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**UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA**

**HEGEMONY  
AND  
ANONYMOUS INTELLECTUAL PRACTICE**

**THE POLITICS OF THEORETICAL REPRESENTATION IN AN AGE OF  
SCIENTIFIC FORECASTING**

**JERROLD L. KACHUR, ©**

**A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.**

**SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS  
EDMONTON, ALBERTA  
SPRING 1995**



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
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
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
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
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
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Dr. Derek Sayer

October 19, 1994

to lin(da):

dragons.  
in battles to be won  
she was the One  
guarding all he had become.

# **Abstract**

This dissertation explores the changing nature of intellectual practice in the contemporary period. It provides an extensive theoretical critique of the historical and sociological approaches to intellectual practice in English Canada. It focuses on the rise of a global corporatist postmodernization narrative and the exercise of hegemony by strategic managers in Alberta's Toward 2000 Together reform initiative. The study identifies the mechanisms for the ideological production of cultural commodities and contends that the rise of the New Right in Canada involves new ways of mobilizing public desire for the legitimation of corporatist and neo-liberal economic policies. The recent reconfiguration of intellectual practices shows a split in class alignments and a surge of public opinion against forms of public service. The thesis concludes that the conception of the "anonymous intellectual" can account for a postmodern form of intellectual practice that is displacing the traditional practices of public intellectuals.

# Preface

As I walked to the University of Alberta on October 19, 1994 for my oral defence of this thesis, I recalled two memories. One memory concerned W.O. Mitchell's 1947 novel *Who Has Seen the Wind* and how it provided an autobiographical grid for my own childhood on the prairie. More vividly though, was a memory of my first walk (at about age four or five and circa 1960) to the public library of Plenty, Saskatchewan (population 150). The library -- if one could call it that -- included a few shelves of books, and as I seem to recollect, imagine or possibly just invent, these books were tucked away in a corner of a small insurance office run by the husband of the first grade teacher (a teacher [Mrs. Stewart?] I had only heard stories about). I signed out four books not contemplating how or why they were where I found them.

Mitchell ends *Who Has Seen the Wind* with a series of descriptions about the Saskatchewan prairie and the thoughts of a boy named Brian. The death of Brian's grandmother and, retrospectively, Brian's thoughts about the death of his father, a meadow lark, a baby pigeon, and a calf with two heads, evoke a sudden familiarity of emotions related to *knowing* death and *explaining* life. This wind creates "the swarming hum of telephone wires" (299) and "turns in silent frenzy upon itself" (300). It symbolizes, as Brian imagines, something to do with death, birth, hunger and love. His last thoughts are that "some day . . . perhaps when he was older than he was now, he would know; he would find out completely and for good. He would be satisfied. . . . Some day. The thing could not hide from him forever" (299).

What meaning could one attribute to Brian's "search" for understanding or my own early naiveté about the political economy of knowledge production? Obviously, after completing my Ph.D., I now realize that I was on a much longer walk than to a small public library and that the "thing" could (quite possibly) hide from me forever. Now, from a distance, I know well how the hallowed halls of academe and that small library cohere as a set of social relations . . . but, nevertheless, Mitchell also accounts one of Brian's pilgrimages. At the Presbyterian manse Brian states to the minister "I'm visiting God today." Brian discovers that God is busy, always never present, leaving only traces (like His picture). So, too, in this recapitulation of my own pilgrimage from small town to urban university (salvation by secular means?), one always finds that God is somehow always out of town. But fortunately for the priests of higher education and assorted research fellows He has managed to leave a few books behind in His many libraries, and like trees, they (I, we) bow before the transcendent signifier to work on traces.

Friedrich Nietzsche asserted the death of God and Martin Heidegger claimed God was not dead merely absent. With God, so-to-speak, relegated to the back pew, that is, no longer an organizing principle of a civilization and reduced to a matter of private belief, new reified transcendental signifiers have jockeyed for sovereignty: "Nation," "Man," and "Nature," to name only a few. The modern struggle for this -- or a new -- transcendent signifier has not been without conflict, contradiction or controversy. Michael Harrington (1983) writes in *The Politics at God's Funeral* that "the nineteenth century was a time of new faiths, of invented Gods and reverential atheisms. Where the Enlightenment had only imagined substitute religions, men and women now tried to create substitute churches" (35). The rise and subsequent triumphs and failures of various positivisms, marxisms, romanticisms and idealisms reveal that if cultural modernity is defined by anything it is as a crisis of faith or reason. According to Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984), in its latter accelerated

"postmodern" phase, this crisis has now evoked an incredulity toward any and all grand narratives. The spectacular collapse of Soviet Marxism is a case in point.

Max Weber understood many of the implications of spiritual disenchantment. He also recognized the importance of committing to a particular method (the new Gods); and for himself "Science as a Vocation" (1970). At the beginning of the twentieth century he wrote ". . . the individual has to decide which is God for him and which is the Devil" (1970: 148). And "Which of the warring gods should we serve?" (153). Weber calls for a commitment to science that demands intellectual integrity in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. He objects to an "intellectual sacrifice" to the "church." That is, in the absence of a prophet or savior who can give answers, church doxa should not be attributed to ". . . thousands of professors, as privileged hirelings of the state, [who] attempt as petty prophets in their lecture-rooms to take over [a prophet's] role" (153). Yet in his calling for the conditions that make intellectual integrity possible, Weber chooses to *publicly* moralize his case, and fails to be true to his vocation and stick with the *political* facts of those *intellectual* conditions that have undermined his moral ideal.

Harrington, too, moralizes and reproduces Weber's error. Harrington begins the last chapter of *The Politics at God's Funeral* with the questions: "Can Western society create transcendental common values in its everyday experience? Values which are not based upon -- yet not counterposed -- to the supernatural?" (197). Harrington's answer is that the dominant consciousness of the next historic period will be technocratic, elitist and manipulative. In spite of this analysis he still calls for a new *spiritual* politics based on community, moral incentives, democracy and global sharing. Karl Marx had much to say about the inadequacies of such moralizing for a socialist utopia. And Michel Foucault let everyone know that Man, the transcendental signifier of Humanism, is now buried along with God. Whilst one might agree with Harrington on the goal of a global society based on a new spirituality, what kind of analysis might get us to that society? On this point one must at least heed Marx and Foucault. The spiritual malaise that Harrington wants to overcome is not a moral failing of the intelligentsia but rather an intellectual failing to self-reflexively comprehend the *originating conditions* of moral regulation. No number of moralizing pep talks will overcome an inadequate analysis of normative development and the insufficient research into the true nature of intellectual practice. Rather than call for a New God, time would be better spent to understand God first. As a starting point I have coined the term the "Anonymous Intellectual" to denote reified authorities that claim God's throne and intend to provide a sovereign foundation for legitimating other values, sanctioning established power, and transcendently symbolizing community.

Max Weber does lay important groundwork for an analysis of how the routines of everyday life challenge religion and how disenchantment evokes old gods to ascend from their graves to take the form of new impersonal forces. But Weber's fact-value split in the distinction between politics and science as separate vocations occludes the crucial territories for research into "intellectual politics" and "political intellectuality." He fails, thus, to scientifically analyze how the historical conditions of these impersonal forces inform his own *individual* valuations and how the collective organization of petty prophets limits the *historical* realization of his own vocation. The collective organization of Weber's petty prophets as privileged hirelings of the state provides a good starting point for a visit to God. The construction of new cathedrals to higher learning and intellectual regulation, the rise of the new middle class, and the dissemination of legitimating ideologies such as professionalism have accentuated the fact that any "snapshot of God" must also consider both the political economy of knowledge production and the central power of the modern intelligentsia in the regulation of meaning-making. But unlike Brian I ask not "Who has

seen the wind?" but rather "What are the conditions of possibility for seeing this wind?" Or more specifically, "What is the Anonymous Intellectual?" and "How does this Anonymous Intellectual function?"

In the following dissertation I use the concept of Anonymous Intellectual five ways to take this snapshot of God. First, I use the concept to mean a residual social artifact of a communicative occurrence. In this case the Anonymous Intellectual refers to the passive element, *the physical text*, a sign that "God" has been present as in the case of the "Bible" as the Word of God. Second, I use the Anonymous Intellectual as an equivalence to Gramsci's "Modern Prince," that is, to represent a supraindividual subject or intellectual community. In this case, the collectivity can be referred to as a class or strata but with the specific intent to include *the material conditions of possibility* for mobilizing the institutional resources of intellectual practice. Third, and also related to Gramsci's concept of the Modern Prince, I refer to the Anonymous Intellectual as the *charismatic authority* of the intelligentsia indicated by their privilege and prestige. In this case, I refer to the "structure of feeling" or aesthetic relationship of trust established by the "petty prophets" with the general population. Fourth, I identify a *postmodern form of collective intellectual practices* as extensions of the second and third cases. At the material level, this practice is marked by the increasing division, and anonymous regulation, of intellectual labour. At the aesthetic-cultural level, it is marked by the increasing importance of scientific management in the mobilization of desire. Finally, by Anonymous Intellectual I mean the "Social Imaginary," that is, as a *grand reification*: for example Nation, God, Nature, Man, Canadian, and Albertan. In this case, these *real* abstractions are the contemporary equivalencies for Brian's "wind."

Such a focus into Canadian cultural politics and an integrated analysis of intellectual practice, social theorizing and higher education is but one step into uncharted waters. First, this dissertation points out the need for more similar studies which take seriously the methodological and theoretical advances in the study of ideology. Not only is the practical orientation of intellectual practice in Canada severely limited by the lack of integrated research concerning a theory, a sociology and a history of the Canadian intelligentsia, it is severely limited by the primitive state of methodological and theoretical development relative to European continental thought. Suffice it to say in this preface is that most studies seem to reproduce the grammar of dominating discourses and tend to reify traditional typologies rather than challenge them. Political economists produce an alternate understanding of industrial modernization limited to economism. Social scientists tend to emphasize ahistorical and quantitative specializations which mirror the needs of the capitalist division of labour rather than challenging its intellectual discipline. Historians have succumbed to the atheoretical and episodic. With few exceptions historical research wallows in individual and group biography or is narrowly circumscribed by provincial topics which limit an understanding of how narrow concerns are also part of world history in the *longue durée*. While recent theoretical critiques arising from French poststructuralism have taken up the anti-totalization thematic, careful scrutiny of the Canadian intellectual tradition reveals a paradigm case of fragmentary and particularist discourses resulting from many centuries of imperial cultural domination. Is it possible that what the Canadian discourses need is not further fragmentation and particularization but rather a few good indigenous generalizations of resistance? The role of Canadian critical philosophy would be crucial here. But what can be said of philosophers? Canadian philosophers have removed themselves long ago from the rough and tumble of the historical material. Most (excluding a select few exemplified by Charles Taylor) are content to live out their existence in the traditionally safe territory of mind experiments about non-

existent abstract individuals while the walls of academic security are breached by purveyors of business performativity. These intellectual and disciplinary fragmentations stifle understanding, and at their worst, spin off into flagrant forms of mysticism, the eternal return of magical responses to the global crisis in the name of "postmodern" playfulness. Identifying and explaining the dynamic struggle over the old gods that are ascending from their graves would mark a crucial improvement in empirical studies of intellectual practice in Canada.

Second, the dissertation points in another two directions which must be contextualized for the reader because they form a fundamental orientation for this study but have been omitted from this final draft for the sake of brevity. To include these analyses would have extended the dissertation well beyond its already too many pages. These latter two directions are now considered works in progress and require a little explication if only as background information for those who might be entertaining such pilgrimages themselves. One of these directions takes up the questions explored in this thesis but at a higher level of generalization. Instead of moralizing about the inadequacy of Canadian radical intellectual practice, this omitted work in progress attempts to understand intellectual practice as a product of the ideological and institutional legacies of Canadian history. In this analysis the canonical representations of the Canadian nation are first and foremost structured by methodological grammars or codes which block the ability of intellectuals to formulate critical responses to hegemonic narratives. This immobilization results primarily from what I call the residual effects of a "colonial mentality." Furthermore, I situate the construction of a critical culture within the institutional formation of Canadian higher education: dependant on Great Britain and on the United States and on the master narratives of modernity that emerged following the French Revolution. This background research identified three different kinds of practical science which emerged as codes for rational prophecy and identified one specific configuration of practical science hegemonic in Anglo-American societies called "Practical Empiricism." Practical Empiricism informs the canonical representations of "Canada," the way they are constructed as four narrational complexes (methodological, moral, economic and educational) and their mode of internal differentiation into conservative, liberal, socialist and romantic forms. The contemporary expression of this ongoing canonical narration in the post-World War II period I have tried to explicate in this dissertation. This latter narrative is represented by the Americanization of intellectual practice and the ideological and institutional changes initiated by the influence of American theories and practices, especially in English Canada. Significant here is the reorientation of intellectual practice into an "anonymous technology" and the increasing ideological hegemony of libertarian theories of "public choice" as two effective contributors to the immobilization of critical intellectual practice.

Another portion omitted in this final draft which I now treat as another work in progress is related to the problematic of self-reflective theoretical practices for intellectuals confronting the nature of capitalist postmodernization. This latter work interrogates the preliminary ruminations by Hegel and Marx on intellectual practice and the way they envisaged the intellectual as a social individual and the master of total understanding. This analysis directed my attention to the limited ways the State has been approached, especially the current failure to identify (as Marx and Hegel had), the "internal" State as the primary mode for regulating the constitution of subjectivity. This background analysis also paid attention to the contributions of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber on the nature of intellectual practice. I also tracked the trajectory of socialist thought on intellectuals from Lenin to Gramsci and the variations taken on the theme by the Frankfurt School's critical theory and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. The recent work of Andre Gorz, Alvin

Gouldner, Ivan Szelenyi, Michel Foucault, Alain Touraine, Pierre Bourdieu and Zygmunt Bauman has proved crucial to my conclusion that the inability to transcend the anomalies in the class analysis of intellectual practice is directly related to Hegel and Marx's inability to correctly identify the specific class form that intellectual practice takes. Subsequent attempts to revision "class" have generalized residual aspects of idealism or else reproduced the anomalies that occluded the intelligentsia in the first place.

I hypothesize that the primary problem with recent critical scholarship is not necessarily the epistemology of historical materialism, but rather the class ontology of historical materialism as it relates to an understanding of the capitalist mode of production. I would now argue that "intellectual office" is a unique mode of production and that the primary "class" function of intellectuals is to produce sacred texts that regulate discourse. It is this latter understanding which frames my own approach to the Toward 2000 Together case study in Part III. While I have retained these many insights from the above works in progress, I have limited myself to include aspects of contemporary theory and enough history on the rise of technocratic discourse to make my limited case about recent Canadian and Albertan reform initiatives.

According to W.O. Mitchell the truly knowable life of Brian is not a mere reflection of sensible intelligence but rather the result of a human propensity for inferring theoretical abstractions. Mitchell cites Christina Rossetti on his title page: "Who has seen the wind?/ Neither you nor I:/ But when the trees bow down their heads,/ The wind is passing by." Mitchell's metonymic use of the "wind" for allusions to an anonymous God is clearly central to his theme. He even prefaces his book for those who might miss the obvious: "Many interpreters of the Bible believe the wind to be symbolic of Godhood. . . . This is the story of a boy and the wind."

Jerry Kachur  
Edmonton, Alberta  
January 21, 1995



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I have surely stolen more than I can commend. They, and many more, are the people that write these pages. I thank them. Of course, I take full responsibility for bending their words for my own purpose.

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# PART I

INTELLECTUALS:  
FROM MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY AND  
ANONYMOUS INTELLECTUAL PRACTICE

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# Chapter One

## Introduction

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. (Karl Marx 1845 "Third Thesis on Feuerbach")

The object is to explore the huge, distant and thoroughly hidden country of morality, morality as it has actually existed and actually been lived, with new questions in mind and with fresh eyes. (Friedrich Nietzsche 1887: 155)

### 1.1. A Historical Event: Toward 2000 Together

In the summer of 1991, the government of Alberta under the leadership of Premier Don Getty initiated an unprecedented provincial consultation process called Toward 2000 Together. In the winter of 1991, the government of Canada also launched the Prosperity Initiative with community talks across the dominion. By April, May and June 1992, the federal consultations focused on regional interests, learning, international trade, competitiveness, financing and science, technology and skills development. The concluding federal roundtable, "Strategy for Prosperity," was held in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada on July 14 and 15, 1992. By then Alberta's provincial consultations were just warming up. After holding what was supposed to be a culminating conference on Alberta's economic strategy in Calgary in May 1992, under a new Premier, Ralph Klein, a new round of consultations with the agricultural community began in earnest throughout the winter just in time to frame the new Progressive Conservative election strategy in the spring.

With the return of the Progressive Conservatives to power by the fall of 1993, Klein initiated another round of consultations to determine the *best* means to balance the budget and to develop a more effective model for economic growth. A central focus was educational reform (in the broadest sense) which was to vault Alberta into the new information age. Two small statements by the premier in *Seizing Opportunity* (1993) summarize the general thrust and import of education in the new economic strategy.

There is still room for further consolidation and improved efficiency without adversely affecting the delivery of essential government services. Every department has been instructed to look at new ways to cut costs and bring an entrepreneurial management style to public administration. (8)

We must also look beyond conventional tools to promote economic growth. Research and development facilities, communications networks, and related infrastructure will be targeted as a priority to build our knowledge-based economy. (5)

The first statement enunciates a central relationship between *rationalization* and *privatization* and the second statement enunciates a crucial link between *educational "capital"* and *economic growth*. Articulating the relationship between these four elements and coopting the language of progressive liberalism is at the intellectual forefront for politically realizing the New Right "future." The general Alberta strategy was first enunciated as a pre-election set of "targets" in April 1993 and had nine parts. The first part had primarily a fiscal focus with the intent of freeing the market. The other eight parts were intimately linked to the restructuring of health care, education and social services as the

means to free the business community and provide a new engine for social development. Each part of the strategy was to be coordinated by some forum of public consultation modeled on "roundtables" which brought together the key "stakeholders" to decide the best means to achieve the government's goals. The roundtables also foreshadowed what were to be major cuts to the public legacy of the provincial welfare state in the name of saving the welfare state. *The Alberta government, historically the leading agency for conservative thought and action in Canada since the Second World War, intends to lead a revolution in the privatization of public assets in the knowledge-based sectors.* While in the Canadian vanguard, the Alberta government is not alone.

While Alberta is usually considered the paradigm case of conservative thought and action in Canada, it rides the wave of *a new kind of right wing politics* across Canada undertaken in various degrees by social democratic, liberal and conservative administrations. Quite clearly, much attention has already been paid to the New Right's interest in education. Livingstone (1987) summarized the educational road to the right as foreshadowing what is increasingly being played out in Alberta's recent reforms:

(1) fiscal cuts and organizational rationalization intended to halt expansion of the scope and scale of schooling; (2) a curriculum which reduces "frills" to get "back to the basics"; (3) an elaborated streaming system of program levels and standardized tests which serves to restrict access to advanced schooling while channelling most young people into a parallel job training system that cycles them in and out of low skill job markets; (4) the diversion of scarce educational funding away from public schools through such measures as voucher systems and state grants to private schools; and (5) a proliferation of commercially manufactured, privately purchased teaching machines and programs through which individuals who can afford to purchase them will self-train and socialize themselves. (58)

A new rightist realignment is bringing a greater correspondence between the needs of business and schools, but education as capitalist social reproduction is not the whole story. *Missing from critical analyses is the way cultural commodities are increasingly perceived as the new engine for the flagging economy and how government constraints created by social expenditures can now be treated as business opportunities in international trade. It is the emphasis on these new elements concerning the profitability of educational commodities which marks the unique shift in the ideology and practice of the New Right as a reinvigorated Social Darwinism.* Public education is now assumed to be the site of increased small business opportunities whereby in one stroke deficit constraints, teacher resistance and salaries, and business taxes can be reduced. This action intends to leave non-profitable production costs (e.g. basic scientific research) and non-profitable socialization costs (e.g. mass schooling) to be subsidized at public expense while spinning off the private production of profitable cultural commodities (e.g. Human Resource Development) and the private reproduction of profitable socialization opportunities (e.g. Centres of Excellence). *To accomplish this task the ideologues of the new Social Darwinism are rearticulating the connotations of technocratic reformism while retaining the textual appearance of the progressive theses of individualized equal opportunity, state-sponsored human capitalization and the ameliorization of cultural deficits.*

In its response to the fiscal crisis of the state which emerged as a global concern in the 1970s, governments from across the political spectrum and around the world, north and south, east and west, have embarked on a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between state and civil society. *A revolution* has been imagined, not by the political left as might be anticipated, but intriguingly by the right. It was, after all, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who came to power espousing the jargon of revolution, while the left,

including the Canadian activists, scurry like little conservatives during two federal administrations of Brian Mulroney's Tory rule and apprehensively, now, under a Jean Chretien's Liberal restoration. These activists now defend the legacy of the *past* and universal rights to progressive education, unemployment insurance, pensions, health care, collective bargaining, minimum wages, and provincial equalization payments. The Right has seemingly captured the "future" and the left has entered a period of visionary malaise espousing incremental resistances to retrenchment in a politics of one step forward, two steps back on both real incomes and collective social benefits.

Francis Fukuyama, former director and consultant to the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, wrote in his 1989 essay "The end of history?" that the triumph of the West and the end of history meant the realization of ". . .the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (3). While recalling Daniel Bell's "end of ideology" thesis, Fukuyama's point runs much deeper. He points to the triumph of ideology over the material social order. He points to the triumph of *one* ideology informed by liberal democracy and the market principles of economic organization. He points to new forms of potential conflicts over outmoded ideologies, religions, and nationalisms based on historical or pre-historical understandings. And he points to the sad end of daring leaps in human imagination -- "idealism" (as he defines it) replaced by economic management and by efforts to meet consumer satisfaction. His corporatist "postmodern" turn of phrase also proclaims the end of the "grand narratives" of human emancipation and he predicts that the most lethal struggles could be between "post-historical" liberal societies and the traditional unmodernized world. Fukuyama provides one of many focal points for corporatist postmodernization strategy.

Where the early 1980s marked the end of a period of self-doubt for the purveyors of entrepreneurial excellence and the beginning of a New World Order armed for global policing with the most sophisticated destructive technologies, the New Right theorists of the early 1990s, complemented by the spectacular collapse of East Bloc communism and the "video arcade" style of the Gulf War, seem to have settled into a more mundane -- and less publicized -- effort to reinvigorate pecuniary excellence and the co-opting of the progressive "reform" agenda. This reconstitution of hegemony and of self-confidence seems to be the primary function taken on by the mandarin intelligentsia and, for a fee for services, they make substantial contributions to reconstructing step-by-step the common identity of the most powerful factions in each nation so that the purveyors of excellence, the new euphemism for the survival of the fittest, can retain and extend their hold. How is hegemony exercised in the contemporary period? From both the left and right there is a dearth of research into the mechanisms of ideological production in the exercise of hegemony. *This rightist revolution is scientifically legitimated by intellectual practitioners who produce what I label corporatist postmodernization theory and is being politically secured by what I label anonymous intellectual practice.* Chapters Two to Five develop in detail these two conceptions. The rest of this chapter provides an overview of the central elements in the study.

The members of the intelligentsia share a common interest because they depend on the direct producers of material goods and they need to sustain their power in a gift economy of symbolic sharing. The intelligentsia are also characterized by diverse practices, relations of offices and differing class alliances that thwart their formation into a self active and interested agent. They are further divided by the differential mediations of the state and the market. The recent reconfiguration of intellectual practices clearly shows the development of a split in class alignments. Those who are against public-service forms of intellectual

practice have been able to mobilize popular opinion against the monopolization of educational credentials and the visible advantages it brings. The purveyors of consumer services present themselves as the solution to the excesses of the public service intelligentsia while deflecting popular resentments away from their own complicity in the global economic crisis.

The assumption that in the contemporary period class relations between capital and labour have been miraculously transformed into a form of post-capitalism serves to reproduce technocratic assumptions concerning the universality, neutrality and objectivity of public discourse. The "nation" or "province" is the most significant universalizing ideological form in the social imaginary. I suggest that a new conception of the "anonymous intellectual" can account for both a "double fracturing" in the universalizing thought produced by administrative systems and the increasingly powerful regimes of technocratic performance. I argue that the rise of anonymous intellectual practices requires rethinking the nature of traditional analyses focused on the "heroic" public intellectual.

Concerning the development of New Right ideology I take my cue from David Harvey (1989: 338) who describes the condition of postmodernity as the interpenetration of two opposed tendencies in capitalism as a whole. These tendencies are Fordist modernity and flexible postmodernity and they create a complex of oppositions expressive of the cultural contradictions of capitalism. *I focus on the complex of economic, political and cultural contradictions and the way intellectual practice in English Canada and Alberta is being transformed through the emergence of a corporatist postmodernization narrative.* Furthermore, this study shows how the corporatist postmodernization narrative is realized through the production of the "prophetic" texts of the "anonymous intellectual." For the moment, *I define the "anonymous intellectual" as "the residual social artifact of an unidentified communicative occurrence."* Or in the style of a Bakhtinian analysis, the manner of how the multiple voices of polyphony are subordinated to the monological authority of an omniscient authorial voice called the imaginary "universal Albertan." As Bakhtin (1984) states "monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any *decisive* force. Monologue manages without the other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word*. It closes down the represented world and represented persons" (cited in Gardiner 1992: 27). More specifically *the case study analyzes how Alberta "vision" reports prescribe social reform for the year 2000 through the metanarration of "anonymous functionaries" in the exercise of hegemony.*

Understanding the nature of the interplay between both the theory of postmodernization and the method of the anonymous intellectual is crucial for understanding the new hegemony which is displacing the social relations of the capitalist welfare state. This new hegemonic strategy is an ominous challenge to freedom and democracy in the name of "freedom" and "democracy" by the pedagogues of "scientific management," "libertarianism" and "corporatism." Alberta's recent political initiatives provide one case in point for understanding what Andrew Ross (1991: 178) calls, a global change in the weather and the probable realization of a strange future. As new knowledge is catalogued and collated into cross-impact analyses, decision trees, scenarios, simulations and computer models, the knowledge emerges as a cultural commodity, written up to appeal to policy makers and corporations as profitable information resources to help plan and create a preferable future. One important question is left begging though: *whose preferences are being served?*



## 1.2. Preferable Futures in Canada?

A significant but limited starting point on the topic of futurism already exists in Canadian research. David W. Livingstone (1983) argues in a seminal book on class ideologies and educational futures that when considering intellectual and popular images of the educational and social futures three essential ingredients can be specified in attempts to restructure social reality. The first ingredient is an understanding of actually existing society. The second ingredient is a vision of the future. And the third ingredient, linking "what is" to "what ought to be," is a strategy for getting there. He writes that an image of a desirable future remains a suggestive fantasy and can only become a social force when it informs social practice. *Alberta's Toward 2000 Together clearly brings together the three essential ingredients in restructuring reality. Now clearly evident is a new vision that resolves the crisis of postmodernization from above without seeming to challenge the social relations of subordination.* In some ways the new vision has the potential for actually deepening domination. The question answered in the next few hundred pages is how these ingredients have been brought together and what are its implications for Canadian politics and intellectual practice.

Livingstone (1983) states that up until the early 1980s the typical manifestations of normatively-based but truncated or deferred envisioning processes were likely to consist of *either ameliorative or apocalyptic* extrapolations from historical conditions and to result in strategies mobilizing largely expedient political tactics. The general tendency in advanced industrial societies was to dismiss "utopian" thought in favour of "realistic" pursuits. In other words, the preferred image of a utopian future had been dominated by incrementalism or what might be called the grand narrative of progressive liberalism expressed in its social democratic, liberal and conservative variants and legitimated with reference to the applied human (behavioral) sciences. *Yet the new tendency indicated by my research suggests that a new combination of ameliorative incrementalism and apocalyptic visionary extrapolations has been mobilized for political expediency. It is the right and not the left that has combined utopian and realistic pursuits to capture the future.* In 1983 Livingstone remarked that the continuing decline of public confidence in all social institutions -- and particularly in politicians to deal with the fiscal crisis of the state and declining productivity in the economy -- raises an extremely important problematic concerning educational entitlements, large budget cutbacks and school closures, wholesale reorganization and reduction of established forms of schooling and the retention of schools as a pervasive bulwark of the existing social order. Hinting at political opportunities for a progressive leftist vision of the future, he states that "how this generalized economic, fiscal and education crisis will be resolved remains quite uncertain at this point" (1983: 12). This window of opportunity, though, has been captured by the right.

According to Livingstone (1983), when the two major contending intellectual traditions are compared, socialists appear committed to egalitarian restructuring and speak for the particular interest of the materially disadvantaged and exploited, and bourgeois thinkers appear committed to the inherent social inequality and speak to and for universalistic interests. Both though, he points out, have tended to denigrate serious attempts to envision preferred futures or analyze how the politics of imagining is central to humane efforts to realize the future. The modern social imagining process has distinguished itself by its emphasis on individualism, nationalism, mastery over nature, rationalism, materialism, and secular progress. And increasingly, as the current global economic crisis has played itself out, forecasters as a whole have tended to focus more on technological rationalization, and educational forecasters have been preoccupied with a dual interest in adapting education to

the electronic age and finding more efficient means for enhancing the social learning process. In offering empirical assessments of the images of the future, Livingstone (1983) also argues that popular sentiments have been largely ignored by visionary intellectuals and policy makers, bourgeois and socialist alike. Increasingly, though, professional futurists and other intellectuals in conjunction with expert dominated private and public commissions have engaged in a variety of systematic efforts to envision probable or preferable societal futures.

In 1983 his criticism of the small amount of scholarly research on ordinary people's images of the future and the scattered, diffuse and abstract exploratory studies of the past generation still holds true a decade later. Livingstone (in making his own contribution to the empirical study of preferred futures and attempting to jump-start a left-leaning research program) had already discerned that the predominant tendency to which popular futures-thinking is oriented is to engage in technological extrapolations and not to envision alternate social futures. He had also identified that ". . . people in the post-1968 period are becoming more concerned about the social future. . . [and] social equity issues are likely for the foreseeable future to constitute major substantive dimensions of popular thinking about the social organization of society" (1983: 203).

Overall, the public expectations for "drastic reorganization" of education presumed not only a technical and incremental orientation but that such changes would be accomplished within the established institutional structure of state schooling and advanced capitalism. Most specifically, common themes attempted to accommodate the contradictory interests of "freedom" and "discipline" and of "local control" and "expert authority." In surveying the shift in general societal and educational expectations (i.e., Canada, specifically Ontario), he notes that in 1973 there was an "evident tendency for different preferences concerning future freedom of choice in education to be associated with preferences regarding future social equality" (1983: 214). By the 1980s, he found that clear majority preferences for greater economic equality continued to be expressed by the subordinate classes, but that indications suggest "that any link between preferences for future educational freedom and economic equality may have weakened considerably" (ibid.). Livingstone (1983: 215) describes a growing, yet by no means complete disjuncture, between popular economic egalitarianism and persistent corporate demands for a more restrictive social form for the learning process. He calls for the engagement of critical intellectuals in efforts which have been largely ignored: (1) to understand the images of potential futures inherent in the activities and the sentiments of subordinate social groups and (2) to articulate and disseminate related normative visions of possible societies consistent with principles of self-management, equality in social relations and diversity of social development. While Livingstone's own project of continuous surveying of Ontario's class opinion-leaders has kept this responsible engagement alive, his challenges have been rarely taken up outside Ontario. Furthermore, his own studies and others have not overcome an important self-criticism, that "a large-scale opinion survey at a single point in time cannot offer deep insight into the stability or dynamics of people's images of the future. It is possible also that a large pre-coded questionnaire can impose overly rationalistic, reified interpretations of images of the future" (216). While large-scale surveys can locate and describe the general patterns of orientations in large populations, he calls for more sensitive, smaller-scale studies using alternate methods to accomplish the tasks. One call he did not make, though, was for an *explanation of the specific mechanisms* that were causing the weakening of the link between educational freedom and economic equality. To do so would have meant challenging the way a theory of ideology and the practices of communication have been historically conceived by the Canadian left.

*This research sympathetically takes up Livingstone's historical materialist challenge, yet attempts to confront several methodological, theoretical and substantive problematics now clearly evident a decade later in such a project that was obviously not taken up by the Canadian left to the degree it was taken up by the right.* It is my argument that unlike the left, the right has developed a vision of the future and an understanding of ideological politics that together are able to mobilize contradictory popular desires for freedom and discipline, centralized expertise and local control, equal opportunity and private choice while maintaining an agenda for the maintenance of (or deepening of) social inequality and class subordination. This research offers an insight into *how* this ideological vision captured the future. Furthermore, I argue that these unaccounted for problems in the Canadian leftist literature on ideology are not specific to Livingstone's project alone, but rather the manifestation of a set of structural relations informing intellectual practice in Canada that have been left unexplicated in many circles. *The problem does not lie with the moral character of left activists, but rather with the inadequacy of their studies of ideology.* So while attentive and sensitive to the limitations identified by Livingstone and the need for a smaller-scale case studies of social reform using an alternate method of analysis, this dissertation points to unresolved issues still unaccounted for in Canadian critical research on ideology. One must turn attention toward the mechanisms by which the ideologues of the right are accomplishing their task, not only to describe the new ideological configurations, but to explain their production, circulation and realization as practice.

### **1.3. The Intellectual Politics for Approaching the Next Millennium**

Ideologues of various stripes are actively preparing the public for the year 2000. As of yet, most responses in the name of the next millennium, appear at first glance to be recasting the social Darwinism of the Age of Imperialism. Rather than formulating anything new except in reconceptualizing the old meanings of patriarchal, racial and class power in terms of progressive language many countries have embarked on similar projects for dismantling public entitlements and reorienting cash flows and legal frameworks for the recapitalization of private enterprises. While the "entrepreneur" as the purveyor of excellence is canonized, the intellectual as social critic has been strangely silent. Liberals have become conservatives and socialists have become cynics. A broad spectrum of intellectuals prefers to speak the language of efficiency, technical expertise and globalization and to share in the spoils as a new mandarin class by opening ever increasing numbers of consulting firms.

Side by side with the global integration in this New Gilded Age and the acquiescence of the intelligentsia to the economic imperative, the contemporary crisis also has another side where the "natural" forms of collective organization are losing their legitimacy. Social relations are fragmenting into their constituent parts based on the real practical experiences of people. There is a fragmentation of norms, a global anomie, recently labeled as the "postmodern sensibility" or the "malaize of modernity." Objective class characteristics representing these competing and disaggregated moralities are fluid. The practical division of labour and of traditional lifestyles are still present but only as elements, requiring the subjective reconstitution of private and public identities to regain social integration at the global level. Social re-integration, or steering through the crisis of accumulation and of meaning, also requires the differential mobilization of the media of language, force and money and the reconstitution of the varied subjectivities and ethics of those who might constitute the new governing class.

The focus on the symbolic constitution of social development and the cultural constitution of a nascent supranational State, does not mean that I assume that the pursuit of

corporate profits or the possible impact of national political events are somehow *really* secondary and that the text of supranational culture or any culture is determinant in *the last instance*. Rather, this research recognizes that what is called the "mode of production" is as much a cultural phenomenon as it is an economic or political phenomenon. When discussing culture, politics or economy, one must be wary not to mistake the map for the territory, and when the territory (the social) is itself both imagined and real and the product of human praxis, one must be confident that the text of culture is as *real* as the texts of the economy and politics. The latter two conceptual frameworks directed at understanding the economy and politics concern social relationships at different levels of ontological abstraction, levels which are central to a critical understanding of social development but are only linked in a secondary way. Fredric Jameson (1990) writes that clear distinctions have to be respected between "an examination of historical events, an evocation of large class and ideological conflicts and traditions, and an attention to impersonal socioeconomic patterning systems (of which the well-known thematics of reification and commodification are examples). The question of agency . . . has to be mapped across these levels" (406).

*My analysis turns attention toward the mechanisms of hegemonic identity formation and the role that the hegemonic intelligentsia play in this global drama.* It is both a practical and hypothetical question whether this global capitalist resurgence can secure the subjective characteristics of social integration to form a new global ruling class. Although contested to varying degrees, the routinization of the new hegemonic ethic in the regulation and rationalization of new social technologies of governance points back to formats for legitimating social inequality as the inevitable outcome of "human nature." The final result of this objectification, reification and commodification of "universal" social relations has yet to confront a challenge of any substance. The general "leftist" interest in the new social movements and identity politics appears in a constant flux, motivated at times by the exclusionary politics of separatism and generally oriented to a fetishization of the particular, the different and the appearance. Thus it is not difficult to hazard a prophecy that new institutional forms of differential corporate patriarchal power will emerge and the private accumulation of socially produced wealth and competencies will continue to be rejustified in the name of a grand narrative or anti-narrative of "progress" akin to Fukuyama's "end of history" or a new postmodern aesthetic. Can life not be otherwise?

*This study focuses on "anonymous intellectual practice" and the way it symbolically establishes a hegemonic agenda for social reform by strategically framing the imaginary of the "future" in the language of "neutrality," "objectivity" and "universality."* With a specific focus on Alberta, it asks how is hegemony in Canada constituted? Max Weber (1927: 352-6) argued that the primary means of breaking down the power of magic and establishing a rational conduct of life was through the enunciation of a great rational prophecy that laid the basis for modern science, technology and capitalism. What is the cultural logic of contemporary *rational* prophecies that provides the locus of class struggle over the sign of the "nation"? The struggle over the sign is centered on the varied discourses re-connoting the meaning of "progressive" social reform. *I hope to reveal that these grammars have a material basis in the offices of intellectuals and make the communication between the discursive domains possible.* The primary grammar mobilized by hegemonic classes in Alberta and English Canada is a practical science which atomizes theory and practice. It is the primary contention of this study that anonymous framing of conceptualizations in English Canada structures discourse according to an hegemonic rationality framed by a meta-grammar with an identifiable set of rules which are used to translate and regulate dissonant conceptual forms, theoretical speculations and empirical

statements made by competing classes in the construction of a "common" imagined community called "Canada" or "Alberta."

*The focus here is on the class struggle over the sign of an imagined community. My research advances the concerns of Benedict Anderson (1983) and Anthony Wilden (1980) by deconstructing the discourses of imaginary national and provincial futures in order to comprehend the mechanisms for producing and reproducing the relations of a colonial imaginary and unequal power in an age of corporatist postmodernization theory and anonymous intellectual practice.* By confronting the ideological and theoretical underpinnings of intellectual practice, I analyze the rarely acknowledged aspects of human activity related to mental labour as a mundane activity and relate it to one aspect of identity formation, the imaginary orientations to the future of "Canada." *The critique directs attention to the use of "situated" theory in shaping and "mis-shaping" desirable perceptions and actions oriented to the future.*

The theoretical conceptualization of "imagined communities" has been largely attributed to Benedict Anderson (1983) whose pioneering work on the origins and spread of nationalism has led the way in understanding the power of social mobilization inherent in imagining a limited and sovereign political community. He posits four characteristics of this modern manifestation of meaning making. First, the "nation" is *imagined* because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their communion" (15). Furthermore, this imagination is not the transmission of a transhistorical essence but the artifact of socio-historical invention. Second, the "nation" is imagined as *limited* because even the largest nations are identifiably finite and bounded, differentiated from both other nations and humankind in general. Third, the "nation" is imagined as *sovereign* with its divinity the result of destroying the divinely-ordained hierarchical dynastic realm and its power invested in confronting the power of living pluralisms of religious truths and subordinating them to the "freedom" of the sovereign state. And fourth, the "nation" is imagined as a community, because, "regardless of actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (16).

But Canadians do not have to go to Anderson to get their first introduction to a critical analysis of imagined community. Antony Wilden (1980) offered the first comprehensive analysis of the unique difficulties for *The Imaginary Canadian* and how the "imagined community" was a site of social struggle, a nation caught between the twin pincers of British and American cultural power where "being Canadian" is confused with "not being someone else." He argues that such an imagined community was also a way to justify a natural internal hierarchy where the "other" Canadian suffers some kind of cultural deficit as a not quite complete Canadian. These "others" include "Quebecois, Canadians who don't speak English, Canadians with 'foreign' accents; Maritimers, Westerners, Northerners, and Canadians from small town; 'lower class' Canadian youth, non-white Canadians, female Canadians, and the Canadian working class" (1980: 1). (As an interesting omission, Wilden fails to specify "Indians.") Wilden's point is that there is a struggle over the identity of an imagined community and that this struggle is as much about power as it is about a self-identification distinctive from other nations. His key premise is that the imagining of Canada is as much connected to internal colonization as it is to external colonization. "Colonized peoples are taught Imaginary histories in which they play the role of 'natural' inferiors" (ibid.: 2). Colonial domination, in this sense, is not merely accomplished by "external" forces but also by "the active and passive collaboration of Canadians in positions of power" (ibid.: 3).

What is the cultural logic of late capitalism? According to a host of critical social theorists, to the prevailing crisis of global accumulation crisis has been added the crisis of meaning, new cultural logics and emergent conditions for reordering intellectual practice (Zygmunt Bauman 1992; David Harvey 1989; Fredric Jameson 1991; Douglas Kellner 1989; Scott Lash 1990; and John Tomlinson 1991). How then does one analyse this reordering? Michel Foucault (1972) writes that an analysis of changes in discourse requires looking at the configuration of power/knowledge:

to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects [and to be concerned with] the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society. (83).

How, then, do the centralizing powers disqualify local knowledges and what can radicalized intellectuals do about it? How, then, does the English Canadian intelligentsia utilize meta-grammar in the reconstitution of a new ruling community composed of an alliance of classes and/or factions? What pedagogy *vis a vis* other Canadians might the intellectual use in the contemporary period to authentically act without moral/political passivity?

One of the most important struggles is over the definition of a community. Cultural redefinition concerns not just community, but, *most importantly, these definitions presume an unexplicated assumption about relations of domination and subordination.* Anderson (1983) and Wilden (1980) identify, a specific *kind* of community integrating relations of domination and subordination. Today, *definitions* compete to describe this "new" global community such as "technocapitalism," "post-industrial society," "late-capitalism," "advanced societies," "post-capitalism," "postmodernity," "spaceship earth" or "global village" etc. Each definition intends to describe a new kind of social condition requiring a different kind of economic organization, social regulation, cultural accommodation and future orientation within imagined boundaries, but as Livingstone (1983) has noted, in most cases the overall expectation has been that preferred futures retained a technical orientation and the implicit assumption is that the institutional structure will be that of advanced capitalist social relations.

Developing a consensus about what a community *is* thus becomes not only an intellectual exercise of social understanding but also an active pragmatic task in the social reconstitution of "a people's" understanding of legitimate social relations of power and inequality. *Naming the "imagined community" is thus not only an intellectual exercise but also an exercise in intellectual politics and the constitution of subjectivity.* Claims to objectivity, neutrality and professionalism in understanding the "crisis" mask the inherent political interest to retain or transform not only the technical relations of production, that is, the adequate efficiency and distribution of competencies, but to retain or transform the social relations of production, that is, the social distribution of power. Furthermore, the imagining of community has become an economic exercise, one of the major growth industries for global consultants and academics situated in the expanding cultural markets of business, government and science. And more than a mere political and profitable exercise, naming "the crisis" is fundamentally about the making of a new object, a new world, a new person -- a practice of social creativity. Invention of a new definition to describe a communal normalcy is not only the discovery of something already existent

called "community" but is *the intellectual production of community* as lived experience. These "found" artifacts, "Canada" or "Alberta" as "names," do not only constitute identity according to territory but also compete with other identifiable objects of experience constituting class, gender and race and the intersection of relations of domination and subordination.

*The problematic of discursive regulation is a complex site for any empirical analysis of theory and prophetic visioning.* The identification of texts, codes and contexts central to New Right ideology presupposes that the totality also includes the social relations of real human beings. At the symbolic level, then, -- that is, when the text "stands in for" or "represents" something else -- one has to recall Louis Althusser's (1971) identification of ideology as "the Imaginary representation of the subject's relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence." Texts as contents and artifacts of a communicative occurrence are both imaginary representations and a real condition of existence. Furthermore, Mikhail Bakhtin prefers the concept of "inter-textuality" to that of text and context (Nielsen and Jackson 1991). He prefers this new conception because the distinction between texts, codes and context residing in structuralist approaches is an artificial distinction. All textual productions, he argues, refer to other textual productions and that the so-called "context" (e.g., "the economy") or "code" (e.g. logic of organization) is already textualized. Although Bakhtin argues that cultural processes are intimately connected to social relations as sites of difference, contradiction and power, he also argues that every ideological sign is more than "a reflection, a shadow of reality"; it is also "itself a material segment of that reality" (cited from Smith 1988: 116-45). How then can one approach this topic?

#### 1.4. Toward an Analysis of Intellectual Practice in Canada

The intelligentsia require a self-reflexive analysis concerning their own practices. They are implicated in social relations yet have an inadequate understanding of those relations. The pedagogical relationship between intellectuals and their publics, clients or students does not end at the office door but *extends to the intellectual institutions and the wider social systems* which embody economic and political imperatives in the unequal and *combined* development of capitalism. Although the emergence of Bell's "end of ideology" ideology seemed to have opened a debate now seemingly slammed shut by Fukuyama's "end of history" ideology, the new debate over the end of ideology and history are conjoined and have taken on many characteristics of an ideology of a different order, what Foucault might call an epistemic break in the nature and mode of ideological rearticulation. Concerning the political regimes or "hidden curricula" of social education, the fact remains that the surveillance of society and the pedagogy of the intelligentsia are essentially morally and politically informed by interests not necessarily representative of a general interest but nevertheless still presented in the technical language of efficiency, administration and assumed universality. The incongruity between how intellectuals define and interpret their role and their actual concrete political activity raises key questions about how ideological processes work in this period of malaise and how researchers can reflexively approach a topic concerning their own practices.

As such, the reflexive study is situated between intellectual history and cultural critique and takes advantage of the ample cognitive resources available in Canada. Raymond Morrow (1991b) writes that Canadian scholars are well situated because they are able to draw on theory and research from a wide variety of national and disciplinary traditions, they have been willing to link cultural studies to the material conditions of cultural production, they have drawn on and transcended the communication studies established by Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan and Northrop Frye, they are focusing on important

aspects of Canadian life resulting from our cultural vulnerability to the American presence, they use methods which transgress disciplinary boundaries to get at problems which cannot be resolved through discipline-based studies alone, and they are committed to understanding the crisis of the Canadian federation and the mediating role played by the academic disciplines. This combination of Canadian cultural studies and intellectual historical sociology is practically organized as a critical and realist depth hermeneutic combining discourse analysis and theoretical critique and a lot of reading, thinking and writing. Friedrich Nietzsche (1887) made a point which still rings true: "One skill is needed -- lost today, unfortunately -- for the practice of reading as an art: the skill to ruminate, which cows possess but modern man lacks" (157). This study is organized in such a way as to recover the importance of reading and ruminating.

Thus in a critical hermeneutic I focus on what Stuart Hall (1992: 277) calls the "discursive strategy" for hegemony and the intelligentsia's own implication in those strategies. The recent prophetic visions of "Canada" resulting from various consensus forums by economic, political and educational elites provide a cultural field of action whereby discursive strategies are deployed to reinvent "Canada." This contested terrain should reveal continuities and discontinuities in the cultural codes which frame the meaning of human nature, of human psychology, of the social order and of social change and the way these meanings are sutured together into complex ideological configurations. *This study is limited to analyzing the development of the English Canadian imaginary and how the intelligentsia contribute to a new mode of moral regulation specifically in Alberta. In a limited way, this thesis addresses the issue of the complicity of hegemonic and accommodating intellectuals in the rise of a new New Right ideology called corporatist postmodernization theory.* The 1980s were marked by increasing challenges and alternatives put forward from the right as part of the general collapse of technocratic liberalism. Critical intellectuals are now confronted with the paradox of having to defend a set of social relations that they had intended to transform: the post-war welfare state. Increasingly critical intellectuals confront a new competitor for the social educational future which transcends simplistic identifications of a new authoritarian populism.

*Another significance of this study lies in its attempt to reveal the ideological nature of contemporary intellectual practice as the production of ruling class subjectivity and to be part of a process of enlightening the intelligentsia about their historical role in social development.* It is remarkable how little research has been directed at the Canadian intelligentsia as a class of individuals in relation to the struggle of other classes. This lack of information has, for the most part, created a situation where the intelligentsia as a whole are unable to generate a rational self-understanding of their own historical role in Canadian development. The result is a contradictory consciousness. On the one hand the intelligentsia actively socialize clients to meet the needs of the social order while, on the other hand, they carry around common sense assumptions and speculations about the apolitical nature of that activity based on their self-understanding of their specialized functions. The social functioning of the intelligentsia within the totality contradicts the intelligentsia's own interpretation of their isolated, specialized and fragmented activities. With a clearer understanding about how theory orients social action, this study presupposes that intellectuals can *learn* to authentically act in shaping their practices without moral or political passivity.

One description of this immobilization of revolutionary potential has been named by Charles Taylor (1991) as the "malaise of modernity." The logic of late capitalism has precipitated a sensibility of cynicism sometimes also described as the postmodern sensibility, a disbelief in the grand narratives of Progress and Enlightenment. Along with



the disbelief, the public intellectual as a "cultural elitist" has fallen on hard times and is caught up in a generalized moral/practical immobilization, waiting for the proverbial Godot. Meanwhile, political, economic and other intellectual elites willingly step into the void to articulate what is to be done. Is this not the essential contradiction of the radical intellectual who acquiesces? Only such a claim would forego *realpolitik* and begin with an ideal which needs to be realized. Cultural elites who claim authority to speak against anti-elitism usually also *rationaly* argue that "Western" enlightenment is the *cause* of contemporary problems. Such a position speaks a reactionary point of view by assuming that somehow a Golden Age of rationality and enlightenment has ended leaving in its place its opposite. Social pathologies have always run deep and to assume otherwise is delusion.

Intellectual cynicism may be rather a product of self-misunderstanding. For the intelligentsia, whether specialist or generalist, mental labour is not always as it first appears. Intellectuals are not above succumbing to a misinterpretation of their own practices. During socialization, they, too, have assimilated a myriad of ideas and assumptions about their role and their social functioning. These ideas constitute the general ideas and ethos of the historical period. As a particular class of individuals the intelligentsia do hold some ideas which accurately represent their own situation, yet may also hold ideas which are derived from representations by other classes. *The conflict between the everyday ideas the intelligentsia gain from practice and the ideas that they have assimilated during socialization create a contradictory consciousness.* This consciousness has definite political consequences which Gramsci (1971) explains:

The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific social group, it influences its moral conduct and direction of will, with varying efficacy [sic] but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity. (333)

### 1.5. Commitments

While much to do has been made about the jargon of "authenticity" and the slippage of the signified away from the signifier of emancipation, this thesis still takes up what in some circles is now decried as emancipatory mumbo jumbo. I presuppose that the nature of intellectual production is open to a change of direction and that the potentialities of new intellectual processes are important enough to focus on. The current reconstitution of the Canadian ruling group is as much reactive as it is active in making history. I assume that conflicts and contradictions precipitated by the agents of counter-hegemony (e.g. workers, women, non-whites, middle-class radicals and others) are fundamentally important *vis a vis* their own cultural constitution and that hegemonic action is made in the face of meeting counter-hegemonic actions. It is beyond the limited scope of this research to include in any depth these counter-hegemonic actions. What I do identify, though, are the accommodations of language made in hegemonic texts which intentionally or unintentionally co-opt counter-hegemonic challenges and diffuse resistance. These resistances are important. An authentic emancipatory interest, though, requires unmasking

ideological distortions which aid in propping up the authority of those who attain social power over the livelihood and lives of others. In the words of Agnes Heller (1991), the modern concept of the political still means "the practical realization of the universal value of freedom in the public domain." *Thus this study retains a hope that a nuanced and tentative defense of modernity in the face of the challenges to political modernism might have some import.* Modernity still retains the potential for a global democracy based on substantive liberty, equality and solidarity.

Because this text is committed to social justice, the elimination of social inequality and the formation of a truly democratic sphere of discourse, it challenges the ideology of political neutrality usually found in most educational discourse. *It also challenges the ideology of political cynicism now fashionably rampant on the margins of academe.* The belief that theory and research can be value neutral or choose to absent its effects does not mean that human interests and effects are not present in the scientific or the "anti-scientific" enterprise, but that the normative historico-restructurations are buried a little deeper. Scientifically informed visions of the future which are presented as objective, universal and neutral proclamations of depoliticized "knowledge" are fundamentally ideological in that such proclamations assume that somehow knowledge is outside the construction of humans, particular humans, shaped by struggles over concrete sensuous existence. An understanding of the contemporary period requires confronting the intellectual's complicity in the moral regulation of hegemony, the rise of scientific forecasting and the challenges of corporatism.

Furthermore, any review of the history of intellectuals immediately reveals a dearth of female protagonists evoking a potential response that I have contributed one more brick to the wall of "male style." This criticism may very well be true. *I do not suppose to escape my structural position or my cultural history.* Further to this, though, the analysis has also revealed an absence of working-class and non-white representatives. These latter two absences I believe speak to the fact that the nature of intellectual practice in the modern period goes beyond merely reflecting the "male style" and has more to do with the ontology of class structure than it has to do with recent formulations intended to displace class analysis with analyses limited to the various identity forms that specify region, gender, ethnicity, race and class. Any analysis which severs a materialist analysis from identity politics creates more problems than it solves and plays to the illusion of the age -- that somehow class struggle has been miraculously transcended and is of no further relevance. This statement is not to argue that the materialist analysis of class is not without its problems concerning androcentrism, Eurocentrism, anthropocentrism and the teleology of progress, but rather to argue that to jettison the realist method of historical materialism because of inadequate theoretical formulations only compounds the problems that such actions are intended to overcome and erringly slips into inadequate varieties of idealism, scientism or irrationalism.

With the above commitment to a class analysis and with my primary intent on examining the class structure and agency of intellectual practice, I leave for others the task of reconfiguring class with gender and racial politics. As it is this study has been extended beyond its originally intended length without having entered into the appreciable implications of sectional, gender and racial interests. *While I would argue my analysis is necessary, I would in no way claim that it is sufficient.* At times, I have only scratched the surface, substituting one sentence for what could have conceivably turned into another dissertation. Nevertheless, in having scratched the surface, my contribution links Canadian research into ideology, international social theory and a critical realist method of social analysis, and, in so doing, I hope, offer new insights for the work of others.

### **1.6. Summary of the Study and Argument**

The study is divided into three parts. Chapter Two completes the introductory Part I: "Intellectuals: From Modernity to Postmodernity and Anonymous Intellectual Practice." It reviews and criticizes the competing theoretical approaches to intellectual practice, presents an in depth discussion of Antonio Gramsci's conception of "hegemony" and defines my conception of the "anonymous intellectual." I introduce many of the theoretical issues concerning intellectual practice to lay the basis for my own approach. The chapter also introduces a few elementary aspects about the functioning of sign systems that are required for understanding a historical materialist approach to discourse analysis and the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and Mikhail Bakhtin. The new conception of intellectual practice and the new approach to ideological production are fundamental for understanding the increasingly anonymous regulation of intellectual labour and the new strategies for managing public desires. The chapter identifies that a special source of power for the intelligentsia is their competency to regulate discourse.

Part II is called "Toward a Critical Sociology of Canadian Intellectual Practice" and makes theoretical, methodological and historical points in three related chapters that justify the specific approach taken in Part III.

Chapter Three argues that Canadian intellectual history is an impoverished tradition in two senses. One, that an indigenous class of intellectuals in Canada is underdeveloped. Two, that the historical analysis of that underdeveloped tradition is inadequate. To make the points I review the Canadian literature (mainly anglophone literature) and initiate a debate concerning four elements of the discourse: (1) the methodological grammar, (2) theories of social development, (3) theories of class and ideology and (4) the fragmentation of a truly national research agenda.

Chapter Four offers a way to enrich the Canadian approach to intellectual practice. This enrichment is based on fulfilling three claims: (1) the hypothesis that to approach the study of the Canadian intelligentsia as a social class offers positive heuristic possibilities, (2) that the study of intellectual practices has to include the analysis of ideological production as well as reproduction, and (3) that a reconstructed Marxism -- based on the perspectives of critical theory (e.g. Habermas and Bakhtin) -- offers the best means to overcome the impoverishment of the English Canadian tradition. The chapter also explicates in more detail the method of discourse analysis introduced in Chapter Two that is required for the analysis of the intellectual regulation of Alberta's public consultation process.

Chapter Five presents a historical argument. Where Chapters Three and Four emphasize methodological and theoretical claims, in this chapter I argue that the present period marks a transformation in nature and content of political discourse. Of central importance is the displacement of a liberal technocratic narrative by a corporatist postmodernization narrative. Furthermore, I claim that the rise of the corporatist postmodernization narrative is also marked by a transformation in the way hegemony is exercised via futurology and strategic management. The combination of a new ideology and a new managerial style in setting the political agenda for social reform, thus, marks a transformation in intellectual practice and the means to understand it.

Part III is a "Case Study of Anonymous Intellectual Practice: Toward 2000 Together" and its chapters provide one illustration of the arguments made in the preceding chapters. To a great extent, culture is being commodified and, in the latest instant, higher education is now under the gaze of entrepreneurs who see the expropriation of knowledge as a new site for enclosing communal property for private gain. Alberta politics offers one site for analyzing these global changes. The case study of ideological production in Alberta

identifies four specific forms in the exercise of hegemony: (1) control of economic and political resources; (2) control of the metanarration on political truth; (3) control of the metanarration on scientific truth and (4) the fragmentation of political and scientific opposition.

Chapter Six directs attention to the infrastructure and circuits of power which make the Alberta "visioning" discourse possible and helped the Progressive Conservatives get reelected. This new discourse currently legitimates the 1993-94 Klein initiative. First I look at a select group of managerial scientists connected to the Banff Centre for Management. Then I describe a visioning conference that played an important mediating function in promoting the corporatist postmodernization narrative. I end by showing how the new vision became the centre of a new political discourse and was used by the Getty and Klein administrations to represent themselves as the legitimate representatives of Alberta's universal interest.

Chapter Seven describes how the many competing elite Alberta interests reconstructed their ruling class subjectivity so they could express their interests through anonymous texts, an universal theory and with progressive language. I show how the Toward 2000 Together intelligentsia regulate the discourse and naturalize their ideas with recourse to organizational devices and to rhetorical mechanisms. I investigate how intellectual authority rests on the non-discursive circuits of power, the manipulation of symbols and the construction of anonymous texts. I also show how the trajectory of Toward 2000 Together changes as its navigators attempt to find the right balance between ruling class interests seeking to maintain moral-political leadership and contradictory popular resistances that might challenge its dominance. I identify the mechanisms for ideological production whereby political power and economic interest distort democratic communication in the name of "consensus-building."

Chapter Eight takes a closer look at the meta-scientific justifications derived from the corporatist postmodernization narrative. This chapter treats the narrative as a *useful fiction* that offers one vision of the future, speaks to the present global crisis and offers a comprehensive response for social action. I identify a series of loosely articulated intertextual references that are used to authoritatively legitimate the "truth statements" of Toward 2000 Together. Whether these truths are in fact true or not is not as important as identifying why these statements or "fictions" are believed to be true by Albertans. Furthermore, I identify how these "truths" capture the intellectual sky from horizon to horizon and appear as a kind of common sense for everyday thinking that transcends logic and science. The ideological "origins" of the postmodernization metanarrative and the milieu for its reception form a broad textual configuration that transcends the provincial boundaries of Alberta and articulates national, continental and global interests. The exercise of hegemony in Alberta is thus only one moment in the exercise of hegemony at a global level. At this level the intertextual referents offer up a more comprehensive and tension-filled set of mediations between global corporatist postmodernism, national technocratic liberalism and Alberta traditionalism. I also establish that aside from the particular limitations of the corporatist postmodernization narrative in Alberta, this new narrative marks the rise of an international configuration of New Right networks and ideological articulations that demand more scrutiny.

Chapter Nine asks: Where is the resistance to Toward 2000 Together? This chapter describes two kinds of potential but inadequate resistance. One kind of resistance awakens in the fall of 1993 as a response to the first phase of the implementation and challenges the political legitimacy of Toward 2000 Together. It is a non-traditional political movement and lacks the economic and intellectual resources to sustain a challenge to the Progressive

Conservative government of Ralph Klein. The second kind of resistance is an intellectual counter-point provided by the Science Council of Canada to the scientific legitimacy of the corporatist postmodernization narrative. This resistance is limited because the institutional structure of the welfare state and the symbolic resources in a left technocratic response cannot substantially challenge the flexibility of market-based intellectual organizations or the metanarrational sophistication of corporatist postmodernism.

Chapter Ten summarizes and evaluates the central claims in Part II in light of the empirical analysis in Part III. I reconsider the nature of the state as an agent and the class relations of the intelligentsia. I identify the important ways that hegemonic intellectuals signify meaning through metanarration, social theorizing and mythical reconstruction. I end by specifying how counter-hegemonic intellectuals might respond to the culture of corporatist postmodernism and to the reconstruction of mythical representations.

# Chapter Two

## On Anonymous Intellectual Practice

As far as walking without grace is concerned, it is demonstrated most effectively of all by those Germans who, before 9 November 1989, disregarded state power, started out across the border, staggering under the weight of their plastic bags, and upset every prediction. The millennium has not broken out with these runaways -- only an everyday normality, which can survive without prophets. (Hans Enzensberger 1991: 18)

### 2.1. Introduction

Enzensberger's above quotation describes the 1989 collapse of East European Communism as "an everyday normality, which can survive without prophets." This tidbit serves notice that a potentially new interpretation of the relationship between new political movements and public intellectuals may be in the making. That humankind has entered into a transition period of some significance cannot be doubted given the various names used to describe the "new information age." That something new is happening, though, still leaves unanswered important questions about the degree, kind, scope and mechanisms of change concerning intellectual practice. Questions remain: is this change significant, what are the empirical dynamics of this change, and how can this change be best understood? .

The first purpose of this chapter is to describe, characterize and criticize the traditional approaches to intellectual practice. The second purpose is to lay the theoretical basis for my own approach and to clarify the theoretical origins and fundamental aspects of a critical discourse analysis. I introduce Gramsci's unique conception of hegemony, focus on his conception of the "Modern Prince" as a collective intellectual and show how my conception of the "anonymous intellectual" complements Gramsci's work by accounting for a postmodern form of normative regulation of discourse. The work of many theorists on intellectual practice informs this conception,<sup>1</sup> but this chapter focuses mainly on the crucial development of Gramsci's ideas on hegemony. Furthermore it highlights Gramsci's historical materialist method of discourse analysis, or what Renate Holub (1992) calls his "critical pragmatics" that provides a basis for introducing the ideas of many theorists, especially the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and Mikhail Bakhtin.

The conception of the "anonymous intellectual" is fundamental for two reasons not evident in Gramsci's analysis: (1) the increasing division, and anonymous regulation, of intellectual labour and (2) the increasing importance of the scientific management of public desires. Gramsci's conceptions of "hegemony" and the "Modern Prince" provide a substantial basis for interpreting the functioning of the public sphere, the mobilization of consent in a representative democracy and the intellectual production of culture. What is also required then is not only to confront the theories of intellectual practice but to identify a theory of cultural *production* as an important requirement for interrogating the artifacts of intellectual practice. In this latter case, each traditional interpretation of intellectual practice articulates (or assumes) a particular theory of cultural production. Here too, Gramsci, as well as Habermas and Bakhtin, offer a potential basis with their critical hermeneutics to interrogate cultural reifications. The last section of this chapter thus emphasizes that the

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<sup>1</sup>Andre Gorz (1976, 1978, 1980); Alvin Gouldner (1976, 1979, 1980, 1985); Ivan Szelenyi (with Konrad 1979; with Martin 1987); Michel Foucault (1965; 1970; 1972a, 1972b, 1977, 1978, 1982a, 1982b); Alain Tourain (1969, 1973, 1980, 1987); Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1988, 1977b, and with Passeron 1977a); and Zygmunt Bauman (1973, 1978, 1987, 1992).

special source of power for intellectuals lies in their ability to monopolize discursive regulation. It also introduces the reader to preliminary aspects of discourse analysis and the nature and functioning of sign systems.

## **2.2. The Canonical Interpretations of Intellectual Practice**

Contemporary approaches to intellectual practice shows that they tend to cluster into constellations which assume a particular defining relationship between class, power and knowledge. The traditional typology for theories of intellectual practice fall roughly into four categories: (1) benign technocrats, (2) liberal elitists, (3) conservative humanists and (4) orthodox Marxists.

According to Gouldner (1979), the first traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as "benign technocrats." Here intellectuals are viewed as a new historical elite which is already entrenched its institutional influence but who act in benign and trustworthy ways adapting to a system which has its own inevitable trajectory. Defenses of this position are made by John Kenneth Galbraith (1972) and Daniel Bell (1973, 1976). Mainly aligned with the American "liberal" tradition, these theorists identify the "new class" of individuals as a product of capitalism's overwhelming efficiency in recruiting and absorbing adversaries to the system. This "new class" -- in the non-Marxist sense -- was a benign technocracy of competently trained and institutionally proficient leaders who were the beneficiaries of an orderly transference of power in the new post-industrial service economy. Of course, post-industrial meant the "end of ideology" and the end of classes as traditionally construed. Because of their professional expertise in running the system better, the trained technical elite merely had taken over the reigns of power from the older hereditary elite. Power was ceded to a technical intelligentsia who needed to promote efficiency, safeguard individual freedoms and guarantee the gains of a minimum welfare state (Ross 1990). This "benign technocrat" approach does not identify the special vested interests which intellectuals pursue as well as the limitations of their rationality. It also occludes their subordinate position to the capitalist class -- at least in its collective form as a diversity of shareholders.

Recent criticisms by these social democratic and left-liberal anti-communists of the rise of the new class and the expansion of the American state drew Michael Harrington's ire. He dubbed Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz and others as "neo-conservatives" and one element of New Right hegemony in the 1980s (Lipset 1988). The neo-conservative critique was that intellectuals, in the nonprofit sector (especially in state and university institutions) were the primary threat to contemporary capitalism and the chief promoters of "bleeding heart" ideology (Bruce-Briggs 1981; Kristol 1978; Steinfelds 1979). The arguments of the neo-conservatives solidified a new hegemonic alignment between scientists, engineers, lawyers and managers in the corporate sector and their chief ideologues, the futurists in *Toward 2000 Together*, such as John Naisbitt and Peter Drucker, the neo-Smithians, such as Michael Porter, and the neo-Keynesians, such as Robert Reich (1983), one of President Clinton's new mandarins. This constellation of thought -- in its neo-conservative form -- closely parallels the development of the second constellation.

The second traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as "elite rulers." Here the benign view is challenged as harbouring a new authoritarianism where domination is exercised by experts who keep power in their own hands by monopolizing knowledge and limiting the "excesses" of democratic accountability. Rather than Bell's claim that technocrats would safeguard individual freedom, adherents to the strong position argue that technocrats may well install a new and deeper domination. Adherents to a weak position,

outlined here, view the shift to professional-managerial control just as another moment in a long history of circulating elites, in that, a new elite does not bring anything new to the world and continues to exploit others as did the old elites but by using education rather than money (Ross 1990). Elite analysis also overlooks the effects of shifting class alliances within civil society which influence the reconstruction of elite power. Early defenses of this position were made by Mikhael Bakunin (1911), J. W. Machajski (1937, 1979), and Robert Michels (1915). Michels distinguished two classes of intellectuals: (1) those who got access to secure posts in the management of the state and (2) those who were locked out. The conflict between heterodoxy and orthodoxy occurred when the state was required to open up the bureaucratic canals to accommodate adversaries to the social order in the hope of transforming them into partisans. Bottomore (1964: 69) writes that the attribution of great social influence to elite groups constituted by intellectuals, managers and bureaucrats was an attempt by elite theorists to displace Marxist theory and show that the transformation of capitalism could lead to a "classless" recruitment of elites but still maintain the distinction between the ruling elites and the masses.

Closely related to elite theory is J. Burnham's (1941) conception of the "managerial revolution." This idea which imputed a special and independent role for intellectuals concerned with planning and managing the new bureaucratic societies. Burnham influenced early critical theory as well as the ideas of George Orwell and Alvin Toffler (Eyerman et al. 1987). It is the identification of the *New Class* that links elite analysis and the managerial revolution to the benign technocrat thesis. Milovan Djilas's (1957) analysis of the rise of the Soviet *nomenclatura* provided the basis for an anti-communist and anti-statist critique which could be appropriated by American theorists as a critique of university dons and state mandarins. Djilas's thesis of a new ruling class of state managers and Burnham's thesis that managers and professionals who monopolized expertise were or had supplanted capitalists as the rulers of economic life in American style democracies were brought together in a synthesis. The newly articulated thesis, used for example by Peter Drucker and the navigators of *Toward 2000 Together*, accomplished several objectives. It could retain the illusion that America, unlike European and Third World societies, was a classless society. Liberal adherents could thus frame a debate between the limited polarities of the democratic thesis of unfettered pluralism versus the stratification thesis of circulating elites. Such an approach could justify democracy and social inequality while at the same time occluding class analysis. The thesis could also justify the corporate intelligentsia. It did this by providing a critique of "communism as statism" and evaluating state-based technocrats and university-based progressives as evil while still reinforcing the rising power of corporate technocrats as good for the American national interest. The logic of the theory culminates in the thesis that America is a "post-capitalist society." The illusion of the private sector technocrat is thus reproduced at the level of "New Class" theory. For these theorists, the differentiation of capitalism from privatized personal ownership to collective share ownership by workers via their pension funds supposedly marks the transcendence of "capitalism." The thesis allows anonymous and collective forms of capitalist and technocratic power to exist and expand. In addition the thesis allows for a continued critique of "class-based" societies and radical intellectuals not committed to America's "core values" (e.g. European, Third World). It does this by evaluating national or socialist orientations to state intervention as a degenerate sign of the "new" class. Claims for an independent state-role by progressive liberals, social democrats, socialists, communists or nationalists can be evaluated as burdened with the "traditional" values representative of 19th century politics in the context of inevitable future of 21st century postmodernization.



Similarly, John and Barbara Ehrenreich's (1979, 1990) "Professional-Managerial Class" (PMC) or the "New Class" (in capital letters) designates a continuance of the above thesis, although in a somewhat different vein by claiming that intellectuals (defined by specific cultural habits and psychological dispositions) may be found (but not likely found) in the New Class which is mainly constituted by the professional middle-class of engineers, lawyers, executives etc. This position also shares some similarity with Erik Olin Wright's "analytical" Marxism in that these professionals-managers represent contradictory or "middle" class positions. The Ehrenreichs presume, though, that the intelligentsia form a class defined by "occupational commonality" and "internal social cohesion" (1990: 174). They have a common ownership of "education" as cultural capital and common interest in a class culture. Unlike Gouldner, though, intellectuals, they argue are not a class but a stratum straddling the New Class and other classes. The Ehrenreichs use a narrow descriptor (which Gramsci designated "traditional intellectuals") to distinguish intellectuals from the New Class. This approach fails to see the recent conjunction of knowledge/power and class/power as being historically unique (Gramsci's "new" or "organic" intellectual) and in some ways fails to acknowledge the present discontinuous aspects of technocapitalism and postmodernity with past relations of capitalist power (Jameson 1990; Kellner 1989; Poster 1989, 1990). The limitation of Ehrenreich's designation is that it generalizes about the functioning of the New Class from assumptions about the functioning of the "Old Class," that is, it theorizes class/power in terms of relations derived from classical capitalism which may not be appropriate considering today's dedifferentiation of state, science and class power and the commodification of culture. This latter limitation is also found in the next two constellations.

The third traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as an "Old Class ally." Here we get a restatement of Durkheim and Weber's class commitment to the economic bourgeoisie. Intellectuals and other members of the New Class are seen as a group of dedicated professionals whose vocation it is to uplift the old propertied class from a venal group of capitalists into a socially-oriented elite protecting more than their own private interest. This position resembles the classical humanist tradition of the university don or public iconoclast. In combination with mandarin intellectuals, this new genteel elite can move society forward (Gouldner 1979). Gramsci (1971 [1926]) defines the ideal typical traditional intellectual as comprised of the organizers of culture (e.g. creative artists, scholars) and the vestiges of organic intellectuals from previous social formations (e.g. ecclesiastics) who fuse in a common illusion that they are autonomous from class interest. While not necessarily sharing the world-view of the ruling class (e.g. idealism versus materialism), they eventually effect a compromise with it, partially because of institutional pressures and financial inducements. Nevertheless, their common conscious is conservative in the name of the social order. The purpose of enunciating a conservative culture is to provide an integrating function as producing compensations for market anomie.

Two well known American proponents to the Old Class ally thesis are Talcott Parsons (1951) and Lionel Trilling (1965) and two of its contemporary spokespersons are Allan Bloom (1987) and E.D. Hirsch Jr. (1987). This position can be roughly described as culturally conservative and the home of Cold Warriors. Made up mainly of "anticommunist" traditional intellectuals, the intent of this position is for intellectuals to police the corridors of knowledge and purify it of any subversive contents. Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) in "The Politics of Literacy" argue that while "anti-communism" does not retain the same resonance in the post-Cold War period, voices such as Bloom and Hirsch now mobilize, anti-Black, anti-gay, anti-woman, and anti-Left political action with

rhetorical claims to be the prime legislators of "liberal education," "neutral standards," "core American values," "equality of opportunity" and "literary efficiency." By appropriating the language of efficiency the new ideologists of the "traditional intellectual" have been able to reconstruct their alliance with the "benign technocrats" and "corporate managers" against the "statist" progressives, socialists, feminists who in alliance with the popular classes threaten the autonomy of disinterested practice. Thus, corporate managers and the private sector intelligentsia now join the laissez-faire liberals and the cultural "conservatives" (along with the religious right) to make up the "New Right" coalition in a new and tentative political accommodation united in an anti-statist and anti-democratic discourse as Old Class allies.

Daniel Bell's (1976) related interests concern the "economic dilemmas" confronting Western societies. By arguing for restoring a commitment to public norms, he illustrates how liberals can become neo-conservatives. He states "we have had no normative commitment to a public household or a public philosophy that would mediate private conflicts" (249). The reason, he posits, for the lack of normative commitment is that the popular classes via a democratic polity have now adopted "bourgeois appetites" and demand more social services and entitlements (248). In other words, it is not the bourgeois appetite that is the problem but rather the bourgeois ethic has been generalized beyond the bourgeois class. Bell also identifies a second reason for the lack of normative commitment. "There has been a loss of nerve on the part of the establishment" (244). The argument as a tautology offers no explanation at all. Cultural decline is explained with reference to cultural decline. Rather than explicating the exploitative nature of the capitalist economy and oppressive structures of racism and sexism, the new Old Class allies thus propose a program of remoralization to dampen the "expectations" of the popular classes, restore the faith of the elites in themselves and reeducate the young about the legitimacy of the traditional institutions. In the case of the United States this means restoring democratic elitism, private property rights, patriarchy, and hierarchical education. The chief carriers of the restoration are the cultural, political and economic elites defined as "experts" in their sphere of influence. While at the same time occluding a scientific analysis of the mechanisms precipitating "moral decline," an evangelical restoration of belief in "America" as defined by the expert not only enforces *religio* on the general population it also cements the relationship of the conservative culture critic with the old ruling class or a new rising class (e.g. technocrats), whoever can best restore the lost order. The humanist's accommodating nature is justified by the ideology of tolerance (i.e., accepting the given relations of power). The empirical fact of institutional disruption, the triumph of conservative culture as tolerance becomes its opposite and is expressed in its weaker form as a lament for a lost Golden Age. In its stronger form, though, fatalism, cynicism or even reaction ensues, resulting in conservative culture critics justifying intolerant actions in the name of defending tolerance.

Allan Bloom (1987), as a case in point, identifies the "irrational pressures of mass movements" and the adoption of "German ideas" such as nihilism and socialism for causing the compromised position of the academic sphere. By occluding the rationalization consequences of elite actions and the use of bureaucratic and market mechanisms of capitalism in the creation of the "multi-university," he pines for a past when traditional intellectual work could proceed in an autonomous university without the bother of intrusions from the uncultured. The so-called autonomous university of the past was merely another name for the organic educational institution of the middle and upper classes whose walls have now been breached by the popular classes. Having aspired to the standard of a bourgeois education, the popular classes are thus condemned for having

lowered the standard by partially achieving the goal. The crisis of modernity is thus perceived by the well-to-do as a lowering of standards created by the external incursions of popular ("democratic") culture rather than as a general organic decline of a society based on class privilege. A property right to differential schooling is thus given primacy over a human right to universal education. The empirical crisis of modernity and the decline of educational standards is interpreted as the moral failing of "others" rather than the failing of a society constructed on the ground of class power. According to the conservative culture critic, this crisis can only be resolved by enhancing the power of the purveyors of excellence, that is, an *empirical* restoration of ruling class hegemony. In the conceptual gymnastics of traditional forms of abstraction promoted by the Old Class ally the victimizers are thus transformed into the victims.

Edward Shils (1982 [1971]) defines the mandarin intellectuals in a formally abstract and functionalist way in a search for the transhistorical essence of these "traditional" intellectuals.

The primary intellectual roles are constituted by: (1) the creation of patterns or symbols of general significance through the action of the imagination and the exercise of observational and rational powers and their precipitation into works, (2) the cultivation of the stocks of intellectual works, and (3) the transmission through interpretation of the traditions of intellectual works to those who have not experienced them. The secondary role is the performance of intellectual-practical (or intellectual-executive) actions in which intellectual works are intimately involved. (224)

Shils structural-functionalist approach starts from an abstract definition of intellectual practice and searches for the "essence" in the historical record. This mode of theorizing is not limited to "conservative" or sociological adherents but rather reproduces a totalizing paradigm for research into intellectual practice even for progressives. Hofstadter (1962) assumes the same distinctions. The history of American intellectual practice is thus specified as the history of anti-intellectualism but its causal mechanism remains unidentified. The rise of technocratic and political integration is perceived as the further degeneration of intellectual activity. Such might well be the case, but basing an analysis on such abstract distinctions cannot get beyond historical or sociological description to the identification of the mechanisms which cause the transitions or transformations in intellectual practice or core culture.

Shils (1982 [1971]) promotes the general method of the traditional intellect (from heaven to earth) as do Parsons and Bell. They offer, though, a scientized language of conservative culture criticism. This dominant form of American sociology -- even in its newest forms -- recycles the assumptions of the "grand" alliance between a traditional cultural aristocracy and a rising economic bourgeoisie. Shils imputes the dominant definition of American "core culture" and then identifies its transmission as the ideal-typical form of intellectual practice. This common practice in educational research is also generalized to research on intellectuals. Intellectuals, as traditional intellectuals, are thus identified to symbolize the essential intellect as both the cultural expert on the core American values and the ideal example of the educated person. Professionals, scientists and managers, on the other hand, are also identified as having their intellect tainted by having to deal with mundane existence. Their mental activity is defined as "intelligence," that is, practical or technical expertise. In pressing the logic to its conclusion, the people who work with their hands, such as the manual labourer, are presumed to be without the competency for either intellect or intelligence. This mythical construct lays the basis for what Paulo Freire calls "the banking model of education." The popular classes thus appear

as objects of education rather than subjects. Freire (1970) writes that "in this view, man is not a conscious being (*corpo consciente*); he is rather the possessor of a conscious; an empty "mind" passively open to the reception of deposits of reality from the world outside" (62). Paralleling the deep resonances of possessive individualism, the intellectual is treated as the banker of culture and the intelligentsia becomes the loans officer of expertise. They invest their capitals in the undeveloped territory of the virgin mind of the populous in return for the right to the surplus profit as personal property, that is, the intellectual as the keeper of "civilization" and the intelligentsia as the keeper of "expertise."

The structural functionalism of Shils thus reproduces a familiar pattern where two holisms of mental activity, between intellectuals (theoretical) and the intelligentsia (practical), are kept separate. Intellectuals who become practically involved thus lose their essence and are by definition no longer considered intellectuals. Intellectuals, to maintain their essence, must aspire to "disinterestedness" and "ideals." The promotion of values must not include political activism, that is, "partisan" values. The only accepted partisan value is the defence of the core value of tolerance which is assumed to be the ground for "disinterested critique." For example, Lewis Coser (1965) in *Men of Ideas* defines intellectuals as characterized by a particular psychological essence as "men who never seem satisfied with things as they are" (viii). By definition then someone who is "satisfied" (or "female"?) is in some way deficient or deviant if claiming intellectual status. But, this definition of critique is also framed within a core culture of American values which the intellectual is responsible to reproduce as eternal and natural truths. This conceptualization of "intellectual" practice, then, gives a rather narrow reading to "critique." Intellectuals are theoretically defined to be carriers of "critique" yet empirically blocked from critically evaluating the first principles of a supposedly transhistorical American "core culture." "Tolerance" finds its real meaning as conformity to hegemonic values defined as "tradition." Tolerance, thus, can be used to justify its opposite, conforming to intolerance. "Intellectuals" who criticize the "core culture" or popular classes who challenge the definition of reality enunciated by the keepers of civilization are themselves defined as "anti-American," "irrelevant" or "irrational" -- or as Bloom in the name of toleration selectively highlights, it is the purveyors of "German ideas" or civil rights or gender equity who are the intolerant ones not the capitalists, racists and patriarchs. To make his *philosophical* claim stick the conservative culture critic must assume a false empirical claim that class-bias, white supremacy and patriarchy do not *in fact* exist. In the division of intellectual labour between the intellectuals and the intelligentsia, the American philosopher is not accountable for empirical correctness which he or she argues is best left to the sociologist and historian, who, in a marriage of convenience, also argue that metanarration is best left to the philosopher

The grand alliance thesis as a *fact* fails to identify that neither the cultural "aristocracy" nor the economic bourgeoisie is necessarily morally bound to the general interest. The economic class is constrained to protect its profits and the cultural class cashes in on its education and social prestige. On one hand, the differences between the classes are based on the fact that each is willing to exploit the other as well as try to impose its own rationality and logic on the society as a whole. On the other hand, both are willing to come to some compromise if their own positions are challenged by the popular movements, in which case, they work together to maintain their distinctive spheres of power and privilege (Gouldner 1979).

The fourth traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as "servants of power." Here is a restatement of variants of Marxist orthodoxy but through the prism of American empiricism. Marxism has historically been given a very narrow reading in the

United States derived from the early reading of Marxism-Leninism as defined by Stalin for the Communist Party. Even the Trotskyist tradition since its emergence in the 1930s has always considered itself anti-communist (anti-Marxist?). Trotskyism still has a strong resonance in the U.S. and provided one basis for neoconservative anti-statism. This "wasteland" effect means that American "Marxism" is equated with the reductionism, economism and abstract materialism of Stalin's Marxism-Leninism.

In spite of the absurdities of Stalin's vulgar Marxism and the straw man arguments by liberals and conservatives who use vulgar Marxism to discredit Marxism, thinkers in this constellation have continued to challenge the premise that Modern America is a classless society. According to structural and analytical Marxists, intellectuals are viewed as instrumentally subservient to the big capitalists who retain power much as they always did by simply *using* the intellectuals to maintain their domination of society. American Marxism thus retains many similarities to the other three constellations by mystifying the relationship between class and elite rule and adhering to many of the paradigmatic assumptions of analytical thought which disdains historical and dialectical thinking. Here, intellectual agency is seen as a *function* of a structural domination whereby the capitalist class controls other classes. Marxist critique thus appears as a mirror to the hegemonic discourse. The Old Alliance thesis between economic liberals and cultural conservatives is accepted as true but evaluated as a form of negative domination rather than positive leadership. Two of the more sophisticated adherents to this position are Noam Chomsky (1967, 1978, 1989) and Erik Olin Wright (1978, 1985). Chomsky and Wright are motivated by different politics but nevertheless they share common assumptions about the nature of domination and provide exemplary arguments common to this "constellation."

Chomsky argues that university system is integrated into the structures of power and scholarly output has to adapt to the logic of power and market demands for intellectual resources. The ethos of professionalism in academic life is used to hide a systematic corruption of intellectual activity where objectivity and neutrality serves vested interests. Because intellectuals have greater access than the average person to the university, mass media and cultural production, they also have a greater opportunity to make critical statements. The intellectuals have abrogated their personal responsibility and have bought into the system. Chomsky's structural analysis undermines his ability to identify collective transformational processes and his pessimistic conclusions, mixed with moral urgency based on a form of socialist spontaneism, result in a call for moralizing intellectuals. According to Boggs (1993), Chomsky views intellectuals as "conscientious *individuals* who confront power with truth and reason in the service of democratic and humanistic goals" (162).

Wright was one of the first Marxists to break with the two class model and recognize knowledge as a potential basis for class. He posits that the intelligentsia is an intermediate and contradictory class between capital and labour. Wright conceives skill as a "productive asset" that can be controlled for economic advantage. His work is highly abstract and analytical and lacks historical analysis of class struggle between capitalists, the middle classes and workers. He posits that managers mobilize "organization assets." Where professionals exploit skill, managers control the nature of jobs and the coordination of tasks. He considers the right of control in corporations and state bureaucracies as a kind of property right. Power is derived from organizational authority, and regardless of individual skills, this power is subordinated to the nature of ownership. Nevertheless, the managerial class as a "class" is indispensable to either bureaucratic capitalism or state socialism. Whether "private ownership" in this form is legitimately a form of capital is unclear. Furthermore, the class position of managers is complex. Top managers are

intimately tied to capitalists and middle managers are organizationally similar to professionals. According to Herman (1981:15) the rationality of capital accumulation has not suffered from the rise of management control, and according to Derber et al. (1990), Wright "glosses over the intimate fusing of managerialism and capitalism at the top, the proletarianization of middle and lower managers, and the growing professionalization of managers at all levels" (223).

There are complex variations within this constellation of analytical and structural neo-Marxism. Thinkers in this constellation have touted different positions but each exemplifies a form of cultural determinism which this study -- while supportive of their critique -- finds quite limited in explaining how intellectual power works and whether intellectuals as part of the intelligentsia will necessarily *always* be at the instrumental service of capitalists.

Briefly stated, adherents to the above thesis posit that the *function* of intellectuals is to manufacture illusion, that is, to actively produce ideology which mystifies social relationships or to reproduce the organizational relations of capitalism, that is, what Bowles and Gintis (1976) call the "correspondence principle." As a class (or its various other designations as group, fraction, stratum etc.) the intelligentsia is at the service of the big bourgeoisie. Managers, doctors, lawyers, journalists, professors, writers and priests etc. make their livelihood perfecting the illusions of capitalism. One such illusion is that the accumulation of wealth is based on the differential effects of hard work and entrepreneurial intelligence but not on the differential distribution of power and the exploitation of wage-labourers. Furthermore, this "class" of functionaries also promulgates a second illusion that capitalism functions on the basis of "equality of opportunity" where the achievement of wealth is based on merit (sometimes luck) and not biased by the ascriptive characteristics of class, gender and race or the power to control the structural "corridors" of "equal" opportunity. A structural corridor could seem as benign as the construction of an "intelligence" test or a public washroom or as generalized as the structure of representative democracy, that is, those with money *represent* those without it. Also, they promulgate a third illusion of "professionalism" by which they are able to sustain their own position between the big bourgeoisie and the popular classes by claiming that their private ownership of a specialized kind of property (mental competencies) is required for the functioning of society as a whole. As such, Marx's complex conception of ideology as a moment of class struggle is de-historicized and instrumentalized.

Although much evidence is available to support the validity of what Chomsky and Wright claim for the presence of ideological domination based on class, their explanations fail to generate information explaining collective agency or the ideological construction of class forms as well as how and why "class" arises, changes or can be transformed. Stanley Aronowitz (1992a) writes that the new debate are those of *agency* and specific here intellectual practice as class agency. In response to the above approaches to class, he adds:

Needless to say, the burning question since Marx bearing on class theory is not, as often assumed, the spatial relation of social categories to the mode of production of material existence. The economic identification of social classes -- whether they own, control, or are objects of the production and reproduction of material existence, whether they occupy an intermediate position between the owners and the propertyless -- are interesting sociological questions but do not exhaust the politico-historico dimension of class issues. (126)

Class contradiction or individual consensus theories based on functionalist assumptions reflect different ideological assumptions about the system but fail to achieve an authentic scientific explanation. To maintain either of the functionalist theses means assuming an

explanation for structuration and ignoring history, especially revolutionary history, where radicalized intellectuals played a leadership role in the structural transformations of the last two centuries. Such theses also greatly exaggerate the common interests linking intellectuals and capitalists and systematically miss the tensions and contradictions between the rationalities they mobilize as specific and differential forms of power. They also ignore the fact that it is within the realm of historical possibility -- claimed by Marx and others -- that the capitalist class is historically constituted and *could* pass away. What the "ruling class" *is*, whether it is in control, and how it is in control, are three empirical questions that should not be presumed to be answered *before* an investigation starts. This flaw is endemic to structural and analytical analysis for both Marxist and non-Marxist approaches alike. Furthermore, to make such synchronic assumptions *and then to* sacrifice diachronic analysis underestimates the transformative potentials the players in the "new class" and in the changing densities of education, research and communication have. To hypostatize "capitalism" and "classes" sacrifices the possible identification of discontinuities in both their specific and general aspects. According to Gouldner (1979), to theorize about capitalism in such a way is to presuppose the permanence of a social order in even a more fundamental way than Talcott Parsons ever did.

Recent shifts in the theoretical discourses on intellectual practice suggest a realignment of non-democratic political interests. The first three traditional approaches appear to be coming to a *rationalized theoretical accommodation* concerning the nature of conservative culture, scientific management and neo-liberal economics. This new official rationalization marginalizes proponents of democratic, humanist, popular and public interests. The case study of *Toward 2000 Together* in Chapters Six to Nine illustrates similar theoretical rationalizations emerge as the common sense assumptions of Alberta's ruling elites.

The above canonical interpretations of intellectual practice focus on the heroic practices of public intellectuals or expert opinion-makers. The primary limitation of these theories is an emphasis on intellectuals as individuals (or groups of individuals) rather than as practitioners of symbolic mediation. Missed are the structural aspects of "collective" agency and the increasingly "anonymous" nature of intellectual practice. Traditional approaches are also compromised because they fail to account for the effects of cultural commodification or for the scientific management of desire. This second problematic concerns the fact that traditional approaches to cultural analysis reify culture. This latter failure means that traditional approaches cannot account for two major elements of the *Toward 2000 Together* initiative: the economy of desire regulated by scientific management or the specific non-discursive power of intellectuals who normatively regulate discourse. The fact that the above approaches to culture are theoretically and methodologically compromised suggests that an alternative theoretical approach is necessary. I now turn to Gramsci's conception of hegemony, organic intellectuals and the Modern Prince as the conceptual bridge linking traditional approaches to a more comprehensive and unique understanding of intellectual practice in the postmodern age. It is with my empirical interest in the *postmodern* intellectual form that Gramsci has theoretical purchase. The Alberta government's recent attempt to legitimate its authority through the *Toward 2000 Together* initiative is a case in point for an analysis based on Gramsci's conception of hegemony.

### **2.3. The Centrality of Gramsci's Conception of Hegemony**

Gramsci's conception of hegemony provides the basis for interpreting "practical consent" in a democratic society. This section summarizes Gramsci's epistemological assumptions for the exercise of moral-political leadership, clarifies his reconception of liberal definitions of consent as practical consent (hegemony) and specifies that conforming

social behavior is not necessarily a sign of consent but could be a sign of domination. For those who are unfamiliar with Gramsci's ideas the next three sections introduce a few of his key concepts.

The epistemological foundation of Gramsci's historical science embodied the practical realization of a socialist society. It focused on a return to Marx's historicism and a critique of Croce's idealism and Bukharin's dialectical materialism. Gramsci links the objectivity of science with universal acceptance of its findings, and this universal acceptance in turn depends upon whether or not the findings work in practice. For Gramsci, objectivity equaled universal subjectivity, thus linking a correspondence and consensus theory of truth to the practical realization of emancipatory truth. He argued that his philosophical materialism was more in keeping with Marx's intent than that canonized by the evolutionists, positivists and/or reductionists of the Second International.

The terminology "philosophy of praxis" which defines his science was not merely a code to get by prison authorities, it was used by Antonio Labriola, the only Second International thinker to call for a distinctive Marxist *Weltanschauung*. In addition, Labriola, the preeminent Italian Marxist, was first to argue against a simple reductive reconstruction of historical and social events to economic explanation. He also argued against the inherent fatalism of naturalistic materialism and the reifying effects of structuralism. Finally, he argued against turning historical materialism into a new philosophy of systematic history or abstract modeling. Although Labriola did not break free of rigid determinism to the extent that Gramsci did, he must be credited with initiating Gramsci's contempt for first principles or simple solutions, his refined sense of history and his feeling for moral and educative aspects of socialism (Femia 1981: 92-4).

Gramsci reconceptualized hegemony as *practical consent*. Gramsci's interest in the Italian national culture and the rise of Mussolini illustrated to him the bankruptcy of workerist purism and proletarian sectarianism for radical socialist politics. He called for the development of an "historic bloc" of tactical alliances united "from below." This idea is quite different than those alliances promulgated as Popular Front strategies in the 1930s which were more concerned with preserving bourgeois institutions and defending an alliance with the Soviet Union than they were concerned with furthering a socialist revolution in the capitalist West. Gramsci's attempt to formulate Hegel's "concrete universal" in national terms and his identification of the "ethical state" of the people as a politically significant fact of social formation allowed him to reconceive of Lenin's "hegemony" as the crucial need to build a national culture. The function of the radical intellectual was to build a linguistic community as a basis for socialism. This "war of position" in democratic capitalist societies was to be fought, although not entirely, on the field of culture.

His conceptualization of "hegemony" as the politics of consent transformed the liberal conception of "consent." Historically the idea of consent functioned within a theory of political obligation and was proposed as the foundation of the right to exercise political authority. Its initial usage, for example in the Roman Empire, simply affirmed that the authority of the ruler was derived in part from his subjects and transcended individual preferences. This definition was challenged by the rising individualism articulated by theology of protestantism, by the economics of mercantile capitalism and by the political philosophy of natural rights and social contract. Here consent was to mean both a deliberate and voluntary act on the part of individuals and the *only* ground for political authority. The inconvenience of realizing this view for the bourgeoisie, for example as expressed by Locke, meant a reversion back to the collectivist sense (Femia 1981: 36).



The contemporary refashioning of the early liberal definition has added a new dimension that goes beyond the foundation for the general right of governments to exercise authority to a position that indicates the *manner* in which citizens are involved in the activity of governing. By substituting the process of governing, such as representative government and freedom of association, the empirical fact of whether or not an individual citizen consents is no longer considered relevant and is replaced by an immanent principle of procedural correctness. Within modern liberal ideology such correctness has acquired a restricted and arbitrary connotation equivalent to familiar democratic institutions thus legitimating the systematic status quo and offering little insight into the structure and functioning of empirical political societies (Femia 1981: 37).

Gramsci's conception of consent refers to a psychological state of acceptance free of moral and prescriptive connotations and emphasizes description and the empirical, if not directly observable, fact. The evidence of hegemony does not have to be restricted to an political order based on liberal institutions but can be applied to totalitarian orders as well. Consent thus is not equivalent to all conforming behaviors. Forced consent as a product of fear of consequences or of unconscious adherence as a product of habitually conditioned goals in response to external stimuli is not considered consent. For Gramsci conforming consent arises from some degree of conscious attachment to or agreement with certain core elements of the society. Although bound up with the concept of "legitimacy," the concept of hegemony, according to Femia (1981), embodies a hypothesis that "within a stable social order, there must be a substratum of agreement so powerful that it can counteract the division and disruption arising from conflicting interest. And this agreement must be in relation to specific *objects* -- persons, beliefs, values, institutions or whatever" (39).

A recent fourth type of conforming behavior concerns pragmatic acceptance in the form of reciprocal acceptance is expressed in exchange theory. Exchange theory does not really speak to Gramsci's concern to empirically identify the basis of legitimate consent. For exchange theory conformity arises out of existent conditions that make social units interdependent. Prudent consent based on the empirical evidence of social harmony and a balance of interests fails to identify *why* certain people define their interests as they do, for example, why consumer hedonism should be treated as a natural and transhistorical human need. Further to this, Gramsci's empirical evidence of consent cannot be limited to verbal affirmations readily catalogued in survey research, but rather has to be extended to include the historical analysis of actual human performance. The degree of contradiction between the verbal affirmation and social performance marks the *empirical* degree that ideology as false consciousness is evident in the practical activity of a society (Femia 1981: 38-42).

With the above conceptual distinctions in mind Gramsci is able to differentiate three forms of hegemony. The paradigm case of hegemony is where mass affiliation would approach unqualified commitment and exhibits an "organic" relationship between rulers and ruled. Modern capitalist society, though, represented for Gramsci a second case where the potential for social disintegration lies just beneath the surface because the bourgeoisie no longer represent or can further everyone's interest. Here the needs, inclinations and mentality of the non-elite are not truly in harmony. Integration in this case is fragile. The third case of hegemony, the minimum level, marks a case of revolutionary possibility and rests on maintaining the ideological unity of the economic, political and intellectual elites and an aversion to the interests and aspirations of other classes being expressed in State life. Gramsci calls the political response in this last case "*transformismo*" whereby hostile groups are incorporated into the elite network by broadening the ruling class and decapitating the oppositional leadership. Hegemony, as Gramsci defines it in this case, exists only in the ruling class, and conformity to the regime by the non-hegemonic classes

is achieved by utilizing habituated behaviors, increasing external stimuli or inflicting punitive deprivations (Femia 1981: 47-48).

By contrasting "hegemony" as moral-political leadership in a community from "domination" as the direct coercive force of the state, he could show how the maintenance of the capitalist state continued to control society through a political strategy of alternating uses of consensual and coercive power. By maintaining this dual perspective on superstructural politics, he was able to argue for the creation of working-class hegemony as a prefigurative counter-hegemony to challenge the power of capitalist ideology through political education. Gramsci (1971) thus reconceives of the state:

The State must be conceived of as an "educator," in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization. Because one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganizing and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating new structures, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination. The State, in this field, too, is an instrument of "rationalization," of acceleration and of Taylorization. (247)

Gramsci's identification of the state as educator points to the importance of analyzing the relationship between the state, individual intellectuals and the collective organization of intellectual activists. As my research of *Toward 2000 Together* shows, the above relationships in the formation of an "organic party" marked the success of the Alberta government's reform implementation under Ralph Klein. What then is an "organic party" and how does it mediate social relationships central to the formation of consent?

#### **2.4. From Organic Intellectuals to the Modern Prince**

Most contemporary applications of Gramsci's theory of intellectual practice focus on the relationship between competing intellectuals who are organic functionaries for various class alliances. But Gramsci's analysis of intellectual practice was much more complex than the conception of "organic intellectual" defines. Although the case study of *Toward 2000 Together* focuses mainly on the relationship of hegemonic and accommodating intellectuals to the ruling class formation in Alberta, Gramsci's analysis of the "state" as "educator" and the "Modern Prince" as an "organic party" which regulates a "structure of feeling" also points toward the importance of analyzing the collective organization of the intelligentsia and the way the desires of the population are mobilized for the exercise of hegemony.

According to Femia (1981), Gramsci's idea of post-revolutionary state was not a license for the technological repression of "Taylorized" social relations or of the rule of Party bureaucrats, but rather meant that intellectuals were to be the vanguard of the coming linguistic and cultural community and the "educators" of the new hegemonic totality. This central importance given to intellectual practice and the mediation of history contrasted with the anarchist hostility to intellectuals and the naive "workerist" celebration which infused most party colleagues. His thesis meant he was the first socialist to confront in a subtle and complex way the dilemma of integrating party organization, intellectual culture and mass culture without reinstituting a new aristocratic caste or priesthood.

Gramsci further nuanced his analysis by distinguishing organic and traditional intellectuals. The organic intellectuals emerged directly out of the class whose consciousness they helped articulate and the traditional intellectuals, although once organic, assumed a certain illusion of autonomy in relation to the class of their origination and usually fancied themselves as above all class ties. In times of revolutionary transformation organic intellectuals from the working class and traditional intellectuals (e.g. Marx and

Engels) in common cause with the working class would herald a new hegemony (Jay 1984a).

First, as an organic functionary, the new hegemonic intellectual has a distinctive *practical* orientation.

The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit); from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanist conception of history, without which one remains "specialised" and does not become "directive" (specialized and political). (Gramsci, 1971: 10).

According to Gramsci (1971), "the elaboration of intellectual strata in concrete reality does not take place on the terrain of abstract democracy but in accordance with very concrete historical processes" (11). Second, within the hegemonic intellectual formation two types of intellectuals were distinguished as "accommodating" or "hegemonic" by their distinctive self-conceptions and practical interests and by their relationship to the texts, each other and the fundamental ruling group.

The accommodating intellectuals are firmly supportive of the hegemonic ideology and the material practices of the dominant society and its ruling groups but they are not self-conscious agents of the status quo, preferring to see themselves in a free-floating role and resistant to class conflict and partisan politics. They function to uncritically mediate the ideas and practices which reproduce unequal social relations and they usually distance themselves from traditional forms of activism while concurrently avoiding risks. An increasing number of these intellectuals proclaim professionalism and/or scientism as their value system (Aronowitz and Giroux 1985; Holub 1992).

The hegemonic intellectuals, on the other hand, are distinguished by self-consciously defining themselves as agents of the ruling group through the varied forms of moral and intellectual leadership they provide by producing symbolic codes which suture the hegemonic bloc. It is this stratum of intellectuals which provides the various fractions of the ruling group with a homogeneous identity in their varied economic, political and ethical functions. Both their interests and the nature of their work are intended to preserve the existing order. Hegemonic intellectuals are to be found on the consulting lists of major foundations and institutes, on the faculties of major universities, as managers of the culture industries, as spokespersons and lobbyists for business organizations and as heads of key government departments (Aronowitz 1985).

As a research precaution, though, according to Gramsci, accommodating or hegemonic intellectuals cannot be ascertained by merely identifying their subject position in the occupational hierarchy of different subsystems. If cultural struggle is anything, it is ambiguous. Certain identification is contingent on the empirical verification of the particular ideological practices of these actors within a specific socio-historical situation -- even if "obvious" tendencies appear representative of a past situation. Such a case is evident in the functioning of *Toward 2000 Together* as an "organic party."

What did Gramsci consider the essential dynamic between socialists and the working class? In describing the social development of Italian capitalism in the early 20th century Gramsci claimed that the subordinate working class was not in a position to create its own "organic" intellectuals and in keeping with Lenin and Kautsky he believed that declassed elements of the traditional intellectuals would join the working class movement and articulate its class interests. The bourgeoisie, though, in a dominant position controlling the key institutions of intellectual life, such as culture and education, would have little to halt

the reproduction of its own organic intellectuals. In either case, Gramsci believed that intellectuals could not form a class by themselves (Eyerman et al. 1987). The transition to the new hegemony was based on Gramsci's optimism about the working-class generating its own organic intellectuals which has not been historically born out. Except for exceptional cases, most radical intellectuals have been renegades from the middle class. Talk, notwithstanding, of the "new working-class" made up of technocrats, engineers and middle level managers as organic intellectuals stretches Gramsci's conception of working-class considerably (Gorz 1976). Furthermore, intellectuals as a whole have historically tended to represent their own interests first rather than the totality (Gouldner 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). Nevertheless, the primacy that Gramsci attributed to intellectuals meant that he was the first Marxist to consider the mediating role of "great" intellectuals in conferring intelligibility on practical activity and how their world-visions are transmitted throughout society by lesser intellectuals such as teachers, activists, journalists and priests to eventually become embodied as "common sense."

"Common sense" thus requires a more sophisticated instrument to deconstruct its meaning, than merely to assume that hegemonic intellectuals impose ruling class ideas. Renate Holub's (1992) discourse analysis of Gramsci's conception of the intellectual shows that Gramsci's discourse on the relations of power and the function of intellectual activities contains *four* major models which must be distinguished. A first model is that of the "traditional intellectual" as an *autonomous* philosopher, artist or poet. A second model is based on the "structure of feeling" and "intellectual community." A third model includes three kinds of organic intellectual: the orthodox "organic intellectual," the "new intellectual," and the "critical specialist." A fourth model is the "universal intellectual."

The "traditional intellectuals" in model one, particularly public figures such as academics, artists and publishers, represent moral and ideological positions in the public sphere and incorporate instances of power whereby their social function as the non-neutral producers and transmitters of knowledge. The "intellectual community" in model two theorizes a supra-individual subject, that is, the identification of the material conditions of possibility for mobilizing traditional intellectual practices for a democratic cause and also the potentialities for mobilizing social change by "universal intellectuals" in their relationship with subaltern groups. Model two focuses on the activities which are carried out in churches, educational institutions and cultural spheres by doctors, pharmacists, teachers, priests, and other professionals and semi-professionals in the dissemination of knowledge which either challenges or produces hegemony via the spontaneous consent of the people in their everyday life. This professional strata may not share a common language with the subaltern people but does share a "structure of feeling" whereby the professional is accorded privilege and prestige in the community by their clients. Without the mediation of this strata, the hegemonic relationship between the masses and the predominant class cannot be maintained. Furthermore, the role of mediation and its privileges does not have to be limited to professional or institutional power but can be gained by any person who is capable of reasoning and promoting an analysis about the practices of everyday life within the cultural sphere. This latter and universal condition for the exchange of ideas is the key characteristic for the foundation of the fourth model called the "universal intellectual." The third model, the "organic intellectual," is the most well known but the most simplistically characterized.

Holub (1991) shows that Gramsci differentiates at least three different forms of organic intellectuality. Because every major social and economic formation develops unequally, it also produces a variety of organic intellectuals which result from the functioning of patriarchal, capitalist and socialist organizations. Each organization leaves traces of

differentiated traditions of organic intellectuals each representing different and complex class interests. Two other unique organic intellectuals also exist which Holub describes as: (a) the "new intellectual" who is a technocrat who must know how his or her own role is related to the roles of others in the functioning of complex capitalist relations; and (b) the "critical specialist" who understands his or her own activity as a partial activity, yet also understands that because this activity is partial, it is also related to other activities in a system of social, political and economic relations.

### **2.5. From Modern Prince to Anonymous Intellectual**

Another important contribution that Gramsci makes to the analysis of intellectual practice is anticipated by his conception of the "Modern Prince" as an organic party in a "postmodern" age. The "anonymous intellectual" as a conception is intended to capture the sensibility of the "Modern Prince" as it might be applied to the contemporary period when cultural production is increasingly informed by two elements: (1) the increasing division, and anonymous regulation, of intellectual labour and (2) the increasing importance of scientific management in the mobilization of public desires.

The first element is that the increasing division of labour once applicable to the factory mode of manual production is now increasingly colonizing the office mode of intellectual production. Cybernetic feedback systems of information processing have been incorporated as regimes of scientific management rendering obsolete or at least increasingly redundant traditional approaches to the analysis of the formation of "political consensus" in a modern public sphere.

The second element missed by most analyses is the changing nature of cultural regulation brought about by the revolution in new communication technology and the applications of the science of consumer management. Not only has cultural regulation become more anonymous, it is increasingly used to mobilize people's desires rather than develop their intelligence. Through this "science of desire," managerial elites secure their political agenda.

The process of "massification" and the use of "emotion" for political purposes has long been under careful scrutiny in the study of authoritarian and democratic populism, especially since the Nazification of Germany from 1933 to 1945, but what the conception of anonymous intellectual specifies is that the fundamental premise of any analysis of "populism" (i.e., what has been traditionally considered Alberta politics) presupposes a politicized public sphere, albeit, de-intellectualized and riven with religious affections. What I posit in reconsidering a theory of intellectual practice based on both cybernetic systems regulating the division of intellectual labour and the mobilization of an economy of desire through the science of management is that reference to "populism" is conceptually problematic if not irrelevant in light of the increasing importance of the anonymous intellectual. In a world without prophets, then, how is the population mobilized?

To answer the above question Gramsci's "Modern Prince" might best describe the collective organization of intellectual activists. He conceived of the "organic party" in the broadest political sense: a state in waiting. While Lenin theorized the "vanguard party" and assumed an essential organic link between the radicalized intellectuals and the working class, Gramsci's interest lay more in understanding the mediation between the party, intellectuals and the working class. The institutional context for elaborating and disseminating the new counter-hegemonic culture was the Communist Party. He often referred to the New Party as a "collective intellectual" or, after the fashion of Machiavelli, as the Modern Prince. Just as Machiavelli tried to free Italian politics from the limitations of religion and traditional morality, Gramsci wanted to free Marxism from economic

reductionism. To do this he emphasized the populist and consensual side of Machiavelli's thought and reinterpreted the Jacobin tradition as strong leadership tied to a democratic mission. By identifying Sorelian myth with Machiavelli's *Prince* and understanding political ideology as a concrete fantasy which organizes and arouses the collective will, Gramsci (1971) argued that in an era of bourgeois hegemony a "Modern Prince" was required, that is,

a myth-prince, [who] cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political party -- the first cell in which there come together the germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total. (129)

In so doing the Prince as proclaimer and organizer of intellectual reform becomes in people's consciousness the basis for a modern *religio* and replaces the divinity or the categorical imperative (ibid.: 133).

Gramsci believed that socialist truth must be brought to the working class from the "outside" because it would not spontaneously develop in the production process or from class struggle. The party, he agreed, was a necessary mediating force to transcend working class mystification. This was a departure from Marx who considered the party as the political form of the proletarian movement but rejected any notion of a political arm distinct from the proletariat's existence. Lenin resolved the question by conflating "inside" and "outside" and calling the vanguard the advanced sections of the working class. In this way, Marx's notion of an organic movement was maintained by Lenin but the nature of organicity was undertheorized. Gramsci confronted the problematic of organicity by identifying that the true principle of revolutionary action for the intellectual was a complete articulation of a worldview, uniting theory and practice that rendered explicit what was already implicit to the movement, and to have the movement confirm that the new view represented experience. Human liberation was not merely formulating a unique vision of social and economic structures but providing an all-embracing and distinctive *Weltanschauung*. This new worldview was the precondition for political revolution, and Gramsci suggested that researchers study the organicity established by the Roman Catholic Church and the ideology of Catholicism in maintaining the organizational and ideological relations between the religion of the learned and the simple folk (Femia 1981: 135-8).

Gramsci's concern for the "simple folk" and mass involvement in the formulation of Party policy became more pronounced after his imprisonment. His concerns for the composition, organization and function of the Modern Prince directly related to what he considered the unsuitability of generalizing the worker council movement, the sectarian and centrifugal strife in the Party and increasing evidence that Lenin's conception of democratic centralism had created the preconditions for Stalin's bureaucratic centralism.

To overcome the tendency for parties to either bureaucratic centralism or political marginalization, he posited a "theorem of fixed proportions." Gramsci distinguishes three fundamental elements in any historically significant political party. The first element was diffuse, composed of average people, disciplined and loyal. This element he distinguishes from the popular mass but nevertheless calls it an organic fraction of it. These people Lenin did not include in the vanguard. The second element was cohesive, composed of a select group of creative innovators and disciplined organizers, akin to Lenin's revolutionary vanguard comprised of a small section of the proletariat but excluding Gramsci's first element. The uniquely new third element, Gramsci postulated, was "intermediate" in political parties and articulated the first element with the second element through not only

physical but also moral and intellectual contact. The "theorem" provided a schematic and metaphorical value for Gramsci, and a device for analyzing the proportional equilibrium specific to various historical contexts. For Gramsci the optimal size and internal organization of a political party had to be determined in accordance with nature of the three elements and the conditions of the social environment. But in all cases the party must be organic in the sense of articulating fundamental values and concerns that unite the leadership and rank and file (Femia 1981: 151-4).

A second distinction from Lenin's conception of the revolutionary party was that Gramsci accepted the traditional social-democratic notion that the party was a *state in miniature*, that the party in its *being* anticipates the character of the collective future, or in today's political language "the means must conform to the end." For Gramsci all true organic parties were not merely instruments but were a complex of cultural, social and political institutions that served a class and worldview. His remarks about the communist party or the Modern Prince must be considered in light of what he wrote about all "organic" parties in general. Nevertheless, he did agree with Lenin that without revolutionary intellectual agitation, the dominance of bourgeois ideology would impose itself on the working class. His focus, though, was more general in articulating the need for an ideological solution grounded in cultural and ethical terms rather than propaganda and political agitation. For Gramsci the "new man" would precede the revolution, not follow. Furthermore, Gramsci distanced himself from Lenin's naive psychology which assumed that capitalist social relations automatically generated great class hostility. Gramsci wished to extend the sort of relationships Lenin envisaged for a small movement based on comradeship to the movement as a whole and to block the development of the party into an "autonomous divinity" or from degenerating into "bureaucratic centralism." Although other Marxist thinkers, like Luxemburg and Trotsky, had articulated a fear of bureaucracy, Gramsci was the first to treat it as a universal problem. For the most part, the struggle for unity could not block free and open discussion, critical research and understanding of political complexity. Intellectual thought had to be liberated from mechanical and schematic application of abstract formulae. Gramsci directly challenged Kautsky and Lenin's version of revolutionary consciousness as exclusively produced at the intellectual level. Where the actual consciousness of the empirical proletariat appeared as an impediment to the Marxist vanguard, Gramsci saw it as a source of theoretical reflection in keeping with Marx's revolutionary science. The truth that the party represented and elaborated had to be developed in dialectical connection with the life of the class and permanently subject to change and reformulation. Practice had to be seen as influencing theory, by posing new problems and by challenging theoretical propositions. The desired relationship was reciprocal, where "every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher" (Gramsci cited in Femia 1981: 161).

Gramsci defended the vanguard Party as an organization where traditional and organic intellectuals would come together in a collective expression of intellectuals and the working class. To assume so Gramsci had to overlook the denunciations by the Party in 1924 of Korsch and Lukacs for their intellectual activity as well as overlook the possible benefits which non-organic intellectuals who were nevertheless critical intellectuals might provide an emancipatory movement. He also had to overlook the *actual* instrumental attitude the Party took towards the masses and his own practice of mixing military and pedagogical metaphors in his analysis of political education, each practice tending to support non-democratic implications. Closely related to this same kind of instrumentalization of social relations was the kind of education he supposed could be fostered within an industrial organization. Worker education was to be an industrial-based technical education absent in

the liberal arts yet intended to form a new kind of worker intellectual, one where the workers could be practical organizers and directors of the production process linking liberal humanism and scientific technique. But Gramsci did not conceptualize the difficulties in practically unifying these distinctly different kinds of cognition. Linked to this same occlusion was the problem of the Marxist attitude to nature, including human nature, which tended to reduce nature to an object for human exploitation. Socialism for Gramsci -- as for many in his time -- was the *rational* domination of nature by unchecked scientism and "species imperialism." The contemporary critique by ecologists, feminists and poststructuralists concerning modernity's full scale assault on "the body" also demands a reevaluation of this last premise.

Having identified the limitations of Gramsci's thought, his conception of the "Modern Prince" and my complementary conception of the "anonymous intellectual" concerning the specific nature of the new forms of intellectual production point toward a more sophisticated analysis of intellectual practice and ideology. Suffice it to say here, the next two chapters deal specifically with the methodological limitations of Canadian approaches to intellectuals and ideology, and the next section introduces the reader to the method of textual analysis I have used to deconstruct the production of texts by the "anonymous intellectual" in the exercise of hegemonic power.

The conception of the "anonymous intellectual" provides a useful conceptual instrument to analyze the Toward 2000 Together initiative in Alberta as a rough equivalent of an organic party. Rather than interrupt the narrative structure of the case study, I have chosen to point out at this early stage some of the findings my analysis identified in anticipation of the more detailed analysis. Many points suggested by Gramsci concerning the functioning of an "organic party" in this section closely articulate with my analysis of Alberta's recent social reforms: (1) the presence of a core intellectual elite articulating the needs of the ruling elites while still incorporating the language of a broader strata of "party" activists; (2) the intermediate role played by conference and consultation navigators and the private media, each espousing objectivity and neutrality; (3) the instrumental relationship established with "non-stakeholders"; and (4) the replacement of future rewards or present punishments for authentic democratic participation. Hegemony, in Gramsci's sense, in the context of Toward 2000 Together, was mainly the property of the ruling class; domination and other mechanisms for mobilizing conformity existed for the majority of the population. Alberta's retention of a delegational form of democracy, of elections treated as plebiscites every four or five years, a weak oppositional party structure, and "public consultations" geared to strategic action rather than ideal communication defines Alberta politics, in its totality, as *not* based on popular consent and lacking authentic democratic legitimacy.

The fact that anonymous intellectual processes and the functioning of power/knowledge are important enough to focus on does not mean that the traditional focus of historical materialism on the "economy" and "class struggle" is no longer important. As the cultural core of a hegemonic bloc, accommodating and hegemonic intellectuals construct valuable texts which symbolically represent the "economy" and "the class struggle" (or lack of it), and it must also be remembered that these texts also provide the crucial mediating artifacts by which a highly fragmented set of subject positions resulting from specialization can be articulated into a self-conscious social interest. In the construction of the social order (as the imagined and real text in totality) *the ruling group not only constructs others it also constructs itself*. It is the institution of an intellectual forum provided by such initiatives as Toward 2000 Together which brings together the highly fragmented specializations as representative of the social order which I call the "anonymous intellectual." It is the voice



that "speaks" anonymously as a "divinity" through the production of "unauthored" texts which I designate "anonymous intellectual practice."

## 2.6. The Intellectual Regulation of Discourse as a Class Power?

How have the rules of prophecy been reconstituted in that latter half of the 20th century? How can imaginary *evaluations* of future orientations be situated in their socio-historical presence, that is, in their capacity for circulation, exchange, consumption and transformation as an asset in the administration of scarce resources, that is as *an economy of discourse*? Much of this prophecy can now be found routinized in strategic planning, that is, the conjunction of scientific prediction and political plan whereby the imagination of social scientists, leading politicians and dominant entrepreneurs can be realized as public policy as exemplified by the Toward 2000 Together initiative in Alberta. In order to engineer history for their own interest, the language of action must be constructed in such a way as to mobilize public opinion and to guarantee moral and political leadership to the dominant groups.

At the dawn of the *postmodern*, prophetic practices are still recognizable as a form of *situated social theoretical practice* whereby "intellectuals" in their various guises as practitioners of signification function to give meaning to the actions and experiences of everyday life. The job of hegemonic intellectuals is to construct a metalanguage which can suture the language of the dominant players working in science, politics and business to that of the general population (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). *Intellectuals, ideal-typically, can be defined as the metatheorists of modernity.* The rest of this chapter focuses on identifying the special source of power that intellectuals mobilize in the exercise of power. To accomplish the task I distinguish between intellectual labour and economic and political labour. I then look at the specialized task of producing intellectual "objects" and how this can be incorporated into a discourse analysis of *a priori* statements. I focus on the general tasks of intellectuals as "metatheoreticians" and how the "grammar" of textual organization can be analyzed as a materialized set of sign systems. I then describe how texts can be read as a politics of definitional struggle, how intellectuals legislate the meaning of texts with recourse to non-discursive forms of power, how theoretical discourse must mediate expert and popular culture for effective reception and how the specialized discourse of intellectuals provides an important function in keeping with Gramsci's conception of hegemony.

Intellectual labour can be analytically distinguished from both political and economic labour. Even though intellectual labour retains elements of the latter two moments, it is distinguishable by the resources it mobilizes in the production and reproduction of life. Economic practices mobilize nature's physical, chemical and biological resources and powers for the satisfaction of material needs and wants. Political practices mobilize human competencies and power for the satisfaction of social needs. Intellectual labour as a form of cultural practice mobilizes the *context* -- or relational structures -- of meanings which orient human action and justify existence. Whether a particular artifact or competency is economic, political or cultural can only be identified through an analysis of its usage within a particular constellation of social action: respectively (1) the human competency to use nature, (2) the human competency to use other humans and (3) the human competency to use meaning. Although these analytical distinctions are crude and problematic, they nevertheless provide a starting point to identify the multiple and shifting meanings that may become attached to a particular object such as an artifact, a word, a text, an organization or an activity.

If theory is treated as the historically and sociologically constituted practice of social justification, then theory, in this sense, is the identification of the rules of the game of

social justification as "situated reason" mediating both the materiality of texts and the broader imaginary configurations designated "myth." Edward Said (1978) writes that "social theorizing occurs within the context of a discourse. Mythic language is discourse, that is, it cannot be anything but systematic; one does not really make discourse at will, or statements in it, without first belonging--in some cases unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily--to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence" (321). Dorothy Smith (1989) defines social science discourse more specifically and from the following quotation one can get a more general sense of the material basis of a theoretical discourse:

We are talking about the same world as we inhabit and our knowledge of it; our share in its ongoing accomplishment is the basis on which we can claim to know and speak of it. Sociology known in this way isn't just ideas in people's heads but a complex of sites, communications, printed texts, teaching in classrooms; a work of reading and writing from and to reading; of the practices of inquiry, thinking, ideas, concepts; of multiple settings of organized talk--workshops, conferences, annual meetings--all of which imply, involve, are accomplished by, and exist only in people's actual activities of which thinking is one moment. I use the term *discourse* to identify those socially organized complexes of actions and material conditions, of course, including the texts and statements they bear. (59)

More specifically, discourse is situated in the power of material "office." The intellectual regulation of a discourse, whether expressed as social theory or routinized as habit, results in a culturally constructed social nature which can be easily mistaken for naturalized human nature or traditional character (Bourdieu 1977). As a set of *a priori* statements, a discourse resembles a "naturalized" set of regulating principles. Foucault's (1977a; 1977b) archaeology of knowledge and his genealogy of morals has set out a partial grounding for uncovering the historicity of normative configurations which have been naturalized. In other words, what is required is not a philosophical ethic to ground the norms of a critique but rather a history of the statements themselves as they erupt on the historical scene as found objects signifying the emergence of a new morality. In so doing, Foucault's deconstruction of the routinization of moral evaluation as regimes of habituated social action shares many similarities with Weber's analysis of the construction of morality or the routinization of charisma and the fragmentations of specialization or Bourdieu's (1972) conceptualization of "habitus."

According to Foucault (1972a), discourse is constituted by statements which emerge as historical *a priori*, that is, each has "an *a priori* that is not a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for statements....An *a priori* not of truths that might never be said, or really given to experience; but the *a priori* of a history that is given, since it is that of things actually said" (127). Foucault identifies the requirements (rules) for the operation of a group of signs as they are linked at the statement level: (1) as referentiality -- a principle of differentiating objects; (2) as subject -- a position filled by individuals; (3) as associated field -- a domain of coexistence for other statements; and (4) as materiality -- the substance, support, status, and usage of the articulation. The materiality of statements distinguishes traditional idealist analyses of ideology (as consciousness) from cultural materialist analyses of discourse (as communicative strategy); that is, this approach assumes "that one can define the general set of rules that govern the status of these statements, the way in which they are institutionalized, received, used, re-used, combined together, the mode according to which they become objects of appropriation, instruments for desire or interest, elements for a strategy" (ibid.: 115).

As a general starting point then, one can define intellectuals as metatheoreticians, that is, people who theorize about explanations and play a central role in the emergence of a discourse by articulating the regulating rules of permissible enunciations. Or to draw on the language of Hegel and Marx, people who can be defined as "world historical individuals"; that is, agents who attain insight into the requirements of the time and what is ripe for development. As practical agents mediating contradictory interests, modern intellectuals might also be defined by identifying the way they enunciate new texts for the moral regulation of discourse and how others politicize these texts to legitimate social activities: to block development as conservatives, to enhance development as liberals, to revolutionize development as socialists, or to deny the existence of development as nihilists. In the current cultural context such "political" designations may not be wholly appropriate. I merely use them to identify that these enunciations have a content which is not politically benign nor divorced from the practical concerns of everyday life. These political designations are "objects" structured by grammars which in turn are mobilized by classes in the regulation of various discourses of justification and are used to organize "texts" in both their material and symbolic forms.

Texts are materialized sign systems which circulate as a discourse and are produced in "offices." Although the study of discourse can be identified with many theoretical traditions, the term "semiotics" can be used as a general descriptor to identify the study of signs and the analysis of both verbal and non-verbal communication. Semiotics distinguishes between signifiers, signifieds and signs. The signifier is either an object, a word or a picture. The signified is the mental concept indicated by the signifier. A sign expresses the *relationship* between signifier and signified. In the case of language signs (as distinguished from iconic signs), the relationship between signified and signifier is highly variable and a matter of social convention. This variability is further complicated by the "layering" of cognitive and affective signification. For example, signs may form myths by standing for a whole range of cultural values and, also, by associating those same significations with a whole range of feelings. Signs may also be organized into codes according to cultural conventions, such as canonical representations of "nation," and may carry different and sometimes contradictory and hidden codes acting at multiple levels (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1984: 218). The "sign" is a relational concept and embodied with materiality. It is implicated in the wider meaning and social systems as material practice. I use the term "materiality" in the broader 19th century sense of "materialism" which meant that concrete social relations were determinant in explanations as contrasted with idealist explanations where ideas were given a "Platonic" or god-given characterization in causality.

A text can be read to identify the politics of definition which asserts an authority to *know* the meaning of a word. To read a text one has to ask: "What does this 'text' mean?" To read a text on, say, "an economy," requires asking two questions. First, what is the "object"? This is called framing the object. This framing may be achieved three ways: (1) unconscious habit (assumed tradition), (2) a communicatively achieved agreement (critical consent) or (3) an act of force by one participant over the other (power). This preliminary act of "reading experiences" is "the politics of definition." This preliminary act of reading the world is central to intellectual practice. Intellectuals produce discursive "objects," but they are objects of a kind which gives this class its special distinction.

As Zygmunt Bauman (1992) argues the legislative function of intellectuals is only as good as the non-discursive power to enforce it, or what I designate the ownership of office. The power intellectuals exert over others by recourse to their monopoly and accumulation of "definitional" power and their ability to act in control of a discursive space

is central to the practice of their hegemony -- that is, the power of their moral and political leadership. In studying the *meaning* of a particular practice, its meaning as a construct always retains an ambiguity which cannot be identified once and for all. Analysis must account for this struggle over definitions. Raymond Williams (1983) cautions against the illusory search for a "true" meaning or word:

It is clear that, within a discipline, conceptual usage has to be clarified. But in general it is the range and overlap of meanings that is significant. The complex of senses indicates a complex argument about the relations between general human development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works and practice of art and intelligence.(91)

Quite simply, "objects" or words for objects evoke a multiplicity of conceptual contents or cultural "resonances." This is not a formal philosophical statement about what the meaning of an object or word ought to be in order to make way for clear communication but rather an empirical statement about the historical actuality of how words as "objects" are used to generate meaning in society. How -- in a world of essentially contested concepts about the nature of the social world -- does a conception of *that* world become dominant?

The second question, "What is the meaning of the 'object'?", is actually assumed by the first question. The question should be rephrased to read "What is the assumed relationship between this object and other objects?" Such a rephrasing is needed because these relationships give the object its meaning. It is here that an assumed definition also presupposes a particular relationship of objects, that is, a presumption of explanation. Again this definition of the explanatory power of relationships is achieved in one of the above three ways: tradition, consent or power -- or what I would call the modal forms of office relations defined by the ratio "intellectual/X."

When texts are enunciated as real abstractions they have both a material and an ideal form. Materially it is enunciated as a *signifier* and ideally it is enunciated as *signified*. While these two moments of an enunciation can be distinguished analytically, to treat them as if they were in fact distinguishable does violence to their nature -- one cannot exist without the other except as a sign relation. Furthermore, theoretical practice can be viewed as not just a specific set of linguistic relations but also as a set of social and textual relations which mediate a "justification" as a constellation of signs. The social (context) and the text, as a constituted set of signs, are the *artifactual representation of a communicative occurrence*; that is, they relate beings socially by both their presence and meaning. Jacques Derrida (1979) also argues that these texts mark a displacement: that which is "different and deferred," beyond representation, that is, "*the differend*." Derrida's point provides a strong critique of textual producers who are not cognizant of the displacement of the *real* objects in the conceptualization of "objects" and the primary problematic for the double fracturing of abstraction which I deal with in more detail in the final chapter. Although Derrida posits a potential infinity of multiple readings, I have presented the cultural materialist position (e.g. Raymond Williams) that argues only a finite number of readings within a specific historical configuration is legitimately possible. In other words, there is always a dominant reading that socio-historically "centres" discursive formations -- in this case, the postmodernization narrative must somehow be acknowledged by non-dominant or "displaced" readings, even if only as an absence.

The material and ideal forms a text may take cannot be abstracted from the relationships they mediate. As a word, "table," "book," "social class," "economy" or "TV sitcom" can only be read as meaningful by also reading the relationships it constitutes. For example, the presence and meaning of "table" is not "in" the table but in the *constellation of*

*relationships*, including the people who treat the table as such an "object." These meanings or abstractions can only be considered *real* when they are situated in a constellation of historically situated sign and social relations. As Marx (1975 [1843-44]) argues in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, "Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses" (251). To put it another way, Medvedev and Bakhtin state: "Works can only enter into real contact as inseparable elements of social intercourse....It is not works that come into contact, but people, who, however come into contact through the medium of works" (cited from Williams 1989: 173).

Works (bodies of texts) are the materially passive component which must be mobilized as a linguistic resource to mediate intersubjectivity, identity formation and meaning. People identify with each other by identifying with the same "object." This "object" becomes a sign of their similarity with each other as well as identifying their difference from any others who do not recognize the sign as such. Today, the key constitutive signifieds or meanings of identity are race, gender, age, class-subjectivity and territory which must be analytically distinguished from the physically passive aspects or signifiers such as skin color, physical appearance, class-position and land-forms. These latter designations as signifiers can only signify meaning in and through discourse by real living people. To not recognize this problematic falls into what Derek Sayer (1987) calls "the violence of abstraction."

Theoretical practice does not exist outside of a community of intersubjective validation. Furthermore, even if it was plausible to argue that intellectuals do constitute a class they are currently divided subjectively. There is not one academic community engaging in social theory, but a number of communities, each engaging in internal arguments but personally isolated from the others. In addition theoretical practice is not merely cognitive. Craib (1984: 19) identifies three dimensions of social theory: (1) the affective dimension whereby the theory embodies the experiences and feelings of the theorist; (2) the normative dimension whereby theories implicitly or explicitly embody "ought" assumptions which regulate the development of theory by presupposing what is "possible" or "desirable" for a society; and finally (3) the cognitive dimension which is necessarily fragmented because we need different theories to explain different things from differing particularities.

Social theory as a textual expression of intellectual regulation is not merely situated within an intellectual community, say academe, but gets its meaning by circulating within the larger social community as canonical representations. These scholarly texts or works constitute the meaning and social organization of a set of communicative relations embodied in a discourse which goes beyond an autonomous intellectual practice; that is, a discourse is *a field of social relations mediated by symbolic systems of representation*. Different fields of communicative relations are embodied in the economic, governmental, scientific and "everyday" discourses of lived experience. As Garfinkel (1984) has shown, highly rationalized scientific activities as well as the moderately rationalized scientific activities of everyday discourse require sociological investigation. Garfinkel's research is highly valuable for identifying (1) the importance of the characteristics of the reasoning and the rationales which enter into the choices for courses of action, (2) the importance of unrelenting critique from the "outside" of intellectual traditions which assume a monopoly over rationality, (3) the importance of bracketing questions of the ultimate validity or effectiveness of a rationality in favour of looking at them as they are worked out in practice, and finally (4) the importance of studying social processes as naturally as possible for the

justifications employed in particular circumstances and articulated to the contexts in which they are used (Heritage 1987).

Theoretical practice also concerns the way humans make sense of the problems of everyday life. Theoreticians must generalize from a particular social situation and from a particular subject position within theoretical discourse. To theorize, then, requires a selective perception of the social totality and, in this way, theory generates its own prejudices (Craib 1984: 7). This prejudicial aspect of theory should not obscure the fact that in everyday life people, too, are affected by events which they have no control over and causes which are not immediately obvious. People, like social theorists, try to find an explanation to link events and causes. Craib calls this process "everyday theoretical thinking."

Although theoretical practice has a basis in everyday thinking there are several differences with scientific thinking: (1) social theory systematically links general ideas to rules of logic which exhibit clearly defined relationships; (2) social theory identifies "second order" problems, such as what is meant by "adequate explanation"; and (3) social theory identifies possible contradictions between our direct experiences and the systematized understandings of experiences with which we have no direct experience. According to Craib (1984), the first step in theoretical practice is "to speculate, to try to invent an answer" (10).

Scientific and everyday theoretical thinking can thus be discursively articulated in a science of political movements, and uncovering this articulation can be the objective of an empirical investigation. Social theory, thus seen, is a complex social practice and not merely restricted to those who are paid to do so -- although this latter fact may be significant. Social theoretical practice, thus, can be understood as a *kind* of intellectual activity which establishes a mutual interpretive relationship between social science and those whose activities constitute its subject matter. Anthony Giddens (1984) calls this mutual interpretive relationship a "double hermeneutic." He states "the theories and findings of the social sciences cannot be kept wholly separate from the universe of meaning and action which they are about. But for their part, lay actors are social theorists, whose theories help constitute the activities and institutions that are the object of study of specialized social observers or social scientists" (ibid.: xxxiii). The specific intersection of theoretical practices in a variety of different fields, the nature of the double hermeneutic in social inquiry, the theoretical practices of lay actors and the lay practices of social theorists provide a multiplicity of sites for this inquiry into the intellectual practice of prophecy; that is, *inventing an answer for the teleological justification for present actions*.

It is important not to underestimate in a state-sanctioned market economy the power of those who are paid for their intellectual labour. While it might seem appropriate to assume that all individuals have some competency to produce theoretical discourse, not all have the same luxury to do so. As Antonio Gramsci (1971) writes "All men are intellectuals... not all men have in society the function of intellectuals" (9). The linguistic and theoretical mediation between functioning intellectuals and others occurs in a legitimately sanctioned space I have designated the "intellectual sphere" of "office" or what Gramsci might call the point of mediation between "political society [and] the State" and "civil society [and] the private" (ibid.: 12). According to Gramsci, the activity of intellectuals is distinguished from the direct productive relationships of "the fundamental social groups" (capitalists and workers) in that the relationship of intellectuals to the world of production is mediated by the "whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures." The work of intellectuals can be mobilized for "hegemony" in society or as "direct domination" through the State and juridical government. In the contemporary context of postmodernity and the

commodification of culture, this aspect immediately posits a potential split in the common interests of intellectuals between those whose subsistence is directly market-oriented versus those whose subsistence is mediated by the state. In fact, Durkheim's (1973b) very first essay on intellectuals is an attempt to distinguish the interests of state intellectuals such as himself from the interests of market-based intellectuals such as Emile Zola. It is this public sphere (sanctioned by the State) that allows the intellectual to combine a particular interest in a special (private) discourse with a general interest in a universal (public) discourse. This meta-theoretical practice of intellectuals is a specialized practice of a particular kind.

Intellectuals participate in the public sphere with a *unique* function as the "legitimate" practitioners of social theory which is the source of their social power, a power which they carry in their texts as expert producers and adjudicators of symbolic meaning. The intellectual's *specialized discourse is a universal discourse*, whereas for other participants in the public sphere their specialized discourses remain merely specialized. Intellectuals, thus, are the private experts on public discourse, whereas others are merely private experts on private discourses.

It is crucial then to distinguish theoretical practice as a general competency of all humans from the actual theoretical practices performed by intellectuals (Gramsci 1971). To be an intellectual is not merely to have the competency in rational expression but also to have the specific power *to define what constitutes competency in rational expression*. Furthermore, the source of their power, connotes a general interest in a regulated and institutionalized space whereby they can exert that power in "office" (i.e., the State and the public sphere). An intellectual expropriated of a material public space for discourse, marks the *actual* death of "intellectuality." This space is redeemed by the struggle to maintain communicative relations even if only as a set of reconstituted prison notebooks which are smuggled beyond the prison wall. For Gramsci, Tatiana Schucht guaranteed his communication with the rest of the world by arranging for his reading material, personal needs and the smuggling out of his manuscripts (Holub 1992). In this case, the Italian state facilitated an "office" for Gramsci. For intellectuals, it is at this conjuncture of the material and the abstract, the particular and the universal, the value of facts and the facts of value where their practices are sacralized. It is the assumption of the sacred "office" whereby intellectuals exert their non-discursive power over the activities of others.

Intellectual power is not only a power to represent sacred meaning but also a power to *represent the sacred rules for the representation of meaning*. In the politics of definition, intellectuals as the "legitimately sanctioned" carriers of a specialized discourse produce conceptual objects and also the *rules* for the constitution of those conceptual objects. In their monopolization of the practice of justification, *social* theorists explain and classify a special group of events within a context of social rules. The value of discourse is mediated by the state sanction (through the ownership of office) of the credentialing process and by the market commodification of its exchange value (Collins 1979; Murphy 1988). According to Hubner (1983), social rules for a particular field "are selected in such a way that we can deduce as many other rules from them as is possible and appropriate for a given sphere. Thus we can say that these theories also serve to explain and classify a special group of events, which are now historical events, within a context of rules that is as comprehensive as possible, and to reduce the historical events to this context" (182). One can be talking here of Gouldner's (1979, 1985) "culture of critical discourse" or Szelenyi and Martin's (1987) "symbolic mastery" as a power resource. In the sense expressed by Hubner, the theoretical practices of intellectuals are at once an intellectual regulation of representation that sanctions what can be considered valid and reliable information and,

more fundamentally, what can be considered "informational." Intellectuals symbolically regulate discourse by their power to produce this specialized discourse.

Intellectuals set the discursive agenda according to three sets of regulative principles: axiomatic, judicative, and normative. First, they produce and reproduce *axiomatic a priori principles* which are the fundamental basic rules of an historical system. Intellectuals make possible any knowledge of facts whatsoever, yet this knowledge can never be verified or falsified directly by those facts. Facts, that is, depend on theories and provide the condition of the possibility of experience, and although these theories are tested by experience, no theory can ever be verified or falsified empirically in an unambiguous and absolute way. Second, intellectuals produce *judicative principles* which allow for the rejection or approval of theories on the basis of interpreted facts. These *a priori* rules determine what will be considered a legitimate fact or a legitimate falsification or verification of a theory. Finally, intellectuals produce *normative principles* which tell us what it is that can belong to a social theory in any sense of the word -- with greatest importance placed on the use of *sources*. To be considered a *scientific theory* "respectable" methods for critical selection and judgement have to be developed and reference to any kind of metaphysical power or force, such as divine providence, is not accepted -- although what constitutes a metaphysical power or force must also be adjudicated by the *a priori* rules for the legitimation of facts (Hubner 1983).

The above principles are the *sacred* regulative principles of a discourse. These rules govern the value of a discourse and erupt as charismatic enunciations and as sacred text, as "objectification" of fact and as a "rule" for the objectification of fact. These acts may seem as inconsequential as establishing definitions, providing a first organizing principle or simply by classifying "objects" according to a typology which is formally presupposed as common sense. Furthermore, these starting points may not even be explicitly stated or fully understood by the author. They may be assumed as an understanding which belongs to everyone or merely the product of a special prerogative by someone in a position of authority.

The identification of a sacred rule of valuation in any discourse undermines the common assumption that there is somehow a definitive break between religion (or ideology) and science. Common designations distinguish science from religion in absolute terms. Science profanes everything and is procedurally open to criticism whereas religion sacralizes everything and is procedurally closed to criticism. The historical reality of scientific discourse, though, is somewhat different than this idealist formalization would presuppose. The social (and discursive) governance of a moral regime used to justify facts and rules is historically situated and specific. This kind of analysis is in keeping with my critique of Liberal and orthodox Marxist approaches which treat concepts as "immaculately conceived" rather than socio-historically specific in meaning and created by real human beings for a purpose. The historical analysis of scientific practice has shown that the forms of mutual understanding within religion and science are more ambiguous and complex about the relationship between the sacred and the profane than is generally assumed by non-realist philosophies of science.

Although mythical reasoning and scientific reasoning are incommensurable to a certain degree, elements of myth as the domain of the sacred or "paleosymbolic" remain in science as the necessary *a priori* belief in axiomatic first principles. These first principles remain closed to critique and are "open" only as an abstract and ideal potentiality (Habermas 1984, 1987a). According to Gouldner (1985), "This paleosymbolism constitutes part of the symbolic grounding, i.e., part of the OL [the ordinary language/elementary level], within which elements on the technical level will be interpreted, especially when they are



ambiguous or contradictory. The deeper structure symbolism specifies what are allowable interpretations of upper level symbols, usually permitting a greater looseness, interchangeability, and a larger set of equivalences, than might be allowed on the technical surface alone" (223). Science and religious theology meet not so much as absolutely oppositional, then, but rather as genealogical relatives whose real difference is one of degree than of absolutes.

Nevertheless, the matter of degree is significant and it is this degree which marks science as progressive over theology and metaphysics. While retaining elements of the sacred, scientific theory (in opposition to religion and ideology) is intended to make an epistemological break with "common sense" and assumes that there is at least the potential for two competing *a priori* conceptualizations of a given situation (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1991). According to Habermas (1984, 1987), the scientific progressiveness of a discourse is dependent on the degree to which mutual understanding is regulated by communicatively achieved understanding rather than normatively ascribed agreement, that is, the degree to which agreement to do something is dictated by critical democracy rather than recourse to traditional authority or other forms of conformism identified by Gramsci.

Habermas's distinction between religion and science, means that discourse can be evaluated as *non-ideological* to the degree that it is regulated by communicatively achieved understanding and the degree to which participants affected by the agreement can actually participate in raising critical claims. A critique of ideological practice, then, is not a critique in the tradition of moral philosophy but rather a scientific validation in terms of the degree to which communicative agreement is freed from the systematic distortion of force or money. The statements "it is commonly believed," and "we take these truths to be self-evident" can be evaluated as to the degree of their dogmatism by validating how the truth of a preconceived notion is justified either with recourse to tradition in the face of criticism or is open to critical claims and challenges; reference to Smith's "invisible hand" or Plekhanov's "inevitable collapse" will not do. Furthermore, the material restrictions on critical claims and the limited access to the means of communication can also be evaluated as social effect in its capacity to exclude criticisms of "commonly held beliefs" or "self evident truths" (e.g. Who is allowed to speak, when and where? How does access to the unequally distributed resources of wealth and power effect the participants' competency to raise validity claims?). As I show in the case study, this dogmatism in Toward 2000 Together abrogates critical democracy in the name of "performativity."

Habermas's approach offers a way to critique "performativity," the new ideology as the technocratic discourse of instrumental organizations such as bureaucracies, political parties and corporations. Gouldner (1976) and Lyotard (1984) also offer similar analyses about the social relationship between ideology and technological development. But according to Habermas (1984, 1987a), in deciding a common belief or verifying a truth, agreements can be evaluated to the degree they are constituted by an act of power or profit rather than based on the democratic principles of free and critical discourse. This kind of evaluation is especially important in administratively governed organizations which are resistant to moral critique because their goals are established "outside" the organization. These organizations are intended to eliminate a discussion of moral or political goals. The bureaucratic action entails reducing discussion to strategy or the expedient means to achieve a prescribed goal -- the "common sense" set by the task masters. While traditional ideological critique based on immanent critique could challenge moral/political ends, this administrative ideology of "performativity" excludes questions of morality as illegitimate. By structuring a discursive space according to the logic of performativity, such as in Toward 2000 Together process, rules of presentation, discussion or publication exclude critical substantive claims of value.

Intellectual power expressed via these kinds of "social technologies" (Foucault) or "administrative apparatuses" (Althusser) in effect, install either a linguistic *a priori* or *ex post facto* terror. While administrative systems present themselves as morally neutral systems, an instrument for ends "everyone agrees with," the administrative system actually imposes its own moral order, a particular form of life, devoid of challenges to evaluation other than meeting the technical requirements of prediction, control and strategic planning for those who already have power to deploy the administrative space of "office."

How does one evaluate a process which excludes moral and political evaluation as a legitimate form of discourse? One either plays the game as established or one is selectively purged as external to the system. An example of the *ex post facto* purging is provided by the publications of the Toward 2000 Together initiative and its complementary national initiative, The Prosperity Initiative. Each attempts to legitimate the continentalist restructuring of the Alberta and Canadian economy according to a corporatist postmodernization narrative. While organizations which are critical of a pro-business point of view are allowed to make their presentations, their concerns and contradictory positions on many issues are excluded from or fragmented in the final reports. It is much more efficient for key interests to exclude or fragment this information than to deal with the fallout of having to report that there was *no consensus* on what to do. Terror, in this sense, as Lyotard (1984) argues is "the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from a language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened" (64). The *postmodern* emergence of scientific regulation and commercialization of communication creates a revolution in politically efficient justification. It is these forms of *anonymous* communicative governance regulated by intellectuals as a "class" in "office" where the analysis of hegemony in the case study begins. Signification, in this case, is viewed as a site of class contestation. In keeping with the analysis of "heteroglossia" developed by the Bakhtin Circle, signification or naming the meaning of a word does not occur in some neutral space but mediates an intersection of meaning reflecting and refracting wider social conflicts. "The attempt by the dominant class to fix meaning and neutralize semantic flux is a specifically political act -- it represents the perennial authoritarian desire hegemonically to secure an inseparable fusion between signifier and signified, between form and meaning" (Gardiner 1992: 17).

## 2.7. Conclusion to Part I

This chapter has critically reviewed the dominant theoretical approaches to intellectual practice and has introduced two important Gramscian concepts, "hegemony" and the "Modern Prince," as a basis for comprehending the "anonymous intellectual." The conception of anonymous intellectual practice is crucial for understanding *postmodern* elements of intellectual practice related to (1) the increasing division, and anonymous, regulation of intellectual labour and (2) the increasing importance of the scientific management of public desires. These two elements challenge traditional conceptions of how heroic intellectuals mediate political movements via the public sphere and are also evident in the functioning of Alberta's implementation of Toward 2000 Together.

Hegemonic intellectual practice in Toward 2000 Together lends itself to a discourse analysis of how an everyday normality can survive without prophets and how these new intellectual practices that mediate social movements may be mobilized for domination or liberation. The chapter ended with an explication of a few methodological preliminaries needed to understand a discourse analysis of the theoretical practices as "situated reason." The analysis of the normative regulation of discourse by the intelligentsia is crucial for

understanding how the symbolic order mediates expert and popular culture and how language can be mobilized in the implementation of modernization from above for hegemonic effect.

At first glance, then, it may appear logical now to proceed with the discourse analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* as an empirical illustration of how the hegemonic intelligentsia participated in social reform by regulating situated reason. This step, though, would be premature for three reasons. Part II of the dissertation confronts three issues and justifies my challenge to established traditions. The first issue is primarily methodological and concerns the poverty of intellectual history and approaches to ideology. The second issue is primarily theoretical and concerns the problematic conception of intellectuals as "class" and highlights the importance of dealing with the signification of meaning in the analysis of the intellectual practice. The third issue is primarily historical and concerns the nature of recent changes in political discourses brought about by "postmodernization." Three related claims are necessary in order to proceed to the case study: (1) a methodological claim: that the history of Canadian intellectuals and approaches to ideology are in need of a major overhaul; (2) a theoretical claim: that the sociology of the Canadian intelligentsia requires a rethinking of the "class practices" of intellectuals in the production of ideology; and (3) an historical claim: that the present period marks the emergence of a corporatist postmodernization narrative in conjunction with a new way for exercising hegemony through futurology and strategic management. The next three chapters (Part II) address these three issues.

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## **PART II**

**TOWARD A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CANADIAN  
INTELLECTUAL PRACTICE**

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# Chapter Three

## The Poverty of English Canadian Intellectual History

The task of [cultural] criticism must not be to search for the particular interest-groups to which cultural phenomena are to be assigned, but rather to decipher the general social tendencies which are expressed in these phenomena and through which the most powerful interests realize themselves. Cultural criticism must become cultural physiognomy. The more the whole divests itself of all spontaneous elements, is socially mediated and filtered, is "consciousness," the more it becomes "culture." (Adorno 1967: 30)

### 3.1. Introduction

If the task of cultural criticism is as Adorno states to decipher the general social tendencies which are expressed in cultural phenomena and through which the most powerful interests realize themselves, then Canadian approaches to ideology and intellectual practice are in need of a major overhaul. For the most part cultural studies in English Canada have naturalized culture as "concept" or in some recent instances as a patterned ideational "structure." Rarely has culture been viewed as an intellectual "praxis" expressing both social tendencies and acts of power. Zygmunt Bauman's (1973: 177) critique of culture as "concept" and "structure" in favour of culture as "praxis" argues that only when sociology recognizes that norms and ideals are not the blinding remnants of metaphysical pre-rational thinking but rather the only perspective from which reality acquires its human dimensions, then cultural studies (as a social science) can ascend to the level of the humanities and come into direct touch with the human condition. If one measures Canadian research against the standards set by Adorno and Bauman, then cultural researchers are faced with new tasks and formidable obstacles. The first obstacle is a colonial tradition where the intelligentsia have been treated and understand themselves as "clerks of the Empire." This approach to culture blocks a holistic understanding of social tendencies and power interests. The second obstacle is the construction of historical narratives which exclude a comprehensive theoretical debate. This approach to culture emphasizes (usually implicitly) a particular theory of social development; that is, it premises research on the industrial modernization and humanist integration model without explicating or challenging alternate interpretations for intellectual development. The third obstacle is the absence of social theoretical debates concerning key concepts used in research such as "culture," "intellectuals," and "ideology." This approach to culture blocks the possibility for identifying cross-disciplinary interests (e.g., sociologists versus historians) and fragments the research community into competing ideological camps (e.g. liberal versus Marxist). Defence of a particular method, narrative and set of concepts thus depends on enforcing traditional authority via non-discursive means rather than through a discourse which openly and critically challenges the foundational assumptions of research. The fourth obstacle is the absence of a "Canadian" approach to intellectuals. This approach further fragments a comprehensive research program on substantive issues related primarily to region and province but also related to gender, race and class and to education, media and biography. Two common threads are woven throughout this impoverished tradition: (1) the lack of a comprehensive meta-theoretical and theoretical debate and (2) the absence of a clear "Canadian" understanding of intellectual practice, culture and power in keeping with the standards identified by Adorno and Bauman.

A topographical review, then, of Canadian intellectual history and sociology fits quite consistently with the inventory method and "common sense" tradition and finds its *raison d'être* in most Masters and Ph.D. theses. So an inventory of research is well in order to map the territory and to provide the reader with a catalogue of current studies about intellectuals and the intelligentsia. In true geological fashion I could call this chapter on Canadian research a "topography." But this chapter does not succumb to reductive and categorical thought. The purpose of the chapter is to do more than merely review the literature concerning intellectual practice. I also want to initiate a debate on the methodological grammar, the theoretical aspects, and substantive research which frame the way the intelligentsia and ideology have been traditionally conceived in English Canada. The debates over the nature of intellectual practice that I reviewed in the last chapter have few Canadian correlates. This critique intends to spark a theoretical debate about intellectual practice. In this debate, though, rather than be right about my own interpretation that I establish in later chapters, I would rather be happy to know that I had started a debate that intended to overcome the obstacles that sustain such an impoverished tradition. This "impoverishment" speaks ambiguously to two points: the underdevelopment of an indigenous class of intellectuals in Canada and the inadequacy of the historical analysis of that underdeveloped tradition. Furthermore, this impoverishment most accurately characterizes English Canada.<sup>1</sup>

### **3.2. The Origins of An Impoverished Tradition**

The first obstacle to overcome the poverty of English Canadian intellectual history is to come to terms with a colonial tradition where the intelligentsia have been treated and understand themselves as "clerks of the Empire." While the British Empire has witnessed the setting sun, certain methodological practices remain institutionalized in the structure of disciplines and in the split between theoretical and practical research. This split approach to culture blocks a holistic understanding of social tendencies and power interests. For the most part intellectual practice -- and specifically cultural research -- has been framed by the dominant tendency to view "research" as a method for taking inventory. The effect of the "inventory method" on the study of culture has been to naturalize ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, rituals, customs and traditions as objects to be collected and categorized and to explain their existence as an expression of a "national" human nature determined by the lay of the land, that is, the topography of English Canada and its relationship to other nations. The resulting combination of "inventory science" and of a theory of "dead culture" has been to create the impression that culture is not a creative historical process but rather one of natural transmission of a storehouse of collective goods. The English Canadian tradition is characterized by "antiquarianism." In this latter sense, a Canadian "identity" is treated as a "thing," a storehouse of goods, which is transmitted from generation to generation rather than as "praxis," an activity, an historical construct mediating powerful interests and expressing social tendencies.

The bureaucratic application of the Empire's "gaze" to culture derived from the "clerking" model has a long history and still influences research through disciplinary specializations that compartmentalize the intellectual interests of sociology, history and theory (philosophy). Generally speaking, the sociology of culture correlates inventories of public opinion but does not penetrate the social origins of opinion-making -- it lacks history. Intellectual history, also, collates inventories of data based on individual or group biography but does not challenge the social origins of its own historical conceptions -- it lacks a self-reflexive theory. Philosophy wallows in the abstractions of mind experiments, and having assumed an *a priori* split between theory and practice, relegates its own interest

to an intellectual space supposedly "outside" of practice -- it lacks historical and empirical sensibility. Disciplinary rigor, in each of these three specializations, means being a good clerk and cataloguing and correlating the world of culture in different ways rather than creative reading, writing and interrogating the meaning of texts as a totality. This "clerking" rigor lacks the means to comprehend the social tendencies of cultural mediation and the way most powerful interests realize themselves as cultural agents.

The origins of "intellectual" history is the history of *knowledge and power* which the impoverished Canadian tradition must come to terms with. This *inability* to interpret culture as "praxis" is learned and therefore can be unlearned. What is important to remember is that the practice of naturalizing culture as a complex set of objects to be classified and of treating the life of the mind as a *mirror* to "reality" is not a new phenomenon which can be easily attributed to American positivism after 1945. It has its own history. This section briefly sketches the originating acts for the clerking mentality. Later, in Chapter Five I discuss my own comprehensive historical interpretation of the major competing theoretical discourses.

The first "social" survey in English relating to Canada is generally regarded as a 1749 anonymous pamphlet published in London called *A Geographical History of Nova Scotia*. This survey was a precis of parts of the 1744 *Histoire et description, générale de la Nouvelle France* written by French historian of North American affairs, Pierre-Francois-Xavier de Charlevoix (Taylor 1989: 10). Other early accounts included David Smith's *A Short Typographical Description of His Majesty's Province of Upper Canada*, John Stewart's (1806) *An Account of Prince Edward Island*, Peter Fischer's (1825) *Sketches of New Brunswick*, Thomas C. Haliburton's (1829) *An Historical and Statistical Account of Nova Scotia* (2 volumes), Robert Gourlay's (1822) *Statistical Account of Upper Canada, Compiled with a View to a Grand System of Immigration* (2 volumes) and Lord Durham's (John George Lambton's) (1839) *Report on the Affairs of British North America* (ibid.).

The more "mature" studies provided by Lord Durham, Haliburton, and Gourlay initiated in "Canada" a systematic method for assembling information for practical use and for the framing of government policy. All three people were committed to the responsible use of information yet all three were also politically committed to a particular social class and order: Lord Durham to the liberal wing of the Whig plutocrats in England, Haliburton to the colonial merchants led by Joseph Howe in Nova Scotia, and Gourlay to the marginalized republican yeomen in Upper Canada. Each, respectively, emphasized ordered governance of the Empire, patriotic economic choreography, or a critical political challenge. Each was rewarded for his contribution to English Canadian intellectual history. Durham was recognised for maintaining his family tradition as an aristocratic reformer, Haliburton was canonized as the first promoter of colonial nationalism, and Gourlay was denounced as disloyal, tried under the Sedition Act and banished from Upper Canada. The "inventory" methodology transmitted by these early "intellectual" practices still predominates in contemporary English Canadian history and the social sciences. Most inventories are still marketed to Canadian governments and businesses or are the product of a longstanding British tradition for Royal Commissions and other public consultations whose deliberations determine the ends for which the inventories will be used and offer a unique political process for accommodating ideological differences. A fewer number, as in Gourlay's case, retain both a practical and critical intent. And even a fewer number are aligned with marginalized classes or risk "sedition." Intellectual practice during public consultations becomes dispersed into the organizational structures of hegemonic administration and limits the potential for seditious acts. This "anonymous intellectuality" is regulated by the

institutional (rather than personal) forms of governance and the most representative forum of Anglo-American intellectual practice is the government inquiry.

The genesis of the public inquiry process was closely related to the enclosure movements in Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. Kemp (1985) summarizes how individual enclosures of land required until 1845 a separate act of Parliament and although many provisions were incorporated in more than 4,000 Acts certain common features were routinized. First, public meetings were held concerning a particular enclosure issue in order to petition and inform Parliament. Second, a final public meeting was held for the enclosure commissioners to consider disputes and make awards. Third, by 1769, commissioners were bound by oath of impartiality, and by 1774 they were further ordered by Parliament to render accounts. Finally, provisions were introduced to ensure publicity for the proposed plans. By 1845 greater central government control was also introduced including permanent commissioners, public meetings and the submission of a report. Thus arose in an extra-parliamentary process a decision-making apparatus related to public planning. These inquiries outwardly displayed characteristics of openness, impartiality, and justice and, after 1845, they also involved increasing state involvement and rationalization.

But underlying the inquiry process was its essential class-based nature usually carried out by the propertied classes who would reap the benefit of agricultural rationalization and increased land ownership. The early processes linked the local clergy, the lord of the manor, the local landowning (middle) class. Furthermore, enfranchisement for voting was restricted to existing property-based qualifications. The traditional inquiry procedure for Anglo-American societies established a form of intellectual governance which made the relationship between class interests and universalistic pronouncements more opaque. The "public inquiry" model used for Alberta's *Toward 2000 Together* and the national Prosperity Initiative form a continuity in having a class-bias and having the flexibility of a parastate organization to bypass the legislative forum.

In 19th century Canada, geographers, botanists, and climatologists institutionalized intellectual practice as an "inventory science" for public inquiry and private profits. Suzanne Zeller (1987) identifies that the funding for William Edmund Logan's Geological Survey of Canada in 1842 marks the first *indigenous* effort to fund an inventory science. In keeping with British Empire tradition, the survey was the first intelligence-gathering initiative taken by the government of Canada after the Act of Union to account for the relationship between the land and people. The people mainly accounted for were aboriginals thus instituting the first anthropological studies as inventories. The practices of "mirroring" began in the early 1800s when Canadian scientists, allied with government and business, founded The Geological Survey. The survey had been blocked by the conservative interests of Bishop John Strachan and the Family Compact. A political realignment was instituted by 1848 and tended to follow the recommendations of the *Durham Report*. The realignment enhanced the power of those interested in railway development, land speculation and geological science. This mapping project, began under the guidance of Logan created the first "image" of a transcontinental and *bourgeois* nation-state: coal, steel and railroads. After 1863, British North Americans could actually "see" what a federation of united colonies would "look" like. The survey also restored the confidence of London investors to invest in Canada for the second railway boom (Zeller 1987).

Furthermore, the antipathy of the Canadian hegemonic tradition to "intellectual" reflection also has its roots in the transplantation of the Scottish Moralistic tradition. The alliance between inventory science and a particular kind of social theorizing was further consolidated in its colonial form when the Scottish tradition was institutionalized in the



Presbyterian colleges and later extended as the master discourse to English Canadian higher education (McKillop 1979). As an example of one of these educators, Thomas Reid lived from 1710-96 and was a member of the Scottish Enlightenment. He succeeded Adam Smith at King's College at the University of Glasgow and the Chair of Natural Philosophy. Thomas Reid equated the actions of "bees and men" and circumscribed the limits of Reason to instinct or "human nature." He wrote that "by instinct, I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having an end in view, without deliberations, and very often without any conception of what we do (cited from Schneider 1967).<sup>2</sup> Such Scottish intellectuals established the foundational principles for Canadian intellectuality as "common sense." Reid claimed that in "a matter of common sense, every man is no less a competent judge than a mathematician is in a mathematical demonstration" (cited from McKillop 1979). Common Sense provided the means to preserve both the British empirical tradition and a metaphysic of political apologetics. It also reduced "intellectuality" to culturally deterministic forms and "intelligence" to an ability to manipulate mathematical calculations. Nevertheless, by articulating the inventory method to Common Sense, the meaning of "common" was restricted to the "schooled" expert. So in its early formulation the sensibility of a "Commoner" was not only restricted to property-holding males, it was also restricted to a reductionist form of categorical thinking. This early pattern established a sacred formula for hegemonic intellectuals to claim the name of a universal "democracy," "science" and "description" while acting in the particular interests of "cultural aristocrats," "bourgeois morality" and "political prescription." This early pattern was a "grammar of power" expressed through the institutionalization of a particular method for apprehending reality, defining intellectual practice and mobilizing of ideology. The ideology, though, had ambiguous effects in that it represented the potential (in combination with social gospel assumptions) to inspire the origins of sociology (see Chapter Five). Intellectual history and the sociology of the intelligentsia must confront the grammar of Common Sense in understanding Canadian intellectual practices.

### **3.3. The Emergence of the Modern Canadian Intelligentsia**

The second obstacle to overcoming the impoverishment of Canadian intellectual history is to confront the fact that the construction of historical narratives excludes a comprehensive theoretical debate. An atheoretical approach to cultural history and intellectual practice emphasizes (usually implicitly) a particular theory of social development; that is, it premises research on the industrial modernization and humanist integration model without explicating or confronting alternate interpretations for intellectual development such as Marxism, poststructuralism, and feminism. A more extended theoretical debate *within the empirical literature* about the developmental assumptions of humanist, modernization, class-based and feminist approaches would help to clarify how pre-theoretical assumptions inform historical narratives. Furthermore, theoretical debate would help researchers integrate different disciplinary and methodological findings by providing a forum for constructing or fine-tuning conceptual instruments. This latter approach would be crucial for categorizing intellectuals, for example, as individuals, a group, a strata or a class. The tasks of research could also be defined. For example, should a study of "information" be based on a naturalized, normative or power-based understanding of culture? For the most part, historical narratives on intellectual practice assume a modernization thesis. In Chapters Four and Five, I return to the following narrative for a discussion of class, ideology, the power of signification, and the rise of the *postmodern* narrative.

Studies of the intelligentsia previous to 1914 make categorizing the intelligentsia quite difficult but there are methods for integrating already existing biographies into historical

sociology (Abrams 1982, 1988; Lanning 1990). In this period, the correlation between higher education and intellectual practice was still quite high. From the early 1800s to 1900, the middle class secured its status in a variety of ways: by owning abundant land, by engaging in trade and commerce, by working as artisans or by belonging to one of the "learned" professions -- the clergy, medicine or law. In the 19th century, most aspiring "professionals" were not required to hold a university degree except for ministers and professors. Other roads to power, prestige and wealth were open. For another 60 years after 1890 universities would still be accessible to an elite constituency with a close interest in government and business. By virtue of their small numbers and advanced education, anyone with a university degree enjoyed great social status up to 1945 (Axelrod 1990).

Although very few people went to theological or university colleges, to advanced academies or institutes or into professional training, the influence of this small class of people was very pervasive given its monopoly over the means of communication, that is, the privilege to speak in the church, schools and press. If the present occupational divisions are projected onto the 19th century, quantifying the intelligentsia may be distorted because learned individuals participated in a broad array of practices which don't conform to present day occupational designations.

As for the intellectual elite, members are both harder and easier to locate. Members of the elite are harder to locate because they wore many occupational hats: concerning business, politics, religion and science. Also many occupational titles which are common today are not accurate attributions to the elite intellectuals, each of whom may have carried several designations: a professor, a clergyman, a lawyer, a botanist, a politician, a farmer, and an entrepreneur. Assigning an occupation usually reflects the historian's interest in a particular institutional biography (e.g., engineering or business) than the actual reality of practice in 19th century. It is better to start with the abstraction "intellectual practice" than the contemporary abstraction of "occupation." Because so few people spoke from strategic positions it is possible to locate these people speaking in many of the following places over a given time period: from the pulpit, from the lectern, in the press, in the learned societies, in political forums, in executive councils, in legislatures, and in business boardrooms. The lives of Robert Bell, Sir William Logan, and Sir J. W. Dawson illustrate the overlap between intellectual, political and economic practice (Taylor 1989; Zeller 1987).

Even by the late 1800s the dominant intellectuals were still a relatively small clique but the increasing division of labour and the growing institutionalization of intellectual practices meant that this class had gained a considerable degree of identity. Consisting of no more than a hundred people from all the provinces -- in what might be described as the site of governance for legislating *official* knowledge -- this clique was also closely integrated with the political and economic cliques governing railway expansion, land speculation, settlement policies, industrial development, scientific study and university reform. Arising from an earlier meeting initiated in 1882, this intellectual elite can be found forming in 1890 the Royal Society of Canada (Harris 1976: 93-102). And its influence is continuous into the post-1945 period (Porter 1965). Ogmundson and McLaughlin (1994) recently reviewed Porter's benchmark analysis of the Canadian intellectual elite and the Royal Society. They found the contemporary period marked by the continued domination of the University of Toronto and an increasing foreign influence, although intellectual domination by those of British origin has declined. In the academic world, issues of gender, ethnic and religious discrimination as well as the separation between the anglophone and francophone traditions are still important.

At the turn of the century the Royal Society, coordinated the activities of 77 persons from French and English Canada in a national network of middle-class societies dedicated

to literature, history and science. Of these scholars and scientists, most held the professorial chairs and administrative positions in the Canadian universities. As well, 21 were civil servants working in federal government agencies (Harris 1976). The close links between governance and intellectual practice are symbolized by the fact that this initial meeting was held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons in Ottawa. One major concern of these intellectuals was to coordinate the production of knowledge for the consolidation of a coast to coast dominion, which of course in those days meant integrating their activities with the National Policy: tariffs, railways, immigration. Even at the turn of the century it is difficult to separate culture, politics and economics when it came to the National Policy. Two of the Royal Society's most important initiatives were to find wealthy individuals to endow chairs in the practical and physical sciences and to reorganize colleges and universities into a national federated system. By 1914 this new system was in place which united colleges into federated universities across the dominion. The resulting organization of the Royal Society of Canada was funded by an annual grant from the dominion government of \$5000. Any contemporary discussion about the *increased* links between business, state and higher education must keep in mind that the so-called Golden Age of university autonomy meant autonomy from the interests of the popular classes and not autonomy from the state *per se*. The reality of intellectual practice in Canada is that business, state and higher education have always been intimately connected (Berger 1986; McKillop 1979; Owram 1986; Shore 1987; S.E.D. Short 1976; Zeller 1987). For the most part, to be an intellectual in English Canada was to be or to have been a student or an academic at one of the various denominational or secular colleges, professional associations and academies in Canada, Britain or the USA. Doug Owram's (1986) study, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945*, also identifies how the later integration of the modern Canadian state and the universities followed the actions initiated by the Royal Society. This modern restructuring of elite intellectual practice in English Canada was accomplished by the withdrawal of funding by the provinces with the intent of *forcing* the consolidation of denominational colleges into federated universities (Harris 1976: 93-102). For example, in 1868 the Ontario government withdrew financial support to pressure the denominational institutions and universities to federate.

The formative years of the Canadian state before 1890 were also the formative years for the intelligentsia. A review of the past two hundred years does reveal increasing degrees of integration at each transition stage between economics, politics and higher education. But what is missed in most of these studies is an analysis of the *kind* of integration and the nature of the transition focused on: who was included *as well as* excluded in making the new hegemonic institutions. By focusing only on the politics of inclusion (consent) while ignoring the politics of exclusion (coercion), the mainstream studies necessarily miss formative relationships between knowledge and power. What needs to be written is a comprehensive history of intellectuals in English Canada. Owram and others' limited periodization and focus leaves the impression that intellectual involvement is merely an *increased* presence of the scientific intelligentsia. But this process was also a shift in class power enhancing certain factions of the middle class intelligentsia drawn from the practical and natural scientists in a re-alliance within the bourgeoisie. In the limited-period studies, a theory of growth and development is rooted in the notion of modernization. But economic growth and development were not the whole story. The reorganization of the financial, administrative, disciplinary and curricular structures of science, education and higher education is also attributable to shifts in class power, the colonization of the already existing institutions controlled by other classes, and the rationalization of state power and

surveillance. These narrow and limited studies which predominate in academic circles merely assume a theory of history that rarely faces theoretical critique. Theoretical conformity, here, is *habituated* specific to a "discipline" and provides a web of belief for the historians or social scientists allowing them to make sense of their particularized studies and the "data." Because scientists were politicians as well as lawyers; physicians and botanists as well as land speculators; educators and clergymen as well as railway promoters, one must be wary of drawing current occupational distinctions in writing the history of intellectual practice. An analysis which situates the intellectual class within the totality of class relations is one of the few ways to make sense of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Of course these class relations occurred in a federal system which had a different dynamic than that of Prussia or France and these comparative differences must be specified (Green 1990).

Missing from the modernization narrative then is an analysis of transition periods in the construction of a new hegemonic alliance. By focusing on the periods of rationalization which followed new hegemonic alliances (e.g. at the start of the 20th century) one misses the ways worker-led intellectual organizations were colonized and radical intellectuals were effectively removed from utilizing both their traditional and the new means of communication. In this case, working class and agrarian intellectuals who were not also preachers or teachers had difficulty in cultivating and maintaining the independent and cohesive intellectual tradition arising from the artisanal and farm societies (Brooks and Gagnon 1988; Monière 1981; B. Palmer 1992; Penner 1977).

#### **1. From Modernization to Hegemony**

While narratives are based on humanist (e.g. Harris 1976) or modernization (e.g. Owsram 1986) assumptions, there are those who challenge such approaches. An exemplary case that breaks with above narrative and introduces a hegemony narrative belongs to Stephan Brooks and Alain Gagnon (1988). I introduce this exemplar for two reasons: (1) it offers a potential challenger to the modernization narrative and (2) it provides a useful class-based summary of the growth and development of Canadian intellectuals, politics and higher education following the Second World War. I return to this topic in more detail in the following chapters.

In endeavoring to understand the political significance of the rise of social science Brooks and Gagnon draw on a wide array of sources to reconstruct the dynamic of intellectuals in politics and to provide insights into the differences between French and English Canada. They identify the increasing presence of American thought, especially on English Canada, as one of the most important changes in the Canadian intellectual tradition. Brooks and Gagnon proceeded in three stages: (1) an analysis of the role of Quebecois social scientists and their forms of political engagement and discourse; (2) an examination of the role of English-speaking Canadian social scientists, especially in economics and political science and their relationship to the Canadian state and economic power in Canadian society; and (3) a conclusion about the political role of intellectuals in Canada.

In Quebec, Brooks and Gagnon found that the first contemporary period extended until the end of the Duplessis regime. The period involved a struggle for legitimacy and an institutionalization of the social sciences. Developments related to a growing opposition to the ideologically conservative Union Nationale government, anglophone capital, and the church establishment. A second period marked a time of rapid growth for the social sciences. This growth was coupled with the secularization of the universities and the consolidation of social scientific legitimacy. These changes in higher education and scientific inquiry coincided with the Quiet Revolution and the expansion of the state sector

under the Lesage government. Social scientists contributed to the project of defining the new Quebec and participated as technocrats within the provincial state. This period ended in the 1960s when a decline in the provincial economy led to strained relationships between the state and the predominantly leftist social scientific community. Increasing tensions created by the gap between provincial revenues and expenditures in the 1970s created a provincial funding crisis. The Parti Quebecois government alienated the new middle class and the public sector unions who had earlier supported them. By the 1980s the nationalist social science community had to reconsider whether the PQ was the correct vehicle for an independence movement.

In English Canada, the relationship between the social scientists and politics was different. The first factor in the relationship was the great influence of American disciplinary developments on the shape of social science. The second factor was the dependant structure of the Canadian economy. The third factor was the differential effect of federalism which meant that most critical questions centered on regionalism, constitutionalism and French-English relations. The period leading up to WWII was dominated by British conceptions and trained personnel. The period after 1945 saw a dramatic change from the colonial origins of intellectual practice to American-based and quantitatively-oriented social sciences. Professional economists increased their status and provided the state with Keynesian demand-management strategies intended to expand the market.

By the mid-1960s, American economic, political and cultural influences on Canadian society became an important issue which galvanized the political left and provided political scientists, sociologists and a few economists with an issue for an organized nationalist response. The degree and effects of nationalism, though, were markedly less than the Quebec variety. The defeat of the nationalist Waffle movement at the 1971 NDP convention was part of a widening split between segments of the social scientific community. The nationalist surge of the 1960s did help create a revival of political economy which was influenced by neo-Marxism. This influence was articulated mainly in sociology and political science. At the same time, there was an increasing American influence and an increasing emphasis on the expert function of the social sciences. The state's requirement for increased analytical capacities in program evaluation, policy planning, social impact assessment and forecasting increased the demands for social scientists to provide the language of justification for competing interest groups. Scientifically-derived evidence and analyses became the normal elements of political discourse.

Brooks and Gagnon concluded that the very forces which led to the explosive growth of the social sciences in the 20th century had different effects in Quebec and English Canada. In Quebec, the role of expert and critic temporarily achieved a measure of fusion. This provincial hegemony was achieved in the alliance of nationalist social scientists with the ascendant new middle class. Opportunities for this fusion did not develop in English Canada. Furthermore developments in the relationship between economics and public policy also led to a bifurcation in the social sciences. The economists acted mainly within the state and political scientists and sociologists acted mainly within academe.

By the end of the 1980s various oppositional publics had developed around issues of equal rights for women, chronic unemployment, de-industrialization, and the persistence of poverty for marginal groups such as native people, the aged, single mothers and the working poor. The integration of social scientists into the public policy process had resulted in the debasement of their critical intellectual functions and policy critique had been

substituted for social critique. Economists, generally speaking the most conservative, left the basic premises of liberal capitalism unchallenged.

### **3.5. Limits to the Analysis of Social Development and Ideology**

The first and second obstacles to a restored richness in Canadian intellectual history concerned both the origins of a colonial grammar informing research and the dominance of untested assumptions based on the modernization narrative. Rarely do the inventory method and/or the modernization narrative confront challengers in common debate. For the most part, research on intellectual practice is one of many solitudes. This section plays close attention to one solitude: the treatment of "class" and "ideology" as conceptual instruments for research.

The third obstacle to restoring a richness to the research is to introduce social theoretical debates over key concepts such as "culture," "intellectuals," and "ideology." This task was accomplished in this dissertation in Chapter Two by focusing on the various theoretical approaches to intellectual practice and by introducing the conceptions of "hegemony" and the "anonymous intellectual." For the most part, such introductions are not provided in the literature I reviewed. This latter approach to cultural research blocks the possibility for identifying cross-disciplinary interests and fragments the research community into competing ideological solitudes. Furthermore, while researchers like Brooks and Gagnon, Monière, Palmer and Penner pay attention to the relationship between intellectual traditions and social classes, there is an overwhelming hesitancy on the part of cultural studies to pay attention to class relations. For example, a more detailed review of the history of the connections between the various learned societies might reveal some interesting conclusions about the Canadian nation-state formation or how a select few accumulated wealth, power or prestige as knowledgeable insiders. The exclusion of class historiography from much of the literature and an overemphasis on regional, bi-national or national conceptualization of cultural contours, masks certain anti-theoretical tendencies in Canadian cultural studies.

While most of the research on intellectuals in English Canada has been accomplished by intellectual and social historians, usually their concerns have not been integrated into a comprehensive social theoretical debate. Humanist histories take two forms: (1) individual biography or (2) institutional (group of individuals) biography. In these cases my review did not uncover one theoretical discussion about the nature of intellectual practice. I provide a more comprehensive critique of these approaches in the next chapter but suffice it to say here exemplars of "biographical approaches" are available at the end of the chapter (footnoted as "biographical sampling"). Also noted at the end of the chapter are various institutional biographies. These approaches also lack theoretical explication or discussion concerning intellectual practice but are too numerous to cite except to suggest that Harris's (1976) *A History of Higher Education* and Horn's (1980) *The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left* should serve as paradigm cases to represent what is clearly an antipathy in history to social theorizing about intellectual practice and the nature of ideology.

The above critique of theory's absence in intellectual history, is not to say that theory is not incorporated into the discourse on intellectual history. Although rare, I have chosen three exemplars that attempt to integrate social theory into the historical narrative on intellectuals. I also focused on their explanatory assumptions concerning ideology. Theory in these cases is evident but is narrowly defined and confined. The exemplars suggest that even when social theory is introduced into intellectual history, the treatment of ideology is still quite primitive.

The first exemplar uses the historical narrative to "prove" the modernization thesis. In this case, "industrialization" is the causal determinant for cultural development. Doug Owram (1986) in *The Government Generation* provides a more sophisticated case of this practice. In his concluding chapter, he considers the contents of his study and provides an explanation concerning the historical forces which maintained the Liberals in power over a long period of time: (1) the social, economic and demographic revolution, (2) the change in philosophical precepts, (3) the increasing presence and status granted to professionals and (4) the effect of political and economic events. What at first appears as a sophisticated theoretical and conjunctural analysis, at second glance, is merely a claim without an acknowledgement, that the "evidence" supports his version of social change theory (implicitly structural-functionalism) to call for a fundamental reassessment of the presumptions and values on which social, economic and state theories had functioned in the nineteenth century. According to Owram (1986: 330), the above "modern" changes occurred because they were naturally "better" than the supplanted "traditions." He backgrounds why particular and not alternate "modern" influences had an effect in English Canada.

For example, as discussed in the previous section, he posits that scientific approaches displaced humanist/religious approaches to governance but he does not explain why particular scientific approaches such as Smithian economics rather than Marxian economics ascended to power in academia. He merely assumes that the best ideas naturally survived (i.e., culture as naturalized). Mere survival provides its own teleological justification and a reified "Canadian" culture naturally evolved to become democratic, meritocratic and technocratic. At the pre-theoretical level, the assumptions of Adam Smith, Charles Darwin and Emile Durkheim unconsciously inform the project. Theory in this sense provides an explanation but there is no debate about whether *this* theory provides the best explanation of the data or why the assumptions of Smith, Darwin and Durkheim should take precedence over the assumptions of Marx or Weber. *Why* structural-functionalism explains the evidence better is backgrounded in favour of showing how the evidence supports the theory. How and why other explanations might offer a weaker or better explanation (e.g. Weberian, Marxian, Feminist or Postmodern explanations) are not considered. He assumes that one thesis can explain development without having to explicate (or mention) possible alternatives

David Mills (1988) in *The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada 1784-1850* provides the second exemplar. He uses the historical narrative to "prove" the humanist thesis. In this case, "Whig-humanism" posits that "ideas" and not the "economy" is the causal determinant for social development. Where Owram provides a materialist-institutional explanation giving structure precedence over culture, Mills less sophisticated case provides an idealist explanation as an alternate form of functionalism. In this case, culture is given determinant status over structure. The debate is then necessarily framed as one between structure or culture in favour of "culture." He claims, after occluding class analysis in a epoch riven with both subjective and objective class politics, that a consensus theory based on *individual attitudes, values and beliefs* best explains his data. Mills focus is not on whether this theoretical claim for the existence of these "individual subjectivities" is true -- it is merely assumed to be true -- and his evidence is used to support his particular argument about how conflicting ideas were required to find a compromise position concerning the idea of "loyalty." Similar to Owram, he makes no attempt to show why this particular theory is stronger or weaker than a host of other counter-theories concerning social change. He does acknowledge that his theoretical approach to Canadian political culture is based on a Pammet and Whittington's (1976) framework -- clarified in

*Foundations of Political Culture* -- but he does not argue why this theory and not another, say Curtis (1992) on hegemony in Upper Canada, explains the data better. And as concerns a theory of ideology, such an approach does not explain ideology or the mechanisms for its production. Here ideas are also naturalized. Ideas belong to individuals as objective possessions and given absolute causal status as gifts from God. Again theoretical differences do not open debate but reinforce solitudes. Individual values explain everything, but nothing but "possessive individualism" explains individual values. Studies similar to Owrain's or Mills's are usually narrowly defined in theoretical scope or inadequately confront controversial issues.

Controversial issues are supposed to be the *raison d'être* for a socialist theory of social development. But here too, when it comes to explanations of ideology, the poverty of the Canadian leftist tradition comes to the forefront in its simplistic reading of "Marxist" approaches to social development. My third exemplar, M. Patricia Marchak's *Ideological Perspectives on Canada* (3rd ed.), provides a highly accessible and common text on ideology and Canadian political movements and confronts much of what is usually absent from liberal approaches to intellectual history and to ideology in an attempt to both popularize and clarify an alternate approach to ideology. As a general text it might be highly suspect but it does offer a straightforward presentation. I am not arguing that there are not better presentations which could be used to exemplify reproductive or hegemonic theory of social development and ideology (e.g. Monière 1981, Curtis 1992 or Brooks and Gagnon 1988). What I am arguing is that Marchak's work does exemplify a particular problematic for most critical approaches to ideology in English Canada where, for the most part, ideology is offered up in the reified categories of modern political thought (e.g. socialism, anarchism, fascism etc.) according to ideologies which speak more to "common sense" rather than to a political sociology of ideological mechanisms. Marchak's work has become somewhat of a Canadian classic. Nevertheless, the text reproduces an all too common approach to the analysis of ideology that this thesis is highly critical of: the reification of cultural mechanisms and the conflation of cultural specificities to economic and political forms, that is, the reduction of ideology to a reflection of political economy.

She writes that "the definition of ideology we use in this book is: shared ideas, perceptions, values, and beliefs through which members of a society interpret history and contemporary social events and which shape their expectations and wishes for the future" (1988: 5). This definition of ideology is a reversion to liberal conceptions of ideology and overlooks the complex treatments of the theory of ideology from Marx, Lenin, Lukacs, Gramsci, Mannheim, Habermas to Foucault and others. There is probably some justification for introducing liberal conceptions, for example, to increase marketability of the book. But when it comes to presenting a Marxist definition of ideology there can be no justification for simplifying in such a way Marx's theories of social development and ideology.

Marchak provides an important "critical" exemplar because she reproduces a common (and incorrect) understanding of theory of ideology and social development *held by many Canadian Marxists or socialists about Marxism!* For example, the nature and functioning of Marx's "commodity fetishism" goes unaccounted for as a theory of ideology in capitalist societies. She does incorporate the idea of conflict between a "dominant" ideology and "counter-ideologies," an ideology "which is held by a substantial minority and which has a noticeable impact on social action" (ibid.). She brushes aside, though, the complex theoretical debates between liberal and Marxist approaches (and within Marxism) by reducing Marx's complex theory to the limited conception of "false consciousness." Marchak adds: "There is *another* definition of ideology. . .: the ideas and values of the



ruling class, disseminated through agencies controlled by that class in ways that obfuscate class realities for subservient classes. We are not using this definition here. . ." (6). The promotion of such an oversimplification *even if not to use it* misses the fact that Marx had more than *one* definition of ideology (i.e., at least four or more, see Eagleton 1991; Larrain 1979; Thompson 1992). By using Marchak's work as the exemplary cutting edge between liberal and socialist conceptions of social development and ideology, I have illustrated the great absences that exist in the Canadian tradition. By not mining the richly textured debates over ideology in the Marxist tradition, many insights into social development, intellectual practice and ideology are missed. Furthermore, much is to be gained as I show in the next chapter from the critical theories provided by psychoanalysts, poststructuralists, feminists, phenomenologists, existentialists, hermeneuticists and critical theorists etc.

While Marchak can be thanked for at least raising the issue of class domination and mentioning an alternate definition of ideology as "false consciousness," in the long run greater harm is done. Reproducing these common caricatures which still impoverish Canadian approaches to intellectual practice and ideology can only do violence to the complex and intriguing understandings now being developed in the various theories of ideology. Even Marchak's quick differentiation of ideology and theory was a topic which perplexed Louis Althusser for his whole life, and still others today. To be fair to Marchak, though, *Ideological Perspectives* is not intended to be a complex reading of the relationship between different theories of ideology and theory; nevertheless, it is an exemplar of an understanding of intellectual practice and ideology that runs deep in Canadian "left" circles.

I have used the above three exemplars to illustrate a few of the limitations in Canadian intellectual history and the sociology of the intelligentsia. The rest of this section identifies both the limitations and a few successes in coming to terms with the role of social theory in the analysis of intellectual practice and the nature of intellectuals as a "class of individuals." The literature on intellectuals and the intelligentsia in the social sciences is even more limited than that found in history. English-speaking social scientists, mostly committed to behavioral social science, have expended little energy in coming to terms with the practices of the "intelligentsia." Nurtured in a culture of individualism and the statistical sciences, it is doubtful whether a social conception of class (let alone one which is self-referential) will be taken up by academics -- but it is possible. There are exceptions already. In Quebec, the increased emphasis on social history combined with a traditional cultural respect for the classical intellectual, means one would expect an interest in socially constituted intellectual practice -- and this is the case. In English Canada, *The State and Economic Life Series* edited by Mel Watkins and Leo Panitch and the *Canadian Social History Series* edited by G. S. Kealy situate intellectual practice in class relations. Bruce Curtis's (1992) *True Government by Choice Men?* is an exemplary case of a historical sociology based on hegemonic theory of social development and ideological practice. Other studies are cited in the next section. Yet, having said this, in both Quebec and English Canada, much more has to be accomplished which could be properly called a comprehensive sociology or historical sociology of intellectuals as a "class" implicated in class struggle.

Furthermore, research rarely touches on the central concern of this thesis: the intellectual practice of social theorizing as situated reason. Some research does focus on social theorizing, though. These two exemplary exceptions are (1) from intellectual history, McKillop's (1979) *A Disciplined Intelligence* covers the dominant intellectuals and their social theories in 19th century English Canada but lacks a class analysis, and (2) from political science, Brooks and Gagnon (1988) *Social Scientists and Politics in Canada: Between Clerisy and Politics in Canada* covers the dominant intellectuals and political theories in the post-1945 period in English and French Canada but lacks a detailed

summary of theoretical developments. In most cases, if an analysis of social theorizing does occur it is usually dispersed throughout a variety of texts and disciplinary interests with a primary focus on individual or institutional biography and is rarely situated in a broader social context. Social class analysis is usually marginalized.

There are exceptions to the above trend, mainly from social history and historical sociology (e.g., Axelrod 1982, 1990; Axelrod and Reid 1989; Curtis 1988, 1992; Houston and Prentice 1988; McLaren 1990; McLaren and McLaren 1986). Furthermore, the monographic tradition in intellectual history seems to effectively block consolidating the particularized approaches to the contents within a comprehensive analysis. This reductionism created by narrow specializations in the diverse aspects of religion, politics, education, science, literature, philosophy, economics, journalism or the arts. A review of these specializations follows. In addition, the marginalization of social theory in the Canadian academic culture as a "separate discipline" has further fragmented an already fragmented approach to intellectual practice. It is also by a study of intellectual practice derived from such specific sites as the learned societies, church councils and university communications that one finds the traditional focus on histories of science, education, religion, news-making and politics too narrowly defined. In many cases, especially for Canada up to 1945, a person's science, education, religion, news and politics were rarely differentiated. Add to this the fact that class, community and ideology were highly integrated, it is hard to understand how a history written from the point of view of atomized persons or institutional biographies can be justified. To confront and nevertheless simplify the evident patterns is not to argue that a theory of history should come prescribed. But rather, as an ideal, theory should inform the careful selection of concepts, generate a comparative debate over explanation, and direct research into new areas for the recovery of data. To argue this, though, is to argue for something substantially lacking in contemporary historiography and sociology on intellectuals. After touching on the above methodological and theoretical concerns, I now turn to a review of the substantive research on intellectual practice.

### **3.6. Topography of Approaches to Intellectuals in English Canada**

The fourth obstacle to the enrichment of Canadian intellectual history and the sociology of the intelligentsia is the absence of a united "Canadian" approach to intellectuals. In addition to the above three impoverishments, this limitation emphasizes the further fragmentation of a comprehensive research program on substantive issues related primarily to region and province but also related to gender, race and class and to education, media and biography. In cataloguing the topography of the following literature in the more traditional sense of a literature review, it is well nigh impossible to review all the specifics of the literature concerned with intellectual practice. My purpose is merely to sketch out how this literature is presently "fragmented." First a review of the recent reviews is in order.

The rich contribution to English-Canadian intellectual history was initiated by S. F. Wise (1968), Carl Berger (1979), Ramsay Cook (1966) and A. B. McKillop (1979, 1987). A. B. McKillop (1987 [1974]) distinguishes the history of ideas from intellectual history by the fact that this latter history is best understood by insisting that the value of ideas is derived from the relationship of those ideas to an historical context. In keeping with the current historical writing in the 1970s, he believed at the time that the viewing of political, religious and literary ideas gained significance from an external context, that is, a relationship to the actions of men [sic] which *reflect* their notions, values assumptions, images and values.

For McKillop and these historians, the action context or external reality was conceived of as social *psychology* and textual *criticism*. Intellectual history, thus understood, was first differentiated from the history of ideas with reference to a social context, but this "social context" was purged of any connection to material contents, leaving a form of objective idealism as a reality check. Social structure was reduced to cognitive structures while political and economic structures were occluded. Furthermore, these structures were conceived as core cultural forms without internal contradiction. The inclusion of political and economic structures as well as the differential power of contradictory and contested formations of culture still distinguishes social history from intellectual history.

McKillop (1987 [1974]) further described the key contours of Canadian thought (objective idealisms) discovered by intellectual history and covering the time from early settlement. First, Canadian intellectual history was characterized by an interest in the "colonial mentality" because key intellectual sources were British and American. He argues that this study of colonial mentalities was valuable because it was a study of a real phenomenon indicative of political, constitutional and social growth. Second, this history was interested in national existence and the twin "problems" of nationalism and national identity. Conditions of nationhood meant that Canadians privileged anti-Americanism and anti-French Revolutionary thought. This reaction was coded as either Loyalist tradition, religious sentiments or the writing of Whig history (liberal-nationalist bias). Research into the Canadian identity focused on "harmony" and "consensus" and a quest for collective-self definition. McKillop called for intellectual history to expand beyond the confines of political and constitutional history to deal with the broad spectrum of cultural traditions including religious sentiments and popular culture.

Almost two decades later, McKillop (1989) in another review of Canadian intellectual history no longer generalized about Canadian culture but limited himself to Ontario culture. He now argued that the expansion of historiography in Ontario had resulted in increased importance given to cultural history. He drew attention to the need for a more systematic and theoretical attention to cultural processes and transformation. He added that historiography was now hobbled by provincial or regional boundaries. Nevertheless, against his own judgement, McKillop attempted to make sense of culture by limiting himself to Ontario's cultural history.

It seems, I must add, that the fetish for focusing on a distinctive identity has created a problem whereby each locality now claims its *right* to a distinctive identity. While Canadian historians or sociologists worry about generalizing findings about one region to another, the same degree of concern is rarely exhibited concerning how generalizations based on class, gender, and race enter these regional representations. The emphasis on one kind of particularism necessarily backgrounds other kinds of generalizations. The attempt to particularize *all* these categories does not solve anything but merely enhances "senselessness."

Judith Fingard (1989) reviewed the intellectual and cultural history of Atlantic Canada, and focused on three aspects: the art of historiography, the influences of religious ideology and the meaning of popular tradition. She found the research had focused on the marginalization of Atlantic Canada, its uniqueness, its economic underdevelopment and its colonial status. Religious studies were dominated by the New Light Movement and its Baptist legacy. Studies of popular culture focused on Newfoundland, Christmas mumming, and concepts of imagined community. She concluded that the regional character of the literature on intellectual and cultural history invariably reflected the continuing economic dilemma of Atlantic Canada.

R. D. Fraser (1989) reviewed the cultural historiography of Prairie Canada by identifying four themes: regional identity, protest, social reform, and imagery. He concluded that a unique prairie intellectual and cultural history exists and reflects an underlying unity based on an ongoing search for a prairie myth (the *Weltanschauung* of unexplored territory).

Douglas Cole (1989) reviewed the intellectual and imaginative development of British Columbia and found that it had been influenced by two themes: (1) finding a home and (2) situating that home within an external context. The geographic fact of isolation, he argued, underlies these themes and pulls the B.C. imagination toward marginality, insignificance and neglect. He also stated that European-based history had been ignored and coastal Indian histories had fared better because of their creative significance. He concluded that the major queries of "How to be a British Columbian?" and "What is a British Columbian?" remain to be explored, as well as, "inter-group complexities" with non-Europeans, between classes and political ideologies, between religion and secularism, and between women and men.

Yvan Lamonde (1989) reviewed the cultural and intellectual history of Quebec. He drew attention to the fact that Quebec socio-cultural historiography has made a methodological breakthrough by synthesizing social history and intellectual history, by increasing the importance of social theory, and by focusing on the production and consumption of culture *and* the material social conditions which make possible cultural expression and diffusion.

D. R. Woolf (1989) surveyed the growth of intellectual history from 1967 to 1987 and concluded from a review of course offerings that intellectual history had failed to expand. Doug Owsram (1989) criticized the recent approaches to intellectual history, especially concerning the problem that Canada is the land of many identities. In reviewing many of the themes set forth by intellectual historians, Owsram found common cause in several basic assumptions: (1) ideas in history are important, (2) the particular ideas represent the whole and (3) that thought and action are linked in historical purpose as "nationalism." He also argued that regional distinctiveness, although important, should not be overstated. He felt a common methodology operated across the country, except for Quebec. Yet, the good news was, increasingly cross-fertilization did exist.

Clarence Karr (1989) provided the most cogent critique of Canadian intellectual history. He argued that intellectual history is limited by a preoccupation with delineating the national mind; its propensity to place everything in an atmosphere of crisis; and its narrow and elitist biographical methodology has created a limited focus which remains Whiggish and centralist. He also stated that problems remain concerning judgements of the past through the eyes of the present, an imputed consensus to the national consciousness, a denigration of ideas and individuals assumed detrimental to national consensus, and an overemphasis on headline news. Karr also criticized the limited periodization of events and the tendency to generalize from the ideas of dominant intellectuals as representative of Canadian culture as a whole. Karr, in aligning himself with Yvan Lamonde, called for an intellectual history to be contextualized with social structures, to reveal the divisions within society, to situate the biographical method within an approach which encompasses all of Canadian society and to support generalizations with adequate research. Karr cites Allan Greer's (1985) *Peasant, Lord and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840* as an exemplar for Canadian intellectual history integrated with social history.

The specific contributions to the study of intellectual practice come from intellectual history, social history and social science and their contents are broad, varied and many times quite particularistic and atheoretically presented. Very few mid-range and/or

theoretically-grounded studies exist although several studies do provide excellent introductions to Canadian ideology, identity formation or aspects of the intelligentsia. Julian Park (1957) provided the first inventory of contemporary Canadian culture which might be properly described as intellectual history. It is a collection of essays from different disciplines. A.B. McKillop (1987) has consistently tried to take an approach to consolidating the findings of intellectual history and attempting to identify the contours of Canadian thought. Several classic approaches from Charles Taylor (1970), S. D. Clark (1948; 1975); W. L. Morton (1972), John Porter (1965), Wallace Clement (1975), Leo Panitch (1977), E. Zureik and R. Pike and (1975) and J. Pammet and M. Whittingdon (1976) also try to generalize about the contour of Canadian thought but spend more time integrating their analyses into social-structural or non-cognitive historical relations. Patricia Marchak (1988) and Denis Monière (1981) provide recent overviews on both Canadian and Quebec ideologies. A few studies take a more specific approach to either political parties or economic theory (Baum and Cameron 1984; Gagnon and Tanguay 1988; Smiley 1980). New studies on Canadian identity also take a broader view of "political" culture, and are not limited merely to political ideologies and draw on literary and philosophical traditions (Mandel and Taras 1987; Matthews 1988; McGoogan 1991). Only a couple of studies are focused primarily on "intellectuals" (Brooks and Gagnon 1988; Gagnon 1987; Owsram 1986). Even Seymour Lipset (1990), an American sociologist, has something *new* to say about his old theme concerning the comparative and differential cultural effects on Canadians and Americans *resulting from the American Revolution*.

Specific and more narrowly focused aspects in the intellectual history of English Canada focus on nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, religion, philosophy and science (Armour and Trott 1981; Berger 1976, 1983; Cook 1985; Errington 1987; McKillop 1979; Mills 1988; Westfall 1989; Zeller 1987). Some are individual biographies of intellectuals (S.E.D. Shortt; C. Taylor 1977, 1982). A number of recent and interesting sociological studies focus more clearly on the practices of hegemony by the middle strata (Bohm 1992; Dawson 1986; Djao 1979; Haverman 1986; I. Taylor 1986).

The following studies are more directly about Canadian culture, each taking a different focus and usually related to specific disciplinary interests in culture. These studies are cited in the chapter notes to provide an overview of the discourse on culture and to illustrate the ways the discourse is reductively categorized, usually by region.

One specific interest is in the intellectual thought of Quebec and French Canada in both English<sup>3</sup> and French.<sup>4</sup> Other regional studies are also centered on British Columbia<sup>5</sup> and the Prairies.<sup>6</sup> Regional studies also focus on Atlantic Canada.<sup>7</sup> A third interest usually ignored by intellectual history is the tradition of the wide-ranging research emanating from the social history and sociology of education.<sup>8</sup> Closely related, to the third interest are those studies of higher education, scientific development, professional education and their relationships to political governance and state formation.<sup>9</sup> Most institutional analyses of education are ignored by the intellectual historians although the social historians do integrate findings from the sociology of education. A fourth interest identifies the importance of the culture industry but is usually separated into discipline-specific biographies<sup>10</sup> or else institutional studies of mass media.<sup>11</sup> A fifth interest is the thought of the left or marginalized radical thought.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.7. Conclusion

The above fragmentations that I have reviewed and the four obstacles that I have identified present a surmountable barrier to the enrichment of Canadian intellectual history and the sociology of the intelligentsia. History, philosophy (meta-theory) and sociology each have much to offer an integrated study of intellectual practice. Two major absences, though, run through this tradition: (1) the lack of a comprehensive meta-theoretical and theoretical debate concerning intellectual practice and (2) the absence of a clear "Canadian" empirical understanding of intellectual practice, culture and power. I have posited that a rich account of intellectual practice would have to identify the general social tendencies which are expressed in cultural phenomena and the way culture mediates the realization of powerful interests. The next two chapters take up the challenge of addressing in more detail the issues raised in this chapter. In Chapter Four I look at how the sociology of Canadian intellectuals might be reconsidered and in Chapter Five I construct my own historical narrative about the development of modern discourses. The next two chapters establish the context to analyze *Toward 2000 Together* as a *postmodern* illustration of hegemonic action by the Alberta intelligentsia.

<sup>1</sup> The francophone tradition has an elevated view of intellectuals and their practices. This is not to say that the Quebec and/or francophone tradition has not had its unique impoverishments, one being the English colonial influence. I have restricted my analysis to the English language literature and my conclusions should not be generalized beyond these boundary conditions. Nevertheless, I have integrated, wherever necessary, the Quebec and francophone connections. Also see the French language literature in footnote #4.

<sup>2</sup> In recovering Reid during his stay at the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois, Schneider acknowledges "I am much indebted to Friedrich Hayek, who directed my particular attention to the Scottish moralists."

<sup>3</sup> ENGLISH on QUEBEC: Allan Greer *Peasant, Lord and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1985); Charles Taylor "Nationalism and the Political Intelligensia" in *Queen's Quarterly* (Spring 1965); Joseph Levitt *Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Bi-Culturalism, 1900-1918* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970); Ramsay Cook *French Canada and The Canadian Question* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966); Ramsay Cook (ed.) *French Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto, MacMillan, 1969); Ramsay Cook *Canada, Quebec and The Uses of Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); Denis Monière *Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1981); Stephen Brooks and Alain G. Gagnon *Social Scientists and Politics in Canada: Between Clerisy and Politics in Canada* (McGill-Queen's University, 1988) Laurier L. LaPierre (ed.) *French Canadian Thinkers of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966); Sister Marie-Agnes de Rome Gaudreau *The Social Thought of French Canada as Reflected in the Semaines Social* (Washington: The Catholic University, 1946); A. Anand *A Sociological History of French Canadian Sociology: Its Development at the Universities of Montreal and Laval* (Master's thesis, Carleton University, 1973); P. E. Trudeau *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968); M. Renaud "Quebec New Middle Class in Search of Social Harmony" in *Quebec State and Society* (ed. A.G. Gagnon, Toronto: Methuen, 1984); A. Gagnon and K. Z. Paltiel "Toward Maitres Chez Nous: The Ascendancy of a Balzacian Bourgeoisie in Quebec" in *Queen's Quarterly* 1986 93(4).

<sup>4</sup> FRENCH on QUEBEC: Marc Henry Soulet *Le Silence des Intellectuels* (Montreal: Saint Martin, 1987). S. Panaccio and P. A. Quinton (eds.) *Philosophie au Quebec* (Montreal: Belarmin, 1976); M. Leclerc *La Science Politique au Quebec* (Montreal: L'Hexagone, 1982); J.-J. Simard "La Longue Marche des Technocrates" in *Recherches Sociographiques* 1976 18(1); M. Fournier "Sciences sociales, ideologie et pouvoir" in *Possibles* 1976 1(1); L. M. Tremblay *Le Syndicalisme Quebecois* (Montreal: PUM, 1972); Andre J. Belanger *Rupture et Constante: Quatre Ideologies du Quebec en Eclatement, la Releve, la JEC, Cite Libre, Parti Pris* (Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1977); S. Proulx and P. Vallieres *Changer de Societe: Declin du Nationalisme, Crise Culturelle, Alternatives Sociales au Quebec* (Montreal: Quebec/Amerique, 1982); Claude Martin and Marc-Henry Soulet "Du Cote des Intellectuel(le)s" in *Possibles* 1986 10(2); J. Dufresne "Ou en sont les Intellectuels?" in *Le Devoir* (February 4, 1982); A. G. Gagnon "L'Influence de l'Eglise sur l'evolution socio-economique du Quebec, de 1850-1950" in *L'Action Nationale* 1979 49(4).

<sup>5</sup> BRITISH COLUMBIA: Maria Tippett and Douglas Cole *From Desolation to Splendor: Changing Perceptions of the British Columbia Landscape* (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1977); Jean Barman *Growing up British in British Columbia: Boys in Private School* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1984); Jean Friesen *William*

*Duncan of Metlakatla: A Victorian Missionary in British Columbia* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1974); David Mulhall *Will to Power: The Missionary Career of Father Morice* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1986); Claude Levi-Strauss *The Way of the Masks* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1982, trans.); Bill Holm *Smokey-top: The Art and Times of Willie Seaweed* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1983); Donald N. Abbott *The World as Sharp as a Knife* (Victoria: British Columbia Provincial Museum, 1981); Bill Hom *Northwest Coast Indian Art* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1965); John Cove *Shattered Images: Dialogues and Meditations on Tsimshian Narratives* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1987); Hugh Brody *Maps and Dreams* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1981); Robin Riddington *Trail to Heaven* (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1988); Douglas Cole *Captured Heritage: The Scramble for Northeast Coast Artifacts* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1985); Douglas Dole *The Journals of George M. Dawson* (1989).

<sup>6</sup>PRAIRIE PROVINCES: Howard Palmer *Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); C.B. Macpherson *Democracy in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1953); W.E. Mann *Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta* (1955); Doug Owram *Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West 1856-1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980); C.A. Dawson and E.R. Young *Pioneering in the Prairie Province: The Social Side of the Settlement Process* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1940); W.L. Morton *The Progressive Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1955); Roger Gibbins *Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980); David Smith "Political Culture in the West" in *Eastern and Western Perspectives*, eds. D.J. Bercuson and P.A. Buckner (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Susan Jackel (ed.) *A Flannel Shirt and Liberty: British Emigrant Gentlewomen in the Canadian West, 1880-1914* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1982); Ian Macpherson *Each for All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979); George Melnyk *The Search for Community: From Utopia to Co-operative Society* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1985); J. William Brennan "Building the Co-operative Commonwealth" in *Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1984); Seymour Lipset *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California, 1971); John H. Thompson *The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); Dick Yarrise *Painted Country: The Struggle for a Canadian Prairie Fiction* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1977); Ken Young *Land of Earth and Sky: Landscape Painting of Western Canada* (Saskatoon: Western Producer, 1988); Ken Young *Green and Naked Land: Making the Prairie Home* (Saskatoon: Western Producer, 1988); Keith Walden *Order of Order: The Canadian Mounties in Symbol and Myth* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); R. Douglas Lewis *Images of the West: Responses to the Canadian Prairies, 1690-1960* (Saskatoon: Western Producer, 1987).

<sup>7</sup>MARITIME PROVINCES: Margaret Conrad (ed.) *They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada* (Fredericton: Acadiensis, 1988); E.R. Forbes *The Maritime Rights Movement* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1979); Kenneth Donovan (ed.) *Cape Breton at 200* (Sydney: University College of Cape Breton, 1985); V. Smitheram, D. Milne and S. Satadal (eds.) *The Garden Transformed: Prince Edward Island, 1945-1980* (Charlottetown: Ragweed, 1982); G.A. Rawlyk and G. Stewart *A People Highly Favoured by God: The Nova Scotia Yankees and the American Revolution* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972); Barry M. Moody (ed.) *Repent and Believe: The Baptist Experience in Maritime Canada* (Hantsport: Lancelot, 1980); J.M. Bumstead *Henry Alline, 1748-1784* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971); G.A. Rawlyk *Ravished by the Spirit: Religious Revivals, Baptists and Henry Alline* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1984); Laurie Stanley *The Well-Watered Garden: The Presbyterian Church in Cape Breton, 1798-1860* (Sydney: University College of Cape Breton, 1983); H. Halpert and G.M. Story (eds.) *Christmas Mumming in Newfoundland* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969); Gerald M. Sider *Culture and Class in Anthropology and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986). For a more detailed review of journal articles too extensive to include here see J. Fingard "Ideas on the Periphery or Peripheral Ideas?" in *Journal of Canadian Studies* 1989 24(3).

<sup>8</sup>EDUCATION: Some literature I have already cited are not included here and can be found in the reference section. The literature in the field is quite extensive and the above representation is not intended to be comprehensive. Alan Metcalfe *Canada Learns to Play: The Emergence of Organized Sport, 1807-1914* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987). E.B. Titley, (ed) *Canadian Education: Historical Themes and Contemporary Issues*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1990); J. Gaskell, A. McLaren and M. Novogrodsky. *Claiming an Education: Feminism and Canadian Schools*. (Toronto: Our Schools Our Selves, 1989). J. Barman, J., Y. Herbert and D. McCaskill (eds.) *Indian Education in Canada: (Volume I) The Legacy & (Volume II) The Challenge* (Vancouver: UBC, 1986); F. Forman, F., M. O'Brien, J. Haddad, D. Hallman, and P. Masters (eds.) *Feminism and Education: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: Centre for Women's Studies in Education OISE, 1990); Celia Haig-Brown, *Celia Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian Residential School*. (Vancouver: Tillacum, 1988); D. Jones, N. Sheehan and R. Stamp (eds). *Shaping the Schools of the Canadian West*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1979); N. Kach and

K. Mazurek (eds.) *Exploring Our Educational Past*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1992); N. Kach, K. Mazurek, R. Patterson and I. DeFaveri (eds.) *Essays on Canadian Education*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1986); L. Lind and S. Prentice *Their Rightful Place: Children, Families and Childcare in Canada*. (Toronto: Our Schools Our Selves, 1991); P. Rooke and R. Schnell *Studies in Childhood History: A Canadian Perspective*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1982); N. Sheehan, N., J. Wilson and D. Jones (eds.) *Schools in the West: Essays in Canadian Educational History*. (Calgary: Detselig, 1986); Charles E. Phillips *The Development of Education in Canada* (Toronto: Gage, 1957); J.D. Wilson, R. M. Stamp, and Louis-Phillippe Audet (ed.) *Canadian Education: A History* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1970). D. W. Livingstone (ed.) (1987) *Critical Pedagogy and Cultural Power* (Massachusetts: Bergin Garvey, 1987); T. Wotherspoon (ed.) *The Political Economy of Canadian Schooling*. (Toronto: Methuen, 1987).

<sup>9</sup> HIGHER EDUCATION: Since higher education is an important focus for this study, many of these have already been cited earlier and can be found in the reference section. I have not included a complete list. Robin S. Harris *A History of Higher Education in Canada 1663-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1976); C. P. Snow "The Humanities and Modern Sciences: Two Cultures or One?" Symposium II, National Council of Colleges and Universities of Canada *Proceedings* (1960: 39-65); S. D. Clark "Sociology in Canada: An Historical Overview" in *Canadian Journal of Sociology* (1975); S. D. Clark "The Changing Image of Sociology in English-speaking Canada" in *Canadian Journal of Sociology* (1979 4(4) 393-403); R. Brym and B. Fox *From Culture to Power* (Toronto: Oxford, 1989); J. Trent and P. Lamy *Global Crisis and the Social Sciences: North American Perspectives* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1984); T. Wotherspoon (ed.) *Hitting the Books: The Politics of Educational Retrenchment*. (Toronto: Garamond, 1991); Rene Hurtubise and Donald Rowat *The University, Society and Government* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1970); Science Council of Canada *The Role of Federal Government Support of Research in Canadian Universities* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969); R. Mathews and J. Steele (eds.) *The Struggle for Canadian Universities* (Toronto, 1969); S. Whyte "Sociology and the Nationalist Challenge" in *Journal of Canadian Studies* 1984-85 19(4); Stephan Clarkson "Anti-Nationalism in Canada: The Ideology of Mainstream Economics" in *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 1978 5(1); L. A. Knafla, M.S. Staum, T. Tavers (eds.) *Science, Technology and Culture in Historical Perspective* (Calgary); Maria Tippett *Making Culture: English Canadian Institutions and the Arts Before the Massey Commission* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990); Paul Litt *The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992). Marlene Shore *The Science of Social Redemption -- McGill, the Chicago School and the Origins of Social Research in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1987); Doug Owram *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State in Canada 1900-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1986); A. B. McKillop *The Disciplined Intelligence* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1979); S.E.D. Shortt *The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals* (Toronto: Toronto University, 1976); M. Brook Taylor *Promoters, Patriots, and Parisians: Historiography in Nineteenth-Century English Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1989); Alison Prentice *The School Promoters: Education and Social Class in Mid-Nineteenth Century Upper Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

<sup>10</sup> BIOGRAPHICAL SAMPLING: Philip Marchand *Marshall McLuhan: The Medium and the Messenger* (Toronto: Random House, 1989); Gordana Lazarevitch *The Musical World of Frances James and Murray Adaskin* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1987); Otto Friedrich *Glenn Gould: a Life and Variations* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen, 1989). These are only a few examples from a quite extensive literature.

<sup>11</sup> MEDIA SAMPLING: William Dendy and William Kilbourn *Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Its Patron and History* (Don Mills: Oxford University, 1986); Kelly Crossman *Architecture in Transition: From Art to Practice, 1885-1906* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1987); Herschel Hardin *Closed Circuits: The Sellout of Canadian Television* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1985); Morris Wolfe *You Are what You Watch: The TV Wasteland and the Canadian Oasis* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985); Paul Rutherford *A Victorian Authority: the Daily Press in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1982); Paul Rutherford *The Making of the Canadian Media* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978); W. H. Melody, L. Salter, and P. Heyer (eds.) *Culture, Communication, and Dependency: the Tradition of H.A. Innis* (Norwood: Ablex, 1981); Rowland Lorimer and Donald Wilson (eds.) *Communication Canada: Issues in Broadcasting and New Technologies* (Toronto: Kagan Woo, 1988); I. Parker, J. Hutcheson and P. Crawley (eds.) *The Strategy of Canadian Culture in the 21st Century* (Toronto: TopCat, 1988); Linda Hutcheon *The Canadian Postmodern: A Study of Contemporary English-Canadian Fiction* (Toronto: Oxford University, 1988); Graham Parker *The Beginning of the Book Trade in Canada* (Toronto: Toronto University, 1985). For a more comprehensive review of this literature see A. B. McKillop "Culture, Intellect, and Context" in *Journal of Canadian Studies* 1989 24 (3).

<sup>12</sup> FEMINISM, LABOUR AND SOCIALISM STUDIES: Many of these studies could have been included in other categories. Related studies which I have already cited are not included here. The list is not comprehensive. Bryan D. Palmer (ed.) *The Character of Class Struggle: Essays in Canadian Working-Class History* (Toronto: McClelland



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# Chapter Four

## Rethinking the Sociology of Canadian Intellectuals

Our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement -- the real depiction -- of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or the present. (Marx and Engels [1846] 1965: 39)

At any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools circles and so forth, all given bodily form. These "languages" of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying "languages." (Bakhtin 1981: 291)

### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter proposes that the Canadian intelligentsia and their practices are best understood through a methodological synthesis of history and sociology provided by a reconstructed historical materialism. In Chapter Two I described and criticized the major theoretical approaches to intellectual practice. At the end of Chapter Two I described how the intellectual regulation of discourse could be considered a class power and I offered a method of discourse analysis for analyzing that power. In Chapter Three I identified the impoverishment of the Canadian tradition on four points: (1) a colonial approach to research, (2) a myopic approach to social development theory, (3) an inadequate approach to class and ideology and (4) a fragmented body of substantive research. In this chapter I offer one means to enrich the Canadian approach to cultural studies. I proceed on three fronts directly related to intellectual practice. First, I claim that the Canadian intelligentsia should be considered a distinctive social class implicated in class struggle. Second, I claim that the analysis of intellectual practice should include an analysis of the social *production* of meaning. Third, I claim that the perspectives of critical theory offer the best means to overcome the obstacles of the impoverished Canadian tradition. The chapter ends by explicating a method of discourse analysis based on critical theory and depth hermeneutics. This chapter completes the methodological and theoretical requirements of the analysis of intellectual power and the signification of meaning in *Toward 2000 Together*.

### 4.2. Critical Assessments for Analyzing Education

The most advanced critical theory and research into the *postmodern* intelligentsia and the hegemonic functions of ideology have been developed in the sociology of education.<sup>68</sup> Little of this theory and research has been assimilated in Canada outside of educational circles or inside the critical sociology community (e.g. Li and Bolaria 1993; Nock and Nelson 1993). Communications and culture studies, though, are exceptions (*Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 28 [2] 1991; Finley 1987; Morrow and Brown 1993). From the accumulated work in the sociology of education, Michael Apple's (1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1986, 1993) contribution to a hegemonic analysis of education, ideology,

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<sup>68</sup>Apple 1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1986, 1993; Apple and Weis 1983; Aronowitz 1988, 1990, 1992a; Aronowitz and Giroux 1985, 1991; Erwin and MacLennan 1994; Giroux 1983, 1988, 1991, 1992; Giroux and McLaren 1994; Lather 1991; Livingstone 1983, 1987; Luke and Gore 1992; Wexler 1987.

power and official knowledge deserves closer attention. His theoretical insights about intellectual practices have applicability beyond "schooling" to the broader societal processes of socialization and ideological *production*.

Apple and L. Weis (1983) presented an early model for understanding the dimensions of *ideological production* as a dynamic interaction of gender, race and class and as a mediation between economic, political and cultural spheres. Although this model has been criticized for harbouring residual structuralism and American ethnocentrism (Apple 1993; Kachur 1988), it nevertheless offers an improvement over current Canadian approaches to the intelligentsia based on the analytical and structuralist assumptions of social reproduction theory (Cuneo 1993) or the economic correspondence principle (Nock and Nelson 1993). My earlier critique in Chapter Two of Wright (1978, 1985) and Chomsky (1967, 1978, 1938, 1989) also apply here. In conjunction with the early assumptions of Apple and Weis, Panitch et al. (1977) were the first Canadians to draw on the common framework provided by James O'Connor (1973, 1984) concerning the state's basic contradictory functions -- *accumulation and legitimation*. The common link between Panitch and Apple provides an important starting point for reconsidering the Canadian state and intellectuals (Miliband and Panitch 1990, 1992) in light of more recent developments in the sociology of education (e.g. Apple 1993; Erwin and MacLennan 1994; Giroux 1992).

Apple and Weis (1983: 25) claim that each sphere of social life is constituted by the dynamics of class, race and gender and each one of these dynamics can be found as a set of *internal relations* in each of the economic, political and cultural spheres. Their major point is that in considering the complex interconnections among the *histories* of class, race and gender oppressions, there is a relational quality to ideology consisting in overlaps between spheres and in contradictions at the level of *internal relations*. This relational dynamic, they argue, makes ideological analyses a complicated endeavor since unpacking one ideological dynamic (e.g. gender) is a large task in itself, and integrating more than one dynamic is exceptionally hard. In the case study of *Toward 2000 Together*, I map the social relations across the economic, political and cultural spheres and focus on the class dynamic. In my analysis of class, I focus on the *historical* and *internal relations* of intellectual practice and not on the *a priori* applications of an abstract definition of class -- as might Wright, Cuneo and Chomsky. The significance of this theoretical turn is to view class as a specific form of historical agency and not merely as an *a priori* analytical category to be applied for statistical purposes.

Apple and Weis (1983) summarize the educational research on hegemony. Research (on schooling) shows that three hegemonic "functions" are at work: (1) assisting in capital accumulation, (2) assisting in the legitimation of the social order and (3) assisting in the production process. Apple and Weis's understanding of schooling offers a reorientation for understanding the functioning of ideology that goes beyond schooling to include higher education and the more general intellectual practices of "public" education, or what J.S. Mill called "government," the normal schooling of the people (see Curtis 1992).

First, schooling assists in the process of capital accumulation by providing some of the necessary conditions for recreating an unequally responsive economy by internally sorting and selecting students by "talent." The objectification of subjective characteristics (which are attributes of the specific cultural forms of dominant groups) means that students are stratified according to different race, sex and class characteristics. While schools respond in this way, this does not mean that the socialized body of students are strictly and mechanistically the product of employer needs but rather only one site of struggle between different classes, races and sexes over control of the socialization process.

Second, schooling assists as an agency of legitimation. Schools not only function to reproduce the dominant ideologies, they are actively participant in creating them. The primary ideology which has been constructed in this process has been the idea that schools, as meritocratic agencies, reflect the movement of society toward social and economic justice. These legitimation processes are not solely concerned with legitimating the economic and political structure but also in legitimating schooling and state formation itself. The close connection between schooling and the state means that people involved in governance and bureaucratic relations have an interest in maintaining and expanding their own power. Expansion of state and educational power need not necessarily conform to the needs of the capitalists or the popular classes, but may contradict those interests in favour of the intellectual classes. The mediations between state, school, business and community are complex. The legitimation processes cannot be predetermined in either their nature or effects without historical analysis.

Finally, education as a whole constitutes an important set of agencies for production. The post-World War II mode of production, distribution and consumption requires high levels of technical/administrative knowledge for the expansion of markets, defense, the creation and stimulation of new consumer needs, the control and division of labour, the need for communicative and technical innovations that will increase market share, accumulation, or cultural control. Here higher education is crucial for producing such knowledge. The socialized costs of creating research and development centers as well as training of expert employees who can produce and use the technically useful knowledge in science-based and cultural industries make the state-higher education link important.

Furthermore, technical/administrative knowledge plays another legitimating role by promoting "technicist" ideologies whereby questions of "why?" are transformed into questions of "how to?" This question is about how instrumental ideologies replace ethical and political awareness and debate. Having said this, it is important to remember that the reproductive model has a tendency to recolonize Gramsci's hegemonic narrative as a variant of "economism" or the rigid base-superstructure model. Apple (1976, 1982, 1986, 1993) has been well aware of this problematic and has tried to emphasize otherwise even in recent formulations of educational practices. To analyze intellectual practices as a form of social action assisting in capital accumulation, in the legitimation in the production process, I must further specify what I mean by intellectual practice as a form of class action.

#### **4.3. An "Intellectual Class" in Canada?**

One of the most contentious issues this dissertation raises is that "the intelligentsia," and "intellectuals" as a special case of the intelligentsia, *should be considered* a social class in the "Marxist" sense of the word. This claim can be justified in two ways: theoretical or methodological. First, the theoretical justification would make a strong case. I would have to show that the conception of the intelligentsia as a class is in keeping with the Marxist or a Marxist theoretical tradition. *It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to make this strong case by taking such a complicated and complex digression*, although I do believe this immanent critique is both necessary and possible. *I am also not willing to entertain this theoretical claim at this moment* simply because it would contradict Gramsci's argument that the intelligentsia formed a strata not a class. To do so would thus undermine my theoretical position established in Chapter Two. Second, the methodological justification would only have to make a weak case. This latter procedure is sufficient for this dissertation. *It is sufficient to hypothesize that the "intelligentsia" may now be a social class in this contemporary period defined as postmodern.* I claim no more. In this case, I posit that whether the intelligentsia is a social class or not is an *empirical question*. A

legitimate defence of this position would merely justify that my *method* was in keeping with *Marx's historical materialism*. In this case, whether the intelligentsia form a class or not is not based on either the Marxist theoretical tradition concerning classes or the substantive research heretofore. Whether *Toward 2000 Together* empirically demonstrates the need to retheorize intellectuals as class I leave to the conclusion. As such, my position offers a third point of view on the intelligentsia that distinguishes itself from the *theoretical* debates that have been the tradition in Canadian critical sociology (Cuneo 1993). This latter debate has been framed as one between E. O. Wright's (1978, 1985) treatment of the intelligentsia as an intermediate class between capital and labour and Barbara and John Ehrenreich's (1979) treatment of the intelligentsia as a new middle class. This narrow framing of the issue is part of a larger debate on the conception of the intelligentsia as a class (see Bottomore et al. 1983: 74). My differences, though, not only concern theoretical points concerning the intelligentsia but also methodological differences concerning how to approach the historical material. This dissertation finds these theories based on faulty methodological assumptions derived from positivist assumptions. Their analytical *a priori*s are useful but inadequate. I would like to distance myself from these positions and treat them as counter-hypotheses.

With the above clarifications in mind, *my theoretical claim would be that the intelligentsia is neither intermediate nor new but a social class with distinctive relational characteristics to other classes and the means of production. As a historical materialist postulate, though, its correctness as a hypothesis depends on empirical verification and not an orthodox authorial assertion of analytical correctness.* In this *methodological* sense, my claim is in keeping with Gramsci and Marx's fundamental methodological principle that the historical analysis of social relations should determine the scientific development of analytical constructs rather than vice versa (Bhaskar 1975, 1979, 1986, 1989; Gramsci 1971; Habermas 1979; Marx 1973 [1857]; Marx and Engels 1965 [1846]; Sayer 1979, 1984). My conclusions about the nature of the intelligentsia as a class in the contemporary period may thus contradict conclusions by Marx and Gramsci without doing violence to their method used in a different historical period. It was through a similar kind of analysis of the Fordist regime of capitalism at the turn of the century that Gramsci was able to modify the conceptual constructs of Marxism and introduce new ideas about the exercise of hegemony and the intelligentsia as a strata. It is through this kind of approach to *postmodern* capitalism that the intelligentsia as a class should be considered. In this latter defense I need only a *sufficient* case. I achieve this sufficiency by remaining true to Marx's method for analyzing *the historical nature of social relations* rather than drawing on the definitional authority of one of many Marxist traditions about the nature of the intelligentsia and a theory of social classes. My theoretical claim, then, is that the intelligentsia are a class because they have two distinctive characteristics that define social classes in the Marxist sense: (1) the intelligentsia has *a distinctive relationship* to other classes and the means of production and (2) the intelligentsia has *a distinctive qualitative power* based on the *cultural production of the symbolic order* and is not reducible to occupational categorization or statistical quantification.

The rest of this section deals with the distinctive relationships exhibited by the intelligentsia. Recent trends in history and sociology do show an increased interest in the social origins and actions of the intelligentsia -- whether this interest will remain mired in writing "transparent" intellectual biography or different forms of structuralism is another question. Intellectual practice is constituted by three kinds of knowledge interests (Habermas 1971). These knowledge interests can be further divided by the kinds of worlds they refer to: the natural world, the social world; and the personal world (Habermas

1984, 1987a). In discussing intellectual practice, thus, the "educated middle class," "cultural bourgeoisie" or "new intellectual class," may be identified by their institutionalized relations with other classes but also *by* the kind of knowledge they are *interested* in. This intellectual class I have categorized in total as the *intelligentsia* has special characteristics which distinguish it from what has been traditionally treated as either the *petit bourgeoisie* (see e.g. Veltmeyer 1986) or an *intermediary class* characterized by its contradictory location within the class structure between capital and labour (see e.g. E.O. Wright 1985). Rather, the *intelligentsia* should be situated in a class position distinguishable from either the classical bourgeoisie, the *petit bourgeoisie*, the working class or intermediary classes. The reason I say this is twofold: (1) the nature of the *intelligentsia's* production and (2) the *intelligentsia's* special social relationship to the state.

Let me clarify. The commodities which the *intelligentsia* produce are called "services" (see Larson 1977). Service production functions according to a different economy than other forms of commodity production in that "services" also circulate as "gifts" and can only retain intellectual value by being "given away" (see Pefanis 1991). Much like circulating in a "kula ring" or "potlach relations," knowledge cannot be privately hoarded to remain "knowledge." The *intelligentsia* thus require what Eric Wolf (1982) calls a "tributary mode of production," and he summarizes the attributes of tribute relations: "social labour is, under these conditions, mobilized and committed to the transformation of nature primarily through the exercise of power and domination -- through a political process. Hence, the deployment of social labor is, in this mode, a function of the locus of political power; it will differ as this locus shifts position" (ibid.: 80). Power and domination, in the case of the *intelligentsia*, is exercised by the "gift" of knowledge and the *intelligentsia's* monopoly over the competency to provide "information." Unlike non-intellectual products, then, intellectual products can only increase their value for domination in accordance with their circulation through exchanges. More exchange indicates more cultural value. When intellectual products are exchanged as capitalist "commodities" they thus embody a double nature, that of a commodity form and that of a tributary form.

Second, because of its special commodity nature as an "abstraction" such as "health service," "education service" or "information service" etc., the production of intellectual commodities requires the double-mediation of the state. Where the other classes require only single-mediation to sanction their private property rights to accumulate, the *intelligentsia* require yet another state sanctioned right to protect their property. They need to monopolize the exchange of their abstract "good"; that is, the *intelligentsia* require the "professional right" to retain a monopoly over an intellectual competency. Professional "value" can only be maintained by appropriating the right to define "expertise." The state is required to sanction the monopolization of "credential" production which standardizes competency and limits expertise to a select few. I am talking about use value not merely as material value but also as symbolic value. "Expertise" has no value if everyone has it. The shorter the supply the higher the value. What makes professionals different (and most of the *intelligentsia* today are legitimated as credentialed professionals *via* higher education) is that while the "credential" is treated as materialized expertise it must also circulate freely as a marketable commodity called "information service." This latter "abstract" expertise must be monopolized through the credentialing process and requires state intervention in the market to make it possible. *For the intelligentsia to retain the value of their products, they require that the state sanction their contradictory demands for the maximization of value: (1) complete exchange, that is, a free market to maximize the exchange of information and (2) complete monopoly, that is, a maximized monopoly over the private possession of*

*expertise*. The practices of *laissez faire* and *professionalism* are contradictory not because the intelligentsia is a "contradictory class" between capitalist owners and wage labourers, but because its practical interests are contradictory and internal to the class as a whole. These interests may be accommodated to each other but not without creating real tensions, subordinations and ambiguous effects. Similarly, their identification with other classes has the potential to create unpredictable alliances. The members of the intelligentsia, thus, cannot be viewed as workers, capitalists or half-worker/half-capitalists without doing some violence to the unique nature of their practices. This is not to say that all members of the intelligentsia should be considered a distinctive class or that the intelligentsia cannot be transformed from petty commodity producers to wage labourers or cultural capitalists. It is to say, though, that if some members of the intelligentsia form a distinctive class or if such a social transformation has taken place, it would be a category error to conflate those who work with the production of symbols with those who do not, or for that matter assume that all "information" workers "work" with symbols. In other words, it might well be time to theoretically reconsider the traditional interpretations of intellectual practice.

My distinction between the intelligentsia and the traditional conceptions of the petite bourgeoisie and proletariat is in keeping (but not identical) with an alternate class model proposed by Nicholas Abercrombie and John Urry (1983). They also argue that the educated middle class be viewed as a separate service class from deskilled white-collar labour. In the contemporary context members of the intelligentsia have become increasingly professionalized and in many cases have gained limited control over their own reproductive system based on monopolizing the credentialling of competencies represented by the expansion of the nation-state and higher education (Collins 1979; Derber, Schwartz & Magrass; Larson 1977; Murphy 1988). In contemporary Canadian capitalism, this control is limited and subordinated to the global market, that is *professionalism* and the mode of intellectual tribute is here subordinated but not necessarily congruent with *laissez faire*. An historical analysis of class politics in Canada must distinguish the unique interests and actions of this intelligentsia and the development of and challenges to state-sanctioned credentialling. Conclusions about the nature of the intelligentsia and the form of their functioning cannot be assumed *a priori* as is done by analytical and/or structural Marxism. Empirical analyses informed by theoretical debates should be the final arbiter in the identification of a "knowledge class."

Based on Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich's analytical typology for the "new middle class," Carl J. Cuneo (1993) has divided the contemporary Canadian intelligentsia into five factions and each faction is defined by different knowledge interests, relationship to the state and other classes. In 1971, this "new middle class" constituted 20.8% of the employed population. By 1986, though, this class had risen to 24.6% of the employed population. Cuneo designates (1) approximately 1/2 of this class as *policy enforcers*, such as managers, administrators and officials whose main work is control and surveillance through the direct supervision of workers. (2) He designates approximately 1/25 of this class as *repressive enforcers*, such as judges, police and prison guards whose main work is not direct supervision of workers but indirect supervision through the use or threatened use of legitimate violence in the form of arrests, judicial sentencing and imprisonment. (3) He designates approximately 1/10 of this class as *material reproducers*, such as physicists, chemists, engineers and architects whose work is to create and sustain the inanimate forces of production in the form of roads, buildings, technologies and raw materials. (4) He designates approximately 1/10 of this class as *physical reproducers*, such as registered nurses, surgeons, veterinarians, and biologists whose work is to sustain the animate forces of production in caring for people and animals. And (5) he designates approximately 1/4 of

this class as *ideological reproducers* such as social workers, teachers, librarians, writers, ministers, and artists who create and maintain the dominant ideas, attitudes and feelings of legitimacy.

Using Cuneo's occupational categorization as a starting point but keeping my clarifications in mind, a look back at the history of the "educated middle class" reveals the growth in numbers and percentage of the Canadian population. As already described, from 1971 to 1986, the intelligentsia have grown in total percentage of the employed population from 21% to 25%. Also, in this contemporary period, women are underrepresented in the intelligentsia but this differential gap with men has narrowed. The total number who constitute the intelligentsia is also growing. This growth of the intelligentsia also positively correlates with the growth and expansion of post-secondary education (especially university education) and the requirements for professional credentialling offered by universities. Recently, though, the reproduction of this class has faced a shrinking occupational structure driving down the value of credentials. The ideological and political outcome of this effect is unpredictable (See Hay & Basran 1991; Schrimpton 1987). The "long-term" growth does not account for qualitative changes in this transition-retrenchment period which has created new kinds of programming, new kinds of differential effects, and differential payoffs in a more restricted labour market with credential inflation.

While Cuneo's analytical and structuralist presumptions do prescribe certain inherent functions to each faction in the reproduction of capitalist culture and class relations (conclusions I have omitted), he also concedes that these functions are contested and may be counter-hegemonic. But as *a priori* categories how would such a challenge be described or empirically verified? Analytical and structural Marxism lack an approach to agency (Craib 1984; Giddens 1987; Sayer 1987). As descriptive rather than explanatory categories, though, this description of the class structure for the intelligentsia is useful but lacks the theoretical power to understand the functioning of intellectual agency. As a *heuristic device* for explaining the dynamic of a capitalist society, Cuneo's categories are not useful for two reasons that have to do with the limitations of structuralist theory and empiricist methods of quantification. First, *power for the intelligentsia is not merely a matter of counting bodies but is also based on the "quality" of the narratives they produce and reproduce*. It is this power which Gramsci (1971) noted belonged to the middle strata and provided the strength of hegemony. Knowledge/power is the complement to class/power as a qualitative aspect and a theory of ideological reception. The commodities (texts) that the intelligentsia produce and reproduce are "fantasies," that is, the service they provide are images of what people were, are or can be. The question about whether these fantasies, stories, or images are real or not is best left to the philosophical speculators. I am not interested in whether a fantasy is "real" or not. As an historical sociologist, I treat fantasies as "real" when people take them to be real and act accordingly. For example, whether "God" is a "Calvinist" or a "Muslim" or whether "Society" is constituted by "classes" or "individuals" is irrelevant. What is relevant is that people act accordingly when they believe these representations are true. The "meaning" of these fantasies are thus variable and ambiguous and the power of fantasy depends on the way others are moved by their reception. Second, *the power of the intelligentsia is internally differentiated by hierarchy within its own ranks*. This hierarchy sanctions who and how creative storytelling will be produced. There are those who make the rules and those who follow the rules. The power of a faction, thus, cannot be determined simply by a quantification of numbers. The researcher must distinguish and analyze this rule-making power. Furthermore, these internal hierarchies are not just a matter of degree but also of kind. The



differentials in power between producing (creating) versus reproducing (transmitting) fantasy are important.

In distinguishing the transmission of knowledge from the production of knowledge, I would like to designate the elite producers of knowledge/power as a sixth category which cuts "horizontally" across Cuneo's factions. The elite of the intelligentsia are the *intellectuals or ideological producers*, that is, the creators of fantasy and the rules of fantasy creation in each faction. Of course, this typological distinction which poses ideological reproducer against producer cannot be reduced to a single category of any structuralist assumption prescribing social function. *In practice, and by this definition, all the intelligentsia in some way produce and reproduce ideology.*

Thus John Porter (1965: 493) in *The Vertical Mosaic* is incorrect to conceptualize the humanities as ideological, the natural sciences as not and the social sciences as somewhere in between. By presupposing that a continuum runs from the ideological and subjective to the empirical and objective, Porter misinterprets Karl Mannheim's theory of ideology and reproduces one of the fundamental ideological presuppositions of Common Sense ideology. The assumptions and social uses of natural science *do* inform political practice in fundamental ways. Those who follow Porter on this kind of conceptualization are bound to miss some of the most fundamental *political* influences legitimated in the name of the empirical and objective.

Scientists are never merely scientists. Even the claim to objectivity is itself ideological as a claim of *professionalism* and has political uses when *expertise* is used to legitimate social authority. Gordon's (1984) "The Image of Science, Technological Consciousness, and the Hidden Curriculum" and Popkewitz's (1985) "Intellectuals, Sciences, and Pedagogies: Critical Traditions and Instrumental Cultures" are just two examples of what Porter's approach misses. Another example is related to the regulation of health. Physicians construct new images of what the "body" is, they reproduce images of the body, they participate publicly in enunciating these images, and they regulate the embodiment of others whether working in their clinics and hospitals or on political commissions and boards of public health. Some recent studies in this area concerning Canada, England and the USA are Angus McLaren's (1990) *Our Own Master Race*, Ogburn's (1993) "Law and Discipline in Nineteenth Century English State Formation: The Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866 and 1869," and Trent's (1993) "To Cut and Control: Institutional Preservation and the Sterilization of Mentally Retarded People in the United States, 1892-1947." The abstractions of architects, engineers, biologists, physicists and others *are also* ideological because they intend to *master* the world, that is, dominate nature, including human nature. The study of knowledge/power, then, cannot be reduced to a structural typification of class/power or to a statistical analysis of occupational categorizations. In this way knowledge/power theory does not displace class/power theory, but rather supplements it. In distinction to Porter, Stanley Aronowitz (1992a) makes an important point about this process of typifying intellectual practice and conceiving of the relationship between knowledge/power and class/power: "Although theory must articulate the categories of analysis prior to a concrete historically specific investigation, the relations among these categories are not, *a priori*, determined. *In this discussion of intellectuals we are obliged to observe the same rule: whether intellectuals form a class or a social category is always an empirical question once the elements of class formation are stated*" (128 emphasis added).

The intelligentsia as a class has a distinctive qualitative power not reducible to numerical quantification or occupational categorization. This claim, I argue, is sufficient to establish an empirical challenge to class models based on pre-given analytical categories. The social

reproduction of ideology is inadequate as a heuristic instrument to comprehend the *cultural production of the symbolic order* in the contemporary period. I now leave sociological considerations of class behind to argue that a historical materialist analysis of the intelligentsia also requires challenging the way historians understand the production of the symbolic order.

#### **4.4. Ignored Problematics in the Signification of Meaning**

This section pushes forward the second front in establishing the claim for an historical materialist approach to intellectual practice. Here, I claim that the analysis of intellectuals should include an analysis of *the social production of meaning*, and that this analysis must take into consideration the body of criticism directed at the "reflection theory" of ideological reproduction and production. I focus on the "textual" problems which are more or less ignored in the Canadian history tradition and significantly undermines researchers' ability to comprehend intellectual practice. When I speak of a "reflection theory," I am speaking of the routinization of a discursive field of research now inadequate to the task of decolonization, and, furthermore, of a practicing Canadian intelligentsia (historians, sociologists, philosophers) who are unwilling to recognize that, in the words of Michel Foucault (1972a), they "are governed by rules that are not all given to their consciousness" (211). These governing rules of "reflection theory" form part of the conceptual apparatus that I have called into question earlier, that is, the "clerking mentality." First, I formulate a general critique of the clerking mentality in favour of a dialogical approach to culture. Second, I identify six problematics immanent to historical analysis of the symbolic order. Thus, this critique lays the basis for proposing an historical materialist method to analyze intellectual practice in the final section of the chapter.

The historical and social scientific study of intellectual practice in Canada has been described in a variety of ways as a combination of science and art. The paradigms of science and art which Canadian academics refer to, though, are *pre-twentieth-century*. In Hayden White's (1978) critique of intellectual history, he writes that "When historians claim that history is a combination of science and art, they generally mean that it is a combination of *late-nineteenth century* social science and *mid-nineteenth century* art" (43). By this, White means that historians and social scientists believe that their major purpose is to tell a story. Furthermore, these 19th century narratives share a set of rules about what constitutes a legitimate story: (1) a precritical conception of "facts" as the atomistic baseline of history, that is, the ultimate "givens" of a narrative; (2) a marginalization of interpretation as "metahistory," far too speculative to be considered "proper" history; and (3) a reliance on "given" perceptually-based sense-making structures such as schematic models, metonymic causal mechanisms and/or the "emplotment" of events in a chronologically arranged story. In the last chapter I showed how this approach fragments Canadian research and divides researchers into disciplinary and ideological solitudes.

It is important to identify the assumptions which circulate concerning the nature of "facts" in Canadian historiography and social science. The basis to research can be simply described as a "documentary" approach rather than a "dialogical" approach to facts. The basis for documentary naivete' is that it assumes that what is inside a text (i.e., statements about the real world) and what is outside a text (i.e., the real world) can be neatly demarcated. What is problematic with this demarcation is that while it assumes there exists a dialogical relationship between texts, it also assumes that texts are not dialogically in the real world. Because the documentary approach assumes that texts are only *about* the real world, it also assumes that there is *no* dialogue between textual *statements* about the real

world and the *texture* of the real world. This latter demarcation is achieved by *conceiving* and idealizing an external referent called the "context."

Raymond Williams (1961) identifies the historical development of these contextual referents called "images." These images emerge as descriptions but become embedded in language as absolute existents. The "individual" and "society" emerge as inseparable elements out of the Renaissance, Reformation and the capitalist economy. By the seventeenth century conceptions of "community" and "State" also merge into "society" in conceptions such as "state of the nation" and "the King's state." It is in this latter period where "individual" is privileged in England, from Hobbes to the Utilitarians, as the fundamental "reality," as an absolute existent (see Macpherson 1962). Following Rousseau and Hegel, the interpenetration of "society" (and "community" or "State") and the "individual" is marked with the conception of the "self." Other mediating concepts such as "association," "corporation," and "class" also emerge and displace the more static concepts of "order" and "rank." These descriptions are absolutized to greater and lesser degrees depending on the socio-historical circumstance. By the end of the 19th century intellectual communities become organized around choosing a primary description as a fundamental basis for the "real."

The absolution of a description (i.e., image) as the fundamental referent and as "context" has only recently been challenged. The "context" problematic is created when an interpretation (description or image) of reality is conflated with reality itself. The realities of people's lived experience, the documentation of that experience and the explanation of that experience are three distinctive ways of living. The primary pathology of Canadian intellectual practice is to privilege the abstraction of the documenting experience and to mistake this documentation of experience (the abstract) for the experience itself (the concrete). Furthermore, theory is then marginalized for committing the sin of abstraction. The treatment of "context" in Canadian intellectual practice proceeds in this manner by treating an abstraction of "context" as the concrete reality when it is in fact only one form of many different kinds of abstraction. It is with this double abstraction in mind that "empiricism" can be called "inverted idealism" or the *metaphysic* of "abstract materialism." I call this intellectual practice the "fetishization of the fact."

In Canada, the privileging of "individual" or "individual values" as fact as well as the appeal to "context" (i.e., the complexes of "data," documents, observations, interviews etc.) as the final arbiter of fact is a deceptive escape which merely hypostatizes "individual," "context" and "texts" and fails to recognize that the meaning of fact is intersubjectively negotiated during communication (see J. Thompson 1981, 1984). The documentary tradition's failure to recognize that history and social science are fundamentally dialogical means that six problematics unknowingly undermine the validity and reliability of historical and social scientific findings.

Dominick LaCapra (1983) identifies six "problematics" that the history of intellectuals has insufficiently considered. I have used his typology to deal with the limitations of Canadian historiography. The first problematic which is ignored by researchers is the relation of authorial intention to text. Treating the contextual and textual relationship as non-dialogical, prevents the researcher from formulating an *explicit* question about the relationship between the intentions of those who provide(d) the "source data" (insofar as they can be plausibly reconstructed), and what the text may be argued to do or to disclose. Although, these intentions may be revealed during interrogation by the researcher and should be taken into account in any interpretation, they should not, in any narrow sense, be the ultimate criteria for ascribing validity. Intentions and performance may not conform to each other; a text may not do what it was intended to do.

The text may be used to perform a contradictory act to that intended by the author. For example, a statistical survey may be used to legitimate an alternate conclusion than the one intended by a statistician. This alternate usage cannot be understood by treating the statistician's intent as unproblematic. For example, the strongest claim by social scientists is that their research is "value neutral." Assuming that this "value neutrality" is plausible (a highly suspect claim itself), this does not mean that the use of the research will in any way conform to the intent of the author, that is, once the text enters into a field of power-relations beyond the personal control of the author. In this case, the "performance" of the text is as crucial for understanding as the meaning of the text which an author attributes to it. A "valid" interpretation must also account for both the *intentions* of the author and the variety of ways the text is *used*. Intent as context is highly problematic.

The second problematic which is ignored by Canadian researchers is the relation of the author's life to text. In determining the author's intent, a belief in the importance of the author's life presupposes a different context. In this case the context provides a relationship between the life of the author and the text. The author's life is used to explain intent. Reference to the context of "life" suggests that an author's motivation is a function of biography. The reduction of motivation to "biography" minimalizes a second problematic concerning the interpretation of that "biography."

The general problem in attempting to relate the text of a person's life (biography) to the intent of the textual language in making meaning usually results in a simple idea of identity of biography and ideas. This process does violence to both the complex meaning of the author's life and the circulation of his or her texts. The Canadian commitment in history to the "biographical method" in dealing with individuals and institutions (group biography) means reading texts within a simplified context of limited psycho-biography which privileges an individual's or institution's self-understanding as an accurate representation of reality. For example, the natural scientific claim that the scientific method is ideologically neutral cannot be taken as the true representation of the method without studying its social performance.

Furthermore, a researcher must always impute meaning from a limited selection of data. A researcher's more sophisticated inferences and secondary elaborations may in fact tell more about the psychology of the researcher, than the intellectual, the institution or the intellectual's texts themselves. A prime example are the histories of science written by scientists which are, more than not, disguised promotional packages for a scientific discipline. This criticism can also be leveled at most administrators writing about administration, historians writing about history and politicians writing about politics. For the most part, Canadian history has been written by patriots, partisans and promoters. This second problematic illustrates the importance of situating the researcher, author and author's text within the "context" of society.

The third problematic which is ignored by Canadian researchers is the relation of society to text. While it might seem a truism that an individual life cannot be understood without reference to society and *vice versa*, how this reference *is* made is just as important as *that* it is made. Canadian historiography based on the biographical method has had to respond to the rise in importance of social history. The recent return to intellectual history, which I reviewed earlier, emerged as a Whig reaction to inroads made by the social historians or the so-called "revisionists" who claimed a privileged referent in the context of geographic, demographic and economic materiality. In correctly identifying the limitations of documentary historiography based merely on intention and biography, the social historians still continued to privilege the documentary methodology. This new approach was most firmly established in Quebec with the introduction of the French *Annales* tradition

and provided a welcomed improvement to Canadian historiography. Nevertheless, the revisionist historians tend to essentialize the *social-structure* as a non-problematic conception of context. It is this essentialization of social-structure which has concerned post-structuralists such as Michel Foucault and cultural materialists such as Raymond Williams. Researchers in cultural studies have actively responded to come to terms with the essentialization of social structures in their various economic, political or cultural guises (see e.g. *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 1991: 28[2]; and Grossberg, Nelson and Treicher 1992).

The complex nature of the problematic relationship between social structure and textual intermediation is often ignored or displaced. Essentialization is the product of mistaking the canonical interpretations of a discipline for the "reality" of a social-structural referent. Reference to the hard fact of "society" or "social structure" (e.g., "class") is in fact a reference to the accepted assumptions of a disciplinary "canon." "Society" *is* what canonical interpretations say it is!

The canon is a complex series of readings and uses which undergo over time a process of legitimation whereby particular selective interpretations are domesticated and privileged. The legitimacy of a new interpretation must, therefore, confront and conform to an accepted interpretation residing in established description or image of what society *is*. A new interpretation is necessarily already situated within the layered and legitimate readings of a canon. The "context" here as "real society" exists in a strange land between the immediate text and the canonical texts which give "reality" its meaning and substance. The question of how societies and texts and their relations evolve is as much a question about how a canon evolves in reaction and adaptation to the interrogations of new texts. The genesis and impact of the dialogue between society as reality, context, and/or text is, to say the least, complex. A valid interpretation, though, must confront this complexity. The central implication is "What is considered 'real' in the canonization of a particular and selective interpretation?" This confrontation concerning how the canon is legitimated by another contextual problematic: "Who has the authority to pronounce knowledge?" A reference to social-structure as contextual explanation is to those people who have the cultural power to authorize the "reality" of the canon.

The problematic which is ignored by Canadian researchers is the relation of cultural power to different markets at different levels which can be typified as the abstract, "high" and "low" culture or "elite" and "mass" culture. In referential terms, the problematic, "canon" here means the "high culture" of official knowledge. The intermediate level can also be typified by those discourses which mediate between high and low culture. This over-generalization is not intended to evaluate any of these three levels as naturally superior to others, but rather to claim that texts are generated, digested, assimilated in different ways by different classes of people based on their interest and education. Furthermore, these levels are hierarchically ordered specific to a given socio-historical reality, but this ordering is open to a dramatic reconstitution. Social revolution, thus understood, is a reversal in what constitutes the *canon* or the *official interpretation* of the canon.

"Expertise" in reading the "primary" texts or sources acts as a supplement to the existing social reality by restricting social and historical inquiry to those who have an interest in and authority to do so. But further to this, expertise is not homogeneously constituted but rather differentiated into intellectual communities. Many of these expert communities are ambiguously related to popular cultural communities through the various media of money, force or language. Recently, this "cultural" problematic has been

identified as the contest between "paradigms" (see Aronowitz 1983; Hubner 1983; Keats and Urry 1975; Kuhn 1962). The researcher, in making a valid interpretation, must identify and document the existence of common presuppositions, questions, themes or arguments that provide the context for the text. The Quine-Duhem thesis regarding paradigms states that the entire theory, scientific methodology, mathematics and logic are "reality tested" in the "Web of Belief" of a scientific community. Further to this N. R. Hanson (1958) coined the term "theory-ladenness" in showing that the meaningfulness of a "fact" was not independent of the theory or language which informed it. It is meaningless, then, to speak of a concept-independent fact-observation when perception organizes and structures otherwise disconnected sensations. What this "paradigm" approach to "context" fails to identify, though, is how common symbols (e.g., ideas) function differentially in different texts and corpuses, how they are received in different intellectual communities (e.g., social sciences), how they are mediated by the intermediate strata (e.g., teachers) or how they are understood by the popular classes (e.g., retail clerks) (Fay 1987).

Cultural "modernization" was marked by the withdrawal of cultural elites from popular culture in a long-term process extending from 1500 to 1800. This withdrawal resulted in the "discovery" of "folk" culture, the exotic "history" which previously had been everyone's second culture. Before the withdrawal of elite culture, European culture was marked by the constant interplay of elite and popular culture in the festivities and celebrations which undermined cultural hierarchy. The Enlightenment repression of these carnivals, also cleared the way for innovative intellectual elites to challenge an established intellectual hierarchy by introducing "popular" cultural forms as the new bases for reinterpreting a canon (Bakhtin 1981). This overthrow of established hierarchical meanings cannot be accounted for by merely identifying a paradigm's assumptions when these very assumptions are continuously open to carnivalesque challenges by creative intellectuals. The paradigmatic approach to a naturalized and hierarchical cultural context remains problematic.

The fifth problematic which is ignored by Canadian researchers is the relation of a text to the corpus of a writer. Another problematic context categorizes innovative cultural transformations by attributing social innovation to a particular set of texts belonging to a particular "heroic" author (e.g., God, Man, Luther, Marx, Smith). The "context" provided by a body of texts raises important questions about the relationship of an author's texts to the texts of other writers as well as other texts of the same writer. At issue here is the presumed unity and identity of an author's corpus. In this case, who is the "heroic" intellectual and what will be considered a legitimate text *in* the corpus? What will be admitted as "authored" or "evidence"? What are acceptable ways to dismember the author or an archive? What can be exhibited as a legitimate text from the author: published sources, unpublished sources, conference presentations, footnotes, statistics, bibliographies, letters, napkin notes, interviews, comments to the researcher, comments about comments to friends, observations of behavior, postcards, love poetry, reconstructed lectures, death-bed confessions, graffiti on the asylum wall, or computer printouts stored in garbage bags? When a researcher cites the texts of "Statistics Canada," who or what is *exactly* being cited? Because texts do not exist as hermetically closed systems, where authorship or archive begins or ends is extremely problematic.

The sixth and final problematic which is ignored by Canadian researchers is the relation between modes of discourse and texts. More attention is being paid to the role of formalized modes of discourse, structures of interpretation and intellectual conventions or rules. Increasingly important are the figurative uses of language which connect levels of description to explicit interpretation or explanation in prose narrative. For example, there

are three dominant uses of figurative language in the social sciences: the "mirror" metaphor which informs empiricism, the "organism" metaphor which informs positivist research and the "base-superstructure" metaphor which informs Marxist research (see e.g. Sayer 1987; Williams 1980). What is little understood is how various modes of discourse (e.g. the figurative use of metaphor), rules (e.g. the metalanguage of formal logic) and conventions (e.g. literature reviews in theses) actually function in texts or extended uses of language. For example, how does the meta-language of formal logic inform the nature of social inquiry and the description of social reality. Most historical and social scientific discourses approach this topic with the "positivist" belief that there are unproblematic realms of discourse which can escape the problematics of metalanguages, metalogics and metatheories. The eternal return of this 19th century scientific belief that a researcher can simply "choose" to ignore meta-forms of cognition which inform documentation procedures now seems merely a claim for the right to selective ignorance.

Dominick LaCapra (1983) states, inquiry must include "the relationship among various analytically defined distinctions in the actual functioning of language, including the use of language by theorists attempting to define and defend analytic distinctions or oppositions in their conceptual purity" (57). The dominance of certain analytical distinctions implies some form of subordination or exclusion which requires some form of justification but which seem to go unchallenged as the "established" order of things. Certainly the purity of analytical distinctions are useful for clarification and orientation at an ideal level, but this is not necessarily how analytical distinctions function in actual discourse or in texts.

Specific to the Canadian intellectual practice is the reduction of debates to inductive versus deductive approaches to documentation. The failure to acknowledge the logic of "abduction" which precedes and follows the inductive-deductive process is also the failure to identify how class/power and knowledge/power mediate the intellectual practice of synthesis during interpretation. Charles Sanders Peirce, American pragmatist and linguist, distinguished three forms of inferential reasoning: deduction, induction, and abduction (Habermas 1971: 113-119). Deduction is generally considered reasoning from the general to the specific or from premises to a logically valid conclusion. Deduction proves that something must behave in a certain way. Induction is generally considered reasoning from particular facts or individual cases to a general conclusion. Induction proves that something does in fact behave in a certain manner. Abduction, according to Peirce, is the form of argument that *extends* our knowledge. It is the rule of inference to which we introduce new hypotheses. It proves that something probably will behave in a certain matter. Abduction also is the power to occlude competing conceptions, "data" and other problems.

What must be said about the above six problematics concerning the "reality" of context is the occlusion of the rules of synthesis in the literature on intellectual practice. In most cases, most of these problems are ignored in what appears to be a most efficient commitment to 19th century narration and documentation, a practice which continues to deny the synthesizing importance of theory and to fetishize empirical facts. Only in a few cases are researchers reflectively confronting any of the above issues with any seriousness within their own work (Karr 1989). The result is often a tacit reliance upon the most conventional narrative structures to combine documented fact and unsubstantiated judgments about the past or analogies between past and present. Further to this reliance, these approaches are not merely limited but fail to recognize that interpretation is itself a form of political intervention which engages the researcher in a critical process relating past, present, and future through complex modes of interaction.

LaCapra (1983) writes that texts are events in history which demand dialogue. A significant text involves a creative art and its interpretation is a performing art. This art of performance is not entirely free but is limited in specific ways. The researcher must attend to the facts, but with an understanding of their complex meaning. The text which confronts the researcher must be viewed as a network of resistances and dialogues. The demand for documentation serves to keep responsible interpretations from becoming irresponsible.

Bryan Palmer (1990) criticizes LaCapra's leadership in the historiographic "descent into discourse." He is quite right to level a critique, especially considering the way "poststructuralism" has been institutionalized in North America (e.g. following the Yale school of deconstruction). Yet LaCapra's criticisms about the North American will to fetishize documentation accurately reveals an attempt to escape from our own dialogical relation to the past and present and the fact that "reality" is textually mediated. Palmer's critique offers an interesting corrective to LaCapra's thesis, especially for those who appropriate "deconstruction" and "post-structuralism" in order to *deny* any value in conceptualizing a reality outside of the "text" or to minimize the centrality of historical materialism in the cultural studies, for example, of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. For Palmer this denial of "reality" outside of the text is the denial of the social structure of "class." But Palmer's assumption that texts mirror class relations fails to account for what is central to the poststructuralist and deconstructionist critique of the documentary method, that is, the ambiguous mediations of language which define a literal reading of "class" from textual materials and articulate the formation of class identities -- a problematic that both Karl Marx and Raymond Williams were much more sensitive to. While those like LaCapra, Foucault and Derrida, who use the metaphor of the "text" to defend themselves against the assaults of the mirror people, the mirror people, up until now, have rarely had to defend their beliefs. Surely, saying that language is the *text* of the real is no less absurd than saying that language is the *mirror* of the real.

The conception of "refraction" in literary theory developed by Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978 [1928]) seems, for this dissertation, an appropriate synthesis of the debate between LaCapra and Palmer over historical poetics. Bakhtin and Medvedev write that

Literature is one of the independent parts of the surrounding ideological reality, occupying a special place in it in the form of definite, organized philological works which have their own specific structures. The literary structure, like every ideological structure, refracts the generating socioeconomic reality, and does so in its own way. But at the same time, in its "content," literature reflects and refracts the reflections and refractions of other ideological spheres (ethics, epistemology, political doctrines, religion, etc.). That is, in its "content" literature reflects the whole of the ideological horizon of which it is itself a part. (1978: 16)

#### **4.5. The Perspectives of Critical Theory**

Now I push my claim for a synthesis of history and sociology on a final front. In the above two sections I argued that an efficacious historical materialist approach to intellectual practice must consider the intelligentsia as a social class and that their power is exercised by regulating (producing, interpreting, sanctioning) the symbolic order. In this section, I propose that critical theories of cultural production offer the best opportunity for a valid and reliable understanding of contemporary intellectual practice. This section also complements previous discussions in Chapters One and Two about discourse analysis and theories of ideology.

Dominick LaCapra (1983) points out that studies of intellectual practice cannot ignore cultural questions about the relationship among uses of language, of signifying practices, and of various modes of human activity bound up with processes of signification and the



production of grand narratives. Questions of intellectual practice and social receptivity must confront questions of how linguistic signification mediates the social imagery about what people are, who they were, and what they can be. The question of reception speaks to the conclusions of Brooks and Gagnon's (1988) study of intellectual practice following the Second World War. If the reader remembers, they called for more attention to be paid to how the ideas of intellectuals are transformed into the premises of society and what factors determine social receptivity to the products of social scientists and other intellectuals. These problems are crucial for understanding intellectual practice and my analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* as the production, circulation and reception of ideology as a class practice. Such kinds of study have been all but ignored by intellectual historians and social scientists in their rush to gather "empirical" data or quantify their conclusions.

George Grant has called the above Canadian fetish for gathering data "Protestant busyness." Grant was one of the last classical conservative philosophers in North America -- a nationalist, a "Red Tory" and a pessimist -- and one of the first Canadians to criticize the rise of technocratic discourse and to challenge the technological tyranny of American liberalism. He argued that the colonized have been taught that their most important vocation is to get on with "business" and leave the interpretation of value to the administrators of Empire. Furthermore, Grant was concerned that the Canadian intelligentsia was all too compliant to subordinate the moral imperative for critical intellectuality to the imperatives of money and power. He writes that "the fact-value distinction was originally formulated by Weber as a means whereby the academy would hold itself free from the pressures of the powerful, [and] it has quickly become in North America a means whereby the university can make itself socially useful. Social sciences so defined are well adapted to serve the purposes of the ruling private and public corporations" (1969: 132). What Grant speaks of philosophically, Brooks and Gagnon (1988) identify empirically.

The Calvinist enunciation says, "leave Ends to God," which means that intellectual practice in the modern context should leave the determination of use value to the capitalists and the state bureaucrats. Colonized intellectuals in Canada presuppose that grace and not salvation is their central purpose in life and the sign of God's grace is revealed in their accumulation of "credentials" and "data," that is, intellectual "capital" inventories whereby the clerks of the Empire collect, categorize and collate stocks of "Canadian" cultural goods. For the professionalized intelligentsia, exchange value and not use value has framed their interest in culture. This intellectual rush to accumulate God's grace as "cultural commodities" forgoes what is central to intellectual practice, the act of "understanding."

In a more elegant turn of phrase George Grant (1969) is worth quoting at length. He prescribes at length the therapy for regaining intellectuality. *To be an intellectual requires breaking with the strategic actions that inform the disciplinary logics that block understanding in the contemporary division of intellectual labour.*

In the realm of the academic, one of the essential therapies will be the reliving of buried memories of what the greatest whether western or eastern, have known of human excellence. This rediscovery of the past will not be accomplished by those who view it as the task simply of technical scholarship, unrelated to what we are now; but by those who in many aspects of their lives, political, sexual, religious, etc. seek in the past the truth which they have here found wanting. Nor will such search be confined to particular disciplines, the specialists of which see this past as their private preserve. All sorts and conditions of students will find in the multitude of subjects means to transcend the aridity of the technological tradition. These means may be realised most openly and nobly by those who spend their lives in the most

modern studies. Philosophy may be regained by those immersed in understanding the immediacies of the public world; reverence rediscovered in psychiatric researches. (119)

The central question for the art of intellectual practice as a psychiatric research concerns how the historian or social scientist will use discourse analysis to mediate critical factors that cannot be reduced to factual predication or direct authorial assertion about "reality." The nature of cultural production, political legitimation and identity formation are complex and contradictory sets of internal and external social relations and constitute what might be called a communication system. In understanding communication systems and their effects, then, it is important to get beyond the production and distribution of communication messages to understand how communication systems actually work. According to Raymond Morrow and David Brown (1993) it is important for Canadians to begin "by looking at those messages directly as message systems, or what are referred to as forms of *discourse*." How does the functioning of accumulation, legitimation and production interact at the level of social consensus-building and the reconstruction of language as intellectual practice? In keeping with Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978), research can treat social theory as a form of practical reasoning to ". . . reveal the very mechanics of ideological generation" (20).

Although theories of intellectual practice concern the role of intellectuals in society, the theories themselves rarely provoke questions which go beyond the boundaries of the object of inquiry to speculate on the nature of their normative assumptions, on their historical enunciation of practical concerns and on the legitimating aspects within the greater context of politics, economics and cultural struggle.

First, social theories as social action appear as competing bodies of knowledge but actually represent competing communities of intellectuals. Second, theories of intellectual practice as social action are also one rare site where intellectuals collectively reflect on their own practices. As self-reflection, one cannot expect to get a true representation of their practices anymore than one would conclude a true representation about any group of people by merely asking them to give a self-characterization (Gramsci 1971). Self-representations are clearly limited and require to be complemented with external observation, alternate evaluations and a study of the specific historical context. But to formulate such a characterization about intellectual practice is not simple. Not only are intellectuals just as easily caught up in self-delusions and the self-interests of their practices as anyone else, but intellectuals are also unique in that they are the ones who *validate* the external observations, alternate evaluations and historical narratives.

Furthermore, the ideological conflict between representations of intellectual practice are not merely free-floating and "neutral" discussions situated in the scholarly language of the ivory tower, but are also tied to the development or decline of particular collectives which provide intellectuals with a working space, sustenance or pay-check. These latter aspects are part of their mundane existence, however much they would like to represent their practices otherwise. The development of any theoretical practice relates immanently to this totality of sociation. Without a material infrastructure, ideas are without words and texts have no social power. Ideas must be expressed within the context of a material reality whether in books, on television, over the telephone or in classroom lectures. In addition, the distribution of material resources and of cultural identities and the conflict between competing ideas represent more fundamental conflicts between regionalized populations, social classes, genders and races. The plethora of ideologies, including scientific theories, expresses the complexity of social configurations and, in no way, should be

misrepresented as a simple and straightforward categorization -- even formal and abstract categories cannot break free of these complex configurations.

Critical theories provide frameworks in keeping with an historical materialist approach to culture. Critical theories anticipate the above complexity of internal cultural relations and provide a sophisticated way to speculate about the human condition in terms of continually changing relationships between the subjective and objective worlds of social life. Within the context of the human condition, critical theories ask a very fundamental question raised by Karl Marx: "Why does this specific historical and social situation exist, under the objective compulsion of which I myself have to preserve, arrange, and conduct my life -- why is this existent [*Seiende*] thus and not otherwise" (Habermas 1973: 202). Humans, in shaping their worlds, shape themselves.

Furthermore, individuals are born into a society with already established patterns of behavior called institutions and learn to conform in culturally specific ways through socialization even before they have matured enough to consider resisting the practices of social patterning. Consciousness as language and communication does not sit outside this sociality. Conscious action to make the world occurs in a world that already exists as a seemingly impermeable and dynamic solidity irrespective of an individual's awareness of that dynamic. For Marx the organizational form, the social structure and the state, are presupposed as the background necessities for the development of the instrumental form of acting on nature (e.g. the division of labour). This foregrounding of the instrumental form allowed him to specify in a comparative analyses differing modes of production by assuming the background entity or social character of an organizational form such as *British, French or German* capitalism. "Tribe," "city," "estate" and "Nation" in this context remain untheorized as a set of horizontal communicative relations which establishes the *meaning* of "ownership." In analyzing a mode of production, followers of Marx tend to favour the vertical instrumental relations between father and family, chieftain and tribe, citizens and slaves, master and vassal, and capitalist and worker rather than horizontal social relations of community. But in Marx's analyses (e.g. pre-capitalist societies), he does emphasize that property is always mediated by membership in a community and that "language itself is just as much the product of a community as in another respect *it is the being of the community, its articulate being. . .*" (Marx [1857] 1973: 399-420 emphasis added).

Humans must necessarily act within the very communal context presupposed by the culture they maintain and actively reproduce in their existence without having to fully comprehend all its elements and contradictory aspects. As well as acting, this social context also includes ways of thinking, seeing and perceiving. Or in the early words of Marx ([1843a] 1975) as it related to the treating "theory" as practical reason: "Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by material force. *But theory also becomes a material force once it is gripped by the masses....*The point is that revolutions need a *passive* element, a *material* basis. Theory is realized in people as it is a realization of the people's needs" (251-2 emphasis added). Critical theory attempts to answer why economic contradictions *have not* gripped the masses in the way they were supposed to and to identify what contribution intellectual labour makes as a form of symbolically mediated social power in fomenting social revolution.

In keeping with the cognitive, moral/practical and emancipatory commitments of critical theory, I dialogically confront the discourses of *Toward 2000 Together*, somewhat in keeping with what Bakhtin and Medvedev (1978) have called "sociological poetics." To focus on the "style" of discourse as well as its contents means that it shares a common

history with the art of rhetoric. Terry Eagleton writes (1983) that "rhetoric, or discourse theory, shares with Formalism, structuralism and semiotics an interest in the formal devices of language, but like reception theory is also concerned with how these devices are effective at the point of "consumption"; its preoccupation with discourse as a form of power and desire can learn much from deconstruction and psychoanalytic theory, and its belief that discourse can be a humanly transformative affair shares a good deal with liberal humanism" (206).

A shorthand name for the analysis prescribed for *Toward 2000 Together* is a "depth-hermeneutic" analysis. Hermeneutic analysis concerns itself with the internal rules and textual reconstruction of meaning. John Thompson (1984) writes:

The tradition of hermeneutics reminds us that the object of our investigations -- utterances, expressions, texts -- is a *pre-interpreted domain*. It reminds us, that is, that the forms of discourse which we seek to analyse are already an interpretation, so that to undertake an analysis of discourse is to produce an interpretation, to re-interpret a pre-interpreted domain. The tradition of hermeneutics also reminds us that the discourse which forms the object of investigation is the discourse *of a subject*. To analyse discourse is to investigate an object which is produced by a subject and received -- read, listened to, understood -- by other subjects; and the understanding of discourse by the subjects who produce and receive it is an element, although by no means the only element, of our investigation. (9)

Generally speaking, a depth-hermeneutic links social meaning to the matrix of social power. Meanings, therefore, not only represent communication, they also represent domination and distortion. A depth-hermeneutic not only reflects on the structure of meanings, but also comprehends meanings within the social whole, in a framework "constituted by language, labour and domination" (Habermas cited in Held 1980: 316). As Thompson (1984) writes, "in undertaking a depth interpretation the reader enters the world of the text, following the movement from its sense to its reference, from its internal structure to the world it projects" (184).

From Habermas the key contribution to discourse analysis is the way institutional relations of power can be shown to intervene in communication intended for consensual understanding (Brand 1990; Habermas 1971, 1973, 1979, 1984, 1987a; Held 1980; McCarthy 1978; Thompson 1981, 1984). For Habermas, "Reason" is always situated reason (i.e., Marx considered language as "practical reason"). This distinguishes such an approach from idealism and situates it clearly as a form of cultural materialism. He also states a distinction for such an approach from economic or political materialism. "The rules of communicative action do develop in reaction to changes in the domain of instrumental and strategic actions; but in doing so they follow *their own logic*" (1979: 148). Furthermore, by favouring specification he does not sever the relationship between economy and culture. He describes work (e.g., capital/labour relations) as the "heart" and interaction (e.g., communication) as the "pacemaker" of social transformation. The mechanisms of interaction, though, develop in a dynamic of their own through a process of social learning and the accumulation of knowledge.

Learning is interactional and develops inter-subjectively by successful communication through language. Habermas distinguishes the *goal* of coming to an understanding from the *process* of coming to an understanding. This goal presupposes the possibility for a genuine consensus through reasoning. But, he argues, language can also succumb to processes other than understanding. These processes are geared to success, that is, encompassed by sanctions or gratifications, force or money. The incorporation of Habermas's ideas into a discourse analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* identifies, at the

micro-level, interaction which is intended for "understanding" but which becomes "colonized" by bureaucratic relations of power and the commodity relations of capital. Habermas (1984, 1987a) has identified the latter kind of cultural imperialism as "internal colonization."

For Habermas the goal orientation of personal success (instrumental ego action) is not the only aspect of goal-rationality. Habermas also identifies the goal orientation of shared understanding (i.e., inter-subjective action) which can be coordinated in different ways. Habermas's breakthrough in the redefinition of rationality allows the case study of *Toward 2000 Together* to distinguish between institutionalized instrumental rationality and communicative rationality at many levels of social life -- including the uses of language. I accomplish this task by distinguishing inter-subjective actions geared to success (called strategic action) from actions geared to understanding (called communicative action) whereby partners coordinate their action through the exchange of communicative acts. I identify the underlying *motivation* for the *coordination* of personal goals for social goals. *I pose a question in the case study: "Has personal coordination been reached by sanction of force, by gratifications of money or by genuine consensus based on shared understanding in communication?"*

Habermas identifies the nature of a genuine consensus (anticipated ideal speech situation) through a reconstruction of the "deep" rules of language use. According to Habermas, communicative competence is based on the speaker's use of sentences to "represent" to "legitimate" and to "express" interpersonal relations rather than as defined by the formal linguistics as presupposing knowledge of particular presuppositions and concepts. During communicative action, a competent participant can either break off communicative action in favour of strategic action, or *bracket* communicative action to raise validity claims (his definition of discourse), or continue with communicative action directed at understanding. When all the participants presuppose reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord with one another, the agreement can be considered one of *genuine consent*. When social action cannot presuppose mutually recognized validity claims, then understanding can only be achieved via indeterminate indicators and action may be coordinated by other factors.

Coordination via language can be mediated by aspects other than merely communicative acts, such as, strategic acts for personal success represented in bureaucratic or market relations. Language mediated by force or money has the potential for being put to use for illegitimate power, manipulation or ideology (systematically distorted communication). Habermas's approach to discourse not only helps identify the elements and general conditions for consensual understanding in language use, it also helps to identify the influence of force or money in *Toward 2000 Together*. Habermas's materialist theory of the subject treats Reason, as stated before, as "situated reason" and the motivations are always *empirical*. Because he does not conflate speech and action, but rather treats speech as the mechanism for the coordination of communicative action, he is able to distinguish coordination based on reason from coordination based on a complementarity of egoistic interests. Concerning this distinction, Brand (1990) states: "since in our present social economic order these [bureaucratic and market relations] are characterized by structured inequality, the fact that coordination takes place via a complementarity of interests does not imply that motivation is based on reason, the conviction that justice is being done all around. It can be in someone's interest to avoid punishment or to accept an offer of unequal exchange" (15). In the latter case, the strategic action of ego influences the context of choice of alter not by communicative acts but by acts of sanction or gratification, that is, in a Gramscian sense, domination not consent as hegemonic practice.

This section lays the final methodological and theoretical basis for a historical materialist analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* as hegemonic intellectual practice, that is, as the enunciation of a set of speech acts ensuring moral and political leadership. Held (1980) states "a speech act is the employment of a sentence in an utterance under certain conditions. Speech act theory is directed to understanding the performative status of linguistic utterances -- *the way in which 'we do things in saying something'*" (335 emphasis added). When agents are assumed to be pursuing communicative action via illocution (disclosing something) but one of the participants is pursuing perlocutionary effects (instrumental ends), this situation can be considered *concealed* strategic action, that is, manipulatory and/or distorted communication. The warrantability or just cause for a strategic action requires reference to the political/moral legitimacy of social institutions as well as the factual nature of those social institutions in which interaction takes place. Habermas's identification of how the propositional content of legitimate communication can contradict the action of that communication allows the analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* to identify what *remains* unjustified (concealed strategic action) or *is* unjustified (has no legitimate democratic sanction).

By empirically examining claims of truth, rightness or sincerity with reference to both their propositional content and their action effects, the case study will focus on claims by students, teachers, parents, administrators, scientists, bureaucrats, politicians, futurists, managers and capitalists etc. Furthermore, these claims are evaluated for their representation as a genuine social consensus based on shared understanding or as strategic acts of power by particular persons or classes attempting to achieve *results* at the expense of opposing interests. As Habermas puts it, "in speech...grammatical sentences are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together" (cited in Held 1980: 338).

#### 4.6. Conclusion

The past two chapters identified the specific nature of the emergence of the modern Canadian intelligentsia and the particular limitations of contemporary Canadian approaches to intellectual practice. Where does this critique of Canadian approaches to intellectual practice and ideological production lead? It is important to remember that the word "intellectual" emerged in the 13th century as an adjective, meaning to belong to the intellect or understanding, that is, "that [which] appeals to or engages the intellect; requiring the exercise of understanding" (*Oxford English Dictionary* : 369). "Intellect" is about "perceiving, discerning, discernment, understanding, meaning, sense, signification.... That faculty, or sum of faculties, of the mind or soul by which one knows and reasons...power of thought, understanding" (ibid.: 368). To be intellectual is to practice "informing," "understanding" or "interpreting." The reduction of intellectual understanding to "intelligence gathering" marks the rise of industrial capitalism and the culture of professional expertise (see e.g. Hofstadter 1962; Larson 1977). *Postmodern* capitalism appears to take the process of "de-intellectualizing" culture one more step by making it a marketable commodity. It is to the history of this latter development I now turn. The critical assessments I emphasized in this chapter were clearly focused on rethinking the nature of intellectual practice as a specific class form and on rethinking the nature of symbolic production in a world increasingly dominated by technocratic discourse on "performativity." The next chapter focuses on the rise of this technocratic discourse and on the discursive macro-context of *Toward 2000 Together*, specifically the development of the corporatist postmodernization narrative.

# Chapter Five

## From Technocratic Reformism to Corporate Postmodernization

The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration. (Karl Mannheim 1936: 118)

### 5.1. Introduction

This chapter justifies the last of three related claims before proceeding with the discourse analysis of *Toward 2000 Together*. Where Chapters Three and Four emphasized methodological and theoretical claims, here I take a different tack to make an historical claim: that the present period marks a transformation in political discourse from a liberal technocratic narrative to a corporatist postmodernization narrative. Furthermore, I claim that the rise of the corporatist postmodernization narrative is also marked by a transformation in the way hegemony is exercised. Now hegemonic effect is the product of introducing new means of social control via futurology and strategic management. The combination of a new ideology and a new managerial style in setting the political agenda for social reform, thus, marks a transformation in intellectual practice.

In previous chapters I have summarized the development of intellectual practice in Canada from the premodern to the contemporary period. The premodern period was dominated by the gentleman scholar who, as a "clerk," collected and collated data for the British Empire and, as a leading community figure, combined economic, political and cultural interests. This period witnessed the transformation of a leisure class into a working aristocracy. Following the premodern period, the professional scholar rose in importance in the latter part of the 19th century. By the first part of the 20th century the division of labour increased between capitalists, bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligentsia. The ethos of a working aristocracy remained strong in the institutions of the state and higher education. But this transition period was also marked by the growing ascendancy of a professional and scientific ethos. The conjunctural effects of the rise of colonial nationalism and the nation state, the emergence of rationalized corporate capitalism and the displacement of religion and humanism by science created the conditions for the growth and development of intellectual specializations focused on economics, government and education. After the 1870s, a new discourse which I have labeled liberal technocratic reformism began to dominate the intellectual landscape as the division of intellectual labour increased. Informed by a grammar of positivism, liberal technocratic reformism combined the central liberal interests in moral uplift and *laissez-faire* and was able to maintain hegemony by articulating a technocratic ideology of science and professionalism. Technocratic ideology also allowed liberals to achieve political compromises from factions in conservative and socialist movements.

Liberal technocratic reformism held the centre stage for most of the twentieth century. But a new discourse has emerged since 1945 to shift the centre in the 1980s toward a neo-conservative alliance that both displaces and transforms the old liberal technocratic alliances. This new discourse I have labeled "corporate postmodernization" and marks the transformation of the professional intelligentsia into an informational entrepreneur. The corporatist postmodern "vision" combines the ideologies of "strategic management," "public choice," and millenarian mysticism. The vision marks a *potential* realignment of

social forces and the introduction of a mode of intellectual practice that challenges modernist political traditions.

This chapter describes the historical context for the emergence of technocratic reformism and the recent challenge by corporatist postmodernism for the centre of political gravity. My own discussion summarizes the changing nature of intellectual practice; reconstructs the ideological configurations that laid the basis for technocratic reformism; identifies the conservative and socialist challenges to technocratic reformism; situates the emergence of corporate postmodernization in the confluence of strategic management and public choice theory; and accounts for both the New Right's interest in and effect on higher education. Corporate postmodernization marks the *dedifferentiation* of science, capital and government. According to Scott Lash (1990: 11) cultural modernization presupposed the differentiation of four cultural components: (1) the relationship among the types of objects produced (e.g. theoretical, practical); (2) the relationship between culture as a whole and the social; (3) a cultural economy constituted by the production, circulation and consumption of the cultural products; and (4) the mode of signification. During the "dedifferentiation" process created by postmodernization the three main cultural spheres (aesthetic, moral-practical and theoretical), the cultural economy and the separation of the cultural and the social realms becomes highly problematic. New "postmodern" distinctions and statuses between signifier, signified and referent thus challenge in a fundamental way liberal technocratic assumptions about political culture in the twentieth century. Where liberal politics presupposed the separation of the public from the private, the economic from the political and the scientific from the visionary, corporatist postmodernization intends to transform these many parts into a cybernetic whole of self-regulating inputs and outputs.

## **5.2. Class, (Post)Modernization and the Rise of Technocratic Discourse**

One reason for reconsidering the nature of intellectual practice as a form of class action is because capitalism has historically exhibited a potential for revolutionary change. In the past these social forces have revolutionized not only economic and political relations but also cultural relations. One of the most dramatic developments in the past two decades in Western societies has been the rapid growth of cultural production and the attempt to name the recent transformation (Bauman 1992; Derber et al. 1990; Drucker 1993a; Harvey 1989; Jameson 1991; Kellner 1989; Lash 1990; Tomlinson 1991). Are Canadians experiencing a revolution at least as comparable to the second industrial revolution and the birth of cultural modernism at the turn of the last century? This section sketches the development of modernization and the different ways that intellectual practice has been conceived from the first impulses of modernization, through two world wars, to the emergence of the *American* "military-industrial complex."

The modernization impulses in Europe and North America released by bourgeois revolutions were differentiated and unequal in both scope and intensity. At the level of the nation-state, industrial capitalists did not play a *leading* role anywhere until the mid-point of the 19th century. It was only following the Second World War, it could be argued, that the industrial bourgeoisie could claim hegemonic leadership over North America, Western Europe and Japan. This new hegemony, though, was also marked at the same time by the internationalization of the industrial bourgeoisie, breaking down the very regional and "national" borders which had enabled it to develop in the first place. The revolutionizing capacity of capitalist industrialization was also marked by an increasingly generalized dialectic of fragmentation and integration creating cross-cutting social cleavages and a mix of "modern" ideologies representing feudal remnants and early capitalism; town and country; Church and State; private and public; lords, peasants, proletarians, intellectuals,



merchants, farmers, capitalists and a whole host of other class divisions. The diversity of social forces could not but precipitate universalizing ideologies that fantasized about solidifying the competing principles, first in the abstract, then as an empirical fact. This was the time of the heroic intellectual who could bring form to the chaos.

The First Great War smashed old solidarities. Where capitalist hegemony was established early, as in the United States, intellectuals found sterile soil. What principles could they enunciate that were not already self-evident in practice? Where capitalist hegemony was established late, as in Germany, intellectuals found fertile soil. Integration would have to realize an ideal, and ideals flourished with a vengeance symbolizing divisions, fragile superstructures, modernization from above, and imposed integration via domination. The Second World War followed. With postwar rationalization in high gear a new reality of bureaucratic centres of power, institutionalized party systems, urbanization, a scientific culture, secular education and consumer markets which had only been partially evident earlier in regions of the United States and Western Europe were increasingly generalized as a new reality for a significant part of the globe. A new social order, class system and institutionalized interests markedly affecting social structure and political culture emerged. Social division and fragmentation were displaced to the periphery in the disintegrating colonial empires resulting in the juxtaposition of "two cultures," the modern and the traditional, and the "niggers" of the world were supposedly presented a vision of their future in the core. Except for the development of mass-based communist and socialist parties up to the 1970s in France, Italy and Scandinavia, the influences of counter-hegemonic movements in the core countries were minimal.

The conception of the "modern" was the carrier of both the economism of technocracy as well as the evaluation of inferiority for "other" cultural traditions. The technocrats were the engineers of modernization. The emergence of the new ideology was initially understood as the cultural expression of the modern societies as a whole. They were treated as autochthonous expressions of a nation and not as the intellectual production of selected classes within the social formation. According to Carl Boggs (1993: 64), with the historic shift from fragmented to convergent political culture in the shift from early to late capitalism, the practices of intellectuals too were transformed. Whole sectors of intellectual production emerged closely tied to rationalization of the state, the corporation and the education systems. Free-floating intellectuals who modeled their strategies on Jacobin practice gave way to institutional analysis of the context of intellectual production. While the collective intellectual became differentiated and occupationally more significant, the significance of heroic influence seemed to decline, except on the periphery with the likes of Mao and Castro. The heroic Jacobin had been displaced from the cultural horizon leaving the traditional role supplanted by a complex of managers, professionals, bureaucrats, scientists and talk show hosts. New radicalized ideologies emerged which pressed the logic of anti-Jacobinism into anti-elitism and finally into stoic resignation or cynical immobilization by vacating the field of legislating discourse to hegemonic cultural, economic and political elites. A legion of radical intellectuals denied themselves the right to speak for anyone, not even themselves, and the enlightenment foundations for a rational left was itself identified as part of the problem. For the left, such a conjunction of events was described by Charles Taylor (1991) as "the malaise of modernity." And now even the periphery is rationalizing. The political work of the intellectual as hero has differentiated into the anonymous politics of World Bank officials and technocratic development workers. This is not to say, as is easily supposed by focusing on what is immediately presented to the senses, that the intellectual hero has disappeared but rather has been transformed. First, to paraphrase Gramsci, in phase one, elements of the traditional

intellectual have been metamorphosed into the new intellectual or functionary. And, second, in phase two, as the rationalization of intellectual division of labour continues apace, the functionary as ego identity is fragmented with elements routinized as "information" technology. In poststructuralist language, the egoistic subject is decentred and the texts of life deconstructed, and in its place, intellectual as collective subject is integrated into anonymous and objective form as a Modern Prince best exemplified by the organizational complexity of the United States as an Imperial power: *America as deity on automatic pilot*. Or such is the illusion resulting from the emerging and totalizing technocratic discourse which privileges (and celebrates) the fetishisms of the new, the fragmentary, the particular, the appearance and the classless.

The great American social transformation brought about following the realignment of class forces and the Civil War envisaged massive industrial growth and technological innovation. By the twentieth century a deeper meaning to anti-intellectualism had already been imparted to American discourse. Pragmatic instrumentalism provided fertile soil for Taylorist scientific management and the ideology of efficiency and control, first enacted at the level of workplace, became quickly generalized into a routine for engineering production and consumption for the whole nation (and now imagines itself managing the whole world). The integration of the state, corporations and education systems provided the basis for what Eisenhower called "the military-industrial complex" and the production of an expansive technocratic stratum unknown in the history of the world. An enormous power structure emerged erected on the foundation of knowledge in all sectors of social life. Intellectuals became integrated into economic and political life, sacrificing their isolation and traditional opposition to "materialism" to become handmaidens of business interests. At the leading edge, the American mandarin was born, no longer merely intent to represent the "nation" by transmitting the cultural canon to the next generation of upper and middle classes, but now active participant in *building* the nation as experts. And below the mandarin, according to Boggs (1993: 77), an entire "class" of knowledge workers "comprised of scientists, technicians, professionals, some white-collar workers, and managers, [and] this stratum embellishes an unprecedented, yet decidedly non-Jacobin, fusion of knowledge and power. It is a phenomenon of historical importance, to be understood within a framework of vastly shifting class and authority relations" (77).

How to theorize this "vastly shifting class and authority relations" has emerged as one of the most perplexing questions in the twentieth century. The nature and implications of this "new class" or "stratum" has become a primary interest for critical theorists and has created a wide-ranging debate about intellectual practice in contemporary societies. Boggs (1993), prefers to use the descriptive term of "stratum" to describe and explain this complex of intellectual relations. He clearly assumes that "under no circumstances, however, do intellectuals as such constitute a distinct class or social bloc; they do not exercise their own unique influence upon historical change" (163). And this proclamation is enunciated after writing over a hundred pages about intellectuals as *agents* of technocratic discourse and participants in the crisis of modernity. Boggs defends this claim not by making a theoretical or empirical case for the conclusion but rather as one element of "long tradition of critical theory" (162). He defends his Gramscian conclusion not as an empirical claim but rather as a claim based on the authority of a tradition that views the intelligentsia as functionaries of other classes who make history. This position poses a fundamental problem for the "critical theorist" and a logical contradiction in the way intellectuals are defined. So while in one place Boggs defends the critical tradition, in another he argues for its irrelevancy. He writes that "with the passing of preindustrial society and then the crisis of modernity, the older modes of understanding the role of

intellectuals are obsolete, demanding fundamental new theories and concepts. The paradigms associated with Descartes, Weber, and Marx, with the entire liberal and Marxist tradition, have more or less exhausted their utility" (1993: 180). Such an approach does more to mystify intellectual practice and the nature of objective culture, as if on one hand one can choose to defend in totality a thesis and on the other hand choose to escape the history of the tradition the thesis is derived from.

In distinction to the thesis that the intelligentsia do not form a class are those who argue that the intelligentsia do form a "class." But here too a different form of residual idealism is substituted for materialist conception of class. People like Gouldner, Bourdieu and Collins, Derber et al. (1990) argue that the intelligentsia form a new mandarin class whose power is based on some form of "cultural capital," "educational authority" or "credential" as a source of class power through the production of cultural commodities. The question here is why is a particular cultural artifact a source of power? The best analogy here is with the power of money. It is not money which is the source of power, but rather that it symbolizes the accumulation of labour power as capital. It is not the control of money which gives the capitalist class power but rather the control of labour power.

A third instance of revisioning the nature of intellectual practice jettisons the conception of class as a relevant heuristic device for analyzing the contemporary social formation. Two closely related positions are evident here marking a return to idealism: analysis based on identity politics or on social movements (see for example on identity politics Giroux 1992; Grossberg, Nelson and Treicher 1992; Lather 1991; on political movements Touraine 1969, 1973, 1980, 1987). Research on identity politics without reference to social structure succumbs to idealism by reifying subjectivity and restoring the old logic of consciousness as "identity." A corollary to this for those who want to retain some notion of class is to mystify class by redefining it as another form of subjectivism equivalent to other identity forms, for example, gender or race identities. Such a procedure can articulate identity to class analysis but connotations of "class" as a structured set of social relations is reduced to a set of cultural relations. Occluding class analysis or foreclosing on the reconceptualization of "class" are inadequate approaches to the task of understanding intellectual practice today. The second position related to identity politics is research into social movements. It too runs into the three problems described for identity politics because social movements are by definition collective subjectivities. Here again class as social movement, if used at all, is reduced to a set of cultural relations and "historicism." What such research can do is to describe the nature of social movements but cannot explain the mechanisms for its functioning. Scientific analysis -- as the identification of explanatory mechanisms such as class -- is sacrificed for an explanation based on empirical description of the movement. Such an approach cannot break with common-sense self-understandings of a social formation and thus provides no basis for a critique of the self-representations of a tradition which may be scientifically false. History is substituted for historical science, and if class is considered at all, it is reduced to an empirical subjective identity.

In distinction to the above three points of view, I would argue as a hypothesis that the intelligentsia do *in some circumstances* make history as a class and that this claim can be legitimately and scientifically defended as consistent with the definition of class in the materialist sense without slipping into idealism. The identification the these "circumstances," though, is an empirical question and worth entertaining considering the history of revolutionary change and the contemporary context of corporate postmodernization. But before proceeding to detail the contemporary changes to intellectual practice and ideological production, it is valuable to situate the rise of liberal technocratic reformism as a revolutionary force in its own right.

### **5.3. The Intellectual Origins of Liberal Technocratic Reformism**

As I show in Part III, the Science Council of Canada fosters the ideological conditions to articulate a relationship between adherents of a liberal welfare state and technocratic reform socialism. Such liberal revisionism tends to view society as composed of empirical individuals with calculable interests. What unifies these individuals is that they live in a community under a particular state, in this case Canada, yet they are assumed to live outside any structure of production. If production is considered, it is reduced to the technical relations of production which occlude the social relations of production. But this technocratic reformism emerged only after a long period of intellectual struggle over the grammatical form that intellectual practice would take. And the most important struggle was to accommodate the needs of capitalists and workers.

The struggle at the political and ideological level resulted in the rise of a class or strata with ideological claims based on *political* compromise, neutrality, objectivity, and efficiency. The ideologies of professionalism and science marked the rise of this third force, a "new middle class" with special interests in articulating the nature of the "state" and the "nation." The rise of this "positivism" and the specific nature of the Canadian "social sciences" was not natural or preordained but rather the product of discursive debates, economic considerations and political struggles. These struggles had to accommodate not only workers espousing "labourism" but also capitalists calling for a "laissez-faire market" and this "state-sponsored" class espousing technocratic amelioration. The liberal synthesis accounted for these three claims while also struggling to marginalize the contradictory challenges of conservatism and socialism.

In Canada, the development of liberal technocratic reformism had its own unique trajectory. Hegemony was exercised through the liberal synthesis of laissez-faire with moral uplift and technology with industry. This section traces the origins of liberal technocratic reformism from French, British and American positivism. It accounts for the ideological accommodations between laissez-faire and moral uplift and for the institutional development of higher education that made it possible.

The narrative which has framed most educational discourse in the post-World War II period is Functionalism -- the metaphysic of industry and technology (Bedarida 1990; Green 1990; Hobsbawm 1968; Landes 1969; Royle 1987). The subsumption of Functionalist assumptions within the Whig narrative of Old Humanism provided a powerful framework to reconstruct the empirical data. This new theory eventually combined a theory for social uplift along with a new economic theory for human capitalization. Positivist assumptions were incorporated by Whig and Common Sense thought into a new form of Utilitarian thought. This combination was by far the dominant paradigm used to construct meaning in English Canada during the twentieth century.

It is important to remember that the reception of Comtean and Durkheimian assumptions in Canada has multiple mediations. In at least two phases, positivism was subordinated to the code provided by the Presbyterian rules of Common Sense. Comtean positivism was first assimilated by radical utilitarians like J. S. Mill and Bentham in England before its coming to Canada. Furthermore, the Structural-Functionalism of Talcott Parsons came to Canada in the post-1945 period from the United States by American-educated researchers.

According to Durkheim education had two major functions: (1) to transmit skills needed for industrial economies and (2) to secure social integration through the transmission of common culture. Durkheim soundly rejected liberal individualism, especially the kind promoted by the Herbert Spencer who prescribed that social solidarity could be achieved

via the individual pursuit of self-interest in the free market. For Durkheim, as a republican, the collectivity based on a publicly-grounded morality always existed prior to and beyond individual self interest. The modern disenchantment of the world led Durkheim to seek out alternative ways in which new *public* "religions" could provide the means for social integration. Integration was strategically important because of the nature of civil society (Green 1990; Hawthorn 1987).

In the development of capitalist modernity the increasing division of labour fractured the collective beliefs based on mechanical solidarity and created pathological deviances which he called "anomie." For Durkheim the state as the organ of social thought must inculcate a civic ideology. In the case of the English "social uplift tradition," though, this republican claim became an appealing justification for state intervention by the Radical Liberals. Although Durkheim's work was deliberately anti-idealist and anti-individualist and stressed the social nature of education, the abstract philosophical individualism of the utilitarians, such as Bentham's "calculus of the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers," occluded materialism from the theoretical equation when it was appropriated in England, Canada and the USA. The practical calculations would not be part of the theory but were left to the decision-makers, an idea which found favour within the ranks of the decision-makers. Durkheim, though, failed to theorize the effects of social contradictions residing in civil society and how these contradictions might distort the collective and universalizing culture of the state and educational organs. The result of this inadequacy provided classical liberalism and reform liberalism with a unique ideology to argue for the maintenance of *laissez faire* ideology in the economy while calling for state intervention in the reconstruction of working class, female and racial identities (Green 1990; Hawthorn 1987).

The rise of the middle-class reformers in England after the Reform Acts of the 1830s marked the first wave of reform which came from the Liberal Radicals, a small group of radical industrialists, scientists and rationalist non-conformists who congregated in scientific, literary and philosophical societies. Highly influenced by Rousseau and the French *philosophes*, they did echo the themes of the humanists, but their main interest was to provide a more scientific and practical education in the established dissenting academies and the education of their own children. Unlike the French positivists who were making plans for national education systems via the state, the English Radical educationalists were rather cool about any state involvement. True to their liberal heritage they rejected republican notions of universal change through the positive state (Bedarida 1990; Green 1990; Hobsbawm 1968; Landes 1969; Royle 1987).

By the second generation of middle-class radicals in the 19th century, the universal focus of positivism was lost and the liberal *laissez faire* aspects were emphasized and resulted in a narrow bourgeois interest to preserve their class position *vis a vis* the landed and commercial plutocracy on one the hand and the emerging popular classes on the other. Their utilitarianism narrowed and became abstract and doctrinaire (e.g., Bentham). The increasing power of the new middle class throughout the 19th century, came to define the character of England. In having to curry favour with the old plutocracy, the recharacterization of English identity was accomplished not with universal principles of liberal nationhood as was the case in France and Prussia with the "Rights of Man," but rather on the principles of classhood: bourgeois Anglo-Saxon males, or in the words of Edmund Burke, "The Rights of Englishmen" (*ibid.*). The objectification of these subjective class characteristics were slowly redefined by Liberal Radicals to incorporate the ideals of educational, scientific, and rational intellectual competency -- the ideology of *professionalism* (Larson 1977).

Intellectual practice now emerges as private property sanctioned by the state and particular combinations were given monopolies over competencies in theology, medicine, law and engineering (Larson 1977). Although the nature of artisanal monopoly had a tradition based on feudal guild organization and was legitimated by the Tudor State, this new property now had *capitalist* "value" and belonged to those with the greatest portion of intelligence, industry and wealth, that is, the newly accommodated class who could only assert themselves through the state in concert with the industrial bourgeoisie in civil society through market relations. Differential effect is important here because at the same time artisans who worked with their hands increasingly found "anti-combination" law being put in place to kill their livelihood. Increasingly for these people, loss of the monopoly right to a craft meant joining the declassed population and moving to the city to become the *new* working class. In a similar process, but having gained monopoly rights from the state, the new industrial and "educated" middle classes used their increasing power over the state not only to reform the political and economic structure in line with their own beliefs, but also to transform education into an instrument for their own purposes. In England this instrumentalization polarized educational ideologies on class lines (Green 1990).

How was the technocratic reform narrative accommodated in Canada? The key British ingredients for this new middle class ideology were (1) the doctrines of non-conformist religion and evangelical Anglicanism, (2) economic individualism and political liberalism in the political economy, and (3) utilitarian philosophy for effective political control based on instrumental social relationships. Middle class education would thus reflect certain contents, notions of piety, respectability, hard work and utility, and its form would take independent control, methodical instruction and reward for achievement. Of course, such an ideology was clearly at odds with the hegemonic ideology of English higher education which the Liberals decried as old-fashioned, impractical and corrupt -- which it was. Where someone like Bentham would offer science and technology at the head of subjects, the universities offered only classical study (Green 1990). In Canada, some described King's College (later federated in the University of Toronto) as "an unreformed Oxford" (Harris 1976).

But the conception of the state was still derived from Adam Smith who categorically rejected the mercantilist notions of state intervention and instead proclaimed the theory of "natural" correcting markets. But, Smith's Common Sense should not be mistaken with the notion of weak governments or state intervention as is commonly done. *Laissez-faire* did not mean weak government. The achievement of a liberal market required strong state intervention. First Common Sense required a negative kind of intervention to pass legislation and continually intervene where it mattered most: trade, land, employment relations and enforcement and regulation. Second, the state also had to pass legislation of a positive kind, especially where it concerned the popular classes. This moment was where the new Radical Positivist ideology became crucial. Here *the free market would not do* and strong intervention was required to *maintain order* as well as *maintain national defense*, two slippery concepts at best, but enough to justify *practical intervention* in the jurisdiction of poor law reform, public health and education (Green 1990).

This logical and social contradiction is still with us today. Whereas in Imperial England plutocratic capitalism took precedence, in Colonial "Canada" the process was different. Plutocratic statism, in both cases, expressed the polarities of the bureaucratic global gaze of Empire politics and regulated development of British and North American capitalism. On the one hand, Common Sense argued that there was a natural harmony in the market order such that individual interests would ultimately coincide with the common good. On the other hand, Common Sense recognized that this Common Good did not always (if ever)

occur *spontaneously* and that social conflicts would arise. The problem for *laissez faire* was that the pursuit of individual interests could only further the common good where individuals recognized their best interests, and this did not always occur especially when the middle classes witnessed the activities of the working class and the *declassed* segments of the population brought on by industrial development (ibid.).

Unique for Canada was the increased emphasis given to Scottish education which was more democratic and practical. This unique contribution was to give a relative industrial advantage to Canada over England during its industrial development in the last half of the 19th century. In England, Scottish thought had to fight a constant battle. London University, home of the Utilitarians, was founded only in 1828-36, but remained subordinate to the Anglican universities (Green 1990: 160). The London University was the model for the reform of the University of Toronto at the end of the 19th century. But unlike English university reforms which had to continually fight the established Anglican orthodoxy of Oxford and Cambridge, the dominant intellectual tradition in English Canada did not provide as strong limitation to the Scottish theology of Common Sense. This triumph of dissenting thought began with the political demise of John Strachan in the 1840s and ended in the marginalization of Anglicanism and Paleyite natural theology by the end of the century in Canadian higher education. In Quebec higher education, Ultramontanism has had a much longer life until the end of the Duplessis regime and the triumph of the Quiet Revolution (Brooks and Gagnon 1988; Monière 1981).

Those who practiced Common Sense came to control the high ground of academe and regimented all residual and challenging thought to its ruling regime of bifurcated consciousness: quantity versus quality, fact versus value, idealism versus materialism and theory versus practice. This is even true in the unique ways Kant, Hegel and Marx have been appropriated. Even the idea of "critical" thought is given a very narrow reading as "tolerance" of dissent within the accepted "first" principle rather than dissent about first principles. And after 1840 what ruled was conservative Common Sense (McKillop 1979; Zeller 1987).

Following the hegemony of a conservative heterodox tradition in public education established by Egerton Ryerson, conservative orthodoxy in Canadian higher education continued to take the form of Paleyite natural theology until the 1870s. After Charles Darwin's *Origin of the Species* (published 1859) and especially *The Descent of Man* (published 1871), Canadian conservative thought required reconstruction. William Dawson, principal of McGill, founder of the Royal Society of Canada and director of The Geological Survey, firmly established two intellectual holisms between philosophy (theory) and science (data collection). First, Dawson's philosophy rejected Darwin's philosophical claims so that Dawson could retain the theoretical contents of aristocratic solidarity. Second, having split off Darwin's cosmological challenge, Dawson could now complete his work in geological science (this natural history also included botany, zoology and anthropology) by verifying the Canadian geological formations and *showing* that there were incommensurable distinctions between species and varieties and that variation occurred only within fixed limits (McKillop 1979, 1987; S.E.D. Shortt 1976). The ideology of the Canadian mosaic of organic solidarities was born here.

A contemporary of Dawson's, Daniel Wilson, from the University of Toronto and president of the Royal Society of Canada in 1885, was not committed to Dawson's Mosaic cosmology but supported the notion of providential design and harmony in nature. For Dawson and Wilson, the two preeminent thinkers of the time, Canadian science was not to be involved with speculation (social theory) which challenged a mosaic and organic social order and science had to necessarily have only a *practical* concern. This meant that ethics,

psychology, physiology and political economy would proceed without challenges to the first principle of conservative organicity (McKillop 1979).

When conservative notions of organic solidarity were increasingly challenged by the realities of industrialization, urbanization and working class militancy, the organic hypothesis on the "speculative" side is again reconstructed under the framework of Hegelian idealism by John Watson (1847-1939) at Queen's. The ascendancy of Queen's thought at the turn of the century and the reform of the University of Toronto based on the London Utilitarian model marks the ascendancy of Utilitarianism on the practical (empiricist) side and a Hegelian conservative-organicity on the cosmological side. It was also this Hegelian element which provided the resources for a critical response from the social reformers, such as Salem Bland and J. S. Wordsworth and their articulation of Social Gospel (Cook 1985; McKillop 1979; Penner 1977).

The Common Sense which triumphed in the Canadas thus did not retain its radical contents as it did in England in the face of Anglican hegemony. In Canada, rather the reverse happened. Presbyterian Common Sense played a fundamentally conservative role in an early ideological accommodation by bringing together the reform elements from the Anglican landed wealth, Presbyterian commercial bourgeoisie and some conservative Methodists (e.g., Ryerson). The accommodations between Anglicanism, Presbyterianism and Methodism marked the fateful alliance in establishing Reform Toryism. Under this umbrella of "conservative nationalism," Ultramontanism could also be accommodated (Monière 1981). But, as a rejoinder, it was also these conservative "practical empiricists" in Canada, such as Ryerson, who provided the foothold for Radical Liberalism in the state. This foothold was provided first through the development of the Ontario public education system and normal schools and second through the consolidation and control of higher education. The foothold did not occur without contradictory effects on the ideology of Common Sense and the split between *laissez faire* liberalism and positivist liberalism.

With the above considerations in mind, the purpose of the British State framed the development of Canadian higher education and state formation. The intent of the new bourgeoisie was thus to help *individuals* to understand what was in their own best interest, and this, however, could only be achieved by the active intervention of the state in the promotion of an adequate general education, or what J.S. Mill called the "great normal school of the people." The contradiction between *laissez faire* and *normal schooling* was logically insoluble, so despite their philosophical principles and intense conviction, Common Sense theorists *had* to intervene on pragmatic grounds. Since the middle class *knew* what its own interest was, state intervention was required to create and enforce the free market for economics and voluntary education. But since, the popular classes did not know what was their true interest, the "educated" middle class would have to intervene on *pragmatic* grounds to teach them what was required. This would be accomplished by *state education as social uplift* in the form of schooling, policing and public health (Curtis 1992; Green 1990; Palmer 1992). To gather information on what was required, they needed an organized research program void of any possible theory to challenge Hierarchical Mosaic Organicity but highly sophisticated in collating an inventory of social data to meet practical contingencies. Positivism English-style was reborn as Practical Empiricism in the Canadian social sciences.

The Radicals could not win the day in nineteenth century England. Their muddled proposals for a national education system found no favour with either anti-statist liberals, aristocratic conservatives or the independently-minded popular classes. The lack of a class compromise meant that national education continued to decline under "voluntarism" and the middle class continued their ascendancy in education via other means such as



administrative reform. In English Canada, with education a provincial responsibility, the Radical Liberals had a head start and with the Ryerson reforms of Upper Canadian education in the post-rebellion period a model was created that led the way in educational reform (Curtis 1988, 1992; Houston and Prentice 1988). Although an industrializing commercial bourgeoisie was in control of state finances and were able to usher in waves of railway mania and massive debt, an alternative basis for higher educational reform was in the making. This liberal alliance was led by the intellectual bourgeoisie and their connection to the modern universities of the USA. It was this connection which would provide the basis for the second wave of positivism introduced to Canada beginning in the last part of the nineteenth century.

Modern functionalism in Canada found a second route via the Americans into the Canadian hegemonic narrative. French sociology, especially in the form of the *Annales* school now emphasizes Durkheim's critical republican morality. This *Annales* tradition has found much favour in Quebec social science today and it is not hard to understand considering that Quebec education was under the provincial hegemony of Ultramontanism until the 1960s and provided a crucial limit to the expansion of atheoretical empiricism (Brooks and Gagnon 1988). The individualist Americans championed those aspects of French structural-functionalism which emphasized conservative educational theories and liberal individualism, and in so doing, emphasized the particular relationship between education and work by focusing on the competitive and "meritocratic" aspects of economic life, that is, America was the land of equal opportunity. And if America could be such, then Canada was not far behind according to modernization theory.

Positivist ideology began to emerge in Canada at the end of the 19th century. The ideas of W.D. LeSueur linked Burkean conservatism and Comtean positivism. LeSueur formulated the first Canadian version of Organic Social Darwinism against the American version of Individualist Social Darwinism (e.g. Sumner). Out of the scientific challenges that came from Darwinian thought against religion, Canadian Social Darwinism provided the basis for the rise of three kinds of Canadian positivism. By the Mackenzie King Era, LeSueur's ideas were decried as dogmatically conservative and would be replaced by a new hegemony, one which emerged from modern university reform in Canada and the conflict between *laissez faire*, social uplift, and conservative reaction (McKillop 1979).

The *laissez faire* wing was institutionalized in the atheoretical empiricism of James Mavor who in 1892 became the second professor of political economy and constitutional history at the University of Toronto and who created the first modern department of political economy in Canada. The second *social uplift* wing was institutionalized in the positivism of Adam Shortt who in 1886 started teaching at Queen's University and in 1891 became the John A. Macdonald Professor of Political Science. Under Shortt, the Queen's faculty instructed and staffed the first generation of *modern* civil servants (Owram 1986; S.E.D. Shortt 1976). This was in keeping with the earlier administrative tradition established by Ryerson in the development of the leading model for public education in English Canada (Curtis 1992).

The third wing developed primarily at McGill which was noted for its institutionalization of the botanical sciences whereby anthropological and zoological explanations also emerged in close alliance with biological and medical science. For a brief moment, though, the positivism of social uplift developed strength at McGill as a reaction to challenges of Bolshevism and the fear of social upheaval in 1919. The ineffectiveness of charity expenditures prompted anglophone social-welfare leaders to push for the creation of a department of social service. A strong link developed between McGill and Chicago sociology which emphasized "social ecology." This approach assumed that the

environment shaped social structure, values, mores and institutional development. Such an assumption rejected the growing idea of psychobiology where genetic predisposition or inherited traits could explain the character of nations, ethnic groups or poverty (Shore 1987).

As one of the first examples of cooperative research in North America, the Canadian Frontiers of Settlement Project in the 1920s studied pioneer settlement in the west under the direction of C.A. Dawson who applied the "metropolis and hinterland" thesis developed at the Chicago School to immigration. The study ended up challenging the notion that land settlement could serve as a solution for growing unemployment. By the time the McGill Sociology Department directed the Social Science Research Project toward more urban concerns in the 1930s, its interests were even less in keeping with the railroad interests in Western immigration and were starting to challenge the economic concerns of business and, thus, the McGill governors. Links of some of the faculty members to the League for Social Reconstruction, such as Leonard Marsh, also found disfavour. The program was down-graded and the economics department was built up (Horn 1980; Shore 1987).

The ascendancy of biological positivism to the hegemonic form of social research emerged at the same time as the marginalization of sociology at McGill. The rise of importance in psychobiology and its genetic explanations for social problems provided important justifications for the conservative biological politics of blood and race led by many important medical and social-worker professionals in the area of social work, public education and public health regulation. The institutionalization of scientific racism as biological politics marked the conjunction of social uplift, eugenics and health policy from the 1920s to 1945. Intellectual practice to construct this discourse of "innate" Common Sense began in the last part of the 19th century in Canada, Germany, USA, and Great Britain. Biological politics emerged full blown in all these countries in the economic downturns of the 1920s and 1930s. Eugenics as public policy and implementation was only to fall out of favour in the post-Nazi period in light of the Holocaust revelations (McLaren 1990). This scientifically supported ethic still remains today in the justifications for social behavior provided by medical science, socio-biologists, neuro-psychologists and genetic engineers. Biological positivism still retains its legitimacy in the nature/nurture debates over intelligence and IQ differentials as argued by such people as Arthur Jensen and Philip Rushton. This innate explanation has been rising in importance as of late (Degler 1991; Gould 1981; Lewontin, Rose and Kamin 1984; Swartz 1986).

This biological strain of Canadian positivism which emerged from the Organic Social Darwinism of LeSueur came into conflict with a fourth ideology located at Laval University in Quebec. Although "hibernating" under the so-called "dogmatism" of the classical Catholic theology of Thomism until the Quiet revolution, this latter ethic was not as "reactionary" as is usually presented by liberals. Unlike "value free" utilitarianism and "progressive" liberalism, it offered a valuable ideological counter-weight to the first scientific form of conservative class politics. That is, Catholic Conservatism offered one of the few blocks to biological positivism which informed the eugenics movement (McLaren 1990).

The results of the Second World War left biological politics scrambling for legitimacy. The two strands of technological positivism and social positivism rose in importance and found common ground in American positivism which emphasized the selective capacity of schools to accord status to different "capacities." In the post-1945 period this new variant of technocratic functionalism was called Human Capital Theory (HCT). HCT was premised on the important role of technology in industrial societies. The requirement for education was to provide the necessary technical skills for Canadian industrialization

(Brooks and Gagnon 1988; Schechter 1977). As the Americans, Halsey and Floud (1961) stated in 1961, advanced industrial society "is dependant to an unparalleled extent on the results of scientific research, on the supply of skilled and responsible manpower, and consequently on the efficiency of the education system" (1).

The three phases which mark the expansion of the state sponsored regulation and financing of higher education allowed for the colonization, subordination and rationalization of institutions which already existed rather than creating anything new. In fact, the hegemonic institutions of secondary and higher education in England and Canada were never the leaders in educational reform. This was true for Quebec under Ultramontanism also (Brooks and Gagnon 1988; Monière 1981). The hegemonic institutions used their right to "autonomy" and their monopoly over access to state finances to block rationalization. Only a realignment of power at the state level could implement the withdrawal of financing to actually force the traditionalists to rationalize higher education. But even here the traditionalists required that they retain their internal autonomy during rationalization and in so doing reserved a separate space to assert their independence within the internal administration of a federated higher education system. These traditionalists emphasized their non-utilitarian classical ethos as a badge of status into the second half of the 19th century. Whatever the nature of higher education provided by the dissenting academies and working class organizations, these latter institutions could in no way fill the vacuum left by the absence of a unified national system. Although English Canada did not fair as poorly as England because of the strong presence of the Presbyterian and Methodist ethic in Anglo-Canadian institutions, as far as the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge and the elite colleges within the Canadian university system were concerned, there was little need for scientific and vocational education or any sympathy for "empiricism," "free thought" or "practical innovation." Although Toronto, Queen's and McGill did retain strong links with Scotland and later the USA, in the second and third phases of industrialization, Canada found itself developmentally limited by its close association with England.

Instead of Germany, Sweden and France -- which should have been the first destination of Canada's brightest -- the first choice was usually Oxford or Cambridge (McKillop 1979; S.E.D. Shortt 1976). When Canadians were going to England and Scotland at the turn of the century, the Americans, British and French were going to Germany to get information first hand (Manicas 1987). Furthermore, because Quebec remained an internal colony of Ontario and Anglo-Montreal business, it was also blocked from developing important capabilities which were present in France, such as the renowned application of the mathematics and physics evident in the Jesuit colleges, the rigorous mathematical training provided by the Napoleonic *lycees* and colleges, and the world-leading developments in technical education provided by the state *polytechniques* and *grandes ecoles* (Green 1990). These kinds of advances could find no favour within the premodern lordship of the Quebec Catholic Church subordinated to the needs of the Anglophone business community.

In the United States, the later phases of industrialization seemed closely matched to the development of technical and scientific education as well as scientific management, but the American model provided only a few connections for the Canadian intellectual elite because of the pervasive fear of small farmer democracy and free thought (Cook 1985). John Hopkins, Chicago, and Harvard did become the destination for a few, such as O.D Skelton, who would later rise to intellectual power under the administration of Mackenzie King (Cwram 1986). Most aspiring intellectuals up to 1945 found Scotland and England their first priority.

The rise of technocratic reformism was the product of political and discursive struggles and not the natural outcome of a modernization process. The intelligentsia as well as capitalists, bureaucrats, politicians and popular movements struggled for hegemony, and in so doing constructed *modern* Canadian life. The next section directs attention toward these latter contradictory influences.

#### **5.4. The Poverty of Technocratic Reformism**

While the central struggle over the Canadian state was between the adherents of *laissez-faire* and moral uplift, the technocratic reform tradition also had to make accommodations throughout the last century to the adherents of conservative and socialist narratives. This section surveys these contradicting narratives, their theories of social development, the institutional basis for their assertions and accommodations and their criticisms that lead to an increased dissatisfaction with liberal technocratic discourse. The combination of material transformations in the global order and increasing dissatisfaction with liberal technocratic discourse resulted in the emergence of new adherents to a corporatist postmodernization narrative. This section ends with a brief critique of liberal and socialist variants of technocratic reformism.

The conservative narrative in Canada was articulated to language of Empire in a struggle with liberalism to define the basis of moral valuation. These theories of Canadian moral development contain competing claims about the primary form that the governance of (normative) value should take: the commands of traditional authority, the contracts of economic market or the solidarities of participatory democracy.

W.L. Morton (1972) argued that

the moral core of the Canadian nationhood is found in the fact that Canada is a monarchy and in the nature of monarchical allegiance...Allegiance means that the law and the state...do not rest on contemporary assent....In Canada, a country of economic hazard, external dependence, and plural culture, only the objective reality of a monarchy could form the centre and pivot of unity. (85)

Morton's statement of normative fact is also a partisan moral claim that established the canon for privileging the commands and contents of a particular class tradition over others. He claimed that the Monarchy was the *only* moral force that could unite the nation. As well as the ruling prerogatives of the sovereignty of the Crown, other forms of sovereignty were also to have claims to the throne. Adherents to the capitalist market and to participatory democracy also made similar claims for different moral forces to bind the nation.

A.R.M. Lower (1957, 1977) offered one challenge to the canon that the moral core of the Empire Tradition was the only objective reality for unity. Lower posited that although common allegiance to the British Imperial system provided one logic for Canadian development another logic resided in the growth of the capitalist industrial market, which he called the "extension of communication." In this sense, communication is the moral attitude of "capitalism," a term not used by Lower except in the sense of an entrepreneurial ethic. He also understood Canada's development within the framework of Turner's frontier thesis, whereby the chief market impulse leads development, and this development explains the presence of an egalitarian and democratic spirit and a distancing from the monarchical tradition of rank and privilege. Crisis for Lower, was caused by a breakdown of traditional values and certainties. He was predominantly concerned with the development of a national community, one which he thought could draw on the inner dualism created by French Canada to temper the effects of frontier materialism and Calvinist individualism.

The debate over the normative structuring of "nation" between the British Empire and American Capitalism was not limited to Lower's thesis. The canon also was differentiated on the terrain of defining which kind of capitalism was progressive: commerce versus industry. Donald G. Creighton (1944, 1956) argued, that the chief economic impulse came from the driving force of the Canadian commercial classes expanding outward from the St. Lawrence.

Harold Innis (1946) on the other hand argued that in the morality contest between empires and markets, a Canadian constitutional structure emerged to represent the need to secure capital at favourable interest rates and to promote expansion. Later Innis came to see the consolidation of monopoly industrial power as distorting democratic communication and resulting in destructive effects on the university, liberal values and Canadian culture -- that is, on what he believed was the cultural core of Western civilization. Here Innis explained cultural "degeneration" as the monopolization of value by free market relations. Innis, like Max Weber, pessimistically prophesied the impending "iron cage" of materialism and was no longer able to celebrate the development of a capitalist monopoly market.

George Grant (1969; 1965) came to similar conclusions. Grant's critique of the technological imperative was based on how the market threatened conservative forms of sovereignty. Marshall McLuhan (1964) took a different tack by celebrating the politics of technology, the progress in communication provided by the new market in electronic communications and the formation of a new mind. This new normative structure, though, was fundamentally "amoral," that is, stripped of its substantive contents whereby the medium was now the message (McLuhan 1967). This last analysis about the nature of the normative structuration and the governance provided by a state constitution versus a market economy, ends with a form of moral resignation to the governance of an economy effectively put on automatic pilot. Thus morality as grounded on tradition or critical discourse is now considered a moot point under the sign of a self-generating technological imperative.

As I show in Part III, the canonical interpretation assumed in the *Toward 2000 Together* process mobilized most of its strength from the liberal narratives concerning the egalitarian frontier, the Calvinist ethic and the celebration of technology. The traditional conservatism of Morton and Grant, though, is missing. The lament of Grant and Innis also goes unrecognized indicating an antithesis to conservative solidarity or liberal democracy. Creighton's thesis of a moral force derived from the commercial classes finds some resonance, but in this case, the traders are considered Alberta's merchants rather than Montreal's old families. The corporatist elements in *Toward 2000 Together* do clearly appeal to a new form of technocratic "social conservatism." This new narrative appears as a challenge to the liberal and conservative canon. The narrow reading of Canadian canonical tradition used to justify the management of Alberta reform, though, does not stop at merely emphasizing aspects of the liberal canon and introducing a new corporatist canon, it also completely occludes reference to the marginalized canon of the Canadian left. It is to this discourse I now turn.

The above theoretical differences on the nature of social development between conservatism and liberalism and about the "moral essence" of governance have provided the traditional canons of reference in Canada, but they by no means exhaust the realm of historical possibility. Implicit to some of the above arguments, such as Innis's, is a prejudice for privileging the sovereignty of what seemed like an increasingly compromised liberal democracy. The result of the Innis-to-McLuhan trajectory, argues Stanley Ryerson (1968) is that such a theory is "abstracted from *social structure*, [and] leads to a new

idealist metaphysic" (427). The reification of the abstractions of crown, constitution, economy, communication or technology fail to acknowledge that people make history. The problem is, how to incorporate an analysis which starts with *real people* and their usage of economic, political and cultural forms without slipping into another metaphysic.

Ryerson (1968: 435) argues that an alternate morality is also present in the constitution of the Canadian society and this morality is the impulse of popular participatory democracy which challenges the constitution of a political union from above. The unfinished business is the realization of radical democracy or post-liberal democracy. C.B. Macpherson (1989 [1965]) has called his focus *the real world of democracy* in liberal states. He posits a normative model immanent to the assertion of the popular classes in Canadian society based on participatory democracy (Macpherson 1989, 1977, 1973). Others also work within this moral tradition which privileges the sovereignty of the popular classes and participatory theory (see Panitch 1977; Whitaker 1977; Rosenblum and Findley 1991).

Besides the conservative narrative, the reform liberals had to incorporate elements of the socialist narrative. This articulation meant splitting off elements of the socialist tradition committed to an accommodation with a Canadian capitalism on limited laissez faire and a regulatory Canadian state. It is this theory of social development that more or less dominated the liberal tradition from Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau. In this case, the technocratic thesis was valuable in marginalizing a Canadian-based Marxian analysis and accommodating a statist form of technocratic socialism. I first look at the marginalization of Marxian socialism and then at the development of technocratic reform socialism.

The first reconfiguration of Marx's canon by a Canadian academic was attempted by McGill philosophy professor John Clark Murray who penned a manuscript in 1887 called *The Industrial Kingdom of God*. The manuscript remained unpublished until 1982 and thus had no discursive effect. Murray attempted to integrate some of the ideas of Marx into Christian reformism and the work of Henry George. His writing cannot be considered in any sense premised on Marxism. His central focus was on the nature of a "just wage" in a modern industrial society and assumed the Protestant conviction that individual regeneration must precede effective reorganization (Cook 1985: 179-184). The work more closely resembles and anticipates the Protestant technocratic liberalism of the future Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his influential book, *Industry and Humanity* (1919).

Until the 1970s, the little Marxist scholarship that was done was pursued outside the universities and mainly in connection with the Communist Party of Canada. Most of this literature did not offer an independent analysis of Canadian political economy or ideology. There were exceptions though. Marxists and neo-Marxists such as C.B. Macpherson and H.C. Pentland managed an independent existence in the universities after the Second World War. The 1960s revival of academic Marxism in the West was delayed in Canada until the late 1970s when it finally eclipsed the instrumentalism of radical elite theory. Western Marxism thus emerged in roughly three schools of thought: structural-functionalist, critical/hegemony and British historicism (Laxer 1992: xviii).

The Marxist discourse as one of the two dominant leftist discourses in Canada dates back to 1872 when an excerpt from *Das Kapital* (predating the first English translation in 1886) was published in the *Ontario Workman* (Ryerson 1968: 446). The relationship between the First International and the Chartist also provided the first link to a Marxist discourse. Another link was the first generation of American Marxists, Daniel DeLeon, Max Eastman, John Reed, and Big Bill Haywood, who in the first quarter of the 20th century influenced the Canadian socialist movement as an extension of the American socialist movement (Diggins 1992; Palmer 1992). The Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) and the Social-Democratic Party of Canada (S-DPC) were Marxist-oriented. Their split in

1911 was precipitated on the issue of immediate demands and to accommodate the needs of the S-DPC as a foreign language federated party. The SPC and SDPC were federated in the formation of the Canadian Communist Party (CPC). As extensions of the newly federated Communist Party of America and the Communist Labour Party of America, the CPC, like the American party, was based on the democratic and federal model promoted by Lenin. Stalin denounced the theory of a federation in 1924 and instituted bureaucratic centralism by 1929 (Penner 1977, 1988).

The formation of the Canadian Communist Party in 1921 set the stage for a potential indigenous Canadian analysis to develop, but early attempts at independent analysis were thwarted by Comintern policy and the sterile sectarianism of ultra-left tactics. Stalin's triumph affected all Western communist parties with purges and witchhunts. Independent Marxist thinkers had to conform to the changing pronouncements from Moscow or find themselves marginalized outside the party. When the original founders such as Jack MacDonald, Maurice Specter, Stewart Smith and Tim Buck attempted independent analysis of the Canadian situation they were disciplined by either expulsion, compromise or reeducation. The first independent analysis was called "Canada and the British Empire" and attempted to point out the conditions that made Canada different from Britain and the United States. It also did not generalize from the Russian experience.

The thinkers given preference for leadership in the CPC were educated at the Lenin School in Moscow. This school opened in 1926 and was established for party workers from the many countries in the Comintern who would devote themselves exclusively to the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. The new cadre trained at the Lenin School, Leslie Morris, Sam Carr, John Weir, replaced the original founders of the party except for Tim Buck. Other sections of the Comintern such as the United States, Great Britain and France faced similar discipline. With the immanent threat of war in 1939, the school closed. After a decline in party membership during the Cold War, the school was reopened in 1960 to reassert the power of the Soviet Party over the world Communist movement. One of the new themes was "back to the classics" of Marxist-Leninism (Penner 1977, 1988).

The rise of Western Marxism in the 1970s eclipsed the moribund assumptions of Marxism-Leninism based on Stalin's 1924 *Foundations of Leninism*. Stalin's work established the principles of Soviet Marxism (DiaMat) and determined the interpretations given to the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Stalin's interpretation was confirmed as dogma even in the post-Stalin period and no mention was made of the "independent" writings of other Marxists such as Trotsky, Gramsci, Luxemburg or Kautsky. But even within the CPC there were temporary exceptions to the discipline which usually arose during the movements for a Popular Front in Canada. Independent analysis was achieved in the Party's submission to the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois) titled "Toward Democratic Unity for Canada," in the publication of Stanley Ryerson's *1837--Birth of Canadian Democracy*, and in the revival of Smith's "anti-imperialist" analysis by the Operating Centre headed by Stewart Smith, Leslie Morris and Stanley Ryerson (Penner 1988).

CP relations with middle-class intellectuals were negative. Prior to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 intellectuals were not welcomed into party ranks. A close associate of Stalin, R. Palme Dutte, announced in 1932 that "there is no special work or role for Communists from the bourgeois intellectual strata. . . .The intellectual who has joined the Communist Party. . .should forget that he is an intellectual (except in moments of self-criticism) and remember only that he is a Communist" (cited in Penner 1988: 154). After 1935 opportunities were given for relations with Canadian intellectuals, but the sharp

swings in party tactics mitigated any long term liaisons. Such concerns were softened in times of the popular front, but for the most part the Communist parties adhered closely to principles enunciated by Zinoviev in 1921: that united front action could only be taken on communist terms. After 1929, this primacy given to the success of socialism in one state meant that the radical left narrative had to be either subordinated to or fragmented from Stalin's directives and Soviet foreign policy. But even in instances emphasizing united front principles (whether from below in the sectarian periods or from above and below in popular front periods), the Party never ceased attacking social democratic leaders even when united in action. At worst, the Stalinist analysis of social democracy as "social fascism" undermined Lenin's strictures on dualisms. Stalin's domination converted the Communist definition of social democracy from an opposing trend to the main enemy or the working class (i.e., the CP). By 1971 the CPSU called this approach to the social democrats a grievous mistake and the Canadian party finally followed suit (Penner 1988: 150).

While the revolutionary left was marginalized and increasingly moribund, the reform left accommodated its discourse to that of progressive liberalism. This second left discourse which was to become the dominant left discourse developed out of several strands in the trade unions and the provincial socialist and labour parties. Early attempts to form the Canadian Labour Party (CLP) failed. Unlike the early Communist Party, J.S. Woodsworth was against a party based on the British model which he thought would become dominated by a labour bureaucracy. The Stalinization of the Communist Party ended the potential for a CLP and the resulting alienation of the left socialists (e.g. Socialist Party of Canada) and the anarcho-syndicalists (e.g. One Big Union) made way for the potential elements of a left party to migrate in the direction of Woodsworth's social gospel vision of a people's party embracing labour, farmers and small business interests. The dream was mainly realized with the formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) -- a precursor to New Democratic Party (NDP). Many of the founders of the CCF in 1933 had been members of the Socialist and Labour Parties and were accomplished Marxists, especially the B.C. sections. They united with the agrarian radicals who were mainly populists in the style of the Non-Partisan League and influenced by social gospel and Christian socialism. Beardian-style Marxism and a British Fabian interpretation were also brought into the CCF by a group of academics and intellectuals organized as the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) (Penner 1977).

The LSR was the first organization of left wing intellectuals in Canada which had an institutional basis in higher education. The LSR was initiated by "the letter of the sixty-eight professors" in 1930 and began to take shape in 1931-32 when two dozen men and women gathered to discuss a tentative title for a book called "Reconstruction -- A Plan for Canada" as a response to the Depression. The LSR was led by Frank Underhill, J.S. Woodsworth, Frank Scott, Eugene Forsey and King Gordon. Half the initial group held university teaching posts, six had been Rhodes Scholars, and most were fairly recent graduates from Canadian and English universities. At its peak the LSR had 400 members in Montreal and Toronto and a total membership of not more than one thousand. Twenty other branches existed in Ontario and the four western Provinces. French Canadian or rural members were rare. The groups were heavily represented by school teachers, clergymen, social workers, housewives and university students. The *Canadian Forum* was its chief journal and *Social Planning for Canada* (1935) became its most comprehensive statement for social reform. Led by Frank Underhill the CCF's 1933 Regina Manifesto was drafted by league members and was based with some modification on the LSR's manifesto. The LSR is primarily remembered for enunciating the Canadian socialism of the CCF. Their



key ideas concerned social welfare and fiscal policy in Canada and the ideas relevant to a transitional stage on the road to socialism. But their ideas were not strictly socialist, hence were appropriated by Liberals and Conservatives (Horn 1980). Where William Lyon Mackenzie King's ideas in *Industry and Humanity* (1919) represented the liberal-Protestant and social-Darwinian foundation for human capital theory and technocratic management (Cook 1985), the ideas of LSR provided the foundation for a theory of social justice based on the generalization of equal opportunity. The articulation of these two theories of social development contributed to the formation of the hegemonic narrative in Canada following World War II and justified the expansion of the progressive-liberal welfare state. It is this progressive-liberal narrative which is currently challenged by the vision of *Toward 2000 Together*.

In the above debates which are central to the development of the imaginary Canadian, that is, debates over constitution versus economy, or commercialism versus industry, or humanity versus technology, or liberal democracy versus radical democracy in all their conservative, liberal or socialist variants, I want to underscore that in their conservative and liberal variants (and some socialist variants) there is a commonality in reproducing not only technocratic/empirical incrementalism but also variations of an idealist metaphysic when it comes to morality and progress. What makes them similar in their orientation to the social development of culture and communication is that they take "the royal road to modernization" (i.e., what Habermas calls Weber's modernization thesis). Missing from their discourse is an analysis of the real world of moral (and *imaginary*) resources, as identified by Macpherson, and their effective and ineffective production and mobilization by the popular classes, workers, and marginalized groups such as women, aboriginals and the unemployed. What were the pushes and pulls from below? Where is their imagined history? Where is their effect as they attempt to mobilize their resources in their own interests? As I show in Part III hegemonic canonical narratives are mobilized in *Toward 2000 Together* and the "people's" canon is written out of history. *The writing and the making of history coincide here*. Ruling elites did not only respond to each other, they also responded to the actions of those from below.

What are the limitations of a Canadian left-liberal and social democratic analysis which continue to antedate current transformations in technology, culture and social knowledge? Stephan Bronner (1990) provides a telling critique. Within the progressive left liberal framework, the definition of class is dehistoricized and conflated with empirical indicators for "status," "income," "occupation" or any number of conceptions. Nevertheless, *the concept of "class" is not only purged of its relational aspects but the "metaphysic" which grounds the means to judge exploitative social relations is also lost*. *With the loss of a transcendent standpoint to guide the subject in making practical choices, critical judgement is reduced to empirical skepticism and disempowers the development of critical philosophy*. The attempt to find a balance between reformist strategists and establishment allies results in a definition of "class" which is acceptable to the contemporary mainstream. The ideology of such a partnership is incapable of placing the values of the exploited above those of the exploiters. Progressive liberalism or reform socialism results in empty pluralism, and the *nation* rather than an international class becomes the centre for reform politics.

The politics of partnership, presupposes that all differences are reconcilable. By viewing private individuals as public citizens who are unaffected by structural interests and open to persuasive compromises it assumes that a steady progress of social reforms can evolve within capitalist relations of production and that a radical break with the status quo is unnecessary. *Thus, just as empiricism denies a certain understanding of class, it also*

*informs a certain view of politics based on incremental reforms through calculable compromises.*

Such an approach is limited, though, by a contradiction derived from an implicit assumption. The perception that reforms within capitalism constitute a progress in liberalism or growth in socialism presupposes both a unilinear and optimistic view of progress. In other words, it has to assume a deterministic teleology toward an ideal which the very assumptions of skeptical empiricism intends to deny. By envisioning progress in material terms rather than moral terms, no speculative categories are provided to make judgements. The rejection of "metaphysical" claims and categories *render impossible normative judgements about a strategic purpose or the differentiation of a "bad" from a "good" compromise.* The rejection of a "kingdom of ends," that is, a transcendent and universal goal, that is, a "vision," to serve as an external referent for practical judgements, creates a logic whereby skeptical empiricism thus surrenders its critical edge. The skepticist attack on idealist categories makes it impossible to judge instrumental compromises or to evaluate how short-term success can lead to long-term failures. *Where "compromise" assumes a transcendent political value, political decision-making becomes defined by "accountability" or "efficiency" or the "end of ideology."*

The unexamined *original compromise*, that is, the exploitative relationship inherent to the class relationship between labour and capital, provides a useful tautology for the uncritical reformer whose attitude must become that of the lobbyist and whose style that of the technocrat. The "pluralistic" strategy focuses on gaining the best possible deal without reference to the ideological and material relations concerning social development. This kind of compromise does not mean that "compromise" in itself is necessarily a confirmation of the status quo or a force for reaction but rather that compromise between "interest groups," such as scientists, politicians, unionists, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, can only be stillborn if an instrumental compromise also entails a compromise of moral principle.

But the juxtaposition of instrumental and principled compromise, is a moot point for the empirical reformer. After having rejected *a priori* speculative categories of judgement the issue can be simply ignored. Political accountability, even in emphasizing the subordination of science and industry to the nation (as is done by the Science Council of Canada), thus becomes defined by an attempt to achieve some form of distributive equality within the existing order by promoting particular interests, as in this case, salvation through technology and the practices of the scientific, engineering, medical and technical communities in the name of "efficiency," "profitability" or "the national interest."

History is far richer than the one-sided instrumental assumptions of progressive liberalism and social democratism now usually expressed in technocratic forms of populism. What at first might appear as progress, tragically becomes its opposite, bureaucratic conservatism, for having occluded the *original compromise*. This conservatism is especially evident in this time of retrenchment expressed not so much by Ralph Klein and Brian Mulroney, *but rather by the social democratic premiers in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario* whose cuts into the gains of the welfare state have been substantial. The *irrationality* of the material contradiction between labour and capital permeates the social relations of calculable compromise and manifestations of social problems result in calls for intensified amelioration or cultural adaptation by "*progressive*" *bureaucrats, politicians, and scientists.* The discourse of the Science Council of Canada and the promoters of a liberal welfare state and technocratic reform socialism cannot challenge the vision enunciated by the promoters of the corporatist postmodernization narrative. *Welfare liberals and reform socialists will, in the end, have to subordinate their empiricism to the grammar of the New Right.* Such is what happens in Part III when

Alberta teachers, parents and students in their resistance have to promote a vision based on human capital theory when they ask for "politicians to view education *as an investment* not an expense."

As a *vision*, welfare liberalism and technocratic socialism cannot challenge the corporatist tendencies promoted by the alliance of scientific, state and capitalist elites. In fact, in a sophisticated and naive way such "*progressivism*" subordinated to *New Right Futurology* may deepen the process of internal colonization. Instrumental thought thus becomes self-fulfilling where, in the words of Karl Mannheim (1936), "the fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration" (118). The result is that empirical reformers of capitalism, such as illustrated by the Science Council of Canada, in the name of science and critical thought promote a closed system enhancing the very iron cage they wish to escape.

In concluding this section, what can be ascertained about the efficacy of the liberal technocratic reformism to meet the challenge of corporatist postmodernization? The origins of reform liberalism are closely aligned with the grammar of positivism that rests on the metaphysic of industry and technology and a belief that an eternal accommodation of mutual benefit can be achieved between labour and capital. It is this broader and more inclusive and flexible narrative that has defined the imaginary Canadian that any construction of the "imaginary Albertan" has to account for. The durability of this positivist narrative throughout most of the twentieth century, though, does not give it an eternal validity. In fact, what I show in Part III is that the visioning process of the provincial *Toward 2000 Together* strategy and the national *Prosperity Initiative* has provided a vehicle whereby the corporate postmodernization narrative has assimilated not only the technocratic thesis from liberalism but also a millenarian vision of progress from individual salvationism. A political movement dedicated to anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-imperialist and anti-class values may face difficulties in mobilizing people by articulating their agenda solely on the basis of empirical incremental reforms and a vision of technocratic socialism in a liberal welfare state.

### **5.5. The Origins of the Corporatist Postmodernization Narrative**

The enunciation of the "corporatist postmodernization" narrative and the reconstitution of the subjectivity of the "post-industrial" ruling class in Alberta is a complex process. Previous sections in this chapter dealt with the rise and stall of the liberal technocratic narrative in the face of conservative, socialist and corporatist challenges. This section looks closely at the emergence of the corporatist postmodernization narrative. This narrative has two points of interest that both reproduce and transform the liberal interest in moral uplift and *laissez-faire*. The first interest in "moral uplift" reemerges as "strategic management" and the second interest in "*laissez-faire*" reemerges as "public choice theory." The synthesis of these two interests and of the means to achieve it provides a centre of gravity that allows the corporatist postmodernization narrative to provide the framework for assimilating other discourses (e.g. Christian fundamentalism, labourism, merchant commercialism). This section focuses on the development of the strategic management interest. The next section then highlights how the language of public choice is subordinated to a corporate management interest in constructing a regime of "performativity." Performativity means that the organized stock of established knowledge and the means to transmit it are reevaluated according to a new logic which answers the question "What use is it?" rather than "Is it true?" In the *American* context of economic commercialization and state expansion this utilitarian quest finds its true equivalences in "Is it saleable?" and "Is it efficient?" (Lyctard 1984: 51).

Unlike the forms of intervention associated with civic privatism and democratic elitism, the corporatist solution aims not to "merely facilitate, regulate, ameliorate, augment, stimulate, stabilize or support private economic activity; the state [tries] to direct and control it -- but without public appropriation." (Winkler 1977: 82). In the recent period, the dissolution of the post-WWII social contract has created a cultural environment of uncertainty about the future direction of American and Canadian development. In periods of stability and transition the underlying fear for hegemonic intellectuals in their "organizational and connective" functions is that something *unpredictable* might happen in the future. What underlies the hegemonic functionaries' fear is that the prestige and confidence of the dominant group *may not* be mobilized *and* that the command and direction of the crisis will not be correctly anticipated. As symbolic warriors, these "new" intellectuals recognize that winning the cultural struggle for prestige, confidence, command and direction is never preordained as belonging solely to the ruling group even if a hegemonic discourse might suggest otherwise. This contradictory aspect of hegemonic ideology is problematic. On the one hand, the legitimacy given to a ruling group to steer society requires that privileges enjoyed by it be universally accepted by all groups (including the ruling group) as naturally and eternally preordained (reified). But on the other hand, if a ruling group believes too strongly in its own preordination as the natural and eternal ruler, it will not see the purpose in providing the necessary resources for the cultural construction of a legitimacy "surplus" in the anticipation of future crisis. The capitalist crisis is thus also a moral crisis concerning who should lead the next phase of development. Primarily, through the medium of language and, secondarily, the media of money and force, the hegemonic intellectuals must vigilantly produce "texts" to reconstitute the desires of different groups in different ways so that when crisis of legitimacy does occur, change remains limited to the boundary conditions preestablished by the social order, that is, the inequitable distribution of property, the subordination of women, and the dominance of the "white" races.

Hegemonic concerns about unpredictability have generated a growing discourse concerning the future which has developed in three phases from "futurism" to "strategic planning" and now to what is called "the visioning process" where the traditional heroic practice of the public intellectual is eliminated from the political process and replaced by a rationalized and anonymous form of authorship. Whether speaking of education as part of a schooling process or speaking of it as the general process of informing the social body in the military, the medical profession, the civil service, the business corporation, or a national population, futurology is concerned with controlling change and crisis and limiting democratic participation to "experts" (Dublin 1990). The hegemonic intellectual's identification of rapidly accelerated change combined with the ever increasing "cross-impacts" of system complexities drives their fear that existing policies and institutions will be inadequate to the task of successfully managing social crisis.

Scientific social forecasting in "the vision process" predates "futurology," but the initial birth of "futurism" as a discursive practice marks that period of time when social forecasters became self-aware that they were not alone in their practices and that other researchers in other disciplines were working on similar projects, that is, attempting to predict and manage the future. Although researchers used methods of prediction which were discipline specific (such as trend analysis in sociology and science fiction writing in literature), the term "futurology" was first coined by a European, Ossip Flechtheim (1969: 264), in the 1940s to describe the practice of combining projections, predictions and planning procedures with goals and values concerning the future and proved a valuable intellectual resource for the consolidation and rationalization of a variety of disciplinary

practices within the rubric "futurology." Andrew Ross (1991: 172-180) highlights that in the United States, futurology originated in the special relationship established between military weapons planners and civilian scientific advisors in "operations research" during the Second World War. One of the first fully integrated institutes for futures research with additional aid from the Ford Foundation was called the RAND Corporation. Other organizations followed suit: for example, the Institute for the Future, the Hudson Institute, Systems Development Corporation, and the Institute of Defense Analysis. The initial impetus for such an organization of intellectuals as a technocratic elite formation was first envisaged by the progressive movement of the New Deal and Roosevelt's Brain Trust. In the elite milieu of these institutes and think-tanks, there was little consideration for popular or democratic decision-making about the future. To merely reduce the development of these organizations to a manifestation of the military-industrial complex, though, would miss the point that a significant number of publicly-minded liberal intellectuals who were anti-technocratic entered the field of futurology to address social and ethical concerns of public interest. The expansion of a "futures" establishment drawn from sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, social psychologists, educators, philosophers and poets etc. meant that the routinization of technocratic practices was signified not by the language of militarism and capitalism but by progressivism and moral uplift. Already, by 1975, an intellectual cult of predicting the year 2000 had developed in the capitalist democracies into a substantial business of professional prophecy.

The attempts to consolidate and rationalize the various discourses into one *overarching* approach called "futurology" emerges as a crucial intellectual project in the United States in the early and mid-1970s where the success of such a project was not just deemed possible but also seen as socially necessary in order to overcome the perceived threats to systems' maintenance evoked by events such as the OPEC oil crisis and the explosive discontent of many people around the world. Such, also, were the interests in maintaining the social order of a young Preston Manning, now leader of the Canadian Reform Party. As a 25 year old graduate in physics and economics, he was also a systems-analysis devotee and helped prepare Alberta's 1967 "White Paper on Human Resources Development." His interest was in the general applicability of systems theory to socio-economic development models (Finkel 1989: 157).

The global fragmentation of futures studies created by the intellectual division of labour was inadequate to manage the crises. For an increasing number of elite specialists, futurology was "required" for governments to move beyond crisis management to a kind of preemptive planning which could anticipate crises and have plans of action already in place for quick implementation. Alexander King (1975), Chairman of the International Federation of Institutes of Advanced Study in Paris and, also, formerly a co-founder of the Club of Rome and Director-General for scientific affairs and education for OECD wrote:

The central issue is whether the world and its constituent nations can build in time a capacity and an initiative with regard to future events and prepare contingency plans and policies to meet them, rather than acting *post facto* when problems arise. It is a matter of decreasing the degree of uncertainty with regard to the future rather than a matter of crisis government. This new approach is not merely a matter of forecasting by extrapolation of past and present trends which can easily collapse under the pressure of forces external to each nation. It is rather a matter of trends and potentialities of the present and of assessing the relative significance of each trend, of examining choices and options and the probable consequences of various combinations of these, of foreseeing incompatibilities, physical road blocks and inter-goal conflicts, of constructing possible and desirable microfutures. It will have to be a continuous

process, kept under constant review as events and deeper insights render modifications necessary. It is a concept of dynamic rather than static planning. (38)

In 1975, King could only argue for the production of a particular kind of analysis which could be marketed to governments or other clients who would have a similar interest in using this kind of "management" product. But the naming of strategic planning was more than just a call for a new kind of intellectual practice. As King's statement shows, strategic planning was actually a call for a particular form of governance which was anti-democratic and inherently totalitarian. By 1990, though, core capitalist governments including American and Canadian (especially Albertan), were initiating fully rationalized forums for consensus building projects representative of King's fantasy. What was new in this form of governance was not social forecasting *per se* (because this was already being provided by the various sectoral and disciplinary analyses) but rather a special kind of social forecasting *and accelerated political action* which was both totalizing in theory and in practice as the administration of national societies in an increasing competitive global economy.

This new form of "planned" governance had to function within a postmodern global capitalism. With increasing cross-border capital flows and cross-class alliances, consensus-building took on a specifically elitist form. Frank Hearn (1985) writes "consensus on these matters [was] facilitated by the strongest tendency of corporatist decision-making to operate in accordance with technocratic criteria in the absence of public surveillance" (149). Such forms of corporatism were also on the hegemonic intellectual agenda in Canada, suturing the economic theories of supply-siders, monetarists and corporatists into a new political vision of a "Canada" which led the Free Trade Debate. The intention was (and still is) to enhance private sector power and to weaken control of nation-states. Nation-states thus become the coordinators of policies desired by the corporate sector and the administrative means to thwart democratic traditions (Cameron 1984: 174; Needman 1989: 309; Panitch 1979: 44).

A detailed look at how this new corporatist postmodernization *vision* became realized as a political strategy in Alberta provides the main focus for the next chapters. For the moment, though, it is important to mention that this kind of "visioning" has implications for intellectual practice because it presumes to be a totalizing intellectual project for technocratic cultural hegemony yet it is predominantly signified by a discourse of left liberal progressivism. Assuming the absence of resistance, the realization of this "vision" not only marks the death of the public intellectual and the emergence of collective authorship as the Anonymous Intellectual, it also marks the death of what is commonly assumed by the Left as the limit case for democratic capitalism, a liberal/ elite *public sphere* as the steering device for the nation-state. Taking the *longue durée* into consideration and concerning the hegemony of liberal elitism, Immanuel Wallerstein (1992) argues that the years 1968 and 1989 signify the collapses of the dominant liberal ideology (i.e., political modernism) which has oriented political praxis since 1848 in its varied conservative, liberal and socialist forms around the world. The Left response, he says, is now sailing "uncharted seas" and "it will take an immense collective effort to develop a lucid strategy of transformation. Meanwhile, the disintegration of the system goes apace, and the defenders of hierarchy and privilege are wasting no time to find solutions and outcomes which will change everything in order that nothing changes." If considered as a hegemonic cultural revolution in the state, then, the moral regulation being rationalized in the visioning process provided by intellectuals must be considered as the dark-side of an administratively perfected "iron cage," a cultural rule by scientific elites, the global totalitarian shadow of postmodernism's

fragmentary playfulness of difference. Still a fundamental question concerning class relations in this "end of ideology and history" period remains unanswered: What new vision has the international bourgeoisie forged? Hannah Arendt (1973) in her detailed historical study, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, states that the fragmentation of class solidarities makes possible totalitarian politics. She also concluded that:

The bourgeoisie's political philosophy was always "totalitarian"; it always assumed an identity of politics, economics and society, in which political institutions served as the facade for private interests. The bourgeoisie's double standard, its differentiation between public and private life, were a concession to the nation-state which had desperately tried to keep the two spheres apart. (336)

Rephrased, the question becomes, what vision has the international bourgeoisie in the absence of the nation-state as a its primary form of governance? Well, what is happening at the "national" level in various countries might presage this new future. According to Hearn (1985), today public policy is formulated through consultative interaction between public authorities and representatives of important interest groups. Promoted as scrupulously non-partisan and non-ideological, the process is designed to promote the progressive ideas of consensus, collaboration and commitment to national goals. The intention is to insulate policy making and implementation from popular pressures. With the breakdown of the party system and in response to "democratic excess" and "governmental overload," the emergence of this new state formation counters the resistance of politically unpopular policies by making "technical necessity" take precedence over popular will. In this case, rationalization and depoliticization of government goes hand in hand and governance shifts to corporate boardrooms and the executive offices of the political elite. Interest groups are coopted when their leadership participates in public policy formation. In return for providing expert advice, information and agreement, the leaders of interest groups must abide by the outcome of effected policies. On the other hand, the citizenry still participates by exercising voting rights but only in relationship to the interests of a corporation which acts as their economic agent during consensus-building forums.

According to Schmitter and Lembruch (1979: 42) liberal corporatism is a voluntary adaptation to growing economic concentration and increasing global competition and is marked by (1) calls for specific sectoral planning, (2) the coopting of recalcitrant groups (e.g. organized labour) to attain social harmony for national recovery, (3) the decline of legislative decision-making power in favour of administrative agencies, and (4) the increasing pressure to rationalize the process of policy formation by deferring on participatory legitimacy and by supplying professional expertise, specialized information and prior aggregations of opinion. *Liberal corporatist structures do not completely replace conventional legislative forms or pluralist competition, but rather are partial in scope and are designed to coexist with established agencies of policy formation and with the promise of widening the political process. By increasing the participation within the elite political class greater moderation is expected in the practice of "democracy."*

Participation in corporatist structures depends on the relative importance of a person in the social division of labour and not on their capacity for electoral success. According to R. Kravik, corporatist participation "is established within administrative decision-making procedures that acknowledge certain organizational positions as the requisite and legitimate voices of a collective interest" (cited from Hearn 1985: 149). Entitlement to participation is based on the acceptance of the legitimacy of the system which they operate. Furthermore, while no challenges to the system will be encountered, the process is speeded up by avoiding politicization and by emphasizing in committee discussions the technical side of

arguments. This process facilitates the importance of technocrats, technical information, technical formats and well-known and respected specialists. Thus, inter-interest group rivalries are muted by incorporating leaders with a social responsibility into quasi-public agencies. Claus Offe (1981: 145) identifies that such processes make opposition less likely because, having participated in the process, the opposition would have to attack its own leadership. In this manner, corporatism protects the state from popular democratic opposition while contributing to the rationalization of the state.

State, scientific and corporate planning is supplemented with continuous collaboration as well as with the premise that the elites who consent to a plan will also enforce the agreement on their members. The state, thus, coordinates economic development and is shielded from popular demands and in the process interest-group elites and the state simultaneously increase their power. The state accords representational monopolies to recognized and licensed national associations while at the same time maintaining some control over the associations through allocation of memberships and rewarding valuable partners with access to direct deliberations with public officials (Nordlinger 1981). Such developments, though, in no way mean that state control translates into more public accountability. Because of the active collaboration of interest groups in proposing the kinds of intervention needed for the economy, politicians can turn their attention to electoral success by monitoring the public mood and developing public relations strategies. Because of quiet technocratic consultation on policy matters, deliberations rarely become a public partisan matter. If public policy does fail, discontent is focused on the political leaders and the legislative representatives and not on the corporatist state.

Offe and Preuss (1991) argue that the potential for corporatist democracy to truly expand participation is a viable goal. But the practical strategy of limiting participation to national or regional leaders who are already loyal to both the pre-established goals and support the technical procedures of decision-making presupposes that solutions to the collective crisis will be narrowly framed, preoccupied with questions of means and primarily beneficial to those close to the reform initiatives. In this way, "democratic" theory finds a new strategy which, as before, increases the power of mediating representatives in the name of extending participation while at the same time extending the power of the state's intervention into civil society in the name of a more efficient and streamlined government to match the technologically sophisticated requirements of a changed political economy -- of course, at the expense of authentic public and private space. In the words of David Dickson and David Noble (1981) "science and technology. . . demand the abandonment of democratic norms. In [this] formulation, democracy [has] become not the hallmark of Enlightenment, but of popular reaction, not the highest expression of progress, but its major obstacle" (276).

### **5.6. Intellectual Practice and the Theory of Public Choice**

The enunciation of "corporatist postmodernization" has two points of interest. The last section focused on the first interest in strategically managing modernization from above and how the science of futurology provides an ideological framework for setting the agenda for social reform. This section focuses on how the libertarian language of public choice and the needs of the laissez-faire market are integrated into the postmodernization narrative and subordinated to the corporate management interest according to a logic of "performativity." Intellectual practice, thus, mediates both the commodity market and state management by "producing proof" in the name of economic freedom and social control. The next section deals in more detail with effects of "producing proof" on intellectual practice and higher education.



According to Gore Vidal (Gzowski CBC: 1992), American politics is quite easy to understand: there is only one political party, the Property Party, which has two wings, both Right Wings. In more sophisticated but less metaphorical terms, property politics of the last fifteen years has been redefined by American neo-liberals as public choice theory (Barry and Harden 1983; Bonner 1986; Laver 1981; Mueller 1979). The common (theoretical) assumption linking New Right liberalism and public choice theory is "methodological individualism" which posits that all social phenomena such as "society" and the "state" can be approached solely in terms of the objective activities and the subjective choices of individuals. The second assumption is that the American constitution is an inviolable bearer of social Truth. *Both public choice theory and liberalism assume that the organization of American society on the basis of private property, the market economy and the capitalist order is legitimate when rational individuals choose to live in such a manner.* Of course, the intent of public choice theory is to justify the contemporary social order as both existent and legitimate. To do so "public choice" adherents must also factor into the equation other crucial but questionable assumptions: (1) that individuals regardless of their political participation rationally maximize their behavior and that this maximization is in accordance with the (humanly innate) norms of capitalist utility and cost-benefit analysis and (2) that individuals have sufficient information to calculate the most rational course of action (King 1987: 91-109). Public choice theory exists in an imaginary world where classes of individuals do not empirically monopolize wealth, power or knowledge.

Public choice theory is only the latest in a history of explanations about the requirements of representative democracy and the people's right to *choose* their rulers from pre-established elites in order that these same elites can defer on popular claims for popular control over the central institutions (Bowles and Gintis 1987). Challenges from below which tend toward popular control now evoke claims from hegemonic intellectuals about a "crisis of democracy" and "ungovernability." What this "crisis" means is that the rhetoric of the liberal "minimum program" of elite/class rule has lost some legitimacy in the face of claims for political voice and/or economic entitlement. Neo-utilitarians justify the social order with claims that the society ought to (and does) maximize social benefits by using what works, that is, using elite representation in the political system, minority ownership in the economic system, and a highly differential distribution and monopolization of access to the steering media of language, force and money. When the social order is not "delivering the goods" or "maximizing the benefits," the system has a steering crisis (Habermas 1975; O'Connor 1973, 1984). But utilitarian claims formally abstract the substantive differentiation in the social order and occlude *for whom* the order is actually "working" and how the "benefits" are polarized. As a language of governance, the definition of "utility" in America thus becomes the site of important political struggle is setting the agenda for social reform. Defining the very meaning of a "working system" or "maximizing benefits" creates a struggle over conceptual representation. The intent of the debate is to legislate the *correct* definition or over the *legitimate means* to correct the functioning of the social order. In the contemporary period, the central intellectual form this struggle takes is over the meaning of *science* with many other forms of knowledge marginalized in public discourse (Aronowitz 1988). This multiple integration of science, commodity production and strategic management has created a new synthesis, a system for cybernetically managing the social order which I call a "regime of performativity."

The power of *legislating legitimate public discourse* has thus shifted to the institutions of intellectual production as the last court of appeal which sanctions the kind of enunciations that will be accepted as evidence concerning the functioning of society. Jean-

Francois Lyotard (1984) argues that research and education now play a central and qualitatively different role in legitimation. In research (i.e., intellectual production), methods of argumentation multiply and procedures for establishing proof rise in complexity and an equation between wealth, efficiency and truth has been established: that is, "no money, no proof" (ibid.: 45). The ability to *produce* proof increases the ability to be right. The technical criterion of performativity which regulates the efficient mobilization of power cannot fail to influence truth criteria. Power, in this instance, does not come from the barrel of a gun or the performance of the GNP but rather from mastering "reality" by *monopolizing effective verification and good verdicts via scientific knowledge and decision-making authority*. In higher education (i.e., intellectual transmission), the desired goal becomes the optimal contribution to the *best* performance of the social system according to two skills: (1) to tackle world competition and (2) to supply the social system with the means to maintain internal cohesion. In the first instance, there is a demand for experts and management executives in the "leading sectors." In the second instance, higher learning is no longer justified with reference to the ideal of an emancipatory narrative but rather to the systems' demand to *create* skills. "The transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions" (ibid.: 48).

The ends have been redefined to include "world-competition" and "system-skills." This redefinition creates a differentiation in the kinds of services (students) provided by higher education: (1) a "professional intelligentsia" whose competencies are those judged necessary for the integrative function of each profession and (2) a "technical intelligentsia" whose competencies emerge as new domains of knowledge linked to new techniques and technologies emerge. These two categories merge depending on the systems' demands. Lyotard considers these clients "active." Another category of students, the "part unemployed," are not the addressees of active knowledge. These students outnumber the active students and constitute uncouneted job-seekers. Along with creating an active intelligentsia and the *soft* unemployed, higher education increasingly plays a role in job retraining and continuing education. Knowledge can no longer be transmitted *en bloc* but is served up in bits and pieces to adults who are working or expect to be working but require improved skills or institutional promotion.

Although the increasing convergence of capital, science and politics in the twentieth century describes the development of American sociality, this recent restructuring on the lines of performativity marks a qualitative change from the formal integration of base and superstructure into its potential and substantive dissolution. This dissolution has tremendous implications for intellectual practices because the identification of subject positions, such as intellectual, academic, bureaucrat, entrepreneur, professional, manager, scientist and artist, loses its purchase. With the increasing division of intellectual labour and the mobilization of increasingly sophisticated communication and information technologies, intellectual practices as they have been traditionally understood may be replaced with cybernetic systems of information regulation. *The logical end may be the Anonymous Intellectual on automatic pilot where the worlds of science, politics and profit start to become indistinguishable. But to posit such an end at this moment is mere speculation, futuristic mumbo-jumbo. The logic of history, contrary to futuristic projections and strategic planning, contains contrary wills and opposing interests. Whether these contrary wills and interests realize themselves awaits an uncertain future so I limit myself to empirical verification of the corporatist postmodern phenomenon as a potential force for either domination or liberation.*

My conception of the Anonymous Intellectual captures the lingering death of the heroic public intellectual created by the application of Taylorist scientific management to intellectual practices. As a formal starting point, a study of intellectual practice that starts from "methodological individualism" no longer seems tenable when the lines of identity formation are increasingly blurred in the reconstitution of present social organizations. The "intellectual" as a role has become fragmented, dedifferentiated and diffused within a social organization. One cannot look at someone in particular as a heroic subject but must look for the various tendencies in contemporary social organizations which merge the practices of the capitalist, scientist and politician into different yet collective subjects.

Corporate capitalism was marked by the rise of the "organization man" (Spring 1972). The contemporary context is marked by the rise of the "personified organ." This organ is a personified mode of communication prefigures the "anonymous intellectual." Where the "organization human" submerges identity within the organization, the rise of the "personified organ" marks the death of a personal identity altogether. Only the organization retains a coherent subjectivity. "Alberta" as one of Peter Drucker's "organizations" in *Toward 2000 Together* has its own "personal" career but *its* citizens and employees must be prepared to reconstruct and adapt their "subjectivity" to the organization's "needs" many times over a lifetime. People no longer have their own needs; only "the organization" can claim a legitimate need, that is, to compete globally and efficiently survive.

In dealing with the global crisis over what works and how its benefits can be maximized, hegemonic intellectuals are called upon to "produce proof," that is, provide the requisite intellectual resources to reconstruct the *self*-perception of the social order or to construct strategic proposals for institutional reform so that the *nondemocratic* social order can remain intact -- or, better, increase the retrenchment of social welfare and inequality for the majority and the accumulation of private profit for a small minority. Theory and practice are at work on both sides of this equation. The modern relationship between knowledge and power, that is, between the political aspects of theory and the theoretical aspects of politics, rests on a dialectic of legitimations: theories provide politics with a rational basis and politics provides theory with an empirical basis. For hegemonic intellectuals, the legitimacy of a scientific prediction must necessarily occlude this political power *to make* the prediction come true or to generate the resources to produce proof. This political power is expressed in their monopoly over the interpretation of events as well as the narrow range of debate which frames the constellation of legitimate dissent (Chomsky 1989; McMurtry 1989).

This framing does not preclude the fact that the regulation of American discourse also provides a range of intellectual debate within a so-called Left-Right spectrum of propertied politics. This flexibility allows the political and intellectual classes a response which is not available to repressive regimes who must constantly resort to force to contain dissent in periods of economic transition. For the educated classes participating in a discourse framed by performativity and for the popular classes mobilized by the surveillance of policing agencies or seduced by consumables satiating libidinal desires, these mechanisms prove more effective means to accommodate contingent social factors and to demobilize counter-narratives. Hegemony, in the above sense, does not repress dissent but rather rearticulates its cultural meaning and power by confining discourse to a *mythical* polarity of predefined social possibilities: liberal capitalism, state bureaucracy and representative democracy, "American-style," sociality as defined by experts (Kachur 1988). Robert Alford and Roger Friedland (1985) write that "certain historical processes therefore correspond both to certain kinds of political theories and to certain kinds of politics. The success of these politics provides the corresponding theories with empirical data and historical evidence. The

theories produced during those periods provide the corresponding politics with the ideological symbols and vocabulary that are most appropriate to their strategy of achieving political power" (424). In the next section I look at how these theories are situated in discursive regimes of regulation provided by the institutions of higher education and become, through the mediation of an increasingly entrepreneurial intellectual class, a social force.

### **5.7. The Commodification of Higher Education in Canada**

Edward Shils (1982) writes that "the incorporation of the intellectuals into the central institutional system is now integral to the structure of American society" (271). As with the United States during the Madisonian and Keynesian accommodations, so too with *all* late capitalist states there has been an integration of science, capitalism and state to aid rationalization of Fordist and now "post-Fordist" industrialization.<sup>1</sup> This section identifies the institutional basis for the emergence of the corporatist postmodernization narrative to highlight the central importance that higher education plays as a site for the realization of a regime of capitalist performativity. First I briefly describe the history of higher education, second I summarize the global changes to higher education and then I highlight the recent influences on financing, pedagogy, curriculum and administration of higher education in Canada.

In Canada in 1941, approximately 2.1 million students were enrolled in grades 1-12 and this growth peaked in 1971 with approximately 5.6 million enrolled (Young 1987). As these students moved upwards through the education systems, increased pressure for access was placed on higher education. The saturation point of approximately 5 million students in elementary and secondary school set the stage for the educational crisis in higher learning in the 1980s (Livingstone 1987). By then education beyond secondary schooling was seen as a right based on choice and not one based on merit or privilege. As the organization of post-secondary education is restructured via market-based commodification and bureaucratic power-relations, capitalism reveals itself as much more than just a system of production, resource allocation and income distribution but also a system of governance which escapes democratic accountability (Bowles & Gintis 1987). Education as "governance" is caught up in a global struggle for the bodies and minds of those who participate in public life (Pannu, Schugurensky and Plumb 1994).

There is also a struggle going on for the bodies and minds of those who participate in universities. According to the logic of late capitalism, a cursory reading of the history of modern education and, specifically university education, shows an incessant concern with crises in education along with the increased commodification and rationalization of its practices. The Middle Ages' university differed from the modern German university in that the former was free from the church and state whereas the latter was, for the most part, developed within the auspices of the state. The modern university was closely tied to the ideological needs of the state (Bohm 1987; Green 1990; Rhors 1987). After emerging in Berlin in 1810, the modern university expanded throughout Germany, France, England, the United States and Canada. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into the specific

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<sup>1</sup>It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to write about the peripheral capitalist and "socialist" countries which have their own difficulties in dealing with the ever present effects of the capital accumulation crisis. Suffice it to say here, certain tendencies for intellectual practices are also evident in the peripheral countries with the spread of precursors to a supranational "state" (i.e., World Bank, UNESCO, GATT etc.) and the effects of globalization, that have replaced economic imperialism with transnational regimes of flexible accumulation and post-Fordist techniques, in Latin America, South Africa, Nigeria, China and the Arabic countries (*International Journal of Contemporary Sociology* 1991: 28 [3-4]; also see Schugurensky 1994).

variations in the different national university systems (see e.g. Clarke 1983; Green 1990), but suffice it to say here the influence of the American Research University, an offspring of the Modern German University, is now the predominant model for university organization (Veysey 1965). Proposed changes to the Research University is the site for contestation today (Schugurensky 1994; Wotherspoon 1991).

Although scholars have overplayed the mythology about the degree of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in universities (e.g. Harris 1976), the incursions into established university autonomy by external actors in Western countries has been real and accelerating. In 1970, Habermas (1970) stated that the period of traditional university autonomy had ended and "... either increasing productivity is the sole basis of a reform that smoothly integrates the depoliticized university into the system of social labor and at the same time inconspicuously cuts its ties to the political public realm. Or the university asserts itself within the democratic system" (5). Twenty years later in the face of global crisis, research universities are *not* democratizing but rather becoming fully integrated into a system of social labor as "service universities." From "the nation/state university" to "the corporate university" is now born a new phenomenon, "the university corporation" (Buchbinder and Newson 1988, 1990). The development of corporate links to public universities and of privately funded universities (mainly in the USA) actually represents a loss of autonomy for the pursuit of knowledge because the paymaster is usually one of wealthy patrons or a religious group (Levy 1986). Nevertheless, public universities in Canada have enjoyed and still enjoy a considerable autonomy and can accommodate a variety of interests because the state lacks the coherent ability to impose its control (Axelrod 1982).

From the beginning the autonomy of the modern university has been increasingly circumscribed. In the first stage in Germany (1810) and spreading to France, England, the United States and Canada (1860-90), universities began with a focus on the liberal arts to produce history (construct a national culture) and to ponder philosophy (coordinate scientific knowledge). In the second stage with the creation of the University of Chicago (1892) subsidized by Rockefeller money, the research university was born with the mandate to integrate national/business culture, scientific research, and the requirements of industrialization. In the third stage, in the post-1945 period with the addition of the applied sciences and the professional colleges under the same administration, the contemporary university as a research/professional university was created (Axelrod 1982, 1990; Clark 1983; Collins 1985; Green 1990; Habermas 1991, 1989; Veysey 1965). Universities now appear in transition to a fourth stage (Shugurensky 1994).

These stages mark not only the incursion of corporate and state forces to influence governance and curriculum but also an attempt to change the selection and socialization of university students. In the first half of the twentieth century, both the upper class and the working class had a minority presence: the upper class because of its small numerical size and the working class because of its lack of wealth. The Canadian universities were predominantly middle-class with mobility limited to movement within the class. The students were from families in which the fathers were mainly professional (27.1%) or in business (27.3%). The professional and business classes were strongly over-represented considering that professionals then constituted 6.4% and businessmen 5.5% of the occupational population. Students with fathers who were in supervisory positions (11.7%), white collar positions (10.0%), skilled/artisan positions (7.9%) or farming/fishing positions (10.8) constituted 40.4% of the university population. Their presence was minimally underrepresented in universities considering that these categories constituted 52.1% of the occupational population. Students whose fathers were unskilled

or semi-skilled made up only 5.2% of the student population. The working-class presence was strongly underrepresented considering the unskilled and semi-skilled categories constituted 33.6% of the occupational population (Axelrod 1990). Thus, universities provided a privileged place for the professional and business classes to reproduce their social standing.

Except in rare cases, university training did not provide a means by which the poor and working class could rise to the ranks of the rich, and the rich could negotiate their futures on the basis of abundant material assets and influential family connections. Among degree holders, the more modestly endowed were normally confined to trading professional credentials for a maintenance of social standing and material well-being. Middle level businessmen and managers extolled the importance of higher education in smoothing out their paths to the future rather than opening up a new one (Axelrod 1990; Barman 1984; Clement 1975; Porter 1965). Jean Barman's (1984) *Growing up British in British Columbia* provides a recent analysis on the destination of those who graduated from three exclusive private schools in British Columbia. While it is important not to over-generalize, it is also important to remember that many from the Canadian upper class went to universities in England, Scotland and the United States. Barman's detailed study of the British Columbia upper class and private schooling mainly in this period also found that the expansion of the credential requirements for upper echelon occupations reduced the efficacy for intergenerational class transfers based on wealth.

Between the World Wars, when Canadian higher education had a limited expansion, the making of the new middle class was still reserved to a select percentage of the population. In 1931, 2.8% of those between the ages of twenty and twenty-four were enrolled in post secondary institutions. For the same period, this participation rate was far below the United States (11.3%), but equivalent to Germany (2.6%) and almost double that of Britain (1.9%). Females constituted less than one quarter of this select group of Canadians (Axelrod 1990; also see Manicas 1987).

Following the Second World War but before 1973 global economic crisis, higher education in the developed countries expanded with vigor within the context of postwar "Fordism." First, the Western economies introduced a model of development based on mechanization and a particular organization of labor called "Taylorism," that is, the application of science to the labor process. Second, the Western economies distributed the productivity gains to the wage-earning population through a network of collective agreements and the institutions of the welfare state (Braverman 1974; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; Lipietz 1989). Fueled by the postwar boom an alliance of social forces was mobilized around the ideologies of "social justice" and "human capital theory" to expand education in keeping with liberal technocratic reformism. The working and salariat classes saw education as an inherent good and as a vehicle for social mobility. The capitalist, institutional (administrative) and professional/managerial classes saw an investment in education as an investment in an economy which would aid in productivity gains. In addition, the coincidental demographic changes and the extension of mass education to males *and* females created an unprecedented explosion in formal education (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979; Katz and Mattingly 1975). In all the industrial societies of the West, the expansive trend for formal education began after 1945 and continued until the 1970s. "UNESCO figures show that in the period between 1950 and 1980 the rate of secondary school attendance in all industrial countries increased from 30 to 80 percent, and the rate of university enrollment went from barely 4 percent to 30 percent" (Habermas 1989: 104).

The development of higher education in the post-World War II period saw higher education become an extension of the mass public education system. In Canada today approximately 10% of the population possesses a university degree. In 1971, 2.9% of the female population and 6.2% of the male population over the age of 15 had university degrees. By 1983, 7.7% of the female population and 11.3% of the male population had university degrees. In 1985-86 approximately 30% of high school graduates attended university and 54% went on to some form of post-secondary education (Hay & Basran 1991; Schrimpton 1987). The postwar period marked an increasing presence of a non-Anglo, non-white, non-male and non-middle-class constituency in higher education. The recent application of the market model to advanced education may seriously impair educational funding and alleviate the actual surplus of underemployment and overeducation but the model will also exacerbate a legitimation crisis for the state because of this embedded popular demand for advanced education (Livingstone 1987). The Canadian universities served (and still serve) mainly a middle class constituency whose ranks ranged from the well-to-do to the struggling. The expansion of access to higher education has increased the possibility of a working class student gaining a university credential. Whether the market payoff has increased proportionately, though, is another question (see Livingstone & Bowd 1990; Livingstone et al. 1991). In the post-1973 period, retrenchment is directed not only at governance and curriculum but at reducing accessibility. Reduced access clearly has negative implications for non-white, working class or female students (Wotherspoon 1991).

What are the economic preconditions for the renewed interest in education by the state and corporations? The postwar economic consensus began to break down with stagflation in the 1970s: both a supply-side and demand-side crisis. Increasing irrationality in industrial organization, a decline in productivity and a fall in profit rates evoked the supply-side crisis. The demand-side crisis developed because production was moving to the Third World to restore productivity, trade was exceeding internal demand and there was a breakdown in supply-demand management which coincided with the OPEC oil shock. From 1973-79 to maintain the old order, countries attempted "demand-management" by increasing the money supply, increasing consumption in the North and expanding exports from the NICs. Stagflation continued with the devaluation of the US Dollar and a continued decline in profitability. The economic crisis set the stage for the conditions that gave rise to the New Right and its challenge to higher education. The period from 1979 to 1982 was marked by monetarist attempts to control the money supply, to restore confidence to creditors, to eliminate non-competitive firms, to cool the economies through recession in the North and to leave the NICs with exploding surpluses and debts. After 1982, the North attempted alternate approaches. The "flexible liberal" approach in USA, UK and Canada cut labour costs by eliminating job security, by increasing productivity with new automation at home and (for those corporations who had the option) by transferring production to cheap-labor countries. The "social contract" approach in Japan, Scandinavia, Italy and Germany was quite varied, especially considering the differences between the conservative-corporative variant versus the social-democratic variant, but, nevertheless, these variants dealt with the supply-side crisis differently than did the countries dedicated to the flexible liberal approach. The countries following the social contract approach cut labour costs through wage-earner agreements and enhanced quality and domestic productivity through internal investment and partnerships between universities and private enterprises (Buchbinder and Newson 1988, 1990; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990; King 1987; Lipietz 1990; Livingstone 1987; Wotherspoon 1991).

The recessions in the late 1970s and early 1980s required early school-leavers to stay in school longer because the job market tightened up. Today in Canada, roughly 200 community colleges and similar institutions provide programs for nearly 300,000 students and 66 universities have a student population of over 400,000 undergraduate and graduate students. Added to this are 1.5 million students in part-time and non-credit courses. The above programs consume over 30 billion dollars annually and count for approximately 8% of Canada's GNP (Mazurek and Kach 1987). The overall tendencies of the global crisis have directed attention to the higher levels of education. *On the one side, educational systems represent a large public expenditure which can be reallocated to the private sector for reinvestment and, on the other side, education systems can be further reconstituted to provide marketable skills and to commodify knowledge and expertise for the new high-tech "post-industrial economies"* (Buchbinder and Newson 1988, 1990; Schrimpton 1987; Schecter 1987; Wotherspoon 1991).

How higher education will be different in the future defines the terrain for a complex hegemonic struggle over access, financing and corporate links. According to Schugurensky (1994), the struggle is over access, financing and corporate linkages. Over access, the pro-private position calls for enrollment restrictions in the name of excellence and the pro-public position calls for open access in the name of a right to education. Over financing, the pro-private position calls for tuition fees in the name of equitable redistribution through profitable rates of return and the pro-public position calls for free education in the name of equitable redistribution through tax reform and universal access. Over corporate links, the pro-private position calls for a "service university" in the name of market responsiveness and financial accountability and the pro-public position calls for institutional autonomy in the name of academic values as well as a public service university in the name of social responsibility (also see Buchbinder and Newson 1988, 1990; Pannu, Plumb and Schugurensky 1994; Slaughter 1990). *The weakness of the Left in North America is shown by the fact that the pro-private position is solidifying its hegemony and the Left has yet to articulate a clear and practical agenda for higher education.*

The global crisis of accumulation and the politics of higher education has entered Alberta consciousness. According to the president of Alberta's Athabasca University, Terrance R. Morrison, "Education has suddenly emerged as an object of public debate and a focus of public apprehension and dissatisfaction. The voices of alarm, blame, anxiety and apology fill the air" (*Edmonton Journal* 1991: Sept. 27). The postsecondary institutions in Alberta are now facing a crunch: higher tuitions, cutbacks, deterioration of maintenance and facilities, quotas, large class sizes, program restructuring and encroachment on faculty autonomy. The initiation of Klein's drive to eliminate the deficit as an extension of Getty's failed initiatives brought the politics of educational retrenchment to a pitch by 1993-94.

How has the struggle played itself out so far globally? Across Canada and the Western World a new direction is being given to higher education (see Pannu, Schugurensky and Plumb 1994). In Europe and Japan, Seidel (1991) identifies the universities as the primary instrument for economic development and transformation. The universities are called on to initiate sophisticated basic research, to deal with "general problems" such as the environment and public health, to coordinate interdisciplinary work and to give up their classical and monopolistic positions. He sees an increased obsolescence of scientific knowledge, professionalization of education and cooperation with business. In the UK higher education is also in transition, although a little behind the continent. Concurring with the policy statements that came out of the Robbins Report, the Conservative government has also embarked on letting market forces govern the development of higher



education (Howarth 1991). The thrust of the Robbins Report was that higher education focus on the instruction in skills, the promotion of intellectual development, the advancement in learning and the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship. In the USA, formal partnerships in the high technology era differ from Europe and Japan but the links between corporations and universities provided by The Business-Higher Education Forum continue to meet new demands though traditional science-based industry, training and legitimation linkages. The corporate community offers political, material and symbolic support to the universities. The universities return the favour by training people and legitimizing multinational and global economic development. Corporations and universities form alliances to lobby the state for more resources (also see Buchbinder and Newson 1990; Slaughter 1990; Spring 1972).

What is happening in Canada? According to Buchbinder and Newson (1990), "in the early 1980s, following a decade of financial retrenchment in Canadian higher education, government policy statements and various scientific research funding organizations began to articulate a new direction for universities....These growing linkages between corporations and universities in Canada are transforming the structure and mission of the university system" (355). Wotherspoon (1991), editor of a series of essays on educational retrenchment in Canada, also identified the implications of the inter-related strategies for social reform as being "potentially democratic and equalizing. . .[but] subordinated to the narrower demands of powerful social interests, thereby enhancing the relative disadvantage of less privileged groups of learners and educational workers" (17). Other analyses confirm important economic and constitutional implications created by the continentalist economic policies regulated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Calvert and Kuehn 1993; Woodhouse 1992).

Business and state interests in higher education did not suddenly emerge in the 1990s but were rather the product of an ongoing strategy reaching back more than a decade; In 1982 the Canadian Council of Ministers of Education met in Toronto to discuss the future of post-secondary education (*Postsecondary Educational Issues in the 1980s* 1982: October 19-22). Bette Stevenson, then Ontario Minister of Education and Minister of Colleges and Universities, summed up the understandings of the conference and concluded that "in the eighties we may be forced to reallocate funds towards activities which have a more direct impact on economic development if we want to ensure that there is a wealth-producing sector within our society which will provide funds to continue to support post-secondary education" (266). David Livingstone (1987) had a less benign view of this Right turn in the 1980s and stated "a growing incidence of underemployment and overeducation in relation to the existing job structure has become apparent during the current crisis....From the vantage point of capital, the surpluses of adequately credentialed intellectual and manual labour are now sufficient that scarce educational resources should be used to place greater emphasis on teaching the basis skills to all and providing advanced education for a smaller elite" (62).

By the 1990s, the corporate agenda was clearly laid out in *From Patrons to Partners: The Report of the Task Force on Funding Higher Education: Corporate Support for Universities* (1987). In the climate of serious underfunding of Canada's universities, corporations were reevaluating their traditional relationship with higher education and the *Task Force on Funding Higher Education* identified how to make corporate support more effective. The universities could secure corporate support through faculty involvement, academic planning, goal setting, project design, inter-university collaboration, board of governors' approval, test marketing and announcement, presentations and negotiations with corporations, and, finally, assessment and review. The corporations could secure

support (without appearing to replace government funding) with contributions that are important to the business community (e.g., trained personnel, educated consumers, new ideas and technologies). In addition, the report identified the need for interaction with all levels of business from large multinational organizations to large and small public and private companies. The corporate funding program also developed a strategic process: from goal setting to assessment and review. Criteria were established to identify projects with the highest potential for "significant impact" for both the university and the company with the objective of improving productivity through technology transfer. The actors representing the interests of the Forum concluded: "Definitive conclusions about the shape of the future are impossible, but a new relationship between the business community in Canada and the country's universities is seen as both inevitable and desirable (1987: 74).

But contrary assumptions were also at work and needed a new spin. The fact that the public was relatively happy with the state of public and higher education posed a key problem for the federal government and the national business community in their strategy (see e.g. *Prosperity Through Competitiveness* 1991). Part III focuses on this process of rearticulating the language of reform. Suffice it to say here, the *Report: Commission of Inquiry on Canadian University Education* (1991) concluded that higher education was "fundamentally healthy." But the *Report* also proposed that to secure the long term *financial future*, Canada's universities had to establish stronger relationships with governments through shared information, ensure responsive to the demands of the emerging educational marketplace and increase public awareness of the universities' accomplishments.

According to Buchbinder and Newson (1990), "Business is in a technology squeeze; universities in a financial squeeze and what seems to be a marriage of convenience is consummated" (359). The reality of the corporate agenda has a dual linkage. Universities are attempting to move out into the market in search of profits and corporations are attempting to penetrate the university boundaries in order to utilize university research. The window to ongoing research influences the direction of such research and gives access to marketable products based on that research. The role of the state, as perceived by the New Right and liberal technocrats, is to facilitate this new economic relationship.

The 1990s mark a period where higher education is already in transition. Structural changes are already evident. First, the role of research funding has changed. The provinces are especially vulnerable to changes in federal-provincial transfer payments and in the money funded through major research councils (e.g. SSHRC and NSERC). Second, the federal government cutbacks in the 1980s immediately intensified the collaboration between academic scientists and the private sector. Matches have been made between business people and the university faculty members based on interest and expertise (Buchbinder and Newson 1990 :364). Market values rather than traditional academic values, such as peer evaluation, are now used to assess research. The development of "third party networks," that is, new organizations outside of business, government or university link all three sectors through their directors (e.g., Corporate Higher Education Forum, Science Council of Canada). These third party networks also provide legitimation for the corporate agenda by presenting corporate interests as the broad interests of Canadian society at large. Third, universities, governments and corporations collaborate to facilitate university-corporate partnerships such as "Innovation Centres."

The institutional developments in the 1980s and 1990s indicate a new political strategy for social integration of business, science and governance that is global in nature. As was shown in this section, higher education provides the institutional basis for reorganizing the socialization of students, facilitating the emergence of an "information economy" and

ensuring restored profitability for business corporations. These infrastructural liaisons are crucial for both the articulation of the corporatist postmodernization narrative and the success of capitalist *postmodernization* from above.

### **5.8. Conclusion to Part II**

This chapter has summarized the changing nature of intellectual practice from liberal technocratic reformism to the emergence of corporate postmodernism. Corporate postmodernization marks the confluence of strategic management, public choice theory, and the New Right's interest in higher education. In Part II three claims were justified in order to proceed with a case study in Part III. I first confronted the poverty of Canadian intellectual history and approaches to ideology and suggested that the sociology of the Canadian intelligentsia required the conception of intellectuals as a class, an analysis of the signification of meaning and recourse to the perspectives of critical theory and methods of historical materialism. I ended Part II with the historical claim that the present period marks a transformation in political discourse to a corporatist postmodernization narrative. The development of futurology and strategic management has also transformed the way hegemony is exercised. The following case study illustrates many of the above claims and focuses on Alberta's Toward 2000 Together reform initiative.

The evidence of a global accumulation crisis since 1973; the rise of post-Fordism in the wake of one of the longest recessions in the history of capitalism; the emergence of globalization with supranational policing and the waning of traditional inter-imperialist rivalries; the proportional shrinking of the international capitalist class and the formation of a growing international underclass; the fragmentation of meaning (the postmodern sensibility) which is mobilized for radical destabilization and/or conservative reaction; and the centrality of American cultural hegemony should make one pause for some critical reflection on the traditional approaches to intellectual practice that have informed modernist assumptions.

The traditional debates about intellectual practice centre on a few key questions concerning the nature of hegemonic integration. Are intellectuals under capitalism becoming a new class or are they merely a strata? Is this "new class" confined only to "already existing" socialist societies? Which instances of intellectual practice have ascendant or descendant power: bureaucrats, managers, academics, professionals, artists, scientists or public activists? What are the elements of class formation under the transformed conditions where knowledge has become a crucial productive force and when culture has become commodified in nearly all societies? Is the reproduction of power shifting from the economic bourgeoisie who transmit intergenerational wealth via monopolizing money to a new cultural bourgeoisie who transmit intergenerational competencies via monopolization of credentialing? Has the rise of knowledge/power transformed the nature of the class/power formation, and if so, are structuralist and/or productivist assumptions adequate to explain this social dynamic? Has the public sphere disappeared, and if so, has the public intellectual disappeared along with it? Has the increased instrumentalization of social relations initiated the "end of ideology" and/or the "death of the individual," and if so, what kind of politics are required for resistance, that is, if resistance is possible at all? Although this dissertation does not answer all these questions, it does raise them with the intent of gaining preliminary insights into the changing nature of intellectual practice.

The assault of late capitalism on the remnants of tradition has created a cultural void whereby the cultural industries are rushing to fill the absence by colonizing the lifeworld via the media of money and in the name of private property and strategic management

(Habermas 1975, 1984, 1987a). To a great extent, culture is being commodified and, in the latest instant, higher education is now under the gaze of entrepreneurs who see the expropriation of knowledge as a new site for enclosing communal property for private gain. Knowledge, as a stock of narratives whereby cultural traditions were transmitted in a process of socialization and enculturation, is increasingly being treated as an industrial product to be exchanged on the market. The increasingly cozy relationship between Alberta entrepreneurs, the managerial intelligentsia and New Right must be situated in the global context where education is increasingly treated as a form of production and profit for itself. Furthermore, Canadian university governance must be situated within its own specific context of national governance, international market forces, basic and applied scientific development, the revolution in information technology, and corporate rationalization, as well as, current global struggles and accommodations over ethnicity, race, class, gender and representation.

Capitalist postwar successes laid the basis for the expansion of higher education, but with the continuing post-1973 crisis, Western universities are finding it increasingly difficult to accommodate the competing claims of sectoral interests about excellence and autonomy versus access and equity. Social production for the private profit of a privileged few is still on the ascendancy. Capitalist hegemony is especially true when considering the global economic transformation which has hastened the call for Canadian competitiveness on the international stage. It is now commonplace to state, as did the Economic Council of Canada in 1990, that "the main factor in Canadians' welfare in the run-up to the 21st century is *education*" (*Au Courant* v11: n1: 14). But such an approach to education is very narrow and requires scrutiny as do recent calls for an integrated Canadian economy and a national education system. The failure of Canadians to develop a national education system and the failure to construct a society based on universalism and equality are two key but complex issues facing Canadians today. However, recent pressures for "competitiveness" to meet global competition already appear to have established an agenda for the future and in the process enunciated simplistic solutions for Canada's economic malaise. The brunt of the criticism has fallen not on Canada's economic leaders in the business community and government offices but rather on educators from early childhood education to the most highly respected research institutes and on those with a "credential deficit," meaning almost everyone working or unemployed. Most of these criticisms do not meet the challenge of close scrutiny, but nevertheless this kind of scrutiny seems beside the point to economists and corporate executives who suddenly claim expertise on educational issues concerning pedagogy, curriculum, administration and financial. Rule by experts has now narrowed considerably foregoing further presumptions about democratic rule. How and why these self-described "educational" experts came to claim and justify their expertise in Alberta is the focus of the following case study. Suffice it to say here, these producers of the postmodernization narrative from above tend to emphasize the sacrifice of popular democracy for pseudo-forms of consensus-building dedicated to enhanced bureaucratic control in the name of freeing the market. Profitability and efficiency inform their enunciations of "Quality First" in education. Such a study of a new regime of performativity requires turning attention toward the production of political culture, the intellectual regulation of discourse and the analysis of ideology as distorted communication.

Part III provides a case study of ideological production and the exercise of hegemony. The Toward 2000 Together initiative in Alberta represents the coalition of the New Right which joins classic economic *liberalism* with cultural *conservatism* in the interest of modernization from above. Public policies must accommodate liberalism's notions of the free market, individualism and a minimal state, as well as, conservatism's notions of

hierarchy, authoritarianism and a public order state. According to King (1987), the New Right has been able to accommodate the two tendencies by reducing conservatism to a set of residual claims to cover the consequences of liberal policies. But even this accommodation is tenuous. He states: "Liberalism and conservatism thus contradict each other on a number of important issues including the role allocated to the state; the role of the individual; the nature and scope of freedom; and the importance of religious and familial values in society" (25). How this contradiction was recently resolved in Alberta politics through the production of a new ideology centres the following analysis of intellectual practice.

How have the circuits of power recently developed in Alberta and what are their ideological and practical effects? I now turn to the Alberta government's promotion of one particular innovation centre to "university" status and how this "centre for excellence" in cultural commodification increasingly met the propaganda needs of business and bureaucratic elites and also provided the managerial resources to legitimate Klein's Progressive Conservative strategy for reform. The following micro study of social theory as situated reason is intended to identify how the various narratives of historical development are used to mobilize a language for the constitution of hegemony in English Canada with a primary focus on the Province of Alberta. In these cases, situated social theorizing informs the assumptions for prophecies about the Canadian future. What follows is a critical hermeneutic of a few selected texts in the Alberta government's *Toward 2000 Together* initiative.

## **PART III**

**CASE STUDY OF ANONYMOUS INTELLECTUAL  
PRACTICE:  
TOWARD 2000 TOGETHER**

# Chapter Six

## Representing "Alberta" and Capturing a Province

Canada needs to develop new mechanisms that allow Canadians to link trade and aid, view HRD (Human Resource Development) as an export, link the public and private sectors together in projects with some bottom-line accountability, and still maintain some integrity about putting the interests of the client foremost. These new mechanisms will be crucial if we are to avoid the accusation recently heard in Southeast Asia that they were seeing something new from Canada: "hustlers posing as educators." (Donald Simpson and Carol Sissons 1989: 25)

### 6.1. Introduction

Toward 2000 Together is both a practice and theory of social reform. As the practice of social reform it has three phases. January 1991 to May 1992 marks its initiation phase under the guidance of Don Getty. May 1992 to September 1993 marks its consolidation phase. The post-September period begins with the legislative sitting of the Klein government and marks its implementation phase. As a theory of social reform, Toward 2000 Together provides both explanation and strategic plan in a series of accumulating texts and rationalizing interpretations. Reference to these texts articulates an ideological configuration and a force field of social integration that exhibit four characteristics: the *religio* of Alberta myth; the universalizing legitimations of Alberta's ruling class; the representational suturing of circuits of power between business, political, bureaucratic and intellectual elites; and the pathologies of distorted communication blocking truly democratic governance. In later chapters I focus on the ideological and social origins as well as the discursive grammar of accommodation and resistance in Toward 2000 Together. This first chapter in Part III directs attention to the infrastructure and circuits of power which make the Alberta "visioning" discourse possible and helped the Progressive Conservatives get reelected. This new discourse currently legitimates the 1993-94 Klein initiative. The next section takes a close look at a select group of managerial scientists connected to the Banff Centre for Management who enhanced their own power by coordinating the needs of Alberta's New Right elites. Then I describe a visioning conference that played an important mediating function in reconstructing the new language of progressive universality for the corporatist postmodernization narrative. The last section of the chapter looks at how this vision became the centre of a new political discourse and was used by the Getty and Klein administrations to represent themselves as the legitimate representatives of Alberta's universal interest and to marginalize counter-discourses as the expressions of particular self-interests.

In January 1991, the Economic Planning Committee of Cabinet for the government of Alberta sketched out the Toward 2000 Together strategy. By August 1991, the Getty government had invited the people of Alberta to explore economic alternatives. By the end of March 1992, the government had distributed 20,000 information packages and heard from 3,500 individuals and groups in various formats including questionnaires, regional workshops and closed roundtables. Furthermore, the government also provided workshop organizers with supplementary documents to discipline the participants by framing the questions and prestructuring information in condensed forms (SDP 1991; FC 1991; WDP 1991; GW 1991). Preceding the Calgary Premier's conference May 1992 on Alberta's economic future, two other important documents were available for participants. The documents were selected and summarized compilations of an extensive amount of

accumulated data into two digestible texts: the *Banff Centre for Management Report of the Round Table* (RRT 1992) and the *Report on the Regional Forum* (RRF 1992). Conference delegates were also provided with a "required reading" called the *Conference Workbook* (CW 1992). These documents were further condensed summaries of three years of government initiated consultation and documentation. The organizers of the conference created a "consensus" document for *Toward 2000 Together* and provided a set of recommendations, this document was available by August 1992 and called the *Moderator's Report* (MR 1992). But an increased rural presence in the Progressive Conservative party marked by Klein's ascendancy to power, required the intertextual rearticulation of reports on agriculture consolidated in *Creating Tomorrow* (CTA 1992; CTB 1993; CTC 1993).

Although breaking with earlier expressed intentions, this last rearticulation was consistent with the consultation strategy which had already written *ex post facto* into the process an avalanche of consultations and reports in 16 areas and related to at least 34 departmental initiatives in the previous three years:

- (1) Alberta Advanced Education: (a) *Capital Funding Policy*; (b) *Responding to Existing and Emerging Demands for University Education: A Policy Framework*; (c) *Student Assistance Reviews, Transfer Issues*; and (d) *Tuition Fees*.
- (2) Alberta Agriculture: (a) *Agriculture and Food Industry Consultation Process*.
- (3) Alberta Career Development and Employment: (a) *Alberta Round Table on Competitiveness and Training* and (b) *Alberta Workforce to the Year 2000*.
- (4) Alberta Consumer and Corporate Affairs: (a) *The Future of the Securities Marketplace in Alberta*.
- (5) Alberta Education: (a) *Vision for the Nineties...A Plan of Action*.
- (6) Alberta Energy: (a) *Cogeneration and Waste Energy Generation Review*; (b) *Fuel Use Policy Review*; (c) *Natural Gas Royalty Review*; (d) *Natural Gas Royalty Simplification Project*; (e) *Oil Royalty Review*; (f) *Regulatory Review of Electrical Generation and Planning in Alberta*, and (g) *Review of the Electric Energy Marketing Act*.
- (7) Alberta Environment: (a) *The Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act and Regulations*.
- (8) Alberta Forestry, Lands and Wildlife: (a) *The Forestry, Lands and Wildlife Advisory Committee*; (b) *Integrated Resource Planning Program*; (c) *A Natural Resource Management Policy*; and (d) *Public Involvement in Forest Management and Utilization*.
- (9) Alberta Labour: (a) *The Alberta Future of Work Project* and (b) *Employment Standards Review*.
- (10) Alberta Municipal Affairs: (a) *Municipal Government in Alberta: A Review of Yesterday and Today*.
- (11) Alberta Research Council: (a) *Vision to the Year 2000*.
- (12) Alberta Technology, Research and Telecommunications: (a) *Science and Technology in the New Alberta Economy*.
- (13) Alberta Tourism, Recreation and Parks: (a) *Tourism 2000-A Vision for the Future*.
- (14) Alberta Transportation and Utilities: (a) *Transportation Requirements for the '90s -The Van Horne Institute, University of Calgary (in cooperation with Alberta Transportation and Utilities)*.
- (15) Northern Alberta Development Council: (a) *Northern Alberta into the 90's*.
- (16) Multi-Departmental/Multi-Stakeholder Consultative Initiatives: (a) *Alberta Round Table on Environment and Economy*; (b) *Clean Air Strategy for Alberta-Alberta Energy and Alberta Environment*; (c) *Local Development Initiative-Minister*



*Responsible for Rural Development; (d) Review of Post-Secondary Apprenticeship Training-Advanced Education and Career Development and Employment; and (e) The Water Management Policy and Legislative Review-Alberta Environment-Alberta Water Resources Commission and the Environment Council of Alberta.*

What was to become finally known as the May document (also called the *Report of the Advisory Committee on Alberta's Economic Future* [RAC 1993]) was presented to the public as a synthesis of all the above documents. The Progressive Conservatives used the May document to legitimate the 1993 pre-election strategy. The document also formed the basis for the Klein government's new economic strategy released as *Seizing Opportunity* (SO 1993) for the fall sitting of the 1993 Alberta legislature.

By the time of the fall sitting, the 1992 "vision" conference was long forgotten but the initial strategy it formulated was, more or less, still in place as both social explanation and strategic plan. What this chapter analyzes is how a ruling class of hegemonic elites came to represent their vision of commercialized education and privatized knowledge-production as a universal and socially valid general interest. I describe the non-discursive circuits of power and situate the institutional basis for the ideological production that aided in the reelection of the Progressive Conservative Party to another term in office in Alberta. First, I describe recent developments at the Banff Centre for Management. Second, I identify the 1992 Calgary conference as a crucible for mediating intellectual, economic and political interests and languages. Third, I show how the Klein administration mobilized the legitimation surplus to override the legitimation deficit developed by the Getty administration.

## **6.2. The Banff Centre for Management**

The Banff Centre for Management as a division of the Banff Centre for Continuing Education provided an important institutional basis for the production of the new postmodernization discourse. This section describes the institutional development of the Banff Centre and how the provincial government, the business community and particular factions of the intelligentsia were able to reconstruct the educational goals and practices of the Banff Centre. Reduced government funding created financial pressures to reconstruct the curriculum and administration of the Banff Centre and new legislation enforced legal changes that increased the Banff Centre's status as an institution of higher education. These changes allowed the Centre to experiment with a commercial-based model for education. This new "client-centred" model created by the Banff Centre treated both the provincial government and business community as "arm's length" consumers of educational services. The government purchased "public consultations" (e.g. Roundtables) and the public bureaucracies and business community purchased "in-house" retraining programs for middle and senior managers. The integration of business, government and higher education created denser networks of communication and enhanced the power of business persons, rightest politicians and the educational elite. The Banff Centre's coordination of communication between the elites provided one precondition for Alberta's ruling class to reconstitute its subjectivity and become the central strategic agent in provincial reform.

The Banff Centre for Continuing Education opened its doors in 1933 as a special summer program sponsored by the University of Alberta (Extension). Its program was intended to provide cultural enrichment for beginners and serious amateurs in drama, music and art. It was called the Banff School of Fine Arts from 1933 to 1978 when it was officially renamed the Banff Centre for Continuing Education to emphasize its broader

scope. Its first director, Donald Cameron (1936-1969), expanded the School of Fine Arts course offerings in music, dance, opera and a wide spectrum of the visual arts. The School's second director, David Leighton (1970-1982) developed it as a year-round advanced conservatory for the arts. By the 1980s the school had evolved into a leading Canadian centre for continued learning and now served advanced students as well as professionals with an extensive curriculum of depth and variety (BCAR 1980-92; Cameron 1956; Leighton and Leighton 1982; Stocking 1988). Under the third director, Paul Fleck (1982-1992), the School was renamed a Centre and dramatic changes took place. Dedication to the "management of arts" became increasingly colonized by the "art of management." Fleck died in 1992 and was replaced by Acting President, Gary Frey (ibid. 1991-92).

Following a 1989-90 organizational restructuring under Paul Fleck, The Banff Centre was divided into three branches called The Centre for the Arts, The Centre for Conferences, and The Centre for Management. The Centre for Conferences, originally called Conference Services, was reorganized to provide facilities and assistance to groups wishing to contract their own educational or developmental programs. By 1990, the conference service had a mission to seek out new clients in areas of environmental studies, management studies and the arts and to generate revenue to supplement declining government funding and other operational grants. The chief calling card of The Conference Centre was the idyllic setting of Banff National Park. Increasingly the scheduling of conferences and meetings for educational purposes was thought of mainly as a means to improve the *economic* position of The Centre for the Arts (BCAR 1988-89). Before the latest restructuring this Centre was called The School of Fine Arts.

The School of Management (now the Centre for Management) began in the 1950s with programs in advanced management, executive development and personnel management. Cameron believed that management and arts training could successfully operate in one institution with mutual benefit. Under Leighton, the School of Management established environmental studies and cultural resources management. The School of Management expanded its scope, increasingly focusing on advanced professional rather than basic training. Under the leadership of Fleck, the Banff Centre faced a period of shrinking financial resources and the need to innovate in the program offerings of management studies, arts management and resource management (ibid.).

In January 1990, Dr. Donald G. Simpson was appointed director of the Centre for Management. He had a 35 year career as a teacher, researcher, consultant and entrepreneur and had worked in 50 different countries. He holds a doctorate in History from the University of Western Ontario and worked in administrative and fund-raising capacities for such organizations as African Students Foundation, Canadian Crossroads Africa and CUSO. He also helped establish a new Faculty of Education and a Centre for International Development at the University of Western University. In the 1970s he worked with Lester Pearson, Maurice Strong and David Hopper in creating the International Development Centre in Ottawa, where he served as its associate director of social sciences. His extensive academic work related to the global economy, including developing and teaching international development courses. During the 1980s, he founded two consulting companies to help Canadian businesses expand internationally. In 1985, he was appointed director of the Centre for International Business Studies at Western. Simpson was also one of the leading Human Resource Development (HRD) experts in Canada, especially as it pertained to the developing world. Human Resource Development has a special appeal also with the World Bank and Alberta Education. His particular concern for development was coordinated through Kanchar International Inc. which draws

on an eclectic group of experienced professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds including those contacts gained from his part-time foothold in academe through his association with the School of Business Administration at the University of Western Ontario in London. In 1990 he was appointed vice-president and director of The Banff Centre for Management. In 1991-1992 he was to go on to coordinate the Roundtables on the Future of Alberta's economy and organize the Calgary vision conference on the economy as part of the Toward 2000 Together initiative. From then on he was to sit as vice-chair on Alberta's Advisory Committee that drafted the May 1993 action plan as a basis for the Klein government's reforms. The Banff Centre provided expertise, networks and personnel for the public consultation process (BCAR 1990-92; CW 1992; RAC 1993; Simpson and Sissons 1989: "Foreword").

The Banff Centre for Continuing Education is generally perceived as an institute for the fine arts -- and this is still its central function -- but its function has not been limited to advanced training for mature and creative artists. What was initially a small part of the program (i.e., devoted to the administration and management of cultural institutions) has grown rapidly. Increasingly management and administration, and individualism and profitability have become chief priorities.

An analysis of selected operating funds (BCAR 1980-92) indicate a period of declining revenues provided from the Province of Alberta in the past decade (82% in 1983 to 68% in 1992) and a doubling of Tuitions and Fees (11% in 1983 to 22% in 1992). During this period of fiscal regulation, numbers also suggest that a restructuring of expenditures advantaged Administration and the Centre for Management while the Centre for Arts struggled to maintain programming in the face of government cuts of 10% from 1983 to 1987. While relative expenditures for the Centre for Arts ranged from 44% in 1981, peaked at 54% in 1987 and returned to 45% in 1992, the same period of time saw expenditures steadily increase for the Centre for Management from 8% in 1981 to 16% in 1992. If the costs of "Administration" are also accounted for from the time that its expenditures were distinguished from "Buildings and Grounds" and "Support Services," the numbers suggest a relative equilibrium for the latter two expenditures but an increase from 16% in 1987 to 22% in 1992 for Administration expenditures. Even conservative estimates reveal that expenditures related to the administrative/management "interest" were relatively enhanced over the last five year period (1987 to 1992) by approximately 9%, in a time of "administrative" strategies for saving money when the Centre for Arts suffered a 9% decline. These shifts in the internal power of the Banff Centre, do not include the increasing colonization of the Arts agenda by Management's commercial prerogatives in curriculum development, a matter which I deal with in more detail below. By 1992 a transition had taken place. The Centre for Arts' mission was no longer to offer courses to people embarking on new careers but rather "a world-renowned centre for professional development offering advanced training and support to professional artists in mid-career" (ibid.: 5). The Centre for Management's goal, too, had changed, and was now intended "to help managers function in an efficient, effective and harmonious manner in organizations which are being forced to adapt to a rapidly changing global environment" (ibid.: 6).

One of the Centre for Management's new and primary clients for the 1991-93 years was the Alberta Provincial Government. The government contracted the services of the Centre to organize the vision conference as well as the preceding and follow up consultations called "roundtables." By 1993 the government was considering the Banff Centre's potential as Alberta's finest *private* university, an international centre for excellence in management, business and cultural commercialization (Government of

Alberta, Advanced Education and Career Development *Budget Roundtable Workbook*. Nov. 1993). The Centre's director, Dr. Don Simpson, not only was a keynote speaker and organizer at the Calgary "vision" conference but was also appointed as a sole vice-chairman on the Advisory Committee of Alberta's Economic Future. Hal Wyatt, Vision Conference moderator and former chairman of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, was appointed chairman of the advisory committee (CW 1992: 6; RAC 1993: "Biographies"). The committee drafted the May 1993 white paper and oversaw the fiscal and administrative reforms of the Klein government (RAC 1993).

Increased interest in the Banff Centre by the provincial government had its advantages. On April 9, 1992, in a period leading up to the vision conference, the Provincial Government passed the Universities Foundations Amendment Act (Bill 15) and it was given Royal Assent on June 26. The bill provided the Banff Centre, the college systems of Alberta, as well as the two technical institutes the power whereby they could become -- for contribution purposes -- agencies of the Crown -- and private citizens could assist post-secondary education by donating to those institutions through a foundation and receive a 100% contribution credit for income tax purposes (*Alberta Hansard* [AH] April 9, 1992: 331. John Gogo, Minister of Advanced Education). Brian Evans, P.C. MLA from Banff-Cochrane and Environment Minister, expressed gratitude that the Universities Foundations Act was extended beyond the four universities to include the Banff Centre. He thought that the move would give the post-secondary institutions in Alberta an opportunity to get access to private funds and take advantage of the options in the private sector, that is, "with some creative fund-raising techniques" (AH April 10, 1992). John Gogo, Minister for Advanced Education, clarified that each institutional level of post-secondary education (because of their different roles) would require separate foundational relationships with their donors. He singled out the Banff Centre as unique, and how it would now have the same foundational status as each of the four Alberta universities. In responding to concerns about how the 100% write off might make the donors the final determiners of programming, he reiterated that the "blessings" of Revenue Canada assure that "the donor cannot *dictate* to that foundation how the funds are to be used" (*ibid.* emphasis added). Also, another advantage, he added, was that the government would no longer be obligated to provide matching grants.

The Banff Centre was singled out in glowing terms: "there is only one Banff Centre in the world, and that's the Banff Centre for Continuing Education, which, as all honorable members know, is very unique not only in its setting but is one of a kind" (*ibid.*: 369). He also emphasized the importance of competing in a global economy and the importance of recognizing that training and education would be the cornerstone on which to build economic competitiveness as well as career opportunities. As with each of the other foundations, the Banff Centre would appoint two directors and the Provincial cabinet appoint three directors to the governing body. In response to NDP and Liberal critics concerning the possible politicization of governance or undue influence by donors, Gogo stated that he did not foresee any problem concerning conflict of interest or the politicization of the directorships (*ibid.*: 369-70).

All the changes were not necessarily beneficial nor benign for the Banff Centre. The Banff Centre was increasingly pressured by the decline in direct funding to depend on alternate funding from tuitions, servicing and endowments provided by corporate largesse and contracts from the Alberta government for its public consultations. The year 1992 ended with the administrators of the Banff Centre claiming that without a real increase in government funding to sustain their core programs and services, to maintain, upgrade and modernize their operations facilities, and to invest in new program research and

development, they were concerned that their competitive position would deteriorate. Without financial support, their reputation and relevance as a centre of creative activity would be diminished and, inevitably, core programming would have to be reduced. The major opportunities for cost reductions and productivity improvements, they claimed, had been exhausted for "all practical purposes" (*Banff Centre for Continuing Education: Annual Report* [BCAR] 1991-92: 59). With the door closed to direct funding, these "major opportunities" would have increasingly to come from contracts with the corporate sector or the Alberta government's reform initiatives -- a "client interest" contrary to Gogo's statement that necessarily required close attention to the business community and the Progressive Conservative agenda concerning the future direction of Canada's political economy. The changing financial and administrative relationships between the provincial government and the Banff Centre permeated the internal financing, administration and programming of the Banff Centre.

Internal evaluations in the Banff Centre were increasingly commercialized. Two special features of the Centre for Management were highlighted for the 1988-89 year: (1) the development of a mission statement by a new national advisory committee and (2) reaching year-end in the black because of the generosity of key donors and the adoption of a new endowment fund management policy. A professional investment manager was retained and endowment funds were thereafter to be pooled in a Banff Centre Endowment fund, and "the preservation of the real value of this capital has been identified as a primary objective" (*ibid.*: 19). Investment income for the year amounted to \$340,000. The 1988-89 year had been one of a continuing response to the substantial reductions to the Centre's operating and capital grants created by the suspension (and later re-introduction at a lower level of funding) of the Endowment and Incentive Fund. The Centre responded by discontinuing certain important activities and limiting the scope of others and by aggressively pursuing alternative sources of funding through grants or earned income.

The Banff Centre had to develop its own competitive ethic, considering the decreased funding coming from the federal and provincial governments to advanced education. The years 1988-1989 marked a round of cuts which saw "a substantial increase in fee revenue, together with other earned income resulted in the School of Management becoming a net provider of funds" (*ibid.*: 16). By 1989-90, "tuition and related fees increased by 16.7% over the previous year.... Other sources of operating funds, including sales, rentals, other grants and donations, and investment income increased by 20% to 30%.... Overall, all sources of operating revenue increased by an average of 8.3% during the year" (BCAR 1989-90: 20).

Administrative changes at the Banff Centre complemented the new "free market" ethic. In November, 1989, G. Peter Green, who had been vice-president and director of the Centre for Management for seven years, resigned to take up a position with PCL Construction in Edmonton. Under Dr. Simpson the 1990-91 year inaugurated tremendous change and growth for The Centre for Management. He sought to develop the leadership that would help organizations function in a global context and respond with innovation to changing social, political and economic environments (BCAR 1990-91: 23). In 1990, along with management changes, the centres developed new mission statements. The 1990-1991 year saw a 3.0% real reduction in base funding from the Province of Alberta. The impact was felt the most in the Centre for the Arts resulting in the reduction, suspension and elimination of services and programs (*ibid.*: 41). The Banff Centre reported that "tuition and related fee income grew by 5.0% during the year and all of the increase occurred with the Centre for Management. This increase, net of related

expenditures, resulted in a modest profit for that division and confirmed the validity of our long-term strategy for it" (ibid.: 42).

Neil Armstrong, director for the Centre for the Arts for nearly two decades and recipient of the Order of Canada, retired in August 1991. Dr. Paul Fleck, formerly president, took on the directorship as well as the presidency and position of CEO just before his death in 1992. Garth Henderson became director of Administration and the scope of the position was broadened. Michael Century took on a new directorate for Program Development. The new triumvirate was charged to re-examine the mission of the Centre for the Arts. The result was a new statement of intent for future program development shifting away from the development of young artists and the promotion of a national cultural identity to one where the Centre now had "responsibility to the *individual* artist as well as the health of the arts in general both on campus and beyond" (ibid.: 7 emphasis added). Along with the retirement of Armstrong, a number of staff changes were made in the Centre for the Arts. The directorship appointed three new people in management and programming. Vern Hume became program director for Media Arts, Jaqueline Dawson became production manager in the Theatre Complex and Sally Drouin became program manager in the Sally Borden Building. One front-office manager, Clara Tarchuk, retired and one vice-president, Pat Judge, also "decided to take early retirement" with the intent of continuing on a part-time basis until 1993 (ibid.: 9).

The new financial considerations and the changes to administration facilitated increased linkages with the business community and changes in programming to complement business interests. In the 1988-90 years, the arts management program was committed to the development of individuals and the survival and growth of the cultural organizations and industries. The program was supplemented by scholarship contributions to offer arts administrators distinctive management training. Federal financial support came from the Canada Council, the Canadian Museum Association, and the Canadian Job Strategies programs. In 1988-90 this financial support was also supplemented by scholarship funds provided by Canada Northwest Energy, Canadian Airlines International, Canadian Pacific Hotels and Resorts, Gulf Canada, Inco, Imperial Oil, Institute of Canadian Bankers, John Labatt Limited, Canada Northwest Energy, Petro-Canada, T. Eaton Company, Trimac and Union Gas (BCAR 1988-89: 12).

The increasing commercialization of the Centre for Arts paralleled an increasing degree of partnerships ("strategic alliances") with business under Dr. Simpson's initial year. His leadership was responsible for a shift in programming to help organizations function in a global context and respond with innovation to changing social, political and economic environments" (BCAR 1990-91: 23). Teaching people to manage change required identifying the global forces combining to change the world, especially the world of the Banff Centre itself. "The resulting new approach made the Centre for Management more entrepreneurial, committed to responding quickly to the specific needs of its clients, and to continually updating its courses as new issues surface, new strategies are devised, and new processes are created" (ibid.).

In the 1989-90 year there was a refocusing in the Centre for Management with the development of programs such as the "Senior Executive Summit for CEOs" and "How Governments Make Decisions" and a variety of courses concerning major issues such as "the environment" and "globalization." The Centre for Management presented programs in four areas: management studies, arts management, resource management and a custom consulting service called "Management Change Agents" (BCAR 1989-90).

The resource management programs, included a round-table funded by Alberta Occupational Health. It also included a series of seminars on Native Canadian Relations,

Conflict Resolution and Geographic Information systems, and delivered professional development in environmental management. The management of change program offered custom designed consulting services and access to a complete array of management resources to advise on needs analysis, program design, faculty selection and program delivery and evaluation. In 1988 and 1989 Gulf Canada, Environment Canada, the University of Calgary's International Centre, and the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada coordinated activities through the Centre (BCAR 1988-89).

One innovative addition to programming was for "custom consulting" and was called "management change agents." The new management studies program was designed to meet the needs of middle- to senior-level managers in state and corporate bureaucracies. In 1988-89, the Centre conducted 27 programs in marketing, municipal management, employee contract management and health management for 774 participants. "Of particular note was an invitational senior executive round-table on how governments make decisions, led by the Honourable Peter Loughheed P.C., C.C., Q.C., the Honourable Pat Carney, P.C., and Chip Collins" (ibid.: 11). Loughheed was former Progressive Conservative Premier of Alberta. Carney was Minister for Trade in the Federal Government of Brian Mulroney. Collins was special advisor to the Provincial Treasurer of the Government of Alberta. They led "How Governments Make Decisions" and "Senior Executive Summit" seminars, and the latter one included participants: George Cobbe (Hewlett-Packard Canada), Dick Hodgson (faculty University of Western Ontario), Ken McCready (TransAlta Utilities Corporation), David Clark (Campbell Soup Company) Vic Hepburn (Canada Brick) and James Raymond (Claridge Inc.) (BCAR 1988-89/ 89-90: 14).

By the 1990-91 year the foremost *program* highlight was that "the Centre for Management offered more courses than in the previous year (70 versus 59), attracted more participants (1,887 versus 1,783) and increased its gross revenues substantially (\$2,674,000 versus \$2,348,000)" (BCAR 1990-91: 25), and this accumulation was achieved in the face of a world-wide economic downturn. Furthermore, "the Centre made a lasting commitment to expanding its capacity to respond to individual clients by developing Customized Management Development programs geared to their specific needs." At the core of many of the customized programs was a new module entitled *Discovering New Worlds*. These programs assisted companies in coming to terms with the "new realities" and in developing strategies, leadership, and implementation plans that their organizations need to remain competitive.

By the fall of 1990, the Centre for Management launched its first major research and development drive for funds. The goal was to provide the resources to develop new courses and programs, to restructure existing courses and to put into place a process for continual modification of programming. The Centre now offered courses in nine program areas: Senior Executive Programs, Managing in Cross-Cultural Environments, Resource and Environmental Management, Health Care Administration, Arts Management, General Management and Specialized Programs for Administrative Assistants and Executive Secretaries, Customized Management Development, and the Banff Festival of Mountain Films. Six new courses were also added: *Thriving on Change*, *Managing Information Technology Efficiently*, *Tools for Sustainable Development*, *Business and the Environment*, *Municipal Waste Management*, and *Doing Business in Cross-Cultural Environments* (ibid.).

The increased linkages to the business community and changes in programming to complement business interests helped increase the profile of a network of "global" experts. A continuing core of full-time professional and support staff coordinated the delivery of courses and programs and the contracting of faculty members from business, government

and academia. The Centre drew heavily on its network of experts and developed several part-time project assistants based in different parts of Canada. In addition the Centre forged strategic alliances and joint ventures with other management centres and began to collaborate informally with institutions in Japan, Germany, Belgium and the United States providing increased international experience and broadened global perspectives for faculty members.

In a short period the Centre's international profile also increased. The Centre co-chaired the European Foundation for Management Development's Task Force on Integrating Environment into Business and was a founding member of the PAC Global Group on Organization Innovation (Asia). Under a contract funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Centre delivered an environmental assessment training program in Barbados for the Caribbean Development Bank. The Centre also delivered a comprehensive program for middle managers for the Royal Government of Thailand and a program for Managing Resources in the Oil and Gas Sector for participants from five countries in South East Asia. In addition, the Centre initiated a joint venture with International Communications of Tokyo to develop cross-cultural management programs ready for 1991-92 year. Along with a few initiatives in the commercialization of the Arts, the Centre for Management, in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Foundation, initiated a series of business associate programs intended to bring Canadian and Asian business people together (*ibid.*: 24).

By 1991-92 the Centre for Management, although constituting only 15% of the Banff Centre's expenditures as opposed to expenditures of 45% for the Centre for the Arts, was definitely increasingly its leadership of the Centre. A new emphasis on such key words as "global economy," "leadership," "innovation," "life-long learning" was a sign that the Centre was moving into new fields promoted by futurists as the "information economy." The Alberta government contracted the Centre to organize several conferences on the future of the provincial economy while at the same time cutting direct base funding for programming. The Centre also created the International Institute for Innovation and anticipated influencing the way provincial, national and international business was to be conducted in the future (BCAR 1991-92: 25).

At the most profound level, program delivery, the Banff Centre changed its focus in response to financial and administrative influences. Curricula were developed with a primary concern for the monetary "bottom-line." The Centre justified The Administration Development program for having "earned substantial profits from seminars attended by administrative assistants and executive support staff" (*ibid.*). The Customized Management Development program "produced a 282 per cent revenue increase" and received an enthusiastic response from Canadian Occidental Petroleum, Nova, Chevron and Gulf who wanted to "maximize their human resource training funds through in-house programs" (*ibid.*).

The Centre also introduced a unique set of workshops for a "blue-ribbon panel of health care experts" in order to "provide the knowledge and networking opportunities that the industry needs to deal effectively with emerging health care delivery and management issues" (*ibid.*). The Centre also increased the delivery of the Resource and Environment Management program by "helping companies keep up with the changes in concepts, products, regulatory demands, and public expectations" (*ibid.*: 26). The Centre also launched a new program called "Management in Cross-Cultural Environments" for managers to succeed in global business and in conjunction with partnership projects in Japan, Thailand, India, Indonesia and Brazil and the facilitation of two conferences in Germany and Japan (*ibid.*).



The "Arts" related projects also continued under the auspices of the Centre for Management in such areas as leadership training and the promotion of The Banff Festival of Mountain Films. The marriage of business and cultural commodification is clearly evident. The directors saw the Centre as "uniquely placed to bring important ideas and developments from the arts into the world of business." This is especially emphasized by the entry of the Centre into "virtual reality," a development which "has huge business implications for fields such as architecture, engineering and entertainment" (ibid.: 27).

Many traditional programs had low enrollments because of fiscal limitations and those programs with low registrations were canceled. The Centre emphasized that its programming was "ever-sensitive to the community it serves" and "continually canvasses senior executives across Canada for their evaluation of existing programs" (ibid.). The "community" was increasingly the private sector and The Centre for Conferences increased its facilitation for "client" groups wishing to conduct their own educational programs. The strategy of the Banff Centre was to provide support and inspiration for clients looking for professional growth for the arts, business and "life-long learning." The Centre for Conferences was exceptionally interested in the "benefits of a loyal client base" (ibid.: 29). A sampling of the activities provides insight into what the Centre considered "life-long learning."

The Banff Centre delivered 21 courses to 525 people for the Institute of Canadian Bankers who developed a graduate level program to expand management-level bankers' expertise by linking them to an extensive network including all the Canadian chartered banks. The centre also delivered a 13 day program called the "Senior University Administrators Course" to 45 people responsible for making institutional policy and dealing with policy issues and management problems. Another 13 day program was delivered to 108 participants in the Canadian Education Association. The Centre also offered practical support for the petroleum industry in two, two-week courses called "Petroleum Industry Training Service" to approximately 50 participants who needed to increase their knowledge and awareness (ibid.: 29-31).

Program changes were constantly developed within a framework of shifting financial arrangements. The year was marked by "reduced conference revenues, inflationary slippage in provincial operating grants, reduced enrollments and an operating deficit" (ibid.: 10). Thirty-two positions were eliminated during the year (ibid.: 53). The Centre developed a new action plan which "incorporated staff and administrative overhead reductions, productivity gains, and in simple terms was designed to improve our ratio of revenues and expenditures" (ibid.: 10). The intent was to put a substantially increased reliance on special project grants from government agencies, corporations and foundations and reflected "the inability of the Province of Alberta to sustain the base grant at the level required to maintain the quality and integrity of Centre for the Arts program" (ibid.: 51). For the first time, the annual report included a comprehensive listing of donors and embarked on a major fundraising campaign "for donors who want to see their investment make a substantial difference" (ibid.: 11). The strategic refocus on donors in 1993 coincided with an amendment to the policies governing advanced education and the termination of the Alberta government's matching grant program as of March 31, 1993.

The introductory page to the Annual Report 1989/1990 stated that "The Banff Centre for Continuing Education operates under the authority of The Banff Centre Act (Revised Statutes of Alberta) with the object of providing the public the opportunity of access to a broad range of learning experiences with emphasis on the arts, management studies, language training and environmental training. By the following year it read "The Banff Centre for Continuing Education operates under the authority of The Banff Centre Act,

Revised Statutes of Alberta." On the front cover a color photo is pasted over two black and white photos of the old campus. The colored shot is of the new TransCanada PipeLines Pavillion, officially opened July 18, 1991. The cover of the 1991-92 Annual Report, titled *Leadership*, shows a man donning a "virtual reality" helmet emphasizing the new direction for "art" and "business" in the areas of new technologies, including computers, video, television and digital audio recording. The mission statement for art focuses on "the needs of mature artists" and "the creativity of the individual artist." The mission statement for management focuses on "the management of change" and "leadership for innovation in a global society" (ibid.: 6). The effect of the 1990 management change has created a situation where the Centre for the Arts, once the leading focus for the Banff School, is now subsumed by the logic of management and business and increasingly vulnerable to cutbacks in core programming. According to the Centre's promoters, "the Centre's core activity must be to develop and expand the creativity of *individual, proven artists*. It encourages interdisciplinary projects between people, traditions and media, and *in relation to the activities of the centres for Management and Conferences*" (ibid.: 13 emphasis added). The most ground-breaking development was the development of a "virtual reality" laboratory as the "heart" of the Centre. Virtual reality, is a computer-controlled method of simulating a realistic, three-dimensional environment and is highly touted as the next profitable venture for visioning the future.

The Banff Centre, the Getty and Klein governments, and the business community integrated their interests to a greater degree throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. While on the one hand the government increased legal support and provided new contracts for the Banff Centre, on the other hand it decreased direct funding and made the Centre's programming vulnerable. The financial cuts motivated the Banff Centre to look for new clients in the business community. The linkages with the business community enhanced endowments, fees and profitability and offered the potential for commercialization of the Centre's management and arts' commodities. The linkages also enhanced the profile of the Centre, decreased its autonomy and redirected the goals of its educational programming to meet "client" demands. The business community hoped the Centre could improve its competitive edge by providing in-house education programmes, access to scarce information and an opportunity to restore profitability. The financial cuts and closer relations with business and government also meant that the Centre was more closely aligned with interests of a brand new "client," the Progressive Conservative government. As a fee for service, the Centre could now use the market model to offer their expertise as an "arms length" facilitator to meet the government's consultation needs and to help formulate a strategy for economic and educational reform. It is to this facilitation process that the next section turns to establish how the class interests of the Banff Centre were facilitated in the name of the universal Albertan.

### **6.3. The Calgary Vision Conference**

In Calgary on May 28th and 29th, 1992, the Getty administration sponsored the "Premier's Conference on Alberta's Economic Future" as a culminating event in the Toward 2000 Together strategy. A few days before the start of the conference, Premier Don Getty announced to the legislature that he was looking forward to the Toward 2000 meeting in anticipation of hearing what "Albertans" had to say about the future of the Alberta economy (*Alberta Hansard* [AH] May 25, 1992: 1084). The conference marked the end of a six month consultation process with "private citizens" and "business people" to show that the government was listening to the ideas of Albertans (*Calgary Herald* [CH] May 28, 1992). Although the Calgary conference was generally received as just another

public relations exercise at taxpayers' expense, its significance for creating and in disseminating a new language should not be discounted. As only one element in an ongoing process of legitimation and strategic action, it provided a crucible for a new theoretical vision to reconstitute ruling class hegemony in Alberta.

Pre-conference planning actually began earlier than March 1992. In December 1990 and January 1991, the Economic Planning Committee of Cabinet outlined the *Toward 2000 Together* strategy. During a retreat they contracted the Banff Centre for Management to develop the consensus-building process. The Centre's director and vice-president, Dr. Don Simpson, called the process "non-partisan, cross-disciplinary" and "arm's length from the government." This description of the process was repeated by government representatives as a theme in most of the core documents (e.g., MR 1992: ii, A6, A10, A12). The Banff Centre for Management had organized the conference to be open to the print and electronic journalists, including the opening and closing plenaries as well as the theme plenaries and the small group workshops (CW 1992: 4). The conference process contrasted with the way the Banff Centre organized the closed roundtables for experts and drafted the core document, the *Report on the Round Table*.

Organizers structured the agenda for the conference much like most other well-funded conferences. Wednesday evening included a registration and reception hosted by the Calgary Chamber of Commerce and the City of Calgary. The government provided background information through an information kiosk. The Thursday morning opening plenary featured speeches by Premier Don Getty; key government ministers Rick Orman and Peter Elzinga; conference moderator, Hal Wyatt; conference organizer, Dr. Don Simpson; and a high school student, Roberta Barker (interestingly, the only one not given an advance billing in the conference program) (CW 1992: 3; MR 1992: A16).

The opening plenary session was followed by a series of workshops, presentations and discussions. In the first set of small group workshops and under close supervision, the participants were instructed to create their own vision of Alberta in the year 2000. After lunch, participants divided into separate meetings of approximately 75-100 delegates. Designated leaders popularized "empirical" information and their own understanding of its relevancy to the new global knowledge-based economy. The six pre-established thematic discussions concerned (1) the future of resources; (2) knowledge, technology, information and innovation; (3) training, education and lifelong learning; (4) competing in a global economy; (5) environment and sustainable development; and (6) community-based development (CW 1992; MR.1992). A second set of workshops reviewed the theme-related "opportunities and constraints" and completed the afternoon. The Thursday evening events included an after dinner speech called "Challenges Facing Alberta" by Diane Francis, editor of the *Financial Post*. Thursday ended with a late night reception with MLA Elaine McCoy and a viewing of a Department of Labour video called "Future of Work" (CW: 3).

Friday began with reports from Thursday's thematic workshops, continued with more thematic discussions called "options and choices," reviewed a second set of reports and after lunch ended with a final plenary session. The moderator, then, summarized the conference events and the premier announced the next steps to be taken by the Alberta government. The conference concluded with the formation of an advisory committee to collate, summate and report on a set of recommendations. Getty announced that a "citizen's council of 'multistakeholders' in Alberta's future" would be appointed by conference organizers and cabinet ministers to draft a new economic blueprint (CH May 30, 1992). The "citizen's council" was to draft a new economic white paper to replace the last strategy plan drafted in 1984 by premier Peter Lougheed. According to Getty, the formation of the

advisory committee was a way of empowering the people. He said that "as a government we are letting go" (*Edmonton Journal* [EJ] May 30, 1992). Letting go of "what" to "whom" was a key question left unanswered.<sup>1</sup>

As might be anticipated, pre-conference opinion was skeptical about what effect the conference would have on "government action." John Curry of the Calgary Chamber of Commerce wondered if the government had the will power "to lead us out of a deficit." David Elton of the Canada West Foundation, usually supportive of deficit cutting measures, thought the series of scandals, such as the NovAtel loss of \$566 million, might overshadow the conference message "to look forward." Richard Woodward, professor of management from the University of Calgary, saw it as a public relations exercise. Mark Lisac, political columnist for *The Edmonton Journal*, also felt that the conference could merely be a "showpiece" and a "centrepiece of next year's Conservative re-election campaign" where "cliche and reality will be on display," a "political veneer on decisions already made." Lisac also felt that the important issues of corporate/business scandals arising from NovAtel, GSR, Myrias, Chembiomed and MagCan would not be legitimately confronted.<sup>2</sup> Business journalists described the effort as important only if it made people think about the future of the economy and participate ... developing a new economic strategy. "It may well turn out," one commentator argued, though, "to be only a well meaning, touchy-feely sort of exercise in creative semantics costing \$300,000" (CH May 29, 1992: B7). Ray Martin, leader of the New Democratic opposition called the whole process "stumbling toward 2000" (CH & EJ May 28, 1992).

The premier's first speech to opening plenary represented the process differently. He urged Albertans to think positively and "to give impetus to a whole new economic thinking and future for Alberta." He saw the video as providing "significant options to consider, and important choices to make, as we prepare for the twenty-first century" (MR 1992: A1). Peter Elzinga, Minister of Economic Development and Trade, saw it as a "milestone in the Toward 2000 Together initiative" and promised it to be both a rewarding experience and the opportunity to develop an economic strategy for "our" province (ibid.: A). Rick Orman, Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Economic Planning Cabinet Committee, also spoke of potential opportunities, and referred to "the video," "the children" and the importance of making "the future better" (ibid.: A10). Youth delegates, though, were said to be "unimpressed by the premier's rosy vision." (CH & EJ May 29, 1992).

The staging and atmosphere of the conference added to the sense of simulated and dramatic importance. Don Martin of the *Calgary Herald* described the "tasteful pageantry" of the Calgary Conference Centre on Thursday, May 28.

The main podium is framed by huge monitors -- one enlarging television feed beamed live across the province, the other offering a slide show choreographed to scripted political platitudes. A slick-and-sappy video was specially produced to open the conference complete with its very own *Toward 2000 Together* theme song. In it kids talk about their hopes, businesses try to appear hopeful and the politicians try not to sound hopeless. . . . All in

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<sup>1</sup>The practical meaning of the Toward 2000 Together initiative became clearly evident with the legislative policies to eliminate the deficit by cutting education, health care and social services and by reducing the tax load and royalty payments for the business community.

<sup>2</sup>The brief mention of these few companies illustrates the degree of commitment that the provincial government already had to the new high tech and knowledge-based sectors. Toward 2000 Together can be treated as one element in a legitimization process to secure stable subsidies from public taxation for these kind of enterprises. In this sense, Toward 2000 Together was not about making a decision to commit but rather to secure political support in a period of declining tax revenue for an already existing commitment.

all, lavish cosmetics have been applied to sell this two-day conference as a Very Important Process toward giving Alberta's sagging economy a facelift. (CH May 29, 1992).

According to Lisac, the ideological content of the conference was a lesson in "neo-conservatism," which pleased the participants, and was best represented by Diane Francis's speech promoting rabid anti-unionism, anti-NDP policies and sharply lowered business taxes. She also blamed problems on everyone who lived an "ever busy life" (EH May 30, 1992). The central interest that absorbed the workshops, no matter what the topic, was an interest in more effective education. The key limitation was the inability of the workshops to deal with conflicting and contradictory proposals in the writing of options (*ibid.*). These conflicts and contradictions arose even in spite of an already circumscribed class, gender, and racial representation at the conference.

Subjective commentary showed that the conference was not universally representative of the Alberta population. Journalists reported the evident social bias. Don Martin wrote "the 500 or so guests, excluding the usual Tory MLA clapping chorus, are the who's who of Alberta business and education with scandalously little representation by the social services agencies treating human casualties of Alberta economic failure" (CH May 29, 1992: B1). Mark Lisac wrote that labour was very under-represented and "other voices were present only in token numbers -- some natives, some establishment immigrants, a few private-establishment immigrants, a few private-sector unionists and the academic cream of the Calgary high schools. . . . No wonder one of the wrap-up speakers celebrated Alberta's classless society. By and large there was only one class here" (EJ May 30, 1992: A10). Some delegates expressed concern that delegates did not represent a cross-section of grassroots Albertans (CH May 30, 1992). Liberal MLA Frank Bruseker identified "a lot of average, white males, 30-50 years and CEOs of companies" (*ibid.*). Hal Wyatt, conference moderator, explained that "every effort was made to ensure conference delegates reflected the community at large." He said he had "invited" more women, natives and ethnic participants but they didn't show up (*ibid.*).

Objective analyses also revealed that "one failure of the conference" was its inability to represent a cross-section of the Alberta population and/or interest groups: ". . . the group was definitely male-dominated, with too few representatives of our ethnic mosaic, and even fewer from environmental interest groups and also from the less privileged sectors of our society. . . most participants were between the ages 35-55, and older Albertans were notably under-represented" (MR 1992: 2, C1-16). The recognition of these absences was not new. Before the conference, the absence of marginal groups was also noted and solutions emphasized. The *Report of the Roundtables* states: "it would be important to expand processes like the current roundtable process to include more people who are now marginalized, to have them identify obstacles to change and assist in the creation of methods of overcoming these obstacles" (RRT 1992: 54). By the end of the process, the obstacles still blocked a valid cross-sectional sampling by class, race and gender.

The end of the conference did not focus Alberta's attention on Progressive Conservative policies. Getty's government had lost legitimacy and the conference did not appear to give the boost needed to lagging support in the polls. Post-conference comments centred on the ongoing government scandals, the inability of the Getty government to get on track, and the failure of the conference to provide a substantive thrust for Alberta's development. *Calgary Herald's* Don Martin stated that "if Getty turns a deaf ear to public fury at government flops [e.g., NovAtel], there's considerable doubt he'll listen to calls for tough action to turn Alberta around" (CH May 29, 1992: B1). He argued that the conference was a "polished finale to an 18-month planning, polling and fact-gathering

mission" and could have been replaced by the 170-page analysis of Alberta public opinion distributed to delegates" (Reference to RRF 1992). He concluded that Albertans should "fire those responsible for the mess." *The Edmonton Journal's* Mark Lisac thought the conference should be tried again and viewed it as a "kind of constituent assembly on the economy" stripped of a broad social representation (EJ May 30, 1992: A10). He concluded, though, that "the conference was so general and tentative that it's difficult to see the government taking any specific direction from it" (ibid.).

Getty responded by suggesting that the press should look forward and not backward. In response to the claim of the under-representation of certain groups, he also said, that in receiving input from "multi-stakeholders" for his "citizens' council," he wanted to include labour, management, government, non-profit organizations, and every walk of life in province (CH May 30, 1992).

Hal Wyatt, concluded in his report of the conference: "In the future, we must strive to include stakeholders from all groups in whatever collaborative process is adopted for the ongoing development and implementation of an economic strategy. Only then can we say the people of Alberta have indeed been empowered to move our province into a brighter future by the year 2000" (MR 1992: 2). But the resignation of Getty as premier did not dethrone the Toward 2000 Together initiative. The strategically organized action plan was to provide the ideological legitimations and the organizational integration that Ralph Klein was able to emphasize for his reelection campaign and his program of fiscal restraint and administrative reform in 1993. (See campaign literature: "Our Plan for a better Alberta." -- "Look forward, not behind" and "He listens, he cares" were key slogans.)

Press and television coverage of the conference was minimal. And except for the participants and a few political junkies, one can assume that the conference -- in itself -- had no lasting significance for the Albertan population. What was important, and missed by commentators, was how the "true" conference, the avalanche of documentation and post-conference social amnesia could be used to reconstruct the "meaning" of government action as representative of the "universal" Albertan and not just a Rightist ruling class. The conference vision, in this sense, was not and could never be a "finale" of Toward 2000 Together, that is, its significance lay in its future as a "representation" of Alberta's past and its eternal practical presence as the theoretical language of reform for the "future." In a short time few people could remember or cared to remember how the Calgary conference represented particular class interests. Central to the conference was the enculturation of a ruling class grammar for thinking which was to become imprinted on the discourse of reform, that is, a new form of "investing" in education in the name of a "universalizing" political action. It was not coincidental that the oppositional forces in the fall of 1993 were to become trapped within this new discourse of human resource development so that in the name of liberation they had to claim themselves in favour of changes that "politicians should view education as an investment not as an expense" (EJ Oct. 31, 1993: A5).

#### **6.4. Representing the "Universal" Albertan**

The last section identified the particular interests mobilized in the reform initiative and exemplified by the Calgary Conference. The reform initiative paralleled concurrent changes at the Banff Centre, that is, a closer realignment of Alberta's intellectual, government, bureaucratic and business elites. The Conference provided the elites with an opportunity to reconstruct a class ideology into a universal discourse. In the next chapter I return to this topic and focus specifically on how this reconstruction was accomplished. But before looking at the specific mechanisms of ideological production, the following section completes the analysis of the circuits of power by accounting for the multiple benefits

provided to the interested parties: the Banff Centre increased its profile and status in the intellectual community, the Progressive Conservatives enhanced their potential for reelection and the business community retained a friendly political ally in control of the Alberta state.

Bill 15, the Universities Foundations Amendment Act, followed the Premier Getty's return from a First Minister's Conference and marked an increased interest by the government in letting the 27 board-governed institutions of advanced learning derive new impetus for creativity and innovation from the logic of the private market. Interest in the commodification of educational products and delivery had already become common currency at the federal level. Education, as a provincial responsibility -- and the communal property of the Canadian public -- was still treated as a public good, "a sacred trust" and a responsibility of the state. The original Universities Foundations Act had marked Alberta's entry into a logic which redefined public service concerning post-secondary education. The unpopularity of the Getty government, though, clearly threatened "the future" of the post-secondary vision that had informed the "public" consultation process.

Following Bill 15, Provincial Treasurer Dick Johnston gave the budget address. The Getty government was not going to get a respite by waiting for recovery. The Canadian economy was faltering and the United States was still in recession. The global economy was weak and the depressed commodity markets had especially effected farm incomes and the energy sector. The government tried to put a bright face on the Alberta economy but poor consumer confidence and increased unemployment were not good indicators, and although farm production, natural gas exports and diversification initiatives showed some signs for potential growth these signs were not enough to assure the road to recovery (AH April 13, 1992). Any gains were also undermined by the fact that the diversification projects by the private sector had provided more in scandals than in hoped for dividends. While the loss of legitimation might be regained through the public relations of vision conferencing, there still remained the nagging problem of poor economic growth. The answer, at least for the Progressive Conservatives, was to speak about a new kind of *educational opportunity* as Johnston enunciated: "Exciting developments are also taking place in industries that are becoming new engines of growth for the evolving global economy....We are encouraging Alberta industry to develop and utilize advanced technology. The commercialization of research will generate high-skill, high-paying jobs for Albertans" (ibid.: 384).

What were these "new engines of growth" in Alberta? Aerospace engineering, medical research, biotechnology, and telecommunications. Who, beside corporations, were central to the project? The universities of Alberta and Calgary, the Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research, research laboratories, *centres of excellence*, and the Alberta Research Council (ibid.). Clearly the economic and fiscal strategy for better sales and expanded employment required action to inject confidence and create jobs by supporting the development of scientific and technological development.

In the above sense, the ladder to heaven was now in place, but God's providence was not shining because no recovery in resource revenues was in sight and the devil was playing deficit games through excessive government spending. Johnston argued that the sensible course (i.e., with a potential election in sight) was not to take drastic action to offset the unexpected drop in resource revenue and not to increase government spending. Whether wise fiscal management or good public relations, the government elected to stay the course in spite of increasing unpopularity.

But staying the course when it came to education was a little more risky because it now appeared as a capital investment on both sides of the ledger, that is, both as a government

"expense" and as the prescribed "engine of growth." How was this *challenge* to be articulated? Committing the government to maintaining the essential aspects of education, health care and social services, meant the government could attempt to hold the line on spending. But as an engine of growth, the government would have to take a first step to realize the vision. So the preliminaries to a redefinition of the meaning of "educational opportunity" were enunciated. For publicly funded elementary and secondary schooling, this meant improving efficiency according to the traditional assumptions of human capital theory: (1) "quality" education was critical for prosperity; (2) Canadians spent more on the product but got less return on their investment; (3) Albertans demanded results from the investment of their tax dollars; (4) performance would be rewarded with funding; and (5) performance would be monitored by tracking and assessing retention rates and student enrollments including attendance. For publicly funded post-secondary education and training there were added challenges and opportunities. Johnston stated:

This government is encouraging increased private support of our post-secondary institutions. The University Foundations Act, which was passed last year, provides more generous tax incentives for contributions for universities. Legislation will be introduced this session to extend those provisions to public colleges, technical institutes, and the Banff Centre. (ibid.: 387)

What was not so publicly obvious at this stage was that Executive Council of Cabinet and The Banff Centre for Management had a strategic plan which regarded public education not only as a current debit but also as a potential credit in their economic jigsaw puzzle. Furthermore, post-secondary education was coveted by different institutional interests. Where the Banff Centre could organize legitimation for the Progressive Conservative agenda, the government could provide the regulative infrastructure to make the Banff Centre a leading post-secondary institution in Alberta and the first international centre of excellence. The prophetic understanding that education no longer had to be viewed as an economic constraint but could be treated as an economic opportunity was the property of only a few insiders. What was required was to get the message out to a selected core community who would bring together the potentially sympathetic business, state and intellectual elites, that is, to sell the gospel that although the devil of the deficit was close at hand, salvation could be provided by privatizing the profitable sectors of advanced education to make Alberta the vanguard in the new post-industrial age.

On the day following the budget address and a week before the vision conference in Calgary, Peter Elzinga tabled in the legislature four copies of a press release and four copies of the inputs the government had received through the Banff school dealing with the Toward 2000 Together process (AH April 14, 1992). In a set piece of questions and responses between P.C. MLA. Diane Mirosh and cabinet minister Elzinga, the government revealed the particular pre-spin meaning they would be giving to the conference. In identifying the participants in the Toward 2000 Together conference, Mirosh emphasized the key players as "big businesses, small businesses, educators, industries, associations, and so on" (ibid.: 908). The conference was about bringing together interests and expertise. Albertans had "great expectations as to the outcome of this report." Albertans also were ". . . really concerned about jobs and the lack of jobs, and with the unemployment crisis. . . ." Clearly, the universal Albertan was waiting for information from a conference of "stakeholders," that is, the elites of central institutions.

Already a year before the election would actually be played out, the issue of a "jobs strategy" was to be the hook for the three provincial parties. Elzinga outlined the strategy



for the government. "Public input" would determine the content and the Toward 2000 Together process would provide the details, and culminating in the Calgary conference, the process would provide the essentials for a white paper (ibid.). Of course, as reviewers of the conference both anticipated and later evaluated, little in detail came from the conference, and as would be revealed over the next year and a half, future details in both the white paper or the new economic development strategy would not be significant either.

It was a speculative component that made it impossible to publicly promote the complete strategy for privatizing knowledge production. Rather, the old theory that education was *not* a property value (i.e., a means of production) could not be jettisoned because public policy had to curry the contemporary resonance for progressive reform. In this sense, education had to be sold as only one input in the total economic strategy and not as it actually was, a total economic strategy including expropriation. In this sense, subordinated to a "jobs strategy," the public discussion of "education" could centre around traditional questions such as maintaining an efficient funding process for the present public system and an efficient socialization process in the creation of a well trained workforce. "Jobs strategy" thus provided a (misplaced) point of discussion for all three of the political parties and was framed by the meaning of an old theory about human capital investment. Missed was a discussion about who had the right to communal wealth and the production of collectively produced surpluses. Appropriation of surplus value rather than job creation should have been the focus for public discourse. Even after the election public discourse remained contextualized by the old meanings of privatization, and most people, including many of the fellow travellers missed the significance of the restructuring of "educational investment."

Upon returning from the Calgary conference, Mirosh was again delegated to frame the question for the post-conference spin. The emphasis of representation had now shifted away from a select community of business elites and educational experts to a more general public including ". . . people from industry, labour, educators, youth, and ethnic groups attending" (AH June 4, 1992). The new spin: "Alberta" was represented at the conference by all people and not just a community of experts.

When Getty returned to the legislature he universalized the event and contradicted the moderator's closing remarks. Getty stated that the Toward 2000 Together conference "brought together in a remarkable show of partnership with the government in terms of looking ahead, a vision of 2000, to see if we also can't lay the groundwork for a stronger, better economy in our province" (ibid.). He also took the opportunity to announce the formation of "a multistakeholder representative group of Albertans" to come up with a white paper. On the question of "jobs" he deferred to the white paper and concluded that "this Toward 2000 Together broke new ground of a partnership between the people and the government that is going to be something that we'll all be proud of *in the future*" (ibid. emphasis added). This was the last time Don Getty spoke publicly as premier about the Toward 2000 initiative. The Progressive Conservatives could not hope to regain legitimacy under his leadership. Ralph Klein replaced Getty. During the leadership transition Toward 2000 still provided a justification for *not* dealing the problems of economic stagnation and corruption. For example, Elzinga deferred on answers about Vencap Equities, a venture capital corporation implicated in the diversification scandals (ibid., also see June 15, 1992: 1363; June 16, 1992: 1408).

Another half year passed and on January 26, 1993 the question of an economic plan for the province was again on the legislative agenda. The new premier referred specifically to Toward 2000 Together. But now Klein had a new emphasis called "Creating Tomorrow," a bonus for the rural constituents who had helped him defeat Nancy Betkowski for the

leadership of the party. Although the *Moderator's Report*, the so-called culminating document, was available, the economic strategy would again have to wait for *Creating Tomorrow* to be integrated into a total strategy and to ensure "... agriculture and the role that industry will continue to play as really the backbone of our economy" (AH Jan. 16, 1993).

In response to NDP questions about speeding up the plan for "the unemployed," Klein responded that the government was doing all it could and "keeping it [the economy] free enterprise." The Liberal leader also raised questions concerning the ethics in preparing the documentation (ibid.). And again in the lead up to a pending election, *Toward 2000* provided a useful vehicle for deflecting questions about the economy and the diversification scandals (ibid. also see Feb. 9, 1993: 2183). Decisions about economic reform were deferred until *Toward 2000 Together* was "completed."

On April 22, 1993 the government came forward with its program of fiscal restraint and governmental and administrative reform and the "new direction" was justified with reference to an "unprecedented series of public consultations and initiatives" (AH April 22, 1993). The premier thanked the public for their participation then listed the initiatives: *Toward 2000 Together*, *Creating Tomorrow*, *Vision 2000*, *The Premier's Council on Science and Technology*, local development initiative, *Tourism 2000*, the *Special Places* program, the *Round Table on Environment and Economy* and "a host of other vehicles used to consult with and listen to Albertans" (ibid.: 2349). According to the premier these reports represented a consensus about more specific contents without ever referring to how it would be done.

Nonetheless, we now know that these consultations have produced an amazing degree of consensus about where we should be going as a province. Although expressed differently by various groups involved, common themes are clearly identifiable: a cooperative approach through partnerships; a focus on competitiveness and innovation; a need to build value-added industries; the need to promote research and technology; a facilitator role for government to be a world leader in bringing about sustainable development; to keep a priority [sic] our core programs of education, health, and social services; a commitment to fairness and equality of opportunity; and above all else jobs for Albertans. (ibid.)

As part of a nine-part development strategy, he outlined four components of the fiscal strategy. The first primary component he summarized as "balancing revenue and spending in four years." The public was introduced to a first test of election rhetoric: "One, we don't have a revenue problem; we have a spending problem. Secondly, no society has ever been taxed to prosperity." More specific proposals were stated for the last three components. He devoted 42 lines in *Hansard* to the importance of creating a competitive tax environment for business, 37 lines to rationalizing and cutting government spending and only 9 lines to reducing or eliminating "direct" financial assistance to business. Klein's latter comments down-played the negative aspects of the diversification strategy and included a small admission of guilt for "incurred losses" by the past administration (ibid.: 2350).

The rest of the nine part strategy established the "targets" including commitments to research and development, to the traditional industrial sector, to the new information sector, to community-based development, reform of the regulatory environment, to an international strategy, to a spirit of co-operation, and to job creation through skill development. The new "program" closely resembled the recurring themes from the vision conference but the "jobs strategy" remained the focal point of interest. After jettisoning the chief liability (the corrupt inadequacy symbolized by Getty) and after minimalizing the scandals created by direct subsidization of private companies, Klein had tested the election waters. He had not

changed direction, everything was on course and the plans by the Executive Committee and the Banff Centre were not to be wasted.

Specific references to education reveal the continuing dual emphasis on both sides of the educational ledger. The emphasis remained human capital theory and bringing the education system more in line with the interests of business. "Well-educated and highly trained people are the key to achieving our goals. We need results-based education that prepares students to meet emerging technologies and to deal with change more rapid than at any other time in the past" (ibid.: 2353). To do this, Klein intended to maintain infrastructure and quality, to simplify access to financial assistance for students, to consolidate programming and "to immediately launch a broadly based call for public input into a practical, long term plan for adult learning with particular emphasis on increased training and retraining opportunities in the labour market" (ibid.).

For the *new* economy, though, the emphasis was also on human capital theory and bringing the education system more in line with the interests of business by commercializing technologies. But little was made of commercializing education itself. The critical components of economic growth were still presented as science, technology and industrial innovation. A number of specific moves included "developing innovative models to foster joint university/industry research, to substantially increase the focus on the commercialization of technologies for sale abroad, to increase available funding for investment through public and private capital funds, and working through Alberta Education, to ensure that science, technology, research, and innovation all become an integral part of our curriculum" (ibid.: 2351). Finally, in discussing business initiatives for diversification he stated that success depended on the high-technology infrastructure. "From our research institutions, both public and private, to the incredible technology available there and to the highly educated and skilled work force that drives it, we have much to offer an information based world" (ibid.). Opposition response was quite predictable. They named it the same old stuff and called for an election (ibid.: 2357).

On the following day, *Toward 2000 Together* would reveal its potential cultural power (AH April 23, 1993). In the upcoming election it was obvious that there would be a focus on a "jobs strategy" and the diversification scandals. Each of the three main parties were intending to emphasize different aspects. The Progressive Conservatives would make their case that the province (i.e., the Getty government) suffered from a communication deficit. With a new leader who would listen to the "public" the scandals could be forgotten and Albertans would have a jobs strategy based on their expressed needs. The Liberals would make their case that the province suffered from an ethical deficit, the Progressive Conservative party. The old leadership was corrupt and a new ethically-committed leadership could work with business to bring the Alberta economy in line with the new information economy, that is, after cleaning house. The NDP would make their case that the province suffered from a management deficit, that is, a leadership without an intelligently articulated or specific plan. The old leadership, they claimed, was tied too closely to the business interest and had no new ideas. The NDP had new ideas to deal specifically with the unemployed.

The debate between the premier and the opposition leader on April 23rd was therefore revealing as a symbolic struggle over universal representation. In the initial exchange, Ray Martin referred to the plan as less informative than "a grade 6 colouring book" and then asked if a more specific plan was forthcoming to deal with job creation. Klein responded that the New Democrats were the real experts on grade six colouring books. He defended his plan as a good example of an economic strategy. Martin then prefaced his supplementary question with reference to the inadequacy and cost of the document and the

reality of "145,000 unemployed Albertans." He then asked "Why doesn't he [Klein] announce something here to deal with those 145,000 people right now rather than giving us happy talk?" Klein suggested that Martin spoke only for the unemployed and that as Premier he spoke for all "Albertans":

Mr. Speaker, certainly we're concerned about unemployment. You can't solve the problem overnight. That's why you need a reasonable and honest blueprint, a plan for the future with targets, not promises but targets.

You know, Mr. Speaker, if you attack this economic development strategy the way the Leader of the Official Opposition is attacking it, I would suggest you are attacking what thousands of Albertans have told us about their vision of the future. You are telling all those people, including some of their own people, who participated in *Toward 2000* that they are wrong. You're telling those people who took part in *Tourism 2000* that they were wrong. You're telling the people of rural Alberta who participated in that tremendous process *Creating Tomorrow* that they are wrong, and on it goes. This plan is the result of all that meaningful public input over the past year and a half throughout the province, and it contains what Albertans are telling us is right (ibid.: 2363).

### 6.5. Conclusion

The success of "Ralph's Team for a better Alberta" had much to do with the *Toward 2000 Together* process. Through the legitimating potential of the documentation process of public consultation the new leader was able to symbolize himself as representing "Alberta" when in fact he represented a narrow cross-section of economic, bureaucratic, political and intellectual elites. Furthermore, through the process he was able to mobilize a coalition and capture a province already ideologically integrated *before* electioneering and using the language of "opportunity" expressed in the new vision for the future.

The Banff Centre played a pivotal role in enabling Ralph Klein, the Progressive Conservatives and "Alberta" to take one step closer to their future. In May 1993, the Banff Centre navigators would report at "arm's length" that the Calgary conference "brought together 550 Albertans from all walks of life to review the input already received through the *Toward 2000 Together* public consultation process. Participants at the conference included representatives from business, labour, education, government, minority and special interest groups, as well as members of the general public and students" (RAC 1993: 8). This "fact" was quite far from the truth. The May 1992 Premier's Conference was a crucible for the cultural consolidation of Alberta's elites into ruling class agent. It was here where the definition of "economic in nature" took on an overarching meaning and was given social force as applying to *all* aspects of Alberta life, especially education. It thus also followed, that "business" was thereafter to be considered the universal stakeholder, that is, the expert on *all* thematic concerns for social reform. Other stakeholders, such as educators, were treated as particularist experts who had to subordinate their concerns to the totalizing business interest.

This chapter focused on the specific changes taking place at one postsecondary institution in Alberta, the Banff Centre for Continuing Education. The Banff Centre for Management provided the initial contours of a theory for reform and during the public consultation process created "anonymous" texts in the name of the universal Albertan that were not universally representative. The ideological production of *Toward 2000 Together* reinforced the circuits of class power while claiming to do otherwise. A common vision developed as a dialogue between people in the elite and middle strata who as carriers of different understandings and "languages" were able to coordinate their activities in a publicly-sponsored forum. The intellectual elite organized "linguistic" rationalization and

mediated expert and popular language. The hegemonic practices of the Banff Centre for Management helped reconstruct popular representations in accordance with an expert theory of social development concerning a knowledge-based economy and the commercialization of education. Toward 2000 Together consolidated and mediated the non-discursive circuits of power and allowed the Klein government to find a suitable mode of reception for the assumptions of corporatist postmodernization. The focus of the next chapter is to analyze how this discursive power of the intelligentsia produced objectifications within traditional universalizing myths. Ideological production in this case informs the universal representation of the "Albertan" with the subjective characteristics of Alberta's ruling elites. I now turn to how an intellectual elite was able to mediate the production of a new political language and to reconstruct the specific ideological contents for a *new* ruling class narrative called corporatist postmodernization.

# Chapter Seven

## Dismal Dreams: Visioning the Future of Alberta

The vision is our "beacon for the future," said conference participants.  
(Hal Wyatt, *Toward 2000 Together Moderator's Report*, 1992: 11)

It appears vain to limit oneself to reflecting reality as in science, and vain to escape it as in fiction. Action alone proposes to transform the world, in other words, to make it similar to dreams. "To act" resonates in the ear with the blast of the trumpets of Jericho. No imperative possesses a more basic efficacy and, for whoever hears it, the necessity to take action is imposed without possible delay and without condition. But he who demands that action realize the will that animates him quickly receives strange responses. The neophyte learns that the will to efficacious action is the one that limits itself to dismal dreams. He accepts; then he slowly understands that action will leave him only the benefit of having acted. He believed in transforming the world according to his dream, but he only transformed his dream on the level of the poorest reality: he can only stifle in himself the will he carried -- *in order to be able to ACT*. (Georges Bataille, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 1985 [1938]: 226)

### 7.1. Intertextualizing the Vision

Reference to the relationship between "texts" articulates an ideological configuration and a force field for social integration called "intertextuality." This intertextual configuration has a centre of gravity which shifts from technocratic liberalism towards the corporatist postmodernization narrative. Corporate postmodernism marks a break with Enlightenment assumptions about human agency by reducing political governance to a set of predetermined adaptations to a naturalized and global economic order. This shift in assumptions is *not* the natural outcome of adaptation but rather the product of ideological production, that is, the product of the active intervention of a hegemonic intelligentsia attempting to reconstruct the way the people of Alberta name the world and explain its dynamic.

The last chapter described the suturing of circuits of power between Alberta elites and the construction of a universal public discourse which helped the Progressive Conservatives get reelected. This chapter describes how the competing and sometimes contradictory interests of the intellectual, bureaucratic, political and business elites were reconstructed into a ruling class subjectivity. Ruling class subjects, thus, could express their interests through objectified anonymous texts, an universal theory for social reform and in progressive language replete with the popular assumptions of Alberta myth.

I show how the *Toward 2000 Together* intelligentsia regulates the discourse in the process of naturalization. To accomplish their task the intelligentsia framed discussions and mediated a variety of disputes over the topics, theories and facts with recourse to organizational devices (such as delimiting attendance at "public" forums) and to rhetorical mechanisms (such as use of popular metaphors). The intellectual authority of the intelligentsia rests on a dual basis: (1) the non-discursive circuits of power described in the last chapter and (2) the competency to manipulate symbols and create a popular reception for ruling class ideas. In this chapter, I further illustrate how non-discursive and discursive power interact at a deep level in the construction of universalizing anonymous texts. I also show how the trajectory of both the language and nature of *Toward 2000 Together* changes in an attempt to find just the right balance between ruling class interests seeking to maintain

moral-political leadership and contradictory popular resistances that might challenge its dominance. I also describe the mechanisms of ideological production whereby political power and economic interest distort democratic communication in the name of "consensus-building." This pathological form of communication results in a universalizing language not representative of universal interests.

By the time of the 1993 fall sitting of the Alberta legislature, the 1992 Calgary "vision" conference was long forgotten but theoretical assumptions remained both continuous and discontinuous with the initial strategy and materialized in the avalanche of documentation identified at the beginning of the last chapter. What this chapter analyzes is the construction of a *social validity* for the strategy, that is, how a community of hegemonic elites and their clients came to believe that they *actually* represented a universal and democratically valid general interest. To accomplish this task I have selected seven core documents which were promoted as central to the legitimation process: *Summary: Discussion Paper* (SDP: Summer 1991); *Banff Centre for Management Report of the Round Table* (RRT: May 1992); *Report on the Regional Forum* (RRF: May 1992); *Conference Workbook* (CW 1992); *Moderator's Report* (MR: August 1992); *Report of the Advisory Committee* (RAC: May 1993); and *Seizing Opportunity: Alberta's New Economic Strategy* (SO: Fall 1993). The documentary continuity of these texts was used to represent "Alberta" and can be treated as the crucible for reconstructing the language for the exercise of hegemony.

When all the background documents and primary responses are also included within this intertextual force field of meaning, one can easily understand why the political leadership had difficulty in constructing a common front out of the multiplicity of contradictory interests and expansive data bases. This problem of data overload, the significance of the vision conference and the importance of expert opinion, though, became crucial elements in the legitimation process. In order to ensure some rational correlation between government action and the accumulated "knowledge" an intellectual context was required to provide both an explanation of the "data" and to popularize the prerogative for strategic action. This intellectual legitimation had to be grounded in the twentieth century liberal assumptions that strategic action must be the expression of the general will and must be informed by truth, truthfulness and rightness. Alberta's development, thus, depended on a metanarrational construct which could bring empirical and normative theory together within a transparent forum and give authentic meaning to the empirical evidence and to legitimate leadership, that is, the moral and political conformity of the ruled classes to the domination of a ruling class exhibiting moral and political leadership.

At first appearance and given the general orientation to anti-intellectualism in Alberta's popular culture, this metanarrational orientation might be viewed as being imposed on the process *ex post facto*, but I argue that elements of this metanarration were already in play, albeit fragmented and contradictory. In a dialectical fashion the metanarration provided an ongoing mediation which structured popular distinctions between "evidence" and "non-evidence" and required some form of public rationalization by an intellectual elite. Cultural dialogue between hegemonic intellectuals and popular representations provided the linguistic resources to reconstruct and to find suitable reception. In other words, the legitimation process as a whole was not knowingly an inauthentic, false or wrong manipulation of the Alberta people, but rather the pathological result of procedures that intended to objectify the desires of Albertans into textual commodities. The commodification of these texts gave them a life of their own, resulting in the purchase of private dreams for public mobilization and the marketing of public mobilization for class power.

## 7.2. Thematic Continuities: When Topics Parade as Theses

The first identifiable mechanism for the exercise of ideological hegemony is to establish a classification system. A typological grid for analysis categorizes the objects under investigation as a mechanism for both comprehending the universal task at hand and for selecting the relative importance of various particulars. This system allows participants to recognize differences as a precondition for the hierarchical organization of those differences. In this case, establishing a description of legitimate topics for discussion is also a way of evaluating those topics which fall "outside" the grid and those which are organized within the grid. In the name of description, then, procedures for evaluation do their work at a subliminal level establishing the topics for legitimate discourse. The classification system, thus, has a dual function and allows the navigators of the process to either invest empirical clarifications with political values or smuggle in political values under a veil of objective and neutral observation.

The ideological ambiguity established between description and evaluation allows the Toward 2000 Together navigators to combine logically contradictory claims and escape rational or scientific critique. Toward 2000 Together -- as a discursive field -- takes on multiple meanings about everything important and nothing in particular and implements both continuity and change in accordance with a political agenda advanced through the reconstruction of meaning. In the language of semiology, the slippage between signifiers and signifieds allows multiple meanings to be attached to the same sign and the power of the intelligentsia resides in its authority to regulate the fixation of one specific meaning when it is strategically important to advance the agenda. In other words, what Toward 2000 Together *means* as an organizational grid for action and what it *actually is* as a political performance are never identical. It is this ambiguity in meaning that makes the discursive field a site of struggle to establish the "true" meaning of Toward 2000 Together. Classification, thus, frames struggles over meaning within a grid and backgrounds the competing political values implicit to the grid itself.

In the fall of 1993 Premier Ralph Klein announced that after public consultation "the people of Alberta have told us that, as we move ahead to the year 2000, the provincial government must adapt -- quickly and comprehensively" (SO 1993: 4). He focused on six "challenges": the economic burden of government spending priorities; fundamental and rapid global economic change; the design, delivery and financing of education and training; the need for individuals to embrace an attitude of lifelong learning and skills updating; the management of sustainable development; the linking of economic and social policies in the delivery of programs; and a new decision-making process to provide a more effective model of economic development (ibid.: 3). These challenges were to be met by a plan to build a climate conducive to investment and to give government the role of facilitating economic development. Klein's first fiscal priority was a "4 year plan to balance the budget" (ibid.: 7). The strategy seemed strangely familiar considering he had run his campaign as a time to forget the past.

Two years earlier, in the summer of 1991 Don Getty established a set of eight "objectives" for Toward 2000 Together as a "guide to stimulate discussion. . . ." The objectives were to promote adaptation and innovation in the workforce through skill development and lifelong learning; to foster an entrepreneurial business culture; to sustain a competitive business and investment culture; to pursue economic development on the principles of environmental sustainability; to strengthen the viability of Alberta communities and their quality of life; to promote a quality work environment that challenges individual Albertans and leads to a more productive and competitive economy; to build strong partnerships among employers, educators, governments and individuals and less



adversarial approaches to employer-employee relations; to encourage the development of science, technology and research to enhance Alberta's competitiveness; and to strengthen Alberta's reputation for international tourism. Getty also assumed that "Albertans have made it clear that a balanced provincial budget is important to them, as it is to the Alberta government" (SDP 1991: 7).

In the intervening documents these "challenges" and "objectives" appeared in many forms as "visions," "values," as "fundamental principles," as "areas of consensus and difference," as "current reality," "as themes" and as "uncertainties, constraints and opportunities." Primarily, though, they appeared without content as formalized "topics" and more correctly could be called the "focus for discussion." In the RRF and the RRT they appeared as the distinctive "topics" for the public forums (RRF 1992: 3) and the roundtables (RRT 1992: 3-4). In the CW they were called "thematic plenaries," in the MR they were called "themes" and in the RAC they provided the "strategic framework" for action.

In the RRF themes were justified as having been "established early in the process as a first rough cut at identifying the cross-disciplinary issues that would prove key to the future of the Alberta economy" (RRF 1992: 4). This was the first moment where all the previous departmental discussions were *revealed*, in fact, as the *ex post facto* representation of Toward 2000 Together process. At this moment, the program was presented as both old and new. "This new program should be viewed as an 'umbrella' initiative, bringing together a number of complementary initiatives and public consultation processes dealing with a wide range of economic, social and environmental issues" (SDP 1991: 5). That is, the themes were a form of classification already pre-established by the ongoing bureaucratic initiative. Getty's objectives in the discussion paper provided the consolidation. What was new were not the ideas of the categorizing themes but the fact that these discourses were being brought together into a comprehensive whole as practice.

Throughout the documentation this "umbrella" was treated as a justification for specific contents and values which are protected from public scrutiny. In the RRF it was then possible to write that the presentation of themes "is intended instead to present a synopsis of the common issues and themes which have been identified as being important to the province's economic future" (Foreword). Note the shift to passive voice and the loss of agency, no longer referring to the earlier initiatives of the bureaucratically driven discussions. Already the document reported that "a number of key themes emerge with remarkable consistency" (RRF 1992: 13). By the time of the conference themes now appeared as "the response so far from Albertans" and "in reviewing all the input submitted to date, a number of themes kept recurring -- areas of concern felt across a wide cross-section of the population representing groups with different mandates" (CW 1992: 10). The original meaning of the categorization process was lost and it was now represented as a "consensus" among the diversity of debates. By the time of the MR, the themes emerged as bridges whereby "recognized leaders in each of the six theme areas [would] set the stage for further work to be done" (MR 1992: 19) and it was now up to the leaders to identify the contents. By the time of the RAC, bridging recommendations and challenges, the themes were introduced as a "a number of goals with specific recommendations . . ." where an underlying theme had emerged "to take a more integrated and interdisciplinary approach to economic activity -- an approach that is complemented by an increasing emphasis on collaboration among all parties" (RAC 1993: 27). Note how the organizing principle for the discussions became the system of classification which then became a consistency in topics and then the underlying consensus. The actual "consensus" was merely the rediscovered initial topics fragmented by the intelligence gathering of the bureaucratic departments and

finally coordinated in a public consultation process. The navigators had "discovered" a description of categories and organization which they had initially created. The continuity was striking because the *new* understanding merely mirrored the process of the consultation. In the later stages the facilitators from the Banff Centre claimed to have established "themes that provided a useful framework for discussion," but, that is, "without imposing preconceived approaches or conclusions" (RAC 1993: 4).

To claim that the themes were developed "without imposition" was important for the navigators because the assumption of having sought consent or having achieved consent provided important universalizing legitimations to justify the process as democratic. The fairly accurate description of the topics and their integration during the consultation process were not new but rather a restatement of the terms of reference into which the ideological contents were poured. The use of the word "theme" was narrowly correct in that the varied topics did provide a common motif throughout the process, but in the broader sense, the use of the word "theme" deceived the participants because it was treated as a proposition maintained and defended in argumentation as a thesis would be defended in a public forum such as in a legislative question period. While people could dispute a thesis, they could not very well dispute a theme such as "life-long learning." So while disagreements continually arose over certain theses, the continuity of the themes allowed for particular theses to be smuggled into the process as a statement of ideological principle -- for example "life-long learning" was *best* "fostered by a competitive business climate." So while the themes were central to organizing the consensus-building process, they only provided the appearance of consensus concerning prescribed action. My analysis must thus attend to the more specific issues contained within the categorization of topics.

### 7.3. Definitional Continuities: Framing the Disputes

Classification framed struggles over meaning within a grid and backgrounded the political values implicit in the grid itself. The second identifiable mechanism for the exercise of ideological hegemony is to establish legitimate definitions for each object in a classification system. In this case, thematic continuities established *what* was to be talked about, but definitional continuities intend to establish *how* each object is to be talked about. These definitional objects are the "goals" of reform and the "means" to achieve the goals. This mechanism establishes in the name of a "universal" political process a set of definitions limited to one particular ideological orientation.

The *Summary: Discussion Paper* not only established the themes but also framed the parameters for debating the issues. The first key assumption was that the provincial budget had to be balanced. People were asked for a strategy to accomplish this task but the goal of a balanced budget was not up for discussion. The participants were to focus on the means for balancing the budget. But here again, the nature of the means was also framed. "Our economic strategy must reflect Alberta's social, cultural and community objectives and, above all, promote economic growth. . ." (SDP 1991: 9). The goal of capitalist accumulation was established and it would be accomplished. The "will" of the Alberta population played an ambiguous role in the discourse because it already presumed that there was only one way to "promote economic growth," that is according to a particular definition of "free enterprise." But the consensus-building process was also treated as an authentic mechanism for finding out what the will and values of the Alberta population actually was. In other words, the consensus-builders were looking for something they already knew existed but were not quite sure they could find (or construct?).

Furthermore what the Alberta people might do was further circumscribed by framing some flexibility in determining the *means*. The options were either to stay the course or

facilitate a more "competitive" environment, with emphasis usually on the latter consideration. For example, concerning high-technology, manufacturing and service industries, the questions ranged within a limited framework of business ideology: either (1) targeting high-potential industries with direct assistance; or (2) providing matching levels of support equivalent to other provinces; or (3) eliminating special funding by providing an attractive business climate for all business (*ibid.*: 11). In other questions even the framing by business ideology favoured a particular libertarian interpretation. For example, concerning human resource development the reader was given three options: (1) government commitments to more resources for education, skill upgrading and training; (2) private sector participation in education; and (3) individual Albertans assume more responsibility for their own training (*ibid.*: 8). These three choices were not necessarily contradictory for a business agenda, that is, according to a libertarian intention to subsidize business, to expropriate public education and to demand that students pay fees for the new consumer (education) services.

To guarantee that participants wouldn't stray too far from what they were expected to consent to, the supplementary *Workshop Discussion Paper* also emphasized a similar framing for each question. Using the same examples as above, the document suggested for high-technology, manufacturing and service industries that "there is a continuing debate on the extent to which the Alberta government should use public funds to encourage development of these industries" (WDP 1991: 5), that is that the government will subsidize business but leave the discussion to the best means. The document suggested for human resource development that "these approaches may require a shift in the responsibilities borne by government, the private sector and the individual" (WDP 1991: 6), that is, the three "options" are in fact only one libertarian option.

When participants were to consider the above questions, they were also *reminded* to keep within the diversification *objectives* "to foster an entrepreneurial business culture. . ." and "to sustain a competitive business and investment climate. . ." (SDP 1991: 7). The procedure excluded debate over the substantive rationality of the goal, framed the means within instrumental considerations and prescribed the ultimate value and outcome. This procedure was repeated for all questions. The consensus-builders claimed that the "objectives" were intended "to stimulate discussion and to provide a framework and a rationale for strategy considerations" (*ibid.*: 7), yet the documentary representations of the discussions eliminated challenges to the rationales and effectively limited responses to the rationales already provided.

Furthermore, SDP also reminded the reader to "please note that the issues being discussed in this initiative are primarily economic in nature. Other issues, such as health and social welfare, are being reviewed in other government initiatives" (*ibid.*: 9). Note the absence of any reference to education. At a later stage when it had to become obvious that education was being discussed, participants were informed that

We recognize that education has much broader objectives than simply economic development. This discussion however, will focus on those aspects of education and training which will help Albertans have more productive, secure employment in the coming decade. It should be noted Alberta's educational institutions are already addressing many of these issues through policy and public consultations. (CW 1992: 31)

So at the Calgary conference, while appearing to limit discussion to "economics," the consensus-builders also claimed that the discussion was also more extensive. Toward 2000 Together was *both* a part of a process *and* the whole process!

By the time the *Moderator's Report* was released half a year later the definition of "economic in nature" took on an overarching meaning as applying to *all* aspects of Alberta life, especially education. It thus also followed, that "business" was the universal stakeholder, that is, the expert on *all* thematic concerns, whereas other stakeholders, such as educators, were defined as particularist experts on "educational issues" and who had to subordinate their concerns to the universal business interest. By the time the MR was released the conflation of the definitions of education and the economic was actualized in the recommendations for reform. An alternate reading of the Calgary conference could have been called the "Premier's Conference on Alberta's *Educational Future*." Out of the 104 recommendations, 87 recommendations were concerned with education with 65 specifically related to financial, pedagogical and curriculum concerns for early childhood, elementary, secondary and post-secondary schooling. Three exemplary recommendations illustrate that more than "economics" were included. Concerning educational governance it was recommended that "businesses and educators must talk in-depth, to promote more collaboration and strategic alliances" (MR 1992: 39). Concerning educational curriculum it was recommended to "increase business awareness among students" (*ibid.*: 41). Concerning educational pedagogy it was recommended to "encourage more business people in the classroom to act as lecturers. Teachers need a better appreciation of business" (*ibid.*: 38).

I now turn to the framing of factual contents and how the consensus-building facilitators emphasized the *fact* that the province only controlled expenditures in health, education and social services and that these *government constraints* could be transformed into *business opportunities*.

#### 7.4. Continuities in Global Facts: Metanarrational Assumptions

First thematic continuities established what was to be talked about and then definitional continuities established how the goals and means were to be talked about. The third identifiable mechanism for the exercise of ideological hegemony was to establish legitimate interpretations for explaining the relationships between each object in the classification system. These interpretations established the longitudinal continuities in the discourse over a three year period. Thus, the Banff Centre facilitators' most potent weapon was an overarching theory of social development that made sense of the multiple and discrete elements arising during consultations. In this case, what is revealed is a situated practice of political theorizing that permeates rather than stands above or outside the discourse. This permeation results from combining expert opinion and popular prejudice in the production of a new language. Theory as situated reason takes on the attributes of empirical and normative factuality. The "new reality" of global competition in an information-based economy is not longer treated speculatively but rather as a naturalized presence requiring Albertans to immediately adapt or risk extinction.

The acceptance of a new natural order also means the acceptance of a set of prescriptive imperatives for social amelioration. The experts, through metanarration, define reality, its functioning and its problems and thus are able to offer their expert advice on the necessary solutions. This necessity, though, is underdetermined. Backgrounded are the potential alternate descriptions and interpretations of the "new reality." Alternate prescriptions find little material or discursive basis to get a hearing. This section identifies the way theory informs the metanarrative concerning economics, knowledge, governance and strategies for amelioration.

Getty initiated the discussion in *Summary: Discussion Paper* by asking the public to explore a limited range of questions within a definite set of prescribed assumptions. But

Getty also further restricted the debate. He asked that the participants were to keep other contextual factors in mind. These "global facts" further circumscribed the content of the discussion. He reminded the participants that resource and manufacturing were influenced by market forces outside Canada; that products were subject to the tariffs and non-tariff barriers of 150 countries; that as a trading province performance was influenced by global economic conditions; that constitutional difficulties could effect business confidence; and that there were federal responsibilities in many areas (SDP 1991: 8).

At the end of the expert consultation process, the Banff Centre facilitators claimed to have "set a shared context around each discussion theme" (RRT 1992: 4). While the thematic objectives established the formal and political parameters of the consensus-building process, the social theorists and their global facts also framed how the massive "data" contents would be organized into a meaningful set of signs and therefore were able to set the agenda for social development. The metanarrational and social theoretical assumptions framed the discourse. The mark of the expert theorizer was coded into the documentation of the RRT, CW, MR and RAC. The *Report of the Roundtables* further described how the Centre's facilitators provided the *factual* context:

As part of our task of setting a shared context, the project team put together a package of background materials for each roundtable to send in advance to the roundtable's crew. For most of the sessions, this package included a brief paper in which the roundtable's 'navigators' [Centre's consultants] set out the key themes and issues that we saw emerging from the literature, as a point of departure for our discussions. For the final session on relations among public and private sector management and labour, we relied instead on summary issues papers contributed by some of the participants. (RRT 1992: 12)

No justification was provided for why government/business and employer/employee relations required a different procedure, but nevertheless, it can be observed that even at the level of expert opinion, the nature of potential dissent over the "facts" was circumscribed by "the literature" and presented as a consensus among "many economists and experts" (e.g. CW 1992: 25). There was also no discussion about how the "points of departure for our discussions" might have undermined both the validity of the truth contents and the reliability of achieving legitimate consent.

This "consensual" overarching theory of social development and knowledge provided by the Banff Centre facilitators underlay all the documents. The RRT presented it in an "expert"/vernacular format. The CW presented it in an "objective" textbook format. The MR presented it in a "public"/vernacular format. And the RAC presented it in its "advisory"/action format. The meta-narrative goes like this. The world is in crisis and the attempts to grapple with the crisis have fostered a multiplicity of different perspectives -- a crisis of paradigms. These crises have occurred previously in history and have been resolved by creating new paradigms. Adam Smith's paradigm helped trigger "a great period of laissez-faire economics" (MR 1992: A13). Later crises in Europe meant that people began to look to governments for change and social betterment. These changes led to communism in much of the world and to the welfare state liberalism in the industrialized West. By the late 1960s the world entered a new stage that has been given many names (e.g., "post-industrial age" "information society," "ecological era" etc.). Albertans are a prisoner of the "welfare state" paradigm because it is based on *old* assumptions. In dealing with uncertainty Albertans must transcend these assumptions to understand the *new* reality where "brainpower and human capital have become as important as physical capital" (ibid.: A13-14).

The expert facilitators also legislated an overarching theory of knowledge which then entailed a particular form of social organization needed for intelligence gathering. The narrative goes like this. To tackle the new problem of the technology/knowledge imperative requires non-linear thinking, innovative possibilities, paradoxical strategies and a reconciliation of opposites to bring about an organizational revolution (ibid.: 14), that is, the need for a "culture shift." "Our ability to sustain our quality of life in the future will therefore depend on our ability to create a more interdisciplinary and holistic approach to economic activity -- an approach that builds on a dynamic collaboration among business, government, labour, the education and scientific and social communities, cultural and not-for-profit organizations" (RRT 1992: 13). This reconciliation cannot be achieved by fearing global competitiveness but by thriving on it and turning "quality of life" advantages, such as community-living, social services, health, education and natural environment, into strategic assets in the global marketplace. Albertans must accept this new definition of reality and bond together in cooperative partnerships to share knowledge in order to compete with the world.

The task of cooperative partnerships will not be easy and will require a shared vision, "open and honest communication, careful and sympathetic listening and a great deal of time and energy" (MR 1992: A14-15). The achievement of an articulated vision and common goal demands honest and clear communication. "At the core our struggle to define a changing reality is the problem of finding a shared language that will allow us to move ahead to take the action that is required. We need new images, new paradigms, new 'mental maps' and new metaphors to help us make sense of this new world and to begin to build a base for collaborative action" (RRT 1992: 14). This new collaborative action marks the facilitators as not just brokers of knowledge but also as legislators of a particular theory of governance which appropriated the linguistic power of progressivism:

There is a full recognition of the changing world in which we live and the difficult hurdles to overcome. But despite these constraints, participants still want to be more involved. They want to be heard, to be consulted and to take more responsibility for solving our complex array of difficulties. So do I, as do most Albertans who welcome empowerment of the people to contribute to the solutions. It is clear from comments made at the conference that our society is ultimately shifting from representational democracy to a more participatory form of government. (MR 1992: 3)

But participatory government within the *new* reality took a particular adaptive form to the exigencies of a god-like economy. The narrative goes like this. Because the world is changing around us at an ever-accelerating pace, so too are society's expectations and the relationships between public and private institutions. These changes have impacted on the everyday life of workers and parents. The uncertainties people face are greater than the ones experienced by previous generations. Reactive adaptation is not enough. Proactive innovation is required to take advantage of new opportunities. But *in order to do this* (i.e., be proactive) within the constraints of shorter business cycles, the province needs a vision so the whole community can pull together to make efficient changes (CW 1992: 9). Government has a *new* role to "manage the process rather than the issues" (RRT 1992: 17). So as the facilitator of pro-action, the government must give up its legislative function to the market and must no longer arbitrate values. The government's new role is in "guiding the players through a process of change by providing information, outlining opportunities, developing supportive policies, and providing a forum in which stakeholders can come together to plan and discuss. The new role of government may be to give courage, confidence and opportunity to community-based alliances" (ibid.). In the face of conflicts

over public expectations for public services, the new reality of limited resources and the blurring of public and private boundaries, innovative approaches based on partnerships between government and business and between volunteer workers and not-for-profit organizations are required (ibid.).

In creating the new mechanisms for the planning and implementation of public policy, multi-stakeholder groups need to work together with government and together they must ensure that "marginalized and disenfranchised" groups play an important role in the debate. Strategies should be designed not by or for government, but for the people. "We need to revitalize a spirit of 'citizenship', recognizing that responsibility and accountability go hand in hand with rights, and encouraging the transition from representative to participatory democracy" (ibid.: 17-18).

But what kind of value-free and *practical* governance do such facilitators initiate? In moving forward with the initiatives, experts should not put forward "firm recommendations, but rather bring together individuals and organizations around ideas which they "find interesting, in an attempt to push toward concrete action" (RRT 1992: 19). Having said this, the experts then sketch out the mechanisms for inter-institutional organization and practical actions: (1) a "public awareness campaign"; (2) a "provincial economic/technology alliance"; (3) an action to institute "an international network"; (4) a "Centre for Privatization"; (5) a "private/public financial alliance"; (6) a multi-sectoral commission based on public/private partnerships "to deliver more efficient public services"; (7) a multi-stakeholder commission to recommend changes "to legislation, regulations, incentives, [and] programs" concerning the relationship between the environment and economy; (8) a multi-stakeholder group to "draft a White Paper on the Economy"; (9) a decision to institute an organization for the commercialization of research and development; (10) an "Innovation Network" co-funded by private and public sectors providing leadership in marshaling resources for the knowledge-based economy from educational institutions, business, labour and government; (11) a "Centre of Excellence" based on valuing cultural diversity; (12) continuation and broadening of the "roundtable" model; (13) a business assistance corporation helping entrepreneurs to rationalize their ideas and find financing; (14) a multi-stakeholder group to create a "Human Resources Development" strategy; and (15) government facilitation of "pilot projects" to deal with a range of labour and management issues and problems (ibid.: 20).

A year later, after the massive public consultations, most of the above recommendations could be found in the *Report of the Advisory Committee* (RAC 1993) but with a shift in meaning. No longer were the experts leading the march to salvation, they were instead following the will of "the people." No longer would they claim to represent expertise but rather *all* Albertans.

To create public awareness in building a shared vision, the experts in fact legislated a particular theory of education as evangelical indoctrination. Expert facilitators

need to articulate a clear and simple message that will help individual Albertans internalize the meaning of all these changes, and the impact on their lives. We need to have messengers from all walks of life who are ready to champion this message./ Celebrating our success stories will be an important aspect of public education/ [...] It will be important to build on the momentum that is being created in the province. (RRT 1992: 18)

The *Report of the Roundtables* preached a range of "public education" needs and "multi-sectoral joint initiatives" to facilitate the "public awareness process" and to "build understanding about the need for collaboration." The experts suggested that "much of the

material coming out of the roundtables and the 'Toward 2000' process might be usefully packaged as learning materials to serve a variety of audiences and needs" (RRT 1992: 20).

### **7.5. Continuities in Global Facts: Empirical Assumptions**

The fourth identifiable mechanism for the exercise of ideological hegemony was to establish the legitimate facts for validating the explanatory relationships for each object in a classification system. In a sense, these are the "facts" that lend credence to the postmodernization case. These facts, though, are organized within the grid of decipherment provided by the themes, definitions and metanarration. The concreteness of the facts and the empirical theories that explain their organization masks their true underdetermination as explanation. Counter-explanations that might explain the same facts differently -- as might occur in a legislative question period -- are *a priori* denied a forum. Alternate-explanations that might prove embarrassing points of internal dissension -- as in the debate between extracting and knowledge-based industries -- are *a priori* separated into different compartments. Empirical facts and empirical theories are thus woven together into a narrative that gives concreteness to the new reality. This procedure establishes the base for concrete proposals to resolve the economic crisis; that is, a revolution in representative governance and welfare statism, security for traditional industries and interests, and an unleashing of the economic potential in the commercialization of knowledge production and information services.

The Toward 2000 Together "learning materials" were to legislate a particular empirical theory concerning Alberta's social development. A look inside the totalizing worldview which sutured together multi-sectoral interests requires a look at the articulation of the specific empirical theories concerning the six central "themes": the future of resources; the knowledge-based economy; training, education and life-long learning; global competition, environment and economy; and community development. The *Conference Report* (CW 1992) and the thematic speeches in the *Moderator's Report* (MR 1992) provided the textbook version for suturing "factual" description and "political" prescription. The effect was achieved by the discursive blending of a "consensus" of experts and economists and the consensus of "Albertans." The former effect justified the "facts" and the latter effect justified the "action." These facts were organized according to six theories that treated description as explanation.

The first empirical theory concerns the future of Alberta's natural resources. The narrative goes like this. The resource sector is crucial for Alberta's development. The energy resource sector has attracted substantial wealth and provided provincial markets with spinoffs in manufacturing, advanced technology and servicing. The 1980s, with declining commodity prices, has effected consolidation and downsizing, and these short term trends are expected to continue. Although conventional crude oil, petroleum, the oil sands, natural gas and the petrochemical industries face similar kinds of challenges for recovery, their potential, according to company spokespersons, can be maintained with reductions in royalty payments, a reduction in government revenues, selective targeting for subsidies, the construction of required infrastructure, the insurance of a competitive tax environment and the broadening of value-added diversification (CW 1992: 19-20). Developments in coal will be minimal because of competition from natural gas and the input costs of transportation, labour rates and taxes. Developments in electricity which are 90% coal generated depend on the regulatory system and, the most important influence, environmental concerns (ibid.: 21).

Albertans should also recognize the ongoing importance of agriculture and food processing. Similar to the energy sector, agriculture relies mainly on the international



export market and volatile price fluctuations and political intervention. Prospects are unclear and depend on attempts to reduce agricultural subsidies during multilateral trade negotiations. In the agri-food industry, the importance of capturing new markets and identifying new consumer trends is crucial for development, as is research and development biotechnology and veterinary sciences and as is investment in provincial infrastructure for irrigation (ibid. 21-22).

In forestry, diversifying investments into pulp, paper, lumber and panel board facilities have created an internationally competitive industry. The next step is to increase value-added production such as furniture and specialty goods. The government is fostering further development of value-added products in the solid wood industry by providing technical assistance and financial advice to small producers. Pressures on the industry include forest management practices and wildlife habitat, mill effluent, solid waste disposal and demands for environmental-friendly products (ibid.: 22-23).

Albertans should look forward to natural resources providing the foundation for the economy and to continue to act as a force in developing other activities. Information-age industries are likely to continue to be dependent on natural resource industries. A realistic strategy must make sure that the resource industries remain healthy and dynamic within the context of the internationally competitive environment. The key to the economy is trade, access to international markets and the provision of quality and price-sensitive products. Success also demands a skilled workforce, efficient management and access to current information (MR 1992: B11).

The second empirical theory concerns knowledge and the development of technology, information and innovation. The narrative goes like this. Because of the strategic shift in the world economy to a knowledge-based economy, information can be transformed into knowledge, knowledge into intellectual capital and "intellectual capital into an economic engine that will increase competitiveness and wealth" (CW 1992: 25). Growth, thus, depends on a culture of innovation and advances in technology. It is the capitalization of human knowledge that will determine Canada's standard of living especially in its interaction with the resource sector and the new clusters of advanced industry in computing, software, biotechnology, health sciences, pharmaceuticals, micro electronics and telecommunications (ibid.: 25).

What Albertans require is a new attitude toward innovation, risk and knowledge. This new orientation means recognizing change as a continual part of life, developing new ways to unleash intellectual capital, valuing cultural diversity, thinking about knowledge as a product, developing new collaborative relationships and viewing expenditures on research and development, education and training as long-term investments rather than short-term expenses (ibid.).

Investment in research and development requires "patient" capital and creative ways to assist the financing of high tech firms and may be solved by the development of industry research consortia. High risk projects have to be sheltered in the early production stages because venture capitalists are reluctant to provide funding. Opportunities also exist for the increased commercialization of university-conducted research which may be enhanced by partnerships between academic researchers and industrial research departments (ibid.: 26).

Alberta industries will have to pay closer attention to technology diffusion to maintain a competitive advantage. Success also depends on greater attention to quality management, labour training, international marketing, technological innovation and reciprocal relations with resource industries. Business services in engineering, computers, communications, transportation, and financing can all enhance productivity (ibid.: 27).

The new economy will require specific skill development to increase the supply of scientists, engineers, technologists and other skilled workers. To guarantee success in this area means ensuring a large base of qualified workers and partnerships between educational institutions, industry, and government. The new economy will also require public sector investment in physical infrastructure to allow Albertans to quickly communicate and exchange technology. This infrastructure might include high-speed telecommunications, information networks, and general access to databases (ibid.: 27-28).

The third empirical theory concerns training, education, and life-long learning. The narrative goes like this. Because a well-educated workforce is essential to remain competitive and to prosper, the new economy will require increasing levels of competence and initiative on the part of workers. Employers expect increased skills at all levels of the workforce. Entry workers need sound literacy, mathematics and communications skills. Industrial workers need technical competence required for the innovative application of science and technology. Professionals and business people require superior problem-solving and communication skills.

Although Alberta has one of the best educated and most highly skilled workforces in Canada, there are a number of disturbing trends. Community demands for excellence are going up and the educational system is struggling to provide basic skills. Also, Canada's level of industrial training is below that of other industrialized countries. Despite the relatively large sums of money spent on education, the capabilities, performance and productivity of the current workforce may not help global competitiveness (ibid.: 31).

To remain competitive will require a high level of scientific and engineering skills and innovative ideas. Alberta has a strong scientific and research community, but there are concerns. Elementary and secondary students' scores get mixed reviews in comparative international studies. Post-secondary students do not reconcile their aspirations with the realities of the labour market. There needs to be an appropriate mix of programs and linkages to industry. Some people believe the education system must lead the way while others suggest that the private sector must show leadership. To link education to the workplace requires more cooperation and better information flows between educational institutions and the labour market so that programs and services can respond more effectively to the needs of the marketplace. The following mechanisms will help: work experience, updated practical and vocational programs, service-based apprenticeship programs, Alberta-wide regulation of training, increased entrepreneurship education, increased credential portability and the expansion of credit-granting status to many institutions. (ibid.: 32-33).

To create a culture of life-long learning responsive to a market-driven, service-based economy means that education must focus on developing thinking skills, flexibility and a willingness to learn traditional basics and new skills. Individuals must take more responsibility for their own training throughout their life and business/community partnerships with the educational system must be enhanced. These partnerships mean that employers must share in the responsibility for education and training. "The private sector will be increasingly called upon to cooperate with educational institutions by defining their human resource requirements, providing more work experience opportunities, and assuming more responsibility for job-specific training" (ibid.: 33). Business has not had a good record in their commitment to training because newly trained employees are frequently hired away. This "free rider" problem discourages business investment in training and needs to be resolved. Previous discussions on improving education have identified the need for business to become more involved (ibid.: 33-34).

The fourth empirical theory concerns competition in the global economy. The narrative goes like this. In addition to short-term market cycles, businesses are also facing long-term structural adjustments as a result of "globalization." There are many factors influencing competitiveness, such as costs for labour, transportation, raw materials and other inputs, and although these are important, an ability to compete is also strengthened through technological innovations and other improvements aimed at enhancing productivity. "Most Albertans agree that competitiveness is the key issue in building a strong, diversified economy" (ibid.: 38). However, competitiveness is eroding because of slow productivity growth, increasing unit labour costs, an increased tax burden on business, a regulatory environment, an overvalued Canadian dollar and a growing level of public debt. Because Alberta suffers from a small local market, distance from larger markets and related federal transportation policies, the presence of inter-provincial trade barriers only increases these disadvantages. Jurisdictional disputes over environmental regulation also limit competitiveness.

A supportive framework for business, investment, innovation, education, training and stakeholder collaboration is the critical response required to take advantage of new business opportunities. "Although it is ultimately the responsibility of industry to be competitive, a key role of government is to foster a business climate which allows companies to compete successfully" (ibid.: 38). This means to some people eliminating government deficits, providing more efficient government and reassessing programs and services in terms of current priorities and affordability.

Governments can have a significant impact on the cost of doing business and their policies should strengthen the role of market forces, maintain a competitive tax and regulatory environment, encourage risk-taking, entrepreneurship and innovation. The increasing cost of capital financing, can be softened by a provincial corporate tax policy to further enhance Alberta's competitiveness and to provide specific investment incentives in light of the needs for balancing the budget (ibid.: 38-39).

As trade barriers continue to come down, as competition from low-wage countries increases and as Albertans adapt to the accelerating pace of change and the development of knowledge-intensive technologies, Alberta firms will have to place greater emphasis on technological innovation to reduce costs, to improve productivity and to develop new products through "flexible manufacturing" and "niche marketing." A well-educated, highly trained and skilled workforce will be essential for competitiveness. New management approaches for increased cooperation between stakeholders and for decreased adversarial relationships with labour are necessary. Partnerships can begin at the level of the individual firm and develop to include strategic alliances or joint ventures in marketing, distribution, training, commercialization, research and development (ibid.: 39).

The fifth empirical theory concerns the environment and sustainable development. The narrative goes like. There is a world-wide concern over the environment and a redefinition of concern from aesthetics to health-related issues but businesses in Canada still see environmental issues as just another cost of doing business. The new perspective turns the "costs" of reducing raw material and energy inputs, of introducing new products and processes, and of improved management practices and image-building into a source of competitive advantage. The link between the environment and the economy is derived from the 1987 Brundtland Commission definition of sustainable development which is intended to ensure that "the use of our resources and environment today does not damage prospects for their use by future generations" (ibid.: 45). Albertans require a shift in thinking to see sustainable development not as a replacement for "environment" nor as an excuse for

"business as usual" but rather as a way to make progress on the economy and environment at the same time.

Alberta's rich endowment of natural resources is a strength. The expertise gained from technologies for hazardous waste treatment and emission control and reclamation offer potential products to trade on the world market. Also the retention of an unspoiled environment can lure people from around the world for tourism and can attract companies seeking to expand their enterprises into favourable locations. In addition, the government's leadership has meant the development of consultation expertise in extending stakeholder discussions, consolidating environmental legislation under one regulatory umbrella and the possible allowance for a market-based approach to regulation. While on the one hand business has expressed concern about the regulation of new ventures, on the other hand such regulation allows the government to press for tougher international standards. Short-term benefits may be derived from providing assistance to less developed nations in meeting new and more stringent standards. The emergence of an interest in "market-based" approaches to environmental regulation allows the government to consider a market in tradable emission permits. This approach allows the private sector to achieve environmental objectives in a cost effective way. With some disagreement in this area, the key is public education to promote sustainable development and environmental and economic literacy for students and citizens (*ibid.*: 43-45).

The sixth and final empirical theory concerns community-based economic development. The narrative goes like this. Although two perspectives orient community development with one focusing on attracting investment from outside the community and a second focusing on growth from within the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive when "quality of life" is factored in as a strategic asset which can attract outside investment and keep entrepreneurs in the community. Entrepreneurs in the community can develop local initiatives to revitalize their local communities by developing their capabilities in information, training, human resource development, leadership, management, entrepreneurial skills and information networks. Supporting services may include the promotion of entrepreneurship, self-employment, home-based businesses, assistance in business opportunity identification and financial structures supporting local initiatives. Development can also come from training and supporting a strong volunteer base (*ibid.*: 47). Another possibility for community development is the pooling of energies for regional innovations in cooperation (*ibid.*).

Because over 60% of the population live in Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta's cities should not be forgotten. Cities drive economic growth in many regions. Large, healthy urban areas are able to provide stabilizing influences on cyclical swings. For Alberta cities to become "world-class" they need to specialize in areas of excellence. Too much competition for the same business or duplication of facilities may be counter-productive (*ibid.*: 49).

In dealing with the increased demands for decentralized authority and effects of conflicting forces in globalization, municipalities will have to "think globally, act locally." Growth could be provided by tourism and local involvement. The successful marketing of the beauty of the Rockies, the cosmopolitanism of the cities and Alberta's heritage network of cultural events have the potential to diversify the tourism industry and spread economic benefit. Also, the manageable scale of community solutions and the increasing pressure on municipal politicians to keep down taxes and increase services could lead to innovative solutions relating to the innovation-driven economy. Many of these innovative solutions must deal with the "front-line" issues resulting from social and demographic changes such as (1) continuing in-migration and immigration and the provisioning of services for

training, social assistance, English as a second language and settlement programs; (2) fundamental changes in the traditional family unit with the increasing numbers of women in the workforce bringing greater demands for daycare, maternity leave, flexible working arrangements, pay equity and affirmative action; (3) an aging population demanding health, education and social service programming; and (4) a growing recognition of aboriginal issues around high rates of illiteracy and unemployment and increasing demands on education, training and employment opportunities (ibid.: 47-50).

From this review of the empirical narratives one can get a sense of the general ideological thrust of the Toward 2000 Together initiative. Economic growth is not going to come from the traditional primary resource sector and signals are mixed from the direct subsidization of diversification initiatives in the secondary, value-added industrial sector. In fact, what is required to maintain the basic strengths of the primary and secondary industries is to reduce their costs of doing business by maintaining subsidies and decreasing royalties, taxation, and regulation and to lower the wages of a well-trained labour force. The question concerned the degree and kind of government largesse and resolving disagreements about how a government can best initiate development in specific sectors without directly "picking winners and losers."

New investment potential and the new engine for growth appears to be the knowledge-based service economy and the payoffs are in the marketing of "human resources." Four problems, though, are foremost in the minds of the navigators. First, government might not be able to provide a level playing field for newly emerging knowledge-based industries that require "patient capital" and therefore if selective sectors are favoured relating to knowledge-based potential then the government has to break the rule of picking no favorites. The second problem is that the control of human resource development is predominantly public property and is now *competing* with the privately owned sector in profitable areas such as research. The third problem is the increasing cost of government expenditures in the provision of health, education and social services that are registered by an ever increasing debt load which further undermines the government's ability to subsidize private businesses. The fourth problem is the pent-up demand for these government services and government's inability and natural inefficiency for delivering the goods. This pent-up demand has created a popular interest for change and the potential for political reform.

What will resolve the crisis? If Albertans stop thinking in terms of representative democracy and welfare-statism, this pent-up demand for change can be mobilized to resolve the multiple paradoxes. The challenge is for the "stakeholders," the heads of key private and public institutions in the different sectors, to coordinate their activities and to develop a common new vision, one based on participatory government involving stakeholders to represent their sectoral constituencies and a market-based provision of public services to gain the efficiency from "less government." Because Albertans know that business is more efficient than government and Albertans also value "free enterprise," this model of efficiency and this common value can provide the organizational rationale for a new vision. Based on the principles of effective marketing, the costs of government can be reduced and revenues can be freed for the resource industries and value-added diversification. If private entrepreneurs can take up the business of providing health, education and social services, government action can in one stroke also reduce government costs, stimulate small business opportunities to create jobs and supply the pent-up demand with new and profitable consumer services.

What is required to achieve an effective consumer market in "public services" is an ongoing process of effective marketing that can mobilize those who are interested in turning

government constraints into business opportunities. Of course, there will be resistance by special interest groups who either cannot or will not understand how this revolution in governance will benefit all Albertans. They lack knowledge or moral character. Ignorance can be overcome by public education, that is, understanding the vision, and selfishness can be overcome by bringing *all* the stakeholders together as cooperating risk-takers. The government's role is to provide publicity and facilitation. Details will be flushed out as opportunities are identified and profitable sectors specified. The important thing is to ACT now, to risk, to grasp the *new*, in order to gain a competitive advantage in the new reality of world-wide global competition. The better Albertans can cooperate in this new form of governance, the better they can compete in economics. Success means saving Alberta's quality of life. The main thrust of the Calgary conference was to take an important step in bringing the multi-sectoral players together as a common community. The face to face contact could also be used for promotion and innovation, resulting in *new* ideas about *how* government constraints can be turned into business opportunities.

What is the above "vision"? Efficiency, innovation and creativity in the name of "how to" action mask nothing short of an ethical revolution in public governance and human resource development. Problems of global economic crisis supposedly *caused* by ineffective human resource development can be solved by a paradigm shift in the mode of public service to one rationalized on the basis of consumer service.

#### **7.6. Negotiating the Vernacular: Translation Code**

The first four mechanisms for the exercise of ideological hegemony were to establish a classification system, to define objects, to metanarrate a comprehensive interpretation and to concretize the narrative with specific facts about Alberta's participation in a global economy. The fifth and sixth identifiable mechanisms concern negotiating the meanings between expert culture and popular culture. The first mechanism is used to establish a translation code and the second mechanism is used to imbue the discourse with mythical meaning. Both the translation code and metaphorical allusions keep the interpretation of any new events or unaccounted facts "on track." In the language of semiology, the code provides a grammar (syntactics) for recombining an infinite number of new elements and the metaphors reintegrate potential logical contradictions into a system of sensible meanings (semantics). Both forms of meaning-making background conscious analysis and critique in favour of the transcendental truths inscribed in popular clichés and analogies. Codes and metaphors thus provide two important mechanisms in the constitution of a new ideology. This section focuses on the translation code and the way it was applied to the analysis of business opportunities, government restraints and the potential profits to be made in education, health care, social services and the environment. To risk the revolutionary destination the roundtable navigators had to sail the uncharted shoals of a traditional public ethic. As done many times in the past, the state had to enclose public commons for private profit. The vision was nothing less than a journey to successfully negotiate a new vernacular. This vernacular would have to justify action for action's sake without having to confront the irrationality of a generalized government policy based on the totalizing assumptions of a class of possessive individualists.

For *Toward 2000 Together*, what was the code for translating the ethic of public service into an ethic of consumer service? A clue was given in the *Moderator's Report* which was structured according to the following logical presentation: *uncertainties* which *challenge* us might at first seem like *constraints* but with knowledge of the future, an entrepreneurial spirit of risk-taking and a common vision of restored profitability, government *constraints* can be turned into business *opportunities*. Armed with this

translation code and the appropriate use of metaphor, the *Toward 2000 Together* strategy transcribed the constraints into practical opportunities for politics and business. This code was at work throughout the *Toward 2000 Together* process but is most evident in the *Moderator's Report* which attempted to bridge the language of the intelligentsia, politicians, bureaucrats, professionals and the chief executive officers of Alberta's many private corporations. What follows is a summary of the kind of ideas from the moderator's report that expresses the new language of business.

**Challenges for Business:** There are uncertainties in the world beyond Alberta's control: international politics, natural disasters and trade barriers. Canadian politics is unpredictable with constitutional dilemmas, subsidy wars and regulatory turmoil. Education has ceased to be relevant. And who is it in business for anyway? The financial world also seems in crisis. What price can be put on the environment? How can the cost of money be reduced and made more accessible? When are commodity prices going to turn around? Productive business is difficult with an ongoing cycle of booms and busts, the increasing importance of scientific research and technological development, the effect of new technologies on jobs and the changing skill requirements for all levels of workers. Public attitudes are also a challenge for business (MR 1992: 19-20).

**Constraints on Business:** Constraints parallel the challenges. Global uncertainties have resulted in short-term and reactive decision-making. Multi-stakeholder consultations are limited, especially in education. The party system has created adversaries and community rivalries have blocked cooperation. This kind of competition is not conducive to Alberta's success. There are too many players and too many delays and government responds to too many vocal minorities and special interests. Decisions are not based on consultation with stakeholders. The regulatory environment is a heavy burden with too many levels of red tape, an irregular playing field, and a system which rewards caution (ibid.: 20-22).

The constraints on business are the most evident in education. The list is long: high dropouts, low literacy, lack of scientific and technical skills, shortage of knowledge-workers, diversity of immigrant needs, lack of information on economic realities and environmental issues, no accountability to stakeholders (parents, students, employers), teacher termination is difficult, teaching performance not related to rewards, shortage of business resources, unwillingness of business involvement and traditional approaches limit business and academic relations (ibid.: 23).

Business is also constrained by government blocks to financing and production. There is an uneven balance between social programs and economic production. There is the deficit and the problem of maintaining important programs in health and education. There is a lack of available risk capital, and there are all those royalties, property taxes, increasing capital costs and corporate taxes which increase the cost of doing business. Other infrastructural limitations also limit entrepreneurship: the lack of scientific knowledge, the cost of environmental cleanup, the presence of ineffective tax incentives, the poor application of new technologies, the ongoing inadequate relationship between schools, universities and industries. Again those ever present constraints of capital markets and government programs (ibid.: 20-22).

Business is also constrained by social attitudes and media coverage. The public is unable to change but quick to criticize. People want to retire too soon, they undervalue technological change, they are closed to other cultures, they resist flexibility in the workforce and they fail to reward the risk-taker. Social attitudes are also constrained by linear thinking and traditional economic planning in knowledge-based industries. People have become complacent and comfort has blinded many to the issue of inexpensive labour in developing countries and the need to refocus on intellectual capital. Albertans are

constrained by narrow attitudes, the absence of innovation and creativity. Albertans expect that government can and will solve problems and do it for political rather than economic reasons. The media does not help. They are too negative and poorly informed. They do not tell the whole story objectively and they are not accountable (ibid.: 23-24).

*New Business Opportunities:* Global restraints on resource and manufacturing industries actually provide new knowledge-based opportunities. Use a market-based approach to regulation. Make a commitment to total quality management and don't overlook the potential inputs from immigrants and young people. Reduce transportation costs by applying new information-age technology. Develop strategic alliances and avoid polarization. Educate for an new entrepreneurial ethic (ibid.: 24-26).

There are also new business opportunities in the knowledge-based industries. Reward and provide incentives for companies to deal with and develop technologies for environmental problems. Also market Alberta's health care system abroad. Create partnerships with universities to gain the market advantages and access to products to be marketed world-wide. There are also opportunities for public education. Market business-knowledge to schools and get involved in post-secondary education by providing the latest technology. There are also opportunities in pension fund management and the development of information as intellectual property (ibid.: 27-28).

There are also opportunities in the restructuring of vocational and business education, and opportunities from consolidations between stakeholders, rebates on training taxes and employer invested training programs. There is the possibility of a voucher or tax credit system for students. Business can be involved in developing schools, colleges, universities and centres of excellence. Technology allows people to do more with less in the education sector. Create more free time for teachers and more time working with business. Link programming through technology hookups. Provide related work experience for students. "Adopt a school" program. Provide new attitudes of independent thinking and values of self-esteem. Link theory and practice by adding economic and business skills into the curriculum (ibid.: 29-31).

There are also opportunities for global competition. Market Alberta's "quality of life" to attract new industries and employees. As examples of new approaches, market valued-added products such as environmental technologies and processes such as waste management, zero-effluent pulp mills, recycling industries, oil and gas pollution technology control, ecotourism and plastic manufacturing. "Waste products can create business opportunities" (ibid.: 34). Sell information technologies such as mapping, geographical information systems and computer programs. Be a leader in environmental protection and management. Attract major "northern climate" conferences. "Environmental quality must be viewed as an opportunity rather than a cost" (ibid.: 32-35).

There are also promising business opportunities for community-based economic development. Market Alberta's space, its clean air, its abundance of natural resources. Market it as a safe place to live. Market "quality of life" and "international reputation" (ibid.: 35). Promote more "home-based" businesses to allow Albertans to live and work in smaller communities. Partner up in joint ventures with Aboriginal communities, municipalities and the provincial government to provide services. Take advantage of communication sources such as cable TV. Provide ongoing communication and promote the ideas and enthusiasm of the message. Especially, ". . . educate young people in the skills they require to be entrepreneurs, rather than employees. Indeed education should be the passport to enable our young people to live prosperous, satisfying lives" (ibid.: 36).



### 7.7. Negotiating the Vernacular: Metaphorical Twists on a Journey

The last section described how the navigators established a translation code. The second mechanism for negotiating the seas of popular culture was to imbue the Toward 2000 Together discourse with mythical meanings representative of traditional Alberta understandings and the new postmodernization narrative. As stated earlier, the translation code provides a grammar for recombining an infinite number of new elements and the metaphorical twists reintegrate logical contradictions into a system of sensible meaning. The transcendental truths inscribed in popular clichés and analogies create an anticipated effect through the use of mythical archetypes that solidify tropes, that is, metaphors are used to reconstruct the meaning of "constraint into opportunity" into a traditional mythology. The mythological narrative centres on the description of Toward 2000 Together initiative as a journey. The navigators use metaphorical tropes to evoke sympathetic responses without ever having to enter into a prolonged or potentially divisive discussion over the contradictory nature of consensus, the relations of authority, the ambiguities of highbrow and lowbrow culture and to the senselessness of action for action's sake that inform the Toward 2000 Together "journey."

The findings of the *Report of the Roundtables* (RRT May 1992) were summarized as "Excerpts From The Journey's Log." At the first roundtable "two speakers launched this first leg of the roundtable journey" (ibid.: 23). Also, in Simpson's presentation to the Conference reviewing the round table process (published August 1992), he stated "We tried to go on a metaphorical journey of exploration. This gathering is another leg in that journey" (MR 1992: A13). And the draft white paper (published May 1993) also read: "This document is the log of our committee's journey" (RAC 1993: 10). It finished with "The Conclusion of One Journey and the Start of Another" (ibid.: 67).

The *Report of the Advisory Committee* (RAC 1993) also reported on "the committee's journey." It had been an "incredible journey." It brought strangers together with a challenging task. They had to learn about issues and review "mountains of material." They had to share perspectives and background knowledge. "There were many areas unfamiliar to some of us." They had to trust. "Through our diversity [a play on adversity] we became strong." There were times of frustration and intimidation by complexity. At the end there was an appreciation of balance, understanding and trust. "Our journey was mind-expanding and very much worthwhile. We explored new ways of thinking and doing things to help us reach our vision for the future" (ibid.: 10).

In spite of all the emphasis on non-linear thinking, the metaphor of the journey invoked linearity, albeit in this case a meandering journey, like the many merchant tales of compass set on fixed Northern Star while the fair-winded traders safely port, a haven from storms with a cargo hold of Oriental spices to make the poorest cabin boy King. Schoolboy fantasies of mercantile traders come close to this fictionalized account of the "T2T Journey," historicized as a series of inputs-outputs (ports in the stormy process?) and a linear rewriting of the legitimation process as if it actually happened or could happen this way. The chronology of events belied the actuality and complexity of the practices:

Stage one: the "Public Input Process" with "Public participation" through questionnaires, written briefs, presentations and forums and the Banff Centre roundtables which led to the "Premier's Conference" and the moderator's report which "consolidates input."

Stage two: the "Advisory Committee Synthesis" with "Vision" the "Fundamental Principles" which drive the "Major Strategic Thrusts," collaborative decision making, wealth creation in a new global economy, address debt and deficit, adapt

education/learning, integrate sustainable development and develop new strategies for social programs. These thrusts led to "Goals for each strategy" and "Recommendations for each goal" and were outputted to the "Draft report."

Stage Three: the "Stakeholder Review" with a "Review of the draft report by stakeholders" inputted to "Incorporate review for final copy" outputted to the "Final Report of Alberta's Economic Future submitted to the Legislature and to the Albertans" (ibid.: 11).

The use of the metaphor of the journey was not accidental. The need for finding a shared language required "new images, new paradigms, new 'mental maps' and new metaphors to help us make sense of this new world. . ." (RRT 1992: 14). A boxed citation from O.B. Hardison Jr.'s *Disappearing through the Skylight* 1989 claimed "A horizon of invisibility cuts across the geography of modern culture. Those who have passed through it cannot put their experience in familiar words and images because the languages they have inherited are inadequate to the new worlds they inhabit. They therefore express themselves in metaphors, paradoxes, contradictions, and abstractions, rather than languages that 'mean' in the traditional way" (ibid.: 9). Metaphor, used here became a justification for deflecting challenges or critical thought or from: ". . . getting bogged down in minute semantics as to be unable to take action" (ibid.). But for the "navigators" and "crew" it was also used to articulate a vision, ". . . the kind of world we are inhabiting, or want to inhabit in the future," and to integrate a community with diverse interests: "what kind of baseline consensus would allow us to move forward while retaining the richness that comes from a diversity of perspective and opinion" (ibid.).

The use of the journey metaphor drew on archetypal relations of authority. The Banff Centre facilitators were "navigators" and each stakeholder was to become a member of the "crew." As Simpson reported to the Calgary conference, "it was a fantastic experience to serve as the navigator of those Round Tables. And to a remarkable degree, the Round Table crews managed to achieve a spirit of learning and working together in community. . . . As individuals and in small groups, the Round Table crew members have been meeting in follow-up sessions to flush out these ideas and to consider the next steps" (MR 1992: A15). In this way, power relationships could be ambiguously inverted as in the case where the navigators state that "several cabinet ministers and senior government officials form part of our crew" (RRT 1992: 5). Furthermore, the navigators either possessed the *new* map or, failing maps, knew how to steer the ship of state into port. No one asked why navigators had a privileged competency to read the maps or to steer by stars into the future. And where was the *captain*? The word "captain" never appeared. He was the unstated master, the invisible hand, captain of souls, an anonymous and multiple personage always offstage as the narrator of the story, coordinator of action and the representative of the participating audience. Missed by absence. The "captain" had a vision of a future, but it was too mystical to be put into words to uninitiated passengers who had just begun the journey. The captain spoke through the navigators who *had to* speak in metaphors, paradoxes and contradiction, to reveal in steps a truth that could not be known in total because it lay just beyond the horizon of the discourse. The "captain's" double duty as both a God-like navigator *and* the passengers evoked a similar relationship to each other as did the universal Albertan *and* stakeholders who were to steer Alberta's prosperity. In this way, the captain and the "Albertan" appeared as tricksters, both leader and led, visionary and disciple, ruler and ruled.

And when the journey was over Albertans would begin again. This point was made in selected citations. For example one citation is taken from T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets"

1942: "We shall not cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time." The highbrow mysticism also resonated with popular cliché to confirm that life was not a destination but a journey, that is, action for action's sake. Hindu Mysticism or Zen Buddhism? Not surprisingly, the navigators selectively call on "Gandhi," business pop psychology, and participant anecdotes: "We need to dream bigger dreams" (RRT 1992: 5). One Roundtable navigator (remember, a professional facilitator), clarified the simplicity of the action void of thought and morality: "The roundtables are about directions, not final answers. . . . We are all amateurs taking our first uncertain steps into the future" (ibid.: 12). But again "ends" were just beginnings as conference participants found that the intended draft white paper, itself, was just another illusory beginning: "Our committee's journey may be nearing its end, but all Albertans must embark on a new one to reach our final destination" (RAC 1993: 10). In the context of *Toward 2000 Together* the resonances of an unending journey justified the absence of moral discourse and conveniently excluded the question: "Why this particular journey or this particular ship?" Such a question could be evoked by a complete reading of T.S. Eliot as a conservative critique of liberalism and a lament for sensibilities destroyed by capitalism. But to study whole poems or discuss whole books was not the purpose of *Toward 2000 Together* convened more as an extended motivational business seminar, more in line with Dale Carnegie and Faith Popcorn than Northrop Frye and Marshall McLuhan.

Still the mythical archetypes evoked by the metaphorical journey had deeper resonances within Western civilization beyond merely a superficial articulation of diverse interests into consensus, hierarchies of power and highbrow and lowbrow sensibilities. The mythical archetypes of a journey laid claim to the motivating resonances of "the new world," leaving behind the decadence of Europe, the contradictions of class conflict and the usefulness of history to reap the manifest destiny of a chosen people on voyages of discovery, all exhilarating and profitable movements to the "West":

. . . new technologies and a variety of global changes have been combining to create a world every bit as new and uncharted to us as that which Columbus encountered 500 years ago was to him. Columbus's discovery was a land mass previously unknown to the European world, to which one could travel more quickly and easily as the physical maps were created and refined. The new world is more nebulous and somewhat terrifying. . . .

We have crossed into unknown territory, and while the navigation instruments by which we have travelled in the past are not useless, they are no longer adequate. (RRT 1992: 6)

The use of the Columbus motif was crucial to distinguish whether the navigators saw the new world as merely populated with exploitable riches (Gold) or whether they could identify with the already existent people (Indians). The Imperial mind of the Great Colonizer is oblivious to the Other. Great Civilizers and Moral Uplift have at least two stories to tell, the one about the Beothuks was obviously missing in this narrative. Simpson spoke to the Calgary conference about the spirit of collaboration and cooperation that "we are coming increasingly to recognize as the hallmark of the new world into which we are journeying" (MR 1992: A15). What is this hallmark? This "hallmark" is pure process voided of the moral implications of Columbus's journey into the future.

The tropes from a metaphorical journey not only evoke the images of the Western civilizing mission and a future without history, especially the history of the Other, they also articulated the mythical and ambiguous archetypes of the independent bourgeois man, that is, the independent commodity producer, long a mainstay of Alberta ideology motivating cowboys, farmers, small town merchants and "entrepreneurs." From the following excerpt the documents preserve a sense of how the moral assumptions of bourgeois independence

and class subordination are smuggled into metaphors of pure process. Remember Simpson's conference audience was one that saw itself as self-made and independent. Here the university-educated intellectual sailed uncharted reefs when his potential crew prided itself on individualism and practical sense rather than strategic alliances and scientific discourse. Simpson called on the archetypical bourgeois man: Robinson Crusoe. Listen carefully as the hearty captain spins his yarn.

On this journey we have to recognize that we may run into some storms and, in fact, we may find ourselves shipwrecked from time to time.

I'll close with one last story of someone who was shipwrecked on a tropical island and found himself faced with a life-threatening problem. But being the graduate of a fine Canadian business school, he didn't panic. Instead, he carried out a quick analysis of his environment and decided that the strategy was to build a raft on which he could float to safety. He began to take down the eucalyptus trees that were on the island. The eucalyptus is a tall, thin tree that can be broken easily into long strips. He then utilized the sisal plant. You can rub the sisal plant with water and make a rough, home-made rope out of it. He began lashing the eucalyptus strips together to make the raft. However, very soon he had used up all the eucalyptus on the island and then was left waiting each morning to see what driftwood came ashore with the tides. Well, you can imagine his excitement when he woke up and saw a complete lifeboat on the beach. A steamer had sunk at sea and a complete lifeboat had washed ashore on this small island. Well, it only took him a few moments to run down and break up that lifeboat to get the last two logs he needed for his raft.

What's the moral of the story? The moral is that if in the next couple of hours, or the next couple of days, or the next couple of months somebody presents you a lifeboat, try not to break it apart just because it doesn't fit the image you have in your mind of what the solution are [*sic*] to our problems.

Let the journey continue. (Simpson MR 1992: A15)

Previous to this story, Simpson had already established that he was the navigator and the round table participants were crew members. The audience was, at this point, somewhat between passenger and crew member. Crew members were already on board, actively involved, and the navigator hoped to bring the passive passengers on board as apprentices. It had also been established that everyone on board the ship would sink or swim together. The question was what would be the audience's role and motivation. Presumably each audience member had already experienced the adversities of the age. As "entrepreneurs" common sense meant forging onward regardless of the weather. As independent and self-reliant persons, though, each faced the world alone as possessive individuals sailing a merchant ship to new lands. Thus each member of the conference could in some way identify with the shipwreck of Crusoe.

Simpson, clarified, though, that Crusoe was a "university" educated business person. This conjunction of business and education must have established a certain tension between Simpson as teacher navigator and the audience as apprentice crew-members. All could identify with Crusoe as the "business" person but most must have retained a distance from the "schooled" person until they gained more information. Simpson then both complemented the effects of good schooling and confirmed that Crusoe's character was sympathetic and strong. Crusoe "didn't panic." This moral characteristic allowed everyone to identify with Crusoe *and* Simpson, both smart men, practical yet scientific.

Everyone was now a sympathetic expert. The technical aspects of building a raft out of eucalyptus and sisal brought everyone into the narrative as their identification with Crusoe increased. But identities remained internally divided by the tension between institutionalized education and practical experience, the intelligentsia and the business community. The

internal distance in the dual characteristics of Crusoe recreated the attracting tensions between Simpson and the audience, theory and practice. The audience was tempted to be an insider to knowledge -- just like Dr. Simpson. The story continued because Crusoe's effort was not quite completed, mirroring the Toward 2000 Together journey. Crusoe waits and works, the committed person making do with inadequate resources, without a clear destination except to return to civilization restored.

Then miraculously the lifeboat washed ashore. Crusoe's salvation had been a stroke of good fortune randomly restored by an opportunity to regain civilization and balancing the loss created by the earlier misfortune. This opportunity was the crucial test for all businessmen facing adversity who had learned to turn adversity into personal profit. All participants now could identify with Simpson and Crusoe. To heighten tension and to make sure everyone realized that this was a climactic moment, the story of the lifeboat was repeated but with the added information about the source of the boat to create a sense of realism and also confirm the market sensibility of buyers and sellers trading in fortune and misfortune of others, buying cheap, selling dear. All face a world of shipwrecks alone. There were only lifeboats for the fortunate and enterprising.

Because Crusoe had committed so much time and effort to one particular strategy, he made a tragic error. Without thinking about an alternate *and* better opportunity right before his eyes he committed an unpardonable business sin of overlooking *that* opportunity. Crusoe revealed that he was actually quite a stupid person and definitely not a practical person who practical people could identify with. The effect on the audience would be to immediately break the tension between intellectual and business sensibility. The audience, also, was forced to choose. Caution about identifying too closely with the educated Crusoe (like Simpson) was now confirmed. No one wanted to identify with an idiot. Crusoe's decision, thus, inverted the hierarchy. Simpson's self-effacing move inverted the passengers relationship to the navigator. Business was now superior to education. But in making this choice, the audience had to conclude that a smart person was only superior if old ways of thinking were rejected. Only idiots would continue with an inadequate strategy given new circumstances.

Simpson's moral of the story was anti-climactic and seems to merely repeat the obvious by doubly confirming that idiots overlooked opportunity, that business school graduates were idiots and that Simpson couldn't tell a good story. The moral of the story was a let down, not the usual story told at business conventions about success and triumph. Businessmen usually had challenges but never tragedies. These confirmations by Simpson further reinforced the idiocy of schooling and probably evoked some contradictory responses for anyone who graduated from university. The self effacement no longer made Simpson appear humble but rather a confirmed loser. Who would identify with a loser? But Simpson was not too long the audience's inferior. In a master stroke, the story was *not* over and Simpson used the explication of the moral to reverse the effect of its meaning. He re-inverted the connotations by saying that if "somebody" presents them, the audience, with a new idea don't be Crusoe. Now it seemed Simpson and his fellow navigators were the carriers of lifeboats which passengers and crew-members must not destroy. The intelligentsia was back on top revealing an unspoken moral of feigned subordination. The expert was the facilitator of the vision in the interests of *all* "the people." The navigator was no longer the idiot from graduate school but the captain who carried the mystical knowledge of salvation from shipwrecks.

### 7.8. Tensions in the Force Field of "Alberta"

The last identifiable mechanism for the exercise of ideological hegemony is the flexibility to accommodate resisting forces yet maintain control of the "centre of gravity." It is important here to think of the dynamic of ideological production as a shifting intersection of different and often conflicting discourses. These ideological conflicts suggest a non-totalizing juxtaposition of changing elements and a dynamic interplay of attractions and aversions. Ideology is never fixed. Ideology is what the intelligentsia creates in attempting to realize an imaginary future while confronting the real forces of opposing ideas, wills and interests. *Towara 2000 Together* does not, as it first appears as a "name," have a generative first principle or common denominator, but rather, if it has a "centre" at all, it should be thought of as a centre of gravity, and if it has continuity, it is the continuity of relations of force, no more visible to the eye than are the grammatical rules for "English."

From the first publication of the *Summary: Discussion Paper* (SDP 1991) to the fall of 1993, the *Toward 2000 Together* documents (and reference to them) provided the continuity and "centre" of the process. The documents also provided a site for struggle over meaning which shifted depending on linguistic usage and other forces constituting economic and political relations. The players in the process -- both individual and institutional -- each had their own reasons for being involved and each had an interest that was more or less served by their involvement. At one time or other many of Alberta's central institutions were involved. The point here is not about involvement but rather about the kind of involvement and the mediations of selection, exclusion, marginalization and distortion of consensual action to elicit conformity. Even oppositional movements were incorporated as counter-points of difference complicit in the construction of the field of force. This section identifies the changing dynamic of ideological confrontation, the syntactic and semantic discontinuities and the reconstitution of the meaning of *Toward 2000 Together* that distinguishes ideological production from deterministic reproduction. As historical actors attempted to balance the interests of ruling elites, to marginalize alternative challenges and to retain the moral and political leadership of a province, the documents provided a universal Albertan but nevertheless still in the *interests* of the Progressive Conservative Party and a reconstituted ruling class.

"Do not let the province become eternally dominant or stable. Arguably the corporate sector has demonstrated an inability to secure hegemony on its own. As this postmodernist discourse marks its accommodation to a more traditional reading of section 97, the documents provide a metaphorical trope given to *Toward 2000 Together* by Premier Lougheed in 1993. By then the new economic strategy, *Seizing the Opportunity*, had taken the echoes of Michael Porter, "Alberta is at a crossroads." (SO 19: 1993) The strategy remained to "move toward the year 2000" and to "adapt quickly to change" in order to position Alberta for future growth" (ibid.: 3). There was the replay of familiar themes: deficits and debts; rapid global economic changes; education and training systems; environment and economic agendas; design, delivery and financing of social program; and new decision-making processes. There was still a priority "to build our knowledge-based economy" (ibid.: 5) and to bring "an entrepreneurial management style to public administration (ibid.: 7). And there still remained a focus on "job creation" and forecasts which provided the required *future* facts to justify present action. The data from Economic Development and Tourism, Advanced Education and Career Development, and the Alberta Bureau of Statistics showed 110,000 jobs to be created from 1993-1997 with the largest share (39,100 jobs) to mysteriously arrive from "Business, Personal and Community Services: Advertising, Professional Business Services, Personal and Household Services, Other Service Industries (less Travel Service),

Education, Hospitals, Physical Health Practitioner, and Medical Laboratory Services, Other Health and Social Services" (ibid.: 23). It is difficult to read this Rosetta Stone of "data" and to make sense of the 1993-94 government without the *new* translation code.

But, there was more than one form of recoding at work. New codes are always reworked within given and contradictory traces. While certain appearances remained the same, the metaphor which gave meaning to the whole had shifted with the arrival of *Seizing Opportunity* and evoked a somewhat different meaning for "frontier" than in the initial stages. Now there was a return to a more familiar history where "this strategy provides directions that take Alberta squarely into a new kind of frontier -- a place where opportunities await those who have the courage to seize them, and where our *pioneering spirit* will serve us well" (ibid.: 22 emphasis added). Even at the end of the public consultation process the unique business culture of Alberta now had mixed metaphors of traditionalism and futurism summarized as "self reliant, born of pioneer roots, hard working, fostered by our farm background, entrepreneurial and outward looking, eager to accept change and technology, and innovative, we have the attributes to compete successfully in the global marketplace" (RAC 1993 "Appendix": 7). This is not the brave new frontier of the 21st century but one increasingly weighted with the 19th century. "Our pride and our strength as a province has always been our people. A determination to succeed, a willingness to work hard, and a faith in the ability of families and communities to solve problems together. . . ." (SO 1993: 22). Here there is no longer a "pioneer" appeal to risk and innovation of the world traveller but rather an appeal to the myth of stalwart yeomen, small towns and patriarchal families tucked in the bosom of God, all adapting to the rigors of inhospitable nature and Eastern banks, all searching for comfort, stability and three square meals. "Our history is full of examples where we have faced hardship and overcome it" (SO 1993:1). These statements evoke a spirit in the long lineage of the Columbus myth but not in keeping with that envisioned by the Banff Centre navigator where the West was supposed to be the Far East and not the banks of the Bow River. The return of the traditional metaphor was the result of the marginalized farm lobby finding its way into *Toward 2000 Together* through *Creating Tomorrow* which expressed the absence of farm concerns which had been conflated with "agribusiness" and an emphasis of industrial diversification, knowledge-based brokering and technological spinoffs. One of Klein's major emphases upon returning to the legislature in the spring of 1993 was to have his minister of agriculture speak in-depth about the substantive issues missed in the *Toward 2000 Together* initiative. Again familiar discourse supportive of rural society and agrarian myth endured: the Crow benefit under the Western Grain Transportation Act, the Canadian Wheat Board, income stabilization and a host of farm-based concerns. As opposition questions rightly noted, this mini-budget wasn't a real plan. But the opposition also noted but missed the significance of the absence of references to "*Paradigm Shift*," "*In Search of Excellence*" and "*Faith Popcorn*" (AH April 22, 1993: 2354-57).

In *Seizing Opportunity* Klein emphasized building on strengths. "Agriculture and Food" received first billing and relegated "Petroleum and Related Industries" to second place, reversing the post-industrial emphasis of the *Moderator's Report*. The significance of the ideological weighting should not be underestimated as one unpredictable element in the configuration of *Toward 2000 Together* where the contingencies of electioneering required the evocation of the world of Sinclair Lewis's *Babbitt* rather than Gene Roddenberry's *Star Trek*. The accommodation between agricultural modernity and industrial post-modernity marked a tenuous accommodation between Klein's rural Alberta and the very changes wrought by the post-industrial millennium promoted by McCready's

multinational corporations and Simpson's MBA knowledge-brokers, that is, those who embrace and *lead* the global changes to flexible accumulation in Alberta.

While the presence of the above articulation was marked by an increasing inclusion of a yeoman ideology, there was also a noticeable increase in nativist ideology as a response to immigration, multiculturalism and gender equality. Throughout the early stages of *Toward 2000 Together*, "multiculturalism," a term encompassing race and gender issues, was a major focus. It received primal billing as Roundtable #5 held in Grande Prairie. Multiculturalism was approached not as a constraint but as a potential business opportunity because "the interaction of people with diverse backgrounds, experiences, expertise, and perspectives would give birth to creative new ideas and approaches....turning the diverse workforce into both a necessity and an opportunity" (RRT 1992: 49). As the process continued this emphasis was reduced and finally displaced against the initial interests of the navigators. In the *Report of the Advisory Committee* this "topic" appeared as a minor subsection within new strategies for social programs and was promoted as only one element to encourage "self-reliance" (RAC 1993: 60-66). In SO it was difficult to find any mention at all of progressive or business multiculturalism except in three sentence fragments that mention ". . .to look outside to attract non-resident investors" (SO 1993: 15), to work "with a group of representatives from business, labour, equity and minority groups, to determine the need for private sector labour market development" (ibid.: 21) and as a principle of *economic* development committed to "fairness and equal opportunity" (ibid.: 6). These fragments were hardly the emphasis promoted by the Round Table strategists in the initial stages of the public consultations.

The differences between the cosmopolitan intellectuality of multiculturalism and the rural parochialism of Alberta nativism created the moral dissent during the Round Tables. These differences came to the forefront at the Grande Prairie Roundtable called "Managing Diversity: The Impact of Changing Demographics and Immigration on the Economy." The navigators recognized the difficulty that marginalized groups had "to work their way into the white male-dominated management" and that progress had come mainly "through legislation in the areas of affirmative action, equal opportunity, human rights, and sexual harassment rather than from a general recognition of the intrinsic value of the diverse skills and perspectives individuals bring to their work" (RRT 1992: 49). In "Acknowledging the Challenges" the evaluators of the Round Table wrote that the "Grande Prairie roundtable could serve as a microcosm of the difficulties of coming to a shared vision that honours the diverse perspectives and opinions of the group. Participants soon found they were not engaged in an intellectual exercise. . ." and "as a group, we found ourselves continually having to stop and ask ourselves how well we were drawing out and valuing all the resources of the group" (ibid.: 51). They continued: "we found how difficult it was to engage in truly effective communication. . . in the course of a very intense weekend. We found ourselves struggling to find a common language" and "we in Alberta, said some participants, have tended to respond to the rapid evolution to a 'knowledge-based' and increasingly 'borderless' economy by turning inward" (ibid.: 51). What was clearly evident here was a breakdown in a preliminary consensus. "Multiculturalism" was thereafter not confronted in the same way but rather subordinated and redefined in keeping with immigration and social policy clearly at odds with the original intent. The breakdown resulted in a major recategorization of two Round Table themes "Managing Diversity" and "Cities and the Wealth of Nations" in time for the Calgary conference. The themes were merged into one theme called "Community-Based Economic Development."

While the changing influence of the rural constituency was marked by an increased emphasis on farm issues and a decreased emphasis on race, ethnic and gender issues, the



influences of the extractive resource sector and value-added sector also marked a site of contestation over the meaning of "sustainable development." The final strategy had to deal with a conflict of interest over the maximalization of natural resource depletions and deregulation with the minimalization of pollution and depletions and environmental regulation of the marketplace. This conflict was most firmly played out as a failure to achieve a consensus on the definition of "sustainable development" beyond the agreement that commercialization of knowledge and "technology" was a good thing. The ideology of technology sutured together a configuration emphasizing "business as usual" on the issue of sustainable development.

The two competing business interests were compartmentalized most clearly at the Calgary conference and the designation of two separate themes to deal with primary resource development: "The Future of Resources" and "Environment and Sustainable Development." This bifurcation of the issue allowed two separate ethics to be contained within distinctive spheres: the first, the ideology of growth and extraction and the second, the ideology of growth and conservation. The strategy was to negotiate the differences by deferring on the problematic of extraction versus conservation.

The contradictory nexus of environmental conservation and capitalist economics first came to the forefront at Roundtable #3 in Medicine Hat, "The Greening of Alberta Business: Competitive Disadvantage or Commercial Advantage." Of note, Ken McCready, President and CEO of TransAlta Utilities, sat in as a Roundtable organizer and advisor (RRT 1992: 71). Concurrently, Honorable Ralph Klein was Minister of the Environment and participating in the provincial public forums (RRF 1992: 55; *Medicine Hat Regional Public Forum: Summary of Presentations*).

In trying to define "sustainable development" for the Round Table, the navigators argued that out of "600 documented definitions" they chose to define it as "a way of thinking that enables us to make progress on both the economy and the environment at the same time" (RRT 1992: 38). Note, that it was defined as "a way of *thinking*. . .to make progress" and not "acting" to make progress and was certainly intended to limit action to communication as a precursor to strategic action. Getting the parties to sit down at the same table was the central challenge.

Once at the table the definition was broad enough to offer the seductive potential for resolution. Out of the general definition were articulated three loose "definitions" that provided three subordinated but contradictory connotations: (1) "environmentalism"; (2) "business as usual" and (3) "progress on both." The navigators favoured "progress on both." "Environmentalism" provided the business counter-point as the Other. Both business interests could agree that the Other should be marginalized from the Round Table discussions. Such "environmentalist" positions found only rare expression during the initiative, for example in the Public Forums in the presentations of Edmonton Friends of the North (RRF 1992: 109) and the Federation of Alberta Naturalists (*ibid.*: 96). The "environmentalist" position provided the important counter-point to unify "business as usual" and "progress on both" in a contradictory accommodation. The counter-point was treated as an extreme position outside "rationality." The environmentalists' position, according to the navigators, called for "a more fundamental shift, a movement toward the deeper ecological world view that in the 'web of life' all organisms and entities in the ecosphere have intrinsic and equal value, and that the human world has no right to exploit the non-human world in the interests of its own growth" (RRT 1992: 38).

First, the navigators attempted to get the opponents to stop thinking dualistically and to start thinking dialectically about "sustainable development": "[sustainable development] begins to shift our thinking from an image of 'balance' in which there are trade-offs

between economic and environmental concerns, to an image of environment and economy as two sides of the same coin. . . .we should simultaneously be working to put the 'whole' back together again" (ibid.: 38). By centring the discussion on their own definition, the navigators sidestepped the ideological power of the alternate definition provided by "environmental advocacy groups" yet still retained the power of the concept for its "inclusive rallying power" (ibid.). The navigators understood "environmental advocacy" as a threat to the ideology of "growth" and the "expansionist paradigm," that is, the capitalist mode of accumulation. The Round Table players were firmly committed to "a set of assumptions in which material economic growth is a core value and the natural environment is a resource for fueling this growth" (ibid.). This definition of "growth" neatly conflated "no growth" positions with "anti-capitalist growth" positions. The exclusion of "deep ecology" and occlusion of emancipatory "growth" from the discourse revealed the contours of hegemonic construction. The navigators were able to accomplish this feat because adherents to the "anti-capitalist growth" were also excluded *a priori* from the Round Tables. With the exclusion of the above two positions, the navigators were able to present their alternate "capitalist" position or as they state "most of us expect that for the near future, we as a country and as a province will continue to seek economic growth -- though not necessarily the type of growth we have sought in the past" (ibid.: 39). And the navigators would accomplish this by ". . . more appropriate ways of measuring success. . . .[by] a shift in focus from 'extracting wealth' to creating wealth' through knowledge-based economic activities" (ibid.: 40). So while distancing their new position from "environmentalism," a catch all phrase for all "irrational" alternatives that compete with their own "rational" alternative, the navigators still risked alienating the "business as usual" position of the extracting industries. The attempt to overcome the potential for disagreement was based on coding the navigator's position in the language of technology, measurement and efficiency and the discourse about knowledge-based and value-added opportunities I discussed in early sections. The differences, though, could not be overcome without fudging fundamental issues. The navigators concluded that

These issues [deep ecology, capitalist growth etc.] are part of a wider philosophical debate about the nature of the world and our place in it that has been ongoing since the beginning of human history. It is an *important* debate, and one that is *becoming more urgent* as the extent of the damage already done to the planet is recognized. The thoughts and suggestions that each of us brought to the table were influenced by our own exploration of these questions. *We chose not to make the philosophical debate the focus of the roundtable.* (ibid.: 39 emphasis added)

The participants decided *not to discuss* important and urgent issues, yet continued to present the *discussion* as just the opposite. They concluded by legitimating the initiative -- to keep discussions going -- in the spirit of past initiatives such as the Clean Air Strategy for Alberta (ibid.: 29-42). The "sustainable development" issue revealed the anti-intellectualism of Toward 2000 Together initiative and its inability to provide a forum for a realistic confrontation of critical issues facing Albertans.

Second, the two business positions still formed a common front against environmentalist irrationality. This ideological exclusion was possible because of the prior material exclusion of the environmental position from the Round Table discussions and the inability of any of its adherents to challenge the founding principles of the discourse. With challenges from "environmentalism" excluded or subordinated the focus remained fixed on the contradictory interests in the business community. The navigators then attempted to

move the participants toward a position conducive to progress on both the environment and the economy. The evidence revealed the failure of the strategy.

At the Calgary Conference, the navigators attempted once again to address the same issue by bringing in the big multinational guns of Ken McCready who represented TransAlta, the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) and the Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD). McCready was to counter the opinions of the extracting industries and small businesses that were calling for totalized deregulation. BCSD is an organization constituted by 50 of the largest transnational corporations. The BCSD also provided McCready with close contact to Stephan Schmidheiny, Chairman of the BCSD, and gave McCready the opportunity to give the "business" point of view to Maurice Strong, the Secretary-General for the Earth Summit to be held the following month in Rio de Janeiro. Other members of the Council included Alex Kramer, CEO of Ciba-Geigy, who had made the argument that "it makes good business sense to secure the future of their corporations by incorporating the principles of sustainable development into their operations" (MR 1992: B36). McCready had to argue for both harnessing market forces and for government intervention; it was the line that separated multinational corporatism from small business libertarianism.

What was the "business principle" of sustainable development according to McCready? "The cornerstone of sustainable development is a system of open, competitive markets, in which prices are made to reflect the full environmental as well as full economic costs" (ibid.: B37). This brought McCready's position into some conflict with David Elton, thematic speaker on "The Future of Resources" whose arguments supported strengthening the extractive resource sector (ibid.: B1-11). The extractive industries feared any policy which appeared like a "carbon tax" (ibid.: B39). Because of the format of the conference, McCready and Elton would never meet in open combat. McCready believed that the resolution of business conflicts over the planning and control of the economy were best resolved by letting government set the overall goals and performance standards, in other words, to use economic instruments for facilitation of economic development rather than direct subsidies, nationalization or, in this forum, some renewed form of wild-west *laissez faire*. McCready favoured corporatism, and to support his point he cited Michael Porter, a Harvard professor of business administration aligned with the Business Council on National Issues and Mulroney's Prosperity Initiative (ibid.: B37). (More on McCready, Porter, BCNI and the Prosperity Initiative in Chapter Six).

The environment and economy issue was resolved in favour of the status quo. The navigators claimed "our committee recognizes that these initiatives -- and others -- [i.e., Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, Clean Air Strategy, Natural Resources Conservation Board, Special Spaces 2000 etc.] are *working towards* sustainable development in Alberta. We want to build on their success. This is one area where collaboration has been tried and is working, *although not maybe perfectly yet!*" (RAC 1993: 55 emphasis added). The failure to *resolve* the issue in favour of "progress" meant that by the time of *Seizing Opportunity*, "progress" had been colonized and redefined by "business as usual" overriding the "moderate" and "extreme" positions and allowing regressive environmental interests to seize the opportunity to use progressive language in the name of environmental deregulation.

"Sustainable development" now appeared as a *principle* of Klein's economic development (SO 1993: 6). Environmental issues were subordinated to "Intergovernmental Partnerships" concerning the rationalization of "overlapping jurisdictions" and the "predictability of environmental standards. . . *critical to maintaining investor confidence*" (ibid.: 18 emphasis added). The value-added opportunities for environmental technologies

were dispersed and subordinated to the traditional strategies for industrial development. For example, in forestry the emphasis was to "ensure that development is managed properly, with a vital balance between economic growth and the protection of the environment" and to the commitments of ongoing policies of management (ibid.: 12). The language of "balance" and "continuity" betrayed the fact that the "business as usual" position for the extractive industries had won the definitional war over "sustainable development" in the Toward 2000 Together initiative.

The use of the progressive language of "sustainable development" and the marginalization of "environmentalism" in favour of "business as usual" was an exemplary case of how the Excluded Other provided an important counter-point for structuring the hegemonic ideological configuration. The next few pages review the tensions in the force field related to the occlusion of the Other, that is, the democratic representatives of the working class, public salariat and the underclass who seem to live without history in the Toward 2000 Together narrative.

### **7.9. Democracy without Representation?**

The exclusion of labour, public professional, and underclass interests provided one of the most obvious and poignant examples of how anti-democratic exclusionary practices were used in the construction of an universalizing democratic ideology. How was this discursive exclusion accomplished? While there was a remarkable continuity between many of the documents in the process, one document stands out as distinctively representative of discontinuity: the Summary Report of the Regional Forums (RRF). Although limited by exclusions, RRF was clearly the most representative report of public opinion and it was continually presented as such in policy formation (RRF 1992: 2; CW 1992: 9; MR 1992: 1; RAC 1993: 11). But, several discursive mechanisms were used to immobilize its counter-discursive contents. At the level of ideology, this immobilization was accomplished by the structuring of the summary document.

The substantive content of *Report of the Regional Forums* (1992) was called "What Albertans are Saying" and can be divided into four parts. The first part reflected the interests of the navigators as a series of short and selective quotations concerning the theme and emphasizing the dominant agenda framed in the same manner as Getty's *Summary: Discussion Paper* (SDP 1991). Selective inclusion was used throughout the Toward 2000 Together initiative and repeated a procedure of incorporation that I have already covered in detail. Its details need not concern us here except to recall that it was the primary mode for excluding counter-discourse.

The second part of the RRF provided visuals and commentaries which summarized the correlation of data from 3,400 questionnaires each containing 11 questions. Again, in this section the commentary emphasized the dominant agenda through selective citation, but this time dissenting agendas escaped the dominant agenda. For example, one set of responses on funding education and training (Question #10) clearly contradicted the recommendation for "individual responsibility" by concluding that ". . . programs should be shared by government and employers, and to a lesser extent, individuals" (RRF 1992: 36). A similar contradictory reading was also evident in Questions #3, #5, & #11. These findings were ignored in later references to these conclusions. But these conclusions, one way or another, still appeared mostly for naught. Although the graphs supposedly provided "information" which could be used to make a multiplicity of counter-generalizations about "public opinion," they still only provided a propaganda function. They simply lack scientific authenticity. It was this authenticity which was easily overlooked in its future usage as another tool in the public management. The methodological clarifications in the document

confirm this critical reading by stating that "while the respondents represent a broad cross-section of individuals from industry, labour, educational institutions, and other organizations across the province, it should be noted that they do not necessarily constitute a valid statistical sample of the adult population of Alberta. The questionnaires were designed to obtain a rough gauge of opinions of people interested in participating in the Toward 2000 Together initiative" (ibid.: 24). Plausible deniability? First the RRF denied the information's authenticity, but then it proceeded to use it in spite of this limitation as a "rough gauge." Rough gauge of what? Efficient expediency favouring the visionary agenda.

RRF used pseudo-science to simulate "science" and thus mobilized the universalizing legitimations of scientific discourse to structure the public legitimations of particularist and contradictory opinions. The scientific potential of survey methodology was thus reduced to another intertextual referent and later used to justify the hegemonic agenda. We know this by the absence of the counter-claims in later documents. As I have already shown, every document in this initiative referred to the questionnaires and the public responses to justify particular actions as a reliable and valid representation of a universal public opinion.

How then does the document get from the finding that 40.8% "believe" that "global competition" is the most important factor shaping Alberta's economic future to the inference that "the greatest contribution that government can make to improving the economy and our competitiveness is to remove the obstacles that business have to overcome in order to compete internationally" (RRF 1992: 32)? Quite simply, paste the "facts" and "inferences" on the same page, and repeat the message over and over again like a mantra. The possible solutions to Alberta's economic and social crisis were provided in the spirit of quantification, measurement and theory but were more akin to numerology than numeracy. Such fictionalizing effects are well known in the advertising industry, for example, pasting together sexy woman and expensive car and *voilà* getting sexy car and expensive woman. The data provided by these kinds of "real" representations provided the publicity managers with a surplus of representations which could be used to construct a universalizing representation out of contradictory meanings. This procedure also justified any expenses from gathering *too much data* when smaller sampling procedures and research budgets would offer more reliable and valid information.

The third and fourth parts of RRF also provided a pastiche of submissions, but in this case the exclusionary effect was achieved through the randomization of the presentations. Even though many of the official voices in the labour movement, women's movement and leading professional associations in public service were absent, the voice of counter-discourse still could be found in these submissions. While earlier parts of the document emphasized consensual items to keep the dominant discourse alive, in these latter sections, the use of pastiche allowed for the counter-discourse to be drowned in a sea of 257 submissions. This is my own count. Others report differently, for example Elzinga reports 223 submissions (MR 1992: A7). What is lost was any sense of clarity in the counter-discourse and an overwhelming presence of the so called majority position.

Oppositional voices still were found in the text within the overall discursive framing of the document by the dominant agenda. The earlier environmental examples concerning sustainable development provided prime examples for expressing the logic of a modified "deep ecology" position. The navigators in RRF, though, also marginalized the counter-discursive effects through the use of pastiche and devalued the differences of the opposition by the sheer weight of dominant interests. The key to the *a priori* exclusion of counter-discourse was to code *Toward 2000 Together* as "economic," "trade" and "technology" forums and thus provided a natural platform for a network of entrepreneurs, business

administrators, economists, and certain representatives of higher education, especially related to engineering services, technical institutes and vocational colleges. The narrow framing of legitimate discourse minimalized the potential effects of counter-submissions with primary interests defined by "global development," "liberal education," "public health" and "social services." As I have shown earlier, "economics" became a catchword meaning "everything," and "business" became the universal "stakeholder."

To provide an example of ideological politics in this mode of exclusion, I use one of the few public sector unions to make a submission. Frances Savage, an Edmonton representative for the Alberta Teachers' Association, claimed that schools should not become "little factories for the production of workers" and the provision of education had to be understood in a broader context because it was difficult to predict just what specific skills will be required in the future. Her argument for a more liberal education also involved the association's position that the government "should not treat labour as a commodity, but must look at what workers hope for themselves" (ibid.: 93). This position was a minority one within the framing of the forums and was overwhelmed by the sheer number of submissions making arguments on the basis of human capital theory. The Edmonton ATA point was purged from later documents. The treatment of other group and individual submissions was similar. For examples see the Mennonite Central Committee -- David Hubert (RRF 1992: 142); City of Edmonton -- Jan Reimer (RRF 1992: 87); Alberta Women in Support of Agriculture (RRF 1992: 118); McCauley Community League (RRF 1992: 142); Martha Kostuch (RRF 1992:140). The discursive counter-effects of these presentations were nullified either by their exclusion or by the distorting effects of subordinating them to the logic of the dominant discourse.

The primary legitimation for annihilating counter-logics and -contents was the Calgary conference and the resulting documentation as the universal position for Alberta. Of note, out of the 164 recommendations documented in the *Moderator's Report* only the Alberta Teacher's Association was singled out for government attention: "Review the role of the ATA and how power and responsibility are allocated in the education system" (MR 1992: 40). In the present context, Alberta's school teachers provide the largest pool of knowledge-producers in a value-added economy, one, albeit informed by the logic of public service rather than consumer service and therefore an identifiable *constraint* on *opportunity*. Public school teachers, along with other public sector workers were only one of the marginalized and excluded voices in *Toward 2000 Together* initiative. It is not surprising, then, that they were one of the few groups to mobilize against the "universally" justified cutbacks directed at them at the end of 1993.

### **7.10. Conclusion**

This chapter focused on reconstructing the contours of the "naturalized" corporatist postmodernization narrative provided by the Banff Centre's navigators during the public consultation process. I identified the production of regulative assumptions in the selection of meaning and the "materialization" of textual evidence as signs of "consent." I argued that the ideology of *Toward 2000 Together* reinforced the circuits of class power while claiming to do the opposite. To accomplish their task the navigators of the consultation process had to provide thematic continuities by treating topics as theses, to frame disputes by defining social reality, to treat metanarrational assumptions as preordained explanations of the empirical data, to create a new vernacular through the selective use of a translation codes and metaphors, and to contain convergent interests in maximizing business opportunities. The ideological effect of *Toward 2000 Together* was the colonization of a public service ethic with a new consumer service ethic. The effect was also achieved by

excluding, distorting, marginalizing and fragmenting resistance in the name of democratic consent.

The political process of textual creation was not universally representative of mass consent but was strategically effective in locating a hegemonic "centre of gravity" to articulate a variety of elite and popular interests and to create the ideological basis for moral and political leadership in Alberta. This centre of gravity did not stay purely within the context of the corporatist postmodernization narrative but rather faced internal differentiation. A bifurcation created tensions between technocratic, modernist and urban ideas that challenged the more traditional Albertan ideas supportive of conservative, anti-modernist and rural interests. This "internal" bifurcation created greater problems for the navigators than either the two corporate antagonisms between the extracting and value-added sectors or the "external" challenges from the traditional liberal and radical left.

As the election neared and the struggle over the meaning of *Toward 2000 Together* moved into the political arena and away from the intellectual arena, the corporatist postmodernists had to relinquish leadership over the narrative to more traditional political protagonists. Although the political capital of *Toward 2000 Together* secured the return of the Progressive Conservatives, the navigators had to partially concede the centre and downgrade initiatives on the information economy, multiculturalism, gender equity, environmentalism and the new internationalism. On the one hand, the Klein government took a more conservative path. In practice it reemphasized the centrality of the resource industries and agriculture as well as courting xenophobia and provincialism. On the other hand, in rhetoric, it coopted corporate postmodernism and mobilized a visionary path to economic salvation. It retained the least progressive "postmodern" proposals for establishing market-based *laissez faire* and state-based social control. It emphasized more traditional populist and corporatist assumptions in combination with *practical* considerations for electioneering. The Alberta government developed a unique strategy in dealing with real social forces, that is, the marriage of strategic planning, the lived experience of public consultation and the pragmatics of political survival.

# Chapter Eight

## Intertextual Origins of the Vision

The news is good. We'll finally learn how to maximize our technology -- stretch our resources and save our souls. (Faith Popcorn 1991: 186)

The future is being made by totally anonymous people, a CEO here, a marketing manager there, a training director or a comptroller yonder doing mundane jobs: building a management team; developing a new pricing strategy; changing a training program so that it matches people with different educational backgrounds to new technologies; or working out a new cost accounting analysis to find out whether automating the welding line will pay off. (Peter Drucker 1986: ix)

### 8.1. Faith Popcorn Comes to Town

In the last chapter I showed that the call to action promoted "dismal dreams" and filled a social imaginary devoid of dreams. The call to action for action's sake has centred on the corporatist postmodernization narrative because it answers questions that many people are asking. Corporate postmodernism is not being foisted on an unsuspecting population. Corporate postmodernism is an expression of the popular desire to fill an absence. Whether it will actually fill the absence in an empirical sense, is debatable, but nevertheless, as an expression of popular alienation, it gives answers and offers hope and therein lies its appeal.

Although the Alberta government did develop a unique strategy that combined strategic planning, public consultation and pragmatic politics to achieve social validity for *Toward 2000 Together*, the usefulness of the corporatist postmodernization narrative should not be underestimated. The narrative's strength, in many ways, comes from its applicability as a *useful fiction*. It offers a vision of the future, speaks to the present global crisis and offers a comprehensive response for social action. This action may naturalize the imperatives of the fictional future and it may limit social responses to those of adaptation to "global competitiveness," but nevertheless, the narrative is *a response that speaks to a "different future"* when other narratives merely call for more of the "incremental past" (now tagged with creating the crisis of modernity) or an opting for "postmodern playfulness" (now validating inaction as a legitimate form of socially responsible action). The corporate postmodern vision for a "different future" has tapped into popular hopes and fears that the other proposals appear to stifle. What are these popular desires and how does *Toward 2000 Together* articulate them?

Where the last chapter focused on those discourses that legitimated political practice in achieving social validity, this chapter identifies another series of intertextual articulations in the metanarrative that were used to *authoritatively legitimate the "truth statements"* of *Toward 2000 Together*. Here the intelligentsia asks for "the truth of your desires." In a regime of performativity these truths are useful as marketable commodities and for social control. Whether these truths are in fact true or not has secondary importance here (although I do provide critique). Rather what is important in this chapter are the "truth effects"; that is, I identify the fact that these statements or "fictions" are believed to be true so that the Alberta people make plans (i.e., *Toward 2000 Together*) and act accordingly (i.e., implemented social reforms). Furthermore, these "truths" dominate the intellectual sky from horizon to horizon and appear as a kind of common sense that has permeated everyday thinking and transcended logic and science. As Dr. David McCamus stated in his



presentation to the Calgary Conference on the knowledge-based economy: "I was delighted with Don's [Simpson] report this morning, because you would think that we were reading from each other's notes along the way" (MR 1992: B14). How can one explain this mystical confluence of understanding?

The ideological "origins" of the postmodernization metanarrative and the milieu for its reception form a broad textual configuration that transcends the provincial boundaries of Alberta and articulates national, continental and global interests. The exercise of hegemony in Alberta is thus only one moment in the exercise of hegemony at a global level. At this level the intertextual referents offer up a more comprehensive and tension-filled set of mediations between global corporatist postmodernism, national technocratic liberalism and Alberta traditionalism. This chapter specifically identifies the truth effects of the metanarrational statements that were used to naturalize the theoretical, empirical and normative statements for *Toward 2000 Together* as "common sense." I also establish that aside from the particular limitations of the corporatist postmodernization narrative in Alberta, this new narrative marks the rise of an international configuration of New Right networks and ideological articulations that demand scrutiny.

The various sections of this chapter deal with the linkages between the intelligentsia of *Toward 2000 Together*. I offer a pastiche of vignettes of leading intellectuals whose works are not logically or scientifically integrated. In some sense, while each author's work is open to logical and scientific critique, the discourse as a "whole" and as an ideological configuration is not. To believe that such a total or limited critique is not only possible or would achieve the intended effect of delegitimizing the configuration misses the point about the nature of ideology, the regulation of discourse and the symbolic power of the intelligentsia (see Chapter Two). What does link the various discourses are common institutional interests and the fact that key statements were used to legitimate *Toward 2000 Together*. These connections I make explicit. As discourse, then, the postmodern social imaginary is quite real if not logically coherent or sensible. Because it has such a generalized presence, it seems to cloud up the sky from horizon to horizon. But it is not the sky. The social imaginary is constructed and its builders can be found in specific locations and articulated in various networks: the Canada West Foundation, the Business Council on Sustainable Development, the Business Council on National Issues, the national adherents to the New Learning Culture, the new international entrepreneurs in Third World development, the futurology market in business administration and the traditional political perceptions of Albertans. What emerges is a loose network of intellectuals who consider themselves Masters of Business Soul, a conception best exemplified and coined by Faith Popcorn for the marketing of desire.

Faith Popcorn came to the capital city of Alberta in August 1992 to hold an evangelical revival for business. Three thousand people attended the Edmonton Conference Centre to hear her speak about the future. Faith Popcorn is in the business of consumer marketing. Her clients and audience are mainly corporations. Her marketing consulting firm, BrainReserve, specializes in developing new products and services and in revitalizing existing brands for Fortune 500 clients. BrainReserve predicted and "named" the stay-at-home syndrome called "Cocooning" and the coming of the "Decency Decade" later mobilized by George Bush's campaign for a kinder, gentler presidency. BrainReserve's most recent prediction for the 1990s is called "Socioquake." Socioquake means a total change of "Everything." "There'll be economic casualties of this decade, but those who see the shakeup coming in time will survive it" (Popcorn 1991: 8).

Popcorn's pronouncements are intended to help individuals "see -- and survive -- the cataclysms ahead." This contemporary Pollyanna wants to "show people how to find a

way out of the gloom" (ibid.: 14). According to Popcorn, "the future is a serious business and if your customers reach the future before you, they'll leave you behind" (ibid.: 7). But the "future" plays a dual role for BrainReserve as both theoretical prediction and strategic realization for corporations because "tracking the trends is one of the ways we anticipate new realities *and help our clients create them*" (ibid.: 22 emphasis added). The enunciation of the future also plays a mythical role linking science and fiction: "that Gloom is the short-term, Hope is the longer-term -- and the trends and methodology. . . are the bridge that will take you to the longer-term, safely and profitably" (ibid.: 23).

The *repeat* client list of BrainReserve clients reads like a who's who of multinational corporations: American Express, American Telephone & Telegraph, Anheuser-Busch, Bacardi Imports, Beatrice/Hunt-Wesson, Borden, Bristol-Myers, Campbell Soup, Carillon Importers, Chesebrough-Pond's, Citibank, Clorox, Colgate Palmolive, Continental Baking, Eastman Kodak, General Foods, Gillette, Hoffman-La Roche, International Business Machines, Johnson & Johnson, Kimberly-Clark, McNeil Consumer Products, Nabisco Brands, Nissan Research and Development, Pepsi-Cola, Pfizer, Philip Morris, Pillsbury, Polaroid, Procter & Gamble, Ralston Purina, Richardson-Vicks, Schering Laboratories, Joseph E. Seagram & Son, and West Bend. The entire client list is at least twice the size of the repeat list and includes other corporations such as Coca-cola, Fisher-Price, Lever Brothers, Mastercard, MCI, Nestle Foods, Texas Instruments and Timex (ibid.: 215-20).

Popcorn promotes a methodology which identifies whether a business activity is "on trend" or not. Her core organization, more akin to flexible kinship association than a corporate bureaucracy, has also developed a network called TalentBank made up of 2000 experts who might not normally exchange ideas and who can be consulted at short notice for brainstorming sessions (ibid.: 13). Mainly working in the US, BrainReserve tracks approximately 300 hundred newspapers and magazines and monitors the top twenty television shows, first-run movies, best-seller books, hit music reviews and the main trends for new consumer purchases. The analysis of popular culture is used to identify trends which are compiled in a "TrendBank" (ibid.: 22). Taken together the trends profile consumer mood. Traditional trend identification usually targets a market audience based on demographics such as income and age. BrainReserve, though, focuses on "psychographics," a kind of socio-structural analysis of desire that taps into consumer feelings, impulses, and acceptances concerning strategies, products and services. The psychographic trends are considered predictive because from the time of their inception to their impact they tend to hold true, on average, for ten years. Furthermore, BrainReserve accounts for contradictory trends and allows businesses to profit on trend/counter-trend tendencies such as that represented by the Fitness/Fatness dichotomy (ibid.: 24-26).

The methodology provides "sound marketing answers for our [Popcorn's] corporate clients" (ibid.: 95). BrainReserve tests its hypotheses and refines its ideas based on three main sources of information: the ten trends making up TrendBank, the network of creative thinkers making up TalentBank and over 3000 nation-wide (USA) consumer interviews per year. For the most part BrainReserve's core business is based on long-range projects (called "FutureFocus") that attempt to find viable marketing solutions for corporate problems. According to Popcorn (1991), "disaster on one side usually spells opportunity on the other" (96). The validity of BrainReserve's predictions is in the results, that is, its ability to attract corporate clients searching for restored profitability. For example, BrainReserve enhanced San Pelegrino's mass-distribution of mineral water in the face of the Perrier recall and benzene scare, it aided Absolut vodka to capture the up-scale market from Stolichnaya vodka during the consumer boycott of Russian products, and it predicted

the rise of spicy foods, flashy cars (e.g., Miata), glamour cocktails, religion, home media rooms, yogurt, electronic agendas, coffee bars and sugarless toothpaste and the demise of New Coke (ibid.: 97-98).

BrainReserve attempts to project far into the future, but increasingly projections have become problematic because for corporations to remain competitive they can no longer assume a long turn-around time for solutions and action. As a solution, Popcorn recommends to her *product* clients to turn their businesses into *service* businesses. She also now realizes that her own service business has to become transformed into a product business. The product she is thinking of is rather unique. She writes: "In addition to our consulting services, the product we're packaging is the future -- trying to bring news and views of the future to more and more people. And the future can be packaged and positioned in any number of ways" (ibid.: 100). As evidence, she claims that one of her company's most successful products is a seminar called "TrendView" where "we take groups of anywhere from 20 to 1500 people through an overview of the future" (ibid.: 100).

She believes that the business of the future will be the future of business and she provides practical advice on business applications from trend *prediction* to trend *production* to trend *product*. The heart of BrainReserve's futurology is called "Discontinuity Trend Analysis," a methodology where specific innovative targets are measured against the psychographic trends. "Our expertise, beyond analysis, is in creating entirely new concepts or rethinking existing concepts -- not only to *fit* the trends, but to give them real expression" (ibid.: 105).

Popcorn describes the process. First, taking each trend one at a time, the business or product is analyzed against the trends by looking for continuities and discontinuities. Corrections are based on identifying the number and degree of elements "on trend." The ten trends are (1) an intensification of "cocooning," that is, withdrawal into controlled private environments; (2) an expansion of "fantasy adventure," that is, emotional escape into safe and simulated adventures; (3) an increasing appetite for "small indulgences," that is, profitable savings in the purchase of luxury; (4) an emphasis on "egonomics," that is, intensification and customizing narcissism; (5) an interest in "cashing out," that is, withdrawing from the alienating office to the home business; (6) the advances of "down-aging," that is, the downward redefinition of age-specific behaviors; (7) a promotion of "staying alive," that is, a hyper-quest for self-sponsored healthcare; (8) the influence of the "vigilante consumer," that is, the demand for corporate responsibility for reliable products and socially just effects; (9) the emergence of "99 lives," that is, the will to choose every kind of life and to live as multiple personalities; and (10) a new dedication to "S.O.S. (Save Our Society)," that is, an ethic of self-sacrifice in fields of education, health, social service and the environment. The astute entrepreneur can profit by tapping into these sometimes contradictory desires represented by the ten psychographic trends.

Next, analysis includes a "Universal Screen Test," that is, using the trends to read the world of data served up in an entrepreneur's everyday existence and to focus on applicable opportunities. Then, the entrepreneur must focus on "TrendBlending" which allows the business to shape the product or strategy around the emerging trends. Once an idea of the product is developed it is extended to the extremes of possibility and then reworked back to the solution, for example, a question derived from dietary changes in the shift from red meat to chicken, is transformed into "What if everyone gave up eating meat altogether?" The final step is "Twisting the Familiar" which creates unexpected payoffs by exaggerating the normative responses or by turning something already comfortable into something new. For example, from ice cream cones to serving french fries in an edible cone. The premise is

that the consumer world is open to continuous change and there are "no [normative] absolutes." "The trick is to challenge the assumptions, change the ground rules" (Popcorn *ibid.*: 126).

Popcorn states that "no one knows (exactly) how the future will feel and unfold, but the trends are pushing us there with a force that's almost tangible" (*ibid.*: 131). And there is a way to capitalize on these trends. "If we change -- scale back, choose more selectively, reverse our priorities from quantity to quality, then *according to Darwin*: we'll be fit enough to survive" (*ibid.*: 131 emphasis added). Primarily, she believes it will not be enough to merely make a decent product and to market it. What businesses require is a "Corporate Soul" which to her means having a public policy on crucial social issues such as the environment, health care, child care and apartheid. This particular strategy she calls "Decency Positioning." Although Popcorn finds it hard to convince corporations to follow the "decency" strategy she believes it creates market advantages by getting an early jump on consumer approval.

The logic in Popcorn's belief system (to call it an argument would not be accurate) is realized in the subsumption of science into industry, industry into management, management into religion, and religion into salvation via capitalist consumerism. According to Popcorn (1991), "you can't fake a Corporate Soul; either you have one or you'd better create one, fast" (162). The "Decency Decade" demands a "Corporate Promise." She identifies four *confessional* steps to salvation that companies can follow in *creating* a Corporate Soul to win over the consumer (God?). First, *acknowledge* the failure to fully act to make the world a better place. Second, *disclose* the interest to become better with the consumer's help. Third, *account* for arenas of responsibility and personal responsibility. Fourth, present a *pledge* to the consumer that the Corporate Soul is to be found in all products. "The corporate world," Popcorn states, "will have to change its priorities, and reward different strengths. The status that an M.B.A. held for marketers in the '80s will be replaced by the status of a new M.B.S. (Master of Business Soul). Guaranteed to be good through the year 2000. And beyond" (*ibid.*: 163).

## 8.2. Masters of Business Soul: The Intelligentsia

Who are the "expert" presenters promoting "empowerment" and "participatory government" that will arise from Toward 2000 Together? This section identifies the institutional networks that Toward 2000 Together mediated and the division of intellectual labour that had to be coordinated. The *Report of the Round Tables* described how expert opinion ("the roundtable crew") was organized. "The round table participants, . . . not only gave up their weekend, but also paid their own travel and accommodation expenses to take part in the sessions. We worked with the Banff Centre's network of associates and contacts around the country, with the Alberta government, and increasingly with recommendations from the roundtable 'alumni' themselves" (RRT 1992: 5).

Hal Wyatt, conference moderator, presented opening and closing remarks. Wyatt is chairman of Monsanto Canada and Liquid Carbonic Inc., vice-chairman and director of British Petroleum Canada, director of Chrysler Canada and Trimac Ltd., director of the University of Calgary's Canada/Taiwan Advisory Committee, director of the Royal Canadian Geographical Society, past vice-chairman of the Board for the Royal Bank of Canada, past co-chairman of the Calgary Economic Development Authority, past director of the Asia Pacific Foundation, past chairman and director of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, current vice-chairman and director of Talisman Energy, director for the Industrial Bank of Japan, and member of the Mount Royal College Foundation and the

Senator Stan Waters Memorial Foundation. Wyatt sits as the chair of Advisory Committee to the Alberta Provincial government (CW 1992: 6; RAC 1992 "Appendix": 13).

Aside from the role of conference moderator, Wyatt played the symbolic "Crown" for the conference. The other roles for the intelligentsia could be further divided into three different categories (1) state officials; (2) conference facilitators and (3) social experts. State representatives could be divided into two kinds of players. The politicians (Premier Getty and Ministers Orman and Elzinga) had the role to present themselves as government representatives who willingly listened to the people of Alberta. The government bureaucrats provided "the guidance and assistance of staff from the Department of Economic Development and Trade and the Public Affairs Bureau" (MR 1992: ii).

The coterie of expert intelligentsia was contracted "at arm's length" to facilitate the process. Facilitators could also be divided into two kinds of players: those who organized the information-presentation and those who organized the technical requirements for the production of documents. The lesser lights were responsible for documenting and typing the inputs from the small groups and thematic plenaries. Richard Roberts, from Praxis "prepared the database and provided the conference output in a usable format" (ibid.). In 1982 Roberts wrote *Resource Community Study* for Canstar Oil Sands Ltd., a joint venture with Praxis in conjunction with George Kupfer, Nova and PetroCanada. The study was a feasibility study on the prospects of development for the northeastern Alberta oil sands. In 1967, Kupfer also wrote a notable study called *Community Opportunity Assessment* which was published by Human Resources Research and Development and by the Executive Council of the Government of Alberta. Kupfer also wrote six titles, mostly in the 1980s concerning development in the North, aboriginal communities, employment alternatives and social assistance in smaller Northern Alberta Communities. This work was published by the Northern Alberta Development Council. Kupfer was also a conference facilitator at the Calgary conference (ibid.: C14).

The second kind of facilitator is represented by Susie Washington and Sari Shernofsky who also helped to prepare the documents and organize the conference. Washington runs a consulting business called Western Environmental and Social Trends (W.e.s.t.) (ibid.: ii). The staff of W.e.s.t. also helped organize and administer the Advisory Committee on Alberta's Economic Future and the *Report of the Advisory Committee* (RAC 1993 "Acknowledgements": 22). Washington holds the executive title of "Facilitator" of the Advisory Committee and has 25 years of experience in environmental conservation and resource management issues with special expertise for clients in project management, interpretation of government initiatives and organizing public consultations. Not only does she help interpret government initiatives, she initiates. She is a trustee of The Nature Conservancy of Canada and a member for the Unesco Program on Man and the Biosphere. She has also served on the Canadian Chamber of Commerce Task Force on the Environment and Economy and is a former director of the Environmental Law Centre of Alberta. She once was the program manager for resource management for the Banff Centre (RAC 1993 "Appendix": 13).

The third kind of role played by the intelligentsia was to provide the specific contents for the reading materials and thematic presentations and to "set the stage for much of the productive output" (MR 1992: ii). These experts could be divided into two groups: the thematic speakers David Elton, Dave McCamus, Caroline Pestieau, Ken Taylor, Ken McCready and Dale Dowell and the thematic moderators, Vern Millard, Don Simpson, Donna Allen, Stella Thompson, Natalie Krawetz and Iris Evans.

A brief biography is available for each of the above experts in the *Conference Workbook*. For example, two players who appear to have minor roles in defining the

Alberta initiative are Ken Taylor and Dale Dowell. Ken Taylor, a charismatic and heroic person, presented "Competing in a Global Economy" at the Premier's Conference. He has spent 25 years as a foreign service officer with the Government of Canada and has served throughout the world, including a post as Canadian Consul General in New York and Canada's Ambassador to Iran. In the latter case he received world renown for smuggling out American citizens during the Iran hostage crisis during the Carter administration. From 1984-89 he was employed by the international conglomerate RJR Nabisco and became Senior Vice-President with world-wide responsibilities. He currently operates as an independent business consultancy and serves as director for a number of U.S. and Canadian corporations (CW 1992: 7). He is a member of the Board of Governors for the Banff Centre for Continuing Education (BCAR 1990-91: 60). He and his wife are individual donors to the Banff Centre's "The Friends Program" (ibid.: 35).

Dale Dowell, a local participant in the globalization strategies, presented "Community-Based Economic Development" at the Calgary conference. He is a partner in Price Waterhouse with extensive consulting experience in both business and government. He holds an MBA from the University of Alberta and manages a recent development strategy for the City of Edmonton. His work includes directing a study of regional linkages for economic development in the Edmonton area. He specializes in strategic management and planning, socio-economic analysis, and management systems design and evaluation (CW 1992.: 8).

After identifying the institutional networks that Toward 2000 Together mediated and the division of intellectual labour that had to be coordinated, the next sections focus more specifically on the ideological articulations of the Toward 2000 Together metanarrative and many of the hegemonic intellectuals and documents used to provide discursive depth to the truth statements of Toward 2000 Together. By discursive depth I mean a set of unexamined texts used to justify statements which are simply believed to be true because they are stated by "authorities" and confirm "common understanding." Many of these authorities and their texts were used in Toward 2000 Together to establish *the facts of reform*. A closer look at these authoritative statements, though, reveals that they too stand on quite a bit of unsubstantiated ground or assert spurious conclusions. The fact that they are treated as solid and non-controversial facts has social effect. This effect is partially achieved by the fact that one statement refers to another statement which refers yet again to another statement until a some point the "truth" dissolves into the multi-layers of discursive references. While the truth is difficult to locate as something other than just a reference to another authoritative discourse or popular understanding, the intended effect is quite clearly tied to the constitution of continentalist economic, political and social policies and the self interests of a New Right intelligentsia.

### **8.3. David Elton and the Canada West Foundation**

At the Premier's conference in Calgary, Dr. David Elton presented "The Future of Resources." In preceding chapters I also identified Elton as one of the press commentators about the significance of the Calgary conference. After the conference he also appeared on Alberta television as an economics expert in support of the economic policies of the Alberta government. His supportive commentary was also congruent with the fact that Elton and the staff of Canada West Foundation helped prepare the background information for *Report of the Advisory Committee* (RAC 1993 "Acknowledgements": 22).

Elton has been president of Canada West Foundation since 1980, received his Ph.D. from the University of Alberta and is a faculty member at the University of Lethbridge in political science. He chairs the Canada West Foundation's task force on Canada/U.S. trade

and has conducted research and published in a number of areas, including resource development, transportation policy, economic development, diversification, trade, political behavior and constitutional reform (CW 1992: 6). He has authored and co-authored at least seven publications, some of which are published by the Canada West Foundation: *Alternatives: Basic Issues in Constitutional Reform* (1980), *Evaluating the Fine Print: The Free Trade Argument and Western Canada* (1988), and *Democracy on the Installment Plan: Electing Senate Nominees* (1989). The Canada West Foundation is also a donor to the General Scholarship and Awards Fund for the Banff Centre for Continuing Education (BCAR 1991-92: 34).

According to Warnock (1988: 116) the Canada West Foundation was one of seven important intellectual organizations to support the 1988 Free Trade Agreement (FTA). These organizations included the Economic Council of Canada, The Institute for Research on Public Policy, The C.D. Howe Institute, the Conference Board of Canada, the Canadian-American Committee and The Fraser Institute. The increased interest in a free trade agreement also saw a marked decline in the nationalist perspective and the inability of Canada's economic planners to deal with conflicts over trade with the United States or to adapt to shifts in the global balance of power. The recession of 1981-82 exacerbated the steering crisis of the Canadian state to deal with lagging productivity, rising deficits and increasing levels of unemployment. In 1982 Trudeau appointed a Royal Commission dubbed the "Commission on Canada's Future" which was to look into the state of the economic union and potential development prospects (Finkel, Conrad and Strong-Boag 1993: 491-97). The chair, Donald Macdonald, released the report in September 1985 and argued that market mechanisms rather than government intervention were the best means for Canada to maintain an adaptive economy which could adjust to global change and technological innovation. To meet this end, free trade with the United States and a guaranteed annual income were offered as answers (*Report of the Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada*; Drache and Cameron 1985).

Although no party advocated a free trade agreement with the United States in the 1984 election, the newly elected Mulroney administration initiated negotiations with the full force of Canadian business behind them. The business community was led by the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), an organization of 150 CEOs of the leading Canadian corporations (mostly multinationals). Along with BCNI, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Bankers Association and the Canadian Federation of Independent Business were crucial institutions organizing the business lobby and movement. FTA was agreed upon in late 1987 and in November 1988 Mulroney received an electoral mandate to proceed in spite of the fact that a majority of Canadian voters (57%) did not support the comprehensive trade agreement. After the agreement was signed in January 1989, American discussions for free trade continued with the Mexicans and led to Canada's involvement and to the Mulroney government's negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). American interest in the deal was to ensure availability of Canadian energy, water and other resources and to guarantee an extended market for American service industries. The two major goals of corporate Canada were to ensure or to increase access to the American market and to resist the incursions of government interventions (Finkel, Conrad and Strong-Boag 1993: 588-92). Despite claims by opponents of the deal that Canada was trading away its ability to control its own destiny, the ideology of "free enterprise and free trade" maintained strength with the hegemonic claims that social programs, cultural industries and regional development would not be threatened, in fact, the *new* economy was supposed to

strengthen social, cultural and regional development (Clarkson 1985; Cohen 1987; Cohen and Shannor 1984; Doern and Toner 1985; Laxer 1986; Marchak 1991).

Concerning the first corporate goal of guaranteeing access to the American market, Alberta's support for the FTA and NAFTA was the strongest in Canada because of the centrality of the energy (oil and gas) sector to the provincial economy. The overwhelming support of Albertans for the free trade deal was also based on an increasing resentment of a Central Canadian boom in the 1980s in the wake of Alberta's sluggish economy and an extensive provincial media campaign in favour of the Agreement. The historical precursors of "necessity" in guaranteeing market access to the US for energy were based on the structural constraints created by state-corporate relations arising from the Cold War and the American identification of Canada's industrial resources as strategic assets. According to Clark-Jones (1987) Alberta's dependence on the western United States oil and gas markets and the emergence of a continentalist energy strategy cannot be explained by the simple logic of economic rationality nor limited to the overwhelming power of the multinational oil companies. "This feat," she argues, "could be accomplished only with the economic, political and ideological aid of the Canadian governments. In the 1950s and 60s the multinational oil companies, led by Imperial Oil, were allowed to define the parameters of the National Energy Policy in such ways as to assure their hold on Canadian energy development for the future. Western independent oil producers were squeezed out of both Canadian and US markets, as they were from the seats of decision-making power in the creation of energy strategy" (76). The extension after 1945 of this characteristic dependence of staple production on US markets to the new industrial strategic resource -- oil -- contextualizes today's *perceived* necessity that Alberta's only economic strategy *must* be based on the given relations of the energy sector to the continental market.

David Elton of the Canada West Foundation succinctly stated at the Calgary conference that "natural resources are the key to Alberta's future. . . a major engine for economic growth. . . 'Don't short your winners'" (MR 1992: B11). His argument articulated a dependent development strategy for Canada. He argued that primary government support should go to the natural resource industries which would then provide a natural foundation for related and indirect economic activities. Information-age industries would likely continue to be dependent on the strength of traditional industries. Services would be based on the market demands from a healthy and dynamic natural resource sector "treated within the context of the international environment within which they exist" (*ibid.*). By assuming that Alberta's economy was determined by global trade [i.e., particularly American] in the resource industries, the lens of dependent staple resource development mediated Elton's vision of the *new* economy and the nature of development of a skilled workforce, efficient management practices and up-to-date information processing. Elton's point is obviously central to the Klein government's priority to directly and indirectly continue subsidizing the traditional resource sectors in what might be called a "fuel and farm" strategy leaving the knowledge-based industries to articulate themselves to the sectoral strategies and initiatives of the resource industries. As I showed earlier this position is not entirely compatible with either McCready's views on sustainable development or Simpson's views on human resource development. Nevertheless, McCready and Simpson accommodated their positions by giving primacy to Elton's thesis.

Concerning the second corporate goal of resisting the incursions of government interventions, Alberta's elite support for "free enterprise" has already been well documented in previous chapters. Because the United States is a much more market-driven economy, the Canadian business elite and political right expect (and have partially realized) the *inevitable* pressures for harmonization. As economist Herbert Grubel on the faculty of



Simon Fraser University and an associate of the Fraser Institute claimed concerning privatization and deregulation: "free trade will slow the creep of socialism in Canada" (Grubel cited from Warnock 1988: 113). Specifically from the Canada West Foundation, research economist Katie Macmillan (1985) wrote in *The Canadian Common Market* that it was unlikely that the Americans would explicitly require the dismantling of Canadian social programs such as U.I.C. and baby bonuses. Rather *market* pressures would tend to make Canadians, themselves, call for a reduction or the elimination of these social programs. As already shown, the increasing fiscal crisis of the Alberta state and the claims of breaking the chains of government constraint on business are today the foundational premises structuring the discourse for reform.

Leading up to the 1988 FTA, the Canada West Foundation did extensive research on the free trade issue. It produced four Task Force reports from June to September in 1987 which identified the pre-agreement positions and enunciated the concerns of industry associations and senior management spokespersons in Western Canada. In April 1988, Foundation president David Elton in conjunction with research and policy analyst Stuart Duncan produced a widely circulated text in anticipation of the 1988 election. The study, called *Evaluating the Fine Print: The Free Trade Argument and Western Canada*, updated the previous task force reports by conducting a survey of industry officials regarding FTA which had been signed in January 1988. The explicit intent of the cost-benefit study was to provide information to western provincial governments, opinion-makers and the public and to frame the discussion for the development of adjustment strategies for industry (Elton and Duncan 1988: 1). The Canada West Foundation was *sponsored and financed* by grants from corporations, institutions, foundations and individuals and was registered as a charitable organization allowing for donations and fees to be deducted for tax purposes (ibid.: 20). A caveat also distanced the anonymous organizational "benefactors" of the document with the statement: "Because of the independence given the authors in undertaking this project, their opinions and recommendations within this document are not necessarily shared by Canada West Foundation's Council, its members, or its contributors" (ibid.: 1).

Of course, the legitimacy of the report was based on the fact that the authors *did* share the interests of the benefactors. Through this filter of "neutrality" and "objectivity," the authors could thus claim a "consensus view." But even here "consensus view" meant an explication of the reactions to and general positions on the FTA by "100 major industry associations and approximately 100 senior officials (mostly chief executive officers) of major western Canadian companies" (ibid.: 2). This "consensus" view obviously lacked the input from at least 99% of the Alberta population or a critical examination by dissenting intellectuals. The Canada West Foundation presented the *opinion* of industry officials as a *factual* evaluation of the *potential* effects of a *written agreement*. Whether the report can be considered a scientific analysis is rather doubtful. As a case for legitimating ruling class beliefs as a scientific facts, it is exemplary.

The report concluded that as a general outlook for every 100 workers in Western Canadian industries, 83 will notice little change, 2 will require program assistance and 15 will benefit from more exports or greater market security (ibid.: 2). Elton and Duncan also identified the main policy features of the FTA including those related to eliminating tariffs, the trade liberalization of services, explicit safeguards, dispute mediation and modeling for GATT. Specific to services, the FTA was called "ground-breaking." They stated that "in general, trade liberalization in covered services means that neither country will discriminate against the services provided by citizens of the other country. Services not covered included sensitive areas such as culture, transportation, government and social services

such as health care, and legal services" (ibid.: 4). They also stated there were exemptions for key "sensitive sectors such as culture, transportation, basic communications, and breweries" (ibid.). Missing from the above analysis were the points made a few years earlier by Katie Macmillan concerning pressures for harmonization and the mediating effects of fiscal restraint on education, health and social services.

Specific to Alberta, Elton and Duncan claimed that the "province" had the most to gain from FTA of all the western provinces and possibly all the Canadian provinces. In terms of exports, this potential gain was credited to Alberta's dependence on the US market which accounted for 75% of its world exports. They argued (in the name of "Alberta's decision-makers") that "secure access will facilitate the growth of resource-based exports and generate a more favourable investment climate" (ibid.: 12). Even though the historical constitution of Alberta's dependence identified by Clark-Jones has been naturalized, Macmillan's 1985 analysis about the effects of harmonization services was implicitly understood, that is, although not written into the agreement, the effect of enhanced dependent development and the *limiting of state intervention* were understood as going hand in hand. Elton and Duncan then argued that this strategy "will be particularly beneficial for communities dependent on the oil and gas industry and [will] reduce their vulnerability to U.S. protectionist measures" (ibid.).

In placing the FTA in this perspective, the authors also identified but did not analyze the long-term uncertain factors that might affect the "magnitude of economic benefits" such as exchange rates, interest and inflation rate levels, the dispute settlement mechanisms, the American Omnibus Trade Bill, the extent of Japanese investment, the outcome of the Uruguay Round of GATT, world demand and prices for commodities, and the actual historical functioning of the Canadian economy. Interestingly, one might think it appropriate that an economic analysis would necessarily include an analysis of the above factors as mediating the effects of the FTA on the Canadian economy. But such analysis is completely lacking. Rather an abstract model of economic functioning devoid of the concrete realities of Canadian-American economic relations is assumed. More specifically, two "uncertain factors" which are central to determining the impending effects of the FTA are completely excluded. Excluded from analysis are the effects that liberalized trade would have on US direct investment and the activity of US owned subsidiaries in Canada. Also excluded is the potential ability of Canadian companies to find market niches in the US. These two factors are merely identified as potential factors in determining the positive effects of FTA depending on various contingencies. How these contingent effects might play themselves out is not even hypothesized. Furthermore, no identification or analysis of the potential for Canadian firms to relocate in the US was marked as a problematic factor. The authors assume a theory of development without ever having to test it and then support abstract assumptions with "quantifiable" data derived from the opinions of CEOs about the future effects of the FTA *document* on their business. The lack of a complete economic description, historical analyses and theoretical debate and the presentation of the report's findings as consensual, neutral and objective mask its pseudo-scientific qualities as merely an alternate form of political mobilization for Alberta's chief executive officers.

By 1992, NAFTA was beyond the drawing-board stage, and what seemed explicit in 1988 to Elton and Duncan concerning the benign effects of the FTA on culture, information, education, science, and communications technology were no longer so benign (Calvert and Kuehn 1993). The effect of market harmonization seemed to be playing itself out just as their colleague Macmillan had explicitly anticipated. But even here, with the acceptance of NAFTA by the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, the full meaning of "economic" trade has yet to be fully realized in practice as a struggle over "intellectual

property." Clearly, though, any economic *service* today is also a cultural commodity, and the Alberta discourse on free markets and trade has already shown that the strategy for the *new* economy is not limited to traditional definitions of natural resources but now implicitly includes the marketing of and trade in "Human Resources," especially related to sustainable development.

#### **8.4. BCSD, Stephan Schmidheiny and *Changing Course***

At Premier's conference in Calgary, Ken McCready presented the thematic presentation "Environment and Sustainable Development" preceding the conference, he was an advisor to the Toward 2000 Together Roundtables (RRT 1992: 71). McCready is also president and CEO of TransAlta Utilities Corporation. The electric utility industry in Alberta consists of three major generating utilities. One is municipal-owned, Edmonton Power, and two are corporate-owned, Alberta Power and TransAlta Utilities (CW 1992: 21). He is also chairman of the Alberta Round Table on Environment and Economy and director of University Technologies International, Maloney Steel, Keyword Office Technologies, PanCanadian Petroleum and the Marigold Foundation (ibid.: 8). TransAlta Utilities is also a corporate sponsor of the Banff Centre's General Scholarship and Award Funds (BCAR 1991-92: 36). McCready also attended the "Senior Executive Summit" as a representative of TransAlta at the Banff Centre during the 1988-89 year (BCAR 1988-90). McCready is also a member of the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) and the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) (CW 1992: 8).

BCSD published *Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment* and represented the point of view of 48 CEOs and chairmen of the boards from many of the largest multinational corporations around the world who serve on the Council, a third of whom come from the "third world." According to the report "each BCSD member serves in his or her private capacity, rather than as a representative of a company" (Schmidheiny 1992: 3). These "non-representative" corporate heads, for example, in addition to McCready of TransAlta, represent Chevron (US), Volkswagen (Germany), ConAgra (US), 3M (US), Ciba-Geigy (Switzerland), Nissan Motor (Japan), Aracruz Celulose (Brazil), Nippon Steel (Japan), Mitsubishi (Japan), Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez (France), Dow Chemical (US), Northern Telecom (Canada), ALCOA (US), TATA Industries (India), Royal Dutch/Shell (Netherlands), du Pont (US), Garovaglio y Zorraquin (Argentina) and others (Schmidheiny 1992: 9-13).

It is through his chairmanship of the Alberta Round Table on Environment and Economy and the Clean Air Strategy that McCready is able to influence the development of provincial government policy. The Round Table resulted from the National Task Force on Environment and Economy and was established in the 1980s by Canada's Environment Ministers to recommend new approaches for combining environmental protection and economic decision-making. The Round Table was established in 1990 to provide provincial leadership, policy advise and long-term strategies. The Clean Air Strategy was also launched in 1990 to develop a response to the effects of fossil fuels on global warming, acid rain deposition and smog (CW 1992: 59).

Maurice Strong, the General-Secretary of the Rio Earth Summit, urged Schmidheiny to become his principal business and industry advisor and to show how business can "fully integrate the value of the environment into their operations" (MR 1992: B35). The result was the formation of BCSD and the production of *Changing Course*. Although I have already shown how the "sustainable development" point of view was marginalized in Toward 2000 Together by the fall of 1993 in favour of "business as usual," a more complete review of Schmidheiny's challenge to business "to self-examine its own

performance" (ibid.) reveals what many of Alberta's industries are currently *incapable* of committing themselves to, that is, responsible stewardship of the environment.

McCready's presentation at the Calgary Conference was closely framed and justified (at times cited directly) with reference to Schmidheiny's *Changing Course*. An executive summary contains the key points. The triumph of this new genre marks the "Readers' Digestion" of contemporary *business* discourse, the fast food equivalent for thinking on the run. The "Executive Summary" of *Changing Course* is introduced by a quotation by Theodore Roosevelt to the US Congress on December, 1907: "To waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and exhaust the land instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will result in undermining in the days of our children the very prosperity which we ought by right to hand down to them amplified and developed."

The quotation is followed by a "Declaration of the Business Council for Sustainable Development." To summarize: business is committed to the future health of the planet, sustainable development and the welfare of future generations. Progress can be made on economic growth and environmental protection but it requires new forms of cooperation between government, business and society. Economic growth provides the bases to sustain and improve livelihoods. New technology provides the solution. Open and competitive markets foster innovation and efficiency *but these markets must reflect the environmental costs of doing business*. This goal is best achieved by a synthesis of economic instruments, regulatory standards and private-voluntary initiatives. Individual jurisdictions will tailor their programs to meet local circumstances (Schmidheiny 1992: 7-9).

Capital markets must emphasize long term development. Trade must be open and environmental concerns dealt with through international agreements. Deregulation, private initiatives and global markets require corporations to assume more responsibility in defining their roles. Stakeholders should not only include employees and shareholders but also suppliers, customers, neighbours citizens' groups and others. Appropriate communication will help refine visions, strategies and actions. Progress toward sustainable development makes good business sense but requires a change in corporate attitudes and new ways of doing business. To move from vision to reality requires *strong leadership from the top* and the implementation of clear plans of actions and the monitoring of progress (ibid.).

Corporations must pay attention and be responsible for the entire life cycle of their products. Corporations must be "eco-efficient" and support "technology cooperation." Cooperation is best supported by business-to-business partnerships and direct investment. Governments and institutions engaged in overseas development work can enhance private initiatives. Government should also promote efficient resource use (e.g., land, forests, water) by providing the right market signals and regulations and by encouraging private ownership. Better use of the creative forces of entrepreneurship can be accomplished by open and accessible markets, streamlined regulatory systems with clear and enforceable rules, sound and transparent financial and legal systems, and efficient administration. Change will require substantial efforts in education and training directed at sustainable forms of consumption. A clear vision of sustainable development can mobilize all parts of society to translate the vision into action. BCSD is committed to promoting a new partnership, replacing confrontation with cooperation, and in changing course toward our common future (ibid.).

The above declaration is followed by a four page list of the "non-representative" representatives from the 48 multinationals and 29 pages of executive summary establishing the steps required for implementing the "business of sustainable development." The 400 page book-form of *Changing Course* specifically elaborates on the summary and gives

approximately half of the text to 36 cases studies about selected multinational corporations, each dedicated to "managing" change in business, "managing" business, stakeholder and financial partnerships, and "managing" cleaner production and products and sustainable resource use. For example, three cases studies are "Du Pont: The CEO as Chief Environmental Officer," "Mitsubishi: Cooperation for Reforestation" and "Dow Chemical: Making Waste Reduction Pay." In reviewing *Changing Course* I limit my focus to chapters six and ten which elaborate a form of governance and a theory of development, that is, a description of how the move from vision to reality requires *strong leadership from the top* and an explanation for why such leadership is necessary.

According to Schmidheiny (1992: 28) business has already proved it can meet the challenge of sustainable development because of success in managing fundamental changes in both planning and action and by having moved toward similar objectives which at first appeared to be opposed, as in the case of the quality revolution and the ability of business to increase quality while lowering costs. He writes that business has been cautious about its approach to the environmental challenge and must now live up to "its responsibility." In so doing, businesses will have to recognize that "environmental concerns [can] become not just a cost of doing business, but a potent source of competitive advantage" (ibid.: 30).

The vision includes recognizing that long-term growth demands environmental sustainability, that products must contribute to sustainable development, that business operations must necessarily maintain credibility with society, that dialogue with stakeholders will create opportunities and legitimacy, that employees must be provided with new meaning beyond salaries to enhance capabilities and productivity, and that leadership on the environment can be used to maintain entrepreneurial freedom rather than await regulatory coercion. Mobilizing the vision through broad-based stakeholder consultation usually leads to better decisions and more universal support for implementation. Commitment to a vision must also be translated into strategies and action plans. This commitment involves reorganizing, restructuring and redesigning many processes and detailed systems within a corporation. *A major component of reorganization is the development of an organizational learning culture involving middle management.* "This culture is based on an appreciation of the need to constantly rethink and be open to relearning the fundamentals of every aspect of business. The ability to tolerate uncertainty, design new strategies, coach, and use statistical tools for managing processes are among the skills required to manage change for sustainable development" (ibid.: 31). Monitoring the process of change through measurement also complements implementation. Business is encouraged to measure performance, conduct regular audits and assessments of compliance and to provide information to boards of directors, shareholders, employees, authorities and the public.

In describing the leadership required for sustainable development in developing countries, Schmidheiny (1992) treats three assumptions as fact in the history of development. (1) Economic growth is a precondition for social equity and sustainable development. (2) Deficiencies of natural resources, finance, or human talents are among the main hindrances to economic development; also misguided domestic policies and patterns of resource allocation have been serious obstacles. (3) Problems in the developing countries affect all parts of the world. In asserting his theses he emphasizes a corporate truism.

Where governments have tried to carry out nation-building largely by themselves, with little reliance on entrepreneurial skills of their people, the result has been wealth for a minority and relative poverty for the majority. Poverty is bad for human beings and it is also bad for

business. It is business that turns needs into markets capable of meeting those needs. Business is concerned about mass poverty not because it wants to be charitable, but because business can assist development *simply by being more effective*. (ibid.: 40 emphasis added)

Note how the discussion of the social relations of production are reduced to the technical relations of production and results in the occlusion of any discussion of power. Similarly, the discussion of economic growth is always stated as a *precondition* for social equity. This precondition is necessarily unrealizable because there can always be a claim for "more" growth to justify any residual inequities. This theoretical inference occludes the possibility that the causal relationship might be reversed and social inequities (e.g. in decision-making power) are the cause of low growth.

Schmidheiny concludes chapter ten by identifying obstacles and opportunities in six areas. Obstacle one is "population growth." By increasing living standards, business can reduce population growth and create jobs, provide training and absorb people into the modern sector of the economy. Obstacle two is "poverty, migration and the environment." The causes can be traced to closed markets, weak education systems and a lack of access to property, credit and know-how. Furthermore, more land for farmers with secure tenure and the right market signals and information can produce surpluses for a growing population. Obstacle three is third world "debt." Debt has been the major impediment to economic growth, the reduction of poverty and improved environmental conditions. Solutions that business suggest are to improve government by providing an environment to attract foreign and local investment and encourage internal saving; to swap international debts in exchange for incentives to finance local projects; and to develop mutual accountability between debtor and creditor nations. Obstacle four is "ineffective rules for the game" which block "trust." Business can trust governments if they establish an attractive investment climate through free and open markets, clear property rights and political stability. Sustainable development and the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund go hand in hand. Obstacle five is the lack of "small enterprises." Business suggests that to alleviate poverty and spread entrepreneurial talent, governments should encourage small- and medium-sized enterprises. These organizations encourage equity in opportunity, adapt to change and enhance innovation. Obstacle six is poor "education and training." Public and private sectors should complement one another here (ibid.: 41-43).

In concluding, Schmidheiny believes that governments must create the frameworks so that business can produce the technology, the innovations and the processes for sustainable development. The improved conditions created by deregulation, privatization and economic stability will allow the traditional business interest in short-term profits *created by insecure situations* to take on the new "special responsibilities and unusual opportunities in the global quest for sustainability" (ibid.: 44). He does not explain how deregulation, privatization and *stability* can be factored into the same equation. Schmidheiny's and BCSD theory of modernization for the third world articulates closely with BCNI's theory of modernization for Canada.

### **8.5. BCNI, Thomas d'Aquino and Michael Porter**

Along with BCSD, McCreedy is also a member of BCNI. The BCNI connection deserves more attention. After using Schmidheiny's text, *Changing Course* to justify his claims at the Calgary conference, McCreedy further justifies his points for the Canadian context by citing Michael Porter, a Harvard intellectual in business administration contracted by the BCNI (MR 1992: B37). Excerpts from Porter's 1991 *Canada at the*

*Crossroads The Reality of the New Competitive Environment* are scattered throughout the documents of *Toward 2000*. Besides *Canada at the Crossroads*, Porter's oeuvre includes *Competition in an Open Economy* (1980); *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysis* (1980) and a set of reprinted essays called "Michael Porter on Competition and Strategy" *Harvard Business Review* (1991).

Murray Dobbin (1992) writes that d'Aquino is the "President and Chief Executive Officer of Canada's most powerful business lobby, the Business Council on National Issues" (6). The connection between McCready, BCNI, Porter and D'Aquino is not accidental. To make this point requires making a brief exegesis on the work of BCNI and Thomas D'Aquino. BCNI was formed in 1976, represents the top 155 business enterprises in Canada and has been the most consistent promoter of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States (Warnock 1988: 115). Before taking an important facilitating role between multinational corporations and the Progressive Conservative government, d'Aquino was an assistant to former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau from 1969 to 1972. D'Aquino later became one of the central champions for the Free Trade Agreement and Brian Mulroney. Following his stint with Trudeau, d'Aquino travelled to Europe where he worked as an international trade law consultant. He watched the dramatic changes concerning European integration and worried about American protectionism in future global economic battles. He feared Canada's isolation. After returning to Canada, he established a private consulting firm in the field of international trade law, worked for BCNI and developed an influential array of corporate contacts. BCNI had been established to polish up corporate credibility which had declined in the 1970s. Disillusioned with the interventionist Liberal Party and uninterested in a protectionist Conservative Party, he turned to the big business community and the BCNI founders: Bill Twaits of Imperial Oil, Alfred Powis of Noranda, and Paul Demarais of Power Corporation. D'Aquino saw "the Council [as a] sleeping leviathan. It had enormous potential" (d'Aquino cited in Dobbin, 1992: 8).

D'Aquino set out to create a quasi-governing body from the ranks of big business. Under d'Aquino, the BCNI established a whole series of task forces which paralleled government department initiatives. These task forces dealt with national finance, international economy, international trade, social policy, regional development, labour relations, manpower development, government organization, state regulation, foreign policy, defence, competition policy, public education and corporate governance. The key objective of the Council was to create a shadow corporate cabinet. Unlike the methods used by the Chamber of Commerce, which only reacted to government initiatives, the BCNI began to develop fully-developed policy options before the government acted on its own. The intent was to build "a consensus within its constituency, and anticipating pressures from other interest groups, *the BCNI presented to politicians and bureaucrats complete policy documents, ready to be implemented*" (ibid.: 8).

According to Dobbin (1992), the success of the BCNI strategy can be measured by the nearly identical nature of Tory policies and the BCNI "white papers." Concerning amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, BCNI began a year before the Mulroney government initiative to put together 25 legal counsels and produced a 236-page report which was adopted with a few minor changes by the government's new Competition Act. The most important policy areas were BCNI's influence on the Conservative Party's position on Free Trade and the strategic refashioning of Canada's political culture in the face of American threats of protectionism and Canada's increasing debt crisis (ibid.).

BCNI's recent output on prosperity includes 16 titles. For example, a report by its Task Force on Competition called *A Consideration of Amendments to the Combines*

*Investigation Act* (1981); a statement on *Economic Priorities for Canada* (1988); a book edited by Watts and Brown called *Options for a New Canada* published in association with the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and Queen's University; and a book co-authored by Doern, Blair and d'Aquino called *Parliamentary Democracy in Canada: Issues for Reform* (1983). But by far the most influential book (and cited by the navigators of the Toward 2000 Together initiative) is Michael Porter and the Monitor Company's *Canada at the Crossroads: The Reality of a New Competitive Environment* (1991).

Porter's text is articulated to Toward 2000 Together in several ways. First, the Calgary conference moderator's observations directly link Toward 2000 Together to the federal "prosperity initiative." Hal Wyatt states that "we [Albertans] must integrate our provincial strategies and vision with our national goals and priorities, which are currently being developed in a similar federal consultative process, the Prosperity Initiative" (MR 1992: 3). And as stated earlier Ken McCready articulates his argument on sustainable development by quoting from *Canada at the Crossroads* that "the strongest proof that environmental protection does not hamper competitiveness is the economic performance of nations with the strictest laws" (ibid.: B38). Second, in the *Conference Workbook*, Porter is the only expert cited in the introduction's marginal quotations alongside two other quips by "Northern Telecom" and a "questionnaire respondent": "Canada's future competitiveness must be driven by a new paradigm, based on productivity and innovation" (CW 1992: 11). And he is cited again as the only expert on the future of resources and concludes that "unless Canada upgrades its resource-based industries, it will be trapped in segments where investments tend to be unprofitable and where its marginal costs are higher than major competitors" (ibid.: 19). In terms of "experts," Porter is the *only* economist cited. The only other person given similar billing in the margin quotations is management guru Peter Drucker.

*Canada at the Crossroads* is a 468 page document dealing with three phases of analysis of the Canadian economy and is open to multiple interpretations. The focus here is on how a theoretical agenda legislates a particular understanding of the Canadian economy and pre-establishes a closed conceptual agenda for strategic action. The first phase of the study analyzes Canada's patterns of trade and the shifts in Canada's relative competitive position over time. The second phase studies 25 industries representing approximately 37% of total Canadian exports in 1989 as well as numerous other industries in less detail. The third phase reviews the institutional and public policy environment in Canada and its impact on the competitiveness of Canadian firms. The explicit aim of the study was "to identify the most significant constraints and challenges to upgrading the economy and to translate these into conclusions and implications" (Porter 1991: 15). Although the mandate of the study was to evaluate the state of competitiveness in Canadian industry and not to make *detailed* policy recommendations, the study *does* make broad policy recommendations. It is in the areas of evaluation, recommendation and the envisioning of future opportunities and policy implications that the study exhibits a value-commitment that contradicts the claims of value-free objectivity promoted by the author.

In 1991 Michael Porter (Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School) and William John Armstrong (Managing Director of Monitor Company) presented the co-sponsors Thomas d'Aquino (President and Chief Executive of BCNI) and Michael Wilson (Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and International Trade for the Government of Canada) with *Canada at the Crossroads*. Porter and Armstrong claim that "the findings and implications drawn in this study are ours and ours alone" (Porter 1991: i).



The study mobilized assistance from a network of non-government and government specialists from across Canada; mainly members of the Economic Advisory Board. Some of the non-government institutions were the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University; Faculty of Management Studies, University of Toronto; Centre for Economic Policy Research, Université du Québec à Montréal; The Conference Board of Canada; the C.D. Howe Institute; the Economic Council of Canada; and The Fraser Institute. Some of the government institutions were the Department of Finance; External Affairs and International Trade Canada; Policy, Industry, Science and Technology Canada; Employment and Immigration Canada; and Consumer and Corporate Affairs. There was also input from Canadian business and labor leaders. Special acknowledgement was given to the BCNI "whose staff worked tirelessly to ensure that we would have access to business-people across Canada and whose efforts in co-ordination and administration proved to be invaluable to the outcome of this initiative" (ibid.: x).

The study had proceeded over a twelve month period "to apply and extend to Canada the theoretical framework" (ibid.: ix) already developed from a previous study called *The Competitive Advantage*. Porter claimed that new economic realities "call for a fresh and non-partisan look at all aspects of Canada's industrial environment" and his aim was "to take an independent, objective look at the Canadian economy." He did this by "using the new framework, . . . [and] bring[ing] a fresh perspective to bear on questions that have in some cases been debated for decades" (ibid.: 11). His principle aim was to provide a "holistic frame of reference" and a "new way of thinking about competitiveness that must be internalized by business, labour, government and individual citizens" (ibid.: 12).

The final chapter, "Towards a New Economic Vision for Canada," broadly concludes that "the central goal for the Canadian economy should be productivity growth" (ibid.: 357). But this evaluation is not derived from the findings of the study but rather is merely a restatement of a foundational assumption. After initially assuming that "the principle economic goal of a nation is to provide a high and rising standard of living for its citizens" and that current rapid structural changes leave Canada at a crossroad where "its economic prosperity is at risk" (ibid.: 3), Porter further assumes that "the underpinning of a nation's standard of living is productivity, which is the value of output produced by a day of work or a dollar of capital invested. In the long run, productivity is the most important determinant of a nation's standard of living" (ibid.: 4). Putting aside a potential debate over Porter's particular definition of productivity and his resulting focus on relative comparative rates of productivity improvements as his central evaluation technique, it is quickly revealed that his conclusions about broad-policy orientations or visionary recommendations are based on his definition of theory, not as something that is "tested" by the data but rather as a "perspective" which is *applied* to the data, deduced from the foundational assumptions, and supplemented with analysis and examples drawn from the case studies.

His particular perspective or "holistic frame of reference" remains untouched by empirical evidence. This frame of reference also provides the basis for his "economic vision" for Canada. So what at first appears at the end of his text as "scientific" conclusions are merely elements of a restatement of faith in one particular point of view, that is, his *religio*. What was called "a fresh and non-partisan look" and "an independent, objective look" at the Canadian economy was accomplished within a pre-defined, partisan, dependent and subjective set of assumptions which were never opened to theoretical or empirical critique. Yet it is this very set of theoretical assumptions which need to be tested in order to determine the validity of Porter's claims and their applicability to the Canadian context.

Porter's premises appear as neither testable hypotheses nor metatheoretical discourses and suggest a form of premodern thought, before science and before philosophy. His claims to vision, then, are revealed as nothing more than pronouncements by a prophet promoting Harvard theology based on institutional and charismatic authority and applying a particular "preunderstanding" or spin to the data. Why one ought to accept this particular understanding and not another remains unjustified either logically or empirically within the text. Nevertheless, it is exactly his visionary pronouncements which have had the most effect on the participants in the Prosperity Initiative and Toward 2000 Together and are used as facts to justify their own actions.

The elements of Porter's vision sound particularly familiar. Here the "holistic framework" is transformed into a totalizing prescription based on untested principles (i.e., masquerading as tested hypotheses). According to Porter, Canada must become an innovation-driven economy. It must increase the sophistication of the natural resource sector. It must tackle barriers to upgrading throughout the economy. It must build on regional strengths. It must move quickly and decisively to achieve complete free trade within its borders. It must transform foreign subsidiaries into home bases and it must create and maintain a supportive and stable macroeconomic climate. What follows is a summary of his visionary pronouncements based on the acceptance of his foundational premises. He has foreclosed on alternate ways of reading these "data."

Canadian firms must assess their competitive advantage and move to innovation-driven modes of competing. They must move toward strategies of differentiation and emphasize unique products and superior quality. They must focus on areas of true competitive advantage and concentrate on advantageous product lines, market segments and sustainable firms. They must upgrade the foundations for competing by increasing investment in specialized human resource development. To upgrade Canada must forge closer ties with educational institutions, improve institutions for technology development and adoption, transform trade associations into factor creating mechanisms, nurture Canadian supplier industries, establish links with Canadian-based firms in related industries, serve the demands of Canadian buyers, develop labour-management relations centred on productivity and rely more on performance-related compensation. Canadian firms must also adopt more global strategies, define a North American or global mandate and redefine their relationship with government away from protection and support.

Canadian labour is called upon to focus on more than dividing the economic pie and concentrate more on expanding it. To do this labour is called upon to focus on productivity, skills upgrading and more cooperative labour-management relations. Porter also calls on government to "be guided by a limited number of principles" to achieve "international competitive success" (ibid.: 376). These principles are to encourage adjustment and upgrading, to minimize direct intervention in the economy, to employ incentives instead of grants, to re-engineer social policies to better serve the economy, to improve intergovernmental policy coordination, to maintain an open policy toward foreign investment and to promote a sound and stable macroeconomic policy environment.

Porter also specifies priorities in specific policy areas. For investment in education and specialized skill upgrading, he calls for more training for the unemployed, for more participation by firms in training and apprenticeship programs, for setting high national educational standards, for more emphasis on practical curricula and science skills that meet the needs of industry, for expanding apprenticeship programs and updating curricula, for working more closely with trade associations, for promoting more extensive co-op program participation and for aligning university funding to support competitiveness.

For more focused technology development he calls for increasing the proportion of government R&D funds for research to be performed in the private sector, for improving coordination for government R&D programs, for forging stronger links among government laboratories, provincial research organizations, universities, and the private sector, for encouraging greater specialization among universities and for expanding information available on intellectual property.

He also calls for an increase in the pace of deregulation and for strengthening resource conservation and renewal policies. He also believes that governments can have significant effects in their procurement policies and he encourages more open competition for government contracts to be accomplished by using challenging performance specifications wherever possible. He also thinks governments should adopt more stringent and forward-looking regulatory standards. In addition he believes that productivity and innovation are best fostered where related and supporting industries are clustered. Government policy should be directed at enhancing clustering by building on regional strengths and promoting the development of specialized factors.

Finally, concerning strategy, structure and rivalry he calls for stronger individual and corporate incentives for investment in upgrading through the following initiatives. First, re-engineer "safety net" programs to target the needy and motivate skill-upgrading. Second, encourage links between performance and compensation. Third, provide a more favourable tax treatment for long-term equity investment. Furthermore, extend efforts to increase domestic rivalries and move aggressively to restore a favourable economic environment by bringing down the deficits and controlling the debt.

I have only touched on Porter's recommendations. His points are more specific and detailed and he provides concrete examples from his case studies. But reference to empirical evidence does not in itself make the findings "scientific" nor do descriptions of data necessarily lead to transparent conclusions and prescriptions. In fact, the above prescriptions, owe everything to the "theory." Indeed, *Canada at the Crossroads* gives a holistic picture of the Canadian economy from only one particular point of view. No attempt is made to understand whether an alternate theory could explain the data "better." But the study does more than merely provide a description and comparative analysis within an unchallenged theory of economic development, it also prescribes a specific set of economic objectives and the means to achieve them.

At the beginning of the study, Porter claims "that it is the task of Canadians and their elected representatives, who are charged with the responsibility of fashioning specific policies to ensure enhanced international competitiveness" (ibid.: 15). At the end of the study he makes a similar claim but with some variation. He states that "the task of fashioning specific policies and action plans must fall on Canadian policy-makers and private sector leaders themselves" (ibid.: 357). Whether Canadians, elected representatives, policy-makers or private sector leaders are ultimately responsible for specific policies, the framework provided by Porter has actually left little margin for alternative perspectives and therefore initiatives to intervene "rationally." He claims that "the study makes no pretense of being exhaustive" (ibid.: 12), and this is true because more details are always available to be specified, but the study also constructs a totalization, that is, there is little that has not come under its gaze or could be done without being regulated by its "principles" of development. The study's power lies in how it frames the "vision" and occludes alternate visions. Thus any reconceptualization of the data -- or case studies -- has to challenge his complete framework or "rationality." But it is difficult to mount this challenge because his foundational premise defines "theory" as a *non-contestable* point of view. Any claim which attempts to challenge Porter's rationality with metatheory or an

*alternate* theory, as such, can be marginalized as either irrelevant or "irrational." Discursive threats by a counter-rationality -- such as this critique -- cannot, in the end, be imposed on the document because the "true" rationality which defines the meaning of the document does not lie "within" the text but rests on enforcement through extra-discursive means. The participants, as shown above, control many of the leading intellectual, business and government positions in Canada and therefore also regulate what will be accepted as "rational" economic discourse. Proponents of counter-meanings must either challenge institutional hegemony by extra-discursive means or they must rearticulate *Canada at the Crossroads* and sublimate its meaning within an alternate discursive logic.

### **8.6. The Steering Group on Prosperity and the *New Learning Culture***

One of D'Aquino's comments can be found justifying the thrust of the Prosperity Initiative documents. For example in the consultation paper *Learning Well . . . Living Well* he is quoted as saying to the 1990 *Financial Post* Conference "Building a Competitive Work Force" that ". . . the accelerating pace of technological change is rendering existing knowledge and skills obsolete with quickening speed. This puts a premium on developing a flexible labour force with excellent generic skills" (LW 1991: 2). The central organizational structure for legitimating this "new learning culture" is the Steering Group on Prosperity, co-chaired by David McCamus and Marie-Josée Drouin.

David McCamus presented the "Toward a Knowledge-Based Economy" paper at the Calgary Premier's Conference. McCamus's special interest is in computing hardware, data processing, telecommunications, database services and "total solutions" for informational networks (MR 1992: B12, 15). He recently retired as President and CEO of Xerox Canada but continues as Chairman of the Board. He has also co-chaired the Prosperity Steering Group for the Prosperity Initiative with Marie-Josée Drouin, executive director of the Hudson Institute of Canada. The Steering Group developed an action plan for the Government of Canada under the administration of Brian Mulroney. This organization was the umbrella organization for a Canada-wide initiative similar to the Toward 2000 Together. On October 29, 1991, the federal government established a Steering Group on Prosperity composed of 20 members who were contracted to operate at "arm's length" from the government as a private sector task force and whose terms of reference were to develop recommendations on how to ensure "Canada's future economic and social well-being" (NRT 1992:2; QC 1992: 1). (See [IOF 1992] for a complete list.) Besides Drouin and McCamus the steering group included such notables as Andre Chagnon, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Le Groupe Videotron; Marshall Cohen, Chairman of the International Trade Advisory Committee and President and CEO of Molson Companies; Gordon Cunningham President and CEO of London Life and London Insurance Group; David Johnston, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of McGill University; Marilyn Lister, National President of the Consumer's Association; Bill MacLennan, CEO, Atlantic Institute of Biotechnology; James McCambly, President of the Canadian Federation of Labour; Jack Munro, Chairman of the Forest Alliance of British Columbia; J-Robert Ouimet, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Ouimet-Cordon Bleu and others.

The Steering Group held a series of regional conferences and an additional 180 community meetings. It also initiated 16 sectoral groups to report on special studies to enhance global industrial competitiveness (IOF 1992). With Drouin providing the French version and McCamus the English version, they co-authored *Inventing Our Future: An Action Plan for Canada's Prosperity*. The plan was published by the Steering Group in 1992 after twelve months of extensive public consultation. They learned that "there is remarkable agreement on the challenges that confront our country. We also learned that

Canadians everywhere share a similar vision of a prosperous Canada" (Drouin/McCamus 1992). Although there was agreement that Canada is still one of the most prosperous countries in the world, they still needed to justify why there was an "urgency" for the action plan. They were able to identify warning signs everywhere: lost market share in exports; reduced investment; weaker technological applications; insufficient manufacturing of innovative products; few company training programs; low educational performance associated with high public costs; ill-equipped students; and lack of skills for adults. "Today, more than a million and a half Canadians are unemployed and many more are underemployed: Canada's prosperity is passing them by. Many Canadians have never had a share of prosperity and continue to lack opportunities to achieve it" (IOF 1992: 1). The assumption was that increased capitalization of "skills," defined as "all the results of learning -- skills, knowledge, attitudes and abilities" (LW 1991:2), would create prosperity and equity.

According to the Steering Group increased capitalization of skills cannot be met through new government money nor increased federal government programming. The Steering Group summarized the innovative actions needed to create prosperity. Increase global demand abroad by creating opportunities at home. Make quality a goal and Canada a symbol of excellence. Reduce the size and cost of government. Make better use of technology and produce value-added goods. Create better financing for small and medium-sized businesses. Develop a global marketing strategy. Improve Canada's investment climate. Transform labour-management relations. Reorient educational systems to results-based evaluation. Ensure adequate preschool education. Improve performance and accessibility to learning systems. Strengthen links between schools and the workplace. Refocus adjustment measures and social programs for training and work. And strengthen voluntary organizations and local economic development.

The action plan also identified key recommendations. The Group proposed a National Quality Institute to coordinate approaches; a review of taxes, regulations and government departments to reduce government costs; an "information highway" and depreciation rates on capital costs for innovative technologies; a coordinated private sector strategy to expand export firms; a Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Development; a national forum on learning; a system of competency-based education; an employer-led training initiative equal to enhance continuity in learning systems; a 30% increase in computer and software capitalization in schools; an integrated approach to income security; worker adjustment programs; workplace accommodations for family and social pressures; training programs in higher education for Aboriginal managers; and the formation of an "independent Prosperity Council" to monitor, assess and report publicly on progress.

The body of the report specifies the challenges and actions required in order to implement the above recommendations. The similarity in style, approach and content to the *Toward 2000 Together* initiative is striking. Again, education is presented as salvation for the economic malaise. And the approach to education is framed within the logic of a particular theory about development that excludes alternate ways of explaining both the reasons for economic crisis and the relationship between educational and economic development. Furthermore failure and success is personalized and individualized. The report concludes with a statement imbued with the ideology of individualism: "There is another major change we have to make, one that each and every Canadian can help bring about. Every Canadian who has not already done so should accept some responsibility for moving the country forward and take personal action to help achieve the goals in this action plan -- on the job, at home and in the community. If every one of us makes this commitment in a spirit of cooperation, our country's prosperity is virtually assured" (IOF

1992: 63). The implicit emphasis (which moralizes about the scourge it is attempting to combat, i.e., unemployment) is that failed prosperity results from personal causes. The failure to find employment lies at the feet of the unemployed. The unemployed individual has failed to become prosperous because of a lack of skills. Lack of skills is equated with moral character and the lack of a will to learn, and both the unemployed and the abstract "Canadian" lack character. The educated expert thus lays claim to both moral authority and to morality itself. The logic leads in one direction: salvation through unlimited credentialling. "Pie in the sky" now requires a diploma.

One of the Prosperity Steering Group's initial four discussion papers was *Learning Well. . . Living Well* (1991). This paper was cited as a key document at the Calgary conference and was used by speaker Caroline Pestieau (MR 1992: B17). Pestieau presented "Training, Education and Lifelong Learning." At the time of the conference she was deputy chairman of the now defunct Economic Council of Canada, a federally funded research agency which directed the study on education and training. Pestieau is a member of the Board for the Canadian Program for Global Change and director of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. She was also previously project manager and head of the Montreal office of the C.D. Howe Institute (CW 1992: 7). These links between the Banff Centre, the Hudson Institute, Institute for Research on Public Policy, C.D. Howe Institute, BCSD, BCNI, and the Canada West Foundation mark an institutional network and connections between an increasingly market-based intelligentsia and government-sponsored intelligence-gathering and public-relations loosely coordinated under the umbrella of the Prosperity Steering Group similar to the *Toward 2000 Together* (ibid.: 6; IOF 1992).

*Learning Well. . . Living Well* (LW 1991) and its companion document, *Prosperity Through Competitiveness* (PC 1991) were released as discussion papers in 1991 as part of the Government of Canada's broadly based public consultations on securing national prosperity. *Prosperity Through Competitiveness* identified the major challenges by providing a market-driven rationale for social development and by relating a number of challenges to a national program of economic development. *Learning Well. . . Living Well* focused on the "learning challenges" facing Canada. Its major purpose was to increase awareness and to stimulate discussion about performance and investment in education. The federal government under the lead of Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Employment and Immigration, and Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and Minister for International Trade wanted to achieve a consensus concerning common targets and priorities for learning in Canada. The government assumed that "a highly qualified work force is essential to ensure that all Canadians have better employment opportunities, more employment security and higher wages" (LW 1991: xi).

The theory of social development promoted by Valcourt and Wilson assumed that "Canada is losing ground to industrial competitors who are simply better than we are at inventing, designing, manufacturing and marketing" (LW 1991: vi). Quite simply, they believed that "more and better learning means more and better jobs" (ibid.). They also claimed that "technology is spurring a trend toward *smarter* jobs -- which means that opportunities for the unskilled are becoming scarcer than ever" (ibid.). The problem for the government was that the Canadian public did not perceive that the cause of the economic crisis as an educational crisis. The framers of the new initiative required a different consensus than the *public consensus* which already existed concerning education, in that, again and again from the 1980s onward Canadian parents were generally satisfied with the educational status quo. The public had not demanded a reduction in the dropout rate, or for that matter demanded that corporations play a larger role or that the system produce measurable "results" (ibid.: vii). Even though, the discussion paper acceded that the report

card on Canadian schools was relatively good, good was not good enough to justify the government's necessary core assumption that the crisis *was* educational. Valcourt and Wilson's theoretical assumptions plus the public's understanding thus presupposed a campaign to "build public awareness" to manufacture a new *consensus* and to mobilize a consultation process that could define the kind of actions required to reorient the learning priorities of the public.

The initiators further assumed that Canada's relative economic decline was a product of a learning deficit and not of political power or economic structure. The underdetermination of theory (i.e., the fact that any set of data can be explained by any number of theories), set the stage where the economic and educational data could be correlated in a way sympathetic to a cultural deficit reading. No other theories were used or criticized as potential explanations for Canada's relative economic decline. Since an educational decline was not so clearly evident, the nature of this decline had to be empirically reconstructed. So even if retention rates were satisfactory, the rates could be still higher, and even if science and math scores, or days in school, or economic productivity were still relatively strong compared to many industrialized countries, they could be still stronger. These points also assume, for example, that such a datum as the number of days in school during a year is a relevant indicator of educational development.

Once the foundational assumption was accepted that the lack of excellence in "education" had caused the economic decline, then it logically followed that "higher" scores or a "stronger" effort was the solution. Once it was accepted that economic prosperity demanded *more* educational development then the next logical step was to focus on where "learning" could be improved. The theoretical framing thus gave the participants an explanation to make the educational data meaningful. The "choice" given to participants in the Prosperity Initiative was to sketch out the actions required to realize this explanatory tautology. Furthermore, even this choice was circumscribed. The companion document *Prosperity Through Competitiveness* prescribed the means.

Discursive action on learning was then limited to considering government financing and the role of business. Since state investments in education in Canada are high and business investments in education are "among the worst in the industrialized world" (ibid.: ix), the solution, based on the pre-given theory, was that government could do more by doing less and by facilitating business more. The discussion paper claims that "Educators will play a major role in meeting the challenge, as they have in the past. Governments must provide important support but, fundamentally, the challenge can be addressed only through changed attitudes, expectations and actions of employers and workers, parents, and students. Canadians must all learn to be more serious about learning" (ibid.: xii). Considering that the public was relatively satisfied with education in Canada, the federal government's new concern really meant that the public should take seriously a new "free enterprise" approach to education.

The explicit challenge of the "arm's length" *Prosperity Initiative* was not a forum for identifying consensus but rather a public awareness campaign to manufacture consent in keeping with Valcourt and Wilson's prescribed agenda. The reticence of the general public to change their opinion on contemporary educational practices and the failure of business to invest in education, training, and research and development were not only viewed as problematic but also viewed with an eye to a strategic goal. Instead of inquiring into alternate explanations for Canada's economic insecurities *vis a vis* education, such as the effects on education of a declining tax burden for the corporate sector and upper income Canadians on education or the effects of a branch-plant economy and foreign ownership on R & D, the key challenge facing Valcourt and Wilson was not to ascertain what the public

wanted, but rather to redefine and reeducate the public according to the needs prescribed by their coterie of arm's length "experts and economists."

Because the discussion paper occluded alternate explanations for Canada's relative economic decline and for the relationship between economy and education, it provided a valuable resource to justify the Alberta Progressive Conservative agenda even when it was not entirely consistent with the federal initiative. The document confirmed that the economic malaise was really an educational malaise, and sanctioned the thrust of Alberta's educational privatization and deficit cutting initiatives even though they were much more radical and thorough (especially under Klein) than the federal government had imagined. In this latter sense *Learning Well. . . Living Well* did not provide a program for Alberta's development. It was merely another text among others used to justify that "prosperity and quality of life depend on our success in meeting the learning challenge" (ibid.: 31). The thesis is framed in a broad enough language so that Alberta's elites could supply their own understandings and interests to fit the explanation. Furthermore, *Learning Well. . . Living Well* also assumed that the public was ignorant of development needs. The discussion paper argued a *new* consensus could be forged "once they [Canadians] became aware of the facts. . . [and that] many people do not yet fully realize the importance of the links among learning, good jobs, prosperity and the lifestyle we enjoy" (ibid.: 28). This element of the discourse confirmed that it was the role of experts in Alberta to define social needs. Such logic also justified the strategy of Alberta's chosen few to ascribe ignorance to anyone who disagreed with their reform strategy. The discussion paper did not and could not concede that the public at large or other critical experts might have been fully informed of the facts and could legitimately *disagree* with the Prosperity Initiative as a moral and political project.

### **8.7. Don Simpson and *Entrepreneurs in Education***

Don Simpson, director of the Banff Centre for Management and vice-chairman of the premier's Advisory Committee exemplifies how technical expertise and credentialed status can be transubstantiated into moral and political authority. To recall, Simpson also played the unique role during the 1992 Premier's Conference in Calgary as a pre-conference organizer, a conference organizer, a guest speaker, a thematic moderator, and following the conference, he sat as vice-chair on the advisory committee for Getty and Klein. This section takes a closer look at the origins of Simpson's intellectual interest in the Banff Centre and the *Toward 2000 Together*.

Before becoming director of the Banff Centre for Management, Simpson drafted with Carol Sissons a 1989 technical study on human resource development for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) called *Entrepreneurs in Education: Canada's Response to the International Human Resource Development Challenge*. IDRC provided the financial resources, encouraged the investigation of the broad aspects of the subject and encouraged some of the action projects that began to flow out of the study (Simpson and Sissons, 1989: vii). The IRDC is a public corporation created by the federal government in 1970 to support research for developing countries into adaptive scientific and technological practices. It is financed solely by the Parliament of Canada and the policies are set by an international Board of Governors. Its main headquarters are in Ottawa with regional offices in Singapore (Republic of Singapore), New Delhi (India), Nairobi (Kenya), Giza and Cairo (Egypt), Dakar (Senegal), and Bogota (Columbia) (ibid.: 102). Even though IRDC financed and encouraged the 1989 study and promoted actions as a result of its findings, it also claimed that "the views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International Development Research Centre" (ibid.:



ii). The case that Simpson and Sisson's make is that international development is constrained by the lack of an entrepreneurial ethic observed in development agencies and workers.

IDRC commissioned the study to investigate the HRD potential that exists in Canada since most of the supportive training for development initiatives is also done in Canada. The intent was to expand HRD potential in Canada as a marketable commodity and to provide solutions for Third World countries to coordinate modernization. HRD received increased attention because of the *Winegard Report*, otherwise known as *For Whose Benefit?* commissioned by the Standing Committee of External Affairs and International Trade. G.R. Bourier, Director of the Fellowships and Awards Division of IRDC, stated that the thesis of *Entrepreneurs in Education* was "that unless new efforts are made to increase the capacity of Canadian institutions to develop and deliver appropriate support for HRD, the Third World institutions looking for Canadian capacity to deliver these programs will be faced with a major resource problem in the future" (ibid.: ix). But instead of focusing on the traditional programming offered by Canadian universities for Third World students, the analysis sets its sights on strategies for joint ventures between either educational institutions or a variety of public- and private-sector organizations.

More specifically, the study prescribes the way in which HRD capacity could be expanded by examining how market forces impact on HRD activities and the role that might be played by developing Canadian centres of excellence. The study concluded that there was an identifiable "need" for "joint ventures and networks among postsecondary institutions, crown corporations, government departments, nongovernmental development agencies and private-sector companies" and for "increasing the funds available to improve the Canadian response to HRD requests from the Third World" (ibid.: iii). In 1985, a draft progress report was circulated and reactions to it and initiatives from it provided the basis for the final report. Based on three years of study, the final report summarized the integration of action projects, analysis, synthesis, and further action in a changing environment of human resource development responses (ibid.: 3).

*Entrepreneurs in Education* thus mediated a series of interests. First, it articulated a new idea of HRD and a centre of excellence. Simpson (1987) had published an eight page called *Human Resource Development Capacity, A Canadian Competitive Export*. Simpson and Sissons link this idea to a 1986 report by P. Green and A. Wright of the Banff Centre who had already made the case for a Canadian international management development institute (Green and White 1986).

Second, *Entrepreneurs in Education* intertextually articulated a series of initiatives by educational and development organizations. The Canadian Bureau of International Education (CBIE) had an interest in managing scholarship programs. The Canadian Home Economics Association (CHEA) had an interest in developing international development connections. The Corporate-Higher Education Forum (CHEF) had an interest in partnerships for growth. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had an interest in implementing human resources development in the Third World, especially China and Indonesia. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRBD/World Bank) had an interest in the development of human resources. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) had an interest in Canadian technological research centres and institutions. And the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had an interest in institutional development initiatives.

Third, *Entrepreneurs in Education* intertextually articulated a series of educational, government and business interests. The World University Service of Canada was interested in improving the quality of in-Canada training for professionals from developing countries.

The Department of External Affairs was interested in the organization of Canada's official development aid. The Ministry of Science and Technology was interested in science and technology policies and initiatives. Development managers were interested in managing the periphery, in networking concepts and in competitive models for efficient delivery. Urban and regional planners were interested in research for third world development. Educators were interested in overseas training for development and donor support. And entrepreneurs were interested in profiting from development in the third world (ibid.: 100-101).

According to Simpson and Sissons (1989) the HRD field, "which for many years was left to a committed band of development agency personnel and educators, has fast become a multimillion dollar international business attracting a wide range of public and private groups" (1). Because of Third World demand for HRD skills, new opportunities exist, not only for focusing Canada's aid effort but for a huge export market for Canadian services. In assisting Canadian organizations to respond, the authors claim that "left-wing ideologues see this trend as another evil promoted by those forces determined to keep developing countries in a dependency position. Subscribers to right-wing ideology suggest that, if allowed to function unimpeded in a free market, the private sector is in the best position to handle most development problems successfully" (ibid.: 2). By examining the role of the private-sector in HRD, the authors hope to enlighten the understanding of the aid community about the potential for market driven HRD strategies for IRDC and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency).

In enlightening the aid community, the authors attempt to legislate a new totalizing definition of HRD. The old definition was based on "education and training" which activated available resources to raise the standard of living and measured successes through raised levels in areas such as health, nutritional standards, housing, access to education and employment. The new definition would mean "the entire spectrum of development and not just a particular sector" (ibid.: 6). The new definition, as they describe, is

neither restricted solely to the school system nor to these systems [activating available resources] plus the formal and informal training programs of other government departments or private organizations. Seen as equally important are the technological inputs, material support, and on-the-job training components of capital projects that develop skills, increase productivity and assist in the use of new technology. . . . This changing definition requires a closer link between education and economic development. It stresses that the development of human resources requires both personal and professional support. Projects increasingly call for tailor-made formal training, backed by on-the-job training and a host of follow-up support activities. Demands of this type of HRD may require cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors in Canada. (ibid.: 7)

This new focus on a totalitarian system of human resource management is also described as a "return to the individual" (ibid.: 6). The authors thus identify 15 strategic issues for development. One, the *new* HRD, as a reference to almost "the whole spectrum of development," can be understood as the paradigm case for the entire aid program. Two it offers the potential for the centralization and coordination of knowledge and bringing together in one package a variety of unrelated training inputs for a coordinated project. Three, it requires an adjustment of the internal procedures of CIDA to incorporate an ongoing process of eternal and integrated adaptation. Four, it can meet the demands for new and expanded focuses but must not compete with new private-sector groups in developing countries. They state that "many of the requests for tailor-made programs do not fit easily within the regular programs offered by most Canadian educational institutions. Special efforts will have to be made to link expertise of two or more different types of

organizations to provide the desired programs" (ibid.: 11). These desired programs are just the kind Simpson initiated at the Banff Centre after 1990. Demands must also meet the needs and interests of the developing country and not just the strategic interests of Canada. Five, the new HRD requires more Canadian Executing Agencies. Six, educational institutions in Canada are under severe financial constraints and "it is now clear that expertise from the private, profit-making sector is needed for HRD projects. . ." (ibid.: 12). Seven, more "centres of excellence" are required. Eight, cooperative efforts between public and private initiatives require "brokers with extensive Third world experience" and the need to nurture various types of networks among Canadian organizations" (ibid.: 13). Nine, new HRD activities are being influenced by the competitive spirit of the marketplace. They state that "now, private nonprofit groups, profit-making corporations, professional associations, crown corporations, and government departments have been entering into competition with universities and colleges in an area they see as a growth business opportunity" (ibid.). Although these market-driven intrusions will be seen by the development community as an "abomination," development workers must be informed that such processes will be profitable for all. Ten, Canadian HRD community is not well enough organized to develop new HRD capacity as an export opportunity. Eleven, a new attitude toward the role of profit-making in development is needed. Twelve, Canadian institutions will have to make long term commitments to institution building in developing countries. Thirteen, postsecondary institutions have to restructure in order to take advantage of the new opportunities. Community colleges have made the best substantial responses but few universities have reorganized. Fourteen, the growing interest of policies supportive of women in development should be developed "without allowing inappropriate quotas or ideological limitations to distort the serious development concerns that motivated these efforts" (ibid.: 15). And fifteen, Africa offers a special case for HRD support best met by the possible establishment of a Canada-Africa foundation.

The rest of the study details how the strategic considerations can be met by freeing market forces and enhancing the profit motive for HRD and by providing examples of institutional developments already in progress. These include the strategies and structures of public and private organizations with a special focus on postsecondary institutions, especially the necessity of bringing together universities, private-sector companies (both profit and non-profit), public-sector departments and crown corporations and professional organizations in joint ventures. There are further analyses of Canadian centres of excellence, specialized support services (e.g., knowledge brokers and managers), entrepreneurial fund raising, and network organizing.

The authors conclude that "the report did not set out to prove a specific hypothesis . . . Thus, there is nothing to be gained in trying to pull together all the findings to justify particular arguments. Rather the report is meant to stimulate further strategic thinking and informed debate on the manner in which Canadian institutions might best respond to developing-country HRD needs" (ibid.: 97). But the authors then proceed *to state* four conclusions. First, "the human resource component of international development is in a state of flux." Second, "in developing a new HRD thrust, Canadian agencies should be concerned with what can be learned from earlier efforts and what it will take to perform better in today's environment." Third, "there is a need for experimentation and support for more entrepreneurial action in support of development." And fourth, "those Canadians who are seriously committed to international HRD at the delivery-product level should be given the resources and autonomy to do their best work" (ibid.: 97-99).

The authors do not state why these assumptions/conclusions are justified. The authors also do not explain how further informed debate is possible without their report also

confronting the counter arguments and evidence to their four theses. Their concluding statement thus offers a different evaluation of the report than that which they initially stated at the beginning of the study: "overall, this report *argues* that the shifts in HRD environment. . . are not minor adjustments. They are substantial and require fundamental changes in attitudes, structures, and arrangements for funding HRD efforts" (ibid.: 2 emphasis added). *Entrepreneurs in Education*, though, does not develop this argument, but rather presents it as a non-controversial set of principles complemented with supporting examples and conforming activities. The "technical" document is neither scientifically nor philosophically rigorous although it presents a point of view and refers to empirical evidence. Nevertheless, as a technical document, the report proclaims a faith in the market and offers a pastiche of cases but never mounts an argument to justify the market-based approach except to claim that it has potential. It is, also, as the authors claim "a call. . . for various public and private sector groups to provide entrepreneurial leadership in responding to the changing HRD environment" (ibid.). Why groups should *reasonably* take up this call for innovative and profitable opportunities is not demonstrated. What remains is faith in the free market and free trade and the realization of its values through the strategic management of human beings. The new HRD has applications not only for the Third World but for Alberta, both as a business opportunity for entrepreneurs and for the construction of the *new* economy. At the Banff Centre, Simpson found a home and a friendly sponsor for the realization of the technological vision to renewed prosperity through strategic management.

### 8.8. Peter Drucker and the "Futures" Market in Management

Interspersed throughout four of the seven core texts in the *Toward 2000 Together* documentation are a pastiche of selected and highlighted quotations taken mainly from "participants" in the consultation process. These participants appear as anonymous individuals, identifiable persons or Alberta organizations, mainly public and private corporations. A small number of quotations are cited from historical eminences such as John Stuart Mill, T.S. Eliot, Niccolo Machiavelli and Ghandi or from contemporary business "experts" and futurists such as John Dalla Costa, William Saywell, Allyn Taylor, Roger Feldman, John Naisbitt, Peter Drucker and Michael Porter. Drucker and Porter are cited the most often. Although, seemingly insignificant in number, closer scrutiny of these latter two intertextual referents reveal a worldview suturing together *laissez-faire* liberalism of Smithian economics and socially conservative Taylorist management. I have already dealt with how Porter's work is used to provide the "Canadian" content for economic restructuring. Drucker's texts also deserve closer attention because they articulate the underlying values and ideas that have been assimilated by the practitioners of strategic management in their socialization. His ideas provide a guiding set of assumptions that organizes the preceding specialized discourses into a worldview.

The three quotations selected from Drucker for the *Toward 2000 Together* texts are strategically placed within summary subsections dealing with knowledge and education. The *Conference Workbook* provides two quotations. First, for the thematic presentation "Knowledge: Technology, Information and Innovation" Drucker is quoted as saying that "the material-based manufacturing industry provided economic growth in the first three-quarters of this century. It is largely the information- and knowledge-based manufacturing industries that are growing now" (CW 1992: 25). Second, for the thematic presentation "Training, Education and Life-Long Learning" he is quoted as saying "education fuels the economy, it shapes society. But it does through its product, the educated person. What is an educated person in the knowledge society?" (ibid.: 31). The source of these two

quotations is not identified. The third quotation from Drucker appears in the *Moderator's Report* and is cited from the *Harvard Business Review* but the name of the article or the edition of the journal is not specified. This quotation is the only quotation used in the moderator's summary and is in the margins of the "education" subsection. The quotation claims "the country that first raises the productivity of knowledge and service workers will dominate the 21st century" (MR 1992: 5). At first these tiny subtexts might seem inconsequential, but they are used to authorize the core assumptions, arguments and data presented in the documentation process of *Toward 2000 Together*. The texts do not adhere to a scholarly citation procedure for authoritative effect. The style is rather a combination of a pastiche of quotations in the margins and unsubstantiated pronouncements in general terms in the body of the text, for example, that "many economists and experts are noting a strategic shift in the nature of the world's economy -- from an industrial or manufacturing base to a knowledge-based economy" (CW 1992: 25). These kinds of statements throughout the documents are treated unproblematically as if all economists and experts agree that these changes are self-evident or that there are no substantial disagreements on how or why these changes are occurring. A range of pronouncements are thus mobilized by the *Toward 2000 Together* strategists as "facts" merely on the basis that an "authority" had stated them.

Drucker's interest in knowledge has a long history as it relates to his understanding of how the electronic revolution is transforming middle management into a "knowledge organization" [sic]. As early as 1959 in his book *The New Society* he talked about a society of organizations and how knowledge work was fast becoming the new socio-economic centre (Drucker 1993b: 447). Even as early as 1977 Drucker was writing that "in the knowledge organization the job, all the way down to the lowest professional or managerial level, has to focus on contribution and have its own objectives. It has to be organized according to assignment. It has to be thought through and structured according to the flow of information both to and from the individual position" (1977: 373). The role of the knowledge professional was to supply knowledge rather than to supervise people. The shift in middle management required a new stress on "responsibility" rather than on "authority."

Drucker's life and writings exemplify the actions and ideology of business management as it emerged in conjunction with the consolidation of American Fordism and the multinational corporation in the post-1945 period. Drucker's texts are used to justify the recent interest by business in education, health and social services. Their usage suggests that the decline of middle managers in the corporate sector brought about by the computer revolution has created the economic pressures for business managers to colonize public administration in the state sector with the intent to displace their chief rivals, the state bureaucrats and public employees.

Drucker's biography is the ideal-typical development of an ideologue for strategic planning. He was born in 1909 in Vienna. He was educated in Austria and England where he took his doctorate in public and international law. During his studies he worked as a reporter in Frankfurt, Germany. Following his studies he worked as an economist for an international bank in London. In 1937 he came to the United States. In 1939 he published his first book called *The End of Economic Man*. His academic career began as professor of politics and philosophy at Bennington College. He then went on to become a professor of management at the Graduate Business School of New York University. He now lives in Claremont, California and since 1971 has been Clark Professor of Social Science at Claremont Graduate School. His oeuvre accounts for at least 25 published books, including popular accounts of economic change, reflections on business administration,

collections of essays on economics and society and textbooks used in undergraduate and graduate business schools. His work has been translated into more than 20 languages. He has also written a recent autobiography, *Adventures of a Bystander*, and two novels, and is a contributor to many magazines and journals. He is currently an editorial columnist for the *Wall Street Journal*. (Drucker 1993a). His recent books include *Post-Capitalist Society* (1993); *The Ecological Vision: Reflections on the American Condition* (1993), *Managing for the Future: The 1990s and Beyond* (1992); *Managing the Non-Profit Organization* (1990); *The New Realities: In Government and Politics, in Economics and Business, in Society and World-view* (1989); *The Changed World Economy* (1986); *Innovation and Entrepreneurship* (1986); and *Frontiers of Management: Where Tomorrow's Decisions are Being Shaped* (1986).

Drucker is the quintessential *new* manager and practical thinker. This does not mean to say that he does not read and write -- as his prolific output demonstrates on a wide-range of topics -- but rather reveals a global mentality which is neither logically rigorous nor empirically sound. Drucker (1993b: 442) claims he is not a futurist but rather a "social ecologist," a discipline which he claims is his own invention with a distinguished lineage of luminaries: Alexis de Tocqueville, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Ferdinand Toennies, Georg Simmel, Henry Adams, John R. Commons and Thorstein Veblen. His closest identification is with the mid-Victorian Englishman Walter Bagehot, who in Drucker's words, is a "liberal Conservative." Drucker states that the goal of the social ecologist is not "knowledge; but "right action," and this right action aims at "impact" and "its aim is to maintain the balance between continuity and conservation on one hand and innovation on the other" (ibid.: 454). That is, he believes in revolutionizing the technical relations of production while conserving the social relations of order.

The intellectuality of Drucker's holistic thinking, should not be confused with intellectualism, which he identifies with ivory-tower thinking. He is a man of economic practicality for both practical and ideological reasons. He accepts Julien Benda's arguments in *The Treason of the Intellectuals* that "for fashion's sake" the intellectuals betrayed their duty and embraced racism and demagoguery. Drucker puts a strange spin to this claim. Benda wrote his piece in 1927, yet in discussing the conclusion Drucker assumes it applies to Communism and Nazism and foreshadows that intellectuals necessarily support tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin. Furthermore, he does not account for the many *leftist* intellectuals who did not support either Hitler or Stalin or the many intellectuals supportive of liberal regimes. This style exemplifies how Drucker continually plays freely and loosely with the historical record and makes sweeping generalizations about a social category, such as intellectuals.

Drucker believes that contemporary intellectuals have betrayed their duty by "obscurantism." He lays the blame for the debasement of culture, especially in the United States, at the feet of intellectuals who have lost touch with their audience. The cause of cultural decadence is their arrogance in not acceding to accessible prose. Drucker does not play his own duty to provide "accessible" prose. Throughout his writing he displays a gift for oversimplifying complex issues and selectively interpreting sources to confirm his worldview. Nevertheless, aside from his grand abstractions and sweeping generalizations, his pretensions are toward practical intellectuality.

He defines the "educated person" as one who is prepared to live and work simultaneously in two cultures -- "that of the 'intellectual', who focuses on words and ideas, and that of the 'manager', who focuses on people and work" (1993a: 215). The problem with his analysis is that he conflates intellectuality, a synthesis of faculties, with intelligence, a specialized technique of knowledge production. He writes that

intellectuals see the organization as a tool; it enables them to practice their *techne*, their specialized knowledge. Managers see knowledge as a means to the end of organizational performances. Both are right. . . . They surely need each other: the research scientist needs the research manager just as much as the research manager needs the research scientist. . . . All educated persons in the post-capitalist society will have to be prepared to *understand* both cultures. (ibid.: 215-16)

Quite noticeably Drucker conflates *techne* for *praxis*, and in so doing eliminates the guiding criteria for *praxis* to separate good from bad practice. Missing throughout Drucker's analysis is an accounting of *phronesis*, the disposition to act truly and rightly. Similarly, by reducing intellectuality to science, he also limits *understanding* to technical understanding. Drucker is caged in a discourse with practical intent that is based on instrumental rationality raised to highest principle and lacking social reflexivity. "Know how" has colonized "know why."

As a social ecologist he argues "his job is not to create knowledge. It is to create a vision. He has to be an educator" (1993b: 455). He claims that his conception of social ecology as a "discipline" is holistic. "It is based on looking rather than analysis. It is based on perception. This, I submit, distinguishes it from what is normally meant by science. It is not only that it can not be reductionist. By definition it deals with configurations" (ibid.: 456). He also understands social ecology as practical, a "tool for action," and value-committed, a "moral science." He believes in the sanctity of spiritual creation. Also fundamental, he writes, ". . . is not a belief in power. It is a belief in responsibility, in authority grounded in competence, and in compassion" (ibid.: 457). So while Drucker attempts to append elements of understanding (*verstehen*) and *phronesis* to his worldview in his commitments to morality and spirituality, the grounding of his claims to moral and spiritual authority are not open to critical interrogation. To claim his project as "moral science," then, does not mean a science of morality but rather a technical science grounded on premodern forms of moral discourse, that is, faith or *religio*. The faith, thus revealed, is a faith in the possessive individual's personal relationship to God and the capitalist market as the final arbitrator of value.

Drucker ends the introduction to his best-selling new book *Post-Capitalist Society* with "this is surely the time to *make the future* -- precisely because everything is in flux. This is a time for action" (1993a: 16). Although published too late to have been cited in the early stages of *Toward 2000 Together*, Drucker describes *Post-Capitalist Society* as a summation of his earlier works about the new knowledge-based economy. Because of Drucker's penchant for visionary thought, the facts and predictions in *Post-Capitalist Society* are difficult to distinguish from each other, that is, distinguish the "ought to be" from the "is." Nevertheless, he does draw on empirical evidence to justify his claim that a new knowledge society has emerged and will come to full form around 2020. He argues that it is risky to foresee what post-capitalist society will look like, and that it will be different than anyone imagines it to be (ibid.: 4). He then proceeds to project its new social form with a claim to having grasped its empirical reality in the present. "These things [the future] have already happened. They can therefore be described. To do so is the purpose of the book" (ibid.).

The future is both now and sometime in the future! More accurately the book represents a dream or what Freud might call a "fantasy." Drucker, in this case, fantasizes how a particular set of elements in the present might be generalized to the social body as a whole. What is this fantasy? It is the fantasy of a strategic manager who makes money writing in support of multinational corporations, against union leaders and for a market-

based heaven on earth. So in a strange way, while arguing that the 1990s are a time for humans to make the future happen (to live the fantasy), he also argues that the "future" can be predicted as a naturally unfolding order beyond human will to choose it. To Drucker humans have individual freedom yet are totally determined socially. At the level of conceptualizing the individual and the historical totality, Deborah Harrison in her critique of Canadian sociologist S. D. Clark clearly summarizes the logical contradictions of Drucker.

The contradiction inherent in the liberal version of the relationship between the individual and society makes liberalism illogical. In the liberal view, the society, like the "fact," is autonomous and deterministic, while the individual, like the "value," is autonomous and free. Hence in the liberal view, the individual is simultaneously determined by his or her society, and free of it. Quite apart from their being contradictory, both contentions are false. The society has too much impact on the individual for the latter to be conceived as autonomous; moreover, the society is perpetuated by too much human decision making to be considered deterministic. A radical or truly problem-oriented sociology reflects, in contrast, upon the fundamental characteristics of the prevailing order, and takes conscious responsibility for their demise or perpetuation. The liberal distinction between the autonomous individual and the deterministic order then collapses. (1981:118).

Drucker does not recognize the contradiction nor the collapse of his distinction between individual value and social fact, but rather attempts to negotiate them anew and transcend their historical manifestations in a new abstract social theory. To accomplish this task Drucker draws heavily on the assumptions of scientific management, where "collapses" are not based on a material contradictions in class interests but on an inefficient rationalization of knowledge. Drucker believes that "few figures in intellectual history have had a greater impact than [Frederick Winslow] Taylor [1856-1915] -- and few have been so willfully misunderstood or so assiduously misquoted" (Drucker 1993a: 34). Drucker believes that Taylor has transcended the misinformed ideas of Karl Marx and Adam Smith. But he reserves scathing disregard for Hegel and Marx, who he calls "those 'terrible simplifiers'" (ibid.: 24). In yet another American case of misrepresenting and oversimplifying Marx, Drucker posits that Marx's great mistake was to define the creators of wealth as "human beings: labor" rather than "something specifically human: knowledge" (1992: 26).

As well, Drucker claims he is not sympathetic to contemporary neo-Smithian or Keynesian economists with their abstract modeling and their failure to study human behavior. He writes that "the basic assumptions of modern economic theory are unreasonable and invalid" (ibid.: 29). His critique, though, is not a critique of the abstract modeling of the "free market" *per se*, but rather of two main points. First, the assumption that the sovereign state is alone in this world and can control the economy through the money supply (ibid.). Second, he has little use for thinkers, such as Milton Friedman, who argue that the *only* social responsibility of business is economic performance (1993a.: 101). Drucker also transcends Marx, Smith and Keynes with his transnational strategies for "responsibility." "Going transnational may be the only rational strategy for any business aiming at a leadership position anywhere in the developed world, whether in a mass market or in a market niche" (1992: 36). In supporting the economics of the multinational firm and global laissez-faire, Drucker's distance from the libertarians is not as marked as he first presents it to be. While he rejects the substantive Marx out of hand, he accepts many of the premises of people like Friedrich von Hayek when he argues that they have not extended their analysis far enough; that is, taking their analysis beyond the boundaries of the autonomous nation-state (Drucker 1993b: 449). Thus he still religiously



believes in the "market," but this is a belief in a new kind of market, a capitalism without borders and a "capitalism without capitalists."

A review of Drucker's *empirical* analysis of "capitalism" illustrates how Drucker continually conflates his facts and vision of the new world order. He argues that the capitalism of today has transcended class society, because, as his logic goes, pension funds are the legal "owners" of today's corporations, and since workers contribute to the pension funds by deferring wages, the workers thus "own" the economy. Managers thus work *as employees* in managing "pension fund capitalism" for these "worker" owners. He has used other names to describe this reality/fantasy such as "pension fund socialism" and "employee capitalism." According to Drucker, in contemporary *post-capitalist* society everyone is now an employee: business, management and labour alike. He simply writes off those who live from profits, interest and rents as irrelevant. He assumes this claim as a first principle rather than testing it with a counter-assumption and counter-evidence.

The above thesis is not Drucker's alone. His assumptions are grounded in the theory of the *managerial revolution* first enunciated in 1933 by Adolph Berle and Gardner Means in *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Berle and Means emphasized that in a large corporation, the shareholders -- as the legal owners -- were no longer able or willing to control the corporation. Drucker promotes this claim to an uncontestable validity. Without ever referring to counter-evidence, Drucker and the ideologues of business management treat the foundational assumptions of the managerial revolution to be true, as *religio*, and it suffices here to show that such imaginative visions by "economists and experts" are treated as fact by those attempting to realize Drucker's fantasy in Alberta.

According to Berle and Means, because professional management had control without an ownership stake, Drucker's interest lay in determining how to make management accountable or "responsible" to the "owners." Starting from the foundational principles derived from the theory of a managerial revolution, Drucker assumes two points as gospel: (1) capitalists no longer have economic power and (2) managers with the *de facto* power are presently not accountable, as the Savings and Loans scandals of the 1980s illustrated.

Many of Drucker's texts are devoted to enunciating the manager's social responsibility and identifying the *efficient realization* of that responsibility. He first attempts to answer the question by counterposing his analysis to the promoters of *laissez-faire* who argue that the manager's sole responsibility is to "maximize shareholder's value." He has argued since 1954 in *The Practice of Management* that the manager is a "trustee." In *Post-Capitalist Society* he continues to enunciate how to make the accountants accountable.

"Management" in the large publicly owned company should act in the "best balanced interests" of a number of constituencies: shareholders, employees, suppliers, plant communities, and so on -- what are now called "stakeholders." Management would discharge its duties by being a benevolent despot. As in all benevolent despotisms, no one tried to define what those "best balanced interests" were or should be, let alone how performance of this "trusteeship" could be defined or measured. Worse, still, there was no attempt to make management accountable to anyone. (1993a: 81)

In Drucker's corporatist thesis, it is not benevolent despotism which is evil -- he never discusses the implications of corporatism for democracy -- but rather the fact that no one is held accountable for *results* and this unaccountability means nations and corporations "degenerate into mediocrity and malperformance." Of course, Drucker is able to make his point by occluding the fact that management *is still* accountable to the capitalist in the last instance (i.e., collective shareholders and their realization of private profit). From the above assumptions and occlusions Drucker can thus account for the degeneracy of any

form of governance, whether for a company or a nation. Drucker assumes that governments (nation-states) could be similar *in kind* to corporations, only bigger. Corporations are run by economic managers. Since governments are run by political managers and not like an "organization" they have to pander to selfish interests rather than collective interests. Political managers are also inefficient managers. Because of their taxation powers they are not accountable to the bottom-line cost-effectiveness of corporations. Corporate economic management of political institutions becomes the only feasible solution for degeneration. Again, Drucker conflates morality with technique. In religious terms, efficiency brings humans closer to God. Perfection is thus conceived as pure efficiency without substantive moral content.

He argues that business managers already know how to balance the interests of different constituencies by setting objectives and integrating "the pursuit of goals from different areas into a focused strategy" (ibid.: 81). He continually presumes that these "goals" are transparent and uncontested in both their purpose and means. And he naively assumes that the function of a social organization should be and can be reduced to one purpose. For example "the result of the hospital is a cured patient. . . . The result of the school or the university are graduates who put to work what they have learned in their own lives and work. The results of an army are. . . deterring war or winning it. The results of the Church are not even on this earth" (ibid.: 54). He also presumes that curing, learning, working, deterring and winning are self-evident practices and non-problematic conceptions in themselves. He *never* analyses distinctions between their good and evil forms or their just and unjust forms. He assumes an obvious transparent morality exists and he believes that the lack of realizing the good is only a matter of failed efficiency in a "market."

He suggests that to assure responsible management for pension fund capitalism "we are going to develop what I have been calling a 'business audit'. It will track the performance of a company and its management against a strategic plan and specific objectives. The model is based on public accountants who inspect and audit financial performance. Capital, as he defines it (i.e., pools of money) takes on a new function "to make knowledge *effective in performance*" (ibid.: 82). This principle claim is, of course, Taylorism generalized beyond the factory floor to knowledge and to a totalizing system of life -- what Simpson designated the *new HRD*. Since Drucker takes business to be the paradigm social organization, his assumption is generalized to all forms of governance including what he calls a "society of organizations."

Drucker claims that "no one in the United States -- or any place else -- talked of "organizations" until after World War II" (ibid.: 49). "Unlike society, community, or family -- the traditional social aggregates--organization is purposely designed and grounded neither in the psychological nature of human beings nor in biological necessity. Yet, while a human creation, it is meant to endure--not perhaps forever, but for a considerable period of time" (ibid.: 48). To support his claim for creative authorship of the concept he cites the *Concise Oxford* as an historical authority. What Drucker has accomplished is to identify the differentiation of management from industry and business. In addition he has ascribed to an "autonomous" management an ascendant function in decision-making as "organization" and then generalized this function as the paradigm case for projecting the libertarian functioning of society as a whole. What Drucker has in fact done is to extend the technocratic thesis of the positivist view of "corporation" once given by French positivists like Comte and Durkheim and sublimate it to the logic of Social Darwinism.

In generalizing the organization of technocratic management within the logic of Social Darwinism, Drucker also seems to have enunciated a hyper-technocratic form of structural-functionalism and applied it to the production and dissemination of knowledge. He states

that the "the function of organizations is to make knowledges productive.[...] Knowledges by themselves are sterile. They become productive only if welded together into a single, unified knowledge. To make this possible is the task of organization, the reason for its existence, its function" (ibid.: 50). Drucker then claims that "organization is a distinct species" and they are special-purpose institutions because they concentrate on one task, that is, they follow their specialty rather than applying their knowledge to the common task. According to Drucker, each member in an organization makes a vital contribution to achieve results but no persons by themselves produce the results. Specialized performances require that as an absolute prerequisite an organization's performance accomplish a clear task. Results need to be defined unambiguously and measurably. "This also requires that organization appraise and judge its performance against clear, known, impersonal objectives and goals. Neither society nor community nor family need to set such goals, nor could they. *Survival rather than performance is their test*" (ibid.: 55 emphasis added).

Abstract decisionism and competitive struggle also enter his scheme, marrying social conservatism (as it relates to the organization) to individualistic and laissez-faire liberalism (as it relates to free association): "Joining an organization is always a decision [so] unlike society, community, and family, an organization is therefore always in competition for its most essential resource: qualified, knowledgeable, dedicated people" (ibid.: 56). Organizations are "associations" of "knowledge-specialists" with no "ranks" but it is always "managed" (unlike society, community and families which have "leaders"). "This management has to have considerable authority. Yet its job in the knowledge organization is not to command; it is to direct [?]" (ibid.: 57). Finally, pressing the philosophy of external relations to an extreme he also states that organizations must be "autonomous," that is "free to do their own thing" (ibid.). He writes that his definition of "Organizations" also implies a destabilizing function in society: "every organization of today has to build into its very structure *the management of change*" (ibid.: 59). The function of organizations in post-capitalist society is to "constantly upset, disorganize, and destabilize community" (ibid.: 60). And even though organizations operate in a community and their results are effected in the community, the organization cannot submerge or subordinate itself to that community but rather "its 'culture' has to *transcend* community" (ibid.: 61).

The question thus arises as to what are the legitimate plans and objectives by which to morally regulate managerial responsibility and morally evaluate the performance of a political organization as a whole, that is, the "society of organizations." As anticipated, Drucker voids morality from the problematic of political governance and substitutes salvation through efficient techniques in market rationalization. Drucker defines the *newly* emerging political structure as the "post-sovereign state" which can overcome the decadence of the megastate in its five forms: (1) the "nanny state" as provider of social services; (2) the "economic agency" as master of the economy; (3) the "fiscal state" as a taxer and borrower without spending limits; (4) the "cold war state" as a response to technology; and (5) the "Japanese exception" as social guardian. Not adverse to making sweeping generalizations, Drucker writes that although Stalinist totalitarian countries and democratic English-speaking countries were antithetical in terms of political, intellectual and religious freedom, when it came to "the underlying theory of government, these systems differed more in degree than they did in kind. . . . They all saw government as the master of society and the master of the economy" (ibid.: 130). Drucker's antipathy to "government" in total masks a fantasy that governance can be left to monadic spontaneity and autonomous individuality, and in the context of American legal assumptions, this includes the internal governance of multinational corporations as "individuals" or rather in its "statist" form: corporate government.

Drucker's political theory cannot account for the preunderstanding of governing rules that make contracts between autonomous individuals binding. His failure to fully comprehend the preconditions for sociality is further limited by his simplistic understanding of the state. His speculations about the deficiencies of the Megastate are based on supposedly obvious but absurd claims, such as, "the United States is the only country (outside of totalitarian ones) where government has attempted to command changes in social values and individual behavior to stamp out discrimination by race, age, or gender" (ibid.: 123). To envisage the *empirical* state as an organ of social thought as Durkheim did or as an agency of subject formation as J.S. Mill did seems beyond Drucker's grasp. He does not confront any arguments about the nature of a positive state in any logical or empirical way except to dismiss them out of hand.

Because Drucker views the productivity of knowledge as crucial for economic development, his specific ideas on higher education are crucial for understanding similar claims for the Toward 2000 Together strategy. First, he believes that all schools should be accountable (responsible for results) based on the above model for the efficient management of an organization. Second, he believes that non-business organizations wield the greatest social power today. "Few organizations in history," he states "have been granted the amount of power that today's university has. Refusal to admit or grant the diploma is tantamount to debarring a person from access to a career" (ibid.: 104). Third, the need for innovation and entrepreneurship realized through the market economy apply just as well to government institutions or universities, but in universities the practices differ in that "there is nothing more reactionary than a liberal faculty in a university. It is the ultimate in reaction" (1992: 339). Drucker concludes that for the new global-market and knowledge-based economy, the university monopoly over credentialing and the liberal arts anti-business ethic are the most serious challenge to progress. Making universities "accountable" is the only way to ensure economic salvation.

While Drucker presents himself as a progressive person, he doubly believes that politicians, diplomats, civil servants, political scientists and political writers speak in yesterday's terms and act on yesterday's assumptions. Yet a review of his writing has also revealed a reoccurring set of foundational assumptions that reach back to the 19th century and are reminiscent of the writings of social Darwinists such as Spencer and Sumner -- but with one important exception which marks the rise of corporatism and its ideological articulation to individual value freedom and social fact determinism. While Spencer and Sumner assumed survival of the fittest *individuals* for social evolution, Drucker assumes survival of the fittest capitalist firm; that is, he understands the perfected society as a set of "organizations" struggling to the death for survival.

In evaluating Drucker's social theory concerning legitimate governance one will search for modern moral discourse in vain. His morality is a *naturalized*, a reified version of the survival of the fittest thesis where "organizations" are spontaneously free to compete unbounded by any limitations of community. Morality, to retain any specification, is social but for Drucker, organizational responsibility is ideologically purged of true social responsibility. To accomplish this task, he conflates both sociality and responsibility with efficiency. Accordingly for Drucker, "the first political task of the post-capitalist polity must be to restore the performance capacity of government, which the Megastate has so seriously diminished" (1993a: 156). Obviously, Drucker is much closer to libertarians like Friedman and Hayek in taking a hard-line on the negative state in his repeated claims. To Drucker the problems of governance are not moral nor political but rather the "urgent need to make government effective again" (ibid.: 157). Legitimacy is continually defined by effective performance. What is *right* is what survives and grows economically. These

statements reveal that the positivism of Drucker has little to do with either J. S. Mill, Emile Durkheim or John Dewey who at least attached a moral analysis of the state to their utilitarianism. Drucker owes much more to Spencer, Sumner, and Hayek than he acknowledges. A selective quotation from one of Drucker's earlier works may suffice to emphasize the absence of even a republican ethic. He writes, "to do something out of social responsibility which is economically irrational and untenable is therefore never responsible. It is sentimental. The result is always greater damage" (1977: 314). Inverting this critique reveals Drucker's totalitarian and economic value system: to do something for economic rationality is *always* responsible and *never* results in greater social damage.

Drucker's "social ecology" reinvents Herbert Spencer's structural functionalism. Spencer wrote in *The Study of Sociology* "that policies, legislative and other, which, while hindering the survival of the fittest, further the propagation of the unfit, work grave mischiefs" (Spencer cited from Abrams 1968: 74). Drucker's vision is the product of a perceived "grave mischief" caused by government policies. His fantasy of a future is one where "organizations" are free of institutional means to regulate substantive rationality. Drucker's ideology is the justification for an instrumentalist, economic and capitalistic "iron cage" yet he speaks in the name of the free "individual."

In a time of fetishism for the *new* promoted by Drucker, it might be revealing to end with an quotation from William Graham Sumner, the chief propagator of American Social Darwinism, who spoke from a privileged pulpit at Yale university. Sumner scientized Calvin's assumptions concerning the predestination of the social order and salvation for the elect through a struggle for existence (Curtis 1981; Hofstadter 1944). He argued that the fortunes accumulated by the Rockefellers and Carnegies of the Gilded Age were the *real* measures of their success. Money, Sumner also argued, indicated the degree of efficient management that had come into the world and was also a sign of the waste that had been eliminated. By substituting "organization" or "manager" for Spencer's "millionaire" the following quotation reveals an ideological grammar for an age of multinational corporations, middle managers and flexible regimes of global accumulation.

The millionaires [organizations/managers] are a product of natural selection, acting on the whole body of men to pick out those who can meet the requirements of certain work to be done. . . . It is because they are thus selected that wealth -- both their own and that entrusted to them -- aggregates under their hands. . . . They may fairly be regarded as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work. They get high wages and live in luxury, but the bargain is a good one for society. There is the intensest competition for their place and occupation. This assures us that all who are competent for this function will be employed in it, so that the cost of it will be reduced to the lowest terms. (cited from Hofstadter 1944: 58).

Drucker's reality is the unfulfilled fantasy of the antebellum overseer, not yet informed of the simple fact that although he doesn't have to cut cane, the slaves still have to be freed and the gentleman planters put to rest.

### 8.9. Fertile Receptions and Traditional Perceptions

No analysis of intertextual origins of a hegemonic vision for Alberta would be complete without a genealogy of the traditional hegemonic ideologies in Alberta. C.B. Macpherson (1953) suggests that the early history of Alberta governance was a series of experiments by popular movements to control representative government without a party system. These experiments did not take the form of direct democracy such as in rule by town meetings or referendums, but rather in delegate democracy. The promotion of delegate democracy first resulted in the representation of concrete groups (e.g. U.F.A until 1935) and then solidified

into representation of a general will emptied of all content (e.g. Social Credit). He argues that the Social Credit movement transformed democratic theory and practice from a substantive representation of the wills of rational interest groups to an insubstantial representation of a supposedly general will by an inspired leader while still confirming a non-party tradition and the predominance of cabinet (ibid.: 214). These early developments, though, cannot be simply explained by Alberta's cultural exceptionalism but rather must also be explained by the unusual nature of Alberta's economy, that is, its quasi-colonial status as subordinated to the outside economy and its predominantly small-property basis as increasingly subordinated by the direction of large capital accumulations.

The petty commodity producers, according to Macpherson, were continually threatened by new transitional groups, thus producing heterogeneous interests and a lack of class consciousness. These producers developed a delusionary understanding about the nature of the society, the economy and their place in it. He states that "they conceive society in their own image, not realizing or not admitting that the day of that society is past. . . . That the essence of man is in his independence of others becomes a belief so strongly felt that it leads them to believe that they can be independent" (ibid.: 226).

Macpherson includes in his critique of the *petite bourgeoisie* the consciousness of Alberta's farmers. As a class the farmers concealed many stratified disparities which created the need for their frequent shifts in political direction and alignments. At times, though, they did find common cause with each other and others. Nevertheless, even in these class formations, agrarian consciousness embodied the illusion of independence that is characteristic of the *petite-bourgeoisie* as a whole. Macpherson concluded that with the working force dominated by independent producers and with free enterprise also defining the institutional arrangement they are subjected to, Alberta producers found it difficult to rebel when the price system broke down because their agrarian consciousness was contradictory, that is, at once hostile to and acquiescent in the established order. Macpherson argues that Alberta's oscillation between radicalism and conservatism can be explained by the nature of *petite-bourgeois* political identifications. Each radical movement began with strong opposition to exploiters from the outside, such as monopolists, manufacturers' associations, banks and financiers but all gradually came to terms with the emerging new system (ibid.: 215-30).

The business analog as the basis for popular democracy began early and partially explains the deterioration of Albertan democracy into a quasi-party system devoid of oppositional politics. For the U.F.A. both their own governance and the governance of the province were in effect to be two boards of directors furthering the common interest of the shareholders. The shareholders were to participate not by taking sides but rather by selecting leaders for their business ability. The failure of the U.F.A. to implement the popular will in the 1930s as well as a rejection of orthodox liberalism and transformative socialism led them to a form of plebiscitary democracy whereby "the people give up their right of decision, criticism, and proposal, in return for the promise that everything will be done to implement the general will" (ibid.: 233).

The business analog was also the basis for the early Social Crediters conception of Alberta democracy but "their image was that of a giant corporation, in which shareholders are atomized, their voices reduced to proxies, and their effective rights reduced to the one right of receiving a dividend" (ibid.: 233). It was presumed that "shareholders" could have no effective control because they did not understand the complexity of corporate affairs. Control would be left to the free reign of directors and experts. Freedom for the individual meant the right to change directors and experts if they did not deliver the dividends.

Following the business analog of independent industry under the UFA to the corporate industry analog of early Social Credit, the later stages of Social Credit were marked by the rise of the analog of corporate commercialism. Democracy was imagined as "the relation of seller and buyer in the retail market" (*ibid.*: 233). This new analog was intended to discard the residual aspects of majority rule implicit to the corporate shareholder model and replace it with a more fragmented relationship between autonomous individuals and technocratic planners. Freedom became the right to choose or refuse propositions without interfering with the same right of every other person. Macpherson claims that Social Credit's "individualism" was the apotheosis of a business civilization passing into its opposite whereby political responsibility is supposedly restored to the individual when in reality responsibility has been taken out of the individual's reach and placed in the hands of the directors and experts who preside over the general will. According to Macpherson (1953) "social credit theory is part of a long succession of utopian systems whose authors have denounced with varying degrees of insights the evils of business civilization, and have sought to remove them without altering the essential economic relations by which they are produced" (234). He also concludes that "as long as the independent commodity producers retain their preponderance in Alberta, the plebiscitarian quality of Alberta politics is likely to persist" (*ibid.*: 236).

Alvin Finkel (1989) argues that "although the Social Credit organization is in the late eighties dead as a doornail, the impact of that organization on political thinking in Alberta is enduring" (214). (Also see Barr 1974 and Bryne 1991). Early steps by Alberta's Progressive Conservative government to move away from the hard right-wing politics of the post-1943 period under Ernest Manning were turned asunder by the recession in 1982 where the resonances of rural Alberta provided Tories with political capital to attack unions and universal social programs. Fifty years of demographic and economic changes dramatically reoriented politics for what had become a largely urban province dependent on the oil and gas sector. These shifts and the prosperity provided by oil and gas, "allowed a once-reformist party [Social Credit] to survive triumphantly as a born-again reactionary party supporting monopoly capitalism in the name of free-enterprise" (*ibid.*: 215). Early Social Credit was marked by combining charismatic leadership, grass roots participation and radical rhetoric that provided a model for lower-class unity for the dispossessed during the Depression against exploiting interests. But unlike other agrarian movements, like the CCF, Social Credit developed no institutional links with existing farm or labour organizations. In the 1940s, with many disaffected radicals joining the CCF, Social Credit was able to mobilize its traditional farm vote by attacking the CCF from the right. Social Credit moved away from reformism while keeping a resurgent right at bay (*ibid.*: 215-16).

Manning's complete rightist turn, though, was not solely opportunistic. Aberhart was able to reconcile a stern evangelical profession of individual salvation with social-gospel politics. Manning, on the other hand, was never comfortable with the socialist implications of the social gospel. He understood socialism's promotion of collective security -- as did most evangelists -- as deemphasizing the individual struggle for salvation. Attainment of grace, he argued, should be the responsibility of the individual and not the state. Collective responses blocked personal salvation. Social benefits caused a breakdown in a person's relationship with God because collective security bred idleness and permitted evil tendencies. Manning's harsh individualism was easily articulated with American Cold War politics and the conspiracy theories espoused by the "social credit" followers of Major Douglas. Under Manning individual salvation and anti-reformism were thus linked to conspiracy theories about Eastern politicians, Jews, bankers, and Bolsheviks. Even though anti-semitic and other extreme views held by the Douglasites were later repudiated

during the Manning-Strom period, "their manner of reasoning was indeed official ideology" (ibid.: 216). Calls for social justice or collective action by workers and farmers could be disparaged by the invocation of "conspiracy."

The underlying rationality of social credit thinking could remain hegemonic because the oil-induced prosperity allowed for a low tax burden while the government was able to spend widely on health, social, and educational programs, as well as on roads and other kinds of physical and social infrastructure. Nevertheless, Alberta under Manning still shunned universal social programs and state-funded health programs without user fees. Meanwhile, the government did not diversify the economy and social credit theory limited modernization by blocking state-intervention in capitalist development. The Manning government preferred to limit its regulation of business and to maximize anti-labour legislation as an appeal to profit-seekers (ibid.: 217).

Even though Alberta begrudgingly followed the Canadian trend in expanding the welfare state, the redistribution of existing wealth was firmly rejected in favour of promoting economic growth. The Social Credit solution for poverty was to let corporations and individuals make profits and then let the expansion create a trickle down effect for job creation. By the end of Manning's rule, the party had become a shell of its former self and epitomized most acutely Macpherson's characterization of the early party, largely a rural-based and lower middle-class party, but in this later case with the populist element severed. According to Finkel, "the party was only a cheering gallery for the government, whose leaders were the darlings of the oil companies" (ibid.: 217). In the postwar period Manning had become the central propagandizer for the virtues of multinational corporate capitalism.

In addition to solidifying the worldview of individual salvation in Alberta politics, Manning also articulated his evangelism to the logic of technological development. Central to this articulation was the Alberta government's 1967 *White Paper on Human Resource Development*. The white paper provided a blueprint for government action according to a Social Credit point of view and values and it attempted to demonstrate that compassion could be institutionalized without interfering with the rights of individuals including corporate entities. Manning assumed that increases in physical resource development to maximize economic growth was a precondition before any humanitarian proposals were feasible (Finkel 1987: 143). Ernest Manning's son, Preston was a devotee of "systems-analysis" and with several friends prepared the white paper. Preston Manning's interest was in the application of general systems theory to socio-economic development models. He proposed to develop two new indexes for social application. One, a "productivity index" that would govern wage increases and replace the cost-of living index. Two, a "functionality index" that allowed the province to scientifically evaluate institutions such as schools, hospitals and government departments (ibid.: 158).

The political philosophy underlying the technocratic proposals by Preston Manning's systems applications were fundamentally anathema to the functioning of the Western parliamentary system through the conflicts between oppositional parties. "The role of the party," argued Ernest Manning, "is not to govern for party's sake, but rather to solve problems and give leadership in meeting challenges on the people's behalf. Likewise the role of those designated as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition is not to oppose the government simply for the sake of opposing, but rather to aid in the solving of problems by keeping vigilant watch for error and by presenting alternate proposals which will lead to more effective solutions and better legislation" (Manning cited from ibid.: 159).

Manning's non-partisan pragmatism was considered good for Alberta where conservatives dominated but not good for all of Canada where a conservative oppositional



realignment was required to oppose creeping socialism. Socialism for Manning meant "statism" and conflated progressive liberalism and social democracy as well as democratic socialism and communism. William Graham Sumner's definition of socialism bears much resemblance to the "social credit" definition of socialism. Sumner writes that socialism is "any device whose aim is to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of 'the state'" (cited in Hofstadter 1944: 63). The emphasis on systems-analysis as the basis for determining government policy was expanded by Earnest Manning (1967) into a book about the federal system called *Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians*. His central thesis was that Social Credit could assist in bringing about the reorganization of the Progressive Conservative Party. Manning called his philosophy of governance "social conservatism" with an aim to "harness the energies of a free enterprise-private economic sector to the task of attaining many of the social goals which humanitarian socialists have long advocated" (Manning cited from Finkel 1987: 163).

In the 1960s under Strom, the Social Credit ideology of social conservatism was able to join together traditional conservatism, scientific management and regional discontent but was unable to deliver Alberta's industrial takeoff. The urban-based Tories were able to deliver on the urban disillusionment with Social Credit policies and to meet the needs of a rising Alberta bourgeoisie requiring state intervention to maximize their growth potential by expanding industrial base in the face of central Canadian encroachments (Pratt and Richards 1979). By the 1970s, though, the "social conservative" phenomenon was incorporated into federal Progressive Conservatism as a marginal ideology.

Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the Tory dynasty was established. The province was wealthier and enough money was available to keep all voters happy even though the Tories, like the Social Credit, continued to favour the better off. Nevertheless, a new kind of political dissent from the working-class and urban middle-class had emerged. These dissenting movements aided in defeating Social Credit only to be marginalized by successive Progressive Conservative governments who continued to espouse free-enterprise rhetoric, to mobilize anti-union/socialist/Ottawa bashing and to promote the fantasy that Albertans speak with one voice. Alberta is no longer a province dominated by petty commodity producers as in the days of the UFA and Social Credit. Even though the ideologies of the varied independent commodity producers live on like ghosts at a barn dance, most people have now left the farm and live as urbanized waged- and salaried-workers or as managers within large bureaucracies in the corporate and state sectors. The decline in resource revenues and the unsuccessful realization of a value-added economy means that there is not enough money to go around to keep everyone happy. What is left of the traditional *petite bourgeoisie* of farmers, cowboys and merchants have hitched their wagon to the multinational corporate giants in the name of Drucker's survival of the fittest "organization." During the 1960s and 70s the new middle class was also incorporated into the ideology of social conservatism via the technocratic thesis, but it has now been severed into two parts: a public middle class devoted to technocracy and the ethic of public service and a private middle class devoted to technocracy and the ethic of consumer service. As the new class configuration plays itself out real choices have to be made concerning the viability of transcendental social conservatism for the year 2000. The new contradictory interests are bound to articulate new oppositional ideologies. At this moment, in a province where evangelical rationality dominates, the success of oppositional thought can only be a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, present resistance to the "future" may create its own alternate future and open new vistas of social possibility.

### **Again 8.1. Faith Popcorn Returns**

Faith Popcorn came to the capital city of Alberta in August 1992 to hold an evangelical revival for business. Three thousand people attended the Edmonton Conference Centre to hear her speak about the future. Popcorn (1991) argued: "There'll be economic casualties of this decade, but those who see the shakeup coming in time will survive it" (8). The logic in Popcorn's belief system (a pastiche) links science to industry to management to religion to salvation to consumerism. "The corporate world," Popcorn (1991) states, "will have to change its priorities, and reward different strengths. The status that an M.B.A. held for marketers in the '80s will be replaced by the status of a new M.B.S. (Master of Business Soul). Guaranteed to be good through the year 2000. And beyond" (163). Popcorn and the others identified in this chapter have tapped into the desires and fears of Albertans about the next millennium.

The various sections of this chapter dealt with the intellectual and institutional linkages between the intelligentsia of *Toward 2000 Together* and the ideological products of the Canada West Foundation, the Business Council on Sustainable Development, the Business Council on National Issues, the Steering Group on Prosperity, the new international entrepreneurs in Third World development, the futurology market in business administration and the traditional perceptions of Albertans. I described a loose coterie of "Masters of Business Soul." This ideological configuration seems to escape the standards of logical or scientific critique. Although I offered logical and scientific critiques of each element in the configuration, my critiques can never add up to a critique of the "totality" and delegitimize the configuration as a whole. Questions about the "legitimacy" of a metanarrative cannot be ultimately justified with reference to another discourse. At this level these metanarratives function as myth. As a set of mythical representations, my conception of intertextuality rejects the conception of original meaning, that is, myth spoken as the Word of God or the Mirror of Nature. To speak of origins, then, is not to speak of discursive origins but rather to sociologically identify the non-discursive aspects of symbolic power, the common class and institutional interests of the intelligentsia and the fact that their metanarration was used to legitimate *Toward 2000 Together* as a set of truth statements. It is not a primal First Principle that "stands behind" this ideological configuration, but rather the non-discursive and discursive power of this collective hegemonic intelligentsia as an Anonymous Intellectual who mediates expert and popular understandings.

This chapter focused on how a social imaginary that is not logically coherent or scientifically sensible can -- in the name of logic and science -- still have the power to dominate the cultural sky from horizon to horizon. The next chapter descends from the heaven of metanarration to the earth of political action, describes the responses to the Progressive Conservative initiative and identifies what kind of resistance might find a footing on Alberta's soil.

# Chapter Nine

## Resistances?

We are showing Ralph Klein we will not be pushed around. (Linda Pullishy, 14 year old "truant" protesting cuts, on the steps of the Alberta Legislative Building, *Edmonton Journal* October 28, 1993)

What is most in demand here and elsewhere is *evolutionary* adaptability and responsiveness. (Janet Halliwell, Chairman: Science Council of Canada, 1992: 15)

### 9.1. Introduction

Where is the resistance to Toward 2000 Together? The question of potential resistance to anonymous intellectual practice and the exercise of postmodern hegemony has been a subplot throughout the case study. The last three chapters described how the exercise of hegemony took three different forms: (1) control of economic and political resources in the constitution of Toward 2000 Together; (2) control of metanarration to inform discussion and justify normative truth claims; and (3) control of metanarration to legitimate discussion and justify empirical truth claims. During Toward 2000 Together and for over three years, the hegemonic strategic managers were able to position and reposition themselves to limit resistance. The question of how hegemony is exercised in such a case raises the question about the nature of counter-hegemony. This chapter looks at two potential points of resistance to the hegemonic strategies of Toward 2000 Toward: (1) challenges to the political legitimacy of the New Right provided by new social movements and (2) to the scientific legitimacy of Alberta's intelligentsia provided by Canada's scientific intelligentsia.

This chapter describes the above two kinds of *potential but inadequate resistance*: one that awakens in the fall of 1993 in response the first phase of the implementation of Toward 2000 Together under the symbolic leadership of a Modern Prince, Premier Ralph Klein; and another that died in February 1992 when Brian Mulroney, then Prime Minister of Canada, disbanded the Science Council of Canada. In the former case, what emerges is a challenge to the political legitimacy of Toward 2000 Together by a non-traditional political movement lacking either the economic resources, heroic intellectual leadership or a counter-hegemonic language to challenge the legitimacy of Toward 2000 Together. In the latter case, what is lost is a counter-point to the scientific legitimacy of the corporate postmodernization narrative. Here, the traditional institutional structure for a challenge to the metanarrative is weakened by an attack on the welfare state and the symbolic resources for a left technocratic response cannot substantially challenge the metanarrational sophistication of corporatist postmodernism.

### 9.2. Resistance Awakens?

This section offers an historical narrative on the implementation of Toward 2000 Together and a challenge to its political legitimacy. In the first phase, the government initiates its election promise to balance the budget and to cut or privatize government services. The second phase is marked by the initial resistances of a traditional oppositional movement, the public sector unions. The government's strategic planners anticipate and ameliorate what becomes an ineffective challenge to their authority. The end of the second phase, though, is marked by an unexpected challenge by a spontaneous coalition of high school students in Edmonton and Calgary. Their actions catalyze the Alberta Teachers Association (ATA), parents and students around one contentious issue concerning

kindergarten. The third phase unfolds without intellectual or organizational leadership. The students' action and the momentum generated to organize a broader coalition and challenge the narrative of *Toward 2000 Together* by public sector unions dissipates. In the last phase of this first implementation, the students initiate but cannot sustain a "war of maneuver," and the government's strategic planners retreat, repoll, reposition and regain the upper hand. The scrambled resistance in phase one collapses by the spring of 1994.

The historical movement toward the year 2000 will not be the inevitable outcome of a vision concocted by strategic planners but rather it will be born as a child of contingency and contradiction and from the action of real historical individuals. In the fall of 1993, Ralph Klein's Progressive Conservatives released unintended social forces, a "many-headed hydra." This "hydra" metaphorically signifies the potential of people to organize resistance to *Toward 2000 Together* and the strategic planning of a handful of managerial scientists. By the end of the first phase of implementation the hydra had retreated, the planners had triumphed with less effort than they had anticipated and Klein maintained popular support for a continuation of the reform initiative into 1994.

On Tuesday, August 31, 1993 the lieutenant governor's Throne Speech laid out the provincial government's agenda with little variation from a previous budget document in May as a preliminary to the provincial election. Short on specifics, the government intended to review regulations, to raise no new taxes, to balance the budget within four years, to streamline government bureaucracy, to review the future of the Heritage Savings Trust Fund along with Alberta's tax system, to establish trade agents to India and Siberia and to pilot community trade bonds (EJ 1993: Sept. 1). Over the next few months, this formal agenda was both complemented and contradicted by a strategic agenda developed in January 1991 by the Economic Planning Committee of Cabinet and coordinated by the Banff Centre for Management. The culminating strategic vision and political process was called *Toward 2000 Together* (MR 1992: A10, A13).

Legislative action immediately followed the first sitting of the newly elected Progressive Conservative government. Early in the first week of September, rumors were spread that the government *might* privatize liquor stores (EJ 1993: Sept. 2). By the end of the week the government announced that the publicly owned liquor stores were for sale. This sale would involve 1500 jobs. Steve West, the minister responsible for the Alberta Liquor Control Board (ALCB), justified the action by stating "we are moving towards the 21st century. . . ." (ibid.: Sept. 3).

By the middle of the second week, again rumors circulated that the new budget expected to emphasize cost cutting and would put flesh on the pre-election "bare-boned budget" of May. The government hinted at trimming \$700 million, and the big question was where the reported \$120 million health care cuts would come from. Jim Dinning, Provincial Treasurer, claimed the budget statement was an opportunity to discuss openly the required structural changes (ibid.: Sept. 8). *The Edmonton Journal* released preliminary details on September 9, under the heading "Budget Deep in Red Ink" and publicized that \$120 million in health cuts would be announced to "maintain a competitive tax regime." Furthermore, the *Journal* discussed how resource revenues had fallen \$77 million below forecasts. The scandal of unaccounted for government losses to private corporations -- such as NovAtel which lost \$566.5 million -- was the key issue leading up to the fall in popularity and resignation of Premier Don Getty in 1992. By the fall of 1993 it was reported that Klein's strategy included \$714 million in cuts directed mainly at the big ticket budget items of provincial expenditure: health, social services and education. Graphs provided the key visuals, comparing expenditures of \$13,421 million and revenues of \$11,462 million. Total debt was pegged at \$29 billion (ibid.: Sept. 9). (Key expenditures:

Health 29.5%, Family and Social Services 11.9%, Advanced Education 8.7%, Education 14.2%; Debt Service 10.4%. Key Revenues: Income Tax Personal 26.3% & Corporate 5.8%, Resource Revenue 20.2%, Government of Canada Transfers 15.1%). One journalist editorialized that the actions were a sign of "Klein's corporate state" and claimed that the province could raise \$3 billion a year "by raising taxes merely to the national average" (*ibid.*: A1). Most journalists were less critical; for example, Rod Zeigler's column, the "Business Beat," complemented the province in giving "the straight goods" on its finances.

The second week in September ended with an announcement that the Alberta Liquor Control Board would open its doors for bids on 208 properties which dispensed alcohol (*ibid.*: Sept. 11). And the next week had barely started when a secret federal report by Guy Fortin written for the Canadian government was leaked. The report, completed in November 1992, showed that Ottawa was alarmed that then premier, Don Getty, was unable to get the Alberta debt under control. The Mulroney government knew that the deficit was much higher (\$3.41 billion) than the pre-election reports by the province (\$3.1 billion). In response to the leak, Treasurer Dinning claimed that Albertans had no idea of the severity of the problem until Premier Klein took office (*ibid.*: Sept. 13). While this report could have been used to put in question the sincerity of the new administration, it also confirmed for the public that the extent of "the deficit" was certainly the major "problem."

With the liquor stores privatization underway, the rest of the week saw escalation of the government's initiative in the area of health care. During this time period, the government was holding a series of "roundtables" consisting of selected participants drawn from local and provincial elites who were given the opportunity to express their opinion on the best means to achieve the government's goal of cutting expenditures in health care. The premier expressed his wish that hospital, municipal, school and university workers would accept a voluntary rollback of 5% in wages. Klein emphasized that it was unlikely that the cut would be legislated. Heather Smith, president of the 14,000 member United Nurses of Alberta, responded immediately that the nurses would never consider taking cuts without guarantees for job security (*ibid.*: Sept. 15). In concert with the actions in health care, government officials also announced that sweeping changes to Alberta schools would be part of Bill 8, the proposed School Amendments Act (*ibid.*: Sept. 16). Also the premier increased his campaign against the public sector by saying that he would force public agencies to reveal the salaries of the top managers in Alberta's schools and municipalities (*ibid.*: Sept. 18). At the same time, University of Alberta Hospital officials announced 280 job cuts and 80 bed closings to cover one half of the expected cuts (\$13.2 million), an action other hospitals in the province were also taking (*ibid.*: Sept. 17).

In the following week there was little respite for Klein. On, Monday, September 21, The Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research, an Edmonton based research facility, was chosen as one of the top research centres in North America. The premier donned a lab coat to promote science and technology and stated that "our medical research foundation has put Alberta on the world map for medical research." But one of the top scientists, Dr. Lorne Tyrell, used the public relations exercise to claim that the government had cut new funding that had been promised for the centre -- an additional \$300 million. Klein responded that there would be no new money and he promised he would not pay down Alberta's deficit by raiding the foundation's assets of \$628 million: "It's sacred. It's not on the table" (*ibid.*: Sept. 21).

A regular pattern of rumor, confirmation and action had emerged as the political strategy of the government. The last two weeks of September were no different. By

Thursday, September 23, a headline pronounced: "City fears 20% slash in grants." The city of Edmonton's council was responding to Municipal Affairs Minister, Steve West's stated expectation to have steeper cuts than those previously established to be at 10%. When asked about the steeper cut, Provincial Treasurer, Jim Dinning said he was not aware of West's statements. Dinning took the time to clarify: "We're going to reduce expenditures from \$12 billion down to \$9.8 billion. Draw your own conclusions" (ibid.: Sept. 23). And on September 28, the following week, Dinning added to the action plan by announcing the establishment of a commission to reform the province's tax system. Five of the six commission members were business people, and the sixth, the mayor of Peace River. The mandate of the commission led by Jack Donald was to look at how the tax system could be changed to attract business, create jobs, and make the province more competitive with other regions. The commission was to report back in December (ibid.: Sept. 28, A7).

On September 28, the Premier announced that "Charities must do more" and he asked the United Way to help fill the void created by government cutbacks. The charities responded the next day by stating that Klein's plea was "ludicrous" (ibid.: Sept. 29). September ended with a press release by Social Services Minister Mike Cardinal, about to unveil a new strategy, "a shake up," for child welfare reform within three weeks. He bragged that Alberta Social Services chopped 18,000 cases from its welfare rolls in 1993, far exceeding its targeted 13,000 cases. And he would like to get rid of a lot more, he added (ibid.: Sept. 29, 30).

If the new month of October started in the hands of the anonymous strategic planners, it ended in the hands of unanticipated challengers to the government's plan for the "future." In the face of competing news from the ongoing Federal election, a new "text" began to make headlines. The text was a small workbook used in the newly initiated educational roundtables and it seemed to embody particular assumptions concerning the "goals" for education. It was increasingly apparent to educational interest groups, such as teacher associations and local boards, that the official roundtable process was not only limited to pre-selected and accommodating individuals but also to a narrow range of questions and what seemed like the proposed "trimming" of \$569 million from the education budget (ibid.: Oct. 1). The proposals contradicted in a fundamental way Klein's election promise of a "\$124 million total increase in funding for basic education and advanced education" (Ralph Klein's constituency literature on how the Progressive Conservatives would balance the budget in four years with sound financial management: "Our Plan for a better Alberta."). First, base funding would be based on the 187.5 instructional days rather than 200. Second, provincial grants were to be reduced by 1%. Third, staff salaries in education were to be reduced by 1%. Fourth, there would be a freeze on capital projects to \$10 million in 1994-95 and \$5 million in 1995-96. And finally, support for education would only be retained for those aged 6-18. This new policy had the potential to deny publicly-funded education for 14,000 children under the age of six in kindergarten and 3,300 teenagers over the age of 18 wishing to complete high school (ibid.).

As knowledge spread about the specifics of the cuts, parents and teachers from across the province reacted, especially to the cutting of funds for kindergarten. Education Minister, Halvor Jonson cautioned that the "workbook contains only suggestions. There are no givens." He continued: "We need strategies to reshape education in Alberta so that we can improve quality in a time of reduced spending." Liberal leader Laurence Decore publicly condemned the education roundtables as a sham and pronounced "the die has been cast." The premier responded that by taking advice from students, parents, school officials and the public the roundtables would tell the government how to "deliver the same level of service with less money" (ibid.). He thereby confirmed and contradicted elements of his

major election promise which had intended to distance the Klein approach from the Getty approach, "a government that listens and keeps its promises every day" ("Our Plan for a better Alberta."). He was listening but he seemed no longer to be keeping his promise for educational funding.

The politicization of the "kindergarten" issue seemed to have struck an unanticipated response from the public. The regular rhythm of strategic pronouncements and government actions skipped a beat. Even the Saturday papers carried political news about the "kindergarten" issue. "Parents could pay \$1500 a year if kindergarten is axed," said Doug Tupper, an Edmonton public school trustee, and this could "cost millions" (ibid.: Oct. 2).

The politics of education was now added to the politics of health care. And in the following week, the four major unions representing 30,000 health care workers were claiming they would not accept the proposed 5% cut. Premier Klein retorted that all doctors, nurses, lab technicians and laundry staff were expected to toe the line (ibid.: Oct. 5). Alberta Healthcare Association president, Larry Odegard, who represented 240 hospitals and health care facilities, also rejected Klein's rollback plan by arguing that "this proposal threatens the collective bargaining process, and it is destructive because it is not supported by any long range health services plan." Klein responded: "I don't know if they understand. We aren't ordering anyone to take a rollback. I'm asking. And I'm asking nicely" (ibid.: Oct. 8). The government publicized that the strong reaction had been caused by having singled out health care workers, so the government used the union demands to justify and extend the policy to all public sector workers. Klein ended the week by calling for wage cuts of 5% to extend to *all* 37,000 Alberta government employees -- not just health care employees but also including education and social service workers (ibid.: Oct. 9). Meanwhile, the press released a Canadian Tax Foundation study showing that Albertans bore the lightest tax burden of any province (ibid.: Oct. 6). (e.g. Average: 36% of GDP. Alberta: 30.4%, Quebec: 39.3%, Saskatchewan: 35.8%, B.C.: 34.1%).

In a related health-care issue, the senior's roundtable report urged premiums for health care. Marjorie Bowker, well-respected participant in the roundtable, had "considerable reservations" about the process used for roundtable discussions. She argued that a small group of 66 people should not be entrusted with the responsibility of speaking for 230,000 seniors. Gary Mar, minister responsible for seniors, said that no decision had been made on health care insurance. He also suggested that "we cannot personally canvas the opinions of some 230,000 seniors in the province of Alberta" (ibid.: Oct. 9, A7). Now it seemed even the meaning of "listening" was framed by limitations.

The second full week of October was centred on a closed meeting between Labour Minister Stockwell Day and the representatives of the four health care unions who said 12,000 jobs would be lost in the four year process if the government balanced its budget. The unions threatened to hold a Saturday rally, the largest in Alberta history. Revealing the caveat placed on who the government would "listen" to, the premier now said he *would not listen to protesters* (ibid.: Oct. 13). The week ended with Stockwell Day and the health care unions breaking from their meetings and "compromising" on the issue of hospital rollbacks. The unions' representatives said they might consider rollbacks if they had a say in the long term plans. Day promised that the 5% cut would only be a one time event and that the proposed \$900 million cut over the four years was only a target. The unions had until November 23 to come up with a strategy of their own (ibid.: Oct. 15). On the weekend the unions staged their rally on the steps of the legislature.

The week also included a four day workshop for "Advanced Education 'Visions'" at a cost of \$30,000, including the costs of retaining the services of Futures Invention Association International for the process of "deep imaging" the future of advanced

education in the province (*ibid.*: Oct.12). Having shifted the meaning of the definition of "listening" several times, the government was now intending to listen to what "Albertans" had to say about Advanced Education. The "Budget Roundtable Workbook" of November 1993 was to become the key text to spark public interest but the government process had already been proceeding behind closed doors for some time (MC 1991; FAL 1991; AL 1993). In addition to health care and education, advanced education was now added to the *public* politicization process.

In the first three weeks of October, the political rhythm had changed from that of September. The serpent had stirred. Now, well into October, a federal election neared its appointed hour on October 25 and the provincial government of Alberta was reformulating its contingency plans to deal with the unions for the first time. If this period cannot be described as one of dialogue, at least the rhetoric of give and take marked it off from the month of September. The strategic plan was still in place as Klein prepared to depart to Asia following the outcome of the federal election. Government spokespersons were silent except for a brief announcement to cut \$5 million for visits to chiropractors, physical therapists and foot specialists. Health care workers were also formulating their strategy.

The ongoing ferment over education symbolized by the "kindergarten" issue had not gone away and the government's use of the "roundtable" discussions for legitimization of the strategic plan had become transparent to many interested parties. On October 22, in a carnivalesque reversal of meaning, the Alberta Teachers' Association (ATA) president Bauni Mackay declared that the government roundtables on education were a sham. Teachers from across Alberta would launch a \$500,000 advertising campaign and hold their own "roundtables," and instead of limiting the interaction to a select 120 people, the teacher's would open their roundtables to the public at large (*ibid.*: Oct. 22).

Premier Klein was set to depart for Asia at the end of the week. On October 25, Liberal leader Jean Chretien attained a majority win in the Canadian federal election. The Reform Party, representing much of Klein's rural constituency, swept the moribund federal Progressive Conservatives out of Alberta.

On Wednesday, October 27 the social order ruptured in an unanticipated way and for a brief few days the scientific managers no longer "represented" Alberta. Where the month of September belonged to the strategic planners and the first half of October belonged to the push and push between department ministers and health care unions and associations, unexpectedly, one head of the hydra would act, and for a brief moment the end of October would belong to an uprising of urban high school students.

On Wednesday, approximately 3,000 Calgary high school students poured into the downtown core demanding that education funding not be cut. They blocked traffic and marched to city hall and then staged a rally in front of the provincial MacDougall Centre. The police praised the students' orderly conduct but the premier blamed the teachers for rallying the students -- including his daughter and granddaughter -- against him. He pronounced to the legislature his conspiracy theory that "there is something going on in the classrooms" and he would use the Truancy Act to firmly enforce attendance rules (*ibid.*: Oct. 28). Students responded that they were frustrated with government actions and did not need teachers to arouse their own actions. Edmonton students from Victoria and Eastglen confirmed that they would organize a march in support of their Calgary colleagues.

On Thursday, approximately 900 students gathered at the Alberta legislature building. They chanted "Down with Ralph" and banged on the doors as police struggled to keep them out. Students, representing at least ten Edmonton schools, pressed their specific demands concerning cuts to drama, physical education, religious courses and language programs. Klein backed down on his threat to take legal action but called the students



"disobedient" and repeated his claim that the teachers were instigating the insubordination. Although the "listening" premier and the education minister offered to meet student council leaders, Klein left within hours for his three-week tour of Asia. In question period, the deputy premier Ken Kowalski was asked to respond to the protests. He stated: "Protest? What protests?" (ibid.: Oct. 29).

The energy of the students stirred other heads of the serpent. On the following Saturday, 2000 Calgary students, teachers and parents held their own "roundtable" at the Jack Singer Concert Hall to urge the provincial government not to cut the education system. The organizers announced they would prepare their own report from the high school roundtables. Liberal leader Lawrence Decore pronounced that "the wheels have now fallen off the Klein initiative. . . ." (ibid.: Oct. 31). Edmonton Public and Separate teachers' locals held a similar public forum for approximately 3,500 people on November 1 at the Edmonton Convention Centre in the presence of Education Minister Halvor Jonson as part of a growing campaign for support against cutbacks which included rural locals from across the province (*ATA News* 1993: Nov. 16). The Alberta Chamber of Commerce was not pleased about the new focus on particular cuts and decried how the discussions had gotten off the track of deficit reduction (*CBC Radio* 1993: Nov. 24).

The Edmonton and Calgary meetings produced the few first public texts concerning a counter-vision for the year 2000. The Calgarians argued that the government should direct cuts at the administrative level; save kindergarten; develop year round schooling; regionalize rural school boards; retain math, English, social science, science, fine arts and physical education as core programs; eliminate driver education, hunter education, swimming, skiing, and outdoor education; and use lottery funds and higher taxes to meet educational expenditures. But, the serpent was trapped. To press their oppositional demands, teachers, students and parents had to use the same language as the strategic planners and argue that: "politicians should view education as an investment not as an expense" (EJ 1993: Oct. 31, A5).

Contrary to Decore's statement, the "wheels" had not fallen off the Klein initiative. The events of late October and early November 1993 meant the planners had to take a second breath, poll the province, recalculate their tactics and rearticulate their intentions in order to meet the requirements of the strategy. The "vision," most still agreed, was "an investment not an expense."

The premier's return from the Asia trip was immediately marked by his investment plans. He announced (as the representative of "Alberta") a rollback to *the budgets* of 5% -- including the biggest ticket item -- the wages of 164,000 public sector workers. This was not a politically legislated rollback but a financially legislated rollback, a down-loading of provincial responsibility to negotiate voluntary rollbacks at the local level. The impending wage cuts, warned Carol Anne Dean, president of Alberta Union of Provincial Employees and leader of Alberta's largest union, will create "one of the biggest labor battles ever seen in this province" (ibid.: Nov. 25, A6). Whether this kind of challenge would be the case or whether this was merely a case of union jingoism in the face political impotency is for history to decide. By the end of October 1994 such a battle had not arisen and the unions capitulated to Klein's first offensive. The "kindergarten issue" had instigated a new management strategy for the government. The public sector workers and local administrators would now have to justify why educational programming for the universal "Albertan" should be sacrificed in the narrow interest of a particular segment of public wage-earners. The lead editorial in *The Edmonton Journal* outlined the new dilemma: "the public employees face the choice of submitting or being clubbed into submission" (ibid.:

A16). Clearly, cultural hegemony shifted back to the government's strategic planners, and the many-headed hydra, although not yet put to rest, retreated.

To the practical scientist of management, the awakening of the many-headed hydra and the unexpected challenges to the social order are considered "social problems" of dysfunction and not the result of resistance to illegitimate power. In Alberta, though, this resistance might have been anticipated as "the biggest labour battle." But this battle did not occur in 1993-94. Was the new scientific management even more effective than expected? Management scientists are paid by their *clients* to predict, plan and change technical relations while maintaining or even enhancing the tradition of unequal property relations. Their job is to anticipate contingent challenges. Planners order the future through the construction of "action plans." To retain their legitimacy they must meet the requirements of the "vision" and restore "equilibrium to the "functioning" social order. Their political practice involves using natural scientific methods of objectification and applying their experimental gaze to the actions of human beings. In the formal case, the "truth" of a scientific theory is validated by the reliability of its predictions. But the practitioners of management science know that the validation of truth is a two edged sword when it comes to politics. "Truth" can be achieved by an alternate method. By manipulating the dialectic of science and power, the scientific managers know that the reliability of a prediction can also be achieved by an act of power that reconstructs human subjectivity to meet the criteria of an absolutized theoretical vision. In this latter case, they can slay the serpent and make the "truth" happen. A dysfunctional system can be ameliorated by putting "things" back in their place rather than revolutionized by changing the relationship between the "things." These "things," though, for the scientific managers are real people. And truth in this case is the subjective identity of people who are acted upon as objects. Slaying the serpent or "managing" the identity of Albertans is a subtle and contradictory process because it attempts to *make the truth happen* within conditions not solely of the managers' choosing, an ambiguous labyrinth of anonymous relations, entangling both slayer and slain.

In the war of position between slayer and slain the hegemonic intelligentsia effectively controlled the economic and political resources in the constitution of *Toward 2000 Together* and mastered the metanarrative that informed and legitimated discussion and justified normative and empirical truths. In keeping with the above metaphor, they were able to slay one head of the hydra and keep the serpent at bay. *Toward 2000 Together* established the topography for an outbreak of hostilities even if it did not anticipate the initiation of a war of maneuver by radicalized high school students. When the Klein government initiated its election promise to balance the budget and cut or privatize government services, it met little *unexpected* resistance -- and even less expected resistance from the public sector unions. But the unexpected challenge by high school students in Edmonton and Calgary was unable to sustain its own momentum. The intellectual and organizational elements provided by a war of position were not in place and the resistance was unable to challenge government reforms or the narrative of *Toward 2000 Together*. The strategic planners retained the upper hand and resistance to implementation collapsed by the spring of 1994.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Postscript on the future: in the spring of 1994, public education took its hit and most Alberta teachers received a 5% cut in salary without challenging in any substantial way the prerogatives established by *Toward 2000 Together*. In response to similar cuts in other provinces, Ontario teachers received a reduced work-year, Nova Scotia teachers participated in a general strike (and withdrew to sign a "sweetheart" deal) and Newfoundland teachers went on strike. In Alberta -- also as part of the first phase of implementation -- cuts to higher education, health care and social services also met few challenges. By the middle of 1994, Klein's second phase of implementation began and points to a future beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, the initiative on the

### 9.3. An Alternative Dies?

The last section identified one challenge to the political legitimacy of *Toward 2000 Together* by a non-traditional political movement lacking the economic resources, heroic intellectual leadership and a counter-hegemonic language. This section offers an analytical narrative about the demise of the Science Council of Canada and the loss of a potential alternative to the corporatist postmodernization narrative. In this case, though, a closer look at the counter-narrative reveals a discourse which is inadequate to the task of challenging the metanarrative of corporate postmodernism or the scientific legitimacy of *Toward 2000 Together*.

In past sections I showed that *the visioning process* of the provincial *Toward 2000 Together* strategy and the national Prosperity Initiative has provided a vehicle whereby the corporate postmodernization narrative can assimilate not only the technocratic thesis from liberalism but also a modernist vision of progress from individualistic salvationism. I have also shown that this metanarrative of postmodern pastiche -- as a totality -- escapes rational and scientific critique and that a political movement dedicated to anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-imperialist and anti-class values may face difficulties in mobilizing people by articulating their agenda *solely* on the basis of incremental reforms and a vision of technocratic liberalism in a welfare state.

I chose the case of the Scientific Council of Canada as an exemplar of technocratic reformism for two major reasons related to its *absence* in the *Toward 2000 Together* discourse. First, it illustrates how the institutions and symbolic resources of technocratic reformism are vulnerable to acts of exclusion during rightist retrenchment. Second, it reveals that even if its presence could be guaranteed, it is questionable whether it offers a viable narrative to challenge corporate postmodernism.

As an illustration for acts of exclusion, the *Toward 2000 Together* navigators simply ignored such points of view that might contradict their core definitions of the "new reality" or create ambiguities in their representations of the future as "fact." This is not to claim that the navigators necessarily set out to exclude such views -- although in preceding chapters I have suggested that they continually used exclusion as a strategy when seeking out those experts who were committed to "the vision" (RAC 1992; RRT 1992). Experts provided a means to narrow and simplify the discussions rather than extend and complicate them. The navigators limited *access* to the public and closed forums and marginalized any views similar to those expressed by the Science Council (RRF 1992; RRT 1992).

More importantly, such points of view were not given a position of political or scientific authority to construct or to challenge the framing of the *Toward 2000 Together* discourse. The Science Council's documents remind people that alternate points of view are available to provide scientific authority. (This latter characteristic of a literate culture allows knowledge to be depersonalized, take anonymous forms and create truth effects beyond the intentions of the authors.) To claim, as might the navigators, that such points of view were not from "Alberta" overlooks the fact that the navigators were not averse to choosing an array of non-Albertan participants for their expert authorities. In addition, to claim that such alternate points of view were not ideologically "Albertan" but "Canadian" would undermine the claim that the scientific knowledge introduced into *Toward 2000 Together* was objective and universal or that the expert opinion chosen by the navigators

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future appears to belong to the strategic managers and the corporate postmodernization narrative. The present may again become the future. After a year of implementation Klein's popular support had risen to 60%.

had conclusively validated the truth about the "new global reality." The Toward 2000 Together navigators, then, have a weak logical claim against absenting the ideas of the Science Council in their discussions.

On the other hand, the navigators could claim that there were *practical* reasons for absenting the Science Council *as an organization* simply because it simply no longer existed. Even if the navigators had considered soliciting the "Science Council," they could not. This latter claim does have some value. The Mulroney government did disband the Science Council *before* it could make presentations directly to Toward 2000 Together (or indirectly via the Prosperity Initiative as did other organizations like the National Research Council and the Maharishi International Academy [IOF 1992:71]). This practical claim lacks substance though. The Science Council's former members and documents were still available as resources for Toward 2000 Together. If the navigators were truly interested in "information," they might have provided participants with the Science Council's documents to create some interesting debates (e.g. at the Calgary Conference over the definition of "competitiveness"). The Toward 2000 Together navigators, also, have a weak practical claim against absenting the ideas of the Science Council in their discussions.

But merely confronting this exclusionary claim in the above way does not distinguish the power to make public presentations from the power to regulate public discourse. It is the latter power which I have emphasized throughout this study as central to the exercise of hegemony. The Science Council lacks this regulatory power and the Banff Centre for Management and the Steering Group on Prosperity have it. The Science Council's exclusion from the exercise of regulatory power thus illustrates how such state-sponsored institutional structures and alternate symbolic resources are vulnerable to the regulatory intelligentsia who frame the corporatist postmodern *metanarrative* and to New Right politicians who lead the attacks on the Canadian welfare state.

The second reason I chose the Science Council for an exemplar is because of my doubts that its narrative can offer a viable challenge to corporate postmodernism. This latter claim is crucial to my discussion about how metanarratives are used to create truth effects. In this case, I chose a Science Council document as an exemplar for its metanarrational limitations. *Even if the Science Council's discourse was made available to Toward 2000 Together participants, it is doubtful whether the discursive resources provided by technocratic modernism can challenge the metanarrational sophistication of a corporate postmodern vision used to strategically manage people's desires.* In making this latter claim, I chose a document that is *exceptionally strong* in making the reformist case. So not only was such a discourse absent from Toward 2000 Together, there remains an unanswered question about whether such a discourse can (even in the best probable circumstances) challenge the corporatist postmodernization narrative for the metanarrational high ground.

The fundamental problem with The Science Council's metanarration is that it reproduces the limitations of the liberal technocratic narrative that I criticized in Chapter Five (Section 4: "The Poverty of Technocratic Reformism."). To repeat: *Welfare liberals and reform socialists will, in the end, have to subordinate their empiricism to the grammar of the New Right.* Without a new grammar to narrate an emancipatory narrative, leftists will probably face increasing incredulity from a sceptical public. In Chapter Five I concluded that the origins of reform liberalism are closely aligned with the grammar of positivism that rests on the metaphysic of industry and technology and a belief that an eternal accommodation of mutual benefit can be achieved between labour and capital. The historical durability of this positivist narrative, though, does not guarantee it a self-evident eternal validity. To make my case I first situate the discourse of the Science Council of

Canada as a counter-point to the dominant Liberal and Conservative approaches to "modernist" dependent development. Second, I review the *visionary* commentary by Chairman Janet Halliwell. Third, I review and criticize *Reaching for Tomorrow*. This report was the Science Council's last and confronts many of the same issues debated in the Toward 2000 Together consultations. The report offers an alternate reading of global competitiveness, the information economy, scientific research, educational reform, environmentalism, and the new frontiers. It differs substantially both in its conclusions and style of metanarration provided by the Banff Centre's navigators and offers a potential but limited counter-point to Alberta's Toward 2000 Together.

In February 1992 the federal government under Brian Mulroney announced in its budget speech its decision to disband the Science Council of Canada (*Reaching for Tomorrow* [RT] 1992). The decision to eliminate an alternate voice on science and technology policy was in keeping with a more general tendency of successive Liberal and Conservative governments to emphasize continentalist strategies and favour dependent development.

The history of the Science Council of Canada is closely tied to the postwar politics of natural resource management and the attempt by successive Canadian governments to use dependent development as a strategy for modernization. According to Melissa Clark-Jones (1987), in 1982 the Liberal federal government had already reorganized its economic development portfolios to reaffirm an emphasis on continentalism and on import-substitution at the expense of a nationalist industrial development strategy that would reduce dependency on staples exports. The restructuring followed a rejection of the 1980 Gray Report which called for the monitoring and regulating of branch plants to ensure innovation and export freedom. The Gray Report was another attempt at reform in keeping with the 1970 Watkins Report on foreign ownership and a series of policy criticisms mounted by the Science Council of Canada on the frailty of Canadian technological and manufacturing structures because of their dependency on the American economy. The major academic adherents to the nationalist anti-staples paradigm were Harold Innis, Mel Watkins, Wallace Clement and Larry Pratt. This "Innis school" emphasized regulating and reducing staples dependence, technological weakness, and foreign control to overcome free-trade blockages to Canadian industrialization. Instead, governments chose to support an open-door strategy concerning foreign investment and manufactures and to emphasize import-substitution and staples-led exports (see Laxer 1991 for an extensive treatment of Canadian development theory).

The choice in the 1980s to stay the course with continentalism as the dominant strategy by both Liberal and Conservative governments since World War II had its academic adherents in W.A. Mackintosh, H.G. Johnson, H.E. English and A.E. Safarian and its initial bureaucratic adherents in Finance as well Industry, Trade and Commerce under C.D. Howe. Later adherents, such as H.A. Olson, Minister of Economic Development in 1981 and Michael Wilson, Minister of International Trade, during the NAFTA negotiations, continued to adhere to the continentalist thesis. It is important to remember, then, that the continentalist economic theory and strategy accelerated by the Mulroney's free trade policies and the Prosperity Initiative discussed in the last chapter were not new but rather the acceleration of an already present logic. Even before the election of Mulroney or the report of the Macdonald Commission, the Liberal budget of 1981 under the guidance of Olson's development strategy called for resource-led investment in megaprojects (excepting energy development) and not monitoring foreign investment. While the Alberta government rejected any kind of restrictions on energy, the policy direction, whether Albertan or Canadian, Conservative or Liberal, was based on the assumption that Canadian industrial

development was best accomplished by producing spinoffs on the basis of supporting megaprojects rather than promoting industrial development.

Such an emphasis has not produced the results the promoters foresaw. Instead, over and over again, the result has been increasing centralization and control over existing productive facilities and resources and the elimination of market and financing access for new and smaller enterprises (Clark-Jones 1987). It is interesting, then, that promoters for a knowledge-based and value-added strategy, such as Don Simpson and Ken McCreedy, continue to assume that a continentalist strategy for Alberta or Canada or that giving priority to the staples-energy sector can successfully achieve their intended goal to develop a *new* economy for Canada. Rather, it seems, that contributing to the legitimization of such a strategy in the name of "efficiency" will only foster the success of a few giant continental and international resource companies and block the success of an indigenously controlled knowledge-based industrial strategy.

The federal Liberals under Lester B. Pearson created the Science Council of Canada in 1966 to advise the government on science and technology policy. Given almost virtual autonomy from ministerial direction, the Council had been able to continually publish work expressing different view points by authors that were certified by the council for their reliability and methodology. The Council published background studies, consensus reports, and the proceedings of workshops and conferences. The Council's legitimacy was based on its wide representation from the Canadian scientific community, both academic and private. As a national advisor on emerging problems and opportunities, it championed university research and lobbied against government predisposition to cut budgets. Its most enduring preoccupation had been to advocate for a national industrial strategy against the mainstream of government, bureaucratic and academic adherents for a continentalist strategy (Millin 1988).

The Science Council of Canada intended *Reaching for Tomorrow: Science and Technology Policy in Canada 1991* (RT) to be the first in a series of annual reports to "review and interpret Canada's science and technology policies and activities, thereby contributing to the development of a coherent national science and technology agenda" (RT 1992: 2). As it worked out, the report was both the first and the last in the series. The Council's goal was to undertake the task of operating at arm's length from government to review the agreements and disagreements over the numerous policies, programs and positions and to evaluate the plethora of initiatives in light of identifying national priorities. The Council's focus was to be on the two central topics already discussed in the previous chapters: (1) competitiveness and innovation, and (2) science and technology policy. Specifically, the report evaluated the various points of view concerning the relationship between innovation and competition and the various applications of policy to (1) education, training and literacy, (2) industrial innovation and technology, (3) infrastructure for science and technology, (4) environmental impacts of science and technology and (5) new frontiers.

What is the Science Council's vision? *Reaching for Tomorrow* presents an alternate vision for the *new* economy and provides a point of departure in both substantive content and style of presentation from both *Toward 2000 Together* and the *Prosperity Initiative*. In the Chairman's message Janet Halliwell enunciates a vision of the future by evoking the spirit of Lester B. Pearson who created the Council in 1966 and who had dual interest in promoting science and technology's role in enhancing quality of life and developing the more general welfare of Canadians. She discusses "the phenomenon of globalization" and emphasizes that "those nations that cannot deploy science and technology to compete effectively in global markets stagnate or decline" (RT 1992: 10). While acknowledging the

importance of the *new* phenomenon, she distances her position from those in *Toward 2000 Together* and the Prosperity Initiative by suggesting that the Canadian response is neither straightforward nor simple. She posits that a reasoned debate must precede strategic action. She states that "the essence of the solution [is] in our people." She makes a rhetorical claim similar to that of the continentalists, in that, she promotes the Council's particular interest in the name of the universal public. But where the continentalists identify that the characteristic to be nourished in the people is "entrepreneurship," Halliwell differs. Salvation depends on "how well we nurture and benefit from the intellectual strength of Canadians -- on the way we use our skills and intellectual resources in a flexible and continuously evolving economy" (ibid.: 11). Her distinction is crucial and pervades *Reaching Tomorrow Together*.

The report argues that "intellectual capacity" fosters innovation (new technologies) and competitiveness (productivity) as opposed to "innovation (free enterprise) and competitiveness (free trade)" fostering the intellectual capacity of the nation. Her emphasis on an intellectual class (the scientific intelligentsia) over an entrepreneurial classes (the capitalists and managers) allows her to claim the necessity of balance between the state and the market as opposed to the continentalists subsuming all logic within the market. She claims that even though the new concepts of management and business are revolutionizing the global process of wealth generation, competitive success is "increasingly characterized by the efforts of firms, often aided by governments, to systematically harness science and technology to gain advantage over others in national and international markets." She also claims that an innovative culture linking science and technology (S&T) infrastructures with managerial and organizational innovation cannot flourish in isolation and requires that "governments shape S&T systems according to their philosophies of the appropriate balance between public intervention and market forces and the values of their citizens" (ibid.: 11).

The Science Council's discourse clearly shifts away from the implicit service theory of *Toward 2000 Together*. Here "historical and cultural factors" are treated as just as important as "economic conditions." Halliwell states that there are "limits to unfettered economic growth." And the goal of sustainable development is "the pursuit of a higher quality of life, rather than a brute struggle for survival" (ibid.: 11-12). *Reaching For Tomorrow* no longer reveals the terrain of Social Darwinism where "quality of life" was just another marketable commodity. Halliwell assumes that quality of life must be evaluated by a different set of values embedded in history and culture, and these values transcend governance via market values. Halliwell intends science to mediate state and market, and therein lies the power of science and the legitimation of its carriers, scientists and technologists. Note though, a confluence of interest between state, market and science in a technological fix for social development or what Halliwell calls "the extensive but judicious use of science and technology" (RT 1992: 12). Included is a claim for the "societal support for science and technology" but this is also a universalizing claim by scientists and technologists to appropriate "intellectuality" for themselves. "There is also wide societal support for intellectual activity at the frontiers of science and engineering -- the challenges that enrich and satisfy the human soul. This is an essential part of the science base" (ibid.: 12). There is, though, a recognition that science and engineering cannot determine the meaning of "history" and "culture" or in fact evaluate the "judicious use of science and technology." Halliwell, also recognizes that all is not well in the relationship between the moral-practical discourse of the public sphere and the scientific enterprise. She writes that

there is, however, deep public scepticism about some of the supposed fruits of science and technology, especially if they are seen as leading to deterioration of the environment or unrestrained commercialism. Public support is essential for the health of the scientific enterprise and the effectiveness of its application. To this end, the cultural, social and human dimensions of science and technology must be kept in mind if we are to have a balanced integration of S&T into the economy and society.(ibid.: 12)

Halliwell clearly understands how the mechanisms of market functioning may undermine historical and cultural quality of life of Canadians and how the mechanisms of state-functioning may enhance scientific innovation and technological improvements and ameliorate the negative aspects of capitalism. This clearly puts her and the Science Council at odds with *Toward 2000 Together*. Still, Halliwell and the Science Council's position is both contradictory and morally vulnerable. Their emancipatory potential can be either coopted or it can provide another form of blocked emancipation. The report, thus, does not fundamentally challenge Social Darwinism but offers a way to ameliorate its functioning with scientific "balancing" via the nation-state.

In identifying Canadian dilemmas she recognizes that success in the new business environment depends on the development of "intellectual capital" and coupling "knowledge, training, skills and hard work" to "private sector vision and capital" (ibid.: 12). Her concern is with effective public policy in developing intellectual resources. Yet, she differs from the continentalists. While using the same criterion of "effectivity" in the pursuit of developing intellectual resources, she acknowledges the strength of the university system which "bears the characteristics of a system appropriate to a modern industrial economy" and lays the blame for weak "knowledge inputs" on the private sector which "seems to behave like a semi-industrial state" (ibid.: 13). When it comes to technological innovation and knowledge capitalization, business is not the solution but rather the problem. In this instance, it is an active and productive private sector which has to create demand. "The solution is not to renounce or diminish our commitment to scientific and technological education or research" (ibid.). Furthermore, in calling for business to take care of business and the state, universities and scientists to take care of education, she also couples here argument with a concern that "technology can be deployed in a manner consistent with the goals of social justice and environmental sustainability" (ibid.). Nevertheless, in calling for more accessibility to mathematics, science and technical subjects and opportunities for both specialized concentration and multi-disciplinary education, she still argues for two-tier streaming for mass and higher education to achieve this goal. She writes that on one hand there should be education and training for the "broad purposes of society" and on the other hand "the development of particular intellectual skills, including research and development capacity" (ibid.). The approach of Halliwell thus reveals a bid for ruling power by the technical intelligentsia. She calls for a "meritocratic" hierarchy based on intellectuality rather than entrepreneurship and for a retention of differential rewards based on the sale of labour power. She believes that the business class is unable to make economic gains with the excellent intellectual resources provided by Canadian science. The problem is the business class and not the science and education community.

Within the Science Council's paradigm, lifelong learning and sustainable development thus take on a slightly different thrust than that promoted by *Toward 2000 Together*. "Lifelong learning" and the "learning culture" are not reduced to business skills and culture but are conceptually broadened. "The quality of the social culture in which R&D activities are embedded is at least as important as R&D itself" (ibid.). "Sustainable development" does focus on "adding value, reducing waste, and controlling consumption patterns" (ibid.:



14) but unlike the free market theory, the limits to growth are located more in consumption patterns than on resource deficiency. Implicit to this argument are theoretical differences between demand-driven and supply-side economic growth models. The focus on consumption therefore requires a shift away from viewing the state and science as mere facilitators of environmental and energy productivity (business profitability) to that of viewing the state and science as the managers of the relationship between public policy and consumer patterns concerning resource use. So while both theories emphasize the managerial state, the former emphasizes the hegemony of business administration and the latter scientific understanding.

To make the latter claim, at least in this instant, Halliwell presupposes the need for a "national response" to transcend and *balance* science and business. In this sense, Canadian history, culture, and social justice are treated as the *prima facie* evidence to support the claim that scientific development is more than a business enterprise but a source of national development. It is in the name of the "national interest" that Chairman Halliwell and the Science Council of Canada are able to stake their claim for social legitimacy. They argue that action must be taken concerning innovation and competitiveness. But action must "blend vision with realism," foster "no oversimplification" and encompass "a better understanding of the nature of science and technology and their interrelated support systems. . ." (ibid.: 14).

How does a "national response" guarantee *realism* (as well as vision) and *understanding* (as well strategic action)? "The Science Council has a continuing role -- as do many others -- in analysing S&T policy options and catalysing that action" (ibid.). The Mulroney government obviously did not agree and eliminated the Science Council after 26 years of service. Since the position of the Science Council dissented from the *new* consensus being manufactured by the Prosperity Initiative, the federal government chose to eliminate the oppositional discourse rather than allowing its counter-claims to circulate in the public sphere.

The theories of social development promoted by the adherents of *Toward 2000 Together* and the Prosperity Initiative were different from that promoted by Halliwell and the Science Council of Canada. Where one promoted the totalization of globalized and unfettered market forces, the other promoted a dualism between science and industry mediated by the state. But a review of the text also reveals that not only were there differences in the content of the two theories of development, there were also stylistic differences in the use of "theory" and in the grammatical structuring of the discourse. Rather than viewing theory as an expression of faith, that is, a point of view applied to the data, *Reaching for Tomorrow* treats theory as an expression of scientific reason, that is, a point of view justified by counter-argumentation and a variety of evidence. The discursive nature of *Reaching for Tomorrow* distinguishes itself not only by prescribing a different point of view but also by *how* it prescribes that point of view.

The report is self-conscious about the above difference and initiates the discussion of "competitiveness" with the statement "it has been called a cliché, 'the C word', and an evangelical pursuit. It has engaged the media, business, and most citizens. It has been the subject of analysis, polemic, rhetoric, and extensive consultation by governments at every level. And yet, the issue of competitiveness -- which lies at the very core of our long-term well-being -- remains unresolved" (ibid.: 18). In calling the debate about competitiveness as "partial and rather lopsided," the report cuts to the core in a definitional struggle and challenges the fact that a "debate" has really occurred. The report clearly targets not only the lack of clear and responsible leadership but also how leadership is exercised. "There seems to be a preference in some business circles for opinion over vision and a reliance in

academic circles on old practices, while some government circles seem to have opted for a process of excessive -- or at least, unfocused -- consultation" (ibid.: 30).

So instead of assuming only one definition or kind of competitiveness, the report initiated debate by problematizing the elusiveness of the concept "competitiveness": first as it applies to the competitiveness at the levels of firm, sector, nation and international comparisons and then as it applies to different analytical approaches. In reviewing the varied concepts, the report also provides criticisms and suggestions. For example, in evaluating "traditional analytical approaches" the report concludes that "all in all it is difficult to find any solace in approaches based on productivity as a key to competition. Productivity growth remains an important piece of the puzzle, but it is in no way the whole picture" (ibid.: 22). What I am pointing out here is not that *Reaching for Tomorrow* comes to a different conclusion than the adherents of *Toward 2000 Together*, but that it comes to different conclusion in a different way. As I showed in earlier chapters, conclusions were not end points derived from defending a thesis through argument, counter-argument and evidence but rather a thesis was stated as an unjustified assumption and used to organize the evidence, provide examples and justify recommendations. While *Reaching for Tomorrow* also provides examples and makes recommendations, it does so only *after* a thorough reading and critique of counter-evidence and the construction of an argument. This procedure of scientific reasoning is used to dealing with education, industrial innovation, infrastructure and new frontiers. Although the report also attempts to mobilize public opinion, the intent for mobilization was that it was to be based on public debate rather than merely proselytizing for urgent action in accordance with the *new* reality.

The report thus raises uncomfortable questions occluded from *Toward 2000 Together* and the Prosperity Initiative. The interest in these questions is not simply to promote an alternate faith in the state or in science, but rather to promote a reasonable and scientific grounding for public decisions. What is sacralized is the Canadian public sphere. So rather than exhibiting boosterism and positive thinking, the report exposes the reader to the potential vulnerabilities for Canada in adapting to the *new* economy "because it is still dependent on undifferentiated resource industries for a large part of its wealth creation." The report continues: "We are heavily dependent on trade with the United States, and our trade pattern is narrowing. We are technologically dependent and our industrial structure is narrow" (ibid.: 29).

In discussing whether Canadians can lose out in their move to the *new* economy, the answer becomes variable rather than assured. Without careful analysis, Canada could deepen its dependency even if intending to escape it. The report is able to invert the claims of visionary hegemony attributed to business economics and public consultation and call government actions "mere proxies for leadership -- as indications of the absence of vision" (ibid.: 30). The report takes the high ground and argues that vision without analysis, evidence and debate actually represents the "absence of vision." Vision now belongs to those who specify concepts, data, critique and counter-critique before proceeding. Such a counter-view of "competitiveness," the Council claims, is truly "a visionary activity" (ibid.).

In making its first substantive argument, the Science Council concludes that it is too early to ascertain the importance or effect of education, training and literacy for social development or on any sector of the Canadian economy. The Council reviews the literature and assumptions surrounding the Prosperity Initiative's views on education and found that "the underlying assumption directing these efforts is that a change in individual and collective attitudes will result in changes in individual and collective behavior. There is not much evidence that these types of programs or strategies work./ Neither is there evidence to

suggest that Canada is any less equipped or trained to define and solve problems than any other country" (ibid.: 46). In specifically evaluating *Learning Well. . . Living Well* as an exemplar of proposed action, the Council suggests that the prescribed target offers no fiscal or policy changes to facilitate action except to suggest the everyone has a part to play.

The Council ranks Canada's educational standards with high regard and concludes that the reason why the nation's industries and public institutions have not harnessed these already existing human resources are perhaps for the same reasons "that industry and government have failed to add value to Canada's other natural resources -- its trees, fish, land, and water" (ibid.). Instead of scape-goating the economic crisis on education, the Council identifies the problematic of Canadian economic development as the result of an ongoing way the *economy* is organized -- alluding to dependent development. "Until some answers can be found to this fundamental question, the educational, training, or literacy solutions offered to revitalize Canada's economy will be viewed, at best, as tinkering" (ibid.).

In assessing the varied findings concerning industrial innovation and technology, the Science Council concludes that business people tend to view global challenges from a *limited* perspective which focuses on government regulation, lack of venture capital and firm size. Although more optimistic about R&D expenditures, the Science Council cites the Conference Board's *R&D Outlook 1992* to call for an increase for business to become more outgoing and to develop more risk-taking attitudes in order to develop future strategic technology partnerships. In the face of globalization and increasing competitiveness, the Council calls for a marketing focus on technology-intensive trade and reviews how the federal, provincial and municipal governments have put in place supporting policies and programs to stimulate innovation while accounting for budgetary constraints.

The Council believes that Canadians have little choice if they want to retain their high standard of living but to move toward a value-added economy. However, it argues, that Canada already has a good start in developing knowledge-based industries and there already exists a well-developed *publicly* funded R&D infrastructure on which to build. After reviewing examples of such developments, the Council identifies that the greatest effect on innovation is Canada's closeness to the United States and the move towards a North American free trade agreement. The Council does not criticize the FTA but rather calls for an awareness of the important implications of market positioning, cooperative ventures and strategic plans for individual technology-based sectors which must accommodate regional perspectives as well (ibid.: 62-63). Success demands "enabling public and private structures. . ." (ibid.: 63).

In assessing the varied findings concerning infrastructures for science and technology, the Science Council concludes that "the bickering will have to stop" (ibid.: 81). It calls for government, industry and academe to work together through constructive dialogue. After reviewing all the various federal and provincial cooperative infrastructure programs, the Council emphasizes that a better appreciation is required for how science is actually conducted and how industrial innovation takes place. It is skeptical of simplistic solutions, such as "a system of outright scientific 'laissez faire'" (ibid.: 79). It writes that a coherent framework for policies must account for the different dynamics of fundamental research, applied science, technological development and the design and manufacture of new products and processes (ibid.: 81).

In assessing the varied findings concerning the environmental impacts of science and technology, the Science Council identifies four approaches to sustainable development: (1) an integrated and balanced approach to environmental and economic factors; (2) an approach precluding economic growth; (3) an approach preserving the environment and

economic growth and combining technological advance with wealth generation; and (4) an approach emphasizing business as usual. The Council reviewed the preparation for the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (Earth Summit) to be held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and the "Earth Charter." The Council argues that "it is not yet clear, however, that domestic Canadian actions and attitudes are developing in accordance with this global vision" (ibid.: 85). The Council identifies that the \$3 billion Green plan and the multi-million dollar initiatives ranging from clean-up technology, the study of the ozone layer, the development of commercially viable pollution abatement technologies and multi-disciplinary ecosystem research and training have potential but in evaluating "progress" it decided that it would be premature to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs. Nevertheless, they raise and evaluate some crucial questions related "to the lack of a clear overarching conceptual framework, to the integration of what appear to be piecemeal efforts, and to the feasibility of the rate of change for the industry" (ibid.: 86).

The Council then reviews the environmental assessment legislation, the regulations and enforcement procedures and the federal, provincial and municipal initiatives. The Council also reviews the response of the private sector and the apparent movement in the thinking of business on public accountability. "The evidence indicates that at least some firms in Canada are placing increasing importance on the integration of environmental concerns within the usual processes of business management, with an emphasis on the development of more environmentally benign processes and products" (ibid.: 87). The Council also indicates that there has been an increasing willingness by industry to participate in serious consultation and consensus-building with environmentalists on particular projects. It then reviewed the actions and evaluated certain problematics created by industry and labour over the potential for business closures and job losses. The Council identifies as particularly ineffective industry attention to the changes in public expectations in years when good returns on investment could have been directed to ensure competitiveness by introducing new production processes and pollution controls. The Council cites Porter to justify the claim that "global competitiveness can be fostered by innovation that responds to stiffer environmental regulations" (ibid.: 88). Then the Council criticizes the lost opportunities created by corporate threats to close factories in order to mobilize workers and communities against firmer regulatory policies.

The Council then suggests that even though many decisions are consistent with sustainability there are many other decisions that contradict sustainable development principles. The Council identifies this position as "business as usual" (ibid.: 89) and cites the "poor marks" given by the environmental groups' 1991 report card on environmental protection, the OECD's 1990 *State of the Environment* report and the Resource Futures International's (1991) *Environmental Assessment of the Federal Budget*. The Council remains skeptical about the misleading indications that these reports might give because they lack a broader examination of the ecosystem context which should also include an examination of both the economic and environmental balance sheet. After citing a series of related reports, the Council identified how policy and project environmental assessments have fueled the most heated environmental debates, especially concerning federal and provincial jurisdictions. The Council also compiled a series of critiques, and then focused on the federal government's dialogue on national prosperity which "intended to drive future economic policy decisions, lacks an in-depth understanding of the links between sustainable development and competitiveness" (ibid.: 91). Again the Council cites Porter, who, it says, raised "comparable questions" (ibid.).

The Council then concludes its discussion of sustainable development, by focusing on the issue of climate change, and claiming that "the vision and international stance of the

Canadians involved [in promoting the Earth Summit] has yet to be matched on the domestic front" (ibid.: 92). The Council argues that there are positive signs but that there is still a long way to go. Immediate environmental action is necessary and there are costs for inaction. The balance sheet must be reassessed, but most of all "we must develop a visionary approach to sustainable development, an approach that all Canadians can support and to which the science and technology community can contribute" (ibid.: 93). Note how vision and universality are mobilized to link the general will and sustainable development to the interests of scientists and technologists.

In assessing the "future" the Science Council identifies "new frontiers" as "largely a question of accountability" (ibid.: 95). In reviewing the narrative of the substantive discourse, the Science Council first identified that the block to development could not be caused by education but was the result of the ineffective organization of the economy. Second, it identified that the lack of innovation and competitiveness had more to do with the business community and third that it was not a problem of individual attitudes as much as it was a crisis of infrastructural relations between state, science and industry. Fourth, for practical concerns about the environment, the "business as usual" position was too entrenched. What was required to provide a future for Canadians was to enhance the power of scientists and technologists. Part five, then entertains a prophetic enunciation of how certain identifiable trends could be generalized to bring about national salvation. In *Toward 2000 Together* and the Prosperity Initiative proponents generalized entrepreneurial and managerial ethics. In *Reaching for Tomorrow*, though, the Council generalizes natural scientific and technicist ethics but subordinates them to the national public will. Both discourses, nevertheless, code their legitimacy to salvation with reference to technology. Also in both cases, a form of futurology is mobilized to establish a teleology for development.

The Science Council of Canada claims that

everywhere these are exciting times on the frontiers of science and technology, but they have produced a certain discontinuity. On the one hand, governments increasingly see advances in science, engineering, and medicine as powerful instruments for social change and comparative advantage in a hotly competitive global economy. On the other hand, scientific, medical, and technological enterprises are beset by organizational institutional, and professional challenges arising from public expectations -- expectations fuelled by the pace of discovery and the impact of innovation. (ibid.: 95).

Unlike many who promote accountability through science, what distinguishes the Science Council's bid for a social balance between the instrumentality of science and business, is its willingness to subordinate "accountability" in the last instance to the public sphere of healthy democratic debate. The Council cites Kenneth Prewitt (1982), president of the American Social Science Research Council that "science should be subjected to the same principles of regulation and accountability as govern other important sectors of public life. . . . It is too late for science to evade the consequences of the participatory democratic culture in which it practices and from which it draws support" (ibid.: 95). Interestingly, the Science Council thus begins its discussion of international trends with a discussion of "moral-political" accountability as identified in conflicts between "megascience and "modest science"; between complexity and cost of forefront research; between scientific and technical communities who want to set their own priorities and the public-at-large who want to establish the public policy environment; between strategic research, strategic technologies and technology management; between knowledge for the cultural "public good" and knowledge as a profitable commodity; between the rise of multinational

partnerships and the development of research networks; and between the call for increased public scrutiny and social impacts of frontier science.

After reviewing the international scene and identifying the Canadian scene as necessarily influenced by debates over the constitution, recessionary recovery and the struggle for competitiveness, the Council then reviews some of the new "strategic assets" which may be vital for sustained economic growth. These include bio-technology, polar technology and marine technology. It also includes telecommunications, enhanced oil recovery techniques, synthetic fuels, remote sensing, computer software, and hydrogen technologies. They also identify the need for global cooperation and the need to develop a new strategic area: "management of new production techniques and human resource questions in the adoption of manufacturing technologies (ibid.: 104).

To accomplish these frontier tasks, the Science Council also distinguishes itself from the promoters of excellence through entrepreneurship by calling for science to have its own rewards as a way to balance research at the international level and research tied directly to industrial needs. The Council suggests that this reward structure is already in place and could be enhanced. But it is not a reward structure based on marketability or profitability but rather as an community evaluation of excellent contributions to the Canadian society. And the rewards, such as cash-based prizes, should be extended to entrepreneurs, technicians, teachers and others for their special contribution to national excellence (ibid.: 105). Fundamental to the Science Council, though, in the evaluation of strategic assets are the questions "*strategic for whom, and what?*" (ibid.: 97). In answering the questions, the national interest is central. *Reaching for Tomorrow* ends by calling for more debate so that Canadians can get the best possible information and insights on science and technology.

#### 9.4. Conclusion

Resistance is a problem when social movements, political leadership and intellectual resources are fragmented. This chapter described two kinds of potential but inadequate resistance: one that awakens a non-traditional political movement in the fall of 1993 as a challenge to the political legitimacy of *Toward 2000 Together* and the other that was eliminated by political caveat because it challenged the scientific legitimacy of continental free enterprise and free trade. In the latter case, what might have emerged as a challenge to the scientific legitimacy of the corporate postmodernization narrative in *Toward 2000 Together* and the Prosperity Initiative also exhibited major weaknesses.

Even though *Reaching for Tomorrow* distances itself in many ways from the documents reviewed in the *Toward 2000 Together* strategy and the Prosperity Initiative, there are fundamental problems in such a project attempting to realize the goal of subordinating science and industry to the will of the public sphere and in the national interest. The main limitation is that it offers a metanarrative that no longer finds much resonance in popular culture -- *it encounters incredulity*. On the one hand, the technocratic reformist metanarrative appears incapable of overcoming the legitimation deficits of late capitalism with the same efficacy as had New Right futurism. On the other hand, public sector unions as a more traditional agent for resistance appear integrated into modernization strategies and complicit with technocratic reformism. Also, spontaneous popular movements arise only to dissolve when confronted with having to use the grammar of either corporate postmodernism or technocratic reformism to make their appeals. Not only was the traditional institutional structure for a challenge to the postmodern metanarrative weakened by an attack on the welfare state, its metanarrative was based on a form of technocratic reformism that faces popular incredulity and cannot substantially challenge the metanarrational sophistication and production of corporate postmodernism. Both the

traditional and non-traditional political movements lack intellectual leadership and a new vision for the future. Questions about the exercise of hegemony, thus, raise important questions about the exercise of counter-hegemony in a *postmodern* age, the problem of resistance in Alberta and the impoverishment of a leftist intellectual strategy. The concluding chapter returns to these questions in light of the case study and my analysis of hegemonic intellectual practice.

# Chapter Ten

## Conclusion

Techno-capitalism should be seen as a form of both progress and domination. It is a form of progress in that it produces new technologies and modes of information which have a potentially beneficial impact on human life. Yet it is a system of domination in that it forfeits many of these potentialities by employing new technologies primarily as a continued imposition of commodification and wage labor which exacerbates class inequalities while intensifying misery and suffering for millions of people throughout the world. (Douglas Kellner 1989: 182)

### 10.1. Introduction

The members of the intelligentsia share a common interest: they depend on the direct producers of material goods and they need to sustain their power in a gift economy of symbolic sharing. But they are also characterized by diverse practices, relations of offices and differing class alliances that thwart their formation into a self active and interested agent. They are further divided by the differential mediations of the state and the market. The recent reconfiguration of intellectual practices clearly shows the development of a split in class alignments. Those who are against public service forms of intellectual practice (e.g. medicine, education, social work) have been able to mobilize popular opinion against the monopolization of educational credentials and the visible advantages it brings. The purveyors of consumer services present themselves as the solution to the excesses of the public service intelligentsia while deflecting popular resentments away from their own complicity in the crisis.

This final chapter evaluates the central claims of Part II in light of the above findings in the case study. This first section reviews the main arguments of the dissertation and highlights the reasons why technocratic reformism is incapable of comprehending or challenging the reconfiguration of intellectual practices. In the second and third sections I reconsider the nature of the state as an agent and suggest how the analysis of the varied social relations of the intelligentsia requires further research. The middle sections identify the important ways that hegemonic intellectuals signify meaning in metanarration, social theories of development and mythical reconstruction in light of heroic and anonymous practices. The final two sections conclude by specifying how counter-hegemonic intellectuals might respond to the culture of performativity and the reconstruction of mythical representations.

Chapters Two to Five presented an argument for reconsidering the nature of intellectual practices in contemporary Canadian society. First, I argued that the rise of anonymous intellectual practices required rethinking the nature of traditional analyses focused on the heroic intellectual. I did not argue that heroic intellectual practices were no longer evident or relevant, but rather that the rise of cybernetic forms of intellectual regulation had changed the dynamic nature of ideological production. I posited that Gramsci's conception of hegemony may not be completely appropriate in the "postmodern" age if the exercise of hegemony had changed. I also stated that a post-Gramscian analyses that denied any purchase for the conception of hegemony had carried the "postmodern" premise too far. The assumption that classical class relations between capital and labour had been miraculously transformed into a form of post-capitalism mirrored technocratic assumptions concerning the universality, neutrality and objectivity of public discourse. The "nation" or "province," I claimed, was the most significant universalizing ideological form in the social



imaginary. To account for the mechanisms in the exercise of hegemony, I suggested that the conception of "anonymous intellectual" could account for both the double fracturing of technocratic thought produced by administrative systems and the deepening of control by regimes of performativity. Understanding the double fracturing required an argument on two fronts: (1) a theoretical, methodological and historical justification for a new kind of analysis in Part II and (2) an empirical analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* in Part III.

In Part II I first argued that the English Canadian intellectual tradition and the analysis of ideology required rethinking the grammar of discourse, the social theories of development, the theories of class and ideology and the sociological reasons for the fragmentation of a national discourse. Second, this rethinking required a synthesis of history and sociology within the framework provided by historical materialism. Further to this claim, I argued that a reconstructed historical materialism was also required to account for the changing nature of intellectual practice as a set of class practices that could no longer be merely reduced or read off of the traditional approaches to class as a valid heuristic device. This latter account of the intelligentsia and ideology seemed more appropriately developed by the perspectives of critical theory, especially the reconstructed historical materialism of Jürgen Habermas and Mikhail Bakhtin. Third, this rethinking of intellectual practice in Canada was required because of the potentially dramatic changes to the nature of discourse and the exercise of hegemony evoked by the conception of "postmodernity." I showed that the contemporary period was not only marked by the rise of new narratives alongside modernist narratives, but also that the corporate postmodernization narrative marked a displacement of technocratic reformism as the centre of gravity in a new global ideological configuration that both appropriated and transformed technocratic and reformist assumptions. Where modernist assumptions presupposed a set of borders between economic, political and cultural spheres, the corporate postmodernization narrative presupposed and augmented the breakdown of those borders. The integration of economic, political and cultural labour or "dedifferentiation" makes the traditional conception of "class" as an "economic" category or "ideology" as its symbolic reflection problematic.

Together, the three above related claims about the poverty of intellectual practice in English Canada, the strengths and inadequacies of historical materialism for the study of the intelligentsia and ideology, and the changing nature of the global capitalism and ideological production justified a new empirical approach. Part III's analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* then illustrated one application of the theoretical, methodological and historical claims developed in Part II for the study of hegemony. The case study of ideological production in Alberta identified four specific forms in the exercise of hegemony: (1) control of economic and political resources; (2) control of the metanarration on political truth; (3) control of the metanarration on scientific truth and (4) the fragmentation of political and scientific opposition. Although the claims in Part II are generalizable outside of Alberta, the claims for the exercise of hegemony in Part III are more limited. This case study, though, has revealed interesting insights in the struggle over the "Canadian" metanarrative for the year 2000 and between technocratic reformism and corporate postmodernism.

The problem with technocratic reformism lies in the assumption that an accommodation of interests can be achieved without having to explicate the operation of capitalist property relations and the functioning of bureaucratic state relations or without having to identify the need to transcend the operation of the liberal public sphere in mediating the instrumental claims of interest groups. A new alternate metanarrative must account for *in fiction and fact* the way state, capital and knowledge inscribe ideological production and the way power

and money can distort communication intended to achieve the democratic consent of the governed.

Toward 2000 Together attempted to achieve democratic consent but could not because of the pathologies inscribed on the discourse by class and state power. To make this point the last nine chapters had to challenge many assumptions about intellectual practice in English Canada. I claimed that colonial dependency and technocratic reformism are but two manifestations of deeper problems. I have argued that the analysis of intellectual practice must incorporate the explication of capitalist property relations, the functioning of bureaucratic state relations and the changing nature of the liberal public sphere. I have also argued that resistance in this "postmodern" period demands the revisioning of the nature of class and state relations and of intellectual participation in public discourse. The nature of intellectual practice and dependency I leave to the following sections. Here I explicate the specific limitations of technocratic reformism in meeting the challenge of corporate postmodernism.

The first form of hegemony concerns the non-discursive (economic and political) working relationship between the hegemonic intelligentsia and the economic, political, bureaucratic and accommodating intellectual elites in Alberta. In this case the elites used their power to establish the collective membership and the allocation of roles for participation. In addition the first form established the working relationship between hegemonic "stakeholders" and non-hegemonic participants. Hegemony remains an important concept because the ruling groups must talk to each other, clarify their interests and consent to coordinated action. Here the elites reconstituted their own subjectivity as a ruling class by establishing a set of in-group and out-group relations. Potential resisters were *a priori* excluded from positions of authority in the determination of the consensus-building forums and the framing of the questions. The control of non-discursive resources set the stage whereby an inner circle (the Economic Planning Committee of Cabinet 1990-91 and appointed subcommittees) limited the participation of non-believers by shaping the nature and availability of public resources.

The second form of hegemony established a discursive relationship between the hegemonic intelligentsia, accommodating intelligentsia and public participants. The hegemonic intelligentsia exercised hegemony by reinforcing "stakeholder" power and establishing instrumental relationships with non-ruling groups. In this case the hegemonic intelligentsia framed the nature of public consultation through its definitional authority to classify questions and information as either legitimate or not. Through a variety of mechanisms they were able to marginalize, distort, exclude and fragment resisting definitions, questions and information. Furthermore, the hegemonic intelligentsia used the public forums to survey and rationalize supportive public opinion and to reconstruct a common language for those who had a common interest in turning government constraints into business opportunities. Supporters of a public service ethic for education, health and social services found themselves without a common public language and had to frame their interests according to the language of human capital theory and the consumer ethic of Toward 2000 Together. Klein, on the other hand, spoke the language of universal representation and decried his protagonists as representatives of "special interests." Not identified was the class interest of Alberta's ruling elites.

The third form of hegemony established a discursive relationship between the Alberta hegemonic intelligentsia and a global and national network of hegemonic intelligentsia. This institutional and ideological configuration of hegemonic intellectuals provided the symbolic resources for an overarching metanarrative that could justify and integrate the variety of truth claims made in Toward 2000 Together. Where the second form of

discursive hegemony legitimated Toward 2000 Together as a politically authoritative exercise representing the will of the people, this third form of discursive hegemony legitimated Toward 2000 Together as a scientifically authoritative exercise representing the knowledge of experts. In the latter case, alternate or counter expert authority was merely excluded from having a presence. Expert metanarration in Alberta or about Alberta appeared as a closed space for alternate metanarratives. In terms of expertise there was little religious, philosophical or scientific *doubt or debate* concerning the metanarrative.

The fourth form for exercising hegemony was to take advantage of the fragmentation of counter-hegemonic political movements and intellectual formulations. To claim that the expert metanarration in Alberta appeared as closed space, does not mean that no one inside or outside of Alberta doubted or debated the metanarrative. There were, for example, many "guest" letters penned in the Edmonton Journal decrying the cuts to public services.. Missing, though, was the collective voice of resistance organized according to its own grammar. Instead resistance was distorted, marginalized, excluded and fragmented because the hegemonic intelligentsia effectively controlled the economic, political and communicative resources in the constitution of Toward 2000 Together and mastered the metanarrative that justified normative and empirical truths. To paraphrase Gramsci, the hegemony of the modern intelligentsia is established by a war of position rather than a war of maneuver. Counter-hegemonic practices based on the assumptions of technocratic reformism and/or the heroic intellectual appeared moribund in challenging the corporatist postmodern narrative and the rise of anonymous intellectual practice.

The Toward 2000 Together intelligentsia justified the "facts" about the new reality by focusing primarily on the theories of libertarian capitalism and strategic management in their continentalist, national and provincial manifestations. This discursive network marked one particular configuration of the New Right centred in Alberta and it articulated a diffuse and global force field of communication. This intellectual force field can be viewed as a "nascent state" spanning national borders with a material infrastructure provided by already existent intellectual institutions (e.g. the Banff Centre) acting as parastate regulatory bodies. These bodies were also articulated to political and economic institutions and had to articulate their actions to the resistances from alternate intellectual and public organizations. These bodies established the discursive agenda for social reform by mobilizing a particular form of theory to regulate speech acts.

The ineffectiveness of the Science Council of Canada and like-minded institutions revealed the inadequacy of progressive liberalism and technocratic socialism to comprehend and act in the face of current transformations in technology, culture and social knowledge. It is worth reviewing Stephan Bronner's (1990) critique of technocratic reformism here. First, because the definition of class is dehistoricized and conflated with empirical indicators for "status," "income" and "occupation," the concept of "class" is not only purged of its relational aspects but the "metaphysic" which grounds the means to judge exploitative social relations is also lost. With the loss of a transcendent standpoint to guide the subject in making practical choices, critical judgement is reduced to empirical skepticism and disempowers the development of critical philosophy. Second, the politics of partnership, presupposes that all differences are reconcilable. Just as empiricism denies a certain understanding of class, it also informs a certain view of politics based on incremental reforms through calculable compromises. Where "compromise" assumes a transcendent political value, political decision-making becomes defined by "accountability" or "efficiency" or the "end of ideology." The unexamined exploitative relationship inherent to the class relationship between labour and capital, provides a useful tautology for the uncritical reformer whose attitude must become that of the lobbyist and whose style that of

the technocrat. The "pluralistic" strategy focuses on gaining the best possible deal without reference to the ideological and material relations concerning social development. This kind of compromise does not mean that "compromise" in itself is necessarily a confirmation of the status quo or a force for reaction but rather that compromise between "interest groups," such as scientists, politicians, unionists, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, can only be stillborn if an instrumental compromise also entails a compromise of moral principle. Third, political accountability, even in emphasizing the subordination of science and industry to the nation (as was done by the Science Council of Canada), thus becomes defined by an attempt to achieve some form of distributive equality within the existing order by forwarding particular interests, as in this case, salvation through technology and the practices of the scientific, engineering, medical and technical communities in the name of "efficiency," "profitability" or "the national interest." The *irrationality* of the material contradiction between labour and capital permeates the social relations of calculable compromise and manifestations of social problems result in calls for intensified amelioration or cultural adaptation by "*progressive*" bureaucrats, politicians, and scientists. The discourse of the Science Council of Canada and the promoters of a liberal welfare state and technocratic reform socialism cannot challenge the vision enunciated by the promoters of the corporatist postmodernization narrative. *Welfare liberals and reform socialists will, in the end, have to subordinate their empiricism to the grammar of the New Right.* Such is what happened when Alberta teachers, parents and students in their resistance had to promote a vision based on human capital theory when they asked for "politicians to view education as an investment not an expense."

As a *vision*, welfare liberalism and technocratic socialism cannot challenge the corporatist tendencies promoted by the alliance of scientific, state and capitalist elites into a new ruling class subject. In fact, in a sophisticated and naive way such "*progressivism*" subordinated to New Right Futurology may deepen the process of internal colonization. As I showed, the New Right was able to appropriate the language of progress while practicing reaction and retrenchment. In the next sections I argue that this challenge to the corporate postmodernization narrative must come from a reconstituted radical discourse that incorporates a vision of a future truly commensurable with anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-imperialist and anti-class politics. Only this latter vision can obtain and sustain a counter-challenge to the discursive regulation used by the New Right ideology. It is to reconstituting this latter vision that I now turn.

## **10.2. Reconsidering the State as Agent**

Juxtaposing Parts II and III reveals important insights. The first major insight concerns rethinking the nature of the state as agent. Before a discussion of intellectual practice in the contemporary context, I want to highlight a problematic concerning the double fracturing of public discourse (i.e., the nascent state) and its major methodological implications for the way historians and sociologists use "official" sources (e.g. public archives, libraries, surveys, statistical data, annual reports). The "double fracturing" problematic justified my dialectical shift from historiographic narrative in Chapter Six to the discourse analysis in Chapter Seven. Traditional methods for policy studies presuppose that "documents" are unproblematically value-neutral in determining the truth or that the "truth" can be readily revealed by collating more and more "data" without also involving metanarration and theoretical discourse. In other words, discourse analysis challenges the transparency of policies as facts. Facts never speak for themselves without value, only particular valuing humans can speak of facts according to an assumption about their particular usage.

Derek Sayer (1991) clarifies Marx's critique of Hegel concerning the modern capitalist state and the double fracturing of political representation. According to Marx (and exhibiting many similarities to claims made by Durkheim and Weber), the bourgeoisie do not rule through personalized relations, such as feudal rulers did, but rather they rule through impersonal forms of power. Impersonal power is manifested in universalistic, rational and consistent law that appears to provide a level playing field for a civil society of abstractly equal and free individuals. Impersonal power is also manifested in the official political system that appears not as a form of class rule but as the autonomous representative of all loyalties. The meaning of "nation," here, thus retains an ambiguous *double meaning* and allows for the cleavage of "public" and "private" representations: one, where the state is assumed as the *public* representative of the nation and, two, where the state is also assumed to be cut off from the real *privatized* nation (civil society) (Sayer 1991: 72-81).

The coincidence of private and public sovereignty implicit to feudalism is *doubly fractured* by the emergence of the public and private spheres in the modern state. On the one hand, the nation state is fractured as both the embodiment of "society" and the basis of individuals' public identity as a "subject" (a *national* citizen). Implicit to this modern notion of citizenship is a separation of the institutions of ruling from the persons of rulers whose most general expression lies in a "class-neutral" bureaucracy, itself fractured by its abstract and real form (*ibid.*). Previous approaches to state/civil relations which account for only one fracture must defend tenuous positions by ascribing either complete autonomy, various instrumentalist ordinations or "relative" autonomy to the state/civil relationship. The result is an under-estimation of cultural power and/or agency in elitist and marxist approaches and an over-estimation of biological, behavioral and/or cultural environments (naturalized determinants) in liberal approaches.

The insight into double fracturing helps reveal that the bureaucracy is not only a hierarchy of real individuals but also a hierarchy of knowledges, where a tautology of authority exists: knowledge is based on the claim to state *authority* and the claim to state knowledge is based on authority. For example, Don Getty was able to initiate the "Premier's Conference," his ministers were able to hire expert opinion, the expert evidence could be selectively organized, "independent individuals" could attend the conference at "personal expense" as stakeholders, the "province" could make laws which financially benefited certain educational institutions, these institutions could provide courses for their corporate "fee paying clients" and when it was all over the Alberta government, the Banff Centre, and key corporations could claim to have represented the province at "arm's length" and in the "universal interest." The government could claim to know the truth and to rule legitimately combining both the power of State and Party. In this way, the loose networks provided by Toward 2000 Together functioned in the Gramscian sense as an organic party (a Modern Prince) and as a set of non-personal relationships (my Anonymous Intellectual).

Because this loose set of knowledge hierarchies is mediated "at arm's length" by money, force and language, it is also held to embody the *province* or *nation*. Any "external" challenges to the bureaucratic construction of reality must necessarily appear as privatized self-interest and thus lack legitimacy because such expressions of self-interest are unauthorized by state power. And so, for example, when the teachers, health care workers, social workers or students challenged the universality of the political agenda, they were forced to challenge the state head to head as an individual would challenge the sovereign. The students could not gain legitimacy without metaphorically "killing the king." Regicide, in this instance, was not possible until the next election. Obviously, the students believed that Klein's initiative did not have their consent even though they had

been supposedly "represented" in the Toward 2000 process by "Roberta Barker." The students' ideas could be regulated by the ruling intelligentsia and treated as the result of a lack of knowledge and resolved by more and better information. But if the students' moral claim was actually justified because they were *not* legitimately represented in the political process, they would still have to prove their case, that is, provide knowledge to justify their case. To articulate legitimacy and knowledge, they would have to make an extra-parliamentary challenge to the so-called "arms length" and "non-partisan" process which prestructured the technical requirements for their participation and consent. To make this extra-parliamentary claim means they would have to have access to some form of economic, political or cultural power which at the moment was unrealized in their isolation. "Proving one's case" in a democratically constituted state is a complex process and rules out the use of violence which is monopolized by the state. The students must mobilize "public opinion." To do so means they must break out of their linguistic isolation and coordinate their activities with those who already possess intellectual power and access to the means of communication. But turning to intellectual power has its own problem for the students. As "students" their very identity is defined by their subordination to those who monopolize the means of communication. Nevertheless, the importance of alternate forms of intellectual power for such movements is also recognized by the hegemonic forces thus precipitating the elimination of organizations (e.g. Science Council) that could provide the students with a legitimating discourse for their moral concerns about issues such as Klein's cutbacks to education and the predetermination of their future. For the members of the Science Council and for the students, concerns to be heard and taken seriously, the mediating effects of a supportive state, whether federal or provincial, were crucial.

Because the link between the "individual" and "office of State" is a technical accreditation provided by "examinations," to transform the students' personal profane knowledge into public sacred knowledge required the "intellectual" or "universalizing class" to linguistically reconstruct their class-based subjectivity into a universally-sanctioned objectivity. The very power the students lacked was the very power retained by the state. Via the state, the Getty and Klein administrations could establish the "stakeholder criteria" and create the fantasy of an universally accessible forum. This does not mean that these administrations intended to manipulate public representation -- although this intent is possible and also likely in some selected instances -- but rather, the fantasy is a self-constructed misrepresentation based on good intentions and the effect of the way personal power is mediated in late capitalist societies. That is, in this case, cultural power does not block desire, but rather releases it for the structuration process which holds a built in social bias via "invisible" and anonymous mediations and articulates those who already hold economic, political and cultural power. The further empowerment of institutional "representatives" who make rules (e.g., CEOs, mayors, cabinet ministers etc.), of expert opinion who reconstruct language (e.g. Banff Centre for Management, Canada West Foundation, Harvard Business School etc.), of corporate clients who purchase educational services with surplus profits (e.g. Imperial Oil, TransAlta etc.), of those in the network as political insiders and cronies (e.g. ex-president of the Conservative party as an "individual" at the Calgary Conference) and of anyone else who can *afford* to attend at *personal* expense to function as an "intellectual" during the work-week (e.g. Michael Porter). Class rule by the bourgeoisie is through impersonal relationships of power and it is exercised by controlling the mediations of money, law and language anonymously. In this case, expert knowledge (intelligence) and the making of a career (state service) are related in a publicly sacred and supposedly "transparent" process that results in a form of private property to be administered and accumulated as commission, credential and/or voice.

In the "loose" bureaucracy established by the visioning process of Toward 2000 Together and the Prosperity Initiative, a particularist civil reality was paralleled by a universal official reality, or the "illusion of the state" (Sayer 1992.), and only with the practice of breaching, such as the students marching on the legislature, was the pathology of the "consensus representation" made visible and the illusion of universal transparency challenged. How the meaning of visibility and challenge are interpreted is a different but related dynamic of meaning-making, but the point is, to *make* "history" the students had to rupture the inter-textuality of the dominant and totalizing discourse. A later example, was a community-based response (approximately 10,000 protesters) to the potential closure of Grey Nuns Hospital in Edmonton.

The insight that a bureaucracy is not only a hierarchy of real individuals but also a hierarchy of knowledges should also alert us to another fact in the double fracturing process that was the primary concern of the last three chapters of the case study. This fact has to do with how power-holders lay down the traces of documentation which are later used to reconstruct what actually happened, that is *the power to control the historical record*. These chapters revealed a problem in the documentation process itself, that is, the source by which historians, sociologists, strategic managers, economists and futurists as intellectuals *make* history.

The double fracturing of representation is the result of a double movement, that is, one, a political movement *in history* whereby the documentation revealed a reality of circuits of power and, two, a cultural movement *about history* whereby the circuits of power "informed" the very construction of an *intertextual* documentation, that is, a *second order historical record* -- the so-called *primary documentation*. To get at the way the circuits of power constructed textuality to marginalize, distort and exclude the other in the name of the "other" required a double hermeneutic analysis, that is, a hermeneutic which also attempted to *imagine* that which was excluded, distorted, marginalized and fragmented in the reports. Such a method was provided by the perspectives of critical theory. This "unretrievable" moment required counter-imagining absences in the documents. In this case a review of the documents could never appear as a transparent rendering of the "real." In counter-imagining, the attempt to merely add to the list of "documents," "statistics" or "information" would not resolve the problem of getting at the truth even if it might make the documentation procedure more *professionally* rigorous. The analysis looked at the very construction of those documents, not as primary empirical data but as *the traces of theoretical fantasies used to organize a cultural "object" a particular way*. At this level then, technocratic reformism revealed a dual impoverishment. The weakness of the progressive-liberal grammar and narrative is not only that it does not offer a vision beyond empirical technocratic reform but that it also does not offer a methodological framework for analyzing intellectual practice in the contemporary period. Philip Wexler (1987) states that the reason for the declining integrative capacity of the progressive-liberal discourse results from the fact that it "expresses the same representational realism as old, conventional or mainstream sociology. It antedates current transformations in technology, culture, and social knowledge" (6). He calls for (and my analysis confirms) the necessary revisioning of critical thought and a recognition of the *epistemic revolution* that the empirical, incremental and technocratic forms of social scientific thought fail to express.

Once "inside" the documentation process, it became evident that the political power to create the inter-textual traces of events was also the cultural power to be able to realize an imaginary relationship to the world, that is, to create a fiction by "representing" dreams or a will to the future that never actually existed but became real as the initial traces for the agenda for hegemonic social reform. So while many of the documents were intended to

represent the real, they also represented the objectification of a dream not yet realized by a select group: the intelligentsia and their clients. I argued that the documents represented a *dismal* dream because they imposed efficacy as a necessity for action without a conditional and explicit discourse on the moral-political agenda other than the necessity of "lowered expectations" for all -- except the business class. I provided a counter-example to this type of discourse in the Science Council of Canada's *Reaching for Tomorrow*. This latter document fundamentally differed not only in its implicit social theory, but also in the grammatical structuring of that theory to mobilize an alternate moral-political agenda for the future concerning the same issue -- the *new* knowledge-based economy.

Needless to say, both Albertan and Canadian government constraints transformed into business opportunities provided the practical contents to the form and direction of the hegemonic theory of social development. The supposed neutrality of arguments for efficiency, constraint and opportunity revealed themselves as the mobilization of the merchant mentality, that is, the brokerage of consumer services where the bottom-line efficiency restored profitability to the "privately-owned" sector.

Specific to Alberta, out of the above *new opportunities* came a series of supposed recommendations, which were described as "not constituting conclusions for the Calgary conference or an action plan, they were simply the suggestions put forward by a number of individuals or groups," that is a "shopping list" (MR: 37). In fact, it is quite difficult to know who actually had "ownership" of Toward 2000 Together process from such statements. Throughout the documentation process *anonymity was the order of the day*. Similarly, when the moderator submitted the report of the "Premier's Conference" it appeared to belong to the government as a "fair and accurate summary of what has transpired since the Toward 2000 Process began" (MR: submission letter). Yet on the backside of the same page of the *official* document was a small paragraph in very fine print: "The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Alberta" (MR: i). The pattern was reproduced again and again and illustrates one element in anonymous intellectual practice.

This documentation process was of course inaccurate and ambiguous and open to scientific or philosophical critique. But to see the anonymous document in terms of scientific correctness and logical argumentation would miss its cultural power to articulate *difference* and create *truth effects*. Difference, counter-factuality, and counter-logics gained *progressive* sensibility in a familiar language deploying the meanings of New Right politics: government constraint becomes business opportunity; quality of life becomes consumer service; public education becomes private profit; popular empowerment becomes stakeholder representation; competition in governance is bad; cooperation in business is good; environmental protection becomes ecotourism and "business as usual"; environmental caring becomes the marketing of waste management; equality of opportunity become the opportunities for private profit; students become clients and consumers of human-resource products; free enterprisers becomes state-interventionists; state-supported community service workers become free enterprisers; non-partisan collaboration becomes anonymous ownership; corporate governance becomes participatory democracy. In the world of the anonymously authored and "unowned" document, the revenge of the mirror people in Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass" seems to be close at hand. Transparent reflections of meaning hide a depth of intriguing networks of class-based power asserting themselves at "arms length." But on the surface, all is calm, and only words, words and more words.



### 10.3. Rethinking the Class Relations of the Intelligentsia

To focus on the above linguistic decadence of surface appearances misses the underlying value-rationality of the discursive field and the relentless propagandizing mantra throughout the documentation which subordinates the ethic of public service to the ethic of consumer service. The cultural values of capitalist consumption are smuggled into the discursive field in the name of efficient performance in business, education and government. The question thus becomes what kind of agent actively regulates the discursive field? I posited in Chapter Four that an answer to this controversial claim required reconsidering -- *as a hypothesis* -- the class nature of the intelligentsia, that is, reconsidering the historical economic, political and cultural relations that constitute social classes in the contemporary period.

My short answer is that the treatment of intellectuals as a "class" proved valuable for the analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* because it refocused attention on a historical analysis of underlying social relations. In a period of social transformation any other approach might miss the emergence of a new social form. No doubt further empirical research is required with such considerations in mind. It is important, though, to reemphasize that whether the set of social relationships that defines this class of individuals is preemptively labeled a "strata" or "class" mystifies more than it contributes to understanding the reconfiguration of intellectual practices. My labeling of the "anonymous intellectual" and the "corporate postmodernization narrative" involved renaming historically evident social relations. The research focus should be on renaming intellectual relations as something distinctive from previous conceptions. This new conception would have to account for the common material and symbolic productions of the *intelligentsias* as well as their varied and complex practices. The identification of specificities, independent effects and mediating relationship must take priority over general conceptions reflecting or read off of the classical relationship between labour and capital or typified in idealist categories.

Are intellectuals (or intelligentsia) a class? To answer such a question presumes a definition of "class." The question also might assume a definition of historical materialism as one form of class analysis. I stayed away from specifying an answer to this question or risking a clear definition, but have preferred to conceive of such terms as "cultural bourgeoisie," the "New Class," "intellectual stratum" or "educated middle classes" as *contested* theoretical constructs that are heuristically valuable attempts at coming to terms with intellectual practices in the twentieth century. I preferred using the designations "intellectual practice" and "mental labour." In so doing I focused on the nature of various economic, political and ideological relations in *Toward 2000 Together*. In other words, I have attempted as much as possible to take an empirical realist approach to intellectual practices rather than assuming an ideal conception of an "intellectual." What must disappear from the lexicon of researchers are such claims as Boggs (1993) makes in reaching for his Gramscian "dictionary" *and assuming a claim that properly should be demonstrated*, that "under no circumstances, however, do intellectuals as such constitute a distinct class or social bloc; they do not exercise their own unique influence upon historical change" (163). Impregnated in this claim is not only a definition of intellectuals *but a worldview about the nature of intellectual practice and its unfolding development, abstracted from critical discourse.*

A longer answer for reconsidering "intellectuals as class" is essential for anyone who might consider a continuation of the debate I have initiated. In the rest of this section I build on clarifications already developed in Chapter Four about the commonalities and divergences in the intelligentsia and in Chapter Two on the theories of intellectual practice.

Simply calling for more empirical studies will not resolve this issue because merely to name "intellectuals as a class" as a point of departure raises fundamental theoretical and methodological questions about the reconstruction of Marxism and/or historical materialism. Of course, more debate at the empirical, methodological, theoretical and meta-theoretical levels of analysis are required. The remainder of this section, thus, raises speculative questions that should be considered starting points -- not conclusions -- for reconsidering the theoretical aspects of class practices.

In recalling that Marx's first premise is that the "real" and "definitions of the real" are ontologically non-identical and that the real must be privileged over definitions of it, one can move on to consider the other sub-premises of historical materialism. *For Marx, laws of class formation were not transhistorical essences as is the case of social analysis based on the positivistic natural sciences. Rather, these "laws" were historically specific to a particular mode of production.*

The classical model of the capitalist mode of production presupposed that the intelligentsia did not constitute a class except on occasion as a declining class of petty bourgeois professionals, that is, "independent commodity producers" similar to merchants, farmers or artisans. Because their interests were subordinated to an exchange of services in the marketplace they could not be considered an "exploitative" class. *So to speak of the "intelligentsia" as a class rather than a strata in the limited sense of a residual petty bourgeoisie is consistent with historical materialism.* As Larson writes (1977), "in the classic personal professions, the exchange of services typically tends to take place between the 'free' professional and his individual client. . . . Because professional labor is not, here, exchanged with capital and does not participate directly in the production of surplus value, it is, in strict terms, unproductive. The free professional escapes, therefore, capitalist exploitation' (214).

According to Marx and followers, the petty bourgeoisie would be eventually assimilated into either of the two dominant classes. And in this case, the predictions were more or less accurate. The anomaly that developed was the development of what might be called an administrative "petty bourgeoisie" or "strata" made up of small and medium officials, office workers in industry, commerce and banking etc., and the expansion of state officials in public administration, education, health-care and social services. Traditionally conceived, the transformation of the petty bourgeoisie into subordinates of the capitalist firm as "expert labour" marks the end of the independent commodity production of services (e.g., science, education etc.). According to Larson (1977), "professional labor which is performed for the benefit of capitalist firm is therefore *not structurally different from any other kind of labor* which is subject to capitalist relations of production. From the point of view of exploitation, therefore, any kind of labor can be productive" (214 emphasis added). Larson's point is crucial in that the vague similarity between petty bourgeois forms of intellectual labour and the imbrication of intellectual labour in the capitalist firm each defined as "professional" does not compensate for the crucial differences between these occupations and does not account for the generalized breakdown of the precapitalist social structure of intellectual production. I will return to this explanation later, but suffice it to say here, although I agree with Larson on this claim I would differ on the point about a structural difference. *Because Larson idealizes the two-class model of the capitalist mode of production, Larson assumes that the generalized breakdown of the pre-capitalist form could not also engender the empirical potentiality that intellectual production could also be transformed into a new kind of pre-capitalist or even a post-capitalist set of relations.* Lost, for example, is the theoretical possibility that "bureaucracy" is the *modern* structural form of a pre-capitalist mode of production or that

the managerial scientist who retains legal control over the Banff Centre and markets the "signification of meaning" and the "regulation of discourse" is the *postmodern* structural form of a new class that cannot be merely read off of traditional class relations. I would argue that rather than a relationship based on a conflation of subjective interests mediated by signs of capital, a (new?) class relationship has been established based on a form of exchange in what might be called a "vassal" relationship in its tributary mode of office or a "client" relationship in its bourgeois mode of office. The question thus becomes, what kind of relationship between intellectual and non-intellectual has been established in *Toward 2000 Together*; that is, what is the nature of the exchange, what is being exchanged and what distinguishes this exchange from tributary and capitalist forms? Let us for the moment call this the "intellectual/X" class relationship.

This "new" class is also theorized in other ways as shown in the work of Gouldner (1979) and Szelenyi (with Konrad 1979; with Martin 1987) but the difference here is that *I emphasize the material basis of the office as a means of production whereas these other approaches treat the intelligentsia as a class based on their cultural characteristics and control of competencies rather than objective control of an "office" which makes the use of culture and competencies possible.* The reference to "credentials" and "skills" as capital merely refocuses on a materialized form of subjective identity as would the equation of money with "capital." *Left unidentified is the underlying mechanism that explains how "credentials" or "skills" can become a social force.* This mechanism, I believe, is a class relationship of intellectual labour power defined as "office," that is as "intellectual/X." An analysis cannot succeed by defining class according to cultural identity (i.e., a ideal thing) nor can it succeed by myopically defending the old version of class interaction in the face of empirical evidence that the intelligentsia at times do appear to act independently of either the bourgeoisie or proletariat through their control of state or state-sponsored office as a means of intellectual production.

An analysis which treats the intelligentsia as a "class" does raise important political questions which are problematic for any "office holder" who claims both professional expertise in knowledge and a necessary fusion of an interest with the others who do not hold office. Following the revival of Marxism in the 1960s in North America, the effect of residual idealisms elicited a central problem that resonates today in the development of neo-Marxism and post-Marxist attempts to reconstruct the conception of intellectual practice. These "revisions" introduced idealist or positivist assumptions, challenged the ideal-typical representation of the capitalist mode of production as a bipolar model of class relations, jettisoned the socio-economic basis of class as it was conventionally conceived, and introduced "tripolar" and "multipolar" models (e.g. E.O. Wright 1978, 1985; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979, 1990) thus denying -- in some cases -- the necessity that the "working class" was the primary agency for emancipation from the capitalist mode of production.

The theoretical turn to "cultural capital" or "intermediate" class positions challenged orthodox interpretations of "class." In defending the "core," the orthodox saviors necessarily had to subordinate the empirical referent in the rise of the "new class." These explanations (e.g. Cohen 1978) had to privilege the analytical "ideal" of "capitalism" as a two-class model and *foreclosed on the possibility in any and all circumstances that the empirically constituted new "class" could destroy their illusion of that two class reality.* Radical theorists may have fallen victim to Adorno's (1973) primal form of ideology, the privileging of the abstract over the concrete, and "identity thinking" became a problem when researchers came to consider the practices of intellectuals.

Marx uses the concept "mode of production" in at least three senses. First in a restricted way as a technical manner of producing. Second, and more commonly, he deploys it to mean a social system of producing carried on within a particular set of ownership relations. Importantly, Marx always considers capitalist relations of production as defined by specific connections between *people* and productive forces even if defined in a technical manner. Third, and of central interest to my argument against the fetishism of idealizing "intellectual practice" and "mode of production," Marx sometimes uses "mode of production" as a connection between social and technical properties and as a claim that *more than one mode of production may subsist within any empirical social formation*. In the Introduction to *Grundrisse*, Marx writes (1973 [1857-8]) that "in all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity" (106). The conflation of an ideal-typical "mode of production" with a particular real "capitalist society" or "capitalism" lends itself to misconstruing the fact that, empirically, modes of production coexist to varying degrees. Marx never specified the number or kind of relationships. He merely claimed that a mode of production articulated a combination of forces and relations. *It was the job of the researcher to demonstrate and not assume the empirical validity of the forces and relations* (Sayer 1987).

*Hypothetically*, then, Marx might argue that different modes of intellectual production could coexist with each other, and only rigorous historical research could determine how these different modes as a combination of forces and relations interacted and how each is subordinated to one particular mode as that which "bathes all the other colours." *It is also entirely conceivable that a precapitalist intellectual practice could subordinate capitalist intellectual practice while itself being subordinated to capitalist forms of economic practice. And many other developments are possible. The assumption that intellectual practice is necessarily subordinated and reflective of a dominant mode of production which itself is articulated in various ways to other modes of production cannot be assumed but must be empirically demonstrated.*

Larrain (1989) correctly calls for considering the development of global capitalism as the articulation of a variety of historically circumscribed modes of production (a social formation), but *what is left unexplicated is the nature of these articulations, that is, questions about the nature of a capitalist mode of production must be subordinated to questions about the constitution of a capitalist society*. The capitalist mode of production may find itself differentially superordinated, subordinated or balanced with alternate modes of production. *What needs to be answered concerns the nature of the mediations defined "as the constitution of society" that enable the varied modes of production at both micro and macro levels to "communicate" with each other.*

Hypothetically, then, in any social formation, intellectual practice could be occurring in at least three ideal-typical forms: precapitalist, capitalist and post-capitalist. In a movement from capitalism to socialism, the socialist mode could appear at once in two different presences: (1) as classlessness and (2), as a form of "class" relationship specific to the socialist mode. No resolution of this complicated and controversial topic appears in sight, although I would like to offer one possible reconsideration that informed my analysis of *Toward 2000 Together* and a rethinking of the nature of the historical transformations in the nature of the intellectual mode of production as "office."

Intellectual practice is never directly linked to material production. The intellectual's life is necessarily once removed from the necessities of material existence. Yet material existence is necessary. Definitions of "class" derived from an imbrication in the capitalist

mode of production assume that the principle agents of social change as classes are derived from the presence of private property. Yet in Marx's analysis of pre-capitalist formations "classes" exercised power not by owning the means of production but by controlling the state apparatus. In other words, the "class" structure of these societies such as slave and feudal societies were defined with reference to the power inscribed in office holding. Struggles between freeman and slave, between creditors and debtors, and between lords and serfs were certainly viewed as agents of "class" struggle, albeit in terms not applicable to the capitalist mode of production, yet nevertheless, retaining an affinity to subordinate and to be subordinated to the capitalist mode of class relations. Marx's usage of class resonates with multiple meanings that go beyond traditionally conceived productive economic relations and empirical indicators of those relations. The emergence of "town burghesses" as a new class in feudal societies and the ambiguous position played by "peasants as a class" in the nineteenth century are not any more or less conceptually correct than similar claims about the intelligentsia today as forms of a new or ambiguous class. The question, more importantly, is whether such specifications of "town burghesses," "peasants," or "intellectual class" heuristically serve historical analysis better. *Crucial here is not whether the new set of social relations is called a "stratum" or a "class" but that the nature of the forces and relations which imbricate this "class of individuals" with other individuals is specified empirically.* The thesis of the "new class" or "stratum" must be derived from this kind of analysis rather than by definitional caveat. With the focus on identifying the combination of forces and relations rather than assuming one definition as a claim to orthodoxy, one can then argue that what distinguishes intellectuals as a class from other classes is that intellectual practice is never directly linked to material production and yet material existence is a necessity for the intelligentsia's reproduction.

Yet to say that intellectual practice is not directly linked to material production is not to say that it is somehow relatively autonomous or completely autonomous from material production. The relationship between intellectual and material existence was not problematic until social differentiation through the division of labour reproduced the fragmentation of mind and body into a real differences between social classes, that is, when conception and execution differentiated into a characteristic that could distinguish a ruling class from the direct producers. In this sense, pre-capitalist ruling classes were never producers in the modern sense but rather office holders. And the struggle for office was primarily between warriors and priests.

In feudal times, this struggle for office "as person" provided the basis for the official power to expropriate social surplus and reproduce the social structure. The tributary form was not completely one-sided between the office holders and primary producers. There was always an exchange -- even if it was a forced exchange -- that motivated the producing class to relinquish its surplus in a variety of tributary forms. This tribute, though, was about material life and *its future promise*. In the case of the priestly class, the direct producer promised life in this world by providing material goods. *The priest in exchange promised life in the next world, that is, material life as the seduction of fantasy.* In the case of the warrior class, the direct producer also promised life in this world and in return the warrior promised the same in kind through active protection or withholding death, that is, through domination.

The rise of the merchant class and the use of bills of exchange were conjunctural with a dissolution of personal exchanges based on vassalage into *impersonal relations mediated by paper*. Similar to the priestly relationship of office, the power of the merchant was based on an exchange that promised a future life to be realized. Different to the priestly relationship of office, the merchants seduced each other on the basis of mutual contract

rather than vassalage. *The exchange of equiva'ences was an exchange of simulated material futures as fantasies.* For the merchant, exchange was based on life deferred. The mediation of a paper exchange, permeated other relations removing the exchangers of paper from relations of mundane exchange and created the illusion of material independence for those whose currency of life was fantasy. The merging of merchant and priestly exchanges completed an inversion of the meaning of real existence as a belief in the perfected form of paper exchange. The WORD had come to earth, only to be resurrected in an exchange of words circulating on paper. For example, the sale of indulgences, was a way of transforming material futures gained in the market into material futures in the afterlife. *Church office mediated a stock exchange of souls thus realizing materiality as life of paper transactions.* University office provided a similar mediation in the provisioning of degrees. The decline of intellectual rigor in the late middle ages was directly related to this sale of paper -- not to the highest intellect based on merit -- but to those whose wealth was generated by non-intellectual merit (see Le Goff 1988, 1993). *The late middle ages and early modernity were marked by this dualism of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary trade in intellectual futures, that is, the seduction of eternal life revealed as the accumulation of signs of grace.* The feudal office remained the primary mode of intellectual production in the state and the commercial office remained the primary mode of intellectual production in the emerging market. Practitioners each attempted to monopolize reproduction, but the power of monopoly was derived not from the market but from the material basis of the office.

The capitalist mode of production gained ascendancy, but in so doing, did not transform intellectual office but rather subordinated it through formal incorporation. Office of vassalage was retained for the state, but in various ways in Europe this office was no longer handed down purely on the basis of kinship but increasingly mediated by money. Offices were purchased. For example, a military officer purchased a commission. In this way, *offices were treated as private property and its purchase created the ownership based on a bundle of rights that allowed the expropriation of surplus value through domination (exchange of force) or seduction (exchange of fantasy).* Offices could also be purchased as "private practice." In this case, what has come to be known as the petty bourgeois intelligentsia, also purchased a bundle of rights to enter into exchanges with their clients. By then the X factor in the office mode of intellectual production had gone through three relational transformations in each of the three modes: feudal, commercial, and petty bourgeois. Although, each "intellectual/X" relationship was articulated and subordinated in different ways, each retained distinctive characteristics, none of which could be considered capitalistic, that is, based on the exploitation of waged labour.

The emergence of a capitalist office, thus exhibits unique features that go beyond merely the introduction of "free" labour into the equation, for the capitalist mode of intellectual production must at least subordinate the other three modes. Furthermore, a dual process was at work and made possible by the increasing specialization -- the division of intellectual labour that centred the analysis for this study. *First, the division of labour created the potential for exploitation to exist at the level of the office creating a relationship between a proletariat and a bourgeoisie who produced cultural commodities, for example, for the market in "credentials."* *Second, the division of labour increasingly depersonalized intellectual labour into anonymous and collective forms contrasting it with the traditional heroic conception of intellectual practice, including traditional professions.*

The capitalist mode of intellectual production was not necessarily completely dominant and allowed for former kinds of office production to be articulated to a variety of modes each retaining different hierarchical forms and in no way reflective of industrial capitalistic

forms. For example, the growth and specialization of the modern medical office incorporated a free exchange based on commercial contract model between doctors, it incorporated a free exchange between various offices based on the petty bourgeois model as an exchange between different private *practices* (e.g. medical, legal or otherwise), and it incorporated a feudal office form in the patriarchal subordination of other salaried and waged personnel (see e.g. Starr 1982). Once the office began to produce cultural commodities for exchange, the workers who directly produced the commodities in an exchange of mental power for wages represent the realization of the capitalist office as distinctive from the merely formal subordination of other modes of intellectual practice to the capitalist organization of society as a whole. The introduction of the examination and credential standardization allowed for the formal incorporation of the bureaucratic form into market relations and a form of intellectual reproduction through the control of the offices of higher education which produced the cultural commodities required to mediate the cash nexus. In the recent cultural transformation, previous intellectual modes of production are being "industrialized," marking the formal subsumption of petty commodity production by the capitalist mode into the real subsumption of cultural commodification into the capitalist mode (see e.g. Derber et al. 1990). In all these cases, it also cannot be presumed that one mode of production dominates the other. In a capitalist society, such as Canada, there may be a variety of office social formations where the capitalist mode of intellectual production does not dominate in the sense of real subsumption. Nevertheless, having said this, an empirical analysis of an intellectual mode of production in a society must take the above specifications into account as I did in the analysis of *Toward 2000 Together*. As a future hypothesis *I would suggest that the state-sponsored producers of fantasy is not a new class, but emerged initially in its modern form wherever the ideology of "nation" was substituted for a conception of intellectual-class power and the imagination of community. Potentially this means that the search begins as far back as the English and French Revolutions and their emerging conceptions (as cultural constructions) of the "nation-state," that is, the ideology of the modern office writ large or what I called in the previous section the "nascent state" as agent.*

The questions I have raised about the intelligentsia as a "nascent state" and producers of a fantasy called "nation" speak specifically to the rise of the modern intellectual as a class. If not resolving the problematic of class, state and nation, this study hypothesized a potentially new set of social relations. I now return to the analysis of those social relations. How then did intellectuals in *Toward 2000 Together* produce *official* fantasies of the future?

#### 10.4. Hegemony, Intellectuals and Metanarration

Many Albertans appear to be the carriers of a grammar which cannot recognize the poverty of *Toward 2000 Together's* dreams as they await for the proverbial Godot to coordinate a parallelogram of consenting, conflicting and contradictory forces. There is no inevitable teleology to be realized in the future as the navigators seemed to be projecting. Their teleological assumptions are potentially limited by contending forces and traditional structures not of their choosing. The students may rise again with more people on their side. The Science Council or some similar forum may be resurrected by the new federal Liberal administration. There are resistances not yet uncovered, discontinuities in the making, seething below the official documentation, ready to knock down the Berlin Wall of Alberta's political tradition and send the futurist scurrying to reconstruct trend lines.

The multiple meanings attributed to the many keywords studied in the previous chapters also revealed the tensions, struggles and the complex interplay between denotation and

connotation. As shown above, the constant ethical motif to provide an expanded material basis for capitalism just does not come up for contestation, and when it does, it is quickly swallowed by the translation code where *uncertainties* and *constraints* are transformed, at least linguistically, into business *opportunities*. Nevertheless, contestations constantly arose in *Toward 2000 Together* even if at the present moment they appear moribund.

Let me review the key points in the continuity of the above hegemonic narrative. The task of the project navigators for the *Toward 2000 Together* initiative was to provide a shared context of meaning derived from expert opinion and selective documentation. This "context" constituted a reality of both material and ideational crises. The navigators assumed that there was an underlying natural equilibrium which had been disrupted by ideational error. To restore the natural material equilibrium meant identifying the deviant paradigm and publicizing the correct paradigm. Because the crisis was caused by ideational factors, what was required was clearer communication and more information restoring correct ideation and communicative equilibrium. Once the correct ideal was restored natural equilibrium also could be restored to material reality.

According to the navigators, several factors blocked a return to material equilibrium in Alberta and the world. One was the fragmentation of knowledge and the other was the absence of information. Fragmentation was caused by representational government which was based on an adversarial model expressing divisiveness and by government bureaucracy because of departmental divisions of labour. Furthermore, ignorance was caused by representational government because it catered to the base desires of the masses and by government bureaucracy (and universities) because it monopolized knowledge by controlling the institutions for education, health and social services. This aim clearly smacks of intellectual arrogance even though the rhetoric claimed the opposite. Cooperation between stakeholders who were not employed by the public sector could solve the problem of fragmentation and ignorance by commercializing knowledge.

To realize the goal of cooperation and commercialization meant that government had to be changed to a facilitator of cooperation and commercialization rather than continuing as a legislator of divisiveness and monopoly. Government should get out of the business of legislating values when the market could do so naturally -- once freed. The metanarration thus also explained the world crisis. The promotion of welfare-state capitalism and state socialism had monopolized and fragmented knowledge and promoted mass ignorance and class conflict. The result was that economic production and the natural order of the material base (contract obligations between free and equal individuals) had become distorted thus creating a global economic crisis. The promotion of a *new* paradigm could create the preconditions for a global market regulating the flow of information, dismantling knowledge barriers and bringing individuals together in a cooperative social order that respected contractual obligations established for mutual benefit. At the same time, the privatization of the means of knowledge-production could restore profitability to economic production by letting the price system regulate education and restore equilibrium to the natural flow of information.

If Alberta moved first in this area, it would get a competitive advantage in the new reality. Restored profitability created by the privatization of knowledge production would accomplish two tasks at once: provide the means to meet the basic needs of all Albertans now inadequately provided by the welfare state and to increase the level of freedom for all Albertans now tyrannized by an increasingly oppressive state. The sign of inadequacy and oppression was the growing debt. Public salvation was equated with a balanced budget, the triumph of a minimal state and a free market. The causes of fragmentation and ignorance, that is state monopolies (such as university credentialling) deflecting market



indicators, would disappear and a new knowledge-based economy dedicated to transparent communication and infinite information would resolve the economic crisis and restore humanity to wholeness.

The task of the project navigators was to share their privileged understanding and inform the public of their expert opinion through selective documentation. To maintain the integrity of the above assumptions the intelligentsia had to believe that the "material order" was naturally based on a common interest and that the unnatural presence of conflicts of interest resulted from either a deficit of knowledge (mass ignorance) or morality (selfish interest). In other words, the goal of the expert facilitator, was to broker facts and values and thus transcend the fact and value deficits of society. To do so meant negotiating the shoals of the vernacular with a translation code to restating government constraints as business opportunities.

The above review summarizes the central assumptions of the narrative that provided both explanations *and* predictions in order to scientifically and legitimately prescribe political actions. Factual data came in two forms: (1) evidence to support expert opinion of the present reality in the form of statistics, graphs, citations, and other expert opinion and (2) evidence to support political action in the form public opinion, traditional values and previous discussion. In other words, two kinds of facts were presented in the discourse: empirical facts and normative facts. These "facts" were continually blended and conflated allowing for the merging of fact and value and the emphasis of one over the other depending on practical expediency and effect.

Not only did the blending of fact and value lend itself to the political expediency, the relationship between explanation and prediction also lent itself to opportunism depending on whether the intelligentsia wished to describe the present or to prescribe the future. In this case, in numerous instances, theoretical predictions about the future were treated not only as expert opinion but as facts *demanding* a prescribed action. Futurology retained the status of a fact presentation because it was supported by an expert's opinion. For example, experts seemed to know *as a fact* that trade barriers were going to come down, commodity prices were not going to recover, consumer demand would continue to grow in sophistication, businesses would be increasingly asked to invest in education, and there would be increased pressure for municipalities to reduce taxes. Some of these "predictions" *as facts* could be realized by government acts of policy but most found their first objectification in numerous graphs in the *Moderators Report* as projections into the future up to the year 2010. These trend analyses were based on the assumption that "all things being the same, such and such an occurrence should happen." The point is that this representation of a "wish" as a fact was constructed to justify a particular political will which also intended to turn the wish into a fact. For example, the wish for reduced royalty payments by oil companies *required the future fact* that commodity prices would *not* go up. The wish to privately profit from knowledge-capitalization also required the future fact that business would be called to take over education because of falling literacy rates.

### **10.5. Hegemonic Practice: Social Theory of Development**

Having identified how the above empirical theories brokered both science and fiction as well as fact and value, we can now try to grasp the total theoretical construct and its political implications of the corporate postmodernization narrative. Quite obviously the social theory is the reconstruction of a form Social Darwinism, that is, the blending of assumptions from Adam Smith's economic theory with Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory. In the contemporary version this is expressed as a privatized form of structural-functional modernization theory. The elements of this theory are constituted by the

assumptions of human capital theory, status attainment theory and cultural deficit theory. Suffice it to say here, the specific Rightist constitution of ideology in these texts emphasized different combinations of bourgeois idealism which retained somewhat contradictory tensions in the differences between corporatism, social conservatism, systems theory, libertarianism, pragmatism and utilitarianism. These ideologies were sutured together by "what works," defined as, what works for possessive individualism via corporate profits and evangelical calling in the mobilization of collective interests.

But the mobilization by the above ideologies of conflicting interests via the state created contradictions in the definition of the state as both "facilitator" and "legislator." Throughout the discourse the reader was continually confronted with a collision between assumptions derived from the idea of the minimalist state concerning issues of trade, private profit and deregulation and arguments for a maximalist state concerning issues of public education, business subsidies and political mobilization. This was an interesting replay of a rather *old* configuration between civil society and the state in nineteenth century England. In the transition from laissez faire to corporate capitalism, the Radicals (i.e., cultural bourgeoisie such as Bentham) had to make arguments that justified the Age of Imperialism; that is, they had to find a place for themselves and the industrial bourgeoisie in an accommodation with the plutocratic state. For themselves they legislated industrial combinations, free trade, private profits and a minimalist state and for the emerging working class, they legislated deregulation of guilds, the commodification of labour power, and the interventionary powers of policing, public health and compulsory education (see Green 1990).

This contradiction between minimalist and maximalist state also played itself out in the bifurcation of liberalism into its laissez faire and progressive wings and the splitting of site specific ethics in the public and private spheres. Business solidified the ethic of customer service, while the subordinated State solidified the ethic of public service, with the primary "public" meaning property-holding white males given a certain social standing. The tension between these two wings are today represented in the disciplinary struggles between economics and sociology, with laissez faire providing the assumptions of human capital theory and progressivism providing the assumptions of cultural deficit theory. Each thesis provides an explanation for an individual's status attainment based on counterpoised ethics for economic growth and individual opportunity.

The tension between the two wings now appears to be collapsing as the borders between state and economy dedifferentiate. The agents of the Toward 2000 Together, symbolized by the rise of MBA power, appear to be attempting to capture the state levers of knowledge-production for business. The new nature of *education* as both a mode of production and a mode of reproduction appears to be resulting in a form of corporatism or "social conservatism" in Alberta under the progressive enunciation of "empowerment" and "participatory government", that is, *participatory governance by executive shareholders and the abrogation of democratic accountability in favour of empowering the private accumulation regimes of corporations, merchants and petty commodity producers*. This also suggests that the old assumptions of "human capital theory" are in the process of being redefined.

When education was considered an expense required for social reproduction, it was best left to the state for two reasons: it solved the "free rider" problem and allowed reproduction expenses of education to be socialized while the profits of production were privatized. The enunciation of human capital theory occurred within the reproductive mode of doing business from 1945-1985. But now that education can be considered as "wealth generating" and not just "a cost of doing business" it appears on both sides of the ledger as production and reproduction. In keeping with the ideology that profit-generating aspects are

best privatized, the core of the above ideology requires that education and training be discussed separately from any discussion about provisioning of education and research. The first is still concerned with social reproduction, an expense, best left in the hands of all taxpayers with an increased emphasis on "entrepreneurial" values, and the second is concerned with social production, that is, a business opportunity, best left in to the hands of the private entrepreneur.

With this understanding of the bifurcation of human capital theory into two wings, the proposals for the restructuring of health, social services and education start to make sense when the production of knowledge is understood as the new engine for the Alberta economy. But because the post-WWII social contract placed the means of knowledge production (exempting broadcasting) in the hands of the state (see Litt 1992), the private sector now believes that it is their god-given right to eliminate public-sector competition in areas of potentially profitable production. *The job of the anonymous facilitator in the Toward 2000 Together initiative is to negotiate a shift in language and to provide a new vernacular for the business community, that is, mobilize a broader public outside of the select intellectual elite who carry the new vision.* Briefly stated the new aspects are redefined in the language of choice in three ways. (1) The equal opportunity thesis is given a libertarian connotation to mean the complete freedom to purchase and to dispose of private property, including credentialled competencies, free of government regulation or bureaucratic monopolies (e.g. universities). (2) The human capital thesis is given a laissez-faire connotation to mean the privatization of investment decisions (as individuals, organizations or corporations) rather than mediated by a state responding to politically derived norms. And (3) the cultural deficit thesis is given a corporatist connotation to mean the right of parastate organizations (i.e. via consultations with organizational elites called "stakeholders") to intervene in the social service, health-care and educational spheres. These actions are facilitated by government support through taxation policies, direct and indirect subsidies, and the sponsorship of "stakeholder" forums and advisory committees -- all at public expense, that is, the socialization of costs for the enhancement of private profits.

Furthermore, the hegemonic intellectual must negotiate the shift in language within a *still* democratic political system requiring the legitimation of the entire voting public once every four or five years. This general public is already sensitized to educational crisis and change is best mobilized by using the language of progressive liberalism. The function of the anonymous intellectual as commercial broker in restructuring the vernacular was twofold: first the facilitator must negotiate the shift in the meaning of human capital theory in order not to alienate the hegemonic constituency and second it must negotiate the shift in meaning by using progressive language in order not to alienate its general population which might provide its nemesis. It had to do this for a particular reason as exemplified by the Calgary vision conference.

The main purpose of the conference was not to provide details or develop a plan of action. The purpose was to educate the potential partisans with a new theory of economic opportunity for "information." Behind the strategy lay the untapped interest in the private expropriation of communal public assets. Such a process of speculation concerning the profitability of public enclosures has a long history. From the expropriation of church lands by Henry VIII and Indian lands by Europeans to the private appropriation of labour power through anti-combination acts under the sovereignty of industrial capitalists, enclosure has provided one method for recapitalization of fixed assets. Knowledge of or participating in an enclosure movement was always profitable for those who had insider knowledge about which public property could be subjected to an extension of property rights, and in these

new cases, the logic of land and labour-power seizure is now brought to bear on "mental power" or "intellectual property." If the new bonanza is to be "knowledge production," the private ownership of the means of producing that knowledge is surely going to be the site of a major political contestation and a source of private accumulation (see e.g. Derber et al. 1990). Also, if the means of knowledge production are to be a site of profitable opportunity, then in the eye of the speculator and knowledge broker, the means of knowledge production and the products themselves *rightly* should belong to private entrepreneurs (insiders) and not to the general public (outsiders). If this right does not exist at the present time, then the realization of the vision through strategic action could make it right in the future. *The "future" becomes a terrain of struggle over archetypes provided by the metaphorical journey. To capture the high ground, capture the mythology.*

#### 10.6. Hegemonic Practice: Mythical Reconstruction

There are the Chosen People in Moses's exodus to the Chosen Land; there are the Knights of the Round Table and the search for the Holy Grail; there are the Crusades to free the Holy Land from the Infidel; there are Marco Polo and Venetian companions mapping Oriental Riches; there are the Voyages of Discovery, the New World and Brave New World; there are the calls for Manifest Destiny, go West young man kill Indians, Mexicans and Gooks and make land safe for private property. These memories have the power to evoke strong and ambiguous messages because they resonate as the cultural habitus of secularized Christianity in a Western civilization now called *America* and they have no national boundaries as the culture of commercial capitalism (see Tomlinson 1991).

Northrop Frye (1973) writes that as a culture develops, its mythology becomes encyclopedic and creates a totalization of past, present and future, of social relations between people and their gods, and a means to approach destiny. This conclusion is also valid for the representatives of "Alberta's" self-understanding and the presentation of the metaphorical journey incorporating not only geography but "concern." Frye contrasts conservative "myths of concern" with liberal "myths of freedom." Frye argues that Canada's "myth of concern" has become a "closed myth," intolerant of dissent and anxious for continuity. Alberta's mythology is riven with the contradictions of concern and freedom, but its social conservatism marks its strength as a closed myth of caring framed in the language of evangelist fundamentalism. To enunciate the meaning of "Alberta," as shown in the political discourse, is to universalize a *religio*. The intellectual class is still in the business of selling salvation.

Why does this universalization happen? Frye (1973) suggests that

The myth of concern exists to hold society together, so far as words can help to do this. For it, truth and reality are not directly connected with reasoning or evidence, but are socially established. What is true, for concern, is what society does and believes in response to authority, and a belief, so far as belief is verbalized, is a statement of willingness to participate in a myth of concern. The typical language of concern therefore tends to become the language of belief. In origin a myth of concern is largely undifferentiated: it has its roots in religion, but religion has also at that stage the function of *religio*, the binding together of the community in common acts and assumptions. (cited from McKillop 1979: 4)

The metaphorical journey of Toward 2000 Together sutured together the tensions in meanings and interests and bound a community to the authority of the facilitator. Frye thus offers a plausible but limited explanation for its use which goes beyond the stated interests of the anonymous "captain" of Alberta's ship of souls. The visioning process *was and is* about submission to anonymous authority, to trust without knowledge, "to momentarily

'suspend disbelief' and to engage in some creative 'lateral' and 'upside-down' thinking" (RRT: 6). While the identification of this kind of thinking with the creative process and fictive imaginary is accurate, to channel it out of art and into mass mobilization by strategic planners takes it beyond the suturing of a community to the suturing of a community *on the move*. In this case, the metaphor of the journey and the evocation of "competitiveness" and "excellence" is not just about trust and communication, it is about a political project that lies beyond a horizon. And in this day, more so than any other, a project justified by a suspension of moral debate over the intended governing destinations can only play to demagogues who would justify other people's suffering in the name of some noble project of social uplift. It is the logic of totalitarianism, right, left or centre, this time corporate style.

Native North American Indians, of course, have a different reading of the voyages of discovery and the "nebulous and somewhat terrifying" effects of imperialist visionaries who carried an ethic of good intentions and transcendent moral uplift. The power of *religio* in Canada to abduct metanarration has a long history. Suffice it to say here, the power of "faith" to hijack discourse means that the only basis for linguistically coordinating normative theory, empirical theory and empirical statements in scientific discourse is removed. Science, thus, becomes open for colonization by the mediating values of money and force. In so doing language is subordinated to the economies of the commodity market and state power. The gift economy of language is subverted by the valuations of private accumulation. Knowledge is subordinated to accumulation and to possessive individualism rather than the logic of disclosure and communal service. The very purpose of intellectual practice is at stake here: discourse delimited by a dialogue about social need versus discourse directed by an extension of private greed, *Reaching for Tomorrow* versus *Toward 2000 Together*.

Edward Said (1978) might argue that *Toward 2000 Together* is merely the manacles of a mythic imagination applied to the general population of Alberta who are *not* "stakeholders."

Mythic language is discourse, that is, it cannot be anything but systematic; one does not really make discourse at will, or statements in it, without first belonging--in some cases unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily--to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence. These latter are always the institutions of an advanced society dealing with a less advanced society, a strong culture encountering a weak one. The principal feature of mythic discourse is that it conceals its own origins as well as those it describes.

According to Said's thesis about anonymous totalizations, the failure to come to terms with Alberta culture is a failure to come to terms with its colonial relationship with the rest of Canada and the effects of Empire. This colonial *mentalité* is further complicated by English-speaking intellectuals who are both objects of cultural imperialism and the producers of an *image* to maintain their own kind of cultural imperialism in colonizing the internal resistances of *Albertans*. The failure to theoretically confront the ambiguities of cultural domination led to the generalization of an illusion of consent by overriding the cultural contradictions of power through the "suspension of disbelief." It also fails to confront the fact that the colonized are still with us in body and spirit. And that intellectual imperialists still speak the dreams of others.

To reveal the presence of cultural imperialism and the colonial *mentalité*, though, would mean recognizing that the base of the natural order is not one of equilibrium but of contradictory practical interests which cannot be resolved simply by a culture shift, that is, transparent and authentic communication. For Albertans, this would mean confronting the

crucial issues of power and inequality, the foreign ownership of the resource and manufacturing industries, the ideological colonization of the intelligentsia by American business administration and the consumer ethic, the marginalization of the working class and the public sector salariat, the exclusion of the underclass and the differential displacements of sex and race. All these practical and contradictory interests are what continually created the paradoxes and logical contradictions which permeate the texts I reviewed. Alberta's problems go far beyond the need for metaphorical mind experiments of the Toward 2000 Together navigators. This is not to say that communication and cooperation are not necessary, but alone they are necessarily insufficient if compromise is devoid of moral principle and metatheoretical debate.

### **10.7. Counter-hegemonic Practice: the Culture of Performativity**

It would be too easy and incorrect to explain away what I have identified in Toward 2000 Together as a contingent accident. This begs incredulity and acts as a cover for denial. It would also be too easy to explain what happened as an effect of conscious instrumental manipulation of reality. To oversimplify a truism that it is in the "stakeholder's" practical interest to manipulate the process also begs incredulity because it has to credit an exceptional degree of both dishonesty *and* intelligence to the production of ideology. It also fails as a first explanation because it assumes that the fundamental form of power in the capitalist mode is exercised via personal relations rather than the mediations of money and law. To believe in such an illusion misses the essential effects of the commodity form that tend to invert reality and appearance. It is not personalized happenstance or class overlordship (although there is always a bit of these in any situation) that we must look to but to the larger configurations of mediation. We must look to the way Albertans have organized their life, and in keeping with this study's specific concern, *we must look to the functioning of ideology as distorted communication and internal colonization.*

For Habermas (1987a) the grammar of the form of life is the process whereby actors satisfy in principle the presuppositions for responsible participation and communication. Global capitalism has captured the world and now turns inward to colonize the very grammar of the form of life in the name of science, growth, efficiency, and profit. Not content to subordinate the majority of the planet's population to material impoverishment, the profiteers of ritual inequality now penetrate, fragment, and dismantle the everyday consciousness and symbolic reproduction of community. As a consequence of capitalist growth, the subsystems of the economy and the state displace communicatively shared understanding. Commodity relations (mediated by money), legal relations (mediated by juridification), and discursive relations (mediated by science) substitute technical requirements for intersubjective dialogue. With internal colonization, culturally-fragmented people face alone the vortex of economic growth, their efforts circumscribed by impersonal and anonymous forces acting from a distance: money markets, legal sanctions, scientific instrumentalization, and technological revolution.

Struggles that used to appear in transparent and class-specific forms seem to have lost their revolutionary potential. The 19th century ruling class has been recast. Isolated individuals, now rarely motivated to act as a class, confront not people but futurology, debts, laws, studies, and machines and are more prone to clash over subjective identities unrelated to class. For the exploited, the oppressed and the dispossessed, it is difficult to organize according to class, let alone find or identify the "class" enemy amongst the anonymous bureaucrats, scientific functionaries, corporate managers, and development technicians who spread the Word: salvation through growth, efficiency, and science. The



community level, the terrain of action is a praxis which strategically challenges hegemonic authoritarianism with radical democracy.

Within this imperial context, understanding the *new* postmodernization and human capital theories as mythical discourse is crucial not only for understanding the dynamics of capitalism but also for identifying the contradictory effects of cultural resistance. Second, contained in the baggage of all modernization theory is one of *America's* key ideological exports: "democracy." As a crucial component of postmodernization theory, democracy as discourse has a mythical character which in itself is neither true nor false yet linguistically and materially contestable. While the effective libertarian and corporatist discourse on democracy can be understood as hegemonic war by other means, that is, a camouflage used in innumerable "non-democratic" ways to justify state or corporate interventions, the long history of the meaning of democracy has shown it to be a contradictory force. "Democracy," as defined by its social usage, is open to contestation and cannot be viewed merely as an ideological tool of the ruling class, even if, in most cases, this is exactly how it has been used by dominant groups, strata, or classes. Democracy has also provided the oppressed and exploited with a rallying cry to oppose, limit and, at times, even end the propertied privileges of a few. "Democracy" has also been used by counter-hegemonic actors in different ways and provides a crucible for cultural politics which acts to proliferate public space and increase collective self-management. In the reconstruction of collective identities, public space for argumentation and decision-making are crucial sites for social mobilization *and* collective self-fulfillment. It is for this very reason that the *American* discourse should be held accountable for its claims of democracy and should be pressed in all forums for its *realization* in universal and material terms as radical democracy. *Toward 2000 Together* was and is no exception. According to Laclau and Mouffe:

*The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of radical and plural democracy....[T]he very fact that [this task] is possible arises out of the fact that the meaning of liberal discourse on individual rights is not definitively fixed; and just as this unfixity permits their articulation with elements of conservative discourse, it also permits different forms of articulation and redefinition which accentuate the democratic moment. That is to say, as with any other social element, the elements making up the liberal discourse never appear as crystallized, and may be the field of hegemonic struggle. It is not the abandonment of the democratic terrain but, on the contrary, in the extension of the field of democratic struggles to the whole civil society and the state, that the possibility resides for a hegemonic strategy of the Left. (1985: 176)*

As shown in this research, democratic struggle at the material level must not only confront capitalism as exploitation but also as internal colonization in the form of performativity and discipline that the navigators imposed on *Toward 2000 Together*. It must not be forgotten that the navigators' power rested on the mobilization of economic and political resources. But this "material" was not their only power. It must also be remembered that the navigators' power rested on their competency to regulate the process of signification. In a period of increasing integration between economic, political and symbolic labour, whether symbolic labour marks a form of class power or not, research must account for the fact that "internal colonization" in the contemporary period tends to exclude ideological confrontation in the traditional sense of social mobilization by heroic intellectuals. Ideology challenges ends while performative imperialism acts through means without ends. Power expressed via social technologies is, in effect, a kind of intellectual terror. Administrative systems present themselves as morally neutral systems, an instrument for ends, yet the end that administrative systems actually impose is a particular



form of life, devoid of meaning other than meeting the technical requirements of prediction and control, and in capitalism, private profitability for a select few. *Administrative systems make "futures" already inscribed in the present relations of social power.* How does one argue with a process which excludes moral and political evaluation as a legitimate form of discourse? As an individual or community, one either plays the game or is selectively excluded as the Science Council of Canada found out. To repeat: terror, in the sense enunciated by Lyotard (1984), is "the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from a language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened" (64). This terror was exacted on the Science Council and was the guiding logic of the Alberta's Toward 2000 Together. By excluding moral concerns over distribution and quality of life from the very definition of economic growth, a whole realm of social relations and future possibilities was excluded *a priori* from debate. Hegemony was exercised not by giving false answers but by not allowing certain questions to be asked or certain definitions to be used.

The challenge for counter-hegemonic and critical intellectuals is to redefine the hegemonic conceptualizations of modernization, efficiency, growth, science, profits, and the "free market," so that *a priori* concepts incorporate notions of exploitation, radical democracy and social justice and can find an experiential resonance in counter-hegemonic movements. *Counter-hegemonic visions must not be incredulous.* The elite intelligentsia, so to speak, are the last court of appeal in the politics of definition and therefore must recognize their crucial position in the cultural struggle over the givenness of concepts, linguistic formations and the production of credibility.

Of course linguistic struggle is necessary for social transformation, but this focus does not preclude the *necessity* for political and economic struggles. But in this day and age is it so easy to distinguish symbolic from political and economic struggles? As shown in this research, strategic action develops from specific material sites, and for the intelligentsia, action takes the form of material struggles *for* and *around* definitions rather than *with* definitions, specifically, in their teaching, researching, publishing and public opinion making. Furthermore, the Toward 2000 Together navigators used the "secondary" discourses provided by such people as Michael Porter and Peter Drucker to perform political labour. Because these documents' could be treated as transcendental sources for naming the "truth," their meta-claims were used to sanction opinion as fact, bourgeois self-interest as universal authority, and dismal dreams of the future as the *new* reality. Considering the nature of internal colonization, it would be an error for any counter-hegemonic or critical struggle to assume that an escape from the ever-tightening instrumental rationality of human relations, the inequitable private accumulation of wealth and the discursive effects of the metanarratives that justify truth claims can occur without a radical *symbolic* challenge to the performative discourse on truth anymore than without a radical economic and political challenge -- even if such distinctions are difficult to make.

With the expansion of economic-administrative complexes, a center composed of a privileged ruling group (directly involved in the production process and capitalist growth) comes into conflict with an array of intellectual groups on the margins who are either excluded because of their performative inefficiencies or mobilized for instrumental action through an administrative apparatus which destroys communicative life. In the margins, the heterogeneous groups are bonded by their critique of growth *as defined by the hegemonic forces.* As new conflicts of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization overlap with old conflicts of material reproduction and distribution, resistance

increasingly takes the form of movements dedicated to restoring the grammar of forms of life but, as it appears, without the intellectual means to do so.

The mythology of the new *postmodernization* narrative provides a crucial starting point for intellectuals to participate in a cultural politics to realize a collective imaginary of liberation. In struggling to redefine the nature and content of theory, Giroux (1983) states that "the struggle will not be over the use of data or types of studies conducted. The real battle will be over the theoretical frameworks in use, for it is on the contested terrain of theory that the debate needs to be conducted" (100). So too this study has focused on myth and theory as situated reason. Through autonomous and local struggles the meaning of postmodernization theory can be both contested as a site of domination and used as a language for liberation. By broadening the debate and extending the field of social conflict to the plurality of subject positions held by the intelligentsia as they live in and through the discourse of postmodernization, a further step can be taken to dislodge the privileged agents of change: hegemonic scientists, state bureaucrats, career politicians, mass-market futurists and corporate managers who, with their totalitarian tendencies, dominate the structures of power and therefore define for *excluded others* the meaning of postmodernization. Furthermore, intellectuals must further the expansion of a public space beyond their own expert culture to include the plurality of other dispersed and excluded subject positions. Giroux (1988) writes that "rather than casually dispense knowledge to the grateful masses, intellectuals fuse with the oppressed in order to make and remake the conditions necessary for a radical social project" (118).

Because speech acts conjoin both meaning and action, the above process further conjoins the meaning and action of socialism *and* radical democracy. Marx and Engels ([1848] 1967) define a still relevant hope: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (105). If postmodern socialism is to mean anything it means the development of a "proletarian public sphere" where questions of democracy *and* "free" labour remain at the center of the emancipatory project (Aronowitz 1990).

The development of such a sphere, nevertheless, will not fall like a ripe apple ready for eating or be the product of one discourse analysis. Within an educational process which is truly committed to emancipation, people must struggle and guarantee the public space to determine the grammatical form of life. This struggle *will* require imaginative linguistic practice in order to identify the mythical character of postmodernization theory, to implicate the role of hegemonic intellectuals in the production of ideology, and to specify the kinds of challenges necessary to transform theory into a force for liberation, not only of the intelligentsia, but for the exploited, oppressed and dispossessed. This dissertation confronted these issues in both theory and practice.

By which primary medium will the new community be reconstituted against democracy? Money? Force? Language? Scientific management has created a profitable industry of pseudo-dialogue for social therapy. Someone must proclaim "Therapy Cancelled." The very fact that outside the governing classes intersubjectivity has been displaced by instrumental social relations means that emancipatory intellectual practice is saddled with the problem of overcoming very specialized knowledges. How is the radicalized intellectual to respond? The consequences for a morally and practically disempowered intelligentsia has serious consequences for enlightened development in the New World Order. But the "future" is situated. Eduardo Galeano (1990) knows about this eternally present future. As a counter to Fukuyama (1989), Galeano writes: "The end of history. Time has been pensioned off, the world has stopped turning. Tomorrow is another

name for today. The places are set, and Western civilization denies no-one the right to beg for crumbs....Now we are told that the future is the present" (7, 9).

This is the time of futurology and its factual fictions: the vision conference, the "project," the scenario, the scientific prediction, the forecast, the utopia, the dystopia, the social goal, the mission statement, the prophecy. "The vision is our 'beacon for the future', said conference participants," noted the moderator of the 1992 *Toward 2000 Together: Premier's Conference on Alberta's Economic Future*. But who is speaking here through the anonymous forms which must be uncovered and analyzed? Of course, Galeano also knows the truth about both the "end of history" and the actual end of history. There is another history, the history not ended, not circumscribed by words, not occluded by a futurist strategically guarding the present. This actual future cannot be named in the endless stream of documentation by experts because it is the underbelly of the New World Order, the new "globalized" wave of economic exploitation and military domination turned inward and now cannibalizing its own culture, a "postmodern" culture, a new sensibility, a cultural logic unable to speak itself as a continuation of blood, death and terror.

Sense *must* be made of the current condition and malaise of intellectuals that goes beyond moralizing and chanting the "can do" principle. The rallying cry of the small town Chambers of Commerce or the rarefied air of the "postmodern" turn to irrationalism in academe will not do. Galeano does identify the lie in the "end of history" ideology, but there must also be a truth that gives such conceptions a resonance in people's experience. While a history of praxis may be spoken of as the modernist unfolding of "real" human experience according to a progressive linearity or dialectic, contemporary historical analysis runs into the dilemma of identifying its object as *either* a new moral ideal *or* empirical description of fact. But the very nature of the historical artifact appears problematic. The modern artifact as traditionally representative of real life experience in a cultural form such as texts, documents, interviews, statistical analysis, observation, etc. is now itself being cannibalized in its "postmodern" form as in the cases of the docudrama, a fiction based on facts, and "econometrics," a fact based on fiction. So in some ways the end of history appears partially true, not because people do not go on living and dying, but because the systemic logic of late capitalism makes it difficult to culturally represent the past as a time distinctive from the present or the future. In late capitalism, cultural representation has shifted from "parody" to "pastiche" and has been co-opted by the logic of technological performativity. Calls for a new morality are stillborn or seem increasingly to descend into Dante's "Yugoslavia." We are witnessing, I have argued, the emergence of the anonymous intellectual.

Actors are robbed of the power for synthetic thought because dialogue has disappeared into cybernetic systems of information management and strategic planning, and everyday experiences find little expression, little articulation, and little validity outside the valuations sanctioned by the internal colonizers who control the offices of the state, the economy, and the natural sciences with their cult of efficiency. Whether we call these hegemonic intellectuals a class or a strata confuses a more strategic consideration that reaches beyond scientific considerations. In such a society informed with internal colonization, moralists cannot seek out an absolute sign for justification, but must recognize their socio-historical situatedness in a real and sometimes anonymous conversation. It is this space for authentic moral and political conversation which the internal colonizers destroy. Analysis must start not from established abstractions but rather from the historical analysis of existing social relations. It is from this concrete analysis we will find the words to name the world.

This project was committed to understanding the totality of intellectual practice and to the reconstitution of existing fragments into a conversation rather than dispersing them into

to the insensible cynicism of silence and abdication. I have attempted to make meaning out of the world; to be in a classical sense, an intellectual. Whether I realized this goal or not is circumscribed -- as I well know -- by the limiting conditions I have explicated. Nevertheless, I still established a telos for my praxis that I considered consistent with both words and deeds and a sense of agency. It is the unrealized hope of this agency that challenges the fatalism of those who agonize over instead of organize their thoughts. It challenges those who continue to lament that there is no technique, no strategy or no answer to the current malaise of intellectual passivity, efficient specialization or pathological postmodernity. Let us start with what we do know and act.

We already know that the conception of a *new* community is part and parcel of providing a social explanation which intends to "re-map" self-understanding *and* to reorient communal action in particular and unequal ways. Let us start here without illusions about *this reality of a unequal conversation*, to begin anew with the artifacts of the old, knowing better than before the implications of how language is informed by the power to name preferable futures. Fredric Jameson (1990) clarifies how the cultural logic of late capitalism might work. Intellectuals produce theoretical discourse as "a flight forward . . . and their method is maintained by what burns all bridges and makes retreat impossible, namely, the growing old of the codes, the planned obsolescence of all the older conceptual machinery" (397). This planned obsolescence will mean transcoding the various codes which are circulating today, to shift situated eyes away from "history from below" and to refocus the intellectual gaze on the networks of power and the hegemonic elites who function to symbolically reconstitute their own subjectivity by making history from above in an age of performativity and conceptual obsolescence.

If counter-hegemonic cultural workers do their job well, those *from below* will do as they have always done and what they have to do. They will enter history on their own accord as agents of everyday normality. It is patronizing on either accord to believe that a cultural elite which regulates discourse, and will continue to regulate discourse, can simply choose to absent itself from the conversation or, for that matter, simply bring the "other" into the conversation by feigning a pseudo-absence. The intelligentsia can no more feign absence from this conversation than they can control it. Bakhtin can still speak even after his marginalization during Stalin's "Siberian winter":

The single adequate form for *verbally expressing* authentic human life is the *open-ended dialogue*. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to need to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium. Reified (materialized, objectified) images are profoundly inadequate for life and for discourse. A reified model of the world is now being replaced by a dialogic model. Every thought and every life merges in the open-ended dialogue. Also impermissible is any materialization of the word: its nature is also dialogic. (Bakhtin 1984: 293 cited by Kachur 1994 from Gardiner 1992: 31)

Whether Bakhtin overlooked the deepening facts of reification or preferred to speak a hopeful fiction about the triumph of dialogue, one can never know. The navigators of *Toward 2000 Together* were experts in pseudo-dialogue. Their fictions appear to be capturing the high ground. In dialogue about the future let us start here with *this reality of a conversation*, to begin anew with the artifacts of the old, knowing better than before the implications of how language is informed by power.

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