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SCULPTURE AND PLACE

by

GARY GENOSKO

A THESIS

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Abstract

I show that an aesthetic judgment about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the placement of a sculpture must be explained and justified. The theory of placement that I develop consists of an explanation of what a place is, three paradigmatic places for sculpture, and three canons that are used to justify the placement of works. I demonstrate that one must take the place of a work into account in order to make correct aesthetic judgments about works of sculpture.

Preface

"Sculpture and Place" is a work in the aesthetics of sculpture. It should not be read as an aesthetics of sculpture. Moreover, the theory of placement that I offer does not exhaust all of the issues that pertain to a complete philosophical investigation into the concept of place. The theory that I develop, however, is a prolegomena to further study.

The issue that I address concerns the placement of sculpture: how might one justify an aesthetic judgment about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement?

On the one hand, such a judgment might be said to remain at the level of an intuition. On this view, one cannot provide a set of criteria in support of one's judgment. On the other hand, a judgment about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement can and must be made explicit in order to correctly appreciate works of sculpture. On this view, which is my own, one gives an explanation of what a place is and on that basis provides a detailed set of criteria (what I will call 'canons') that may be used to justify the claim that a work of sculpture is appropriately or inappropriately placed.

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I. The Placement Of Place

There is a work of sculpture that is said to be appropriately placed; another work is said to be inappropriately placed. What more can one say about both placements? Are there guidelines or tell-tale signs of appropriate and inappropriate placements?

The eminent British sculptor Henry Moore states that "there aren't any rules for discovering 'correct' settings for works of sculpture."[1] For Moore, one cannot appeal to a set of "rules" in order to assure the appropriate placement of a work nor can one specify what is appropriate about a placement. A work *seems* to be appropriately placed; one has the *feeling* that a work is out of place; there is *something* about a place that *suits* a work. While there may be something that is intuitively correct about a placement, what that intuition involves cannot be made explicit.

In *Nine Basic Arts*, Paul Weiss states that "a piece of sculpture belongs anywhere."[2] This position may be best described as radically anti-place: sculpture has no place. A remark to the effect that a work is appropriately or inappropriately placed makes little sense in Weiss' philosophy of sculpture. If there are no places for sculpture, then one cannot talk about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of placements. For Weiss, there is nothing beyond the material body of a work that is germane to it. On

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[1]Henry Moore, *Henry Moore on Sculpture* (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 229.
[2]Paul Weiss, *Nine Basic Arts* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961), p. 89.

this view, a work of sculpture belongs anywhere because one need not look beyond its material body in order to appreciate it aesthetically.

For Rosalind Krauss in "Sculpture in the Expanded Field,"[3] sculpture becomes placeless at the moment when the site of a historical event no longer determines the placement of a work. The condition of placelessness, thinks Krauss, is particularly evident if one attempts to think of the place of non-representational works that are found in the urban environment.

In *The Stones of Venice*,[4] John Ruskin contends that the niche is no place for sculpture. Although Ruskin recognizes that the niche is a recess intended for sculpture, the architectural definition of the niche or what I will call the basic understanding of the niche as a place for sculpture is said to be inapt since the niche is no more than a decorative abyss.

In *The Art of Sculpture*,[5] Herbert Read argues that a discussion of sculpture in terms of place precludes an understanding of the autonomy of the art of sculpture. For Read, place is a concept that implies the subordination of sculpture to a context that is conceived of in terms of a visual or painterly prejudice.

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[3]Rosalind Krauss, "Sculpture in the Expanded Field," *October* 8 (1979): 30-44.
[4]John Ruskin, *The Stones of Venice*, Fourth Edition (Sunnyside, Orpington, Rent: George Allen, 1886), I. xxiv. 8-9.
[5]See Herbert Read, *The Art of Sculpture* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956).

For F. David Martin in "Sculpture and Place,"[1] there are several ways to reach an understanding of the placement of sculpture. However, in the theory of placement that I will present, Martin's place-concepts must be unpacked and critically reevaluated before their soundness and applicability may be determined.

When I refer to the position of the sceptic or the sceptical view of sculpture and place, I mean to suggest a generalization of Moore's and Weiss' positions. The sceptic thinks that there are no places and, even if there were, one could not explain what it is that makes them appropriate or inappropriate places for sculpture. At best, one can simply report that a work seems to be appropriately or inappropriately placed.

The positions of Krauss, Ruskin, and Read are not manifestly sceptical. Rather, in each discussion a notion of place is introduced only to be subsequently dismissed. What remains, however, is not a placelessness that is the result of a radical uncertainty about place as a critical and useful concept. For instance, Krauss finds that the separation of the logic of the monument and the logic of sculpture has created a kind of sitelessness; Ruskin dismissed the definition of the niche since he failed to find a "noble" example of a niche-bound statue; and Read argues against the Greek concept of *topos* since it imposes limits on one's understanding of the art of sculpture. At no

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[1] F. David Martin, "Sculpture and Place," *Dialectics and Humanism* III/2 (1976): 45-55.

time does Krauss argue that the logic of the monument dissolves; Ruskin does not deny the possibility of an appropriately placed statue; and Read does not lose a sense of place. A theory of placement that consists, in part, of three sets of paradigmatic places for sculpture will emerge from my reconsiderations of Krauss', Ruskin's, and Read's deliberations on particular notions of place.

Consider the following example. In Sir Winston Churchill Square in downtown Edmonton, Alberta, there is a work entitled *Lunchbreak* (1983) by J. Seward Johnson Jr. The sculpture is located in a corner of the small park. It is a cast of a labourer: a carpenter complete with overalls and the tools of his trade. The work sits on a bench and, in fact, appears to be reclining on the bench. Further, he has a cup that sits on the bench beside him and contains, when the weather permits, rainwater. At other times he can be seen in the shade of the park trees. This work, I contend, is appropriately placed.

The work, as I have attempted to relate through a mild anthropomorphism, is a realistic representation of a carpenter. However, it is not in virtue of my anthropomorphic description that the work may be said to be appropriately placed. It is in virtue of what is co-present with the work that it is appropriately placed. The work is designed to be placed on a bench; a place for a lunchbreak. The work is placed on a bench together with a lunchbox, thermos, and cup. It is, after all, *Lunchbreak* - a break for

lunch in a park.

There are three points of interest here. First, a park or a square, just as other designed places like the piazza and the walk to a building, are common urban places and common places for sculpture. The work is found in a place in which one might expect to find it; on reflection, in one of the common urban places for sculpture. I will pursue this line of thought in Chapter II in the form of an argument against Krauss' notion of the placelessness of sculpture in the outdoor urban environment.

Secondly, the work is placed on a park bench. That is, the figure reclines on the bench and is not simply set on a bench. The figure, then, is designed in such a way that it would be inappropriately placed if it was set on a flat surface, a slope, or a lower or higher bench. In my discussions of niches and other architectural contexts in Chapters III (on Ruskin), IV (on Martin), and V (on Read), I will show that one must take into account the design of a work in relation to what it is placed in, on, or against in order to determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement. What is co-present with a work constitutes the place of a work.

Thirdly, the place of the carpenter cannot be adequately described in terms of a single, frontal position. The manners in which the work appears to a spectator who moves in and around its place in relation to the trees, the bench, and the objects on the bench are essential components

in my understanding of the aesthetically significant features of the place of sculpture. In Chapter VI, I will show how a free-standing object that is co-present with a work can be said to influence the appearance of a work and the appropriateness of the placement.

The theory of placement that will appear in Chapter VII consists of three sets of places: urban places, niches, and free-standing sculpture in-the-round in relation to free-standing co-present objects that are in the immediate vicinity of a work. The three sets of places provide canons that I will appeal to in order to explain what the place of a work is and how one can correctly appreciate it. As I have stated, the three sets of paradigmatic places for sculpture emerge from my reconsiderations of Krauss', Ruskin's, and Read's positions. The three sets of places yield canons that I will use in order to show that the sceptical view of sculpture and place is incorrect. I will give a rigorous account of sculpture and place by applying my canons to particular works. The applications will appear throughout the text as illustrative examples. In Chapter VII, I will treat several examples in order to demonstrate the general applicability of the canons.

The study of the place of sculpture is essentially an investigation into the relationships between works of sculpture and what is co-present with them. The goal of the investigation is to make such relationships explicit and show how the co-present determines the appropriateness of

placements. A place has a clearly defined boundary and it is within such a boundary that a work is found. The study of place brings to light the aesthetic significance of what is co-present with a work. What is co-present and how the co-present is related to a work will emerge as the canons of the theory of placement are formulated.

II. Urban Places

By way of an introduction to this Chapter, I will consider some remarks by art historian and critic Rosalind Krauss in "Sculpture in the Expanded Field." Krauss declares that prior to Auguste Rodin's *Gates of Hell* (1880-1917) and *Balzac* (1897), the logic of sculpture was identical with the logic of the monument. It is with Rodin's works (but more explicitly with much of the sculpture of the 1960's) that the logic of the monument is transgressed. For Krauss, the monument is "a marker at a particular place for a specific meaning/event." [7] Further, "by virtue of this logic a sculpture is a commemorative representation. It sits in a particular place and speaks in a symbolical tongue about the meaning or use of that place." [8] The representational monument, then, marks its place as the site of, for instance, a battle, a discovery, the home of an important figure or, the "first," the "last," the "only," etc. A sculpture can be said to monumentalize by representing some element (a figure or figures) from a past event which occurred that place.

The logic of the monument is transgressed at the moment when a historically significant site is no longer the determining factor in the placement of a sculpture. For Krauss, the negative condition of the monument is placelessness, homelessness, or a kind of sitelessness. It is of some interest to note that the language of place and

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[7] Krauss, "Expanded Field," p. 35.
[8] *Ibid*

placelessness is quickly becoming a widely used mode of expression in architectural criticism. The current literature on postmodern architecture, perhaps fueled by Kenneth Frampton's widely published article "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," [9] is reminiscent of Martin Heidegger's "Art and Space" [10] and *The Question Concerning Technology*. [11] Frampton's influence is particularly evident in the work of the Canadian design critic, Adele Freedman. Unfortunately, the distillation of Heidegger yields a widely used but uncertain sense of place.[12] I will return to Frampton and Heidegger later in this Chapter.

For Krauss, if the placement of a work is no longer determined by the events of the past, then the notion of the place of sculpture is passed over. Regarding the absence of a unique and original site, Krauss writes: "But it would

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[9] Kenneth Frampton, "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance," in *The Anti-Aesthetic*, edited by Hal Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983), pp. 16-30.

[10] Martin Heidegger, "Art and Space," *Man and World* 6 (1973): 3-8.

[11] See Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

[12] What Frampton has firmly grasped in his reading of Heidegger (and translated into critical remarks on construction techniques) is that there is not a place for a building before there is a building. A place is constructed, cultivated, or opened up in virtue of building. In Freedman's use of place, there is already a place for a thing; a bare position (*locus*) that may be occupied by any number of things. Moreover, such positions are said to be "right" or "wrong" for particular works (Adele Freedman, "A garden of overwrought, picturesque folly," *The Globe And Mail* , September 22, 1984: E5; *idem*, "Postmodernism," *Canadian Art* 1/1 (1984): 84-9; Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 145-61).

probably be more accurate to say of the work that one found in the early sixties that sculpture had entered a categorical no man's land: it was what was on or in front of a building that was not the building, or what was in the landscape that was not the landscape."[13] It is with this remark that Krauss finds an answer to the question "what is sculpture?": the peripheral category that results from the addition of the neither/nor of not-landscape and not-architecture. In a manoeuvre that I will not be concerned with, Krauss uses the (positive) inversion of not-landscape (architecture) and not-architecture (landscape) to construct a logical square. The square is used to define, in terms of the combinations of its oppositions, various sculpturesque projects.[14] Krauss' attempt to define sculpture as one of several categories that are generated through the addition of the possibilities given by the square overcomes some of the difficulties that one encounters in an attempt to organize the enormous variety of sculpturesque forms under the single heading of "sculpture."

A work that is in front of a building, for instance, is in a categorical no man's land. A work that is in a no man's land has not been placed according to the commemorative thesis. If the thesis does not obtain, then the sense of sculpture and place that Krauss entertains is lost and thus we are left with no place. Consider Isamu Noguchi's *Red Cube*

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[13] Krauss, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-8.

(1968) in the plaza of the Marine Midland Bank in New York City. Noguchi's huge rhombohedron does not mark the site of a meaning/event nor does it symbolize a past use of its current place. For Krauss, the work is in a plaza that is a no man's land.

The commemorative thesis is not exhaustive and is, in fact, misleading. The notion of place need not be passed over by virtue of the transgression of commemorative representation since a monument might be erected in a place that is not the site of a historically significant event. The commemorative thesis can be used to account for the place of some works. However, Krauss' "logic" is misleading since the commemorative thesis continues to operate even in the absence of a physical connection between a sculpture and the site of a historically significant event.

Let us consider a few possibilities within the terms of Krauss' project. If the site of a past event is in a city in Japan or, even better, on the moon, a monument might be erected in the center of an intersection in a North American city or, in terms of the latter case, in front of a building in any city. Although the work would not sit in the place that, according to the logic of the monument, it was meant to be placed, a sense of place need not be lost since the work signifies the site of a historically significant event but does so in a no man's land. Such a monument might be said to signify a site that is absent but made present to a spectator by the fact that the work is a reminder of a

significant event which took place at a site that is not the place or ground on which the work sits. Although the placement of the work is not determined by the site of a past event, the original site (Hiroshima, the moon) is still signified. This is, of course, the "logic" of the war memorial or veterans statue. The "logic" is very simple. A monument is erected in front of a building in Washington, D.C., in order to commemorate the first moon walk. Krauss thinks that the monument is in a no man's land. According to the commemorative thesis, the work should be erected on the moon since that is the site of the walk or meaning/event. Krauss suggests that the American flag on the moon (if she is willing to admit that the flag is a monument) is in its proper place. The monument in Washington, however, signifies or "speaks in a symbolical tongue" about the moon walk, the space program, etc. In this respect, I want to claim (against Krauss) that the commemorative thesis operates in cases in which the monument does not sit on the very ground on which an event occurred. I also want to make the claim that the monument in Washington is in a place regardless of whether it signifies the moon walk, the space program, etc.

What one must now inquire into is the place of a work that is no longer a historically determined site in Krauss' sense of a meaning/event. I do not mean the site signified by the work but the actual or immediate place of the work. The actual site of the work is the place of the work. In the *Red Cube* example, the work is not in the plaza by virtue of

a historically significant event that occurred in that place. While there are some works that are placed according to Krauss' "logic," and other works that signify a historically significant site that is not the place on which they sit, there are other kinds of places for sculpture. The *Red Cube* is one of those places: the plaza. We must begin to reflect upon where works of sculpture are found in the urban environment.

One way of shedding some light on my suggestion about place is to consider the structurally analogous case of the earthwork. What is structurally analogous about this case is that the idea of place that I am suggesting remains subjacent to an existing notion of place as site. An earthwork or earthmark such as Robert Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970) may be understood in terms of the relationship between the work and its site. That is, in terms of the collapse of the work and its site. The site is a part of the work and as such, the site is a part of the work conceived of as an aesthetic object.'[5] It would appear that the complicity between site and work accounts for any questions one might want to ask about the place of *Spiral Jetty*. Although the site is a part of the work, the work has a place over and above the initial collapse of site and work. I am referring to what is co-present with the work. A second notion of place emerges in as much as the work has a place

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[5] Allen Carlson, "Is Environmental Art An Aesthetic Affront to Nature?" mimeographed (Edmonton, Alberta: University of Alberta, 1984), p. 1.

in a great expanse of salt water and is connected with a part of the shore of the lake. If, in the first instance, the site of the work is a relevant part or aspect of the work, then, in the second instance, not all of the lake nor the shore are parts or aspects of the work. If the site is a part of the work as a definable aesthetic object, then the work as an aesthetic object will have a boundary. The features of the place of the work are not aspects of the work itself but are present together with the work and are aesthetically significant features of the place of the work. It will not be until Chapter VI that I will fully elaborate on the relationships between a work and a co-present object. The example I will use is one in which the co-present object is not physically connected with the work. However, the analogy is useful since it shows us that in both the monument and earthwork examples the prevailing notions of place require further expansion since neither notion exhausts the ways in which we can come to account for the place of sculpture.

The understanding of place that I wish to develop in this Chapter is derived from Krauss' idea of a no man's land. As we can recall, the front of a building, for instance, is a no man's land. Krauss thinks that a work which is found in front of a building is simply what is not the building. One might initially think that this negative definition militates against a positive interpretation. However, one might ask: where is the work? The answer, of

course, is that the work is placed in front of a building. This answer is simple and deceptive. In giving it I have indicated that the front of a building is a place. Moreover, the front of a building is a place for sculpture and not a no man's land. Just as a second understanding of place emerged in my discussion of *Spiral Jetty*, a second understanding of place emerges out of what appears to be a no man's land. Krauss has unwittingly directed us to a second understanding of place by giving us an example of an urban place. But Krauss has not simply directed us to the plaza. She has explicitly told us that the front of a building (plaza) contains sculpture. Krauss provides the same service with several of her examples. For instance, she states that "Bernini's statue of the *Conversion of Constantine*, placed at the foot of the Vatican stairway connecting the Basilica of St. Peter to the heart of the papacy is another such monument, a marker at a particular place for a meaning/event."[16] More accurately, Bernini's *Constantine* (1654-68) connects the portico of the piazza retta with the Basilica of the Vatican, Piazza di San Pietro (Rome). The important point is that the work is accessible from an urban place: the piazza.

The outdoor spaces of the urban environment such as the park, the plaza, and the piazza are places for sculpture. What we have come to recognize is that sculpture has a place in the urban environment. Public art and especially

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[16] Krauss, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

sculpture are found in urban places as a result of the strategies of the urban planner, architect, sculptor, art foundation, and other public and private institutions. What has become a bad cliche for some and an improvement for others is the fact that works of sculpture are predictably placed in front of the entrance - or in some relation - to a building in a designed plaza. In short, the front of a building is a common place and a common place for sculpture.

The examples that we might appeal to are numerous. If one considers Barcelona, one might point to Joan Miro's work in the pool of the Parc de l'Escorxador; if one thinks of Toronto, one might point to Henry Moore's work before the entrance to City Hall in Nathan Philips Square; if one chooses Philadelphia, one might point to Claes Oldenburg's work in Center Square. Sculpture can be found in renewed urban places which are as old in their conception as places for social interaction and civic action as the piazza and the town square. Sculpture is a part of designed outdoor spaces regardless of their function or age. Moreover, regardless of its function, age, or style, sculpture is found in urban places. For example, in William Lake Douglas' report on the Louisiana World Exposition (1984), "An Event of Place,"[17] we find a sense of place that answers to Kenneth Frampton's demand for a place that is cultivated with a view to regional inflections and local topographical features. Douglas points out that the Exposition site is in

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[17] William Lake Douglas, "An Event of Place," *Landscape Architecture* 74/4 (1984): 44-55.

a bend of the Mississippi River overlooking the Port of New Orleans and contains a large variety of water sculpture, designed lagoons, bayous, and waterways. The theme of the Exposition (The World of Rivers: Fresh Water as a Source of Life) reflects the features of the place (*topos*) in as much as the topography is characterized by its aqueousness. The "absolute precondition" of Critical Regionalism is a clearly defined domain or place-form. The galleria, the atrium, and the forecourt are, for Frampton, examples of introspective types of place-forms that fight against the modern tendency to level and build over without a view to the peculiarities of existing built and non-built formations. In the Exposition site the place-forms are either waterworks or bounded by waterworks. On a related front, we might begin to understand Martin Heidegger's treatment of the place of an anonymous sculpture in "Art and Space" by making reference to a work in a modest piazza.'* That is, to the extent that sculpture is said to take place by opening up a vista for human dwelling, the sculpture preserves the piazza as a gathering place for the people of the neighborhood. The piazza is understood here as a familiar local context; a homey place for a game of *scopa* (a Neopolitan card game) or a visit to the cafe in view of the local landmark, the sculpture. Within the Italian context, a Bolognese portico or what we might call an arcade or sheltered passageway takes place not merely as a route of circulation but as a

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'* See Heidegger, "Art and Space."

place in which the public and private domains overlap and engender social interaction. The portico makes space for such interaction. Indeed, the portico as a clearly defined urban place does take place as a short-circuit: it is given meaning through lingering, socializing, and the gathering of friends, family, and strangers.''

One might also point to the successive placement of Michelangelo's *David* (1501-4), Donatello's *Judith and Holofernes* (1457-60) and *Marzocco* (1410-22), Ammanati's *Neptune* fountain (1563-75), and (da) Bologna's *Cosimo I* (1554), in the L-shaped Piazza della Signoria (Florence) throughout the sixteenth century as an instance in which sculptures systematically found their way into an urban place (they were placed in the piazza in order to solve a design problem: to facilitate a smooth passage or transition from one space of the L-shape to the other).[20] What all these apparently disparate discussions have in common is that they involve built urban places and the presence of sculpture therein.

The first set of places for sculpture in the theory of placement are urban places. Such places are clearly defined built (designed, landscaped, constructed) formations in the urban environment. There are, then, contrary to the sceptical position, places in which one can and does find

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'' Samuel Packard, "The Porticoes of Bologna," *Landscape* 27/1 (1983): 19-29.

[20] N.T. Newton, *Design On The Land: The Development Of Landscape Architecture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 133.

works of sculpture appropriately placed.

Urban places are common places in the urban environment and common places for sculpture: the implications of this canon for the placement of sculpture will not be felt until the second and third canons are formulated. In Chapter IV and to a greater extent in Chapter VII, I will show how the places for sculpture and the canons may be combined. Since the second and third kinds of places for sculpture may be found in urban places, it is essential to know how the parts of the theory of placement fit together.

The recognition of the commonality of the urban place and the placement of works therein brings to light a convention that underlies the appropriate placement of works in piazze, parks, and plazas. The convention or the standard practice of placing works in urban places indicates that such places are appropriate but does not address the placement of the individual work. The individual work in relation to the co-present as an architectural formation will be discussed in Chapters III, IV, and V. In Chapter VII, I will unpack the temporal dimension of the convention. However, we are not in a position to assert that a work is appropriately placed because it is in an urban place. In Chapters IV and VI, I will show how the "crowding" thesis may be used to determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement. In this respect, a work that violates the thesis is inappropriately placed even if it is in an urban place.

III. Niches and Embedment

A survey of the history of Western art reveals that the niche is a place for sculpture. In these general terms, however, the niche is little more than a receptacle that might be said to house all kinds of sculpture. Moreover, on this general line of thought, all niches appear to be the same. In this Chapter I will enquire into the second set of places for sculpture in order to unpack these generalizations.

The touchstone for my inquiry will be the basic understanding or architectural definition of the niche: sculpture has a place in a niche because a niche is a place for sculpture. I will defend the basic understanding against the challenge of John Ruskin with a view to showing that it is a valuable heuristic device. The basic understanding is valuable since it gives us an object of study: the relationship between a work and its niche. It is through my study and delineation of the spatial relationships between works and their niches that a tripartite canon will emerge. By appealing to this canon I will be able to determine if a work is appropriately or inappropriately placed in a niche.

A niche, writes John Ruskin in *The Stones of Venice*, is "a hollow intended for a statue, and crowned by a canopy."[21] A statue, then, usually of some liturgical or iconographic import, has a place in a niche or recess in a wall. But the niche, thinks Ruskin, is a decorative abyss:

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[21] Ruskin, *The Stones of Venice*, I. xxiv. 8.

> It is a pity that thus we have no noble example of the effect of the statue in the recesses of architecture, for the Flamboyant recess was not so much a preparation for it as a gulf which swallowed it up.[22]

As far as Ruskin is concerned, the niche is a place for statuary but a place that becomes an abyss. A statue is lost in its niche and the niche becomes the distinctive configuration.

Is it the case that a statue might be embedded in such a way that it need not disappear into the abyss? That is, if the niche is a place for statuary and statuary, once it is embedded, disappears into the niche, then the niche is a place that is no place for statuary. On Ruskin's view, statuary is out-of-place even in its place.

In what sense is a statue engulfed? We might do well to consider a distinction between central and peripheral embedding with respect to the niche and its statue(s). I borrow the central/peripheral distinction from Donald Preziosi's analyses of space-cells and forms in *The Semiotics of the Built Environment* in order to make several points about niche-boundedness.[23] A form (i.e., an elementary geometrical solid such as a cylinder) may be said to have the features of centrality, peripherality, and embeddedness in relation to a space-cell. A space-cell

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[22] *Ibid.*, I. xxiv. 9.
[23] Donald Preziosi, *The Semiotics of the Built Environment* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 38-59.

(i.e., a hollow three-dimensional square) is a bounded space that contains or has an object on, against, under, through, or beside it. The space-cell (square) will represent the niche while the form (cylinder) will represent a statue (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

In the text that accompanies Jas. T. Ball's *Detailed Working Drawings of The Five Orders of Architecture*, we read: "The depth of the niche must be sufficient to contain the whole of any statuary placed within it."[24] Ball is stating that niche-bound statuary is to be centrally embedded. That is, no part of a work (i.e., a limb or an attached object) should protrude from its niche. If a limb or an attached object were to protrude from the niche, this would not constitute a case of peripheral embedment. What is essential to peripheral embedment is the placement of the work on the threshold of the niche. Before we return to Ruskin's challenge, consider the following example from Roger Scruton's *The Aesthetics of Architecture*. With respect to Verrochio's group of *Doubting Thomas* (1465) on the facade of Or San Michele (Florence), Scruton writes that "the saint's foot emerging from the frame gives to the figure a unique sense of startled understanding, precisely because of its refusal to be fixed in the architectural surround."[25] What is significant in the group of *Doubting Thomas* is not

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[24] Jas. T. Ball, *Detailed Working Drawings of The Five Orders of Architecture* (New York: Willliam T. Comstock, 1908), Plate JJ.

[25] Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (London: Methuen & Co., 1979), p. 99.



Figure 1 Central Embedment



Figure 2 Peripheral Embedment

only the foot of the saint but the entire statue of the saint. The statue provides us with an example of peripheral embedding while the protrusive limb serves to heighten our awareness of the peripherality of the statue in relation to the other centrally embedded figure.

The statue of the saint, as an instance of a peripherally embedded statue, is not engulfed since it extends beyond the mouth of its niche. Ruskin's notion of disappearance refers, it appears, to centrally embedded statuary. Since a centrally embedded statue is fixed in the partial surround of the niche such that none of its parts emerge from their recess, such a statue might very well be said to be engulfed.

If we understand the central/peripheral distinction as an either/or distinction, we are lead to say that if a statue is not peripherally embedded, it must be centrally embedded. For Ruskin, if a statue is centrally embedded, then it is engulfed by its niche. If a statue is engulfed by its niche, it is out-of-place even in its place.

However, in the Verrochio example the either/or reading of the distinction is inappropriate since both centrally and peripherally embedded figures are found in the same niche. The Verrochio example gives us a middle ground consisting of two statues with different geometrical features between the alternative and mutually exclusive configurations of a single work that is centrally embedded in a single niche and a single work that is peripherally embedded in a single

niche. The distinction should be understood as a conjunction or, at least, to have conjunctive possibilities. I will pursue this matter later in this Chapter. In the meantime, let us ask: since the Verrochio example presents us with both kinds of embedment, is it the case that one of the figures is subject to Ruskin's gulf?

What is it to be subject to Ruskin's gulf? If a statue is centrally embedded, then it is swallowed up by its niche. If a statue is swallowed up by its niche, then it is subject to Ruskin's gulf. However, a centrally embedded statue reveals a single aspect of itself to a spectator. Since a statue which is centrally embedded shows a single aspect of itself, it is not actually swallowed up and thus not engulfed. If a statue which has more than a single aspect comes to be centrally embedded, then it might be said to be partially engulfed since only one aspect of the work can appear to a spectator. We might even say that such a work should be peripherally embedded since more than one aspect of it is revealed in virtue of its peripheral position. If, however, a statue is designed to be seen only from the front or from one aspect, then we might say that it should be centrally embedded since such embedding accomodates that sort of statue. The above arguments give us a sense of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the placement of a statue in a niche. By bringing the geometrical features of niche-boundedness to bear upon individual cases, we can make a move towards understanding aesthetic judgments about

place.

Just as Ruskin considered the canopy, Scruton emphasizes the shell (the scallop in the cove of a niche). Unlike Ruskin who took the canopy to be a dubious embellishment, Scruton presents the classical shell and variations on it not as pompous motifs but as triumphs of niche design. For Scruton, it is the shell as detail in the vocabulary of classical architecture that not only initiates a standard for niche detail but is the condition of the possibility of expanding our understanding of niche-bound statuary. It is in the shell work Borromini that Scruton sees the reaffirmation of the niche as a place for statuary. The reaffirmation appears in the form of an anti-Ruskinian development in as much as the fluidity of the Borromini shell is said to complement niche-bound statuary. What is reaffirmed is the basic understanding of the niche as a place for statuary but a place that is far removed from Ruskin's gulf. Scruton goes so far as to attempt to expand our understanding of the niche as a recess in a wall:

> But the niche has now come forward into the wall space, it has acquired an entablature which follows its form, making it appear as an articulation of the wall rather than a niche cut into it.[24]

It is the fluidity of the shell, thinks Scruton, that enhances the niche. The niche is a dynamic place that need not engulf statuary. The statue is cast forward as an

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

integral part of the wall; the niche is an enlivened space that is no longer simply a receptacle. Scruton's vision of the niche suggests that centrally embedded statuary may be experienced as that which is equi-present with the wall. In essence, Scruton's suggestion is based on the observation that a centrally embedded statue shows a single frontal aspect of itself to a spectator. That is, one can think of the single aspect of the statue as an articulation of the wall.

In *The Art of Sculpture*, Herbert Read describes Henry Moore's *Time-Life Screen* (1952-53) as a marriage of modern functional architecture and modern sculpture through geometrical law. What is of interest here is the place of the work in the wall of the building. I will illustrate the conjunctive possibility that I mentioned earlier by taking Moore's work to be both centrally and peripherally embedded.

Some years before Moore was asked to develop a sculpture for the terrace of the Time-Life Building (London), he had been commissioned to carve a relief (*North Wind*, 1934) on the Senate House Building. The work that Moore proposed would have consisted of eight seated figures on eight separate stones to be placed some 50 to 60 feet from the ground on the facade of the building. Although the architect had the stones placed on the building, Moore did not complete the commission. For Moore, *North Wind* would have been: a) too far from the ground to be viewed properly and; b) the fact that the commission called for a set of

reliefs "went against the grain" of his attempt, at that time, to achieve form in-the-round. I include this discussion in order to draw attention to the design of the *Time-Life Screen*. Unlike Moore's plan for *North Wind*, the *Screen* consists of four non-representational sculptures which are mounted in a divided frame, side by side, in such a way as to admit the passage of light through the pierced portions of the "screen." Although Moore's *Screen* appears to be mounted on the facade of the building, it is an achievement, in a sense yet to be unfolded, of sculpture in-the-round. Further, it is mounted at the level of the mezzanine floor which is the lower level/terrace of the building (the building consists of a lower level/terrace and a higher level which is the office tower). From a frontal perspective, the *Screen* might be taken to be a partition which encloses the side of the terrace that faces Bond Street. Unlike *North Wind*, the *Screen* is relatively low to the ground; placed in such a way as to be seen from the front as well as from the rear; it can be approached from the rear at the level of the terrace and can also be seen, with some difficulty, from a lateral position (on both terrace and street sides).

For Read, the *Screen* "is suspended in the prime architectural plane and thus is completely integrated"[27] into the flat surface of the building. What is unique about Moore's work is that it is centrally and peripherally

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[27] Read, *The Art of Sculpture*, p. 23.

embedded at the same time. The geometrical features of Moore's niches in-the-round may be seen by using the form and space-cell that I used earlier (see Figure 3). The drawing represents one section of Moore's work. From the frontal, lateral, and rear positions (perhaps even from the windows of the office tower), the form is peripherally embedded. However, there is a sense in which the space-cell (the square has become a frame), as an extension of the wall (following Read's insight that the work is set into the prime architectural plane), is a centering device: the work protrudes on the front and the back of the wall and is, in this respect, centrally embedded in relation to the depth of the space-cell. Unlike the niches we have previously considered, Moore's niches are pierced and allow a spectator to experience them from a number of perspectives. What should be obvious here is that a work designed to be seen from a single perspective is inappropriately placed in such a frame.

Read writes:

> To hang a stone picture on the building was exactly what the Romanesque sculptor did, and the pictorial scene he wrought was relevant to the function of the building. His problem was to hang a picture in the right place.... He achieved this effect by carving *into* the walls rather than by hanging a carving *onto* the walls, and this is what Henry Moore has done.[28]

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[28] *Ibid.*



Figure 3 Central and Peripheral Embedment

The appropriate place for Moore's work is a niche-like structure according to the basic understanding of the niche. The kind of niche in which the work belongs must be specified since it would be inappropriately placed in a niche that is closed on the back. In another respect, Just as Roger Scruton contended that it is with the Borromini shell-niche that the niche as a dynamic place for statuary is reaffirmed, it is with Moore's niches in-the-round that the niche as a place for sculpture is reaffirmed as an open place. Although Moore's *Screen* is non-representational and secular unlike the representational and sacred niche-bound statuary that we are accustomed to seeing, the *Screen* is placed in a location that is not peculiar to niches but is a place where we might expect to find it. That is, on the outside wall of a building. Further, the place of Moore's work is also appropriate because of the concomitant geometrical planes which it fits into rather than contravenes. The work does not interrupt the rhythm of the window rows nor spoil the flat surface of the wall, nor impose a naturalistic or organic form upon the contiguous rectangular forms; neither does the work interrupt the parallel lines of ledges nor contrast with the colour of the co-present stone. In short, the *Screen* does not contravene what is essential in Read's use of "functional." The redundancy of the design is maintained in being extended.

What I have indicated in this Chapter is that a niche can be an appropriate or inappropriate place for sculpture.

One can determine if a placement is appropriate or inappropriate by appealing to the design of a work, the kind of niche, and the features of niche-boundedness. A work that is designed to be seen in-the-round is inappropriately placed if it is centrally or peripherally embedded. A work like Moore's *Screen*, however, which is designed to be seen as a sculpture in-the-round in the wall of a building is appropriately placed if it is centrally and peripherally embedded in a niche that is open on the back. Since it is the individual work that is important, we are in no position to assert that all sculpture in-the-round is appropriately placed if it is centrally and peripherally embedded. The three components of the canon apply to individual works and as such, each work demands close scrutiny in and of itself. A work that is designed to be seen from a single frontal position is appropriately placed if it is centrally embedded and inappropriately placed if it is peripherally embedded. A work that is to be seen from more than one perspective but is not a sculpture in-the-round is appropriately placed if it is peripherally embedded and inappropriately placed if it is centrally embedded. On the basis of the tripartite canon (design of a work, kind of niche, features of niche-boundedness - embeddedness, centrality, peripherality) it is possible to make an informed and exacting case for the appropriateness or inappropriateness of niche-bound sculpture.

IV. F. David Martin And Place

In this Chapter I will critically appreciate and evaluate F. David Martin's investigations into the place of sculpture with a view to unpacking and extending the constellation of place-concepts that appear in his texts. I will pay special attention to proper place, place-boundedness, and the between. As a critical thinker of sculpture and place, Martin's poetical and Heideggerian utterances often appear as approximations to intuitions or feelings about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the place of sculpture. However, Martin's attempts to articulate what the sceptic claims to be impossible, namely, feelings about placements, warrant close scrutiny. In my reading of Martin I will attempt to further his notions with art historical facts; indicate where there is a confusion of concepts; and direct his thoughts back to the basic understanding of the niche. The basic understanding will appear as a point of entry, in the final section of the Chapter, for the application of the tripartite canon from Chapter III in the context of a similar but more general case for the appropriateness of place that Martin makes. In short, we now have a canon that will allow us to make Martin's claims explicit and in so doing show that a rigorous account of place can be given.

In "Sculpture and Place," Martin suggests that the proper place of Donatello's *St. George* (c. 1417) is its niche on the outside north wall of Or San Michele

(Florence). Unlike my treatment of Verrocchio's group of *Doubting Thomas* (Or San Michele) in Chapter III in terms of the features of niche-boundedness, Martin's investigation revolves around the term "proper." What is it about a particular niche on the outside north wall of Or San Michele that might contribute to our understanding of proper place? For Martin, it is not so much a question of the position of the niche on the wall nor the particular features of the niche itself but, rather, the historical fact that the original place of *St. George* (where it stood for centuries) is its niche on the outside north wall of Or San Michele. In fact, it is "the Niche of the Armourer's Guild"[2'] rather than a niche without a title that is the proper place of *St. George*. In other words, Martin does not simply write that the work has a place in a niche because a niche is a place for sculpture; *St. George*'s proper place is the Niche on the Armourer's Guild because the Niche is the original place of the work.

Although Martin does not make his case explicit, his position is straightforward and historically grounded. Donatello was a member of the *Arte dei Pietra e Legame*, the guild of stone and woodworkers. *St. George* is a work in marble by a gifted stoneworker. *St. George* was the patron saint of the *Arte dei Corazzi e Spadai*, the guild of armourer's and sword-makers. The patron saint of the Armourer's Guild is in its proper place when it is in the

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[2'] Martin, "Sculpture and Place," p. 51.

Niche of the Armourer's Guild. On another level of analysis, one might appeal to the drill holes in the head of the statue and the traces of corroded metal in its right hand in order to support the relationship between the work and its place. Originally, the work was designed to hold a sword and wear a helmet. But it is not simply as "niche-dressing" that *St. George* sported the products of the Guild. Rather, *St. George* was the guardian of the Armourer's Guild at a time when the Florentine Republic was threatened by the forces of King Ladislaus of Naples. Martin, I maintain, would concur with us on the following point. *St. George* would have been inappropriately placed if the statue had found its way to the niche of the *Arte dei Linaiolie Rigattieri* (linen drapers and peddlers), for example. And if such a misplacement can be imagined, we would then be inclined to admit that the Niche of the Armourer's Guild would be, especially over and against the religious, emblematic, and material implications of the misplacement, the proper place of the statue or, at least, a more appropriate place. Hence, the proper place of *St. George* is its original place in virtue of the religious (patron saint), emblematic (a model for the fighting men of Florence who used the weapons of the Guild), and material (products of the Guild) factors.[30]

With respect to the complicity between proper and original place, there is another factor to consider:

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[30] For a full art historical account see Frederick Hartt, *History of Italian Renaissance Art*, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 176-79.

Martin's elusive notion of place-boundedness. On this level of analysis, a work is place-bound in virtue of occupying a place over time. That is, *St. George* occupied the Niche of the Armourer's Guild "for centuries." Martin also wants to include one's experience of a work in its original place (if possible) as an essential component of place-boundedness, as well as one's experience of the same work in a new location. It is not merely the historical fact that the work occupied a particular place "for centuries" that is important, but one's experience of the work in its original place at some point during those centuries (Martin is also willing to accept one's experience of a replica of the work in the original place of the original work) and one's experience of the same work in a new place (at some time) that is important. There are two ways of reading place-boundedness.

First, a work might be said to be place-bound in terms of one's experience of it at place *A* at *t* and one's experience of it at place *B* at t_1. If the latter experience includes associations from one's first encounter with the work at an earlier time and place, such associations would then be said to constitute place-boundedness to the extent that one could not disassociate the work from the place in which one first encountered it (particularly if one had become accustomed to its position at place *A*). One might claim, as Martin does, that the work has been dislocated. On the one hand, such a claim might merely entail that place-boundedness is contingent upon one's personal history.

A claim, I note in passing, not unlike the adage that a place and its objects may evoke strong memories. Such memories, of course, are based on one's personal history. On the other hand, Martin's point is well taken. To make the point that a work is bound to a place in one's memory is not to make a rigorous case for place-boundedness, nor to make a startling psychological insight and, even less, to make a point peculiar to sculpture. However, and this is my second reading, when coupled with some or a great deal of art historical knowledge about a particular work in the context of the cultural climate in which the work found its place, one's personal experience of a work that has been moved from its original place can evoke strong associations or ties to that place as one encounters the work in a museum or a similar new location. On a generous reading of Martin, one would attribute the second point to him. However, he makes no move to untangle the two points.[31]

On a slightly different line of thought, Martin maintains that "sculptures settle into a place by enlivening the surrounding space, reaching out and centering things around themselves, and resisting detachment."[32] The enlivened, surrounding space of a work is its perceptual extension or between. The between is "the space from the material body of a work to the participator."[33] Martin's

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[31] Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-8.
[32] F. David Martin, *Sculpture and Enlivened Space: Aesthetics and History* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1981), p. 190.
[33] F. David Martin, "The Arts and The 'Between'," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 17/1 (1977): 72.

central philosophical notion of the "impacting between" of a work of sculpture may be traced to Rudolf Arnheim's notion of *l'espace-partner.*[34] Both Martin and Arnheim refer to an energized space or field of forces which emanate from a sculpture. For Martin, a work impacts into the between and such impacting suggests that a work has the power to anchor a spectator or actively manipulate him. While the between of a work is defined in terms of the spectator, Arnheim's "daring extension of the sculptural universe" is not circumscribed by the spectator. In a recent article, Arnheim has reaffirmed the affinity between his and Martin's positions on the extension of sculpture into the space which surrounds it.[35]

St. George, it seems, had firmly settled into its Niche on the outside north wall of Or San Michele. However, *St. George* has been moved to the Consiglio Generale in the Museo Bargello (Florence). For Martin, the statue "has lost much of its proud fierceness in an anonymous niche inside the Consiglio Generale."[36] The work is stifled by the space of the room in two ways: the bustling street which it overlooked is lost to a museum room "filled" with sculptures of the Italian Renaissance (each work, thinks Martin, unsuccessfully fights for its own place); in the winter, the room becomes "strangely like a morgue" since very few people

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[34] Rudolf Arnheim, "The Holes of Henry Moore," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* VII/1 (1948): 29-37.
[35] Rudolf Arnheim, "Notes on Seeing Sculpture," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* XLII/3 (1984): 319-21.
[36] Martin, "Sculpture and Place," p. 51.

visit it (in the summer too many people visit the room). It is the new location and the conditions therein that smother or stifle *St. George*. I will return to these points shortly.

Since sculpture enlivens its surrounding space, *St. George* enlivens its surrounding space. In the Consiglio Generale, *St. George* continues to impact into the between but does so in the presence of other sculptures which also impact into the between. Martin maintains that there is a confusion of betweens in the museum room. The difference that makes a difference in the relocation of the work is a change in the nature of the extension of the work in the museum room as opposed to the nature of the extension of the work in its original place. The inside location signals a corruption of *St. George*'s between while the outside location involved an uninhibited impacting into the between (Martin does not make this point explicit but it follows from what he says about sculpture in general). Further, Martin suggests that the quantitative difference between a room that is "filled" with sculptures and a sculpture on the outside north wall contributes to the nature of the extension of *St. George* since the inside location is a competitive location.

The problem Martin has raised is a problem of the between. Let us take *St. George* to be centrally embedded in both locations. *St. George* impacts into the between or into a spectator through an energized space in the museum room and in its original place. A centrally embedded statue

impacts into the between only from the front since it is limited by the partial surround of the niche. In both places, *St. George*'s between is defined in terms of a spectator. In essence, it appears as if one can participate with the work in the same way in both places since the spectator experiences it in terms of the manner in which it is embedded. The niche delimits the between of the work to the extent that it can only impact from the front. A front, it should be noted, that is marked-off by the width of the niche such that the between of the work is channelled to the spectator.

As I noted earlier, Martin presents us with a contrast between an outside location and an inside location. In the former location, *St. George* overlooked a bustling socio-cultural milieux (a busy street in Florence) while in the latter location *St. George* is placed in a seasonally cold/empty - hot/overcrowded room. One might very well apply the description of the latter location to the former location given the meteorological, touristic, and crowd pattern variables which mark the description. In the same way, one might describe the latter location in terms of a socio-cultural milieux. What seems to generate a difference here is an implicit polemic against the museum environment which is expressed in terms of a cold, dead context as opposed to a bustling, noisy, or lively context. Such a polemic cannot adequately support what appears to be a philosophical objection to the inside placement of *St.*

George.

What is wrong with the museum location? Although Martin is often willing to admit that there are cases in which museum environments are the appropriate places for sculptures, *St. George* cannot be included in those cases.[37] Let us consider two hypothetical examples. First, there is a room "filled" with niche-bound statuary and free-standing sculpture in-the-round. In the first example, each wall of the room contains one or more centrally embedded statues in niches that are closed on the back. In the second example, there is more than one free-standing sculpture in-the-in and around the center of the floor space of the roo the first example, we find that one may move from statue to statue without a problematical overlapping of betweens since each work impacts frontally and as such, one need not move into the frontal projection of an adjacent niche-bound work (the case would be different if the wo ks were peripherally embedded in a single, all-inclusive niche). In the second example, the presence of free-standing sculptures together with niche-bound statuary may be problematical since the impacting between of a free-standing sculpture in-the-round must be understood as an extension in-the-round. In this example, the movement of a spectator around a free-standing sculpture in-the-round may lead into the frontal extension of a niche-bound statue. It is in this sense that an overlapping of bet ens may occur. One might be engaged by

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[37] See Martin, *Enlivened Space*, p. 110; *idem*, "Sculpture and Place," p.53.

the betweens of two free-standing sculptures in-the-round; perhaps as one moves around one work, one comes upon an aspect of another work that engages one's attention in such a way that one moves into the surrounding field of the other work. If such a disruption were to occur, it would answer to Martin's notion of the corruption of the between of a work.

In general, the relationship between two independent works of sculpture concerns the distance between the works. Martin suggests a useful rule of thumb which is once aspect of an aesthetics of crowding: as the distance between two works increases, the potential for a confusion of their betweens decreases; as the distance between the two works decreases, the potential for a confusion of their betweens increases. On this Venn-diagrammatical account of the confusion of betweens, an overlap signals the possibility that a complete experience of a sculpture may not be achieved. And this, I take it, is Martin's objection to the inside location of *St. George* in the context of his notion of the between. The other aspect of Martin's aesthetics of crowding concerns the inappropriate placement of sculpture in-the-round. Such sculpture is inappropriately placed if it is set in a corner, against a wall, or set in a close proximity to a co-present object. In such cases the spectator cannot move into a position in which he may experience the work in-the-round. In this respect the between of the work is delimited. I will return to this aspect (without the between) later in this Chapter and again

in Chapter VI.

In conjunction with the historical case for the proper place of *St. George*, the place of the work may be understood in terms of its between; by way of its role as a patron saint; in terms of its status as an exemplar of courage for the fighting men of Florence; and through its material connection with the products of the Guild. Martin fails to explain, however, how these "levels" of analysis fit together to form a complete inquiry into place (I have been using the notion of "levels" for the sake of simplicity). In passing, some combinations of the above "levels" generate philosophical problems. For instance, if a work can "breathe" or enliven its surrounding space without being inhibited, then it is properly placed. Here, then, the proper place of a work need not be the original place. However, if the original place of a work does allow the work to impact into the between, then it is a proper place. The original place may also be an inappropriate place if it stymies the between of a work. Hence, the between of a work may be enhanced by being moved from its original place. But what constitutes an original place? It may be the case, for example, that the original place of a work is unknown. Is a work that is moved after occupying a place for a very brief period of time dislocated from its original place in any significant way? Martin does not say. Further, it is not clear that the rule of thumb regarding the distance between works applies in the case of a group sculpture. It is

especially difficult to determine (on Martin's grounds) whether or not related works that are placed in a single file are subject to this general rule. Moreover, if there are two works of the same size and shape and one work is intricately carved while the other has a smooth, reflective surface, is it the case that their betweens are the same? Martin does not consider surface features nor kinds of materials in his discussions of the between. I am suggesting that he might have considered such differences since the inside-surface-between movem t of what he refers to as the forces of mass of a given work are likely to be influenced by the surface features given that the surface is that which channels the forces.

The point that works designed to be experienced from a single point of view are inappropriately placed if they are peripherally embedded or placed as if they were sculpture in-the-round is recognized by Martin. Martin arrives at this insight by relying on the first part (the design of a work) of the tripartite canon that I introduced in Chapter III. While Martin's presentation is grounded on the planar organization or two-dimensional qualities of some works, we may extend and concretize his position by employing the other parts of the canon.

Consider Martin's account of his experience of Donatello's *Mary Magdalene* (1456) after the flood of Florence in 1966.[3*] Martin encounters the work in the

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[3*] Martin, "Sculpture and Place," p. 48, n. 4.

temporary restoration center (the work is in a horizontal position on a table): "The 'Magdalene' seemed terribly out of place."[39] Given his thesis that sculpture impacts into the between, he concludes: "Consequently, the 'Magdalene' on the table carried about her, like an aura, something of the space inside the Baptistery. It was impossible for me to separate her completely from my memory of her in her original place."[40] Martin is ambiguous here: is the "something" the perceptual extension of the work in the Baptistery which lingers like a musty odour, or is it Martin's memory of the work that lingers? Something like an aura, but not just any aura, lingers around the work: a spatial aura distinctly from the Baptistery. The work impacts into the between in the Baptistery; the work impacts into the between in the temporary restoration center. In its niche in the Baptistery, the between of the work was well-defined. On the table, however, the between of the work is ill-defined. What survives from one place to the next, it appears, is some order in the form of definitive qualities: those qualities of the between of a work that is designed for a niche. Martin writes: "The 'Magdalene' needs a wall as a niche, for its backside is of little interest and a wall, as in the Baptistery, helps accentuate the planar aspects of the figure which, in turn, accentuate its impact into the between."[41] According to the basic understanding of the

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 48, n. 4.

niche, a statue is out of place when it is out of its niche. In this case, the work requires a niche because of its planar aspects. Further, the work is inappropriately placed in the Baptistery if it is peripherally embedded since the planar aspects of the work can only be fully accentuated and directed by being placed with a view to centrality. I use the phrase "with a view to" for the following reason. As Martin relates, the work did not have a niche proper but, rather, it had a wall. The work, then, was not literally centrally embedded. Moreover, the wall functions as a flattening device since it emphasizes the frontal aspects of the work. Since central embedment accomodates such an emphasis, the work would be appropriately placed in this way. Martin's colloquial use of "niche" suggests that Donatello's work is inappropriately placed when it is not standing against a wall. The work would be appropriately placed in a niche that is closed on the back if it is centrally embedded. Such a placement, like the placement against the wall, accomodates and emphasizes the two-dimensional qualities of the work.

Why is Tino di Camaino's *Charity* (1321-24) out-of-place in its free-standing position in the Museo Bardini (Florence)? The work was evidently designed, says Martin, for a niche; it is out of place because it is out of a niche. However, even in the Museo Bardini, "something of a planar organization is still evident."[42] The "something" we

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[42] Martin, *Enlivened Space*, p. 149.

asked about above, then, is the between of the work as it is determined by its planar organization and accomodated by its place if it is centrally embedded in a niche that is closed on the back or placed against a wall.

There are two points that I wish to retain and further from my discussion of Martin. First, the material connection between a work and its place. In a recent article by the social critic Tom Wolfe, we read:

> The Rockefeller's Number One Chase Manhattan Plaza was the first glass skyscraper on Wall Street. Out front, on a bare Bauhaus-style apron, the so-called plaza, was installed a sculpture by Jean Dubuffet. It is made of concrete and appears to be four toad stools fused into a gelatinous mass with black lines running up the sides. The title is *Group of Four Trees*. Not even *Group of Four Rockefeller's*. After all, there *were* four of them then: David, John D. III, Nelson, and Laurance. But the piece has absolutely nothing to say about the Rockefeller's, Wall Street, Chase Manhattan Bank, American business, or the building it stands in front of. [1]

Wolfe is decrying the absence of a clear material connection between the work and its place. Just as *St. George* sported the products of the Guild that he protected, there is a sense in which *Group of Four Trees* (1972) in the plaza of the Chase Manhattan Bank should, according to the material

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[1] Tom Wolfe, "The Worship of Art," *Harper's* 269/1613 (1984): 66.

connection thesis, sport, exhibit, or display something of the activities of the Bank. Wolfe's objection is a common one: there is no relationship between a work and the building which it sits in front of. Thus, the work is inappropriately placed. But Wolfe is begging the question (Wolfe is actually begging several questions here - one of which is this: Is he suggesting that something like a gold dollar sign should have been placed in front of the Bank? If so, would that mean that there are gold dollar signs in the Bank?). If the material thesis does not obtain, then the work is out-of-place. If the material thesis obtains, does it follow that the work is appropriately placed? On Wolfe's view, all works of sculpture that are found in plazas are characterized as "turd(s) in the square." I take it that if a work did satisfy the material thesis it would not be appropriately placed in light of being a "turd" (i.e., it should be removed). The work is found in a common place for sculpture regardless of the material thesis. It is in a common urban place but it is not necessarily appropriately placed even if the material thesis obtains. A free-standing sculpture in-the-round is inappropriately placed if it is set in relation to an object that physically impedes one's access to part of it. Moreover, if the material thesis does not obtain, the work may be appropriately placed in virtue of being in a place for it and by being accessible on all sides if it is a sculpture in-the-round. If, however, the work is niche-bound, in an urban place, and the material

thesis obtains, the work might be inappropriately placed for the reasons given in Chapter III. The important point is that the material thesis is not the only criterion on which one can determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement. The material thesis may be used to supplement an account of place and I will further demonstrate its use in Chapter VII.

Secondly, an expanded reading of Martin's notion of "crowding" will appear in Chapter VII in my analysis of a free-standing sculpture in-the-round in relation to a free-standing co-present object.

In this Chapter I have employed my tripartite canon in order to show where a work should be placed and why it should be placed in such a way. In so doing I have provided further examples of how one can give an exacting account of place. From another perspective, what Martin presupposes and rarely makes explicit is the historical background against which he develops his place-concepts. In my reading of proper place, the use of art historical facts proved to be essential to an understanding of the term "proper." In my reading of place-boundedness, background information proved to be the means by which we were able to clarify the relationship between personal experience and familiarity with a work and the conditions surrounding the original placement of a work. But art historical facts are not the only means of bringing Martin's concepts into focus. A reading of Martin requires a sensitivity to the design of

works of sculpture and the design of urban places. For instance, Martin's brief discussion of the Piazza di San Pietro (Rome) may be shown to be grounded on the composition of the Piazza.[44] I have taken such background information and placed it in the foreground. In so doing I have been able to show how the design of a work and the material thesis may be used to provide and supplement an account of place.

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[44] See Martin, "Between," p. 27; *idem*, *Enlivened Space*, p. 87. His remarks on the Piazza di San Pietro (Rome) are perfectly clear if one considers the design of the place.

V. Herbert Read And A Sense Of Place

In this Chapter I will prepare the groundwork for a reading of the place of a free-standing sculpture in-the-round (Henry Moore's *Three Standing Figures*, 1947-48) and a free-standing co-present object in Chapter VI. The preparation will take the form of a critical discussion of a basic problem in Herbert Read's aesthetics. In *The Art of Sculpture*, Read holds that *a space* (a differentiated space) or place (*topos*) influences the manner in which sculpture appears and such an influence is said to be detrimental to the art of sculpture. For Read, a work of sculpture is subordinate to its place. Place or a frame of reference imposes the law of frontality on sculpture. The "law," which is not a law proper, says Read, is connected with place and is manifested in the form of a two-dimensional, visual, or painterly prejudice. The "law" calls attention to the context, whole, or setting of a work. In this respect, sculpture that is placed under the "law" is a work of "pictorial artifice."[45] What is most disturbing for Read is that the inclusion of place in the aesthetics of sculpture fights against the autonomy of sculpture as an art.

While Read dismisses the Greek concept of *topos* because it implies that a work is subordinate to its context, he wants to maintain that some architectural contexts are appropriate places for sculpture. In the latter use of context, it is not altogether clear what the relationship

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[45] Read, *The Art of Sculpture*, p. 67.

between a work and a place is: in order to avoid a contradiction, Read must maintain, as he does, that sculpture is not always subordinate to its context. If he did not make this admission, he would be asserting that sculpture is and is not subordinate to its place. What, then, is the relationship between a work and its context if it is not that of subordination? I am inquiring into the nature of the "relationships" between a work and its place in order to show, through the use of my canons, that Read's sense of place requires further expansion and can, in fact, be treated as an incomplete but instructive intuition. A "sense" of place is clearly evident from the following:

> We may assert that the figures in the Portail Royal at Chartres are architecturally more appropriate for that particular location than would be the *Three Standing Figures* of Henry Moore, but three figures from Chartres, torn from their context, their architectural setting, would look fragmentary and frustrate in a London park.[‘‘]

If Read only has a "sense" of place, then such an elusive notion is a target for the sceptic: to have a "sense" of place is to say nothing in particular about what a place is and how one may come to appreciate it. The answer to the sceptic, of course, is to show that one can say a great many rational and specific things about place. I am not so much interested in rescuing Read from the sceptic. Rather, Read's

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‘‘ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

position, in all its ambiguity, provides us with a theoretical challenge: how can we specify the relationships between a free-standing sculpture in-the-round and a free-standing co-present object? In Chapter III, I examined works that are found in niches. In Chapter IV, I examined works that are in niches and other architectural contexts. In this Chapter, I will again analyze works that are in walls and works that are near walls. However, I will move out of the architectural context and into the park. The co-present in the park will be that which is completely detached from the work. The Moore example, which begins and ends this Chapter, forces us to ask the following questions: Why is Moore's work appropriately placed in the park and inappropriately placed in the Portail Royal? Why are the three figures from Chartres appropriately placed in the Portail Royal and inappropriately placed in the park?

In less abstract terms, the "law" is a prejudice for frontality and a purely visual experience of sculpture over and against all-roundedness and the experience of those qualities of sculpture that cannot be grasped in visual perception alone: integral mass and volume. The special sensibility which sculpture possesses and exploits (tactual sensibility), writes Read, is given as an evident tangibility or palpability. Much of the criticism that has been directed against Read's aesthetics of sculpture has focused on his elevation of the tactual. For instance, in "The Autonomy of Sculpture," F. David Martin writes that

"Herbert Read claims that if we cannot touch the material body of a sculpture, we perceive the work basically as a kind of painting rather than as a sculpture. This is surely mistaken... ."[47] Read seems to have anticipated such criticism:

> I have not assumed that sculpture is an art of tactile sensation only; I have pointed out that even within the concept of "tactile sensation" we must include the somatic or haptic sensations that take place inwardly.[48]

Although Read does not hold that sculpture has an impacting between that can be felt (on Martin's view one can make contact with a sculpture not by touching the material body of a work but by "touching" or "being touched by" its impacting between), he maintains, as does Martin, a distinction between tactile sensations (external) and haptic sensations (internal).

In essence, Martin shortens the distance between the spectator and the body of the work by stretching the perceptible limits of the work. In *The Art of Sculpture*, Read does not go so far as to say that Alberto Giacometti's sculptures for the blind or Marcel Duchamp's *A Bruit Secret* (1916) are paradigmatic modes of sculpture since they require handling. While it is the case that both Martin and Read make tactual experience an integral part of the

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[47] F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* XXXIV/3 (1976): 282.
[48] Read, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

experience of sculpture, it is not the case that one must actually touch a work in order to experience it aesthetically on Read's (and Martin's) views. Read's claim that sculpture is "a palpable presence" indicates that what is most obvious about sculpture or what is most prominent in the aesthetic experience of sculpture is that sculpture is present as ponderable mass. The impact (but not the impacting between) of sculpture, in as much as the tactile/haptic distinction obtains, can be direct but is initially felt without direct contact with the work. The presence of the tactile/haptic distinction indicates that direct tactual experience is not a necessary condition for haptic sensations. Read, it seems, is much more subtle and closer to Martin than Martin makes him out to be.

Read thinks that what is peculiar to sculpture as an art "is that it creates a three-dimensional object *in space*."[49] Further, "sculpture is delimited from the space surrounding it."[50] Read's understanding of sculpture is such that a work is an autonomous object which fills space. Moreover, the boundary of a work is its material body. In short, a work of sculpture displaces a certain amount of space and does not extend beyond its body. In terms of the extension of sculpture, Read's position is diametrically opposed to Martin's. For the latter, a work of sculpture is not merely a three-dimensional object that occupies space. The occupation of space is not peculiar to sculpture. A

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

brick, let us say, is a three-dimensional object in space that is ponderable as integral mass and volume. On the other hand, a brick might easily be said to have an impacting between. What is important here is that Martin wants to claim that although it is not incorrect to point out that sculpture occupies space (on one level of analysis), sculpture does more than simply occupy space.

Let us return to Read's point about the "law" and place. "One cannot emphasize too strongly that the *objet d'art*, as a detached and independent thing, transportable or movable in space, is foreign to the Greek,"[51] writes Read. The Greeks lacked a sense of abstract space. That is, they lacked a concept of objectified space; space grasped independently of a set of differentiated places. The notion of space as homogeneous as opposed to a view of space as a set of heterogeneous places is, as Read notes, a "peculiarly modern conception." If there is no space for place or nowhere for place, the art of sculpture can emerge from its subordination to architecture and become free, detached, sculpture in-the-round. The connection between place and the "law" becomes, for Read, not so much an extension of the Greek concept of place into modern thinking, but a prejudice which appeared throughout the centuries in the form of the subordination of sculpture to an architectural function or background. If place is conceived of in terms of an architectural context and sculpture has a place, then

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

sculpture is subject to the "law" of frontality.

Read suggests that there are degrees of subordination. For instance, Donatello's *Judith and Holofernes*, which I mentioned earlier in the context of urban places (Chapter II), "was thought of not merely as occupying a niche or an architectural [illegible] but as an object viewed standing in a niche and therefore always viewed frontally."[52] Read implies that the work was centrally rather than peripherally embedded in a niche that is closed on the back. If the work was peripherally embedded, then it would not be subject to the "law." Moreover, sculpture which is detached from architecture may achieve a complete aesthetic integrity as sculpture in-the-round but may also be subordinated to an architectural function by being attached to a quasi-architectural structure (a pedestal) and set against a background:

> Another possible way to freedom lay through the development of city planning and through the consequent use, for decorative purposes, of free-standing statues. The sculpture of the Italian Renaissance of the period before Michelangelo attains its greatest dignity in two equestrian statues - the Gattemelata statue (c. 1450) at Padua by Donatello and the Celleoni statue (1481-96) at Venice by Andrés del Verrochio and Alessandro Leopardi. Such statues still have an architectural

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[52] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

> function, and their architectural pedestals unite them with the surrounding buildings. They are still spectacles to be viewed in a perspective of buildings and not to be realized in themselves as distinct palpable presences.[53]

The equestrian statues are conceived of in visual terms in an architectural context. The pedestal functions as a device to assist in the picturesque placement of sculpture. It elevates the work so that it may be viewed against an architectural background. Primarily, the pedestal distances the spectator from the work such that the work cannot be experienced as a palpable presence. As Read contends, if sculpture is not accessible as plastic form in actual space, then the special sensibility which sculpture possesses and exploits cannot be realized. We should note that Read is not objecting to all pedestals. In the examples quoted above, Read seems to be objecting to the size, the height, and the architectural detail of the pedestals. At the beginning of the quotation Read notes that free-standing sculpture has come to be placed in urban places for decorative purposes. It will become clear why Read has misunderstood such placements.

It is at this point that Read's reaction against place begins to break down. First, the notion of an architectural background is misleading. A free-standing sculpture in-the-round which is in an architectural context has a

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

background which is a surround. Alternatively, such a work does not have a background. The background changes as one moves around the work. In this sense, to claim that an architectural background delimits the palpability of a work is to ignore the fact that a work is experienced from more than a single perspective. One must also keep in mind that an unobstrusive background which is not a surround (it is only from one point of view that a work appears against an architectural background) does not impinge upon the appearance of a work. If it did, then one would be giving an insufficient account of free-standing sculpture in-the-round since that kind of sculpture can only be fully experienced from a number of perspectives. I will return to this point in Chapter VI. Read's "law" is itself prejudicial with respect to the placement of free-standing sculptures in urban places.

Secondly, consider Read's position on Michelangelo's *David*. Read holds that the appropriate place of *David* is close to a wall-surface. That is, *David* requires a wall-surface since "it is entirely worked in planes to be seen from the front and not from all sides."[54] In this respect, *David*, like Donatello's *Mary Magdalene*, is appropriately placed in terms of the planar aspects of the figure. But a wall-surface is an architectural background. And an architectural background is detrimental to sculpture. There are, then, exceptions in Read's aesthetics; exceptions

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[54] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

that may be grasped by appealing to my tripartite canon.

Thirdly, early in *The Art of Sculpture*, Read states that even though John Ruskin is correct in asserting that sculpture is accomodated by architecture through the adaptation of the former to the perspectives and distances imposed by the latter, many architectural sculptures which are detached from their buildings are "among the noblest works ever conceived." Giovanni Pisano's works from the Baptistery, for instance, owe their aesthetic appeal to the very adaptations necessitated by their architectural contexts. In short, once such works have been removed from their places, one can see that the architectural contexts which they were subordinate to produced positive aesthetic values. At the beginning of this Chapter we saw that three figures from Chartres would appear fragmentary and frustrate out of their architectural context. The anonymous figures do not seem to possess positive aesthetic values once they have been removed from their architectural context. In some, perhaps many, but certainly not all cases in which architectural sculptures are removed from their contexts, the works can be said to possess positive aesthetic values in virtue of their initial subordination. On the other hand, Read is willing to admit, as in the *David* case, that some works which have not found an architectural context (the *David* is in an architectural context and not on a work of architecture) require such a context since it would enhance their aesthetic appeal.

The anonymous figures from Chartres would appear to be fragmented and frustrate in a London park. Their fragmented appearance suggests that the figures must be viewed together with co-present objects in the forms of architectural details and other works. Read is suggesting that there are no co-present objects in the park that would answer to the co-present, built objects that one would find in the Portail Royal. However, if I am correct in claiming that the figures would be inappropriately placed in a park because of the absence of certain co-present forms, then Read's claim that sculpture is delimited from the space which surrounds it is called into question. Since the anonymous figures would be, I take it, delimited from the space which surrounds them in the park and this delimitation would be inappropriate, then particular co-present forms which are in the space surrounding the works and bear upon the manners in which the works appear are required.

Although Read shows some sensitivity to urban places and the planar aspects of works, the "sense" of place that emerges concerns the role of co-present objects which are in the immediate vicinity of works of sculpture. Such objects do not appear to be, contrary to what Read on occasion claims, detrimental to sculpture. In fact, a sculpture is appropriately placed in relation to co-present objects. What we must uncover is the nature of such relationships and how it is that a co-present object may be said to bear upon the appearance of a work. Moore's *Three Standing Figures* will

provide us with a case in point.

VI. Sculpture In-The-Round And Co-Present Objects.

In this Chapter I will move away from the architectural environment and examine Henry Moore's *Three Standing Figures* (1947-48) as it was sited in the first open air sculpture exhibition in Battersea Park (London). In the course of this analysis I will unfold the place-relations of the site based on the co-presence of a natural object and the manner in which such an object might be said to contribute to the successful placement of the work. In essence, I will work from a comment made by the artist about the original place of the work and, through careful consideration of the possibilities engendered by his brief remark, present a schematic as a canon that one may appeal to in order to understand the place of free-standing sculpture in-the-round in relation to co-present objects.

Moore writes:

> The three figures were well sited when they were shown in the first open air sculpture exhibition at Battersea Park, but they couldn't remain there because the tree to the right of one of them was rotten, and after it was felled the site lost a good deal of its attractiveness.[1]

Consider the following context. One approaches Moore's *Three Standing Figures* from the front. To the right of one of the figures is an anonymous tree. The place of the work in Battersea Park is appropriate, thinks Moore, because of the

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[1] Henry Moore, *Henry Moore on Sculpture*, p. 103.

relationship between the work and the tree. If we are to understand the place of Moore's work as appropriate, then we must concern ourselves with that anonymous tree as it contributes to the work in its place. Moore's example is diachronic in as much as it is a before and after case. With respect to the former, Moore outlines the position of the work with reference to a co-present object from a particular line of sight. With respect to the latter, if the tree is no longer co-present with the work, then the place loses its appropriateness. In fact, if the work is to remain in its place, it will do so in virtue of the presence of the tree. If the tree is removed, the work will have to be moved. Moore does not make it clear, however, what the organization of the place is for a spectator who is in the neighborhood of the work. Let us first concern ourselves with a schematic of the place of the work based on the presence and absence of the tree as well as the position of a spectator in relation to the work and the tree. Once again, consider the original context. On a frontal view of the work, the tree is seen to be in a right lateral position.

Consider the following contexts of approach (the reference point is the frontal position). One approaches Moore's work from the rear. The tree now appears in a left lateral position. Consider an approach to the work from its left side such that it appears in profile (there are numerous microanalyses of the figures that we might need not consider) and the tree appears as a background against

which the work is seen. Further, one approaches the work from a position which is to the right of the tree. The tree, of course, is in the foreground and, although it might be said to obscure some part of the work, it need not do so. That is, one may be at a distance (or slight angle) which allows the work to appear in the background, in profile (the converse profile vis-a-vis the approach from the left side). In all of the above contexts of approach, the work is present in the field of vision of the spectator together with the tree. The presence of the tree in one's field of vision before it was removed, we recall, is the basis of Moore's description. In all of the above contexts of approach, the work is appropriately placed since Moore's conditions (presence of the tree; visibility of the tree) are satisfied; when the tree is removed, the place loses its appropriateness.

Let us consider a final context of approach. With the frontal reference point in mind, one moves into a position in-between the work and the tree. In this position the subject faces Moore's work. The tree, even though it is present, is no longer in one's field of vision. Since the tree is not in one's field of vision, the place is not appropriate. The tree is absent not in virtue of being pulled from the ground, but absent from one's field of vision. In order to understand the place as appropriate, we must concern ourselves with the tree as it bears upon the work in its place. Since we cannot do so, we cannot

understand the place as appropriate. We might even go so far as to say that the place is inappropriate.

One might object to the above analyses on the grounds that they are too rigid. In fact, one might want to say that the final example is artificially conceived, static, and quite absurd: it does not reflect a state of affairs known quite generally as being in a park and experiencing a work of sculpture. But this kind of hypothetical objection brings my point to fruition. Moore's initial account, like my final context of approach which is constructed along the lines of Moore's account, is a static account - the viewpoint is fixed. Moore's initial account and the final construction do not give us a sense of the polyperspectival appearances of the work for a spectator who moves in and around the place of the work; a spectator who has the ability to take up different positions relative to the work and the tree. Moore's description is insufficient in the same way that my final and earlier constructions are insufficient. They are conceived of as isolated and static points of view and do not capture what I have referred to as being in a park and experiencing a work of sculpture. If we treat the constructions as experiences which are independent of one another, they are simply inadequate accounts of one's experience of a free-standing sculpture in-the-round.

We have been presented with an initial description which makes no move towards a recognition of the various approaches one can make to the work in the Park. Moore's

description is, no more and no less, a frontal account of the place. Although my schematic is by no means exhaustive, it can be used to make a series of discrete cases for the appropriateness of the place of the work from different and fixed points of view. At the same time and in the same terms, my schematic can also be used to show that the same place is unattractive simply by changing the perspective and retaining the essential co-present object (the tree). What we have come to see is the extent to which a work is experienced in relation to a co-present object from a number of different perspectives which are, in terms of my schematic, five connected experiences of the work. As one moves around the work in its place, the objects (work and tree) are experienced in different relationships and reveal otherwise hidden dimensions of each of their bodies. One's experience of Moore's *Three Standing Figures* is accomplished over time and from a combination of varied points of view and distances.

With the above combinatory reading of the schematic in mind, we may now return to the final construction. What was most puzzling about this context of approach was that it did not satisfy the visibility condition but appeared to satisfy both sides of the presence/absence condition. We can now see, especially by reflecting on my overriding sensory metaphor "see", that the prejudice which guided Moore's initial account (and my constructions) was the presence of an object in the field of vision of one who views the place

from a fixed position. But if we are to do justice to one's experience of the place we must recognize that as one moves around the place the tree might very well disappear from one's actual and momentary field of vision. Although the tree might not enter into one's field of vision at a given position in the place for a varying duration, this fact does not warrant the claim that the place is inappropriate. Such an assertion is based on the inadequate condition of the presence of the tree in the field of vision of a subject for a moment; a moment, as in the final construction, which is cut-off from the continuous experiences of the work in its place. We must introduce the notion of a combination of the experiences of the place as the basis of our understanding of the role of the tree. We can still retain Moore's original point that the place was no longer appropriate for the work after the tree was felled only on the grounds that we do not isolate a single experience of the place and treat it as if it was an account of the whole place. As we have found, we might take the tree to be absent even though it is present if we do not take this precaution.

If the tree is momentarily absent, it can enter into one's field of vision by moving in a particular direction. In fact, one can place one's back against the tree and view the work. In this respect the tree becomes tactually present. One might smell the flowering buds of the tree while it is not in one's field of vision (more accurately, one might hear the buzzing of hymenopterous insects which

have found a home in the rotten tree); one might come upon a twig near the work and turn towards the tree or, for that matter, recall that this tree was rotten and that it was decomposing - the organic fragments one encounters might very well be from the same tree that entered into ~~one's~~ perceptual field from another perspective at an earlier time. One can be wrong about the origin of those fragments. I do not want to exclude that possibility. However, one's suspicions about the presence of a tree may be verified or falsified simply by moving around the place of t: work.

In my discussion of F. David Martin's notion of place-boundedness in Chapter IV, we discovered that his notion was, on the one hand, based on one's personal histor and experiences of a work in its original place as well as in a new place; on the other hand, his notion was framed in terms of a group of historical facts about the original placement of the work. With respect to the former, let us consider Mocre's before and after case. Moore, it is clear, is not so much interested in comparing one's experience of *Three Standing Figures* in its original place with one's experience of the work in a new place. In this sense Moore's case differs from Martin's since Moore simply indicates, on the basis of a co-present object, that the work should be moved. Martin, however, makes no such claim. Martin does, as we have seen, make a number of suggestions which are compounded in a rather obtuse fashion (i.e., as in the combination of the two readings of place-boundedness). In

terms of the latter case that Martin unfolds, we might take Moore's work to be appropriately placed since it is in its original place. As far as Moore is concerned, the Battersea Park exhibition was "the parent of all the outdoor sculpture parks which have grown up since."[5] That is, the work found a proper place in its original place in the Park. But we have achieved a different type of insight into place. It is through our elaboration of Moore's example that we have gained an understanding of place based on what is co-present with the work in the area immediately surrounding the work. In Moore's example, the tree is indispensible to our grasp of the place of the work and the manner in which the work is perceived by a spectator. To use the terms of Martin's autobiographical notion, one encounters *Three Standing Figures* in its original place in Battersea Park together with the tree; one then encounters the same work in the same place but, on this lat occasion, the tree is absent. In Martin's analysis, it was not so much the presence or absence of an object together with the work in its original place that made a difference in one's experience of a work, but the fact that the work itself was physically removed from its original place that made a difference. Moore's object is a tree - a natural, co-present object - while Martin's concern with co-present objects surfaces, in the *St. George* case for instance, in the relocation of the

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[5] Henry Moore, *Sculpture and Environment* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1976), p. 234

work.[57] Martin's objects, as in the *St. George* case, are other sculptures. Unlike Martin, Moore makes explicit reference to what is with the work in its initial place as a determining factor in the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the place. With respect to Moore's work, the before/after case is made with reference to what is not the work (a co-present object that is not physically connected with the work) but in a variety of relations to the work for a spectator in its place. It is clear, however, that one must first experience the work with the tree and be able to return to the same place once the tree had been felled: the subject cannot be excluded in our nor Martin's analyses since it is the experience of a subject over time at two distinct times that is essential in both cases. We must emphasize, especially in terms of the schematic, that the relationships between the work and the tree are invariables in any experience of any subject who moves in and around the place. I will return to this point shortly.

With respect to the relocation of a work in the context of Martin's former reading of place-boundedness, Moore recognizes "that even people who have no feeling for

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[57] Although Martin does make reference to co-present objects that are not sculptures (walls, corners of rooms, pedestals), his main concern is with the perceptual extension of the work. Martin does explicitly concern himself with the interrelationships between "things" in centered places (i.e., natural and built objects in such places as canyons and piazze) but these places do not require the presence of sculpture and are primarily discussed in terms of architectural environments (Martin, "Between," pp. 25-31).

sculpture become aware of a kind of dislocation when a sculpture they have been seeing pretty regularly in the garden goes away."[5] Like Martin, Moore recognizes this general feeling for the place-boundedness of a thing and does not , unlike Martin, proceed beyond this observation. However, there is a sense in which the place of *Three Standing Figures* is corrupted by the removal of the tree; one can no longer experience the work in its relations with the tree. That is, the tree cannot be experienced as a co-present object that influences the manner in which the work shows itself. For Martin, it is in the relocation of a work that its between becomes corrupted by the addition of co-present sculptures. The "manner of influence" in the Moore case might be understood, from a roving perspective, as the position of the tree as obstrusive foreground; the work as background; the tree might very well diffuse the afternoon light in a way that heightens one's awareness of certain contours of the figures; the tree may emphasize the verticality of the figures; the work may produce effects on the tree and the tree may produce effects on the work by mediating a spectator's access to one another from certain positions in and around its place.

The "mediations" noted above are the invariables of the place. While my schematic adumbrates other possible lines of approach, what is important here is that the invariable relationships become significant terms of reference in

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[5] Moore, *On Sculpture*, p. 108.

relation to the relocation of the work. I am not so much concerned with the changing moods of a conscious subject while he is in and around the place, but the fact that any subject who moves in and around the place will encounter the work as I have described it. In the relocation of Moore's work, the tree, trees, or perhaps another object or objects, might be located to the right or left of the work since the configurations that I elaborated in the schematic are maintained. These invariables constitute the canon that may be appealed to in order to gain some understanding of the place as an appropriate place. If, let us say, the new place is in the Park with a tree or trees in the vicinity of the work, we can easily admit a tree to the right or the left of the work without changing the schematic. However, if we admit a tree in a position that is immediately in front of or behind the work (the work is actually located in an open space but appears to sit in-between two large trees on a frontal view), the schematic would have to contain different contexts of approach.

If it was our objective to adhere strictly to Moore's original judgment, the frontal and rear positions of the tree would make the place inappropriate. In other words, we might demand that a close identity or similarity be upheld in transferring the invariable relationships of the original place to the new place. Since the work cannot be seen in the same ways if the tree is located in the area immediately to the front or the rear of the work, then the place would be

inappropriate. However, we adhere to a different position since it is our objective to unfold the place-relations of the work in its place. And the place-relations of a new place would simply entail a different schematic. A schematic that might show the place to be appropriate or inappropriate in whole or in part.

One might want to claim that if the tree found a position immediately in front of or behind the work such that a spectator could not move in-between the work and the tree (the spectator could not experience a part of the work by changing his position), such a place would be an inappropriate place since it delimits one's access to the work from a particular perspective within a continuous and differentiated (but not isolated) experience of the work. This sort of claim is compatible with Martin's aesthetics of crowding since it indicates that one's access to a work is physically impeded and cannot be corrected by taking up another position relative to the work and the co-present object. At the same time, one might also want to say that in the schematic the context of approach in which the tree appears as obstrusive foreground is problematic on Martin's grounds. One must be careful here not to compound a momentary blind spot that can be corrected with a situation in which the movement of the spectator cannot correct the blind spot. While I admit Martin's point as straight-forward and incontestable, I cannot admit the confusion of Martin's thesis and a momentary blind spot since sculpture

in-the-round and co-present objects such as trees, as three-dimensional objects, always imply a blind spot or hidden aspect that one has the ability to discover if the blind spot is not the result of a physical impediment.

In this Chapter I elaborated a schematic in-the-round in order to discover the variety of ways in which a spectator's experience of a work can be mediated by a co-present object. I also discovered a judgment about the place of a work that is made from a frozen perspective as if a single perspective was sufficient to account for the experience of a sculpture in-the-round was unacceptable on the grounds that: a) it could be shown to generate contradictory judgments and; b) it did not provide us with a means to distinguish between a momentary blind spot and a physical impediment. This latter point is of some importance since it engenders a confusion of judgments based on an inadequate account of one's experience of three-dimensional objects. By employing and applying the factors of the subject's mobility, use of sensory modalities, connection of perspectival experiences, and a reconsideration of an experience which many of us have had - being in a park and experiencing a work of sculpture -, I provided a canon that one may appeal to in order to unfold a judgment about the place of a work in relation to a free-standing co-present object.

For the sceptic, a work that stands in a meadow in a park has no place. On this view, the co-present tree does

not enter into one's experience of the work. What I have shown is that the place of such a work is marked by the co-present object in an urban place, the park. While the [illegible] of Moore's work is not circumscribed in the same way as a niche-bound statue or for that matter, a work in a plaza, the boundary is determined by a single object that appears in various perspectival experiences of the work. The tree is not a solid, continuous boundary but appears as a marker that is apparently displaced as one moves around the work.

The need for a schematic may be understood by considering the delimitive effects of a description of a work from a fixed point of view. Such a description fails to account for the movement of a spectator and limits the aesthetic appreciation of sculpture and space to a visual, frontal experience. My schematic differs substantially from a consideration of the number of significant views of a sculpture or the directionality of a spectator's movement around works and the elevation of temporality in the aesthetic experience of sculpture. The schematic is a description of a work with an object that can incorporate the above issues. However, in the schematic I am concerned with more than the work itself and how a co present object enters into one's actual appreciation of a work in a place.

VII. The Theory Of Placement And Further Investigations

The theory of placement that I have developed consists of a series of paradigmatic places for sculpture in virtue of which we may learn what places are and how to appreciate them. In the movement from urban places to niches and architectural contexts for freestanding sculpture on the ground, at no time does a work of sculpture appear as an isolated object. What is aesthetically indispensable in the theory of placement is the co-present as it bears upon one's experience of the work.

The series of places for sculpture begins with a set of designed forms that I have referred to as urban places. The urban place is the largest context in the series; it is said to be large in terms of the distance between the body of a work and the boundary of the place. In the urban place, the distance between a work and the boundary of the place is the greatest in magnitude.

The components of the second set of places (niches) in the series are much smaller than urban places. That is, the distance between the body of a work and the boundary of the place is considerably smaller in magnitude in relation to the first place in the series. In this sense, the first two sets of places for sculpture are progressively contracting, clearly defined contexts.

The third set of places is not defined in terms of the material body of a work of sculpture. What is important here is that the individual work is not its own boundary in the

t[illegible] of placement. A boundary is always taken to be s[illegible]thing other than the work itself. In the third set of places, the body of a work as a boundary is digressed and co-present objects that are in the immediate vicinity of a work serve to define the boundary of the place. Co-present objects are boundary markers if they influence the manners in which the work appears and are themselves influenced by the work. The critical vantage point is that of a spectator who moves in and around the immediate vicinity of the work.

In the third set of places as well as in the former two sets, the distance between the work and the boundary will vary in accordance with the example under discussion. In the third set, however, the boundary is not a closed and continuous formation a row of buildings, a wall, the frame of a n[illegible]he but is, as I have noted, a free-standing object that determines the magnitude of the place.

The second and third kinds of places may be found within the first kind of place: a niche or a work in relation to a free-standing co-present object can occupy an urban place. However, an urban place cannot occupy a niche nor a member of the third set. Moreover, a niche cannot occupy a member of the third set and vice versa. In short, the paradigmatic places for sculpture may be combined in an extremely limited fashion.

In the first instance, I have referred [illegible]he urban environment. As an object of study, the urban environment is ill-defined and, for the most part, an ambiguous space. To

claim that sculpture has a place in the urban environment is to make an inexact and awkward claim. In fact, one cannot develop a theory of placement on this level of analysis since the relationship between the work and the place is general and vague. For instance, a sculpture that is in the urban environment is in a single, undifferentiated expanse or an anonymous space. On this level of analysis, one cannot specify a boundary or co-present objects. As I have pointed out, one must recognize that there are urban places in the urban environment and that these places are distinct formations.

What is sorely absent in the attempt to think of place in terms of the relationship between sculpture and the urban environment is a mediating set of forms. The constituent designed spaces or the urban places of the urban environment enable us to speak with some accuracy about where works of sculpture are found. The skeptic denies the mediating set of forms by treating the urban environment as a homogeneous space or fabric. From his standpoint, there are no places for sculpture because there are no places. On the other hand, the mediating set of forms gives the urban environment some degree of heterogeneity. For instance, with respect to outdoor spaces, the piazza and the park are common places; with respect to indoor spaces, the galleria and the atrium are well-known places. On both diachronic and synchronic axes of analysis, such built formations constitute the places of and for sculpture. The conjunction is important

since it indicates that the presence of sculpture in urban places. I have limited my inquiry to outdoor places. It is a historical commonplace that has persisted and become definitive. What is defined is the type of place that continues to accomodate sculptures. There are, of course, various types of piazze and parks. A further inquiry into these types of places would reveal, I suspect, a finite number of geometrical variations and topological invariances. But such an inquiry is best left to the historian of urban design or the urban geographer. The philosophical point is the location of urban places as places for sculpture in-between the individual work and the all-inclusive urban environment.

The piazza, the park, and the plaza, then, are common places and common places for sculpture. It is only at this point in the theory of placement that we may fully appreciate the canon which pertains to urban places. There are urban places which are common kinds of designed formations in the urban environment. By identifying such places, I have demonstrated (against the sceptic) that the urban environment is not placeless. Such urban places are common places for sculpture. Sculpture has and will continue to find an appropriate place in urban places. There are elements of history (having found an appropriate place), contemporaneity (having an appropriate place), and prediction (will have an appropriate place) in the canon. It is incorrect, however, to state that all sculpture that

occupies an urban place is *a priori* appropriately placed. To the extent that the second and third kinds of places may be found in urban places, we must recognize that: a) sculpture that is found in the second and third kinds of places is not always appropriately placed; b) if a work is inappropriately placed in the second or third kinds of places and these places are in urban places, then a work is inappropriately placed and not, to be sure, appropriately placed merely in virtue of being in an urban place. Urban places may be appropriate places for sculpture by example, convention, and the canons of placement that pertain to the second and third sets of places. But the appropriateness of urban places does not override inappropriate placements in niches and works that are set in relation to free-standing co-present objects if the latter are found in urban places. As I pointed out in Chapter IV with respect to the material thesis and "crowding," an urban place cannot be said to be appropriate on the sole ground that the material thesis obtains nor can it be correctly asserted that the placement of a work in an urban place is appropriate if a spectator cannot experience an aspect of the work (if such a work is designed so that the inaccessible aspect must be experienced if one is to appreciate it).

As we have seen, the urban place as a common place for sculpture served to dispel the notion that the urban realm had been reduced to a ubiquitous placelessness and that sculpture, as a part of such a non-place, had lost its

place. Let us consider a work by the German-Mexican sculptor Mathias Goeritz. The *Ciudad Satelite:Five Towers* (1957-58) in "The Square of the Five Towers" some 9 miles outside of Mexico City, is an urban place that has been displaced from the city and built in a barren landscape. The work is in a square that is set in-between two sections of the highway to Mexico City. As its name suggests, *Five Towers* is a satellite city of sorts. The work is much like the "downtown" core of an urban center on a smaller scale. This work of sculpture is located on a barren stretch of highway but is at one and the same time a model of a built place (towers in a square) and a work that is placed in the center of a roadway much like a monument. The place of the work is familiar but disconcerting. There are no free-standing co-present objects with the work. The vehicular traffic, while at times heavy, for the most part moves past this strange skyline. The towering pylons are intramarginally placed in the square; what is co-present with the work for a spectator who moves in and around the pylons is the square. It is the square that defines the limits of the work and is itself defined by the pylons to the extent that it becomes a plaza (the pedestrian space before and between buildings). The white, yellow, and orange pylons form a variety of overlapping rectangular masses and quadrilateral apices that are accessible from intercolumnar spaces as well as from varying distances outside the square. The work is a skyline in-the-round that may only be fully experienced by a

spectator who moves in its place and in so doing overcomes the delimiting notion of the skyline as facade. The all-roundedness of the work is marked by a distinct border that defines its place. Goeritz' complex work can accomodate the appropriate placement of other works of sculpture since the plaza that it has opened up is a place for sculpture. The square can become a plaza because of the essential ambiguity between the pylons as parts of a work of sculpture and their obvious resemblance to "towers" or "buildings."

The position of the sceptic threatens the basic understanding of the niche as a place for sculpture. Although he recognizes that the niche is defined in terms of sculpture and place, he maintains that the niche is no place for sculpture. For the sceptic, the niche is a frame that makes no positive contribution to an individual work. The niche is irrelevant since the sceptic holds that there is nothing beyond the material body of a work that is aesthetically significant in one's experience of a work. Since the niche is a place, place is aesthetically irrelevant.

What is evident in one's experience of a sculpture in a niche is that the niche is co-present with the work. The work, let us say, is in its niche. If we inquire further into the manners in which the niche can be said to be co-present with the work, we will discover various kinds of niches: those that are closed on the back and those that are open on the back. In terms of the relationship between a

work and its co-present niche, close inspection reveals several features of boundedness: embeddedness, centrality, and peripherality. Moreover, every work has a design that must be understood in relation to the kind of niche and the features of niche-boundedness. As I have elaborated in Chapter III, it is through the use of my second canon that a niche-bound work can be shown to be appropriately or inappropriately placed. If one does not examine the components of my canon and apply them to individual works, then one is lead to the sceptic's position since the niche seems to be a place for sculpture only in virtue of an architectural definition. By appealing to my second canon, the sceptic's use of the niche is shown to be an inappropriate generalization that mistakenly precludes a theory of placement.

I have indicated that the niche is aesthetically relevant to the experience of sculpture in so far as we recognize that it is not simply in virtue of an architectural definition that the niche is aesthetically relevant. One must think from the definition rather than simply declare that the definition can stand on its own. The aesthetic relevance of the niche becomes apparent if one considers that the niche influences our experience of works of sculpture. In showing that some works are inappropriately placed in niches and appropriately placed in niches but inappropriately embedded, we may come to see how it is that placement influences the aesthetic properties of a work. For

instance, if a sculpture in-the-round is centrally embedded, I would claim that it is inappropriately placed. However, I also want to claim that the perceptual properties of the work are (obviously) influenced in a negative way in this case since the work is designed to be seen in-the-round. One might claim that the property or feature of embeddedness (central) engenders incorrect aesthetic judgments about the work. In fact, in order to appreciate the work correctly it must be displaced from its niche. In order to correctly appreciate the work (or realize that the work cannot be correctly appreciated in its current place), one must have some knowledge of the canon that pertains to niche-boundedness. If, like the sceptic, one denies that such knowledge is relevant (or simply does not possess such knowledge), then one cannot correctly appreciate works of sculpture that are found in niches and, for that matter, one cannot correctly appreciate works that are in other architectural contexts. In this respect, the sceptic must recognize the aesthetic significance of places such as niches in the correct experience of works of sculpture.

My investigation into the geometrical features of niche-bound works adumbrates a further line of inquiry into related space-cells and forms. While the niche discussion showed that one cannot simply refer to niche-boundedness at large, it is equally certain that "enthroned" works require similar analyses. For example, Michelangelo's *Moses* (c. 1515) in the San Pietro in Vincoli (Rome) is peripherally

embedded in an elaborate architectural throne. From a frontal position, the left leg and shoulder of the work are turned outwards while the right leg and shoulder move back into the throne. The head of the figure appears to face the wall on the right side of the throne. The work is inappropriately placed as a peripherally embedded figure. This does not mean that *Moses* shold be centrally embedded. On the contrary, the work should not be embedded in either way. Although *Moses* is not a sculpture in-the-round, the manner in which the work turns towards the right indicates that it should be seen in front of a space-cell that is the obverse of the throne. That is, the throne must become a solid, rectangular mass which protrudes from the wall. Since *Moses* is appropriately placed in a position in which it is accessible from all positions except the rear, the solid, space-cell enables one to experience the work from at least full frontal and lateral positions. In this placement the turn of the figure becomes accessible.

The third set in the series consists of places that are determined by the positions that a spectator may take up in the immediate vicinity of a work and a free-standing co-present object. The theoretical problem that is addressed in what I have called a schematic of the place is the nature of the interrelationships between a free-standing sculpture in-the-round and a free-standing co-present object. The schematic is used to unpack the notion of the interrelationships between two autonomous objects by

introducing a third factor into the context: the spectator. Rather than simply positing interrelationships, I have explained what these interrelationship are and how two autonomous objects can be said to interrelate. If one fails to offer an explanation of interrelationships, the notion can take on an air of mystery in as much as it appears that one must possess a special sensibility in order to experience them. On the other hand, one might use the notion of an interrelationship to support a claim without explaining the initial notion on which the claim rests. In short, an interrelationship might become a wild card in theoretical discussions of contexts. In the schematic, however, there are no mysteries. The relationships or connections between two or more objects are established by the changing points of view of a spectator. For instance, in the immediate vicinity of a work there is, let us say, a free-standing object. The schematic accounts for the motion parallax effects for a spectator who changes his position relative to the two objects. The apparent displacements of the objects and the manifold appearances of the objects are the interrelationships of the place or, alternatively, the place-relations of the context. The schematic is a description of the connected experiences of a spectator in the place of a work.

The schematic is a canon that one may appeal to in order to give an exacting description of the place of a work and avoid giving an insufficient description of a work in

relation to a co-present object. The appeal may appear in the form of a reconsideration of a description that is given from a fixed position. A description that is insufficient may result in an aesthetic judgment about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a placement that is incorrect. For example, there is a sculpture in-the-round that is set in relation to a co-present object. The work is in the foreground while the co-present object is in the immediate background. On this frontal view, the work might be inappropriately placed because it appears as if the co-present object would impede one's access to an aspect of the work. It is not clear, from a single perspective, if the co-present object is in fact an impediment. In short, the "crowding" thesis is posited without the mobility of the subject. In this case, the mobility of the subject is important since one can approach the work and in so doing validate or invalidate the claim by attempting to experience the aspect of the work that was supposedly inaccessible. The original claim is subject, of course, to certain perceptual effects such as the size of the work and the size of the co-present object, one's inability to see the back side of the work, and one's inability to see all of the front of the co-present object. At a more basic level, what was said to be co-present may be a part of the work since the potential point of contact between the "two" forms cannot be seen from a frontal position. In this example, one may use the schematic to verify or falsify a judgment about the

placement of a work.

The schematic also establishes a boundary where no obvious boundary exists. The place, as I have already indicated, is circumscribed by the mutual influences of work and object for a spectator. By establishing a boundary, I have shown that place is not a vague expanse that might very well include anything that one desires to find in it. The schematic illustrates, against the sceptic's general claim that one cannot give a rigorous account of place and the theoretical challenge to account for interrelationships in a clearly defined context, that to speak of the place of a work together with a free-standing object is not only intuitively correct but can be fully elaborated and made explicit.

The accounts of the places of Picasso's monumental concrete sculptures provides us with some insight into the role that place can play in the placement and execution of sculptures. As Sally Fairweather explains in *Picasso's Concrete Sculptures*, all of Picasso's monumental works were executed, with Picasso's permissio , by the Norwegian artist Carl Nesjar.[5] Each of Picasso's original painted cardboard and metal maquettes were photographed by Nesjar and together with a photograph of the proposed place of each work, combined to produce a photomontage of each work in its place. Picasso was then presented with a photomontage of a proposed place with the work for that place that he was

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[5] See Sally Fairweather, *Picasso's Concrete Sculptures* (New York: Hudson Hills Press, 1982).

asked to approve. For instance, *Sylvette* (1970), Rotterdam, which is placed in front of the Bouwcentrum (Building Center) tower (across from the train station) in an area of heavy pedestrian traffic, was found to be a particularly appropriate place by Picasso. What can one say about the place of *Sylvette*?

First, the work is located in a common place for sculpture: on the walk to a building. In Holland, however, it is government policy to reserve a part of the cost of a new building for works of art - especially sculpture. In this respect, sculpture has become an integral and appropriate part of the architectonic of Holland's urban centers. Secondly, the relationship between the Bouwcentrum as a Building Center that is known for its exhibitions of new building materials and *Sylvette* recalls the material thesis that I discussed in Chapter IV. It was Nesjar's use of Betograve or concrete engraving that first attracted Picasso to Nesjar's proposals. Since the Bouwcentrum is a center for innovative construction, the work, perhaps in Picasso's eyes, is appropriately placed since it is the result of an innovative sculptural technique. But as I indicated in Chapter IV, the material thesis is a supplementary point of interpretation. Thirdly, it is not clear from the photomontage that the work is a sculpture in-the-round. Although this would have been perfectly evident to Picasso and Nesjar, the photomontage is misleading. What is clear is that the work is free-standing.

When the actual work is seen against the background of the Bouwcentrum from a frontal position it appears to be a flat, free-standing, two-dimensional engraving on a wall. As one moves around the work, it becomes apparent that the engravings appear on the back and not on the edges; that the concrete is moulded in such a way that it can be seen to be a curved form with a series of rounded protrusions that are set at slight angles to the frontal plane of the work; the work appears to the left of a tree from a frontal position; it appears in the foreground against the background of the tree and a series of streetlamps from another line of sight; from the line of sight just elaborated, the work appears in a profile of blank edges, rounded protrusive parts and markings which vanish with the curves of the work; as one moves in and around the place of *Sylvette*, there are a variety of ways of experiencing the work that are necessary for an understanding of its three-dimensionality and all-roundedness. The co-present objects do not impede one's access to the work. They appear as elements in the composition of the place as relational invariances for a spectator who moves in and around the place of the work. There are, of course, relational variances given that the work is in an area of heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic. In short, it is through the schematic that we may come to appreciate the work in its urban place.

The place of sculpture is by no means an enigmatic concept. What I have shown is that the position of the

sceptic is clearly mistaken. It is not the case that a judgment about the placement of a sculpture must remain at the level of a *hunch* or a good or bad *fit*. I have shown what places are and how to appreciate the works of sculpture in them. As I indicated in Chapter I, what is co-present with a work constitutes the place of the work. The co-present as an attached or detached formation proved to be essential to the correct appreciation of works of sculpture. The relevance of the co-present is denied by the sceptic. For him, a work must be isolated and considered in itself. The isolation of works from their places such that they might be placed anywhere is an unacceptable position given the mutual influences of the co-present and the work for a spectator. I have demonstrated that one must have a theory of placement in order to correctly appreciate works of sculpture. Since the sceptic thinks that such a theory cannot be formulated, he cannot correctly appreciate works of sculpture. And one, I should think, that makes incorrect aesthetic judgments has very little of interest to say about sculpture.

In the formulation of the theory of placement, I examined the place-concepts of Krauss, Ruskin, Martin, and Read with a view to presenting a series of three paradigmatic places for sculpture. I developed a canon for each place and explained the spatial combinations of the places and concatenations of the canons. In so doing I discovered what one must be aware of in order to specify what it is about a placement that makes it appropriate or

inappropriate.

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