University of Alberta

Canada's Non-Imperial Internationalism in Africa: Understanding Canada's Security Policy in the AU and ECOWAS

by

Edward Ansah Akuffo

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

©Edward Ansah Akuffo

Spring 2010

Edmonton, Alberta

Examining Committee

Dr. Tom Keating; Department of Political Science

Dr. Malinda S. Smith; Department of Political Science

Dr. W. Andy Knight; Department of Political Science

Dr. Lois Harder; Department of Political Science

Dr. Guy Thompson; Department of History and Classics

Dr. David R. Black; Department of Political Science/Centre for Foreign Policy

Studies, Dalhousie University

Dedication

To the Glory of God and for Alexandra, Gideon, Lydia, Angel-Gabriel, and Agnes

Abstract

This study is concerned with Canada's policy towards peace, security and development in Africa. It examines Canada's response to these issues in relation to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Security Mechanism. With the intensification of violent conflicts in parts of Africa and their impact on individuals, communities, and socioeconomic development, African leaders transformed the OAU into the AU and established APSA to promote regional and human security in Africa. At the sub-regional level, West African leaders established the ECOWAS Security Mechanism to address the (human) security deficit in the West Africa region.

These institutional transformations coincided with the launching of the NEPAD, which became one of the central instruments of engagement between Africa and the international community to address the peace, security and development challenges on the African continent. Canada's response to the NEPAD under the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien came in the form of a $500 million Canada fund for Africa (CFA) that among other things supported the capacity building of APSA and the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The promotion of human security played a key role in Canada's approach to the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. I use a non-imperial internationalist approach that draws on the theoretical insights of a constructivist approach to international relations to provide an understanding of the Canadian government's policy. I argue that the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of the moral identity that

Canada has built or acquired over the years in Africa. While this moral identity provides the means through which Canadian interests are pursued in Africa, it appears that the interest in maintaining this image has overshadowed the need for the Canadian government to craft an overarching policy and put resources behind the rhetoric of promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa.

Acknowledgement

"Now I know that the LORD will help his anointed; HE will answer him from HIS holy heaven with mighty victories by HIS right hand. Some boast of chariots, some of horses; but we boast of the name of the LORD our GOD" (Psalm 20: 6-7 RSV).

I would never have come this far in my academic career and achievement had it not been the doing of the LORD GOD ALMIGHTY. How can I thank the LORD GOD ALMIGHTY for all HIS grace, goodness, and mercy toward me? *"I will offer to thee the sacrifice of thanksgiving and call on the name of the Lord"* (Psalm 116:17 RSV).

The LORD GOD ALMIGHTY has blessed me with so many people who have been instrumental in my life and have contributed immensely in my academic achievement. They deserve to be mentioned and acknowledged for their contribution as "co-authors" of this work.

A very special note of thanks is directed to my wife Alexandra and my children: Gideon, Lydia, and Angel-Gabriel for standing solidly behind me throughout this journey. There were several hours, days, weeks, and months that you never set eyes on me yet you had strong faith and hope through our LORD JESUS CHRIST that the mission will be accomplished. Sweetie, you always tell me, take courage, you can do it. Indeed, today the mission has been accomplished and your prayers, patience, and love have made it possible. I thank GOD for you and I will always remain grateful.

I thank my mum and dad, Mr and Mrs Otu for their prayers love and care throughout all these years. Auntie Yaa, I have kept you waiting for far too long but you never lost faith in me. Thank you very much. My special thanks also go to Dr. and Mrs. Edgar T. Peer, my "adopted parents" in St. Catharines, Ontario. Your love, care, and prayers for me gave me a reason to call you "dad" and "mum". I am grateful for all your assistance. I wish to express my special thanks to my brothers, Frank, Samuel, Bright, and Christian for putting so much faith in me. You always told me I can do it. To Madam Kate Tabua, Mr. and Mrs. Amoatia, Pastor Felix Otu, and all the extended family members who encouraged me and waited patiently for this day, I say thank you.

I wish to acknowledge my co-supervisor, Dr. Tom Keating, for all his advice, guidance, encouragement and showing so much interest and commitment in my work. He was always there when I called and there was no single day that he turned down my request to meet with him concerning my work. Dr. Keating, people like you are very difficult to come by. Your patience is exceptional and your care is beyond my understanding. You are a great mentor and I am very pleased that I studied under you. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to my co-supervisor Dr. Malinda Smith for all the encouragement, advice and care that she gave me. Dr. Smith, your contribution to my scholarly training will not be forgotten. My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Andy Knight, my dissertation defence committee member, for all his advice and encouragement. I am very grateful to the Department of Political Science and especially to Drs. Harder, Judson, and Urquhart who took time out of their busy schedules to provide me with advice and guidance. I am very glad that I came to the University of Alberta and even more grateful that I met such outstanding professors in the Department of Political Science. To all the teachers who taught me at various stages from day nursery to university, and all those whose

Table of Contents

Chapter Six: Canada and Human Security in West Africa

Chapter Seven: Theorising Canadian Policy towards the AU and ECOWAS

Chapter Eight

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACHPR   African Charter on Human and People's Rights

ACSRS   African Center for Strategic Research and Studies

AMIB   African Mission in Burundi

AMIS   African Union Mission in Sudan

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

APCs   Armoured Personnel Carriers

APCE   African Peacekeeping Centres of Excellence

APRM   African Peer Review Mechanism

APSA   African Union Peace and Security Architecture

ASF   African Standby Force

AU   African Union

AVGPs   Armoured Vehicles General Purpose

BRIC   Brazil, Russia, India, China

CADSP   Common African Defence and Security Policy

C3IS   Command Control Communication and Information System (C3IS)

CCIC   Canadian Council for International Cooperation

CECI   Canadian Center for Education and International Cooperation

CEO   Chief Executive Officer

CEWS   Continental Early Warning System

CFA	Canada Fund for Africa
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIFA	Canada Investment Fund for Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSDCA	Conference on Security Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DND	Department of National Defence
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSAP	ECOWAS Small Arms Programme
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EMP	Ecole pour le Maintien de la Paix (EMP)
EMSC	ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council
EPF	ECOWAS Peace Fund
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union

EWS	(ECOWAS) Early Warning System
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty (Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors)
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HCSCFAIT	House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IAC	Information Analysis Cell
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICC	International Criminal Court
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MAP	Millennium Africa Recovery Programme
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPMC	Mission Planning and Management Cell
MSC	Military Staff Committee

NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
P5	Permanent Five of the UN Security Council
PCASED	Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PMAD	Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNA	Protocol on Non-Aggression
PPC	Pearson Peacekeeping Center
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSI	West Africa Peace and Security Initiative
PW	Panel of the Wise
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAU	Small Arms Unit

SSCFAIT	Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement
START	Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	UN-AU Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNPAARERD	UN Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery and Development
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter One

Introduction to the Study

This study is a critical examination of Canada's policy towards peace, security and development in Africa. Specifically, it examines Canada's response to the post-Cold War security-development challenges in relation to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Security Mechanism. Drawing upon the theoretical insights from constructivism, I argue that a non-imperial internationalist approach helps to understand the Canadian government's policy in Africa. I also argue that the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of what may be called Canada's 'moral identity' in Africa. While this moral identity helps to promote Canadian interests, the Canadian government does not match this image with resource contributions. The Canadian government's interest in maintaining this image often has overshadowed the need to back its rhetoric with resources in promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa. This study reveals that Canada does not have an overarching policy towards Africa and that Canadian activism, which is event-driven, is based on the perceived poverty and violence in Africa.

The concept "non-imperial" has been used to describe Canada's historical past as a non-colonial power, which makes Canada a "non-threatening partner for international initiatives"[1] on peace, security, and development. According to the United Nations Association of Canada,

---

[1] For details see United Nations Association of Canada website
<http://www.unac.org/learn/wrld/background/cu.htm> Accessed on January 12, 2010

this non-imperial image motivates Canada to support UN activities such as peacekeeping and the promotion of norms like human rights, human security, and disarmament.[2] The concept of non-imperial internationalism has not been developed more analytically or used systematically to account for Canadian foreign policy in Africa. Indeed, there is no study, at least in the context of Canada's relations in Africa, that is grounded in a non-imperial internationalist approach and that draws on the theoretical insights of a constructivist approach to international relations.

The study explores the intersubjective construction Canada's moral identity in Africa, which is a central feature of the non-imperial internationalist approach. The study examines how this moral identity has influenced Canada's approach to protect human security on the African continent. By Canada's moral identity, I mean the normative image of Canada that motivates or shapes the behaviour, interests, and activities of Canada in the global arena generally and on the African continent specifically. Canada's moral identity entails how Canada perceives itself as caring, a good international citizen, and as a humanitarian and moral actor. The other side of the coin is the construction of Africa as the 'other' which is conflict-ridden and poor and, hence, requiring the benevolent support of Canada especially through development assistance.

At the onset of the twenty-first century, a small cadre of African leaders including Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, articulated a commitment to revive their ailing states and regional institutions through conceptions of good political and economic governance. These leaders embraced 'new ideas' such as human security, and the need to build the capacity of African

---

[2] Ibid

regional institutions to confront the twin challenges of insecurity and underdevelopment on the African continent. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed some of the most brutal armed conflicts[3] across parts of Africa. This was epitomised by the 1994 Rwanda genocide that claimed the lives of over 800,000 people within a span of 100 days and destroyed the economy of Rwanda. Similarly, protracted conflicts raged in at least a dozen African states including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan. The African Union (AU) maintains that the prevalence of armed conflicts is an important factor that contributes to socioeconomic decline and human insecurity in parts of the African continent.[4]

To address the security deficit and its impact on peoples and development, African leaders transformed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the AU and established the APSA with a wide range of functions for Africa's peace and security. At the sub-regional level, West African leaders established the ECOWAS Security Mechanism as part of the AU's efforts to address the security deficit in the West Africa region. In establishing APSA, the AU made the protection of human security a core objective through the incorporation of article 4(h) in the *Constitutive Act of the AU*. Article (4h) grants *rights* to the AU to intervene in member states in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.[5] Furthermore, the establishment of the APSA coincided with the launching by African leaders of the NEPAD in 2001. The NEPAD called for a partnership among Africans and between African states and the international community to address the interconnected challenges of security

---

[3] I accept the African Union's (AU) definition which uses conflict to connote armed conflict within and between states. According to the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, armed conflict is exacerbated by illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and landmines. See AU protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council pp2-3

[4] For detailed information see the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union pp2-3

[5] See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h)

and development on the African continent. An important element of the NEPAD initiative is the link it draws between security and development. The NEPAD has become one of the central instruments of engagement between Africa and the international community, particularly the G8, to build the capacity of African institutions to promote peace, security and development. The launching of the NEPAD, the establishment of the APSA and ECOWAS Security Mechanism, and the AU's call to the industrialised states to enter into a partnership to promote development and security influenced the Canadian government's policy on the African continent.

The Canadian government under Jean Chrétien took leadership in the G8 in support of the NEPAD initiative and helped to craft the G8's Africa Action Plan. The Chrétien government's own response was the establishment of a $500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA). Among other things, the CFA provided support for the AU peace and security capacity building. As well, the Canadian government established the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI) as part of the CFA to support specific peace and security initiatives in ECOWAS including projects to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and to build the capacity of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The promotion of human security played a key role in Canada's approach to the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. Arguably Canada's promotion of human security in Africa has waxed and waned, from Chrétien to his Liberal successor Paul Martin and the Conservative government of Stephen Harper.

These developments call for a study of the Canadian government's human security policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. Although there is literature on Canadian development assistance policy towards African states, there is no

4

significant body of literature on Canadian policy toward Africa's regional organisations. This study is among the first to analyse Canada's bilateral and multilateral relations with regional organisations in Africa especially in the area of peace and security. In a departure from the dominant focus of Canadian development assistance policy in African states, this study will examine the role of human security in Canada's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS within the broader context of the Canadian government's response to NEPAD. The study contributes knowledge to Canada's relations in Africa and the debate on human security that has been couched in the framework of an "Axworthy legacy" to Canadian foreign policy—referring to the former Liberal Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy who was a prominent advocate of human security. Sceptics like Denis Stairs (2001) are less sure the concept will survive in Canadian foreign policy. Other scholars argue that human security has come to stay as a central focus of Canadian foreign policy (Donaghy 2003; MacLean 2006).

These debates leave out a number of things in Canada's policy in Africa: first, the substantive content of human security policy; second, the interplay of ideas, norms, and the perception of Canada on the African continent; and third, how Canada's perception of Africa influences Canadian government policy. These suggest a need to understand the intersubjective construction of Canada's identity and how this plays out in its support for the AU and ECOWAS's effort to build their peace and security capacity. This study explores the factors that influenced the Canadian government's policy as well as the meaning and understanding of human security and how it has translated into the Canadian government's support for the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. As well, this study investigates African

perspectives of human security and regional security and whether they had any impact on the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS.

Despite the diverse meaning and understanding of human security in Canada and Africa[6], there is an intersubjective construction of human security as the protection of people in violent conflicts. This understanding of human security has provided an opportunity for the Canadian government to forge close partnerships with the AU and ECOWAS to promote human security, albeit by proxy, on the African continent. This suggests that the idea of human security has outlived the tenure of Lloyd Axworthy. More importantly, the pursuit of human security is consistent with and reinforces Canada's moral identity in Africa.

This study raises the question of how to understand and theorise the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. The understanding of human security among the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS— as the protection of people from physical threats, and the moral image that Canada has cultivated partly through the provision of development assistance, influenced the Canadian government policy on the African continent. Drawing on a constructivist approach to international relations that emphasises the importance and influence of ideas in constructing the interest and foreign policy activities of states, I argue that a non-imperial internationalist approach—which central element is Canada's moral identity in Africa, helps to understand the Canadian government's policy in the AU and ECOWAS. By interpreting Canadian foreign policy through a non-imperial internationalist lens, I am aware of the tension that exists between this understanding and other aspects of Canada's policy especially in the economic realm that

---

[6] This builds on the information I obtained from both the Canadian government and AU and ECOWAS documents, as well as through the interview of Canadian and African officials.

suggests imperialistic, hegemonic, or at least neo-colonial practices. Although I speak to this tension in the following chapters, I have provided a fuller discussion of the theoretical implications of this study in Chapter Seven.

Constructivism as the Theoretical Framework

A major contribution of this study is the incorporation of constructivists theoretical insights into a non-imperial internationalist approach, which may provide some theoretical guidance for future research on Canada's policy in Africa and, perhaps more generally, in the global south. Constructivists vary in their analysis of international politics but central to the constructivists' approach is the role of ideas in constituting agents and structure in the international system.

Constructivists make several assumptions about state behaviour in the international system. One of the central claims of constructivists is that international reality—including taken-for-granted structures like anarchy—is socially constructed based on the intersubjective understanding of states as actors. Reality does not exist 'out there' to be discovered but depends on historically produced and culturally bound knowledge which enables actors to construct and give meaning to reality (Barnett 2005: 259, Waever 1996: 164-169). For constructivists, human agreement is a key framework for conceptualising reality even though there are brute facts such as rocks and land which exist independent of human agreement. Put differently, structures are not only material they are defined by norms, ideas and rules. However, state and non-state actors determine those norms. In this vein constructivism helps

to explain how social norms such as human rights and human security are internationalised and institutionalised in the international system (Barnett 2006: 259-266).

The construction of reality underscores another central principle of constructivism, that is, people or actors act towards objects depending upon the meaning that the objects have for them (Wendt 1995: 135). Normative factors including states' identities shape states' interests and behaviour in the international system. This suggests that states might have specific identities that shape their interests and the outcomes in the international arena (Ruggie 1998 14-15). This leads constructivists to argue that identity and interest of actors are not exogenously given but, rather, they are produced by intersubjective understanding through processes of interaction. As such, interest and identity might change over time as the process which produced it changes. Actors' identities and interests are not only structurally determined but are also the result of their interaction with each other (Kratochwil 2000: 58 Wendt 1995: 129-134). In this sense, the behaviour of states in the international system does not happen by chance but rather is based on the intersubjective understandings of the norms that in turn shape their behaviour. For instance, the ideas of interest and power presuppose an understanding of the rules that conditions the game in which actors want to play. Thus, without intersubjective understanding the notion of winning or taking certain strategic decisions based on states interests and power does not make much sense (Kratochwil 2000:56).

By conceiving international politics from a "relational ontological" perspective, constructivists take account of the important role that norms, rules, ideas and language play in the conduct of interstate relations (Ruggie 1998:4; 1998: 33 Waever 1995: 51). Constructivists argue that structures are cognitive entities and without having an idea about their existence

through interaction they will convey no meaning that will shape the foreign policy of states. This suggests that without collective knowledge, structures will cease to exist. For example regular practice produces mutually constitutive sovereign identities (agents) and their associated institutional norms (structures) (Wendt 1995: 151). Thus, regular practice reproduces the identity and interests of states as well as the structures which over time constrain their behaviour.

Finally, constructivists make a strong case that the international system is not fixed as it is susceptible to change through conscious action by states. This means that changes at the unit level (states) can lead to a transformation at the system level (Ruggie 1986: 146-152). Competitive structures of identity and interest can be transformed into collective or cooperative structures through the transformation of state identities and interests. This can occur when states embrace "New Thinking" through self-reflection of their interactions with other states (Wendt 1995: 156-160).

Language plays a crucial role in this new way of thinking by generating meanings that states attribute to specific situations. Ole Waever's conception of security as a speech act provides a useful illustration. According to Weaver security is an act and its utterance is the reality. Therefore through "securitisation", that is by "naming a certain development a security problem, the state can claim a special right…to use whatever means as possible to block it" (Waever 1995: 54-55). What this suggests is that in addition to the material existence of international reality (Ruggie 1998: 33), language (ideational factor) is capable of generating specific actions from states depending on the meanings they attribute to a particular situation

or development. In this regard, the foreign policies of states may be generated from the material existence of things as well as through language (speech act).

The insights from constructivism provide a useful framework for a non-imperial internationalist approach to understand the Canadian government's contribution towards the protection of human security in Africa through the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. From a constructivist standpoint, we may describe the concept of human security as constituting a set of norms or ideas that shape state policies and prescribe appropriate behaviour in the international community. Following Michael Barnett, "norms are generally understood as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Barnett 2006:265). Norms constrain behaviour on two accounts: first, actors are reluctant to break them because of the potentially costly consequences of their action and, secondly, norms are connected to a sense of self, hence, breaking a norm is injurious to oneself (Ibid). As well, norms should be understood not only as constraints but as facilitators of state action—foreign policy. In this light, human security can be seen as a structural determinant of Canadian foreign policy. It follows that Canada and Africa[7] can be regarded as agents who have intersubjective meanings and understandings of the structure—human security. Drawing on these assumptions, the non-imperial internationalist approach elucidates how the meaning and understanding of human security from the African and Canadian contexts shape the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. Among

---

[7] It is important to point out that the use of "Africa" does not mean the whole of Africa but rather in reference to the focus of this study that is the AU and ECOWAS. Hence I use Africa as a general reference to these two institutions which are the subjects under investigation in this study.

other normative factors, the interest in promoting human security is consistent with Canada's moral identity in Africa.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research strategy particularly an analysis of Canadian government and AU and ECOWAS documents, speeches, and interviews conducted in Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Ottawa to empirically investigate the Canadian government's human security policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. Qualitative methods, Devine (2002: 197) argues, is a generic term that refers to a range of techniques including observation, participant observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews which seek to understand the experiences and practices of key informants and to locate them firmly in context. In conducting qualitative research description is less important than the researcher's interpretation of the data relating to the event or phenomenon under study (McNabb 2004: 104). Qualitative research seeks to capture and interpret subjectively the meanings of people's experiences, phenomenon, or an event. In this respect, qualitative research is aligned with an interpretive epistemology which sees the dynamic, constructed, and evolving nature of social reality (Devine 2002: 201).

This study employed document analysis and intensive individual interviews to capture and interpret the subjective meanings that policymakers, diplomats and NGOs and think tank officials have for the concept of human security, APSA and PSI, in both Canada and Africa and also how these meanings are reflected in the Canadian government's policy. In the field, I used open-ended questionnaires interview method to capture in detail the views of the respondents.

This approach provided some valuable insights about the processes involved in policymaking and how ideas come to be accepted in the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore, the open-ended questionnaires provided an avenue for me to seek clarifications when there was misunderstanding of the opinions of the interviewees but also more importantly I took the opportunity to ask the interviewees to elaborate on key documents and reports.

I used purposive sampling technique to select the participants for this study. Following Neuman and Kreuger the goal of purposive sampling "is to select cases with a specific purpose in mind" (Neuman and Kreuger 2003: 211). Johnson and Reynolds (2005: 253) argue that the goal of purposive sampling is "typically to study a diverse and usually limited number of observations rather than to analyse a sample representative of a larger target population". The purposive sampling technique helped to target the respondents—officials—who were privy to the information I needed to understand the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building.

My field interviews included three categories of officials. First, I interviewed federal government officials in Ottawa who worked in the Africa Bureau in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), officials in the Africa section in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and in the Department of National Defence (DND). Second, I interviewed diplomats and officials at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as diplomats and officials at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. In Addis Ababa and Abuja I interviewed those diplomats and officials in the Peace and Security Departments as well as in the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The final category of respondents included officials of some NGOs and think-tanks in Canada, Ethiopia and Ghana.

For Canadian NGOs and think-tanks my target was those who focused on Africa and have head offices in Ottawa. I chose those with head offices in Ottawa as they were close to the 'heart' of policy-making in Canada. In Ethiopia and Ghana, I interviewed officials of think-tanks who were involved in the area of human security and regional security in Africa. I chose the think-tanks in Ethiopia and Ghana primarily because some of the head offices of African think-tanks are located in these countries.

In addition to the information I obtained from interviews, I also consulted primary materials. In this category, I used official policy statements, reports and speeches some of which were readily available on departmental websites and websites of NGOs and think-tanks and, others which I collected during my field research. Finally, I used media reports, statements, and articles from newspaper websites, electronic databases, and hard copies of Canadian government documents which were available at the University of Alberta Library.

Organisation of the Study

The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Chapter Two explores the human security concept by outlining the diverse meanings, interpretations and debates of the concept. The chapter also discusses the understandings of human security in the Canadian and African context. It explores how and why human security became an important focus of the Canadian government's support towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. Chapter Three provides an overview of the sources of Canadian foreign policy in Africa that is shaped primarily by the provision of development assistance. This is followed in Chapter Four with a more detailed discussion of the Canadian government leadership in the promotion of the

NEPAD initiative in the G8 through the establishment of the CFA. These chapters provide the context for a more detailed discussion of the Canadian government's contribution towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building in Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively. Chapter Seven delves into the non-imperial internationalist approach to understand the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. The study ends in Chapter Eight with a summary and conclusion of the main findings and reiterates the central thesis that the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of Canada's non-imperial internationalism—moral identity—that Canada has built or acquired over the years in Africa. While this moral identity provides the means through which Canadian interests are pursued in Africa, it appears that the interest in maintaining this image has overshadowed the need for the Canadian government to develop an overarching policy and put resources behind the rhetoric of promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa.

Chapter Two

Human Security: The Canadian and African Conceptualisations

Introduction

The theory and practice of human security has attracted diverse debates among academics, policy-makers, states and non-state actors, and human rights activists in the international arena. The primary focus of this chapter is to explore the meanings and uses of the concept of human security in Canadian foreign policy and in the policies of the AU and ECOWAS. To get at these meanings, I examine the understanding of the concept among officials in the Canadian government and NGOs in Canada, as well as officials in the AU and ECOWAS and NGOs in Africa. The chapter examines a set of interrelated questions. First, what is human security? Second, what is the meaning of human security for the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS? And lastly, are there any similarities (or differences) in the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS's understanding of human security that may provide guidance for cooperation in the pursuit of human security objectives in Africa?

Human security is a highly contested concept which has different meanings within the Canadian and African contexts. The meanings of human security are often value-laden and appear to draw on local and regional cultural experiences. Like the concept of security itself, both Canadians and African officials use different cultural lenses and draw on diverse experiences to derive the meaning of human security. On the Canadian side, the Chrétien government placed emphasis on the security of the 'individual' in the freedom from fear understanding of human security (DFAIT 2000). More importantly, Canada's conception of

human security as freedom from fear helped to shape the notion of Canada's moral identity which draws on Canada's peacekeeping reputation in the international arena. Across Africa, human security has a broader socio-cultural meaning. The African conception of human security places emphasis on the interconnectedness of security between the individual, the family, and the community (Cobbah 1987; Obasanjo 1996; NEPAD 2001; Henk 2001; Deng and Zartman 2002; Hussein et al 2004; Tieku 2007, Cilliers 2004a). Within Africa, human security relates to the 'human' as an individual, and also refers to the family and the community as a whole. In spite of the apparent differences in the conceptualisation of human security, there appears to be a general understanding of the individual as the referent object of security at the agenda level of the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS especially when it comes to the protection of people from violent conflict. This 'consensus' provides an avenue for cooperation in the pursuit of human security objectives by the Canadian government in the AU and ECOWAS.

The argument in this chapter that human security has a diverse meaning yet there is a general understanding between the Canadian government and AU and ECOWAS of the individual as the referent object in violent conflicts, serves as the background for understanding the arguments put forth in the remainder of this study. The arguments here are important in two ways. First, it helps us to understand why the Canadian government is forging close partnership with the AU and ECOWAS to promote human security in Africa. And second, it also helps us to understand that although the Canadian government human security agenda is narrowly focused on the protection of people in violent conflict, in practice the Canadian government's programmes also addressed wider concerns about human development through

the work of CIDA. This explains to some extent, the influence of CIDA officials on the Canadian government's human security agenda on the African continent.

This chapter is organised into five main sections. In the first section, I discuss briefly, the 'transition' from the idea of traditional security to human security. This short introduction is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the diverse theories in security studies. Rather, the main objective here is to provide the context for understanding the arguments in the subsequent sections. The human security concept defies a single definition therefore in the second section I use 'an explanatory perspective'—that is the power of explanation, to discuss extensively the meaning of human security and its freedom from fear and freedom from want interpretations or approaches. The third section focuses on the conceptualisation of human security in the Canadian context. In this section, I analyse the Canadian government's perspective on human security in relation to the conceptualisation of human security among Canadian government officials and NGOs. In the fourth section, I focus on the conceptualisation of human security in the African context. The analysis also focuses on the meaning of human security in the AU and ECOWAS as well as among African officials who are working in these organisations and in NGOs in Africa. The last section draws on the convergence of the ideas about human security in the Canadian and African contexts. I argue that the AU intervention mandate converges with the Canadian government's freedom from fear approach to human security and this provides the grounds for the operationalisation of human security in Canada and the AU and ECOWAS relations.

From State Security to Human Security: a Brief Theoretical Review

Keith Krause and Michael Williams rightly argue that 'security' as a concept is derivative in that it carries no particular meaning unless it is linked to what is to be secured which, in turn, informs the kinds of threats that we should be concerned about (Krause and Williams 1997). Traditionally, the dominant concept of security was articulated by realists and neorealist in international politics. The realists' conception of security placed the state both at the centre of international politics and as the beneficiary of security. The state, in the view of the realist, is the object that is to be secured—protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Realists argue that national security is the ultimate goal of interstate relations and this can be ensured through the military defence of the state from external threats (Mearsheimer 1994, 2001; Waltz 1979, 1999, 2000).

This understanding of security derives from the key realist assumptions that states are the most important actors in the international system, and the international system itself is characterised by a condition of anarchy. Although realist do not conceive anarchy as lawlessness or disorder they do argue that without any overarching authority above states, states are left to fend for themselves and therefore state leaders tend to think strategically and use all means including war to protect the security of the state. The anarchical condition in the international system produces mistrust among states. As such states are always in the business of looking for opportunities to acquire more power—defined in terms of military capability—that will guarantee their survival.

Furthermore, realists argue that even the presence of international institutions cannot limit the state's quest for self-preservation in a competitive security environment. Realists

maintain that international institutions have no independent effect on state behaviour as these institutions themselves are based on the self-interested calculations of great powers. It follows that international institutions are not guarantors of peace (Mearshiemer 1994). Even though realists admit that states can cooperate in a condition of anarchy they see cooperation as difficult because states worry about relative gains and cheating which might offset the balance of power.[1] In short, for realist, states are the dominant actors in the international system and power politics rules the affairs of interstate relations. To a large extent the realist understanding of security shaped the Cold War politics. Arguably this understanding continues to shape international politics in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In short, realists see the threats to security as externally-conditioned by anarchy and the potential for military aggression by states in the international system. As such other issues which can be placed within the analytical category of 'domestic politics'—although they can have significant impact across national borders—such as poverty, disease, and environmental degradation are considered by realists as non-security threats to the state.

There are however dissenting views to the realists' grim picture of international politics. While the liberal institutionalists accept the basic assumptions of realism such as the primacy of the state and anarchy in the international system, they see international institutions and regimes as capable of mitigating the security effects of anarchy (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1993). Thus, in the view of the liberal institutionalists, international organisations and the emergence of transnational actors as well as the deepening of economic interdependence

---

1 For details see Mearshiemer(1994: 12-13)

between states serve as constraints on state behaviour and in turn promote peaceful relations between states.

Furthermore, Critical Security Studies (Booth 1997; Booth 2005; Krause and Williams 1997) which is made up of a wide variety of critical theoretical approaches such as constructivism, feminism and postmodernism (for example see Wendt 1992; Tickner 1992; Enloe 1989) have questioned the realist premise of security in the international system. Indeed these critical approaches differ in their assumptions and the set of questions they investigate. For instance by viewing security through gendered lenses and asking the question, what is being secured in the provision of security as traditionally defined, feminists argue that masculinised security—which is premised on the protection of the state through the military— marginalises and de-emphasises the role of women knowledge and consequently renders women insecure and vulnerable to violence. In this respect, feminists shed light on the social, economic, as well as the political experiences of women and challenge the patriarchal power relations within the state that underpins the traditional logic of security (Dalby 1997; Enloe 1989; Whitworth 2004 and 2005). The feminists' interrogation therefore can be understood as sharing the same objective of other approaches of Critical Security Studies to broaden and deepen our understanding of the concept of security.

Robert Cox's (1986) distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory provides a useful framework to understand the seeming 'unity of purpose' in Critical Security Studies that challenges the realist conception of security. As Cox argues, problem solving theories like realism "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions into which they are organised as the given framework for action.

The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble". Critical theory, on the other hand, "is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about...and how and whether they might be in the process of changing" (Cox 1986: 208).

Another important critical theory that interrogates the realist assumptions about security is constructivism (Wendt 1992, 1995; Ruggie 1992).[2] Constructivists give priority to the role that ideational factors and norms play in influencing behaviour.[3] As well, constructivists question the taken-for-granted assumptions of the realists such as the primacy of the state and anarchy in the international system. In an often cited essay, Alexander Wendt argues that, "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1995). For Wendt, anarchy is not an objective reality which conditions state actions but rather a socially constructed structure. Its existence depends on the intersubjective agreement of states. In this sense, anarchy by itself does not produce insecurity in the international system. It follows that the intersubjective understanding of anarchy will shape the way states relate to each other, but on the other hand, changes in the meaning of anarchy through 'new thinking' at the state level will have a corresponding effect of transforming the relations between states. In this regard, as the realists take anarchy and the struggle for power as *a given* in interstate relations, constructivists focus on how (new) ideas and norms can change the statutes quo of insecurity in the international system.

---

[2] It is important to reiterate that constructivism is the theoretical framework for this study therefore it is in order to narrowly concentrate, at this stage, on its theoretical assumptions and how it might help us to understand the changing meaning of security from the state to human security.
3 For a detailed discussion of Constructivism, see the theoretical framework in chapter 1.

Drawing on the constructivists' standpoint, one can argue that the way we think about international politics shapes what we know or seek to know about state behaviour and the concept of security. As Booth (1997: 106) puts it, "security is what we make of it". This also suggests that the concept of security can be applied to a wide variety of issues and objects as well as have cultural specific understandings. Our thinking about security will be quite limited if we choose only to focus narrowly on the security of the state without thinking about the changing economic, political, and perhaps cultural environment within which states operate and how these changes affect the state itself and its citizens. The precarious conditions of individuals resulting from the recent developments in the global arena such as international terrorism and high levels of poverty and economic inequality due to the intensification of globalisation, and the emergence of intrastate conflicts after the Cold War, have contributed to the broadening and deepening of the concept of security (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998; Booth 2005; Duffield 2005). One of the outcomes of this theoretical debate is the shift in focus of security from the state to the level of the individual. This has brought to the fore different questions and ideas about the meaning of security. A shift in the security focus to the individual level has opened an avenue for students to raise new questions and study the 'new kinds of threats' facing people and how states and non-state actors have responded to these threats. Consequently, the idea of *human security* has attained salience in the security discourse and has produced some of the most interesting debates in the field of international relations.

What is Human Security?

Just like other social science concepts, the meaning of human security is highly contested. The human security concept lacks a precise meaning and this problem is exacerbated by the different dimensions and issues to which the concept has been applied. Nevertheless, the primacy of promoting and protecting the wellbeing of the individual unifies the different understandings of human security. In order to get a better grasp of the concept of human security I use an 'explanatory perspective'[4] rather than adhering to a strict definition of the concept. Borrowing insights from Zan (1982:17) "the explanatory model increases our ability to explain similarities and differences" of phenomena—human security. This is done primarily because there is no such thing as a universal definition of human security. Although I will refer to some specific definitions, my central objective is to explain the concept without a strict emphasis on generating an overarching definition.

Human security is an older concept (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 23-60). However, many of the recent debates over its meaning and policy implications take their root from the assessment of the emerging security and development challenges in the immediate post-Cold War environment. These are outlined in 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report. In an attempt to seek a departure from the *high politics* of nuclear security that characterised the Cold War era, and to address the immediate challenges that confronted states and the international community, the UNDP argued that, "we need another profound transition in thinking-from nuclear security to human security" (UNDP 1994:

---

[4] I use this to mean exploring the concept of human security through the power of explanation. I do this in view of the diversity of understandings that the concept connotes. My objective here is to offer an understanding of the concept without necessarily adhering to strict definitions that cannot be applicable in varying contexts.

22). The UNDP Report argued that "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It (security) has been related more to nation-states than people" (ibid). With this assessment, the UNDP report marked the beginning of the revolutionary thinking about security by linking the concept to people instead of the traditional reference to the state. In spite of the desire to change security thinking, the UNDP admitted the difficulty of having a precise definition of human security; hence the report argued that human security is identified by its absence than its presence. Human security, the report argued, "can be said to have two main aspects. It means first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (ibid: 23). "Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity" (ibid: 22).

The UNDP Report sought to expand the meaning of the concept of *security* at least in terms of its referent object (Krause and Williams 1997; Booth 1997; Both 2005; Smith 2005), yet the report failed to give a precise definition of human security itself. Critics such as Paris (2001:89) argued that the UNDP conception of human security made virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort a threat to human security. Despite Paris's argument what is significant was that the UNDP's new thinking attempted to shift the focus of security from the state to the individual. That is making the individual secured from the threats that affect his/her dignity and livelihood. As Krause and Williams argue, "Security is a condition that individuals enjoy, and they are given primacy both in the definition of threats and of who (or what) is to be

secured" (Krause and Williams 1997: 43). This understanding echoes what Aravena (2002: 6) calls thinking about relations in the international system as a 'people issue'.

The UNDP understanding of human security places the legitimate concerns of people at the center of the security discourse. At the practical level, the UNDP argued for, first, a fundamental shift in the meaning of security from its exclusive focus on protecting the territories of states to protecting the wellbeing of people. Second, the achievement of human security goals required a shift from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development. The UNDP's attempt to place more value on issues like sustainable development was a conscious effort to shift resources that hitherto financed the Cold War national security programmes such as the acquisition of nuclear armaments and other instruments of war, to promote the well being of people in the global south. Accordingly, the 1994 UNDP report identified human security as encompassing seven broad issues of physical security, political security, community security, food security, health security, environmental security, and economic security which form the core of the threats against individuals in the global south (UNDP, 1994: 24-25).

In practice as well as in theory, each of the UNDP's seven dimensions of human security can be very expansive. In addition, these dimensions often are interrelated, creating confusion as to what exactly human security means in each context. In spite of this difficulty, however, in its simplest understanding, human security sees the individual as the object of security in relation to the dignity that the individual has for his or her life (Mack 2005). In its generalised understanding, human security is both a destination and as a means to achieve wellbeing and dignity (Tadjbakhsh 2005). King and Murray (2001) proposed what they call a measurable

definition of human security. According to them human security is, "the number of years of future life spent outside a state of 'generalised poverty' (ibid: 585). In their view generalised poverty refers to the deprivation of any basic needs and capabilities. King and Murray identify income, health, education, political freedom and democracy as domains for measuring human security or wellbeing. Thus "a person is in a state of generalised poverty whenever he or she dips below the pre-defined threshold in any of the component areas of wellbeing" (King and Murray 2001: 593-94).

King and Murray's definition further problematises the concept of human security by restricting its meaning to some sort of 'quantitative measurement'. In this respect they appear to pay attention to the measurability of quality of life or human dignity whilst ignoring the fact that these variables—such as income, political freedom, health and education can have different meanings for different peoples in different cultures. Murray and King's argument raises important questions such as, what is well-being and should we limit income to paid work in the formal sector? And should the measurability of the individual's level of education be limited to formal education? How do we account for informal education especially through socialisation of individuals in their culture? If people value their culture and would not engage in formal education can we take this to be a threat to human security? There are no straight forward answers to these questions. What is true is that in spite of the apparent weaknesses of Murray and King's argument, the substance of placing the wellbeing of the individual at the center of security elucidates our understanding of the human security concept. In fact it demonstrates the growing desire to treat individuals as the object of security instead of sovereign states.

Some critics (Thomas 2001) see the conceptualisation of human security as based on the liberal notions of competitive and possessive individualism. In this sense, the 'human' in human security tends to exclude the community and group living as well as our interconnectedness as a people. By extending the definition of human security to the level of the (global) community, Caroline Thomas (2001:161) asserts that "human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another". Human security goes beyond material sufficiency to encompass non-material dimensions to 'form a qualitative whole'. The non-material dimension of human security includes emancipation from oppressive power structures at the global, national, and local levels enabling individuals to achieve human dignity (Krause and Williams 1997; Booth 1997; Thomas 2001: 162). Given the divergent views about human security, Tadjbakhsh (2005:1) suggests that "there is little chance that a globally satisfied definition (of human security) will be found in the near future". Tracing the 'origin' of human security to the immediate post-Cold War era would further enhance our understanding of the concept and why it has gained currency in foreign policy and in the academic field of security studies.

As noted previously, the 1994 UNDP Human Development report is the most widely cited document on the 'origin' and definition of human security (Paris, 2001: 90); however, if one takes a step back, it can be argued that at least on the global scale, the 1992 UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali's report, *Agenda for Peace* perhaps set the pace for the 'post-Cold War evolution or development' of the concept of human security. Human security was mentioned in

the *Agenda for Peace* without any specific meaning assign to it. Yet, Boutros Ghali used human security to suggest the challenges that face individuals, communities and families as the Cold War was dissipating.[5] Boutros Ghali indicated that with the winding down of the Cold War, new security threats have emerged through ecological damage, poverty, disease, famine, drought, refugee flows, and communal violence that impedes on the rights of communities, families, and individuals.[6] These 'non-traditional threats' were not new (Bakwesegha 1995; Thomas 2001; Duffield 2005; MacFarlane and Khong 2006). However, they became too important to ignore because of their perceived linkage to post-Cold War global security in a time when globalisation was intensifying. There was a perception that the non-traditional threats like famine and disease could be as lethal as traditional threats such as interstate war and nuclear war; non-traditional threats could pose grave dangers to international peace and security. The *Agenda for Peace* argued that, "drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war, therefore...efforts to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterise the past."[7]

The *Agenda for Peace* also noted that the sources of conflicts and war are pervasive and deep and to address them will require respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, sustainable economic and social development and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.[8] The pervasiveness of the sources of conflict will also require international

---

[5] For details see " An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping" Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. (http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html) Accessed on September 9, 2008
[6] ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid

collective efforts involving individual states, regional organisations, NGOs, and the UN system

to address the threats to peace and security which transcend state borders.[9] In this respect the

Agenda for Peace anticipates a shared responsibility from the local to the global level where

"each has a special and indispensable role to play in an integrated approach to human

security".[10] In sum, although the human security concept is not clearly defined in the *Agenda*

for Peace, the non-traditional threats outlined by Boutros Ghali form part of the core elements

of the concern about human security as elaborated in the 1994 UNDP Human Development

Report. To a significant extent then, 'the new thinking' that has emerged in the field of

international security in the post-Cold War era is that human security (protecting and

promotion of the wellbeing of people) is an important component of promoting global peace

and security.

The Two Approaches to Understanding Human Security

Analytically as well as practically, the human security concept is divided into two

interrelated approaches. The concept of human security sees the individual as the basic unit of

analysis on security issues. This section analyses the threats from which individuals should be

protected. Andrew Mack (2005) argues that, "all proponents of human security agree that its

primary goal is the protection of individuals" (ibid: viii). Yet there is a breakdown of consensus

when it comes to identifying precisely the threats that individuals should be protected from

(ibid. viii). Similarly, Tadjbakhsh (2005: 1-2) argues that there is consensus among advocates of

human security only to the point of shifting attention from state-centered to people-centered

---

[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid

approaches to security. Beyond this consensus, different organisations, states as well as scholars have adopted different interpretations of human security and the threats individuals should be protected from. This in turn has led to the development of specific instruments to address the threats to human security. This will be discussed shortly but first let us get a general sense of the debate.

The debate about the threats that individuals should be protected from is played out in two distinct but interrelated perspectives. These are the "narrow" or "freedom from fear" perspective and the 'broad' or "freedom from want" perspective (Mack 2005; Bosold and Werthess, 2005; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, Debiel and Werthes, 2006). The freedom from fear and the freedom from want perspectives themselves have several dimensions that focus on specific and interrelated threats to individuals. The key factor responsible for the lack of a precise definition for human security is that its ardent backers have an interest to keep the term expansive and vague (Paris 2001). Both at the theoretical and practical levels, human security advocates have sought to shift attention and resources from traditional issues of security to other issues that traditionally fell under the umbrella of international development (Paris 2001; King and Murray 2001: 585-92).

Freedom from Fear

The freedom from fear (Canadian) perspective defines human security as the protection of individuals from violent threats such as war, genocide, and terrorism. The central claim of the freedom from fear approach is that the protection of people is as important as the

protection of the sovereignty of the state.[11] The rights of civilians should be protected in times of violent conflict. In this context, human security is understood as a conflict prevention or management tool which has a core objective of protecting people from physical violence. The freedom from fear perspective has been the framework for negotiations and agreement on a number of important international instruments. These include small arms trade, the Land Mines Treaty of 1997 (also known as the Ottawa Treaty), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that was launched by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, Maclean, 2000). The R2P doctrine appears to be the central pillar of the freedom from fear perspective in situations where violent conflict has actually occurred. It is noteworthy that at least in theory the R2P doctrine is interrelated with the humanitarian objectives of the ICC and the Ottawa Treaty—providing justice after war and preventing physical hurt through landmines—respectively. Therefore these three international instruments provide some means for the protection of people from physical violence.

The R2P doctrine is interrelated with the traditional ideas about humanitarian intervention—protecting civilians at risk (Gareth and Sahnoun 2002; MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss 2004). In a re-conceptualisation of state sovereignty and its relationship to humanitarian intervention, and the international community's role to protect human security, the ICISS reframed sovereignty from "a right" to "a responsibility". That is, sovereignty is a dual responsibility that is shared by the state and the international community. This gives the international community the mandate to intervene when states are unable or unwilling to

---

[11] See DFAIT (2000). Freedom from Fear: Canada's foreign policy for Human Security. p.1

perform their primary duty of protecting their own citizens (ICISS 2001: xi). In this context, the 'just cause' principles of the R2P such as the large-scale loss of life (e.g. genocide and ethnic cleansing), is seen as the threshold for the international community to intervene to protect human security. The international community's responsibility also includes "the responsibility to prevent" and "the responsibility to rebuild" which hitherto fell outside the domain of traditional humanitarian intervention (Gareth and Sahnoun 2002).

As pointed out by some (Bellamy 2008a; Bellamy 2008b), the responsibility to prevent conflict and the responsibility to rebuild after conflict is neglected as much attention is focused on the reaction to the outbreak of violent conflict. This situation has fuelled suspicion about the R2P especially among the governments of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The military intervention prescribed by the R2P is seen as a means to 'legalise' or 'legitimise' non-consensual intervention. Indeed, the R2P doctrine revived the 'old' concerns that states do not intervene purely on humanitarian grounds since interventions are selective and based on geo-strategic interests of the interveners (Bannon 2006; Upadhyaya 2005; Bellamy 2008b). According to Bellamy, the "...R2P is simply a 'Trojan Horse' for the legitimisation of unilateral intervention" (Bellamy 2008b: 617).

From a theoretical standpoint, the R2P doctrine is consistent with traditional security in so far as it does not undermine the relevance of the state and the role of the military to protect human security. The R2P relies on the 'old tools' of the state and the military to pursue the 'new' function of protecting human security. On one hand the ICSS acknowledged the primary responsibility of states to protect their own citizens. And on the other hand the ICISS recognised the need to use force to pursue human security objectives as a last resort by the

international community (Gareth and Sahnoun 2002; MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss 2004). In this context, the military becomes indispensable to the protection of human security within the principles of the R2P. Jockel and Sokolsky (2000) have argued that the emergence of human security in Canadian foreign policy provided an opportunity for the Canadian government to retool the Canadian military to be able to intervene to protect people during violent conflict. It is, however, noteworthy that the effectiveness of military intervention can be seriously undermined when the pursuit of human security does not tackle the root causes of violent conflict which may be embedded in the political, economic, and socio-cultural fabric of the state.

It is possible to understand the importance of the link between the role of the military to enforce the principles of the R2P and the protection of human security through the framework of the Landmines Treaty and the ICC. To operationalise the R2P's 'just cause' principles of intervention, the UN or other legally constituted regional bodies can deploy military as well as civilian police to carry out peace operations that may include a mandate for peace enforcement to protect civilians. Similarly, the military and the police may be used to carry out demining exercises and, as well, carry out operations that may lead to the arrest and prosecution of war criminals at the ICC. Under the freedom from fear perspective, the justification for non-consensual use of force by the international community is linked to the protection of people which is not the case under the traditional notion of security (Hubert and Bonser 2001). The use of force under the R2P, to some extent, constitutes part of the process to resolve the political underpinnings of the insecurity of individuals during violent conflict.

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report appears to suggest that human security is radically different from state security.[12] From a freedom from fear perspective which also draws on the report (UNDP 1994: 24-25), human security is seen as a complement to traditional conception of security which is based on the military protection of the state. Human security is related to traditional normative ideas about state security because both seek to address some form of insecurity or threat (Linklater 2005; Maclean 2000; Upadhyaya 2005). However, a clear difference can be made between human security and traditional security when it comes to identifying the object of security. As Maclean (2000: 270) puts it succinctly, "human security is distinct from territorial security in that it is not just a 'defensive' concept, but an 'integrative' concept, designed to incorporate governance and protection of political communities with the broader goals of individual welfare and invulnerability."

Within the context of the freedom from fear perspective, the R2P is concerned with the construction of a new global order that places human beings at the center. States, which continue to be the main actors on the international scene, play the crucial role of ensuring people's physical security and contributing to overcoming the vulnerabilities and difficulties that confront people in their efforts towards achieving progress and development. The construction of a new global order with the physical security of people as the primary objective also rests on greater cooperation from different actors including states, international organisations and non-state actors. This recognises that vulnerabilities of human security are interlinked and transcend national boundaries through the forces of globalisation (Aravena 2002: 5-11).

---

[12] For a detailed discussion see the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report, New Dimensions of Human Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press especially chapter 2

Freedom from Want

The proponents of freedom from want (Japanese perspective) focus on both violent and non violent threats to individuals. This perspective holds that human security can be best achieved by embracing a broader framework that includes addressing both violent and non-violent threats such as civil war, environmental degradation, hunger, diseases and natural disasters (Bosold and Werthes, 2005; Atanassova-Cornelis, 2006). The freedom from want perspective holds that the physical protection of individuals is necessary but not a sufficient condition to guarantee human security. This is a holistic approach that encompasses both a concern for individuals' physical and nonphysical needs. In many respects, this broader conception of human security is consistent with the interpretation of the concept in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* and other subsequent reports of the UNDP[13] that draw a linkage between security and development.

The freedom from want perspective sees security and development as interdependent and mutually reinforcing public goods which ultimately benefit the individual (King and Murray 2001 585-90; MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). The link between security and development was epitomised by the 'historic' invitation of the World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, to address the Security Council on January 10, 2000. James Wolfensohn argued that "if we want to prevent violent conflict, we need a comprehensive, equitable, and inclusive approach to development". Furthermore, "when we think about security, we need to think beyond battalions and borders. We need to think about human security, about winning a different war, the fight against poverty" (Quoted in Caroline Thomas 2001: 160). What this suggests is that

---

[13] See the 1994 UNDP human development Report pp 22-26. Also see the UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press, especially chapter 1 on the issue of poverty.

the prevalence of poverty and underdevelopment (defined broadly) were conceived as a threat to human security not only in places where they occur but also at the global level. Poverty and other related issues of underdevelopment such as the prevalence of diseases or famine constitute a threat to 'global human dignity and safety'. This conceptualisation of human security has generated debates among scholars about the nature of the linkage between security and development.

Some scholars (Collier 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2002 and 2004; Collier 2007) identify a causal link between poverty, underdevelopment and violent conflict. They argue that economic grievances drive violent conflict. In order to correct this anomaly they argue that the pursuit of economic growth based on market-oriented policies provides a better way to mitigate the impact of poverty on violent conflict. Creating opportunities for people to overcome poverty may reduce the prevalence of violent conflict. For instance Antonio (2001) argues that building a culture of peace through the pursuit of good governance and liberalisation policies that focus on people-centred development provide the way out of the violent conflicts that have engulfed some parts of the African continent. Others scholars such as Starr (2006) acknowledges the linkage between poverty and violent conflict. Starr sees violent conflict as a social phenomenon and therefore rejects the overtly neoliberal analysis of Collier and Hoeffler. Instead, Starr proposes a social economics alternative. Its basic foundation is the promotion of the common good within the state.[14] In order to promote (human) security there is the need to create broad-based cooperation among ethnic divides and address diverse grievances with the goal of achieving a mutually beneficial economic system.

---

[14] For a detailed discussion about Social Economic Alternatives see Starr (2006)

Caroline Thomas (2001) asserts that material sufficiency lies at the core of human security. She draws a close link between poverty, inequality, and human security and argues that neoliberal policies based on the free market have served to perpetuate and deepen the problem of poverty and inequality within and between states. The sources of human insecurity fall at the doorstep of global institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which are the instruments of neoliberal economic globalisation. As she puts it, "...globalisation impacts on the relative vulnerability of real human beings and communities rather than abstract states" (Thomas 2007: 128). Such analyses see the link between poverty, violent conflict, and human security as unproblematic.

Mark Duffield's (2005) analysis of the security-development nexus traces the history of the link between security and development. Duffield (2005) argues that the 1981 Aga Khan report on the root causes of conflict and political instability (refugee flows) is one of the first clear linkages between underdevelopment and security. The Aga Khan report suggested that conflict and insecurity are a reflection of underdevelopment; such conditions may pose threat across national frontiers. In the present neoliberal environment, development and security are connected by the globalisation of threats. Not only is conflict associated with poverty and underdevelopment but conflict itself destroys development and further complicates poverty. Hence, the promotion of development in the South is synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security has become the prerequisite for sustainable development, which has the central aim of transforming societies and the people within them. According to Duffield, the linkage between security and development is not as a result of an impartial analysis but rather a historical and political construct that reflects the rivalry between mainstream liberal

37

development approach on one hand and Third Worldism and International Socialism on the other hand.

Reflecting on the 1994 UNDP Report, the link between poverty and violent conflict, and the scepticism inherent in Duffield's arguments, one can argue that inequalities generated by globalisation and the threats it poses across borders require global reallocation of resources to achieve the goals of human security. Ngaire Woods (1999) sheds some light on this. According to Woods, the notion of world order based on the traditional state-centred and hierarchical understanding is seriously undermined in the face of the globalisation of threats. She rejects the traditional understanding of world order, which considers inequality as positive and argues that global issues such as environmental degradation, transnational crime and migration that affects individuals across national borders demand greater levels of cooperation among states and non-state actors. What this suggests is that in an era of globalisation, the security of individuals is linked to the security of other states and people in the international system. Protecting the security of individuals outside one's borders has ramifications for the maintenance of security at home.

In sum, the concept of human security is imbued with diverse meanings and interpretations which also reflect in the diverse approaches to attain it. So far, I have provided some explanation about the meaning of human security and the two main conceptualisations of human security. The 'narrow' perspective of human security focuses on the protection of people from violent threats while the 'broader' perspective is concerned with the interrelatedness and mutual dependence of security and development. While both perspectives may generate diverse policy actions, there is a clear consensus on the individual as

the referent object of security. I pointed out that just as the state is the object of security for the realist, the individual is the object of security for proponents of human security. However, within the context of freedom from fear, there is the need to treat this understanding with caution because, in theory, human security and state security are not opposed to each other but can be complementary; both seek to address some form of insecurity or threats to well being.

Again, it should also be noted that even the emergence of consensus about the threats that individuals face could still leave room to grapple with the cultural understandings of human security and the roles that stakeholders[15] should play to protect human beings from threats to their security. What constitutes a threat to human security may be different in different cultures not only in terms of the threats *themselves* but also where, when and how they assign responsibility to address those threats. Although a fuller analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the subsequent sections especially on Africa provide some useful insights. In the next sections, I will take a closer look at how the human security concept has been deployed in Canadian foreign policy followed by a deeper examination of the African conceptions of human security.

Conceptualising Human Security to Reinforce Canada's Moral Identity as Peacekeeper

Canadian government officials argue that elements of what we now understand as human security have a long history in Canadian foreign policy, stretching from the Pearsonian era of peacekeeping to the evolution of the understanding of governance, economic

---

[15] The stakeholders may include the local community, the state, civil society, NGOs and international organisations.

development, human rights, and the promotion of democracy in Canadian aid to developing countries.[16] Although the concept of human security was not used until the mid-1990s, its elements have long been part of Canada's international policies. Some scholars of Canadian foreign policy such as Tomlinson et al (2007) argue that the seeds of human security were sown under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993). Under Prime Minister Mulroney, Canada began to move away from its cautious middle power posture to active promotion of the 'new world order' after the Cold War. This saw Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping operations with robust mandates such as in Haiti, Somalia, and Yugoslavia and in Central America. The objectives of the peacebuilding efforts in such states were focused on the needs of the civilian population as well as the security of the states.

During the Mulroney era, Canadian foreign policy witnessed the integration of development and security issues into the foreign policy agenda when Canada participated in development projects as well as in peacekeeping operations. The movement towards a broader conception of security—human security—drew on the support from Canadian civil society organisations such as Project Ploughshares, Oxfam and Partnership Africa Canada (Ibid: 220-221). Thus, as early as the mid-1980s, Canada began to expand its traditional international security role as a peacekeeper into a relatively new area of promoting activities that currently are captured under the conceptual umbrella of human security. This also suggests that Mulroney's policy initiatives which are consistent with what is now called human security, was the critical juncture for the revamping of 'Canada's moral identity' after the Cold War.

---

[16] Interview with CIDA and DFAIT officials in Ottawa January 17, 2008

As noted in Chapter One, by the term Canada's moral identity, I mean the normative image of Canada that in turn motivates or shapes the behaviour, interest, and activities of the Canadian government in Africa and the global arena. Canada's moral identity involves how Canada perceives itself as caring, a good international citizen, humanitarian, and moral actor that in turn constructs the 'other' including Africa, as lacking human rights, conflict-ridden and poor and therefore needs the benevolent support of Canada. More precisely, the moral identity makes Canada(ians) a part of the 'developed world' which has an ethical obligation to help the 'other', the 'underdeveloped'(Pratt 1990, 1994; Jefferes 2010; Sjolander and Trevenen 2010). In this vein, the concept of Canada's moral identity is consistent with what others call the "branding of Canada" in the international arena through the projection of Canadian values and culture (Nimijean 2005 and 2006; Potter 2009).

This self-perception about what Canada stands for in the international arena was very well captured by a dialogue participant in the 2003 *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians*. The dialogue participant argued, "Our domestic values of multiculturalism, bilingualism, federalism, and our commitment to strive—even though we often fall short—towards tolerance as a society, are ones that we should be proud of internationally. The values translate well into what I believe should be Canada's primary underlying value in foreign policy which is the value of multiculturalism and the development of international institutions for security, human rights, environmental protection, and fair trade" (Quoted in DFAIT 2003: 5).

Central features of Canada's moral identity include peacekeeping, development assistance and the promotion of human rights which are at the center of Canada's foreign policy in developing countries. It is important, however, to note that Canada's moral identity

does not in any way assume the substantial transfer, by the government in power, of material, personnel, financial and other resources to back Canada's policy agenda in the global arena. There is "rhetoric-reality gaps" in Canada's international engagements especially in Africa (Nimijean 2006; Potter 2009). Indeed as the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, in real terms Canada has not lived up to the 'high standard' of this moral identity. In short therefore, Canada's moral identity is used discursively to mean the normative framework through which Canadian governments have constructed their policies especially in Africa and other developing areas.

Canada became one of the first countries to adopt human security as a central pillar in its foreign policy[17] when Lloyd Axworthy was appointed as the foreign minister by Prime Minister Chrétien in January 1996. It was Axwothy's relentless effort to integrate human security issues into Canadian foreign policy that 'redefined' Canada's role in the world after the Cold War and, in turn, gave meaning to Canada's 'new' moral identity as a 'protector of people' in violent conflict instead of 'protector of states' that was associated with Canada's traditional role in peacekeeping. As some have argued, the Liberal government's human security agenda witnessed a revival of ethics and morality in Canadian internationalism that was overshadowed by the narrow pursuit of economic interests especially in the 1980s to the mid-1990s (Irwin 2001; Brown 2001; Black 2000; Knight 2001). What this view suggests, at least in theory, is that it was 'unCanadian' when leaders put economics and national security concerns ahead of the

---

[17] Even though the current conservative government of Stephen Harper hardly uses the human security concept, its policy initiatives continue reflect human security goals in the area of health, education, conflict resolution and reconstruction especially in Darfur, Sudan. For further details see DFAIT " Canada committed to Protecting Civilians in Darfur (Ottawa, March 1, 2007) <http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=384898&language=E&docnumber=32> also see Canada's commitment at the 2006 G8 Summit <http://www.g8.gc.ca/g8summit_2006-en.asp> Accessed on September 20, 2008

promotion of humanitarian norms. The pursuit of economic and national security interest is mainly seen as contravening Canada's role as a middle power with an ethical responsibility to promote what Cranford Pratt calls humane internationalist policies especially in the developing countries (Pratt 1990, 1994, 2007). In this vein, the emergence of human security in the global security discourse with all its ethical impulses provided a prime opportunity for the Liberal government of Chrétien and Martin to 'genuinely' place an emphasis on the promotion of human rights norms as a defining character of Canadian foreign policy. In this sense, Canada's support and leadership on human security has been used to reinvigorate the promotion of Canadian values and identity in the international system.[18]

Since the mid-1990s, Lloyd Axworthy ensured that Canada's security policy shifted from the concentration on the state to the individual as the primary object of security (Keating 2002; Maclean 2000). As noted previously the shift in the policy focus was in response to the changing domestic and international security environment after the ending of the Cold War. That moment unmasked the human suffering as a result of intrastate conflicts and the prevalence of non-violent threats such as poverty especially in developing countries (Kaldor 2007; Duffield 2005). In 1998, Lloyd Axworthy argued that "our basic unit of analysis in security matters has shrunk from the state to the individual. This human security lens produces new priorities— everything from countering terrorist bombs to child labour and the climate. These issues have now become the daily concern of foreign ministers and governments. They are the human security agenda" (cited in Keating, 2002:222-3). Within Canadian foreign policy, human security

---

[18] The government's 1995 official policy statement " Canada in the World'' specify among other things, the rule of law, human rights respect for democracy and the environment as central to the pursuit of Canadian interest is a changing world.

represented a paradigm shift from traditional security which was largely considered as inadequate, and in some cases a contributing factor to insecurity.

The Liberal government did not conceptualise human security as a substitute for traditional security. Rather the achievement of human security goals was made dependent on traditional instruments such as armed forces and development assistance which have "become integral to a new and more comprehensive approach centered on the protective welfare of civilians"(McRae 2001: 22). This further suggests that human security policy relied on the adaptation of both new and existing instruments to the new security environment in order to make them more reliable and responsive to the protection of civilians (Ibid). Accordingly, the shift to human security, with its associated moral impulses, for the Canadian state culminated in the Liberal government's launching of the *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* in September 2000. The Liberal government spelt out its human security foreign policy agenda in five main issue areas which were the protection of civilians; peace support operations; conflict prevention; governance and accountability; and public safety.[19]

As the name of the policy document and its essential components suggest, the central goal of the Canadian government's human security agenda was "to ensure that people can live in freedom from fear" (DFAIT 2000: 1). This translated into the protection of individuals from physical threats to their lives during violent conflicts. The choice to focus on the protection of people in violent conflict arose from the Canadian government's belief that "...this is where the concept of human security has the greatest value where it complements existing international agendas already focused on promoting national security, human rights and human

---

[19] For details see DFAIT (2000). Freedom from Fear: Canada's foreign policy for Human Security p. 3

development" (DFAIT 2000: 3). As one official remarked during my interviews in Ottawa, the freedom from fear approach allowed for programmatic responses to violent conflict through instruments such as peacekeeping.[20]

Although the human security concept was seen as a new norm, its meaning and utility as a guide to policy action was linked to the preservation or reinvigoration of an important feature of Canada's moral identity, that is its reputation as a peacekeeper in the international system (Dorn 2005, Grayson 2010). Indeed, the placing of the protection of human security within Canada's peacekeeping image led to the revamping of the Canadian military (Jockel and Sokolsky 2000). The policy agenda for human security suggested a process of 'continuity in change'. The Liberal government acknowledged the changing security environment after the Cold War, yet, the government dwelled on the conceptual idea of peacekeeping, which for several decades has been one of the key defining features of Canada's international policies, as a means to protect civilians from the threats of violent intrastate conflict (Grayson 2010).

Some scholars argue that the peacekeeping role is as a myth or distorted image of Canada in the international system (Jefferess 2009; Sjolander and Trevenen 2010; Bell 2010). But the Liberal government's desire to promote Canada's peacekeeping image through the promotion of a particular meaning of human security was notable. To be sure, the Chrétien government accepted the broad definition of human security that integrates security with development (the 1994 UNDP definition) although the government defined human security in a narrow sense as freedom from fear. Perhaps this was a strategic decision to claim 'ownership' for this particular interpretation of the concept and to bring it more in line with Canada's

---

[20] Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs Official in Ottawa, January 15, 2008

capabilities in peacekeeping. As Axworthy (2001) has pointed out, the human security concept is not Canada's invention. The UNDP which popularised the concept provided seven dimensions—economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political—which made the concept too encompassing and awkward as a policy framework. Axworthy goes on to argue that "focusing the (human security) concept on protecting people from acts of violence and helping build a greater sense of security in the personal sphere have been principally Canada's initiatives" (Axworthy 2001: 4).

Although the Canadian government's interpretation of human security relied on Canada's capacity as a peacekeeper which carried the notion of military intervention in conflicts, Canada's human security policy generally came to mean building a world where universal humanitarian standards are enforced through the rule of law and democracy, to protect people from violent threats, and establishing mechanisms of accountability at the global and regional levels to bring human rights abusers to justice (Brown, 2001: 197; Thomas 2001: 161). In practice, the Canadian government's human security agenda dealt with a wide range of issues that may be categorised as the 'physical protection of people' for example through the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as in post-conflict justice and child soldiers. Within the context of Canada's leadership on the ICC, the idea and meaning of Canada as a peacekeeper was not limited to military intervention alone, it can be broadly understood to include the promotion of international legal norms aimed at protecting people from violent threats.

By integrating human security into its foreign policy, the Liberal government reinforced Canada's longstanding commitment to core humanitarian principles in the international system.

More importantly Canada took on the role of building the norm of human security, albeit in the narrow interpretation of the term, in the changing international security environment (Knight 2001). It appears that the interest of the Liberal government to build the human security norm was the consequence of what Andy Knight describes as the "growing interest (of Canadians) in the ethical, normative, and moral aspects of foreign policy" (Knight 2001:114). The interest of Canadians in a moral-oriented foreign policy found leadership in Lloyd Axworthy, who was himself a norm entrepreneur as he pursued human security (Tomlin et al 2007). The Liberal government through Lloyd Axworthy, employed soft power, "the power to influence the behaviour of others through the use of ideas, values persuasion, skill and technique" (Quoted in Knight 2001:116). This soft power was used to promote human security and in the creation of the Ottawa Treaty, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). These are three major policy initiatives that have come to express the meaning of human security and to reinforce Canada's moral identity and commitment to building new norms in the global arena.

Although Canada was not the main initiator of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, the R2P and the ICC, the Canadian government provided leadership as well as other resources in the areas of finance and personnel. Furthermore, the Canadian government was very innovative in its approach to building the norms of prevention, protection/intervention and justice that underpin the Ottawa Treaty, the R2P and the ICC, respectively. Consistent with the idea of middle power internationalism (Wood 1990; Black and Smith 1993; Cooper 1997; Keating 2002), Canada worked with like-minded states and also forged close collaboration with NGOs in

a fashion that is described as the "new diplomacy"[21] to promote the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC and the R2P. The new diplomacy refers to the strategic partnership between NGOs and governments that employ traditional diplomatic settings to promote, cajole, and entice governments in support of new international norms, as well as using the advocacy of NGOs in support of those norms. In the strictest sense the new diplomacy is a unique combination of relentless bottom-up and top-down pressure to generate the political will necessary to achieve success with regards to the institutionalisation of new norms in the international arena (Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001: 32-34).

The process leading to the creation of the Ottawa Treaty—the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)[22]—emerged from outside the foreign policy system of Canada. The ICBL was initiated in 1992 by humanitarian NGOs led by Jody Williams, a well known American activist. In addition to the ICBL, France and the United States in the early 1990s, initiated the global campaign to revise landmines policies as part of the process to control the proliferation of arms in the UN. However, differences between DFAIT and DND stalled the Canadian government's support for the ban on landmines in the UN. Ironically, Canada joined the ICBL when its name was mistakenly included as part of the countries that adhered to an export ban in a UN resolution that was sponsored by the United States (Keating 2002: 220). But another irony was that the ICBL turned out to be a major Canadian diplomatic success for promoting the norm of human security and set the stage for other Canadian human security initiatives. Canada took the opportunity of its comparative advantage for not being a major user or producer of

---

[21] For a detailed description see McRae (2001: 250-59)
[22] For a detailed account on the processes leading to the creation of the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC and the R2P see (Tomlin et al 2007) chapters 10 and 11 and 14

landmines and drew on its diplomatic resources, multilateral networks, and international reputation as a peacekeeper to move the landmines issue from the arms control and disarmament agenda of the UN to the mainstream of human security. As a result the campaign to ban landmines was later dubbed the Ottawa Process which reflected Canada's leadership of using NGOs in the negotiations to build international legal norms to control the proliferation of landmines and other light weapons (Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001:28-38; Tomlin et al 2007: 209-222). The Ottawa Process which was Canada's first initiative on human security culminated in the December 1997 signing by 122 states of the Ottawa Treaty to Ban Landmines (Tomlin et al ibid: 223).

The lineage of the ICC dates back to the creation of the UN and the subsequent establishment of the International Law Commission in 1948 with the mandate to progressively develop and codify international criminal law.[23] To encourage the development of international humanitarian law, the 1948 Genocide Convention and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on War[24] recognised the jurisdiction of a future ICC to address the breach of these conventions (Tomlin et al 2007: 211). Cold war politics hampered the institutionalisation of the ICC as the high politics of state security trumped the development of low politics such as placing the individual at the center of security and putting in place mechanisms to control transnational threats (Robinson 2001; Robinson and Oosterveld 2001; Tomlin et al 2007).

---

[23] For details of the role of the International Law Commission in the development and codification of international law, see,< http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>

[24] The four conventions relate to the treatment of prisoners of war, war wounded and sick armed forces, and protection of civilians in time of war. They are the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

The end of the Cold War and the violent conflicts that erupted in places like Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, however, opened a new page for interstate relations that encouraged cooperation in the development of legal mechanisms to control transnational security threats. The images of human suffering from the violent confrontations in parts of Africa and the independent Soviet states awakened the conscience of the international community including Canada as well as non-state actors to step-up the efforts to enforce international humanitarian law to protect human rights. But apart from the moral impulse that underpinned the Canadian government's agenda to institutionalise international legal mechanisms to address the human rights abuses associated with violent conflict, Canada had a vested interest to promote human security. As Jorge Nef argues, Canada is particularly vulnerable to global threats because it has a highly penetrated political system with a transnationalised economy (Nef 2001).

Civil society groups played a crucial role in maintaining the momentum to establish an international court that will have the mandate to try the perpetrators of injustice during violent conflicts (Robinson 2001; Tomlin et al 2007: 212-13). However, leadership from a state actor was needed if any meaningful progress could be made to establish such a court. Canada rose to the occasion and relied on its diplomatic resources to provide leadership to foster an agreement on the 1998 Rome Statute that provided the legal basis for the ICC. The ICC has the mandate to put on trial individuals who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.[25] An important diplomatic resource that assisted Canada's leadership in the ICC was the role played by Louise Arbour, a respected Canadian lawyer, as the chief prosecutor of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda war crimes tribunals. Louise Arbour's work in these war crimes

---

[25] See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Pp3-10

50

tribunals raised Canada's profile as a state that abhorred impunity. In addition, the Canadian government drew motivation from the successful conclusion of the Ottawa Treaty when the government relied on soft power and the new diplomacy to generate ideas to support the ban on landmines. The successful conclusion of the Ottawa Treaty provided the 'trump card' for Canada. By using these invaluable diplomatic resource, Canada provided leadership to establish the ICC with the active participation of civil society groups[26] (Robinson 2001: 170-76; Riddell-Dixon 2005: 1070-71).

The R2P doctrine was recommended by the ICISS. Canada, as noted previously, played a key leadership role in the establishment of the ICISS (Riddell-Dixon 2005; Mathews 2005; Tomlin et al 2007).[27] The establishment of the ICISS was in response to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's challenge that "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should be respond to a Rwanda, to Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?...Surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity...Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, it is an option that cannot be relinquished".[28] The central objective of the R2P as explained in the earlier section is to reconcile humanitarian intervention with state sovereignty. In many ways, the R2P doctrine provided an additional mechanism for the Canadian government to build the norm of freedom from fear with regards to humanitarian intervention. This was evident when the ICISS argued that sovereignty does matter however "the defence of

---

[26] For details about the process see Tomlin et al (2007) pp. 220-229

[27] Of the twelve members of the Commission, Canada was the only country which had two members—Michael Ignatieff and Gisele Cote Harper. And Lloyd Axworthy was the chair of the advisory board.

[28] Quoted on the ICISS website, see< http://www.iciss.ca/progress-en.asp> Accessed on December 4, 2009

state sovereignty by even its strongest supporters does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people" (ICISS 2001: 7- 8). According to the ICISS "sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: first, externally to respect the sovereignty of other states and, second, internally to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state" (ibid).

Within the context of humanitarian intervention therefore, the state's inability to protect human rights or its culpability in situations of large scale loss of life, genocide, and large scale ethnic cleansing, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, through terror or rape, will invoke the responsibility of the international community to intervene to protect human rights (ibid: xii-xiii; Welsh 2002; Wills 2006). According to the ICISS, military intervention should be used as a last resort when all non-military options for prevention and securing a peaceful resolution have been explored. In this respect, while the Ottawa treaty and the ICC may be seen as relying heavily on the use of soft power or moral suasion, the R2P recognised the important role of peace enforcement to protect human rights in conflict situations. In fact Axworthy argued that "promoting human security can also involve the use of strong measures including military force" [29] (Welsh 2002; Molier 2006). In the final analysis, the R2P reinforced Canada's image as a peacekeeper in the international system

The R2P also include other sets of responsibilities in which the international community share roles to protect human rights and advance peace and security. The set of responsibilities to prevent, include activities such as early warning and addressing the root causes of conflict; the responsibility to react by using non-military means such as political, economic and military

---

[29] Quoted in Tomlin et al (2007: 254)

sanctions to address situations of compelling need for human protection; and responsibility to rebuild which include post-intervention activities such as the transfer of material and financial resources for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and promoting good governance and sustainable development with the active participation the local people (ICISS 2001: 19-45). From the above exposition, it is clear that the Canadian government's support for the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC, and the R2P firmly placed physical safety at the center of Canada's human security policy. These reinforced Canada's moral identity in the international arena especially in peacekeeping.

The reinvigoration of Canada's moral identity through the definition of human security as freedom from fear, in the Liberal government's active support for the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC and the R2P, nonetheless, obscured the diverse meanings and debates about the utility of the concept as a policy guide. Different meanings of human security were held within the state bureaucracy as well as among Canadian NGOs. In one of my interviews in Ottawa, a well informed observer pointed out that the emergence of human security led to a 'clash between the idealist and the realist in DFAIT'.[30] According to this informed observer, on the one hand the 'DFAIT realists' opposed human security because they saw it as undermining what Canada should really be doing, namely pursuing its national security interest and other strategic goals in the international system. On the other hand there was also the so-called 'boy scouts' (DFAIT idealist) who supported human security perhaps because of its potential to build a positive image for Canada. However, within the boy scouts there were two opposing camps—those who supported the freedom from fear perspective and those who argued for the freedom from

---

[30] Interview with an official of North-South Institute Ottawa, January 18, 2008

want perspective. The core disagreement in this conflict between the two camps was the kinds of threats on which they wanted the Canadian government to focus.

The end result was that the freedom from fear agenda of the Canadian government was internally driven based on the accommodation of interests of the freedom from fear and the freedom from want camps within DFAIT. State elites especially within DFAIT and the foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, himself were the main drivers of the human security foreign policy agenda with the Canadian public playing a facilitative role. Although the Liberal government brought some civil society groups on board to promote the freedom from fear agenda, the motive was to solicit public legitimacy for an already made government foreign policy agenda which built on Canada's peacekeeping experience. In short, the freedom from fear agenda excluded the views of key government institutions like CIDA and Canadian NGOs, who preferred a development-focused foreign policy.[31] The preference for a development-focused foreign policy was evident in the broader meaning of human security which was espoused by the CIDA officials and the NGOs I interviewed in Ottawa.

The concept of human security attracts diverse meanings in sections of the Canadian society. Some Canadian government officials and some in the NGO sector understand human security as encompassing the protection of people from both violent and non-violent threats that undermine the dignity as well as the freedoms of the individual.[32] The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), the umbrella organisation for Canadian NGOs[33], argues that

---

[31] For instance within the context of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Canadian NGOs/think tanks I interviewed called for increased development assistance to Africa and therefore saw the Canadian government's five-year $500 million CFAas inadequate in view of the perennial development challenges confronting Africa.

[32] This idea was expressed by various officials I Interviewed in Ottawa, January 16-31, 2008

[33] The CCIC has close to 100 Canadian NGOs as members. See www.ccic.ca

"human security means enough to eat, a clean environment, a chance to earn a fair share. It is not a concern with weapons but rather a respect for human rights and dignity" (Foxall 2003: 14). This broader meaning of human security requires substantial and long-term development assistance commitment by the Canadian government to developing countries, especially those in Africa.

In its policy document, *The Global Challenge to End Poverty and Injustice*, the CCIC sets out a *10 Point Agenda* about the role that Canada should play in the global fight against poverty and injustice. The 10 Point Agenda, which reflects the broader meaning of human security are: women rights and equality; health and education; the right to food and sustainable livelihoods for food producers; global economic justice; corporate accountability; peace; global environmental justice; democratic governance and global citizenship; democratic and effective multilateral system; and better aid.[34] These thematic areas are interlinked and echo the complex policy actions that are needed to promote human security instead of the Canadian government's 'fast track and simple approach' to protect people from violent threats. The President-CEO of CCIC, Gerry Barr, argues that "The 10 Point Agenda...reflects CCIC members' holistic understanding of the challenges of global poverty. And it underscores that our desire for social change springs not merely from charity or good intensions, but from a commitment to justice and human rights" (CCIC 2008: 3).

CIDA officials also argued that although CIDA played a vital role to promote the freedom from fear agenda of the Canadian government for instance through the implementation of projects related to the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building and post-conflict

---

[34] For details see CCIC (2008). The Global Challenge to End Poverty and Injustice: A Canadian 10 Point Agenda. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation

reconstruction in some parts of Africa, CIDA remains committed to its original mandate to reduce poverty and promote human rights and sustainable development.[35] Thus, CIDA's conception of human security is consistent with the broader meaning of the concept. One can conclude that CIDA and NGOs have a shared meaning or at least a preference for a broader conception of human security and see the need to address both violent and non-violent threats to individuals. The CCIC's 10 Point Agenda and CIDA's statutory mandate suggest that there should be a multi-dimensional response to the threats that individuals face and human security should be pursued both in time of violence and in time of peace. Paying attention to the complex relationship between poverty and violence can provide important clues to address the threats to human security. This is what the Canadian government must do.

According to the Canadian NGO officials I interviewed, poverty and the lack of basic needs such as water and food in itself is not violent, but constitutes insecurity to people and may inform violent behaviour in a competitive environment. This will in turn worsen the plight of individuals. This was supported by CIDA officials[36] who suggested that poverty is a significant factor in violent conflicts and constitutes a major threat to human security. As well, while violent conflict may lead to poverty and insecurity, poverty in itself does not cause violent conflict. One NGO official[37] remarked that most of the conflicts (especially in West and Central Africa) are caused by the pursuit of wealth and the struggles to control natural resources such as oil, diamonds, or timber.[38]

---

[35] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa January 17, 2008
[36] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa January 17, 2008
[37] Interview with an NGO official in Ottawa , January 18, 2008
[38] Some of the detailed discussions on this issue can be found in Berdal and Keen (1997), and Collier (1999) and Malone and Nitzschke (2005)

The discussion of the poverty-violence nexus raises the question as to whether poverty explains all forms of violence that threatens human security especially in places like Africa? Sambanis (2004) argues that poverty does not explain all forms of violence such as terrorism; however, as argued by Collier and Hoeffler, economic grievances may generate violent conflict especially civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler2002; Collier 2007). Indeed, agreement on the relationship between poverty and violence can be difficult to reach yet this relationship cannot be overlooked especially in parts of Africa where violent conflict and poverty appear to reinforce each other and constitute the primary sources of threat to the well being of people (Kingma 1997; Olonisakin and Aning 1999; Moran and Pitcher 2004; Derouen and Barutciski 2007). In the African context and perhaps elsewhere, the narrow conception of human security may fall short to address the multi-dimensional causes of insecurity to individuals especially in post-conflict situations.

Aside from the diverse meanings and their related policy actions that are required to protect human security, what unifies both the Canadian government (freedom from fear) on one hand, and CIDA and NGOs (freedom from want) on the other hand, is that they talk about human security in terms of the security of 'the individual' as derived from the understanding of human rights in the so-called Western societies. The individualistic approach to human security that unifies the Canadian government, CIDA and NGOs (at least those I interviewed) is based on the Western experience of promoting human rights. This conceptualisation of human security overlooks the cultural meanings and implications of the concept in other states and societies. Referring to human security as individual security does not elucidate fully the means through which the protection of the individual can be achieved depending on how the concept is

understood in different cultures. A contextual meaning of human security within specific cultures will shed more light on how and where to muster and deploy resources to resolve the threats to the security of people.

In spite of the 'discontent' about the freedom from fear agenda, another important unifying force behind the diverse meanings of human security was a consensus within CIDA and the NGO community about the moral and ethical role that Canada ought to play in the global arena. Although the CIDA officials and the NGO officials I interviewed preferred a development-oriented human security policy, they considered the freedom from fear agenda as an equally important avenue for Canada to promote human rights and peace and security around the world. CIDA and the NGOs were supportive of the freedom from fear agenda as it contributed to Canada's moral identity as evidenced in the Canadian government's efforts to provide leadership in the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC and the R2P. This perception reinforces the constructed image of Canada as a benevolent peacekeeper with an ethical obligation to advocate for the human rights and well being of the 'other' especially those in Africa.

The above discussion has explored the conceptualisation of human security by the Canadian government as well as officials of CIDA and NGOs. In the view of CIDA and NGOs, the meaning of human security must go beyond the physical protection of people in violent conflict to include other issues such as poverty and sustainable development. The Canadian government, on the other hand, interpreted human security narrowly as the protection of people from physical threats. The narrow conception of human security is consistent with the idea of niche diplomacy,[39] which calls on the government to concentrate resources on specific

---

[39] For a good read on niche diplomacy see Cooper et al (1993) and Cooper (1997b)

issues base on the capacity to deliver and to ensure the efficient and effective performance of those functions rather than trying to do it all. The Canadian government's official conception of human security is closely linked to Canada's reputation in peacekeeping operations through which Canada used multilateral consensus building to achieve its foreign policy objectives. By choosing the freedom from fear approach to human security, the Canadian government has worked to uphold its multilateralist tradition of norm building and consensus building in the international system as well as devising new ways of working with NGOs to pursue its foreign policy objectives(Knight 2001; Keating 2007).

From a moral standpoint, the Ottawa Treaty, the ICC and the R2P cemented the Canadian government's freedom from fear approach to human security and illustrated the willingness of the Canadian government to address impunity not only because the effects of impunity can transcend borders. It is also because of Canada's inalienable interconnection with 'other' people occupying the same planet, earth. This perception is consistent with the foreign policy objective to promote Canadian values and culture. For the Liberal government, protecting human security was the right thing to do. As such Canada and its partners should come to the aid of 'helpless individuals' who are either targets of abuse by their own states or when the state in question is unable or unwilling to protect their rights. Canada's position is that people should be protected just as the state or the economy.

The African Conception of Human Security[40]

The idea of human security is not new to scholars, policymakers, and activists on the African continent. Although the usage of 'human security' is relatively new in the academic and policy circles, the idea has long been an important feature of many African societies such as the Akans of Ghana and the Ibos of Nigeria where the security of individuals and their community is linked to the inalienable rights to land (economic rights) and the participation in the affairs of the community (political rights) . The emergence of the state system in colonial Africa as well as the advent of military governments alienated and undermined the development of human rights norms which are a central pillar of human security, when state leaders shifted their attention to state/regime security (Cobbah 1987; Mamdani 2001; Udogu 2001; Mamdani 2002; Bekker 2007).

In the traditional sense, human security was synonymous with 'communal security" or the security of the community, which reflects the communitarian system of living in many parts of Africa. The embeddedness of human security in African societies and cultures is well captured by Cobbah (1987:320) who argues that, "as a people, Africans emphasise groupness, sameness, and commonality. Rather than the survival of the fittest and control over nature, the African worldview is tempered with the general guiding principle of the survival of the entire community and a sense of cooperation, interdependence, and collective responsibility". This communal nature of African societies has ramifications for the meaning and practice of human security (Hussein et al 2004; Obasanjo 1996). The traditional or customary ideas and values of communal security were transposed to the continental level in the post-colonial period. The

---

[40] Unless otherwise stated, I use Africans to mean the views expressed by the AU and ECOWAS officials and views in these organisations documents as well as the views expressed by officials of African think tanks, NGOs.

renewed effort to protect human rights both at the collective and individual levels, was

entrenched in continental agreements such as the 1969 Organisation of African Unity's (OAU)

Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa, and in the 1981

African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), popularly called *The Banjul Charter.* In

addition to these continental instruments, most African countries are also signatories to, and

have ratified, international conventions like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

that seek to entrench international humanitarian law in interstate relations.

In recent times, Africa regional and sub-regional policymakers, as well as scholars and

NGO activists, have been at the forefront of the efforts to redefine security after the end of the

Cold War. African leaders and scholars realised that security threats against the state are not

only externally driven but are also an intrastate phenomenon. The post-Cold War rethinking of

security in Africa was first expressed by the 1991 Kampala Movement led by its main architect,

the former head of state and later the president of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo. The

Kampala Movement included several African heads of states, businesses, scholars and civil

society groups (Obasanjo 1996).

Based on the negotiations to redefine security and sovereignty, the Kampala Movement

produced the Kampala Document that contained the proposals to establish a Conference on

Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), modeled after the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Obasanjo 1996; Deng and Zartman

2002: 5-9). The CSSDCA was an ambitious project that sought to broaden national security to

include political, social, economic, and environmental factors. The CSSDCA recognised that

human rights abuse, lack of basic needs such as food, water, energy and critical issues such as

underdevelopment, threatens the security of the people as well as the state since they may lead to bloody confrontations between governments and their citizens (Nathan 1998: 71).

The CSSDCA redefinition of security drew a close link between state security and human security. The meaning of security was linked to all aspects of society with particular reference to economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and national life (Henk 2001; Deng and Zartman 2002). The CSSDCA argued that "the security of the nation must be based on the security of the individual citizen to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs, while being able to participate fully in societal affairs and enjoying freedom and fundamental human rights".[41] The CSSDCA goes on to argue that " the security of the African people, their land and property and their states as a whole, must be a sacred responsibility of all African people and governments—individually and collectively, which must be exercised within the basic freedoms and rights of the African people".[42] In this vein, the CSSDCA's redefinition of security did not only call for the protection of individuals but as well, it echoed the communitarian culture in Africa that ascribed sacred responsibility to the community and the individual to care for the needs of 'all African people'.

The CSSDCA offered a broader conception of human security with three interrelated components: first, the protection of people from violent threat; second, the protection of their rights to the means of economic sustenance; and third, their participation in the affairs of the state. In the 1990s, the OAU accepted in principle to integrate these human security ideas into its policy framework but opposition from some key members such as Libya's Muammar

---

[41] See Ayodele Aderinwale (ed.), "Africa Leadership Forum: CSSDCA: An African Agenda for Peace and Prosperity" p.15 <http://www.africaleadership.org/library/ALF/CSSDCA.pdf> Accessed on June 16, 2009
[42] Ibid

Ghaddafi, Sudan's Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir and Kenya's Daniel arap Moi stalled efforts. The election of Obasanjo, who was the main architect of the Kampala Movement as the president of Nigeria, and the decision to transform the OAU to the AU in 2000, provided the opportunity and the fresh start to incorporate human security ideas in the new pan-African organisation (Tieku 2007: 31-32).

The embeddedness of the idea of human security in the 'African culture'[43] was reinvigorated in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative that was launched by African leaders in October 2001. In many ways, the conceptualisation of human security in the NEPAD document is intriguing as it elucidated how the concept is 'entrenched' in the collective psyche of African leaders, and how the concept can be interpreted broadly by these leaders. In fact, the NEPAD document did not overtly use the term human security. Nonetheless, it placed Africans at the center of development (NEPAD 2001: 28-33). African leaders conceived development as a "process of empowerment and self-reliance, therefore, Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather, they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment" (NEPAD 2001:6).

This suggests that in the context of NEPAD, human security originates from the development of the creative potentials of the people. The empowerment and self-reliance of Africans will strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These are necessary for addressing 'the weak state syndrome', which include human rights abuse, poor governance and corruption that are the major constraints to sustainable peace and development in African states (NEPAD: 2001: 5).

---

[43] This does not suggest a single culture in Africa. I use the term to express the commonality of ideas on human security in Africa.

The idea of human security as interpreted in the NEPAD document was consistent with the broader conception of human security as freedom from want. The NEPAD Strategic Framework Document argued that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are the conditions for sustainable development in Africa (NEPAD 2001: 16-20). The lack of these conditions is evident in the inextricable poverty and violent conflict that affect millions of people on the African continent. In view of this understanding, African leaders argued that "long term conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa require measures for addressing the political and social vulnerabilities on which conflict is premised" (Ibid :16). Thus, through NEPAD, African leaders saw the need to address human *in*security through the building of state capacity and regional and sub-regional institutions to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, and to promote long term conditions for development (Ibid).

Consistent with the idea of human security in the CSSDCA and the NEPAD initiative, the officials I interviewed at the AU and ECOWAS headquarters suggested that human security involves the protection of people from both violent and non-violent threats. Human security is about securing the individual and the community in which they live. Jakkie Cilliers (2004a) of the Institute of Security Studies based in South Africa, argues that "Africa has traditionally followed an expansive approach to the concept of human security" (ibid: 8). Within the African context, human security takes into account both the protection from physical hurt or injury and the elimination of non-violent threats such as poverty, disease, famine, and powerlessness. This conception of human security was fully expressed in the African Union's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP).

The CADSP defines human security as a multidimensional notion of security that goes beyond the traditional notion of state security to include elements of human development and human rights (or both freedom from fear and freedom from want). Human security, the CADSP states, is "the security of the individual in terms of the satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development".[44] The aim of the AU's human security framework is to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities and the state/national life in all of its economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions.[45]

In terms of intervention, the most visible pronouncement of protecting human security is found in article 4h of the *Constitutive Act of the AU.* The Act asserts the "right of the Union to intervene in a member state ...in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".[46] In this regard, the AU's human security agenda shares with the R2P the need to protect the physical safety of people in violent situations. Some scholars argue that the AU intervention mandate is a bold initiative to protect ordinary Africans from abusive governments (Malan 2002; Cilliers and Sturman 2002; Tieku 2007). In fact the AU mandate in article 4h of the Constitutive Act is a departure from the OAU policies that adhered strongly to the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention. The inclusion of article 4h in the Constitutive Act of the AU has ramifications for the policies of sub-regional organisations.

---

[44] The Common African Defence and Security Policy was adopted by member states to deal with threats to peace, security and stability on the African continent and to ensure the well being of African peoples.
[45] See AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.
[46] See AU Constitutive Act Article 4h

At the sub-regional level, the human security doctrine has been integrated into recent institutional transformations with the aim of making these institutions more receptive to the needs of people. In the ECOWAS for instance, the transformation from a Secretariat that was more concerned with inter-state politics, to a Commission, gave power to the ECOWAS to develop and implement programmes and projects that have direct benefits to individuals. As one official puts it "there is a move from ECOWAS of member states to ECOWAS of and for the people of West Africa".[47] This is an ambitious objective. Critics might point out that ECOWAS has not done enough to protect human security in West Africa (Human Rights Watch 2005), however, at least in theory the policies of ECOWAS as outline in the Revised Treaty clearly focus on making the organisation beneficial to the ordinary West African.[48] Moreover, ECOWAS is actively involved in combating trans-border crime, small arms and light weapons, as well as promoting democratic governance in member states. In this light, the decision to place individuals at the center of ECOWAS activities reflects an emerging transition from state security to human security.

The African understanding of human security draws a close resemblance with the broader conception in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*. An important feature of the African understanding of human security is that it articulates the view of the close relationship between development and security and also sees human security as a function of the state. For instance the CADSP asserts that "the causes of intrastate conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security based not only on political values but on social and economic

---

[47] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[48] See the July 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty Article 13 and Article 25

imperatives as well".[49] Related to this, Jakkie Cilliers (2004a:12) argues that "human security...includes an obligation on the state to provide a facilitating environment for equality and individual participation through democracy, adherence to human rights, and the participation of civil society". Yet the African conception is also deeper in the sense that human security does not only concern the protection of the safety or physical wellbeing of the individual; the understanding of human security extends to the protection of families, communities, local, and national life. In the African context, human security implies the protection of all facets of societal life in the political, social, economic, and cultural realms.

In spite of the broader and deeper understanding expressed at the continental level, human security is still recognised as a contested concept that may have different meanings and understanding for different people, communities, and cultures across the African continent. As a former top military officer puts it "an important aspect of human security is that people are not only interested in physical development but also how they feel emotionally connected to their communities and beyond and how their rights are respected in the state."[50] Another official I interviewed argued that human security is not only about physical survival it is also about spiritual wellbeing of the individual and the community.[51] This suggests that even the AU's broader definition may be limited in capturing the complexities of the understanding of human security in Africa. At best the AU has provided the parameters within which we can gauge human security especially with regards to intervention in violent conflict and the protection of human rights.

---

[49] See the AU Common African Security and Defence Policy p3
[50] Interview with Major General (Rtd) Arnold Quainoo, first Commander of ECOMOG in Liberia, and the head of Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution Accra, Ghana February 21, 2008
[51] Interview with Mr. Emmanuel Bombade the Executive Director of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Accra, Ghana February 22, 2008

It is noteworthy that the broader understanding of human security including the aspects of individuals' spiritual and emotional attachment to the state and community exposes the limitations of the Canadian government's freedom from fear approach in the African context. The freedom from fear approach may fall short of addressing the complexities that are involved in ensuring the security of people in Africa. Within the African context, the issue is not only about identifying the threats individuals should be protected from but also human security makes little sense without reference to the security of the community. In communitarian societies like those in Africa the insecurity of the community affects the individuals within the community and vice versa (Cobbah 1987). This raises a question about the precise values that should inform human security protection in Africa.

There are some differences between the Canadian and African understanding of human security. The Canadian government's emphasis on human (individual) security parallels Western liberal thought about human rights.[52] In the Canadian context, 'human rights' is used in reference to the individual. However, in the African context it also implies the rights of people or the community, hence communal rights.[53] Analytically, within the African context, this means that the individual constitutes 'two inseparable parts' in the sense that he/she is part of the community but also more important, the individual's being or rights are integrated with that of the community. For instance, Okere notes that, "the African conception of man is not that of an isolated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity" (Quoted in Makau wa Mutua 2000:167). It follows that human security is intertwined with community security or 'security of a people'. Human security and community

---

[52] Political theorist like John Locke offers a good example. For instance see his work, "Two Treaties of Government"
[53] See the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights chapter 1

security reinforce each other as the insecurity of the individual also implies the insecurity of the community as a whole. Africans see human security as an all-encompassing concept. In practice, the protection of human security stresses the importance of the nexus between the individual as a person, the community as a people, and the state as an institution. This is what I call 'the African human security complex'.

The three parts of the African human security complex are the individual, the community, and the state. They are mutually intertwined and thus it makes little sense to talk about human security solely as the safety of the individual when other parts (community and the state) are not secured. Perhaps, this might have informed the (re)definition of security put forth by the AU's CASDP that demonstrates the intertwined nature of human security, community security, state security and even regional and continental security. According to the CADSP:

> " ...ensuring the common security of Africa...encompasses both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intrastate conflict. The causes of intrastate conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multidimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the

right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation. At the national level, the aim will be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic, political, and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental level, the principle would be underscored that the 'security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole' ".[54]

To a significant extent, the role of the state in safeguarding the security of the individual and the community is also reflected in the duties of the state as stipulated in the ACHPR. For instance, Article 18 (1 and 2) respectively stipulates that "The family (which includes the individual) shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the state which shall take care of its physical health and moral". "The state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognised by the community".[55] Article 17(3) adds that "the promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognised by the community shall be the duty of the state". The importance of promoting and protecting the morals and traditional values of the community was linked to the fact that morals and traditional values shape the identity of a people, and the adherence to these values and traditions is a source of security for individuals and their community.

---

[54] See the AU's Common African Security and Defence Policy p.3
[55] See Articles 17 and 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

The African human security complex is expansive. In its simplest form, as well as practical requirements, the African human security complex has to do with ensuring better relations and wellbeing of individuals and their community; individuals and the state; protecting healthy community-community relations and community and state relations; as well as interstate relations because of the possibility of the spread of violent conflicts and non-violent security threats beyond state borders. It is important to reiterate that the centrality of the individual is undeniable and should be the basic unit of analysis in security matters; however, it is equally undeniable that the security of the person rests on the security of the community and the state. Issues regarding communal land ownership, poverty, police and armed forces brutality, armed robbery, and how to improve the justice system are among the core priorities that were identified by African officials to ensure human security.[56] Although the international community, international organisations and civil societies have responsibilities to ensure human security, my findings agree with scholars such as Cilliers (2004a) and Antonio (2001) that the state stands at the top of providing security through the institutionalisation of rule of law, democracy and good governance that brings peace, freedom, and development to individuals and their community.

Finally, from conflict prevention perspective, the complex understanding of human security was linked to the deprivation of cultural development and freedoms to individuals and their communities that in turn create the possibility for violent conflict. As one experienced conflict analyst puts it:

---

[56] These priorities were identified by a cross section of the officials in the AU and ECOWAS , as well as officials of think tanks and NGOs in Accra, Ghana and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

"...individuals are very much attached to their communities because of the communal nature of African societies. Most Africans perceive human security through cultural lenses that place the community at the center. In spite of the emergence of the nation-state and concern for individual rights, our (African) sense of security goes back to the survival of the community. Security is not only about the individual it is also about the community. Therefore promoting glorification and respect for the community values and norms play a central role in ensuring human security".[57]

This suggests that human security also involves the 'cultural emancipation' of the individual and their community. It involves freeing people from oppressive power structures that undermines their safety and the development of their cultural values (Booth 2005; Thomas 1999). Creating the political and economic environment for people to develop and maintain their culture values and norms is an essential component of human security.

In sum, the above discussion indicates that Africans have a broader and deeper conception of human security. However, there is no single African understanding of the concept although the AU has at least set the parameters within which we can gauge human security consistent with the UNDP understanding of protecting human rights and promoting human development. The specificities of human security may be found in the several unique cultures in Africa yet the interrelatedness of human security and community security remains an important feature of the African understanding of the concept. In practice therefore, policies that are aimed at addressing human security issues in Africa should be aware of Africa's human security complex, in which cultural and community values play a central role.

---

[57] This view was expressed by Mr. Emmanuel Bombade Executive Director of West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Accra, Ghana February 22, 2008

Convergence of African and Canadian Ideas of Human Security

So far the discussion in this chapter has focused on the different conceptualisations of human security in the international (UNDP), Canadian and African contexts. In this final section, I try to analyse some of the similarities in the understanding of human security in Canada and across Africa. Although there is no consensus in Canada or across Africa, there appear to be a general understanding around some of the basic elements of the concept. There are some convergences of understanding on what human security should entail among Canadian government officials, officials of Africa's regional institutions (AU and ECOWAS) and NGOs/think tanks in Canada and across Africa[58] As one AU official puts it, "Africa[59] and Canada share the same principles of human security but we look at human security with different value lenses".[60] Indeed as the discussions demonstrate, human security is a value-laden concept. Yet, the convergence of ideas about human security could be seen from two levels: first, from the personal views of officials, and second, from the human security agendas of the AU and ECOWAS on one hand and the Canadian government on the other hand.

Both constituents (i.e. African and Canadian officials) expressed the view that human security is a re-conceptualisation of the discourse on security from the state to the individual level although the African view also stressed on the security of the family and the community. Further, these officials shared a broader conception of human security that transcends the protection of individuals from violent threats to include the protection of individuals from nonviolent threats. In the officials view, human security should focus on the provision of basic

---

[58] This assertion is the result of the compilation of the similarities in the opinions expressed by interview respondents both in Canada at the AU and ECOWAS
[59] The AU official used Africa more generally to mean the AU and its officials
[60] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008

needs and the protection of people from both violent and non-violent threats that undermines their existence and freedoms. Human security includes the provision of the overall needs that guarantee the physical and non-physical safety and freedoms of the individual.

According to the African and Canadian officials, in the AU and ECOWAS and in the Canadian government respectively, the elements of human security include the provision of basic needs such as food, water, safe environment, and other economic and political necessities such as jobs and the right to participate in the affairs of the state, social justice, and self-determination. In addition, human security involves the protection of individuals from physical violence such as ethnic and tribal war, civil conflict, state repression and landmines. To ensure human security, there is the need to create the enabling environment for individuals to enjoy economic, political, legal, social and cultural rights and these rights must be protected at all times. The synthesis of these official ideas collaborates with the UNDP's conception of human security.

The ideas also reflect the orientation of Canadian development assistance policies in Africa. CIDA's view[61] which was also expressed by several Canadian NGOs is that if you reduce poverty and promote human rights and sustainable development you will end up improving human security. Many African officials share CIDA's perspective of human security. They questioned the wisdom behind the priority that Western governments have given to the building of regional and sub-regional security structures and the inadequate response to poverty alleviation, human rights promotion and sustainable development on the African

---

[61] This view was expressed by CIDA officials during my interview in Ottawa, January 16, 2008. Interestingly, the same view was expressed by a top official of CIDA programmes in Accra Ghana, February 21, 2008. Also see the mandate of CIDA (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-829101441-JQC#1)

continent. Consistent with the views of CIDA officials, most African officials I interviewed in the field assert that although poverty in itself does not cause violence it serves as a catalyst for violent confrontations.[62] This suggests that protecting people in violent conflicts is necessary but not sufficient unless such actions are linked to other factors like poverty alleviation.

The second level of convergence of ideas about human security prevails at the institutional level of the AU and ECOWAS and the Canadian government human security agendas. The Canadian government's freedom from fear approach to human security is consistent with the AU's mandate on intervention in member states to protect human rights in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Similar to the R2P doctrine, the AU's intervention mandate largely deals with the physical threats to people.[63] It is not surprising that one of the central objectives of the Liberal government's human security policy in Africa was to assist the AU and ECOWAS to strengthen their peace and security capacities especially the African Standby Force (ASF) to address the human security deficit on the African continent (CIDA 2003; DFAIT 2000). In short, the Canadian government found Africa as a conducive geographical space to operationalise its human security policy.

As noted earlier, some of the African officials I interviewed had concern about the priority that was given to institutional capacity building for peace and security without adequate response to poverty, human rights and sustainable development in Africa. These are important concerns because the AU (which also includes West African states) defines human security broadly to include the protection of people from violent and nonviolent threats as well

---

[62] This view was expressed throughout the personal interviews I conducted in Ottawa, Canada; Accra, Ghana; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Abuja, Nigeria

[63] See Article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and also DFAIT (2000). Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security.

as the security of families and communities. It is reasonable to expect that the AU's human security agenda would reflect this broad understanding of the concept. However at the level of human security agenda setting, the AU and ECOWAS 'consented' with Canada and other G8 members to build Africa's peace and security capacity especially the intervention capacity of ASF.

Although the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was involved in the investigation of human rights abuses in places like Darfur, Sudan,[64] what is significantly missing in the AU's intervention mandate in article 4h of the Constitutive Act is that it makes no reference to intervention to protect communal rights consistent with the understanding of human rights in the organisation's documents such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. In fact, according to article 4 of the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (PSC Protocol), the Peace and Security Council (PSC)—which is the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts—is to be guided by the principles in the Constitutive Act, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Also important is that article 19 of the PSC protocol stipulates that the PSC should seek close cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in matters relevant to its objectives and mandate; however, there is no specific mentioning of how the PSC can help to protect communal rights in Africa.

The PSC Protocol's silence on the protection of communal rights as well as placing the PSC intervention mandate, at least in theory, within the framework of the principles of the

---

[64] See the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur(the Sudan) presented at the 12th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 4 July 2004

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter, makes the AU intervention approach consistent with the promotion of human rights as individual rights (in the liberal understanding of the concept). In theory, the AU and ECOWAS human security agenda, which was premised on the protection of civilian populations, was consistent with the Canadian government's policy. It provided the opportunity for Canada to pursue its human security objectives through its support for the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. Indeed, the AU mandate provided the space for Canada to reinforce its moral identity in Africa.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the diverse meanings and understandings of the concept of human security. I argued that human security has broadened the discourse on security after the ending of the Cold war. At the academic level, debates on human security have focused on the narrow conception—freedom from fear, and the broader conception—freedom from want. Although the central issue in this debate relates to the types of threats people should be protected from, there is an agreement that the individual should be the referent object of security. I have also discussed the diverse conceptions of human security among the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS, and African and Canadian officials, as well as the convergence of ideas on human security at two levels; first, the personal views of African and Canadian officials and, second, the agendas of the AU and ECOWAS and the Canadian government. I argued that the convergence of ideas at the agenda level of the AU and ECOWAS and the Canadian government provided the opportunity for the advancement of Canadian foreign policy objectives on human security in Africa. This theme will be explored further

especially in Chapters Five and Six. In the next chapter, I will discuss the sources of Canadian

foreign policy in Africa, which are anchored on the provision of development assistance, a

central pillar of Canada's moral identity in Africa.

Chapter Three

The Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the sources of Canadian foreign policy in Africa and especially, it examines Canada's leadership in promoting the NEPAD initiative that was launched by African leaders in October 2001. The sources of Canadian policy in Africa are multiple and multi-dimensional. They interact in a complex fashion to shape Canada's identity as moral, and in turn construct Africa as the 'other', as poor, conflict-ridden and in need of development assistance.[1] For analytical purposes, I categorise the sources of Canadian policy into domestic and external dimensions. I argue that development assistance constitutes the central pillar and a defining feature of Canada's moral identity in Africa and that the support of development assistance especially by NGOs and the Canadian government itself reinforce the construction of Africa as the other. Furthermore, Canadian policy on development assistance is event-driven and the Prime Minister plays a central role in shaping and sustaining Canadian activism on the Africa continent.

The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed discussion of Canada's development assistance policy in African states. There is a wide range of good literature on this subject although many of them are dated (for examples see Clark 1991; Lane 1991; Freeman 1982; Tomlinson 1991; Morrison 1998; Black 2009). Rather, this chapter is to provide some detailed historical and contemporary analysis in order to contextualise our understanding of the main factors that have influenced Canadian internationalism on the African continent.

---

[1] For a good discussion of the construction of Africa as poor, conflict-ridden and security threat , see Smith (2003, 2005 and 2006)

Development Assistance as the foundation of Canada's Internationalism in Africa

The Canadian government does not have an overarching policy on Africa. This is especially true when you compare Canada's approach to Africa to others like the United States, United Kingdom, and China which has an "Africa Policy" (Cumming 2004; Porteous 2005; Commission for Africa 2005; Copson 2007)[2]. The origins of Canada's internationalism in Africa can be traced to first, Canada's historical relations with Britain and France, which were the two largest former colonial powers in Africa. In this context, Canada and Anglophone and Francophone African states share a common history and a 'traditional bond' with respect to the 'colonial origins' of their modern state forms[3] and this, to a significant extent underscores the contemporary Canadian internationalism on the African continent. Second, and closely related, Canada's membership in multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the UN, provide important platforms for the sustenance of Canada's internationalism in Africa (Keating 2002; Black 2005). This is not to suggest that Canada's foreign policy in Africa is dependent on its 'founding nations' or that Canada's foreign policy interests in Africa are tied to the objectives of multilateral institutions, although this is the case with respect to certain aspects of Canadian foreign policy , for example UN peacekeeping in Africa (Dorn 2005).

Historically, Canada's policy in Africa has focused on a wide range of political, economic, and security interests such as trade and investment, good governance, democracy, human rights, the environment, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and human security. More often than not, Canadian policy is largely implemented through the provision of development

---

[2] See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm> Accessed on January 15, 2010
[3] I use "modern state forms" to mean the formation of Canada and Anglophone and Francophone African states as they exist today, and not in terms of the type of government or levels of economic and political development.

assistance to African states. The Canadian government and observers of Canadian foreign policy in Africa tend to view Canada's relations in African states and with Africa as a whole through 'development assistance lenses' (Howard 1988; Freeman 1995; Clark 1991; Pratt 2002; Black 2005; Black 2009). Some of the observers analyse the underpinning self-interest of Canada in African states, yet, the general perception of poverty, disease and violent conflict in Africa shape the literature and to a significant extent reflect the practice of Canadian foreign policy in Africa. As argued by a CIDA official, "development assistance constitutes the central focus of Canada's cooperation with Africa and our (CIDA) aim is to reduce poverty, promote human rights and support sustainable development".[4] As discussed in Chapter Two, this contributes to the perception of Africa as the other. African states need the benevolence of Canadian aid rather than Africa as a strategic partner in Canadian policy. The construction of Africa as the other, as poor and conflict-ridden, in turn legitimise the discourse as well as the practical provision of development assistance to African states (Smith 2006; Duffield 2005). In this context, Canada perceives itself (but equally is perceived by African officials as discussed in detail in Chapter Seven) as moral in respect to its commitment, albeit minimal in terms of the real commitment of resources to Africa's development.

Generally, the objective of Canadian development assistance in Africa appears to be rooted in the promotion of the ideals of humane internationalism, "a vital tradition in Canadian political culture" (Black 2009: 49). Canada, it is argued, has an ethical responsibility as a middle power to assist in the development process in developing countries including those in Africa (Pratt 1990). This humane internationalist view—"an acceptance that the citizens and

---

[4] Interview with CIDA official in Ottawa, January 16, 2008

governments of the industrialised world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty" (Pratt 1990: 5)— appears to be deep rooted in the Canadian society as well. As one observer of Canada's internationalism in Africa said, "Canada is sympathetic towards Africa".[5] This suggests that Canada occupies a privileged position of being a developed country and this places an obligation on Canada to be morally responsible towards the other—Africa, which is poor and conflict-ridden. By constructing Africa this way, Canada's policy appears to be driven by sympathy which further suggests that Canada's interests in Africa are not derived from the geopolitical or security importance of the African continent to the Canadian economy. Indeed, Canada's sympathy for Africa appears more meaningful in the sense that Canada is not a former colonial power in Africa and therefore it bears no direct responsibility for the colonial origins of Africa's predicaments.

The construction of Africa as the other, has contributed to the 'perennial' peripheral status of Africa in Canadian policy. In many respects, Canada's policy has become 'conservative' as it is narrowly focused on development assistance. For instance, Andrew Clark (1991: 1-13) argues that especially in the 1980s, Africa was not a foreign policy priority of Canada and Canada had no integrated policy towards the continent. Development assistance was the dominant factor that appeared to bring Africa within the purview of Canadian politicians and policymakers. Without development assistance which invokes Canada's moral obligation as well as the desire of state leaders to maintain this identity in Africa, the continent may be 'forgotten' in Canadian foreign policy. To be sure, in the twenty-first century, Africa appeared

---

[5] Interview with anonymous NGO official Ottawa, January 22, 2008

to have gained some geopolitical or economic interest in Canadian foreign policy with the introduction of NEPAD by African leaders in 2001, which I will discuss more fully in Chapter Four, yet, the perception of poverty and conflict in Africa reinforces the overall practice of Canadian government policy. It also reinforced the literature which is skewed towards the analysis of the provision of development assistance to African states.

The idea and the practice of development assistance have a long history in Canada's engagement with the African continent. In the 19th century, Canadian professionals such as missionaries, teachers, and explorers worked in Africa (Ram 1980; CIDA 1981). Canada's contact in Africa predates the establishment of current regional or global institutions such as the UN, Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the G8 and G20 that now play key roles in shaping Canadian foreign policy in Africa. Analytically, the work of the 19th century Canadian professionals in Africa reflected the primary objective of contemporary development assistance to African countries to alleviate poverty, and contribute to sustainable development. On this account, it could be argued that the work of the Canadian professionals reflected and even reinforced the same construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden as found in contemporary Canadian foreign policy. It is, however, noteworthy that those Canadian activities in Africa in the 19th century were limited to British and French colonised territories. The emergence of independent African states beginning in the 1950s marked a profound shift in Canada's relations with African states, as Canada began to develop direct relations with independent African governments (CIDA 1981). The establishment of CIDA in 1968 provided the institutional framework to consolidate the focus on development assistance as the central pillar of Canada's engagement in Africa. But it is noteworthy that even before CIDA was formed the Canadian government

supported the Commonwealth Africa Aid Programme that was established in the 1950s, and as a result of its bicultural heritage, distributed aid to both former British and French colonies in Africa (Keating 2002:128; Gendron 2000-01).

The primary objective of Canada's development assistance is to support the efforts of developing countries, including those in Africa, to promote good governance, democracy and alleviate poverty. According to the Chrétien government's 1995 *Government Statement: Canada in the World*, development assistance expresses Canada's compassion and generosity towards the less fortunate.[6] This was echoed in the Martin government's 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the Word—Development* (Government of Canada 2005). And captured succinctly in the Harper government's 2008 budget statement that, "Canadians are a compassionate and generous people"[7]. Development assistance as a policy preference and a central theme of the Canadian government helps define Canada as a *moral state* that has a 'genuine interest' in assisting African states and institutions. Through development assistance, Canada pursues values-oriented objectives like poverty alleviation, human rights, democracy, human security, and sustainable development. As such, Canada's moral identity and interest have become mutually constituted. As will be elaborated upon in Chapter Seven, the moral identity of Canada has an intersubjective quality as African officials appear to see Canada as credible, as a non-imperial country without colonial baggage, and friendly in its dealings with Africa, especially the AU and ECOWAS. This suggests that Canada's moral identity depends on how Canada perceives itself in relation to Africa, on how African

---

[6] See the 1995 Government Statement: Canada in the World pp40-47
[7] Government of Canada, Department of Finance (Ottawa, February 2006) <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/glance-apercu/brief-bref-eng.asp)>Accessed on August 27, 2008

officials have come to accept this image, and how this image informs Canada's practices in Africa.

There is an inherent contradiction in Canada's moral identity in terms of the peripheral status of Africa in Canadian policy. Development assistance envelope to Africa has witnessed cuts over several decades and Canada's economic and political interests promoted through DFAIT and other government departments override CIDA's development assistance programme that purports to be poverty-focused (Morrison 1998; Pratt 2001: 61-62; Pratt 2007). In the 1980s about eighty percent (80%) of Canadian bilateral and food aid to Africa was tied to the purchase of Canadian goods (Clark 1991: 28-31; Lane 1991; Freeman 1982). In addition, Canadian bilateral aid to Africa was concentrated in 'middle income' developing countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Egypt, where Canada could have returns on aid expenditure in terms of providing "mutual benefits" in trade and investment (Tomlinson 1991; Morrison 1998). Moreover, African states were severely hit by the decrease of the Canadian aid budget by the Chrétien government in the mid to late 1990s. Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) that stood at 0.49 percent in 1991-92 was slashed to 0.34 percent in 1996-97 and further reduced to 0.25 percent of GNP in 2000 (Morrison 1998: 369; Canadian Development Report 2003; Tomlin et al 2007; Black 2009). In contrast, while Canada's aid disbursements to Africa declined significantly during this period, there was a significant increase in Canadian aid to Newly Industrialised Countries where Canada had greater economic interests (Morrison 2000). Perhaps, in order to maintain Canada's moral identity in Africa, Canadian state officials cut but did not cancel aid to Africa's states in the 1980s and 1990s. In this context, Africa's lack of 'competitiveness' in the Canadian aid budget appeared to be a

direct consequence of how Africa is perceived as poor and also the need for Canada to continue with the provision of aid even if the Newly Industrialised Countries provided better opportunities for the Canadian economy. In short, the moral identity that Canada projects towards Africa and the need to maintain this identity appears to be the compelling factor that sustained Canadian aid to Africa.

During the second term of the Chrétien government, the Canadian aid disbursement to Africa witnessed some increases as Canada spent 16.5% and 37% of the total aid budget in 2001/02 and 2002/03 respectively, in Africa.[8] Under the Martin government that succeeded Chrétien, there was also a slight increase from $1.7 billion to $1.9billion of Canada's aid disbursement to Africa in 2005-06 and 2006-07 fiscal years (CIDA 2008: 42; CIDA 2009: 36). As well, 14 out of the 25 CIDA's countries of focus in 2005 were in Africa.[9] As the CCIC argues, however, much of the recent recovery and concentration of aid in African states is only making up for the lost ground in the 1990s.[10]

The concentration as well as increase in aid to Africa was short lived. Indeed, the inconsistency or perhaps more accurately the ad hoc manner of Canadian aid to Africa has re-emerged under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper. While the Harper government's February 2008 budget affirmed Canada's promise under the Martin government

[8] See " A CCIC Briefing Note: Recent Trends In Canadian Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa"
<http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/003_acf_2004-10_subsaharan_africa_aid_trends.pdf> Accessed on July 18, 2009
[9] The 14 African countries were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana Kenya, Malawi, Mali Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia. For details see " CIDA Announces New Development Partners: developing countries here Canada can make a difference" (CIDA, News Release April 19, 2005) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7> Accessed on July 18, 2009
[10]See " A CCIC Briefing Note: Recent Trends In Canadian Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa"
<http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/003_acf_2004-10_subsaharan_africa_aid_trends.pdf> Accessed on July 18, 2009

to double aid to Africa (Government of Canada 2005)[11], Canadian policy priorities has now

shifted to Afghanistan and the Americas. The Harper government is implementing the promise

that was made by Paul Martin but the Harper government itself appears not to have significant

interest in Africa. This was confirmed at a meeting with African diplomats in Ottawa on January

20, 2009, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, said that the geographic

priorities of the Harper government lie in Afghanistan, the Americas and emerging markets.[12]

This shift marks a turning point for Canada's policy that saw some signs of hope and revival

through the 'repositioning of Africa' as a partner of Canada especially since the introduction of

NEPAD in 2001. This overview suggests that the moral argument that underscores Canadian

aid—expressing Canadian compassion and generosity towards the less fortunate—is primarily

rhetorical, yet it reinforces Canada's moral identity through the construction of Africa as needy

and Canada as the benevolent provider. At least, the Harper government's approach to Africa

reflects the perception of the continent as 'good for aid' and of little geopolitical value to the

Canadian economy.

The perception of Africa as the other forms the key to understanding Canadian policy in

Africa as more fully developed in the 'non-imperial internationalist approach' in Chapter Seven.

As a prelude to the main discussion in Chapter Seven, the Canadian government appears to

have interest in maintaining a moral image in Africa, with limited resource commitment, at

least on two interrelated fronts. First, the moral image is consistent with the longstanding

---

[11] See, Department of Finance <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/glance-apercu/brief-bref-eng.asp> Accessed on
August 27, 2008
[12] See, DFAIT, " Notes for an address by honorable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Heads of
African Missions to Canada" Ottawa January 20, 2009
<http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=386828&Language=E&
docnumber=2009/4> Accessed on May 10, 2009

tradition of humane internationalism which, until the late 1980s at least, appears to be ingrained in the 'collective conscience' of state officials and the Canadian public (Pratt 1990). The moral underpinnings of humane internationalism also construct Africa as poor and conflict-ridden and in turn justify the Canadian government's provision of development assistance. On the second front, the development assistance lenses and its moral connotations appear to create some hesitation by state officials to discuss publicly the growing geopolitical and economic importance of Africa to the Canadian economy. Paradoxically, Canada's commercial profile in Africa is rising as Canada does more business in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the emerging economies of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (SSCFAIT 2007:113-114). Canadian government officials hardly speak about this development in the public realm. Perhaps, a public discourse of Canadian economic interests may prove the contradiction in Canada's moral identity. Indeed, the Canadian public (civil society groups) contests Canada's moral identity but appear not willing to disrupt it as they use humane internationalist arguments in what Pratt (1983/84; 2007) calls "the counter-consensus"[13] to press for poverty-focused Canadian development assistance in Africa.

The above discussion leads us to explore the sources and forces that influence Canada's policy in Africa. From an analytical standpoint, both domestic and external factors interact in a complex fashion to shape Canada's foreign policy in Africa. This suggests that although analytically, a distinction could be made between domestic and external sources of Canadian policy, they are nonetheless intertwined as the domestic factors appear to be inspired by Canada's historical links with African states in multilateral institutions. In terms of the execution

---

[13] These are mainly Canadian NGOs and Church Groups

88

of foreign policy, however, it should be noted that in spite of the traditional preference for multilateralism, Canada's foreign policy in Africa is pursued through both bilateral and multilateral channels with individual African states and organisations.

The Complex Sources of Canadian Policy in Africa

Multilateralism that is, working under the umbrella of international organisations is a defining characteristic of Canadian foreign policy (Keating 2002). Consistent with this tradition, Canada employs multilateral diplomacy as the main instrument of its leadership engagements in Africa. Canada's membership and participation in multilateral institutions and 'Canada's self-defined status' as a middle power interested in promoting a peaceful, just and equitable international order, informs Canada's bilateral relations with individual African states and Africa's regional organisations. The preference for multilateralist approach to African issues can be partly explained by Canada's middle power status and the lack of overarching capacity to deal with Africa and global challenges unilaterally. But an important dimension of Canada's multilateralist approach to Africa is rooted in the fact that Canada has never been a colonial power in Africa. Although Canada pursues its own national interests in Africa, there appears to be a conscious effort by state leaders to maintain a positive international image in Africa in contrast with for example, former colonial powers Britain and France or the United States, which are perceived either as imperial and/or belligerent powers. Thus, with the advantage of history on its side, the African continent is a place where Canada promotes its middle power image of a moderate reformer and good international citizen (Wood 1990; Black and Smith

1993; Pratt 1994; Cooper 1997; Keating 2002) through the delivery of development assistance, peacekeeping, and human security.

Canadian contact in Africa predates the establishment of current global or regional organisations such as the UN, Commonwealth and the IMF, yet these multilateral organisations as well as plurilateral ones such as the G8, are important platforms that shape Canada's activism in Africa. Within Africa itself, an important source of Canada's multilateral contact is through its accreditation to the AU, which hitherto had an exclusively African membership under the Charter provisions of the now defunct OAU.[14] Especially under the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, Canada used the G8 as a platform to provide leadership on Africa's development through the NEPAD initiative that was launched by African leaders in 2001, and endorsed by the G8 at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002. While the transformative impact of Canadian policy in Africa can be contested, Canada's reliance on multilateralism appears to be a foregone conclusion.

Over the years Canada has relied on its greatest asset—soft power— especially within the UN to provide leadership on African issues particularly on apartheid in South Africa, peacekeeping operations, refugees, debt relief, development assistance and the support for the NEPAD initiative (Howard 1988 and 1991; Mathews and Pratt 1985, Pratt 1983; Freeman 1995; Clark 1991; Black 2005). During the Cold War rivalries, Canada's close association with the United States and Britain impacted on Canadian policy in Africa especially in the areas of development assistance and peacekeeping. For instance development assistance became more

---

[14] Canada was accredited to the AU on March 9, 2005. See, EUbusiness, " African Union for first time accredits envoys of non-African countries"< http://www.eubusiness.com/External_Relations/050308171759.ucg6xrig/> accessed on May 20, 2009

90

or less a strategic device to contain Soviet expansion in Africa (Morison 1998). But even though Cold War politics and Western interests remained an important influence on Canadian policy, Canada stayed the course of multilateralism. Through the UN, Canada contributed, although minimally, to resolve the twin challenges of insecurity and underdevelopment in Africa.

The Canadian government policy in Africa is event-driven and to a significant extent a reaction to the policies that emerge from multilateral settings. Canadian officials appear not to instantiate their own policy on Africa but rather react and respond to key events and policy initiatives in multilateral institutions which, in turn, result in leadership activities or, at a minimum, breathe new life into Canada's activities in Africa. One such event was the economic crisis that swept across the African continent in the 1980s. This led to the introduction of structural adjustment programmes by the IMF/World Bank. Perhaps, the economic crisis reinforced Canada's perception of Africa as poor. It provided a prime opportunity for Canada to build on its moral identity through the provision of development assistance. As well, it allowed Canada to promote its own economic, political, and strategic interest on the African continent. Canada's leadership in resolving the economic crisis was evident in 1986 when Stephen Lewis, Canada's ambassador to the UN, chaired the ad hoc committee that established the UN Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAARERD). The UNPAAERD was a five-year plan of reforms and investment for Africa that was premised on shared responsibility of African states and the international community for the causes of the economic crisis. Although officials in the Department of External Affairs (DFAIT) were initially reluctant to let Mr. Lewis chair the UN ad hoc committee for fear that it might lead to a greater financial commitment by Canada for the Africa recovery programme, Mr. Lewis was

subsequently appointed by the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, as his Special Advisor on Africa. This enhanced Canada's role in the UNPAAERD and Canada's image abroad (Clark 1991:4). Perhaps, as a consequence of the resistance from External Affairs, the Canadian leadership did not translate into substantial resource commitment to Africa. Development assistance which forms a central pillar of Canada's internationalism in Africa, and which may have helped to resolve the economic crisis, was cut by 33 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Morison 1998: 412-420).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Canadian government took advantage of the UN's Millennium Declaration that launched the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reinvigorate its commitments to Africa's development. The MDGs are a set of specific targets to be achieved by 2015 in the areas of poverty reduction, improvement in health, education, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and global partnerships.[15] In a response to the MDGs targets but also as part of the overall response towards the NEPAD initiative, the Liberal government under Jean Chrétien launched the $500 million CFA in 2002 to address the development and security challenges in Africa. Together with other G8 members, Canada also pledged to double aid to developing countries in the amount of $50 billion by 2010 out of which Africa will receive at least an extra $25 billion per year.[16] Similarly, the April 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* that was tabled by Prime Minister Paul Martin, pledged to double Canada's development assistance between 2001 and 2010, with

---

[15] For details see, Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) <http://www.undp.org/mdg/> Accessed on May 1, 2009
[16] See, Canada and the Millennium Development Goals: An Overview of the First Five Years (CIDA, November 29, 2007) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-13175444-H69#pdf> Accessed on May 1, 2009

a focus on twenty five (25) development partners including fourteen (14) countries in Africa,[17] and concentrate spending in health, education, governance, indigenous private sector development and the environment.[18]

As a general characteristic of Canadian government policy in Africa, rhetoric appeared to have trumped the real commitment of resources to Africa's development. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper that took over from Prime Minister Martin, initially reiterated Canada's commitment to the MDGs in the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in Russia in July 2006.[19] According to the Harper government, "Canada will contribute $450 million between 2006-2016 in support of country-led efforts to strengthen health systems, and make concrete progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in Africa".[20] However, although Harper gave priority to health issues, which are an important component of the MDGs, the overall Canadian aid focus on African states suffered a setback when the Conservative government announced twenty (20) 'new' development partners in February 2009. Moreover, the announcement came with a shift in Canadian aid focus to the Americas and Afghanistan. Consequently, the number of Canada's development partners in Africa was reduced from fourteen (14) to seven (7)[21] under the so-called "aid effectiveness agenda" of the Conservative government, and the top two recipient of Canadian aid became Afghanistan and Haiti.[22]

---

[17] The 14 countries of focus in Africa were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Gambia. See, Lee Berthiaume (February 25, 2009). "CIDA Confirms Shift to Americas, Fewer Countries" <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/cida_shift_americas-2-25-2009> Accessed on May 1, 2009

[18] See, Government of Canada (2005). International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Ottawa: DFAIT

[19] See "The 2006 G8 Summit"(Office of the Prime Minister, July 17, 2006) <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1251> Accessed on May 1, 2009

[20] Ibid

[21] See, Lee Berthiaume (February 25, 2009). "CIDA Confirms Shift to Americas, Fewer Countries" <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/cida_shift_americas-2-25-2009> Accessed on May 1, 2009

As well as facilitating the development policy, the UN has provided a platform for the pursuit of Canada's security interest in Africa, especially in the area of peacekeeping during the Cold War and in the Post-Cold War eras. As discussed in Chapter Two, peacekeeping is a key feature of Canada's international identity as a middle power although Canada's contribution to UN peacekeeping has declined (Dorn 2005; Bratt 2007). The interrelatedness events of the Cold War and the emergence of violent conflicts had drawn Canada close to Africa. In peacekeeping, Canada's security interest was closely aligned with its obligations in the UN to promote international peace and security, although in some instances such as in the Congo in 1960-64, one could make the claim that Canada's involvement in the peacekeeping in that country was motivated by one of its strongest allies, the United States, which was engaged in a proxy war with the Soviet Union.[23] Thus, during the Cold War especially, Canada appeared to serve the security interest of the West to prevent the spread of communism on the African continent. Although Western interests appear to have influenced Canadian policy, Canada stayed the course of multilateralism as it participated in UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa (Keating 2002; Dorn 2005).

As with development policy, there is also a mixed record of Canadian contributions to peace and security on the African continent. Canadian peacekeeping in Africa has a long history. Canadian troops joined the first UN peacekeeping operation in Africa, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-1964. In the immediate post-Cold War era,

---

The seven new development partners are Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Senegal and Tanzania

[22] See, Canadian International Development (CIDA)—Haiti (Gatineau; January 13, 2010) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/Eng/JUD-12912349-NLX>. Also see CBC News, " Canada in Afghanistan" (February 10, 2009) <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/10/f-afghanistan.html> Accessed on January 16, 2010

[23] See, " CBC Digital Archives: Congo Crisis" (Broadcast date: February 25, 1962) <http://archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/peacekeeping/clips/7520/> Accessed on July 25, 2009
For some details about the Congo crisis, see Meredith 2005 (93-115)

Canadian troops were also deployed to UN peacekeeping operations in African states such as Angola, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Even after the much publicised 1993 Somalia Scandal—the murder of a Somali teen by members of Canada's elite Airborne Regiment[24]--Canada continued to showed its commitment to peacekeeping in Africa when the Canadian General, Roméo Dallaire, led the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994 (Oliver 1998; Gordon 1994; Dallaire 2003; Dorn 2005). In the twenty-first century, Canadian troop's involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa has witnessed a significant decline. As will be discussed in detail in chapters Five and Six, Canada's troop contributions to UN missions in Africa have declined significantly, as the Canadian government policy shifted towards the promotion of human security and the building of the capacity of the ASF to undertake peace support operations in Africa. The decline in troop contribution has undermined Canada's leadership on UN peacekeeping operations especially in Africa (Dorn 2005).

The emergence of human security in the Canadian government's policy at the end of the Cold War gave a new dimension to Canada's security interest in African states. The Chrétien government supported several UN initiatives that were focused on the protection of people in violent conflicts. For instance, as a Security Council member, Canada chaired and actively supported the Angola Sanctions Committee that was aimed at limiting UNITA's (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) access to arms, petroleum and revenues from illicit trade in diamonds. Canada also spearheaded the investigations by an independent group of experts on the international implementation and compliance with the UN sanctions on UNITA. As a

---

[24] For a detailed discussion of this scandal see Oliver (1998). Also see Gordon 1994

result, the UN passed a Canadian-led resolution that took action on the key recommendations of the international experts including the setting-up of a monitoring mechanism to investigate and report on the violations of the sanctions.[25]

From the mid-1990s, Canadian aid became a key instrument for the promotion human security in Africa under the Liberal government. One could describe this trend, which continued into the twenty-first century, as the 'human securitisation' of Canadian aid. The human securitisation of Canadian aid, that is linking Canadian aid to the promotion of human security objectives, reinforced Canada's moral identity in Africa. For instance, Bill Graham, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, said that "our … support demonstrates Canada's ongoing commitment to Africa and the need for greater peace and security for the African people".[26] With the outbreak of violent conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda, increasing proportions of the Canadian aid to these countries were focused on conflict resolution, peace-building and post-disaster programming (Morrison 1998: 410; Stewart 1994: 1-7). Again, as part of the promotion of the human security agenda, Canadian aid was focused on postwar justice efforts in war torn countries such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Canada led the establishment of the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute individuals who had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide[27] to demonstrate Canada's commitment to promote human security and to the use of multilateral institutions as the manner in which this should be done rather than alternative bilateral commitments. As well, Canada played a key leadership role in creating

---

[25] See, Government of Canada, " Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security" Ottawa: DFAIT 2000

[26] See <http://www.expotimes.net/backissues_monthly/backissuesapril/april2004/23april04.htm> Accessed on September 2, 2008

[27] See (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue21/07-title-en.asp) Accessed on September 2, 2008

a UN resolution that supported the establishment of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme to stop the trade in 'conflict diamonds' that funded violent conflicts, especially in Africa.[28] While Canadian peacekeeping contributions to UN missions in African states has witnessed a serious decline since the 1990s, the UN still constitutes an important avenue for Canada's multilateral diplomacy in Africa.

Apart from the UN system, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie are important platforms through which Canada engages Africa. These organisations are particularly important to Canadian foreign policy because of their large African membership, their historic and symbolic nature, and their reflection of Canadian bilingualism. Canada's membership in the Commonwealth and La Francophonie provide the opportunity for Canadian political leaders to become acquainted with leaders from member states in Africa and to advance Canada's relations and interests[29] and foreign policy goals. As well, and as argued by Keating (2002: 29-32), Canada's involvement in the Commonwealth was originally motivated by the desire of Canadian state officials to project an independent and autonomous Canadian foreign policy from Britain in the post-World War II era. The main channel used to enforce Canada's foreign policy independence within the Commonwealth was Canada's contribution to Commonwealth reforms to make the organisation more appealing to ex-colonies by resisting pressures from Britain for a unified voice, allowing for membership of republics, and removing the stain of racial discrimination (Keating 2002: 31). In this context, it can be argued that Canada was using the Commonwealth reforms to strategise for its future relations with 'post-colonial' African

---

[28] See, Kimberly Process: from conflict diamonds to prosperity diamonds
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/background/index_en.html> Accessed on January 11, 2010
[29] See, Canada and the Commonwealth (DFAIT, October 29, 2008)
<http://www.international.gc.ca/commonwealth/index.aspx> Accessed on April 22, 2009

states by portraying a more moral and friendly image, or at least to make its policy less colonial in its make-up and orientation.

Through the Commonwealth as well as the UN, Canada contributed significantly to a wide range of issues concerning Africa especially in the late 1970s and 1980s, with the most notable issue being the international resistance against apartheid in South Africa and the struggle for independence in Namibia (Tennyson 1982; Brown 1990; Black 2001). Within the context of the Commonwealth, Canada's policy against apartheid reflected its commitment in the UN to promote self-government, human rights, and international peace and security. As a staunch supporter of the UN, Canada acceded to the UN Charter's call for self-government of colonies.[30] In the 1970s to the early 1980s, CIDA, through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), provided non military aid to African liberation movements in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique. Although this policy attracted fierce criticism at home, the Pierre Trudeau government at the time pushed for this policy to guarantee future good relations with the liberation movements that would sooner or later become the governments of these liberated states (Howard 1981). Indeed, Canada did not provide direct military support to African liberation movements perhaps to avoid confrontation with Britain and France (in the case of French colonies); not to ruin its traditional relations with the West in the midst of the Cold War; and to maintain its middle power image as a mediator and "helpful fixer". Canada's leadership in the Commonwealth and UN in opposing apartheid in South Africa beginning in the late 1970s was significant. Yet, there was an overriding influence of Canada's economic interest in trade and investments as against the desire of Canadian state leaders to

---

[30] See the UN Charter Article 73

promote human rights in South Africa (Howard 1988; Mathews and Pratt 1985; Pratt 1983; Freeman 1995; Clark 1991). In other words, Canada's South Africa policy appeared to have rhetorically delinked the pursuit of economic interests from the promotion of human rights in apartheid South Africa.

The political and strategic importance of the Commonwealth to promote Canadian foreign policy interests and goals cannot be underestimated. One could agree with the view that especially on economic matters such as trade relations "... Canada often appeared more sympathetic to Third World demands in speeches and statements than in practice" (Keating 2002: 120). However, in the pursuit of what appeared to be an independent foreign policy and autonomy from Britain and France, and to maintain a moral image in Africa, Canada took opportunity of being the host of the 1987 Commonwealth and Francophonie summits to forgive almost all of its ODA debt to Sub-Saharan Africa in the amount of $740 million. As Clark (1991) suggests, this Canadian initiative perhaps influenced France to forgive three times the Canadian amount forgiven ($2.3billion). In fact, the forgiveness of African debts in the 1980s was particularly important in the face of the huge economic crisis that was sweeping across the continent. Thus the moment was just right for Canada to have a significant impact on Africa's development and reinforce its moral image in Africa. Canada set a worthy example for its founding nations to follow to alleviate the debt burden of African states.

Canada's activism with regards to the forgiveness of African debt was not done for purely altruistic reasons, to promote development in Africa. The debt forgiveness helped to entrench Canada's historical political advantage over Britain and France. It helped Canada project a 'non-imperial' image in Africa consistent with the middle power trait of good

99

international citizen and in contrast to the imperial outlook of Britain and France (Wood 1990; Black and Smith 1993; Cooper et al 1993; Pratt 1994; Cooper 1997; Keating 2002). As Brown (1990) has pointed out, the relatively low historical and cultural ties in Africa placed Canada in a unique position to project a more progressive foreign policy image, as in the case of apartheid in South Africa. Canada's progressive image as reflected in the policy towards South Africa and also through the provision of development assistance has survived. It continues to define the general character of Canada as a moral state in Africa. For instance, unlike the former colonial powers, African officials saw Canada as more credible and reliable to promote the NEPAD initiative in the G8.[31]

The ending of the Cold War and the emergence of democratic governments in Africa has had a tremendous impact on Canadian government policy. Since the 1990s the main area of Canadian activism in the Commonwealth has been the promotion of democratic governance in Africa. As well argued by McIntyre (2002: 287-291), Canada provided leadership in the most powerful ministerial organ created in the Commonwealth in recent years—Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group—that was set up in 1995 to enforce the Harare declaration on democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law in African states such as the Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. Canada's annual contribution to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has helped in this direction. Canada's support for democracy, good governance, and human rights in the Commonwealth reflect the broader objectives of Canadian development assistance programme in Africa. Key Canadian officials have participated in the conduct of elections in some African states. For instance in

---

[31] Interview with African officials in the AU and ECOWAS, as well as think-tanks in Addis Ababa, Accra, and Abuja February-May, 2008

2004, former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Christine Stewart and former Prime Minister Joe Clark were involved in the Cameroon's elections as the Commonwealth Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the head of Commonwealth Election Observer Mission respectively. In addition, former Member of Parliament, Audrey McLaughlin, was a member of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to Tanzania in October 2005.[32]

Although these activities have contributed to Canada's moral image, it is also important to keep in mind as David Black argues that "there have always been significant limitations and contradictions in Canada's humane internationalism" (Black 2001: 147). And this appears to have undermined Canada's diplomatic clout in the Commonwealth on African issues in the mid-1990s. One could agree with Black that the "pattern of consistent inconsistency" (Black 2001: 14) on issues such as the promotion of human rights in Canadian policy as related to the cut in the aid budget and the pursuit of economic interest in middle income and sometimes undemocratic African states (Mathews and Pratt 1985; Pratt 1983; Freeman 1995), and other factors such as Canada's relatively small power status on the African scene, had consequences for Canada's leadership activities in the Commonwealth. For instance, Canada was isolated in the Commonwealth particularly by African countries when it took a hard-line position against the Nigerian leader, Sani Abacha, for his anti-democratic policies and abuse of human rights in the mid-1990s (Black 2000 and 2001). Perhaps Canada could have made a significant impact on the Nigerian case if Canada was a major donor or investor in Africa's economy. But of course this is not the case. The Nigeria episode presented a significant limitation to Canada's

---

[32] See, Commonwealth Promotion of Democracy (DFAIT, October 29, 2008)
<http://www.international.gc.ca/commonwealth/democracy-democratie.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=2&menu=R>
Accessed on April 22, 2009

multilateral efforts to promote human rights norms and development in Africa. Canada appears to have (re)gained some influence or credibility in Africa by supporting the NEPAD initiative.

Like the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, is a strategic institution that provides opportunity for Canada to give a bilingual as well as a multicultural outlook in its policies in Africa. La Francophonie has a large African membership—thirty (30) out of the fifty six (56) member states[33]—and over the years CIDA's aid to Francophone African states has been an important dimension of Canada's influence and image on the African scene. In fact until the late 1980s, CIDA's aid programme in Africa was managed separately by its Francophone Africa Division and the Commonwealth Africa Division (CIDA 1981). La Francophone portrays Canada's bilingualism in view of the French speaking provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick, which were granted participation status in la Francophonie Summits in 1971 and 1977 respectively.[34]

La Francophonie provides an avenue for the advancement of Canadian political, economic, and strategic objectives especially in the areas of democracy development, human rights, trade, peace and human security.[35] In la Francophonie, "Canada's ultimate goal is to contribute to the development of a true community that will strengthen its members' interdependence and foster an atmosphere of solidarity".[36] This ultimate goal could be achieved from several dimensions of Canada's relationship in la Francophonie including the political, cultural, and economic contacts. The economic relationship with least developed Francophone countries appears more important to Canadian officials as it is consistent with the promotion and the sustenance of the liberal economic order that lies at the heart of successive

---

[33] See, La Francophonie, <http://www.francophonie.org/English.html>

[34] See, DFAIT, " Events of La Francophonie" (Ottawa: DFAIT, May 12, 2009) <http://www.international.gc.ca/franco/index.aspx#prov> Accessed on May 15, 2009

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid

Canadian governments' policies (Keating 2002; Neufeld 1995). In this light, Canada's route to achieve interdependence and solidarity with Francophone African states is embedded in Canada's economic interest as expressed in the government's objective to "promote the integration of la Francophonie's least developed country members into the global economic system".[37]

The provision of development assistance which constitutes a central pillar in Canada's relationship with Francophone African states is very crucial to advance Canada's economic objectives. Over the years CIDA's countries of focus in Africa have included both Commonwealth and Francophone African states[38] in order to satisfy the English-speaking and French-speaking domestic constituents and to open the avenue for the pursuit Canadian of interests (Gendron 2000). Apart from bilateral aid to Francophone African states, CIDA provides assistance to la Francophonie institutions to help to promote democracy, human rights, basic education, higher education (e.g. the Canadian Francophonie Scholarship Programme) and peace and security. The province of Quebec in particular, has been a strong influence on Canada's bilateral and multilateral relations with Francophone African states especially in the area development assistance (Gendron 2000).

The Canadian government policy in francophone African countries also encompasses the security realm. The Canadian government sees la Francophonie as another instrument to resolve violent conflicts in Africa. For instance in the 2006 la Francophonie Summit in Romania, Prime Minister Harper reiterated Canada's commitment to la Francophonie and the strategic

---

[37] Ibid
[38] For example see, CIDA, " Countries of Focus- sub-Saharan Africa" (CIDA, February 23, 2009) < http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-51895926-JEP>; " CIDA announces new development partners: developing countries where Canada can make a difference" (CIDA, news release, April 19, 2005) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7> Accessed on May 20, 2009

importance of the organisation to address the security challenges in the Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[39] Prime Minister Harper argued that, "the Francophonie must also help to reduce the tensions and conflicts that affect us. We all need to act to save a desperate people. That is the responsibility to protect".[40] Nonetheless, this "ear candy"[41] rhetoric did not match the resource commitment of the Harper government to resolve the conflict in places like the Sudan. The Harper government has committed more resources and troops to the war in Afghanistan than violent conflicts in Africa. And more importantly, compared to the UN, la Francophonie appears to play a minor role in resolving conflicts in Africa. But aside this however, what is evident in Mr. Harper's speech is the construction of African states as poor and conflict-ridden and therefore creates the need for Canada to uphold its moral image through its membership in the la Francophonie to "save a desperate people".

On the economic front, the Bretton Woods financial institutions of the IMF and the World Bank are important external sources of Canadian economic policy in Africa. Although Canada is a relatively small shareholder compared to say the United States (Clark 1991), and in spite of poverty reduction being the central objective of Canadian development assistance, the Canadian government policy in Africa has followed the neoliberal policy prescriptions of the Bretton Woods financial institutions. These policy prescriptions include the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that were introduced in the early 1980s and the late 1990s, respectively. As pointed out by some observers (Clark 1991; Morrison 2000), successive Canadian governments supported the SAPs

---

[39] See, Office of the Prime Minister, " Prime Minister Addresses Francophonie Summit" (Ottawa: September 28, 2008) <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=2&id=1338> Accessed on May 15, 2009
[40] Ibid
[41] This expression is used by Kim Nossal to characterise Canadian policy on Darfur under the Paul Martin government. See Nossal (2005)

which were aimed at restructuring African economies by cutting down public expenditure on social programmes, privatising public enterprises, assigning importance to exports, and practicing sound fiscal and financial management.

The SAPs were embedded in the neoliberal principles of the free market economy and aimed at liberalising the economy of African states to generate internal growth and development. During the 1980s, Canadian aid to African countries was linked to the acceptance and implementation of market reforms associated with SAPs. The bulk of government-to-government aid was concentrated on projects that were formulated to support economic policy reforms by African governments (Clark 1991: 20-28; Morrison 2000: 25). However, SAPs did not deliver on their promise of promoting development through economic growth. Indeed, the IMF and World Bank conditionalities brought untold socio-economic hardships on Africans which aggravated the impact of the debt burden on many African states.[42]

The impact of IMF and World Bank on the Canadian government's policy in Africa cannot be overemphasised. Recent policy changes in the IMF and the World Bank to address the shortcomings of SAPs—but not necessarily a step back from the neoliberal agenda—are reflected in Canadian aid policy in Africa. Consistent with the apparent commitment to advance the neoliberal economic order with key allies in the G8,[43] Canadian aid to African countries since the late 1990s has been anchored on the acceptance and preparation of country-directed PRSPs under the supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions. Unlike the SAPs that were imposed on African countries, the PRSPs are said to be a country-led programme that is built on

---

[42] For some details about the failure of SAPs see Riddell (1992) and Carmody (1998)

[43] For a detailed discussion on how Canadian foreign policy promotes hegemonic neoliberal economic order, see Neufeld (1995)

local participation in the formulation of policies and strategies for broad-based growth and poverty reduction. The preparation of PRSPs involves the participation of domestic stakeholders such as civil society groups and external development partners including the IMF and the World Bank.[44] CIDA's Country Programming Framework for countries such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, and Mozambique was based on the individual country's IMF/World Bank approved PRSPs, which CIDA assisted these countries to produce[45] (Arthur and Black 2007). In theory, the central objectives of the PRSPs reflect CIDA's policy on poverty reduction that is aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty through a multi-level strategy at the individual, community and systemic levels.[46] Moreover, the principles of PRSPs reflect CIDA's policy on aid effectiveness that is anchored on principles such as local ownership of development strategies, improved donor coordination, and good governance.[47] Nonetheless as mentioned earlier, the PRSPs are very much rooted in the promotion of market-based economies in African states.

Closely related to the preparation of PRSPs, Canada has also supported the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) of the IMF and the World Bank through which it has forgiven debts owned by African countries.[48] For instance, through the Canadian Debt Initiative under HIPC, Canada provided $590 million debt relief to African countries in 2005.[49] As important as it may appear in terms of the freeing up much needed funds for development

---

[44] See , Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) (IMF, April 14, 2009) <http://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/prsp.asp> Accessed on April 15, 2009
[45] For instance see "Senegal" (CIDA July 31, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-217123240-NKY > Accessed on April 15, 2009
[46] For details see CIDA's Policy on Poverty Reduction (January 1996). <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/STE-42484628-GZF> Accessed on April 15, 2009
[47] For details see, Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (CIDA September 2002) < http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/STE-32015515-SG4#21> Accessed on April 15, 2009
[48] See, " Helping the Poorest: an update on Canada's debt relief efforts" (Ottawa, Department of Finance, January 2005) <http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/cdre0105_-eng.asp> Accessed on April, 15, 2005
[49] See, Canada Proposes 100 Percent Debt Relief for World's Poorest Countries (Canada Department of Finance Ottawa February 2, 2005) <http://www.fin.gc.ca/n05/05-008-eng.asp#Canada> Accessed on April 15, 2009

projects in African countries, Canada's debt relief was made conditional upon the acceptance of neoliberal policy prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank. It required the demonstration by HIPC African countries to reform their economies and liberalise their trade in accordance with WTO rules, and to implement the World Bank's 'good governance' prescriptions including elections, the rule of law and democracy (Arthur and Black 2007; Smillie 2007; de Renzio and Mulley 2007).[50] Canada's economic policy in Africa has not wavered from its 'traditional' link to the Bretton Woods' policy directives to developing countries. Indeed, Canadian governments, despite constructing Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, have consistently applied the norms and values of a web of neoliberal prescriptions in African states. A central contradiction is that these neoliberal prescriptions have not served well the development interests of African states (Smith 2007; Lesufi 2007; Taylor 2007; Owusu 2007).

Of course, the external influences on Canadian government policy in Africa cannot be fully understood without specific reference to the impact of the political, economic and institutional transformations that took place in Africa especially in the post-Cold War era. The political and economic policy changes in Africa created conducive atmosphere for an active Canadian engagement on the continent. It could be argued that the wave of democratisation and the institutional transformation that swept across the African continent at the end of the Cold War (Ake 1993; Chabal 1998; Sandbrook 2000) gave strong indications of Africa's readiness to embrace liberal democratic values and market reform and these have also influenced Canadian policy on the continent. The movement towards democratic governance in Africa was evident in the immediate post-Cold War era when African leaders adopted two

---

[50] Ibid

important instruments—the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation* in Arusha, Tanzania on August 22, 1990, and the OAU *Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government* in Lome, Togo on July 10-12, 2000.[51] While these instruments remain important in the contemporary transformation of African continental politics, the launching of the NEPAD initiative in 2001 was the single most important factor that appears to have 'consolidated' African leaders' willingness and readiness to *popularise* liberal democratic values and the free market ideology on the continent. In this regard as mentioned earlier, the transformation of the OAU to the AU and the subsequent accreditation of Canada to the AU provided an important motivation for Canadian policy in Africa.

The Canadian government's support for the NEPAD initiative was motivated by the determination of a 'new breed' of African leaders to promote continental leadership, ownership, and control of economies for sustainable peace, growth and development on the African continent. Some concrete developments across Africa, such as the emergence of democratic governments in states such as Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania (Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Ndegwa 2001; Black 2005); efforts towards the entrenchment of the rule of law; as well as the average economic growth rate of 5 percent in Africa—was up from the 2.9 percent in 2002—provided impetus for Canadian policy in Africa within the context of the NEPAD initiative (CIDA 2003, 2004, and 2006).

---

[51] For details see (http://www.un.org/issues/docs/documents/a-45-427.html#Monitor) and (http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/OAU-Decl_Framework_Unconst_change_govt.pdf) Accessed on August 30, 2008

During this period of democratisation, what some scholars referred to as the "second liberation" (Teshome-Bahiru 2008), African states face enormous political, economic and security challenges. The effort of the African leaders to transform the OAU to the AU with a new security mandate, and the African leaders' commitment to the market-oriented policies [52] created an image of hope for Africa's development. It encouraged the Chrétien government to take a leadership role in support of NEPAD in the G8 (Baker 2000: 9-34; Wade 2007:23-29). If the 1980s was described as the "lost decade"[53] for Africa, and the 1990s plagued by violent conflicts, then in the context of the NEPAD, the twenty-first century presented new opportunities for sustainable development and peace and security.

The image of hope for Africa was an important factor that attracted Canadian officials especially Prime Minister Chrétien to support the NEPAD initiative. The NEPAD provided an opportunity for Canada to reinforce its moral image in Africa. This was evident in Chrétien's speech to the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa on April 11, 2002 in Ethiopia, when he argued that "I prefer action to rhetoric. That is why I am pleased to come before you today to speak about the renewal of real hope for Africa. A renewal conceived by Africans for Africans that puts the needs of people first. It is powered by progressive vision and values and global partnership. And, if fully implemented, will transform the relationship of Africans with each

---

[52] All the 53 member states of the African Union have endorsed NEPAD. The 37th summit of the OAU/AU in July 2001 formally adopted the NEPAD strategic framework document. (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php) Accessed on August 14, 2008

[53] The "lost decade" is used to describe Africa's economic decline in the 1980s. In the 1980s, almost all African states were heavily in debt resulting from mismanagement of the economy. Tax revenues were severely cut and this affected the provision of public services which led to the introduction of structural adjustment programmes by the IMF and the World Bank. For detailed analysis see Martin Meredith (2005). The fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair, a History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York: Public Affairs pp-368-77

other and with the world".[54] The CFA document adds that, "despite the development challenges facing Africa today, never before have Africans been so ready, so capable and so committed to working together to ensure a better future".[55] With the introduction of NEPAD, some African leaders acknowledged the development challenges on the continent and offered themselves to international scrutiny as they placed human security at the top of the development agenda.[56] The Chrétien government, in turn, bought into the idea of a 'New Africa', one in which the old image of corruption, human rights abuse and bad governance was giving way to a progressive and secured continent for economic growth and development.

The NEPAD was the latest event that had drawn Canada close to the African continent. Recent Canadian government policy in Africa cannot be fully understood without also placing it within the broader context of the Western countries reaction to the growing influence of China on the African continent at least in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Alden 2007: 93-119). In the post-September 11 2001 era, many African countries[57] are 'turning to the east' for loans, trade, investment, and development/military assistance. They are attracted to China's foreign policy doctrine of 'no conditionality' and 'non-interference in domestic affairs of African states, which runs counter to the traditional Western countries' imposition of neoliberal conditionalities on African states especially through the IMF and the World Bank (Taylor 2009;

---

[54] See, H.E. Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada, " Notes of for an address to the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa" (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 11, 2002) <http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/041102_Speech_PM_Jean_Chr%C3%A9tien.htm> Accessed on May 25, 2009

[55] See CIDA (2003). Canada fund for Africa: New vision New Partnership. p1

[56] See NEPAD Document (October, 2001) particularly, pp1-13

[57] Countries such as Zimbabwe have officially adopted "look east" policy. In addition, there is growing Chinese business in Africa's giants such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Senegal. See, " The race for influence in Zimbabwe" <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/25/zimbabwe-aid-china-west> Accessed on July 30, 2009 Also see " China's wide reach in Africa" (The New York Times, July 18, 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/business/19shelf.html> Accessed on July 30, 2009

Manji and Marks 2007). Among other things, China's trade and investments in the energy sector, its military cooperation through the sale of arms, and development assistance to African states has witnessed an unprecedented boom in the contemporary history of China-Africa relations. As a result, China is perceived as the new threat to Western interests especially the United States in Africa since the ending of the Cold War (Shinn 2009; Alden 2007; Keenan 2009; Ofodile 2009).

In the Sudan, for example, China shielded the Bashir government from UN sanctions over the violent conflict that has claimed over 300, 000 lives in the Darfur province (Ofodile 2009: 89-92; Alden 2007). China's growing influence is also notable in African regional organisations. At the continental level, the AU officials I interviewed revealed that China has offered to build a $600 million conference center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as a gift to the AU.[58] The project was started in November 2008 and expected to be completed in 2011.[59] Thus in many ways as Alden argues, "Africa, the erstwhile forgotten continent, is once again the object of great power interest" (Alden 2007: 93). Canada is not a great power on the African scene, nonetheless, it cannot be disputed that at least Canada's interest would be enhanced if its policies reflect the mutual interest of its allies especially the United States, Britain and France who are among the main financiers of the IMF and the World Bank, and who have enormous economic and security interest in Africa. More importantly, Canada appears to stay committed to its moral identity that is opposed to China's disregard for human rights and democratic credentials of African governments (Manji and Marks 2007). In order to enforce Western

---

[58] Interview with AU officials at the AU headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 25, 2008
[59] See, "AU Commission News" <http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/Publication%2035%20Nov%202008.pdf> Accessed on July 31, 2009

dominance through the promotion of the neoliberal ideology of the free market and multiparty democracy, the NEPAD, especially, presented the opportunity for Canada and its G8 allies to strengthen relations with Africa and to 'put Africa back on their foreign policy agenda' with the promise to double their aid to the continent by 2010. In this light, the support for NEPAD could be seen as one of the means to contain China's influence in Africa. Thus, China's policy in Africa appears to have contributed to the reinvigoration of the Canadian government's engagement on the African continent.

The above discussion has highlighted the external sources of Canadian government policy in Africa. In general I have argued that Canadian government policy is event-driven. I have also argued that key multilateral institutions such as the UN, la Francophone, the Commonwealth, the IMF and the World Bank have had varied influences on Canadian government policy. In many ways, these multilateral institutions have provided the platform for the pursuit of Canadian economic, political and security interests in Africa. Moreover, I have argued that internal policy transformations within Africa, which is epitomised by the introduction of the NEPAD in 2001, and China's growing influence, have motivated recent Canadian government policy on the African continent. In the next section, I turn to the discussion of the domestic factors to elucidate further, the complex nature of the sources of Canadian policy in Africa.

There are a wide range of domestic factors that work in a complex fashion with the external sources to shape and sustain Canadian policy in Africa. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the institutional mandates of key government departments including especially DFAIT, CIDA, Department of National Defence (DND), Department of Finance, the Treasury Board of

Canada, as well as key individuals, and civil society have taken on greater significance in sustaining Canada's internationalism in Africa. Although the government institutions and some key individuals influence Canadian policy at different levels, for example, the Treasure Board of Canada play "the role of ensuring value-for-money as well as providing oversight of the financial management functions in departments and agencies",[60] the DFAIT and CIDA are the most prominent by virtue of their institutional mandates and in view of the fact that Canada's policy in Africa is concentrated on the provision of development assistance. It is, however, important to also note at the onset that the PMO is the most important arena for Canadian policy in Africa.

Generally speaking, Canadian civil society (including NGOs, the media and church groups) play important roles in shaping and sustaining Canadian policy in Africa especially through the Canadian Council for International Cooperation's (CCIC) Africa-Canada Forum Working Group.[61] The CCIC has programmes such as MP Days when NGO officials meet with Members of Parliament and also organise forums through its working group, the Africa-Canada Forum, to discuss issues on Africa. Although civil society groups are limited in terms of their capacity to actually dictate policy, their ideas, experience, and advocacy on African issues helps to maintain Africa on the foreign policy agenda of the Canadian government.[62] Indeed, apart from the government itself, Canadian civil society also has been a key player in the construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden which, in turn, demands that Canada uphold its moral

---

[60] See the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBCS February 6, 2006) < http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/abu-ans/tbs-sct/abu-ans-eng.asp>   Accessed on April 20, 2009

[61] The Africa-Canada forum brings together over 40 NGOs, churches, unions and solidarity groups, from across Canada that have specific interest in development issues, and social justice in Sub-Saharan Africa. For details see CCIC, " Africa Canada Forum" <http://www.ccic.ca/e/003/acf_introduction.shtml> Accessed on May 22, 2009

[62] Interview with groups such as CUSO, Mine Watch Canada, and the Canadian Red Cross in Ottawa January 15-29, 2008

responsibility to provide development assistance to the African continent. The important role of Canadian civil society in promoting African issues is well captured by Andrew Clark who argues that "without strong support from the public to influence politicians and policymakers, Africa will slip even further off Canada's political and economic agenda" (Clark 1991: v-vi). On this account, the Canadian civil society appears to be the 'torch bearers' of humane internationalism and represent the "counter-consensus" in Canadian policy (Pratt 183/84 and 2007). The civil society put pressure on the Canadian government to honour its international commitments to alleviate poverty and create a just and equitable international order.[63] This suggests, as pointed out earlier that Canadian civil society groups play a key role in the construction of Africa as the other which is poor and conflict-ridden and thus needs Canada to uphold its moral obligation to provide development assistance. But as mentioned before, this perception or better still construction of Africa as the other has generated into a 'conservative Canadian foreign policy' that is narrowly focused on defining Africa 'as good-for aid' and lacking geopolitical and security interest for Canada.

As one of the key implementers of CIDA programmes in African states, Canadian NGOs, in collaboration with the media and Canadian churches used key events in Africa such as famine, HIV/Aids, and violent conflicts to call for more Canadian efforts to alleviate the suffering in African states. For example, the humanitarian and ethical motivation of Canadian civil society was brought to bear in the Canadian government's response to the devastating famine in the Horn of Africa in the 1980s. Civil society pressure in conjunction with the images on CBC Television, helped influence the Brian Mulroney government's response to the famine

---

[63] For a good discussion on the influences of Canadian civil society on Canada's aid programme see Pratt (2000)

in the Horn of Africa; the government sent food aid to millions of starving Ethiopians. As well, the Mulroney government established an African Emergency Fund to coordinate the Canadian efforts in the period when Canadian ODA as a percentage of GNP was declining[64] (Morrison 1998). Similarly, in the area of security, Canadian NGOs deliver humanitarian aid and as well put pressure on the Canadian government to do more in the peace process in places such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda.[65]

The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien consulted with Canadian civil society when the government was formulating Canada's response to the NEPAD initiative prior to the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002.[66] The significance of the consultation with the civil society groups lies in the fact that the NEPAD initiative and the transformation of the OAU to the AU in 2001 marked an important turning point for Canadian foreign policy in Africa. The consultation with the NGOs helped to strengthen the Liberal government's *new diplomacy approach* to foreign policy that aimed at generating the broadest input possible from the Canadian public in order to formulate Canadian foreign policy including that on Africa.[67] To reiterate a central argument thus far, the act of consulting with civil society on African issues is a clear demonstration of how Canadian governments are influenced by the dominant idea of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden which is reinforced by civil society.

In some respect, the influence of Canadian civil society in shaping Canadian government policy on NEPAD appeared more like 'window dressing'. That is although they reinforced the

---

[64] See, Brian Stewart, " When Brian Mulroney Was Great" (CBC, May 15, 2009)
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/05/14/f-vp-stewart.html> Accessed on May 22, 2009
[65] See Surendrini Wijeyaratne, " Canada's Support for Peace Processes in Africa" (CCIC, Africa Canada Forum, April 2009) <http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/003_acf_2009-04_notes_for_sw_public.pdf > Accessed on May 22, 2009
[66] For details see Government of Canada, "Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit" Ottawa: House of Commons (Chapter 3)
[67] See Axworthy, (2003); Keating, (2007); McRae, 2001; and Stairs, (2001) for insightful account on the new diplomacy.

dominant idea of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, civil society did not play much of a role in the final policy. As one NGO official remarked during my interviews in Ottawa, "even though the CCIC has a strong advocacy component in its work and leads the advocacy to influence the Canadian government to pay more attention to Africa, this does not always work".[68] Similarly, a senior official of the North-South Institute in Ottawa said that the think-tank tried to influence the Canadian government to establish long-term programmes to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI). However, the think-tank was not successful as the Chrétien government resorted to short term support for APSA and PSI through the five-year, $500 million CFA.[69] This suggests that the Canadian civil society had limited scope to influence the actual policy of the Canadian government. The participation of the NGOs in the policy formulation process may partially support the thesis on the democratisation of Canadian foreign policy (Nossal 1997; Stairs 1970), as the NGOs' contribution was limited in terms of the final policy and more importantly in terms of the political leadership that was needed to pursue the policy. The role of the state (government officials) appeared more crucial as was the case in the Harper government's selection of the twenty (20) new development partners in February 2009.

The February 2009 announcement by the International Cooperation Minister, Bev Oda, of the twenty new priority countries of focus for CIDA to implement what she called an "aid effectiveness agenda", also challenged the idea of greater democratisation in Canadian foreign policy by allowing wider public input in the policy-making process (Stairs 1998; English 1998; Lee 1998). Opposition critics and development NGOs have chided the Harper government for

---

[68] Interview with an official at CUSO, Ottawa, January 21, 2008
[69] Interview with North-South Institute official, Ottawa January 18, 2008

the lack of public debate on the selection of the development partners and the shift of the development focus from Africa to the Americas, which casts doubts about the extent of Canada's commitment to Africa's development. Arguably, the Harper government's apparent policy shift from Africa long has been anticipated by Canadian civil society groups. In my interviews with NGO officials in Ottawa in January 2008, that is more than a year before the announcement of the CIDA development partners, they raised concerns about the impact of the Harper government's 'withdrawal' from Africa on Canada's commitment to achieve the targets of the MDGs. As well, these NGO officials were concerned about the repercussions of the disengagement with Africa on Canada's image and reputation on the African continent.[70]

The dropping of African countries such as Rwanda and Malawi from the February 2009 CIDA priority country list, and the inclusion of countries such as Peru and Columbia, where Canada signed free trade agreements in 2008, raised concerns about the Harper government's shift to a trade-focused Canadian aid programme. The view of Gerry Barr, the President and CEO of the CCIC, sums-up the displeasure of the NGO community. He argues, "Africa is at the epicentre of global poverty. Several countries on the continent are being dropped in favour of countries that are not doing as badly. This shift causes Canada's leadership in Africa to be seriously questioned".[71] In describing the Harper policy, the NDP's CIDA critic, John Rafferty, echoed the views of the NGOs when he argued that "it's more a trade effectiveness agenda as opposed to an aid effectiveness agenda".[72] Similarly, the Liberal CIDA critic, Glen Pearson, said,

---

[70] This view was expressed by several NGO officials during my field work in Ottawa from January 16-20, 2008

[71] See, " Priority Countries for Canada's International Assistance Africa Left on the Sidelines (CCIC, Ottawa March 3, 2009) <http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/003_acf_2009-03_acf_priority_countries_africa.pdf > Accessed on August 1, 2009

[72] See, Lee Ber thiaume "CIDA Confirms Shift to Americas Fewer Countries" (Embassy , Ottawa February 25, 2009) <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/cida_shift_americas-2-25-2009> Accessed on March 6, 2009)

"why would you do it (focus development assistance) in a place where you have just signed a trade agreement? Many of the other countries in Africa that they have dropped... don't have that kind of blessing or we don't have those kinds of trade agreements with them".[73]

To be sure, these criticisms are legitimate in their own right, but two additional insights could be drawn from them. First, the criticism of the Harper government's CIDA priority list reinforces the construction of Africa as an impoverished continent that needs the benevolent support of Canadian development assistance. The criticism implies that Canada has a moral obligation which is derived from how Canada perceives itself as developed in relation to African states as poor. Indeed, by referring to Africa as the epicentre of global poverty for instance, Gerry Barr, inadvertently reinforces the construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden. It also raises concern about the implication of the Harper government's policy on Canada's moral leadership in providing development assistance to African states.   Lastly, the criticism of the Harper government's policy also exposes the limitations of public participation in the foreign policy-making process at least in the context of providing development assistance to Africa. The view of the Liberal CIDA critic, Glen Pearson, on the February 2009 CIDA countries of focus list is very instructive. He argued, "Obviously, they (the Harper government) have done a departmental review, but I am not sure that they've included the rest of us in parliament"[74] or the wider Canadian civil society. As Black (2009:48) argues, the Conservative government seems intent on breaking the traditional bipartisan approach to aid policy at least with regard to Africa. Thus at least in the current policy environment, these criticisms reinforce the view that

---

[73] Ibid
[74] Ibid

118

the government in power and the state bureaucracy have greater influence in the determination of Canadian foreign policy and upholding Canada's moral identity in Africa.

Canadian government departments such as DFAIT, CIDA, Department of Finance, and the Treasury Board of Canada, have played key roles in the formulation of Canadian government policy on Africa, notably in apartheid South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s; development aid, international debt within the framework of the IMF and World Bank; and Canada's relations within multilateral institutions such as the UN, Commonwealth, La Francophonie and the G8 (Clark 1991: 6-13; Morrison 1998). Furthermore, the Department of National Defence (DND), specifically, the Canadian forces have been involved in the promotion of peace and security on the African continent especially through peacekeeping and peacekeeping training.[75]

Within the context of their institutional mandates, government departments have contributed to sustaining Canada's activism, as well as promoting Canada's foreign policy objectives in Africa. In the context of the NEPAD, government departments played significant roles by supporting the Chrétien government's rhetoric of placing Africa at the centre of Canadian international cooperation. As one interviewee opined 'some bureaucrats have genuine concern and see Africa as important in Canadian foreign policy'.[76] In the absence of a coordinated and comprehensive policy on Africa; however, the Canadian government departments generally have fragmented relationships with African states. The different departments, such as DFAIT, DND, and CIDA, pursue different objectives which sometimes can

---

[75] See, Government of Canada < http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/highlights-faits/peace_course-cours_paix.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on January 12, 2009
[76] Interview with an official of North-South Institute, Ottawa, January 18, 2008

be contradictory and duplicated.[77] Without a comprehensive policy, the influence of bureaucrats weighed heavily on the nature and direction of the relationship between Canada and African states. Even with the shift of the Harper government's policy focus to Afghanistan and the Americas, some senior bureaucrats in CIDA and DFAIT argue for the need to provide more development assistance and sustain the support for the development programmes that were initiated under the CFA.[78] In many ways this would sustain CIDA's work in Africa which provided an additional motivation for the Canadian leadership on NEPAD in the G8.

Some critics (Nossal 1988; SSCFAIT 2007) might see the bureaucratic support for the CFA or the provision of development assistance as an attempt to maintain the relevance of CIDA. Despite its challenges, CIDA has been instrumental in bringing development to many local communities in some African states and this has enhanced Canada's moral image on the African continent. The introduction of NEPAD provided a new opportunity to reinforce CIDA's work and to improve Canada's image in Africa. In sum, the Chrétien government had both the moral and the practical support generated from over forty years of CIDA and Canadian NGOs' work in Africa, as well as other departmental level engagements to be a leader on NEPAD in the G8.

The PMO and key individuals who are close to the Prime Minister play a central role in shaping and sustaining Canadian foreign policy in Africa. As John Noble (2008: 38) argues "the prime minister always has been the key player in the determination of Canadian foreign policy from the time of Sir John A. MacDonald to Stephen Harper". Arguably, the PMO is the single most important institution that reinforces the construction of Africa as poor and upholding

---

[77] Several officials of the NGOs I interviewed in Ottawa expressed this frustration.
[78] This emerged in my discussions with CIDA and DFAIT officials, as well as officials of the North-South Institute in Ottawa on January 16 and 18, 2008

Canada's moral identity in Africa. The role of the Prime Minister is particularly important, first because there is no overarching Canadian foreign policy on Africa, and second because Canada's Africa policy is driven by events on the African continent. By operating within the confines of the dominant idea of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, the 'personal interest' of the Prime Minister in Africa has a strong influence on Canada's activism in Africa. In other words, even though events in Africa—such as poverty, conflict and famine—are necessary to instigate Canada's response, they are not sufficient factors to dictate an active Canadian policy in Africa. When the foreign policy interest of the Prime Minister is focused on Africa it provides the impetus for an active Canadian engagement in Africa. As one DFAIT official stated during my interviews in Ottawa "when the Prime Minister leads on Africa, it makes a big difference".[79]

Civil society played an important role, but it was the keen interest and the leadership of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney that helped to sustain Canadian policy during apartheid in South Africa as well as in Canada's response to the famine in the Horn of Africa in the mid-1980s (Brown 1989; Morrison 1998). Similarly, the introduction of NEPAD was an important moment in Africa and Canada's support did not arise out of an already made Canadian policy but through the personal leadership of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien who spearheaded the efforts in the G8 to develop the G8 Action Plan in response to the priorities that were set out in the NEPAD strategic framework document[80] (Black 2005; Black 2009). As a senior AU official said in my interviews related to Canada's support for the peace and security capacity building of APSA, "Canada supports the AU because Prime Minister Chrétien once said Canada has a moral

---

[79] Interview with DFAIT official Ottawa, January 16, 2008
[80] See Message from the Minister for International Cooperation, Canada fund for Africa: New Vision New Partnership. Also see pp2-3

obligation to assist Africa".[81] Perhaps Chrétien 'believed' or at least was influenced by the dominant idea of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden. Chrétien addressed the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa and as well, from April 3-13, 2002, he visited Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa to consult with African leaders on NEPAD and the G8 response to it.[82] At least, rhetorically, both Mulroney's and Chrétien's engagement in Africa stands in contrast with the current Harper government's policy that has shifted from Africa to the Americas and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the Harper government's policy is a strong indication that the prime minister matters when it comes to understanding Canadian policy towards the African continent. As David Black puts it succinctly," that Harper has little personal background on, or interest in, Africa is fairly well established. Indeed His trip to Uganda and Tanzania for the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was his first to the continent" (Black 2009:46). Black argues further that Harper's lack of interest in Africa is supplemented by his pro-American/Western "worldview" and his disdain for special interest groups and "celebrity diplomats" such as Bob Geldof, who champions the cause to alleviate poverty in Africa. As well, Harper's intellectual views as a theoretical economic conservative would incline him to be sceptical of the usefulness of aid, which has been at the core of Canada's humane internationalist policy in Africa (Ibid: 46-51).

For Prime Minister Chrétien, the G8 provided an important avenue for Canada to reassert its moral leadership on African issues. Canada's leadership on Africa in the G8 is not new; however, under Chrétien, Canada began to forge close relations with Africa's regional

---

[81] Interview with a senior AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008
[82] See DFAIT, " A New Partnership for Africa's Development" (DFAIT, April 15, 2004) <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/photos_pm_africas-en.asp> Accessed on May 25, 2009

organisations, especially, the AU and the ECOWAS. Over the years Canada has used its membership in the G8 to lead on issues that are relevant to Africa's development, such as on debt cancellation, democracy, human rights, and apartheid in South Africa. Prime Minister Trudeau took the opportunity of Canada's hosting of the 1981 G8 Summit in Ottawa to make North-South relations a central focus of the Summit's agenda. Similarly, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney used the G8 as a platform for Canada's anti-apartheid policy and spearheaded efforts to reform agricultural trade as well as to strengthen multilateral agreements on Third World debt, all of which affected African development (Gotlieb 1988). As a result of these leadership initiatives, "Canada came to be seen by many Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as the spokesman of their interests at the (G8) Summits" (Gotlieb 1988).[83]

It was this tradition of supporting issues of particular interest to African states in the G8 and the positive image it created for Canada that persuaded the Chrétien government to support the NEPAD in the G8. One can also agree with Black (2005: 4-5) that Chrétien's support for NEPAD was driven by his quest to build a legacy for his leadership as a Canadian prime minister. Yet, one cannot ignore the interconnection of Chrétien's leadership with Canada's image in Africa. Therefore, in view of the general trend of Canadian policy in Africa—being event-driven with the support of the Prime Minister—it can be argued that it was Chrétien's 'personal interest' in Africa that made the big difference in Canada's active support for the NEPAD initiative in the G8. The G8 and the NEPAD provided an opportunity for the Chretien government to reassert Canada's moral identity. Although the Chrétien government almost

---

[83] See Gotlieb. A. (May, 1988). Canada and the Economic Summits: Power and Responsibility. Center for International Studies, University of Toronto Bissell Paper No. 1
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/gotlieb1988/gotpap.htm> Accessed on March 30, 2009

abandoned Africa in the 1990s with the deep cut in development assistance, Chrétien's interest in Africa was rejuvenated perhaps to repair "our (Canada's) credibility (that) has been hurt by sharp decline in ODA commitments to Africa during the past decade" (HCSCFAIT: 28). It was not surprising as Robert Fowler argued that "the Prime Minister ensured that African concerns would have their full place at Kananaskis" (Fowler 2003: 219).

As the host of the G8 Summit in 2002, Prime Minister Chrétien spearheaded the efforts to develop the G8 Africa Action Plan in response to the priorities that were set out in the NEPAD *Strategic Framework Document*.[84] Chrétien appointed one of the most skilled and experienced Canadian diplomats, Robert Fowler, as the Sherpa for the Kananaskis Summit and his Personal Representative for Africa. Fowler chaired the creation of the G8 Africa Action Plan[85] (Fowler 2003). The appointment of Fowler was a clear demonstration of the Chrétien government's renewed interests in Africa. Fowler's expertise went beyond his diplomatic skills as he had indepth knowledge and interest in African issues. His appointment was strategic and added momentum to 'the new beginning' of Canada's relations in Africa in the twenty-first century. As noted earlier, this was necessary as Canada's relations in Africa had suffered because of the budget cuts to development assistance in the 1990s (Canadian Development Report 2003: 78; Morrison 1998; Tomlin et al 2007; Tomlinson 1991; Pratt 2000; Morrison

---

[84] See Message from the Minister for International Cooperation, Canada fund for Africa: New Vision New Partnership. Also see pp2-3

[85] During his 38 year Public Service career, Bob Fowler was the Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Ministers Trudeau, Turner and Mulroney, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Canada's longest serving Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador to Italy and the 3 Rome-Based UN Food Agencies, Sherpa for the Kananaskis G8 Summit (for which he chaired the creation of the Africa Action Plan), and the Personal Representative for Africa of Prime Ministers Chrétien, Martin and Harper. Mr. Fowler retired from the Federal Public Service in the fall of 2006, and is now a Senior Fellow at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Interview with Mr. Fowler, Ottawa, January 24, 2008

2000; Black 2000 and 2001). As part of his experience on Africa, Fowler was the chair of the

Angola Sanctions Committee that was set up during Canada's presidency in the UN Security

Council in the 1990s.[86] The Angola Sanctions Committee was put in place to limit the Angola

rebel movement, UNITA's, access to arms, petroleum, and revenue from illicit trade in

diamonds after UNITA abandoned the peace process in Angola. Through the efforts of Prime

Minister Chrétien, Canada became the 'spokestate' for Africa in the G8 and inspired Africa's

friends throughout the world to embrace the new vision and partnership that was aimed at

lifting Africa from a cycle of dependency and put it on the path of sustainable peace and

development.[87]

Some officials of Canadian NGOs and think-tanks I interviewed in Ottawa expressed the

view that some prominent Canadian statesmen with keen interest in Canada's engagement in

Africa, played crucial roles in the Chrétien government's foreign policy agenda on Africa.[88] The

experience and interest of these statesmen were important resources that boosted Prime

Minister Chrétien's policy on Africa. They argued that Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, the Force

Commander of the UNAMIR during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 was a force behind Canadian

activism in Africa especially in the area of peace and security promotion. In his capacity as a

Senator and a former commander of UNAMIR, Gen. Dallaire assisted in the Liberal

government's response in the ongoing conflict in Darfur and has the led advocacy especially to

sustain and improve on the Canadian government response under the Conservative

government. The influence of key personalities such as Fowler and Gen. Dallaire cannot be

---

[86] See Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security. p.9
[87] See Message from the Minister for International Cooperation, Canada fund for Africa: New Vision New Partnership. Also see pp2-3
[88] A host on Canadian civil societies I interviewed shared this view. Worthy to mention are officials of PeaceBuild, and North South Institute.

underestimated in the sense that they were close to the 'heart of policy-making'—the prime minister's office—therefore it could be said that they had significant input in the Chrétien government's policy in Africa (Fowler 2003). In the absence of a comprehensive Canadian policy on Africa, the ideas, experience, and reputation of these personalities on African issues formed a vital ingredient to assist the Chrétien government's activism in Africa.

In some respects, Chrétien's commitment went beyond rhetoric in terms of upholding Canada's moral identity and interest in Africa. It was practical in some sense as the House of Commons passed the *Canada and Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act* on May 13, 2004, which was the first legislation of its kind that allowed drug companies to provide low cost anti-HIV/AIDS drugs to African countries.[89] While the Chretien government put in place a $500 million CFA to assist in the implementation of the priorities that were set out in the NEPAD document, Canada's support for NEPAD was not based on purely altruistic motives. The objectives of NEPAD were consistent with the Liberal government's foreign policy agenda. Despite the construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, the values and norms of NEPAD were embedded in the neoliberal philosophy of political and economic development, which was consistent with Canadian foreign policy objectives as outlined in Canadian foreign policy statements including the 1995 *Canada in the World*, the April 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* as well as the *Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratisation, and Good Governance*.[90] The Canadian

---

[89] See Canada and the G8 Africa Action Plan: Maintaining the Momentum. P3

[90] See Government of Canada, " Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratisation and Good Governance" <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/HRDG2/$file/HRDG-Policy-nophoto-e.pdf)>Accessed on August 22, 2008; Government of Canada, "Canada in the World: Government Statement" Ottawa: DFAIT, 1995 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp> Accessed

government's support for NEPAD provided an opportunity for Canadian businesses to invest in Africa and promote Canada's economic interest on the continent. This is will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has discussed some of the major sources of Canadian government policy in Africa. Canada does not have an overarching policy towards Africa, and Canadian government policy, which is event-driven, is based on the construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden. Although one cannot deny the reality of poverty and conflict in Africa, the construction of Africa in this way has helped to sustain Canada's interest in development assistance, which is interlinked with Canada's moral identity in Africa.

Africa has featured on Canadian foreign policy agenda over several decades; yet, the continent has been treated as peripheral to 'real' Canadian foreign policy interests in the global arena. On this account, the shift of the Harper government's development assistance focus to the Americas and Afghanistan should not come as a surprise. Indeed, the shift of policy could be explained partly due to the change of government from the Liberals to the Conservatives. Nonetheless, it appears more as rooted in the character of Canada's policy which is often event-driven as well as constructing Africa as poor. As such, the Harper government's decision to maintain the Martin government's promise to double aid to Africa fed into the same cycle of Africa as poor. By focusing on development assistance, Africa is generally portrayed as a non-strategic geographical space on the Canadian foreign policy agenda. Except perhaps for South

127

Africa where the Canadian government had a clear cut policy on apartheid especially in the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian state leaders have shied away from designing a more innovative and comprehensive foreign policy on Africa.

Finally, although there are established foreign policy institutions such as DFAIT and CIDA, as well as Canada's multilateral associations that helped to determine Canadian policy in Africa, the role of the prime minister is the key factor for gauging Canadian activism on the African scene as demonstrated by the Trudeau, Mulroney and Chrétien governments' engagement in Africa. Despite the key role of Canadian civil society groups in espousing the dominant idea of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, John Noble was right when he argued that "the prime minister always has been the key player in the determination of Canadian foreign policy from the time of Sir John A. MacDonald to Stephen Harper" (Noble 2008: 38). The Chrétien and Martin government's support for the NEPAD initiative was a prime example of the 'supremacy' of the Prime Minister to push the foreign policy agenda forward in Africa. This suggests that when the Prime Minister's interest lies elsewhere, Canadian policy in Africa (including Canada's image) suffers as evident in the shift of the Harper government to the America's and Afghanistan. Yet, at least within the context of the NEPAD, Canada's portrayal of a moral image in Africa was not devoid of the pursuit of economic interest. The next chapter provides a detailed discussion of Canada's response to the NEPAD initiative.

Chapter Four

Canada and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

Introduction

The primary objective of this chapter is to discuss the NEPAD initiative within the broader context of human security, and the Canadian government's response to it through the CFA. This chapter provides the context for Chapters Five and Six where I discuss the Canadian government's support for the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building, respectively. The larger part of the argument in this chapter is that the neoliberal principles that underpinned the NEPAD and the opportunity it offered for the advancement of Canada's economic interests as well as the promotion of the human security agenda, served as the motivating factors for Canada's leadership in the G8 which, in turn, led to the establishment of the CFA. The CFA was framed in the context of development assistance and supported the Canadian government's human security agenda, which gave a new dimension to Canadian foreign policy and reinforced a positive image of Canada on the African scene. While the Canadian government's rhetoric on NEPAD suggested that Africa was at the center of Canada's international cooperation, in reality Africa occupied a peripheral status in Canadian foreign policy.

The chapter provides a brief overview of the NEPAD as a useful context to understand the Canadian government's response. This is followed by a more detailed analysis of the CFA and its implications for human security. It should be noted that the purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the success and failures of the NEPAD or the process leading to the creation of

the CFA. Rather, I analyse the political, economic and security factors that shaped Canada's response to the NEPAD initiative, while shedding some light on the role of human security in Canada's policy in Africa.

A Brief Overview of the NEPAD

The NEPAD initiative is a vision and strategic framework for Africa's political and economic renewal.[1] It is a merger of two earlier plans, the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan. The NEPAD was initiated by four African heads of state, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. It was officially adopted by the 37th Summit of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. The NEPAD became a programme of the AU when the OAU was transformed to the AU in 2002. Since its establishment, the NEPAD was managed by a secretariat that was separate from the AU's organisational structure. The NEPAD secretariat is being transformed into an executive agency within the AU system with the mandate to implement projects based on continental policies that will be initiated by the AU Commission (Blame 2009).

Among its many objectives, NEPAD seeks to end the marginalisation of Africa in the global economy, eradicate poverty, put African countries individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth and development, and accelerate the empowerment of women (NEPAD 2001: 1). The NEPAD is rooted in eight principles that have implications for the protection of human security in Africa. These principles are the promotion of:

---

[1] This is the summary of what NEPAD is about. See<(http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php> For a good genealogy of the NEPAD initiative, see Adesina (2004 and 2006) and Smith (2006)

"good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development; African ownership and leadership as well as broad and deep participation by all sectors of society; anchoring the development of Africa on its resources and resourcefulness of its people; partnership between and amongst African peoples; acceleration of regional and continental integration; building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent; forging a new partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world; and ensuring that all partnerships with NEPAD are linked to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other agreed development goals and targets".[2]

In the context of these principles, NEPAD is a promise by African leaders to promote democracy, human rights, rule of law, and peace and security in return for increased foreign investment and trade that are seen as the core of the solution to Africa's development challenges (Owusu 2006; Smith 2006). African leaders called on the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations to, among other things, take up responsibilities and obligations to promote free trade in accordance with WTO rules; accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries; meet the ODA target of 0.7 per cent of GNP; facilitate partnerships with countries, pharmaceuticals and civil society to provide existing drugs to fight infectious diseases; and provide material support for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. In this regards, the NEPAD seeks to 'correct' the legacy of colonialism and the workings of the international economic system that have led to the marginalisation of Africa in order to improve the quality of life of Africa's people (NEPAD 2001: 5, 28- 54).

---

[2] See " NEPAD in Brief" <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php> Accessed on August 14, 2008

From a (human) security perspective, the NEPAD was anchored in the shared responsibilities and the mutual benefits that security and development in Africa will bring to Africans and their partners abroad. The NEPAD document recognised that Africa has tremendous human, cultural, and natural resources that when harnessed could make it a significant player in the global economy. In this light, the NEPAD document draws a link between Africa's security and global security by arguing that the collapse of more states in Africa as a result of poverty and violent conflict, will not only threaten Africans but will also have enormous impact on global security and economy (NEPAD 2001: 2-8,52). The NEPAD principles suggest the path to prosperity, peace, and security in Africa lies in the promotion of democratic values and good governance.

For African leaders, a democratic Africa will become one of the central pillars of world democracy and would allow the world to divert the resources that are being used to resolve conflicts for meaningful development activities on the continent (ibid). In short, African leaders argued that the development of Africa will help to reduce the level of global social exclusion and resolve a potential source of global social instability. The implementation of the NEPAD will serve the mutual interest of Africa and its partners. As pointed out by NEPAD's Executive Secretary, Dr. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, "this (NEPAD) is not charity but it is a matter of mutual interest. Take Europeans for example, they know that the cost of immigration control weighs heavily on their public resources. And if they help African countries in development activities, they will reduce the cost they incur on curbing immigration" (Blame 2009: 60).

One of the key innovations in the NEPAD that demonstrate the seriousness of the commitment of African leaders to turn a new page on Africa's development and security

challenges was the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a voluntary African self-monitoring instrument with the mandate of ensuring that participating countries conformed to the mutually agreed values of political, economic, and good corporate governance, and socio-economic development, which are the four governance pillars of the NEPAD.[3] Thus the main purpose of the APRM process is to ascertain the progress that participating states are making towards democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market reforms. The APRM does not impose sanctions or coercive measures on states that performed poorly in the four governance areas (Killander 2008; Stultz 2007; Kanbur 2004). Rather, the APRM encourages the sharing of experiences of participating states, reinforces best practices, identifies deficiencies, and assesses the need for capacity building in the states that willingly submit to the process.[4] In short therefore the APRM hopes to encourage good governance in African states with the sole aim of ensuring that the objectives of the NEPAD are achieved.

The APRM review process consists of country self-assessment, and a five-stage international review process that comprises of background study, country review mission, country review report, discussion of the report in the APRM Heads of State Forum, and disseminating the report to regional and sub-regional institutions including the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (Killander 2008). The APRM is led by a seven-member Panel of Eminent Persons who must be of high moral stature and demonstrated commitment to the Ideals of Pan Africanism. As well, panel members must have expertise in the four governance areas of the NEPAD: political governance; macro-

---

[3] See NEPAD's official website <http://www.nepad.org/aprm/> Accessed on September 3, 2008
[4] See " Documents and Speeches: 38th Ordinary session of Assemble of Heads of State and Government of the OAU: African Peer Review Mechanism" AHSG/235(XXXVIII) (Durban, South Africa 8 July 2002) <http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/aprm.htm> Accessed on June 11, 2009

economic management; public financial management; and corporate governance. The composition of the Panel of Eminent Persons reflects regional balance, gender equality, and cultural diversity in Africa.[5] Currently (in January 2010), twenty nine states have voluntarily joined the APRM and are at different stages of the five stages international review process. Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda are the first countries that have completed the review process (Killander 2008; Stultz 2007).[6] At the practical level, this demonstrates the willingness of African states to deepen democracy and promote human rights and human security on the continent. Although the APRM was not designed as a conflict prevention mechanism to deal with intrastate or interstate conflicts, it has such potential as it helps to promote human rights and human security by assisting member states to develop and implement policies that have the support of citizens and respond to their needs.[7]

The 'extravagant' vision of the African leaders attracted widespread support in the corridors of power in developed countries as the NEPAD was hailed as containing a new message of hope for Africa to reclaim its rightful place in human history. At the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, the G8 called the NEPAD, "a bold and clear-sighted vision of Africa's development" (Africa Action Plan 2002:1). The G8 promised to build and support a new partnership with African countries and their own people on the basis of mutual responsibility and respect to

---

[5] The current (January 2010) members of the Panel are: Mrs Marie Angelique Savane (Senegal)-Representing West Africa; Prof. Adebayo Adedeji (Nigeria)-Representing West Africa; Amb Bethuel Kiplagat (Kenya) Representing East Africa; Dr. Graca Machel (Mozambique)-Representing Southern Africa; Mr. Seghir Babes (Algeria)-Representing North Africa; Dr. Dorothy Njeuma (Cameroon)-Representing Central Africa; and Dr. Chris Stals (South Africa)-Representing Southern Africa. See, Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) <http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3945&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3#pax> Accessed on January 12, 2010

[6] The countries are: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Cameroon, Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Egypt, Benin, Malawi, Lesotho, Tanzania, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Djibouti and Mauritania. See <http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_id=3945&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3>
[7] Ibid

implement the priorities of the NEPAD. The G8 adopted over 100 specific commitments that reflected the NEPAD priorities in areas such as trade and investment, debt relief, health, and peace and security (Africa Action Plan 2002). More specifically, the G8 welcomed the APRM and recognised its potential for promoting democracy, human rights, and human security in Africa. In this light, the G8 promised to, among other things, support "African efforts to promote reconciliation and to ensure accountability for violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including genocide, crimes against humanity and other war crimes" (Africa Action Plan 2002:7). Nonetheless, the euphoria that greeted the NEPAD at the Kananaskis Summit has waxed and waned over the years. Despite the wide range of commitments that were made in Kananaskis, the G8 members appear more interested in doubling aid to Africa, showing half-hearted commitment to build peace and security capacity, and improve health and water. Other equally important issues such as trade and investment—especially the call on G8 members to reduce agricultural subsidies that hurt African farmers, as well as debt relief does not receive firm attention in the G8 Summit agendas (G8 Research Group 2010). This gives some credence to the critical voices against the NEPAD initiative.

Some critics argue that despite claims of being a 'new development strategy', and the support it received especially in the G8, the NEPAD contains several weaknesses that may undermine the achievement of its core objectives of promoting, democracy, people-centred development, and ending the marginalisation of Africa in the global economy. For instance some scholars (Taylor 2006; Taylor 2005; Taylor and Nel 2002; Owusu 2006) argue that the G8 accepted the NEPAD primarily because it communicated the hegemonic neoliberal discourse of the free market economy and liberal democracy that are being promoted by international

financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this vein, NEPAD plays into the hands of the industrialised countries. African leaders who initiated the NEPAD were uncritical of neoliberal policies despite the negative impact of globalisation on African economies.

With the APRM, African leaders promised to liberalise their markets and promote democracy in return for foreign investments. Nonetheless, critics (Taylor 2005) argue that the APRM lacks 'teeth' to enforce its decisions on African states to promote and deepen the norms of human rights, the rule of law and democracy as the APRM relies on the voluntary participation of AU member states. This criticism has some value in the case of Rwanda, Ghana, and Kenya where key civil society groups were not included in the county review process (Killander 2008; Stultz 2007; Jordaan 2006 and 2007). Especially in Rwanda, Eduard Jordaan argues that that country's self-assessment report marginalised civil society groups that were critical of government policies. Moreover, despite the crucial role that the security forces—the military and police—could play to maintain law and order, and promote democracy, human rights and freedoms as the country recuperates from the 1994 genocide, they were excluded from the self-assessment process. However, the APRM Heads of State Forum, the highest body of the APRM, has ratified the Rwanda government's programme of action, which largely ignores issues of democracy and freedoms. This therefore raises questions about the value of the APRM to deepen democracy and economic development in Africa (Jordaan 2006 and2007). In short, the APRM appears more as 'window dressing' and a 'self-congratulatory instrument' that masks the real governance and economic situation in African states.

Furthermore, critics of NEPAD argue that African leaders failed to blame global political and economic forces for the unequal power relations between African states and the developed

world that, in turn, undermine development and security on the African continent (Taylor 2006; Taylor 2005; Taylor and Nel 2002; Owusu 2006). The idea of creating a 'partnership' with the developed countries was based on an idealistic or false understanding of the impact of power in the international system. In reality, NEPAD proposed a partnership based on unequal power relations and appeared more as conforming to the prevailing hegemonic neoliberal order rather than as an innovative programme to lift Africans from poverty and insecurity. In terms of its substance, some have argued that the NEPAD was not very different from Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)[8] that were imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on African states in the 1980s (Hope Sr. 1999; Owusu 2003 and 2006; Moss 2007). Like SAPs, NEPAD was based on neoliberal economic strategy—free market—that critics argued undermined the eradication of poverty and prevented an end to the marginalisation of Africa in the global economy. As Lesufi (2004 and 2006) puts it, economic strategies such as NEPAD that are premised on promoting the private sector, easing capital flows and promoting free trade will only serve to deepen the inequalities that already exist in the global economy.

Criticisms were also levelled at the process leading to the formulation of NEPAD. There was no broad consultation with African people especially women and civil society groups whose interest NEPAD proposed to address. The top-down policy approach by the African leaders to some extent 'de-legitimised' the NEPAD in the eyes of the public as it elicited protest in states leading it, particularly in South Africa (Adesina 2004 and 2006; Lesufi 2004 and 2006; Mercer et al 2003; Taylor 2005). NEPAD proposed to eradicate poverty; however, Lesufi (2004) points out that the social forces behind its formulation in South Africa, which was one of the key

---

[8] For a good assessment of SAPs, see O'Brien (Summer-Fall 1995)

architects, was the multinational corporations. He argues further that "in reality, a lot of what NEPAD was calling for was not just an expression of a wish, but importantly a tacit reference to the emerging practice of these corporations" (Ibid: 821).

The neoliberal message of the NEPAD was couched not to meet the specific interest of the poor in Africa. It was rather to serve as a means to transform and integrate the 'African bourgeoisie' into the global economy. The NEPAD provided a platform to increase the interaction between African businesses and their counterparts abroad. As Embong (2000: 990) points out, "today transnational class relations cannot be ignored. Just as capital, production, labour and culture have become globalised classes too are increasingly becoming transnational". Globalisation has led to the emergence of transnational elites in Africa, and through NEPAD, African leaders and these elites pushed for greater integration of Africa into the global capitalist order (Taylor and Nel 2002).

As a 'made-in-Africa policy', NEPAD upheld the promotion of democracy, human rights, good political and corporate governance and the rule of law as the requirements for socio-economic growth and sustainable development.[9] But NEPAD also revealed the importance that African leaders attached to market-oriented policies for political and economic development and the extent to which the neoliberal paradigm has gained influence among African elites. As Ian Taylor has rightly pointed out, the values and norms associated with the liberal prescriptions of NEPAD is the starting point of engagement between African elites and their Western counterparts (Taylor 2005: 15). In this context, it was natural for the Chrétien government to support NEPAD since the government also promoted liberal values not only for

---

[9] See NEPAD Document (October 2001) pp 16-20

"their own sake but also our (Canadian) values and rights will not be safeguarded if they are not enshrined through the international environment".[10] In this sense NEPAD provided the platform for Canada to pursue its foreign policy objectives in Africa.

The Road to Kananaskis

The Chrétien government demonstrated its commitment to the NEPAD initiative prior to the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis. In compliance with the 2001 Genoa declaration of G8 member states to push the NEPAD process forward,[11] Prime Minister Chrétien appointed Ambassador Robert Fowler as his Personal Representative for Africa.[12] Fowler consulted with African leaders, other G8 members' Representatives for Africa[13], and civil society organisations to develop the G8 Africa Action Plan that was approved by the G8 at the Kananaskis Summit. As well, Fowler undertook advocacy in Canadian universities and other public forums to create awareness about the NEPAD and to receive input from Canadians for the G8 Africa Action Plan (Kirton and Hajnal 2006: 294).[14]

The commitment of the Chrétien government to the NEPAD initiative was further demonstrated by the appearance of Fowler as the first witness before the House of Commons

---

[10] See Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap5-en.asp>Accessed on August 22, 2008

[11] The G8 members declared that "To take this process (NEPAD) forward, each of us will designate a high level personal representative to liase with committed African Leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G8 Summit next year under the leadership of Canada." <http://www.g8.gc.ca/2001genoa/july-21-01-1-en.asp> Accessed on August 20, 2008

[12] See the 2001 Genoa Compliance Report: Africa Action Plan <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2002compliance/2002reportCompAfrica.pdf> Accessed on August 20, 2008. P.33

[13] The G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

[14] Also see for instance " G8 Representative Speaks" (McGill Reporter Volume 34 Number 16, May 9, 2002) <http://www.mcgill.ca/reporter/34/16/fowler/> Accessed on September 2, 2008

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (HCSCFAIT) that authored the report, *Securing Progress for Africa and the World: a Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit*. As the name of the report suggests, the HCSCFAIT provided additional momentum to the Canadian government to accept the NEPAD Leaders' call to the world to join in a new vision of partnership for the promotion of sustainable growth, peace and development on the African continent.   In short, Canada ensured that the Genoa declaration that the G8 will approve a "concrete Action Plan"[15] in response to NEPAD became a reality at the Kananaskis Summit.

The leadership and the commitment of the Chrétien government to Africa can be appreciated more when placed within the context of the prevailing international security environment at the time. The Kananaskis Summit was held less than a year after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which led to the Bush administrations' global war on terror, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, Chrétien ensured that Africa and NEPAD received a full day of the two day summit, and for the first time, African leaders (the architects of NEPAD)—Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa, Wade of Senegal and Bouteflika of Algeria—were invited to participate in the discussions in summit (Fowler 2003; Black 2005; Smith 2006). Canada had three main priorities at the Kananaskis Summit—fostering conditions for shared global recovery and advancement; ensuring a constructive G8 response to Africa and to NEPAD as a work in progress; and terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (HCSCFAIT 2002: ix-xvii). It is noteworthy that the HCSCFAIT called for Canada's leadership on eight issues for an effective G8 Action Plan for the NEPAD. These

---

[15] See , " Genoa Plan for Africa" (Genoa July 21, 2001) <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2001/genoa_plan_africa-plan_genes_afrique.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on September 2, 2008

were peacebuilding as a condition for sustainable human development; providing aid that benefits the poorest; supporting public health and education priorities; reforming international trade, investment and finance; improving democratic governance and fighting corruption; making development environmentally sustainable; building a true partnership with civil society; and evaluating mutual responsibilities and accountabilities (HCSCFAIT 2002).

The translation of the leadership proposals into full scale policy action can be questionable; however, to some extent Canada did put its words into action and incorporated the eight issues in the CFA (CIDA 2003 and 2004). Not since the end of apartheid in South Africa, had a Canadian government demonstrated such keen interest by soliciting public support and devoting so many resources to African issues as the Chrétien government did with NEPAD in 2002. The NEPAD provided an opportunity for Canada to strengthen its relations with African states.

The Canada Fund for Africa

The G8 Africa Action Plan that came out of the Kananaskis Summit proposed to establish enhanced partnership with African countries based on "measured results" in good governance, the rule of law, investing in the people and embarking on policies that will promote economic growth and alleviate poverty (Africa Action Plan 2002:1). Specifically, as mentioned above, the G8 Africa Action Plan included over 100 commitments to Africa in the areas of peace and security; governance including the African Peer Review Mechanism; trade and investment; debt relief; health; education; agriculture; and water resource management.[16] In accordance with its

---

[16] For a detailed account see the G8 Africa Action Plan

G8 commitments, the Canadian government established its own project-oriented fund, the five-year $500 million CFA, to support the development and security priorities in the NEPAD.[17]

The CFA operated at two levels by supporting the capacity building of African institutions and supporting the programmes that were implemented by these institutions. More importantly, the CFA was rooted in a "common vision based on mutual goals, mutual respect, and mutual accountability" for Africa's development, peace and security (CIDA 2003:2). The CFA complemented CIDA's programmes on the MDGs by supporting thirty three initiatives[18] in the areas of governance, health, agriculture, environment and water resource management, trade and investment, information and communications technologies, and peace and security issues. The Canadian government's support focused on countries that were making significant progress towards democracy, human rights, and good governance.[19]

Canada's 'new partnership' with African states and regional organisations to implement the NEPAD priorities marked a significant shift in Canadian foreign policy that was hitherto concentrated on Canadian-driven development assistance. Canadian aid through the CFA appeared to be 'more sensitive' to the needs of African states and peoples in accordance with the principles of NEPAD and consistent with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

---

[17] Apart from the Canada fund for Africa, the Canadian government also initiated policies of debt-relief and opened its market to African countries to enable them to implement their programmes under NEPAD. However, the CFA stands out as the Canadian response to NEPAD.

[18] See the appendix of CIDA 2003 and 2006, for a summary of the projects that were supported by the Canada fund for Africa.

[19] For details see CIDA Announces New Development Partners: Developing Countries Where Canada Can Make a Difference" (Ottawa: CIDA News release April 19, 2005) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7>Accessed on August 25, 2008. Also see Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratisation and Good Governance" (Ottawa, CIDA December, 1996) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218124821-P93> Accessed on August 25, 2008.

that include principles such as local ownership, and mutual accountability.[20] This is not to suggest a denial of the pursuit of Canadian political, economic or security interests in Africa. Indeed development assistance has over the years provided the means through which Canada pursues its own diverse interests in Africa including the promotion of trade and investment, human rights and human security. Yet, in contrast to the past when policies were imposed under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, the goal of the CFA was to foster African innovation and economic growth, strengthen African institutions and improve the wellbeing of future generations as Africans take leadership and ownership of their own development (CIDA 2003; CIDA 2006). In my interviews in the AU and ECOWAS, African officials agreed that Canada does not impose its ideas on these organisations through the support they receive from the CFA.[21] Thus for its establishment as well as orientation, the CFA contributed to the reification of Canada as a moral state that cared about the interests of Africans.

The CFA officially ended on March 31, 2008. However, some of the projects that the fund supported including the Africa water facility, Multi-donor Water Partnership Programme, NEPAD infrastructure project preparation facility, ECOWAS institutional capacity building for peace and security, and the Canada investment fund for Africa were transferred to CIDA's Pan-African Programme after the CFA Secretariat was disbanded by the Harper government on September 30, 2008.[22]

---

[20] For detail of the Paris Declaration, see <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> Accessed on August 8, 2008
[21] Interview with AU and ECOWAS officials in Addis Ababa and Abuja ,February-May, 2008
[22] See , " Canada fund for Africa" (Ottawa CIDA June 19, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-4465251-H54> Accessed on August 15, 2008

The CIDA report, *Focus on the Future: The Legacy of the Canada fund for Africa*[23] outlined the initial achievements and the challenges of the CFA as well as the prospects for the future. According to CIDA, although the impact of the investments of the CFA will become evident over the years, concrete results were achieved that demonstrated Canada's commitment to sustainable growth, development and peace in Africa. The CFA helped in the construction of new clinics, the provision of water and sanitation, containment of polio, the integration of communications and information technology into healthcare, and increased trade, investment and business in counties such as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Benin and Togo (CIDA 2006).[24] Specifically, in the area of health, Canada provided funding for research in biosciences and HIV vaccine.

Through a multiplier effect, the CFA provided a platform for other donor investments and partnerships in new areas such the APRM. As CIDA pointed out,[25] the support for the training of women, the youth, and parliamentarians helped to increase public participation in the APRM which measures the progress of good governance in African countries. Furthermore, the creation of the $100 million Canada Investment Fund for Africa (CIFA)[26], which was a public-private risk capital fund that combined profitable investment with corporate social responsibility, increased Canadian investment in African businesses. The CIFA was leveraged to raise an additional $111 million from the private sector for a total of US$211 million. The CIFA disbursed over $160 million for investments in mining, oil and gas, paper manufacturing,

---

[23] The report can seen found at " Focus on the Future: The Legacy of the Canada Fund for Africa" (Ottawa CIDA June 19, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/MAR-619131753-NAQ#4> Accessed on August 15, 2008
[24] Ibid
[25] See CIDA, " Focus on the future; The legacy of the Canada Fund for Africa"
[26] This fund is part of the Canada fund for Africa.

consumer product, and financial services sectors. This led to job creation and the introduction

of new technologies in African states including Kenya, Tanzania Ghana, Togo and Benin.

Another important dimension of the outcome of the Canadian government policy was that the

combined effects of the NEPAD and the establishment of the CFA played a key role in helping

Canada to double its aid to Africa from the 2003-04 level of $1.05 billion to $2.1 billion in 2008-

09.[27]

Africa and Canada's International Cooperation Agenda

The height of Canada's engagement with Africa in the context of the NEPAD can be

found in the Chrétien's government's rhetoric of placing "Africa at the center of Canada's

cooperation agenda" (CIDA 2004:2). A post-Kananaskis study by the University of Toronto's G8

Research Group in May 2003 and February 2004 gave Canada a score of 85% for compliance

with the commitments of the G8 Africa Action Plan. The University of Toronto G8 Research

Group concluded that Canada led in the implementation of G8 recommendations to support

sustainable peace and development in Africa.[28] Canada increased its development assistance

envelope by 8% or $248 million for 2005/2006 in line with the G8 objective of doubling aid from

2003/04 levels by 2008/09. As well, Canada provided leadership in debt forgiveness to Africa

countries and opened its market to 34 LDCs in Africa. Again, Canadian contributions to the

Global Fund on HIV/Aids added some substance to the new cooperation agenda in Africa. In

order to make medical treatment accessible to the over 30 million people in Africa living with

---

[27] See " Focus on the Future: The Legacy of the Canada Fund for Africa"

[28] For details see, John Kirton et al, "2003 Evian final Compliance Report" (Toronto: May 31, 2004) <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003evian_comp_final/index.html> Also see " 2004 Sea Island Final Compliance Results" (Toronto July 1, 2005) <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2004seaisland_final/index.html> Accessed on August 13, 2008

HIV/AIDS, Canada passed the *"Canada and Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act"* on May 13, 2004,

the first legislation of its kind that allowed drug companies to provide low cost anti-HIV/AIDS

drugs to African countries (CIDA 2004). Finally, as noted in Chapter Three, the Martin

government backed up the rhetoric with action, when fourteen out of the twenty five CIDA

countries of focus were African.[29]

Nonetheless, some observers[30] of Canadian policy I interviewed were sceptical about

the claim that Africa was at the center of Canada's international cooperation agenda. In their

view, Africa was not and has never been at the center of Canadian international cooperation.

As well, there was no comprehensive Canadian policy on Africa. Both Canadian and African

observers argued that there was no long term Canadian commitment to Africa under the

Chrétien government, and there was the danger that Canada's project-based support for the

NEPAD initiative would decline significantly with a change of government.[31]

As discussed in Chapter Three, Canadian governments have engaged Africa on an ad hoc

basis. This is reflected in the instability of Canadian development assistance to the continent

especially since the 1980s (Morrison 1998). Even the Liberal government which showed support

for the NEPAD had earlier abandoned Africa with the deep cuts in the aid budget in the 1990s

(Black 2009). An important factor that challenged the notion of Africa at the center of Canada's

international cooperation is the establishment of the CFA itself. In many respects, the $500

million CFA was woefully inadequate. It did not come close to the $64 billion that was needed

---

[29] These countries of focus were meant to increase poverty reduction and ensure aid effectiveness. For more information see <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7> Accessed on July 15, 2008

[30] These views were expressed by officials in Ottawa, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria.

[31] This was expressed by many of the officials through personal interviews I conducted in Ottawa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Nigeria. From January 17- June 20, 2008

annually to reduce by half the number of Africans who live in poverty by 2015 (NEPAD: 37).

Thus Canada's financial contribution in the CFA did not match the rhetoric of placing Africa at

the center of Canada's cooperation agenda. Under the Liberal governments of Chrétien and

Martin, Canada's participation in the war in Afghanistan appeared strategically more important

than the development and security challenges facing Africa. For instance, the Chrétien

government allocated $270 million and $250 million in additional funding to the war in

Afghanistan in the 2003 and 2004 budgets respectively. The two-year budget for security in

Afghanistan exceeded the $500 million that the government allocated for several projects in

the five-year CFA.[32]

Moreover, Canada's bilateral aid to Afghanistan from 2002 to May 2006 was more than

$466 million.[33] The same period saw increased Canadian aid to Africa, but the actual increase

for Africa amounted to $275 million in 2002/03.[34] Commitments to Afghanistan and other

states such as Iraq and Haiti dwarfed the overall Canadian aid efforts in Africa. As Brian

Tomlinson of the CCIC pointed out, "commitments of additional aid to these three countries

(Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq) between 2002 and 2009 will total close to $1billion. By

comparison, incremental aid promised each year to Africa from the 8% aid increases amounts

to about $1.2billion in these same years".[35] For the most part the shift to Afghanistan, Haiti and

---

[32] See, " Government of Canada: The Budget in Brief 2003"< http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget03/pdf/briefe.pdf> and " Government of Canada: The Budget in Brief 2004" <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget04/pdf/briefe.pdf> Accessed on August 7, 2009
[33] See, " Afghanistan by the numbers" (CBC News, January 17, 2008) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/bythenumbers.html> Also see, the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan (The Manley Report)" (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, January 2008) <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf > Accessed on August 7, 2009
[34] See, Brian Tomlinson (2004). "A CCIC Briefing Note: Recent Trends in Canadian Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa" <http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/003_acf_2004-10_subsaharan_africa_aid_trends.pdf> Accessed on August 7, 2009
[35] Ibid

Iraq started with Prime Minister Paul Martin who succeeded Jean Chrétien in 2003. Under Martin, Canadian foreign policy turned more nationalistic as development assistance increasingly became an instrument for the pursuit of Canada's economic and security interests (Brown 2005).

As noted in Chapter Three, the Martin government's *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* promised to double the aid budget to over $5billion per year by 2010 with a focus on Africa (Government of Canada 2005: 7). However, Stephen Brown argues that the "projections do not even restore Canadian aid levels to where they were in the 1980s (and early 1990s where aid was about 0.49% of GNP), let alone reach the (0.7% of GNP) target to which the (Canadian) government committed itself in 1970".[36] Following Brian Tomlinson's assessment, one could reasonably expect that the concentration of aid in terms of the dollar amounts in each of the Fourteen CIDA countries of focus in Africa would have been far less than the amounts that Martin would have spent—if he was still in power—in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq.

The concentration of Canadian spending especially in Afghanistan has continued dramatically under the Conservative government of Harper. Compared to the five-year $500 million CFA, the Canadian government (both the Liberals and the Conservatives) have spent over $7.5 billion in Afghanistan since the war on terrorism began in 2002.[37] In practice, both the Liberals and the Conservatives appeared to have more interest in the war on terror than

---

[36] See Stephen Brown (2005). Achieving the Development Objectives of Canada's International Policy Statement Fall 2005 McGill International Review <http://www.irsam.ca/mir/Brown%5B52-55%5D.pdf> Accessed on August 7 2009

[37] For more information see, "Tories Try to Dampen Afghan Overspending Report" (CTV, The Canadian Press, March 12, 2008)
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080312/tories_afghanistan_080312/20080312?hub=Politics> Accessed on July 15, 2008

the development and security challenges facing Africa at the turn of the twenty-first century.

There are, nonetheless, marked differences in the level of commitment to Africa between the Liberal and Conservative governments. Compared to the Liberal government which pursued a more values-oriented policy on human rights, human security, rule of law and good governance in Africa[38], the strategic interest-oriented policy of the Conservative government as evident in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*[39] partly accounted for the rapid rate at which Africa fell off the so-called centre of Canada's international cooperation. As noted in Chapter Three, the Conservative government's 2008 budget[40] placed Afghanistan as the central focus of Canada's international assistance. Canada increased its total aid to Afghanistan to $1.3 billion over the next 10 years. Indeed, this begs the question of whether Africa, which is made up of 53 independent states, fits into the Conservative government's foreign policy agenda. Although the Harper government upheld the promise by Paul Martin to double aid to Africa, the government itself has not proposed any comprehensive policy on Africa.

These lead us to conclude that at least in the recent history of Canadian foreign policy, relations with Afghanistan, the Americas (including North America), and Europe have emerged as the foci for Canadian governments, both Liberals and Conservatives. Save for the 'positive' rhetoric of Chrétien and to some extent Martin, which is even lacking under Harper, in reality, Africa is at the periphery of Canadian foreign policy agenda. If Africa was at the center of

---

[38] This does not mean the absence of strategic interests in the liberal government's engagement with Africa. To a large extent the liberal government's activism in Africa was based on the understanding that the security of Africa is linked to the security of Canada.

[39] For details see, "PM Unveils Canada First Defence Strategy" (Halifax, May 12, 2008) <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2095> Accessed on August 23, 2008. Also see The Budget Plan 2008: Responsible Leadership. Tabled in the House of Commons by Hon. James M. Flaherty, P.C. M.P. February 28, 2008 pp.179-180

[40] See The Budget Plan 2008: Responsible Leadership. Tabled in the House of Commons by Hon. James M. Flaherty, P.C. M.P. February 28, 2008 p.181

Canada's cooperation agenda this was limited to the Liberal government government's rhetorical support for the NEPAD. In spite of its peripheral status, it is possible to identify the pursuit of Canada's economic, political, and security interest in Africa within the context of the NEPAD, as will be discussed next.

Canadian Foreign Policy interests and the NEPAD

The Canadian government's acceptance and support for the NEPAD initiative through the creation of the CFA was not based on a purely philanthropic concern for Africa's development.[41] MacLean (2006: 64) is right to argue that "Canadian foreign policy has always been about self-interest. Any other basis for a foreign policy makes no sense". In many ways, NEPAD provided the means for Canada to renew its economic, political, and security interests in Africa. Although Africans may benefit in the short and long term through the investment of Canadian resources on the continent, several economic, political, and security factors underscored Canada's leadership and contribution to the implementation of the NEPAD priorities.

Canada's support for the NEPAD was driven by economic interest and the opportunity that NEPAD offered to 'institutionalise' the neoliberal ideology in African economies. NEPAD was built on the idea of the free market and liberal democracy which is also the foundation of Canadian economic policy (Keating 2002; Neufeld 1995). NEPAD provided an opportunity for Canada to increase its trade and investment as well as to foster closer business relations with

---

[41] For a good read on philanthropic motives of Canadian foreign policy see Nossal (1988)

Africa.[42] As a reflection of the peripheral status of Africa in Canadian policy, Canada's trade and investment was low when the NEPAD was launched in 2001. At that time, Africa accounted for only 0.75% and 0.33% of Canada's imports and exports respectively. Moreover, Canadian private direct investment amounted to $1.2 billion which was largely concentrated in natural resources.[43] The NEPAD offered opportunities for Canada. In the immediate aftermath of the Kananaskis Summit, the Canadian Council on Africa, which is the only pan-Canadian organisation that represents the private sector in Canada was formed, and has been active in lobbying the Canadian government and African states for trade and investment opportunities in Africa on behalf of its members.[44] In this context, the inclusion of the CIFA in the CFA has helped to sustain the active engagement of the Canadian Council on Africa in Africa's development.

The Liberal government promoted the interest of the dominant class represented by the Canadian Council on Africa (corporate sector), to increase their trade and investment in African economies (Pratt 1983/84 and 2007). This was evident in a speech by the trade minister, Pierre Pettigrew, at a plenary session of Canada's trade mission to Africa on November 18, 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa. Pettigrew said that, "the Canadians (more than 60 business delegates) you see before you today are just the start. Indeed, to use a saying that has much resonance back in Canada, I expect this mission to have a snowball effect. In other words, as our business relationship develops, more and more companies will see the enormous

---

[42] For more information see <http://www.international.gc.ca/eet/trade/sot_2002/section04-en.asp> Accessed on August 13, 2008
[43] Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit pp.25-26
[44] For more information about the Canadian Council on Africa see the official website <www.ccafrica.ca> Also see <http://www.ccafrica.ca/publications/Canadian%20Council%20on%20Africa.pdf>

opportunities that strong ties with Africa present."[45] The primacy of Canadian economic

interest in the NEPAD was underscored by the fact that the trade mission was the first to Africa

in many years by a Canadian trade minister.[46] The trade mission did not target the whole of

Africa but rather middle income African countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal that

provided the best opportunities for Canadian businesses. Indeed, these countries were among

the five initiating states of NEPAD and, thus, it was strategic for Canada to send trade missions

to them.[47]

The Canadian government's interest was in promoting trade and investment in African

countries. In some respects, trade was seen as a tool for development. This gave a new

dimension to Canadian policy that was traditionally focused on development assistance to

African states. This is not to say that Canada had no trade relations with African countries prior

to NEPAD or that development assistance was given a low priority in Canadian policy after

NEPAD. Indeed as mentioned previously, development assistance itself has been and still is a

major instrument for the promotion of diverse Canadian economic, security and political

interest in Africa including trade (Morrison 1998; Pratt 2001: 61-62; Pratt 2007 Clark 1991: 28-

31; Lane 1991; Freeman 1982) and human security. But what was clear in the immediate post-

Kananaskis era was that there appeared to be 'a new thinking' of the Liberal government that

saw trade as a key instrument not only for Africa's development but also for Canada's

prosperity. Trade minister, Pettigrew argued that "a dollar of trade will generate far more

---

[45] For more information see, " Notes for and Address by Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade At the Plenary Session of the Canada Trade Mission to Africa" (Ottawa, DFAIT March 25, 2008) <http://w01.international.gc.ca/Minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=379758&Language=E&docnumber=2002/N/A> Accessed on August 12, 2008

[46] Ibid

[47] The five initiating states of NEPAD are Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php> Accessed on August 12, 2008

development than a dollar of aid".[48] This suggests that Canadian trade and investment was not only meant to serve Canadian interest. As Pettigrew put it "the main objective in this area is to explore ways of allowing the world's poorest countries to develop by increasing their private sector revenue flows".[49]

Canada took leadership by opening its market to the world's least developed countries including those on the African continent. It encouraged other developed countries to do the same. The Canadian government established the LDCs Market Access Initiative to eliminate all duties and quotas on imports from 48 LDCs on January 1, 2003. As well, Canada contributed $1.8 million to the WTO's Global Trust Fund for Trade-Related Assistance to Developing Countries between 2002 and 2003.[50] The central aim of these initiatives was to build the trade capacity of developing countries, the majority of which are in Africa. In this context, some of Canada's bilateral and, to a large extent, multilateral aid to Africa through the WTO became an instrument for free trade and liberalisation that would in turn advance Canada's economic interest in Africa.

The Canadian government's trade and investment advocacy in Africa is paying some dividends. Since its formation, the Canadian Council on Africa has increased its membership to more than 150 members that are active in every sector of the African economy.[51] As well, a February 2007 report on Africa by the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and

[48] See, "Notes for an Address by Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade, at the plenary session of the Canada Trade Mission to Africa <http://w01.international.gc.ca/Minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=379758&Language=E&docnumber=2002/N/A> Accessed on August 12, 2008

[49] ibid

[50] See " Trade Development-Archives" (Ottawa, DFAIT May 8, 2009) <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ds/archives.aspx?lang=en&menu_id=50&menu=R> Accessed on August 11, 2009

[51] See Canadian Council on Africa <http://www.ccafrica.ca/ccafrica/about_us.php> Accessed on August 6, 2009

International Trade pointed out that Canadian commercial relations with Sub-Saharan Africa are rising and that Canada does more business in Sub-Saharan Africa than in each of the emerging markets of the BRIC (SSCFAIT 2007: 113). In comparison of Canadian commercial relations in Africa and China, the Senate report argued that Canadian merchandise exports to Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 13.6% in 2005 (a total of $ 1.3 billion) second only to China. Canada exported more in services to Africa ($458 million) than China ($298 million) in 2003. Finally, merchandise imports from Africa grew at an annual rate of 20% between 1990 and 2004 (SSCFAIT 2007:113). Consequently, the Senate report called for additional Canadian unilateral action to increase Africa's access to the Canadian market in view of the slow rate of progress in the WTO. The SSCFAIT proposal reiterated the position of the Liberal government that a dollar of trade will generate far more development than a dollar of aid.

The Canadian government's interest in trade raises the pertinent question as to why the government also promised to double its aid budget to Africa in compliance with the G8 Africa Action Plan.[52] Put differently, if a dollar of trade will generate far more development than a dollar of aid why is Canada on record to be the first G8 country to meet the G8 target of doubling aid to Africa in 2009 and why did the Liberal government set up the CFA?[53] Perhaps, the answer could be found in Canada's political interests in Africa—maintaining a positive image on the African scene. From a political standpoint, Canada's effort at putting Africa on the G8 agenda in Kananaskis was, an attempt to redeem its image as 'a trusted development partner' in Africa. As mentioned before, development assistance formed a central pillar of

---

[52] See, " G8 Africa Action Plan" (DFAIT, Ottawa, May 27 2009) <http://www.international.gc.ca/ssa-ass/aap-paa/index.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on August 6, 2009
[53] See , " Focus on the Future: The Legacy of the Canada fund for Africa" (CIDA, Ottawa, June 19 2008 <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/MAR-619131753-NAQ> Accessed on August 12, 2008

Canadian activism in Africa and it is, at least in the view of the government but also civil society groups, the means through which Canada expresses its compassion and generosity to African states.[54] For the most part, development assistance was the source of Canada's good reputation in Africa. Paradoxically, this development assistance to Africa was on a sharp decline before the introduction of NEPAD in 2001 (Morrison 1998 and 2000).

The political damage that the declining development assistance spending caused Canada was evident in the HCSCFAIT report on Canadian priorities for Kananaskis summit. The HCSCFAIT noted that although Canada had spent billions of dollars over several decades on aid projects in Africa, "... some witnesses pointed out that our (Canada's) credibility has been hurt by a sharp decline in ODA commitments to Africa during the past decade".[55] The HCSCFAIT argued that the Kananaskis summit presented an historic opportunity to (re)build a better relationship with Africa and to allow this opportunity to escape Canada was "...not an option".[56] In short, the Canadian government's support for the NEPAD was an opportunity to repair, as well as reassert Canada's moral image in Africa by making some real commitments in terms of establishing the CFA in addition to the regular CIDA programmes in African countries.

The Canadian government also saw the support for NEPAD as a means for Canada to reassert its leadership within the G8. As pointed out in Chapter Three, Canada provided leadership in the G8 on African issues such as the debt crisis and apartheid in South Africa. Notably, however, Canada's leadership on Africa in the G8, just like its policy on development assistance, had been on a decline until the launching of the NEPAD 2001. The HCSCFAIT noted

---

[54] There was a broad consensus among the officials I interviewed in Ottawa that development assistance is the main focus of Canadian policy in Africa.
[55] See Securing Progress for Africa and the World
[56] Ibid p28

that 'Canada's role in the G8 context is not obvious on the basis of the size of our (Canada) relationship with Africa'.[57] Thus there was the need for Canada to reassert its influence in the G8 on African issues.

Canadian leadership was also needed in the security realm as well in view of the challenges that faced several African states and peoples. Indeed Canada's security contribution was one of the key elements that reinforced Canada's moral image in Africa. The emergence of NEPAD provided a platform for the pursuit of Canada's human security policy in Africa as was revealed in the Canadian government's policy to strengthen the peace and security capacities of the AU and ECOWAS.[58] The Canadian government shared the idea that, "African leaders have learned from their own experience that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights, and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development"[59]. This view was expressed in several Canadian government documents on the CFA.[60] Although Canada had previously undertaken peacekeeping in African states through the UN and supported peace and security capacity building in Africa such as the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export, and Production of Light Weapons and the ECOWAS Child Protection Unit that assisted war affected girls and boys,[61] Canada broke new grounds under NEPAD to build a much closer security relationship with Africa's regional organisations.

The Canadian government's support for the peace and security capacity building in the AU and ECOWAS echoed the ideas entrenched in the Canadian government's foreign policy statements. In the 1995 foreign policy review document, *Canada in the World*, the Canadian

[57] Ibid p25
[58] See For instance see, Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results p9
[59] See, The New Partnership for Africa's Development, October 2001 p16
[60] For instance see, Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results p9
[61] CFAp4

government made it clear that the threats to security are complex and transcend national and international borders. As such, the security of Canada, including economic security, depends on the security of others.[62] Similarly, in post-Kananaskis, Paul Martin's 2005 *International Policy Statement*: *A role of Pride and Influence in the World* noted that the "increasing interdependent world has tightened the links between international security and domestic security and developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways".[63] Africa's security is an important aspect of global security therefore insecurity on the African continent can have repercussions in Canada. Thus, helping the AU and ECOWAS to build their security capacity was to at least *in*directly support the security interests of Canada in a globalising world.

The Canadian government's support for peace and security capacity building in Africa was linked to the protection of Canadian economic interest in the region. Canadian mining companies are the second largest investor in the mining sector in Africa after South African companies.[64] As noted by the SSCFAIT (2007), Canada's commercial profile in Africa is rising. In what appears related to the promotion of security for Canada's economic interest, at least in West Africa—through the ECOWAS peace and security capacity building, David Kilgour, who was the Secretary of State for Africa and Latin America in the Chrétien government, argued that, "West Africa is becoming a new frontier for Canadian business"[65] since Canadians businesses have a comparative advantage in their ability to use both English and French, which are the official languages in West African states. Canadian ties in the Commonwealth and la

---

[62] See the 1995 policy document, Canada in the World- Canadian foreign policy review pii
[63] See Canada's International Policy Statement: A role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence p5
[64] Interview with Mr. Robert Fowler Ottawa January 24, 2008.
[65] See " West Africa- A New Frontier for Canadian Business" (African Access Magazine 2nd Quarter 1998)
<http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/westafri.htm> Accessed on August 18, 2008

Francophonie provided additional leverage for Canadian businesses".[66] In other parts of Africa, Canadian oil imports from Algeria accounted for the vast majority of the growth in Canadian trade with Africa.[67] About 90 percent of Canadian imports from Africa come from Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and South Africa. With the exception of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa, all the other countries especially those in West Africa have experienced or are experiencing war or minor conflict.[68] In this respect, the threat to Canadian economic interests in Africa was real and thus the support for the AU and the ECOWAS to build their security capacity also was a step to protect Canadian economic interests.

The Canada Fund for Africa and the Promotion of Human Security

In spite of the material self-interest of Canada, a major strand of the NEPAD was the opportunity it offered the Liberal government to promote its human security agenda in Africa, especially through the AU and ECOWAS. Africa's security challenges provided a unique opportunity for the Liberal government to use its support for NEPAD to advance the values of human security and improve the image of Canada as a moral state[69] that placed the wellbeing and safety of individuals at the center of its policy. As will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, Canada's support for human security was couched in a development assistance framework. This gave more credence to the morality of Canada on the African scene. Although the CFA

---

[66] Ibid

[67] See Peter Julian, '"A Policy of Fair Trade for Canada and Africa" (Embassy, March 19, 2008) <http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2008/march/19/fair_trade/> Accessed on August 26, 2008

[68] See the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php> Accessed on August 26, 2008

[69] In comparison with other state actors such ad Germany, Japan, the United States, and former colonial powers such as United Kingdom and France, many African officials I interviewed see Canada as a moral and friendly state in Africa.

documents hardly use the language of human security, CIDA officials who managed the CFA stressed that the peace and security initiatives component of the Fund were designed primarily to support the Canadian government's human security policy in Africa.[70]

The Canadian government pursued a dual strategy to promote the objectives of human security through the Canada fund for Africa. The dual strategy was, first, to support the peace and security capacity building at the regional and sub-regional levels and, second, to support regional and national programmes that had direct impact on human security (CIDA 2003 and 2004). The Liberal government gave priority to the strengthening of the peace and security capacity of the AU and ECOWAS, and as well, the government did not operate on a strict adherence to its freedom from fear perspective of human security that focused on the protection of people from physical violence. These issues are fully discussed in the subsequent chapters but I will provide brief review at this point to set the stage for that discussion.

A review of the CFA document shows that the Canadian government prioritised the institutional capacity building for peace and security at the regional and sub-regional levels in Africa with a focus on the AU and ECOWAS. The AU and ECOWAS were allocated $4 million and $15 million respectively in the CFA to support peace and security capacity building (CIDA 2003 and 2004). Although the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, the Canadian government's assistance to the AU and ECOWAS was based on the understanding that there was the need for the international community including Canada to help regional organisations to carry out their peace and security mandate.[71] More

---

[70] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa, January 17, 2008
[71] These views were expressed by CIDA and Department of Foreign Affairs Officials I interviewed in Ottawa on January 17, 2008.

importantly, the Canadian government's approach reinforced the belief that regional peace and security are vital requirements for sustainable development and human rights protection in Africa and this demands leadership from Africans since they know their terrain better (Cilliers 2008).

Apart from the institutional capacity building, the CFA generally supported projects that had direct impact on physical security, poverty reduction, human rights, and community development in African states.[72] This suggests that in practice, the Liberal government pursued a mixture of the elements of freedom from fear and freedom from want perspectives of human security although the government defined human security as the protection of people from violent conflict. Axworthy, who was the main architect of human security in Canadian foreign policy, as well as the Martin government, firmly recognised the relationship between security and development (Axworthy 1999, 2001 and 2003).[73] To some extent, the implementation of the human security-related projects in the CFA at least reflected the complexities of the human security challenges in Africa.

The pursuit of the mixture of freedom from fear and freedom from want was apparent in the Canada fund for Africa's allocation of $6 million for War-Affected Youth Programme for the rehabilitation and reintegration of war-affected children and youth into their communities. The war-affected youth fund supported projects in health, education, skills training particularly for abducted girls, and peacebuilding in war ravaged countries such as Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and Northern Uganda (CIDA 2003

---

[72] See Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results
[73] See the 2005 Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development p1

160

and 2004). Canada provided financial support for the Government of Sierra Leone-UNDP Arms for Development Programme that assisted the Government of Sierra Leone and local authorities to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in exchange for community development projects (CIDA 2004: 11). The Government of Sierra Leone-UNDP Arms for Development Project supported law reforms and border control that provided checks against illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. In this respect Canada's contribution helped to create a safe environment as the Sierra Leonean police declared large communities as "weapons-free" communities.[74]

Similarly, the local initiatives component of Canada's assistance to ECOWAS[75] for post-conflict reconstruction has supported economic recovery in post-conflict countries such as Guinea Bissau and Liberia. Through the ECOWAS's local initiative programme, former combatants and war-affected youth were trained in conflict prevention and vocational skills. The Canadian government contributed $300,000 to Guinea Bissau to rehabilitate 6000 amputees and $200,000 to six Liberian NGOs working in the area of conflict prevention. The Canadian government also provided assistance to ECOWAS for post-conflict election in West Africa. In 2007, the Canadian government provided $100,000 to support an ECOWAS fact finding mission in Togo and in 2008 the government contributed $200,000 for electoral observation mission in the Ivory Coast.[76] Nonetheless, a senior ECOWAS official I interviewed maintained that although the Canadian government's contribution appeared to address human

---

[74] For detail account see, " Project Profile-Arms for Development Programme" (Ottawa, CIDA) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/cpo.nsf/vWebProjByNumEn/BE649CC71C85BEF48525710F0036FDD1> Accessed on August 19, 2008
[75] See Contribution Arrangement between the Government of Canada and ECOWAS. Signed at Ottawa on March 9, 2004
[76] Interview with ECOWAS Official Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008

security concerns in these countries, the assistance fell far short of the enormous challenges that confront post-conflict societies in Africa.[77] Indeed, the short term arms for development and amputees projects supported through the local initiative component of the ECOWAS capacity building has stopped for lack of funding.[78] Given the financial constraints, the protection of human security in the post-conflict countries is difficult sustain.

Other projects in the CFA also had implications for the promotion of human security in Africa although they were designed primarily to build the capacity of African governments rather than the direct promotion of human security. In this category are projects in the areas of governance, trade and investment, health, agriculture, environment and water resource management, and information and communications technologies. On the specific issue of agriculture, for example, the CFA provided support for food security through new biosciences research however it was project-based and short term.[79] In many ways, these projects complimented CIDA programming in African countries on issues such as poverty reduction, democracy, human rights and HIV/AIDS. These issues reflected a broader conception of human security by CIDA officials.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the NEPAD initiative as a major source of Canadian government activism in Africa in the early twenty-first century. The central argument here is that the neoliberal values and principles that underscored the NEPAD initiative were consistent

---

[77] Ibid
[78] Ibid
[79] See Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results p3-24

with Canada's foreign policy goals. In this context, NEPAD served as a strong motivation for the Canadian government to provide leadership in the G8 as well as to forge close partnership with African states and regional organisations to promote (human) security and development on the African continent. Development assistance continued to be a major feature of Canada's 'new engagement' with Africa under the NEPAD initiative as evident in the establishment of the CFA and the promise by the Canadian government to double its aid budget to Africa by 2009. In this sense, the Canadian government's support for the NEPAD priorities was framed as development assistance to African states. Although the Liberal government favoured a narrow definition of human security that was concerned with the physical protection of individuals in violent conflict, in practice, the country-based projects in the CFA reflected the broader conception of human security through the integration of the idea of physical security with the provision of development.[80]

The Canadian government's support for the NEPAD initiative was not based on purely altruistic or humanitarian motives as the rhetoric may have suggested. Even though one cannot deny the short term and long term benefits of Canadian assistance in Africa, the NEPAD provided an opportunity for Canada to promote its political, economic and security interest. At the political level, NEPAD served as a means to reinvigorate Canada's moral image in Africa. Arguably, this has contributed to the advancement of Canada's economic profile on the continent in the twenty-first century. In terms of security, a unique dimension of the Canadian government's policy was its support for the peace and security capacity building of the AU and ECOWAS. This is the subject that will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.

---

[80] The Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results document provides a full account of the projects which have implications for the promotion of human security in Africa.

Chapter Five

Canada and the African Union Peace and Security Architecture

Introduction

This chapter provides some insights about the transformation of the Organisation of African

Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) especially in the context of the search for a Pan-African

mechanism to promote peace and security in Africa. I discuss the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention Management and Resolution (MCPMR) as well as its transformation into the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the AU to provide a background for the

discussion of Canada's foreign policy. I argue that at least in theory, the MCPMR was

constrained in promoting peace and security in Africa because of the OAU Charter's strict

adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in member states. However,

since the formation of the AU, its Constitutive Act places limitations on member states with

regards to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. As a result, the AU has assumed

the *right* to intervene in member states even *without consent* to protect human security

through the operationalisation of APSA. APSA should be seen as a work-in-progress because it

has not attained the status of full operationalisation.

The AU's mandate on intervention through APSA is consistent with Canada's foreign

policy on human security. Accordingly, I argue that both the idea of human security, especially

the protection of civilians in violent conflicts, as well as Africa's views on the APSA have

influenced Canadian foreign policy on peace and security in Africa. With the establishment of

APSA, the Canadian government resorted to promoting human security by proxy by

contributing to the strengthening of the capacity of the African Standby Force (ASF), which is

the military/civilian police component of APSA. Canadian forces are being spared from direct participation in peacekeeping operations in African conflicts. The idea of promoting human security by proxy is applied in a case study of the Canadian government's engagement in Darfur.

The argument in this chapter is important in three ways. First, it demonstrates that the idea of human security still resonate in Canadian foreign policy towards the AU despite the fact that the Liberal government which initiated the concept into Canadian foreign policy is no longer in power and also in view of the fact that the Conservative government of Mr. Harper hardly uses the language of human security. Second, the argument also shows that the Canadian government has come to accept the authority of the AU to intervene in violent conflicts in Africa because the AU's mandate on intervention as entrenched in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act is consistent with the principles of the Responsibility to Protect. Finally, Canada's middle power status in Africa and the Canadian government's approach of flexibility and non-interference in AU politics has made Canada more receptive in the AU and consequently has raised Canada's moral profile.

AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND HUMAN SECURITY: FROM THE OAU TO THE AU

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The birth of new states in Africa in the immediate post-World War II period provided a political space for the formation of a continental organisation in Africa. The road to the formation of a continental organisation was, however, not going to be smooth. Against the odds of serious disagreements between the three main political groupings that emerged in the

immediate post-independence period—the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group, and the Brazzaville Twelve—over the status of Algeria during its fight for independence, as wells as on policy towards Congo which was then engulfed in civil war, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was born on May 25, 1963 based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism[1] (Cervenka 1969: 1-28; Obasanjo 1996; Murithi 2005: 22-26).

Pan-Africanism is an idea that calls for solidarity and cooperation among African states and society to address the challenges that face them. The ideals of Pan-Africanism rest on cooperation, brotherhood, and solidarity that transcend ethnic and national differences.[2] To this end, the central belief of Pan-Africanism is togetherness or having a sense of 'we-ness' among Africans. Its primary objective is to eradicate all forms of racial, economic, and political discrimination against people of African descent whether they are in the Diaspora or reside on the African continent. Essentially, Pan-Africanism is a call on Africans to create the conditions necessary for the enjoyment of freedoms required for socio-development (Murithi 2005).

Consistent with the ideals of Pan-Africanism, the core objectives of the OAU were to promote unity and solidarity among member states; intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states; eradicate all forms of colonial rule; to promote international cooperation with due regard to the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (OAU Charter: Article 2.1).

---

[1] For a detailed discussion on the idea of Pan-Africanism see Murithi (2005) chapter 2. Also see Tieku (2006). The formation of the African Union (unpublished PhD dissertation) Chapter 3
[2] See the Preamble of The 1963 Charter of OAU

It is important to add that the OAU recognised the need to establish peace and security among member states as a prerequisite for promoting development on the African continent. (OAU Charter: Preamble). The OAU adhered to principles such as respect for the sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; unreserved condemnation of political assassination and subversive activities of neighbouring states or other states; total emancipation of African territories; and policy of non-alignment (OAU Charter: Article 3). All the four organs of the OAU—The Assembly of Heads of States and Government; The Council of Ministers; The General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration had crucial roles to play in promoting peace and security in Africa. In addition, the OAU established a Defence Commission, to promote inter-African cooperation on defence matters (OAU Charter: XX).

Although the OAU was concerned about peace and security in Africa, African leaders placed emphasis on the protection of their states from external military threats. The OAU paid less attention to the protection of the security of individual citizens or communities within member states. In this light, the OAU's approach to security was more consistent with the realist understanding of security that focuses on the protection of the state from external threats. As a result, the OAU had a mixed record of successes and failures in promoting peace, security and human rights in Africa (Legum 1975; Obasanjo 1996; Gomes 1996). On the positive side, there should be little argument that the OAU succeeded in its primary objective of supporting African Liberation Movements to eradicate colonialism on the African continent with the ending of apartheid in South African on April 27, 1994. Moreover, the OAU achieved

modest success in negotiating for the peaceful settlement of disputes between some member states. For example, the OAU helped in negotiating for peace in disputes such as those between Algerian and Morocco in 1963, Tanzania and Uganda in 1972, and Ethiopia and Somalia on several occasions (Legum 1975: 212).

The OAU, however, fell short of promoting human security and human rights within member states. This was partly because the organisation revered the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in member states. As well, the idea of promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law within member states virtually did not exist on the agenda of the OAU. Under the OAU's watch, the African continent experienced a rise in authoritarian regimes with high incidence of corruption, human rights abuse, economic mismanagement and prevalence of poverty and violent conflict all of which affected human security (Meredith 2005). These undermined the true meaning of freedom and hindered the development process in Africa in the post-colonial period. Indeed, these raise questions about the true meaning of Pan-Africanism.

Even though the OAU was established on the Pan-African ideals of solidarity and cooperation, the adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention undermined the authority of the organisation to intervene in member states to protect civilians during violent conflicts as well as monitor the behaviour governments concerning development and human rights issues. This was the case in spite of the fact that the OAU recognised the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the need to establish peace and security for the total advancement of African peoples (Akinyemi 1972-73; Ojo and Sesay 1986; Welch 1981). Paradoxically, the OAU was proactive in condemning apartheid and racial abuse

especially in South Africa. The OAU was silent on human rights abuses in independent African states. Perhaps, the OAU's attitude towards South Africa should be expected because the fight against apartheid and racial abuse in that country was consistent with the organisation's decolonisation policy. Within its own ranks, however, aside from the obstacles of sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity, most of the African leaders who constituted the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU were self-appointed and corrupt dictators. Their own record at home discouraged them from criticising the human rights abuses of their peers. Indeed, the African leaders had no moral authority to question each other about their domestic affairs. In effect, the OAU had little impact in protecting human security and the well being of the ordinary people of Africa.

In principle, the OAU's adherence to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states contradicted the Pan-African ideals of solidarity, brotherhood, and cooperation among African states and peoples to pursue common goals on peace, security, and human rights. Although the OAU Charter[3] called for the peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, it was based on the principle of consent. Related to this, the OAU had no enforcement mechanism to intervene in violent conflicts to establish peace and security on the African continent. Two important examples are the Congo and the Nigerian civil wars in 1964-1965 and 1967-1970 respectively. In spite of the several attempts to negotiate for a settlement, the OAU failed.[4] Similarly, in Chad in 1982, the OAU failed in its first peacekeeping operation as a result of multiple factors which include, inadequate planning, perceived partiality of some troop contributing countries, confusion over mandate, and

---

[3] See Article 4 of the OAU Charter.
[4] For a detailed discussion see Cervenka (1977) chapters six and seven.

absence of OAU command and control mechanism (Naldi 1985; Cedric de Coning 1997; Massaquoi 1990). Essentially, the OAU was what Murithi (2005: 26) has correctly labelled as a "toothless talking shop".

An informed Pan-Africanist (Gomes 1996:37) has rightly argued that, the principles of the 1963 OAU Charter reflected the preoccupation of the organisation at the time and there was the need for an amendment to conform to present circumstances. Indeed, until the early 1990s, the eradication of colonialism took almost all the attention of the OAU over concerns for the day to day needs of the African people. The meaning of Pan-Africanism was more pronounced at the level of eradicating colonialism and oppressive rule by foreign powers. It was not translated into a day to day practice of cooperation among African states to promote peace, security, and sustainable development for the benefit of the African people.

The surge in violent conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War era was a key moment for the OAU to rethink its peace and security mandate in Africa. In places like Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia, bloody confrontations claimed thousands of lives. Thousands of Africans became refugees or IDPs. Indeed, Africa's worst nightmare became a reality when close to a million Africans were slaughtered in cold blood within a period of 100 days in Rwanda in 1994. For some observers of African politics (Murithi 2005; Lyons 1996) the seeds of some these violent conflicts were sown during the US-Soviet geopolitical rivalry in Africa in the Cold War. Olusegun Obasanjo (1996:16) makes the point clearer by arguing that African states could not escape the contagion of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. Although superpower competition encouraged competitive economic assistance to African states, African states' involvement in the ideological battle and

the readiness of superpowers to supply arms aggravated internal conflicts and instability in Africa. While this external factor among others carries some weight, it should be noted that internal factors such as poverty, human rights abuse, dictatorship, and lack of development equally accounted for the surge in violent confrontations in Africa after the Cold War (Meredith 2005; Maclean 2008; Akokpari 2008; Zaleza 2008).

The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR)

The violent conflicts that emerged in some African states in the post-Cold War moment presented an opportunity for the OAU to rethink its mandate to promote peace and security through the revival of the ideals of Pan-Africanism. At the twenty-sixth ordinary session of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from July 9-11, 1990, the OAU declared that Africa's development was the responsibility of African governments and peoples and "We (OAU) are now more than before determined to lay a solid foundation for self-reliant, human-centred, and sustainable development on the basis of social justice and collective self-reliance, so as to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our economies".[5] This 'new collective thinking' echoes Pan-African ideals of solidarity, cooperation and brotherhood. The collective thinking was premised on the need for a deeper economic integration in Africa as was happening in other parts of the world.[6] It is noteworthy that the regional leaders saw the need to promote development that focused on the citizens of Africa. As well, the OAU leaders placed emphasis on the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The OAU was now

---

[5] See Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World. AHG/Decl.1(XXVI) 1990
[6] ibid

determined to focus on the internal issues of member states with particular interest in human development, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Any progress towards socioeconomic development is dependent on the eradication of the endemic (human) insecurity on the African continent. In this context, the OAU renewed its determination towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts in order to create the atmosphere needed for development, and divert additional expenditure which may have been used on defence and security for socioeconomic development.[7] As one insightful observer of African politics argues, the OAU recognised that internal wars have external consequences and "collective actions to manage these conflicts were now judged both appropriate and necessary" (Cedric de Coning 1997). In short, in the immediate post-Cold War moment, the OAU embraced the idea that peace and security are preconditions for development in Africa.

The OAU's renewed focus on the central importance of peace and security as a precondition for sustainable development culminated in the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR) at the twenty-ninth Assembly of Heads of States and Government in Cairo, Egypt in June, 1993. The OAU institutionalised a Central Organ made up of a committee of member states to take charge of the operationalisation of the MCPMR. The Central Organ was the heart of the OAU decision-making process on peace and security issues but unlike the UN Security Council, the Central Organ had no permanent membership and none of the members had a veto. The Central Organ took decisions on the basis of consensus and on the consent of the parties involved in a conflict (Cedric de Coning 1997).

---

[7]ibid

The primary responsibility of the Central Organ was the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. Furthermore, in situations where conflicts have occurred, the Central Organ was mandated to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions. In this regard, the Central Organ had the power to mount and deploy civilian and military observer missions to conflict areas. In addition, the Central Organ had the responsibility of laying down the general guidelines for the operation of the MCPMR as well as the overall direction and coordination of the activities of the Mechanism (Cedric de Coning 1997). However, the OAU upheld the primary responsibility of the UN for Africa's security. As such the OAU relied on the UN for military intervention in African states.

A decade after its institutionalisation, the Central Organ held ninety-three (93) ordinary sessions at the ambassadorial level[8] where decisions on prevention, mediation, and resolution of conflicts were taken on a variety of issues including on a coup d'état in Sao Tome and Principe, and the violent conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone. Moreover, the OAU through the MCPMR deployed Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to Rwanda and helped to maintain a modest stability until 1993 when it handed over the mission to the UN. Again, through the MCPMR, the OAU deployed an African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in October 1993 and at least succeeded in preventing a Rwanda-like genocide situation in Burundi. This is because Burundi is populated by Tutsis and Hutus and the violence in that country occurred within the same period of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Indeed, the OAU's intervention in Burundi was extremely necessary and timely because it was mounted after the Security

---

[8] See the Ninety-Third Ordinary Session at Ambassadorial level of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/COMM.(XCIII) 24 July 2003 Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

Council's refusal of the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request to send a special mission to Burundi after the assassination of the democratically elected president, Melchoir Ndadaye (Cedric de Coning 1997).

The MCPMR had its challenges as the OAU was more interested in respecting the sovereign rights of member states. The MCPMR was also criticized for lacking 'the teeth' to deal with the security challenges in Africa by reserving peacekeeping duties for the UN. Furthermore, the MCPMR lacked key institutions such early warning system that could provide timely and accurate intelligence on emerging conflicts in Africa (Levitt 2001). Other analysts (Powell and Tieku 2005: 40-41) argue that the MCPMR was ineffective due to its non-military approach and too much reliance on preventive diplomacy in addressing the security challenges in Africa. In addition to these weaknesses it can be said that the MCPMR lacked a clearer set of criteria for intervention which is spelt out in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union on issues of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The norms governing the MCPMR did not go far enough to ensure the protection of human security in Africa.

The African Union

The idea of Pan-Africanism has grown overtime in tandem with the search for peace and security in Africa. At its Summit on 8th-9th September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, the OAU Assembly for Heads of State and Government decided to transform the OAU into the African Union (AU). The Constitutive Act of the AU which replaced the OAU Charter was signed in Lome Togo on July 11, 2000 and the AU was officially formed on May 26, 2001, 30 days after the ratification of the

Constitutive Act by two-thirds of member states.[9] The AU was inaugurated on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa. Although some observers of African politics (Murithi 2005; Manby 2004) either tacitly or overtly see African leaders as the driving force behind the formation of the AU, according to Tieku (2006), the formation of the AU and its agenda emerged from Africrats (OAU bureaucrats) who "...took advantage of their strategic position and internal knowledge to consciously construct African leaders' interest in a new continental security and integration project" (ibid: 93).

The AU constitutes a new phase of entrenching Africa's self-reliance in the political, economic, cultural, and social and security spheres. Put directly, the formation of the African Union can be understood in the context of the changing international relations and the need to revive and strengthen Pan-African ideas to confront the peace, security, and development challenges on the African continent. The formation of the AU was guided by a... "common vision of a united and strong Africa... determined to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our (Africa) continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world" and based on the recognition"...that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for implementation of our(Africa) development and integration agenda", as well as to "promote and protect human and people's rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law" (AU Constitute Act: Preamble).

---

[9] See, Tieku, Thomas. K. (2006:1). The formation of African Union: Analysis of the Role of Ideas and Supranational Entrepreneurs in Interstate Cooperation. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

A central feature of the AU is that in the area of peace and security it is more interventionist-oriented unlike its predecessor, the OAU. As one AU official remarked in my interviews in Addis Ababa, "there is a growing sense among African leaders toward the principle of non-indifference when it comes to promoting peace and security, and especially human security in Africa".[10] It can be said that the key to this new dimension of thinking among African leaders resulted from the recognition of the sovereign equality of member states but also at the same time the emphasis on interdependence of member states as the first principles of the African Union.[11] Therefore, the acceptance of these principles by member states opened the window for more elaborate forms of proposals on intervention in member states, especially to protect human security. By all accounts, the AU's vision on peace and security as entrenched in the Constitutive Act reflects the current political and socioeconomic circumstances on the African continent. Therefore, one could be right to say that the formation of the AU marked a true revival of Pan-Africanism that was inspired by a new spirit of unity, solidarity and cooperation among African states and peoples. To this end, the formation of the AU is the latest incarnation of Pan-Africanism (Murithi 2005:8).

New Intervention Mandate and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Ali Mazrui (1994: 40) argued that in order for Africa to avoid re-colonisation and a new 'trusteeship system', there was the need for a "*Pax Africana* – that is an African peace established, enforced, and consolidated by Africans themselves. In fact African states have long learned the lesson that in order to promote peace and security, the

---

[10] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 2, 2008
[11] AU Constitutive Act, Article 4(a)

authority of the OAU/AU must be accepted by member states.[12] Nevertheless, the acceptance of the authority of the OAU was constrained by the entrenchment in the OAU Charter of the Westphalia principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

Of course, the AU has not abandoned the principle of sovereignty; however, the idea of absolute sovereignty is 'disappearing' as the AU is becoming more proactive on peace and security matters on the African continent. While the OAU was noted for its policy of non-interference, the AU is more proactive through a policy of non-indifference to human security issues within member states. The resolve of African leaders to promote peace and security is expressed in Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act which stipulates the right of the AU to intervene *even without consent* "...of member states in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as serious threat to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability to the member states of the Union, upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council" and "the right of member states to request intervention from the Union (AU) in order to restore peace and security".[13] This is the core of the AU policy on non-indifference to impunity on the African continent.

War crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity which are the catalyst for AU intervention are also the key concerns of the R2P as well as the jurisdictional mandate of the ICC. Again, it should be noted that consistent with the redefinition of security discussed in Chapter Two, the AU also sees the need to promote human security in tandem with state

---

[12] See Cervenka (1977) discussion of the Congo crises and The Nigerian civil war in chapters six and seven respectively.
[13] See Constitutive Act of the African Union. Also see the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy

security. Therefore, the AU's intervention mandate is not limited to human rights issues but also on issues of restoring order in member states. Some scholars (Biamu and Sturman 2003) see this as a deviation from the protection of human security as stipulated in the original wording of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.[14]

In terms of structure, the AU has institutionalised an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in order to pursue its new security mandate. In accordance with article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, a Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established on 25 May 2005 to replace the Central Organ of the OAU as a standing decision-making organ within the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.[15] The PSC is supported by the AU Commission[16], Panel of the Wise (PW), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), and Peace Fund.[17] These institutions are established as permanent components of APSA and therefore indicate the AU's desire to move away from ad hoc and sporadic security arrangements that characterised the period of the OAU (Aboagye 2007). As noted in Chapter Two member states of the AU have adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy to give more meaning to their resolve to deal with the threats to peace, security and stability in Africa and especially for the protection and promotion of the well being of African peoples.[18]

---

[14] The original wording of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU called for "the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. This was amended in the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy

[15] Article 2(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

[16] The AU Commission is the secretariat of the Union

[17] See Article 2(2) of Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

[18] See the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, adopted at the second extraordinary session of the Assembly in Sirte, Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya February 28, 2004.

The landmark change to Africa's security governance was the institutionalisation of the PSC. The PSC performs a wide range of functions including the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management; and any other functions as may be decided by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments.[19] In this respect, the PSC has the mandate to authorise the deployment of peace support operations as well as the implementation of other regional security instruments and conventions of the AU such as the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

The PSC is made up of fifteen members. Ten of the members are elected for a two-year term and five members are elected for a three-year term to ensure continuity. The AU applies the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation in the election of the PSC members. Moreover, each member has a single vote and none of them have veto power.[20] The decisions of the PSC are guided by the principle of consensus and when consensus cannot be reached, the PSC adopts its decisions on procedural matters by simple majority and decisions on all other matters by a two-thirds majority.[21] Consistent with the mandate to promote human security, the AU requires of the PSC members to be committed to constitutional governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. As well, PSC members have to demonstrate willingness to participate in conflict resolution, peacemaking, and peacebuilding at the sub-

---

[19] Article 6 of PSC Protocol
[20] See Article 5 of the PSC Protocol.
[21] Article 8 (12&13)

regional and continental levels.[22] The incorporation of these standards into the selection process and the structure of the PSC are necessary to create political competition among member states to observe human rights and enforce the norms of human security. However, the 2010 election of Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda and Zimbabwe which are described as "Not Free" by Freedom House contravene the AU's ideals and principles of promoting human security, human rights and democracy.[23]

APSA also comprises of five other institutions which assist the PSC to discharge its functions effectively. The first is the AU Commission. The protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC (PSC Protocol) mandates the Chairperson of the Commission, under the authority of the PSC, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, to deploy efforts and take appropriate initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. Specifically, the Chairperson of the Commission brings to the attention of the PSC matters that threatens peace and security in Africa and also consults with the Panel of the Wise on peace and security issues that needs their immediate attention.[24]

Second, the PSC Protocol establishes a Panel of the Wise (PW). The PW is made up of five eminent African personalities who have made outstanding contributions to peace, security and development on the African continent. The first members of the PW were appointed by the AU in March 2007.[25] The PW performs advisory functions to the PSC and the AU Commission

---

[22] Article 5 (d) & (g)

[23] Paul D. Williams "Autocrats United? The Peace and Security Council of the African Union" (CSIS, March 16, 2010) <http://csis.org/blog/autocrats-united-peace-and-security-council-african-union> Accessed on March 18, 2010

[24] See Article 10 of PSC Protocol for details.

[25] The pioneers of the PW are: Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the OAU (East Africa); Brigalia Bam, President of the Independent Commission of South Africa (Southern Africa); Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria(North Africa); Elizabeth K. Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin (West Africa); and Miguel Trovoada, former President of Sao Tome and Principe (Central Africa) <http://www.panapress.com/freenews.asp?code=eng015268&dte=16/03/2007>Accessed on September 22, 2008

for the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. As well, the PW has the mandate to act on its own initiative to prevent conflicts in Africa. In this respect the PW carries out fact finding missions, shuttle diplomacy, and generate ideas and proposals that can contribute to peace, security and stability on the African continent. [26]

Third, the PSC Protocol establishes a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) with an observation and monitoring center known as the "The Situation Room" at the Conflict Management Directorate at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It can be said that the inclusion of the CEWS is the result of the lessons learned from the operationalisation of the OAU's MCPMR about the need to have intelligence on emerging conflicts. The CEWS is charged with the duty of data collection and analysis for early warning on the emergence of conflicts to ensure immediate response by the PSC.[27] "The Situation Room" is supported by observation and monitoring units, which are to be established in the five sub-regions of Africa. "The Situation Room" relies on these decentralized units in the sub-regions for effective and efficient operation of the CEWS. It is expected that the sub-regional observation and monitoring units will provide timely information and necessitate immediate response by the PSC to address threats to peace and security in Africa.

Finally, the PSC Protocol establishes a Peace Fund to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other activities relating to the promotion of peace and security in Africa.

---

[26] For details of the functions see Article 11 of the PSC Protocol. Also see the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise as adopted by the PSC at its 100th Meeting held on 12th November 2007
[27] See article 12 of the PSC Protocol for further details.

African Standby Force (ASF)

To ensure a rapid deployment of peace support missions, the AU has established the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene in conflicts pursuant to the provisions of article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act and in accordance with the powers conferred on the PSC. The ASF is the central instrument for promoting peace and security when violent conflicts have actually occurred. The ASF performs functions such as peace support missions, humanitarian assistance, and preventive deployment to maintain peace and security.[28] In order to ensure the efficient performance of its functions, a Military Staff Committee (MSC) is established under the PSC Protocol to advise and assist the PSC on issues relating to military and security requirements in Africa.

At least on paper, the AU appears to have learnt important lessons from the weaknesses of the OAU peacekeeping operations as well as from other peace support operations conducted by sub-regional organisations in Africa,[29] which were effectively *ad hoc coalitions for peacekeeping* because of the lack of effective planning, control and command procedures. In order to avoid these weaknesses, the AU seeks to establish the ASF as a permanent military brigade that will be well trained with rapid deployment capabilities to intervene in conflicts in Africa. The PSC Protocol calls for the establishment of five standby brigades made up of 3000-4000 troops in each of the five regions of Africa—Central, East, North, South, and West Africa[30] (Neethling 2005b:11). The standby brigades will be made up of multidisciplinary contingents

---

[28] See PSC Protocol, Article 13
[29] For a detailed analysis of the challenges of peacekeeping operation in Africa see for example Clapham (1999); Hutchful (1999); Berman & Sams (2000) especially chapters 3,4 and 5;
[30] See PSC Protocol, Article 16(1)

with military and civilian components and stationed in their respective countries. The target of the AU is to make the brigades ready for deployment to all parts of Africa by 2010.

Moreover, to ensure effective command and control, the AU is establishing an Africa wide integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS) that will link deployed units with mission headquarters, the AU and other planning elements, as well as the five regions.[31] In pursuance of Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, the AU has established a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the five regions also known as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa to ensure the full operationalisation of APSA and the ASF in particular.[32]

The MOU is a binding legal document that sets out the principles, rights, and obligations of the AU, the RECs, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades in Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.[33] The MOU recognises the primary responsibility of the AU to promote peace and security in Africa, and the need for the AU to work closely in partnership with the five regional security architectures in Africa.[34] It is important to mention that some efforts have been made by the five regions of Africa to achieve the AU's target of operationalising the ASF by 2010. However, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appears to be ahead of the other regions (Neethling 2005b). Perhaps, ECOWAS's achievement is due to the experience it has gained from its peacekeeping operations through

---

[31] See the Road Map for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force. EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I) Addis Ababa, 22-23 March 2005

[32] See the Memorandum on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.

[33] Ibid

[34] The five sub-regional security architectures are based in Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and West Africa

the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast.

According to some observers (Powell and Tieku 2005), it appears that the AU has subtly arrogated to itself the primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa by using the language of the 'right to intervene' even without the consent of member states. Indeed the AU's claim for the primary responsibility for Africa's peace and security is clearly stated in Article 16(1) of the PSC Protocol. But one needs to probe further and tease out the reasons why the AU makes such a claim from both theoretical and practical levels. In theory, one could argue that AU's right of intervention can be understood in view of the fact that member states have decided to cede the authority of intervention to the AU by accepting the provisions of Articles 4(h) and (J) of the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as other conventions and instruments regarding the establishment of APSA. In addition, what is unique about the AU's intervention mandate and at the same time reinforces its authority is that PSC decisions on intervention in member states is primarily based on the principle of consensus as the first step. When consensus cannot be reached, the PSC resorts to either simple majority or two-thirds majority on procedural matters and all other matters respectively, unlike in the UN where a veto by any member of the Permanent Five (P5) can overrule Security Council decisions on intervention. Furthermore, the AU's new approach to intervention is in sharp contrast with its predecessor, the OAU, which required complete consensus from member states on issues of intervention in Africa.

Second, from a practical level, after the ending of the Cold War, Western countries especially, have shied away from intervening in African conflicts as the lessons from the 1994

184

Rwanda genocide suggest. It is becoming a norm that while Western countries rhetorically express concern about the international implications of violence in Africa, they are increasingly reluctant to put troops on the ground to protect people and promote security in Africa. As Charles Pentland has noted, although Africa's security deficit is large and growing after the Cold War, "the list of outside potential suppliers has dwindled" (Pentland 2005 : 923). Perhaps the West is experiencing *peacekeeping-fatigue* in Africa as a result of the bitter experiences that were encountered by countries such as the United States and Canada in Somalia in the mid 1990s (Howe 1995; Oliver 1998; Gordon 1994; Dorn 2005). It is reasonable then for the AU to take primary responsibility as it is better placed, in terms of proximity, to respond immediately to crises in Africa. Moreover, the borders of African states are very fragile and conflicts could easily spread to other states as former combatants are willing to offer their services elsewhere. This in fact happened in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote D'Ivoire from the late 1980s and into the 21st century (Human Rights Watch 2005). Perhaps a collective action by Africans themselves can stop this menace.

Despite the theoretical and practical reasons that support the AU's right of intervention in African conflicts, the PSC Protocol takes into account the UN Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security including that of Africa. The PSC operates in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter on the role of regional arrangements or agencies to maintain international peace and security.[35] To this end, the PSC Protocol recognises the needed for the AU to forge closer partnership with the UN and other international organisations to promote global peace, security and stability particularly, in

---

[35] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII

Africa.[36] In short, the APSA is a manifestation of the operationalisation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The establishment of APSA is consistent with the recommendations of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, which was chaired by Lakhadar Brahimi in 2000.[37] Among other things, the report called for partnerships between the UN and regional organisations to promote peace and stability in conflict areas (Neethling 2005a). In fact experience has shown especially in the post-Cold War era that in Africa regional groups are normally the first to respond to violent conflicts before the UN joins with multidimensional peace support operations.[38] In this respect, the creation of APSA is to enable the AU to promptly respond to crises in African states. Instead of the six-month average that the UN takes to respond to crises with peacekeeping forces, the AU seeks to complete deployment in the case of genocide within 30 days with a robust military presence within 14 days (Kent and Malan 2003: 69-75).

From the discussions so far, it is clear that inasmuch as the AU derives its authority on intervention from member states, this authority is recognised by the UN as it falls within the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This echoes the idea of subsidiarity—burden sharing to promote international peace and security (Knight 1996). Although the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, the AU's primary responsibility for Africa's peace and security is not only derived theoretically from the Constitutive Act but also practically in view of the proximity of the AU to quickly respond to conflicts in Africa. In addition, the lack of security supply to Africa after the ending of the Cold

---

[36] See PSC Protocol, Preamble
[37] For details see, " Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations"
<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/> Accessed on August 17, 2009
[38] This was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda and recently in the Sudan, Ivory Coast and Somalia

War reinforces the AU's primary responsibility to maintain peace, security and stability in Africa.

The AU intervention mandate comes with its practical limitations. The AU's right of intervention and the preparedness of APSA to prevent, manage, and resolve violent conflicts was tested first in Sudan's Darfur region between June 2004 and January 2008 with the launching of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Initially, AMIS was deployed as an observer mission mandated to implement the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement that was brokered between the Sudanese government and the rebels—SPLA/M and JEM. AMIS was later transformed into a protection force of 7700 with a more robust mandate that included assisting in confidence building, creating secured environment for humanitarian relief, and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).[39] However, in spite of its promise, AMIS was not able to restore peace to Darfur as the mission encountered several operational, financial, and logistical problems before it was transformed into the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in January 2008 (De Waal 2007). The efficiency and effectiveness of APSA or more specifically the ASF, to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict is far from being actualized as the human security situation in Darfur worsened during the AMIS deployment.[40]

The latest test case of APSA is the ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which was launched in January 2007. Just like AMIS, AMISOM has not been able to restore peace in Somalia. The surge in sea piracy has added a difficult dimension to the protracted conflict. From an optimist point of view, the AU needs time to resolve the highly complex

---

[39] See Overview of AU's Efforts to Address the Conflict in the Darfur Region of the Sudan. CONF/PLG/2(1)
[40] For a detailed discussion of the AU performance in Darfur see Eric Reeves, "The UN Security Council and a final Betrayal of Darfur. (Sudan Tribune, June 23, 2006) <http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article567-p1.html> Accessed on September 22, 2008. Also see Williams 2006; Zwanenburg 2006; De Waal 2007; and Udombana 2007

Somali conflict. Nevertheless, using the performance of AMIS in Darfur as a yardstick, we may conclude that the AU needs to overcome enormous challenges in the area of funding, logistics, training, and administrative requirements to ensure the full operationalisation of APSA, especially the ASF to play a meaningful role in resolving conflicts in Africa.[41]

In sum, the establishment of APSA which authorises the PSC to intervene in member states in grave circumstances regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide which are the key concerns of human security, gives an indication of the willingness of African leaders to deal with the peace and security deficits on the African continent. At least in theory, African leaders have committed themselves to shelve the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the interest of pursuing 'collective human security' in the spirit of its slogan— African solutions for Africa's problems. Human *in*security in Africa has implications for global security governance especially in the context of operationalising chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this sense, APSA has implications for the foreign policy of states beyond the borders of Africa. It is within these premises that the next section takes a closer look at Canadian foreign policy towards APSA.

Canada and the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)[42]

Since the turn of the twentieth century, Canadian foreign policy in Africa has witnessed a shift towards institutional capacity building in the AU to promote of peace and security in Africa. Although aid constitutes a central pillar of the Canadian government's policy in Africa,

---

[41] See Malan (2005), Klingebiel (2005) for some insightful comments about the challenges facing the AU.
[42] It should be noted that Canada has no official foreign policy towards APSA. Therefore I use 'Canadian foreign policy towards APSA' to connote the Canadian government's engagement with APSA

the partnership with Africa's regional organisations to promote peace and security is an important dimension of contemporary Canadian foreign policy in Africa. As argued in Chapter Three, Canada's security relationship with Africa is not new since Canadian forces have participated in several UN peacekeeping operations in African states including the first UN peacekeeping in the Congo in 1960, and recently in Somalia and Rwanda. Moreover, Canadian armed forces played a limited peacekeeping role during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War beginning in the late 2000s.

Aside from peacekeeping, Canada has a long history of providing military assistance to African governments and armed forces. In the immediate post-independence era, Canadian armed forces assisted Commonwealth countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania to build their militaries. After Ghana's independence in 1957, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah became distrustful of the British in the Ghana army and replaced them with Canadians after making a request for military assistance to Prime Minister Diefenbaker in 1961.[43] Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's government in Nigeria followed Ghana's lead and asked Canada to assist in the training of Nigerian cadets in Canada. The Canadian government, after receiving a similar request from Tanzania in 1964, authorised the formation of the Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania to assist in the establishment and training of a professional army and air force for Tanzania. Canada's key policy objective during this period was to foster democratic and pro-western governments in these post-independence African countries. Thus, during the Cold War, Canadian military assistance was used as a tool to prevent the spread of communism in Africa (Onwumere 1978; Godefroy 2005; Kilford 2009). Yet, the request for

---

[43] See, CIA Released Documents, " Implications of Ghana's Diplomatic Rupture with UK" <http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/75/0000652174/IMPLICATIONS-OF.html> Accessed on June 30, 2009

military assistance from African states and the partnerships that were developed with Canada through training and advisory services speak a lot about the trust and positive perception that African states have for Canada. After refurbishing its military assistance to developing non-NATO countries through the establishment of the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP), the Canadian armed forces has continued and expanded military assistance to several African states including Burundi, Egypt, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Senegal.[44] Canada's military assistance in the post-Cold War period is largely conceived as a means through which Canada can share the burden of peacekeeping by assisting in the training of a larger number of African peacekeeping forces (Rasiulis 2001). However, just like development assistance, Canada's bilateral military assistance to African states lacks generosity and has been provided in somewhat ad hoc and inconsistent manner.

Traditionally, Canada's military relations in Africa are focused at the inter-state level. What is intriguing and relatively new in the twenty first century is Canada's growing security partnership with Africa's regional organisations, primarily, the AU and ECOWAS. It can be said that both theoretical and practical factors account for Canada's response to peace and security challenges in Africa. In theory, the establishment of APSA which epitomises the resolve by African leaders to tackle the peace and security deficit on the African continent appears to be the central motivating factor that is responsible for the shift in Canadian foreign policy focus in Africa in recent years. A top AU official referred to the emerging security engagement as "the watershed" of the AU-Canada bilateral relations.[45] This is supported by practical factors. As Paul

---

[44] See, "Military Officers from 12 African Countries attend Peace Support Course conducted by Canadian Forces" <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/highlights-faits/peace_course-cours_paix.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on March 12, 2010
[45] Interview with a senior AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2, 2008

Williams (2007: 1021) argues "the world judges Africa to be its most insecure region". Events such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the memories of the Canadian General, Roméo Dallaire, who commanded the UN peacekeeping troops at the time (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003), as well as the impact of violent conflicts on civilian populations that are reported by the media (popularly called the *CNN effect* or what can equally be called in Canada, *the CBC impact*), appear to have awakened the conscience of the international community, including Canada, to support the AU's initiative to promote peace and security.

In the context of the NEPAD, Canada was the first country to initiate formal arrangement with the AU to support the operationalisation of APSA through the CFA. As noted in Chapter Four, the Chrétien government allocated $4 million out of the $500 million CFA to strengthen the peace and security capacity building of APSA. Under the Contribution Arrangement with the AU, the $4 million was meant to support unarmed military observer missions; political mediation; peace support operations; institutional capacity building; as well as support for the AU Special Representative for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (CIDA 2004:9).

The programmes that were supported by the CFA reflected the Canadian government's human security agenda. The bulk of the Canadian government's support was narrowly concentrated on the capacity building of the African Standby Force (ASF) to protect civilians in violent conflicts. Thus, Canada indirectly supported the AU's authority and its intervention mandate on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Just like its development programmes in African states, CIDA was the main executing agency of the Canadian

191

government's funding for the ASF, although DFAIT, DND, as well as the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) were also involved at various implementation levels.[46]

Normative Impulse of the Canadian Government's Support for APSA

The APSA was launched at a time when human security was the central focus of Canadian foreign policy under the Liberal governments of Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin (1993-2006). As argued in Chapter Two, Canada performed key leadership roles to create the Ottawa Treaty on the Ban on Landmines, the Responsibility to Protect, and the International Criminal Court which are the three key instruments to promote human security in the international system. Coincidentally, the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Common African Defence and Security Policy, and the PSC Protocol which are the three key legal instruments for promoting peace, security, stability, and regional integration in Africa, contain normative conventions that are central to the promotion of human security in Africa, and therefore made the AU security agenda on human security consistent with the Canadian government's foreign policy objectives.

The normative conventions which are contained in the above AU legal instruments especially, the PSC Protocol which established the APSA, placed emphasis on the 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; the 1997 Kempton Park Plan of Action on a Landmines Free Africa; the 2000 Bamako Declaration on the Common African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons; the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights; the 1948 Universal Declaration of

---

[46] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa, January 16, 2008

Human Rights; the 2000 Lome Framework for and OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government; and the 2000 Lome Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). Indeed what unifies these normative conventions is that they indicate the political will of African leaders to collectively address the threats to peace and security especially, the protection of civilians in Africa. Consequently, these conventions as well as other AU decisions, culminated in the inclusion in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the right of the Union (AU) to intervene in member states in grave circumstances of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, as well as serious threats to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability to member states of the Union.

The AU's intervention mandate in Article 4(h) and also in Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act is the single most important provision that places constraint on the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in the interest of promoting human security in situations of violent conflict. As a result, the AU's intervention mandate is closely aligned with the principles of the R2P that reconciles humanitarian intervention with state sovereignty (ICISS 2001: xii-xiii). Although there are fundamental differences in the understanding of human security in Canada and Africa, the AU security agenda especially its intervention mandate falls in line with the Canadian government's human security agenda that was based on the protection of civilians in violent conflict. To this end, it appears that the Liberal government's interest in supporting the operationalisation of APSA was as a result of the convergence of the understanding with the AU to protect civilians during violent conflicts.

At the practical level, the emergence of intrastate conflicts in some African countries and the AU's determination to intervene through the operationalisation of APSA provided fertile grounds for the Canadian government to forge partnership with the AU as a means to advance Canada's human security policy and leadership on Africa. As one Canadian observer argued, "the drafters of the AU constitutive Act may have been influenced by the R2P doctrine of intervention, therefore, the Liberal government saw the AU's intervention mandate as an opportunity to further institutionalised the R2P principles in the international system by helping to building the capacity of the AU standby force (ASF)".[47] In other words, the Canadian government realised that the incorporation of R2P ideas in the AU intervention mandate was a major step forward to redefine sovereignty and non-intervention in order to protect people in violent situations.

The AU's intervention mandate provided the first opportunity to give a 'practical meaning' to the principles of R2P in light of the fact that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide which are the catalyst for intervention are codified into international law under the Rome Statute that established the ICC. In this context, the AU intervention mandate provided a clearer set of criteria for intervention unlike the R2P (Powell and Tieku 2005). It follows that the Canadian government's support for the operationalisation of APSA provided an opportunity to legitimise Canada's leadership and commitment to advance new international norms to protect people in violent conflicts.

It is equally important to note that by supporting APSA, the Canadian government together with other G8 members tacitly recognised the authority and responsibility of the AU

---

[47] Interview with official of the Peacebuild in Ottawa, January 22, 2008

to intervene in conflicts in accordance with the provision of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Indeed, Canada was the leader of a Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations which was adopted as part of the G8 Africa Action Plan for the implementation of the NEPAD initiative in Kananaskis in 2002. The central aim of the Africa/G8 plan, which informed Canada's contribution to the AU, was to strengthen the capacity of the AU to enable it to conduct peace support operations in accordance with the UN Charter (Africa Action Plan: 3-5)[48]

Aside from the normative issues especially regarding the rationalisation of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty, ethical considerations also appear to have informed Canada's support for APSA. In many respects, this was largely derived from the emerging understanding of the linkage between underdevelopment and insecurity in Africa. The security-development nexus provided strategic opportunity for Canada to project its values in Africa. As noted earlier, Paul Williams argues that "the world (including Canada) judges Africa as its most unsecured region". In this respect, the norms that govern Canadian development assistance especially the promotion of human rights and the eradication of poverty and mass suffering played a key role to influence the Canadian government's policy towards APSA. As a top Canadian official in Addis Ababa remarked, "Canada's support for APSA was based on the understanding that there is the need for the international community to help resolve violent conflict and promote human rights and development on the African continent".[49]

---

[48] For further details see, " Joint Africa/G8 Plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations" <http://en.g8russia.ru/g8/history/evian2003/16/> Accessed on August 20, 2008
[49] Interview with a top official in the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008

Related to the ethical overtone, other Canadian government officials[50] expressed the view that Canada's approach to APSA was based on the principles of aid effectiveness to allow African ownership and leadership to resolve conflicts that also impact on human security and human development. It can therefore be argued that the perception of the AU as an institution in need of 'help' to operationalise APSA was an important factor that influenced the Canadian government's support. This was very well expressed by a key AU official that "Canada supports the AU because Prime Minister Chretien once said Canada has a moral obligation to assist Africa"[51] to promote human security and development. Although one cannot deny the dire security and development challenges in some African states, the construction of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden informed the Canadian government's policy. That is, the Canadian government framed its support for APSA as a moral responsibility towards Africa. We can perhaps agree with Chris Brown (2001) that the deployment of resources to promote human security—and I will add 'the construction of Africa as a conflict-ridden continent'—risks perpetuating an "unfortunate stereotype of Africa as victim" (Brown: 211).

The Canadian government saw the creation of APSA and its components units such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Panel of the Wise (PW) as important innovations for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Especially the Liberal government saw the PW as embedded in the culture of African people.[52] The establishment of APSA is a demonstration of African leadership and ownership and therefore Canada was attracted to provide support and

---

[50] These include officials from CIDA, Foreign Affairs as well As diplomats in Accra and Addis Ababa.
[51] Interview with a senior AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008
[52] Interview with a top Canadian official in Addis Ababa

advance its human security agenda in Africa. In accordance with the so-called moral obligation towards Africa, the Canadian government's support for APSA can be understood as providing 'aid for security.'[53] In this light, it helped in the exportation of Canadian values of human rights, human security, and especially peacekeeping in Africa.

Human Security by Proxy—Promoting Human Security with AU Leadership

As noted in Chapter Four, the language of human security actually does not feature prominently in the CFA document. Again, CIDA and DFAIT officials maintained that the central objective of the Canadian government's assistance was to support the AU's leadership to build the institutional capacity of APSA to respond to threats to peace and security on the African continent. Consistent with this, AU officials said that Canada was not interested in interfering in AU policy. Unlike the United States, European Union (EU), Britain and France who normally insist on their own way, Canada preferred to work within the confines of AU policy as the AU takes leadership to promote human security in Africa.[54] The Canadian government's support to APSA was flexible and demand-driven based on AU priorities. In this light, it is understandable when some officials of Canadian NGOs concluded that the connection between Canada's human security policy and APSA was not tight, on the ground.[55] Perhaps this was the case because APSA is still a work in process. It is not fully operationalised to take charge of the enormous human security challenges on the African continent.

---

[53] I use 'security aid' to mean the provision of support purposely for security related capacity building in the AU in the contrast with development assistance/aid to individual African countries.
[54] Interview with African Union officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in April and May 2008
[55] This idea was expressed by several NGO officials during interviews in Ottawa January 16-31, 2008

Both Canadian and African officials said that Canada's role was to support the AU's leadership without intervening in the internal politics or practices of the AU. Canada performed a supportive role by providing funding and technical advice and not a direct role of intervening in African conflicts to promote human security. This indicates that unlike in the past when Canada put 'boots on the ground' in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, there was a shift towards an indirect approach to promote human security through the Canadian government's support for strengthening the capacity of APSA. Canada saw the need for Africa to build its own capacity for peace and security with the AU taking ownership and leadership to find African solutions for Africa's problems.

The AU's leadership to promote peace and security is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity as it will help to reduce the burden of peacekeeping on the UN system (Knight 1996). However, one Canadian critic said that Canada's indirect approach in promoting human security "is a way for Canada to get rid of direct involvement in African conflicts".[56] Canada's assistance to build the capacity of APSA may prevent a situation whereby the Canadian military is called to play a direct role in resolving conflicts on the African continent. Interestingly, the evidence supports this perception. Canada's troop contribution to peacekeeping operations especially in the UN system has been declining especially since the mid-1990s (Dorn 2005). For instance, according to the UN Department of Peacekeeping August 2008 ranking of military and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, Canada ranked 53rd with a mere 168 troops to UN peacekeeping operations whiles Pakistan sat at the top with 10, 574 troops.[57] In the case of UN peacekeeping in Africa, Canada's troop contribution to Darfur is not significant

---

[56] Interview with an NGO official in Ottawa, January 16, 2008
[57] See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/aug08_2.pdf>

even though the Darfur crisis occurred at the height of Canada's global campaign for human security. In total, fifty Canadian forces and twenty five police officers have participated in peacekeeping in Sudan as at the end of September, 2008.[58]

Of course, the Sudanese government maintained that only African troops will be allowed in Darfur.[59] Although, the Liberal government did not show keen interest in deploying Canadian troops, the Sudanese government's resistance to non-African troops provided a window of opportunity for the Harper government to further shift Canada's responsibility in UN peacekeeping to African states. Indeed, Harper made it clear that Canada will not contribute troops to UNAMID which replaced AMIS in Darfur in January 2008. The reason for the cut in Canadian peacekeeping contributions in terms of military personnel was that according to the Conservative government, Canadian forces have been stretched thin by years of budget cuts as well as the war against terror in Afghanistan.[60] In other words, the mission in Afghanistan served Canada's strategic interest than participating in peacekeeping in Darfur. Even though it may be early to say that the Canadian government's indirect approach to promoting human security through AU's leadership will culminate into a permanent policy, there are reasons to believe that this is going to be the case in the unforeseeable future.

The discussion that follows, although not exhaustive, will provide adequate information to back the argument that Canadian forces may not have to directly participate in African conflicts in the unforeseeable future. The argument is focused centrally on the Canadian

[58] See, DFAIT <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/site/security-securite-en.asp)> Accessed on September 28, 2008

[59] Daniel Leblanc (The Globe and Mail May 17, 2005). "Ottawa to comply with ban on troops in Darfur". Also see <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2004seaisland_final/18_2004_seaisland_final.pdf> accessed on September 24, 2008

[60] http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060514/qp_dallaire060514/20060515?hub=Canada Accessed on September 24, 2008

government's support for peace and security capacity building of the ASF. In fact African officials in the AU hold the view that the Canadian government is very concerned about the safety of Canadian personnel in African conflicts.[61] Not surprisingly, Canada was involved at the diplomatic level, as well as in the provision of funding, expert advice, logistics, and training for African troops instead of providing assistance in the form of direct participation of Canadian forces in peacekeeping operations in Africa. To some extent the principles of NEPAD as well as the Constitutive Act of the AU and the PSC Protocol itself which calls for Africa's leadership and ownership on peace, security and development, has provided Canada with the opportunity to refrain from direct involvement in protecting human security in Africa through peacekeeping. In this light, one could understand the justification for Canada's support for strengthening the capacity of APSA and the recent Canadian forces disengagement in direct peacekeeping operations to promote human security in Africa.

Canada was offloading the burden of direct participation in peacekeeping operations— in terms of the potential human cost—by concentrating on building the capacity of the ASF. Aside from the emerging normative environment in the AU— the AU's efforts to build its own capacity for peacekeeping—that provided Canada with the opportunity to pursue this line of policy, it appears that the 'Canadian body bags' from the Afghanistan mission in recent years, has raised public concern about the safety of Canadian forces in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.[62] Perhaps, as more dangerous as African conflicts are perceived, it was natural that

---

[61] Interview with AU officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2, 2008
[62] See Public Support for Afghan Mission Lowest Ever: Poll (CBC New, Friday 5 September 2008) <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/09/05/poll-afghan.html> Accessed on October 3, 2008

the Canadian government—both Liberals and Conservative—refrained from making any commitments to send troops to places such as Darfur.

Canada is not a major power on the African scene, yet it has been one of the countries that have maintained consistent support for strengthening the capacity of the ASF. As mentioned earlier, the Canadian government allocated $4million from the CFA towards the strengthening of the peace and security capacity of the AU. The Contribution Arrangement for this funding was signed on September 20, 2003 by the AU Commission and the Canadian government. According to the Contribution Arrangement, the purpose of the funding was to assist the AU to respond speedily and effectively to emerging crisis. The Contribution Arrangement covered broad activities which included rapid response mechanism for civilian/non military peace and security and humanitarian issues.[63] This suggests that the funding was for all other activities regarding conflict prevention, management and resolution except for the provision of military hardware for the ASF. Even though APSA has other institutional components, the Canadian government assistance was concentrated on peacekeeping training for African military, gendarmerie and police forces as well as the civilian component of ASF.

The Canadian government's support was provided within the context of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations which was part of the G8 Africa Action Plan. The aim of the Joint African/G8 Plan was to mobilise technical and financial assistance to help the AU so that APSA will be able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflicts and undertake peace support operations in

---

[63] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 2, 2008

accordance with the UN Charter by 2010.[64] In accordance with this objective the Canadian government provided funding as well as technical support through the Canadian military and the PPC to the African Peacekeeping Centres of Excellence (APCE) that were established to train Africans in conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

The APCE is made up of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, that offers peace support training at the operational level; the African Center for Strategic Research and Studies (ACSRS) which is part of the National War College in Abuja, Nigeria, that offers training at the strategic level; and the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix (EMP) in Bamako, Mali, which concentrates on training at the tactical level. The main area of Canadian support for the APCE was the provision of technical and advisory support on peace support operations courses for the military, civilian police, gendarmerie, and civilians including officials of the AU, African government officials as well as civil society organisations. It is important to mention that the Canadian government allocated $4 million out of the $15 million West Africa Peace and Security Initiative envelope of the CFA to assist in the strengthening of the capacity of the KAIPTC.

The Canadian government's contribution to the APCE was important for building the capacity of the ASF; however, there were concerns among African officials that the courses that were taught especially at the KAIPTC lacked African content on human security. Canada sent PPC experts as course officials and decided who should take part in the training courses. Thus, there was the danger of creating a system of dependency regarding the training of African

---

[64] See the G8 Africa Action Plan, from the Kananaskis Summit 2002

peacekeepers.[65] As one official commented, "Canadian courses that are thought at KAIPTC are not adequately based on the lessons learned from Africa's experience in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention'.[66] Nonetheless, it appears that the dependence on PPC staff which was largely blamed for the lack of African content in the courses was a short term measure to allow the KAIPTC time to build its own capacity to run training courses.[67] Indeed, the KAIPTC has initiated course reviews to incorporate African content into the courses that Canada supports. It is hoped that this will have a trickling down effect of reducing the dependence on PPC staff.[68] It is important to add that although the CFA has officially ended, funding to the APCE including the KAIPTC will continue under the Global Peace and Security Fund in DFAIT.[69] It can therefore be argued that except perhaps in a situation of budget cutbacks, at least in theory, Canada has shown long term commitment to help to train Africans to take charge of peacekeeping operation.

Aside from the support for training at the APCE, the DND has sponsored military officers of the ASF as well as officers from AU member states to undergo training in Canadian military institutions. African military personnel have benefited from courses and training partnerships in several areas that include army operations, junior command and staff, civil military relations, integrated peace mission, online English and French language training, and chaplaincy training

---

[65] Interview with KAIPTC officials in Accra, February-March 2008
[66] Ibid
[67] Ironically in my interview with Canadian officials, they expressed discomfort about British influence at KAIPTC, which is true because the top level executives at the KAIPTC are packed with British officers. What this means is that Canadian attempts at incorporating African content in the courses it supports may encounter administrative setbacks at KAIPTC.
[68] Interview with KAIPTC officials Accra, February-March 2008
[69] For more information see, " The Global Peace Operations Programme" (Ottawa, DFAIT July 14, 2008) <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpop-pomsp.aspx?menu_id=96&menu=R> Also see , " Focus on the future: the legacy of the Canada fund for Africa" (Ottawa, CIDA June 19, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/prnEn/MAR-619131753-NAQ> Accessed on August 28, 2008

in Canadian institutions such as Aldershot Training Center, Canadian Land Staff Command and College, and the Canadian Forces Chaplain School.[70] Furthermore, to demonstrate Canada's commitment to transfer expert knowledge to the AU, Canadian military officers were involved at various levels to develop the capacity of the ASF. For instance Canadian military officers took part in an AU Working Group that was mandated to develop logistical depot for ASF.[71] The Canadian government's commitment towards a long term capacity building of the ASF became evident when the Canadian military launched Operation AUGURAL that focused on providing an expert advice and training in strategic planning, air operations, contracting, logistics and operations planning, and land operations to AMIS in Darfur.[72] The Canadian government also provided equipments to the AU. For instance, Canada donated IT equipments worth $81, 000 dollars which was used by the Canadian Information Support Team to the Darfur Integrated Task Force which was part of AMIS.[73] With regards to AMIS operations in Darfur itself, the Canadian government provided several equipments which I will discuss in the next section.

Within AU circles, the Canadian government was revered as among the independent, generous and flexible contributors to APSA. This reinforces the perception that Canada is a moral actor in Africa. As one official of the ASF puts it, "Canada is always ready to help the AU to build the capacity of ASF".[74] A case in point was that at an ASF training implementation workshop in October 2007, the AU identified senior mission courses as the missing link in the training needs of ASF. Despite its avowed foreign policy focus on Afghanistan and the Americas, Stephen Harper's Conservative government pledged to support the training courses for the

[70] See the Africa Clearing House- Activity Programme 2008 Onwards (final version 18.04.2008)
[71] Letter dated November 22, 2006 from the Canadian Embassy, Addis Ababa.
[72] See (http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/augural/index_e.asp) Accessed on September 22, 2008
[73] Letter dated January 28, 2008 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU.
[74] Interview with an AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 25, 2008

senior mission officers.[75] In addition, the Conservative government reiterated Canada's commitment to support the capacity building of the ASF. According to the Foreign Minister, Maxime Bernier, peace and security is at the heart of good governance, poverty reduction and economic development and that is why contributing to peace and security in Africa is a priority of the Canadian government.[76]

In April 2008, the Conservative government announced to provide $10.3 million out of the Global Peace and Security Fund to the PPC for the strengthening of African peace and security capacity over the next three years.[77] According to the Conservative government, $7.9 million will be used to support the Pan-African Police Project for peace support operations up to March 2010. Among other things, the Pan-African Police Project aims at strengthening the capacity of African countries to be able to contribute more effectively to civilian police components of peacekeeping operations of the UN and AU. The remaining $2.4 will be used to train African personnel for peace missions as well as to improve the institutional capacity and coordination of the APCE.[78] Generally speaking, it appears that this new funding was to demonstrate that Canada will continue to provide support, albeit not substantial under Harper, to the AU and other regional organisations. This will help to train, integrate, and deploy civilian police to emerging conflicts on the African continent.[79] Putting the Harper support in context, it can be said that Canada may refrain from intervening directly in African conflicts as long as it continues to provide training and other forms of support to the AU to build the capacity of the

---

[75] Interview with an AU official in Addis Ababa, May 2, 2008

[76] See Canada Announces Important Contributions to Strengthen Peacekeeping in Africa (DFAIT, April 16, 2008) <http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&Language=E&publication_id=386082&docnumber=90>Accessed on October 6, 2008

[77] Ibid

[78] Ibid

[79] Africa Clearing House-Activity Programme 2008 onwards (final version 18.04.2008)

ASF. Indeed, the funding from the Harper government demonstrates Canada's commitment to peace and security and at the same time helps to maintain Canada's moral image in Africa.

From the above discussion it appears that a 'new bilateral security relations' is emerging in Canadian foreign policy in Africa as there appears to be a shift to strengthen the capacity of Africa's regional bodies especially the ASF. The AU has achieved the status as an 'acceptable authority' to intervene in African states to promote human security. As Jakkie Cilliers (2008:1) has rightly pointed out, the PSC Protocol and the ASF demonstrate a serious political commitment to the conflict prevention and management initiatives of an invigorated AU. The Canadian government appears to share this view and therefore has joined the bandwagon of states especially the G8 members to forge closer relations with the AU to promote peace and security in Africa. To this end, Canada supports the AU leadership on intervention through the ASF capacity building. However, Canada has also shown lack of interest in deploying troops to directly support peacekeeping operations in Africa. This in essence is what I call human security by proxy. The following case study on Darfur will shed more light on the idea of human security by proxy.

Promoting Human Security by Proxy: The Case of Darfur[80]

The violent conflict that erupted in the Darfur region in the Sudan in February 2003[81] has been a test case of the will and might of the African Union as well as Canada's commitment to APSA to prevent another humanitarian tragedy in Africa since the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

---

[80] A version of this section has been submitted for publication in the Journal of Conflict Studies.
[81] Although the Darfur region over the past decades has experienced intermittent low intensity conflicts, the current crises began when the Sudan Liberation Army launched an attack and captured Gulu, one of the Cities in Darfur in February 2003.

Indeed, the human security challenges in Darfur are diverse but two main characterisations sum up this ongoing tragedy. United States officials have labelled the situation as 'genocide' and the UN refers to it as 'the worst humanitarian situation in the world'.[82]

In accordance with the multilateralist approach to foreign policy, Canada has refrained from giving names to the Darfur situation. Rather, Canada appears to have accepted the UN's characterisation of the conflict as the worst humanitarian situation in the world. The Martin government and to some extent the Harper government provided diverse support to AMIS and recently to African troops in the UNAMID to assist in the protection of civilians and the overall efforts to bring durable peace in Darfur. In practice, therefore, both the Liberal and Conservative governments relied on AU leadership through the AMIS without providing 'boots on the ground' in Darfur. This amounts to human security by proxy. In fact the idea of human security by proxy as an alternative Canadian policy in Darfur originates from the 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.* Prime Minister Martin stated that "Canada will work closely with the African Union to improve its ability to restore security and bring stability to the region (Darfur), and we will do more in the areas of training, equipment and logistical support".[83] Although I may tacitly imply in the analysis that follow, my objective is not to examine the performance of AMIS which has been well treated by others (Williams 2006; Zwanenburg 2006; De Waal 2007; Udombana 2007). Rather, the rest of the chapter examines the Canadian government response to the Darfur crisis.

---

[82] See " UN Human Rights Fact Finding Mission Arrives in Sudan" (UN News Center, 22 April 2004) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10493&Cr=sudan&Cr1> Accessed on September 1, 2008
[83] See "Forward from the Prime Minister", Government of Canada, "Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World". Overview Booklet, Ottawa:2005

Some insights about the AU's efforts through AMIS will pave the way for an examination of the Canadian government's response to the Darfur crisis. The main parties in the Darfur conflict are the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M). In the course of the violence, other groups have emerged such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the "Janjaweed" militia—a 'private' militant group that is supported by the Sudanese government. The Janjaweed militia is accused of deliberately targeting civilians who are perceived as supporting the SPLA/M and JEM. Initially, the AU adopted a mediation approach (finding political settlement) to resolve the conflict in the form of inter-Sudanese meetings through a Chadian Mediation Team led by President Idriss Deby.[84]

The mediation efforts of the AU/Chadian Mediation Team culminated in the signing on April 8, 2004, the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in which the Government of the Sudan, SLA/M, and JEM agreed to "...cease hostilities and proclaim a ceasefire for a period of 45 days which is automatically renewable unless opposed by one of the parties; establish a Joint Commission and a Ceasefire Commission with the participation of the international community, including the African Union; free all prisoners of war and all other persons detained because of the armed conflict in Darfur; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency relief to the displaced persons and other civilians victims of the war".[85]

To ensure the effective monitoring and implementation of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, the AU initiated the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks to find a political

---

[84] See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), 5th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2004. CONF/PLG 3(1) pp.1-7
[85] Ibid.

settlement to the Darfur Conflict. As well, the PSC established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) chaired by the AU and the International community (which was represented by the EU through France) as the deputy chair. The PSC also authorised the establishment of the AU Monitoring Mission (AMIS) as the operational arm of the CFC.[86] Subsequently, a small AU observer mission of one hundred and sixty two (162) persons made up of both military and civilians with twenty four (24) support staff was deployed to Darfur on a $26 million budget. The bulk of the funding came from the EU, United States, UK, Germany, and Canada.

The small AU observer mission which included the Sudanese parties to the conflict, the Chadian Mediation Team, and representatives of AU member states and the international community, had no enforcement mandate to ensure the strict adherence to the humanitarian ceasefire agreement. International humanitarian law was violated and serious human rights abuses were committed especially by the Janjaweed militias with the tacit support of the Sudanese government.[87] The breach of the humanitarian ceasefire agreement caused massive refugee flows into neighbouring countries like Chad. As well, several thousands of Darfurians have become internally displaced persons (IDPs). In several reports, the AU Commissioner, Alpha Oumar Konare, described the humanitarian situation in Darfur as precarious, grave, and as a matter of very serious concern.[88] Indeed, conservative estimates assert that several thousands of people have died. Moreover, about 2.3 million of the 6 million inhabitants in the

---

[86] Communiqué on Darfur of the Solemn Launching of the 10th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa 25 May 2005. See also Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur(the Sudan) presented at the 12th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa 4 July 2004

[87] For instance see, " Sudan 'backs' Janjaweed Fighters" (BBC News October 18, 2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6060976.stm > also see " Janjaweed loyalty to Bashir under strain" (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, January 27, 2009) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IWPR,,SDN,456d621e2,49817d40c,0.html> Accessed on August 13, 2009

[88] For instance see the "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), 5th Meeting of the PSC", Addis Ababa, 13 April 2004. CONF/PLG 3(1)

Darfur region are IDPs who are supported by an equally vulnerable population of conflict-affected residents of about 390,000 people.[89] The gravity of the Darfur conflict was also reflected in a report by two high-ranking UN officials including the Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, who suggested that the death toll of the five-year conflict has risen to 300,000 people.[90]

According to the AU, the persistent human *in*security in Darfur was as a result of the inadequate troops on the ground, lack of logistics and equipments, bad state of infrastructure in Darfur, and insufficient funding for AMIS. Consequently, the AU through the assistance of its partners including Canada enhanced the observer mission with a protection force of about 7700 personnel comprising of 6171 military personnel and 1560 civilian police personnel. Furthermore, the mandate of AMIS was expanded to protect civilians under imminent threat it being understood that this was the primary responsibility of the Sudanese government; protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity within capabilities; provide visible military presence by patrolling and by establishing temporary outpost in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population; establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police authorities; and investigate and report all matters of police non-compliance with the humanitarian ceasefire agreement.[91]

On the diplomatic front, the AU efforts through the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, and other negotiations involving AU partners, culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace

---

[89] Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur(the Sudan) presented at the 23rd Meeting of the PSC, Libreville 10 January 2005
[90] See " Darfur's Death Toll Could be as High as 300,000: UN Official" (CBC News 22 April 2008) <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/04/22/darfur-un.html> Accessed on September 27, 2008
[91] Communiqué of the 17th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa 20 October 2004

Agreement (DPA) between the government of the Sudan and the SPLA/M on May 5, 2006. The DPA set the modalities to provide lasting peace in Darfur.[92] Nonetheless, the DPA was widely criticised as 'dead-on arrival' since the negotiations for peace was rushed to a premature conclusion as the UN Security Council demanded that the mediation meets a deadline of April 30, 2006 to conclude the peace talks. As a result a key rebel movement, the JEM, did not sign the final document.[93] Through a partnership agreement with the UN, and in spite of the resistance from the Sudanese government against non-African troops in Darfur, AMIS was transformed into the UNAMID in January 2008 with an authorised force of 26,000. The partnership agreement between the AU and UN reflected the demands of the Sudanese government[94] to the effect that UNAMID should have an African character and as far as possible the troops should be sourced from African countries.[95] As a result all the key personnel of UNAMID were drawn from Africa including the Joint AU-UN Special Representative, Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo), the Deputy Joint AU-UN Special Representative, Henry Anyidoho (Ghana), the Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations and Management, Hocine Medili (Algeria), the Force Commander, Gen. Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria), and the Police Commissioner, Michael J. Fryer (South Africa).[96]

---

[92] As indicated, the Peace Agreement was signed between the government of the Sudan and the largest rebel group, the SPLA/M. The other party to the conflict, JEM has not signed the agreement.

[93] See, Alex de Waal, "Darfur Peace Agreement: So Near, So Far" (28 September 2006, Open Democracy) <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa_democracy/darfur_talks_3950.jsp> Accessed on March 12, 2010

[94] The Sudanese government has on several occasions maintained that only African forces are welcomed in Darfur. The Sudanese government made it clear to the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, Rick Hiller that non-African troops were not welcome in Darfur. Nossal (2005)

[95] See UN, "Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007)" Adopted by the by the Security Council at its 5727 Meeting on 31 July2007. S/RES/1769(2007) Also see the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union on the hybrid operation in Darfur. UN Security Council document S/2007/307/Rev.1

[96] See " Darfur-UNAMID- Facts and Figures" (UNAMID) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html> Accessed on May 10, 2009

The mandate of UNAMID is not different from the expanded mandate of AMIS, however, there were important additions such as the provision of support for the early implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); preventing the disruption of the DPA implementation and armed attacks; and the protection of civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of the Sudan.[97] Operationally, UNAMID is faced with similar obstacles that confronted the AMIS. Although it is widely acknowledged that the UN is better resourced to resuscitate the failing AMIS intervention, only 15,351 out of the 26000 troops that were authorised by the Security Council were deployed on the ground as at 31 March 2009— that is more than one year after UNAMID was created.[98] Many Western officials have accused the Sudanese government[99] for its non-compliance with the 2007 Security Council Resolution 1769 that establish UNAMID. As well, they have blamed the Sudanese government for the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur.[100] Although the Sudanese government has denied these charges, what is true is that the security situation has not improved. As of now UNAMID has not been able to guarantee the protection of civilians who are caught-up in the conflict in Darfur.

---

[97] See Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) Adopted by the by the Security Council at its 5727 Meeting on 31 July2007. S/RES/1769(2007) Also see the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union on the hybrid operation in Darfur. UN Security Council document S/2007/307/Rev.1

[98] See " Darfur-UNAMID- Facts and Figures" (UNAMID) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html> Accessed on May 10, 2009

[99] See, " Darfur death toll could be as high as 300,000: UN official" (CBC News, April 22, 2008) <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/04/22/darfur-un.html> Accessed on September 27, 2008

[100] See UN, "Security Council Authorises deployment of United Nations-African Union 'hybrid' peace operation in bid to resolve Darfur conflict. <(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9089.doc.htm> Accessed on September 27, 2008

The Canadian Support in Darfur: Interplay of Diplomacy, Development, Security

Canada's commitment to Darfur portrays a mixture of heavy emphasis on rhetoric and less substantial contribution of resources to resolve the violent conflict that has claimed several thousands of lives and displaced millions across the African continent. Consistent with the idea of protecting human security by proxy, the Liberal government of Paul Martin relied heavily on the AU leadership and adopted a three-pronged approach in the areas of diplomacy, development, and security, to respond to the Darfur crisis. The three-pronged approach— diplomacy, development, and security—originated from the 2005 *International Policy Statement: A role of Pride and Influence in the World*, in which the Liberal government proposed to breath a new life into Canada's global responsibilities with regards to the military, international assistance, and diplomatic presence that has suffered from the federal budget cuts in the 1990s.[101] The three-pronged approach to Darfur has persisted under the Harper government although there are notable differences in terms of the resource contribution and the overall commitment to protect human security in Darfur.

With the notable exception of development assistance, the Liberal government's efforts in the areas of diplomacy and security (intervention) were channelled through the AU. On diplomacy, the Liberal government was an active participant in the Darfur peace process. The government used both bilateral and multilateral channels including statements in the UN to put pressure on the Sudanese government to end the human rights abuses and violence in

---

[101] See, Forward from Prime Minister", Government of Canada, "International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World" Ottawa: 2005

Darfur.[102] Although Canada played a key role in UN multilateral efforts, it appears that emphasis was placed on bilateral relations with the AU. Canada was among the few countries that were invited by the AU to participate in the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which was a major AU diplomatic effort to find a peaceful settlement to the Darfur crisis. The Martin government provided financial support and expert advice through the Canadian diplomats in Abuja to the AU in the course of the Abuja Peace Talks. For instance, as at October 2007, Canadian funding to the Abuja Peace Talks totalled $229, 143.68.[103] Even though this contribution appears limited and perhaps symbolic, it kept Canada actively engaged in the peace process in Darfur.

Paul Martin appointed a Special Advisory Team in May 2005 led by his Personal Representative for Africa, Robert Fowler, and including Senators Mobina Jaffer and Roméo Dallaire to strengthen Canada's diplomatic support to the AU leadership on Darfur. The expertise of the advisory team cannot be overemphasised. As mentioned in Chapter Four, aside from his experience in African issues, Ambassador Robert Fowler served as Prime Minister Chrétien's Special Representative for Africa and Sherpa of the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002. On his part, Senator Roméo Dallaire has in-depth experience in African conflicts as the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the early 1990s. Lastly, Senator Mobina Jaffer is the first Muslim and the first African-born to sit in the Canadian Senate. As an African and a Muslim, she brought an important experience to engage with the Muslim dominated Sudanese government.

---

[102] See <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/site/diplomacy-diplomatie-en.asp>Accessed on September 28, 2008

[103] I received this information from the AU Department of Finance during my field research in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The knowledge of the advisory team on Africa added some urgency to the Liberal government's commitment to Darfur. It appeared that the Liberal government was putting some weight behind the rhetoric of promoting human security in Darfur. Aside from participating in the Abuja Peace Talks, the Special Advisory Team had the mandate to oversee all aspects of Canada's initiatives in Darfur including the files of the Darfur Task Force that was set up in DFAIT. By putting words into action, the Martin government requested that the AU Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konare, make time to meet Ambassador Robert Fowler in Brussels on May 16, 2005 to discuss Canada's support to AMIS and identify other areas where Canada can be of further assistance to the AU in the Darfur peace process.[104]

The Martin government's diplomatic engagement on Darfur was also focused on traditional multilateralism in the UN where Canada played an active role in the Human Rights Council to ensure that the Council was involved in monitoring the human rights situation in Darfur. As a result of the multilateral diplomacy in the UN, Canada became a co-chair with the United States of the "Friends of UNAMID" which aims at ensuring the swift and full deployment of UNAMID troops in Darfur. Moreover, Canada was the first country to make a voluntary contribution of $500,000 to assist the ICC in its investigations in Darfur when the Security Council in its resolution 1593 passed on March 31, 2005 decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC.[105] On March 4, 2009, the ICC issued arrest warrants for key Sudanese government

---

[104] Letter Dated May 13, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission.
[105] See (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/06/sudan11076.htm) Accessed on September 28, 2008

officials including the President, Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, to face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.[106]

In the area of development assistance, the Martin government's policy did not depend on AU leadership although the delivery of humanitarian aid complimented the overall peace efforts that were led by the AU. It is noteworthy that as part of the overall support for AU peace and security capacity building, the Liberal government contributed $500,000 to the AU to assist in humanitarian issues.[107] However, both the Martin and Harper governments' development assistance policy was focused on the provision of bilateral and multilateral aid through CIDA and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank. Since 2005, Canada has pledged over $135 million of aid to Sudan including $85 million for humanitarian assistance and $50million for reconstruction.[108] CIDA's bilateral aid is mainly focused on humanitarian assistance in three priority areas which are the reintegration of IDPs; mine action; and governance.[109] Canada's multilateral funding through the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund is focused on long-term post-conflict reconstruction projects. Furthermore, the DFAIT's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is assisting in other areas such as the implementation of Sudan's peace agreements, the rule of law, the reduction of small arms, and community security in Darfur.[110]

---

[106] The other key officials charged are the Humanitarian Affairs Minister, Ahmad Harun and militia leader Ali Kushayb for details see of the charges see (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7504640.stm) Accessed on September 28, 2008 Also see BBC, " Warrant Issued for Sudan's Leader" (BBC: March 4, 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923102.stm> Accessed on May 10, 2009

[107] See the Contribution Agreement between the Canadian government and the AU Commission on the Strengthening of the Peace and Security Capacity of the AU signed on 20 September, 2003.

[108] See (http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/library/humanitarianassistance-en.asp) Accessed on September 28, 2008

[109] Ibid

[110] The overall Canadian aid programme in Darfur is provided within the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army/ Movement on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. For full details see

As the initiator of these projects it can be said that the Martin government appeared committed not only to the political settlement of the Darfur conflict but as well, it demonstrated a commitment to the rebuilding of Darfur to protect human security. This appears to have some influence in the Harper government's response to the Darfur crisis.

On security, the Liberal government's contribution to provide "boots on the ground" was the most elaborate of all the support to the AU towards the Darfur peace process and portrays more accurately the protection of human security by proxy. In the AU, Canada found a means to avoid a direct deployment of Canadian troops as part of the international efforts to end the violence in Darfur. Indeed some have argued that the unwillingness of the Canadian government to deploy Canadian peacekeepers on the ground signifies a retreat from the promotion of the R2P doctrine (Nossal 2005; Black and Shaw 2007). Nonetheless, without a UN authorisation for international deployment in Darfur, protecting human security by proxy through the AMIS appeared to have provided an alternative route for the Canadian government to sustain the global campaign for human security. Although there were different policy choices of the Martin and the Harper governments, such as Martin's reliance on AMIS and Harper's preference for UNAMID,[111] what unites these governments is the fact that both did not deploy Canadian troops in Darfur. Harper's Conservative government to some extent has worked

---

(http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf) Also see (http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/library/humanitarianassistance-en.asp)

[111] See DFAIT, " Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the United Nations Ministerial Meeting on the Situation in Sudan" September 22, 2006 <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/speeches-discours/2006-09-22.aspx?lang=eng > Accessed on May 10, 2009

bilaterally with the AU and also multilaterally especially through NATO to provide airlift capability and training for AMIS staff.[112]

Under Martin, the support to AMIS was conceived as part of the long term process of strengthening the capacity of the AU to enable it to undertake its peace and security mandate in Africa as enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.[113] The Liberal government placed emphasis on Canada's willingness to provide support to the military and the police personnel of AMIS based on AU's request and depending on Canada's capacity.[114] In this context, the Martin government supported AMIS with expert advice, logistics and equipment, and financial contributions. The government provided experts to the AU to establish an Information Analysis Cell (IAC) which was part of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF). The DITF was among other things charged with strategic planning, procurement and logistics, liaising with AU partners, and providing management support to AMIS. The Martin government provided equipment and bore the cost of the Canadian information support team that provided training to the AMIS personnel.[115]

Related to the IAC, Canadian technical contribution was notable in other areas such as the establishment of the Joint Logistics Operation Center, map production, and intelligence capability of AMIS.[116] Through *Operation AUGURAL and operation SATURN*,[117] the Canadian

[112] See, " Canada, NATO and the International Community: Canadian Multilateral Peace Operations and Future Prospects" (DFAIT, November 4, 2008) < http://www.international.gc.ca/nato-otan/resources-ressources/speeches-allocutions/canada.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on August 13, 2009

[113] Interview with CIDA and DFAIT officials in Ottawa January 16, 2008

[114] Letter Dated May 13, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

[115] Canadian Functions Under the MOU Concerning the Contribution of a Canadian Information Support Team to the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) 2006.

[116] Letter Dated May 13, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

[117] Operation AUGURAL was set up by the Canadian Military to support AMIS. This has been transformed to Operation SATURN to support UNAMID. See "Canadian Forces Launches Contribution to UN-African Union Mission

military loaned 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) or Armoured Vehicles General Purpose (AVGPs) made up of 100 Grizzlies and 5 Husky to the AMIS operation in Darfur. In addition, the Canadian military provided more than $1.4 million worth of basic army equipments including 2000 fragmentation vests and 1900 protective helmets to AMIS.[118] Canada also provided aviation assistance through contracted helicopters to AMIS. It is noteworthy that since the transfer of AMIS operations to UNAMID in January 2008, the Harper government has committed $40 milion to purchase equipment and for providing training assistance to African countries to deploy military and civilian police to UNAMID. The sum of the Liberal and the Conservative government's contribution has made Canada the second largest voluntary contributor to UNAMID.[119]

Finally, apart from the technical support and the provision of equipments, the Canadian government's cash contributions to AMIS stood at $26, 708 340 at the end of October 2007. Most of this funding was spent on aviation fuel as well as AMIS and civilian police accommodations.[120] It is noteworthy that, related to the peace process in Darfur, Canada has also provided military and police personnel support to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS is mandated to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed by the government of the Sudan and SPLA/M on January 9, 2005 in

---

in Darfur" (CEFCOM/COMFEC NR 08.008- February 4, 2008)
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2567> Accessed on September 27, 2008
[118] See Letter Dated July 21 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission. Also see (http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/augural/index_e.asp) Accessed on September 29, 2008
[119] See <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/site/security-securite-en.asp#UNMIS> Accessed on September 29, 2008
[120] AU Department of Finance

Nairobi, Kenya. The CPA brought an end to the civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan.[121]

Assessing the Canadian Contribution to Darfur

Canada's support to AMIS especially under the Liberals acknowledged the authority and leadership of the AU to intervene in the Darfur conflict. The Conservative government also appears to see the AU leadership as important when it argued that "regional organisations are often best placed to make the most efficient contributions to peace operations. They are closer to the situation and are able to respond quickly. They understand local sensitivities. And their involvement builds regional stability."[122] To be sure, Darfur is not the first time that Canada has provided assistance to the AU or other Pan-African organisations to undertake peace support operations in Africa. In the 1990s the Chrétien government provided financial support to the OAU missions in states such as Burundi and Rwanda and during the Ethiopia-Eritrea war[123] (Mathews 2005; Powell 2005). Nonetheless, as pointed out earlier, a senior AU official I interviewed in Addis Ababa said that the Liberal government's support to the AMIS operation in Darfur "is the watershed" of Canada's bilateral peace and security relations with the AU.[124]

---

[121] For some details see, Steve Fortin, "Meanwhile in Sudan..." (The Maple Leaf, July 29, 2009) <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Commun/ml-fe/vol_12/vol12_26/1226_07.pdf > Also see, "Operation Safari" (National Defence, July 28, 2009) <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/safari/index-eng.asp> Accessed on August 18, 2009.

[122] See "Statement Issued by Canada on the Occasion of the UN Security Council High-Level Meeting on Regional Organisations, particularly the African Union and the Joint Meeting of UN Security Council- African Union Peace and Security Council" New York April 16, 2008.

[123] See Narrative and Financial Report in Respect of Canadian Contributions for Strengthening the Peace and Security Capacity of the African Union. Addis Ababa, September 2003-March 2004

[124] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 22, 2008

AU officials acknowledged Canada's 'faith' in the AMIS especially by the Martin government. According to AU officials the Martin government was flexible and attached no conditions to Canadian assistance to AMIS unlike other states such as the United States, the EU and the UK. For instance at the Brussels Donor conference on Darfur, the United States support to AMIS was tied by asking the AU to send two (2) battalion instead of six (6) battalion to Darfur. As well, the United States asked African states that contributed troops to AMIS to sign agreements in view of the fact that some of the parts of the Canadian grizzlies that were leased to the AMIS by the Liberal government were made in the USA.[125] On this account, Canada appeared more caring and reasonable than the United States.

Canada's flexibility was handy when the Liberal government allowed the AU to use an amount of $750,000 from the CFA that was originally allocated for strengthening the AU peace and security capacity to support the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks.[126] The Special Advisory Team that was appointed by Paul Martin as well as other financial and logistical assistance to the AMIS contributed to the successful negotiations and the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006. The Abuja Peace Talks produced four important protocols on humanitarian, security, political questions, and economic and social issues, as well as the declaration of principles that will guide the future deliberations of the Sudanese parties for the just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the violent conflict in Darfur.[127]

Of course, the Liberal government could have done more to match its rhetoric with more resources, nevertheless, Canada's contributions to some extent helped to strengthen the

---

[125] Interview with a top AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on April 23, 2008

[126] Letter Dated September 12, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

[127] Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur(the Sudan) presented at the 28th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 28 April 2005

operational capacity of AMIS. This also helped to improve Canada's image in Africa and reinforced its 'moral leadership' as a non-colonising power in Africa. A senior AU official who extensively participated in the negotiations for the Canadian government's assistance to AMIS said that Canada did not interfere in AU politics because it did not want to incur "the wrath" or displeasure of the 53 AU member states. In many respects, Canada maintained a friendly and independent approach to the AU-led intervention in Darfur.[128] It is noteworthy that the Martin government's non-interference in the AU politics was not to portray that Canada was passive to AU leadership, rather, this attitude reinforced the belief among AU officials that Canada does not project a belligerent posture in Africa. The Liberal government showed genuine commitment, although with some substantial resource gaps, to help the AMIS to be operationally effective in Darfur. In short, the AU officials saw Canada under the Liberal government, as a more committed and reliable partner than other G8 members like the United States that normally interfered in AU policies.[129]

The Martin government was a staunch supporter and a leading contributor to AMIS, however, officials of the AU also said that what Canada provided for AMIS became 'Canadian owned and Canadian controlled'. For instance, one of the key factors responsible for AMIS's inability to carry out its mandate more effectively was that the Information Analysis Cell (IAC) which was set up by the Canadian government as part of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was managed and controlled by Canadian officers and was not successfully integrated into AMIS operations in the field.[130] The IAC did not provide timely briefings to the mission

---

[128] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008
[129] Interview with AU officials in Addis Ababa in April 2008
[130] Ibid

commander on the ground in Darfur. In terms of the material support to AMIS field operations, the AU officials argued that the APCs that were supplied by the Canadian military were old and difficult to operate. In my interviews, AU officials pointed out that some of the APCs could not even move from the airport to the frontlines where civilian lives were at risk. Similarly, the aircraft that Canada provided were old and the flight hours was not enough as it was tied to the amount of fuel supplied. The net result of these operational difficulties was that much time was spent on repairs and training instead of the deployment of AMIS personnel to the frontlines to protect civilians.[131] This among other things impeded on the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The critical views of the AU officials paralleled those that were expressed from within Canada in the context of the Martin government's commitment to promote human security based on the principles of the R2P. One insightful Canadian observer who was involved extensively in the process leading to the creation of the Landmines Treaty, the R2P and the ICC, opined that "Canada's response to issues in Africa is generally unplanned and done spontaneously". He went on to argue that "Canada does not have vested interest in Africa" and that "Canada's support to Africa is because there is just some money available to spend."[132] Similarly, a Canadian military officer who was posted as part of the technical team that supported AMIS argued that "Canada joined in Darfur by accident. The Canadian military's involvement was not planned. The 105 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) which were leased to AMIS were surplus equipment and outdated".[133] Although Canada has a positive image as a committed and reliable partner of the AU, the support for AMIS fell below the expectation of

---

[131] Ibid.

[132] Interview with anonymous former official of DFAIT in Ottawa on January 17 , 2008

[133] Interview with a Canadian forces personnel who was posted to Darfur as part of the technical support to AMIS January, 2008

some key AU and Canadian officials. To some extent, the resource contribution shows the reticence in Canadian foreign policy in Darfur. As Mathews (2005) have concluded, Canada's efforts towards the peacebuilding process in Darfur lacks in generosity. In short, the Canadian contribution suggests not only a policy of human security by proxy but also human security on the cheap.

In comparing the efforts of the Liberal and the Conservative governments, however, it is fair to say that the Liberal government showed more interest and commitment to support AMIS to protect human security in Darfur. To a large extent, the Conservative government has reduced the rhetoric and has not made a significant improvement upon the Liberal government's resource contribution to Darfur. Overall, there are significant continuities and changes in Canadian policy on Darfur from the Liberals to the Conservatives. The Conservative government allowed the AU to use the equipments that were provided by the Martin government including the 105 grizzlies. As well, the Harper government has provided training assistance to African troop contributing states through the Pan-African Police Project. In this light, Harper continued the Martin's policy of relying on African troops to intervene in Darfur. Moreover, under Harper, Canada became a co-chair of the "Friends of UNAMID". The Harper government also named Sudan as one of CIDA's countries of focus.[134]

It is quite ironic and surprising that even though the Harper government has not publicly declared its support for the Martin government's approach to Darfur, it is riding on 'the past glory' in respect of the policies that were initiated by the Martin government. Although the human security concept and the R2P doctrine are scarcely mentioned by the Harper

---

[134] See CIDA " Countries of Focus" <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-51895926-JEP> Accessed on May 10, 2009

government in respect to Darfur, the government's policy supports the protection of civilians. One of the few occasions when Harper himself referred to the R2P in relation to Darfur was at the 2006 Francophonie Summit when he said that "we all need to act to safe a desperate people. That is the responsibility to protect".[135]   Similarly, in 2006, Peter Mackay who was Harper's Foreign Minister said in a speech in the UN that "the responsibility to protect must now move from abstract words to clear action".[136] Moreover, two years later, Harper joined in a 2008 Canada-EU Summit Statement that proposed to "deepen...the dialogue on issues related to the responsibility to protect with the objective of providing greater operational scope for this concept".[137]

While these statements gave some assurance of the Harper government's commitment to end the human tragedy in Darfur, the government's rhetoric does not match the reality. Under the Harper government, Canadian foreign policy focus has shifted towards the traditional objectives of protecting Canadian national security especially in Afghanistan.[138] According to some insiders,[139] in practice, the Conservative government does not want to be associated with anything concerning the promotion of human security that was initiated by the Liberal government. The Special Advisory Team that was appointed by Paul Martin was dissolved immediately after Harper came to power. Related to this the Harper government is not open to public dialogue with groups such as the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group that

---

[135] See, "Prime Minister Addresses Francophonie Summit" (Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, Ontario, September 28, 2006) <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1338> Accessed on August 13, 2009

[136] See DFAIT, " Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the United Nations Ministerial Meeting on the Situation in Sudan" September 22, 2006 <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/speeches-discours/2006-09-22.aspx?lang=eng > Accessed on May 10, 2009

[137] See Government of Canada, "Canada-EU Summit Statement" Quebec City, October 17, 2008

[138] For Instance see the Conservative Government's defence policy document, "Canada first Defence Strategy"

[139] This view was expressed by an official of a prominent think tank based in Ottawa January 17, 2008

met on regular basis with the DAFIT's Sudan Taskforce that was set up by the Liberal government. Although the Sudan Taskforce was maintained by the Harper government some of the key officials were transferred to work on security issues concerning Afghanistan.[140] These changes have undermined the overall effectiveness of the Sudan Task Force as an important arena for Canada's engagement in Darfur.

At the parliamentary level, the House of Commons have scarcely carried out any serious debate on promoting human security in Darfur since October 2006. Perhaps, the deterioration security situation in Darfur and the Harper government's inadequate response led Senator Hugh Segal to argue that "the situation in Darfur is a classic example of how our collective inaction may destroy even the idea of the Responsibility to Protect".[141] He went on to suggest that "... what is needed immediately... not only in Canada...is how far we are prepared to go exactly with the obligation for the Responsibility to Protect".[142]

The crisis in Darfur is not among the priorities of the Harper government. As noted earlier although Canadian forces are deployed to Afghanistan, the Harper government has made it clear that Canada will not contribute troops to UNAMID. Perhaps, the Harper government's policy was in response to the Sudanese government's objection to non-African troops especially from Western countries. Nonetheless, the Harper government's public declaration, refusal to send troops, and the overall reticence towards the Darfur humanitarian crisis may tarnish Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper (Dorn 2005; Bratt 2007). In many ways,

---

[140] ibid

[141] According to available records, the last time the House of Commons Debated the Darfur Crisis was October 3, 2006. In the Senate available records show the last debate was on March 27, 2007 See Debates of the Senate (Hansard) 1st Session, 39th Parliament Vol. 143 Issue 8 March, 27, 2007. Also See 39th Parliament, 1st Session edited Hansard no. 058 October, 3 2006

[142] See Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 1st Session, 39th Parliament Vol. 143 Issue 8 March, 27, 2007

both the Martin and the Harper governments' policy towards Darfur validates the claim by some critics (Hampson and Oliver 2001; Stairs 2003; Nossal 2005) that Canadian government policy is infused with self-serving rhetoric that is not equally matched with resources. In total, Canada has spent $7.5 billion in Afghanistan since 2001. This is far more than the $477 million that has been spent in Darfur.[143] The deteriorating situation in Darfur suggests that human security cannot be protected 'on the cheap'.

There is a gap between the rhetoric and resource contribution of Canada in Darfur. Nonetheless, Canadian contribution in Darfur was also constrained to some extent by the inability of the Security Council to authorise intervention based on the R2P. Again, the Sudanese government's resistance to non-African troops posed significant challenges to Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations in Darfur. As rightly pointed out by Ambassador Robert Fowler "civilians can only be protected within the limits of the possible".[144] This suggests that it is very difficult if not impossible to adequately protect civilians in Darfur when there is a fierce resistance from the Sudanese government to non-African troops. Although Canada's security interests lies in Afghanistan, under these circumstances one could understand why the Liberal government especially, and to some extent the Conservative

---

[143] The Canadian government has spent $7.5 billion of Canadian in Afghanistan since 2001 as compared to the $500 million CFA of which $4 million and $15 million are allocated for the strengthening of the capacity for peace and security of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States respectively. For more information see
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080312/tories_afghanistan_080312/20080312?hub=Politics> Accessed on July 15, 2008
Also see DFAIT, "Canadian Statement to the 63rd General Assembly: Statement on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD" New York, October 15, 2008 <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-declarations/general_assembly-assemblee-generale/15.10.08.aspx> Accessed on May 10. 2009
[144] Interview with Ambassador Robert Fowler Prime Ministers Chrétien/Martin Special Representative for Africa Ottawa January 24, 2008

government, relied on the AU leadership through AMIS and UNAMID respectively, in Darfur. This policy alternative illuminates what I call human security by proxy.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the emerging security relationship between Canada and the African Union. I have argued that Canada has forged close partnership with the AU to promote human security in Africa. To a large extent, this security relationship has been possible as a result of the consistency of the AU's intervention mandate on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide with Canada's human security policy. Nonetheless, although Canada's material contributions to the ASF capacity building, and more specifically to AMIS in Darfur, did not match the rhetoric of promoting human security in Africa, Canada appears to have built a positive image for itself in the AU as a reliable, non-belligerent, and committed partner.

Canadian governments are becoming 'disinterested' in deploying Canadian peacekeepers in Africa. Although this approach may change over time, there are at least five interrelated reasons to believe that a policy change may not take place in the near future. First, to enforce the slogan of Africa's solution for Africa's problems, the support to AMIS was conceived as part of Canada's contribution to the capacity building efforts of the ASF. Second, even in the midst of the shift in the foreign policy focus to Afghanistan and the Americas, the Harper government has maintained the funding to the APCE to train African peacekeepers even though the CFA has officially ended. Third, and related to the first and second points, the Harper government has established the Pan-African Police Project to support the capacity building of the civilian police component of the ASF. Fourth, for as long as Canadian forces

remain engaged in Afghanistan, it is very unlikely that Canadian troops will be deployed in large numbers for peacekeeping duty on the African continent.

Finally, the consistency of the AU intervention mandate with Canada's human security policy has provided a window of opportunity for Canada to rely on AU leadership on intervention in Africa. This at least in theory is the core assumption of human security by proxy that to some extent has improved Canada's image in the AU. Perhaps, we can reasonably expect that Canada's relationship with the AU will be maintained albeit with minimal resource contribution as a means of projecting Canadian image as a moral leader in Africa. The next chapter will further examine some of these themes, within the context of Canada's support for the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI).

Chapter Six

Canada and Human Security in West Africa

Introduction

The West African sub-region has experienced some of the most violent confrontations that have plagued African states since the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s. To a very large extent, these violent conflicts have created large flows of internally displaced persons, refugees, war-affected children, and small arms and light weapons that pose consistent threats to peace and security in the West African region (Bakwesegha 1995; Reno 1997; Adebajo 2002; Sawyer 2004; Diarra 2005). Within this context, this chapter discusses the Canadian government's support towards the institutional capacity building of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote peace, security, and stability in the West Africa sub-region through the CFA's West African Peace and Security Initiative (PSI).

The chapter is divided into two broad sections. First, I will provide a brief discussion of the evolution of peace and security in the ECOWAS which was primarily established to promote economic integration in West Africa. I argue that although economic integration remains the primary concern of the ECOWAS, the emergence of violent conflicts in the West African region is transforming the role of the ECOWAS into a regional security organisation. In this respect, ECOWAS has established the ECOWAS Security Mechanism which is being integrated into the continent-wide APSA to enhance ECOWAS's preparedness to pursue its mandate of promoting peace and security in West Africa.

The second section then flows in to an analysis of the Canadian government's financial, technical, and training support to strengthen the peace and security capacity of ECOWAS

through the PSI. I argue that the PSI has opened an avenue for bilateral cooperation between Canada and ECOWAS in the area of peace and security promotion. Although the PSI is a Canadian government initiative, it has relied on the leadership of ECOWAS to promote peace and security in West Africa. Indeed, the normative framework of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism is consistent with the Canadian government's policy on human security especially regarding the promotion of the principles of R2P. Hence, similar to the argument in Chapter Five, the Canadian government policy within the context of the PSI follows the idea of promoting human security by proxy. The argument in this section portrays the belief that Africa's security is interlinked with global security and for that matter Canada has an obligation to assist ECOWAS to build its peace and security capacity.

The argument in this chapter is important for two main reasons. First, it shows that in order to ensure the effective realisation of the objectives of Canadian foreign policy in the area of peace and security promotion, the Canadian government appears to prefer to cooperate with African regional organisations (in this case ECOWAS) that have demonstrated a commitment to establish the necessary legal norms and structures for the promotion of peace and security, particularly human security. Second, the discussions also indicate that although the Canadian government's support for ECOWAS may further Canada's economic interests in the region, the PSI reinforces Canada's image as a moral state in (West) Africa. In this respect, although Canada is a middle power on the African scene in terms of its financial, technical, and training support for ECOWAS peace and security capacity building, its moral image gives it strategic comparative advantage over other states such as UK, US, and France. Canada's moral image, to a large extent, derives from the efforts by the Canadian government to pursue issues

around human security and human rights through development assistance to (West) African states, as well as maintain a non-imperial, non-interventionist, and non-belligerent posture on the African continent. This provides a unique opportunity for the strengthening of Canada's international cooperation with Africa's regional organisations.

ECOWAS: From Economic Integration to Peace and Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on 28 May 1975 with the goal of creating an economic union of 15 independent West African states.[1] Like the origins of the OAU, the road to the formation of ECOWAS was marked by intense rivalry at the state level, notably, between Ghana and Nigeria, and Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire, as well as rivalry between Anglophone and Franchophone groups in the West African region (Adedeji 2004: 21-30; Frempong 2006). Nevertheless, through strenuous efforts, ECOWAS was finally launched in November 1976 in Lome, Togo.

The central objective of ECOWAS as its name suggests, is to foster regional economic integration of West African states by creating an economic bloc with a single market and monetary union to enhance the competitiveness of West African states in the global economy. The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty outlined the aim of the regional group:

" to...promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity

particularly in the field of industry , transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture,

natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural

---

[1] The fifteen states of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde (Joined in 1976), Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (ceased to be a member in 2000) , Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing an

maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of

contributing to the progress and development of the African Continent" (1975 ECOWAS

Treaty, Article 2 (1))

But as Adedeji (2004: 32-46) has argued, ECOWAS has been impeded by numerous structural

and leadership problems that have undermined efforts at achieving economic integration.

The emergence of violent conflicts in the West African sub-region especially since the

late 1980s have forced ECOWAS to rethink its mandate by taking a relatively new role in peace

and security promotion in West Africa. In view of the rivalry that preceded the formation of the

ECOWAS, none of the original sixty-five articles of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty was concerned

about issues of security and defence (Diarra 2005; Frempong 2006). Consistent with the

economic integration agenda, the member states at the inception of ECOWAS in 1975 agreed to

establish four technical and specialised commissions to pursue the objectives of the sub-

regional organisation. These are the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments

Commission; the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; the Transport,

Telecommunications and Energy Commission; and the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.[2]

This should be expected because the founding fathers of ECOWAS appeared not to be ready to

include political issues that may be interpreted as an attempt to violate the sovereignty of

member states or interfere in their domestic affairs. Furthermore, like the OAU, it appears that

ECOWAS member states recognised the mandate of the UN to maintain international peace

and security. It is, therefore, fair to say that in strict adherence to the core objectives of

---

[2] See Article 4 of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty

ECOWAS, member states were prepared to cooperate with the regional organisation only at the level of taking collective decisions regarding economic integration. The violent conflicts that erupted in member states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote D'Ivoire have forced ECOWAS to rethink its mandate. As a result, the Pan-West African organisation is increasingly taking a peace and security role in West Africa.

As far as ECOWAS is concerned, conflict prevention, management and resolution have almost become parallel objectives to the original objective of promoting economic integration in West Africa. At least in theory one can argue that ECOWAS is gradually shifting from being an exclusively economic organisation with an increasing focus on peace and security in the West African sub-region. This follows the widespread believe that peace and security are necessary preconditions for socioeconomic development. Indeed, ECOWAS mandate has come to reflect the growing consensus on the nexus between security and development.[3] As Olusegun Obasanjo[4] argued, "our primary concern in this exercise (i.e. building an ECOWAS Security Mechanism) is to ensure that we lay the necessary foundation for peace, security, and political stability as a prerequisite for sub-regional cooperation, integration, and economic prosperity" (Obasanjo 2001: vii). Thus, ECOWAS involvement in peace and security promotion in member countries is part of the efforts of the organisation to pursue its economic integration mandate. Article 2(a) of the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS Protocol) asserts that

---

[3] For a good read on the nexus between security and development, see Hurwitz and Peake(2004); Haag (2004) also see Duffield (2001)

[4] Olusengun Obasanjo is a former chairman of ECOWAS and former president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

"economic and social development and security of peoples and states are inextricably linked".[5]

If ECOWAS member states are to achieve the original objective of economic integration, there is a need for the Pan-West African organisation to take an active role to establish peace and security in member states and possibly on the African continent and beyond. This idea is well expressed in the 24th July 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty.

Article 4 of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty set out the fundamental principles that should guide the regional organisation in the pursuit of its aims and objectives with reference to peace and security promotion in West Africa. Among other things the fundamental principles of the ECOWAS Treaty call for equality, interdependence, solidarity and collective self-reliance of member states. In the area of peace and security, Article 4 (d), (e),(f) and (g) also call for " non-aggression between member states; maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness; peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, active co-operation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development; and recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights". These principles in my view, draw ECOWAS into the mainstream of conflict prevention, management and resolution and more importantly on the need to promote human/peoples' rights as a key component of economic integration. ECOWAS member states have realised that the pursuit of economic integration cannot be delinked from the promotion of peace and security especially when

---

[5] See the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, December 1999

violent conflicts in member states threatens the stability of the entire West African region and beyond.

Indeed, ECOWAS's policy shift to engage in peace and security promotion as a requirement for economic integration started when the Pan-West African organisation adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) in 1978. The PNA's preamble specified that ECOWAS "... cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among member states of the Community".[6] The central objective of the PNA was to ensure that member states refrained from using force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity of other member states. In essence, the PNA was meant to promote good neighbourliness and interstate security among ECOWAS member States as a means to achieve economic integration. In 1981, ECOWAS adopted a more comprehensive Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) as a supplement to the PNA. The PMAD clearly adopted the principles of collective security and collective defence (Adedeji 2004; Frempong 2006). Article 2 of the PMAD specified that any armed threat or aggression against any member state was a threat to the entire ECOWAS member states. Accordingly, Article 3 of the PMAD asked member states to provide mutual assistance to members that faced aggression or threats to their security.

Other important innovations of the PMAD were that Article 13 provided for Allied Armed Forces of the Community, a Political Defence Council that took decisions on peace and security, and supported by a Military Defence Commission that provided technical advice on peace and security issues. The PMAD also provided for the appointment of Deputy-Executive Secretary who was to be in-charge of all the military affairs of the organisation (Frempong 2003

---

[6] See Preamble, ECOWAS Protocol on Non Aggression. Lagos, April 1978

& 2006; Ekiyor 2008). The PMAD incorporated three scenarios that provided ECOWAS with the permission to intervene in member states. The first scenario was armed threat or aggression against a member state which shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community; second, was armed conflict between two or more member states; and third, internal armed conflicts that have been engineered and actively supported from outside which have direct consequence of destabilising the entire West African region (Adedeji 2004: 44)[7].

Despite the elaborate approach towards the promotion of peace and security, the PMAD remained theoretical, and as well, it was more concerned about maintaining interstate and regional security than the security of peoples in the sub-region. Practically, as at 1990 that is almost 10 years after the PMAD was adopted, ECOWAS did not muster the political will to appoint the Deputy Executive Secretary for Military Affairs. Member states did not provide troops to form the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (ibid: 24-25). Although it is reasonable to argue that the economic crisis that affected African countries in the 1980s undermined the implementation of the PMAD, the fact that it remained just on the 'drawing board' demonstrated the lack of political will of member states to cede their sovereignty to ECOWAS. It is equally important that aside from military regimes that dominated West African states between the period of ECOWAS's formation in 1975 and the first major conflict in Liberia in December 1989, West African countries were relatively stable at least in terms of the non-existence of large scale intrastate warfare that threatened (sub) regional security. In this sense, ECOWAS saw no urgency to implement the PMAD.

---

[7] See Article 4 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence. Freetown, 29th May 1981

Of course, military dictatorships or coup d'états in West African states undermined democracy, good governance, and rule of law that led to massive human rights abuses and human insecurity[8] (Agyemang-Duah 1990; McGovern 2006). Yet, it appeared that as long as these abuses were confined within the borders of member states they were seen as not posing threats to sub-regional security and stability. Indeed, human insecurity that arose from coup d'états were overlooked by West African leaders because they lacked the moral authority to question their peers as they were coup leaders and abusers of rights themselves. ECOWAS member states began to take keen interest in internal conflicts when these conflicts developed into full-blown wars and quickly became *West Africanised* and posed threats to the entire sub-region and even beyond.

The emergence of the Liberian civil war in the immediate post-Cold War era in 1989 provided ECOWAS with the opportunity to rethink its mandate. As a response to the civil war, ECOWAS launched its first regional peacekeeping operation through the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. In many respects, the Liberian civil war was an apt moment for ECOWAS to resort to its almost dead PMAD (Frempong 2006) to try and resolve the conflict that threatened the stability of the West African region.

The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia raised concerns about the legitimacy of the ECOWAS to undertake peacekeeping operations without the prior consent or authorisation from the UN Security Council. There were also concerns about the democratic credentials of the five states that contributed troops to ECOMOG (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra

---

[8] For a good discussion on coup d'états in West Africa, see McGovern (2006)

Leone). These states were either governed by military dictators or one party government. But a major concern was that divisions among ECOWAS member states about the ECOMOG intervention threatened the very existence of the organisation (Olonisakin 2000: 110-15; Adebajo 2004: 295-8; Frempong 2003 & 2006). Despite these challenges, ECOMOG has undertaken peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone in 1997 and in Cote D'Ivoire in 2002.

Opinions about ECOMOG's performance to promote peace and security in West Africa differ significantly. However, according to Adedeji (2004) ECOMOG was outstanding in Liberia and particularly in Sierra Leone where it was able to reverse a coup d'état and reinstate a democratically elected government. These successes may not have been possible if the regional super power, Nigeria, was not ready to spend almost $8 billion to assist ECOMOG peacekeeping operations. What is true about ECOMOG interventions is that ECOWAS was the first to respond to crisis in member states before the UN came in with a stronger multinational peacekeeping force. It is equally true that ECOMOG interventions were undertaken on an ad hoc basis. ECOWAS has realised the need to be more serious about establishing permanent structures and set out the legal framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa. Thus, ECOWAS is increasingly taking the role of a regional security organisation in West Africa.

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS Security Mechanism)

West Africa is among the world's most unstable regions (Adebajo 2004: 1; McGovern 2006). Since 1990, six out of the fifteen member states of ECOWAS have been plagued by an

interconnected web of civil wars.[9] As a result of these violent conflicts, large numbers of refugees, rebels, and arms spill across the porous borders of West African states. Aside from fully fledged civil wars, Nigeria, Mali, Niger and Ghana have all experienced low level internal conflicts. These pose security threats in the West Africa region (Addo 2006). A report by Human Rights Watch in 2005 indicated that young fighters (regional warriors) from these wars see war as an economic opportunity and therefore are attracted to other places in West Africa where they can offer their 'military' service as a means of survival (Human Rights Watch 2005).

The interdependence of security in West Africa and the indifference of external actors to intervene in African conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Adebajo 2004: 294) has provided an opportunity to the ECOWAS to establish the ECOWAS Security Mechanism as a collective effort by member states to address the common challenges of peace and security. The experiences from the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau have informed the collective thinking and the practical efforts by member states to promote peace and security in West Africa. In this respect Article 58 of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty encouraged member states to:

"undertake to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability, and security within the region; ... undertake to cooperate with the Community (ECOWAS) in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts; with the

---

[9] These states are Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote D`Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Senegal

agreement that...the detailed provisions governing political cooperation, regional peace

and stability shall be defined in relevant Protocols".[10]

At its meeting in Lome, Togo on 10th December 1999, ECOWAS Head of States adopted the

Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,

Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS Protocol) as a bold step towards the institutionalisation of

a regional mechanism to address the peace and security deficit in West Africa.

Although the ECOWAS Protocol did not use the term, human security, its preamble

clearly articulates concern for the safety and well being of civilians especially women and

children in violent conflict. According to the Preamble, ECOWAS Head of States and

Government express

"concern about the proliferation of conflicts which constitute threat to peace and security

in the African continent, and undermines our (ECOWAS) efforts to improve the living

standards of our people; ... the need to develop effective policies that will alleviate the

suffering of the civilian population, especially women and children and restore life to

normalcy after conflicts...; conscious of the fact that good governance, the rule of law and

sustainable development are essential for peace and conflict prevention".[11]

Consistent with the protection of human security, ECOWAS member states reaffirmed their

commitment to important normative instruments such as *the Universal Declaration of Human*

---

[10] See 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty Article 58 (1,2,3)

[11] See Preamble of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja. December 1999

Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the October 1998 Authority of Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapon.[12] These normative instruments constitute part of the core elements to promote human security. Therefore it can be argued that it is no accident that the first principle of the ECOWAS Protocol asserts that "economic and social development and the security of peoples and states are inextricably linked".[13] In addition, ECOWAS called for the promotion and consolidation of democratic governance, protection of human rights and the rules of international humanitarian law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of member states. The ECOWAS Protocol reflected the emerging shift towards the protection of human security in violent conflicts and brought it in line with the Canadian government's policy on human security.

In terms of institutions and functions, the ECOWAS Security Mechanism builds on the experience that was gained from ECOMOG's intervention in West Africa's three most brutal civil wars- Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau.[14] The ECOWAS Protocol acknowledges "the Authority" (composed of Heads of State and Government of Member States) as the highest decision-making body of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The ECOWAS Protocol provides for the establishment of Mediation and Security Council, an Executive Secretariat supported by a Defence and Security Commission, Council of Elders, and ECOMOG (which is now called the ECOWAS Standby Force or ESF). As well, the ECOWAS Protocol provided for an Early Warning

---

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid., Article 2(a)

[14] For a detailed discussion see Adebajo (2004: 295-315). Also see the Preamble of ECOWAS Protocol

242

System and a Special Representative of the Executive Secretary. The institutions and their functions are discussed in turn.

"The Authority" which is made up of Heads of State and Government is the ECOWAS Security Mechanism's highest decision-making body.[15] "The Authority" has the power to act on all matters pertaining to peace, security and stability in West Africa. Article 6(2) of the ECOWAS Protocol states that, "It (The Authority) shall have powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support, peacebuilding, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the provisions of this mechanism (ECOWAS Protocol)". However, in order to ensure that the effectiveness of the "The Authority" is not compromised with regards to its wide-ranging powers especially concerning economic integration as outline in Article 9 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty[16] and also as outlined above, Article 7 of the ECOWAS Protocol mandates the Mediation and Security Council (EMSC) to take charge of the peace and security functions of the "The Authority".[17]

The EMSC was initially composed of nine (9) Member States. However, ECOWAS leaders have increased the membership of the EMSC to ten (10) (Adebayo 2004: 303). Eight (8) of the members are elected by the Authority and the other two are the current Chairman of the Authority and the immediate past Chairman of the Authority.[18] The Members of the EMSC have a renewable two-year term. The EMSC meets at three levels which are, the Head of States and Government, the Ministerial, and Ambassadorial levels. The decisions of the EMSC are made

---

[15] See Article 6(1) of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security

[16] See Article 9 of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty for details of the functions and Powers of 'The Authority"

[17] ECOWAS Protocol, Article 7

[18] Ibid., Article 8(1)

based on two-thirds majority of members present.[19] Consistent with the powers conferred on it by the Authority, the EMSC;

> "decides on all matters relating to peace and security; decides and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security; authorises all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment and of political and military missions; approves mandates and terms of reference for such missions; reviews the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations; appoints the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander upon the recommendation of the Executive Secretary".[20]

This brings us to the last major institution of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism that is the Executive Secretariat. The head of the secretariat, the Executive Secretary, plays a key role as the initiator of actions for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security in the ECOWAS region. The functions of the Executive Secretary include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict.[21] In addition, the Executive Secretary recommends to the EMSC for the appointment of the Special Representative. The Special representative serves as the chief of ECOWAS missions on the field. The Special Representative performs functions such as directing peacekeeping activities; initiating political and diplomatic negotiations; briefing troop contributing statutes; and coordinating activities of sub-regional and international organisations including NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and peacebuilding.[22] The Executive Secretary also recommends to the

---

[19] Ibid., Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 11(1)
[20] Ibid., Article 10 (2a-f)
[21] Ibid., Article 15 (1,2)
[22] Ibid., Article 32

EMSC for the appointment of the Force Commander of ESF as well as the Council of Elders. The ECOWAS Protocol also mandates the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Security and Defence to assist the Executive Secretary in the performance of these functions but also more specifically "to initiate and undertake all activities relating to the implementation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism".[23]

The ECOWAS Protocol makes specific provisions for key supporting organs of the institutions. These organs are the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). As well, the ECOWAS protocol provides for an Early Warning System. It is important to discuss these organs in turn because in my view they form the "operational wings"[24] of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism and therefore constitute important components of ensuring peace and security in the West African region. Furthermore, it is important to discuss these organs in other to make sense of the Canadian government's contribution to strengthening the ECOWAS Security Mechanism.

The Defence and Security Commission have a wide range of members which in a sense indicate ECOWAS's broad approach to address the peace and security challenges in West Africa. In addition to the Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states, the Defence and Security Commission includes officers responsible for internal affairs and security, experts of the ministries of foreign affairs, heads of immigration, customs, drugs/narcotic agencies, border guards, and civil protection force.[25] In terms of its functions, the Defence and Security Commission assist the EMSC in "formulating the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force (ESF);

---

[23] For details see Article 16 of the ECOWAS Protocol

[24] I use "operational wings" to mean those institutions that take actual field operations with regards to the overall implementations of the functions of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism.

[25] See Article 18 of ECOWAS Protocol

defining the terms of reference of the Force; appointing the Force Commander; and determining the composition of the contingents".[26] The constitution of the Defence and Security Commission expresses the belief in the interrelated and interdependent nature of national/human security and the role to be played by other sectors to ensure peace and security in West Africa. ECOWAS sees the need to bring all hands in the security sector on board to ensure an effective and proactive Defence and Security Commission. Information sharing and the pooling of ideas from various sectors of the security apparatus of member states of ECOWAS will be valuable to find solutions to West Africa's volatile security situation.

The Council of Elders (now called Council of the Wise) is composed of eminent personalities who have the experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators, and facilitators to promote peace and security in West Africa. The ECOWAS Protocol calls for the inclusion of eminent persons from all segments of society including women, political, traditional, and religious leaders who are expected to carry out their functions on the basis of neutrality, impartiality, and objectivity. The members of the Council of Elders are appointed annually by the Executive Secretary with the approval of the EMSC at the level of the Heads of States and Government.[27] The ECOWAS Protocol is silent on the number of people who should compose the Council of the Wise. At its inauguration in 2001, there were thirty two members. However, the Council of the Wise was recomposed as a fifteen-member body with a representative from each of the member states of ECOWAS.[28] The inclusion of the Council of

---

[26] Ibid. Article 19
[27] See Article 20 of the ECOWAS Protocol
[28] Since members are appointed annually, the composition is not stable however, it is important to note that at its inauguration in 2001, the Council of the Wise was made up of 32 members drawn from 10 member states: Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo. In 2004 the members were: Mr. E. M. Debrah, Ghana; Mr. Bernadine Do Rego, Benin; Dr Ouidi Naba Douamba, Burkina Faso;

the Wise in the ECOWAS Security Mechanism, expresses the embedded ideas in the culture of Africans where "eldership" is revered as the epitome of wisdom and the embodiment of knowledge and experience. Eldership provides the means to find amicable solutions during conflicts. That is, elders are held in high esteem as key brokers of peace. In this respect, in terms of its nature and functions, the Council of the Wise is parallel to the Panel of the Wise (PW) of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) discussed earlier in Chapter Four. However, it should be noted that in terms of representation, the ECOWAS's Council of the Wise is made up of fifteen members with a representative from each of the fifteen member states. The PW of the AU on the other hand is made up of five eminent persons with a representative from each of the five regions of Africa.[29]

The ECOWAS Protocol also makes provision for an Early Warning System (EWS) for early detection and prevention of conflicts. The EWS has observation and monitoring centre located at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. As well, it has four (4) observation and monitoring zones.[30] The EWS is responsible for data collection and analysis as well as preparation of reports for the Executive Secretariat on the peace and security situation in the West African

---

Mr. Antonio Mascarenhas, Cape Verde; Mr. Essienne Dieudonne, Cote D'Ivoire; Alhaji John Bira, Gambia; Mr. Abdourahaman Sow, Guinea; Ms Eugenia Stevenson, Liberia; Mr. Sira Diop, Mali; Mr. Amirou Garba, Niger; Gen. Abdusalami Abubakar, Nigeria; Mr. Mbaye Mbengue, Senegal; Mr. Desmond Luke, Sierra Leone; and Bitokotipou Yagninim, Togo. Only Guinea Bissau did not have a member on the Council of Elders. See "Council of Elders Hold Inauguration Meeting in Niamey" (ECOWAS, Abuja, Nigeria 28 June 2001) <http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=61&lang=en&annee=2001> also see " Kuffuor Inaugurates Council of Elders" (Ghana News Agency, Accra, March 19 2004) <http://ghanaweb.com/mobile/wap/news.article.php?ID=54253> Accessed on January 10, 2009

[29] The members of the Panel of the Wise are Salim Ahmed Salim, East Africa; Ahmed Ben Bella, North Africa; Elisabeth K. Pognon, West Africa; Miguel Travoada, Central Africa; Brigalia Bam, Southern Africa.
See Peter Heinlein (December 18, 2007). " AU Launches 'Panel of the Wise' <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-12/2007-12-18-voa47.cfm?CFID=91034869&CFTOKEN=84876612> Accessed on January 10, 2009

[30] The Four Zones are zone 1(Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal); zone 2(Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Niger); zone 3 (Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone); and zone 4(Benin, Nigeria, Togo). See Article 24 of the ECOWAS Protocol

region. And in order to ensure a coordinated effort in the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa, Article 23(2) of the ECOWAS Protocol specifically mandates the observation and monitoring center in Abuja to collaborate with the UN and AU and other relevant international and regional organisations.

The last organ that supports the ECOWAS Security Mechanism is the ESF which has both military and civilian components. The personnel of ESF are located in their countries of origin and ready to deploy to the West African region and even beyond. In terms of functions, the ESF is charged with "observation and monitoring; peacekeeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster; enforcement of sanctions including embargo; preventive deployment; peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilisation; policing activities including the control of fraud and organised crime; and any other operations as may be mandated by the EMSC".[31] It is important to reiterate that the ECOWAS Security Mechanism has become one of the components of APSA as will be discussed in the next section. ECOWAS has advanced in terms of establishing the ESF as a component of the African Standby Force (ASF).

As noted earlier, ECOWAS appears to have incorporated its experiences through ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau into the development of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism particularly, the ESF. The Defence and Security Commission have approved the structure and operational capability of the ESF which allows the ESF to be deployed in UN Chapter VI or Chapter VII situations.[32] It is envisaged that the ESF will have personnel strength of 6500 which is made up of 1500 ECOWAS Task Force (soldiers) that are

---

[31] Ibid. Article 22
[32] See ECOWAS Standby Force Operational Framework. ECOWAS Draft as at 07 April 2005. ECOWAS Master Copy

trained and well equipped in order to deploy within 30 days and be self-sustaining for 90 days;

as well as ECOWAS Main Brigade of 5000 soldiers prepared to deploy within 90 days and fully

self-sustaining for 90 days.[33] Comparing this to the 1980s under the PMAD, the establishment

of the ESF is an important achievement of the ECOWAS. However, the organisation has

challenges in the areas of finance, logistics, personnel, and training of the ESF.

Having outlined the institutions and functions of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism, I will

discuss the criteria for intervention, what the ECOWAS Protocol calls, the 'conditions for

application'. The criteria for ECOWAS intervention are spelt out in Article 25 of the ECOWAS

Protocol. According to this Article, the ECOWAS Security Mechanism shall be applied, "(a)in

case of aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof; (b) in case of conflict

between two or several member states; (c) in case of internal conflict that threatens to trigger

humanitarian disaster or that poses serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; (d)

in event of serious and massive violation of human rights and rule of law; (e) and in the event of

an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government".

The criteria for intervention especially with regards to Article 25 (c) and (d) underscores

ECOWAS's concern for protecting human security which, in turn, expresses the willingness of

member states to place limitations on state sovereignty. In this light, Article 25 (c) and (d) of

the ECOWAS Protocol are consistent with the principles of the Responsibility to Protect and

especially with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU that asserts the AU's right of

intervention in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Thus, the ECOWAS

---

[33] Ibid p.5

intervention criteria echo the shift towards the protection of people in violent conflict and make it consistent with the Canadian government's policy on human security.

ECOWAS member states have retained the decision to intervene in member states in view of the reluctance of the UN Security Council to authorise peace missions in Africa especially in the post-Cold War era (Adebajo 2004: 302 Jonah 2004: 323). Article 52(3) of the ECOWAS Protocol asserts that "in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of the mechanism". What this suggests is that ECOWAS does not have to wait for a UN authorisation before it intervenes in violent conflicts. Rather, it will inform the UN of any interventions it undertakes. In short, as far as the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism is concerned the authority for intervention is internally-driven by ECOWAS.

The 2005 ECOWAS Standby Force Operational Document asserts that ECOWAS is recognised by the UN and AU under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter as a regional security arrangement with the responsibility for creating an enabling environment to promote peace and security and harmony in West Africa and in the African continent.[34] Accordingly, Article 26 of the ECOWAS Protocol asserts that the ECOWAS Security Mechanism shall be put into effect upon a decision by the Authority or Mediation and Security Council, at the request of Member States; on the initiative of the Executive Secretary; at the request of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) or the United Nations. It can be said that although, the ECOWAS Protocol clearly mandates "The Authority" as the highest decision-making body regarding intervention, perhaps in theory, the mandate given to the other institutions to also

---

[34] Ibid. p.4

initiate intervention may create confusion, competition, and duplication of efforts in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. These challenges can be resolved through effective coordination of the activities and decisions of the other institutions within the EMSC at the level of the Authority. Again, this seeming anomaly can be resolved if ECOWAS recognises and respects the primary responsibility of the AU for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa in accordance with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and in the spirit of operationalising the APSA.

ECOWAS and AU: Towards an Intra-Regional Cooperation for Peace and Security

The creation of the AU in 2002 and its renewed focus on peace and security in Africa through the APSA has influenced the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. In what could be described as the decentralisation of APSA institutions and functions to the five regions of Africa (East Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, South Africa, and West Africa)[35], the ECOWAS Security Mechanism especially the ESF and EWS have become an integral part of the continent-wide APSA. Indeed, Article 16(1) of the PSC Protocol of the AU states categorically that "the regional (security) mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union (AU), which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa". More importantly, Article 16(1) of the PSC Protocol is consistent with Article 52(1) and (2) of the ECOWAS Protocol which calls on the ECOWAS to fully cooperate with the AU and UN in the areas of conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in Africa.

---

[35] The five regions for APSA are Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, South Africa and West Africa

The cooperative arrangement between the AU and the five regions to operationalise the APSA is outlined in a *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities(RECs) and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa*[36] (MOU). The MOU was drafted by the AU in consultation with the five regional groups in 2007 and should come into force upon the signature by the parties including the AU Commission. The MOU is based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage. It calls on the parties (that is the five regions of APSA) to recognise and respect the primary responsibility of the AU for Africa's peace, security and stability. The MOU also calls on the AU to acknowledge and respect the role and responsibilities of the five regions for the promotion of peace, security and stability in their respective areas of jurisdiction.[37] This suggests that although the AU is accorded the primary responsibility for Africa's peace and security, it has to recognise the important role that has to be played by the five regional security architectures which form an integral part of the overall peace and security architecture of the AU. In this respect, it appears that the AU does not intend to usurp the mandates of the five regional security mechanisms. Rather, the AU complements the efforts of the regional mechanisms in view of the comparative advantage they have in terms of local knowledge,

---

[36] As noted earlier, in order to operationalise APSA, the AU has divided Africa into five regions; 3 of the standby forces are managed by RECs (Economic community of West African States, Economic Community of Central African States, and Sothern African Development Community) and the remaining 2 are East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism(EASBRICOM) and North Africa Regional Capability (NARC)

[37] See Article 4 of African Union (2007). Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

culture, experience and the proximity to promote peace and security in their respective regions.[38]

The central objective of the MOU is to foster cooperation and coordination of activities towards the shared goal of eliminating the scourge of conflicts and laying the foundation for sustainable peace, security and stability in Africa.[39] The MOU identifies several areas for cooperation between the AU, the RECs, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa. These areas include the operationalisation and functioning of APSA; prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; humanitarian action and disaster response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism and transnational organised crime; and capacity building, training and knowledge sharing.[40]

With respect to APSA, the MOU calls on the parties to work together especially on the operationalisation of the five regional early warning systems and the five regional standby brigades. Furthermore, the MOU also requires of the five regions of APSA to establish structures similar to the PW as a key component of their conflict prevention strategies.[41] One could argue that the ECOWAS Protocol which preceded the PSC Protocol provided excellent clues to the AU strategy to institutionalise the APSA. It is not surprising that in terms of progress, ECOWAS's experience through ECOMOG interventions puts it ahead of the other regions and perhaps the AU itself in developing the African Peace and Security Architecture.

---

[38] For some theoretical insights about subsidiarity see Knight(1996)

[39] See Article 3(1) of African Union (2007). Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

[40] Ibid., for details see Articles 5-16

[41] Ibid., Article 6

To recap the above exposition, the adoption of the MOU is important in three interrelated ways. First, the MOU reinforces the resolve by African leaders to transcend the sovereignty-oriented politics during the OAU era. Under the AU, African leaders have adopted an interventionist posture to protect human security and promote regional security as a requirement for socioeconomic development in Africa. Secondly, the MOU provides the legal framework that will shape Africa's intra-regional cooperation in the area of peace and security promotion. This is particularly important in the sense that the MOU does not only cover issues of intervention, but as well, it provides the framework through which regional organisations in Africa can cooperate to address other pressing issues such as illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and the threat of terrorism and transnational organised crime.[42] Third, viewed from an incremental perspective, the MOU supports the movement towards the revitalisation and institutionalisation of the ideals of Pan-Africanism that rests on cooperation, brotherhood and solidarity among African states and peoples.

Response to NEPAD: Canada and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (PSI)

The overview of ECOWAS's efforts to promote peace and security in West Africa has provided us with the background to focus on the Canadian government's assistance through the PSI. As noted in Chapters Four and Five, the launching of the NEPAD by African leaders led to a significant transformation in Canada's response to peace and security in Africa. The Liberal government cooperated with Africa's regional organisations and also contributed towards the

---

[42] See the Preamble, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

strengthening of their peace and security capacity building. In 2002, ECOWAS was designated as the organisation responsible for regional NEPAD programmes in West Africa. In the context of the CFA's support for the implementation of NEPAD priorities, it can be said that the ECOWAS region was the main focus of the Canadian government's security relationship with Africa's regional organisations. The Canadian government allocated $15 million of the $500 CFA towards the West Africa Peace and Security initiative (PSI) specifically, in support of peace and security activities in the West African region and also for the strengthening of the capacity of ECOWAS to undertake its peace and security mandate.

It is important to note that none of the sub-regional organisations in Africa was accorded this opportunity by the Canadian government. As well, the $15 million funding for the PSI projects in ECOWAS is more than 300 percent of the $4 million that was allocated by the Canadian government in support of the peace and security capacity building of the AU. Perhaps, the Canadian government focused its security assistance in ECOWAS in view of the security predicaments in the West African region and the leadership taken by ECOWAS members to address these challenges. At the normative level, ECOWAS intervention mandate is also with the Canadian government's human security policy. These provided an avenue for Canada to cooperate with ECOWAS to promote peace and security, particularly human security in West Africa. The PSI was an expression of Canada's commitment to build a sub-regional architecture to promote peace and security in West Africa.

The $15 million funding of the PSI supported five programmes in the ECOWAS region. The programmes were the ECOWAS institutional capacity building ($4.2 million), Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) ($4.1 million), Government of Sierra

Leone/UNDP Small Arms for Development ($1.5 million), ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP) ($2.0 million), and Civilian Police in Peacekeeping Operations ($3.0 million). In addition, $388 000 of the PSI funding was allocated for Administrative Arrangement with Foreign Affairs of Canada.[43] It is important to note that the PSI projects reflected the core objectives of the Canadian government's human security policy on protecting civilians in armed conflict.[44] The focus of the Canadian government was to assist the ECOWAS to build its capacity for the protection people in violent conflicts, related issues through peace support operations, and dealing with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.[45] To a large extent, the Canadian government's support to ECOWAS was narrowly focused on promoting the freedom from fear aspect of human security in the West African region.

The Canadian government's support for peace and security in the ECOWAS region through the PSI was consistent with some of the core components of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) document that was adopted by the EMSC on January 16th 2008 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. In the ECPF, ECOWAS set out to pursue its peace and security mandate in fourteen (14) main areas which are, early warning; preventive diplomacy, democracy and political governance; human rights and rule of law; media; natural resources governance; cross border-crime; security governance; practical disarmament; youth employment; ESF; humanitarian assistance; peace education; and women, peace and security.[46] The ECPF reflects ECOWAS's broader understanding of human security as freedom from want.

---

[43] See Annex A, CFA Initiatives by NEPAD Priority Area and CFA Programming Elements. (Undated document from ECOWAS) or see Canada Fund for Africa: Delivering Results. P.9

[44] See, Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security.

[45] See " West Africa Peace and Security Initiative" (CIDA, July 8, 2008)< http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on January 17, 2009

[46] For details see The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. Pp1-51

In this vein, the ECPF placed emphasis on humanitarian assistance, the promotion of democracy, human rights and rule of law, youth employment, and peace education as important elements for establishing sustainable peace and development. The Canadian government's support through the PSI in the five areas outlined above falls within the other components of the ECPF that is concerned with freedom from fear issues such as ESF capacity building, preventive diplomacy (which may include peacekeeping) and practical disarmament.

Although the ECPF is primarily concerned with conflict prevention measures, it is a complement of the functions of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism which is primarily concerned with intervention during violent conflicts. Together these security strategies (conflict prevention and conflict intervention) informed the Canadian government's policy to strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS. However, as will be discussed shortly, the Canadian government's support was narrowly concentrated on the institutional capacity building of ECOWAS which reflected a focus on freedom from fear aspects of human security.

Consistent with the norms of human security, the ECPF reiterates the ECOWAS Strategic Vision of transforming the pan-West Africa organisation from an "ECOWAS of States" into an "ECOWAS of people" by 2020.[47] This suggests that ECOWAS hopes to transform itself from an institution that promotes and protects the interests of member states into an institution that promotes and protects the interests of the people. In other words, it can be said that ECOWAS's declaration of intent through the Strategic Vision is to make the organisations relevant for the needs of the ordinary citizens in West Africa. ECOWAS member states have set out to progressively resolve the tensions between sovereignty and supranationality on one hand, and

---

[47] For details the strategic vision sees, ECOWAS Leaders Adopts Strategic Vision for Regional Development. Press Release No.57/2007 Abuja, 15 June 2007.

between regime security and human security in favour of supranationality and human security.[48] Although transcending state sovereignty and regime security represents a huge task for ECOWAS, at least in the area of intervention, it can be said that ECOWAS has made important inroads to uphold its vision through the ECOWAS Protocol and the subsequent establishment of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism that has the mandate to intervene in member states to protect human security. In addition there appears to be some willingness of member states to address the menace of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. Indeed, according to ECOWAS, "the overall aim of the ECPF is to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa".[49] This calls for cooperation among member states and the international community, "to push conflict prevention and peacebuilding up on the political agenda of member states in a manner that will trigger timely and targeted multi-actor and multi-dimensional action to diffuse or eliminate potential and real threats to human security in a predictable and institutional manner.[50]

The ECPF is the latest demonstration of the progress that is being made by ECOWAS to promote peace and security in West Africa since the launching of the ECOWAS Protocol to establish the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. Although the Canadian government's security assistance through the PSI was launched earlier in 2002, it cannot be delinked from the overall strategy or vision of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism and the ECPF to promote peace and security, particularly human security in West Africa. In my field interviews in Ottawa, CIDA Officials said that the Canadian government's support to ECOWAS through the PSI was aimed at

---

[48] ECPF, p.6
[49] Ibid.,p11
[50] Ibid.,p11-12

assisting ECOWAS to meet the peace and security needs of the community (West Africa) as part

of the long term objective of assisting Africa to achieve continental unity in a secured region.[51]

The Canadian government's PSI placed more emphasis on institutional capacity building and the

physical protection of people in violent situations without an equal emphasis on broader

human security issues such as democracy and political governance, human rights and rule of

law, the media, and natural resource governance that are included in the ECPF.

Canada and ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security

The Canadian government's support for peace and security promotion in West Africa

reflected Canada's human security policy and the notion that Africa's security (which is part of

global security) is closely interlinked with the security of Canada.[52] In this vein, Canada has a

role to play in Africa's peace and security initiatives. Canada's international responsibility for

promoting peace and security in West Africa may contribute mutual benefits for both

Canadians and West Africans. West Africa's security predicaments and the headway that was

made by ECOWAS through the institutionalisation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism and

adoption of the ECPF played a key role in influencing the Canadian government's policy.

Some observers[53] rightly pointed out that in terms of power and financial contributions

Canada is a small player in Africa. For instance at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, the G8 members

made a commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010 but as at 2007, Canada ranked sixth among

G8 members in terms of aid budgets that form a central pillar of the G8's relationship with

---

[51] Interview with CIDA and Department of Foreign Affairs officials in Ottawa, January 15, 2008
[52] Both the 1995 and 2005 government of Canada's International Policy Statements have expressed the view that Canadian security is interlinked with the security of the World.
[53] Interviews with Key officials at KAIPTC, AU and ECOWAS in Accra, Addis Ababa, and Abuja respectively, February to June 2008

African countries. The overall Canadian aid budget stood at $3.9 billion as compared to $21.7 billion of the United States; $12.2 billion of Germany; $9.9 billion of UK; $9.9 billion of France; and $7.6 billion of Japan.[54] At the face value these figures show that at least in the financial realm (development assistance contributions), Canada cannot compete with states such as the US, France, and the UK in Africa.

It is equally important to note that Canada has a moral image that provided it with an advantage to pursue its peace and security policies in Africa. This image advantage shaped the Canadian government's PSI in West Africa. Generally speaking, Canada is in a good position to act as a leader in West Africa as it has never been a colonial power or directly involved in the violent conflicts that undermine development in some parts of West Africa. For these reasons, Canada has a moral advantage over other G8 member countries such as United Kingdom, France, and the United States of America who are either former colonial powers (UK and France) or great power (US) whose colonial and Cold War policies respectively, are partly responsible for the instability in parts of Africa (Murithi 2005; Lyons 1996 Obasanjo 1996). Within the context of this analogy, the Canadian government's PSI in West Africa was part of the overall strategy to maintain Canada's moral standing on the African continent.

Canada's moral image also serves as a cover for the pursuit of Canada's economic and security interests. As pointed out by a key ECOWAS official, "Canada is a strong development partner of ECOWAS for peace support operations. Canada is a committed and reliable partner, friendly and very supportive of ECOWAS initiatives on peace and security and this excellent

---

[54] For details see, Chris Van Berkum "Are the G8 members keeping their ODA Commitments?" (University of Toronto G8 Research Group, July 7, 2008)<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet_oda.html> Accessed on January 17, 2009

relationship between Canada and ECOWAS is mutually beneficial as it helps to prevent conflicts in West Africa and also promotes Canadian investments in the region".[55]

As outlined above, the Canadian government's PSI supported five main programmes—ECOWAS institutional capacity building, KAIPTC, Government of Sierra Leone/UNDP small arms programme, ECOSAP, and Civilian Police in Peacekeeping Operations. With the exception of the Government of Sierra Leone/UNDP small arms programme which was a country-specific programme concerned with direct promotion of human security in a post-conflict environment, the central objective of the PSI was to strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS to undertake its peace and security mandate in West Africa.[56] Put directly, the Canadian government's PSI was focused on supporting ECOWAS to build the structures and institutionalise the norms that are central to the promotion of human security in West Africa.

The Canadian government's support to ECOWAS through the PSI follows the idea of promoting human security by proxy as discussed in Chapter Five. The Canadian government supported ECOWAS's leadership and ownership of its own programmes to address the security deficit in the West African region.[57] The PSI was aimed at helping ECOWAS to help itself. As pointed out by a senior ECOWAS official, "Canadian assistance is provided in accordance with the principles of aid effectiveness that calls for among other things local ownership and leadership as enshrined in the 2005 Paris Declaration".[58] The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is consistent with CIDA's policy on aid effectiveness that also echoes the principles

---

[55] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[56] See Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results p. 10
[57] See, the Contribution Arrangement between the Government of Canada and ECOWAS. Signed at Ottawa on March 9, 2004
[58] For details of the Paris Declaration see, OECD, "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability", High Level Forum, Paris, France, 28 February-2March 2005 < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> Accessed on October 22, 2008

of local ownership and leadership.[59] Therefore, drawing on the above discussions it can be said that ECOWAS has strengthened its leadership and ownership, which, in turn, has promoted its image as an organisation that is committed to promote peace and security. This position gave a comparative advantage to ECOWAS over the other regions in Africa and helped to influence the Canadian government's policy.

In my interviews in Ottawa, CIDA and DFAIT officials conceded that ECOWAS is ahead in developing its regional security architecture especially the ESF and this attracted the Canadian government to support the efforts of ECOWAS. This is well expressed in the PSI Contribution Arrangement between the Canadian government and ECOWAS. The Contribution Agreement said, "ECOWAS has played a (key) role in addressing particular regional peace and security challenges for more than a decade, but its efforts to date have been made with limited supporting institutional and operational capacities".[60] This implies that the Canadian government's assistance to ECOWAS may be more effective in achieving the objectives of promoting peace and security in West Africa because of the preparatory work that has been done by ECOWAS through the institutionalisation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism.

According to a senior official of ECOWAS, Canada had a liberal and flexible attitude towards ECOWAS in the sense that Canada provided funding through the PSI and allowed ECOWAS departments to decide on what the money should be used for but within the framework of building the peace and security capacity of ECOWAS. This official puts it bluntly

---

[59] See, " CIDA Policy on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness" (CIDA, September 2002) < http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/pdf/$file/SAE-ENG.pdf> Accessed on January 19, 2009
[60] See, Contribution Arrangement between the Government of Canada and ECOWAS. Signed at Ottawa on March 9, 2004

that "the exceptionality of Canadian policy towards ECOWAS is that it is not dictatorial".[61]

Another ECOWAS senior official shares this view:

"The relationship between Canada and ECOWAS is flexible and Canada gives room for ECOWAS to apply its own rules and procedures thereby allowing ECOWAS to exercise ownership and control over its policies. There is no imposition of Canadian government views. What is done is based on what ECOWAS wants to do and not what the Canadian government thinks. Canada does not impose ideas and rules on ECOWAS in terms of administering the projects under the PSI. The only clear exception is that the Canadian government insists that ECOWAS's reporting procedure to CIDA should be based on results-based management approach".[62]

The views of the ECOWAS officials were consistent with those expressed by Canadian government officials as well as in the guidelines of the Contribution Arrangement. The Contribution Arrangement specified that ECOWAS will manage and supervise the "ECOWAS: institutional capacity building for peace and security project" and keep CIDA which was the executing agency of the Canadian government informed of the progress that was made. As well, ECOWAS administered the contribution of the Canadian government in accordance with the rules and regulations of the organisation. This included the application of ECOWAS rules and regulations regarding the procurement of materials for the capacity building project.[63] With these guidelines, Canada appeared to abandon the idea of tied aid in its relationship with

---

[61] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[62] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 17, 2008
[63] See, Contribution Arrangement between the Government of Canada and ECOWAS. Signed at Ottawa on March 9, 2004

ECOWAS. As noted in Chapter Three, tied aid has been a major feature of Canada's development assistance policies in Africa.

Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the PSI was a Canadian government initiated programme, it was tailored to support ongoing ECOWAS peace and security initiatives. CIDA officials said that the policy towards ECOWAS was driven from within CIDA but also with influence from the Prime Minister's Office (Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin) as well as other government department's such as the Department of Foreign Affairs.[64] In other words, Canadian government officials including Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin had some influence in determining the policy and setting the agenda of the PSI. Nonetheless, the projects that the PSI supported were ECOWAS-initiated projects. A major feature of the PSI was its flexibility in terms of allowing ECOWAS to use the funding in support of its peace and security priorities. In addition, the rules governing the PSI were flexible enough to support new peace and security projects that were initiated by ECOWAS.

As a regional organisation, ECOWAS represents a strong and powerful voice that influenced Canadian government policy. Unlike individual (West) African states, ECOWAS is a stronger configuration of power. According to a top ECOWAS official, "ECOWAS strategic vision is driven by ECOWAS and not Canada. Africans know what they want and therefore development partners should tailor their assistance to the needs of ECOWAS."[65] Within this context, Canada's policy towards ECOWAS appeared to encourage dialogue and participation of Africans. In Ottawa, a senior official of CIDA said that "Canada needs to do what Africa asks and

---

[64] Interview with CIDA and Foreign Affairs Officials in Ottawa, January 15, 2008
[65] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, June 20, 2008

it is essential to have African inputs into Canadian policy".[66] This is because without dialogue

and participation by ECOWAS the projects earmarked under the PSI may not work.

The overall impact of Canadian assistance cannot be easily quantified, however, it is

reasonable to suggest that the projects that were supported through the PSI may improve the

peace and security capacity of ECOWAS in the long term. In the shot term, the quarterly reports

that were submitted by ECOWAS to CIDA[67] provided evidence that progress has been made

with the Canadian government's assistance. Canada's assistance helped in the establishment of

a Small Arms Unit (SAU), Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) and ECOWAS Peace

Fund (EPF) in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. As a result of its flexible framework, the

PSI Contribution Arrangement was amended to enable ECOWAS to establish a Project

Management Unit (PMU) at the ECOWAS Secretariat.[68] The establishment of the EPF will

strengthen ECOWAS' capacity as a pivotal peace and security actor in West Africa. As well, the

PMU is an important capacity building instrument to help ECOWAS to achieve its strategic

vision of moving towards a project-oriented organisation that focuses on the needs of the

people.

Moreover, the establishment of these institutions are vital for the effective functioning

of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. Canada's support may have both short term and long

term benefits of contributing to the effectiveness of ECOWAS through the institutionalisation of

normative regulations for conflict prevention (small arms control) and the establishment of

structures for conflict intervention (ESF). The regulative and intervention structures are

---

[66] Interview with CIDA official in Ottawa January 16, 2008
[67] See, ECOWAS Secretariat (2006-2008). Canada-ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security in West Africa Project. Draft Quarterly Reports, Abuja Nigeria 2006- 2008
[68] See, Contribution Arrangement between the Government of Canada and ECOWAS. Signed at Ottawa on March 9, 2004 Amendment 1(5)

necessary for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in West Africa. At this point, I will narrow the discussion towards the main areas of the Canadian government's support—assisting ECOWAS in building its regulative capacity especially concerning the proliferation of small arms, and building the peace and security mechanism of ECOWAS especially the ESF. It is important to note that although the ECOWAS Security Mechanism comprises of other institutions such as the Council of the Wise and Early Warning System, the PSI was focused largely on the ESF.

Building ECOWAS Regulative Capacity: Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small arms control is one of the central foci of the Canadian government's human security agenda and West Africa has become one of the main theatres for the Canadian government to pursue this agenda. West Africa is a region where the proliferation of small arms and light weapons constitute a major threat to peace and security. Among other security threats, small arms and light weapons are used to violate human rights in intra and inter communal feuds and local wars; to facilitate drug trafficking; to carry out coup d'états; and to create and maintain a general state of fear, insecurity and instability.[69] In response to the threats that small arms and light weapons pose to (human) security, the ECOWAS, in 1998, enacted a *Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa*. This was done to affirm the belief that "...the proliferation of light weapons constitutes a destabilising factor for ECOWAS member states and a threat to the

---

[69] See, International Action Network on Small Arms(IANSA), "Foundation Document for the West Africa Network on Small Arms" (IANSA, May 21, 2002) <http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm> Accessed on January 19, 2009

peace and security of our people".[70] As Diarra (2005: 35) has rightly pointed out, the Moratorium is binding on all member states and not just a list of exhortations. It has genuine legal obligations that member states have accepted. Quite remarkably the ECOWAS Moratorium came into force on November 1, 1998 (Ayissi 2001: 13) a day after it was adopted and three years before the international community adopted the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. This indicates that ECOWAS members are at least, in theory, demonstrating some serious political commitment towards the promotion of human security and regional security through the eradication of small arms and light weapons.

According to the UNDP, there are about eight million illicit small arms and light weapons in West Africa (Vines 2005:341). In order to enforce the norms of small arms control in West Africa, one of the main foci of the Liberal government's PSI was to assist the ECOWAS to establish a SAU as part of its peace and security strategy. The establishment of the SAU within the ECOWAS Secretariat is aimed at strengthening the political ownership and regional capacity of ECOWAS to implement the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons[71]. In 2006, the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms was transformed into the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Material (ECOWAS Convention on SALW).

---

[70] See Preamble, " Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa" Abuja, Nigeria October 31, 1998 <http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/1ECOWASFirearms.pdf> Accessed on January 20, 2009

[71] See, PSI Contribution Agreement Annex A

Although the ECOWAS Convention on SALW has a limited scope in its application to West African states, it forms part of the global efforts to set normative regulations on the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons and more importantly to limit their impact on human security. As noted earlier, the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons is one of the global efforts to limit the impact of small arms and light weapons on human security. Another one is the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on Landmines which was led by Canada and supported by many African states and non-state actors.

The Canadian government supports the Control Arms Campaign in Africa that is jointly run by Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam International. The Control Arms Campaign is calling for a legally binding global arms trade treaty to stop weapons from being used to fuel conflict, poverty, and human rights abuses.[72] Within this context, the ECOWAS Convention on SALW is based on the realisation that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons constitutes a major destabilising factor and poses serious threats to the peace and security of the people. The central objectives of the convention are to build trust among member states, exchange information, and build the institutional capacities in the ECOWAS Secretariat to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons.[73] As noted, the SAU was established with financial support from the Canadian government to strengthen the administrative capacity of ECOWAS in order

---

[72] For more information see, Control Arms home page <http://www.controlarms.org/en> Accessed on October 30, 2008

[73] See Preamble, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Material. Also see Article 2.

to provide policy direction for the implementation the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.[74] On this account, the Canadian government's support for ECOWAS was consistent with Canada's commitment to multilateral agreements, as well as "endorsing common strict transfer principles to promote responsible transfers of SALW" (Epps 2006: 1).

As a norm entrepreneur and leader in creating the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on Landmines, Canada appeared to understand and shared the view of ECOWAS on the need to put in place the administrative capacity to enforce the ECOWAS Convention on SALW (Tomlin et al 2007; Gwozdecky and Sinclair 2001; Axworthy 2003: 126-156). The Canadian government's contribution to the establishment of the SAU were in the areas of providing staffing support by paying the salaries of four key personnel of the unit for the first two years of the PSI project; the provision of technical support for the initial strategic planning of the SAU including the definition of its priorities; support for training of the staff to strengthen their knowledge and skills as well as the provision of material support.[75] Although the Liberal government's contribution was inadequate in view of the challenges that face ECOWAS, it can be argued that at least in practice, the Liberal government was making some genuine effort to assist ECOWAS to take dangerous weapons that have dire consequences for human security off the streets of West African states.

A central feature of the Canadian government's support to the ECOWAS's SAU, which is also true for other areas of Canadian government support through the PSI, was that according to CIDA officials, "the (Canadian government's) approach is to match the needs articulated by

---

[74] See, ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme home page, < http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/> Accessed on October 28, 2008
[75] See PSI Contribution Agreement, Annex A (2a-e)

ECOWAS and as CIDA understands with resources CIDA can offer".[76] In other words, the Canadian government's assistance was designed to meet the specific requirement of ECOWAS based on the capacity of the Canadian government to provide. Since its establishment in 2005, the SAU has been instrumental in the transformation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons into the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.[77] Furthermore through the Canadian government's assistance, the SAU was able to draft for the approval of ECOWAS member states, the standardised form for the exemption request pertaining to the ECOWAS Convention on SALW. As well, Canada assisted ECOWAS to print and disseminate the English and French versions of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW. Moreover, the establishment of the SAU enabled ECOWAS to undertake important steps towards the spreading of the norms governing small arms and light weapons in West Africa through sensitisation and advocacy missions in member states for the ratification of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.[78]

The Canadian government allocated $2million of the funding for PSI to support the work of the ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP) which is based in Bamako, Mali.[79] ECOSAP is a five-year capacity building programme which was launched in June 2006 by ECOWAS as part of the efforts regarding the building of the normative and regulative capacity of National Commissions of ECOWAS member states for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention

---

[76] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa, January 15, 2008

[77] Interview with ECOWAS official, Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008

[78] See, ECOWAS Secretariat (July-September 2007; October-December 2007). Canada-ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security in West Africa Project. Draft Quarterly Reports, Abuja Nigeria

[79] Other ECOWAS partners who support ECOSAP are European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Japan, Netherlands, and New Zealand. See, ECOWAS Small Arms Programme home page <http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/> Accessed on October 28, 2008

on SALW.[80] The National Commissions are key policymaking and implementation arenas within member states. The National Commissions are made up of relevant authorities and civil society organisations.

The functions of the National Commissions include; the formulation of strategies, policies and programmes to counter the proliferation of small arms; sensitization of the public to turn in illegally held weapons to security forces; updating arms registers and transmission of this information to ECOWAS Secretariat; provision of appropriate recommendations to ECOWAS on exemptions to be granted to the moratorium for weapons covered by the agreement; liaison on a permanent basis with ECOWAS on issues relevant to the moratorium as well as on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in general; and initiation and development of an exchange of information and experience with the other national commissions (Bah 2004: 10). The creation of the National Commissions was based on the conviction that "... any measures taken towards the effective and efficient application of the Moratorium (ECOWAS Convention of SALW) can be effectively applied, monitored and evaluated only with the genuine involvement of member states" (Quoted in Ayissi 2001: 14).

The Canadian government's support for the establishment of the SAU had a multiplier effect. The SAU assisted in the operationalisation of ECOSAP specifically through the recruitment of staff for the ECOSAP office in Bamako. Canada also assisted the ECOSAP directly. In terms of direct support, the Canadian government's funding for ECOSAP programming was implemented by the Canadian Center for Education and International Cooperation (CECI) and Oxfam UK. In accordance with the functions of the National Commissions, the funding was used

---

[80] See, ECOWAS Small Arms Programme home page <http://www.ecosap.ecowas.int/> Accessed on October 28, 2008

to support community and government capacity building programmes in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea- Bissau and Guinea as well as projects for the safe collection, storage, and destruction of surrendered weapons, and arms-for-development initiatives that supported community development.[81] Aside from the bilateral assistance to ECOWAS, Canada also used multilateral channels to support the eradication of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. This was done through the UNDP's regional programme—the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED)[82] that was set up at the request of ECOWAS to ensure the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW. The PCASED provided technical support to ECOWAS member states to implement the ECOWAS Convention on SALW (Kamara 2005: 39).

Related to PCASED was the country-based post-conflict reconstruction programme such as the Government of Sierra Leone/UNDP Small Arms for Development Programme. As noted in Chapter Four, this was a community-led voluntary surrender programme that collected and destroyed small arms and light weapons in exchange for community development projects such as sports/social center, marketplace, community schools, and health centers. The programme also supported law enforcement and reform as well as tighter controls at the borders. This led to a reduction of small arms and light weapons that were trafficked into Sierra Leone.

---

[81] See, CIDA, "Canada fund for Africa-Peace and Security" (CIDA, July 8, 2008) http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2 Accessed on October 29, 2008

[82] See, United Nations, "the Chronicle Interview"<http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue2/0203p57.html> Accessed on January 20, 2009

According to CIDA, as a result of this programme most of the central region of Sierra Leone was certified as "weapons-free" by the Sierra Leonean police.[83]

In conjunction with other ECOWAS partners who supported ECOSAP (European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Sweden) or PCASED (UNDP, Belgium, France, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) Canada contributed its quota to take dangerous weapons from the streets of West African countries. The Canadian government's support was based on the commitment that was demonstrated by ECOWAS to reduce the impact of small arms and light weapons on human security through the adoption and implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW. The support for the work of ECOSAP and the National Commissions was consistent with the Liberal government's human Security agenda which has the reduction of armed violence as one of its essential components.[84] Through the support for ECOSAP, Canada was helping to spread the idea of human safety in violent and post-violent situations in the West African region.

Building ECOWAS Peace and Security Structure: ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF)

The projection and sustenance of Canada's international identity as a peacekeeper played an important role in the Liberal government's support for the peace and security capacity building of ECOWAS (Dorn 2005; Thomsen and Hynek 2006). The conflict situation in the ECOWAS region provided an opportunity for the Canadian government to promote the values of human rights, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human security. In

---

[83] See, CIDA, " Government of Sierra Leone-UNDP Small Arms for Development Programme" (CIDA, July 8, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on October 10, 2008
[84] See, Freedom From Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security p. 9

the area of peacekeeping and the promotion of the norms of human security, the Canadian government, through the PSI, supported ECOWAS to put in place security structures to assist it to carry out its peace and security functions.

The PSI supported ECOWAS to establish a Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) which is an important component of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism particularly for the effective functioning of the ESF. The MPMC which is at the ECOWAS secretariat plays a key role in planning and managing ECOWAS missions. As well, the MPMC assesses crises situations and makes recommendation on possible courses of action for conflict resolution.[85] The ESF forms the backbone of the overall security strategy of ECOWAS. Ensuring the effective functioning of the ESF appears to be a priority of ECOWAS. The Canadian government responded accordingly through its support for training of the civilian police and gendarmerie forces as well as helping to build the institutional capacities of training facilities, and administrative capacities in the ECOWAS secretariat.

Similar to the support that was provided for the establishment of the SAU, Canada assisted ECOWAS to pay the salaries of eight staff members of the MPMC for two years. Moreover, Canada provided technical assistance including mentoring, advising on training priorities, as well as support for training that was required to strengthen the knowledge and skills of the MPMC staff.[86] The establishment of the MPMC has enabled ECOWAS to undertake various activities to strengthen the capacity of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism especially the ESF. These activities include a global logistics conference for the ECOWAS Peace Support Operations Logistics Depot that was held in Sierra Leone in October 2006; a joint medical

---

[85] See, PSI Contribution Agreement Annex A (1)
[86] Ibid., Annex A (1a-e)

exercise with the US European command; an African contingency operation training assistance command post exercise for ESF; strategic training needs assessment workshops to identify the gaps in ESF training needs and verification visits to troops contributing countries for options and solutions to be found.[87] These activities may contribute to the overall strengthening of the capacity of ECOWAS to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict in the West Africa region.

The establishment of the MPMC has assisted ECOWAS in its efforts to incorporate the civilian dimension of peace support operations in its overall peace and security strategy. In August 2007, the MPMC held sensitisation workshops for police and gendarmerie focal point officers through the contracting of two senior police officers on secondment at the ECOWAS secretariat. The significance of the police/gendarmerie component of the overall security strategy of ECOWAS is that aside from contributing to the peace support operation capacity of the ESF, they are key players for the implementation of ECOWAS articles and protocols on trans-border crime which includes vehicle theft, armed robbery, arms trafficking and child/women and drug trafficking.[88]

Still within the context of strengthening the capacity of police/gendarmerie for peace support operations and trans-border crime, it can be said that the establishment of the MPMC with the Canadian government's support, may contribute to the achievement of the long term security objectives of ECOWAS. According to ECOWAS, the main objectives of the Security Division of the Department of Peacekeeping and Regional Security for 2008-2020 are to, "engage and involve the civil police, the gendarmerie and other related security services to

---

[87]See, ECOWAS Secretariat (July-September 2006). Canada-ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security in West Africa Project. Draft Quarterly Reports, Abuja Nigeria Also see, the Draft Quarterly Report for April-June 2006

[88] See, ECOWAS Secretariat (July-September 2007; October-December 2007). Canada-ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security in West Africa Project. Draft Quarterly Reports, Abuja Nigeria

work with the ECOWAS Commission to fast track the implementation of the relevant security articles and protocols of ECOWAS; assist in the development of the capacity of the police and gendarmerie including women to effectively deploy to support ECOWAS, AU and UN peace operations; assist in the development of training manuals to be incorporated into training curricula of the security services to broaden and deepen their knowledge of the ECOWAS Commission, its institutions, vision and global objectives; and facilitate the development of a robust sub-regional strategy to fight organised trans-border criminality in order to enhance legitimate free movement of persons and goods for economic development and regional integration".[89]

Indeed, the above objectives are broad and long term in nature. Arguably they are limited to the strengthening of the capacity of the civilian police component of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The Canadian government found a niche to support the capacity building efforts of the ESF especially its civilian police/gendarmerie component although the military aspects of ESF received some attention through the development of training programmes for West Africa military personnel especially at KAIPTC.[90] Through the activities of the MPMC, the Canadian government funding was used to support military exercises for ESF personnel. One of these training activities was Exercise DEGGO XXVII which was a command post /field training exercise involving Senegalese armed forces and ESF task force. Exercise DEGGO XXVII helped to train 1997 officers and soldiers on the concepts, principles, and doctrines of peace support

---

[89] Undated document from the Department of Peacekeeping and Regional Security, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja Nigeria

[90] See, CIDA, "West Africa Peace and Security Initiative" (CIDA, July 8, 2008)<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on October 28, 2008

operations.[91] The main focus of the Canadian government's PSI was the training of police/gendarmerie component of ESF to be combat ready for peace support operations. The Liberal government allocated $3 million of the funding for PSI for the capacity building of the civilian police/gendarmerie component of the ESF. As noted in Chapter Five, the Conservative government has continued this funding under its West Africa Police Project. The PPC was the main implementation agency of the police project. The police/gendarmerie project encompassed wide range of activities that was aimed at strengthening the capacity of ECOWAS peace and security frameworks and national structures to effectively integrate and manage civilian police contributions to peace support operations and enhancing the training capacity in the West Africa region.[92]

An important element of the West Africa Police Project was that it incorporated gender mainstreaming in the training of the police/gendarmerie forces of the ESF. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) define gender mainstreaming as "the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality" (Quoted in Marks and Denham 2007: 10).

---

[91] See ECOWAS Secretariat (October-December 2007). Canada-ECOWAS: Institutional Capacity Building for Peace and Security in West Africa Project. Draft Quarterly Reports, Abuja Nigeria

[92] See, CIDA," Canada fund for Africa- Peace and Security" (CIDA, July 8, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on October 29, 2008

In a December 2002 study, ECOWAS recognised the need to pay serious attention to gender issues by creating an effective gender policy in order to enhance its regional cooperation and integration process.[93] Part of the recognition to pay attention to gender mainstreaming in the Pan-West African organisation came from lessons learned from women network groups about the importance of including women in peace and conflict resolution. (Marks and Denham 2007: 14). ECOWAS has established a Gender Development Center to generate requisite knowledge and transfer of skills in gender mainstreaming and women empowerment in the sub-regional policies and programmes. In the words of Colonel Toure, the Deputy Executive Secretary of Political Affairs, Defence and Security of ECOWAS, "ECOWAS realised that men in uniform alone are not enough to bring about peace in the sub-region" and that "gender mainstreaming of peace operations is therefore not just fair, it is clearly beneficial" (Quoted in Marks and Denham 2007:14). ECOWAS's view on gender mainstreaming reflects the views of the Canadian government to advance women's participation with men as decision-makers and reducing gender inequalities as found in key documents such as the 1999 *CIDA's Policy on Gender Equality.*[94]

The Canadian government and ECOWAS appear to fulfill their obligations under multilateral agreements. Gender mainstreaming played a key role in the Canadian government's support for ECOWAS consistent with the 2000 Security Council resolution 1325[95]

---

[93] See," Harmonisation of the ECOWAS Gender Policy" <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B556B87B8-E17C-45AC-83CA-A78240E66B5A%7D_ECOWAS-Gender-Policy.pdf> Accessed on January 22, 2009

[94] See, CIDA, " CIDA's Policy on Gender Equality" (Canadian International Development Agency, November 29, 2007) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIimages/Policy/$file/GENDER-E-nophotos.pdf> Accessed on January 20, 2009

[95] See, Resolution 1325, adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting on 31st October 2000. S/RES/1325(2000)

on the integration of gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations because of the important role that women play in conflict prevention and resolution, and the need for their equal participation and involvement in the promoting of peace and security. In accordance with the shared view on gender mainstreaming, the Canadian government placed emphasis on the promotion of gender sensitive training in its support for ECOWAS capacity building. The Canadian government assisted ECOWAS to hire a gender specialist to ensure that issues concerning women and children are incorporated into mission planning for peace support operations in the ECOWAS region.[96] Under the Canadian government's West Africa Police Project, police and gendarmerie women were trained to increase their participation in peace support operations. The Canadian government also assisted ECOWAS to establish a child protection unit to promote and protect children rights especially war-affected children and child soldiers.[97] The child protection unit monitored the rehabilitation and reintegration of war-affected children and child soldiers into post-conflict societies. The Canadian government's policy was aimed at protecting the most vulnerable during violent conflicts by ensuring that their needs were integrated into peace support operations, post-conflict peace building activities, and the training of the ESF personnel.

The Canadian government's contribution was inadequate in view of the huge challenges that face women and children as a result of the endemic insecurity in West Africa. Critics such as Sjolander (2005) and Smith (2005) might be right to argue that the Canadian government does not pay adequate attention to feminist views and as a result commitment to gender mainstreaming in Canadian foreign policy, "to say the least is rhetorically robust" (Sjolander

---

96 Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa, January 15, 2008
97 See, Freedom From Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security

2005: 20). Within the context of ECOWAS, the Canadian government did not demonstrate real commitment to support gender issues as it claimed.

Assisting in the building of the capacities of peacekeeping training institutions in West Africa is also an important component of the Canadian government's support for ECOWAS. As noted in Chapter Five, the training of the ESF personnel takes place at the APCE which is made up of the KAIPTC in Accra, ACSRS in Abuja, and the EMP in Bamako. The Liberal government allocated $4 million of the PSI for the capacity building of the KAIPTC. The KAIPTC offers training in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, UN logistics, and civilian policing for peacekeeping operations.[98] Staff from the PPC assist in the capacity building and training programmes at the KAIPTC in the areas of curriculum and course development; delivery and participation in courses exercise, workshops and seminars; development and facilitation of workshops in support of courses and other training activities; and technical and personnel support for knowledge development of KAIPTC.[99] The long term objective of PPC is to ensure that the KAIPTC takes ownership to "design, develop and deliver training that is relevant to evolving needs".[100]

Although the KAIPTC serves a broader peace and security training needs of the ASF, it was primarily established in 2003 to build and enhance the capacity of West African states through ECOWAS, to conduct peace operations through education training and research that

---

[98] See , CIDA " Canada fund for Africa- Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center" (CIDA, July 8, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on October 28, 2008
[99] See, Statement of Intent: An Agreement between the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC). September 5, 2007
[100] Ibid

will contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability.[101] As part of contributing to the peacekeeping training capacity in ECOWAS, the PPC has established Peacekeeping Documentation Centers in five West African states namely, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Peacekeeping Documentation Centers aim at providing military, police, gendarmerie and civilian population with access to current information on peace support operations including training and deployment of peacekeeping personnel in West Africa and beyond.[102]

Summary and Conclusion

The above discussions indicate that ECOWAS has taken leadership to institutionalise mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution as prerequisites for achieving economic integration in West Africa. The ECOWAS Security Mechanism which comprises of institutions such as the Early Warning System, Council of the Wise, and ECOWAS Standby Force, constitute important components of the overall security architecture of the AU. The Canadian government's PSI supported ECOWAS to undertake its peace and security function in the West Africa sub-region and as part of the overall strategy to promote peace and security in Africa.

The Canadian government used a two-pronged approach in its security assistance to ECOWAS. First, Canada contributed to ECOWAS's regulative capacity building in the area of

---

[101] See, Statement of Intent: An Agreement between the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC). September 5, 2007   Also see, CIDA " Canada fund for Africa- Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center" (CIDA, July 8, 2008) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218125228-PL3#2> Accessed on October 28, 2008

[102] See, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), " Strengthening West Africa's Peace Operations" (DFAIT, September 30, 2008) <http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/features-manchettes/west_africa-afrique_ouest/index.aspxAccessed on October 30, 2008> Accessed on October 30, 2008

small arms and light weapons control. Second, Canada contributed to building the institutional and operational capacity of ESF through training. The discussion has shown that consistent with its peacekeeping tradition, Canada's contribution to strengthen the ECOWAS peace security capacity was narrowly focused on the training of police/gendarmerie. As well, Canada focused on building the institutional capacities of the APCE especially the KAIPTC. Other equally important components of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism such as the Early Warning System and the Council of the Wise did not receive much attention from the Canadian government. The next chapter focuses on a brief discussion of the challenges of Canadian policy. The chapter concludes with a Non-imperial Internationalist Approach as an alternative theoretical framework to understand Canada's foreign policy toward the AU and ECOWAS.

Chapter Seven

Theorising Canadian Policy towards the AU and ECOWAS

Introduction

Drawing on the broad findings discussed thus far in the study, this chapter proposes an alternative perspective, Non-imperial Internationalism, to understand Canadian foreign policy in Africa. The non-imperial internationalist approach draws insights from the theoretical assumptions of constructivists approach to international relations. I argue that Canadian government policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of the moral identity/image that Canada has constructed over the years in Africa. What is profound is that while this moral identity/image provides the means through which Canadian strategic interests are pursued in Africa, it appears that the Canadian government's interest in maintaining this image has overshadowed the need for the Canadian government to put more resources behind the rhetoric of promoting peace and security and particularly human security in Africa. Canada's moral identity/image is resolute to the extent that even with the shift of Harper's policy focus to Afghanistan and the Americas, Canada still has a positive perception in Africa.

In order to illuminate the non-imperial internationalist approach, I will recap the challenges of the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. I argue that although the government has shown interest in promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa, the Canadian government's resource contribution towards the AU and ECOWAS did not match 'the weight of the rhetoric' of placing Africa at the center of the Canadian government's international cooperation. This is followed by a discussion of what I call the mainstream approaches to Canadian foreign policy—liberal pluralist, statist, dominant class

and neo-Gramscian approaches. The discussion in this section highlights the weaknesses of these approaches and their inability to help us to understand the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. I will then conclude with a detailed discussion of a non-imperial internationalist approach as an alternative to understand Canadian policy.

The Challenges of Canadian Policy towards AU and ECOWAS

Contrary to the norm of imposing prescriptions for economic development in African countries such as through the SAPs in the 1980s (Morrison 2000; Smith 2006), the Canadian government's peace and security contribution to the AU and ECOWAS was not based on the imposition of Canadian ideas or Canadian-made solutions. Instead, the Canadian government's contribution was designed to respond to the leadership undertaken by the AU and ECOWAS to institutionalise legal and structural mechanisms to address the security deficit in Africa.

Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapters, it appear that drawing on the reputation and experience in peacekeeping (Dorn 2005), the Canadian government took a keen interest in the training of the civilian police/gendarmerie component of the ASF although the military component of the ASF also received some attention. It follows that both at the continental and sub-regional levels, the Canadian government concentrated its energies on helping to build the conflict intervention capacity aspect of the AU and ECOWAS security architecture in the form of supporting the training of ASF personnel and the capacity building of the APCE (KAIPTC, ACSRS and EMP). As a result, the Canadian government paid less attention to build the capacity of the other institutions of APSA—the CEWS and the PW—which when

284

effectively established can be important instruments for preventing the escalation of violent conflicts in African states.

Even though one cannot deny the benefits of conflict intervention to protect human security, an AU official[1] pointed out that the Canadian government's policy towards Africa follows the idea of ensuring global security by helping to build "grand security architectures" in Africa to equip Africans to intervene in conflicts themselves. But as pointed out by another observer, by concentrating on conflict intervention through the strengthening of the capacity of the ASF, "the Canadian government does not pay adequate attention to conflict prevention at the local level which may have direct impact on community and individual security".[2] Thus, although CIDA's development programmes in African countries through its regular aid budget or the CFA may improve human security, it appears that for the most part the Canadian government's policy was more focused on physical security through the ASF capacity building for conflict intervention.

Indeed at the sub-regional level, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts was part of the Canadian government's contribution in the ECOWAS. The Canadian government's PSI supported ECOWAS to build its conflict prevention capacity through the establishment of the SAU which was very instrumental in the transformation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) into the ECOWAS Convention on SALW. In addition, the Canadian government's PSI supported the ECOSAP and country-specific programmes such as the Government of Sierra Leone/UNDP Small Arms Programme. Thus, given the impact of the proliferation and illegal trade in small arms and light weapons on peace

---

[1] Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, April 22, 2008
[2] Interview with an official of a prominent think tank in West Africa, Accra, February 22, 2008

and security in West Africa, it can be argued that the Canadian government's support was a step in the right direction to prevent conflict and rebuild post conflict countries. Nonetheless, an ECOWAS official I interviewed in the field argued that "Canada desires to be seen as doing something (in the area of conflict prevention) but its funding is inadequate".[3] For instance, the five-year CFA ended on March 31, 2008 after a one year extension and the Harper government declined the proposal of CECI and Oxfam UK to extend the funding for the small arms programme in ECOSAP.[4] One can agree with Ali Mazrui that "if prevention is better than cure it follows that reducing the risk of conflict (for instance through the small arms programme) is better than strengthening the methods of resolving conflict" (Mazrui 1994: 42). In this respect, the future of Canadian government support for peace and security in Africa should also have a long term focus on conflict prevention capacity building.

Generally speaking, the challenges of Canadian activism appear to be deeply rooted in the lack of overarching policy towards Africa. Consequently for the most part, the Canadian government's leadership on Africa especially in the area of peace and security promotion is more pronounced at the rhetorical level than with material resources commitment. The Canadian government's support to the AU and ECOWAS has followed the path of Canadian development assistance that lacks sustainability and clear focus.[5] As much as the Canadian contribution can make some impact in supporting the AU and ECOWAS preparedness to intervene in conflicts, the contributions fall short of the real needs of Africa.

---

[3] Interview with ECOWAS official Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[4] Interview with CIDA officials and NGO officials in Ottawa, January 17 & 25, 2008 respectively
[5] See Freeman, A. (October 18, 2007). Political winds buffeting Canada's Foreign Aid Policy, Report Says. Globe and Mail

The lack of an overarching Canadian policy has produced an inconsistent focus on Africa over the years. To a large extent this has become even more evident in the transition from the Liberal to the Conservative government and the consequent policy (re)focus on Afghanistan and Americas. As candidly expressed by an expert at the North-South Institute, Africa seems to be the missing "A" in Canadian foreign policy under Prime Minister Harper since Canada's foreign policy priority has shifted to Afghanistan and the Americas.[6] Indeed, Prime Minister Harper asserted that "We (Canada) are a country of the America's and (Canada's) re-engagement in our hemisphere is a critical international priority for our government. Canada is committed to playing a bigger role in the America's and to doing so for the long term."[7] As discussed in the previous chapters, the shift to the America's has raised concerns about the future of the Canadian government's activism in Africa. A senior NGO official[8] I interviewed in Ottawa argued that the shift of Canadian foreign policy focus to the America's might lead to an exodus of Canadian NGOs to the Americas leaving behind uncompleted projects in parts of Africa since most of the NGOs receive their funding from CIDA. The field operations of Canadian NGOs are to some extent dependent on the geographical focus of Canadian aid and this suggest that although the NGOs might prefer more aid to Africa they are less influential in determining the geographical priority of the Canadian government.

Canadian policy on Africa is generally related to the level of resources to support policy. As one observer retorted "if you want to know where Canada's real commitment is, follow the

---

[6] Interview with Official of the North-South Institute Ottawa, January 18, 2008
[7] See Prime Minister Harper Signals Canada's Renewed Engagement in the Americas (Office of the Prime Minister 17 July, 2007) <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1760> Accessed on December 18, 2008
[8] Interview with NGO official Ottawa January 21, 2008

money".[9] Indeed this assertion provides some interesting revelations. The funding for governance/peace and security including capacity building of AU and ECOWAS constituted just 15% of the $500 million Canada Fund for Africa. Other allocations of the CFA are health 22%; agriculture, environment and water 28%; bridging the digital divide 7%; trade and investment 24%; and administration 4%.[10] It is important to note that apart from the funding that was earmarked specifically for peace and security, the other components of the CFA were more or less part of the traditional development assistance programming through CIDA in African countries. Perhaps, the linking of the larger part of the CFA to the regular CIDA programming should not be surprising because it serves the twin objectives of projecting Canada's moral image in Africa while at the same time serving its economic interest especially in middle income African countries (see chapter three).[11]

On security, the 15% of the CFA ($25 million) that was allocated for AU and ECOWAS capacity building among the other human security related projects was far below the commitment in Afghanistan alone. As pointed out in Chapter Four, since 2001, the Canadian government has deployed troops and as well spent $7.5 billion in the war on terror in Afghanistan[12] which is far more than the five-year $500 million Canada Fund for Africa. In fact some analysts have projected that the Canadian government will spend between $18 billion

---

[9] Interview with a top NGO official in Ottawa January 22, 2008

[10] See, About the Fund: Why the CFA(Canadian International Development Agency) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-419113138-L8B> Accessed on November 12, 2008

[11] See Government of Canada, "Budget 2008-Budget in Brief" (Department of Finance, February 26, 2008) <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/glance-apercu/brief-bref-eng.asp> Accessed on August 27, 2008. Also see the 1995 Government Statement: Canada in the World p. 40

[12] See "Tories Try to dampen Afghan overspending report" (Canadian Press March 12, 2008) <http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080312/tories_afghanistan_080312/20080312?hub=Politics> Accessed on July 15, 2008

and $20 billion by the close of the Afghan mission in 2011.[13] This is a clear contradiction of the Liberal government rhetoric of placing Africa at the center of Canada's international cooperation. Not surprisingly, a senior AU official I interviewed opined that "the Liberal government's idea of placing Africa at the center of Canada's international cooperation policy was more of a declaration of intent that only served to portray Canada as an important player in Africa. Rhetorically, it helped to serve Canada's psychological needs as a liberal and important humanitarian player in Africa".[14] An ECOWAS official puts it bluntly that "perhaps the rhetoric suited Canadian audience but it does not have a true meaning for many Africans".[15]

Closely related to the above argument, a senior Canadian military officer who served in Darfur as part of the Canadian task force that assisted AMIS argued that "although the Canadian military is looking forward to play a more significant role in Africa, at the moment the military's attention is focused on Afghanistan because Canada's policy follows the United States. As one of its strongest allies, Canada does not want to offend the United States on the war on terror".[16] Indeed, generally speaking, Canada has a modest military capacity (Jockel and Sokolsky 2000 11-13; Black 2005:8) and cannot easily deploy troops to every emergency around the globe. However, the general picture reflects the Canadian government's disengagement in peacekeeping in Africa. For instance, Canada's troop contribution was a mere 68 personnel out of the 61,265 peacekeepers who were serving in six African states as of October 2008.[17]

---

[13] CBC News, The National, November 11, 2008
[14] Interview with AU official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 25, 2008
[15] Interview with ECOWAS official Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[16] Interview with a senior Canadian military officer Edmonton, January 10, 2008
[17] See, International Security Assistance Force (effective September 1, 2008), with Regional Commands and PRT Locations < http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf> Accessed on November 14, 2008

According to some observers,[18] the lack of Canadian peacekeepers in Africa in the past decade is partly because the Canadian military seeks to transform itself from peacekeeping to war-making as in the ongoing war on terror in Afghanistan. The Canadian government has sought to portray the Canadian military as warriors instead of peacekeepers (Bratt 2007: 243). In this vein, the Canadian military prefers to undertake peacekeeping through NATO with a robust mandate that includes peace enforcement which is contrary to traditional UN peacekeeping practice (Dorn 2005; Bratt 2007). In Africa, however, NATO-led peacekeeping remains a remote possibility at least for now that the AU appears to take leadership in this regard. Even more important is the fact that some of the officials I interviewed in Ottawa pointed out that there is little or no justification for the Canadian government to engage in war-making in Africa because insecurity in Africa does not constitute a direct threat to Canada.[19] In short, as the Canadian military takes a new role as 'warriors', one can anticipate a continuous decline in Canadian peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Furthermore, although the Canadian government has performed better at articulating new norms and ideas such as the protection of human security in Africa, the lack of sustained and adequate resource contribution in support of the AU and ECOWAS Security institutions may undermine Canada's leadership on African issues. In fact on Darfur for instance, a senior DFAIT official who served in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the height of the crisis pointed out that the Canadian government's support to AMIS was done spontaneously and not based on long term policy calculations since the government was expecting the UN to take over the mission

---

[18] This idea was expressed by Canadian officials in CIDA and DFAIT as well by some senior NGO officials in Ottawa
[19] Ibid

from the AU sooner than it happened in January 2008 as a result of the Sudanese government's resistance.[20] The DFAIT official added that "Canada was forced under the circumstance to continue its support to AMIS since it will have been politically damaging if Canada cut support for AMIS".[21] Again on the APCE, some African officials pointed out that in terms of financial contributions, Canada was a small player and that paradoxically, the KAIPTC especially, appears to have contributed to the positive image of Canada in Africa.[22] Although the government may see itself as doing its bit to promote peace and security in Africa, in real terms Canada is not a major contributor to peace and security training in Africa.[23] From the above it appears that Canada's contribution was more of window dressing to sustain its positive image in Africa that was gained albeit through limited aid contributions to African states over the years.

As argued before, in the AU and ECOWAS, Canada has a positive image as a non-colonising, non-belligerent, liberal and committed partner. But it appears that there is a central contradiction that is rooted in 'Canadian perception' of Africa that in turn undermines policy on the African continent. For instance, the Canadian government argued that "for most Canadians, Africa is a paradox: a continent in crisis-but a continent with immense human and natural resource potential that if harnessed, could be the success story of the 21st century".[24] To some extent David Black (2005) concurs as when he argues persuasively that although "interest-based calculus may seem less immediate, especially from the safe distance of Canada... a developmentally robust Africa would enrich the world (including Canada but) an impoverished and declining Africa compromises world prosperity." It follows that it is in the Canadian

---

[20] Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs official Ottawa October 15, 2008
[21] Ibid
[22] Interview with an official at KAIPTC Accra Ghana February 21, 2008
[23] Ibid
[24] See Canada fund for Africa: New Vision, New Partnership, p. 1

governments' own interest to put more resources to assist in Africa's development since this will in turn benefit the Canadian economy.

Yet, as pointed out by a DAFIT official, "the smallness of the Canadian government contribution including peace and security capacity building of the AU and ECOWAS is inherent in the politics here in Canada. People are not willing to put money in Africa because the prospect of economic return is minimal".[25] This perception of course stands in contrast with the recent growth in Canadian trade and investment in Africa (SSCFAIT 2007: 113-114), nevertheless, it gives a clear indication that the way Africa is constructed by Canadian foreign policy officials and perhaps the public, as a least developed continent that is plagued by violence in itself undermines Canadian government policy in the region and more so Canadian government support towards the peace and security capacity building of the African Peace and Security Architecture. As one official candidly puts it "Canada will prefer to provide more support to a stronger African Peace and Security Architecture".[26] To this end, aside from budgetary constraints, and the focus on Afghanistan and the Americas, 'the pessimistic perception' of Africa as poor and conflict-ridden[27] partly explains the inadequacy of Canadian government contribution towards the promotion of peace and security, particularly human security in Africa.

Perhaps the lack of overarching security policy and the 'good for aid perception' of Africa was the result of the ad hoc manner in which the peace and security envelope of the CFA was managed at the administrative level. As mentioned before, the CFA was conceived largely

---

[25] Interview with DFAIT official in Ottawa, January 21, 2008
[26] Interview with CIDA official January 17, 2008
[27] For an insightful reading about the pessimistic perception of Africa, see Smith (2005); and Smith (2003), especially Chapter 1

as a development package to Africa with CIDA as the appropriate implementing agency. But the decision of the Canadian government to implement the peace and security capacity building aspect through CIDA undermined the overall efficiency of the peace and security project. Although one could not doubt the expertise of CIDA in the area of development programming, CIDA was not equally competent on peace and security issues. Thus, even though the DND and PPC were involved in the implementation of the Canadian government funding for the ASF, CIDA officials conceded that CIDA was not able to function well unlike in the area of development programming in Africa.[28] As one of the officials opined "the Canadian government's approach to use CIDA to implement the policy towards the AU and ECOWAS has affected the efficient running of the programme (peace and security capacity building of ASF)".[29]

Closely associated with the argument so far, the Canadian government, generally, has been unwilling to take action when it comes to issues such as human rights abuses, environmental degradation and forced eviction of local communities by Canadian companies in the mining and other extractive industries in some parts of Africa.[30] Indeed, Canadian mining companies were at the forefront of the Global Mining Initiative. The central objective of the Global Mining Initiative is to enforce appropriate standards of corporate social responsibility in the countries and communities where mining companies operate (Dashwood 2005). Despite this the activities of some Canadian mining companies are counterproductive to the objectives of human security and more so the security of post- conflict states in Africa. In West Africa for

---

[28] Interview with CIDA officials, Ottawa, January 17, 2008
[29] Ibid
[30] See Abdulai Darimani, "Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa " (Third World Network-Africa Secretariat October 31, 2005) <http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/Africa_case_study.pdf> Accessed on December 13, 2008

instance, it is feared that the activities of Canadian mining companies—Alcan, Golden Star

Resources, International Gold Resources and Mano River Resources—which are exploring

mineral commodities around the Mano River area where Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

converge may threaten the rich biodiversity of this area and become a potential source of inter-

state conflict between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.[31] The situation can be potentially

dangerous because the borders of these countries are porous and there is availability of young

fighters (ex-rebels) in the West African region who see war as an economic opportunity (Berdal

and Malone 2000; Human Right Watch 2005).[32]

Even in more stable places like Ghana, Mali and Tanzania, Canadian mining companies

have been 'guilty' of polluting the water sources of local communities as well as engaging in

forced evictions of villagers and the destruction of farmlands.[33] The Canadian government's

failure to regulate these companies undermines the Kimberly Process to control conflict

diamonds, as well as "promoting corporate social responsibility as an important element of the

Government of Canada's approach to promoting international trade and investment".[34] In fact

some Canadian NGO officials I interviewed opined that although Canadian investment in Africa

may contribute to the development of African states and peoples, the human rights abuses and

the destruction of the environment by Canadian mining companies undermines human security

---

[31] See Abdulai Darimani (October 31, 2005)

[32] Also, for a more detailed discussion on war as economic opportunity see Paul Collier (2000; 2007)

[33] For details see, In Debt to Water: Ghana, Gold and Debt. (Mining Watch Canada)
<http://www.kairoscanada.org/fileadmin/fe/files/PDF/EcoJustice/Mining/InDebttoWater_GhanaStory.pdf>
Accessed on December 11, 2008; Also See Abdulai Darimani (October 31, 2005)

[34] See DFAT, "Notes for an address by Hon. Pierre Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade at the Plenary Session of the Canada Trade Mission to Africa" (Johannesburg, South Africa November 18, 2008) (http://w01.international.gc.ca/Minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=379758&Language=E& docnumber=2002/N/A) Accessed on August 12, 2008

on the African continent. The Canadian government needs to do more to ensure that Canadian mining companies adhere to the principles of corporate social responsibility.[35]

Most African conflicts are resourced-based (Berdal and Malone 2000; Madlala-Routledge & Liebenberg, 2004; Gueli et al; Cilliers, 2004b) therefore controlling the behaviour of mining companies especially those in conflict areas will augment the Canadian government's support for peace and security capacity building in the AU and ECOWAS. For instance in 2005, a Canadian mining company, ANVIL, which operated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) allowed the Congolese army to use the company's trucks and airplanes to carry out a military operation that resulted in the Kilwa massacre of civilians.[36] Although the case went to a military court, "ANVIL maintained that it had no responsibility in the massacre and that the DRC military general who made the request for the company's equipment is a nice guy".[37] According to a Canadian NGO official, the Canadian government did not investigate and ANVIL was not charged thereby raising concerns about Canada's commitment to promoting human security in the DRC.[38] In a cynical but perhaps candid opinion, the official argued that to some extent some mining companies operating in conflict areas in Africa want the current *dis*order to be maintained since it will be difficult to exploit the resources of a peaceful Africa.[39]

It is noteworthy that the challenges of Canadian policy go beyond the limitations of the Canadian state itself. According to CIDA officials, the AU and ECOWAS were not forthcoming with projects and it took a long time for officials to identify areas of need that Canada can

---

[35] Interview with NGO officials in Ottawa January 21 &25, 2008 respectively
[36] For details see, " Anvil Mining and the Kilwa Massacre, D.R. Congo: Canadian Company Implicated (Ottawa: Mining Watch Canada June 16, 2005) (http://www.miningwatch.ca/index.php?/Anvil/Anvil_Mining_Kilwa) Accessed on November 14, 2008
[37] An interview with an official at Mining Watch Canada, Ottawa January 21, 2008
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid

support. Especially, it appeared more difficult for the AU to isolate crises of the day (for instance Darfur) from future planning.[40] In other words, the AU was distracted by the crises of the day and was not able to come out with a long term plan that Canada can support. Although AU officials conceded to this problem they argued that the major challenge at the AU Peace and Security Department was inadequate personnel to push the peace and security agenda of the organisation forward.[41] Similarly, in the ECOWAS, a senior official pointed out that the organisation lacks the administrative and logistical capacity to implement projects that have strict deadlines and this was partly responsible for the two extensions of the peace and security capacity building projects in the organisation under the Canada fund for Africa.[42] The short time frame of the CFA and the requirement on the AU and ECOWAS to use the funding within five years put a lot of constraints on the staff of these organisations. In this context, an AU official argued that Canada's policy should take into consideration the AU capacity and priorities to build a durable architecture that will assist the AU to implement its peace and security mandate in Africa.[43]

In sum, "...human security operations remain discretionary" (Jockel and Sokolsky 2000:18) and Canada just like other states in the international system has a free choice as to where and how much it is willing to contribute to protecting human security in Africa. The rhetoric of placing Africa at the center of Canadian international cooperation raised high expectations that Canada should do more in Africa. The APSA is symbolic as the first comprehensive continental security arrangement so perhaps it was a source of pride for

---

[40] Interview with CIDA officials in Ottawa, January 16, 2008
[41] Interview with AU officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April-May 2008
[42] Interview with ECOWAS official, Abuja Nigeria June 18, 2008 Although the CFA has ended, the peace and security capacity building project in ECOWAS will end on March 31, 2009
[43] Interview with AU official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008

Canada to support it. But as argued so far, there is a resource supply gap in Canadian policy in Africa. Perhaps, within Canadian official circles, a genuine 'reconstruction' of the image of Africa as a land of opportunities—as demonstrated by the relatively successful economic and democratic reforms in some states such as Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania— would give real meaning to the linkage between Africa's insecurity to Canadian security, and would set the stage for the development of an overarching policy with an efficient administrative set-up to manage Canada's activities in Africa. The rest of the chapter will put the study in a non-imperial internationalist theoretical perspective.

Mainstream Approaches to Canadian Foreign Policy

This study has investigated the Canadian government's policy towards the APSA and the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The study has explored the factors that influenced the Canadian government's policy, the meaning and understanding of human security, and how it has translated into Canadian policy as well as whether African perspectives of human security and regional security have had any impact on Canadian foreign policy decisions. The findings of this study provide us with important theoretical lessons. To reiterate the question in the introduction, how can we best conceptualise theoretically, the relationship between Canada and Africa regional organisations at least in the context of Canada's support for peace and security capacity building on the African continent?

The mainstream theoretical approaches to Canadian foreign policy are concerned with analysing Canada's status, role, and foreign policy behaviour in the global arena as a middle power or principal power. These are discussed in turn. It should be noted at the onset that this

study accepts the notion of Canada as a middle power in the international arena. This is largely due to Canada's behaviour and perceptions of Canada on the African scene. The middle power concept attracts diverse explanations among scholars of Canadian foreign policy but broadly speaking, middle powers have been defined as a group of states that occupy *the middle* in the international status ranking based on capabilities as measured by their Gross National Product (GNP). The international behaviour of these states is described as "moderate reformers", which is synonymous with the western like-minded group of countries which tend to act as mediators between contending blocs. Furthermore, middle powers include states with international *influence*—actual or potential—to modify the behaviour of other actors and exercise influence in important areas of international activity (Wood 1990: 72-78). Others (Cooper 1997; Keating 2002 and 2010; Nossal 2010) argue that the term middle power has strong normative implications and central to this normative basis is the belief that middle powers are good multilateralists or international citizens committed to orderliness and security in the international system, and abiding by international law. David Black and Heather Smith (Black and Smith 1993) add that middle powers' behaviour concentrates on coalition building and multilateralism, mediating international conflicts, and promoting a just and equitable international order. Middle powers are also noted for their pursuance of humane internationalist policies in the international system (Pratt 1994).

Moreover, Andrew Cooper et al (1993: 14-27) argue that niche diplomacy which is based on the theory of functionalism is a core organising principle associated with middle power behaviour. Niche diplomacy involves concentrating resources on specific issues based on the capacities of states to ensure efficient and effective performance of those functions rather

298

than trying to do it all. That is, niche diplomacy involves selecting areas or functions that the resources of the state can accommodate. It is argued that with the ending of the Cold War, middle powers like Canada are more flexible to resort to leadership roles and respond to new conditions and circumstances in the international system. In other words the vulnerabilities after the Cold War have created opportunity for middle powers to take selective forms of responsibility in issue-specific agendas depending on their capacities (Cooper, 1997: 4-5).

Andrew Cooper et al (1993) claim that changing global politics—for example the expansion of the security agenda and the intermeshing of domestic and foreign policy—allows for greater opportunity for societal influence in policy and this serves as an impetus for middle power activism in the international system. According to them, leadership based on structure is being replaced by leadership based on entrepreneurship and technical skills. The sources of leadership of middle powers such as Canada are both systemic and domestic and are based on specific terms, context, or policy issue. Middle powers can afford leadership in the economic and social realm and in order to play this leadership role, middle powers can serve as catalysts by initiating agendas, collaborating with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and serving as facilitators and managers of specific issues in the international system (Keating 2007; Cooper 1997: 20). In this context, the practice of niche diplomacy by middle powers expands traditional international relations theory which concentrates on hegemonic factors such as the military capability of the state.

Standing at the opposite end of the notion of middle power is Canada as a principal power. The main advocates of this approach are David Dewitt and John Kirton (Dewitt and Kirton 1983 and Kirton 2007). Using a complex neo-realist theory, which identifies national

interest and autonomous state behaviour as its core principles, Dewitt and Kirton argue that *principal powers* are not the familiar great powers of realist theory rather they are principal states in three senses. In the first place they are states that stand at the top of the international status ranking; secondly, they act as principals in their international activities and associations rather than as agents of other states; and lastly, these states play a principal role in establishing, specifying and enforcing international order. On this account, Dewitt and Kirton (1983: 36-45) contend that national interest and autonomous state behaviour inform Canadian foreign policy. Canada stands at the top of the international status ranking, acts as a principal in its international activities and association, and plays a principal role in establishing, specifying, and enforcing international order. This suggests that Canada has transcended the status of a satellite state, and a middle power to a principal power. Like the middle power approach, Dewitt and Kirton identify the decline of US hegemony in the international system as a major factor that has propelled Canada to principal power status. The middle power and principal power approaches have some weaknesses.

Aside from their main concern in specifying Canada's role, status, and behaviour in the international arena, both the middle power and principal power approaches do not really speak to the substantive contents of foreign policy or why certain ideas, norms or policies such as human security come to be accepted in the conduct of Canada's external affairs. Indeed, Canada's foreign policy interest in human security through the peace and security capacity building support for the AU and ECOWAS is not *a given*, it is an idea that is shared, and dependent on a multiplicity of other normative factors which include the Canadian government's self-perception or how Canadians perceive Canada's place or is being perceived

300

by other states or regions in the international system and how these perceptions, in turn, shape policy. Furthermore, even though both the middle power and principal power approaches agree among other things that the central objective of Canadian foreign policy is to build Canada's image through leadership initiatives, enhancing Canada's influence and promoting Canada's national interest, these approaches do not acknowledge the intersubjective and mutually constitutive nature of Canada's interests and identity in the international system. To this end both approaches to Canadian foreign policy do not help us to understand how Canadian foreign policy interest can change over time.

The analyses of the middle power and principal power approaches of Canada's status, policy preferences, behaviour, and national interests on the global stage are rooted in domestic sources of policy-making. These are the liberal pluralist, statist, and dominant class approaches. They are summarised in turn. First, the liberal-pluralist approach holds that the Canadian state is a mere facilitator of foreign policy as it reacts and adjudicates over conflicting demands from individuals and groups in the society. In this sense the state bases its political decisions on the policies that would be supported by the greater number of its constituents, interests, organisations, and groups in the society (Nossal 1997: 11). Put directly, the states authoritative decisions—national interest—is based on the preferences and demands that are dictated by the society (Stairs 1970-1).

Second, and contrary to the liberal-pluralist view, the statist approach contends that the state is an autonomous entity with interest, values, attitudes, and preferences that are independent from societal interest and preferences, and these inform the state's policy decisions (Nossal, 1983/84: 15-19, Nossal 2007: 165-168). On this account, the Canadian state is

seen as an independent entity capable of formulating policies, and pursuing these policies without undue intervention from civil society. A modified statist approach also acknowledges the autonomy of the state as well as the influences from civil society in the determination of policy. Nonetheless, this approach argues that officials of the state have their own preferences and conceptions of the national interest which is informed by their ideological beliefs, the interest of the institution or department they are attached, and their personal career interests. When these interests conflict with the inputs that they receive from the civil society, officials use their authoritative capacity and state resources to help convince society of the rightness of the state's conception of the national interest and its policy choices.

Finally, Cranford Pratt (1983/84 and 2007) contends that Canadian foreign policy is heavily influenced by the dominant class—capitalist class—in Canadian society. The dominant class approach argues that although the state may be relatively autonomous from those who own capital, the state is exceptionally influenced by the values, attitudes and interests of the corporate sector. The corporate sector and their partners in the bureaucracy favour the pursuance of economic interests and the maintenance of the capitalist system to the subordination of broader societal interests which are based on humane or ethical considerations—what Pratt calls the 'counter-consensus' (Pratt 1994 and 2007). It follows that the definition of the national interest which is articulated by the bureaucratic process and conceded by both the liberal pluralist and statist approaches is uncritical and flattering as it obscures the wider implication of representing the economic interest of the dominant class.

A central theme runs through the liberal-pluralist, the statist, and the dominant class approaches. That is, Canadian foreign policy is not based on altruistic motives towards other

states and that policies tend to benefit the state itself (in the case of the statist approach) and the Canadian society or at least a part thereof (as argued by the liberal-pluralist and dominant class approaches). Aside from this, the approaches make different assumptions about the making of Canadian foreign policy. The liberal-pluralist view provides an extensive role for broader societal interests, preferences, and attitudes in the determination of policy but the dominant class approach argues for a much narrower range of interests, in this case, that of the capital owning class. Finally, the statist approach, even though it gives room for societal influence, argues that government officials and their departments are the key players in determining the foreign policy of the state. These provide useful insights to understand this study but they are not without weaknesses that provide the ground for an alternative theorising. I will discuss them in turn.

First, although the liberal pluralist approach may partially account for the participation of civil society groups in the creation of the CFA, as explained in Chapter Three, it cannot account for the behaviour of Canada with respect to its engagement with the AU and ECOWAS. The liberal-pluralist approach cannot tease out the intersubjective understandings of the ideas, norms, and values that are shared by Canada and the AU and ECOWAS and that in turn shape the Canadian government's policy and interests in Africa. To a large extent, this shortcoming is rooted in the fact that the liberal-pluralist approach, even though it provides an explanation for the outcome of the interaction between the state and society in the making of policy, it does not take into account external factors that are mostly ideational forces that constitute the identity and image of Canada in Africa. It follows that the liberal-pluralist approach has little to say about how Canada is perceived by African officials as well as how human security became

the central theme of Canada's contribution towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building.

Second, the statist approach could also account for the state's conception of the national interest in the context of the Canadian government's resort to the short-term five-year CFA instead of the a long-term programme that was proposed by civil society groups.[44] In fact, some like Nossal (1988) may argue that the Liberal government's resort to a short-term five-year CFA is rooted in the desire of Canada to limit real expenditures while projecting and maximising the prestige associated with providing assistance to African states and regional organisations. But the statist account just like realism,[45] takes the idea of the national interest (maximising prestige) as *a given* and therefore does not account for how Canada's identity shapes its interest. Put directly, the statist approach does not explain how identity and interest are mutually constituted and shape the behaviour of the state in the international arena. In this case, what is particularly important is the way Canada is perceived in the AU and ECOWAS and how this, in turn, shapes Canadian policy. The statist approach cannot provide a useful lens to account for how the identity of Canada as a moral state was cultivated over the years and how this influences the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS.

As noted in this study, the Liberal government had an interest in pursuing the freedom from fear aspect of human security but this was made possible in Africa because the AU and ECOWAS shared a similar understanding of human security at least in the context of conflict intervention in Africa. This suggests that the external environment in Africa in which Canada operates as well as the perceptions of Canada by the AU and ECOWAS, played a role in shaping

---

[44] Interview with North-South Institute and CUSO officials in Ottawa, January 18 and 21, 2008 respectively
[45] For instance see Wendt (1995)

304

the policy behaviour of Canada. Closely related to this, the statist approach could fall short of explaining the role of ideas and norms—e.g. human security—in shifting Canada's bilateral policy in Africa from what can be called the delivery of development assistance to African countries to a collaboration with the AU and ECOWAS to build their peace and security capacity.

Finally, the dominant class approach could also explain the promotion of the economic interests of the corporate sector in the context of the NEPAD as discussed in Chapter Four. Yet, the dominant class approach has little to offer in the area of the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. As regional and sub-regional organisations with a security role, the dominant class approach's bias towards 'purely' economic impulses for policy makes it inadequate to account for Canada's human security policy in these organisations. Strictly speaking, the Canadian government's support for the AU and ECOWAS falls outside the purview of economics. When the idea of human security is brought into perspective, the Canadian government's policy appears to go beyond economic interest in the strictest sense. Rather, the Canadian government appears to want to sustain its image, albeit with minimal resources, as a moral actor by supporting the AU and ECOWAS to protect human security in Africa. In fact even if we accept that economic interest was the sole motivation for the Canadian government's response to the NEPAD initiative, the dominant class approach cannot fully answer the question as to why the African leaders appear to have accepted the 'spoke-stateship' of the Canadian government in the G8. In other words why should the African leaders rely on the Canadian government to be the advocate of the NEPAD within the G8? The answer lies in the

construction of Canada's moral identity in Africa that I will discuss under the non-imperial internationalist approach.

Before this discussion, let's turn to a derivative approach of the dominant class theory, neo-Gramscian approach, which offers a more critical account of Canadian policy by linking the domestic factors to the global context (Neufeld 1995 and 2007). This discussion, just like the foregoing ones, will help to throw more light on the theoretical importance of a non-imperial internationalist approach. Like a constructivist approach to international relations, Mark Neufeld (1995 and 2005) argues that a neo-Gramscian approach acknowledges the important role of ideas such as neoliberalism as key features or motivations of Canada's foreign policy. On this account Neufeld argues that as a middle power, and a Western state, Canada's role in the global arena helps to sustain a hegemonic capitalist world order in which relations between classes is a key variable. That is, the institutionalisation of a hegemonic economic world order serves the interests of the dominant classes of the dominant state and other dominant classes in other states. More precisely, Canada's middle power role helps to sustain hegemonic order in two respects. First, Canada's behaviour as facilitator and mediator helps to avert any tensions that may undermine the global order. Second, Canada's desire to sacrifice short-term national interests in pursuit of international initiatives helps to legitimise the global order as representing the common interests and not just the interest of a dominant actor like the United States (Neufeld 2007).

The bias of a neo-Gramscian approach in its analysis of hegemony within the context of neoliberal economic order makes it particularly useful for understanding why the Canadian government supported the NEPAD initiative. As noted in Chapter Four, the principles of NEPAD

are consistent with Canadian foreign policy objectives of promoting a free market economy that serves Canada's economic interests. Thus, NEPAD played into Canada's national interest that is supported by the dominant class and helps to maintain the global capitalist economy. Furthermore, a neo-Gramician approach contributes to our understanding of how the hegemonic neoliberal agenda is taking root on the African continent at least in the context of the NEPAD. In this vein, Canada's economic policy which supports the implementation of NEPAD, the IMF and World Bank policies such as SAPs and PRSPs, as well as the growing influence of Canadian investment in the extractive sector in Africa, creates a tension in Canada's moral identity as a non-imperial actor as these suggest a more imperialistic or at least neo-colonial practice.

Nonetheless, while the neo-Gramscian approach gives agency to the important role of ideas of the dominant class and its link to the global context in the construction of Canadian policy, it suffers from its lack of space for the agency of others in the configuration of power—in this case the AU and ECOWAS—and how this 'power bloc' influences Canadian foreign policy practice. More precisely, a key weakness of a neo-Gramscian approach is that it does not give agency to the ideas and perceptions of other actors expressed through the configuration of power at a regional and sub-regional levels and the impact these have on Canadian foreign policy. To a large extent, a neo-Gramscian approach assumes that Canadian policy operates in a global setting in which Canada is a 'servant' for the pursuit of its own interest. In this sense, whatever Canada does on the global stage is taken as supporting a hegemonic order that is in a sense imperialistic.

Related to this a neo-Gramscian approach will assume that the perceived weakness of African economies will make their regional organisations to conform to Canadian foreign policy preferences. This study has shown that this is not the case at least with respect to the promotion of peace and security—human security—in Africa. Canada preferred to follow the lead of the AU and ECOWAS as it took a non-imperial approach to its policy with Africa's regional organisation. As an AU official pointed out Canada does not want to incur the wrath of the AU. Thus, while Canada's relations with individual African states may support imperial or hegemonic practices, especially through multilateral organisations like the IMF and the World Bank, Canada's bilateral relations with regional organisations provide some novel insights about the practice of Canadian foreign policy that is more effectively captured in a non-imperial internationalist approach. Indeed, as will be discussed shortly, Canada's moral identity that underscores its non-imperial internationalism in Africa even helps to promote Canadian economic interests in the region. The weaknesses of the above approaches opens the door for alternative theorising that takes into account how Canada perceives itself, how it is perceived by others especially the AU and ECOWAS, and how these, in turn, affect Canadian foreign policy.

Non-Imperial Internationalist Approach

The findings of this study provide us with important theoretical lessons. Accordingly, this section attempts to put the findings of the study into an alternative theoretical perspective. I argue that a non-imperial internationalist approach provides more theoretical guidance to understand the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. This approach

may also provide a general understanding of contemporary Canadian foreign policy towards African states.

As the name suggests, the non-imperial internationalist approach looks at how Canada's moral identity in Africa has been constructed especially through development assistance and in its relationship with African regional organisations—AU and ECOWAS—and how this identity in turn influences the pursuit of Canada's interests (including economic, security and political) on the African continent. The non-imperial internationalist approach is embedded in constructivists approach to international relations and therefore anchored on the role of ideas in constituting agents and structure in a country's foreign policy.

The non-imperial internationalist approach shares the view of the constructivists that foreign policy is not fixed since the ideas that hold it together are produced by societal actors, states and (international) institutional practice over time and space and therefore are subject to change (Ruggie 1986 and 1998; Wendt 1995 and 2003; Waever 1995; Kratochwil 2000; Fierke 2007). The non-imperial internationalist approach acknowledges the existence of such things as poverty and physical suffering through violence, but draws on the constructivist claim that reality (including human *in*security) is socially constructed based on the intersubjective understanding of states as well as international organisations and other agents as actors (Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1995; Barnett 2005: 259; Waever 1996: 164-169). What constitutes the meaning of the 'reality of human security' depends on historically produced circumstances and culturally bound knowledge in Africa and Canada that are intersubjectively shared. Put directly, human security is an idea to describe a particular issue. It is not a reality in and of itself. Therefore human security would have no meaning if actors cannot relate to it.

Within the realm of foreign policy, the non-imperial internationalist approach makes an important assumption that states embrace change with respect to new ideas—human security—when it is consistent with their foreign policy objectives and historically produced image, and these same states find the geographical space where these objectives can be pursued. On this account it can be argued that the idea of human security in Canadian policy was not developed for its own sake, it reflected Canada's image, and was intended to have practical relations with the issues from which it derives its meaning. In this respect what is profound is that as a state, Canada appears to have found it convenient to cooperate with the AU and ECOWAS to promote peace and security in Africa, particularly human security albeit through proxy. As a key leader of the human security doctrine, Canada has found Africa as a fertile ground where human security can be promoted because of the violent conflicts that have plagued some states and their consequent effects on people. But it is equally important to reiterate as discussed in Chapters Three and Six that the Canada-AU-ECOWAS cooperation has become possible since the AU and ECOWAS have a concomitant interest in the idea of human security that is consistent with Canada's approach of freedom from fear as expressed in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, and Articles 25 (c) and (d) of the ECOWAS Protocol, respectively.

It is at this juncture that the non-imperial internationalist approach further accepts the constructivist assumption that the interest and identity of (state) actors are mutually constitutive (Wendt 1995 and 2003; Ruggie 1995; Barnett 2005). The identity of states will determine their policy interest in a particular geographical space and vice versa. But again the non-imperial internationalist approach also adds an important dimension that in the realm of

310

foreign policy, a state perhaps does not need to invest heavily to maintain a positive image. This is possible in the geographical space where the state pursues its policy insofar as the state can be absolved from blame or cannot be directly implicated in the historical antecedents that have led to contemporary insecurities. States can afford to spend less in terms of material resources in a geographical area insofar as this does not significantly undermine its constructed positive image.

In addition to being embedded in the constructivist understanding of the nexus of identity and interest, the non-imperial internationalist approach has three key interrelated features that augment the moral identity of Canada and in turn shape Canada's interest in Africa. First, Canada has never been a colonial power in Africa and this 'historical asset' provides a leverage for Canadian foreign policy in Africa. Without a colonial past, Canada has still found it necessary to identify some moral ground for getting involved in Africa. As one British official in KAIPTC argued, "Canada is helping to make up for the guilt of colonisation although Canada was not a colonial power in Africa. Canada sees this role (peace and security promotion) as a moral obligation and also for the fact that Canada has close association with Britain and France, the two most prominent colonialists in Africa".[46] Furthermore, as pointed out in Chapter Five, an AU official asserted that "Canada supports the AU (peace and security capacity building) because Prime Minister Chrétien once said Canada has a moral obligation to assist Africa".[47] Although the above suggests a colonial link or 'borrowed' colonial past in Canadian policy, the fact remains that Canada itself was not a colonial power in Africa. The lack of real colonial connections therefore enables Canada to grant more freedom to the AU and

---

[46] Interview with KAIPTC official in Accra, Ghana February 22, 2008
[47] Interview with a senior AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008

ECOWAS as Canada helps to empower these organisations to take charge of Africa's peace and security issues. Put directly, in order not to be perceived as colonial and to maintain its moral identity, Canada relies on the AU and ECOWAS leadership to implement its support for the peace and security capacity building.

Closely related to the above is the second feature. Consistent with its moral identity the Canadian government appears to refrain from interfering in the internal politics of the AU and ECOWAS and rather supporting African leadership in the area of human security since the Canadian government, the AU and ECOWAS share a similar understanding of the concept. The Canadian government has consciously avoided the practice of being an 'external dictator' of policies and ideas to the AU and ECOWAS because they already share a common view of what is necessary. Thus, in order to reinforce Canada's identity as a moral actor and not to replicate the colonial strategy of imposition of ideas, a CIDA official I interviewed in Ottawa said that "Africa's participation at the KAIPTC is an important way to sustain the programme".[48] The CIDA official resented "the extent of British influence at the executive level at the KAIPTC (which) is undermining the participation of Africans in decision making".[49]

The third and last interrelated feature is that in order to reinforce Canada's identity as a moral actor, Canadian officials place an emphasis on promoting human rights, poverty reduction, and human security by maintaining an aid programme, albeit with limited resources, and with variation of focus in some African states. The key point here is that in spite of its contradictions and limitations, Canada's aid in Africa has been couched to support values-oriented objectives that reinforce a particular Canadian identity. Perhaps this helps in the

---

[48] Interview with CIDA official in Ottawa, January 17, 2008
[49] Ibid

branding of Canada in the international arena as more caring about the needs of Africa (Nimijean 2005 and 2006).

These features constitute the exceptionality of how the Canadian state is historically produced in terms of its relations with Africa and how it has come to be perceived among African officials as the spokes-state for Africa in the G8 and perhaps other international forums such as in the UN. Canada's constructed moral identity as a non-imperial internationalist in Africa helps to understand the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS. The moral image that Canada has constructed for itself whether consciously through the avoidance of interfering in the internal affairs of the AU and ECOWAS, pursuing values-oriented objectives such as human rights through the delivery of aid, or as a circumstance of history—lack of imperial past—plays a key role in facilitating the pursuit of Canadian foreign policy interest in Africa. For example, Canada's economic profile is growing in Africa, and it is my contention that the non-imperial internationalist posture of the Canadian state will likely enhance Canada's engagement in Africa if policy officials were to take advantage of the opportunity. Indeed, it appears that the non-imperial internationalist identity is regularly reinforced since its gives Canada a moral comparative advantage, but also with the potential of facilitating Canada's economic interests over other states such as the UK and France who are former colonial powers in Africa. Canada indeed has a unique position in Africa.

The launching of the NEPAD initiative by African leaders provided an impetus for Canada to reactivate its moral behaviour on African affairs. The Canadian government has used its support for building the peace and security capacity of the AU and ECOWAS as a means to reinforce its image as a moral power in Africa. As a middle power, Canada was able to use its

313

international influence to modify the behaviour of G8 members to initiate the G8 Africa Action Plan in Kananaskis in support of the NEPAD initiative. And to add momentum to Canada's influence on African affairs and enforce its moral image in Africa at least within the context of NEPAD, the Canadian government established the CFA consistent with the agreement of the G8 Africa Action Plan which supported various NEPAD priorities including the provision of peace and security as a prerequisite for sustainable development in Africa. When placed within this broader context, it can be argued that in the aftermath of the launching of the NEPAD, the Canadian government's international activity in Africa reinforced Canada's moral image.

The idea of human security influenced the Canadian government's policy in the AU and ECOWAS. The Canadian government's support for APSA and the ECOWAS Security Mechanism also took shape from the institutional transformations that are ongoing in the AU and ECOWAS, regarding intervention in member states to promote peace and security, especially human security. By viewing Canada and the AU and ECOWAS as agents, we can see that both appear to have an intersubjective understanding on the need to promote human security in Africa. While Canada and the AU have different conceptions of human security as discussed in Chapter Two, there is an intersubjective agreement on protecting people in the context of the physical threats to their lives. This understanding has opened the door for the Canadian government's support for the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building, especially the ASF. Indeed the AU and Canada appear to be on the same page with regards to the protection of people in violent conflict which transcend the norms of non-intervention and sovereignty.

Canada's identity as a moral power in Africa is historically produced by years of interaction with Africa. Consistent with its constructed image as a middle power and a good

multilateralist (Cooper 1997; Keating 2002), Canada has maintained an active aid programme to support economic development in some African countries. Despite the contradictions and limitations of the aid programme in Africa, Canada appears to have built a moral image for itself through its tradition of providing development assistance to African countries. As one Canadian NGO official argued, "Canada is sympathetic to Africa"[50] because Canada has a moral obligation to reduce poverty, promote human rights, and support sustainable peace and development on the African continent. The importance of development assistance as the cornerstone of Canada's moral identity in Africa is underscored by the fact that civil society groups in Canada have never called for the cancellation of Canadian aid to Africa. As noted in Chapter Three, civil society groups have rather been the torch bearers of a poverty-focused aid to Africa. The Canadian government itself conceives of development aid as an expression of Canada's compassion and generosity towards the less fortunate[51] including those in Africa. In this vein, there appears to be a consensus between the Canadian state officials and civil society on the important role that development assistance can play to project Canada's moral identity in Africa. This helps to understand why the Harper government, in spite of its focus on Afghanistan and the Americas, maintained Paul Martin's policy of doubling aid to Africa. Harper could only cut the number of CIDA's priority countries, but not eliminate Africa entirely from Canada's development agenda. Canada's moral identity also accounts for why civil society groups continue to press the Harper government to pay more attention and resources to Africa.

---

[50] Interview with anonymous NGO official Ottawa, January 22, 2008
[51] See the 1995 Government Statement: Canada in the World pp40-47; also see
<http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/glance-apercu/brief-bref-eng.asp)>Accessed on August 27, 2008.

The evidence demonstrates that the intersubjective meaning of self (Canada) and the other (Africa) is related to the policy that is pursued by Canada in Africa. Canada's moral identity predisposes it to pursue values-oriented objectives such as human security, human rights and poverty reduction in Africa. By conceiving itself as generous, compassionate and sympathetic state, Canada has self-consciously elevated itself as a moral state in Africa and Canada's aid policy can only become meaningful if Africa is perceived as poor and conflict-ridden. It follows that Canada's historically produced identity as a non-imperial internationalist will be meaningless if Africa is not constructed as poor and conflict-ridden where Canada's aid contribution can make a difference in protecting human security and human rights.

Canada's moral obligation which in many ways expresses Canadian common humanity with and responsibility towards other people beyond Canada's borders is echoed in several Canadian foreign policy documents[52] and often reiterated by government officials. The former Minister of International Cooperation, Aileen Carol, argued that "... poverty offends our (Canadian) most basic values of decency and fairness. There is simply no good reason why in the twenty-first century, half a million women a year should be dying during child birth, or why thousands of children should be killed every day by easily preventable and treatable diseases. Such poverty is a moral affront to all of us, and this reason alone compels our response".[53]

---

[52] For details see for instance, Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratisation and Good Governance (Canadian International Development Agency, December 1996) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/REN-218124821-P93#pdf> Accessed on December 12, 2008; Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (Canadian International Development Agency September 2002) <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/pdf/$file/SAE-ENG.pdf> Accessed on December 12, 2008. Also see the 1995 Canada in the Word : Government Statement, and the 2005 Canada International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development

[53] See "Message from the Minister" in the 2005 Canada International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World- Development,

The moral expressions of the Canadian government towards the precarious conditions of poverty, human rights abuse, and the impact of violent conflict on individuals in some African states is well captured in a speech by Prime Minister Paul Martin in the UN General Assembly in September 2004. Martin admitted that "the world is organised into independent states and the primary objective of the governments is to look after their own people. However, this presents us with a dilemma and ... unless we also act collectively on the basis of our common humanity, the rich will become richer, the poor will become poorer, and hundreds of millions of people will be at risk". [54] Subsequently in reference to the violent conflict in Darfur, Martin argued that instead of the Security Council getting embroiled in the debates as to whether Darfur constitutes a threat to international peace and security or a situation of genocide, "our common humanity should be a powerful enough argument"[55] for the international community to act based on the principles of responsibility to protect and assist the AU to bring the situation under control. Martin's speech echoed the moral identity of Canada in Africa and this was reinforced by his call on the international community to support the AU leadership on the intervention in Darfur.

But rhetoric is cheap. Generally, when measured against Canada's limited resource contribution to AMIS in Darfur and the overall Canadian aid contribution which was 0.32 percent of GNI in 2008[56]—far below the UN mandated 0.7 percent of GNI—this moral discourse could be seen as a rhetorical device to win sympathy for Canada especially among developing

---

[54] For details see, Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations (New York, New York September 22, 2004) <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/media/2004/paul_martin_un-na_2004.aspx?lang=eng> Accessed on December 18, 2008
[55] Ibid
[56] , "OECD, Table 1: Net Official Development Assistance in 2008"
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/34/42459170.pdf > Accessed on August 25, 2008

countries in Africa. The reaction of African officials to Canada is an important way of measuring how this rhetorical device has contributed to Canada's identity in Africa.

Various African officials I interviewed described Canada as a non-colonising, non-interventionist, non-belligerent, liberal, committed, humanitarian, friendly and reliable partner that has "genuine interest" to help to build the peace and security capacity of the AU and ECOWAS and promote development in Africa. For these African officials I interviewed at the AU and ECOWAS, Canada's moral image in Africa has been built through several years of Canadian activism especially through development assistance and peacekeeping.[57] A top AU official expressed a candid opinion that, "Canada is a friend of Africa and has shown sincerity with Africa by helping to build the capacity for peace and security in the AU and ECOWAS".[58] Moreover, the AU official said that, "there appears to be genuine feeling on the part of Canadian officials towards Africa's challenges".[59] In the ECOWAS, a senior official said that, "the exceptionality of Canadian policy towards ECOWAS is that it is not dictatorial".[60] Indeed, another ECOWAS official wondered why Canada does not have official representatives in the ECOWAS headquarters like the EU, to assist in managing Canadian-sponsored projects.[61] These views suggest that Canada's moral image does not exist independently of the intersubjective understanding of both Canadian and African officials.

Interrelated with the personal views of African and Canadian officials have been the normative and institutional transformations that have swept through the AU and ECOWAS

---

[57] Interview with AU official as well as a cross-section of officials at ECOWAS and think tanks (These Interviews took place Accra, Addis Ababa and Abuja between February to June 2008)
[58] Interview with AU official Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 28, 2008
[59] Ibid
[60] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 18, 2008
[61] Interview with ECOWAS official in Abuja, Nigeria June 17, 2008

especially regarding the priority given to peace and security promotion. These are rooted in the human security doctrine, reflecting the role of ideas in influencing the behaviour of Canada in Africa. The growing stature of the AU and ECOWAS has become a medium through which the Canadian government's interest in human security—protection of people from violence—is pursued in Africa. As a human security norm entrepreneur (Tomlin et al 2007), Canada's behaviour, interests, and identity in Africa regarding its peace and security relationship with the AU and ECOWAS, can be seen as mutually constituted. In this light, Canada may continue to concentrate its support, as it has done even under the Harper government, to improve African security through sub-regional and continental capacity building..

The AU intervention mandate enshrined in Article 4 (h), and the ECOWAS intervention mandate in Article 25 (c) and (d) are both consistent with the R2P doctrine on intervention that the Chrétien and Martin governments supported. Furthermore, both the AU and Canada support other international norms such as the Ottawa Treaty and the International Criminal Court. From a constructivist perspective, it can be argued that while the African understanding of human security includes security for the community, the Canadian government and the AU and ECOWAS share an understanding of human security as freedom from fear. The intersubjective understanding of human security made it politically convenient for the Canadian government to identify with and support the peace and security capacity building of the AU and ECOWAS while representing Canada's image in Africa.

Canada's interest in Africa is not only normative but material as well. The material interests of the Canadian government have both economic and security dimensions, what I simply refer to here as its strategic interests. The launching of the NEPAD initiative provided an

opportunity for Canada to build its investment and trade relations with Africa. This underscores the trade missions of Canadian officials and Prime Minister Chrétien's personal visits to several African countries in the period following the launching of the NEPAD. The result has been an increase in Canada's economic relations with Africa as recent data indicates that Canada does more business in Sub-Saharan Africa than in each of the emerging markets of the BRIC (SSCFAIT 2007: 113-114). In fact, Canadian mining companies rank second to South Africa in the extractive sector in Africa[62] and it is projected that by 2010, Canadian mining interest in Africa will double.[63] Canada is described as a "mining superpower" in Africa. In less than ten years Canadian mining operations expanded from 24 countries in 2001 to 35 out of the 53 African countries, in 2007. The total value of Canadian mining assets grew from US$233 million in 1989 to US$21 billion in 2010.[64] This suggests that the Canadian government's support for building the peace and security capacity of the AU and ECOWAS had implications for Canadian strategic interests on the African continent. A peaceful and secured Africa will be good for Canadian economic interests. Additionally, in a globalising world, peace and security in Africa may have reciprocal impact on Canada's security and prosperity at home.

Canada's strategic interests thrive on Canada's behaviour and identity as a moral state in Africa. Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that while the evidence points to growing Canadian economic profile, Canada has not matched resources to the rhetoric of placing Africa at the

---

[62] In 1996 there were more than 170 Canadian mining companies in Africa with interest in over 440 mineral properties located in 27 countries. In 2002 Canadian mining companies increased their dominance on the continent with 530 mineral properties in 35 African countries. See Abdulai Darimani, "Impacts of Activities of Canadian Mining Companies in Africa" (Third World Network- Africa Secretariat , October 31, 2005) <http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/Africa_case_study.pdf> Accessed on November 19, 2008

[63] Mine Africa (Toronto, Ontario, Canada) <www.mineafrica.com>

[64] For further information see Denis Tougas " Canada in Africa: the Mining Superpower" (Pambazuka News: Pan-African Voices n for Freedom and Justice, 11 November 2008 Issue 407) <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/52095 > Accessed on October 10, 2009

center of its international cooperation. More importantly, Canadian governments have not developed a comprehensive policy on Africa. The key question then is why has Canadian governments refused to contribute more resources to Africa? The non-imperial internationalist approach suggest that first, as a non-colonising power with arguably no direct involvement in Africa states, the Canadian government does not have a strong urge to put more resources towards Africa's peace and security and development. Second, it appears that the limited material contribution has encouraged successive governments to promote values-oriented objectives including human security by proxy, which in itself projects Canada's non-imperial internationalist identity.

The Canadian government could contribute more resources, however, insofar as it cannot be blamed for the atrocity in Africa, whatever contribution the government makes is perceived as expressing compassion and sympathy for Africa. Although African and Canadian officials expressed concern about the meagreness of Canadian resource contribution towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building, a senior officer of the ASF candidly opined figuratively and summed-up these concerns to the effect that, "the poor man is always impressed with even a little support. However, Canada can do more to support peace and security in Africa even though it does better than others".[65] This suggests that Canada's non-imperial internationalist identity should encourage state officials to contribute more resources towards Africa's peace, security, and development.

---

[65] Interview with ASF officer, AU headquarters Addis Ababa, Ethiopia May 2, 2008

Summary and Conclusion

First, this chapter analysed the challenges of Canadian policy in Africa. I argued that the Canadian government does not have an overarching policy in Africa and as a result, there is resource commitment gap in Canadian policy in Africa. Second, drawing on a constructivist approach to international relations, the chapter has proposed an alternative approach, non-imperial internationalism, to understand the Canadian government's policy in Africa, particularly towards the AU and ECOWAS. The non-imperial internationalist approach has elucidated how norms, values, and ideas have shaped Canada's identity and interest in Africa.

Canada is perceived among other things as committed, non-belligerent, reliable, and friendly partner of Africa. To this end the non-imperial internationalist approach provides an account of the Canadian government's policy in the AU and ECOWAS by elucidating the intersubjective understanding of human security and the moral identity of Canada in Africa. The identity of Canada as a moral state is not a given as it does not exist independently of the shared understanding between Canadian and African officials. Canada's moral identity is historically produced and the desire of Canadian officials to maintain this identity has drawn the government close to Africa to promote values-oriented objectives including human security through the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building.

Chapter Eight

Toward a Canada Africa Policy?: Summary and Conclusion of the study

This study, principally, has focused on Canada's policy on peace, security and development in Africa in relation to NEPAD, the APSA, and ECOWAS Security Mechanism. It has explored the variation in Canada's policy in these areas from Jean Chrétien and his Liberal successor, Paul Martin, to the Conservative government of Stephen Harper. This study does suggest the Harper government's policy represents some continuity but also change in Canada's approach to human security generally, and particularly in Africa. The study did not fully capture the policy changes that have and continue to occur under Harper. These are all areas requiring additional research and I hope that this study will provide some guidance as to how this research might proceed in the future.

This study has revealed that Canada does not have an overarching policy towards Africa and that Canada's internationalism often is event-driven, and heavily based on the perceptions of poverty and violent conflict in Africa. Chapter One provided an introduction to the study. As well, it focused on a discussion of a constructivist approach to international relations, which elucidates the interplay of ideas and norms in constructing the identity and foreign policy interests of states. The chapter also provided insights about the methodology for this study including my field research in Ottawa, Accra, Addis Ababa, and Abuja. In Chapter Two, the study explored the meaning and understanding of the human security concept in Canadian foreign policy and in the policies of the AU and ECOWAS. As well, I examined the understanding of the concept among officials in the Canadian government and NGOs in Canada. I also

examined the meaning of human security among African officials in the AU, ECOWAS, and NGOs in Africa. I argued that human security has widened the security discourse after the Cold War. The concept has diverse meanings and understandings in Canada and Africa. In Canada, the Liberal government advanced the notion of human security as freedom from fear by linking it to the protection of individuals as 'a person' from physical violence. My research and interviews suggested that CIDA and Canadian NGO preferred the freedom from want perspective that includes the protection of people from both violent and non-violent threats such as poverty and civil war. The Canadian government's freedom fear perspective reinforced Canada's peacekeeping reputation and moral identity in the global arena.

My research in Africa showed that human security was broadly understood to include the protection of individuals, families, and communities. This flowed from the communal traditions of many African societies. For Africans, human security included the protection of individuals and communities from both violent and non violent threats such as civil war, landmines, disease and poverty. In this sense, individual (human) security was not delinked from the security of the family or community. However, the study also found a convergence of ideas at the agenda level of the AU, ECOWAS and Canada, where human security is understood as the protection of people from physical violence—freedom from fear. The principles of the R2P supported by the Canadian government was consistent with Article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act of the AU*, which grants the AU the *right* to intervene in member states in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This convergence provided the opportunity for the advancement of Canadian foreign policy objectives in Africa.

324

In Chapter Three, the study analysed the sources of Canadian foreign policy in Africa. The sources include the UN, Commonwealth, la Francophonie, IMF and World Bank, DFAIT, CIDA, and Canadian civil society groups. I argued that Canada does not have an overarching policy on Africa and that Canadian policy, which is event-driven, is heavily dependent on development assistance to African states. Aside from peacekeeping, development assistance helps to define Canada's moral identity which, in turn, constructs Africa as poor and conflict-ridden. Africa, generally, is understood as a non-strategic geographical space on the Canadian foreign policy agenda. The PMO, specifically the interests of the Prime Minister have been the key mover of Canadian policy in Africa despite the existence of foreign policy institutions within the Canadian state. This was exemplified by Chrétien's active support for the NEPAD in contrast with Harper's shift of Canadian foreign policy focus from Africa to Afghanistan and the Americas.

In Chapter Four, I discussed the NEPAD initiative and the Chrétien government's leadership, which led to the crafting of the G8 Africa Action Plan at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, and Canada's own CFA. The Chrétien government's support for the NEPAD in the G8 and other international forums appeared to be a genuine attempt to reverse the downward trend of Canada's engagement in Africa that began in the mid-1990s. The Chrétien government established the CFA in response to the NEPAD priorities on Africa's security and development. The NEPAD served as a strong motivation for the Canadian government to provide leadership in the G8 as well as to forge a closer partnership with African states and regional organisations to promote security and development in Africa. Canada is on record as the first G8 country to double its aid to Africa from the 2003/04 levels in 2009. A key finding of this chapter was that

apart from the economic incentives that the NEPAD offered Canada, the Canadian government took opportunity of the violent conflicts that emerged in post-Cold War Africa to collaborate with the AU and ECOWAS to promote human security. Although the Liberal government favoured a narrow definition of human security that was concerned with the physical protection of individuals in violent conflict, in practice, the country-based projects in the CFA reflected the broader conception of human security with their integration of the idea of physical security with development assistance. Canada's support for the NEPAD reinforced its moral identity in Africa.

Chapters Five and Six examined Canada's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS, respectively. I argued that the idea of human security influenced the Canadian government's policy towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. The Canadian government's support to the AU and ECOWAS was concentrated on building the capacity of the ASF (including ESF) and the APCE. With Canada's support for the AU peace and security capacity building, Canadian governments became less interested in deploying peacekeepers in Africa. I called this practice human security by proxy. As the study of Darfur indicated, Canada's contribution to AMIS was seen as part of the overall strategy to strengthen the peace and security capacity of Africans to undertake peacekeeping themselves.

The Canadian government assisted ECOWAS in strengthening its capacity to control small arms and light weapons. Through the War-Affected Programme, the Canadian government supported the Government of Sierra Leone-UNDP Arms for Development Programme. The latter assisted the Government of Sierra Leone and local authorities to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in exchange for community development projects. As

well, the Canadian government assisted Guinea Bissau's Amputees Rehabilitation Project. I argued that the importance of these projects to protect human security, and assisting in the reconstruction of the states in question, as well as preventing the outbreak of conflict in West Africa should not be underestimated. However, most of these projects suffered from inadequate funding, which was directly linked to the short term nature of the CFA.

Chapter Seven elaborated upon a non-imperial internationalist approach and explored the challenges of Canadian foreign policy in Africa. A resource-commitment gap was identified as among the central challenges to Canada's policy in Africa. Although Africa has remained a constant on Canada's foreign policy agenda, Canadian governments often have not matched rhetoric with resources. While the Liberal government of Chrétien appeared to change the tide of Africa's peripheral status in Canadian policy by placing Africa at the center of Canada's international cooperation, more resources were spent by his government in Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti than on the African continent. The Martin government continued the shift of focus from Africa to the Americas and Afghanistan, and this overall trend has continued with the Harper government.

The lack of sustained and more significant resource contributions to Africa is rooted in the overall reticence of the Canadian government to develop an overarching policy towards Africa. Canada's engagement with Africa has been ad hoc with little to no long-term commitment by the Canadian government to support development or peace and security-related projects, let alone genuinely transform its policy in Africa. Paradoxically, this government trend is in spite of Canada's growing economic profile in Africa. For Liberal and Conservative governments alike, Africa still is conceived largely through development

327

assistance lenses. There appears to be a deep-seated belief, at least among Canadian officials, that Africa is only good for aid. To this end, Canada's support for AU and ECOWAS were conceived as development assistance or 'aid for peace and security', with CIDA as the main implementing agency.

Despite the Canadian government's limited material contributions to Africa, Canada appears to have built a moral identity for itself in the AU and ECOWAS and, arguably, across Africa. This moral identity underscores the non-imperial internationalist approach which I have argued helps to understand Canada's policy in Africa. According to the non-imperial internationalist approach, Canada is perceived as committed, non-belligerent, reliable and friendly partner of Africa. The moral overtones of these descriptions about Canada are rooted in the fact that Canada has never been a colonial power in Africa, and despite the flaws in its aid policy, the government has been consistent in promoting values-oriented objectives such as human rights, poverty reduction, and human security in Africa. These objectives are based on how Africa is perceived by Canada as poor and conflict-ridden. Another important aspect of Canada's non-imperial identity is the fact that Canadian policy does not interfere in the internal politics of the AU and ECOWAS but, rather, supports the AU and ECOWAS' lead.

To conclude, non-imperial internationalism has influenced Canada's image and policy in the AU and ECOWAS, but is it moral for Canada to cut aid, disengage in peacekeeping, or shift its international cooperation focus from Africa in a time when the continent is (re)gaining its geopolitical importance in global politics? Africa lost its geostrategic and political importance in the immediate post-Cold War era, however, as Alden argues "Africa, the erstwhile forgotten continent is once again the object of great power interest". Although often constructed as poor

and conflict-ridden by various Canadian governments, global powers such as the United States and China, and powerful regional organisations like the EU, are forging closer strategic relationships with Africa on a wide range of issues including peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and investment, energy, migration, and climate change. The AU and EU signed the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement in December 2007, which defined long-term policy orientations between the two continents.[1] Moreover, the United States has the objective of establishing an Africa Command (AFRICOM), a unified combat command for military operations to protect its foreign policy interests in Africa. Although AFRICOM was a Bush administration's policy, the Barack Obama administration has left it on the policy agenda. It is expected that President Obama will refurbish this policy and use his African connections to give AFRICOM a boost as the administration has rooted its Africa Policy objectives in security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests.[2] China, as noted in Chapter Three, has growing interests in Africa's natural resources and its trade with Africa has received tremendous boost in the last decade. China has crafted an Africa policy and provided US$ 600 million to build an ultra-modern office complex for the AU as "a gift", which will further enhance its relations in Africa. To be sure, Canada's own commercial profile is also growing in Africa. Canada has been called "Africa's mining superpower". Canada's investment in Africa's mining sector is expected to reach $21 billion in 2010, a tremendous rise from just US$233 million in 1989. As the competition in Africa grows, Canada has a great asset to rely on,

---

[1] See, AU-EU Partnership Website <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/pdf/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf > Accessed on January 20, 2010

[2] See, United States Africa Command, "Hilary Clinton Outlines Obama's Africa Policy" <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2493> Also see, AU Monitor, "Africom, Obama's Headache" <http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/2051/> Accessed on January 12, 2010

its non-imperial identity. If translated into an overarching Canadian policy, it will bring mutual benefits to Canada and African states.

Canada is not a great power in Africa, however, Canada can translate its moral image, which is power in itself into a genuine commitment of resources, and build stronger partnerships covering wider issues of mutual interests, such as energy, trade and investment, climate change, science and technology, democratic governance and human rights, and peace and security, in its relationship with the AU and ECOWAS, as well as African states. The desire of Canadian state officials to maintain a non-imperial identity especially, by couching Canada's policy in a development assistance framework, helps us to understand why Canada does not have an overarching policy on Africa. Canada perceives Africa as poor and conflict-ridden, hence, Canada does not want to be perceived as (neo) imperial or colonial, with long-term economic, political, and strategic interests crafted in a comprehensive policy. Yet, the non-imperial identity provides a unique comparative advantage to Canada to develop a long term overarching policy that is morally responsible and promotes mutual interests of Canada and Africa. This will require Canada to reconstruct Africa as an important geopolitical and economic space, and wed this new Africa image with Canada's own moral identity to craft and promote policy objectives of mutual interests. Although this is possible, it will take strong and genuine political will to develop a more consistent and long-term overarching policy that would match Canada's image in Africa.

Directions for Future Research

This study has helped to fill a vacuum in research on Canada-Africa relations. It also suggests some future directions for research. First, more detailed research is needed to unveil the impact of the Canadian government's contribution towards the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. An outcome-based analysis would provide directions on where Canada can have maximum impact in terms of its spending in the AU and ECOWAS. As discussed in this study, the Canadian government did not pay adequate attention to conflict prevention capacity building in the AU and ECOWAS. Additional study is needed to assess the ways through which Canada can contribute to the PW as well as the CEWS.

Second, research is needed on how Canada can use its moral standing and goodwill in Africa to promote greater autonomy for African states and organisations in their dealings with powerful states, international financial institutions, and other organisations. In view of China's expansionist policy on the African continent, future research must focus on how Canada can translate its non-imperial identity to lead the West to foster greater autonomy on the part of African states and organisations. This is very important if African states and organisations are to take leadership and control in addressing the security and development challenges on the continent. This research will support my call for Canada to develop a comprehensive policy on Africa that draws on its non-imperial identity.

Third, the transformation of the OAU to the AU and the subsequent creation of the APSA have opened new opportunities for the AU to cooperate with other regional organisations such as the EU and NATO to promote peace and security and development in Africa. Canada's (growing) economic interest especially in the mining sector cannot be delinked from regional

security in Africa, and in view of Canada's active engagement in these organisations, future research is need on the opportunities that exist or what sort of impact the emerging 'interregional security cooperation' has on Canada's engagement with the AU. If Harper's shift of policy focus from Africa continues into the long term, how is this going to impact on Canada's moral identity in Africa? This needs further research.

Finally, in the theoretical realm, the non-imperial internationalist approach has opened the door for students of Canadian foreign policy to apply this approach in a comparative study of Canadian policy in other regional organisations such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organisation of American States (OAS), in a variety of issue areas. A comparative study at the regional level perhaps may speak to whether the non-imperial internationalist approach is more broadly applicable to other regions of the world. Similarly, further research is needed to examine how the non-imperial internationalist approach is reflected in other policy arenas such as the distribution of Canadian aid beyond African states.

Bibliography

Aboagye, Festus. B. May 2007. "Complex Emergencies in the 21st Century: Challenges of New Africa's Strategic Peace and Security Policy Issues". *ISS Monograph* 134 Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies <http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=4807&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3>.

Addo, Prosper. May 2006. "Cross Border Criminal Activities in West Africa: Options for Effective Responses". Paper No. 12. Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-6ZAH8E/$file/KAIPTC-peacekeeping-May06.pdf?openelement>.

Adebajo, Adekeye. 2002. Liberia's *Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Adebajo, Adekeye. 2004. "Introduction". In *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Adebajo, Adekeye. 2004. "Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms". In *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Adedeji. Adebayo. 2004. "ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey". In *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Adesina, Jimi. O. 2004. "NEPAD and the Challenge of Africa's Development: Towards the Political Economy of a Disclosure". *Society in Transition* 35(1): 132-135

Adesina, Jimi. O. 2006. "Towards Political Economy of African Development Discourse". In *Beyond the 'African Tragedy' Discourses on Development and the Global Economy*, ed. Malinda Smith. Aldedrshot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

African Union. 2005. *Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact*. Abuja, Nigeria. January 31.

African Union. 2000. *Constitutive Act of the African Union*. Lome, Togo. July 11

Agyemang-Duah, Baffour. 1990. "Military Coups, Regime Change, and Interstate Conflict in West Africa". *Armed Forces and Society* 16(4):547-70.

Ake, Claude. 1993. "The Unique Case of African Democracy". *International Affairs* 69 (2): 239-244

Akinyemi, Bolaji A. 1972-73. "Organisation of African Unity and Concept of Non-Interference in the Affairs of Member States". *British Yearbook International Law*. 393-400.

Akokpari, John. 2008. "'You don't belong here' Citizenship, the State and Africa's Conflicts: Reflections on Ivory Cost". In *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost,* ed. Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zaleza. Oxford: James Currey.

Alden, Chris. 2007. *China in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Antonio, Daniel. 2001. "The Challenges for Africa: a Culture of Peace, Good Governance, and People-Centered Development"*. Asia-Pacific Review* 8(1): 63-73.

Aravena, Francisco. R. 2002. "Human Security: emerging Concept of Security in the Twenty-First Century". *Disarmament Forum* <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1442.pdf >.

Arthur, Peter and David Black R. 2007. "The Benefits of and Indirect Approach: The Case of Ghana". In *Exporting Good Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada's Aid Program*, ed. Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Atanassova-Cornelis, E. 2006. "Defining and Implementing Human Security: The Case of Japan". In Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases. ed. Tobias Debiel. and Sascha Werthes. *INEF Report* 80/2006, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen.

Axworthy, Lloyd. 1999. *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Axworthy, Lloyd. 2001. "Introduction". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Axworthy, Lloyd. 2003. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf.

Ayissi, Anatole. 2001. *Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: Agenda for the 21st Century*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Bah, Alhaji. 2004. "Implementing the ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium in Post-War Sierra Leone". *Working Paper 04*. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares

Baimu, Evarist and Kathryn Sturman. 2003. "The Amendment to the African Union' Right to Intervene: A Shift from Human Security to Regime Security?". *African Security Review* 12(2)

Baker, Bruce. November 2000. "Can democracy in Africa be sustained?" *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics.* 38(3): 9-34

Bannon, Alicia. L. 2006. "The Responsibility to Protect: the UN World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism". *Yale Law Journal* 115(5) 1157-65
<http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/115-5/Bannon.pdf >.

Barnett, Michael. 2006. "Social Constructivism". In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relation*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beier, Marshall J. and Wylie, Lana. 2010. *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Bekwesegha, Christopher. J. Summer 1995. "The Role of the Organisation of African Unity in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution". *International Journal of Refugee Law:* Special Issue.

Bekker, Gina. 2007. "The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African States". *Journal of African Law* 51(1): 151-72.

Bell, Colleen. 2010. Fighting the War and Winning the Peace: Three Critiques of the War in Afghanistan. In *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, ed. J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Bellamy, Alex. J. April-June 2008a. "Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect". *Global Governance* 14 (2):135-156.

Bellamy, Alex. J. 2008b. "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention". *International Affairs* 84(4): 615-39.

Berdal, Mats R. and David M. Marlone. 2000. "Introduction". In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Marlone. Boulder: Rienner Publishers.

Berdal Mats R. and David Keen. 1997. "Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications". *Millennium* 26(3): 795-818.

Berman, Eric G. and Katie. Sams E. 2000. "Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities". Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Black, David. R. and Heather Smith. December 1993. "Notable exceptions? New and Arrested Directions in Canadian foreign policy Literature". *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 26(4): 745-74.

Black, David. R. 2000. "Canada, the Commonwealth and Nigeria: The Limits of Ethical Multilateralism". In *Worthwhile Initiatives? Canada Mission Oriented Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Geoffrey Hayes. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd.

Black, David. R. 2001. "Echoes of Apartheid? Canada, Nigeria, and the Politics of Norms". In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Black, David. R. 2005. "From Kananaskis to Gleneagles: Assessing Canadian leadership on Africa". *Behind the Headlines* 62 (3): 1-16

Black, David. R. 2006. "Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian Experience". In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. Sandra MacLean, David Black and Timothy Shaw. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Black, David R. and Timothy Shaw. August 2007. "Canada out of Africa? Are Disappointments Around Darfur Omens for Canada's 2010 G-8 Summit?" *CCHS -Human Security Bulletin* 5(3).

Black, David R. 2009. Out of Africa? The Harper Government's New "Tilt" in the Developing World. *Canadian Foreign Policy* (Summer) 15(2): 41-56

Blame, Ekoué. 2009. "NEPAD: We Cannot Fail" *New African* (December): 60-61

Booth, Ken. 1997. Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist. In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases,* ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Booth, Ken. 2005. *Critical Security Studies and World politics*. London: Lynne Rienner

Bosold, David and Sascha Werthes. 2005. "Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences". *International Politics and Society* :1/2005

Bratt, Duane. 2007. "Warriors or Boy Scouts? Canada and Peace Support Operations". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*: *Classic debates and new ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, Chris. 1990. "Canada and Southern Africa 1989: Autonomy, Image and Capacity in Foreign Policy". In *Canada Among Nations: The Challenge of Change*, ed. Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hapmson. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Brown, Chris. 2001. "African in Canadian Foreign Policy: The Human Security Agenda". In *The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, Stephen 2005. "Achieving the Development Objectives of Canada's International Policy Statement Fall 2005". *McGill International Review* <http://www.irsam.ca/mir/Brown%5B52-55%5D.pdf>.

 Johwa, Wilson. 2004. "An African Army, for Africans?" *Inter Press Service* July 2 <http://www.aegis.org/news/ips/2004/IP040707.html>.

Burton, Charles, Kristiana Powell, Thomas Kasi Tieku with Edward Ansah Akuffo. 2003. "The African Union's Standby Force: Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Options." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 11(1): 47-80

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and J. de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Canada. Parliament. 2002. House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (HCSCFAIT). Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A report on Canadian priorities for the 2002 G8 summit. Ottawa: House of Commons.

Canada. Parliament. 2007. Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The (SSCFAIT). Overcoming 40 Years of Failure: A New Road Map for Sub-Saharan Africa. Ottawa: The Senate

Canadian Development Report. 2003. "From Doha to Cancun: Development and the WTO". Ottawa: North-South Institute

Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) .2008. The Global Challenge to End Poverty and Injustice: A Canadian 10 Point Agenda. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation

Carment, David. B. 1996. "Rethinking Peacekeeping: The Bosnia and Somalia Experience". In *Canada among Nations: Big Enough to be Heard*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Carmody, Padraig. 1998. "Constructing Alternatives to Structural Adjustment in Africa". *Review of African Political Economy* 25(75): 25-46

Cervenka, Zedenek. 1969. *The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter*. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers.

Cervenka, Zedenek. 1969. *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. London: Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd.

Chabal, Patrick. 1998. "A few Considerations on Democracy in Africa". *International Affairs* 74 (2): 289-303

Charter of the United Nations   <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) .1988. *Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance*. Hull Quebec.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (1981). *Canada's Development Assistance to Commonwealth Africa*. Ottawa: CIDA.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 2003. *Canada fund for Africa: New Vision New Partnership.* Ottawa: CIDA.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 2004. *Canada and the G8 Action Plan: Maintaining the Momentum*. Ottawa: CIDA.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 2006. *Canada fund for Africa: Delivering Results.* Ottawa: CIDA.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 2008. *Statistical Report of Official Development Assistance.* Gatineau: Canadian International Development Agency.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 2009. *Statistical Report of Official Development Assistance.* Gatineau: Canadian International Development Agency.

Cilliers, Jakkie. and Kathryn Sturman. 2002. "The Right Intervention: Enforcement Challenges for African Union". *African Security Review* 11(3)
<http://www.issafrica.org/PUBS/ASR/11No3/Cilliers.html>

Cilliers, Jakkie. (2004a). "Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review".
Nairobi: African Human Security Initiative
<http://www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf>.

Cilliers, Jakkie. 2004b. "Evidence and Analysis: Peacekeeping and Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Trap through Development". Paper prepared for the Commission for Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Cilliers, Jakkie. March 2008. "The African Standby Force: An Update of Progress". Paper 160. Tshwane (Pretoria): Institute of Security Studies

Clapham, Christopher. April 1999. "The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Africa". *ISS Monograph* No. 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/unitednations.html>.

Clapham, Christopher. 2001. "Rethinking African States". *African Security Review* 10(3) <http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/10No3/Clapham.html>

Clark, Andrew. 1991. *Mosaic or Patchwork? Canadian Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*. Ottawa: North-South Institute.

Cobbah, Josiah. A.M. 1987. "African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective". *Human Rights Quarterly* 9(3): 309- 331.

Collier, Paul. 2007." Economic Courses of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy". In *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Collier, Paul. 2000. "Doing Well Out of War: Economic Perspective". In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Marlone. Boulder: Rienner Publishers

Collier, Paul. 2003. "How to Stem Civil Wars: 'It's the Economy Stupid'". *International Herald Tribune* May 21.

Collier, Paul. 1999. "'Doing Well Out of War'. Paper prepared for the World Bank Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London, April 26-27.

Collier, Paul. and Hoeffler. Anke. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars". *Oxford Economic Papers* 56.

Commission for Africa. 2005. *Our Common Interest* <http://www.uneca.org/commreport.pdf>

Cooper, Andrew. F. 1997a. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions*. Scarborough: Prentice Hall.

Cooper, Andrew. F. 1997b. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. London: Macmillan Press.

Cooper, Andrew. F., Richard Higgott and Kim R. Nossal. 1993. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Copson, Raymond W. (2007). *The United States in Africa: Bush Policy and Beyond*. London: Zed Books

Cornwall, Andrea and Karen Brock. 2005. What Do Buzzwords do for Development Policy? A Critical Look and 'Participation', 'Empowerment' and 'Poverty Reduction'. *Third World Quarterly* 26(7):1043-1060.

Crosby, Ann. D. 2007. "Myths of Canada's Human Security Pursuits: Tales of Tool Boxes, Toy Chests, and Tickle Trunks". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic debates and new ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cox, Robert. 1986. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. In *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press

Cumming, Gordon D. 2004. UK Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: From Realpolitik to Moralpolitik? Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42(1) 106-128

Dalby, Simon. 1997. Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse. In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Dallaire, Roméo with Bent Beardsley. 2003. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda.* Toronto: Random House Canada

Dashwood, Hevina. S. Autumn 2005. "Canadian Mining Companies and the Shaping of Global Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility". *International Journal* 60(4): 977-998

de Coning, Cedric. April 1997. "The role of the OAU in conflict management in Africa. *ISS Monograph* no. 10 Conflict Management, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No10/DeConing.html>.

Debiel, Tobias. and Sascha Werthes. 2006. "Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Introduction to Changes, Concepts and Cases". *INEF Report* 80/2006. Institute for Development and Peace , University of Duisburg-Essen.
< http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report80.pdf >

Deng, Francis. M. and William I. Zartman. 2002. *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). 2000. *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy on Human Security.* Ottawa: DFAIT.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). 2003. *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians.* Ottawa: DFAIT

de Renzio, Paolo and Sarah Mulley. 2007. "Donor Coordination and Good Governance: Donor-Led and Recipient-Led Approaches". In *Exporting Good Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada's Aid Program*, ed. Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Derouen , Karl. Jr. and Michael Barutciski. June 2007. "The Link Between Protracted Refugee Situations and Civil Wars in Africa: Encouraging a New Direction of Research". *Civil Wars* 9(2): 214-25

De Waal, Alex. November 2007. "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect". *International Affairs* 83(6): 1039-54

Devine, Fiona. 2002. "Qualitative Methods". In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Second Edition, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dewitt, David. B. and John Kirton. 1983. *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Toronto: John Wiley &Sons.

Diarra, Cheikh O. 2005. "The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as the Institutional Framework for Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Arms in West Africa". In *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces,* ed. Anatole Ayissi and Ibrahim Sall. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Dorn, Walter A. Fall 2005. "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12 (2): 7-32

Donaghy, Greg. Winter 2003. "All God's Children: Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996-2000". *Canadian Foreign Policy* 10(2): 39-53

Duffield, Mark. 2005. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Ekiyor, Thelma. 2008. "ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: A New Approach to and Old Challenge". *West Africa Civil Society Institute* WACSI OP-Ed Vol./01/06/08 <http://www.wacsi.org/wacseries/785vc7691r2u3h68594OP-ED.pdf >

Elbe, Stefan. 2002. "HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa". *International Security* 27(2): 159-77.

Embong, Abdul. R. 2000. "Globalization and transnational class relations: some problems of conceptualisation. *Third World Quarterly* 21 (6): 989-1000.

English, John. 1998. "The Member of Parliament and Foreign Policy". In *Canada Among Nations: Leaders and Dialogue,* ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

English, John. 2001. "In the Liberal Tradition: Lloyd Axworthy and Canadian Foreign Policy". In *The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations.* London: Pandora

Epps Ken. 2006. "Canada and Small Arms Exports". Working Paper 06-2. Waterloo: Project Ploughshares < http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp062.pdf>

Eyo, Dickson. 1996. From Economic Crises to Political Liberalization: Pitfalls of the new Political Sociology for Africa. *African Studies Review* 39(3): 43-80.

Fierke, K. M. 2007. "Constructivism". In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversit,.* ed. Tim Dunne Milja Kurki and Steve Smith. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fortier, Patricia. 2001. "The Evolution of Peacekeeping". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace,* ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Fowler, Robert. 2003. "Canadian Leadership and the Kananaskis G8 Summit: Towards a Less Self-Centred Foreign Policy". In *Canada Among Nations: Coping with the American Colossus*, ed. David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Foxall, Justine. December 2003. "Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Options for CCIC Policy Focus". Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation <http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_humanitarian_2003-12_ccic_options_for_ha_pb.pdf>

Fraser, Alastair. 2005. "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls the Shorts?". *Review of African Political Economy* 32(104/105): 317-340.

Freeman, Linda. 1982. "CIDA, Wheat, and Rural Development in Tanzania". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 16(3): 479-504

Freeman, Linda. November 1995. "Canada and South Africa: Less of the Same". *Southern Africa Report* 11(1) 3-7

Frempong, Alexander. K. D. December 2003. "Trajectories of Sub-regional Conflict Management: An Assessment of ECOWAS". Paper presented at the CODESRIA 30th Anniversary Celebrations Grand Conference, Dakar, Senegal.

Frempong, Alexander. K. D. May 2006. "The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): The Search for Peace and Democratic Governance". *Legon Journal of International Affairs* 3(1)

Gareth, Evans. and Sahnoun, Mohammed. November/December 2002. "The Responsibility to Protect". *Foreign Affairs* 81(60): 99-110.

Gendron, Robin. S. 2000. "Education Aid for French Africa and Canada-Quebec Dispute over Foreign Policy in the 1960s". *International Journal* Winter 56(1): 19-36

Godefroy, Andrew B. 2005. "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania (1965-70)" *Canadian Army Journal 8*(3): 5-6
<http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_3/CAJ_vol8.3_03_e.pdf>

Gomes, Solomon. 1996. "The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security". In *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Gordon, Nancy. 1994. "Beyond Peace Keeping: Somalia, the United Nations and the Canadian Experience". In *Canada Among Nations: A Part of the Peace*, ed. Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff . Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Gotlieb. Allan. May, 1988. "Canada and the Economic Summits: Power and Responsibility". Bissell Paper No. 1 Center for International Studies. University of Toronto.
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/gotlieb1988/gotpap.htm>

Government of Canada .1995. *Canada in the World: Government statement*. Ottawa: DFAIT

Government of Canada. 2005. *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Development.* Gatineau: CIDA.

Government of Canada. 2005. *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview Booklet*. Ottawa: DFAIT

Grayson, Kyle. 2010. Clandestine Convergence: Human Security, Power, and Canadian Foreign Policy. In *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, ed. Marshall J. Bier and Wylie, Lana Wylie. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Gueli, Richard, Sybert Liebebberg, Elosana van Huysteen Orienda Maitin. May 2006. Developmental Peace Mission Theory" Report prepared by CSIR for Conflict and Governance Facility. Version 1.2
 <http://www.maoner.com/conflict_citation_2005.pdf >

Gwozdecky, Mark and Jill Sinclair. 2001. "Case Study: Landmines and Human Security". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2009. " Another Step Forward for Ghana" *Journal of Democracy* 20(1): 138-52

G8. 2002. *Africa Action Plan*.
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/2002Kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf>

G8 Research Group. 2010. *Plans for the 2010 G8 Muskoka Summit: June 25-26, 2010*. University of Toronto
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2010muskoka/2010plans/2010-g8plans-100113.pdf>

Haag, Den. September 2004. "The Political Dynamics of the Security-Development Nexus". Paper presented to ECPR/SGIR
<http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Hague/Sending_Development_security_nexus.pdf>

Hampson, Fen. O. and Dean Oliver F. Summer 1998. "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine" *International Journal* 53(3): 379-406

Hampson Fen O, Norman Hillmer Maurenn Appel Molot. 2001. "The Return to Continentalism in Canadian Foreign Policy". In *The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Henk, Dan. 2001. "Security: A new African Paradigm". Occasional Paper No.1 University of Zimbabwe.

Hope, Kemper. R. 1999. "Development Prospects and Policy for Africa: Structural Adjustment and Beyond". *The Review of Black Political Economy* Spring: 75-92.

Howard, Rhoda. E. 1988. "Black Africa and South Africa". In *Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Robert O. Mathews and Cranford Pratt. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Howe, Jonathan. T. 1995. "The United States and UN in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement". *Washington Quarterly* 18(3):

Hubert, Don and Michael Bonser. 2001. "Humanitarian Military Intervention". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Human Rights Watch. 2005. "Youth Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors". Vol. 17 No. 5(A): March.
<http://fr.allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/id/00010617.pdf>

Hurwitz, Agnas and Gordon Peake. 2004. "Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice since the 1990s". New York: International Peace Academy

 <http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/STRENGTHENING_SEC_DEV_NEXUS.pdf>

Hussein, Karim and Donata Gnisci and Julia Wanjiru. 2004. "Security and Human Security: An Overview of Concepts and Initiatives. What Implications for West Africa? " OECD Issues Paper (SAH /D (2004) 547 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/2/38826090.pdf>

Hutchful, Eboe. 1999. "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa". *ISS Monograph* No. 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies (ISS) <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html>

Hynek, Nik and David Bosold. 2010. Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power. Toronto: Oxford University Press

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development and Research Center

Irwin, Rosalind. 2001. "Linking Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy". In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy.* ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Irwin, Rosalind. 2001. Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Jefferess, David. Spring 2009. Responsibility, Nostalgia and the Mythology of Canada as a Peacekeeper. *University of Toronto Quarterly* 78(2): 709-27

Jockel, Joe. and Joel Sokolsky. 2000. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy". *International Journal* 56 (1): 1-18

Jonah, James. O. C. 2004. "The United Nations." In West *Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Jordaan, Eduard. 2006. Inadequately Self-Critical: Rwanda's Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism. *African Affairs* 105(420): 333-351

Jordaan, Eduard. 2007. Grist for the Sceptic's Mill: Rwanda and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 25(3): 331-353

Kaldor, Mary. 2007. Human Security: Reflection on Gobalisation and Intervention. Cambridge: Malden

Kamara, Abubakarr. M. 2005. "Implementing the Moratorium on Light Weapons". In *Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security* Forces, ed. Anatole Ayissi and Ibrahim Sall. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Kanbur, Ravi. 2004. The African Peer Review Mechanism: An Assessment of Concept and Design. *Politikon* 31(2): 157-166

Keating, Tom. 2002. *Canada and Word Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keating, Tom. 2007. Canada and the New Multilateralism. In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classis debates and new ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Keating, Tom. 2010. Whither the Middle-Power Identity? Transformation in the Canadian Foreign and Security Milieus. In *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, ed. Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Keenan, Patrick J. 2009. "Curse or Cure? China, Africa and the effect of unconditional Wealth". *Journal of International Law* 27(1): 84-126

Keenleyside, Terrence. A. 1988. "Development Assistance". In *Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Robert O. Mathews and Cranford Pratt. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Kent, Vanessa and Mark Malan. 2003. "African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects". *African Security Review* 12(3): 71-81

Keohane, Robert O. 1993. "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War". In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye. 1997. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Kilford, Christopher R. 2009. *The Other Cold War: Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University, Ontario, Canada

Killander, Magnus. 2008. The African Peer Review Mechanism and Human Rights: The First Reviews and the Way Forward. *Human Rights Quarterly* (30): 41-75

King, Gary and Christopher Murray. 2001. "Rethinking Human Security". *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (4) 585-610

Kingma, Kees. 1997. "Demobilisation of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and their Reintegration into Civilian Life". *Policy Sciences* 30(3): 151- 165

Kirton, John and Peter I. Hajnal. 2006. *Sustainability, Civil Society and International Governance.* Aldershot: Ashgate

Kirton, John. 2007a. *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World.* Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd.

Kirton, John. 2007b. "Canada as a G8 Principal Power". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press

Kingebiel, Stephan. 2005. "How Much Weight for Military Capabilities? Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture and the Role of External Actors". Discussion Paper. German Development Institute <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No2/FKlingebiel.htm>

Knight, Andy W. 1996. "Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational". *Third World Quarterly* 17 (1): 31-52

Knight, Andy W. 2001. Soft Power, Moral Suasion, and Establishing the International Criminal Court. In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy.* ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2000. "How do Norms Matter?" In *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law*, ed. Michael Byers. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. 1997. *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Lane, Charles .1991. "Wheat at What Cost? CIDA and the Tanzania- Canada Wheat Programme". In *Conflict of Interest: Canada and the Third World*, ed. Jamie Swift, and Brian Tomlinson. Toronto: Between the Lines.

Lee, Steven. 1998. "Beyond Consultation: Public Contribution to Making Foreign Policy". In *Canada Among Nations: Leaders and Dialogue*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Ottawa: Carleton University Press

Legum, Colin. 1975. "The Organisation of African Unity: Success or Failure". *International Affairs* 51(2.): 208-219

Lesufi, Ishmael. 2004. "South Africa and the Rest of the Continent: Towards a Critique of the Political Economy of NEPAD". *Current Sociology* vol. 52(5): 809-29

Lesufi, Ishmael. 2007. "Towards a Critique of the Political Economy of NEPAD". In *Beyond the "African Tragedy": Discourses on Development and the Global Economy*, ed. Malinda S. Smith Aldershot: Ashgate

Levitt, Jeremy.2001. "Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Africa-Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons: The Case of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD". *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 11(39): 39-79

Linklater, Andrew. 2005. "Political Community and Human Security". In *Critical Security Studies and World politics*, ed. Ken Booth. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc.

Lyons, Terrence 1996. "International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea". In *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

MacFarlane Neil S, Caroline Thielking and Thomas G. Weiss. 2004. "The Responsibility to Protect: Is anyone interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" *Third World Quarterly* 25(5): 977-92

MacFarlane, Neil S. and Yuen F. Khong. 2006. *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Mack, Andrew. 2005. *The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

MacLean, George. 2000. "Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54(3): 269-276.

MacLean, George 2006. "Human Security in the National Interests? Canada, POGG and the 'New' Multilateralism". In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. SandraMacLean, David Black and Timothy Shaw. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Maclean, Sandra J. 2008. "Fighting Locally, Connecting Globally: Inside and Outside Dimensions of African Conflict". In *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost,* ed. Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zaleza. Oxford: James Currey

Madlala-Routledge, Nozizwe and Sybert Liebenberg. 2004. "Developmental Peacekeeping: What are the advantages for Africa?" *Africa Security Review* 13(2): 125-31

Malan, Mark. 2005. "Conflict Prevention in Africa: Theoretical Construction or Plan of Action", *KAIPTC* Paper, No. 3. Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center.

Malan, Mark. 2002. "New Tools in the Box? Towards a Standby Force for the African Union". Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies

Malone, David. M. and Heiko Nitzschke. 2005. "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What we know, What we need to know". Discussion Paper 2005/07. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. "Beyond Settler and Natives as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43(4): 651-64

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. African States, Citizenship and War: a Case Study. *International Affairs* 78(3): 493-506.

Manby, Bronwen. 2004. "The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda". *Human Rights Quarterly* 26(4): 983-1027

Manji, Firoze and Stephen Marks. 2007. *African Perspectives on China in Africa*. Cape Town: Fahamu-Networks for Social Justice

Marks, Ryan. T. and Tara Denham. 2007. *A roundtable on Police and Gendarmerie Women in Peace Operations: West Africa Solutions to Gender Mainstreaming Challenges*. Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

Massaquoi, Bamayangay. J. 1990-91. "Conflict Resolution: the OAU and Chad". *Transafrica Forum 7(*4): 83-99

Mathews, Robert. O. 2005. "Sudan's Humanitarian Disaster: Will Canada live up to Its Responsibility to Protect?" *International Journal* 60 (4): 1049-64

Mathews, Robert O. and Cranford Pratt. 1985. "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Canadian Practice". *Human Rights Quarterly* 7(2) 159-188

Mazrui, Ali. 1994. "Africa in Search of Self-Pacification". *African Affairs* 93(370): 39-42

McGovern, Patrick .J. 2006. "Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings". *Armed Forces and Society* 32(2): 234-253

McGrew, Anthony and Nana K. Poku. 2007. *Globalisation, Development and Human Security*. Cambridge: Polity Press

McIntyre, David W. 2002. "Canada and the Commonwealth". In *Canada among Nations: A Fading* Power, ed. Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

McRae, Rob. 2001. "Human Security in a Globalized World". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

McNabb, David E. 2004. *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods.* New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 19(3) : 5-49.

Mercer, Claire Giles Mohan and Marcus Power. 2003. "Towards a Critical Political Geography of African Development". *Geoforum* 34: 419-36

Meredith, Martin. 2005. *The fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence.* New York: Public Affairs.

Molier, Gelijn. 2006. "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect after 9/11". *Netherlands International Law Review* 53(1): 37-62

Moran, Mary. H. and Anne M. A. Pitcher 2004. "The 'Basket Case' and the 'Poster Child': Explaining the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique". *Third World Quarterly* 25(3): 501-519

Morrison, David. R. 1998*. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Assistance.* Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Morrison, David. R. 2000. "Canadian Aid: A Mixed Record and an Uncertain Future". In *Transforming Development*, ed. Jim Freedman. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated.

Moss, Todd. J. 2007. *African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors.* London: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc.

Murithi, Timothy. 2005. *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Naldi, G. J. 1985. "Peacekeeping Attempts by the Organisation of African Unity". *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 34(3): 593-601

Nathan, Laurie. 1998. "Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa". *African Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 69-79

Ndegwa, Stephen. W. 2001. "A decade of democracy in Africa". *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. 36(1): 1-16

Neethling, Theo. 2005a. "Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects". *Military Review* 85(3): 68-71

Neetling, Theo. 2005b. "Realizing the African Standby Force as a Pan-African Ideal: Prospects and Challenges". *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 8(1) 1-25

Nef, Jorge. 2001. "The Ethics of Multilateral Vulnerability: A Developmental Perspective for Foreign Policy". In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press

Neufeld, Mark. 1995. "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The case of Canada as Middle Power". *Studies in Political Economy* (48): 7-29

Neufeld, Mark. 2007. Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The case of Canada as Middle Power. In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classis debates and new ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Neuman, Lawrence and Larry Kreuger. 2003. *Social Work Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Applications*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon

New Partnership for Africa's Development, The (NEPAD). 2001. Framework Document.

Nhema, Alfred. G. 2006. "The Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa's Contribution to Human Security Research in Africa". In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. Sandra MacLean, David Black and Timothy. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company

Nimijean, Richard. 2005. "Articulating the "Canadian Way": Canada and the Political Manipulation of Canadian Identity". *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 18(2): 26-52

Nimijean, Richard. 2006. "The Politics of Branding Canada: The International-Domestic Nexus and the Rethinking of Canada's Place in the World" *Mexican Journal of Canadian Studies* Vol. 11 <http://revista.amec.com.mx/num_11_2006/Nimijean_Richard.htm>

Noble, John J. 2008. "PMO/PCO/DFAIT: Serving the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Agenda". In *Canada among Nations: What Room for Manoeuvre?*, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Nossal, Kim R. 1983-84. "Analyzing Domestic Sources of Canadian foreign policy". *International Journal* 21(1)

Nossal, Kim R. 2007. "Analyzing Domestic Sources of Canadian foreign policy". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: classic debates and new ideas*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

 Nossal, Kim R. 1988. "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's interest in Development Assistance". *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 21(2): 35-56.

Nossal, Kim R. 1997. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.

Nossal, Kim R. 2005. "Ear Candy: Canadian policy toward humanitarian intervention and Atrocity in Darfur." *International Journal*   60(4): 1017-32

Nossal, Kim R. 2010. 'Middlepowermanhood' and 'Middlepowermanship' in Canadian Foreign Policy. In *Canada's Foreign and Security Policy: Soft and Hard Strategies of a Middle Power*, ed. Nik Hynek and David Bosold. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Obasanjo, Olusegun. 2001. "Preface". In *Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: Agenda for the 21st Century*, ed. Anatole Ayissi. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Obasanjo, Olusegun. 1996. "A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War". In *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

O'Brien, D. P. 1995. "Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa". *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. 19(2):115-30

Ofodile, Uche .2009. "Ire Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China's Africa Policy in Perspective". *Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology* 4(2): 16-99

Ojo, Olusola and Amadu Sesay. 1986. "The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond". *Human Rights Quarterly* 8(1).

Oliver, Dean F. 1998. "The Canadian Military After Somalia". In *Canada Among Nations: Leadership and Dialogue*, ed*.* Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Olonisakin, Funmi and Emmanuel K. Aning. 1999. "Humanitarian Intervention and Human Rights: The Contradictions in ECOMOG in Liberia". *International Journal of Human Rights* 3(1): 16-39

Olonisakin, Funmi. 2000. *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations.* The Hague: Kluwer Law International

Onwumere, Chukwudi P. 1978. *At Arm's Length: Canada's Relations with Commonwealth West Africa*. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

Organisation of African Unity. 1963. *Charter*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. May 25

Owusu, Francis. 2003. "Pragmatism and Gradual Shift from Dependency to Neoliberalism: The World Bank, African Leaders and Development Policy in Africa". *World Development*. 31 (10)

Owusu, Francis. 2006. "Discourse on Development from Dependency to Neoliberalism." In *Beyond the "African Tragedy": Discourses on Development and the Global Economy,* ed. Malinda S. Smith. Aldershot: Ashgate

Paris, Roland. 2001. "Human Security; Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?". *International Security* Vol. 26(2): 87-102

Pentland, Charles C. 2005. "The European Union and Civil Conflict in Africa *International Journal* 60(4): 919-36

Porteous, Tom. 2005. "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour". *International Affairs* 81(2): 281-297

Potter, Evan H. 2009. *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's Soft Power through Public Diplomacy.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press

Powell, Kristiana. May 2005. "The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect". Ottawa: The North South Institute.

Powell, Kristiana and Thomas K. 2005. "The African Union's New Security Agenda: Is Africa Closer to Pax-Africana?" *International Journal* 60 (4): 937-52

Pratt, Cranford. 1983-84. "Dominant Class theory and Canadian foreign policy: the case of the counter-consensus". *International Journal* 39(1): 99-135

Pratt, Cranford. 1990. "Middle Power Internationalism and Global Poverty" In *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*, ed. Cranford Pratt. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's

Pratt, Cranford. 1994. "Humane Internationalism and Canadian development assistance policies" In *Canadian International Development Assistance* Policies, ed. Cranford Pratt. Montreal &Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press

Pratt, Cranford. 1983. "Canadian Policies towards South Africa: An Exchange between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 17 (3): 497-525

Pratt, Cranford. 2000. "Alleviating Global Poverty or Enhancing Security: Competing Rationales for Canadian development Assistance". In *Transforming Development: Foreign Aid for A Changing World*, ed. Jim Freedman. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Pratt, Cranford. 2007. "Dominant Class theory and Canadian foreign policy: the case of the counter-consensus". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*: *Classic debates and new* ideas, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pratt, Cranford. 2007. "Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance: Reducing Global Poverty, Enhancing Canadian Prosperity and Security, or Advancing Human Security". In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*: *Classic debates and new* ideas, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher Kukucha. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pratt, Cranford. 2001. "Moral Vision and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canadian Development Assistance". In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press

Ram, K. V. 1980. "Survey of Canadian Protestant Missionary Archives Relating to Africa". *History in Africa* (7): 359-368

Rasiulis, Andrew P. "The Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP): An Instrument of Military Diplomacy. *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn):63-64
<http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo2/no3/doc/63-64-eng.pdf>

Rempel, Roy. 2006. *Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Reno, William. 1997. "War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States". *Comparative Politics* 29(4): 493-510

Richmond, Oliver and Jason Franks. 2005. "Human Security and the War on Terror". In *Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change*, ed. Felix Dodds and Tim Pippard. London: Sterling

Riddell, Barry J. 1992. "Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30(1): 53-68

Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 2005. "Canada's Human Security Agenda: Walking the Talk". *International Journal* 60(4): 1067-92

Robinson, Darryl. 2001. "Case Study: The International Criminal Court". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace,* ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Robinson, Darryl and Oosterveld, Velerie. 2001. "The Evolution of International Humanitarian Law". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace,* ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Ruggie, John. 1986. "Continuity and Transformation in World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis". In *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press

Ruggie, John. 1998. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. New York: Routledge

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "Poverty and the Organisation of Political Violence: A Review and Some Conjectures". Washington: Brookings Trade Forum
<http://www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/tradeforum/papers/200405_sambanis.pdf>

Sandbrook, Richard. 2000. *Closing the circle: Democratization and Development in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Sawyer, Amos. 2004. "Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(3): 437-63

Shinn, David. 2009. "Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent". *Journal of International Affairs* 62(2) 37-53.

Sjolander, Claire. T. 2005. "Canadian Foreign Policy: Does Gender Matter?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* Spring 12(1): 19-31

Sjolander, Claire T and Kathryn Trevenen. 2010. Constructing Canadian Foreign Policy; Myths of Good International Citizens, Protectors, and the War in Afghanistan. In *Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective*, ed. J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Stairs, Denis. 1970-1. "Publics and Policy Makers: The Domestic Environment of Canada's foreign policy Community". *International Journal* (26): 221-248

Stairs, Denis. 1998. "The Policy Process and Dialogues with Demos: Liberal Pluralism with a Transnational Twist". In *Canada Among Nations: Leaders and Dialogue*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot. Ottawa: Carleton University Press

Stairs, Denis. 2001. "The Changing Office and the Changing Environment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Axworthy Era". In *The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Stairs, Denis. 2003. "Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the Paul Martin Era" *International Journal* 58(4): 481-506

Starr, Martha. A. 2006. "Growth and Conflict in the Developing World: Neoliberal Narratives and Social-Economy Alternatives". *Review of Social Economy* 64 (2): 205-224.

Stewart, Christine. 1994. "Canada Making a Difference: Canada in Latin America and Africa". *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2(2): 1-5

Sinnott, Richard. 1994. "Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the Internationalization of Issues: Implications for Legitimacy". CEEPA EUI Working Paper RSC No. 94/13. European University Institute.

Smillie, Ian. 2007. "Boy Scouts and Fearful Angels: The Evolution of Canada's International Good Governance Agenda". In *Exporting Good Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada's Aid Program,* ed. Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press

Smith, Heather. 2001a. "Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Human Rights Policy: Ethics or Economics". In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin. Vancouver: UBC Press

Smith, Heather. 2001b. "Chicken Defence Lines Needed: Canadian Foreign Policy and Global Environmental Issues". In *The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Smith, Heather A. 2005. "Of Faultlines and Homefronts: A Letter to the Prime Minister". *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12(1): 3-20

Smith, Malinda. S. 2003. "Representations of Post-Colonial Africa". In *Globalising Africa*, ed. Malinda S. Smith. Trenton: Africa World Press.

Smith, Malinda. S. 2005. "The Constitution of Africa as a Security Threat". *Review of Constitutional Studies* 10(1&2): 163-206

Smith, Malinda. S. 2006. "Discourses on Development: Beyond the "African Tragedy". In *Beyond the "African Tragedy": Discourses on Development and the Global Economy*, ed. Malinda S. Smith. Aldershot: Ashgate

Smith, Steve. 2005. "The Contested Concept of Security". In *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc

Snyder, Ross. 2001. "Case Study: The Optimal Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict". In *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, ed. Rob McRae and Don Hubert. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press

Stultz, Newel M. 2007. African States Experiment with Peer Reviewing: The APRM, 2002-2007. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13(2): 247-57

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2005. "Human Security: the Seven Challenges of Operationalising the Concept". Human Security : 60 Minutes to Convince. UNESCO Conference, Paris, France September 13. < http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/unesco_13-09-05.pdf>.

Taylor, Ian. 2005. *NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Taylor, Ian. 2006. "When 'Good Economics' Does not Make Good Sense". In *Beyond the "African Tragedy": Discourses on Development and the Global Economy*, ed. Malinda S. Smith. Aldershot: Ashgate

Taylor, Ian and Philip Nel. 2002. "New Africa, Globalization and the confines of Elite Reformism: 'Getting the Rhetoric right', Getting the Strategy Wrong". *Third World Quarterly* 23 (1): 163-180

Taylor, Ian. 2009. *China's New Role in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Tennyson, Brian. D. 1982. "Canadian Policy towards South Africa". *Africa Today* 29(1): 3-20

Teshome-Bahiru, Wondwosen. 2008. "Democracy and Elections in Africa: Critical Analysis". *International Journal of Human Sciences* 5(2): 1-14

Tessier, Manon. and Michel Fortmann. 2001. "The Conservative Approach to International Peacekeeping". In *Diplomatic Departures – The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1993*, ed. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal. Vancouver : UBC Press

Thomas, Caroline. 1999. "Introduction". In *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*, ed. Caroline Thomas and Peter. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Thomas, Caroline. 2001. "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links". *Third World Quarterly* 22(2): 159-175

Thomas, Caroline. 2007. "Globalisation and Human Security". In *Globalisation, Development, and Human Security*, ed. Anthony McGrew and Nana K. Poku. Cambridge: Polity Press

Thomsen, Robert .C and Nikola Hynek. 2006. "Keeping the Peace and National Unity: Canada's National and International Identity Nexus". *International Journal* 61(4): 845-858

Tickner, Ann J. 1992. *Gender and International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security.* New York: Columbia University Press

Tieku, Thomas. K. 2004. "Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union". *African Affairs* (103): 249-267

Tieku, Thomas. K. 2006. "The formation of African Union: Analysis of the Role of Ideas and Supranational Entrepreneurs in Interstate Cooperation". Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario.

Tieku, Thomas. K. 2007. "African Union Promotion of Human Security in Africa". *African Security Review* 16(2): 26-37

Tomlin, Brian. W., Norman Hiller and Fen O. Hampson, F. O. (2007). Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives and Politics. Toronto: Oxford University Press

Tomlinson, Brian. 1991. "Development in the 1990s: Critical Reflections on Canada's Economic Relations with the Third World". In *Conflict of Interest- Canada and the Third World*, ed. Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson. Toronto: Between the Lines

Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Lagos, Nigeria. 28 May 1975

Ukeje, Charles. 2005. "Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century". *CODESRIA* 9-13

Udombana, Nsongurua. J. 2007. "Still Playing Dice with Lives: Darfur and Security Council Resolution 1706"*. Third World Quarterly* 28(1): 97-116

Udogu, Ike E. 2001. "Human Rights and Minorities in Africa: a Theoretical and Conceptual Overview". *Journal of Third World Studies* 18(1): 87-104

UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press

Upadhyaya, Priyankar. 2005. "Human Security, Humanitarian Intervention, and Third World Concerns". *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 33(1): 71-91

Vines, Alex. 2005. "Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa". *International Affairs* 81 (2): 341-60

wa Mutua, Makau. 2000. "Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis". In *The Role of Law in International Politics,* ed. Michael Byers. New York: Oxford University Press

Wade, Abdoulaye. 2007. "Democracy and Development: Consolidating Peace in Africa". *Harvard International Review* 29 (3): 26-29

Waever, Ole. 1996. "The Rise and fall of the Inter-paradigm Debate". In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization". In *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz E. New York: Columbia University Press

Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security* 25 (1): 5-41

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Addison Wesley: Massachusetts.

Waltz, Kenneth. N. 1999. "Globalization and Governance". *Political Science and Politics* 32(4): 693-700

Welch, Claude. E. 1981. "The OAU and Human Rights: Towards a New Definition". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 19(3): 401-420

Welsh, Jennifer M. 2002. "From Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society". *Global Governance* 8(4): 503-21

Wendt, Alexander. 1995. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics". In *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian. New York: New York University Press

Wendt, Alexander. 2003. "Anarchy is What States Make of it". In *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. New York: Longman

Whitworth, Sandra. 2004. *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne and Rienner

Whitworth, Sandra. 2005. Militarised Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping: the Canadian case. In *Critical Security Studies and World politics*, ed. Ken Booth. London: Lynne Rienner

Williams, Paul. D. June 2006. "Military Responses to Mass Killing: African Union Mission in Sudan". *International Peacekeeping* 13(2): 168-83

Williams, Paul. D. 2007. "Thinking About Security in Africa". *International Affairs* 83(6): 1021-38

Williams, Paul D. 2009. "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating the Embryonic International Institution". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(4): 603-26

Wills, Siobhon. 2006. "The'Responsibility to Protect' by peace support Forces under International Humanitarian Law". *International Peacekeeping* 13(4): 477-88

Wiredu, Kwasi. 1999. "Society and Democracy in Africa". *New Political Science* 21(1) 33-44

Wood, Bernard. 1999. "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalition". In *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*, ed. Pratt Cranford. Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Woods, Ngaire. 2004. "Order Globalization and Inequality in World Politics". In *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate,* Second Edition, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Yung, Fiona 2001. "Far More than a Health Issue". *UN Chronicle* No. 1
<http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue1/0101p10.htm>

Zaleza, Paul T. 2008. "The Causes and Cost of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the 'war on terror'". In *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost*, ed. Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zaleza. Oxford: James Currey

Zan, Yigal. 1982. "The Text/Context Controversy: An Explanatory Perspective" *Western Folklore* 41(1): 1-27

Zwanenburg, Marten. 2006. "Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Three Recent Regional African Peace Operations". *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 11(3): 483-508

Appendix A: Preliminary list of questions for Interview

A. Canadian Government Departments and NGO's in Canada

1. How would you define human security?

2. How does the Canadian government come to define its human security policies towards PSA and PSI?

3. Do African views on human security influence Canadian policies towards the region?

4. Do you see a consensus or divergence in the meaning and understanding of human security from the African and Canadian contexts? Can you give examples?

5. What role does the Canadian government play in the spreading of the norms of human security in Africa? How would you describe this role? Can you give examples of policies, projects or programmes?

6. Does the Canadian government (or your department or you as an individual) see violent conflict as generated by poverty?

7. How would you describe Canada's relationship with Africa?

8. Are you satisfied with the Canadian government's policy towards APSA and PSI?

9. What motivates the Canadian government's policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and West Africa Peace and Security Initiative?

10. Are you satisfied with the Canadian government's policy towards the APSA and PSI?

11. Can you identify some strengths of Canadian policy towards APSA and PSI?

12. Can you identify some weaknesses of Canadian policy towards APSA and PSI?

13. Is the Canadian government's human security policy based on the understanding of the needs of Africa? Why?

14. Is Africa's perception of human security and that of the Canadian government the same?

15. Do you see Africa's participation and ownership of Canadian policies towards APSA and PSI as important? Why?

16. What should the Canadian government do to improve its policies towards the AU and West Africa?

17. What does it mean to place Africa at the center of Canadian international cooperation?

18. What are the objectives of Canadian government's policy towards the APSA and PSI?

B. African Diplomats, NGOs/Think Thanks

1. Do you think Africa has a unique view of what human security should entail? What is it?

2. How would you define the Canadian government's policy towards APSA and PSI?

3. Is the Canadian government's human security policy based on the understanding of the needs of Africa?

4. Are you satisfied that the Canadian government has integrated African views on human security into its foreign policy? Why?

5. Is Africa's perception of human security and that of the Canadian government the same?

6. Can you describe how you perceive Canadian government's involvement in resolving violent conflicts on the continent?

7. What will you recommend to improve Canada's policies toward the APSA and the PSI?

8. What role has the Canadian government played in spreading the idea of human security in Africa? Can you give examples of policies, projects or programmes?

9. How would you describe the Canadian government's role in Africa?

10. Do you see Africa's participation and ownership of Canadian policies as important? Why?

11. What does it mean to place Africa at the center of Canadian international cooperation?

12. What are the objectives of the Canadian government's human security policies towards Africa?

13. Do you think the Canadian government is achieving its policy objectives in with regards to APSA and PSI? Why?

14. Can you identify some weaknesses of Canadian policy towards APSA and PSI?

15. Can you identify some strengths of Canadian policy towards APSA and PSI?

16. What should the Canadian government do to improve its human security policies towards the AU and West Africa?

17. What should the AU and West African states do to achieve the objectives of Canadian assistance to human security?

18. Are you satisfied with the Canadian government's policy towards the AUPSA and WAPSI?

Appendix B: List of Government Departments, and NGOs interviewed

I. Canadian Government Departments

 a. Foreign Affairs and International Trade

 b. Department of National Defence

 c. Canadian International Development Agency

 d. Canadian Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

 e. Canadian High Commission, Accra Ghana

II. Departments at the AU

 a.   Peace and Security Department
 b.   Peace and Security Council
 c.   The AU Commission

III. Departments at ECOWAS

 a.   Department of Defence and Security

IV. Canadian NGOs Working in Africa

    a. Care Canada
    b. Oxfam Canada
    c. Partnership Africa Canada
    d. Canadian Red Cross
    e. War Child Canada
    f. North-South Institute
    g. Inter Pares, Canada
    h. Canadian Council for International Cooperation
    i. Mining Watch
    j. Peacebuild
    k. Canadian University Service Overseas

V. African Think-Thanks/NGOs

    a. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Accra Ghana

    b. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre, Accra Ghana

    c. African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra Ghana

    d. Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

    e. West Africa Dispute Resolution Centre, Accra Ghana

    f. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Accra Ghana

    g. Oxfam UK, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

    h. West African Action Network on Small Arms (WANSA)

Appendix C : Invitation Letter to Participants

Dear Name,

My name is Edward Ansah Akuffo. I am a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. I am conducting a dissertation research under the supervision of Dr. Thomas Keating and Dr. Malinda Smith, who are both professors in the Department of Political Science. I wish to invite you to participate in this research. Please note that your participation is voluntary, however I would appreciate that you take part in view of your experience in and knowledge of Canada's policy towards Africa.

As a form of introduction, the proposed title of my research is ***Canada's Policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative: Towards a Constructivist Analysis and Implications for Policy.***

The central objectives of this study are (a) to explore the factors that influence Canadian government's policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative, (b) explore the meaning and understanding of human security and if and how it has been translated into Canadian policy, and (c) investigate whether African perspectives of human security and regional security have had any impact on Canadian foreign policy decisions towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative.

I will be in Ottawa from January 15 to February 1, 2008 to conduct interviews. If you agree to participate in this research, I will like to meet with you at your convenience and ask you about 20 questions. The interview would take about 30-45 minutes. I wish to assure you that I will take every measure to protect your confidentiality and anonymity. As I mentioned earlier, your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw from the interview at anytime.

There is no financial remuneration for participating in this research but I would like to encourage you to take part since your responses will contribute to improving Canadian foreign policy and finding solutions to Africa's security challenges. At your request, I will provide you with a summary of the findings at the end of the research project.

Please contact me at eakuffo@ualberta.ca or (780) 434-5323 if you are able to participate in this research.

I appreciate your support. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Edward Ansah Akuffo

Appendix D: Letter to Interview Participants

Dear Name,

I appreciate your acceptance to participate in the interview for this project. The session will take approximately 50 minutes. Please be assured that I will take every precaution to protect your anonymity and confidentiality. Please also let me remind you that you are under no obligation to participate in this interview. In this regard, you are free to decline to discuss any question(s) on topics you do not wish to address. Please also note that you have the right to stop participating in the interview at any point during our conversation.

Your participation will be a valuable contribution to research on Canadian foreign and security policy towards Africa. Your contribution will help researchers to understand and provide ways of improving Canadian policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative. Ultimately, your contribution will be a valuable source of information towards finding solutions to protracted conflicts in some parts of Africa.

The information that I gather in this survey will be maintained in a locked filling cabinet and will be retained for a maximum period of five years after which it will be destroyed by shredding. Your identity will be coded and your answers will be kept completely confidential. Prior to the interview, I will provide you with an informed consent form and a letter which provides further information about the research. You will be asked to sign the consent form if you agree to participate in the research.

If you have any further questions regarding the interviews and the results of my analysis, please do not hesitate to contact me at (780) 434 5323. My email address is eakuffo@ualberta.ca . You may also contact my supervisors; Dr. Thomas Keating at (780) 492 5772 and email: tom.keating@ualberta.ca Dr. Malinda Smith at (780) 492- 2586 and email: malinda.smith@ualberta.ca.

Once again, I appreciate your acceptance to participate in this interview. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Edward Ansah Akuffo

Appendix E: Research Information and Participant's Informed Consent Form

Dear Name,

My name is Edward Ansah Akuffo. I am a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. I am conducting a research under the supervision of Dr. Thomas Keating and Dr. Malinda Smith, who are both professors in the Department of Political Science. I wish to invite you to participate in this research. Please note that your participation is voluntary, however I would appreciate that you take part in view of your experience in and knowledge of Canada's policy towards Africa.

The Study: the proposed title of my project is ***Canada's Policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative: Towards a Constructivist Analysis and Implications for Policy.***
The central objectives of this study are (a) to explore the factors that influence Canadian government's policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative, (b) explore the meaning and understanding of human security and how it has translated into Canadian policy, and (c) investigate whether African perspectives of human security and regional security have had any impact on Canadian foreign policy decisions towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative. Due to your position and familiarity in these areas, you are chosen to participate in this research. In all I will interview between fifty to sixty people in Ottawa, Addis Ababa, and Accra.
Your participation: Your participation will be in the form of an interview where I/you will record your responses in writing and where appropriate your responses will be audio-taped. If you agree to participate in the research, I will ask you about 20 questions and the process will take approximately 50 minutes. I will arrange with you an appropriate time for the interview.
Your Rights as Participant: Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary and you have the right to decline to be interviewed. You are under no obligation to participate in this interview. In this regard, you are free to decline to discuss any question(s) on topics you do not wish to address. Please also note that you have the right to stop participating in the interview at any point during our conversation.
Confidentiality and Anonymity: Your responses will remain anonymous and confidential; however you may also choose not to remain anonymous. If you choose to remain anonymous, your identity as a participant will be coded and therefore in the event that I have to use excerpts of the information you provided to clarify my research findings, your name or job title will not be released. I will ensure the security of all data/materials I collect during the interview under lock and key and eventually destroy them after I have disseminated the findings of the research. The results of this study may be presented at scholarly conferences and published in academic journals. In addition, copies of the final product of this study which is my Ph.D. dissertation will be kept in the department of political science and the university of Alberta library for reference by students.

Benefits and Risks: This study has the potential of contributing to our understanding of human security and provides ways of improving Canadian policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative. Ultimately, your contribution will be a valuable source of information towards finding solutions to protracted conflicts in some parts of Africa. There is no monetary or other type of reward for participants however; their efforts and time will be greatly appreciated. Upon request, I will provide you with a summary of my research findings.

If you have any questions or comments about the study, please feel free to contact me at (780) 434 5323 or by mail eakuffo@ualberta.ca. Below is the informed consent form, please read and sign it to indicate your willingness to participate in this study.

Thank you very much for considering participating in this study.

Sincerely,

Edward Ansah Akuffo

Informed consent form

By signing below, you are indicating that you are willing to participate in this research, you have received a copy of this letter, and you are fully aware of the conditions above. Please keep copy of this letter for your files.

> **Participant's Name _____**
> **Signature _____ Date _____**

Please initial if you would like a summary of the findings of the study upon completion: _____

Please initial if you agree that the interview will be recorded: _____

Please initial if you choose not to remain anonymous: _____

> **Researcher's Name _____**
> **Signature _____ Date _____**