

17723

NATIONAL LIBRARY  
OTTAWA



BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE  
OTTAWA

NAME OF AUTHOR.. Roger Wehrell.....

TITLE OF THESIS. Heidegger's Ontological Framework of 'Existential  
Possibility', 'Authenticity' and 'Inauthenticity' as a Solution to the  
Problem of Uniqueness in the Logic of Historiographical Explanation

UNIVERSITY. of Alberta.....

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED. Master of Arts.....

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED. 1973.....

Permission is hereby granted to THE NATIONAL LIBRARY  
OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies  
of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and  
neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be  
printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's  
written permission.

(Signed) *Roger Wehrell*

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

Department of Philosophy...

University of Alberta...

Edmonton Alberta.....

DATED... September 3..... 1973

NL-91 (10-68)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF 'EXISTENTIELL POSSIBILITY',  
'AUTHENTICITY' AND 'INAUTHENTICITY' AS A SOLUTION TO THE  
PROBLEM OF UNIQUENESS IN THE LOGIC OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EXPLANATION

by



ROGER WEHRELL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY


EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1973

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF 'EXISTENTIELL POSSIBILITY', 'INAUTHENTICITY' AND 'AUTHENTICITY' AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF UNIQUENESS IN THE LOGIC OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EXPLANATION submitted by Roger Wehrell in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Supervisor

P. A. Schenk

Charles D. Morgan

James C. Mackin

Date Sept. 3, 1973

## ABSTRACT

The general question from which this thesis takes its direction is whether a methodological-logical account or analysis of historiographical inquiry and explanation differs in significant respects from an account of the logic and/or method of inquiry and explanation in the natural sciences. And the general approach that is here assumed for dealing with particular issues falling within the scope of the general question is one that takes account of the nature of the historian's subject matter-- of human behavior and its results-- and the categories of inquiry and understanding demanded by the nature of the subject matter as important factors for deciding logical and methodological issues of historiographical procedure. The philosophical analysis of the nature of human behavior and its results (i.e., of what it means to be human) emphasized in this thesis is Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein supplemented and clarified in places by Winch's analysis of human behavior as rule-governed. The reasons for emphasizing Heidegger's account of what it means to be human rather than the work of other philosophers are partly intuitive. His account is systematic and rigorous and explicitly aims at outlining a set of categories in terms of which we understand human behavior and its results (i.e., instances of human being). His account or analysis seems plausible. Lastly it provides the basis for an interesting and plausible answer to one of the issues falling within the scope of the general question outlined above.

The specific issue with which this thesis is concerned is with a putative answer to the question. The answer is: There are significant differences between the logic of historiographical explanation and inquiry and that of explanation and inquiry in the natural sciences insofar as the

concept of 'the general law' is essential to the latter while the former is to be characterized by a concern with the unique and individual which would seem to render the concept of 'the general law' or indeed of any generalization out of place in historiographical inquiry. In Chapter I, I evaluate the arguments of Dray, a philosopher of history who gives just this answer. I show that this answer cannot be justified by claims about mere interest on the part of the historian in the unique or individual aspects of what he is studying but rather that this answer must be justified by, or rest upon, an account of how the historian's subject matter is unique or individual in some sense other than that in which phenomena studied in the natural sciences can be said to be unique and individual. In Chapter II, I consider Heidegger's account of what it means to be human given in Sein und Zeit. There I am mainly concerned with clarification and exposition of relevant parts of the account and in some places defence of its plausibility, though not with a rigorous defense of the account as a whole. The division of the chapter into three main parts reflects an examination of the three categories of primary relevance to the specific issue at hand-- those being 'possibility', 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity'. In the last chapter I show how these categories do render support for Dray's arguments against general laws having a place in historiographical explanation and inquiry and for his arguments that uniqueness constitutes a special factor in the logic of historiographical procedure. However, I also outline the sort of generalizations that these categories do demand as having an essential place in historiographical inquiry and explanation such that we can speak of uniqueness and individuality as a special factor in the explanation of human behavior.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.....	1
Footnotes to Chapter I.....	24
CHAPTER II.....	31
Introduction.....	31
Footnotes to Introduction.....	51
Section 1.....	55
Footnotes to Section 1.....	101
Section 2.....	107
Footnotes to Section 2.....	128
Section 3.....	133
Footnotes to Section 3.....	180
CHAPTER III.....	187
Footnotes to Chapter III.....	223
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	230

## CHAPTER I

Although the aim of this monograph is a clarification of the method and logic characteristic of historiographical explanation, this problem must first be placed within the context of the traditional controversy concerning the differences between what are known as the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften.<sup>1</sup> That the two sorts of science are different-- i.e., are indeed of two sorts-- few will deny, but as to the nature and significance of the differences there has been a continuing controversy, a great deal of which has focused on the method and logic of explanation characteristic of explanation in each of the two sorts of discipline. Whether there is a distinct explanatory logic and method appropriate to and necessitated by the nature of the Geisteswissenschaften and/or by the nature of its subject matter is usually the point at issue, and as might be expected from a glance at the surface simplicity of the issue, there have been two apparent traditional approaches to this theme-- Yes and No, methodological pluralism and methodological monism.

Of those who emphasize a diversity in method between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften many have sought to explain and to argue for the alleged diversity by pointing out a difference in the aims of the two sorts of inquiry.<sup>2</sup> The natural sciences are supposed to seek to discover or to formulate general laws under which to subsume particular phenomena as a way of explaining or accounting for past phenomena and of predicting future ones of the same sort as covered by the general laws. The social-human sciences, on the other hand are said to seek to understand the particular phenomena they study as individual and

unique, not as instances of general laws which may be used to account for and to predict instances of a sort similar to those under study. If we continue to speak of explanation in these so-called ideographic sciences, general laws should not play any major role in their explanations since these laws work in terms of similarities between phenomena while the ideographic Geisteswissenschaften would be interested in any particular phenomenon studied as being unlike any other,<sup>3</sup> or, to put it a more forceful way, they would be interested in that phenomenon in its own right so to speak. The social-human sciences as ideographic seek to grasp "how this Mensch, this people, this state has become what it is as a unique [einmálig: occurring at only one time, only once] historically concrete phenomenon."<sup>4</sup>

The point concerning the uniqueness and individuality of phenomena studied by the Geisteswissenschaften, although a traditional one on which methodological pluralists in the nineteenth century explicitly based their arguments for a distinct method in historiography and the other social-human sciences, remains a confusing one subject to misunderstanding on all sides.<sup>5</sup> Is it a point about some quality or characteristic-- an "irreducible uniqueness"-- inherent in all human doings and the results of those doings-- human institutions, language, etc.-- which sets them apart from the physical, natural phenomena treated by other disciplines? Or is it a point about the inquirer's interest in the ways the phenomena under consideration are distinct and different from other phenomena? What exactly does it mean to say that an historical event or condition was or is unique? How could such social-historical-human phenomena be treated as unique or individual in any sense different from Halley's Comet and its arrival in the solar system in 1682 or from the Grand Canyon for example.

One thing that is obviously not meant by the claim that the aim of the Geisteswissenschaften is one of understanding and elucidating the



phenomena they treat as unique individuals is that these phenomena are completely unlike anything else in any way whatsoever. They are not "absolutely unique" in the sense that we should be unable to see or to discover any respect or aspect in which they resemble anything else such that any classification and/or description of the phenomena in question would be impossible.<sup>6</sup> If this were the case, it seems we would be unable to say anything about such happenings. They would indeed resist generalization and subsumption under general laws, but they would also defy any explanation or description. Few would want to support a view that led to these consequences since such a view would thereby establish the impossibility of any science of or inquiry into social-historical-human phenomena. Several idealist-oriented philosophers who maintain that in historiography and the other social-human sciences phenomena are explained as individuals and not as instances of general laws argue against the above concept of absolute uniqueness as being what is meant by the individuality or uniqueness of an historical event, an institution, a nation, etc.<sup>7</sup> But we are still in the dark as the positive point to be made. I think we can take a step toward an appreciation of the point to be made concerning the uniqueness and individuality of social-historical-human phenomena by an examination of Dray's treatment of the problem.

Dray uses what seems to be an argument related to the one outlined above concerning the uniqueness of historical phenomena in an attempt to show that historiographical explanations do not rely either explicitly or implicitly on empirical general (covering) laws, and his argument may be used to begin to clarify the point at issue here. He first sets out to clarify the point to be made concerning the uniqueness of historical events as the historian's subject matter by distinguishing it from an alleged

idealist doctrine of and argument for the uniqueness of historical events which runs as follows:

1) No event or thing is exactly like any other.

2) The aim of historiography is the description and explanation of what happened in all its concrete detail-- that is, its aim is to account for the uniqueness and individuality of what happened.

3) Any classification of a given event as an instance of a certain sort involves an abstraction or an idealization since the emphasis is on the similarity of that event or thing to others of the same sort while ignoring their differences-- at least for the purposes of classification and the uses to which the classification is put.

4) But general laws depend upon the classification of particular events or things and are therefore relevant only insofar as differences between the event in question and others of the same ilk can be ignored.

5) But ignoring the differences between past events is contrary to the avowed aim of historiography. Therefore, historiographical explanations cannot rest upon general laws but rather must rest on some sort of direct insight or intuition into the particular connections between the unique events of history.<sup>8</sup>

Of course this last point would and does excite no end of furor and commotion among those committed to misunderstanding idealist "nonsense" concerning mysterious intuitions and reliving of these unique events,<sup>9</sup> but Dray raises another sort of objection against the supposed pitfalls of classification on which the above argument rests. Most obvious to Dray is the fact that historians do manage to classify events without much trouble.<sup>10</sup> While this point is of little direct consequence against the alleged idealist position (since our alleged idealist pre-

sumably is not arguing that historians do not have the ability to classify events but is only arguing that insofar as they do so they are not doing proper historiography),<sup>11</sup> Dray is on solid ground in raising this point. For in describing historical events, as in describing anything else, it seems necessary to describe them as being of one sort or another and thereby, according to our imaginary idealist, to classify them. To call the course of events in France in the summer and autumn of 1789 "the French Revolution" is to classify these events or the overall happening as (a) revolutionary one(s) in some way similar to other revolutions. Whether such a happening is to be described as a revolution or a coup, a retreat or a rout, a civil war or a case of intervention by a foreign hostile power can be the sort of issue on which an historiographical inquiry turns, and reasons and justification for describing an event as being of a certain sort rather than of another, are expected to be available. Such reasons would stress similarities between the event in question and events of the sort as an instance of which the event in question is to be branded. (Any description of an event seems to entail branding it as an event of a certain sort and thereby to entail at least an implicit classification of that event.

Furthermore, a description that sought to elucidate the uniqueness or individuality of an historical event, institution or agent (x) with respect to all other historical events, institutions or agents such that we might see how x was (is) unlike any other particular event, etc. would have to specify those respects in which x differed from each in turn of all the others. The aim would be for what Hempel calls a complete description of x, and the task would be an indefinite one.<sup>12</sup> For to differentiate x from some other event, etc. (y) with respect to some to some

characteristic of  $x$  ( $p$ ) that  $y$  lacks is to classify  $x$  as similar to some other events, etc. ( $z$ 's) which also happen to have  $p$  as a characteristic. This in turn raises the necessity of differentiating  $x$  from  $z_1, z_2, \text{etc.}$  by citing further characteristics ( $q_1, q_2, \text{etc.}$ ) of  $x$  which distinguish it in turn from  $z_1, z_2, \text{etc.}$ , but which perhaps liken it to yet other individuals and so create a further insatiable demand for differentiating  $x$  from more and more other particular historical events, etc. The aim of understanding and accounting for an historical event ( $x$ ) as individual and unique seems to present us with a demand for a description of all aspects of  $x$ , and "there is no limit to the number of them we can insist on taking into account."<sup>13</sup> Providing a description of an historical event that would satisfy the suggested uniqueness aim of historiography would be an impossible task, and if we must first describe an event in order to explain it, historiographical explanation would on this account also seem to be an impossible task.

These points appear to undermine the argument from the doctrine of the historian's interest in the "absolute" uniqueness of events against the applicability of general laws to historiographical explanation. Classification and limited description of historical events are to be admitted as proper and necessary features of historiographical inquiry, but Dray does not think that this admission forces us to concede the necessity of using general laws in historiographical explanation and that this admission precludes us from making a point concerning the uniqueness of historical events, institutions, agents, etc. that will differentiate the aims of historiographical explanation and understanding from those of scientific, nomological explanation and understanding.

In making his point concerning the uniqueness of historical events

Dray seems to be working out a clue left by Gardiner in considering the same issue. Gardiner writes:

When an historian says an event is unique, his statement is incomplete until he states in what respects it is unique,

and

to say that something is unique is to describe some feature or features belonging to it... and not belonging to other things. Louis XIV was unique in the sense that he ruled over France at a particular time of her history, but he was not unique in being a man who lived at a particular period.<sup>14</sup>

Accordingly what the historian is interested in, Dray claims, is the uniqueness of an historical condition or event "in the sense of [its] being different from others with which it would be natural to group them under a classification term."<sup>15</sup> We might say that his interest is in the

"relative" uniqueness of the event, and presumably he will be out to fill in the framework of its relative uniqueness by specifying the respects in which the event in question differs from those with which it would be natural to group it. Thus the French Revolution, which of course has already been recognized as a revolution in the naming of it, is as such similar in certain respects to events like the Russian Revolution and the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth century England, but the historian in explaining the why's and how's of this revolution "is just not interested in explaining it as a revolution;" rather he is "concerned with it as different from other members of its class."<sup>16</sup> Therefore,

he cannot appeal to a covering law generalization derived from general knowledge of revolutions. For the most such a law could do is explain the French Revolution qua revolution, whereas the historian will almost certainly want to take its peculiarities into account as well.<sup>17</sup>

This doctrine of the historian's interest qua historian in the relative uniqueness of the events he studies comes to take on the status of

a presupposition or necessary condition of historiographical inquiry-- a presupposition that prevents an event from being explained (historiographically) as an instance of some sort of event. In making this assertion Dray suggest that he is following Oakeshott,<sup>18</sup> and this suggestion is, I gather, supposed to make clearer exactly what he (Dray) is on to in the very sketchy account he gives of his doctrine of relative uniqueness. Indeed, it first appears that he is following Oakeshott from the quotes from Experience and Its Modes that he sprinkles in his text. But the presupposition of relative uniqueness is presented by Dray as being one of the historian's interest-- of his "'approach' to his subject matter" as if we could talk about the historian's subject matter independently of of this presupposition of historiography.<sup>19</sup> Nowhere in Dray's account is it even suggested, let alone shown, that the historian's interest is related to his subject matter. On the contrary, the 'approach' Dray has outlined seems to be suitable for or applicable in dealing with any sort of subject matter. As we have already been told by Dray, any actual occurrence or thing is unique-- i.e., there is nothing else exactly like it. In conformity with Dray's doctrine the historian could be interested in a particular happening of any sort from a particular star's unusual and unexpected explosion in the far reaches of space to a certain caterpillar's seasonal molting to the causes of some animal's unusual disease, as long as he were interested in the ways it differed from other instances of the same sort of phenomenon. Of course, in his argumentation Dray relies on examples of happenings that historians actually have been interested in and which we intuitively feel they ought to be interested in (e.g., the French Revolution and the unpopularity of Louis XIV). However, since he merely states that an interest in the relatively unique is a presupposition

of historiography without arguing for this claim, he at least owes us an account of why we should assume that the historian ought to restrict that interest to the sort of subject matter he in fact restricts his interest to.

Now all these assertions on Dray's part concerning the historian's interest are in marked contrast to Oakeshott's whom Dray claims to be following at least to ~~some~~ extent in laying down his presupposition of the historian's interest. None of the presuppositions of historiography that Oakeshott lays out seem to involve mere matters of the historian's interest. The whole system of presuppositions of historiography is said to be interconnected,<sup>20</sup> and it is as an interconnected whole that the system apparently is supposed to determine the mode of experience as being that of historical experience (historiography) rather than practical or scientific experience. For Oakeshott with his idealist bent experience is to be treated as a whole-- as a unity of the experiencing and what is experienced.<sup>21</sup> Ultimately no line can be drawn between Geschichte and Historie<sup>22</sup> or between what is presupposed on the part of the knower and what is known<sup>23</sup> whereas we can certainly draw a line and distinguish between the interests of an historian and what he knows about the subject matter in which he is interested. But for Oakeshott the facts are not 'out there' independently of our presuppositions. Exactly what the complete implications of Oakeshott's views are I do not want to discuss here, but one important one, I think, is that a discussion of the presuppositions of historiography is at the same time necessarily a discussion of the nature of what is historiographically known, of the subject matter of historiography. If historiography has presuppositions that differentiate it and in particular the logic of its explanation from other disciplines and the

logic of their explanation, then we should be able to recognize these presuppositions as connected with or recognize them 'in' the sort of subject matter peculiar to historiography (i.e., history).

Traditionally this is just the force of certain philosophical arguments which seek to establish a distinction in aims between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften in terms of the former's being committed to elucidating the uniqueness and individuality of the phenomena they study. This aim is to be justified by or connected with or reflected in the peculiar uniqueness or individuality of human actions and institutions and of the historical events in which these are involved. It is against this position that Gardiner attempts to direct the argument "that uniqueness is not a mysterious quality possessed by some events (i.e., historical events) as opposed to others."<sup>24</sup> And it is a position that Dray wants to avoid, partially because of Gardiner's arguments against it, I suspect; yet Dray does want to make a point about uniqueness and individuality in the phenomena that the historian studies in order to argue against the applicability of general laws in historiographical explanation and thereby in effect to distinguish it significantly from the sort of explanation employed in the natural sciences. The result of Dray's waffling is his doctrine of the historian's interest-- an attempt to ignore the necessity of considering the nature of the historian's subject matter in dealing with the presuppositions of historiography.

It may be argued that we are being too hard on Dray-- that we are in fact making something out of nothing because Dray's stated aim here is a limited one. He does not seek to differentiate exhaustively between the logic and method of historiography and that of the natural sciences. He seeks only to show that the use of or implicit reference to general laws



is not a necessary condition of historiographical explanation and has little or no place in the logic of historiographical explanation. He seeks to accomplish this by showing that reference to general laws, tacit or otherwise, conflicts with a presupposition of historiographical inquiry-- i.e., its interest in the unique or individual in a relative sense. There may be other presuppositions of historiography interrelated with the one Dray has focused on and these may have to do with the nature of the historian's subject matter, but all of that is irrelevant to Dray's purposes. If he can establish a distinction between nomological explanation and the sort of explanation proper to historiography by discussing the sort of interest historiography presupposes on the part of its practitioners, that is enough. However, Dray's doctrine of the historian's interest in relative uniqueness fails to do its job, and an examination of its failure will reinforce our point about the necessity of dealing with nature of the historian's subject matter.

In formulating his doctrine of the historian's interest Dray claims to point out a divergence between the historian's interest in event  $x_1$  as different from all other  $x$ 's with which one would naturally classify  $x_1$  and the force of a general law covering all  $x$ 's which emphasizes a similarity between  $x_1$  and all other  $x$ 's. But Dray's claim only points out what it points out-- in the example Dray uses, namely, that an historian of the French Revolution would not use a covering law governing all revolutions to explain the course of the French Revolution. It does not show that he would not use or implicitly refer to any generalizations whatever in his explanation.<sup>26</sup> He could very well be guided in his inquiry into the French Revolution by an interest in its differences from other revolutions-- e.g., the nationalistic spirit of the time, France's peculiar

economic structure prior to the revolution including its internal tariff system and taxes, etc. Presumably citing these factors and perhaps examining some of them in detail would contribute toward an explanation of why the French Revolution took the relatively unique course it did. But in citing these factors as reasons for the French Revolution's particular turn of events it is not altogether clear that we are not referring to, or 'consuming' general laws to explain the contribution of each of these factors to the revolution's uniqueness. It might be claimed that in order to explain anything or to be explained themselves these factors must be taken as instances of general laws. Far from conflicting with the historian's interest in the relative uniqueness of an event, some might want to claim, general laws make it possible.

To fully appreciate this point we might look at an example drawn from another discipline like meteorology where one often finds that generalizations are obviously being used or tacitly implied in explanation but where there is also a frequent interest in the relative uniqueness of some phenomenon under study. Thus a meteorologist might very well be interested in explaining the pattern of an unusually destructive storm not as an instance of a generalization about storms that occur in that area but as different from the sort of storm that usually occurs there-- i.e., as different from the phenomena with which it would normally be classified. He might then go on to sift through meteorological observations and data taken before, during and after the storm to discover whatever features he can that distinguish this storm from others-- for example, sudden temperature changes prior to the storm or unusual combinations of intersecting masses over the area of the storm, etc. Some combination of these features might be cited as an explanation for the storm's unusual intensity, but

the contribution of each feature to the development of the storm will be understood by the meteorologist with reference to a background knowledge of general laws in a framework of theory that will account for the behavior of that sort of feature. The general laws implicitly assumed or consumed by the explanation could be quite numerous including laws of physics and chemistry covering the effect of sudden temperature changes on air movement for example. What our meteorologist would have done in this case is to have analyzed the event to be explained, the occurrence of the storm of great intensity, into various component events and conditions (and sub-component events and conditions if need be) each of which does fall under some general law as an instance of that law. It is not altogether clear why historiographical explanation of an event should not be considered as having a similar logical structure since the historian's interest and the meteorologist's in this case appear to coincide-- at least if we are to believe Dray.

Dray recognizes to some extent the challenge that a more refined account of historiographical explanation's reliance on and utilization of general empirical laws poses to his own claim that general laws play no part implicit or explicit in such explanation. He therefore sets out to examine an account of the logic of explanation where deduction from a single covering law is not required to explain the course of an event under study but where deduction from any number of suitable empirical general laws and appropriate initial conditions will do the job. He briefly considers Hempel's classic example of an automobile radiator cracking during the night where Hempel analyzes the gross event of original interest into a number of "initial and boundary" conditions which led to the radiator's cracking and each of which falls under a general law which

explains its contribution to the gross event.<sup>27</sup>

He then goes on to consider what might be a parallel case in historiography-- the French Revolution analyzed into component events like the meeting of the States General, the swearing of the Tennis Court Oath, etc. and perhaps into component conditions like the nationalist fervor of the new republic, the cleavage between the middle class assemblymen and the Parisian proletariat, etc.-- "in short, whatever the historian feels obliged to mention in his description of what is to be explained."<sup>28</sup> On Hempel's account of the logic involved in the explanation, when each of the components is seen to be covered by an empirical law, the explanation is complete.<sup>29</sup> But, Dray claims, although this sort of piecemeal approach is closer to the historian's method, "the problem of uniqueness may recur for every attempt to subsume a component event of the gross event under law."<sup>30</sup> Sometimes we might recognize a component as a "routine". "But surely it is implausible to say that all must be; and it is simply false to say that, in typical historical cases, all in fact will be."<sup>31</sup>

Dray has subtly shifted his ground here in the heat of his defense against an imagined proponent of methodological monism who holds that all 'real' or 'scientific' explanation rests upon empirical general laws. Prior to this point Dray's argument has been based on the historian's interest qua historian in the relative uniqueness of an event to be explained. Now he talks about the problem of uniqueness recurring in the component events into which the original event has been analyzed as if this uniqueness were some strange characteristic of the events themselves.

If the problem were one merely of interest in the relative uniqueness of the event to be explained, then there should not be any problem at all unless the historian is also interested in explaining the component

events and conditions. But then these would have to be analyzed in turn into their component events and conditions much as the original was. But somewhere this sort of analysis must cease as indeed it does in actual practice. It may take an historian three volumes to recount all the detailed events leading up to and through the course of the French Revolution and to examine all the social, political and economic conditions he thinks necessary to explain the eventual outcome, but eventually he finishes the job. If Dray means to suggest that the presupposition of the historian's interest in the relative uniqueness of an historical event or condition is meant to apply to any event or condition that comes to the historian's attention, then his task will never cease. Every time he distinguishes an event  $x_1$ , which is under study, from other  $x$ 's by virtue of some component event, condition or other aspect  $p_1$  which is cited as part of the analysis and explanation of  $x_1$ , he must then in conformity with Dray's putative presupposition be interested in  $p_1$  as a relatively unique event, condition, etc.; analyze it; and distinguish it from other  $p$ 's by citing some relatively unique aspect of  $p_1$ ; and so the process would carry on without rest. The historian's interest in historical events coming to his attention as being relatively unique must come to an end somewhere if only in sheer exhaustion, and there ends our problem-- if Dray is referring to this problem as one of the historian's interest.

But I think he has shifted his ground here and the problem of uniqueness which bothers him is not merely one interest in the unique. He talks about recognizing some of the component events in the analysis of the gross event as "routines" and therefore as subsumable under a law. Presumably the other component events will be recognizable as unique. But the recognition of something as something should not be dependent on

interest. It depends at least partially on what is recognized being what it is recognized to be.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps Dray really wants to claim that the problem of the uniqueness of an historical event has to do with the event's being obviously unusual and unlike other events of its sort in some significant way-- the one member of a special sub-class, so to speak, such that there is no obvious and familiar established general law that covers it. This sort of case would parallel the case of the intense storm whose unusual intensity prompts the interest of the meteorologist in its relative uniqueness.

If this is indeed the sort of case which Dray has in mind when discussing the relative uniqueness of an event, we may notice that the problem of possible recurring uniqueness in component events and conditions into which an original relatively unique gross event has been analyzed is not peculiar to the historian. The meteorologist faces this problem also. When he analyzes the occurrence of the storm into component events and conditions in explaining the storm's relative uniqueness, he may very well find that some of the components are unusual and can be explained by no familiar covering laws or regularities. Even further analysis would then be called for until he reached a point at which he would be able to apply or assume familiar general laws of physics, chemistry or meteorology on which to base his complicated explanation of the storm and its various contributing factors.<sup>33</sup> It is not at all clear on Dray's account why or how the historian's inquiry into his subject matter is to be regarded any differently. The historian explains the course of the French Revolution, for example, by citing and analyzing in turn various prior and component events and conditions. Presumably these components are of a more familiar sort and more readily understandable than the gross

event in which he was originally interested as being relatively unique; otherwise these component events and conditions would not be cited in explaining the revolution. If our familiarity with them is not based on their being subsumable under general regularities of human behavior, upon what then?<sup>34</sup>

Dray's only immediate answer to the alleged analogy between the historian and the meteorologist would seem to be what amounts to an article of faith that in the typical case of historiographical explanation we never reach a point where we rid ourselves of the problem of uniqueness. His faith seems to be placed in the end in the nature of the historian's subject matter, but such faith must have an aura of mysticism about it since he apparently takes great pains to avoid discussion of the nature of the historian's subject matter as being in any way special or distinct from the natural world which the physical scientist studies. Dray's attempt to clear up the problem of uniqueness in historical phenomena still leaves us in confusion as to exactly what is involved in the problem.

Neither is it entirely clear just what (if anything) this alleged historiographical presupposition concerning the uniqueness of historical phenomena is supposed to entail with respect to the historian's procedures and method of inquiry. Dray claims that an historian of the French Revolution is concerned with it as different from other revolutions. Is this to say that the historian must be concerned with comparing the French Revolution to other revolutions and elucidating the differences between it and them? As an illustration of this possible interpretation of Dray's claim, George Allen in his work on the French Revolution mentions briefly the differences between the English and French revolutions in terms of the limited political and to some extent ecclesiastical aims of the English

revolutions of the seventeenth century as opposed to the not only political but also social aims of the French Revolution.<sup>35</sup> The result of the latter was a sudden and major change in the status of, among other classes, the French clergy and aristocracy while the former left the status of their English counterparts pretty much intact. Is this sort of comparative procedure, then, what Dray has in mind as properly historiographical method while Allen's subsequent drawing of parallels and mention of similarities between the French and Russian revolutions is to be condemned or labelled as indicative of non-historiographical interest and procedure-- although perhaps an appropriate method for another discipline or science? We are not quite sure, for Dray's effort at clarification of this point is a shallow one.

Of course in Allen's case the similarities and dissimilarities drawn between the French and the other two revolutions are not meant to explain anything. They are mentioned only to whet our curiosity and arouse our interest in the French Revolution. They are only attention getting devices for the historiographical examination of that revolution that follows. They are only of peripheral interest with respect to this examination. Except at isolated points the actual body of the text seems to indicate interest in neither similarities nor dissimilarities between the French Revolution and other revolutions. It examines in detail the development of French institutions like the States General and phenomena like the French intellectual movement prior to the revolution which had a prominent role in bringing the revolution about and influencing its course. Occasionally he compares French institutions and conditions of the time with those of other European countries.<sup>36</sup> But mostly he seems interested in events and conditions in pre-revolutionary and revolutionary



France in themselves-- as having a life of their own, so to speak, within the context of the French Revolution and as providing that revolution with a life of its own-- not as different from, nor the same as, other revolutionary conditions and events.

For Dray to claim that the historian's concern qua historian lies in explaining why the French Revolution took a course unlike any other revolution (as indeed he does claim at one point)<sup>37</sup> is for him to risk indulging in sheer nonsense. Historians of the French Revolution by and large seem to be interested in explaining why the French Revolution took the course it did, and this is to say nothing about an interest in it as like or unlike other revolutions although this is not to rule out such an interest either. If Allen and others are to be believed, in some significant respects its course resembled those of other revolutions and in some respects it differed from many of the others. But all this is not direct concern to the historian of the French Revolution. He is interested in the French Revolution in its own right-- in itself-- and this observation or claim by itself does not begin to settle the issue of whether historiographical explanation is in principle nomological, the same as explanation in certain other fields of inquiry is.

I do not wish to push any further this speculation as to what historians actually, typically are interested in and as to what they actually, typically do in making their inquiries and explanations. It is certainly not to be used as evidence for or against Dray's philosophical claims concerning the logic of historiographical explanation. However, since Dray himself seems to set great store by such speculation, one might expect that a consideration of the actual practice of some historians might clear up the point Dray wishes to make. It does not of course, and the problem

of uniqueness remains as mystifying as ever.

I suggested earlier that an examination of Dray's treatment of the issue of the alleged uniqueness and individuality of historical events, agents, institutions and conditions would help us to clarify the point which methodological pluralists might make concerning the significance of the aim of the Geisteswissenschaften as one of understanding particular phenomena as individual and unique, not as instances of a generalization. The examination seems to have done anything but that. Dray's account in terms of the historian's interest is very confusing, and possible interpretations of this account are all quite objectionable. But there is an important lesson to be learned from Dray's attempt to deal with the problem, and to appreciate the lesson will take one a long way toward clarifying the issue.

If we are to fully appreciate the argument that a distinct aim of the Geisteswissenschaften (and inter alia historiography) is methodologically and logically significant with respect to explanation, we are going to have to refrain from confining our attention to procedure, method, interest, "judgement" and/or approach.<sup>38</sup> We shall have to take account of the nature of the subject matter of historiography.<sup>39</sup> As Oakeshott would say, we should not try to draw a line between Historie and Geschichte. To attempt to talk about a distinct historiographical approach to its subject matter without discussing how the nature of the subject matter governs and demands that approach will lead us to talking about the approach as if it were one strategy or plan of attack that might be chosen from among others in making an inquiry into any sort of subject matter.<sup>40</sup>

In the case of the claim that historians are interested in the individual, the singular and even the relatively unique, it is open to the

methodological monist to argue that natural science must also be interested in individual, particular and even relatively unique happenings and that this interest does not necessitate basing explanation of particular events on something other than general empirical laws. Furthermore, the fascination with the sorts of vague interests and approaches we have been discussing in Dray's case leave the methodological pluralist open to the sort of schema of classification of the sciences that Popper suggests in the Poverty of Historicism. There he makes a distinction between the theoretical and the historical sciences.<sup>41</sup> The theoretical sciences include physics, economics, sociology, etc. and are said to be concerned with establishing general empirical laws under which to subsume particular phenomena by way of explanation and prediction. The historical sciences, on the other hand, including history, astronomy, geology, paleontology and the applied technological sciences are interested in the explanation (the "how?" and the "why?") of particular happenings, for which purpose they implicitly or explicitly consume the laws which have been established by the theoretical sciences or which it would be the proper business of the theoretical sciences to formulate and confirm or disconfirm.

Popper's classificatory schema might be open to criticism by philosophers of science as being oversimplistic and misleading with respect to the sciences, but the truly interesting point about it is that it offers (although I do not think it was intended as such) a reductio ad absurdum of the methodological pluralist's argument merely from the alleged interest or concern of the Geisteswissenschaften with elucidating the individual and the relatively unique. Popper's schema seems to be based solely on interest and consequently blurs the significance of any distinction there may be between the social-human and natural sciences,

especially the difference in the nature of their respective subject matters.

It is (at least partially) in terms of the nature of the subject matter that methodological pluralists of the German historicist school have argued for a distinct logic and method of explanation and inquiry for the social-human sciences. For example, Dilthey held that historiography and the other Geisteswissenschaften have a distinct sort of subject matter and consequently need a distinct method of inquiry, Verstehen.<sup>42</sup> Their subject matter was human-social-historical reality, the mental content or "inner", non-physical aspect of human doings past and present, human institutions, and human creations. This reality was said to have the character of Life (das Leben), and human actions, institutions, etc. he called "expressions of Life".

I do not at this point want to get involved in an elucidation of Dilthey's doctrines with their accompanying philosophical problems and in particular that of das Leben upon which Dilthey himself lavished a good deal of time in the way of explanation. But I do think it worthwhile to point out that Dilthey believed or assumed that the distinctive nature of the subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften is reflected in the peculiar categories in terms of which we are said to deal with it and which constitute das Leben as it is.<sup>43</sup> He claims that meaning, purpose and value are among these categories and that purposes and values are in a special sense singular and unique to the situations in which we find them.<sup>44</sup> The phenomena under study in the Geisteswissenschaften are therefore to be characterized as individual in some sense not appropriate for characterizing the phenomena studied by the natural sciences.<sup>45</sup> With respect to Dilthey's claims, the significance of the aim of the Geisteswis-

senschaften as one of understanding, elucidating and explaining the phenomena under study as individual and unique, is therefore to be understood with reference to the nature of the subject matter.

The results of our examination of the problem of the individuality and uniqueness of historical phenomena thus far suggest that we temporarily abandon our immediate concern with the problem and turn to a prior consideration of the nature of the subject matter peculiar to the Geisteswissenschaften before returning to grapple with original problem. Accordingly, we turn next to an attempt to analyze the nature of this subject matter-- an inquiry into human being or what it means to be human. The author characterizes his inquiry and analysis as an "ontological" one, which among other things means that in his inquiry we shall face the problem of the categories in terms of which we must approach the phenomena of human institutions, human behavior both individual and social, and historical events-- the subject matter of historiography and the other Geisteswissenschaften. Once an effort to establish these categories has been made we can return to the original problem of the historian's interest qua historian and of the logic and method of his explanation, and we can clarify the issue by deciding what interest, logic and method these categories demand.

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. The term "Geisteswissenschaften" was made current by Dilthey although it had been introduced earlier in a German translation of Mill's Logic as an equivalent for Mill's term "the moral sciences". See Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode pp. 1 ff. for a history of the term. For Dilthey the Geisteswissenschaften included "historiography, economics, law and political science, religious studies, psychology, and the study of literature, poetry, architecture and music and of philosophical world views and systems." (Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VII, p. 79) In short, they included most of the social sciences and humanities.
2. Some have attempted to underline the distinction between the two sorts of inquiry by denying that the aim of inquiry in the Geisteswissenschaften is explanation at all. Rather, as opposed to the Naturwissenschaften, which are said to seek to explain the phenomena they study, the Geisteswissenschaften are said to 'understand' the phenomena they treat. This allegedly distinct aim is then said to require a distinct method of inquiry-- the method of Verstehen. (For example, see Rickman, Meaning in History, p. 37 and Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, p. vii, p. 1 and p 18) But the dichotomy can be a misleading one and needlessly so. In both sorts of discipline what are commonly called "explanation" and "understanding" seem to be involved. The final aim of inquiries in both the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften might be said to be an understanding of the phenomena under study in each, and understanding them means, among other things, being able to explain the why's and how's of the phenomena to others are puzzled about them and thereby to share one's understanding with others. In this monograph we shall assume that it does not make sense to separate understanding and explanation as two distinct aims reflecting the different natures of the two sorts of inquiry.
3. According to Collingwood (The Idea of History, p. 166), Windelband first introduced the term "ideographic sciences" and by it meant those disciplines like historiography whose aim is a description of individual facts in their concrete detail as opposed to the aim of formulating abstract general laws characteristic of what he termed the "nomothetic sciences". (see Windelband, Praludien, Bd. II, pp. 136-160) According to Nagel (The Structure of Science, pp. 547-548), the aim of the ideographic disciplines is said to be an understanding of the unique and nonrecurrent while the nomothetic disciplines are said to establish abstract general laws for indefinitely repeatable sorts of events and processes.
4. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 2.
5. According to Liebel ("The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought", p. 384), interest in the unique and individual was emphasized as a significant factor in the methodology of historiography only from Meinecke on.

6. Several philosophers use the term "absolute uniqueness" in order to show that it is nonsense or suspect. These include Gardiner (The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 42 f.) and Oakeshott (Experience and Its Modes, pp. 119 ff.).
7. For example, see Collingwood, op. cit., p 303 and Oakeshott, op. cit., pp. 119 ff.
8. Dray sets the argument in a more condensed form in Laws and Explanation in History, p. 45.
9. For example, see Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 42 f.
10. Actually Dray borrows the argument from Gardiner, op. cit., p. 43. (See Dray, op. cit., pp. 45 f.)
11. We can formulate the difference between our approach to problems of logic and methodology in historiography and the approach that Walsh, Dray and Gardiner, among many others in Anglo-American philosophy of history, believe themselves to be taking. We may describe their approach (at least as they define it) as a natural wildlife study of historians, their activities and the results of those activities. Walsh, for example, writes in An Introduction to Philosophy of History, "Starting from the fact that people do think about historical questions, our aim will be to discover precisely what they are doing" (p. 29)-- where "they" seems to refer to those known at large as historians. Concerning a procedure for dealing with problems of logic and methodology in historiographical explanation, he writes: "The right way of tackling the question, one would have supposed, would be to begin by examining the steps historians actually take when they set out to elucidate an historical event or set of events." (p. 24) For Walsh the criterion of truth for the results of philosophical inquiry into the logic of historiographical explanation is whether or not those results reflect what historians (or those known at large as historians) actually do when about the business of providing explanations. (For example, see how he handles the problem of explanation by colligation on page 62.) The philosopher's inquiry seems, by his account, to be an empirical one.

Dray and Gardiner, for all the disagreement of the former with the latter over the role of general laws in historiographical explanation, seem quite in agreement as to the nature of the philosophical task that confronts them in dealing with this traditional issue within the philosophy of history. Dray writes: "Gardiner's discussion of the nature of explanation in history seems to me a most useful one. It puts the case for the covering law model with a moderation clearly induced by the desire to illuminate what the historian actually does." (p. 18, emphasis mine) Again this involves a concern with what historians or those known as historians are actually doing. (See also Dray, op. cit., p 21) The disagreement between them concerning general laws and explanation is to be resolved in the following manner: "We must... consider what it is that historians are doing when they speak of two events as causally related to one another, and under what conditions it is deemed legitimate in history, to say that two facts are connected." (Gardiner, op. cit., pp 80-81, quoted approvingly by

Dray, *op. cit.*, p 21) There is room for disagreement between the two, according to Dray, because Gardiner's account of the logic of historiographical explanation is inaccurate and misleading. "This is not to say that no trace of it [the Covering Law Model] will be found at all in the explanations historians normally give, for it is an odd philosophical doctrine which can be shown to be false. But the traces, I shall argue, are almost always misdescribed." (Dray, *op. cit.*, p. 19) In other words, Gardiner's account is said to be faulty because it misdescribes the facts concerning the behavior of a certain well (?) defined group of individuals and the results of that behavior.

Our approach is to be contrasted to the sort of approach to the problem laid out above. Instead of worrying primarily about what historians (or those known at large as historians) in this (or in any other) day and age are actually doing, our approach will be less avowedly historiographical or sociological and more philosophical, less empirical or ontical (as Heidegger would say) and more ontological in character. Heidegger's statement of program in Sein und Zeit might be taken as suggestive of how our approach ought to be characterized. "The issue here is not one of 'abstracting' the concept of historiography from the way something is factually done in the sciences today, nor is it one of assimilating it to anything of this sort. For what guarantee do we have in principle that such a factual procedure will indeed be properly representative of historiography in its primordial [ursprünglich] and authentic possibilities." (Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 393) Rather, the business of a philosophical inquiry into the logic and methodology of some science or discipline is characterized as one of laying the foundations for that science. "Laying the foundations for the sciences... is different in principle from the kind of 'logic' which limps along after, investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its 'method'. Laying the foundations, as we have described it, is rather a productive logic-- in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of Being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry." (Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 10) For Heidegger, laying the foundations seems to involve elucidating or explicating or making clear in a theoretical inquiry or endeavor the prior understanding one has (or must have) of the nature of the subject matter of a science in order to even begin an empirical investigation and inquiry into facts within that science. The ontological project of laying the foundations of a science presupposes that one already has some understanding of the terms or frame of reference within which new facts will be described and discoveries made within the science-- that one has a prior understanding of the Being of the entities and objects and phenomena with which that science concerns itself. (See Heidegger, *op. cit.*, "The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being", pp. 2-40)

12. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", p. 253 and "The Function of General Laws in History", p. 233.
13. Dray, *op. cit.*, p. 45.



14. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 43. Actually the point had already been made by others; for example, see Walsh, op. cit., p. 39.
15. Dray, op. cit., p. 47.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 49.
19. Ibid., p. 54.
20. Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 101.
21. Ibid., p. 9.
22. Ibid., p. 94.
23. Ibid., pp. 96-101.
24. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 43. Here Gardiner is arguing against Croce, but Dilthey, among others wanted to make the same sort of point. Collingwood also used the strategy of attempting to establish a subject matter peculiar to historiography which demands a peculiar historiographical method. (See Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 318 ff. et passim.)
25. Dray acknowledges the influence of Gardiner on his work in the preface to Laws and Explanation in History, and Dray sees his book as a reaction to and disagreement with Gardiner's defence of what Dray terms "the Covering Law Model" of historiographical explanation presented in The Nature of Historical Explanation. However, he freely acknowledges his obvious debt to Gardiner for points that the latter has made. (See Dray, op. cit., pp. 18-21) Thus Dray feels that Gardiner's views against the claim that the phenomena studied by the historian are unique and individual in some sense different from the one in which a natural phenomenon may be said to be unique, and individual have particular force. Dray is bent on clarifying the allegedly unclear idealist position with respect to the nature of historiographical explanation and inquiry (see Dray, op. cit., p. 9), but in attempting to do so he gives away the most important clue they have to offer concerning the uniqueness and individuality of historical phenomena. He follows Gardiner into talking about all events and things-- all phenomena of any sort-- as being unique and individual in the sense that no two are alike in every respect and into claiming that this is the only sense in which it is meaningful to claim that historical phenomena are individual and unique.
26. Such generalizations might be about what all men do or would do in the sorts of circumstances being considered or what all Frenchmen or all Europeans do in certain sorts of circumstances under certain sorts of conditions. The historian might be said to be assuming general laws of psychology, economics and/or sociology in order to

understand various aspects of what was going on during the revolution.

27. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History", p. 232. Hempel does not actually talk about the "analysis" of a gross event as Dray does but simply about the determination of a series of initial and boundary conditions and general laws under which they are to be subsumed.
28. Dray, op. cit., p. 53.
29. Actually, for Hempel an explanation is incomplete until we have specified a number of initial and boundary conditions which together with the explicitly formulated relevant general laws under which the initial and boundary conditions are subsumed are sufficient for, or would have been sufficient for, the prediction of the event of original interest. (Hempel, op. cit., p. 235) What we are said to usually find in historiography is a case where we do not know of precisely formulated general laws (statistical or otherwise) that are without disconfirming evidence and under which we can subsume the initial conditions. (Ibid., pp. 236-237) And in "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" Hempel writes that historiographical explanations are incomplete because the what seem like obviously true generalizations implicitly assumed in the historian's actual explanation are not and cannot be explicitly formulated in a way that cannot be undermined by existing disconfirming evidence. (Hempel, op. cit., pp. 251-252) These sorts of claims lead to his claims about historiographical explanations actually being "explanation sketches". (See Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History", p. 238)
30. Dray, op. cit., p. 54.
31. Ibid.
32. In one fleeting sentence during his argument against the more 'sophisticated' covering law model of historiographical explanation, Dray is forced to explicitly recognize this point. He writes: "For to a large extent, the uniqueness of what is to be explained is a matter for decision; it is traceable to the historian's interests, his 'approach' to his subject matter, his 'presuppositions'. But the uniqueness of what is offered as explanation is something which the historian discovers-- something which he generally cannot ignore." (Dray, op. cit., p. 84) But no more is said about this uniqueness which the historian "discovers" in some of his subject matter (i.e., in the phenomena cited in explaining the event of original interest) but which the natural scientist presumably does not discover in the natural phenomena he cites in explaining a gross event of original interest.
33. Indeed, we might want to claim that he had not explained the storm's unusual or relatively unique behavior until he could bring such a body of familiar general laws to bear on the problem.

34. This sort of rhetorical question seems to be the lynch pin of Gardiner's defense of the covering law model of historiographical explanation. (See Gardiner, op. cit., p. 98) As such it constitutes an argument from and to ignorance and lack of imagination. Dray correctly observes that in Gardiner's position the "Humean assumption that nothing but 'regularity' can justify a 'because' [the very point to be defended with respect to historiographical explanation] is thus made from the beginning" (Dray, op. cit., p. 57), and he thereby implies that Gardiner's argument for the necessity of at least tacitly assuming general laws in giving and defending an historiographical explanation is circular. However, Gardiner's circular argument seems to have a greater circumference (at least greater than a two or three sentence circumference) and greater lucidity than Dray's circular counterargument, as we are now finding out.
35. Allen, The French Revolution, vol. I, pp. xvi ff.
36. Ibid., pp. 133 ff. Here he compares and contrasts the conditions of the French agricultural classes with those of their counterparts in the rest of Europe in order to answer the question of why the French nation underwent the revolution it did while much of the rest of Europe remained quiescent.
37. Dray, op. cit., p. 47.
38. In particular, with respect to the problem of uniqueness we are calling into question the following claim of Gardiner's which Dray apparently accepts (at least, he does not raise any opposition to it). "The given is neutral; and our judgements of uniqueness or otherwise depend amongst other things upon human selection, points of view, purposes and convenience." (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 44)
39. Concerning the subject matter of historiography (and the other Geisteswissenschaften), we shall take Walsh's claim (though his is merely representative of many others) as axiomatic. "History begins to be interested in the past when humans first appear in it. Its essential concern is with human experience and actions... [that is, with] what human beings did and suffered." It is said to record and concern itself with natural events and phenomena but only insofar as they serve as a background to human activity. (Walsh, op. cit., p. 31)
40. Louis Mink comes closest, as far as I know, to explicitly taking up such a position. In "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding" he claims that while the doctrine of the irreducible uniqueness of historical events "is an error if taken as a theory about events, it can be defended as obliquely revealing a distinctive characteristic of the historical judgment." (Mink, op. cit., p 183) This sort of judgment apparently precludes another sort (presumably applied in the natural sciences) involving "analytic comparison". (Ibid., p. 184) "The suggestion is that the distinctive characteristic of historical understanding consists of comprehending a complex event by 'seeing things together' in a total and synoptic judgment which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique." (Ibid.) And this,

he claims, involves "a distinctive kind of judgment rather than dealing with an autonomous subject matter or employing a unique method" (*Ibid.*, p. 186) Why one does not or cannot use the sort of judgment appropriate to scientific understanding on the subject matter of historiography or synoptic judgment on the subject matter of the natural sciences Mink does not say.

41. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 143.
42. For an exposition of Dilthey's general position see Tuttle, Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of Historical Understanding: A Critical Analysis. Tuttle deals with this specific point on page 4.
43. Dilthey, op. cit., Bd. VII, p. 73 and p. 232. For commentary on this point see Rickman, op. cit., p. 96.
44. Dilthey, op. cit., Bd. VII, p. 312 and Bd. V p. 268. For commentary on this specific point see Tuttle, op. cit., p. 86.
45. Dilthey, op. cit., Bd. VII, p. 312 and p. 87; and Bd. I, pp. 26 ff. For commentary on this point see Tuttle, op. cit., p. 85.

## CHAPTER II

### INTRODUCTION

The claim that the understanding, explanation and elucidation of the phenomenon under study in its uniqueness, individuality or singularity constitute an interest and aim peculiar to the Geisteswissenschaften and therefore necessitate a method and logic of inquiry distinct from the Naturwissenschaften is not the only claim that has been made as an attempt to differentiate the aims of the two sorts of inquiry. In K.-O. Apel's brief monograph Analytic Philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften an interesting suggestion as to distinct aims arises out of a discussion of the relationship of teleological<sup>1</sup> to nomological-causal<sup>2</sup> explanation and Hempel's claim that there is no 'formal' difference between the two sorts of explanation. Apel's counterclaim is to the effect that teleological explanation must be seen to be of an entirely different sort than nomological explanation when it is realized that teleological explanation properly serves the "altogether different 'aim of knowledge'"<sup>3</sup> that we encounter in the Geisteswissenschaften wherein this sort of explanation is most at home. This "different 'aim of knowledge'" is said to be the understanding of the "setting of a goal as the creation of a future possibility for human beings in a particular situation." Such goals "insofar as they can be 'understood', continue to exist as possibilities of human action; i.e., they can be realized by those who understand them or they can be transmitted by them to the following generations as motives for possible future actions." From further points made by Apel, we gather that the main interest of an inquiry in the Geisteswissenschaften is

accordingly tied to the inquirer's orientation and direction of his own future action or that of others, to communication between himself and others, and to enlarging his community of interpretation, rather than to the prediction and control of phenomena studied and of future phenomena like those studied.<sup>5</sup>

To be sure, Apel's suggestion is very sketchy and a bit unclear, and it remains so throughout his monograph. He had other primary concerns here. He never makes clear exactly what is involved in this "altogether different 'aim of knowledge'" such that it requires distinct methods and a distinct logic of inquiry. In particular, he doesn't touch upon the difference between future possibilities of human being and possible future natural happenings or phenomena. Certainly in the natural sciences the latter are understood in terms of general natural laws and possible initial conditions; why not the former? Why exactly is nomological-causal explanation inappropriate and inadequate for serving the peculiar aim of inquiry in the social-human sciences?

In spite of the vagueness of Apel's claim concerning the aim or interest peculiar to inquiry in the Geisteswissenschaften, it is with his suggestion with respect to historiography that we shall work for the rest of this thesis, and it is to his suggestion that we shall finally reconcile the point raised and dealt with in the previous chapter concerning the aim of historiographical inquiry as one among the Geisteswissenschaften. In dealing with Apel's suggestion, however, we must remember the point affirmed at the end of the last chapter. Talk about the aims or interests that govern the method and logic of an inquiry must be tied to a consideration of the nature of the subject matter of that inquiry. In particular, we shall have to tie Apel's suggestion to a consideration of the

nature of human being, human doings and the results which people achieve in their doings, for such is the subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften. In doing so we shall attempt to establish the categories of inquiry which the nature of the subject matter demands--especially the notion of a "possibility for human beings" or in the jargon of another older contemporary, the notion of an "existentiell possibility". Indeed we shall spend most of our time making sense of the notion of an existentiell possibility, establishing it as the primary category of inquiry in the social-human sciences and outlining the consequences on the aims, interests, methods and logic of these sciences.

The concept of an existentiell possibility is actually that of Martin Heidegger and is developed as one aspect of his work in Sein und Zeit. I believe it is from Heidegger's influence that Apel's suggestion comes. But that speculation is beside the point, for Heidegger's work in Sein und Zeit is extremely important to our present undertaking in any case since it in effect offers us a detailed analysis of human Being (or Being human)--of the nature of human doings and their results. It is to an analysis of the nature of this subject matter that claims concerning distinct aims of the Geisteswissenschaften must be tied. In what follows we shall render an explication of some of Heidegger's analysis, develop the relevant aspects of it, and use it to make sense of and support both Dray's and Apel's claims, the former's concerning historiography alone and the latter's concerning the aims of all the Geisteswissenschaften. We shall see that it is through the concept of existentiell possibility as a category of inquiry in the Geisteswissenschaften that both claims can be supported.

The author's avowed primary purpose in writing Sein und Zeit is

not that of an analysis of what it means to be human; rather, the work is to be taken as an analysis of what it means to be, as an interpretation of Being.<sup>6</sup> His primary goal is never completely realized in this work. Of its projected two parts of three divisions each only the first two divisions have been published, although it is claimed that material from the projected but unpublished divisions forms the basis of some of his subsequent works. We shall not directly concern ourselves with the question of the meaning of Being as Heidegger seeks to pose it, although it is claimed by some that other parts of the work can only be fully understood when this question has been adequately confronted and understood. Our objectives, however, are restricted, tentative though our results may be.

Most of our attention will be focused on the first division, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein." Dasein is said to be an entity<sup>7</sup>-- a peculiar entity that is not merely found along with and alongside tables, trees, books, roads, schools; etc.-- the other entities we encounter in the world. It is distinguished from these by the fact that by its very nature its own Being is an issue for it-- that is, part of what it means to be Dasein is to have its Being as an issue.<sup>8</sup> This fact is significant for Heidegger, who seeks to pose the question of the meaning of Being because he thinks the best approach to answering his question will be an investigation of the nature of an entity that already has an understanding of Being as part of its very nature. That entity is Dasein, which must have an understanding at least of its own Being in order to make it an issue for it. For us the alleged fact is also significant because "Dasein" (literally "Being-there")<sup>9</sup> can roughly and tentatively be translated (as far as Heidegger's use is concerned) as "human being" or "man" or maybe with a number of qualifications "person".<sup>10</sup> Dasein is an entity



we ourselves are,<sup>11</sup> and therefore is thought of in terms of "who?" rather than in terms of "what?" as other entities are.<sup>12</sup> Heidegger's preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, although it is incomplete, having been carried through only far enough to further his principle aim in the work,<sup>13</sup> provides us with an analysis of the nature of human being.

Important characteristics of Dasein noted briefly at the outset and developed in the course of his work are the following:<sup>14</sup>

1. Dasein is always personal. Its Being is always 'mine' and is characterized by Jemeinigkeit. As noted above, one thinks about Dasein in terms of "who?" and addresses it and discusses it in terms of personal pronouns like "you," "they", etc. One might say that Dasein belongs to itself and relates to itself. It is its own man so to speak.

2. The essence of Dasein is its existence--its "to be." The important question about Dasein is, "What is it going to be?" or "What is it about to be?" As existence Dasein is an ability to be. Its Being is Being-possible [ Möglichsein ]. Central to talk about Dasein will be talk about doing and therefore possible ways for it to be through its doings. Dasein's existence is to be thought of as analogous to a kind of doing, performance or activity (existing or Being) involving a kind of ability (it is able to be) and thereby is a making possible of that which it can do and is to do (it can be and is to be itself).

If we consider the two features of Dasein outlined above in their unity we come round to Heidegger's concept of Dasein's ownmost possibility (its own Being) which it can lose just because its own possibility belongs to it as its own. Consideration of this personal possession of itself as its own possibility in turn leads to talk about Dasein's authenticity and inauthenticity.<sup>15</sup> From Heidegger's analysis of these various features of

Dasein's Being we shall try to outline a set of categories for inquiry into human doings, particularly into history. In the clarification of his claims concerning the first feature we shall find clarification and support of Dray's claim concerning the interest of the historian qua historian, and from the clarification of his claims about the second feature of Dasein's Being we shall find clarification and support of Apel's claim concerning the 'aim of knowledge' in the Geisteswissenschaften and the proper place of teleological explanation. The principal category of historiographical inquiry, on which Dray's and Apel's claims concerning the 'aim of knowledge' in this area will rest, will be that of existentiell possibility in its authentic and inauthentic aspects, and this category will reflect the two features of Dasein briefly outlined above.

Before explicating Heidegger's analysis of Dasein and developing the category of existentiell possibility, however, let us try for a preliminary intuitive grasp of what might be involved in this concept of an existentiell possibility.

Suppose we come across two people playing a board game bearing an apparent resemblance to chess but a game which the two players themselves have invented. They have written out at length all the rules governing the game including the movements allowed of the various kinds of pieces and a definition of the winning situation. We watch the play proceed for some time. In the course of the play, one player manages to retain the initiative for some time, attacking his opponent's position and apparently threatening to bring about the winning situation only to lose the initiative to his opponent when his attack fails and thereby to be forced to defend his own position. The initiative changes hands several times in this fashion as each in turn tries different strategems for bringing about the winning situation without success.

After some time the two divulge that they have been playing this game for two months--the same one-- the inaugural game-- but without success for either side. Neither player has been able to win. All the pieces that may be captured according to the rules have been captured by an opponent prior to this session and removed from the board, but the play still proceeds without decision. Perplexed, we proceed to analyze the game in terms of possible combinations of moves allowed by the rules, and after a great deal of computer time we find that it is impossible to achieve a winning situation given the rules of play. For the two months during which the two had continued their 'game' it was impossible that either win unless, of course, they had changed the rules and modified the game.

Yet it is terms of the possibility of winning that we must understand and explain their behavior. The particular moves they made--e.g., blocking an opponent's move, threatening and occasionally capturing an opponent's capturable piece--and the execution of their various successive strategies, only make sense in terms of one's achieving the winning situation before the other. Their demeanor during the game-- their reticence concerning strategies each is employing at the time, reticence between two good friends who otherwise converse a great deal about what they are doing--must again be seen with reference to the possibility of winning where the other player constitutes an obstacle and a resistance to the realization of the possibility. Each minimizes that resistance by reticence concerning what he intends to do next. Finally their returning to the same unfinished game day after day to continue play can only be seen or understood in terms of the as yet unrealized possibility of winning. It is this possibility of winning which Heidegger would call each's

existentiell possibility as opposed to his empirical or logical possibilities (logically or empirically possible outcomes of the situation in which we find the two players). It is to this sort of possibility that he refers when he claims aphoristically that Dasein is possibility.<sup>16</sup>

Now objection may be made to the terminology thus far employed in talking about the situation as being misleading and needlessly strange. The two players in question may be said to have various possibilities open to them none of which is winning the game as presently constituted. They could simply give up playing the game and forget about it; they might modify the rules of the game so that it looks like one of them might win it sooner or later; one of them might attempt to attain the winning situation by cheating (thereby not really winning the game) or they might continue playing stubbornly attempting to bring the game to a conclusion with one as winner. One might also talk of various possibilities that might befall them in the course of the playing. They might grow bored and fall asleep, or frustrated and suffer a nervous breakdown, or tired and accidentally upset the game board. At any rate we would not explain their behavior to date in terms of any of these possibilities. That they have such possibilities is merely a matter of speculation concerning what might happen.

We might explain their behavior in terms of the goal each has of winning the game. Their persistent play over the last two months, their particular moves and their strategies could be seen as designed to bring about or to contribute to bringing about that goal or end. Our explanation of their behavior would take on a teleological character. But it might be further suggested that this talk of explanation in terms of goals could be a bit misleading if we are led to think that by citing this goal as an

explanation of their behavior we are citing some future state which governs or determines or causes their present and past behavior. A goal as a future state cannot determine our present actions because the goal may never be realized. Indeed, in the case under consideration it is impossible that it be realized. Therefore it might be better to describe the two players as each having the desire to win the game, and it is in virtue of this psychological fact (along with additional assumptions perhaps) that we explain and make sense of their behavior.<sup>17</sup>

Heidegger does not use the terms 'goal' and 'desire' at all in his talk about Dasein and human doings. He does not even consider them, so we have no explicit explanation of why he chose to use 'possibility' in a somewhat unfamiliar role in place of what at first might seem to be more appropriate vocabulary. Let me advance some possible reasons for his choice that might be worth considering.

In dispensing first with the latter qualms concerning the suggestion implicit in teleological explanation that present actions are governed by some future state and with the resultant preference for 'desire' or 'motive' as the appropriate terms in which to describe and explain human behavior, let it be noted that in common with 'goal', 'purpose' and 'aim', 'possibility' shares strong futural connotations or at least connotations of being what is not yet present, not yet the case, or not yet established as the case. Using this term to talk about the meaning of being human and as a category in terms of which to explain particular cases of human behavior also suggests that such action is 'oriented toward' or 'governed by' or 'determined by' some future state. Far from avoiding this suggestion, Heidegger wants to take the teleological character of human action as an explicit clue to the nature of human doings. Those

indulging unexamined metaphysical prejudices in objections that a present action cannot be determined, governed, or caused by a future state may be ignored--at least until we have had a chance to discuss the meaning of 'action', 'determine', 'govern', etc. and even 'future'.<sup>18</sup> Heidegger claims that the clues to working out these problems lie in the character of our everyday ordinary doings,<sup>19</sup> and presumably these include our ordinary everyday discourse in which we find ourselves familiar with a wealth of teleological talk about the behavior of our fellows and about our own doings.

Efforts to restrict significant talk of human actions to a framework of the psychological facts of present desires and actual motives only masks the problem it is designed to undermine, since 'desire' and 'motive' themselves have a futural orientation and their meaning must be understood in futural terms. Talk of a present desire as the cause of an action only suggests the future existing in the present in some mysterious sense--which is a way of talking only a philosopher would get himself into, at least at the outset. We might avoid this by tentatively admitting that in some sense the future determines our present actions, and the sense needn't be a queer one.<sup>20</sup> Heidegger chooses 'possibility' with its blatant futural connotations in an effort to make clearer this sense.

But why chose 'possibility' for this philosophical role instead of 'goal', which would seem more at home in talk about human behavior? At least one connotation of 'goal' which I know Heidegger wants to avoid is what might be called its "thinks-bubble" aura. That is, our goals are usually associated with conscious planning and formulation; at least, they should be verbalizable upon questioning. We have, for example, the typical case of the university student being questioned by psychological or sociological questionnaires or interviewers as to what his goals with respect

to attending university are. In the face of an answer like 'I don't know. I hadn't really thought about it. I guess I'm just here because my parents sent me here'--where the questioned person doesn't seem able to formulate a goal, we tend to conclude that he does not really have any goals in attending university. Perhaps he ought to take time to think about possible educational goals like becoming a lawyer and choose one for himself. The notion of having a goal often seems to be interwoven with deliberation, explicit formulation and planning on the part of him whose action is goal directed. Furthermore, having goals implies results or end conditions or end-states to be brought about by the goal directed action--for example, a university degree acquired by passing a certain number of courses or being on the other side of the fence brought about by jumping the fence. But there are some actions which are not meant to lead to any aimed at end-state or result separate from performance of the action itself like taking a walk or dancing. The notion of having a goal seems appropriate for only a limited number of human actions.

But Heidegger wants a category (an "existential" he calls it)<sup>21</sup> in terms of which we can characterize Dasein-- that is, a category in terms of which to explain (or not be able to explain) any particular human action much as we seek to explain and usually are able to explain physical phenomena in terms of universal laws (or so some theorists would have us believe). He does not want a category suitable only for talking of actions carried out in accordance with consciously formulated aims on the part of the agent or of actions characterized by their bringing about an intended end-state or result. It is significant that Charles Taylor in his book on teleological explanation has to admit that he must speak of "'goals' in a special extended sense [in order to say] any action can be said to have

a goal."<sup>22</sup>

Heidegger, perhaps, might have resorted to talking about aims or purposes in lieu of using 'goal', and perhaps these terms might be more suitable for the job he wants done. But all of these words seem to lack a 'logical' dimension which 'possibility' has-- a dimension which Heidegger seems to think is useful or even necessary in elucidating what it means to act or do something. We can, I think, illustrate this dimension in the following fashion. Suppose A claims that, possibly, x is the case or that it is possible to x or that x is a possibility (or an impossibility). It is perfectly in order (where the reasons are not obvious) to ask him why he thinks so (or how he knows), and what would be expected by way of answer are reasons (or evidence) that suggest the possibility of x. The claim that x is a possibility is ordinarily supported by reasons, beliefs, 'facts', evidence by virtue of which the questioner should be led to also conclude that x is a possibility or in light of which it makes sense for A to suggest that x is a possibility or which allow x as being possible.<sup>23</sup> The possibility of x is meaningful and justified with respect to a background context of beliefs etc. that may or may not be made explicit depending on whether the questions above or questions like 'How can it be possible that x?' are asked.

Thus Columbus' claim that it is possible for a ship sailing west from Spain to reach the Indies was made in, makes sense within, and derives support from a context of geographical and other related facts and beliefs (e.g., the spherical shape of the earth with no proper top or bottom such that those on the bottom would fall off the earth; there being an all water route between Spain and the Indies without intervening land; etc.). This context would be at least partially exposed for consideration by one who



doubted the possibility of reaching the Indies by sailing west because of a belief that the earth is flat. At any rate, we might say that the posing of the possibility (of sailing west to the Indies) rests on or refers to an entire context of related beliefs, etc. which allow for the possibility (or, as it were, allow the possibility to be possible).

We should add here that abstract logical possibility is no exception to our remarks. Although a logical possibility doesn't call for reasons in the ordinary sense of the word to support it, such a possibility does make sense only within a context of rules including the definition of a contradiction, rules of derivation, and the injunction prohibiting the possibility of explicit contradictions and of expressions which lead to explicit contradictions through the rules of derivation. A logical possibility thereby also rests on a context of beliefs (of a sort) which allows the possibility to be possible.

It might at this juncture be pointed out with respect to goals, purposes, and aims that A's having a particular goal may also rest on a sort of context that allows us to make sense of his having that goal. Often the claim that A has a particular goal prompts a question as to why he has assumed that particular goal--for example, becoming a doctor (Why would A want to become a doctor?)--and we might receive by way of answer a further goal related to the first--like his wanting to make lots of money. Indeed, we might receive a whole story of interrelated goals, aims, desires and motives (perhaps a hierarchy of goals) in which becoming a doctor is really a subsidiary goal--a step on the ladder towards what A is really aiming for, money and status. His becoming a doctor makes sense as a means towards these ends. As a means it has been placed in a context where it makes sense as a step towards realizing other further ends. It

serves as part of an answer to the question, 'How will A realize these further ends of wealth and status?'

But what of the further goals of wealth and status? Need these also be explainable in terms of further ends. Of course not. They might simply be chosen ends desired for their own sake. No more explanation could be called for. The same could conceivably hold true for the original goal, A's wanting to become a doctor. To the question of why A wants to become a doctor we may have to accept in reply simply that he likes the idea of being a doctor. He simply has chosen that profession as an end. Insofar as it is an end, no context of further goals, etc. need be supplied to understand it. Although the further question of how the goal is to be realized might be raised, it ~~seems~~ we can consider the goal as an end apart from the means by which it is to be realized. Indeed, we might consider alternative means for realizing the same goal so that we would have to understand and make sense of the goal prior to and apart from the means. A particular goal, purpose, aim might be justifiable in terms of a context of further goals, purposes, aims in which it serves as a means or step toward further ends, and then again it might not rest upon such a supporting context. It might have been chosen as an end in itself and be susceptible to no further explanation or justification. The attempt to suggest that 'goal' has a logical dimension similar to 'possibility' is a vain one.

Exactly what Heidegger makes of this feature of a possibility's ordinarily resting upon a context of related beliefs or facts that allows it to be possible we shall see shortly. For now let us return to our board game and the futile efforts of the two players to win in order to raise yet one more way of characterizing human behavior--as rule governed

behavior. We wanted to speak of explanation of their behavior in terms of the existentiell possibility of winning. What all that entails we haven't yet worked out, but we shall want to entertain the question, 'How can it be their possibility?' or 'How is that a possibility of theirs?' Further, we shall want to go into the necessity of answering such a question by making sense of this possibility in terms of a context that allows it to be their possibility.

We might begin to set out this context by elaborating on the rules of the game which govern their moves on the board and which define the situation at which play ends, but of course the context would have to include more than these. We can easily imagine two players at a board game (either at our imaginary one or at chess) where one of the two makes all his moves in accordance with the rules of the game and where he is prepared to stop play when one of the two achieves the winning situation but where he is moving in an aimless or absent-minded fashion while conversing with a third onlooker or where he is calculatedly just killing time in an effort to make his opponent impatient and angry or even where he is obviously trying to lose. In such cases we would not want to explain his behavior in terms of the possibility of winning although in the case of a chess game winning would remain one of his empirical or logical possibilities. Such a player is out of the spirit of the game; he is not really playing the game.

The possibility of winning the game, in terms of which we want to explain the behavior of the original two players, must rest on a context including not only the explicitly formulated rules of the game, but also on what some might call implicit 'rules' that govern play of this game and of similar games. These 'rules' might include what Searle calls

regulative rules--'rules' of courtesy, 'rules' of prudent demeanor like not divulging one's plans to an opponent, and 'rules' of strategy like capturing as many of one's opponent's pieces as possible at the outset and like keeping one's opponent off balance.<sup>24</sup> In short, the context upon which their existentiell possibility rests will include all that must be understood in order to understand how the two players take winning the game as a possibility determining their behavior.

It has been claimed that what must be understood in order to understand human action, meaningful action or action with a point to it is a context of 'rules' of a sort similar to what I have begun to sketch above. Thus Winch, for one, writes that "the analysis of meaningful behavior must allot a central role to the notion of a rule, that all behavior which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behavior) is eo ipso rule governed."<sup>25</sup> In saying this, he follows Wittgenstein in including as rule governed behavior not only actions observing explicitly formulated rules but any behavior where it makes sense to say that the agent has made a mistake.<sup>26</sup> Winch thinks such behavior should be considered as the application of an implicit rule and is thereby concerned, he maintains, with behavior or action which is symbolic (i.e., meaningful or having a sense)--action which "goes together with certain other actions in the sense that it commits the agent to behaving in one way rather than another in the future."<sup>27</sup> Presumably then, Winch sees rules as the central category in terms of which we should explain human behavior since for him it is in terms of rules, implicit or explicit, being applied that we explain the aim or point of an action.

The notion of meaningful human behavior as being essentially rule governed is fraught with difficulties similar to those that lie in the

notion of meaningful human behavior as being essentially goal directed. Our initial interpretation of the notion of rule governed activities would probably lead us to conclude that the notion is useful for the elucidation of a very restricted class of human activities. Which is not the first to speak of human behavior as being rule governed. Wittingly or unwittingly he follows Dilthey who argued that human behavior is end oriented according to rules as opposed to natural laws, which are properly and peculiarly employed in natural scientific inquiry.<sup>28</sup> But Dilthey's notion of behavior according to rules has been interpreted by at least one otherwise astute commentator to imply "deliberative behavior, for it involves a conscious choice between different rules, or a refusal to follow rules at all."<sup>29</sup> Tuttle here seems to be taking his clue for his interpretation of Dilthey from our ordinary understanding of what it is to follow a rule or obey a law. Our ordinary use of these expressions seems to imply that one knows the law or rule one is following in that one could cite it if asked, that the rule has been formulated prior to one's following it, and that one has learned or been told the rule prior to one's following it.<sup>30</sup> Instructing someone to follow some rule without assuming his already having learned what the rule is to which one is referring or without telling him what that rule is is an absurd enterprise. Thus he who follows the rule should also be able to deliberately, consciously ignore the rule and possibly chose to follow another rule or perhaps to follow no rules at all.

But this sort of behavior is not all that common. Tuttle's example of United Nations forces' conduct of the war in Korea (if this is indeed a genuine example of this sort of behavior) where these forces refrained from conducting operations against the Chinese across the thirty-eighth parallel because they were acting consciously and deliberately in

accordance with the rules laid down for a peace keeping mission is a comparatively rare sort of incident in history.<sup>31</sup> Most wars are characterized by breaking or bending the rules (deliberately and consciously or not) of warfare laid down by international conventions. Rarely in the conduct of their affairs do men deliberate and choose rules in accordance with which to act even if rules appropriate to the situation have been formulated.

Behavior in accordance with rules may be seen as similar to behavior in accordance with or governed by plans. Following a rule may be thought of as being like following a preconceived plan where the plan is deliberately and consciously carried out by some historical agent. But as one historian of repute has observed with respect to statesmen in history, they "are too absorbed by events to follow a preconceived plan. They take one step, and the next follows from it. The systems are created by historians."<sup>32</sup> At any rate, whether an agent has acted according to a plan or has followed a rule would on this sort of account of the notion of rule governed behavior be an empirical problem, and cases of behavior where the agent was following rules or a plan might be considered to require explanation as to why he carried out the plan in the face of certain circumstances instead of abandoning it or why he followed that particular rule instead of ignoring it or even choosing to follow another. This sort of account of what it is for behavior to be rule governed is hardly the sort of account Winch and Wittgenstein and, I suspect, Dilthey have in mind.

To be sure Winch defends his view against just the sort of interpretation that Tuttle would give to it. Specifically he disputes Oakeshott's contention "that the dividing line between behavior which is habitual and that which is rule governed depends on whether or not a rule is consciously

applied."<sup>33</sup> He goes on to make the counterclaim that the real criterion of rule governed behavior is the meaningfulness of distinguishing between a right and a wrong way of doing whatever the agent in question is doing, whether or not the agent can in fact formulate the principles "embodied" in his action-- i.e., the principles or rules in accordance with which he is acting. As was pointed out above, the concept of rule governed behavior is according to Winch interwoven with the concept of mistake making. The agent has to be able to distinguish a right and a wrong way of doing what he is doing, and this implies the possibility of reflection by the agent on his past behavior with the aim of elucidating the principles embodied in and governing his behavior. Presumably this means the further possibility of rule formulation on the part of the agent and further deliberate application of the rule to maintain consistency of future behavior with his past behavior-- or at least it means his being able to understand tentative formulation by others of rules or principles embodied in his past behavior and his being able to deliberately apply these rules in future cases. Winch adds that people normally do reflect upon past behavior and the principles embodied in this behavior when they face unusual situations where they are forced to deliberate as to what to do. In these cases they tend to seek rules to apply to and to guide their future course of action through the unusual situation.<sup>34</sup> But the concept of rule governed behavior is not to be restricted to these cases of actual reflection, rule formulation and deliberate application. It is to apply in all cases of meaningful human behavior.

Thus the question of whether a particular human act or action is rule governed or not is not an empirical question for Winch. The concept of a rule in effect becomes a category for inquiry in the Geisteswissenschaften, and the empirical question becomes, "What rule is embodied

in this particular case of human behavior?"

We won't therefore dismiss out of hand Winch's claim that the concept of a rule has a central role in the analysis of meaningful human behavior. On the other hand, although Heidegger never explicitly considers the concept of a rule, I think he would find it inadequate for the job that Winch has chosen for it. But we shall return to Winch's analysis to examine it in detail because though inadequate it can be used to throw light on and to sharpen up aspects of Heidegger's analysis. Indeed, I would suggest that Winch's notion of rule governed behavior can fruitfully be incorporated into Heidegger's analysis of Dasein.



FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, INTRODUCTION

1. By "teleological explanation" Apel is referring primarily to explanation in terms of purpose. (See Apel, op. cit., pp. 19-20) Others (for example, Charles Taylor, Explanation of Behavior) have wanted to carefully distinguish explanation in terms of purpose as only one sort of teleological explanation in general.
2. Apel talks about causal explanation from general laws. Whether there are other sorts of causal explanation or whether there are any nomological but non-causal explanations is an issue he ignores, perhaps because it is irrelevant to the point he wants to make.
3. Apel, op. cit., p. 20.
4. Ibid.
5. Apel himself does not say that the goal of knowledge in the Naturwissenschaften is one of prediction and control. He says the goal or purpose of such knowledge is one of "causal or statistical 'explanation' of objective events by means of general laws." (Ibid., p. 21 and p. 18) However, at this point he is discussing Popper, Hempel and Oppenheim, who explicitly link good explanations with good predictions. Apel has also alluded to the possibility of prediction using general laws consumed in explanation implying that it is an essential possibility. (Ibid., p. 18 and p. 22) Finally, he suggests that "the final purpose of historical research, according to this view [i.e., the extreme positivist position], would be its integration into a sociology which deduces and perhaps even predicts particular cases of human behavior from general laws." (Ibid., p. 18)
6. In the Introduction to Sein und Zeit-- "The Necessity, Structure and Priority of the Question of Being"-- Heidegger lays out his task as one of an "Interpretation of the meaning of Being." That task is said to first involve an examination of Dasein's Being. Dasein is said to rate special attention as opposed to other entities like tables and clouds because Dasein's Being is already characterized by an understanding of Being. (See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 2 ff.) In citing passages from Sein und Zeit we shall primarily use the translation into English by Macquarrie and Robinson-- Being and Time-- noting the occasional place where we modify their translation. We shall, however, refer to the pagination of Sein und Zeit rather than to that of Being and Time since Macquarrie and Robinson indicate the original pagination in their translation. With respect to the word "Being", we follow Macquarrie's and Robinson's translation with the capital "B" of the German substantive "Sein" and "das Sein" used by Heidegger in treating "die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins."
7. See Heidegger, op. cit., p. 7. Again we follow Macquarrie and Robinson in rendering "das Seiende" as "entity" or "entities" depending on the context, even though the German word is not used in the plural

here. Macquarrie and Robinson suggest in a footnote to their translation (on page 3) that "das Seiende" is used in a collective sense literally meaning "that which is". They mention the possibility of distinguishing between "das Sein" and "das Seiende" in Heidegger's account. Heidegger's principal question concerns "das Sein von Seienden", and "das Sein des Seienden 'ist' nicht selbst ein Seiendes." (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 6) It seems easier to keep "Being" and "entities" distinct rather than "Being" and "being" (or "beings").

8. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 12.
9. According to Cassell's German-English Dictionary, "Dasein" translates as "existence", "presence" or "life". Using one of these alternatives, however, could easily confuse us concerning Heidegger's use of the word. He seems to emphasize its components-- "da", the spatial adverb of location, and "sein" or "being". We discuss this emphasis in greater detail below on page        and in footnote 18 of Chapter II, Section 1. Following Macquarrie and Robinson, we translate "Dasein" as "Dasein"-- a technical term.
10. We want to be especially careful about considering "person" as an equivalent for "Dasein" because Dasein will turn out to involve a social dimension, and toward the end of this thesis we will want to suggest that communities and social organizations as well as individuals have the character of Dasein. Heidegger himself lists reservations concerning equating "Dasein" with "person" as well as with the other possibilities we have mentioned (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 46), even though in other places he speaks of Dasein as "das Sein des Menschen" (Ibid., p. 25) and implies that "Mensch" and "Dasein" are roughly equivalent in meaning. (Ibid., p. 11 and p. 48 and p. 165) Elsewhere he states that the "existential analytic of Dasein gives an a priori basis which must be made visible before the question of what man is can be discussed philosophically." (Ibid., p. 45) And this implies that questions about Dasein can be distinguished in some way from questions about man and human beings. We should also note that in the Introduction Heidegger emphasizes that "Dasein" denotes the entity which can inquire into the meaning of Being.
11. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 41, p. 46, p. 53 and p. 7. He states a slight qualification to this claim on page 114.
12. Ibid., p. 45. See also p. 53 et passim.
13. Ibid., p. 17. An example of admittedly incomplete analysis is that of his analysis of language where he poses add leaves unanswered questions about the Being of language. (Ibid., p. 166)
14. Ibid., pp. 42-44.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 42.

17. This is just the tack that Hempel takes in "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", page 254 and that Nagel takes in his The Structure of Science, pages 24-25.
18. A good deal of Sein und Zeit is spent in a discussion of time and temporality, although we will not deal with these aspects of the work. For an example of such discussion, however, see Chapter IV, Division Two-- "Temporality and Everydayness"-- and Chapter VI, Division Two-- "Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time."
19. "At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part." (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 43)
20. Wittgenstein puzzles over this sort of problem in his Philosophical Investigations I, sections 189-199.
21. See pages            below for a discussion of existentials.
22. Charles Taylor, op. cit., p. 28. He says this in light of some of the considerations we have been discussing.
23. Malcom, "The Verification Argument", pp. 254 ff. and "Certainty and Empirical Statements", pp. 28 ff. Malcom is the only philosopher I know of to catch on to this feature of our ordinary use of "possibility" and to attempt to clearly differentiate between logical possibility and possibility in the ordinary sense of the word.
24. In his book Speech Acts on pages 33 and following Searle lays down the distinction between regulative as opposed to constitutive rules. Constitutive rules are said to create or define a form of behavior. Laying down such rules constitutes the creation of the form of activity they define. Regulative rules, on the other hand, are said to regulate antecedently independently existing forms of behavior. What he seems to have in mind for regulative rules are techniques and rules of strategy for accomplishing already defined ends. Constitutive rules seem to be those which define the ends or the situations which make such ends possible. He draws most of his examples-- at least his clearest examples-- from games where constitutive rules would include the rules of the game that the referee (if there were one) would enforce. Presumably, he is also speaking of constitutive rules, although unformulate ones, when he says in a footnote on page 34: "Furthermore I think there are some rules crucial to competitive games which are not peculiar to this or that game. For example, I think it is a matter of rule of competitive games that each side is committed to trying to win."
25. Winch, op. cit., pp. 51-52
26. Ibid., p. 32.

27. Ibid., p. 50.
28. Dilthey, op. cit., Bd, VII, p. 154 and p. 299; and Bd. V, p. cvii.
29. Tuttle, op. cit., p. 88.
30. Wittgenstein would presumably challenge this claim, and perhaps Winch, who follows Wittgenstein in these matters, would do likewise. In section 54 of his Philosophical Investigations I Wittgenstein claims not only that rules are employed in teaching a game or employed as an instrument in the game itself or set down in lists of rules, but also that "we say that it [a game] is played according to such and such rules because an observer can read off these rules from the practice of the game-- like a natural law governing play." One might reply that insofar as the observer 'reads off' such rules from the participants' activity, he is formulating 'rules' as theoretical constructs to help him understand what they are doing. This is not to say that they are actually following or obeying rules but only that the observer finds it helpful to see them as if they were following rules.
31. Tuttle, op. cit., p. 88.
32. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 98.
33. Winch, op. cit., p. 58.
34. Ibid., pp. 63 ff.

## CHAPTER II

### SECTION 1

Explication of any of Heidegger's ideas and of his terminology in Sein und Zeit is an arduous and formidable task, and making clear just exactly what is involved in his concept of existentiell possibility and of possibility as an existentiale is no exception to the rule. The problem is not merely one of technical terms and otherwise harmless looking words used in an esoteric way in accordance with apparently strange ways of looking at things. These are usually features to some extent of most philosophical writing--even that which is allegedly most acutely attuned to our ordinary ways of speaking. Unlike some philosophers, Heidegger is quite well aware of the potential strangeness of his jargon to the reader, and in many cases where a new term is introduced he offers an apparently well worked out explicit definition. In other cases (including "possibility") new terms seem to be introduced in a carefully prepared context so that what we really have is an implicit definition. Furthermore, Heidegger seems to be systematically rigorous and consistent with his jargon in not attempting to get more mileage out of a technical term than it is worth by trading on intuitive connotations of the term that are out of place with the technical usage as originally set up. Finally, he indulges in no strange primitive terms--terms that are undefined and undiscussed in the course of the work and that leave us intuiting or guessing as to their meaning-- by means of which he defines the rest of his jargon. He discusses his unfamiliar vocabulary and concepts again and again as he constantly reworks his material, deepening it and hopefully making it clearer and more interesting.

What, then, is the problem with Heidegger? The main difficulty for us with "possibility", as it is with most of his terminology, is that in his definitions, implicit and explicit, the definiens is usually more confusing and apparently strange than the definiendum. What he says about "possibility" involves his own highly technical terms of which we have even less grasp than of "possibility". Often some terms in a definiens are not discussed in detail until a point farther on in the exposition than the point of the definition and then with the help of the definiendum. The entire work itself is a tightly interwoven whole where the meaning of any of its vocabulary is obviously and explicitly dependent on the rest of the vocabulary. Making sense of any aspect of the work will involve making sense of much of the rest of the work. But we are immersed in his jargon at the outset of the book. All this is in keeping with his claim that all philosophical exposition is by nature circular,<sup>1</sup> and he seems to have gone to great pains to be explicitly faithful to his claim. Thus we are faced with a problem somewhat akin to listening to a conversation in a completely foreign language. There is no obvious point of departure for making sense of the whole.

The approach we shall use is the following one. We shall briefly sketch the relationship of possibility to other features of Dasein as Heidegger has set them out with a view to discovering one feature of Dasein that is more readily understandable than the others. An explication of Heidegger's analysis of this feature will then serve as a point of departure for tracing our way back through the interrelationships of features of Dasein that we have sketched and thereby for explicating the concept of 'existentiell possibility' and of possibility as an *existentiale*.

Heidegger first explicitly introduces possibility as an existentiale of Dasein in the section on understanding. There possibility is said to be the most fundamental or original [ursprünglich]<sup>2</sup> and ultimate positive way of characterizing Dasein ontologically.<sup>3</sup> I suppose this is to say among other things that in distinguishing what is involved in being human as opposed to being another sort of entity we might begin with this concept of possibility, and we really need go no farther than a full explication of what is involved in possibility. It is the most original and ultimate existentiale, the beginning and the end of what is involved in being the sort of entities that we are, and there are, it turns out, many, many existentiales introduced in Sein und Zeit.

As for the notion of an existentiale, I do not wish to pursue it farther than a few sentences because it is not that important for our purposes. Suffice it to say that an existentiale is analogous to a category. Heidegger has divided the universe of entities [das Seiende: that which is] into two classes<sup>4</sup>--human beings, us (those entities whose character is that of Dasein)<sup>5</sup> and all other entities (those the character of which is not that of Dasein).<sup>6</sup> The sorts of ways in which we can characterize these latter entities are said to be categories. For example, to say that the table is red is to say something with respect to the quality of the table--to borrow one of Aristotle's categories. To cite the table's color is one distinct way of characterizing it as opposed to citing its position -- at least for Aristotle. Talk about the various categories is presumably seen as illuminating for what it means to be an entity other than Dasein, and the various categories like the various existentiales are determined by an a priori inquiry. On the other hand, existentiales as sorts of ways of characterizing an entity are appropriate only for Dasein and reflect

Dasein's distinctiveness from other entities. Heidegger seems to think that this distinctiveness is in danger of being overlooked, so he insists of speaking of existentials in his analysis of Dasein as opposed to categories.<sup>7</sup>

As noted above, "possibility" is first introduced to us (though the term appears before its formal introduction) in the section on understanding, also an existential, and the two existentials seem intimately bound up together. Understanding (as an existential) is seen as a kind of competence or ability that Dasein has, not just with things and their use, but with itself as existing.<sup>8</sup> (Existing [Existenz] is said to be the essential nature of Dasein)<sup>9</sup>. In other Heideggerian words, understanding is Dasein's being-able-to-be [Sein-können], and it is this by way of Being possible.<sup>10</sup> Understanding always presses forward into possibilities, and it does this because it has the structure of projection. "As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities."<sup>11</sup>

Though we still remain confused concerning the meaning of these claims, I think we can ascertain this much: If we can figure out what is involved in Heidegger's notion of understanding, we stand a good chance of cracking the possibility-projection puzzle. I think there is plenty of evidence (of a sort) here to support Schmitt's contention that one's existentiell possibilities are always understood ("known in a non-theoretical way" as Schmitt would have it)<sup>12</sup> and that they are not independent of our understanding of them. They are not "free-floating" as Heidegger puts it. Dasein has always already gotten itself into these definite possibilities.<sup>13</sup> Certainly our understanding (as an existential) is not independent of the possibilities in terms of which it projects itself. We might keep this in mind for later when we want to sharpen up the distinction between the



concept of an existentiell possibility and the more familiar senses including the logical possibilities in which we might ordinarily use "possibility"-- the possibilities Heidegger calls "free-floating".

Turning our attention now to "understanding" we note that understanding is "one of two constitutive ways of the Being of the there"<sup>14</sup>, and "the Being of the there" is a way of talking about Being-in; a constitutive item of Being-in-the-world.<sup>15</sup> "Being-in-the-world" is the term Heidegger uses to describe the whole, unitary phenomenon that is Dasein.<sup>16</sup> Though we may single out one aspect of this phenomenon at a time for discussion, the basic unity of Dasein means that discussion of this one aspect must in some way involve a discussion of the whole phenomenon. Thus in considering Being-in as a constitutive item of Dasein we are, as well, considering the world in that unity of Being-in-the-world, and we must keep that unity in view. Consequently, in focusing on understanding as a constitutive way of Being-in, we must remember that this existentiale is tied up with the world. We must grasp what it is to understand the world even to make sense of Dasein's understanding of (competance with) itself as existing. Its understanding of itself and its understanding of the world cannot be separated, for the world is a constitutive item of Being-in-the-world and is therefore not something alien to or other than Dasein. The structure of the world (i.e. worldhood [Weltlichkeit]) is said to be an existentiale of Dasein.<sup>17</sup>

Heidegger's concept of "world" is, I think, the key to understanding much of what he says in Sein und Zeit. So far what has been sketched must be very vague and incomprehensible, but one point that has partially emerged may be a bit disconcerting-- namely, that the world is actually a constitutive item of Dasein (of being human), that one cannot in the

last analysis meaningfully consider the world apart from Dasein and vice versa. It sounds almost like a form of idealism-- on the surface of it at least. We shall have to master this concept of "world", but one point deserves to be made now. Heidegger wants to emphasize the fact that any human being is located in a world and that one cannot divorce him from his world. To examine a human being qua human is in the last analysis to examine his world. There is a deliberate play on "Dasein" in this work of Heidegger's in accordance with this point he wants to emphasize. "Dasein", which normally translates "existence", might also be rendered as "Being-there" (here)<sup>18</sup> according to its components [Da-sein]. Being human is being somewhere. Its location or place is the 'there' of "Dasein", and the 'there' involves more than or is something other than location according to a system of physical coordinates. What it does involve will be considered below.

Heidegger defines "understanding the world" as the "previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed."<sup>19</sup> This clue leads us to the questions of what we do encounter within-the-world, how we encounter it, and for what we encounter it. That which is encountered within-the-world are entities belonging to the world. Exactly what sort of entities we do encounter, how best to talk about them and the other questions raised above determine the principle points of the third chapter of the first division of Sein und Zeit-- a chapter entitled 'The Worldhood of the World'. All these questions are clearly, if tentatively dealt with there. Appropriate sections of this chapter will be our point of attack on the maze of jargon indulged in in the immediately preceding paragraphs above.

The stated task of Chapter III is that of describing the phenomenon

of the world which means that Heidegger must make clear, among other things, what he means by "world".<sup>20</sup> One thing he does not mean by it is a way of characterizing those things or entities which we are not; that is, the world is not to be regarded as a collection of all the things which we find lying round about us or which we manage to discover and to know about but which as objects of our knowledge are to be distinguished from what we are.<sup>21</sup> Nor is a detailed catalogue and description of those entities found within-the-world likely to help us in characterizing the structure of the world. On the contrary, ontologically "world" is said to be a way of characterizing what we (Dasein) are.<sup>22</sup> This means that in discussing the phenomenon of the world and its structure (i.e., the worldhood of the world) we shall discuss ourselves, what we do and what it means to do things.

But on what aspects of ourselves and of our behavior shall we focus attention? What sorts of human behavior and human activity shall we take into account, and again, what aspects of human activity are to be emphasized? In the philosophy of action and action theory it is pointed out ad nauseam that in the course of one action many things may be happening and that there are accordingly many, correct descriptions of that action--many sorts of correct answers to the question, "What's going on here?" Where do we begin? Where do we focus our attention? For example, we might be interested in ourselves as producers and consumers who buy and sell commodities in accordance with various laws of supply and demand. Emphasis would be on economic aspects of behavior; attention would be focused on specific sorts of activity--commercial activity-- and on the aspects of other activities which are economically significant and that can be fit into a framework of economic exchange. Or we might consider ourselves as so many souls to be saved in God's struggle with Satan or as

rational inquisitive animals discovering various truths about the world at large. Any one of these might be regarded as an aspect--perhaps the most significant aspect--of what we do.

But Heidegger claims he does not want to deliberately construe a specific theory of man with empirical or ethical consequences or pseudo-empirical claims;<sup>23</sup> accordingly he does not want to emphasize any specific aspect of behavior or a specific sort of activity.

[I]t is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted [interpretieren] with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally [zunächste] and for the most part [zumeiste]. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being--and back into it again--is all existing, such as it is.<sup>24</sup>

He will focus our attention, then on what we do ordinarily everyday in an everyday manner<sup>25</sup>-- i.e., the almost habitual very familiar sorts of activities and actions like our walking to school every morning or the carpenter's hammering nails in putting up the frame of a new house-- actions we do in a competent or able or familiar manner almost without thinking about them. For this manner is appropriate to most any specific sort of action.

A comparison here with another contemporary philosopher might be helpful.

Theorists have often been so preoccupied with the task of investigating the nature, the source and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks. In ordinary life...we are much more concerned with people's competences than with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with the truths that they learn.<sup>26</sup>

In Chapter Two of the Concept of Mind Ryle seeks to focus our attention on the sorts of tasks and doings people attempt and perform in the course

of their ordinary, everyday concerns.' The aim of the chapter is to reopen the entire question of what it is or what it means to know how to perform a task. Ryle's overall aim, of course, is to exterminate a ghost or some such thing, but our interest in Ryle lies in his immediate aim and his attempt to overthrow what he sees as the "'intellectualist'" account of knowing. Such an account, according to Ryle, construes all intelligent, rational and meaningful behavior either as theoretical-- the discovery of answers to questions and the consideration of truths-- or as practical-- merely applications of considered truths. Practical behavior is seen as behavior "piloted by" or "controlled by" a grasp of true propositions.<sup>27</sup> This 'intellectualist' account apparently emphasizes a select group of human activities and the results of these activities-- theoretical, intellectual activities. It focuses attention upon activities like setting out to discover why something happened, constructing a theory to account for some phenomenon, attempting to predict how a certain happening will turn out, weighing evidence to reach a verdict in court, thinking up a proof for a mathematical theorem, etc.-- activity that leads or may lead to knowing or claiming to or affirming or concluding that something is the case. It is just this special sort of activity that Ryle wants to put off for consideration until after he has established what is involved in task performance.<sup>28</sup> His putting off treatment of theoretical and intellectual tasks until the end of his book amounts to an effort to overthrow the 'intellectualist' account and to suggest the primacy or priority of knowing how over knowing that in giving an account of what it is to know.

Intelligent practice is not a stepchild of theory. On the contrary theorizing is one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted.<sup>29</sup>

Heidegger may be seen as attempting, among other things, a move somewhat similar to Ryle's overthrow of the 'intellectualist' account of

knowing. He attempts to show that the theoretical attitude toward the world (presumably the attitude characteristic of activities involving discovery and explanation of facts about the world) arises out of, or is derivative from, the circumspective concern he claims is evidently characteristic of our everyday doings and performances.<sup>30</sup> Further, like Ryle, he asserts that traditional accounts of our doings including task performing are misformed and mistaken. They focus on a special sort of human endeavor and seek to interpret all human activity in terms of this one specialized sort of activity.

Thus the phenomenon of Being-in has for the most part been presented exclusively by a singular exemplar-- knowing the world [knowing that something is the case] ..., [f]or even practical behavior has been understood as behavior which is 'non-theoretical' or 'atheoretical'. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own-most kind of Being gets led astray...<sup>31</sup>

Heidegger like Ryle aims to set our self-understanding straight, and like Ryle he attempts to do this through a detailed consideration of some everyday activities. But exactly which activities? In his second chapter, Ryle runs through a wide spectrum of human tasks and doings while hardly pausing for breath. Among the activities he mentions, some of which he dwells on at length, are learning how to play an instrument, playing chess, appreciating and telling jokes, fishing, arguing, humming a tune, clowning (i.e., purposefully tripping and tumbling to provoke laughter in an audience), finding out how to prune trees, rock climbing, knot tying, speaking Swedish, performing surgery, boxing, and shooting, to name a few. Next to Ryle, Heidegger looks like a piker when it comes to examples of everyday activity. He does not try to mention as many of the various sorts of activities that people engage in as he possibly can, as Ryle gives the impression of doing. He does not seem to feel that an examination of as

great a variety of human behavior as possible is necessary to support his claims about what it means to be human and to behave in a meaningful fashion. In his third chapter he mentions the acts of unlatching the door, hammering, signaling for a turn on to a side road and one or two others. Most of his examples are doings that involve manipulation of something-- a tool, the door latch, etc.-- and often with the production of some finished piece of physical work. He seems to be interested in behavior where something is used-- practical behavior-- and the question may arise as to whether Heidegger's analysis of these select tasks holds good for a wider range of behavior including telling and appreciating jokes as his analysis is intended to do. We shall take up this issue in good time, however.

Heidegger's initial interest in a select sort of behavior-- practical, productive, manual behavior-- makes a certain amount of sense given his aims in the third chapter. As we have already pointed out, his aim is an analysis of the structure of the world as an existentiale of Dasein-- of Being-in-the-world. He seeks clues as to the nature of this existentiale in our everyday doings, but unlike Ryle he will not be interested in how we appraise other people's performances or, "what is involved in our descriptions of other people as knowing how to make and appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish or to argue."<sup>32</sup> Rather, he is interested specifically in the character of those entities people encounter within-the-world [innerweltlich]<sup>33</sup> in the course of their everyday doings. The character of these entities within-the-world should serve as a clue about the structure of the world, and those entities encountered within the world of manual, practical work are encountered in a most visible tactile and audible way. The craftsman has to handle his tools and equipment often keeping them at his finger tips, and he has to keep his eyes on

his work. The character of the entities he encounters within-the-world should be most obvious, so his behavior might be a good place at which to start the inquiry into the structure of the world.

To start with an example, we might consider the cobbler. His daily task is shoe repair, and what he encounters at work are, among other things, his cobbler's hammer, nails, last, new soles and heels, glue, old shoes to be repaired; and other instruments and machines. The entities he encounters in the course of his daily work, Heidegger claims, have the character of Zeug. Their Zeug-character is to be a first clue in developing the problem of what it means to be in a world.

"Zeug" may be translated roughly from the German as "stuff". Heidegger claims it has the same meaning as the Greek "pragmata". Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "equipment" in their English translation of Sein und Zeit.<sup>34</sup> "Equipment" is a fair enough translation of "Zeug" with which to begin to tackle Heidegger's concept of "Zeug", for one feature of an entity having the character of Zeug is the fact that it is not encountered as an isolated thing separable from other entities with which it belongs or with which it goes. There is no such thing as 'an equipment', but there are pieces of equipment which go together with other pieces of related equipment even if those other pieces are lost, broken, unavailable or even uninvented.<sup>35</sup> Thus the cobbler's hammer goes with or, as Heidegger says, is assigned to or refers to [verweisen]<sup>36</sup> his nails and his last on which he hammers new soles on old shoes. This is not to say that the cobbler could not find his hammer physically isolated from the rest of the equipment with which it goes. Somehow it may have been dropped in the gutter outside his shop one night, or he may have taken it home for some reason. But if he came to the shop in the morning to find his hammer lying in the gutter (indeed, if any passerby saw it lying there), he would



find it out of place, not in its proper place, unusual; and if after having brought it home the night before he finds it on the kitchen table in the morning, he finds it as a piece of equipment to be taken back to its proper place in the shop. It is something that will be missed if it is forgotten. This is so just because the hammer is a piece of equipment that is used with and belongs with related pieces in an equipment context or "totality of equipment".

Furthermore, things having the character of Zeug are properly encountered as Zeug, he claims, in just those dealings suited to them-- i.e., through using them in an effective manner. Equipment must be thought of in terms of use-- of getting the job done. Items of equipment no longer usable or just lying around no longer used become junk, or ornamentation, or even museum antiquities. To be sure, we do not forget that an item of discarded equipment was once a piece of equipment or that an item of presently unused equipment is still an item of equipment, but Heidegger claims in effect that equipment is equipment in virtue of some possibility of its being used. To say that some item is an item of equipment is to say that it was used, is being used, will be used, might have been used, or might be used for something. Thus the cobbler "authentically" encounters the hammer as equipment (for repairing shoes) not by staring at it but by using it<sup>37</sup> -- by hammering in nails and getting the job done. Heidegger calls the character of objects of use in use their being ready-to-hand, and it is in terms of their being ready-to-hand (either their not being very ready-to-hand or their being extremely ready-to-hand) that we are said to encounter objects in the course of our everyday doings.<sup>38</sup>

It is important to note that when we do encounter objects in use as very ready-to-hand that these entities are inconspicuous.<sup>39</sup> We do not take special note of them. They seem to subordinate themselves to the

work or task to be done, and they accordingly arrange or order themselves (I say, "They order themselves", because we do not consciously set out to order or arrange them in the sense Heidegger is talking about), Heidegger claims, in an 'in-order-to' structure that assigns [verweisen] one piece of equipment to other pieces in various ways (e.g., the hammer to pounding in the nails) and the totality of equipment towards a task or piece of work to be completed. Thus when the cobbler is going about his job most competently and efficiently, when he is most 'genuinely' encountering the hammer as an entity ready-to-hand, he is probably taking no note of it. He certainly need not be thinking about the hammer and its relation to the nails nor about his technique of hammering nor about the principles of shoe repair, and he probably is not, although he is paying attention to his work. But he does demonstrate skill and training in his work. He shows he knows how to use the hammer by using it correctly with respect to the rest of the items in the equipment context in order to perform the requisite task of repairing the shoe. He places the shoe on the last in order to hold it steady and level so that he can pound nails with the hammer in order to fasten the new sole on the shoe to be repaired. He shows that he grasps the whole inconspicuous ordered structure of the equip-mental context by using the right item of equipment at the right time in its proper assignment in doing the work and by modifying his technique with the various items to correct mistakes he happens to make and to circumvent difficulties that happen to arise in the work on which he concentrates and towards which the equipment is used. Heidegger suggests that the fact that none of the worker's equipment stands out and catches his attention when he is normally absorbed in his work means that the whole ordered structure of the equipmental context to which the items of equipment belong is inconspicuously borne or carried in the work to be done or

the task be performed.

"Equipment" as a translation "Zeug" has its merits for suggesting the character that Heidegger claims those objects (entities ready-to-hand) encountered in our everyday dealings have. This character includes:

1. The inconspicuousness the entities most immediately encountered in everyday use and their relations to other entities encountered along with them. The experienced hiker carrying his gear in a backpack may 'feel' the pack on his back, but he hardly thinks about it or notices it (except perhaps at the end of the day); nor does he think about or notice or take notice of its assignment towards the other items of camping gear that it holds.

2. The belonging of an individual piece of equipment to a totality of equipment. The pack goes with other camping equipment necessary if one is going camping.

3. The order of assignment within the totality of equipment governed by the work to be accomplished with the equipment. The pack bears an assignment to most of the other items of camping equipment as their container for transporting them. The ax is assigned to the tent stakes, ropes and tent itself among other things in that it pounds the stakes into the ground to which the ropes are fastened which hold up the tent inside of which the sleeping bag is unrolled, etc.

But "equipment" is at the same time a poor translation of "Zeug" because it is too restrictive or narrow. Heidegger wants to claim that we always encounter entities within-the-world as having the character of Zeug in our everyday dealings-- whether we are working with particular tools and other items of what we would normally call "equipment" or not. Even in merely taking a walk or in walking to work in the morning we are

said to encounter the street or path as Zeug for walking.<sup>41</sup> The room of my apartment in which I am writing this page is said to be encountered "not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense but as Zeug for residing."<sup>42</sup> Aspects of nature are also encountered as Zeug ready-to-hand in our everyday dealings-- for example, the southwind as a sign of bad weather,<sup>43</sup> or natural raw materials as that whereof we fashion finished products, or natural sources of power like the wind in the sails of a ship.<sup>44</sup> Finally it is even suggested that words may be encountered ready-to-hand.<sup>45</sup> The claim that most of what we encounter in our everyday dealings are entities ready-to-hand casts doubts on the adequacy of translating "Zeug" as "equipment". We might try to translate it as the indefinite word "stuff" as in "Pack up all your stuff and get out!" or, "What's all this stuff for?", but "stuff" has a perjorative sense and would be inadequate in any case, I think. In desperation we shall try translating it as "usable things" or "things to be used (or not to be used)" or "things of possible use", or we shall simply leave it as "Zeug". These alternatives also have their problems, but we shall do our best to avoid (or ignore) them.

For now we should note that Heidegger wants to make a great deal of the inconspicuousness of 'things to be used'-- entities ready-to-hand-- in use. Such things are inconspicuous because in performing our everyday tasks in an everyday manner we are 'concernfully'<sup>46</sup> absorbed in our work. We pay heed to or focus attention on what we are doing-- the work at hand. We do not necessarily or usually examine that which we use to accomplish the task-- the tools, the raw materials, the room, the furniture-- in accomplishing the task. We do not make these entities a theme for investigation or grasp them thematically as Heidegger would say.<sup>47</sup>

Yet we do see or perceive, or are aware of, all those entities that we encounter ready-to-hand in performing a task. We are aware of them through a kind of sight or awareness Heidegger calls circumspection [Umsicht] by which we grasp the entity as given in an 'in-order-to' structure or ordering or "assignment" of the totality of Zeug with which or among which we are working.<sup>48</sup> How do we know that someone (or even ourselves) is circumspectively aware of the items he is using in performing his task? Must we ask him what color patches he is sensing at that moment? Not at all. We watch what he does, where he goes, what he reaches for, what he uses, how he varies his use of it. His use of items ready-to-hand shows that he is aware of the various items being arranged in a certain way governed by the work at hand whereby each item has its assignment. The cobbler goes to his shop in the morning, reaches for the first pair of shoes to be mended, reaches for his hammer and his nails, and ignores other useless stuff lying around the shop or other tools that are used on other sorts of jobs. He pounds nails with the hammer into the bottom side of the shoe sole fastening it to the shoe resting on the last as opposed to pounding nails into the handle of the hammer with the shoe sole. He is circumspectively aware of the shop, the hammer, the nails, etc.

In absorption in a task in our everyday manner the world has already been disclosed to circumspection, Heidegger states, but it is inaccessible to circumspection, which is always directed toward particular entities within-the-world<sup>49</sup> -- e.g., the hammer, the nails, the shop, the road to the shop, etc. This is to say that what the cobbler sees or feels or is aware of in circumspection is the entities he is using, not the world, which according to Heidegger, is to be distinguished from any one of these entities and from their mere sum. If the sweating cobbler loses his grip on his hammer on the upswing and it sails behind him into the corner, he

loses sight and touch of the hammer, (which he circumspectively sensed), not of the world. He can point out or display what he sees and feels and hears circumspectively, but he cannot point out the world because there is really nothing to point out and nothing to lose sight of with respect to the world.

But then how does the world become accessible? How do we know that we are in a world in the sense Heidegger claims we are? What does it mean to say that the world has already been disclosed to circumspection? and finally, What is the world? which is the question we set out to answer in the first place. To the first question Heidegger, still in accordance with his original clue, the Being ready-to-hand of entities encountered in everyday tasks, answers that the world becomes accessible or apparent in mishaps during everyday task performance. In such cases the world is "lit up". He does not claim that it is seen or observed as entities ready-to-hand are. It becomes accessible by "announcing itself."<sup>50</sup> How exactly?

Consider one sort of mishap-- the malfunction of a tool (Heidegger considers several sorts of mishaps including unexpected obstructions, and undoubtedly there are other sorts). Suppose the handle of the cobbler's hammer breaks in the course of his resoling a shoe. It becomes unusable. He has no way of grasping it and getting the leverage necessary to pound in the nails to fasten the new sole to the shoe. The job cannot get done (unless he can find a substitute), and the hammer becomes useless. Its becoming useless means that it cannot fulfill its assignments to the other entities in the Zeug context within which the cobbler is working, and they become at least temporarily unused. The arrangement of the items governed by the work to be done is disturbed at that point-- i.e., the hammer's hammering-- and the usefulness of the other items is arrested. The hammer is still encountered as an entity ready-to-hand, but it is now conspicuous

in its unusability, and its assignments to other entities in the Zeug context and to the work to be done also become conspicuous because fulfilling these assignments is now problematical. The hammer is still a 'thing to be used', an item of Zeug, but because it cannot be encountered as "genuinely" ready-to-hand in performing the work which goes undone, it stands out as conspicuous.

Similar remarks apply to an item's being lost or used up. If the hammer gets lost, it is noticed as missing because it belongs to a context of ready-to-hand items related in an arrangement 'determined' by the task to be done. The absence of the hammer is noticed because we are held up from performing the task.<sup>52</sup> Our attention is drawn to the problem of how to get the work done. In such a problem the arrangements of items in the Zeug context becomes problematic because the fulfillment of assignments among the items is problematic. While the problem remains explicitly one of how to get the work done rather than one of simply getting the work done, the items encountered as belonging to the Zeug context just sit there or at most are tinkered with. The cobbler sees unused nails, last, etc., and in so seeing these and in having his attention drawn to the relationships among these as problematic in the absence of the hammer, the world is said to announce itself.

What is announced in these particular mishaps is an involvement of the defective or missing item in the performance of a certain task and along with its particular involvement a whole totality of involvements of other items belonging to the Zeug context and to which the original item may be assigned in various ways. To say that the world "announces" itself, of course, sounds a bit wildly metaphorical, but there is no clearly better way to put it. When the hammer breaks, the cobbler does not suddenly 'see'

a world. He sees a broken hammer. But the work stops; other items ready-to-hand that belong with the hammer go unused; and the job does not get done. The cobbler shows he is aware something is wrong by desisting from his task, and he shows an awareness of the nature of the disruption in the assignments among items of the equipment context by trying to repair the hammer so that it can again fulfill its assignment to the other items of the Zeug totality or by searching for an appropriate substitute. He shows an awareness of the way the hammer is involved in the task.

With the phenomenon of involvement and the totality of involvements of an item encountered within-the-world we have Heidegger's concept of "world" within our grasp. For Heidegger the concepts of "world" and "involvement" are interwoven.<sup>53</sup> The structure of involvements of an entity (i.e., of the assignments an item ready-to-hand bears to other items in its immediate Zeug context and to items beyond this immediate context and vice versa) can be quite complicated and quite interesting. For example, the cobbler's hammer bears certain assignments to the nails and the new sole. The last and the bench and even the room bear certain assignments to the hammer. Furthermore all these items are involved in the task of repairing the shoe, or, to put it another way, each bears an assignment to the repaired shoe-- the work to be done or end product of the work. Heidegger calls the work the "towards-which" assignment. It is the projected end state, so to speak, of the cobbler's work-- his task. More generally stated, that in which Dasein lets an entity be involved has the character of a 'towards-which'.<sup>54</sup> But this work might itself bear further assignments to other entities within the world. It might be involved in further tasks and doings. The repaired shoes will be returned to the owner in exchange for money with which the cobbler will buy the necessities of life. And the repaired shoes may be used by their owner as effective



equipment for walking in performing other tasks involved in turn in further 'towards-which'. But, Heidegger asserts, there is a limit on the structure of the involvements of any particular entity encountered ready-to-hand within-the-world by Dasein. There is a primary involvement towards a 'towards-which' beyond which there is no further involvement.<sup>55</sup> This one is perhaps the most interesting involvement in the totality of involvements.

The ultimate involvement of an entity encountered within-the-world is with what Heidegger calls the "for-the-sake-of-which", and that for the sake of which something within-the-world is involved is said to always pertain to the Being of Dasein itself.<sup>56</sup> Specifically, any entity within-the-world is addeged ultimately to be involved for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. This claim is partly to the effect that entities encountered within-the-world are encountered as ultimately involved with other people or with oneself. (Although to put it this way might be misleadingly simple.) The ultimate involvement toward which all the other involvements lead is thereby markedly differentiated from these other involvements, according to Heidegger's account. For example, the cobbler's hammer is involved with the nails towards repairing the shoe. In these involvements it is assigned to other entities within-the-world. However, the hammer's ultimate involvement for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being (e.g., the cobbler's supporting himself and his family) is an involvement with an entity (Dasein) that is to be sharply distinguished from other entities (the nails and the shoe) which are merely encountered within-the-world. Heidegger's own illustration of what he is driving at runs as follows:

[W]ith this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an

involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein-- that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being.<sup>57</sup>

Presumably the possibility of Dasein's Being alluded to in this example is the possibility of being sheltered.

What we are considering in these examples is a structure like the means-end hierarchy mentioned earlier on where there is a final end or goal of our purposeful behavior which need not or cannot be explained as a subsidiary goal on the way to a further one-- where the final end has simply been chosen as an end in itself and no further explanation is called for. -But I think Heidegger would want to drop the suggested analogy between the 'for-the-sake-of-which' involvement and the notion of the final goal of an action as being misleading, for the structure we are discussing here, he claims, is a unified "promordial [ursprünglich] totality",<sup>58</sup> as opposed to a means-goal hierarchy where we can consider the means and goal separately and where we may possibly be in a position to choose from among alternative sets of means one set we actually wish to employ in achieving the goal. The entire unified totality of involvements that constitute the structure of the world, on the other hand, is already reflected in any item ready-to-hand when it is encountered within-the-world. It is not a matter of choosing or planning out in advance the ways some entity will be involved towards its ultimate involvement. The entire unified structure of involvement in which entities ready-to-hand are encountered as already involved Heidegger calls "significance" [Bedeutsamkeit] where "(t)he 'for-the-sake-of-which' signifies an 'in-order-to'; this in turn, a 'towards-this'; the latter, an 'in-which' of letting something be involved; and that in turn the 'with-which' of an involvement."<sup>59</sup> Each sort of assignment signifies

another sort so that all these assignments are related to each other in the total structure of significance in such a way that they all come to grief or are affected when an item ready-to-hand becomes defective, encounters unusual resistance, is not good enough to accomplish its assignment, is missing, etc.

The entire world structure might be said to be defined or governed by the 'for-the-sake-of-which'-- the 'towards-which' in which any item within-the-world is ultimately involved-- which 'signifies' the 'in-order-to' assignment for each item and so forth.<sup>60</sup> That in which any item within-the-world is ultimately involved, as noted above, alleged to be quite different from entities within-the-world. Items within-the-world are ultimately involved for the possibility of Dasein's Being-- for a possibility of Being-in-the-world. That in which they are ultimately involved, therefore does not have the character of a mere happening within-the-world or of a finished product or some other entity within-the-world; rather, it has the character of Dasein and of the world itself. In fact, one might say that that in which the entities within Dasein's world are ultimately involved is a feature or part of the involvement world itself and therefore that these entities are ultimately involved with that which makes possible their other involvements with each other. Or, to put it another way, they are involved ultimately with their Being involved (i.e., with each other and for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being). Consequently, one might say that the world is self-defining. An ultimate involvement of all entities within-the-world with a feature of the world (i.e., of the involvement structure itself) defines the rest of the involvement structure.

To sum up what we have so far made clear about Heidegger's concept

of "world": The meaning of "world", according to Heidegger, is intimately bound up with what it means to do things. In particular we have been examining some tasks where we manipulate things in an everyday manner in order to accomplish some usual everyday familiar results. This examination has led us to the claim that the world is characterized by involvement. It is that for which things are encountered as already involved, as Heidegger says at one point.<sup>61</sup> In the examples considered tools and other entities were said to be encountered as involved in some way or other in the performance of a task. It might be thought that such entities are encountered as involved for the performance of a task as the cobbler's hammer is for mending shoes. Then we might conclude that Heidegger is using "world" in an extremely odd way as synonymous with "performing a task."

But to jump to this conclusion would be to misconstrue Heidegger. The concepts of "task performance" and "world" are, according to him, in effect interwoven but not the same. One might say that the former concept is too narrow to be equated with "world" or even to play more than a part in elucidating the meaning of the latter. For one thing, the notion of "Being-in-the-world" is used to elucidate the meaning of being human, and we are not as human beings always engaged in performing tasks. It would be needlessly stretching the ordinary notion of "performing tasks" to say, for example, that playing chess or watching a play or appreciating a joke involve task performance or are instances of tasks being performed. Yet it is Heidegger's claim that we are always in a world of involvements which allows all the entities we encounter within-the-world to be encountered as already involved-- when we are generally 'doing things', when we refrain from doing something, and when we are 'doing nothing at all in particular'.

Furthermore, the involvement of an entity encountered ready-to-hand within-the-world, as we have seen, is said to extend beyond the immediate task in which it might be employed or is in some way involved; for the results of our doings are often involved in further endeavors of our own or of other people, and it is important to note just where this further involvement is said to lead. As has been remarked any item encountered ready-to-hand within-the-world is ultimately involved for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being according to Heidegger. But Dasein's Being is Being-in-the-world, and as such the world is an item of Dasein's Being and the structure of the world an existentiale. Thus in explicating this notion of "the world" we are led in an apparent circle. The world is that for which entities within-the-world are involved, and ultimately they are said to be involved for the sake of some possibility of Being-in-the-world. Here we explicitly encounter for the first time the circular nature of philosophical exposition as Heidegger claims it should be and as he practises it. To add insult to injury, in explicating his concept of "world" he has already used "possibility" in the sense of "existentiell possibility" which must depend for its explication on a prior grasp of the concept of "world". But the point still remains that the world of involvements is not to be equated with performing a task, although Heidegger might be loosely interpreted at this point as claiming that the world in which Dasein is is reflected in any task it performs or any of its doings.

Setting out what we have so far managed to make out concerning "the world" we may say:

1. The world is a feature of Being human and is interwoven with the concept of human behavior or 'doings'.
2. It is distinct from the entities encountered within it.

3. Its structure is that of the involvements of entities encountered within it-- i.e., their "significance" in Heidegger's jargon.

On the other hand we must keep in mind the following problems concerning Heidegger's concept of "world":

1. His explication of "world" is apparently circular.

2. The sorts of doings or human behavior Heidegger has so far concentrated on in his exposition have been task performances requiring the manipulation of tools. Accordingly the Being of entities encountered within-the-world has been seen in terms of their being ready-to-hand, and his talk about the structure of the world has so far depended on the ready-to-hand character of these entities-- that is, the notion of "involvement" has so far been tied up with that of "use".

We now turn to the consideration of a question raised previously-- namely, what is the meaning of Heidegger's claim that when we are absorbed in doing something (in particular, in performing some task in an everyday manner), the world, within which we encounter ready-to-hand the entities we encounter, has already been disclosed? To ask Heidegger's question:

(What does it mean to say that that for which entities within-the-world are proximally freed must have been previously disclosed?<sup>62</sup>)

What does it mean to say that the structure of the world is that to which Dasein has always already assigned itself and that with which Dasein is always already familiar? The question of what Heidegger means by these claims is crucial, for this "previous disclosure of the world", it turns out, is our understanding (as an *existentiale*) of the world.<sup>63</sup>

Whatever we do take this claim concerning the prior disclosure of the world to mean we must not take it as a claim to the effect that we always already know exactly what sorts of entities we shall encounter and sorts of happenings shall befall us in performing some task-- that we are

always able at the outset of an undertaking to correctly predict what will happen. As was pointed out previously, according to Heidegger the world is to be distinguished from the entities encountered within-the-world. The world's disclosure is not the same as discovering entities within-the-world or facts about them<sup>64</sup> although the former apparently is alleged to be a necessary condition for the latter. Neither need Dasein understand the world in a theoretically explicit manner such that it can state and describe precisely what the structure of its world is in order to be said to have previously understood its world.<sup>65</sup> Rather "the previous disclosure of the world" is to be taken as meaning a kind of familiarity with the world, and this familiarity may be said to be displayed in the behavior of the individual Dasein in question.

As we have already seen, Heidegger wants to claim that the concept of "world" is interwoven with the concept of "involvement". Entities encountered within-the-world in the course of our everyday doings in an everyday manner are said to be encountered in terms of being ready-to-hand, and this means in terms of involvement. They are involved essentially or marginally, in one way or another in what we are doing. Or perhaps they are unable to be involved even though they ought to be, or they may obstruct the work and involve themselves in a negative sort of way, interfering with the assignments among other entities. Or maybe they are simply not involved in any way except as surroundings and are thereby ignored, treated with indifference, not taken into account. The total structure of an entity's involvements was termed "significance" and as such was said to be the structure of the world. Thus the claim that we are always familiar with the world prior to the discovery and use of entities within-the-world in part must mean that we are familiar with the significance of an entity and

its involvement with other entities in some task or doings for the sake of some possibility of our Being as Dasein prior to our making ourselves familiar with the entity itself in the case where we encounter something new. Indeed, our prior familiarity with the significance of an entity discovered is claimed to be a necessary condition of its discovery.

Exemplifying and explicating this point with respect to our stock example of the cobbler going about his everyday business of shoe repair in an everyday manner will not be easy because when the cobbler attacks his daily task, he is not only familiar with the world but also with most of the entities he encounters within-the-world-- in this case his shop, its furniture, and the tools he uses everyday. Even the shoes he takes in to work on in the morning are pretty much the same sort of shoes he has worked on before. However, I think Heidegger would want to claim that the cobbler's familiarity with the world is of a different sort than his familiarity with his tools, his familiarity with which is based on his previous use of them day after day. The cobbler is said to be always already familiar with his world whereas he might not always be already familiar with all the equipment he uses and with other entities he encounters in attempting to perform his daily task. For example, he might arrive at his shop one morning to find the floor covered with a foot of unfamiliar viscous liquid that has leaked into the shop from the warehouse next door. But unfamiliar though the liquid be, it is discovered as already involved. It may be an obstacle to be removed in order to get on with the work or to be waded through and temporarily put up with in order to get on with the work. It may also be an excuse for not bothering to work that day. This would depend on the particular cobbler and the way his work was involved within the rest of his world with other entities within-the-world in other



of his doings. But the discovery of the unfamiliar, liquid as an obstacle and a hindrance out of place in the workshop as opposed to an unexpected aid to his work depends on the cobbler's prior familiarity with his work-world and the sorts of involvements into which entities encountered within it can fit.

The items on which our cobbler works may also be unfamiliar revealing unexpected. The cobbler may be asked to fix an unusual pair of shoes with specialized structures designed to aid their paraplegic owner in walking. Unfamiliar though these specialized structures may be to the cobbler, he discovers them as already involved (only marginally involved and therefore quite 'ignorable') in the task in one way or another-- as requiring special attention or even possibly as making the work easier. The disclosure of the ways these entities are already involved when discovered within-the-world is his prior understanding of the world. Dasein exercises this understanding in doing what it does. Examples where such understanding is most obvious, however, are those sorts of behavior where the doer tries unfamiliar items to do a job and tries to use them in different ways or to adapt them until they work; or failing that, where he casts them aside and looks for others to do the job. Attempting to circumvent unexpected difficulties presented by unfamiliar items of resistance is a further sort of behavior in which the doer's or agent's familiarity with the world of involvement is obviously prior to the discovery of unexpected unfamiliar entities within-the-world.

Perhaps the best illustration of what Heidegger is driving at with his point about the previous disclosure of the world is to be found in the following example. Someone is lost in an unfamiliar wilderness region and is trying to find the base camp from which he started his hike. The

features of the forest are of course unfamiliar and strange; their location in relation to the base camp is unknown. But various features of the wilderness are discovered in turn as already involved as the hiker tries to make his way out of the forest. In fighting his way through the underbrush he may come across a stream as a welcome break in the dense underbrush and as a possible easy route through the underbrush in the suspected direction of the camp. On the other hand, the rocks he stumbles across on the unfamiliar rocky bottom of the unfamiliar stream and the unexpectedly cold water present difficulties in making use of the route.

There is no single way any unfamiliar or newly encountered item must be involved in the lost hiker's general enterprise of reaching safety, nor need any such item be involved in only one way. But whatever use the lost hiker makes or does not make of unfamiliar entities encountered in the course of the enterprise-- whatever aspects of these entities become important-- each is stumbled upon as already involved in the enterprise itself and its involvement is only possible because of the prior set up of the enterprise. The underbrush could not be an obstacle unless the hiker wanted to travel in that direction in order to get out of the forest, and the stream could not be encountered and involved as an easy route through the underbrush unless the hiker wanted to get through the underbrush which presents an obstacle. In this sense the world is set up and understood prior to the discovery of entities within the world. In this sense Dasein has already assigned itself a structure of involvement by engaging in doing what it is doing.

The claim that understanding is an existential of Dasein means, then, that entities are always encountered within the world as significant or as involved in one way or another in Dasein's doings or doing nothing

as the case may be, and the claim that the structure of the world, which is previously disclosed to Dasein in understanding, is a structure of various involvements always bounded by an ultimate involvement for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being means that Dasein's understanding of the world is at the same time, in a sort of circular fashion, an understanding of itself (as understanding).<sup>66</sup> It is suggested at one point that Dasein's understanding is a kind of competence [etwas können] or ability--not necessarily over things, although some degree of competence or incompetence in using entities within-the-world will be involved, but with or over itself.<sup>67</sup> As a kind of competence with itself (as Being-in-the-world) its competence or ability is a kind of competence with its world as a structure of involvement and competence with the definite possibility for the sake of which an entity within-the-world is ultimately involved and which defines or orders the other involvements in the structure of the world.

This circular sort of exposition that Heidegger keeps throwing at us may still be quite confusing, so let us take up in detail the suggestion that Dasein's understanding is a kind of competence over itself. We should be familiar with the notion of a competent, skilled, able workman. Competence at a job or task means getting that job (and maybe others of the same sort) done efficiently by working effectively to produce the desired result. It also means being able to produce similar results when called upon in similar circumstances. To return to the cobbler and the realm of the manual crafts, our cobbler demonstrates his skill and competence in his craft by effectively using his tools to repair shoes. He may make some mistakes, but he is able to detect and correct them without getting confused or wasting time in perplexity. He can confront and solve unfamiliar sorts of problems in shoe repair; he can deal with unexpected difficulties.

He is said to be competent by way of his results and his technique. He is competent insofar as he is able to perform some task-- insofar as he knows how to do something."

Schmitt spends a great deal of time in his study of Sein und Zeit distinguishing "knowing how" from "knowing that" in an attempt to interpret Heidegger's "understanding" as a sort of knowledge-- knowing how. Schmitt calls competence or knowing how to do something or capability with things "non-theoretical knowledge". He claims that such knowledge, which is tied to action and the results of acting, is opposed to "theoretical knowledge", which is tied specifically to language behavior and being able to handle facts and to say what is the case. Unlike theoretical knowledge, in non-theoretical knowledge, we are told, knowing and what is known (the 'object' of knowledge) are not distinct. The fact which is known in theoretical knowledge remains a fact whether it is known as such or not. The entities about which we have knowledge are assumed to be as they are whether someone knows about them or not. The earth was in fact round whether anyone knew it to be so in pre-Christian times or not. The known, other than the fact that it is known, is independent of its being 'theoretically' known. But what is known in knowing how to do something or in being competent at something is what is displayed in the exercise of that 'practical', non-theoretical knowledge.<sup>68</sup> For example, competence at cabinet making is exercised in the use of various tools to perform the various tasks involved in making a cabinet. What is known is how to build a cabinet and therefore how to use the various tools and materials in order to complete the job of producing a cabinet. Apart from the cabinet maker's exercising his skill or competence, apart from his building cabinets i.e., his performing the various sub-tasks required in order to build a cabinet),

there is nothing to be known in a non-theoretical fashion. There is no 'object' of his knowledge that I too can know even though he may forget and no longer know.

These sorts of claims appear disputable. We might reply to schmitt that the cabinet maker while not engaged in cabinet making at the time could make the claim that he knows how to build cabinets and that furthermore one builds them in the following fashion (as he outlines the method to us). Surely he is not at this point exercising his competence in cabinet making, but he is nonetheless a competent cabinetmaker, and by outlining the procedure for building a cabinet he shows that he knows how a cabinet is built. Even further, the way that he outlines as the way a cabinet is built may in fact be the way to build a cabinet even though in earlier times people had not yet discovered how to build cabinets or in later times they may forget. In practical, non-theoretical knowledge the 'object' of knowledge (i.e., how to build a cabinet) can after all, it seems, be distinguished from and is independent of its being known.

This sort of reply, however, misses Schmitt's and Heidegger's point. For Schmitt the cabinetmaker's claim that he knows how to build cabinets, and his outline of how one goes about it are instances of theoretical knowledge or belief about his own ability and of a belief that cabinets are built in a certain way. He may be called upon to back up his claims that such and is the case by showing us that what he has claimed to be so is indeed the case-- by demonstrating his ability to produce a cabinet to back up his first claim and by having anyone (including himself) to through the procedure he has outlined to produce a cabinet to back up the second claim. He may be able to support his claims or he may not.<sup>69</sup> He could have been mistaken in his claims. But the claims that something is the

case, which can be evaluated as true or false, are instances of theoretical knowledge if they are true.

On the other hand, what one non-theoretically knows is what one is able to do. Whether the carpenter is right or wrong in his beliefs about his ability and about the correct or best or only effective procedure for building cabinets, if he can and does produce good cabinets efficiently, we say that he knows how to build them-- he is competent. If the results of his endeavors are shoddy products of inferior workmanship, if his endeavors are clumsy and he seems unable to finish the job, we might claim that he really does not know how to build cabinets even though he knows (or might know) what the procedure is that one ought to follow in building them-- even though he knows (or might know) how cabinets are built by others who can and do build them. Being able to say what is the case-- language behavior-- is not an essential aspect of non-theoretical knowing according to Heidegger.

Our original practice of explication [of our procedure in in doing something] does not consist of a theoretical statement, but in circumspectively and carefully laying down or changing the tool "without wasting words."<sup>70</sup>

Therefore an analysis of what it means to know something in a non-theoretical fashion, to be competent, to know how, must not make reference to linguistic entities (e.g., propositions) and linguistic behavior (e.g., making a claim) as integral essential aspects of non-theoretical knowledge.

According to Schmitt, what such an analysis of skill and competence will make reference to, at least in part, is the notion of ease and confidence in executing a task one knows how to perform-- or more generally, ease and confidence in action in doing what one knows how to do.<sup>71</sup> The skilled and competent craftsman may in all sincerity voice a lack of

confidence in his ability to do a particular task. He may not 'feel' confident, and he may believe himself unable to perform the task before him, but the issue of his acting confidently rests on the way he tackles the job. Does he hesitate? Does he confuse things or act confused? Does he stumble or make repeated minor slips? Is he perplexed about the results of his actions? Finally, are his movements and maneuvers-- his doings-- efficient and effective-- that is, do they bring about the desired results within a reasonable amount of time? The theoretical issue of whether someone in fact knows how to do something (x) or not is in the last analysis settled in the doing. Whether that someone displays ease, confidence and efficiency in doing x-- i.e., non-theoretical knowledge of x-- will determine the truth or falsity of the theoretical, factual claim that he does know how to do x. I think it is within the scope of considerations such as these that Schmitt makes his claim that non-theoretical knowledge and its 'object'-- what is known-- are not distinct.

Heidegger urges us to look upon the existentials of understanding in these same terms-- as a kind of competence, or ability, or non-theoretical knowledge or 'understanding how' on the part of Dasein. Specifically it is to be seen as Dasein's competence with its Being-in-the-world and with its world. But the cabinetmaker's competence with his hammer means a competence at hammering, and competence with all his tools and materials leads to a competence at cabinet making. What does Dasein's competence with its world mean? According to Heidegger competence or capability with its world seems to be involved in its business of existing (or of existence) in which Dasein displays its competence or ability with itself as Being-in-the-world. As we suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Dasein's existence is to be thought of in terms of activity involving a kind of

ability-- its Being-able-to-be [Seinkönnen].<sup>72</sup> We are told that the claim that Dasein is distinctive as an entity in that it exists is merely a formal way of indicating that in its Being Dasein makes an issue of that very Being itself. Dasein's 'activity' of existing is its working out what it is and what it is to be.<sup>73</sup> And this working out of what it is is done everyday in an everyday way. No theoretical knowledge or intellectual activity of planning is necessarily involved. But prior familiarity with the world is said to necessarily be involved.<sup>74</sup> Thus, Dasein is characterized by its existing; that involves its Being-able-to-be; and that in turn involves its competence or ability with the world. This entire complex of claims is what is packed into Heidegger's aphorism: "Dasein's essence lies in its existence".<sup>75</sup>

Furthermore, Dasein understands itself primarily by existing-- by working out what it is through an understanding of its world and all that that involves. For if, as Schmitt has claimed, in non-theoretical knowledge no distinction can be made between knowing and what is known, then Dasein's understanding of itself as a kind of competence with, or non-theoretical knowledge of, itself as existing is itself existing-- that is, understanding as Dasein's competence at existing and Dasein's existing cannot be separated. Dasein exists insofar as it understands itself in the same sense that the cabinetmaker builds cabinets insofar as, and to the extent that, he is able to do so or knows how to do so or is competent at doing so. Those sorts of cabinets requiring the kind of craftsmanship he is not capable of he does not build, unless, of course, he takes time to learn the requisite skills. And Dasein's understanding of itself will involve an understanding of its world and of the possibility of its Being for the sake of which entities encountered within-the-world are ultimately involved.



Therefore on Heidegger's account one might say that Dasein exists insofar as it understands the world defining possibility of its own Being. Its existence and its understanding (or competence with) of this possibility are intimately and inextricably interwoven.

We still are not clear of our original confusion concerning this notion of Dasein's understanding as a kind of competence over or with itself by which the world is always already disclosed or understood. Perhaps we can cut to the heart of the matter with the following question: The notion of a cabinetmaker's competence at cabinet making is tied to his making cabinets efficiently and effectively with a certain sort of ease and confidence characteristic of skill in his craft. We can to some extent evaluate his performance because we have some idea of what goes into making cabinets, how the tools should be used and what the final product should ~~like~~. On the other hand, we have an idea of some of the doings that indicate incompetence on the part of our cabinetmaker-- for example, driving the nails when hammering and consequently irreparably denting and damaging the wood, or not planing down the edges of the doors enough so that they do not close properly, or mismeasuring the legs so that the cabinet wobbles. What are the indications of an incompetent Dasein-- of its incompetence with itself and its world at existing? Is it possible for a Dasein to not understand itself and its world but rather to misunderstand them, and if so, what does this misunderstanding or incompetence involve?

The answer to the question is that in one sense any Dasein is always competent with itself and its world. This is not a kind of competence or ability that it merely possesses and can lose but one which it is. Dasein always already understands (is competent with) the world of involvements even when it is most incompetent at using entities encountered within-the-

world. Indeed, the very precondition of a Dasein's being incompetent with things at doing something is an understanding of the totality of involvements of the things with which it is concerned such that it is conceivable that it could evaluate its use of things as a misuse, as leading to mishaps in which the job cannot get done and in which entities cannot fulfill their assignments to other entities. Incompetence is displayed in attempting to do something and mismanaging the attempt, but the very notion of an attempt implies a prior familiarity with 'towards-which' and 'in-order-to' assignments of entities encountered and used towards what is to be done. A Dasein's perplexity and confusion on the job is possible because it is already oriented in a world of significance. A particular Dasein's hesitation in doing something only reveals certainty and confidence on its part concerning a world of significance and a possibility of its own Being defining that world. Hesitation as significant act (involving a refraining from doing) on the part of a particular Dasein confronted by a wide and deep stream is understandable in terms of an 'in-order-to' (in order not to slip and jump short of the far bank into the stream) structure and a 'towards-which' (towards getting safely to the other side of the stream) structure and finally an ultimate involvement for the sake of some possibility of its Being (its being safely at home). Our hesitating Dasein is certain and confident enough of his world, so to speak, to be uncertain of and hesitate in his jumping. In his hesitation he displays his familiarity and competence with his world and his familiarity with his own familiarity (or his competence with his own competence) with his world. The empirical question for Heidegger would not be, "is this Dasein competent with himself and his world?" but rather "What is the particular structure of the world with which this Dasein must already be familiar and competent

in order to display the uncertainty and incompetence, at doing what he is doing? What is the existentiell possibility which it must already understand and which governs the structure of involvement that it has assigned itself?"

Thus Heidegger's claims concerning Dasein as an entity that always has already understood its world and itself are to be taken as ontological claims about what it means to be human. Human beings are entities which can display competence and incompetence, ability and inability, in their behavior as opposed to planets or trees, which are not in any particular case said to display either. In their behavior humans may show indications of understanding or misunderstanding what they are about, or making mistakes and suffering mishaps, and of attempting that at which they are not successful. Heidegger claims that such possibilities make sense only if man is the sort of entity (Dasein) which is in every case already oriented in a world of significance that it already understands. Its understanding of its world and thereby its understanding of itself as Being-in-the-world is to be seen as a kind of 'understanding how'-- a kind of competence or ability or capability-- that is not to be associated with one way of doing something as opposed to other incompetent ways of doing or attempting to do it. Rather it is to be associated with being human, which means possibly managing or mismanaging in any given case, as opposed to being some other sort of entity which is normally said neither to manage nor to mismanage anything. This sort of competence which Dasein has as part of its Being is involved in all instances of 'meaningful' human behavior-- in doing anything (or refraining from doing anything) at all and in all ways of doing or attempting to do it. Understanding and accounting for what someone has done is to be seen as a problem of understanding that someone's competence with (i.e., his understanding of) the world; this in turn becomes

a problem of elucidating the involvements that structure his world-- especially the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' involvement that defines the others; and this in turn is a problem of grasping the significance of those entities which that someone encountered within-the-world in the course of his doings.

We get here a brief and misleadingly incomplete sketch of what will be involved in the logic of historiographical explanation as implicitly demanded by Heidegger's analysis of what it means to be human. But before filling out the schema let us consider some possible difficulties with respect to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as it has developed so far.

As emphasized at the outset of our explication of Heidegger, his analysis of Dasein is tied to an analysis of what it means to do something in an everyday fashion which is allegedly integral to the notions of "human behavior" and "Being human". Heidegger sketches out what is involved in doing something in an everyday fashion in Chapter III of Sein und Zeit, but his analysis is ostensibly specifically geared to behavior in which tasks are performed involving the often manual manipulation of tools and physical objects, especially with the aim of crafting some physical product. The question then raised but left unanswered was whether Heidegger's analysis of this select sort of behavior in terms of understanding a world of involvement of the entities within-the-world that is ultimately defined by an involvement for the sake of some definite possibility holds good for the wide variety of all meaningful human behavior as Heidegger intends it to. In particular, certain social-linguistic sorts of everyday behavior may appear to defy his schema as we have so far laid it out.

It may be helpful to note at the outset of our attempt to answer this question that some sorts of behavior other than strictly tool using task performances may immediately be seen to be amenable to Heidegger's

analysis. We have, in fact, already used some examples of such behavior. Finding one's way out of the woods does not necessarily involve using tools or manipulating anything. It mainly involves walking, climbing and jumping over obstacles, etc. and looking about to find likely routes back to camp. Yet the claims concerning the structure of the world and the ways entities encountered within-the-world are encountered as being already involved can be seen to hold good here also. The entities encountered belong together as a Zeug totality in that they are assigned to each other in certain ways. The fallen log that lies across the stream is a way over the stream, an obstacle (although also a source of water to slake one's thirst), in order to get back on the path which is an easy way through the undergrowth and perhaps over the ridge looming ahead since it seems to be keeping the right direction as far as one can tell by the sun. The relationships and assignments among the various entities encountered are governed by the 'in-order-to' involvements "signified" by the 'for-the-sake-of-which' involvement-- in this case, for the sake of one's being safe and found and comfortable again.

Heidegger's claims concerning the involvement structure of the world of everyday manual task performing Dasein seem to be applicable to other sorts of behavior partially because they are phrased in a general terminology improvised from expressions appropriate when speaking of 'almost' any human doings. His talk about the "in-order-to" structure is an example. "x is y-ing in order to z" where y and z are verbs with or without accompanying objects and qualifying expressions or where z can be the verb "to be" with an accompanying condition is a general form of expression appropriate not only for speaking of task performing but also of game playing and other recreational activities. It is appropriate where behavior is seen to have a point to it. Furthermore, "in order to" comments are in

order whether the agent spoken of has consciously planned out his action or not. That question need not arise. What is crucial in the use of an "in order to" claim, Heidegger would assert, is a totality of involvements defined by an existentiell possibility governing the action.

When touching upon this problem of the representativeness of Heidegger's analysis of tool using behavior in an article "On Understanding Heidegger: Some Difficulties", Fløistad trades on the ordinarily wide applicability of the locutions Heidegger uses in his improvisations to suggest that the concept of "world" as an already disclosed structure of involvement applies to and is representative of "the understanding of a theoretical proposition."<sup>76</sup> In particular, Fløistad shows that in understanding a theoretical proposition, the proposition is encountered as already involved in an 'in-order-to' structure. It has a use, so to speak. Presumably Fløistad is assuming that this theoretical, language oriented activity of attempting to understand and succeeding in understanding a theoretical proposition is most far removed from practical tool using activity and that success in applying Heidegger's concepts here suggests that success will follow elsewhere.<sup>77</sup>

By "theoretical proposition" Fløistad means one that is properly at home in a hypothetical-deductive system.<sup>78</sup> As part of such a system the proposition is said to be encountered as already involved in proving further propositions as theorems of the system and in making predictions (assuming that we are talking about an empirical hypothetical-deductive theory)--that is, our proposition may be 'used' to understand other propositions as further theorems in the system. All the aspects of the system are, of course, understood in a way that reflects the activity of theory construction for the purpose of drawing predictive conclusions. Axioms are used in order to deduce further theorems, and these along with certain

statements of initial conditions are used in order to predict further phenomena. The various propositions in the system are encountered as belonging together, involved with each other, and assigned to each other in various ways. The theorist is already familiar with the involvement structure of a new theorem (i.e., the way it will be involved qua theorem) even before he discovers it and further theorems and phenomena deducible from it.

Moreover, the "system as a whole has an explanatory use of function-- that is, it is (usually) advanced 'in order to' explain certain observations."<sup>79</sup> Such explanation would be the 'towards-which' assignment of the various propositions in the system. Understanding a proposition in a theoretical system would be a significant step towards understanding the sort of phenomena the system accounts for. Theoretical activity as Fløistad represents it (i.e., the activity of constructing, and acquiring an understanding of theories) seems susceptible to Heidegger's analysis.

Fløistad's defense of Heidegger's schema seems plausible because he concentrates on the constructive aspect of theoretical activity-- in particular, on constructing systems of explanation that can be used for prediction of phenomena-- and accordingly the business of understanding such a theory comes to be seen as one of learning how to 'use' the construction-- of learning how to find one's way about among the propositions of the system, so to speak.<sup>80</sup> Presumably then, the entities encountered most immediately as entities ready-to-hand by the theoretician in his theory construction and understanding are linguistic entities including propositions and words. In spite of significant differences between words (or propositions) and manual tools Heidegger would seem on this interpretation to be committed to drawing out even more significant similarities. Heidegger himself in Sein und Zeit does not systematically attack this problem although much of what he says in connection with other problems

and with laying the basis for attacking this problem suggest significant similarities between tools and words both as entities of use.<sup>81</sup> Instead of developing and arguing for these alleged similarities, however, he moves on to tackle what he feels are problems more central to his overall thesis.<sup>82</sup>

Nevertheless, he might have sought to establish the claim that linguistic entities are entities possessing a ready-to-hand character encountered within a world of involvement by focusing on ordinary situations in which one might speak of using a word-- e.g., "I wanted to break it to him gently, but I just didn't know what words to use"-- and in which we use "in order to" locutions-- e.g., "He shouted 'Fire!' in order to scare the people inside." Heidegger could rightly claim that in appropriate circumstances it makes perfectly good sense to ask why a particular person is talking or speaking in a particular manner or even why he is speaking at all. To such questions one might get answers to the effect that the speaker is speaking (in this particular fashion) in order to convey information, to get a point across, to pass the time, to convey a good impression of himself, to hear himself speak, or another of many similar sorts of answers. He might claim that such locutions suggest that the expressions and words used in the course of a speaker's speech act bear certain assignments towards each other and towards the 'towards-which' of the speech act. Such assignments of a word to other words and to larger linguistic entities are at least partially apparent in the rules of grammar and stylistic canons that regulate the use of phrases and words and at the same time rest upon the ways words and locutions usually 'go together' or 'belong with each other'.

But as in tool using behavior the ready-to-hand character of entities encountered within a world of involvement becomes fully appreciated when that world becomes 'lit up' in a mishap or difficulty. There are many



sorts of mishaps or difficulties that may arise in communicative-linguistic behavior although normally they arise only occasionally among fluent speakers of a language. Usually our speech is fluent in the sense that we are concentrating fully on what we are speaking about and not upon how we are speaking-- i.e., our selection of words, our style of speech. We do not normally plan out exactly what we are going to say although there are of course situations in which this is called for. Yet even in the middle of such everyday fluent discourse we sometimes stumble when the particular word we need to say just what we want to say escapes us at the moment. In such a case we may for a while become very self-conscious about our speech. We grope for just that right word, or perhaps we try to talk around the difficulty until we achieve the effect originally intended or convey the information originally intended. Then we can resume our normal unthinking fluency. Groping for the right words is a fairly common occurrence for the not yet fluent speaker of an alien tongue. Not being fluent in a language means among other things having constantly to circumvent difficulties of this kind and having often to carefully plan out one's circumvention. In these situations of communication breakdown when a word is missing (i.e., escapes us) or when a word or sentence fails to do the job intended (either because of our poor command of the language or because of our listener's) the various involvements of these linguistic entities becomes apparent. These involvements include involvements with other linguistic entities-- with what has already been said (i.e., prior sentences or words of an incomplete sentence) but which is still incomplete and with what would have been said but cannot yet be said and make sense without the missing locutions-- and they include further involvements with what the speaker is doing in a larger sense-- e.g., conveying information, warning someone, demanding something, running for political office, attempting

to save a life, leading a platoon out of the jungle, etc.

I think I have shown that a strong case can be made for Heidegger's schema as so far outlined being applicable to linguistic behavior. There may yet be other sorts of human behavior that the reader believes to defy the analysis that Heidegger has given. I do not intend to try to anticipate all the conceivable counterexamples that might be brought against Heidegger's analysis. Instead, from here on we shall assume that Heidegger's fundamental preparatory analysis of Dasein is indeed an analysis of what it means to be human as he claims it is and not an analysis properly restricted in its adequacy only to tool using behavior although, of course, we have only scratched the surface of the issue. But our brief consideration of linguistic behavior has brought up some points that will force us to consider another dimension in Heidegger's analysis of Being-in-the-world. For in our consideration of linguistic behavior we spoke of communication-- of speakers and listeners. Linguistic behavior as communicative behavior is obviously social behavior in which we encounter not just entities ready-to-hand within the world but other people as other Daseins. Furthermore, the linguistic entities most immediately encountered within-the-world and 'used' are obviously different from tools in that they are 'public property'. They are not owned by just one craftsman but can be 'used' simultaneously by many speakers. Finally, the effectiveness of their 'use' is to some extent regulated by explicitly formulated and implicit rules of language applicable to many 'users' of these entities. In such behavior the social dimension of the world's structure becomes so obvious that it cannot be overlooked any longer.

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, SECTION 1

1. The claim that the nature of philosophical exposition is circular arises in several places in Sein und Zeit, most notably on pages 152 and following where the claim is discussed and argued for. However, on page 7 Heidegger suggests that the circle is an inappropriate metaphor to describe the course of ontological exposition. It is said not to be circular so much as a back and forth relationship.
2. "Ursprünglich" seems to be one of Heidegger's favorite terms, and in view of the extent to which he works it, Macquarrie and Robinson's more technical sounding translation of "primordial" may well be more appropriate than rendering it by the obvious "original". At any rate we follow their rendering for the most part trusting that differences in translation of this term will not affect the philosophical issues on which we want to concentrate.
3. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 143.
4. Ibid., p. 45.
5. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
6. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
7. Ibid., p. 44 and pp. 54-57.
8. Ibid., p. 143.
9. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
10. Ibid., p. 143.
11. Ibid., p. 145.
12. See Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to "Sein und Zeit", p. 180.
13. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 144.
14. Ibid., p. 133.
15. Ibid., p. 53.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 64.
18. In emphasizing the spatiality or spatial character of Being-in-the-world Heidegger often emphasizes the components of the word "Dasein". For example: "By its very nature, Dasein brings its Da along with it.

If it lacks its Da, it is not factually the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed it is not this entity at all." (Ibid., p. 133) Elsewhere he says that Dasein is delivered over to its Da; indeed, that it is the Da. (Ibid., p. 135) In yet another place we are informed: "To say that in existing, Dasein is its Da, is equivalent to saying that the world is 'da'; its Being-there [Da-sein] is Being-in. And the latter is likewise 'da', as that for the sake of which Dasein is." (Ibid., p. 143) In discussing the spatiality of Being-in-the-world we hear claims from Heidegger like the following. "The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 'Da'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'Da' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder' ['dort']. The 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this 'yonder'-- a Being which is de-severant, directional and concerned. Dasein's existential spatiality, which thus determines its 'location' ['Ort'], is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The 'yonder' belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-world. 'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'Da'-- that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of, the 'Da'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off.... By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein) together with the Being-there [Da-sein] of the world, is 'da' for itself." (Ibid., p. 132)

19. Ibid., p. 86.
20. Ibid., p. 63. Heidegger distinguishes several different uses of the word "world". (Ibid., pp. 64-65) We shall focus on the third-- "not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that 'where-in' a factual Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. World has here a pre-ontological existential signification. Here again there are different possibilities: 'world' may stand for the 'public' we-world, or one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment [Umwelt]."
21. That is, the world is not equivalent to the set or the collection of things that I can possibly encounter or discover or see or sense around me like the pen and table, house, street, tree, river, wind, molecules of air, etc.
22. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 64.
23. For a discussion of this issue in interpreting Heidegger, see Fløistad, "On Understanding Heidegger: Some Difficulties", pp. 435-436.
24. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 43.
25. See also Heidegger, op. cit., p. 66.
26. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 28.
27. Ibid., p. 27.

28. Ryle spends most of Chapter IX-- "The Intellect" dealing with this problem.
29. Ryle, op. cit., p. 27. See also p. 31 for further hints along this line.
30. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 356-357.
31. Ibid., p. 59.
32. Ryle, op. cit., p. 29.
33. Heidegger's creation "innerweltlich" has the form of a German adjective or adverb, and Heidegger uses it in both capacities. We follow Macquarrie and Robinson in rendering it as the hyphenated "within-the-world". One might think of this word in its adverbial capacity as providing an answer to the question: How do we encounter entities? Within-the-world.
34. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 68.
35. Heidegger says, "EIN Zeug 'ist' strenggenommen nie." (Ibid., p. 68) He seems to be playing on a point of language here. As a mass noun the locution "ein Zeug" should strike us as odd or as bordering on nonsense or perhaps as puzzling concerning what the speaker meant. This linguistic force would indicate that the claim about entities having the character of Zeug not occurring in isolation does not refer to physical isolation but a more interesting sense of the word "isolation" interwoven with Heidegger's claims concerning the character of the world.
36. Ibid., pp. 68 ff.
37. Ibid., p. 69.
38. Ibid. The kind of Being a piece of equipment (i.e., an entity with the character of Zeug) is said to possess is that of readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]. It is thought of in terms of being in use or out of use, usable or not fit for use, no longer used for this but still used for that, etc.
39. Ibid., p. 69, p. 73 and p. 75.
40. Ibid., p. 68.
41. Ibid., p. 107.
42. Ibid., p. 68.
43. Ibid., p. 80.
44. Ibid., p. 70.
45. Ibid., p. 161.

46. Concern is yet another of Dasein's existentials and characterizes its relationship with the world. See page      below.
47. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 69.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 75.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 74.
52. This claim is not merely a psychological one. An item can be missing in the course of performing a task only insofar as it has a 'place' in performing that task-- that is, insofar as it facilitates getting done what is to be done. The claim is more on the order of a conceptual one about what it means for an item of use to be missing qua item of use.
53. The section "Involvement and Significance; the Worldhood of the World" (Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 83-88) can be understood as a detailed argument in support of this claim.
54. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 48 and p. 353.
55. Ibid. p. 84.
56. Ibid., This claim is not to be construed as meaning that we are all guided ultimately by egotistical selfish ends.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 87.
59. Ibid.
60. That we might say this is suggested by Heidegger's claim that significance (the structure of the world) is "grounded" in the 'for-the-sake-of-which' (Ibid., p. 143) and the claim that Dasein always assigns itself from a 'for-the-sake-of-which' to the 'with-which' of an involvement. (Ibid., p. 86)
61. Ibid., p. 86. His full definition of "world" given here runs as follows: "The 'wherein' of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world."
62. Ibid., p. 85.
63. Ibid., p. 86.
64. Heidegger makes this point clearly in a succeeding chapter dealing

with Being-with-Others when he writes, "This understanding [of Others as a dimension of the world], like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible." (Ibid., p. 123)

65. Ibid., p. 86.
66. Ibid., p. 146. Here Heidegger suggests that in understanding the world Dasein always understands its Being-in along with, while an understanding of existences as such is always at the same time an understanding of the world.
67. Ibid., p. 143. The actual quote is: "When we are talking ontically, we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a match for it', 'being competent to do something' ['etwas können']. In understanding, as an existentiale that which we have competence over [Das im Verstehen als Existentzial Gekonnte] is not a 'what', but Being as existing." Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of "können in terms of "being competent" is potentially misleading because 'competence' is a concept usually reserved for complicated task and doings where skill is involved. Dasein is competent with its world in all its doings whether or not skill is involved in its behavior. Instead of talking in terms of competence we might less misleadingly speak in terms of Dasein's being capable or able with its world. Schmitt uses these alternatives as well as speaking of Dasein's understanding as a 'knowing how'. We shall not stick to any one of these alternatives but will talk mainly in terms of Dasein's competence or ability with its world while keeping in mind that competence with its world is involved in all of Dasein's doings, no matter how simple, even if no other competence is involved. (See Schmitt, op. cit., p. 166 and pp. 170 ff.)
68. Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 166 ff. That there is a dichotomy between the two sorts of knowledge of the significance, that Schmitt alleges may be questioned. Presumably Ryle would question it. Neither would Heidegger want to maintain such a dichotomy. Theoretical behavior is said to involve its own canon and rules according to which it proceeds (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 69), and the theoretical attitude is said to involve a modification of the circumspective concern that characterizes everyday Dasein. (Ibid., p. 351 and pp. 356 ff.)
69. See Schmitt, op. cit., p. 170 for a discussion of the relation between 'theoretical knowing' and evidence.
70. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 157. For a commentary on this point see Schmitt, op. cit., p. 171.
71. Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 173-174.
72. Why Macquarrie and Robinson translate "Seinkönnen" as "potentiality-for-Being I do not know. We shall follow Schmitt's rendering of it as "Being-able-to-be". (See Schmitt, op. cit., p. 179) For the con-

nection between Dasein's prior familiarity with or understanding of its existentiell possibilities defining its world-- its "Being-possible"-- and its Being-able-to-be see Heidegger, op. cit., p. 86 and pp. 143-144. "Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own Being-able-to-be; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of." (Ibid., p. 144.)

73. Ibid., p. 231.

74. Ibid., pp. 12 f.

75. Ibid., p. 42.

76. Floistad; op. cit., p. 439.

77. Ibid., pp. 435 ff.

78. Ibid., p. 439.

79. Ibid.

80. It is important to keep in mind here that Floistad's concentration on theory construction is a focusing on theory formulation and the linguistic result. Accordingly then, he will also be concentrating on what Ryle calls the "didactic ends" or didactic uses to which a theory and the propositions within the theory are put, not on its involvement in wider contexts of 'practical' behavior. (See Ryle, op. cit., pp. 269 ff.)

81. At one place Heidegger suggests that language as a totality of words is something that we can come across ready-to-hand (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 161), but later on he raises again the question of what kind of Being language has-- of whether it is a "kind of Zeug ready-to-hand within-the-world or has it Dasein's kind of Being or is it neither?" (Ibid., p. 166) He does not explicitly answer his question in Sein und Zeit, but other sections in the book do suggest that the words of a language and linguistic constructions within the language do have a ready-to-hand character and are encountered in terms of circumpective concern. For example, see page 157 and also the entire section entitled "Reference and Signs", pages 76-82. Schmitt interprets Heidegger as claiming that words are ready-to-hand 'objects' of 'use' and suggests a similarity between words and signs. (Schmitt, op. cit., p. 100) How significant Heidegger actually thought any such similarity to be, however, as well as his views on the Being of words is an issue the consideration of which must take into account his later writings on language simply because he handles the issue in such a sketchy and tentative manner in Sein und Zeit.

82. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 166.



## CHAPTER II

### SECTION 2

So far Heidegger's account of what it means to be in the world and to understand the world might be construed as being rather solipsistic in orientation. In doing things a man is said to operate in a world of involvement which is always already disclosed to him and the structure of which is in some sense defined by the possibility of his Being for the sake of which entities within-the-world are encountered as already involved. It might appear that each man lives in his own little world, as it were, oriented by his own peculiar possibility of Being. But according to Heidegger, such is not the case if it is taken to mean that each man occupies his own separate isolated world cut off from others so that on an epistemological level none can be certain that others exist or, if they do, what they are really like. Nor is his account to be taken as implying that the possibility of a man's Being that defines the world of involvement cannot be a shared possibility of the Being of other men as well. Being-in (the world), according to Heidegger, is essentially Being-with (Others), and this is to be taken as an ontological claim about the world, not as a factual one about the existence of non-existence of other human entities encountered within-the-world.<sup>1</sup> In other words, man is by nature social.

In examining this social dimension of the world of involvement we again begin by attending to everyday doings and concerns and to those entities within-the-world of everyday activities.

The work produced refers [anweisen] not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and "whereof" of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The

work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges.... Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world.<sup>2</sup>

The items encountered in performing a task bear assignments not only to other items within the Zeug totality-- to other equipment and to the finished product of work-- but also to other people-- to other Daseins. Even when absorbed in work by himself or ignoring others around him the craftsman does in a sense encounter the others for whose use the work he does is intended or from whom perhaps his tools have been borrowed. He encounters them through the involvement with others of that which he is using or of that upon which he is working.

Much of the work we do is for others. The cobbler repairs shoes for his customers according to their order and in return for payment. No payment, no work. In fact most of us encounter others within-the-world all the time in one way or another, but that is not the essential point Heidegger wants to make. His claim is that any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand in the public world. The point to be made is not a factual one but an ontological one about what it means to be human. In fact that upon which we work often bears an assignment to other individuals who will subsequently concern themselves with it in some way, but even work done with my own tools and materials resulting in a product to be used exclusively by me for my own sake in the most private and selfish manner possible utilizes and produces that which is ready-to-hand in a public world. This is so because entities encountered within-the-world in use are all usable by others of the same ilk as he who is using or is to use them. The cobbler may be working on his very own shoes for his very own use, but even these are ready-to-hand in a public world since anyone else of the same size or even smaller feet could wear them, and the cobbler

could very well part with them and make them available to others for their use.

Heidegger's notion of the world as essentially a public world can be sharpened by a consideration of possession and "belonging to". Items within-the-world are encountered not only in terms of being ready-to-hand for me or others but also as potentially belonging to me and or others.<sup>3</sup> Items encountered within-the-world of our everyday concern were said to have the character of Zeug, and as noted above, Heidegger suggests that this word is to be taken as roughly equivalent to the Greek "pragmata".<sup>4</sup> Originally this Greek term was used with connotations of "possession."<sup>5</sup> "Zeug" is to have similar connotations. Entities encountered as Zeug are possessed and/or possessable by the encountering Dasein and others who are using, or might use, or used, or might have used, or cannot find a use for, etc. them.

When, for example, we walk along the edge of the field but 'outside' it, the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person and decently kept up by him.<sup>6</sup>

Thus entities ready-to-hand show themselves in terms of "belonging to" and are thereby encountered within a public world. Some items with explicit social significance like pieces of money are meant to be seen as possessable by everyone-- i.e., as able to be used in similar ways by everyone (to have similar involvements for everyone) else besides him who actually happens to have those particular pieces of money in his pocket. But even the most private possessions marked off for the owner's exclusive use, forbidden for the use of others by law, are ready-to-hand in a public world. All the conscious efforts on the part of owners to prevent others from appropriating and using the owner's private possessions would not make sense if others were not able to possess them by using them-- if it were

not possible for a private item to be involved in what others might do in a way similar to its involvement in the owner's doings.

Thus a world of Others<sup>7</sup> is revealed in the entities ready-to-hand encountered within the world of everyday task performance, but we must take note of exactly who these Others are. Heidegger says that it is not the case that these Others are everyone else but me. "They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself-- those among whom one is too."<sup>8</sup> The Others that constitute Dasein's public world are not a particular group of other Daseins to whom Dasein can pay attention as a group of individuals, for Dasein always finds itself among the Others with whom it always shares its public world. These Others, therefore, do not stand out as definite others as the Boy Scouts do for a Girl Scout or the university staff does for a student or even the other residents of Alberta do for me when I fancy myself above the common herd.<sup>9</sup> The Others are inconspicuous (in the same way the world is inconspicuous since they are an aspect of the world), but they are none the less real.<sup>10</sup> They use the street outside (which of course is specifically for public use) in much the same way as I do, but they might also use or possess my most personal possession as I do-- that is, that possession could and would have the same significance for them as for me.

But all the above description still does not give a specific answer to the question of who these Others are who constitute the public world in which Dasein is as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's answer to that question is given in the following way: When Dasein is absorbed concernfully in its everyday doings, "the Others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do." [Sie sind das was sie betreiben] And what they do is what one man does. The Others encountered as a part of the world are said therefore to be indefinite and impersonal; they are the neuter 'one'

[das Man] of "What one does".<sup>11</sup> As the neuter, impersonal, indefinite 'one', the Others are inconspicuous. They represent the average which included Dasein and into which it is 'absorbed'.

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'one' is unfolded.<sup>12</sup>

In this dictatorship

Dasein is for the sake of the 'one' in an everyday manner, and the 'one' itself articulates the referential context of significance.<sup>13</sup>

The original question of the identity of these Others who constitute Dasein's public shared world may accordingly be answered briefly, "noone in particular" and at the same time "everyone including ourselves".<sup>14</sup> There is no one to take responsibility for what Dasein does in its everyday manner since it (Dasein) does what one does the way one does it; yet everyone seems to have a hand in determining what is done and how it is done.

We have a concise Heideggerian answer to the question of the identity of the Others that constitute the world, but we must clear away some plausible misunderstandings of the answer and sharpen the point Heidegger is making.

First, the claim that the Others encountered as part of the world of everyday concerns are indefinite and impersonal, everyone and noone, is not to be taken as denying that we meet personal friends and acquaintances and other identifiable people in the course of our everyday doings and that we recognize and address them as definite persons holding them responsible for many of their actions. Heidegger calls the ways in which we pay attention to and concern ourselves with other individual Daseins encountered within-the-world "solicitude" [Fürsorge], and he spends some time in one

section discussing possible ways of interacting with other individuals in solicitude.<sup>15</sup> But the point about das Man and the indefiniteness of these Others is not a point about specific entities or sorts of entities within-the-world. Rather it is a point about the world itself, which, as a totality of involvements, of assignments, of significance, in which entities are encountered as already involved or significant is to be distinguished from the entities themselves. Thus the point about das Man and the indefinite impersonal Others is a point about all human activity and meaningful human behavior no matter how solitary, no matter how physically and/or socially isolated the agent is from other particular, individual Daseins.<sup>16</sup> Heidegger's point is that the world of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is essentially a public world whether other individual Daseins are encountered within-the-world or not. Dasein's world is a 'with-world' shared with Others among whom it is in the world. For Heidegger the problem of ontological or epistemological solipsism does not arise since in understanding its world Dasein always already understands the involvement with-Others-with-whom-it-shares-the-world of the entities encountered within-the-world.<sup>17</sup> Meaningful human behavior is therefore essentially social.

To claim that man is essentially social, however, is not to claim that a man cannot live in a solitary state or cannot be lonely. The Robinson Crusoe figure marooned on the tropical island is certainly still human and continues to act quite meaningfully. He works at providing shelter for himself, fashioning tools for various tasks and generally engages in the everyday affairs of survival. In working and relaxing and generally looking out for himself he operates in a world of involvements and significance. Yet he encounters no other individuals on the island or even traces of other men. What he works on is for himself alone. Nevertheless, Robinson

Crusoe as human encounters entities within-the-world as usable by others and as possessable by others. The work he does could benefit others. That is part of the meaning of Robinson Crusoe's being marooned and lonely. That towards which he labors could be involved ultimately for the sake of some possibility of Being of some other Dasein, and that with which he labors (his equipment) could be involved in the same way for some other fellow. But these are not in fact so involved. The island is usable as a place of habitation by others besides Robinson Crusoe, but in fact he does not share it with others. Because Robinson Crusoe as Dasein is essentially Being-with (a social being), it is meaningful to say that he lives in solitude and can be lonely even if he is physically surrounded by people in a large indifferent city. It is only "in and for a Being-with"-- whose world of involvements is a public world with a dimension of Others-- that others can be missing.<sup>18</sup>

Granting all that has so far been said about das Man and the indefinite Others as a 'dimension' of the world, however, it is still not clear exactly what is involved in this alleged 'dimension' of Dasein's world.<sup>19</sup> It is still not clear how these indefinite, inconspicuous Others as a feature of the world are encountered and how this feature is related to individual personal Daseins encountered within-the-world. To return to the cobbler, the cobbler encounters the Others of his world in the course of everyday doings in the following manner whether other Daseins are physically present or not, whether he is thinking of other individuals or not: The entities within-the-world are, as we have already pointed out, encountered as already involved with other entities within-the-world and with an existentiell possibility for the sake of which they are involved. The hammer, for example, is involved with nails; it is used to hammer nails. One generally uses a hammer in this fashion. One does not use it to pick one's teeth nor to

eat one's food nor as an instrument for performing surgery. Furthermore, one generally hammers in a certain fashion using certain movements of one's arm and wrists which I am sure our cobbler would be quick to demonstrate to an exceptionally awkward or ignorant apprentice. Heidegger's point concerning das Man is that Dasein encounters entities within its everyday world in terms of the way one uses (or does not use or ignores) them or, to put it another way, in terms of the way one lets them be involved. In this manner entities are encountered as placed within a public world.

What one does with a hammer in using it, as the way in which the cobbler encounters his hammer, is not merely a matter of the cobbler's actually using the hammer in a way or pattern consistent with the way he has used it previously and consistent with the way other cobblers have used and are using their hammers. Consistency in use (or in behavior in general) or a regularity in the pattern of use (or in behavior in general) certainly is involved with the notion of das Man and what one does. Such consistency and regularity in use would mean the existence of an established tradition in the use of a hammer. But our cobbler might have an active imagination and he might constantly be discovering innovative and original ways to use his hammer in repairing shoes or even for other purposes like picking his teeth. In these cases Heidegger would not retract his claim that the cobbler encounters the hammer in terms of what one does with it. For the most original and innovative use could become a tradition, a matter of subsequent consistency and regularity in behavior. The cobbler's innovation (especially if successful) is a 'very possible' future standard practice for himself and for others he might teach (e.g., his apprentices) or for those who might copy him. Man's behavior is therefore essentially traditional insofar as it is essentially social whether he acts in conformity with an established tradition or not or even where he purposefully violates the



established tradition. It is the possibility of a man's establishing a new tradition or maintaining an old one through his behavior that matters. It makes sense to say that an instance of innovative unusual human behavior could form the basis of a tradition and as such could be copied such that the same way of doing things is learned by others within the tradition, whereas it does not make sense to say that a planet's altered orbit can establish a tradition in planetary behavior that could be learned by and passed on to other planets.

The point about the possibility of establishing and maintaining traditions is filled out even more when one considers how other individual Daseins are encountered within-the-world in terms of das Man. These entities are usually not encountered as being merely ready-to-hand within the everyday work-world, but they are encountered as already involved in certain ways. Take, for example, the cobbler's customer for whom the shoes are repaired. He is of course encountered as a Dasein and therefore as distinct from other entities within-the-world (like the hammer, nails and shoes) since as a Being-in-the-world he shares the cobbler's world. Nevertheless, the customer (like the hammer, etc.) is already involved in certain ways with other entities within the cobbler's world insofar as he is a customer (or potential customer), and the cobbler behaves toward him as one generally behaves toward a customer. The cobbler listens attentively to the customer's order and undertakes to repair the shoes according to the order within the specified amount of time. Furthermore, since the customer is also a Dasein sharing the public world, the cobbler expects that the customer will behave in certain appropriate ways that one behaves as a customer--namely, collecting the shoes and paying the bill in currency. The cobbler orients his behavior to an extent around these expectations and holds the customer responsible if he fails to act in the way one acts as a customer.

The customer is involved as one of those (the Others) among whom the cobbler as Dasein counts himself as sharing the world. Where those with whom we in fact share the world fail to act as one acts in a given situation, we blame them, and where they are ignorant of the way one acts in the given situation we hold them responsible for learning how one acts in this case. We treat them as potentially one of those among whom we include ourselves. Not only the casual acquaintances of the cobbler's work-world but his personal friends are involved in this way-- in roles where one expects certain things of them and where one acts in certain ways in response. They are to some extent involved as the Others with whom Dasein shares the world of involvement.

Summing up the points to be made concerning das Man, we may say that entities encountered within-the-world (both entities ready-to-hand and other Daseins) are encountered as already involved and involved in the same way for the encountering Dasein as they are for the indefinite Others with whom Dasein shares its world. Other individual Daseins encountered within-the-world may be further involved in filling the role of the indefinite Others. Talk about these indefinite Others among whom Dasein counts itself is talk about a feature of Dasein's world-- a public shared world.<sup>20</sup> It is talk about the way entities within-the-world are encountered as already involved. They are encountered as involved in the way one uses or attends to (or does not use or does not attend to or ignores) them. When Dasein is most absorbed in its doings going about its business in an everyday, routine, familiar, competent manner, its world (and therefore das Man also) is most inconspicuous, but the entities within-the-world are involved in the way one generally lets them be involved; entities ready-to-hand are used in the way one generally uses them. The structure of involvements, the significance of what Dasein encounters, is dictated by

das Man.<sup>21</sup> Heidegger claims that this aspect of human behavior is an aspect of all human behavior.<sup>22</sup> He calls it Dasein's inauthenticity.<sup>23</sup> Das Man is said to be an existentiale<sup>24</sup> and therefore will be developed as a category of inquiry in the social-human sciences.

As a category of inquiry into human activities and the products or results of these, Heidegger's existentiale of das Man may be compared with Winch's notion of 'rule-governed' behavior-- a notion that Winch claims is central to understanding meaningful human behavior. Encountering entities within-the-world in terms of what one does (or does not do) with (or in the face of or to or about, etc.) them might be held to involve or perhaps simply be analogous to encountering them in terms of rules governing what is done with or about those entities by those with whom Dasein shares the world and among whom it counts itself.<sup>25</sup> This would be to say, among other things, that entities are encountered as involved in the same way as they are for the indefinite Others that constitute Dasein's public world;<sup>26</sup> entities are involved with other entities within-the-world for the sake of some public existentiell possibility. What Dasein does with or about these entities is the same as what Others do. In driving about on the city's streets, which are explicitly socially and publically involved entities, we encounter specific others who fill the role of the Others with whom we share the world by obeying the rules of the road-- legal rules, rules of courtesy and rules of common sense. They use the road as one generally uses it-- as a route along which to drive motor vehicles or bicycles in order to get about town-- and they drive according to the rules of the road by doing what one does in a given situation. Some of these individuals, of course, occasionally break the rules, but even they subject their behavior to evaluation by themselves and others in terms of

what one does (or simply, "What is done") in a given situation. Following rules is doing the same thing as Others do in the specified situation.

Winch's development of the notion of "rule-governed behavior" in following Wittgenstein's discussion of the issue takes just this tack. The question of what it means to follow a rule arises for them through a discussion of the meaning of "same"-- specifically as in, "to use a word in the same way as laid down in the definition."<sup>27</sup> Winch asserts the following:

1. "Same" is systematically ambiguous. Whether two things are to be regarded as the same or not depends on the context in which the question arises.

2. This means that it is only in terms of a given rule that we attach a specific sense to the words "the same". The words "same" and "rule" are interwoven in meaning.<sup>28</sup>

Ignoring the implied broad claim about the meaning of "same" and concentrating on the narrower point of what it is to use a word in the same way as laid down in a definition or to act in the same way as someone else, which is the point Winch concentrates on, we may grant a certain plausibility to the claim that the notion of "acting in the same way" or "using something in the same way" is interwoven with the notion of "following a rule". When an institution wants to induce a certain conformity in the behavior of its members-- when it wants people to act in the same way in a certain situation-- it lays down a rule for them to follow. The rule specifies the respect in which their behavior is to conform-- the sort of behavior and the aspects of it in which one person's behavior is to be the same as another's.

Now in claiming that all meaningful behavior is eo ipso rule-governed (in effect claiming that "rule" is a category of inquiry in this area),

Winch would not want to claim that in all meaningful human behavior the agent is consciously attending to some rule which has been laid down to govern the sort of activity in which he is engaged nor that the rules governing what he is doing have necessarily been formulated and promulgated prior to the instance of behavior in question in order to induce conformity in some respect in instances of that sort of behavior-- as in the case of the provincial rules of the road.<sup>29</sup> His claim is that where it is meaningful to talk of an agent making mistakes (i.e., of behavior in which a mistake has been made or might have been made or might yet be made), of correcting them and of evaluating his behavior, it is meaningful to talk of his behavior as being rule-governed.<sup>30</sup> Such behavior is said to involve the application of a rule whether or not the agent or anyone else has in fact followed or explicitly formulated that rule.<sup>31</sup> The rule governing the behavior functions as a standard or criterion by which the behavior is evaluated.<sup>32</sup>

Such sentiments are fundamentally in concert with Heidegger's notion of 'understanding' as an existentiale. As was discussed in the preceding chapter, Dasein's understanding of the world does not necessarily or even usually involve a theoretical grasp of the structure of its world. Dasein is not always able to say in what ways various entities are involved with each other and with that towards which they are involved. When Dasein is most absorbed in what it is doing, the world is most inconspicuous, and das Man as a feature of that world--i.e., the involvement of Dasein's doings with what one does in that sort of situation-- is also most inconspicuous. If the dictatorship of das Man is understood in terms of following rules, then Dasein will not normally be paying attention to those rules. It is following as the ways in which entities with which it is concerned are involved for the Others of its public world.

Even in the case of a mishap when the world is said to be "lit up"-- to announce itself as the structure of various involvements of the entities with which Dasein is concerned-- Dasein would not necessarily or usually explicitly formulate or keep formulations of appropriate rules in mind. In a mishap the involvement structure of the world was said to become conspicuous, but Heidegger's line of argument implies that this sort of case does not necessarily involve any theoretical knowledge of the world and the involvements that structure it.<sup>33</sup> Rather it involves Dasein's altering its course to circumvent obstacles, searching for a substitute for equipment that has failed or gotten lost, adjusting its technique to overcome difficulties, and generally attempting to get the job done in the face of problems. In such behavior the agent shows he is 'aware' of the various involvements that structure the world including the involvement for the sake of some existentiell possibility that defines the world; he shows that he has evaluated the situation. But such mishaps always involve mistakes (or possible mistakes) on the part of the agent, and so his evaluation of the situation will always include or imply an evaluation of his own behavior-- his technique, method, way of going about things etc.<sup>34</sup> Presupposed by its evaluation of its behavior is an understanding on the part of Dasein of how it should go (or should have gone) about its task-- i.e., how one would go about that task. In the case of mishaps and consequent evaluation of the situation, the involvement of entities within-the-world with the indefinite Others of Dasein's public world becomes conspicuous. Das Man-- the rule Dasein is following in Winch's account-- thereby becomes conspicuous, though not necessarily theoretically grasped and verbally formalized by the agent. It becomes conspicuous insofar as Dasein concerns itself with the right way to get the job done. Thus rules (in the sense that Winch is attempting to use the word "rule") may be said to be 'understood' and

applied in all cases of meaningful human behavior (i.e., behavior that can be evaluated by the agent and by others. If we follow Winch in his use of "rule", we need not restrict the locution "following (or applying) a rule" only to those cases where the agent is consciously following a rule.

Nor need such rules in accordance with which an agent is acting have already been explicitly laid down in an established society of which the agent is a member. For someone who is acting in accordance with some socially established rule there are definite individuals who could be encountered as the Others with whom he shares the world-- namely, those other members of society who fall within the scope of the rule. In Alberta one buys a fishing license annually before going fishing, for which one pays three dollars if one is a resident of Alberta. In accordance with the rule I pay my three dollars each year before going fishing. I include myself among the Others to whom the rule applies, and those Others are in this case other Alberta fishermen, whom I expect to also pay the fee. However, although there are in fact definite individuals that might in this case be cast in the rule of the Others among whom I include myself, the provincial rule qua rule (and not as a command directed at a specific individual or group of individuals) retains its indefinite dimension. No one is named. Anyone fitting the description or who comes to fit the description must include himself among those to whom the rule applies. Following such socially established rules presupposes on the part of the agent a prior understanding of the involvement of what he is doing with what the Others among whom he includes himself do. He must be familiar with a public world of involvement in which what he does is what one does. Such an understanding on the part of the agent is an understanding of the world in which he encounters entities like his fishing gear, other fishermen and lists of provincial fishing regulations. Such understanding as an existentials of

Dasein is characteristic of human doings in any case whether a particular Dasein in fact lives in a well established society and conforms to its rules or not.

Winch himself at times distorts the point he is making (or ought to be making depending on an exact interpretation of his work) when following Wittgenstein in claiming that rule-governed behavior and therefore meaningful human behavior is essentially social. His claim is based on the arguments that:

1. Rule-governed behavior must in principle be able to be grasped and copied by others; that is, it must be conceivable that another could learn to do the same thing and "be brought to the pitch of going on the same way as a matter of course."<sup>35</sup>

2. It must be possible to make a mistake (to break the rule, so to speak) in such behavior. Such behavior must be susceptible to evaluation using the rule as a standard. But "(e)stablishing a standard is not an activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation from other individuals. For it is contact with other individuals which alone makes possible the external check on one's actions which is inseparable from an established standard."<sup>36</sup>

The first sort of argument we have already advanced above in our explication of Heidegger's notion of "das Man". The second, however, is misleading. It might be interpreted as a quasi-empirical speculative claim to the effect that an isolated Robinson Crusoe figure could not establish new practices pertaining to his survival and therefore could not establish new standards by which to evaluate his performance in these activities since there are no others actually present to provide an external check on his performance. The rebuttal to the argument so interpreted seems obvious since we can easily conceive of the solitary Robinson Crusoe innovating



and establishing new techniques and practices in food gathering, etc. and consequently new standards by which to evaluate his endeavors. Winch attempts to clarify Wittgenstein and to guard against distortion by interpreting Wittgenstein as wanting to conclude that:

it makes no sense to suppose anyone capable of establishing a purely personal standard of behavior if he had never had any experience of society.<sup>37</sup>

But even this qualification is bound to give rise to all sorts of speculation concerning the possibility of raising infants in isolation without any contact with other humans as a way of rebutting Winch's argument.

Heidegger's development of the concept of 'das Man' is less subject to misinterpretation on this issue than Winch. Das Man is an existentials of Dasein. As we have seen, Dasein need not encounter other individual Daseins in order for the existentials of das Man to be operative since the indefinite Others it encounters and among whom it counts itself are a feature of its world. They are a way in which any entity ready-to-hand is already involved in what Dasein is doing (or is not doing) just as any entity ready-to-hand is already involved in what Dasein is doing for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. Das Man-- the indefinite Others-- is not a class of actual individuals inhabiting the same geographical area as Dasein. It is a dimension of Dasein's world interwoven with Dasein's evaluations of its doings and its situation and with being able to teach others to do what it is doing. Even if a solitary Robinson Crusoe set ashore on the island as a babe had survived and matured through some miraculous turn of events so that for all practical purposes he had no actual experience of society, we would still be obliged to understand his behavior in terms of das Man insofar as he is able to and has taught himself new skills for survival-- insofar as he is able to create, as it were, his own

tradition of custom and habit, which could conceivably be copied and learned by other individuals if there were any on the island. On the other hand, even in the most well established and tradition bound society an occasional individual might be found who marches to the beat of his own drum-- who evaluates his behavior in a way different from the way everyone else evaluates this unusual individual's behavior. In effect, such an individual establishes his own personal standards and rules of behavior, but insofar as his behavior does reflect new rules and standards, it could conceivably be learned and copied by others, thereby establishing a new tradition or a modification of the old one. Meanwhile such abnormal individuals have a difficult time with others just because their standards are purely personal-- i.e., anti-social or a-social-- but at the same time potentially social.

Perhaps Winch wanders from the essential point to be made on this issue in his effort to defend his and Wittgenstein's notion of 'rule-governed behavior' because in the end he is seduced by his own terminology-- namely, the word "rule". We have already noted that Heidegger has not used the notions of a 'rule' and of 'applying or following a rule' in his explication of what is essentially (or ontologically) involved in the existentials of das Man and Dasein's inauthenticity. Perhaps he coined his esoteric vocabulary of "Uneigentlichkeit" and "das Man" in order to make much the same point as Winch attempts to make with his notion "rule-governed behavior" because he realized that what is involved in the application of a rule according to our ordinary understanding of the concept of 'rule' is too restrictive to speak of all meaningful human behavior in terms of following or applying a rule. Ordinarily we should want to say that there are some cases of human behavior where rules are not being followed or

applied, where they are just not involved.

As we suggested earlier, ordinarily we would want to say that applying or following a rule involves a formulation of the rule prior to the instance of behavior to be characterized as involving the application or the following of a rule.<sup>39</sup> This is not to say that the particular agent to whose behavior a rule is applicable has actually already formulated or is even able to formulate the applicable rule. For example, sometimes we may be accused of breaking obscure rules of the road or obscure rules of play in some game in which we are participating where we are ignorant of the rule being violated. Ignorance is often no excuse in a court of law where it is determined that we ought to have known the law or rule to be followed. But here it is our accuser who is applying the rule to our behavior in evaluating our behavior as incorrect. And his application suggests that the rule applied had been in force through its formulation as a rule prior to the rule breaking instance of behavior. In other cases we may note that someone's (A's) behavior is in accord with some rule that we can formulate and then may find that A cannot formulate the rule with which he acted in accord and that he even denies knowledge of any such rule and most certainly denies paying attention to any rule. Instead he was following the example of B's behavior in similar circumstances. A was following an example, not a rule. If B were following a rule in his behavior, we might want to say that A also was following a rule in doing what he did insofar as he was following B's example. But in any case the rule or law in these cases has indeed already been formulated by definite others in the community to which the agent to whose behavior the rule is applied belongs. The possibility of rules seems to be tied to that of legislation-- to the formulation and establishment of a rule in a concrete

social context of definite others in the role of the Others among whom the agent includes himself and is included and some of whom at least are able to cite the rule that is applicable in certain cases and are able to tell the agent whose behavior is in question what he should do or should have done according to the rule. The notion of 'a rule' seems to be intertwined with that of social sanctions for rule violation, and this means a social setting with actual others. It means actual social experience in an established society.<sup>40</sup>

This being so, it is understandable that Winch missed the boat in his exposition of what it means to say that man is essentially social by implying that the possibility of rules and standards, with which man's social Being is interwoven, according to Winch, rests upon or is dependent upon the existence of an established society. But it also means that we must be careful about equating Winch's notion of 'rule-governed behavior' with Heidegger's existentials of das Man.<sup>41</sup> In arguing that the notion of 'rules' is central to an analysis of meaningful human behavior Winch makes claims about what it means to follow a rule that accord with and help illuminate what Heidegger wants to claim about das Man. If it helps in grasping Heidegger's forbidding jargon, one may think of das Man in terms of 'rules', remembering, however, that this is Winch's sense of 'rule'-- a special 'extended' sense of the word compared to what we normally understand by it. Winch himself implicitly admits to this when he is dealing with his claim that even the anarchist follows rules.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, if we do think of das Man in terms of Winch's 'rules', we must remember that we are doing violence to our ordinary understanding of the word because we shall want to claim that in all instances of Dasein it is following such 'rules' even where a social context of actual others has not actually been established. We

shall have to be careful that our violence to Reality does not turn on us in the end by confusing the issues as it does with Winch. For this reason, perhaps it is best not to take the equation of das Man with Winch's 'rules' too seriously.

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II, SECTION 2

1. These sorts of claims are made, explicated and argued for throughout Chapter IV of Division One of Sein und Zeit. Heidegger's position in this chapter is meant to grow out of his account of the world in Chapter III. Throughout Chapter IV we find such claims as: "In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated 'I' without Others is just as far from being proximally given... '[T]he Others' already are there with us in Being-the-world." (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 116) "Since the worldhood of that world in which every Dasein is already, is thus constituted [i.e., in terms of significance, of which the disclosure of Others is an aspect, and in terms of the 'for-the-sake-of-which'], it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we are circumspectively concerned, and it does so in such a way that together with it we encounter the Dasein-with of Others. The structure of the world's worldhood is such that Others... show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world." (Ibid., p. 123) "According to the analysis which we have now completed, Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others. This must be understood as an existential statement as to its [Dasein's] essence." (Ibid., p. 123)
2. Ibid., pp. 70 ff.
3. We might look at Dasein's tendency to personally possess items within-the-world in terms of the spatial character of entities ready-to-hand within-the-world and their involvements and of the spatial character of Being-in-the-world as outlined in Heidegger's account. (Ibid., pp. 102-109) Dasein might be said to personally possess things insofar as it brings them 'close'. "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency to closeness." (Ibid., p. 105) "Circumspective Concern decides as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells alongside beforehand is what is closest and this is what regulates our deserverences." (Ibid., p. 107) "[D]e-severing [das Ent-fernen] is a circumspective bringing-close-- bringing something closeby, in the sense of procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand." (Ibid., p. 105) It is an existentiale. Dasein possesses items within-the-world in bringing them close to it by giving them a 'place' within-the-world in terms of other entities ready-to-hand-- by letting them "belong somewhere". (Ibid., pp. 102-103) It is said to "make room" for entities within-the-world. (Ibid., p. 111) "To free totality of involvements equi-primordially, to let something be involved at a region, and to do so by de-severing and giving directionality; this amounts to freeing the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand." (Ibid.) We might say that Dasein's possessing entities or letting them belong to it involves giving them a 'place' and letting them belong somewhere

with other entities within-the-world.

4. Ibid., p. 68
5. According to the Liddell and Scott Greek-English Lexicon, "pragma", the singular form, may be taken to mean "that which has been done", "a deed", "a thing", "matter", "an affair". In the plural form, "pragmata", it is used to talk about circumstances or affairs, sometimes in the sense of one's private affairs as well as in the sense of affairs of state. Zeug pertains to Dasein's private or personal affairs. It is what Dasein busies itself with-- what Dasein is involved with. In equating "Zeug" with "pragmata" Heidegger notes that in its meaning as things pragmata is "that which one has to do with in one's concerned dealings." (Ibid., p. 68) It is insofar as Zeug is a part of Dasein's personal or private affairs or matters that we can say that Zeug comes to be possessed by or comes to belong to Dasein.
6. Ibid., p. 118.
7. Both Heidegger and his translators use an initial capital letter here presumably because "the Others" denotes an ontological structure of Dasein-- not definite other people.
8. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 118.
9. Although specific individuals or groups can assume the role of Others among whom a particular Dasein counts itself. For example, in paying my quarter when getting on the bus, I count myself among the law-abiding, bus-using Edmontonians, and in writing exams I count myself among students. "Any Other can represent these indefinite Others." (Ibid., p. 126)
10. Ibid., p. 128. Elsewhere he says, "The more inconspicuous this Being [Being-with-Others] is to everyday Dasein itself, all the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out." (Ibid., p. 126)
11. Ibid. Macquarrie and Robinson translate "das Man" as "the they". This is unsatisfactory in that such a translation loses the point of Heidegger's description of the Others as those among whom Dasein includes itself. We get some of the "flavor" of the way Heidegger wants to use the German word "man" in his term "das Man" in the following sorts of admonitions: "Around here one doesn't speak with one's mouth full of food" and "Around here we chew our food with our mouths closed" and "In this class you speak only when spoken to by the teacher." But "you" and "we" do not seem to have enough of the indefinite 'neuter' connotations of the German "man" that Heidegger trades upon in "das Man". "One" as a translation for "man" is probably best, but "the One" as a translation for "das Man" is probably too confusing, especially in philosophical contexts. Therefore, we shall render "das Man" as "das Man".
12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 129.
14. Ibid., p. 127
15. Ibid., pp. 121 ff.
16. Ibid., p. 120.
17. Ibid., p. 123.
18. Ibid., p. 120.
19. Heidegger himself does not actually say that the indefinite Others are or that das Man is a feature of the world. He says: "Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world." (Ibid., p. 125) And presumably this Being-with refers to at least Dasein's Being-with-Others. He also says: "As Being-with Dasein is essentially for the sake of Others." (Ibid., p. 123) The Others must therefore be an aspect of the for-the-sake-of-which involvement, which is a part of the structure of Dasein's world.
20. Heidegger repeatedly stresses that Dasein's world is essentially a public one. "Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world." (Ibid., p. 71) The environment on which we focus our concern is already (in all cases) a public one. (Ibid., p. 126) "Distantiality, averageness and leveling down, as ways of Being for das Man, constitute what we know as 'publicness' [die Offentlichkeit]. Publicness proximally controls [regelt] every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right [und behält in allem recht]." (Ibid., p. 127)
21. Ibid., p. 129.
22. "Das Man, which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein, is the 'nobody' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another." (Ibid., p. 128. The emphasis on "every" is mine.)
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 129.
25. We can at least say that, according to Heidegger, rules constitute one aspect of das Man or one way in which the existiale takes concrete form. Heidegger suggest that behavioral conformity to rules and norms is involved in das Man (Ibid., p. 288), and that Dasein's lostness in das Man means that "the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concerned and solicitous Being-in-the-world" have already been decided upon. (Ibid., p. 268) We might construe these brief and few statements by Heidegger about rules to imply a position on his part from where he would reply to Winch that Dasein's inauthenticity is not merely a matter of its following or failing to



- follow rules. That is to say, not all instances of Dasein can be said to involve following rules although in all instances, Dasein can be said to have already surrendered to the dictatorship of das Man and to have a dimension of inauthenticity.
26. Heidegger states that by "the Others of Dasein's public world" he means those among whom one (or Dasein) is too and that by "too" is meant a sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned Being-in-the-world. (Ibid., p. 118)
  27. Winch, op. cit., p. 26.
  28. Ibid., pp. 27-28. Winch here is following Wittgenstein, op. cit., section 215.
  29. Winch tries to distinguish a precept from a rule where the former is an explicitly formulated rule or set of directions such as one finds in a recipe. (Ibid., pp. 51 ff.) Of course it is only in some behavior that we set about following precepts. However, Winch argues, "in the sense in which I am speaking of rules" the notion of a rule is presupposed wherever behavior has a point to it and can be seen in terms of a way of life. (Ibid., p. 52) He then argues against Oakeshott's distinction between rule-governed activity and customary or habitual activity where the former, Oakeshott claims, involves the conscious application of an already formulated rule. (Ibid., pp. 57 ff.)
  30. Ibid., p. 32 and p. 58.
  31. Winch tries as much as possible to get away from the notion of rule formulation being involved in following or applying a rule. He says that in the case of rule-governed behavior, the rule being followed must be discoverable by others but that this does not necessarily involve the formulation of the rule; rather it involves the ability to carry on in the same way the sort of behavior for which the rule was discovered. (Ibid., pp. 30-31 and p. 59) He also speaks of "the application, however unselfconscious, of a rule." (Ibid., p. 62) And he further says, "The test of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can formulate it." (Ibid., p. 58).
  32. Ibid., pp. 58-59 and pp. 32-33.
  33. See Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 73-76. Here he suggests that we discover the unusability or obstinacy of Zeug that is 'out of order' in some mishap through circumspective concern in the dealings in which we use it, not merely by observing or looking at the Zeug in question and ascertaining certain of its properties-- a mode of behavior that he elsewhere characterizes as "theoretical" behavior.
  34. Heidegger himself does not point out that evaluation of the situation in the case of a mishap involves evaluation of the agent's behavior in terms of a possible mistake. However, mishaps and mistakes go together because mishaps are to be seen in terms of possible corrective

or preventative control over the situation-- what is to be done in similar future situations, what should have been done in the last one to get the job done. Thus, when the cobbler's hammer broke, its involvements became conspicuous, and the cobbler circumvented the difficulty by finding a substitute. But part of the involvement structure that becomes conspicuous with the hammer broken is how one uses a hammer, since the carpenter himself may have been responsible for the hammer breaking by using it incorrectly-- by using it carelessly or by pounding too hard with it. The cobbler's evaluation on this point may be reflected in how he sets to work with the substitute hammer. Does he alter his technique or become more careful and restrained in his hammering and so forth? The question that must be asked in the evaluation of the situation where something is 'out of order' is how much of a mere mishap it is and how much error on the part of Dasein is involved.

35. Winch, op. cit., p. 31. Here Winch is following Wittgenstein, op. cit., sections 237-238.
36. Winch, op. cit., p. 32. Here Winch is following Wittgenstein, op. cit., section 265.
37. Winch, op. cit., p. 33.
38. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
39. See pp. ff. above.
40. This indeed seems to be Winch's own point (Winch, op. cit., p. 32) in emphasizing the possibility of an external check by actual definite others in cases of rule-governed behavior.
41. Ibid., p. 52. See footnote 29 above.

## CHAPTER II

### SECTION 3

Heidegger, however, does not leave his claim concerning what is essential to meaningful human behavior merely with its being involved with the "dictatorship of 'das Man'" as Winch leaves his claim about meaningful human behavior at the notion of its being 'rule-governed'. Winch claims that the notion of a 'rule' is central to an analysis of such behavior. Presumably this means that a necessary condition of a phenomenon's being an instance of meaningful human behavior is that the notion of its being 'rule-governed' is applicable in talking about it. Winch does not specify what other notions are central to such an analysis or even if there are any other such central notions. Heidegger does try to specify other notions or "structures" or "existentials" as being central to an analysis of Dasein.

To begin with he has already laid down the concept of 'possibility' as central. A possibility of Dasein's Being as that for the sake of which entities within-the-world are encountered as already involved defines the structure of Dasein's world of involvement. Heidegger's analysis of such a possibility-- an existentiell possibility-- and the world of involvement that it structures may be seen as an analysis of the "point", the "sense" or the "meaning" of meaningful human behavior that Winch occasionally refers to. Heidegger has filled out this central concept of 'possibility' by considering the social dimension of the involvements of entities encountered within-the-world-- .e., their being involved for Dasein in the same way that they are involved for the Others with whom Dasein shares its world and among whom it includes itself. Thus, linked to the existentials

of 'possibility' we found the existentials of 'das Man'. The possibility of Dasein's Being for the sake of which entities within-the-world are ultimately involved is also a possibility of the Being of indefinite Others. Dasein's possibilities are public; it 'exists' for the sake of Others among whom it includes itself. Heidegger calls this feature of Dasein's existence its "inauthenticity", and with "inauthenticity" we are given a second concept central to the analysis of meaningful human behavior. All of Dasein's existentiell possibilities (with the exception of one that we shall soon consider) are essentially inauthentic. As Winch might say, they are essentially 'rule-governed' or more appropriately 'rule-defined'. Yet this second central concept leads on, according to Heidegger, to yet a third and for our purposes final central concept in the analysis of Dasein. Insofar as Dasein is essentially inauthentic (i.e., insofar as an instance of meaningful human behavior can be characterized in terms of what one does), it is also said to be essentially authentic and the existentiell possibility defining that instance of Dasein or particular Dasein is accordingly said to be authentic.

"Authenticity" is perhaps the most problematic of Heidegger's concepts to explicate. The first part of Sein und Zeit, "The Fundamental Preparatory Analysis of Dasein"-- the part that we have so far been concerned with-- centers its attention on Dasein's inauthentic mode of existence.<sup>1</sup> This part accordingly deals with Dasein's absorption among the entities it encounters within-the-world; Heidegger's examples and the examples we have put forward by way of explication have been ones of people absorbed in what they are doing in an everyday manner. It is only in the second part of the work, "Dasein and Temporality", that he undertakes a characterization of Dasein's authentic mode of existence. Yet we are not

think that new examples of human behavior of a different sort are now in order to make clear Heidegger's concept of Dasein's authenticity. To speak of "Dasein's authentic mode of existence" is not to speak of certain ways of behaving as opposed to certain others in which Dasein is inauthentically existing.<sup>2</sup> Of the particular existentiell possibilities in terms of which we explain some Dasein's behavior at various times it is not the case that some possibilities will be able to be labeled "authentic" as opposed to others which are "inauthentic." "Inauthentic" and "authentic" are not classes into one and only one of which we must be able to sort a particular Dasein's existentiell possibility. Any particular existentiell possibility is to be seen in terms of both its inauthenticity and authenticity. Conceptually it can only be considered authentic insofar as it is inauthentic and vice versa.

[A]uthentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.<sup>3</sup>

We may assume at the start then that Dasein's authentic and inauthentic modes of existence are for Heidegger inextricably interwoven. We should be able eventually to return to the sorts of examples we have already used in order to explicate this new concept. And we may assume that the structure of Dasein's world as we have outlined it in terms of a structure of involvements defined by an ultimate involvement for the sake of some existentiell possibility is the same for its authentic as it is for its inauthentic mode of existence.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the first part of Sein und Zeit centered on Dasein's inauthentic (or 'rule-governed') mode of existence contains many hints about what it means for Dasein to authentically be in the world and about the way the two modes of existence are interwoven.

We might best begin our explication of the concept of Dasein's "authenticity" by examining the connection between it and "inauthenticity" as laid out by Heidegger at a superficial and quite misunderstandable level. The two of them and the connection between them are said to be grounded in "Jemeinigkeit", a characteristic of Dasein mentioned at the outset of our explication of Heidegger. Heidegger suggests that in each case Dasein is 'mine'. In each case Dasein's Being, its existence, is said to be a matter of concern or of indifference to it, and such an entity is to be contrasted with such things as a table, for example, for which its manner of existence of Being is neither a matter of concern nor of indifference. Talk of tables in these terms is entirely inappropriate. The question of their concern or indifference with what they are does not arise whereas it is entirely appropriate to speak of a man being concerned with or indifferent to what he is-- what he is doing.<sup>5</sup>

The point being made with respect to this alleged characteristic of 'mineness' turns out to be a rather complicated one but one on which we can begin to get a grasp by recalling the points made earlier about Dasein's understanding of the world and consequent understanding of itself. "Concern" [das Besorgen] is yet another of Dasein's existentials, and as such it is one of the terms in which Dasein's possible ways of Being-in-the-world must be seen.<sup>6</sup> The suggestion that Dasein is essentially a concerned Being must rest primarily upon the claim that entities encountered within-the-world of everyday doings are encountered as being ready-to-hand-- as being involved (or not involved) in one way or another.<sup>7</sup> This worldly character of involvement implies that Dasein is concerned with its world; the concept of Dasein's understanding of the world is thereby interwoven with that of its concern with the world. This is simply

to say that an instance of Dasein is to be seen in terms of its concern with (or indifference to) entities within-the-world which it uses or with which it does things (or which it ignores, or cannot make do with, etc.). And just as Dasein has already understood itself in understanding the world and the possibility of its Being that defines the world, it is also concerned with itself in being concerned with the world and therefore also with its existentiell possibility. So far all is clear-- at least within our Heideggerian scheme anyway. Dasein is an entity which is to be distinguished from other entities in that it concernfully encounters other entities and is concernful about itself. But why should Heidegger coin the word "Jemeinigkeit" or "mineness" to denote this characteristic? To say that Dasein is in each case 'mine' is to suggest connotations of personal possession and ownership-- of me owning or possessing myself.

This suggestion, however, is exactly the move Heidegger seems to want to make. In effect he wants to claim that yet a third concept is interwoven with those of Dasein's understanding the world and concern with the world. That third one is that of personal possession. Dasein is the sort of entity that can possess or own other entities or the sort of entity to which other entities may belong. It usually makes sense to say that other sorts of entities belong with each other-- e.g., the table belongs with the chairs-- but not to each other (the table does not belong to the chairs) while the table and the chairs may certainly belong to a Dasein.<sup>8</sup> The point Heidegger is attempting to make here should not be misconstrued by a narrow interpretation of "possession" or "belonging to" as implying our institution of private property. The sense of "personal possession" or "belonging to" that Heidegger seems to be working with here is similar to that operative in a host requesting the dinner guest at the table:

"Pass your plate for another helping." The plate legally belongs to the host of course. It is the host's property; yet the host refers to it as the guest's plate because the guest happens to be eating off of it at the time. It is the plate that the guest is using at the time and is therefore most involved for the sake of the guest. Heidegger is, I think, suggesting that the concept of 'personal possession' is interwoven with the concept of 'use'. Dasein possesses in a personal sense whatever it lets be involved in what it is doing and possesses it to the extent that it lets it be involved.<sup>9</sup> It is in this sense that Heidegger suggests that Dasein is the sort of entity that has the possibility of owning or possessing things, not in the sense where the possibility of possession rests merely on the Western institution of private property.

The concept of Dasein as a possessing entity becomes extremely important for understanding how Heidegger sees Dasein's modes of authentic and inauthentic existence grounded in "Jemeinigkeit". Dasein's ability to possess things and its possession of itself set up further possibilities. In particular, only "insofar as it is essentially something which can be authentic-- that is, something of its own-- can it have lost itself and not yet won itself."<sup>10</sup> Only because Dasein is essentially concerned with itself (i.e., involved for itself), can it be lost or missing to itself just as the hammer can be lost or missing for him who has let it be involved in something he is doing. And because Dasein can be lost to itself, it can find or reclaim itself itself as its own. The connection between authenticity and inauthenticity is to be seen in terms of possession and loss and recovery.

The above claim that "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" are interwoven with the concept of Dasein as a possessive entity should prompt us



to reassess the translation of Heidegger's terms "Eigentlichkeit" and "Uneigentlichkeit" as "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" respectively. Although 'correct' this translation may blur the point Heidegger is trying to make in distinguishing between these two modes of Dasein's existence. His further talk of "eigenstes Sein-können" and "die eigenste Möglichkeit-des Daseins" which have to do with Dasein's "eigentliche Existenz" (authentic existence), must reenforce the suggestion I am about to make that Heidegger sees his own term "Eigentlichkeit" primarily in terms of its root component "eigen". "Eigen" is to be taken primarily in the sense of "own" so that Dasein's "eigentliche Existenz" is Dasein's "own existence" peculiar to it and possessed by it. In translating "eigentlich" as "authentic" we might keep in mind the latter's Greek roots<sup>12</sup> rather than its English synonyms "real" and "genuine".

In any case, the authentic-inauthentic distinction must be seen in terms of "possession". Just how we are to see it need not be fixed yet, but we might mention some possibilities here to be kept in mind until later. Dasein's inauthentic existence can be thought of as Dasein's "dis-owned" existence, for that which is disowned must one have been owned and could conceivably be reclaimed. Presumably the possibility of reclaiming its disowned self is involved with Dasein's authentic existence on this account. Another alternative is that Dasein's existence is something over which it exercises an option of taking up ownership. In inauthenticity it does not go about exercising this option in a proper way and so does not actually come to exercise proper possession or ownership of its existence (i.e., of itself) even though the option that it exercises creates the possibility that it could do so.<sup>13</sup> Yet another alternative is thinking of Dasein's inauthentic existence as that existence of which

it has been dispossessed. But if we think of it in these terms we must interpret Heidegger as claiming that Dasein is disposed of its own existence by none other than itself.<sup>14</sup> Or we might think of Dasein's<sup>a</sup> inauthentic existence as its 'unowned' existence in the sense that its ownership has been undone because it has lost that which it once owned (i.e., itself). To have lost something is not, however, to have renounced the claim to ownership of it or to possession of it as one's own even though one does not now in fact possess it by having it on hand or at hand. The lost item could be found and reclaimed. If we think of this situation of ownership undone through loss of the owned item in terms of Heidegger's sense of personal possession outlined above, we note that loss of the item implies that it is missed because it has an involvement in some doings or some concern. It is a significant item. The possibility of its being reclaimed or repossessed if found rests on its fitting in where it is missing-- of fulfilling the assignments or involvements in the concern which misses it. It could be reintroduced at that point in the concern where it left off before being lost. We shall return to the problem of just how we are to interpret the authenticity-inauthenticity distinction in terms of possession. But we might point out here and emphasize the fact that Heidegger claims that Dasein is in every case inauthentic.<sup>15</sup> It has in every case already lost itself or dispossessed itself or disowned itself, and this implies that Dasein in all cases has already had possession of itself, that it can find itself, repossess itself or reclaim itself, and that such repossession is a significant possibility.

What we have begun to lay out so far is a somewhat confusing connection between authentic and inauthentic existence. Cases of losing or disowning and then finding or reclaiming things-- cases that might be used

in establishing analogies to explain what is involved in the distinction and connection between the inauthentic and authentic modes of Dasein's existence-- are themselves easy enough to understand. What we have to ask is what Dasein's existence could possibly be such that it would have anything to do with possession-- such that it can be disowned and reclaimed or lost and regained. Furthermore, there is the question of what Dasein's inauthentic mode of existence as its (in some sense) 'unowned' existence has to do with inauthenticity as that feature of Dasein's existence that allows us to characterize an instance of Dasein (i.e., a particular case of human doings) in terms of what one does or with inauthenticity as the (as Winch would have it) 'rule-governed' aspect of meaningful human behavior discussed in the previous chapter.

We can begin an examination of what is involved in the notion of Dasein as the sort of entity which, insofar as it exists, possesses itself by examining what it means for Dasein's existentiell possibility to be its own. For we have already seen how, on Heidegger's account, Dasein's understanding of (or competence or ability with) itself is interwoven in an apparently circular fashion with its understanding of the world and of some possibility of its Being-in-the-world for the sake of which entities within-the-world are ultimately involved in a way that defines the structure of the totality of other involvements among these entities. Dasein's possession or ownership of itself, the world and the possibility of its Being that defines the world's structure ought to be similarly interwoven. So our immediate attention now shifts to the question of what it means to say that Dasein's existentiell possibility is its own, and what it would be for Dasein to lose possession of that possibility such that it were no longer its own. Heidegger, it seems, intends his analysis of what he

calls Dasein's "ownmost" [eigenste] possibility, death, to answer the first part of the question and to go some way towards suggesting the answer for the second part. Death as Dasein's ownmost possibility makes possible the authentic aspect of any other of Dasein's existentiell possibilities.

Death, Heidegger claims, is in every case Dasein's ultimate possibility.<sup>16</sup> It is a possibility Dasein has to take over in every instance of Dasein. "Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost being-able-to-be."<sup>17</sup> The point being made here is an odd one, especially when we place it in the Heideggerian schema that we have so far worked out. According to Heidegger, any particular Dasein is to be understood in terms of a definite existentiell possibility (a possibility of that Dasein's Being) which defines the structure of the world of that Dasein and the way it, as a Being-in-the-world, is in the world-- i.e., the terms in which it understands (in the sense of "understand" that Heidegger has worked out as an existentiale) itself and its world. Of course, for a given instance of human behavior we may on one occasion cite one definite existentiell possibility; on another occasion we might cite an apparently different (although not contrasting with the first) one as the possibility defining this Dasein's world, all depending on the degree of explanation and depth of comprehension of this instance of behavior required on the particular occasion on which explanation or description is called for. Thus cobbler's doings may be understood in terms of the possibility of his being well off financially; yet this possibility might be seen as merely a 'towards-which' involved with the further possibility of his being a good provider for his family and this in turn in terms of the further possibility of his being a good child raiser and

father.<sup>18</sup> For the purposes of a particular explanation or description one of these (or others) might serve to elucidate what the cobbler is doing in the particular instance or instances in which we are interested, the others serving as 'towards-which's in the web of involvements or perhaps going unmentioned at all. Now what Heidegger seems to be claiming is that in any case of Dasein, no matter what the particular instance and no matter which other definite possibilities can and cannot be cited by way of elucidating this instance of Dasein, the possibility of its being dead can be cited as a definite existentiell possibility defining its world<sup>19</sup> and as the possibility which cannot be further involved as a 'towards-which' for the sake of further definite existentiell possibilities of Dasein's. Being dead is in every case Dasein's ultimate possibility; in every case Dasein understands itself and its world in terms of the possibility of its being dead.

Let us draw out some of the implications of Heidegger's claim. First, being dead becomes a unique sort of existentiell possibility, if we accept Heidegger's account of it, in that its definition of a particular Dasein's world becomes an a priori matter. No matter what a particular person is doing, no matter how else we characterize a particular instance of meaningful human behavior, we are to characterize it ultimately in terms of the possibility of the particular Dasein's being dead. This of course is in contrast to the other definite existentiell possibilities in terms of which we may elucidate a particular instance of Dasein. Characterizing an instance of Dasein in terms of one of these would be an empirical matter-- that is, our characterization must be in principle falsifiable. There must be further conceivable evidence about that instance of human behavior in the face of which we would give up our initial

characterization or explanation as incorrect or at least in the face of which we would suspect it and seriously entertain the possibility of giving it up. For example, I might characterize and explain what our cobbler is doing at his workbench in terms of the possibility of his Being financially well off, making money, earning a living, etc. Of course, I would begin to suspect that description of what the cobbler was doing if I found out later that he did not charge for his shoe repair services or that he subsequently gave away the money he received for his work. I could even suspect my characterization of his activity in terms of his being a shoe repairman if, when I returned for my shoes that were to be mended, I found that many long nails had been systematically driven through the soles, points up, rendering the shoes impossible for wear. The anthropologist (among many others) faces these sorts of problems in attempting to describe and explain the (to him) strange behavior in unfamiliar societies. The problem of when (i.e., in the face of what conceivable further experiences) an initial characterization of what is being done is falsified, or at least becomes strongly suspect, always arises. When is the possibility defining someone's behavior to be described as winning a game rather than as participating in a religious ritual? Can the two possibilities be regarded as incompatible in this society? To characterize and explain an instance of an individual's behavior in terms of a definite existentiell possibility involves an understanding of the social dimension of that person's behavior, and such an understanding is an understanding of the behavior of the others who are involved in the role of the Others with whom the individual shares the world. The problem of disconfirming conditions for a tentative description for an instance of human behavior may be extremely complex, but the issue is at bottom an empirical one. Sooner or later we have to look to

what X is doing in order to answer and evaluate answers to the question, "What is X doing?" For one answer, however, it seems we need not look to what X is doing in order to legitimately be able to give it.

This point about the a priori nature of characterizing Dasein's ultimate possibility in every case as one of death leads us to a further point: namely, to describe a particular instance of Dasein in terms of the possibility of its being dead does not really say anything informative about that instance of Dasein, whereas citing other existentiell possibilities by way of description and explanation is potentially informative.<sup>20</sup> If we express puzzlement at the seemingly out of place lack of real effort and the systematic bungling on the part of some football player during a football game by asking, "What's he up to?", and are answered, "He's out to throw the game", the answer is highly informative. For that sort of behavior is in marked contrast with an endeavor guided by the possibility of winning the game or even by the possibility of merely getting through the ordeal. The answer tells us the ways in which the other participants, the football, the field and the plays are likely to be involved for this player who is out to throw the game, and it gives us a frame of reference for evaluating his behavior as successful or unsuccessful, etc. On the other hand, if the answer, "He is dying," can be given as an answer to the question in any case no matter what the football player is doing, no matter what he might do; then in no particular case would the answer prove informative about what he is doing in that case.

However, in any case, we might ask how we are to take the claim, "He is dying." There are, I suppose, a number of ways to take the claim, but if it is taken as a statement about a person's physical, medical condition, as I think it usually is,<sup>21</sup> then it is not a direct answer to the

question of what that person is doing, although in context it might suggest such an answer like, "He is lying in bed waiting to die because his physical condition is such that he is unable to do anything else." The claim might even suggest an answer in the football contest outlined above. It might suggest that the football player is playing to win but that his physical condition is such that many more things take on an involvement as obstacles for him than for other players. The answer gives us some idea of the involvement structure of this player's world and why his apparent bunglings are to be considered in terms of being mishaps for him in the course of what he is out to do rather than mistakes on his part. But the claim that someone is dying when taken as referring to someone's medical condition can only be correctly put forward in a limited number of instances of Dasein. It is an informative answer.

But our outline of Heidegger's concept of an existentiell possibility and his claim about Dasein's-being dead as Dasein's ultimate possibility in every case suggests that he would claim that the answer "He is dying" could sensibly be given in any case where the question, "What is he doing?", arises.<sup>22</sup> Certainly the answer is not meant to describe a merely medical or biological condition. But what is it meant to suggest? There is the old saw that one begins to die as soon as one is born, but if we take this to refer to something everyone does, it is a rather odd activity. Can one make a mistake in dying, or can one fail to die in the same way that one can fail to win a race? Can we say of a person that he is trying hard to die but we are afraid he is going to slip up and not die after all? What is one doing when dying? What results? How do we and the one who is out to die evaluate the results of his endeavor? These questions are odd and yet not odd. Looking at them on their odd side,



they may make us suspicious that Heidegger is dabbling in nonsense with his claims about being dead as an existentiell possibility. We might be willing to grant that any particular Dasein's death is an empirical and logical possibility or even a certainty. But now that he has set up his schema of existentiell possibilities ordering a world of involvement-- a somewhat teleological schema in appearance-- we might urge him to give up this talk of Dasein's death as a definite existentiell possibility of Dasein's. We might urge that death or dying is something that happens to Dasein rather than something it does.

Heidegger would be the first to admit that Dasein's being dead is rather odd existentiell possibility, and he would acknowledge the a priori nature of the claim that every Dasein has its death as an existentiell possibility. In fact he would claim that Dasein's having its death as an existentiell possibility is constitutive of its Being as Dasein-- i.e., if Dasein did not have its death as an existentiell possibility, it would not be Dasein. It would not be a Being-in-the-world because this allegedly ultimate possibility is allegedly constitutive of Dasein's world qua world. Thus, it sounds odd to mention this possibility by way of elucidating a particular case of Dasein because in asking the questions-- "What is P up to? What is P doing?"-- such that one is already presupposing that P is the sort of entity that has the ontological structure of Dasein, one has already presupposed that its being dead is its ultimate existentiell possibility.

So at this stage of the game we might temporarily allow Heidegger his claim that Dasein's death is in every case an existentiell possibility of Dasein's in order to see where the claim takes us. We can easily dispose of some probable objections based on misunderstandings of the claim

at this point by pointing out that the claim need not entail that everybody plans on his death or entertains other morbid thoughts.<sup>23</sup> It has already been shown that Dasein's competence with or understanding of its existentiell possibilities is not necessarily or usually a theoretic or thematic one where Dasein plans out its activities in terms of realizing some explicitly formulated goal. On the contrary, an instance of Dasein formulating a goal or planning out some activity is itself an instance of Dasein's doings guided or oriented or defined by some existentiell possibility. But if we are to try to understand Heidegger's claim to see how far it takes us, the questions do remain: "In what way is Dasein's world of involvement structured in every case such that its structure is ultimately defined by the possibility of Dasein's death? In what way is every entity encountered within-the-world involved such that it is involved ultimately for the sake of the possibility of Dasein's being dead?" These questions may be briefly answered. The possibility of Dasein's being dead as its existentiell possibility ultimately defines and structures the world of involvement as being its own. Entities within-the-world are encountered in terms of belonging to Dasein, and other definite possibilities for which the entities are encountered as involved are ultimately understood as being Dasein's own possibilities. Now to explicate this brief answer.

Supposing that Dasein's being dead is, as Heidegger claims, an existentiell possibility, it is easy to see why he calls it Dasein's ultimate existentiell possibility. Whatever other existentiell possibilities a particular Dasein might have can always conceivably be realized, and in that case further possibilities would define subsequent behavior; that is, most of Dasein's definite existentiell possibilities could conceivably serve as 'towards-which' to further possibilities. Death as an existentiell possibility is said to be the exception to the foregoing remarks.

Therefore it can be said to be Dasein's ultimate possibility in two respects.

First, it is the only existentiell possibility which must remain a possibility for Dasein. Should death as the possibility of Dasein's no-longer-being-able-to-be-there ever be realized for Dasein, it would mean Dasein's nonexistence. Being dead as a possibility means the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein.<sup>24</sup> But that which Dasein accomplishes or realizes or brings to fruition and that which happens to Dasein always happens or is accomplished, on Heidegger's account, within a world of involvement such that it is to be understood in terms of involvement with further doings on Dasein's part. And Dasein's death as the impossibility of its Being-in-the-world means the impossibility of that world of involvement (as an item of Being-in-the-world) within which or in terms of which it (Dasein's being dead) would have to be encountered in order to be encountered as a happening or an accomplishment (as a realized possibility). The actualization of the possibility of Dasein's being dead can have no significance for it because it cannot be involved for Dasein in any of its doings.<sup>25</sup> Its death must remain a possibility for it, and this claim leads to the second sense in which death is to be seen as Dasein's ultimate, "uttermost" existentiell possibility.

The possibility of Dasein's being dead may be said to serve as the upper or outer or ultimate bound of the structure of Dasein's world of involvement in any and every case. It serves as the possibility of no further involvement. There are no further existentiell possibilities of Dasein's beyond its being dead in which its dying could be involved. A person's death may be involved for the sake of the existentiell possibilities of others, and it may even be involved for the sake of possibilities that the deceased shared with others before his death-- for example, the

instances of supreme self-sacrifice for a shared political or religious cause and the cases of martyrs whose deaths others acclaim as significant and meaningful with respect to the ideal the martyr himself held. But Heidegger maintains he is not interested in these aspects of a person's death and that these aspects are irrelevant to the point he wants to make.

We are not asking about the way in which the deceased has Dasein- with or is still-a-Dasein with those who are left behind. If death as experienced in Others is what we are enjoined to take as the theme for our analysis of Dasein's end and totality, this cannot give us, either ontically or ontologically, what it presemes to give.<sup>26</sup>

Of course a person may consciously plan on taking or losing his life and on the part his death is to play in the subsequent course of events which he hopes to bring about. The existentiell possibility of being the savior of the situation through losing his life or of becoming the martyr may define the behavior on his part which results in his death, and that possibility may have reference to events, conditions, etc. obtaining chronologically after the event of his death. But Heidegger wants to maintain that the existentiell possibility of being dead remains the martyr's ultimate existentiell possibility-- that is, that the possibility of the martyr's being dead is not further involved for the martyr towards any further possibility of the martyr's Being. For example, the possibility of his being dead would not be further involved as a 'towards-which' towards the definite possibility of his being the savior of the situation obtaining after his death. On the contrary, any definite possibility in terms of which we understand the martyr's or the self-sacrificing hero's behavior (e.g., rescuing friends or furthering the cause of the proletariat) must be said (within Heidegger's account) to be ultimately involved with the existentiell possibility of his death.

How can Heidegger maintain this? By focusing on the definition of

death as Dasein's end-- as the impossibility of existence or as Dasein's Being-unable-to-be. As the end of Dasein Dasein's being dead would mean its no longer Being-in-the-world and therefore its no longer being competent with, or its no longer understanding, its world including the public dimension of the Other. Therefore, questions of its learning or teaching behavior, of its conforming or not conforming to tradition in its being dead, and of its doing anything further, and of its accordingly evaluating its present and past doings no longer arise. Heidegger must base these claims, it seems to me, on our ordinary understanding of the dead. Questions of meaningful behavior concerning the remains of the deceased no longer arise. Questions concerning present doings on the part of the deceased also do not arise.<sup>27</sup> One does not take the event of the person's death as involved in a purposeful, meaningful way with the corpse's present doings, simply because the corpse is not doing anything. Its behavior cannot be evaluated as correct or incorrect. It is after all merely a corpse. The dead are no longer there-- i.e., no longer Dasein.

Dasein's no longer being competent with a world (its world) and no longer having a world in turn means it cannot understand itself and its doings and the happenings to it within-the-world. These problems simply no longer arise. Dasein's being dead gives it nothing actual, no accomplishment, to evaluate and leaves it no world in terms of which to evaluate it or within which Dasein's death itself can be involved as an event. Whatever the martyr or hero do that lead to their deaths they can evaluate (while still alive) and understand with reference to definite possibilities of their Being-in-the-world, but the possibility of their being-dead bounds even these possibilities, no matter what they are, as the possibility of their (the martyr's and the selfsacrificing hero's) not-Being-in-the-world

and therefore as the possibility of the impossibility of these definite possibilities-- as the possibility of the impossibility of achievement and of the evaluation of achievement.

But how does the claim that death is Dasein's ultimate existentiell possibility help us to understand the claim that it is also Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility? Briefly, the answer is that because death is ultimate, it is what Heidegger calls "'non-relational'", which, as Macquarrie and Robinson point out, seems to mean that Dasein's death is one possibility to which others do not have access.<sup>28</sup> The possibility of Dasein's being-dead is cut off from the Others of the public world. It has no involvement with these Others. Its being-dead is a possibility, as Heidegger has earlier pointed out, which Dasein cannot share with others, specifically with the public Others, whereas its other existentiell possibilities must be seen in terms of being shared with Others.<sup>29</sup> They are shared to the extent that they define behavior which can be evaluated as correct or incorrect-- as the way to do whatever is being done or not quite the way to do it-- and therefore to the extent that these possibilities represent what can conceivably be actualized, realized or accomplished by Dasein. For insofar as such possibilities can conceivably be actualized by Dasein, they can be actualized by the Others with whom Dasein shares the world. The Others have access to them in the notion of the way a possibility is realized, of how that which is to be done gets done, of how one does whatever is to be done, of what one does. Dasein thereby shares its possibilities in terms of their realization with those Others among whom it counts itself-- among those who do what is to be done in the way it (ordinarily) gets done. Dasein's chores, tasks, doings, and performances are to be seen in terms of their being able to be done by others. As Heidegger

puts it, Dasein could conceivably be represented by others in these endeavors who would do the job just the way Dasein would-- the way one would.<sup>30</sup>

The possibilities defining such behavior on Dasein's part could be said to be accessible to others defining their behavior insofar as they behave the same way Dasein does. Insofar as the behavior defined by Dasein's existentiell possibilities is essentially social, the possibilities can be shared.

But death is alleged to be Dasein's one existentiell possibility that is, as it were, antisocial and cannot be shared. To be sure, the claim is ironic since death as an empirical certainty is a fate that all men share.<sup>31</sup> All men are mortal. Nevertheless, Dasein's death is an antisocial possibility insofar as it distinguishes Dasein from the Others of its public world among whom Dasein is said to lose itself in its inauthentic mode of existence. It isolates Dasein from the Others because Dasein's being-dead is the one possibility the realization of which defies Dasein's evaluation and understanding (in terms of worldly involvements) and which therefore loses its public dimension of involvement with the Others of Dasein's world. For Dasein's being-dead is by definition its no-longer-being-in-the-world; it is the absence of a necessary condition for Dasein's encountering anything actual, for its achieving anything, or for anything befalling it. It is the absence of the world of involvement, which is a constituent item of Being-in-the-world and within which entities are involved, and results are achieved as involved, ultimately for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. Dasein's being-dead means the impossibility of such an existentiell possibility. Thus Dasein's being-dead can be for it only a possibility the realization of which can have no significance for Dasein. It does not make sense to speak of its death

in terms of its accomplishments or incidents that befall it. And consequently it does not make sense to speak of Dasein's evaluating those instances of its behavior which are ultimately involved for the sake of the possibility of its being-dead in terms of how the Others of its public world behave. How one gets the job done or does what is to be done is irrelevant insofar as the 'job' you are talking about is Dasein's being-dead because Dasein cannot 'get this job done'. Insofar as Dasein is dead, nothing is accomplished, nothing 'gets done'. Thus insofar as a particular instance of Dasein's behavior is defined by or can be characterized by or is involved ultimately for the sake of the possibility of Dasein's being-dead, it is beyond evaluation in terms of what the Others do. It is 'antisocial'.

We have then the following argument. Death is said to be Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility because Dasein cannot share it with the Others of its public world. The possibility of being dead 'belongs' to Dasein alone; that is, this possibility must be seen as its possibility and as such incomparable with any of the possibilities that define the behavior of others with whom it shares the world. Those worldly involvements of entities within-the-world that are ultimately involvement for the sake of Dasein's being dead cannot be shared with others. Such involvements are not public and not sharable insofar as they are involvements towards what is not a matter of accomplishment or non-accomplishment, of happening or mishap, of being done or failure to be done. The behavior oriented within the structure of these involvements cannot be evaluated. The categories of 'correct' and 'incorrect' and of 'same' and 'different' do not apply to such behavior insofar as such behavior derives its point and meaningfulness from and within the framework of these involvements, which are



ultimately defined by a possibility of Dasein's Being the actualization of which is without significance for Dasein. In support of the general argument it is argued that it is only with reference to the actualization of possibilities (i.e., with reference to doing things, getting results, accomplishing things) that it makes sense to evaluate Dasein's behavior and to compare it as being the same as or different from the behavior of others, as being in the tradition or not, as being what one normally does, and as conforming to the pattern of how one (normally) does what is being done. Since the actualization of the possibility of Dasein's being dead is without significance for Dasein, it is concluded that the evaluation of behavior defined by this existentiell possibility and its comparison with the behavior of others is ultimately without significance also.

In outlining the preceding argument we get some idea of what Heidegger means by his claim that Dasein's death is its 'ownmost' existentiell possibility. It can 'belong' as a possibility only to Dasein; it is inaccessible to the public das Man; it is not a feature of the public world; the existentials of das Man does not really apply to it. But we must take careful note of the crux of the argument in order to further develop the notion of Dasein's owning or possessing a possibility. This key point may be put as follows: The possibility of being dead is Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility because it must remain a possibility for Dasein; its actualization lacks significance for Dasein. What is of significance is only its being possible and this alone. Being dead qua possibility is significant. Or to put it yet another Heideggerian way, it is the 'possible character' only of this possibility that is significant.<sup>32</sup> I think we can infer from this crucial point in the argument for death as Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility that its (death's) being possessed or owned and its

character qua possible are alleged to be inextricably interwoven.

It is time to pull some loose threads together to further develop this inference. We recall that in our brief discussion of Heidegger's concept of 'Jemeinigkeit' we suggested that the concept of 'personal possession' is interwoven with that of 'involvement'. Entities Dasein encounters within-the-world are to be understood in terms of belonging to Dasein insofar as, and to the extent that, they are involved for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. Thus we may speak of the cobbler's section of town even though that section of town does not belong to him as a legal possession or even to all the people collectively who live there. That section (his section of town) is simply involved for him as the place where he sets up shop and lives and whose inhabitants he knows and does business with. We can speak of his route to work not because he owns (in a legal sense) the streets and sidewalks along which he walks or even because he has an exclusive right of way along this route but because that is the route he takes to work everyday. We speak of his customers and his competitors although he does not own these people like he owns his tools. And so the list might continue; his favorite sport or his favorite place of entertainment, his home town, his difficulties, his taxes, his worries, his problems, his old school, his nemesis, his softball team, etc., and to each of these we might contrast customers, routes places of entertainment, problems, or teams and so forth that are not his-- that he is indifferent to or ignorant of-- that he ignores-- that have no 'place' in what he does<sup>33</sup>-- that are not involved in a positive fashion in what the cobbler as an instance of Dasein does. To the extent that items within-the-world are encountered by Dasein as involved (in what it is doing) and their involvement is centered in what Dasein is doing we speak of these items in

terms of their belonging to Dasein.

We also dealt with the further claim of Heidegger's that the involvement of any entity Dasein encounters within-the-world ultimately leads to an involvement for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. We suggested an interpretation of Heidegger to the effect that this ultimate involvement defines or orders the totality of other involvements. It is this ultimate involvement with an existentiell possibility that makes the rest of the involvement structure possible as being structured the way it is, and therefore that makes it possible for items within-the-world to be what they are (e.g., for a hammer to be what it is-- an instrument for pounding nails into various materials and so forth).<sup>34</sup> An item's involvement for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being (i.e., an existentiell possibility) is extremely important (i.e., essential) for its being involved with other entities within-the-world in Dasein's doings. And because Dasein's personal possession of entities within-the-world is inextricably interwoven with their being involved for Dasein, Dasein's being a personal Being capable of possessing entities is dependent upon its having an existentiell possibility-- i.e., upon the entities it encounters within-the-world (the candidates for personal possession) being involved for the sake of some possibility of its Being.

Thus Heidegger appears to be making the following sort of claim with respect to its possession of itself and the world. Just as Dasein's competence and incompetence with (or understanding and misunderstanding of) entities within-the-world seemed to presuppose its competence or ability with (or understanding of) a world of involvement within which the entities with which it is competent or incompetent are encountered, the possibility of questions arising concerning what belongs and does not

belong to it-- what are its items and what are another's-- presupposes that Dasein possesses its own world of involvement. For if items within-the-world are to belong to Dasein, they must be involved for Dasein (or for the sake of Dasein). Dasein must be 'concerned' with them-- competent or incompetent, familiar or unfamiliar, with them. But in this case it must already be competent or familiar with, or understanding of, the world of involvements that allows for such competence or incompetence with entities. And to the extent Dasein must be said to already be familiar or competent or concerned with, or understanding of, the world of involvements, that world itself may be said to be already involved with and for Dasein (in Dasein's being itself), and Dasein may be said to already possess the world (its world) as its own. Its competence with (or understanding of) the world and its possession of the world are inextricably interwoven. Dasein is simply the sort of entity for which we can see other entities within-the-world as already involved, or rather, we can see these other entities in terms of their already being involved for (possessed by) Dasein.

A brief consideration of Sartre's colorful portrayal of a person centered world might be instructive here because of its metaphorical exaggeration of the point I think Heidegger wants to make. In Being and Nothingness Sartre is examining the so-called "problem" of the existence of others (other people or other consciousnesses) and his (Sartre's) original relation to the Other (another person insofar as it is another consciousness(?)) that he finds to be a matter of everyday reality. He considers an instance of his watching another man pass by some benches in a public park. He asks himself, "What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man?", and he answers:

Perceiving him as a man... is to register an organization without distance of the things in [the] universe around that privileged object. To be sure, the lawn remains two yards and twenty inches away from him, but it is also as a lawn bound to him in a relation which at once both transcends distance and contains it. Instead of the two terms of the distance being indifferent, interchangeable, and in a reciprocal relation, the distance is unfolded starting from the man whom I see and extending up to the lawn as the synthetic upsurge of a univocal relation....[I]f there exists between the lawn and the Other a relation which is without distance and which creates distance, then there exists necessarily a relation between the Other and the statue which stands on a pedestal in the middle of the lawn, and a relation between the Other and the big chestnut trees which border the walk; there is a total space which grouped around the Other....[T]here is... a regrouping of all the objects which people [the] universe. This regrouping does stop there. The grass is something qualified; it is this green grass which exists for the Other.... [I]t appears to the Other.... Thus suddenly an object [the man walking through the park] has appeared which has stolen the world.... Everything is in place; everything still exists...; but everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of the new object.<sup>35</sup>

Sartre's description brings out through hyperbolic metaphor the aspect of Dasein that Heidegger is emphasizing in claiming that Dasein possesses its world and itself-- i.e., Dasein as a possessive Being which can let entities be involved for it in various ways. The man in Sartre's description on his way through the park, perhaps taking a walk, has let the various features in the park be involved as his surroundings to be seen and walked through for his pleasure, and it is in terms of their involvement for him that we must consider these items in the park when we consider the man. Because he possesses the structure of involvements Heidegger calls the "world" as an item of Being-the-world, the man out for a stroll can take possession of, can 'steal', the 'world', where "world" here (as Sartre seems to use the word) simply means the collection of entities the man encounters in the course of his walk-- i.e., all the items in the park. Because he is the 'center' of the involvement structure of the ways in

which these items are involved (for him), they seem to 'gravitate' towards him. He monopolizes them. They must be seen in terms of their involvement for him, according to Sartre.

Thus the claim about Dasein's possession of the world, just like the claim about its competence with the world, is a claim about Dasein itself and its relation with itself, not about the relation between Dasein and some other entity within-the-world distinct from Dasein. Unlike its possession of entities within-the-world, its possession, or rather its claim to ownership, of the world cannot ultimately be forfeited or lost, just as it cannot lose its competence with the world. Dasein's existentiell possibility of being dead guarantees this ownership or claim to ownership even though Dasein has in every case for the short term already **forfeited** its sole possession of its world insofar as it is always doing (or not doing) something-- insofar as the 'towards-whiches' that may be understood as definitive for its involvement world for particular instances of Dasein (for particular instances of behavior) are actualizable and are therefore public possibilities. The a priori claim about death being an existentiell possibility of Dasein in all cases is not meant to be informative about a particular case of Dasein. Rather, it is alleged to be ontologically (conceptually) interwoven with the structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, with 'world' and with 'existentiell possibility' (in other words with our concept of meaningful behavior). Presuppose the one, and you presuppose the lot according to Heidegger.

We can now, I think, satisfactorily outline the ontological significance of Heidegger's claim that Dasein's being-dead is its ownmost possibility. To quickly review that has so far been asserted and argued for:

1. Death is said to be Dasein's 'ownmost' existentiell possibility

in effect because it cannot lose its 'possible character' for Dasein. Its actualization lacks significance for Dasein. It cannot be shared with the Others of Dasein's world as if it were a public possibility. Where being-dead is Dasein's existentiell possibility, it is its ultimate such possibility-- that is, all other existentiell possibility candidates must be seen as ultimately involved towards this possibility for the sake of this possibility. Insofar as they are so involved, these other existentiell possibility candidates must be seen also in terms of being Dasein's own, private (as opposed to public) possibilities even though insofar as they are actualizable they must be considered sharable public possibilities.

2. Dasein's being dead is in all instances an existentiell possibility of Dasein's. From these claims we can conclude that in all cases Dasein has at least one possibility exclusively its own (i.e., unsharable) as its ultimate existentiell possibility in which, (for the sake of which, all other 'towards-which'es' are further involved. That is to say, any instance of Dasein has at least one possibility (its being dead) which must be understood by Dasein solely in terms of its being possible and which guarantees that other existentiell possibility candidates must be understood (though not solely) in terms of their being possible. It also guarantees a non-public, non-evaluable aspect of any other possibility candidate of Dasein's because any such 'empirical', contingent possibility, insofar as it is an existentiell possibility of Dasein's, is, according to Heidegger, involved towards the necessarily ultimate possibility-- Dasein's being-dead.

The further ontological significance of these claims concerning Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility is to revive the question of how we are to understand Heidegger's concept of existentiell possibility-- how we are

to understand Heidegger's concept of existentiell possibility-- how we are to understand an existentiell possibility qua possibility-- or how we are to understand the 'possible character' of an existentiell possibility. We claimed earlier that the possibility of Dasein's Being for the sake of which entities encountered within-the-world are ultimately involved is Dasein's existentiell possibility. We might ask why we call this state of affairs (the cobbler's being a good provider for his family was one of the examples we used) a "possibility of Dasein's Being" or an "existentiell possibility" rather than merely "a not yet realized condition or state of Dasein's Being which will fall into one of two classes-- those states of affairs or those conditions that will be realized and those that will not." Heidegger suggests by way of answer that to consider a possibility in the latter terms-- in terms of the future actualization of a state of affairs-- is to "annihilate the possibility of the possible" by understanding it in terms of its 'availability'.<sup>36</sup> And presumably "availability" here refers to how we would set about making the not yet actual actual or how we could expect that which has not yet happened to happen.

What makes an existentiell possibility a possibility, according to Heidegger, is its defining and limiting a complex of involvements in terms of which Dasein encounters entities within-the-world and which in turn sustains the possibility. The availability of a happening or a condition or a result, on the other hand, is always availability within an involvement world in terms of its involvements. The actualization, realization, creation, achievement, occurrence, etc. of a state of affairs, condition, result, etc. are said to be (as we have already argued) always within-the-world of involvement. But the possibility of Dasein's Being for the sake of which entities within-the-world are involved has been



argued itself not to be an item within the-world but rather a feature of the world. The notion of an 'existentiell possibility' and therefore its character as a possibility are alleged to be interwoven with that of 'world'. The existentiell possibility defines and makes possible the world within which (or in terms of which) whatever is actual is so (is used, ignored, measured, destroyed, created, reworked, or reshaped), and therefore an existentiell possibility qua possibility is not to be understood in terms of its being actualized or in terms of the actual. Rather, it is to be understood in terms of its defining and sustaining the worldly involvement complex within which whatever is actualized (whatever is to be done or is done or is to happen) is done or happens-- within which whatever is actual is what it is.

Thus the claim that Dasein always has at least one existentiell possibility whose possible character cannot be lost and which must be understood by Dasein in terms of the possible rather than merely in terms of the not-yet actual means that in all cases Dasein operates in an already understood world of involvement, and this in turn means that Dasein is in all cases to be understood as a 'personally possessing' entity. Its possessions, as we have argued, must include its world. And the far reaching implications of the claim about death as Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility extend yet farther by raising and answering the question of the way in which Dasein possesses or owns the world.

That question arises out of our earlier consideration of the relationship between Dasein's authenticity and its inauthenticity in terms of possession. If Dasein is to be understood as possessing the world of involvement in terms of which it operates, can it give its world away or lose it as it can its money and other items within-the-world? Can it share its world with others in the way that it can make its goods available

for use by others-- in the way that it can donate goods or property to a social organization for the common use of the members of the organization? Can it be robbed of its world? Can it let its world be involved for others in the same way as it is for it, just as it can make its tools available to neighbors for roughly the same sort of jobs its uses these items within-the-world? Heidegger's answers to these questions would be, "Yes and No." We have already examined the claim that Dasein is essentially social and that its world is essentially public. Insofar as Dasein's existentiell possibilities can be and are understood in terms of the way they can be realized-- insofar as these possibilities are public-- Dasein can be said to have already lost exclusive possession of its world to the Others with whom it shares the world. Of course, it has not lost all possession. It retains some stake in the world because it includes itself among the public who possess the world-- who do what one does the way one does it.

But this forfeiture of its claim to exclusive possession of the world is valid only within certain limits. Dasein's 'ownmost' ultimate existentiell possibility of being dead marks those limits, since Dasein cannot share this possibility with the public Others.<sup>37</sup> And consequently it must answer for, or 'own up' to, the world defined by that possibility as being exclusively its own. Thus the possibility of Dasein's being dead ensures an unsharable, non-public aspect to any of Dasein's subsidiary other possibilities insofar as they are further involved with that ultimate possibility. Dasein must claim the 'possible character' of any of these particular possibilities as its own. That is, insofar as an existentiell possibility of Dasein's defines a world of involvement in terms of which Dasein encounters entities within-the-world and achieves results, Dasein

must claim (or own up to) possession of the possibility and answer for it as exclusively its own. Dasein's world cannot be shared or lost to others insofar as it has this possible character guaranteed to it by the possibility of its being-dead.

Thus, to answer the original questions: Dasein may share its possibilities (in terms of their realization) and its world (as defined by these public possibilities), but it cannot disown them. It must ultimately answer for them as its own. Insofar as Dasein's possession of its world and of itself is a condition of its making entities within-the-world its own, it cannot forfeit its claim to exclusive ownership of the world. And the force of this assertion is simply to emphasize the distinction between the world as an item of Being-in-the-world and the entities encountered within-the-world. Dasein's competence with (or understanding of) and its possession of the world is not a matter of empirical fact such that we could conceive of a state of affairs where Dasein has lost possession of its world-- a state of affairs that would falsify the claim that Dasein possesses the world as exclusively its own and is competent with its world. The world is not something that it can forfeit its possession of, can lose, or can give away as it can some item within-the-world. Rather, Heidegger's claims concerning Dasein's possession of its world-- the world's being involved for Dasein-- and Dasein's consequent possession of itself and involvement for itself are meant to emphasize the distinction between Dasein and other sorts of entities. An instance of Dasein is the sort of entity to which other entities can belong and for which they can be involved. And this being able to possess other entities and to let them be involved for it is tied up with its being the sort of entity that can die as opposed to merely being destroyed or perishing. And the

possibility of its being dead is claimed in turn to assure it a kind of individuality or dimension of uniqueness distinct from the individuality or individualness of other sorts of entities encountered within-the-world.<sup>38</sup> This is to say that insofar as Dasein has a claim to exclusive ownership of its world-- insofar as it can possess entities within-the-world and let them be involved for it-- insofar as it is a personal Being with the character of 'Jemeinigkeit'-- the categories of comparison ('same' and 'different') do not apply to Dasein and its world. It is its own Being-in-the-world, its own world and its own possibility. It is individual or unique but not in the sense of being different from all other things or all other cases of Dasein with respect to some one or all of its properties. The point is that its similarities to, or differences from, others are irrelevant. It is simply beyond comparison insofar as it is a self-possessed or self-owning 'authentic' Being.<sup>39</sup>

We have outlined in what Heidegger would call a "formal" fashion<sup>40</sup> the significance of his claim that Dasein in all cases exists authentically as well as inauthentically-- that in any instance of Dasein its existentiell possibility must be seen in terms of its authenticity as well as its inauthenticity. In other words we have tackled the problem of elucidating or making sense of Dasein's authenticity or individuality in terms of the Heideggerian notions of 'world of involvement', 'existentiell possibility', 'concern', etc., all of which we had discussed earlier on. Yet at the outset of this chapter we suggested that we ought to be able to use examples of ordinary everyday behavior like the ones we used earlier in considering Dasein's world and das Man in order to help clarify Heidegger's notion of 'authenticity'. It is to this problem we now turn with the initial question of the sorts of everyday behavior on which we should focus at the

outset in order to approach the problem with best advantage.

Heidegger himself recognizes the problem posed here at the end of Chapter I and beginning of Chapter II in Division II.<sup>41</sup> He outlines the problem we face and the necessity of facing it as follows. He claims at this point to have outlined the significance for Dasein of the possibility of its being-dead and then to have outlined Dasein's authentic ('ownmost') way of understanding or being competent with this possibility or rather the world defined by this possibility.<sup>42</sup> But this way of understanding the significance of the possibility of Dasein's being-dead and of understanding Dasein's authentic way of being competent with this possibility is so far only been shown to be ontologically possible, he says; that is, if and only if we construe or define Dasein's being dead in a certain fashion (in terms of the impossibility of any further possibility for Dasein) as we already have, does it have the significance that we have outlined. It individualizes Dasein in a way distinct from the way in which other sorts of entities can be said to be individual. It is tied to Dasein's being a personal Being which is self-possessed and able to possess other entities. But must we construe Dasein's being-dead in the fashion that we have? Must we accordingly understand Dasein as an authentic self-possessed individualized Being able to possess other entities within-the-world? In order to answer these questions

[W]e must investigate whether to any extent and in any way Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost Being-able-to-be, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself.... What we are seeking is an authentic Being-able-to-be of Dasein, which will be attested in its existentiell possibility by Dasein itself.<sup>43</sup>

What Heidegger is in effect seeking is an ordinary everyday phenomenon which must be understood or is ordinarily understood<sup>44</sup> in terms of

Dasein's authenticity. The phenomena upon which he focuses are those of conscience (or the "'voice of conscience'" as he puts it)<sup>45</sup> and guilt. He argues that conscience is a kind of discourse on Dasein's part with itself.<sup>46</sup> Specifically, it has the character of a call-- of Dasein calling itself to lay claim to the world of involvement as its own.<sup>47</sup> Insofar as an instance of Dasein can be said to have a conscience, it must be understood as calling itself from its place among the Others with whom it shares the world and among whom it counts itself to answer for the world as an item of its own Being-in-the-world and therefore in effect to answer for itself.<sup>48</sup> The call of conscience is an unusual sort of discourse, however. Nothing actually gets said in the call. It is discourse in the mode of keeping silent-- of being reticent. There is no message that can be rephrased and passed on to or shared with others.<sup>49</sup> Yet the call of conscience has a certain force to it and an effect or a significance which rests on Dasein's being individualized in such a way that "it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything [or anyone] else."<sup>50</sup> The call of conscience, which in effect says nothing, can be effective just because Dasein is the sort of entity which can isolate and single itself out from the Others with whom it is to be classed and with whom it classes itself. Otherwise a call which says nothing could mean anything, could be about anyone, and could be directed to any one or all of the many Others among whom Dasein counts itself. The possible range of ambiguity of such a call would be unlimited. But because Dasein understands itself as authentic, individual or unique in the sense of being beyond or outside comparison with Others, it can address itself without ambiguity or confusion in the mode of keeping silent. The questions of who is addressed and what about do not arise. There is only one to whom

the call could be addressed-- to Dasein itself as an individualized personal Being. There is only one thing the call could be about-- about itself as its own Being-in-the-world. The call summons Dasein to its 'ownmost' possibility qua its own possibility defining its 'ownmost' world and thereby addresses Dasein as Being-guilty.<sup>51</sup>

What Heidegger's arguments amount to is a claim that where it makes sense to speak of something (or someone) having a conscience with the possibility of understanding himself as being guilty (in conscience Dasein addresses itself as "guilty") of some deed (or misdeed), we must understand that something (or someone) in terms of the category of authenticity as laid out above.<sup>52</sup> Only an authentic, self-possessed, individualized, personal Being able to possess other entities is capable of the phenomena of conscience and guilt.

[C]onscience, in its basis and its essence, is in each case mine-- not only in the sense that in each case the appeal is to one's ownmost Being-able-to-be, but because the call comes from that entity which in each case I myself am.<sup>53</sup>

Following Heidegger's arguments from the everyday phenomena of guilt and conscience, we can figure out the sort of examples of everyday behavior with which to best illustrate the concept of Dasein's authenticity-- namely those which involve mistakes and misdeeds. Where incorrect doings are involved, the phenomena of conscience and guilt as well as related phenomena like blame and responsibility seem most at home, and it is in these cases of Dasein that we ought to be able to begin to see the sense of Heidegger's claim that Dasein understands itself as individualized and isolated from the Others of its public world.

We have already touched upon the notion of mistaken behavior. We noted that Winch argued that the notion of meaningful behavior which in

principle can be learned is necessarily interwoven with that of mistaken or incorrect or unsuccessful behavior. And where one can speak of an instance of mistaken behavior, one can speak of standards or criteria for correct or successful behavior of that sort-- of the way one does whatever is to be done or of the way the job to be done gets done. When I return to the cobbler's shop for my resoled shoes only to find to my discomfort that two or three nail points now protrude through the inner sole of each shoe, I call his attention to the shoddy workmanship and evaluate it as a mistake on his part. In doing so I take for granted a host of generalizations about how one repairs shoes, how shoes are involved for those who own and use them (namely for walking easily without pain), and how one behaves toward customers one is doing business with. I assume he shares my public world of involvement in which shoes are involved in one's doings in certain ways although I may have to remind him of some of these generalizations if he becomes defensive over my criticism of his work. But the point is that this instance of behavior and the results of that behavior-- this instance of shoe repair or attempted shoe repair-- is understood as a mistake by both me and the cobbler. (supposing him to acknowledge the mistake) in terms of the way one does or accomplishes what was to be done. His efforts at shoe repair could lead to or involve a mistake only if the behavior in question had a point to it, only if it was defined by a 'public' existentiell possibility-- namely, resoling and repairing the shoe.

Yet what makes the cobbler's mistake a mistake is the fact that he did not do what was to be done. He did not resole the shoes the way one resoles shoes using the nails one uses for that particular sort of shoe. His behavior did not conform in an important respect to the generalization in terms of which we understand his behavior (as a mistake). What he has



done is not in accordance with what the Others of its world, among whom he includes himself, do. In having made a mistake Dasein understands itself as isolated from the Others of its world. What it has done is its own doing. It could have done otherwise. It could have done what one does in realizing the possibility that ordered its involvement world, but it did not, and because it did not, the possibility remains unrealized. The shoes are not soled so as to be usable and consequently returned in exchange for payment for services rendered.

But the mistake is not merely the nonactualization of some state of affairs-- in this case the secure attachment of new soles to the shoes without protruding nails. Insofar as the mistake issues in an unrealized existentiell possibility, a whole complex of involvement becomes problematic; assignments among entities within-the-world go unfulfilled. The shoes cannot be worn comfortably. They cannot be used for walking. Therefore they cannot be returned to the customer in exchange for payment. Some of the items of repair are themselves 'out of place'. Some of the nails are too long. They do not belong where they are. As in the case of a mishap discussed earlier, the world of involvement 'announces' itself, and the 'possible character' of the existentiell possibility that defines the cobbler's attempt at shoe repair-- his mistaken behavior-- becomes problematic and evident; that is, the way in which the existentiell possibility orders the involvement structure of the cobbler's world becomes apparent. As a shared involvement structure ordered by a public possibility, it is within and according to this involvement framework that the cobbler will (or will fail to) correct his mistake-- that he will remove the nails that do not belong there and substitute those that do or that he will modify those presently out of place there so that they 'fit in'

with the rest of the shoe.

What is most interesting about the case of the cobbler's mistake with reference to Heidegger's ontological scheme, however, is that the cobbler's mistake opens him to such phenomena as blame and guilt and conscience; that is, to evaluate the results of the cobbler's efforts in terms of his having made a mistake is to single out the cobbler for blame-- to hold him responsible for not doing what one does or for doing what one does not do in repairing shoes. In blaming the cobbler for the piece of shoddy workmanship we are assuming that the 'point' of his behavior in the shoe repair shop is to be understood in terms of public possibilities-- in terms of what one does to repair shoes-- in terms of what the Others of his world among whom he includes himself do. We emphasize his inclusion of himself among the Others of his world in that we assume he will correct his mistake with reference to the way one gets the job done or at least that he sees the results as something to be corrected in accordance with public standards. Yet the very idea of his having made a mistake singles him out from the Others among whom he includes himself. It individualizes him, and his behavior, in the course of which a mistake has been made, must be seen as his own behavior in contrast to the way other cobblers including himself would have repaired the shoe.

Of course, in the face of blame from another or even in the face of his own bad conscience the cobbler may resort to excuses for his shoddy workmanship. In doing so he still admits a mistake has been made-- or at least that the results of his endeavor are somehow 'out of order'.<sup>54</sup> There is at least a tacit admission that the workmanship is shoddy. But his effort in this case is directed toward mitigating the blame or guilt perhaps by partially relocating it elsewhere. To this end he may cite

extenuating circumstances or additional factors that complicate or complicated his involvement world. For example, he may plead that marital difficulties have made it difficult for him to concentrate on his work. He therefore failed to notice the several longer nails which had become mixed in with the batch of shorter nails of correct length for the job. He attempts to avoid 'full responsibility' for the incident by covering what he has done, at least implicitly, with a generalization concerning what one does. When one is having marital difficulties, one thinks about them a lot; one concerns oneself with them above all else. He attempts to retreat from being singled out from the Others with whom he shares the world. The bald mistake becomes complicated by the extenuating circumstances and additional factors which offer opportunities for covering or subsuming his situation or aspects thereof under generalizations concerning what one does. Indeed, one might say that the success of any attempt at excuse depends upon the acceptability of tacit or explicit generalizations in terms of das Man covering the problematic situation.

The extenuating circumstances and complicating factors offered by way of excuse may, however, only serve to relocate or mitigate the blame. Our evaluation of these proffered excuses will be in terms of what one does. In the case of the cobbler, for example, we may admit that when one has marital difficulties, one thinks about them or dwells on them or concerns oneself with them or lets them preoccupy one's mind, but we may also hold that when one cannot pay attention to one's work because one's mind is preoccupied with other things, one puts off one's work until one can give it proper attention. We might maintain that that was the cobbler's real mistake-- attempting to repair the shoe in the first place while in his distracted state. The cobbler is still to blame. He can still be

singled out as standing apart from the Others of his public world-- as not having done what one does; only now, we have modified the blame by modifying our original judgement about the way in which the cobbler stands apart from the Others among whom we include him. We have modified our original judgement about, or our evaluation of, the mistake. We have accepted an elaboration of the cobbler's world of involvement within which the mistake was made. We may even take a more sympathetic attitude towards the cobbler in relocating the source of the mistake and partial responsibility for it, according to the extenuating circumstances cited. But the cobbler is still to blame (at least partially) for the 'out of order' results; he is still guilty; he is still singled out from the Others.

At the extreme end of the spectrum of possible success in excuse attempts lies the sort of situation where the seeming, suspected or alleged mistake turns out to have been merely a mishap-- where the extenuating circumstances and additional factors discovered and/or cited enable all aspects of what the cobbler has done to be covered by what one does. The results are 'out of order', but the results are due to mishap, not mistake. Something went wrong with the materials or the environment etc. that could not be foreseen or avoided by the cobbler. In the particular example we have been working with a clear case of a mishap is difficult to imagine or to contrive. But if we must do so by way of example, suppose that the cobbler received a shipment of nails in which a few special ones had accidentally become mixed at the place of manufacture. These special nails were manufactured so as to extend in length upon being hammered into whatever substance or material they are hammered into. The cobbler had no way of knowing about these odd nails mixed in with the others and no reasons to suspect anything unusual about the nails he was using. He

went about the business of repairing my shoes the way one goes about repairing shoes. He is not to be held 'at fault'; he cannot be blamed for the 'out of order' result of his endeavors, although he might be expected to correct the results or set them right.<sup>55</sup>

We have already touched upon the connection between mishaps and mistakes to say that the possibility of the one is interwoven with that of the other. The problem of evaluating a particular case where something is 'out of order' and determining whether a mistake has been made and if so where or whether the incident is merely a mishap-- the problem of evaluating excuses and of placing blame-- is handled in terms of what one does. This was understood as part of the force of Heidegger's claims about das Man as an existentielle of Dasein. The actual intricacies of blame and acceptable excuse in any particular situation where a mistake has allegedly been made will of course depend on the situation and the ways one does things in the particular community of Others that includes the participants in the situation.

But the notion of a 'mistake' and accompanying blame and guilt and conscience where invoked or appropriate depend on the point of the mistaken behavior being understood in terms of a generalization about the way one realizes the point of the mistaken behavior where the instance of behavior contravenes the generalization in terms of which it is understood. The instance of mistaken behavior has implicitly been compared with the way one does what was to be done in that case and found to be different. One need not go and cannot go to further comparison or generalization in order to understand the case of mistaken behavior and subsequent efforts to correct the mistake insofar as the case is to be understood as a case of mistaken behavior. Further comparison becomes irrelevant at this point.

In this sort of case Dasein can be said to be individual or unique in standing out from the Others with which it is understood and understands itself to stand-- in standing apart from the other instances of Dasein with which it is to be classed in understanding it. The instance of mistaken behavior has implicitly been recognized as 'its own'-- as exclusively its own.

It is just this sort of ontological possibility involved in making mistakes that is crucial for understanding an instance of Dasein, according to Heidegger. This seems to be the force of his claim that Dasein is essentially authentic and of our derivative claim that authenticity is a necessary category for an inquiry into any instance of Dasein. This is not to say that Dasein is authentic only in cases where mistakes are actually made or that Dasein is always making mistakes in order to be authentic. Indeed Heidegger himself does not discuss mistakes as such in arguing for Dasein's existentiell attestation of its authenticity in the phenomena of conscience and guilt. Furthermore, he seems to purposefully avoid doing so, because in considering mistakes we are led to considering corrections for the mistakes-- to making good on what was not done or what we let go wrong-- to setting things right. Such considerations lead to questions of how one acts in the face of mistakes. And this leads us back to a consideration of doing things and therefore back to the realm of das Man and inauthenticity. Attempts to correct the mistake-- to realize the 'point' or possibility that defines the original instance of behavior-- proceed according to the way one goes about realizing that possibility. We get on with doing what we failed to do before, and what we failed to do was what one does. Or to take another concrete possibility, in leaving the mistake uncorrected we also act in accordance with public possibilities

in ways in which one avoids setting things right in the circumstances in which one does not correct or need not correct or atone for one's mistakes. Even in the very way one admits or acknowledges (or refuses to acknowledge) one's mistake das Man is involved.

The common sense of das Man knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making "mistakes".<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand, Heidegger's claims about Dasein's authenticity can be taken as implying that Dasein is the kind of Being capable of making mistakes and, more importantly, that this is so because Dasein is the sort of Being that stands apart from the Others among whom it includes itself in understanding itself and consequently which stands apart from the others with which we classify it in understanding it. It is a personal Being able to own up to or answer for itself-- able to recognize 'the deed' (or misdeed) as exclusively its own and the existentially possibility defining the world within which the deed is done as its own. And from a 'formal' point of view this means that we must understand an instance of Dasein in terms of the possibility of modification of its behavior, such that it makes that behavior its own and distinct from the other instances of behavior with which it is to be classed in being understood and such that insofar as it has this personal dimension to its behavior, the categories of comparison ('same and different') become irrelevant. It seems that this possibility is most evident or obvious in cases of mistaken behavior, but I think that it is also evident in cases of innovative<sup>57</sup> behavior and that such cases must also be clearly understood in terms of the category of authenticity.

Thus, Dasein's uniqueness or individuality or authenticity is not

to be understood as implying that any instance of Dasein defies subsumption under any generalization or classification at all. Rather this uniqueness or individuality is a result of, or interwoven with, the very sort of generalizations in terms of which we must understand instances of Dasein. Dasein's authenticity and inauthenticity are intimately interwoven. The generalizations in terms of which we understand instances of Dasein are like rules. The exceptions make them, and we are led to see any instance of Dasein as a possible 'exception' to the 'rules' that govern that instance of behavior. This doctrine is the force of Heidegger's claim that "[a]uthentic Being-one's-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of das Man."<sup>58</sup>

To sum up then, Heidegger's claims concerning Dasein's authenticity might be outlined as follows. An instance of Dasein is the sort of phenomenon which must be understood in terms of an existentiell possibility defining the world in which it is. Roughly speaking, we may say, "in terms of the 'point' to its behavior." That existentiell possibility as realizable is public and sharable. As such it defines or dictates what one does. However, in any case of Dasein that world defining existentiell possibility may or may not be (might or might not have been) realized. There is in every case of Dasein a possibility of not doing what one does-- a possibility of the existentiell modification of das Man. That possibility of standing apart or in isolation from the Others with whom Dasein shares the world is interwoven with Dasein's being an essentially personal Being capable of answering for or owning up to itself. And finally interwoven with its being a personal Being capable of standing apart from the Others among whom it includes itself is its having its own death as an ultimate world defining existentiell possibility in all cases. This



ultimate existentiell possibility guarantees Dasein's authenticity by guaranteeing that Dasein's world in all cases retains its 'possible character'-- that Dasein in all cases must be understood in terms of the possibility or 'possible character' of its existentiell possibility. If the argument or scheme or system as just sketched seems circular, that is because in a way it is so. Heidegger has claimed that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is a thoroughly unified or unitary phenomenon and that all aspects of it including the three main existentials or categories on which we have been concentrating are thoroughly interwoven or intertwined with each other.

FOOTNOTE TO CHAPTER II, SECTION 3

1. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 232.
2. "As such, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behavior in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence." (Ibid., p. 265) Elsewhere in a discussion of the nature of conscience as a call summoning Dasein to its authenticity-- its 'ownmost' Being-able-to-be-- that to which conscience is said to summon Dasein is "not a concrete single possibility of existence." Rather, it is "what belongs to the existential condition for the possibility of its factual-existential Being-able-to-be." (Ibid., p. 280) And as an existing Being in all instances, the ontological structure of 'Being-able-to-be' is appropriate for talking about an instance of Dasein-- that is, Dasein may be said to possess the ability to be in every instance of Dasein. (Ibid., pp. 305 ff. and pp. 169-170)
3. Ibid., p. 179. See the full context of this quote for the other side of the coin-- namely, that Dasein is essentially inauthentic only insofar as it is also authentic. Its authenticity always remains an essential ontological possibility for it.
4. Ibid., p. 44.
5. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
6. Ibid., p. 57 and p. 121. Concern is said to be existentially constitutive of Being-in-the-world. It is implied to be equivalent with our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world.
7. Ibid., p. 69. For example, in performing tasks "our concern subordinates itself to the 'in-order-to' which is constitutive for the equipment [Zeug] we are employing at the time."
8. These claims are not meant to represent a rigorous piece of ordinary language analysis although I think they could be made to do so. Obvious possible exceptions like "The chair belongs to the dining room set" could be handled by an analysis of entities like collections and sets in terms of being derivative forms of Zeug totalities and therefore of having the same character as the world rather than as entities within-the-world. Such totalities are said to allow entities ready-to-hand to belong somewhere-- i.e., to have their 'place' with respect to the other items in the totality. Thus we might say that such an item belongs to the Zeug totality that allows it to belong with other items within the totality in a certain way. See the section of Sein und Zeit entitled "The Spatiality of the Ready-to-hand Within-the-world" for an analysis of the way in which the world allows entities within-the-world to belong somewhere. (Ibid., pp. 102 ff.)
9. This claim is implied in Heidegger's description of the way the Others

are encountered in an everyday manner in the world of work as the producers, suppliers and users of items within-the-world. (Ibid., pp. 117-118)

10. Ibid., pp. 42-43. Elsewhere he says, "As the Man-self [the self given over to das Man], the particular Dasein has been dispersed into das Man, and must first find itself." (Ibid., p. 129) And later he speaks of Dasein's "factual lostness in the everydayness of the Man-self" (Ibid., p. 263), and says that "this entity, in its everydayness, has lost itself." (Ibid., p. 179)
11. For example, "Dasein KANN SICH als verstehendes aus der 'Welt' und den Anderen her verstehen oder aus seinem eigensten Seinkönnen. Die letztgenannte Möglichkeit besagt: das Dasein erschliesst sich ihm selbst im eigensten und als eigenstes Seinkönnen. Diese EIGENTLICHE Erschlossenheit zeigt das Phänomen der ursprünglichsten Wahrheit im Modus der Eigentlichkeit." (Ibid., p. 221)
12. Etymological dictionaries of English trace the ancestry of "authentic" back to the Greek "authentēs" meaning "one who does things by his own hand" (Skeats, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language), "one who does things for himself" (Weekly, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English), "one who acts on his own authority" (Partridge, Origins), and "one who acted for himself, hence did the job well" (Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins). The word "authentēs" in turn is said to derive from "auto" ("self") and "entēs" ("guilty"). Such Greek roots with their suggestions of one who is responsible for what he does and must 'own' up to his deeds as his own convey some of what Heidegger is after with his concept of 'Eigentlichkeit'.
13. This alternative is suggested Schmitt's rendering of "die Uneigentlichkeit des Daseins" as Dasein's "not being genuinely self-possessed". See Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 185-186 and pp. 204-205.
14. Dasein itself seems alone to be responsible for its existence in the mode of inauthenticity. It diverts itself into the mode of inauthenticity (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 259) and loses itself in das Man (Ibid., p. 177) and flees from itself into inauthenticity. (Ibid., p. 185 and p. 189)
15. This point has already been touched upon (see footnote 22, Section 2 above), but it needs to be stressed because Heidegger should not be understood as laying out a kind of 'ethics' which operates in terms of a good to be striven for (i.e., authenticity) and an evil to be avoided (i.e., inauthenticity). In every case Dasein has already surrendered itself to the dictatorship of das Man insofar as its public world has always already been disclosed to Dasein and it is competent with it. As long as it is what it is, Dasein remains essentially inauthentic (Ibid., p. 179), and this point will constitute a highly significant methodological point for understanding any particular case of Dasein. "This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against

- it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself' so that it just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibility of having a mood-- that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world 'matter' to it. Das Man prescribes one's state-of-mind, and determines what and how one 'sees'." (Ibid., pp. 169-170)
16. Dasein has always already been "thrown" into this possibility, as Heidegger puts it. (Ibid., p. 251)
  17. Ibid., p. 250.
  18. This interpretation of Heidegger grows out of his claims about the relativity of the actualization of the ready-to-hand. "But the concerned actualization of Zeug which is ready-to-hand (as in producing it, getting it ready, readjusting it, and so on) is always merely relative, since even that which has been actualized is still characterized in terms of some involvements-- indeed this is precisely what characterizes its Being." (Ibid., p. 261)
  19. Heidegger says that death is a "certain" possibility (Ibid., pp. 255 ff.), one that is not to be "outripped". (Ibid., pp. 250 ff.) There is in his view, no question as to whether death is an existentiell possibility in any given case of Dasein.
  20. Heidegger claims that an ontological characterization of death is formal and empty seen from an ontical point of view and that it entails no existentiell commitments. (Ibid., p. 248) This means that the existentiell possibility of Dasein's being dead will serve as the defining possibility for any of its doings-- for any sort of meaningful or purposeful behavior or behavior with a 'sense' to it.
  21. At one point Heidegger mentions a distinction between Dasein's dying as the end to, or impossibility of, its existence and perishing as merely the biological end of life. (Ibid., pp. 240-241)
  22. Ibid., p. 259.
  23. Brooding over death and calculating chances of survival is said to cover up the 'possible character' of the possibility of being dead. (Ibid., p. 261)
  24. Ibid., p. 250.
  25. Death is said to give Dasein nothing to be actualized. (Ibid., p. 262)
  26. Ibid., p. 239.

27. Of course this claim only holds good unless the doings and happenings are those of the departed individual in another 'world' beyond this one. In that case the individual does not really die but triumphs over death. As the Christian would have it, the grave is no bed of its victory and death of its sting. Death is denied as being a fact. The claim is that in fact one does not die but rather is immortal. But to deny something in fact obtains as being the case one has to know what it is that one is denying. Heidegger claims that his analysis of death is an ontological one of what it means for Dasein to be dead and for Dasein to have its being dead as a possibility. He therefore claims that his existential analysis of death has a certain priority to theological claims about death (since we have to understand what such claims are about before we can decide whether they are true or false) and that it maintains a certain neutrality among such claims concerning the issue of whether man is in fact mortal or not. (Ibid., pp. 247-248)
28. Ibid., p. 250 (Macquarrie and Robinson, Being and Time, p. 294, footnote 4).
29. Ibid., pp. 239-240.
30. Ibid., p. 239.
31. Death is said to be a "certain" possibility (see footnote 19 above), but Dasein's Being-certain with regard to its death is said to present us with a distinctive sort of certainty different than our certainty concerning particular events and conditions within-the-world, even though in everyday existing death is often regarded as if it were just an event occurring within-the-world and therefore an empirically certain one. (Ibid., pp. 256 ff.)
32. "But Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility.... The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual.... Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as possibility." (Ibid., p. 262; see also p. 253)
33. This sense of "place" is the one with which Heidegger is concerned when dealing with Dasein's spatiality and the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world. (Ibid., pp. 102-109)
34. See the section of Sein und Zeit entitled "Understanding and Interpretation" (Ibid., pp. 148 ff.) and the one entitled "Reality as a Problem of Being and Whether the 'External World' can be Proved". (Ibid., pp. 202 ff.)
35. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 254-255.
36. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 261.

37. In Being towards this possibility Dasein cannot include itself among the Others with whom it shares the world as it can in Being towards other possibilities when its Being towards these possibilities is a matter of getting something done or waiting for something to happen or letting it happen. "[D]eath lays claim to it [Dasein] as an individual Dasein." (Ibid., p. 263)
38. "Death individualizes Dasein down to itself." (Ibid.)
39. Such a usage of the word "unique" as implying that something is beyond comparison or defies comparison, or is such that comparison of things to it is out of order is consistent with at least one sense of the word listed, for example, in Roget's International Thesaurus.
40. By "formal account" Heidegger seems to mean an "abstract account" and contrasts it with a concrete one. What all this is supposed to mean is not entirely clear, but we may say at the outset that the formal abstract account conveys a minimum of empirical information. We are told that any ontological account is formal if measured against ontical standards-- i.e., if evaluated with expectations of an informative account of definite ways of doing things or of a description of particular forms of human behavior. (Ibid., p. 248) At one point he describes his ontological account of death as Dasein's ultimate possibility as a "formal" account and then points out the need for a concrete analysis of everyday Being-towards-death. This "concrete" analysis turns out to be a description of what is often said-- i.e., everyday ordinary clichés, etc.-- concerning the subject of death. (Ibid., p. 255) At yet another point he argues that "the idea of 'Guilty!' must be sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' which are related to our concerned Being with Others will drop out." (Ibid., p. 283) In other words, his account is not to be concerned with procedures for deciding whether someone is guilty of some misdeed or not, or with particular views about what constitute misdeeds as opposed to accidents or even merely 'neutral' doings which seem to call for neither praise or blame or guilt being attached to the agent.
41. Ibid., p. 267.
42. We have not dealt explicitly with this latter project of Heidegger's. He calls such authentic understanding, competence or ability Dasein's "authentic Being-towards-death" and links it in turn to Dasein's Being-a-whole. (Ibid., pp. 231-237) It must be remembered that having such an authentic understanding, competence or ability is not a contingent matter. Competence with the world is not like competence with things within-the-world. Dasein cannot set out to become authentically understanding of its world or competent with its world. One cannot establish that some instances of Dasein are authentically able with the world and that others are not. Such an understanding is an integral part of existing which is what any instance of Dasein does'.
43. Ibid., p. 267.

44. Heidegger terms such understanding "preontological". (Ibid., pp. 12 ff.) His claim is that Dasein is an ontological entity in that its Being is always an issue for it; it is always concerned with its Being insofar as it is always already in a world which is always already understood and whose ultimate involvement is for the sake of some possibility of Dasein's Being. Dasein is said to always understand its Being in this fashion even where it has not gotten into the theoretical business of formulating an explicit ontology. For commentary on this point, see Schmitt, op. cit., p. 204.
45. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 268.
46. Ibid., pp. 272-273.
47. Heidegger says that in conscience Dasein calls itself. (Ibid., p. 275)
48. Ibid., p. 277 and p. 280.
49. Ibid., p. 273.
50. Ibid., p. 277.
51. Ibid., pp. 281 ff.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 278.
54. The cobbler does have distinct alternatives to making excuses, one important one being justification or attempted justification of the results of his labors. He could justify his actions by showing that the results are 'in order' according to further public existentiell possibilities and/or generalizations about what one does in view of relevant circumstances that the cobbler can cite. For a brief discussion of the importance of considering excuses and justifications distinct alternatives, see Austin, "A Plea For Excuses", esp. pp. 175-177.
55. "[B]ecause das Man presents every judgement and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability." (Heidegger, op. cit., p. 127)
56. Ibid., p. 288. Elsewhere he argues, "The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be detached from relationship to any law or 'ought' such that by failing to comply with it one loads himself with guilt," (Ibid., p. 283) where he is discussing how the phenomenon of guilt is to be shown as interwoven with Dasein's authenticity. It is interesting to note that in discussing his concept of 'rule-governed' behavior' Winch, by following Wittgenstein, concentrates on just that aspect of behavior that Heidegger wants to avoid as being irrelevant to a discussion of Dasein's authenticity-- namely, the possibility of mistakes insofar as they represent a deviation

from a standard or 'rule' and could be corrected according to the 'rule'. Winch's focus then remains primarily on the inauthentic rather than on the authentic side of human behavior. Exceptions would be his touching on the notion of 'reflectiveness (Winch, op. cit., pp. 64-65) and upon the notion of 'voluntary behavior'. (Ibid., pp. 91 ff.)

57. Innovations might be contrasted to mistakes in that insofar as they set new standards they are to be copied rather than corrected. They must be understood as existentiell modifications of an old generalization or 'rule' concerning what one does, but they must also be understood as embodying a generalization about what one does. Like all human behavior they are to be understood in terms of both Dasein's authenticity and inauthenticity. The relationship between mistakes and innovations, however, is an interesting one because in actual cases there is often no clear dividing line between the two sorts of case. In the history of art one finds that sometimes what one generation condemns as a 'mistake'-- as a violation of the canon or rules of good artistic technique-- another hails as innovation and a laying of the foundations of a new tradition.
58. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 247.



### CHAPTER III

We initiated this thesis with an assessment of Dray's claim to the effect that general laws do not play an essential (if any) role, either implicitly or explicitly, in the historian's explanations and accountings for historical events because a necessary presupposition of historiographical inquiry is an interest in the uniqueness of the event being explained or accounted for-- specifically an interest in the relative uniqueness of the event studied "in the sense of [its] being different from others with which it would be natural to group [it] under a classification term." We found that the claim is misleading and inadequate if its force is as a claim about mere interest on the part of the historian-- as a sort of psychological claim-- and completely unsupported and unjustified (by Dray) if its force is as a claim about how the nature of the historian's subject matter governs the approach to the subject matter he must take and the conceptual framework within which he must operate. Having shown that the real force of Dray's claim, despite the initial camouflage concerning the historian's interests, is of the latter sort (this became obvious when Dray struggled with anticipated counterarguments by the methodological monist to the possible significance of the historian's alleged interest in relative uniqueness), we went on to consider a system of categories allegedly in conformity with the nature of the historian's subject matter-- human doings. The system of categories we considered was Heidegger's complex of three ontological structures-- 'possibility', 'inauthenticity' and 'authenticity'. We explicated the system with reference to Heidegger's claims about Dasein and Winch's claims concerning meaningful human behavior. If we accept their analyses of the nature of human doings, then we

can claim that it is in terms at least of these categories, as elucidated, that the historian must conduct his inquiries, understand his material, and render his explanations. It remains to be shown that such a system of categories does indeed support the sort of claim Dray wants to make concerning the logic of historiographical explanation.

To see how our Heideggerian system of categories does render support for some of Dray's claims, let us return to that point in Dray's argument on behalf of his claim where his assumptions about the nature of the historian's subject matter become obvious. He is concerned with arguing that covering laws are not necessarily tacitly assumed at any point in an explanation of an historical event-- even in the case of a gross event which is analyzed into component events and conditions and those in turn into subcomponent events and conditions in the course of the historian's account of the gross event. He then claims that no matter how far the analysis proceeds not every such component event can in turn be assumed to fall under some general covering law because "the problem of uniqueness may recur for every attempt to subsume a component event of the gross event under law." Now if we understand Heidegger correctly and accept the conceptual complex of 'possibility', 'inauthenticity' and 'authenticity' as at least part of the system of categories in terms of which historians must approach their subject matter, then we must conclude that the so called "problem" of uniqueness not only may but must recur for each of the component events and conditions as well as for the gross event under study. For any instance of Dasein-- of human behavior-- is, on this account, to be understood in terms of its authenticity, or rather the authenticity of the existentiell possibility defining that behavior, as well as its inauthenticity.

But before going further let us make clear what is being assumed here on our part. We are presupposing that when Dray speaks of analyzing historical gross events into component events of various levels, he is in all cases speaking of human behavior-- of human doings-- and that these doings constitute the historical events Dray is talking about.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, we are assuming that in analyzing an historical event into component events and conditions and these in turn into subcomponents and so on in rendering an account of the event of original interest, eventually we can get to speaking explicitly about the doings of the individuals involved in the event. At this level at least we want to make out a case for Dray's claim concerning the 'problem' of recurring uniqueness with a view to extending the case to the social entities that the historian also talks about.

In accordance with Heidegger's account we might say that Dasein is an ontological structure.<sup>2</sup> "Dasein" is not to be construed as synonymous with "human", as we have already argued, and an instance of Dasein cannot, I think, be taken for granted as equivalent to a single person or an instance of behavior on the part of an individual person. However, we still stick to our interpretation of Heidegger's explication of Dasein as an answer to the question: "What does it mean to be human?"-- allowing for the possibility that the concept or ontological structure of 'Dasein' is operative in understanding the behavior (presumably meaningful behavior) of creatures other than humans (e.g., certain animals and gods). But it is with reference to examples of the behavior of individual people and their situations that we have in this thesis sought to make sense of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. We note here that this leaves open the question of the applicability of the ontological structure of 'Dasein' and the

Heideggerian system of categories we have been dealing with to treating larger social entities where we speak of the behavior of such entities-- e.g., France's and Britain's declaration of war on Germany in 1939 where the entities spoken of are nations. We shall turn very briefly to this question at the very end.

What we want to argue first is that where Dray's analysis or account of gross historical events in terms of component events leads us to citing and perhaps further accounting for instances of behavior on the part of the individuals involved in the gross event, the 'problem' of uniqueness must recur according to the Heideggerian account. However, it recurs, according to this account, not because it is some "mysterious" quality of the phenomena in question-- a quality awaiting our discovery in every case through empirical procedures.<sup>3</sup> Nor is the event (the instance of behavior on the part of an individual) unique in the sense that no generalizations or general regularities are tacitly assumed and involved in understanding, explaining and/or accounting for the event in question (although Dray may be correct in claiming that it is not in terms of a general law covering the event that the event in question is understood). Rather, we must say that the uniqueness or individuality of an instance of human behavior is an aspect of the conceptual framework demanded by the nature of the subject matter (i.e., of its ontological structure in Heideggerian terminology). The subject matter is subsumed under the category of 'authenticity'; it is treated as being self-possessed. And furthermore, we must note that uniqueness or individuality is an aspect of the system of categories demanded by Dasein because of the sort of generalizations and regularities involved in understanding, explaining, etc. instances of Dasein. To parrot Heidegger again, Dasein's authenticity involves merely an existentiell

modification of its inauthenticity.

To quickly review what was said earlier with regard to Heidegger's notion of 'inauthenticity', we interpreted Heidegger as arguing that this existentielle has to be understood in terms of das Man and that an elucidation of this latter existentielle involves a consideration of the claim that any instance of human behavior has to be understood in terms of what one does or how one does what is to be done. That is, the claim was to the effect that any human behavior has to be understood in terms of regularity and consistency in that sort of behavior among the Others among whom Dasein includes itself. This is the 'public' dimension of Dasein's existentiell possibility and of its world of involvement. Even in case of behavior where there do not seem to be actual other people who behave in that way under the circumstances-- where no other actual people fill the role of the Others who act in the same way-- the behavior is still to be understood in terms of what one does because it could conceivably be copied by others and become the basis for future regularity and consistency in some community. Dasein is always in a tradition even if in a particular case it turns out to be a short lived tradition with one member only. Dasein is essentially social even if the community to which a particular instance of Dasein belongs is comprised of that individual Dasein alone. In all cases Dasein's community or tradition is potentially enlargeable. From our characterization of Heidegger's notion of 'inauthenticity' we ought to be able to say a few things about the nature of the general regularities in terms of which the historian must understand the behavior of historical individuals in which he is interested or with which he is concerned.

The first thing we can say is that these regularities or consistencies

will involve generalization about the behavior within a specific group or 'community' or tradition of people. In accordance with our Heideggerian schema the historian will have to understand an instance of Dasein in terms of what the Others with whom that case of Dasein shares the world (and therefore shares that existentiell possibility defining its world) and among whom it includes itself do or in terms of how they do what is being (or has been) done. Of course for the purposes of treating a given individual's behavior we may have to widen and then narrow the community of reference in which we include him insofar as we account for different aspects of his behavior. We may do so either implicitly or explicitly in giving an explanation for that individual's behavior. Thus, in the example Dray considers of Louis XIV's non-invasion of England from Holland in 1688<sup>4</sup> some of the various 'communities' or groups of reference-- i.e., of Others among whom Louis XIV might have included himself-- of possible relevance to understanding Louis' behavior would be prior French kings, European monarchs contemporary to Louis, the French aristocracy, the French kings since the Hundred Years War and the emergence of France as a nation state, French statesmen since the Hundred Years War, and so on. Various aspects of Louis' aims and calculations with respect to intervention in English affairs, his concern with Germany, and his political and military methods for dealing with these concerns must be understood with reference to traditional concerns of French statesmen with England and Germany especially since the close of the Middle Ages and the consolidation of the French nation state and with reference to political and military methods and tactics current in Europe at the time. Such generalizations or regularities which the historian would either be tacitly assuming or explicitly interested in are on the order of customs, norms, traditions,

standard practises, common ways of doing things, etc. within certain groups. Which would have us think of them as 'rules' or rule-like regularities. implicit in a group's way of life or life-form. We can speak of them simply as generalizations about what one does in specific social groups and therefore probably involving some sort of temporal and geographical restriction.

From the above point it might be further argued that such generalizations avoid the ideal of universality which, if we are to believe a multitude of philosophers of science, is the ideal form for a generalization in the natural sciences.<sup>5</sup> And it seems that in arguing against a covering law model for explanation in historiography and against the necessity of subsuming the explained event or any aspect thereof under general covering laws or even the necessity of defending the validity of such an explanation by reference to general laws, Dray has universal general laws in mind as being incompatible with the aims of historiographical explanation. For example, he takes Popper on as an opponent and Popper's analysis of any causal explanation into a universal law (or universal hypothesis) of the form, "Events of kind A are always and everywhere followed by events of kind B" along with specific sentences about the initial conditions (i.e., the event of kind A in question).<sup>6</sup> He also places Hempel in the enemy's camp and Hempel's claim that for proper scientific explanation, as opposed to pseudo-explanation, a set of universal hypotheses are required of the form, "Whenever an event of kind A occurs, then one of kind B occurs."<sup>7</sup> We have the following as significant examples of the sort of generalization Dray is arguing against as having an essential place in the logic of historiographical inquiry:

1. "If of two armies which are about equally well armed and led,

one has a tremendous superiority in men, then the other never wins." (from Popper)<sup>8</sup>

2. "Populations will tend to migrate to regions which offer better living conditions." (Hempel's example)<sup>9</sup>

3. "Rulers are unpopular whenever their policies prove detrimental to the fortunes of their countries." (from Gardiner)<sup>10</sup>

Now in opposing the applicability of these sorts of laws to analysis of the logic of the explanation of the actions of historical individuals, Dray would seem to be in the right according to the Heideggerian categories required for the understanding of meaningful human behavior. Dray himself contends that the sort of examples given above as allegedly tacitly assumed by historians in giving explanations are so trivial and devoid of content as to be methodologically uninteresting. The logician, who argues that general laws or regularities must at least be assumed in all genuine explanation, had to become so trivial in order to find a somewhat plausible universal hypothesis in terms of which to analyze the historian's example of explanation.<sup>11</sup> Dray further argues against the "less than universal" laws (i.e., hypotheses in universal terms but qualified by a probability claim) suggested by Hempel.<sup>12</sup> The qualifying verb "tend" in the second example above may be taken as indicative of such a "less than universal" claim. Dray contends that these do not explain anything. But leaving Dray's specific arguments against these aside, his general argument against all such laws of universal terms as being intuitively unsatisfying and unsatisfactory could be rendered substantial support by pointing out that universal hypotheses do not conform to the categories in terms of which we must understand meaningful human action-- at least of individuals-- for the point of such universal hypotheses seems to be to transcend mention



of specific 'communities' among which the individuals whose behavior is being explained include themselves. In other words such universals do not accord with the existentials of das Man, which would seem to require reference on the part of the generalization the historian tacitly assumes to specific social groups and would therefore likely include temporal and geographical restriction.<sup>13</sup>

It should be stressed here, however, that the support for Dray's claim that no general covering laws (as Dray understands them) are or must be involved in an essential way tacitly or otherwise in proper historiographical explanation does not imply that no generalizations of any sort are involved.<sup>14</sup> As Langham has convincingly argued against Gallie, historiographical explanations are logically dependent on generalizations concerning behavioral regularities even though none may actually be explicitly included in a particular historiographical account. Some, of course, may be presupposed as background knowledge on the part of the historian and his reader, but in skillful historiographical narrative (of the behavior of individuals in this case) "others are suggested by skilled scene setting" and filling in of background details even where the narrator is not explicitly interested in detailing the customs and ways of life and other generalizations about how and what things are done in the society or societies which serve as the setting of the action.<sup>15</sup> Such general background information must at least be assumed or presupposed in order to understand the point of many of the things going on in the historiographical account.<sup>16</sup>

The second thing we should consider in characterizing the sort of generalizations that the historian must at least implicitly apply in his work, according to our Heideggerian system of categories, is how they are

applied. In what fashion (to get back to the issues Dray raises) are these generalizations involved in historiographical explanation? What is the logical relationship between the generalizations involved in an explanation and the behavior or event explained? This second issue is crucial, as Dray has implicitly recognized, to characterizing the sort of generalizations necessary for proper historiographical explanation. Dray notes that Gardiner, for example, on one page alone waffles between characterizing the logical role of historiographical generalizations in two ways. "[A]n explanation holds by virtue of a law, at another [place] he says that in history a covering law only has 'a bearing upon' what falls under it."<sup>17</sup> Such waffling on their role will likely be correlative with a waffling on the characterization of these generalizations. Dray goes on to point out the diverse characterizations of these generalizations employed by Popper and by Gardiner.

Popper speaks of 'causal laws', 'laws of nature' and 'trivial empirical generalizations' as if the differences between them did not much matter for covering law theory. Gardiner refers indiscriminately to the covering law as a 'generalization', a 'rule', and a 'general hypothetical'. My argument... will endeavor to show that it is only if we take the differences between such logical characterizations seriously that we can see whether the model is sound.<sup>18</sup>

The "model" Dray is referring to above is, of course, the Covering Law Model of explanation. Dray wants to argue, among other points, that the logical role of generalizations in explanation as outlined by that model are normally quite out of place logically in historiographical explanation. In attempting to so argue he interprets certain philosophers of science and history to hold the position on this issue that he is arguing against. Among these "covering law theorists" he includes Popper, Hempel and Gardiner. But we must be careful in assessing the support our

Heideggerian system of categories will lend Dray's arguments against the positions of these individuals because his version of the Covering Law Model does not really represent a fair interpretation of at least some of those theorists who do hold that general laws of the same logical order as those formulated and applied or consumed in the natural sciences have an essential (not merely a peripheral) theoretical function in historiography analogous to that which they have in the natural sciences. We want to focus only on what in Dray's position is of relevance to answering their claims concerning the roles of general laws in historiography.

Dray takes the Covering Law Model to hold "that explanation is achieved, and only achieved, by subsuming what is to be explained under a general law,"<sup>19</sup> where subsumption under a general law seems to involve the deducibility of a statement of the occurrence of the event being explained (the 'explanandum' in Hempel's terminology) from a statement of antecedent conditions determinative of the event in conjunction with a statement of the general law. As Gardiner puts it, the explained event gets understood as "an instance of a general rule stating that, given the presence of certain initial conditions, events similar to the one to be explained will occur."<sup>20</sup> Dray also seems to understand the covering law theorists he is attacking as being committed to the following claims:

1. In rendering an explanation of the occurrence of some event, besides citing the causal, the antecedent, the determinative and/or the initial conditions for it, we also ordinarily cite a generalization about that sort of event and its initial, etc. conditions which justifies our citing the initial, causal, etc. conditions we did.

2. If a question exists as to the connection between the initial causal conditions cited by way of explanation for some event in a proffered

nation (i.e., if there is some question concerning the relevance of the initial conditions to the event being explained or about what the initial conditions have to do with the event being explained), the questioner can be satisfied or brought to understand the connection by reminding him or informing him or showing him that a general law or regularity holds between events or conditions of similar sort to the initial events or conditions and events of a similar sort to the event originally to be explained.<sup>21</sup>

3. There must be single established general law under which to subsume the event to be explained and the initial determinative conditions which explain it.<sup>22</sup>

Dray seems to take statements (2) and (3) as integral parts of the covering law theorist's position, especially with respect to characterizing the logical role of general laws in their model of explanation. He spends a good deal of time examining (2), for example, in arguing against the sufficiency of an established general law covering the event explained and some conditions antecedent to it for guaranteeing a proper explanation of the event by citing those antecedent conditions.<sup>23</sup> He maintains that there is at least one further logical requirement for proper explanation.<sup>24</sup>

But we need not go into this because it will lead us far from our purpose since statements (1-3) do not represent a fair interpretation of either Hempel (at least in "The Function of General Laws in History", the article Dray most often cites) or of Gardiner both of whom do otherwise argue that general laws play an essential logical role in all proper explanation.

The former claims that an explanation of an event E "consists, as usually expressed, in indicating the causes or determining factors of E". He then goes on to assert that such an explanatory statement of causes,

etc. for E "amounts to the statement that according to certain laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event of kind E."<sup>25</sup> Hempel clearly recognizes that we normally do not mention general laws in rendering explanations.<sup>26</sup> In these cases the laws according to which one sort of event is accompanied by the same sort of event as the event to be explained are tacitly assumed or presupposed or taken for granted on the part of the explainer and 'explainee'. Hempel suggests that such explanations can often be made "complete" by mentioning what is assumed or taken for granted-- i.e., the general laws implicitly "applied" as well as any determining or boundary initial conditions presupposed. He claims that historians tacitly assume general laws in giving the explanations they do.<sup>27</sup> Thus, it seems that for Hempel the general laws "applied" in "scientific explanation" are a logically integral part of such explanation. One's commitment to such laws is a matter of making sense of the business of giving the explanation. If we have trouble seeing how an ordinary proffered explanation of some event could possibly be an explanation for that event-- that is, if we have trouble understanding the alleged connection between the cited initial conditions and the event to be explained-- then that means we are going to trouble understanding (at least some) the general laws tacitly assumed in the explanation, for, on Hempel's account, they seem to be interwoven with the sense of the explanation.<sup>28</sup> Mentioning the tacitly assumed laws will not clear up puzzlement (unless the listener merely needs to be reminded of some general regularity he already understands but has forgotten for the moment) although it may help to put one's finger on the source of puzzlement.

To take Dray's example, "Does the fact that the sky was red this morning explain the fact that rain fell before lunch?"<sup>29</sup> Well, keeping

in mind Dray's own advice for caution on the issue,<sup>30</sup> we might answer that it might to someone but that speaking for ourselves and Dray, "Surely not". And why not? Because we do not really understand the generalization, "Red sky in the morning is followed by rain." The statement may be true, but we do not understand why it should be so. Difficulty with understanding how a possible explanation could indeed be an explanation is going to be involved with difficulty in understanding the general law that according to Hempel constitutes an integral part of the explanation. Mentioning the general law or laws tacitly assumed will not serve as a logical guarantee for the solution of problems of understanding an explanation's force, since that force is, according to Hempel, to be seen in terms of the tacitly assumed general laws. The force of the explanation is interwoven with these laws. This claim about the role of the general law as a sufficient logical guarantee of effectiveness in explanation-- a claim to which Dray interprets covering law theorists as being committed-- can have no place in Hempel's position. By the very nature of his position Hempel would have had to stand with Dray, had he specifically considered the issue.

Gardiner might more readily be saddled with statement (2) as an interpretation of his position, though certainly not with statement (1). He seems to fail to distinguish between raising the question of whether a proffered explanation is indeed correct or not and questioning the force of a proffered explanation-- i.e., the possibility of its removing puzzlement about the event to be explained in any case. At the outset in discussing Hume he baldly claims: "[A]n event is explained when it is brought under a generalization or law."<sup>31</sup> -- a claim suggestive of the position in statement (2). In going on to discuss the example of Hume's billiard balls he qualifies his claim, however.

It is this general rule, established by observation of the behavior of billiard-balls on past occasions that warrants our giving the explanation that we do give when, on a particular occasion, a billiard ball is observed to move after it has been struck by another.<sup>32</sup>

What this "warrant" amounts to is instanced in the following claim in which he says that although we normally do not explicitly cite such general laws,<sup>33</sup>

whenever a causal explanation is doubted or queried (as opposed to doubting or querying the truth-value of one of its limbs [i.e., whether an alleged initial condition occurred as stated or not]...) it is the generalization that warrants its utterance that comes under fire.<sup>34</sup>

Here as elsewhere Gardiner seems to be concerned with the general law as a warrant for the correctness of the explanation, not as a warrant for its 'sense'. He seems to take for granted that we already understand the force of the proffered explanation or that the issue is one of demonstrating the falsity of the explanation. However, had he taken up this specific issue of the sense or force of an explanation, it seems to me that he might have maintained that, given the truth of the cited initial conditions, problems of understanding the sense or force of an explanation would tend to focus on the general laws explicitly mentioned or tacitly assumed that, according to Gardiner, serve as a warrant for the explanation. Gardiner at one point does touch obliquely on the issue when he concludes an argument for the necessity of understanding historiographical explanation in terms of general laws with the question: "For how [else] then is the force of the 'because' to be accounted for, unless we fall back once more upon the notion of individual and 'intuitable' connexions...?"<sup>35</sup> In spite of some ambiguity the relationship of general laws to explanation seems in his view to be one of being interwoven with the sense or force of the explanation. He also can in the end be exonerated from a commitment to statement (2).

Regarding statement (3), neither Gardiner nor Hempel should be taken as committed to the position that an explanation, historiographical or otherwise, necessarily or even usually involves the application of a single established law 'covering' the phenomenon to be explained. Hempel constantly speaks of laws and hypotheses. Although his single example of historiographical explanation in the article on which Dray concentrates is alleged by Hempel to rest on a single universal (or 'near universal') hypothesis concerning population migration to regions with better living conditions, he cites several laws as implicitly or explicitly involved in other examples of explanation that he considers, including one from the discipline of economics.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, his notion of the 'explanation sketch' employed by the historian seems to suggest the likelihood of many general laws being involved, on his view, in an historiographical explanation.<sup>37</sup>

Gardiner, on the other hand, is another case. His claim that explained events are brought under a generalization or law<sup>38</sup> and his many examples of historiographical explanation where the historian turns out, according to Gardiner's account, to be committed to a single general law suggest that Dray might be able to interpret Gardiner as holding statement (3). However, at the last possible moment Gardiner waffles out of that position.

Further, it is usually the case that not one, but many generalizations of the type we have been considering must be used to guide the historian in his quest; it is rarely true that he reaches his conclusion by presupposing one simple law.... Historians offer several causes for an event of any degree of magnitude or complexity.<sup>39</sup>

More importantly, however, Gardiner's position about the necessity of analyzing historiographical explanation in terms of at least the tacit assumption of general laws would seem to allow plenty of room for such waffling. There seems to be no good reason why those who argue that the



historian must deal with his subject matter in terms of general laws are committed to the position that the historian must assume one general law covering each event or phenomenon he wants to explain.

So we want to divorce ourselves from Dray's specific position arguing against the applicability of the Covering Law Model to analyzing historiographical explanation and ally ourselves with his more general and somewhat vaguer position of argument against the necessity of general laws or universal hypotheses playing any essential role in historiographical explanation-- that is against the necessity of understanding historical phenomena as instances of established general 'lawlike' regularities such that, given these general laws and statements of the initial conditions, we can deduce the occurrence of the event being explained in an historiographical explanation. We want to ignore all of Dray's other talk about the logical roles general laws are alleged to play in explanation by covering law theorists and focus our attention on the 'deducibility' requirement. These laws are supposed to allow for the deduction of the explanandum from a statement of the initial determining conditions.

Dray himself does in effect eventually get around to focusing on this role or function of general laws in explanation if only obliquely. He does so in discussing an account of certain sorts of explanations in historiography which he gives as an alternative account to that given by covering law theorists. He is specifically interested in the explanation of historical behavior on the part of an individual where conscious deliberation was to some degree involved.<sup>40</sup> Such explanations will, according to Dray, seek to display the rationale for what was done by the historical agent.

The goal of such explanation is to show that what was done was the thing to have done for the reasons given,

rather than merely the thing that is done on such occasions, perhaps in accordance with certain laws (loose or otherwise).<sup>41</sup>

What we are said to want in demanding an explanation for such behavior is to understand the point of what was done. To do so we have to investigate the reasons of the agent for acting as he did, which will involve taking into account, among other things his beliefs, purposes and any peculiar principles he had.<sup>42</sup> This procedure will not, according to Dray, involve subsuming an instance of behavior under a general law or laws.

"Why not?" the covering law theorist might ask. In giving our explanation are we not assuming that anyone with certain beliefs, principles, purposes, etc. in the sort of circumstances cited will act as the agent in question has done? Are we not assuming a certain generality and regularity in what is being explained such that we would expect people with similar reasons in similar circumstances to act in a similar fashion? Are we not implicitly applying general laws?

Dray does prepare an answer to these anticipated questions. "It is quite true that 'reasons for acting' ... have a kind of generality or universality,"<sup>43</sup> he admits, but the generality implicit in his 'rational' explanation is said to be distinct in kind from a general law. It is better called a 'principle of action.' Its form is of the order, "When in a situation of type  $C_1, \dots, C_n$ , the thing to do is x," rather than of simply stating that people do in fact behave in a certain way under certain circumstances,<sup>44</sup> and "[t]he connexion between a principle of action and the 'cases' falling under it is thus intentionally and peculiarly loose."<sup>45</sup> This loose connection turns out in effect to be due to a waiving of the deducibility requirement or 'means-of-deduction' role accorded a general law in empirical explanation. Dray puts his point thusly:

[I]f a negative instance is found for a general empirical law, the law itself must be modified or rejected, since it states that people do behave in a certain way under certain circumstances. But if a negative instance is found for the sort of general statement which might be extracted out of a rational explanation, the latter would not necessarily be falsified.... It is true that finding a large number of negative instances-- finding that people often do not act in accordance with it-- would create a presumption against the claim of a given principle [of action] to universal validity. But it would not compel its withdrawal; and if it was not withdrawn, the explanatory value of the principle for those actions which were in accordance with it would remain.<sup>46</sup>

Dray seems to be thinking of the problem of confirmation and disconfirmation of general laws in the natural sciences and implicitly comparing it to a similar problem with his principles of action. He seems to have in mind the following case. We are interested in some puzzling natural phenomenon or event. We have carefully noted what happened and are sure that  $z$  happened. We have also carefully noted the antecedent determinant and boundary conditions  $(x_1, x_2, \dots)$  and are sure that all the relevant initial conditions are on our list of them and that all are correctly described so that certain established laws (or a certain established law) ought to be applicable in this case. Yet the initial conditions taken in conjunction with the seemingly relevant laws would lead one to conclude that something other than  $z$  (perhaps  $y$ ) ought to have occurred; that is, the outcome of the puzzling phenomenon under study ought to have been different. It ought to have been  $y$ ; instead it was  $\sim y$ ; specifically it was  $z$ . If we maintain confidence in our listing of relevant initial conditions (that is, that they have been correctly described and exhaustively listed so that we are sure no further established or establishable general laws are applicable to the case such that they would change the outcome to be expected to coincide with the actual outcome) and in our description of the outcome ( $z$ ) under study, then we are 'compelled' to a vote of no

confidence in the general law (or at least one of the general laws) originally deemed applicable to the case. We have a 'disconfirming' instance for the law because the law has failed in its role as a means of formal deduction in the sense that the formal logician understands the word "deduction". Its (or their) role was to guarantee the truth of the statement, " $(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n) \supset y$ ." But the phenomenon under study presents us with the actual case of  $(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n)$  and  $\sim y$ , which is equivalent to  $[(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n) \supset y]$ . So the general law (or at least one of the general laws in the case of many) must be untrue. It has failed only once, but to fill the role allotted to it in any case it must be able to fill its logical role in every case where it is applicable. Should its batting average fall below 1.000, it is immediately cut from the team.

Dray seems to be arguing that the generalizations applied in the explanation of human behavior marked by conscious deliberation to some degree do not have, nor is it appropriate that they have, the same logical role as that which general laws have in the forms of explanation in which they are at home. The principle of action does not act as a means of or license for deduction in the formal logician's sense of the explicandum. Of course, it may lead one to see an instance of behavior as what was to be expected where the behavior accords with the relevant principle(s) of action.<sup>47</sup> But where the instance of behavior was not what was to be expected in accordance with all the relevant principles of action, the principles are not put in the same jeopardy as general laws would be in the analogous case. Just how far one would have to go to disconfirm a principle of action and just what the possibilities are for disconfirmation of such principles Dray does not say. Nor does he say if and how such a principle is relevant for understanding negative instances to it. But he

does want to claim that "rational explanation falls short of, as well as goes beyond, subsuming a case under a general empirical law."<sup>48</sup>

Our Heideggerian system of categories will support some of Dray's inadequately and hastily worked out intuitions about the role of generalizations in historiographical explanation. However, to appreciate exactly how, we must sketch out the points imbedded in Dray's account of rational explanation which are consonant and then those which are dissonant with our system of categories.

First we note that Dray's model of rational explanation is given as an account of how we (or rather historians) treat human behavior. The approach involved in giving the appropriate sort of explanation for such behavior is said to involve treating the phenomenon under study in terms of the point or rationale of what was done and therefore to involve grasping the beliefs, purposes and principles of the agent and in general appreciating the agent's reasons for his behavior as really being "reasons (from the agent's point of view)."<sup>49</sup> The historian must appreciate and convey the cogency of the agent's reasons for acting, and this again involves the agent's point of view. Such talk might well be taken as consonant with Heidegger's claims about Dasein as a Being that must be understood in terms of its understanding a world of involvement structured by an existentiell possibility-- a world within which it does what it does. Understanding an instance of Dasein involves treating it in terms of the possibility ordering its world-- a possibility and a world which it necessarily understands or with which it is necessarily competent. Furthermore, the generalizations applied in Dray's model of explanation, the principles of action as the thing to do in the circumstances cited, bear an interesting resemblance to Heidegger's concept of 'das Man'-- what one does.

But the similarities between what is involved in Dray's model or rational explanation and Heidegger's existentials must, however, be carefully qualified.

First, Dray's model on first glance seems to be appropriate to a limited class of human behavior. He himself suggests that it is applicable in analyzing "the kind of explanation historians generally give of the actions of individuals."<sup>50</sup> But he also claims that "there is a general presumption that a given action will be explicable on the rational model if we study it close enough."<sup>51</sup> He thereby registers a conviction against definite limits for his model within the sphere of individual action even if we find ourselves obliged to look for queer beliefs and peculiar principles on the part of the agent in order to make sense of and account for what he did. That there are or may be limits to his model's range of applicability within this sphere he does not want to "dogmatically" deny, but he does allege that those limits are impossible to theoretically define.

There will be particular cases in which we find it impossible to rationalize what was done, so that if explanation is to be given at all, it will have to be of another kind... We give reasons if we can, and turn to empirical laws if we must.<sup>52</sup>

Besides acknowledging these limits he also suggests that some historiographical explanations might be understood and analyzed either way-- as applying general laws or in terms of reasons and the rationale for the behavior.<sup>53</sup>

Yet the terms in which Dray explicates what he means by rational explanations suggest even more serious limitations to his model's range of applicability than he admits to, for he claims that a rational explanation takes the form of "reconstruction of the agent's calculation of means to be adopted toward his chosen end in the light of the circumstances in

which he found himself."<sup>54</sup> In other words, all individual human behavior is to be understood, according to Dray's model, in terms of a specialized sort of human behavior-- namely, that of conscious deliberation-- even where the agent did not indulge in a 'high degree of' conscious deliberation. In these latter cases Dray claims that

there is a calculation which could be constructed for it: the one the agent would have gone through if he had had time, if he had not seen what to do in a flash, if he had been called to account for what he did after the event, etc.<sup>55</sup>

But clearly this will not do, for in many cases where the agent could have brought himself to take the time necessary for the business of rational deliberation concerning his aims, means, beliefs and circumstances, he would not have acted as he did, had he deliberated. Haste, habit, overconfidence, nonchalance and impulse, to name a few are often factors in such behavior that obviously preclude such intellectual activities as rational deliberation or even the formulation of goals or aims to deliberate about. Indeed, rational deliberation itself is a human activity with a certain 'point' to it involving technique and circumstance and often unformulated beliefs on the part of the deliberator concerning technique and value of the activity. It would seem to be involved or associated with other intellectual activities such as planning out what one's next moves will be in a game or adjudicating a legal dispute between two parties. Dray's model of rational explanation seems to be geared to behavior of an intellectual sort. Despite his disclaimers concerning limitations, our initial impressions are reinforced by the way he treats his examples and his general contention: "There is a sense of 'explain' in which action is only explained when it is seen in a context of rational deliberation."<sup>56</sup>

Heidegger, we know, was anxious to avoid an attempt to give an

account of Dasein-- of all meaningful human behavior-- in terms of some specialized sort-- especially in terms of intellectual or theoretical behavior. This is probably the reason for his, at first glance, esoteric vocabulary. His system of existentials is supposed to enable us to talk about any instance of meaningful human behavior including those where certain factors like haste and habit preclude rational deliberation. Such instances of human behavior have a sense or point to them. They are, according to Heidegger's account, defined by a possibility of the agent's Being. The agent acts (or does not act) within a world of involvement in which things are involved in such a way as to preclude certain intellectual activity. But their sense or point does not necessarily have anything to do with how the agent would justify his action after the fact or plan it out prior to the fact. These very possibilities (of justification and planning of action) define a distinct sort of involvement world of their own where there are definite ways one goes about justification or planning-- public ways at home in the particular social context of the instance of Dasein in question. Our Heideggerian system of categories has, I think, a larger scope than Dray's model of rational explanation.

A second point of dissonance between Heidegger and Dray is that although the latter's principles of rational action bear certain resemblances to Heidegger's existentials of das Man, there are marked differences in the two insofar as Dray has failed to grasp the fact set forth by Winch that man is essentially social. Dray still thinks of the generalizations involved in his model of rational explanation in universal terms-- as "fundamental principles on which any man may be expected to order his activities."<sup>57</sup> They involve what "any sensible person" would have done.<sup>58</sup> He implies that principles of action involve "a claim to universal



validity."<sup>59</sup> But as we have already argued, the logical form of a generalization which patterns itself after Heidegger's existentials of das Man as that in terms of which we understand human behavior demands a reference to a specific social context for the generalization. Dray seems to ignore this as being a central essential feature of the logic of historiographical explanation, although he does touch on the issue obliquely. He does note that it is often necessary for the historian to think in terms of what is rational according to the purposes and principles prevalent in the society of the historical individual under study rather than in terms of the concept of rationality operative in the historian's own society. Dray calls such alien and unfamiliar principles, purposes and beliefs "'foreign' data".<sup>60</sup>

That his qualifications concerning the possibility of 'foreign' data only touch on the issue obliquely showing no real grasp of the issue of man's 'social nature' is betrayed in his hang-up about regularity and routine in human behavior. Dray seems to think that his model of rational explanation and the generalities it involves--~~all~~ principles of action as a "universality of reasons"-- essentially have nothing to do with regularity and routine in human behavior. In at least two places he suggests that in historical events "some of the details analyzed out for explanation may be recognized as routines; and thus as falling under a law."<sup>61</sup> The regular or routine in human affairs seems for Dray to have an entirely different and distinct nature from human behavior of a less routine or more rational (?), purposeful(?) or pointed (?) sort. Routine behavior seems for him to demand treatment in entirely different terms, specifically in terms of general laws. At least the routine seems to presuppose an entirely different conceptual frame of reference for understanding it than the rational does.

When we subsume an action under a law, our approach is that of a spectator of the action; we look for a pattern or regularity in it. But when we give an explanation in terms of the purpose which guided the action, the problem which it was intended to solve, the principle which it applied, etc., we adopt the standpoint of the agent. In adopting this standpoint, the investigator appreciates the agent's problem and appraises his response to it.<sup>62</sup>

We are forced to the conclusion in interpreting Dray that for him a concern with pattern and regularity in human behavior is divorced-- completely divorced-- from approaching the problem or what someone did in terms of rational principles. He consigns a concern with the routine to social science as a "social 'physics'".<sup>63</sup> The principles of action or rational principles involved in understanding an instance of behavior seem to be thought of as analogous to some sort of abstract moral principles where the agent can sit down and 'calculate', consciously and deliberately, what, given the circumstances, he should do in accordance with his own principles irrespective of what others do. The result is his own unique plan of action. Dray's model of rational explanation seems, according to his own claims, to be inappropriate for understanding any behavior that has habitual or customary aspects about it or that is to be seen as standing in a tradition. At best we can take Dray as claiming that the historian can apply the rational model of explanation to such cases, but in doing so he must ignore the customary, habitual or traditional aspect of such behavior.

According to our Heideggerian system of categories, on the other hand, the historian is obliged to think in terms of the customary, the traditional, the habitual and the ordinarily done in the social milieu of the individual whose behavior is under consideration. That social milieu is the 'public' among whom the individual understands himself to be included where "understand" here refers not merely or even principally to

cognitive understanding of or to belief about the fact or alleged fact that he belongs to or is associated with some social group. Nor is it necessarily a matter of organized groups with which the individual deliberately and consciously attempts to associate himself or among which he deliberately attempts to include himself or to whose ways of doing things he deliberately attempts to conform. These may be factors. Rather, "understand" here refers to the sort of familiarity or competence or ability that we discussed in dealing with understanding as an existential. Dasein was said to always already be familiar or competent with its world in encountering entities within-the-world and therefore already familiar or competent in any particular instance of Dasein with specific ways in which one deals with the world and entities within-the-world such that Dasein can make mistakes and run into mishaps and evaluate these as such. These ways in which one deals with things are definitive of the social groups or the public among which Dasein includes itself.

Heidegger would claim that in not all, or indeed not even in most, human behavior does the agent deliberately calculate what he should do according to formulated principles irrespective of what others do. This is not to say that the agent deliberately conforms to what others do in all cases either. There is too much to be done including the sometime business of deliberation and calculation to be deliberating and calculating beforehand all the time. Even the business of calculation and deliberation has its methods and techniques, its customary and traditional and habitual, its routine and regular aspects about it. The routine and the regular in human affairs are not to be consigned to the realm of a "social 'physics'" treating its subject matter in terms of general laws. Explicit attention concentrated on the routine and regular in history

belongs to the sphere of the social and economic historian among possible others. In the area of contemporary affairs the political scientist, anthropologist and sociologist may focus on these. The routine, the regular and the patterned in these areas will be seen in terms of what one does. The historian interested in explaining an individual's historical act may not always, or even often, explicitly mention the routine and the usual and the customary-- the "typical"-- of the age and place, but some understanding of these must be presupposed on the part of his reader. (Otherwise, the historian will have to fill in this background knowledge in some way or other.

The significant differences between our Heideggerian system of categories and Dray's model of rational explanation and the possible inadequacies of the latter have been delineated. In view of these formidable differences, in what respect can the former lend the latter support? The answer is: In defending Dray's claim that the general principles (the principles of action) involved in rational explanation do not function as a means of deduction (as formal logicians understand the term) of the event to be explained from the initial and boundary conditions-- that "the connexion between a principle of action and the 'cases' falling under it is thus intentionally and peculiarly loose." Dray's claim will be supported in that, given our Heideggerian system of categories, we shall want to make this sort of claim for any generalization in terms of which we understand a case of meaningful human behavior-- for any generalization framed according to the existentials of das Man.

The claim is supported in the following fashion. According to our system of categories, any instance of Dasein must be understood in terms of its authenticity as well as its inauthenticity where its authenticity

amounts to the possibility of existentiell modification of its inauthenticity. This in effect means that any instance of Dasein is a case that may contravene the generalization (about what one does) appropriate to understanding the point of the behavior. The case of a mistake, for example, makes sense qua mistake only as a negative instance of the generalizations about what one does applicable to understanding the case. It is a contravention of what is done. The truth of all the generalizations appropriate and relevant to understanding an instance of Dasein in conjunction with the truth of descriptions of all the relevant initial conditions will not guarantee the conformity of what ought to have occurred or what one would have expected to occur with what actually occurred. And even where an instance of behavior does conform in all or most respects to what one does in the 'community' involved, the instance of behavior as an instance of Dasein must be understood in terms of its authenticity-- in terms of the possibility of existentiell modification of what one does. Even in these cases the behavior of the individual with whom one is concerned is understood as his own. /It is individual (or uniquely his) in that he is answerable for in terms of the possibility of existentiell modification of what he did as what one does. And this reflects the crucial way in which the logical role of generalizations patterned according to the existentials of das Man will differ from the logical role of general laws in the natural sciences.

The repercussions of this characteristic of generalizations and general regularities in the area of the human-social sciences and their subject matter is far reaching. In the last chapter we argued that a consideration of the possibility of making mistakes most obviously illustrated Heidegger's claims about Dasein's authenticity as an existentiell

modification of its inauthenticity, but we also mentioned that the possibility of innovative behavior could provide another illustration. In innovative behavior Dasein also modifies what one does-- what is ordinarily done in the community in which it includes itself and understands itself as included. Qua innovation such behavior represents what has not been done before and so is not in accordance with what is done-- at least prior to the innovation. But instead of being behavior tied to the possibility of correction in accordance with what is done, as is the case with mistaken behavior, it is, rather, behavior tied to the possibility of being copied by Others among whom Dasein counts itself. It is tied to the possibilities of teaching and learning through copying and of starting a new tradition or of modification of the old one. It is tied to the possibility of learning what to do from now on rather than what not to do, as is the case with mistakes. As another way in which the ontological possibility of Dasein's authenticity can take concrete form, the possibility of innovation is another way in terms of which we can think of an instance of Dasein's behavior as individualized, as uniquely its own, and as that for which Dasein as a self-possessed Being is answerable. Perhaps it is a preferable way to that of thinking in terms of possible mistakes.

Where the possibility of innovation is realized, an interesting situation arises. We have real historical change. The regularities in terms of which we understand the behavior or the innovative individual and the appropriate behavior of other individuals who include themselves in his 'community' and his new 'tradition' by copying and learning the new behavior change. There is modification in the generalizations used to understand the behavior prior to innovation, and these modified generalizations are necessary to understanding the behavior in the community

assimilating the innovation. What one does now is not what one used to do. This formal possibility for generalizations applied in historiography merely reflects the commonly observed and trivial fact that customs and norms change over the years in a given community and vary from community to community. But it also emphasizes the theoretical and formal doctrine argued for earlier in the chapter that the logical form of the generalizations used in historiography to understand and explain its subject matter (as well as those applied and of interest in the other human-social sciences) demands reference to specific communities and involves temporal restrictions on the scope of the generalization. The demand for specific reference to time and community recognizes the possibility of historical agents modifying the regularities in terms of which their behavior must be understood and the consequent possibility of modification in the customs and way of life of an entire community and perhaps divergent modification in customs and way of life of an originally unified community.<sup>64</sup> The historian's job often involves detecting just what the restrictions appropriate for a given generalization are. His dilemma involves drawing the line at the point where an innovation has been assimilated by an already defined community to the degree where it is no longer an 'innovation' or a 'mistake' in the behavior of isolated individuals but has become the prevailing norm in the community with consequent explanatory power for dealing with the behavior of other individuals in the community and in the tradition.

Our explication of Heidegger's concept of 'authenticity' and its impact on the problem of the sort of generalizations that the historian applies in historiographical explanation thereby lends new life to Dray's argument for the historian's interest in the relative uniqueness of historical events under study. For if we take the historian's approach to

his subject matter to be guided by the nature of the subject matter itself, as we have discussed earlier, then we may claim that the historian must concern himself with the authenticity of the historical individuals he studies and of their behavior. According to Heidegger in any scientific inquiry the scientist already has an understanding of the Being of the entities he investigates even before he discovers any facts about them.<sup>65</sup> For the historian this means at least a prior understanding of what it means to be human. The scientist's prior familiarity with the nature of his subject matter involves a familiarity with the standards or criteria whereby he distinguishes between facts and 'only 'seeming facts', false or inaccurate characterizations of the facts or outright misdescriptions; and it includes a familiarity with the form or terms in which the facts will be stated. It includes a familiarity with the standards of objectivity in the science-- with what can possibly count as an object of investigation. Heidegger himself argues that "the Objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity that belongs to it as its theme."<sup>66</sup> With respect to historiography he states that in "authentic historiography" "the Dasein which has-been-there is understood in its authentic possibility which has been."<sup>67</sup> Because the historian's subject matter-- Dasein which has-been-there-- is essentially authentic or self-possessed so that ultimately its world and its existentiell possibilities-- its behavior-- must be understood as exclusively its own, the historian's approach must be guided by the possibility of authenticity in any instance of Dasein under study. The historian's approach in terms of this ontological possibility might be characterized as an 'interest' in the relative uniqueness of the instance of Dasein under study.



The complexity of historical phenomena is a truism cited by all. The complexity of a single individual's behavior is also an often cited truism on the part of psychologists. There are so many respects and aspects of a normal individual's doings that description of a given instance could go on and on. Such complexity reflects the complexity of the involvement-worlds of most individuals, and such complexity is reflected in the myriad of generalizations about what one does and how one does it that are applicable to understanding a given case of Dasein. In most cases of human behavior there are many empirical possibilities for existential modification of what one does in that situation. There are many aspects of what is done that could conceivably be modified in some way. The chances are that in any given case at least some of these possibilities are realized. And it is upon these, it seems, that Dray would have the historian focus his interest. These would be the respects in which an individual's behavior differed from the behavior of other individuals with whom it would be most natural to group him. It is in terms of the respects in which an individual's ontological possibility of authenticity is realized in concrete form that it is easiest to understand his behavior and his situation as being exclusively or uniquely his own-- as singled out and standing out from the Others among whom he includes himself. Dray's claim about the historian's presupposition of interest in relative uniqueness really depends for its force and sense and significance in the debate between methodological-logical monists and pluralists on an assumed category of inquiry into human behavior somewhat on the order of Heidegger's concept of 'authenticity' and therefore also on the sort of generalizations applicable to human affairs implicit in Heidegger's concept of 'inauthenticity'.

But, of course, Dray started his argument about relative uniqueness with a claim about the historian's interest in historical events on the order of the French Revolution which involve not merely the behavior of individuals acting on their own behalf but also, and perhaps principally, the collective action by groups of individuals acting as a social unit. Such events seem to involve social entities like the Estates General, the Paris proletariat and the French Army. Can and must the historian use our Heideggerian system of categories when investigating the 'behavior' of these larger entities too?

Dray also briefly deals with the problem with respect to his model of rational explanation.

In highly condensed-general histories, classes and nations and societies are often personified and written about in a quasi-rational way. Thus Germany's attack on Russia in 1941 may be explained by citing the threat of encirclement-- as if a 'calculation' of this sort were relevant to the actions of a superagent called 'Germany'.<sup>68</sup>

Dray is worried about the sense of attributing calculations (in terms of which he wants to be able to treat any instance of human behavior) to entities like nations. (One wonders what he would have said about mobs.) He solves the problem by suggesting that when the historian talks in terms of nations, etc., he is actually talking about the calculations made by some specific individual or individuals empowered to act on behalf of a nation (such as Hitler and his advisors deliberating about the problem of Russia in 1941) or about the typical calculation made by a typical member of the group or social entity of concern, as would be the case if the historian were giving reasons for Slavic hostility towards the Hapsburg monarchy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.<sup>69</sup>

Unlike Dray, we need not worry about the sense of attributing calculations to entities like nations because from the standpoint of our

system of Heideggerian categories calculation is to be understood as a sometime human activity, not as that in terms of which we are to understand all human activity. With the concept of 'existentiell possibility' no such contrary intuitions and inhibitions of sense ought to occur. There seems on the face of it no good reason why we cannot apply the concept of 'existentiell possibility' and the concepts that are interwoven with it in Heidegger's account (like 'world of involvement' and even the ultimate existentiell possibility of being dead) to social entities. With respect to the latter concept it is true that nations do not perish in the way that biologically alive organisms do and that they are not destroyed in the same fashion that physical objects are, but these possibilities are, according to Heidegger, to be distinguished from Dasein's ultimate existentiell possibility of being dead anyway. Civilizations do 'die out.' The Roman public world of involvement is no more. There is no possibility of further Roman existentiell possibilities and Roman achievement through the realization of such possibilities. Nations can be seen as individualized in terms of the possibility of authenticity-- of modification of their tradition and so forth. Heidegger's existentials can be used to treat large and small scale social phenomena.

Furthermore, they must be so applied insofar as Dray is correct about the historian's talk concerning social entities being analyzable into talk about individuals acting on behalf of a social group or to talk about the typical individual within a group. In the latter case what the historian is talking about is the public existentiell possibilities defining what one does within the group with respect to some situation. It reflects an explicit concern on the part of the historian with the generalizations that can be used to understand the behavior of specific individuals within

the group. And the group or social entity as a whole can be understood in terms of the possibility of authenticity-- and therefore as an individualized Being-- insofar as there is the possibility of modification of the typical through the assimilation throughout the group of innovation by individuals within the group. In the former sort of case where the large scale historical phenomenon is analyzable in terms of the actions of specific individuals, Heideggerian categories are to be applied, as has been argued throughout. More than this we cannot say without wading into the issues of methodological holism versus methodological individualism except to register the intuition and the conviction that insofar as the historian's talk about and concern with large scale historical events involving larger social entities is talk about and concern with human affairs, our Heideggerian system of categories derived from the answer to the question: "What does it mean to be human?" must be applied and does support Dray's contention about the historian's interest qua historian in relative uniqueness in all, not just in some or most, areas of historiographical inquiry and explanation.

### FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. See footnote 1, Chapter I above.
2. Heidegger himself does not say that Dasein is an ontological structure. It might actually be more in accordance with what Heidegger does say to speak of the ontological structure of Being-in-the-world. "Dasein" is said to denote an entity. Being-in-the-world is said to be a state of Being or a structure fundamental to Dasein's Being although not the only one necessary for determining Dasein's Being. (Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 53 ff.) Being-with and Dasein-with, for example, are said to be equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world. (Ibid., p. 114) I shall, however, continue to speak in this chapter of Dasein as an ontological structure, and this structure I am referring to the entire integrated complex of existentials or states of Being or ontological structures which Heidegger outlines as determinative of Dasein's Being. This 'conceptual' complex of course includes the three categories or existentials of possibility, authenticity and inauthenticity in which we are interested. Any entity denoted by by the term "Dasein" (and it is the very extension of this term which we want to keep an open issue for the present although we can say that people at least will fall within this extension) presumably must be understood in terms of the complex of categories or existentials or structures that we have been discussing.
3. Just as we do not employ empirical procedures to discover whether some geological phenomenon is a sort of phenomenon which precludes it being understood and explained in terms of any natural laws and regularities.
4. Dray, op. cit., p. 122.
5. For examples see Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II, p. 343 and Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History", p. 232.
6. Dray, op. cit., p. 3. Here he is citing Popper, op. cit., p. 343.
7. Dray, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Here he is citing Hempel, op. cit., p. 232.
8. Dray, op. cit., p. 5. Here he is citing Popper, op. cit., p. 264.
9. Dray, op. cit., p. 28, citing Hempel, op. cit., p. 236.
10. Dray, op. cit., p. 25 and pp. 32 ff., referring to Gardiner, op. cit., p. 82 and pp. 87 ff.
11. Dray, op. cit., pp. 28 ff. Actually Dray here is echoing Popper's characterization of such general laws as trivial, and Dray acknowledges it. See Popper, op. cit., p. 264.
12. Dray, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

13. It should be noted that we are not claiming or implying that generalizations with restrictions as to place and time or generalizations containing proper names (referring to specific social groups or individuals) are peculiar to historiography or to the Geisteswissenschaften in general. In arguing against a distinct methodology and logic of historiographical inquiry in The Structure of Science, Nagel naturally seeks to minimize the significance of the point concerning restricted generalizations. He notes that the natural sciences also make use of restricted generalizations and "singular statements" with proper names with which historiographical work apparently abounds. As an example he cites the law of acceleration of freely falling bodies at sea level in certain latitudes being 980 centimeters per second per second. But as he himself notes, "laws of this kind... are specializations of laws not similarly restricted." (Nagel, op. cit., p. 548) With the logical ideal of universal hypotheses in the natural sciences such restricted generalizations as these themselves call for explanation (with regard to the restrictions) in terms of unrestricted general laws and the particular conditions or circumstances giving rise to the restricted regularity. In historiography, where the ideal of generalization through a specific community is operative, we will not have the methodological and logical presupposition that restricted generalizations are to be understood in terms of unrestricted ones, although cases may arise, of course, where ways of doing things within a restricted social group (for example, an organized club) can be understood and calls for explanation in terms of what one does within a larger less restrictive social group (for example, the social-economic class or classes in which the club members are included). But at no point in proper historiography do we escape or attempt to escape reference to specific social groups. A similar point can be made with reference to the mention of particulars and the use of proper names in any generalizations the historian tacitly presupposes or explicitly discusses. These would seem to be essential features of historiographical generalization, given the necessity for reference to specific social groups. A charitable interpretation of Dray, op. cit., pp. 36-37, will understand him as developing this point, even if he does so in a rather bumbling fashion.
14. Dray, op. cit., pp. 36-37. Although later on in his book Dray admits that a sort of generalization or generality (i.e., a "principle of action") may be involved in an essential way in historiographical explanation conforming to his model of rational explanation, his remarks on pages 36-37 suggest an argument on his part to the effect that wherever the historian mentions the names of particular people, institutions, social groups and peoples, the possibility of generalizations being involved tacitly or otherwise in an explanation is ruled out.
15. Langham, Explanation and Understanding in the Human Sciences, pp. 52-53.
16. Ibid., p. 50.

17. Dray, op. cit., p. 23. Here he is referring to Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92.

18. Dray, op. cit., p. 23.

19. Ibid., p. 1.

20. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 1.

21. Dray, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.

22. One encounters this interpretational assumption throughout Dray's book from the very outset, and his summary statement of the covering law model on page 1 as involving the subsumption of "what is explained under a general law." He qualifies this assumption, however, in two places, if only briefly. In the first place on pages 52 and following he admits that Hempel's formulation of the model is more sophisticated than the model of the single covering law theretofore considered. We examined his argument against Hempel's account in Chapter I above and found it wanting. The second place in which he briefly admits a more sophisticated version of the model is on page 70. He brushes aside the more sophisticated version here as not affecting his central line of argument against the sufficiency of covering laws as a guarantee of adequate explanation. To do so, however, he must make blatant use of his unacknowledged second assumption about the way the covering law theorist is to be understood.

23. Dray, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.

24. Ibid., pp. 66-71. It is here that he presents his model of continuous series in outlining a further logically necessary condition for adequate explanation. It must be remembered that the sense of "logic" that he and we are using is broader and philosophically more interesting than the sense of logic as a merely formal or mathematical enterprise. Dray claims that it is "the broad sense of 'logic' familiar among analytic philosophers. For it is my claim that it is essential to the notion of giving an explanation that even if subsumption under law were a necessary condition of it, there should be criteria which allow us to distinguish some law-covered phenomena from others."

25. Hempel, op. cit., p. 232.

26. Ibid., p. 235.

27. Ibid., pp. 236-237.

28. Dray himself seems to give evidence of an intuitive grasp of this issue on his part in his comments about such generalizations as "All swans are white," and about his own example of the automobile engine seizure. (Dray, op. cit., p. 62 and p. 67) This issue of the explanatory adequacy of enumerative generalizations leads into the issue of nomothetic versus merely enumerative generalizations.

29. Dray, op. cit., p. 61.
30. Dray's advice for caution on this issue concerned the need for taking into account contextual factors and the person for whom the explanation is intended in any analysis of explanation. (Dray, op. cit., p. 68)
31. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 1.
32. Ibid., p. 2.
33. Ibid., p. 25.
34. Ibid., p. 26.
35. Ibid., p. 98.
36. Hempel, op. cit., p. 236.
37. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
38. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 1.
39. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
40. Dray, op. cit., p. 123.
41. Ibid., p. 124.
42. Ibid., p. 125.
43. Ibid., p. 132.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 133.
46. Ibid., p. 132.
47. Ibid., p. 133.
48. Ibid., p. 131.
49. Ibid., p. 126.
50. Ibid., p. 118.
51. Ibid., p. 137.
52. Ibid., p. 138.
53. Ibid., pp. 133-136
54. Ibid., p. 122.



55. Ibid., p. 123.
56. Ibid., p. 150.
57. Ibid., pp. 136-137.
58. Ibid., p. 134.
59. Ibid., p. 132. He also refers to it here as "this universality of reasons."
60. Ibid., p. 130 and p. 125.
61. Ibid., p. 54 and p. 58.
62. Ibid., p. 140.
63. Ibid., p. 139.
64. It might also be argued that the possibility of modification of the regularities in terms of which an historical agent's behavior is to be understood-- modification by the agent himself-- precludes the possibility of prediction (in the rigorous sense in which the natural sciences understand the term "prediction") in historiography. This preclusion may also be seen in formal terms as a consequence of waiving the "means of deduction" logical role of generalizations in historiographical explanation (and in inquiry in the other Geisteswissenschaften) discussed above. Considerations along these lines are probably behind Winch's argument against the compatibility of scientific prediction with conceptual framework required for the social sciences. (Winch, op. cit., pp. 91-94) Such considerations may also be involved in Popper's argument against the possibility of prediction of historical phenomena given on pages v-vi in the "Preface" to his Poverty of Historicism. I am specifically referring to the second premise of the argument: "We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific knowledge." As philosophical support for this claim, he can only offer the intuition "that we cannot anticipate today what we shall only know tomorrow." Popper's point does seem intuitively convincing, but why it should be so remains problematic. If at least part of the force of his argument rests on the presupposition of the possibility of historical modification (through innovation) of what is done (or what one does) in all areas of human activity including the sciences, then it becomes an interesting argument from our point of view. The force of the argument could be the following. What is involved in current scientific method and procedure (all the way from general standards of truth and criteria of what is to count as fact to factual assumptions made in the course of the various scientific disciplines to the most trivial aspects of actual procedure in scientific inquiry) as aspects of human behavior and activity and therefore as aspects of Dasein (see Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 11-12 and Winch, op. cit., pp. 84 ff.) must be seen in terms of the possibility of historical change. Such a possibility cannot allow us to predict the future

Leaf 228 omitted in page numbering.

state of science according to the standards of rigor accepted by scientific method itself because historical change means the possibility of modification in that very method-- the way one goes about doing science-- and even in the criteria for what will count as sound prediction and what will count as proven fact. The prediction of the future state of science would involve science predicting change and innovation in its predictive procedures, thereby outlining new standards of prediction and finally thereby undercutting the force and authority of the predictive procedures by which it predicted innovation in these predictive procedures in the first place.

65. Heidegger. op. cit., pp. 9-11.

66. Ibid., p. 395.

67. Ibid., p. 394.

68. Dray, op. cit., p. 140.

69. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allen, G.H., The French Revolution, 4 vols., George Barrie's Sons, Philadelphia, 1922.
- Apel, Karl-Otto, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1967.
- Austin, J.L., "A Plea For Excuses", Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Collingwood, R.G., The Idea of History, Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm, Gesammelte Schriften, 14 vols., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1958.
- Dray, William, Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Fløistad, Guttorm, "On Understanding Heidegger: Some Difficulties", in Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, ed. R.E. Olson and A.M. Paul, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1972.
- Gadamer, H.G., Wahrheit und Methode, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1965.
- Gardiner, Patrick, The Nature of Historical Explanation, Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Heidegger, Martin, Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1967.
- Hempel, C.G., "The Function of General Laws in History", Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Collier-Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Collier-Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.
- Langham, Paul, Explanation and Understanding in the Human Sciences, an unpublished thesis for the degree of Magister in Artibus of the University of Wales, 1969.
- Liebel, Helen, "The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought", Eighteenth Century Studies, vol. 4, no. 4, University of California Press.
- Malcom, Norman, "Certainty and Empirical Statements", in Readings in Introductory Philosophical Analysis, ed. John Hospers, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Verification Argument", in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963.

- Mink, Louis, "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding", in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. W. Dray, Harper and Row, New York, 1966.
- Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., New York, 1961.
- Oakeshott, Michael, Experience and Its Modes, Cambridge University Press, 1933.
- Partridge, Eric, Origins, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966.
- Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols., Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
- Rickman, H.P., Meaning in History, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961.
- Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, Penguin Books, 1966.
- Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, Methuen and Co., London, 1957.
- Schmitt, Richard, Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to "Sein und Zeit", Random House, New York, 1969.
- Searle, J.R., Speech Acts, University Press, Cambridge, 1969.
- Shipley, Joseph, Dictionary of Word Origins, Littlefield, Adams and Co., Patterson, N.J., 1961.
- Skeat, Walter, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1961.
- Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books, 1964.
- Taylor, Charles, The Explanation of Behavior, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964.
- Tuttle, H.N., Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of Historical Understanding: A Critical Analysis, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1969.
- Walsh, W.H., An Introduction to Philosophy of History, Hutchinson and Co., London, 1951.
- Weekly, Ernest, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, Dover, New York, 1967.
- Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.