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Archive, Transgender, Architecture: Woolf, Beckett, diller scofidio + renfro

by

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Abstract

This project favours transgender narratives and affects inspired by exteriority, folds, queer décor, assemblage, and the archive. These spatial models help the project displace models of gender that are grounded in the concepts of enclosure, privacy, and property. As a response to the enforced interiority, integrity, and ownership of the trans subject, the project theorizes transgender as a series of modes (of actions rather than states) that push beyond the conscious agency of sovereign subjects to a new architectonic of "transing" affect.

The constellation of modernist architectures that comprise this project share many concerns: how to remember, how to forget, how to transform, how to feel differently, and, ultimately, how to use art and aesthetic inquiry to become something new. First, diller scofidio + renfro's (DS+R's) Brasserie space in Manhattan injects cheeky queer-coded décor and fashion into their space as a response to high modernist abjections of "feminine" décor. The architects thereby turn the space into a self-conscious archive of gender. In Virginia Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography*, the trans subject itself is treated as precisely such an archive of décor – one whose temporality exceeds and critiques the generic conventions of biography (a genre often respected as the truest form of transgender history and experience). Written just as transgender was becoming codified as a sexological (and medical) subject, *Orlando: a Biography* shows us an early alternative theory of transgender – one that makes fantasy, art, and writing absolutely central. Woolf's critique of what this project calls the

"biographical imperative" of transgender studies is extended by Samuel Beckett's cryptic text, *The Unnamable*, in which the coherence of the subject is pushed to (and perhaps beyond) its limit – to a "groundless" relationship to language not unlike that experienced by trans name-changers. Finally, the project turns from its implicit urbanism (and that of queer theory) to consider, with L. Frank Baum's *The Marvelous Land of Oz*, what might happen if less scripted spaces – such as "the rural" – were inhabited both literally and metaphorically by transgender.

Acknowledgements

How does one craft a series of carefully scripted (yet sincere), public (yet password-protected), and heartfelt (yet necessarily disembodied) emotions to their supporters? I hope my friends will forgive me, as I hereby forego the generic convention of choosing one of our memories to serve as a synecdoche for all of what you have meant. I could list many relics of our times: a condemned house in St-Henri, a bottle of Chin-Chon, the Corona LRT, a wig-buying excursion, Prism, my angry neighbours, Red Star, Tristan chords, the Gansevoort, trombones, bruises, gin rummy, and lobsters. But, I heartily hope that you will find more insight and traces of memories in the document that follows.

I offer heartfelt appreciation to my supervisors Cressida Heyes and Dianne Chisholm, whose time, efforts, and intelligence mark this project and its author in considerable ways. Thank you to my attentive readers, Mike O'Driscoll and Mark Simpson for important feedback, generosity and interest. Susanne Luhmann joined us as "internal external" for my candidacy exams and defense. I thank her for her enjoyment in the spirit of the project. To my external examiner, Ann Cvetkovich, I owe many thanks for her time, wonderful provocations, and support. Thank you all for the example of your own work. Other professors at the UofA provided early support: Julie Rak, Brad Bucknell, Cecily Devereux, Karyn Ball, and Heather Zwicker.

The preceding statements are the barest formal signs of a gratitude that happens elsewhere, already, and always in the future – one that we will share here and there.

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Introduction

Archive, Transgender, Architecture: Beckett, Woolf, diller scofidio + renfro

Transgender and architecture have an uneasy – often closeted – relationship. On the surface, the two couldn't seem less alike. Architecture stands firm; transgender is at heart an ethos of change. Transgender is a type of identity; architecture is an aesthetic production. Architecture excludes and divides; transgender encompasses, includes, and bends boundaries and binaries. Transgender demands a voice, agency, and subject; architecture is usually anonymous, institutional, and seemingly without agency. These dissimilarities – generative, one might assume, of trans troubles such as washroom violence, exclusion from institutions, and danger faced in public – seemed the stuff of a clear, feasible argument for this dissertation: that the relative fluidity of the trans body could serve as a model for a renovation of the stark modernist lines, aesthetics, and exclusions of architectures – that we could queer modernist space with postmodern bodies. Like most well-laid plans, that project was not written. There are two reasons for this. The first is a shift in my perception of what kind of work is most creative for the trans communities (scholarly and otherwise) with which I run. I become more and more uneasy with the tendency to elevate trans and queer to heroic catch-all terms that do not deserve their own serious analysis and critique. I remembered William Blake, who, in "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," suggests that "opposition is true friendship." What, I began to ask, might

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transgender become if we were dissatisfied not only by the dictates of normative culture but with our own models of self-understanding and subjectivity?

Secondly, that the dissertation described above was not written is also due, in large part, to my encounter with the radical New York City architectural firm diller scofidio + renfro (DS+R), known as much for their art projects and performances as for their high-profile building contracts (which include New York City's High Line Park, renovations at Lincoln Centre, museums in Rio de Janiero, Oslo, the Netherlands, and so on). The specific DS+R project that instigated the dissertation that *has* been written is called the Blur Building, which nabbed a coveted spot at the Swiss Expo 2002. (See fig. 1-5.) The building (if we may call it that) consists only of a lightweight *tensegrity* structure that, in shape, lies somewhere between spaceship and boat. (And, appropriately, the building appears to float atop Lake Neuchâtel.) As Anthony Pugh explains in his text, *An Introduction to Tensegrity*, the word is "a contraction of *tensional integrity*" (3). The integrity of the Blur Building and other tensegral structures is, to put it plainly, a result of 1) beams on the inside pushing outwards and 2) a tight thin façade pressing inwards. (More precisely, tensegrity structures are a result of the *equilibrium* of these contrary forces.)[1] Embedded in the Blur Building's hollow light structure is a complex weather system: a series of tools and gauges that measure the shifting climate of the surrounding environment. Upon absorbing and computing this information, the 35,000 high-pressure nozzles built into the Blur Building emit a fine mist. The result is an ephemeral building that is, literally, a blur – or, as DS+R put it, "an architecture of atmosphere" (diller scofidio + renfro,

"Blur," Web) that is never for one moment standing still. Subverting the usual celebratory and nationalist tone of World Expo architecture, DS+R provide an experience for the senses, or, rather, an experiment in blurring the senses. The shape and consistency of the Blur Building is, then, a direct intelligent response to the conditions of its ever-changing surroundings; it listens, reacts, and builds in concert with its space. Visitors to the Blur Building do not simply inhabit the building as they do other spaces: instead, visitors feel the architecture condensing upon them as dew; visitors walk through the deep "walls" of the building itself; and, visitors' bodies must adapt quickly and continuously to the changing conditions. The Blur Building is not merely a liminal space. In fact, while this dissertation may, presumably, be about the relationship between transgender and architecture, the Blur Building places under erasure the very distance and sovereignty implied by this "between." After all, visitors could even taste the architecture. (As DS+R note, "the public can drink the building" ["Blur," Web].)

For what other reasons does the Blur Building incite a new conception of transgender architecture for this project? There are five main reasons, which will, in turn, become the five related shifts that this project seeks to motivate for transgender:

1. The Blur Building has an activated, dynamic temporality, insofar as it is always changing in response to multiple factors. In this sense, the Blur Building disposes with the notion of any normal, natural, default, or ideal state. The very "state" of the Blur Building *is* change.

2. Since the nozzles respond to the current climate of the lake, the Blur

Building's changes are produced in concert with its unpredictable surroundings. The Building does not present itself as a sovereign body rising and isolating itself from its milieu. In the most blunt sense, the Blur Building *is* its milieu.

3. Visitors to the Blur Building are welcomed not just inside the building but inside of the architecture itself. In fact, the architecture does away with the idea of a clear inside and outside altogether.

4. With mist, immersive music, the pulsing of the nozzles, the feeling of dew and fog on the skin, and of course highly reduced visibility, the Blur Building disorients the visitor. This is in direct contradiction to many buildings, which are presented as fully-mapped, fully-legible spaces to be masterfully navigated by human subjects. As a result, visitors do not walk about in strictly *visual* awe of the majesty of the building. Rather, they hazily explore the space and in so doing confront (and, by necessity, change) their own bodily habits and comportment.

5. The Blur Building has a minimal "light" structure that, against the high modernist convention of revealing and valorizing "pure" structure, is hidden away by the excessive and anti-functional fog that it creates. This design radically minimizes the amount of unchangeable material required to constantly create new shapes and experiences.

This introduction will show how these five characteristics of the Blur Building imply five correlative modes of change for transgender and for architecture. By way of explaining these, this introduction traces the path that took this project

from a trans-celebratory critique of architecture's stability to an architecturally-inspired critique of transgender's propensity to stall, internalize, protect, and fix itself in the space of discourse, emotions, and agency. It does this in four steps: first, I explain my critique of the most popular transgender architectonic of the body (the body-as-home); secondly, I survey and respond to the two main ways in which feminist architectural theory represents instances of gender transience (architecture as feminine; architecture as cross-dresser); thirdly, by way of developing the underlying theoretical approach of the project, I argue that a combined Derridean and Deleuzian approach to the trans body *as archive* will show us that critical remembering and critical forgetting both have their place in a trans economy of memory; finally, I provide a blueprint for the four chapters that make up the remainder of this dissertation.

Transgender Without Architecture

When I began this project, I looked first to transgender studies, a field that was at the time just beginning what may be called a spatial turn. Indeed, it is a vibrant time for trans and queer studies of spatiality. In just the last two years alone, trans and queer scholars and artists have made compelling cases for gender-neutral space and accessibility, such as Sheila Cavanagh's *Queering Bathrooms: Gender, Sexuality, and the Hygienic Imagination*. We have told stories about the spatial confinement and exclusion that meet trans people, such as those told in Eric A. Stanley and Nat Smith's *Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex*. We have used film and mixed media to insert the trans body into landscapes, institutions, and historical sites. (For instance, Chris Vargas

places his body into a series of famous and everyday spaces in his short film, "Have You Ever Seen a Transsexual Before?") Writers have questioned the currency of transgender in transnational migration, such as those featured in Trystan Cotton's edited collection *Transgender Migrations: the Bodies, Borders, and Politics of Transition*. These texts, taken together, have allowed us to see not only that the demarcation of spatial boundaries play out disproportionately on transgender people (and many others), but also that we have fashioned many of our own ways of short-circuiting the spatial systems that would exclude us. Yet, startlingly little *architecture* is discussed in even these crucial and innovative accounts of transgender. As we'll see in Chapter One, for instance, although Cavanagh's text about queer bathrooms is astute in its political analysis of the role of race, gender, and ability in washrooms, she stops short of considering the role, the stakes, and the potentials of aesthetic history, convention, and intervention.

None of these interventions has *yet* achieved the status and influence of the now nearly-household phrase "queer space" – two words that have been implicitly and explicitly put together over the past twenty years in the work of forward-thinking geographers and cultural theorists. Although the phrase is perhaps associated most strongly with Judith Halberstam's 2005 text, *In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives* – in which Halberstam attempts the difficult, perhaps impossible, task of defining queer space – her text benefits from a wide archive of other thinkers. Heterogeneous though these authors are, this body of work has left three prominent legacies for queer studies. First, much of this work has sought to revalue the category of the local, in order to

show how queers live differently in different spaces. Frank Browning's *A Queer Geography: Journeys Toward a Sexual Self* blends travelogue with reflections on the tenuousness of gay identity – and its dependence on nation. Following Browning's lead, others have focused on specific places and travels as (potential) queer spaces. The essays in *Geographies of Sexualities: Theory, Practices and Politics* (edited by Kath Browne, Jason Lim, and Gavin Brown) are typical of this approach: the essays contained therein address literal spaces as diverse as BDSM bars, drag performance spaces, women's bathhouses, New Zealand, and the queer Muslim diaspora. Some texts in transgender studies have adopted this commitment to locality and specificity and thereby implicitly forwarded a theory of queer space. One of the most important of these texts (for this project) is David Valentine's 2007 monograph, *Imagining Transgender: an Ethnography of a Category*, a text that takes the actual spaces and sometimes microscopic practices of Manhattan's meat-packing district as both its stage and its topic. The benefit of this approach is also its first drawback: what ethnographic accounts of queer space gain in specificity and accuracy they sometimes run the risk of losing in applicability to other spaces or communities. As we'll see, however, Valentine's book in particular aims to extrapolate from his spaces many general theoretical propositions about the discursive creation of the category of transgender. Secondly, the very methodological rigour and ethnographical approach of such accounts also directs their scope towards the goal of representing things as they are, often to the exclusion of providing new ideas about how things could be.

At the opposite pole of the attempt to represent queer localities lie those

accounts that imbue queers with an almost mystical ability to change space.

"Space" in these accounts is often rendered in the abstract. For instance, although

Judith Halberstam's landmark text has no shortage of examples of "queer time," it

is surprisingly low on examples of queer space. Indeed, although Halberstam

engages cultural geographers, literary theorists, and writers such as Edward Soja,

David Harvey, Frederic Jameson, Samuel Delany, Stuart Hall, and Doreen

Massey, she does so in order to revalue the "local" as a site of analysis. That

Halberstam leaves the imagining of actual queer spaces (including which "local"

spaces Halberstam has in mind) to her readers suggests that architecture itself

does not matter – only how queers orient to space within it. In other words, as a

trans writer and acquaintance once informed me: "houses don't have any

meaning. It's what people *do* with architecture that matters." This statement, as do

the ones that open this introduction, sets up a false dichotomy between space and

subjectivity, wherein space is passive and subjects are active and in control of

their world (a world apparently not shaped by architectural traces of old and new

ideologies). Accounts of queer space that do not engage in the aesthetic history

and aesthetic life of architecture run the risk of enforcing a false division between

architecture (as merely a neutral setting) and subjects (who wholly animate the

space and "give it" meaning). In his 1997 text *Queer Space: Architecture and

Same-Sex Desire*, Aaron Betsky, knowing this, takes a different tack than

Halberstam would later take. In order to define queer space, Betsky studies spaces

as diverse as Oscar Wilde's house and the designs of Louis Henri Sullivan, Julia

Morgan, and Frank Lloyd Wright. Throughout his text, Betsky unfolds a theory of queer space as accumulative – as space that is treated as a private archive:

> collecting becomes the hallmark of modern queer space. By cruising the world continuously...the queer brings home to his palace of sensual seductions all the parts and pieces out of which to build his closet world...This is what makes the modern queer space the domain of middle-class white men. (57)

Tempted though we may be to dismiss the last sentence, it is a useful reminder about what is problematic about defining queer space as one of interiority, ownership, and material accumulation. Queer space, for Betsky, is inherently domestic space: it is any attempt to cruise the world for material relics and "to create an artificial world" (13) where one can continually refashion oneself. In response, Chapters One and Three of this project will (in order to redefine transing as external, assembled modes of change) take this very valorization of queer interiority as its counter-narrative. Moreover, Chapter Three will, as we'll hear below, also question the queerness of the (material and psychic) accumulation to which Betsky refers. In any case, we may note that Betsky shares with Halberstam the following: an attempt to redefine queer space as an act. While the latter looks to "place-making practices" (6), the former suggests that "queer space is not a place: it is an act of appropriating the modern world for the continual act of self-construction" (193). Though the willingness of both accounts to imagine what queer relations of space could be is an approach on which this project builds, the reader is sometimes left with the question of how precisely one

ought to "queer" space, and of how actual spatial design participates in this queering. This is perhaps appropriate, if queering space is as imperceptible an act as these thinkers sometimes imply; as Betsky suggests, "the queerest space of all is the void" (182). But, between these two poles of representing queer space as specific and local and imagining it as an indeterminate act, are there theories of queer space that not only think of local and actual spatial conditions but also use these conditions to launch large theoretical interventions into theories of space?

The third precedent of the subfield of queer space studies walks the line between the specific and speculative approaches described above: these thinkers have rightly renewed our concerns with formulations of the public and private divide. For instance, in their essay "Sex in Public," Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner lay bare the stakes of this concern with public spheres with this question: "does heterosexual culture actually secure itself through banalizing intimacy?" (556). Throughout their article, they respond in the affirmative, going as far as to suggest that if we allow our "public sexual cultures" to be similarly banalized and limited to private property, then "almost all *out* gay culture will wither on the vine" (563). With regards to how we might fashion a "queer counterpublic" (558) that can respond to the privatization of desire and intimacy, Warner and Berlant suggest the following:

> we have developed relations and narratives that are only recognized as
> intimate in queer culture: girlfriends, gal pals, fuckbuddies, tricks. Queer
> culture has learned not only how to sexualize these and other relations, but
> also to use them as a context for witnessing intense and personal affect

while elaborating a public world of belonging and transformation. Making

a queer world has required the development of kinds of intimacy that bear

no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to

property, or to the nation. (558)

Taking these thinkers and their advocation of queer counterpublics together, we

see that the privatization of intimacy not only abjects – indeed, criminalizes –

public sexual cultures, but that it also grants to property and ownership far too

great a role in our concept of what constitutes a sexual citizen. Other attempts to

question precisely the constructed morality of private, domestic sexual citizenship

often focus on the persistence – and pleasures – of queer public sex. For instance,

Patrick Califia's *Public Sex: the Culture of Radical Sex* is a well-thumbed book

on the desks and nightstands of many a queer sex radical. In this text, Califia

traces out the role of sadomasochism, leather cultures, and lesbian sex cultures in

the history of public sex in the United States.[2] Like Berlant and Warner, Califia

takes issue with the heternormative moralities shored up by the imperative to

censor sexual cultures (practised by sources as diverse as feminist anti-porn

writers, those who champion age-of-consent laws, and more obvious anti-queer,

pro-family groups).[3]

Allan Bérubé's essay "The History of Gay Bathhouses" (originally written

as a legal brief in 1985) is an early attempt to question the way in which the

imperative to privatize intimacy works against queers. As Bérubé reports, "the

dominant legal defense of gay baths at the time was based on a right-to-privacy

argument that attempted to avoid explicit discussions of gay male sexuality and

desire" (187). Bérubé departed drastically from this implicit shoring up of the imperative to privatize sex. Here, he points out that privacy is a "right" only very, very recently given to (some) queers: "because *all* sex acts between men were considered public and illegal, gay men were forced to become sexual outlaws. They became experts at stealing moments of privacy and at finding the cracks in society where they could meet and not get caught" (189 original emphasis). Bérubé reminds us that, in this context, gay men "had no legal right to privacy" (189); men were often spied upon in order to be caught *in flagrante*. Ironically, those who fancied themselves as protectors of privatized intimacy were quite zealous in their invasions of privacy when gay men came into the picture; Bérubé even recalls stories of "YMCA janitors [who] drilled tiny holes in walls" (189) to catch gay men. This essay, reprinted in *Policing Public Sex: Queer Politics and the Future of AIDS Activism* (a 1996 collection edited by a group called Dangerous Bedfellows), anticipates Samuel Delany's 2001 text *Times Square Red, Times Square Blue.* In this landmark text, Delany documents the evaporating (or, evaporated?) public sex cultures of New York City's Times Square. Drawing from his years of experience in Times Square-adjacent gay porn theatres and peep shows, Delany focuses specifically on the class politics of New York's anti-sex gentrification – or "Disneyfication" (ii) – of Times Square into a primarily tourist area. The problem, as Delany sees it, is the following:

> the economic 'redevelopment' of a highly diversified neighborhood with
> working-class residences and small human services...into what will soon
> be a ring of upper-middle class luxury apartments around a ring of tourist

hotels clustering about a series of theaters and restaurants, in the center of which a large mall and cluster of office towers are slowly but inexorably coming into being. (148-9)

Following Delany's critique, Dianne Chisholm, in *Queer Constellations: Subcultural Space in the Wake of the City*, turns her attention not just to the gay bathhouse but to the effects of how histories of the bathhouse are written. While queer historians sometimes cast the bathhouse as an utopic space, Chisholm "views the gay bathhouse as historical object, blasting the specific era of gay bathhouse culture out of the narrative of progress" (252). The "blasting" of her text – a Benjaminian attempt to free events from the linear progress narratives into which they are inevitably fixed – consists in looking specifically to postmodern literature, rather than to the realist and naturalist texts often taken up by those writing queer histories of the city (36). Instead of such histories, Chisholm suggests that we, after Benjamin, imagine queer "constellations" (36) of events and texts – a model that assumes a "spatial, not chronological, framing" (252). Events, in this framing, are not steps in a progressive narrative history, but are rather, crucially, dialectical images – monads that do not feign cultural progress.[4] Within this framework, Chisholm poses a serious challenge to accounts that fetishize the revolutionary pasts of gay spaces. After taking up Betsky's problematic class outlook, for instance, Chisholm provides the following corrective to the theory of history that underpins Betsky's explicit celebration of middle-class male accumulation:

Dwelling on the aesthetics of the interior, the bathhouse historian is

distracted to the extent he overlooks the precariousness of the production

of gay social space in the commodity space of capitalism. When the

history of space is displaced by fetish spatiality the danger is gravely

increased. But to charge the historian with fetishism is insufficient; he

must see that his historical object cannot be redeemed until he detaches it

from the capitalist narrative of progress and critically – dialectically –

constellates the space of its production. (76)

Although this project does not shy away from its own valorizations of interior

design, it follows Chisholm's lead in trying to simultaneously question the ways

in which trans discourse and spaces are often so quickly and thoroughly

appropriated and fetishized "in the commodity space of capitalism." As a

response to what often sound like trans-historical (or even anti-historical)

defenses of transgender rights and practices, I try to blast the seemingly

postmodern figure of the trans person out of its progress narrative by finding its

precedents – and its critiques *avant la lettre* – in modernist and postmodernist

texts and spaces. Where Chisholm looks initially to the gay bathhouse as a

dialectical image of modern queerness, we will look first to public washrooms –

sites that, though they appear merely to be "stuck" in gender-segregation on the

way to gender-neutrality, might tell us much more about the gender-fraught

(often, normative) qualities of hygiene, of bodily discipline, and of the very

privacy and interiority Betsky defines as inherently queer. To further build on the

work of these thinkers of queer public space, this project extends the purview of

the subfield of queer counterpublics to the narrative architectonics of trans and

queer bodies and genders. That is, rather than ask about how trans people are affected by new definitions of public citizenry, this project will ask: what is at stake for transgender discourse in the privatization of gender into the interior, owned, space of the mind or psyche? In order to effect truly radical queer counterpublic of bodies, must our genders be similarly de-privatized? As we'll hear below, Chapter One (on DS+R's Brasserie) will address these questions with regards to the fraught trans space of the public washroom; Chapter Two (on Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography*) aims to de-privatize transgender from the space of the psyche – the head – by questioning what I'll call the biographical imperative of trans studies; and Chapter Three (on Beckett's *The Unnamable)* will seek to further break transing free of the monadistic interiority to which it has been relegated. By looking to a very popular architectonic of trans, the next section introduces the stakes of this overarching critique of interiorizing models of transgender.

Transgender as Home-Body

This project therefore departs from some of – and builds on some of – the methodological approaches described above: it does not, for instance, study the aesthetics of spaces that are already considered transgender. Rather, it turns to the ways in which aesthetic design and literature can be used to actively *trans* space – a mode that will nonetheless be seen to have real outcomes for the possibilities of living as a trans body. The project will also ask: what about the aesthetics (and architectures) *of* the subject? Is there an implicit spatiality of (trans)gender itself? In this project, I take to task one particularly prevalent spatial model of the trans

subject: that of the body as a home. Above, my friend's statement about houses suggests that houses contain no residue of cultural (including gendered) life: they are raw material until we fill them with gendered subjects. However, architectural theorists have, since the 1990s, emphasized that the relationship between gendered subject and architecture is by no means so simple or unidirectional. Appropriately enough, "the house" has been a focal point for this subfield of architectural thought. Mark Wigley (Dean of Architecture, Preservation and Planning at Columbia University) in particular has shown that houses are, of course, an aesthetic form that has been designed and redesigned throughout history based on human ideas, anxieties, normativities, and violence – such as the domestication of relationships, the imperative to own and protect, and the privatization of the body. As Wigley argues in "Untitled: the Housing of Gender,"

> Marriage is the reason for building a house. The house appears to make a space for the institution. But marriage...cannot be thought about outside the house that is its condition of possibility before its space. The physical house is the possibility of the patriarchal order that appears to be applied to it. (336-7)

For Wigley, the foundation of privacy and ownership that a house is thought merely to provide for a marriage is in fact produced by and required of the very structures of privatization and ownership that comprise marriage in the first instance. He therefore shows precisely why it is paramount to attend to the cycle of influence that happens "between" subjects, bodies, buildings, aesthetic norms and the ideas that underpin conceptions of all of these. We may begin,

then, with one crucial corrective: (trans)genders were already spatial before trans studies "applied" spatial inquiry to them. As Wigley points out, genders perform spatial logics, which are in turn reflective and generative of gender habit and affect. This model of "application" of gender or sexuality to architecture is one that Wigley critiques with force:

> Architectural discourse…routinely applies to itself the very concepts that it unwittingly guarantees. Its institutional limits are defined by its capacity to mask its complicity in the construction of the concepts it employs. Gender is such a concept, underpinned by a spatial logic that is masked in the moment of its application to architecture, as an extra-, or rather, pre-architectural given. The question of sexuality and space here is that of the structure of this mask. ("Untitled" 330)

We may say the same thing of transgender: that in the moment of "applying" architectural thought to it, we run the risk of covering over the always already spatial underpinning of it. To the end of *unmasking* the spatiality of transgender that goes missing in the metaphorization of the trans body "as a home," the paragraphs below trace out the spatial model (or, architectonic) of this particular body narrative. In *Second Skins: the Body Narratives of Transsexuality*, trans scholar Jay Prosser shows that in trans autobiographies, "home may prove a powerful organizing trope" (77). Indeed, Prosser traces out this trope in trans autobiographies and interprets it as a desire to be "at home in one's skin" (77). This home-like feeling is achieved in these autobiographies by, as Prosser suggests, finally "feeling one *owns*" his or her body (77, emphasis added).

Ownership is a key word here: Prosser argues that trans autobiographers often configure the completion of their transition as both the climax of their life narrative and also as a process of "coming home to the self through body" (83). (Narrative is also a crucial word for Prosser: "the point of every narrative is, after all, to return home" [205].)[5] At the time it appeared (1998), Prosser's account did a keen job of legitimizing transgender narratives, especially of 1) attributing to trans narratives their own theoretical logic and nuance, and 2) modelling a hermeneutics of trans texts that gives (seldom-recognized) authority to trans writers. Both of these he accomplishes through his critique of anti-trans dismissals of the "wrong-body" narrative, a narrative he imbues with theoretical strength by comparing it to Didier Anzieu's adaptation of Freud's idea of the "skin ego" (Prosser 65). Prosser takes up this theoretical framework in order to suggest that trans people who adopt the "wrong-body" narrative are not merely dupes of a Cartesian false consciousness (in which we are thought to have translated the body/mind split into a sexed body/gendered psyche split). He aptly takes this common belief to task through reference to Anzieu's argument that the psyche is a projection drawn specifically from bodily feelings. As Prosser describes this theory,

> [Anzieu's] concept of the "skin ego" takes the body's physical skin as the primary organ underlying the formation of the ego, its handling, its touching, its holding – our experience of its feel – individualizing our psychic functioning, quite crucially making us who we are. Bordering inside and outside the body, the point of separation and connection

between you and me, skin is the key interface between self and other,

between the biological, the psychic, and the social...Anzieu emphasizes

"the projection of a surface" as "derived from bodily sensations" to

represent the image of the body as derived from the feeling of the body.

(65)

Ultimately, Prosser's advocation of the wrong-body narrative hinges on the way

in which Anzieu's ideas allow him to attribute a *material* source for the trans ego.

In his view, the wrong-body narrative therefore does not imply a mind/body split

because it refers to an ego that is always already material. Prosser's account is one

of very few texts that seriously engages with the theoretical implications and

underpinnings of this narrative – and, indeed, there still remain many compelling

reasons for us to begin our work on transgender by adopting a tone of

justification. However, since Prosser has already forwarded one theoretical

defense for the mutually implicated wrong-body and body-as-home narratives, we

can perhaps assume a different starting point. We might ask instead: do these

narratives (even when their validity is so hard-won) sometimes perpetuate

conservative relationships to bodies?

Some trans and queer scholars have indeed already critiqued the trope of

the trans "home" and have repurposed it in ways that more radically address and

maintain the actual spatial economies of (trans)gender. Aren Aizura, for instance,

addresses the "imaginary community of (trans)sexual citizenship" (289) by

critiquing the conservative underpinnings of any "narrative of (trans)sexual

citizenship that figures transgression as a necessary but momentary lapse on the

way to a proper embodied belonging, a proper home and full social inclusion"
(293). For Aizura, the imperative to find and own rhetorical homes can also effect
any number of apolitical domestications of trans affect. The imperative can, that
is, urge us to reproduce "the public fiction that recognition of queerness or gender
variance is gained under the aegis of universal entitlement, rather than because
'difference' has remade itself as non-transgressive or non-threatening" (296). This
formulation of the fictions of "entitlement" draws our attention to the troubling
requirements of homey affect, which will be critiqued throughout this project.
Others, such as Cressida Heyes, directly critique this ownership-oriented model of
relating to bodies. As she describes it, the current model of a body-crafting or
"somatic" "individual relies on sovereign power—on an understanding of the self
as monarch, residing within the palace of the body, guiding its renovation so that
its unique status will be made manifest" (6). Heyes refuses the idea that anyone
exercises "sovereign power" in a world where gender (for instance) is an
intersubjective production. Her rhetoric also points out that a very controlling idea
of ownership guides the current architectural models available for those
committed to re-crafting bodies.

The most relevant (if implicit) critique of this model comes from trans
historian Susan Stryker, whose article "Dungeon Intimacies: the Poetics of
Transsexual Sadomasochism," discusses actual spaces (the old San Francisco
National Guard armoury, now a cyber-porn production warehouse; and, the House
of the Golden Bull, where trans and queer play parties used to take place).
Crucially, Stryker also examines the spatiality of the trans body. Specifically, she

argues, in response to Halberstam, Harvey and Soja, that "no place can be more local than the body" (38). Stryker refigures "the lived space of the body" as "a 'glocal' hybrid" that both incarnates its ideological milieus but retains its idiosyncrasies. For Stryker, the body is certainly not a home: it is, rather, a body-in-motion whose acts – such as sadomasochism – materialize (or, archive) "the specificity of its location" (38). As she puts it, acts of *ars erotica,* such as transsexual sadomasochism, are engaged in "installing the body that practices it as a place – one as contingent, situated and real as any armoury or repurposed Victorian house" (38). Though Stryker leaves these particular possibilities (body-as-armoury; body-as-Victorian house) in suspension, she suggests new bodily architectonics that anticipate the transing modes I have enumerated above. Here, she focuses on rupture, folding, and blurring the lines of interior and exterior:

> From my forward-looking perspective I look back on my body as a psychically bounded space or container that becomes energetically open through the break of its surface – a rupture experienced as interior movement, a movement that becomes generative as it encloses and invests in a new space, through a perpetually reiterative process of growing new boundaries and shedding abandoned materialities: a mobile, membranous, temporally fleeting and provisional sense of enfolding and enclosure. This is the utopian space of my ongoing poesis. (45)

Trans poesis, in Stryker's account, is a non-subjective ongoing process of change. It is one that entails both "look[ing] back" on the body but also tossing out incarnations that are no longer generative. As she makes clear, this poesis is

emphatically not that of the trans subject: "gender is a percussive symphony of automatisms, reverberating through the space of our bodies *before there is an awareness of awareness itself*" (42 emphasis added). Yet, Stryker reminds us that displacing our focus on the trans subject does not entail a denial of trans experience. As she puts it, "these feelings were real. I am agnostic as to their origin. I did not choose them. I chose only how I would inhabit the architecture of their affect" (42, emphasis added). This dissertation is an explanation of this last turn of phrase; it provides one response to how and why we make precisely these choices of how to inhabit architectures of affect that seem to precede one's consciousness as a subject.

Following these examples, then, this project departs sharply from the model of the trans body as a "home" in favour of less stable, less "owned," and less private architectures of the subject. Though the project therefore departs from the dominant model of the trans body-as-home, it is motivated nonetheless by Prosser's account. Significantly, Prosser associates "going home" with transsexuality, "resisting domestication" with queerness, and "ambivalence" (177) about homes to transgender narratives. Books such as Leslie Feinberg's *Stone Butch Blues*, he suggests, "contain important ambivalences about home and territory, belonging, and political affiliation" (177). Citing both Feinberg's own political life as a gender-ambiguous activist and hir works of fiction, Prosser argues that

Feinberg's own writings and hir life create transgender out of interstices. Overlapping, intersecting, but ultimately marking out a specific location

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apart from both transsexuality and a generic queerness, Feinberg's *Stone Butch Blues: A Novel* – a text that for many represented the voice of the new transgendered movement – heads towards liminality on all fronts; yet idiosyncratically and poignantly *Stone Butch Blues* makes of liminality a transgendered home. (177)

Here, Prosser identifies home-ambivalence as a specifically liminal existence – one that muddies the waters of trans and queer identity categories. Although this ambivalence towards the "body-as-home" narrative is an underlying emotional economy of this dissertation, we may also extend Prosser's thinking about ambivalence by considering how such ambivalence may actually intervene in our economies of gender affect. That is, while Prosser suggests that Feinberg is confidently and securely "marking out a specific location" of ambivalence, is it possible to, inversely, be ambivalent about this very marking? To respond, we may take our cue from Adorno's advocation of architectural ambivalence in his "Refuge for the Homeless." Here, Adorno suggests the following:

The best mode of conduct still seems an uncommitted, suspended one: to lead a private life, as far as the social order and one's own needs will tolerate nothing else, but not to attach weight to it…. It is part of morality not to be at home in one's home. This gives some indication of the difficult relationship in which the individual now stands to his property, as long as he still possesses anything at all. The trick is to keep in view, and to express, the fact that private property no longer belongs to one. (39)

This version of ambivalence, when brought to bear upon the trans "body-as-

home," advocates a continual renegotiation between the requirement of having a subjective and affective "home," the pain and suffering entailed in not having one, and the perhaps equally painful capitulations one must make to normative culture in order to have even a semblance of one. This ambivalence about the bodily "home" is indeed different from the one Prosser champions: for Prosser, "ambivalence" can describe one's relation to binary "gender homes," not to body-homes in general. (His version of transgender ambivalence does not seem to imply any discomfort or *felt* ambivalence; in a sense, his ambivalence refers to feeling *at home* in between genders.) While Prosser sees in Leslie Feinberg's character, Jess Goldberg, a protagonist who journeys from home to home, the transient homes that Jess crafts are rather regular. As she says of her first apartment in New York City, "Gradually I bought furniture . . . I went crazy buying sheets at Macy's. As my house came together, I suddenly wanted things that made my body feel good . . . And then one day I looked around at my apartment and realized I'd made a home" (Feinberg 237). Adorno advocates instead that we acknowledge the inescapable unhomeliness of every home, resign ourselves to the conditions of ownership in late capitalism rather than capitulate to them, and refuse to perpetuate the illusion that renters and even owners actually possess anything at all.

In between Prosser's attachment to bodily comfort and Adorno's suggestion that we not attach much weight at all to private life, I locate my own approach to the bodily "home," one that can be allied with Feinberg's later novel, *Drag King Dreams.* This text falls more in line with Adorno's ambivalence with regards to

homes and ownership. (It is worth remembering that Feinberg is a vocal

Marxist.[6]) Indeed, the text's protagonist (Max Rabinowitz, an older and perhaps

more resigned version of *Stone Butch Blues'* coming-of-age Jess Goldberg)

regards constant home-migration as an integral part of what it means to live in late

capitalism. For instance, having substituted Jess's shopping spree at Macy's for

hir own murals and painted Jewish verse, Max explains to hir friend Heshie the

origin of hir apartment's painted walls:

> "What will you do when all the walls are full?" he asks. I shrug. "I
>
> usually have to move before that happens...Suddenly all the things
>
> about my apartment that make it my home, that feel so familiar, seem
>
> bizarre and strange, even to me." (120-1)

By anticipating hir inevitable departure, even as ze creates hir home (and by

allowing this home to become other to hirself), Max illustrates hir

acknowledgment that "home" is only ever temporary, and not always safe, secure,

or even accommodating of oneself. In the sense that Max does not emotionally

invest in hir home as a permanent place of comfort, ze is less at home in hir home

than Jess seems to be. When Jess's apartment building burns down in *Stone Butch*

Blues, she is crushed; when Max's apartment is robbed and hir Jewish art defaced

with swastikas and words like "faggot" (262), ze leaves hir apartment that night

without hir belongings and never returns (which is not to say ze was not at all

affected). Still, Feinberg's increasingly Adornian version of the ambivalent

transgender home complicates what Prosser calls Feinberg's earlier "crucial irony

about home:" that is, "although home is a place we make up, recognizing its

fictionality only fuels its mythic lure" (177). As Max Rabinowitz and Adorno both suggest, "recognizing [the] fictionality" of one's home *does* indeed change the way one lives within it. Although Adorno's clearly non-transgender perspective might be seen as an indication of its irrelevance here, it is precisely such an intersectional perspective that allows for this project's main response to the body-as-home narrative in general: at this historical moment, it is fair to say that nobody is at home in their bodies. Such a perspective allows us to take Prosser's perspective of trans embodiment and turn it outwards to the dissimulations and unhomely bodies of others – a change in focus that, as we will see, reminds us that trans people have more in common with non-trans people than we might often think. On this topic, Prosser suggests that if trans people "feel confined in the wrong body on a fundamental level, it must be said that [we] fail to own [our] own skin, to accept it as [our] own" (73). Given that this failure to "own" one's body is in no way an exclusively trans phenomenon, this project will extend Prosser's account by suggesting that, even if some normatively-gendered people have somehow *succeeded* in becoming properly-gendered citizens when they psychically invest in their bodies, this does not prove that psychic harmony and peace is a natural state from which trans people depart. (And, indeed, many trans people simply do not feel the "alienation" often associated with trans embodiment.) If, as Marxist thinkers like Adorno and Feinberg might suggest, one does not simply "own" one's body (if the body is never an instrument or product of our complete and independent agency), then the body demands a different kind of care and theorization – one that attends to architectonics of the subject and the

body that fall beyond the realm of the metaphorical home.

What, then, are our alternatives to this transgender "home"? The Blur Building with which this introduction begins models an unhomely ethic of embodiment: its blurred boundaries of interior and exterior, disoriented visitors, ethereal and transient body, transforming and responsive mist, its literally groundless and foundation-free position, and its transmogrification of ecological milieu into architecturetogether imply an architecture of the body that is based on change rather than fixity. We can name five ways in which the transing body must change in order to renovate this narrative architectonic, which again correlate to the five attributes of Blur with which we began.

Could (trans)gender operate in similar ways? Yes. The five characteristics of the Blur Building traced above are loose correlates to the five underlying trans modes of this dissertation:

1) Transgender is a temporality or a rhythm of continuous change, rather than a change from one stable "state" to another.

2) Transgender is an aesthetic mode that happens not just between but across and in bodies, buildings, and the rest of one's milieu.

3) Transgender can function as an invitation to assemblage and profound intersubjectivity, in which one is invited not just into dialogue with the other (who is held to be wholly separate) but, rather, into their very "walls" and structures – which can no longer so easily be described as "theirs" or "ours."

4) Transgender can work to disorient and rupture bodily affect rather than

seek out the feigned wholeness and comfort of normative embodiment. In this way, transing can disrupt people's sense of where they belong; in short, it affectively throws into question one's "entitlement" (an architectural term, of course).

5) (Trans)gender is a matter of décor more than of (ostensibly) "pure" structure. It is a transient fashion that resides on the surfaces of the body rather than deep in the psyche. Like the Blur Building, maintaining a minimum of structure will allow for the flexibility and mobility required in order to affirm and exploit the capacity of bodies to continually reform and deform.

These five propositions for transgender draw directly from a wealth of theoretical sources discussed below, including from sources not often considered relevant for transgender studies. Together, these propositions and their theoretical precedents require that this project undertake correlative critiques of current understandings of the trans subject, trans agency, memory, and the body. In the case of DS+R's Blur Building, the primacy of these four matters is called into question: the agency of the architect evaporates with every climate-inspired nozzle-pump; the subject who visits the space becomes "blurry," indistinct, and highly affected; the building does not work like a memorial, but is instead always forgetting its last incarnation; and, as such, the body of the building literally disappears into ether and reconstitutes itself at every moment. Inspired by this, we will see that the increasingly legible model of the transgender subject, as one new type or "species" of human subject, may be productively redesigned both affectively and

theoretically. Of course, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, this does not entail the death of subjectivity: "you have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn...you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality" (160). However, this displacement of the trans subject does entail a change in how and why we think and talk about transgender. Keeping "small rations" of trans subjectivity – like the "light" structure of Blur – does not mean leaving the form of the subject completely intact. On a different register than that of the trans subject, then, the above propositions require a redefinition of transing as an architectural event. At its most basic, this means that transgender is an unpredictable and dynamic phenomenon that happens, continuously, via ideas, art, literature, and fashion. Throughout this project, the model of (trans)gender as an internal, passive object lodged inside of the human body, brain, or sovereign self is set aside in favour of non-subjective moments of transing affect – that is, in favour of moments of change that occur before affect is harnessed and disciplined into coherent forms, narratives, emotions, and identities.

Architecture Without Transgender

With these five transformations of the trans subject in mind, I looked then to writing about architecture in order to find inspiration. In the feminist architectural theory boom of the 1990s, I found many tools that helped me go about this subjective and aesthetic renovation. These are some of the most important ones. First, in "Untitled: the Housing of Gender," Mark Wigley studies the history of architectural privacy (especially that offered by closets) as a story of

how gender became so thoroughly interiorized. Likewise, in *White Walls,*

Designer Dresses: the Fashioning of Modern Architecture, he shows that

influential modernist architects such as Le Corbusier based their practices and

writings on problematic rejections of transience and fashion – qualities they

attributed to femininity. In "Battle Lines E.1027," Beatriz Colomina traces the

history of a house that co-builders Eileen Grey (a bisexual designer) and Jean

Badovici (architect and writer) called precisely that, E.1027. Colomina reminds us

that Le Corbusier provided nude female sketches that eventually adorned the

walls of the house, much to Grey's chagrin. Colomina reads this intervention in

décor as a de-queering of the space. Henry Urbach, in "Closets, Clothes,

(dis)Closure," looks again to the closet as a site of queer aesthetics. By opening

and closing into a room, closets, Urbach suggests, disrupt the feigned stability and

lifelessness of architectural blueprints: a dotted line, which traces the movement

of a closet door, is the only mark of action and change that is mapped onto a

blueprint. Urbach calls the space that is delimited by this dotted/folding line a

queer space, owing both to its ability to disclose what is hidden inside the walls

and to the opportunity this space provides to dress ourselves, try clothes (and

selves) on, change ourselves, and experiment. In short, there is a wealth of

scholarly work coming from the discipline of Architecture that attempts to

question how spatial design, history, and conventions also "build" the

architectonics of gender. These theories and others allowed me to see that 1)

architecture is an archive of gender – that is, it contains an alternate history of

gender; 2) architectural appropriation and revision can be tantamount to scribbling

and drawing all over another person's gender or sexuality – that is, aesthetic intervention is ethical, sexual intervention; and, 3) just as there are queer "closets," so too are there architectural closets – that is, architecture can feign full disclosure and stability by hiding away its vulnerable points (behind the walls, in the closets, in the basements) just as precisely and intentionally as a gender-normative person can "pass."

Yet, just as trans analyses of space often elide architecture, so too do these architectural studies of gender largely erase transgender from the equation – or, at best, turn it into allegories that both erase the possibility of actual gender change and also do not do justice to the radical trans architectonics I have introduced above. For instance, Urbach's closets of clothes – and his mother's heels, which he used to try on in her closet – are places for specifically gay people to work on their aesthetics (not all of which are so campy or non-normative these days). (Similarly, for Colomina, the bisexuality of Grey is rewritten as lesbianism.) For Wigley, the privatization of gender refers primarily to the domestication and containment of women, with little attention paid to the psychic containment and interiorization of gender itself. In the following section, then, I show that when the spectre of gender change appears in feminist architectural theory (and it often does not), it is almost uniformly interpreted via one of two limiting frameworks, from both of which this project specifically departs.

1. Architecture as Fleeting Femininity

First, *transience is figured as a trope of femininity in many architectural theories of gender*. For instance, in *White Walls: the Fashioning of Modernist*

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Architecture, Wigley suggests that early modernist architects seek obsessively to dissimulate the influence of transient fashions on their work (and, indeed, the status of their work *as* a fashion). These early modernists would very much have liked to "securely ghettoize" fashion as "'the supposedly inferior,' as 'feminine,' domains of 'ornament,' 'accessories,' 'interior decoration,' 'Art Nouveau,' 'architect's partner,' 'homosexual,' 'woman,' and so on" (xxv). Yet, Wigley shows, fashion always makes its discursive return in even their most virulent anti-fashion treatises. To be clear, it is novel and crucial to this project that Wigley identifies transience with gender whatsoever. However, in the gesture of questioning binary gender, even Wigley adheres to a rather binary hermeneutic: he associates changing or dynamic architectures and décors with female femininity rather than with actual changing, dynamic genders (which is not to say that feminine women are not dynamic, only that they are historically and commonly associated with normative, stable gender – an association not without both privilege and violence). Although Wigley leverages his reading to find a place for women in architectural discourse (and, granted, he briefly mentions that such penchants for material change may have been associated with the "homosexual" as well), why is the phenomenon of gender change translated so thoroughly onto one side of the gender binary?

One answer is that, historically, this equation makes a lot of sense: women and femininity have long been negatively associated with cosmetics, fickleness, superficiality, and fashion. Early modernist architects wrote a great number of treatises that implied a rejection of Victorian and early twentieth-century

architectural fashions based on precisely these associations. Specifically, Wigley argues that the ubiquitous *white walls* of modernist architecture are an attempt to institute architecture that appeared clean, new, and unburdened by history and fashion. (This way of thinking was largely inspired by Le Corbusier's essay "Law of Ripolin," which associates *whitewash* with both cleanliness and morality.) This solemn anti-fashion "cleanliness" was achieved, as Wigley shows, by abjecting the whimsies of what these architects saw as feminine fashion and malleability. (As we will see further in Chapter One, Le Corbusier and others defended their aesthetic style by arguing that it was not a style at all. Already we can hear echoes of the ways in which normative gender dissimulates its own, as Butler puts it, "corporeal style" [5].) As Wigley details, Austrian architect Adolf Loos and Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier are the icons of this kind of thinking. Loos' famous essay "Ornament and Crime," for instance, makes one startling overarching argument: "the evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian objects" (20). This removal is, for Loos, a gradual becoming-male of architecture: as Beatriz Colomina points out, for Loos, "the exterior of the house...should resemble a dinner jacket" (qtd. in Colomina 94). As Loos writes in "Heimat Kunst:"

> When I was finally given the task of building a house, I said to myself: in
> its external appearance, a house can only have changed as much as a dinner
> jacket. Not a lot therefore...I had to become significantly simpler. I had to
> substitute the golden buttons with black ones. (qtd. in Colomina 94)

As Colomina argues, Loos' theory of the exterior implies a theory of the male as a

"unified self, protected by a seamless façade" (94). All in all, Loos' "exterior is masculine" (94) not just because it is compared to a specifically masculine piece of fashion, but moreover, because this masculine article of clothing is associated precisely with *not changing* – it is a piece of fashion that, for Loos, symbolizes invincibility to the very whims of fashion.

We can see clearly, in this account, that as much as transience is interpreted as a feminine quality, it is the reciprocal hermeneutic we may wish to question with the most urgency: the taken-for-granted equation of masculinity with transcendence. In the introduction to his edited collection *STUD: Architectures of Masculinity*, Joel Sanders acknowledges precisely this. As he suggests, "Western architects and theorists from Vitruvius to Le Corbusier...in their attempt to locate and to fix architecture's underlying principles in a vision of transhistorical nature, recruit masculinity to justify practice" (11). By way of recruiting a theory of masculinity as fixed and transhistorical (in order to prop up and naturalize their styles as "authentic, rational, and timeless" [14]), these architects must perform an exorcism of both femininity and transience, which, in a sense, become synonymous. As is common knowledge in the discipline of Architecture, this abjection relies on a strict division between structure and ornamentation in design – a division that associates men with transcendent, timeless, anti-fashion, functional structure and women with transient, superfluous, supplementary, and derivative décor. As Sanders describes this conundrum, "because of its long-standing associations with the feminine, ornament has come under sustained attack in this century from architectural modernists invested in upholding the

notion of a building's pared-down inner truth" [14].

In response to the common equation of architectural and decorative transience solely with femininity and specifically the category of female, this project makes two interventions: first, transgender is forwarded as a more sensible pairing with transience; and, secondly, the superficiality and transience against which women architectural theorists argue is recuperated here as an ethics. On the first count, this project does not dispute the virulent sexism present in the history of high architectural modernism (which will be explored in Chapter One). While a hermeneutic that understands the trope of transience as a figure for abjected femininity makes very much historical sense, this dissertation shows that in this age of culturally legible transgender, an updated and more politically astute hermeneutic is required. One way of looking at this is to note that the sexist abjections performed by Loos, Le Corbusier and others were always already generated by anxiety about transgender. That is, although it is clear that Loos and others are not talking about trans people proper, their anxiety about the transience of women is, at heart, an anxiety about changing genders: a worry about men designing – perhaps tantamount to *becoming* – like women. Their anxious performances of timeless architecture are, then, an act of normative gender-passing wherein they must conceal the necessary failures of the transcendence of masculinity and architecture. Therefore, this project does not merely replace "female" with "transgender" in this hermeneutic of architectural transience, as if to suggest that the *ressentiment* of being so abjected from architecture rightly and exclusively belongs to transgender. Instead, this project reclaims and revalues the

ostensibly negative characteristics often attributed to femininity, ornament, and impermanence (for Loos, "degeneracy;" for Le Corbusier, dangerous affect; and for others, transience and fashionability) as a new mode of transing. Throughout this dissertation, I read the "degeneration" of ornamentation as a figure for the refusal of queers to healthily reproduce the status quo; I read heavily textured and ornate architecture as a decorated (ie. "modified") body that draws us into sumptuous interpretation and thereby incites a queer hermeneutics of the body and also restores dimension to the flat white bodies and walls of high modernism; I read changing and imploding spaces as an indication not of gender failure ("wrong" bodies or not being "at home") but instead as becomings that are not oriented to finding a resting place in a final, fixed, form. In sum, this project does not so much reject the association of queer gender with transience, but affirms it, rereads it in a celebratory mode, and, by turning it against the deadening set of sexist dissimulations from which it derives, breathe new life into it.

2. Architecture as Cross-Dresser

The second way in which transgender appears in architectural discourse is the rather predictable equation of *transgender as a crossing between two otherwise stable and natural genders*. In his essay "Transgendered Media," for instance, Guido Incerti suggests that diller scofidio + renfro, by combining the logic of various genres of visual media, "allow projects to continually slide back and forth between different artistic fields in a sort of 'transgendered' approach" (33). This crossing of genres (equated with a crossing of genders) sometimes results, Incerti suggests, in a "hybrid, transvergent entity" (39) wherein "two

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instruments that are diametrically opposed in a technological sense become a media device to convey a single message" (38).[7] Incerti effortlessly discusses multimedia art as transgendered (a crossing that may itself be cause for pause) but, moreover, leaves the two "diametrically opposed" poles – and their clear "single" message – intact. More often, this "crossing" mode is used to critique "male" architects who are interpreted as too feminine, and "female" architects thought to be excessively masculine. This rendition of the trans-as-crossing trope accepts the basic fiction that such "crossings" are in fact deviations from some original or natural correlation between women and femininity and men and masculinity. Chicago architect Louis Henri Sullivan is an excellent example of an architect whose supposed gender-crossing was cause for discipline. As Jennifer Bloomer suggests, Sullivan's work fell out of favour in modernist circles owing to his passion for ornamentation both architectural and fashion-related, his apparently dandy vanity, and his decadent designs (170-1). This crossing was remarked upon even in his biography by Robert C. Twombly. Of Sullivan's Gage Building, which was adorned with thin columns exploding into highly ornate reliefs at the top of the building, Twombly writes that "the Gage imagery was of the male *becoming* female" (qtd. in Bloomer 175, Bloomer's emphasis). (See fig. 6.) Here, Twombly associates clean straight lines with the apparently simpler and clean aesthetic of the cultured and organized male, and the elaborate clusters of leaves at the top as female, owing to their decorative mimesis of wild nature.

Similarly, Zaha Hadid Architects (whose founder and namesake is arguably the most prominent woman architect of all time) often describe their work as

combining or crossing aspects of male and female. As they say in reference to the Neil Barrett Flagship Store they built in Tokyo (2008),

> The concept of the store plays with the complementary characteristics and the related dualism between male and female. This is echoed in the furniture design on both floors through the formal language and tactile quality of the materials used. The furniture piece on the ground floor is designed as a strong, masculine and dynamic form whilst the piece on the first floor enunciates femininity through more fluid contour lines. (See fig. 7-9)

Here, again, these mixtures of genders uphold the very structure of the "dualism" of female and male. Rather than challenge the association of females and males with certain kinds of design features, this description suggests that even Hadid caters to these stereotypes by associating masculinity with the "ground" of architecture and femininity with fluid, ethereal décor. Perhaps ironically given this model of architectural gender-dualism, Hadid herself has been subject to highly gender-fraught critique and praise that each in turn reference her feminine and masculine "crossings." First, Hadid is critiqued for being insufficiently masculine. As a reader on *DeZeen Magazine* comments, in response to Hadid's design for the Stone Towers in Cairo:

> If we close our eyes, cross our legs and take deep breaths and invisage the Egyptian stone, one can imagine a heavily sculptured masculine form rising up from the undulating horizontal planes of the Egyptian landscape. A baron [sic], dry land should be reflected in the form, yet [Hadid's]

scheme has more in common with freshly cut grass than stonework. Grass

is feminine, and femininity and Egypt are two things that do not go hand

in hand. More masculinity is definately [sic] required here. I love

masculinity. (Web) (See fig. 10-11)

Here we witness the equation of men with transcendence or with an unadorned

aesthetic: masculinity is linked to "a baron [sic], dry land" and austere stonework,

while femininity is like transient grass, coiffed purely for show. Hadid's work is,

therefore, critiqued as feminine for its refusal to feign transcendence of history

and gender. Secondly, Hadid's work garners precisely the opposite response as

well: she is critiqued for being *too* masculine. As a blogger on "What We Do Is

Secret" writes, "Zaha Hadid's design is too masculine (funny to say so) and too

sharp for me. I have a tendency to skip information on her work (I'm not a sexist,

though)" ("Talk To Your Daughter"). Third, Hadid is praised by women for

maintaining her femininity in the masculine world of architecture. As Anne Enke

gushes:

To Zaha Hadid, womanly **Smart Sensuality** is the core of design in the

21st century, the very opposite of seeking to conceal oneself from public

view. It is only feminine principles that may hold the new world together

and we must stop hiding from our obligations...Buried in the design womb

of Zaha Hadid this morning, my own decades-ago imagined possibilities

have come to life. Architectural details are undulating, snake-like and

curvaceous. Buildings are portable and jointly owned by more than one

country...Only the strongest women flourish under tyrants. Zaha Hadid is

one of them, bending iron masculine minds with her sensual embrace.

(Web, original emphasis)

Here, in the gesture of reclaiming and celebrating Hadid's feminine aesthetic, the writer equates masculinity with architecture: "masculine minds" are "iron" while a feminine aesthetic is akin to a "sensual embrace" that is "curvaceous" and womb-like. If Hadid can, then, be praised and critiqued for her supposed femininity, as well as praised and critiqued for her masculine crossings, it is fair to say that her "gender-crossing" is by no means clear.[8] That her style can be interpreted through so many different gender-based hermeneutics is, perhaps above all, a sign that women, whether regarded as "masculine" or not, are certainly equated with "gender," while men maintain the unmarked position of gender transcendence. (Certainly, interpretations of Hadid's supposed crossings derive in part from the sense many have that being a successful architect is implicitly a masculine act.)

In sum, we may see that the "gender-crossing" associated with architecture is sometimes used as a way to mark (and often discipline or dismiss) those whose entrance into the architectural discipline and industry is itself regarded as a "crossing." For Hadid and Sullivan, then, crossings of the architectural sort – for Sullivan, crossing backward in time to ornament and dandy fashion; for Hadid, crossing into the masculinist field of architecture – must be translated into crossing of the gender sort, both in order to abject "feminine" presence *through aesthetic judgement* and also to thereby protect the implicit masculinity of the field. For Incerti, Hadid, and Sullivan, there is a sense that the simile of

transgender-as-crossing certainly implies that transgender may describe the act of merely "switching" rather than generating something new. This is itself a problematic reading of what transgender architecture could be.

With feminist architectural theorist Diana Agrest, however, this slightly under-ambitious reading of trans architecture turns to outright accusation and old-school trans vilification. In her essay "Architecture from Without: Body, Logic and Sex," Agrest uses a figural transsexuality to explain the violence done by masculinist architecture. In this essay, Agrest argues, via an interpretation of architects Filarete and di Giorgio, that male architects, by conceiving of their buildings as children – as acts "of giving nourishment, that is, life, to the city" (36) – figure themselves as both mothers and fathers. This becoming-mother of the male architect is, in her estimation, "a transsexual operation" whereby the male architect "has usurped the female's reproductive qualities" (36). In the following passage, readers see clearly that Agrest repeats the well-trodden and outmoded fringe-second-wave belief that transsexuality can be homogenously interpreted as an unnatural *crossing* that represses ("real") women:

> First woman is excluded (repressed) by making architecture an image of man as an analogue to man's body and, as we have seen, to the point of turning it into a living organism. Then, in an extraordinary operation that I call here architectural transsexuality, for which her repression is essential, woman is replaced – her place usurped by man, who, as the architect, possesses the female attributes necessary for conception and reproduction. (34)

The word "transsexuality" in Agrest's account is simply a place-marker, then, for repressive appropriation; it is also, one senses, a word intended to shame those who would emulate the masculinist architects to whom it is applied. Unlike Bloomer's work on Sullivan's dandyism, that is, Agrest identifies the transsexual operation as an inherently negative operation rather than as one that could (as it did for Sullivan) rupture the masculinism of architecture. By suggesting that woman is wrongly "replaced" in this discourse, Agrest implies that there is a proper and default "place" for women *vis-a-vis* creation. Indeed, Agrest delimits "woman" (as procreator) in the very gesture of protecting her: "woman's unique quality, that of motherhood, is projected onto the male body. Thus woman is not only suppressed, but indeed *her whole sexual body* is repressed" (36, emphasis added). In sum, Agrest illustrates one of the main problems of viewing "transsexuality" as a rhetorical crossing-over into the place of the other: she reifies the "proper" place of woman (and vilifies transsexuality) in the name of gender equality.

Architect and writer Bernard Tschumi seeks to mobilize this trans-as-crossing trope in a much more affirmative way. In *Architecture and Disjunction*, Tschumi suggests that the relationship between a piece of architecture and the space's intended purpose (its program) must be dissociated in order for architecture to realize its potential to rupture the banality of life. One way in which this dissociation may be made possible, he suggests, is "cross-programming," which he defines as "using a spatial configuration for a program not intended for it...a museum inside a car park structure" (205). In contrast to

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Agrest's more critical outlook, Tschumi proposes a kind of radical spatial appropriation and incongruity (a kind of architectural drag or architectural counterpublic) with which trans and queer people may be more familiar. Quite far from Agrest's model of crossing-as-repression, Tschumi suggests that architecture can better disrupt the norms of everyday life if it "crosses" beyond its supposed "purposes" or proper functionality. It is worth noting that Tschumi specifically has queer gender in mind as a model for this practice of architectural disjunction. As he quips after his brief definition, "reference: crossdressing" (205). In Agrest and Tschumi, then, we see the two poles of interpretation of this trope of gender/architectural crossing: Tschumi forwards a whimsical theory of drag-inspired aesthetics that figures cross-dressing as a radical architectural practice, while Agrest uses the figure of "transsexuality" to discipline masculinist architecture and, in so doing, she demarcates boundaries of sex.

In between these starkly different accounts lies the work of architect and philosopher Hélène Frichot, who neither attributes violence nor pure rupture to the figure of gender "crossing" as it happens in architecture. The attention she pays to both the disruptive and potentially appropriative aspects of "crossing" provides a crucial balance and a model for this project. In her essay "In Search of an Ethico-Aesthetics for Wet Architectures," Frichot addresses a project by architect Greg Lynn (and his students) entitled *The Embryological House*. (See fig. 12-13.) Lynn, champion of curved architecture and "blob" architecture, leads his UCLA students to create computer-mutated hyper-houses that eschew the parts (or organs) of a traditional home and instead look to biology, cybernetics,

and science fiction to create blob buildings.[9] As Lynn describes this in an interview,

> The goal is to build a design system that supports free variation. The trick
> is to set up a design program that would control changes. You do the
> working drawings for what I call the "seed" of the house, and then the
> computer generates all the mutations. You never really see the norm; it's
> all monsters. That's why it's called an Embryological House. You can
> have young ones, egg-like ones that haven't been mutated much, but when
> these things get adult – in other words, after they've been designed and
> customized for their context, the client, the whims of the architect,
> whatever – they mutate into full-blown monsters. (qtd. in Dery, web)

The result of these mutated computer-generated blobs is architecture that contains absolutely no straight lines or planes. Lynn, understandably, is poised to discuss the radical aspects of this novel design process: it negates the existence of any "norm" or "form;" it produces dynamic malleable architectures; and it is based on "free variation" rather than discipline and adherence to either aesthetic conventions or to taken-for-granted comportments of the domestic body. Frichot, however, notes a crucial diction in Lynn's rhetoric, words that reinstates the model of the agential architecture he is trying to subvert. As she puts it, although The Embryological House is "an open system that allows for an unending series of formal permutations," Lynn nonetheless repeats Agrest's transsexual parenting, which Frichot has revised as the trans*gender* process of architectural genesis:

Of his serial experiments (he formally tested 6 instances of the house)
[Lynn] says, "I love them all equally as if they were my children. The
design problem was not about the house, but the series, the entire
infinitesimally extensive and intensive group." Lynn's anthropomorphic
attitude troubles his uptake of the embryological process; he personalises
the process rather than freeing potential forces. There is also the issue of
the transgendering that takes place here, in that Lynn acts as mama and
papa, superseding the necessity of the maternal womb for the creation of
his "children". By basing its inception in the morphogenesis of individual
human life, does this architecture assume the same body, and the same
regimes of subjectivity that we are familiar with, or does it open up new
universes of value, and generate transformative possibilities and modes of
expression? It appears to promise the latter, while remaining trapped in the
former. (Web)

For Frichot, then, the problem with the model of architecture as "crossing"
genders is not, as Agrest has it, the impropriety of male architects intruding upon
properly female rhetoric of procreation; rather, the problem is that such rhetoric of
parenting reinstalls the primacy and agency of the architectural subject even as it
tries to give away such sovereignty by recruiting cybernetic co-designers. The
"crossing" that Frichot addresses, therefore, is also a problematic crossing
between the human subject and architecture: can we, she asks, modify or mutate
the bodies of architecture while leaving the status of the human subject
untouched? Clearly, Frichot suggests that a dual deconstruction is necessary.

In response to the model of transgender-as-crossing, this project therefore follows Frichot's point that any celebratory boundary-crossing that revels in the model of the human subject undercuts its own critique. Such accounts do so, Frichot suggests, by reinstalling the sovereignty and agency that, perhaps, must be renovated in order to allow for architectonics that are not limited to the owned "home" of the body. Rather than look only to architects or authors who "cross" into gender non-normative territory, then, this project looks to texts and sites that seize upon bodies as constantly shifting forms and, in so doing, undoes the logic of property that underpins the humanist subject. The model of "crossing," of course, implies that one was firmly located somewhere to begin with. To mobilize the figure of transgender beyond this linear architectonic (in which one crosses from one side to another), I look to "bad" or incomplete crossings, that do not start or end with coherent forms or genders, and ones that feature architecture rather than subjects – all in all, to moments of transformation that undo this very logic of crossing. What, then, does architecture have to do in order to "trans" itself? Again, we can draw out five clear modes.

1) Trans architecture must out itself as the aesthetic, textured, and vulnerable (to decay, to time, to users) mode of production that it is. It must foreground its archival qualities and its historical specificity; it must not, as Le Corbusier and Loos' modernism dictates, adopt a transhistorical aesthetic that places their styles and investments beyond the reaches of history, ideology, and fashion.

2) As such, trans architecture must also foreground and respond to its gender-

charged economies and conventions.

3) Trans architecture must question the boundaries of inside and outside, as not only architectural distinctions that ground affective experiences of ownership and propriety but also as a division that, writ large on the trans body and psyche, generates and reproduces our sense of the body and the location of gender.

4) Trans architecture must question the underlying aesthetics of ownership that are built into space – and, as shown earlier, into the narrative architectonics of the trans subject.

5) To the above ends, trans architecture can question comfort and affective "ownership" as the natural and ideal affects of architecture.

An Archive of Forgetfulness: a Methodology of Transing

Taken together, the above propositions implicitly require a paradigm shift for transgender studies with regards to the role of archiving. That is, the feasibility of each of these propositions hinges on our ability to also transform the currency and felt conventions of both bodily and cultural memory. How, for instance, can subjects engage in continuous change without also learning how to affectively *leave behind* (or even forget) our current and past incarnations? In *An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures,* Ann Cvetkovich suggests that a specifically queer archiving practice does indeed call for a transformation in our cultural ideas about what is worth remembering or preserving. In her call for queer archives, she suggests that gay and lesbian trauma "challenges common understandings of what constitutes an archive," which

"giv[es] rise to new genres of expressions" (7) – to new kinds of archives that make feelings central. The resultant archives of feeling therefore "propose that affects – associated with nostalgia, personal memory, fantasy, and trauma – make a document significant" (243-4). A queer archive, in Cvetkovich's account, evaluates ephemeral entries for their affective value rather than for their prominence or wide distribution. Queers value "apparently marginal and ephemeral materials...occasional publications and paper documents, material objects, and items that fall into the miscellaneous category when being catalogued" (243-4). The archival ethic of this project translates Cvetkovich's work from the archive of feelings to the interpretation of feelings and affects *as* archives. Therefore, its object is not the archive proper but instead transing bodies and spaces as particular kinds of archive that may be invested in gathering, consolidating, organizing, deleting, erasing, and/or revising. In order to make clear this project's theoretical bases, the next section traces out the two main theoretical genealogies with which this dissertation works out its correlative argument about a transing ethics of the archive. These genealogies are, first, a Derridean understanding of history and the archive, and, secondly, a conception of material transformation that draws mainly from Deleuze and Guattari (and, in later chapters, from Bergson and Leibniz). I argue that, taken together, these theories show the following: the transing body-as-archive demands *both* self-critical remembrance (so as to not dissimulate and cover over one's pasts, thereby feigning stability) and also a forward-looking bodily forgetfulness (so as to be able to change).

First, by way of introducing my use of Derridean archive theory, I discuss

briefly why and how architecture in particular may be understood as an archive in

this project. Throughout this introduction and project, architecture will be

discussed as normalizing and dissimulating – as engaged in problematic

configurations of femininity, fashion, and ownership. It will also, however, be

discussed as a potential site for change – as an aesthetic production that can

disorient the body and provide models for new architectonics of the body. Taking

these two modes of architecture together, it is fair to say that in this project

architecture is seen to both record and preserve the past by building ideologies

and conventions into lasting forms and also to build for an unknown future,

placing new (sometimes experimental) forms into our environments. In these

seemingly contradictory functions, architecture functions in much the same way

as Derrida's archive. In his text *Archive Fever: a Freudian Impression*, Derrida

insists that "every archive...is at once institutive and conservative. Revolutionary

and traditional" (7). This project's architectural hermeneutic adopts Derrida's

seemingly paradoxical characterization of the archive; I read architecture (and

narrative architectonics) as invested both in maintaining and instituting a space

(and a subject) and also in providing the means for spaces and subjects to change.

In Chapter One, it will become clear that architecture functions as an archive of

the body: the aesthetic convention of, for instance, the smooth white porcelain of

washrooms will be shown to be a relic of late nineteenth-century anxieties about

visuality, the germ theory, and contagion. This is one simple way in which

architecture is an archive: it is the relic matter in which a cultural idea enjoys its

afterlife. Stryker interprets architecture in precisely this way. As she sees it, the old San Francisco National armoury is an archive: it "occupies an intermediate timespace framed and inflected by these maximal and minimal fixed points in temporal distance within the present built environment; it is the materialized remnant of its own distinctive meshwork of force relations" ("Dungeon" 37).

For Derrida, however, treating architecture like an archive would be somewhat of a recursive definition: the archive is already a space. It is crucial to note that Derrida specifically links the traditional function of the archive to the spatial economy with which we associate (institutions of) cultural memory. Below, he traces out the architecturally-figured origins of the word:

> the Greek *arkeion*: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrate; the archons, those who commanded… They do not only ensure the physical security of what is deposited and of the substrate. They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives. (2)

Central to this project's critique of the trans body-as-home architectonic, Derrida locates this conservatism – a conservatism of hermeneutic authority, clearly demarcated interiors, and ownership – in the architectural form of *the house*. The theoretical propositions forwarded earlier aim, then, to release the "house arrest" of the gendered psyche. Crucially, Derrida reminds us that the notion of "archive" contains at its kernel the very promise of its control and institutionalization in space – of the necessity of "archons" who not only control access to the archive but who also determine the intellectual means through which the archive will be

interpreted. Such "house arrest" is indeed a mode of disciplining memory: the literal *placement* of the archive for Derrida takes the form of "consignation," a word that refers not only to 'assigning place' but also to the "gathering together [of] signs" (3) into a coherent whole. If, to occupy a proper place, the archive is consigned in order "to coordinate a single corpus, in a system of synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration" (3), then the very authority that bars access to the archive for those on the "outside" is also what sets the conservative means of interpretation for those archons within it. As we will see in Chapter Two's analysis of Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography* (which features a gender-changing protagonist who lives – and accumulates, or, archives – across the centuries), an implicit theory of the body as an archive underlies many conceptions of the gendered body as a home. That is, for the body to feel and function as a wholly "right" home, the subject must be installed, like an "archon," as the sovereign and sole interpreter of one's self and of one's history. (The archon-subject's interpretation of their own gendered history may then be shared with others as the correct interpretive key.)

Prosser shows that this role as archivist of one's gendered self entails operating as a kind of narrative archon, filing events into clear places and coherent narratives. Prosser opens his book by discussing the difficulty of teaching while transitioning; he speaks specifically of the difficulty, or impossibility, of coming out and thereby resolving the ambiguous forms of address he often received from students. Here, he configures his text as an archive – not as a record, but as an organization or re-placement – of his transition:

this book works as a deferred return in writing to that absent act of

articulation ["coming out"]: so much easier with the body framed in

narrative; so much easier now this body has a clearer gendered

location...For transsexuality is always narrative work, a transformation of

the body that requires the remolding of the life into a particular narrative

shape. (4)

Prosser hereby translates Derrida's cautionary statements about the conservatism

of the archive to the narrative architectonic of the trans body-as-home. As Derrida

suggests, the archon, subject, or "owner" of the body-archive has as its primary

power control over the narrativization and interpretation of its archive. This is not

an authority to wholly dismiss at a time when trans people have so little power for

what is often called self-determination – and, of course, Prosser's lived experience

of the difficulty of actually living in narrative limbo is a useful reminder about the

difficulties we must navigate. Derrida, however, helps us to see that the tendency

to treat our bodies as self-owned archives involves a specific theory of history

that, crucially, already enacts its own gendered architectonic. Here, Derrida

suggests that this impulse to accumulate the traces of one's self into one

controlled "archive" or narrative of the self is an impulse that is, by definition,

institutional and familial:

[The archive] keeps, it puts in reserve, it saves, but in an unnatural fashion,

that is to say in making the law (*nomos*) or in making people respect the

law…it has the force of law, of a law which is the law of the house

(*oikos*), of the house as place, domicile, family, lineage, or institution. (7)

For Derrida, then, the power of the archive is modelled on the law of the ancestral house. This critique is echoed and brought to bear on transgender body-homes earlier in this chapter: Mark Wigley showed that the house is the architectural pre-condition for the state of marriage. Marriage is, he claims, a spatial institution not just steeped in, but defined by, ownership and cohabitation. Likewise, then, the body-as-home – as an owned archive – configures the owner, subject, or archon quite specifically as the patriarch of the house. The body-as-archive, then, has as its conservative side its architectonic of family ownership and legacy. In Derrida's account, the disciplinary and hermeneutic authority that holds the archive together is of an explicitly familial and reproductive bent: the archive as a model of cultural memory takes as its architectonic logic the form of a family home that is owned, handed down, and disciplined according to familial traditions.[10] What does this entail? As Derrida suggests later, this architectonic of the archive implies a particular temporal mode – a particular sense of how time and history work. The archive takes the form of a performative promise for a better future. As Derrida puts it, "the archive has always been a pledge, and like every pledge, a token of the future" (*Archive* 18). Therefore, what Derrida calls the "archontic principle" of the "domiciliation" of the archive (3) is, to put it bluntly, a hetero-archontic principle – one that dictates that cultural memory be arbitrated by and for the inheritance of recognizable (familial) affiliations.

In sum, Derrida's suggestion that the archive pledges the future according to the law of the family domicile, applied here to the body-as-archive, can be reread thus: owning and instituting the body as a familial home (keeping one's

gender "in the family") entails restraining one's archive to the *familiar*. In other words, to phrase it as a question: must one's body-as-archive operate like a piece of familial property (owned by the subject) or can it be loosened from this ancestral and accumulative mode and be directed towards unknown futures? Each of the chapters of this project will argue that the latter is indeed possible.

Above, I have suggested that architecture and transgender can be interpreted as archival insofar as both 1) absorb and bear one's cultural milieus and 2) often do so with a bent towards predicting (and thereby limiting) the future by acting as archons that limit the interpretation of one's materials. If this mode of familial conservation, future-pledging, and hermeneutic authority comprises the "traditional" and "conservative" aspects of the archive, what is its "revolutionary" side? Perhaps counterintuitively, Derrida attributes this more radically oriented aspect of the archive to something that sounds irredeemably negative: the death drive. In his account, the death drive constantly undoes the "token of the future" that the archive produces; it "works to destroy the archive: on the condition of effacing but also with a view to effacing its own 'proper' traces" (10). Without name or concern for memorialization (including its own), the death drive in this account is what disrupts the fantasy of the future towards which the preserving archive strives. It does so, then, with anarchy: it "is above all *anarchivic*" (10, original emphasis), leaving anarchy and disorder in its wake. (This description is echoed very closely by Cvetkovich's queer adaptation of the archive. As she puts it, "because trauma can be unspeakable and unrepresentable and because it is marked by forgetting and dissociation, it often seems to leave behind no records at

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all" [7].) For Derrida, then, the revolutionary side of archiving is, precisely, its negativity – its erasures and its critical drive against accumulation and history. If we take together Derrida's equation of revolutionary archiving with the death drive and Cvetkovich's figuration of the archives of trauma as absent and forgetful ones, we see that disrupting the drive to accumulate is a negative, if not downright painful, critical operation.

But: must this forgetting always be traumatic? The above equation of transing with archiving would, in Derrida's account, contain an inherently pessimistic connotation: the negativity and self-destruction of the death drive. By way of introducing the other theoretical basis for this project, I will suggest below that when Derrida's approach is balanced by that of Deleuze, the anti-accumulative undercurrent of archiving can indeed be seen in a far more affirmative and generative light. As Asja Szafraniec notes in her excellent text, *Beckett, Derrida, and the Event of Literature*, Derrida's archive theory appears to clash very strongly with Deleuze and Guattari's ideas about history and accumulation. Indeed, as she puts it, their difference on the issue of archiving is "the difference between seeing literature as an institution set on gathering (Derrida) and seeing works as 'becomings' (Deleuze), which involve a nomadic flight from memory or history – and from institutions" (108). Therefore, while Derrida's archive theory pairs together the imperative to remember and to disrupt the futures towards which these memories write, Deleuze and Guattari state quite bluntly that "becoming is an antimemory" (qtd. in Szafraniec 113). As Szafraniec points out, this archival difference between Derridean and Deleuzian approaches

is also clear in their conceptions of how change (or events) occur: while Derrida's subject is loaded down with history (like a house), Deleuze's figure of "the nomad," like the Blur Building, "travels light" (Szafraniec 112). Can the trans body-as-archive do both? Yes: I show throughout this project that, filtered through Deleuze's theory of becoming, the body-as-archive can become a different kind of archive: one whose exclusions are not primarily violent but are instead 1) reflective of a tenuous subject that does not need to gather up and control every past and every affect and 2) ways of clearing the ground for change.

First, it is necessary to gauge the currency of forgetfulness in Deleuze and Guattari's idea of becoming as an "antimemory." I show here that in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the thinkers configure forgetfulness as absolutely integral to becoming – to the capacity to change. Several times throughout this text, Deleuze and Guattari advocate forgetfulness in almost aphoristic ways. "The anticultural book," they suggests, "may still be burdened by too heavy a cultural load [too heavy an archive]: but it will use it actively, for forgetting instead of remembering" (24). Against our assumptions, it is forgetting and not remembering that is associated with action in this passage. As they say later as imperatives: "substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for interpretation. Find your body without organs" (151). This is as blunt a response to the ethics of archiving and gathering as one can find: substituting forgetting for "anamnesis" – remembering, recollecting, literally re-collecting or archiving one's self – is configured here as the way to change bodies with experimentation. But what precisely do Deleuze and Guattari mean by forgetting? Crucially, they suggest that forgetting is a complex event that

occurs on a different register than that of the subject. Here they forward this

theory via a discussion of the novella form:

> the novella has little to do with a memory of the past or an act of
> reflection; quite to the contrary, it plays upon a fundamental forgetting. It
> evolves in the element of 'what happened' because it places us in a
> relation with something unknowable and imperceptible...It may even be
> that nothing has happened, but it is precisely that nothing that makes us
> say, Whatever could have happened to make me forget where I put my
> keys, or whether I mailed that letter, etc.?...What is this nothing that makes
> something happen? (193)

Here Deleuze and Guattari remind us that forgetfulness is an event that queers

subjectivity: it happens to or with a person without the subject's conscious

knowledge of it. It is a non-subjective act that occurs without the will or agency of

the subject (echoing the non-subjective transing I posited earlier). In a sense, then,

forgetfulness is always already a forgetting of the self. It requires distraction from

the intentions or controls of the self and is imperceptible to it. Forgetfulness is,

like trauma, dependent on an absent self and deferred realization: as we say, "oh, I

forgot." Forgetfulness is the postscript to an imperceptible "nothing" that has

made "something" happen; the subject always arrives after the event of

forgetfulness. This belatedness, they suggest, is prefigured by Nietzsche in his

works on history: he theorizes "the Untimely, which is another name for

haecceity, becoming, the innocence of becoming (in other words, forgetting as

opposed to memory, geography as opposed to history, the map as opposed to the

tracing, the rhizome as opposed to arborescence)" (296).[11] In these pairings, we see, in sum, that forgetfulness for Deleuze and Guattari is akin to the untimely arrival of things that have happened to us without us knowing when, why, or how. Such distracted subjectivity is, they suggest, what will allow for becoming.[12]

However, as Deleuze and Guattari also note, forgetfulness is far from a homogenous act. Riffing on Elias Canetti's text *Crowds and Power*, they suggest that cultivated forgetfulness can also be used in order to absolve one's self of responsibility. For Canetti, this is the case for those who reformulate their previous acts of violence as merely following orders. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, "this provides a profound explanation for the Nazis' feeling of innocence, or for the capacity of forgetfulness displayed by old Stalinists, whose amnesia worsens the more they invoke their memory and past in order to claim the right to follow new and even more insidious order-words" (525). In this passage we see that remembrance and forgetfulness may both be mobilized in the name of self-righteousness or of the status quo. How, then, must we balance an ethics of archiving and an ethics of forgetfulness? Deleuze and Guattari suggest something in between these two poles: short-term memory. Again, it is literature's queering of memory and form that allows for this line of flight.[13] Here, they valorize the "short-term Idea" and "short-term memory" for the ways in which they elude the very "long-term" narratives of family, ancestry, and the archive that Derrida discusses. As they put it,

> The splendor of the short-term Idea: one writes using short-term memory, and thus short-term ideas, even if one reads or rereads using long-term

memory of long-term concepts. Short-term memory includes forgetting as

a process; it merges not with the instant but instead with the nervous,

temporal, and collective rhizome. Long-term memory (family, race,

society, or civilization) traces and translates, but what it translates

continues to act in it, from a distance, off beat, in an "untimely" way, not

instantaneously. (16)

Short-term memories and short-term ideas about space, selves, bodies, and

genders may, in Deleuze and Guattari's estimation, allow us to sidestep the long-

term narrative architectonics of the family home against which Derrida lightly

warns us. The texts analyzed in this project each show us modernist examples of

dealing with precisely the difficulty, struggle, *and* pleasure and potential of

treating the body and the self as a short-term lease rather than the owned home

described by Prosser and Clare. In these texts, we will see that introducing

forgetfulness to a trans body-as-archive or building-as-archive means, therefore,

dealing differently with forgetfulness. It is my hope that rereading these texts in a

trans light will show us how to better welcome the afterlives of forgetting (which

we often experience as instances of shocked remembrance, surprise, or the trauma

of incomplete self-mastery) instead of disciplining them or admonishing ourselves

for taking leave from ourselves. We can instead cultivate narrative architectonics

that encourage such transing acts of taking affective leave from our subjectivities.

How? Cvetkovich's queer ethic of the archive focuses on ephemera: "the term

used by archivists and librarians to describe occasional publications and paper

documents, material objects, and items that fall into the miscellaneous category

when being catalogued" (243). In other words, queer archiving consists in keeping things that would usually be thrown away. The combined archival/forgetful mode of transing forwarded here says the same of the body: throw out the "long-term" relics of memory and archive the "miscellaneous" pieces of affective ephemera – but only for as long as they are useful.

A Blueprint

With this archival intervention into the narrative architectonic of the trans subject in mind, we may now adapt the five related propositions I have forwarded for transgender and architecture into a more general aesthetic/ethic of transing. Drawing again from the five original characteristics we noted in DS+R's Blur Building, we may provisionally define "transing" thusly:

1) Transing is an aesthetic operation does not entail a move from one gender or materiality to another (or one gender to ambiguity) but instead to the very ubiquity of constant transformation for all. In this sense, the figure of "transing" (like queering) does not "add" trans to something non-trans, but instead draws out the always-already trans quality of materiality – and, in so doing, shows the normative processes and dissimulations whereby specifically gendered "transing" is configured as exceptional and diagnosable.

2) Transing will be relocated from the life of the sovereign subject to the acts and collaborations that happen across bodies, buildings, and milieus.

3) As such, transing will not inhere inside the private psychic life of the subject. It is not only outward-facing but also traverses and undoes the

demarcation of a body's inside and its outside. Transing is, then, an act of folding and refolding rather than containing.

4) Acts of transing, therefore, cannot be owned or claimed like identities. They are happenings or movements rather than objects or presences.

5) Transing revels in aesthetics of the surface. Transing shows the inherent instability and décor of even the most "foundational" or "inner" architectures (of the self). In direct opposition to the stability and fixity of bodily "homes," transing requires a "light" structure that makes infinite bodies.

In order to bring these propositions to life, each chapter of this project looks to instances of failed crossing, queer transience, forgetfulness-as-becoming, and archiving as the becoming-ephemeral of the body. In Chapter One, for instance, diller scofidio + renfro's Brasserie restaurant crosses backwards in time by recuperating the transient ornamentation so rejected by the building's original architect (Mies van der Rohe). This the intrepid New York City firm accomplishes by reinserting highly self-conscious, coloured, and textured décor into the austere high modernist body of the restaurant's milieu, the Seagram Building. This piece of architecture is therefore self-consciously archival: its aesthetic calls out the location's ideological pasts and literally rebuilds them. Another facet of DS+R's intervention consists of their critique of the norms of hygiene: normative hygiene, their design suggests, is a mode of constant body modification directed towards covering up the gaps and ruptures in the sovereignty and solidity of the subject and the body (the dissimulation of which

allows "body modifiers" such as trans people to appear exceptional even though all bodies change continually). By doubling back to the past while moving the space ahead into a postmodern aesthetic, Brasserie does not return to so much as orbit its own history. The chapter reclaims heavy ornamentation as a transing aesthetic, a model that sets aside the question of an underlying and passive truth (gendered or architectural) in favour of affirming transing as an active mode of continuous change.

Chapter Two turns this valorization of transing as a mode (or fashion) of novelty and change to the trans body. In Woolf's 1928 text, *Orlando: a Biography*, transgender is redefined – specifically and sharply against the sexological wisdom of the 1920s (and of today) – as a mode of aesthetic, rather than internal and pathological, disjunction. In this, Woolf follows a conveniently-forgotten concept from sexologist Havelock Ellis, who defines early gender "crossing," or "eonism," as "Sexo-Aesthetic Inversion" (qtd. in Koppen 58). As Woolf critic R.S. Koppen notes, Ellis (and Woolf after him) regarded eonism as "the visual manifestation of an imaginative crossing-over to the philosophy of aesthetics as much as to the science of sexology" (59). Despite tendencies in Woolf criticism to interpret the gender-morphic Orlando as either a lesbian woman or as a gender "crosser," Orlando's supposed crossings do not resemble those of any familiar kind of subject. Like Brasserie, Orlando's body is a space where times collide and coexist; by living across several centuries, Orlando, as "the body of time" itself, accumulates and accommodates eras all the while letting genders, feelings, and styles fall from and enter him/her with an ease that implies

an almost infinite elasticity. Woolf's text models what Frichot advocates above: a theory of change that does not reinstate the form of the human subject as the agent and ruler of such changes. Indeed, as this chapter will show with attention to Woolf's essays about autobiography and her little-known, unpublished story "The Ladies Lavatory," part of Woolf's critique in *Orlando* is of the very genre of autobiography (a genre that, as Prosser notes, underpins the sexological history of contemporary transsexuality [82]). Orlando, this chapter will show, models a queerly critical archival practice of transing: he/she accumulates the centuries, but adapts continuously, becoming the "spirit" of every age she inhabits. By way of fiercely critiquing the archival consciousness of specifically trans autobiography, Woolf's modernism clears the way for a non-subjective literary architectonic for transgender.

Chapter Three takes Woolf's gradual disintegration of the gendered subject to its limits with Samuel Beckett's notoriously ambiguous text *The Unnamable*. This chapter suggests that trans studies may profitably take note of the unnamable's predicament: his orientation to his body, space, and name is premised on forgetfulness, instability, and resistance. The result is a narrative voice that "tries on" names like articles of clothing but finds nothing that entirely fits. Hurtling towards different lines of flight (that is, his continually refashioning names) the unnamable may be understood as a figure for the flights of fancy, flexibility, and pain that are required in order to dodge the various modes of narrative capture to which one is (or through which one becomes a) subject. In contrast to trans studies' emphasis on transgender autobiography and transgender

subjects, Beckett's text takes the very impossibility of autobiography – as an archive that gathers and consolidates the past – as its operating assumption. Quite against what I will, with regards to Woolf, call the biographical imperative of trans studies, the protagonist of Beckett's text continually sheds (and mocks) names and selves, even calling the first-person narrative perspective "too red a herring" (391). For the duration of the text, voices from "up there in the light" bid the unnamable to cross into their enlightened social world – a forceful invitation the unnamable does not (or cannot) ever accept. Beckett's text, then, models for us the narrative queerness required to forever resist and defer a firm human subjectivity. Indeed, furthering Frichot's suggestion, this unnamable entity bears very few marks of the human subject or a literary character whatsoever. In this way, Beckett's text offers a model of the non-subjective becomings that the dissertation as a whole seeks to introduce to trans studies.

Secondly, while Woolf's text may be easily misconstrued as a whimsical and painless take on the becomings of transgender, Beckett's image of unnamability (like Stryker's sadomasochism) foregrounds the *suffering* that is entailed in refusing and refuting the conventions of being "at home" with subjectivity. As the unnamable puts it at his most blunt point: "I'm not at home to anything" (448). With this trope of bodily homelessness, the unnamable casts new light on what might be meant by this figure in trans studies. Specifically, Beckett's text allows us to note that although this homelessness is indeed (as Prosser suggests) quite painful, there are many ways to receive, live out, and experience pain. The unnamable implicitly suggests that a practice of ongoing change –

continually seeking out and navigating this "homelessness" – is required. This homelessness is of course not mere metaphor: as Prosser notes the actual conditions of domestic isolation that face many trans people (76), so too does Beckett's text underline the extent to which people without legible ground in normative cultural narratives are most likely not to have stable "ground" – in the sense of property – either. In this light, this chapter will interpret the shifting ground of the unnamable's space alongside the many name changes he undertakes. These two coincident shifts (in ground or property and in name) offer us a model of name change that clashes with that routinely enacted in trans and queer communities (in which recognition of the new name, dissimulation of the old name, and dissimulation of the new name's actual *newness* is sometimes mandated). In contrast, in Beckett's text, the "crossing" of a new name never sticks: the name remains a transient marker of the need for continuous change and novelty. Crucially and affirmatively, then, the suffering of which this text is comprised does not lead the unnamable to capitulate to the old stable forms forced upon him or to simply create a new stable form within those old languages. The unnamable is compelled to continue innovating and finding new, seemingly impossible, temporarily sufficient ways to live – precisely through his conjuring of stories and spatial images. The unnamable's methods of resisting the violent calls from above directly anticipate Deleuze and Guattari's theories of becoming-forgetful. As the unnamable puts it: "my inability to absorb, my genius for forgetting, are more than they reckoned with. Dear incomprehension, it's thanks to you I'll be myself, in the end" (370). In fact, the unnamable's primary quality is

precisely that: his inability to archive, to remember, and to accept a past as his own. This forgetfulness leads, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, to a non-subjective body that is not organized as such. Or, in the words of the unnamable: "Organs, without them, it's easy to imagine" (347). The second intervention this chapter makes in trans studies is, then, the suggestion that it is groundlessness (not property) in language that will in part allow bodily forgetfulness – which is, in turn, what this project advocates as a bodily mode that may allow us to experience change (and its pains) in radically different ways.

　　Beckett's *The Unnamable* and Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography* each, we will see, throw the narrative form of "the life" into suspension in order to create new non-subjective modes of trans individuation. A crucial way in which the narrative of the transgender subject has gained steam is recent: the positing (and naturalizing) of the figure of the transgender child. In just the past two decades (and especially the past five years), this form – one which provides the generic "beginning" to the linear and biographical narrative of any species of subject – has gained a foothold in trans discourse. In the conclusion to this project, I turn to L. Frank Baum's 1904 text, *The Marvelous Land of Oz*, a tale that 1) features a gender-changing child before this figure assumed its current valences, and also 2) reminds us that certain spaces – rural ones – are still problematically relegated to the position of "child" in the lifespan of modern queer history. Having both traced the disintegration of the transing subject and also forwarded a theory of an alternative transing aesthetic through the modernism and postmodernism of DS+R, Woolf, and Beckett, the conclusion of the project also, therefore, crosses

the boundaries of the space that is most often associated with queer modernism (the city) to a place where things are regarded as *anything but* transient and novel (the rural realm). Baum's text follows a proto-trans child through a fantastical world of "wishing pills" and "powder[s] of life" that, again, recedes from the *scientia sexualis* of modern medicine to the seemingly retrograde aesthetic practices of magic. The young protagonist, Tip, reminds us that some modes of gender crossing do indeed require or imply other crossings – particularly that of land (migration) and class (wealth). Despite the text's cautionary tale about class and urbanism, this fantastical and fictional proto-transgender nonetheless clashes with the form of the contemporary transgender child, whose existence has largely been vindicated on the basis of refusing the ethos of transformation, change, innovation, and creativity towards which transing, in this project, strives. The project ends, therefore, with a response to the firmness of this new child category, by affirming the hope offered by the text's transformations of sovereign bodies and subjects into magical assemblages – transformations that persist despite anyone's best attempt to bring all of these blurring buildings and bodies into focus.[14]

Chapter One

How to Beat a Straight Flush:
DS+R's Brasserie and the Rhetoric of Transgender "Plumbing"

post-op FTM wants front hole filled 2nite - t4m - 26 (mission district)
Masculine looking FTM trans man, post op above, original plumbing below, some facial hair, handsome, hairy and caucasian and clean and not on drugs or booze looking to get FUCKED TONIGHT… Send face pic, cock pic, and let me know if you have any FTM experience. Thank you!" *(craigslist.org)*

While the closet – a "structure of narrative" (67), a figure for an economy of secrecy that inaugurates and reifies distinctions such as inside/outside, public/private, and subject/object – is, in Sedgwick's account, "the defining structure for gay oppression in this century" (71), I argue here that the washroom takes the place of the closet when it comes to transgender in *this* century. The concrete and compromised conditions of accessibility (documented by important efforts such as the Sylvia Rivera Law Project's educational film *Toilet Training*, the website safe2pee.org, and coverage of campaigns for gender-neutral space) are only partly responsible for this shift. (See fig. 14-15.) That is, the equation of transgender genitals with "plumbing" cited by our craigslist suitor above suggests that washrooms have been insinuated into trans bodies on a subtler, metaphorical level. This architectonic of the body is enjoying much popularity currently, owing largely to San Francisco's wildly popular magazine, *Original Plumbing: Trans Male Quarterly*. (See fig. 16.) Decades earlier, Kate Bornstein brought the metaphor to the daytime TV public when she appeared on the Geraldo Rivera show, long before Thomas Beatie ever thought about sitting on Oprah's couch: when an audience member asks, "can you orgasm with that vagina?" [31], Kate

quips, "Yah, the plumbing works and so does the electricity" (31). On the positive side, by suggesting that genitals are 'mere' plumbing – are merely mechanical and utilitarian materials – trans people can use this phrase to develop an architectonic of gender that is not genital-centric or determined by popular or medical definitions of body parts. However, it is because of the very urgency of these projects (such as accessibility and new vocabularies of gender) that we must question the currency of such architectonics of the body. Is "plumbing" as gender-neutral a term as it might sound? Similarly, is it possible for "gender-neutral" washrooms to live up to their name – or might the design of washrooms lodge such spaces firmly in multiple gendered histories of aesthetics? If so, how might transing washrooms – as opposed to "neutral" washrooms – intervene in the troubling ideologies of modern hygiene and architectural conventions?

Diller scofidio + renfro's (DS+R's) Brasserie restaurant – a space they reopened in 2000 – underlines these gender-charged conventions precisely as it reconfigures them and disorients its visitors. First, DS+R disrupt the *privacy* that structures both the interiority of the modern psyche and the management of the public hygienic subject: DS+R toy with the solemn need of privacy by poising hidden cameras above the restaurant's front door, by cutting peeking slots into washroom stall doors, by emphasizing the liminal and limited role of doorways with mirrors and *trompe l'oeil*, and by placing only a barely-opaque honeycomb wall between its two washrooms. Secondly, the space bucks the social and affective conventions of *hygiene* with an anti-modernist dark orange matte trough-style sink, with a lack of built-in soap fixtures, and with emblazoned mirrors that

equate "to clean" with "to deny," thereby asking us to reconsider both our investments in our culturally and historically specific definition of cleanliness and also the hygiene industry that works to make cleanliness an increasingly interminable, expensive, and paranoid project. Finally, the Brasserie space raises questions about the role of architecture in the feeling of *comfort* precisely by using the aforementioned design features in order to make users somewhat uncomfortable in at least two ways: by putting them on display, and by drawing their attention to the most minute aesthetic detail of the space. Ironically, it is precisely on the preservation of these tenuous values – privacy, hygiene, and comfort – that feminist philosopher Christine Overall bases her argument for gender-neutral washrooms. Overall suggests that transitioning to gender-neutral washrooms will not have any bearing on "human beings' needs" (87) of "individual privacy" (81), "standards of cleanliness and hygiene" (77-8), and "comfort" (87). We will see in this chapter that these three main reassurances about gender-neutral washrooms each overestimate the extent to which gender violence inheres merely in signs on doors and not in actual washroom comportment, bodily acts, and the conventions of subjectivity thereby maintained. In contrast, DS+R's space shows us that privacy, comfort, and hygiene are aesthetically designed feelings that are often put to work in shoring up the tenuous sovereignty and self-discipline of the contemporary subject of gender. In so doing, DS+R "make perceptible a social situation [hygiene, privacy, comfort, gender] that is understood to be the 'cause' of the project in the first place" (Dimendberg 136).

In addition to the feelings named above, a crucial convention that DS+R critique is the modernist imperative for architecture to represent its stability and immovability with regards to fashion, mutability, and history. On one hand, high modernist architects achieved this feigned stability by denying any and all influence from recent architectural history; as the influential modernist architect Le Corbusier writes, for instance, "if we set ourselves against the past, we are forced to the conclusion that the old architectural code, with its mass of rules and regulations evolved during four thousand years, is no longer of any interest; it no longer concerns us" (*New* 288). By placing modernist style outside of history in this way, Le Corbusier even emulates the narrative pattern of normative gender. He relies, that is, on the "retroactive installment" (Butler, *Bodies* 5) of his material style as transhistorical. Le Corbusier shows us a second way in which modernist architecture dissimulates or represses its vulnerability (and debts) to history, change, and transience: he insists that buildings themselves ought to perform this constant erasure of historicity. That is, in his chapter "The Law of Ripolin: a Coat of Whitewash," Le Corbusier demands that "every citizen...replace his hangings, his damasks, his wallpapers, his stencils" (*Decorative* 188) – in short, all of "his" décor – "with a plain coat of white ripolin" (188). For Le Corbusier, this whitewash imperative was necessary because he considered white to be an "extremely moral" (192) and "appropriate" (186) hue, one that literally washes away dirty signs of the building's use and ageing. The viability and uniqueness of the architecture of Le Corbusier's age, then, was constructed on both the cleansing of the architectural past and also on the erasure of the pasts of specific

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buildings. (Le Corbusier even urged readers to reject the ornate décor of the nineteenth century by implying that we must defecate it out: "when we eat, nature knows well how to rid us of what has served its purpose" [*Decorative* 189].) In sum, this erasure was motivated by Le Corbusier's equation of newness with cleanliness with whiteness – a fraught racial equation that will be addressed throughout this chapter.

As Mark Wigley puts it, this obsessive inclination towards smooth, non-porous white space in the canon of modernist architecture is not merely a functional technology of cleanliness. It also "purifies an age, cleaning away the detritus of the past to open a new future" (*White* 284). In contrast, DS+R insist on dragging up the ideological dirt of their restaurant's context (the famous and era-defining Seagram Building in midtown Manhattan) – especially the space's modernist investment in the feigning of historical 'cleanliness' described above. In its meticulous citation of the felt outcomes of modernist conventions, Brasserie functions as an affective genealogy. Using Foucault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" as a model, I suggest in this chapter that architecture can itself operate genealogically, or, as a body that can cite its own ideological history, intervene in it, and ultimately trans the smooth narratives of history with which we often imbue architectures and bodies alike. Brasserie, in other words, "divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 154) while displaying full awareness of its own vocabulary and citationality. This is a consciously archival sensibility, one that is diametrically opposed to Le Corbusier's "modernist dream of the self-

effacing archive" (O'Driscoll 293) that is always perfectly clean of history. From their queer cake decorators that mock the Seagram Building's fraught relationship to décor to their dark orange sink that colours all over the implicitly racist and dissimulating imperative for white space, DS+R not only self-consciously cite the context in which they build, but also quite literally move Brasserie's visitors beyond conventions of buildings and bodies. This chapter argues, secondly, then, that Brasserie avoids and reconfigures the troubling temporal mode of high architectural modernism and its dissimulating aesthetic.

Mobilizing "Stalled" Ideas

Before proceeding to my case study of DS+R's Brasserie, it is necessary to contextualize this analysis in current thinking on the status of gender with regards to public washrooms. First, in "Public Toilets: Sex Segregation Revisited," an article published in *Ethics and the Environment* in 2007, feminist philosopher Christine Overall provides a comprehensive overview of popular arguments against the establishment of gender-neutral washrooms. She names and counters seven such narratives. In response to the overarching belief that 1) sex-segregation is simply "what women and men want" (76), Overall suggests both that the desire of the majority is not necessarily an indicator of an ethical condition and also that these desires deserve to be reassessed. Perhaps, she asserts, these desires are underpinned by false and gendered assumptions about cross-gender contamination – as though people are contagious to the "opposite" sex only. Although many people believe that 2) "women need both more time and greater privacy when they visit public toilets" (78), Overall reminds us that "there

is nothing inevitable or necessary about the practice of preserving privacy by grouping people on the basis of their putative sameness of genitalia" (78-9). What is more, she notes, the role of sex-segregation in our definitions and feelings of privacy presumes universal heterosexuality of its users. The need of private space for breastfeeding is the third defense of sex-segregation that Overall critiques; as she puts it, "confining breastfeeding to toilets reinforces the bigoted and false idea that there is something shameful or obscene about breastfeeding" (81). It also, she adds, "buys into the convoluted set of taboos around women's bodies that end up exaggerating or misinterpreting women's needs for privacy in the first place" (81). In response to the argument that 4) "members of vulnerable groups have a need for sex-segregated public toilets...[to ensure] safety" (82), Overall points out that, ironically, "such facilities can actually create dangers for women, children, and members of sexual minorities by isolating them" (82). One of the most persistent defenses of sex-segregation is that we ought to preserve 5) "their social function for members of each sex" (83). Overall argues, however, that preserving such gender-specific modes of socializing not only reinforces social segregation but can also disadvantage women because "men's facilities often serve as places for sharing information and male bonding" (83). In this sense, "it can be difficult [for women] to get access to the kind of news that is casually shared in the men's facility" (83). In response to the issue of 6) "religious concerns" (83), Overall points out that providing a number of private unisex stalls would "retain… the individual privacy that many people, regardless of their culture, may want to preserve" (83-4). Finally, to the often-heard protestation that 7) gender-neutral

facilities will simply cost too much, Overall states the obvious: a new set of signs is all that is needed, not a set of new washrooms.

Overall's summary of North American cultural stereotypes, as well as her refutations of them, is useful inasmuch as it traces out the landscape of current popular thinking about gender-neutrality – including arguments made by those campaigning for such spaces. Overall names cross-gender pairings of parents and children, cross-gender pairings of disabled people and attendants, and gender non-conforming people as the beneficiaries of gender-neutral space. What Overall does not sufficiently address, however, is whether or not new signs on doors will actually make these spaces safer, less divisive, or less sexist. Although such spaces eliminate the possibility of being told that one is in "the wrong bathroom," there is no evidence to suggest that treatment of gender non-normative people will improve because of this. After all, much violence and discrimination experienced by transgender people occurs in places where we are officially allowed to be. Overall's systematic dismissal of each popular argument also overestimates the extent to which our fears and desires are determined rationally; are her convincing arguments sufficient to move users to experience their own genders, bodies, and spaces differently, or might art be better suited to generating such affective changes? In the following sections, I will show that, ironically, the paradigm shifts required in order to make such spaces safer and more "transing" are related to precisely the matters that Overall seeks to protect: the privacy of the subject and the norms of hygiene. That is, whereas Overall insists that hygienic standards and personal privacy will not be affected by a transition to gender-neutral space, I

suggest that changing our notions of sovereign gender depends precisely on changing these spatial conventions of the self. DS+R's Brasserie compromises privacy with a tongue-in-cheek flair that demands that we rethink the role accorded to both privacy and hygiene in our senses of self in general, and the management of our genders in particular. In this sense, DS+R remedy Overall's account by demanding that we take aesthetic design seriously as a non-rational mode of redesigning our emotional investments in gender.

In her recent monograph, *Queering Bathrooms: Gender, Sexuality, and the Hygienic Imagination*, Sheila Cavanagh suggests that "there is nothing rational or legitimate about gender panic in modern facilities. The upset is irrational" (4). In a sense, this statement is in accordance with Overall's own critique of irrational fear of gender-neutrality. However, Cavanagh's approach foreshadows my point here: if such fears are ingrained in bodily habits and affect at a very different register than thoughtful rationality, then it stands to reason that such fears will not respond to rational arguments (such as those Overall proposes). Cavanagh's most significant contribution is that she, unlike Overall, attends to the gendering aspects of hygienic norms. She does this by emphasizing both the historical quality of washrooms and the ways in which the ideological legacies of these spaces operate across the boundaries of categories like gender, race, and class. She shows, for instance, that "white, sterile, industrial bathrooms in North America are rooted in colonial and puritanical angst about racial and class mixing that dates back to the eighteenth century" (25-6). She also reminds us that such angst is indelibly linked to historically situated moments of public health

emergencies. As Cavanagh puts it, "the plague was not just a physical ailment"

(134). It was also

> a rationale upon which people could be internally divided and subject to
>
> surveillance...worries about contamination were projected onto the body
>
> of the leper, the criminal (often thought to hide out in the underground),
>
> the prostitute (symbolically aligned with raw sewage, disease, and
>
> contaminating fluids), the destitute (who searches for sellable items buried
>
> in septic sludge), the vagrant (who slept in the city sewers), the scourer
>
> (who cleans city drains and sewers), and those racialized as degenerate.
>
> (134-5)

Here, Cavanagh makes clear that the plague – as a technology of surveillance –

demanded new ways of reading certain marked bodies as dangerous to public

health.

Although gender non-normativity (refracted through the lenses of race,

class, and ability that Cavanagh brings to mind) may today be watched and

disciplined with a similarly panoptic obsession with public safety – as Cavanagh

puts it, "there is a metonymic relationship between gender variance, danger, dirt

and disease in the present-day restroom" (6) – Cavanagh leaves it to us to discern

the role played by architectural design and aesthetic theories of architecture in

inaugurating and enforcing both this imperative for whiteness and its specific link

to gender non-normativity. I will explain this briefly here. In the wake of the

confirmation of the germ theory of disease (which holds that diseases were caused

by transmittable, invasive, and microscopic organisms – in contrast to the

randomness of the previous paradigm of "spontaneous generation") in the 1880s, the advent of widespread modern plumbing and modernist utopian impulses in architecture were both at work in instituting white architecture as the new anti-fashion fashion. According to Wigley, the queer intersections of race and gender (later noted by Cavanagh) are largely attributable to aesthetic theories and practices (which were, of course, informed by racial and sexual norms of the time in turn). That is, as the germ theory threw the supremacy of vision into a crisis (illness inhered in microscopic matter), white spaces were not just about "a certain look of cleanliness" but also about "a cleansing of the look, a hygiene of vision itself" (*White* 5). In response to Le Corbusier's widely-held suggestion that "decoration...is added to objects as a kind of mask" (qtd. in Wigley 3), Wigley points out that whitewash was supposed to cause an affective shift in the beholder of the architectural object: "it ought to bring about a "shift from body to vision, sense to reason...Whitewash liberates visuality. It is a form of architectural hygiene to be carried out in the name of visible truth" (3). Le Corbusier also makes quite clear that it is a style of aesthetic phenomenology that is at stake in such colour-codings: white he calls a "sedative" (qtd. in Wigley 284), while he likens architects who overuse colour to "those who do not resist dangerous caresses" (qtd. in Wigley 296).The modernist morality of white architecture is, then, a legacy of the intersected discrimination of bodies, but also – and not unrelated – of aesthetic control: of a renovation of what precisely the body of a building is and what feelings and modes of perception it ought to awaken in its visitors and beholders. As Wigley puts it, against the "absorption" (7) of the

senses proffered by nineteenth-century ornamentation, the modernist "white surface liberates the eye by reconstituting the idea of a body hidden behind it" (7). In all, the white surface – as a technology of vision – "bracket[s] the sensual out in favour of the visual" (5), throws up a screen that shows us blemishes while concealing the body, and is configured in this discourse as clean and modern specifically because of its honesty. The supposed "mask" of colour and ornament is, as Wigley reminds us, very much like a mask of feminine cosmetics and queer fashion: decorative art was largely abjected in modernist architectural history as "'feminine,' domains of 'ornament,' 'accessories,' 'interior decoration,' 'Art Nouveau,' 'architect's partner,' 'homosexual,' 'woman'" (Wigley, *White* xxv), as "degenerate" (Loos, *Ornament* 167), "crime" (Loos 167), a "disease" (Loos 106) and "a lie" (Le Corbusier, *New* 3).

Where my account extends Cavanagh's is, therefore, on the matter of aesthetics. Though Cavanagh ends her text with a brief exploration of what would comprise "the ideal bathroom" for her survey-respondents, the colour, texture, sounds, and shapes of such utopian spaces go largely unreported. The responses Cavanagh includes diverge along somewhat predictable lines: many seek increased "safety and containment," while others wanted "communal and non-restrictive designs" (215). Cavanagh herself suggests that "disorientation" in space is not enough; rather, "we need pedagogically thoughtful lavatory designs that will gently guide unsuspecting patrons through non-normative spatial maps" (218). While DS+R's aesthetic at Brasserie is, perhaps, 'gentle,' it by no means offers any pre-determined or didactic 'lesson' in the manner Cavanagh describes.

Instead, its very open-ended and dialogic quality strives not for the inclusion of recognizable identities, but rather for ways of orienting to identity and to gender that are not yet known. Brasserie allows me to continue where Cavanagh's text leaves us: what might a transing washroom actually look and feel like? In the following two related sections, I argue 1) that Brasserie's queer use of décor cites and queers the ideological history lying behind the aesthetic of its context and 2) that Cavanagh's evocation of the attribution of degeneration to certain non-normative groups must be rethought with the vital role of aesthetic history and intervention in mind.

Icing on the Cake

Before proceeding to my discussion of the Seagram Building and Brasserie, allow me to explain that the equation of women and non-normative gender with décor is upheld on several levels. Most literally, it is upheld at the concrete level of the profession: in *Designing Women: Gender and the Architectural Profession*, Annmarie Adams and Peta Tancred suggest that "the sexual division of space into interior/female and exterior/male" (38) is upheld by the notion that "interior design…[is] the 'feminine' side of architecture" (71), not to mention the ongoing presumption of "women's supposedly innate understanding of things domestic" (60). Secondly, the historical level of this gendering of ornamentation can offer many examples of this conflation of décor with non-normative gender, the oldest and more obvious being Vitruvius' *De Architectura*. There, he writes that the "unadorned" Doric column was modeled after the male form, and the adorned Ionic after the female. And, according to

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Jennifer Bloomer, this equation of ornate style with femininity has contemporary comparison points. For instance, in her essay "d'Or," she chronicles Louis Henri Sullivan's fall from fame, which she claims documents the way in which queer gender and ornament became mutually reinforcing categories in early modernism. On one hand, Sullivan's work was called out as queer because it was ornate (even his biographer said that "the Gage [Building] imagery was of the male *becoming* female" [175]) and on the other, *he* was mocked for the queerness this ornament apparently bespoke. Critics commented on his vanity, dandyism, diva attitude, insufficient masculinity, and decadent interest in his appearance; in other words, they critiqued what they saw as his personification of degenerate interest in ornament and style.

What does it mean, in this milieu, for an architect or architectural movement to be proud of their anti-décor aesthetic? The Seagram Building, an era-defining modernist skyscraper on Park Avenue in midtown Manhattan, was designed (and completed in 1958) with precisely such austerity in mind. (See fig. 17-19.) Chosen by Canadian heiress Phyllis Lambert Bronfman (who found her father's initial choice of design to be "very mediocre" [Lambert, qtd. in Flowers 211]), prominent architect Mies van der Rohe's international style sought to remove all ornament from the façade of the building. The theory behind this removal was that it was preferable – even more honest – to reveal the structural elements of a building. This emphasis on revealing structure came to be a modernist principle; Le Corbusier writes, for instance, that "decoration is disguise" (*Decorative* 87) and that such modernist displays of structure are

somehow "not decorated" (84). Ironically, just as certainly as it is impossible to have an unstylized façade (or body), the repressed décor of the Seagram Building made its return. That is, despite Mies van der Rohe's ornament-free plans, New York fire codes demanded that all structural steel be covered in a fireproof material. As a compromise, the architect added bronze beams to the outside of the building in order to simulate pure structure, thereby using supposedly superfluous décor in order to evoke the idea of anti-décor he had planned. As the ostensibly pure structure was thereby made entirely reliant on the décor it prohibited, "the functional imperative that requires buildings to wear a protective outer skin implicitly challenged modernism's devaluation of ornamentation" (Sanders 14). In sum, I would like to begin by suggesting that the status of décor is already a fraught and gender-charged matter of repression and dissimulation, long before DS+R enter the picture.

In 1995, a fire in the original Brasserie (designed by Philip Johnson, and occupying the basement of the Seagram Building) left the space open for reinterpretation. Echoing her earlier architectural clout, Lambert – having "wangled an unheard-of arrangement to retain 'aesthetic control'" (Gordon 2) of Brasserie – vetoed the new plans and instead suggested three progressive firms, DS+R among them. The plans Lambert kyboshed essentially proposed "a variation on the old theme" (Gordon 1), a predictable response to the decidedly modernist crisis they faced, of simultaneously struggling to mourn the loss of its own past through the act of creating something new. In contrast, rather than mourn or try to heal the wounds of the burnt body of Brasserie's modernism,

DS+R took the process of material transformation – *its* material transformation – as its very principle (as we will see throughout this chapter). There is an obvious and implicit transgender reverberation to the task of rebuilding Brasserie: a reckoning with the past, a refurbishment of space, and an interrogation into how precisely a new materiality can be assumed.

But perhaps the best way to introduce DS+R's transgender aesthetic is by showing how slyly and cleverly they mock and refuse the representational economy whereby décor is considered an implicitly feminine, queer, or genderqueer realm. Tucked in the corner of DS+R's renewed restaurant, a series of fake cake-icing bags hang behind frosted glass that is only visible if one is viewing the pieces of art directly or 'head-on.' (See fig. 20-26.) The cloth icing bags have been silk-screened with one word, rendered in elaborate cursive: "Outcast," seldom a word invited to the table of haute cuisine. More significantly, the "icing" (shiny steel) that is shown being piped out of these bags takes the form of gendered washroom icons. As such, DS+R thereby mark the icons of sex-segregation with the very gendered presumptions about ornament that inhere in the Seagram Building in the first instance. The art objects show these usually-static icons in seldom-seen motion: the male icon crawling towards the female icon, for instance, and the female drawing a gun on the male – though, when in motion, it's not so easy to distinguish the ubiquitous "skirt" of women from what usually appear as undressed "legs" of men.[15] As a first way of transing the Seagram Building, then, DS+R use cake frosting – a superfluous food *par excellence*, existing to decorate and not to sustain – to make a stylized and

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citational intervention in the history of its setting that aims to contextualize the new space in and against a particular ideological history. Gendered decor, the objects assert, have been 'outcasted' by modernist architecture.

Precisely by citing and mobilizing the staid icons of gender-segregated washrooms, then, DS+R's piece casts doubt upon the claims of timeless and eternal style claimed by modernists like Loos and Le Corbusier. DS+R also refuse this dissimulation of historicity by situating the restaurant in the history of its location. With the deeply entrenched gendered economy of décor looming large over Park Avenue, Brasserie's icing bags are, therefore, very far from the blasé "pastiche" or "blank parody" (17) with which Frederic Jameson associates postmodern citations of modernist art. Rather, its citations are both nuanced and fulsomely engaged with the social outcomes of architectural conventions. While Overall's conception of the ways in which architecture communicates is quite limited – she suggests that "toilets convey symbolic information about what it means to be a woman or a man" (76) – Brasserie's aesthetic communicates (via a contextualization of washroom icons in a specifically architectural history of *décor)* that "what it means to be a woman or a man" is determined through seemingly gender-neutral projects such as design, architecture, décor, and hygiene, rather than merely by a simple identification with a sign on the door. By putting their icing behind a specifically architectural "frosting" (of glass), they also make a statement about the ways in which seemingly neutral building materials limit vision, "cloud" judgement, and therefore demand that critical viewers literally look awry to get the whole picture. That the icing bags are

labelled with precisely the status modernist architectural history grants to the idea of décor not only reminds us of the building's fraught relationship to décor, but also demands that we rethink the notion that gender is merely a matter of icing on the cake.

"I Sink Therefore I Am"

The abjection of décor in modernist architecture finds a literal analogue in transgender's abjection from contemporary public washrooms: we are often regarded as figures of bodily excess or dishonest adornment ourselves. It is crucial, then, to look beyond the "symbolic information" (Overall 76) of the doors, to see the logics of privacy, interiority, and hygiene as potentially complicit in shoring up the normativity of bodies that, as in Loos' discourse, feign being unadorned. While I concur with Overall's feminist argument that "there is no reason in principle to perpetuate sex-segregated toilets because of some notion of the supposed inherent contamination of fluids coming from members of the other sex" (78), her wholly approving orientation to hygiene neglects to consider how hygiene itself creates the conditions whereby these ideas about contamination become possible. To get at these subtle connections, we need to be aware of the gender normative narratives that inhere in "what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 140). Overall's suggestion that "standards of clean/liness and hygiene must be maintained by individual users of [gender-neutral] public toilets and by those charged with cleaning them" (77-8) is a very sensible statement. Its very obviousness, however – the fact that it need not even be explained or argued –

shows how very entrenched we are in the erroneous assumption that gender

feelings and feelings of cleanliness are two totally disparate projects. Indeed,

modern plumbing and hygienic practice have been so thoroughly absorbed into

the architectonic of the modern subject that, according to Nadir Lahiji and D.S.

Friedman's account of the plumbing fetishes of Le Corbusier and Loos, this

subject may be summarized by a simple formula: "I sink therefore I am" (55). For

Loos, plumbers are icons of modernism; as he puts it, "without the plumber the

nineteenth century just would not exist" (*Ornament* 15). Bearing in mind that

hygiene is an inherently spatial project – as Mary Douglas suggests, "dirt" is

simply "matter out of place" (36) – I take DS+R's explicit re-choreography of

hygiene as a challenge to the nearly invisible collapse of gender norms into the

realm of "cleanliness."

Surprisingly, Brasserie offers only *one* washroom sink for all users – for

all genders. The sink is a long cast-resin one, matte and burnt orange in colour.

(See fig. 27-30.) With literal gender-crossing savvy, it straddles the men's room

and the women's room. A barely-there honeycomb wall is all that separates the

two rooms, and even this parts for a few inches in order to let the sink continue

unimpeded. Directly below the interruption in the wall sits the one drain, a feature

that positions plumbing as a way through which the spatial division of genders

turns into a runny abyss. Here, the leftover materials of personal hygiene run

together, figuring cleanliness as the half-hidden site in which genders do not just

meet, but mix. While Overall rightly argues against "the supposed inherent

contamination of fluids coming from members of the other sex" (78), here DS+R

put this critique into effect; by redesigning the usual washroom sink, they show

that it is the aesthetic conventions of design – ones underpinned by the modernist

morality of smooth white surface – that maintain the illusion that our fluids never

mix. As DS+R's matte orange sink operates on the smooth white body of the

functionalist washroom, then, the single washroom-straddling drain is an all too

appropriate flourish.

The more unusual consequence of this drain, however, has to do with

another kind of fluidity: the horizontal movement of all water in the sink, as it

moves slowly sideways, often under the hands of other users, to reach the drain.

This movement literally defies the meaning of "sink," as the water does not spiral

downwards, but travels laterally. This reconfiguration of water flow effects a

transing of movement in a literal sense: it moves "across, through, between"

rather than down and out of sight. In so doing, it also challenges the spatiality of

what Lahiji and Friedman call "the hygienic superego" (55). To trace out this

theory, they cite a long history of plumbing rhetoric in psychoanalysis. Lacan uses

washroom doors to teach about language, public washrooms at train stations as a

story about language and gendered perspective, and, of course, his theory of the

mirror stage seems to locate our primary moments of misidentification and

selfhood in the washroom. Moreover, Lacan relies specifically on the spatial axes

of plumbing in his rhetoric as well: he refers to a friend who insultingly calls

Anna Freud "the plumb-line of psychoanalysis" (42) and suggests that his (self-

appointed) role is to be the "water-level" (42) of psychoanalysis. Freud too relied

on such spatial moralities: he suggests "that human uprightness, the move from

quadripedal to bipedal orientation, is coextensive with civilization's diminution of olfactory stimuli" (42). For Lahiji and Friedman, then, the hygienic superego of this critical tradition demands that waste be whisked *downward* out of sight as quickly as possible. And, as Cavanagh points out, this superego is concerned with not just dirt but also with movement: "the horizontal is aligned with the feminine, the city's underground, crime, vice, death, disease, and degeneracy...The upright position is metonymically associated with the masculine, the 'good,' the 'clean'" (81). If sinking – not just washing, but having our waste "sink" directly out of sight – is a piece of spatial choreography well known to the modern subject, then DS+R's sink goes beyond breaking down architectural gender barriers to actually hint at a reconfiguration of the spatial organization of the subject of gender. They do this precisely by *disrupting* our usage of a mythic "hygienic superego" to account for various hygienic routines and obsessions. This disruption challenges the idea that our conventions of cleanliness and bodily maintenance are ahistorical and beyond our interventions. It also cites and changes the spatial morality of (not just sinks, but also) the body.

The colour of this queer sink may be even stranger than its flow: unlike the modernist white porcelain (and cheaper replicas) still used in most public washrooms, DS+R's deep, flat and dark trough only obscures rather than amplifies the presence of what precisely is being washed away. In dark distinction to such charged estimations of colour and cleanliness, DS+R's burnt-orange trough is just a couple of shades shy of brown, a colour just as tainted in this chromatic economy of cleanliness. This might seem innocuous enough, but

Wigley reminds us that, in Le Corbusier's influential essay "The Law of Ripolin," the modernist imperative towards smooth white surfaces is a visual technology as much as a hygienic one, and, of course, a racial one. White, to repeat Wigley, "liberates visuality. It is a form of architectural hygiene to be carried out in the name of visible truth … [by] bracketing the sensual out in favour of the visual" (*White* 3-5). The misuse of colour, on the other hand, is figured by Le Corbusier (as we saw earlier) as a specifically sexual transgression: he equates this misuse to being unable to "resist dangerous caresses" (qtd. in *White* 284). Excessive colour, to Le Corbusier, is an immoral and feminine architecture of affect and desire. And while he sees colour as an immoral and feminine architecture of desire, Loos decries it as a matter of national backwardness or degeneracy. As he says of his native Austria, "[t]he weakest part is surely our bathroom fittings … Instead of cladding the bathtub in white tiles, people in Austria prefer coloured ones" (*Ornament* 87). In his estimation, the aesthete and the plumber are polar opposites; the former holding back national progress and the latter being a "pioneer" (86), "the first artisan in the state" (86), and "the billeting officer of culture" (86) capable of "leading us to this great goal – the achievement of a level of culture equal to that of other Western countries" (86). Taking Le Corbusier and Loos together, we see that flamboyant use of colour is tantamount to both queer sexuality *and* to a reversal of progressive historical time. In this equation of dangerously affective colour with degeneracy, the seemingly gender-neutral matter of hue becomes an aesthetic analogue to Lee Edelman's queer temporality, in which queers "bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all…to figure

the fate that cuts the thread of futurity" (30). As Aaron Betsky reports in *Queer Space*, Oscar Wilde's "profound aestheticism" (80) is the very picture of this equation of queerness, degeneracy, and décor: the Chelsea house in which he resided from 1884 to his trial had not one white wall in it, but instead deep blue, yellow, mahogany, and so on. Those attachment to such colourful designs came, in the twentieth century, to be seen as harbouring an unmodern attachment to the past – or, in precisely the terms Heather Love uses to describe the representation of queers in the twentieth century, "as a backward race" (6).[16]

"Race," in this economy of white futurity, is concurrently a matter of colour, sexuality, and eugenic purity. Unsurprisingly, given this confluence, many of Cavanagh's interviewees point out what she calls "the racialization of the public toilet as white" (86). We see above that this "racialization" is in no way added to the hygienic project of plumbing after the fact, as if the form and colour of hygienic fixtures were somehow separate from the very purpose of them. Cavanagh also focuses on the effects of the washroom's whiteness for trans subjects: she suggests that "White backdrops function to stage gender. For trans interviewees, glass and public mirrors highlight a lack of congruence between the body as it is felt and the body as it is intercepted by others" (86). In so doing, Cavanagh usefully underlines how technologies that appear to be discretely "racist" affect queer subjects of all colour – and how, as I suggest above, anti-queer theories of heredity and degeneration became the occasion for white architecture and its ostensible purity. These intersections at work in hygienic management of the body point us towards a new definition of discrimination that

looks beyond the liberal lens that would identify explicit anti-gay or anti-ethnic sentiment only.

This line of thought echoes Foucault's account of late nineteenth-century psychiatry in his 1974-1975 lectures collected under the title *Abnormal*. There, Foucault develops a theory of "neoracism" that describes the social hygiene accomplished by the ideological life of bodily hygiene. While some trans theorists (including Prosser) invest in psychiatric categories and theories of the self, Foucault reminds us of their disciplinary force. As he puts it: "you can see that when it became possible for psychiatry to link any deviance, difference, and backwardness whatsoever to a condition of degeneration, it thereby gained a possibility of indefinite intervention in human behaviour" (*Abnormal* 315), a possibility that in turn allowed psychiatry to "dispense with the ill or the pathological and to connect a deviation of conduct directly with a definitive hereditary condition, psychiatry gave itself the power of dispensing with the need to find a cure" (315-6). Consolidating and naturalizing illness into congenital degenerative types functions (as does the consolidation of sex acts into a homosexual type) to constitute the "abnormal" rather than ill individual. The management of such abnormal people came to be seen less as a medical project and more as one of public hygiene and protection: Foucault argues that psychiatry "could claim to replace justice...and hygiene" (316) as it worked towards becoming "the general body for the defense of society against the dangers that undermine it from within" (316). Given then, that ideologies of public hygiene also assert the existence of congenital degeneration in certain 'types' of people,

the whiteness of the washroom is problematic for reasons that span far beyond the choice of white tiles or white sinks.[17] That is, the anti-abnormality of the washroom (along lines we recognize as race, class, ability, sexuality, and gender) can and indeed must be addressed in terms that go beyond the discrete categories of racism, transphobia, ableism, cleanliness, and so on. Even though our experiences of washrooms may vary greatly along these lines of identity, representing these categories as separately and passively 'excluded' from washroom design misses the ways in which they are connected in the first instance – in architectural treatises as much as in psychiatry.

With this assemblage (rather than mere 'intersection') of ostensibly degenerate bodies in mind, we can see that DS+R's strange sink does much more than tell us that grey water from various genders "all goes to the same place," that gendered spaces ought to be "fluid," or that waste is a category that straddles all categories of person. More interesting than these more literal interpretations of their sink, DS+R's horizontally-oriented and shadowy orange sink colours all over the very figure of modernist architecture's valorization of "self-cleaning" temporality, dirtying up Loos' hygienic gauge of nationalist modernism while refusing to "resist" the affective operations of colour. Whereas cleanliness is one of the first issues about which Overall offers reassurance, the sink at Brasserie cites and distorts an aesthetic genealogy of hygienic fixtures that is underpinned by abjection of adornment and by the dissimulation of material history – the exact characteristics of gender this project as a whole seeks to change. While "for architects such as Le Corbusier, the bathroom and plumbing held central place

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because of their ability to drain off the reality of the body as quickly, hygienically, and elegantly as possible" (*White* 103), DS+R push "sink" water sideways, allowing it to seep along slowly in a dark trough, and to flow against the current of psychoanalytic models of the self (and its hygienic superego). The orange sink is, in the most literal sense, abnormal. It does not partition space as vertically-organized individual-use sinks do. The space lodges the icon of hygiene (the sink) into the architectural tool and symbol of division (the sex-segregating honeycomb wall), as if to suggest that the 'types' of people required for psychiatric notions of degenerates *types* are inaugurated by the meeting of spatial discipline and personal hygiene. Most notably, the sink refuses the chromatic code of public hygiene and thereby forgoes the convention of using white in order to make dirt hyper-visible and vertically whisked out of sight. The sink thereby refutes the visual logic of Le Corbusier's "hygiene of vision" (Wigley, *White* 5) in favour of a colour that neither allows this "sink" (that "I am") to remain beneath notice nor reproduces the banal fiction that white sinks are merely un-invested functional spaces in which to wash our hands. On the contrary, as Le Corbusier and Loos show, they are fixtures in a modernist discourse that seeks to cleanse unaffected nationalist temporality of its degenerate, backwards, insufficiently masculine aesthetes.[18]

To Wash is to Dissimulate is to Normalize is to…

Above, we witness a certain *figuring* of sinks in one particular strand of modernist architectural discourse. DS+R also, however, call out the actual *acts* accomplished with this fixture, literally labelling hygiene as a series of

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emotionally-invested and normative body modifications – a label, I will suggest, that helps us see what problematic ideas and dissimulations allow us to regard trans body modification as so entirely different than the modifications most people accomplish daily. Directly above the long orange sink at Brasserie are two texts, each of which configures the washroom as a place to be "read." On each washroom's large mirror, a glowing white message is emblazoned at the eye-level of those standing at the sink to wash their hands. The messages call out the affective operations of precisely the "standards of cleanliness" (77-8) that Overall regards as gender-neutral and unchanging: in the men's room, the mirror reads, "washistopurgeistodenyistowashis" and in the women's, it reads, "tocleanistoabsolveistoreformisto." (See fig. 31-33.) No one "clean" interpretation may be wrought from the playful texts. Where "wash is to purge" becomes "wash is top urge," the usual logic of washroom signification is reversed: the words multiply interpretations and generate conversation rather than divide bodies into rooms. Bursting the seemingly purely functional/anti-bacterial act into the series of emotional projects in which the act participates, these messages operate as a micro-genealogy of hand-washing. That is, rather than provide "the integrity of the body" (76) and safety from "vulnerability" (76) for which Overall strives, they "permit… the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events" (Foucault 145-6).

To what effect? The use of text in single-sex spaces enacts the idea that if a person feels confined to only one room, he or she quite literally only knows half the story – and perhaps not even that much. These compressed and never-ending

texts are too frantic to allow even a space to breathe; the difficulty of reading

them reproduces the perpetual cyclicality of cleaning itself and of the

indeterminacy and performativity of a subject sustained by it. Though the notion

of incessant hand-washing inevitably brings Lady MacBeth to mind, guiltily

trying to absolve herself through needless scrubbing, DS+R's cryptic texts suggest

instead that "wash[ing]" in order to "purge" oneself or "absolve" oneself might

also be the project of the modern hygienic subject. Here, DS+R let into trans

theory an emotional outlook seldom considered – what it means to happily and

easily modify bodies. How, in other words, does the dissimulation of hygiene's

effects of (often painful) body modification contribute to our limited

understandings of transgender?

　　　　One answer, I argue, is that the cultural fiction of hygiene – that it only

maintains the body – is a crucial way in which the "wrong-body figure" (Prosser

69) seems to apply so easily to trans body-modifiers and seldom to other identity

categories. The popular "wrong-body figure" (69) of trans embodiment accepts as

its premise that the pain and body modification trans people undergo is singular,

and that the feeling – wrongness – that inspires it should be accepted simply

because it is "material" (69) (even though Butler has so fully dismissed this idea

of pre-social materiality). It is ironic (considering the hygiene industry, which

takes as its basic selling point that *nobody* feels "right" in their bodies) that

"living in the wrong body" is a spatial narrative of feeling that has coalesced

around so *few* people. Thousands of dollars, hours, and a lot of pain go towards a

lifetime of hygienic "maintenance" of the body. Trans people are not the only

people who feel "wrong-bodied" or modify their bodies, of course: as Cressida

Heyes writes in her account of cosmetic/trans surgeries (dis)analogies, "I am quite

clear that I am not a transsexual, but I have often wished (including for periods of

years at a time) to be in a different body. In some ways, I feel as though the body I

have is the *wrong* body: too large, too female in some respects, too clumsy" (41).

And, as David Valentine points out, drugs and implements are used by most

people everyday, including – to reference a hyperbolic example he gives – coffee

drinkers.[19] How strange, then, that Prosser insists that "the ability to give oneself

pain [...] to harm one's own body, surely depends upon a great degree of bodily

alienation" (74). Significantly, Lahiji and Friedman define their term "hygienic

superego" in a way that reminds us that pain and pleasure are not to so strictly

separated. In their account, this superego refers to "the belonging together of the

Law and Enjoyment, by which we mean the Law's injunction of Enjoyment as its

obscene reverse; they are two parts of one and the same movement" (11). Though

I am sensitive to what Heyes calls the potential *ressentiment* of some trans

narratives, I am not at all suggesting that specifically transgender pain is somehow

'actually' pleasurable.[20] On the contrary, I am suggesting that obeying "the Law"

of normative hygiene and bodily upkeep produces pleasure, even as so many of

the acts that comprise this obedience are also painful on the sensory level. Since,

as Heyes remarks elsewhere, "body modifier" is a term that describes "all of us"

(127), it is rather odd that this narrative of self-harm and alienation seems to

adhere more to transgender than to other categories of embodiment. Underlying

the uneven application of the "wrong-body figure" (69) lies, I argue, a certain

naïveté about what it means to feel "right" – about the very belief in such a possibility of pure comfort and bodily integration. Cavanagh challenges this image but recoups it too quickly: she suggests that insofar as

> the disintegration [attributed to trans people] is part and parcel of human subjectivity[,] the gender embodiments had by those who are trans and cissexual should be characterized not by an absolute difference in the way the visual imago and the sensational ego are psychically negotiated but rather by a difference in the degree to which each is felt to be compatible.
>
> (48)

Cavanagh's assertion that "disintegration" is not an exclusively trans phenomenon is crucial to the overarching arguments of this project; she demands that we contextualize trans pain and alienation in our specific cultural moment and alongside other bodies. However, her alternative – that trans people simply feel less compatible than do other variously "disintegrated" selves is a question I prefer to leave open. It is not clear that non-trans people (a group I hesitate to consolidate) experience any less dysphoria or pain than transgender people. In any case, it is problematic to make any such judgements of "degrees" of alienation when normative and non-normative body modifications are caught up in such different conditions of financial accessibility, narratives of selfhood, economies of shame and privacy, and architectonics of such changes (such as the ideological divide between "modification" and "maintenance" of the body). Still, trans writers often shore up precisely such divisions by implicitly asserting the existence of a fully comfortable and "right" body. For instance, while DS+R's appropriately-

located mirrors aim to make hand-washers uncomfortable with their normative "hygienic superego" (Lahiji and Friedman 11), Prosser promotes precisely the opposite economy of feeling: he writes of the importance of being "at home in one's skin" (73), "feeling one owns" (73) one's body, and of transition as a process of "coming home to the self through body" (83), all of which imply a domestic architecture of the body and feeling. DS+R's mirror messages make clear that inclinations to deny, purge, absolve, and reform accompany normative modes of modifying the body – the modes that are seen as easy, right, and only as maintenance. Rather than crafting the feelings of "wrong" embodiment into a narrative of transgender exceptionalism, DS+R's mirrors call for us to contextualize feelings (including of pain and alienation) in our culture, which has so much of those feelings on offer to most people.

To provide one instance of architectural context for this equation, I look to Teyssot, who shows that the narrative of homey bodily comfort – one Prosser implicitly valorizes as the right affective life of gender – is steeped in problematic histories of class, domesticity, and especially "the genesis of a new individualism" ("Cleanliness" 79) coming about in nineteenth-century France. (This domestically-wrought individualism is also far from exclusive to that particular scene: Wigley, for instance, scrutinizes fifteenth-century architectural narratives by Leon Battista Alberti for similar moments of privatization.) My interest here is to, in Foucault's words, "be sensitive to the…recurrence" of sentiments and instincts – "not in order to trace their gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles" ("Nietzsche"

140). The scene I am concerned with is the advent and increased availability of modern plumbing, and the role I seek to decipher is the extent to which our architectonics of gender owe some of their qualities to situated, accidental, and seemingly unrelated hygienic norms – to what Foucault calls "the exteriority of accidents" ("Nietzsche" 146).

Something so easily taken for granted today – "the idea of comfort as arising out of a domestic environment" (77) – was not so obvious in the nineteenth century, as the implements, time, water, resources, and servants necessary for domestic hygiene existed largely in the realm of the aristocracy. Not surprisingly, then, the acts now regarded as hygienic necessities and tasks were once known as aristocratic luxuries. Appropriately, the word in French used to describe these bodily practices was "commodités" (Teyssot 77) – a word used to describe both the body-crafting acts and their object (dressing tables, portable tubs, bidets, basins, hot water). Given this, the word "commodités" or commodities is all too appropriate here: Lupton and Miller point out that the Lever Company – whose own famed skyscraper stands across Park Avenue from the Seagram Building – was the first to design built-in shower-and-bath ensembles that were affordable for working-class home-owners. Here, Teyssot probes this etymology and makes reference to Paul-Emile Littré's 1875 *Dictionnaire de la Langue Français* for context:

> In French, the term *commodités* was usually used in the plural to describe those things that allowed for 'ease' in domestic life. The term derives from

the Latin *commodus*, a noun taken from the adjective, the etymology for which is *cum* and *modus*, meaning 'with measure or manner.' (79)

In this definition, *commodités* – usually translated in English as *comforts* – were *modes* or measured ways of doing things to the body that made home life easier. If these products institute manners, modes or genres of crafting the appearance of the body, these modal acts of comfort are indeed little genders. In his historical account, Teyssot illustrates that these *commodités* shifted from the realm of aristocratic luxury to middle-class obligation, following the advent of a series of small cheap home innovations such as more efficient oil-burning lamps, gas lamps, plants to produce coal gas, better distribution systems, and the general shift towards increased mechanization. What began, then, as aspirations to ape aristocratic body practices soon became normative practices and signals of one's class standing. It is in this shift, Teyssot suggests, that the emotional life of these acts changed: the increasing availability and affordability of these *commodités* allowed for "the imperceptible shift that led from the aristocratic world of *commodités* to the prevalently bourgeois universe of *confort*" (87) – from wealthy acts of home-based leisure to middle-class attempts to make the body into a luxurious home equal to that of the aristocracy.

The effect of this class-based shift in practices led a correlative shift in the domestic architectonic of affect. That is, as modern bathing and grooming practices became widespread, this association of home-bound hygiene with comfort – indeed, the creation of "bodily comfort" *as* homey hygiene – generated new possibilities for how subjects felt and functioned. As Teyssot argues, "in fact,

an internal, or private luxury, or 'comfort,' started to appear" (83) as these home-based genres of crafting the body became normalized. In short, through the normalization of hygiene-bound *confort*, "the individual was privatized" (81). The body took another step towards becoming a "home" (Prosser 73). The particular narrative of "feeling comfortable in one's body" is, then, steeped in a class-charged historical moment at which modes of crafting the body became absolutely tied to the *home*, privatizing not only gender but the subject – and, in turn, generating precisely the kind of interiorized and privatized subject instituted by psychoanalysis, which can validate the transhistorical "mythic lure" (Prosser 205) of homey embodiment. The body-as-owned-home does indeed cite a history of the owning class; as DS+R's mirrors so bluntly state, hygienic practices have been absorbed and privatized in the body as a way to feel "right" – and seldom do we imagine that our technologies of "right" embodiment have anything to do with the definition of others as "wrong."

Therefore, while Overall would suggest that "individual privacy is not compromised by the absence of sex-segregated toilets" (81), DS+R's equations – writ large on the psychoanalytic scene of subject-producing misrecognition – remind us that the things *we do* in washrooms are already technologies of another kind of privatization: of gender feelings, of the "individual," and of the body. She is quite right to suggest that "the sex segregation of toilets arguably rests upon a concept of privacy that assumes…that heterosexuality is universal" (80), and especially that "privacy can be defined and protected in more than one fashion" (80). What she leaves for us to discern – and what I have tried to describe above –

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is that the feelings that seem to make sex-segregation and privacy *necessary* (gender-charged modesty, disgust, embarrassment, and so on) are themselves generated by architectures and habits of washroom privacy. To repeat Dimendberg's description of DS+R: they "make perceptible a social situation that is understood to be the 'cause' of the project in the first place" (Dimendberg 136).

The (Trans) Man in the Mirror

On one register, then, DS+R's naming of washroom-based emotional projects remind us that seeking to create gender-neutral space while upholding conventions of privacy is counterproductive: the respect given to absolute washroom privacy both shores up individualism and helps privatized subjects dissimulate the acts of body modification we call hygiene. But what about the more literal level of washroom privacy – does it enable a privatization of bodily acts to accompany the privatization of feeling described above? In response to both of these registers of body-privatization, I read DS+R's reconfigurations of architectural conventions of privacy – one of the overarching principles of Brasserie – as an interrogation of the norms of washroom privacy.

Like the glass panels that case in Brasserie's cake-decorators, the doors to the restaurant washrooms are also composed of frosted glass, with the only transparent portion being the background portion of the conventional male and female washroom signs. In effect, DS+R mimic the convention of the square washroom sign without actually having one; here, gender is precisely the place where we can literally "see through" the door's role in shaping space. Moreover, mirrors are installed several feet inside the washroom, which run parallel to the

doors at eye-level. The result of this is that the "blank space" of the washroom sign functions as a mirror – but at a distance. Patrons see themselves with a gender icon imposed over their face, as if literally labelled with an icon upon choosing a washroom. (See fig. 34.) That the mirror stands several feet *behind* the doors effects a strange reconfiguration of feeling: as a patron begins to open the door to the women's room, for instance, she sees herself reflected, but at a distance – already *inside* the washroom, a confusing feeling that had me looking very closely at the door to see if it was mirrored. This spatial trick not only has users looking awry at the routinely-ignored icons of gender, but it also, by literally projecting users *into* it from the outside, blurs the boundaries between the inside and outside of the weirdly public/private space of the washroom. But why should the literal architectural marginalization of washroom functions into a peripheral and closed-off room warrant any attention? Why is the privatization of these acts playfully configured here as an "indirect reflection" of the gender segregation marked on its door?

I suggest that the accidents and chance technologies that consolidated hygienic acts *into* one room in the first instance were also an important node of the shift towards the privatized, interiorized, subject of hygienic gender described above. First, leading up to the normalization of washrooms in public and at home, an especially significant shift in scientific paradigm occurred. As stated earlier, the 1880s saw the confirmation of the germ theory of disease, which holds that disease was caused by invasive microorganisms. In distinction to the previous model of spontaneous generation (an Aristotelian theory positing that life could

emerge from inanimate matter, such as air and water) the germ theory's original

point of transmission is bodies. Paranoia about contagion was certainly not an

invention of germ theory, but it did change why and how the public sphere could

be considered dangerous to one's health. Teyssot gives one example: "since it was

deemed dangerous" in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, "all social

intercourse which opened up the body to infected air, especially bathing, was

prohibited. Doctors asked everybody to get out of bathtubs" ("Cleanliness" 75).

Today, in contrast, private bathing is considered tantamount to one's suitability

for appearing in public. This shift in scientific paradigm leaves an aesthetic

convention in its wake: the very idea that danger and disease inhered in household

matter too small to *see* grounded the valorization of smooth white non-porous

architecture, which would provide an anxious "cleansing of the look" as much as

cleansing of space or bodies. And secondly, in the wake of this change in the

spatiality of illness, the landscape of domestic life changed as well. While the

advent and eventual ubiquity of modern plumbing brought many benefits (from

"decreased typhoid rates" [Lupton and Miller 23] to the eventual inclusion of

water provision in public health acts), it also drastically exacerbated the

privatization of bodily self-fashioning by requiring that mobile pieces of furniture

(such as tubs and basins) become fixtures (modern toilets, pre-fabricated tubs, and

so on.). To repeat Sigfried Giedion, this practical outcome of modern plumbing

was a shift from "nomadic" to "stable" hygienic conditions (qtd. in Lupton and

Miller 27), a move that required the centralization of all water-related tasks. In

this switch from decentralized and mobile hygienic practices to centralized ones,

the proper place of primping, preening, and washing was settled, a literal privatizing of acts that accompanies the affective privatization of gender critiqued above. At the same time, this paradigm shift with regards to disease caused a sizable increase in the market for hygienic products and fixtures. (See fig. 35.)

Considering these contexts, DS+R's gender-marked blurring of the inside and outside of washrooms shows that the many levels of privacy acted out in washrooms bespeak neither transhistorical human needs nor socially-neutral aesthetic conventions. DS+R's doors gesture towards a different kind of architecture – one that questions privacy and interiorization as principles of safety. Given that "the emerging ideology of the individual subject depends [on] the new sense of privacy" (Wigley, "Untitled" 343), taking aim at conventions of body privacy implicitly tears at the model of the individual subject as the owner of a privatized body and gender. "By substituting mirrors for windows," Edelman suggests, the washroom usually "gestures… towards an idea of interiority, towards a principle of containment…modeling the subject as a container of space" (Edelman 152). But these doorways and mirrors both cite this containment and also purposefully loosen it. It is telling that this visual trick is done with male and female washrooms signs: for DS+R, the categorization of gender is where the interiorized space of this subject opens up. In stark contrast to Overall's reassurances about privacy, DS+R suggest that washrooms are themselves an architectural mode of segregation – segregating the body from living space in the name of the privatized liberal individual.

If this critique seems too big for these small washroom mirrors to bear, consider one particular door inside the men's room. Taking up Edelman's contention that any contact with others in a men's room is regarded as too public – that "in the men's room, looking sucks" (158) – the room contains three stalls, two of which shelter toilets, and one that contains a urinal. While it is no longer unheard of to shelter urinals behind stall doors (though it is rare), stall doors that clearly gesture towards queer sex are, of course, virtually unimaginable. According to Lee Edelman, however, even the existence of a private urinal admits that queers *could* be here; he suggests that open urination secures the fiction of heterosexuality for washrooms. Though "hiding your ass" (158) while defecating is required (in order to show a lack of interest in the anal realm), "hiding your dick" (158) would be to admit that somebody present in the washroom could be interested in looking at it. A man hiding his dick, in a sense, is showing other users that he is already anticipating the queer gaze. The containment of urinals in stalls therefore entails a change in sexuality as much as modesty, an open architectural admission that queers do exist and visit the washroom. As a remark on precisely that, the door of the urinal stall has a long rectangular section cut out of it, a stylized and obvious peephole that "outs" the open secret of public queerness by reframing furtive peeking acts that used to be in the open. (See fig. 36.) A stall door, in this instance, encourages paranoia, elicits gazes, and configures privacy-in-public as a necessarily failed project only possible in a culture of surveillance. Overall and Cavanagh both regard the issue of privacy and stalls as a problem for public washrooms. For the former, it is urinals that are the

problem, specifically: Overall suggests they "might have to be removed and replaced with stalls" (84) – this is probably not the kind of queer stall she has in mind. In a sense, DS+R mock precisely this idea that increased privacy will generate meaningful change in our culture of public surveillance; instead of providing more privacy, DS+R publicize the norms of privacy, thereby suggesting that the norms themselves (and not just our resources for dealing with them) must be changed. Cavanagh hints at this when she suggests that because "cubicle walls and doors do not reach the floor" (93), the washroom's "partitioning of the body" (93) into individual cells indicates the washroom's panoptic function: "the gaps enable feet to be seen, while the person inside cannot know when or by whom or to what end a look may be given. Feet are subject to extensive visual scrutiny in the stall" (93). This seems entirely plausible (indeed, several of Cavanagh's interviewees report being called out for feet facing the 'wrong' direction), but Cavanagh's emphasis on only the disciplinary possibilities of stall design forecloses the question of whether or not literally redesigning washroom privacy might allow us to redesign the optic management of bodies and gender. For instance, in anticipation of Cavanagh's suggestion, DS+R playfully joke that the doors that purport to protect us actually make the operations and emotions of surveillance possible. Beyond mere critique, however, DS+R frame the possibility of *more* intersubjective connections – even sexual ones – as new architectural imperatives. Their door operates as an architectural invasion of privacy, a queering of the door that puts on display the heteronormative side of washroom privacy itself.

DS+R's built critique complicates the matter of gay and lesbian washroom politics as well. To Overall, the fact that gay people can safely use washrooms gestures towards the suitability of gender-neutral space. As she puts it:

> gays' and lesbians' adaptation to the current arrangements shows that personal privacy need not be understood in terms of an overriding necessity of shielding oneself completely from members of that group with which one is having, was having, or will be likely to have sex. (80)

It is certainly true that isolation from one or another gender ought not be central to the feeling of safety, but Overall's conclusion that we must therefore seek new and equally strict conventions of privacy is not at all a foregone conclusion. (This is not to mention that, as Edelman and countless others have pointed out, queers have not had such an easy time "adapting.") But more importantly here, DS+R show that the seemingly gender-neutral "basic need" (Overall 87) of privacy is itself a crucial subplot in the narrative of liberal body/home ownership. By flirting with a queer lack of privacy, DS+R not only poke fun at the solemnity of the spatial rituals that have aggregated around this privatized hygienic subject, but they also take direct aim at the implicitly heteronormative conventions of this privatization. Doors, although the usual guarantors of privacy, operate in Brasserie, then, precisely as they ought not; taking seriously the swinging and liminal role of doors, DS+R project you into a room, let you see through, encourage you to peek, and – at the very front door to the bar – use the seeming innocuousness and low-key quality of most restaurant entryways in order to make patrons an active part of the architecture from their first step into the space.

Against the convention of gentle entrance-ways, the long "slow" staircase of Brasserie deposits patrons into the very middle of the dining room, which necessitates and exaggerates the idea of "making an entrance." (See fig. 37.) This entrance only happens, however, on Brasserie's terms: a camera perches above the ground floor entryway, directly above the revolving door. It takes photos every five seconds, which are streamed directly to a row of small LCD screens that form a decorative border above the bar. (See fig. 38-40.) Patrons *see* themselves in the architecture; their privacy is explicitly violated as they enter; the aesthetic of the space changes according to its patrons. To bring this chapter full circle, then: on the threshold of this high modernist space, patrons are transformed into the very architectural element that modernists such as Loos and Le Corbusier seek to abject as superfluous, feminine, degenerate and queer: décor.

Conclusion

In a sense, the question at stake in this chapter is as simple as: why does the personal ad with which this paper begins make so much sense? I have sought neither to dismiss the increasingly common trans phrase "original plumbing" nor to suggest that hard-fought struggles for washroom access are unworthy of time and energy. On the contrary, DS+R have shown us precisely why washroom rhetoric and campaigns are *so* relevant and sensible at the current moment, at a time when the fictional "pure" functionality of unadorned architecture still passes as every bit as normal and harmless as the normative straight white and able middle-class male body. I have tried to show specifically which dissimulated material/aesthetic conditions allow both modernist architecture in general and

washrooms in particular to "pass" as so entirely ungendered beyond the signs on their doors. In light of DS+R's interventions, the purview of "transgender washroom" has a new meaning, one that demands that aesthetic intervention is not only important, but moreover, that all narratives of trans bodies and activist campaigns have their own aesthetic sensibility that necessarily implicates histories and ideologies that may seem gender-neutral. Brasserie, I have suggested, presents itself as a nuanced open archive of gender-charged hygienic affect, as a space that – through disrupting the predictable choreographies of how washrooms feel – signifies and enacts the potential to remobilize the body's capacity to operate as an open archive of affect rather than a foreclosed set of emotional narratives. "Archive" in this usage is quite different than the archive suggested by Cavanagh, which she describes here:

> the lavatory is a museum or relic of the past. It is a storehouse for what has been lost and foreclosed in the making of the modern gendered and sexual body...If...the lavatory is a memorial to what has been lost or foreclosed in the making of the self, it stands to reason that it acts as a cultural repository of the unconscious. (41-3)

Cavanagh is right to suggest that some washrooms may be able to pry open the locked vaults of the gendered self – even if just fleetingly, at the mirror – but her emphasis on loss and foreclosure is challenged by DS+R's wry optimism about the role of architecture in transing the body. Ironically, DS+R's melancholic archive is the anti-décor stance of the (seemingly gender-neutral) high modernist Seagram Building; their token for new queer futures is a set of sex-segregated

washrooms that push us to rethink the spatial politics of gender far beyond

categories of sex and strict spatial division. Counter to Cavanagh's sense that

visitors to the washroom are visiting "a museum or relic," DS+R insist that

visitors play no such passive role. We are not merely observers, interpreters, or

pre-gendered visitors to washrooms; we are, rather, archivists of historically-

influenced aesthetic and social conventions in our own right.

In this way, Brasserie has given us a robust model of what Stryker,

Currah, and Moore call "the explicit relationality of 'trans-'" rather than "the

implied nominalism of 'trans'" (11) – a descriptor that aims to capture

"operations" and "movements" (13) rather than the discrete identity-bound

subjects we imagine entering washrooms already finalized as gendered subjects.

"Transing," which they emphasize "takes place within, as well as across or

between, gendered spaces" (13), is a fit operation to describe DS+R's practice,

one "that assembles gender into contingent structures of association with other

attributes of bodily being, and that allows for their reassembly" (13). But DS+R

also challenge the purview of the word: rather than focus solely on "attributes of

bodily being," Brasserie brings the role of architecture to the forefront as a

constituent part of shaping "gendered spaces" (13). While Wigley sees an

unfortunate elision of the role of the "house" in considerations of the gender

economy of the "home" ("Untitled" 331), Brasserie does not let us separate design

from gender. Rather, it shows us that in order to make officially "gender-neutral"

washroom spaces meaningful, we need to address not just the institutional

markings of the space, but also the ways in which design can shore up gender

normativity through the repetition and dissimulation of body management. As Deane Simpson suggests, "space is understood in their practice in performative, rather than representative, terms" (*Ciliary* 21). Though in Brasserie, DS+R are more "representative" than usual (with scripted mirrors and words silkscreened on cake decorators), their interventions in modernist architectural history still call out its "retroactive installment" of modernist architectural identity as transhistorical. Everywhere insisting that bodies, architectures, and styles are always in process, DS+R refigure the "constituted social temporality" (Butler, *Trouble* 140) by which banal daily bodily habits become negligible, and through which architects can still regard the International Style of the Seagram Building (and the implications of its anti-décor stance) as functional, unadorned and beyond history.

I would like to conclude by returning to the chapter's heretofore unchecked opening sentence: while the closet – a "structure of narrative" (Sedgwick, 67), a figure for an economy of secrecy that inaugurates and reifies distinctions such as inside/outside, public/private, and subject/object – is, in Sedgwick's account, "the defining structure for gay oppression in this century" (71), the washroom takes the place of the closet when it comes to transgender in *this* century. It is in this privatizing and sanitizing sense that transgender people *are* accurately captured by an architectonic of plumbing – and not simply by our own playful choosing in *Original Plumbing*. I don't wish to suggest that plumbing is our metaphor simply because we are treated "like shit," though that is one meaning. More subtly, the conceptions of privacy and interiority named by Sedgwick adhere to transgender in our culture in a different way than occurs with

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a closet. Whereas the interiority of the closet refers to a bodily desire that cannot be spoken in a broken homophobic culture, the washroom's interiority is one of bodily shame interiorized *in* the subject, the trans subject who is not "in" either the right washroom or body. Neither spaces are thought to be "living" spaces but are instead places where, in preparation of the public sphere, we practice bodily acts – either a style-charged selection from a queer archive or a clearing out of a different kind of functional archive of the body. As metaphors, the two are very different: the closet is an archive, a place of accumulation, and filled with things to put *on* the body; in contrast, the washroom is the anti-archive, a place of erasure, equipped to remove things *from* the body. What are the stakes of adopting this narrative of transgender temporality? "Original plumbing" justly allows trans people some freedom from a genital-centric model of gender – and the witty phrase deserves the credit it gets. What I have shown here, however, is that the metaphor's legibility relies on precisely the same claims made to naturalness and originality feigned by Loos and Le Corbusier – the very operations of dissimulation that uphold the popular representation of some bodies as unadorned, transhistorical, and unstylized and others as ornate body modifiers blown by the winds of fashion. This is not to suggest that those for whom the phrase is useful are reproducing the problematic narratives of these modernist architects. Rather, it is to make one simple point, one that does disturb the sense of the phrase: plumbing is not gender-neutral. Washrooms, even with no signs on the door, are not gender-neutral. Rather, both categories are steeped in the imperative for privacy, functionalism, the modernist décor prohibition, the temporal logic of the

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self-effacing archive, and dissimulation of body waste and modification. Some washrooms can, however, operate genealogically. They can remind us that while our desires for privacy, safety, segregation, neutrality, and cleanliness might feel both unavoidable and without history, this is not the case. Brasserie puts into action Foucault's suggestion that "every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history" ("Nietzsche" 153). It also asserts with great force and wit that while our feelings are historical, they are also mutable. While changing washroom-based desires is no simple task, DS+R provide a model that points us towards "lowly...derisive and ironic" beginnings instead of heroic overarching narratives, and that contextualizes both bodies and spaces as singular events and transformations rather than placing them in "any monstrous finality" ("Nietzsche"140). Safety when using the washroom in public is paramount. Brasserie reminds us that narrow access-based definitions of washroom safety are not enough to eliminate the washroom's disciplinary, individualizing, and interiorizing force. It reminds us that there's much more we need to – and perhaps can – rebuild.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

One opening premise of this chapter requires a coda here, one that helps us use Brasserie to address the need for a better architectonic of trans embodiment. I began by suggesting that washrooms are the figurative space of modernism and of transgender. Though Anthony Vidler's caution against "search[ing] for a unified vision of modernity following the heterogeneous experiments of the avant-gardes of the first quarter of the twentieth century" (1) is important, this chapter

admittedly takes as its counterargument just one dominant strand of written architectural history in order to make a point about the legacies of those particular writers and of the Seagram Building's style. By no means does this imply a total rejection of modernist architecture's potential for transing the body. On the contrary, as even DS+R themselves indicate (they identify in an interview in *The Ciliary Function* as "modernists," "neo-modernists" and even "post-postmodernists"), the word has many different intonations. In Betsky's estimation, "the lessons of postmodernism, and of a queer architecture in general, are those of ambiguity and contradiction resolved through the body" (139). DS+R's practice does precisely the opposite: it uses ambiguity and contradiction in design to introduce those very qualities *to* the body, an aesthetic employed by others who similarly straddle modernism and postmodernism, such as Beckett. While for Loos and Le Corbusier, modernism is about abjecting the past yet retroactively installing one's built conventions *in* the past, as origins – what Heather Love calls "the temporal splitting at the heart of all modernism" (6) – for literary modernists such as Beckett and Woolf, phenomena such as trauma and loss are occasions to mourn, attach, and reckon with the changing versions of history seen by the early and mid-twentieth century, not as reasons to efface the past. In the case of the disintegrating body of Beckett's *The Unnamable*, for instance, it is the very inability to claim one's past that grounds not only the character's quickly vanishing subjectivity but also first the dissolution of his gender. While Beckett's protagonist is unable to claim a past while also seemingly unable to die – he yearns to be able to stop being – Woolf's gender-changing

Orlando lives for centuries, gathering up bodies and selves without consolidating them, like an open archive of "sympathies, little constitutions" (201) with one "key self" (202). In these literary modernist trans/genders, then, critical interrogations of concepts of interiority, the psyche, mourning, and the changing body take the place of the dissimulating temporality and hygienic vocabulary of the toilet – even or especially as Beckett's narrative voices insistently call to be killed by precisely those: "That's right, wordshit, bury me" (118). The next two chapters address these two authors.

In its own right, Brasserie offers us what Svetlana Boym calls an "Architecture of the Off-Modern," which "doesn't follow the logic of crisis and progress but rather involves an exploration of the side alleys and lateral potentialities of the project of critical modernities" (4). "Off-modern" is an apt description of Brasserie; suspending what Betsky sees as a clear-cut divide between clean modernist space and its "queering" in postmodernism, DS+R's Brasserie both situates itself in critical queer dialogue with the original restaurant but also becomes something *new*. In so doing, Brasserie comprises what I call a "trans archive" in the introduction to this project: materiality that changes, that becomes anew, without either dissimulating or merely ironizing the past. What does this feel like? What does it mean to feel "off" one's gender? Boym suggests a model: she defines the off-modern as "the architecture of adventure. Adventure literally refers to something that is about to happen, *à venir*. But instead of opening up into some catastrophic or messianic future, it leads rather into invisible temporal dimensions of the present" (6). DS+R's many strange doors

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and confusions of interior/exterior ring true with Boym's further explanation: "the architecture of adventure is the architecture of thresholds, liminal spaces, porosity, doors, bridges, and windows…Adventure has the shape of a Möbius strip" (6). These, I have argued, are the affective places and qualities that characterize DS+R's Brasserie – qualities that characterize trans architecture by citing the past to defamiliarize the bodily habits of the present. Boym's wording gets to the heart of the architectonic of transgender this chapter has described: the archive of gender operating porously in the mode of adventure and potentiality rather than of bored pastiche.

But, for whom is this made possible? Brasserie hosts power lunches and expensive first dates in the middle of mid-town Manhattan – it even hosts the women of *Sex and the City* for their final soirée before Carrie Bradshaw moves to Paris. In a chapter that seeks to point out the gender-modifying power of normative acts of hygiene, the question of access is not so simple as calling out the class-exclusive realm of Brasserie, as drawing attention to the gendered life of washrooms in socially normative spaces might even be especially important. The question of use, however, remains a fraught one – especially for a field such as architecture that combines aesthetic production with needs of clients and users. One of DS+R's highest profile projects yet – the High Line Park in New York City – helps us understand the questions of audience, use, and appropriation in their work. As a park that has become the icon for the gentrification and corporatization of NYC's meat market – an area formerly known for its radical trans scene and as a home to trans sex work – helps answer another obvious

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question: where do trans architecture and transgender subjects meet? In the next chapter, Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography* sheds light on this question with a theory of trans modernism that simultaneously represents a transgender protagonist but also, crucially, provides a model for a non-subjective organization of transgender affect that challenges this very biographical imperative.[21]

Chapter Two

"The Body of Time:"
Virginia Woolf and the Biographical Imperative of Transgender Studies

Introduction: Not Your Mother's Vogue

In the 1920s and 1930s, Virginia Woolf was photographed for the British edition of *Vogue* many times (including by Man Ray in 1934) but only one portrait can be said to shatter the presumed sincerity and referentiality of the body of portraiture: in 1924, Woolf posed in her deceased mother's dress – the ruffled shoulders, long sleeves, empire waist, and considerable train of which look anything but regular on Woolf's body. (See fig. 41.) In 2009's *Virginia Woolf, Fashion, and Literary Modernity*, R.S. Koppen suggests that this photo presents "an incongruity that seems citational; thoughtful more than playful – as if to see what happens" (29). Koppen is correct, but she leaves the crucial question to us: what precisely happens? In donning the dress of the mother with whom she was not close (and the death of whom is often considered an important motivating factor in Woolf's first mental breakdown[22]), Woolf turns the stillness and capture of the photographic medium into a dynamic reaching through time – through the history of both outmoded fashion and outlived family. Although Woolf portends nothing as recognizably transgender as a "drag king" aesthetic, this portrait is undoubtedly an act of kinship *drag*, one in which the spectre of cross-dressing takes on two intertwined meanings: dressing across time as well as across historical genders. Against the gender aesthetic of a different time, Woolf's body is reframed and indeed does not measure up to the Victorian look of femininity

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for which the dress seems to call. Metaphorically and literally, Woolf exceeds the dress of her mother (and of her mother's time): her fingers and wrists look incredibly long while her trumped-up shoulders might now read as masculine bulk rather than as feminine ornament. Her facial features, as Koppen states, suggest thoughtfulness but their very pronouncement queers the photo as well. Her sharp nose, which may well function as what Roland Barthes calls the disruptive *punctum* of the photo, is not minimized with a choreographed pose.[23] This image, dead tulips and all, employs what Scott Herring will in Chapter Five of this project call an "anachronistic stylistic" (103) that introduces temporal discontinuity by jarring the viewer with its ambiguous – unsynthesized – citation of past aesthetic conventions. In this way, the photo comprises a literal drag on temporality as well: as in her experimental biographies, Woolf "tries on" the clothes of the Victorian era but exceeds them, subverts their tight seams and cinched waists from within by introducing temporal incongruity and citation into smooth narratives of time and history.[24] By straddling eras in this way, the portrait offers an alternative view of modernism's relationship to this past. But, precisely what is accomplished – for trans architecture in particular – by Woolf's insertion of her body into archives both familial and fashionable?

For this project, the stakes of Woolf's *en Vogue* act of slipping into the textiles of another era are high: namely, in the previous chapter, the gender politics of high modernist architecture were seen to pivot on the ambiguous figure of fashion. In the name of their anti-fashion break with Victorian emphases on texture and ornateness, Loos and Le Corbusier abjected colour and decorative

flair as dishonest, degenerate, and decadent – with all heteronormative, nationalist, and racist implications. At first glance, Woolf and the Bloomsbury Group appear to fall in line with this anti-fashion approach: in her diary, for instance, Woolf recounts with pleasure an occasion on which her friends had not dressed up for dinner. As she writes, "it was precisely this lack of physical splendour, this shabbiness! That...meant that life could go on like this, in abstract argument, without dressing for dinner" (qtd. in Koppen 16). When it came to the oppressive norms of dress and respectability, then, Woolf did indeed contrast the dictates of bourgeois dress with matters of intellectual substance. However, as Koppen argues, "in Bloomsbury (as place as well as aesthetic and social project) the sartorial embodiment of the modern went beyond deliberate shabbiness as an anti-fashion statement, protesting against the assumptions of class and gender inherent in bourgeois fashion" (19). Indeed, a closer look at Woolf's sartorial practices and theories reveals that far from a wholesale rejection of fashion, Woolf was deeply – and ambiguously – invested in fashion's radical possibilities.[25] Quite against Loos' and Le Corbusier's admonishments of fashion in favour of an ostensibly unfashioned modernism, "it seems to be the hybridity of clothing – its dual nature as system and event – that makes it the signature of the modern for Woolf and many of her contemporaries" (Koppen 26). This description of fashion as an *event* suggests that, for Woolf, fashion is a way to make things happen. For Woolf, aesthetic events are (as DS+R would later see) a way to introduce rupture into the mundane continuity feigned by the aesthetic (architectural, fashionable, and literary) bodies of modernisms. Might it be the

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case, then, that upholding transgender as an unfashioned truth category is also to reproduce the valorizations of historical continuity, the abjection of aesthetic history, and the dissimulation of (body and literary) fashions that the previous chapter critiqued in anti-queer high architectural modernism? Do we sometimes, like Loos and Le Corbusier, dissimulate the discontinuity and stylization of our own corporeal and narrative styles?

This chapter shows that, yes, transgender is no more transhistorical than the stark and protective body of the Seagram Building. As such, it can operate in much the same mode as Woolf's portrait: as a continuous revolution of available styles – one that acknowledges its historicity even as it creates new, contingent, and temporary bodies. By putting Woolf's fashion-oriented literary style into conversation with a particular genealogy of ideas about *how material changes* (a strand reaching from Henri Bergson, to Deleuze and Guattari's Bergsonism, and to Sanford Kwinter's implicitly Deleuzian work) this chapter argues for a renewal of the study of transgender aesthetics. By this, I do not refer merely to the aesthetics of transgender subjects, but rather, of the often taken-for-granted aesthetic forms that create and delimit transgender as a recognizable phenomenon and subject category in our culture. These are, I will argue, the mutually constitutive genre forms of the conventional (trans) autobiography and the sovereign subject. Bergson, Deleuze, and Kwinter each take issue with these forms in turn. First, Bergson insists that what subjects often experience as stable forms (such as genders and selves) are actually extrapolated snapshots of the body-in-motion. As he puts it: "there is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is

not undergoing change every moment...But it is expedient to disregard this uninterrupted change...The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change" (*Evolution* 3-4). In the Introduction to this project, it became clear that varying theories of transgender imply correlative theories of the temporality of the body; Bergson's account is no different. In his account, that is, bodies archive their milieu in the form of dynamic *tendencies* instead of stable states. Or, as Kwinter later adapts this theory in concert with de Certeau's theory of "tactics," the material event "cannot 'store' its triumphs" (123), only renew them.[26]

The critical affinities between Bergson and Woolf have been much noted and much debated, although Bergsonism has largely fallen out of favour in Woolf criticism.[27] A recent text that revives this interpretive tradition is Mary Ann Gillies' *Henri Bergson and British Modernism*, in which she argues that Woolf focuses on "moments" of being rather than smooth narratives – on, in other words, events that rupture the pretended continuity of time. As she sees it, this is an explicitly Bergsonian temporality: "Woolf's moments of being are instances of pure duration, moments during which past and present time not only literally coexist, but during which one is aware of their coexistence. In a Bergsonian sense, these are moments of pure *durée*" (109).[28] Throughout this chapter, we will see that our turn to transgender requires a drastic reframing of this debate. First, this turn demands that *Orlando: a Biography* be taken seriously with regards to Bergson and Woolf's theory of time (it is often not) and, more importantly, while many Bergsonian critics of Woolf believe that her "mode of perception is

temporally, not spatially, oriented" (Gillies 108-9), I will show that, on the

contrary, Woolf incites a radical temporalization of *the fashioned space of the*

body.

Following Bergson's ethos of change, Deleuze, in *Bergsonism*, interprets

Bergson's oeuvre as a theory of material change – an interpretation of Bergson

that this chapter adopts. Similarly, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari

seize upon Bergson's work – not to mention the work of Anglo literary

modernists, Woolf and Beckett chief among them – to develop their theory of

becoming. What Bergson calls "tendencies," Deleuze and Guattari read as

"haecceities, events, the individuation of which does not pass into a form and is

not effected by a subject" (*Thousand* 264). These principles of non-subjectified

individuation also, like Bergson, imply a rupture in conventional temporality. As

Deleuze and Guattari put it, these events or haecceities have "the force to emit

accelerated or decelerated particles in a floating time that is no longer our

time...nothing left but the world of speeds and slownesses without form, without

subject, without face" (*Thousand* 283). Finally, in his recent text *Architectures of*

Time: Toward a Theory of the Event in Modernist Culture, Kwinter turns the

work of Bergson (and, implicitly, that of Deleuze) towards the narrative

architectonics of temporality. Most importantly, Kwinter argues that "time"

comes to signify something linear and predictable when it is in fact engaged in

"drawing matter into a process of *becoming-ever-different*" (4). What Deleuze and

Guattari call haecceities or events (which Kwinter also translates as "qualitative

changes in state, differentiations") are, in this account, the only "type of

movement that can account for the appearance or creation of 'the new'" (x).

Taking these connected thinkers of change and novelty together, we may say that

the event of transformation does not, therefore, occur at the level of the subject.

As Deleuze and Guattari see it, the difference between trans subjectivity and trans

events is, again, one of temporality: "the difference is not at all between the

ephemeral and the durable, nor even between the regular and irregular, but

between two modes of individuation, two modes of temporality" (*Thousand* 262).

These two modes of temporality are *Aeon*, "the indefinite time of the event, the

floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides" and *Chronos*, "the

time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines

a subject" (*Thousand* 262).

This theory of non-subjective transformation – and its correlative

temporality – is quite distant from the most popular conceptions of queer

temporality, many of which derive from Halberstam's widely-read *In a Queer

Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives*. Here, the queer time of

"transgender bodies" is defined in the terms of the subject, as the "specific modes

of temporality that emerge within postmodernism once one leaves the temporal

frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and

inheritance" (6). What is specifically "queer" about this is the following: "queer

subcultures produce alternative temporalities by allowing their participants to

believe their futures can be imagined according to logics that lie outside of those

paradigmatic markers of life experience – namely, birth, marriage, reproduction,

and death" (2). What survives Halberstam's redefinition is the model of the "one"

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queer participant, a subject that remains bound by the temporal narrative of biography and "life time" even as he or she resists several heteronormative structures of time. Likewise, as we will see throughout this chapter, trans thinkers often recognize the genre of trans autobiography as the most significant or only narrative history of transgender and transsexuality. Such accounts are interested only in the temporality of *Chronos*. As Kwinter suggests, "where meaning, origins, and tradition are endowed to the subject, time here is always subjective time; tradition ('history') is tradition-for-the-subject" (39). In response, Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari, Kwinter, and perhaps especially Woolf mount their theories of transformation as specific attempts to take apart the very generic conventions of "a life" that Halberstam and Prosser presume as the basis for transgender. As Kwinter says of Kafka's novels: "the proper tendency of this temporality [of the event] is to encompass, indeed, in a certain sense to demolish, the unity of the 'life'"(147). These thinkers, and this chapter, move instead into *Aeon*, "the indefinite time of the event" (*Thousand* 262).

Therefore, in departing from trans theories of subjectivity and redirecting the Bergson/Woolf debate towards bodies, this chapter finds its clearest intervention: a mobilization of transgender as *durée* or aesthetic event of transformation – as a mode of individuation that *escapes* the narrative captures of subjectivity, autobiography, and various hermeneutics of diagnosis and instead *extends* the body through time towards change. This argument proceeds through two mains steps. First, the chapter shows that transgender studies and subjects can benefit considerably by replacing what I call the "biographical imperative" in

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trans studies – itself generated in part by a certain anxiety about literary style and the spectre of transgender being "so trendy" (Namaste 9) – with a less generically rigid aesthetic of transgender narratives of the self. To do this, I analyze Jay Prosser's endorsements of the sexological narrative history of transsexuality and Woolf's work on biography (especially one of Woolf's final texts, the unpublished and seldom-cited short sketch "The Ladies Lavatory" – a text that explicitly connects Woolf's critique of the biographical subject to norms of hygienic space and gender). Then, to develop this new aesthetic theory of transgender, I argue that Woolf represents transgender as just such a transing event of queer temporality rather than as a matter of the subject or psyche.

The (Anti-Alpha) Omega Workshops

Woolf and the Bloomsbury Group believed that fashion could lead to radically new ideas and experiences of embodiment. In this way, we can see that Woolf's milieu is quite literally concerned with developing what Kwinter calls "the positivity and fullness of a 'praxis'" (131) – not merely by putting their aesthetic to work but by developing this theory through various genre of aesthetic experimentation. Far beyond the fancy dress parties and fashionable cross-dressing that are well known to readers of the Bloomsbury Group, this cadre of thinkers and artists also made fashion a major venture in their Omega Workshops (their design enterprise overseen by Roger Fry, about whom Woolf would later write a biography). At the urging of Woolf's sister Vanessa Bell, textiles and fashion were a part of the Omega's repertoire from 1914 (first exhibiting in 1915) to the shop's closure in 1919. As Valerie Mendes and Koppen both point out,

Omega textiles "set a fashion for abstract and geometric patterns, bright bold colouring, emphatic black lines and undyed groups" (Koppen 21), largely inspired by Cubism and Futurism. (See fig. 42-49.) The hand-designed patterns produced by the Omega de-emphasized reproducibility and profit in favour of retaining the individual marks of the artists. In this, the group's aesthetic reaches, like Woolf's portrait, across times and fashions: it hearkens back to a design history that *precedes* the grandstanding and moralizing of Loos' and Le Corbusier's modernism. Namely, as Christopher Reed reports, critics "were quick to recognise the Omega as a modernist version of the idealistic decorative arts guilds associated with the Arts and Crafts Movement" (*Beyond* 12) as exemplified by William Morris. (For instance, Reed reports that Yone Noguchi, Japanese poet and essayist, visited the Omega in its first year of operation and later reported the following: "he [Roger Fry] is trying to create an applied art just as Morris did" [qtd. in Reed, *Beyond* 11].) As it was for Morris, one of the Omega's operating philosophies was that the distinction between high and low design – the distinction that protects Loos' and Le Corbusier's hierarchization of architecture over décor – must be disrupted. The Bloomsbury Group's orientation to fashionability and décor thus complicates the previous chapter's equation of modernism with a monolithic rejection of the past and of décor. As Koppen puts it,

> Omega's sartorial venture exemplifies the avant-garde's need for
>
> distinction from mass culture, which is in turn the very driving force of
>
> fashion. As Gutzov observed, the modern and fashion share the quality of

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uniqueness, of always wanting to be ahead of the mass. What is

particularly interesting in the Omega's case is that the quality of being

'ahead' is achieved through a fusion of high with low (fine with applied

arts), and, in part, of old with new. Rather than being at odds with the

modern understood as a negative moment, a break with the past, the

playful citation of old styles corresponds to Gutzov's conceptual definition

of the modern as a moment of return. Omega's clothing project, then, is

modern not only in its contribution to the construction and project of

modern identities, but in its affirmation of the defining principle of

modernism, which is also the principle of fashion. (22-3)

Omega designs playfully cite high modernism while subverting its principle of

newness, precisely by infusing their work with the "low" décor of "applied" arts –

an infusion that is neither anti-modern nor wholly obedient to the dictates of

architectural and design-based modernism. As we saw in the previous chapter,

DS+R's playful citation of the Seagram Building's modernism writes this

subversion onto the architectural body by framing décor as an "Outcast" on the

cake-decorators that line the back room of the bar. Ironically, it is exactly the

modernist principles of building critiqued in the previous chapter that have largely

erased the Omega Workshops' legacies from the annals of design history. As

Reed points out, although we ought not underestimate the "splash that Omega

made in its time," "it was quickly forgotten...after its closure in 1919" (*Beyond*

14). Scholars who study the Omega attribute this cultural forgetfulness to the very

ideologies of white, functional, modernist architecture that in many ways underlie

the design of the Seagram Building itself. Reed, for instance, recounts the

aesthetic judgements that ground the abjection of the Omega from the realm of art

history:

> Important earlier attempts to document and revive interest – most notably
>
> Judith Collins's book on the Omega and Fiona MacCarthy's exhibition for
>
> the Crafts Council, both in 1984 – were met with scepticism and even
>
> ridicule by an art-historical establishment committed to the plain-white
>
> walls model of modern design. (*Beyond* 13-4)

As I described in reference to the case of Louis Henri Sullivan in the previous

chapter, this omission from art history cannot be wholly attributed to these artists'

divergence from modernist principles. Rather, as Reed argues in *Bloomsbury*

Rooms: Modernism, Subculture and Domesticity, the influence of Omega's work

has been suppressed precisely because of the homophobic and sexist attitudes that

underpin the virulent dismissal both of decorative arts in general and of the

domestic interior as an important place for aesthetic history in particular. The

aesthetics of washrooms, Brasserie reminded us, are underpinned by a modernist

emphasis on functionality – passed off as a merely aesthetic preference when it in

fact grounds judgements of "ornate" or "modified" bodies as well. These

judgements in turn shape what kinds of art production become possible and

profitable: in "Omega Textiles: a Sea-Change into Something Rich and Strange,"

Mary Schoeser emphasizes the way in which these ideologies about art were

translated into and enforced by art markets and means of artistic reproduction:

The rise of modernism, which equated functionality with simplicity, was

inimical to fabrics, whose distinguishing feature is their decorative nature.

And because only a handful of mills produced cloth that suited modernist

discourse, the majority of its proponents writing in the second half of the

twentieth century overlooked this medium to a degree that sidelined the

impact and legacy of Fry's experiment [with fashion at the Omega]. (24)

Here, the stakes of the aesthetic judgements made by Loos and Le Corbusier in

the previous chapter become even clearer: the Omega's interventions in design

conventions fell out of favour quickly and largely disappeared from art history

due to their association with effete décor and their hybridization of high and low

art as much as the strangeness of their avant-garde clothing designs.[29] With this

context in mind, the particular "event" of Woolf's portrait in *Vogue* is a crucial

challenge to the kind of modernism espoused by Loos and Le Corbusier: the

portrait uses the folds of clothes – which themselves become folds of time and

memory – to introduce discontinuity into both the progressive historical narrative

of fashion (a narrative that would later exclude the Omega's work from art

history) and also into the myth that gender is a timeless (not aesthetic and

fashionable) set of universal characteristics of the body. What the Omega

Workshops experienced is precisely this: the violent outcomes and exclusions that

stem from others' insistence on the historical continuity and underlying truth of

their aesthetic style. In the previous chapter, we saw that such insistence can

produce implicitly homophobic and sexist outcomes that demonize transformation

and transience. The stakes of this analysis for transgender are, then, already clear:

while Woolf's own cross-dressing of temporality in her portrait asks us to think of gender as both historical and aesthetic (rather than universal and psychical); the Omega Workshops challenged the anti-effete and anti-transience dictates of high architectural modernism; and, with their anachronistic return to Morris' ideals of production and colour, the Omega reinstates the queer value of décor, texture, and flair. Taking her *Vogue* portrait and Omega's ventures together, then, we may begin with the knowledge that Woolf's theories of fashion and change are not just tested in reality but are created, enacted, and extended precisely there – fighting against (and dismissed by) heteronormative conventions of design all the while.

Sexology and "Sexo-Aesthetic Inversion"

The following sections argue that in service of this experimental praxis, Woolf paves the way for an aesthetic conception of gender that does not bind transgender to the narrative shape of the life of the subject. She does this by satirizing, critiquing, and re-aestheticizing the naturalized genre of biography. In order to make clear the stakes of this argument for transgender studies, the first sections below trace out the imbrication of life-writing in the development of the trans subject in the first instance, taking care to show that the generic literary conventions that have been absorbed into the model of the trans subject run the risk of taming dynamic aesthetic events into the very specific literary shape of memoir.

The year in which *Orlando: a Biography* was published (1928) was in many respects a banner year of progress in the project of normalizing the newly coined identity category of the "transvestite" (Hirshfeld 28). Crucially, this

normalization was achieved precisely through intertwined forms of narrativization. The most important and telling contemporary text, also published in 1928, is Radclyffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness*, a novel widely read as a lesbian text (and, less often, as a proto-transgender text).[30] Hall's text makes clear the context of "trans" identity and narrative in which Woolf was writing: one dominated by sexology and medicine. For all of the gender-transing moments of its female-assigned protagonist, Stephen Gordon, sexology remains the authoritative voice of gender and sexuality in the text. Stephen's father, for instance, tries to understand his daughter by studying the works of early homosexual writer Karl Heinrich Ulrichs. In Ulrichs' essay collection, *Forschungen über das Rätsel der mannmännlichen Liebe* (*Researches on the Riddle of Male-Male Love*, 1862) he for the first time discusses sexual inclinations as a matter of orientation or type. (Urnings [men attracted to men] and Dionings [women attracted to women] were the Platonian terms Ulrichs used to describe these types.) Stephen's father dies the following year, with much drama: his dying act is a failed attempt to tell Stephen's mother that Stephen is an invert. Later, Stephen comes across the work of psychiatrist and sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, whose *Psychopathia Sexualis: eine Klinisch-Forensische Studie* (*Sexual Psychopathy: a Clinical-Forensic Study*, 1886) continued Ulrichs' delineation of "natural" sexual types with his own distinct flair. Sexual inversion, Krafft-Ebing posits, is both a biological anomaly and a cerebral neurosis. Reading this book is the definitive moment of Stephen's self-knowledge: after reading her father's

notes in the margins of Krafft-Ebing's text, she suddenly conceives of herself as a genetically-inverted type and as a member of a group:

> suddenly she had got to her feet and was talking aloud – she was talking to her father: 'You knew! All the time you knew this thing, but because of your pity you wouldn't tell me. Oh, Father – and there are so many of us – thousands of miserable, unwanted people, who have no right to love, no right to compassion because they're maimed, hideously maimed and ugly – God's cruel; He let us get flawed in the making.' (186)

In Prosser's estimation, these scenes, as well as sexologist Havelock Ellis' short preface-like note that was appended to *The Well of Loneliness*, "authoriz[e] [the] text as a sexological narrative" (131). In both of these 1928 novels, then, sexology and its assertion of generalizable sexual types is configured as both authoritative and as the harbinger of self-discovery and self-knowledge. In this same year, trans-advocate and sexologist Magnus Hirshfeld founded the World League for Sexual Reform (Stryker, *Transgender* 39) and the drag and trans bars of Weimar Berlin were in full swing, due in part to Hirshfeld's presence there. Ellis published *Eonism and Other Supplementary Studies*, a text that emphasizes that practitioners ought to "carefully divide...transvestites from transgender people" (qtd. in Whittle 36). Many signs of the times, then, point towards a more rigid taxonomy of in-born sexual and gendered types. In such models, gender-crossing or desires for sex change cannot be considered acts or events but instead are reduced to symptoms of an underlying, preexisting pathology (or other biological cause). Through stories and sexologist case studies (a kind of proto-lifewriting), the

gender non-normative person was in many regards finally becoming a finely articulated (and usually pathologized) trans "species" (Foucault, *History* 1: 43). As Koppen puts it, with a critical bent that is the opposite of Prosser's, "contemporary sexologists were quick to inscribe such cross-dressing within a discourse of authenticity" (55), "attempt[ing] to regulate and codify ambiguity by making it signify within a system" (57). Koppen suggests that with *Orlando: a Biography*, Woolf offers an alternative to this renewed and medicalized faith in nineteenth-century models of authenticity:

> Presenting history as a sequence of fashions, and sexual identity as
> mutable and performative, may be understood as a strategy directed partly
> against a nineteenth-century idealist discourse of authenticity and
> *Geist*...partly against what seemed like a contemporary recasting of such
> discourse in putatively scientific and liberal terms. (57)

Koppen's literary criticism of Woolf provides a crucial corrective of context to Prosser's largely celebratory account of the sexological history of the trans subject: while Prosser names sexological narratives as the definitive genre and narrative history of the trans subject, it is merely one such narrative history. Contemporary to the sexologists and writers Prosser cites, Woolf satirizes their investments in medical narratives of gender and gender change. We may note, then, that critiques of the medicalization of transgender are not a recent phenomenon of genderqueer academics or of deconstruction: rather, they existed in the first instance of this medicalization (in genres such as fiction, to which the biographical imperative does not attribute the ring of truth).

It is necessary to trace out Prosser's arguments in detail in order to see the ways in which the literary presuppositions of sexology-inflected proto-trans-lifewriting have insinuated themselves into today's narrative and emotional conventions of the trans subject and trans studies. Mainly, from some of the strongest corners of transgender scholarship, a biographical imperative – a strict insistence on the primacy of individuals' reported experience – has settled into near-orthodoxy. Prosser has been perhaps the most vocal proponent both of the history of sexology and of its inflections in contemporary trans autobiography. Prosser turns to the thinker who largely displaced Krafft-Ebing's theory that inverts were "biologically anomalous" with theories of the psyche: Freud. Following Freud's supposition that the ego is a "projection of a surface," Prosser refutes the popular notion that transsexuals merely play out the superficial body-alienation of Descartes' mind/body split (or, as Ulrichs writes of inverts, "*anima muliebris virili corpore inclusa*" (Hall 402) (a female psyche confined in a male body). Prosser follows Didieu Anzieu's Freudian framework of "the skin ego," in which Anzieu asserts that skin is the primary organ for conceiving of the ego, as "our experience of its feel...individualiz[es] our psychic functioning" (qtd. in Prosser 65). Prosser cites this theory in order to suggest that trans body modifications are, therefore, just "skin deep," but that changes to skin and surface are in themselves quite profound and constitutive of one's gendered ego. Where his largely astute account goes awry is in its *naturalization* of trans narratives, both the case studies of sexology and the life-writing of trans people. First, Prosser overestimates the extent to which feelings may be interpreted as signs of

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underlying truths (instead of as themselves always already narrativized

formulations of transing affect):

> A transsexual leitmotif appearing across transsexual narratives, the
>
> proliferation of the wrong-body figure is not solely attributable to its
>
> discursive power. My contention is that transsexuals continue to deploy
>
> the image of wrong embodiment because being trapped in the wrong body
>
> is simply what transsexuality feels like. (69)

As I stated in Chapter One, it is clear that transsexuality is reducible neither to a

simple feeling nor to a uniform one. More important here is Prosser's move from

validating this one trans narrative to naturalizing it as a feeling that defines trans

experience (a move that, perhaps unwittingly, cites Ulrich's model of the psychic

trap). That some or many people formulate bodily experience through reference to

a similar architectonic of the body is not evidence enough to name any one

narrative as *the* underlying narrative of trans-embodiment. Prosser later takes

pains to defend the status of sexology in trans circles. Though he is certainly right

to suggest that "transsexuality is always narrative work, a transformation of the

body that requires the remodeling of the life into a particular shape" (4), he again

defines sexology as the most obvious or natural shape of transsexuality:

> Sexology provided the narrative setting for the transgender subject to
>
> become medicalized...The transgender narrative needed to become
>
> diagnosable. Sexology provided the discursive space for medicalizing and
>
> diagnosing transgender narratives in the form of the case

history...Inversion's case histories crucially propelled the transgender

subject – through narrative – toward transsexuality. (139)

This historical progression narrative (from transgender to transsexuality) not only

suggests that transgender people were lacking a better narrative (and therefore a

lifestyle and identity "more accurate" to some underlying true self) but it also

configures case histories as a crucial pivot point in trans history.[31] The shape of

such trans narratives must inevitably be, as Prosser suggests, a linear "journey

from one location to another" (5) with a clear beginning, middle, and end – bound

to the shape of an autonomous human life. But what does it mean for an aesthetic

style of gender to be written and defended as "real?" Prosser suggests further that

one of the goals of such narratives ought to be "the recognition of our sexed

realness" (Prosser 204). It is on this very notion of "realness" that the privileging

of biography as a genre depends. Reciprocally, how does the "realness" factor of

biography itself shore up and enforce certain "realities" of the transgender lives

that the genre appears merely to accommodate rather than to shape? In fact,

Havelock Ellis (to whom Prosser often looks for historical corroboration) is far

more attuned to the aesthetic qualities of transgender than is Prosser. As Koppen

points out, crucially, Ellis used to refer to eonism as "Sexo-Aesthetic Inversion"

(58), as "the visual manifestation of an imaginative crossing-over to the

philosophy of aesthetics as much as to the science of sexology" (59). Though

Prosser points out that Ellis is savvy to the constructed quality of his narratives, he

does not address Ellis' understanding of the aesthetic history and experience of

(trans)gender in its own (always narrativized) right. Ellis, as Koppen aptly shows,

develops his theory of eonism as an "aesthetic empathy" or "Einfühlung," "a theory which he adapts from contemporary aesthetic philosophy...[It is] a type of emotional identification that is symptomatically or symbolically signified as transvestism" (58). Is it too late to recuperate this idea of sexo-aesthetic inversion – of gender-change or ambiguity as the outward sign of aesthetic "wrongness" or "inversion" in the context of the aesthetic norms of one's culture?

Biography, "That Queer Amalgamation"

In this section I begin that task in earnest by looking to Woolf's struggles against the "realness" of the genre of life-writing that was burgeoning as she wrote *Orlando: a Biography*. I argue that her critical approach to the genre of biography (in her essays and in *Orlando*) highlights the extent to which this genre contains and shapes trans narratives in ways that sometimes violently insist that only certain narratives (and, in fact, genders) are "real." Woolf sharply questions the "realness" of some genres over others and thereby makes us see the stakes of taking the literary conventions (and literary history) of trans narratives for granted. While Prosser would have readers implicitly trust the authorial voice of trans autobiographies, Woolf keeps the categories of fiction and reality in suspension. As Elena Gualtieri argues in "The Impossible Art: Virginia Woolf on Modern Biography:"

> 'Granite and rainbow,' 'fact and fiction,' 'truth and personality' – Virginia Woolf's lapidary definitions of modern biography figure it as a being precariously balanced between irreconcilable possibilities … As a genre that inhabits the indefinite space between these two well-defined poles,

biography represents for Woolf a particular kind of synthesis that does not

erase the originary opposition but rather preserves it in a hybrid form.

(349)

Here, Gualtieri cites one of Woolf's essays on specifically modernist biography,

aptly called "The New Biography." In that text, Woolf casually defines "queer"

(100) as the "hybrid" (96) qualities of the self: "Nor can we name the biographer

whose art is subtle and bold enough to present that queer amalgamation of dream

and reality, that perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow" (100). If, as Gualtieri

emphasizes, Woolf defines biography as a hybrid genre that resists the synthesis

of its representative qualities with its aesthetic ones, then we can better understand

how one might read *Orlando: a Biography*, a novel that both appears to be a

biography (in tracing one life) and does not (the fantastical life is immortal, which

eliminates the requisite "ending" of the biographical life). Woolf does not simply

dismiss the genre of biography but hybridizes it, uses it and undermines its

suppositions about history and subjectivity from within. As she writes in *Orlando*,

"the true length of a person's life, whatever the *Dictionary of National Biography*

may say, is always a matter of dispute. For it is a difficult business – this time-

keeping; nothing more quickly disorders it than contact with any of the arts"

(200). Writing from within one of the arts, Woolf refuses to let official

biographies stands as the true measure of either life or temporality, though this

critique itself refers to her own biography by referring to the *Dictionary of*

National Biography, edited by her father Leslie Stephen. This cycle of

biographical 'truths' and subversions is dizzying: a biographical critique of

biography written in a highly stylized biography whose narrator constantly

undermines the terms of the genre.[32] One aspect of biography about which Woolf

is far less ambivalent is the genre's potential for artistry, a topic that calls forth

her scepticism. Most forcefully, she describes biography as "a life lived at a lower

degree of tension" ("Art" 122) than fiction or poetry. After pointing out that our

"interest in our selves and in other people's selves is a late development of the

human mind" ("Art" 116) – one she locates in eighteenth-century England – she

goes as far as to suggest that this recent genre "is not a work of art, but something

betwixt and between" (122). In Woolf's words, "it would seem that the life which

is increasingly real to us is the fictitious life; it dwells in the personality rather

than in the act" ("New" 100). Here, Woolf reminds us that conventions of

"fiction" are quite easily mistaken for what is "real," including in our privileging

of types (personalities) over acts. Despite these protestations, Woolf sees potential

in the specifically modernist biography. As she puts it, "a change came over

biography … the point of view had completely altered … [The biographer]

chooses; he synthesizes; in short, he has ceased to be the chronicler; he has

become an artist" ("New" 97). Not only does Woolf point out that the very

interest in "selves" ("Art" 116) is a recent invention, but moreover, she suggests

that this evolution of biography's aim from the chronicling of events to the tracing

of selves demands and generates a specifically literary shift as well. While the

modernist biography in which Woolf has faith is resolutely artistic, it is an

opposing turn – towards soft science – that underpins the translation of trans

autobiographical narratives into case studies. Has modernism (and

postmodernism) happened in transgender (auto-biographies), in a literary sense? If, instead, we still read with the discovery of "realness" as our interpretive approach, what does this matter?

In *The Novel and the Menagerie: Totality, Englishness, and Empire*, Kurt Koenigsberger underlines the stakes of this seemingly neutral or apolitical literary distinction. In light of Woolf's comments about the Empire Exhibition of 1924, he argues that "Woolf treats the dominant mode of realism as a kind of praxis that is complicit with the totalizing aims of imperialism" (151). While engaged in matters of literature rather than explicitly with "imperialism" (151), Arnold Bennett raised the ire of Woolf for being rather "totalizing" (151) in his definition of "reality" ("Fiction" 37). Woolf persuasively makes the case for a new kind of "Character" "in Fiction" – one that "has the power to make you think not merely of it itself, but of all sorts of things through its eyes" (43). Bennett, on the contrary,

> says that it is only if the characters are real that the novel has any chance of surviving. Otherwise, die it must. But, I ask myself, what is reality? And who are the judges of reality? A character may be real to Mr. Bennett and quite unreal to me. (43)

As Woolf points out, what constitutes reality (and realism) depends entirely on what one person regards as real, a highly varying definition if ever there was one. The "totalizing" aspect of this kind of realism is simply that it mistakes its version of character-based (that is to say, subject-based) reality for the entirety of human experience, eliding the existence and importance of experiences that are

irreducible to the model of the subject. Underneath Bennett's dissimulation of the constructed quality of what is "real" to him, Woolf suggests, lies a very particular definition of the act of reading. As she puts it:

> But the Edwardian [Modernist] were never interested in character in itself; or in the book in itself. They were interested in something outside. Their books, then, were incomplete as books, and required that the reader should finish them, actively and practically, for himself. (44)

In this sense, Woolf asserts that realist fiction is quite literally totalizing in its creation of an airtight mimetic world. If realist fiction is turned in on "itself" (44), then modernist fiction grasps for an "outside" (44) – an active reader whose constitutive role the book self-reflexively anticipates rather than dissimulates. Prosser's valorization of "sexed realness" (204) as the ultimate goal for transsexual people is at stake here: in Woolf's estimation, using the word "real" as though it is generally applicable is indeed "totalizing" (Koenigsberger 151). Woolf suggests that texts (and here we can include bodies) that purport to be self-evidently "real" and sealed off from the world of interpretation not only dictate the very limited hermeneutic by which they can be read but also make a very clear statement about the more-or-less important role of their 'readers.' Should a reader of a body be active or passive, engaged or merely receptive of information? If genders and gender narratives must automatically be respected and read as "real," then the vitality of interpretation is foreclosed – a foreclosure that troublingly and anxiously privileges sovereignty over intersubjectivity or assemblage.

Attending "The Ladies Lavatory"

"The Ladies Lavatory" is a four-page hand-written sketch that not only rewrites these very conventions of the sovereign individual (ones that the previous chapter on Brasserie critiques as well) but, moreover, hinges these critiques on the very impossibility of biography. To repeat Kwinter, this text breaks up the temporality of its protagonist from a biographical narrative into a series of disjunctive events. The thrust of the text "is to encompass, indeed, in a certain sense to demolish, the unity of the 'life'" (147). Like DS+R, Woolf's text accomplishes this by making the marginal time and space of the washroom (as a place of rushing, relaxing, stranger intimacy, and always *passing through*) into a place to inhabit and to theorize, a place where privacy and sovereignty are tenuous and are constantly breached by bodily events and anonymous interruption. Eminent Woolf scholar Susan Dick argues that this late text was inspired by Woolf's own experience of overhearing women speak in a public washroom while doing their make-up: as Woolf recorded in her diary days before penning the sketch, she sat "behind a thin door, p---ing as quietly as I could" (qtd. in Dick 141) while listening to them – a bawdy image that, for Dick, "remains unthinkable even in Woolf's late and unpublished fiction" (141). Crucially, Woolf's translation of this eavesdropping into a literary sketch consists largely of a shift in narrative voice: the omniscient voice of the text watches women come and go from the washroom through the eyes of a wearied lavatory attendant. The previous chapter on Brasserie concluded on just such a scene, asking how the class politic of a space's use-value intersects with the space's aesthetic

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interventions in norms of hygiene, privacy, and gender. Woolf's shift in narrative perspective brings this question into sharper focus and again connects this political concern to the inadequacy of existing literary conventions. In effect, Woolf reminds us that nobody knows the aesthetics, functions, and conventions of hygiene played out in washrooms better than those who clean them.[33] Woolf, however, was not such a person, and the substitution of her own class-privileged perspective for the labouring gaze of an employee can be easily cast as a kind of class-masquerade. Indeed, as Heather Levy, in one of only three published analyses of "The Ladies Lavatory," suggests, "Woolf actually pretend[s] to put on the body of the working-class woman...using her brief occupation of the stall as an equivalent of the working woman's experience" (39). Two responses to this reading are necessary: first, Woolf's text offers no simple dichotomy of rich and poor; rather, the text features diners at a working-class restaurant and an employee of the restaurant who cleans up after them and cannot enter into social relations with them. In this way, readers are reminded (in light of Brasserie) that no space, including working-class spaces or widely diverse ones, is in any way free of class distinctions, hierarchies, and the residues of power that adhere to these structures in most spaces. Secondly, and more importantly, the narrative arc of the text is precisely the opposite of what Levy suggests: it traces Woolf's self-conscious knowledge that she *cannot* tell the story (or "put on the body") of this lower-working-class woman. In this excerpt, Woolf introduces the attendant by way of addressing this necessary failure:

As usual, there was an attendant – one of those women who are forever

opening doors...of their private times nothing is known. When in old age

they look back through the corridors of memory, their heart must be

different from any other. It must be cut up: disconnected. The door must

be always opening: and shutting. They can have no settled relations with

their kind. The memoirs of a lavatory attendant have never been written.

The human race to them must be always running in hastily. (1-2)

It is worth noting, first, that Woolf (perhaps contrary to her desire) does not try to

speak from the perspective of the attendant, but rather, tries to underline the

reasons for which the attendant's life cannot be written or appropriated: "of their

private times nothing is known" (1). Similarly, Woolf tries to sympathize (albeit

distantly) with the conditions of labour that can make working-class communities

more of a challenge to forge: due to busy work schedules (akin to today's

janitorial night-shifts) lavatory attendants "can have no settled relations with their

kind," who are partaking in leisure activities (such as dining out at this fish and

chip shop) or are themselves working while the lavatory attendant works. Woolf

does not and cannot imagine the ways in which such attendants forge

communities despite such conditions of labour, but, again, she foregrounds this

narrative failure: she cannot know or write about these "private times," despite

Levy's admonishment of Woolf's ostensible masquerade. Beyond the polarity of

vindication or vilification of Woolf's class politics, this excerpt leaves readers

with a more indeterminate question about the temporal life of the labouring

lavatory subject and its uneasy relationship to the specific genre of memoir, a

genre about which Woolf harbours serious reservations.[34] Can memoir, autobiography, and the conventions of life-writing accommodate the life of the lavatory attendant? While these genres, by subjecting life to the narrative shape of a story, presume a certain coherence of one's life, Woolf's tale suggests that the life of the lavatory attendant lives out a critique of these genres:

> The woman who lives in this room has the look of someone without any consecutive past...She is like a piece of sea weed that floats this way, then that way. For the fish who float into the cave are always passing through... She inhabits a fluctuating water world... constantly[35] tossed up and down like a piece of sea weed [sic]. She has no continuity[36].... The rush of water is always floating her up and down. (4)

What happens to the conventions of life-writing narratives, Woolf asks, when one occupies marginal or liminal spaces for extended periods of time, thereby normalizing a space and practice that stand at the edge of both sociality and of architectural blueprints? The first excerpt cited responds: such a life cannot be absorbed into the narrative shape or market of memoir, which cannot make sense of this "fluctuating water world" in which the labouring subject is seen to bob along with the world rather than to be a sovereign subject acting in and moving progressively through it. In this sense, Woolf does not reduce labour to a non-life that cannot and ought not be written (or that could be easily written, through class-masquerade, by an upper-class white woman) but instead elevates the temporal shape of certain kinds of labour (particularly their spaces) and attributes to them the potential of disrupting the constructed life-shapes of memoir. What

sound like negative attributes – having "no continuity" and being "without any consecutive past" (4) – are re-figured here as ones that are both difficult to live out yet crucial to unearthing the disorganization of life from the orderly and selective genres of biography that we too often conflate with chronicles and truth. For Woolf, the temporal discontinuity of lavatory labour produces what Foucault later (and earlier in this project) describes as the radical uses of history. History is useful, Foucault suggests, "to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body, sets it against itself" ("Nietzsche" 154). For Woolf, the phenomenological experience of one's daily occupation of the liminal washroom produces just such "discontinuity" into the organization of one's life and, by extension, to life-writing. Dwelling in – and dwelling on – the washroom, even if one does not work in one, "relentlessly disrupt[s] [the] pretended continuity" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 154) of both space and time: it is to live in architectural margins, to remember the matters of the body that we wilfully forget, to disorient conventional schedules of bodily "maintenance" and ritual, and it is to remark upon the self-effacing modernist aesthetic of hygiene and whiteness of which the public washroom is an icon. The washroom *can* (but often does not) stage what Woolf calls "moments of being" or events. Appropriately enough, the very opposite of these rupturing event – Woolf's "moments of non-being" – are, for Woolf, best represented as an object that is a feminine cosmetic product: Woolf refers "to living in this state as being like 'cotton wool' ('A Sketch,' 84)" (Gillies 109).

As I suggest at the beginning of the previous chapter, washroom politics of all kinds have come to be seen as relevant for, and even metaphorical of, transgender. But what does Woolf's washroom-generated introduction of "discontinuity" into space, bodies, and memoirs have to do with transgender specifically? Above, we saw that Woolf places a labouring and listening non-subjective figure of the attendant in the washroom (a change that I suggested is an elevation and not a classist reduction). This figure of *attendance*, waiting not for Godot but for women to go, enacts a queer temporality that I have been slowly introducing to the trans subject itself: a consciousness that combines an evacuated "being there" with a Deleuzian forgetfulness of one's self. But secondly, on the most literal level, we must note that this eventual mode (as personified by the lavatory attendant) is figured as the listener and archive of specifically *gender-charged* knowledge. That is, "The Ladies Lavatory" offers an unforgiving critique of the gender politics and practices of single-sex space, one housed (indeed, cryptified) in the non-narrativizable attendant. For instance, the lavatory attendant watches as highly gendered cosmetic procedures are undertaken – procedures that Woolf describes as matters of aesthetic discipline (as DS+R will later):

> On the one side [of the door] the claims of nature were gratified; on the other, at the watering table, at the looking glass, nature was subdued, put under the discipline of art. The young ladies had arrived at the second stage of this daily ritual. They were all subduing nature with their powder puffs and little red tablets. (2)

While these cosmetic disciplines are undertaken, however, a significant conservation takes place. The women discuss a military man named "Bert," who apparently has a reputation for forcing himself on women. Readers learn this fact through an oblique narrative of "gossip," one that begins by demonizing Bert's latest conquest (or, victim). As one woman says, "I don't like her. She's a simpering little thing" (2). The women proceed to emblazon Bert's beauty: "his eyes, they're so blue...like jewels" (2) but also indicate, through an allusion to physiognomy, that he may well be a questionable character: Bert has a gleaming white smile, but his teeth are "a bit crooked" (2). Finally, readers hear the women's light admonishment of Bert, which informs us of his misdeeds: "but he had ought to be careful. If he does it again, he'll be court-martialled" (2-3). Levy quite inappropriately suggests that "the two-stalled room becomes the site of convivial gossip, and where three customers admire the physical beauty of men and women in equal portions" (38). I suggest instead that Woolf's representation of single-sex space comprises a fiercely critical, if not cruel, representation of the actual social lives of (female) single-sex space: these women "subdue nature" with cosmetics while also "covering up" rape with narratives of attraction and simpering victims.[37]

In sum, Woolf's work on biography, especially "The Ladies Lavatory," makes us ask serious questions not only about the uses and limits of memoir in general but also about this genre's implication in the transgender subject in particular. Given, as Prosser argues, that the transgender subject as a subject is historically underpinned by the presumptions of conventional life-writing,

Woolf's critiques of this genre can offer us new, specifically aesthetic, modes of trans embodiment that eschew the generic conventions of biography. What new orientation to transgender biography is required so that not having "continuity" in one's gender, one's self-knowledge, or one's narrative of self can be redeemed as a way of transing conventions of time and transformation, rather than as gaps or failures in one's otherwise coherent (trans)gender identity? What kinds of bodies and genders would we have if we inhabited a "fluctuating water world" and imagined ourselves as "sea weed" instead of "fish"? In the two sections below, I argue that Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography* entails just such a paradigm shift from prioritizing our trans agency and sovereignty to regarding ourselves as part of a large assemblage that flows according to a different sense of temporality. First, below, I review LGBT criticism of the text with the above arguments about memoir in mind.

Who's Afraid of the Empty Archive?

Much LGBT criticism of *Orlando* employs the very biographical hermeneutic that Woolf so thoroughly critiques throughout her oeuvre. As Deleuze and Guattari would put it, this criticism remains rigidly lodged in *Chronos*, the temporality of the subject. Why have such accounts turned so readily to Woolf's life to develop reading strategies for this deceptively readable text? For Prosser, it is "the form of autobiography" in particular "that would heal the rupture in gendered plots" (9). And, it is indeed with a sense of rupture or loss that *Orlando* is often approached. Stemming from this sense of loss, interpretations of the text often take the form of what Heather Love calls "feeling

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backward" (4), a queer affective mode in groups whose (perceived) coherence is borne of a represented shared injury. Feeling backwards, Love suggests, is a way of finding continuity for one's identity across time; it leads us to seek "the vagaries of cross-historical desire and the queer impulse to forge communities between the living and the dead" (31). This mode of cross-generational desire and community-seeking is by no means a dismissible one. Rather, to the end of taking what Sianne Ngai calls "ugly feelings" (qtd. in Love 12) seriously, Love valorizes this kind of "turning back" (5) to the past as a potentially ethical gesture, as an attempted act of mourning and a good-faith attempt to render present what appears to be absent when subjects confront what Valerie Traub calls the "empty archive" (qtd. in Love 42) of lesbian history. Yet, as Love points out, there is a suspect emotional regime that underlies the act of feeling backward. As she puts it: "by including queer figures from the past in a positive genealogy of gay identity, we [believe that we] make good on their suffering, transforming their shame into pride after the fact" (32). To unsettle the clichéd reclaiming of queer ancestors, Love analyzes "texts or figures that refuse to be redeemed [and thereby] disrupt not only the progress narrative of queer history but also our sense of queer identity in the present" (8). Without dismissing these ventures for identity, Love articulates the self-serving underbelly of them, which she sees as being borne of perpetuated gay shame today. That is, Love sees this "cross-historical desire" (31) as "a way of counteracting the shame of having a dark past" (32) of shame and erasure. That we have to make these figures from the past into "positive" figures of contemporary identity is a strange emotional economy

indeed, one that serves to shore up the emotional conventions of "pride" today. Why, for instance, hasn't Orlando been interpreted as a "bad" lesbian, one that is or was a man and who is bisexual? Or, as a "bad" transgender person who oscillates between genders, refuses to identify strongly with his/her *ressentiment*, and who regards his/her lifetime as a continually unfolding series of genders rather than as a trajectory to one "true" gender?[38] In this sense, while for Love the "shame" (32) that motivates more "positive" histories (that is, affirmative of existent identity categories and conventions) consists in the very silence of the "empty archive" of lesbianism, the thorough lesbian reclaiming of *Orlando* seems to be generated by a different kind of shameful past: the gender-bending and gender-transitioning spectre of transgender that haunts any model of lesbianism that relies on the stability of the categories of female and woman. Most troublingly, many of these instances of "feeling backward" to *Orlando* are in fact attempts to feel backwards to Woolf herself. Earlier in this chapter, I cited Gualtieri, who emphasizes that fact and fiction are "irreconcilable" for Woolf and therefore cannot be simply synthesized or stand in for one another. A relationship between *Orlando: a Biography* with Woolf's feminism, lesbianism, or transgender politic exists, but, following Woolf's own work on biography, they cannot be equated.

The most obvious way in which criticism of *Orlando* does indeed equate the text with Woolf's identity is a critical propensity to treat the text as a pedagogical or liberal parable with a coherent and contemporary message or moral that usually cites Woolf's same-sex inclinations. For example, in "'A

Precipice Marked V:' Between 'A Miracle of Discretion' and 'Lovemaking

Unbelievable: Indiscretions Incredible,'" Leslie Kathleen Hankins posits that the

text was intended as a political primer for the "pre-feminist" Vita Sackville-West.

This political primer is certainly, for Hankins, a lesbian text: "*Orlando* came out

of the closet as a lesbian text in the 1970s" (181). By employing the figure of the

closet – with its attendant senses of shame, of having previously been hidden, and

lying asexually undiscovered – Hankins suggests that prior to being announced as

a lesbian text, *Orlando*'s life in criticism and in the hands of variously horny

readers must have been not just straight, but also untrue, disingenuous, and

insufficiently honest with its readers. To follow the metaphor, the text has now

been transformed into an "out," proud, and positive text, in the manner that Love

describes above. The main reason that Hankins interprets the text as so thoroughly

lesbian is a biographical one: Woolf, Hankins argues, "slips coded lesbian

signatures and subplots into the novel" (181) and contemporary readers are finally

lesbian-savvy enough "to enlist Vita and Virginia as decoders" (181). By using

Woolf and Sackville-West's correspondence as the interpretive guide to *Orlando*,

Hankins suggests that the text is not just understood differently by contemporary

readers but can only be understood correctly by us.[39] Shoring up our interpretive

superiority requires a presentist approach to reading: past interpretations of

Orlando simply did not have the correct hermeneutic code. In other words,

Hankins reinforces precisely what Julie Abraham will later critique: the

implication "that there were other, more direct ways for saying what was being

said, of writing 'about lesbianism,' that the writer avoided because of social

pressure" (Abraham 25). By critiquing the very idea that the text's queer subtleties keep it in the closet – that the 'real' text lies beneath the censorship-sensitive one that was written – Abraham reminds us that no narrative of lesbianism is simply and purely direct, or, written without being stylized for various audiences. Indeed, Abraham offers a useful alternative to this unqueer code-cracking, separating a text's plot from its meaning as she does: "does a text have to be 'about' desire between women in order to be 'lesbian?'" (xiii). Regarding *Orlando*, however, Abraham figures the text as just another twist in a lesbian historical plot, deciding not to treat it in detail but instead use it as a general segue into her book. As she puts it later in the text while explaining her choice to focus on other texts: *Orlando* has already "been discussed as a lesbian text, more or less as a version of a lesbian novel" (160). Even in Abraham's keen account, *Orlando* is already so 'out' that it scarcely warrants engagement.

These lesbian readings of Orlando variously deflect the dynamic bodies and becomings of *Orlando* into allegories of identity.[40] Do academic analyses of the *transgender* qualities of the text fare any differently? Melanie Taylor's essay, "True Stories: Orlando, Life-Writing and Transgender Narratives" is based explicitly on Jay Prosser's work and follows his valorization of trans life-writing narratives. Woolf's own biography occupies an uncomfortable place in Taylor's essay. Though she continually cautions readers against overestimating the extent to which Woolf's life may be used as an interpretive code for the text, she provides many biographical anecdotes that seem to suggest that Woolf's life does indeed show us that Woolf thought explicitly about transgender. Two of these are,

if not equatable with *Orlando*, rather interesting. The first is an incident that occurred in September of 1927, as Woolf was conceiving of the novel. Woolf was at a party held by Lydia and Maynard Keynes. Quentin Bell recalls: "Someone had brought a newspaper cutting with them; it reproduced the photograph of a pretty young woman who had become a man, and this for the rest of the evening became Virginia's main topic of conversation" (205). Also, Taylor cites what is often thought to be Woolf's "first attempt at writing, a letter to her half-brother George Duckworth," which declares, "I AM A LITTLE BOY AND ADRIAN IS A GIRL" (204). This second narrative is a perfect fit for contemporary acts of "feeling backwards" for one's transgender origins in childhood, and, though Taylor warns us not to "conflate [it with] autobiographical accounts" (204), she compares this early rewriting of gender norms to the convention in trans autobiographies of describing one's gender-bending childhood. Taylor leaves the relationship between these anecdotes and Woolf's text in suspension, but readers get a clear sense that these anecdotes are to be read as reflective of Woolf's interest in rewriting gender norms. In any case, it is clear that whether Woolf or Orlando is the subject at hand here, it is certainly the matter of the transgender subject as a form (not an action or mode) that Taylor seeks in Woolf's text.

At the heart of Taylor's analysis is her interpretation of the text's famous gender-change scene. Disregarding both Woolf's ironic critique of biography and Orlando's constantly fluctuating body, Taylor suggests that Orlando's first gender transition is a "seamless, pain-free, and absolute transition from male to female… an ultimate transsexual vision… effecting complete biographical authenticity"

(202). Taylor hereby misconstrues *Orlando* at the level of plot: Orlando's body

and gendered life continues to change throughout the text, and Orlando's lover

Shelmerdine cries "Orlando, you're a man!" when they begin their romance, a

turn of events for which the narrator offers no simple explanation. More

importantly, the main point on which Taylor's configuration of *Orlando* as a proto

trans-autobiography pivots is the narrator's account of Orlando's initial

'transition.' In Taylor's words:

> As the narrator so emphatically states: 'Orlando had become a woman –
>
> there is no denying it.' This biographical endorsement of the legitimacy of
>
> Orlando's change of sex constitutes a representation of truth which
>
> provides a compelling link to a particular form of transgender narrative:
>
> transsexual autobiography. (202)

In this reading, the "authenticity" (202) – itself a contentious and outmoded term

– of the gender change is not the only one taken for granted; in addition, Taylor

interprets Woolf's narrative voice as an authentic and reliable reporter of facts, as

though this narrative voice were obviously to be taken literally and not be read as

part of the text of *Orlando* itself. For the most part, Taylor describes Orlando's

gender changes as illustrative of the mind/body split: Woolf "isolat[es] the truth

of Orlando's identity from its corporeality" and shores up "the social imperative

for gendered embodiment" (211), in her view. Part of the interpretive problem

with Taylor's account is its naïveté in parsing Woolf's gendered 'plot' from her

modernist aesthetic. As Jonathan Boulter has argued regarding Beckett's prose,

modernist fictions not only render language uncanny (present their "opacity" for

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re-interpretation) but they also, through their self-consciousness as "willed (that

is, constructed) narrative[s]" (43), "articulate the means of their own reading" (92)

and thereby draw us to interpret the ways in which these texts self-consciously set

up their own interpretations. The necessity of interpreting our own taken-for-

granted modes of interpretation is nothing new to readers of Woolf's modernism.

Citing *Between the Acts* ("don't bother about the plot: the plot's nothing" [109])

and *The Waves* ("how tired I am of stories… Alas, how I distrust neat designs of

life" [135]), Kaushal Kishore Sharma argues in 1981 that the plotting of storied

lives so lauded by Prosser and Taylor is a particular source of irritation for Woolf.

He goes as far as to suggest that "Virginia Woolf does not find the element of

story in the traditional sense – a chronological narration of events in time

sequence – necessary to the novel. She considers the idea of story as something

ridiculous and redundant" (18), a reading substantiated by not only the

biographer's fraught status in the text but also the opacity that surrounds

Orlando's continued bodily flux.

    Though Taylor reads for Woolf's critique of systemic mismanagement of

transgender, she remains largely interested in affirming the similarities between

Woolf's text and contemporary trans autobiographies.[41] Where Taylor finds

discontinuity between the two (for instance, in Woolf's critique of gendered

realness) she theorizes it in a way that resettles the trans subject and performs a

hierarchization of "real" life over fiction:

    there are good reasons for this lack of equivocation. One is personal: there

    is a marked difference between living in society and living in someone's

imagination or theories. The transsexual subject needs to present her or his gendered identity as coherent and whole. Another lies with the genre itself, which supplies what Prosser calls 'narrative coherence.' (212)

Taylor quotes Prosser, who remarks that:

Before critiquing transsexual autobiographies for conforming to a specific gendered plot, for writing narratives in which gendered meanings are 'unilinear,' we need to grasp the ways in which the genre of autobiography *is* conformist and unilinear. (qtd. in Taylor 212)

Prosser chalks up the narrative conventions of transgender autobiographies to the genre of autobiography itself, as if to suggest that lives cannot be expressed or written in different genres or that the genre cannot be queered or transformed from within in order to address the "unilinear" critique that he dismisses. For Taylor, Woolf's text doesn't have to be unilinear, but, following Prosser, transgender autobiographies apparently do. The status of Woolf as an author in Taylor's account is ambiguous: standard warnings against applying the biographical fallacy are repeated, yet the spectre of Woolf remains as the author figure who resembles or foreshadows transgender autobiography. Recalling Hélène Frichot's suggestion in this project's Introduction – that Greg Lynn's blob architecture undercuts its cybernetic "free variation" ethos by reinstalling the model of the architect as parent and architecture as children bound to subjective temporality – we may ask the following of Woolf and her critics cited above. Is it perhaps impossible to eschew the biographical fallacy without equally challenging the model of the neo-liberal subject as the category through and into which we

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shape interpretation? In the final section that follows, I suggest that this may well be the case.

Only a Matter of Time

In sum, we may now say that the status of *narrative* in these accounts is precisely the opposite of that which is required for the non-subjective hermeneutic of trans proposed in this chapter. While Woolf's narrative is mined for its story of the (lesbian, feminist, or trans) subject, Kwinter suggests that "narrative is less a medium here for the telling of events than a procedure for developing the practical consequences of events and their radiation and imbrication in material reality" (128). Kwinter configures "the event" as a rupture of virtualities into actualities and, therefore, as the mode through which "novelty" emerges:

> When something occurs, it may be said that that which previously remained only a potential or a virtuality now emerges and becomes actual, though only in place of something else that could have arisen here at this time, but did not. This double 'difference' – between what is here now but previously was not – and between what emerged and what did not, in all of its complexity and fatality and in all of its own pregnant virtuality or potentiality is what I will call 'the event.' The event is a principle of individuation, indeed the principle of individuation in a nature understood as complex and dynamic – it divides, limits, but especially produces. (48-9).

For Kwinter, then, events do not merely consist of a perceptible material result; rather, the term event denotes two *differences* or movements (that occurring

between what existed and what emerged, and that occurring between what emerged and what could have but did not). As it is for Bergson, outcomes and seeming ruptures are not without precedent or their "virtual" existence. The role of narrative is, therefore, to develop the consequences of events and to note how and to what effect they take perceptible material effect in our world. Following Kwinter's Bergsonian valorization of events over stories – his hermeneutic of "read[ing] the relations and the movements, not the image [or] the totalities" (210) – the sections below analyze *Orlando: a Biography* not for the truth of Orlando's gender but instead for its bodily (often architecturally-figured) temporality. In the largely presentist criticisms of *Orlando: a Biography* cited above, as much as in Loos and Le Corbusier's anti-fashion modernism, one's aesthetic style (of design or of identities) is configured, as we've seen, as an enlightened discovery of a transhistorical constant, rather than as one phase of a continually transforming fashion. In *Orlando: a Biography,* Woolf takes the opposite tack: she configures gender-change (and indeed, the phenomenological state of bodies in general) as just one particularly legible event of the changing body. I will now show below that the resultant temporality of Woolf's text delivers a key rewriting of the now-commonplace phrase "queer time" and of the stunted temporalities played out in modernist and trans rejections of the past. Where the queer or trans subject is left intact in most celebratory accounts of queer temporality – and certainly in texts that reproduce the biographical imperative – Woolf turns instead to the temporality of the changing body itself. In so doing, Woolf does nothing less than theorize modernist bodies as ones that are both always news *and* always

connected to the past – precisely the combination of critical remembrance and forgetfulness that the Introduction of this project forwards as a trans economy of the archive.

To introduce this argument, I turn to one particularly telling moment in *Orlando: a Biography*, one that shows precisely why Woolf's satire is so relevant for critiques of high architectural modernism. One day, as the title character of *Orlando: a Biography* mopes about his family crypt, twisting and turning the joints of his dead ancestors, he strikes upon a solution to the melancholic anxiety of influence he had recently been experiencing: the most important legacy he could ever leave, he decides, is architectural. As the narrative voice states his epiphany: "better was it to go unknown and leave behind you an arch, a potting shed, a wall where peaches ripen, than to burn like a meteor and leave no dust" (65). Achieving heroic and lasting status through architecture draws Orlando to consider his estate as a way to self-actualize: the estate was built, he imagines, "not hither and thither, as this man wished or that, but circumspectly, by a single architect with one idea in his head" (64). This exaltation of the individual architect and the many "obscure noblemen, forgotten builders" who laboured to build the home lead Orlando to give a stirring speech to his house, though he cannot imagine his own role in this genealogy of architecture: "he apostrophised his house and race in terms of the most moving eloquence; but when it came to the peroration – and what is eloquence that lacks a peroration? – he fumbled" (65). Looking upon the vast estate, Orlando concludes that "to add even a single stone seemed superfluous" (65). In this moment of failure, Orlando turns to décor,

but not before wondering if such trivial matters belong in his dramatic speech: "could one mention furniture in a peroration? Could one speak of chairs and tables and mats to lie beside people's beds?" (65). In the months that follow, Orlando "devote[s] himself to the furnishing of the mansion" (65) with much fussiness and dedication. He travels to find specific fabrics, "set a whole city of blind women near Bruges to stitch hangings for a silver canopied bed" (67), and payed attention to the tiniest detail of décor: he even received "chest[s] from Persia, stuffed with wool and sawdust, from which, at last, he would take a single plate, or one topaz ring" (67). The text describes this process of furnishing as one that literally fills in the many folds of space of Orlando's family home: "At length, however, there was no room in the galleries for another table; no room on the tables for another cabinet; no room in the cabinet for another rose-bowl; no room in the bowl for another handful of potpourrri; there was no room for anything anywhere; in short the house was furnished" (67).

In short, Orlando becomes an interior decorator – the very enterprise dismissed as effete by high modernist architects such as Loos and Le Corbusier, and the very project that the Omega Workshops sought to revive and imbue with artistic significance. Although the text figures architectural elements – a wall, a shed, an arch – as structures that may allow Orlando to transcend biographical time, the spectre of transient décor persists even in Orlando's initial architectural epiphany: an *ornamental* arch, a shed for *potting* (perhaps potting purely decorative *flowers)*, and a wall for *peaches* are hardly masculine statements of permanence like the Seagram Building and its ilk. This chapter began with

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Virginia Woolf's *Vogue* portrait in order to introduce her practices of using aesthetic incongruity and temporal disjunction to defamiliarize gender, bodies, and eras – practices that deliberately shun the stability and continuity of biography in favour of dynamic fashion. In these excerpts, readers see Woolf blatantly satirize the architectural temporalities I have previously critiqued in Loos and Le Corbusier. Like Mies van der Rohe's bronze beams on the Seagram Buildings (ornamental flourishes meant to simulate pure structure), Orlando's architectural attempts to effect permanence inevitably collapse into décor. In the context of the preceding sections of this chapter, we can see that Orlando's concerns with leaving an individual legacy on his estate are grounded in a specifically biographical anxiety of taking up his role in his family genealogy and literally leaving his mark on their space as each previous generation did. That this house takes up the role of family archive of influence is evinced by one seemingly simple detail: the mansion has three-hundred and sixty-five rooms. The house is, then, built as a physical calendar of the basic unit of biographical time (the year), as if to suggest that the home itself dictates the temporality of the legacy-bearing subject that must inhabit it and work upon it. By decorating each of the three-hundred and sixty-five rooms (or days) of the mansion, Orlando in effect makes his legacy literally decorative and, metaphorically, refashions biographical temporality itself.

But why is it so relevant to our overarching concern with bodily transformation that Woolf satirizes the partitioning of the family house into the days of the year? In fact, this spatial representation of time is a recurring figure of

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stunted temporality in this project: in my analysis of the Seagram Building, I suggested that its austere modernist body was meant to represent the building's transcendence of history and its immunity from the passage of time – the same characteristics I seek to displace from trans studies. In this way, the building is a space that attempts to trump temporality and literally make it stand still. For a number of philosophers and critical architectural theorists, such spatializations of time are precisely what makes material transformation seem like such an exceptional occurrence that it requires metaphysical and psychical explanation. Kwinter argues, following Henri Bergson's critique of Kant, that the spatialization of time is responsible for making us experience time as a predictable, ordered, and simple tool, rather than as a process of "becoming-ever-different" (4).[42] As an example, Kwinter writes about clocks, panopticons, and the bookkeeping of Benedictine monks as technologies that presume and enforce a theory of time as "unreal." "Power derives," he suggests, from the "capacity to vanquish time by spatializing it" (21). Here, Kwinter explains this vanquishing:

> How paradoxical, one may think: the origin of the clock as the *demise,* rather than the invention, of time! But the clock, we must remember, did not produce time, it merely standarized it and permitted, or rather *forced*, it to be correlated. The clock reduces fraught, immanent time to a single transcendent time, it relates all events to a single, "thin" duration that is general – the same for everyone, for all processes, and so on – not specific or local. Clock time fixes in order to correlate, synchronize, and quantify,

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renouncing the mobile, fluid, qualitative continuum where time plays a
decisive role in transformative morphogenetic processes. (21-2)

This "unreal" (33) theory of time as an immutable measurement began, Kwinter
claims, with "the invention of linear perspective" (22) in mathematics, in which
time became an ordered grid whose qualities could not change (and in which,
Bergson notes, we began to pay more attention to the stable line on the
mathematical grid rather than on the infinite movement through time of which the
line is merely a trace[43]). As a preliminary illustration, we can see that the narrative
voice of Orlando concurs with Kwinter's critique of clock-time. Here, the voice
takes care to distinguish between the temporality of the always-changing body
(the "nervous system") and the striking of the clock:

It may have been her love of poetry that was to blame for making Orlando
lose her shopping list and start home without the sardines, the bath salts, or
the boots. Now as she stood with her hand on the door of her motor-car,
the present again struck her on the head. Eleven times she was violently
assaulted. "Confound it all!" she cried, for it is a great shock to the
nervous system, hearing a clock strike – so much so that for some time
now there is nothing to be said of her save that she frowned slightly,
changed her gears admirably, and cried out, as before, "Look where you're
going!" (200)

In the speeding car – the movement and stops and starts of which are aligned with
the feeling of "love of poetry" – Orlando's body takes off from her self, both
forgetting the trinkets of everyday consumption and also, as I suggest with

Deleuze and Guattari in the Introduction to this project, forgetting herself. Being jolted back into clock time (into remembrance of self) is represented here not only as a violent return to order (an order against which the wandering mind struggles) but also as a return that itself inspires speed and negative affect. Arriving back in the present moment due to the eleven strikes of the clock, Orlando adopts a need for speed and channels her affective incongruity with clock-time into early modernist road rage. Clock-time, Woolf shows, is not body-time. It is, following Kwinter, a potentially violent way to stay the becoming capacities of time. Similarly, in Orlando's house, readers do indeed witness time being "forced...to express the false unity and rationality of all being" (22) by being reduced to stable spatial expression. It is quite easy to read this sudden and forceful remembrance of self as a hazy daydream followed by clarity and remembrance. However, for Woolf, the opposite is the case: forgetfulness of self is where "poetry" happens, while remembrance brings frustration, impatience, and an angry halting of the wandering mind. On this point, we must remember that Woolf likens such self-present "moments of non-being" (which, as Gillies points out, comprise the majority of our lives) to cotton wool or cotton batting – to, that is, to soft, fuzzy, indistinct forms that suggest life lived at a lower state of phenomenological intensity. As Gillies puts it, the "cotton wool" of moments of non-being – like rushing through traffic rather than traversing the roads poetically, driving from one's self – are "something that muffles the senses and prevents a feeling of being alive" (Gillies 109).

Following Woolf's satire of this kind of spatialized halting of time, the text crucially figures the Orlando character as a body of "becoming-ever-different" through time, a character that – by outliving a regular lifetime – can be continually ruptured by unpredicted material transformations and (dis)continuous change. By living for several centuries, Orlando thereby defies biography its generic beginning, middle, and end; instead, Orlando is a personification of what Bergson calls "duration," in which the only defining quality of one's state *is* constant change. For Bergson, "the truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change" (4). Any concept of our stable "state" of being is, then, merely one falsely isolated snapshot of a body in motion. Yet, as we saw in the LGBT criticism of *Orlando: a Biography*, identities were consistently teased out of Orlando's duration and firmed up into natural types such as lesbian and transsexual. Throughout the text, Orlando not only continually changes sex (with such frequency that the event is not often explicitly reported) but also manages to morph into the milieu of his/her contemporary era. It is our inattention to the constant changes of the body that, in Bergson's estimation, allows us to regard some accumulated changes as discrete transformations that enter into our otherwise stable state:

> a slight effort of attention would reveal to me that there is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every moment... But it is expedient to disregard this uninterrupted change, and to notice it only when it becomes sufficient to impress a new attitude on the body, a new direction on the attention. Then, and then only, we find that our state has

changed. The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state

itself is nothing but change. (3-4)

In the case of *Orlando: a Biography*, it is only by ignoring these constant

transformations that we could possibly read Orlando's most-narrated sex change

as the main (and permanent) movement of the text. This interpretive move has

high stakes for transgender far beyond the boundaries of *Orlando*. Judith Butler

takes issue with the gendered stakes of this taming of time into stable space.

Critiquing the popular metaphorical wisdom that there must be an irreducible

"ground" (of sex) underlying gender identity, she suggests that the "retroactive"

instalment of this "ground" is achieved only through the "stylized repetition of

acts through time" (*Trouble* 141). Butler argues that the metaphor of a gender

"ground" stabilizes and halts gender flux, which only happens in time and as

"temporalized" (*Matter* 31) matter. In Butler's hopeful vision, "the spatial

metaphor of a ground will be displaced as a stylized configuration" (*Trouble* 141).

This "ground" will be, she continues, "displaced as...indeed a gendered

corporealization of time" (*Trouble* 141). That Butler and Kwinter make such

similar claims about the vanquishing of time's quality of "becoming-ever-

different" reminds us that like technologies such as clocks, bodies and genders

also become false bearers of the feigned stability and predictability of everyday

life.

   In contrast, I now turn to *Orlando: a Biography* in earnest in order to show

that in this text, as in her forays into fashion and washrooms, Woolf conceives of

time as duration, as consistently becoming materially different, and as an open

archive of trans affects that do not stabilize into Form. In my emphasis on key moments of movement and architectural figures in the text, I again follow Kwinter's methodology of his studies of Kafka: when a text features "(positive) experimentation" rather than "(negative) reconciliation" or "cure" (209), then "one must read the relations and the movements, not the image, the totalities" (210). Until the end of this section, I set aside Orlando's discrete gender change that other critics have focused on as a totality of the text.

Though Orlando's role as an interior decorator is indeed a pro-décor statement on architectural temporality itself, the excerpt below serves as somewhat of a thesis statement for the text's refiguring of time, a refiguring that for Woolf has everything to do with disrupting the linearity of the biographical subject. As the narrative voice relates:

> But Time, unfortunately, though it makes animals and vegetables bloom and fade with amazing punctuality, has no such simple effect upon the mind of man. The mind of man, moreover, works with equal strangeness upon the body of time. An hour, once it lodges in the queer element of the human spirit, may be stretched to fifty or a hundred times its clock length; on the other hand, an hour may be accurately represented on the timepiece of the mind by one second. This extraordinary discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the mind is less known than it should be and deserves fuller investigation. But the biographer, whose interests are, as we have said, highly restricted, must confine himself to one simple statement: when a man has reached the age of thirty...(59)

Here, Woolf anticipates Foucault's redefinition of "history" as "the concrete body of a development" (145), a phrase that, like Woolf, hangs flesh on the western world's abstract and rigid sense of clock-time. When "time" becomes a "body," it once again becomes three-dimensional, material, and transformational. In a sense, time also becomes queerly architectural (but not homogenized): time is a body that "lodges" itself "in the queer element of the human spirit." Clearly, in such a model, the passing of time is far from a human's inevitable and steady march through minutes, hours, or the three-hundred and sixty-five days/rooms of one's calendar/house. Instead, a person's temporal life is represented specifically as a *meeting* of heterogeneous bodies (the body of time and the human body). Though time is said to lodge queerly within us, the text makes clear that time is much more than a parasite that survives by literally 'occupying' the human mind: the human mind queers time by stretching it, compressing it, and throwing it off, precisely by operating at different, and varying, *speeds*. As in Einstein's theory of relativity (which, as Kwinter details, shifted our paradigm from uniform and absolute time to relative, mobile, space-time) velocity for Woolf is what defines time and movement. In this quotation, Woolf suggests that each body literally marches to its own rhythm. Some successful people, the text indicates,

> contrive to synchronise the sixty or seventy different times which beat
> simultaneously in every normal human system so that when eleven strikes,
> all the rest chime in unison, and the present is neither a violent disruption
> nor completely forgotten in the past. Of them we can justly say that they
> live precisely the sixty-eight or seventy-two years allotted them on the

tombstone. Of the rest some we know to be dead though they walk among

us; some are not yet born though they go through the forms of life; others

are hundreds of years old though they call themselves thirty-six. (199)

Woolf suggests here that time is a highly individual and felt phenomenon (rather

than an abstract and universal one), but the narrator undoes any valorization of

individualism that may appear to accrue in this rewriting of time as lodging

differently in each human body. The narrator ends the excursion by exemplifying

the sharp irony with which this text as a whole critiques biography: biography, in

this quotation, is a narrative form that restricts and elides the body of time by

reigning its queer affects into a bounded "lifetime," or, to repeat Bergson, into the

traces of lines left by the chaotic movement that inspired it. (Prosser, as we saw,

celebrates this linearity of biography, as it provides narrative order to trans lives.)

In contrast, Woolf dissembles this biographical subject into a multiple and

inconsistent series of movements and acts, one in which the mind is "a melting

place of dissemblables" (113), in which one's various selves pile up "as plates are

piled on a waiter's hand" (201), and in which nature sets about "making us so

unequally of clay and diamonds, of rainbow and granite [creating] a perfect rag-

bag of odds and ends within us – a piece of a policeman's trousers lying cheek by

jowl with Queen Alexandra's wedding veil" (46). In this last instance, two images

lie at the heart of Woolf's model of dynamic bodies: 1) a pile of solid building

materials studded with diamonds and lit by a rainbow, and, 2) a set of cross-

gendered *clothing* that nonetheless carries the law and monarchy in its pockets.

By placing the ephemerality of bodily and spatial décor next to architecture's

promise of stability in this image of the fragmented subject, Woolf configures

both of these temporal conditions as elements in her architectonics of the

fragmented subject. This is the same ambiguous relationship between the stability

of architecture and the ephemerality of décor is one that we witnessed in Orlando

himself at the beginning of this section.

The above citation hints at the fact that, for Woolf, the trans-approved

genre of biography is indeed subtly implicated in the anti-transformation ethic of

spatialized, halted temporality. The soul-searching that precedes Orlando's

decorative furor shows a different Orlando, one considering material legacy

outside of the realm of narrative-worthy biographical glory. In the following,

Orlando's narrative voice describes the way in which the young melancholy

Orlando begins to theorize his interventions in the family archive:

> Sunk for a long time in profound thoughts as to the value of obscurity, and
>
> the delight of having no name, but being like a wave which returns to the
>
> deep body of the sea; thinking how obscurity rids the mind of the irk of
>
> envy and spite; how it sets running in the veins the free waters of
>
> generosity and magnanimity… the church builders built like that. (63)

This passage suggests, in the place of the named individual, something that is both

moving and geological – a wave, through metaphor – and something seemingly

fixed and artificial – a church, through the 'plotting' of Orlando's thinking. In this

cross-troping image of what it might mean to leave names behind, the text

confuses signs easily read as nature (the sea) and nurture (art), and, as form (a

metaphor) and content (a character's thoughts). Leaving a name behind (as the

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thrust of biography) is replaced here in favour of an ethics of velocity and assemblage. A wave, though subject to tides, ebbs, and flows, is a perfect way to explain Einstein's revolutionary rereading of time: when touched by a slow hand, it is soft; when touched by a fast falling body, it is hard. It has its own rhythm but is still part of a larger assembled body of the sea.[44] Therefore, quite aside from biographically-minded trans theorists such as Prosser and Taylor, for whom "the transsexual subject needs to present her or his gendered identity as coherent and whole" (Taylor 212), Woolf explicitly theorizes the possibilities of nameless movement, relativity, and the kinds of assemblage made possible by that orientation to biography and legacy. Woolf's image of the nameless wave redirects our attention from the agency of the fully recognizable liberal individual to the possibility that 'we' ("who are 'we?'" [131], the narrator asks) are engaged in flows of events that are neither fully mappable nor predictable, *and,* neither fully unprecedented or discontinuous.

As suggested at the beginning of this section, Orlando's family home holds a preeminent place in the text's economy of biographical legacy. Contrary to the nameless wave Woolf describes, a family home is destined to, quite precisely, carry on a name. The text departs from this architectural/familial convention as well: though readers briefly hear that Orlando has become a parent, the supposed resultant children are never mentioned, characterized, followed, or treated as a real part of Orlando's so-called "Biography." Instead of the classic image of the future generation taking up their role at the family mantle (an image Lee Edelman associates with the perpetual deferral of change in the very name of

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preserving futurity), readers are left with the opposite: the text ends with Orlando leaving the house. Similarly, even though the adolescent Orlando equates architecture with permanence and legacy, the body of the house is described in the text as something far more dynamic. The house in fact transforms throughout the ages just as Orlando does: in the nineteenth century, for instance, his (now her) home acts as an embodied sign of the times. At the turn of the century, the house "became damp" (146) and the wall is said to be "sweating" (150). Moreover, the narrative voice of the text makes clear that these domestic transformations owe themselves to the impossibility of ever (like Kant) separating space from its occupants and contents. As Woolf writes, "the chill which he felt in his legs the country gentleman soon transferred to his house" (147). In this vein, Woolf goes as far as to suggest that design conventions are unconsciously modelled after historically-specific human experiences of embodiment. That is, this Victorian "chill" in the legs of the country gentleman in turn elicit "muffled" furniture and rooms in which "nothing was left bare" (147). Homes, Orlando notices, have "become extremely important" in this era – a shift the text attributes to chills and that previous chapter of this project attributes to the Victorians' gradual acceptance of the germ theory and the hygienic protocols and privatized bodies that accompanied it. In sum, in its recurring role as archive – crypt, decorative legacy, and mirror of a time's sentiment – Orlando's house is a literal architecture that breathes and heaves the affect of an historical era. Orlando's final thoughts about the home echo the narrative voice's earlier metaphorization of wave-like affects: "the room . . . shone like a shell that has lain at the bottom of the sea for

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centuries and has been crusted over and painted a million tints by the water . . . it was frail as a shell, as iridescent and as empty" (207). Far from imposing immovable architectural order, the home as described in this last figuring of the family archive is also a part of the "body of the sea" that makes up affective assemblage; it is, to extend Woolf's metaphor, a "shell" that shapes the movements of the "wave[s]" and is itself coloured and shaped by them. Rather counter-intuitively, architecture in this instance is seen as inhabiting the subject – as flowing through it, as "empty" without people, as moving only by virtue of waves, and as beating away with a "frail indomitable heart" (207) upon Orlando's departure from London.

This chilly affect and its eruption at the *fin-de-siècle* reminds us, further, that the velocity that Woolf puts in the place of ordered life-time is about the body "rushing" in more than one way. Namely, making time real and transformative entails a significant shift in how time and change are *felt*. Below, I cite two excerpts from Orlando that each show this double meaning of the "rush" of temporality.

What is love? What friendship? What truth? but directly he came to think about them, his whole past, which seemed to him of extreme length and variety, rushed into the falling second, swelled it a dozen times its natural size, coloured it a thousand tints, and filled it with all the odds and ends in the universe. (60)

"Time has passed over me," she thought, trying to collect herself; "this is the oncome of middle age. How strange it is! Nothing is any longer one

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thing. I take up a handbag and I think of an old bumboat woman frozen in the ice. Someone lights a pink candle and I see a girl in Russian trousers. When I step out of doors – as I do now," here she stepped on to the pavement of Oxford Street, "What is it that I taste? Little herbs. I hear goat bells. I see mountains. Turkey? India? Persia?" Her eyes filled with tears. (198)

The orientation to objects traced out here is symptomatic of this text's overarching suggestion that architectural objects function as archives of affect: "nothing is any longer one thing" (198). Here, even quotidian acts are 'a rush' and relationships are lived and felt through a variety of material relays. This moment of being does indeed "appear to arrest the flow of time," but instead, as Gillies suggests, it "bring[s] about a conflation of times as each individual moment is related to previous moments that are resurrected almost instantaneously" (Gillies 109). The only temporality it arrests – or, rather, suspends – is that of the subject. The body dis-organizes in this moment of being and, once again, a synaesthetic sensibility prevails: grabbing an object (touch) inspires memory; stepping outside is a matter of taste ("little herbs"); and, so on. (We can remember DS+R's Blur Building, which turned architecture into a matter of taste, feeling, and heightened awareness of the senses and their fragility.) Both the past and Orlando are "no longer one thing" (198) when every moment of daily life cannot be experienced as discrete acts but only as affective events that exist in relation.

As Koppen points out, queer temporalities of fashion are crucial elements of the multiplication of Orlandos that occurs throughout the text. She suggests that

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the use of draperies and veils in Orlando's transition scene (and in the text as a whole) comprises its own critical act of "feeling backwards" (Love 4) or "anachronistic stylistics" (Herring 103). As she puts it: "draped, veiled and garlanded figures – suggestive of Greek sculpture of Pre-Raphaelite iconography – keep turning up in her narratives at moments of heightened significance, gesturing towards a temporality other than the present and a domain one might think of as other-worldly" (35). As much as clothes have a clear role to play in Woolf's aesthetic, we see above that this rich fragmentation of Orlando's present moment occurs precisely through her body; the inscrutable conclusion to this series of synaesthetic memories is tears – a material response that signifies emotion without naming any one in particular. If joy, laughter, pain, and sorrow are each associated closely with tears, Orlando's crying is not the simple nostalgia for her past that we may assume. Rather, these unqualified tears stand in as affect itself, a sign that the fragmentation of the time of the subject registers on our bodies and ought not (or cannot) be narrated down into any one order of emotion. In the first clause of the second excerpt, the long-living Orlando reflects on her own ageing with a spatial metaphor for time. As she thinks, "time has passed over me" (198). Far from our sense of time as the steady "ground" to which experience is anchored, Orlando positions time above her as the transcendent scientific concept to which it has been reduced. And, indeed, *that* version of time does "pass over" this protagonist, who lives according to a very different temporality than that of clock-time or biographical time.

Moreover, in the first passage, the past not only encroaches affectively on the present, blurring the boundaries between the two, but moreover, time itself is able to "rush" (60). And, for Orlando, time rushes in a very particular way: his past does not merely rush in the sense of 'coming quickly,' but it arrives, swells, takes on colour, and fills. In that passage, Woolf's image of Orlando's affective experience of time passing nearly mirrors Bergson's own:

> My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling
> with the duration which it accumulates: it goes on increasing – rolling
> upon itself, as a snowball on the snow. Still more is this the case with
> states more deeply internal, such as sensations, feelings, desires, etc.,
> which do not correspond, like a simple visual perception, to an unvarying
> external object. (4)

For Bergson and Orlando, the past is welcomed in: it fills the present "with all the odds and ends in the universe" (Woolf 60), so that the present only coheres in its relationship to the past. As it is for Orlando, for Bergson, we are neither determined nor unaffected by this accumulating past: "our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea" (8).[45] In a sense, then, Orlando's felt rush translates the radical paradigm shifts of Einstein's theory of relativity to the scale of the human body; "the theory's radicality," Kwinter argues, "lay in freeing time itself of its metaphysical and absolute character and reducing it to but one more dependent (i.e., variable) coordinate in the kinematical transformation equations" (57). If, after Einstein, "each inertial system...would

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now express its own particular time determined as a mutual relation of events to the frame in which they are registered" (57), then time is indeed relative, plastic, and above all, comprised only by relationships between events and not by sudden shifts between stable forms. This "rush" (60) of time, in sum, is nothing if not material. It is a rush that collapses both of our commonsense usages of the word: a rush of time and a rush in a body. The word in Woolf's text signifies the inseparability of both usages: the specifically affective life of time. In the next excerpt, readers see more clearly the way in which speed, perception, and affect collude to disassemble the biographical subject. Here, near the end of the novel, we follow Orlando in her motor-car and can track her perceptual experience of driving through urban space. The speed of this modern technology is described as a factor in changing her sense of self:

> After twenty minutes the body and mind were like scraps of torn paper tumbling from a sack and, indeed, the process of motoring fast out of London so much resembles the chopping up small of identity which precedes unconsciousness and perhaps death itself that it is an open ended question in what sense Orlando can be said to have existed at the present moment. Indeed we should have given her over for a person entirely disassembled were it not that here, at last, one green screen was held out on the right, against which the little bits of paper fell more slowly; and then another was held out on the left so that one could see the separate scraps now turning over by themselves in the air; and then green screens were held continuously on either side, so that her mind regained the

illusion of holding things within itself and she saw a cottage, a farmyard

and four cows, all precisely life-size. (200-1)

Perhaps obviously, for Orlando, new technologies of speed entail new

architectonics of the self because of the new perceptual experiences these

technologies allow for and require. Driving, as a relatively new mode of

movement, literally tears up visual access in a way that resembles Orlando's own

torn-up identity. Due to the felt experience of such speed, including the feeling of

constantly seeing only part of something – "nothing could be seen whole or read

from start to finish. What was seen begun – like two friends starting to meet each

other across the street – was never seen ended" (200) – Orlando has her attention

drawn to the phenomenological tenuousness of the senses, so much so that the

narrative voice ends the excerpt by suggesting that perception is, if not illusory,

then always a matter of speed and relativity. As Leena Kore Schroder argues in

her excellent essay, "'Reflections in a Motor Car': Virginia Woolf's

Phenomenological Relations of Time and Space," Woolf "uses the device of the

car in movement to render the horizon indeterminate and ever-changing, ensuring

a relativity of self whose synthesis of time and space must be forever re-calculated

rather than fixed" (140). Again, and in sum, the felt "rush" of non-clock-time both

generates and reflects a life lived as a series of constant transformations that hinge

both on speed and on the perception of space.

     With Woolf's rewriting of temporality at hand, we can finally turn to the

image on which so much criticism of this novel has focused: the seemingly

sudden, complete 'sex change.' The fantastical rhetoric employed to describe this

scene – the very fantasticality of which critics like Melanie Taylor take as a sign of the "reality" of the transition – comprises, I argue, a satirical critique of the "unreal" scientific temporality that would place such non-medical gender changes in an entirely different register of material transformation than everyday bodily change. Here are two excerpts that together summarize the tone and tenor of Orlando's "transition."

> Truth, Candour, and Honesty, the austere Gods who keep watch and ward by the inkpot of the biographer, cry No! Putting their silver trumpets to their lips they demand in one blast, Truth! And again they cry Truth! And sounding yet a third time in concern they peal forth, The Truth and nothing but the Truth! (84)
>
> We are, therefore, now left entirely alone in the room with the sleeping Orlando and the trumpeters. The trumpeters, ranging themselves side by side in order, blow one terrific blast: –
>
> "THE TRUTH!"
>
> at which Orlando woke. He stretched himself. He rose. He stood upright in complete nakedness before us, and while the trumpets pealed Truth!
>
> Truth! Truth! we have no choice left but confess – he was a woman. (87)

First, readers notice that a critique of biography – specifically, the genre's claims to truth, candour, and honesty – is part and parcel of this transformation. By satirizing the sense of "THE TRUTH" (87) with which we imbue conventional narratives of gender transition today, Woolf disarticulates gender change from not only realist biography but also the realist revisionary narratives we too often use

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to validate our current identities. The repetitiveness of these Gods' demands (which, strangely enough, turns indeterminate music into a lingual imperative for "truth") mimics the way in which this genre is often attributed high moral ground and authenticity. Secondly, and more obviously, the scene satirizes the very idea that transformation appears out of nowhere, in accordance with some metaphysical truth. As one often hears in pop accounts of homosexuality, one doesn't merely 'wake up one morning and decide' that one is gay. In our denial of this agency (a denial that troublingly buys acceptance at the cost of investing in a model of in-born immutable genders and sexual tendencies), however, we may have argued too thoroughly for the polar opposite case: that a gender has always – immutably – underlain one's body. Bergson pushes us to regard legible scenes of transition as neither unprecedented nor predetermined. Instead, he suggests that our ability to regard some bodily changes as exceptional events rupturing the otherwise consistent fabric of everyday life is one grounded in expedient ignorance of the body. As he puts it,

> just because we close our eyes to the unceasing variation of every psychical state, we are obliged, when the change has become so considerable as to force itself on our attention, to speak as if a new state were placed alongside the previous one...This amounts to saying that there is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and persisting in the same state. If the state which 'remains the same' is more varied than we think, on the other hand the passing from one state to

another resembles, more than we imagine, a single state being prolonged;
the transition is continuous. (4-5)

As I argued of the relation between normative hygiene and trans body-modification, the feigned stability of one state prefigures the transience and volatility of the other (and vice-versa). The juxtaposition of truth-crying trumpets with Orlando's relatively muted response – he yawns, and then takes a bath "without showing any sign of discomposure" (87) – brings into relief the disjunction between our two common narratives of change – of 1) shocking rupture and 2) change as an obvious (in retrospect) fulfilment of one's self. (And, even the passage's most resolute statement – "he was a woman" (87) – confounds the very grammar of these popular narratives by mixing genders and tenses.) If, then, *Orlando* configures this transition as a fantastical yet mundane scene of a constantly changing protagonist, we may note two bold suggestions from Woolf and Bergson: bodily change is not so utterly transformative, and bodily stasis is never as still as we might think. Supporting this first idea is not as easy as it may sound; it entails an acknowledgement that turning *some* bodily changes (ones that tip our consciousness towards longstanding rhythms of change) into exceptional instances of the body helps reproduce the feigned stability of the normative body. This cycle of normalization is by no means easy to break: heteronormative culture can make any perceptible bodily transition into a very big deal indeed. However, following Woolf and Bergson, we may see the benefits of locating the *exceptional* experience of trans life in this cultural context – in our culture's anxious abjection of some bodies in the name of shoring up others – rather than *in* our trans bodies

(though we, in turn, certainly feel the effects of our culture's ideas about transformation precisely there).

In sum, although this scene is often taken for granted as effecting a "real" sex change, it is in this scene that the text's temporality (which implies its own ethic of bodily transformation) is brought to bear most directly on the follies of subjecting bodily transformation to biographical time. A favourite citation of many scholars is one that, at first glance, appears to challenge this reading. Here, the narrative voice discusses the ways in which people seek to make sense of the 'new' Orlando:

> The change of sex, though it altered their future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity. Their faces remained, as their portraits prove, practically the same. His memory – but in future we must, for convention's sake, say 'her' for 'his', and 'she' for 'he – her memory then, went back through all the events of her past life without encountering any obstacle. Some slight haziness there may have been, as if a few dark drops had fallen into the clear pool of memory; certain things had become a little dimmed; but that was all. The change seemed to have been accomplished painlessly and completely and in such a way that Orlando herself showed no surprise at. Many people, taking this into account, and holding that such a change of sex is against nature, have been at great pains to prove (1) that Orlando had always been a woman, (2) that Orlando is at this moment a man. (87-8)

For Taylor, Orlando's lack of surprise and unaltered identity are reasons to compare this character to a contemporary male-to-female transsexual who, we are to presume, subscribes to the idea of an unchanging underlying female essence. Bergson allows us to think of this quite differently: this gender change (the one that is culturally perceptible) is of course not a shock to Orlando, for whom constant change is a defining feature, not only day to day but from era to era. After these anti-biographical manoeuvres around conventional temporality, what identity best describes Orlando? Is she a lesbian, an MTF, a genderqueer, or intersex? As Woolf's narrative voice states with force: "let the biologists and psychologists determine" (88). For Woolf, the answer is not important. But doesn't this run counter to the common legitimation of transgender agency and self-determination for which we so often must fight on the everyday subjective register?

As Kwinter suggests, despite this chapter's implied de-emphasization of trans agency, we are all still unique actors. To explain this, Kwinter talks about the formation of snowflakes. Every snowflake, he suggests, "is different because the crystal maintains its sensitivity both to time and to its complex milieu" (28). Here, difference is guaranteed not by the validation of several categories of 'different' bodies, but rather, by the very openness to change, time, and space that don't maintain the feigned coherence of such categories. Kwinter continues, recalling Bergson's memory that accrues like a snowball: "as the snow crystal falls, it absorbs, captures, or incarnates all the chance events, all the fluctuating conditions...and builds them, or rather uses them, to assemble itself, to form its

structure or edifice" (28). Crucially, a snowflake's "body" is the result of chance, accidents, and assemblage; in turn, the snowflake's trajectory is changed because of the events that occurred during its fall to earth. This plasticity (which Kwinter traces to Einstein's "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," in which Einstein develops his special theory of relativity – of how things change while they're already moving) means that there are far more potentialities for the trans subject or agent rather than fewer, even if they are in many ways beyond our sovereign control. Unlike hard-and-fast mathematical formulas, we and our genders are (or could be) more like snowflakes: a snowflake can "update itself from within its own trajectory...[by] remain[ing] perpetually sensitive to its milieu" (23). Kwinter hereby incites the clearest and most concrete trans ethic of this chapter: by seeing our "individuality" as dependent on non-subjective events of "individuation" rather than exclusively on subject-based acts and statement of selfhood, we are in fact left with more, not fewer, options and ideas about how are all different and continually differing (even from ourselves). We can then reverse our popular wisdom on the importance of self-determination as *the* method of individuality: events of individuation happen not because of but *despite* our best attempt to determine, know, and control's one's self.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that as a biography of the *zeitgeist* of modernism itself, the always-new, always-refashioning Orlando character redefines time as a duration, as a series of both continuous and discontinuous events and changes. By recapturing Ellis' outmoded "sexo-aesthetic inversion" as an early modernist

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theory of gender change as aesthetic and philosophical, we saw that the

sexological history of transgender advocated by Prosser is not the sole unstylized

account of gender change from the early twentieth century. Instead, we see that

this exact generic hierarchy of lifewriting over fiction is part of what helps us

mistake the history of transgender as in any way a homogenous and non-aesthetic

enlightenment achieved through psychiatric inquiry in the first instance. Woolf

has explicitly critiqued such a valorization of the lifewriting genre, perhaps most

of all by her ironic title: *Orlando: a Biography*. While Prosser argues that

Feinberg's text is "transgenre" because of its combinations of biography and

fiction, Woolf – by putting self-consciously stylized and ambiguously

biographical material into "a Biography" that reads like a new kind of novel –

makes genre non-coincidental to itself. This is a kind of transgenre that doesn't

just mix stable generic categories but instead, works to trans or change the very

limiting parameters of these genres. As such, the use of "Biography" in the title of

the text is a cutting comment on those texts and genres that announce to the reader

precisely how they must be interpreted – of Derrida's "archons" who strive for

complete hermeneutic authority over their body-archives.

     Against the hermeneutic etiquette of realism of *her* time, Woolf shows us

ways to take leave from this biographical imperative and hermeneutic authority in

our time. That is, doubling back to writers like Bergson and Woolf (whose

oeuvres respectively predate and are contemporaneous to early sexological

accounts of sex change) allows us to witness event-based modes of transing

available before transgender tendencies were consolidated into a diagnosable and

psychiatric "species" of human being. Once again, a theory of the archive is at stake in this shift from trans subjects to transing events: while the subject is accumulative (complete with its self-as-archon), the theory of trans events forwarded here remakes the archival capacities of the subject into capacities for forgetting, absent-mindedness, and the affective rejection of clock-time – all accomplished while Orlando cycles through the ages, editing and editing his literary works, feverishly furnishing his house, and always throwing out what no longer fits his age. After all, if Orlando were too effective an archivist (of the self) or if we were perhaps better at remembering and memorializing, he would not have been able to change enough to be able to live "at home" throughout several centuries. His primary event is not, therefore, a gender change. It is his "tendency" – the word Bergson gives to the light archive of events – to adapt, to constantly reedit the literature he writes, and to throw out what is no longer working. As Bergson suggests, matter (here, Orlando's body) takes no actual "form" or "state" but is in fact matter in motion.

Redefining transgender as an event in this manner entails several paradigmatic shifts in transgender thought and narrative. First, it demands that we look to the activity of transing affects rather than to the "validity" of the resultant transgender subject, which is itself restricted by the "life-time" or *Chronos* of biography. Secondly, as "the event" includes both potentials that did not emerge and potentials that may still emerge, considering transgender as an event requires that we seriously rethink the presentism that we often attribute to our genders and selves in favour of regarding our current and tenuous self as our formulation of

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just one set of potential conditions that emerged and that may still emerge. In other words, in this chapter's overarching critique of the (auto)biographical imperative in transgender studies, it has become much more difficult, and perhaps more crucial, for all gendered people to make ourselves into very special little snowflakes.[46]

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

After her 1924 *Vogue* portrait was taken, an entry in Woolf's diary betrays her thoughts on what fashion and the fashion world does to one's fragmented consciousness, the very point of radical fragmentation at which *Orlando: a Biography* leaves us. In April of 1925, she writes,

> people have any number of states and consciousness: & I should like to investigate the party consciousness, the frock consciousness & c. The fashion world...is certainly one; where people secrete an envelope which connects them & protects them from others, like myself, who am outside the envelope, foreign bodies. (qtd. in Koppen 29)

Fashion, for Woolf, is substantial enough to generate oscillations in the consciousness of the subject who wears clothes thoughtfully. Self-conscious fashioning, she suggests, allows one to "secrete an envelope" that connects us to others but also separates us and protects us from them. We must recall that Woolf is discussing her own forays into this fashion world – that is, her own affective experience of the ways in which fashion can traverse oneself across the seeming borders of bodies and seams. These "foreign bodies," then, become anything but foreign when they are folded into a world of fashion, where clothes and bodily

style are – against the dissimulating narratives of high architectural modernism – considered to matter. In such a world, new consciousnesses become possible in new enfoldings of bodies in clothes. According to our reading of *Orlando: a Biography*, the "frock" or "party" consciousness may not, then, refer to the consciousness that *a subject* has when in a frock or at a party. Rather, the literal "event" of a party (effected by a "people," not a person) traverses bodies, creating its own felt spirit or consciousness. In this excerpt, fashion is credited with the multiplication and assemblage of bodies as much fabrics. And, as Koppen suggests, fashion – as the very principle of the new – is figured here as an icon of modernism. That is, the text's folding of both cloth and time defines modernism as "a time when memories tucked away among the folds, the scents in the fabrics, the memory of a lover magically returning in fancy dress, alternately unfold and refold, layer upon layer, lining, interweaving, and 'plumping out' the simplest everyday words and acts" (54).

However, to return to Woolf's diary entry, what does it mean for the body to envelope, or to become an envelope of folds? Of what does this "secretion" of an enveloped body consist? In the following chapter on Beckett's *The Unnamable*, we will see that Beckett's disintegrating protagonist makes sense of his constant bodily transitions through precisely this rhetoric: he regards himself as "two phases of the same carnal envelope" (377). Not coincidentally, Beckett's text thematizes the very questions that this chapter as a whole leaves open: is it possible to conceptualize and reorient ourselves to bodily experience that is not that of the subject? What might it mean to refuse to be or narrate oneself as a

subject? Beckett's answer to Woolf's slow disintegration of the genre of autobiography is to showcase the struggles and resistance of a non-subjective entity who quite explicitly does not believe in the first-person narrative perspective. For both authors, the impossibility of autobiography is figured quite precisely as unstoppable transformation. (Or, to put it more affirmatively, the persistence of bodily change exceeds the generic limits of autobiography – and, as we'll see in Beckett's text, of narrative in general.) As such, Beckett picks up and extends another of Woolf's main interventions here: while Woolf's protagonist is a highly adaptive yet sometimes archival entity, Beckett's unnamable evacuates the archive of the subject even further. In Woolf, we see the subject-as-archive reduced to Bergsonian "tendencies," while we see in *The Unnamable* that Beckett's protagonist survives capture from violent voices above only by virtue of his near-complete refusal to accept a past (an archive). We will see that, above all, the unnamable is a figure of difficult but required forgetfulness. How does the speaking subject of such an empty archive of self – upon refusing a biographical narrative of his past, as this chapter has suggested trans studies could do – disintegrate yet speak?

Chapter Three

Architectures of Namelessness: Beckett and the Décor of the Mind

And when a name comes, it immediately says more than the name: the other
of the name and quite simply the other, whose irruption the name announces.
Derrida, *On the Name* (89)

To have or to possess is to fold, in other words,
to convey what one contains 'with a certain power.'
Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (110)

Introduction

At his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, Michel Foucault

began by wishing it were possible for him to disown the authorial voice of his

own discourse, as if the very name Foucault were posing a difficulty to the task at

hand. He expressed this desire by beginning with an extensive citation of Samuel

Beckett's *The Unnamable*, a text that perhaps above all underlines the aporia

between the necessity of speaking of (and *as*) one's self and the very impossibility

of speaking from such a sovereign location. Here is Foucault's opening gambit

from that day:

> I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse which I must
>
> present today, and into the ones I shall have to give here, perhaps for many
>
> years to come. I should have preferred to be enveloped by speech… I
>
> should have preferred to become aware that a nameless voice was already
>
> speaking long before me, so that I should only have needed to join in, to
>
> continue the sentence it (*lui*) had started and lodge myself… in its
>
> interstices…. I should have liked there to be a voice behind me which had
>
> begun to speak a very long time before, doubling in advance everything I

was going to say, a voice which would say, "You must go on, I can't go on,

you must go on, I'll go on, you must say words, as long as there are any,

until they find me, strange pain, strange sin, you must go on, perhaps it's

done already, perhaps they have said me already, perhaps they have carried

me to the threshold of my story, before the door that opens on my story,

that would surprise me, if it opened." (qtd. in Mowitt 139)

In his reading of Foucault's citation of Beckett, John Mowitt suggests that

Foucault's wish to "lodge" in the voices of others is inherently queer, owing to its

"interpenetration of voices" (144). Foucault, he suggests, is "being addressed

from behind by a voice without a name" (139), a spatial figure he reads as an act

of anal sex translated into authorial voice and narrative. Elsewhere in *The*

Unnamable, Mowitt decodes a number of ostensibly queer images and references:

for instance, the name Basil – "clearly a Wilde allusion" (145) – and the

unnamable's spatial descriptions of what it means to be spoken by discourse: a

voice "issues forth from me, came back to me, entered back into me" (144).

Foucault's desire to de-emphasize his own name, identity, and authorial voice is,

for Mowitt, tantamount to anonymous queer sex. (If only giving up one's

authority and sovereignty were always such a pleasurable act!) If these narrative

postures are indeed akin to sexual positions as Mowitt has it, then what kind of act

is the event of name change? As a formal version of the de-naming Foucault

effects above, what kind of spatial and sexual act is the insertion of a new name

into one's *own* voice? Is name change, following Mowitt's allegorical reading, an

auto-erotic act of fucking oneself – of triumphantly delivering a new voice from within oneself?

This may appear to be the case for transgender people, for whom name change is often considered the "threshold," signifier, or decisive event of one's trans narrative. No other moment, it seems, could be more indicative of one's agency and sovereignty than of rewriting the beginning (archive or *arkhē*) of one's entrance into discourse. Trans names are often received by allies in queer and trans communities in ways that attribute to the trans person the power of self-determination and authority. There are reasons why doing so is very important.[47] Indeed, when I changed my name, I fully expected that the difficult responses would be those that refused me recognition or legitimacy. However, the opposite turned out to be true: I found myself suddenly called to make use of a surfeit of agency with regards to self-determination and sovereignty. That is, I quickly developed the sense that, in the name of recognizing my new name, people sought to continually affirm (what they perceived to be) my true and underlying gender. Though I had instead thought of my name change as 1) what Derrida might call "a sweet rage against language" (*Name* 59) and as 2) a vehement disarticulation of my name from any coherent or unchanging category of self, I found myself, then, called to answer to much more than a new name. I grew increasingly uncomfortable with the sense that answering to Lucas also meant answering to interpellations of theories of subjectivity and gender with which I strongly disagreed.

In Beckett, Foucault, and Derrida alike, I found kindred theorizations of what it means to name and to rename. For these thinkers, the "threshold" of adopting a name is (as I'd hoped for myself) forever deferred: the latter suggests that the name can only be a "post-scriptum" (*Name* 60) to the event of change, while for Foucault (and Beckett speaking within him), it "would [be a] surprise" (qtd. in Mowitt 139) if the door of his story opened and led to a narrative climax and denouement. Moreover, even if the door were to open on an ultimate name for the unnamable, readers see in the passage cited by Foucault that the unnamable does not arrive to this threshold on his own steam (even in his own daydream). Rather, "they" (a multitude of voices "from above" that compel the unnamable to accept a past, to become a subject, and to accept a name as his own) *carry him* to this narrative threshold. In stark contrast to the agency with which we might associate new trans names, then, Beckett muddies the sovereignty of the renaming subject by figuring self-definition as a chorus act: "the self-accompaniment of a tongue that is not mine" (348). As such, renaming ourselves inevitably entails the other, both as corroborator of the name, but also, with all positive and negative connotations, as a voice that we sometimes hear or speak as our own. It is, in Derrida's terms, both a repetition and reminder of the unavoidable absence at the heart of the name and also a break from that very structure of trauma: "renaming (*renomment*?) [as] repeated severance from the originary severance" (*Name* 12).

For Mowitt, Foucault's authorial "lodging" is a lodging of genitals: the pen of the author (become penis) thrust into the hands of another. But might the

architectural condition of this "lodging" (not to mention the doors, thresholds, and interstices) mentioned in Foucault's introductory remarks merit its own queer reading – one that does not immediately pull Beckett's diction into an allegorical hermeneutic? What, we may ask, is specifically *spatial* about name change and about the theories of the subject that generate the name-changer's ideals of recognition, agency, and sovereign interiority in the first instance? As Derrida makes clear throughout his oeuvre, proper names are underpinned by implicit concepts of both property and propriety, inasmuch as names gather together what "belongs" to one. "Title," it is no coincidence, refers both to names and to documents that prove ownership or one's "entitlement" (all implications intended). Following Derrida's assertion that proper names, property, and propriety – each a derivative of the Latin *proprius*, which means "own" – are mutually implicated, Wigley suggests in *The Architecture of Deconstruction* that giving a name to something is inherently both a spatial act and a repressive one:

> To name something is always to locate it within a space. The sense of the proper name is that of the proper place. Names are always place names. By designating something as 'art' or 'law,' for example, is already to resist its subversive qualities and to make a place for it in a conceptual scheme, marking its site, delimiting its domain. (155)

Proper names, in this sense, both "give place" to something within a system and also, in assigning such a conceptual place, inaugurate a sense of what is proper and improper to the phenomenon at hand. Changing a proper name, then, could entail a transformation of propriety and our sense that to be human is to treat

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one's self as sovereign property. It is my contention, however, that currently it is often the case that the rupture of a new name is too often neutralized because, in the manner that Lacan describes, the name is treated like a social pact upon which we have all agreed in advance. As Butler puts it, we "simultaneously" agree to recognize the same object (man, woman, trans-woman, trans-man, etc.) under one sign. This social pact, she suggests, "overrides the tenuousness of imaginary identification and confers on [the sign] a social durability and legitimacy" (152) that a transing subject may or may well *not* desire.[48] There is much at stake in simply and silently accepting a new name through the etiquette and assumption of this kind of "social pact." Namely, the previous chapters of this project juxtapose Bloomsbury's modernism (as the pursuit of fashion and novelty) with the high architectural modernism of Loos and Le Corbusier (who presented the newness of their aesthetic styles as anti-fashion returns to universal and enduring principles of building). It has been my experience that, in the worthy names of respect and validation, the etiquette of many queer communities calls for the second model, which is an approach to time and space that I critiqued in Chapter One for its dissimulation of the past and its anti-queer dismissals of fashion, transience, and adornment.

In response to what I have perceived as an imperative to name (and the type of self-contained subject this imperative sometimes protects) I will argue here that *The Unnamable* shows profound understanding of not only the ambiguous quality of name change but, moreover, the specifically spatial and architectural modes required in order enact new practices of naming. Such new

practices are crucial if one is to consistently renegotiate and survive a life where one can always count on getting (as Mowitt might interpret it) fucked over by discourse. This chapter therefore departs from Mowitt's allegorical queer interpretation and lingers on the spatial economy that generates the possibility of namelessness in Beckett's text. First, I analyze the tenuous "ground" of the subject in the text (a spatial figure that Kwinter and Butler each criticize for its vanquishing of the specifically temporal qualities of becoming or materialization) in order to suggest that losing one's ground in discourse (rather than protecting it) is the architectonic of name change that may best capture a transing politics of language. Secondly, staying with the doors, windows, and spaces of Beckett's text rather than translating them into sexual acts and orifices, I argue that this text offers us a model of radically compromised interiority – a critique of the very privacy and privatization of the subject that I addressed in Chapter One. The chapter therefore focuses, respectively, on the ethics of the unnamable's pained (yet liberatory) transitions between names, and then on the aesthetic representation of the space of this transitioning body. Together, these two tasks effectively blur the line between the ethics and the aesthetics of name change, precisely by showing why the ethics we build for name change must consider the constitutive role of the aesthetic conditions of trans narratives (especially narratives of interiority and agency). In all, then, this chapter shows that new names and aesthetic inquiry can rip into the psychic interiority and sovereignty of the self, the principles upon on which the sanctification and naturalization of new names and new categories depend. In Beckett's deferral of the properly named

subject, we might find new trajectories for trans life; we can question the taken-for-granted ends of our stories by repeatedly severing and rewriting the conventions of beginnings.

Improper Names

In Beckett's text, readers follow the unnamable through a series of insufficient names: Basil, Mahood, Jones, and Worm. The levity and speed with which the unnamable changes names – "Decidedly Basil is becoming important, I'll call him Mahood instead, I prefer that, I'm queer" (351) – offers a stark alternative to transgender etiquettes of name change: he changes names without the validating narratives of memory – without, in other words, an archive. As Jonathan Boulter suggests, the unnamable is without *arkhē*, or, without beginning.[49] Many critics, including Boulter, interpret the unnamable's name changes as "desperate attempts to assert a kind of agency" (*Perplexed* 128). The opposite may be true: the unnamable may change names precisely to escape the imperative to accept (and equate himself with) a past and a subjectivity. (Throughout the text, voices from above try to force a past onto him in order to pull him up into their world of nameable and proper humanity, but he ultimately does not capitulate.) Such a resistant practice of name change certainly desanctifies the process! While names often function in trans lives to anchor the transforming subject firmly in place, could we imagine employing names in a Beckettian mode? As a line of flight not only from specifically male or female subjectivity but from the archival conventions of subjectivity (ones that, as we've seen, imply their own problematic conception of gender) in general? In service of

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this possibility, the following section argues that by redefining all names as "improper," Beckett provides an alternative to the naïve politics of language and interpretation that underpin any insistence that a name can be, beyond question, 'real.' This alternative is, in a phrase that will become clear, a theory of names as groundless signifiers that both 1) function as linguistic prostheses of the always-already fragile subject and 2) prop up the inadequate privatization of the subject attempted by architectural ownership. This architectural rhetoric, we will see, derives from Beckett's own emphasis on the slippage between material and linguistic "grounds" and spaces; it is precisely the voice's lack of location in discourse – his lack of narrative "property" and a proper name – that permits his always compromised but absolutely constitutive impropriety.

First, by way of introducing the style of this cryptic text, we must look to Beckett scholars who have considered the role of naming in this author's work. Beckett's practices of naming are sometimes misconstrued by critics. For instance, Rubin Rabinowitz, in *Women in Beckett*, suggests that Beckett "often changes the names of the characters…to hint that they are not people in the outer world but surrogates of an underlying persona" (112). In the case of *The Unnamable*, it is the very lack of any underlying persona that the voice is at pains to point out: as the voice says, referring both to himself and his narrative: "the subject doesn't matter, there is none" (412). In *Beckett, Derrida, and the Event of Literature*, Asja Szafraniec acknowledges this. As she puts it, the two main names between which the narrative voice shifts (Worm and Mahood) are "meaningful for Beckett's project of questioning the conditions of the possibility of the subject"

(128). As the ultimate goal for the voice of *The Unnamable* is to be able to stop

speaking, Szafraniec suggests that self-naming is the unachievable act that would

attain this pure silence for the voice:

> To silence the clamor of voices, the "I" should become the owner of those
>
> voices, to thereby saturate the flow of words with its (the "I"'s) own
>
> intentions. Should the "I" identify itself, reject that which is its other and
>
> therewith take full possession of the speaking voice – should it say "I" – it
>
> would be free to go silent. (124)

Becoming the "owner" of the voice would entail all three of Derrida's

interpretations of *proprius*: a proper name, a location for oneself within discourse

(a property, a "ground"), and the propriety of speaking like a subject, acting like a

subject, and claiming a past like a subject. Refusing all three of these versions of

ownership does indeed leave the Beckettian voice, as Boulter puts it, "homeless"

(*Perplexed* 128), as his "inability to name himself, that is, his inability to identify

his language as his own" leaves him "in a space where it is impossible to locate

oneself within discourse" (*Perplexed* 124). (Boulter's own diction here shows us

exactly how difficult it is to speak of the non-subjective voice of this text: he

locates the voice in "a space" in the very gesture of suggesting that he has no

proper place.) While it is commonplace among innovative Beckett critics to

therefore interpret the voice of this text as fulsomely seeking to "own" these

voices – Szafraniec also reads the names as the voice's "vain attempts to establish

its own identity" (128) – below I read the voice as engaged in a struggle to *resist*

the temptation of caving to the pressure of "owning" a name, to resist the benefits

of peace, ease, and approval that would accompany such a capitulation to normative modes of language, feeling, and autobiography. On this point, this chapter is in accordance with Garin Dowd, who suggests that "in *The Unnamable* Worm *resists* the similarly violent *resolution* attempted upon him/it by 'them' (that is, by representatives of the Tribunal of Reason)" (Dowd 168, original emphasis). A preliminary point, then: the ultimate goal of attaining a new name occupies an ambiguous place within this text. While capitulating to a new nameable life and subjectivity "up there in their world" (Beckett 339), in the light, is a tempting resolution that would end the pain of the unnamable's compelled speech, he ultimately resists.

Integral to this insistence on the impropriety of naming is Beckett's spatial figuring of names, a trope that I trace out below in order to suggest that naming is an inherently spatial act (one that locates us in discourse but also, in so doing, produces the affect of being "at home" that Prosser and others discuss as the right affect of gender). The condition of feeling in excess – or, adrift – of one's name is in fact the definitive spatial quest of Beckett's text. As Szafraniec points out, the fact that "Where now?" is the first sentence of *The Unnamable* suggests that spatial dislocation is the meagre "plot" that the reader can expect in the text and is therefore constitutive of the felt experience of becoming unnamable (129). For this reason, Szafraniec interprets the name Worm "as a calque, a loan translation from the Latin *ubi sum,* [where/am] since it sounds like the 'where'm' in [the later line of] 'where'm I?'" (129). As the voice recounts, "Where am I? That's my first question, after an age of listening" (qtd. in Szafraniec 129). In contrast to the

inquisitive "Where am I?" of Worm, the name Mahood in the text "is the embodiment of the gesture of substantialization that produces the subject, subject as substance, 'my selfhood' or 'minehood'" (128). In Szafraniec's reading, then, the difference of the names is a spatial one: Worm (where'm) doesn't know where he is while Mahood (minehood) partakes of the "ownership" of self that we associate with safety and security. The unnamable's oscillation between the two names therefore implies a correlative oscillation between the imperative to own and the impossibility of even knowing where one "is" in discourse.

But what does Worm's lack of discursive location imply about names and space in general? In fact, Worm's predicament is one that this project has slowly been creating for the (trans)gendered subject. In the previous chapter, the spatialization of the subject implied by the rhetoric of 'owning a place' in discourse was questioned by both Sanford Kwinter and Judith Butler. Together, they reminded us that the spatial metaphor of a "ground" (for time and for sex) that we use to anchor subjectivity is "indeed a gendered corporealization of time" (*Trouble* 141). As Kwinter writes, "matter, form, and subjects ('doers') come only later, reintroduced at a second order level, not as ground but as produced effect" (40). The unnamable is a fragile subject who lives with this very knowledge: he exists in a "world of pure discourse without ground, without *arkhē*" (Boulter, *Interpreting* 104). Beckett, as we will see below, does not describe this discursive ground as in any way metaphysical or otherwise immaterial. Rather, the groundlessness of the self is equated specifically with actual shifting territory, as though the firmness of one's environment is a required condition for the firmness

of one's self. The voice of the text explicitly questions the make-up of the material beneath him. As he reports, "I may add that my seat would appear to be somewhat elevated, in relation to the surrounding ground, if ground is what it is. Perhaps it is water or some other liquid" (Beckett 338). If, as Szafraniec argues, the question of "Where'm I?" is the very affective condition of namelessness, then these two kinds of domestication – having a proper ground for the self (in discourse) and the body (in space) – are not just related but are in fact mutually implicated. Later in the text, the voice suggests that the underpinning of this tenuous self is comprised of a stickier situation than merely "water or some other liquid." In this excerpt, the voice attributes Worm's inability to enter the enlightened human world (or, his capability to resist it) to the specific make-up of his groundless turf:

> Worm should have fled, but where, how, he's riveted, Worm should have dragged himself away, no matter where, towards them, towards the azure, but how could he, he can't stir, it needn't be bonds, there are no bonds here, it's as if he were rooted, that's bonds if you like, the earth would have to quake, it isn't earth, one doesn't know what it is, it's like sargasso, no, it's like molasses, no, no matter, an eruption is what's needed, to spew him into the light...it's like slime, paradise, it would be paradise, but for this noise, it's life trying to get in, no trying to get him out, or little bubbles bursting all around, no, there's no air here, air is to make you choke. (417)

Here, readers learn that Worm's compromised ground is like sargasso (brown algae that floats *en masse* atop some ocean waters), molasses, and/or slime. In the first instance, Worm's milieu is described (like Orlando's rooms and bodies) as a marine environment. Algae is a suitable metaphor for the consistency of names without grounds: algae is of course underpinned only by the diverse and dangerous body of the ocean itself. Worm's sargasso ground is an illusory and slippery one that rises to the top only due to its lightness (its ability to float) rather than because of the heaviness with which we associate ground and substantiality. In the case of molasses and slime, Beckett introduces both the slowness and the malleability of this sticky ground. This surface is quaggy and sticky rather than solid. It also not easy to move on a ground that moves along with one or holds one back: Worm is "rooted," but not with "bonds" like gravity – by the gummy quality of the ground itself. Clearly, then, this space is not meant to describe a pre-human condition from which the voice will eventually emerge according to plan: after all, only an eruption, a sudden paradigm shift, rather than a natural progression of self-knowledge or enlightenment, would propel him into the "light" of the world above.

What, then, is the subject to do who lives in a world with such a slippery ground for one's name and one's discourse? Beckett's text presents a series of responses to this question that, while certainly non-prescriptive, approach the tone of aphorism. In what might be regarded as a thesis statement for Beckett's theorization of naming, the voice of the text suggests that "the essential is never to arrive anywhere, never to be anywhere, neither where Mahood is, nor where

Worm is, nor where I am, it little matters thanks to what dispensation. The essential is to go on squirming forever at the end of the line" (386). In this spatial rendering of name change, the key direction is to *not* be where one's name is located, which entails never "arriv[ing] anywhere" (386), a proposition that might understandably throw the pilots of even the queerest trajectories for a loop. As Boulter suggests, the elimination of *telos* from the equation of name change suggests that renaming is not only an endless act but also one that entails *distance.* Indeed, it is from "this condition of distance," this distance "from desire, power, and language" (*Perplexed* 128) that the voice is compelled to speak. But how might distance from one's own name be accomplished? For the voice, "squirming at the end of the line" is both his suggestion and also an apt description for his own actions throughout the text. Even at the end of his (quasi-) life, the text's voice continues to "squirm" rather than finally capitulate to self "ownership" in language, name, and body. As such, Beckett makes a deceptively simple point: we can never reach the location of our names. Names, in this sense, are not trajectories or destinations, but instead are decoys that disrupt our linear path to self "ownership" or discovery. Or, more precisely, these decoys function as detours on such paths. As the text continues a page later, "perhaps it's by trying to be Worm that I'll finally succeed in being Mahood, I hadn't thought of that" (387). For Beckett, then, names – in effecting more than what they intend or appear to name – exceed themselves, in the sense that their performativity moves the object (intended to be merely labelled) into new territory. The result of this performative shifting beyond one's name is nothing short of a crisis in the very

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structure of referentiality, a structure we rely on when multiplying and naturalizing new names of people and categories.

Butler and Derrida have each addressed this crisis in turn and I turn briefly to their work in order to show the stakes of Beckett's extension of this crisis of referentiality to new names in particular. Derrida suggests in *Limited Inc* that the intended authority of names is self-destructing. As he puts it, "the signature is imitable in its essence. And always has been. In French one would say that *elles s'imite*, a syntactical equivocation that seems to me difficult to reproduce: it can *be* imitated, and it imitates *itself*" (34 original emphasis). In other words, although names are meant to be unique and distinguishing, it's their very iterability – and therefore vulnerability to counterfeit – that gives them their meaning. Butler elaborates on this point in *Bodies That Matter*, where she argues (explicitly against Žižek's sense that names effect permanence) that "identity is secured precisely in and through the transfer of the name, the name as a site of transfer or substitution, the name, then, as precisely what is always impermanent, different from itself, more than itself, the non-self-identical" (153).[50] Butler also points out that the changeability of women's names is precisely what secures the "illusory permanence" (153) of patrilineal structure that requires women bear the new name that operates as a sign or signature for the transfer of (female) *property*. That women's names are required as prostheses for a transfer between men suggests that names attempt to "seal a deal" that is otherwise lacking a performative. As Derrida suggests in his analysis of Lévi-Strauss, "The Battle of Proper Names," proper names are in fact impossible:

nonprohibition, the consciousness or exhibition of the proper name, only

makes up for or uncovers an essential and irremediable impropriety. When

within consciousness, the name is called proper, it is already classified and

is obliterated in being named. It is already no more than a so-called proper

name. (*Grammatology* 109)

For Derrida, then, not only is the relentless saying and confirming of a proper

name a means by which to dissimulate its performativity but, moreover, the name

of "proper name" itself changes the currency of the name, such that when its

designation as proper is so emphasized, the propriety of the name suffers even

more: "it is already no more than a *so-called* proper name" (emphasis added). As

the voice of Beckett's text suggests, a name (as well as a pronoun) is a "matter of

habit" (391), an iterable linguistic token that becomes meaningful and adheres to a

subject only through time, repetition, and habit – a phenomenon that Beckett, in

Proust, defines as the polar opposite of art.[51] In *The Unnamable*, the voice

discloses the open secret of renaming, and, in so naming the process of naming,

turns his name(s) into, in Derrida's words, "no more than a so-called proper

name." Below, following a tale about Mahood's refusal to learn that man is a

higher mammal, the voice flaunts the impropriety of renaming:

but it's time I gave this solitary a name, nothing doing without proper

names. I therefore baptize him Worm. It was high time. Worm. I don't like

it, but I haven't much choice. It will be my name too, when the time

comes, when I needn't be called Mahood any more, if that happy time ever

comes. (385)

The unnamable does precisely what Derrida suggests brings forth the impropriety of naming: by naming the proper name *as* a name, readers are – despite the voice's appellation of Worm as a "solitary" – "restored to the obliteration and the non-self-sameness [*non-proprieté*] at the origin" (*Grammatology* 109). The mock solemnity ("baptize") and sarcasm ("nothing doing") with which this name change is announced only sharpens the voice's critique as it calls out the conventions of naming. That this new name is specifically a non-human one indicates, in Boulter's reading, that the non-self-sameness of *The Unnamable* is indeed a posthuman existence (*Perplexed* 124). Quite contrary to much trans etiquette of naming, Worm is not only configured here as a name he doesn't *like* but as one over which he has limited choice. Renaming, therefore, is anything but a moment of the sovereign agency of the human in this text; it is, rather, an occasion that draws the voice into conversation with his other names, even an occasion on which the voice assesses his own process – his own failure – to stop narrating himself into existence.

Instead of speaking names as though they are successful at describing what we already are, then, we might theorize renaming, as Derrida does, as a potential "expansion of self" (*Name* 13) made possible precisely through "the ability to [like the unnamable] disappear in your name" rather than "return [the name] to itself" (*Name* 13) and to its own constructed stability. The "your" in Derrida's account seems to denote a parent (he begins, "that which bears, has borne, will bear your name seems sufficiently free, powerful, creative, and autonomous to live alone and radically to do without you and your name" [*Name*

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13]), but his sense of disappearing "in" a name suggests that renaming can indeed become a mode of imperceptibility in which one has the transient and compromised freedom to change. Elsewhere in his text, however, Derrida claims that a name is too often a "post-scriptum" that "comes after the event" (*Name* 60) of change. (Indeed, this is precisely how new trans names are often interpreted: as a definitive sign that something has already changed in the bearer's self-perception and/or body.) Again, Beckett flips this temporality inside-out: if by trying to be one name, one becomes another name entirely, then an act of naming is itself an event that announces the irruption of novelty and unprecedented change. Naming then becomes "a gesture of renunciation" (Szafraniec 94) rather than a tool of recognition; a performative rather than expressive statement; a generator of, rather than a post-script *to,* material change; and, a means to "expose the name as a crisis in referentiality" (Butler, *Bodies* 139) rather than a feigned sign of an infallible economy of the symbolic.

Therefore, even though renaming hereby has many seemingly negative connotations (exposing, evacuating, critiquing, renouncing), they also comprise events in their own right by generating change. The misunderstanding of Beckett's work as inherently and absolutely nihilistic is (as much as anti-deconstructive transgender theory) premised on the implicit belief that critique and rupture do not generate anything novel.[52] For Beckett and Derrida alike, however, it is a certain negative ontology of the self that allows and demands for change. Derrida's collection *On The Name* takes negative theology as one of its main concerns. It is "impossible," he suggests there, "to give a univocal sense to

the 'I'" (13). This is too true in *The Unnamable*, in which "I" marks quite explicitly both its own fictionality and its transferability among names. Even the text's first page marks out this narrative pattern: "I, say I, unbelieving" (331). Here, the speaker addresses himself as "I," telling "I" to "say I," a formulation that shows his knack for acknowledging the fictionality both of his own rhetoric and his own self-presence. Derrida formulates this sense of multiplicity clearly: "sorry, but more than one, it is always necessary to be more than one in order to speak, several voices are necessary for that… this voice multiplies itself, dividing within itself: it says one thing and its contrary" (*Name* 35). Derrida's description of contradiction and multiplicity is of course explicitly true for the voice of *The Unnamable*, who begins by asking: "how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later?" (331). In a discursive world in which the voice of the text eventually dis*owns* all statements he makes about himself, the reader's sense of him as a character is indeed comprised of a series of erasures and negations only. This negative mode of self-definition is explicitly labelled by the voice as a tool of the voices above in the social world. Here is another excerpt in which this negative ontology of the first-person perspective is presented:

> First I'll say what I'm not, that's how they taught me to proceed, then
> what I am, it's already under way, I have only to resume at the point where
> I let myself be cowed. I am neither, I needn't say, Murphy, nor Watt, nor
> Mercier, nor – no, I can't even bring myself to name them, nor any of the
> others whose very names I forget, who told me I was they, who I must

have tried to be, under duress, or through fear, or to avoid acknowledging

me, not the slightest connection. (371)

To circle back to the introduction of this section, we see most clearly here that the

unnamable is defined through negation, or more precisely, through "owning"

nothing of his own save for his displaced names – emptied husks that name only

the absence of ground. Later in the text, the voice claims that this absence is his

only constitutive feature: "I'm all these words, all these strangers, this dust of

words, with *no ground* for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming

together to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they, all of them" (443

emphasis added). This apparent evacuation of names is a gesture towards what

Derrida elsewhere calls "the irremediable absence of the proper name"

(*Grammatology* 106-7), or, in other words, the recognition that at its origin any

name – like any gender – is grounded in a performative speech act that can never

attain full presence.

So how does this "negative ownership" of discursive ground imply

anything affirmative? For Derrida, the language of negative ontology is

affirmative of something much more radical than finally finding one's 'real'

identity: the very ethical imperative to do impossible things. Here, he insists that

the language of impossibility is in fact deeply ethical and affirmative:

And the language of ab-negation or of renunciation is not negative: not

only because it does not state in the mode of descriptive predication and of

the indicative proposition simply affected with a negation...but because it

denounces as much as it renounces; and it denounces, enjoining; it

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prescribes overflowing this insufficiency; it mandates, it necessitates doing

the impossible, necessitates place, again. I shall say in French, *il y a lieu*

de (which means *il faut*, "it is necessary," "there is ground for") rendering

oneself there where it is impossible to go. Over there, toward the name,

toward the beyond of the name in the name....Going where it is possible to

go would not be a displacement or a decision, it would be the irresponsible

unfolding of a program. The sole decision possible passes through the

madness of the undecidable and the impossible: to go where...it is

impossible to go. (59)

There are three points that require emphasis in this excerpt. First, Derrida allows

us to see that seemingly negative language and denunciation of existent paths or

programs is precisely the kind of thinking that mandates novelty – that leads to

the dissatisfaction that calls for continual transformation and change. Secondly,

we see that the ethical imperative – "il faut" – that results from this language of

mutual denunciation and ethics is once again an explicitly spatial imperative. In

effect, Derrida suggests that the formulation of "there is ground for" is only

ethical inasmuch as it leads us into impossible, groundless, territory. Thirdly, the

impossibility that Derrida champions here is precisely how, in "On a Certain

Possible Impossibility of Saying the Event," he (negatively) defines the event:

this impossibility is not simply negative. This means that the impossible

must be done. The event, if there is one, consists in doing the impossible.

But when someone does the impossible, if someone does the impossible,

no one, above all the doer of the deed, is in a position to adjust a self-

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assured, theoretical statement to the event and say 'this happened'...A

decision should tear – that's what the word decision means; it should

disrupt the fabric of the possible. (231, 237)

If Derrida defines the event as a singular emergence that cannot be owned or

perhaps even effected by any one subject, then the event of name change is not (at

least not exclusively) about agency and self-assertion. Rather, it may consist in

the necessary impossibility of tearing through one's own sovereignty. In this

reading, the seemingly negative aporia and denunciations of *The Unnamable*

remind us of something radically affirmative: names, including new names, could

instead move (us) towards the other in unexpected ways, could dislocate us from

that which we feel is our "ground" and our affective "property" and propriety, and

could motivate us to use names as a reminder that we must, rather than unfold

possible identities, pursue the impossible instead.

Transgender Monads

How? I show below that reconceiving of the trope of interiority in

everyday talk about (trans)gender constitutes a first step towards remaking the

triad of proper names, property, and propriety. In Chapter One of this project,

Mark Wigley reminded us that the privatization and interiorization of the subject

depended in large part on new architectural norms of privacy and containment. As

I have pointed out, popular conceptions of transgender often rely on just such

protective assertions of interior gender: gendered psyches are thought to reside

"in" bodies, which may be experienced as right bodies or 'wrong bodies' (in other

words, as proper or improper ones – accommodating or inhospitable ones). My

contention here is that a limited and limiting monadology has been imposed upon

the idea and possibilities of transgender. By this I mean that through the continued

valorization of gender as (or, located in) a hermetically-sealed interior – the

psyche, self, soul, or mind – (trans)gender is repeatedly privatized, made into a

piece of ethereal property, and held aloft from others and aesthetics. The

interiority of (trans)gender is a much remarked-upon, if little agreed-upon, notion.

Queer theorists such as David Eng and Judith Butler write in quite different ways

about the fantasies and conventions shored up by our persistent desire for

interiority. In his analysis of *Lawrence V. Texas*, Eng looks to Hegel in order to

critique the ruling's implicit privatization of homosexuality. "In *The Philosophy*

of Right," Eng recalls,

> Hegel defines modern personhood as the development of individual self-
>
> consciousness through political forms of property, family, civil society,
>
> and the state, in which each successive dialectical stage marks the
>
> sublation (*Aufhebung*) of contradictions into a more inclusive whole.
>
> Through property, Hegel contends, the liberal individual's right to self-
>
> possession – of body, interiority, mind, and spirit – is established. And it is
>
> through the development of property in more complex social forms, most
>
> notably marriage and family, that freedom and moral action are cultivated
>
> and actualized. (52)[53]

In service of his argument against the privatization of queerness, Eng reminds us

that this "modern personhood" often seems to be synonymous with "self-

possession" – including the ownership of an interior. More importantly, Eng

reminds us that this small-scale self-possession is cultivated through larger

cultural practices such as marriage and family. By including gender in this list of

interiorized self-possessions, then, we place it on par with the "political forms of

property," as if liberating (trans)gender may be best attained through the

protective ownership of one's gender. This would be to problematically limit the

pursuit of transing to a model that feigns the transhistoricity of both "human" and

"rights," without considering how and why "trans" has and has not fit into those

tenuous categories. Butler forcibly critiques this tendency, following both

Nietzsche (for whom consciousness is an illness) and Foucault (whose concept of

inscription, Butler suggests, has not been sufficiently put to work in gender

theory). Specifically, Butler refers to Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, wherein

he suggests that the prisoners' *internalization* of surveillance (in Bentham's

architectural design for the panopticon) is the key affective technology of modern

power. Below, she reformulates Foucault's observations about inscription in a

way that allows us to easier see their relevance for the idea of (trans)gender

interiority. As she puts it,

> The figure of the interior soul understood as 'within' the body is signified
>
> through its inscription *on* the body, even though its primary mode of
>
> signification is through its very absence, its potent invisibility. The effect
>
> of a structuring inner space is produced through the signification of a body
>
> as a vital and sacred enclosure. The soul is precisely what the body lacks;
>
> hence, the body presents itself as a signifying lack. That lack which *is* the
>
> body signifies the soul as that which cannot show. In this sense, then, the

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soul is a surface signification that contests and displaces the inner/outer

distinction itself, a figure of interior psychic space inscribed *on* the body

as a social signification that perpetually renounces itself as such. In

Foucault's terms, the soul is not imprisoned by or within the body, as

some Christian imagery would suggest, but 'the soul is the prison of the

body.' (*Trouble* 172)

Rereading this contestation of "naturalized interiority" (Butler, *Trouble* 44) with

regards to transgender interiority entails the following: that in order to conceive of

a purely interior "sex" of the subject, we have had to turn the body into a "vital

and sacred enclosure" – a sacralization I have critiqued throughout this

dissertation. Secondly, we have had to accept that gender is marked by an

inherent, inaccessible, and unfixable "lack" – inasmuch as no "exterior" can

perfectly represent the pure essence of its (feigned and immaterial) original.

Third, we have had to strategically forget that the very existence of this interior

"sex" only appears – as absence – on the "surface" of the body, as gender. The

point of disrupting these three habits is the following. For Foucault, this

sacralization of the body-as-enclosure effectively *limits* what bodies can do and

imagine: to interiorize sex, we have to first regard gender as unreal – as, indeed, a

bastard copy or a false idol. This, as many of us know, is a theory of gender

whose main result is pain and oppression. In other words, by believing in gender's

constitutive lack – a belief on which our faith in a pure interior sex wholly

depends – we accept from the outset that our genders are marked by absence,

insufficiency, and, above all, "wrongness." To adapt Foucault, we may then say

that although we often think of sex as imprisoned in a gendered body – "I'm a woman trapped in a man's body" – the opposite is in fact true: internal concepts of "sex" are what comprise the prisons of the body. In other words, interiority (sex) is not imprisoned in the gendered body. Rather, the body is itself imprisoned by the lacks and pains created in the wake of the fabrication of sexed interiority.

For a challenge to Butler's critique of interiorized gender, we can look to Jay Prosser's Chapter One, "Judith Butler: Queer Feminism, Transgender, and the Transubstantiation of Sex" (21-60), for an example of the recouping of interiorized gender in trans studies. In this chapter, Prosser takes issue with what he calls Butler's "emphatically occularcentric [sic]...prioritization of surface" (43). Prosser's usage of Freud, Abraham and Torok, and Anzieu offers a new valorization of trans interiority; with Freud, he suggests that the sexed interiority self (as ego) is a result of "the psychic projection of a surface" (41) – the surface of the body. While Butler shows us that Freud hereby creates an image of a psychic interior, Prosser holds fast to this psyche and the division of inner and outer on which it depends: "Freud's original assertion maintains a distinction between the body's real surface and the body image as a mental projection of this surface" (41). In a sense, Prosser therefore agrees with Butler that the psyche is an internalized projection of the surface – the difference seems merely to be between their opinions on whether or not this is a good thing! In any case, however, we must take issue with his reading of Butler's "surface" as a primarily (even exclusively) visual plane. While Prosser critiques Butler's "dependence on the visible, on body-as-surface" (43), there is reason to remember that Butler nowhere

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suggests that this "surface" of gender is an anaesthetic one. In fact, following

Foucault, Butler knows that the pursuit of a perfect expression of interior sex is a

painful one – one she equates, after Foucault, with prison. Our response to Prosser

must be Foucault's original point: that the purpose of the panopticon was not to

actually see the prisoners better, but to instead have them incorporate this

discipline into their (seemingly unrelated) feelings and habits. As Butler puts it,

"in the context of prisoners, Foucault writes, the strategy has been not to enforce a

repression of their desires, but to compel their bodies to signify the prohibitive

law as their very essence, style, and necessity" (171). The body is not, for Butler

or Foucault, a visual plane that is watched into oppression. Rather, it is an

instrument through which power operates by insinuating itself inwards, infecting

(what appear to us to be) the roots – feelings, selfhood, and "necessity" (a word

whose force captures the way in which we now think of interiorized gender

identity). We may begin with two provisional suggestions, then: first, that the

interiorization of gender is phantasmatic, and secondly, that, as such, it is not to

our benefit – *it,* rather than our bodies, is the prison against which we 'wrong

bodies' struggle.

Beckett, in his own right, writes against the very aesthetic mode of

"expression" that is part and parcel of this architectonic of the body's interior and

exterior. The model of expression, we will see, reduces aesthetic production (and

gender as such) to a secondary "post-scriptum" to the real (internal) event of sex.

As Bersani claims in *Balzac to Beckett*, "expression" makes sense as a description

of aesthetic production "only...as long as artists believe there are prior 'occasions'

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to be expressed" (303). (Or, as Deleuze puts it: "what is expressed does not exist outside its expressions" [*Fold* 39].) As I argue in the remaining sections of this chapter, *The Unnamable* allows us to rethink both the stakes and the outcomes of this imperative to privatize the self in an inaccessible psychic space. In extension of Butler's model cited above, Beckett's text suggests that the tenuous subject is a thin surface effect that is both inside and outside. Indeed, the unnamable is a Möbius strip that negates the spatial binary of inside and outside and demands that we conceive of a new spatial model of the self. Recalling DS+R's many queer doors in Brasserie, each of which seeks to question precisely this boundary between inside and outside, the stakes of such a spatial reorganization of the subject become clearer: while DS+R's interventions made us rethink the divisions of space (particularly the inside and outside of strictly demarcated hygienic space) here Beckett has turned these interventions to the body and self. What does it mean to actually become the thin partition of, for instance, Brasserie's honeycomb wall between washrooms, of the rotating door that is filmed and broadcast inside Brasserie, or, in the case of Woolf's lavatory attendant, to become the door that cuts her memory into discontinuous pieces? What does it mean to be a "partition"? How, like the unnamable, can we move beyond the binary of inside and outside and therefore rebuild our conceptions of what the social and aesthetic life of gender can be?

A useful figure through which to gauge the currency of interiority in Beckett's text is the "monad," a concept elaborated by Leibniz and later adapted by Deleuze in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.* It is well established in Beckett

criticism that the author's oeuvre illustrates a long-standing obsession with Leibnizian philosophy. (Like many of these critics, returning to Leibniz with Deleuze's interventions in mind will be the most useful approach here.) Beckett's characters have often been compared to the monad, which Leibniz defines as the smallest unit of matter: "a simple substance...without parts," capable of "neither extension nor form" (1). Monads are, for Leibniz, sealed-off from the world: "external cause can have no influence upon their inner being" (3). It is this interiority and self-sufficiency attributed to the monad that is most crucial to our concerns and to Beckett in general; here Leibniz describes the monad using specifically architectural rhetoric:

> The monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species' of the Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside. (2)

Leibniz's spatial figuring of the windowless monad has, understandably, ignited a number of accounts that equate Beckett's protagonists (especially Malone) with a monad. As Katrin Wehling-Giorgi puts it: "in Beckett's works, the monad is at times illustrated by a spatial metaphor, most frequently that of a closed room with a small window (or no window at all), recalling the 'hermetic closure' of Leibnizian origin" (63). Following Garin Dowd's excellent monograph, *Abstract Machines: Samuel Beckett and Philosophy After Deleuze and Guattari*, Chris Ackerley and S.E. Gontarski suggest that "Leibniz's influence continued into *The*

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Unnamable, in its evocation of a resilient Worm at the threshold of reason and conciousness, his very being the embodiment of Leibniz's "monade nue," the naked or degenerate form of the monad at a low level of elevation in the divine hierarchy" (315). As Dowd, Ackerley, Gontarski, and Wehling-Giorgi all variously suggest, the unnamable is therefore not a high-level *human* monad that has been "raised to rank of reason and to the prerogative of minds" (Leibniz 19); he has not attained this reason, which is what "distinguishes us from the mere animals" (7). He comprises instead a non-human monad that does not transcend this condition despite repeated offers and pressure from the voices above. The Beckettian monad has, therefore, "regressed from the Leibnizian self-sufficient, rational entity presided over by a divine creator to a de-centered self" (Wehling-Giorgi 64). Ackerley suggests that in Beckett's *Comment C'est* (*How It Is*, published in 1961, eight years after *The Unnamable*) this rewriting of Leibnizian monadism reaches the level of comic rejection. In his masterful essay, "Beckett and Mathematics," Ackerley suggests that "at first [a] sense of unity, that of being the 'sole elect,' is a comfort; but, like everything else in the novel, including the hope of a life in the light, it is rejected in the ultimate parody of the monad...as 'all balls'" (19). In Beckett's oeuvre, then, the monad occupies a fraught place: it is degenerated and parodied, yet represented as the very figure of hermetic closure that would allow these characters some internal peace.

The Unnamable foreshadows *Comment C'est*'s parody of the monad's pure interiority, but with less levity. Indeed, what we shall see in *The Unnamable* is a voice that ambiguously desires and resists his ascension into the realm of the

high-level, reasonable, interiorized, human monad. More importantly, Beckett's

rewriting of monadism here offers two crucial lessons to those who would locate

their rights and selves in an inaccessible interior: first, Beckett shows that

inasmuch as the unnamable (and presumably, we) does not contain the "certain

perfection" and "self-sufficiency" that Leibniz associates with monads (which he

also calls "incorporeal automata" [4]), such pure interiority is a myth. By

illustrating both the impossibility of pure interiority and also the suffering endured

by he who both seeks and denies this mythical human sovereignty, Beckett

suggests, secondly, that the goal of pure interiority and self-presence causes great

pain to those who accept these ideals. (We may extend this to those who regard

living "in" the wrong body as a problem that is possible to remedy, rather than as

a particular narrative of the discomfort and inhospitable encounters that are part

and parcel of the human condition.) As Wehling-Giorgi points out, Beckett

forcefully shows that the attainment of such pure interiority would be, if it were

possible, quite a lonely life indeed: Beckett "posits an indefinable 'otherness' in

the world outside which does not give his protagonists any comfort or points of

reference" (63). With this point about the inherent isolation implied by the image

of pure interiority in mind, we may understand the unnamable's challenges and

resistance as comparable – or, at least, instructive – to those of the gendered

subject who struggles with the concurrent imperative of interiority and the

suffering entailed in not ever achieving it. Beckett's more monadistic protagonists

(such as Murphy and Malone) therefore show us "the lack of interaction (or

solipsism) of the individual with the rest of the world" (63), a lack that trans and

queer communities must perhaps refute not just through name-change etiquette but through our taken-for-granted ideas about the interiority and "self-determination" of gender that threatens our hard-earned practices of collaboration.

Get Out and Stay Out

Beckett fiercely critiques the enforced interiority that this project as a whole questions with regards to the (trans)gender subject. In *The Unnamable*, this "proper" interiority – itself an imperative to own, to keep things proper to the space of one's head – is critiqued as an impossible and painful pursuit. As the unnamable describes his own voice: "it issues from me, it fills me, it clamours against my walls, it is not mine, I can't stop it, I can't prevent it, from tearing me, racking me, assailing me" (349). Here, being filled up with an unstoppable voice that is not purely one's own comprises a primary violence of self-expression: the necessity to speak as and of oneself in words that cannot do the job. Boulter suggests, indeed, that all the unnamable is able to interiorize is his own condition of being spoken by discourse: "the unnamable's speech thus interiorizes the opposition that defined Malone's position as aporetic: he interiorizes the opposition of speaking/being spoken only, of course, to produce more aporia" (*Interpreting* 98). In this sense, the compromised interiority of the voice does not consist of anything that may properly be said to be his own: interiority, as I suggested earlier with Wigley, is a matter of absorbing discourse ("if I speak of a head, referring to me, it's because I hear it being spoken of" [Beckett 403]) and of spatially mapping the body in order to place what is most precious inside, safe from influence and change. While the voice of the text seems to understand such a

desire for safety, he suggests that we not misconstrue the purpose of our protective interiority and desire to "own" our bodies and selves: "it's only natural, you want yourself, you want yourself in your own little corner, it's not love, not curiosity, it's because you're tired, you want to stop, travel no more, seek no more, lie no more, speak no more" (459). Or, as Beckett puts it earlier, in a way that underlines the inherent inactivity of being "home:" "Quick, a place. With no way in, no way out, a safe place. Not like Eden. And Worm inside. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, capable of nothing, wanting nothing" (398). Despite his own ambiguous resistance to this imperative to become human and stop speaking, the voice admits that he himself sometimes seeks out the protection that underpins the desire for complete interiority:

> And in my head, which I am beginning to locate to my satisfaction, above and a little to the right, the sparks spirt and dash themselves out against the walls. And sometimes I say to myself I am in a head, it's terror makes me say it, and the longing to be in safety, surrounded on all sides by massive bone. (400)

The terror of being subject to the discourse and interpretations of others leads the voice to imagine himself as existing within the ostensibly airtight space of a head. However, the whole of the text demonstrates that enforced interiority provides no such refuge from discourse and discipline: the voice is enclosed within just such a space for the duration of the text. As the voice indicates of his spatial condition, "the truth being I have no vent at my disposal, neither the aforesaid nor those less noble, how can one enjoy good health under such conditions" (428). Just as an

interiorized gender would not exist as such without its constitutive outside

(without the social world that has created the very idea of both interiority and

gender), the unnamable points out that without a vent to an exterior, "good health"

cannot be maintained. Indeed, it is clear that in this space, into which watchers

bore holes, point lamps, shout, and stare, such interiority can never be complete.

Later in the text, the unnamable explicitly mocks the idea of sovereign interiority

when making clear precisely what he would need in order to be able to stop

talking. Here, he speaks in ambiguously directed imperatives:

> Better, ascribe to me a body. Better still, arrogate to me a mind. Speak of a
>
> world of my own, sometimes referred to as the inner, without choking.
>
> Doubt no more. Seek no more. Take advantage of the brand-new soul and
>
> substantiality to abandon, with the only possible abandon, deep down
>
> within. (447-8)

Here, we see that it is by taking recourse to "deep down within" that the

unnamable would be able to abandon the painful projects of doubt, or seeking,

and discourse. Recalling the collusion of proper names and property, the voice

makes clear that the figure of an "inner" world does indeed stand in for an

affective sense of ownership: "speak of a world of my own." This critique of the

imperative for sovereign interiority leaves one crucial question: if Beckett's

narrator casts off this imperative, then what is the architectonic of this radically

fragmented self? How does Beckett represent the body that is without an inside?

As Boulter and Szafraniec both suggest, the unnamable configures himself as a

hymenal figure, one that, by being both inside and outside, goes beyond the

binarism of such distinctions. A passage frequently cited by Beckett scholars

brings our attention to what it might feel like to adopt such an architectonic of the

self. Below, the voice's "it" refers to the question of his own being, of 'who he

is.'

> I'll have said it, I'll have said it inside me, then in the same breath outside
>
> me, perhaps that's what I feel, an outside and an inside and me in the
>
> middle, perhaps that's what I am, the thing that divides the world in two,
>
> on the one side the outside, on the other side the inside, that can be as thin
>
> as foil, I'm neither one side nor the other, I'm in the middle, I'm the
>
> partition. I've two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that's what I feel,
>
> myself vibrating, I'm the tympanum.
>
> (438-9)

Here the voice entertains an architectonic of the body that locates the self as the

very divider between inside and outside, as the occupant and creator of liminality

itself. This is, perhaps, an accurate representation of how we currently think of the

self, as simultaneously sovereign and 'owned' but also outward-facing, social, and

to some extent intersubjective. But the passage goes beyond this model to forward

a theory of the self as a "thin" vibrating membrane, a surface effect that not only

lacks depth but whose sounds (whose words) are both material and reactive: as a

tympanum (a kettle drum, an eardrum, or a vibrating gland that some insects use

to hear), the unnamable echoes and reverberates with the physical impact of

movements in space. In this sense, conceiving of the self as a membrane that

separates inside from outside means acknowledging that we "vibrate" with

discourse and language that is not our own, that is not "proper" to us. Moreover, it means re-conceiving of the self as a malleable foil, a material that (like a dress shirt) remembers its many postures and shapes but cannot hold them. This inability to hold is in fact performed by the text itself, as the unnamable no sooner forwards the above spatial theory than he denies it: "the words are everywhere, inside me, outside me, well well, a minute ago I had no thickness" (443). As Szafraniec emphasizes, the hymenal surface of the unnamable is eventually redefined as a flimsy but constitutive film of words, a film that he must "pierce or perforate" (131) with his own words in order to become a true subject "up there in the light." The membrane proposed above is then redefined as a discursive construct:

> I'm in words, made of words, others' words, what others, the place too, the air, the walls, the floor, the ceiling, all words, the whole world is here with me, I'm the air, the walls, the walled-in one, everything yields, opens, ebbs, flows, like flakes, I'm all these flakes, meeting, mingling, falling asunder. (443)

Architecture, rather than figure for the stability of the proper place of the self, is rendered here every bit as transient and discursive as the "homeless" subject without abode in either word or space. Without so much as a non-discursive "ground" or membrane, the subject has neither inside nor outside; instead, he becomes, as Leibniz describes the monad, "a mirror of the universe" (15): "the whole world is here with me" (Beckett 443). Unlike Leibniz's hermetically sealed monad, however, the unnamable is an infinite series of intertwined folds: he is

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like a crinkled piece of "foil" or an assemblage of flakes that "meet" and "mingle"
haphazardly. These "words" of which he is constructed ebb and flow like the
rhythm of Orlando's ocean, yet fall like the snowflakes that Bergson and Kwinter
alike valorize for their ability to corporealize chance encounters while on the
move. Words act like performative and excessive bodies; they break down any
stable walls that would feign to hold the self "inside" of anything.[54]

The stakes of this performative quality of language are significant for
those who use the concept of interiority to explain identity and gender: that is,
enforced interiority demands a correlative measure of control over language. As
such, Beckett associates chosen silence (the decision to stop seeking, a decision
which the unnamable cannot, in the end, make) with interiority. Indeed,
throughout Beckett's text, the phrase "shut up" refers to both of these intertwined
meanings: in *The Unnamable*, to be shut up in space requires shutting up with
words, while the goal of complete interiority means reining in the possibility of
speech and treating it solely as an "expressive" form that translates our pre-
existent interiorities. In the two passages below, Beckett suggests that these two
forms of "shutting up" go hand-in-hand. As the voice yearns,

> if I could put myself in a room, that would be the end of the wurdy-gurdy,
> even doorless, even windowless, nothing but the four surfaces, the six
> surfaces, if I could shut myself up, it would be a mine, it could be black
> dark, I could be motionless and fixed...none was ever mine...a roof is not
> indispensable, an interior, if I could be in a forest, caught in a thicket, or
> wandering round in circles, it would be the end of this blither...If I could

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only shut myself up, quick, I'll shut myself up, it won't be I, quick, I'll

make a place, it won't be mine, it doesn't matter, I don't feel any place for

me, perhaps that will come, I'll make it mine, I'll put myself in it, I'll put

someone in it, I'll find someone in it, I'll put myself in him, I'll say he's I,

perhaps he'll keep me, perhaps the place will keep us, me inside the other,

the place all round us, it will be over, all over, I won't have to try and

move any more. (458-9)

Notably, architectural interiority is aligned with the repression of discourse three

times in these two passages. The voice repeats the desire and the impossibility to

shut himself up in space, the architectural condition that could end his "wurdy-

gurdy" obligation to keep speaking and seeking. In the second passage, the voice

makes clear that the positing of any such interior is indeed a sham architecture

erected in the name of stability. As the voice says, "it will be over, all over, I

won't have to try and move any more" (459) once he has inserted himself –

crucially – into "someone." Even in the voice's imagined scene of capitulation to

the norms and affects of self-ownership and first-person narrative, he still

imagines his interiority as a parasitic act of inhabiting something *other*. In this

sense, even the unnamable's wishes for silence and interiority are underpinned by

his operating assumption that he could never fully inhabit himself. While for

Leibniz, monads "cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of

another" (12) save through divine intervention, the unnamable imagines himself

as eventually transforming/transporting himself *into* another. He imagines himself

(and the other caves with other unnamables that he imagines) as a constellation of

folds rather than as independent and self-sufficient monads. The ethic of

assemblage posited here is clear: becoming a proper human subject, in this model,

is a matter of not just living with but living "in" others.

To translate Beckett's general ethic to transgender requires only that we

hold Prosser's sense of the importance of "owning" one's body alongside

Beckett's very similar diction. In the passages above, the inability to inhabit

oneself (an inability often represented as radical *unwillingness*) is described as not

"owning" oneself, and, as not feeling like the owner of the place of one's body.

For Prosser, it is precisely this affective condition – the "improper" feelings of the

wrong body – that is to be avoided, especially insofar as feeling wrong implies a

larger crisis in subjective agency. For Beckett, however, the opposite is true.

Using the very same language of the body as "home" as we are accustomed to

hearing in transgender discourse, Beckett's unnamable hereby imagines a crisis in

agency (a crisis that this project as a whole attempts to refigure as an affirmative

aesthetic practice) as the freedom from the weighty conventions of being a proper

human subject. As the unnamable imagines his condition late in the text: "no

matter, I've shut my doors against them, I'm not at home to anything, my doors

are shut against them, perhaps that's how I'll find silence, and peace at last, by

opening my doors and letting myself be devoured" (448). This complete rejection

of monadistic interiority, yet another imagined endpoint for the unnamable, makes

one of the crucial points of this project: agency and sovereignty are perhaps

compromised above all by the imperatives for pure sovereignty and pure

interiority that make the fevered process of their (impossible) attainment a matter

of suffering and pain indeed. In other words, the unnamable suggests that if one were to recognize that one is "not at home," then perhaps one could throw one's doors open and set loose one's feigned sovereignty rather than so fiercely protect the ownership of one's "insides" and the protective demarcation of interior and exterior that grounds this proprietary condition. This is not at all to suggest that Beckett's unnamable provides any easy way to live out one's unhomely body in the social sphere; on the contrary, being "devoured" rather than being protective implies a no less painful mode of living. However, notwithstanding the pains of being "devoured," it is nonetheless suggested in the above passage that doing so may be the unconventional means by which some degree of freedom may be won. Szafraniec suggests that Beckett himself, dealing with the ostensible sovereignty of authorship, arrives at just such a solution:

> Beckett alternates between the acknowledgement of his sovereign position as writer and language user and the desire for release from this sovereignty (in silence, forgetting, the loss of self). Deleuze's interpretation of Beckett via "exhaustion" is perhaps most successful in presenting itself as a limit case in this choice: the supreme sovereignty through the supreme loss of sovereignty. (189)[55]

While for Prosser, then, having a proper home for the interiorized gendered psyche is paramount to transgender identity, happiness, and survival, Beckett suggests something different: the very difficult possibility that by eschewing the conventions of agency, we might actually feel freer of their grasps – that if we refused the felt conventions of "ownership" and property underlying the "right

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body" narrative, new and less constricted emotions become possible. It is this impropriety with regards to language, realist narrative, and feeling – Beckett's critique of "mastery and control" (Szafraniec 124) – that this project as a whole motivates for transgender. This critical openness to being "devoured," then, is far from a wholesale desertion of one's self; it is, rather, an honest acknowledgement of the interpretation, consumption, and construction that we can only take up in concert with others – often in painful ways or ways that feel "wrong" to us.

Though Beckett associates this devouring with freedom, "exhaustion" is a feeling that is likely familiar to many transgender people: the process of defining and defending oneself *ad nauseum* seems to be a necessary but certainly tiring part of our lives. Understandably then, the suggestion that we ought to rethink our relationships to interiority, our new names, and our politics of language seems too heavy a task when we're already "tired." By exhaustion, however, Deleuze means something quite different than this common sense definition of exhaustion (a definition he associates with "a simple tiredness with talking [that] drys up the flows" of becoming [*Essays* 156]). His sense of exhaustion refers instead to Beckett's propensity to literally entertain – and exhaust – every possibility. The unnamable, for instance, attempts to exhaust language itself and no longer have to speak. This project ultimately fails, thereby affirming the inexhaustive quality of language and meaning. As Deleuze puts it, "the aporia" of *The Unnamable* "lies in the inexhaustible series of all these exhausted beings" (157). The unnamable's compromised agency and ability to survive is derived precisely from the "obligation" (Boulter, *Interpreting* 93) he feels to continue on, to entertain every

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possibility and ultimately find it lacking, to refuse the easy humanism proffered by the voices above, and, ultimately, to keep imagining new spaces for himself. Beckett's ethic of the subject is based, then, on neither the self "expression" nor the interior peace that are often elevated to sacred status in trans communities. Instead, he offers an outward-looking parable that is deceptively simple: in order to continue living, the tired trans subject must keep exhausting the world.

Architectures of Grey Matter

Above, I argue that the imperative for gendered interiority is one that Beckett critiques at its very root: the positing of an airtight sovereign "space" for the subject, usually in the head, "surrounded on all sides by massive bone" (400). In response to this imperative, Beckett has, in this reading, suggested 'opening one's doors' as a metaphor for the active shrugging off of the residues of sovereignty that the spatial figure of interiority is meant to evince. But what – if not pure interiority – *is* the spatial condition of the unnamable in particular? By extension, how may we reconceive of the matter of interiority with regards to gender? What – if not a natural or stable psychic or biological property that inheres in the brain until it is "expressed" – might comprise a gender of the inside? Below I make three progressive arguments in order to answer to this perseverance of the trope of interiority in transgender discourse. First, I configure architecture in Beckett's text as one of – if not *the* – technology of domination in this text. I argue that Beckett's unnamable is subject to panoptic, specifically architectural discipline, which he largely resists. This argument allows us to understand the role played by "vertical" architecture in disciplining the "vast"

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(333) horizontal subject into an "upright" citizen who owns both space and subjectivity. Secondly, I argue that in response to this architectural discipline, the unnamable theorizes his tenuous self (his compromised interior) as a decorative effect that ruptures the feigned stability and pure structure of his disciplinary architecture every bit as much DS+R's "Outcast" icing bags mock the austere body of the Seagram Building. Taking these arguments together (the unnamable's architectural discipline, and his ability to write himself into this space, as décor) we are left with a new version of the trope of "interior decoration" that has infused this project as a queer architectural mode: the interior design of the mind.

First, I will show briefly that as a literal prop to the apparent metaphor of "homelessness" traced out in the preceding sections, the condition of Beckett's unnamable is indeed one shaped by actual architecture – by, more than this, the very fragility or denial of safe architecture. Recalling Chapter One's discussion of the vertical organization of the subject in both plumbing and psychoanalysis, it is significant that the unnamable describes a horizontally "vast" space in which he cannot rise like a (literally and figuratively) upstanding citizen. Here, being away from his "walls" and "doors" – openings that interrupt the vertical partitioning of space – is tantamount to the loss of his subjectivity:

> Yes, but there it is, I am far away from my doors, far from my walls,
> someone would have to wake the turnkey, there must be one somewhere,
> far from my subject too, let us get back to it, it's gone, no longer there
> where I thought I last saw it, strange this mixture of solid and liquid,
> where was I, ah yes, my subject, no longer there, or no longer the same, or

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> I mistake the place, no, yes, it's the same, still there, in the same place, it's
>
> a pity, I would have liked to lose it. (449)

The word subject here refers appropriately to both the topic of his discourse and his self: losing his subject in narrative does indeed entail a correlative loss of subjectivity. More importantly here, we see that this coeval loss of "subjects" is described as being "far" from walls and doors. One reading is that the unnamable is, obviously, "far" from prescribed or pre-fabricated ways of leaving his own interiority or of having exterior elements enter. But, more interestingly, we may read the passage as an indication, given this distance from all vertical supports, that the unnamable inhabits a boundless horizontal world, a world that therefore offers the possibility of moving forever. Extending DS+R's horizontally-oriented sink to infinity, the unnamable's horizontal space also symbolizes his inability to ever ascend into the human realm or become a vertically-organized subject of reason (for whom the head is the top of the body and the seat of the rational self). Earlier in the text, however, the unnamable does describe the possibility that he has "walls" – that he has the capacity for an ascent to vertical subjectivity. Below, readers see that even this possibility is not only broached as a long series of hypothetical statements and images located in the future but is also scripted as a failure in advance. After an impermanent silence sets over the unnamable, eventually,

> the voice will begin again, low at first, then louder, coming from the
>
> quarter they want him to retreat from, to make him think he is pursued and
>
> struggle on, towards them. In this way they'll bring him to the wall, and

even to the precise point where they have made other holes through which

to pass their arms and seize him. How physical this all is! And then,

unable to go any further in any case, and not needing to go any further for

the moment, because of the great silence which has fallen, he will drop,

assuming he had risen, but even a reptile can drop, after a long flight, the

expression may be used without impropriety. He will drop, it will be his

first corner, his first experience of the vertical support, the vertical shelter,

reinforcing those of the ground. That must be something, while waiting for

oblivion, to feel a prop and buckler, not only for one of one's six planes,

but for two, for the first time. But Worm will never know this joy but

darkly, being less than a beast, before he is restored, more or less, to that

state in which he was before the beginning of his prehistory. (408-9)

Here we see unquestionably that the subjective capture of the unnamable is

specifically an architectural project; being driven towards walls and feeling a

"first corner" are theorized as the beginning points of pulling the unnamable up

into the human world of sovereign subjectivity. Crucially, this "first experience of

the vertical support," as the result of a "first drop," positions the experience of

architectural enclosure as both the condition of human subjectivity and also the

feeling of this project's very failure. That is, the unnamable's first feelings of

"vertical shelter" occur when he has returned again to rock bottom, to a place

where he does not "own" himself. In a sense, this is an accurate statement about

the prosthetic function of architecture: it is only because of the impossibility of

pure interiority (a pure privacy) of the subject that the ownership of homes,

buildings, and even washroom stalls must stand in for – literally prop up – this compromised ownership of the body and self. In "Prosthetic Theory: the Disciplining of Architecture," Wigley defines the prosthetic function of architecture in a similar manner. There, citing the architecturally-figured academic virtues of the "thesis" – that is, a "position," "placing," "making a stand," "theses that stand up" and are "solid" (8), etc. – Wigley claims that Architecture is the prosthesis of academia. It was, in his words, the "very metaphor [of the thesis] that the buildings [of universities] were called in to protect" (11). As is the case in Beckett's text, wherein we are reminded that "vertical shelter" is the (failed) prosthesis to our feigned self-ownership, for Wigley, "the prosthesis is always structural, establishing the place it appears to be added to" (8). In sum: the vertical shelter appears to only reflect or confirm the interiority and privacy of the self-owned subject when, in fact, it appears in order to literally prop it up.

Décors of the Mind

As the two excerpts above make clear, the voice of the unnamable is one both forced into – yet denied entry to – the vertical organization of architecture: he has yet to feel a "first corner," as Beckett puts it. Although this appears to be a situation of domination, I suggest below that rather than merely existing in, through, within, or without architecture, the unnamable is configured as a piece of décor – one that challenges both 1) the division of interiority and exteriority that underpins any concept of the psyche as a monad and, also, 2) the modernist economy of colour that valorizes white space. As I have discussed in Chapter

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One, Wigley discusses the relationship of décor and architecture in "Untitled: the Housing of Gender" in much the same way as he does in the quotation above: as a prosthesis that is actually constitutive of architecture. (The ornamental history and quality of architecture is, as is the gendered construction of "sex," thoroughly dissimulated and abjected.) If the unnamable is, as I'm claiming, a piece of "décor," then he is, like Orlando, fashioning himself as the very project that ruptures architectural stability with transience, or, the queer surface effect that reveals the ornamental quality of structure in the first instance. To introduce this idea, we must return to an excerpt and a reading from the previous section. There, I followed the standard reading of Beckett's "tympanum" as a kettle drum or eardrum, a "hymen" that places the thin surface subject in between inside and outside. Here is the quotation once more:

> perhaps that's what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one side the outside, on the other side the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I'm neither one side nor the other, I'm in the middle, I'm the partition. I've two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that's what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm the tympanum. (438-9)

Earlier, I followed Boulter and Szafraniec in reading this image of the tympanum as a way to redefine the unnamable as a reactive voice with "no thickness," as an eardrum able to hear but unable or unwilling to absorb or remember the lessons of the enlightened voices above. This reading suggests that the quotation begins with architectural diction (partition, surface, thickness) and ends with a word that appears to connote something naturalistic, in contrast (an eardrum). What is not

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remarked upon in Beckett criticism, however, is that the word tympanum also refers to an architectural element. Because Beckett's texts are highly ambiguous – sometimes seemingly impenetrably so – it is crucial that we entertain both possible readings. Moreover, we can ask: how might these two readings work together and actually enrich each other? The reading of the tympanum as an eardrum forwarded by Boulter, Szanfraniec, and many others is one that places the unnamable literally on the leading, listening, edge of the body's commune with others.[56] But might an architectural understanding of the tympanum extend (rather than refute) this ethically-inclined reading?

I will suggest that this is indeed the case, because – not in spite of – the ambiguity of Beckett's diction. "Tympanum," as we'll see, straddles naturalistic and architectural rhetorics (as well as ethical and aesthetic registers). Historically, tympana (the plural form of tympanum) are the elaborately decorative triangular or arch-shaped areas that sit above doorways and are framed by arches or triangular molding (known as the archivolt). (See fig. 50.) Tympana often mark institutional and religious buildings and, unsurprisingly then, often feature detailed reliefs of religious figures or scenes. If this definition is added to our interpretation of the unnamable, then he hereby defines himself as a piece of décor. Specifically, as a tympanum, he identifies himself as the décor that not only majestically marks liminal space but that also engages the body moving from exterior to interior in sumptuously textured representative art. (This is the very textured interpretation that Wigley suggests the white wall is meant to ward off. It is also a function that DS+R have modernized with cameras, televisions screens,

trick mirrors, and peepholes). Given the unnamable's architectural diction in this passage, this reading follows quite suitably. However, even though the word "partition" seems to confirm this reading, the word "vibrating" certainly indicates that the unnamable speaks of something like a film, such as a hymen or eardrum. If both interpretations are accepted as credible, then the unnamable hereby defines himself as a kind of listening, audible décor, a décor that reverberates with the sounds of its milieu, a transient reactive décor capable of affecting and being affected. In short, the unnamable is a literal and personified rendering of an adage: "the walls have ears." For the unnamable, this is more than a pun: the architectural definition of "tympanum" modifies the accepted reading of his hymenal self by theorizing a living, reactive architecture that is emphatically not a piece of human or even animal material. The conjoining of these two seemingly polar readings is in fact quite sensible, insofar as the hymen is every bit the ornamental material, transient marker, unreliable signifier, and masculinist scapegoat as the enterprise of décor.[57]

Though an architectural reading of the tympanum seems to clash with the unnamable's suggestion that he has no thickness, we may (taking into consideration his obsessive penchant for contradicting himself) understand his final statement as one that relies on both of these readings for its most nuanced sense. "I'm the tympanum" can be interpreted less as a summary of his thinness and more as a statement about his metaphorical "superficiality," his lack of subjective profundity, and his existence on the surface of architecture. These qualities are, of course, the very reasons for which décor, interior decoration, and

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ornamental architecture have been cast out of certain definitions of architecture and modernist architectural history. (To recall Chapter One, these qualities are also, of course, rejected precisely through their alignment with women, queerness, and transient embodiment in general.) In fact, Beckett's queer tympanum has a significant precedent in this project that is worth considering for its fraught role in the development of architectural modernism. That is: one of the signatures of Louis Henri Sullivan (whose ornamental ways have been mentioned throughout these chapters as the queer style that, according to Jennifer Bloomer, began his demise) was the use of (secular) tympanum-like arches on many of his buildings. Similar to the unnamable's obsession with windows and doors as tears in interiority, Sullivan often marked doors (and sometimes windows) with highly ornate and textured arches. Bloomer discusses Sullivan's Transportation Building (built for the "White City" at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893) in particular. Its iconic feature is its neo-tympanum, its "Golden Door," which consists of a massive arch. (See fig. 51.) As Bloomer suggests, Sullivan's career took a downward turn when modernism in architecture started to become more synonymous with the austere international style of which the Seagram Building became iconic; in other words, he was dismissed for the queerness of his décor, its unmodern quality as much as its "being light in the feet" or having no "no thickness," in the diction of *The Unnamable*. For his critics, Sullivan lacked the serious substance associated with white and classical architecture. Likewise, the key excerpt above takes as its theme the unnamable's existence as a light, thin, insubstantial, architectural surface. The unnamable explicitly treats the imperative

for subjective and spatial profundity with sharp disdain, lingering instead on the surface: "The place is no doubt vast. Dim intermittent lights suggest a kind of distance...Are there other pits, deeper down? To which one accedes by mine? Stupid obsession with depth" (333). In sum, the double-meaning of tympanum forwards a definition of the unnamable as both queerly decorative and, given his incessant self-undercutting, as *transient* superficial décor above all. This section begins by considering the architectural condition of the unnamable. Now, more precisely, we can describe the unnamable as a *façade*, in both the everyday sense and the architectural one.

Appropriately, then, "façade" is precisely how Deleuze, in his work on Leibniz, describes the (paradoxical) condition of pure exteriority – an exteriority that, like the unnamable, has no recourse to an inner, elevated plane. In his rereading of Leibniz below, Deleuze might as well be directly describing the spatial images provided by the unnamable:

> The monad is the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside. It has as its correlative the independence of the façade, an outside without an inside. Now the façade can have doors and windows – it is riddled with holes – although there may be no void, a hole being only the site of a more rarefied matter, and onto the outside. To be sure, the organic matter already sketches an interiorization, but a relative one, that is always ongoing and forever unfinished. It is because a fold passes through living material in order to allot to the absolute interiority of the monad the

metaphysical principle of life, and to make the infinite exteriority of

matter the physical law of phenomena. (28)

Here Deleuze suggests that the interior and exterior of the monad exist

independently of each other, which mirrors my reading of the tympanum-like

unnamable as an independent façade – as a piece of décor that does not gesture

towards any more profound "structure" beneath it. Beckett, however, takes

Deleuze's reading of this "independence" a step further: the unnamable is only an

"outside without an inside." Beckett severs the "inside without an outside" and

places it in an inaccessible (and unappealing) space "above" of pure, impossible,

interiorized humanism. Deleuze describes Leibniz's distinction between low- and

high-level monads as precisely such a vertical order: "the façade-matter goes

down below, while the soul-room goes up above… Pleats of matter in a condition

of exteriority, folds in the soul in a condition of closure" (35). As Garin Dowd

points out earlier, the unnamable is a low-level monad. However, crucially,

Deleuze labels these two independent states differently: "the monad is the

autonomy of the inside" while "the façade," with its doors and windows, is "an

outside without an inside." In this sense, the unnamable is made up not of pure

interiority but rather pure – decorative, "outcast" – exteriority. In response to the

tendency in Beckett criticism to equate the unnamable and other characters with

monads, we may then respond that the opposite is the case: the unnamable is a

façade.[58]

On this insistence of the décor of the unnamable's compromised space,

this reading departs sharply from the Beckett critics cited throughout this chapter.

In some of these accounts, it is taken for granted that the unnamable lives in a
bare world, free of aesthetic flourish. As Ackerley describes it,

> the trilogy may be mapped by a diagram similar to that which illustrates
> Murphy's mind: a movement from an outer realm of light (Moran) to the
> inner grey zone (Molloy to Malone), and then to the inner dark (*The
> Unnamable*)...As the story [of *The Unnamable*] is told, fictions such as
> Mahood and Worm, and those of mathematics, are stripped away, until all
> that is left is consciousness itself, unadorned, unaccommodated. (14-5)

This rhetoric strikes a chord with that of high modernist architecture: the
unnamable's space is described by Ackerley as every bit as "stripped away" and
"unadorned" as the Seagram Building, as though a pure immaterial,
unaestheticized consciousness has been revealed. (And, as I will suggest later, it is
far from clear that the unnamable's voice constitutes a "consciousness" at all.)
While Dowd's equation of Beckettian characters with a kind of nakedness makes
more sense (insofar as the unnamable does seem to approximately fit the
description of Leibniz's "monade nue," the lowest order of monads), neither
Dowd nor Beckett imply that the body or the interior of the unnamable is
therefore "bare." To show that this is the case, I begin here by considering
Ackerley's description of the unnamable as "the inner dark." Given that this text
is a discursive space defined by a thousand shades of grey – by aporia, ambiguity,
and especially self-contradiction – it is all too appropriate that, despite Ackerley's
reading, the interior decoration of the unnamable's space consists of precisely
that: grey tones. The commonplace phrase "interior decoration" takes on a double

meaning here: as I've suggested, one of the text's main thrusts is to explore the delicate state of the unnamable's interiority – his "grey matter," if he does indeed have any.

Though the voice spends a great deal of time detailing the colour and appearance of this space, he, as always, denies and critiques these descriptions in advance: "All the rest I renounce, including this ridiculous black which I thought for a moment worthier than grey to enfold me. What rubbish all this stuff about light and dark. And how I luxuriated in it" (348). Here, the unnamable dismisses his own obsession with light and dark with disdain. Yet, even when trying to "renounce" all, he retains – or reinstates – the colour grey. In a sense, this continual return to grey signifies not so much a true or underlying colour of his imagined space but, rather, an appropriate symbolic colour for his very own oscillations and unwillingness (or inability) to commit to any one thing. Here, in an odd affirmative sentence of one word, grey is afforded an unquestioned role for a moment: "Grey. What else? Calm, calm, there must be something else, to go with this grey, everything here, as in every world, a little of everything. Mighty little, it seems" (414). Grey, the unnamable suggests, doesn't merely "go with everything" but indeed contains everything; as a bastard mix of colours, the grey of his space has "a little of everything" that, together, become "mighty little." In a sense, then, the unnamable hereby describes this grey as the colour of the archive – as a colour that absorbs "a little of everything" into itself.[59] This grey has as its own "property" only that it is indiscernible, transient, and illusory: he is "lost in the smoke, it is not real smoke" (410). Indeed, the voice emphasizes that the grey

colour of this space is not *sui generis* but is rather the result of his compromised

architecture. Below, he suggests that the voices from above employ specifically

architectural technologies in order to literally shine "enlightenment" into his skull.

The voices above bore holes into the walls of his space, and then

> they fixed their lamps in the holes, their long lamps, to prevent them from
>
> closing of themselves, it's like potter's clay, their powerful lamps, lit and
>
> trained on the within, to make him think they are still there,
>
> notwithstanding the silence, or to make him think the grey is natural, or to
>
> make him go on suffering, for he does not suffer from the noise alone, he
>
> suffers from the grey too, from the light, he must. (417-8)

Again, we have an equation of the unnamable's space with a figure of décor and

craft: his walls are as malleable and artisanal as "potter's clay." More importantly,

what we often conceive of as the internal enlightenment and self-knowledge of an

individual is spatially refigured here: the subject is "backlit" from without.

Skewering Plato's scene of the cave with its shadows (its false representations

that its chained inhabitants mistake for truth), this passage turns Plato's

illumination into a matter of artifice and discipline cast by exterior forces. That

the material is described as "potter's clay" rather than merely clay emphasizes not

just (affirmatively) the malleability of the unnamable's matter but moreover (far

less affirmatively, perhaps) its vulnerability to intervention from without. The

voices above the unnamable therefore function in a panoptic mode: the lighting of

his space not only stands in for them but in so obscuring the presence (or absence)

of the voices, the lamps operate like Bentham's tower. The ever-present

possibility of voices (without the ability to verify it) generates the reflexive and

incessant narrative of self of which the text is comprised. As the excerpts above

suggest when taken together, this "backlit" panoptic grey allows his own hazy

resistance, but "he [also] suffers from the grey too" (418).[60] This dual figuring –

of the space as both malleable and vulnerable – gives us another way to think of

what we called, earlier, the double-sided nature of being "devoured" (through the

clay) rather than protected (behind the concrete walls of a monadistic psyche).

More specifically, what function does the colour grey serve in the

unnamable's interpretations of his space? Below, he wonders about the colour's

effect on his mood:

> this grey to begin with, meant to be depressing no doubt. And yet there is
>
> yellow in it, pink too apparently, it's a nice grey, of the kind recommended
>
> as going with everything, urinous and warm...In any case this grey can
>
> hardly be said to add to his misery, brightness would be better suited for
>
> that purpose, since he cannot close his eye. (412)

Given the double-edged possibilities and pains of mental lability explained above,

it is all too appropriate that the grey of this space is figured as "depressing," a

word that describes an emotional condition as an application of physical pressure

onto the mind – which is precisely what having a head of clay might feel like if it

were continually pushed upon by lamps. (Just as quickly, however, it is suggested

that this grey is not in fact depressing.) Moreover, that this grey is described as

"going with everything" suggests, in a sense, that nothing can clash with it – that,

unlike an archive that seeks to absorb and regulate, it could work in collaboration

with anything. The unnamable, we may suggest, does not clash enough with his space in order to differentiate himself from it and become a sovereign subject. Indeed, he is too coincident with it, a coincidence not possible with the high modernist whitewash that works specifically as a stage and a "hygiene of vision" that frames everything that appears before it. The pink and yellow that he projects onto the grey walls of this space are indeed a kind of rank marker of his presence there: the unnamable's "dirty" aestheticization of his austere (perhaps imagined) space is what allows him to create the very slim sense of space and location that he feels, which is precisely the sense that compels him to keep speaking and surviving. As we have seen throughout this project, flat white surfaces are a dissimulating aesthetic of high modernist architecture: from the white city to white walls and to white toilets, white operates, to recall Wigley, as a technology of vision, control, hygiene, and – crucially – due to its flattening out of surface texture, as a curative for over-affected, over-involved interpretation.[61] Quite against the binarism of "black and white thinking," the unnamable's imagined grey space casts shadows on the interiority of the subject and suggests a tympanum-like space that boasts both texture and colour.

"Grey" here is, emphatically, not a stripped-down "bare" space. Although this space is not sumptuously decorated with carpets, jewels, and robes like Orlando's proud and self-consciously ornate space, the unnamable's space is no more natural or unadorned – even if, rather like the supposedly unadorned space of the washroom, it is decorated with bodily matter, mess, or waste. It is not like the dissimulating white walls of high architectural modernism that Wigley

critiques in Chapter One of this project; rather – like the opaque sinks and grey water of Brasserie – the grey of this space retains the status of both mixture and ambiguity. As James Hansford argues in his essay, "'Imagination Dead Imagine:' the Imagination and Its Context," "grey is both subject and object here," as if "consciousness [is] itself grey" for Beckett (166, n34). In Hansford's reading, subject and object (body and space) become blurred in this mélange of greys.[62] The grey space, if not treated to dandy décor, is a vibrating "tympanum" that nonetheless has the aesthetic of the grey (and 'grey water') of the body and of consciousness. That is, recalling Wigley's focus on the hygienics of white-wall modernism, we must take special note that the heterogeneous blend of pink and yellow that makes up this grey is described as "urinous." As much as grey water washing over white porcelain, the "grey" of the unnamable's grey matter is equated with urine – with dirty, used, occupied space. Though in high modernist architectural treatises, it is transient décor that is explicitly equated with excrement (recall, for instance, that Le Corbusier asks us to eliminate ornate Victorian textures like a digested useless piece of shit), for the unnamable it is our most solemn pieces of permanence and legacy that are so equated. That is, scat in Beckett's text is often used to describe the cultural artifacts of identity and autobiography (the generic failure of the latter is, after all, the trajectory of this particular Beckett text).[63]

Space is treated to a similar figuring here. Indeed, after exhausting a long series of spatial possibilities – what we could perhaps call a process of *elimination* – the unnamable describes his space in, precisely, excremental diction: "it's like

shit, there we have it at last, there it is at last, the right word, one has only to seek,

seek in vain, to be sure of finding in the end, it's a question of elimination.

Enough now about holes" (418). The "holes" bored by others into the

unnamable's space are, therefore, aligned with assholes. But, "it" in this passage

can refer both to the space he has been deferring and redefining but also to his

narrative itself: both proceed by a never-ending process of elimination, a kind of

narrative trash heap that demands vigilant rereading and rearranging of its

erasures and scraps.[64] That the apparently stripped-down grey space of the

compromised psyche is figured here as a place with its own wastes, relics, and

ruins should not be misunderstood as a pessimistic argument. Rather, that even

this most bare space is littered with bodily colours, hazes, fixtures, clay, and

holes, comprises a hopeful suggestion in this aesthetic study of transgender: that

even the most "bare" psychic space is neither empty nor plain but, instead,

material and marked with the presence of bodies. After Wigley, we know that

Beckett's warm grey space is no more "bare" than the white walls of high

modernism, even if these walls of grey waste are not as pretty as those Orlando

designed. This is, in the end, the point with which Chapter One (on Brasserie)

begins, by invoking Wigley: no architectural or rhetorical figuring of space does –

or can – achieve the effect of being "undecorated" without anxiously feigning

trans-historicity and the quality of being natural. When architects succeed in

pulling off this illusion, Wigley suggests, it is because they have evacuated

bodies, texture, and decorous "waste" matters from the building's dissimulative

strict interpretation of itself. In his highly ambiguous – "grey" – text, Beckett

absolutely does no such thing. Rather, the grey of the unnamable's space is the always already decorated space of the body. His "grey matter" – his mind – is material: it consists in folds of pink flesh and yellow waste that do not appear without light fixtures, the labile clay that binds them in place, and the interlocutors who fix and hold them. The unnameable, therefore, has no 'raw material' to speak of, inasmuch as this very concept presumes that the material of his psyche preexists its own existence as, and figuring as, aesthetic.

This is one of the overarching interventions in trans discourse that this project as a whole has sought to mount: the unavailability of any pre-aesthetic interior (psychic) life of gender. As it is for Beckett, there does not exist for us any pure point of gendered origin where the 'raw' materials of gender identity precede both the aesthetic lives of our bodies and, moreover, the narrative and affective architectonics we absorb into our most seemingly natural habits of thought and feeling. After all, as Beckett asks here, why must a space (or a psyche) be conceived of (or represented as) empty, raw, or original in order for it to be considered a fertile ground for new, creative, refashionings of self and body? In all, then, our readings of the unnamable's (readings of his) space leave us with two related points: first, the unnamable identifies with the art of décor as a "thin" surface aesthetic of subjectivity, a theory that implies the body could function not so much as an owned couplet of inside and outside, but rather as a responsive, textured, and transformative piece of decorative art (the abjected "shit" of high architectural modernism). We may, then, now understand the Beckettian character as a façade in the related senses of artifice and architecture. In contrast, secondly,

the text configures architecture (that which is ostensibly "purely" structural, without décor) as a process of elimination – as the vertical prosthesis that props up the "upstanding" human subject and, through spatial division, inaugurates the ownership that underlies the conventions of proper names, property, and propriety.

Conclusion

This chapter has forwarded a new reading of Beckett's *The Unnamable* in the service of a new spatially-focused theory of transformation as an aesthetic mode. *First,* by tracing out Beckett's non-subjective and dissonant representation of continuous name change, this chapter suggests that a new politics of language (one that acknowledges its performativity and its approximations and not merely its accurate or inaccurate "expressions") will allow name change to be seen as a non-predictable event in its own right. This, I suggested, will restore the obligation to interpret (and to engage in dialogue) to what I have perceived as an all too settled ethic of immediate, silent recognition and repetition of new names. By suggesting that we acknowledge the "groundlessness" of all names, I by no means intend to say that transgender people are responsible for representing the performativity of their names in our milieu of naturalized cis-gender names. The opposite may be true: how might cis-gendered people develop a critical hermeneutics and ethics of response to new names, given both trans people's (highly variable) needs and the unethical quality of automatic and thoughtless response (even if it is the "right" response according to one or another community etiquette).

Secondly, I have argued for a revision of the trope of interiority in trans discourse – perhaps the very sense of "open doors" and impure agency that might allow us to engage in the different, less scripted sort of dialogue than those trans people and allies sometimes rehearse. By redefining Beckett's monadism as a façade (through his figure of the tympanum), I have forwarded a theory of gender as an exterior that is severed from its interior, an interior Deleuze describes as "always ongoing and forever unfinished" (28). This theory implies a complete inversion to our current spatial architectonic of the gendered/sexual subject. That is, while currently we think of our interior as inaccessible, enduring, and needing merely to be better and more accurately expressed (pushed *out*) the opposite is true here: our façades (exteriors, genders, ornamentations and events) are seen to be folded up into our interiors. These interiors are then, as Butler suggests of sex/gender, installed as the *a priori* of the very "expressions" (which we may perhaps rename *impressions*) from which it derives. I have described this process of interiorization (the evental post-script that the unnamable, crucially, denies) with the phrase "the décor of the mind." As a final word on the status of interiority in trans theory on which this chapter is based, I must return briefly to Butler. Here, she very plainly suggests that the fabrication of interiorized essence is what institutes the "integrity" of the subject.

> If that reality [of the gendered body] is fabricated as an interior essence,
> that very interiority is an effect and function of a decidedly public and
> social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface

politics of the body, the gender border control that differentiates inner

from outer, and so institutes the 'integrity' of the subject. (*Trouble* 173)

It is crucial to note that Butler places the word "integrity" in scare quotes. Without

the "gender border control" that institutes interiors and exteriories of bodies, we

are left, then, without this (already tenuous) integrity. What are we, if not integral

and integrated bodies? We can recall the piece of architecture with which this

dissertation begins: the Blur Building, a *tensegrity* structure. As Anthony Pugh

relays in his well-known text, *An Introduction to Tensegrity*, the word tensegrity

is "a contraction of *tensional integrity*" (3 original emphasis). A tensegral (rather

than "integral") structure maintains a shape because of its internal beams, which

run in contradictory directions and give shape only because the façade – a thin,

flexible, and, dare we say, "vibrating" surface – of the building pushes against

them. (See fig. 52-55.) In a sense, then, a tensegrity structure is made of internal

tensions and contradictions that matter only because of the pressure put on them

by the façade.[65] Appropriately, another term for tensional integrity is *floating

compression* – in other words, a building that holds up because of its intensities

and not, crucially, due to any relationship to the *ground*. In this kind of structure,

the model of surface/depth no longer applies in the usual way: the façade and the

beams *together* make the building stand up. These buildings are neither purely

interior nor wholly dismissive of the structural importance of interiors. Rather,

they are, precisely, intense. Beckett and Deleuze together made us question the

spatial model of expression inasmuch as they both represent matter as infinitely

folded (and unfolding). DS+R help us extend Deleuze's sense of inter-expression

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of folded matter: the Blur Building, as a body, does not merely trade its impressions and expressions back and forth, 'crossing' the boundary of interior and exterior. Rather than impression or expression, Blur is a structure of compression, a body that stands up by virtue of its capacity to push inwards and push outwards at the same time. I have suggested above that (trans)gender, after Beckett, can work similarly: *not* as an integral monad with an interiorized, sacralized sex, but instead, as a tensegral body that – through tension and groundless structure – casts off the interior that we mark on the surface of the body as lack, and, with it, the pains and punishments of living with the prison (and as the named inhabitant – or, guard?) of any such interior.

What are the outcomes of these two related arguments for trans people and trans studies? In a sense, to prescribe new paths of behaviour for the subject would be to dismiss the critique of pure agency and sovereignty forwarded here. As Derrida writes of the event, "when someone does the impossible, if someone does the impossible, no one, above all the doer of the deed, is in a position to adjust a self-assured, theoretical statement to the event and say 'this happened'" ("Certain" 231-2). Yet, we can still harvest some practical ideas about how we might speak and live new names – and the gendered interiority they are presumed to "express" – differently. An overarching suggestion made in this chapter is that the language of duty, etiquette, and obligation is insufficient to the task of transing language. As Derrida puts it in *On The Name*, the duties of a friend (or an "ally") are precisely to work against prescribed modes of response:

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Friendship as well as politeness would enjoin a double *duty*: would it not precisely be to avoid at all cost both the *language of ritual* and the *language of duty*?...A gesture "of friendship" or "of politeness" would be neither friendly nor polite if it were purely and simply to obey a ritual rule...Would there thus be a duty not to act *according to duty*[?] (7)

As one may well imagine, it is both perceptible and undesirable to get the sense that one is being addressed and recognized in the name of, in the language of, "duty." In fact, Derrida suggests that the silence and dutiful recognition produced by ritualized behaviour is, in a sense, violent. As he puts it, "there is an art of the nonresponse, or of the deferred response, which is a rhetoric of war, a polemical ruse. Polite silence can become the most insolent weapon and the most deadly irony" (21). Politeness and presumptions of respect sometimes take the form of this "nonresponse," while other times, of course, such responses to new names are said with the very best of intentions. However, as Derrida and Beckett alike show, speaking or responding according to duty is not the same as friendship.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, this project as a whole suggests that friendly speech from or to trans people must, at root, not be accommodating – that we ought not seek or be given spaces in discourses in ways that politely include a spot for us on the shelves of the human rights archive. Indeed, the move from trans-accommodation to trans-modulation has been a subtextual narrative of this project. We saw in Chapter One, for instance, that hygienic commodities – "used in the plural to describe those things that allowed for 'ease' in domestic life" (Teyssot 79) – reflected and generated *modes* of the body. To recall Teyssot, "the

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term derives from the Latin *commodus*, a noun taken from the adjective, the etymology for which is *cum* and *modus*, meaning 'with measure or manner'" (79). This etymological chain (mode, commode, *commodités*, comfort, accommodation) describes the trajectory of this project as a whole. Departing from Prosser's model of the trans body as a home (a model of accommodation), the three main case studies of this project have progressively forwarded a counternarrative of *la mode* (as fashion) over accommodation. DS+R critiqued hygienic comfort or *confort* in favour of décor in the commode of Brasserie; Woolf preferred fashion (*mode*) over sexology; Beckett's unnamable remains, not without a measure of suffering, "a stranger forever to the boons and blessings of accommodation" (412). Therefore, unlike the white wall that is meant to ward off aesthetic interpreters and trespassers of all kinds, transing force will inhere instead in being like an ornate Victorian room with crevices, wrinkles, flourishes; like Beckett's superficial but textured relief of the tympanum; or like Woolf's and DS+R's worlds in which the whimsical folds of fashion hold more water than angry denials of one's style (such as those offered by Loos and Le Corbusier). This ethic may well seem too impossible, abstract, or backwards. But as Derrida pointed out earlier, impossibility is the hallmark of the event. Beckett's unnamable concurs. When he finds himself unable to conjure up rich images of landscape, he mourns not the inability to "find himself" but rather the opposite, that yearning for the ability to forget that Deleuze and Guattari describe in this project's introduction. "I would have liked to lose me, lose me the way I could long ago, when I still had some imagination, close my eyes and be in a wood, or

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on the seashore, or in a town where I don't know anyone...is that what it is to be

unable to lose yourself" (449)...?

Conclusion

Forget the Yellow Brick Road:

The Marvelous Land of Oz and Transgender Migration Beyond the City Walls

In 1904, rural Missouri dust almost killed a man. Not unlike the brain hemorrhages that snorted crack can generate, this dust drew blood on the inside of William Garcia, a lather from Oakland who was one of many to have a rather difficult time with the St. Louis 1904 Olympic marathon. "Large quantities of dust… coated his esophagus and entered into his stomach" (Martin and Gynn 47), as "road conditions along the route in several places were poor…mostly over rural roads west of St. Louis" (43). This marathon is a powerful synecdoche for the history of Olympic urbanization: it pitted the dirt roads of St. Louis county against drivers (in newfangled automobiles) who wanted to follow the race. Between dealing with the humidity and eating these cars' dust, few runners even crossed the finish line in this clash of rural landscape with urbanizing technology. How ironic, then, that the Games' relocation to St. Louis from Chicago (partly due to pressure from New York City boy Teddy Roosevelt) was to help St. Louis flaunt the wonders of modern technological advances in electricity and mobility that were on display at the Louisiana Purchase (World) Exposition. In a sense, the 1904 St. Louis Games mark a last gasp of Olympic rurality; since "the construction of the White City Olympic Stadium" in London's 1908 Games, the events have been "agents of urban transformation" (Liao and Pitts 1232). Despite

the purpose of showcasing modern technology in St. Louis, then, the return of the repressed rural kicked up trouble.

The 1904 Olympic Games' other legacy (every bit as fraught with attempts to prove the superior modern advances of American culture) was another set of Games running concurrently with the Exposition and the Olympics: "Anthropology Days," which pitted indigenous people (largely from Africa) against each other in unfamiliar American sports. While uneasiness about these racist displays of the "savage" had long been brewing,[66] in St. Louis this uneasiness reached its apex just as such white-gazing was being institutionalized as a discipline. At this and other fin-de-siècle expositions, "the juxtaposition of civilized and savage was," of course, "the key symbolic dichotomy" (Brownell 5) – a key image of not just American modernity but also of the bodies on whose backs this image was upheld. Taking the Anthropology Days and ill-fated marathon together – each a spectacle of "failed" races – two contradictory legacies present themselves: one of nationalist and racist smugness, needed at a time when "both sports… and anthropology (as pushed by Franz Boas) were undergoing a process of professionalization" (Brownell 5), and another, of American's own land rising up against the exposition's emphasis on the nation's civility and urbanity. Rural Missouri dust got stirred up and spoiled that nationalist/civilized spectacle precisely by – like any good witch – defying gravity.

* * *

This collective image of the 1904 World Exposition, Olympic Games, and Anthropology Days highlights what has been an ongoing if subtextual dynamic of this project: the mutual implication of new forms of social scientific knowledge about bodies, urbanization, modernity, and technologies of spatial and bodily mobility. The image given above reproduces a familiar trope: the city as the icon of modernity and, reciprocally, the rural realm as the space of backwards resistance to progress and change. A concept of degeneracy – that, in Chapter One, Adolf Loos associates with both ornamentation and a plague on the body of the nation – is at work here, where the Expo boasts its modernity through the juxtaposition with non-modern, non-urban "savages." The sense of this juxtaposition relies on our understanding that, as Loos argues, human cultures proceed on a clear and progressive track towards civility and (urban) architecture.[67] One of the overarching interventions of this project has been that the trans version of this narrative architectonic of progress – one that situates and locks us into one enlightened, progressive, historical story – must be thrown into reverse. Each chapter has extended the ethos of combined forgetfulness and remembrance with which the Introduction of this project ends: diller scofidio + renfro (DS+R) circle back to pre-modernist economies of décor in order to queer the hygienic space of not just Brasserie's bathroom but the "clean" modernist Seagram Building itself; Woolf shrugs off the burgeoning genres of lifewriting and sexology in favour of fiction and pre-modernist Bergsonian models of continuous change, thereby casting back to previous centuries and aesthetics in which the trans subject did not live; Beckett simultaneously evacuates the archive

of the transing subject and moves the subject backwards into its pre-subjective

modes of transformative events and individuations. For Beckett, this is a move

that specifically breaks through the firm walls of the subject's (monad-like)

interiority, an interiority built, as Wigley suggested earlier, by psychoanalysis,

ownership, and domestic privacy – the very interiority and privacy that we

witnessed at work in normative public washroom comportment.

In all, these chapters have shown that we can reanimate outmoded

architectonics of the body as a way to feel differently and to avoid subjective

capture and interpellation by the reigning identity narratives of the day. Heather

Love's theory of queer modernism as a kind of "feeling backwards" towards

empty archives has thus been put to its limit and extended past it: by following

"the queer impulse to forge communities between the living and the dead" (Love

31), we have to some extent placed under erasure both the subjectivity and

affinity presumed by "communities" and also the sense of impossible distance

implied by Love's "between." While for Love, "by including queer figures from

the past in a positive genealogy of gay identity, we make good on their suffering,

transforming their shame into pride after the fact" (32), this project has reversed

the flow of judgement, narrativization, and transformation. That is, rather than

write historical architectonics of transing bodies into a contemporary "positive"

genealogy, the project has introduced discontinuity, backwards movement, and

inassimilable histories into the seeming positivity, sovereignty, and

transhistoricity of the contemporary trans subject. Like Love, the project analyzes

"texts or figures that refuse to be redeemed [and thereby] disrupt not only the

progress narrative of queer history but also our sense of queer identity in the present" (8). But to further her project, this dissertation has looked beyond identity and queer history to the actual historical qualities of trans and queer bodies. In addition, then, to continually unlearning and rewriting queer history, DS+R, Woolf, and Beckett show us an ethics of unlearning one's own body.

Given this overarching "backwards" movement from contemporary trans models to early modernist ones, it only makes sense to conclude this dissertation with the spatial realm so often reduced and relegated to the status of "backwards," lack of modernity, and slow stubborn temporalities: the rural. Is there a certain rural ethics implied by this dissertation? Between DS+R's predominantly urban resume, Orlando's life in (and eventual desertion of) London, and Beckett's inscrutable spaces, it is not clear that this is the case. However, the architectonic of aesthetic backwardness practised in this dissertation echoes Scott Herring's characterization of radical rural backwardness. In *Another Country: Queer Anti-Urbanism*, Herring mounts this reclamation of "backwardness" through a close reading of Michael Meads' art project *Alabama Souvenirs*, which he reads for its critical use of backwardness as an aesthetic. Making use of Kath Weston's work, Herring's argues that "Southern backwardness" is often represented as

> committed to ideals of uncritical rusticity. Such cultural lack also ties to a
> temporal "backwardness," most prominently expressed in the caricature of
> the U.S. South as a frozen region outdated by supposedly more
> progressive spaces across the nation… such southern "backwardness" also
> links to temporal norms that structure queer metronormativity in the form

of trendy fashions or being in the know. As Kath Weston notes in her

discussion of compulsory queer urbanisms, there is often "a broader

cultural tendency to map time onto space by characterizing inland

locations as 'ten years behind' cities on the coasts." (114)

In Herring's view, Meads' photographic aesthetic reactivates the anti-urban

critical potential of the "backwards" stereotype by restaging scenes from classical

art in rural locales and with bodies marked as rural. The project consists of

choreographed "portraits" of Alabama men, each of which cites classical

conventions of, for instance, Pater and Caravaggio. The most obvious example is

Aaron: As a Caravaggio VI (1994), in which a young man strikes a pose quite

similar to Caravaggio's iconic *Saint John the Baptist in the Wilderness* (1604-5),

save for Aaron's substitution of a beer can, white briefs, toolkit, and garage for

Saint John's staff, robes, and wilderness. (See fig. 56.) The citationality of this

work comprises what Herring calls "anachronistic stylistics" (103), or, in other

words, a kind of aesthetic backwardness. Despite the Seagram Building's iconic

addition to mid-town Manhattan's skyline, DS+R's aesthetic may be described

quite accurately in the same terms Herring applies to Meads: the design of

Brasserie employs self-conscious citationality of its milieu precisely by

recuperating anachronistic conventions of design (the colours, textures, and

curves of pre-modernist spaces). Likewise, as R.S. Koppen pointed out with

regards to Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography*, the title character's most trumped-up

scene of transformation (the apparent sex change) swathes its outmoded anti-

medical transformation in equally anachronistic drapery. As Koppen puts it:

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"draped, veiled and garlanded figures – suggestive of Greek sculpture or Pre-Raphaelite iconography – keep turning up in her narratives at moments of heightened significance, gesturing towards a temporality other than the present" (35). In these cases, as in Herring's account, backwards modes of transformation and ornamentation are coeval with the renaissance of outmoded aesthetic styles.

Therefore, while this project is not located – literally or thematically – in any rural spaces, I argue that the various modes of trans aesthetic backwardness forwarded in this dissertation both draw from and can be characterized as what I will call a rural temporality. By this, I refer to backwards-leaning ruptures introduced into otherwise linear and progressive narratives of modernity – specifically to those that, like DS+R and against Loos, do so by deploying decorative aesthetics or "anachronistic stylistics" (Herring 103) of space and the body. This statement raises one obvious question that must be dealt with immediately: why is this backwards temporality specifically rural? Above I have suggested that moves backwards from modernity implicitly break with any presumed urban superiority, inasmuch as early modernist or pre-modernist aesthetics and architectonics bring us back – through bodily practice and theory – to times when the city did not function as it does today. However, it is crucial to note that the structure of the question – why specifically rural? – maintains our taken-for-granted equation of urban styles and places with the power to represent 'things in general.' Identifying the backwards temporality forwarded by this dissertation as a kind of rural mode is both to extend this representative and metaphorical authority to the status of "the rural" and also to acknowledge that the

forms of subjectivity and space that this project critiques (and throws into reverse) are ones that have been for the most part developed in urban locales – contemporary trans urban scenes in New York and San Francisco, Hirshfeld et al in Berlin, Loos in Vienna, the urban-centric necessity and development of public health acts and modern plumbing (especially in London and New York), and so on. This chapter is not, then, a sociological representation of the condition of living as trans in contemporary rural locales. Rather, it is both a cautionary word against the implicit urbanism of trans and queer discourse and also an imaginative attempt to align the idea of the rural with a radical mode of queer temporality.

With this desire of attributing actual metaphorical and theoretical characteristics to "the rural" in mind, this chapter aligns rural backwardness with Deleuze and Guattari's theory of "becoming-minor" (*Thousand* 116). While the most obvious approach to trans or queer rurality would be to advocate for our rights as legitimate minorities, Deleuze and Guattari write specifically against this model: "one does not attain [becoming] by acquiring the majority. The figure to which we are referring is continuous variation, as an amplitude that continually oversteps the representative threshold of the majoritarian standard, by excess or default" (117-8).[68] As they put it later, becoming an official rural minority is only to retrace, rename, or reterritorialize ourselves as an appendage of existent models. As they write, "it is important not to confuse 'minoritarian,' as a becoming or process, with a 'minority', as an aggregate or a state...One reterritorializes, or allows oneself to be reterritorialized, on a minority as a state; but in a becoming, one is deterritorialized" (321). Crucially, this theory of

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"becoming" (derived in part from "the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different 'durations'...in communication" [262], which Woolf illustrates) concerns non-subjective variations and the creations of new "alliances" (263) that are irreducible to minority communities or states. Like the modes of backwards temporalities summarized above, Deleuze and Guattari's becoming has everything to do with moving towards less self-definition, less self-knowledge, and less finely named differentiations between subjects. The becoming that interests them, that is, is inspired by "phenomena...in which evolution does not go from something less differentiated to something more differentiated" (263). As such, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish "involution" – to create, to involve seemingly heterogenous times and bodies with each other – from the presentist linear narrative of evolution. Becoming-minor, then, is a mode of continuous variation that works specifically to move forward by undoing the variations and taxonomies created by contemporary "progressive" work. This chapter's "backwardness" follows precisely this task, refusing the modes of subjective capture and "minority" rights available today in favour of less differentiation – like Deleuze and Guattari, "on the condition that involution is in no way confused with regression" (263). This theoretical model is useful for another reason. First, the progress narratives duly mentioned above each, like Loos, trace the human lifespan onto the history of identities and cultures. Recall, for instance, that Loos regards people from New Guinea as people who are "child[ren]" (167) on the human path to civilization, while "modern" European cultures are akin to adults. In the most stereotypical renderings of the country, we are represented similarly:

as literally non-progressive in our resistance to (urban) maturation and culture. Rural temporality is "minor," then, in the sense that we may appropriate our (negative) figuring as a place of extended cultural "childhood" as a way to halt the forward motion of narratives that figure the urban as a symbol of maturity.

This chapter proceeds via four related avenues of inquiry. First, I review current work on rural queerness and rural temporality and present alternatives. Secondly, as a piece of evidence that seemingly neutral categories of difference such as transgender do in fact imply or require an unstated urbanism, I analyze L. Frank Baum's 1904 text *The Marvelous Land of Oz* as a cautionary tale that features mutually implicated moves to the city, to wealth, and across genders. Third, in order to mount a response to these intertwined patterns of migration, I subvert the conservative message of Baum's text by reading for its subtle critique of the newest trans subject category: the child, the very positing of which (and figuring of which as anything *but* becoming-minor) completes the biographical form and coherency of the firmed-up modern trans subject. Finally, following my disintegration of the figure of the trans child in Baum's text, I suggest that the trans body lived in this text's fantastical, rural, and early modernist mode traverses the borders of the sovereign body and subject to instead become assemblage.

Back-Roads Backgrounds

Recently, some queer theorists have finally started to address the implicit metronormativity of queer culture and queer theory.[69] In this review section, I will draw from two of these sources – Herring's *Another Country: Queer Anti-*

Urbanism and Halberstam's *In a Queer Time and Place* – in order to develop my theory of ruralizing temporality as a way to disrupt these three intertwined modes of (what we regard as) upward mobility: rural to urban, working class to middle class, and immaturity to adulthood. Against these mutually implicated narratives of "progress," rural temporality revels in a series of continuous, simultaneous presents (events) that cannot – or simply *are* not – absorbed into meta-narratives about the history of transgender or queerness. First, with Halberstam, I will suggest that turning "queer time" into "ruralizing time" will entail a correlative shift in our concept of agency: while practitioners of queer time are figured by Halberstam as choosers of their queerly organized lives, the real difficulty of some rural queerness demands that queer time be thought beyond this emphasis on choice. Secondly, in place of this subjective time, ruralizing time will be defined as involutionary, "backwards," and recursive rather than progressive, linear, and modernizing. In this way I follow Herring's reclamation of rural backwardness but extend it by reminding us that citational and involutionary ruptures into narratives of progress and mobility are anything but "regressive" or immobile. Thirdly, building on this complication of Herring's rejection of urban "fashionability," I turn to the question of the implicit social class mobility often implied in urban migration. To remind us that urban and class mobilities are intertwined, I review previous work done on social class and urban migration (and "renewal") from Kenyon Farrow and Gayle Rubin. Then, bearing in mind this dissertation's overarching recuperation of trans fashion, I extend Herring's work by not wholly rejecting but rather partly recuperating fashion as a temporality (of

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the body and of space) that can indeed operate beyond the "closed time of capitalism" into the "excessive time of revolution" (Khatib n.p.).

First, Halberstam's notion of queer time is figured within the limits of what Kwinter calls the time of the subject (39). In her widely influential text, Halberstam shows that the parallel binaries of rural/urban, rustic/modern, and normative/queer are indeed grouped in some representations of trans life – a grouping that cautions trans people not to live in *places* that are out of step with modern *times*. While Halberstam's text on queer time is probably the most influential one cited in queer studies today, it is important to note that her theory of time has a number of important precedents and foils. What she regards as normative time, or "reproductive time" is precisely this:

> the time of reproduction is ruled by a biological clock for women and by strict bourgeois rules of respectability and scheduling for married couples. Obviously, not all people who have children keep or even are able to keep reproductive time, but many and possibly most people believe that the scheduling of repro-time is natural and desirable. Family time refers to the normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing...The time of inheritance refers to an overview of generational time within which values, wealth, goods, and morals are passed through family ties from one generation to the next. It also connects the family to the historical past of the nation, and glances ahead to connect the family to the future of both familial and national stability. In this category we can include the kinds of hypothetical

temporality – the time of 'what if' – that demands protection in the way of

insurance policies, health care, and wills. (5)

This version of time, which Halberstam fairly attributes to only some hetero-

reproductive subjects (and also to some homo-normative subjects), has not, of

course, developed quite so neatly or homogeneously. Inasmuch as any text

presumes and enacts its own temporality, there are many other variously

normative and queer versions of time.[70] I have elaborated on many of these

throughout this dissertation. We have looked specifically to theories of space-time

(theories that do not uphold the false isolation of either) that each, in turn, enact

their own temporality through the continuous variation of matter in space. We can

recall, for instance: DS+R's citationality; Woolf's preference of fleeting fashion

and ornament over the systematization of sexology, as well as her (related)

Bergsonian theory of time as durée; Sanford Kwinter's Deleuzian reading of time

as a process of "becoming-ever-different" (4); Butler's redefinition of gender as a

"constituted social temporality" (*Trouble* 140); Stryker's poesis-in-motion, "a

mobile, membranous, temporally fleeting and provisional sense of enfolding and

enclosure" (*Transgender* 45); and Beckett's simultaneous refusal of and clinging

to the "ground" of memory, comprehension, and having a past as the basic

condition of 'feeling at home.'

With these ruptures of temporality in mind, we can reconsider

Halberstam's work on rural queerness. This is a topic that is conspicuously absent

in her more celebratory chapters about queer time. However, in two rather darker

chapters, Halberstam considers the implicitly metronormative bent of the

discourse surrounding Brandon Teena's 1993 Nebraska murder. Although Halberstam does not describe Brandon as such, the excerpt belows shows that rural bodies enact an ambiguous version of her otherwise affirmative concept of "queer time." Specifically, Halberstam suggests that the Hollywood blockbuster of Brandon's tale, *Boys Don't Cry*, represents Brandon's rural life as one that employs a non-modern temporality.

> When Brandon explores a mature and adult relationship with one woman who recognizes him as 'really female,' that film suggests, Brandon accedes to a modern form of homosexuality and is finally 'free.' Reconstituted now as a liberal subject, Brandon's death at the hands of local men can be read simultaneously as a true tragedy and an indictment of backward, rural communities. In this sense, Brandon occupies a place held by so-called primitives in colonial anthropology; he literally inhabits a different timescale from the modern queer. (25)

Just as the "primitive" bodies of the 1904 Anthropology Games were held apart from the white bodies of the 1904 Olympics (bodies that were a spectacle of progress and modernity) so too in *Boys Don't Cry* is Brandon's rural transgender body contrasted with more urbane models of homosexuality. This juxtaposition, Halberstam suggests, figures Nebraska as an immature, stunted, and savage place where transgender is only a symptom of internalized homophobia, while the urban sphere is implicitly figured as a mature, adult, and enlightened model of homosexuality. By identifying Brandon's body as one represented as being temporally out of step with history, Halberstam's critique of this representation all

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but implies that rurality is an exemplary case of what she calls "queer time" (6).

(As she puts it, queer time derives from "specific modes of temporality that emerge within postmodernism once one leaves the temporal frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance" [6].) Although Halberstam associated queer time specifically with *postmodernism*, her fleeting reading of Brandon as "inhabit[ing] a different timescale than the modern queer" (25) suggests that queer time might not be limited to the postmodern aesthetics we associate with urban architecture, urban trans and queer communities, urban literature, and the parody and pastiche made possible in urban performance scenes and drag bars. Perhaps, as she implies, living in "backward, rural communities" is already to live out a different temporality than the modern urban queer.

However, we might respond, what is radical about living "out of time" in a place where one is simply stuck, through (the presumed and sometimes actual) conditions of poverty, immobility, or lack of will or other resources? The very notion of ruralizing temporality demands that we throw into suspension this valorization of agency with regards to queer temporality. The importance of doing so becomes clear via another oft-cited figure that Halberstam champions in her text: "the notion of a stretched-out adolescence" (153). This Halberstam sees as an alternative to "reproductive temporality" (4), which she in turn defines as one form of normative Western temporality according to which "we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation" (4). Although it is again the case that Halberstam sees this happening exclusively in urban spheres – "queer subcultures," she

suggests, " offer us an opportunity to redefine the binary of adolescence and adulthood that structures so many inquiries into subcultures" (161) – the notion of extended adolescence speaks directly to Brandon's case and to the figuring of rural spheres and rural queers as somehow stunted in our development. That is, while for Halberstam, there is cause to celebrate such extensions of adolescence, the case of Brandon (forever halted and memorialized *in* adolescence) immediately brings to mind the dangers and violences risked by actually doing so without the comfort and safety of a safe, mature, "adult" community of affinity. This difference (between positive and playful urban "adolescence" and inhabiting "adolescent" rural spaces) asks us to extend Halberstam's non-rural theories beyond implicitly urban models of community. As she suggests via her brief example of Mark Doty's AIDS-focused poetry, queer temporality has no certain relationship to agency. That is, "[W]hen one leaves [normative] temporal frames" (6), it is only sometimes of one's choosing and certainly never resides totally under one's own design. We are pulled into queer time, pursue it, deal with it, struggle to form a life within it, and sometimes die of our ambiguous imbrication in it. The concept of rural temporality reminds us of this affective and agential ambiguity – an ambiguity that echoes Deleuze and Guattari's critical "forgetfulness" with which this project begins. Therefore, we can extend Halberstam's subject-based work here by acknowledging that queer temporalities are not (always) a matter of will: rather, following this project's emphasis on non-subjective "continuous variation" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand* 117), we see here that being suspended in "extended adolescence" is not always of our

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choosing, within our control, or without violence. In sum, the extended

adolescence attributed to rural spheres is – unlike that attributed by Halberstam to

urban queer and punk subcultures – one that, sometimes painfully, seems to

precede one's will. Following sections will aim to recuperate this seeming *loss* of

agency into a gain.

Above I have suggested that in her attempt to account for her implicitly

urban focus, Halberstam actually configures rural queerness as an icon of queer

temporality – an equation that led us to underline the ambiguity of agency in

Halberstam's account.[71] This dissertation pays very much attention to the pitfalls

of the imperative for complete agency, and this ambiguous representation of rural

trans agency follows this line of thought. While above we saw that the extended

adolescence of rurality (with regards to the progress narrative of the modern

queer) is doubled-edged – both painful and radical – in Scott Herring's work we

find an author who, in revelling on the radical side of things, illustrates the power

of queer rural appropriations of authority. Although Herring follows Halberstam's

point that queer, urban, and modern have been collated to great effect, Herring

extends Halberstam's work in several ways: he looks to affirmative rural styles,

focuses on rural aesthetic production (rather than on rural *tragedies* and *urban*

aesthetic styles), and writes with attitude from the South.[72] One of the main

interventions Herrings makes is to reclaim the "backwardness" stereotypically

attributed to rural spheres, an attribution to some extent echoed by Halberstam's

ambiguous figuring of Brandon's milieu. Though Herring admits that anti-

urbanism hasn't always had a radical bent (he reminds readers that "in the

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eighteenth century it connoted a Jeffersonian ideal of non-urban agrarianism" [11] that aligned with nostalgic, conservative moralities), he suggests that, currently, queer anti-urbanism offers a line of flight from some of the trappings of urban queer subjectivity. And, like Halberstam, Herring's reclamations of backwardness have everything to do with temporality. One of the examples of extreme queer metro-normativity with which Herring opens his text is a quotation from Edmund White's memoir-travelogue, *States of Desire: Travels in Gay America* (1980). Below, readers witness once again the equation of urban queerness with a temporal mode of living that is, quite simply, faster.

> Whatever our sensibility may be, New York gays are justifiably proud of their status as tastemakers for the rest of the country...Our clothes and haircuts and records and dance steps and décor – our restlessly evolving style – soon enough to become theirs...In return for the costliness and inconvenience, the squalor and discomfort of our lives, we get to participate in whatever is the *latest*. We are never left out of anything; we know what's happening. (259-60, qtd in Herring 18)

At first, Herring responds to this placement of New York queers at the cutting-edge of time with two simple questions: "Really? How come?" (18). This is a feisty response that makes a point worth considering: what kind of evidence must one have in order to self-proclaim the superiority of one's lifestyle in the manner White does? Herring then responds at length in a way that underlines White's temporal self-satisfaction:

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[W]hat White describes here is an urbanized and urbane stylistics that intersects temporal ("up-to-date," "the *latest*," "soon enough"), racial, socioeconomic, narratological, and, adamantly, aesthetic norms. It's "style" as invasive species and it's really impressive. In just a few sentences White manages to encapsulate these stylistics not only for "proud New York gays" and their enclaves but – in what we'll come to see as an all-too-familiar elision – for the rest of the country as well. Think of it as circum-Manhattan performance where the remainder of the United States becomes Greater New York City. (18)[73]

Herring's point is deceptively simple: the judgement and elision of rural queerness is not even accomplished through a blatant anti-ruralism *per se*, but is, rather, displaced onto or transformed into a seemingly innocent discourse of style and fashion. Similarly, in Chapter Two of this project, I used DS+R's Brasserie space to show that the disciplining and valorization of particular aesthetic norms entails and obscures troubling ideas about gender. Herring validates this argument in the above quotation, but my work in Chapter Two – especially my responses to Le Corbusier's and Loos' *rejection* of fashion as the basis for modern urbanism – extends it by showing that while "fashion" comes to stand in for queerness, some urban architectural fashions have been explicitly anti-decadent, anti-fashion, and implicitly anti-queer.[74] In any case, Herring's insistence that aesthetic preferences and norms disguise suspicious judgements about the temporality of rural life leads him to (rather than try to "fit" rural queers into urban aesthetic norms) develop his

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own model of "rural stylistics" (22) that aims to introduce rural disruptions to urban queer temporality. As he explains it:

> If cosmopolitanism, sophistication, knowingness, refinement, wordliness [sic], and trendy fashion – all under the umbrella term "queer urbanity" – inform idealizations of U.S. metronormativity, then I turn the tables to chart how stereotypically ruralizing stylistics of rusticity, stylelessness, unfashionability, anti-urbanity, backward-ness, anti-sophistication, and crudity try to undercut the metronormative demands made on modern queer life. (22)

It is worth noting that Herring hereby employs quite a different political tactic than the standby of arguing that the excluded group (here, rural queers) are in fact modern, capable of sophistication, and are equally forward-thinking and progressive as the majority group (urban queers). Instead of taking issue with how we are interpreted as lying outside of these progressive values, he takes issue with the temporality of these values themselves.[75] This is a crucial reminder of the ways in which aesthetic judgement can stand in for problematic dismissals of other places and styles of life. However, in so responding to White's valorization of (his own) urban self-fashioning, Herring dismisses "fashion" out of hand. Throughout this dissertation, the temporality of fashion has been configured as a series of continuous events that occur on the non-subjective register and that therefore resist capture and neutralization into linear progressive narratives of history (including the history of one's self). In Herring's account, however, fashion is associated with a great degree of leisure and wealth – and certainly,

Edmund White's description of clothes, haircuts, records, dance steps, and décor give us reason to follow Herring's lead. Below I review texts that, taken together, remind us that Herring is right to take umbrage with the implicit class mobility implied by urban migration and development. After this attempt to historicize Herring's ethic of "unfashionability," I will – bearing in mind the violence of Loos' and Le Corbusier's feigned anti-fashion politics – show that ruralizing temporality must (against Herring) be redefined as itself a kind of crucial refashioning of time in its own right.

In recent years, activists in New York and San Francisco (and certainly many less publicized queer towns) have taken up the intersecting issues of queer class politics and urbanism with vigour. Kenyon Farrow, former Executive Director of the NYC group Queers For Economic Justice, for instance, regularly writes about (often gay-led or gay-supported) campaigns for increased social policing of public space, particularly of gentrifying spaces that were formerly home to less affluent queer communities of colour. As he suggests, after decades of aggressive rezoning and gentrification in Manhattan, "queer people of color throughout New York city share [a] landless status," becoming "refugees...in a city where cultures are defined as much by the place they claim as the identities they represent" (web). One of the main targets of groups such as Queers for Economic Justice is the increasingly middle- and upper-class mainly white gay community – or, more specifically, the classist violence that this community sometimes visits upon working-class queers through both campaigns against street-involvement in their neighbourhoods and through their massive financial

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support of political goals that invest in state control (such as marriage and the military). Here, Farrow relates a cultural moment that illustrates this conflict between different socioeconomic elements of gays and queers:

> [While] by the 1980s, the strip of Christopher Street west of Seventh Avenue and down to the piers was the main social space for the black and Latino queer community...a campaign spearheaded by 'block associations' (most notably Residents In Distress, or RID, an acronym that many of the youth took as an allusion to a brand of lice remover), prompted heightened policing of the area. With little community beyond a few local bars to stick up for them, the neighborhood quickly became extremely hostile to black and Latino queer youth.[76] (web)

In her widely-read 1984 essay "Thinking Sex," Gayle Rubin predicted some aspects of this kind of urban-queer conflict. In this essay, Rubin historicizes the urban aura of queerness by attending to the labour conditions that made what Kath Weston calls "the Great Gay Migration" to cities possible in the first instance. As Rubin puts it, "the relocation of homoeroticism into these quasi-ethnic, nucleated, sexually constituted communities is to some extent a consequence of the transfers of population brought about by industrialization" (17).[77] One of these transformations had to do specifically with the migration of labourers: "as laborers migrated to work in cities, there were increased opportunities for voluntary communities to form" (17). Quite against the image of decadent faggots of leisure that some histories (even White's) might ask us to picture, Rubin points out that the great gay migration was as much about labour and working-class

people. Rubin also predicts that class-based problems will accompany queer people living in cities: not only does she suggest that "the relative prosperity and cultural florescence of the gay ghetto may be equally fragile [as Depression-era post-Renaissance Harlem]" (24), but she also predicts that gays who would move into "central but rundown" neighbourhoods and dominate the affordable-housing market would create conflict with the poor communities of colour who would be pushed to the borders of the area. As Farrow and others have started to remind us, queer communities, impoverished communities, and communities of people of colour cannot be so strictly delineated from each other, either by identity or by neighbourhood.

If, as I've suggested, Rubin is right to suggest that "like blacks who fled the south for the metropolitan North, homosexuals may have merely traded rural problems for urban ones" (24), and if many of these problems are racially-charged ones of spatial control and social class, then what is needed for rural queer and transgender studies is a conception of rurality that goes far beyond campaigning for "inclusion" in metro-centred conceptions of queerness. Rather, to echo Herring's reclamation of rural stylistics and rejection of urban narratives of modernity and sophistication, we might instead begin with the premise that urban queer stylistics and norms have been designed directly out of economic and temporal ideologies and histories that are, at best, ambivalent to the goals and needs of rural queers and transgender people (and those who are most in need). There cannot, in other words, be a mode of rural queering or transing that does not equally disrupt the normativizing forces of class and fashion. I have shown above

that beyond the "intersections" of rural queerness with ideas about time and about

class, these very ideas *underpin* the judgements whereby rurality is both

menacingly backwards and poorly unfashionable. However, we must ask: is

White's urbanizing, superior version of urban "fashion" – which, reversing Loos

and Le Corbusier, uses this word mainly to claim one's position at the cutting

edge of "fast" culture – the only way of employing "fashion" to queer ends? What

is a rural refashioning of temporality?

I respond below with a suggestion that a temporality of fashion can indeed

be turned towards (and derive from) concerns with social class, place, and

seemingly regressive citationality. To do this, we could look to various strands of

Marxist theory that have paid attention to the pitfalls of the continuous and linear

narratives of time that have been critiqued throughout this project. (Indeed, the

status of temporality in Marxism is another precedent for "queer time.") While

readers of Marx have noted two temporalities in his work – "a closed time of

capitalism and a disruptive, excessive time of revolution" (Khatib n.p.) – the most

influential rewriting of Marxist temporality derives from Walter Benjamin's last

known piece of writing, 1940's *On the Concept of History*. In this text, Benjamin

develops the concept of *Jetztzeit* or "now-time" (395) which he describes as non-

linear and evental inasmuch as it disrupts the continuum of history. As Benjamin

puts it, our "historical progress cannot be sundered from the concept of its

progression through a homogenous, empty time. A critique of the concept of such

a progression must underlie any criticism of the concept of progress itself" (395).

Tellingly for this dissertation as a whole, Benjamin figures evental temporality as

a kind of fashion that looks back to the past in order to incite revolution. As he puts it:

> Thus, to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with now-time, a past which he blasted out of the continuum of history. The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It cited ancient Rome exactly the way fashion cites a bygone mode of dress. Fashion has a nose for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long ago; it is the tiger's leap into the past. Such a leap, however, takes place in an arena where the ruling class gives the commands. The same leap in the open air of history is the dialectical leap Marx understood as revolution. (395)[78]

For Benjamin, then, blasting the past out of its proper place in a historical continuum is to fill the supposedly homogenous empty time of history with non-linear events of "now-time," a temporality that is both citational, a mode of fashioning, and a risky leap. In this image of revolutionary recuperations of outmoded historical "fashions," Benjamin is in accordance (for instance) with Woolf's own fashion-incited theories of time, gender, and dress, which blast transgender out of the "progress" narrative of autobiography, sexology, and medicine, thereby allowing us to see its continuous, non-progressive, aesthetic fashioning. In Dianne Chisholm's queer reading of Benjamin, she emphasizes the way in which his theory troubles conventional historiography. Benjamin offers us "a way of seeing antitheses of history that are catastrophically obscured by myths of progress" (2). As Chisholm suggests, by refusing to recognize the syntheses and elisions on which clear and coherent narratives of history depend, Benjamin –

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and, I argue, the persistence of rural queerness in an age of queer metronormativity – shows us "'dialectics at a standstill'...reveal[ing] the city's progressive devastation in the 'Now-time' of its betrayed history...rous[ing] us from redevelopment dreams to revolutionary hindsight with a 'constellation of awakening'" (8). In Benjamin's rewriting of the trope of fashion as a mode of history and time, we see the need to tweak Herring's keen account: we need not to reject fashion (and in so doing shore up an impossible sense of ourselves as un-aestheticized or purely anti-fashion, as Loos and Le Corbusier do) but to refashion the narratives and capitals of fashion. After all, as we saw in Chapter One on Brasserie, locating the spectre of "fashion" in the urban realm is also to locate a few other associated phenomena of transience and décor exclusively there: modifying bodies, bodily ornament, anachronistic uses of décor and texture, and other transing modes.

Can we relocate Benjamin's "now" time – derived from his studies of the arcades *in Paris* – to a matter as seemingly small as transgender ruralism? On the surface, this does not seem possible. After all, Herring points out above that we must reclaim the "stereotypically ruralizing stylistics of rusticity, stylelessness, *unfashionability*" (22 emphasis added) and so on. But history occurring in the form of fashion, as Benjamin describes above, is a different matter: it may well consist in citations and leaps into the past. This, I suggest in sum, is one way that we may reread the temporal "regressions" of rurality: as recursive rewritings of times that are seen, from the perspective of the urban cutting edge of modernity, as already past and over. In all, this ruralizing twist on "queer time" therefore

involves three main changes in our interpretation of the category of "the rural:" 1) from "rural" as a place of non-choice to a place that points out the compromised conditions of choice for all practitioners of queer time; 2) from "rural" as regressive to rural as involutionary; and 3) from "rural" as unfashionability to rural as adhering to its own temporality of fashion. How do these three shifts, these three modes of becoming-minor, play out in representations of rural spheres? Does transgender get caught up in the intertwined modes of upward mobility discussed above? How have these narratives of queer progress both demanded and created various modes of trans and queer "childhood," and how can we turn these biographical figures into modes of becoming-minor? In the sections that follow, I take up an ambiguous case study in order to respond to these questions: L. Frank Baum's *The Marvelous Land of Oz*. I analyze the body politic and gender transitions of this text with an eye attuned to precisely the modes of ruralizing temporality I have forwarded here, paying special attention to the text's mutually implicated mobility narratives.

Not in Kansas Anymore

Below, by way of introducing Baum's text and its reception, I will briefly show how and why it lends itself to a specifically transgender and queer interpretation. One reason the text invites such a reading is its charged context: *The Marvelous Land of Oz* is the lesser known sequel to *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*, which is an "erotically antisocial queer utopia" (Pugh, "Lived" 218) that has become central to the sensibilities of American and Canadian gay male culture. The original text of the series, and especially its film adaptation, have of course

been enshrined in the halls of queer camp archives. As Tison Pugh explains it, "with Judy Garland as the star, its exaggerated characters of good and evil, and its Technicolor wonderland of vibrant colors and outlandish costumes, the film displays a queer sensibility" ("Lived" 217). As compatible as this original text appears to be with cultures of modern homosexuality, its ruralizing thrust – after all, the entire *Bildungsroman* of Dorothy hinges on a desire to return home to Kansas *from* the Emerald City of Oz – has been seldom remarked upon. More importantly, however, the ready absorption of this original text into gay male culture perhaps overshadows (if not obscures) the transing and ruralizing impulses of both texts. Indeed, the sequel has enjoyed very little of the subcultural caché of the original text, despite its more obviously genderqueer qualities. By turning to specifically this text, then, the following sections implicitly try to disabuse us of the notion that transgender identification is (quite literally) a *sequel* to what appears to be the originary queer cross-identification of homosexual subcultures with Dorothy and Oz (if not Kansas!). Instead, we will see that *The Marvelous Land of Oz* lends itself to a trans reading that goes beyond the logic of "gender-crossing" identification on which the gay male absorption of Dorothy depends – to foreground the transforming *bodies* and various modes of intertwined mobility enacted in the text.

The text follows protagonist Tip, a young boy whose journey may sound familiar in its shifts of both geographical and gendered territory. At the outset of the text, Tip lives in the country with a much-despised evil witch named Mombi. One day, Tip builds a fake man (with a pumpkin for a head) in order to scare

Mombi upon her return home. To teach Tip a lesson, she uses her "Powder of Life" to bring this humble mannequin to life. The next day, Tip escapes with this new being (whom he has named Jack Pumpkinhead), in search of Emerald City. On the way, the two gather up a motley crew of other odd personages and loners (the Tin Woodman, the Saw-Horse, the Woggle-Bug, and the Gump) who become allies. The need for such allies arises quickly, as the crew learns that Emerald City is under siege by an army of girls lead by an apparently sassy lass named Jinjur. Back and forth the crew go between the city and the country, seeking out aid in their campaign to recapture the urban kingdom for the Tin Woodman, who had been made king after the Wizard of Oz's hasty departure at the end of the series' first book. The crew is ultimately successful in this task, but a Hollywood-calibre plot-twist interrupts a potentially simple ending to this tale, a tale that already champions the restoration of male (urban) power. Readers learn that Tip not only used to be a girl but is also the proper heir to the Emerald City throne. The Wizard of Oz, it is revealed, hid Tip – named Ozma at birth – in the country under Mombi's supervision so that he himself could rule. The decision with which the text ends, then, is whether or not Tip will return to his former life of rural duress and remain a boy, or else return to his "original" gender so that he may inherit the city. Tip chooses the latter, which sets the stage for the text's ending: a classic tranny *deus-ex-machina* brought to us by a benign witch, "Glinda the Good." On its most legible register, the plot of this text therefore anticipates some of the modes of gender change that have taken hold today: the representation (and validation) of gender change as a return or restoration of an original order; the

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dependence of some transgender mobility and perceptibility on correlative class status and mobility; and a highly exaggerated collusion of urbanism, gender change, and maturity.

As an introductory push *beyond* the obviously proto-transing event of Tip/Ozma's gender change(s), I will suggest briefly that the relations between bodies in this text suggest an ethics of becoming that are far more ambiguous. To draw upon Pugh's analysis of *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*, it is very clear that this second text also focuses on relationships and bodies that are neither familiar nor species-bound but are instead built upon the "anti-reproductive intimacy" ("Lived" 226) that becomes possible when life springs from magic touches and friendships are founded because of extreme difference and happenstance. Here are three short examples of the text's transing economies of bodily transformation and relationships. First, the text features several moments of magical animation in which objects spring to life through the use of a "Powder of Life." In Pugh's estimation, the text thereby "challenges the libidinal economy of heteronormative reproduction" ("Lived" 218). Moreover, these scenes of anti-familial procreation often feature bodies and selves beginning their lives as "queer assortment[s]" (*Marvelous* 92) of things. One of these queer assortments, a "Gump," is assembled through the non-logic of a frantic scavenger hunt: each member of the text's crew of characters is tasked to find one random object to help comprise the Gump, which is then brought to life and serves as their vessel of travel. Secondly, in addition to this image of procreation-as-same-sex-potluck (the crew are all coded as "male"), the text reveals a clear disdain for taxonomy and the limits that

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come with classifying types of bodies and selves. A Woggle-Bug that has been

magically blown up to epic proportions, for example, is welcomed into the crew

precisely for the ways in which his body exceeds ideas about species. As he puts

it, he "cannot be classed with ordinary insects" and is therefore "entitled to both

curiosity and admiration from those I meet" (71). The Woggle-Bug prefers

difference to assimilation or sameness – "it affords me great pleasure to surprise

people" (71) – while the text's crew of heroes neither ignores nor elides his

body's startling queerness: though the Scarecrow admits that his crew is startled

by the magnified bug, he quickly concludes that "we shall probably get used to

you in time" (71) and even philosophizes about this approach, stating that

"everything in life is unusual until you get accustomed to it" (75). Relationships

and bodies are created strangely here, and exceeding taxonomies of body-types is

not just the norm but somewhat of a virtue. Finally, in a decidedly non-medical

economy of ingestion and transformation, "DR. NIKDIK'S CELEBRATED

WISHING PILLS" (101) are a constant help to the heroes throughout the text,

allowing them to create exterior realities and material changes through a

combination of oral intake and desire.

In at least these four ways, then, the text seems initially to comprise a

veritable trans utopia: here, pills and powders truly grant wishes; material

transformation happens instantly and often easily; relationships and bodies exceed

our usual categories of affiliation and identity; "lacking" an organ or two is just

part and parcel of life; and, of course, genders change. In the relatively small body

of queer work published on the *Oz* series, scholars generally agree with this

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affirmative reading of Oz's queerness (although, notably, none mention transgender by name or allusion). Pugh, for instance, identifies a feminist overtone to the economy of relationships enacted in Oz. The male characters, he suggests, connect via "predominantly feminine community" while boy-driven adventure tales would, in contrast, resemble a sub-category of *Bildungsroman* featuring "the individualist quest of a lone male" (221a). The character's lack of desire and need to at any point adopt procreative and familiar roles – a pleasant lack that Pugh equates with the anti-social strand of queer theory – is a large factor in making this kind of community possible.[79] (That this male group is specifically organized as a defence strategy against Jinjur's Army of *girls* taking over the city demands, however, that we take Pugh's interpretation with a grain of salt.) The characters' very unusual methods of interpreting difference and bodies also makes this community possible. When the Tin Woodman meets Jack Pumpkinhead for the first time, for instance, he accepts him because, not in spite of, his queerness: as he says, "you are certainly unusual, and therefore worthy to become a member of our select society" (63). Alison Lurie sums up this preliminary argument succinctly: "in the world of Oz, acceptance of minority rights is taken for granted" (qtd. in Pugh, "Cannibals" 326).

However, given that, in the end, Tip chooses to "restore" his gender in order to inherit the riches of the city, we must extend the contexts and critics represented above in order to make this text relevant to a specifically rural-focused (and, implicitly, class-conscious) trans account. The next sections of this chapter use Baum's text to show that the recognition of "minority rights" in this

text – and of becoming a legal, knowable "minority" in our culture – often comes

at the precise cost of shutting down the possibilities of "becoming-minor"

(Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand* 27) in relation to the State and the normative

lifestyles it sanctions and rewards. We will see below that *The Marvelous Land of*

Oz tempers the queer qualities described above by figuring its mutually

constitutive urbanization and upward mobility not just as happy endings but also

as precisely the "transitions" through which gender change becomes possible and

gender normativity – appearing as "restoration" – becomes compulsory. We will

have reason to consider whether or not the text's ending of gender change jars

with the remainder of the text, which concerns itself with "the deterritorialization

of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the

collective assemblage of enunciation" (18). This description of "minor literature"

from Deleuze and Guattari resonates with the strange, tenuous, bodies and allies

of the text. The "minority rights" Lurie and Pugh are pleased to find in Oz,

however, hearken back to the state as the arbiter of difference – so too does Tip

reterritorialize his royal body and man-crew in the name of ownership and the

nationalist City-State. After all, this text replaces Kansas-loving protagonist

Dorothy with gender-crossing and soon-to-be rural-expat Tip. What is so wrong,

someone might ask, with such a happy ending for a proto-transgender child? To

grapple with this minority rural-rags-to-urban-rights ethos, the sections below

follow Deleuze and Guattari's reminder that "the power of minorities is not

measured by their capacity to enter and make themselves felt within the majority

system" (*Thousand* 471) but rather to bring the power of "multiplicities"

(*Thousand* 470) against the totalizing, singular, and "denumerable" (*Thousand* 470) coherence of the State.

Guided by this approach to "minority," this analysis of Baum's text advances three related arguments. First, I argue that narratives of transgender urban migration ought to be read through an intersectional lens that attends to the financial and geographical implications of transgender conventions of subjectivity and migration. This hermeneutic does, I will suggest, question both the intuitive urban quality of transgender and also the model of the neo-liberal subject of rights, a subject that seeks rights and validation from the state (rather than, say, a subject whose ethics of community and belonging is contingent upon battling against the violences of nation-states). In sum, I read Baum's text as a cautionary tale about intertwined urban migration, upward mobility and gender normativity – one that flirts with but ultimately rejects the ruralizing temporality I've described above. Secondly, I show that the text's economies of bodies and relationships (especially those of youth) exceed the model of the subject critiqued in section one. The text unwittingly offers a number of escape routes from the urban citizenship it appears to champion, especially its intervention in the increasingly-coherent and stable concept of "transgender youth." Finally, I forward a theory of transgender "magical contact" inspired by the text's anti-medical, anti-enlightenment styles of body modification and animation. At a time when transgender people still seem to vanish into thin air, I suggest that changing what constitutes transgender knowledge (including in ways that might seem as "backwards" or "backwater" as back roads) is a crucial way to change the

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affective possibilities of transgender life and to regain the political potential of

transing as an act of becoming-minor. In all of these arguments, the usefulness of

a specifically ruralizing temporality – as a mode of slow, anti-progressive,

involutionary events – will be brought into focus.

Don't be a Drag, Just be a Queen

To show the political compromises necessary for the maintenance of

progressive, linear narratives of (trans and queer) history, this section provides a

comprehensive reading of Baum's text that is attuned to the implication of the

text's social class politic with its economies of gender. Ultimately, the section will

show that Baum's text may function productively as a cautionary tale about the

ways in which gender mobility sometimes involves spatial (urban) and social

(class) mobility – a cautionary tale in which mobility is gained only at the cost of

shunting away rural temporalities in favour of linear urbanization. As Herring

points out that the division between rural and urban is a slippery one at best, so

too does the context of Tip's gender change illustrate the stakes of mistaking what

Aren Aizura calls "the *imaginary* community of (trans)sexual citizenship" (289

emphasis added) for natural, given, and urban. In fact, Tip's migration narrative,

like one of Aizura's case studies, is "a narrative of (trans)sexual citizenship that

figures transgression as a necessary but momentary lapse on the way to a proper

embodied belonging, a proper home and full social inclusion" (293). This is

precisely the kind of temporal trajectory of transgender that this project as a whole

seeks to challenge: it consists of an initial period of transgression followed by

inclusion that comes at the cost of becoming both a "proper" citizen and a

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properly gendered citizen. Read against this project's hopes to unsettle happy medical and institutional endings to acts of transing, Tip's tremendously happy ending (the book's final chapter is entitled "The Riches of Content" [135]) is problematic, and not only for its seemingly conservative reinstatement of the protagonist's "original" gender. Following Aizura's definition, we see that in Baum's text, Tip's rural and transing youth is only a necessary lapse on his way to a "real" gender, to a home he never knew he had, and to both social inclusion and a seat (actually, a *throne*) atop the social hierarchy of the biggest city in the land. This plot results in a troubling three-way equation of ownership, urbanism, and the restoration of "original" genders.

This equation, I would like to suggest, casts some light on what it might mean, today, that most mainstream LGBT movements and groups still seek to couch queer and trans rights claims in the language of productive citizenry, nationhood, and family-based morality. Aizura suggests that this architectonic of activism – which equates justice with having both a gendered and geographical "home" in one's body, house, and nation – is upheld by one precise misunderstanding about how social change occurs. Neo-liberal activist groups (such as the Human Rights Campaign in the US context or EGALE in the Canadian context) fully invest in, that is, "the public fiction that recognition of queerness or gender variance is gained under the aegis of universal entitlement, rather than because 'difference' has remade itself as non-transgressive or non-threatening" (296). Tip's coincident capitulations to both the duties of inheritance and the gendered requirements of the throne play out this plot: what appears as a

triumphant ascension to the throne by a rural misfit youth, owes itself to urban migration, the perpetuation of inheritance, and gender "restoration." Below, I address this argument in more depth, looking both to key moments of resistance and capitulation in Tip's trajectory in order to show the possibilities and limitations of this kind of neo-liberal relation to rurality, class, and gender – and to gauge precisely what kind of representation and fantasy of the rural realm is necessary in order to protect the city's role as the proper "home" for queer and trans citizenship.

One of the ways in which the rural/urban divide structures queer and trans desires (for urbanism) is the implicit suggestion that the rural is a place of poverty while the city is a place of plenty. This dynamic comes all too clearly to life in Baum's text, where Tip's rural life is one of labour and pain. The figuring of the rich city and poor country in Baum's text reflects the exclusion of rural locales from the imaginary vision of the nation – a representative move that, Mary L. Gray argues, figures small towns as "inadequacies in need of urban outreach instead of a bellwether for the nationwide dismantlement of public services" (52), thereby maintaining the illusion that such problems of class and poverty do not continue (and thrive) in cities. So terrible is Tip's country life that his migration begins precisely because he is threatened with the possibility of never being able to leave: upon playing a practical joke on his guardian Mombi (trying to frighten her with a pumpkinhead man he had built for the purpose), Tip runs away after hearing about his punishment. As Mombi tells him as she prepares the potion, "it will change or transform you into a marble statue… I'm going to plant a flower

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garden, next Spring, and I'll put you in the middle of it, for an ornament" (21-2).

Deciding with a clever pun that becoming a literal fixture in a garden is not for

him, he exclaims, "it's a hard thing, to be a marble statue" (23). Tip beckons the

pumpkinhead (now brought to life by Mombi) and leaves behinds his life of

"carry[ing] wood from the forest…work[ing] in the corn-fields, hoeing and

husking…[feeding] the pigs and milk[ing]" (13). At first, the twosome's

destination is indeterminate: "'where to?' asked Jack. 'You'll know as soon as I

do,' answered Tip… 'All we've got to do now is to tramp'" (24). But a mere page

and several minutes of narrative time later, the destination is spontaneously

decided: the Emerald City, at "the center of the Land of Oz, and the biggest town

in all the country" (25). Like many a rural trans person, Tip can say, "never been

there, myself, but I've heard all about its history" (25). The ubiquity of urban

representation carries over to Baum's fantasyland; very early on, readers get a

sense of the mobility implied by a move from the country to the city. In the

country, Tip lives a non-familial life, friendless, amused only by the "love of

mischief" (17) that lead him to the road in the first place. In Emerald City, by

contrast, "sparkling green gems ornamented the fronts of the beautiful houses and

the towers and turrets were all faced with emeralds. Even the green marble

pavement glittered with precious stones, and it was indeed a grand and marvellous

sight" (40). It's clear from the outset of the text that the move from the country to

the city is, perhaps unsurprisingly, also a move from relative poverty to wealth.

Therefore, whereas the thrust of this project has been to blast transgender out of

the linearity of similar narratives (from interior to exterior, from pre-op to post-

op, from one name to another, from modernism to postmodern, and so on), here Baum's text shows us that upholding such a progress narrative requires that one's new location – the cutting edge – be interpreted as a space of unambiguous improvement.

On an allegorical level, Tip's first encounter with the city suggests that this divide of capital (rural labour and poverty versus an urban aura of abundance) is a matter of both perspective and a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, although Herring reminds us that metronormativities can be found in rural spheres too (he suggests that "sometimes you don't need a flight to the city to fashion-police in the sticks" [17]), this text represents the rural realm as lawless and the urban realm as a highly organized space of rules. A case in point: the text's first instance of explicitly bodily discipline occurs right at the gates of the city, where the guard insists that all who enter don green spectacles. The pumpkinhead – "knowing nothing of wealth and beauty" (40) – is surprised at this mandatory accessorizing: "'But why need I wear spectacles?' asked Jack. 'It's the fashion here,' said the Soldier, 'and they will keep you from being blinded by the glitter and glare of the gorgeous Emerald City'" (39). As Herring's text suggests throughout, it may well be the increased spatial norms and fashions of the city that lend it some of its exciting aura. Moreover, in Baum's tale, the blinding wealth of the city is completely artificial. As those who read the original book in Baum's series will remember, rather than protecting citizens from the glow of riches and emeralds, these green spectacles are actually the relic of an earlier monarch, the Wizard of Oz. As he tells Dorothy, "as the country was so green and beautiful, I would call it

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the Emerald City, and to make the name fit better I put green spectacles on all the people, so that everything they saw was green" (109). In an allegorical sense, these glasses represent a state-sanctioned ignorance of one's own constructed perspective on the city. And, in this second volume, the myth of the city actually being green continues. That this perspective is mandated under the auspices of *fashion* recalls Herring's argument that anti-ruralism too often disguises itself as "mere" preferences in style. In this specific case, the shining normative body of the city requires a prosthetic; all who enter must view the city through rose-coloured glasses – or, rather, green ones that suffuse Emerald City with the aura of both money and envy.

Despite the open secret that the city is not the bastion of green it appears to be, the ownership of the city – as a home – remains the text's definitive plot point. This continued fascination with the Emerald City bears out Jay Prosser's suggestion about the desire for the gendered/geographical home: "recognizing its fictionality only fuels its mythic lure" (177). For Tip, I suggest here, this sustained quest for illusory "homes" comes at the cost of "requiring radical difference to recreate itself as domesticated" (Aizura 295). The parallel plot of Baum's text – that of the others who would like to claim the city as their own – shows that a proper gendering of the subject is indeed part of this domestication of radical difference. That is, Baum's text juxtaposes Tip's eventual "coming home" with another process of gendered domestication: an opposing group of young girls who threaten to overtake the city. Early in his trek to Emerald City, Tip comes upon a young woman named Jinjur, whose face "wore an expression of discontent

coupled to a shade of defiance or audacity" (46), and who intended to overthrow the king of Emerald City (the Scarecrow) on behalf of her "Army of Revolt" – a group of young women who "intend to conquer the City and run the government to suit ourselves" (47). Why, in their "Jaunty and becoming" (48) uniforms, "laughing and talking together as gaily as if they had gathered for a picnic instead of a war" (48), would these girls want to take over the city? Jinjur explains the army's reasoning to Tip:

> "Because the Emerald City has been ruled by men long enough, for one reason," said the girl. "Moreover, the city glitters with beautiful gems, which might far better be used for rings, bracelets and necklaces; and there is enough money in the King's treasury to buy every girl in our Army a dozen new gowns. (47)

From thereon, the main matter of the text is Tip's growing gang of "queer" friends working to defend the Scarecrow's reign from this army of girls. What began as a parent-defying wandering trek very quickly, then, turns into a sex-segregated battle royal for rights to the city. (Tip, Jack Pumpkinhead, the animated Saw-Horse, the bug, the Gump, the Tin Woodman and the Scarecrow are each coded as male.) Despite the city gatekeeper's warning to the girls – "go home to your mothers, my good girls, and milk the cows and bake the bread" (49) – the girls overtake the city with their weapons of choice (knitting needles) and put the men of the city to work at daily household chores. When Tip's pack of "bros" eventually overthrows the girls once again, the mutually implicated class/labour politic and gender politic of the text comes even further to the fore.

Upon hearing that she will soon be overthrown, Jinjur cries, "To think…that after having ruled as Queen, and lived in a palace, I must go back to scrubbing floors and churning butter again! It is too horrible to think of! I will never consent!" (135). But consent she does, as all girls are "sent home to their Mothers" (137). While Tip's choice to run away is rewarded with a kingdom, Jinjur reaps no such prize for her disruption of the gendered rule of the city. Exile from the city not only means the disbandment of the girl army, but also means a labouring life at home with Mother – a re-installment of gender order that successfully re-domesticates the young woman subject while rewarding the young boy (for the moment) Tip for his correlative disobedient journey to the city. This seems like a strange parable for a story that Baum imagines as having a female audience; as he writes in his preface, "I promised one little girl…that when a thousand little girls had written me a thousand letters…I would write the book" (unpaginated).

Thus far I have suggested that Baum's text represents the city as an escape from poverty, as a place of bodily discipline that dictates the terms of its own interpretation, and as a kind of nationalist "home" that requires both the tight control of gendered economies of labour and the domestication of gender mobility (just as Aizura describes the domestication of the radical trans subject in the name of geographical homes, legal rights, and communities). With this ambiguous perspective of Emerald City in mind, I turn now to the most surprising element in the text's domestication of gender: the "restoration" of Tip's sex to "female." It is ironic that just after successfully defending the land from a reversal of gender roles at the hands of Jinjur, Tip finds himself plunged into just such a swap. And,

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Tip's initial response sounds like a confirmation that becoming a girl would be a fate worse than being exiled from the city (the very predicament Tip and his crew try to avoid for the majority of the text). As the text reads moments before his re-gendering:

> "Oh, let Jinjur be the Queen!" exclaimed Tip, ready to cry. "I want to stay a boy, and travel with the Scarecrow and the Tin Woodman, and the Woggle-Bug, and Jack – Yes! And my friend the Saw-Horse – and the Gump! I don't want to be a girl!" (132)

It's easy to read Tip's clinging to gender privilege (at even the expense of the class privilege he stands to gain) as a sign of just how good it is to be a boy. However, the response could also be read as both an affirmation of the intimacies of his crew and also a reluctance to "grow up" into a proper figure of state power. That this reluctance to accede to the throne is described as a reluctance to re-gender himself, however, leaves readers with the unavoidable equation of the restoration of "original" gender with birthright and mobility. It is quite odd, moreover, that his "sex change" is accepted as a matter of course, given that the text takes a cautious approach to the concept of bodily transformation. For instance, Glinda the Good (the witch who bids Mombi to return Tip to femalehood) just a moment earlier delivers the text's most conservative warning against bodily change; when responding to Tip's insistence that he would only "try" being a girl "just to see how it seems" (133), Glinda takes the chance to proselytize:

"Really," said the Sorceress, "that is beyond my magic. I never deal in

transformations, for they are not honest, and no respectable sorceress likes

to make things appear to be what they are not. Only unscrupulous witches

use the art." (133)

Tip's transformation to Princess Ozma falls outside of this category,

readers are left to assume, because it is a return to a natural order rather than an

actual change. As Glinda puts it to Tip: "you must resume your proper form, that

you may become Queen of the Emerald City" (132). Why this is so (why Tip

must become a female in order to rule) is not explained whatsoever. The

implication is, then, that to be a fair ruler in one's true home, one must be one's

true self; furthermore, since royal inheritance and dynasty attaches to the royal

body, one must also quite clearly *be* the body that one is said to be.

Transformation, then, is moral only insofar as it can be seen as a restoration to

something real, natural, and original. For Tip/Ozma, this entails returning to an

ethereal concept of a "real" body that had not, at that point, existed for Tip for

years. This strangely metaphysical ethic of transformation is eerily similar to that

which Jay Prosser attributes, approvingly, to transsexual autobiographers. As Tip

"returns" to a gender he never occupied, "transsexual autobiographies inscribe the

event(s) of surgery as a return: a coming home to the self through body" (82-3)

motivated by a "drive to get the body back to what it should have been" (83). Sex

Reassignment Surgery, Prosser suggests further, "is a recovery of what was not"

(84). Here in Baum's text, Tip's gender changes remind us that couching our

validations of transformation under the name of restoration is essentially a

conservative move, one that defensively holds the "unscrupulous" practice of actual transformation at arm's length.

In this conservative ethic of "restorative" transformation, it is no surprise, then, that the actual moment of Tip's transformation into Ozma is obscured. Not only is the transformation not discussed in terms of actual sex/gender characteristics, but, moreover, it is described solely through the language of wealth and riches, thereby echoing the text's equation of gender restoration with upward-mobility. In the country, Tip's labouring life made him "as strong and rugged as a boy may be" (13), and after her magical transition, her appearance literally embodies the décor of the city: "Her eyes sparkled as two diamonds and her lips were tinted like a tourmaline. All adown her back floated tresses of ruddy gold, with a slender jeweled circlet confining them at the brow. Her robes of silken gauze floated around her like a cloud, and dainty satin slippers shod her feet" (134). In this coeval gender/class transition, the equation of the city with financial prosperity is writ large on the gender-transitioning body; the body of the future ruler is literally urbanized – an urbanizing transition that not only includes a gender restoration but actually stands in for it. It goes without saying that this rags-to-riches transformation is not "unscrupulous" but is instead the climax of Tip's/Ozma's urbanizing *Bildungsroman*. In this scene, to become a proper urban ruler demands not just a magical gender restoration but also an alchemical transition of class. This instantaneous bedecking of the body in signs of wealth is, intriguingly, described as part of a *gender* change, as though to suggest that displaying signs of wealth are a natural aspect of the aesthetic of normative

gender. Obviously, this model of gender-change as class-alchemy is the very antithesis of becoming minor: the class aesthetic of the gender change suggests that this proto-transgender is one premised on becoming more visible, more recognizable, true to one's "original" gender – all in the name of properly occupying the most obvious majoritarian (monarchical) position in the city.

This occupation of a position of power does not, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, comprise any "becoming" whatsoever.[80] Indeed, the text ends with a final lesson about happiness, morality, and wealth that demonstrates that Tip/Ozma's process of transformation is indeed, to repeat Aizura, one from transgressive difference to non-threatening sameness (296). The scene begins with the Tin Woodman and the Scarecrow debating who among them is the richer (by virtue of their brains, hearts, or being stuffed with money). Princess Ozma weighs in with her final word: "'You are both rich, my friends,' said Ozma, gently; 'and your riches are the only riches worth having – the riches of content!'" (138). "Content" as a final emotional lesson (delivered by one who has taken the throne because of his initial *discontent* with rural life) is a questionable ethic for this tale of transformations and disobedience. As Aizura writes, Tip's "transgression [is] a necessary but momentary lapse on the way to a proper embodied belonging, a proper home and full social inclusion" (293). In contrast, Jinjur is first introduced as young girl wearing an "expression of discontent" (46). In a sense, the message to young girl readers is rather totalizing: be "content."[81] Social change is figured here as a case of extraordinary individuals and upward mobility, rather than of any kind of actual systemic change or of paying attention to how the rural realm is

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experienced by those still living there. As a final indignity to the audience of girl readers, the text emphasizes just how important it is to social order that girls remember their lot. When the Army is disbanded and sent home,

> At once the men of the Emerald City cast off their aprons. And it is said that the women were so tired of eating of their husbands' cooking that they all hailed the conquest of Jinjur with joy. Certain it is that, rushing one and all to the kitchens of their houses, the good wives prepared so delicious a feast for the weary men that harmony was immediately restored in every family. (136)

In this starkly conservative denouement, the text's strange assemblages, wayward children, magically animated bodies, and unnatural affiliations (analyses of which make up the rest of this chapter) are all tied up with the tight binds of familial divisions of labour in the home. Being discontent and audacious, girl readers learn, will only disrupt order, which will inevitably be restored. Turning the interlocking inequalities played out by Tip and Jinjur into an emotional difference – "discontent" versus "the riches of content" – is an all too familiar individualizing move: it relocates systemic troubles to the attitudes of individuals. In other words, to return to the Lady Gaga lyric that gives this section its subtitle: "don't be a drag/just be a queen." Baum's tale reminds us that being "Born This Way" in our contemporary moment might refer far more honestly and productively to one's class standing than one's gender or sexuality. In the lyric's preference for fun and sassy "queen" attitude over the "discontent" and transgression associated with being a "drag," we see Jinjur and Tip's antagonism

played out. This emotional hegemony is ubiquitous: in Gay Pride versus Gay Shame[82], in groups happily trying to get in on state privilege and those refusing them, on those who find happiness and "content[ment]" in their gender transitions and those for whom transition is an imperfect process that may help us experiment in dissent.[83] In Tip/Ozma, we see the compromises required in order to be a Queen.

Throughout this section, I have interpreted Baum's text as an allegory and a case study of the way in which the mutual reinforcement of national, gendered, architectural, and urban homes works to both domesticate transgression and to require the rural body to urbanize in order to be legible as properly gendered (even properly transgendered). However, it is the text's power as a fantasy that makes it relevant to queer and trans readers today. There has been no shortage of such vernacular readings of the text. Sherilyn Connelly, in *Fantasy*, agrees outright that the text represents a desirable fantasy: Tip's transformation might mean little, she suggests,

> Except for those...who wanted at that age and every age which followed to be a girl rather than a boy, making that scene wish-fulfillment [sic] of the highest order. I'm ambivalent about travelling to a magical land with talking scarecrows and flying monkeys and little people who've based their municipal government around getting a sugar fix, but a no-fuss no-muss transformation into a beautiful girl, and a princess, no less? Yes, right now, please please please thank you.

Presumably for these very reasons, the text is often addressed on internet discussion boards, where it is both recommended as a suitable transgender young adult novel and discussed wistfully as a tale that had some effect on one's early transgender identity formation.[84] The text is equally a fantasy for queer and feminist critics: Pugh sees "feminine community" ("Lived" 221) and Lurie sees "minority rights" (qtd. in Pugh, "Cannibals" 326). I've shown here precisely what unqueer fantasies lie behind the rights and communities of the text. Moreover, when considering the import of the text's historical distance from the present moment, it is worth noting that as transgender has become increasingly legible to (and possible for) mainstream audiences, this gender-change subplot has been intentionally dropped from adaptations of the story. Disney's 1985 live-action film adaptation, for instance, reduces Tip/Ozma to a very minor role. Dorothy displaces Tip as the protagonist, while Ozma (who, indeed, viewers only ever meet *as* Ozma, never as Tip) merely tells Dorothy near the end of the film that she had previously been transformed into a *mirror* (not a boy) by Mombi. This elision demands the question: as ambiguously proto-transing texts such as *The Marvelous Land of Oz* have given way to "transgender young adult literature" that consists mostly of pedagogical awareness/acceptance parables, has the increasing legibility of the transgender child actually helped generate a less imaginative literary life for transgender fantasy tales and narratives?[85] Could Tip become Ozma in this text only because such a transition was so patently impossible at the time? What can be unearthed when reading a trans text written before transgender youth was even conceivable?[86]

At first glance, an early twentieth-century youth tale may hold little

relevance for our present situation; however, it is precisely because of the flights

of fantasy made possible by the text's historically removed and utopic world that

it is able to clarify some conditions of contemporary transgender for us. In sum,

taken up in our own cultural milieu, the tale functions as a very specific fantasy of

intersecting modes of mobility (gender, class, geographical). Yet, these dynamics

are precisely what is *obscured* by contemporary narratives of transgender that

represent genders as neutral, individual, sovereign traits that are unaffected by

factors such as space, race, and class. Following Slavoj Žižek's arguments that

"fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its co-ordinates" (7) and that "the radical

intersubjectivity of fantasy" means that fantasy is "really about [our] attempts to

form an identity" (9), I have suggested that this text's life as a contemporary

fantasy of gender change may work to teach us the dubious lesson of how to

desire a particular form of urban citizenship/identity as the natural ending to rural

trans upbringing. In Oz's fantasy world of "minority rights" and "feminine

community" – which appears to be imbued with an utopian freedom of bodies – I

have suggested that the apparent freedom of fantasy actually produces a very

limited version of bodily transformation. In this sense, as Žižek puts it, the fantasy

"simultaneously *closes the actual span of choices* (fantasy renders and sustains

the structure of the forced choice, it tells us how we are to choose if we are to

maintain the freedom of choice)" (Žižek 29). This lesson about desire is played

out through the juxtaposition of Tip with Jinjur, whose transgressions are

disciplined while Tip's are rewarded; Jinjur's wrong choice (leading an army of

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girls in rebellion against the men of the city) is positioned as a threat to the democratic value of choice. This paradox – one must choose a certain way in order to preserve the very possibility of choice – is a powerful allegory for the current norms surrounding transgender architectonics of the body. As Aizura and Žižek together suggest, the fantasy of the free choice to be able to be transgender (without discrimination, with health care, and with legal recognition) is very specifically contingent upon one's official (legal, medical, public) adherence to a very limited model of gender. Specifically, protecting the very few choices for transgender means, at current, ensuring that transgender is absolutely not seen *as* a choice but instead as the restoration of what 'should have been.'

In this section, I have tried to show the stakes of cleaving to the "forced choice" of state-sanctioned medical models of gender transition and the problematic ideas that underpin these. Specifically, I have suggested that 1) perpetuating this forced choice equation of national, economic, and gendered homes is a classist and essentially urbanist venture, and, 2) in response to this, that we require a new architectonic of the trans subject that renovates these problematic investments. In the next and final section, I approach this reconstruction from two related angles, each of which tackles different figures through which the transgender subject is increasingly sharpened, defined, and domesticated: the transgender child and the question of what constitutes transgender assemblage.

The Genitalia Fairy and Other Youthful Figures

How is childhood represented in this text that precedes the institution of the transgender child – and to what effect? I argue below that invested in conventions of inheritance though it is, *The Marvelous Land of Oz* remakes family dynamics; it constitutes, in Pugh's words, a world of "anti-reproductive intimacy" ("Lived" 226) that undoes the tenets of what Edelman calls "reproductive futurism" (4). But Baum himself conceived of his Oz series as a more kid-friendly kind of fairy tale, one that "gladly dispenses with all disagreeable incident" (vii). To him, this new positive tone comprises a new Americanized[87] genre of "wonder tale" (vii), one "in which the stereotyped genie, dwarf and fairy are eliminated, together with all the horrible and blood-curdling incident devised by their [European] authors to point a fearsome moral to each tale" (vii). If there is one conventional kiddie lit moral left out of the text, however, it is the forceful imperative to listen to one's parents and guardians at all costs. Tip's whole adventure is premised on the moment he decides to run away – a decision left undisciplined. In this narrative, the truculent kid is *right*; the joke he plays on his guardian ends up being a ticket out of town; his decision to run away is the best one he makes (from his perspective). This disobedient premise, along with the bodies, affiliations, and interrelationality characteristic of Tip's trips, challenge the intertwined upward-mobility narratives of class-urbanism-maturity traced out in the less hopeful section above. For Tip, "growing up" was achieved the moment he agreed to stay and live in the city forever. If this rings even somewhat true for some rural trans and queer kids (as it certainly did in the small village

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from which I write this chapter) disrupting representations of "youth" is indeed a

way to question why "growing up" seems so often to mean "growing out of" the

country. Here another meaning of Deleuze and Guattari's phrase "becoming-

minor" comes to the foreground: ought we to regard children – minors – as

engaged in becoming or as interpretable bodies whose futures and typologies we

can read, predict, guide, and pathologize? A rural temporality that breaks the trans

subject out of this historical narrative – writ as a microcosm on the "lifetime" of

the trans subject – suggests that the former ought to be the case.

Why, we might begin by asking, is the child such an important question

for any attempt to disarticulate transgender from firm taxonomies and progress

narratives? Athough Lee Edelman fixes his sights on the ways in which

*hetero*normative culture offers up the child as the fetishized excuse for its

homophobia, one reason why the question of childhood is so salient is that there

has been much *pro*-LGBT fervour about LGBT youth as of late. For instance,

long-running Canadian television show *Degrassi* (*Saved by the Bell* meets *Gossip

Girl*) recently introduced a transgender character, a young "FTM" (though the

plot and the character's presentation suggest some less determinate mode of

transgender than a hormonal regimen) named Adam. Understandably, there has

been much commentary within and beyond Canadian trans communities about

this character: why is he not played by a trans actor?[88] Why does he not get laid?

Why does he seem to know so few of the tiny intuitive tricks a trans person learns

about survival – ie. don't pick fights with bullies; don't join fight clubs with

bigots; don't gag with disgust at the thought of using the "accessible" washroom

at your school (solidarity, man!). To silence any critiques, however, evoking the rural trans child does the trick: as one blogger sees it, this character is "ground-breaking… for the sake of the trans kids watching, maybe stuck in the middle of nowhere in a rural town, wondering if anyone else has ever felt like they feel." In this way, as a very specific *fantasy* of televised urban outreach, *Degrassi* might tell us more about how some urbanites might like to represent themselves to themselves, rather than about what rural trans kids might be, become, want, or need. To repeat Žižek, there is a "radical intersubjectivity of fantasy" such that "what the fantasy…is really about is [our] attempt to form an identity…that would satisfy [others]" (8) and thus make the city the object of our rural desire. If fantasy is about making oneself seem attractive, then who benefits from this always-available emotional narrative (this fantasy) of the rural queer or transgender child, always in need of some televised simulacra of urban community, urban possibilities, and practices of the body and relationships that are likely only available elsewhere (if at all)?

Herring points out that one result of this particular narrative of youth is that it excuses the metronormative superiority of urban queer theory. One of the first writers Herring addresses is Michael Warner, who, in *The Trouble With Normal,* suggests the following: "the sexual culture of New York City serves people around the world, even if only as the distant reference point of queer kids growing up in North Carolina or Idaho, who know that somewhere things are different" (qtd. in Herring 3). As Herring puts it, Warner "rais[es] the stakes of his local critique to global proportions" (3). The very difficulty we might have

reducing a New York-based analysis to the status of a "local critique" proves the very point Warner makes: American urban queerness has indeed been constructed in our cultural imaginary as a globally-relevant source of hope. Like Dan Savage's viral "It Gets Better" Campaign,[89] this model relies upon a very uninteresting temporality of youth: it suggests that if rural youth just *wait* (and become upwardly mobile, and leave behind whatever has sustained them) then things will get better. This advocation of waiting for later (adulthood) is especially ironic as an implied trajectory and temporality, given the importance placed on the *prolonging* of adolescence in queer culture. As we saw earlier, Halberstam valorizes this reconfiguration of youth: "the notion of a stretched-out adolescence, for example, challenges the conventional binary formulation of a life narrative divided by a clear break between [youth and adulthood]" (153). While her analysis of the Backstreet Boys begins by acknowledging that "extended adolescence is not particularly new, and nor is it always and everywhere a sign of resistan[ce]" (175), her definition of queer time nonetheless hinges on an ethic of adolescence that relies on its practitioners' access to many resources and choices. Again, we may note an interesting double-standard if we take these various thinkers together: it is central to queer temporality that we "redefine the binary of adolescence and adulthood" (161) that leads us into normative adult life, but it remains commonplace that rural queer and transgender youth are encouraged to wait, look forward to adulthood, and then flee. In a sense, we see, then, that the privileged queer adolescence we often celebrate – in adults – is not only an urban

adolescence but also an adolescence that assumes a degree of freedom, resources, and capacities that are distinctly those of the contemporary and resourceful adult.

If, then, rural transgender youth throw a wrench into theories of both prolonged adolescence and queer temporality, then this fraught category can help us question the urban-centric architectonic of the transing subject in general. Considering that, in Warner's and Savage's views, the hopes for rural transgender are merely urban ones (to be attained later), part of any model of rural temporality must include a redefinition of transgender youth and must remain suspicious of the ways in which institutional (medical, psychiatric, normative) hermeneutics are not solving but are in fact shaping the conditions whereby rural trans youth are by definition either an impossible or a miserable category. Whereas Edelman interprets the category of "youth" as a largely heteronormative one, here we see it functioning in a homonormative mode; here we see the category of rural queer youth function to shore up the equation between queerness and the city – the rural queer or trans child as a figure or beam in the emotional architecture of urban queerness' proud image of itself. What kind of violence is produced in this reduction of rural transgender youth to a figure in urban adult economies of (spatial) desire and identity? Not coincidentally, for Edelman, evocations of "The Child" always entail a troubling mutation of *figure*. Concerned evocations of the category of "youth," he suggests, set out to nullify the possibility that "the Child…might find an enjoyment that would nullify the figural value, itself imposed by adult desire, of the Child as unmarked by the adult's adulterating implication in desire itself" (21). In other words, Edelman identifies that cultural

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narratives of childhood are marked by both desire and fear; the fear is, in Edelman's estimation, that the child will find a desire and a life that disrupts the child's role (as non-desiring and in need of saving) imposed by the adult (or by the "adult" urban queer community). Is it even possible to imagine a rural transgender person (configured as immature and undeveloped despite one's age) who does not need or desire the interventions or representations of urban queers and trans people? The very difficulty of doing so shows that Edelman's critique of the child figure must be extended to LGBT-produced evocations of LGBT youth as well. In this application of Edelman's counter-narrative of youth, we see that there is much that may be rather controlling, normative, and self-centred about the increasingly incessant discourse about transgender youth.

One of the ways in which adult priorities take precedence in this discourse is what Edelman refers to as the figural life of the child. Indeed, figurative speech has taken on a strange life in trans discourse, one that helps evince the always already tragic *image* of The Transgender Child. For instance, in the *20/20* special *My Secret Self*, hosted by fervent tranny-chaser Barbara Walters, a worried mother describes the first time she "knew" her child was transgender. It was "the day she came up to me… [and] said, 'mommy, when's the good fairy gonna come with her magic wand and change, you know, my genitalia?'" The specifically *tragic* note of the spectacle is produced through the supposed juxtaposition of a life problem as grave as transgender with the "empty, innocent, pur[e]" (Kincaid 10) language from the mouth of a babe. The juxtaposition delivers us the *image* of the Child as not only "a coordinate set of *have-nots*" (Kincaid 10) (here, not

having language to grasp the gravity of the situation) but also as the bearer of an innocent purity that we wish to preserve. Its emotional mobilization of narrative also forgets Kincaid's point about the power of stories: that "a child's memory is developed not simply from data but from learning a canonical narrative; we know that what we are and have been comes to us from narrative forms that take on so much authority they start looking like nature" (15). The poignant but only implied answer to the child's question is, of course, the adult knowledge that of course no "good fairy" will come; the child's narrative of magic can figure – without explanation - *as tragic*. Rarely do we see such an explicit instance of Edelman's contention that "the Child, in the historical epoch of our current epistemological regime, is the figure for this compulsory investment in the misrecognition of figure" (Edelman 18).

I now turn back to Baum's text in order to mount a response to both this misrecognition of figure and fantasy and also to seek out Oz's transing mode of youth. Baum's text restores the child from "figure" to agent (albeit in a fantasy world), one that engages in relational gender-making and *makes* relationships rather than merely fits into or threatens a pre-existing family form. (It also, undeniably, suggests that leaving the old country house is where one's life begins.) The family of this text is transspecies, inter-generational, and are comprised of "*unnatural participation*" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand* 240) rather than by genetic make-up or legal relationships. For instance, the relationship configured as most familial in this text is that between Tip and Jack Pumpkinhead. The latter, though he is many feet taller than the young Tip,

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happily calls Tip – who built him – "Father," even though it was Mombi who brought him to life. This "child" was conceived as a ruse, as an object of familial disobedience, and as a product of imagination; Jack figures, therefore, as an effect of Tip's discontented energy made manifest. Though the relationship between them is often reined in under the sign of family – "you must be my creator my parent my father!...Then I owe you obedience…and you owe me – support!" (25) cries Jack – a remainder of this queer parenthood persists: Tip laughs at the idea that he is a father and interjects, "or your inventor" (24). Moreover, a sense of the unsettling quality of the relationship is also marked: "the boy, small and rather delicate in appearance seemed somewhat embarrassed at being called 'father' by the tall, awkward, pumpkinheaded man" (27), but in order to avoid "another long and tedious explanation" (27), Tip represses the discomfort by "chang[ing] the subject…abruptly" (27).

Despite the text's ambivalent orientation to this queer "family" dynamic, Tip's crew is, in a very literal sense, made up of anomalies: each of the pack (the Scarecrow, Cowardly Lion, Tin Woodman, Woggle-Bug, Jack Pumpkinhead, the Gump, and the Saw-Horse), are literally one of a kind, or temporarily "anomalous" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand* 243).[90] Their various refutations of taxonomic logic do not stop them from engaging in the assemblage-building practice of limb-swapping. For instance, when the animated Saw-Horse loses a leg and can no longer carry the stiff-jointed Pumpkin, the solution is a matter-of-fact one of cross-body prosthesis: as the Woggle-Bug asks, "If the Pumpkinhead is to ride, why not use one of his legs to make a leg for the horse that carries him?

I judge that both are made of wood" (76). With little hesitation that very solution is enacted – a reassignment of limbs that fulfills the pack's imperative to move, with an understated disregard for the sovereignty of the body or the individual. With these prosthetic assemblages traversing the boundaries of bodies, this is not, as Pugh suggests, "community" ("Lived" 221); if anything, it is what Jean-Luc Nancy calls "inoperative community" (1), in which "the relation (the community) is, if it *is*, nothing other than what it undoes, in its very principle – and at its closure or on its limit – the autarchy of absolute immanence" (4). This "community," rather than shore up "the absolute-subject of metaphysics" must "*cut into* this subject" (4), an appropriate trope for Oz and even trans narrative. The group often strives, of course, to fit together and cohere: prior to one escape from the city, the Scarecrow even commands the others to "fetch a clothesline… and tie us all together" (54). But even this image of a forced integrity or connection is imagined only as a way to coordinate their failure to operate. The Scarecrow's caveat: "Then if one falls off we will all fall off" (54).

The reconfiguration of the concept of inter-species relations is one's of the text's exemplary dynamics of such unnatural affiliations. In the text's economies of animality, that is, contact overrides scientific divisions (of species and types). As Pugh points out in relation to the entire *Oz* series, "the fragile balance between food and friends in Oz" is managed by one simple but inconclusive rule: "surely one would never eat a friend" (330) in this land of pumpkins, humans, wizards, talking mice and cowardly lions. Here, affiliations are mediated and defined not by an abstract taxonomy or from a nutritional standpoint but rather by one's

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actions and appetites. Pugh goes on to suggest that the land of Oz's food practices imply a critique of the divide between nature and culture. As he suggests, Oz challenges Claude Lévi-Strauss' well-trodden argument that "the raw/cooked axis is characteristic of culture; the fresh/decayed one of nature, since cooking brings about the cultural transformation of the raw" (142). It does so precisely by figuring being cooked and eaten as a looming punishment for "uncivilized" behaviour. That is, if an animal "cannot be effectively civilized," Pugh suggests, it/he/she "should be quickly consumed to serve a constructive role in the maintenance of the social order" ("Cannibals" 328). In this animal world, humans "are frequently derided as 'meat people' who suffer the many vagaries of biological existence" (Pugh, "Cannibals" 334). This contextualization of the humans as merely one type of agent in the social world of Oz hints at the mode of relationality enacted by the text: one of what trans theorist Eva Hayward calls "transspeciated selves" (64). Here, she explains this concept in light of Antony and the Johnson's song "The Cripple and the Starfish" (a song that brings these two bodies together through the theme of loss and regeneration). As Hayward asks:

> In becoming transsexual am I not also becoming 'like a starfish' as the song suggests?...Is the analogical device of 'like-ness' ('like a starfish' or like a woman) too clumsy a rhetorical device for the kind of poetic and material enactments of transsexing/speciating? (67)

As Deleuze and Guattari state in relation to Lolito, "an eater of bottle, earthenware, porcelains, iron, and even bicycles," to say that Lolito is "like" a dog

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or a transsexual is "like" a starfish would only be to "propose a structural analogy of relations (man-iron = dog-bone)" (302) or starfish-limb = transsexual-prosthesis. Becoming, they insist, is entirely a different matter: "it is a question of composing a body with the animal, a body without organs defined by zones of intensity or proximity" (*Thousand* 302). Affiliation, in this sense, is not merely contact across a pre-determined taxonomical border; it is, rather, a matter of material collaboration and of recognizing that these collaborations preexist such taxonomies. In Baum's text, this economy of collaboration and affiliation seems not to strike any of the characters as odd: they appreciate each other's refutation of taxonomic logic, create magical bodies that they have randomly assembled together, and use magic to go beyond becoming "like" a pumpkin or "like" a girl to instead become something new and indeterminate. Yet, such assembled trans-speciated bodies do not merely transform into ideal species-bound bodies: they still evoke the material from which they rose. For instance, Jack Pumpkinhead comes to life through magic but does not become a man, which is the body after which Tip modelled him. Instead he becomes a living set of sticks and fruit. What results is somewhere between pumpkin and human but is certainly neither: the pumpkin part of this new body (which was, of course, *already* alive – as a pumpkin) doesn't become a human head but instead takes on some new kind of life in assemblage with Tip, Mombi, and the other bodies that help him move and survive.

In this sense, the text offers ambiguous glimpses of what Hayward calls trans-speciating and what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as becoming. Hayward

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makes clear that these related transings of the body have much to do with gender and our current conceptions of it. As she suggests,

> Transsexuals and starfish challenge disembodied metaphors (such as like, resemblance, or simile), and propose how we are metonymically stitched to carnal substrates. In other words, I'm not like a starfish; I am of a starfish. I am not trapped in my body; I am of my body. (76)

This description of moving beyond models of "likeness" is very similar to Deleuze and Guattari's advice on "becoming-animal:"

> Do not imitate a dog, but make your organism enter into composition with *something else* in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest. (*Thousand* 302)

Together, Hayward and Deleuze and Guattari point us towards modes of affiliation with bodies that destroy our taken-for-granted ideas about the divisions between bodies, species, genders, and families. As Hayward concludes, relationships "between" humans and starfish "have no structuring lack, no primordial division, but are sensuously intertwined" (69). To be sure, readers get only the humblest hint at the kind of becoming and "unnatural participation" that Deleuze and Guattari associate with the packs, affects, and multiplicities that challenge state- and family-based organizations of bodies. But in even that small peek, we can see that despite Tip's eventual capitulation to urban "original" gender adulthood, there remains a core of transing materiality in this text that challenges the borders of subjects and species – a challenge that is urgent in light

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of the increasing frequency with which emotional evocations of transgender youth

institutionalize and tame the potential – even the magic – of being a weirdo hick

kid who knows that the interpellations of mainstream representations are not

calling you. In this section, Oz has shown us that transing the temporality of the

queer or trans rural child means refuting the Oedipal trajectory and foreseeable

emotional economies of the biological family in favour of magical contact with

others. The becoming-minor of rural temporality therefore refers to two related

movements: first, following Benjamin's lead, the blasting of trans out of

progressive urban-centric narratives of queer history, and secondly, at the level of

the body, blasting the trans child out of the structure of subjective "lifetime" (the

very temporality undone by Woolf) in favour of fashioning and refashioning

becomings.

Conclusion: Rural Transgender, an Ass-Backwards Possibility

This chapter responds to the metronormative quality of queer and trans

studies by developing a slow and backwards rural temporality that refuses both

the linear progressive narratives of flights to the supposed wealth of the city and

also the conventions of transgender youth that prop up these pilgrimage narratives

(of history and of the body). As a correlative, we have seen that changing the

status of rural queering and transing is not a matter of inclusion, recognition, or

awareness, but is, rather, a matter of changing our beliefs about such seemingly

gender-neutral topics as style, childhood, wealth, and migration. The

"backwardness" – or, after Deleuze and Guattari, involution (rather than

regression) – forwarded here is an extension of Scott Herring's keen attempt to

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recuperate the stereotype of rural backwardness and slowness. While Herring's

backwardness refers to the anti-fashionable aesthetic styles of rural gay and

lesbian subjects, here I have focused instead on the incessantly re-fashioning

aesthetic styles of transing as a mode (of designing bodies and writing histories).

Both versions of rural backwardness specifically disrupt the way in which trans

and queer history is *accessible* to (when not simply equated with) urban queers or

with "modern" queers who view others from their position at the "cutting edge."

As Herring says of Michael Meads' aesthetic: its rural aesthetic "undermine[s]

any sense of continuity or cross-identification" (114) from queer urbanites. Here,

Herring describes this denial of urban cross-identification:

> Aggravating a legacy that gives historical weight to metronormative
>
> imaginaries past and present, *Alabama Souvenirs* refuses to allow queer
>
> urbanites to find yet another version of their historical selves through his
>
> photography...By doing so, Meads' intimate stylistics could be said to
>
> perform what Jose Esteban Muñoz terms a "disidentification," "a mode of
>
> dealing with dominant ideology...that neither opts to assimilate within
>
> such a structure nor strictly opposes it"...Evoking several icons of white
>
> gay male art, Meads re-stages them in Alabama rurality only to mystify
>
> homonormative and heternormative identification processes, past and
>
> present, altogether. (114)

In Herring's account, then, Meads uses the aesthetic "backwardness" of

anachronism to bring the disruption of queer ruralities into the "traditional

archives of Western gay male art that naturalize queer urbanism" (106). In this

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chapter, I tried to model this approach: to anachronistically look to a text that predates the eruption of transgender youth in order to introduce some epistemological uncertainty to the transgender subject and citizen. One question with which this project as a whole ends, then, is: is there something useful in "going backwards" with regards to transgender politics and philosophies? Have we come to implicitly accept certain kinds of action, knowledge, and narrative as sole producers of "progress" for transgender? Throughout this project, I have suggested that this is the case. I have looked for moments where the forward-thinking ethos of modernism has collapsed into obsessions with, citations of, and melancholy relationships to the past – into, that is, certain kinds of backwardness. In Chapter Two, I read Brasserie as exemplary of what Heather Love calls "the temporal splitting at the heart of all modernism" (6); both DS+R and Woolf deal with the dual momentum of what Michael O'Driscoll calls "the modernist dream of the self-effacing archive" (293); and Beckett's protagonist explicitly struggles to refuse to accept a past and identity. In Chapter Two in particular, we saw that in modernist architectural manifestos and histories, attachment to colourful and textured designs was regarded as both backwards (through an over-pronounced attachment to the past) *and* as queer. This judgement of aesthetic queerness made sense not only because colour came to be seen as flamboyant and unmodern but also because, as Love suggests, queers were regarded "as a backwards race" (6).

In fact, queerness, for Love, is even defined in exactly this way: queers have "backwards feelings" (to reverse the title of her text) about ourselves, about history, and about futurity. With Herring, this chapter has insisted that rurality can

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be an exemplary and not-yet institutionalized form of queer backwardness that Love valorizes and the queer temporality that Halberstam champions. Our backwardness is perhaps even cause to swagger, given its reflection of and intervention in these heroic terms of queer theory. Perhaps rural queers and transgender people can even swagger about their style-setting ways: we were backwards long before queer time was in vogue; we were thought to have no futures before Lee Edelman suggested a thing; and, we explored our land by legwork before "smooth space" was something to work towards. On the other hand, Herring's reclamation of our backwardness undermines the very importance of any such claim of primacy or style. Casting aside claims of importance and prominence, we can instead struggle against the practiced abjection of rurality and ruralizing temporalities in our everyday lives, reconfiguring our ideas of wealth, family, space, and time in such a way that de-emphasizes the "civilization" and "sophistication" on which the supremacy of the urban, as a category and a fantasy, depends. We can live out the concurrent critical backwardness and counterintuitive hope it takes to never let the dust settle during this ongoing marathon of trans and queer institutionalization and urbanization.[91]

Endnotes

1   As Pugh puts it, "a tensegrity system is established when a set of discontinuous compressive components interacts with a set of continuous tensile components to define a stable volume in space" (3).

2   For more on ways in which specifically lesbian or cross-dressed counterpublic behaviour can throw urban norms into question, see Sally Munt's queer reading of Benjamin's flâneur, "The Lesbian flâneur" in *Mapping Desire: Geographies of Sexualities* (104-14).

3   For more on queer interventions in what is considered intimacy (and why), see David Bell's "Perverse Dynamics, Sexual Citizenship and the Transformation of Intimacy" in his text (co-edited with Gill Valentine) *Mapping Desire: Geographies of Sexualities* (278-90).

4   For more on Chisholm's use of Benjamin's critical historiography, see especially her Introduction (1-62). Here is an explanation of Benjamin's method, as forwarded by Chisholm:

> The task of the historical materialist is threefold: he (1) approaches a historical object as a monad, where it confronts him as such; (2) recognizes "the specific era" wherein this historical object comes into being, and *of which* that era is traced in the object in miniature; (3) blasts that era out of "the homogeneous course of history" into a constellation of antitheses or "configuration saturated with tensions." The historical materialist substitutes teleology – narratives of progress – for monadology. Conjoining the metaphysical and the material, he apprehends the dialectic that "is crystallized as a monad." What specifies the era are its modes of production. The metropolitan era is marked by its dialectics of ubanization. The "lifework" of this era is "preserved" and "cancelled" in artifacts and architectures of urban industrialism that are prematurely and wastefully remaindered or fetishistically renovated and aggrandized. (247-8)

5   Eli Clare has recently defended this architectonic of the body in his article "Resisting Shame: Making our Bodies Home" (2010), in which he explicitly sets up the complex feeling of shame as the opposite of 'feeling at home.' For Clare, living in a proper bodily home means feeling "beautiful, strong, right" (463) and free of shame. Even if we are to discount the considerable body of work that has been produced on the topic of gay or queer shame, the question remains: why is a "home" in particular held to be the opposite of shame? For an account of queer shame, see David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub's edited collection, *Gay Shame*. See also http://www.gayshamesf.org/ for the online archive of gay shame's cutting edge in radical activist communities.

6   For evidence of Feinberg's Marxist approach to transgender, see hir 1992 pamphlet *Transgender Liberation: a Movement Whose Time Has Come*. See also *Stone Butch Blues*. (Note especially Jess' experiences in factory work and union organizing.)

7   Notably, Incerti invokes Haraway's figure of the cyborg to describe the mixed-media productions of DS+R. In this association of transgender with futuristic multi-media cyborg life, we are reminded that "transgender" for Incerti and others figures as an harbinger of both the postmodern occupation with cyber-technologies and also the end-of-history that such technologies will ostensibly occasion. In such a reading, transgender is reduced to not only a symbol of the mixture of two apparently heretofore-discrete genders but also to an evacuation of meaning rather than a proliferation. For more on the mutual implication of end-of-gender narratives with apocalyptic end-of-history narratives, see Rita Felski's essay "Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sexe: Transsexuality, Postmodernism, and the Death of History." For an example of this kind of anxious thinking about technology and transgender, see Jean Baudrillard's "The Final Solution: Cloning

Beyond the Human and Inhuman" in his book *The Vital Illusion*. Here, Baudrillard suggests that technologies such as cybersex and artificial insemination mark the end of sexual revolution. As he suggests, since we no longer have to have sex in order to procreate, these technologies entail "the obliteration of sex" (29).

8   As I have learned in conversation with architects in Canada, it is also commonplace among self-identified feminists to chide Hadid on the basis that she has willingly "given up" her femininity in order to succeed as an architect. Of course, we seldom remark upon what things, including femininity, are "given up" by men in order to succeed as architects.

9   For more on Lynn's blob architecture, see his 1998 text, *Folds, Bodies & Blobs: Collected Essays.*

10   As Cvetkovich points out, Derrida's text itself is certainly not free from these familial legacies. His text continually returns to scenes of father-son legacy (in texts by Yosef Yerushalmi and Freud). As Cvetkovich puts it, "the dependence of Derrida's argument on a father-son story suggests that the general theory of the archive is in fact situated within a culturally specific context" (268).

11   To trace Deleuze and Guattari's suggestion back through its predecessor, see Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* (which contains four essays). See also Foucault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," which will be a key theoretical text in Chapter One of this project.

12   Tellingly, both Stryker, in her trans account, and Deleuze and Guattari, in their account of becoming, each look to sadomasochism as a model. Here they are in tandem:

> I want to claim that transsexual sadomasochism affords me a glimpse of non-unique revolutionary potentials – exemplifying the materially productive effects of extending and prolonging into the world poetically generated patterns of response to external conditions, demonstrating how body modification can become a site of social transformation, proving that the real can be materialized differently than it now is or once was. (Stryker 44)

> Take the interpretation of masochism...it is claimed that the masochist, like everybody else, is after pleasure but can only get it through pain and phantasied humiliations whose function is to allay or ward off deep anxiety. This is inaccurate; the masochist's suffering is the price he must pay, not to achieve pleasure, but to untie the pseudobond between desire and pleasure as an extrinsic measure...In short, the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire. (Deleuze and Guattari 155)

Both texts, to repeat Stryker, are interested in bodies "before an awareness of awareness itself." Masochism is a turn towards this (or, sometimes, a mimesis of this) non-subjective mode of bodily becoming precisely for its relinquishing of power: the subject is no longer in control. As all of these thinkers see it, suffering and forgetting one's self generates the possibility for change. This gives us an indication of precisely how difficult Deleuze and Guattari's critical forgetfulness is: in their example, a masochist must use suffering as an affective tool in order to effect this forgetfulness. Also, Stryker brings Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs" to bear on the actual painful modification of organs that happens together in transsexuality and sadomasochism. Her article ends with an analysis of "The Cripple and the Starfish" by Antony and the Johnsons, a song that associates love with being hurt: "It's true I always wanted love to be hurtful... So come on hurt me / I'll grow back like a starfish" (Stryker 44). In each of these texts, pain and suffering are required for radical change. Yet, these pains are configured as small prices to pay for the freedom of having yourself beat out of you. This is a drastically different theory of trans pain and suffering than those that circulate in trans discourse currently. For a survey of and a response to these narratives (which often claim suffering as the authority of one's speech as a victim) – see

David Valentine's "The Calculus of Pain: Violence, Narrative, and the Self," in his text *Imagining Transgender: the Ethnography of a Category* (204-30). One example is telling here: of self-mutilation exercised by pre-operative transsexual people, Jay Prosser suggests that "the ability to give oneself pain, to harm one's own body, surely depends upon a great degree of bodily alienation" (74). Deleuze and Guattari would suggest, on the contrary, that the ability to give oneself pain is a way of strategically choosing suffering as a way to introduce such alienation and self-forgetfulness.

[13]   Deleuze and Guattari also attribute this self-absenting forgetfulness to other literary archetypes: "The knight of the novel of courtly love spends his time forgetting his name, what he is doing, what people say to him, he doesn't know where he is or to whom he is speaking, he is continually drawing a line of absolute deterritorialization, but also losing his way, stopping, and falling into black holes" (174).

[14]   An early draft of a portion of this chapter has been published as "Breaking Ground on a Theory of Transgender Architecture" in the *Seattle Journal of Social Justice*, June 2010. A close reading of DS+R's Blur Building, based on this chapter, will appear in truncated form in *Theorizing Sex* (Sydney: Cape Breton UP, 2012).

[15]   Appropriately enough for this consideration of Brasserie's cake decorators, Loos almost addresses the question of icing directly: he insists that when he eats his gingerbread, "it tastes better" (21) if it is smoothly cut rather than shaped like "a heart or a baby or a rider" (21). While for Loos, geometric rather than representative gingerbread is considered *un*shaped, rectangular skyscrapers came to be seen as the "unadorned" body of modernist architecture.

[16]   Cavanagh makes this point in a very different way than I do here. As she puts it, "Gendered ways of being at odds with a coordinated system of normative signs and significations governing the border between male and female, masculine and feminine, are related to large worries about white heterosexual reproductive futurity and the health of the nation" (151). I try to show above how and why gender non-normativity and colour are "related." Specifically, I supplement Cavanagh's account by suggesting that (rhetorics of) plumbing and the utopian impulses of high modernism's white architecture played a significant role in propelling such nationalist and hetero-futurist thinking.

[17]   Here, Foucault describes in detail the way in which psychiatric mobilizations of the concept of degeneration result in a new, subtler, perhaps more dangerous, "neoracism:"

> With this notion of degeneration and these analyses of heredity, you can see how psychiatry could plug into, or rather give rise to, a racism that was very different in this period from what could be called traditional, historical racism, from "ethnic racism." The racism that psychiatry gave birth to in this period is racism against the abnormal, against individuals who, as carriers of a condition, a stigmata, or any defect whatsoever, may more or less randomly transmit to their heirs the unpredictable consequences of the evil, or rather of the non-normal, that they carry within them. It is a racism, therefore, whose function is not so much the prejudice or defense of one group against another as the detection of all those within a group who may be the carriers of a danger to it. It is an internal racism that permits the screening of every individual within a given society... The new racism specific to the twentieth century, this neoracism as the internal means of defense of a society against its abnormal individuals, is the child of psychiatry. (*Abnormal* 317)

[18]   Here, Le Corbusier makes clear the confluence of colour, hygiene, and the cleansing of the self: with whitewash, he suggests, "there are no more dirty, dark corners. *Everything is shown as it is.* Then comes *inner* cleanness, for the course adopted leads to refusal to allow anything at all which is not correct, authorized, intended, desired, thought-out: no action before thought" (188).

[19]   Valentine's reminder about non-trans modes of daily body modification can be found in his forthcoming article, "Sue E. Generous: Toward a Theory of Non-Transsexuality" in *Feminist Studies* (2012).

[20]   See both "The Case of Transgender" in Heyes' *Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies* (38-62), and "*Ressentiment*, Agency, Freedom: Reflecting on Responses to *Self-Transformations* in *Hypatia* 25.1 (2010): 229-33.

[21]   The beginnings of this theorization of DS+R's Brasserie space appear in Trystan Cotton's edited collection, *Trans/Migrations: the Geopolitics of Border-Crossing*. (New York: Routledge, 2011.) Another portion of this chapter has appeared in much-truncated form as "Fashioning Transgender Architecture" in *English Studies in Canada*, September 2010.

[22]   For readings of Woolf's life that equate her mother's death with her first "mental breakdown," see, most famously, her nephew Quentin Bell's *Virginia Woolf: a Biography* and Thomas Szasz's *"My Madness Saved Me": the Madness and Marriage of Virginia Woolf.*

[23]   In *Camera Lucida*, Barthes distinguishes between what he calls the *studium* and the *punctum* of a photograph. The studium of a photo is our culturally-prescribed interpretation, one that interprets according to "a certain training" (26) that we've learned in our everyday lives. In contrast, the *punctum* is: "a kind of subtle beyond – as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see" (59), an "accident," a "detail" that punctures the culturally-prescribed surface reading of the image, a "wound." By making fashion into an event in this portrait, Woolf confuses the easy readings of any one culturally-prescribed hermeneutics of the image. Though Barthes tellingly offers no model of how to discern or study the *punctum*, I cite his definition here because it speaks to the many ways in which Woolf's *Vogue* portrait pierces the interpretive habits of the viewer: its jarring discontinuities pierce through the aesthetic of 1920s fashion magazines, through the models of gender through which we interpret represented bodies, and through our learned instincts that allow us to "date" a photo as soon as we see it.

[24]   Two years after this portrait appeared in the British edition of *Vogue*, the American edition of the magazine introduced a modernist fashion trend that lasts to this day: the understated, plain, and (like modernist architecture) "unadorned" little black dress by Coco Chanel, the aesthetic of which is the polar opposite to Woolf's Victorian appropriation and refiguration here.

[25]   As Elizabeth M. Sheehan argues, "the most avant-garde aspect of the Omega designs [were] their colours" (54). Sheehan goes on to show that Woolf's orientation to this dual-impulsed modernism (that both looked to the past and sought to disconnect from it) was by no means simple or unchanging. Here, Sheehan quotes Woolf (from a letter to her sister Vanessa Bell, who ran the fashion section at the Omega) and suggests that Woolf's fashionability was ambiguous and creative. "Woolf," she suggests, "emphasised the aggressively modern aesthetic of Bell's boldly coloured designs:"

> My God! What colours you are responsible for! Karin [Stephen]'s clothes almost wrenched my eyes from the sockets – a skirt barred with reds and yellows of the vilest kind, and a pea green blouse on top, with a gaudy handerkerchief on her head, supposed to be the very boldest taste. I shall retire into dove colour and old lavender, with a lace collar, and lawn wristlets.

Woolf's dramatic description of the violence of Bell's designs rehearsed the Omega's claims to a defiantly avant-garde style, with all the connotations of advancing modernity and its assault on Victorian dress and behaviour. Woolf's claims to resist such trends by returning to 'lawn wristlets' were part of this rhetoric. Yet, in truth, Woolf was a faithful customer of the Omega, and not all of Bell's designs were so outrageous. (54)

[26]   Following de Certeau, Kwinter suggests that tactical space – in contrast to traceable and legible strategic space – "does not have a 'proper' place, it belongs to a nonspace, which is that of

a shifting, transitory, and volatile materiality, a materiality of flux and movement – in a word, the materiality of the event" (122). For more on this distinction of the city-walker's tactics versus strategies, see de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

[27]   For important texts that show these thinkers' similarities on specifically their concepts of time, see Shiv Kumar Kumar's texts *Virginia Woolf and Bergson's Durée* (1977) and *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel* (1962), as well as James Barry Veitenheimer's 1973 text *Bergson and Woolf: Fluxing Reality*. For a contrary interpretation, see J.W. Graham's 1956 article "A Negative Note on Bergson and Virginia Woolf." See also Ann Banfield's 2003 essay "Time Passes: Virginia Woolf, Post-Impressionism, and Cambridge Time," in which she argues that "Woolf adopted not Henri Bergson's philosophy but G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell's realism. Time passes not as durée but as a series of still moments" (471). As we will see in this chapter, there is reason to take issue with Banfield's dismissal; not only does a focus on transgender make clear the political stakes of Woolf's Bergsonism, but moreover, it will helps us to see that Woolf's politics of narrative is based specifically on an outright *rejection* of realist temporality.

[28]   See Gillies' chapter 5 (107-131) for a survey of classic Bergsonian readings of Woolf, from 1932 onwards.

[29]   To see a comprehensive archive of the textile and fashion designs of the Omega Workshops, see *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-1919*, edited by Alexandra Gerstein. In that text, readers see that the dress designs and textile patterns of the Omega intentionally retained the handmade mark or "signature" of their creators, in contrast to those created with mechanical precision and reproduction. This uniqueness, as well as the designs' general flair for colour and texture, sharply distinguishes them from the modernism of designers like Loos and Le Corbusier.

[30]   To see the diversity of lesbian and trans readings of Hall's text, see *Palatable Poisons: Critical Perspectives of The Well on Loneliness*, edited by Jay Prosser and Laura L. Doan. For a specifically transsexual reading that focuses on the text's narrativization of trans-embodiment, see Prosser's "'Some Primitive Things Conceived in a Turbulent Age of Transition:' The Invert, *The Well of Loneliness*, and the Narrative Origins of Transsexuality" in his book *Second Skins: the Body Narratives of Transsexuality* (135-70). Here, Prosser suggests that despite the decades of lesbian criticism of the text written in the age before transsexuality was a well-known phenomenon, "subliminally, transgender has been the subject of criticism all along" (136).

[31]   It is crucial to consider that case studies are not as coherent and simplistic a category as we may think. Their multiple meanings are formed in the continuous slippages between speaking them, recording them, stylizing them, and interpreting them. For instance, in *Studies in Hysteria*, Freud makes explicit comments about the genre trouble of case studies: "I myself still find it strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one may say, they lack the serious stamp of science" (qtd. in Bernheimer 10). As Jane Marie Todd suggests, however, not all of his narratives read like short stories: "Dora's homosexuality does not make a good story" (qtd. in Johnston 52), and so it remains "a Fragment." This queer dismantling of the biographical "short story" into a fragment is an illustration of Heather Love's argument that "lesbian desire generates an opacity that challenges the order of realist representation" (Love 402). In this sense, the constructed nature of the case study genre ought not to be taken for granted or treated as less fictitious or fragmented than other genres.

[32]   Another statement in which Woolf's aesthetics of biography exceed her explicit critique of biography appears at the conclusion of 1933's *Flush: a Biography*. "He had been alive" (106), the narrator writes of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's dog, "he was now dead. That was all" (106). That this statement appears at the end of a book-length account of the dog's (like Orlando's, fictional) life suggests that that was, emphatically, not all. Yet, even here Woolf disappoints the

narrative conventions of the genre, if only because Flush merely dies at the end: no moralizing, no flourish, and no assimilation of the death into a larger narrative of afterlife or redemption.

[33]   This is, of course, a point that many people discovered in far less leisurely circumstances than Woolf. I thank members of the audience at the Los Angeles Queer Studies Symposium 2010 for underlining this fact and for encouraging me to extend my thinking (on the washroom's racialized aesthetics and hygiene's dimensions of degeneracy and decadence) to this question of labour in the washroom.

[34]   For the most comprehensive and fair indictment of Woolf's representations of working-class and middle-class women's experiences of public space, see Heather Levy's excellent 2010 monograph, *The Servants of Desire in Virginia Woolf's Shorter Fiction.* See also Alex Zwerdling's *Virginia Woolf and the Real World* (especially Chapter 4, "Class and Money," 87-119).

[35]   Though Levy interprets Woolf's handwritten word here as "empathy," my own reading – corroborated by Susan Dick in "The Writing 'I' Has Vanished" (141) – is "constantly."

[36]   Again, my interpretation of Woolf's manuscript differs from Levy's here: I read "she has no continuity," while Levy reads "she has no unkindly." Again, my initial reading is substantiated by Dick's interpretation (141).

[37]   As Dick points out, Woolf's animosity towards the women holding this conversation is quite fierce: she describes the real-life women on which they are based as parasitical "white slugs" (qtd. in Dick 141) in her diary. The tenuous status of *privacy* in the washroom is also brought to life here, as the lavatory attendant not only overhears this conversation, but, as a crossed-out paragraph of the manuscript describes, she "had heard them when the Regiment was all the rage. And long before that" (3). The "privacy" of the washroom is thus never complete; it is always tainted by economies of labour, the presence of others, and in this instance, one's ability to ignore the figures of this labour. The lavatory attendant is not just a cultural repository of gender "maintenance" and the rhetorical style of single-sex space, but she also accumulates a history of sexual assault, reputations, desire, and violence. In this sense, despite the fact that the temporality of memoir eludes her (or she it), her knowledge of the washroom is an accumulated series of seemingly disparate events of overheard stories, accidental mentions, and coincidences – micro-narratives from others, gathered up by her through chance.

[38]   At a time when butch lesbians and FTMs (female-to-male transsexuals) are anxiously engaged in what Judith Halberstam calls "border wars" (141) at the overlapping edges of their respective categories, lesbian reclamations of Woolf's gender-bending text provide crucial backdrop: they show us an early example of the ways in which the coherence of sexual identities (when defined by gender-specific attraction) sometimes rely on a studied absent-mindedness when it comes to transgender.

[39]   Faith in the text's relationship to Woolf's lived reality has been fuelled by three seemingly undeniable biographical facts: first, (Vita Sackville-West's son) Nigel Nicolson's famous description of *Orlando: a Biography* as "the longest and most charming love-letter in literature" (202), and secondly, an entry in Woolf's diary in which she reports that she first imagined the text as "Orlando: Vita; only with a change about from one sex to the other" (Wednesday 5 October 1927). Finally, the photos of Orlando in the published text are indeed Vita Sackville-West. That Woolf and Sackville-West's relationship provides interesting context for *Orlando* is indisputable, though reducing this text to a mere representation of a relationship doesn't do justice to its specifically aesthetic interventions and, moreover, its representations of the ways in which the pair might have challenged rather than foreshadowed contemporary lesbian norms.

[40]   There are other queer analyses of *Orlando* that attempt to decenter the supremacy of lesbianism in critiques of *Orlando* since the 1970s. Georgia Johnston, for instance, focuses on the potential bisexuality of the text. In her estimation, this fantastical gender-swapping immortal character is meant to normalize same-sex love, making "bisexuality... a part of the daily fabric of life" (75). Making bisexuality a part of everyday life is certainly an ambitious goal and one worth pursuing, but the aesthetic of Woolf's anti-realist text suggests anything but normalizing difference into a preexisting fabric of life. I suggest in the second section of this chapter that the opposite is true: that Woolf uses gender-transing to cause rupture in the daily fabric of life and the ordering of time this fabric requires.

[41]   As Taylor writes, "In *Orlando* various discourses in the text – legal, social, sexual – join forces to give Orlando's new female identity the semblance of being fixed, stable, and singular... Woolf exposes the woeful inadequacy of existing constructions of sex and gender to deal with the complexities of individual lived experience" (211).

[42]   In his first critique ("Critique of the Aesthetical Judgment"), Kant argues that free will can only exist outside of time and space, a condition that Bergson (in *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*) suggests is underpinned by Kant's scientific notion of time as an always already spatialized succession of immobile and unvarying parts. As Bergson suggests, in Kant,

> we thus get a homogenous time whose moments are strung on a spatial line. In place of an inner life whose successive phases, each unique of its kind, cannot be expressed in the fixed terms of language, we get a self which can be artificially reconstructed, and simple psychic states which can be added to and taken from one another just like the letters of the alphabet in forming words. (237)

In the place of this turn to "homogenous space" as a way to express time, Bergson forwards a theory "of a heterogeneous duration whose moments permeate one another" (237) , which he describes as "a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another without precise outlines" (104) of forms (such as male and female). Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography* implies a similar emphasis on duration and motion rather than trajectory and linearity.

[43]   In *The Creative Mind*, Bergson uses math to describe the way in which our focus is pulled to movement's stable legacies in homogenous space rather than to the movement and transformation itself:

> it is not the moving act itself that is never indivisible, but the motionless line it lays down beneath it like a track in space. Let us take our mind off the space subtending the movement and concentrate solely on the movement itself, on the act of tension or extension, in short, on pure mobility. This time we shall have a more exact image of our development in duration. (194)

[44]   It is worth noting that waves make a similar, if more literal, appearance in "The Ladies Lavatory." The flushing of the toilets is described as a gushing tide that interrupts and punctuates the discussion that the women are having about Bert. As the text indicates, "their talk was interrupted by the erratic [Heather Levy reads "climactic"] flush of water in one of the compartments" (2). The wave of water returns as if to wash over the truth of the sexual assault: "if he does it again, he'll be court-martialled. Here water gushed" (2-3). And, in "The Watering Place" (the small edited excerpt of "The Ladies Lavatory" that was printed, which de-emphasizes the washroom and deletes the attendant), this rush of water is represented quite specifically as part of the sea: "the water gushed... The tide foamed and withdrew. It uncovered next..." (291). The water of the washroom, in these instances, is a "wave" like Orlando in the sense that its movements are part of the assembled choreographies of the washroom as a social space. Notably, Deleuze and Guattari read the characters of Woolf's *The Waves* as non-subjective waves as well:

> In *The Waves*, Virginia Woolf – who made all of her life and work a passage, a becoming, all kinds of becomings between ages, sexes, elements, and kingdoms – intermingles seven characters . . . But each of these characters, with his or her name, its

individuality, designates a multiplicity . . . each advances like a wave, but on the plane of consistency they are a single abstract Wave whose vibration propagates following a line of flight or deterritorialization traversing the entire plane. (*Thousand* 278)

[45]   For Bergson, tendencies replace what we think of as "states." Whereas Bergson suggests that we are both continuous and discontinuous, these tendencies are the residues that remain as legacies. Although Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick does not mention Bergson by name, her book *Tendencies* offers a queer-leaning illustration of this move from states back to tendencies and acts.

[46]   The compromised sense of trans agency that remains after this analysis is one that dispels with the illusion of sovereignty and instead revels in the subject's potential as a tenuous result, narrative formulator, and, oblique generator of transing events. The agency permitted in this model of the trans event is paradoxical and ambiguous, as Judith Butler suggests in *Bodies That Matter*:
> The paradox of subjectivation (*assujettissement*) is precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power. (15)

[47]   The main reasons why this attribution of agency has taken shape is, I suggest, the serious difficulty trans people face with regards to our new names in social worlds beyond trans and queer spheres. What we already understand as bad behaviour in response to trans name change may be summarized by a story relayed by Kate Bornstein: at the DMV, Bornstein struggled to be taken seriously as she tried to procure a new driver's license. The officer flirted, asked if she'd been recently married, and asked if she recently divorced; Kate stood under surveillance, as two officers were "looking at me, then the paper, then me, then the paper" (29) trying to figure her out. This model of response – one based on confusion, disbelief, lack of imagination, and a stubborn attachment to normalcy – does not, of course, position the trans person as the sovereign author of one's new name and narrative. These are obviously problematic responses that cause inconvenience (at best) in the lives of trans people. However, is it possible that in our fight against these denials of trans agency, we have over-invested in the concept of agency? This was my experience: an attribution of agency that itself overrode my desire to question the very conventions and narratives of complete, sovereign agency – conventions that took as much (if not more) real effect in my life as rude people refusing my ID or refusing me access.

[48]   For more on Butler's critique of Lacan, see *Bodies That Matter: on the Discursive Limits of Sex*, especially Chapter 5, "'Dangerous Crossing:' Willa Cather's Masculine Names." Here, Butler critiques "Lacan's notion that the name confers legitimacy and duration on the ego" (209). Against his sense that names are "nominal zones of phallic control" (153) always based on the Law (and name) of the Father, Butler suggests instead that, for women, propriety is all about having a *changeable* name. As she puts it, "the durability of the subject named is not, then, a function of the proper name, but a function of a patronym, the abbreviated instance of a hierarchical kinship regime" (154).

[49]   Boutler follows Edward Said in his description of the act of beginning (which he equates with ground and *arkhē*):
> to begin...is to circumscribe a space... Articulating or inscribing a beginning is thus an act of profound epistemologico-hermeneutic consequences: it is the logic of beginning as ground (*arkhē*) that presupposes the movement toward end (*telos*). But the unnamable's narrative calls on a kind of thinking about the logic of beginning that he will acknowledge to be defunct. (99-100a)

[50]   Žižek, Butler suggests, implies that names have the "power to confer durability" (153) even though they have no content. That is, for Žižek, names are referential but not descriptive. For more, see again "'Dangerous Crossing:' Willa Cather's Masculine Names in *Bodies that Matter*.

[51]   In the service of his theory of narrative "obligation-as-suffering" (97) in *The Unnamable*, Boulter cites Beckett's *Proust* at length. I cite the same passage here, drawing attention to Beckett's equation of art, suffering, and "a window on the real." This valorized triad exists, Beckett states, precisely because of the possibility of shaking off the duties of habit. (It is interesting to note in light of previous chapters and in light of this approach to "habit" that Beckett, reciprocally, associates boredom with *hygiene*.) As Beckett writes:

> the fundamental duty of habit...consists in a perpetual adjustment and readjustment of our organic sensibility to the conditions of its worlds. Suffering represents the omission of that duty, whether through negligence of inefficiency, and boredom its adequate performance. The pendulum oscillates between these two terms: Suffering – that opens a window on the real and is the main condition of the artistic experience, and Boredom – with its host of top-hatted and hygienic ministers, Boredom that must be considered as the most tolerable because the most durable of human evils. (qtd. in Boulter 95-6a)

[52]   For a *tour de force* of the currency of nihilism in Beckett's work and Beckett criticism, see Shane Weller's excellent monograph, *A Taste for the Negative: Beckett and Nihilism*. For the work that best represents a commonplace distrust of deconstructive approaches to transgender, see Viviane Namaste's *Invisible Lives: the Erasure of Transsexual and Transgendered People*, in which she writes approvingly of what she calls Foucault and Derrida's post-structuralism, but virulently critiques similar ideas as they are elaborated by queer writers such as Butler, Garber, Halberstam, and Feinberg. As she puts it, rather curiously, "Butler proposes a representationalist conception of language...whereas Foucault and Derrida examine the social institutions that produce subjects" (22).

[53]   Here, Eng explains how queer critiques of this kind of modern personhood are silenced in Lawrence's implicit domestication of sex:

> By domesticating our sex lives, *Lawrence* removes queer liberalism from the public domain as an issue of homosexual equality and difference. Instead, it relocates it in the private sphere of intimacy, family, and bourgeois respectability. From another angle, *Lawrence* not only inducts gays and lesbians into the time of liberal progress but also places them into the space of the liberal nation-state. In other words, it reinscribes the traditional divide between the public and private, upholding conventional liberal distinctions between the state and the family, and between civil society and domesticity. (52)

[54]   Rather than merely expressing the truth of a pure interiority, words here move between "in" and "out." Therefore, for Beckett, they mark what Deleuze calls "a new kind of correspondence or mutual expression, an *entr'expression*, fold after fold" (35) – a new kind of moving "between" inside and outside that does not uphold the sovereignty or closure of either. *Entr'expression*, a concept that Deleuze adapts from Leibniz, is commonly understood as "inter-expression" (Lambert 48), "mutual expression" (Deleuze 35) or even the "in-between" (Stivale 22). Insofar as Deleuze sees all material as a series of "caverns endlessly contained in other caverns" (5), he insists on the continuity of folds – and, therefore, the endlessly intertwined quality of any "expression." As he puts it:

> The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity. It is not only because the fold affects all materials that it thus becomes expressive matter, with different scales, speeds, and different vectors (mountains and waters, papers, fabrics, living tissues, the brain), but especially because it determines and materializes Form. (34)

If, as Deleuze suggests, all matter is infinitely folded ("caverns endlessly contained in other caverns") rather than merely divided into interiors and exteriors, then it follows that any "expression" in the fold is always already a mutual expression that reverberates through each fold. As Charles J. Stivale puts it in *Gilles Deleuze's ABCs: the Folds of Friendship*, "entr'expression" or the "fold after fold" "serves as the seam along which many new gatherings can take place" (10).

With regards to the quotation from Beckett's text above, we can see that the unnamable figures himself as just such an event of (not merely expression) but instead of communication happening "in-between" any supposed interior and exterior. As he says, "I'm the air, the walls, the walled-in one, everything yields, opens, ebbs, flows" (443). That the unnamable describes himself as both "the walls" and "the walled-in one" suggests that he consists in a series of multiple and overlapping folds; rather than protect any naturalized interiority, the unnamable continues his folds down to the material level of "flakes" and up to "the whole world." While the word "expression" brings to mind a subject articulating an idea or viewpoint, the phrase 'mutual expression' could instead conjure up no such sovereign act.

[55]   Szafraniec refers here to Deleuze's essay "The Exhausted," which is the last essay of his collection, *Essays Critical and Clinical*.

[56]   For a reading that interprets "the ear" in just such a way, see Christie McDonald's edited text, *The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation: Texts and Discussions With Jacques Derrida*.

[57]   We have seen throughout this project that Loos and Le Corbusier abject décor as shallow in the name of shoring up austere, "serious," stable, implicitly masculine architecture. Certainly, the hymen has occupied a similar place in discourse (a superfluous site of change, femininity, and lack) for Freud, who regards its puncture as a primal wound for female sexuality. In "The Taboo of Virginity," he calls this a "narcissistic injury," a reading that Derrida and Irigaray have each overshadowed in turn. The latter, in *Speculum of the Other Woman*, traces out the figure of the "artificial wall curtain" that is never breached in Socrates' cave (a wall on which the very falsity of representation is literally projected – precisely the falsity of masquerade attributed to femininity). And, throughout his oeuvre, Derrida has drawn our attention to the fact that the hymen is "the tissue on which so many bodily metaphors are written" (*Disseminations* 217). For Derrida, the hymen is more generally a figure for the undecidable or for aporia (which, of course, characterizes Beckett's text). As Derrida and Kamuf write: "the partition of the hymen partitions itself, departs from itself and from any proper meaning" (xxxvix). The same may be said here for the tympanum: it is the architectural figuring of undecidability and of maintaining "distance" between interiority and exteriority.

[58]   Though Leibnizian readers of Beckett tend to look to the closure and spatial confinement of Beckettian characters in order to gauge Beckett's rewriting of the monad, the characters' events of transformation and qualities of transience – the qualities still attributed today to superficiality, décor and façades of all kinds – are just as likely a comparison point. In fact, in a similar manner as Bergson in the previous chapter, Leibniz suggests that change – rather than any stable form – *is* the definitive property of the monad:

> [every monad] is subject to change, and further than this change is continuous in each... the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since as external cause can have no influence upon their inner being... But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a particular series of changes [*un detail de ce qui change*], which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple substances... This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit [*unité*] or in that which is simple. For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts. (2-3)

This positing of an "internal principle" of change suggests, first of all, that what is interior to the monad (and indeed, to us) has as its property the very opposite of the safe seclusion we often locate there: its only property is in fact its drive to change. As is the case of Kwinter's event, the event of change in Leibniz's monad involves what does and doesn't change, what might have but did not; the monad's "multiplicity" derives from precisely that inclusion: "something changes and something remains unchanged."

[59]   Although this space contains a mixture of everything, this grey, like an archive itself, becomes illegible and hazy to those who would visit. In the case of the unnamable, his imagined grey space is both what protects him from the voices above but it is also produced by them: "they see grey, like still smoke, unbroken, where he might be, if he must be somewhere, where they have decreed he is, into which they launch their voices, one after another, in the hope of dislodging him, hearing him stir, seeing him loom within reach of their gaffs, hooks, barbs, grapnels, saved at last, home at last" (410).

[60]   This simultaneous suffering and resistance allowed by the unnamable's grey space, the text suggests elsewhere, is the aporetic condition of living subject to language and discipline. That is, in a manner quite the opposite to Jay Prosser's valorization of curative narrative, the antidote of narrative in this text can only try to heal the ruptures that the voices have themselves thrust upon the unnamable: "the inestimable gift of life had been rammed down my gullet…some of this rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don't deny it, on occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me in peace. I use it still, to scratch my arse with. Low types they must have been, their pockets full of poison and antidote" (339).

[61]   For more on the specifically literary/hermeneutic practices of the unnamable, see Shane Weller's text *Beckett, Literature, and the Ethics of Alterity*. Here, Weller points out the trope of "ethical fiction" in Judith Butler's work, a literary practice he suggests may characterize the unnamable. As he puts it: "Although she does not focus specifically on literature in *Gender Trouble*, Butler is here producing nothing less than a theory of ethical fiction, defined as a self-reflexive performance that both identifies and communicates its own fictionality" (162). I have shown in this chapter that the unnamable enacts just such a continuous revelation of his own fictionality. Likewise, Weller suggests that the unnamable, like Butler's ethical subject of performative gender, is "orientated towards the articulation of an identity beyond disintegration, an identity not with a being or even with Being, but precisely with non-being" (184). Weller proposes that this ethics of non-being (in a sense a non-gender) implies what he calls an "anethics of gender."

[62]   Here is Hansford's fuller argument about the overlapping greyness of subject and space: "Grey is both subject and object here. Consciousness, itself grey, is surrounded by the object of the discourse's subject. As the two overlap, one is not distinguishable from the other and the third term, consciousness of the world, shares both places – the place of narration and the narration of place" (166, n34). For more on Beckett's grey worlds (interpreted through a specifically negative lens), see John L. Murphy's "Beckett's Purgatories" (109-24) and Lois Oppenheim's "The Uncanny in Beckett" (125-140) in Colleen Jaurretche's *Beckett, Joyce, and the Art of the Negative* (a special issue of *European Joyce Studies*).

[63]   In the following, for instance, the unnamable imagines what it might be like to finally capitulate to the imperative to accept a past and identity: "then I'll let down my trousers and shit stories on them, stories, photographs, records, sites, lights, gods and fellow-creatures" (435). Autobiographical artifacts such as stories, photographs, and archives are indeed shit for the unnamable: digested and useless afterlives that are poisonous to humans even though we produce them. It is no wonder, given this equation of shit with identity records, that in "Cultural Droppings: Bersani's Beckett," Calvin Thomas suggests that Bersani's namedropping of Beckett in the final pages of *Homos* may be attributed to Beckett's "culture of failure," "aesthetics of waste," and the "privilege [he affords] the anus as a site of both self-shattering and indifference to personhood" (179).

[64]   In "The Exhausted," Deleuze distinguishes between three modes of language in Beckett. His "language III" describes quite closely the kind of tearing and compromised interiority I am forwarding here. This third register of Beckettian language, Deleuze suggests, relates language "to immanent limits that are ceaselessly displaced – hiatuses, holes, or tears that we would never

notice, or would attribute to mere tiredness, if they did not suddenly widen in such a way as to receive something from the outside or from elsewhere" (158).

[65]   It is worth repeating Pugh's definition from the Introduction to this project. As he explains it, the shape of tensegrity structures (though he warns against calling them anything as firm as a structure) is maintained due to the simultaneous pushing and pulling forces working together and against each other. As he puts it, "a tensegrity system is established when a set of discontinuous compressive components interacts with a set of continuous tensile components to define a stable volume in space" (3). Therefore, the equilibrium of these two forces (precisely what keeps the building standing) is produced by contrary forces – not by the prioritization of either interiorizing or exteriorizing forces.

[66]   See Christopher Robert Reed's *All the World is Here!: The Black Presence at White City* for an account of race relations at the 1893 World's Columbian Fair in Chicago. For an analysis that focuses on the tropes of progress and modernity, see also Robert W. Rydell's *World of Fairs: the Century-of-Progress Expositions*, which discusses the "coloniale moderne" (61) sensibility of these retrospective fairs of the 1930s.

[67]   In "Ornament and Crime," Loos produces a very clear narrative of (décor and) degeneracy, one in which, by juxtaposition, non-European and American cultures are installed at the cutting edge of modernity and culture. Here he suggests that each human life reproduces in itself this progressive march of cultures towards civilization.

> In the womb the human embryo passes through all the development stages of the animal kingdom. At the moment of birth, human sensations are equal to those of a newborn dog. His childhood passes through all the transformations which correspond to the history of mankind. At the age of two, he sees like a Papuan [a people of New Guinea], at four, like a Teuton, at six like Socrates, at eight like Voltaire. When he is eight years old, he becomes aware of violet, the color which the eighteenth century had discovered...The child is amoral. To us the Papuan is also amoral. The Papuan slaughters his enemies and devours them. He is no criminal. If, however, the modern man slaughters and devours somebody, he is a criminal or a degenerate. The Papuan tattoos his skin, his boat, his oar, in short, everything that is within his reach. He is no criminal. The modern man who tattoos himself is a criminal or a degenerate. (167)

In effect, Loos argues that modern humans now know better than to decorate their skins or their spaces. Those cultures which, in Loos' views, have not yet progressed far enough down the linear path of civilization, cannot be blamed for not being as far along this path as the predominantly white cultures about which Loos cares. His admonishment of white cultures is this precise, racist formulation: 'when you, with all the benefits of modernity, choose to decorate yourself, you literally de-generate, pulling our culture back towards these savage ones.' It is this very aesthetic backwardness that this project in general, and DS+R in particular, have sought to recuperate.

[68]   Here is a longer explanation of the distinction Deleuze and Guattari make between majoritarian and minoritarian positions. They see

> the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, becoming. The problem is never to acquire the majority, even in order to install a new constant. There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian... Minorities, of course, are objectively definable states, states of language, ethnicity, or sex with their own ghetto territorialities, but they must also be thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority. (*Thousand* 117)

[69]   Prominent among these are a number of thinkers from Indiana University-Bloomington: Scott Herring (*Another Country: Queer Anti-Urbanism*), Mary L. Gray (*Out in the Country: Youth, Media, and Queer Visibility in Rural America*), Colin Johnson (who has previously studied

queer life in rural California circa 1970 and is currently working on a manuscript entitled *The Little Gay Bar on the Prairie: Gender, Geography and the Invention of Sexuality in Non-Metropolitan America*) and, until her 2011 move to Arizona, Susan Stryker (who has recently begun a project on the queer affect of alternative country music).

[70]   Feminist theories of temporality comprise one of the most significant (if implicit) precursors to Halberstam's well-known phrase "queer time." As this dissertation shows, Judith Butler's work has been central to rethinking the temporal and citational qualities of gender and bodies. For more on Butler's influence, see Stephanie Clare's essay "Agency, Signification, and Temporality," which addresses the modes of temporality addressed and enacted in both Butler's and Saba Mahmood's work. Here, Clare draws from Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Bergson, in order to refocus what she considers Butler's overemphasis on signification onto Mahmood's continuous becoming. For an excellent review of Butler's implication in various contemporary theories of temporality (including notions of the event and of Benjamin's "now-time," discussed below) see Kattis Honkanen's "Aion, Kronos and Kairos: On Judith Butler's Temporality." For another much-cited essay on feminist time – and the temporal "moment" of feminism – see Julia Kristeva's essay "Women's Time" in *New Maladies of the Soul* (201-24). Here, Kristeva suggests the women have historically been represented very differently than men with regards to temporality. As she puts it, "Joyce said 'Father's time, mother's species,' and it seems indeed that the evocation of women's name and fate privileges the space that generates the human species more than it does time, destiny, or history" (204). Although in Kristeva's account, women have been associated with space more than time, she suggests nonetheless that two modes of temporality have been attributed to women, owing to their reproductive capacities: "two types of temporality – cyclical and monumental – are traditionally associated with female subjectivity, when female subjectivity is considered to be innately maternal" (205). These modes already, Kristeva suggests, pose a problem "with respect to a certain conception of time that of time as planning, as teleology, as linear and prospective development...that is, the time of history" (205). Therefore, for these thinkers, the temporalities of self-consciously citational gender and women in general have already "queered" time in the way Halberstam describes. Yet, in the process of doing so, Kristeva both reinscribes the maternal temporalities that many would argue need not define women's temporality and also reinstalls "the *fundamental difference* between the sexes" (206) that transgender accounts such as Halberstam's seek to displace. Moreover, these accounts do not take into consideration the role of locale in theories of spatiality; that is, even though Kristeva suggests that "the time may have come, in fact, to celebrate the multiplicity of female perspectives" (206), no questions of urban or rural models arise. Therefore, I turn to Halberstam here because hers is the only theory of specifically transgender, rural temporality available. In this project I follow both Butler's emphasis on the temporality of genders, as well as Halberstam's trans focus, a combination that allows us to (rather than shore up categories as Kristeva does) "involve" different genders in a becoming. In other words, as Deleuze and Guattari write, "to form a block that runs its own line 'between' the terms in play and beneath assignable relations" (*Thousand* 263).

[71]   As Karen Tongson notes in her 2011 monograph, *Relocations: Queer Suburban Imaginaries*, Halberstam's famous text repeatedly illustrates her "residual attachments to urban settings for subcultural expression" (6). As Tongson puts it:

> unlike other scholars of queer rurality of the queer peripheries more broadly defined, Halberstam inevitably refuses to relinquish "the city" as the emblematic habitat for queers... *In a Queer Time and Place* focuses primarily on a rural 'horror of the heartlands' mythology at the core of representational debates about the transgender icon who was martyr of rural violence, Brandon Teena...Beyond her chapter on Teena, however, Halberstam leaves the task of documenting the complex interrelations of queer life beyond metropolitan subcultures to other scholars. (5-6)

Indeed, as Tongson suggests, Halberstam bookends her chapters on Brandon's rurality by stating her continued dread of the rural. As Halberstam opens the chapters:

> I am one of those people for whom lonely rural landscapes feel laden with menace, and for many years nonurban areas were simply 'out there,' strange and distant horizons

populated by hostile populations. It is still true that a densely packed urban street or a metallic skyline can release a surge of excitement for me while a vast open landscape fills me with dread. (22)

Here, Halberstam appears to equate feelings with places in such a way that elides her own role as a participant in both spatial meaning-making and in interpreting space. The irony here is this: while Halberstam defines space *as* practice, she attributes affective qualities to the "vast open landscape" as though the landscape's meaning and agency resides in and of itself. The rhetoric used in the above paragraph echoes this double-standard: the city only "release[s]" excitement, thereby acting upon and colliding with existent aspects of herself. The rural, however, "fills [her]" like a malignant force acting upon a passive bystander. In this equation, the city is where queers *do* queerness, and the country is where things *are done* to queers; the city resonates, coincides, and releases an inner affective queerness, while the country seems to naturally clash with it. This is not at all to diminish the influence of Halberstam's work on research in this area; rather, it is to point out the extent to which anti-rural sentiment may still be stated as a neutral preference for cities – even in accounts such as Halberstam's that aim to critique metronormativity.

[72]   Herring's approach, it is worth noting, is quite different in tone, purpose, and focus. Herring's formulation focuses on what rurality can do rather than on what happens to queer people in rural locales, a revolutionary perspective at a time when the stories of Matthew Shepherd and Brandon Teena are still the most common ones told about rural transgender or queerness. His definition of rural is also different. For instance, he acknowledges that any tenuous divide between "urban" and "rural" consists of "language game[s]" and leads to a "definitional roundabout" (8). After all, does "rural" describe small municipalities of 200 and under, 20 000 and under, or cities (like Edmonton) with an incredibly low population density? As Kath Weston states in her historic essay "Get Thee to a Big City: Sexual Imaginary and the Great Gay Migration," even though "the Great Gay Migration of the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an influx of tens of thousands of lesbians and gay men (as well as individuals bent upon 'exploring' their sexuality) into major urban areas across the United States" (32), she also makes the point that the queer urban sphere is also a fantasy that perpetuates itself. " As she puts it, "the gay imaginary is not just a dream of a freedom to be gay that requires an urban location, but a symbolic space that configures gayness itself by elaborating an opposition between urban and rural life" (55).

[73]   Taking Halberstam and White together, we see an ironic formulation here of the relationship between urban and rural locales: when it comes to fashion and queer culture, rural locales can only be derivative – as White writes, "our restlessly evolving style – soon enough to become theirs" (qtd. in Herring 18). However, when it comes to matters of hate and conservatism, rural locales are suddenly independent, capable of producing their own attitudes, and have certainly not learned such hatred from city-based institutions and cultures. As Halberstam says, the forms of fear and hatred she lists "take shape" in rural locales – but, it seems, whatever queerness that appears in the country takes shape elsewhere.

[74]   Moreover, DS+R's work in Brasserie appropriates and refigures certain "retro" styles of design, such as reclaiming the "Outcast" of colourful décor for the austerely modernist Seagram Building. In this way, they demonstrate that after the strict ethical imperatives of early architectural modernism, the status of "fashion" is actually an anti-modern throwback rather than a sign that one is, as White says, a tastemaker. We may note that Herring does *not* refute that cities are fashionable. Instead, he and DS+R alike ask: how fashionable is it to be fashionable? And, what assumptions about space are built into the criteria by which we decide what is "the *latest*"?

[75]   It is important to note that urban trans people, queers, and writers do not homogeneously espouse anti-rural attitudes or metronormativity. There are many figures that suggest otherwise: queer cruising, the flâneur, and urban enclaves or bohemias ground themselves in their refusal of the very upwardly-mobile narrative of the metronormative subject critiqued in books such as Herring's. Dianne Chisholm's text *Queer Constellations: Subcultural Space in the Wake of the City* is one such example to use urban literatures and space to critique metronormative

valorizations of (classist) urban development. For instance, in her tracing of the broadway musical *Rent*'s appropriation (and de-lesbianification) of Sarah Schulman's East Village-centred novels, Chisholm opens up these questions: "what role does lesbian bohemia play in the history of urban development and the making of the gay metropolis? If the history of lesbian bohemia is not continuous with the plot of global gentrification and cultural triumph, then how is it it (to be) documented?" (197). Significantly, these questions remind us (like Woolf's counterhistory of trans, which was contemporary to the development of sexology) that there are urban-based counter-histories written before and against neoliberal, aseptic urban histories of "progress" in the first instance. In addition to Chisholm's figure of "the lesbian boheme" (195), Ross Chamber's theory of "loiterature" and the "loiterly subject" are also useful examples of urban-based impulses against metronormativity. In fact, Chambers describes the "loiterly subject" in similar fashion as do Deleuze and Guattari when describing forgetfulness (in this project's Introduction). This self-digressivity is, for Chambers, made possible by urban space. Here, Chambers aptly summaries much of his book:

> if the dividedness of attention (the permeability of contexts, the proximity of difference, the familiar otherness of the self) is the condition that makes digression possible (chapter 1), and if digressivity is in turn a condition of the possibility of stepping away (chapter 1) but also of stepping out of line (chapter 2), the loiterly subject, who is always on the cusp of a context and its other, becomes a socially marginal figure to the extent that social centrality is defined in terms of stability, permanence, and closure – the virtues of single-mindedness and discipline that eschew digressivity. Thus, he is also on the cusp of a dominant social context and its other, always on the periphery of things, the legendary nonparticipant bystander, a bit out of step with respect to the march of the majority, and swimming not exactly against the current but not with it either. (56-7)

There is no doubt that these urban models effect similarly backwards moves, eschewing progressive narratives of modern urban history as they do. This does not, in my view, temper the importance or specificity of rural modes of challenging such histories. For one thing, not all urban models of anti-metronormativity will work in rural locales. For instance, Chambers' descriptions of the simultaneously peripheral and socially central urban loiterer is not one that speaks to the experience or affect of being shunted (by most queer stereotypes and some queer theory) *completely* to the margins of queerness, where one's peripheral quality is not of one's choosing. The image above – a loiterer that passes in and out of socially "central" scenes is not one accessible in most rural locales, where, at least in my experience, anonymity seldom exists and attempts at "coolness" or disinterestedness are often mocked as urban affectations. However, there is another point to make about the usefulness of radical queer urban modes. In their respective introductions, Herring and Tongsen each show that contemporary queer life is defined through its abjection of the rural. It is a crucial tactic of this chapter *not* to merely reverse this binary logic by arguing that the backwards temporalities I call rural are exclusively rural or are anti-urban. Instead of perpetuating this trend of defining the rural or urban through contrast with each other, I am instead focusing on the process or act of *ruralizing* – an act that can happen anywhere where the periphery of modern urban queer history pulls in or involves the majority or lodges itself imperceptibly within it, "loitering" on it, creating bohemias underneath it, or otherwise cutting the coherent body of modern queer urban history – a pesky politics that Herring aptly calls "paper cut politics" (13).

[76]   For more information about the (un)queer consequences of the 1995 rezoning of Manhattan, see Michael Warner and Lauren Berlant's "Sex in Public" and Samuel Delaney's *Times Square Red, Times Square Blue*.

[77]   Notably, Halberstam reads Rubin's essay through a very pro-urban lens. As she states: Most theories of homosexuality within the twentieth century assume that gay culture is rooted in cities, that it has a special relationship to urban life, and that as Gayle Rubin comments in "Thinking Sex," erotic dissidents require urban space because in rural settings queers are easily identified and punished; it made sense [for Rubin] to contrast the sexual conformity of small towns to the sexual diversity of big cities. (35)

As I've suggested here, Rubin says no such thing: on the contrary, Rubin highlights the labour and class dynamics of the great gay migrations and suggests that queers found plenty of new problems in cities. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the main experience of rural queers is to be "easily identified and punished," though this is certainly a popular urban legend. In my experience, many rural communities have a wide variety of ways of making sense of those who would be labelled queer in most cities: in smaller communities consisting of "characters" instead of countless strangers, increased familiarity sometimes means that many "peculiarities" can be accepted as non-threatening.

[78]   For more readings of Benjamin that consider the politics of his theory of evental, messianic time, see Peter Osborne's *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* and also his essay "Small-scale Victories, Large-scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin's Politics of Time" in *Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience* (59-109). In the latter, Osborne describes Benjamin's *felt* temporality of the event as "avant-garde experience" or "the experience of history within the time of the 'now,'" an "experience [that is] a political temporalization of history, alternative and preferable to the underlying prevailing forms of historiography" (61).

[79]   For more, see Tison Pugh's "There lived in the Land of Oz two queerly made men": Queer Utopianism and Antisocial Eroticism in L. Frank Baum's Oz Series" in *Marvels & Tales* 22.2 (2008): 217-39. Here, Pugh relates the queer crews often found in Oz to the anti-social "self-shattering" queerness of Leo Bersani's work in *Homos*.

[80]   As Deleuze and Guattari put it: "the problem is never to acquire the majority, even in order to install a new constant. There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian" (117).

[81]   Baum himself thought that the text subscribed to this very emotional economy: he intended it to be a "modernized fairy tale, in which the wonderment and joy are retained and the heart-aches and nightmares left out" (vii).

[82]   For theoretical considerations of the possibilities of queer shame, see David Halperin and Valerie Traub's edited collection, *Gay Shame* (especially their introductory essays, "Beyond Gay Pride" (3-40) and "Why Gay Shame Now?" (41-8). For a more direct approach, read about the San Francisco activist group Gay Shame at gayshamesf.org. As the group states on their website: "GAY SHAME is a Virus in the System. We are committed to a queer extravaganza that brings direct action to astounding levels of theatricality. We will not be satisfied with a commercialized gay identity that denies the intrinsic links between queer struggle and challenging power. We seek nothing less than a new queer activism that foregrounds race, class, gender and sexuality, to counter the self-serving "values" of gay consumerism and the increasingly hypocritical left. We are dedicated to fighting the rabid assimilationist monster with a devastating mobilization of queer brilliance."

[83]   The Human Rights Campaign and Against Equality occupy the two poles of this debate. The former is the US' largest LGBT advocacy group, a heavily corporate-sponsored foundation that focuses primarily on issues such as marriage, military inclusion, hate crimes, affecting election outcomes, coming out, parenting, bullying, and so on. Against Equality, a very small radical queer group from New York, has appropriated and skewed the HRC's logo (an "equal" sign) into a "greater than" sign (a sideways V). As they state on their website, "we are committed to dislodging the centrality of equality rhetoric and challenging the demand for inclusion in the institution of marriage, the US military, and the prison industrial complex via hate crimes legislation. We want to reinvigorate the queer political imagination with fantastic possibility." See againstequality.org and hrc.org to further note the drastically different emotional conventions (pride and positivity versus critique, anger, and fantasy) practiced by these respective groups.

[84]   See The Transgender Boards for one example:

http://www.tgboards.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=2081, Yahoo for another, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20081217182156AADyPL0 (where the text is one of four, alongside Woolf's *Orlando: a Biography*, that is recommended) and at the Straight Dope Message Boards at the following link: http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/archive/index.php/t-146035.html .

[85] See, for instance, Marcus Ewert's *10, 000 Dresses,* Jennifer Carr's *Be Who You Are*, and Cheryl Kilodavis' *My Princess Boy.*

[86] Queer artists and musicians have recently produced variously experimental adaptations of the *Oz* franchise that are, interestingly, intended for *adults*: in "Men with Missing Parts: Queer Visitors from the Marvelous Land of Oz," Tara Mateik and Michael O'Neill (of musical group MEN) mix live narration, magic lantern slides, "fairylogue videos," live singing of Diana Ross hits, and a pair of transgender actors in order to bring out the queer and feminist aspects of Oz. Also, on their 2004 debut album, American pop/electronica band Scissor Sisters feature a song called "Return to Oz," which addresses the use of crystal meth in urban US queer communities. The lyrics' citations of the *Oz* texts underlines the specifically urban quality of queer drug culture: "what once was Emerald City is now a Crystal Town." Queer drug use is also figured as urban decay, as though queer problems are writ large on the body of cities: in Crystal Town, "the grass is dead" while "gold is brown."

[87] For more on Baum's explicitly American outlook, see Jack Zipes' "Oz as American Myth."

[88] See Michael Pihach's interview with show writer Michael Grassi, in which he broaches this question (but receives little in the way of response).

[89] "It Gets Better" refers to a campaign against LGBT youth suicide started by gay columnist Dan Savage and his partner Terry Miller. In the original video that the couple produced, they told gay youth about their own conservative religious upbringings and their journey to becoming an urban family of means. As many bloggers have noted, the sense of the original "It Gets Better" video depends both on classist conceptions of a life worth living and also on the idea that youth ought to be forward-looking: it gets better in the future. For many LGBT youth, this "future" is like the one that Edelman critiques in *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive:* it is forever in suspension, held out as a piece of hope that distracts us from the possibilities of dissension in the present. The website now boasts over 10, 000 videos and the couple has produced a book. For more information, see itgetsbetter.org.

[90] Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the "Anomalous" (*Thousand* 243) is one they hold in clear distinction from "abnormal" or "a-normal" (the more common French connotations of *anormal*). While these "refer to that which is outside rules or goes against the rules," "*an-omalie*, a Greek noun that has lost its adjective, designates the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization" (244). It would be an overstatement and simplification to suggest that the future Princess Ozma somehow fulfills this role. But, in a rather generous reading, his/her assembled crew – a "pack" – are not, like the abnormal, "defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or generic" but are a "set of positions in relation to a multiplicity" (244).

[91] An early iteration of this consideration of Deleuze and Guattari's potential for a theory of transing rurality appears, as "Transgender Without Organs? Mobilizing a Geo-Affective Theory of Gender Modification" in *Women's Studies Quarterly* 36 (3-4): 2008. 127-43. (It will also appear in *The Routledge Queer Studies Reader*, ed. Annamarie Jagose et al, in 2012). This chapter's analysis of *The Marvelous Land of Oz* has been accepted as a chapter in *Queering the Countryside*, edited by Mary L. Gray and Colin Johnson (manuscript under consideration).

Figures

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Fig. 1. DS+Rs' Blur Building at work. Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 145. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 2. DS+Rs' Blur Building at work. Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 148. Print.

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Fig. 3. DS+Rs' Blur Building at work. Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 149. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 5. DS+R's Blur Building at night with its pedestrian bridges in the foreground. Aaron Betsky, K. Michael Hays, and Laurie Anderson, *Scanning: the Aberrant Architectures of Diller + Scofidio* (New York: Whitney Museum, 2003) unpaginated (located between p. 94 and 95). Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 6. Louis Henri Sullivan's Gage Building. Jennifer Bloomer, "d'Or," *Sexuality and Space*, ed. Beatriz Colomina (New York: Princeton Architectural P, 1992) 176. Print.

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Fig. 8. Zaha Hadid's Neil Barrett Flagship Store in Tokyo. Zaha Hadid Architects;
Architecture; Neil Barrett Flagship Store, 2008; Web; 19 Aug. 2011; image 5.

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Fig. 9. Zaha Hadid's Neil Barrett Flagship Store in Tokyo. Zaha Hadid Architects;
Architecture; Neil Barrett Flagship Store, 2008; Web; 19 Aug. 2011; image 4.

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Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 11. Zaha Hadid's Neil Barrett Flagship Store in Tokyo. Zaha Hadid Architects; Architecture; Neil Barrett Flagship Store, 2008; Web; 19 Aug. 2011; image 4.

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Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 13. One of Greg Lynn's Embryological houses. Museum of Modern Art (PS1); Explore; Multimedia; Audios; Greg Lynn FORM, 1997-2002; Web; 18 Aug. 2011; image 1.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 14. Cover of *Toilet Training* by Tara Matek and produced by the Sylvia Rivera Law Project. Sylvia Rivera Law Project; Films; Toilet Training, 2003; Web; 9 Feb 2011; image 1.

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Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 16. The Spring 2010 cover of *Original Plumbing: Trans Male Quarterly*. Original Plumbing; Products; Issue 3, 2010; Web; 9 Feb. 2011; image 1.

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Fig. 17. The Seagram Building photographed from the Southeast. Eric Peter Nash
and Norman McGrather, *Manhattan Skyscrapers* (New York: Princeton
Architectural P, 2005) 107. Print.

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Fig. 18. The Seagram Building photographed from the Southeast. Ezra Stoller,
The Seagram Building (New York: Princeton Architectural P, 1999) front cover.
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Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 19. The front entry and lobby of the Seagram Building. Eric Peter Nash and Norman McGrather, *Manhattan Skyscrapers* (New York: Princeton Architectural P, 2005) 105. Print.

Fig. 20. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 21. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 22. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 23. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 24. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Clare Ros, with permission (2010).

Fig. 25. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Carmen Ellison, with permission (2009).

Fig. 26. One of the cake-decorator art objects displayed behind frosted glass in the back room of Brasserie. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 27. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 28. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Fig. 29. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Carmen Ellison, with permission (2009).

Fig. 30. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Carmen Ellison, with permission (2009).

Fig. 31. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Carmen Ellison, with permission (2009).

Fig. 32. Brasserie's orange cast-resin sink, which straddles the restaurant's two washrooms. Carmen Ellison, with permission (2009).

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 33. A collage that gives the reader a sense of moving through the women's washroom of Brasserie. Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 134. Print.

Fig. 34. Door to men's washroom at Brasserie. The optical illusion of Brasserie's washroom doors – the actual door (frosted glass) in the foreground, with a camera flash registering on the mirror that is *inside* the washroom. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 35. The proliferation of hygienic fixtures and furniture that accompanied the confirmation of the germ theory in the 1880s and the subsequent development of modern plumbing and modernist aesthetics (of cleanliness). Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller, *The Bathroom, the Kitchen, and the Aesthetics of Waste: a Process of Elimination* (New York: Princeton Architectural P, 1997) page unknown. Print.

Fig. 36. The stall, door, and peephole of Brasserie's sole urinal. Lucas Crawford (2009).

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 38. Brasserie's bar. (Note the television screens above the bar.) Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 132. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 39. A series of illustrations that captures the general feeling of Brasserie, especially its dark panelled walls that seem to float in the space (rather than feign any structural purpose). Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 131. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 40. Top: one of Brasserie's dining areas, partitioned by tall green slanted walls. Bottom: a collage that gives the reader a sense of Brasserie's backroom (at the back of which is located the series of cake decorators). Guido Incerti and Deane Simpson, *Diller + Scofidio (+ Renfro): The Ciliary Function*. (Milan: Skira, 2007) 135. Print.

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Fig. 41. Virginia Woolf posing in her mother's dress for *Vogue* in 1924. *Ratsoff*; 29
May 2011; Web; 27 Jun. 2011; image 1.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 42. Two iterations of "Maud," a printed linen attributed to Vanessa Bell, which is currently held at the Victoria and Alberta Museum. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 117. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 43. "Cherry Orchard" a work of discharged and block-printed silk attributed to Paul Nash, which is currently held at the Whitworth Art Gallery. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 23. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 44. "Log" (1915), a hand-printed linen mounted on card, which is held at the Crafts Study Centre at the University for the Creative Arts. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 20. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 45. A painted silk stole featuring a pair of "confronted peacocks," attributed to Roger Fry (and currently held at the Victoria and Albert Museum). Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 87. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 46. A rug design (gouache and pencil on paper) attributed to Vanessa Bell, which is currently held at the Courtauld Gallery. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 90. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 47. A preliminary design (gouache on squared paper) for Vanessa Bell's "Lady Hamilton Rug," which is currently held at the Courtauld Gallery. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 110. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 48. Vanessa Bell's "Lady Hamilton Rug" (hooked carpet, woollen pile on jute warp and weft), which is currently held at the Victoria and Albert Museum. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 111. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was
Fig. 49. In this photo (which originally appeared in The Illustrated London Herald
on 24 Oct. 1915) Nina Hamnett and Winifred Gill pose in some of Omega's
fashion designs. Ed. Alexandra Gerstein, *Beyond Bloomsbury: Designs of the
Omega Workshops 1913-19* (London: Courtauld Gallery, 2009) 54. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 50. A famous tympanum at Ephesus. Ed. John Juluis Norwhich, *Great Architecture of the World* (Cambridge: Da Capo P, 2001) 73. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 52. Two basic forms of tensegrity. Anthony Pugh, *An Introduction to Tensegrity* (Los Angeles: U of California P, 1976) 20. Print.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was
Fig. 53. One of Kenneth Snelson's many tensegrity art works and structures,
"Dragon." Kenneth Snelson; Sculptures; Dragon, 2000-3; Web; 23 Sept. 2011;
image 1.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 54. The view from inside of Kenneth Snelson's most famous tensegrity structure, "Needle Tower" (1958). Hard Press Editions; Books; Snelson; Web; 12 Sept. 2011; image 1.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 55. Another of Kenneth Snelson's outdoors tensegrity structures, "v-x" (1968). Hard Press Editions; Books; Snelson; Web; 12 Sept. 2011; image 2.

Page removed due to copyright restrictions. The information removed was Fig. 56. Right: Caravaggio's "Saint John the Baptist in the Wilderness." Left: Michael Meads' rural reinterpretation of Caravaggion's classical piece. Scott Herring, "Caravaggio's Rednecks" (*GLQ* 12.2 [2006]: 217-36) Web; 12 July 2011; images 5 and 6.

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