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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION QUESTION: FORTY YEARS LATER AND STILL UNRESOLVED

BY

ROBERT J. RIDDELL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION QUESTION: FORTY YEARS LATER AND STILL UNRESOLVED submitted by ROBERT J. RIDDELL in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

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(Supervisor)

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Date: 2 April 1988

This paper is dedicated to every European who has suffered as a result of the division of his/her continent--but particularly the Germans, whose very nation is divided.

ABSTRACT

The present division of Germany has moved into its fifth decade now. What originally was intended to be a temporary situation has developed into the seemingly permanent partition of the German nation into two ideologically antagonistic states and, concomitantly, the splitting of the continent into two Europes. It is ironic to note that the defeat of the former Third Reich has led to a peace without a peace settlement, followed by the Cold War and the rearming of the two German states; all of which means that Germany, once again, is perhaps the most volatile region in the world today. The German-German border remains the most heavily controlled and defended border in Europe--a symbol of man's inhumanity toward his fellow man and a testimony to either the inability or the lack of political will of the decision-makers in both the East and the West to make any sort of compromise regarding the fate of German nationals and Europeans in general.

With the exception of the West German government, the division of Germany appears to have been accepted, albeit reluctantly, by most of the world. This was not always the case. Hopes were high regarding German reunification until the mid-1950s when both German states became members of opposing military alliances; whatever frail hopes remained were shattered in 1961 with the erection of the Berlin Wall. The ensuing years have witnessed Bonn's struggle to come to terms with the division of Germany and lessen the consequences of such division through such policies as Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik. Such pragmatic policies do not mean, however, that Bonn has resigned itself to the

present status quo, for its official goal of a reunited Germany still stands, as laid out in the preamble of its Basic Law.

This paper includes a historical review of postwar developments in Germany, with special emphasis placed upon those episodes having an important influence on the division of the nation. The two subsequent chapters focus on external (international) and internal (German) factors which affect the German reunification question. The concluding chapter includes a prediction of future trends based on past and present developments and the author has ventured to offer an alternative to the status quo.

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I hereby wish to acknowledge five professors at the University of Alberta: Dr. M. Mote and Dr. T. Yedlin for awakening an interest in East-West relations, with special emphasis on central and eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union; Dr. M. Prokop for making further study of the German language a rewarding and joyous experience; Dr. G. Marahrens for his instructive comments and suggestions; and last, but not least, Dr. T. Keating who, as my supervisor, provided helpful advice and assistance, and permitted me to submit my draft copies in longhand.

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Ich liebe Deutschland so sehr, daß ich froh bin, daß es zwei davon gibt.

François Mauriac

Introduction

Germany has rarely been a united nation. Most of its history reveals, in fact, a nation that has been divided in one way or another. Former parts of Greater Germany have separated themselves from the latter on a permanent basis and have become distinct nation states unto their own right--such countries we recognize today as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, for example.

At a time when other nations in Europe were successfully consolidating themselves on an ethnic basis within a distinct political unit, the Germans were proving to be a truly "belated nation," in that several territorial states came into being as a result of the process of fragmentation. Various reasons have been given for the fragmentation of the former Holy Roman Empire, or Roman Empire of the German Nation (tenth to early nineteenth centuries), among them: the Emperor's dependence on support of feudal lords in order to maintain his authority, the religious division after the Reformation (in the early sixteenth century), as well as the custom of the various imperial dynasties to strengthen their own respective territories.

The subsequent weakening of imperial authority led to the partite units becoming sovereign states. In the eighteenth century, Austria acquired Hungary as well as parts of the former Turkish Balkan countries, and rose to become a large power--large

enough, in fact, to be the chief rival of Prussia, which had grown into a first rank military power under Frederick the Great.

The dissolution of the Reich occurred at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries with the French invasion led by Napoleon. Both Austria and Prussia were defeated and the Confederation of the Rhine was created--a number of Napoleonic satellite states.

Following the subsequent victory over Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) led to the reduction of German states from 365 to 39 and set up the Deutsche Bund (German Confederation), which was basically a loose association of the individual sovereign states, wherein Prussia and Austria still remained the two great powers. In 1834, the creation of the Zollverein (Customs Union) signified economic unity and led the way to eventual political union.

The failure of the 1848 revolution was due mainly to the division over the "greater Germany" and "smaller Germany" concepts; that is, a German Reich with or without Austria. In the end, the "smaller German" concept won the day, although it was not until 1871 when Bismarck achieved the kleindeutsch (little-German) solution, thereby creating the Second Reich (which excluded Austria). The ensuing decades witnessed the spectacular growth of the Hohenzollern Empire into a strong German military and economic power.

Here, it is important to emphasize the unique non-statist concept of German nationalism which had been prevalent until the time of the Bismarckian Reich. Ferenc Vali describes this phenomenon in the following passage:

> The German national feeling, so powerfully aroused and stimulated by Napoleonic domination, had no territorial message to convey. At the turn of the eighteenth century, and even later, nation and state had become divergent if not antagonistic concepts for the Germans, unlike those held by such nations as the French or English. Because of her weakness, portions of Germany's ethnic body had broken off in the course of centuries, some of them forming separate nations. She lost the Dutch and the Flemings in the northwest, the Alsatians in the west, the Swiss in the south, and, finally the Austrians. She compensated herself, however, by pushing far into the east, mixing with and absorbing Slav populations but without reaching anywhere natural and clear ethnic frontiers....
>
> The Bismarckian Reich, when created, possessed no nationalist-ideological basis; it was intended by its founders to be a greater Prussia, that is, the Prussian military and bureaucratic machine enlarged by permanent confederates. Thus, Prussian power hunger and nationalistic aspirations to German unity could be satisfied at a stroke and for the benefit of all.

It was only after 1871 when Germany truly became a nation-state; that is, as a result of the Bismarckian unification. The Second Reich enabled its citizens to finally think of themselves as being part of a German national community; and this despite the fact that some critics would call the Second Reich a "Great Prussia," due to the stifling predominance of Prussia itself.

The defeat of the Second Reich in 1918 led to the creation of the Weimar Republic in 1919--a fragile and short-lived democratic state that eventually fell victim to the economic crises and political turmoil

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1. Ferenc A. Vali, The Quest for a United Germany (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 6.

prevalent at that time. The postwar economic misery and oppressive terms of the Versailles peace treaty forced upon Germany did much to create a growing domestic instability in the republic. Democracy in Germany ceased to be on January 30, 1933, when Hitler took power, becoming Reich Chancellor.

In 1935 the Saar region, which until then had been governed by the League of Nations, was returned to Germany. In 1938 Austria was annexed to the Reich. Hitler then went on to annex the Sudetenland, an act which the Western powers passively condoned through a policy of appeasement. The invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939 marked the beginning to World War II--a war which lasted six years, destroyed most of Europe and other parts of the world and resulted in the deaths of some 55 million people. Never before had mankind suffered from the agony and the hell that is war on such a large scale.

The end of the war brought about the division of Germany into four occupation zones: British, American, French and Soviet. Eventually these four zones became two separate states, each one a member of opposing military, social, political and economic systems. To this day, Germany has remained a nation divided into two states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The pursuit of reunification of the two parts of Germany still remains an unresolved and open issue today. The goal of a reunited Germany has been a cornerstone of West German foreign policy since its constitution, known as the Basic Law, came into effect on May 23, 1949. Witness the following excerpt from the Preamble of the Basic Law: "The entire Ger-

man people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany."

Although there are many sceptics who proclaim that German reunification is a "dead" issue, it nevertheless remains true that Germany is a divided nation. That division is artificial and was imposed upon the German nation by external forces--namely, by other nations with conflicting ideologies. Despite the unnatural division of Germany, it also remains true that two separate states have existed side by side in Germany for almost four decades now. Furthermore, these same two states have been, by and large, extremely successful within their own economic and political systems. From the above it is already possible to ascertain the existence of two contrasting themes: First of all, what factors have served to keep the two German states apart? Seoondly, what factors keep the German reunification question alive?

Undoubtedly, some factors are of greater importance than others. Furthermore, some of these factors will be more amenable to change. All of this will be considered in the concluding chapter, as the latter will include an analytical examination of the various factors involved in the reunification question propounded throughout this paper, as well as a glimpse into the future.

The paper itself has been divided into three major sections. The first chapter is devoted to the history of the division of Germany and the evolution of the present two states. Much of this chapter is a chronological review of important events which have occurred throughout modern German history and an analysis of those events thought to have an

overriding impact upon the outcome of the division of Germany has been made wherever possible. The first chapter has also been divided into different periods, each one representing a new phase in the evolution of the German reunification issue. In view of the fact that many factors have an influence upon the German reunification question, an attempt has been made to clarify and facilitate an analysis of these factors and their effect upon the unification issue by dividing them into two groups: external and internal factors. The former group includes, for example, the policies of other nation-states toward Germany, international legal agreements relative to Germany and international trade. The latter group includes such factors as the past and present policies of the two states, intra-German trade and domestic political parties.

The final chapter alluded to above attempts to reach some conclusions regarding the German reunification issue and to predict future developments in this area. Here, a word of warning is in order: there are no pat solutions to the present division of Germany, for the division of Germany symbolizes the division of Europe and the latter is a reflection of opposing ideologies of blocs of states hostile to one another. Most forces today--be they ideological, political, economic or military--work against the chances of German reunification occurring in the near future, as the contents of this paper will make clear. The systemic forces of the two blocs serve to further entrench the two German states into opposing realms, thus pushing the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic further apart from one another, which bodes ill for the prospects of German unity. Despite this, however, intra-

German relations have improved markedly, particularly since the arrival of détente. Furthermore, the recent negotiations between the two superpowers regarding nuclear disarmament, as well as the new Soviet trend toward a more market-based economy, give grounds for hope regarding developments pertaining to German reunification. This new-found willingness to negotiate and be flexible on heretofore unresolvable issues is the type of approach needed for any progress to be made on the German unification question.

No country in the world has been more creative than Germany, and no other can better help create our future... The experts expected it would be decades before Germany's economy regained its prewar level. You did it in less than one. The experts said the Federal Republic could not absorb millions of refugees, establish a democracy on the ashes of Nazism and be reconciled with your neighbors. You did all three.

U.S. President to a Gathering of Germans in Hambach, West Germany, May 6, 1985

After the war a line was drawn across Europe. We would have liked it to be further west. You would have liked it to be further east. We will make trouble for you, and you will make trouble for us. We will find it easier to make trouble for you, in Berlin as everywhere else. But there will be no risk of war.

Former Soviet deputy prime minister Frol Kolzov in conversation with Sir Frank Roberts (in Moscow) prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall

The Wall is the price we pay for Hitler and the Nazis. I am afraid it will take a war to bring it down. The Wall is monstrous, but it's better than a war.

West Berlin school teacher

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES: FROM 1945 UNTIL TODAY

The Origins of Division

The two German states originated in 1949. One must go back even further, however, in order to ascertain the origins of divided Germany. Already by late 1943, at an Allied conference in Teheran, plans were being made to divide up Germany and to move Polish territory westward to the Oder River. Several months later (September 1944), the London Conference took place, where it was decided that Germany should be divided into three occupation zones. In addition, Berlin would be declared a special area.

At the end of the war France joined the U.S., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. as the fourth occupying power. France's involvement as an occupying power had been decided in February 1945 at the Crimean Conference. It was agreed that this fourth occupation zone was to originate from the Anglo-American zones.

The military commanders of the four zones together formed the Allied Control Council, assuming supreme authority for all of Germany. Berlin, the capital, was jointly administered by the four powers, since, as a result of its special status, it belonged to none of the zones. Each of the four powers instead occupied a particular sector of the city: the Soviets held the eastern sector, the French the northwest

sector, the British the west central sector and the Americans the south-west sector.

The unconditional capitulation of the German armed forces took place May 7-8, 1945 in Reims and Berlin-Karlshorst. On June 5, 1945 a declaration regarding the defeat of Germany reaffirmed that all four occupying powers would assume

> ... supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption... of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Allied Control Council met together for the first time on July 30, 1945. At the same time, at Potsdam, near Berlin, the heads of government of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain were busy dealing with important questions regarding postwar Germany, as well as the other European states that had been ravaged by the war. The results of this trilateral conference were summarized in an official "Protocol" signed on August 2, 1945, which later became known as the "Potsdam Agreement." Containing, in fact, a number of agreements, it had a decisive influence on Germany's future. For example, the conference adopted decisions regarding demilitarization, denazification and the democratization of Germany. The arms industry and the monopolies were to be dismantled and a peace-oriented economy created. Reparations were imposed on Germany as partial compensation for the damage inflicted by the Nazi aggressors.

Perhaps the most important agreement with regard to Germany was the one concerning Poland's western frontier. The German-Polish border

was moved westward to the Oder and Neisse rivers and the "former German territories" east of these rivers were to be placed under Polish administration. The final determination of the western frontier of Poland, however, was to await a peace settlement. In addition, the city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) and the area adjacent to it (northern East Prussia) were to be transferred to the Soviet Union.

Indeed, about a quarter of the Reich area was affected by these decisions. One can say, however, that this westward territorial expansion on the part of Poland was compensation for war losses inflicted not only by Germany, but by the Soviet Union as well. It must be noted that in 1939 Hitler and Stalin had agreed on a delineation of mutual spheres of interest in eastern Europe, resulting in the Soviet Union's annexation of about 200,000 square kilometres of eastern Poland in the same year. Once the U.S.S.R. became Poland's ally during the war, the shifting westward of the Polish-German border can be seen as compensation for the Poles on the part of the Soviets.

The German eastern territories covered about 114,000 square kilometres, comprising East Prussia, Silesia and part of Pomerania and Brandenburg. They had held great cultural, agricultural and economic importance for Germany.

Also contained in the "Protocol" of the tripartite Potsdam Conference was the agreement necessitating the "transfer" of the peoples of Germanic origin from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Germany. A tremendous amount of misery and suffering was brought upon millions of people as a result of this agreement. Prior to the Potsdam Conference,

four million Germans had already fled their homelands in the eastern territories. An additional 5.6 million Germans were subsequently expelled by force from the German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Also included were the 3.5 million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.

About 13 million German expellees--(from which one million are estimated to have died)--thus migrated to all occupation zones and Länder, the majority finally settling in what eventually became the Federal Republic of Germany. Needless to say, the above-mentioned expulsion and severance of territories east of the Oder and Neisse were felt to be unjust in Germany. All political parties, including the Communists, initially rejected them. In 1950, however, the Görlitz Agreement, concluded between Poland and the GDR, recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the final Polish-German frontier. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, due to its contrasting views regarding the frontier issue, was prevented from normalizing its relations with Poland until 1970, with the signing of the Warsaw Treaty.

With regard to what was to be done with defeated Germany, it soon became obvious that each of the victorious powers was interpreting the Potsdam Agreement in its own particular manner, true to its own interests. For example, France vetoed any attempt to create German central authorities, fearful as it was of the German goal of unity. Furthermore, France had made territorial claims that had not been met; that is, the separation of the Rhineland and the Saar district from Germany and the internationalization of the Ruhr. The Americans and the British

rejected French demands; as well, the British vetoed any attempt to create a central German administration, preferring to federalize the German state structure instead. The Soviets, on the other hand, demanded the establishment of a German government before any peace treaty could be signed.

It was with regard to the question of the democratization of Germany, however, where the biggest differences were to be found. Differences of opinion aside, the Western powers did agree on the following basic principles: parliamentary democracy, legal security, civic liberties, human rights, private property and private enterprise. The Soviets, on the other hand, interpreted "democratization" in accordance with Leninist doctrine; that is, a socialist order was necessary, wherein the means of production would be controlled by the state, with the communist party dominating it. Conflicting ideologies thus had a major influence in the immediate postwar period with regard to the division of Germany. Failure to see "eye to eye" on fundamental concepts, such as "democracy", led to both the East and the West offering two different Germanys of opposing socio-political orders.

The issue of war reparations also developed into another source of conflict between the western occupying powers and the Soviets. In the Protocol of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference it was agreed that the Soviets receive a certain amount of reparations from the western zones in exchange for food and raw material shipments. Witness clause 4 (a) of Section III ("Reparations from Germany"):

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

The problem was that the reparations deliveries did flow from the western zones to the Soviet Union, but the promised food and raw material deliveries failed to arrive from the Soviet zone. In addition, the Soviet Union continued importing food from her own zone. Here, it should be remembered that the economic situation in Germany during the winter of 1945-46 was grim to say the least. The western zones had been especially hard hit due to the arrival of millions of refugees (as mentioned above). To prevent starvation on a massive scale, the United States and Britain exported several million tons of food to Germany. The one-sided reparations deliveries to the U.S.S.R. eventually became too much of a strain on the economic situation in the western zones. As a result thereof, in May 1946 the American military government put an end to all such shipments, a step which did little to improve East-West relations.

It is an established fact that the U.S.S.R. pursued war reparations with fervent ardour. Postwar Soviet policy toward reparations is summed up very well in the following excerpt:

> During its brief tenure as the sole power in Berlin, ... the Soviet Union removed 75 percent of all capital equipment. Also in the first several months, machinery from about nineteen hundred industrial enterprises in the Soviet occupation zone was either partly or completely dismantled and shipped to Moscow. This prac-

> tice, coupled with a policy of extracting reparations from current productions, violated the letter as well as the spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and seriously hampered economic recovery throughout East Germany for many years. It is estimated that reparations to the Soviet Union in the postwar period amounted to 66.4 billion marks.

In September 1946 an attempt was made to overcome the stalemate regarding the German economy when U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes spoke of the need to unify the economy, followed by political rehabilitation. Byrnes recognized the fact that the quadripartite division of Germany was hampering attempts to create an economically self-sufficient country:

> The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas throughout Germany. The barriers between the four zones of Germany are far more difficult to surmount than those between normal independent states.

As it turned out, the maximum possible unification was in fact the economic merger of the American and British zones in 1947. The area became known as "Bizonia" and its creation caused an uproar among the Soviets, despite the fact that all four occupation powers had been invited to fuse their zonal economies together. Bizonia proved to be, in fact, the germcell of the later Federal Republic of Germany.

With regard to German political parties, as early as 1946 the Communist Party (KPD) in the Soviet zone forced the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to merge with it. This merger resulted in the Socialist United Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) and it received the majority of the votes in the 1946 municipal and

state elections. Since that time, the SED has never taken part in free elections in East Germany. Subsequent elections in that state have presented only a single list on the ballot leaving the voter no option.

In late 1947, a People's Congress was formed by the SED on the basis of its own membership. The congress named a 400-member People's Council (Volksrat) in March 1948, a significant development in the establishment of a government for East Germany. The People's Council then appointed a committee to draft a new constitution. The draft constitution was eventually approved by the People's Congress and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was thus established.

A newly appointed People's Council had declared itself to be the provisional People's Chamber (Volkskammer) and declared the new constitution to be valid. The basic law portrays the People's Chamber as being a popularly elected representative body. Such a claim, of course, offends the western view of democracy (government by the people on the basis of free elections) and it has been a major sore point in inter-German relations until today. The People's Chamber appointed itself, rather than being elected, and this translates into a government with no legitimacy as far as the West is concerned. In other words, the German Democratic Republic is not 'democratic' at all--it lacks a popular mandate. The Federal Republic of Germany responded with a policy of non-recognition and the enactment of the Hallstein Doctrine.

The development of political life proceeded from the bottom to the top in the three western zones. The formation of political parties was at first restricted to the local level; it then took place at the

state level. Mergers at the zonal level occurred later, brought about largely because of the lack of successful coordination within the four-power administration. The aforementioned union of the economies of the American and British zones led in turn to a common government and parliament in those areas (as well as the French zone).

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers held in March and April, 1947, the Americans proposed the establishment of a German government made up of the heads of the governments of the various states (Länder). This proposal was rejected by Molotov, who favoured a centralized government. The impression gained by the Western delegations was that of a planned Communist takeover of Germany on the part of the Soviets by means of a centralized government in that country.

Here it must be asked whether such suspicions were accurate and well-founded? It is no secret that the Americans felt that the considerable increase in Soviet power and influence in Europe since the end of the war constituted a serious threat to democracy in the western tradition. The westward expansion of Soviet power as far as the Elbe River was one of the greatest accomplishments of Stalin. It was a great victory for communism in general.

Nevertheless, the question here is: did Stalin harbour desires for an all communist Germany? or, was his primary goal rather one of a dismembered Germany, wherein a pro-Soviet government would be firmly established in merely one part of that truncated country (in this case, the Soviet occupation zone)? It seems that, like many episodes in history, the question remains debatable. For example, if the Americans and

the other Western allies were overly anxious with regard to the vast increase in Soviet power in Europe, it also remains true that the sudden increase in American influence and power in postwar Europe was no less important to the Soviets. If the Western powers feared a Communist takeover of Germany, the Soviets also feared a Communist defeat in Germany. The war against Germany had developed into a sort of war for Germany. It became a battle between two different economic and sociopolitical systems. Germany had become the spoils of war for the two major victors: the United States and the Soviet Union.

The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 marked the beginning of the Cold War between these two countries. The doctrine pledged the assistance of the United States to any people whose freedom was threatened either by militant minorities or by any external pressure. Specifically, it promised aid to Greece, which was involved in a civil war with communist rebels, and to Turkey, from whom the Soviets were demanding control over the Dardanelles.

The enactment of the Marshall Plan on June 5, 1947 had a great and determining influence on the division of Europe into two opposing economic blocks. The Marshall Plan was basically a massive economic aid programme offered by the Americans to all the European states--including the Soviet Union and its satellites--in order to facilitate the reconstruction of their devastated economies. Two major motives were behind this plan: first of all, the U.S.A. feared that the growing impoverishment in the western countries would strengthen the communist parties. Secondly, the American economy faced an economic decline

(reduced production) in the postwar period which could be overcome through exports to the European market.[5]

As was expected by the U.S., the Soviet Union rejected the offer and forced its satellites to do the same. The war-ravaged Soviets were, perhaps justifiably, afraid of their sphere of influence becoming economically overrun by the American superpower. Implementation of the Marshall Plan in the Eastern European states would have brought about the liberalization of international trade in that area--a policy contrary to Soviet interests.

A meeting in London by the Council of Ministers (November 25 - December 16, 1947) also ended in a deadlocked situation. U.S. Secretary of State Marshall described it as being nothing but "... a dreary repetition of what had been said and resaid at the Moscow conference."[6] The basic issues at the London conference were to be whether or not agreement could be reached by the Allies with regard to German reunification, as well as talks regarding the Austrian treaty. Much of the disagreement resulted from the Soviets' insistence on preparing a German peace treaty before any consensus was reached regarding whether or not Germany would be reunified. Molotov was also against France's intention to separate the Saar from Germany and integrate it into the French economy.

It was during the heated discussions regarding the preparation of a peace treaty, however, when the irreconcilable nature of the Western and Soviet views, pertaining to the establishment of a German central government, became apparent. Marshall's report on the London conference

revealed the lack of trust toward the Soviets on the part of the three Western delegations:

> ... Mr. Molotov insisted that the Four Powers should agree upon the immediate establishment of a German central government. Although the United States had been, I believe, the first of the four occupying countries to suggest at Moscow the desirability for the earliest possible establishment of a German provisional central government, it was obvious that until the division of Germany had been healed and conditions created for German political and economic unity, any central government would be a sham and not a reality. This view was shared by the other western delegations but to Mr. Molotov was completely unacceptable. This was the first clear evidence of his purpose to utilize the meeting as an opportunity for propaganda declarations which would be pleasant to German ears.

The question of reparations did nothing but add oil to the fire as far as American-Soviet relations were concerned. Basically, the Americans felt that their economic support of Germany was being severely undermined by Soviet reparation claims-- "We put in and the Russians take out." The Americans saw the vast amount of reparations taken by the Soviets in their occupation zone as resulting "... in a type of monopolistic stranglehold over the economic and political life of eastern Germany which makes that region little more than a dependent province of the Soviet Union."[8] They were determined to prevent such a stranglehold over the economic life of all Germany... or at least the western zones.

The London conference provided no solution to the problem of German reunification. Nevertheless, the obstacles to this unresolved issue became much clearer and easier to define. As Marshall put it, "We cannot look forward to a unified Germany at this time. We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt."[9]

Entrenchment

Indeed, an important step in this direction was taken on June 18-20, 1948 with the introduction of the currency reform in the three western zones of Germany. This in turn was followed by the currency reform in the Soviet occupation zone a few days later (June 24-28, 1948). The issuance of new money led, in fact, to the battle for Berlin, which occurred between June 1948 and May 1949. Both the Soviets and the Western powers wanted to introduce their own currencies in Berlin, as well as their respective zones, although the Western powers restricted themselves to West Berlin. In view of the fact that the right to issue money is held to be an essential element of sovereignty, Berlin's pluralistic system of authority and the increasingly common pattern of disagreement between the Western allies and the Soviets were almost destined to become important factors in the showdown for Berlin... and indeed they were.

The Soviet Union began a blockade of Berlin on June 24, 1948, which effectively sealed off all road and rail access routes to that city. The Western powers chose, however, to defy the blockade by means of an air lift, thereby supplying West Berliners with the necessities of life: food, coal and other important articles. The Soviets did not attempt to interfere with these flights. Needless to say, the blockade only served to deepen the division between the Western powers and the Soviets. It also served to strengthen the unity between the United States, Great Britain and France. On August 1, 1948, for example, the

French occupation zone merged with the British-American economic area in Germany (Bizonia) to become Trizonia.

Despite the eventual success of the airlift, the municipal government of Berlin fell victim to the crisis. The lawful city government was deposed and a separate Berlin Magistrate was established solely for the Soviet sector. The split in the municipal administration was not unlike the division of the rest of Germany.

It was in the summer of 1948 (at the height of the Cold War), when the Western powers finally abandoned their hopes of solving the German problem together with the Soviet Union. They then advocated the establishment of a West German state, wherein a national assembly would create a constitution. Such a suggestion, as was to be expected, encountered resistance from most German politicians who feared that this sort of political development would only finalize the division of Germany.

After long negotiations it was finally decided to go ahead with the establishment of this new West German state. Much emphasis was placed, however, on the <u>temporary</u> nature of the state organization that was to be created, including the lack of a definitive constitution. The territorially incomplete and provisional status of the new political unit was to be stressed. The German leaders therefore preferred to name their new constituent assembly a "Parliamentary Council," and the constituent law of the new state was to be called the "Basic Law" (<u>Grundgesetz</u>); the use of the term "Constitution" (<u>Verfassung</u>) was deliberately avoided.

The delegates to the Parliamentary Council, which had been elected by the legislatures of the Länder, met in Bonn on September 1, 1948. Although they were denied the right to vote, delegates from Berlin did attend the assembly. The inclusion of Berlin as a regular member of the Federation was, however, vetoed by the Allied military governors. The Berlin deputies were therefore denied voting membership in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag).

On May 8, 1949, the Basic Law of the "Federal Republic of Germany" was approved by the Parliamentary Council. The capital chosen was to be Bonn (and not West Berlin, as some had hoped). The Basic Law was eventually approved by the legislatures of all the Länder (although Bavaria withheld its signature). The Federal Republic of Germany was established with the proclamation of the Basic Law on May 23, 1949, almost four years after the unconditional surrender of the German Armed Forces, and less than two weeks following the lifting of the Berlin blockade imposed by the Soviets.

The first elections under the new constitution were held in August 1949. Theodor Heuss was elected as Federal President; and the first Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) of the Federal Republic of Germany was appointed on September 15, 1949: Konrad Adenauer. A leader dedicated to integration with the west--even at the price of keeping Germany divided, his critics argue--Adenauer would remain in power for more than 14 years. He had a very strong influence on the political development of inter-German relations.

Here, it should be pointed out that the Federal Republic of Germany did not have full sovereignty when it was founded. Supreme authority rested in the hands of the three Western occupation powers. The occupation regime was done away with little by little in subsequent years. Full sovereignty was finally bestowed upon the Federal Republic on May 5, 1955.

The formation of a new state government in the West was followed by similar actions in the Soviet occupation zone. On October 7, 1949, the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) was founded. Its first president was Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl became the East German Prime Minister. Although the GDR was founded after its western counterpart, it must be remembered that the establishment of state organs and changes to the organization of society on the Soviet model had begun much earlier (see above). The Socialist Unity Party (SED) had always presented itself as the pioneer of German reunification in its propaganda and the political parties in West Germany were accused of betraying the national cause. This is also the reason given for its allowing the foundation of the western state to occur first; that is, the onus was put on the Western leaders.[10]

As was to be expected, just as the creation of a government in West Germany had caused the Soviets to protest strongly against such a regime, the establishment of a new government in the Soviet zone brought about harsh denunciations in the West. Consider U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's harsh declaration on this matter:

> The United States Government considers that the so-called German Democratic Republic established on October 7 in Berlin is without

> any legal validity or foundation in the popular will. This new government was created by Soviet and Communist fiat. It was created by a self-styled "People's Council" which itself had no basis in free popular elections. This long-expected Soviet creation thus stands in sharp contrast to the German Federal Republic at Bonn which has a thoroughly constitutional and popular basis....[11]

Chancellor Adenauer took a similar stand with regard to the newly created East German state. Because it did not rest on the freely expressed will of the people in the Soviet zone--in this case, 18 million Germans--Adenauer refused to recognize any legitimate status to which the GDR laid claim. This was in keeping with the clause in the preamble of the Basic Law which noted that the Parliamentary Council had acted not only for those Germans living in the Western part of divided Germany, but also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. As mentioned earlier, the goal of reunification was affirmed in the preamble of the Basic Law, a cornerstone of West German policy toward inter-German relations.

If the accusations emanating from the West were harsh and full of condemnation, then the charges and rhetoric directed back to the West were just as shrill and steeped in acrimony. The East German regime accused the Adenauer government of territorial expansionism, specifically

> ... the re-establishment of a German state at least as large as the Germany of 1937, which would have meant the annexation of the Soviet zone of occupation and the former German territories to the east of the Oder-Neisse-line.[12]

They therefore felt compelled to take counter-measures in order to combat the threat to peace resulting from such a policy.

Reunification Sought by Both States

The German Democratic Republic also declared itself the champion of German reunification. The National Front, for example, a mass movement comprised of the working class and its party in alliance with a broad political and social section of the population, declared both consolidation of the GDR and the reunification of Germany on a democratic basis to be its major tasks.[13] Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minister, also pledged to "... do everything to serve the unity of Germany."[14]

Despite such honourable pledges on the part of the leaders of both newly created German states, the fact remained that by 1949, Germany was more divided than ever. Proceeding from the four-power control established at Potsdam, within a few years Germany had become dissected into five parts: 1.) the Federal Republic of Germany; 2.) the Saar region,* which was economically and politically integrated with France; 3.) the German Democratic Republic; 4.) West Berlin, which was under three-power control; and 5.) East Berlin, controlled by the Soviets. Both the former Soviet occupied zone and Trizonia had become states, a German peace treaty had yet to be concluded and, although Western leaders strongly denied it at the time, the reunification of Germany would prove to be a perpetually unattainable goal in the years to follow.

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* The Saar was eventually allowed to reunite with West Germany on October 27, 1956, due to the overwhelming desire of the people of this area to do so (this became evident through the results of a referendum held in October 1955). German unity was thus re-established along the western borders.

One of the reasons for this development was the eventual integration of both West and East Germany into opposing military alliances. By 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) had been established in Western Europe in order to coordinate defense of that part of the continent. Once West Germany had been founded as a state, intense domestic debates occurred over whether or not it should begin rearmament and participate in the Atlantic alliance. (Disagreement also prevailed regarding the question of a West European integration process and the Federal Republic's role in it.)

Undoubtedly, the question of West Germany's integration into the Western alliance system was the greatest source of concern for domestic and foreign critics alike. It led to violent disputes with opponents charging the government that integration into one military camp would seriously undermine all future attempts toward German reunification. Such integration would provoke similar actions in the Eastern bloc and only serve to deepen the division of Germany. It would be infinitely better, in the interests of German unity, they argued, to negotiate with the Soviets now, before it was too late.

The Soviets themselves used the dissension bred within West German political circles to their own advantage, siding with the opposition. Attacking Adenauer's policy favouring integration with the West, they argued that German unification and Western integration were mutually exclusive. One author describes the effect that the stand the Soviets took had on the debate taking place within the Federal Republic:

> The West German Social Democrats, neutralist circles, and other segments of the population subscribed to this view. They felt

> strongly that unification must have precedence over any other political program, even if this should mean the defeat of a United Europe. This played clearly into the hands of the Soviets who were hoping that, in the struggle between nationalism and Europeanization, the former would win out.[15]

Such vociferous opposition did little to quell the determination of the Christian Democrat government of Konrad Adenauer to pursue the Federal Republic's integration in the Western alliance system. According to their view, the stronger and more resolute the West appeared, the sooner the U.S.S.R. would permit self-determination by those peoples it suppressed--which included the citizens of the GDR. The policy Adenauer subscribed to became known as the Politik der Stärke ("Policy of strength"). Adenauer's policy eventually won out.[16]

In defense of his Politik der Stärke Adenauer made use of another slogan to explain the existing dilemma with regard to German reunification: "Freiheit oder Einheit" ("Freedom or Unity"). West German citizens had to choose between the two; unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain both. Adenauer convinced the people of West Germany that their freedom was of greater importance... German unification would fall into place later, once the freedom of the Federal Republic was secured.

> The majority of people in West Germany realize by now that they cannot have both unity and freedom. For the time being we must choose either the one or the other. Faced with this alternative it seems more opportune to be content with freedom now, and to work for unity later rather than to begin by striving for unity which can be gained only under Russian domination and to renounce freedom forever.[16]

At home, the biggest opposition to Adenauer's remilitarization campaign came from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) headed by Kurt Schumacher. Still, Schumacher "... never made it clear what price they

would be ready to pay for reunification; they possibly might have offered the neutrality of united Germany had such an opportunity arisen."[17] The major difference between Adenauer's view and Schumacher's view was simply that of diplomatic timing; that is, Adenauer held the security and freedom of West Germany as being the essential prerequisite in the achievement of unification. Schumacher, however, gave first priority to reunification and blamed Adenauer for not wanting the same.

Indeed, Adenauer would continue to be blamed by critics for having forsaken the cause of German reunification. Many accused him of being a lackey of the West and doubted his sincerity regarding the commitment of his government to pursue unification. One author states: "Adenauer... may, in his heart, have been somewhat ambivalent about a united Germany."[18]

American president Richard Nixon attributed Adenauer's ambivalence to his roots in the Rhineland--a region where strong sympathies toward France are commonplace. Nixon viewed such feelings on the part of the former Federal Chancellor as simply having taken precedence over his concern for Prussia, which was then under communist rule; here, Nixon astutely underscores the traditional will of Prussian Germany toward France. Nixon's argument, based on regional loyalties, is very convincing:

> After World War II many Germans thought he was not really interested in reuniting the divided German nation. When Adenauer faced toward Western Europe, they saw him as turning his back on his seventeen million countrymen in East Germany. To an extent this was true.
>
> Adenauer was born in the Rhineland, part of the "middle kingdom" between medieval France and Germany. Many Rhinelanders are born with a kernel of ambivalence. They are both German and a

> little French at once. Some of his critics charged that he was more pro-Rhineland, or even more pro-France, than he was pro-Germany. While his patriotism was never legitimately in doubt, it is true that his heart always remained in the Rhineland and that he had none of the Prussian German's antipathy toward the French.[19]

In 1950 Rudolf Augstein, publisher of Spiegel magazine, was one of the first critics of Adenauer's policy of putting security before reunification. Augstein viewed Adenauer's Westpolitik ("Western policy") as being the subjugation of Germany under French supremacy, not unlike the former Confederation of the Rhine under Napoleon.[20] Such charges, whether exaggerated or not, would continue to plague Adenauer as long as he lived. Despite such accusations, however, the former Chancellor would remain resolute on the issue, convinced that his policies were politically sound.

A few important questions must now be asked: if Adenauer was indeed responsible for neglecting the reunification issue, was he the only one guilty? That is, where did the West German electorate stand? Surely, if Adenauer's policies were so unpopular, he would have been defeated, would he not? What did the people of West Germany have to say on the matter?

One authority blames not only the people of West Germany for their ambivalence, but those of East Germany as well! Hans Mommsen claims that:

> ... during the immediate post-war period and even after the cold war the overwhelming majority of Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain showed very little active interest in a commitment to the German question. Certainly, they did not protest the separation. If they had, one could rightfully wonder if a different course would have been followed.[21]

There is, however, a major flaw in Mommsen's statement above due to the fact that he omits describing the German political and economic situation immediately after the war. Germany was a defeated country that was devastated politically, morally, economically and socially. The time had come for the average German to atone for the atrocities inflicted upon the whole of Europe by the Nazi war machine. As a result thereof, Germany would be burdened with a massive guilt complex and this would invariably have an influence on their way of thinking with regard to the future of Germany. Pride in being a German national suddenly turned to shame. Germany was a conquered nation and its citizens were well aware of this fact. The first priority in the immediate postwar period was survival; if national unity had to be sacrificed in the name of peace, so be it. The division was originally thought to be temporary in any case.

Secondly, throughout the 1950s the Social Democratic Party (SPD) did criticize Adenauer's strong Western orientation; they even objected to West Germany's membership in the Western alliance. They feared that close integration with the West would shut out future possibilities for reunification. It was not until the Social Democrats' party conference at Bad Godesberg in 1959 that they finally approved the Federal Republic's role in the Western community.[22]

With regard to protests on the part of the German Democratic Republic over the division of Germany, the GDR leaders (and the Soviets) posed as the real champions of unification. The blame for the division was passed on to the West whenever possible. Vali claims that the

Soviets and its German satellite were insincere in their proposals for reunification and only made use of them when it was politically expedient to do so.[23] When proposals were made by the GDR or the Soviets, they were almost invariably criticized by the West for their undemocratic and unfair nature--at least as far as Western beliefs were concerned. A case in point was the 1951 proposal put forth by the Volkskammer (East German parliament) to the Bundestag, calling for the creation of a constituent assembly "on a parity basis." Such an offer was harshly attacked by the Western powers for two reasons: first, the existence of single list elections in East Germany ruled out the possibility of legitimate representation of GDR citizens, as far as the West was concerned. Secondly, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson correctly put it, "... why should the 18 million captive Germans of the East have equal representation with the 47 million free Germans of the West?"[24]

Perhaps a more telling way to examine protests by GDR citizens regarding the division of Germany is to look at the number of refugees passing from East to West that occurred during the postwar period (until 1961, when the Wall was erected). The huge number of GDR citizens fleeing to the Federal Republic during this period amounted to a very real refugee crisis. One authority viewed such an exodus as being proof that East Germany was unable to "sell itself" as a fully-fledged state:

> Not so long after the founding of the GDR, the SED had begun to face the embarrassing and alarming fact that it could not even retain its own population. Lured by the glittering appeal of the West, in conjunction with comparatively poorer conditions in the GDR, East Germans were leaving their homeland in mass numbers. In 1952, the SED reacted to this giant exodus by partially sealing

> off the GDR's borders with the Federal Republic. While this action did make the flight to the West more difficult, it also had the unintended consequence of making the open city of Berlin more attractive as an easy escape route. ... West Berlin illuminated the SED's limitations, for the crossing from the communist world into the West was as simple as a short ride on the subway. Under these conditions, the flow of refugees continued. Overall, between 1945 and 1961, as many as three million people left the GDR, roughly one-sixth of the country's population. Most important, these refugees were exactly the kind of people, the young and the skilled, doctors, engineers, and technicians, that were needed for any kind of economic and political development in East Germany.[25]

The phrase "actions speak louder than words" was never more applicable than here. Despite the SED's official rhetoric regarding the "socialist achievements" of the German Democratic Republic, its citizens were leaving en masse. In 1961 the East German regime finally took drastic measures to cut the flow of refugees with the erection of the Berlin Wall.

Support for Adenauer's Westpolitik grew in the Federal Republic with the onset of the Korean War in 1950, particularly with regard to the FRG's membership in the Western military alliance. There was a strong parallel between Korea and Germany in the early 1950s: both were divided countries with a strong military force in the communist sector. The North Korean aggression had an enormous effect on the perception of the Soviet threat--and this applied not only to West Germany, but to all of Western Europe and the United States as well.

> The shock of the North Korean attack, whether correctly interpreted or not as a possible forerunner of Soviet action elsewhere, was profound in Europe as well as in the United States. A consensus emerged that NATO would have to be given sufficient substance to defend Western Europe on the ground.[26]

Whether it was well-founded or not, the general view of the Korean War, as far as the West was concerned, was that it marked the beginning of Soviet expansion elsewhere on the globe--specifically Europe. Those in the West feared that that part of Europe which was not already part of the Soviet bloc would eventually become so through the "domino principle." The effect that the war had on political developments within the Federal Republic of Germany is amply described in an essay by Wilfried Loth, from which the following excerpt is taken:

> Hier wurde der Vormarsch der nordkoreanischen Truppen zum Teil als Auftakt zu einer weltweiten militärischen Offensive des Sowjetblocks gesehen, zum Teil als Beginn kriegerischer Expansion über die 1945 gezogenen Blockgrenzen hinaus, der nach dem Dominoprinzip immer größere Teile der westlichen Welt zum Opfer zu fallen drohten.[27]

Despite a growing consensus regarding the need for a strongly defended Western Europe against the formidable Soviet bloc forces, there still remained a significant amount of opposition to the future rearmament of West Germany. Most of the opposition came from the French and the British, although the latter were less vociferous in their opposition than the former. Witness the following statement by a leading French scholar regarding the West German rearmament question: "L'obstacle majeur au réarmement de la République fédérale était la résistance d'une importante fraction de l'opinion française et, par suite, l'opposition du gouvernement de Paris."[28]

France's apprehension regarding German rearmament was perfectly understandable, given the fact that it had fought two devastating wars with Germany in less than four decades. One of its deep fears was that

a rearmed Germany could very well attempt to unify itself by force. This would have resulted in a resurrected Germany with more than 70 million inhabitants; that is, a greater population than that of France, thus becoming a major threat to French desires to have the leading role in a united Europe.

The French also feared any re-emergence of the dreaded German Schaukelpolitik, wherein Germany plays off the West against the East and vice versa. The pawns referred to here are France versus Russia. Memories of the Nonaggression Pact of 1939 signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviets were still too vivid in the minds of the French people (to say nothing of the Poles!).

Although Britain was much less vociferous in airing its objections to a rearmed Germany, it nevertheless harboured strong suspicions regarding German reunification policy. One author characterizes such mistrust by the English as being part of a widespread "Germanophobia" in Britain.[29] Like France, Britain feared the re-emergence of the German Schaukelpolitik. Unlike France, however, Britain was prepared to adopt U.S. policy favouring the rearmament of West Germany much more readily.

Despite initial French objections, a consensus was finally reached (1954) among the Western powers regarding the role of the FRG in the Western alliance. West Germany's close ties to the United States through the NATO alliance, as well as its multilateral ties to France, Britain and the other West European countries through such organizations as the Western European Union and the European Coal and Steel Community (later followed by the European Economic Community), acted as a

safeguard against a resurgence of the German problem. It is ironic that British and French mistrust of the Germans necessitated a strong alliance with the latter.

On July 6, 1950 the Görlitz Treaty between the GDR and Poland was signed. It recognized the Oder-Neisse Line as the official border between the two states. The GDR government thus gave its final recognition of the surrender of the German eastern territories. It should be noted, however, that such recognition on the part of the GDR did not impose a binding commitment on the government of the FRG, nor on a possible all-German government at some time in the future.*

From September 12-19, 1950, the Foreign Ministers' Conference of the three Western Powers took place in New York. It resulted in a declaration stating that until the reunification of Germany occurred, the government of the Federal Republic alone was the only freely and legally constituted German government. Such a declaration, of course, was a direct attack on the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, particularly its SED government. It also represented the beginning of West Germany's policy of non-recognition toward the GDR, embodied in the Hallstein Doctrine of 1955.

Despite such blatant attempts to undermine the authority of the SED regime, the first elections to the People's Chamber in the GDR were held on October 5, 1950. The single list elections resulted in an "astounding" victory--99.7% "yes" votes for the communist party. Need-

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* The FRG finally recognized the Oder-Neisse boundary as the western frontier of Poland in December 1970, with the signing of the Warsaw Treaty between Poland and itself.

less to say, the fact that the unity list of the ballot was packed with communists led to cries from the West that such elections were a sham.

The "Missed Opportunity"

It was in early 1952 when one of the most controversial episodes regarding German reunification took place. (To this day, the debate continues over the matter and the issue remains unresolved.) On March 10, 1952 the Western powers received a note from the Soviets proposing a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviets called for a neutral but united and armed Germany. The proposal was, to the great dismay of those Germans desiring a reunited country, largely ignored by the Adenauer government and its Western allies. The latter dismissed the proposal as being little more than an attempt by the Soviets to slow down German political, economic, and military integration with the West. German unity was merely the bait used by Moscow, or so the leaders in the West thought.

Critics continue to blame the former Adenauer government and the Western allies for the 'great opportunity missed in 1952.' Both sides appear to have valid points in their argument. Unfortunately the experts have been unable to unequivocally answer the important question here: Were the Soviets serious in their proposal? i.e. Was it indeed a "missed opportunity" for German unity? Instead of offering a pat answer to this question, it is therefore necessary to describe the events as they happened, including arguments from opposite ends of the political spectrum.

In the note extended from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France on March 10, 1952, with which was enclosed a draft of a peace treaty with Germany, mention was made of the fact that 7 years had passed since the end of the war in Europe without the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Soviet government therefore desired to correct "such an abnormal situation"; it requested the three Western powers to convene with itself in order to prepare "an agreed draft peace treaty." The participation of Germany in the negotiations was also deemed to be necessary by the Soviets. Precisely stated:

> It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with the direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government. From this it follows that the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France who are fulfilling control functions in Germany must also consider the question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of an all-German Government expressing the will of the German people.[30]

The major points were then outlined in the form of a draft peace treaty attached to the note. Under the heading of "Political provisions" of the treaty, seven conditions were itemized, of which the first two and the last one are the most significant:

> (1.) Germany is re-established as a unified state, thereby an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified Germany has a possibility of development as an independent democratic peace-loving state.
>
> (2.) All armed forces of the occupying powers must be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated.
>
> ...
>
> (7.) Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.[31]

Under the following heading marked "Territory," the Soviets declared the territory of Germany to be "... defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers." Under "Military provisions" the Soviets proposed the establishment of national armed forces for defense purposes only. The recommendation was then made that, upon conclusion of a peace treaty, Germany be accepted as a member of the United Nations.

Replies to the Soviet proposal came 15 days later, on March 25, 1952, from the American, British and French embassies in Moscow. It was pointed out that the three Western powers had consulted with the government of the German Federal Republic and the representatives of Berlin regarding the proposal from the USSR. While the Western powers maintained that the conclusion of a peace treaty ending the division of Germany had always been one of their major goals, they stressed the fact that an all-German government could only be established through free elections. They then insisted that, in order to ensure the existence of conditions which "... safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people," a Commission of Investigation appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations be allowed into the "Soviet zone" and East Berlin (as it had been in the Federal Republic and West Berlin). Until such conditions were created for free elections and the subsequent formation of a free all-German government took place, the Western powers would refuse any discussion of a peace treaty.

Other objections were made regarding the Soviet-proposed peace treaty. For example, with regard to the territory of Germany:

> ... the United States Government notes that the Soviet Government makes the statement that the territory of Germany is determined by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Potsdam conference. The United States Government would recall that in fact no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, which clearly provided that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.[32]

Criticism was also levelled at Soviet attempts to restrict Germany's freedom of association with other nations. In an argument that was steeped in contradiction and irony the Western powers maintained that "European unity" (read "West European unity") was in the best interests of peace, wherein international relations would be "... based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust." Furthermore, it was argued that the participation of Germany in a European defense community would "... preclude the revival of militarism." The irony, of course, has been the military build-up and concurrent arms race that has taken place not only in the two German states, but in all of Europe, since integration has begun.

The contradiction in the American argument is due to the fact that the stress was put on the "purely defensive" nature of the future German national armed forces. This is <u>exactly</u> what the Soviets proposed in their draft peace treaty: "... its own national armed forces ... necessary for the defense of the country." Nevertheless, the Americans accused the Soviet government's proposal for the formation of German national forces as being "inconsistent" with the preservation of peace.[33] No further elaboration was made to explain their rejection of the Soviet proposal.

To sum it up, "European unity" was the catchphrase used in the Western argument; it was obvious that they were bent on achieving their goal of integrating West Germany into Western Europe ... at the cost of German unity. The Soviet proposal called for a reunified but neutral Germany--a political solution that was unacceptable not only to the Western powers but to the Adenauer government as well. Although the Americans never mentioned it in their reply to the Soviets, by 1952 the U.S. influence in Western Europe was very strong--they had a vested interest in that region of the world that needed protection. Socio-political, economic and military integration between the United States and the Western European countries was a viable solution; a neutral Germany was not.

To be sure, the political orientation of a future unified "neutral" Germany was a major concern not only for the Western powers but for the USSR and its satellite countries in Eastern Europe as well. Germany lies in the very heart of Europe and nothing can change this geographical fact. The major powers on either side of Germany were France in the west and the USSR in the east. Although both France and the USSR had suffered from the war, the USSR had--despite its devastating losses--gained immense power through the westward expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence into Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period. The rise of the Soviet empire could only be checked by one other nation which was also gaining ascendancy--the United States.

The Soviet proposal to withdraw from Germany all the armed forces of the occupying powers within a year's time following the entry into

force of a peace treaty would have, in the eyes of the Western powers, given the Soviets the strategic upper hand in Europe. The American forces would have been sent back home across the Atlantic, while the Soviet forces needed only to withdraw as far as the Oder-Neisse line (the western Polish border). Such proximity on the part of the Red Army posed a real threat to the security interests of Germany.

Adenauer and the other Western leaders realized this. They therefore decided to cut their losses by bolstering the security of that part of Germany which they already controlled. In a move that was almost certain to be vetoed by the Soviets, the Western powers demanded that conditions in the GDR be met with their satisfaction regarding the carrying out of free elections. Much to the relief of Adenauer and the Western powers, the Commission of Investigation was indeed refused entry into East Germany.

One expert in German politics maintains that Adenauer would not have allowed the Federal Republic to give up its membership in the European Defense Community (EDC) even if the Soviets had permitted all-German free elections to take place![34] The same author also claims that Adenauer simply increased the demands of the West to the point where they proved to be unacceptable by the Soviets and the GDR. This would enable the Chancellor to conclude his negotiations with the West at the expense of reunification. One example of such tactics was Adenauer's insistence on including the former German eastern territories in the reunification issue. Adenauer was fully aware, however, that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was a Soviet precondition for any

reunification negotiations and that the GDR had already recognized the border by contract.

Another tactic employed by Adenauer was his proposal, on American advice, to ban the German Communist Party (KPD). The motive for such a move was obvious: how could all-German elections take place if the KPD was forbidden in West Germany? Even Kirkpatrick, the British High Commissioner, questioned the wisdom of such a move.

With regard to the sincerity of the Soviet proposal for German reunification in early 1952, it is a well-known fact that the major goal of the USSR at that time was to prevent West Germany from becoming part of an American-dominated defense community. Several well-informed experts on Soviet and East European affairs held the opinion that Moscow was ready to pay a steep price for a neutral Germany. It was thought that Soviet policy toward Germany was a two-tracked one: one being the forced socialization and sovietization of East Germany, and the other being a unified Germany which was either pro-Soviet or, at the very least, neutral in its political orientation. Koch maintains that both options were held open by the USSR until 1955.[35]

To the Soviets' credit, the so-called "Stalin note" of March 1952 represented the first document offered by one of the occupying powers that was aimed at a settlement of the results of World War II. That the proposal was made with the concomitant goal of delaying and disrupting the negotiations taking place between the Federal Republic and the Western powers at that time seems undisputed; that the offer of a reunited

Germany was made at all deserves honourable mention with regard to the Soviets.

For many of those who refer to the Stalin note as a "missed opportunity" for a reunified Germany, much emphasis is put on the temporal significance of the proposal; that is, exactly thirteen years earlier, on March 10, 1939, Stalin had declared himself ready to conclude a deal with Hitler's Germany. The announcement was made at the eighteenth party conference of the CPSU.[36] Whether or not the date of the proposal had any political importance, rather than being a sheer coincidence, remains highly debatable.

There is little doubt that the Soviet proposal made a very strong impression on the Western powers. According to the British ambassador in Washington, for example, former U.S. State Secretary Acheson was greatly influenced by the note due to its different tone. It was therefore imperative for the West to increase their demands with regard to a German settlement, as the following passage so vividly illustrates:

> ... Acheson wollte, daß der Westen in einer gemeinsamen Antwort mit der Forderung nach freien gesamtdeutschen Wahlen und der Zulassung der UNO-Ueberwachungskommission die Konditionen hochschraubte. Der britische Außenminister Eden, der die Regie bei der Koordinierung der westlichen Haltung übernahm, sah in der Sowjetnote einen "bedeutenden Fortschritt", den "ernsten Wunsch" Moskaus nach Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und zugleich ein wohlüberlegtes Manöver, um die Integrationspolitik zum Scheitern zu bringen. Als Taktik empfahl Eden, die Verhandlungen mit Adenauer über das westliche Vertragswerk fortzusetzen, und meinte, vielleicht würden die Sowjets dann noch ein besseres Angebot machen. ...Die Franzosen schreckte die Aussicht auf ein wiedervereinigtes bewaffnetes Gesamtdeutschland. Außenminister Schuman bestand deshalb darauf, der Sowjetunion von Anfang an klarzumachen, daß über eine Neutralisierung Deutschlands oder gar eine nationale deutsche Armee nicht verhandelt werden könne. Aus taktischen Gründen--vornehmlich dazu gedacht, deutschen Neutralisten die Freude am sowjetischen Angebot zu verderben--forderte Schuman, daß

der Westen in seiner Antwort auch die für die Sowjetunion nicht verhandelbare Frage der deutschen Ostgrenze aufwerfen sollte.[37]

The response of the Western powers to the Soviet proposal indicates that they were neither ready nor willing to accept the Soviets' "very dangerous" solution to the German problem. As one critic claims, the reunification proposal was not in the interest of the Western powers; the big question is, however, whether it would have served the interests of Germans in the West and the East.[38] Nor was the opposition to the proposal confined to the Western occupying powers; Adenauer is claimed to have once said, "Wir werden in unseren Verhandlungen über die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft und den Deutschlandvertrag so fortfahren, als ob es die Note nicht gäbe."[39]

It is ironic to note that Adenauer was not against talks with the Soviets; it was, however, the timing that was wrong. Adenauer was convinced that the Western agreements first had to be signed. Once West Germany was integrated with the West and accepted into the western alliance, it would be able to deal with the Soviets from a position of strength (Politik der Stärke). Furthermore, the idea of a neutral all-Germany was totally unacceptable to Adenauer (as was the case with the other Western leaders). Adenauer believed that such a political solution represented nothing less than the first step toward the sovietization of Germany, not to mention a dangerous departure from his heretofore emphasized Westpolitik. A sudden turnabout would have destroyed the trust that Adenauer had slowly won back vis-à-vis the West:

Ein neutralisiertes Gesamtdeutschland erschien ihm als erster Schritt zur Bolschewisierung, als "Unterjochung Deutschlands unter Sowjetrußland". Die Deutschen waren in seinen Augen ein politisch unreifes Volk, das eine feste Einbindung in die westeuropäische Staatengemeinschaft brauchte. Von einem plötzlichen Kurswechsel befürchtete er verhängnisvolle Auswirkungen auf das mühsam wiedergewonnene Vertrauen bei den Westmächten: " Wenn wir jetzt auf Sondierungen drängen, sitzen wir zum Schluß zwischen allen Stühlen."[40]

Once the treaty was signed, however, Adenauer again refused to deal with the Soviets, insisting that such talks could only follow ratification.[41] The Chancellor feared the Soviets would prolong the talks and this would obstruct signing of the treaties.

On April 9, 1952, the Soviets answered the Western note dated March 25th. Moscow showed signs of readiness with regard to a compromise on the issue of free all-German elections. A commission comprised of representatives from the four occupying powers could verify the existence of the necessary conditions for such elections.

Such a commission was rejected outright by Adenauer, however, who labelled it a "farce." He argued that it was well-known that Western views were in direct opposition to those held by the Soviets. In further defense of his hard-line views, Adenauer argued that it was better to have a detailed exchange of notes than a conference with no results, as had been the case in the past. In reply to the accusation that the fate of the 18 million Germans in the Soviet zone did not interest him, Adenauer shot back that a free united Germany, in which the SPD was the strongest party, was preferable to a Federal Republic with the CDU as the strongest party, for: "Wenn es um das Vaterland gehe, habe die Partei zurückzustehen."[42]

A further exchange of notes between East and West seemed only to highlight the different views held by both sides. It peaked with the Soviet note dated May 24th, which was seen as being vindictive and highly propagandist and offering nothing concrete toward a solution; if anything, the tone of the letter helped increase the support of Adenauer's policy of Western integration. The Western powers saw the exchange of notes as resulting in a victory* for themselves, and the Soviets were unable to prevent West Germany from integrating itself with Western Europe. On May 26, 1952 the German Treaty was signed in Bonn between the Federal Republic and the three Western powers, bringing an end to the occupation statute.

Whether one criticizes the West or the USSR for failure to reach any agreement on a German settlement as a result of the Stalin note, it is worth mentioning the lack of any real out-and-out domestic opposition to Adenauer's refusal to negotiate with the Soviets. To be sure, the Social Democrats fought against the Chancellor's Westpolitik, but they still failed to break out of the anti-communist front and develop a German policy (Deutschlandpolitik) together with the GDR leadership. Opposition leader Kurt Schumacher's criticism of Adenauer was remarkably moderate, even with Adenauer's insistence on making the eastern territories part of the reunification package.[43] One is left to wonder what

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* The Western "victory" proved to be short-lived when French and British opposition to EDC increased in the latter part of 1952. French Foreign Minister Schuman, for example, a strong supporter of EDC, was forced to leave office in January 1953. France demanded a revision of the already-signed treaty. The treaties were eventually scrapped, leaving the German issue again in a state of deadlock.

the results may have been had the opposition been stronger at home. GDR leader Walter Ulbricht was at no loss of words with regard to the West's rejection of the German peace treaty offer made by the Soviets. In a speech given at Humboldt University on May 3, 1952, Ulbricht accused the West of harbouring revanchist plans toward Poland and Czechoslovakia, and establishing a military dictatorship in West Germany. The GDR leader described the Western treaties, which were about to be signed, as being "general war treaties," whereas the Soviets were offering a peace treaty. Germans had to decide for themselves:

> Either the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany by the four great powers--this means peace.
> Or Adenauer's general treaty of war--this means establishing a military dictatorship in West Germany and aggravating the danger of war.[44]

Rhetoric and propaganda aside, the debate over the sincerity of the Soviet proposal made in March 1952 has continued for more than three and a half decades. The views remain polarized and will undoubtedly continue as such for a long time to come. Whatever point of view one holds, there will always be some nagging doubt hovering over the debate. There is much to be said for the "missed opportunity" argument, given the unwillingness of the Western powers to hold talks with the Soviets, coupled with their increased demands. More credence is lent to this argument with the disclosure of the "Beria affair" which occurred shortly thereafter.

On the other hand, perhaps the Soviet draft peace treaty offer was indeed only a ploy to slow down and/or halt negotiations in the West. For the supporters of this view, the idea that the Soviets were

ready to abandon East Germany--at a time when Soviet hegemony was being consolidated in Eastern Europe--is hard to accept. The GDR's geographic position and its industrial strength were important factors to consider, as one source points out:

> The USSR has always had a particular interest in East Germany, not only as a buffer between the other East European states and the West, but also as a source of industrial power. When the failure of the Berlin blockade stymied Soviet expansionist aims in Europe, the USSR turned its attention to integrating East Germany with the bloc.[45]

Indeed, the Soviet Union's offer of a reunited Germany does seem a little incredulous, given the fact that in the 1950s Germany was the only nation reputed to be "both esteemed and feared in Moscow."[46] In 1952, memories of the German invasion of the USSR just over a decade ago were still vivid in Stalin's mind. If the Soviet leader feared a military revival in West Germany, then he feared a reunited German nation no less, despite the call for "neutralization." How long would a strong united Germany be able to maintain its "neutral" status with the forces of capitalism to the west and those of communism to the east?...

Here, it is now important to mention the so-called "Beria affair," which occurred one year after the Stalin note. Shortly after Stalin's death in March 1953, it is said that Beria, Stalin's secret police chief, and Premier Georgi Malenkov proposed the liquidation of the Communist regime in East Germany. This accusation was made by Krushchev in a speech given in March 1963.[47] Krushchev's remarks are most interesting because

> ... the Malenkov-Beria "plot" closely resembled a proposal that is known to have been made by Stalin, himself, to the East German Communist regime in early 1952.

> At that time, as reported by Pietro Nenni, the Italian left-wing Socialist, the late Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, the East German Communist leaders, were told by the Kremlin that their regime would have to be liquidated in the interests of unifying Germany. Nenni was told by Pieck and Grotewohl that Stalin had advised them that they must "follow the Italian example," that is, become a minority party in a united Germany....
>
> ... The orders to the East German party were issued preliminary to an appeal by Moscow in March, 1952, for four-power negotiations to end the occupation of Germany, unify the country and establish the peace treaty. The Soviet move was interpreted at that time in the West as a design to block the Western intention of recognizing West Germany and ending occupation rights in its territory.[48]

Following the West's rejection of the Soviet offer, the GDR regime was advised that its existence would no longer be questioned. According to Krushchev, however, Beria and Malenkov did renew the liquidation idea in 1953 but again it was dropped. (Beria was executed in December 1953 and Malenkov was ousted as Premier in February 1955.)

Krushchev's statement implied the possibility of a link between these proposals and the workers revolt that occurred in East Germany in June 1953. Whether or not the link exists, it is generally accepted that Beria welcomed 'de-Stalinization' in the period immediately following the former Soviet leader's death.[49] Talk of liberalization in Soviet policy toward the GDR in early 1953 was welcomed by the reformers but greatly troubled the apparatchiks in the East German state. Wolfgang Leonhard describes how the new Soviet foreign policy affected the course of events in the GDR:

> It was confidentially known in May that Beria supported these views and that he had chosen Rudolf Herrnstadt to prepare a change in the SED leadership. After the end of April the SED leadership was pressed from the Soviet side to accept the new line: In the economic field to increase the production of consumer goods and in the political field to show willingness to make concessions to middle class and church circles and to be more restrained in

> criticism of the German Federal Republic. At the end of May and the beginning of June Soviet pressure increased. When the 'New Course' with its economic and political concessions was finally proclaimed in Eastern Germany on 9 June 1953 it still lagged behind Russian wishes. For the Soviet representatives desired the far-reaching changes which they had prepared to be announced not only in a Politburo statement but also at a session of the SED.[50]

Wilhelm Zaisser, Minister of National Defense in the G[illegible], had been directly subordinate to Beria at this time and he played a key role in the entire affair. He had helped Beria and Malenkov to formulate a policy aimed at a settlement on East Germany. Denounced shortly thereafter by Ulbricht as being a "policy of capitulation before the West," Zaisser was subsequently ousted.[51]

Although both Beria and Malenkov were central to the short-lived Soviet liberalization campaign, it was Beria who was the stronger advocate of reformist policies, particularly with regard to foreign policy. This is firmly maintained by Boris Nicolaevsky in the following passage:

> What Beria did do in the months before his arrest he could not have done without the consent of Malenkov. But the support of Malenkov's government was far from complete. The facts at our disposal leave virtually no room for doubt that the decisive dispute and rupture occurred in the realm of foreign policy, in the matter of concessions to the West which Beria considered necessary. There is almost no doubt that these concessions were to be very substantial and go as far as withdrawal from East Germany ....[52]

Such reformist policies clashed directly with those of the SED regime, which was busy consolidating itself in East Germany. In the summer of 1952, for example, the SED proclaimed the "building up of socialism." The following passage illustrates how the Soviet proposal

of abandonment of East Germany would meet fierce resistance from the SED leadership:

> ... [By mid-1952] the transformation of the social and state order along communist lines was continued at an accelerated pace and in all openness. Already in 1950 the GDR had become a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, COMECON, and its accession to the Warsaw Pact in 1955 completed its integration in the eastern bloc.[53]

Despite such opposition to liberalization emanating from the SED regime, as well as the expected opposition from communist hard-liners in Moscow, in early 1953 there was an easing of the rigid Stalin-style sovietization in East Germany; the orders for such reformist policies came from Moscow and the leadership in East Berlin was forced to comply with these new directives. Seeing that the time was ripe for talks on the German question, Churchill made an appeal to the Western leaders for a Summit Conference, which was to have taken place in the spring of 1953. Dulles, however, opposed such a conference and Eden had reservations against the same.

It was only in 1954--that is, after the 1953 riots in East Germany were put down with the aid of Soviet troops--that Dulles started to regret his decision not to enter any negotiations with the Soviets the previous spring:

> By the time that January, 1954, arrived Dulles felt that the chances of reaching any significant agreement with the Russians, never more than slim, had grown even slimmer. He was inclined to think that, if a conference had been possible immediately after Stalin's death, or if the famous riot in East Berlin had never taken place, the chances of a breakthrough would have been better. But, with the passage of time, the psychological elements in the situation were hardening as it was inevitable that they would in a period when the realities of nuclear power were so patently shifting.[54]

Those critics who charge the Western powers as having missed yet another opportunity often refer to the liberalizing measures which came into effect in the GDR in early May and remained thus until the advent of the riots on June 16-17th. More specifically, they argue that "... the liberalization was designed to render East Germany a more respectable negotiating partner in an all-German settlement."[55] Whether there was any such grand design intended by the reformist moves or not, the possibility of holding talks on a German settlement vanished with the workers' riots in June 1953. Soviet forces were used to defeat the uprising and this was followed by the re-emergence of a hard-line Communist dictatorship in the GDR. In other words, as far as the German reunification question was concerned, it was back to "square one"; the Cold War was still very real. To this day, the question of whether or not the Soviets were willing to make concessions in the spring of 1953 leading to an all-German settlement remains unresolved and hotly disputed--as is the case with the Stalin note of March 1952.

As already mentioned, the workers' revolt in the GDR began on the evening of June 16, 1953. The riots were due to political discontent and economic dissatisfaction, specifically Ulbricht's raising of work norms. With regard to the liberalization program, the workers saw that the new policy (Neuorientierung) gave preferential treatment to the bourgeoisie.[56] The workers' demonstration on the Stalinallee in East Berlin, in which they demanded reduced work norms, spread into a wave of strikes and protests on the following day. The revolt was significant

in that it was the first of its kind in a Soviet-controlled country. It was also a direct attack against the SED regime.

In an underhanded attempt to shift the blame for the revolt in the GDR on the West, the Soviets described it as a 'foreign mercenaries' affair.'[57] Taking their cue from the Soviets, the GDR regime also refused to take responsibility for their workers' unrest. Witness the following historical account of the 1953 revolt, published by an official GDR government agency:

> The Cold War caused a great deal of damage and obstructed socialist construction. Western secret services, underground groups and terrorists were infiltrated from West Berlin to stir up malcontents. On 17 June 1953 a counterrevolutionary coup was attempted in Berlin and other cities with the aim of overthrowing the socialist state. It was defeated very quickly. The majority of the working class remained loyal to their party at this difficult time. The SED's alliance policy had withstood a historic test.[58]

Not only was the blame put on foreign mercenaries, but the intervention of the Red Army--(mercenaries of a different colour?!)--was conveniently omitted.

In a letter from President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer dated July 23, 1953 regarding the uprising in East Germany, the U.S. president claimed that the workers had chanted, "We want free elections." This served to validate the Western point of view that the SED regime was "bankrupt." Eisenhower used the occasion to reaffirm his conviction that integration with Western Europe was the best possible route for the Federal Republic and would eventually result in German reunification:

> It has long been my conviction that the strengthening of the Federal Republic, through adoption of the EDC, the contractual

> agreements and further progress in the integration of Western Europe, can only enhance the prospects for the peaceful unification of Germany, by increasing the attractive power of this prosperous Western Germany vis-a-vis the Soviet zone, an attractive power which has already been demonstrated by the steady stream of refugees in recent months, as well as the demonstrations which began on June 17. This increasing contrast between Western and Eastern Germany, the latter with its bankrupt regime and impoverished economy, will in the long run produce conditions which should make possible the liquidation of the present Communist dictatorship and of the Soviet occupation.[59]

One analyst criticizes the Western powers for their failure to act according to their words. Political economist Angela Stent maintains that, "The failure of the West to come to the aid of the East German opposition in the abortive uprising of 1953 in some ways diluted the alleged Western commitment to liberate the GDR and strengthened the Soviet position."[60] Indeed, the West's inaction coupled with Soviet intervention in the affair amounted to de facto support of the SED regime, whether intentional or not.

It is worth mentioning that shortly after the June 17th uprising, negotiations took place between the Soviet government and that of the GDR (August 20-22, 1953). As a result of these negotiations, some significant economic and political concessions were made, such as the termination of reparations removals (effective January 1, 1954) and "... the release of Germany from the payment of postwar state debts to the Soviet Union."[61] In addition to the above measures, the Diplomatic Missions of both countries were to become embassies and ambassadors were to be exchanged; the goal of a "...united, peace-loving, democratic Germany ..."[62] was given as justification for this last move.

A Foreign Ministers Meeting took place in Berlin in 1954 from January 25 to February 18, where all four occupying powers were represented. The GDR government had tried in vain to be present. The FRG government took part by sending an advisor-representative (Professor W. G. Grewe), not wanting to be officially represented in order to prevent the East Germans from doing the same. The Eden Plan resulted from the conference, a plan for German reunification that was proposed by the British Foreign Secretary of the same name. The plan called for free elections supervised by the four powers, a constitution drafted by an elected assembly and the formation of a government according to the new constitution, which would then help negotiate a peace treaty. The Eden Plan was opposed by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on the grounds that a united Germany should not be permitted to enter any political or military alliance. The meeting was a failure, as one author explains:

> The Berlin Conference was absolutely unproductive as far as the German problem was concerned. Neither the Russians nor the Western positions had changed essentially. The Soviet proposals were aimed not only at preventing the possibility of Germany's alignment with the West but also at arranging in advance, the character of the future all-German government.[63]

Despite the stalemate over reunification, it should be kept in mind that, until 1955, both states continued to declare the restoration of German unity the supreme goal of their policies. (In 1955, the GDR dropped its reunification rallying cry, changing instead to the proposal of a confederation of the two states.)

On March 25, 1954, a few weeks after the unsuccessful Foreign Ministers Conference, the Soviet government announced its recognition of

the GDR as a sovereign state. In response to this declaration, the three Western governments, as represented by the Allied High Commission, announced on April 8, 1954 that they refused to recognize the newly declared sovereignty of the "so-called German Democratic Republic." To quote:

> The three governments represented in the Allied High Commission will continue to regard the Soviet Union as the responsible power for the Soviet Zone of Germany. These governments do not recognize the sovereignty of the East German regime which is not based on free elections, and do not intend to deal with it as a government. They believe that this attitude will be shared by other states, who, like themselves, will continue to recognize the Government of the Federal Republic as the only freely elected and legally constituted government in Germany.[64]

This policy of non-recognition toward the GDR on the part of the three Western powers was to be officially adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany the following year (1955) and proclaimed as the "Hallstein Doctrine."

NATO Integration of the FRG

On October 23, 1954 the Paris Treaties were signed by those Western nations wanting to be part of a new Western European Union; such countries as the Federal Republic and Italy were included. The Western European Union served to replace the defunct Defense Community. West Germany was also admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Also noteworthy was the fact that the Federal Republic became a sovereign power; there were, however, various restrictions with regard to her right to rearm.

The most significant development resulting from the Paris Treaties was the end of the occupation regime for West Germany. Despite this, however, Article 2 of the new Contractual Agreement stipulated that:

> In view of the international situation which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the re-unification of Germany and a peace settlement....

Following the ratification of the Paris Treaties in January 1955 and the official admission of the FRG into NATO when it came into effect on May 5, 1955, it was acknowledged that Adenauer had been successful with his policy of western integration. Now a sovereign country and part of a strong Western military alliance, West Germany was gearing up to pursue negotiations which would hopefully lead to a satisfactory solution to the German problem... or so Adenauer thought.

Unfortunately, the Soviets held quite a different view, as did Adenauer's critics at home. The Soviets left no doubt that German reunification would be impossible for quite a long time should the FRG become part of NATO. SPD chairman Erich Ollenhauer blamed the Chancellor for missing yet another opportunity, (i.e., a repeat of 1952):

> Die Sowjetunion hatte keinen Zweifel daran gelassen, wie sie sich verhalten würde, wenn die Bundesrepublik der NATO doch beiträte. Dies würde "auf lange Zeit hinaus die Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands unmöglich machen."
>
> Der neue SPD-Vorsitzende Erich Ollenhauer bedrängte vergeblich den Bundeskanzler. "Man hat es 1952 versäumt, die Ernsthaftigkeit der damaligen Angebote der Sowjetunion zu erproben. Uns jetzt der gleichen Unterlassung schuldig zu machen, würde vor dem deutschen Volk nicht verantwortet werden können." Adenauers Antwort: "Über

alles, was die Sowjetunion in den letzten Tagen und Wochen zur deutschen Frage geäußert hat, läßt sich nach der Ratifizierung genauso gut verhandeln wie vorher."[65]

Indeed, only nine days following the FRG's official acceptance into NATO, the GDR became a founding member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the East-bloc counterpart of NATO. By 1955, then, both German states had been incorporated in opposing alliance systems and the German question moved into a new stage. As mentioned earlier, East Germany's reunification campaign ceased and was replaced by proposals for a confederation of both states (die Zwei-Staaten-Theorie or the Anerkennung der Realitäten).[66] The Federal Republic, however, continued to maintain that reunification would only occur as a result of all-German free elections; it also claimed to be the only rightful party that could speak in the name of all Germany. Incorporated as the "Hallstein Doctrine" in 1955, "...Bonn treated other states' assumption of diplomatic relations with the GDR as an "unfriendly act"...."[67] Furthermore, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany declared that it would not maintain diplomatic relations with any country which took up or maintained diplomatic relations with East Germany. As a result thereof, the GDR was only recognized by communist countries and some socialist countries in the Third World until the late 1960s. It was almost completely ignored elsewhere in the world.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by the Federal Republic in 1955 was the only exception to the Hallstein Doctrine. West Germany's stand regarding its "sole right to representa-

tion" remained unaltered following its taking up diplomatic relations with the USSR; as one source states:

> In a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin, Adenauer indicated that the establishment of relations did not mean recognition of territorial ownership, which could only be settled in a peace treaty and that the government's legal views regarding representation of the German people remained unchanged.[68]

It is worth noting that the government of the FRG addressed its initiatives with regard to policy on Germany to the Four Powers, rather than to the GDR, as the former were responsible for all of Germany. Furthermore, contacts at the government level between the FRG and the GDR were, of course, impossible. There were, however, numerous contacts at the non-governmental level, as well as a growing amount of trade between the two.

West Germany was not the only one to obtain full sovereignty in 1955; through a Treaty of Friendship signed between the USSR and the GDR on September 20th of that year, the latter was also formally granted full sovereignty. "Friendly relations" were also developed with the other socialist countries. In a speech given by Ulbricht before the People's Chamber on the Treaty on the Relations between the GDR and the USSR on September 26, 1955, the GDR leader demanded the dismantling of NATO before any move toward German reunification was possible:

> All that is said by western politicians on the reunification of Germany is empty talk as long as the western powers and with them Adenauer cling to the policy of NATO and the restoration of German militarism. The reunification of Germany is only possible through the creation of a democratic, peace-loving state. This requires the overcoming of the North Atlantic military grouping which is hostile to peace and directed against the interests of the German people....[69]

Although Ulbricht did not mention doing away with the Warsaw Pact, it was indeed mentioned by the Soviets in a Draft Treaty on Collective Security in Europe proposed on July 20, 1955. In section II, paragraph 14, the Soviets proposed:

> The States-parties to the Treaty agree that on the expiration of an agreed time-limit from the entry into force of the present Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 shall become ineffective.[70]

Paragraph 13, however, proposed "...the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European countries...," a move obviously directed against the American presence in West Germany. Should both the Americans and the Soviets have vacated Europe, the Soviets would still have gained the strategic advantage on the basis of geographic proximity alone. The Soviets had always maintained that the occupation of Austria would end only after an agreement on Germany was reached. Its sudden volte-face in the spring of 1955 therefore came as a shock to the West and a source of inspiration to those desiring German reunification. The only condition attached to Austria's independence was a neutral political status. The treaty was signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955 and provided for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces. The new-found optimism regarding German reunification proved to be short-lived, however, when two summit conferences that took place in Geneva in 1955 served only to highlight the different views held by the Soviets and the West.[71] Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, for example, insisted upon the consolidation and possible expansion of the communist system in a united Germany, as well as "...an 'all-German Council' composed of equal num-

bers of representatives of the East and West German parliaments, instead of the 'free elections' mentioned in the directive."[71] Both conferences proved to be fruitless.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria was truly unprecedented and did much to raise false hopes regarding a settlement of the German question--the phrase "spirit of Geneva" was coined and erroneously applied to the summit conferences that were held in the city of the same name. However, there were those who refused to link the Austrian treaty with a German settlement; one expert helps provide critical insight regarding this issue:

> ... although it had withdrawn from an important area, the USSR could reap the strategic benefit of creating a neutral wedge some 500 miles deep between West Germany and Italy. This in effect split the Western defense area.
>
> ... Austria was a unique example, the result of a special combination of circumstances. Austria was militarily and industrially insignificant, it had been declared a liberated rather than an enemy territory, and no communist regime had been placed in the Soviet zone. Thus, through a particular series of events, Austria was spared the fate of Eastern Europe and the USSR appeared to be magnanimous. Because the FRG was already in NATO, there was little to be gained by delaying a solution to the Austrian problem.[72]

The year 1955 represented a major turning point in the German question. Both East and West Germany were integrated into opposing military alliances and both parts of Germany were recognized as being sovereign states by fellow members of their own respective blocs. Adenauer had successfully completed the most important step toward western integration for the FRG when it joined NATO. A strong western-oriented Federal Republic had opted for freedom over unity. Reunification was still a major goal of the FRG but this could only occur "in

freedom"--and NATO played an integral part in maintaining this freedom. This was officially proclaimed on June 13, 1956 in a joint communiqué on the German question by Adenauer and Secretary of State Dulles.[73]

If, as the Western leaders had always argued, the Soviets' true aim, with regard to their numerous peace treaty proposals, was merely to delay or prevent the integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe, then the USSR had failed. Moscow did benefit from the fact, however, that West Germany joined the western alliance and acquired its sovereignty prior to East Germany; that is to say, the USSR could cast the blame upon the West for failure to reach any agreement dealing with German reunification. Moscow had always portrayed itself as the champion of reunification.

Following East Germany's entry into the Warsaw Pact and its acquisition of sovereignty, both Moscow and East Berlin propagated the view that there now existed two German states. Furthermore, the GDR was non-negotiable in any future settlement of the German problem--the German Democratic Republic was here to stay. With regard to Soviet - West German relations, if the goal of the Soviets before had been to prevent the FRG from joining NATO, then the events of 1955 necessitated a major change in Soviet policy. The new Soviet goal was to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany and have it recognize the regimes in Eastern Europe. This would help legitimize the status quo in the Soviet-bloc countries:

> At a minimum, the presence of ambassadors from two German states in Moscow would, in Soviet eyes, contribute to the legitimization of the GDR and enhance Soviet prestige in the international arena. At a maximum, the USSR may have hoped that, if it were able to im-

> prove its relations with the FRG, it might be able to influence West German policy within the Atlantic Alliance and possibly encourage its independence from the United States. The attempt to divide the FRG from the U.S. has been a consistent Soviet goal since 1955.[74]

The year 1955 brought about the incorporation of the two German states into their respective Western and Eastern alliance systems. Both regimes refused to renounce their respective economic, military and socio-political systems in the name of German unity. If West Germany was now operating from a position of strength, then the same could be said about its eastern neighbour. Both states were suddenly part of strong military alliances with diametrically opposed socio-political and economic systems. The German question had most definitely moved into a new phase.

Berlin

As the division of Germany deepened in the 1950s, the Soviets were confronted with two major problems in their bid to control East Germany: Berlin and legitimization of the SED regime. With regard to the former, the western half of the former German capital was:

> ... a thorn in the flesh of the GDR and the Soviet Union and a hole in the Iron Curtain. Even though not on its territory, a city of 2 million with a Western political system was located right in the middle of the GDR and it was accessible to everyone from the Eastern bloc countries. Not just the considerable material advantage, which became manifestly evident in the 1950's, made West Berlin attractive for East Germans. It was above all the political and cultural freedoms present there that made the difference between the East and the West so impressively clear. It was not even necessary for people to visit West Berlin to experience this, since West Berlin's radio and television broadcasts can be heard and seen in large parts of the GDR.[75]

Despite the existence of the "iron curtain" that had separated the two German states for several years, discontented East Germans (as well as other East Europeans) were able to move to the Federal Republic via West Berlin, since passage through the four-power city was virtually unrestricted. The West German government assisted these refugees in a most efficient and welcome manner, owing to the labour shortage in the west. The steady stream of refugees was quite substantial and represented a serious labour loss to the East German economy, which had already been suffering from a shortage of manpower. To be more specific, (by the spring of 1961):

> In the period since the end of World War II in 1945, some four million ... had left East Germany, trekking westward. It was the most concentrated mass migration ever in a highly developed industrial society. Between 1949, when the German Democratic Republic was founded, and 1961, when the Wall was built, 2,800,000 people, one in every six, had abandoned East Germany for the West, a total greater than the remaining population of the dozen largest East German cities.[76]

This huge exodus of GDR citizens to the west caused political damage to the SED regime and the Soviets as well. West Berlin highlighted the deficiencies and shortcomings of communism in general. The fact that so many East German citizens openly sought the capitalist alternative was nothing less than an insult and an embarrassment to Ulbricht's and Khrushchev's policies. Something had to be done--and soon.

On November 27, 1958 Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin was given to the West in which the Soviet Premier declared that the London Agreement of September 12, 1944 was no longer valid, the Western occupation

of Berlin illegal [illegible] of Berlin was located on GDR territory, West Berlin would have to be transformed into an independent political unit and a free city and a settlement of this kind would have to be reached within 6 months. The [illegible]atum declared that the GDR had full sovereignty with regard to its territory, and this included the access routes to West Berlin. Furthermore, there would no longer be any more Four-Power contacts.

It should be remembered that the Khrushchev ultimatum was the second attempt by the Soviets to rid West Berlin of the Western powers and obtain complete control over the access routes to Berlin, the first attempt having been the unsuccessful 1948-1949 Berlin blockade. During the crisis that immediately followed the ultimatum, Moscow also warned the Western powers that if they did not remove their garrisons form the city within the allotted six months, then they (the Soviets) would unilaterally sign a peace treaty with East Germany, thereby ending World War II in a "formal" manner.

However, such a treaty would have had much greater significance than just formally concluding the war, as one critic points out:

> If it had been implemented, it would have put an end to legal justification for the presence of the western garrisons in Berlin. It would have endangered the access routes from West Germany by which those garrisons were supplied and would have left West Berlin open to a Communist take-over. As a "free city" located within East Germany and shorn of Allied protection, West Berlin would not be "free" very long.[77]

Despite the implied threat of war that went with the ultimatum, the West called the Soviets' bluff by firmly assuring West Berliners that they would not be abandoned. Although there followed some sporadic harass-

ment of the western access routes to Berlin, the Soviets did not follow through with their ultimatum. Western unity had paid off in this particular episode.

In May 1959 there began another Foreign Ministers Conference dealing with the German problem. Held in Geneva, it was the first such meeting since the one that took place in the summer of 1955. According to Secretary of State Herter, the conference of 1959 was essentially a continuation of the 1955 meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Although the Western stand had remained essentially unchanged with its demand for free elections and German reunification, the Soviets now wished to exclude the problem of German reunification and instead limit the discussion to Berlin and a peace treaty with the two parts of Germany. The Soviet government feared losing the East German regime with its "social achievements." It emphasized the de facto situation; i.e., the existence of two German states:

> ... the Soviet Government sees no other possibility but to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States; and, in the event that a German confederation has been formed by the time the peace treaty is signed, to sign the treaty with the German confederation as well as with the GDR and the FRG.[78]

Such demands clashed with the West's policy of non-recognition toward the GDR. The West had argued that any peace treaty signed with the FRG and the GDR would have had no legal basis, since the Allies were never at war with them. Such a treaty would have served only to recognize the permanent partition of Germany. A peace treaty could only be signed with an all-German government which was freely chosen by the German people. Given the opposing points of view held by the Western

powers and the Soviets, it is not surprising that the conference ended without any agreement on the German problem.*

At the same time of the Berlin crisis of 1958, numerous proposals were put forth dealing with disengagement in central Europe--a so-called "zone of relaxation." Examples of such projects were the Deutschland-plan ("Germany Plan") of the SPD opposition and the Rapacki Plan, named after the former Polish Foreign Minister. (It is still debated whether or not the Rapacki Plan represented an independent Polish initiative; some say that its origins lay in the Soviet Union.) The SPD's plan for reunification was rejected in the West because it would have granted recognition to the GDR, as well as numerical parity in an all-German body of representatives. FRG critics foresaw a communist takeover of West Germany.

The Polish Rapacki Plan, which called for a "denuclearized zone in Central Europe," was eventually rejected by the West because "...its motives and intentions were mainly strategic, not political."[79] The plan did not provide for the overcoming of the division of Germany, nor did it "...affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack...."[80] That is to say, denuclearization envisaged in the plan dealt only with central Europe--the USSR remained unaffected. The

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* Another major disputed point was the West's support of a united Germany's freedom to join any military alliance it chose versus the Soviet Union's restrictions on the same. The Soviets accused (West) Germany of harbouring revanchists who desired to join NATO and were unwilling "... to resign themselves to the defeat of Hitler Germany."

plan's rejection did nothing to ease the growing tensions between the East and the West.

By 1960 the situation in Germany, particularly in Berlin, was worse than ever. Although Khrushchev had failed to follow through with his ultimatum, thinly disguised threats regarding the urgent need to resolve the "abnormal situation" continued to emanate from both Moscow and Berlin (capital of the GDR). The aforementioned stream of East German refugees westward via West Berlin was aggravated by such factors as the forced collectivization of agriculture throughout the GDR in early 1960, a lower standard of living in the eastern part of Germany and forced worker indoctrination sessions and lectures in factories and offices. In many cases, those fleeing the GDR were merely going over to sell their labour to a higher bidder. In other instances, it was the oppressive political situation that convinced East German citizens that life in the West would be better. (One extreme example of such political hectoring was that "children in the city of Halle ... were warned that reading Mickey Mouse comics ... could lead them astray."[81])

That the steady exodus westward was a source of grave concern to both the SED regime and the Soviets readily becomes apparent upon reading the following passage:

> Almost one thousand university professors and lecturers (including the entire law faculty of the University of Leipzig) joined the exodus, as did more than fifteen thousand high school and elementary school teachers and some thirty thousand students, many of them waiting to receive their graduation diplomas before departing. A West Berlin television executive says, out of his high school class of twenty-five in a small town outside of Erfurt, twenty-two ultimately made their way to the West. More than half the refugees were under twenty-five years of age. Three out of four were younger than forty-five. These were the people the

> East German Communist leaders were counting on to build the first German socialist state. Older people, on state pensions, generally preferred not to shift to new surroundings so late in life.[82]

Such a human drain not only wreaked havoc on the GDR economy, but it also undermined attempts by the SED regime to gain recognition through legitimization. The exodus to the West represented a public rejection of the Ulbricht government and was a slap in the face for Soviet bloc politics.

The ultimate solution was found when construction of the Berlin Wall began on August 13, 1961. Hastily erected by East German authorities, the Wall physically divided the western sectors of Greater Berlin form the Soviet sector. Only a few gateways for traffic between West and East Berlin were perm[illegible]ceforth GDR citizens, as well as those of East Berlin were [illegible] into West Berlin without special permission by the state--w[illegible] might add, was rarely granted. Despite the obviously repugnant nature of the Wall, the GDR government tried to justify its existence by accusing West Germany (and West Berlin) of revanchist policies toward it. Witness an excerpt from the decree made by the East German regime on August 13, 1961:

> The West German militarists want, with the help of all sorts of fraudulent maneuvers, ... at first to extend their military base to the Oder [River] and then start another big war....
> To put an end to the hostile activities of the revanchist and militarist forces of Western Germany and West Berlin, such control is to be introduced on the borders of the German Democratic Republic, including the border with the Western sectors of Greater Berlin, which is usually introduced along the borders of every sovereign state.[83]

Denounced by the West and labelled "The Wall of Shame" by the West Germans, the Wall nevertheless remained in existence and went, for

the most part, unchallenged by the West. No military action was taken by the Western powers, with the exception of a forgettable American - Russian stand-off later in October of that year at one of the crossing points. The decision by the West not to take retaliatory measures has been likened to the events of 1953 when the workers revolt occurred. Western inaction had its costs, however, as one author suggests:

> For the West Germans the shock of August 13, 1961, resembled that of June 17, 1953. Helplessness and reluctance to take risks increased bitterness, and these feelings were expressed in the returns of the September, 1961, elections. For the first time the Berlin issue had directly affected West German elections by turning the electorate against the party of the Chancellor....
> ... Although the future impact of the Wall is not yet foreseeable, it promises to revive nationalistic sentiments and to foment latent hostility toward the Western powers, especially the United States, whose inaction dismayed the public.[84]

The sudden appearance of the Wall in the very heart of Berlin was a shock to the West Germans, in that it forced them to open their eyes and see Germany for what it really was: a divided nation. Until August 13, 1961, West Germans had, for the most part, believed Adenauer's promise that Western integration would eventually lead to German reunification. The Wall showed, however, that the two halves of Berlin represented two very distinct societies--one capitalist, the other communist--with opposing economic and socio-political systems. The Wall's construction meant "the end of the illusion" of Adenauer's policy of integration, which would eventually result in a new Ostpolitik ("Eastern policy").

Despite this rude awakening on the part of the West, there was a minor "victory" to be had with the removal of the ultimatum. This be-

came apparent at the 22nd Party Congress when Khrushchev renounced the idea of the free city. In doing so, the Soviet leader was in fact admitting that there was no longer a crisis. Angela Stent gives her view of the political situation in the period immediately following the construction of the Wall:

> Despite his menacing posturing and his repeated threats, Khrushchev had not succeeded in changing the status of West Berlin; nor had he secured a peace treaty that would have meant Western recognition of the GDR. However, he had achieved one important gain--stabilizing the Ulbricht regime and ensuring its economic and political survival.[85]

Although the latter part of Stent's argument remains valid, one can find fault with that which she fails to mention in the first part: that is, the status of West Berlin did not change but the status of Berlin as a whole did change most significantly! The erection of the Wall by East German security forces and decrees made by the same was a violation of the four-power agreements by the Soviets, as the GDR security forces had no legal status or authority in the eyes of the Western commandants. The sudden restrictions on travel within Berlin were also a violation of the four-power status of Berlin and they violated the right to circulate freely throughout the city. That the Western powers did little more than lodge a formal protest against the Soviets starkly shows that the real victory was had by the Communists. Inaction on the part of the West was nothing short of a major concession to both the Soviets and the SED regime. Western inaction signaled its de facto acceptance of the division of Berlin and the role of East German authorities in East Berlin.

Furthermore, as Stent correctly points out above, the Wall prevented the Ulbricht regime from collapsing. It succeeded in drastically cutting the flow of refugees westward. For example, the flow has been reduced to fewer than 5,000 a year.[86] Compare this figure with the 2,000 refugees which were leaving the GDR every day, just prior to the erection of the Wall.[87] Despite the lame excuses put forth by Ulbricht and Khrushchev for the construction of the Wall, it did play a very important role in the consolidation of the SED regime.

One of the most important results following the construction of the Wall was the recovery of the GDR's economy. Although it still remained far behind that of the Federal Republic, the standard of living rose considerably, eventually entitling the GDR to second place among the East bloc countries, after the Soviet Union, with regard to industrial production and foreign trade. Such success in the realm of economics only served to lend credibility to the socialist system in the GDR. It also took away some of the sparkle from the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle") which was unfolding next door in the Federal Republic and which could have been a major cause of renewed worker unrest in the GDR.

Ironically, it was in the realm of politics where the FRG's economy inflicted most of the harm upon the East German regime. Through its Hallstein Doctrine and its economic clout the Federal Republic succeeded in diplomatically alienating the GDR throughout the 1960s. As the following passage explains:

> With the exception of the socialist Cuba, which formally recognized the GDR ... on 12 January 1963, as Havana was beginning its

> own process of socialist consolidation, no other state was able to open diplomatic relations with East Berlin, mostly out of fear of West German recrimination. Not only did Bonn have the power to impose heavy economic sanctions upon an offending government, but it could also draw much of the Atlantic Alliance behind it. In this eventuality, East German economic and technical assistance was never an adequate substitute.[88]

It is also ironic to note, however, that Bonn's reliance on its economic strength in the international community, and particularly in its relations with the GDR, in order to obtain political concessions, had become the dominant trend as early as the 1950s and it has remained so until today. (By the 1960s it was often said that West Germany was an economic power but a political lightweight.) No less ironic was the fact that West Germany's policy of non-recognition toward the GDR gave Ulbricht and his cronies an open hand, if you will, in the consolidation of their regime. McAdams calls this "the paradox of nonrecognition":

> In theory, the policy of all but ostracizing East Germany was supposed to weaken the GDR politically--as indeed it did internationally. But in domestic terms, Ulbricht and his colleagues were at least availed one comforting, if totally unintended, certainty as a result of the FRG's refusal to engage in dialogue: the West Germans would not be around to complicate their undertakings. In essence, East Berlin could present itself to its population in any manner it wished, without ever having to worry about direct competition form the FRG. Thus, in contrast to the image generated by the SED, it may have been not so much the Wall which shut the West Germans out of the GDR, but instead the West Germans themselves.[89]

Bonn's uncompromising "everything now or nothing" stand on the German question and its intransigence toward the SED regime drew sharp criticism not only from Ulbricht, but from a growing domestic opposition to the Christian Democrats as well. The construction of the Berlin Wall

marked the beginning of the end for Adenauer. His Politik der Stärke ("policy of strength") had led to the physical division of the historic capital of the German nation instead of progress toward reunification. His people realized what Adenauer refused to publicly admit: that Germany was more divided than ever ... a new political modus operandi had to be found and, concomitantly, a new leader.

A New Ostpolitik

Adenauer resigned the chancellorship in 1963 and was replaced by Ludwig Erhard. Erhard was unable, however, to halt the decline of the CDU. It was at this time when the Social Democrats adopted a more pragmatic stand with regard to inter-German relations. Such an approach struck a responsive chord with the West German electorate; the SPD did very well in the parliamentary elections held in 1965. It was in 1966, however, when the Free Democrats quit the coalition with the Christian Democrats who in turn formed a Grand Coalition with the increasingly popular SPD.

Although diplomatic relations would not follow until years later, in early 1962 the FRG's new foreign minister Gerhard Schröder proposed to exchange economic missions with all of the Soviet bloc states, except the GDR. In what later became known as the Politik der Bewegung ("policy of movement"), it represented a significant change in policy, due to its more accommodating nature. It must be remembered, however, that Schröder's new policy was not (yet) an abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, since diplomatic relations were not offered. Between March 7,

1963 and March 6, 1964, the Federal Republic established trade missions in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

West Germany's overture to the East was matched by a similar wooing of the West by the GDR in the realm of economics. Nor did the approaches by Ulbricht's regime go unnoticed in the West, for despite [illegible]allstein Doctrine,

> ... in opening itself to the East, Bonn had gradually, though unintentionally, begun to break down the barriers that had kept its allies from pursuing more flexible policies in the socialist world.[90]

In other words, Schröder's Politik der [illegible]ung spelled the eventual death of the Hallstein Doctrine.

There had been, in fact, a definite softening of West German foreign policy, particularly regarding its relations with East Germany, since the erection of the Wall. The sudden materialization of the same made it clear to those in the Federal Republic that the division of Germany would remain so for a rather long time. Now the first priority of the FRG was to lessen the hardships of the division.

Several agreements concluded between the Federal Republic and the GDR in the 1960s concerning travel permits between the two states are examples of attempts by the FRG to ease the suffering caused by the division of Germany. For example, on December 17, 1963, the first such agreement was reached allowing citizens of West Berlin to visit relatives in East Berlin during the Christmas period (unfortunately, the citizens of East Berlin were not permitted to do likewise). On September 9, 1964, the GDR Council of State permitted its pensioners to travel

to the Federal Republic and West Berlin; those GDR citizens that were younger than retirement age were denied such privileges--for obvious reasons. On November 25, 1964, the government of the GDR introduced the minimum obligatory exchange into GDR currency for all Westerners.

On May 5, 1965, Ulbricht addressed the People's Chamber regarding "The National Mission of the GDR and the Peace Forces of West Germany." In his address, he claimed that a reunited Germany could only come about if it were a socialist Germany. Furthermore, Ulbricht declared that only the German Democratic Republic could speak in the name of the German nation:

> Only we, the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, with its state doctrine serving the cause of peace, the German nation and also the forces of peace in West Germany, have the right to speak in the name of all peace-loving Germans. In fact, we represent the interests of the great German nation as a whole. The government in Bonn, on the other hand, is at most entitled to speak in the name of a handful of monopolies, multimillionaires, Hitler generals, hanging judges and--apart from this--also of a few U.S. concerns. But that is not the voice of the German people. The voice of the great German nation is to be heard here, at this session of the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic.

Five months later, in October 1965, international recognition was accorded to the GDR when the International Olympic Committee decided to accept two German teams for the 1968 Olympic Games. Such recognition on the part of a renowned international body went a long way in lending credibility to the SED regime's claims to legitimacy. Unfortunately, it also helped deepen the division of Germany through its tacit acceptance of two separate German states.

Also in favour of East Germany in the mid-1960s was the strong growth of its economy--so strong, in fact, that "... by 1966 and 1967, the West German growth rate was actually slower than that of the GDR."[92] At the same time, the "economic miracle" of the Federal Republic ceased to be in 1965 when Bonn underwent a period of economic recession. Between 1964 and 1967, the GDR's national income rate of growth averaged 5% per year and industrial production neared 7% annually.[93] SED authorities were quick to point out with pride the distinctly East German nature of this "economic miracle." The strong GDR economy also worked like a magnet in attracting the West European countries (other than the FRG) to the increased trade potential of the state. This only served to further downgrade the Hallstein Doctrine, leading eventually to its abandonment.

On May 26, 1966 representatives of the SPD and the SED reached an agreement in East Berlin regarding an exchange of speakers, which was to take place July 14 in the East German city of Karl-Marx-Stadt and a week later in Hannover (West Germany). The issues to be covered included fundamental questions regarding Germany's testing and possible measures that might "lessen the burdens of a divided Germany"; that is to say, the reunion of families, the furtherance of cultural ties and the promotion of a common historical heritage. The GDR called off the exchange on June 29 on the pretext that the Federal Republic could not guarantee the safety of its representatives while visiting West Germany. The real reason for the SED's cancellation is obvious: it was too risky a venture for the GDR, since the exchange would expose the regime to strong

criticism; furthermore, the government of the GDR was still consolidating its authority and therefore felt vulnerable and unready for an open dialogue with its rival state.

As mentioned above, in October 1966 Erhard's Christian Democrat - Free Democrat coalition collapsed; this was due primarily to the economic recession and the dissatisfaction it created among the West German populace. The Christian Democrats joined forces with the Social Democrats to form the Grand Coalition government, with Willy Brandt (SPD) becoming the new foreign minister and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) the new chancellor. It marked a turning point in inter-German relations for, although Kiesinger continued to stress reunification as being a priority of the new government, as well as the FRG's sole right to represent Germany, the SPD, under Brandt, advocated greater flexibility for the Federal Republic in its international relations, with particular emphasis on its contacts with eastern Europe or Ostpolitik.

A major turnaround in West German Ostpolitik came about with Kiesinger's proposal to begin diplomatic relations with all of the Soviet bloc states, with the exception of the German Democratic Republic. This spelled the death, of course, of the Hallstein Doctrine. On January 31, 1967, the Federal Republic established diplomatic relations with Romania. It was politically significant in that Romania was the first East European Warsaw Pact state to extend diplomatic recognition to the FRG. The event also led to open disagreement between the SED and the Communist Party of Romania.

The new Ostpolitik was strongly opposed by the East German government. Renewed charges of revanchism and imperialism were levelled against Bonn. East Berlin feared a loss of support of its allies in eastern Europe as well as a lessening of their anti-Western stand regarding the German question. No less threatening was the isolation East Germany would feel, should it be the only state in the Soviet bloc without diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic. It was at this time when East Germany took defensive measures and established a GDR citizenship, which replaced the "all-German" concept.

Despite such measures taken by the GDR, as well as its insistence that the Federal Republic abandon its "sole right of representation" theory and officially recognize East Germany under international law, the Kiesinger government realized that there was a growing trend towards détente policy and it did not want to be left out. Two of West Germany's key allies, the United States and France, for example, were independently making overtures to the East. Kiesinger feared that a failure to do the same on the part of the FRG would leave his country isolated and many key important questions concerning the future of Germany would be resolved by others:

> The domestic and international context ... was creating pressures favoring the Social Democratic approach. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had become convinced of the need to improve relations with the Soviet Union, and specifically to open negotiations on limitation with Moscow. At the same time, French President de Gaulle, having removed France from NATO's integrated military command to demonstrate French independence of American influence and control, sought to open an autonomous dialog with Moscow.
>
> The American and French openings to the East were consistent with the general NATO-wide "Harmel Report" agreement in 1967 that the alliance, while continuing to deter Soviet aggression with

> nuclear and nonnuclear forces, should seek to expand cooperation with the East--the now-legendary Harmel and détente formula. The pressures these trends placed on the Bonn government had influenced the Grand Coalition's abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine.

If the Western powers were attempting to ease East-West tensions by "opening up" to the East, then the SED regime was doing its best to repudiate these efforts. Ulbricht's government felt especially threatened by the "Prague Spring" in 1968. Reformist measures taken by the new Czechoslovakian regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. Ulbricht feared a "contamination" of his own state as well as the rest of Eastern Europe; he also helped convince the Soviets that such fears were warranted.[95] In addition to breaking off regular contacts between the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the SED regime turned westward as well by imposing restrictions on the transit routes linking West Berlin with the Federal Republic:

> At first, the Party limited itself to prohibiting members of the West German, ultraconservative National Democratic Party from using the traffic corridors into Berlin. But then, on 13 April, East Berlin raised the stakes in the contest by extending the ban to include all active members of the Bundestag. Later, these measures were supplemented with the introduction of obligatory passport and visa requirements for all travelers.[96]

This tough stand taken by the GDR amounted to an assertion of sovereignty and a show of strength by Ulbricht's government. Furthermore, by inducing the East-West tensions at this particular time, "... East Berlin provided an appropriate tense international atmosphere under which a crackdown in the CSSR would be most easily justified."[97]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by East German and other Warsaw Pact troops brought an end to reformism in the CSSR. It was also supposedly a display of "bloc solidarity," if one excludes Romania and Czechoslovakia itself. Following the invasion, the GDR became the "main partner" of the USSR--undoubtedly due to Ulbricht's strong support of bloc unity at any cost, including military intervention. What is implied here, however, is that if the GDR was the main partner of the USSR, the latter was nevertheless the leader in this relationship and would "call the shots," so to speak.

Ironically, the period following the Czech crisis was not one of increased East-West conflict, but rather one of relative détente. No doubt the Soviets were confident of the recently demonstrated bloc solidarity, which opened the door for negotiations with the West. Also in favour of the Soviets was their nearness in obtaining strategic parity with the Americans by the late 1960s. Acting against the Soviets but in favour of a dialogue with the West was the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations--Moscow wanted to avoid dealing with two hostile powers, so it chose to negotiate with the West.

The major turning point in East-West relations, and particularly the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik, occurred in late September 1969, when Brandt's Social Democrats formed a new coalition government with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This meant that Brandt was now the Chancellor of a center-left coalition with the CDU/CSU in opposition. That a new era in East-West politics was imminent, revealed itself in Brandt's inaugural address of October 28, when the new government an-

nounced its intentions to settle its affairs with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor also let it be known that his country intended to seek renunciation of force agreements with all of the Soviet bloc states in Europe.

One scholar describes the new coalition's Ostpolitik as being a long-term, calculated philosophy whose political foundation was made up of four basic points:

> ... Einmal wurden die Bemühungen, zu einer Versöhnung zwischen Ost und Westeuropa zu gelangen, fortgestezt, doch stand hinter diesem Bemühen nicht mehr das Ziel, eine Isolierung der DDR zu erreichen; zum zweiten ging die Bundesregierung endgültig von der Auffassung ab, daß Abrüstungsschritte, Rüstungskontrolle oder sonstige Entspannungsmaßnahmen mit Lösungsversuchen der deutschen Frage gekoppelt werden müßten; drittens wurde der bisher abgelehnte Kontakt mit Organen der DDR gesucht, Kontakte also nicht mehr mit "Anerkennung" gleich welcher Stufe gleichgesetzt; und viertens wurde mit der Neuaufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien am 31. Januar 1968 die Hallstein-Doktrin de facto außer Kraft gesetzt.[98]

One could take issue with Noack over the fourth point: the end of the Hallstein Doctrine occurred one year earlier, on January 31, 1967, when the Federal Republic established diplomatic relations with Romania.

Brandt was the first West German chancellor to speak of the existence of two German states,[99] despite the fact that he refused to recognize de jure East Germany as being a foreign country (which is how the GDR officially perceived the Federal Republic). Brandt's de facto recognition of the GDR's existence gave impetus to the East-West dialogue. By December 1969, negotiations were under way between West Germany and the USSR, as well as Poland.

Brandt's new Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik ("Germany policy") were subject to criticism, to be sure. The Christian Democrats, who formed the opposition at that time, strongly criticized the Brandt government's reference to "two German states," fearing that such remarks would lead the rest of the world to believe that the Federal Republic had abandoned its policy of non-recognition and was about to recognize the GDR.

The SED regime also reacted with skepticism and distrust toward Brandt's new overtures to the East. The GDR was, in fact, the only Soviet bloc country not to approve the new stance of the West German government; the other Warsaw Pact states advocated bilateral negotiations between themselves and the FRG almost immediately following Brandt's inaugural address of October 28. The East Germans, however, would have preferred multilateral talks, as this would have given them greater control vis-à-vis their allies.[100] Although the GDR would shortly begin talks with West Germany, it would only do so with extreme caution and utmost wariness: "The DDR [GDR] remained the satellite least interested in détente, because of lingering fears of its leaders that their power would be weakened by closer links with the West."[101]

A true landmark in inter-German relations occurred on March 19, 1970 in Erfurt, East Germany, with the first official meeting of government heads of the two German states. Brandt himself and Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, presented the views of their respective governments to one another, the latter maintaining a hard-line approach toward his western counterpart:

> Not only did Stoph express his government's customary expectation that an improvement in the two states' relations be premised on their assumption of diplomatic ties, but he also leveled a new demand: the FRG should first pay reparations to his country for the massive losses inflicted upon it during the days of open borders![102]

A subsequent meeting between the two heads of government took place two months later (May 21) in Kassel, West Germany, culminating in Brandt's proposal of a twenty-point program intended to "formalize" inter-German relations. Five of the above-mentioned points were aimed at improving cooperation in practical areas, such as postal service and family reunification. Although the two meetings failed to produce any contractual agreements between the two German states, they were nevertheless extremely important for their political significance, as well as later negotiations between the two states. The meetings symbolized West Germany's recognition of the GDR as an equal negotiating partner as well as the former's acceptance of the latter's "autonomy."

Contractual breakthroughs were achieved when Brandt and Soviet Minister President Kosygin negotiated a renunciation of force treaty in the summer of 1970, (which was signed on August 12), and when a similar treaty was signed between the Federal Republic and Poland on December 7. The Moscow Treaty was most significant in that it permitted the normalization of relations between the USSR and the FRG through West Germany's implicit acceptance of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and Moscow's recognition of the Federal Republic as a sovereign equal. The treaty also encouraged Bonn to pursue similar agreements with other Warsaw Pact states, which it did, most notably with the

Poles, culminating in the signing of the Warsaw Treaty in December 1970 (see "Legalities," Section (c), in Chapter 2).

Here, it should be mentioned that Four-Power talks on Berlin had begun on March 26, 1970. U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had agreed that the tensions arising from the situation in Berlin were to be alleviated on the basis of negotiations. Such talks, combined with the FRG's pursuance of negotiations with the USSR and its satellites, slowly made the East German regime realize that they, too, would have to do likewise if they did not want to be "left out in the cold":

> The GDR had no choice but to engage in negotiations as well if it did not want to completely isolate itself from détente policy. In October two GDR officials travelled to Bonn and proposed an exchange of views. On November 27, 1970 negotiations began between State Secretaries Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl on a treaty on the basis of relations between the two German states.[103]

The process of détente was a direct challenge to the SED regime. East Germany was forced out of its isolationist stance vis-à-vis the West, and the Federal Republic in particular. A way had to be found by the GDR to negotiate with West Germany and yet at the same time reduce the potentially destabilizing effects that such negotiations would have upon East Germany as a state. East Berlin's solution to the problem came with its adoption of a policy of "delimitation," or Abgrenzung. Introduced by Willi Stoph in 1970, and fully utilized by Erich Honecker (Ulbricht's successor) throughout the 1970s, the new policy aimed at defining and maintaining the distinct and separate identity of the GDR

vis-à-vis its western counterpart primarily through political and ideological means. As one source put it:

> ...the idea of delimitation was a lot like raising a new wall of political and ideological emphases where an old one based on non-relations and the absence of inter-German contacts had begun to succumb to events around it. Ideally, East Germany's citizens could then be routinely exposed to the West, while their underlying commitments to the GDR would remain untarnished.[104]

The policy of Abgrenzung was thus a defensive stand adopted by the SED regime in response to the increased East-West negotiations that were characteristic of the détente period of the 1970s. It represented the continuance of the GDR's isolationism, albeit solely in the ideological realm.

As was briefly mentioned above, the quadripartite talks on Berlin began in March 1970. For a long time, the negotiations met with little success due to Ulbricht's insistence that Berlin access was a matter of inner-German negotiation; the FRG, on the other hand, demanded that the Berlin question be resolved by the Four Powers. Ulbricht's harsh criticisms of the Federal Republic were matched with sporadic interference of traffic between the FRG and West Berlin. This continued until Ulbricht's removal from his post as First Secretary on May 3 at a Central Committee meeting. It was only after Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker as Party Chairman that progress was made on the Berlin question.[105] An agreement was reached by the Four Powers assuring the status of and access to West Berlin in 1971.

As one source notes:

> The quadripartite Berlin accord did not change the legal status of Berlin, but it did provide greater assurance that the Soviet Union would not in the future use access to West Berlin as an explicit lever in its relations with the Federal Republic, even if the status of Berlin remained an implicit source of Soviet influence with Bonn.[106]

Another important development regarding the Four Power agreement on Berlin was the "verbal upgrading" of the GDR. The western powers implicitly acknowledged the GDR as a state, subject to Four Power legal rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, the "German Democratic Republic" was "... consistently referred to throughout the agreement in juxtaposition with the Federal Republic and Four Powers."[107]

Following the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement, numerous inner-German negotiations took place, resulting in several agreements designed to normalize relations between the two states. Undoubtedly, the most important of these agreements was the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) signed on December 21, 1972. With the treaty, Brandt finally obtained one of the most important goals of his Ostpolitik: the normalization of relations with the GDR through de facto recognition, which allowed for an improvement in human reldtions on the other side of the border, thereby helping the German nation as a whole. This was Realpolitik at its best. The Soviets and the East Germans also gained significantly as a result of the Basic Treaty: Bonn's recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse-Line translated into world recognition of the same; that is, the territorial status quo was recognized and, indirectly, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

The following points were fundamental to the 1972 Grundvertrag:

> Die Qualität der innerdeutschen Grenze als Staatsgrenze im Sinne des Völkerrechts wurde bestätigt. Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten basierten fortan auf Gleichberechtigung und Nichtdiskriminierung. Die Bundesrepublik verzichtete ausdrücklich auf ihren Alleinvertretungsanspruch. Die Vier-Mächte-Verantwortung für Gesamtdeutschland und Berlin blieb bestehen. Beide Vertragspartner bekannten sich zur Wahrung der Menschenrechte und zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht. Beide Staaten äußerten die Absicht, den Vereinten Nationen beizutreten.[108]

Although the Basic Treaty cleared the way for international recognition of the GDR--in 1973, for example, both German states were accepted as members of the United Nations--it must be stressed that the FRG still refused to recognize East Germany as a foreign country. The GDR was held to be nicht Ausland ("not a foreign country") by Bonn and permanent missions, rather than embassies, were established in 1974 in each other's capital. Nor was the goal of national reunification abandoned by the FRG with the signing of the Basic Treaty: a letter on German unity and Bonn's determination to achieve the same was attached to the treaty; the letter was not formally confirmed by the GDR, however.

Of further interest is the fact that on May 28, 1973, the Bavarian state government filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the Basic Treaty because, it claimed, it was incompatible with the Basic Law and was therefore null and void. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on July 31, 1973, however, was that the Basic Treaty was indeed constitutional since the FRG's reunification mandate continued to apply despite the signing of the treaty (see "Legalities," Chapter 3).

The Court also ruled that the German Reich survived the defeat in 1945 (its "identity theory": Identitätstheorie) and that the Federal Republic was only partly identical (teilidentisch). Furthermore, the GDR still belongs to Germany despite its international status, and every citizen of the GDR is at the same time a German citizen. The last two items are specifically mentioned in clauses 3 and 4 of the ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court:

> 3. Die DDR sei zwar ein völkerrechtliches Objekt, gehöre aber zu Deutschland und könne deshalb nicht als Ausland angesehen werden. Die "Staatsgrenze" zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR habe den gleichen Charakter wie die Grenze zwischen den Ländern der Bundesrepublik.
> 4. Die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit sei zugleich die Staatsangehörigkeit der Bundesrepublik. Damit sei jeder Bürger der DDR auch automatisch deren Staatsbürger.[109]

Juridicial rulings aside, Brandt's new Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik represented a significant departure from the previous CDU-dominated government's political platform on matters concerning the GDR and the other Soviet-bloc countries. The domestic debates generated by Brandt's policies of normalization of relations with the East, especially those pertaining to the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties in the early 1970s, are evidence enough that Bonn's new course was controversial and open to doubt at the very least. To many it seemed that Bonn's postponement of the reunification issue for an indefinite period of time amounted to nothing less than an abandonment of the same. To those same people, it seemed that the division of Germany had only deepened--after all, there were now two states receiving world recognition.

One critic sees Brandt's policies as being a loss--a defeat--for West Germany:

> Willy Brandt's "new" Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik were policies of resignation, realizing that West Germany had to accept what existed in order to strengthen Bonn's position vis-à-vis the East. The Ostpolitik of the SPD and its coalition partner the Free Democratic Party (FDP) represented a West German acceptance of the postwar status quo, thus meeting Soviet and East German demands.

But, in response to the above, was the situation really so black and white as to imply a victory for the Soviets and the GDR? After all, despite de facto recognition, Bonn still refused to recognize East Germany as a foreign country. Nor did it drop the eventual goal of reunification. Furthermore, the Soviets and the East Germans failed to achieve all their goals: intra-German agreements were not contingent upon Bonn's diplomatic recognition of East Germany; also (to the dismay of East Berlin), the Soviets acknowledged West Berlin's "unique ties" with West Germany.

Indeed, there are those who view Brandt's Ostpolitik as being merely a new means of achieving German unity. Instead of employing Adenauer's strong anti-Sovietism, attempts were made to reduce East-West tensions, thereby encouraging (hopefully) a lowering of the barriers between the two German states. Henry Kissinger describes Brandt's Ostpolitik as follows:

> ... Brandt did not really present his policy as an acceptance of the division of Germany. Rather, he put it forward as a means to achieve German unity by building good relations with the East and turning the Federal Republic into a magnet for Eastern Europe. As a first installment, there would be a better life for the 17 million East Germans. Travel and exchanges would multiply. Trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would increase. Gradually, so the argument went, the ties would become close; the

dividing line between East and West in Europe would begin to fade.

(Kissinger even mentions how Brandt's policies sometimes verged on "nationalist neutralism" and were thus a cause for concern for the other Western leaders!)

Given the discrepancy in these two interpretations of Brandt's Ostpolitik, what is a constant is the pragmatic nature of Bonn's new policies. Such pragmatism was evident when the Federal Republic finally recognized the GDR as another German state. Failure to have done so would have amounted to nothing less than a denial of reality. It should be remembered that when its constitution was drawn up, the Federal Republic was regarded as merely a temporary institution, as a transitional state. That is to say, the FRG was no more a permanent state than was the GDR. By 1970, however, with the great debate in West Germany over the nature of Germany an the question of there being or not being two German states, history had played an important role in changing the situation, as well as one's perception of the same. For example, Professor Carlo Schmid, one of the creators of the Federal Constitution, revealed just how much his views had changed since the early days of the FRG in a speech made in the Federal parliament more than two decades later:

> Is the GDR today still only a "shell," a passing phenomenon? Is it not something which can lay claim to the title of "state"? In all concepts of the state, the state is defined as follows: a state can be said to exist where there is a population, a territory and a central authority. The moral and democratic quality of this state is irrelevant. Under "population" we do not mean the free population in the sense of Rousseau which determines the form of its own state, but simply the people who live within its

> territorial authority and, freely or involuntarily, are prepared to obey this authority. The definition is as crude as that.[112]

Schmid's argument obviously won out. Despite strong protests from the opposition, Brandt's government abandoned the claim of its predecessors that the FRG was the sole legitimate German state and formally recognized the SED regime. It is worth noting that the chancellor put much emphasis on the "cultural nation" common to all Germans, rather than emphasizing reunification per se. In what evolved into the official West German position, Brandt claimed that common historical experiences and cultural characteristics were stronger than the political disparities between the two governments, and trade would overcome the ideological differences. Stressing the one nationality common to all Germans, Brandt referred indirectly to reunification when the two German states joined the United Nations in 1973 with the words, "My people live in two states but continue to think of themselves as one nation."[113]

The East German leadership, on the other hand, put emphasis on the "socialist" nature of the GDR, and continues to do so. According to East Berlin, there are irreconcilable differences between the two German states, primarily due to their opposing political systems and ideologies. The GDR puts heavy emphasis on its ties to other European Communist states, and particularly the Soviet Union. Indeed:

> Hard-line Communists in the Democratic Republic, like militant anti-Communists in the Federal Republic, consider the very existence of the other political system a threat to their own and believe that German reunification will be possible only if one or the other is overthrown.[114]

That being said, the Basic Treaty can be seen as an agreement based on compromise and an attestation to Realpolitik. Kissinger also implicitly states this when he writes, "Brandt's historical accomplishment was to find a way to live with the partition of Germany, which for the entire period his predecessors in Bonn had refused to accept."[115] While the 1970s (and 1980s) marked a period of numerous intra-German agreements aimed at improving relations between the two states, it nevertheless remains true that Honecker's regime did all it could to ward off unwelcome western influences through Abgrenzungspolitik ("policy of delimitation"). Since inter-German détente threatened to cut through the physical barriers that separated East from West Germany, ideological barriers would have to be strengthened and inner "protective walls" (Kurt Hager) erected. The West German SPD was now portrayed as a counter-revolutionary party which threatened to undo the socialist achievements in the GDR--an imperialist wolf in socialist garb, if you will.

Nationalist sentiment now posed a major threat to East Germany; Honecker thus took steps to downplay--and even deny--common bonds between the two German states. For example, all official references to "Germany" itself were toned down. Seemingly unimportant changes in terminology were made, such as the renaming of the Deutschlandsender, one of the GDR's major radio broadcasts, to the "Voice of the GDR." Even the country's national hymn was not spared: it was no longer permitted to sing, "Germany, united Fatherland."[116]

The SED regime also stressed the fact that the GDR formed an integral part of an international socialist brotherhood. Cultural and economic ties were strengthened between the GDR and other socialist states. (To this day, approximately 70% of the GDR's foreign trade is conducted with other communist countries, and the USSR is its major trading partner.)[117] Part and parcel with the increased stress on ideology was the reassertion by East Berlin of the leading role of the party. In what amounted to a hate campaign directed against the West, particularly West Germany, the GDR's youth were taught to respect the National People's Army (NVA) and "... hate their enemy with the same passion and conviction with which they love and trust a friend."[118]

An intensified drive for increased economic centralization within the GDR took place shortly following Honecker's accession to power. By mid-1972 the last remaining enclaves of private ownership had been eliminated. It is more than apparent to say that this nationalization campaign was linked to East Berlin's call for greater political solidarity.

Of all the measures that the SED regime took to defend the socialist nature of the GDR, however, it was the manipulation of the exchange rates which had the biggest and most direct effect upon the citizens of West Germany. On November 5, 1973, for example, the government of the GDR doubled the amount of currency that Westerners were obliged to exchange into East German marks before they were allowed entry to the GDR. The effect that this measure had on visits made by Westerners to the GDR was drastic: in the following year, there was a

40% decrease in the number of West Berliners visiting East Berlin, and there was a 52% decline in extended visits in the GDR.*

An increase in the production of consumer goods was effected early in Honecker's reign in the GDR in order to satisfy East German citizens, thereby promoting political and economic stability. In 1971, the SED also initiated an ambitious apartment construction and renovation program, in order to improve housing conditions in East Germany. During the 1970s, for example, the amount of apartments either constructed or modernized more than doubled: from 76,000 in 1970 to 169,000 in 1980.[119] Despite such ambitious projects, plus the fact that the GDR has the highest standard of living within the Soviet bloc and is the tenth most industrialized country in the world,[120] it is claimed that East Germany has had its share of economic difficulties, due primarily to forced industrialization and Soviet and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) requirements. The latter have served to hinder normal economic development in the country; for example:

> Plans for the development of Rostock as a major shipbuilding center and seaport were suspended because of competition with the Polish port of Szczecin. The aircraft industry was abandoned altogether. Automobile and textile plants were held back. An industrial complex for uranium mining that employs 140,000 workers is being maintained at the Wismuth Aktiengesellschaft works simply to fulfill the needs of the USSR.[121]

The fact that the GDR does not resist such CMEA policies (as other bloc countries have successfully done in the past) illustrates the loyalty

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* One year later, on November 5, 1974, the GDR Finance Ministry reduced the increase by approximately two-thirds.[122]

of the SED regime to Soviet bloc collective interests, and the price it is willing to pay in order to retain its socialist character, thereby highlighting the systemic differentials existing between itself and its capitalist neighbour to the west.

Having stated the fact that the GDR was devoted to economic integration within the Soviet bloc, it is interesting to note that East German trade with the Soviet bloc from 1971 to 1974 actually decreased.[123] Although higher western prices for raw materials and gas are attributed to much of the GDR's increased turnover with the West, it still remains an interesting example of one's actions not living up to one's rhetoric, for in 1971 East Berlin had projected an increase in trade with the socialist community.[124]

It has already been established that reunification has been and remains a goal of the Federal Republic. It is constitutionally committed to this goal, as is laid out in the preamble. The GDR, on the other hand, formally removed from its constitution all mention of the concept of eventual reunification of the two German states in 1974. Furthermore, if one compares the constitutions of 1949, 1968 and 1974, one readily sees how the SED regime has progressively sought not only to downplay reunification, but also to rid the idea of there being one German nation (albeit divided)--since 1974, the official view in East Berlin is that there are two nations, and two nation states in Germany. (See Chapter 3, "Legalities.") This being so, it becomes obvious to the reader that the Federal Republic is the sole champion of the reunifica-

tion question--in fact, it is Bonn alone which has kept and continues to keep this issue alive.

In addition to its resulting in a new constitution for the GDR, 1974 also marked the year in which Chancellor Brandt resigned, primarily due to the fact that one of his closest assistants had been arrested as an East German agent. Brandt was replaced by Helmut Schmidt as the new SPD chancellor of the Social-Liberal Coalition.[125] Schmidt was to remain in office for the next eight years (until 1982). His personal popularity eventually exceeded that of his party.

It is noteworthy that Schmidt's accession coincided with the first major economic recession West Germany had experienced since it was founded. Renewed economic growth was thus top priority on Schmidt's agenda upon entering office. Social programs were reduced at home, intra-German trade increased steadily and trade between the FRG and the USSR rose considerably in the 1970s. With regard to the latter, "Total two-way trade rose from $739.9 million in 1969 to nearly $6 billion in 1979."[126] It is worth noting that the biggest increases in West German - Soviet trade occurred in 1974 and 1975; that is, the first two years that Schmidt was in office.[127]

Also important is the fact that, during the 1970s, the COMECON countries became increasingly integrated in the (Western-dominated) world economy. This has translated into greater interdependence at the economic level coupled with a decrease in American and Soviet hegemony at the political level within their respective spheres of influence. One superpower's loss has been the other's gain: the GDR's growing

reliance on economic support from the FRG, as well as Hungary's attempts to become a recognized member of the EEC, are just two examples of this. (An example in the other direction was the split caused between the United States and her Western European allies in the early 1980s as a result of the former's decision to embargo the Soviet gas pipeline.)

The 1970s witnessed the growth of East-West trade and the use of the same in order to reach political goals vis-à-vis the Eastern European states. It is generally acknowledged by most experts in the field that East-West trade is more important for the East bloc countries than for the Western countries--particularly with regard to technology and grain exports.[128] The fact that the amount of intra-German trade more than doubled during Schmidt's reign, climbing from 6,918 million clearing units in 1974, (wherein 1 C.U. = 1 West German mark), to 14,068 million clearing units in 1982,[129] when combined with the fact that intra-German trade equals only about 2% of the FRG's foreign trade volume, whereas trade with the FRG comprises about 10% of the GDR's external trade, translates into political leverage in favour of Bonn.

It is therefore somewhat unsettling when one finds how little the Federal Republic has achieved through such a policy. To be sure, some significant gains have been had, such as improvements with regard to travel, family reunification, the liberation of political prisoners, clearance procedures at border checkpoints and so on. Such "developments" go hand-in-hand with Bonn's professed policy of finding mutually agreeable solutions in the interest of those living in both parts of Germany. One is left to wonder, however, if the Federal Republic's sub-

stantial economic support of the GDR is not too high a price to pay. One could even liken such payments to ransom money: the SED regime is holding its own citizens as well as those in West Berlin hostage and Bonn willingly pays exorbitant amounts of money in order to obtain political concessions on their behalf. A case in point:

> Between 1972 and 1975, ... the GDR received almost 235 million marks annually from the FRG solely in the form of transit fees resulting from the Berlin accord; this amount was raised to 400 million marks a year in 1976.[130]

(It should be pointed out that, with reference to the above, both East German civilian and military traffic use the roads between West Berlin and West Germany as well.) Many West Germans share the view--particularly those belonging to the CDU--that more political concessions should be obtained by West German negotiators from the SED in exchange for such trade and credits.[131]

Concomitant with Schmidt's pledge to improve the West German economy in 1974 was the increased tendency to neglect the German problem even further. The new government's first priority was to restore the economic well-being of the Federal Republic, which had been badly shaken by the 1973/74 oil crisis and the world currency crisis. This meant that the reunification question was therefore put "on the back burner." Added to this was the GDR's strengthening of its ideological policy of Abgrenzung from 1974 onward. Honecker's policy of delimitation was most vividly illustrated on September 27, 1979, when the Volkskammer ("People's Chamber") concluded the "Law for the Amendment and Alteration of the October 7, 1974 Constitution of the GDR." All references to a whole

Germany and the German nation were done away with, and the GDR was defined as a "socialist state of workers and farmers." Furthermore, Article 6 spelled out the GDR's "irrevocable" ties with the Soviet Union.

Despite such measures taken by the SED regime, it nevertheless felt compelled to render the issue of the German nation obscure by adopting such formulas as, "The socialist nation in the GDR is of German nationality." Andreas Hillgruber claims that the SED used a "dual strategy" when it refused to change the names of such bodies as the "Socialist Unity Party of Germany" and the party newspaper, Neues Deutschland ("New Germany"), as well as the fact:

> ... daß der der DDR plötzlich von der Sowjetunion, ausgerechnet an ihrem 26. Gründungstage, aufgezwungene, sehr weitreichende ... "Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitigen Beistand zwischen der DDR und der UdSSR", den Breschnew und Honecker am 7. Oktober 1975 in Moskau unterzeichneten, eine "Nichtberührungsklausel" der Verträge von 1955 und 1964 enthielt, die beide gesamtdeutsche Fernziele proklamierten.[132]

Whether or not a dual strategy was employed by the SED regime, it appears that East Berlin was simply "covering all the bases" on the issue of German nationality. It could not afford to risk losing the loyalty of the citizens of the GDR by suddenly not representing the German nation--this would have left the Federal Republic as the sole state representing German nationals, and the consequences could have easily been disastrous for East Berlin. The SED therefore chose to keep the German nationality door open while simultaneously strengthening its international standing as a socialist state in the world.

With regard to the latter, both the aforementioned 1975 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Moscow, as well as

the conclusion (in the same year) of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation went a long way in establishing the credibility needed by the GDR. Begun in 1972, the Helsinki Conference brought together almost all of Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, in order to find new ways of lessening tensions on the continent and improving East-West relations. The GDR put much importance on the conference, going so far as to claim that the concluding agreements, the so-called Helsinki Final Acts, equalled a European peace treaty; Honecker even argued that Helsinki was more important than the Grundvertrag. However (as McAdams argues[133]), the failure to address the German question remains a major reason why the meeting cannot be equated with a peace conference. Despite this, it is generally agreed that the Helsinki Conference confirmed the postwar continental status quo-- something the Soviets had been striving for since 1954, according to Hillgruber:

> Die Ergebnisse dieser Konferenz trugen ... ein Doppelgesicht: einerseits verpflichteten sich alle Unterzeichnerstaaten zur gegenseitigen Respektierung ihrer Souveränität, der Grenzen, der territorialen Integrität, der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten und zum Frieden, mit anderen Worten: der Status quo in Europa wurde, wie von der Sowjetunion seit 1954, seit sie für eine solche Konferenz plädierte, angestrebt, nunmehr nicht nur wie in den Ostverträgen zweiseitig zwischen der Sowjetunion bzw. Polen, der DDR und der CSSR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, sondern multilateral vertraglich "zementiert". Andererseits ... hätten sich alle Unterzeichnerstaaten zur Anerkennung der Menschenrechte verpflichtet ....[134]

It should be pointed out that by 1975 the GDR had established diplomatic relations with 119 countries. This fact, combined with the GDR's membership at the United Nations (1973) and its participation in the Hel-

sinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, meant de jure recognition for the German Democratic Republic in the international community. Although Bonn would argue otherwise, the GDR (and the Soviets) interpreted agreements such as the Quadripartite Agreement of Berlin (1971), the Basic Treaty (1972) and the Helsinki Conference (1975) amounting to:

> ... a recognition of the realities which had come about as a result of the Second World War and post-war development in Europe, particularly the inviolability of the new borders, including the borders of the GDR.[135]

The Basic Treaty and the Helsinki Final Acts nevertheless had very positive effects on inter-German relations. For example, there was an easing of restrictions on visitors from the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Inter-German trade flourished through FRG-guaranteed interest-free "swing" loans and overdraft credits (see Chapter 3, "Intra-German Trade", section). The 1976 Postal Agreement helped to increase telephone communications between the two German states. Numerous transit agreements were concluded which served to improve connections between West Berlin and the Federal Republic; for example, the agreement concluded on November 16, 1978 between the FRG and the GDR regarding the consruction of a highway between Berlin and Hamburg.

To say that détente, as it stood in the latter half of the 1970s, meant intra-German relations were free from any conflict would, however, be far from the truth. This becomes readily apparent in the following passage:

> Although Abgrenzung, as a rule, was less and less frequently mentioned in the official press--apparently because the word had acquired a negative connotation after Helsinki--definite strains

> of the sentiment remained to shape the thinking of the country's policymakers. On numerous occasions, East German officials held up traffic on the transit routes between the FRG and West Berlin. There were several well-publicized cases of shooting on the East German border. Public opinion in the West was also aroused by the expulsion of West German journalists for allegedly defaming their hosts. Finally, in early January 1977, relations between the two Germanies were also strained when the SED regime placed guards in front of Bonn's Permanent Representation in East Berlin, inhibiting the access of East German citizens to the building.[136]

Briefly put, the FRG's commitment to German unification was matched with East Berlin's determination to safeguard GDR sovereignty and independence. The SED wanted "... both to benefit from its contacts with the FRG and to insulate its precarious social order."[137] Such a policy, for all its limitations, represented a significant development vis-à-vis the Ulbricht period.

Ostpolitik Threatened

Three major developments that occurred in the years 1979-80, and which chilled U.S.-Soviet relations considerably, threatened to undermine and eventually destroy any future attempts to improve intra-German relations. Firstly, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 served to kill détente and heighten East-West tensions. The West saw the USSR as an expansive communist military power bent on increasing its sphere of influence. Western Europe suddenly felt more threatened by the Warsaw Pact forces stationed in the East, and West Germany in particular was overcome by a strong "fear of the Russians" (Angst vor den Russen). The second major development to occur was the outbreak of strikes in Poland in August 1980, as a result of

Polish workers demanding independent labour unions. Given that Poland was a fellow socialist country sharing its borders with the GDR, it was only natural that the SED regime would take a defensive stand, as it felt threatened by the unfolding of events next door. This clashed directly with the FRG's support of the Polish workers' demands. The imposition of marshal law by Premier Jaruzelski in December 1981 only helped increase the tensions between the two German states. The third major development was the NATO decision on December 12, 1979 to deploy land-based Pershing II and cruise missiles on West European soil beginning in the autumn of 1983, in response to the USSR's stationing of mid-range nuclear missiles in the western part of the Soviet Union. The deployment of Western nuclear missiles would only occur, however, should interim negotiations with Moscow be unsuccessful. This decision by NATO amounted to a renewed arms race and threatened to wreak havoc on intra-German relations.

Given the negative impact of these developments upon East-West relations--détente was, for all intents and purposes, "dead"--and given Schmidt's central role in the 1979 NATO decision, it is thus remarkable that inter-German détente continued into the 1980's. Anti-Western rhetoric aside, Honecker made it clear that he did not want relations between the two German states to be adversely affected by the recent heightening of world tensions. East Germany had, after all, gained international recognition and economic benefits during the previous decade; it was therefore loathe to forfeit such gains merely as a result

of its principal ally's military adventures and the possible deployment of missiles in the West a few years down the road.

One can see here the beginning of a divergence of views held by the two superpowers and their respective German allies. That is to say, while the two superpowers were waging a cold war with one another, East and West Germany were keeping their doors open for each other (although the GDR's doors were probably more ajar than open). Having obtained limited recognition by the FRG, East Berlin still hoped to receive full diplomatic recognition from Bonn through the continuance of détente. Honecker's speech held in Gera in October 1980 clearly illustrated this:

> ... Erich Honecker demanded that in the interest of "further arrangements" of various kinds the government of the Federal Republic of Germany recognize GDR nationality, the permanent missions of the two German states be upgraded to embassies, a settlement be found to the dispute on the location of the borderline in the Elbe River, as well as that the "Central Register for GDR Crimes" (an institution maintained by the states in the Federal Republic) be dissolved.[138]

(For obvious constitutional reasons, the first two demands could not be met by Bonn.)

It was undoubtedly the unrest in Poland which led to the GDR's reversion to Abgrenzung. Threatened with domestic instability à la polonaise, the SED regime increased significantly the minimum amounts of currency that West Germans and West Berliners were required to exchange upon entering the GDR. Implemented on October 13, 1980, the currency amounts were:

> ... doubled for extended stays in East German and quadrupled for day-long visits in East Berlin. While children and retired citizens had previously been exempted from these obligations, now they too were required to exchange currency on the borders.

> ... the new rates were high enough that the East German regime could count upon cutting back its visitors from the West by over fifty per cent--which is exactly what happened in the following months--and still take in more foreign exchange than in previous years. Equally noteworthy, in view of the SED's domestic concerns, East Berlin's action came even before a similar decision on 30 October to end nine years of visa-free traffic between the GDR and Poland and to impose strict conditions on those citizens still wishing to travel between the two states.[139]

Although such measures did not help inter-German relations, they also fell far short of killing the détente established between the two states in the 1970s.

By early 1981, in fact, there was a noticeable upswing in inter-German relations. The events in Poland were not so threatening to the SED regime, primarily because of the GDR's healthy economy: a healthy 4.2 per cent increase in its gross domestic product in 1980 followed by a surplus in intra-German trade in 1981. The surplus in inter-German trade in favour of the GDR amounted to 220 million clearing units in 1981.[140] Moscow's support of a continued inter-German dialogue also worked in favour of détente: massive peace demonstrations in the Federal Republic were viewed by the Kremlin as being a positive development, since they represented opposition to NATO and American weapons policies which could be exploited by East Berlin.

Schmidt and Honecker did meet on December 11-13, 1981, at Lake Werbellin, just north of Berlin. Probably the most significant point with regard to the meeting was the fact that it took place: it represented the renewal of détente between the two German states. Also noteworthy was Schmidt's "soft" stand regarding the imposition of martial law in Poland. The event occurred on the second day of the former

chancellor's visit to East Germany, and he sided with Honecker, claiming that the Poles should solve their own problems, free from any outside interference. (In the weeks to follow, the U.S. pressed for sanctions against Moscow and Warsaw, but Bonn refused to adopt such a strategy, preferring instead a dialogue with Warsaw, with appeals to end martial law.)

Schmidt's reticence with regard to the unrest in Poland earned him sharp criticism from hardliners in the West. It is easier to understand the chancellor's position, however, when one considers his valid fears of a military intervention and a blood bath in Poland. As one source puts it:

> That would put paid to hopes of modest but real reforms in Poland on the lines of those in Kadar's Hungary. It would almost certainly mean a tougher line in all Moscow's satellites for years to come.
>
> Schmidt was not only thinking of invasion by the Russians. He was haunted by the thought that other Warsaw Pact forces might take part too, including those of East Germany. Once again German troops would be on the march to crush the Poles! Well before the Werbellin meeting Schmidt had found ways of making plain to East Germany how much it stood to lose, not least financially, if Poland were invaded. The point was surely not lost on Honecker.[141]

Nor was this the only instance when the Federal Republic was wielding its economic power to obtain political objectives: the trade credit arrangement with the GDR was about to expire, and Schmidt made it clear to Honecker that a renewal of the same depended on improvements to the minimum exchange requirements imposed upon West German visitors. It will be remembered that one year prior to Schmidt's visit to Werbellin, East Germany drastically raised the minimum amounts of exchange, which resulted in a substantial reduction of visitors form West Germany and

West Berlin. Schmidt only partially succeeded when the credit accord was renewed and a few small improvements on the visits issue took place in 1982.

Many critics argue, in fact, that East Berlin came out with the upper hand as a result of the inter-German agreements that were signed on June 18, 1982. The improvements to the visiting conditions were only marginal at best: a two-hour extension of day visits for West Berliners into East Berlin and the opening of new pedestrian border crossings into the city. The GDR also proclaimed a general amnesty for all citizens who had "illegally" left the country before 1981; such an amnesty would supposedly allow them to return to East Germany for family visits. The SED's heart was "not where its mouth was," however: two-thirds of those newly-amnestied persons applying for travel visas to the GDR were rejected.[142]

East Germany, however, emerged from the talks with a renewed full extension of interest-free credit, which served to protect its international credit image. Furthermore--and of greater importance--East Berlin managed to preserve inter-German détente, even though it had given the FRG substantially less than the latter had originally desired. This represented a significant victory for the GDR.

The time between the autumn of 1982 and late 1983 constituted yet another potentially destabilizing period for inter-German relations. This was due to two major factors: West Germany's new center-right coalition government led by Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democrats (1 October 1982), and the planned deployment by NATO of cruise and Pershing

II missiles in Europe as a result of the stalemated U.S.-Soviet arms talks (November 1983).

With regard to the first factor, Kohl's Christian Democratic/Free Democratic coalition government was elected with a definite pro-NATO and pro-American stand. However, Free Democratic leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher remained foreign minister in the new coalition, and this implied substantial continuity in Bonn's Ostpolitik, as well as its new Deutschlandpolitik (Germany policy). It became, in fact, a paradox of West German foreign policy that Bonn continued its Ostpolitik while simultaneously accepting the deployment of American intermediate range missiles. As one source suggests, Ostpolitik had developed a life of its own, whether or not the superpowers were talking to each other:

> ... the Kohl government's pursuit of contacts with the East and, in particular, expanded relations with East Germany, was equally ambitious as that of the SPD. While the Social Democrats in power had to be sensitive to criticism from the right and were required religiously to assert their place in the Western alliance in order to justify their policy of expanding relations with the East, the Christian Democrats faced no such difficulties in domestic politics. In the late 1970's, West Germans were inclined to assert that their Ostpolitik could only thrive in an atmosphere of détente between the superpowers. Under the Kohl government, however, the breakdown in the dialog between the United States and the Soviet Union was interpreted as all the more reason for the two Germanies to intensify their dialog.[143]

The Soviets applied pressure on Kohl's government when they warned that missile deployments in West Germany would seriously affect East-West relations. Despite such warnings, however, the center-right coalition was returned to power in the Bundestag elections on March 6, 1983. East Berlin, to be sure, had also warned Bonn on numerous occasions not to deploy the missiles, but the threats seemed to be more an

echo of Moscow's warnings than anything else; consequently, they went largely unheeded in the Federal Republic. Besides, Bonn was well aware of the fact that the GDR had even more to lose than the Federal Republic should a rupture occur in inter-German relations.

In a move that was heretofore completely out of character for Kohl's government, a one billion deutsch mark loan was granted to East Germany in June 1983. Even more incredulous was the absence of attached political preconditions, plus the fact that this was the first loan made by the FRG which was not specifically linked to inter-German trade. However, although Bonn never said as much, it has generally been accepted that the FRG was "... seeking to ensure that East Germany would continue to have an interest in the inter-German dialog even after missiles were deployed."[144] The West Germans were rewarded for their magnanimity in September 1983 when certain foreign exchange requirements for visitors to the GDR were rescinded, and when East Berlin announced that the automatic firing devices along the GDR-FRG border would be dismantled.[145]

In November 1983, the West German Bundestag voted in favour of missile deployments and the USSR subsequently walked out of the Geneva arms control negotiations with the U.S. According to past Soviet and East German threats regarding such a deployment, an "ice age" in inter-German relations was supposedly imminent. It is thus all the more remarkable to find that, far from deteriorating, inter-German relations actually improved considerably. Both Honecker and Kohl agreed upon the necessity of maintaining an East-West dialogue, and they both professed

their support of coexistence and cooperation between the two German states. Such views were summed up in a statement issued after a meeting that took place between the two leaders in February 1984 in Moscow on the occasion of Yuri Andropov's funeral.

To the dismay of the Soviets, intensified inter-German relations led to what eventually became known as the "German spring" of 1984. In the first four months of that year, more than 20,000 emigrants left the GDR, the biggest exodus, in fact, since the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Such a large number of emigrants was unprecedented, as the normal amount of East Germans allowed to leave is about 6,000 per year.[146] Shortly thereafter (in July), the Kohl government granted yet another 1 billion deutsch mark loan to the GDR and it was made public that East Germany had made further concessions regarding foreign exchange requirements and emigration policy. Furthermore, it was announced that GDR leader Honecker would be visiting the Federal Republic in the autumn.

It was at this time (early 1984) when Moscow began to voice its displeasure over the ever increasing inter-German dialogue and observers noticed a distinct rift occurring between the Kremlin and the SED regime. Soviet toleration had indeed turned into opposition. The all too familiar refrain of "West German revanchism" was harped on in Moscow and East Berlin was expected to join in. It was therefore somewhat of a shock for the Soviets (and some Western analysts) when Honecker replied that cooperation with the Federal Republic was in the interest of the

East bloc countries. Here was Moscow's most loyal ally daring to speak out differently--how could this be?

As if this were not enough, Honecker's presence at the fortieth anniversary celebrations of Romania's liberation from German occupation in late August 1984 was enough to send sparks flying in Moscow. Honecker was the sole communist head of state to attend the celebrations, and this fact alone amounted to a challenge to Soviet hegemony regarding bloc foreign policy and formulation of the same. The Soviets were undoubtedly given cause for grave concern when Honecker chose to side with the longtime maverick of the East bloc in the area of foreign policy and continue the pursuit of détente, rather than abandon his Westpolitik and become part of the Soviet-inspired chill vis-à-vis the West:

> Not only was the East German party chief greeted with a public display of warmth by Nicolae Ceausescu, the head of a country that had seldom been supportive of the GDR (or the USSR) in the past, but both leaders also joined together in calling for a turning point in East-West politics and underscored the 'necessity' of pursuing dialogue with détente-minded forces wherever they might be found.[147]

The high point in the dispute between East Berlin and Moscow occurred with the "postponement" (read: abortion) of Honecker's visit to West Germany in the fall of 1984. The visit would have been a historical breakthrough: the first visit by an East German head of state to the Federal Republic. There had already been visits by West German chancellors to the German Democratic Republic; it was now time for the move to be reciprocated. There was great political importance attached to Honecker's proposed visit: it would have affirmed recognition of the

GDR by the Federal Republic at the international level as far as East Berlin was concerned; and it would also have been a recognition of the sovereignty of the GDR as a state. Honecker knew this; unfortunately, the Soviets did not appreciate this fact--either that, or they did not care, so alarmed were they over the progress of inter-German relations. Although the official reason for the cancellation was the "unseemly" public debate surrounding the proposed visit in Bonn, it has generally been accepted that the trip was cancelled rather because it would have undermined the Soviet propaganda line that the NATO decision to deploy missiles in the fall of 1983 had destroyed prospects for contacts between East and West in Europe.

The ice age in East-West relations proposed by the Soviets--typified by Gromyko's so-called "refusal strategy"--clashed with Honecker's espoused policy of "damage limitation" prevalent in the early 1980s. Boris Meissner explains:

> The differences (between the Soviets and the East Germans) were exacerbated by Gromyko's "refusal strategy." In contrast to this attitude, Honecker, addressing the SED Central Committee plenum, advocated the continuation of the arms limitation talks and, hence, the resumption of the East-West dialogue. By stressing the joint responsibility for peace of the two German states, he also underscored the common basis that suggested the necessity not only of "damage control" but also of an improvement of the existing German-German ties. He thus became the protagonist of a more flexible foreign policy....[148]

Honecker's policy of "damage control" was in keeping with the new Deutschlandpolitik ("Germany policy") of the 1980s. Having realized that the GDR was the beneficiary of Ostpolitik of the 1970s in the economic and political realms, the East German leader realized that his

state had a vested interest in the continuance of détente--if not between the superpowers, then at least between the two German states.[149] The agreements and contacts between the two German states have continued to take place throughout the 1980s at a more or less steady rate. Economic trade between the two states has also grown steadily.

Due to the fact that the common German identity is stressed under Deutschlandpolitik, one can also note the revival of German nationalism in both German states. This phenomenon is particularly interesting in the case of the GDR, since (as already noted) the SED regime had, in the past, consistently downplayed the common German heritage of its citizens and those in the Federal Republic, preferring instead to stress the GDR's bonds with its socialist allies. One has only to remember Honecker's policy of Abgrenzung ("delimitation"), prevalent in the 1970s, in order to see the about-face adopted by his regime. The recent praise by East Berlin of Martin Luther is only one case in point.

If the German mini-détente, as a result of the Deutschlandpolitik of the 1980s, has caused distrust and concern among the Soviets and other East bloc states, then it can also be said that there were those in the West who found the new situation to be unnerving at the very least. Such Angst was voiced by the Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti in September 1984, when he stated (to a crowd of Italian Communists):

> Everyone agrees that the two Germanies should have good relations... [but] pan-Germanism is something which must be put in the past. There are two German states and two German states must remain.[150]

Although Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi later apologized to the government of the FRG for Andreotti's harsh words, one can be sure that many people in Europe shared the latter's view.

Walther Kiep suggests that East Germany has integrated its Deutschlandpolitik into its "peace policy," so that the focus of its policy on Germany will not be on the national question, as this would meet with resistance by the Soviet Union.[151] Indeed, both Honecker and Kohl have stated that further relations between the two German states and the safeguarding of peace are intertwined--this was agreed upon at their meeting during Andropov's funeral.[152] It is interesting to note, however, that the GDR finds the peace movement in the FRG "progressive," whereas its unofficial counterpart in East Germany is condemned.[153] The SED regime obviously prefers a state-sanctioned peace movement which it can control, for a movement based on spontaneity represents a threat to the regime's authority. One has only to read the following to realize this:

> So far the GDR has been able to contain her Peace Movement. After the Bundestag vote in favour of INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) deployment and the end of the Luther anniversary celebrations, there was a harsh clamp-down, several leaders were arrested, and Western sympathizers were refused entry into East Germany.[154]

The East German wariness with regard to its peace movement has been matched by the Soviet concern over the inter-German dialogue, despite Honecker's assurances that such talks would serve the interests of peace. Despite Moscow's official advocacy of peaceful relations with the West, such relations must be initiated and led by the Soviet Union,

rather than one of its socialist allies. Such reasoning helps to explain the 1984 rift between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic and is offered in a report prepared by the U.S. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division:

> Perhaps the most important reason for Moscow's opposition was the fact that the Soviet leadership had decided by the summer of 1984 to reopen the dialog with the United States. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was scheduled to meet with President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz in September, and the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to be groping for ways to resume nuclear arms control negotiations. Having decided to resume discussions with Washington, the Soviet leadership may have preferred that the inter-German dialog take a back seat to the United States-Soviet dialog.[155]

By 1984 both German states professed the viability and the role that smaller states--that is, states other than the two superpowers--could play in securing and maintaining world peace. The more threatening aspects and consequences resulting from the stalemated relations between the U.S. and the USSR were felt most severely in the heart of Europe; that is, East and West Germany. The leaders of both states therefore took the responsibility upon themselves for the continuance of détente--if not between the entire two blocs, then at least between two member states. It was argued that peaceful relations between the two German states would serve the interests of their neighbours in Europe:

> Im Zentrum Europas teilen die beiden deutschen Staaten in besonderem Maße die Pflicht, zur Förderung von Frieden und Entspannung zusammenzuwirken. Ein konstruktives Verhältnis zwischen ihnen liegt im Interesse aller Nachbarn. In den Zeiten des Kalten Krieges war das Klima in ganz Europa von den deutsch-deutschen Gegensätzen schwer belastet. Es ist europäische Friedenspolitik, wenn beide deutsche Staaten heute aus einer Verantwortungsgemeinschaft heraus für den Frieden in Europa handeln.[156]

Concomitant with the German mini-détente and the adoption of the policy of "common responsibility" between the two German states has been the resurgence of the German question and increasing evidence of a growing German nationalism--particularly in the Federal Republic. Whether this is seen as a positive or negative development, however, depends on whether or not one perceives German nationalism as constituting a threat to world peace. Given the present military build-up and East versus West arms race that seems to have no limits, one could easily argue that German nationalism could hardly exacerbate any further the already volatile state of East-West relations. Indeed, Bavarian premier Franz Josef Strauss, during his electoral campaign in January 1987, claimed that West Germany needed a strong national identity and an end to "the blockade of its return to historical normality":

> We don't want any totally fanatical nationalists, and nothing like a nation of youthful fanatical nationalists.... But instead of a nation of 60 million fanatical nationalists we don't want a nation of 60 million nihilists![157]

Repressed nationalism can be no less dangerous than "unleashed" nationalism, for sooner or later the voices of nationalism will make themselves heard.

Despite the controversy aroused by the "right-wing overtones" present during the last West German election campaign (January 1987),[158] and particularly evident in the CDU/CSU campaign, the fact remains that

> ... the chancellor's Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, had their weakest showing since the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949.
>
> They dropped a staggering 4.5 percentage points from their 1983 share, to 44.3 percent of the vote.[159]

To further illustrate how the pendulum of West German domestic politics has swung further to the left, one need only look at "the Greens" party's latest election results. First established at the federal level in 1980, the Greens were not taken seriously by many people until recently. Their pro-ecology, anti-nuclear stance includes their demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO. It is therefore important to note the increase in popularity of this grassroot party: in 1983 they won 5.6% of the votes,[160] whereas in the January 1987 election they won 8.3% of the vote.[161] Not only did the election results represent an impressive gain for the Greens, but also a significant loss for conservative forces in West German politics in general.

If the advent of the Greens into the West German political arena represents a threat to NATO--and it does--, then the SED regime feels just as threatened by this relatively new party. This is primarily due to the Greens' advocacy of the elimination of the Warsaw Pact, as well as NATO. Not only does the SED regime avoid aligning itself with the radical elements among the Greens, but it also keeps its distance from West German left-wing circles in general. East Berlin is seeking, rather, to pursue an inter-German dialogue "under the umbrella of the two alliances."[162]

Seeing that 1987 marked the 750th anniversary of Berlin, it is only fitting that brief mention be made of the status of the divided city and the effect that the anniversary celebrations have had upon the various regimes in both blocs. One can begin with West Berlin's out-

spoken (CDU) mayor, Eberhard Diepgen. Elected in 1984, he appeared at first to be "bland and predictable." Within a few months, however, the young mayor:

> ...called on the Western allies in the city to abolish a number of "obsolescent" postwar occupation laws (which they eventually did). He sounded more like an SPD man than a conservative on several social issues. One Greens politician in Berlin noted that Mr. Diepgen surprised everyone by "overtaking the socialists in the left lane." He exemplifies the new generation of West German politicians who were unburdened by wartime guilt feelings.[163]

Diepgen's eagerness to accept an invitation given by East Germany regarding its official anniversary ceremony caused a row amongst West Berlin's protective powers. The invitation specified that the ceremony was in (East) "Berlin, capital of the German Democratic Republic." The Western allies were quick to point out the political consequences of such a visit, as is explained below:

> Senior American, British and French diplomats in West Berlin claimed the agile Mr. Diepgen was about to step into a "clever trap" to undermine the Western position that Berlin is still one city. They argued that they could not accept East Berlin as the East German capital without eroding their own position in Berlin.[164]

To complicate matters, Diepgen had the full support of Chancellor Kohl in his bid to re-establish these relations between East and West Berlin.

It was the West German proposal to invite Honecker to West Berlin's own 750th ceremony that finally broke the stalemate. Diepgen agreed to accept the East Berlin invitation on one condition: that Mr. Honecker accept an invitation to West Berlin. A further complication arose, however, when Honecker claimed that Mr. Erhard Krack, the Lord Mayor of (East) Berlin, failed to receive his invitation to the ceremony

in West Berlin. The West did not forget to invite Krack, however, as the following passage points out:

> The one oversight was intentional, ... as the West insists there is only one legally elected Berlin Government, that of West Berlin. This was also the reason Mr. Diepgen did not reply to an invitation from Mr. Krack to attend a meeting of mayors in East Berlin in June although several West German mayors had accepted.[165]

Such politicking on both sides of the Wall, plus the fact that even the anniversary celebrations were themselves divided, serve as testimony to the irreconcilable ideological differences ensconced in both halves of Berlin, as well as the political and economic systems which are inimical to one another. The tragedy of Berlin is more vividly illustrated each time a GDR citizen is shot at when trying to escape to West Berlin. The tragedy of Germany as a whole is illustrated through the waning patriotic and emotional bond to the East that is characteristic of young West Germans: a 1984 opinion poll revealed that 43% of those aged 14 to 21 saw East Germany as a "foreign" country.[166]

Despite the continued division of Germany and Berlin, however, the shared forces of history, language and cultural heritage must be recognized. These forces remain common to both Germanys. West German President Walter Scheel described the situation eloquently when he said in the Bundestag nine years ago, "A nation which can only be separated by a wall and barbed wire must indeed have a strong sense of togetherness."[167]

With regard to Honecker's recent (September 1987) visit to the Federal Republic, although no progress was made on the reunification issue itself, the event was nevertheless a milestone in the history of

relations between the two German states. Being the first visit ever to West Germany by the Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, it is a reflection of improved relations between both the superpowers and the two German states themselves. The fact that the GDR's government has eased the travel restrictions imposed on its citizens--about two million people were allowed to visit the FRG in 1987--, plus the very fact that Honecker made the visit at all shows the increased self-confidence of the GDR leadership and a move away form the policy of Abgrenzung. The latter is a testimony to the present FRG government's policy on Germany and to the success of inter-German détente. For the time being the Wall still stands, but it is indeed becoming less of a barrier as relations between the two German states steadily improve.

Notes

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103. Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 49.

104. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 110.

105. Conflicting views regarding the status of Berlin between the Soviets and the GDR under Ulbricht are said to have been the cause of the latter's downfall. Most important was the Soviets' recognition of the ties between the FRG and West Berlin; this view clashed directly with Ulbricht's charge that the Federal Republic could claim no rights of citizenship in the city. See McAdams (op. cit.), p. 113.

106. U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 7.

107. Ernest D. Plock, The Basic Treaty and the Evolution of East-West German Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 61.

108. Noack, Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik, p. 147.

109. Ibid., p. 148.

110. Angela E. Stent, "Intra-German Relations: The View from Bonn," in The Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s: Foreign Policies and Domestic Changes, ed. Robert Gerald Livingston (New York: German Information Center, 1983), p. 21.

111. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), p. 145.

112. Quoted in Michael Freund, From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Germany and the New Europe, trans. R. W. Last (London: Oswald Wolff Ltd., 1972), p. 84.

113. Lewis J. Edinger, West German Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 67.

114. Ibid., p. 68.

115. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 145.

116. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 129.

117. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 121.

118. Reden und Aufsätze, quoted in McAdams (op. cit.), p. 132.

119. German Democratic Republic, German Democratic Republic, p. 160.

120. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 123.

121. Ibid.

122. Plock, The Basic Treaty, p. 113.

123. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, pp. 145-146.

124. One should take into account, however, the fact that the GDR established diplomatic relations with several Western industrial states following the signing of the Basic Treaty on December 21, 1972--in the next year, alone, 68 states extended full diplomatic recognition to East Germany, including France, the U.K. and Italy.

125. Brandt stayed on, however, as the SPD's chairman.

126. Stent, Embargo to Ostpolitik, p. 209.

127. (U.N.) Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, quoted in Stent (op. cit.), p. 210.

128. See, for example, Hanns-D. Jacobsen's article, "Probleme des Ost-West-Handels aus Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in German Studies Review 7 (October 1984): 531-553.

129. See table 7 in Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 126.

130. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 146.

131. Childs, Moscow's German Ally, pp. 151-152.

132. Andreas Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1982: Die "deutsche Frage" in der Weltpolitik, enl. 4th ed. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1983), p. 139.

133. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 148.

134. Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 140.

135. German Democratic Republic, German Democratic Republic, p. 55.

136. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, pp. 156-157.

137. Ibid., p. 159.

138. Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 61.

139. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 170.

140. See table 7 in Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 126.

141. Jonathan Carr, Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 175.

142. Der Tagesspiegel, quoted in McAdams (op. cit.), p. 218.

143. U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 8.

144. Ibid., p. 9.

145. This was mainly a cosmetic measure, however; it should be kept in mind that the Schießbefehl ("order to shoot") is still rigorously adhered to by the East German border guards.

146. Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 78.

147. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, pp. 196-197.

148. Boris Meissner, "The GDR's Position in the Soviet Alliance System," Aussen Politik, Engl. ed., 35 (Winter 1984): 388.

149. David P. Conradt calls it "the German minidetente" in his article entitled, "West Germany's Center Coalition," Current History 85 (November 1986): 357-358.

150. "Two German States Must Remain," ANSA (Rome), 14 September 1984, quoted in U.S., Congress, The German Question, pp. 21-22.

151. Walther Leisler Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 325.

152. Ibid.

153. Roland Smith, Soviet Policy Towards West Germany, Adelphi Paper No. 203, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 33.

154. Ibid.

155. U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 12.

156. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze 1974-1985 (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell GmbH, 1985), p. 492.

157. James M. Markham, "Whither Strauss--Bavaria or Bonn? Premier Campaigns for 'Emergence From Third Reich,'" International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1987, p. 1.

158. See, for example, Elizabeth Pond's article, "W. Germans dispute import of campaign's rightest overtones," The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1987, p. 11.

159. James M. Markham, "Tougher Times, Weaker Base for Kohl," International Herald Tribune, 27 January 1987, p. 1.

160. Federal Republic of Germany, The political parties in the German Bundestag, by Arno Mohr, eds. Manfred Neuber and Michael Hierholzer (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1986), p. 13.

161. Markham (op. cit.), p. 2.

162. Kiep (op. cit.), p. 325.

163. Leslie Colitt, "Profile: Eberhard Diepgen, Mayor of strong presence," Financial Times (London), 30 March 1987, p. 11.

164. Idem, "Political smog begins to lift," Financial Times 30 March 1987, p. 9.

165. Ibid.

166. Ross Laver, "The Germanys move closer," Maclean's, 27 August 1984, p. 29.

167. Quoted in ibid.

The security of the Polish border along the Oder and the Neisse rests today on the security of the frontier along the Elbe which divides the two German states.

Gomulka's speech of December 4, 1958

... you have still more surprises coming! It isn't a question of Russia. No, gentlemen, I spit on Russia! That's only one stage we have to pass through on our way to world revolution!

Lenin

... I think NATO is essentially the security of the Federal Republic, and we regard it as essentially the security of the United States. Those who do not place comparable importance on it, it seems to me, are ignoring history and are over-optimistic of the future.

President John F. Kennedy, Bonn, June 24, 1963

CHAPTER II

EXTERNAL FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE GERMAN QUESTION

a.) The Policies of the Three Key Western Allies: the U.S., the U.K. and France

America and Its Allies

Before attempting to outline the policies of the above-mentioned countries, it must be noted that none of the western allies have ever truly been tested with regard to the German question. For example, the Soviet bids in the early 1950s for German reunification were rejected outright by the pro-western FRG leader Adenauer, the latter bent on integrating the Federal Republic into NATO first. Once West Germany was a member of NATO, the prospects for German reunification became increasingly remote--just as the Soviets had warned.

Officially, all three western powers support German reunification through peaceful means, as laid out in the preamble of West Germany's Basic Law. To do otherwise would not be politically expedient. However, the fact remains that all three western countries harbour doubts as to the feasibility, and even the desirability, of such a development, each for its own political reasons. In some cases, these reasons may overlap--Britain and France, for example, both oppose the idea of a rearmed united Germany for historical and geographical reasons.

The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 went by virtually unopposed by the three western protecting powers despite the fact that it was an illegal act: all of Berlin legally fell under four-power joint jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Wall was erected by East Germans, even though the Soviets were responsible for the administration of that part of Berlin--another violation of the four-power agreement. Lastly, one can argue that the Wall's construction represented a major infringement upon the right of the citizens of Berlin to move freely throughout the city. Ineffective protests aside, the three western powers did nothing to prevent the physical division of Berlin into two parts--capitalist in the West and communist in the East.

It would be very easy to criticize the soft stand taken by the Americans, the British and the French and accuse them of forsaking the citizens of East Berlin and the GDR. Indeed, many critics have done just that. One must remember, however, that it was not the West which erected the Wall--it was a Soviet-sponsored act. Furthermore, the main reason for the construction of the Wall was to prevent the economic and political collapse of the East German state--the ever-increasing flood of GDR refugees into the Federal Republic via West Berlin threatened to topple the SED régime. This East-West exodus had a very destabilizing effect upon international relations and the construction of the Wall was viewed as being a stopgap, albeit a less than desirable stopgap, by the major powers.

The appearance of the Wall proved to be a rude awakening for those Germans who had hoped for a quick end to the division of their na-

tion. Perhaps they would have been spared much of their disillusionment if they had paid closer attention to such indicators as President Kennedy's report to the nation on July 25, 1961. In his speech Kennedy referred several times to America's commitment to West Berlin, rather than Berlin. As one source claims, this amounted "... to telling the Soviets that contrary to four-power agreements, they could do anything they pleased in the city so long as they left West Berlin alone."[1]

Unfortunately, the self-imposed restraints of the western powers meant less bargaining power for the same and played into the hands of the Soviets. Here it should be noted that the British and French leaders of the day, namely Macmillan and de Gaulle, approved Kennedy's speech mentioned above. The primary concern of the western powers was the welfare of their own sectors in Berlin. Many West Germans feared, moreover, that Washington might extend some form of recognition to the GDR once the Soviets calmed down.

Such fears were, in fact, realized thirteen years later when diplomatic relations were established between the U.S.A. and the German Democratic Republic (September 4, 1974). Diplomatic relations were also established between the GDR and Great Britain, as well as France. Such official recognition on the part of the three western powers differs from the Federal Republic's policy of limited recognition of the GDR and thus undermines Bonn's claim that the East German government is a sham since it lacks a popular mandate.

Although the FRG officially became sovereign when the Paris Treaties came into force on May 5, 1955, one can safely say that West

German sovereignty is limited--at least until a peace treaty between Germany and its former enemies is signed. The Paris Agreements of 1954 dealt with, among other things, the Federal Republic's membership in NATO; in 1955 occupation rule ended--occupation troops were henceforth stationed troops with contractually regulated status. Although the FRG became integrated within the western (NATO) alliance, such factors as arms limitations, particularly its inability to possess and/or manufacture nuclear weapons, as well as the continuation of the situation wherein the Three Powers retained "... the rights and responsibilities ... relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement..." (Article 2 of the new Contractual Agreement), relegated the Federal Republic to a second rank position within the alliance with the final say regarding the German question and other issues vital to Germany emanating from the three western powers: the U.S., Britain and France.

To substantiate this argument, one need only look at two recent affairs: the Pershing 1A's issue and West Berlin mayor Diepgen's forced cancellation of his visit to East Berlin. With regard to the first affair, it is widely understood that Americans twisted the Bonn government's arm in order that it give up its 450-mile-range missiles, the Pershing 1A's. Although Washington officially denied applying any pressure on the West Germans, "... its claim that it was on the verge of a historical agreement implicitly put onus on Germany if the talks failed."[2] It is understandable that Bonn was reluctant to give up its Pershing 1A's, given the fact that the nuclear missiles left in Germany

after the INF agreement goes into force will be unable to reach targets outside either of the German states. To put it simply, the national interest of the West Germans was weighed against the common interest of the NATO alliance as a whole, and the latter prevailed.

With regard to the second affair, despite West Berlin mayor Eberhard Diepgen's eagerness to take up Honecker's invitation to share in East Berlin's 750th anniversary celebrations, plus the fact that Chancellor Kohl supported the same, the western powers took quite a different view and forbade Diepgen to cross over into East Berlin. (Here, it should be mentioned that Diepgen's invitation to GDR leader Honecker caused a similar reaction in Moscow.) According to diplomats, "An official Diepgen visit to the eastern sector ... could imply Western recognition of East Berlin as the capital of East Germany." One wonders about the sort of logic used in such an argument, given the fact that the United States, Great Britain and France granted diplomatic recognition to the GDR back in the mid-1970s and all three countries presently have embassies in East Berlin.

Despite hopes a few months ago that the Berlin anniversary would lead to a breakthrough in East-West relations, the fact remains that there were two different sets of celebrations in the city. When Reagan visited Berlin, he stayed in West Berlin; Gorbachev, on the other hand, remained on the eastern side. Perhaps the view of the late Robert Kennedy on a visit to Berlin shortly after the construction of the Wall is of particular relevance here; Kennedy claimed that

> ... though the Wall was an atrocity, no miracle was going to bring it down. A new situation had been created ... and the West had to

> reconcile itself to it. Remaining unsaid but clearly implied was what Willy Brandt knew already--no matter what the official position, American acceptance of the division of Berlin signaled American acceptance of the division of Germany.

The above illustrates that there appears to exist among the Americans quite a different view regarding the German reunification issue than that officially espoused--namely, the division of Germany has been accepted, at least for the time being. Here, however, one should take care not to discount the possibility of the Americans' acceptance of the division of Germany as being merely an interim phenomenon. That is to say, it is not inconceivable that the situation regarding the German question will change. The reality of today will not necessarily be the reality of tomorrow. For the time being, however, West Germany's strong economy and its staunch anti-communist stand represent a real tribute to American-style democracy, i.e., a success story. It is not difficult to understand why the Americans are reluctant to trade in a sure thing for something with no guarantees.

The British View

As one of the three western powers, Great Britain wholeheartedly endorsed the Federal Republic's entry into the Western alliance. However, the British discouraged West Germany from taking any independent move which would promote German unity. They also strongly opposed the concept of neutralization, since it might remove Germany from the western alliance: "They opposed neutralization, not because they distrusted

the Soviets but because they distrusted a neutral and powerful united Germany."[4] Even the British-inspired Eden Plan of 1954-55 was based on the assumption that a united Germany would remain within the western alliance.

For historical and geographical reasons, Great Britain's old fears of the recovery of a nationalist, revanchist Germany are somewhat understandable.[5] The presence of the Allied forces in West Germany and West Berlin--especially those of the United States, the key protector--goes a long way in helping to allay dormant British fears concerning the revival of a strong and united nationalist Germany. One can go even further by saying that continuation of the division of Germany helps accomplish this as well, as Vali points out below:

> It seems that the British government, without spelling it out, was quite happy to have the question of German unity postponed ad infinitum. And the reason is not only the wish to put aside troublesome business but also the latent fear of a united, powerful, and perhaps unaligned Germany, playing off East and West against each other. This fear is also heightened by the possibility that Germany will acquire nuclear weapons. English public opinion is much less concerned by actual French bombs than by the slight chance that the Germans might have them ....

With regard to the latter part of the excerpt above, the British (and the French, for that matter) must get some satisfaction that the Federal Republic is barred from possessing nuclear weapons of its own, forcing it to rely on the deterrent arsenal of the United States, Great Britain and France.

As far as the realm of economics is concerned, it has been said that the Federal Republic is the economic powerhouse in Western Europe. (The same can be said of the GDR vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.) Although

both Great Britain and the FRG belong to the European Economic Community, this does not negate the fact that their state economies compete with one another. Should the economic division of the two German states one day end, the resulting combined strength of an all-German economy would serve to only widen the gap with the British economy--a distinct disadvantage for the United Kingdom. In other words, continuation of the division of Germany (the status quo) has economic benefits for Britain.

The present western democratic political system installed in the Federal Republic has gone a long way in rectifying the long-held distrust between the British and the Germans--at least those living west of the Elbe River. West Germany's strong anti-communist stand has earned it the respect of the British government and the FRG has evolved into a fellow middle power within the Western alliance. As is the case for the United States, it is politically expedient for the British to lend official support to the West German government's long-term goal of reunification. Should fantasy become fact, however, the United Kingdom is very aware that a reunited Germany would eclipse the island power in demographic and economic realms alone--to say nothing of its future foreign policy trends.

The French View

Given that France and Germany have been traditional enemies throughout history, the Franco-German reconciliation, typified by the treaty signed between the two nations on January 22, 1963, represents

one of the great political achievements of the postwar era. The two countries pledged close cooperation with each other in such areas as trade, cultural exchanges and defense. There were contradictions, however, in such matters as defense. For example, de Gaulle, avid nationalist that he was, insisted upon France's absolute freedom and right to maintain its force de frappe, or nuclear arsenal. Adenauer, on the other hand, ensured that the Federal Republic maintain its close military ties with the United States. For example, while the Franco-German treaty was being signed, West Germany was conducting intense negotiations with the U.S. over the MLF (multilateral nuclear force) project.

Indeed, West Germany's rapprochement with a nationalist France intent on creating a "Europe of nations" with France as the leader--at the expense of the United States (and Great Britain)--unleashed a major debate within the Federal Republic between the Gaullists and the Atlanticists. De Gaulle's vision of Europe as a "third force" clashed with the Atlanticists' view of maintaining strong links with the U.S. in order to ward off the Soviet threat. Despite Adenauer's pro-French leanings, he nevertheless proved himself to be a loyal ally of the Americans, as well as a supporter of supranational integration in Europe. It was probably just as well, given the different views held by de Gaulle and himself:

> Adenauer war der Fürsprecher der supranationalen europäischen Integration, während für de Gaulle der Erhalt der Nationalstaaten unabdingbar war. Adenauer wollte die Gleichberechtigung Deutschlands in Europa erzielen, während de Gaulle die französische Vorherrschaft in Westeuropa wiederherstellen und die Reste der Besatzungskontrolle über Deutschland erhalten wollte. Adenauer war

für eine Stärkung der NATO, de Gaulle trat aus der Militärintegration der NATO aus. Adenauer erhoffte im Bündis mit de Gaulle eine deutsche Mitverfügungsgewalt an Atomwaffen zu erreichen, während de Gaulle seine Force de Frappe unter ausschließlich nationaler Kontrolle haben wollte.

More than six years after the Franco-German reconciliation treaty was signed, U.S. president Nixon spoke to de Gaulle about the same. The French leader's comments regarding the Germans were far from flattering:

> . . . de Gaulle spoke with pragmatic candor about his decision to proceed with rapprochement and cooperation with Adenauer, despite the misgivings he had about the Germans generally. While he recognized the "tremendous vitality, drive, and capacity of the Germans" and that they had a certain "bonhomie," he had proceeded with the reconciliation cautiously because he felt that deep down the Germans had a driving ambition, which, when not constantly checked, had led to bitter experiences for France and other nations. For this reason the French were determined that the Germans should never possess their own nuclear weapons.

De Gaulle's nationalist feelings were obviously surfacing, and he undoubtedly spoke for a great many of the French. Memories of the wars fought against a powerful Germany were still vividly etched on the minds of many Frenchmen. French control over its Force de frappe, as well as integral ties with the Federal Republic, would go a long way in guaranteeing French security vis-à-vis Germany.

Although France officially supports the Federal Republic's goal of peaceful reunification in free self-determination--"This right belongs to all Germans. No one can deny it to them."[9]--France constantly qualifies its support by pointing out the realities of the present East-West division. Witness the comments made by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson which immediately followed the quote above:

> Today, however, we should not delude ourselves. The realities of the world cannot be made to disappear by the stroke of a pen.

Two German states are seated at the United Nations. France maintains relations with both.[10]

Furthermore, France's support for a free united Germany is qualified by [redacted] demand for freedom for the peoples of Eastern Europe; that is, not must the GDR be freed from Soviet rule, but countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary must also be accorded the same freedom. As one French authority put it:

> A national reunification of the German people in a State with a current population of 80 million inhabitants would arouse a feeling of uncertainty and fear among all European parties in the West and neighbours in the East.
>
> These considerations point to the conclusion that a free and democratic common future for all Germans should only be envisaged via the reunification of East and West Europe within a democratic federal state of Europe.[11]

Given the desire of the Soviets to maintain their hegemonic rule over Eastern Europe, linking the reunification of Germany--a divided nation--with the reunification of all of Europe serves to make the possibility of German unity even more remote than it already is. Rovan readily admits this, as the following passage clearly illustrates:

> In view of the current pattern of power in Europe, the hope of rapidly achieving the liberating process of a reunification between Eastern and Western Europe is bound to appear illusory for the time being. How should the Soviets be induced to give up their empire and to release our East European peoples without a war, which would destroy Europe?[12]

In view of the above, one can therefore see France's official support of German reunification as being overshadowed by its tacit endorsement of the status quo. The present division of Germany, as well as its membership in such multilateral organzations as NATO and the European Economic Community, helps to mitigate the threat of a strong, nationalistic reunited Germany located on France's doorstep. Further-

more, not unlike Britain, France's current trade imbalance with Germany would become even more tilted in Germany's favour should the economies of the two German states unite to become one.[13] Lastly, the demographic lead already held by the Federal Republic would also be given a boost of about 17 million people should reunification occur, dwarfing France in comparison.

Conclusion

Ironically, although Great Britain and France would be much more directly affected by the coming into being of a reunited Germany than, say, the United States, it is the latter which has more influence on the Federal Republic, particularly with regard to the German question, due to the security guarantee provided by the Americans. (This situation could change, however, should the Europeans assume greater responsibility for their own defense.) Until now, however, the issue of German reunification has not been a priority for the members of the western alliance as a whole; it is, rather, of primary interest only to German nationals. Given that a united Germany is viewed as a potential threat to the western alliance--and some members feel more threatened than others --, consensus politics have ruled and the common good has taken precedence over one particular German national interest.

b.) The Policies of the Soviet Union and Poland

Soviet Policy

Lenin is supposed to have once said, "Who has Germany, has Europe." Indeed, the strategic importance of Germany, due to its geographical location, the industrial prowess of its people and its economic strength, qualifies it as a prime target for Soviet imperialistic aspirations. To deny that the Soviets do not have their eye on West Germany (and the rest of western Europe) is pure folly. Lenin, the Soviet ideologist par excellence, wrote in 1920:

> We have always known, and shall never forget, that our task is an international one, and that our victory [in Russia] is only half a victory, perhaps less, until an upheaval takes place in all states, including the wealthiest and most civilized.[14]

In real terms, Stalin advanced the cause of communism the most when he expanded the Soviet empire westward at the end of World War II, finally stopping at the Elbe River in the middle of Germany. A common Soviet argument defending their presence in Eastern Europe is the security need of a cordon sanitaire--a "buffer zone"--between the USSR and the "fascist" Western European governments, particularly "revanchist" West Germany. A Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic may not be the ideal solution, however, as Vali points out: "Realistically, a separate East German state is less a protection against possible West German aggressive designs than an incentive for German irredentism."[15] Vali's agrument is a very convincing one: the division of Germany is artificial and forced upon that nation; it is therefore dangerous and

promotes instability in international relations. The Federal Republic realizes this and has been seeking reunification through peaceful means with its truncated brother to the east since its inception in 1949. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is quite content with the status quo and resents the Federal Republic's attempts to alter the same. The following excerpt clearly shows where the Soviets stand on this issue; according to Tass, the official Soviet news agency:

> The security interests of European countries ... require a rejection of militaristic and revanchist concepts in politics (and) full recognition of the political and territorial realities resulting from the second World War....
>
> The Soviet Union and the (East) German Democratic Republic resolutely come out against any concepts about the 'German question being unsolved,' Tass said, referring to West Germany's refusal to accept a divided Germany as irrevocable.[16]

Indeed, the often-cited "German threat" employed by the Soviets, in order to defend their own militaristic build-up and occupation of Eastern Europe, must be understood as being a political challenge to the Soviets, rather than a military challenge, if it is to be given any credibility at all. The fact that the USSR is a nuclear superpower, while the Federal Republic relies primarily on the United States for a nuclear deterrent (because the FRG is prohibited from having its own nuclear weapons), illustrates that the real threat comes from the east, rather than the west. Add to this the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces vis-à-vis NATO, plus the fact that Soviet forces are on the West German frontier, while the West German forces are not anywhere near the USSR, and one can see that the "German threat" is not a military one. It would not be unfair to say that the Soviets use

this argument, however, to express their apprehension regarding the political and economic threat posed by the FRG, as one author suggests:

> ... if West Germany does not and will not constitute any real military threat from the Soviet point of view, she does, nevertheless, embody a political and economic challenge which could be described as a 'German threat.' Since the effective abandonment of the concept of 'roll-back' by the United States, West Germany has been the only Western country with the declared aim of changing the status quo between East and West in Europe, albeit by peaceful means. In view of the Soviet Union's lack of success in establishing an organic and settled relationship with the Eastern Europe allies, the continued existence of this West German aspiration is profoundly unwelcome ....[17]

Many analysts have claimed that the goal of the USSR is to woo the Federal Republic out of the NATO alliance and toward a neutral, or even a pro-Soviet, stand.[18] There is no question that the Soviets have played upon the weaknesses within the NATO alliance in the past and they continue to do so, for it only strengthens their own position. Such tactics on the part of the Soviets meet with stiff resistance, however, given the political orientation of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of West Germany, i.e., their pro-NATO stand. In a poll conducted in the FRG regarding the alliance, for example, in 1983 79% of those polled advocated remaining in NATO, versus 8% wanting to quit NATO.*[19] With such a western-oriented population in the Federal Republic, plus a questionable percentage of GDR citizens loyal to the communist cause, the idea of a neutral, but particularly a "pro-Soviet," united Germany remains doubtful at the present time. Bearing this in mind, it is more politically expedient for the Soviets to retain control

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* It should be noted, however, that this 8% has steadily been increasing since 1980, when only 1% of those polled advocated leaving NATO. (A previous high of 5% was reported back in 1971.)

over that part of Germany which they already have (the GDR), thereby consolidating their power and periodically raising the issue of German reunification in order to win more concessions from Bonn.

Both the Soviets and the West Germans know that the way to German unification is not through negotiations with East Berlin, but rather with Moscow. That the Soviets hold the key to solve this issue translates into a great deal of power and influence held by Moscow in its dealings with Bonn--as long as the latter continues to regard German reunification as a core value and an open issue. In short, should the Federal Republic ever abandon this policy, it would weaken the Soviet position considerably:

> When Chancellor Kohl raised the theme of German unity during his visit to Moscow in July 1983, he found no response.
>
> However remote the likelihood that the USSR would ever grant reunification, it would certainly not be in the Soviet interest for the FRG to give up her aspirations in that direction, for that would deprive Moscow of an important means of influence. For obvious reasons, this is not something normally stated directly in Soviet sources, but occasionally hints of it emerge. In conversation with three leading Soviet spokesmen on the Hungarian television programme Panorama in April 1983, the interviewer, Peter Horvath, put the question: 'Do you expect a change in the Kohl Government's policy towards the East, with reference to the Ostpolitik?' The revealing answer was:
>
> No. In my view, at present this policy is determined not so much by who is in power in Bonn, but far more by West Germany's real geopolitical position ... partly by economic interests, but there are also important political factors. After all, West Germany is still concerned with the long-term perspective of a future unified Germany. And this problem, whichever direction we are approaching it from, cannot be solved without maintaining good relations with the USSR.[20]

On the whole, Moscow has been largely successful with its policy on Germany: the status quo has not only been maintained since the founding of the two German states in 1949, but the division of the two

Germanys has been deepened in both physical and political terms. The GDR is recognized as a sovereign state by most of the world and non-recogition on the part of the Federal Republic has been replaced by limited recognition. The passage of time has served the interests of both the Soviets and the East German government because the de facto division of Germany has evolved, many claim, into de jure division of the same. The Basic Treaty signed in 1972, in "recognizing the postwar realities," was a policy of compromise on the part of the FRG and a victory for the GDR's statehood and the cause of communism. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, both the Soviets and East Germany have gained from West Germany's Ostpolitik: economically and politically. It would therefore not be in Moscow's interest to make any major concessions to West Germany now, particularly with regard to the reunification issue.

Polish Policy

As could be expected, the Poles strongly oppose the recreation of a German power center in central Europe. Of all the East European countries:

> The Poles are the most vociferous opponents, displaying not only suspicion regarding West German objectives but also betraying lingering mistrust of Germans in general. Poland and the other East European countries support the East German regime's claim to legitimacy and oppose reunification.[21]

Polish support of the SED regime should not be misconstrued as being an indication of socialist bloc solidarity and an overcoming of past Polono-Germanic hatreds. The grievances held by each nation are still very strong, even today. Germany under Hitler, with Soviet com-

plicity, inflicted incredible savagery upon a spiritually strong but militarily weak Poland, making it "... the most victimized country of World War II; she lost 22 per cent of her population (including more than three million Jews) and an even greater percentage of her intellectuals."[22] Although anti-Soviet feelings run very deep in Poland, they are still not as intense as the ill will held toward the Germans. This is to be expected when one considers that, "... the Soviets wished to liquidate the Polish ruling class; but Nazis intended to exterminate the entire Polish nation."[23]

By the end of World War II, Poland had moved westward on the European map: she had lost her eastern provinces to the USSR (in 1939) and she acquired the German Eastern Territories at the close of the war. Herein lies one of the main areas of contention between the Poles and the Germans: according to the Potsdam Protocol, this acquisition by the Poles was supposedly a temporary (implied) administration--the final settlement of Poland's western boundaries was to follow the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The issue became explosive when Poland expelled the overwhelming majority of the population of the German territories--about 5.6 million Germans. As was already mentioned (Chapter 1), by the time the Postdam Conference was underway, 4 million Germans had already fled their homelands in the eastern territories, due primarily to the advancing Red Army.[24] When one includes the 3.5 million Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia, the exodus totals some 13 million Germans. The number of deaths of the German expellees is estimated to be over one million.[25]

The rapid resettlement of the former German eastern territories by Poles--to the point where approximately one third of the Polish population inhabits this region--only served to complicate the issue. Temporary Polish administration of these territories has evolved into de facto, and finally, ostensible de jure Polish possession of the region through an indirect process. Specifically stated, on July 6 1950, the GDR recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the final German-Polish frontier with the "Agreement of Zgorzelec" (Görlitz). Two decades later (December 7, 1970), the Federal Republic recognized the Oder-Neisse line as being Poland's western state frontier, with the signing of the Warsaw Treaty. However, an important proviso was made by the FRG regarding the treaty, as explained below:

> The Federal German Government has made clear that it can act only on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, that is that it cannot commit a reunited Germany. The treaty ... does (not) replace the still lacking peace treaty. (Italics added.)[26]

On the basis of the above, it becomes readily apparent to the reader that the Polish government is understandably justified in its opposition to a reunited Germany--Poland's very existence is at stake here. Making the issue even more vital to the Poles is the fact that a recovery of the former eastern provinces--now in the hands of the Soviets--is simply out of the question. Poland's "recovered Western Territories" are therefore not open to negotiations.

Although his words were uttered almost three decades ago, Polish leader Gomulka's declaration rings true even today: "The security of the Polish border along the Oder and the Neisse rests today on the

security of the frontier along the Elbe which divides the two German states."[27] This being so, Poland's friendship with the GDR can be labelled a "marriage of convenience," and Poland's ties with the USSR are vital to maintain and guarantee the continuance of the present status quo in Europe. In short, the Soviet Union is the guarantor of the Polish state.

It is most interesting to note that Poland's opposition to a reunited Germany is not limited to a capitalist political orientation, but includes the idea of a united communist Germany as well:

> Die Furcht vor einem hegemonialen vereinigten Deutschland in Europa ist nicht auf ein kapitalistisches Deutschland beschränkt. Nur scheinbar paradoxerweise erstreckt sich die Furcht vielleicht noch mehr auf den im Augenblick unwahrscheinlichen Fall eines vereinigten Deutschland unter kommunistischen Vorzeichen--vorgeblich doch im sozialistischen Interesse liegend--, das die Machtverhältnisse im sozialistischen Lager grundlegend und--so der polnische Einwand--wahrscheinlich zuungunsten Polens--gegenwärtig die Nummer Zwei im sozialistischen Lager--verändern würde. Polen wäre von den beiden größten und mächtigsten Ländern Europas, von denen das eine nicht mehr durch die Teilung geschwächt wäre, "eingekreist": eine klassische und tragische Situation in der polnischen Geschichte. Unter allen heute denkbaren Umständen würde ... eine Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands das europäische Gleichgewicht zerstören.[28]

Poland's deep-rooted and historically justified fear of once more being encircled by two strong powers--whether they be capitalist or communist --thus means Warsaw's predisposition to oppose any attempt at German reunification.

Conclusion

If it is true that the Soviets have more say than the East Germans with regard to German unification, then it is also true that the Soviets have more influence than the Poles on this issue. It is the Soviet Union, not Poland, which dominates the political, economic, ideological and military spheres of the German Democratic Republic. Should the reunification of Germany be contingent upon the removal of the foreign troops presently stationed in both German states, then the Warsaw Pact would have to recall 20 Soviet divisions--and not 20 Polish divisions. It is the Soviet Union which was one of the four occupying powers in Germany and Berlin, and not Poland. It is the Soviet Union which now holds the former eastern provinces of Poland and would more than likely have to sacrifice all or part of the same, should a unified Germany make claims on the former German Eastern Territories--the western part of modern day Poland. (Such a future scenario seems doubtful, however; rarely do the victors return the spoils of war to the vanquished ... without another war.)

To the extent that Poland would feel threatened by the sheer political and economic weight of a united Germany--not to mention a history shared with the USSR regarding German invasions--, the government in Warsaw will encourage Moscow to continue its present policy on Germany, i.e., maintain the status quo. Without a doubt it is Poland's role as a fellow-communist state and as a member of the Warsaw pact which gives it the most influence with regard to the German question. Should Moscow one day seriously contemplate giving the go ahead as far

as German unity is concerned, one can safely bet that the Polish régime will do its best to try to influence the Soviets in the other direction.

c.) Legalities: Some Important International Treaties and their Impact on the German Question

It is ironic to note that both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe when it was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. With regard to the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, particularly Article VIII, "Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples," it was declared that:

> ... all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.[29]

Specifically stated, the irony lies in the fact that the "... GDR's relationship with the Soviet Union is the main determinant of its foreign policy."[30] It has already been established that the Soviets are against German reunification. It therefore follows that any bilateral treaties concluded between the USSR and the GDR serve to strengthen the bonds between these two states; they also serve to keep the GDR in line with Soviet foreign policy. Given that the Soviet Union is a pro-status quo state with regard to recognition of post-World War II European frontiers, it was to be expected that such a clause be reiterated in the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Between the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic, signed in Moscow on October 7, 1975. Article 6 reads:

> The High Contracting Parties regard the inviolability of the frontiers in Europe as the paramount requirement for safeguarding European security and declare their firm resolve to assure, jointly and in alliance with the other states parties to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 14 May 1955, and in conformity with it, the inviolability of the frontiers of the states parties to that Treaty as they emerged in consequence of World War Two and postwar developments, including the frontiers between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. (Italics added.)[31]

Of further interest is the fact that this treaty was signed before the expiry date of the alliance treaty of 1964, concluded between the USSR and the GDR. More important is the fact that the earlier treaty held open the possibility of German reunification. This is not mentioned in the 1975 treaty, however. (Nevertheless, the old treaty was not abandoned in a formal manner.)

The first article of the above-mentioned treaty pledges the "eternal friendship" between the GDR and the USSR. Such a promise serves at the very least as an indicator of the long-term political, ideological and economic trends of the German Democratic Republic.[32] Of prime importance is the fact that the treaty serves to homogenize the foreign policy of the GDR, so that it will be aligned with that of the Soviet Union. Some critics even charge that the treaty essentially deprives the GDR of its own unique foreign policy:

> Article 9 would seem to deny the possibility of any separate East German foreign policy, for it states that the two sides 'will inform and consult each other on all important international questions and will act from a common position in the interests of both states.'[33]

It is ironic to note that the very existence of the German Democratic Republic as a socialist state, and its tie with the Soviet Union and the other states in Eastern Europe, serves as a guarantee against the revival of German militarism and revanchism. In 1977 the GDR signed treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with fellow Soviet bloc states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Each treaty commits the two states to military assistance in case of attack and each one includes an article upholding the inviolability of the post-World War II frontiers in Europe; that is to say, they are pro-status quo in nature and in direct contrast to the Federal Republic's goal of German reunification, as spelled out in the preamble of its Basic Law.

As mentioned earlier, although the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 was a breakthrough in West German-Polish relations due to the Federal Republic's recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as being Poland's western state frontier, Bonn nevertheless declared that it could not commit a reunited Germany. In other words, the Görlitz Agreement of 1950 concluded between the GDR and Poland and the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 between the Federal Republic and Poland give official recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary on the part of each German state; should a peace treaty be concluded regarding Germany, however, the Oder-Neisse line would have to be renegotiated--at least according to Western legal interpretation.

The question of the German eastern territories is also closely linked with the Oder-Neisse line issue. A ruling of the Federal Con-

stitutional Court of July 7, 1975 was devoted to this question; its ruling included the following comments:

> ... The territories of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, as well as the other Reich territories within the borders of 1937, were not annexed by the victorious powers at the end of the war.
> ... The Soviet-Polish Treaty of August 6, 1945, which defines the Soviet-Polish border in Eastern Prussia, expressly reiterates in Article 3 the peace settlement reservation, making reference to the Potsdam Conference... The three Western powers have not agreed to a final assignment of the German eastern territories to the Soviet Union and Poland.[34]

Indeed, the Potsdam agreement signed on August 2, 1945 conferred on Poland the temporary administration of the "former German territories" east of the Oder or western Neisse rivers. Furthermore, "final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await a peace settlement."[35]

Although the Federal Republic was granted its sovereignty on May 5, 1955 through the entry into force of the Paris Treaties, certain restrictions were imposed upon it, such as its right to rearm. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the three Western powers would maintain their supremacy with regard to the reunification of Germany, pending a peace treaty with the same. It is worth quoting Article 2 of the October 23, 1954 version of the Bonn Convention once more:

> In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement....[36]

The three Western powers also retained the right to station their armed forces in the FRG (see section below entitled "Military Alliances").

It has often been said that Berlin is a microcosm of Germany itself--a divided city reflecting a divided nation, where East meets West. It should therefore be instructive to examine the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 dealing with Berlin. Although it was heralded as an enormous success in East-West relations, particularly due to the practical regulations contained in the agreement, one must probe deeply in order to understand the real significance of the accord.

The name itself--the Four Power Agreement--in fact sums up the German predicament. It was an agreement concluded by the four occupying powers, not by the Germans themselves. Again, the supreme power with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole rests in the hands of the Soviets, the Americans, the British and the French. Anything to the contrary is a fallacy. West Berlin mayor Eberhard Diepgen's inability to attend the 750th anniversary celebrations in the eastern half of the city is a vivid illustration of the occupied status of Berlin and, finally, of Germany.

Under the Quadripartite Agreement, the Soviet Union officially recognized the links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. The Soviets also guaranteed access through the GDR between West Berlin and the Federal Republic:

> The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of cilivian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded ....[37]

Such a guarantee represented a definite gain for the Federal Republic and a corresponding defeat for the East German régime. The latter is

due chiefly to the fact that the GDR had made enormous efforts to control the transit routes linking West Berlin with the Federal Republic.

One authority explains the East German dilemma:

> ... the SED leadership had repeatedly argued that for sovereignty to be meaningful it had to entail the right to govern the use of one's territory, or as Ulbricht had once put it, to grant permission for others' entry. But with the Berlin accord, significantly, the Soviets gave in to Western demands that they, and not their allies in East Berlin, guarantee the free flow of traffic to and from the city. Not only did this concession deprive the GDR's leaders of their ability to wreak havoc with the transit routes, but it also had all of the markings of a modern form of extraterritoriality and undoubtedly raised serious questions in the eyes of the SED leadership about whether they had any power at all.[38]

As if this was not enough for the SED regime, the Soviets also allowed a substantial increase in the number of West Berliners wanting to visit the GDR. The resulting flood of visitors from West Berlin, particularly in the period from mid-1972 until the end of 1973, meant an increased exposure to Western influences on the part of the East German state that was not only unwelcome by the SED regime, but it was imposed on the same from above, i.e., the Soviet Union. The significance of such developments lies in the fact that the East German state was powerless to block such measures taken by the Soviets; the GDR showed itself to be, in effect, no more than a vassal state in this particular episode.

Further evidence of this last point can be found in the status-of-forces treaty negotiated between Moscow and East Germany in March 1957 and which continues to remain in effect today. Without going into the specifics at this point--(see the section below on "Military Alliances")--, suffice it to say for now that the GDR has a status in-

ferior to that of, say, Poland or Hungary. The mere presence of 20 Soviet divisions on East German territory illustrates who is in control as far as the military is concerned. Such a strong physical presence in the GDR, when combined with the tenets of the Brezhnev Doctrine, translates into Soviet military hegemony.

Returning to the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, it must be mentioned that the Federal Republic suffered a political loss as well. The agreement declared that West Berlin was not a "constituent part" (Bestandteil) of the Federal Republic and could not therefore be governed by Bonn. This meant that official acts of the FRG, the election of representatives and the assembling together of political conventions would henceforth be prohibited in the city and it represented an important gain for the SED. Such a stipulation made, in effect, the status quo official; in other words, it was a defeat for the Federal Republic.

Perhaps it is not always what is contained in an international agreement that is most important, but rather how each signatory party interprets the agreement. For example, the term "democracy" has an entirely different meaning for, say, the Soviets, than it does for the Americans and the citizens of Western Europe--the latter would hardly call the "German Democratic Republic" democratic in practice. Such a variation in interpretation obviously leads to something short of the desired settlement--disputes and harangues between parties can follow long after the treaty has been concluded. A case in point is the Quadripartite Agreement itself; the signatories disagreed on its geographi-

cal area of application: all of Berlin is covered in the Western interpretation, whereas in the Soviet view only West Berlin is covered.[39]

Of particular relevance to the question of interpretation of international treaties are the remarks of one high-ranking SED official at the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference. According to Hermann Axen:

> ... not individual states but two opposing ideological blocs had been brought together at Helsinki. One bloc, led by the USSR, had fought for years for the principles of security and coexistence that were embodied in the Final Acts. The other, led by capitalist giants like the US and the FRG, had come only reluctantly to Helsinki, following years of prodding from Moscow. ... in the end, ...the capitalist forces were compelled to recognize 'the existence of real existing socialism' ....[40]

As McAdams correctly points out, Axen's claim that two ideological blocs had met at Helsinki, rather than solitary states, tends to override the guarantee to sovereignty of the latter. On the basis of Axen's interpretation, as well as the 1975 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded between the Soviets and the East Germans, wherein both states committed themselves to socialist integration to a heretofore unprecedented degree, Article VIII of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States can now be read in a different light. Namely, the GDR, with the full support of its socialist benefactor the USSR, was guaranteed its socialist existence and its right to remain so in the future. To both the GDR authorities and the Soviets "external interference" meant "capitalist" and "revanchist," whereas the West would view "external interference" in the case of the GDR as being Soviet influence and control.

Despite the reduction of East-West tensions and the practical benefits that have been derived from both international and intra-German agreements, the ensuing modus vivendi between the capitalist and socialist states has led, first, to de facto and, finally, to de jure recognition of the same. In less than three decades, East Germany evolved from a "Soviet Occupation Zone" into a sovereign state recognized at the international level by both socialist and capitalist states alike. East Germany's gain has been West Germany's loss, as far as the reunification question is concerned--witness the fate of the Hallstein Doctrine. The status quo-oriented Soviets expressed their satisfaction with the Helsinki Conference, whereas the West has generally viewed it as an exercise in the politics of compromise. Whatever view or interpretation one adopts, one thing is certain: the two German states are just as divided today as they were four decades ago--in fact, probably more so. Overall, the international agreements that have been concluded since the end of World War II have served to strengthen the alliances and weaken the possibility of there being a reunited Germany in the foreseeable future.

d.) Economics: The Two German States and International Trade

It should be remembered that the germcell of what was to become the Federal Republic of Germany had its origins in the 1947 decision of the U.S.A. and Great Britain to unite their two administrative zones in economic matters. This resulted in a united economic area known as "Bizonia," which itself would grow into "Trizonia" with the addition of

the French zone. Unfortunately for Germany, this newly created economic area would never fully unite, as the Soviet occupied zone's economy was built according to socialist norms and Moscow's specifications. The result was two very different economic systems: one market economy that would become increasingly integrated with the economies of the other countries of Western Europe, and one socialist economy closely linked with that of the USSR and other socialist states.

The GDR joined the Moscow-founded Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1950, whereas the FRG became a member of the European Community (EC) in 1957, along with Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.[41] The USSR has always been, and remains, the most important economic partner of the GDR, and the same is true for the Soviet Union, with regard to East Germany: in 1982, for example, trade with the GDR amounted to 10.2% of total foreign trade for the USSR.[42] The corresponding figures for the GDR reveal the importance of the Soviet Union for the East German economy--not only is the USSR the GDR's leading trading partner, but it occupies this position with more than a 500% lead over the next most important trading partner, Czechoslovakia:[43] the figures show a trade turnover of 38.6% and 7.4% respectively for the year 1984. (See Table 1.) Furthermore, the COMECON countries account for approximately two thirds of GDR trade (about 65%).

Although the FRG is also heavily integrated with the economies of its own respective political bloc, (i.e., Western Europe), the latter accounting for approximately 50% of West Germany's total trade turnover,

TABLE 1

THE TOP TRADING PARTNERS OF THE GDR IN TERMS OF FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER (1984)

USSR	38.6%
(FRG	7.9%)
Czechoslovakia	7.4%
Poland	5.0%
Hungary	4.9%
Bulgaria	2.8%
Romania	2.7%
Austria	2.7%
Switzerland	2.4%
Belgium-Luxembourg	2.2%

SOURCE: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1986), p. 602.

there is no inordinate amount of trade with the superpower of the West, the United States: although the U.S. ranked second place with regard to consumption of the FRG's exports, accounting for 9.6% of West Germany's exports, it ranked fifth with regard to its exports to the FRG, behind four much smaller West European countries and accounted for only 7.2% of West Germany's imports in 1984 (see Table 2). Countries such as France and the Netherlands are much more important to the economy of the Federal Republic, France being West Germany's leading trading partner today.

West Germany's concentration of trade within the European Community (EC) is consistent with its political aims: since its foundation in 1949 the FRG has pursued the goal of European unification.[44] The fact that all tariff and trade barriers between the member countries of the EC have been abolished has meant that a common market has been created for about 270 million European people in which goods are freely exchanged. The political significance of such an economic union must not be overlooked, of which the European Parliament is just one example. As one official source states, "... the Federal Republic keeps firmly to the aim of its European policy of developing the European Communities ..., ultimately into a political union."[45]

It is interesting to note that the FRG is the Soviet Union's leading Western economic partner. Official Soviet figures for 1983, for example, showed that trade with the Federal Republic amounted to 18.2% of total trade with Western countries, or about 5.5% of total foreign trade.[46] West Germany has occupied this prestigious position since 1971

TABLE 2

THE TOP TRADING PARTNERS OF THE FRG (1984)

Imports (Manufacturing Countries)		Exports (Consuming Countries)	
Netherlands	12.2%	France	12.6%
France	10.6%	U.S.A.	9.6%
Italy	7.9%	Netherlands	8.6%
U.K.	7.7%	U.K.	8.3%
U.S.A.	7.2%	Italy	7.7%
Belgium-Lux	6.6%	Belgium-Lux	7.0%
Japan	4.2%	Switzerland	5.3%
Switzerland	3.6%	Austria	5.0%
USSR	3.3%*	Sweden	2.7%
Austria	3.2%	USSR	2.2%*

* The USSR slipped to tenth position in 1985 after Austria climbed to 3.3%, versus 2.9% for the USSR.

* The USSR slipped to eleventh position in 1985 when it fell to 2.0% and Denmark climbed to 2.2%.

SOURCE: Statistisches Bundesamt (see Table 1), p. 272.

on a continuous basis. As Smith correctly points out, the economic pre-eminence of both East and West Germany with regard to their trade relations with the USSR reflects a traditional relationship--Germany was Russia's number one trading partner long before the Revolution.[47]

One most not exaggerate, however, the importance of West German - Soviet trade. First of all, foreign trade is much less important to the Soviet economy than to the economy of the FRG, which is virtually dependent upon its exports. Despite this fact, trade with the USSR accounts for only about 2.6% of total FRG trade (see Table 2). The bulk of the trade for both the USSR and the FRG is conducted within the confines of their own economic communities, COMECON and the EC respectively. Again, about half of West Germany's trade is limited to Western Europe and over half of all Soviet trade is with socialist countries.[48]

Of further interest is the fact that trade between the Federal Republic and the East bloc was down in 1986 for the first time in years. Exports were down DM 2 bn to DM 25.9 bn and imports down DM 5.2 bn to DM 21.2 bn, due mainly to a slump in trade with the USSR. West German imports from the USSR dropped from DM 13.6 bn to DM 9.4 bn, due primarily to lower oil and gas prices.[49] The Soviets placed fewer orders in the FRG since their foreign exchange earnings were down; this meant a corresponding drop in German exports: from DM 10.5 bn to DM 9.4 bn.

Like the Soviets, the East Germans are suffering from low world oil prices and their hard currency earnings will be restricted this year, as they were in 1986. It should be noted that sales of processed Soviet crude products have comprised about one third of the GDR's ex-

ports to the West. Total hard currency loss in 1986 due to the oil price tumble has been estimated at $800 mn.--about 20% of hard currency income. Coupled with this is the Soviet-initiated emphasis on closer economic integration within the alliance. Not only is closer integration stressed, but the "... COMECON member states have been and are put under deliberate pressure to orient their economic strategies inwards, i.e., towards Moscow."[50] With specific reference to East Germany, a long-term agreement was signed with the Soviets in November 1986 guaranteeing continued above-average growth and greater importance of the USSR in GDR trade. The new five-year pact will, to be sure, help ensure a steady supply of vital raw materials (oil, ores, etc.) from the Soviet Union and one hopes that it will aid in the reduction of the GDR's accumulated trade deficit with the USSR, but at the same time it will bind East German trade even closer to the Soviet Union. (In light of the fact that the Soviet share of total GDR trade turnover already hovers at the 40% mark, one is left to wonder just how much further Soviet-East German economic integration can go.)

It is important to note that the Soviets have put emphasis upon "...high-quality industrial consumer goods, manufacturing materials, and plant and equipment ..."[51] in their economic cooperation agreement concluded with the GDR. Such demands on the part of Moscow, however, should have a debilitating effect on East German trade with the West for, as the report quoted above correctly argues, up until now these have been the very same export commodities which the GDR has relied upon in its economic dealings with the West.[52]

On the other hand, it would be premature to assume that the leadership in East Berlin is eager to follow the Soviet lead in decentralizing, privatizing and restructuring (perestroika) its economy, as encouraged by Gorbachev. First of all, it has become evident since the early 1980s that Honecker has been pleased with his state's trade with the West. The GDR has benefited both economically and technologically by East-West trade. Secondly, the GDR has one of the most centralized economies in the Soviet bloc; it is also the strongest and most successful. SED officials thus remain understandingly sceptical regarding the new Soviet formula based on decentralization. More than 90% of employees working in state-owned industry are concentrated in large Kombinate, which have a certain degree of autonomy in production and trade. The Soviet-desired move toward decentralization would certainly go against such concerns. A remark recently made by an SED official to a West German publication serves as an indication regarding the Party's current stand toward Gorbachev's reforms in the social and economic realms: "If your neighbour decides to put up new wallpaper in his flat, do you feel obliged to do the same?"[53]

Although the GDR conducts most of its trade within the confines of the CMEA (64% in 1985), its share of trade with non-socialist countries has increased from 28% in 1970 to 34% in 1985 (down from a high of 35% in 1983).[54] In addition to expanded trade with West Germany (see next chapter), the GDR has generally increased its volume of trade with such Western countries as Austria, Switzerland, France and Great Britain at more or less a steady rate since the 1970s.[55] Bilateral trade

agreements have encouraged East-West trade, such as the one signed in 1980 between the GDR and France, designed to establish France as East Germany's second largest Western trading partner, and extended by a 1985 agreement to expand trade between the two countries five-fold by 1990.[56] GDR trade with another key Western country, however, namely the United States, has dropped by over 300% in the five-year period 1980-1985. In 1984, in fact, the U.S. volume of trade with the GDR was surpassed by its economically much smaller neighbour to the north, Canada.[57]

Like West Germany, East Germany is virtually 100% dependent on imported oil. (East Germany is said to have the highest per capita energy requirements in all of Europe, due to its highly industrialized economy based on high energy consuming industries, such as steel and chemical plants.) Unlike West Germany, however, the GDR depends almost exclusively upon the USSR for its imported oil: 80% is transported through the "Friendship pipeline" completed in 1964, for example. Other pipelines link the GDR to such oilfields as those in Western Siberia. West Germany's dependence on imported oil is hardly restricted to the Soviet Union, however,-- as of 1982, only 4.7% of its oil imports were derived from that country, a negligible amount to be sure. The Federal Republic relies, rather, on diverse sources, such as the Gulf states and Great Britain, which together supplied about 53% of the FRG's oil needs in 1982.[58]

One can safely say that the GDR is bound, at least in the foreseeable future, to maintain close cooperation with COMECON countries, particularly the Soviet Union, with regard to both energy and

economic policy. Despite a recent decline in oil supplies from the Soviet Union, East Germany's natural gas and electricity supplies have increased; it also depends on nuclear technology from its big brother to the East. Added to this is the joint declaration to further integrate the two economies within the alliance, despite the fact that the GDR already conducts approximately two thirds of its trade with other COMECON countries.

Should the GDR be forced to follow Soviet economic patterns even closer, then it should cut down its trade with the West: in 1986 the Soviets conducted three times as much trade with other socialist countries th[illegible]trial capitalist countries: 87.5 versus 29.0 thousand million rubles.[59] Soviet trade with COMECON countries rose in 1986 by 2.4 per cent and declined with capitalist countries by 23.5 per cent.[60] Although this decline was largely the result of the fall in prices of the major commodities of Soviet exports, especially of oil, it is indicative of a trend which is sure to continue for at least the next few years. Less hard currency revenues translate into less trade with the West. As already mentioned above, the GDR has not remained unaffected. Its reduced hard currency earnings, when combined with its deficit with the USSR and its recent commitment to increase deliveries of microelectronics and consumer goods to the Soviet Union, all point toward a levelling off, if not a decrease, in trade with the West, particularly Western Europe.

Although the West German economy is in no way dominated by its big American brother to the extent that the GDR economy is, it neverthe-

less belongs to the capitalist system and therefore runs counter to the Party-controlled socialist system that exists in East Germany. The FRG's membership within the European Community also sets it apart from its socialist brother to the East. One only has to compare the figures regarding each German state's economic involvement with the CMEA countries in order to see just how divided they are from one another: as of 1981, for example, West Germany conducted only 4.5% of its trade with the CMEA countries; East Germany, however, conducted 63.4% of its trade with the same, from which 37.5% was with the USSR alone.[61] Although one can argue that intra-German trade helps to bring the two German states closer (see following chapter), it nevertheless comprises only about 2% of West Germany's volume of foreign trade. The overwhelming majority of the FRG's foreign trade is conducted, rather, with other Western capitalist countries: approximately 76% as of 1981.[62] (Next follows developing countries at 18.6%.) One can therefore conclude that, despite détente and increased East-West trade, the economy of West Germany is still very Western-oriented. The GDR's economy, on the other hand, despite intra-German trade, is still heavily integrated with those of the other CMEA countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Both of these factors will do little to promote reunification in Germany.

e.) <u>Military Alliances: NATO versus the Warsaw Pact</u>

The membership of East and West Germany in mutually antagonistic military alliances precludes the possibility of reunification between the two states. Although the official role of both the NATO and Warsaw

Pact alliances is to defend, rather than invade, the fact remains that the combined strategic, intermediate and short-range nuclear forces, as well as conventional forces, are aimed in each other's direction. Both East and West Germany remain strategically the most important military partners vis-à-vis their respective superpowers. The border separating East and West Germany is the most strictly controlled border in the world today, as it separates not only two different states, but also two fundamentally opposed political, economic and military blocs. Should there be an outbreak of war between the East and the West in central Europe, the strength of each military alliance will have a most decisive role in the outcome.

The German Democratic Republic has been a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) since its inception in May 1955. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, did not acquire membership in NATO until six years had lapsed. NATO was founded in 1949 but West Germany only became a member in 1955. The raison d'être behind NATO was to preserve the sanctity of the western democracy and its pluralistic political system from the Soviet threat to the east; there was much fear in the United States and Western Europe of a Soviet power expansion westward toward the Atlantic in the postwar period. The existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would supposedly hinder such an expansion.

The Soviets argue that the Warsaw Treaty Organization was set up merely as a "counterbalance" to NATO. The fact that it was founded six years after NATO does lend weight to their argument.[63] Critics charge, however, that the WTO was more probably a legal measure taken by the

Soviets to justify the stationing of their troops in East Central Europe:

> The pact was initialed in the capital of Poland on 14 May 1955, only one day before the signing of the state treaty in Vienna that restored sovereignty to Austria and obligated Moscow to evacuate its forces from Hungary and Romania within 40 days after the Austrian state treaty had gone into effect. The Warsaw Treaty Organization ... also provided an additional legal basis for the continued presence of Soviet troops in Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). However, in the case of the GDR, such provision appeared to be superfluous, due to the absence of a peace treaty.[64]

There is much to be said for the latter argument quoted above. Although the GDR gained its sovereignty officially in 1949, the continued presence of twenty Soviet divisions on East German soil does little to support the notion of such sovereignty. Furthermore, it seems that the GDR has an inferior status vis-à-vis the other East European countries, as far as its military relationship with the USSR is concerned. The Soviet Union concluded status-of-force treaties with its other East European satellites, but the treaty with East Germany is unique, since it includes a safety clause permitting the USSR to intervene if it finds its own security threatened. Article 18 of the status-of-force treaty concluded between the two countries on March 1957, and which still remains in effect today, goes as follows:

> In case of a threat to the security of the Soviet forces which are stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, the High Command of the Soviet forces in the GDR, in appropriate consultation with the GDR Government, and taking into account the actual situation and the measures adopted by GDR state organs, may apply measures for the elimination of such a threat.[65]

Further curtailment of the East German claim to sovereignty is to be found in its legal guarantees to the USSR of the use of both military

and nonmilitary facilities, including transport and communications. The movement of Soviet troops is also subject to less restrictions in the GDR than it is in such countries as Poland and Hungary. Staar explains the inconsistencies below:

> [The] movement [of Soviet troops] can occur allegedly in Hungary and Poland only with consent of the host government and with plans made in advance. The GDR agreement provides a general understanding on maneuver areas, but says nothing about troop movements.... the treaties with Poland and Hungary require the consent of the host governments to changes in the strength of Soviet military formations and to relocation of garrisons, whereas in the treaty with the GDR, only consultation is needed.[66]

It is interesting to note that, unlike the members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact states have also concluded a series of bilateral treaties with one another; that is, treaties with other East European states, as well as with the Soviet Union. The GDR, for instance, has concluded Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Poland (March 1967), Czechoslovakia (March 1967), Hungary (May 1967), Bulgaria (September 1967), Romania (October 1970) and the USSR (October 1975). As mentioned earlier (see "Legalities: International Treaties" section), the GDR renewed its pledge to provide military assistance in case of attack to most of the above-mentioned Soviet bloc states when, in 1977, it signed updated treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the same. As was also earlier mentioned, the treaties are pro-status quo in nature, since they uphold the inviolability of the post-World War II frontiers in Europe.

Here, it is interesting to note that the FRG and its fellow NATO members view the western military alliance as being defensive in nature,

whereas the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine is considered to be offensive.[67] In defending their argument, the West almost always points to Soviet supremacy in conventional forces, including manpower. Such quantities of armaments and military forces go beyond the needs of defense, it is argued. Another often cited factor indicating the offensive nature of the Warsaw Pact Organization is the geographic proximity of Soviet bloc troops to Western Europe--they could just "roll in" to West Germany, while strategically important American troops would still be mobilizing on the other side of the Atlantic.

Without wishing to discredit such arguments, and without examining in detail the logistics of the East-West military situation, let it be said that there are those in the West who deny that the Soviet military alliance is offensive with regard to Western Europe. Rather, as has already been mentioned, those in the East find such policies as West Germany's official goal of reunification to be "revanchist," anti-status quo and very offensive in nature. If NATO guarantees its members protection against Soviet-inspired aggression, then the Warsaw Pact countries are protected no less from the anti-status quo aims of the western capitalist countries, particularly West Germany.

If the GDR has legally committed itself to the "eternal friendship" of the Soviet Union with the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation signed between the two states in 1975, then the Federal Republic is no less bound to the United States for its military protection. A basic West German conviction for a long time now has been

that the deterrence of war is more important than the preparation to fight one.[68] The central question for the NATO alliance is said to be, in fact, how to achieve such deterrence. The West German military defense dilemma is explained below:

> If, as many West Germans feel, conventional defense at the central front is either undesirable (because a conventional war on German soil would leave Germany once again destroyed) or, given geographical factors and Soviet conventional superiority, doubtful, then deterrence must derive primarily from the threat of using nuclear weapons. Because the Federal Republic is barred from nuclear weapons of its own and the deterrent forces of France and Great Britain offer no credible alternative, West Germany must rely on the guarantees of the United States to use nuclear weapons in the case of an attack against West Germany. This shifts the burden of deterrence onto the United States in a dual sense: to make those guarantees credible, the United States must maintain forces in Europe equipped with nuclear weapons and certain to be involved when war breaks out, and the United States must be willing--particularly once the Soviets have the capacity to retaliate--to risk the destruction of its own cities for the defense of West German ones.
>
> It is understandable that the United States--in order to make that burden less heavy, but also to make deterrence more credible --should be interested in stronger conventional defense efforts. An all-out conventional effort on the part of West Germany is impossible, however: It would detract from deterrence and thus make war more likely, it cannot be afforded either financially or politically, and it would require preparations for war that West Germany simply could not tolerate.[69] (Italics added.)

It is of no minor significance to note that as the years of the NATO alliance have gone by, its reliance upon nuclear weapons as a means of defense has decreased. From Eisenhower's doctrine of "massive retaliation," to the doctrine of "flexible response" introduced during the Kennedy years, followed by a step back toward greater reliance on the deterrent effects of strategic weapons under the Nixon and Ford administrations, the policy under Carter and Reagan has been to increase conventional forces and convince NATO allies to do likewise.[70] The

Americans have been largely successful in their solicitation of increased defense spending on conventional armaments by their allies in Western Europe, as the following makes clear:

> Since the early 1970s West European defense spending has increased by 2 percent per annum in real terms. All in all, the European share of NATO defense spending increased by 27 percent in real terms from 1971 to 1983. This is equivalent to an increase of 21 percent over American NATO-related defense spending in the same period.
>
> The increased European defense efforts serve almost exclusively to strengthen conventional defense in order to adjust the existing Alliance strategy to the increased military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and thus to maintain credibility.

Of all the countries in Western Europe, it is by far West Germany which leads in both defense spending and its contribution of conventional forces. This is all the more remarkable when one considers the furor that raged in the capitals of Western (and Eastern) Europe in the early postwar years with regard to rearming the Federal Republic. Despite the fact that West Germany is still prohibited from possessing nuclear weapons, today the country is a virtual warehouse of such missiles--all of them American-owned and under joint allied control. The Federal Republic's contribution toward NATO can hardly be termed insubstantial: an official breakdown of the "Distribution of Costs for NATO Infrastructure Program 1985-1990" ranks West Germany as a close second after the United States, with 26.8% and 27.8% of the costs respectively--well ahead of such countries as Great Britain (12.2%) and Italy (8.1%). (See Table 5.)

Given the geographic proximity and vulnerability of the Federal Republic, due primarily to its more than 1,000 miles of common borders

with the Warsaw Pact, it is only fitting that it be the biggest West Europpean contributor to NATO defense. What is noteworthy, however, is its absolute reliance on the United States as a deterrent against possible Soviet aggression. (In a similar vein, West Germany is the most important NATO member in the eyes of the Americans, particularly in the aftermath of the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command in 1966.) Indeed, it is the West German-American relationship itself which accounts for most of the balance of power between East and West as far as the West is concerned.[72]

This is not to say that the West German-American friendship has been spared its share of rifts. The present disarmament negotiations going on between the superpowers are one case in point. Although nuclear disarmament is very popular with the citizens of West Germany--92% of FRG citizens polled in April 1987 favoured the "zero option" for nuclear middle-range missiles[73]--the present talks have caused some alienation between the U.S. and the present Bonn coalition, which in itself is most significant given that the coalition is centre-right in its political orientation and has been a traditionally strong supporter of the United States.

As was mentioned above, the key defense strategy held by NATO for quite some time now has been "flexible response"; that is, deterrence through conventional force in the first stage combined with the implicit threat to escalate the defense to include the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. Such a doctrine until now has succeeded in deterring the

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS FOR NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM 1985-1990

United States	27.8%*
FRG	26.8%*
Great Britain	12.2%
Italy	8.1%
Canada	6.4%
Netherlands	5.2%
Belgium	4.6%
Denmark	3.8%
Norway	3.2%
Turkey	0.8%
Greece	0.8%
Luxembourg	0.2%
Portugal	0.2%

* Together the U.S. and the FRG bear approximately 55% of the costs of NATO defense.

SOURCE: (Federal Republic of Germany), Federal Ministry of Defense, The German Contribution to the Common Defense (Bonn, 1986), p. 20.

Soviets from any acts of military aggression against Western Europe, it is argued. The recent disarmament talks between the two superpowers aimed at removing all middle-range nuclear missiles, although popular with the masses, are the cause of increasing scepticism and dissent in Bonn. The long-held belief in the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces, when combined with the prospect of the removal of those very weapons that could reach the USSR, has led some government officials to proclaim their anger that the United States, together with the Soviet Union, was "dealing over their heads"; that is to say, West Germany's security interests were not being given proper consideration. Indeed, there was even evidence of mistrust in the American position, according to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.[74]

CDU/CSU Party leader Alfred Dregger recently wrote in an essay in Welt that, should only nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 meters be left in Europe as a result of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals, then a "special nuclear threat" (atomare Sonderbedrohung) would result.[75] FRG Defense Minister Manfred Wörner argued that the Soviets, due to their conventional superiority, would be free to apply political pressure or even military actions once nuclear weapons were done away with in Europe.[76] The most common fear, however, and perhaps the most understandable one, was that of the increased likelihood of nuclear war limited basically to German soil, using short-range nuclear weapons. The following excerpt sums up the dilemma as seen by those in Bonn:

> The West German Government's trouble is that, from its point of view, the zero option was flawed from the start. Bonn strate-

> gists believe NATO can best deter the Soviet Union by having nuclear missiles that can hit Soviet soil. The nuclear weapons Bonn has most interest in getting rid of, therefore, are the shorter-range ones, which would be most likely to trigger a nuclear war, simply because they are close to the front line.
>
> The disarmament negotiations under way in Geneva would, in this West German view, get rid of the weapons that are the safest and most deterring while leaving behind the most dangerous.[77]

Gorbachev's offer in mid-April (1987) to include short-range weapons with intermediate nuclear missiles has hardly calmed the sceptics, for there would still remain 4,000 battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.[78] Should a "double-zero option" agreement be reached between the superpowers, the battlefield systems left would be able to hit German cities, it is argued. German sentiments are summed up by Volker Ruehe, an arms control adviser to Kohl: "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."[79] Nor do such feelings go unappreciated--a Canadian diplomat in Brussels recently claimed:

> Many in the alliance have identified with the Germans in wondering whether NATO has looked carefully enough at this. There is a lingering fear we may be trading away our finest armor--NATO's doctrine of flexible response--for a big question mark.[80]

Indeed, although the official West German view is that there is "... no recognisable alternative to the current NATO strategy of the "flexible response" to an attack...,"[81] U.S. actions have caused at least some high-ranking FRG military officials to declare that flexible response is obsolete.[82] Many in Bonn feel deserted by their allies and the subject of "singularity"; that is, the assumption of greater risk than any of their allies. Undoubtedly the remarks made by conservative Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss in early June (1987) should be

cause for concern for Washington: "The whole thing means a decoupling of Americans from Europe."[83] (Decoupling signifies the end of the U.S. guarantee of European security.)

Despite the fact that a recent poll in the Federal Republic revealed that 63% favoured remaining in NATO, it is significant to note that Gorbachev is much more popular than Reagan in West Germany: as far as the leader's credibility is concerned, the Soviet premier won 37 to 14 percent.[84] Furthermore, of those polled, a full 92% favoured the zero option regarding middle-range nuclear missiles and, in addition to this, 84% believed that the military threat would not increase if both the East and West relied solely on conventional weapons.[85] Such results can be cause for alarm for NATO strategists when one considers the following: when asked which side would be superior in conventional weapons, should total nuclear disarmament occur in both the East and West, while 47 percent of those polled thought both would be equally strong, a full 43% conceded that the Warsaw Pact would be stronger (versus only 8% for NATO).[86]

The implications of such sentiments are obvious--there is a definite trend away from the United States as far as defense policy is concerned. Whether or not the FRG is moving closer into the realm of the Soviet Union is a matter of debate. There are those who argue that the Federal Republic is striving to make itself equidistant from both superpowers, and this would ultimately lead to a neutral country between the two blocs.[87] Here, it is interesting to note that, of those polled, over one third (35%) favour a neutral (West) Germany.[88] This figure is

more or less constant with past poll results: during the past twenty-five years, high points were reached in 1961 and 1973 when 42% favoured neutrality; 1978 and 1980 witnessed a significant drop in the concept of German neutrality: 27% favoured neutralism then.[89]

As far as present and future trends go with regard to the Federal Republic's defense policy, it seems that the country will strengthen its ties with the rest of Western Europe, including France, rather than rush into the arms of the Soviets. Bonn has recognized as of late that until now defence policy has not been a priority in the joint consultations of the European Community. Indeed, Chancellor Kohl declared after his re-election that "the European side of the Atlantic Alliance" had to be strengthened.[90] The idea of a European defense charter proposed by the French Prime Minister Chirac was also favoured in Bonn. Nor is such a proposal limited to official circles--a recent survey entitled "Europe 2000" revealed that a great majority of those polled were in favour of a common European defense policy.[91]

Chancellor Kohl's recent suggestion to set up a joint French-German military unit received overwhelming support in France: a Paris-based poll revealed that 71 per cent were in favour of such integration between the two countries.[92] Such "pragmatic cooperation" does have its limits, however: all of West Germany's forces are integrated within NATO, whereas the French forces are under their national command. For the time being, the FRG is not ready to exchange the U.S. nuclear umbrella for French nuclear deterrence, according to Kohl.[93] Despite such assurances to Washington, however, perhaps it will be more prudent

to wait until a (double?) zero option accord has been concluded and the American nuclear umbrella has holes in it.

East German "sovereignty" was criticized earlier in this section, the presence of twenty Soviet divisions on that state's soil being only one case in point. One must now examine the situation in West Germany and ask: just how "sovereign" is the FRG? Although it was granted its sovereignty, like the GDR, in 1949, certain provisions have made West Germany's sovereignty limited at best. Like East Germany, foreign troops are stationed on West German soil, albeit in the name of allied defense. Of the 900,000 military personnel stationed in the Federal Republic, over 400,000 are allied forces, 240,000 of which are American.[94] It is interesting to note that the density of the military population in the FRG is 26 times higher than that of the U.S.[95] Although the major qualifying difference between the foreign forces stationed in both German states lies in the fact that they are divided up between six major allies in the case of West Germany, (i.e., the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada), whereas there are only Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, the presence of such troops on each state's soil only undermines the concept of sovereignty on the part of both East and West Germany.

Of further importance is the ban on nuclear weapons imposed upon the Federal Republic, as a result of the Paris Treaties. The FRG is forbidden to either own or produce both nuclear and chemical weapons. The significance of such a ban is obvious: West Germany must depend on its allies, particularly the United States, for its defense against the

nuclear might of the Warsaw Pact forces. Not only are the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) quantitatively restricted in conventional defense, but the FRG will always remain subservient to its allies for nuclear deterrence. It is precisely this asymmetrical relationship of dependency which helps perpetuate West Germany's close ties to the western alliance--as well as its division from East Germany.

Symptomatic of the complexities of West German defense was the recent discord displayed during the ongoing disarmament talks between the U.S. and the Soviets. The stumbling block until late August was the presence of some 72 Pershing-1A missiles--although they are about 25 years old and at the end of their useful life, the political significance of the same for Bonn had been recognized by Washington. The problem was that the nuclear warheads are, to be sure, owned by the United States, but the missiles themselves are owned by the West Germans. The Reagan administration's decision to allow Bonn to make the ultimate decision regarding these missiles was of purely political significance: already accused of "dealing over their heads" by CDU/CSU elements of the West German coalition, Washington did not want to create any further impression that the FRG was being treated like a vassal state. A concession had therefore been made in order to "keep the peace" with Bonn.[96] Likewise, Bonn's recent decision to scrap the missiles pending a "fully signed and completed" arms agreement, was a major concession on the part of the Federal Republic not only to the Soviets, but to the Americans as well, when one considers the political significance of the weapons.

Both East and West Germany have a common interest in reducing East-West tensions in central Europe. This has led to pledges from the leaders of both German states that never again will war start on German soil. Despite such noble promises, however, the fact remains that both the FRG and the GDR are heavily integrated in opposing military alliances with the nuclear capability to easily destroy the German nation--and all of Europe, for that matter--in a matter of minutes. Ironically, it is precisely this prospect of mutually assured destruction which offers the most hope for German unity in the future. As one source points out, "The nation is divided between two ideologically opposed societies but united by the knowledge that both German states will be the first to be destroyed in any future European war."[97] As has already been described above, there have been important developments with regard to defense in Europe. Whether or not such concepts as that advocated by Gorbachev of a "post-nuclear" world are feasible remains to be seen; still, it is worth looking into.

Conclusion

Developments at the international level since World War II have resulted in the political, ideological and economic division of not only Germany, but Europe as a whole. The end of the war witnessed the presence of both America and the USSR in Europe: the former was committed to safeguarding the western democratic way of life in Europe, whereas the latter was busy consolidating the Soviet brand of socialism in Eastern Europe. The subsequent transformation of the Old Continent

into two separate Europes--one capitalist, the other communist--reached a major turning point in 1955 when the Federal Republic effectively became a member of NATO and gained its sovereignty and the German Democratic Republic joined the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Each German state thus became a member of two opposing world systems. Furthermore, East Germany, like the Soviet Union, abandoned its support of the political goal of German reunification in 1955. Evidently the entry of the two German states into opposing military alliances precluded the possibility of reuniting the German nation.

Whether it has been intentional or not, both alliances have served to maintain the status quo, i.e., the division of Europe. Likewise, the ideological war waged between East and West has resulted in a stalemate regarding the German question and has prevented the signing of a peace settlement with Germany. The postwar years have witnessed the eclipse of national interests in Europe by bloc interests. The pitting of the two systems against each other has resulted in separate economic communities, such as the EEC and COMECON, inconvertible currencies, trade restrictions, travel restrictions, division of the Church and limited freedom of association.

As far as the two German states are concerned, their division appears to have been strengthened since 1945 despite such developments as an expanded intra-German trade. For example, the GDR today conducts about 65% of its trade with other COMECON countries while the FRG does about half of is trade with the EEC. Such factors as the aforementioned Soviet goal of increased economic integration among socialist states, as

well as the GDR's dependence on Soviet oil and other energy supplies for its industries, do not bode well as far as German reunification is concerned. Nor does the prospect of an American decoupling from NATO mean progress toward German unification--Kohl's bid to strengthen the European side of the Atlantic Alliance only means the perpetuation of NATO, albeit in another form. It is strangely ironic that the economic strength of each German state has made them strategically indispensable vis-à-vis their respective alliances, hence increasing the unlikelihood of reunification.

Notes

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1. Gelb, Berlin Wall, p. 117.

2. Henry A. Kissinger, "Kissinger: A New Era for NATO," Newsweek, 12 October 1987, p. 59.

3. Gelb, Berlin Wall, p. 263.

4. Vali, Quest for United Germany, p. 251.

5. See D.C. Watt, "Anglo-German Relations Today and Tomorrow," in Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy, eds. K. Kaiser and R. Morgan (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 203; also, ibid.

6. Vali (op. cit.), pp. 252-253.

7. Koch, Konrad Adenauer, p. 302.

8. Nixon, Leaders, pp. 76-77.

9. Excerpt from the speech given by French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson at the Berlin Press Conference held on 2 December, 1982, printed in Bulletin (Bonn), no. 1 (February 1983), p. 22.

10. Ibid.

11. Joseph Rovan, "The Division of Europe and Germany from a French Standpoint," in Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations, The Division of Germany and Europe: Background and Prospects (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations, 1984), p. 46.

12. Ibid., p. 47.

13. It should be noted that France is already West Germany's biggest trading partner, as far as the latter's exports are concerned. See Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 73.

14. Collected Works, quoted in K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), p. 134.

15. Vali, Quest for United Germany, p. 281.

16. William J. Eaton, "Soviets, E. Germans Bar Reunification," Los Angeles Times, 6 May 1985, p. 18.

17. Roland Smith, Soviet Policy Towards West Germany, Adelphi Paper No. 203 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 10-11.

18. See, for example, Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), pp. 226-227.

19. EMNID: Meinungsbild zur Wehrpolitischen Lage, quoted in Gebhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting, The Washington Papers, No. 106, with a Foreword by Walter Laqueur (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 110.

20. Smith (op. cit.), pp. 18-19.

21. U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 20.

22. Vali, Quest for United Germany, p. 229.

23. Ibid.

24. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 66.

25. Vali claims there were 1.47 million deaths; see Quest for United Germany, p. 229.

26. Bulka and Luecking, eds. (op. cit.), p. 67.

27. Gomulka's speech of December 4, 1958, Nachbar Polen, quoted in Vali, Quest for United Germany, p. 231.

28. Dieter Bingen, Die Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der internationalen Politik aus polnischer Sicht 1969-1976, with a Foreword by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Hain: Forum Academicum in D. Verlagsgruppe Athenaum, 1980), p. 187.

29. U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, 4th ed. rev. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 1290.

30. Childs, Moscow's German Ally, p. 308.

31. U.S., Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, p. 1299.

32. The treaty is in force for 25 years and will subsequently be renewed for another 10 years, unless one of the parties gives one year's notice prior to the expiry date of the treaty. See D. Childs (op. cit.), p. 308.

33. Ibid.

34. Quoted in Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, pp. 24-25.

35. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 64.

36. As quoted in Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 19.

37. "Provisions Relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin," quoted in ibid., p. 99.

38. McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p. 119.

39. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 78.

40. McAdams (op. cit.), pp. 149-150.

41. The community has since expanded with the entry of Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

42. Smith (op. cit.), p. 16.

43. Although the second most important trading partner of the GDR is actually the Federal Republic of Germany (7.9%), such trade will not be considered as being international, given the special terms of intra-German trade. This is in keeping with the view of the West German government. (See section on intra-German trade in Chapter 3.)

44. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 133.

45. Ibid., p. 134.

46. Tass, 18 April 1984, quoted in Smith (op. cit.), p. 15.

47. See ibid., p. 16, for historical trade figures.

48. Ibid.

49. "German trade with East Bloc declines," The German Tribune, 31 May 1987, p. 7.

50. Dr. Josef Adamek, Centrally Planned Economies in Europe: Economic Overview 1985 (Brussels: The Conference Board, Inc., 1985), p. 7.

51. Ibid., p. 22.

52. Factors such as high trade dependence and trade orientation between the USSR and the GDR only work against the prospects of reunification between the two German states. Nor should one ignore the negative effect on the domestic economy. For example, with regard to the GDR's booming electronics/robotics industry, the main computer maker, Robotron, has fallen victim to Soviet economic policy i.e. trade quotas:

> "A lot more new equipment will have to be made before the demand of East German industry is satisfied, especially since many of the highest-tech devices produced at home have to be delivered to Soviet factories, not East German ones," (Italics added.) ("It's a long way from Prussia to Russia," The Economist, 22 February 1986, p. 50.)

53. SED ideologist Kurt Hager in an interview with Stern magazine, as quoted in Claire Tréan, "Why East Germany looks askance at Gorbachev's reforms," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 June 1987, p. 12.

54. German Democratic Republic, Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1986), p. 240.

55. Ibid., p. 241.

56. Despite such noble intentions on the part of the two countries, as of 1985 France had failed to achieve the number two position, trailing behind the likes of Austria, (West Berlin!), Switzerland and Great Britain respectively.

57. German Democratic Republic, Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, ed. (op. cit.), p. 241.

58. Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1983: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Kassel: Paul Dierichs, GmbH, 1983), p. 23.

59. "Soviet Trade Drops in Value," Soviet Analyst (Hove, Sussex), 1 July 1987, p. 4.

60. Ibid.

61. Federal Republic of Germany, Gesamtdeutsches Institut. Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben, ed., Zahlenspiegel Bundesrepublik Deutschland/Deutsche Demokratische Republik: Ein Vergleich, 3d ed., rev. (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1985), p. 42.

62. Ibid.

63. USSR, USSR: 100 Questions and Answers (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), p. 107.

64. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 270.

65. Der Warschauer Pakt: Dokumentensammlung, quoted in Staar (op. cit.), p. 271.

66. Ibid.

67. See, for example, Federal Republic of Germany, Gesamtdeutsches Institut (op. cit.), p. 27; also Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1983, pp. 5-6 and pp. 115-116; and "NATO's Central Front," The Economist, 30 August 1986, suppl., p. 3.

68. Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, p. 62.

69. Ibid., p. 63.

70. Holsti, International Politics, p. 291.

71. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense, The German Contribution to the Common Defense (Bonn, 1986), pp. 6-7.

72. Ibid., p. 24.

73. Der Spiegel, 27 April 1987, p. 3.

74. "Angst vor der Courage: Bonns Christdemokraten fürchten eine Einigung der Supermächte," ibid., p. 22.

75. Ibid., p. 23.

76. Ibid.

77. Mark Frankland, "West Germany caught in middle with missiles," The Globe and Mail, 15 August 1987, sec. D, p. 8.

78. Peter Lewis, "New rules for war," Maclean's, 8 June 1987, p. 20.

79. Ibid., p. 21.

80. Ibid.

81. "Strengthening Europe's Position," Scala, no. 4 (1987), p. 9.

82. Elizabeth Pond, "W. Germans losing faith in allies," The Christian Science Monitor, 15 June 1987, p. 12.

83. Ibid.

84. Der Spiegel, 27 April 1987, p. 3.

85. Ibid.

86. "Gorbatschow populärer als Kohl," ibid., p. 63.

87. Ibid., p. 59.

88. Ibid.

89. Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, pp. 100-101.

90. "Strengthening Europe's Position," Scala, no. 4 (1987), p. 9.

91. Ibid.

92. "Growing support for Franco/German joint army unit," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 5 July 1987, p. 11; see also Elizabeth Pond, "France and Germany: Europe's odd couple," The Christian Science Monitor, 10-16 August 1987, pp. 14-15.

93. Ibid.

94. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defense (op. cit.), p. 21.

95. Ibid.

96. Hella Pick, "US pledge on Pershing 1As," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 2 August 1987, p. 7; also, idem, "The hurdles that could trip up the INF talks," ibid.

97. Jonathan Steele, "Glasnost melts the ice of the Forty Years' Cold War," ibid., 10 May 1987, p. 8.

Good neighborliness requires respecting realities as they have been formed as a result of the Second World War and post-war development.

Erich Honecker, September 7, 1987

Die deutsche Frage ist so lange offen, als das Brandenburger Tor zu ist.

Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker, June 1985

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE GERMAN QUESTION

a.) The Policies of the Two German States

FRG Policy

As was mentioned earlier, the mandate of the Basic Law of 1949 of the Federal Republic of Germany is to achieve German unity in freedom. Nor is such unity restricted to Germany--the long-term goal of the FRG is to achieve the unity of Europe itself. The preamble of the Basic Law reads as follows:

> The German People...
> Animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe,
> Desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period,
> Have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
> They have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied.
> The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany.

West Germany became a member of NATO and the European Community (EC) largely as a result of its shared values and culture of the West, its commitment to parliamentary democracy, to the rule of law and to an economic and social order based on freedom. The shared ideals of freedom, respect for human rights and self-determination of the FRG and

its fellow members of the EC and NATO have played a central role in determining the policy of West Germany with regard to the issue of reunification. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer set the course early in the life of the Federal Republic when he chose Western integration over national unification. In an address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany given on February 27, 1985, Chancellor Kohl reiterated his government's support of such a policy:

> Konrad Adenauer's unequivocal decision in favour of integration into the West and of the community of shared values with free democracies amounted to a rejection of any temptation to follow special national courses. This fundamental decision is and remains irreversible.[2]

Bonn views the division of Germany as being synonymous with the division of Europe. This division has led to the existence today of two states in Germany; nevertheless, according to the official FRG view, there remains only one German nation.[3] Such a view runs counter to that of the SED regime, which holds that there are two nations in Germany (see section below on "GDR Policy").

Observers have sometimes noted that the Federal Republic must perform a "balancing act" in terms of its foreign policy due to its interest in developing and maintaining good relations with both the East and West. West Germany's cultivation of relations with the USSR, for example, if done too strongly, may reawaken fears in the West of another Rapallo, whether warranted or not. Unfortunately, a common Western perception in the past has been that Bonn's Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) has threatened the interests of the Western alliance members. FRG officials deny such a claim, however, and argue that progress in German matters is

synonymous with progress in Western matters; that is to say, the gains to be had by Germany as a result of Ostpolitik were also to be had by the rest of the Western alliance:

> From the very outset ... a separate German policy towards the East did not come into play. Any such idea--in whatever form--has been unequivocally repudiated by the Federal Republic. Rather, it was the task of reconciling German and European interests, indeed German and overall Western interests, regarding the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thus, the Federal Republic's efforts in the early 1970s to achieve normalized relations with its Eastern neighbours by means of bilateral treaties, were made in close consultation with the Allies, and were simultaneously supplemented and supported by multilateral diplomacy.[4]

The FRG's strong moorings within the Atlantic Alliance, combined with its normalized relations and cooperation with the East, are consistent with the Alliance's policy on East-West relations, as was laid down in the Harmel Report in 1967. The Report advocated a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of an assured defence capability.[5] One author concurs with the aforesaid and even suggests: "The Federal Republic with its Eastern policy is the prototypical supporter of the two-track approach of defense and dialogue with the Soviet Union."[6]

According to Bonn (and the Western view), the German Reich continues to exist.[7] This is primarily due to the fact that a peace settlement regarding Germany has not been reached, plus the fact that the Potsdam Agreement said that "Germany as a whole" was to be jointly administered by the four victorious powers: "The Potsdam Agreement ... is unambiguously based on the concept of a unified Germany. Any other settlement is a fundamental violation of the Potsdam Agreement."[8]

Bonn, like its Western allies, views Germany's present borders as being temporary in nature, their final settlement being determined only following the conclusion of a peace treaty between Germany and her former enemies. This is officially laid out in Article 7 of the October 23, 1954 version of the Bonn Convention signed between the Three Powers and the Republic of Germany. Furthermore, not only are the current borders of Germany provisional, but so too are all of the agreements between the victorious powers and the two German states.[9] The latter are simply regarded as a modus vivendi by the Federal Republic.

The West German government lays claim to rights of sovereignty with regard to all of the territory of the German Reich.[10] As was mentioned earlier, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany claimed that it alone represented Germany since it was the only democratically elected German government and thus had a right to speak for Germany as a whole. (This policy was abandoned in 1969 under Chancellor Brandt.) Given the above-mentioned official West German view regarding rights of sovereignty, it should therefore come as no surprise that the government in Bonn readily grants FRG citizenship to fellow German nationals from the GDR, should they request this.

The Federal Republic does not see the German Democratic Republic as being a foreign country. East Germany has therefore been granted only qualified recognition by Bonn. Permanent missions, rather than embassies, were therefore established in the two states' capitals in 1974. These diplomatic entities have remained in place since, despite the in-

ternational recognition granted to the GDR by the other states of the world.

Of further interest is the view held by the government of the Federal Republic that the intra-German border is of a special nature. It is no different than the boundaries dividing the various Länder (states) of the FRG. Such a view has often interfered with attempts by the other Western allies to increase the security of the eastern front by constructing such barriers as walls and so on (as was done in the East bloc). This is indeed a good example of the priority put by Bonn upon the maintenance of a relatively open intra-German border--at least as far as the Federal Republic is concerned:

> To ... [the West Germans, forward defence fortifications] ... too closely resemble the hated iron-curtain fence separating the two Germanies, and it is unlikely any West German government would agree to them, at least within the next ten years.[11]

The question of Berlin remains an integral part of Bonn's policy on Germany. Its division into East and West Berlin has been likened to that of Germany and, indeed, Europe. The importance that Bonn and its Western allies place upon maintaining links with West Berlin was vividly illustrated with the Allied airlift in response to the Soviet blockade of the city in 1948-49. More recent proof of the FRG government's determination to maintain close links with West Berlin is shown through the annual fee of 525 million marks paid to the GDR for the use of transit routes on the latter's territory. Not only does Bonn pay East Berlin such enormous sums for the privilege of using these corridors to West Berlin, but it also foots the bill for the improvement and/or con-

struction of the same--the FRG recently provided, for example, 1.2 billion marks for the construction of a new freeway from Berlin to Hamburg.[12] When one combines the sums paid for the use of transit routes with the money paid for postal and telecommunications services, family reunification and buying freedom for political prisoners, then one begins to grasp just how strong Bonn's commitment is to both Berlin and all of Germany itself.

One source argues that the present situation in Berlin rules out the possibility of Bonn ever allowing the German question to be settled. In other words, as long as the Berlin question remains open, so too will the German question:

> The FRG is committed to maintaining firm links to West Berlin. For West Germany, as well as for the West more generally, West Berlin has become an important political symbol of freedom from Communist rule. The Soviet Union will not allow West Berlin to become legally part of the Federal Republic, and neither West Germany nor its allies will allow West Berlin to become part of the GDR. Thus, the German question cannot be closed while the status of Berlin remains open.[13]

Although the Four Power Agreement of September 3, 1971 brought no final solution to the Berlin problem, the practical regulations nevertheless helped stabilize the situation in the divided city, thereby benefiting Bonn. The Soviet Union finally accepted, for example, the existing ties between West Berlin and the FRG, including Bonn's right to represent West Berlin to the outside world.[14] Other gains included the renewed accessibility of both East Berlin and the GDR to West Berliners, as well as the resumption of telephone services between the two halves of the city--services which had been suspended for years.

West Germany's Ostpolitik and its development into the Deutschlandpolitik in the 1980s represents significant progress with regard to the West German goal of reunification. There is more attention being paid to all-German values and interests, including a common German history. The numerous agreements and treaties concluded between the two German states since the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 are proof of Bonn's success in lessening the division of the two German states and improving the living conditions for Germans on both sides of the Elbe. Heinrich Windelen, the centre-right coalition's Minister for Intra-German relations, summed up Bonn's German policy well when he said that a solution to the German question was moved to "a distant future" while:

> ....efforts were devoted to the task of at least making the consequences of the division of Germany more tolerable ... giving our compatriots in the GDR the feeling of not having been abandoned; in short, the aim was to foster the ties of unity at least in this restricted sense.[15]

Perhaps Bonn's present policy on Germany can best be termed a policy of compromise--realizing that the division of Germany is the result of a political and ideological impasse between the two superpowers, the West German government has decided to relegate the issue of German reunification to "sometime in the future" and in the meantime lessen the burdens of divided Germans in specific, restricted ways--by permitting increased intra-German travel, for example.[16] Indeed, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher realizes the psychological and historical strength that a policy of increased human contacts has upon a pan-German communal spirit:

> Die Bedeutung der Ostpolitik für die Deutschland-Frage liegt in der Möglichkeit, durch die Aufrechterhaltung und Verstärkung von Kontakten zwischen den Menschen das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl, den Zusammengehörigkeitswillen innerhalb der deutschen Nation zu wahren, der eine reale psychologische und geschichtlich wirksame Kraft ist. Es wird in den achtziger Jahren darauf ankommen, diese Entwicklung kontinuierlich weiterzuführen.[17]

Although the two German states remain fully integrated within opposing political, economic and military alliance systems, Bonn's change in its policy toward the GDR from confrontation in the 1950s and 1960s to negotiation and accommodation in the 1970s and 1980s has led, if not to a shifting of boundaries, then at least to partly overcoming the same. Furthermore, its goal of German reunification through peaceful means is as valid today as it was in 1949 when the Federal Republic was founded, despite some claims to the contrary.

GDR Policy

Erich Honecker has on numerous occasions suggested that unifying East and West Germany, merging socialism and capitalism, would be "as impossible as bringing together fire and water." Honecker again used this expression during his first visit to the Federal Republic (September 7, 1987). Such a view implies that East Berlin sees the political, social and economic differences between its state and its estranged cousin to the West as being so substantial as to be insurmountable.

Official East German (and Soviet) repudiation of German reunification was not always the case. The East German constitution of 1949 advocated, for example (see "Legalities" section below), the reunification of Germany (as did its West German counterpart). Immediately fol-

lowing the founding of the GDR, Wilhelm Pieck, the first GDR president, stated, "The German Democratic Republic will never recognize the division of Germany."[18] The FRG was blamed for Germany's division and East Berlin called for the formation of a unified democratic republic as a model for German reunification. Despite such noble statements, however: "... the GDR proceeded to work systematically towards establishing a socialist system closely based on the Soviet model and which was certainly not supported by the majority of Germans."[19]

It soon became evident that neither the leaders in the GDR nor the USSR were willing to give up these "socialist achievements." The SED regime later argued that the GDR was the only German state with the right to call itself "sovereign." The same regime claimed that, "The German bourgeoisie ... had led the German nation into two disastrous world wars, thereby forfeiting its right to national leadership..."[20] It was therefore the right of the German working class to pursue the "national mission."

Official East German rhetorical support for reunification was abandoned in the middle 1960s (1966-67) in response to the FRG Grand Coalition's creation and its more offensive policy on Germany and Eastern Europe:

> .. the SED began to withdraw from its all-German position. The State Secretariat for All-German Questions was renamed the State Secretariat for West German Questions, since "concepts such as 'all-German' are empty of meaning." Later it was dissolved altogether.
>
> At the beginning of 1967 a law was passed in the GDR abolishing a single German citizenship and proclaiming GDR citizenship .... The GDR's policy on Germany was seen as part of its foreign policy. From then on the GDR considered the Federal Republic of Germany a foreign country.[21]

The evolution of GDR policy first toward a two-states theory regarding Germany, and finally toward a two-nations theory, reached a high point in 1974 when the new constitution no longer included the concept of the German nation (see "Legalities" section below). Such measures represented attempts at self-defense on the part of the SED regime, which felt threatened by Bonn's new Ostpolitik, as well as its policy of Wandel durch Annäherung ("transformation through rapprochement"). Honecker's answer thus became a policy of Abgrenzung ("delimitation" or "demarcation"): the utilization of primarily political and ideological measures in order to define and maintain the distinct and separate identity of the GDR vis-à-vis its western counterpart.

Further evidence of the SED leadership's tough new stand against the concept of reunification came about with the removal of those passages proclaiming the goal of German unity from "friendship treaties" concluded with fellow Warsaw Pact members. Previous treaties (1967) contained a passage aiming at "the peaceful settlement of the German question" and "the creation of a unified, peace-loving, and democratic German state." This provision:

> ... was removed from similar treaties signed between (the GDR, on one hand, and Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, on the other,) in 1977 and no equivalent sections were inserted. In addition, while the 1964 Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty declared the GDR to be "the first workers' and farmers' state in the history of Germany" and registered the aim "to promote the unity of Germany," the October 1975 "Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Cooperation" referred to East Germany as "a sovereign, independent socialist state" and contained no all-German phraseology.[22]

Politburo member Hermann Axen summed up the view of the SED leadership when he denied that the German question was still open. He

argued in 1973, for example, that the issue had been "unambiguously and precisely regulated through many international treaties, including the Basic Treaty." As a consequence thereof:

> ... no German question exists at all anymore, rather, there are two sovereign, socially-opposite German states, independent of one another and with two nations as was confirmed by the Eighth Party Congress of the SED.[23]

Using the historical conflict of the ideologies, Axen later went on record as saying that inner-German relations "are not determined by any sort of 'common character' but rather by insurmountable oppositions, by the irreconcilable opposition between socialism and capitalism."[24] While Honecker admitted that GDR citizens continued to be German nationals, their separate identity was stressed through the formula: "citizenship --GDR, nationality--German." In a similar vein, the regime in East Berlin required in mid-1976 that West German visitors to the GDR in the future describe their citizenship as "FRG" instead of "German" when filling out travel applications.[25] Such steps were obviously intended to play havoc with Brandt's thesis of "unity of the nation." The policy of Abgrenzung was East Berlin's defensive reaction against the political and ideological threat emanating from Bonn following the latter's decision to pursue closer contacts with the GDR.

It must be noted that delimitation was not restricted to the theoretical realm--practical measures were also taken to help implement such a policy. Such measures included the raising (by 100 per cent or more) of the so-called minimum daily exchange requirement for Westerners wanting to visit the GDR in November 1973 and in October 1980. These

increases in the minimum exchange requirement had the desired effect, since they cut the number of visitors to the GDR by one half in some cases.

> [Increasing the minimum daily exchange requirement] ... has made trips to the GDR so expensive that many families can hardly afford to go. ...the number of visitors to the GDR dropped sharply when the minimum daily exchange requirement was increased. The visits across the border by West Berliners on the basis of the visiting arrangements under the Quadripartite Agreement declined by around 50 per cent after the exchange requirement increase of October 1980.[26]...

Nor were the East German citizens themselves exempt from Honecker's Abgrenzung policy. Shortly before the signing of the Basic Treaty in late 1972, a large number of GDR citizens were instructed not to receive any more Western visitors and to break off all postal and telephone contacts maintained with the same up until then:

> Officially this ban on contacts with people in the West was announced for "persons with access to sensitive information." In practice, however, it applied to all employees of the government and administrative apparatus, the People's Army as well as all paramilitary units, party officials, socialist industry officials, state trade officials as well as their families. This ban on personal contacts with Westerners was so strict that persons serving in the army were not allowed to attend family gatherings if any of the family members present were from West Germany.
>
> Thus the GDR's most loyal adherents were excluded from the "improved contacts" codified in the agreements. ...Honecker remarked in this context: "In view of the large numbers of encounters between people of contradictory political beliefs and lifestyles, an extremely high degree of class vigilance and activity are the order of the day."[27]

It would not be exaggerated to suggest here that such measures resembled those taken by any police state.

In a speech held in Gera in October 1980 Honecker demanded, among other things, that Bonn recognize GDR nationality and that the permanent

missions of the two German states be upgraded to embassies. The inability of the government of the Federal Republic to give in to such demands--for the aforementioned constitutional reasons--has only been matched by East Berlin's determination to achieve these goals. As recently as September 1987, during Honecker's visit to Bonn, the East German leader reiterated his demand for full diplomatic recognition on the part of West Germany.[28] Bonn cannot grant such a request, of course, since it does not view the GDR as being a foreign country but rather a separate state. This also means that the permanent missions will remain just that.

Bonn's refusal to grant full diplomatic recognition to the GDR has also been matched by Honecker's refusal to even talk about reuniting Germany. The East German leader started out his visit to the Federal Republic by ruling out such a possibility.[29] Aside from the greater legitimacy Honecker may win for his regime in the West (and at home) as a result of the intra-German summit, the benefits will prove to be mainly of a pragmatic nature. In addition to the technical and scientific agreements signed between the two states, the summit serves to highlight the fact that two states of opposing political and social orders are able to reach agreement on both practical and vital issues.

The most vital issue common to both German states is obviously that of maintaining peace. Honecker's call upon Chancellor Kohl in 1983 for "a coalition of reason" of all Germans wanting to help prevent a nuclear holocaust is a case in point. Despite both domestic and inter-

national pressures against such a coalition, it has survived until today.[30] This strongly illustrates how ideological barriers can be overcome when common interests are at stake.

However, one must remember that the GDR for now remains firmly entrenched within the Soviet sphere of influence; the Wall still stands on its western frontier and the shoot-to-kill orders are still followed by East German border sentries. Honecker's remark during his visit to Wiebelskirchen (West Germany) on September 10th that the German-German border could possibly be "upgraded" to that between Poland and the GDR is hardly a formula for reunification. Visas and routine border checks would continue to be the order of the day. Such practices are typical of those used at border crossings between different countries; they would therefore only continue to highlight the division of Germany.

Unfortunately, one can only speculate as to the view of the East German people regarding reunification. The SED regime is obviously loathe to publicize any enthusiasm on the part of its voters for reuniting with the Federal Republic. Even experts in the field remain predictably vague on this question. Witness the response of Dr. Gerald Livingston, Director of German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, when asked, "Who really wants the two Germanies closer together?" In addition to saying that the Federal Republic wanted reunification, Dr. Livingston claimed: "There probably is considerable sentiment for some sort ... of reunification on the part of the East German population."[31]

Perhaps it would be useful to study the number of emigration applications and political prisoners in order to gain some insight with

regard to this question. Although East German officials proudly predict that only 0.03 per cent of GDR citizens permitted to visit the West this year will fail to return,[32] the SED regime nevertheless continues to penalize those who legally (and illegally) seek a permanent way out:

> East German jails hold 4,000 political prisoners,[33] most of them caught trying to escape to the West. For those who try to move to the West legally, the penalties are more subtle. Only three years ago those who applied to emigrate would be hounded by the security police and lose their jobs and their right to higher education for their children. Now--with a reported 500,000 applications outstanding--the authorities have left the candidates for emigration in their jobs while punishing them in lesser ways, such as denying them subsidized holidays or tearing up their orders for cars or better housing.

On the basis of only the 500,000 applicants quoted above, this represents three per cent of the population of the GDR. Although this figure may at first seem relatively small and insignificant, it acquires importance when one realizes that it is only a very conservative estimate of the number of East Germans wanting to trade in communism for capitalism. One can only guess at the number of GDR citizens who desire the same but fear the consequences imposed upon them by the state. In any case, there is a strong ring of truth to Dr. Livingston's assertion above. The fact that Bonn bought 1,600 East German prisoners last year at a cost of several tens of millions of D-Marks,[35] when combined with the (officially denied) allegation that the number of East Germans allowed to emigrate is directly tied to payments made by West Germany,[36] shows at the very least that the number of GDR citizens dissatisfied with their regime and its system is higher than East Berlin cares to admit.

Western analysts estimate that if the barrier between the two German states were removed tomorrow, about one-fifth of the GDR's citizens would move to the West.[37] Although such a figure means that only a minority of the East German population would forsake the GDR and its "socialist achievements," it nevertheless is most significant when one considers the reunification question. One can safely conclude, for example, that at least twenty per cent of the GDR's population would favour a reunited Germany according to the present Western political and economic model. It follows that a reunited Germany based on the concept of non-alignment or neutrality would receive the endorsement of considerably more of the East German population--perhaps even the majority. For the time being, however, such a suggestion remains speculation...and highly unlikely, given Honecker's strong stand against reunification.

b.) Legalities: Intra-German Treaties and the Constitutions of the two German States

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl once declared that the Federal Government's policy on Germany remains determined by, among other things, the Basic Law for the FRG, the Letters on German Unity and the Joint Resolution of the German Bundestag adopted on May 17, 1972, the Basic Treaty with the GDR and the judgments handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1973 and July 1975. As Kohl put it:

> These documents unequivocally reaffirm the German legal positions, our adherence to the peace treaty reservation, and our willingness to seek accommodation and understanding with our Eastern neighbours.[38]

It has already been established that the German reunification question remains open today primarily because of the mandate of the Basic Law of 1949 of the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve German unity in freedom. This mandate has never been abandoned by the government of West Germany, despite the unpopularity that such a policy holds in the rest of Europe.

It is interesting to note that the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic was never intended to be anything more than a provisional constitution, just as the division of Germany has never been recognized by Bonn as being permanent in nature.

> The Basic Law ... of the Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949 "to give a new order to political life for a transitional period." Since then [almost four] decades have passed. The provisional constitution has become permanent for the foreseeable future and has proved a viable foundation for a stable democratic system of society.[39]

Such a view should not be surprising when one considers that the German Reich has not ceased to exist according to prevailing legal opinion in the West. Although two German states were created on the territory of the German Reich following the removal of the latter's organizational structures, the German Reich continues to exist as a legal entity--such was the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on July 31, 1973.[40]

The signing of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (hereafter referred to as the "Basic Treaty") on December 21, 1972 was a legal landmark in intra-German relations. The treaty was based on the principle that neither of the two states may represent the other in in-

ternational affairs or act on its behalf. It also laid the foundation for further agreements and treaties between the two states, thereby promoting a new period of German-German relations based on peaceful coexistence. Both sides agreed to find a solution to questions of a humanitarian nature, as well as those that were based on pragmatism. Issues which promised not to be resolved in the near future--the national question, for example--were expressly ommitted from the treaty. Furthermore, existing international treaties and agreements were not affected by the Basic Treaty, particularly the responsibilities of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole and for Berlin.[41]

Article 9 of the Basic Treaty was not only a reiteration of Bonn's and East Berlin's submission to the supremacy of the Four Powers' position vis-à-vis Germany, more importantly, it was also a reaffirmation of the FRG's and the GDR's respective ties to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, among others:

> The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are agreed that the present Treaty does not affect the bilateral and multilateral international treaties and agreements previously concluded by them or concerning them.[42]

Nor was Bonn's decision to have regulated contacts with East Germany an abdication of its constitutional mandate of German reunification. In a "Letter from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the German Democratic Republic on German Unity" dated December 21, 1972 and submitted to SED official Michael Kohl on the same day, the West German government repeated its long-term political goal:

> ... the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honour to state that this Treaty does not conflict with the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination.[43]

Bonn recognized the existence of two independent states belonging to different political and social systems, yet it continued to speak of one nation, whose division was reluctantly accepted--at least for the foreseeable future. In a memorandum regarding the Basic Treaty sent to the Bundesrat by the government of the FRG on December 21, 1972, the latter declared: "The Treaty does not resolve the German question but rather keeps it open. It regulates relations between the two States in the sense of a modus vivendi."[44] The memorandum continued:

> --The Treaty and the related documents keep the road to the reunification of Germany open and avoid that the two States in Germany become foreign countries to each other....
> --The Treaty and the related documents are, moreover, the prerequisite and basis for an improvement of contacts between the people in the two States and thus make it possible to preserve and deepen their sense of belonging to one nation.[45]

There were, to be sure, strong objections to the Basic Treaty within the Federal Republic, particularly on the part of the CDU/CSU parties, the Bavarian affiliate being especially virulent in its attack on the Treaty. The CDU/CSU opposition charged that the Basic Treaty held too many concessions to the GDR on the part of the Federal Republic. They claimed that the FRG was veering dangerously toward "socio-political neutralism."[46] The fears of the opposition were fed by the FRG's qualified recognition of the GDR after so many years of refusing to grant the same. Here it must be noted, however, that the Hallstein Doctrine was ended, for all practical purposes, with the

coming into power of the Grand Coalition... the Basic Treaty was merely the legal realization of this fact. In any case, the GDR came short of receiving full diplomatic recognition on the part of the Federal Republic--"permanent missions," rather than embassies, were established in the two states' respective centres of government, for example.

In response to the charges laid by the CDU/CSU opposition, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1973 that such charges were unfounded and that the Basic Treaty concluded in December 1972 was compatible with the Basic Law. It was a landmark decision in that it affirmed the constitutional validity of the aforesaid treaty. The Court also ruled that, although two German states had been created on the territory of the German Reich, they were not, as already mentioned, foreign countries for one another. One could not equate the intra-German border with that between two foreign states. The Court ruled that one single German nationality continued to exist; in other words, East Germans and West Germans are not foreign nationals for one another.[47]

The question of the German eastern territories was the subject at issue two years later. A number of Germans complained to the Federal Constitutional Court in 1975 that the rights regarding their property in the eastern territories had been infringed upon as a result of the treaties the Federal Republic concluded with the USSR and Poland. These complaints were rejected by the Court on the following grounds:

> ... The territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, as well as the other Reich territories within the borders of 1937, were not annexed by the victorious powers at the end of the war.

> ... The Soviet-Polish Treaty of August 6, 1945, which [illegible] Soviet-Polish border in Eastern Prussia, expressly [illegible] Article 3 the peace settlement reservation, making reference to the Potsdam Conference... . The three Western powers have not agreed to a final assignment of the German eastern territories to the Soviet Union and Poland. (Italics added.)
> ... With regard to the overall responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole, under the legal interpretation of the Federal Republic of Germany, decisions on the territorial status of Germany that would have anticipated a peace treaty could not have been made without Four-Power approval.[48]

The Federal Court's reference to the territories of the Reich "within the borders of 1937" is an interesting point, as Article 116 of the Basic Law bases its assumptions on "the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December, 1937."[49] Such statements have brought about charges of "revanchism" on the part of the SED regime. Bonn feels that such charges are unwarranted, however, because the territories acquired after 1937 under the National Socialist regime are not considered part of the German Reich. Furthermore:

> The "national and state unity" of Germany spoken of in the preamble to the Basic Law does not mention any specific territory, the unity of which is to be guaranteed. In other words, the Basic Law by no means imposes the constitutional obligation of restoring German unity within the borders of 1937. Quite different borders are also conceivable, indeed even probable, if a peace treaty should ever come about.[50]

Bonn has also made it clear that the "legal annexation" spoken of occasionally in the GDR does not exist. The "purview of the Basic Law" refers only to the territory of the Federal Republic. Germans residing in the GDR are not affected by the laws of the FRG. Bonn also recognizes the necessity of taking into account the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union, given the present territorial realities.

The Joint Resolution of the German Bundestag adopted on May 17, 1972 and referred to by Chancellor Kohl above emphasized the principles underlying the West German government's policy on Germany, as well as its Ostpolitik:

> Ziele sind die Friedenssicherung, die Erhaltung der Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, der Gewaltverzicht und die Herstellung eines Modus vivendi mit den östlichen Nachbarn. Der Moskauer Vertrag mit der UdSSR und der Warschauer Vertrag mit Polen bedeuten keine Vorwegnahme einer friedensvertraglichen Regelung und schaffen keine Rechtsgrundlage für die heute bestehenden Grenzen. Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung wird durch die Verträge ebenso nicht berührt wie die Rechte und Verantwortlichkeiten der Vier Mächte für Deutschland als Ganzes und für Berlin. Ein Gebiets- oder Grenzänderungsanspruch ist mit der Forderung nach Verwirklichung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts nicht verbunden.
>
> Weiter enthält der Text der Entschließung ein Bekenntnis zum Atlantischen Bündnis und zur Politik der europäischen Einigung. Die Bindungen zwischen Berlin (West) und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sollen gemäß dem Viermächte-Abkommen und den deutschen Zusatzvereinbarungen aufrechterhalten und fortentwickelt werden. Das Verhältnis zur DDR soll im Sinn der Entspannung und der guten Nachbarschaft normalisiert werden, insbesondere auch im Hinblick auf die Menschen in beiden Teilen Deutschlands.[51]

Indeed, as the last point above makes clear, the new emphasis was on human rights and respect for the same in both of the German states. With the understanding that political reunification was a long-term goal at the very least, Bonn set out to ease the burden resulting from the division of Germany at the human level for East and West Germans alike.

It is often overlooked that the German Democratic Republic used to adhere to the idea of a unified Germany at the time when it was founded. The GDR's first constitution, passed in 1949, had many similarities to the Federal Republic's own legislation, as the following author points out:

> ... the 1949 constitution had been written for all of Germany and purposely resembled the Weimar Constitution, on the assumption that the East and West zones eventually would be reunited. In regard to this prospect of reunification, it paralleled also the Basic Law in the Federal Republic ....[52]

The preamble to the GDR's first constitution spoke of the "German people." Article 1 of the 1949 constitution declared that, "Germany is an indivisible democratic republic, it is based on the states (Länder)."

The 1968 constitution reflected the GDR's new position regarding the German question. Article 1 of the 1968 constitution declared, "The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state within the German nation."[53] At the beginning of the 1960s the SED had proclaimed that German reunification was a very long-term possibility, the necessary prerequisite being that the FRG become socialist. East Berlin let it be known that the socialist German state embodied the future of the entire nation.[54]

Largely in response to the Grand Coalition's more offensive policy toward Eastern Europe, and Germany in particular, the SED veered away from its all-German position. In early 1967, as was already mentioned, a law was passed in the GDR terminating a single German citizenship and proclaiming a GDR citizenship. The demand for reunification suddenly was dropped and the GDR started to view the Federal Republic of Germany as a foreign country. Evolution of the GDR's two-nations theory, which began in the early 1960s, culminated with the 1974 constitutional reform.

The preamble to the 1974 constitution, for example, speaks of the "working class" and the "people of the German Democratic Republic"

(whereas the 1968 version had spoken of the "entire German nation"). Article 1 of the 1974 constitution declares that, "The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of workers and farmers."[55] The SED regime's attempts to propound its two-nations theory took on holier-than-thou overtones with the portrayal of the advanced (East German) socialist nation versus the backward (West German) capitalist nation and eventually more than a few citizens of the GDR were beginning to doubt if they were still German nationals. The following passage explains:

> According to SED party theoreticians there were not only two states and two peoples in Germany, there were also two nations, i.e. a "socialist nation" in the GDR as a result of "progressive social development," and a "capitalist nation" which, to their way of thinking, was still historically retarded. This theory and the constitutional reform of 1974 made many GDR citizens ask if they were still Germans. The reaction to this was that a subtle distinction was drawn in the GDR that had not been there before, i.e. the distinction between the concept "nation" (socialist) and "nationality" (still "German").[56]

The signing of the Basic Treaty between the two German states in 1972 represented a significant gain for the German Democratic Republic. Based on the principle that neither of the two states may represent the other in international affairs or act on its behalf, it was the official end of the Hallstein Doctrine and the beginning of international recognition for the GDR as an independent state. Such diplomatic recognition enabled the GDR to join the United Nations in 1973 and take part in such multinational forums as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

According to the official East German view, the Basic Treaty, together with further treaties and agreements concluded between the two states:

> ... amounted to a recognition of the realities which had come about as a result of the Second World War and post-war development in Europe, particularly the inviolability of the new borders, including the borders of the GDR.[57]

The SED Central Committee members dismissed the notion of a still open "German question." Not only were there two sovereign German states but, according to the SED view, there were also two nations. (See Hermann Axen's quote above, p. 208.)

Inasmuch as the primary goal of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe since the end of World War II has been to gain recognition of the status quo, the GDR has been more or less successful, with the exception of the Federal Republic. Honecker's inability to achieve full diplomatic recognition from Bonn in order to gain uncontested legitimacy for his regime amounts to a hollow victory for the GDR leader. Bonn's refusal to abandon the goal of reunification, as well as its refusal to recognize GDR nationality, have proven to be the Achilles heel in the SED policy on the German question. As long as "GDR nationals" are aware that Bonn sees them as being fellow German nationals, there will always be a political alternative available for them.

c.) Intra-German Trade

It has already been mentioned (in the previous chapter) that the Federal Republic of Germany is the second most important trading partner of the German Democratic Republic--and definitely the most important Western trading partner. Trade with West Germany occupies between 8 and 10 per cent of the GDR's volume of external trade.[58] Intra-German trade comprises only about 2 per cent of the FRG's foreign trade volume,[59] however, making it much more important, in economic and political terms, for the GDR than for the Federal Republic.

The East German regime is loath to admit the special nature of intra-German trade, preferring to lump it under the "foreign trade with capitalist industrial countries" category. East Berlin's deliberate attempts to downplay the importance of its trade with the other German state result in government reports containing such general statements as the following: "The GDR's most important trading partners in the capitalist world include France, Austria, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Great Britain."[60] Perhaps it would have been more precise to have added to the above, "... but not necessarily in that order."

Bonn, on the other hand, views trade between the two German states as being neither internal nor external, "... since the Federal Republic recognizes the GDR as a sovereign but not foreign state."[61] The existence of many peculiarities in intra-German trade illustrates the special nature of the latter. For example, there are no official exchange rates between the currencies of the two German states. Accounts

are settled through central banks in units of account which correspond to the West German Deutsche Mark. In other words, East Germany does not have to use convertible currency, should it find itself short of hard currency.

Furthermore, under a system called "The Swing," the GDR is granted interest-free loans. No other state can claim this, of course. East Germany makes virtually full use of this interest-free credit line, which is currently running at about 500 million units of account.[62] If this figure is combined with the credit granted by West German suppliers, then the GDR is about DM 4.4 billion in debt, as far as intra-German trade is concerned.[63] Insiders predict that this trend will continue for the foreseeable future, i.e., East Germany will fall further into debt.

Another key element regarding intra-German trade is the absence of tariffs and adjustment levies to even out price differences. The fact that both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formally regard intra-German trade as "internal German trade" means that the GDR has a back door entry into the EEC--the only East bloc state that can claim this. One source argues that the provision in the Treaty of Rome regarding intra-German trade is proof of a "European approach," wherein the FRG's EEC partners also share responsibility for the situation in Germany. With regard to the former:

> ... the protocol on intra-German trade which is annexed to the Treaty of Rome "considering the conditions at present existing by

> reason of the division of Germany" notes that "trade between the German territories subject to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and the German territories in which the Basic Law does not apply is a part of German internal trade.[64]

Whether or not one adopts Windelen's European approach, there can be no denying the special nature of intra-German trade. In what amounts to a clear advantage for East Germany, for example, the value-added tax (VAT) applied to deliveries to that state are generally about six per cent--lower than the VAT applied within West Germany, usually 14 per cent.[65] Furthermore, purchases from East Germany are also favoured due to a prior-tax deduction of eleven per cent which can be used. This amounts to a refund on East German goods for purchasers in the FRG. All of the above means that there is a lot of incentive for mutual transactions between the two states. Proof of the success of Bonn's economic policy vis-à-vis East Germany lies in the phenomenal growth of intra-German trade since the early 1950s:

> Between 1951 and 1982 the value of the purchases of the Federal Republic from the GDR rose from some 120 million to 6,700 million units of account, the value of deliveries to the GDR from 150 million to 6,400 million units of account.[66]

More recently, the total trade turnover for the two German states reached a high point in 1985, when a total of 15,536.8 million units of account was reached.[67] Total intra-German trade turnover dropped to 14,284.9 million units of account in 1986; that is, by eight per cent.[68] However, statistics can, in this case, be deceiving, as one source points out: "... the causes were economic: the sharp drop in oil prices, lower profits from chemicals and metals. In fact, <u>in volume terms, more goods were actually traded</u>." (Italics added.)[69]

Despite the fact that intra-German trade represents only about 2% of the Federal Republic's foreign trade, one must consider additional economic costs and fees that Bonn is willing to pay in order to further its contacts with the GDR. East Germany receives, for example, an annual fee of 525 million marks for the use of the transit corridors under its jurisdiction.[70] The Federal Republic has also proven itself to be more than generous with regard to financial assistance in the form of loans, as the following passage explains:

> Over the last several years East Germany has received five major hard currency loans, at least three of which were directly guaranteed by the West German government. Of the latter, the politically most spectacular was the DM1-billion ($370-million) credit negotiated in June, 1983, by Franz Josef Strauss, the head of West Germany's right-wing Christian Social Union (CSU), long an outspoken critic of Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik and a bête noir of the SED's.[71]

Although much fanfare is being made about the increased number of East Germans under pensionable age being allowed to visit West Germany for "urgent family reasons"--the rate has recently doubled to more than a million per year--, much less is known regarding Bonn's subsidization of the same. The government of the FRG pays out 100 marks per person i.e. for every visiting East German. This represents an increase of more than 300 per cent over recent travel subsidies.[72]

The minimum exchange requirements imposed upon visitors from the Federal Republic and West Berlin in order to gain entry to the GDR represents another important source of revenue for the Honecker regime. To this should be added the huge amount of western products that find their

way into East Germany in the form of gifts from friends and relatives residing in the FRG.

Although it is officially denied because of its controversial nature, it is well known to insiders that the number of East Germans allowed to emigrate is directly tied to payments made by Bonn. West German author Peter Schneider describes in a colourful manner how the Federal Republic pays for East German political prisoners on a yearly basis:

> Chaque année l'Allemagne de l'Ouest achète systématiquement une certaine catégorie de prisonniers est-allemands. Ce commerce dure depuis des années et donne lieu à des séances de négociations dignes de marchands de tapis. Comme à l'Est on a pour principe qu'un homme vaut ce que l'Etat a investi dans son éducation, on réclame 60000 marks pour un ouvrier, 90000 pour un étudiant, et 100000 pour un médecin. L'année dernière, nous avons rapatrié 1600 personnes, au coût de plusieurs dizaines de millions de marks.[73]

Not only does Bonn pay East Berlin for the release of East Germans eager to live in the West--such as the 40,000 or so GDR citizens who left in 1984--, but it also pays the Honecker regime to halt the flow of non-German refugees into the Federal Republic via West Berlin. In what has evolved into a major political issue and, indeed, a refugee crisis, third-world unfortunates desiring a better way of life have been pouring into West Germany at the rate of about 100,000 a year, most of them via Berlin. The refugee crisis and Bonn's inability to take any legislative action to end it, serve to vividly illustrate the vulnerable position the West German government is in with regard to the German question.

> The East Germans, making mischief in the hope of throwing Berlin's special status into question, have taken to promoting the flood of refugees. In West Germany's book, stopping them at the wall would be tantamount to recognizing it as an international frontier, which principle forbids.[74]

The same source claims that Bonn had offered the Honecker regime DM 1.5 billion to stop the refugee flow. The government in Bonn denies such allegations, of course. Still, the FRG government's record regarding its policy on Germany reveals a heavy reliance upon economic means in order to achieve political "gains." Bonn's denials in this matter should therefore not be taken too seriously:

> The closing of the Berlin loophole may now depend on a secret intra-German haggle over cash. "It is a matter of goodwill," noted one West German diplomat, "and as so often in life goodwill has its price."[75]

It should become apparent from the above that the chief beneficiary of intra-German trade in economic terms is the German Democratic Republic. As a result of such trade, East Germany can acquire Western technology, basic materials and production goods at competitive (read: subsidized) prices. East Berlin can also find a close and ready market in the FRG for its many products which would otherwise meet with difficulty in gaining trade outlets.

Although the SED leadership is certainly aware of the importance of its state's trade with the Federal Republic, it has officially denied the existence of any political linkage with the same. At the 1977 Leipzig Fair, for instance, Honecker declared that trade between the two German states should develop independent of the political relationship.[76] The logic behind such a statement is self-evident given the official GDR

view regarding German unity: the Honecker regime wants to reap the economic rewards of intra-German trade and at the same time shut out any unfavourable (read: Western) political and/or social influence.

If the truism that economic prosperity leads to political stability is applied to the GDR, then the SED regime should not be too worried about the political and social consequences of its trade with West Germany. The GDR has the highest standard of living in the Soviet bloc and ranks among the top ten industrial countries of the world. Despite the fact that the West German standard of living is substantially higher than that of East Germany, the GDR is still the envy of its Comecon neighbours.[77]

It is perhaps ironic that Bonn is helping the Honecker regime to remain in power through its subsidization of the GDR economy. However, the Federal Republic: "... promotes intra-German trade above all for political reasons ... the trade serves as a link between the two German states whose existence contributes to lessening political differences."[78]

Despite Honecker's assertions to the contrary, intra-German trade is very politicized because the issues involved are of primary importance for the Federal Republic and the chances of successful leverage are high. Since the signing of the Basic Treaty, Bonn has had more influence upon developments in East Berlin than it had previously, due to the absence of any formal political ties between the two German states:

> Now that there were bilateral relations, and in view of the GDR's signature on the Helsinki Final Act, intra-German political and economic interactions greatly increased, and the possibility of influencing developments in the GDR meant that East Berlin became

> increasingly important for Bonn.... Although the trade was profitable for Bonn, the FRG's main goal in intra-German trade, which gave the GDR an especially privileged position, was to use economic incentives to secure greater political flexibility on humanitarian issues in the GDR. For instance, 8 million West Germans and West Berliners per year were visiting the GDR in the late 1970s.[79]

Indeed, West German chancellor Schmidt was quick to realize how economic concessions on the part of Bonn could be linked with political concessions on the part of East Berlin. He stated on December 16, 1976 that, "Travel alone between the two German States does more for people than any amount of heated rhetoric."[80] Here, the fundamental question must be asked: has true progress been made on the German question as a result of Bonn's economic policy toward East Germany? An extremist would argue in the negative to this question, as the Wall still stands and Germans are still politically divided, as they have been since 1949. The reunification of Germany is commonly thought to be possible, if at all, only in the far future.

On the other hand, if one remembers the SPD policy Wandel durch Annäherung ("change through rapprochement") first enunciated by Egon Bahr in 1963, one can see that since that time "... there has definitely been Annäherung, but the Wandel has been more in domestic East German politics--in particular, the greater readiness to permit family contacts between the two Germanies...."[81] Indeed, the steady growth of intra-German trade has been matched by increased contacts between the two states, both personal and commercial. For example, the number of telephone calls from the Federal Republic and West Berlin to

the GDR and East Berlin has increased from 0.7 million in 1970 to 23.3 million in 1983.[82] Last year the Honecker regime allowed one million East Germans to visit the West[83]--an unprecedented example of the GDR leadership's newfound self-confidence and goodwill toward the FRG. Honecker's visit last year to the FRG represents yet another historical breakthrough in intra-German relations.

While it would be incorrect to attribute all of these developments to intra-German trade alone, one cannot discount the importance of the same and the effect that it has had upon intra-German relations. The increased contacts that have come about as a result of the Bonn government's focusing upon improved trade, freedom of movement and cultural links have been based on pragmatism and realism. Such efforts have indeed made the Wall "more porous" and have therefore been largely successful.

d.) Domestic Political Parties, the Peace Movement and the Church

Political Parties in the FRG

Of the five major political parties represented in the West German Bundestag--the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens--it is only the Greens which have a decidedly different approach to the German question. For the most part, the other four parties have adopted the same policy regarding the national question: the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom remains the

supreme objective--but not at the cost of abandoning (West) Germany's integration in the West. The concept of a neutral Germany is flatly rejected and all four of the aforementioned parties view West Germany's continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community as being necessary in order to safeguard the security and Western democratic values of the Federal Republic.

Concomitant with the reunification of Germany is the concept of European unity. The European Community represents the ideal prototype for all European nations (read Eastern Europe). The goal of European Union is held to be synonymous with a policy for peace. Witness the CDU/CSU's stand regarding Western and European policy:

> The CDU/CSU consider it a historical task to intensify the efforts to achieve European union. The European Community is a model for lasting peace in Europe based on freedom. It remains our aim to develop the Community into a political union. European co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy should be stepped up, the powers of the European Parliament extended, and the internal European market completed by 1992. Within the Alliance it is essential to strengthen the European pillar so that Europe will be on a more equal footing with the United States and the partnership between Europeans and Americans within the Alliance enhanced.
>
> It remains our basic aim to end the division of Europe and to create a united Europe of free people. Freedom and democracy are the essential basis for European union. We need a Europe of citizens, not of bureaucrats, a Europe without frontiers and barriers.[84]

The year 1983 witnessed two important developments in West German politics: in July, Bavarian Minister-President Strauss, an ardent anti-communist, visited East Germany and negotiated a one billion DM loan for the Honecker regime; 1983 was also the year in which the Greens cleared "the 5 per cent hurdle" and entered the Bundestag for the first

time. If the former event showed that there was a move toward homogeneity on the part of the CDU/CSU vis-à-vis its traditional opposition party, the SPD, given the fact that the "floor" of inner-German contacts maintained under Brandt and Schmidt would not be removed by Kohl (and Strauss), then the Greens' election to the Bundestag represented a definite move away from centrist politics, due namely to the latter's stand on NATO.

In view of the other four parties' commitment to the Western Alliance and the traditional support of the same on the part of the West German populace, the recent advances and rising popularity of the Greens can be seen as being somewhat of a revolutionary development in FRG politics.[85] The Greens' endorsement of unilateral disarmament and the Federal Republic's withdrawal from NATO is radical, to say the least:

> If this produces a crisis within NATO with the prospect of the Federal Republic's withdrawal, so much the better. The Federal Republic must pull out of NATO because it is incompatible with the maintenance of peace. The weakening, disintegration and ultimate abolition of this alliance is essential for peace. NATO is not reformable.[86]

If it is of any consolation to those in the West, NATO is not the only alliance which the Greens want to disband--the Warsaw Pact should also be done away with in order to achieve "a Europe of non-alignment." Also rejected by the Greens are the "authoritarian methods" of the governments in Eastern Europe.[87] With specific reference to West Berlin, the Greens advocate, among other things, recognition of the same as the 11th federal state of the Federal Republic "... on condition that the GDR is recognized as a State on a par with the Federal Republic"[88]

(italics added), as well as it becoming an international city. The Greens' advocation of recognition of the GDR represents a radical departure from Bonn's traditional policy on Germany and runs counter to the constitutional mandate as defined in the preamble. Not only does the Greens' policy toward the GDR clash directly with the long-held (CDU/CSU) view that there is only one German nationality, but it represents the virtual defeat of German reunification--and self-initiated, at that. One needs only to read the Greens' statement regarding its policy for Germany to realize this:

> We allow for the existence of two German states by recognizing the GDR on the one hand and by the "self-recognition" of the Federal Republic on the other. "Self-recognition" of the Federal Republic implies abandoning the self-deception of a common German identity and pursuing the formation of an independent democratic identity. International recognition of the GDR implies that the Federal Republic should unequivocally abandon all territorial claims and the argument that it alone is entitled to represent Germany.[89]

Although there are other parties in the West German political arena, their influence is minimal--at the 1983 Bundestag election, for example, 99.6% of valid votes went to CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Greens, the remaining 0.4% to others, for the most part left- or right-wing extremist groups. Such groups include the National Democratic Party (NPD) on the extreme right and the German Communist Party (DKP) on the left. Their present inability to achieve much political influence due to their lack of popularity with the West German electorate relegates them to a position outside the mainstream politics in that state.[90]

It must be noted, however, how certain political groups can have some influence on the major political parties and, indeed, the climate

of East-West relations. The most striking example of recent years was the rift caused by Chancellor Kohl's attendance at the Silesian expatriate rally in Hannover in early 1985. Considered to be a radical group not only by Poland and the GDR, but also by much of the FRG's electorate, due to their claims on former German territory that is now part of Poland, Kohl's presence at the rally prompted doubts to be voiced about his commitment to continued observance of the Eastern and Basic Treaties. Although such actions on the part of the West German chancellor are potentially explosive with regard to East-West relations, it must be equally noted that the CDU party refused to name the arch-conservative Herbert Hupka, chairman of the Silesian branch of the Society of Expellees, as a candidate for Bundestag re-election. The CDU's support for such groups as the Silesian expellees thus does not extend to actual policy.

Political Parties in the GDR

Political power in the GDR is held by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which dominates the National Front of the German Democratic Republic. The latter includes four minor parties: the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany (DBD), the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LPDP), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) and four mass organizations: the Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD), the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions (FDGB), and the German League of Culture (KB).

The Socialist Unity Party itself came about as the result of a forced merger between the Socialist party and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in April 1946, once the KPD had come to regard the Socialist party as a serious competitor.[91] The last relatively free elections were held in East Germany in the fall of 1946, when there still existed a choice of candidates for the voters. Thereafter national elections have offered only a single list on the ballot--the so-called "unity list" (Einheitsliste) and the voter has had no alternative but to approve it. Given the fact that such "unity lists" are packed with communists, this had meant that free elections have been ruled out, which does little to give the SED regime an air of legitimacy. Indeed, that the GDR calls itself a "parliamentary democracy," has been rebuked by those in the West who refer to it as a sham. Some critics have been particularly harsh in their criticism of the SED's stranglehold over the East German political process: "... the communist SED dominated from the outset all political activity and its leading organ, the Politbureau, to all intents and purposes exercised dictatorship."[92]

To illustrate the control that the SED has over the above-mentioned organizations and parties, one need only look at the Free German Youth (FDJ) organization. Affiliated with its Soviet counterpart, the Komsomol, and with other bloc youth organizations, it has 2.3 million members ranging in age from 14 to 25, several of whom also belong to the SED. That the directorates of both organizations interlock is vividly illustrated by the fact that the former FDJ secretary, Egon

Krenz, was a candidate member of the Politburo of the SED.[93] Marxist-Leninist indoctrination plays a large role in the FDJ organization (as it does in the Pioneer Corps for younger children). Not only are the virtues of the communist system extolled in the FDJ, but so too is the Feindbild theory ("image of the enemy") propagated in the socialist classrooms--an integral part of the educational system in the GDR. It is interesting to note that the Feindbild of the GDR is directed in particular at West Germany, especially at the hostile forces which threaten to subvert and assault East German socialism. Such arguments help justify the existence of the Wall.

It is not difficult to see how the ideological educational forces within such SED-dominated organizations as the FDJ work against the prospects for German reunification. Perhaps the biggest hope for the dismantlement of such indoctrination lies in the increased German-German contacts that have resulted since the conclusion of the Basic Treaty: "The credibility of the 'Feindbild' is ... regularly subverted for many East Germans by their contacts with friends and relatives from the West."[94]

Given the SED regime's opposition to German reunification, due to the fact that the latter would almost certainly mean the collapse of communism, given the strong anti-communist feelings on the part of the great majority of the West German electorate, and shown by the 5 million dollars paid by the East Germans every year in order to keep the 857 mile-long inter-German border impenetrable, one is left to conclude that the prospects for German unity look particularly dim at the offi-

cial political level. Those who have dared to criticize the SED regime in the past have done so at great personal and professional cost; for example, professor Robert Havemann was fired from his teaching position in 1966 and ousted from the SED because he advocated "human socialism." Likewise, SED member and economist Rudolf Bahro's book, Die Alternative. Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus [The Alternative. A Criticism of Real Existing Socialism], was published only in the Federal Republic (1977) and was basically a leftist attack against the established, corrupt SED bureaucracy.[95]

Almost immediately following the publication of Bahro's work and his subsequent arrest, one of the most striking episodes of SED opposition took place. In the first two 1978 issues of the West German weekly Der Spiegel, excerpts from the so-called "SED Opposition Manifesto", were published, wherein socialism and reunification were praised and "real socialism," as practiced by the SED regime, was strongly attacked.[96] The manifesto was written by the "Federation of Democratic Communists" (Bund Demokratischer Kommunisten), supposedly a cell of opposition within the SED party. It represented a manifestation of discontent on the part of non-conformist SED communists.

Two elements deserve particular attention in this affair, the first being, of course, the "Democratic Communists'" view of a reunited Germany and, secondly, Bonn's reaction (or lack of the same) to the manifesto. With regard to the former, the authors referred back to Marx's statement in 1848 on Germany, namely that Germany will be one united, indivisible republic.[97] Furthermore, a reunited Germany could

only come about through free elections and the withdrawal of the two German states from their respective military alliances. Precisely stated:

> Dieses Deutschland kann und muß eine Brücke zwischen Ost und West, ein friedensstabilisierender Faktor werden. Die Stichworte dazu lauten Abzug aller fremden Truppen im Gefolge der Entspannung, Austritt aus den Militärpakten, Friedensverträge mit beiden deutschen Staaten, Neutralitätsgarantie durch den Sicherheitsrat der UN, totale Abrüstung und Abführung der ersparten Rüstungskosten an die Vierte Welt, Assoziierung mit der EWG und dem RGW. Zulassung aller BRD- und DDR-Parteien in ganz Deutschland, freie, geheime Wahlen zur Nationalversammlung, zur Ausarbeitung einer Verfassung, stufenweise Rechtsangleichung in allen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen.[98]

With the exception of the SPD fraction leader Herbert Wehner, who had already supported the view that a united workers movement was a necessary prerequisite for German reunification, Bonn chose not to side with the SED opposition, supporting instead Honecker's regime. The government in Bonn preferred to keep the peace with East Berlin rather than risk upsetting the balance between the two German states. It is difficult to explain why the government in the FRG preferred maintaining the status quo, rather than support democratic reforms in the GDR. Perhaps the fact that the opposition called itself "Democratic Communists," rather than "Democratic Capitalists," had something to do with it?... More probable, however, was the interest in pursuing Ostpolitik which may have been damaged if Bonn gave support to dissidents.

The Peace Movement

Although, to be sure, there are some nationalist peace activists in the (West) German peace movement, it would be a mistake to conclude that nationalism is the driving force behind the movement. The growth in popularity of the peace movement in both German states--particularly since the early 1980s--, as well as the recent gains made by the anti-nuclear Greens, are due for the most part to one overriding concern: the fear of nuclear annihilation. (Such a fear, it should be added, transcends national boundaries, as witnessed by the spread of the peace movement throughout Europe and the rest of the world.)

The peace movement is of special significance to the German nation, owing to its unique geopolitical position. Situated in the heart of Europe where the West's forces of destruction face those of the East, Germany represents "ground zero": almost certain eradication of the German nation will occur should nuclear war break out in central Europe. It is the German people themselves who stand the least chance of surviving a war involving nuclear weapons--regardless of their capitalist or communist beliefs. The spectre of such a war became increasingly real with the onset of the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations beginning in late 1979. As a result of this, the "politics of peace" gained great importance in both German states and the policies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact--but particularly NATO-- came increasingly under fire. (One radical solution has been the Greens' advocation of the Federal Republic's withdrawal from NATO and the subsequent neutralization of West Germany.)

Despite the existence of both left-wing (Peter Brandt, Herbert Ammon, Heinrich Albertz, Rudolf Bahro and Erhard Eppler) and right-wing nationalists (Wolfgang Venohr and Helmut Diwald), their influence is limited to the extent that the peace movement is based not upon nationalism, but rather upon anti-nuclear politics. Inevitable attempts on the part of some nationalists to use the peace movement to promote development on the German unification question have had little success, to say the least.[99] Nationalists have been more successful, however, in their manipulation of the feeling of "national victimization" held by many Germans. The following passage explains:

> Nationalists ... are often able to play successfully on the sense of national victimization that pervades the Green and peace movements. Antinuclear activists feel that the dilemmas of the nuclear age are being forced on them by the superpowers. Resentment of the superpowers creates a sort of neutralist, strategic parochialism that very often becomes the foundation of attempts by Germans on both sides of the East-West border to identify with one another as common victims of outside powers. The strategic parochialism of most antinuclear activists, however, is more of a geopolitically defined neutralism than a consciously developed nationalist ideology.[100]

Indeed, between nationalism and neutralism, the latter plays a much bigger role in both the peace movement and the Greens. A national awareness of the dangers of the nuclear arms race and the need to rid Germany--and Europe--of the same simply does not translate into nationalism per se. Nor does the spillover effect, via television, of the West German peace movement into the GDR.[101] What emerges, rather, is the common perception on the part of Germans in both states that they have a joint interest in survival.

Given the fact that the peace movement is anti-status quo, it is not surprising that it is seen as a threat by both German states--and particular care is taken to prevent the West German peace activists from "linking up" with their GDR counterparts. As far as the latter are concerned, it should be noted that reference is made here of the autonomous --as opposed to the "official"--peace activists in East Germany.[102] The so-called "Havemann Initiative," however, proved to be an exception and transcended the intra-German border, and it has since been recognized as being an "All-German Peace Initiative." Robert Havemann was an East German critical Marxist who, despite his sharp attacks on both German states, maintained that the GDR was still the more advanced and "better German state." His peace initiative of 1981 took the form of an open letter to Leonid Brezhnev, wherein he proposed the demilitarization and neutralization of Germany in order to achieve peace in Europe. In addition to the more than two hundred and twenty-seven signatures collected in the GDR, Havemann's letter was signed by over 20,000 West Germans. This all-German peace initiative was condemned both in the West and the East alike, as the following explains:

> Havemann's statement that, after the withdrawal of foreign troops, 'How we Germans will then solve our national question will have to be left to us' can only have compounded the iniquity of his letter's earlier reference to American and Soviet troops as 'occupation forces' as far as the East German Government was concerned.[103]

Sandford claims that it would be erroneous to view the autonomous peace movement in East Germany as being "... irremediably opposed to the State and its policies,"[104] saying that this is not the case, as the ac-

tivists more often than not pay tribute to the achievements and morality of socialism. While it is true that the peace movement in general in the GDR is not "anti-socialist," there is some room for doubt as to its not being "anti-Soviet"--witness the aforementioned "Havemann Initiative" and the "Eppelmann Letter," addressed to Erich Honecker in June 1981 by the East German pastor of the same name, wherein the withdrawal of foreign troops, total disarmament and a nuclear-free zone in central Europe were advocated; as well as the "Berlin Appeal," formulated by both Eppelmann and Havemann in early 1982. The references to the tabooed German Question in the Berlin Appeal led to Eppelmann's arrest. This leads one to conclude that, although the East German autonomous peace movement may not be anti-socialist, it nevertheless is critical of the GDR's present policy of support for the arms build-up in order to "defend the peace." Certain activists decry the hypocrisy inherent in the official GDR claim that it is a "peace state" while the Feindbild theory (see above) is simultaneously propagated in socialist classrooms. In this respect, the peace movement in East Germany is seen as a threat by the SED regime.

The Church

The involvement of the Church in the peace movement in both East and West Germany is viewed as being another potentially destabilizing force to contend with, especially as far as the GDR authorities are concerned. In view of the fact that East Germany is overwhelmingly

Protestant--one estimate gives about 9 million or 53 per cent as being Protestant, and 1.36 million Catholics or 8 per cent[105] --despite its official status as an atheist state, the Protestant Church, especially the Evangelical Church, has been viewed by the SED as a major force to contend with, primarily because of its links with its West German counterpart, but also because of its recent support of the West German peace movement. With regard to the former:

> For many years the Evangelical Church of Germany withstood numerous attempts to end its existence as the one remaining all-German organization and thus bridge between East and West. In 1968, however, announcement was made of the pending amalgamation of the churches in the German Democratic Republic into a newly established "Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR." The break was formalized in September 1969 when the first synod of this federation was held dt Potsdam.[106]

With regard to the East German Church's involvement in the peace movement, it is worth noting that when the East German Protestant Church condemned the NATO double-track decision in 1979, it met with the support of the East Berlin government and there resulted a temporary "... de facto alliance of the East German government and the East and West German peace movements against the NATO accord."[107] Since that time, however, the decision by the Protestant Church in East Germany to support GDR peace activists has been the cause for concern by authorities in East Berlin and the latter fear closer involvement between the Protestant Church and Western peace movement activists. The SED regime seems, however, to be failing in its attempts to control the Protestant Church, as one source explains:

> The East German Church has ... continued to move closer to the positions of Western peace activists on nuclear issues. In an official report released in September 1983, Church leaders stated that "The freeze of nuclear weapons [in both East and West] is a realistic, practical and necessary step which must be taken now," and they referred to the Soviet Union and the United States as being equally responsible for the arms race. This willingness to speak out against the Soviet Union, and by doing so to challenge the East German Communist Party's official line, demonstrates a new boldness which encourages not only peace activists in the West but the West German Protestant Church as well.[108]

Some of the SED regime's worst fears were realized when, in September 1979, on the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, and in direct response to the GDR's introduction of Defence Studies in its schools beginning in the fall of 1978, a joint "Statement on Peace" was made by the churches in both German states. Not only did the two Churches declare their intention to cooperate closely in their programme of "Education for Peace" in order to counter the introduction of Defence Studies, but more importantly, "It was the first time in ten years that the Evangelical Churches in both East and West Germany had issued a common statement."[109]

Although the West German Evangelical Synod comes short of openly condemning the policy of nuclear deterrence (as did the Calvinist wing of the Church, the Reformed Union [Reformierte Bund] in August 1982), claiming that such policies should be left up to the government, there is evidence that the Evangelical Church is moving closer to a nuclear freeze position. In 1983, for example, it demanded an end to the arms race and claimed that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was merely provisional and the use of nuclear weapons to be immoral.[110] Given the fact that the Evangelical Church in West Germany is committed to an

eventual reunification of the Protestant Churches in the two German states, plus the desire of the East German Church to improve its ties with its counterpart in the FRG, it is not altogether unlikely that the West German Evangelical Church will adopt a more negative policy towards NATO's nuclear doctrines--perhaps even going so far as advocating unilateral disarmament. In any case, the more bellicose the policies of the two German states become, and the more East-West tensions increase, the more likely the Churches in both states will adopt similar calls for peace and condemn official state doctrines, particularly those relating to defence. Indeed, the early 1980s period has borne witness to such developments.

e.) German Nationalism and National Identity

A factor that plays a key role in the reunification question is that of German national identity--or the lack thereof. It has been generally accepted that postwar Germany's political life was traumatized by the loss of its national identity. This loss was especially severe, given the fact that it followed a period of extreme nationalism, i.e., the Hitlerian era. Four important aspects of German national identity can be viewed as being destroyed or damaged by the war and its consequences: German territorial nationhood, the German sense of national sovereignty and self-determination, a sense of history and tradition, and the feeling of moral pride and moral legitimacy. Of these four aspects, it is probably the last one which has had the most profound effect upon German nationalism. Much has been said and/or written about

the "war guilt" of the German people and how this has contributed to a loss of pride in being German.[111]

It is ironic to note that pride in being German decreases with age--it is almost as if the younger generations are willingly "paying the price" of atoning for the infamous Nazi past of their elders. In a 1980 West German poll, for example, although 44 per cent of the general population affirmed that they were very proud to be German, only 31 per cent of the under-30-year-olds responded thus, compared to 41 per cent of the 30-to-59 year-olds and 66 per cent of the older people.[112] In other words, those Germans who had actually lived under the Nazi regime far outnumbered their grandchildren--who were born long after the war was over--in national pride by a ratio of more than two to one.

Such a trend seems to bode ill for the prospects of German reunification in the future. So does the fact that, despite reports that the word "fatherland" is being used more frequently as of late,[113] a 1981 poll revealed that 61 per cent of those between 16 and 29 were opposed to the term Vaterland ("fatherland"), as against 39 per cent in the general population.[114] It is interesting to note that those who objected to the term Vaterland had no word to replace it.

Central to German nationalism is the definition of Germany itself. A recent Emnid (West German) poll addressed this question by asking the following: "What is Germany for you--the FRG, the FRG and the GDR or the former German Reich?" The results, given in Table 4, were then compared with those compiled in 1979. Although the majority

TABLE 4

DEFINING "GERMANY"

"WHAT IS GERMANY FOR YOU--THE FRG, THE FRG AND THE GDR OR THE FORMER GERMAN REICH?"

FRG:	1979:	57%
	1987:	57%
FRG and GDR:	1979:	27%
	1987:	32%
Former German Reich:	1979:	11%
	1987:	11%

SOURCE: Der Spiegel, 31 August 1987, p. 21.

of those polled viewed the Federal Republic as being "Germany," it is significant to note a five per cent increase in those who view both the FRG and the German Democratic Republic as comprising Germany. Perhaps this can be attributed to the increased "national awareness" and the quest for a "German identity" that is characteristic of the Deutschlandpolitik of the 1980s.[115]

The experts themselves seem to be divided over what form national identity takes among the German people. Some argue that West Germans are steadily losing their all-German national consciousness and developing a strictly West German one in its place: "A West German sense of identity has come into existence and is likely to increase in the future."[116] Others espouse the view that a common national identity has developed in both East and West Germany since the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 and the period of détente.[117] Not only have Germans in both states been united by their common interest in peace and the avoidance of nuclear war, but a sense of common history and culture has grown among the inhabitants of both the FRG and the GDR.

Indeed, the 1980s witnessed an astonishing turnaround, as far as the East German regime's approach to the German nation is concerned. Whereas in the 1970s the East German Communists went to considerable lengths to persuade their people that a single German nation no longer existed, by the early 1980s the GDR leaders were basing "... their legitimacy on German history, laying claim to that history as a whole, without any limitations regarding historical periods, geography or class."[118] The inevitable all-German overtones of the GDR's search for

historical roots have come about primarily as the result of the regime's failure to gain legitimacy for the East German state on the basis of its socialist nature alone. Events such as the 1983 Luther celebrations held in the GDR reveal that defining the German Democratic Republic as a "socialist state of workers and peasants" (Article 1 of the present [1974] Constitution) at the cost of its links with the past is a politically bankrupt policy. A German national identity based on true historical roots is needed for the GDR--and the Federal Republic too, for that matter. For the moment, however, the GDR is inheriting a rewritten German history, thereby presenting itself as "the embodiment and keeper of all progressive traditions in German history and as the inevitable culmination and highpoint of the German historical process."[119]

This renewed interest in German history and culture has obvious consequences: it should foster more feelings of a shared German past and could eventually lead to an all-German nationalism and a renewed interest in national unification. Such a policy of Kulturnation has therefore been supported by some and condemned by many others. One author claims that the recent rise in national consciousness among West Germans does not represent feelings of all-German nationalism (gesamtdeutsche Gefühle), but rather a heightened social awareness vis-à-vis their East bloc counterparts:

> Most West Germans who want closer relations with East Germany do so out of a desire for closer personal relations with specific East German individuals or families. In this respect, the German question is ... not a national but a social question for the majority of West Germans. Feelings of solidarity with the East Germans, when they exist, are more often than not a function of the sympathy (or guilt) which many West Germans feel for the suffering of the East German people.[120]

Whether the German question is a national or a social question--or both--, the increased intra-German contacts that have occurred between the two German states since the mid-1970s have gone a long way in promoting a common feeling of oneness among FRG and GDR citizens. Dramatic proof of this can be witnessed through the results of a 1981 West German poll examining the perception of East Germany: 70 per cent of the adult respondents did not view the GDR as a foreign country, whereas only 56 percent of those between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one felt the same. However:

> The percentage of young people answering that the DDR was not a foreign country rises dramatically when the respondents have visited East Germany two or more times; the figure for this group is 71 percent. The relative indifference of the young toward the DDR, therefore, can be attributed largely to a lack of personal experience with East Germans. If the ... government's education policies and its Ostpolitik of improving personal relations with the DDR should succeed, young West Germans may have more opportunities in the future of developing a national consciousness.[121]

Given the improbability of achieving German reunification in the political sense in the near future, French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert is nevertheless not alone when he claims to believe in the unity of the German people, but not the state. In a recent Spiegel interview, Jobert cites the common German language, one German culture and a common German history in support of his argument; more specifically, however, he describes how the West Germans reacted to the victory of the East German athletes during the Olympic Games in Munich:

> Wenn die Ostdeutschen gewannen, brach bei den Westdeutschen und sogar bei den Süddeutschen eine ungeheure Begeisterung aus.... Damals habe ich mir gesagt: Es gibt hier vielleicht zwei getrennte deutsche Staaten, ein großes Drama, aber es gibt zunächst nur ein Volk.[122]

Jobert then avoids calling this feeling of unity "nationalism," preferring instead the term "patriotism." Even then, he describes it as being a "natural" patriotism, rather than a "political" patriotism: "Man spricht, man denkt in seinem natürlichen Umkreis, und der ist deutsch, nichts anderes."

Despite West Germany's economic, political and military integration in Western Europe and its alliance with the United States, and despite East Germany's leading role as far as political orthodoxy and fidelity to the Soviet-led communist system are concerned,[123] the fact remains that both German states still possess similar characteristics linked to their national identity. Both German states have the strongest economies in Europe, and this, combined with their infamous past, has resulted in the "ugly German" syndrome, setting the Germans apart from other Europeans. This is particularly true with regard to West Germany in its relationship with the other West European states. One well-known German nationalist maintains that the West Germans only identify themselves as being European when they are dealing with the world outside of Europe; otherwise they feel more German than anything else.[124]

With regard to East Germany, the (same) author cites "national communism" in Eastern Europe and the GDR's strong economy as the most important factors which foster German nationalism in the GDR. In an obvious reference to the tradition of German productivity and expertise, Bender calls it "die Arroganz der alten Industrienationen gegen osteuropäische Zurückgebliebenheit."[125] Perhaps one could add to Bender's

list East German dissatisfaction with the Soviet-imposed economic system. Evidence of the latter is found in the huge number of packets for West German consumer items given to friends and relatives in the Federal Republic. Although the East German economy is the strongest in the Soviet bloc, more than a few GDR citizens must wonder how much stronger it could be, were it not for such things as central planning and domination by the Party. An emulation of the West German economy, with its vast range of consumer products, is the ideal, acting as a magnet on the inhabitants of the GDR.

Given the extremely close ties between the Federal Republic and the United States, as well as the fact that most West Germans consider the U.S.A. to be "Germany's best friend,"[126] much has been said about West Germans identifying with Americans. It would be much closer to the truth, however, if one stated that the close West German-American relationship has a more pragmatic raison d'être: namely, the U.S. guarantee of the Federal Republic's security. To be precise, the "West Germans could not rely on Europe to guarantee West Germany's security. Only close cooperation with the United States could achieve that goal."[127] Although this relationship probably contributed to the inability of West Germany to develop a "European identity," it would be erroneous to assert that it caused West Germans to identify with Americans. What has happened, rather, has been the adoption of and respect for western democratic values on the part of the Federal Republic. As long as the people of West Germany remain convinced of the superiority of the western democratic political system, the possibility

of there developing an all-German nationalism remote, given the political stipulations demanded by the Honecker regime regarding German reunification.

It must also be said, however, that the European option has always held a certain fascination for more than a few (West) Germans. Peter Bender once wrote that the Federal Republic is the only western state that has a national interest in all of Europe.[128] Successful arms negotiations between the Soviets and the Americans, combined with closer military ties between West Germany and France, may go a long way in lessening the Federal Republic's dependency upon the Americans, leaving Bonn to focus more on Europe. This in turn may lead to a rise in German national awareness, as future policies would be more inwardly oriented.

Indeed, some insiders claim that the Germans have already been bitten by the nationalism bug. According to one writer, the "growing trend of Euro-fatigue" has overcome the Germans as well:

> Like most of their neighbours, the Germans have become inward-looking and more nationalistic. Mr. Kohl and his powerful minister of finance, Gerhard Stoltenberg, fully reflect this mood. Despite a torrent of pro-European statements, they rarely wonder how their policies affect the interests of others. Rather, they have stuck to the convenient belief that what is good for Germany will ultimately be good for Europe as a whole.[129]

Likewise, Bavarian premier Franz Josef Strauss urged his constituents to come out of "the shadows of the Third Reich" and be proud to be Germans again during his campaign last winter.[130] Such statements foreshadow the possible coming into being of a Federal Republic with a new German identity: a more self-reliant West Germany with more global political responsibility. It remains to be seen whether such a concept regarding

the German national identity and Germany's role in world politics takes root in the German Democratic Republic.

Conclusion

It is clearly the Federal Republic which is the driving force behind the bid for German reunification and which keeps the question alive on its political agenda--despite accusations on the part of sceptics that the German question is no longer a priority for Bonn. If the latter were true, however, then the West German government would make some radical changes with regard to its policy toward the GDR. For example, it would grant full diplomatic recognition to the same. Bonn could also save a tremendous amount of money by changing its policy on intra-German trade: instead of continuing to subsidize the Honecker regime, it could instead choose to compete directly with the East German socialist economy. Why should, in fact, the Federal Republic lend economic support to a state which teaches its people to mistrust and even hate West Germans through Feindbild indoctrination?

Bonn's policy on Germany since Ostpolitik has been qualified acceptance of the division of the nation combined with a determination to improve the quality of life for Germans on both sides of the Elbe. The increased amount of intra-German contact that has come about in the last two decades bears testimony to the success of such a policy. Such contacts serve to promote the development of an all-German identity, in addition to counteracting such negative influences as the SED's Feindbild propaganda. At the very most Bonn's Deutschlandpolitik will lead toward

German unity; at the very least it will promote peace between the two blocs.

Notes

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1. Federal Republic of Germany, The Parliamentary Council, The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Wiesbaden, 1977), p. 13.

2. U.S., Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, p. 1386.

3. Ibid., p. 1365.

4. Andreas Meyer-Landrut, "Prospects for Allied policy towards the East: the German view," NATO Review 35 (April 1987): 11.

5. Ibid. p. 13.

6. Jonathan Dean, "How to Lose Germany," Foreign Policy, no. 55 (1984), p. 69.

7. Federal Republic of Germany, Relations Between the Two, p. 23.

8. Ibid., p. 15.

9. Ibid., p. 20.

10. Ibid., p. 25.

11. "NATO's Central Front," The Economist, 30 August 1986, suppl., p. 15.

12. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), pp. 60-61.

13. U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 18.

14. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 78.

15. Basic aspects of German reunification, Policy on Germany pursued by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Kohl, quoted in U.S., Congress, The German Question, pp. 18-19.

16. Such efforts have certainly paid off: in 1986 over 2 million people from the GDR visited West Germany. More than 500,000 of them were under pensionable age, compared with only 66,000 in 1985. (Only pensioners can travel whenever they desire.) In 1987 the total should reach 3 million. See "As sparks fly upward," The Economist, 6 June 1987, p. 49.

17. Genscher, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, p. 230.

18. Quoted in Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 36.

19. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

20. "The GDR and the German Nation: Sole Heir of Socialist Sibling?," quoted in U.S., Congress, The German Question, p. 16.

21. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 38.

22. Plock, The Basic Treaty, p. 97.

23. "Hermann Axen: Zwei Staaten--zwei Nationen. Deutsche Frage existiert nicht mehr," quoted in ibid., p. 98.

24. "Hermann Axen zur nationalen Frage," quoted in ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 97.

26. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 59.

27. Ibid., p. 58.

28. "Honecker urges full recognition of E. Germany," The Globe and Mail, 9 September 1987, p. 1.

29. Ibid.

30. Heinz Wetzel, "A historic German visit," Maclean's, 14 September 1987, p. 19.

31. CBC, "The Journal," 8 September 1987.

32. Peter Lewis, "Inside East Germany," Maclean's, 14 September 1987, p. 17.

33. Another source claims that there is only half that number---that is, that there are 2,000 political prisoners being held by East German authorities. See Paul Koring, "Cracks in the wall that divides Germany," The Globe and Mail, 5 September 1987, sec. D, p. 1.

34. Lewis (op. cit.), p. 18.

35. Pierre Turgeon, "Le Berlin schizo de Peter Schneider," L'Actualité, September 1987, p. 151.

36. See Koring (op. cit.), sec.D, p. 8.

37. Lewis (op. cit.), p. 17.

38. U.S., Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1985, p. 1388.

39. Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 92.

40. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 23.

41. Federal Republic of Germany, Gesamtdeutsches Institut, Zahlenspiegel, p. 111.

42. U.S., Senate (op. cit.), p. 1217.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 1221.

45. Ibid., pp. 1223-1224.

46. Plock, The Basic Treaty, p. 67.

47. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 23.

48. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

49. Federal Republic of Germany, The Parliamentary Council (op. cit.), p. 83.

50. Federal Republic of Germany, (op. cit.), p. 26.

51. Federal Republic of Germany, Gesamtdeutsches Institut, Zahlenspiegel, pp. 110-111.

52. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 103.

53. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 36.

54. Ibid., p. 37.

55. Ibid., p. 36.

56. Ibid., p. 39.

57. German Democratic Republic, The German Democratic Republic, p. 55.

58. The latter figure is given in Bulka and Luecking, eds., Facts about Germany, p. 209.

59. Ibid.

60. German Democratic Republic, Report by the Central Statistical Office of the GDR on the fulfillment of the 1985 National Economic Plan (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1986), p. 43.

61. Bulka and Luecking, eds. (op. cit.), p. 209.

62. Joachim Nawrocki, "German-German trade 'is separate from politics,'" The German Tribune, 2 August 1987, p. 6.

63. Ibid.

64. Heinrich Windelen, "European Responsibility for the Policy on Germany," in The Division of Germany and Europe, p. 15.

65. Nawrocki (op. cit.), p. 6.

66. Bulka and Luecking, eds. (op. cit.), p. 209.

67. Federal Republic of Germany, Statistiches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, no. 3 (Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1987), p. 236.

68. Ibid.

69. Nawrocki (op. cit.), p. 6.

70. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 61.

71. Melvin Croan, "The Politics of Division and Détente in East Germany," Current History 84 (November 1985): 388.

72. Koring (op. cit.), sec. D, p. 1.

73. Turgeon (op. cit.), p. 151.

74. "Do they have to go on paying the Pied Piper of East Berlin?," The Economist, 23 August 1986, p. 39.

75. Ibid., p. 40.

76. Plock, The Basic Treaty, p. 109.

77. "East Berlin: Comecon's showcase," Financial Times, 30 March 1987, p. 11.

78. Bulka and Luecking, eds. (op. cit.), p. 210.

79. Stent, Embargo to Ostpolitik, p. 248.

80. U.S., Senate (op. cit.), p. 1304.

81. Stent (op. cit.), p. 248.

82. Federal Republic of Germany (op. cit.), p. 125.

83. Lewis (op. cit.), p. 17.

84. Federal Republic of Germany, Inter Nationes, Procedures, Programmes, Profiles: The Federal Republic of Germany elects the German Bundestag on 25 January 1987 (Bonn, 1986), p. 40.

85. The Greens received 8.3 per cent of the national vote in the 1987 election--a healthy gain from the 5.6 per cent it got back in 1983.

86. Federal Republic of Germany, Inter Nationes (op. cit.), p. 41.

87. Ibid., p. 43.

88. Ibid., p. 51.

89. Ibid., p. 52.

90. It is estimated that only 1 per cent of the FRG's electorate is communist. See Turgeon (op. cit.), p. 151.

91. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 101.

92. Bulka and Luecking, eds. (op. cit.), p. 71.

93. Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 115.

94. John Sandford, The Sword and the Ploughshare: Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany (London: Merlin Press, 1983), p. 36.

95. "Das trifft den Parteiapparat ins Herz," Der Spiegel, 22 August 1977, pp. 30-32; and "Gegen sich selbst und gegen das Volk," ibid., pp. 33-40.

96. "DDR-Widerstand: Sehnsucht nach Demokratie," Der Spiegel, 2 January 1978, pp. 19-24; and "Einheitsfront gegen die Störenfriede," Der Spiegel, 9 January 1978, pp. 17-26.

97. Ibid. ("DDR-Widerstand"), p. 21.

98. Ibid., p. 24.

99. Attempts by the West Berlin nationalist wing of the West German nationalist wing of the West German peace movement to bring the German question into the peace debate during the second Conference

for European Nuclear Disarmament, held in West Berlin on May 15, 1983, met with stiff resistance by their non-German colleagues. See Kim R. Holmes, The West German Peace Movement and the National Question, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press, Inc., 1984), p. 14.

100. Ibid., p. vii.

101. Robert English mentions this phenomenon in his article entitled, "Eastern Europe's Doves," Foreign Policy, no. 56 (1984), p. 45.

102. For the difference between the two, see Sandford (op. cit.), pp. 20-22.

103. Ibid., p. 61.

104. Ibid., p. 79.

105. DDR Handbuch, quoted in Staar, Communist Regimes, p. 119.

106. Ibid. (Staar), p. 120.

107. Holmes (op. cit.), p. 29.

108. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

109. Sandford (op. cit.), p. 41.

110. Holmes (op. cit.), p. 55.

111. Regular polls show that even today the Germans are the least proud within the European Community. In a 1983 poll, for example, Germans were among the least proud of sixteen nations studied. See Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 72.

112. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Who Needs a Flag?: Thoughts on German Attitudes, New & Old," Encounter, January 1983, p. 76.

113. See "As sparks fly upward," The Economist, 6 June 1987, p. 49.

114. Mueller and Risse-Kappen (op. cit.), p. 72.

115. See Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 316-329.

116. Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, p. 45.

117. See, for example, Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question

Transformed," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984-85): 304.

118. Kiep (op. cit.), p. 316.

119. Ronald Asmus, "The GDR and the German Nation: Sole Heir of Socialist Sibling?," International Affairs 60 (Summer 1984): 414.

120. Holmes (op. cit.), p. 26.

121. Ibid.

122. Dieter Wild and Valeska von Roques, "Die Einheit des deutschen Volkes ist ewig," Der Spiegel, 7 September 1987, p. 26.

123. Here, one should consider the August 1984 dispute between Moscow and East Berlin as being the exception rather than the rule with regard to Soviet-East German relations.

124. Peter Bender, "Die Deutschen werden wieder deutscher," Deutschland Archiv: Zeitschrift für Fragen der DDR und der Deutschlandpolitik, no. 5 (1978), p. 449.

125. Ibid., p. 450.

126. A 1981 poll revealed that 48% of the FRG's inhabitants considered the United States to be Germany's best friend, followed by France at 15%. Source: The Germans and Jahrbuch 1983, quoted in Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, p. 97.

127. Ibid. (Schweigler), pp. 36-37.

128. Bender (op. cit.), p. 451.

129. Christoph Bertram, "Should West Germans Really Get More of the Same?," International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1987, p. 6.

130. James M. Markham, "Whither Strauss--Bavaria or Bonn? Premier Campaigns for 'Emergence From Third Reich,'" International Herald Tribune, 15 January 1987, p. 1.

The future is in the laps of the gods. It will probably be decided, once again, by Germany's decisions. And Germany is, as it always was, a mutable, Proteuslike, unpredictable country, particularly dangerous when it is unhappy.

Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (1983)

CHAPTER IV

FUTURE PROSPECTS, OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The reunification of Germany is essentially a German national interest. It should be clear by now that the past and present policies of the other European nation-states have worked against the prospects for German reunification and have instead promoted the continuation of the status quo, i.e., the existence of two separate German states. Generally speaking, a combination of external and internal factors have served to keep the two states apart, whereas primarily internal factors have helped to keep the reunification issue alive. With regard to the former, for example, the opposing ideologies of the two superpowers represent a primary factor in the continued division of Germany--and Europe, for that matter. Given the irreconcilable ideological differences between the West and the East, and given the fact that the Soviets, the Americans, the British and the French have the final word regarding the issue of German reunification, it becomes difficult at the best of times to imagine an end of the division of Germany. Realistically speaking, why indeed should the Soviets or the Americans promote German unity, since it is not in their own national interest? One does not have to repeat the inevitable resistance of the various allies of both the superpowers to the very concept of a strong united Germany ... old war wounds heal slowly, as the Austrians are beginning to realize

due to the recent allegations directed against President Kurt Waldheim regarding his participation in Nazi atrocities.

As already stated, the membership of both German states in opposing military alliances and separate economic systems has played a very important role in keeping the FRG and the GDR divided. Each state's strategic and economic importance vis-à-vis its respective bloc has translated into their indispensability within the same. Perhaps a glimmer of hope can be found in the fact that intra-German trade has grown just as the integration of the Soviet and East German economies has; whether the effects of intra-German trade will offset GDR-Soviet trade orientation remains to be seen, however. With regard to the military alliances, despite the present disarmament talks taking place between the superpowers, the overwhelming majority of West Germans support the Federal Republic's continued membership in NATO--just as the presence of twenty Soviet divisions on East German soil helps ensure GDR allegiance to the Warsaw Pact.

East Berlin's abandonment of its goal of German reunification in 1955 represented yet another factor that served to keep the two states apart. The burden was put on the statesmen in Bonn to keep the reunification issue alive. Given Honecker's recent remarks regarding German reunification, SED intransigence is but one more serious obstacle to overcome, should any progress be made on this issue. Furthermore, SED hate propaganda, such as its Feindbild theory, is hardly conducive to German unity.

In more concrete terms, physical barriers, such as the Wall, serve to keep the two German states apart. The Schießbefehl ("shoot-to-kill order") is, unfortunately, still adhered to by the East German border guards--a strong deterrent against visits to West Germany and/or West Berlin that have not been sanctioned by the GDR. Perhaps it would be more accurate, however, to view such physical barriers as being symptoms rather than causal factors, i.e., the Wall exists as a result of opposing political, ideological, social and economic systems already established.

As was mentioned above, primarily internal (domestic) factors have helped keep the reunification issue alive. At the official level, Bonn continues to promote the development of intra-German relations and its long-term goal of German reunification still holds true today, as laid out in the preamble of the Basic Law of 1949. Although some critics charge that Bonn does little more than pay lip service to the cause of German unity, the fact remains that each succeeding West German federal government has publicly supported German reunification through peaceful means. Barring the possibility of a future West German government eliminating the aforesaid clause, there is no reason to believe Bonn's policy on German reunification will change.

Increased intra-German trade, as well as German-German contacts, have played a very important role in fostering the cause of German unity. The former has permitted the GDR to escape in part the economic stranglehold imposed upon it by Moscow by gaining access to the EEC. The latter has helped create a sort of all-German awareness, and this

in turn helps negate the impact of socialist indoctrination directed against the West, such as the aforementioned Feindbild theory. Although the SED regime could theoretically clamp down on intra-German relations and seal off its borders--as it has done in the past--, present trends indicate that this will not happen; the 1984 "German spring" is only one example of East Berlin's desire to promote intra-German relations regardless of the situation concerning the superpowers. Evidently the SED regime has weighed the pros and cons and has decided that healthy intra-German relations are indeed very important.

Bonn's policy of Deutschlandpolitik has thus been very successful regarding German unity. Although the barriers between the two German states have not been removed, they have been partially overcome. A record number of East Germans were permitted to visit the FRG in 1987 and, although critics may say that such a phenomenon is evidence of a newly won confidence on the part of the Honecker regime, the flip side of the coin is that East and West Germans are in contact with one another as never before. Such contacts serve, as aforementioned studies have indicated, to promote an all-German consciousness. Furthermore, recent trends indicate a renewed interest in a common German history and culture; whether or not this leads to a renewed all-German nationalism remains to be seen, but an increased interest in German reunification could prove to be an inevitable offshoot of all of this.

Another primary factor that has kept the reunification question alive has been Bonn's refusal to grant full diplomatic recognition to its eastern neighbour. Despite the vastly improved relations between

the two states, East Berlin has fallen short of its ideal goal: full diplomatic recognition on the part of every state in the world--including the Federal Republic of Germany. As long as Bonn continues with this approach toward the GDR, the latter will continue to be plagued by accusations of illegitimacy. Furthermore, East Berlin's refusal to hold free elections, as desired by the West German government, only serves to strengthen Bonn's position in this matter. (Here, perhaps one could point out the paradoxical nature of the Basic Treaty: intra-German relations and contacts increased significantly following the signing of the treaty, to be sure, but this went hand-in-hand with greater [illegible] for the GDR through both full diplomatic recognition on the part of other states and qualified recognition on the part of the FRG.)

Perhaps the only external factor which helps keep the reunification issue alive is the absence of a peace treaty involving an all-German government. It is ironic to note that in purely legal terms the Allies of World War II are at war with Germany. Practically speaking, of course, such a notion seems absurd to say the least, but such a situation helps support the argument that an all-German government can, and should, be created... if only for the sole purpose of signing a peace treaty.

Another important factor which heightens both East and West Germans' awareness regarding the reunification issue is their joint interest in peace. Events such as Chernobyl make it clear to Germans on both sides of the Elbe (as well as to fellow Europeans), that the

nuclear force is awesome in its destruction, regardless of ideology. When the citizens of both German states begin to perceive themselves as being victims of superpower politics, then they begin to seek alternative solutions... a reunited neutral Germany represents one such solution. It still remains true, however, that the great majority of West Germans favour continued membership in NATO, and the GDR seems firmly entrenched within the Warsaw Pact for the foreseeable future.

Related to the peace activists are the Churches in both German states. Their joint interest in peace and nucledr disarmament transcends the Iron Curtain and contributes to an all-German awareness on the peace issue, thereby indirectly promoting German unity. Such a phenomenon has been met with consternation on the part of generals of both military alliances. The latter have good cause for alarm, for the more East-West tensions increase, the more likely the Churches in both the FRG and the GDR will adopt similar calls for peace and denounce official state doctrines, especially those relative to defence.

With regard to the future, given the ideological polarization of the two superpowers, one realizes that no answer to the division of Germany will be found in a radical solution. For example, a reunited German national state with the social order of the present Federal Republic is simply not feasible due to the objections of both the USSR and the present GDR regime to the same. Nor is the opposite "solution" any more realizable: that is, a united communist state--the preferred Germany concept of the present GDR regime.[1]

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1. For these and other options, see Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte, pp. 161-162.

It thus follows that the only hope in finding a solution to the division of Germany lies somewhere in between such extreme concepts. That is to say, a happy medium must be found which would be acceptable to the parties on both sides. Compromise would be necessary on the part of all the parties involved in both the East and West so that interests to all may be realized. One such interest is the securing of ce and the maintenance of a geopolitical balance in central Europe.

Perhaps the most feasible of all the future options for a united Germany would be neutralization. That is to say, both German states would terminate their membership in the respective military alliances and this would go hand-in-hand with a withdrawal of all foreign troops on German soil. Free elections would be held under international supervision, which would amount to a definite concession on the part of the Soviets. The newly created all-German government would pledge to abandon forever its claims on the former German eastern territories and recognize the Oder-Neisse line--a definite concession on the part of the West, particularly the present West German government.

This future all-German state would also promise not to enter into any military alliances, whether it be in the West or in the East, owing to the state's neutrul status. A neutral all-German state would serve as a buffer zone for those states situated both east and west of it, thereby offering the latter some psychological comfort as far as security is concerned; such a buffer zone would also help to defuse East-West tensions, given that the weapons and troops of the two sides

would no longer face each other with such geographic proximity, as is the present case.

Given that the Federal Republic of Germany is a self-professed temporary state and Bonn a makeshift artificial capital, it follows that Berlin should once again become the capital of the newly created all-German state. The division of Berlin would end, of course, with the division of Germany itself and the city could be designated not only as the national capital, but also as an international city--the "capital of Europe," perhaps--dedicated to the promotion of peace, East-West negotiations and the eventual unification of Europe. Such a process would necessitate the participation of representatives from every nation-state in Europe, as well as Canada and the United States. (The participation of the latter two nations would be necessary due to their involvement in the security of Western Europe until this time. They would also serve as a balance with respect to the USSR.)

A neutral Germany would obviously be a militarily denuclearized Germany as well. This new German state would be allowed to have its own conventional armed forces for the purpose of self-defense only. Countries such as Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union would continue to maintain their nuclear capabilities, especially in the realm of defense, each promising to protect the neutral status of Germany. This would serve as a nuclear deterrent on both sides, thereby discouraging any one state of violating the sanctity of a neutral Germany through conventional means.

The newly created all-German government would pledge to expand its trade with both the East and the West, thereby making a conscious attempt to avoid being overly dependent on either of the economic systems. Such a strategy would be necessary, due to the economic strength that this new state would possess; trade expansion with both the East and the West should help mitigate such a force and lessen the chances of an imbalance of forces occurring in Europe.

Ironically, the strongest objections to such a plan (i.e., a neutral Germany) would probably come from the governments of the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, not to mention the citizens of these two states. As already mentioned, the overwhelming majority of West Germans support the FRG's membership in NATO, and only about one third of the West German electorate favour a neutral Germany concept. At the official level, Chancellor Kohl has pledged his allegiance to the Atlantic alliance and has underscored West Germany's strong ties with the United States. With respect to the GDR government, its ties to the USSR are indeed very strong--probably the strongest in Eastern Europe. The SED regime is well known for its ideological and political orthodoxy in the communist world...despite its present resistance to Gorbachev's new econo-political reforms.

Also of great importance is the fact that both German states are the economic powerhouses in their respective blocs. If West Germany's economy is a tribute to free market capitalism and the envy of most of her West European neighbours, then East Germany's economic strength is no less a tribute to the tenets of communism and the centrally planned

economy. Both the FRG and the GDR are thus already very successful in their own spheres and serve as prototypes for other states in their respective blocs. This translates into a lack of incentive to change the status quo on the part of the two states. The question then becomes: why change a sure thing for an unknown?

The most crucial determinant with regard to finding a solution to the reunification issue thus becomes: the absence or presence of political will on the part of all the parties involved. The political and ideological barriers must first be overcome if some sort of mutual agreement regarding Germany is to be reached. Opposing ideologies are responsible for the division of Germany and, indeed, for the division of Europe. Realistically speaking, the ideologies of the two superpowers will not change fundamentally in the years ahead. Nor will the common need for peace and the realization that a modus vivendi must be further developed between East and West. Ending the present military stand-off in central Europe and signing a peace treaty with Germany are two basic steps in this direction. Compromises would have to be made on both sides which would most likely prove to be unpopular with some, perhaps with many. If the end goal is to lessen East-West tensions and promote stability and unity in Europe, however, then perhaps such a strategy is worth a try.

The alternative is simply a continuance of the present status quo; that is, one German nation divided into two separate states armed with forces and weapons ready to attack and, if need be, destroy the other state should such orders be given by the commanders of their

respective alliances. Continuation of the status quo also means the further propagation of the myth that each state represents the best interests of the German people, for the truth is that only a unified Germany and a united Europe promise freedom and security to the German nation and the other peoples of Europe. West German Chancellor Adenauer, for all his accomplishments, may have done a great disservice to the German people when he proclaimed "freedom" to be of greater importance than unity, for as long as the German nation and Europe as a whole remain divided, true freedom will prove to be illusory.

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