's oil discover, see Rodney D. Sieh, 'Doubts over oil discovery- did African Petroleum stretch the truth? *FrontpageAfrica,* 23 May 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201305230923.html (Accessed 25 May 2013)

[131] Chevron to acquire deep-water interest offshore Liberia, 8 September 2010, http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/09082010_chevrontoacquiredeepwaterinterestoffshoreliberia.news (Accessed 20 December 2011); on the urging of both President Sirleaf and US state department authorities, Chevron purchased 70% of Oranto's three offshore plots. On the deal, see Jonny Dwyer, 'Big Oil, Small Country', *Foreign Policy journal*, 22 February 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/22/big_oil_small_country; ExxonMobil is

The American military approach focused narrowly on "train and equip" such as improving combat skills and providing equipment (vehicles, weapons) while neglecting the importance of inculcating human rights norms and civil protection training into the overall regiment. Former Liberian President Dr. Amos Sawyer criticised US military assistance during the Cold War for exacerbating insecurities in Liberia, recalling how earlier US military training and hardware procurement (especially under Samuel Doe's rule) in the absence of human rights considerations created new sources of instability in Liberia: "every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these US trained AFL soldiers".[133] American-led military assistance was implicated in Liberia's military repression pre and post 1980 coup. There is a concern that past practices will be repeated if attention is not paid to a wider set of responsibilities beyond "training and equipping" the AFL.

Are we likely to see an expansion in America's military presence in Liberia? General Carter Ham, commander of AFRICOM during his remarks at Brown University on December 8, 2012, stated that the US Africa Command's mission was to "advance the United States' security interests in Africa, and we think we do that best by strengthening the defence capabilities of African countries so that they are increasingly capable of providing for their own defence

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zeroing in on the forth concession. See also Jonny Dwyer, 'The Oranto deal explained', *ProPublica,* http://www.propublica.org/special/the-oranto-deal-explained

[132] A. Sarjoh Bah, and Kwesi Aning. "US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM." *International Peacekeeping*, 2008, 125

[133] Malan 2008, 46

and of contributing to regional security and stability".[134] This homogenisation of African defence threats obscures the fact that current and project security threats in Liberia are no longer military in nature. Insecurity stems from internal civil unrest, socioeconomic underdevelopment, unequal distribution of opportunities and inequitable allocation of revenues from natural resources—all of which necessitate a security sector approach beyond traditional approaches.[135] The increased presence of AFRICOM and the continued Liberian defence reform program ("Operation Onward Liberty") make it plausible that US security strategy will continue to a dominant logic that guides how the Liberian army and defence force is organized and oriented for mostly external missions. It is unclear how to reconcile US strategic concerns with Liberia's human security challenges without sacrificing the latter for the former. The US views militaries in Africa as the bulwark against destabilisation. This is emphasised in the resources and attention placed on military reform as compared to resources directed to strengthening law enforcement and internal security mechanisms.

Sustainability concerns
There are genuine concerns whether the Liberian government can sustain its military on its own after external funding withdrawal.[136] For instance, the

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[134] Transcript of General Ham discussing US AFRICOM objectives and Africa security issues at Brown University, 19 December 2012, http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Transcript/10176/transcript-general-ham-discusses-us-africom-object (Accessed 15 January 2013)

[135] See UN Technical Assessment report dated 16 April 2012, S/2012/230, 13, paras. 49. The report notes that internal civil unrest currently poses the largest threat to insecurity in Liberia.

[136] In 2006, the CIA estimated that Liberia's GDP was US$902.9 million

Liberian government does not budget for its own military training.[137] The cost of up-keeping the AFL to MTOE (US) standards (in terms of procurement, training and maintenance costs) is expensive and this decision did not adequately consider Liberian governmental budgetary constraints. For instance, the contractors spent US$12 million on vehicles, including sixty-two five-ton trucks, which meant that the AFL had three times the lift capability of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), which is more than four times the size of the AFL.[138] The cost of repairing and maintaining these vehicles is substantial and must fall on the shoulder on the Liberian government. Repair and maintenance of vehicles was not part of the equipment that was provided '*gratis'* to Liberia.[139] The MTOE standards surpass what the AFL's needs and financial resources require. During the SSR process, the Government of Liberia was only required to pay salaries for soldiers, officers and staff. The SSR program funded all other aspects, from barracks construction and maintenance, uniforms, rations and initial training.[140] While the government is able to pay AFL salaries on time every month, funding constraints will likely translate into minimal funds directed at sustain training needs.[141] It remains to be seen whether Liberia can take on this burden or if military and political leaders will let the Americans and Chinese outbid one another for influence.

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[137] During the first four months of 2010, the AFL conducted no field training exercises because the Government failed to allocate funds to support the AFL. (see Welken 2010,,19).

[138] AFRICOM working paper,12, cited in Welken 2010, 29

[139] Ibid.

[140] Malan 2008, 39

[141] Welken 2010, 37

In 2009/10, the AFL/Ministry of Defence's budget was US$8 million, or approximately 2.3% of GDP.[142] During the SSRP, the defence ministry's only financial responsibility was the payment of AFL salaries. Nonetheless, the payment of salaries was a constant cause for concern for the SSR program.[143] Moreover, the United States continues to provide US$3 million from the defence reform budget to support Operation Liberty and donates approximately $134,000 per month towards fuel for generators since military barracks are "off the grid".[144] The Liberian government will no doubt remain under intense pressure to allocate funds from its limited budget to finance its own training, rehabilitation of barracks and ensuring social conditions remain adequate.[145] There is a high likelihood that Liberians politicians and defence ministry officials will use this as a point of departure to maximize its aid with its foreign partners, as Western countries (the US and EU) and China compete for influence in Liberia. The international politics functions in a way that undermines the development of self-help oriented practices to empower the AFL to operation within its own means.

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[142] Defence expenditures were 1% of GDP in 2006 and increased significantly under President Johnson-Sirleaf from US$4.6million in 2006 to $8.3 million in 2010. The 2009-2010 budget recommended a defence allocation of $8.29 (2.4% of the total state budget) but this amount was reduced to US$8 million due to unexpected budget cuts. (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Defence Budget Liberia, 21 May 2012)

[143] Welken 2010, 37

[144] Welken 37

[145] The lack of government resources to ensure sustainability in military-building in Liberia is illustrated in the fact that the government cannot afford to promote qualified private soldiers to the NCO rank. In March 2011, privates and private first class soldiers were rotating in company commander positions without receiving the corresponding elevated rank.

In the 2012 budget, the government allocated US$73 million towards education and US$71 million towards security and defence.[146] This raises an important question about priorities and trade-offs. Channeling external resources to security sector institutions can be controversial in a country where entrenched and chronic poverty exists. Whether the Government of Liberia ought to spend US$70 million on defence and security despite the large UNMIL military and police presence and the non-operational Armed Forces of Liberia is subject to criticism. Are the post-conflict priorities in the right order? The fact that the Government prefers to "invest" in security while allocating a mere $20 million towards investments in skills and livelihood programs for youth in 2012 is illustrative of the lack of commitment within the political establishment to bring about "transformational change" for the majority of Liberians.

Conclusion
The content and shape of the military was determined by what normative assumptions external actors held relating to the nature, role and responsibility of modern African militaries. Much was taken for granted in the shaping of the early reform efforts. Security reforms were implemented under the problematic assumption that functioning state institutions like an independent judiciary existed. There is a seemingly inescapable proclivity for Liberia to remain dependent on US assistance and American military doctrine to continue their historical relations and to procure aid for training, logistics (for regional or

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[146] In 2012/2013 fiscal year, allocations for the national police increased by 29%, while the AFL received an increased allocation of 22% as compared to the 2011/2012 budget (UN Secretary General report, S/2013/124, 28 February 2013, 8, paras. 34)

international theatres) and fuel subsidies. The outcome is an external *de facto* veto over the operational viability of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

By failing to give enough attention to more 'bottom-up' concerns such as education, human rights and civic training to rank-and-file soldiers during the first decade of military reform efforts, external actors have adopted the military paradigm of security that epitomizes the problem-solving approach that resembles obtaining "negative peace" as the end goal of international peacebuilding efforts. US contractors eliminated the human rights training for AFL recruits after funding issues were experienced. The SSR model adopted in Liberia had the underpinnings of a militarised "Train and Equip" approach that resembled traditional US military assistance to Liberia.[147] The SSR model, although people-centered on paper, remains state-centric and top-down in practice with its focus on reforming central state institutions (army, police, ministries and parliament secondarily).

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[147] Nicole Ball, 'The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda' in Mark Sedra (ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, Ottawa: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010.

Chapter 9
Conclusions

Previous chapters have identified the modalities that external actors used to control, influence and shape statebuilding efforts in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. These statebuilding practices can shed light on how peacebuilding interventions are conducted, envisioned and implemented. Despite considerable western involvement over the past decade, the structural causes of conflict have been unaddressed and continue to persist in the so-called "post-conflict" period. The way that interventions were conceptualised and practiced in the particular cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia has not produced outcomes that have been favourable to establishing the foundations for sustainable peace. While large-scale violence has not returned to either country, there are signs of trouble laying over the horizon.

With respect to UK and US statebuilding strategies, the imposition of an international framework for statebuilding that emphasised institutional, bureaucratic and administrative aspects of the state, peacebuilders failed to problematise the nature of that state—historically as either as a post-colonial creation in Sierra Leone or as an institution that exercised more than one hundred years of domination over indigenous Liberians. Imposing tight deadlines to conduct elections and implementing strategies to reconsolidate state authority ignored the logic of violence embedded within the state and the exercise of power associated with state authority that has inflicted structural violence against citisens. In doing so, the bracketing of historical violence failed

to understand the multiple reasons why individuals take up arms against state authority and falsely views youth as products of "senseless violence" or "barbarism" instead of realising the political nature informing their actions. The emphasis on "stabilisation", resumption of state authority, disarmament and "capacity" building of police and military failed to consider whether these efforts aimed at quickly stabilising a "post-conflict" situation could actually sow the seeds for a more unstable, chaotic and tension ridden politics down the road.

One of the main differences in the two approaches was that Britain—as former colonial master—had a long history of assuming an entrenched role in Sierra Leone. The security-centric and problem-solving nature of British foreign policy in post-conflict Sierra Leone represented a continuation of dominant practices that date back to the colonial period involving the imposition of a universalizing logic on the political, social and cultural foundations in that society. The restoration of traditional authorities in the provinces within the larger framework of consolidating a unified nation-state broadly in the mold of a Weberian state represents the continuation of past colonial practices.[1] In contrast, the Americans had never assumed an entrenched role within Liberian state institutions. Since a decision was made to "outsource" military-building to US private contractors (organisations that did not have extensive local contacts

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[1] During the transition to independence in Sierra Leone in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the British military played a primary role as executive authorities in the Ministry of Defence and RSLAF and shaped important technical matters related to budgeting, training, procurement and military development. A British military commander (Brigadier Blackie) served in the capacity of Force Commander of RSLMF until 1964 while junior Sierra Leonean officers were being groomed for top-level posts. The foundations of the post-colonial "state" were largely skeletal and oriented towards continuing the pre-existing colonial order. The British left behind a small military training team of about twenty military personnel but its influence waned considerably as did its strategic interest in Sierra Leone.

beyond the capital), the Liberian government was unable to extend its state authority to the rural counties in the same manner and level of effectiveness as had happened in Sierra Leone. Almost a decade after the war ended in Liberia (in 2011), the United Nations continues to recognize the Government of Liberia's limitations in extending its state authority in the counties. In Sierra Leone, for example, the British government supported President Kabbah's proposal of re-establishing local chiefdom institutions as an extension of central state authority in the provinces. Insights from the case studies in this dissertation demonstrates the need to problematise not only the central state structures and practices embedded within African states but also local institutions that reproduce the causes of violent conflict.

Major questions flow from this dissertation. First, is that peacebuilding and security sector reform interventions raise important questions about the selection of individuals and groups who participate in shaping the overall vision and approach. Second, how peacebuilding and SSR interventions are practiced and the methods employed during all stages of the process—from the inception and throughout the course—has a significant impact on the degree of ownership that is created or squandered.

The way that SSR interventions were conceptualised and practiced in the particular cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia has not produced outcomes that have been favourable to establishing foundations for sustainable peace. While large-scale violence has not returned to either country, there are signs of trouble laying over the horison. In the cases examined, with a few exceptions, the

peacebuilding literature has ignored the political nature of statebuilding interventions and the problematic nature of reconsolidating state authority during the immediate war-peace transition. The failure to problematise this approach underscores the conservative, problem-solving bias inherent in most peacebuilding perspectives. The failure to address underlying structures of conflict, including concentration of power (and wealth) in the elite; the continuation of state practices that perpetuate violence, inequality, and poverty; and the nepotistic nature of the state and the elite's monopoly of control over socio-economic opportunities has left Sierra Leone and Liberia in "permanent states of transition" to nowhere.

Peacebuilding practices are fundamentally interlinked with "political engineering", shaping who is selected as a local interlocutor, and in some cases, placing senior officials in high-level state administration positions. External actors were influential in determining priorities and which actions should take precedent over others. The mainstream SSR "post-conflict" literature does not underscore the political nature of these interventions, nor have SSR scholars properly interrogated the positionality of so-called foreign "experts" vis-à-vis local actors and how asymmetrical relations of power shape and condition the intervention and the relationship between "local ownership" and sustainability of reforms on the ground. Additionally, the willingness to expedite and condense statebuilding tasks into a narrow timeframe is inherently problematic and contravenes the logic under which state formation evolved in Western Europe.

Underscoring the political nature of peacebuilding and SSR practices, the

political class' role in war-peace transitions is a critical consideration. Their involvement may be a necessary but insufficient condition for lasting peace. An exclusive focus on elite accommodations may result in the obtainment of "negative peace" but perpetuates the underlying structures of violence embedded within the state and society unless it is accompanied by robust commitment for change. However, in the particular cases examined, the political class in Liberia and Sierra Leone continue to show a lack of interest in improving material standards of living for the majority of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. Over a decade of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and nearly a decade in Liberia, both countries continue to demonstrate a lack of progress in socio-economic development. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia continued to languish near the bottom of the UNDP's human development index and Transparency International's Corruption Index despite considerable external investment/aid targeted at social reforms in economic, security and the polity.[2]

While it is important for peacebuilding approaches to engage but "go beyond" the elite and the central government, it is also critical to problematise the inclusion of rebel leaders and warring factions into precarious power-sharing agreements. Problem-solving approaches concentrates on who holds the balance of power after the war and works deliberately through those actors to make a deal for peace. This approach does not questioning dominant power structures that state and society. The point I am making is that the selection of interlocutors

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[2] By 2007, Sierra Leone's per capita income stood at US$241, which is considerably lower than incomes in the 1970s (International Monetary Fund, Sierra Leone: Selected issues and statistical appendix, Washington, DC: IMF, 2009, 34, 45). See also Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2011', available at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/re- (Last accessed 2 January 2013)

is itself a political act and is hardly a "technical" consideration as "SSR" literature assumes.

Despite what some believe in Africa, greater international attention and resources focused on post-conflict statebuilding will not necessarily lead to better outcomes. One Sierra Leonean academic told me that if her country had received even a fraction of what NATO was spending on "SSR" in Afghanistan or Iraq, then the problems embedded within Sierra Leone's security sector could have been more adequately addressed.[3] It is not about spending more money or even greater UN Security Council focus on African countries on the margins of the global community's attention. It is more important to focus on developing better interventions within the limited resources available and concentrating on developing more endogenous frameworks that integrate local knowledge and broad-based national dialogue before statebuilding reforms are implemented. The UN/US/UK's propensity to consolidate state authority and "build state capacity" (to "reduce state fragility") in the way that is outlined in this dissertation obscures the political nature of these interventions, the biases towards their western models and the lack of problematisation the nature of that state authority, which serves to support a status quo and perpetuates political structures and practices in the state that inflicts violence against its citizens and

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[3] We were talking about the IMATT mission in Sierra Leone and comparing it to the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. The NATO training mission has 2,700 trainers and in 2012 operated on a budget of $11.2 billion. In comparison, IMATT's ten-year expenditure in Sierra Leone was about $105 million—not even 1% of expenditures and less than 1% of the total manpower for the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. The American-led military reform efforts of the Armed Forces of Liberia cost about 2% of what the NATO's mission and less than 1% of total manpower in Afghanistan. She had made the point that if Sierra Leone or Liberia received even a fraction of what NATO provides Afghanistan, there would be a qualitative difference in the outcomes on the ground, without interrogating whether how external military assistance is envisioned and how it is implemented.

in the everyday realm.

The peacebuilding literature "brackets" these aspects and downplays the highly politicised nature of "reforms" (through its technical language and "expertise" discourse) thereby obscuring the legitimizing role of outside assistance in strengthening particular political orders and supporting the local political class's position during the immediate "transition" period. The NTGL authorities in Liberia (2004-2005) demonstrated its unwillingness to refrain from continuing corrupt practices that are endemic within the state in order to secure their narrow economic interests. The US was forced to backtrack on the previously agreed power-sharing arrangement and forced Liberia to embrace international standards of governance (through the GEMAP).

By failing to problematise in both theory and in practice each country's history in state formation and recognising that "state authority" has potentiated violence in these societies misses the point entirely that statebuilding tasks need to be practiced differently. No amount of "reform" or "tweaking" of the system by holding regular competitive elections will address the deficit in legitimate political rule in these societies. Defining "legitimate political rule" as something that can be achieved through narrow procedural requirements like conducting elections during in the war-peace transitions reproduces the same structures and institutions that perpetuate violence between state and its citizens and in everyday life. Ultimately, the "stabilisation" proponents of the "liberal peace" scholarship either fail to recognize or simply only give token nod to the need for addressing the structural causes of violence in these societies, almost implying

that it is not within the realm of the possible or is simply a "pipe-dream" envisioned by the social justice advocates. In doing so, these scholars hide their conservative, problem-solving bias towards the status quo that may have more to do with obscuring their interests in sustaining a particular western/Liberal global order. I have tried to outline how a critical theory approach that focuses on power analysis at the center of analysis can aid in developing more effective outcomes on the ground. An alternative paradigm is required, perhaps one that focuses on job creation and stimulating the economy, as opposed to conducting statebuilding that enables the established elite to benefit disproportionately from the so-called "peace dividend".

A critical theory approach that recognizes (state) power at the center of its analysis calls attention to the fact that external efforts aimed at "tweaking" the system take place in a field of constantly evolving political struggle and external reforms becomes an endeavor that ultimately requires altering particular groups' political positioning vis-à-vis the state. Chapter Five (Security Sector and Military Reform in Sierra Leone) demonstrates that the British held executive authority over decisions relating to the police during the initial three years of the war-peace transition. Assigning a British ex-police officer as Inspector-General of Police in Sierra Leone enabled the British to streamline police practices and restructure the organisational template of the police institution. While these practices were implemented in a highly political environment where senior Sierra Leonean police officers were subordinate to the British Inspector General

(and even British advisors), a certain degree of success has been achieved, notwithstanding funding and sustainability concerns.

The international macro-approach demonstrated a lack of understanding of the structural causes of the conflicts in both Sierra Leone and Liberia and a general misunderstanding of the key warring factions' motives, compositions, and politico-historical dynamics. It is therefore unsurprising that despite more than a decade of international intervention, the UN has failed to ameliorate the underlying structural causes of violence in these particular societies. Instead of relying on military personnel to "keep the peace" and implementing "quick impact" projects, in the first ten years of the war-peace transition, the UN could have engaged in fostering dialogue ethnic groups in conflict with one another as a result of the brutal civil war in Liberia (in particular, reconciling the Krahns and Gios on one hand and Gios and the Mandingos ethnic groups on the other, are obvious examples). There are material, institutional cultural and bureaucratic reasons why the UN works within the Westphalian nation-state framework, and is unable to effectively engage in other "nation building" tasks involving building social capital and fostering a democratic political culture. But is it even desirable and does the UN have the capacity and political will to "facilitate" national dialogue and cultivate more "nationally owned" peace that goes beyond achieving "negative peace"?

By adopting its passive and conservative practices, the UN is supporting the re-establishment of the status quo at least as it relates to the particular cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. At worst, UN intervention is complicit in creating

short-term dependency (in terms of material resources as well as primary security) and undermines the re-writing of "social contracts" between the political elite and ordinary citizens.

The international community should recognise that some humility concerning the limits of international "statebuilding" in the Global South is necessary. Peacebuilders need to be more careful in presuming that liberal peacebuilding is a benign form of the *mission civilitrice*. It is unrealistic to assume that after ten years of "peacebuilding" that external can create western state institutions in post-conflict African in a compressed period of time. Interestingly, the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States notes that governance transformations may take "twenty to forty years" to realise and that "overly technocratic interventions have failed to produce local ownership and yield legitimate reforms from the perspective of local actors".[4]

African state institutions need to be given an opportunity to develop their own institutions outside of the mirror reflections of their former colonial mold or the Weberian ideal-type. African institutions need to be given space to develop outside of the western intellectual and political traditions. This necessarily requires a shift away from economic and intellectual and military dependence on the former colonial masters.[5] This may require a complete departure from the various forms of political, educational, and intellectual systems in both form and

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[4] OECD/International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, 'A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States', 2011,
http://www.oecd.org/site/dacpbsbdialogue/documentupload/49151944.pdf

[5] I do not mean a radical shift in the way that Charles Taylor attempted to build an alternative state structure during his presidency from 1997-2003 (See Chapter 6 on Taylor's alternative security forces and his attempts to reform the AFL; see also Appendix 2)

content. At the same time, one cannot assume that the established political class has an interest in broad based development in their countries. International donors should attempt a critical assessment of the performance of African (and elsewhere) governments and heads of state by asking if the leader or the institution in question is doing its "best" given the circumstances and to critically question whose interests are being served by their dominant agenda.

Alternatives to the Theory of "Liberal Peacebuilding" in Africa?

The concept of "reform" implies tinkering on the margins as opposed to the long and arduous task of "transforming" the state security apparatus to become more democratic and accountable to its citizens. Additionally, we need to formulate alternative concepts of so that SSR agenda can support a vision of "peacebuilding" that is more broad-based and transformational in nature.

Emphasis must be placed on security sector transformation—without fully addressing structures and practices within the state that impact on the everyday realm of social relations in society, then equitable economic development and justice cannot ever be fully realised. At the same time, security sector transformation is not the solution to sustainable peace. One needs to security sector with economic transformation, specifically, the creation of jobs for ex-combatants and youth. In Liberia, investing in local industries and improving skills would have reduced the sources of internal insecurity, allowing for an earlier downsizing of UNMIL's military component as early as possible.[6]

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[6] WDR 2011; Christine Cubitt, 'Employment in Sierra Leone: What Happened to Post-Conflict Job Creation?' *African Security Review* 20:1, 2011. The replacement of a larger but less

Conducting SSR in challenging contexts such as Liberia or Sierra Leone is amplified under conditions of widespread poverty, illiteracy and weak civil society institutions. Military-building is not a "magic bullet" and prioritising economic development or addressing the causes of human insecurity may be a more appropriate starting point in the first decade of peacebuidling efforts. The SSR process may empower military officers to engage in illegal extraction of resources from the state, especially after external actors departure from the country and after the reality sets in that state budgets are limited. Efforts could perhaps prioritise building a larger police force and small, well-trained and mobile military instead.

To what extent is it possible to envision a new role for external actors in peacebuilding, whereby their interests are in creating a "level playing field" in postwar environments to ensure that marginal voices can meaningfully participate in the political, economic and social space and to place more robust contraints on the political elite's exercise of power. This might involve delaying multiparty elections for a period of three or four years to allow for substantive national dialogue to occur on constitutional reform and other mechanisms to democratise the powers of the Republican-style Executive Branch in sub-Saharan Africa (and North Africa). One should reconsider a role for more disinterested "Lead States" (other than Britain, France and the US) that could specialise in UN peacebuilding operations to replace the standard former colonial power paradigm that is often adopted in West Africa.

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expensive CivPol presence (UNMIL military troops totaled 14,785 and represented 43% of UNMIL's budget for that year) could have reduced costs towards the mission.

An alternative "security sector transformation" paradigm would go far beyond transforming existing state security structures. SSR must be informed by a social transformation approach that seeks to build an active, educated and engaged citisenry that can be capable of defending the nation against arms and can hold elected politicians accountable and remove the "spoils logic" that characterises the organisation and exercise of political power in post-colonial African states.

<u>**Appendences**</u>

Appendix 1: Notes on Data Collection in West Africa
During the data collection in West Africa, I strived for "orderly cumulation" as much as possible. It was difficult to know in advance whether components of the data I sought could be obtained. Students seeking to understand the relationships between external and internal actors in peacebuilding confront access and data problems. Not only is data on African militaries difficult to obtain for security reasons, but unfortunately in Sierra Leone and Liberia, there is an absence of robust record-keeping practices in the past. Additionally, the effects of wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were felt not only in terms of unwritten narratives by the deceased, but also in terms of those existing historical documents that were penned on paper. For instance, in Sierra Leone, many documents in the national archives were destroyed in the Armed Forces Personnel. Army personnel records had been kept at Murraytown barracks until 1997. When the AFRC took over Murraytown in 1997, most of the records were destroyed by junta soldiers seeking to destroy their personal files in order to avoid prosecution in the future. Some documents were destroyed by looters.[7] Those that were not destroyed were archived and currently reside at Cockerill—Armed Forces Personnel Center (AFPC) in Freetown.

The data problem was remedied in part through interviews with individuals involved in the post-conflict DDR and SSR process. Some documents from Sierra Leone's defence ministry were unobtainable due to the classified nature of the data. Defence officials told me that Britain advises their office to destroy

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[7] Interviews with Sierra Leone police; military and security officials, Freetown

internal documents every 3-5 years.[8]

In Monrovia, I was unable to access Liberia's ministry of defence internal documents. I did however locate a significant number of Ministry of Defence annual reports to the Legislature, at the Library Information Service at the Legislature, thanks to the kind assistance provided to me by the director, McCarthy. In order to access any archives in Liberia, I relied on a letter of introduction prepared and signed by my advisor, Dr. Joseph Guannu. Dr. Guannu is well-known historian in Liberia and his assistance was instrumental. What he was able to do in a week, would have likely taken me a few months. Dr. Guannu's assistance was helpful for gaining access to the Ministry of Defence in Liberia. The initial goal was to interview the minister. However, Brownie Samukai refused my request on several occasions. I was unable to convince him to make time for an interview, despite many attempts through other contacts in the Ministry of Defence, Government of Liberia as well as the Government's National Security Advisor. There was a dearth of records remaining in Monrovia from the People's Redemption Council (PRC) days. I obtained only a few documents from this period at the Library Information Centre at the Liberian Legislature. According to Professor Guannu, Liberia has a history of poor record keeping practices.

In order to access archives from Sierra Leone's national archives (located at Fourah Bay College), I was required to fill out a form, along with a letter of support or institutional affiliation from a Sierra Leonean authority, a $50 fee and

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[8] Author's interviews with Ministry of Defence officials, Freetown, November-December 2011

an explanation of the type of materials I wished to access. The archives at FBC were open most days from 9 a.m. to 3p.m from Monday to Friday. There was electricity in the archives for the most part; I relied on my personal laptop and was able to set up a desk to work at. Any documents of interest were digitized personally by myself. Photocopying arrangements were made onsite for certain documents.

For the DDR archives in Sierra Leone, there was an existing catalogue of the collections that proved useful during the data collection process. Fortunately, a great deal of the written records were available at the archives, which helped to illuminate government positions before key meetings. These documents were stored in pink and blue small boxes (approximately five to six inches wide and 1.5 feet in length). Some important final reports were however missing (stolen by previous researchers before me). I obtained records from the tripartite meetings, including hand-written notes from the meetings, Government of Sierra Leone position papers relating to negotiations, and minutes from technical coordinating committee meetings (which dealt with the demobilisation component) and project appraisal committee meetings (PAC) (which dealt with reintegration component). I sought to gather a balanced perspective from key decision-makers and individuals in-charge of devising and implementing the strategies—both international and local. I was unable to access the I.D database of ex-combatants participating in the "DDR" program—either in hardcopy or soft copy—despite a number of requests made to Dr. Francis Kai-Kai (former executive secretary of NCDDR).

Where documents were impossible to obtain, I relied on in-depth interviews with as many key stakeholders close to decision-making circles as possible I was in close contact with Dr. Francis Kai-Kai and gained more in-depth insights during those interviews than I could have otherwise. Additionally, Dr. Kai-Kai provided helpful suggestions on individuals to speak with both in Sierra Leone and Liberia. For instance, Dr. Kai-Kai put me in touch contacts from the NCDDRR in Liberia.

In Liberia, obtaining access to the DDR files was initially difficult. When I met a former NCDDRR official, I was informed that the DDR archives could not be made accessable since they were in storage, and 'disorganized'. One former NCDDRR staff member was in the process of applying for a grant from UNDP and the World Bank to organize the records into a proper archival database for storage and future research. After gaining permission from the director of Liberian Archival Center (Tubman Boulevard in Sinkor), I located the files/binders in a locked storage building at the back of the Center for National Documents and Records (National Archives) at 96 Ashmun Street in Monrovia. There were approximately 12-15 cardboard boxes full of binders that contained documents and files from the NCDDRR. The collection contained mostly reports that could not be obtained otherwise. However, the quality of some of the documents was poor due to inadequate storage facilities and archival practices.

Appendix 2: Taylor's Security Forces

Charles Taylor
Commander-in-Chief

Kpenkah Y. Konah
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff[9]

Benjamin D. Yeaton   ATU[10]
Deputy-Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff
Director of Special Security Service (SSS)

Chuckie
Taylor

Army	Marine	Navy	Strike Force	Wild Geese

General Fassu Coco Denis[11]   Adolphus Dolo Michael Cheaplay
Deputy CoS   CoS   CoS   CoS

---

[9] This position was largely ceremonial. At the political level, Moses Blah was Vice-President. However, real power was exercised by Taylor's second-in-line, Benjamin D. Yeaton.

[10] Anti-terrorist unit (ATU) was reportedly headed by Mr. Taylor's son 'Chuckie' and a Sierra Leonean Momoh Jibba (a Mende from Kailahun)

[11] Coco Dennis headed the various commercial operations in Gbarnga and Grand Gedeh, for Mr. Taylor's including logging interests in Rivercess in 1997 (The Usual Suspects, pp. 21); Dennis was also reportedly one of the commanders (alongside Sam Bockerie and Benjamin Yeaton) of former ATU ex-RUF and former NPFL combatants fighting in western Cote D'Ivoire after 28 November 2002 (Charles Taylor's Son on the Rampage Again, The Perspective, 20 December 2002).

Taylor's political wing, (most of whom were members of the educated but marginalised political or economic elite):

- John T. Richardson – Advisor to National Security
- Harry A. Greaves[12] – Advisor to the chairman on Economic Affairs
- Benoi Urey – Maritime Commissioner – 1999-2002
- Oscar Cooper (Captain Marvel) – business partner
- Cyril Allen – Chair of National Patriotic Party (NPP)
- Tom Woewiyu – former defense minister in NPFL; friend of Taylor's who studied in the US (New Jersey area) in the 1970s
- *Daniel Chea – Defense Minister
- Lavalla Supuwood- legal advisor, former labour and justice minister; former Solicitor General in Doe's government
- Reginald B. Goodridge – deputy minister of state and press secretary
- Dr. Walid Arbid – Lebanese legal advisor[13]
- Abass Fawaz- Lebanese business man based in Harper and Abidjan; President and chief shareholder of Maryland Wood Processing Industries (MWPI); attached to Merilin Wood Processing Industry
- Charles Brumskine – legal advisor
- Mussa Cissé[14]- business partner/Chief protocol officer for the Executive Mansion (Mohamed Group of Companies) owned by Mohammed Salame
- Nathaniel Barnes, Former Minister of Finance
- Emmanuel Shaw- business partner
- Edwin M. Snow – former Managing Director of Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation (LPRC); current legislative member representing Monsterrado county district #5; after the war he obtained a Bachelors degree in public administration
- Alfred Mehn, - respected government official that fled after PRC came to power (key recruiter in late 1980s)
- Sanjivan Ruprah- Kenyan national designated as Ambassador-at-Large-facilitated arms shipments in 2002 with Serbia
- *Former Liberian Coast Guard officer

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[12] According to Stanley Meisler, Greaves basically adopted Americo-Liberian culture and was a member of the TWP, but his father is a Bassa and mother is from River Cess Bassa too. His real name is Harry A. Zachpah Jr. (Stanley Meisler, Liberia, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1973).

[13] Both Farwad and Arwaz were connected to Robert Bourgi, a 66-year old lawyer who was a key conduit between France and its former African colonies in the 1980s. He was primarily responsible for securing ties with Franco-African leaders. Bourgi was born in Senegal and became a law professor. He was close to Laurent Gbabgo. In September 2011, Bourgi admitted to accepting bribes (about US$20 million) from African leaders to French President Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin between 1995-2005. (See Robert Bourgi and the 'dirty cash' scandal, 14 September 2001, France24, http://www.france24.com/en/20110913-week-france-dominique-de-villepin-jacques-chirac-banking-financial-crisis-sport-doping (Accessed 8 August 2012).

[14] Cissé died in June 2007 in Monrovia, according to a US wikileaks cable dated 21 June 2007 (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07STATE86894.html)

Appendix 3: Sierra Leone's Disarmament Schedule and Timeline

- Kambia (May 2001) Lunsar, Port Loko (completed June 2001, followed by Sierra Leone military deployment in Kambia district on 31 May 2001.[15]
- Bonthe (July 2001)
- Koinadugu (RUF/AFRC) and Moyamba (RUF) 31 August 2001. In practice, Moyamba's disarmament started on 15 August 2001. Koinadugu began disarmament on 22 August and completed on 22 October;
- Bombali and Bo (completion date expected 30 September 2001). In practice, Bo disarmed 23 September 2001 and Bombali completed disarmament on 14 October 2001[16];
- Tonkolili and Pujehun (31 October 2001). These two districts were disarmed from 1-14 November 2001;
- Kenema and Kailahun (30 November 2001) were disarmed 15-30 November, notwithstanding setbacks that occurred in early December. Disarmament stalled in Kenema and Kailahun as Issa Sesay ordered his commanders cease disarming to protest what he perceived was ill treatment suffered during the national consultative conference held in Freetown in November 2001. The RUF expressed concern over the delay in transforming the RUF into a political party and the continued detention of RUF leaders. The disarmament process resumed, however, on 11 December 2001.[17]

Appendix 4: The 48 ex-Generals political structure during NCDDRR

Each faction had an elected or appointed Chairman designate, a Secretary-General, treasurer and members-at-large. In addition to sixteen 'Generals', an overall leader was selected to represent the 48 Generals during UN meetings.[18]

Edward Q Teah, a former MODEL member, assumed the role of Chairman for

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[15] Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/627, 25 June 2001.

[16] Makeni is Bombali largest city and economic center of the Northern province, and at the time was an RUF headquarters; Bo, the southeastern capital was a stronghold of the CDF/*Kamajor*. Bo was essentially impenetrable as a result of robust *Kamajor* military presence in and around the city.

[17] Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 1 December 2001, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 31 December 2001.

[18] Roland Duo served as the former Government of Liberia coordinator. George Tarley served as senior coordinator for MODEL and Philip Kamara was LURD's senior coordinator. (Author's confidential interview with former 48 General, 16 April 2012)

his faction. Amos S. Yini acted as General Secretary (former GoL); James Vayee, member, former GoL; A Mussah Kanneh, Member, former LURD; William McGill, member, former MODEL; Sharke Kamara, member, former LURD. See below for the composition and membership list of the '48-former Generals'.

Appendix 5: Sierra Leone's Postwar National Security Architecture

National Security Council Coordinating Group

Defence policy committee

Parliamentary Oversight Committee on defence and parliamentary affairs

Appendix 6: Annual Salary of RSLAF officers and soldiers (as of September 1999)

Brig	Le 9.0m
COL	Le 6.335m
Lt. Col	Le 4.8M
Major	Le 1,920,240
Capt.	Le 1,043, 700
Lt.	Le 907,500
WOI	Le 742,500
WOII	Le 697,500
SSGT	Le 594,000
SSG	Le 567,300
CPL	Le 494,100
L/CPL	Le 483,600
PTE	Le 421,200

Appendix 7: Principles for Sierra Leone's Military Reintegration Programme (MRP)[19]

1. Fairness
2. Transparency
3. Recruitment based on objective, ability based criteria
4. Individual choice
5. No 'free passes' for any group
6. Level playing field
7. Training to be integrated as soon as possible
8. Firm linkage between civilian and military reintegration programs
9. Fixed manpower ceiling for the new Armed Forces
10. The process to be fully representative.

Appendix 8: Military Reintegration Programme: Six Phases

Stage 1: During the demobilisation and pre-discharge orientation of the encampment phase of "DDR", ex-combatants were briefed about the MRP and provided with an opportunity to express their interest in joining a new RSLAF.[20]

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[19] The general framework of Military Reintegration Program (MRP) informed who was eligible to participate in the programme was based the following criteria as interpreted from the CPA. (Restricted D/DHQ/ACOS Sp/1014/2 dated 30 July 2001, 2)

[20] The post-discharge orientation process was conducted by NCDDR officials or an RSLAF briefing team deployed at NCDDR request. 'Potential Recruit Application Forms' were distributed to those demobilised combatants that expressed interest during DDR. A course-

Stage two: Temporary holding camps were created at THC Kabatha Junction and opened on 4 June 2001. Recruits were placed in Syndicates of 30 soldiers while they underwent military training drills and engaged in sporting activities. A formal screening was conducted based on medical background, marital status and age.[21]

Stage three: A personnel selection camp was established at Lungi Garrison on 11 June 2001 and later located at the THC, Kabala and Gondama. Potential recruits underwent medical examinations here, according to existing RSLAF standards and were tested for physical, basic literacy and numeracy and military tests. On the selection tribunals the UNAMSIL Colonel usually chaired and included MRP liaison officers from the RUF and CDF, hired by NCDDR.[22] IMATT officers were also involved in providing the Secretariat and served as "impartial observers and as chairman on several occasions".[23] Successful applicants were offered entry to the RSLAF as either Private, *Potential* NCO or *Potential* officer.[24] Successful applicants were attested into the RLSAF

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grained filter (age and visual medical screening) was also applied to screen out the no-hopers' (D/DHQ/ACOS SP/1014/2 dated 30 July 2001 2)

[21] Jackson and Albrecht claim that background checks were made by SLP and RSLAF intelligence personnel, which is incorrect (see Jackson and Albercht 2009, 65)

[22] The MRP liaison officers (from RUF and CDF-Aaron and Kangoma) were normally deployed (by helicopter) during the first phase of the DDR process and to major centers to 'identify, group and sensitize those wishing to join the MRP'. (MRP memo dated 5 February 2002, in author's possession).

[23] Ibid. p 3

[24] Rank offered was based primarily on numerical score, age and overall assessment of potential. Entry standards were: a) 6 to 9 points – Private soldier; b) 9 to 12 points – potential NCO; c) 12 to 15 points – potential officer. Although initial proposals included HIV and Drugs testing, these were later discontinued for administrative reasons. This author viewed the rudimentary tests results within the MRP participant's military personnel files. He observed that these tests were very simple and many individuals could not even write properly.

immediately upon completing the personal selection camp, and moved directly to Stage 4.[25]

Stage four: At Mape/Santigieya (known as Mape), the holding and basic training group (HBTG) opened on 14 June 2001 and closed one 20 March 2002. Recruits were placed in platoons (albeit still dressed in civilian clothes) and began the process of integrating with their unit. Payment of salaries commenced. Soldiers were subjected to military discipline, and undertook basic military training.[26]

Stage five: Integrated bridging training at the Armed Forces Training Center (AFTC-Bengeuma): The first batch of MRP participants received training on 30 July 2001 and the last completed their training on 17 May 2002. Recruits were provided with uniforms and equipment and commenced 9 weeks of infantry training within their platoon. Training was led by British soldiers and assisted by RSLAF instructors. Those with Potential rank status underwent additional "leadership training". British military officers overseeing the programme wrote weekly reports for all holders of Potential rank and an overall summary report at

---

[25] Failures of the MRP were discharged from the process and automatically qualified to receive NCDDR benefits.

[26] This included, Drill, Fitness Training, Sport, International Humanitarian Law, Medical (Personal hygiene, First Aid, HIV/Aid awareness), Basic literacy, and community projects and assessment of their conduct was evaluated.

the end of the training. The first tranche of 316 ex-combatants were trained alongside existing RSLAF soldiers on short-term training team 9 (STTT9).[27]

Stage six: In the final stage, soldiers were assigned to units and subject to oversight and the achievement of "satisfactory performance" for a six-month period after which their temporary rank would be substantiated.[28] Immediately after, the British increased pay for RSLAF soldiers from \$15.00 per month to \$50.00 plus a provision of rice.[29]

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[27] A summary follows: a) STTT9 – 30 July to 28 September 2001 (Run by 2L1); b) MRPG 1 – 22 October to 21 December 2001- (run by 1 RGJ); c) MRPG 2 – 7 Jan to 8 March 2002 – (run by 1 RGR); d) MPRG 3- 18 March to 17 May 2002 – (run by 1 RGR). The final batch of about 51 ex-combatants completed training in August 2002.

[28] Jackson et al 2009, 65

[29] Keen 2005, 285

Appendix 9: Clearance Letter to Access Military Information and Archives, Letter from Ministry of Defence, Tower Hill, Freetown, Sierra Leone

RESTRICTED

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
TOWER HILL
FREETOWN
Tel: 076616457/033441279

Reference: MOD/Pers/Trg/7/2/15

CO AFPC   Date: 23 January 2010

CLEARANCE TO ACCESS MILITARY INFORMATION AND ARCHIVES

1.   Bearer is Mr Christopher Dyek is a Phd candidate from the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada on research for his doctoral thesis with specific focus on the DDR and the Security Sector Reform process

2.   The MOD has granted permission that he is allowed access for an interview so that he can collect primary information pertinent to his subject of research. Please grant him any further assistance he may deem necessary for his subject of research.

EN TAYLOR
Col
D Def Pers

Copy to:

CDS
DCDS
ACDS Pers/Trg
Mr Christopher DYEK
DDTER

RESTRICTED

Appendix 10: Clearance Letter to Access Military Personnel from Ministry of National Defence, Monrovia, Liberia

CUTTINGTON UNIVERSITY

SUAKOKO, BONG COUNTY
P. O. BOX 10-0277

1000 MONROVIA 10 LIBERIA

Office of the Director
Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution
Cuttington University

Email: jsayeguannu@yahoo.com
Cell#: (+231)886556988

February 13, 2012

_____

_____

_____

This is a brief note of introduction to one of my visiting researchers, Christopher Dyck, a Canadian PhD candidate who is completing fieldwork in Liberia for his doctoral dissertation. in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. I am hosting Mr. Dyck at as a research associate in the **Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida Graduate School of International Studies (IBB),** University of Liberia, Monrovia.

Would you be so kind as to allow him access for an interview so that he can collect primary information on Liberia's Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reintegration processes. Mr. Dyck identified you as an expert he would like to speak with. I would ask if you could kindly grant Mr. Dyck an interview for this leg of his research. **Please be assured that your full confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed.** The interview should take no more than one hour. Also, if you can suggest other colleagues knowledgeable on this topic, that would be very useful as well.

My sincere thanks and appreciation for providing this assistance to Mr. Dyck. You may contact Mr. Dyck directly in order to coordinate a suitable time for the interview. Should you have any questions concerning this request, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Professor Saye Guannu, Senior Professor, IBB

Republic of Liberia

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA
Monrovia, Liberia
Cell: 05-700477

HQ AFL/11/A

See Distribution   01 Mar 12

REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH SOLDIERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA AT VARIOUS BASES

Reference:

A.   A letter from office of the Director Institute for Peace & Conflict
      Resolution Cuttington University
B.   A letter from office of the Policy Analyst HMoD undated   Feb 12.

1.   Reference A conveyed a request by the office of the Policy Analyst
HMoD in favor of Mr. Christopher Dyck from the University of Alberta in
Edmonton-Canada to hold an interview with some members of the Armed
Forces of Liberia in furtherance of his PHD dissertation. The office of J-1
along with Mr. Dyck has selected names of some AFL member as possible
candidate from various units for the interview.

2.   Consequently, I am directed to convey the COS approval for the
interview with members of the AFL as requested by HMoD. I am further
directed to forward a copy of a selected list comprising member of all units
from which commanders will play supervisory role. Category of names to
be submitted are as follows; Ten (10) enlisted and five (5) officers for the
interview. The following units to submit are as follows:

    A. 23RD Inf Bde---------- 10 EM and 5 Officers
    B. LogCom AFL ------- 10 EM and 5 Officers
    C. Camp Ware AFL---- 10 EM and 5 Officers
    D. LCG AFL   --------   5 Enlisted only.

1

3.   Please treat and acknowledge.

SS SHERIFF
Lt Col
for COS

Distribution:

External:
Action:

HQ 23rd Inf Bde
LogCom   AFL
LCG   AFL
AFTC   AFL

Information:

Internal:
Information:

COS
File

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