34497

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR_____

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE_____

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ_____ University of Alberta _____

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE_____

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADE_____

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE_____

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
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COMPARATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT:
WESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE MODELS AND
SOVIET DISSENT LITERATURE


BY


(C) Lyn M. Tait


A Thesis

Submitted To The Faculty Of Graduate Studies And Research

In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree

Of Master Of Arts

In

East European And Soviet Studies


DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DIVISION OF EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES


Edmonton, Alberta
Fall, 1977

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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Date: 28 September 1977

ABSTRACT

Soviet studies in the West has moved from an area-study approach to the use of comparative frameworks to examine the Soviet Union. With the acceptance of the comparative approach, models designed to explore Soviet government became common. This paper reviews the major models that have been applied in the field of Soviet studies: the totalitarian, bureaucratic, Kremlinological, interest group, and modernization models. The basic premises of each model are presented and discussion about the model is summarized.

Terms used by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Andrei Amalrik to describe the Soviet system are discussed. Despite differences in ideological positions, these four dissidents describe the Soviet Union in similar terms, tending to emphasize totalitarian and bureaucratic features of the regime.

A comparison of the writings of Soviet dissidents and models developed by western social scientists reveals both similarities and differences. The terms used by Soviet dissidents to describe the Soviet regime are not in contradiction to the conclusions of many western social scientists. However, there are distinctive differences between western and Soviet writings, especially with regard to purpose of writing and methodology. While western social scientists generally employ comparative methods of analysis emphasizing similarities between the Soviet Union and the West, dissidents stress totalitarian feautres of the Soviet regime. There is a definite lack of objective study by dissidents who are so emotionally involved in the issues about which they are writing. It is the scientific approach and use of comparative methodolog, which makes western writing on the Soviet Union so different from Soviet political literature.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# Table of Contents

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION


A current debate in the field of communist studies in western
countries focuses on the relationship of communist studies to the aca-
demic disciplines. During the early years of the development of commu-
nist studies, investigation o  Soviet and East European governments was
generally conducted within the boundaries of area studies. This approach
viewed the communist systems as unique. Because of this belief that
communist systems were not comparable with other systems, and in order
to answer the needs of the western governments who were unfamiliar with
communist regimes, the area study approach received support and became
very popular.

It is widely recognized that the dominance of area studies was a
valuable and necessary contribution to the development of communist
studies.[1]  However, there are several problems identified with that
approach. Although area study does allow one to amass data in various
fields, it tends to study the communist system as abstracted from the
international arena, and it stresses the uniqueness of the Soviet Union.
One of the major weaknesses of the area study approach was its failure
to raise questions about communist systems; communist governments were
accepted on the basis of their ideology, and very little critical analysis
was initiated. Scholarship tended toward an indiscriminate collection
of data or to an exposition of theoretical considerations. For many
years, the area study approach isolated itself from methodological
advances in the academic disciplines, creating a significant gap, which

has been referred to by Walter    queur as a "communications gap".[2]

Scholars began to recognize similarities between communist systems and non-communist regimes and to admit a growing diversity in the communist camp.[3] Consequently, new frameworks and approaches were needed for analysis of communist governments. Turning to the discipline of political science, the scholars of the area studies began to borrow concepts from comparative analysis. Concern for methodology resulted in an effort to draw communist studies into a comparative framework.

The incorporation of communist studies into comparative studies represented a definite attempt to merge communist studies with the discipline of political science, rather than allowing it to remain on the edge of the discipline, as had been the case with the earlier area studies approach. As a result of this move, there has been an attempt to apply the tools developed by political scientists to the field of communist studies. This was done in order to obtain more objective, more reliable results, and to deal with the mass of data and descriptive material that was garnered with no particular method or exposed to no particular systematic analysis.

However, the adoption and application of tools and concepts belonging to the discipline of political science have caused, confusion and difficulty for specialists in the communist field. These scholars have not always been familiar with or trained in the use of these terms. Consequently, there is much diversity in the field of communist studies today, and much energy and brain power are wasted in debating concepts and terminology that have been misunderstood and incorrectly applied.

Among the concepts borrowed from comparative political analysis, there are three in particular that are often misused: model, theory,

and ideal type. Although this paper deals primarily with models of Soviet government, a brief discussion of the three terms is necessary in order to clarify their usage in further analyses.

Although the definition of a theory depends on the context in which it is defined, this term can be described as follows: "T is a theory relative to the context, if and only if T is a set of propositions that (depends on the context) is (was, might have been, and so forth) not known to be true or to be false but believed to be somewhat plausible, potentially explanatory, relatively fundamental, and somewhat integrated."[4]. A theory is composed of assumptions and statements as well as generalizations (which may be empirically tested) about the system or phenomenon being described.

Although, as one author points out, an ideal type and a theory are similar in that both are "meant to serve as an interpretive or explanatory schema embodying a set of 'general empirical rules' which establish 'subjectively meaningful connections between different aspects of some kind of phenomenon, such as rational economic behavior, a capitalistic society...or the like",[5] there are qualities of the ideal type which are unique from those found in the theory. Consider, for example, Stephen Wasby's definition of an ideal type, which underlines the capacity of an ideal type to serve as a basis for comparative measurement in order to determine the degree of development in a given situation or country. He states that an ideal type is:

> ...a logical construct the purpose of which is
> to identify clearly, by simplifying, significant
>   pects of an event or institution. The ideal
> type, although "never found in reality, being
> ideal precisely in the sense that it is an ab-
> straction, accentuation, and extension of rela-
> tions found in social life",[6] provides us with

> a useful baseline against which to judge and ex-
> plain phenomena. Sometimes the ideal type is re-
> ferred to as an "extreme" or "polar" type, parti-
> cularly when used in pairs or apposites.[7]

Unfortunately, the term "model" has been one of the concepts most abused by researchers in the communist field. There is no general agreement on the definition or use of a model in either the discipline of political science or in that of communist studies. In the discipline of political science, however, there seems to be more consensus on the matter as scholars attempt to demonstrate the origins of the model in the physical sciences and to point out the benefits which accrue to the social sciences in adopting this method of analysis. One example of a more or less generally accepted approach in political science is given by Peter Achinstein in his work, Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis.[8] He distinguishes between three kinds of models.

Firstly, he describes the representational model as a three-dimensional physical representation which is not symbolic of the original, but rather a reproduction of it.[9]

Secondly, there is the imaginary model, which is based on assumptions of the proponent of the model, although the designer of the model is not necessarily committed to the truth of these assumptions. The purpose of the model is to show that a given described condition is plausible if certain conditions are previously fulfilled.[10]

It is his treatment of the third or theoretical model, however, which is most significant to the social sciences and provides a building tool for political analysis and investigation. He notes five points concerning the theoretical model, which, when examined, reveal its characteristics and use:

(a) The theoretical model is a set of assumptions concerning a given object or a system.

(b) The object or system examined is given a structure or composition which is intended to explain obvious properties of the object or system--it is an attempt to determine the essence of the system or object, to go beyond the mere cataloguing of observable characteristics and discover the causation of discernible traits.

(c) The theoretical model is designed for a definite purpose, and in order to accomplish this purpose, the model is a simplified version of reality. This explains why there is more than one model of the same phenomenon. In order to facilitate explanation of different functions and properties of the object or system, the theoretical model is deliberately less complex than reality, designed to present the most important features of the object or system. The model is a means of finding order in the chaotic complexities of the every-day world, of "separating the significant from the milieu".[11] Since it serves as a guide to indicate significant research, the model is a valuable tool of research in the social sciences. Thus it is generally designed to account for and deal with the most significant factor(s) of the real situation and represent the main relationship(s) which results from an interplay of these factors.

(d) The theoretical model is designed within the boundaries of a general theory. General properties or theories of behavior which have been more or less proven are taken into account. Such a model does not build castles in the air, but within the boundaries

of established work; the abstraction of conditions and character-
istics is limited.

(e)     Finally, Achinstein asserts that the theoretical model may be
        formulated on the basis of an analogy between the given object or
        system and another object or system being examined to the object
        or system being designed.[12]

This treatment of models clearly shows the derivation of this con-
cept from the physical sciences, and also provides a strict interpreta-
tion of their function and use. Another definition, adapted to the so-
cial sciences yet incorporating the main points of Achinstein's work, is
advanced by George Graham in his book, Methodological Foundations for
Political Analysis: "A model is an abstraction of reality that is devel-
oped for presenting systematically the most important relationships in a
situation being described."[13]  This definition, as well as Achinstein's,
clearly underlines the purpose and advantages of employing a model in
social science research.

It is generally accepted that a model provides a framework for
analysis, allowing the researcher to systematically deal with the neces-
sary data.  Use of a model facilitates the processing of quantitative
material by simplifying relationships from reality and making them readi-
ly understandable.  The employment of a model in analysis helps the re-
searcher to set out his assumptions and biases in an attempt to give a
measure of objectivity to the investigation being carried out.  Such
systematic treatment of information and data helps to avoid clogging re-
search with personal values.

These are some of the advantages to be gained from employing models in social science research. It was with the intention of embracing these benefits that scholars in communist studies began the construction of models. While the discipline of political science usually employs a more rigid defintion of a model, scholars in communist studies adopt a wider definition of the word, and often the definition varies according to the personal interpretation of the author.

Alex Inkeles offers a concept of a model which is very broad: "...most social scientists approach the subject they are studying with some kind of conceptual scheme which we may call a model."[14] His definition is so unstructured that he refuses to consider any model as either right or wrong, but classifies them merely as richer or poorer.[15] This definition of a model seems to be no more than an identification of the perspective (biases) of an author, and Inkeles does not deal with the conscious formulation of a model on the part of the researcher. While a model may facilitate identification of biases, this is not its exclusive characteristic.

In contrast to Inkeles' description of a model as a representation of a piece of the truth, Alexander Dallin describes models as fictions.[16] He insists that a model is designed for the analysis of immediate events, and is not necessarily structured to account for future developments. In his presentation, he ignores what some students regard as one function of a model--a cap    to predict. Instead, he asserts that, "We too easily forget that models are necessarily fictions and are valuable as heuristic devices, not as ir   s of the Soviet system, and are not endowed with predictive attri   s."[17]

Frederic Fleron advances this somewhat ambiguous definition:

> Two theories whose laws have the same form are
> isomorphic or structurally similar to each other.
> If the laws of one theory have the same form as
> the laws of another theory, then one may be said
> to be a model for the other.[18]
> [Emphasis in the original].

In a book designed to clarify the confusion over concepts, Fleron has only contributed to the muddle of terminology. For example, his criticism of the totalitarian model is based on the premise that, according to his strict interpretation, this so-called model might not even be a model. He wastes much space and energy playing with this idea, although he seems to have confused the distinction between a model and a theory. His conclusion that "all models are theories..., but not all theories are models"[19] involves a reversal of terms and concepts that are generally established.[20]

It is evident, even from this small sampling, that there is much confusion in communist studies over the use of the term "model". It is a term that is widely used but which fails to have a commonly accepted meaning or application. The models of Soviet government, which are examined in the following chapters, are based on differing concepts of a model. However, the terms that the authors use to describe the Soviet Union are clear, and they all employ the framework of a model to point to the characteristics they feel are essential to understanding the system.

In this study, the terminology used by western political scientists to describe the Soviet system will be compared to the writings of Soviet dissenters on the same topic. An attempt will be made to determine the similarities and differences between these two bodies of literature

Chapter I

Endnotes

[1]Roger Kanet, The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 5. See also Charles Gati, ed., "Symposium on Communist Foreign Studies", Studies in Comparative Communism 8 (Spring-Summer 1975). pp. 3-65.

[2]Kanet, The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies, p. 5.

[3]Alfred Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems", Slavic Review 26 (March 1967), p. 12.

[4]Peter Achinstein, Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 129. [Hereafter cited as Concepts of Science].

[5]Carl Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Natural and the Social Sciences", in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Carl Hempel (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 5-6, as quoted in Frederic Fleron, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies", in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory, ed. Frederic Fleron (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 21. [Hereafter cited as Communist Studies and the Social Sciences].

[6]Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type", in Symposium on Sociological Theory, 2nd ed., ed. L. Gross (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 77, as quoted in Stephen Wasby, Political Science: The Discipline and its Dimensions (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp. 64-65.

[7]Wasby, Political Science: The Discipline and its Dimensions, pp. 64-65.

[8]Achinstein, Concepts of Science, pp. 211-216.

[9]Ibid., p. 211.

[10]Ibid., pp. 219-221.

[11]George Graham, Methodological Foundations for Political Analysis (Waltham, Massachusetts: Xerox Publishing, 1971), p. 114.

[12]Achinstein, Concepts of Science, pp. 212-216.

[13]Graham, Methodological Foundations for Political Analysis, p. 112.

[14]Alex Inkeles, "Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society", in The Soviet Political System, ed. Richard Cornell (New York: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 14.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Alexander Dallin, "Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR", Slavic Review 32 (September 1973), p. 570.

[17]Ibid.

[18]May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning, and Theories", in Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed. L. Gross, pp. 381-3, as quoted in Fleron, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies", p. 20.

[19]Fleron, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies", p. 20.

[20]Ibid., pp. 20-22.

# Chapter II

## THE TOTALITARIAN MODEL OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

### Introduction

The totalitarian model, the first model applied to the Soviet

government, has had much influence in the development of communist studies.

It dominated area studies of communist systems for almost twenty years.

Even when many alternative models of Soviet government were formulated,

there were still scholars who insisted on the viability of this model and

the possibility of revising it. This chapter will examine the development

of the totalitarian model representing the arguments advanced for its use

in the study of the Soviet Union and by discussing arguments for abandoning

the model.

### Early Development of the Concept of Totalitarianism:

The term "totalitarian" entered into popular usage in the late 30's

and early 40's, some ten years after Mussolini's first use of the word in

a speech on June 22, 1925.[1] The word soon appeared in western scholarship.

The 1939 meeting of the American Philosophical Society devoted a

symposium to the discussion of the totalitarian state,[2] where the

phenomenon of totalitarianism was investigated from both philosophic and

descriptive points of view. Published results of these proceedings attempted

to explain the rise of totalitarianism with reference to a number of forces

and movements of the twentieth century: industrialization, the rationalist

attack on and the subsequent decline of religion, and the rise of social

mobility.

11

According to Fritz Marx, editor of the proceedings, the crucial
question at this time in history becomes: "Will enlightened considera-
tion of individual self-interest translate itself autonomously into a
public morality firm enough to give promise of political stability?"[3]
He views the appearance of totalitarianism as a negative reply to this
question. He claims that man, encouraged to develop his individualism,
needed the security of totalitarianism in an era when faith and the
former security of the church were undermined.

The work in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
is significant not only because of the early date of the discussion, but
also because this discussion dealt with many of the features of totalitarian-
ism which became the main characteristics employed in describing
totalitarianism. The main points of the Society's work appear in the works
of Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Marx states that ideological proclamations are the pillars of the
Soviet totalitarian system. Yet, even at this early date, when many western
political scientists accepted the ideological proclamations at face value,
Marx identifies many of these statements as propaganda which the Soviet Union
is far from achieving. He states: "In fact, it seems today entirely probable
that the transition [dictatorship of the proletariat] will freeze into
permanency."[4]

Marx underlines the importance of the small elite group which controls
the totalitarian society and the necessity of the single leader who
represents the unity of purpose. Marx points out that the leader in the
regime becomes an embodiment of stability, helping to banish the fears of
citizens who are unable to cope with the twentieth-century emphasis on
individualism. A strong leader appeals to the people of the regime and

reinforces the unity of the country. Marx also emphasizes the Communist Party's role in the totalitarian regime: "The Party is the dynamic force, determining the general direction of State activity."[5] His discussion deals with Party organization and its attempt to control all sectors of the nation's activity. He concludes that a significant gap results between the Party organization and the workers.

It is ironic that even in this preliminary work which preceded the development of the totalitarian model, the problem encountered by the participants of the symposium was one still plaguing discussion of totalitarianism today--the problem of defining "totalitarianism". Herbert Heaton, at the close of the Symposium on the Totalitarian State, comments that, none of the papers presented had really forwarded a clear definition of totalitarianism.[6] However, his own discussion does little to clarify the concept. Having read Heaton's article, one is left with the impression that totalitarianism is the concept of an all-controlling state.[7] Yet, the author does not elaborate on this point and leaves the reader with an inadequate definition of the term.

Early development of the investigation of totalitarianism was profoundly influenced by Hannah Arendt's work in the area. Her massive study, The Origins of Totalitarianism,[8] was cited by Robert Tucker as a culminating synthesis of this entire trend of theory in the first stage."[9]

Arendt's approach to the subject does not differ drastically from that take     the scholars who participated in the Symposium on the Total           of the American Philosophical Society. However, Arendt present    a     more detailed and exhaustive description. Her discussion of totali        so under     several characteristics of totalitarian politics.

The most obvious of these themes is the concentration of power in the totalitarian regime. The following extract conveys the essence of her discussion on this topic:

> It is in the very nature of totalitarian regimes to demand unlimited power. Such power can only be secured if literally all men, without exception, are reliably dominated in every aspect of their life.[10]

Power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite to control the masses, according to Arendt. Terror becomes the basis of the totalitarian system and the means to annihilate individualism and achieve ideological goals.[11] Arendt describes this process as "merciless".[12]

Arendt's style and choice of descriptive words is criticized as being journalistic. Her work is cited as a blatant Cold War piece. Robert Burrowes, professor of New York University and reviewer of her revised work published in 1966, very bluntly states that, "...Arendt is not a social scientist."[13] Burrowes suggests that her formulation of a thesis from the Nazi experience and its application to Soviet Russia is not valid. He accuses her of disregarding data and of seriously marring her presentation with moralistic attitudes. This charge may not be unfounded. Consider, for example, Arendt's description of the emergence of totalitarianism as a process whereby "radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous."[14] She also refers to a "totalitarian virus".[15]

Arendt assumes that totalitarianism is a new, unique form of government which has developed new political institutions for the achievement of its own ends.[16] Therefore, Burrowes points out that Arendt's work cannot be used in comparative analysis with other non-communist writers.[17]

Arendt's examination of totalitarianism is somewhat blurred by her

reluctance to clearly define the term. In her introduction to Part Three, written for the revised edition published in 1966, she is content to repeatedly substitute the term "total domination" for "totalitarianism". She prefaces many sentences with "Totalitarianism is..." in order to describe the characteristics of the term; yet, she is unable to condense her rambling treatment of the subject into a concise, clear presentation of the concept. This weakens her work and leaves the reader with some vague notion of different aspects of totalitarianism, but unable to give a synopsis of Arendt's treatment of the topic without launching into a lengthy account of the consequences and implications of totalitarianism.

## The Totalitarian Model of Friedrich and Brzezinski:

The concept of totalitarianism in Soviet studies is usually associated with Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski's formulation of a syndrome of six factors which, taken together, isolate the phenomenon of totalitarian dictatorship. The six factors composing the syndrome are as follows: an official ideology; a single party typically dominated by one man; police control and the use of terror to maintain this control; a monopoly of arms and armed forces; a monopoly of communications; and a centrally controlled economy.[18] This totalitarian syndrome is used by Friedrich and Brzezinski as a basis for examination of the political processes in the Soviet Union.

The original totalitarian model constructed by Friedrich and Brzezinski relies very heavily on ideology and on the attempt of leaders in the Soviet Union to implement this ideological doctrine. According to this model, the emergence of the totalitarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union was the result of evolution from a combination of circumstances and not the result of conscious deliberate plans on the part of those who later emerged as

dictators. After the creation of the new regime, the concentration of power in the controlling group facilitated the maturation of totalitarianism.

Friedrich and Brzezinski are wary of attempting to explain precisely why totalitarian dictatorships emerge. Indeed, they admit their inadequacy in tackling this problem. They suggest that totalitarianism emerges upon a breakdown of ideology subsequent to the revolution which has promised the restoration of society. Because ideology pales in the face of reality, tactics of the government shift in an attempt to maintain the declared ideology of the movement at all costs. From this explanation of the maturation of totalitarianism, it is obvious that the authors consider ideology to be one of the most important, if not the most important, factors of the syndrome.

In this model, emphasis is also placed upon the power concentrated in the leaders of the regime, the use of this power to maintain their position, and the impact of this power on the individual and on the society. Police control, monopoly of communications, and the use of force to attain ideological goals are stressed. The regime is portrayed as being dependent upon the use of power and coercion, which is unrestrained by anything or anyone in the society.

The impact of the demands of the totalitarian regime is discussed in Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy but is more clearly depicted in Brzezinski's book, The Permanent Purge.[19] This book, which is really the companion to the first edition of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, has fallen into discredit. Its main thesis that the purge was an essential and permanent tactic of the totalitarian regime has been proven false by historical developments. Nevertheless, the

book is helpful in understanding a society ruled by a totalitarian government.

Brzezinski points out that this political system requires the total compliance of all citizens with established standards. Stating that, "...the totalitarian citizen cannot have a loyalty above that to his state and the party which directs it,"[20] Brzezinski declares that the totalitarian regime reduces man's role in society to that of a mechanized response to state demands.

Yet the appeal of the regime, in Brzezinski's assessment, lies in its provision of an escape from the turmoil and uncertainty of the twentieth century. He repeatedly stresses this point:

> For it holds out the vision of man free from the absorbing and shattering conflicts of Western society, from the contradictions and crises of our age, from the price which liberty and democracy, as institutionalized in our time, seem to extract from people. Totalitarianism holds out a glittering and, to many, appealing conception of a society in which man is not torn by conflicting allegiances, in which he does not suffer from insecurity, in which he belongs to something very tangible--the State, the Nation, the Party, the Leader, the Idea.[21]

On the basis of the totalitarian model, the authors predict very little further evolution of the Soviet political system. Although there may be a lessening of violence, and the régime may give the appearance of becoming more stable, Brzezinski warns that such a development should not be interpreted as fundamental change. The authors forecast that the dictatorship will continue and will become "more total, even though the rate of intensification may slow down."[22]

The totalitarian model was revised by Friedrich in 1965 and was republished under the same title, Totalitarian Dictatorship and

Autocracy.[23] The second edition adheres to the basic tenets of the

original work and, on the whole, there is no drastic revision or change.

Friedrich justifies this unaltered rendering of the topic with the

following explanation: "At present the Soviet Union still exhibits all

the criteria of totalitarian dictatorship, even though the extent of

terror may in some respects have dropped..."[24] Despite the addition of

chapters on autocracy, the judicial process, and totalitarian expansion,

the essence of the original work remains unchanged. The totalitarian

syndrome is still used as the backbone for examining the Soviet Union.

The basis of the work rests heavily on ideological considerations and

the power and coercion of the regime are still emphasized. This revised

model also predicts a continuation of the trends established in Stalin's

time--total domination of all aspects of the life of the ordinary citizen.

## Discussion of the Model

The totalitarian model has provided a basis for further study of

the political system of the Soviet Union. This provocative model has

initiated analysis and discussion, thereby contributing to an under-

standing of a system considered to be (at the time the model first

emerged) so different from and challenging to the western democratic

model. It accomplished this in part by presenting new perspectives on

the relationship between autocracy and totalitarianism and by delving

into an examination of the theory and practice of totalitarianism.

However, during the reign of the totalitarian model in Soviet

studies,[25] this model encountered many criticisms and incited much

debate in the field. It is worthwhile to review these criticisms in

order to develop a feeling for the evolution of Soviet studies and in

order to determine the attitudes of scholars in the field who eventually constructed numerous opposing models.

One of the major criticisms of practically all who encounter the totalitarian model is that the latter emphasizes very heavily the role of ideology and the desire of the leaders to attain ideological goals. Of course, it should be noted that at the time the model was constructed, there was little else beside ideology on which to build a concept of the Soviet political system.[26] The Soviet regime had only existed since 1917. Therefore, in trying to analyze the differences between the Soviet system and western politics, it was only logical to accept that motivation which the regime itself declared as most important--ideology.

It cannot be denied that ideology is a core issue of Friedrich and Brzezinski's presentation. One reviewer, Frederick Barghoorn, states that, "Friedrich and Brzezinski seem, on the whole, to regard 'ideology' as the most important element in totalitarianism."[27] Yet, despite the fact that ideology occupies much of the discussion in the book, the actual relationship of ideology to everyday life in a totalitarian regime and the trade-off between the pursuit of the goals of the leaders and the power considerations of the role are themes not adequately considered. This leads Robert Burrowes, one of the most comprehensive reviewers of the work of Friedrich and Brzezinski, to state that, "The principal shortcoming of the original edition of <u>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</u> is the absence of a solid core of theory."[28]

Their indeterminate, weak treatment of the relationship of ideology to totalitarianism results in confusion, and subsequently distorts their presentation. The example of this occurs in the discussion of the impact of totalitarianism on the ordinary citizen. Friedrich and Brzezinski

observe that the totalitarian regime offers meaning and security to

the people. However, the authors do not consider whether this offering

is unique to totalitarianism and they do not attempt to determine whether

this kind of security was available in the pre-totalitarian stage. Also,

they later stumble in their analysis with what appears to be a contradic-

tion of their former assertion regarding the security offered a citizen in

a totalitarian regime. They declare that constant change and striving

for advancement and progress within the regime strains the inhabitant of

the totalitarian system: "The totalitarian citizen in actuality thus

leads a highly nervous life. He is constantly striving to meet

unattainable goals. He lives in a constant state of animation."[29] This

contradiction is useful in illustrating the paradox in the ideological

certainty opposed by everyday striving to accommodate constant change.

But, it also shows a basic flaw in handling the topic.

Another criticism of the totalitarian model is that it is unsuited

to comparative analysis. Because the totalitarian model is designed to

explain only the differences between communist regimes and those in the

West, the model is inadequate in accounting for similarities between the

two systems. Alfred Meyer points out that the totalitarian model treats

communist systems as unique and groups together many incongruent systems.

He states:

> One of the reasons w      [the totalitarian
> model] is of limited   ulness is that it is
> a residual category, lumping together a
> variety of mass mobilization systems simply
> because they are neither constitutional nor
> traditional. Residual categories purvey false
> notions of sameness where in fact there is
> heterogenity. Moreover, the concept of
> totalitarianism implies that the systems to
> which we apply the term are unique. But this
> notion of uniqueness, I think, is an ethnocentric

myth which conceals innumerable precursor
systems in the Western World.[30]

A. H. Brown, in his article "Policy-Making in the Soviet Union",
emphasizes the same point in the following statement:

> It [the totalitarian model] also brings into
> sharp focus the differences between the Soviet
> political system and the political systems of
> Western Europe. It does nothing, however, to
> indicate the points of similarity.[31]

A very interesting criticism of the totalitarian model is discussed
in a recent publication, The Russians, by Hedrick Smith.[32] In a colorful
account of Russian society, he points out that the totalitarian model
does not discuss the human element in its depiction of Soviet society.
With a flair for identifying and describing the mood of the Russian
people, he notes an attitude in Soviet society which is overlooked in
the totalitarian model. He writes:

> For the notion of the totalitarian state, per-
> haps useful for political scientists as a bird's
> eye view of Soviet society, misses the human
> quotient. It conjures up the picture of robots
> living a regimented existence. Most of the
> time, it is true, the vast majority of Russians
> go through the motions of publicly observing the
> rules. But, privately, they are often exerting
> enormous efforts and practising uncommon
> ingenuity to bend or slip through those rules
> for their own personal ends. "Slipping through
> is our national pastime," a woman lawyer
> smilingly commented to me.[33]

Smith believes that the totalitarian model does not accommodate
this measure of rebellion, and it is thereby missing a very significant
factor in the makeup of this society.

The totalitarian model is also criticized for being pessimistic
and extreme in its presentation of the political system of the Soviet

Union. Barghoorn says that Friedrich and Brzezinski view Soviet society
"to be more a madhouse than a society".[34]   Ernest Pisko, in his article
"On the Future of Soviet Dictatorship", also identifies an overly
pessimistic forecast which foresees the Soviet government becoming more
"total" and, in the international sphere, increasing the possibility of
war.[35]

The gloomy overtones of the totalitarian model are mainly a product
of its predictions. The original model did not allow for change or the
possibility of development.[36]   And, by the time the second edition of
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy appeared in 1965, events in Eastern
Europe plainly illustrated that change does occur in communist systems and
that the western perception of communist regimes as monolithic was no
longer applicable. Also, it is evident that since the pro   s of de-
Stalinization, terror and its use have decreased in Soviet society.

Consequently, the important question of the relationship and
interpretation of the six factors to each other is raised. Therefore,
definition of totalitarianism in terms of a syndrome is also criticized.[37]
Burrowes comments on this method of defining totalitarianism:

> Unfortunately, a syndrome of identifying
> characteristics is not an adequate substitute
> for an explicit connotative definition; in the
> medical sciences, from which the term is
> borrowed; a syndrome identifes an otherwise
> defined pathology. The result, in the case
> of Friedrich and Brzezinski, is confusion and
> vagueness as to the essentially distinct
> nature of totalitarianism. The conceptual
> problem their approach creates is somewhat l
> that created by an attempt to convey the mea
> ing of an automobile solely by a description
> of its parts...[38]

There is some attempt to rectify this problem in the second edition edited by Friedrich who supplements the syndrome of six factors with his definition of totalitarian dictatorship as "an autocracy based upon modern technology and mass legitimation".[39] This is obviously an effort to compensate for the rigidity of the original model by diluting the term "totalitarian" in order to make the model applicable to recent developments. The result, however, is a further weakening of the presentation of the model.

Consequently, there is much confusion over the definition of totalitarianism. Frederic Fleron, in his article, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences," points out the uncertainty in defining the term. He states:

> ...I should like to raise some crucial questions which, in my opinion, must be resolved if we are to be able to salvage the concept 'totalitarianism'. Does totalitarianism differ from totalism only in terms of the MEANS [emphasis in the original] employed to achieve goals? Are Friedrich's and Brzezinski's six traits really defining characteristics of 'totalitarianism' or are they empirical generalizations about totalitarian systems implicitly defined in some other way?[40]

Under the onslaught of such criticisms, it is hardly surprising that both Friedrich and Brzezinski revised their views somewhat on the Soviet political system. Friedrich, even in the post '65 period, had a tendency to cling to the model of revised totalitarianism as still applicable to analysis of the Soviet Union. Restating the original syndrome, he names the following three factors as characteristic of totalitarianism: a totalist ideology; a single party committed to this ideology with the party usually being led by one man; a fully developed

secret police with monopolistic control of mass communications, operation-,

·al weapons, and all organizations (including economic enterprises).[41]

Significant by its absence is the factor of terror, which played

such an important role in the original model. Friedrich admits that this

factor had been over-emphasized in the model and he states: "We, too,

on the basis of numerous writings in the 1940's and 1950's overestimated·

the long range significance of this feature, even though we never gave it

the prominence which the writings of cold-war journalism insisted upon."[42]

Yet, Friedrich is still very defensive about the retention of this factor,

insisting that the form of terror employed in the Soviet regime has been

subtly changed into different forms of propaganda.[43] He asserts that

there is now reliance on psychic terror. Because the regime is now

securely established, it is possible to dispense with overt terror, and

substitute propaganda and group pressure in order to maintain the regime.

However, he also insists that, in this situation, ideology is still

influential.

> The fact that the rulers of totalitarian regimes
> are engaged in revising their ideologies is,
> therefore, an indication of the continuing
> influence of ideology, and not an argument
> against it.[44]

It appears that Friedrich is directly reacting to the criticism that

the original totalitarian model was too heavily based on ideology. In reply,

·he claims that ideology is important, and he even predicts that the

significance of ideology may increase. In an attempt to balance his

argument, Friedrich points out that rulers shape and remodel their ideology,

thereby proving that ideology is not only necessary, but also vital to the

maintenance of the regime.

The revisions in this article are much more dramatic than that of
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy in 1965, which is not a significant
re-working of the first edition. The factors of the syndrome are revised
to accommodate the different form of terror being used. He does admit
that there has been a loosening of controls, although he emphatically
points out that this cannot be considered a movement to liberalization.
Also, his interpretation of the concept of totalitarianism is a major
revision. He now accepts that totalitarianism is a relative category
and it is possible not only to speak of totalitarian regimes, but of the
degree of totalitarianism, and even of totalitarian trends in non-
totalitarian regimes. Friedrich defines this trend as follows:

> A totalitarian trend may be said to exist
> whenever one or another of the features of the
> totalitarian syndrome appear. One of them a
> monopoly of operationally effective weapons,
> seems to be fairly universally in the hands
> of modern governments. By weakening the
> institutional structure and the belief system
> of a pluralistic constitutional order, it
> paves the way for a totalitarian takeover, if
> conditions are ripe.[45]

This concession concerning the definition of totalitarianism makes
it applicab  to almost any regime. It virtually reduces the usefulness
of the term in analysis because it abandons an explicit meaning. From his
quotation on totalitarian trends given above, Friedrich rejects some of
the distinctive characteristics of totalitarianism. For example, although,
in the original work, the authors are hesitant to state exactly how
totalitarianism occurs, it is obvious that the combination of the six
factors of the syndrome marks a totalitarian regime. Friedrich's
admission that one of the factors may signal the beginning of the birth of
totalitarianism even in a pluralistic society introduces several questions:

What is the relationship of ideology to totalitarianism?; Because a total

ideology is definitely missing in a pluralistic society, is it proper to

label the appearance of one factor of the syndrome in this environment

as a totalitarian trend?; How can one tell when conditions are ripe for a

totalitarian takeover in a pluralistic society?

It would appear that in an attempt to defend the honor and

applicability of the totalitarian model, Friedrich has actually raised more

questions than he has answered.  It is, at best, an inadequate defence.

On the other hand, Brzezinski, co-author of <u>Totalitarian Dictator-</u>

<u>ship and Autocracy</u>, reconsiders his original adherence to the totalitarian

model, evaluates obvious changes in the Soviet Union since de-Stalinization

and recognizes the development of the Soviet Union.[46]  In an interesting

analysis of this development, he divides Soviet  history into four

distinct stages.  The 1917-28 period is analyzed as the time of consoli-

dated  power in the Party; the years  between 1928 and 1941 are described

as the Stalinist phase, the breakthrough of totalitarianism, and "the

all-out effort to destroy the basic institutions of the old order and to

construct at least the framework for the new".[47]  The years between 1945

and 1953 are viewed by Brzezinski as not unlike the preceding period,

although during this period, Stalin concentrated his power in the secret

police, state bureaucracy and the Party.  It is Brzezinski's treatment

of the Khrushchev period which is significant, and he describes it as

"... a certain maturation--and social acceptance--of the new order."[48]

The ground for the regime had been effectively ploughed and broken by

Stalinist tactics, and, as a result, the use of overt terror and coercion

was no longer necessary.[49]

Brzezinski's perception of the Soviet Union underwent  discernible

change.  In an article entitled "The Communist World in a New Phase", he

states:

> It is no longer a personal, autocratic totali-
> tarianism.  Increasingly it is a political system
> characterized by bureaucratization and emphasis
> on professional bureaucratic skills.[50]

He describes the Soviet Union as "a regime of clerks"[51] and, in his analysis,

he underlines the bureaucratic nature of the political system where power

and authority are concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite.

Brzezinski is still reluctant to recognize the possibility of

change being provoked from the grass roots of society.  However, his former

unwavering prediction that this situation is impossible alters.  He

suggests that:

> There is still some disruptive potential from
> below in Soviet society, particularly among some
> of the younger intellectuals, the peasants, and
> the non-Russian nationals.  These groups could
> perhaps be stimulated into a violent reaction
> against the system in the event of a breakdown
> within the leadership.[52]

The differing views of Friedrich and Brzezinski are representative

of the conflict which arose in the field of communist studies regarding

the totalitarian model.  There is no paucity of material on this issue, and

writers have aligned themselves into several groups.  A.H. Brown, in his

work Soviet Politics and Political Science,[53] discerns three possible

stances of writers with regard to the totalitarian model.  Firstly, there

are those who reject the concept as useless and irrelevant.  Secondly,

there is a group who considers that the totalitarian model is appropriate

in analysis of the Soviet Union.  The third group regards totalitarianism

as an ideal type.[54]

As convenient as these groupings may be for understanding the diverse views on totalitarianism today, it must be recognized that these groups are not mutually exclusive and that there are problems with categorizing some of the more significant writers on the totalitarian model.

The arguments of the first group, who reject the model are discussed above in the presentation of the criticisms of the totalitarian model.[55] Leonard Schapiro sums up this attack by identifying three main trends in the works of the anti-totalitarian writers.[56]

The term "totalitarian" was originally designed to starkly point out the differences between communist and western systems. As a result, some writers think the term is derived from the Cold War mentality. Alexander Dal'ın expresses this opinion in his writing:

> ...there remains the troubling circumstance that one finds an empirically observable congruence between the political temper of the times and the general thrust of dominant interpretations by specialists on the USSR. With some remarkable exceptions, not many specialists dealing with Soviet problems....have been entirely immune to the dominant currents of public opinion, public policy and public mood. It will not do to dismiss this as an accident or anti-fact. The kindest and I believe often correct way of looking at this congruence is to posit that the same things that generate changes in public outlook and policy--presumably new data or events--also stimulate changes in the experts' professional orientation.[57]

The second accusation of the anti-totalitarian group is that the model is historically limited and cannot account for changes in the Soviet Union since 1953. For example, Hannah Arendt, in the introduction to the 1968 edition of her book, Totalitarianism, states that although there are features usually associated with totalitarianism that still appear in the

Soviet Union--domination of one leader, the presence of the army and
their control and monopoly of armed force, the evidence of a kind of
purge still exercised in the system[58]--the system can no longer accurately
be described as totalitarian. She concludes: "It looks as though
nothing has changed, while in fact everything has changed."[59]  In her
analysis, the totalitarian era was equivalent to Stalinism, and it
ended with his death.[60]

The third argument of this anti-totalitarian group is that the model
dwells on the relationship between the ruled and the rulers, and is
therefore outdated in its approach.  It does not allow     hange
resulting from social and economic forces.

Benjamin Barber supports this third point of view,     aimi 3 that the
concept of totalitarianism is nothing more than a revived for  ᵒ   atism
threatening the rights of the individual.  He concludes:

> The unhappy truth is that the classic liberal
> paradigm conceived in terms of an abstract dualism
> between the atomized individual and the monolithic
> state has never been very useful in concrete
> analysis, and is almost entirely without
> relevance to the problems of contemporary politics;
> yet despite overt rejection by most political
> scientists, the model has been covertly revived
> in the concept of totalitarianism (in the statist
> element), perhaps because its pertinence to totalism
> has been largely unrecognized and its moribund
> conceptual antecedents thus mostly overlooked
> or ignored.[61]

The second group of writers are those who consider the model adequate
and necessary in the examination of the Soviet Union.  For example, John
Armstrong defends the concept of totalitarianism.  He admits that the term
"totalitarianism" has many varied meanings, but he insists that, "the
concept of a peculiar ideological drive for remaking human nature is

hardly dispensable, if only as a starting point for investigating its declining force in the Soviet system."[62]

Patrick O'Brien, in an article "On the Adequacy of Totalitarianism", also defends totalitarianism, and although he recognizes the debate over the validity of the term employed as a model, he is loath to abandon it altogether.

> ...the term totalitarian is still apposite, not,
> it must be stressed, as a model for academic
> gamesmanship, but as a descriptive category to
> assist the Western student of politics in
> depicting for himself the nature of human experience
> in societies in which the demarcation line between
> "public" and "private" statements and actions is
> frequently blurred or non-existent.[63]

This is not a particularly strong argument for retention of the term. However, it is indicative of the tenacity with which some writers cling to the concept of totalitarianism. They assert that de-Stalinization and the basic characteristics of totalitarianism still appear in the Soviet Union today.

It is interesting to note that all adherents of the totalitarian model have accepted revisions. There are numerous examples of this[64] but generally, revisions follow the pattern established by Friedrich in his article "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends".[65] These writers recognize some change in the Soviet Union since the days of Stalin--either a change in the form of terror being used or change in the leadership. But, they say that change is not significant enough to warrant abandonment of the totalitarian model.

Other writers willing to accept the adequacy of the totalitarian model qualify their acceptance by applying this model to the era of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Robert Tucker is one such person who concludes:

> But are we now to discard the concept of
> totalitarianism as an obsolete or obsolescent
> category in modern political science?
> Considering it an essential part of our theoretical
> equipment, I for one would not like to see this
> happen.[66]

He proposes that this term is useful for examining the period of

Stalinism, but he suggests that the post-Stalinist period is a post-

totalitarian system.[67]

Arendt's opinion is much the same, although she is much more

vociferous about rejecting the validity of the totalitarian model in the

post-Stalinist period. Indeed, there are few scholars who completely

reject the use of the totalitarian model in communist studies. This

reluctance to entirely abandon the notion of totalitarianism has led to

the third school of thought which Brown cites as those who declare the

totalitarian model as an ideal type.

Jerzy Wjatr and Adam Przeworski, in an early publication on this

topic, outline the case for using the original totalitarian model as an

ideal type. They propose that:

> The case of totalitarianism should be considered
> separately. The use of the word 'totalitarian' to
> describe one clearly defined and well-stabilized
> political regime obscures both the basic ideological
> and socio-economic differences among the various
> 'totalitarian' regimes, and the fact that
> totalitarian phenomena appear in various political
> systems, under various conditions, etc. But if
> we use the term to describe an ideal type, we
> may then analyse totalitarian tendencies and/or
> elements in various regimes.[68]

They consider that use of the totalitarian model is constructed upon

the notion of the monolith. This obscures any differences among the

members of the Soviet bloc.  Wjatr and Przeworski describe the

totalitarian model as an ideal type in order to discuss Soviet develop-

ments.

A. H. Brown also identifies the muddle in communist studies over the

totalitarian model and proposes the construction of an ideal type as a

means of clarification.  He justifies his point of view:

> Just as one can compare any particular
> bureaucracy with its ideal type, so particular
> states can be examined in terms of their deviation
> from or proximity to a totalitarian ideal type.
> This is why the features of totalitarianism are
> best presented in stark and extreme form, for the
> alternative of constantly modifying what  the concept
> connotes so that particular states which one  has
> in mind--such as the Communist states generally
> or the  Soviet Union in particular--remain within
> the bounds of totalitarianism is both scientific-
> ally pointless and politically misleading.[69]

Brown points out that scholars in the communist field originally

perceived the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state.  When it became

evident that changes had occurred in the Soviet Union, rather than using

new tools for analysis, writers modified their  view of totalitarianism

to make it applicable.  Brown sees the solution to this dilemna as the

construction of an ideal type:

> ...an ideal typical totalitarian regime might be
> specified as one in which there is a monolithic
> party led by a dictatorial leader with total power
> over the political, economic and social instit-
> ions of the given society.  Such total control
> can only be achieved where there exist (i) a body
> of theory which professes to explain both history
> and contemporary society, thus providing a frame-
> work into which all social phenomena can be fitted;
> (ii) a political police force employing terror on
> a mass scale and thus bringing about an atomiza-
> tion of society; and (iii) the technological means
> to impose central control over an entire country
> (having in mind speed of transport and communications

modern mass media of information, and the
technical devices available to twentieth
century security forces). 70

Yet, after examination of Brown's formulation of the ideal type
of totalitarianism, a question, How does this description differ from
the original totalitarian model? must be raised. If we accept Brown's
formulation as a mere restatement of the original totalitarian model, then
we must accept his implication that the work of Friedrich and Brzesinski
was not a model, but an ideal type.

It is Fleron who illustrates the confusion following consideration
of the work of Friedrich and Brzezinski as a model when it may have been
only an ideal type. He states:

> Since there is very little in the way of an
> empirical theory of totalitarianism, it seems
> premature to talk of constructing models of
> totalitarianisms. One might wish to construct
> models of something else in order to suggest
> hypotheses about totalitarianism. For this
> reason, it appears strange that Friedrich and
> Brzezinski refer to their work as developing a
> MODEL of totalitarianism. Of course, they refer
> in other places to their work as a theory of
> totalitarianism. Clearly, they are not constructing
> a model in the present usage of that word. It
> is possible that they are merely using "model"
> and "theory" synonymously. Closer analysis may
> indicate that they have neither a model nor a
> theory, but really an ideal type of totalitarianism
> another construct to which the term "model"
> is sometimes applied. 71

Of course, Fleron's discussion of models, theories and ideal types
is clouded by his inexact treatment of model and theory. However, his
presentation of totalitarianism suggests that it be interpreted as an
ideal type and the totalitarian "model" cannot be considered as a model
because it does not exist in reality.

Obviously, the concept of totalitarianism is an unsolved question that still plagues scholars of communist studies today. It has been a major concept of Soviet studies, notably in the early years when area studies were popular. It has emphasized the differences between communist and western regimes. It served to draw attention to the ideology of the communist states and to the power centralized in the hands of a few leaders who desired to direct all the energies of the state and its citizens to the furthering of this ideology.

The model dominated the field during the Stalinist era, and it was only after de-Stalinization and the concurrent introduction of new concepts in western political science analysis, that alternative models for the Soviet Union were considered.

Despite the appearance of alternative models, however, discussion on totalitarianism is still prevalent today. Those who reject its usefulness are countered by a still-significant group who charge that the totalitarian model may be successfully revised. Perhaps the solution to this debate exists in accepting the recommendation of scholars who wish to reclassify the totalitarian model as an ideal type, making it historically applicable to the Stalinist era of Soviet development.

Chapter II

Endnotes

[1] Leonard Schapiro, _Totalitarianism_ (London: Pall Mall, 1972), p. 13; see also Herbert Spiro, "Totalitarianism", in _International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences_, ed. David Sills (New York: Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968; reprint ed., 1972), pp. 106-113.

[2] Fritz Morstein Marx, ed., "Symposium on the Totalitarian State", _Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society_ (Philadelphia) 82 (1940), pp. 1-102.

[3] Fritz Morstein Marx, "Totalitarian Politics", in "Symposium on the Totalitarian State", p. 1.

[4] _Ibid._, p. 3.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 16.

[6] _Ibid._, p. 36.

[7] _Ibid._, pp. 36-37.

[8] Hannah Arendt, _The Origins of Totalitarianism_ (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951).

[9] Robert Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism", _World Politics_ 17 (July 1965), pp. 555-556.

[10] Hannah Arendt, _Totalitarianism_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968), p. 154. This is the concluding section of her three-part work, _The Origins of Totalitarianism._

[11] _Ibid._, p. 164.

[12] _Ibid._, p. 176.

[13] Robert Burrowes, "Totalitarianism: The Revised Standard Version", _World Politics_ 21 (January 1969), p. 280. [Hereafter cited as "Totalitarianism"].

[14] Arendt, _Totalitarianism_, p. 157.

[15] _Ibid._, p. 4.

[16] Ibid., p. 159.

[17] Burrowes, "Totalitarianism", p. 281.

[18] Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 9-10.

[19] Zbignie  rzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism  ambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). [Hereafter cited as The Permanent Purge].

[20] Ibid., p. 1.

[21] Ibid., p. 2.

[22] Brzezinski and Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 300.

[23] Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed., rev. by Carl Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). In the preface to the second edition of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Friedrich claims that Brzezinski was unable to participate in the revision because of prior commitments.

[24] Ibid., p. viii.

[25] John Armstrong, in his article "Comments on Profesor Dallin's 'Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR' ", Slavic Review 32 (September 1973), pp. 560-576, introduces the possibility that maybe the totalitarian model never really was the paradigm of the field, and that historicism was. Yet, it is evident from reviewing the political literature of the 1950's and from noting the discussion of or reaction to the totalitarian model that the impact of this model on the field was profound.

[26] Ibid., p. 581.

[27] Frederick Barghoorn, review of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Political Science Quarterly (December 1957), p. 613.

[28] Burrowes, "Totalitarianism", p. 282.

[29] Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, p. 3.

[30] Alfred Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems",

<u>Slavic Review</u> 26 (March 1967), p. 12.

[31]A.H. Brown, "Policy-Making in the Soviet Union", <u>Soviet Studies</u> 23 (July 1971), p. 148.

[32]Hedrick Smith, <u>The Russians</u> (New York: Quadrangle; The New York Times Book Co., 1976).

[33]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[34]Barghoorn, review of <u>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</u>, p. 614.

[35]Ernest Pisko, "On the Future of Soviet Dictatorship", <u>Christian Science Monitor</u> (16 January 1957), p. 9.

[36]For example, see Chalmers Johnson, <u>Change in Communist Systems</u> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 2-3.

[37]It is interesting to note that Brzezinski, in an article which preceded his publication of <u>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</u>, made an attempt at a distinctive definition of totalitarianism which is, for some reason, abandoned in his work with Friedrich. Brzezinski states:

> Totalitarianism is a system where technically
> advanced instruments c. political power are
> wielded without restraint by centralized leader-
> ship of an elite movement, for the purpose of
> effecting a total social revolution, including
> the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain
> arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by
> the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced
> unanimity of the entire population.(Zbigniew Brzezinski,

"Totalitarianism and Rationality", <u>American Political Science Review</u> 50 (September 1956), p. 754.

[38]Burrowes, "Totalitarianism", p. 283.

[39]Friedrich and Brzezinski, <u>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</u>, 2nd ed., p. 4.

[40]Frederick Fleron, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies", in <u>Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodological and Empirical Theory</u>, ed. Frederick Fleron (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 18.

[41]Carl Friedrich, "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends", <u>Problems of Communism</u> 17 (May-June 1968), p. 37.

[42]Ibid., p. 39.

[43]Ibid., p. 40.

[44]Ibid., p. 39.

[45]Ibid., p. 43.

[46]See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Communist World in a New Phase", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (New York) 28 (April 1965), pp. 55-63.

[47]Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 69.

[48]Ibid., p. 70.

[49]Ibid., pp. 69-71.

[50]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Communist World in a New Phase", p. 57.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 417-418.

[53]A.H. Brown, Soviet Politics and Political Science (London: Macmillan, 1974).

[54]Ibid., p. 38.

[55]See pp. 18-22 of Chapter II.

[56]Schapiro, Totalitarianism, pp. 105-106.

[57]Dallin, "Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR", p. 565.

[58]She cites Khrushchev's removal of Zhukov after his manipulation to the top as an example. See Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. xvii.

[59]Ibid., p. xviii.

[60]Arendt bases this analysis on three main developments in the post-Stalinist period: (1) the revival of the arts, even though this was, for the main part, an underground occurrence; (2) the decline of terror; she notes that trials of dissidents, although not always public, are held and the accused frequently plead not guilty, which manifests a breakdown in the terror tactics of the regime; (3) a significant change in the balance of power between the army and the police; she states that the total state is a police state, whereas the modern state of the Soviet Union is characterized by the ascendency of the army. (See Arendt, <u>Totalitarianism</u>, pp. xvi.-xix). [It should be noted that her analysis is, in part, dated as it was written before the post-1966 period when the police were once again used to stem dissent.]

[61]Benjamin Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totalitarianism", in <u>Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views</u>, ed. Carl Friedrich <u>et al.</u> (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 33.

[62]Armstrong, "Comments on Professor Dallin's 'Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR' ", p. 581.

[63]Patrick O'Brien, "On the Adequacy of the Concept of Totalitarianism", <u>Studies in Comparative Communism</u> 3 (January 1970), p. 56.

[64]For examples, refer to the following:
Herbert Spiro, "Totalitarianism", pp. 106-112.
Richard Lowenthal, "Totalitarianism Reconsidered", <u>Commentary</u> 29 (June 1960), pp. 504-512.
Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in <u>Handbook of Political Science</u> 3, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 175-353.

[65]Friedrich, "Totalitarianism: Recent Trends"; see discussion pp. 23-25, Chapter II.

[66]Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism", p. 566.

[67]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 571.

[68]Jerzy Wjatr and Adam Przeworski, "Control Without Opposition", <u>Government and Opposition</u> 1 (January 1966), p. 230.

[69]Brown, <u>Soviet Politics and Political Science</u>, p. 39.

[70]<u>Ibid.</u>

[71]Fleron, "Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies", pp. 20-21.

Chapter III

COMPARATIVE MODELS OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

## Introduction

With the appearance of criticism of the totalitarian model, a search began for new approaches in the field of communist studies. The call for a comparative perspective in communist studies was raised in the 1960's, notably in the second half of the decade.[1] Dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model increased, and many scholars regarded comparative studies as a viable new approach to accommodate obvious changes in the communist sphere. In addition, the occurrence of the behavioral revolution in the social sciences was a contributing factor in the shift to the comparative approach. As the main disciplines changed focus, emphasizing empiricism, explanation of the behavior of systems, and establishment of general theoretical premises, so, too, communist studies eventually took a faltering step in this direction.

It cannot be denied that the behavioral revolution in communist studies was delayed somewhat. Rudolf Tokes, editor of a special issue of Studies in Comparative Communism devoted to the examination of the Science of Communist Politics, notes that behavioralism began to have an impact in communist studies just as it was beginning to lose momentum in political science. He states: "During the next ten years [mid-sixties to mid-seventies] this movement has refought every battle of the 1940's and 1950's, by 1975 arriving at about the same point as had the 'mother discipline' ten years ago."[2]

The concept of comparative studies, although now being re-examined and debated, is still very attractive to a large group of scholars in the communist field. Despite Rudolf Tokes' assertion that comparative communism "has failed to become an established subdiscipline",[3] the following argument of David Finley, in his contribution to the Symposium on Communist Foreign Policies, is representative of the conviction of many writers:

> Comparative method presents, it seems to me, some unique advantages to these ends, advantages that we can and should exploit. For theory-building, systematic comparison allows differences of consequence to be correlated with difference of process and circumstance. It allows us to identify crucial variations of structure and process and to separate them from incidentals; this to a degree of confidence which the case study, no matter how refined, cannot logically be expected to do. Through comparative study we can obtain bases for generalizations. At the same time, comparison implicitly puts to the test attendant temptations to deduce from principle which have so long been imprisoned in stereotypes. Further, because of their different ages and the different problem-clusters facing various Communist states, comparative study can suggest the developmental probabilities of Communist foreign policies, so far as domestic politics determine or condition them.[4]

As a result of this quest for a comparative approach in communist studies, a number of models employing comparative frameworks were designed to study the Soviet Union. This paper will examine four models commonly used in Soviet studies: the bureaucratic, Kremlinological, interest group, and modernization models. The bureaucratic model emphasizes the similarities between the functioning of the Soviet system and that of a western corporation or bureaucracy. While the Kremlinological model emphasizes the existence of power struggles in

the ruling elite of the Soviet Union, the interest group model focuses

on several groups in Soviet society which are related to the formulation

of policy.  The modernization model identifies several features and

patterns of development in Soviet society that are similar to those found

in western societies as industrialization and economic development were

pursued.  The basic tenets of each model will be presented, followed by

a brief summary of the academic discussion about the model as applied to

the Soviet Union.

## The Bureaucratic Model

A.    The Model:

One writer who has suggested a bureaucratic model of Soviet politics

is Alfred Meyer.  Reacting to the totalitarian model and its emphasis on

the uniqueness of the Soviet system, he attempts to find an alternative

model.  He presents his reasons for choosing the bureaucratic model in

the following passage:

> Like modern bureaucracy, Communistic rule is
> essentially an attempt to impose rational manage-
> ment over social life by means of complete organi-
> zation.  This attempt leads to the emergence of
> structural forms, political processes, psycho-
> logical adjustments as well as malfunctionings
> which make Communist systems look remarkably
> similar to bureaucratic organizations in other
> parts of the world.[5]

Meyer's oft-quoted statement--"...the USSR is best understood as a

large, complex bureaucracy comparable in its structure and functioning to

giant corporations, armies, government agencies and similar institutions...

in the West"[6]--constitutes the underlying theme which he expands and

explores in his work.  Describing the political structure of the Soviet

Union as authoritarian and controlled by an elite, Meyer suggests that

the Soviet Union's political system functions similarly to that of a modern bureaucracy. He finds several trends in the society which reinforce these bureaucratic tendencies. For example, Meyer cites the bureaucratization of power as a compensation for the Stalinist terror tactics and the growing dependence of Party officials on techno-crats.[7] These tendencies in the system contribute to the bureaucratic nature of the political system and the insurance that these patterns will be projected in future development.[8]

Meyer points out that acceptance of the bureaucratic model has two main implications which are relevant for the completion of his depiction of the Soviet Union in bureaucratic terms. Rejection of the notion that the Soviet Union is developing the characteristics of an open society is the first implication of accepting the bureaucratic description of the Soviet Union. Because of centralized control, standards, patterns of organization, and what Meyer describes as a uniform set of values, Meyer maintains that the Soviet society cannot be classified as open. He states that,"The bureaucratic ethos is incomparably stronger than the libertarian."[9] Secondly, Meyer declares that adherence to the bureau-cratic model dictates rejection of the totalitarian model as exclusively descriptive of Soviet government.[10] Critical of the totalitarian model, he suggests that bureaucratization is the essence of the Soviet system:

> The main reason, however, why I prefer the
> bureaucratic as against the totalitarian model
> of Communism is that the latter, if at all ade-
> quate, probably applies to Communist systems only
> for a limited period of their development, a period
> of growing pains, of system-building, a period
> devoted to the "primitive accumulation" of both
> the means of production and the authority to rule.[11]

Allen Kassoff's essay, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror",[12] also contributes to the literature on the bureaucratic model. He recognizes that many of the conventional patterns of analysis for the Soviet Union are borrowed from the Stalinist period and are no longer adequate. Consequently, he proposes a concept of the administered society which he defines in the following terms:

> The administered society can be defined as one in which an entrenched and extraordinarily powerful ruling group lays claim to ultimate and exclusive scientific knowledge of social and historical laws and is impelled by a belief not only in the practical desirability, but the moral necessity of planning, direction, and co-ordination from above in the name of human welfare and progress.[13]

He supports this description by discussing examples of social stratification, educational policy, controls in industry and agriculture, youth organization, literature and art, and sociology. He emphasizes that, although Khrushchev's changes after de-Stalinization appear to be reforms, they are actually necessary changes whose initiation was designed to maintain and increase the power and control of the administration. For example, in education, Kassoff cites the new provisions that require applicants for higher education to have worked or served in the armed forces as:

> ...quite consistent with the ethos of a system in which the official emphasis is on treating people as aggregate resources and elements of planning rather than individuals whose voluntaristic impulses will be sufficient to keep the system running.[14]

Describing the search for order and co-ordination in Soviet society as "a kind of compulsive's dream of beehive ord  projected upon an entire society",[15] Kassoff states that such compulsion tends to form a

new ideology, perhaps even a replacement for the old Bolshevik ideology.

He states:

> If it [the administered society] lacks some of
> the romantic appeal of barricade-storming, it is
> perhaps no less revolutionary in its consequences,
> for its purveyors insist that they will not rest
> until all societies have undergone the transfor-
> mation to superorganization. Its potential impact
> on an audience, say, of hard-pressed political
> leaders...may be considerable, for the idea of
> total co-ordination must tempt many of them as the
> answer to problems and frustrations of economic
> backwardness and the awkward necessities of coping
> with competing political interests.[16]

Another writer who portrays the Soviet political system in termin-

ology similar to that employed by Kassoff and Meyer is T. H. Rigby.[17]

Identifying the three modes of co-ordinating society by contract, by cus-

tom, or by command, he describes the Soviet Union as an organizational

society based on command. He _ _s this as a trend established in pre-

reform Russia, but one that did not ripen until the twentieth century.

According to Rigby, several factors contributed to the development of an

organizational society: the original character of the Bolshevik movement;

the ideology with its all-encompassing goals; the history of the country

during the early years after the revolution when survival necessitated

command; and Stalin's obsession with assuring personal control, which par-

alleled the rise in the Party's domination over everyday life. Conse-

quently:

> ...by the mid-1930's there was no sphere of social
> activity, from retail sales to internal security,
> and from farming to the arts, which was not di-
> rected by a chain of command culminating in Stalin.
> Soviet society had been welded into one large orga-
> nization.[18]

Admitting that Stalin's death initiated changes which stimulated the market forces, Rigby insists that this trend has been reversed since the leadership of Khrushchev. Indeed, Rigby declares, "The Soviet Union is the most long-lived and one of the most highly developed of twentieth-century 'organizational societies'."[19]

These three articles present the main core of the argument and tenets of the bureaucratic model. Although these three authors apply different descriptive terms to illustrate the functioning of the Soviet system, there is a similarity in their approach. Meyer describes the system as "bureaucratic", Kassoff uses "administered society", and Rigby adopts "organizational", but they all emphasize bureaucratic organization in the Soviet Union. Meyer very clearly establishes an analogy between the western model of bureaucracy and the Soviet system. Kassoff and Rigby define their terms more carefully, stressing co-ordination and planning by a hierarchical chain of command.

## B.   Discussion of the Model:

Di    ssion of this model is definitely not as animated as that associated with the totalitarian model. However, the bureaucratic model has initiated some debate over its validity. Some of the most significant comments about Meyer's work are made by the author himself. Much of his writing seems to be a reaction to the totalitarian model, and Meyer attempts to formulate an alternative model to fill the gap created by the rejection of the totalitarian model by many scholars.[20] However, he is reluctant to completely abandon the notion of totalitarianism. Indicating that the bureaucratic and the totalitarian models are complementary, he states that "they highlight different elements of the Communist world and may well be

applied jointly."[21]  Meyer's discussion does not seem to explain the
relationship between the bureaucratic and the total    ian model; indeed,
at times he entwines the two notions so that his presentation  of the
bureaucratic model depends upon the presence of some of the characteris-
tics of totalitarianism in society.  Consider, for example, the following
statement in which he endeavors to clarify his treatment of totalitarian-
ism:

> Those political systems are totalitarian which seek
> to politicize all human endeavor and plan all human
> relationships.  In such systems the outside observer
> detects something like creeping coercion, and silent
> transformation or perversion of all beliefs, values,
> attitudes, and patterns of life according to a
> preconceived design.  In effect, this amounts to the
> extension of bureaucratic principles of organization,
> decision-making, and control over all aspects of
> human existence.[22]

Meyer seems to be indicating that bureaucratization is an intrinsic
part of totalitarianism.  His notion of the bureaucratic model depends
on the existence of features of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union.

Aside from these shortcomings, criticisms of writers and scholars
on the topic of the bureaucratic model revolve around two main points.
Firstly, it is maintained that the similarities between the Soviet
Union and the West identified by the bureaucratic model are over-emphasized.
Consequently, presentation of the Soviet political system through the
bureaucratic model fails to acknowledge some of the basic differences
that exist.  Secondly, many scholars conclude that the bureaucratic
model has very limited usage.

Paul Hollander argues that similarities between the communist
political system and the western bureaucratic example are superficial.

In his article, "Observations on Bureaucracy, Totalitarianism, and the Comparative Study of Communism",[23] he suggests that communist bureaucracies are radically different from western models and that there is little understanding to be gained from application of the bureaucratic model to the Soviet Union.[24] He suggests that we must use the model carefully and that we must ask, "What do these comparisons accomplish?" in order to determine whether the comparison is superfluous or relevant.

L.G. Churchward, in his article "Bureaucracy--U.S.A.: U.S.S.R.",[25] describes this problem in the following manner:

> Does it really help to understand Soviet politics
> if we ... compare the CPSU, or even the entire U.S.S.R.,
> with an American corporation? Surely the purposes and
> range of activities comes out at the point where the role
> of an ordinary party member in the CPSU is compared
> to the role of an ordinary shareholder in an American
> corporation ... These two roles are in fact so
> different that they are not strictly comparable.[26]

John Armstrong has undertaken a study of the similarities and the differences between Soviet and West European administrative behavior.[27] He divides their characteristics into three groups: (a) essentially similar characteristics; (b) factors in Soviet administration which explain differences from Western European administrative behavior; and (c) characteristics determined by modernization, but influenced by communist doctrine.[28] Such a study is valuable because it illustrates the administrative similarities between the Soviet Union and the western model, yet recognizes that it is inadequate to illustrate only the similarities; therefore, an attempt is made to present some of the differences.

The second criticism of the bureaucratic model is its limited usage. Hollander speaks favorably of the bureaucratic model, recognizing that it stimulates discussion of similarities between American and Soviet systems. Yet, he thinks that bureaucratization should not necessarily be the main focus of discussion, and that it is consequently a limited tool of analysis:

> What I am suggesting is that we can and should recognize and study the differences between Communist societies without falling back on the bland, homogenizing approach toward all modern societies, Communist and non-Communist alike, implied by the bureaucratic model. Little is gained if we exchange one set of over-simplifications for another.[29]

The bureaucratic model has definite limitations, which, according to Meyer, are found in such areas as education for participation in the system, opportunities for upward social mobility, and welfare measures. These factors cannot be accommodated in the model which ignores the importance of non-bureaucratic features in the regime. L.G. Churchward concludes:

> Clearly there is much to be learned from a comparative study of American and Soviet bureaucracies. Much still remains to be done. Neither system is uniformly or fully bureaucratic. In some ways very distinctive features of both systems are essentially non-bureaucratic. Hence to regard either or both systems as simply bureaucratic is inadequate.[30]

Employing the bureaucratic model, which relies heavily on the western model of bureaucracy, tends to present a picture of the Soviet Union as an all-encompassing bureaucratic organization that is dc        nated d more or less efficient. Studies  such as the one by John Armstrong oduce some of the problems of administration in the Soviet Union.

These problems include: overloading of vertical command channels,
inefficient formal communications, and friction between line and staff
administrators.[31] Thus, the description of the Soviet Union as
efficient bureaucracy is questioned. Professor Jerry Hough
discusses this view of the Soviet Union as a complete, co-ordinated
system:

> Despite the frequent tendency for Westerners to
> speak of "the" party and of "its" functions and
> "its" relation to the state, the different levels
> of the party hierarchy have strikingly different
> functions and relationships to the state apparatus
> and cannot be discussed most fruitfully as a unit.[32]

The perception of the Soviet political system presented by the
bureaucratic model is somewhat incomplete. The parallels it draws
between the Soviet government and western political administration are
superficial, based upon an analogy that does not truly represent the
state of affairs in Soviet Russia. The bureaucratic model not only
overlooks significant differences between the western model of bureau-
cracy and the occurrence of bureaucratic features in the Soviet Union,
but it also is unable to account for non-bureaucratic features such as
education. Perhaps most significantly, the suggestion of the bureaucratic
model that the Soviet Union is a well-run, efficient unit may obviously
be challenged.

In an historical context, the bureaucratic model could be considered
as a product of reaction to the totalitarian model and its excessive
emphasis on the uniqueness of the communist system. The model introduced
a new era in which scholars were willing to accept--indeed, even emphasize--
likenesses between the Soviet Union and western governments. Therefore,

despite the criticism that the bureaucratic approach obscures some

important differences between the systems, the introduction of the

bureaucratic model heralded the disintegration of the perception of

the Soviet Union as a unique country diametrically opposed to the West.

## The Kremlinological Model

A.  The Model:

Kremlinology, described as a means of identifying reality behind the

elaborate facade in th Soviet political system, focuses upon power in

the regime and on the elite who possess this power.  It analyzes esoteric

communications to determine the real situation in the Soviet Union.

Arthur Adams, in his article "The Hybrid Art of Sovietology", outlines

Kremlinology in the following terms:

> Kremlinology is another special technique used
> for plumbing the less knowable areas of Soviet
> life.  It relies heavily upon the art of breaking
> the code of Soviet jargon, but its attention
> centres primarily upon the power struggle at the
> top levels of the party and state leaders.[33]

As western scholars sought to discover the actual situation in

the Soviet Union, the use of Kremlinology to penetrate "the elaborate

smoke-screen around the inner workings of Kremlin politics"[34] became

popular.  T. H. Rigby, in his article "Crypto-Politics", identifies the

origin of Kremlinology after World War II.  The problem of succession to

Stalin was explored by searching the official So        press for clues to

the identity of possible future leaders.  Thus  th  ri e of Kremlinology

was directly related to intra-leadership confli       was a technique of

investigation eagerly explored.[35]  It initially attracted such journalists

as Michel Tatu,[36] but fascination with this approach quickly spread to

academic fields. The popularity of Kremlinology rested in its attempt to explain contemporary developments and to predict future events.

The study of Soviet politics is especially susceptible to Kremlinological-based studies because of the nature of this country's political administration. The scope of activities subject to state direction, the closed nature of the society, and the existence of pseudo-democratic institutions are factors which tempt scholars to use Kremlinological tactics.

Several journalists and scholars feel that the Kremlinological approach definitely has a contribution to make in the study of the Soviet Union and can be employed as a valuable tool of analysis. Sidney Ploss, in his book Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia, points out that empirical data for studies using Kremlinological techniques are available. He asserts that "a proved reliability attaches to the jargon of Communist discourse"[37] which may be used to determine alignments in the leadership when examined carefully in conjunction with issues, career patterns, and leadership.

According to Robert Conquest, the Kremlinological approach is valid because it accounts for realities of power in the Soviet policy-making process. Conquest also asserts that Kremlinology portrays differences between political cultures in the East and in the West. Furthermore, he thinks that this approach is important because it provides for the role of luck and the accidental, factors which are significant in reality but often over-looked in political schemas. Conquest also points out the use of the Kremlinological model in prediction of future events.[38] In fact, he cites examples where predictions based on Kremlinological studies have been accurate.[39]

Conquest admits that Kremlinology cannot provide any iron rules

of prediction. However, he asserts that Kremlinology does contribute to meaningful discussion of forces which shape political events. He states:

> Kremlinology...is merely the assertion that faction
> and divergence exist in Russia as in every polity,
> and the formal determination to discover or deduce
> as much as possible about it by a conscientious
> study of the relevant evidence.[40]

## B. Discussion of the Model:

The Kremlinological model aroused much discussion among scholars. The movement has lost much of its momentum since its blossoming during the time of Khrushchev and his dominance. Nevertheless, there are a few survivors, like Conquest, who continue to extol the virtues of the Kremlinological approach.

Major disenchantment with this model resulted from questioning its capacity to predict events in the Soviet Union. Despite Conquest's assertion that Kremlinology was a viable and proven basis for prediction of some events, such scholars as Rigby point out that, at times, Kremlinology has failed miserably, following "one step behind 'life itself' ".[41] Eric Hoffmann , in his study of the "Methodological Problems of Kremlinology", declares that inadequacy of prediction results from concern with prediction rather than the development of a clear method for generalizations and formulations of conclusions.[42]

Thus, the lack of a clearly expounded method in Kremlinology is criticised. For example, Hoffmann questions the capability of empirical study to produce general laws for use in the social sciences. The assertion is also forwarded that the Kremlinological method of conclusion and/or prediction is inherently biased and includes fundamental assumptions which are not outlined or admitted. The matter that the Kremlinologist's

task is hampered and restricted by the problems of determining the validity of available data is also raised.[43]

Alex Nove points out that Kremlinological-based predictions are often inadequate because they place too much emphasis on the whims of leaders and on change itself. He states that the choices of Soviet leaders are as limited as the choices of leaders in western countries.[44]

Finally, there is the criticism that the focus of Kremlinology is misdirected, that it tends to simplify all events as a power struggle, thereby ignoring other considerations in the formulation of policy. Hoffman asks whether the drive for greater personal power is the only, or the most important, factor influencing the behavior of Soviet politicians.[45] In an attempt to raise the matter of the possibility of Kremlinology over-estimating the differences between the East and the West, Nove queries, "Are real issues and doctrinal statements in the USSR subordinated to the power struggle in some special sense which does not apply elsewhere?"[46]

It seems that the Kremlinological model may be viewed as a transitional approach, valuable because of its contribution to criticism of the totalitarian model. Perhaps it is most significant because of the foundation it laid for development of the conflict school and the interest group model. Kremlinology is viewed by both Linden and Rigby as the forerunner of the conflict school. The Kremlinological model represented a definite rejection of totalitarian schools of thought and attempted to compensate for the lack of recognition of factionalism in other models. Eventually, this recognition of factionalism was developed by the conflict school, which attempts to present a more general picture of Soviet politics

than the Kremlinological model depicts. Linden describes this development in the following passage:

> He [the Kremlinologist] thereby contributed a
> key element in the outlook of the conflict school,
> which sees the emphasis on factional politics in
> the Soviet leadership as more in tune with broader
> themes of Soviet and Communist history. At the
> same time, the conflict school has moved beyond
> the initial Kremlinological tendency to play down
> the policy dimension of Soviet politics, that is,
> the question of power for what?[47]

Although some journalists and scholars still show an attraction for Kremlinological-based investigation, it is an approach whose former popularity has faded. Like the bureaucratic model, it is significant in Soviet studies because it attempts to account for features which could not be accommodated by the totalitarian model. At one time, it was considered a valuable approach in determining the behind-the-scenes reality of power in the Soviet Union, but the attention of scholars has now turned to the formulation of alternative models.

## The Interest Group Model

A.  The Model:

The notion that there is not total agreement within the Soviet leadership elite with regard to formulation of policy was a key element in the Kremlinological model.[48] T acknowledgement of differing opinion among the ruling elite soon fostered the possibility that perhaps groups, more or less similar to interest groups found in western democratic countries, could also be identified in Soviet politics. The question became a popular theme of investigation not only as corresponding bases for East-West comparisons were sought, but also as it became apparent that significant changes were being made within the system. As a debate

over the role and strengths of the leadership in the Soviet Union emerged,[49] western scholars seemed to divide into two schools of thought. The conflict school in the West recognized that the period of a totally dominant leader had ended, and that the contribution of Party officials, civil servants, scholars and educators to the Soviet policy-making process should be stressed.[50] On the other hand, there existed a group of western observers who stressed the stability of the Soviet leadership and, although they admitted that struggle and conflict occurred during a succession crisis or in transitional periods, they were reluctant to identify factional struggle as a continuous and underlying characteristic of the Soviet political system.[51]

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington were two of the first authors to incorporate some of the premises of the conflict school in their work, Political Power: USA/USSR. In their chapter on power and policy, the authors state that no real distinction between the processes of policy-making and the process of acquiring power is made in the Soviet Union. They declare that policies are subsumed by the succession struggle in which each leadership faction appeals to different groups for support until a given group is victorious. An attempt is then made by this group to gain the support of other groups. Despite recognition of the existence of friction among groups, the authors do not deny that the central leadership controls and manipulates these groups.[52]

Brzezinski and Huntington outline a hierarchy of interest groups existing in the Soviet Union: amorphous social forces; specific interest groups (i.e. from the intellectual community); and policy groups from the military and industrial spheres. The functioning of these groups is

hampered by little (or no) means of interest articulation, as well as by their susceptibility to manipulation by the leadership.[53]

As a result of supression of interest groups in the Soviet Union, political bargaining actually occurs among the central leadership behind closed doors, a process T. H. Rigby has described as crypto-politics. He states:

> On the analogy of other non-liberal democratic
> states, we might reasonably hypothesize that
> conflicts of interest and aspiration in the Soviet
> Union, denied a special political sphere of
> operation, tend to give a political coloration
> to processes ostensibly executive and administrative
> in character, that is, to generate a distinctive
> crypto-politics.[54] [emphasis in the original]

Outlining the phases of the policy process in the USSR, Brzezinski and Huntington illustrate the role of interest groups. They identify the first stage of the initiation of policy as a response usually spurred by a deficiency or difficulty. This stage is followed by the persuasion phase which is followed by the development of support. The subsequent decision stage is brief and deliberately designed to give the illusion of unity and, during this phase, the authoritative legitimization of a proposal is given. Finally, of course, is the execution which entails, according to the authors, either adoption or distortion.[55]

It is apparent that Brzezinski and Huntington wish to establish a place for interest groups in the policy-making process in the Soviet Union and, according to their schema, the contribution of interest groups to policy formulation is significant.

Another major work identified with material in the pro-conflict school or interest group model is Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths' book, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics.[56] Like many other authors who

adhere to the interest group concept, Skilling opens with the assertion

that interest groups do exist in the Soviet Union:

> It is the central assumption of this volume
> that in the seventeen years since Stalin's death
> the Soviet political system has been passing
> through a period of transition, characterized
> among other things by the increased activity of
> political interest groups and the presence of
> group conflict.[57]

Skilling maintained the acceptance and application of the totalitarian

model hindered adoption of any comparative tools for many years,

suppressing examination of groups and group conflict. Skilling defines

a political interest group in the following terms:

> ...an aggregate of persons who possess certain
> common characteristics and share certain attitudes
> on public issues, and wh. adopt distinct positions
> on these issues and make definite claims on those
> in authority.[58]

He admits that the interest groups examined in his work are indeed

a function of the elite stratum of the society,[59] and, for the sake of

analysis, he outlines two main divisions of groups--the occupational and

the bureaucratic groups. These two main divisions may be divided into the

following seven groups: apparatchiki; military; security police; managerial

class; jurists; economists; and writers.[60] Although Skilling recognizes

that a group may have differences among its members, he assesses groups

as fundamentally aligned on common occupational interests, a factor which

leads to similar viewpoints on public policies.

Emphasizing that existing groups are more often informal groups or

groupings, he stresses that interaction among the members of the group are

less frequent than in western experience. Yet, despite this realization

that groups are not formally organized, Skilling states:

> The paradox of the Soviet situation is that
> loose associations of individuals are more likely
> to be active exponents of common attitudes than
> organized groups, and more likely also to assert
> demands for government or party action. In fact,
> such groups may come into existence because
> organized groups, such as the Union of Writers,
> do not perform these functions adequately.[61]

Because of these characteristics of groups in the Soviet Union, the

existence of conflict in the top echelons of the leadership, who

ultimately control these groups, has an important impact on political

groups. Skilling states:

> Leadership conflict...will provide the framework
> within which other forms of group conflict will
> take place. Leadership factions will continue
> to perform significant functions of articulating
> and amalgamating the interests of socia and
> political groups.[62]

In many cases, the arguments for acceptance of the conflict model

are presented in case studies of policy formulation in the Soviet Union.

One such study is that by Joel Schwartz and William Keech on the educa-

tional reforms of 1958.[63] Through their examination of the educational

reforms and explanation of discrepancy in policy between Khrushchev's

announcement of intended reforms in September 1958 and the final act in

December as a result of disagreement among the top leaders and the subse-

quent involvement of factions and interest groups, the authors conclude

that interest groups not only exist in the Soviet Union, but definitely

have an impact on policy formulation. They state:

> It has become widely recognized that Soviet
> officials do not formulate public policy in a
> vacuum, and that, indeed, their deliberations

> take into account in some fashion the needs and
> demands of various elements of the society.
> Further, it has been observed that social
> groups of various types play a noticeable, if
> only rudimentary role in articulating interests
> to the top of the hierarchy.[64]

They assert that there are "continuous sources of dispute among the top leadership",[65] a premise upheld by Khrushchev's ouster in October of 1964. From this assumption, the authors attempt to formulate some generalizations concerning the functioning of interest groups in society.[66]

B.  Discussion of the Model:

The interest group model or conflict approach stimulated much discussion and debate among scholars in the area. Criticism seemed to focus on either the general theoretical framework employed in the interest group model or on the specific conclusions drawn from applying this model.

Bill McGrath and Simon McInnes, in their recent study " 'Better Fewer but Better': On Approaches to the Study of Soviet and East European Politics",[67] raise objections to the theoretical framework used by such people as Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. They charge that the model is a "pluralist paradigm"[68] which regards politics as a process of bargaining negotiation as the government attempts to formulate policy. McGrath and McInnes state:

> They never manage to deny completely the implicit
> assumption that the state is a neutral adjudicator
> required to referee the interest maximization
> contest.[69]

Sidney Ploss, in his article on "New Politics in Russia",[70] also discusses the theme of pluralistic tendencies emphasized by the conflict school. In his opinion, this school of thought overly exaggerates these

factors. T. H. Rigby proposes that the group model has been constructed on the basis of western political science perceptions and then imposed on the Soviet system, even though there are too many points of difference between the two systems to accurately employ this model.[71]

Roy Macridis, who contends that the interest group model is nothing more than a "crude form of determinism",[72] points out that such an approach eclipses other factors important in understanding Soviet society and politics. Proposing that the interest group model is not a true or adequate reflection of reality, he states:

> Interest is the primary propelling force and
> every action is based upon sharing of interest.
> Power configuration is basically the configurat-
> ion of competing and struggling interests
> organized into groups. Ideology, values, the
> state, the formal organization of political
> decision-making, and the content of decisions
> are determined by the Bentleyian parallelogram
> of group forces. This may be an over-simplificat-
> ion, but I do not think that it does violence to
> the schema of group analysis. It is interesting,
> for instance, that not only concern with the
> state recedes into the background in the writings
> of all proponents of the group theory, but also
> the role of ideology, of ectra-economics and
> non-rational motivational patterns, and of the
> political system as an independent factor
> influencing group behavior.[73]

One of the general complaints aimed at scholars using the interest group model is that the term "group" is often not adequately defined. Consequently, there is a problem in identifying a group in the Soviet Union before one is able to determine their impact on the policy-making process. Many conclude that the term "group" is not even applicable to the informal groupings which do exist in the Soviet Union. Andrew Janos, in his article "Group Politics in Communist Societies: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model", concludes that:

> ...the integration of groups is too low to be
> meaningful; the prev        political formula
> does not recognize the principle of social
> autonomy, and the groups that exist in the form
> of structured associations are hierarchically
> subordinated to the party-state.[74]

A serious handicap of the interest group approach, which generally

attempts to illustrate its thesis through the use of case studies, is the

limited availability of data to support its work. This makes it difficult

to test an approach which must necessarily rely heavily on empirical

study. Indeed, Roy Macridis evaluates this reliance on empirical data as

a definite weakness of the interest group approach and he is convinced

that studying groups, their organization, and their impact on decision-

making is an approach that can only lead to isolated empirical studies and

is unable to contribute to a general theory.[75]

Thus, there is an informal group of critics opposed to the use of

the interest group model, who form the anti-conflict school. In general,

they declare that there is little      movement toward pluralism in the

Soviet Union. Consequently, they conclude that the interest group model

is inapplicable, distorting the real        the Soviet political situation

where the leadership is not a filter and arbitrator for vying interest

groups, but rather a group firmly in control of the country. The anti-

conflict school even suggests that the post-Khrushchev leadership has

reinstated some of the old Stalinist methods in a period they describe

as re-Stalinization.

For example, Sidney Ploss describes the interest group model as

somewhat presumptuous when, in fact, "the post-Khrushchev leadership is

firmly in control of the levers of political command and has resurrected

many of the secretive policy-making procedures and orthodox attitudes of a

bygone age."[76]   He builds his case around the observation that the present-
day leadership is rather desperately seeking stability and s      ty to
insure concentration and centralization of power in the Politburo.[77]
Khrushchev's attempt to regularize consultation and his appeal to public
opinion have been cast aside.  On the    asis of these conditions, Ploss,
like many others who oppose the interest group model, writes:

> Even during the era of Stalin there was room inside
> the framework of Soviet dictatorship for senior
> bureaucratic groupings to compete for i   'uence
> and to argue about policy alternati es    .he re-
> sultant process of closed politics wa  .omewhat
> ventilated under Khrushchev as the top leader
> reached out into society for moral support for
> h's official actions and power position.  The
> Bre-hnev leadership, however, appears to share
> Stalin's concern about the cohesiveness of the
> system and it has accordingly restored the more
> covert forms of politics which are far removed
> from the open bargaining processes limiting
> arbitrary deeds of government in the modern
> societies of the West.[78]

The issue is raised that there is a strong anti-group attitude in the
Soviet regime, where every attempt is made to separate interest articulation
from group structures.[79]  The basic rights of an interest group do not
exist in the Soviet system.  The freedom of speech, discussion and
association are severely limited, making the comparison of the interest
group model betw     estern interest groups and groupings in the Soviet
Union very tenuous.

Given the inherent weaknesses in the approach of the interest group
model, many scholars declare this approach to be inadequate and they search
elsewhere for an analytical framework which will genuinely reflect the
reality of the situation in the Soviet Union.  Adherents of this school of
thought emphasize that, although there are similarities between western
governments and communist regimes, the interest group model goes too

far, applying inapplicable western concepts to the Soviet Union.

It is interesting, however, that most of these scholars--even those who are most vehemently against the conflict approach--tend to admit that this model has made a contribution in demonstrating the inadequacies of the totalitarian model and in highlighting the need for an alternative model. Andrew Janos, for example, states:

> To conclude then, the group concept, while not totally relevant in the context of communism, must be used with utmost caution as a device to our research on the political process. There is no doubt that the study of group models in the Soviet Union and elsewhere has been most useful in revealing the inadequacies of the earlier totalitarian model, yet this does not mean that it can, ipso facto, take the place of the latter as the fundamental theoretical construct to describe and explain the functioning of political systems that are moving away from the regimentation and discipline of the command society.[80]

The interest group model, with its comparison of western interest groups and those groupings found in the Soviet Union, has been instrumental in further highlighting similarities between the two systems. However, it should be used with caution since it obscures some of the important differences between the West and the Soviet Union. It also has many weaknesses in its construction that limit its use.

## The Modernization Model

### A. The Model:

The concept of modernization, defined in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as "the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies",[81] has been widely applied by political scientists. Most scholars employing this concept emphasize that modernization is a

universal characteristic, one of the central and essential features of society. David Apter opens his study of The Politics of Modernization with the following statement:

> The work of modernization is the burden of this age. It is our rock. It is an objective that is not confined to a single place or region, a particular country or class, or to a privileged group of people. Modernization, and the desire for it, reaches around the world.[82]

Marion Levy describes modernization as "a universal social solvent",[83] a process which touches every country of the world, sooner or later affecting their development. Consequently, this concept, which paved the way for a new area of investigation on a comparative basis, eventually influenced communist studies. Scholars in communist studies became interested in applying a modernization model to the Soviet Union.

In some cases, the application of modernization was a deliberate attempt to integrate communist studies with the comparative approach and to escape the trend of emphasizing the uniqueness of communist regimes. For example, John Kautsky, who pioneered in the field of the politics of development,[84] states:

> By dealing with communism only in the context of the politics of modernization and never separately, I hope to have shown that many significant aspects of communism can be satisfactorially accounted for, as political consequences of modernization and without any special reference to their unique communist character.[85]

Kautsky admits that the goals of modernization and industrialization are cloaked in the language of the ideology proclaimed by the regime, but he points out that this in no way changes the basic aims of the country involved.[86] He states that "Communism is a phenomenon of underdevelopment"[87]

and summarizes this thesis in his examination and study of the Soviet
Union in the following terms:

> If prerevolutionary Russia is itself seen as
> an underdeveloped country and the Communist
> revolution as a revolution of a modernizing
> intellectual-led movement, then Soviet policy,
> too, can be seen in the context of the politics
> of development rather than merely as an alien
> force acting on the underdeveloped world from
> the outside.[88]

Another writer who discusses the Soviet Union in terms of moderni-
zation and encourages the application of the concept is Alexander Eckstein.
In an article, "Economic Development and Political Change in Communist
Systems", he suggests that the given stage of economic development imposes
directives on a system.[89]  Eckstein indicates that he regards the
correlation between economic and political change as very significant,
although he points out that he is not asserting that economics is the
only factor which has an impact on politics.  He writes:

> It could be said that the polity in a state is
> a function of this continuing interplay between
> the capabilities of the system as constrained by
> the stage of development and the technology
> associated therewith, on the one hand, and the
> demand mix and demand intensity placed upon it,
> on the other.[90]

According to Eckstein, communist countries are caught in a trap
resulting from the demand of economic factors.  The economic development
has taken up the slack in the skilled labor force.  Coercive and norma-
tive mobilization appeals used during the early stages of industrialization
were no longer completely effective, and material incentives have been
introduced to realize and maintain growth.[91]

Eckstein describes how industrialization has had an impact on many factors--the division of labor, differentiation of occupational and social roles, bureaucratization, urbanization, decline in rural population, as well as many other factors. This makes it impossible to halt the process of modernization, and he states that the resulting pressure for change is manifested in the communist regime:

> All of these factors in combination then contribute
> to rising personal aspirations of the population
> at large, and of the more educated portions of it
> in particular. This, in turn, is then reflected
> in growing consumer demand and mounting pressures
> for sharing in the material benefits of economic
> advance. These economic and social transformations
> necessarily create mounting pressures for change
> in the character of Communist regimes.[92]

Consequently, the command economy becomes difficult to maintain because of the growing complexity resulting from industrialization. The cost of maintaining growth and modernization is the efficiency which is essential in order to make the most of industrialization. Communist regimes are faced with the dilemma of continuing to pursue industrialization, yet maintaining the communist ideology--at least superficially.[93]

The diverse approaches of Kautsky and Eckstein illustrate the many variations used by writers employing the modernization model. Eckstein, for example, has emphasized economic factors and has indicated a degree of economic determinism, while Kautsky's treatment is much more general. However, despite ultimate differences, there are general characteristics which are identified with the modernization model: emphasis on change and development; the importance of economic factors; and discussion of the eventual outcome of modernization.

The modernization model focuses on change within political systems. The use of this concept in analysis of the Soviet Union usually involves the assumption that "communist leadership came to power seeking rapid, radical change in the societies they came to rule."[94] Consequently, their goal was, and is, modernization of the regime. This goal affects three major areas: administrative, integrative, and economic.[95] Thus, the striving for change has reverberative effects on many spheres of the society.

This interpretation of change in the Soviet Union[96] emphasizes initial movement toward modernization as a conscious, deliberate step by communist leaders.

When applying the modernization model, there is a definite tendency to emphasize economic factors, as Eckstein has done.[97] It is assumed that once the modernization process has been set in motion, it is difficult to check. Thus, there is a snow-balling effect; the first step toward modernizing society results in a chain of events that affects every aspect of society. There can be no reversal, and as modernization is pursued, the effects on the communist society are such that change in its basic structure is necessary for the survival of the regime. Consequently, the usual implication derived from this chain of logic is the association of modernization with social evolution, and in the case of the Soviet society, it is a movement from a totalitarian or authoritarian regime to one closer to a pluralistic society.

B. Discussion of the Model:

Discussion among scholars following the introduction of the concept of modernization focused on some of the difficulties inherent in this approach. One of the first problems to be raised was the usual discussion of the concept and definition of the term. A major complaint among

writers was that a definite distinction between industrialization and modernization was not made, and, as a result, there was confusion in dealing with these terms. For example, John Kautsky points out that the processes of modernization and industrialization overlap,[98] but he is careful to outline meticulously his distinction between the two terms. He states:

> Modernization may include industrialization, but industrialization does not encompass all elements of modernization. Industrialization always involves modernization....modernization does not always involve industrialization...
>
> Industrialization and modernization are always associated processes, then. But while we can see some elements of modernization quite clearly as the consequences of industrialization, others can be associated with industrialization only respectively as its precondition...as the two processes overlap, so will my use of the two terms, and I can probably be accused of a tendency to use them almost interchangeably.[99]

In David Apter's work, the distinction between the two terms is unclear. He defines modernization in the West as the result of commercialization and industrialization. He states that, in non-western areas, modernization has been a result of commercialization and bureaucratization.[100] He explains the relationship between these concepts in the following passage:

> Development, modernization, and industrialization, although related phenomena, can be placed in descending order of generality. Development, the most general, results from the proliferation and integration of functional roles in a community. Modernization is a particular case of development...Industrialization, a special aspect of modernization, may be defined as the period in a society in which the strategic functional roles are related to manufacturing. It is possible to attempt the modernization of a given country without much industry, but it is not possible to industrialize without modernization.[101]

It is easy to recognize problems that arise when, despite the
distinction which tends to preface a treatment of modernization, the
terms "modernization" and "industrialization" are mixed.[102]

The interesting comment that the concept of modernization is often
synonymous with a form of westernization is made by the writer V. V.
Aspaturian. He sees this as a definite built-in bias in the model which
limits the utility of the concept. Aspaturian states his argument as
follows:

> Because of the inextricable connection between
> the concepts of modernization and westernization,
> modernization assumes a normative imperative that
> existing paradigms skirt and is not simply an
> empirical concept. Substituting the more neutral-
> sounding concept of modernization for the more
> blatantly culture-bound and normative concept of
> westernization, however, does not solve the
> theoretical difficulties involved; it merely
> serves to obscure and avoid them in the int ests
> of rapid theoretical development. Importar
> questions such as whether modernization is a
> fate or a choice, inevitable or optional, absolute
> or relative, remain unraised once westernization
> is objectified as modernization and decreed to
> be a desirable, inevitable, and universal phase
> of development.[103]

William Griffith, in his contribution to Charles Gati's book,
The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe, also points out that
the concept of modernization originates in a notion of westernization.
Arguing that the model was born with the vision of American-style
modernization, he links westernization and modernization, thereby
underlining the biases in the model.[104]

Different aspects of concepts of change presented in the model have
come under attack at various times. There is disagreement over the
eventual outcome of modernization among writers on the subject. Jeremy

Azrael categorizes those involved in the dispute as the liberal-democratic school opposed to the administrative-technocratic school. The liberal-democratic school, considered to be the majority, views liberal governments' incorporation of the rights of individuals as a consequence of economic development and modernization. On the other hand, the administrative-technocratic school asserts that industrial growth fosters bureaucracy and that this occurrence is definitely not conducive to the growth of individual liberties.[105]

In Soviet studies, the vast majority of writers on the topic of modernization are found in the first camp of the liberal-democratic school. They recognize, as do Godwin, Azrael, and Eisenstadt, that the initial move toward modernization in the Soviet Union was made with the intent of the Party maintaining firm control. As modernization progresses, and Soviet leaders attempt to maintain control, there results a dilemma. The factors of increased differentiation, stratification, and the creation of specialized elites in the society foster a situation in which pressure for continued change occurs.[106] Paul Godwin sums up this phenomenon in the following terms:

> The dilemma for Communist systems is that the very fact that they achieved the goals of the mobilization stages creates an environment less and less conducive to monopolistic control by political generalists.[107]

The assumption of positive social evolution is very evident in the liberal-democratic school whose writers feel that as modernization increases its demands on society, change will occur. Many adherents of this school contend that one of the most important agents of change resulting from modernization is the managerial elite who will eventually influence and change the system. Jeremy Azrael, in his book, Managerial Power and Soviet

_Politics_, challenges this premise. Although he is willing to admit that this managerial group has had an impact on Soviet political development, he concludes that this group exerts little, if any, pressure for change on the existing system. He presents the following conclusions:

> Far from growing at a progressive and ever accel-
> erating rate...managerial power has been both
> marginal and contingent, and there is little
> doubt that it will remain so for some time to
> come. And the probability is high that this
> power will be used in the future as it has in
> the past, for essentially functional, system-
> supporting goals.[108]

This conclusion has a definite impact on the applicability of the modernization model. Admission that specialization resulting from modernization does not necessarily result in pluralism counters the premise of the model that the creation of a group of specialists will encourage the movement of the Soviet Union toward a form of democracy.

It has been pointed out that the belief that modernization will result in positive social evolution is somewhat reminiscent of the convergence theory which emerged in the 1950's. William Taubmann sees moderni-zation as "reminiscent of an older and much-maligned approach--[the] old-fashioned, optimistic convergence theory."[109] He assesses the convergence theory as the first stepping stone to the fully developed concept of modernization.

The use of the modernization model also raises the question of the relationship between economics and politics. With the model's heavy emphasis on economic factors and their pre-eminence in the development of society, many writers have claimed that, in the words of Paul Hollander, "the development [or modernization] model is little more than a sophisti-cated version of economic determinism".[110] Azrael also recognizes the assumption in many treatments of modernization that economic factors and/or

technology are deemed dominant. He counters this with the assertion that "the primacy of politics has so far been the rule in the development of the Soviet system",[111] and that the leadership, more or less, contains the ability to influence and control affairs as it has done in the past. He does not deny the increasing complexity of Soviet society, but he does imply that the modernization model, as the majority conceive it, is a misrepresentation of the relationship between politics and economics. He is convinced that "Politics will continue to dominate economics and will remain largely in the hands of the committed technicians of power."[112]

The model's assumption of the unilinearity of chan    nd development is also questioned. Change is seen as a pos    ve factor and the model is based on belief in ongoing progress.[113] Howe    this perspective over-looks the possibility of a reversal in e   nic growth and of a decline or recess   n in the standard of living. Indeed, this assumption of unlimited growth was obviously formulated before the economic recession and crippling inflation of the seventies.[114]

The concept of the Soviet Union as a modernizing nation does emphasize certain features which the country has in common with non-Communist countries. For example, Taubmann points out certain of these features: the nature of contemporary technology; the system of mass education; the role of cities; the development of transportation and communications; the support and encouragement of scientific investigation; and the utilization of human resources and organization or production in a rational manner.[115]

Many writers recognize that the modernization model gives a new perspective to the study of the Soviet Union.[116] However, despite major efforts by scholars to rework this model in an attempt to strengthen it,

there is a definite reluctance to accept it as the principle treatment of the Soviet Union. Robert Sharlet concludes that the limitations of the model resulting from "the current value-freighted developmental 'models' "[117] must be recognized. Vernon Aspaturian also feels that the modernization model should not be presented as the only model to explain development in the Soviet Union because of its painful inadequacies.[118]

Perhaps the last word on this subject should be given to Robert Sharlet, who points out that, at least, the modernization model is a step in the right direction to formulate a conceptual framework of Soviet political development and to find order in the present maze of data in the field. Yet, the implied biases in the model and the definite overtones of convergence and economic determinism limit the model's usefulness.[119]

Chapter III

Endnotes

[1] For examples, see John Armstrong, "Comparative Politics and Communist Systems: Introductory Remarks", Slavic Review 26 (March 1967), pp. 1-2; see especially page 1, where Armstrong remarks that although comparative studies are becoming more widely accepted, they have not produced any significant impact on communist studies. See also John Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development", Slavic Review 26 (March 1967), pp. 13-17.

[2] Rudolf Tokes, "Comparative Communism: The Elusive Target", Studies in Comparative Communism 8 (Autumn 1975), p. 224.

[3] Ibid., p. 226.

[4] David Finley, "What Should We Compare, Why, and How?", Studies in Comparative Communism 8 (Spring-Summer 1975), p. 14.

[5] Alfred Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems", Slavic Review 26 (March 1967), p. 5.

[6] Alfred Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 467.

[7] Ibid., p. 470.

[8] Ibid., p. 469.

[9] Ibid., p. 470.

[10] Ibid., p. 468.

[11] Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems", p. 5.

[12] Allen Kassoff, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror", World Politics 16 (July 1964), pp. 558-575.

[13] Ibid., p. 558.

[14] Ibid., p. 565.

[15] Ibid., p. 572.

and the USSR", <u>World Politics</u> 16 (July 1964), pp. 539-557.

[18]Ibid., p. 549. Rigby qualifies this statement somewhat, noting that there are still some activities which are left to the individual-- aspects of consumption, leisure, and mating.

[19]Ibid., p. 557.

[20]Meyer, <u>The Soviet Political System</u>, pp. 471-2.

[21]Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems", p. 5.

[22]Meyer, <u>The Soviet Political System</u>, pp. 471-472.

[23]Paul Hollander, "Observations on Bureaucracy, Totalitarianism, and the Comparative Study of Communism", in <u>Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodological and Empirical Theory</u>, ed. Frederic Fleron (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 219. [Article hereafter cited as "Observations on Bureaucracy and Totalitarianism"].

[24]Ibid., p. 219.

[25]L. G. Churchward, "Bureaucracy--U.S.A.:           , <u>Co-existence</u> 5 (July 1968), pp. 201-208.

[26]Ibid., p. 202.

[27]John Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons", in <u>Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodological and Empirical Theory</u>, pp. 357-378. [Hereafter cited as <u>Communist Studies and the Social Sciences</u>].

[28]Ibid., pp. 374-378. In summation, Armstrong classifies these characteristics. He determines that Western European and Soviet adminis- trative behavior is similar with regard to: depar re from hierarchical command structure, especially in industrial production and foreign trade; the importance of informal relationships; continuing associations made during schooling; and p rmance criteria replacing doctrinal considera- tions. Also the factors of authority acquired by staff reporting directly to the top echelons and the friction between line and administrators are found in both societies, but accentuated in the Soviet system. The differences between the two systems examined are, he charges,

probably a result of communist doctrine and "the requirements of economic modernization". This includes such factors as internal pressures for improving formal communications, informal relationships based on ethnic solidarity, the high level of career achievement of production administrators, and a technocratic approach to human problems.

[29]Hollander, "Observations on Bureaucracy and Totalitarianism", p. 219.

[30]Churchward, "Bureaucracy--U.S.A.:U.S.S.R", p. 209.

[31]Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior", p. 375.

[32]Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 2.

[33]Arthur Adams, "The Hybrid Art of Sovietology", Survey # 50 (January 1964), p. 160.

[34]Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 3.

[35]T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics", Survey # 50 (January 1964), p. 185.

[36]Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (London: Collins Ltd., 1969).

[37]Ploss, Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia, p. 23.

[38]Robert Conquest, "In Defence of Kremlinology", in The State of Soviet Studies, ed. Walter Laquer and Leopold Labedz (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 127-132.

[39]For example, Conquest states that Kremlinological-based investigation accurately predicted the events of June 1957. Also, he quotes an extract from his analysis of the circumstances of Khrushchev's secret speech which demonstrates that the speech was a compromise between those who wanted the purges and the cult of Stalin openly discussed and others who did not want to endanger the control of the Party. Five years after Conquest advanced this interpretation, Khrushchev reported in an address to the 22nd Congress that this had indeed been the case. See Conquest, "In Defence of Kremlinology", p. 132.

[40]Ibid., p. 134.

[41]Rigby, "Crypto-Politics", p. 186.

[42] Eric Hoffman, "Methodological Problems of Kremlinology", in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, p. 138.

[43] Ibid., p. 138.

[44] Alex Nove, "The Uses and Abuses of Kremlinology", Survey # 50 (January 1964), p. 175.

[45] Hoffman, "Methodological Problems in Kremlinology", p. 138.

[46] Nove, "The Uses and Abuses of Kremlinology", p. 175.

[47] Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 6.

[48] Rigby, "Crypto-Politics", p. 183.

[49] See "Conflict and Authority: A Discussion", Problems of Communism XII (September-October 1963), pp. 27-46.

[50] Sidney Ploss, "New Politics in Russia", Survey 19 (Autumn 1973), p. 23.

[51] Robert Tucker, "Foreword", in Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964, pp. 2-3.

[52] Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964), pp. 191-195.

[53] Ibid., pp. 195-196.

[54] Rigby, "Crypto-Politics", p. 183.

[55] Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, pp. 202-207.

[56] Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[57] Ibid., p. 19.

[58] Ibid., p. 24.

[59] Ibid., p. 406.

[60] Ibid. pp. 384-387.

[61] Ibid., p. 30.

[62] Ibid., p. 35.

[63] Joel Schwartz and William Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Proc Chin (Pal in the Soviet Union", in Comparative Communism: The Soviet, and Yugoslav Models, ed. Gary Bertsch and Thomas Ganschow lto, Calif.: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976), pp. 228-241.

[64] Ibid., p. 228.

[65] Ibid., p. 235.

[66] Ibid., pp. 238-241.

[67] Bill McGrath and Simon McInnes, " 'Better Fewer But Better': On Approaches to the Study of Soviet and East European Politics", Canadian Slavonic Papers XVIII (September 1976), pp. 327-337.

[68] Ibid., p. 328.

[69] Ibid., p. 329.

[70] Ploss, "New Politics in Russia", p. 35.

[71] Rigby, "Crypto-Politics", pp. 183, 192, 193.

[72] Roy Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis", Journal of Politics ^3 (February 1961), p. 32.

[73] Ibid., p. 32.

[74] Andrew Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model" in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970), pp. 441-442.

[75] Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis", p. 26.

[76] Ploss, "New Politics in Russia", p. 23.

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[95] Ibid., p. 120.

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[103] Vernon Aspaturian, "Ma    sm and the Meanings of Modernization", in Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe, ed. Charles Gati (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 3-4.

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[105] Jeremy Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 2.

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[111] Azrael, _Managerial Power and Soviet Politics_, p. 175.

[112] _Ibid._, p. 177.

[113] Eisenstadt, "Change in Communist Systems", p. 174.

[114] Griffith, "Comment: Some Problems in Analysis", p. 359.

[115] Taubmann, "The Change to Change in Communist Systems: Modernization, Postmodernization, and Soviet Politics," p. 388.

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[117] Sharlet, "The Soviet Union as a Developing Country", p. 275.

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## Chapter IV

## DISSIDENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

### Introduction

Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 initiated a period in the Soviet

Union that has generally come to be called the thaw, a term borrowed from

a book of the same title by Ilya Ehrenburg.[1]  The book, which dealt with

the pursuit of happiness by individuals, was one example of the trend that

led literature away from the traditional treatment of industrialization,

and the building of the socialist society which had been common themes

under the banner of socialist realism.  The death of Stalin released such

repressed energies and forces that, in the field of literature, some

startling works were circulated.  One literary historian of the period

writes:

> There is no doubt that by 1955 a large part of
> Soviet literature was breaking away from the
> official mold.  The changes were wide-ranging and
> various.  There was greater diversity of style,
> more inventiveness in plot, more freedom in the
> unfolding of a story.  Such dangerous subjects
> as personal tragedies brought on by Stalinist
> terror were now being treated.[2]

The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the

secret speech by Khrushchev in 1956 signalled the official beginning of

de-Stalinization, movement away from the tactics of terror and the cult of

the personality.  The impact of this policy on the intellectual community

was profound.  Although, as a Kremlin official pointed out, the secret

speech was designed "to let in some fresh air", it resulted in "such a

stormy wind...that we have to take protective measures".[3]  Because of the

84

aftermath of steps taken toward liberalization, the Communist Party was split, uncertain how to deal with the matter of de-Stalinization while still maintaining the control of the Party.

By 1957 and 1958, censorship was introduced once again, but the authorities found it difficult to totally suppress dissident writings. Consequently, many articles and literary pieces were "written for the drawer", waiting for a time when the official censors would accept and publish such work. A brief respite from the harsh control of printed material in the early 1960's saw the publication of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn's short story, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch.[4] This period was short-lived, however, and by the beginning of 1963 there was a tightening of censorship. This zig-zag pattern of slackening control followed by strict supervision was common in the fifties and sixties, and although there were some interesting books published in this period, many were denied publication.

The content of the dissent literature began to change subtly and by 1965 the dissent movement had taken on a definite political flavor with the circulation of materials supporting human rights. This trend was exemplified by the protest of intellectuals at the trial of Andrei Sinyavskii and Yuli Daniel in 1966. The trial, in which the men were charged with publishing material abroad, is generally marked by both western and Soviet writers as a significant point in Soviet intellectual history because for the first time since Stalin's consolidation of power, open protests and support were shown on behalf of the defendants.[5]

Many political writings, not acceptable for publication in the official Soviet press, were circulated from person to person. The term

"Samizdat", a word modelled on  Gosizdat ("State Publishing House") but
indicating self publication because of rejection from Gosizdat, was
applied to the many articles, letters, and documents that were made
available through an ever-growing underground network.  Much of this
material made its way through border security measures to be distributed
in the West.  Consequently, many people in the West have become familiar
with the civil rights movement in the Soviet Union and with many of the
main participants of this struggle and their writings.

## Typologies of Dissent

To date, most treatments of samizdat material, both in the West and
in the Soviet Union, have consisted of compilations of bulletins, docu-
ments, and articles designed to acquaint the reader with the basic problems
of the civil rights movement, the people and the groups involved, and the
details of situations involving the violation of human rights in the Soviet
Union.  The scope of the dissent movement is illustrated by the fact that
the documents and material offered for publication come from diverse
sources--individual writers expressing religious, national, and intellectual
themes.  However, it is only very lately that the writings on samizdat
attempt to devise a schema to handle the many ideologies and factions
involved in the movement and to give an overview of the issues involved.

One of the first western writers to attempt a comprehensive typology
of the ideologies involved in the dissent movement in the Soviet Union was
Robert Tokes in his book, Dissent in the USSR.[6]  His system of classifica-
tion, presented in Figure 1 below, initially identifies three ideological
positions.[7]  The first category he uses is that of the moral absolutist,

# Figure 1

## Rudolf Tokes' Typology of Dissent

Ideologies of Dissent in the USSR (1966–70)

|  | Moral-Absolutist | | Instrumental-Pragmatic | | | Militant-Anomic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | The Essential Left | Left | Center | Right | | Fundamental Right |

**The Essential Left:** Galanskov, Delone, Bukovsky, Amalrik, Ginzburg, Gorbanevskaya, Yakhimovich, Kosterin, Khaustov, Fainberg, Marchenko, Petrov-Agatov, Pisarev; Agursky

**CRIME AND PUNISHMENT:** Okudzhava, Vysotsky

**Left:** PHOENIX 66 — Yakir, Krasin, Nozhkin, Kim, Galich, Yesenin-Volpin, Grigorenko, Gabay, Razumny; Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights; Malyshko; Mandelshtam

**Center:** THE SOWER; SOCIAL PROBLEMS; POLITICAL DIARY; Chalidze; Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Tvardovsky; Plyushch, Pimenov, Rostropovich; Roy Medvedev; Zhores Medvedev, Voznesensky; "Constitutionalists"; CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS; Sociologists; "The Democrats"; Revisonist Historians; Liberal Scientists; Educational Reformers; Liberal Economists; Moscow Human Rights Committee; Dzyuba; UKRAINIAN HERALD; Union of Fighters for Political Freedom

**Right:** NOVY MIR; Yevtushenko; Ehrenburg; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; TEATR; Rendel; Levitin-Krasnov; Talantov; EXODUS (Jewish); All-Russian Christian Socialist Union; Moroz, Chornovil, Karavansky; HERALD OF SALVATION (Baptist); FRATERNAL LEAFLET (Baptist); Lithuanian Catholics; INFORMATION (Tatar); Osipov

**Fundamental Right:** Stalinists "Russian Patriots"; OKTIABR', Kochetov; DIET; THE NATION'S WORD; Crimean Tatars

a position which usually involves the proposal of an alternative morality by philosophers, writers, or religious groups. The instrumental pragmatic group includes competing interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the development of definite programs. The anomic militants represent programs of national identity or unusual alienation from the political system.[8]

Tokes admits that this classification is rudimentary, but he believes it at least indicates that, although the dissenters are not totally unified, there are definite patterns and trends which can be distinguished.[9]

Andrei Amalrik, a Soviet dissenter, uses a similar approach to examine the dissent movement in his article, "Ideologies in Soviet Society."[10] His wheel of ideologies, reproduced in Figure II below, represents ideological trends, both official and unofficial, that he has discerned in the Soviet regime. He uses the following categories to provide a schema of dissent: Neo-Stalinist Marxism, Neo-Stalinist National-ism, Neo-Slavophilism, Social-Religious ideology, Liberal Democratic ideology, and Liberal Marxism.[11]

Another approach employed to provide an overview of dissent litera-ture, used by Zev Katz in his study, Soviet Dissenters and Social Struc-ture in the USSR,[12] is given in Figure III. The framework he chooses for a typology of dissent is partially guided by the dissenters' occupations or by identification of an existing group. In this way, his method of arriving at categories is somewhat different than that employed by Tokes and Amalrik, who carry out their examination from the point of view of ideology, a factor which may or may not cut across group lines. For example, Katz offers the following categories based on the existence of

# Figure II

## Andrei Amalrik's Wheel of Ideologies

## Figure III

### Zev Katz's Schema of Dissent

**Basic Characteristics of the Major Categories of Dissent in the Soviet Union**

| | Literary | Democratic | Religious | Minority Nationalist | Great Russian Nationalist |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goals | anti-Stalinism; creative freedom; and democratic reform | anti-Stalinism; human rights; rule of law, democratic reforms | religious rights; freedom from forcible interference by the state | abolition of all forms of discrimination; repatriation; fuller national and cultural autonomy | assertion of Russianism |
| Geographic support | metropolitan | metropolitan; and provincial centers | rural; non-metropolitan; peripheral | peripheral republics and towns; sprinkling in big centers | central Russian areas |
| Publications | novels; memoirs; stories; literary journals | Khronika, 23 nos.; Social Problems (Obshchestvennye problemy), 12 nos. | e.g., Bratskii listok; Vestnik spaseniya; bulletins | Ukrainskii Visnyk; Iskhod (Exodus); bulletins; collections of papers; essays | Veche; Slovo natsii |
| Social support | writers; students | scientists; intellectuals; students; workers; some military people | peasants; workers; artisans; some intelligentsia and students | peasants; workers; intellectuals; artisans; some intelligentsia and students | intellectuals; some military and security personnel; students |
| Estimated size | several hundred writing; millions reading and listening | thousands active; tens of thousands supporting | several score of thousands active; hundreds of thousands supporting | Tatars: 300,000 to 400,000; Meskhetians: 80,000; Jews: 100,000 to 500,000; Ukrainians and Baltics: thousands active, hundreds of thousands supporting | small group writing, thousands active; mass impact on Great Russians possible |

groups: literary dissent, religious dissent, and national minorities' struggle. However, he also uses the categories of the democratic movement and Great Russian nationalism, philosophies which are not limited to a specific occupational group.[13]

Katz admits that his typology does have some drawbacks and that the given categories are not exclusive, since some individuals fit the given characteristics of two or even more groupings. However, Katz' typology is significant in that it not only uses some ideological stances to achieve the ordering of dissent literature, but also recognizes the existence of dissenters belonging to the same occupational group.[14]

Even from this small sampling of the typologies available and of the use of various categories to classify different strains of the dissent movement, the broadness of the movement and the spectrum of the theories involved are indicated.

### Dissident Perceptions of the Soviet System

This section will examine the writings of four Soviet dissenters discussing their statements on the ideology of the regime, their descriptions of the society and government, and their differing views on the future of the Soviet state. The writings of these four authors have been widely circulated in the Soviet Union through the samizdat channels. All four have also been published in the West and are considered to be backbones of the civil rights movement in the Soviet Union. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, both Nobel Prize winners, have had major roles in this movement. Roy Medvedev's study of Stalinism[15] is accepted as a valuable contribution to literature on the Stalinist period of Soviet history, and his book, On Socialist Democracy,[16] is

accepted as a document interpreting the development of the Soviet Union as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. Andrei Amalrik is a playwright and author of the political document, <u>Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?</u>,[17] a work considered essential in examining the conditions in the Soviet Union. His analysis of the content of the dissent movement is often cited by western academics.

Aside from the contribution of these authors to political literature and their pre-eminence in samizdat material, these four men represent different strains of the spect... of di..ent. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn's suggestions for the future d             the Soviet Union are somewhat reminiscent of Slavophile wriι  ..          .is call for an authoritarian but moral government differs dramatically from Sakharov, who regards the western model of democracy as an answer to the political dilemma in the Soviet Union. Roy Medvedev, a neo-Marxist, presents a penetrating, detailed analysis of Soviet society, calling for a return to the      logy which inspired the revolution of 1917 and a correct interpretation     its tenets. Amalrik, a critic of the Soviet system, does not readily offer an alternative to the present system. He points out many factors which hinder liberalization in the Soviet Union and makes it clear that the Soviet Union is a degenerating society which will eventually collapse if important, necessary changes are not made. His philosophy is an unusual pessimism that asserts the inability of both the people and the intelligentsia to initiate change. However, behind this pessimism lies a determination to support the goals of civil liberties and democratization.

A. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn:

Solzhenitsyn is a writer whose career has been frustrated by the Communist regime. Despite his prolific writing, only his novella, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch,[18] and some of his short stories have been published in the Soviet Union. Consequently, Solzhenitsyn has been forced to resort to circulation of his works in his own country through the network of samizdat.

Solzhenitsyn's own life illustrates the harsh and strict conditions about which he writes and his personal experiences form the background for many of his works. For example, he drew material for his camp stories--One Day, The Love Girl and the Innocent,[19] and The First Circle[20]--from the eight year period that he spent in different prison camps after his arrest in February of 1945 for his comments about Stalin in a personal letter to a friend.

Solzhenitsyn did not submit any of his work for pub ation until 1961; this was after the XXII Party Congress, when political speeches denouncing Stalin and which seemed to be a call for more explicit criticism of the personality cult of Stalin were made public. One Day was officially approved by Khrushchev himself and was printed in Novy Mir in November of 1962. The 100,000 copies were sold out within hours. This publication, a significant break with the past in that it was one of the first published literary works to openly discuss the years of Stalin's regime in which the camps had become an institution of the system, was introduced by the editor of Novy Mir, Alexandr Tvardovsky. Tvardovsky quoted Khrushchev's comment on the publication of One Day: "We do this so that such things can never happen again."[21]

The resulting acclaim and publicity that Solzhenitsyn received for the publication of <u>One Day</u> was short-lived; political pressures forced Khrushchev to retreat somewhat from his pursuit of personally-endorsed policies. Criticism of Solzhenitsyn in the press for his style, narrow perspectives and un-Soviet characters began to appear in January of 1963. Solzhenitsyn was obviously caught in the middle of a serious political debate of the early sixties. On one side there were those in the Communist Party who recognized the need to acknowledge and deal with the past before making plans for the future, while others feared the chain of events that such a move would produce. The controversy over <u>One Day</u> and the case presented for its publication pitted against loud protestations of Solzhenitsyn's work was symbolic of the attitudes of the Party on how to handle the subject of Stalinism.[22]

Solzhenitsyn continued to attempt to publish his work in the Soviet Union, but aside from the release of <u>Matryona's House</u>[23] in January of 1963, he was unsuccessful. In 1965, his novel, <u>The First Circle</u>, was confiscated, along with other archives. This date also marked the beginning of close police surveillance of his activities. However, Solzhenitsyn did not curtail his activities but became bolder in action and more out-spoken in statements; then, in 1970, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. He did not attend the Nobel Ceremony, fearing that during his absence from the Soviet Union his citizenship would be revoked and he would be unable to return to his country. However, in 1974, Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Soviet Union for his anti-Soviet behavior.

Solzhenitsyn has stated in his assessment of Soviet society and government that ideology plays an important role in the country. He refers to

ideology as something "like a red-hot electrode [that] has seared our souls throughout all the past fifty-five years".[24] He states that ideology is a viable force in Soviet society and that it does have an impact on the people:

> Ideology wrings our souls like floor rags; it
> corrupts us and our children; it brings us down
> below the level of animals.[25]

For Solzhenitsyn, ideology is the driving force behind the regime and the motivation for the actions of the leaders. Therefore, in Solzhenitsyn's opinion, the ideology of the regime is a major stumbling block which hinders the action necessary for the restoration of the Russian nation. He states:

> Marxist ideology is the fetid root of present
> day Soviet life, and only after we have cleaned
> ourselves of it can we begin our way back to
> mankind.[26]

In both his political statements and his literary work, Solzhenitsyn demonstrates disgust for the ideology of the system which controls men. One example, in his novel Cancer Ward,[27] is found in the character of Pavel Nikolayevich Rusanov, a party apparatchik who has worked his way up through the ranks of the Party and is fully convinced that the ideology of the Party is correct. Rusanov is presented as a weak little man who, for the sake of the cause of the Communist Party, betrayed his friends. Once in a position of power, he used his status for his own advancement and gloated at others from his position of authority. Rusanov and his wife are described as a couple who "loved the People, their great People...served the People...but as the years went by they found themselves less and less able to tolerate actual human beings, those obstinate creatures who were always resistant...."[28] By relating Rusanov's

conversation, Solzhenitsyn makes it clear that Rusanov is motivated by the ideology of the regime, which has poisoned his mind. Such characters receive little pity and much scorn from Solzhenitsyn, who delivers a scathing account of their naivete and blindness in failing to recognize the negative features of the system.

Solzhenitsyn views the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as a foreign import from the West. Declaring that this ideology is rotten to the core, he states that Stalinism was not a corruption or distortion of the Marxist formula, but was the logical conclusion of the pursuit of a Marxist utopia. He charges:

> ...it is easy to see that it was Lenin and not
> Stalin, who managed to implement all the main
> measures against the people. And...Trotsky in
> his proposals (he was not given the time to rea-
> lize them) provided the other part of Stalin's
> programme, which Stalin in fact executed. Stalin
> executed the will of Lenin and the will of Trotsky.[29]

Solzhenitsyn's writings illustrate the conditions in the society which result from adherence to this ideology. He emphasizes that the centralization carried out under the Soviet regime has had an impact on society and on the people. He underlines that centralization has resulted in "spiritual murder".[30] He refers to the society as a "stifled, suppressed society",[31] and illustrates these conditions in his work. For example, in his novel Cancer Ward, the inefficiency resulting from centralization, the overburdened staff, the unbalanced supply of materials resulting from a command economy are strong themes. Thus, Solzhenitsyn demonstrates that centralization hampers the functioning of Soviet society.

Solzhenitsyn is also concerned with the structure of Soviet society. Many of his works deal with the common folk and his

presentation of this stratum of society is disdainful of the ordinary worker who has allowed himself to be pulled down by the regime which surrounds him. In his short story Matryona's House, for example, the ordinary workers are presented as a drunken, greedy, self-centred lot who continually exploit Matryona, a saint-like martyr who uncomplainingly accepts fate. Matryona functions as an antithesis to the immorality of the villagers.[32] In this story, Solzhenitsyn seems determined to point out the faults of the ordinary working class.

This theme is presented again in One Day, where the hero of the story is a prisoner who, despite his cruel surroundings in a labor camp, maintains his integrity. This character, Shukhov, clearly believes in an ethical order where goodness, humanity, truth, and honesty rule. Solzhenitsyn contrasts his attitude with many others in the camp who have, in his opinion, become as dishonest as the system which oppresses them.[33]

Solzhenitsyn's article "The Smatterers"[34] makes some interesting comments about the intelligentsia and their relationship to the society. He points out that under Stalin's rule the ranks of the intelligentsia have swelled to include the quasi-intellectuals and the bureaucrats. Consequently, the word "intelligentsia" fails to have any real meaning today.[35] In his opinion, the intelligentsia have betrayed themselves and the society by letting themselves be absorbed into this amorphous mass now referred to as the intelligentsia and by submitting to the regime. He states that, in many cases, the intelligentsia are as passive as the ordinary folk in working toward change in the society,[36] and that the intelligentsia have betrayed the tradition of the Russian intelligentsia of the past.[37] Solzhenitsyn declares, "We [the intelligentsia] have got

what we deserve. So low have we sunk..."[38]

Solzhenitsyn, having expressed his analysis of the Soviet society in this manner, continues to assert that a wide schism between the people and the government exists. He describes the relationship between the people and the government in the following manner: "I have deliberately expressed this as a sort of fraction with the system pressing down on society from above."[39] The dominance of the government is maintained, according to Solzhenitsyn, by the totalitarian terror of the regime.[40] This is clearly illustrated in his works. Aside from his writings which describe the system of camps and the repressive measures which attempt to silence those who oppose or do not conform to the system, such works as Cancer Ward, set in the post-Stalin period, demonstrate the grip of terror which still enslaves the people. Solzhenitsyn calls the system an authoritarian regime which demands the submission of all people:

> The tsarist regime was a type of authoritarian
> system of which there have been plenty for several
> centuries in every country. But the Soviet
> regime ranks as a totalitarian system such as
> never existed anywhere on earth before. These
> regimes bring incomparable pressures and fears to
> bear on humanity because they destroy people in
> enormous numbers. And in addition they tear out
> our souls--they want to subjugate our souls and
> not just our bodies.[41]

According to Solzhenitsyn, the Communist regime will continue to oppress the Russian people until the ideology is eradicated totally from political and social life. For Solzhenitsyn, the ideology must be cast aside and replaced by a return to an ethical order to guide society. This theme is expounded again and again in Solzhenitsyn's work. The political concepts which he suggests as a possible path of future development for the Soviet Union are perhaps most concisely advanced in

Chapter Ninety of The First Circle. a chapter which was released by Solzhenit-
syn after his expulsion from the Soviet Union.[42]  Nerzhin, a character who
is considered to reflect Solzhenitsyn's own political views, stresses the
necessity of a return to morality and the need for an authority capable of
ruling the country with respect and love for the people.  And the comment
that Nerzhin makes about the West voices the opinion that Solzhenitsyn
has forwarded:

> As for the West, it has grown too self-complacent,
> values its abundance and comfort, its material
> well-being, more than anybody else's freedom or
> even its own.[43]

Solzhenitsyn insists that the Russian people must look to their own
past for the answers to the future, and not the West, whose path of devel-
opment is alien to the Soviet Union.  He condemns western political
development and institutions as unsuitable for the Soviet Union.  He in-
sists that the ideology of the present regime, which he evaluates as a
pillar of the system, must be eradicated before any positive accomplish-
ments can be made by the Russian nation.  He rejects Marxism-Leninism as
a foreign import which nurtured and justified the Stalinist era.  In his
examination of the present-day social and political order which has
resulted from adherence to this ideology, Solzhenitsyn strongly emphasizes
the centralization of the regime in all aspects of life.  Centralization
has created an insensitive, inhuman system that is alienated from the com-
mon people.  He portrays the society under the regime as divided into
three main strata:  the ruling elite who are so far removed from contact
with and sensitivity to the needs of the people; the common folk who are,
for the main part, a self-centred lot who have allowed themselves to be
pulled down by the regime; and the intelligentsia who have permitted

themselves to be absorbed into the class of bureaucrats and technocrats, thereby surrendering their effectiveness and voice for change in society. Solzhenitsyn continues to cling to the ho  of moral regeneration of the Russian society.

## B. Andrei Sakharov:

Andrei Sakharov, who devoted almost twenty years of his life to scientific investigation and achieved the distinctive title of father of the Soviet H-bomb, became involved in active dissent against the Soviet regime in the sixties. He has stated in an interview, "I developed a moral consciousness gradually in the 1950's. I suppose the turning point came when I sent a letter of protest to the Government against our atomic tests in 1958..."[44] Sakharov began to show an interest in humanitarian concerns and in the goal of peace in the period of 1957 to 1958 when Soviet military strength matched that of the United States and the frightening possibility of an arms race faced the world. However, all protests that he made, even personally to Khrushchev, were ignored. In 1962, Sakharov vigorously protested a planned atmospheric test that would have had a significant numbers of victims. He was again ignored. He considers this event as a watershed in the kindling of his consciousness and in the development of his attitude to the Soviet government. He describes his reaction when his objections were lightly turned aside:

> The feeling of importance and fright that seized
> me on that day has remained in my memory ever
> since, and it has worked much change in me as I
> moved toward my present attitude.[45]

In 1964, Sakharov took a further step in demonstrating his nonconformity by daring to broach in public the subject of the state of biological studies in the Soviet Union, an area which had been repressed for

many years. Again, he appealed to Khrushchev, this time in a lengthy
memorandum to the Soviet leader. Becoming acquainted with other citizens
who also protested the conditions in the country, Sakharov signed joint
communiques which called for the recognition of the brutalities of the
Stalinist era and the establishment of civil rights.

The publication of his book Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual
Freedom [46] in the western press and its circulation in samizdat in the
Soviet Union had a profound impact on Sakharov's lifestyle. As a result of
the reclassification of his security pass, he was taken off secret assign-
ments and his access to research projects was painfully limited. He was
demoted to the position of senior researcher at the Lebedev Institute, his
salary was drastically reduced, and his prestige diminished as he was
attacked in the Soviet press.

Yet his campaign to illustrate the injustices of the regime inten-
sified. At a 1970 International Conference on molecular physics held in
Moscow, Sakharov took the opportunity during an interval to write the
following on the demonstration blackboard:

> ACADEMICIAN ANDREI D. SAKHAROV IS IN THIS
> AUDITORIUM COLLECTING SIGNATURES FOR A PRO-
> TEST AGAINST THE PLACING OF ZHORES MEDVEDEV
> IN A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL. [47]

This is but one example of his support of persecuted political
prisoners, and he actively campaigned for the release of people such
as Valentin Moroz, Yuri Orlov, and General P. Grigorenko, who had been
imprisoned for voicing their dissatisfaction with given conditions and
the desire for civil rights. He also expressed protest at the plight of
such groups as the Jews, the Crimean Tatars, and the Baltic Germans who
were denied the right to move back to their original homelands. In all

such campaigns, he made an attempt to call world-wide attention to these problems in the Soviet Union, determined that "the facade of prosperity and enthusiasm not conceal from the world this real picture of things."[48]

In 1970, Sakharov, V. N. Chalidze, and A. N. Tverdokhlebov took a concrete step to achieve this goal in formation of a Human Rights Committee, which was dedicated to work to obtain guarantees of human rights. It was a bold step that cost Chalidze his Soviet citizenship during a lecture tour of the United States, Tverdokhlebov his position, and brought increased suspicion and repression of family for Sakharov. However, despite these conditions and the continuous threats, Sakharov continues his work for the realization of civil rights in the Soviet Union.

Sakharov's work, including his two books,[49] various interviews, memoranda to Soviet and world leaders, and short articles published abroad focusing on the theme of restrictive conditions in the Soviet Union, reflect his growing disenchantment with the regime and his determination to publicize the human repression that occurs.

Sakharov notes, in his writings, that there has been a change in his attitude toward socialism. In his much-publicized interview with Olle Stenholm,[50] Sakharov states that, during the early stages of his career, he thought that he understood socialism and considered it basically good. Eventually, he declares, he came to the stage where, "I couldn't make out whether there was anything to it but mere words and propaganda for internal and international consumption."[51] He describes his skepticism about socialism and rejects it as a "new theoretical plan... for the better organization of society."[52] He asserts that there are positive features of Soviet society, but that these result from general

human . . . . truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . experiment in the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . as an alternative. He . . . . state that . . . . . . . . . to which the regime clings is no . . . . more than . . . . to be conveniently manipulated to justify actions of the leadership. In . . . . going . . . . the ideology of the regime is meaningless.[53]

Sakharov definitely emphasizes the totalitarian and repressive aspects of the regime in his writings on the Soviet Union. He views these negative features as a consequence of the failure of the leaders to effectively deal with the issue of Stalinism, which had such a profound impact on the society. Sakharov describes the regime of Stalin as one example of "the use of demagogic, hypocritical, and monstrously cruel dictatorial police regimes".[54] Admitting that the Soviet Union has begun "cleansing away the foulness of Stalinism",[55] he declares that this process has not gone far enough, has not dealt with the total eradication of traces of the brutal past and, in essence, the fundamentals of the Soviet regime have not changed. When a memorandum Sakharov sent to Brezhnev on 5 March 1971 met with no reply, Sakharov sent a postscript in June of 1972 which included the following statement:

> The first beginnings of a moral regeneration
> of the people and the intelligentsia, which
> resulted from the curbing of the most extreme
> manifestations of the Stalinist system of blind
> terror, met with no proper understanding in the
> ruling circles. The basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> undergo any essential change.[56]

Sakharov points out that the stifling air of Stalinism lingers, prohibiting the growth of the economy and the nation and crippling the

creativity of the people. He discusses several features found in contemporary Soviet society which are directly inherited from the rule of the dictatorship. For example, a factor which he stresses repeatedly is the lack of freedom in the country and the "servitude and compulsory conformism"[57] which is expected, and demanded, from all citizens. He cites specific repressive measures such as the standardization of the press and the suppression of intellectual life. Even though the intelligentsia are particularly afflicted by the policies of the regime, the entire society is subject to the persuasion and fear instilled by the system of warnings used in the country for those who deviate from the official line.[58]

Sakharov is insistent that recognizable elements of terror still exist and that the government relies upon the fear of the people to maintain order. He states:

> The era of terror--when tortures and special
> conferences threatened everyone, when they
> seized the most devoted servants of the regime
> simply for the general count and to create an
> atmosphere of fright and submission--is now
> behind us. But we are still living in the
> spiritual atmosphere created by that era. Against
> those few who do not go along with the prevalent
> practices of compromise, the government uses
> repression as before. Together with judicial
> repression, the most important and decisive role
> in maintaining this atmosphere of internal and
> external submission is played by the power of
> the state, which manipulates all economic and
> social control levers.[59]

Sakharov also stresses that, as a result of this regime which maintains itself through the use of terror, there are still many thousands of political prisoners in Soviet camps and psychiatric hospitals. He has demonstrated the monstrous treatment of these people by making public reports of the torture and harsh conditions to which political prisoners

are exposed. He is concerned that the entire practice of detention and mistreatment of prisoners has been continued from Stalinist days.[60]

What are the consequences of these conditions in the Soviet society? Sakharov states that basic change has not and cannot occur because of "the monolith we have created which is so fossilized and so oppressive on the life of the whole country".[61] He characterizes the Soviet Union as "a society on the decline".[62] In his book, My Country and the World, Sakharov states that underneath the surface of this society is a "sea of human misery"[63] that expresses itself in alcoholism which has assumed the dimension of a national problem. He analyzes drunkenness as "one of the symptoms of the moral degeneration of a society that is sinking ever deeper into a state of chronic alcoholic poisoning".[64]

The government structure, Sakharov asserts, has been affected by the reluctance and failure of the leaders to make fundamental changes in the system. The machinery of government has become cumbersome and bureaucratic.[65] In reply to the question of an interviewer, "What concrete shortcomings do you see in today's society?", Sakharov replied:

> In lack of freedom, in the bureaucratization of
> government, in its extremely irrational and also
> terribly egoistic--that is, class-egoistic--ten-
> dency that actually aims only at preserving the
> system, maintaining a good appearance to conceal
> a very unpleasant, internal state of affairs.[66]

Sakharov declares that the regime is based on a system of privilege and in his postscript to the 1971 memorandum, he refers to "the hierarchical class structure of our society, with its system of privilege".[67] Developing this theme more extensively in his interview with Olle Stenholm, Sakharov describes the vacation, medical, career, and supplemental pay privileges of the elite as well as their access to closed shops that

stock quality items not normally carried elsew.. [68]

Sakharov's perception of the Soviet regime may be summed up with reference to two extracts from recent publications in the West. The first is from his Nobel Lecture Address delivered in absentia. [69] He expresses the opinion that the Soviet Union, as well as China, have emerged in the twentieth century as "hostile totalitarian empires with excessive power vested in a single party and government having authority over all aspects of the lives of its citizens and possessing a huge expansionalist potential..."[70]

The second statement is from Sakharov's book, My Country and the World. In an attempt to demonstrate the reality of the Soviet system which lies behind the elaborate facade, Sakharov used the following description:

> In my opinion, contemporary Soviet society can be concisely characterized as a society based on state capitalism; that is, a system differing from contemporary capitalism of the Western type by virtue of complete nationalization, a Party-State monopoly of economic affairs--and therefore in culture, ideology and other basic aspects of life.[71]

Despite the urgency for reform and Sakharov's desire to take steps to establish democracy in the Soviet Union, he emphasizes that the process must be gradual. In order to avoid the upheaval and disorientation that would result from dramatic and sudden change, he advocates maintenance of continuity:

> ...there must always be some kind of continuity and some kind of gradualness, otherwise there would again be the terrible destruction through which we passed several times and a total collapse. Thus, I of course, am inclined to gradualness. I am a liberal or a 'gradualist', if you please.[72]

Sakharov turns to the West, proclaiming his fundamental belief in a western-type democracy as "the only true guarantee for the safeguarding of human values".[73] He stresses the necessity of "the development of openness in public affairs, the rule of law, and the safeguarding of basic human rights..."[74]

. In his writings, Sakharov underlines the misery and hardship of the Soviet people which have resulted from the pursuit of socialism. He declares that the ideology of the regime, which has ceased to have any meaning, is used as justification for the actions of the leaders who are involved in power politics. This leadership employs authoritarian and totalitarian measures to maintain control. Sakharov charges that, in essence, there have not been any changes since the Stalinist era. Repeatedly emphasizing this point, he describes methods used to contr the people and the elements of terror still recognizable in society. Indeed, Sakharov's description of the system is very close--almost identical --to Friedrich and Brzezinski's original formulation of the totalitarian model and their definition of totalitarianism in terms of six factors: an official ideology; a single party (typically dominated by one man); police control and the use of terror to maintain control; a monopoly of communications; a monopoly of arms and armed forces; and a centrally controlled economy.[75] Sakharov deals with each of these factors in his work and his discussion of the system revolves around illustrations of these factors. He emphasizes totalitarian aspects of terror and control in the regime and the crushing results these features have on the people.

C.   Roy Medvedev:

Roy Medvedev, formerly a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has made important contributions to samizdat.  He is not to be confused with his twin brother, Zhores Medvedev, the biologist, who is also a Soviet dissenter.  Roy Medvedev's writings reflect his versa- tility and competency with various topics.  Although not trained as an historian, he has taught history, worked as a research associate in the pedagogical sciences as well, and has contributed to the literature on vocational training.

Medvedev became interested in encouraging reform from within the Communist Party in the post-Stalin period.  In the years from 1964-1970 or 1971, he edited a small publication called the Political Diary.[76]  This journal, which probably had a readership of one hundred, was presumably designed for those in positions of authority in the Soviet Union and offered digests of the official press as well as some reproductions of samizdat.  Apparently, Medvedev was attempting to foster critical thinking among Communists and stir support for liberalization.[77]  Albert Boiter, a writer for Radio Liberty and author of an article which summar- ized and analyzed the available twelve issues of the Political Diary, states:

> The Political Diary intellectuals are also
> thoroughly patriotic, interested in making the
> Soviet Union a healthy and strong society at
> home and increasing its influence abroad.
> They are against dogmatism, neo-Stalinism
> and anti-semitism.  The struggle against the
> rehabilitation of Stalin and the revival of
> Stalinist practices in any form is an over-
> riding concern; documentary material which
> serves to undermine the position of the neo-
> Stalinists appears to enjoy priority in the
> journal.[78]

Publication of the journal was suspended in 1970 or 1971, reportedly because of Medvedev's disinterest.[79]

In the atmosphere of liberalization of the XXII Congress of the Communist Party, Medvedev began his work, Let History Judge.[80] However, by the time the study was completed in 1968, many Party members had re-evaluated how the period of Stalinism should be dealt with, and were encouraging a tightening of command over society in order to check the increasing patterns of nonconformity. Consequently, Medvedev's book, which discussed Stalinism as a deviation from socialism, was never published in the Soviet Union.

Increased censorship and control in other sectors of society resulted in a period generally referred to as re-Stalinization. During this time, many positive aspects of the Stalinist regime were lauded while the negative features of Stalin's leadership were discreetly omitted. For example, issue #2 of the magazine Kommunist in 1969 presented memoirs of Soviet commanders who described Stalin's favorable characteristics. This issue also carried articles by other authors who warned of the danger of further criticism of the era of Stalin.[81] Medvedev wrote a scathing reply entitled "Is the Rehabilitation of Stalin Possible Today?"[82] in which he firmly counters the arguments presented in Kommunist and describes the blunders, mistakes, and cruel shortcomings of Stalin as a leader. He asserts that everyone must be aware of the truth about Stalinism so that the Soviet Union can recover from the horror of that period and proceed to build a socialist democracy.

Medvedev declares himself to be a Marxist,[83] and he interprets Marxism as an on-going process, as "a science that should be developed and enriched by new ideas and theories, while propositions that prove

to be obsolete, one-sided, or even wrong must be discarded".[84]  In his

view, Soviet development has been nothing more than a deviation from

Marxism-Leninism.  He points to the many shortcomings in the Soviet

state and declares that open discussion is needed to correct the

straying of the Party from a true interpretation and pursuit of social-

ism.[85]  Medvedev states in his book, On Socialist Democracy:

> In the last forty to forty-five years, the
> deviations from Marxism and Leninism have been
> so extensive that without penetrating scholarly
> anu political study, without the free play of
> different points of view, the party will never
> be able to get back to the right road.[86]

Indeed, Medvedev describes the present-day ideology in the Soviet

Union which is fed to the masses as "a stultified, dogmatic, distorted

and highly oversimplified version of Marxism-Leninism".[87]

From this Marxist perspective, Medvedev offers a detailed analysis

of Soviet society.  He is quick to point out, as many other writers of

samizdat, the centralization of the system.  Because of this phenomenon,

Medvedev believes that the social structure of the Soviet Union is not

really very complex.[88]  He is reluctant to resort to the use of class

divisions in his analysis of society, stating that, "As a general rule,

there are no clear cut divisions in society,"[89] and that there are usually

too many people between classes for the use of the term "class" to be

suitably applicable.  He also admits that conflict of interest exists

between different groups but that it is not really significant and

ression of these conflicts is almost non-existent...[and] virtually

tire economic and social life of our vast country is run from a

centre."[90]

edev stat that the majority of Russian society is passive and

apathetic. He declares:

> The political passivity of our population 'below'
> is...obvious. People have learned to become
> silent, and have acquired such a sense of guilt,
> that no individual dissenter--not even small
> groups of dissenters--can give rise to a mass
> movement capable of bringing about real
> political change.[91]

He finds this lower stratum of society rifled with a growing sense
of frustration and dissatisfactio., because of the nature of the regime.[92]
Medvedev maintains that the Soviet Union has made great strides in the
area of economic, social, and cultural rights since the Revolution, but
he insists that the country is "still very backward when it comes to the
whole complex of civil and political rights".[93] Even though steps have
been taken to erase shadows of Stalinism, many traces of that era still
remain today.

The intelligentsia have, in Medvedev's view, undergone change in the
post-Revolutionary period. He asserts that the inclusion of engineers and
technicians in this category has increased the numbers of intelligentsia
but has also altered the composition of this group. Although admitting that
this development has given the intelligentsia a "greater role and signifi-
cance",[94] Medvedev is reluctant to assign them the role of political
leadership.[95]

In his discussion of the nature of the Soviet government, Medvedev
emphasizes very strongly the bureaucratic features of the regime. Denoun-
cing bureaucracy as "the most serious obstacle to the advance of Soviet
society",[96] he states that bureaucracy is cumbersome, blocking the progress
of the country. Bureaucracy is in opposition to the apid economic,
scientific, and technical progress being pursued.[97] Medvedev feels that

bureaucracy is also responsible for secondary trends in society "that include a lack of consideration for individuals, a profusion of red tape, the primacy of form over content, and ineffective leadership."[98]

Although after the Revolution, the organization of the Soviets was democratic and every attempt was made to avoid bureaucratization, Medvedev claims that it was not long before bureaucratization began to penetrate every area of Soviet life. In his opinion, this process increased under Stalin:

> During the years of the Stalin cult the power
> of the state became an autonomous force. Pass-
> ivity was cultivated not only among the masses,
> but also within the ranks of the Party and all
> initiative from below was disregarded or
> suppressed.[99]

The phenomenon of bureaucracy and the leadership isolate the government from the people. Medvedev recognizes the existence of a ruling elite whom he calls "the Soviet establishment".[100] According to Medvedev, all members of this elite are "united by a mass of material and other privileges."[101] However, he states that it would be misleading to present the leadership as totally unified and the existence of factional struggles within the Party must be recognized. There are a variety of opinions within the leadership and different philosophies among Party members, some of whom favor the return to Stalinist methods, while others support basic reform.[102] But, Medvedev assesses the present leadership as ineffective and incapable of introducing change:

> The system of leadership and management that has
> become established in our country is incapable
> of solving, quickly and correctly, many problems
> of importance for the further development of
> society. Moreover, the administrative apparatus
> of this system tends to become isolated from the

> masses and is often inclined to take important
> decisions on the basis of its own interests as
> an apparatus rather than on the basis of society's
> interests as a whole.[103]

The government is characterized by a hierarchal arrangement with "the absence of accountability from the top down."[104] Medvedev asserts that although the leaders are aware of domestic problems, they attempt to stifle any existing protest. Medvedev thus depicts the Soviet government as an unwieldy, top-heavy bureaucracy that is unresponsive not only to the needs of the people but also to the needs of the society where change is necessary in order to maintain social, economic, and technical progress.

From his analysis of the Soviet Union, Medvedev advances theories about the possibility of accommodating change in the future. He rejects the likelihood of change introduced by the masses or the intelligentsia, insisting that initiative must originate from within the leadership of the Party. He notes that pressures from the international community may help set the proper atmosphere for change, but he insists that, in the end, "the main, the substantial change can be achieved only by the country's internal forces."[105]

He acknowledges that change will not occur automatically and that it should result from a carefully initiated plan. Medvedev hopes that the people will participate in the development of such a plan:

> Of course I know that democratization cannot
> come about automatically and have no illusions
> about the difficulty of the struggle. But all
> the same, it is wrong to exclude the possibility
> of an alliance between the best of the intelli-
> gentsia supported by the people and the most
> forward-looking individuals in the governing
> apparat.[106]

Medvedev adamantly believes that this change, which must take place, is not a rejection of the socialist society, but rather a re-examination of the development of contemporary society. Gradually, steps for reconstruction must be taken. He states:

> We can proceed only from the possibilities of a society which exists in the USSR, and which is neither a state-capitalist society, as some allege, nor a society of 'developed' or 'mature' socialism, as is alleged by others. We can only proceed from the social consciousness which has already been formed among our people, and which will not turn either toward ancient Orthodoxy or towards capitalism. The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens are unquestionably in favor of the socialist path of development for our society... There is, therefore, no real path of development in the Soviet Union other than the perfection, in theory and practice, of socialist society, no other path than that of transition from primitive bureaucratized variants of socialism and pseudo-socialism to socialism with a human face.[107]

Roy Medvedev is a self-declared Marxist who favors reform from within the existing system. He describes the present regime as a centralized bureaucracy. In his evaluation, the basic contradiction in society will eventually dictate change: bureaucracy stifles change. The government is led by a group of short-sighted men who are presently incapable of introducing the necessary change, but Medvedev hopes that this leadership will eventually be forced to introduce reform designed to construct a truly socialist society. The first step to this recovery, Medvedev claims, is open discussion in the regime which now restricts and monitors all activities.

Medvedev's analysis of the Soviet Union is somewhat reminiscent of the tenets of the modernization model. He emphasizes economic and technocratic trends which will eventually dictate change in the society.

In Medvedev's opinion, economics and modernizing factors will determine the future development of the country, turning it from a bureaucratic dictatorship into a socialist democracy. This is a premise usually associated with the western model of modernization applied to analysis of the Soviet Union.

## D.  Andrei Amalrik:

Andrei Amalrik is a Soviet historian whose education was interrupted by his expulsion from the University of Moscow. Amalrik refused to revise his Masters' thesis, which had originally stated that the early Russian state owed a great deal to the Normans for the development of its culture and civilization. This statement, denounced by authorities as anti-Soviet and as tarnishing to the glory and independence of the Russian state, left Amalrik unable to work in the field for which he had been trained. Following a period of part-time and temporary jobs which sometimes included unskilled labor positions, Amalrik was arrested in May 1965 for anti-Soviet activity resulting from his liaisons with foreign correspondents, underground Soviet writers, and others whose reliability was questioned by the state police. This charge, dropped during legal proceedings, was replaced by the parasite charge because Amalrik had not been holding a steady, socially useful job. Sentenced to two and a half years of exile on a kolkhoz in Siberia, Amalrik had served about half of this term when, through the efforts of his friends and of his lawyer, the parasite charge was cancelled and he returned to Moscow.

However, in spite of the censure of the regime, Amalrik did not halt his activities. He continued to write and live as he pleased, with no thought of conforming to the usual life-style of workers in the Soviet

Union.  In 1968, Amalrik and his wife picketed the British Embassy in Moscow, protesting the supply of arms to Nigeria in the Biafran War. Consequently, he was observed by the Soviet police until his arrest in May 1973 when he was sentenced to three years of hard labor.  He was finally expelled by the regime in July of 1976.

Amalrik does not involve himself in the squabble over ideologies, a popular topic among dissidents.  Of the four Soviet authors discussed in this section, Amalrik and Medvedev are somewhat similar in style and both attempt to present concrete details and analyses.  Amalrik appears to strive for a measure of objectivity in his writing, to present an undistorted picture.  Even in his personal story, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, [108] his presentation remains somewhat detached and he devotes much attention to the attitudes and actions of the regime.  However, unlike either Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, or Medvedev, Amalrik aligns himself with no ideological stance, letting his work rest independently on its own merits.

Amalrik has written two books and various articles which have been widely circulated in the West.  His books, Involuntary Journey to Siberia and Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, offer some very interesting comments and opinions about the present-day situation in the Soviet Union and about the role of the democratic movement in the future development of the country.

In his book, 1984, a result of his observations of and experiences in the Soviet regime, Amalrik describes the Soviet government as a bureaucratic, stagnant machine that crushes society beneath its weight. For Amalrik, recognition of the bureaucratic nature of the government is essential in understanding events in the Soviet Union.  Power is

concentrated in the hands of the elite of the regime, but Amalrik claims
that these people have no idea how to use it constructively. He states:
"Not only are they incapable of conceiving new ideas, they regard any
novel thought as an assault on their own prerogatives."[109]

Yet Amalrik declares that the elite are passive; their only concern
is survival and the preservation of their privileged and powerful position.
Consequently, the rulers operate in an arbitrary manner, based on the
immediate needs of the regime. Amalrik describes the resulting crisis in
the following manner:

> In order to remain in power, the regime must
> change and evolve, but in order to preserve
> itself, everything must remain unchanged.[110]

Despite this crisis situation, Amalrik charges that, "There are
only isolated and unco-ordinated attempts at emergency repairs by tinker-
ing in various ways with the bureaucratic machine."[111] Meanwhile, the regime
pursues survival, and operates in the arbitrary manner designed to achieve
this goal.

A consequence of this phenomenon of arbitrariness in Soviet
society is the operation of the judicial system, a target for Amalrik's
dissecting examination and criticism. In his book, Involuntary Journey to
Siberia, Amalrik describes his own personal experiences with the judicial
system when he was caught in its machinery. Amalrik outlines the
process through which he arrives at the painful realization that his trial
and his opportunity to defend himself were complete farces, and that the
court proceedings also were a meaningless sham, nothing more than the
staging of a necessary step in the legal process:

> I did not yet regard my case as lost: my trial was
> still to come and I hoped then to answer all the
> arguments of the police, naively failing to
> realize that the trial was just as much a formality
> as the policeman's report or the questioning of my
> father, and that the outcome of my case had been
> decided at the very moment at which it was begun.[112]

Amalrik even tells how the investigator admitted to him that the
entire procedure was a game and that the verdict had been decided before
the trial convened. According to Amalrik, the judge of the case behaved
in an "unfair, prejudiced, and illegal manner."[113] With these and other
details of his long wait in prison for trial, the conditions of the
prisons, treatment of prisoners, and the ineptness of the handling of his
papers, Amalrik clearly demonstrates what he considers the arbitrary,
inefficient, and inhuman judicial and administrative procedures of the
country.

Having established that the bureaucratic elite of the regime are
passive, unwilling and unable to accommodate change, Amalrik then examines
the structure of the society and the nature of its groups to explore the
possibility of reform originating outside the leadership. He suggests that
specialists in the Soviet Union who have emerged as a result of post-war
industrial and scientific progress have a better-than-average standard
of living and would benefit most from the rule of law. This new class would
therefore provide a logical basis for the growth of the democratic movement.[114]

However, Amalrik cites three factors which are in opposition to
this development in the Soviet society. Firstly, there is the deadening
mediocracy and greyness of these specialists which has emerged when the
most independent and active members of society were deliberately eliminated.
Secondly, this "middle class", although recognizing the need for democratic
reforms, is immobilized by its inactivity and conviction of the

inability to accomplish anything in the given conditions. Thirdly, this stratum of society, in its role as state employees, tends to become passive and automaton-like, merely punching the time clock and leaving things unchanged.[115] Amalrik concludes that this class of specialists is an enigma in Russian society--a class that recognizes the need for change but because of its very position is unwilling to initiate democratic reforms. He states:

> Consequently we are faced with an interesting phenomenon. Although there exists in our country a social class capable of comprehending the principles of personal freedom, rule of law and democratic government, a class that needs those principles and provides the emerging Democratic Movement with its basic contingent of supporters, the vast majority of this class is so mediocre, its ways of thinking are so much those of the government employee, and its intellectually most dependent members are so passive that the success of a Democratic Movement based on it seems to me to be gravely in doubt.[116]

Because of the possibility of questioning the success of this middle class in building the democratic movement into a viable force in the Soviet Union, Amalrik turns to the issue of the ability of the democratic movement to find a solid base of support in the masses. Yet, Amalrik has little faith in the capacity of the people to exert enough pressure for democratic and civil rights. In his opinion, the Russian people are unable to conceive and properly understand a notion of freedom.

> Whether because of its historical traditions or for some other reason, the idea self-govern-ment, of equality before the la d of personal freedom--and the responsibility that goes with these--are almost completely incomprehensible to the Russian people.[117]

According to Amalrik, the concept of democracy is so alien to the

Russian people that they will probably never actively support a move-
ment whose aim is the achievement of democracy within the country.  He
contends that, "To the majority of the people the  very word 'freedom'
is synonymous with 'disorder' "[118] and that their notion of justice sug-
gests that "nobody should live better than I do."[119]  Given the background
of the low cultural level and social disorientation of the masses,
Amalrik insists that this distorted notion of justice and force is the
only thing  the masses understand.[120]

In summation, Amalrik views Soviet society as a bureaucratic, inhuman
machine controlled by an elite that does not want its status altered.
However, there are too many internal conditions within the Soviet Union
which press for reform and which will eventually  create a crisis situa-
tion; the existence of nationalities, inequality, agricultural problems,
and external relations will necessitate drastic change and possible
upheaval.  Amalrik is rather skeptical about the possibility of change
resulting from the efforts of dissenters.  He thinks that the middle
class, which forms the most likely basis for organized  dissent, is
generally passive and unwilling to become involved in democratic
reforms.  The broad mass of the population has no concept of freedom
or of the aims of the democratic movement.  Amalrik describes the rigid-
ity of the government which results from this composition of the society
and the nature of the ruling elite.  In his view, the Soviet Union is:

> ...a caste-ridden and immobile society, a rigid
> governmental system which openly clashes with
> the need for economic development, general
> bureaucratization and the existence of a privi-
> leged class, and national animosities within a
> multinational state in which certain nations
> enjoy privileged status.[121]

Amalrik's writings tend to be rather pessimistic about the future of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. He offers no concrete alternative for the salvation of the Russian nation. He suggests, however, that if future reforms are to succeed, they must be the consequence of the execution of a deliberate plan. He states that the people, bewitched by a growing sense of freedom--in comparison to former days--and by an improvement in the standard of living, have become hopeful of further and progressive reforms. Amalrik describes this hope, based on the belief in the eventual triumph of reason over tyranny and dictatorship and in the positive influence of western culture in the Soviet Union, as naive.[122] To Amalrik, the improvement in the standard of living in the Soviet Union is only incidental to the political situation and liberalization, in his opinion, does not occur accidently.

Amalrik offers no solutions to alleviate the situation in the Soviet Union and his analysis generates a sense of pessimism. Yet, Amalrik's involvement in the human rights movement indicates his hope for reform in his country.

## Summary

All four contributors to dissent literature who have been examined in this section approach their topic in different manners. This is most vividly reflected in their discussions of ideology. For Solzhenitsyn, ideology is a very important factor which must be dealt with before the reconstruction and reform of the Soviet regime. For him, Marxism-Leninism is a foreign import that has strangled development of the Russian nation and has poisoned the system. Medvedev, on the other hand, accepts the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism as desirable goals for society and believes that the doctrine of socialism is part of the consciousness of the Russian people and the only possible rational path of future development. Sakharov maintains that the ideology of the regime is meaningless and only camouflages the power politics of the government. Amalrik, by not discussing ideology in his works, renders it insignificant. He probably holds the opinion similar to that of Sakharov, who finds that the people no longer believe ideological proclamations. Their differing opinions of ideology are, of course, also reflected in their views of the future path of development in the Soviet Union. Both Amalrik and Solzhenitsyn point out that a western type of democracy is foreign to the Russian experience and that the masses, incapable of understanding democratic reform, will not likely support it. Sakharov disagrees and states unreservedly that the only fulfillment of the people and of the state is found in pursuing western democracy--the only guarantee of civil liberties and freedom for the average citizen. Medvedev continues to hope for Russia's salvation by correcting the deviations from Marxism-Leninism that have occurred in the Soviet Union, and by building a socialist society that will overcome the

ills and shortcomings of contemporary Soviet society.

However, despite these different ideological stances, it is interesting that all four authors use the same words and phrases to describe the nature of the Soviet government. All refer to the centralized, totalitarian, and bureaucratic features of the regime, and all describe the existence of a passive, ineffective elite extremely isolated from the people. Sakharov, Medvedev, and Amalrik explicitly refer to the inability of the leadership to accommodate change, and Solzhenitsyn, the more literary of the four, elucidates this point in many of his writings.

All four writers comment upon the lingering effects of Stalinism which continue to suppress society and cripple its development. They all emphasize the passivity and ineffectiveness of the entire society. Solzhenitsyn underlines that it is a society which has lost its values; Sakharov suggests that the national problem of alcoholism demonstrates the decline of the nation; Medvedev accuses the population of passivity, of having become silent and inactive; Amalrik also emphasizes the inertia of the system which is caused by the passivity of the specialists, but also by the people who wordlessly accept their lot.

It should be noted that these authors emphasize different aspects of the Soviet regime, despite the use of similar terminology. For example, the nature of Solzhenitsyn's work is essentially different from that of the other three writers since his political statements are presented in literary works. But, his political comments are as clear and developed as in the works of any other dissident writer. He is concerned in his work with humanity and morality in the Soviet Union, with the lack or loss of standards in society. In contrast, Sakharov describes the totalitarian nature of the regime very precisely and the terror

that it has caused the people. This is not to state that Sakharov is not

concerned with the theme of morality, but, in general, the impression one

is left with after reading Sakharov's work is his emphasis and description

of the totalitarian features of the regime. Medvedev, again, does not

ignore these features, but all his writings point to the bureaucratic

features of the system and its hindrance to progress. He is concerned

that the system has become immobile and rigid, not open to change or to

discussion. Amalrik's concern--the passivity of the people and the leaders--

is close to that of Medvedev, but has a different flavor which takes on a

pessimism despite his general hope for attainment of the goals of demo-

cracy and civil liberties.

Given the closed nature of the Soviet society and the existing

censorship, it is not surprising that discussion about perceptions of the

Soviet society is limited among the dissenters. It is difficult to

obtain much of the samizdat literature and discussion of the material

must be held in private. However, in some of the samizdat writings,

there are comments that demonstrate a limited access to underground writings

and documents. For example, Medvedev makes some stinging comments about

the anthology From Under the Rubble, which was edited by Solzhenitsyn,

criticizing its ideological stance and its absolute rejection of

socialism.[123] Medvedev also describes the journal Kontinent as a

"journal...addressing itself in the main not to the East, but to the West

and that its principal task is to turn Western intelligentsia and youth

against Marxism and socialism."[124]

Kontinent also demonstrates one dimension of this dialogue

among dissenters in its treatment of "The Solzhenitsyn/Sakharov Debate"

about the place of ideology in the regime. This journal not only printed

Sakharov's criticism of Solzhenitsyn's <u>Letter to the Soviet Leaders</u>,[125] but also Solzhenitsyn's reply to this criticism.[126] Such publications illustrate the existence of a limited discussion among the dissenters as they present their views and descriptions of Soviet society and government. However, discussion has definitely not developed to the extent of debate among social scientists in the West about models of Soviet government and it is limited by the regime. Contributions to discussion about the Soviet regime and society are sporadic in the Soviet Union.

Chapter IV

Endnotes

[1] Ilya Ehrenburg, The Thaw (London: Harvill, 1955).

[2] Marc Slonim, Soviet Russian Literature: Writers and Problems, 1917-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 303.

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[4] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch, trans. Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963). [Hereafter cited as One Day].

[5] Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the U     Dissent 22 (Spring 1975), p. 138.

[6] Rudolf Tokes, Dissent in the USSR (b   ι    : John Hopkins University, 1975).

[7] Ibid., p. 15.

[8] Tokes, Dissent in the USSR, pp. 13-14.

[9] Ibid., p. 14.

[10] Andrei Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society", trans. Hilary Sternberg, Survey 22 (Spring 1976), pp. 1-11.

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[12] Zev Katz, Soviet Dissenters and Social Structure in the USSR (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971).

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[15] Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, ed. David Joravsky and George Haupt, trans. Colleen Taylor (New York: Vintage Books, 1971). [Hereafter cited as Let History Judge].

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[20] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>The First Circle</u>, trans. Thomas Whitney (New York: Bantam Books, 1969).

[21] Chistopher Moody, <u>Solzhenitsyn</u> (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1973), p. 13.

[22] Ibid., p. 14

[23] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>Matryona's House and Other Stories</u>, trans. Michael Glenny (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975).

[24] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, "Sakharov and the Criticism of 'A Letter to the Soviet Leaders' ", trans. Barry Rubin, in <u>Kontinent I and II</u> [English language edition with selections from Vol. I and II of the original Russian edition], ed. Vladimir Maximov (New York: Anchor Press, 1976), p. 16.

[25] Ibid., p. 17.

[26] Ibid., p. 18.

[27] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>Cancer Ward</u>, trans. Nicholas Bethall and David Burg (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969).

[28] Ibid., p. 213.

[29] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>Press Conference</u> (Stockholm), 12 December 1974, trans. Christopher Barnes, <u>Radio Liberty Dispatch</u> (3 June 1975, supplement), p. 10.

[30] Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>Letter to the Soviet Leaders</u>, trans. Hilary Sternburg, <u>Sunday Times</u> (London), 3 March 1974.

[31]Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, <u>Press Conference</u> (Zurich), 16 November 1974, trans. Christopher Barnes and Roy Glashan, <u>Radio Liberty Dispatch</u> (14 February 1975, supplement), p. 4.

[32]See fn. 23.

[33]See fn. 4.

[34]Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, "The Smatterers", trans. Michael Scammell et al., <u>From Under the Rubble</u> (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 229-279.

[35]Ibid., p. 242.

[36]Ibid., p. 248.

[37]Ibid., p. 251.

[38]Ibid., p. 252.

[39]Solzhenitsyn, <u>Press Conference</u>, 12 December 1974, p. 20.

[40]Solzhenitsyn, <u>Press Conference</u>, 16 November 1974, p. 23.

[41]Solzhenitsyn, <u>Press Conference</u>, 12 December 1974, p. 23.

[42]This chapter was originally published in <u>Vestnik RChd</u> (YMCA) 114, IV, 1974, pp. 193-203. The comments on and quotes from this chapter are made on the basis of the summary by Laszlo Tikos, "Solzhenitsyn Publishes Two More Missing Chapters from <u>The First Circle</u>", <u>Radio Liberty Dispatch</u> 306/75 (25 July 1975).

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[44]Jay Axelbank, "A Voice Out of Russia", <u>Observer</u> (London), 3 December 1972, p. 29.

[45]Andrei Sakharov, <u>Sakharov Speaks</u>, ed. Harrison Salisbury (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 34.

[46]Andrei Sakharov, "Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom", in <u>Sakharov Speaks</u>, pp. 56-114.

[47] Zhores Medvedev, "The Sakharov I Knew", _Observer_ (London), July 1974, p. 9.

[48] Sakharov, _Sakharov Speaks_, p. 44.

[49] Sakharov, "Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom", pp. 56-114; and
Andrei Sakharov, _My Country and the World_, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).

[50] Andrei Sakharov, "Interview with Olle Stenholm, Swedish Radio Correspondent", 3 July 1973, in _Sakharov Speaks_, pp. 166-178.

[51] _Ibid._, p. 167.

[52] _Ibid._, p. 172.

[53] Andrei Sakharov, "On Alexander Solzhenitsyn's 'A Letter to the Soviet Leaders' ", trans. Geoffrey Hosking, in _Kontinent_ I and II, p. 16.

[54] Sakharov, "Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom", in _Sakharov Speaks_, p. 79.

[55] _Ibid._, p. 83.

[56] Andrei Sakharov, "Postscript to Memorandum" [sent to Brezhnev, March 1971], in _Sakharov Speaks_, p. 155.

[57] Sakharov, _My Country and the World_, pp. 14-15.

[58] Andrei Sakharov, "Interview with Foreign Correspondents", 21 August 1973, in _Sakharov Speaks_, p. 195.

[59] Sakharov, _Sakharov Speaks_, pp. 42-43.

[60] Sakharov, "Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom", p. 93.

[61] Sakharov, "Interview with Olle Stenholm", p. 177.

[62] _Ibid._, p. 168.

[63] Sakharov, _My Country and the World_, p. 13.

[64]Ibid., p. 154.

[65]Sakharov, "Postscript to Memorandum", p. 155.

[66]Sakharov, "Interview with Olle Stenholm", p. 168.

[67]Sakharov, "Postscript to Memorandum", p. 155.

[68]Sakharov, "Interview with Olle Stenholm", pp. 169-170.

[69]Andrei Sakharov, "Peace, Progress and the Rights of Man", Samizdat Bulletin #35 (March 1976), n. p.

[70]Ibid., p. 2.

[71]Sakharov, My Country and the World, p. 14.

[72]Sakharov, "Interview with Olle Stenholm", p. 175.

[73]Sakharov, "Postscript to Memorandum", p. 153.

[74]Ibid., p. 153.

[75]See pp. 15-18.

[76]Gretchen Brainerd, Director, Information Services, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, personal letter to the author, Edmonton, Alberta, 16 August 1976.

[77]Albert Boiter, "Notes on the 'Political Diary' ", Radio Liberty Research Paper # 43 (1971), p. 2.

[78]Ibid., p. 3.

[79]Gretchen Brainerd, Personal letter.

[80]See fn. 15.

[81]Robert Slusser, "A Soviet Historian Evaluates Stalin's Ro History", American Historical Review 77 (December 1972), p. 1392.

[82]Roy Medvedev, "Vozmozhno li segodnia reabilitirovat' Stalina?: Otkrytoe pis'mo v zhurnal Kommunist"

[83]Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. xx.

[84]Ibid., p. xx.

[85]Roy Medvedev, "What Lies Ahead for Us?', trans. Brian Pearce, New Left Review #87-88 (September-December 1974), p. 70.

[86]Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 50.

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[90]Ibid., p. xviii.

[91]Roy Medvedev, "Problems of Democratization and Detente", in Detente and Socialist Democracy: A Discussion with Roy Medvedev, ed. Ken Coates (New York: Monad Press, 1975), p. 18.

[92]Ibid., p. 19.

[93]Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 36.

[94]Ibid., p. 305.

[95]Ibid., p. 309.

[96]Ibid., p. 296.

[97]Ibid., p. xix.

[98]Ibid., pp. 291-292.

[99]Ibid., pp. 294-295.

[100]Medvedev, "Problems of Democratization and Detente", p. 145.

[101]Ibid., p. 145.

[102] Ibid., 46.

[103] Medvedev, "What Lies Ahead for Us?", p. 73.

[104] Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 291.

[105] Medvedev, "Problems of Democracy and Detente", pp. 140-141.

[106] Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, p. 313.

[107] ...vedev, "What Lies Ahead for Us?", pp. 67-68.

[108] Andrei Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, trans. Manya Harari and Max Hayward (London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1970).

[109] Amalrik, 1984, p. 22.

[110] Ibid., p. 22.

[111] Ibid., p. 30.

[112] Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 57.

[113] Ibid., p. 116.

[114] Amalrik, 1984, p. 18. Amalrik employs the term Democratic Movement to describe the group who are actively supporting the goal of the establishment of democracy and civil rights in the Soviet Union.

[115] Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[116] Ibid., p. 21.

[117] Ibid., p. 33.

[118] Ibid., p. 34.

[119] Ibid., p. 35.

[120] Ibid., p. 36.

[121] Ibid., p. 43.

[122] Ibid., p. 30.

[123] Roy Medvedev, "Problems of General Concern", in Detente and Socialist Democracy:  A Discussion with Roy Medvedev, p. 151.

[124] Ibid., p. 154.

[125] Sakharov, "On Alexander Solzhenitsyn's 'A Letter to the Soviet Leaders' ", pp. 2-14.

[126] Solzhenitsyn, "Sakharov and the Criticism of 'A Letter to the Soviet Leaders' ", pp. 14-23.

# Chapter V
## CONCLUSIONS

In the West, the totalitarian model of Soviet government dominated communist studies for many years, notably during the fifties. This situation altered in the sixties when scholars began to recognize change in the Soviet Union following de-Stalinization. Consequently, many academics felt that the totalitarian model was no longer adequate and they began to search for alternatives. It was at this point that the scientific trend in the social sciences influenced communist studies as concepts and terminology were borrowed from comparative studies.

The influence of comparative methodology on communist studies has changed the tone of western scholarship. Emphasis on the unique characteristics of the Soviet Union, which had existed during the reign of the totalitarian model, has been replaced. The trend of the now-existing comparative era of communist studies is to highlight similariti between western and communist systems. The major models--the bureaucrat Kremlinological, the interest group, the modernization models--all draw parallels between western governments and the Soviet regime.

Adoption of the comparative approach in communist studies has also caused some problems. There tends to be a paucity of studies and reliable data on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which makes comparative-based surveys difficult.[1] In addition, communist studies have been traditionally area based and for many years were somewhat isolated from the development of methodological advances. Exposure to comparative analysis has pressured scholars in communist studies to adopt

model-building. However, comparative methodology has not been universally accepted by scholars in communist studies and many of the scholars who have experimented with the construction of models have not adapted well to the use of comparative terminology. There is still disagreement over the concept and definition of a model.[2]

As a consequence of these factors, the models constructed in communist studies seem to be overly simplistic in their representation of Soviet government and society. Although a model is designed to be a simplified version of reality, the models in communist studies do not seem to be comprehensive reflections of Soviet reality. For example, Alfred Meyer, one of the main proponents of the bureaucratic model, admits that this model is meant to complement the totalitarian model.[3] Therefore, the bureaucratic model becomes a mere addendum to the totalitarian model rather than an independent analytical framework. The Kremlinological model is designed to penetrate the smoke-screen of Soviet ideology, to discover the real power situation in the regime. Yet, it also seems to be a compensation for a shortcoming of the totalitarian model--over-emphasis of ideology. By H. Gordon Skilling's own admission, "the interest group concept does not offer a complete model of the Soviet political system..."[4] He points out that although interest groups are not the most important feature of the political process, their exclusion from other models distorts the picture of Soviet politics.[5] The modernization model is the only model which attempts to present an overall explanation of the development of the Soviet political process. However, the significant defects of this model must be recognized.

The bureaucratic, Kremlinological, and interest group models appear to be reactions to the dogmatism of the totalitarian model and its

domination of communist studies. These models attempt to emphasize factors overlooked by the totalitarian model but they do not endeavor to formulate a framework to explain the working of the Soviet system. The modernization model is the only model from comparative communist studies which strives for a comprehensive interpretation.

These problems with the comparative approach in general and the existing models of communist government in particular have led to support of the use of a combination of approaches. Many scholars are dubious about employing only models in the analysis of communist governments. Rudolf Tokes, for example, declares in his book, Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's, that "the introduction into Soviet studies of semantic, culture-bound neologisms and intellectually barren model-building exercises [have] thus far produced neither the kind of new evidence nor original insight that their proponents have claimed."[6] Charles Gati, in his introduction to the Symposium on Communist Foreign Policy, states that scholars should recognize that there are aspects of communist studies "that do not readily lend themselves to a strictly scientific inquiry".[7] He concludes that methodological pluralism should be developed and that "A 'party line' can erode the necessary diversity of American scholarship on the Communist countries. Once it was a subtle form of the Cold War mentality; now it is the harmful trend toward methodological uniformity."[8]

Debate on the relationship between communist studies and the academic disciplines continues, as does the discussion of the methodology to be used. It is a theme that will be constantly explored as western social scientists gain further information about Soviet bloc countries and as there are changes in the methodological persuations of scholars.

The wide-spread phenomenon of identifiable dissent in the Soviet Union resulted from de-Stalinization. Dissent became apparent when new styles and themes contrary to those associated with socialist realism were used. By the 1960's, some dissent literature assumed a political nature. This was not only the era of Solzhenitsyn's literary work which incorporated many political themes, but also of the circulation of many political documents and memoranda to officials. Materials, documents, and protests of this era became bolder and more condemnatory of the regime and conditions in society.

With the appearance of political dissent, there was a definite attempt to base criticisms of the regime on personal or group experience, or on available data. Literary works which had shrouded their political messages gave way to underground distribution of political material which attempted to arrive at an overall view of society and its development. Even Solzhenitsyn, whose early works are fictional treatments of political themes, endeavours in his later books, such as the volumes of the Gulag Archipelago,[9] to document names and facts of the Stalinist years. His themes are no longer portrayed through fictional characters, but through real inmates of the camps. Roy Medvedev searches for an historical basis for his comments about Soviet society and illustrates many of his points by describing specific trends in the Party. Amalrik also offers some statistics to portray conditions in society. Even Sakharov, who tends to be emotional, adopts a more organized, methodical approach to his subject matter in his later works. His early writings are mere protestations of specific injustices he wishes to call to the attention of the authorities; his later work is a more comprehensive treatment designed to acquaint readers with the overall situation in

the Soviet Union.

The trend in the writings of these authors is illustrative of
the trend in <u>samizdat</u> in general. Early literary samizdat often developed
into political documents and material. The current trend is to support
arguments with specific documentation, incorporating some generalizations
about the Soviet regime.

One of the latest developments in dissent literature is the
alignment of writers with specific ideological stances. These ideo-
logical positions are not just artificial categorizations imposed by
western scholars but, as much of the discussion among dissenters
indicates, they are factors considered important by dissenters them-
selves. The dimension of ideology has resulted in more sophisticated,
more complex dissent literature being circulated.

Despite differences in ideological beliefs of the authors examined
in this study, all writers underline the same characteristics of the
Soviet regime; its arbitrariness, totalitarian features, and bureaucratic
tendencies. All refer to a ruling elite who are passive and incapable
of initiating change, and all consider the topic of Stalinism to be
important in describing the regime. Sakharov, Medvedev, Solzhenitsyn, and
Amalrik may differ in their approaches, but the terms they use are
similar.

Medvedev is the only writer of those examined who explores the
theme of modernization and its impact on the Soviet Union. He believes
that economic and technocratic factors which account for progress in the
country will eventually create change. This analysis has overtones of
the western modernization model. Sakharov's hope for change in his country
is also linked to economic progress and scientific advancement. However,

in his estimation, detente and western pressure for observance of human rights in the Soviet Union play a decisive role in effecting change. Therefore, his analysis of Soviet development has only a few statements in common with the western notion of modernization.

Beside underlining similar characteristics of the Soviet regime, writings of the four authors have the same tone of moral indignation aimed at the Soviet government. Despite the appearance of political samizdat and the use of more methodical treatments of subject matter, this underlying tone of samizdat remains. It is hardly surprising since the purpose of dissent writing is to highlight moral and human injustices in the Soviet system.

A comparison of models of western social scientists and the perceptions of Soviet dissenters reveals both similarities and differences in the two bodies of literature. The terms that Soviet dissenters employ. in describing the Soviet regime--bureaucratic, totalitarian, managed by a passive elite--are not in contradiction with the conclusions of many western social scientists. In pointing to the essential features of the Soviet system, both Soviet and non-Soviet writers agree on the use of certain terms. Whether or not this is a result of exposure to western writings on the Soviet system or through listening to radio stations from the West which broadcast in the Soviet Union is difficult to determine. However, some samizdat writers exhibit familiarity with western writers. Sakharov, for example, has many references in his My Country and the World to the ideological stances of western writers[10] and Medvedev also mentions communist writers from the United States and Europe.[11] From such evidence, it is possible to conclude that there is a limited discourse between Soviet and non-Soviet writers that contributes to cross

fertilization of ideas and concepts. The similarity of terms used in indicating the essential features of the Soviet system are undeniable. This similarity does not overshadow the distinctive differences between the writings of Soviet dissenters and western social scientists, especially with regard to the aim of writing and methodology. While western social scientists generally use comparative methods of analysis today, dissenters emphasize the totalitarian features of the Soviet regime; western scholars tend to accentuate similarities between the Soviet Union and the West whereas dissenters stress the unique characteristics of the Soviet government which result in the repression of many individual freedoms. The Soviet writers are expressing ethical judgments on their system and are attempting to illustrate the violation of human rights on the part of the government. There is a discernible trend in samizdat literature which shows the adoption of mor ncrete and documented studies, but there is still a definite lack ective study by this group. Not only are dissenters hampered by restricted information but they are so emotionally involved in the issue that to achieve an objective perspective is virtually impossible. They have not been exposed to some of the scientific methodology which is available and so fashionable in the West.

On the other hand, western social scientists are attempting to find universal schemas for describing and analyzing political systems. They are not concerned with moral judgments but with objectivity and methodology. Western social scientists are striving to conduct a scientific inquiry that will produce a pattern for understanding all political systems. And it is this scientific approach and use of comparative methodology

which makes western writing on the Soviet Union so different from Soviet political literature.

The comparison of models of western scholars and perceptions of Soviet dissenters raises an important matter. The existence of the phenomenon of dissent in the Soviet Union should lead western social scientists to examine the adequacy of existing models to account for dissent. None of the present models attempt this. Rudolf Tokes, in his book, <u>Dissent in the USSR</u>, states that dissent is an occurrence which definitely undermines western notions of the totalitarian model as it now exists:

> The sudden availability of more than 1500
> uncensored self-published documents that have
> been smuggled out of the USSR by sympathetic
> Western travelers (many others have yet to
> reach the West) touching on virtually all
> aspects of Soviet life should, therefore,
> compel us to take a fresh look at the state
> of the arts and reconsider some of our possibly
> outdated views about the nature of Soviet
> society and politics.[12]

Of course before assigning a specific place to the dissent movement in Soviet politics, several things must be decided. For example, it is difficult to determine the exact impact that dissent in the regime may have on political development at this time. Also, the unity within the dissent movement is a complicated matter to ascertain. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper and, therefore, no suggestion is made concerning the precise role of dissent in a model of Soviet government. However, perhaps social scientists would do well to consider the suggestion of Tokes to re-examine their perceptions of the Soviet Union in light of the phenomenon of dissent. Then, with the experience gained from the academic discussions about other models of Soviet government, new models or methods of analysis could be formulated to enrich our knowledge of the Soviet Union.

Chapter V

Endnotes

[1] Helen Cohn, "Soviet Area Studies: The Undergraduate Major", Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism IV (August 1971), p. 25.

[2] See discussion, pp. 1-8.

[3] Alfred Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 471.

[4] H. Gordon Skilling and Frank Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 413.

[5] Ibid., p. 413.

[6] Rudolf Tokes, "Introduction", in Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's, ed. Henry Morton and Rudolf Tokes (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. xxiii.

[7] Charles Gati, "Area Studies and International Relations: Introductory Remarks", Studies in Comparative Communism 8 (Spring-Summer 1975), p. 10.

[8] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[9] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, Vol. I and II, trans. Thomas Whitney (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). Also, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, Vol. III and IV, trans. Thomas Whitney (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

[10] Andrei Sakharov, My Country and the World, trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 85-98.

[11] Roy Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, ed. and trans. Ellen de Kadt (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 399, fn. 5.

[12] Rudolf Tokes, Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1975), p. 8.

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