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Governing Bodies: A Foucaultian Critique of Paralympic Power Relations

by

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Abstract

In this thesis, I use Foucault's methods of discourse analysis and genealogy, and my own experiences as a Paralympic athlete, to analyze and critique the power relations of the Paralympic Movement. In Chapter 1, I contextualize my study by discussing relevant literature in Critical Disability Studies, Sociology of Sport and Adapted Physical Activity, and by introducing my methodological and epistemological frameworks. In Chapter 2, I analyze two historical accounts of the Paralympic Movement to demonstrate how they discursively represent, reproduce and justify Paralympic power relations. In Chapters 3 through 5, I use genealogy to critique Paralympic power relations: analyzing their systems of differentiation, types of objectives, instrumental modes, forms of institutionalization and degrees of rationalization. This analysis brings to the forefront how discourses of empowerment reproduce, justify and conceal the increasingly rationalized structures that enable Paralympic experts to act upon the actions, bodies and identities of those experiencing disabilities.

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Chapter 1: Contextualizing My Critique

One does not drive to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy.... One asks about the limits of the ways of knowing because one has already run up against a crisis in the epistemological field in which one lives. The categories by which social life are ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges. (Butler, 2002, p. 05)

In the spirit of Butler's (2002) above quote, I have chosen to write this particular thesis, not (only) because it is thrilling, sexy, or necessary for the acquisition of my Master's degree, but (also) because I have "run up against a crisis in the epistemological field" in which I live (p. 5). The categories by which my sporting life, and by extension my social life, have been ordered have produced a strong sense of "incoherence" and "entire realms of unspeakability," both in terms of my experiences and my identities (p. 5). "It is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of (my) epistemological web," that this particular critique of Paralympic¹ power relations has emerged (p. 5).

The epistemological tear of which I speak has emerged from the last ten

¹ The word *Paralympic*, within this thesis, refers to the activities, institutions, power relations, technologies and subjects that have emerged out of the post World War II institutionalization of sports for those determined to have (mostly) physical or sensory disabilities. *Paralympians*, more specifically, refers to athletes who have competed or are training to compete in the international, quadrennial, multi-event disability sport competitions that emerged out of this movement, and which were originally named *The Stoke Mandeville Games* and are currently named *The Paralympics*.

years that I have spent as an athlete, coach, administrator and activist within national and international disability sport systems. The tear has emerged from the stark, yet rarely discussed, contrast between pervasive narratives of Paralympic empowerment, and the predominant power relations of elite disability sport: relations that I perceive as discursively and structurally securing the ability of disability sport experts to silence, overrule, discipline, categorize, coerce, induce, and more generally, “to structure the possible field of actions” of Paralympic athletes (Foucault, 2003d, p. 138). This epistemological tear also emerged from an incoherence within my own identity: from my own struggle to pass as a member of either side of the able-disabled dichotomy (a dichotomy upon which disability sport is predicated); and from my struggles with both the paternalism and pedestal that accompanied my eventual ‘success’ at passing as an athlete with a disability (AWD).

My thesis, and the critique that it contains, is motivated not only by the epistemological tear outlined above, but also by the great difficulty, and sometimes animosity, that I have encountered when I have tried to articulate these contradictions and concerns. How does one call into question the legitimacy of experts whose knowledge is constructed as more legitimate than your own? How does one speak critically about the power relations in which Paralympians are subjected and subjugated, when these very relations are widely celebrated as benevolent and empowering? As Tremain (2005) argues, it is the discourses and institutions that appear most liberating that are both the hardest to critique and, by extension, the most important to call into question. Both the motivation and procedures of this thesis, therefore, revolve around the rather difficult task of articulating and analyzing “entire realms of unspeakability,” that have been

produced through Paralympic discourses, power relations and subjectivities (Butler, 2002, p. 5).

In this thesis, I engage with the post-structuralist theories and methodologies of Michel Foucault in order to critique Paralympic power relations and the discourses and subjects that these relations serve to (re)produce. My critique revolves around three interrelated research questions. First, how are discourses used to describe, reproduce, justify and conceal Paralympic power relations? Second, what types of discourses, subjects, objectives, technologies, and institutions structure the power relations between the experts and the athletes of the Paralympic Movement? Third, how do these power relations serve to broaden, limit or otherwise structure the field of possible action of AWDs, Paralympians, and others who experience disabilities?

My thesis is divided into five chapters. In the remainder of this first chapter, I contextualize my research project within existing disability, sport and disability sport scholarship, and explain the epistemological and methodological frameworks that I have adopted. In Chapter 2, I analyze some of the discourses that describe, reproduce and justify Paralympic power relations, through an analysis of two book-length histories of the Paralympic Movement. In Chapters 3 through 5, I use Foucault's genealogical methods to critique Paralympic power relations, and their concomitant subjectivities, technologies and structures.²

Before moving on to my literature review, I would like to briefly articulate the aim of my critique. My purpose is not to mend all of the above-mentioned

² I will give a more specific breakdown of these final three chapters after I have introduced my genealogical methods, largely because both the content and organization of these chapters are best explained within the context of their specific theoretical and methodological approaches.

epistemological tears, thereby producing a more comfortable and coherent grand narrative of Paralympism. Neither do I aim to destroy and discard the existing field of knowledge, only to replace it with a more *authentic* or *coherent* truth. What I hope to achieve, in pulling at the seams of existing Paralympic knowledge, is to open up space for me, and hopefully other researchers, administrators and athletes, to explore different ways of understanding, articulating, engaging, experiencing, reworking and resisting various aspects of Paralympism.

Literature Review

I conduct my critique of Paralympic power relations at the underexplored intersection of three scholarly fields: Critical Disability Studies (CDS), Sociology of Sport (SS) and Adapted Physical Activity (APA). Although there is very little research in any of these fields that offers substantial critiques of Paralympic power relations specifically, research from each of these fields has substantially contributed to both my theoretical framework, and to the archives from which my research draws.

Critical Disability Studies (CDS)

Since the end of the 18th century, disability has been largely defined, in North America at least, as a *biomedical* problem: a problem rooted in the abnormal bodies and minds of individuals (Brittain, 2004; Davis, 2002; Foucault, 2003b; Garland-Thomson, 2007; Tremain, 2005). In the late 1970s, disability activists and scholars contested this biomedical model of disability, offering an alternative social model. The social model positions the problem of disability not in the individual's biological impairment, but instead, in the society's disabling architecture, attitudes, institutions and discourses (McDermott & Varenne, 1995;

Oliver, 1996; Shogan, 1998; Wendell & Linton, 2000).

In some health and rehabilitation-based disciplines, the social model informed the development, wide acceptance and eventual institutionalization of disablement models, which were intended, for the most part, to help experts measure, categorize and counter the impairment and disablement of individuals and populations (Crooks & Chouinard, 2006; Lawrence & Jette, 1996; Masala & Petretto, 2008; Oliver, 1990; World Health Organization, 1998). In other disciplines, such as CDS, the social model inspired critical analyses of the social processes and institutions that contribute to the power and coherence of disablement models, and various other means by which institutions, practices and experts define, measure and control disabled³ people. Critical research of this kind has been carried out on a number of institutions and practices including: medicine and rehabilitation (Albrecht, 1992; Lane, 2006; Shakespeare, 2006; Sullivan, 2005); education and research (Davis, 2002; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Hardin & Preston, 2001; Taub & Fanflik, 2000; Tremain, 2008); laws and social programs (Campbell, 2005; Davis, 2002; Fawcett, 1998; Hedlund, 2000; Titchkosky, 2007; Yates, 2005); and charities (Fleischer & Zames, 2001; Haller, 1994; Hevey, 1992).

Despite notable differences in the institutions studied, and the theories and methodologies used, many of these above studies have resulted in the emergence

³ I use the term *disabled* in order to signal the active construction of disability, showing that subjects are *disabled* by their social, cultural and political contexts. I also use various other terms for disability throughout this thesis. These include terminology used by recently quoted sources, as well as the more theoretically interpretable term, *person experiencing disability*. In my lack of consistency, as in my use of this last term, I intend to highlight the contextual, constructed, disparate and fluctuating conglomeration of bodily and social interactions that form contemporary notions of disability.

of similar themes. One such theme is that, despite the attention that some institutions give to socially disabling conditions, disability is most often portrayed in ways that reproduce the biomedical model of disability; it is the individual who is constructed as 'having' the disability, and it is the medical and rehabilitation practitioners who are constructed as having the ability to diminish and/or cure the disability (R.S. Black & Pretes, 2007; Davis, 2002; Garland-Thomson, 2007).

A second, related, theme is that these institutions tend to reproduce many of the negative stereotypes that are embedded within the biomedical model of disability. Individuals who are construed as having disabilities are often portrayed as suffering, asexual, unable, abnormal, helpless and dependant (Davis, 2002; Titchkosky, 2007). This portrayal stands in direct opposition to the normalized discursive ideal of the healthy, independent, productive and reproductive able-bodied citizen, and in particular, the helpful and benevolent able-bodied expert (Corker, 2000; Davis, 1999; 2002; Hahn, 1987; 1988b). The reproduction of tragic stereotypes of those with disabilities enables many remedial institutions to construct disability as problematic for the disabled person, and because of this person's dependence and inability, also problematic for the families and communities that must support them (unless they have access to expert help) (Albrecht, 1992; Lane, 2006; Mitchell & Snyder, 1997; Titchkosky, 2007). As such, disability is constructed as mattering largely in terms of it being, as Titchkosky (2007) argues, "a problem in need of a remedy": a problem that continues to be reproduced largely because "the existence of remedial programs, and their professionals, is reliant upon disability mattering in this way" (p. 150). In other words, the institutions, practices and professionals that set out to help the disabled, often end up (perhaps unwittingly) contributing to, and relying upon, the

perpetuation of disabling discourses and conditions.

Although CDS scholars have critiqued many different disability-based institutions, Howe (2008) argues that, “little attention within disability studies has been paid to the practice of sport” (p. 63). In other words, there has yet to be a substantial CDS analysis of the ways that benevolent and remedial sports organizations, like those of the Paralympic Movement, participate in the reproduction of disabling discourses and conditions. Although not providing sport-specific evidence, the many studies listed above, and particularly the post-structuralist analyses and genealogies (Armstrong, 1990; Campbell, 2005; Diedrich, 2005; Fawcett, 1998; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Garland-Thomson, 1996; McRuer, 2006b; Shildrick, 2005; Sullivan, 2005; Titchkosky, 2007; Tremain, 2006; 2008; Yates, 2005) provide crucial theoretical support for my critique of Paralympic power relations, and in particular, the institutions and discourses that reproduce these relations.

Sociology of Sport (SS)

Just as CDS scholars have studied disabling aspects of benevolent institutions, SS scholars have studied the important and often-problematic role that institutionalized sports play in the (re)production of social inequalities. SS scholars have theorized institutionalized sport as a site that reflects, perpetuates and naturalizes dominant power relations (Donnelly, 1996; Parry, 1984; Pringle, 2005; Sage, 1993). For example, many have argued that sport serves to reinforce the *naturalness* of the white, middle class, young, masculine, heterosexual, hyper-able athlete (Caroline Fusco, 2005; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; Shogan, 1999; Theberge, 1991). The (re)production of this *natural* and *normal* athlete is integral to the processes whereby athletes are racialized (Abdel-Shehid, 2005; Caroline

Fusco, 2005), gendered (Maas & Hasbrook, 2001; Theberge, 1998;) and queered (Caudwell, 1999; Price & Parker, 2003), and are thus constructed as unnatural, derivative and marginal (this can also apply to athletes marked by class, age, ethnicity and religion).

What is of particular relevance to my thesis, is how SS scholars, like Andrews (2000), have used post-structuralism, and particularly the theories and methods of Foucault, “as a means of critically dissecting the sporting body as an important locus of control in the discursive constitution of gendered and sexed norms, practices and identities” (p. 125). In other words, SS scholars have engaged with post-structuralism to analyze and critique the technologies, discourses and disciplinary practices of sport that serve to reproduce meaningful differences (e.g., gender), the subjectivities that embody these differences (e.g., woman) and the normalizing technologies within these categories of difference (e.g., how to look or act like a real woman) (Andrews, 1993; 2000; Cole, 1994; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Rail, 2002; Shogan, 1999).

Many of these scholars have also argued that the continuous reproduction of meaningful difference translates into perpetual opportunities to resist, sabotage and transform these same differentiations (Andrews, 2000; Foucault, 1978; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999). For example, Shogan (1999) argues that “hybrid athletes,” those whose subjectivities do not wholly reflect the straight, white, able-bodied athletic norm, must constantly negotiate contradictions between their marginalized subjectivities and their athletic identities: a negotiation that necessarily leads to “gaps” and failures (p. 45). These failures can serve to naturalize the superiority of the *normal* athlete, but as Shogan (1999) points out, athletes can also negotiate them as sites of resistance through

“questioning, refusal, and creation” (p. 87). From a post-structuralist perspective, therefore, sport can serve to reflect and reproduce dominant power relations, but can also serve as a potential site of resistance to this power and its effects (Andrews, 2000; Bridel & Rail, 2007; Broad, 2001; Chapman, 1997; Chase, 2006; Darnell, 2007; Markula, 2003).

Although SS scholars have applied the above critique to a number of structural inequalities that are reproduced through institutionalized sport (such as gender, race and sexuality), similar critiques have very rarely been applied to sport’s role in the reproduction of disability. The most notable exception is Shogan’s (1998) critical analysis of APA, wherein she asks: “to what extent is adapted physical activity part of a social context that sustains disability?” (p. 275). Although more sports sociologists have since written about the athletes, socialization patterns and media portrayals of disability sport (as best evidenced by the March 2001 special issue of the *Sociology of Sport Journal* which was entirely devoted to disability sport) I have yet to come across a substantial sport sociology critique of any aspect of APA, Paralympism or disability sport that addresses Shogan’s important question.

Adapted Physical Activity (APA)

Like their counterparts in CDS, many APA scholars have analyzed discourses and representations of disability, and in particular, representations of AWDs (DePauw, 1997; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Maas & Hasbrook, 2001; Schantz & Gilbert, 2001; Schell & Duncan, 1999; Schell & Rodriguez, 2001; Sherrill, 1997; Shuaib, 2005; Smith & Thomas, 2005; Stone, 2001; Thomas & Smith, 2003). For the most part, these APA studies have focused on representations of AWDs in mainstream media and textbooks, and

have found, similar to their CDS counterparts, that AWDs are often portrayed in ways that reproduce the biomedical model of disability and that reproduce negative stereotypes about the tragedy, inability, asexuality and dependency of those experiencing disabilities (B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Maas & Hasbrook, 2001; Schantz & Gilbert, 2001; Schell & Duncan, 1999; Schell & Rodriguez, 2001;). There are, however, some significant differences between the analyses performed within APA and CDS.

The first major difference is the prevalence of the supercrip discourse in representations of AWDs (B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Schell & Duncan, 1999; Schell & Rodriguez, 2001). According to B. Hardin and Hardin (2003), the supercrip discourse “assumes that people with disabilities are pitiful (and useless), until they ‘overcome’ their disabilities through rugged individualism and pull off a feat considered heroic by the mainstream” (p. 249). This heroic event can be anything from climbing a mountain, to having a boyfriend, to seeking normalcy: as long as the feat surpasses incredibly low expectations of what disabled people can do (and how *normal* they can be) (Clare, 1999; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Titchkosky, 2007). Although supercrip discourses appear emancipating, they serve to reproduce a number of disabling discourses: they show the individual overcoming a disability that is biomedically and tragically rooted in their own body; and they celebrate the overcoming to such an extent as to reify the low expectations that the supercrip is ‘amazingly’ surpassing.

The second major difference is that APA scholars seldom assign any responsibility for disabling discourses to the institutions and experts of disability sport. The blame for disabling discourses is most often assigned to the media,

who are often accused of having misrepresented and underrepresented AWDs, and of having, in the words of Schantz & Gilbert (2001), “misconstrued the ideal of the Paralympic Games” (p. 69). This reading is consistent with much of the literature in APA that tends to unequivocally hail disability sport as a site of individual mediation, or even global transformation, of disabling discourses (Ashton-Shaeffer et al., 2001; Berger, 2004; Brittain, 2004; DePauw, 1997; Guthrie & Castelnovo, 2001; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; M. Hardin, 2007; Huang & Brittain, 2006; Pensgaard & Sorensen, 2002; Taub, Blinde, & Greer, 1999). It is worthy of note that this relatively uncritical celebration of disability sport is not only prevalent in qualitative research in APA, but also in historical accounts of disability sport, and the Paralympic Movement more specifically (Bailey, 2008; DePauw, 2001; Fajardo, 1997; Labanowich, 1989; Legg, Emes, Stewart, & Steadward, 2004; McCann, 1996; Scruton, 1979; Sherrill, 2004; Steadward & Peterson, 1997; Stein, 2004).

There are, however, some critical voices in APA. A number of scholars have written about women’s marginalization within disability sport and its histories (DePauw, 1994; 1999; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2005; M. Hardin, 2007; Kolkka & Williams, 1997; Sherrill, 1997). Others have criticized the marginalization of disabled people, in terms of the strategic inclusion or visibility of certain disabilities at the expense of others, or in terms of the marginalization of disabled researchers within the field of APA (Bredahl, 2007; DePauw, 1997; Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Smith & Thomas, 2005). Howe’s (2008) recent book, *The Cultural Politics of the Paralympic Movement*, however, is the only disability sport publication that has yet to mount a substantial critique of Paralympic institutions, power relations, and in particular, their discourses of

empowerment. Howe's (2008) ethnography draws from anthropological theories, and his own Paralympic experiences, to explore and problematize "the nexus between the physical embodiment of athletes with a disability and the structures imposed upon them in light of the development of institutions which govern Paralympic sport" (p. 7). Although both Howe and I use our experiences as Paralympians to mount critiques of Paralympism, our theoretical, methodological and epistemological differences lead us to very different kinds of analysis. Nonetheless, my research draws heavily from the critiques and examples included within Howe's book, as well as those within much of the APA research listed above.

Epistemological Framework

In contrast to much of the disability sport research to date, this project is explicitly framed by a post-structuralist⁴ epistemology. That is, this project explicitly rejects positivist claims of objectivity and truth discovery, and instead, seeks to interrogate the social processes through which objectivity and truth are constructed (Andrews, 2000; Flax, 1992; Rail, 2002). In this section, I briefly explain my post-structuralist approach and articulate my rationale for adopting this epistemology.

Andrews (2000) describes post-structuralism as a "loosely aligned series of philosophical, political and theoretical rejoinders" that emerged out of the rapid

⁴ Work of this kind can be identified as either postmodern or post-structural. These two terms overlap considerably and are sometimes used interchangeably (Rail, 2002). Whereas *postmodern* is used to refer to a range of theories, artistic practices, aesthetics and epochs, *post-structural* refers, more specifically, to theories and epistemologies that are inspired by French post-WWII philosophers who interrogated language (or discourse) as one of the primary means of interrogating modernity (such as Derrida and Foucault) (Andrews, 2000; Rail, 2002).

modernization of post-World War II France (p. 106). According to Andrews (2000) and Flax (1992), the aim of most post-structuralist research is to interrogate and deconstruct dominant discourses, institutions, subjectivities and knowledges in order to address the marginalization and violence that accompany the modernist Enlightenment project. An important component of post-structuralism, therefore, is critiquing the dominant, positivist epistemology of the Enlightenment project: the well-circulated belief that if a researcher receives appropriate scientific training, follows the appropriate methods and thinks rationally about the results, that they can acquire objective knowledge about what *really* and *truly* exists (Flax, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Samdahl, 1999). Within post-structuralist epistemologies, by contrast, the researcher does not objectively discover knowledge (or Truth), but rather actively constructs it through interaction with established knowledges and dominant relationships of power. In the words of Flax (1992): “truth for postmodernists is an effect of discourse” (p. 452). As Andrews (2000) argues, this does not necessarily equate to the ontological assumption that there is “nothing outside of text”; the claim “that there is nothing *meaningful* outside of text,” represents, rather, an epistemological claim that nothing can be objectively known or accurately represented because all knowledge and experience is mediated through the existing structures of language, knowledge and power (p. 114).

Post-structuralist epistemologies are well-suited to this project for at least three reasons. First, as I have outlined in my literature review, post-structuralism has been incredibly useful for interrogating the role of benevolent and remedial institutions in the (re)production of disabled subjects and disabling societies (Campbell, 2005; Fawcett, 1998; Sullivan, 2005; Titchkosky, 2007; Yates, 2005).

As Tremain (2006) argues, post-structuralism allows researchers to interrogate entities, like impairment, which are understood as “objective, transhistorical and transcultural,” thereby exposing the ways in which they are “an historically specific effect of knowledge/power” (p. 185). Second, post-structuralist approaches have also proven useful for deconstructing the power effects of sport discourses, structures and disciplinary technologies (Andrews, 1993; 2000; Markula, 2003; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Pringle, 2005; Shogan, 1999). As argued by Andrews (2000): “clearly, the variants of post-structuralism offer important interpretative vehicles for disrupting the stifling and oppressive formations of sporting (post)modernity” (p. 131). Third, despite the usefulness of post-structuralism in the study of both disability and sport, it has rarely been applied where these two fields intersect: the study of disability sport.⁵ It is the notable gap at this research intersection that makes my epistemological choices both so difficult to defend and so crucial to undertake. As Sparkes argues (1992), one of the greatest strengths of post-structuralism is that it can help researchers to question a “particular way of seeing the world” which has become “not only unquestioned but unquestionable” in one’s research community (p. 12). My departure from the more established positivist epistemologies of APA research is particularly important to this project, given the structural and epistemological proximity of much of the APA research community to the disability sport

⁵ The most notable exception to this claim is Shogan’s (1998) above-mentioned article, and her subsequent adaptation of the same into a chapter in a later book (Shogan, 1999). It is also worth noting that a handful of other disability sport scholars have occasionally borrowed concepts from post-structuralist theorists such as Foucault (Ashton-Shaeffer, Gibson, Holt, & Williming, 2001; Howe, 2008; Huang & Brittain, 2006; Shuaib, 2005; Stone, 2001). In many of these cases, however, these concepts have been used outside of their original post-structuralist frameworks.

institutions that I critique. In order to challenge the particular way that disability sport institutions construct disability, I must also challenge the epistemological framework that has rendered this construction largely unquestioned and unquestionable within APA (Sparkes, 1992).

Methodologies

In this thesis, I follow two different methods, both of which are inspired by the works of French post-structuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault. In Chapter 2, I perform a discourse analysis on two histories of the Paralympic Movement. In Chapters 3 through 5, I use Foucault's genealogical methods to analyze and critique the power relationships between athletes and experts of the Paralympic Movement.

Discourse Analysis

For the purposes of this thesis, discourses can be understood as combinations of statements that are both exercises of power, and a means by which power circulates (Foucault, 1978; 1992; Gubrium & Holstein, 2003; Tremain, 2005). Analyzing discourses, therefore, involves studying how language and power interact in ways that both restrict and produce certain knowledges, institutions and subjects (Foucault, 1978; 1992; Webster, 1990).

In Foucault's theories, this relationship between discourse and power is extremely complex. Discourses *reflect* existing power relations: their legitimacy and authority are determined by the knowledges and institutions of a particular discipline, which are the direct product of power and discourse (Flax, 1992; Foucault et al., 1992; Pringle, 2005). Additionally, discourses *reproduce* existing power relations: their strategic collusions with existing knowledges increase,

simultaneously, their own authority and the authority of those that they collude with (Foucault, 1978; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Webster, 1990). Discourses also *exercise* power in a number of ways: they proscribe (e.g., rules restricting who can play), they prescribe (e.g., instructions on how one must train) and they describe (e.g., the purpose of disability sport) (Foucault, 1978; Shogan, 1999). Although this power can be punitive and repressive, the most powerful discourses are productive: they produce knowledges, truths, institutions, desires, and importantly, subjects (Bové, 1990; Foucault, 1978; 1995). Discourses establish the logic by which certain humans are differentiated from others (e.g., disabled vs. able); they produce the authority by which experts can declare this differentiation (e.g., medical diagnosis); and they produce the means and rules by which these subjects can be identified by others (e.g., white stick for blind subjects). They create, in the end, self-identified subjects who, for example, whether a chair user or not, see a white on blue stick figure of a man on wheels, recognize themselves in it, and promptly park, enter, sit or pee where demarcated (Foucault, 1978; Foucault et al., 1992; Shogan, 1999; Tremain, 2005; 2006).

The discourses that I study in Chapter 2, are those that can be found in two histories of the Paralympic Movement, namely: Steadward and Peterson's (1997) *Paralympics: Where Heroes Come*, and Bailey's (2008) *Athlete First: A History of the Paralympic Movement*. I have chosen to limit my analysis to these two texts largely because these are the only two book-length histories of the Paralympic Movement that have yet to be published. The substantial historical accounts within these two books allow me to analyze Paralympic discourses within the context of the historical structures, discourses, actions and power relations from which such discourses emerged. They enable me to trace how specific historical

events are translated into dominant discourses of Paralympism, and how dominant discourses are used to produce and translate specific historical events. Through the analysis of these histories, I do not intend to make new truth claims about the past. Rather, I intend to analyze how discourses about Paralympic history help to justify and reproduce contemporary Paralympic discourses, practices and power relations.

The restriction of this analysis to two texts, I argue, should not detract from the argument that I am making. As Wood and Kroger (2000) argue: “the issue of small sample size in discourse-analytic work is moot, because the samples in discourse-analytic work are usually quite large in terms of language instances” (p. 77). In other words, the units analyzed in this discourses analysis are not the books, but the statements that they contain, that is, the building blocks of discourse (Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Tirado & Gálvez, 2007). A statement, within discourse analysis, can be understood as a well-regulated set of signs or symbols that makes a claim of knowledge or truth; statements can be delivered either directly, as an argument, image or fact, or indirectly as a metaphor, assumption or absence (Burck, 2005; Foucault, 2005; Tirado & Gálvez, 2007; Vehkakoski, 2007). Despite this very general description, Tirado and Gálvez (2007) argue that statements are relatively easy to find and analyze systematically because they are, by definition, very highly ordered and regulated things. Flax (1992) explains further:

each discourse has its own distinctive set of rules or procedures that govern the production of what is to count as a meaningful or truthful statement.... The rules of a discourse enable us to a make certain sorts of statements and to make truth claims, but the same rules force us to remain

within the system and to make only those statements that conform to these rules. (p. 452)

The job of the analyst, therefore, is to identify the rules and regulations that govern theoretically relevant discourses, and to analyze the kinds of statements, identities, actions and power relations that these rules serve both to enable and to restrict (Burck, 2005; Diaz-Bone et al., 2007; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Tirado & Gálvez, 2007; Vehkakoski, 2007).

The specific methodological procedures that I follow in this analysis are based on Kendall and Wickham's (1999) five steps of discourse analysis. The first step involves close readings and re-readings of the two Paralympic histories in order to identify relevant statements and loosely code them by potential rules and systems of production. In the second stage, I formalize my coding of the rules and systems (of knowledge production, dissemination and legitimization) that make specific statements sayable, intelligible and seemingly logical. In the third stage, I identify the "rules that delimit the sayable," that is, I analyze how the rules of the discourses in question make certain kinds of statements illogical, illegitimate or incomprehensible (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 42). In the fourth stage, I theorize the productive capacity of the identified discourses and rules, that is, the kinds of people, institutions and knowledges that such discourses serve to produce and reproduce. In the fifth and final stage, I theorize how the effects of these discourses play out, not only in the realm of what can be said, but also in the material realm of bodies, technologies and structures.

Genealogy

In Chapters 3 through 5, I use genealogical methods to analyze and critique Paralympic power relations According to Markula and Pringle (2006),

“genealogy is an examination of the relations between history, discourse, bodies and power in an attempt to help to understand social practices or objects of knowledge that ‘continue to exist and have value for us’ (Foucault 1977C: 146)” (p. 32).

Although a form of historical inquiry, genealogy differs greatly from the kinds of histories analyzed in Chapter 2. As Andrews (2000) argues: “Foucault developed a radically different conception of history founded upon the antithesis of the idea of progress in and through history” (p. 115). Whereas existing Paralympic histories are narrated chronologically, focus on large important benchmarks, and lead towards progressive Paralympic empowerment, genealogy seeks to “record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising of places, in what we tend to feel is without history” (Foucault, 2003c, p. 351). In other words, genealogy forsakes the coherent grand narratives about the important events of the distant past, and turns instead to the specific relations of power that produced and naturalized contemporary bodies, beliefs, feelings and subjectivities (Kearins & Hooper, 1999; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Meadmore, Hatcher, & McWilliam, 2000; Wilson, 1995). It is for this reason that genealogy is often described as a *history of the present* (Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Markula & Pringle, 2006). Meadmore et al. (2000) explain further:

[in genealogy] historical data are used to unsettle and destabilize the self-evidence of the conceptual bedrock of present understandings and analyses (McCallum, 1990). By asking specific and definite questions in the present tense, it is possible to investigate past practices, showing them to be “strange” (Meredyth & Tyler, 1993, p. 4). In this way the legitimacy

of the present can be undercut by the foreignness of the past, offering the present up for reexamination and further enquiry. (p. 464)

One aspect of traditional Paralympic histories that this genealogy “opens up for reexamination and further enquiry” is the way that disabled, Paralympian, and expert subjects are conceptualized (Meadmore et al., 2000, p. 464). Whereas traditional histories tend to represent subjects as ahistorical entities that have the power to make history, genealogy theorizes the subject as having been socially constituted through politico-historical processes (Foucault, 2003c; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Scott, 1992). As Kendal and Wickham (1999) explain, within a genealogical framework, “knowledge, power and the subject can not be understood separately, they each condition each other” (p. 54). It is therefore important to analyze, not only how subjects exercise power and construct knowledge, but also the role of knowledge and power in the construction of specific kinds of subjects. As Tremain (2005) argues, “a historical awareness of the present, requires archaeological and genealogical analysis of the conditions in the past that have made the subject who it is in the present, and how” (p. 16).

Another key difference between traditional Paralympic histories and genealogy is the way that power is conceptualized. The notion of empowerment, within the Paralympic context, supposes that power is something that Paralympic experts can and do ‘give’ to Paralympians through their programs, and that, as a result, Paralympians ‘have’ increasing amounts of power over their own lives and within society. Within a genealogical context, however, “the object of analysis,” should be “*power relations* and not power itself” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 137). This is because, according to Foucault (2003d), “power exists only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action” (p. 137). The exercise of power,

according to Foucault, can be characterized as a mode of action that seeks to control, coerce, limit, induce, produce or otherwise “structure the possible field of actions of others” (p. 138). As such, power must be studied in the context of relationships between actors (or groups of actors): relationships that, although constantly re-negotiated, are often reproduced as unequal due to the knowledges, subjectivities, institutions and the “field of sparse possibilities” produced by power relations of the past (Foucault, 2003d, p. 139).

I have structured my genealogical analysis so as to be attentive to these key characteristics outlined above. In my genealogical analysis I seek to de-naturalize existing Paralympic discourses and to historicize Paralympic subjects (including AWDs, Paralympians and Paralympic experts) by analyzing the relationships of power that serve to produce, and to govern interactions between, Paralympic experts and athletes. Isolating and analyzing these power relations, however, is not a straightforward or objective task. I have taken the advice of Kearins and Hooper (1999) in choosing to follow, most closely, the points of analysis outlined in Foucault’s (2003d) influential essay “The Subject and Power”. Within this essay, Foucault (2003d) states that, “the analysis of power relations demands that a certain number of points be established” (p. 140). He lists and explains five such points of analysis: (a) “the system of differentiations,” i.e., the ways that certain subjects are systematically differentiated from others in order to allow certain types of subjects to act upon the actions of other types of subjects, (b) “the types of objectives” that might be pursued by those acting on the actions of others, (c) “the means of bringing power relations into being,” i.e., the specific technologies and techniques through which actions are acted upon, (d) “the forms of institutionalization” that these relations of power take on, and (e)

“the degrees of rationalization,” i.e., the efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility with which a subject’s possible field of action can be structured within the given relationship of power (Foucault, 2003d, p. 140-141).

In order to clearly address each of the five points above, and to resist the progressive, chronological structure of traditional histories, I have organized my genealogy by these five points: the first two points, *systems of differentiations* and *types of objectives*, are addressed in Chapter 3; the *means of bringing power relations into being* is discussed in Chapter 4; and *the forms of institutionalization* and *the degrees of rationalization* are addressed in Chapter 5. Both theorizing and structuring my genealogy according to these points was a very difficult task, as each of the points deals with structures, functions and practices that are inextricable from those dealt with under the other points. This analysis may have been more appropriately structured as a kind of choose-your-own-adventure web of interrelated analyses. However, as a kindness to both the reader and to myself, I do my best to artificially partition the analysis into the five points discussed above.

The analysis of each of these points, at a procedural level, involves close and repeated readings of a wide variety of historical and theoretical texts, accompanied by rigorous note-taking about useful content, theoretical interpretations and personal reflections (Burck, 2005; Karlsson, 2007; Meadmore et al., 2000; Vehkakoski, 2007). Source selection is ongoing and is guided by what Kearins (1999) calls “pragmatically oriented historical interpretation,” that is, it is guided by emerging hypotheses and questions (p. 739). Throughout my analysis, I consistently return to key theoretical and methodological texts in order to operationalize my chosen methodological structure. The most influential of

these texts have been three of Foucault's essays: "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," "The Subject and Power" and "What Is Critique?" (2003c; 2003d; 2003f).

Experience

Aside from the wide variety of historical, theoretical and methodological texts that I used in this research, I also borrowed heavily from my own Paralympic experiences. There are three main reasons that I have chosen to explicitly integrate personal experience into my research. First, in keeping with my post-structuralist epistemology, I wanted to be clear about the ways that my analysis was influenced by my experiences and subject position(s) (Flax, 1992; Foucault, 2003c; Lather, 1991; Rail, 2002). The second reason is one of practicality: primary sources about Paralympian-expert relationships are rare, and those that do exist are often subject to very restricted access (Bailey, 2008). Where other documented examples could not easily be found in primary or secondary sources, my own experiences provided accessible examples through which to theorize Foucault's concept of power. The third reason is both methodological and theoretical. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, a major motivation for undertaking this critique is to find ways to articulate and address significant "epistemological tears" that I have experienced (Butler, 2002, p. 5). Experience and subjectivity, however, are not only the motivation for this critique, but also the very objects that such a critique sets out to analyze and deconstruct (Butler, 2002; Foucault, 2003c; Scott, 1992). Critique, according to Scott (1992), "entails focusing on the processes of identity production, insisting on the discursive nature of 'experience' and on the politics of its construction" (p. 37). My intention in articulating my own experiences is not to claim them as

authentic and credible evidence, but rather, to offer them up for re-interpretation and re-examination. After all, “experience,” within this paradigm, “is at once and always already an interpretation *and* is in need of interpretation” (Scott, 1992, p. 37).

Methodological Rigor and Scope

Standard measures of validity and credibility within the social sciences are aspects of the very truth games that Foucault’s methods are designed to destabilize (Foucault et al., 1992; Kearins & Hooper, 1999; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Lather, 1991; Samdahl, 1999; Sparkes, 1992). Scior (2003) explains how using Foucault’s methodologies necessarily “shifts the theoretical goal of any analysis from ensuring methodological conditions for the discovery of ‘truth,’ to one of understanding the conditions in which particular accounts are produced” (781). This, however, does not mean that Foucault’s methods do not require rigor, or that they cannot be critiqued. Based on a variety of suggestions written by Foucaultian researchers, I have chosen three guidelines to strengthen and guide my research: theoretical consistency, transparency and intelligibility.

Theoretical consistency involves using Foucault’s methods without divorcing them from their theoretical underpinnings (Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Meadmore et al., 2000). This is easier said than done, since there are many different interpretations of Foucault’s theories and methods. In fact, Meadmore et al. (2000) argue that “there is no blue print” for using Foucault’s methods: that the most one can know is “what would be inappropriate given the epistemological and ontological assumptions being made by Foucaultian scholars” (pp. 463, 466). This is why a number of scholars suggest that inexperienced researchers enter into an ongoing dialogue with a more experienced researcher, in order to troubleshoot

interpretations and assumptions (Burck, 2005; Karlsson, 2007; Vehkakoski, 2007). Dr. Judy Davidson generously volunteered for this role, engaging with me in a series of guided readings of Foucault, and helping me to explore and question some of my early methodological and theoretical interpretations.

The second guideline, transparency, involves rigorously documenting sources, their rationale for being used, the author's initial interpretations of them, and the logic by which these interpretations developed into arguments (Meadmore et al., 2000). Aside from making and keeping track of these extensive notes, I incorporated some of them into the final text: outlining key examples of my process from source content, to interpretation, to argument (Karlsson, 2007; Meadmore et al., 2000). I have also, as discussed earlier, tried to be transparent about the relationship between my subject position and the topic under study (Scior, 2003). Rather than simply mentioning my subject position in the preface, I have chosen to keep my subjective relationship to my work consistently visible through my use of first person narration.

I have used the third guideline, intelligibility, in lieu of standard qualitative measures of exhaustiveness, saturation and scope (Kearins & Hooper, 1999). The point of this project is not comprehensiveness, but comprehensibility: to ask important questions and to offer perspectives that are useful in conceptualizing the strangeness of present Paralympic discourses, practices and power relations (Karlsson, 2007; Meadmore et al., 2000). As I make no claims at truth, I certainly make no claim about the scope of this truth. My findings cannot be directly generalized, but they can be "extrapolated at the level of theory": they can be used and modified, with an acknowledgement of the changing contexts, for whatever subjects and relationships that they render intelligible (Kearins &

Hooper, 1999, p. 738). In other words, like Foucault's work itself, this research is perhaps best understood as a theoretical toolbox from which other researchers, activists, athletes and sport administrators can draw, in order to try to explore, resist, critique or transform the relationships of power in which they are enmeshed.

Chapter 2: (Dis)empowering Paralympic Histories⁶

Through sport, its ideals and activities, the IPC seeks the continuous global promotion of the values of the Paralympic Movement, with a vision of inspiration and empowerment. (International Paralympic Committee, 2003, p. 4)

...every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history. (Foucault, 2003c, p. 360)

In a brochure published in 2003, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) set out its mission, vision and values. The purpose of the Paralympic Movement, it states, is not to promote sport, but rather to use sport for “the continuous global promotion of the values of the Paralympic Movement” (International Paralympic Committee, 2003, p. 4). The promotion of Paralympic values at a global level, has been operationalized through increased marketing efforts, greater media exposure, more formalized ties with the Olympics, and an institutional focus on expansion, “especially in developing countries” (International Paralympic Committee, 2003, p. 4; see also Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008;). Given the deliberate propagation, popularization and globalization of the Paralympic Movement, it is crucial to critically analyze the discourses and discursive effects that Paralympism promotes, produces and reproduces.

In this chapter, I analyze contemporary discourses about the Paralympic Movement with a focus on how they narrate the past. What kinds of stories must one tell about the past in order to make 21st century Paralympism, and its claims of “inspiration and empowerment” (International Paralympic Committee, 2003, p.

⁶ A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication. Peers, D. (in press). (Dis)empowering Paralympic histories: Absent athletes and disabling discourses. *Disability & Society*, 24 (5).

4), make sense? By analyzing discourses that are necessary for the production of the Paralympic Movement, I am also analyzing the discourses that must be reproduced by the Movement in order for it to reproduce itself.

For the sake of scope, I limit this analysis to discourses that appear within the only two book-length histories of the Paralympic Movement yet published: Steadward and Peterson's (1997) *Paralympics: Where Heroes Come*, and Bailey's (2008) *Athlete First: A History of the Paralympic Movement*. Before I analyze these texts, however, I will begin with a short personal narrative about my own ambivalent experiences as a Paralympian and "poster-child." I start here in order to situate myself as the analyst, as well as a producer and a product of Paralympic discourses. In so doing, I hope to emphasize the necessary, mutually dependent elements of Paralympic discourses, which include: progressive, empowering and benevolent able-bodied experts; heroic, empowered, and grateful Paralympians; and tragic, passive and anonymous disabled.

Pedestals and Pitfalls: A Paralympian's Narrative

I read the newspaper articles and press releases that others have written about me. I read my own grant applications, speeches and business cards. I read myself defined, in each of these, by one word: not cripp, queer, athlete, activist, student, woman or lesbian, but Paralympian. I read my life story transformed into that of *The Paralympian*. I see my origins declared, not at the moment of my birth, but at some tragic moment of my physical disablement. I read my new coherent life narrative: my salvation from the depths of disability by the progressive, benevolent empowerment of sport. My destiny reads as a coming of age. I am the heroic Paralympian: pedestal, medal and all.

I realize the ways that this pedestalled narrative has paid off for me: the grants, the speaking gigs, the looks of awe, and the postponement of pity. I read deeper, and I realize its costs. I see how it renders me anonymous just as it renders me famous. I feel how it renders me passive, so that it can empower me (Linton, 1998; Nelson, 1994; Titchkosky, 2007). I realize how the pedestal turns the social inequality of disability into something to overcome, rather than something to challenge and change (B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; Schell & Rodriguez, 2001; Shapiro, 1994). I realize how the heroic Paralympian relies on discourses of the pitiful cripple who can't overcome, and the burdensome gimp won't (Clare, 1999; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Linton, 2006). I realize how these discourses serve to set us apart, whether up on the pedestal or down in the gutter: they enable others not to look us in the eye, they induce us not to look into each other's, and they encourage us not to look inside of ourselves.

This individual Paralympian's story is neither benign nor isolated from larger narratives of Paralympic history. In many ways, it is inseparable from the two published Paralympic histories that I am about to critique. I am implicated in Paralympic histories at the same time as I am an implication of them. These histories construct me as the tragic-gimp-turned-heroic-Paralympian, and this identity serves, in turn, to reproduce these stories about Paralympism. In analyzing these histories, I seek to challenge my own unified identity, I seek to trouble my own disabling stories, and I seek a more intimate relationship to resistance.

Covers and Titles: A Surface Analysis of Two Paralympic Histories

On the surface, there are a number of differences between Steadward and Peterson's *Paralympics: Where Heroes Come* and Bailey's *Athlete First: A*

History of the Paralympic Movement. Most notably, *Athlete First* has the distinct feel of an academic textbook, while *Paralympics* seems more like a book one would store on one's coffee table. While the former has only sixteen black and white photographs to break up the small print, the latter is filled with hundreds of glossy, full-colour photographs and larger font. Additionally, *Athlete First* offers complex and detailed accounts of the Movement's conflicts, power struggles, and domineering personalities, while *Paralympics* offers a more simplified, linear, and accessible narrative. Another key difference between these two texts is that all 280 pages of *Athlete First* are concerned with narrating a history of the Paralympic Movement, while only 154 of *Paralympics*' 260 pages deal with Paralympic history. As such, I limit my analysis to the first 154 pages of *Paralympics*, but analyze all of *Athlete First*. The last significant difference that I address is that of author credibility, an issue addressed in the "forward" sections of both books. Dr. Robert Steadward, the primary author of *Paralympics*, is constructed as having the credibility of a Paralympic insider, both as an academic in the field of Adapted Physical Activity and as the founding president of the International Paralympic Committee (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 9). In contrast, Dr. Steve Bailey, author of *Athlete First*, is constructed as credible due to his professional distance from, and thus objectivity about, the Paralympic Movement, and due to his professional expertise as a sports historian.

Although clearly different in their intended audiences, range of content and authorial perspectives, *Paralympics* and *Athlete First* share remarkably similar discourses and discursive effects. These discursive similarities are present in many aspects of the books, but perhaps none so symbolic as their front covers. Both front covers feature remarkably similar photographs of Paralympians in

action: both feature a skier, a goalball player, and a track athlete⁷, while *Athlete First* includes an equestrian and two soccer players, and *Paralympics* includes a diver. Above these photographs, the titles proclaim either the athletes' heroism, in the case of *Paralympics: Where Heroes Come*, or their centrality, in the case of *Athlete First: A History of the Paralympic Movement*. Although these titles and photographs explicitly represent Paralympians as active, empowered and central to the Paralympic Movement, they also serve, more implicitly, to construct Paralympians as passive, disabled, and marginal.

One example of how Paralympians are implicitly constructed is that eight out of the nine photographs that adorn these two front covers feature clearly discernable markers of disability. Whether through the marked absence of limbs, or the marked presence of a wheelchair, sit-ski, or blindfold, the reader is able to quickly identify the disabling difference of every athlete except for, perhaps, the soccer players. As DePauw (1997) argues in her analysis of visual representations of athletes with disabilities, the "visibility of disability" acts as a kind of caveat, lowering expectations of the athlete's abilities and re-centering their disability-based (as opposed to athlete-based) identities (p. 424). The hyper-visibility of disability allows the athletes to be read within the context of common stereotypes about the inability and passivity of disabled bodies. These covers also play to disabling stereotypes by rendering the athletes in the photographs anonymous;

⁷ The covers of both books feature the same track athlete: Canadian wheelchair racer, and multiple world record holder, Chantal Petitclerc. I am able to identify Chantal because I have met her. There is, unfortunately, no way for me to identify the other athletes portrayed in these books, without me undertaking a lengthy research project involving interviews and access to restricted Paralympic documents. Documentation of these athletes' identities, however, would have been remarkably simple if undertaken at the time that the photographs were taken, or even, perhaps, at the time that these histories were written.

nowhere in either book are photographed athletes named or otherwise acknowledged. Although the covers are plastered with photographs of Paralympians, individual Paralympians, and their accomplishments, are completely absent.

Given the hypervisibility of disability and the anonymity of the athletes portrayed on the cover and in the pages of the books, it is hard to miss the (presumably unintended) irony of the title *Athlete First*. However, the discursive importance of the title *Paralympics: Where Heroes Come*, may be less obvious. As explained in Steadward and Peterson's (1997) preface, this title was inspired by an advertising slogan for the 1996 Paralympics: "the Olympics is where heroes are made. The Paralympics is where heroes come" (p. 8). The first sentence of this slogan articulates the active process through which specific athletic achievements during Olympic competition earn certain able-bodied Olympians their heroic status. The second sentence contrasts this active and specific heroism against the passive, generalized heroism bestowed upon all Paralympians, regardless of their accomplishments or actions. This contrast downplays Paralympians, in comparison to Olympians, in the following terms: their athleticism; the relevance of their achievements and identities; and the importance of their training, strategizing, organizing, innovation and resistance. According to this quote, Paralympians need only appear disabled and appear at the event in order to be considered heroic. Thus, the titles and cover photographs of both books construct the Paralympian as passive and disabled, as well as marginal to Paralympic history.

Constructing Origins: Tragedy and Paternity

The relationship between the explicit discourses of Paralympic empowerment, and their implicit disabling effects, is evident in the origin narratives of both texts. Both *Paralympics* and *Athlete First* claim that the Paralympic Movement began in 1944 when Dr. Ludwig Guttman began working with paralyzed war veterans at Stoke Mandeville, England. *Paralympics* goes so far as to hail him as “the father of the Paralympic Movement” (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 21). Both books construct Guttman as primarily responsible for igniting hope, through sport, in a population that they represent as unequivocally tragic, hopeless, passive, and as good as dead. This population is signified, in *Paralympics*, through the description of Guttman’s alleged inspiration: a big, strong (anonymous) soldier with a spinal cord injury, who was put at the end of the ward to die (p. 21). In *Athlete First*, this population is first introduced in the second chapter, entitled, “An Air of Hopelessness,” which begins with a quote in which Guttman describes paraplegia as, “one of the most devastating calamities in human life” (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 13). In order, presumably, to attribute these tragic origins to the wide range of current Paralympians, Bailey (2008) confidently, and without citation, claims that: “this description can equally be applied to many other debilitating causes that so radically affect the mobility and functioning of individuals in society” (Bailey, 2008, p. 13). In this way, Bailey constructs all forms of disability as unequivocally tragic problems rooted in bodies of individuals.

Both books further marginalize those with disabilities by focusing on Guttman’s 1944 sport programs as the origin of Paralympism. This move downplays the importance of competitive sports that were being organized by

members of Deaf communities by 1888⁸, that were practiced in schools for the blind by 1909, and that were invented by the patients of Stoke Mandeville before Guttmann even began his sports programs there⁹ (DePauw & Gavron, 2005; Goodman, 1986; Howe, 2008; Legg et al., 2004). Although both histories briefly mention some of these events, they do not treat them as significant enough to challenge Guttmann's declared paternal role or to call into question the passivity of athletes within the Movement.

Furthermore, constructing Guttmann as Father of the Paralympic Movement conceals significant social shifts that contributed to the construction of disability as sites of both tragedy and potential athletic rehabilitation. These developments include: post-war urbanization and industrialization; increased state control over the health and productivity of populations; the construction and popularization of statistical (ab)normality; and the institutionalization of medicine's power over defining, treating, discovering and controlling disabilities (Davis, 2006; Foucault, 2003d; Linton, 2006; Shogan, 1998; Tremain, 2005). These developments are the contexts within which we must read how the Paralympics, and its origin narratives, became both possible and intelligible.

Guttmann is not only the paternal figure of these Paralympic origin narratives, but he is also their primary source of information. Both histories rely

⁸ The 1888 creation of the Sport Club for the Deaf in Berlin is often cited as the first sporting organization for the disabled. I acknowledge that members of Deaf communities may not identify as disabled. I use this example, not to conflate these two sporting histories, but to show how marginalized athletes created and organized their own sporting events. Notable Deaf athlete-builders include Antoine Dresse and Eugène Reuben-Alcais, two organizers of the first International Silent Games in 1924 (Bailey, 2008; DePauw & Gavron, 2005).

⁹ There is evidence to suggest that some of the early sports that Guttmann is credited for inventing, such as wheelchair polo, were simply modified and institutionalized versions of games that Guttmann witnessed some of his patients inventing and playing (Goodman, 1986; Anderson, 2003).

almost exclusively on the words of Guttman, as sometimes paraphrased by his biographers or friends, to characterize the lives of all those experiencing disability in the first half of the 20th century. It is assumed that, because Guttman is both able-bodied, and a doctor, he has no personal stake in how those with disabilities are represented. However, if the pre-Paralympic disabled were not represented as wholly tragic, they would not seem in need of rescuing, and by extension, Guttman and his movement could not claim to be wholly responsible for their empowerment and salvation. It is only by acknowledging what is at stake in discourses of tragic origins, or through providing alternate sources about them, that we can challenge the tragedy embedded in Guttman's descriptions of those who: ““dragged out their lives as useless and hopeless cripples [*sic*], unemployable and unwanted... with no incentive or encouragement to return to a useful life”” (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 14). Unfortunately, the authors of both texts fail to acknowledge which egos, institutions, and worldviews this prioritization of sources, and its resulting construction of tragedy, might serve, and to whom it potentially does a grave disservice. They fail to consider how pre-Paralympic ‘cripples’ actively interpreted and differentially navigated their own lives. Did they all really live without hope? Did they feel like useless and unwanted burdens on their loved ones? By contrast, did many find joy, hope and use in their lives as lovers, parents, friends, thinkers, teachers, artists, organizers, and perhaps even revolutionaries?

As argued above, the origin narratives within both texts marginalize larger social contexts and those experiencing disabilities, in order to prioritize Guttman's paternity and to (re)produce an unequivocally tragic and disabled pre-Paralympian. As stated in my introduction to this chapter, however, my intent is

not to make new truth claims about the past, but rather to analyze how the stories constructed about Paralympic history help make 21st century Paralympic discourses and practices make sense. It is important to note, therefore, that this tragic origin discourse does not end where Guttmann's Paralympic dream begins. That is, the Paralympic Movement did not remedy the tragedy of disability, but rather, it continually reproduces the figure of the tragic disabled in order to reproduce itself. As M. Hardin and Hardin (2004) argue, this discourse is reproduced in every news story about the heroic Paralympian who overcomes his or her tragic disabled fate, and in each comparison of this Paralympian to those who have not overcome. This discourse also weaves its way through most celebrations and justifications of disability sport, such as that offered by Steadward and Peterson (1997): "as soon as the community sees the person with a disability participating in sports, that person is looked on as an equal member of society, not as an appendage" (p. 15). Through this statement, the authors seek to justify and reproduce Paralympic institutions with explicit claims of emancipation for athletes with disabilities. In order to make this claim of emancipation, however, the authors must reproduce a not-so-emancipated alternative: the non-sporty, or pre-sporty, tragic disabled 'appendage'.

The most recent area where discourses of tragic disability have come to be used is in the institutionalized push to expand the Paralympic Movement, "especially in developing countries" (International Paralympic Committee, 2003, p. 4). It is in this growing Paralympic priority that discourses about tragic disability collude with colonialist and racist discourses about the (under)developed and the (un)civilized (Darnell, 2007; Landry, 1995). For example, Bailey paraphrases one such discussion at the 1994 Paralympic

Congress, led by prominent Paralympic organizer Carl Wang. Bailey (2008) writes: “Wang went on to decry the situation in developing countries, where millions of persons with a disability were being denied even the simplest trimmings of a civilized society” (Bailey, 2008, p. 158). This call to action uses tragic origin discourses about those needing sporting salvation to reproduce the colonial benevolence of able-bodied Western experts, and to justify their paternalistic involvement in the ‘betterment’ of other cultures. At the same time, the argument uses colonialist discourses to justify institutional Paralympic expansion, to reproduce tragic disability, and to efface the economic, social and structural ‘trimmings’ still being ‘denied’ to millions of ‘persons with a disability’ in the so-called developed world.

Progressive Empowerment of/over Paralympians

Paralympics and *Athlete First* share a celebratory narrative that begins with the original tragedy of disability and steadily progresses, through institutionalization and expertise, toward ever-increasing levels of athlete empowerment. The great irony of this progressive empowerment discourse is that it serves to disempower athletes in at least five overlapping ways: it reproduces the tragic disabled object; it effaces the actions and stories of athletes; it prioritizes those credited for empowering the athletes; it undermines athlete resistance; and it justifies the increased degree to which experts exercise power on the bodies and actions of Paralympians.

I have discussed the first three of these five disempowering elements in earlier sections of this paper, so I will only discuss them briefly here. First, empowerment discourses require the continuous reproduction of the tragic and passive disabled. Without this needy and powerless disabled population,

volunteers and experts would not seem so benevolent, empowerment would not seem so necessary, and the discourse of athletes being passive recipients of empowerment would not seem so rational. Second, empowerment discourses reproduce the passivity of Paralympians by marginalizing their stories within Paralympic histories. These histories use athlete images, praise their technologies, and add up their records, but omit their names, their stories of innovation, and their stories of excellence. Athletes enjoy a central role within the empowerment discourse, but only as the generalized, anonymous and passive Paralympians for whom, and to whom, named, able-bodied subjects procure and provide empowerment. This leads us to the third disempowering element of empowering discourses: the predominant focus on the decisions, actions and sacrifices of the volunteers, experts and institutions of empowerment. The focus on these subjects, not unlike the earlier focus on Guttman's paternity, marginalizes athletes' actions and voices, thereby leaving disabling discourses uncontested.

All three of these overlapping elements of disempowerment are easily discernable in Steadward and Peterson's (1997) claim that, "the story of the Paralympic Games is the story of volunteers, thousands and thousands of volunteers, who over the years have made tremendous sacrifices to improve the lives of those with disabilities" (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 8). This quote clearly prioritizes the role of volunteers in the movement, includes Paralympians only as the object of the volunteers' actions, and represents these Paralympians, not as athletes, but as "those with disabilities" who require and inspire "tremendous sacrifices" (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 8). Likewise, in the preface of *Athlete First*, Bailey (2008) claims that the Paralympic Movement was advanced by, "highly dedicated individuals passionately expressing their vision of

the future for athletes with a disability” (p. xvii). Again, the author centralizes the role of those acting for athletes while marginalizing the role of the athletes themselves. Bailey does not explicitly construct the Paralympian to be as passive and tragic as Steadward and Peterson do, however, his marginalization of the athlete’s importance in the Movement implicitly reproduces (and relies upon) the discourse of disabled passivity. In both cases, the athlete is central to the explicit discourse of progressive empowerment, but only as the passive object that is acted upon.

The fourth disempowering element of the progressive empowerment discourse is the undermining, silencing, and downplaying of athlete resistance. This reaction to resistance is not surprising given the marginalization of athletes’ stories in general. It is also not surprising given that athlete resistance throws discourses of Paralympic passivity and expert benevolence radically into question. This becomes evident when athletes, or others experiencing disabilities, unite and resist within the Paralympic Movement. In these cases, Paralympic histories do not represent those resisting as empowered, knowledgeable, and experienced subjects with legitimate or important critiques. Instead, both *Athlete First* and *Paralympics* represent them as misguided, ignorant dissenters who pose a threat to the Movement and to themselves. This attitude is illustrated by Bailey’s (2008) following argument: “the extent of negativity existing within the community of persons with disability was ironic, and also a factor in slowing the initial development of the Paralympic Movement” (p. 12). Bailey construes the disability communities’ objections to the Paralympic Movement as ironic because he presumes that athletes were foolishly acting against their own best interest: that they were acting against those more knowledgeable experts who were

empowering them, despite themselves. In this way, Bailey dismisses the legitimacy and productivity of athlete resistance by representing it as ironic negativity that is counterproductive to the cause of athlete empowerment.

Similar themes are apparent in Bailey's (2008) narrative about the 1992 Korean boccia team. During the medal ceremony, the team members threw their bronze medals to the ground to protest a new "sport-specific rule" (p. 127). Bailey recounts, in detail, the agitated deliberations that purportedly led to the Paralympic executive committee's decision to ban these athletes for their entire lives (as compared to the four year ban issued for a positive steroid test that same week). He then recounts how the ban was eventually lifted due largely to arguments that it was not "humane" to ban athletes who were so "severely disabled" (Bailey, 2008, p. 127). Bailey's narrative shows how the Paralympic experts explicitly set out to undermine resistance through extreme sanctions, and then implicitly undermined athlete power through discourses of tragic disability. What Bailey predictably omits in his detailed, half-page retelling of this story are: the athletes' names (according to the IPC website, the athletes were: Shin Hyuk Lim, Jin Woo Lee and Ki Yean Lee); details about what it was that they were protesting; their goals for protest; why they had to resort to protest; their reactions to the sanctions; and whether the protest was regarded by the protestors as successful. Bailey undermines the legitimacy of this resistance by omitting the stories of those resisting, and by superseding the story of resistance with the story of expert sanctions.

My final example of the undermining of athlete resistance is Steadward and Peterson's (1997) celebration of how Steadward "narrowly averted" a potential catastrophe during his reign as the President of the International

Paralympic Committee (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 86). The event occurred at the end of the 1996 Atlanta Paralympic Games, where a large number of athletes were preparing a peaceful protest in regards to their second-class treatment at the games. Steadward (2007) recalls:

the athletes were so angry with regard to the village: the lack of bedding, the dirty accommodations, food lineups or no food ... that they were going to hold a protest at closing ceremonies. This would have been quite a spectacle and public embarrassment for the host committee. I only found out about the protest 20 minutes before I was going down to make a speech at the Closing Ceremonies. I had people go down onto the field and bring back to me the athletes who were leading this protest. (p. 86)

Having used his authority to successfully undermine the protest, Steadward further disempowered the athlete-leaders by reminding them of their marginal role within the Movement: “you have provided great entertainment and some great thrills for us; let’s not spoil it and put a black mark against yourselves in these Games” (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 86). In one succinct phrase, Steadward manages to construct these leaders as mere objects of entertainment, while threatening them with the consequences of further resistance. As the historians retelling this story, Steadward and Peterson further undermine the resistance effort by presenting it as an unequivocal victory, wherein the authoritative expert managed to save the Movement from embarrassment, and the misguided athletes from themselves.

These stories demonstrate how resistance is undermined, in Paralympic histories, through omission, and through collusion with discourses of disabled tragedy, Paralympian passivity, expert primacy, and athlete empowerment. These

stories also showcase how these very same discourses justify the authoritarian and paternalistic actions of Paralympic experts in undermining athlete resistance. This brings us to the fifth disempowering element of empowerment discourses: its role in justifying the increasingly numerous and invasive technologies of power being exercised through the images, bodies, careers and consciences of Paralympians.

Almost all athletes are subjected to a battery of disciplinary technologies. These include conditional playing time, team selection, training systems of punishment and reward, and disciplinary decisions by both game officials and sport administrators (Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999). Not only are athletes in disability sport subjected to these disciplinary technologies, they are also often subjected to the following: disability-based labelling; the enforcement of disability-based role expectations; discretionary assigning of necessary and expensive equipment; induced participation in the coach's or administrator's academic research on disability; and, most notably, classification (Howe, 2008; Williams, 1994).

Classification is one of the earliest and most binding forms of authority to which aspiring Paralympians must submit themselves. Classification is a process whereby experts determine the level of an athlete's (dis)function and thereby assign him/her permanently to an appropriate category of competition, assuming an appropriate category exists (DePauw & Gavron, 2005; Nixon, 1984). Various (mostly able-bodied) experts create, modify and eliminate these categories based on their ideas about fairness, about what is disabled enough, and about what will improve the efficiency, economic viability or entertainment value of the games (Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Rayes, 2000). These subjective deliberations create objectified categories of disability, and objectify the individuals that they

classify as *having* such disabilities. These deliberations may also have other significant consequences to which athletes have no recourse, such as: placing athletes in categories where they are not competitive; deeming an athlete too able to compete; discontinuing an event for an entire classification of athletes because they are not seen as competitive; or submitting athletes to conditions in which they feel that they must under-perform in order to continue competing.¹⁰

As athletes move toward more elite levels of participation, one might expect that their increased ‘empowerment’ would lead to increased autonomy over their bodies and their sports. To the contrary, elite Paralympians are increasingly subjected to surveillance and potential sanctions in order to both maximize their empowerment and to protect them (and other athletes) from the dangerous consequences of this empowerment. A prime example of this logic is the 1993 IPC medical sub-committee’s argument for increased powers of surveillance and sanctioning. Due to increases in the elitism and commitment of Paralympians, they argued, “most athletes... would jeopardize their present and future health for victory. It is our duty, therefore, to protect them from themselves” (p. 156). Arguments like these have led to the compulsory submission of all aspiring Paralympians to the World Anti-doping Agency’s systematized and institutionalized surveillance of their urine, blood and daily whereabouts (Bailey, 2008; Beaver, 2001; D. Black, 2001; World Anti-Doping

¹⁰ Many have accused athletes of purposely under-performing in order to be classified into a category that gives them a competitive advantage (or that allows them to compete at all) (Bailey, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). They may also under-perform in order to keep races (or games) close. Events won by large margins, especially in competitions involving women and those deemed to have more *severe* disabilities, are considered non-competitive, and by extension, neither elite nor entertaining. Dominating wins, therefore, are often rewarded with the cancellation of the event in question, with little chance of it ever reappearing (Howe & Jones, 2006; 2008; Rayes, 2000).

Agency, 2003). This surveillance occurs both in and out of competition, and concerns not only substances and practices deemed to be performance enhancing, but also “social drugs” (Bailey, 2008, p. 213). In this way, the authority of experts and their technologies of surveillance have moved further and further from the playing field, increasingly invading the bodies, consciences, and daily lives of Paralympians.

Coaches and National Sports Organizations have also increasingly deployed invasive technologies of surveillance on their athletes, such as: detailed training logs; diet and sleep journals; compulsory assessments by team psychologists, doctors, nutritionists and physiotherapists; and compulsory, or strongly coerced, blood and urine tests (Howe, 2008; Shogan, 1999). National sports organizations, in Canada at least, secure access to many of these systems of surveillance by making their athletes sign non-negotiated, legally binding athlete agreements (Kidd, 1988; Shogan, 1999). These agreements also often serve to secure the ownership of athlete images, the control over athlete sponsorship affiliations, and the power to withhold all training, competition and funding opportunities if the athlete attempts to resist any of the above.

Many of the technologies outlined above are not unique to Paralympic sport. Countless sport sociologists, sport historians and athlete activists have documented and theorized the disciplinary and surveillance technologies of mainstream sport, and the athletes’ struggles to resist those technologies (Bridel & Rail, 2007; Broad, 2001; Cochrane, Hoffman, & Kincaid, 1977; Kidd, 2005 for example; Shogan, 1999; Theberge, 1998). The Paralympic Movement, however, is largely sheltered from such critiques, or at the very least, it is sheltered from the public and academic dissemination of such critiques. The reproduction of those

with disabilities as unequivocally tragic and passive, and the reproduction of the Movement as unequivocally benevolent and empowering, ensures that these critiques are easily suppressed.

Coming of Age: Taking (Away) Responsibility

Athlete First closes with the following assertion: “the Paralympic Movement has come of age; now a mature adult accepting responsibility for those in need of support and their own empowerment” (Bailey, 2008, p. 263). This claim is not intelligible without discourses of tragic origins and progressive empowerment. Challenging these discourses, as I have done above, unravels the series of assumptions upon which these histories rest. It opens up space from which we can begin to ask the following kinds of questions. What responsibilities has the Paralympic Movement accepted? Who gave the Movement these responsibilities, and from whom were these responsibilities taken? And to whom are we referring when we speak of the Paralympic Movement? If, as my analysis suggests, the Paralympic Movement refers to the Paralympic experts and not to the athletes, then what responsibility do Paralympians have? What must Paralympians do in order to support and empower the empowering Paralympic Movement? As I suggest above, to make these histories coherent, Paralympians must be seen in photos, but not heard in histories. They must be visibly maimed, but must not be named. They must sit tall on their pedestal and point, passively and anonymously, towards the gutter from which they came.

In saying this, I do not mean to silence athletes even more. I know that many athletes thrive through sport. I know that they build communities and resistances. I know that they actively organize, disorganize, invent and pervert the sports that they play. I know that these athletes have names, and that they have

stories that neither originate in disability nor terminate with their sporting careers. I know this because of the stories that athletes tell each other. We tell each other stories that help us remember the historically irrelevant. We tell stories that help us resist the institutionalized silences. We also tell stories, however, that help us raise ourselves above others: stories that reproduce the pedestals from which we speak, and the gutters on which these pedestals are built. Because I have heard these stories, and because I have heard myself telling these stories, I know that resistance must be more than pointing accusing fingers at the institutions, and institutionalized histories, of the Paralympic Movement. I know that the seeds of resistance are also embedded in every story that I tell about myself, and to myself. Resistance means giving up the heroism of the pedestal in order to debunk the myth of the tragic gutter. It means meeting the eyes of those I have put in the gutter, and those who have put me on the pedestal. It means telling different stories: the stories that might not sell, and the stories that will likely be omitted from the history books – until, perhaps, we write our own.

Chapter 3: The Systems and Objects of Differentiation

Subjects are produced who 'have' impairments because this identity meets certain requirements of contemporary social and political arrangements.

(Tremain, 2005, p. 10)

As discussed in the previous chapter, prevalent discourses of Paralympism characterize Paralympic power relationships as the progressive empowerment of tragically disabled Paralympians by (mostly able-bodied) benevolent Paralympic experts. This construction of Paralympian empowerment is problematic, not only because of its effects on Paralympic histories, but also because of its impact on contemporary subjectivities and power relations. Perhaps the most dangerous effect of Paralympic empowerment discourses is that they make critiques of Paralympic power relations seem unnecessary, unreasonable or even unintelligible (Foucault, 2003f; Tremain, 2005). In Chapters 3 through 5, I engage with each of Foucault's (2003d) five points for the analysis of power relations, in order to excavate and critique the not-necessarily-empowering technologies, relationships and effects of power that have come to form contemporary Paralympism.

In this chapter, I engage with the first two of Foucault's (2003d) five points, which are: "*the system of differentiations* that permits one to act upon the actions of others," and "*the types of objectives* pursued by those who act on the actions of others" (p. 140). The *system of differentiations* refers to the ways that existing relationships of power mark certain bodies, behaviours and subjects in different ways than others, thereby contributing to the ability of certain kinds of subjects to more easily act upon the bodies, subjectivities and actions of other kinds of subjects (Foucault, 2003d; Kearins & Hooper, 1999). The system of

differentiations is characterized by a cycle of self-perpetuation. As Foucault (2003d) argues: “every relationship of power puts into operation differences that are, at the same time, its conditions and its results” (p. 140). In other words, differentiated subjects are produced through relations of power and serve, in turn, to reproduce and justify both the power relations and the system of differentiations from which they emerged.

In order to excavate and critique the power relations from which differentiated AWDs and Paralympians emerged, one must also establish *the types of objectives* pursued by those who engage in Paralympic power relations (Foucault, 2003d; Kearins & Hooper, 1999). Foucault (1978) argues:

there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject...the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them. (p. 95)

The analysis of objectives, therefore, does not involve psychoanalyzing *powerful* individuals or unravelling intentionally constructed conspiracies. What it does involve is the logical analysis of perpetually reproduced systems and actions in order to trace their results and the ways that these results serve various subjects and institutions (Foucault, 2003d; Kearins & Hooper, 1999).

In this chapter, therefore, I analyze the system of differentiations that enable Paralympic experts to act upon the actions of Paralympians, as well as the types of objectives pursued by Paralympic experts, those that enable these experts, and the athletes who voluntarily submit themselves to expert authority. I begin, however, with a discussion of biopolitics: a concept that, according to

Foucaultian disability theorists, best characterizes the processes through which contemporary disabled bodies are differentiated from able bodies as well as from each other (Shildrick, 2005; Sullivan, 2005; Tremain, 2005; 2008; Yates, 2005). I then move to an analysis of how the bio-political construct of normalcy enables certain subjects to act upon the actions of differentiated disabled subjects. Lastly, I address how bio-politics, and normalization specifically, serve to further differentiate AWDs and Paralympians from disabled populations, and I discuss the objectives that this further differentiation allows certain subjects to pursue.

Biopolitics

A number of disability scholars have traced, through genealogy or other means, the systems and objectives that have led to the creation of contemporary disabled subjects (Davis, 1995; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Linton, 1998; Shildrick, 2005; Tremain, 2005). Although many of these scholars admit that the differentiation and marginalization of some form of disabled bodies has taken place in nearly every culture and epoch that has yet been studied, most agree that there was a significant shift, between the early 1700s and the late 20th century, in the way that Western European and North American cultures constructed disability (Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Tremain, 2005). This shift coincided with larger historico-political changes outlined by Foucault, including the rise of the modern, capitalist nation-states in Western Europe, and the wide proliferation of disciplinary technologies that had previously been limited to specific institutions (Foucault, 1995; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Markula & Pringle, 2006).¹¹

¹¹ Disciplinary power, according to Markula and Pringle (2006), is a form of power that is “focused on the control and discipline of bodies and exercised fundamentally ‘by means of surveillance’ [Foucault, 1991, p. 104]” (p. 38). Foucault (2003d) argues that the modern state, and contemporary power relations

According to Foucault (2003d), the adoption of disciplinary technologies by the emerging nation-states gives rise to “a new political form of power” (p. 131). This new form of power is novel because it is “both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (Foucault, 2003d, p. 131). This power is totalizing in that it involves the development of “globalizing and quantitative” knowledge about the bodies and practices of groups of people, or populations (Foucault, 2003d, p. 131). At the same time, it is individualizing in that it involves increasingly intimate “analytical” knowledge of specific bodies and their behaviours, which allows such bodies to be compared, classified and manipulated in relation to population norms (Foucault, 2003d, p. 131). This new form of political power, which seeks to increasingly know and control the bodies of both individuals and populations, is what Foucault refers to as *biopower*, or alternatively, *biopolitics* (Foucault, 2003a; Tremain, 2005; 2006). As Tremain argues (2005), it is the totalizing, individualizing and disciplinary technologies of biopower that “have created, classified, codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies through which some people have been divided from others and *objectivized* as (for instance) physically impaired” (p. 6).

In order to increase their political stability and wealth, the emerging nation-states often pursued biopolitical tactics, and their resulting system of differentiations, (Foucault, 2003d; Tremain, 2005). A politically stable nation-

more generally, must be understood in the context of the proliferation and de-institutionalization of disciplinary power, particularly a form of surveillance and discipline that had hitherto been associated with the church (pastoral power) (p. 131-134). Foucault (1995) also argues that modern disciplinary power involves the wide proliferation of specific disciplinary technologies, such as hierarchical observation, timetables, ranking, classification and examination, that had previously been confined to specific institutions, such as monasteries, hospitals and prisons (Foucault, 1995).

state requires a population large enough to inhabit its land (particularly on its borders) and, at the same time, a population docile enough to be effectively and efficiently governed. A wealthy nation-state requires an economically productive population: a population with an appropriate number of workers; a population with bodies and abilities appropriate to the work required; and a population disciplined enough to work efficiently, consistently and obediently. Biopolitical technologies serve these objectives by enabling a nation-state to: count and control births, deaths and reproductive rates of more or less desirable sub-populations; monitor, categorize, discipline and prescribe certain behaviours, desires, and political beliefs; monitor, categorize, and discipline certain bodies based on their productive and reproductive potential; and finally, encourage individuals to monitor and discipline their own actions, thoughts, bodies and identities. In effect, biopolitical technologies are pursued in order to produce “docile or well-disciplined bodies,” that is, bodies that are “economically efficient but politically obedient: bodies that (are) ideal for employment within the capitalist workforce” (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 40).

The Systemic Differentiation of Abnormal Disabled Subjects

The systemic differentiations between contemporary disabled and able-bodied individuals, and between different *kinds* of disabled individuals, are largely grounded in the biopolitical construct of normalcy. As articulated by Garland-Thomson (2007):

both our bodies and the stories we tell about them are shaped to conform to a standard model of human form and function that is called normal in medical-scientific discourses, average in consumer capitalism, and ordinary in colloquial parlance. The measure of all things human, normal

is the central concept governing the status and value of people in late modernity. It is the abstract principle toward which we are all herded by a myriad of institutional and ideological forces. (p. 114)

The discourse of normalcy, as we now know it, emerged in the 19th century and was central to the construction of contemporary disability, and to the operation of biopower, more generally (Davis, 1995; 2006; Shogan, 1998; Tremain, 2005).

Normalcy gained prominence as a scientific and ideological category for understanding humanity when statisticians, such as Quetelet and Galton, began applying the bell curve and related statistical methods (that had been developed for math and astronomy) to demography and a host of other human sciences (Davis, 2006; Shogan, 1998). Due to the kinds of human characteristics that came to be plotted on bell, or *normal*, curves, differentiating the abnormal from the normal also served to differentiate the underproductive from the productive, the potential threat from the docile worker, the liability from the asset, and the *naturally inferior* from the *naturally superior* (Davis, 1995; Davis, 2006).

Through these differentiations, the construct of normalcy has served to justify existing unequal power relationships, and to categorize and objectify populations according to their economic and political usefulness, where the abnormal, or less useful, populations are constructed as both natural errors and social problems (Davis, 2006; Shogan, 1998; Titchkosky, 2007).

Although individual bodies may have previously been disabled through various social forces, normalcy is markedly different in that it serves to construct and objectify distinct, quantifiable, disabled populations, and furthermore, to construct these populations as social problems that require economic, legislative, discursive and scientific solutions (Shildrick, 2005; Titchkosky, 2007; Tremain,

2005). In this way, normalcy is not only descriptive, but also productive and prescriptive: it produces the norm against which it produces disabled populations; it constructs these disabled populations as problematic errors; and it prescribes normalizing solutions for diminishing or eradicating the very problems that it constructs. Through the mechanisms of normalization, Stiker (1999) argues, the disabled are “designated in order to be made to disappear, they are spoken in order to be silenced” (p. 134).

Although state-supported institutions often undertake normalizing solutions, normalization is neither localized within, nor limited to, institutions and state-apparatuses. Normalization, like power itself, is “a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them” (Foucault, 1978, p. 96). What makes normalization such a potent system of differentiations, therefore, is that it is everywhere: it runs, like capillaries, through large institutions, it plays out in all of our social interactions, and it embeds itself in our thoughts, identities, desires and bodies (Andrews, 1993; Foucault, 1978; Markula & Pringle, 2006).

The power relations enabled by differentiating abnormal disabled bodies, therefore, play out on numerous levels simultaneously. For example, normalcy enables statistical and medical experts to categorize and quantify disabled populations, and to act on the actions of the disabled through social programs designed to manipulate their rates of birth, death, production, reproduction, and consumption (Davis, 1995; Tremain, 2005). At the same time, through normalizing technologies of examination, experts are able to act on the actions of disabled individuals by categorizing them as a member of a problematic population, and then solving the problem by prescribing surgery, prosthesis,

rehabilitation, sterilization and/or institutionalization (Tremain, 2005). At an even more intimate level, disabled people are subjected to the surveillance and discipline of parents, teachers, friends and strangers, who are empowered, though the discourses of normalcy, to judge whether the disabled individual is both sufficiently disabled (i.e., not a faker), and sufficiently attempting to normalize (i.e., not a free-loader). As Foucault (1995) argues: “judges of normality are present everywhere... (and) it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based” (p. 304). Normalcy plays out on one more level as well: the level of the individual. In order to meet the expectations, escape the repercussions, and benefit from the opportunities embedded in each of the normalizing exchanges discussed above, disabled individuals are induced to act upon their own actions, bodies and desires. They are expected to internalize their disabled identity, to defer to the authority of medical experts, to normalize their bodies through rehabilitation, surgery and prosthesis, to increase their economic productivity, and “to desire, at the very least, to be normal” (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 142). It is crucial, therefore, to recognize that disabled people are not simply victims of normalization. They participate, not only as differentiated objects and normalized subjects, but also as normalizing agents who watch, police and discipline themselves and others, in order to pursue their own objectives.

The Objectives of Differentiation and Normalization

The objectives of political stability and national prosperity may well account for the normalizing technologies that are developed and enacted at the level of the nation-state; however, in Foucaultian theory, they cannot fully account for what individuals hope to achieve when they act upon other’s actions. The medical expert, for example, in examining, diagnosing and prescribing

normalizing solutions for a disabled subject, might well be pursuing a number of the objectives outlined by Foucault (2003d). The expert is likely trying to proficiently perform “the exercise of a function or a trade,” which, in the case of a doctor, leads to the significant “accumulation of profits” (Foucault, 2003d, p.140). The expert, through the examination, gets to exercise a great deal of “statutory authority”: an authority that gives his opinions the weight of fact, which, serves to reproduce this differential relationship of power, thereby contributing to the “maintenance of [his or her] privileges” (Foucault, 2003d, p.140).

The differentiating and normalizing actions of family, friends and other non-experts on the actions of disabled subjects can also be traced to a number of the above objectives. More normalized and productive subjects may enjoy exercising their “statutory authority” at the expense of less normalized and productive citizens, and may work hard to ensure the maintenance of their relative position of privilege (Foucault, 2003d, p.140). Similarly, a disabled subject may attempt to appear or become more normal (or at the very least, less abnormal than other disabled subjects) in order to pursue the “accumulation of profits” (in terms of wages or funding), or to exercise and maintain their greater status or authority relative to less normalized disabled subjects (Foucault, 2003d, p.140).

There is yet another objective that, according to Shildrick (2005), motivates the differentiating and normalizing actions of experts, family members, strangers and disabled subjects: the desire to alleviate the anxiety provoked by the categorical instability of disability. Shildrick (2005) argues: “people with disabilities provoke anxiety, not because of their differences as such, but because they are too much like everyone else; worse yet, anyone could become one of them” (p. 765). Because the differentiation of subjects (whether by gender, race or

otherwise) is always an imposed, socially constructed category, these differentiations are always imperfect, unstable and in need of constant reproduction and policing (Bhabha, 1983; Lather, 1991; Rail, 2002; Tremain, 2005). In order to feel less anxious about the instability of one's body, therefore, subjects are induced to incessantly reproduce the structures and discourses that construct human categorizations as natural, innate, constant and mutually exclusive. As Garland-Thomson (2007) argues, disability is particularly difficult to construct in this way:

one of our most tenacious cultural fantasies is a belief in bodily stability, more precisely the belief that bodily transformation is predictable and tractable. Our cultural story of proper human development dares not admit to the vagaries, variations, and vulnerabilities that we think of as disability. (p. 114)

The anxiety produced around disability, therefore, is the result of how difficult it is to create an effective illusion of disability's categorical stability, and in particular, its distance from ourselves (Davis, 2002; Garland-Thomson, 2007; Tremain, 2005). In the words of Shildrick (2005): "each one knows, but cannot acknowledge, that the disabled other is a difference within, rather than external to, the self" (p. 768). It is the constant failure of normalizing technologies to consistently and comprehensively differentiate, distance, and eliminate disability (both from the individual and social body) that motivates both individuals and institutions to expend ever-increasing efforts to reproduce, reinforce, and reaffirm the system of normalization, and the differentiations that it seeks to produce.

The Systemic Differentiation of AWDs and Paralympians

The differentiation of AWDs from other disabled populations, and the

differentiation of Paralympians from other AWDs, are both extensions of the normalizing system of differentiations discussed above. Although some have argued that sport is a means of escaping or transforming disabled identity (Ashton-Shaeffer et al., 2001; Berger, 2004; Brittain, 2004; DePauw, 1997; Guthrie & Castelnuovo, 2001; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; M. Hardin, 2007; Huang & Brittain, 2006; Pensgaard & Sorensen, 2002; Taub et al., 1999), I argue that disability sport also serves to further objectify and differentiate disabled bodies, to submit these bodies to increasingly rationalized technologies of normalization, and to secure the ability of more normalized subjects to act upon the actions of disabled bodies, in order to pursue their own economic, political, statutory and anxiety-related objectives.

Disability sport serves to further objectify and differentiate the disabilities of its athletes in at least three important ways. First, disability sport most often involves segregated sporting competitions, wherein disabled bodies compete only against other disabled bodies, often in different venues, and with different rules and equipment, than their mainstream counterparts (DePauw, 1997; Nixon, 1984).

¹² The very existence of these (mostly) dichotomous and mutually exclusive competitions reifies the existence of categorically different bodies, and furthermore, reproduces the assumption that disabled bodies practice the inferior, unnatural and adapted version of sport, and are therefore not capable of competing with normal, naturally superior, non-disabled bodies (Shogan, 1998).

Second, athletes who wish to compete in disability sport must submit themselves

¹² Some, mostly recreational, sporting activities involve both disabled and non-disabled participants. Much more rare elite sport examples include: the integration of non-disabled athletes into disability sport, and the integration of exceptional individual AWDs into specific mainstream competitions (DePauw, 1997; 2005; Nixon, 1984).

to examinations performed by medical and/or sport experts, in order to be objectified and classified as a legitimate member of a specific, sport-appropriate, disabled population.¹³ Third, once determined to be an AWD, athletes are subject to well established supercrip discourses that consistently forefront their disabilities and thereby relegate any athletic accomplishments to the generalized list of disability-based overcoming (Clare, 1999; M. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; 2005; Smart, 2001; Thomas & Smith, 2003).

Once athletes have been successfully differentiated as appropriately disabled, and thereby become AWDs, they are then submitted to an endless series of normalizing technologies (not unlike those to which able-bodied athletes are submitted) that are most often administered by coaches, trainers, classifiers, referees and other disability sport experts (Howe, 2008; Shogan, 1998; Williams, 1994). If AWDs willingly submit themselves to the authority of these experts, and successfully undergo and internalize the systems of normalization, then they have a much greater chance of undergoing yet another stage of differentiation: they may become Paralympians. In these ways, disability sport serves to both differentiate and normalize disabled bodies, and in so doing, serves to produce new subjects, including disability sport experts, AWDs and Paralympians.

The Objectives Pursued Through Disability Sport and Paralympism

The differentiating and normalizing systems of disability sport meet many of the objectives discussed earlier in this chapter. For example, the explicit justification for many disability sport programs has been their ability to decrease the costs and increase the productive contribution of disabled people to their

¹³ Systems of athlete eligibility and classification, as well as various normalizing technologies of disability sport, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

nation. According to Guttman, the declared founder of the Paralympic Movement, disability sport was developed in order to rehabilitate disabled people so that they may return to “a useful life and employment” (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 15). Similarly, past IPC president Steadward and co-author Peterson (1997) argue that disability sport is important because it “teaches independence,” serves to “integrate the person into society,” and encourages participants “to become healthier, to look critically at their own lifestyle, and to become equal contributors in society” (pp. 15-16). In other words, disability sport is explicitly designed to increase the productivity of disabled populations (employability, usefulness and equal contributors), to decrease the cost of their care (independence, become healthier), and to induce them to fully integrate themselves into the insidious systems and practices of normalization (look critically at their own lifestyle, integrate into society).

The differentiation of Paralympians from other AWDs can also be understood in economic terms. Aside from inducing athletes into increasingly numerous and rationalized technologies of normalization, Paralympism implicates AWDs in the “ever increasing commercial agendas” of the Paralympic Movement (Howe, 2008, p. 69). While the majority of Paralympians remain unpaid and unrepresented within the organizations of Paralympic sport, their images and performances have increasingly been deployed in order to finance disability sport organizations, to profit sponsoring corporations, and to sell the Paralympic Movement and its discourse of empowerment (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008). Whereas a major objective of early disability sport was to prepare AWDs for capitalist productivity (or at the very least, lower their cost of care), contemporary Paralympism has made (at least some of) its Paralympians economically

productive in and of themselves. Paralympians have become un-paid labourers (players in games to which tickets are sold), consumers (of expensive disability sport equipment), and increasingly “the product” to be consumed by Paralympic spectators and advertising audiences (IPC 1996 Task Force report, as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 185).

The differentiating and normalizing technologies of disability sport also serve and restrict, in various ways, the disability sport experts that they create. Most obviously, disability sport grants “statutory authority” to its newly formed experts, allowing them to determine the breadth of their own authority and to exercise this authority by acting on the bodies and behaviours of the AWDs that they claim (Foucault, 2003d, p.140).¹⁴ However, this authority, in order to be maintained, must be exercised within (and must serve to reproduce) a field of discourses and actions that is limited by the differentiating and normalizing technologies from which this authority was formed. Therefore, disability sport experts are induced to reproduce these discourses and technologies in order to pursue a number of objectives, including: “the exercise of (their) function or () trade,” in order to accumulate grants, wages and other profits for themselves and their organisations, and in order to ensure the “maintenance of privileges” and the raised social status of a job that is constructed as benevolent and charitable (Foucault, 2003d, p.140).

Because disability sport participation is, under many circumstances, the choice of AWDs, it is important to also recognize what objectives AWDs may be

¹⁴ For examples of the self-declaration of authority within disability sport, see the founding constitutions of the ISMGF, the ISOD, the ICC and the IPC, as well as the cases of self-declared presidencies in most of these organizations (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008).

pursuing by subjecting themselves to differentiation and normalization.

Objectives pursued by participating AWDs may include: access to recreational and social opportunities; access to sport, rehabilitation or charitable funding; and increases in their social status through normalization and AWD identity. This increased status, however, is invariably reliant upon differentiating AWDs from (and therefore reproducing) the lower status of less normalized disabled subjects. As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, Paralympian identity is an extension of this status-driven differentiation: Paralympians enjoy an increase in social status through differentiating themselves from (and therefore reproducing) the lower status of less normalized AWDs.

Lastly, disability sport also serves those who neither participate in, nor wield authority within, differentiating and normalizing athletic programs. Most notably, the systems, discourses and exhibitions of disability sport (and particularly those of increasingly mediated and commodified Paralympic sport) serve to counter and contain anxiety over disability's categorical instability. They serve to systematically (re)produce distinct, seemingly-stable and oppositional categories of biomedical ability and disability, and furthermore, to create "a spectacle of bodily otherness" that "assure[s] the onlookers that they [are] indeed normal" (Garland-Thomson, 1997, pp.16-17, describing 19th century freak shows).

Chapter 4: Instrumental Modes

*This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects.*¹⁵ (Foucault, 2003d, p. 140)

In this chapter, I will engage with Foucault's (2003d) third point for analyzing relationships of power: the "instrumental modes" through which experts act upon the bodies, identities and actions of AWDs and Paralympians (p. 140). Disability scholars have already theorized many horrific and violent technologies of power that have been used to institutionalize, sterilize, and/or euthanize the disabled against their will (e.g., Borbasi, Bottroff, Williams, Jones, & Douglas, 2008; Malacrida, 2006; Pfeiffer, 1994; Reinders, 2000; Scully, 2008; Turner & Stagg, 2006). Not all forms of disabling power, however, are as well researched or as obviously dangerous. "Despite the fact that power appears to be merely repressive," argues Tremain (2005), "power functions best when it is exercised through productive constraints, that is, when it *enables* subjects to act *in order* to constrain them" (pp. 8, 4). In other words, technologies of power can be effectively used to produce discourses, desires and identities that induce subjects to discipline themselves into an increasingly limited field of possible action (Foucault, 1978; 1995; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Tremain, 2005). In this section, I analyze various technologies of power that are instrumental in producing AWDs

¹⁵ Foucault wrote in a period and academic milieu in which gender-neutral language was rarely used. For the purposes of this thesis, I have interpreted his use of the words *he*, *him*, *his* (when not referring to a specific individual) as a reference to a hypothetical human subject with no specified gender.

and Paralympians, and in enabling, constraining and otherwise acting upon their possible field of action. Rather than analyzing each of these technologies as discrete and uncontextualized practices, I analyze how various technologies of power interact within specific disability-sport contexts, largely drawn from my own experiences of becoming and being a Paralympian.

Athlete Eligibility: Producing AWDs

A prime example of how technologies of power interact in the creation of AWD identity is the process through which potential athletes become eligible to play disability sport. Many disability sport organizations require their participants to have at least a minimum level of disability. Most quad rugby organizations, for example, require that athletes have “some dysfunction in all four limbs” (US Quad Rugby Association). Similarly, to be eligible to compete in the Special Olympics programs, “athletes must have an intellectual disability; a cognitive delay, or a development disability, that is, functional limitations in both general learning and adaptive skills” (*Special Olympics: Athlete resources.*). The US deaf sports organization, along with many similar organizations, require their athletes to have at least a “marked or moderate disability,” which is more precisely defined as, “a hearing loss of 55 decibels (dB) or greater in the better ear” (*USA Deaf Sports Federation.*). What these few examples demonstrate is that disability sports organizations not only require their athletes to *have* disabilities, but also to *have* specific types and/or levels of disability, and to be willing to have their bodies and behaviours quantified and compared to pre-determined disability sport criteria.

The rules and processes of athlete eligibility in disability sport offer extraordinary examples of what Foucault (2003d) identified as “the three modes

of objectification that transform human beings into subjects” (p. 126). These three modes are: scientific classification, dividing practices and subjectivation (Foucault, 2003d; Markula & Pringle, 2006). I address each of these three modes in different sections of this chapter.

I begin with scientific classification, which refers to “modes of inquiry that try to give themselves the status of sciences” (Foucault, 2003d, p.126). The eligibility criteria of disability sport are largely established and justified through scientific modes of inquiry in the fields of medicine, rehabilitation, and more recently, adapted physical activity. In order to establish rules of eligibility, experts from these areas use scientific processes to: (a) categorize and create knowledge about different types and severities of disability (b) develop knowledge about what kinds of activities these different populations of disabled people can and should do (c) develop appropriate sports for these specific populations, and; (c) develop technologies to police the eligibility criteria for each sport. These scientific or quasi-scientific modes of inquiry are therefore highly implicated in determining and justifying the kinds of sports that a given athlete can play, the kinds of athletes that they can play against, the rules by which they must play, and the technologies to which they must submit themselves in order to be allowed to play.

Athlete eligibility, however, is not the only level at which scientific classification is implicated in disability sport. It is also implicated in what the disability sport world appropriately calls *classification*. According to the International Paralympic Committee website (2007), “athletes with disabilities are grouped in classes defined by the degree of function presented by the disability.... Classes are determined by a variety of processes that may include a physical and

technical assessment and observation in and out of competition.” In other words, classification involves the further differentiation, by (mostly able-bodied) experts, of eligible disabled populations into numerically (or alphanumerically) designated subgroups (e.g., class 3.5 or class 1A) (DePauw & Gavron, 2005; Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008). These categories are designed to reflect the scientifically formulated “functional capacity” of participants in a given subgroup, and are arranged hierarchically: with the largest numerical classifications representing those groups with the most *normal* functional capacity (*Home of the IWBF*). These classification categories are then reified through sport structures, which are often organized either in: (a) divisions comprised solely of similar classifications, or (b) teams that must be comprised of an array of classifications. This sport structure, therefore, reproduces the need for classification, and for the expertise of classifiers.

The scientific classification processes that determine eligibility criteria and classification categories involve a number of specific technologies. These include: (a) hierarchical observation, which involves the differentiation of populations based on the scientific observations of experts (b) normalizing judgment, which involves using these observations to differentiate the normal, from the abnormal and to quantify the stages in between, (c) sign systems, which involve the use of alpha-numeric symbols to objectify and rank the normalcy of disabled athletes, and (d) technologies of production, which reify classifications through the development of sports, their rules, and their competition structures (Foucault, 2003e; Shuaib, 2005). Once eligibility criteria and classification categories have been established through these technologies of scientific classification, individual athletes are then subjected to these criteria and categories through Foucault’s

(2003d) second mode of objectification, which he termed “dividing practices” (p. 126). According to Tremain (2006), dividing practices consist of:

modes of manipulation that combine a scientific discourse with practices of segregation and social exclusion in order to categorize, classify, distribute and manipulate subjects who are initially drawn from a rather undifferentiated mass of people. Through these practices, subjects become *objectivized* as (for instance) mad or sane, sick or healthy, criminal or good. (p. 186)

In other words, dividing practices are the means by which specific individuals are singled out of the masses of human variation, categorized within the system of scientific classifications discussed above, and thereby objectified as a specific type of differentiated subject. This process of individual classification and objectification usually involves various technologies of surveillance. The most effective of these, according to Markula and Pringle (2006), is the examination, because it “measures, classifies, differentiates, punishes, rewards, records and qualifies subjects” all within a highly ritualized and scientifically justified procedure (p. 42). Examinations, within disability sport, can occur in a number of more or less official ways. In each case, however, these examinations serve to differentiate disabled individuals from the otherwise undifferentiated masses, to impose, enforce and justify “social and spatial divisions” between the disabled and the able-bodied, and furthermore, to impose similar divisions between differently categorized disabled bodies, based on their degree of normalization (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 26).

The least official of disability sport’s examination processes occurs when potential recreational athletes police their own bodies and behaviours in order to

conform to the stereotypes of the eligible disability group. In such cases, these athletes may only be required to subject themselves to a quick visual and oral examination by the sport's (unofficial) gatekeepers. For example, when I was joining a recreational skiing program, the coach simply asked me: "what happened to you?" My stated diagnosis and the wheelchair that I was sitting in seemed to match their mandate, and I was deemed eligible to rent their equipment. Although unofficial, I understood this process to be an examination: I recognized that refusing to answer, answering in a socially constructionist way (i.e., "society disables me"), or standing up out of my wheelchair, would all potentially disqualify me from accessing their sports equipment and coaching.

Athletes at more competitive levels, as well as athletes who do not conform to visible stereotypes of disability, are often subjected to more official and invasive medical examinations in order to have their disabilities either denied or confirmed and classified. My own experience of trying to become eligible and classified for wheelchair basketball competition in the United States and internationally is a good example of such procedures. Almost all international wheelchair basketball competitions, and most countries' domestic competitions, are ruled by eligibility criteria that are similar to the following National Wheelchair Basketball Association (USA) guidelines¹⁶:

to be eligible for play in the NWBA, a player must have an irreversible lower extremity disability, such as paralysis, amputation, radiological evidence of limb shortening, partial to full joint alkalosis or joint

¹⁶ In some countries, most notably Canada, wheelchair basketball has been availed of all such eligibility criteria for domestic competition. All interested athletes may compete domestically, however they do so under a classification system. All athletes, therefore, must still submit themselves to examinations for classification purposes.

replacement, which consistently interferes with functional mobility.

Findings such as soft tissue contracture, ligamentous instability, edema or disuse atrophy, or symptoms such as pain or numbness, without other objective findings shall not be considered a permanent lower extremity disability. (*Official Rules.*)

My struggle to become eligible under these guidelines involved a number of difficult and invasive steps. I had to: (a) convince my general practitioner that I needed to see a series of specialists about the pain and weakness that I often felt in my legs (sport eligibility is not a valid reason to see such specialists in Alberta, so this often involved lying to my practitioner about why I was seeking a specialist's advice), (b) wait six months to two years to see these specialists, (c) convince specialists to order tests that will objectify, measure and diagnose my bodily *dysfunction*, (d) undergo a battery of invasive bodily surveillance techniques, such as X-rays, MRIs, Needle EMGs, and muscle biopsies, (e) get diagnosed and then convince my specialists to write a letter about my results, and (f) submit my test results and my body to examination by a committee of classifiers who eventually determined both my eligibility and my classification. Thankfully, my eligibility and classification process took *only* three years. I have teammates, however, who had to undergo another even more invasive step. Because most eligibility guidelines state that one has to have an "irreversible lower extremity disability," some athletes are told that, in order to compete, they have to undergo expensive, experimental, painful and/or risky surgical procedures that could potentially reverse their physical symptoms (*Official Rules.*). For one teammate in particular, this process added an additional three years to the eligibility process (due to surgery wait times, rehabilitation, and then repetition of all of the above

procedures). *Luckily*, after this six-year process, the experimental surgery left more damage than it fixed, and therefore this athlete was deemed eligible to compete in both the NWBA and international competition.

The technologies of AWD eligibility and classification discussed above correspond to Foucault's first two modes of objectification (scientific classification and dividing practices) which, according to Markula and Pringle (2006), "are primarily concerned with how people are classified, disciplined and normalised by social processes that they have little direct control over" (p. 24). In the following sections, I analyze disability sport technologies that correspond with Foucault's (2003d) third mode, which he called "subjectivation" (p. 126). Subjectivation, according to Tremain (2006), is concerned with the processes by which "subjects become tied to an identity and come to understand themselves scientifically" (p. 186). In other words, it involves individuals coming to understand their own bodies as disabled, internalizing the classifications given to them, and identifying themselves as AWDs. This subjectivation of AWDs involves a large number of disciplinary technologies that induce athletes to discipline their own bodies, behaviours, discourses and identities in order to conform to both the disabled and athletic expectations of their AWD identities.

The Surveillance and Discipline of Disabled Identity

Once athletes are deemed eligible and are classified, their disabilities continue to be subjected to various technologies of surveillance and discipline. For example, in the sport of wheelchair basketball, athletes are issued official classification cards that contain their name, picture, classification, and equipment setup. This card must then be submitted to sports officials at every national and international game, so that it can be assessed and used by scoring officials,

classifiers, referees,¹⁷ and potentially by other coaches if they question a player's classification. There is constant suspicion that functional classifications of athletes are unfair: that athletes exaggerate their disabilities in order to get a lower, and therefore more favourable, classification (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). Players are therefore constantly watched by suspicious classifiers, coaches, adversaries and teammates: they are watched while they practice and train, they are captured on video and assessed, and, despite claims that functional classification is based purely on sport performance (DePauw & Gavron, 2005), they are also, in my experience, watched once they leave the court: their bodies, behaviours and identities are assessed by the ways that they walk, wheel, transfer, or answer questions about their disabilities.

In order to guard against these suspicions, coaches and teammates have often encouraged me to play and behave more like the majority of those in my classification and gender categories. They have advised me not to walk and not to set up my equipment to maximize my stability. They have also, at times, advised me not to use some of the more difficult skills that I developed (like tilting up on one wheel), because, even though many men of my classification had mastered them, they were not yet seen as typical (or perhaps even possible) for women of the same functional classification. As my skill level and my investment in the sport increased, I became increasingly expectant of perpetual surveillance,

¹⁷ Sociology of sport scholars have theorized the role of referees in the production of well-disciplined athletic bodies (Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999). Referees in disability sport have a similar role of policing athletic bodies, but have the additional role of policing disabled bodies. Despite having no requirement for medical or sports classification training, referees police the disabilities of AWDs by measuring their equipment, policing their equipment setup, and assessing *physical advantage fouls* to players who are deemed to have used their relative physical ability in inappropriate ways (such as hopping a chair or balancing on the front two wheels).

increasingly conscious of the behavioural expectations of those who were watching me, and increasingly motivated to meet those expectations. This constant expectation of surveillance, and its accompanying sense of obligation to comply, are what Foucault theorized as panopticism. Although most famously exemplified by a specific architectural design for prison surveillance, panopticism can refer to any situation where a subject is perpetually submitted to the potential of surveillance, and can never be assured of not being watched (Andrews, 2000; Foucault, 1995; Markula & Pringle, 2006). In the words of Foucault (1995), panopticism is at play when:

he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (pp. 202-203)

The self-surveillance and self-discipline that panopticism induces in AWDs takes many different forms. Within disability sport competitions, athletes submit their own classification cards at competitions, they identify their disabilities and classifications when asked, they register in classification-appropriate competitions, they set up their equipment in accordance with the rules and expectations of their classification, they submit their bodies and their equipment to institutionalized surveillance, and they manage their behaviours, both on and off the field of play, according to disability-specific expectations.

This web of disability surveillance, and its induced self-surveillance and self-discipline, are not limited to the venues and practices of disability sport. For a number of athletes, including myself, AWD and Paralympian identities create an

uncomfortable juxtaposition between bodies that might otherwise have passed as able-bodied, and mainstream expectations about what Paralympian or AWD bodies look and act like. In my case, qualifying for the Paralympics increased both the media attention that I received and my personal investment in my Paralympian identity. Both of these factors served to widely out me as disabled, and therefore to extend the potential agents of disability surveillance across my entire community. I learned very quickly that being seen standing, as well as switching back and forth between ambulation and the use of crutches and wheelchairs, tended to result in uncomfortable stares, demands for explanations, angry accusations, and a wide variety of other forms of daily surveillance and discipline. For example, after winning a major athletic award, I was interviewed by *Chatelaine* magazine. The first question that the reporter asked me was: “how does it feel to no longer be able to walk?” After I told the reporter that I could still walk, there was a five-second silence, followed by the angry and confused outcry: “but you are a Paralympian!” I spent the next thirty minutes of the interview explaining my disability to the reporter. Despite my efforts, the headline of the *Chatelaine* article reads: “How it Feels to No Longer Walk” (How it feels to no longer walk, 2007). In a subsequent interaction, a man that I had just recently met saw me stand up out of my wheelchair and began angrily yelling: “cheater! Cheater! Faker!” until I calmed him with appropriately tragic stories about my degenerative neuromuscular disease.

As a result of experiencing these kinds of interactions on a daily basis, I have become increasingly conscious of behaviours that are inconsistent with my Paralympian identity. Most notably, I have become self-conscious about leaving my apartment without my crutches or wheelchair. However, consistently passing

as disabled does not preclude further surveillance of one's disabled identity. In fact, consistent markers of my disability, such as wheelchairs or crutches, often induce complete strangers, such as taxi drivers, reporters, classmates, teachers and people off the street, to ask what Samuels (2003) calls the "ubiquitous question," that is, to ask after the nature and origin of my disability (p. 239). In short, since adopting my Paralympian identity, I have come to expect that my *disabled* body and behaviours will be under constant surveillance and questioning. Furthermore, when the nature, type, or existence of my disability is questioned, or even when I receive an inquisitive look, I feel, in the words of Samuels (2003), "obliged to respond with an extended narrative," explaining what my disability is, how it functions, how it came about, and how I am working to try to overcome it (p. 239).

This sense of obligation to identify and explain one's disability, in biomedical terms, to complete strangers is exemplified in a number of autobiographies written by Paralympians. As a rule, Paralympic autobiographies tend to construct, rather early on, a tragic and detailed account of what the Paralympian's biomedical disability is, and how it came about (Grey-Thompson, 2002; Juette & Berger, 2008; Miller, 2008; Zupan & Swanson, 2006). The compulsion of Paralympians (and their editors) to recite biomedical details of disablement, however, not only applies to the author's disability but also to the disabilities of their teammates and competitors. For example, Zupan and Swanson (2006) introduce rugby teammate Burt Burns by stating that he "had been injured by a drunk driver," and introduced teammate Bobby Lujano by explaining that he:

didn't have any forearms, hands, or lower legs and feet, just rounded, scarred nubs at his elbows and knees. I would later learn that he had

contracted meningococemia, a rare form of meningitis, when he was a boy, and the doctors had to amputate. (pp. 203-204)

Juette and Berger (2008) first introduce dozens of athletes in a similar way. For example, they tell the reader that: “Frog’s disability stemmed from a car accident he had in 1986 when he was twenty-two years old,” and that, “Eric was born with scoliosis of the spine” (p. 94, 97). Juette and Berger (2008) then follow each of these introductions with a paragraph detailing the exact events of disablement, and the exact nature of the disability.

This compulsion to explain the disabilities of other AWDs, and to characterize them in purely biomedical terms, is not isolated to a few Paralympian autobiographies. I have witnessed, and participated in, this ritual on the sidelines of countless games. We athletes point out fellow athletes to family, friends and reporters, introducing each athlete by the dependable triad: their name, their disability, and the story of how they became disabled. In so-doing, we put the spectators at ease by reaffirming and reproducing the able/disabled divide. We enable the spectators to feel comfortably distant from the abnormal bodies on display, and to feel comfortably normal in comparison. And perhaps, by participating in the voyeuristic policing and disabling of our friends, we momentarily bring our own bodies out of the disabling gaze: we are normal, for the duration of the story, at least, because we are not as freakish as *them*.

The Surveillance and Discipline of Athletic Identity

Disciplinary technologies of disability sport serve to produce subjects that are not only adequately differentiated as disabled, but also adequately normalized through athleticism. The increased elitism of disability sport, and in particular, Paralympic sport, has resulted in the adoption of a host of normalizing

disciplinary technologies from elite mainstream sport, and a host of other techniques for differentiating elite Paralympians from their less normalized and less-disciplined AWD counterparts.

Many sport theorists have argued that the technologies of elite sport serve to produce well-disciplined, normalized athletic subjects that are economically productive, politically compliant and, more generally, useful for the perpetuation of existing power relations (Andrews, 1993; 2000; Chase, 2006; Hargreaves, 1987; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Pringle & Markula, 2005; Shogan, 1999). Sport, according to Andrews (2000), “is implicated as an optic of modern disciplinary power: a mechanism of surveillance which renders visible and intelligible the normal body, and the abnormal body against which the norm is constituted” (p. 124). Elite sport, therefore, functions both to normalize differentiated bodies, and to further differentiate bodies that do not adequately pass as normal, or at the very least, that do not strive to pass as normal. Elite disability sports, and specifically Paralympic sports, have adopted many normalizing and differentiating disciplinary technologies from mainstream elite sport. For example, elite AWDs and Paralympians are disciplined by the rules of their sports: rules that, according to Shogan (1999), “*prescribe* certain actions, *proscribe* others actions, and *describe* boundaries or contexts within which these actions make sense” (p. 4). They are disciplined into following these rules by potential negative consequences (e.g., disqualification, accusations of cheating), by potentially positive rewards (e.g., encouragement from coaches, prizes for winning, status), and by the internalization of these rules, based on the recognition that one’s behaviours and body are constantly under surveillance (by sports officials, coaches, other athletes, and spectators) (Andrews, 2000; Markula & Pringle, 2006).

The training programs of Paralympians and elite AWDs also involves many of the same disciplinary technologies used on mainstream elite athletes. Both streams of athletes subject their bodies and behaviours to the surveillance, measurement, and classification of numerous experts, so that these experts can better implement what Andrews (2000) describes as, “regimes of measured, corrective and continuous corporal training, designed to facilitate the controlled manufacturing of suitably docile bodies” (p. 122). Coaches, for example, use “the organization and regulation of time, space, and movements” in order to “train, shape, and impress bodies with the habituated gestures, procedures, and values of a discipline” (Shogan, 1999, p. 9). In my experience, coaches often subject their athletes to repetitive drills; they time, count or otherwise measure the athletes’ performances; they punish sub-normal performances through physical pain, continued repetition, and/or chastisement and humiliation; they reward above-normal performances with water breaks, encouragement and better competitive opportunities.

Head coaches, however, are not the only experts to whom athletes are induced to submit: their bodies are also subject to surveillance, measurement, rewards and repercussions from a wide variety of other agents. Examples from my own Paralympic career include: assistant coaches, shooting coaches, conditioning coaches, fitness trainers, sport doctors, nutritionists, sport psychologists, physiologists, physiotherapists, athletic therapists, stretch therapists, massage therapists, managers, marketers, sport administrators, anti-doping officers, and urine and blood analysts.¹⁸ Each of these agents has a role in

¹⁸ Blood and urine tests are collected randomly for anti-doping procedures and increasingly collected for use by team doctors and coaches who use them to gauge the health and training efforts of athletes.

the production of well-disciplined and normalized athletic bodies: bodies that can be increasingly “subjected, used, transformed and improved” according to the objectives of experts, institutions, states, and athletes themselves (Foucault, 1995, p. 128).

Not unlike the process of disability-identification discussed above, AWDs eventually internalize the constant athletic surveillance over their bodies and learn to watch and discipline their own bodies according to normative expectations. Elite AWDs, like their AB counterparts, often survey and discipline many of their own training sessions: submitting their own bodies to painful and/or highly repetitive training regimes, recording and measuring their own performances of said regime, and punishing and rewarding themselves accordingly. In this way, disciplinary technologies not only induce individuals to submit themselves to greater discipline, but also induce “individuals [to] enthusiastically discipline themselves” (Hargreaves, 1987, p. 141).

The interaction of disabled and elite athletic identities in AWDs, and specifically in Paralympians, often plays out through the discursive and structural distancing of elite, normalized and well-disciplined athletes from other less normalized disabled populations. For example, in the book, *The Cultural Politics of the Paralympic Movement*, sports anthropologist, and former Paralympian, Howe (2008) argues that certain Paralympians deserve to share the elite status of their Olympic cousins. The raised status of the elite athlete, according to Howe, should not be the consequence of a body’s aesthetics or performances but of an athlete’s “intensive and long-term commitment to training and competition,” and to their willingness to “mak[e] sacrifices both socially and physically that are part of the cultural capital that elite athletes hold” (Howe, 2008, p. 57). In other words,

Howe argues that the social status of AWDs should be defined by the level of discipline and surveillance that they willingly submit themselves to. Although this proposal appears inclusive, the raised status of certain well-disciplined Paralympians is achieved by differentiating them from AWDs who are perceived as less willing, or less able, to submit themselves to elite sport's disciplinary regimes. This exclusionary side of Howe's inclusive argument is exemplified by his differentiation of elite, well-disciplined INAS-FID Paralympians (athletes with minor intellectual disabilities who compete in the Paralympics) to his unsubstantiated construction of the undisciplined AWDs of the Special Olympics. Howe (2008) writes:

the athletes from the INAS-FID are not as impaired as those athletes who participate in the Special Olympics, as they do compete to win and, importantly, have some understanding of what that means... Special Olympians appear to have very limited understanding of their sport or training.... Their involvement can be seen as charitable, but because of the cognitive developmental level of many of the participants they could be simply going for a walk in the park on a sunny day rather than doing sport. (p. 48)

Howe's differentiation of Paralympians from Special Olympians is echoed by many Paralympians and Paralympic organizers. A classic example occurs in the movie *Murderball* (2005), when Scott Hogsett, a USA Quad Rugby athlete, is congratulated for going to the Special Olympics. Scott recalls, "all of a sudden I went from being THE MAN at the wedding to a fucking retard (*sic*)! And it was the worst feeling... we're not going for a hug, we're going for a fucking Gold medal!" (Rubin et al., 2005).

The attempt to distance more normalized Paralympic athletes from their less normalized counterparts also occurs at the level of Paralympic Administration. Bailey's (2008) history of the Paralympic Movement is full of examples, including IPC member, Lebanowich's argument that the "admission of mentally retarded (*sic*) persons to a Paralympic competition would be detrimental to the sports movement of the disabled" (p. 95). According to Bailey (2008), even Atha, the president of INAS-FID, argued that "competitors should have minimum standards stringently applied, and that people with learning difficulties should not be admitted to the Paralympic Games. Only the highest standards would be acceptable" (p. 134). It is Aberger, the IPC treasurer, however, who was most straightforward about the motivation for continually marginalizing the most stigmatized athletes within the movement. In response to the proposal to include INAS-FID athletes, according to Bailey (2008), "[Auberger] stressed that the press would be watching very closely, and, 'we cannot permit the Games to be discredited'" (p. 134).

It is clear, not only in discourse but also in action and structure, that the Paralympic administration considers certain kinds of Paralympians more discrediting than others. Athletes who discipline themselves into the desired image of elite, normalized and yet visibly disabled Paralympians are rewarded with opportunities to compete in the events that receive the most media, sponsor and spectator attention, and that are also the most integrated with able-bodied sport. The IPC, for instance, negotiates with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic hosting committee about which Paralympic events will be included as demonstration sports during the Olympic Games. The proposals put forward by the IPC, and accepted by the IOC and hosting committees, have

tended to largely include the most functional classifications of wheelchair athletes to the exclusion of, or relative marginalization of, blind athletes, athletes with intellectual disabilities, athletes with cerebral palsy, athletes with higher level spine lesions, and many of the athletes categorized as *les autres*¹⁹ (Bailey, 2008).

This exclusive inclusion of Paralympians can be seen both as an expression of institutionalized power relations within the IPC, and as a conscious IPC decision to brand Paralympians as, on the one hand, elite, normalized and well-disciplined, and on the other hand, clearly distinguishable as disabled (Bailey, 2008; Ellwood, 2006; Howe, 2008). According to Smith (2005), there is a similar trend in the inclusion of elite AWDs in the Commonwealth Games.

Smith (2005) argues that:

[a] consequence of the inclusion of [elite AWDs] in the Games was that in the process of being constrained to convey what some (and the media in particular) might consider to be a ‘sporting spectacle’ to the audience, those athletes with what might be considered as more severe disabilities were largely excluded (consciously and otherwise) from the programme.
(p. 63)

Even when less normalized AWDs are included in elite disability sporting events, their presence is often discursively and structurally marginalized from the sporting spectacle. For example, when the IPC and the organizing committee of the 1996 Atlanta Paralympics begrudgingly included athletes with intellectual

¹⁹ The *les autres* category includes athletes who are deemed to have sufficient physical disabilities to compete, but cannot be categorized in any of the other disability groups. The *les autres* category includes athletes who are diagnosed as having “dwarfism, limb deficiencies, muscular dystrophy, osteogenesis imperfecta, postpolio conditions, and multiple sclerosis” (Mastro, Burton, Rosendahl, & Sherrill, 1996, p. 200).

disabilities in a handful of swimming and athletic events, they managed to almost completely hide these same athletes from the spectators and the media: neglecting to announce the INAS-FID athletes at the opening ceremonies, and entirely excluding INAS-FID competitions and results from all of the daily information bulletins (Bailey, 2008, p. 181).

My last, and most extreme example of how Paralympic sport serves to distance Paralympians from less normalized AWDs, is the recent erosion of competitive opportunities for the least normalized and athletic-looking competitors: those competing in categories designated for women and for the *severely disabled* (Bailey, 2008; DePauw, 1994; 1999; Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Rayes, 2000; Sherrill, 1997). As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the IPC has adopted various elite sport technologies and discourses that have made it increasingly difficult for a sufficient number of athletes in these categories to qualify for the Paralympic Games, as well as making it increasingly easy for the IPC to permanently cancel events with insufficient participants. As a result, AWDs from these cancelled competitions are faced with one of two options: (a) to submit themselves to increasing levels of normalizing elite sport discipline, in the hopes of qualifying to compete against athletes with considerably higher functional potential, or (b) to withdraw their own insufficiently athletic-looking bodies from Paralympic competition. Regardless of what option these athletes choose, the result is an increasingly athletic-looking Paralympic spectacle containing categorically disabled, yet sufficiently able Paralympians.

To summarize, in this chapter, I argued that the experts of rehabilitation, medicine and APA use technologies of scientific classification to differentiate and

categorize disabled sub-populations, and to develop appropriate sports for these sub-populations. I argued that disability sport experts then use examinations, and other dividing practices, to confirm each athlete's disability, to categorize its type and severity, and to decide which sports each athlete can play. I then demonstrated how, through various technologies of subjectivation, athletes are induced to attach themselves to both their disabled and athletic identities, to submit themselves to the surveillance and discipline of an increasing number of people, to internalize this surveillance and discipline, and to differentiate themselves from other, less normalized, disabled subjects. All of these technologies, or instrumental modes, serve to simultaneously differentiate subjects, and to normalize them into increasingly useful and well-disciplined forms. They serve to induce AWDs and Paralympians to participate in the very processes that serve to limit their own field of possible action.

Unfortunately, my own athletic career is full of examples where I have colluded with disability sport technologies that have drastically limited my own field of possible action. As I became more successful in the sport of wheelchair basketball, I felt an increasing identification with the term *Paralympian*, and along with it, a growing motivation to train hard, to differentiate myself from less normalized AWDs, and to enthusiastically submit myself to the disciplinary technologies of my sport. When I realized the toll that some of these technologies were having on my health, and on the disablement of myself and others, I became a much less enthusiastic participant in these technologies. For fear of losing all that Paralympism offered me, however, I often participated nonetheless. My participation in the technologies that limit my own field of possible action, however, has not been limited to the athletic sphere. As discussed earlier in this

chapter, embracing my Paralympian identity involved subjecting myself to the constant pressure to look, act and pass as disabled, both on the court and on the street. Although I felt this pressure from classifiers, coaches, teammates, reporters, academics and absolute strangers, the most compelling pressure has been that which has grown within myself. I have internalized disability surveillance and discipline well. Even alone, in my hotel room after a game, I struggle to stand up out of my wheelchair to enter the shower. Whereas the struggle was once a physical manipulation of hip muscle against the impossible height of the bathtub, this struggle is now overshadowed by another more anxiety-provoking one: the struggle to retain some semblance of authentic Paralympian identity while walking through a narrow, seemingly wheelchair-proof doorway.

Chapter 5: Institutionalization and Degrees of Rationalization

The problem for a modern promoter, therefore, is how to reconfigure the nineteenth-century freak show for a late-twentieth century audience. What kind of exhibition would be grotesquely fascinating, politically correct, and a sure draw? (Stulman Dennet, 1996, p. 320)

In this chapter, I will engage with Foucault's final two points for analyzing relationships of power. The first of these two points, "*forms of institutionalization*," refers to the ways that a specific relationship of power interacts with existing institutions, as well as how it develops its own "specific loci, its own regulations, its hierarchical structures that are carefully defined" (Foucault, 2003d, p. 141). The second of these two points, "*the degrees of rationalization*," refers to the elaborateness of a specific relationship of power "in terms of the effectiveness of its instruments and the certainty of its results" (Foucault, 2003d, p. 141). In other words, the degrees of rationalization refers to the efficiency, reliability and adaptability of the technologies and relations that allow certain subjects to act upon the actions of other subjects. Using these two concepts, I argue that the increasing institutionalization and rationalization of Paralympic power relations is inextricable from its adoption and adaptation of the technologies, discourses and structures of three key antecedent institutions: mainstream sport, the freak show and biomedical rehabilitation. I begin this chapter with brief introductions to each of these three antecedent institutions, and then follow with a more detailed, chronological, discussion of how the increasing integration of these institutions within disability sport have enabled Paralympic experts to further institutionalize and rationalize their ability to act upon the actions of Paralympians.

Three Antecedent Institutions

Mainstream Sport

By the time that disability sport institutions emerged in the 1940s, sport was well established as a means to produce well-disciplined, economically efficient and politically docile bodies (Andrews, 2000; Hargreaves, 1987; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999). According to Wassong (2000), sport was explicitly used in working class schools across Europe and America in order to produce physically fit and obedient workers and soldiers. Within the more privileged school systems (public in England, private in the U.S.), sport was explicitly used to produce self-confident and self-disciplined leaders, military officers, and gentlemen (Wassong, 2000). These same class distinctions formed the basis of the European professional and amateur sports system: a system that reproduced social difference, justified class-based hierarchies and produced politically and economically useful subjects (Andrews, 2000; Wassong, 2000). These normalizing technologies and segregated structures of sport had also already proven useful for the reproduction and justification of race and gender inequalities (Andrews, 2000; Hargreaves, 1987; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999).

There are a number of sporting technologies, discourses and structures that have enabled political, economic and sports authorities to act upon the actions of sport participants with a great deal of efficiency, reliability and adaptability. For example, despite the fact that sports are often designed to measure skills that the dominant culture, class and gender most value, they are discursively constructed as politically neutral measures of the *natural* physical and/or mental ability of specific athletes and of particular populations (B. Hardin & Hardin, 2004;

Hargreaves, 1987; Markula & Pringle, 2006; Shogan, 1999). Sport, these scholars argue, serves to reproduce and reify the *natural* superiority of the race, gender and class of those who establish and govern sport, and to justify the social and sporting hierarchies that further differentiate and segregate differently racialized, gendered and classed populations (Andrews, 2000; Shogan, 1999; Theberge, 1991; 1997). Furthermore, the systems of reward and punishment that are embedded in sport are designed to encourage members of these segregated populations to develop and perfect the specific skills needed for their population-specific sports: skills that most often serve the objectives of the political, social and economic elite (e.g., the importance of brute strength and discipline in the originally working-class sport of football) (Andrews, 2000; B. Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Sage, 1990). In this way, the seemingly politically neutral sporting processes encourage participants to “enthusiastically discipline themselves” into more ideally productive and normalized forms, thereby minimizing both the economic cost of discipline and the political risk of revolt (Hargreaves, 1987, p. 141). As I will argue in the upcoming section “The Institutionalization and Rationalization of the Paralympic Movement,” disability sport is an excellent example of how sporting technologies are adapted to specific populations in order to more efficiently and reliably induce athletes to enthusiastically discipline their own bodies in accordance with the objectives of experts and the state.

The Freak Show

The emergence of institutionalized disability sport in the 1940s coincided with the shift away from carnival-style freak shows in America and Europe. Freak shows, at the height of their popularity in the 19th through to the mid 20th centuries, were highly profitable circuses, carnivals, and dime-museums that

paraded racialized, disabled, hermaphroditic or otherwise differentiated bodies in such a way as to attract mostly white, able-bodied spectators, or ‘gawkers’ (Bogdan, 1988; Clare, 1999; Garland-Thomson, 1996; Lindfors, 1996). These shows came in a wide variety of forms, but the more rationalized and successful versions tended to share most of the following characteristics: they dichotomized human variation; they amplified abnormality; they exploited performers; they were designed to induce the able-bodied gaze; and they colluded with dominant discourses.

First, freak shows dichotomized human variation by collapsing a wide range of racialized, gendered and disabled bodies into two categories: the abnormal freaks on display and the normal spectator. In the words of Garland-Thomson (1997): “perhaps the freak show’s most remarkable effect was to eradicate distinctions among a wide variety of bodies, conflating them under a single sign of the freak-as-other” (p. 62). Second, freak shows amplified abnormality by reducing performers to their abnormal trait, and by using costumes, choreography and embellished origin narratives to exaggerate, exotify and otherwise amplify their abnormality (Bogdan, 1988; Coco Fusco, 1995; Garland-Thomson, 1997). Third, the freak shows exploited their performers by consistently attracting paying spectators while consistently procuring cheap or free freak labour. Although certain well-established freaks were economic partners in the shows in which they performed, the majority of them were either grossly underpaid (because disabled bodies, for example, had no other employment options) or were forced to perform for free because the exhibitors had bought (from parents), stolen (from other countries) or been granted legal guardianship of the freaks in their shows (Bogdan, 1988; Garland-Thomson,

1996). Fourth, exhibitioners acted upon the bodies and actions of freaks in order to induce seemingly white, able-bodied spectators to gawk at the freaks, to distance themselves from the freaks, to feel more normal in comparison, to feel less anxious about their identities and to pay well and often for this service (Bogdan, 1988; Clare, 1999; Clark & Myser, 1996; Garland-Thomson, 1996; 1997; Larsen & Haller, 2002)²⁰. As Garland-Thomson (1997) argues, “such shows choreographed human variation into a spectacle of bodily otherness that united their audiences in opposition to the freak’s aberrance and assured the onlookers that they were indeed normal” (pp. 16-17). The fifth characteristic of successful freak shows was their ability, in the 19th and early 20th centuries at least, to co-opt, reproduce, justify and otherwise collude with the imperialist, patriotic, anthropological, medical, ableist, heteronormative and racist discourses of their time (Coco Fusco, 1995; Garland-Thomson, 1996; Rothfels, 1996). Although collusion with dominant discourses was once their strength, the inability of carnival-style freak shows to adapt to the changing discourses of the 20th century would eventually lead to their downfall, or at the very least, to their transformation.

The carnival-style freak shows were not the only dichotomizing, amplifying, exploitative, voyeuristic and discursively colluding institutions of the 19th and 20th centuries. Carnival-style freak shows co-existed, and in many ways colluded with, touring exhibitions of racialized, disabled, hermaphroditic and

²⁰ This is not to say that all spectators necessarily partook of the freak show for the same reasons, but rather that exhibitioners were often explicit about the spectatorship that they attempted to induce, and the differentiating and normalizing effects that they orchestrated and sold (Garland-Thomson, 1996; Bogdan, 1988;). The ‘gawkers’ to whom I refer, therefore, can be understood as the spectatorship that the freak shows attempted to draw.

otherwise abnormal freaks by anthropologists, teratologists and bio-medical physicians (Bogdan, 1988; Clare, 1999; Davis, 2006; Coco Fusco, 1995; Garland-Thomson, 1996; 1997; Lindfors, 1996; Rothfels, 1996). These science-based freak shows, however, were much more rationalized than their carnival counterparts, and were thus much more able to adapt to the changing discourses of the 20th century. “By the 1940s,” according to Garland-Thomson (1997), “scientists had transformed the freak into a medical specimen” (p. 75). This transformation, although discursively constructed as progress, equated to similar or worse conditions for the freaks on display: whereas carnival freaks were dressed up in elaborate costumes, medical specimens were often stripped naked in front of large audiences; whereas some freaks earned income, all specimens were unpaid legal charges of their scientific guardians; whereas freaks often co-opted the discourses of awe in order to laugh at the spectators, specimens were subject to the much more rationalized and less empowering discourses of pity (Bogdan, 1988; Clare, 1999; Garland-Thomson, 1996).

According to disability and post-colonial scholars, dichotomizing, amplifying, voyeuristic, exploitative and discursively colluding freak shows continue to thrive in contemporary Western cultures. “The problem for a modern promoter,” according to Stulman Denet (1996), “is how to reconfigure the nineteenth-century freak show for a late-twentieth century audience. What kind of exhibition would be grotesquely fascinating, politically correct, and a sure draw?” (p. 320). Promoters have found many profitable answers to this quandary, including: anthropological, ethnographic, medical, biological, and multi-cultural exhibits (Bogdan, 1996; Clark & Myser, 1996; Garland-Thomson, 1996; Lawrence & Jette, 1996); reality TV shows, talk shows, inspirational dramas,

science fiction and charity telethons (Hahn, 1988a; Larsen & Haller, 2002; McRuer, 2006a; Stulman Denet, 1996; Weinstock, 1996); and, I argue, modern Paralympic sport.

Biomedical Rehabilitation

The 1940s emergence of disability sport coincided with a period of increased rationalization and medicalization of all aspects of disability (Garland-Thomson, 1996; Linton, 1998). Biomedical experts and institutions were increasingly able to co-opt the technologies, discourses, and cultural roles of freak shows and other religious and community-based responses to bodily difference, and therefore were able to more efficiently, effectively and consistently exercise both their trade and their authority on an increasing number of disabled bodies. This shift was partially due to the continued proliferation of Enlightenment philosophies that equated scientific inquiry with objectivity, truth, authority and benevolence, and partially due to the integration of biomedicine into the biopolitical apparatuses of the Western nation-states (Flax, 1992; Rail, 2002; Tremain, 2005). I have already discussed various technologies of biomedicine in previous chapters of this thesis; however, it is worth reiterating the significance of biomedicine's dividing practices. It is dividing practices, and in particular, examinations, which enable biomedical experts to differentiate subjects and to offer these subjects, individualized normalizing prescriptions. Dividing practices enable bio-medical experts to adjust their technologies and discourses to a wide range of specific situations: a trait that is the hallmark of a highly rationalized institution (Foucault, 2003d; Tremain, 2005).

As biomedicine became the dominant institution through which disability, and its social and economic costs, was determined, there developed countless

spin-off institutions and experts whose roles were to treat, solve or diminish the social problems caused by disabled bodies. Biomedical solutions, though taking on a myriad of forms, tended to fall into two categories: (a) the further differentiation and segregation of disabled bodies by incarcerating or exterminating them in the most economically efficient means possible (e.g., institutionalization, sterilization, euthanasia), or (b) to attempt to reintegrate disabled bodies back into social and economic usefulness through normalization (e.g., surgery, prosthetics, rehabilitation) (Clare, 1999; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Linton, 1998). The latter category, and particularly the rehabilitation solution, became increasingly popular and powerful in the wake of the first and second World Wars, due partially to the potential economic burden and political resistance that might have resulted from putting thousands of wounded war heroes in dehumanizing institutions (Anderson, 2003; Linton, 1998). The rehabilitation alternative, therefore, gained strength in the post-war years, and in so doing, developed its own experts, disciplinary practices, and highly rationalized discourses of progress, empowerment, humanitarianism, and citizenship (Anderson, 2003; Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Linton, 1998). As I demonstrate in the following section, it did not take a large institutional shift to incorporate the normalizing technologies of sport and the voyeuristic technologies of freak shows into the normalizing institutions of rehabilitation.

The Institutionalization and Rationalization of Paralympism

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there is a tendency to paint Paralympic history as a progression from exploitative freak shows (and other tragic disability stories), through benevolent rehabilitative disability sport, and on to today's empowering, elite Paralympic Movement. In this section, I

demonstrate, instead, how the integration of the technologies, discourses and structures of mainstream sport, freak shows, and bio-medical rehabilitation have led to the increased institutionalization and rationalization of the Paralympic power relations that empower experts to act on the bodies and actions of Paralympians. Ideally, such an analysis would trace the many minute events that have led to the emergence of contemporary Paralympism. For the sake of scope, however, I am limiting this analysis to an alternate reading of the pivotal institutional (trans)formations highlighted within other historians' progress narratives. These are: the first Stoke Mandeville Games; the development of International Organisations of Sport for persons with a Disability (IOSDs); the creation of the International Coordinating Committee (ICC); and the Paralympic Movement under the rule of the IPC (Bailey, 2008; Legg et al., 2004; Steadward & Peterson, 1997).

The Stoke Mandeville Games: Reframing Paralympic Origins

Despite evidence for earlier, and relatively contemporaneous, disability sports and leagues, most Paralympic histories trace the origins of the Paralympic Movement to Sir. Ludwig Guttmann's rehabilitating sports programs in the early 1940s in England (Bailey, 2008; DePauw, 2001; Goodman, 1986; Howe, 2008; Legg et al., 2004; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). The relationship between Guttmann's disability sport programs and institutionalized rehabilitation is widely acknowledged (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2008; Goodman, 1986). Although sporting activities, such as throwing balls and hitting pucks with crutches, were first invented and recreationally enjoyed by Stoke's patients, Guttmann quickly adapted, formalized, regimented and imposed these sporting practices for the explicit purpose of returning injured war veterans to economically useful, or at the

very least, less economically costly, lives (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2008). As described by Guttman's then-secretary, Joan Scruton: "they had to do a sport. It was part of the treatment... like taking their medicine, or doing physiotherapy. And Sir Ludwig would make sure that they did it" (as cited in Steadward & Peterson, 1997, p. 22). Ludwig Guttman was not the only expert that demonstrated a kind of authoritarian rule. As Bailey (2008) argues, "the games administrators were principally physicians who held a view of participants as patients" (p. 19). This often, according to Bailey, "led to an authoritarian, paternalistic - and possibly patronising - approach" (p. 20).

Disability sport, from its institutional inception, adopted and adapted a number of aspects of institutionalized mainstream sport. For example, both disability sport and mainstream sport were explicitly used, in the post-war period, to produce more economically and politically useful citizens (Andrews, 2000; Wassong, 2000). As such, the athlete/patients over whom Guttman presided had, most likely, been previously conditioned to the disciplinary and surveillance technologies of sport through their education, recreational pursuits, and/or military service (Anderson, 2003). This enabled Guttman, and other experts, to apply familiar and widely accepted sporting technologies (such as repetitions, competitions as examination, segregation of different athletic types, and inducement to self-policing) without undue burden of justification or undue risk of resistance. The technologies and structures of sport also proved useful for early disability sport, in that they served to expand the reach of rehabilitative technologies and experts far beyond the walls of hospitals. It served to induce AWDs who had since left the hospitals, and eventually those who had never been hospitalized, to voluntarily submit themselves to the authority of disability sport

experts. Despite the integration of these and other sporting technologies, the influence of sport remained secondary, at this stage, to the authoritarian practices of rehabilitation medicine (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008).

The connection between early disability sport and freak shows (both scientific and carnival-style) is much stronger than most scholars admit. I argue, however, that relatively early on in the history of disability sport, AWDs were induced to perform in activities that dichotomized their bodies as disabled, that amplified their disabilities, that sometimes exploited their performances for the financial or statutory gain of rehabilitation institutions, that sought the voyeuristic gaze of able-bodied spectators, and that colluded with dominant discourses about disability and medicine. For example, an important aspect of sport at Stoke Mandeville was that it was designed, not only to be played, but also to be watched by able-bodied funders and community members (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). This accounts for the bleachers that were set up in even the most make-shift of Stoke's sporting venues (Steadward & Peterson, 1997), the co-ordination of Stoke events with the visits of funders (Anderson, 2003), as well as the kinds of exhibition events in which patients/AWDs were invited, or sometimes required, to compete. One example of early disability sport exhibition events was the well-attended wheelchair polo exhibition games, wherein well-trained AWDs of Stoke Mandeville consistently and handily defeated groups of untrained able-bodied citizens from the surrounding communities (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2008).²¹ These games, I argue, had more

²¹ Similar events were staged in the U.S., where practiced wheelchair basketball athletes played exhibition games against able-bodied basketball teams (who used wheelchairs for their first time in these games). One such game was attended by as many as 15,561 spectators (Bailey, 2008, p. 20). Another notable example of a voyeuristic exhibition was Stoke's demonstration of wheelchair

in common with freak shows than with mainstream spectator sport: they dichotomized ab/normality by pitting the disabled athletes against the able-bodied citizens (as opposed to having mixed teams); and they were not constructed to be well-matched competitions between well-trained athletes (i.e., entertaining athletic spectacle), but rather, spectacles, where the obviously untrained (in wheelchair polo or in wheelchairs) able-bodied citizens were handily beaten by the disabled patients. The orchestrated success of the disabled athletes served a number of purposes: (a) the amazing abilities of disabled athletes gave credibility to the hospital's rehabilitation programs, (b) this ability was always contextualized by the obvious lack of training of their opponents, therefore posing no serious threat to the able/disabled competence divide, and (c) the successful role of the AWDs in these spectacles contributed to the acceptability of the spectators' gaze, enabling spectators to more comfortably gawk at disability, to have the disabled/abled dichotomy reaffirmed, and, by extension, to have their own normalcy confirmed.²²

The beginnings of institutionalized disability sport, and specifically the sport programs at Stoke Mandeville, incorporated various technologies, structures and discourses of pre-existing rehabilitation, sport and freak show institutions. Although still largely housed within the physical and administrative structures of rehabilitation, the preliminary integration of aspects of the other two institutions

archery in front of 10,000 spectators at the 1951 Festival of Britain: a London-based festival showcasing science, art, and colonial wonders, such as Trinidadian steelpan musicians (Bailey, 2008; Sparkes, 1992).

²² I am not claiming that disability sport spectators (or other freak show spectators) are all the same, or that they all watch for the same reasons. I argue, rather, that the institutions of disability sport have adopted technologies and discourses of freak shows in such a way as to attempt to draw the spectatorship of similar types of subjects as freak shows had, and furthermore, to orchestrate similar differentiating and normalizing effects within this spectatorship.

enabled disability sport experts to produce increasingly potent, efficient, and adaptable relationships of power with disabled athletes. AWDs were subject to both the authoritative discipline of medicine, and the internalized self-discipline of sport. AWDs were differentiated from the norm, and from each other, through medical examinations, sport segregation and freak show voyeurism. In exchange for their subjection to the differentiating and normalizing practices of disability sport, AWDs gained access to recreational and community-building opportunities, as well as accessing the relatively higher status of the more normalized AWD: a status that was built on the reproduction of, and differentiation from, the construct of the *tragic*, *selfish* and *lazy* disabled subject who refused to normalize.

The IOSDs: Institutionalized, Rationalized and Internationalized

The high degree of rationalization embedded in early disability sport institutions may well be responsible for disability sport's incredibly rapid expansion and institutionalization. The first Stoke Mandeville Games for the Paralyzed were held at Stoke in 1948 and included 16 British competitors with spinal cord injuries (Bailey, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). By 1960, the Stoke games included 400 participants with spinal cord injuries from 23 countries, and were held in the same venues as the Rome Olympics (Steadward & Peterson, 1997, pp. 23, 37). This rapid process of expansion was accompanied by an equally rapid process of institutionalization. Although the experts-turned-administrators of disability sport were still overwhelmingly made up of doctors and rehabilitation practitioners, these experts emerged from under the direct control of hospitals by forming a series of International Organisations of Sport for persons with a Disability (IOSDs). In many cases, the expert-founders of these IOSDs promptly named themselves officers of the organizations and granted

themselves absolute authority to determine the rules, eligibility criteria, and competition and administrative structure for all of the sports that involved athletes in their self-proclaimed jurisdiction (Bailey, 2008). One of the most powerful of these IOSDs was the International Stoke Mandeville Games Federation (ISMGF), which was established in 1959 to govern sport for AWDs with spinal cord injuries, and to which Guttman undemocratically appointed himself President (Bailey, 2008).

While the Stoke Mandeville Games remained, until 1976, solely for AWDs with spinal cord injuries (those under the ISMGF's jurisdiction), alternative competitions were being organized by other IOSDs who catered to other specific disability groups.²³ The most prominent of these were: the International Committee for Deaf Sports (CISS); Cerebral Palsy - International Sports and Recreation Association (CP-ISRA); the International Blind Sports Association (IBSA); International Special Olympics, Inc (ISO); the International Association for Sport for Persons with Mental Handicap (INAS-FMH - Later changed to INAS-FID); and the International Sports Organisation for the Disabled (ISOD). This last IOSD, ISOD, catered to athletes with amputations, and to all other AWDs who were deemed disabled enough to compete, but who did not easily fit into any of the other disability categories (termed *les autres*). It is worthy of note that Guttman also served, for some time, as the president of ISOD, while still maintaining his presidency of the ISMGF (Bailey, 2008).

²³ Athletes diagnosed as having visual impairments and amputations were added to the Paralympics in 1976, while those diagnosed with cerebral palsy and other loco-motor disabilities were added, in stages, throughout the 1980s (Bailey, 2008; Mastro et al., 1996; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). Athletes diagnosed with intellectual disabilities were added in 1996, only to be removed after the 2000 Paralympics (Bailey, 2008).

The creation and growth of these IOSDs signalled a distinct shift towards both increased institutionalization and rationalization of disability sport, and the increased integration of mainstream sport systems, technologies, structures and discourses within disability sport. The IOSDs busied themselves with the consolidation and globalization of sport rules, the development of more consistent eligibility criteria, the standardization of classification procedures, the improvement of training techniques, the surveillance of sport equipment and bodies, the creation of increasing administrative capacities, the proliferation of athletes and events, the expansion of their public profile, economic capacities and political efficacy, and their symbolic, structural and/or financial alignment with the Olympic Movement (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). In all of these ways, IOSDs increased not only their bureaucracies, but also their abilities to more consistently, and precisely, measure, control, and discipline the bodies and behaviours of their respective AWDs.

The IOSDs, although increasingly integrating institutionalized sports practices, still carried the vestiges of their rehabilitation roots. With the notable exception of the CISS, these organizations were almost entirely run by non-disabled, medically trained experts, and they provided little-to-no opportunities for athlete feedback or leadership. In the eyes of the administrators, the AWDs were still patients who needed experts to tell them what was best for them (Berger, 2004; Howe, 2008). The participation structure of the sports themselves was also based on medical institutions: competitions were still segregated by medically defined disabled populations, and individuals were still inserted into appropriate sports competitions and categories through processes of medical examination (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008). As the IOSDs increasingly fought for

official Olympic recognition, however, these medical structures would become less overt, giving way to the more celebrated discourses of elite sport, and the more familiar voyeuristic structures of the freak show.

The ICC: Differentiation Through Co-operation with the IOC

There is evidence to suggest that the International Olympic Committee (IOC), from the onset, was not eager to align itself with the disability sport movement (Bailey, 2008; Gold & Gold, 2007; Greig, 2007; Kidd, 2005). Some of the IOC leadership, however, strategized that a well-defined, minimal relationship with disability sport would give the IOC enormous leverage in maintaining their safe distance from disability sport's parasitic cooption of Olympic symbols, marketing campaigns and social status (Bailey, 2008). By the early 1980s, therefore, the IOC offered to provide some financial and administrative support for the disability sport movement, provided that the IOSDs met with a number of distancing and differentiating IOC conditions. For example, the IOC demanded that the IOSDs and their athletes discontinue the use of any symbols, slogans or terminology that could be, in any way, construed as associated with those of the Olympics (Bailey, 2008, pp. 27, 47, 112). The Olympic Games, according to IOC president Samarach, were "a unique event and the IOC was thus duty-bound to protect them" (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 47).

In order to theorize what the Olympic Movement was seeking protection from, I will theorize another, less obviously distancing condition of the IOC: the condition that all disability sport institutions negotiate as one international disability sports entity (Bailey, 2008). This condition would eventually lead to a major shift in the structures and technologies of disability sport. The existing, highly segregated structure of disability sport had been based on medical

differentiation, categorization, segregation, and eventually, normalization. In other words, it was based on a system that differentiated all bodies from each other, and all bodies from the (impossible to embody) statistical norm. And although various kinds of bodies (such as the disabled) were distinguished as particularly abnormal, all bodies - even Olympian ones- were subject to both the differentiating and normalizing gaze of medicine. In opposition to this medical model of sport categorization, the IOC supported a disability sport structure that was more in line with the ways that freak shows differentiated bodies. In the words of Garland-Thomson (1997): “perhaps the freak show’s most remarkable effect was to eradicate distinctions among a wide variety of bodies, conflating them under a single sign of the freak-as-other” (p. 62). The consolidation of all of the different IOSDs would, like the freak show, serve to conflate a wide variety of differently distinguished bodies, homogenizing them under a single umbrella of disability sport. In so-doing, the consolidation would serve to reproduce the abnormal/normal binary: a binary through which Olympians and their fans could confidently and comfortably recognize their shared normalcy.

Disability sport consolidation also served to ensure that the IOC could more efficiently and predictably act upon the actions of disability sport experts and athletes. At the most basic level, it would make negotiations and financial transactions more efficient for the IOC: the IOC need only deal with one organization, and that organization, in turn, would have to deal with all of the disparate factions that it claimed to represent. The consolidation of disability sport organisations would also increase the efficiency of the IOC’s surveillance and discipline of disability sport, by enabling the IOC to hold this new body accountable for the actions of all IOSDs and AWDs. Through this one condition,

the IOC could induce the disability sport community to police their own compliance to IOC demands.

The IOC's conditions were greeted with mixed reviews from the leaders of the IOSDs, who were still cautious of, in Bailey's (2008) words, "the loss of autonomy, or of the status that came with their position" (p. 41). It is also worthy of note that some leaders of the IOSDs recognized that, although a joint international federation would lead to various administrative and practical benefits, it would likely come at the expense of IOSDs "representing their own constituency less well" (Bailey, 2008, p. 40). In 1982, however, four IOSDs (ISMGE, ISOD, CP-ISRA and IBSA) agreed to form the International Coordinating Committee (ICC), to declare themselves the international authority of disability sports, and to begin serious discussions with the IOC (Bailey, 2008, p. 46). The ICC did not replace the existing IOSDs; it simply added an additional level of international bureaucracy above the IOSDs, whose executive committees were still its major stakeholders. Eventually, the four initial IOSDs, at the urging of the IOC, invited two new associate members into the ICC: the CISS and the INAS-FMH.²⁴ Although granting these new members little power within the ICC, and no significant competitive opportunities at its games, the addition of the two new members enabled the ICC to proudly and paternalistically claim to the IOC and to the world, that "every handicap is ours!!" (ICC objectives, as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 75).

²⁴ The choice to include the much less established INAS-FMH to the exclusion of the Special Olympics, who had also applied for membership, was, according to Bailey (2008), largely based on the desire of existing ICC members to maintain their authority (Bailey, 2008). As Bailey argues, "the younger organisation would be more malleable, and would serve the aims of the ICC better in the future" (p. 74).

Around the same time that the ICC was being formed, the quadrennial Games began including more athletes from the ICC's other three founding members: increasing the numbers of events for the blind, and including events for athletes with cerebral palsy and athletes from the category *les autres*. Although sharing the Paralympic platform, athletes continued to compete only within their own disability category, and often even lived and competed in venues segregated by disability type (Bailey, 2008; Steadward & Peterson, 1997). Over the years, however, these distinctions began to erode, and members of the ICC became increasingly strategic about which kinds of disabled bodies were included, which were excluded, which were highlighted, and which were combined and collapsed into one (Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Rayes, 2000). These decisions were sometimes explicitly justified as a means to induce the IOC to integrate more fully with the disability sport movement. In essence, in order to try to convince the IOC to stop distancing themselves from disability sport, the ICC increasingly tried to distance themselves from their own sports and athletes who carried the most disabling stigmas. For example, the ICC, in a 1983 letter to the IOC president, argues that:

quite a few of 'our' sports have today developed a high level of competitiveness, quality and standards. They are aesthetically performed and contain action, drama and excitement for the spectator. These sports, at least, are worthy of the highest possible status of amateur sports, i.e. to be 'Olympic sports'. (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 48)

Ironically, the claimed proximity of some Paralympic sports to Olympic sports was, I argue, more likely to induce the IOC to distance themselves further from disability sport, rather than ease their anxieties. If my above argument about

Olympic differentiation is correct, what members of the IOC most feared was that Paralympic athletes (and their athletic accomplishments) might become increasingly difficult to distinguish from those of the *real* Olympics.

Another example of both the ICC and IOC's attempts to differentiate themselves from certain kinds of athletes is the IOC's eventual inclusion of certain disability sport demonstration events at the Olympic Games. It was the ICC's responsibility to suggest suitable demonstration events to the IOC, and then the IOC and the local Olympic organizing committee's responsibility to make the final decision. The ICC, in their applications to the IPC, consistently suggested events that highlighted athletes who best matched the aesthetics of able-bodied athleticism: events for well-muscled wheelchair athletes with minimal (low point of lesion) paraplegia, and short distance running events for athletes with visual impairments (Bailey, 2008). The IOC, on the other hand, often rejected the inclusion of events for those with visual impairments, while happily including wheelchair athletes (Bailey, 2008). This IOC decision gives further credence to my argument about differentiation. The IOC embraced the participation of wheelchair athletes, I contend, because their equipment use (wheelchairs) clearly differentiates them from Olympians and makes their athletic achievements impossible to compare to those of Olympians. On the other hand, spectators could easily mistake a blind athlete for an Olympian, and the blind athletes' times could be easily - and perhaps even favourably - compared to their Olympic counterparts. The consistent refusal of the IOC to include athletes who looked able-bodied, and their refusal to grant full medal status to disability events, induced some ICC members to argue that "demonstration events were demeaning and provided curiosity value rather than empowering those people with disabilities striving for

excellence in sport” (Bailey, 2008, p. 86). In other words, at least some ICC representatives recognized that the dichotomizing, amplifying and voyeuristic elements of freak shows were not completely foreign to some of the ways that disability sport was being used.

The emergence of the ICC, and the ICC – IOC relationship, represented a distinct shift in the ways that the technologies, objectives and discourses of medical rehabilitation, sport, and the freak show interacted within institutionalized disability sport. Whereas the objectives of the IOSDs were often served by increasing the number of athletes and events over which they presided, the administrative, political and economic interests of the IPC were increasingly served by a more contained and exclusive Paralympic Movement. Unlike the IOSDs, whose primary role was to normalize disabled bodies through sports rehabilitation, the ICC’s primary concern quickly became the normalization of the Paralympic Movement itself. The ICC exercised an increasing number of normalizing technologies on the images, bodies, behaviours and opportunities of AWDs, in order to produce not only productive disabled bodies, but also palatable, profitable and efficiently administered sporting spectacles. Although medical technologies and discourses would continue to thrive within the movement, the colluding discourses and technologies of international corporatized sport and the freak show would become increasingly salient in the production of these spectacles: particularly in terms of the IOC’s attempts to adequately distance themselves from disability sport, and in the corresponding attempts of the ICC to align themselves with Olympism, through distancing themselves from the most stigmatized AWDs. These shifts constitute the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the elitist, corporatized IPC and

their elite, spectator-friendly Paralympians.

The IPC: The Cutting Edge of a Modern Paralympic Movement

The ICC, although representing a distinct shift towards the technologies and structures of institutionalized sport, was not an institution that would last very long. By 1987, only five years after its emergence, a working group was created to “formulate a constitution of the new organisation that will replace ICC” (Bailey, 2008, p. 41). What resulted was the formation of the International Paralympic Committee (IPC). For the next four years, disability sport was the battleground for power struggles between the IPC and the ICC: while on the one hand, the IPC declared itself to be “the supreme authority of the international sports movement for the disabled” (item 8 of the IPC constitution cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 102), the ICC was still organizing the Paralympic Games, and many of its officers were “questioning the (legal) existence of the IPC” (Raes of the ICC cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 105). At the end of the 1992 Paralympic Games, this struggle would end with the dissolution of the ICC, and the IPC would therefore be left to exercise its full self-mandated authority over the bodies, images, and sports of the Paralympic Movement.

The institutional shift from the ICC to the IPC was accompanied by an unprecedented growth in the number of experts, administrators and organizations that were invited to participate in the movement. Whereas the ICC was ruled largely by the four founding IOSDs (and to a lesser degree the two associate members), the IPC appeared to increase the democratization, bureaucratization and rationalization of disability sport governance by giving many more stakeholders the right to vote. A significantly reduced voting block was given to the IOSDs, while voting status was granted to each of the Paralympic sports and

to each of the participating nations (Bailey, 2008). This latter inclusion, in particular, necessitated the creation of over one hundred national disability sport organizations, which did not necessarily replace the disability-specific organizations already operating in those countries. There was also a multiplication of committees and sub-committees, which were designed to represent the interests of officials, medical officers and athletes. The inclusion of these committees, and in particular the athlete's committee, was largely ornamental in that these committees were granted only the right to consult with voting members, not the right to actually vote (Bailey, 2008; Howe, 2008). While the optics of democratization were achieved through this restructuring, the new IPC structure led to democratic representation of only the administrators of disability sport (not the athletes), therefore shifting the institutional focus even further towards the administrative success of the Paralympic Movement (and not, for instance, the needs or desires of Paralympians). As Howe (2008) argues:

athletes are centre-stage and an important part of what the IPC does - after all, it is the IPC's mandate to run the Paralympic Games, and athletes are required in order for the show to go on. However the structure of the organisation suggests that the presence of the athletes is of little or no importance to the successful running of the administrative side of the organisation. (p. 44)

As Bailey (2008) argues, even in 1993, after the IPC attained full authority, the "earlier deficit of consultation of athletes had still not been attended to" (p. 147). This sentiment is echoed by Howe (2008) nearly a decade and a half later: "what is certain is that athletes are not any closer to being in a positions (*sic*) of influence within the [IPC Athlete's Committee] then (*sic*) they were over a decade

ago” (p. 59).

The disempowering of Paralympians in the IPC was not only evidenced by its structure of governance, but also by the mandates, technologies and discourses that this governing body adopted. For example, the explicit mandate of the IPC shifted away from the ICC’s focus on the rehabilitation of athletes and the growth of disability sport, moving instead towards the delivery of elite Paralympic Games and the promotion of the Paralympic Movement (Bailey, 2008). As Howe (2008) argues, “choosing this role obviously gave the IPC the sort of influential position that it desired without the need to consider the seemingly more tedious issues of grass-roots development of athletes, which became the responsibility of IOSDs” (p. 43). In other words, the IPC took ownership of the profitable elite sporting spectacle and the desirable Paralympians, while downloading the more stigmatized AWDs, and their sports, onto organizations that no longer wielded the power to properly provide for them. As Howe argues, “it was a structural shift of political significance, because in a single meeting the IPC was empowered and the IOSDs and the athletes were disempowered. Quite simply, it placed the IPC at the centre of the Paralympic Movement” (p. 43).

This move, and many more distancing and streamlining ones to come, were explicitly justified and technically accomplished through the discourses and technologies of elite sport. The sentiment was that “the Paralympics must be serious and they must be only for elite athletes- distant from any notion of recreation sport” (Bailey, 2008, p. 104). This quote, I contend, captures the crux of the issue: the IPC was not only motivated by the pull of elite sport status and profitability, but also by the push to distance itself from the kinds of disabled bodies that the IOC, and potential spectators, might want to distance themselves

from (i.e., bodies that do not appear adequately disabled and bodies that do not appear adequately athletic). This distancing was achieved, partially, through the technologies of elite sport. For example, in 1994, the IPC changed the Paralympic qualification procedures from a system of national quotas (where the top athletes from each country were admitted) to a system of qualification standards (where athletes were admitted based on a combination of national/regional ranking, world ranking and their achievement of a minimum percentage of the world record) (Bailey, 2008, p. 170; see also Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008). This system of qualification was explicitly designed to minimize the number of competitors, increase the efficiency of administering games, and increase spectator and sponsor interest. This system also functioned, however, to induce AWDs to submit themselves to increasingly elaborate and invasive disciplinary regimes of normalizing elite sport training, and to dissuade or disqualify athletes who were unwilling or unable to submit themselves to these regimes.

The elite sport technology of qualifications colluded especially well with medical technologies of differentiation and classification. The explicit justification for sports classification had hitherto been based on increasingly differentiating bodies for the promotion of an increased number of participants in increasingly fair competitions. The IPC's medical committee, however, began collapsing and integrating classification categories for the promotion of a more efficient, rationalized and authoritative administration, and a more normalized, elite and aesthetically pleasing sporting spectacle. Bailey (2008) paraphrases the IPC's chief medical officer, Michael Riding:

functional or integrated classification should not lead to a multiplication of events or individuals competing, nor should the process reduce the

competitive or aesthetic impact of the Paralympic Games for the spectators. Riding stressed that the ‘pursuit of excellence cannot always be fair, or equitable’...there was a need to submit to the authority of the IPC for those who wished to participate in the events under IPC’s authority...The different problems faced in classification of different disabilities would need research to rationalise classification procedures - combining them where possible. (p. 106)

In other words, the IPC sought to cancel or combine classification groups, in order to minimize the number of competitions, but also to enable the sport qualification system to *naturally* and *objectively* eliminate the least competitive and least *aesthetically pleasing* athletes and events (Craft, 2001; Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Rayes, 2000). Unsurprisingly, these changes to both the qualification and classification systems corresponded with steep declines in the participation numbers and opportunities for those athletes who were already most marginalized within sports: female AWDs, athletes categorized as having *severe* disabilities, and in particular, athletes who fit into both of these categories (Bailey, 2008; DePauw, 1994; 1999; Howe & Jones, 2006; Howe, 2008; Rayes, 2000; Sherrill, 1997). As Craft (2001) argues:

athletes with very limited function or with disabilities who do not fit the stereotypical beautiful people image may find it increasingly difficult to compete successfully in the collapsed categories. The Paralympic Games may be going Hollywood and some athletes are going to be left behind. (p. 30)

It is this concerted effort to “go Hollywood” that not only demonstrates the IPC’s increasing proximity to corporatized elite spectator sport, but also its increased

integration of the technologies, objectives and characteristics of the freak show.

In order to make the Paralympics more marketable to (largely Western, able-bodied) spectators and sponsors, the IPC increasingly choreographs Paralympic bodies, discourses and performances in ways that are reminiscent of the 19th century freak show. That is, they choreograph spectacles that collapse human variation into the able/disabled dichotomy, that amplify the disabilities of the performers, that exploit the performers, that are designed to induce the able-bodied gaze, and that collude with dominant imperialist and ableist discourses.

The modern Paralympic games function to reaffirm the disability/ability dichotomy by collapsing a wide variety of elite athletic bodies into two (mostly) mutually exclusive categories: Paralympians and Olympians. The IPC's adoption of collapsed, functional classification systems has contributed to this dichotomization. Whereas before, in the medical classification system, athletes were segregated into a wide variety of separate competitions based on shared physical characteristics, functional classification serves to combine athletes with different diagnoses and capacities into integrated competitions. These integrated competitions are much easier for able-bodied spectators to understand and enjoy because they reproduce the dominant, ableist construction of disability. They reproduce disability as a single, stable category that stands in opposition to able-bodiedness, rather than a complex and fluctuating system of human variation and interpretation, in which a disabled person may have more in common with an *able-bodied* spectator than with their *disabled* competitor.

The modern Paralympics also resembles the 19th century freak show in that both exhibitions focus on, and serve to amplify the importance of, the disabilities of their performers. As Garland Thompson argues (1996):

a freak show's cultural work is to make the physical particularity of the freak into a hypervisible text against which the viewer's indistinguishable body fades into a seemingly neutral, tractable, and invulnerable instrument of the autonomous will. (p. 10)

In the Paralympic context, the most obvious way that athletes' disabilities are amplified is through the ubiquitous supercrip discourses of heroic overcoming and inspirational empowerment, both of which are predicated on the tragedy and centrality of an athlete's disability (see Chapter 2; see also B. Hardin & Hardin, 2003; 2004; Schantz & Gilbert, 2001; Schell & Duncan, 1999; 2001). The accentuation of the disabilities of Paralympians is also achieved through the images used for Paralympic news coverage, sponsor advertisements, books and pamphlets. As DePauw (1997) notes, Paralympian bodies tend to either be underrepresented in imagery (invisible), or represented in a way that makes their disabilities hyper-visible: it is very rare that Paralympians are present in imagery that does not focus on their disabilities. As the obviously voyeuristic gaze on amputated stumps and paralyzed limbs has become less politically correct, however, the focus seems to have shifted to the assistive and athletic technologies of these athletes (e.g., prosthetics and sports wheelchairs). The focus on the cyborg-like technologies of Paralympians invites spectators to gawk with a distancing wonder, and enables spectators to easily differentiate the unnatural, adapted and disabled athletes from their seemingly-natural able-bodied Olympian antitheses (Shogan, 1998; Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008).

Another similarity between the carnival-style freak show and the modern Paralympics is the central role of the spectator. In both cases, the exhibitioners/experts strategically exercise disciplinary technologies on the bodies

and actions of the freak/Paralympian in order to induce spectators to watch, to gawk, to gasp, to feel differentiated from the freak, to feel comfortable in their own normalcy, and to feel motivated to pay (or tune-in) for more of these feelings. These spectator reactions are induced through well-choreographed spectacles that dichotomize and amplify the disabilities of Paralympians, thereby making the spectator feel comfortably normal and momentarily safe from their anxieties over their own body's instability. There is at least one significant difference, however, between the 19th and 21st century choreography of the freak show. Whereas the old carnival freak shows both sought out and constructed freaks who appeared as grotesque, abnormal and exotic as possible, Paralympic freak shows seek out and construct athletes who are as normalized (yet still obviously disabled) as possible. In so doing, spectators are induced to feel three sentiments at once: comfortable in their own normalcy (relative to the obviously disabled bodies); confident in the superiority of their normalcy (since Paralympians are obviously striving for it); and inspired by the charitable and benevolent work that IPC experts have done (in normalizing these tragic disabled bodies).

The modern Paralympics also resembles 19th century freak shows in that its experts, organizations and sponsors accumulate status, funding and profits from the actions and images of athletes whom they are neither obliged to pay, nor obliged to consider in their decision-making processes (i.e., no right to vote). In the corporate structure and discourses of the IPC, athletes are not conceptualized as shareholders, as directors, or even as employees, but rather, as stated in the 1996 IPC Task Force report, "the product" that is produced, marketed, sold and consumed (as cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 185). Within this logic, Paralympians (i.e.,

the product) can be justifiably disciplined, normalized, excluded, included, hidden, marginalized, emphasized, silenced, ignored, plastered with logos, and of course leased out and sold, as long as it serves capitalist and corporate objectives. Much like the non-sentient products of other corporations (and the carnival and scientific freaks before them), the Paralympian is constructed as neither deserving a share of Paralympic profits, nor deserving a say in how their bodies and images are used.

The final similarity that I will draw between the freak show and the Paralympic Movement is the way that both of these spectacles collude with dominant ableist and imperialist discourses of their time. Although it is easy, in retrospect, to recognize the “racism, imperialism and handicapism” that both validated and fuelled the success of carnival-style freak shows (Bogdan, 1996, p.34), it is much harder to recognize how these same forces are embedded in the neo-liberal discourses that serve to justify and celebrate contemporary Paralympism. For example, contemporary Paralympism does not officially embrace the 19th century discourses of racial superiority that justified freak show exhibits of *primitive* people and imperialist missions to civilize (and extract freaks, land and resources from) these same people. However, current Paralympism *is* steeped in discourses of Western moral and medical superiority. Western nations, for example, are often quick to “attribute their success to the better treatment of the people with disabilities in their countries,” as opposed to, say, the greater financial resources to which their countries have access (Howe, 2008, p. 126). Discourses about Western technological and moral superiority are also used in order to justify the IPC’s well-publicized involvement in various *development through sport* programs in “developing countries, where,” as one

IPC official put it, “millions of persons with a disability were being denied even the simplest trimmings of a civilized society” (Wang cited in Bailey, 2008, p. 158). Although the 21st century *development* discourses appear more benevolent than those of the 19th century, both discourses serve to reinforce the superiority of Western civilizations and therefore condone the patronising and ethnocentric involvement of Westerners in the economies, cultures and recreation pursuits of other countries (Darnell, 2007).

Similar shifts can be theorized in terms of the ableist discourses with which both 19th and 21st century freak shows collude. The voyeuristic, ableist and anxious gaze of the 19th century gawker, for example is, under contemporary Paralympism, rationalized through more politically correct discourses. Spectators are still induced to gawk at, ask after, and focus on the disabilities of the freaks/Paralympians; however, they must now do so with a sober (rather than humorous or aggressive) tone, and they must veil their anxious curiosity in the discourses of pity, inspiration or scientific inquiry. Similarly, the exploitation, lack of representation and authoritarian power relations to which Paralympians are subjected can no longer be justified through Darwinian claims of racial or biological inferiority. These unequal power relations and structures are now justified through the construct of tragic bio-medical disability, the discourses of medical benevolence and expertise, and the narrative of progressive empowerment.

To summarize, the Paralympic Movement, under the direction of the IPC, is characterized by increasingly rationalized and institutionalized relationships of power in which athletes are subject to increasingly integrated technologies of bio-medical rehabilitation, elite sport, and the freak show. These relations of power

can be understood as progressively empowering, in the sense that they have progressively empowered Paralympic experts and administrators to act with greater efficiency, reliability and adaptability, upon the bodies and actions of Paralympians. This is not to say that Paralympians have not benefited from, contributed to, or resisted the power relations that I have critiqued throughout this chapter, and throughout this thesis. I am arguing, however, that the rationalization of Paralympism has made it increasingly difficult for athletes, experts and spectators to recognize the signs of athlete resistance that lie beneath official IPC sanctions, the disabling technologies and discourses that enable the victorious overcoming, and the athlete disempowerment upon which the empowering Paralympic Movement is built.

Concluding Thoughts

In this thesis, I used Foucaultian theories and methods to critique Paralympic power relations, and the effects of these relations on the subjectivities and opportunities of people experiencing disabilities. My analysis revolved around three interrelated research questions. First, how are discourses used to describe, reproduce, justify and conceal Paralympic power relations? Second, what types of discourses, subjects, objectives, technologies, and institutions structure the power relations between the experts and the athletes of the Paralympic Movement? Third, how do these power relations serve to broaden, limit or otherwise structure the field of possible action of AWDs, Paralympians, and others who experience disabilities?

The first of my research questions, regarding the effects of Paralympic discourses, was addressed most specifically in Chapter 2. Through my analysis of two histories of the Paralympic Movement, I demonstrated how Paralympic discourses of tragic origins and progressive empowerment serve to (re)produce *tragic* disabled subjects, *empowered* Paralympian subjects, and *benevolent* and *empowering* expert subjects. I argued that, partially through their (re)production of such subjects, these discourses serve to reproduce, justify and conceal the ways that Paralympic experts silence Paralympian voices, efface their stories of resistance and self-empowerment, and attempt to control their bodies, actions and images.

My second research question was concerned with the types of discourses, subjects, objectives, technologies, and institutions that structure Paralympic power relations. I addressed this question, in stages, throughout each of my four analytical chapters. In Chapter 2, for example, I demonstrated how discourses of

tragedy, empowerment and progress help to structure, reproduce and justify the relationships that enable Paralympic experts to act upon the actions of Paralympians. In Chapter 3, I argued that Paralympic power relations are structured through systems that differentiate disabled subjects from able-bodied subjects, experts from patients, AWDs from other disabled subjects, and Paralympians from AWDs. Additionally, I argued that these systems enable certain kinds of differentiated subjects (most notably able-bodied experts) to more easily act upon the actions and bodies of other kinds of subjects (most notably disabled patients). I also argued, in Chapter 3, that Paralympic power relations are produced and reproduced because they serve the personal, professional and political objectives of a number of different kinds of subjects, including Paralympians. In Chapter 4, I analyzed various technologies, or instrumental modes, of Paralympic sport (and disability sport more generally), including: the technologies of examination and classification that serve to produce AWDs and Paralympians; the disciplinary technologies that serve to police and discipline Paralympian bodies into more normalized and productive - but still appropriately disabled - forms; and the technologies of surveillance that induce Paralympians to discipline their own bodies, identities and actions according to expectations of both disability and normalcy. Finally, in Chapter 5, I analyzed the increasing institutionalization and rationalization of Paralympic power relations in the period between the Stoke Mandeville Games of the 1940s and the 21st century Paralympic Movement under the reign of the IPC. Specifically, I demonstrated how this rapid institutionalization and rationalization has been achieved through collusion with, and co-option of, crucial technologies, discourses and structures of three antecedent institutions, namely: biomedical rehabilitation, mainstream sport

and the freak show.

My third research question dealt less with the structure of Paralympic power relations, and more with its effects, that is: how do Paralympic power relations serve to broaden, limit or otherwise structure the field of possible action of AWDs, Paralympians, and others who experience disabilities? This research question provided an overarching focus that bridged the different chapters, and their different planes of analysis. I demonstrated, for example, in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, how disabled subjects become differentiated from other subjects, and in so doing, become more susceptible to having their actions acted upon, especially by those (mostly able-bodied) subjects who have been differentiated and legitimated as experts. In Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, I provided specific examples of technologies, structures and discourses that enable various experts to significantly constrain the range of actions that are permitted, socially accepted, personally desired or even recognized as possible by athletic disabled subjects. Notable examples include: medical examinations, diagnosis, rehabilitation, normalization, classification, sport regulations, disqualification, training regimes, orchestrated and mediated spectacles, inspiration narratives, financial incentives and structures of sport governance. Furthermore, I argued in each of my chapters, but most specifically in Chapter 4, that AWDs and Paralympians are induced to further limit their own field of actions (and/or to submit themselves to the disciplinary authority of others who will limit their field of actions) in order to achieve greater normalization, success or access to power, and importantly, to differentiate themselves from other, less normalized, disabled subjects. In each of these ways, I have demonstrated that various experts, technologies, structures and discourses of the Paralympic Movement serve to limit the possible field of actions experienced by

Paralympians and others who have been disabled.

As I explained in my introductory chapter, I first chose to take on this project because I had come across instances in my career as a Paralympian where the available discourses of empowerment did not seem to accurately portray the sense that I had no input, no recourse, and very few choices about policies and procedures that had serious implications for my fellow athletes and me. My sense of powerlessness, in these situations, was not only because of the ways that my body and actions were being governed, but also because there were very few available discourses with which I could analyze my situation, speak to others about it in a way that they could comprehend, mobilize around it in a way that could not easily be de-legitimized, and resist it in a way that did not further disable ourselves or others. The initial motivation for this project, therefore, was to find words and ideas for describing, critiquing, resisting and transforming the power relations of Paralympic sport.

Within the context of this initial motivation, both the findings and the process of writing this thesis have proven, to a large degree, successful. In and through this thesis, I have managed to articulate many of my concerns, I have come into conversation with others who have shared some of these concerns, and I have had my concerns considered and debated by some people who had not previously imagined that there could be reasonable Paralympian concerns of any kind. In finding a language and a voice to describe these things, I have also come across new possibilities of action and resistance, and crucially, new tools for disentangling, problematizing, re-interpreting and re-imagining my own experiences and subjectivities. In all of these ways, the process and results of this thesis have significantly transformed how I experience and identify with the

Paralympic Movement.

This is not to say, of course, that this thesis has transformed Paralympic power relations for anyone else. The larger transformative potential of this work resides in the following possibility: that parts of this thesis will be read by a variety of athletes, experts, students, activists, and sport and disability scholars; that some of these readers will resonate with some aspect of this work; and that at least some of these readers will use the ideas, theoretical tools or examples herein to critique, augment, twist, broaden, deepen, or act on my arguments. The most that I could wish from this thesis, in other words, is not that people readily agree with it, but that it challenges people to find new ways of thinking about, engaging in, resisting, imagining and transforming Paralympic sport.

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