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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Liberal Party Reform

by

(c)

Veronica E. White

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF Master of Arts

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EDMONTON, ALBERTA

Fall 1986

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7
Date *July 25 1986*
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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated

to the memory of my father,

who taught me to laugh at life's adversities,

and to my mother whose limitless love

helps me appreciate life's miracles.

Abstract

"Liberal Reform" is an analysis of federal Liberal organizational history from 1919 to the present. The intent of the thesis is to discover the role played by organization in the party's formula for political success. It applies the lessons of history to the 1986 Liberal party led by John Turner in hopes of discerning the organizational changes he and party president Iona Campagnolo must carry out in order to make the party a viable alternative to the Conservative party in 1988.

This thesis argues that there are two discernable periods in Liberal history since 1919: an elite-based phase and a democratic phase. The elite-based phase is characterized by an autocratically controlled party in which the membership is merely an electoral machine. In the democratic phase, the membership plays an essential role in policy making while the elite is accountable to the grassroots. It is during the elite-based phase that the seeds of defeat are planted as the leadership becomes isolated from the voices of the membership. I argue that Turner must restore the Liberal party to the democratic phase if it is to be rebuilt. Egos within the membership must be stroked if the enthusiasm of the membership is to be restored. It would appear Turner and Campagnolo have begun this process.

Chapters 2 to 6 examine five elements in the party's internal structure with a view to discerning their relative

importance to electoral success since 1919. Chapter 7 analyses the opinions of the membership and the party elite as to reforms that must be made to the party's structure in order to rebuild the party.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank Dr. Fred Engelmann for not only his academic contributions as my advisor, which I know were often laborious, but also for his contributions as an individual. He is an exceptional human being and I am thankful to have had the opportunity to work with him on this thesis. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Ken Munro and Dr. Allan Tupper, for their obliging assistance throughout the course of this project. I would like to extend my boundless thanks to Darlene Holowaychuk. If it had not been for her patient advice and guidance with the computer the thesis would not have been completed. If it had not been for her contributions as a very special friend my sanity would have been in jeopardy. Finally, I would like to thank various members of the Department of Political Science, especially Alice Lau, the department Librarian, whose patience and dedication is appreciated.

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Membership	17
III. Party Finance	38
IV. Links Between Party Wings	57
V. Federal-Provincial Relations	77
VI. Leadership	99
VII. Members and Elites	117
VIII. Conclusion	134
Bibliography	143
Appendix I	146
Appendix II	151
Appendix III	157

I. Introduction

"On that grey late-autumn day there were no bets being made that Pierre Trudeau would ever again sit on the prime minister's bench in the House of Commons.... Twenty-one weeks later he would be sitting on the prime minister's bench listening to the throne speech opening the 32nd session of Parliament." The 1980 reincarnation of Trudeau mirrors the pattern of existence followed by the Liberal party from 1919 to the present. When Liberal fortunes seem at their lowest, a period of renewal is instituted, and future triumph is ensured. It is as if a supreme being had willed the party to sit at the right hand of the Speaker. The party's pattern of reform followed after 1984 would indicate that this model has not ended.

In 1919, when William Lyon Mackenzie King took over the leadership, the party was in an organizational mess, its electoral future in doubt. The Liberals had won only 82 seats in the previous vote. By 1921, the Liberals managed to win 116 of 235 seats in the House, ruling as a minority government, and by 1935 they had won the largest victory ever in federal politics with 173 of 245 seats.

From 1935 until 1957, King and subsequently Louis St. Laurent managed to maintain a Liberal majority in the House. In 1957 Diefenbaker wrested a minority government from St. Laurent, who resigned in favour of a new party leader. A leadership convention a few months later chose Lester

¹I. Anderson, "Anatomy of a comeback," Maclean's, April 21, 1980, p.22.

Pearson to succeed St. Laurent.

Like Mackenzie King, Pearson faced a dismal future as party leader when in 1953 the Tories won 208 of 265 seats. Yet in the 1963 general election the Liberals gained considerable ground on their main opponents as the vote was 129 for the Liberals and 95 for the Conservatives. Finally, as noted earlier, Pierre Trudeau's political future looked grim in 1979 as the Clark-led Conservatives won 136 of 282 Commons seats. Yet Trudeau came back in 1980 and won 147 of the Commons' 282 seats, leaving Clark with 103 and the NDP with 32. Following Trudeau's resignation, Brian Mulroney led the Conservatives to a landslide victory over John Turner's Liberals, in 1984. In summary, the Conservatives have held office only four times between 1921-1986: 1926, 1930-1935, 1957-1963, and from 1984 to the present. Liberal hegemony in terms of time in office is decisive.

One incompletely answered question concerns the reasons for the Liberals' dominance. What is the Liberals' formula of success? Despite some undefinable hold the party has over the electorate and despite policies they may or may not have adopted, organizationally there are certain features which make the Liberal party a success. Although a superior organization may not be paramount it is certainly an element in the party's success.

What this leaves the writer to discover is the essential elements of a political party's organization and relate these to the successes of the Liberal party. We must

also examine the future prospects for the Liberal party, led by John Turner. "Does the 1985 Liberal party have the will to change?"² Turner won only 40 of the Commons' 282 seats in 1984, the worst defeat suffered by the Liberal party since Confederation. Can the Turner-led Liberals repeat the miracles of King, Pearson and Trudeau? Through an examination of the essential elements of party organization that have emerged since 1919, and comparing them with the elements in existence at present, some speculation is possible.

The essential thing to remember about the party's past is the fact there is a long history of internal reform.³ Joseph Wearing in his book The L-Shaped Party said, the Liberals are a party of two leitmotifs, one, idealistic that seeks to make the party into a democratic, reformist, broadly based organization, and a cynical one in which the party is controlled autocratically by an ever-diminishing coterie around the leader; the volunteer wing is then used only for whatever it may contribute to the winning of elections.⁴ Upon electoral defeat the Liberal party looks to its volunteer wing and its provincial brethren to increase membership and improve financing. Once re-elected, the party becomes less internally democratic and more elitist. During

²"Reform: Does Our Party Have The Will To Change," Notes for a speech by the Honourable Iona Campagnolo, P.C. To The Conseil General of The Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec) Saturday, April 13, 1985, p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴Joseph Wearing, the L-Shaped Party: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1958-1980. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1981), p. 235.

the period of democracy substantial reforms are introduced into the party organization, thus small steps are taken to improve the state of the party for both the elected and non-elected members. The point is that the party is ever changing and these reforms must be examined in relation to the success they provide at election time. Upon making such an observation we can then look at and evaluate the changes that are being made to the 1986 Liberal party which in defeat is currently entering a democratic phase, democracy being defined as an accountable elite and grassroots involved in policy and organizational decisions. To review, the dominant recurring theme when examining Liberal history is that of the alternation between democracy in defeat and elitism in victory within the party's organization. Throughout the remainder of the thesis the intention is to examine these two opposing phases of Liberal history, in terms of five organizational elements, in order to discover how the party can recoup its losses of 1984.

The five organizational elements which will be examined are: membership, finance, provincial participation, leadership, and parliamentary-non-parliamentary links. The strengths and weaknesses of these elements mean the difference between a successful political organization and one which is destined indefinitely for the opposition benches.

As I noted in the previous paragraph membership is an important element of organization. In my opinion, to be a

truly strong party the Liberals must enter a phase of democracy and abandon their elitist tendencies. There must be a volunteer machine in place so that when an election is called, an appropriate number of people are available as foot soldiers, to accomplish such varied tasks as manning polling stations, putting up signs and stuffing envelopes. In addition, specific volunteers are involved in policy formulation. For any party it is people who make the difference. They formulate policy and spread the party line throughout the electorate.

Maurice Duverger, a recognized authority on political parties, notes cadre parties like the Liberals have a tendency to ignore membership. Such an opinion is reflective of the elite-based Liberal party. The number of members becomes secondary to the quality: "Quality is the most important factor: extent of prestige, skill in technique, size of fortune."⁵ In Duverger's judgement, cadre parties do not engage in rescuing people from the clutches of capitalists, nor do they educate the masses and politicize their activities.

In direct contrast to Duverger, the Liberal Party of Canada, during its democratic phases, recognizes the importance of membership to the purposes of a political organization. My opinions of membership are firmly anchored in the succeeding quotation from the Liberal party

⁵Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity In The Modern State. (Toronto: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1954), p. 64.

constitution which characterizes the democratic phase:

The Liberal Party of Canada recognizes that human dignity in a democratic system requires that all citizens have access to full information concerning the policies and leadership of the Party; and the opportunity to participate in open and public assessment of such means, such modifications of policies and leadership as they deem desirable to promote the political, economic, social, cultural and general well-being of Canadians.

To realize this objective, the Liberal Party of Canada strives to provide a flexible and democratic structure whereby all Canadians can obtain such information, participate in such assessment and militate for such reform through open communications, free dialogue and participatory action both electoral and non-electoral.⁶

For a political party to be a viable entity it must have a "large and steadily increasing membership base".⁷

Without such a membership base, riding or constituency meetings and provincial/territorial meetings would be meaningless, policy meetings would be intellectually incapacitated and annual fundraising drives would be a failure. From the provincial and constituency meetings come the respective executives which dominate their organizations. Without a substantial membership, competent people would not be available and thus, riding and provincial business would be ignored or handled shabbily. Neither the Liberal party nor any other political organization should accept this. Membership practices since

⁶ "Preamble to the Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada," p.4.

⁷ "Discussion Paper on Reform of the Liberal Party of Canada," prepared by the President's Committee for Reform of the Liberal Party of Canada, formed in January 1983, p. 13.

the days of Mackenzie King, the elite-phases and the democratic phases of the party, will be examined. After all, in the words of the Party itself:

The Liberal Party of Canada is committed to the view that the dignity of each individual man and woman is the cardinal principle of democratic society and the primary purpose of all political organization and activity in such a society.⁸

In addition to democratic participation, one of the reasons membership is so important is, that a strong membership base often means a more secure financial underpinning to the party's ongoing political efforts.⁹ Like people, money is generally needed for the party to be a success. Party operations cannot be carried out without proper financial backing. Such operations would include the following:

1. Riding maintenance costs.
2. Maintenance of provincial offices.
3. National conventions.
4. Maintenance of national executive.
5. Research staff.
6. Communication funds.
7. Surveys.

The final and most important use of funds is campaign costs. It should be apparent that without a proper financial base the party would be ineffectual in its efforts to be re-elected.

⁸"Preamble to the Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada," p.8.

⁹"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p.13.

In using the party as a test case for electoral success it is essential to reveal where the Liberal party acquires its financial resources as it is apparent the party has had enough money to stay in power for 43 out of the last 50 years.

Two other elements in the financial puzzle are also important when considering the part played by money in the formula for success. The first of these is accountability. Certain questions must be answered in this portion of the discussion: What measure of financial accountability is acceptable to a successful political operation? Is it important to success that regular financial statements are transmitted among party members? Are the members concerned where their money goes? All these questions are important to the democratically based organization. During the elite-based phase accountability is a non-issue.

The second element in solving the financial puzzle is the Liberal maze of financial structures. Who is responsible for what? Because the Liberal party is a federated structure where member organizations, constituencies, and a national executive are playing an essential part, it is important to examine who makes the decisions about the expenditure of party funds. In order to discover the elements of a successful political organization, the complexity of its financial operations must be analyzed.

No discussion of party finance would be complete without a look at the effect of the Election Expenses Act

instituted in 1974. The Act had a profound effect on all parties and the Liberal party is no exception.

Who donates the money, how many, who is in charge of it and where it goes, are all essential questions that must be answered if we are to solve the puzzle of success set out by the Liberal Party.

As well as membership and finance, the formal organizational structure of the Liberal Party is important when discussing the elements of a successful political party. As I mentioned earlier, the Liberal Party of Canada has a federal framework. "The essence of federalism for the Liberal Party is that our national party membership is composed of organizations, not individuals, and most of those organizations are geographically defined."¹⁰ Currently the party is made up of twelve member organizations, seven of which are combined federal and provincial parties and five which are federal parties only. The highest strictly party body in this structure is the national executive. For a successful party one would assume there must be a certain level of communication among these organizations. In examining the success of the party it will be essential to examine the relationship between the national party and its member organizations: How often do they meet? What powers do each have? The history of this relationship, from 1919 to the present, is a complex one and must be scrutinized. In addition, such an examination must be broken down into

¹⁰Ibid., p.11.

regions. More specifically, do differences exist in the relationship between the national office, the West, the Maritimes, Ontario and Quebec?

The responsibilities of the provincial organizations are complex. Among the main governing bodies of the Liberal party are various non-elected committees. As a rule specific representatives of the various provincial and territorial associations sit on these committees in order to offer expression at the national level, to the broad political concerns of the grassroots.

In terms of relationships between provincial and federal Liberal parties it is necessary to discuss why five of the party's provincial organizations are not connected with their federal wing. In addition the kind of relationship that exists between the separate provincial wings and the national office is important.

Finally, Joseph Wearing notes, in the L-Shaped Party that "it had always been part of the accepted political wisdom in Canada that federal success was dependent on having a strong provincial base, not least because of the value of provincial patronage in building a party organization."¹¹ Only a close scrutiny of this issue will give us a clue as to the contribution of provincial victories to the formula for federal success.

As the '1984 Discussion paper on reform of the Liberal party' notes, "without question, the position of leader in

¹¹Wearing, op. cit., p. 13.

the Liberal party is the first position in the party and to such an extent that there is really no second and no third."¹² Like party structure, leadership plays an important role in Liberal successes. George Perlin, in The Tory Syndrome, notes that "Competition between the Liberal and Conservative parties is most often described in both scholarly and popular literature in terms of the activities and attitudes of their leaders. It is fairly common to identify the differences between the parties as an expression of differences in their leaders' personalities."¹³ Perlin goes on to speculate that the personality of the leader has an important effect in federal politics.

John Meisel, in Working Papers on Canadian Politics,² notes that in a national survey he conducted in 1968, 42 percent of voters (the largest number) asked said that the party leader was the most important party aspect in their voting choice.¹⁴

On this basis alone it would seem prudent to scrutinize the history of leaders in the Liberal party and attempt to analyze their contribution to the party's success. There should be no question in anyone's mind that the Liberal party has been led by some impressive and controversial

¹²"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p. 13.

¹³George Perlin, The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics In The Progressive Conservative Party. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), p.13.

¹⁴John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics, ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), table VIII.

figures. Two which come to mind immediately are William Lyon Mackenzie King and Pierre Elliot Trudeau. In this study, leadership's contribution to the formula of success will be scrutinized.

Furthermore, a quick comparison will be made with the Conservative party, in terms of their handling of the leadership issue, in order to discover some clue as to why the Liberals have been led by only five men since 1919 and have been in power for all but seven years while the Conservatives have been led by thirteen men and power has been elusive.

The final component in this search for a formula of success is the link between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary wings of the party. The national executive, the other ruling bodies centered in Ottawa, the provincial executives and the constituency organizations form the voluntary wing of the party. Without these organizations the party would lack a backbone in its current state of electoral disarray. Yet, traditionally the national party "has not been taken seriously by the parliamentary wing."¹⁵ There is very little relationship between the central party organization and the parliamentary party.¹⁶ The voluntary wing of the Liberal party has long been considered an electoral machine which is geared up every four years while being ineffectual in the interim. This reality has been blamed for the current electoral defeat as

¹⁵"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p.21.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 21.

well as Liberal defeats in the past. An essential element of any discussion of the party must include a description of the above-noted relationship.

An overview of the voluntary wing itself, the people, the responsibilities and the reforms, should be included. Colourful individuals have been a part of the Liberal's national office from 1919 to the present. Norman Lambert, Walter Gordon and Keith Davey among others. These individuals and their contributions to Liberal successes are a necessary component of my discussion.

And finally, no analysis of the Liberal party would be complete without noting the various ruling bodies which make up the Liberal party itself. The party is ruled by a confusing array of bodies with the national convention considered the supreme governing entity. What part these entities have played since 1919 in the party and reforms which have occurred in their composition or powers, will be included in the succeeding analysis. To understand the party one must first understand its component parts.

The authors of the 'Discussion Paper' extol the Liberal party by noting that it "has been the most effective national political organization throughout Canada's 20th Century."¹⁷ "Other nations have few, if any, comparable examples of parties that have been as successful in managing to adapt and to win favor with the electorate."¹⁸ For this reason alone it is important to consider the Liberal party's

¹⁷ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.8.

internal structures in order to find some clues to the formula for political success and what is needed to restore success.

Yet other reasons for such a study can be found. Throughout its years in government the party has not had the automatic periods of renewal and regeneration that are part of the alternation of power between parties. People have come to consider the Liberal party as synonymous with Ottawa and the bureaucracy. Further, the party seems to have lost its ideology, subsequently eroding into an elite-based organization. The party loses touch with reality and it loses the people who can bring it back into the mainstream without renewal. Every party needs a period in opposition, in order to review its priorities, renew, regenerate and evolve into a broadly-based, democratic organization. The party obviously has not had this opportunity before 1984. The Clark tenure in 1979 was too short for the party to be able to rethink its priorities.

Fundamentally, the party has not changed in structure since the 1960's. The party now has the opportunity to examine its organization and structure as it no longer forms the government. A question that must be answered is whether the party is using its time well in opposition to initiate reform. Current reforms must be initiated if the Liberal party is to avoid reflecting a bygone era. We must examine whether the party has the will to change, or if past errors have inflicted irreparable damage on the party's structures.

Once an examination of current reforms is complete a more thorough reflection on the party's future can be undertaken, using the lessons of the past as a guideline.

The format of the thesis will not follow a chronological perspective; rather it will review the party since 1919 by topic of organization. In this way the reader will better grasp the formula for success that exists among parties in Canadian politics.

Throughout the thesis various references will be used. Specific books written, describing the history of the party, will be referred to extensively: Reginald Whitaker's The Government Party, Christine McCall Newman's Grits and Joseph Wearing's the L-Shaped Party are some of these. As well, various magazine and newspaper articles will be employed for current information. Finally, interviews were undertaken with party officials at all levels and questionnaires distributed to various party members, in order to get a feel for current Liberal thought on reform.

Such a work was undertaken at this time owing to the current state of disarray in which the party finds itself. I want to discover if the Liberals have the will and/or the ability to rebuild a government party. If not, the course of Canadian political history will have been changed, the Conservatives becoming Canada's first lady of political parties and the New Democrats the bridesmaid.

1919 was chosen as an arbitrary starting date because it represented a new beginning for the party with the

Introduction of Mackenzie King as the leader of the party.

The changes in party organization instituted by King were the first ones treated systematically by political scientists.

H. Membership

For the Liberal party to regain power, it must maintain a large and active membership. A stable membership provides energetic campaigning and novel policy ideas. Furthermore, it makes the party more financially and organizationally secure. The membership must be taken seriously by the party's parliamentary leadership. The party must appear, at least, to be a democratic, broadly based organization. Opportunities for policy input from the grass-roots must be made available. Regular visits from party officials, elected politicians and senators make people feel that they have a sounding board for party grievances. An adequate method for membership recruitment is necessary if the party is not to remain an archaic institution.

Individuals join and remain in a political party to influence the political process through their membership.¹⁹ People want to make the country a better place to live, or fight some other political philosophy seen as destructive.²⁰ For these reasons it is important that recruitment methods portray the party's sympathy to people's opinions. Once the people have been recruited into the party the volunteer wing must be seen as playing a crucial role in the day-to-day activities of the organization. The party must avoid being perceived as an autocratically ruled structure with the volunteer wing fulfilling an inconsequential function, merely acting as an electoral

¹⁹"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p. 7.

²⁰Ibid., p. 7.

machine. In essence the party must avoid becoming an elite-based organization.

The Liberal party recognizes the importance of membership as reflected in many of the statements party officials and Liberal documents pronounce. The Honourable Iona Campagnolo, president of the federal Liberal party, when speaking to the conseil general of the Liberal party, in Montreal on April 13, 1985, notes the important role that must be played by Liberal membership:

Rank and file members in today's world, will not tolerate a subservient and demeaning role. Every member must count in the system and not become just a little mindless election machine, rolled out every 4 years at voting time and then dismissed. A revitalized Liberal party, one called for by John Turner as open, accessible, democratic and accountable is only possible if we responsibly spell out the duties, expectations and obligations and responsibilities of all the various elements that make up our complicated and somewhat amorphous, loosely-knit, broadly based, regionally representative 'federation' party.²¹

Campagnolo's sentiments are reflective of a feeling emerging throughout the party. The Constitution of the party notes the importance of allowing members to participate in "open and public assessment of policies and leadership."²²

The party does not merely recognize the essential nature of providing the grassroots with a voice but it also states the importance of people to the functioning of the party. Donald Johnston, Liberal finance critic, noted in a speech to a Liberal Association annual meeting in Edmonton,

²¹Campagnolo, op.cit., p.4.

²²"Preamble to the Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada," p.4.

in 1985, that new faces are needed if the party is to rebuild:

Indeed the events of 1984 have provided us with that new opportunity to rebuild. But the engineers of defeat must not be the principal architects of reconstruction. We need a blend of old and new; experience yes, but more important, new creative thinking to address the problems of tomorrow.²³

Not only is membership important but it also must be provided a voice so it feels as if it is making a difference in Canadian society.

In attempting to prove that membership is important to Liberal party success, I will note the opinions of such experts as Duverger and Michels, who believe that cadre parties like the Liberals and the Conservatives do not seek the support of mass membership, but rather attempt to use the political and financial strength of the masses as a subordinate force. Robert Michels' Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy includes the following statement:

Theophrastus noted long ago that the strongest desire of men who have attained to leadership in a popularly governed state is not so much the acquirement of personal wealth as the gradual establishment of their own sovereignty at the expense of popular sovereignty.²⁴

Michels with his Iron Law of Oligarchy believes that the masses will always be dominated and the rulers will

²³Honourable Donald Johnston, P.C.: Speech delivered to Edmonton South constituency annual meeting, February, 1985, on Liberal reform.

²⁴Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p.349.

never reflect or identify with the totality of the members. This is much like the opinions of DuVerger who holds the notion that, in a cadre party, the middle class politician has no need, political or financial, to seek the organized support of the masses. It is the notables who are sought out in order that they may help in preparing elections and conducting campaigns. The aforementioned statements on membership are reflective of the elite-based Liberal party. The party must not make them the norm or future success will be elusive.

In order to discover what role party membership has played in the formula for success it is necessary to scrutinize party practices in terms of the grassroots, from 1919 to the present. From such an exercise it will become apparent that party rank and file must play an important role in the organization or electoral success will not be realized.

As I noted previously the Mackenzie King era was representative of the elite-based phase of the Liberal party. It is important to note here that the Conservatives, at this time, were also ruled in oligarchical fashion. In 1919, when King took over the leadership, the party was in an organizational mess. There was no permanent organizational superstructure. The Liberal party had been suffering from a lack of funding between and during elections. A plan was adopted at the 1919 national convention to establish a permanent national organization,

including a national office under the direction of a national organizer. However, the extra-parliamentary party was essentially ignored by Mackenzie King. King did not call a national convention until his retirement thus preventing any challenges, from the membership, to his leadership or to his policy initiatives. The national organization, which is essentially a voice for the membership (or non-elected members), was an informal affair during King's tenure as leader. Another reason for the silence of the membership is the fact that the Liberals were in power for most of the 1920's, thus the extra-parliamentary organization had a tendency to atrophy and the parliamentary party dominated.

After the 1930 electoral defeat, however, King's attitude toward the membership changed. When King addressed the first meeting of the National Liberal Organization Committee, "he spoke about the need for the non-parliamentary members of the party, including the women and young people, to take some real part in party management and framing of policies."²⁵ Between 1932-1935, the extra-parliamentary organization, and thus the membership, became an effective body. The National Liberal Federation (NLF) educated the rank and file and organized policy meetings.

In 1935 King won the largest victory ever in federal politics. This victory was not without the efforts of

²⁵Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing The Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 25.

Liberal rank and file. Following the victory the membership was activated as an electoral machine, in 1940 and again in 1945, yet it also continued its efforts in education and promotion, despite the freeze in partisan activities during the war.

The underlying message of the King era, which ended with his retirement in 1948, is that despite his jealous prerogatives as leader of the Liberal party he was constantly concerned about the membership and recognized its importance. Evidence of this can be found in The Government Party:

Having no organization, he wrote in his diary, excepting what was arranged in the constituencies at the last moment, was of course a major factor. I do not see how the latter is to be overcome because none of the young Liberals are prepared to put time or money into an organization or to seek to find the latter.²⁶

The point to be made is that although King did not give sufficient recognition to the membership during victory, he acknowledged that it must be given a role. King's era was representative of a man's personal desire for power and the knowledge that he must balance this with input from rank and file. Although he generally followed this rule, when he first assumed the leadership he completely disregarded the membership. This initial phase can be called the silent '20s. While King showed some interest in the rank and file owing to the fact that he recognized its importance to his party's electoral revival, his successor, Louis St. Laurent

²⁶Ibid., pp. 168-169.

showed no interest at all:

King for all his personal pettiness and his disinclination to give recognition to party organizers, none the less showed a persistent interest in the matter, and, to an extent at least, kept the legitimacy of the extra-parliamentary party before the attention of the cabinet.... In the case of St. Laurent no such commitment was ever entered into, let alone maintained.²⁷

The membership had virtually no power from St. Laurent's election as party leader until his resignation in 1957. Essentially, the ministerial political organization ruled the day. The NLF had no responsibility and had no power. This elite-based organization led directly to the minority defeat of the Liberals in 1957 and the devastating defeat in 1958. Liberal leadership had cut itself off from an important source of information. The strangulation of the extra-parliamentary party "meant that one possible channel of rank and file opinion had been stilled."²⁸ By not listening to the membership, St. Laurent and his cabinet colleagues were ignoring trends in opinion that were occurring throughout the country. The longer the party stayed in power the fewer quality people entered the party and the more mediocre it became.

The essential lesson to be learned in terms of membership from the St. Laurent period is that elite-based politics suffocates policy input from the membership and inhibits new blood from entering the party. Evidence of this can be found in the 1980s elite based Liberal party led by

²⁷Ibid., p. 180

²⁸Ibid., p. 211.

Pierre Trudeau: Membership declined drastically while party policy was not that of the rank and file but that of the elite coterie surrounding the leader. Electoral defeat is the direct consequence of these tendencies.

By 1957, Wearing notes in the L-Shaped party, "the Liberals had become an extension of the cabinet and, when ministers went down like ninepins before the Conservative onslaughts of 1957 and 1958, not much of the party was left."²⁹ The man elected in 1958 to rebuild the ruins left by St. Laurent was Lester Pearson. Obvious reforms that had to be made within the Liberal party of the 1960's concerned the membership. The grassroots had to play a larger role. For instance, the various executives, provincial and federal, were to be elected by the grassroots rather than appointed from Ottawa. In other words the party had to enter a democratic phase.

The resurrection of the rank and file began in Toronto after the 1958 defeat with Cell 13 and soon moved to the national scene, with Walter Gordon and Keith Davey spearheading the reforms. Keith Davey, as national director, wanted to use the same tactics nationally as Cell 13 had used provincially to rebuild the Ontario party: 1. Greater involvement by the membership; 2. Greater democracy.

The seriousness with which the Pearson Liberal party approached the contributions of the membership appeared in 1961, one year following the Kingston Conference. In 1961

²⁹Wearing, op. cit., p. 13.

the National Rally was held, it was the first policy convention of rank and file constituency delegates since 1893. This rally of the Liberal rank and file produced numerous resolutions which served as an election platform as well as an agenda once in government. For the first time in 68 years, the membership of the Liberal party was directly responsible for policy. In 1962 the Québec Liberals decided that instead of the federal leader hand-picking constituency candidates there should be democratic nominating conventions in each riding.

Pearson essentially left the affairs of the membership to Walter Gordon and Keith Davey who both wanted to make the party truly democratic. Davey set up campaign colleges where basic electoral skills were taught to new candidates and their campaign officials. He spent a great deal of time meeting with the grassroots, ensuring the existence and preservation of active constituency organizations. By the 1962 election the membership was enthusiastic and committed to the party.

Despite the loss in 1962, the politics of joy (an active membership and an accountable leadership), as Christine McCall-Newman calls it in Grits, was still practiced and in 1963 the Liberal party, led by Pearson, won a minority victory. The new politics had been effective, and the membership was responsible.

Once in power, however, there were fears that this democratic phase would give way to an elite phase. If it had

not been for the persistence of Keith Davey, these fears may have become realities. Davey wanted to maintain high visibility for the party. He wanted to get new people involved in party activities. These people would recruit other people and they would bring new ideas and enthusiasm. The National Council Meeting in 1964, which instituted biennial conventions and the election of party officers at these conventions, assured the maintenance of an active rank and file.

Democracy was not a success everywhere, as fund-raising and patronage became uneasy bedfellows with the new politics. As well, communication between the ministers and the party broke down. Following the failure of Pearson to win a majority in 1965, the two main proponents of the politics of joy, Davey and Gordon, resigned yet their legacy remained as a national meeting was held in 1966, and delegates were given free rein in their deliberations on policy and new powers were given to the conventions: i.e., the policy convention was given the power to establish the basic policies of the party.³⁰

When Pearson resigned in 1968, there is no question that the party membership was far better off than in 1957 when he had taken over. Despite the opinions of such notables as McCall Newman who states in Grits that the party was still not open to the grass roots, and that Davey and Gordon had "simply replaced one elite with another"³¹, the

³⁰Ibid., p. 74.

³¹Christina McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of

rank and file was certainly more involved in the party than in 1948 when Mackenzie King declared that a prime minister was responsible only to Parliament and not to any party organization. That is, although following the 1966 convention Pearson repudiated two impractical resolutions, the party was heading in the right direction by giving itself a chance to listen to what the man on the street wanted. The people were not now just accepting what the leadership wanted and this was revolutionary.³²

The 1968 leadership convention, called to replace Pearson, was an open and democratic affair. The delegates truly represented the rank and file as they were not selected by their MP's but lively contests were held for all positions. On the fourth ballot Pierre Trudeau was chosen as leader. Soon after his election, Trudeau asked for the dissolution of Parliament and he managed to attain the first Liberal majority since 1953.

Trudeau's presence, at first, meant increased membership and a new meaning to the participation of the rank and file. The interest in Trudeau himself brought thousands of new faces into the election rooms across the country. Furthermore, the slogan 'participatory democracy' was prevalent. Following the election, the party president Richard Stanbury tried to apply the ideals of membership participation. Evidence of Trudeau's and the party's

³¹(cont'd) the Liberal Party. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1982), p. 49.

³²Wearing, op. cit., p. 76.

commitment to maximum participation was an ambitious three phase program of rank and file input:

1. The first phase was a thinkers' conference at Harrison Hot Springs, B.C. in November 1969.
2. It was to be followed by a series of grassroots meetings in which ordinary citizens as well as party members would react to the experts' ideas and formulate their own proposals in constituency meetings.
3. There was to be a normal policy convention in 1970.

As well as this three phase program, innovations like advisory groups and a political cabinet were initiated in order to give the grassroots as much clout as possible.

When the two years of work had been completed by the party rank and file in terms of the three phase program, it had all led to nothing. The policy statements that had been developed were rejected by Cabinet. Furthermore, by 1969, the advisory groups were found to be working ineffectually. Essentially, by 1972, the participatory model had been scrapped. "Trudeau was more in love with the idea of participation than with the reality."³³ In his mind the masses were, in reality, incapable of providing an intelligent contribution to the party's platform.

The results of the 1972 election (minority government for the Liberals) were indicative of the ignorance of rank and file desires. What had happened was that the party had given participatory democracy a try, but soon abandoned it

³³Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus: Pierre Trudeau and Canadians. (Markham: Paper Jacks Ltd., 1981), p. 105.

in favour of rule by a small clique of people: "Centralizing power in the office of a particular leader cut against the very grain of the country. Trudeau tried. As soon as Canadians realized what he was doing, they threw him out, almost."³⁴ As the party moved closer to an inevitable election call, volunteers were not in place as the Prime Minister's Office had neglected the psychological patronage or egostroking of people in the volunteer wing. It is difficult to claim electoral victory with an invisible election day work force. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) was obviously where the power lay. Unfortunately Trudeau's staff knew very little about party politics.

Following the 1972 election, predictably the grass roots began to assume a greater role in the workings of the party. "Keith Davey convened a series of dinner meetings with Liberal workers, so that Trudeau could hear their complaints, their ideas, their inchoate yearnings."³⁵ In the minority situation Trudeau had to learn to uphold the morale of the grass roots so they would feel needed and involved. The party was ready for another election.

The 1974 election victory was attributed, partly, to the ability of rank and file to bring political concerns and realities to bear on Trudeau and his 'supergroup'.

Unfortunately, following the victory the membership became merely an electoral machine. There was no conscious effort to draw up an election platform on the basis of

³⁴Ibid., p. 92.

³⁵ McCall-Newman, op. cit., p. 151.

convention resolutions, which were now a regular feature of Liberal party operation. The membership became isolated from the leadership as the national executive failed to act on behalf of the rank and file between elections. Following 1974 Trudeau reassembled his court. Jim Coutts, as Trudeau's principal secretary, cut off access to the Prime Minister. Even his own ministers were irrelevant. Trudeau had become the Liberal party, the government and the state.

There existed an ingroup of eight men who were usually called the PMO in-group or the Coutts 'n' Davey gang:

Keith Davey	Jim Coutts
Jerry Grafstein	Colin Kenny
Tom Axworthy	Martin Goldfarb
Richard O'Hagan	Michael Pitfield.

These individuals interpreted what was good for the party, and they were Trudeau's eyes and ears within the party.

When planning began for the 1979 election, the party did not spend too much time thinking of the grassroots. After all, on paper the party was certainly more democratic than it had been in 1919. For example, there was an elected national executive and biennial conventions. Trudeau preferred to think that members of the grassroots could become part of the network and then get to the inside if they only worked hard enough. Yet the party was, in essential ways, no more powerful than it had been under King and St. Laurent.

This reality, combined with the fact the Canadian people wanted a change, led to the minority victory for

Clark. Upon defeat renewal began once again, as Trudeau submitted his resignation, and the broad concerns of active Liberals were discussed by key volunteers and parliamentarians. However, renewal was cut short by the decision, authored by a small group at the top of the party, to topple the Clark government. The caucus asked Trudeau to return and he came back to win one more election. If the membership would have had their way Trudeau would not have been asked to return.

The lessons of defeat had not been absorbed as Trudeau once again let "the Grit election machinery fall into disuse."³⁶ "Liberals had always believed that they governed Canada by Divine Right",³⁷ Charles Lynch wrote, thus they ignored the masses of volunteers who provided vibrancy and a voice to the party's message. By 1984 and Trudeau's resignation:

The decline of the Liberal party had been amply chronicled, and the stage was set for the fall, marking 1984 as the longest year for the Grits, and the blackest. Everywhere in the land, and all across Quebec, the political roses had turned blue.³⁸

Pierre Trudeau's personality was to blame for the isolation of the membership from 1968-1984. "He had no knowledge of the human condition - he existed apart from the rest of humanity."³⁹ He was isolated from life, from ideas.

³⁶ Charles Lynch, Race for the Rose: election 1984. (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1984), p. 152.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 190.

³⁹ Gwyn, op. cit., p. 165.

from people.⁴⁰ Trudeau ignored Liberal blood lines as he scarcely gave the party the time of day in the 16 years he was its leader. To quote Richard Gwyn, a well known Trudeau biographer, "he shifted the balance of power from the many to the one."⁴¹ His charismatic qualities were what kept the party in power for so many years. Liberals and Canadians in general let him off the hook for a time because he was so attractive to them.

The Trudeau years represented the single-minded rule of an over-bearing man.⁴² He alienated participatory democracy and became the party and the government. He disregarded the usefulness of the party and felt it should be quiet while he was in power.

When John Turner assumed the leadership of the Liberal party in 1984, his biggest task was rebuilding the Liberals as a national party. When he turned to the electorate, in September of that year, for a mandate to rule, that which he already knew was confirmed by the voters: his predecessor had allowed the Grit election machinery to fall into disuse. In essence he was trying to run an election apparatus which did not exist. Trudeau and his supergroup had ignored the members which therefore were not there when they were most needed. "In his disastrous 1958 campaign," Lynch writes, "Liberal organizers let Pearson down the way they had failed

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 313.

⁴¹Ibid., Prologue

⁴²Walter Stewart, Shrug: Trudeau in Power. (Toronto: New Press, 1979), p. 2.

Turner in this election."⁴³ After the equally disastrous 1984 campaign, Turner's only hope was that he could emulate Pearson and rebuild the shattered party.

Turner's commitment to rebuild started with the rank and file as he vowed to reconstruct the party into a new coalition of Liberals across the country. He recognized the fact that electoral success rests in the hands of the Liberal man on the street. The party must recognize the importance of the rank and file and allow it a voice: ego-stroking must begin anew.

Evidence of the party's commitment to renewal is everywhere. First of all, Turner along with Campagnolo and several prominent caucus representatives have been travelling throughout the country, since the September electoral disaster, meeting with Liberals, listening to their message and assuring them of their importance in the future of the Liberal party. For instance, between September 1984 and September 1985 John Turner was in Edmonton three times and Campagnolo twice.

Furthermore, in the party's 1985 'Final Report of the President's Committee on Reform of the Liberal Party of Canada', the authors recognize the importance of the membership:

In our drafting, we have been conscious of certain fundamental themes: The need to enhance the links between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary wings of the Party, and, in particular, to ensure

⁴³Lynch, op. cit., p. 187.

meaningful policy input by the ordinary Party member.⁴⁴

To highlight the significance of the individual in the party, changes have been instituted to the Constitution. Specifically now, instead of only organizations becoming members of the federal party, individuals can become members by virtue of their membership in the constituency associations and provincial or territorial associations. This was not previously the case.

Evidence of a commitment to the rank and file can be discovered in the planning of a policy convention in Halifax in November of 1985. At this meeting of the membership and ex-officio representatives, policy was discussed and voted upon, while the membership had an opportunity to meet with the leadership and express its concerns. This is an invaluable exercise if the man on the street is to feel that he is making a contribution to the system. As well, the Wednesday, January 15th, 1986 issue of the Globe and Mail carried an article ('Drifting without aim' by Jeffrey Simpson) discussing Turner's suggestion to hold a Son-of-Kingston conference next September, perhaps in Sherbrooke, in order to give Liberal-leaning citizens a chance to suggest policy directives. Plans are also being made to hold conferences in Western and Atlantic Canada, in

⁴⁴"Final Report of the President's Committee on Reform of the Liberal Party of Canada." August, 1985, p. 5.

the summer. These facts do not portray a leadership withdrawing, rather it shows a leadership reaching out to ordinary Canadians and giving them an opportunity to make a difference in the Canadian political system.

As well as the changes in the membership regulations, innumerable reforms can be found in the 1985 Constitution which provide for greater rank and file input. For example:

...at no time, shall the number of automatic, ex-officio delegates exceed 15 percent of the total number of delegates attending the convention.⁴⁵

This important provision ensures that ex-officio delegates will not carry the voting weight at conventions, rather the rank and file will be the dominant force.

...the Reform Committee recommends increasing the number of delegates elected to the constituency association from 7 to 12 and in so doing, greatly decrease the percentage of ex-officio delegates attending conventions.⁴⁶

It is well documented that the leadership of the Liberal party has every intention of involving the grassroots in the next drive for electoral victory. Extracts from speeches given by party officials will portray the good intentions of the party toward the rank and file.

In Campagnolo's speech to the conseil general of Quebec, she made an impassioned plea for an open party:

The party that was is no more. The Party that is, is fully committed to creating the open, accessible, accountable and responsible, mass democratic political organization, which we must

⁴⁵Ibid., p.44.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 29.

create together, if our fighting 40 band of Parliamentary Guerillas are going to grow into a governing force.⁴⁷

Clearly the lessons of the past have not been lost on the party President as she recognizes the dangers of a top-heavy party evidenced during the King-St. Laurent and Trudeau eras.

Donald Johnston, in a speech in Edmonton in 1985 and in an interview with me in Calgary at the annual Liberal party of Canada (Alberta) convention on February 23, 1985, noted the importance of people to the fortunes of the party in 1988: "To hold that middle ground and win in 1988 we need, organization, money, policy, and people."⁴⁸

John Turner, responding to questions from the national panel on the CTV show Question Period on March 17, 1985 noted that his mandate was to "reach out to Canadians; to get the best people possible in the country." He said he wanted to "open up the doors and let the new people in." Turner wanted the Liberal party to be "open, accessible and accountable."⁴⁹ Although one would expect such statements from Turner, it is reassuring to Canadians to know the Liberal party is once again courting the interests of ordinary Canadians.

Finally, at the Calgary Convention, David Dingwall, a Liberal Maritime MP spoke of the need for more consultation with the regular party and he brought to the attention of

⁴⁷Campagnolo, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴⁸Johnston, op. cit., p.8.

⁴⁹The Right Honourable John N. Turner, when responding to questions from the panel on the CTV show Question Period on March 17, 1985.

delegates the effort being made by Campagnolo and Turner, travelling across the country, listening to the membership.

To conclude, it is apparent that Turner and the rest of the Liberal leadership have examined the party's history and concluded that the best route to revival is through the rank and file. Liberal fortunes dwindled in 1958, 1972, 1979, and 1984 partially because the membership was ignored. In years previous to those mentioned the leadership consulted no one, choosing to rule as an oligarchy rather than a democracy: it was rule by the few rather than the many. Rule by the many is the first key to the formula for Liberal electoral success. Once a party withdraws from the membership, electoral defeat is in the future. If John Turner is to regain power he must grasp this message and not let it fade. Although an active membership alone will not win an election, the people at the grassroots must feel as if they are making a difference in the party, even if this is not the reality, or they will not do the necessary groundwork building up to an election.

III. Party Finance

A vital Liberal party requires proper financing. In addition once adequate funds are collected, a financial structure is necessary to distribute properly, those funds. Political parties require funds for such activities as campaign preparation, the maintenance of a central office, surveys, conventions, publicity materials pamphlets and letters from the leader. If funding is inadequate or control is unclear then these tasks may be left undone.

The Liberal party recognizes the significance of a broadened financial base in its "Discussion Paper on Liberal Reform":

Money is at the very centre of the reform topic. It is wrapped inextricably with the question of party government.... Exploring the second line of thought, the first and easiest solution is to raise more money. That should be done in any case. It is worth enquiring why the party that has been in government most of this century stands so dismally in the fundraising contest.⁵⁰

Not only does the party recognize the importance of cash flow but also of an accounting of current cash balances to the general Liberal citizenry, as reflected in the reforms suggested by the Special Committee on Finance, formulated in October of 1984:

A copy of the annual audited financial statement of the Liberal Party of Canada should be distributed to designated members of the party. It should be available on request to any paid-up Party member.⁵¹

⁵⁰"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p. 28.

⁵¹"Report of the Special Financial Review Committee to the National Executive of the Liberal Party of Canada."

In light of current controversy, this chapter examines the Liberals real pattern of the relationship between money and success. The effects of the 1974 Election Expenses Act on Liberal fortunes are scrutinized closely.

In 1919 King assumed the leadership of a party whose membership rolls and coffers were depleted. Since 1911 the party had lacked adequate funding during and between elections. According to Reginald Whitaker, King felt that financial stability was the key to a renewed party:

...the securing of financing was the sine qua non of organizational revival. King constantly returned to this theme whenever suggestions were put to him about party organization.... If we could secure the financial end, there would, I believe, be little trouble in securing what is needed in other directions....⁵²

King's concern about money was founded in the fact that without money there could be no publicity, no education, no campaigning, no research, no speech writing, etc. The provincial executives were demanding money for organization, the national executive office needed to be financed, constituencies needed money to clear up old debts.

The party continued to grapple with financial insecurity through the 1920s and the initial portion of the 1930s. Two years following the 1930 election and the notorious Beauharnois affair the party was virtually bankrupt and Mackenzie King was forced to beg money from wealthy Liberal businessmen. In addition, Senators were

⁵¹(cont'd) February 9, 1985, Appendix B.

⁵²Whitaker, op. cit., p. 15.

called upon to kick back part of their salary to the party that appointed them.

Some relief to the party's financial picture came when King gave responsibility for financial functions to the NLF, and Vincent Massey, in 1932, became the first president of that organizational structure. However, shady Liberal bag men were still in evidence in Montreal and Toronto and the autonomy of Quebec fundraising efforts continued to pose a problem to Massey. In 1934, when efforts to raise money for the 1935 election were in high gear, the financial situation of the NLF was desperate. The party was having trouble raising money, owing to a lack of organization in the party's financial arena and the fact that the party was in opposition.

Despite the financial difficulties, the party raised sufficient money to be elected, Massey became high commissioner in London and Norman Lambert took over the presidency. Over the five years in office from 1935 to 1940, Lambert "had built up an adequate reserve to pay for the 1940 election campaign and for the expenses of the provincial finance committees."⁵³ The Liberals had made enough to build up an impressive victory over the hapless Conservatives. Lambert departed in 1940, unhappy with his relationship with King.

During the war years the cabinet was put in charge of finances as the NLF virtually ceased to function. The final

⁵³Ibid., p. 122.

election campaign of King in 1945 was not as well organized financially as the 1940 election, due in large part to the departure of Lambert. The party slush fund was said to be substantial, though no figures are available.

The affluence of the Liberal party continued throughout the St. Laurent years. In fact, according to specific available figures, "the revenues available to the NLF grew considerably in the latter years of the St. Laurent government."⁵⁴ The party's affluence continued into St. Laurent's tenure as Prime Minister.

Whether the party was financially secure or not in this period did not seem to affect the level of accountability. Generally speaking the Liberal party from 1919-1958 handled its finances secretly. "Money was raised by a relatively small group of fundraisers, most appointed by the leader. Few people, and certainly no one outside the party, were aware of how much was raised, from what sources, and for what purposes."⁵⁵ These tendencies are reflective of an elite-based party.

In fact, it seemed that the closer the Liberals got to economic self-sufficiency, the more secretive they became. Whitaker, when discussing financing in the post-war era, uses terms such as - "there is much less detailed and specific information available for this year"⁵⁶ - and "there can only be speculation on the matter - and rather

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 204.

⁵⁵"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p. 16.

⁵⁶Whitaker, op. cit., p. 58-59.

ill-informed speculation at that."⁵⁷ The elite-based party did not consider it necessary to tell the membership where it stood financially, a reality today's democratic party would feel uncomfortable with.

The point to be made about the King-St. Laurent Liberal party in terms of finances is that victory meant money and money meant victory. That is, the relationship between the two in the late 1930s and 1940s and early 1950s was intimate. The Liberals were able to outspend the opposition, beyond 1935 owing to their hold over government contracts and patronage. Reginald Whitaker, on page 105 of The Government Party, notes that the party, by 1940, had considerably more money than its opponents in their campaign funds. Therefore the Liberals were able to conduct more effective election campaigns. Meanwhile victory ensured the constant influx of funds.

Unfortunately for the party, despite the intimacy of this relationship, extraneous factors like improper organization and low public opinion can upset the established balance. This reality was in evidence in 1957 and 1958.

Despite the financial surplus of the party in 1957, the Canadian people were anxious to see a change in colours in Ottawa, as they were in 1984, and no amount of money would have counteracted their building resentment for the Liberal party; Canadians wanted a change and the Liberals and Louis

⁵⁷Ibid., p.198.

St. Laurent were at their mercy. Furthermore, following this loss, the party soon faced deficits, thus upon entering the party as leader, Pearson and his organizational coterie faced financial losses. By 1963 in fact the party had a \$140,000.00 deficit.

During the early years of Pearson's leadership, the party's financial structure was basically unaltered. Token recommendations, of course, were made. A sector of the party recommended that the NLF be exclusively in charge of finance. As well, in planning for the 1962 election, Keith Davey instituted federal campaign committees in each province which were to have responsibility for fund raising.

Unfortunately, the party's fund raising activities remained secret. To quote Joseph Wearing, "The new politics and the traditional fundraising operation were uneasy bedfellows, not because the traditional fund-raising methods were actually so bad, but because they looked so questionable."⁵⁸ Party membership did not know where the money came from or where it went. This reality was certainly not in keeping with the democratic, broadly-based organization sought by Davey, Gordon and others. In fact, the executive of the NLF was not permitted to see the party's financial statements: they had no power over the fund-raisers.

Walter Gordon attempted to initiate a nationwide fund-raising drive in 1960 in order to raise enough money to

⁵⁸ Wearing, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

operate the national office. Although some money was raised, the party was in deficit by 1963. In 1964 a finance committee was established. It recommended that the provincial associations begin taking responsibility for funding the national office because it is more difficult to get people to donate for the maintenance of an office than it is to get money for a campaign. The committee felt that the provinces, having substantial campaign funds, could aid the national office somewhat. This was a ludicrous proposal as only Ontario and Quebec were secure enough to finance their own head offices while they also carried the burden of the other eight head offices. As Wearing notes, further plans were proposed, like that of Paul Hellyer, who felt a national membership plan might increase funding. However, because the Liberal party was, and still is, a federated organization, uniform membership was unlikely. A more practical plan, at that time, would have been to have province-wide memberships co-ordinated by the Federation.

The most credible change instituted in the Pearson era, to party financing, was the effort to raise medium-sized donations from a large number of people. Previously the party had looked almost exclusively to large donations from a few corporate donors. For a party attempting to become more democratic a broad donor base was attractive. Party officials in Ontario instituted this reform when they went after 1000 donations of \$100.00 each. ⁵⁹ Other provinces

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 62.

followed suit as they instituted \$100.00 a plate dinners and other such fundraising schemes. These projects were successful, yet the national office remained underfunded and counted on money from left-over campaign funds, as it was more difficult to raise money between elections rather than before and during elections. The party recognized the significance of the \$100.00 donation and thus set in motion the plan to establish a national Century Club. In order to carry this off, they realized that tax relief for the donors was essential because those who would offer the \$100.00 donations would then do so for their own benefit as well as that of the party's. For this reason and others, the party braintrust proposed to change the election laws "to provide for the registration of parties, public subsidization, spending limits, disclosure of income and expenditures, and tax credits for individuals who contributed to political parties."⁶⁰ However, once in power, the government was slow to introduce the changes, as those in parliamentary leadership did not see it as a priority, thus the Century Club was temporarily on hold.

The party was able to retain a measure of financial security through the efforts of its chief fundraiser from the mid 1960s to 1968, John Aird. He had no trouble raising money from corporations, as they consistently donated to Canada's two major political parties. Difficulty was still encountered, however, in an effort to acquire the small

⁶⁰Ibid.

donations of \$100.00. The broadly funded organization was not a reality yet. In addition, the national executive was still not in control of financing: rather, responsibility for fund-raising remained somewhat clouded. Thus, although relative stability in terms of money had been achieved, the party's search for democratic accountability had come up short. The party membership was still not told where money was found or spent.

When Pearson resigned in 1968, the party was financially stable. Those responsible for fund-raising throughout his tenure managed to erase the debt through the corporate route and through large donations from a few people, and give the party financial security. This contrasts markedly with the statement made by Daniel Lang in 1959, as treasurer of the Ontario Liberal Association:

I was somewhat relieved to find that most of the other treasurers of our Party throughout the country are in the same position in which I find myself, namely not in the position of being the custodian of the purse but more in the position of being the custodian of an overdraft.⁶¹

Stability in organization meant financial security. Furthermore, as is usually the case, more money came with electoral success. For example, in 1965 all Liberal candidates across Canada raised a total of 2,616,000 compared to 1,779,000 for the Conservatives and in 1968 the Liberals raised 3,510,000 and the Conservatives 2,464,000. Thus the party was able to run a credible campaign in 1968.

⁶¹Whitaker, op. cit., p. 202.

There does not appear to have been a relationship, however, between accountability and electoral success. The formula for success of a party does not seem to include accountability.

During the initial stages of the Trudeau years, an effort was made to ensure that the national executive would control finances and that the membership would be informed about the party's finances. The system put in place was a veritable maze of responsibilities. Those so-called shady individuals who previously collected large corporate donations became the Treasury Committee of the Federation. Furthermore, the previously powerless Finance Committee of the NLF would be responsible for: 1. Raising money from individual party members to cover operation costs of the Federation; 2. Finding ways to broaden the base of financial contributors. Two co-chairmen were to head both committees, while the leader was to have appreciable responsibility for fund-raising.

Despite the party's good intentions in attempting to clarify lines of responsibility, problems were still inherent in the system. The primary dilemma lay in the competition for money. Every campaign committee from the riding level up was competing for the Treasury Committee's funds. This competition became intense during elections. Every constituency believes that just a little more money will put it over the edge of victory. This led to indiscretions which the party tried to reduce by encouraging

ridings themselves to raise their own money while donations of \$1,000.00 and up were to be left to the Treasury Committee.

A consistent problem for the Federation stemmed from the constant bickering among Ontario, Quebec and Ottawa concerning interparty transfers. The Ontario party claimed that it was paying more than its share to maintain the federal budget, while Quebec normally fell behind in its payments, claiming poverty. The relationship was an uneasy one and the Federation often lacked the political clout to handle the dispute, despite its newly discovered power:

In its efforts to broaden the base of its financial contributions, thus increasing the participation in the party, the Liberal party experimented with fund-raising efforts:

1. Nationwide membership campaign - 1968: Advertisements placed in various newspapers.
2. Fundraising dinners: successful although Trudeau did not like them, thus not sufficiently carried out.
3. Red Carnation Fund - target group professional non-Liberal members - receive Christmas card and wear carnation at Prime Ministerial functions. It was very successful.

The party had managed to make significant reforms, yet the party waited in anticipation of the Election Expenses Act. By 1974 the party was on firm ground financially.

Following the introduction of the Act in 1974, parties' fundraising techniques were changed profoundly. In fact,

looking at figures from 1986, it would seem as though the Liberal party was the most adversely affected. The act itself has three component parts:

1. The disclosure requirement for donations over \$100.00.
2. Public subsidies for the campaign expenses of both federal candidates and national campaigns.
3. Tax credits for political donations of up to \$500.00.

The Act meant that the constituency and provincial levels were able to raise more money from small and medium-sized donors due to the tax credit provision; the Treasury Committee, which generally collects the large sums of money, was, however, collecting less as companies were reluctant to donate large sums of money if their donations were to be open to public scrutiny.

The Liberal fund-raising donor base has increased while an additional effect of the Act concerns a substantial increase in inter-election financing and reduced election year financing by corporations. Joseph Wearing notes that, in 1974, individual contributors numbered 9,882, while in 1978 22,350 contributed.⁶²

The problems of underfunding for the national office continued, however, after the Election Expenses Act. The riding and provincial levels were able to keep most of the money they raised while the Treasury Committee controls

⁶²Ibid., p. 232.

national funds. The executive had not, by Trudeau's retirement, acquired the expected power of 1968. The Treasury Committee had the power to approve or disapprove the budget of the National Executive.

The primary fault of the Trudeau administration was its lack of adjustment to the effects of the Act. The party did not effectively go after the small to medium sized donations. Unfortunately this was their most important fundraising source, owing to the reluctance of large donors to contribute. For this reason the party was unable to raise as much money as before the Act. In the 1974 election, before the institution of the Act, the party raised \$2,250,000.00 in Ontario, while in 1979 only \$1,150,000.00 was raised. This is a considerable decrease in funds.

In comparison with Canada's two other national parties, the Liberal party was and still is in a dismal state financially. For example, in 1982, under the Trudeau regime, approximately 33,000 people donated to the party, while 60,000 donated to the Conservatives and 70,000 to the NDP. In terms of fund-raising results during the Trudeau tenure, in 1982 the Liberal party collected \$6 million, the Conservatives \$8 million and the NDP \$4.5 million. This compares with \$4.5 million for the Liberals, \$3.5 million for the PC's and \$2.5 million for the NDP, in 1977. Clearly the Trudeau entourage has paid little attention to fund raising and this has had a profound effect on election results. As I noted before it was not the new law itself

which brought the party down but the party's lack of reaction to it.

In terms of innovations the PC's have successfully instituted direct mail fund-raising since the 1974 Act, while the Liberals did not start plans until 1979, and even then the plan was slow to come off. In addition the national executive is underfunded while some riding associations hide their wealth. Trudeau did nothing to correct this imbalance.

To summarize the Trudeau era, he left the legacy of \$1,250,000.00 debt for his successor, while accountability was low. When it came to fighting the 1984 campaign, he had left inadequate financing while encountering an opposition party that had shrewdly built up a vast surplus. Along with organizational malaise and low opinion poll readings, inadequate financing contributed to the 1984 election loss of the party. Insufficient attention was paid to financing and the results have been documented.

When examining the beginning of the Turner years, an expedient approach would be to outline the financial structure and outlook when he assumed the office in 1984 and to examine the reforms that have been proposed since.

Following the 1984 electoral debacle a Special Committee on Finance was established in order to review the current financial situation of the party and report on it and to propose a new financial structure.

As I noted previously the committee discovered an overall combined deficit of \$1,250,000.00 with a

\$2,750,000.00 debt at the national level. In terms of structure the committee discovered a confusing array of financial elements in the party:

1. The Treasury committee - approaches all large corporate donors; the members of the committee are appointed by the leader; national executive has no control over committee funds.
2. The Federal Liberal Agency - responsible for issuing receipts for donations; in charge of national direct mail program; the Agency does not provide the executive with success in ridings/provinces fundraising efforts or details on expenditure of funds.
3. National executive - no revenue sharing agreements with provinces/ridings, thus making national fund-raising campaign difficult; relies on treasury committee for its funding.
4. The six national standing committees rely on the national executive for funding.
5. Provinces and riding associations keep most of the funds they raise - with some, out of their own good heart, transferring money to the national executive.
6. Election expenditures are controlled by a committee set up at the time of an election.

The problems with the system are numerous. First, and this is no secret, there must be a system to raise more money from existing sources and to tap new sources. Second, the party's finances require centralized control: an overall boss who pulls all the activities together. In addition to these problems, more money has to be given to the national level of the party. Greater accountability is also required by the party membership if they are to become more involved

in the party. Finally, a mechanism must be put in place to "prepare and revise budgets and match the demand and supply of funds."⁶³ These and other changes must be made to the party's financial structure if the Liberal party is to eliminate its deficit and regain its seat at the right hand of the Speaker.

The party's commitment to reform is underlined by the party president Iona Campagnolo:

We have made the executive and a large number of party members fully cognizant of all the labyrinthian detail of our party finances and we have agreement for the compiling of a consolidated financial statement and annual report to members of our financial position... The party must have equal access to inter election finances.⁶⁴

John Turner's commitment to change goes farther than this, however, as specific recommendations for change were introduced in the 1985 "Report of the Special Financial Review Committee to the National Executive of the Liberal Party of Canada." One of the most important changes proposed was a provision for the allocation of funds raised by the party:

1. Funds raised by the constituency level - 25 percent to the national level and the remainder to remain as previously designated.
2. Funds raised by provinces/territories - 25 percent to Ottawa - remainder again distributed as previous practice would dictate.

⁶³"Report of the Special Financial Review Committee,"
 op.cit., p. 6.

⁶⁴Campagnolo, op. cit., p. 6.

3. Direct mail program - 50 percent to national level and 50 percent to member organizations. ⁶⁵

The rationale for these changes is that they will allow the national executive to carry out its functions more adequately. Further, the committee recommends the compilation of national membership lists, in order to facilitate proper direction of direct mail fund raising. The changes in membership regulations, mentioned earlier in the thesis, will make the job much easier. Structurally, a Chief Financial Officer is recommended, to be appointed by the Leader in consultation with the President. This Officer would be responsible for raising and disbursing all funds at the national level. ⁶⁶ He or she will report to the Leader and the National Executive. As well, a Financial Management Committee is recommended and the Treasury Committee should be made a sub-committee of the Financial Management Committee. The Committee will "prepare and implement long-range financial plans for all aspects of the national level of the party." ⁶⁷

Finally, in terms of accountability, the party appears to be travelling in the right direction; that is, it is moving in the direction of a democratically based organization. In the words of the Special Financial Review Committee: "An annual report to the members and supporters of the Liberal Party, including the audited financial

⁶⁵"Report of the Special Financial Review Committee," op. cit., p. 11.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 9.

statements of the LPC, should be prepared and distributed...." ⁶⁸

To summarize, the party has clearly adopted the view that financial stability is one of the keys to electoral revival. Unfortunately, Turner and Campagnolo are still grappling with a \$2 million debt. The Reform Committee has recommended the adoption of the changes proposed by the Financial Review Committee. This appears to be a positive move by the party. However, only time will tell whether the party is to be successful in its objectives, or if the words are empty. Clearly the party is attempting drastically to change its direction by providing a strong, financially secure centre, as opposed to giving financial clout to the riding and provincial organizations.

To review the conclusions of this chapter, it is clear that the financial situation of the party does not alone influence its electoral success. However, what is also clear is that the financial state of the party does have an impact on the party's fortunes. Pierre Trudeau ignored the monetary state of the party thus leaving John Turner strangled electorally. He had insufficient funds to fight the wealthy Conservatives. Throughout the King-St. Laurent years electoral success and money were closely related. Electoral success meant financial security and security meant success. Yet as opinion poll scores dropped in 1957-1958, so did the party's financial state. It was left to individuals like

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 10.

John Aird, the party's chief fund-raiser in the 1960s, to rebuild the party's bank accounts and allow Trudeau the opportunity to capitalize on his immense personal appeal. Money is not everything but without it success on election day will be elusive. Finally, it appears accountability is not a part of the formula for success: but, still, for a democratically based organization, it is essential.

IV. Links Between Party Wings

The Liberal party, like Canada's two other national parties, comprises a parliamentary and a non-parliamentary wing. The non-parliamentary wing is led by the party president and the national executive, while the parliamentary wing comprises the Liberal caucus. When examining the elements of a successful political regime an overview of the relationship between these two factors is necessary. Specifically, has the nature of this relationship shaped the Liberals' electoral success? This chapter addresses this broader point by studying the degree of consultation between the two wings, and the relative strength of each.

This chapter asserts that the non-parliamentary wing represents the grassroots of the party. In addition, it represents all those ridings which did not elect Liberal members of parliament in the previous election. According to the 1983 "Discussion Paper on Reform", "their (unrepresented Liberals) only guaranteed vehicle is through the party, and if the party at the national level is not important to MP's, then by extension, neither is that unrepresented Liberal."⁶⁹ This discussion, thus focusses on the level to which Liberal grassroots are considered, by the leader, to be important to party success. If the party is not taken seriously, and traditionally (since 1919) it has not been, then apparently the membership is secondary to the Liberal party's formula for success.

⁶⁹"Discussion Paper on Reform," op. cit., p. 21.

The King era was a tense period between the two wings of the party. According to Reginald Whitaker, King was jealous of powers held by the National Liberal Federation. During King's tenure, the leader and the extra-parliamentary organization never achieved an easy accommodation. Any accommodation which might have been achieved between the party and the caucus was made difficult by King's ambivalence toward the volunteer wing, at times recognizing its importance while at other times referring to its inconsequential nature. King was suspicious of the volunteer wing's appearance of thwarting the leader's power and consequently refused to give it proper recognition.

The nature of the relationship between the two entities is characterized by King's relationship with the two presidents of the NLF throughout his tenure. The first, Vincent Massey, reluctantly accepted the position in 1932. King was jealous of Massey's wealth and position while Massey resented King's constant calls for subordination.

Massey wished to have the NLF take policy initiatives while King pressured Massey to concentrate upon financial matters. Although it was apparent that King respected Massey's qualifications, the working atmosphere was unpleasant and after the 1935 election Massey left his post for an appointment as high commissioner in London.

Following Massey's departure, Norman Lambert, former party secretary, took over as president. In 1935 the Liberals won a majority and special concern was paid to the

future relationship between the two wings of the party. "The party did not in fact return to the situation of the 1920's, and the new factor was the creation of a special role for Norman Lambert as an organizational link between the cabinet ministers and the external party..."⁷⁰ Attempts were made to link party and cabinet. A committee was established in order to forge a cooperative atmosphere between the two, yet it was a failure. The reason for the failure can be attributed to the ministers who selfishly guarded their areas of power. Essentially what Lambert did was link contributions and government contracts. Thus he controlled patronage to a point, but not to the extent to which he had hoped.

Lambert, like Massey, did not get along with King, thus straining the relationship between the two elements of the party. Although Lambert managed to improve the relationship slightly, it was not a significant change. Lambert left the NLF with ill-feelings towards the leader, in 1940.

The remainder of the King era was marked by the Prime Minister's inability to define the terms of the relationship between the two wings of the party. This was an important issue because it was felt by King and other party officials that if a proper link were not established between cabinet ministers and the membership, the party would fall into another period of organizational malaise. An effort was made in the early 1940s to give the extra-parliamentary wing a

⁷⁰Whitaker, op.cit., p. 87.

voice in formulating policy as organizational meetings were arranged in order to reactivate the national office which had been rendered inactive during the war.

Again because they felt as though their own arenas of power were being invaded by uninformed spectators, the cabinet resented volunteer input in policy. Therefore the extra-parliamentary wing was seen as a weak sister of the caucus and especially the ministers. Although tasks such as direct mailings were adopted by the party, when all is said and done, the party was run by the prime minister and the powerful ministers. King, throughout his tenure as leader, perceived the extra-parliamentary wing with suspicion, constantly guessing whether they were stealing power from him. An example of the relationship between the two levels can be found in Walter Herbert's comment who, when asked to return to his former post as NLF secretary, said: "he wouldn't have anything to do with Liberal organization so long as King was leader."⁷¹

The trend that was started by King was taken to its extreme by his successor Louis St. Laurent. Although there was none of the animosity between the NLF and St. Laurent as there had been with King, the party was again ignored by the parliamentary wing. The various Presidents during the 1950s - Foggo, Woodrow, MacTavish and Matthews - were called upon to raise funds for the party but they did little else. The party was run from the East Block.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 134.

To conclude, the King and St. Laurent years represented an era of resentment and ~~in~~ance of the party. Many attributed the losses of 1954 and 1958 at least partially to this phenomenon. King managed to rule the party with an iron will for over a decade with poor relations between himself and the party. It was not until the latter stages of St. Laurent's regime that the general disregard for the volunteer wing became a factor. Thus one can view with skepticism the opinion that for a successful political party there must be a good working relationship between the two wings.

As Wearing notes in the L-Shaped Party, "by 1957, the Liberals had become an extension of the cabinet, and when ministers went down like ninepins, nothing of the party was left."⁷² After the 1958 debacle, relationships between the two wings were transformed. Senator John Connolly became party president in 1961, James Scott, and then Keith Davey, assumed the position of national director. The party and its leadership worked to regain power.

The primary link between the party and the caucus was Walter Gordon, Lester Pearson's confidant. Through Gordon, Davey and Connolly had constant contact with Pearson and the relationship was certainly congenial. Most of this can be attributed to Pearson's personality. He was a 'groupie' who, unlike King, generally got along well with others. Davey, as director, was not put in the position of constantly battling

⁷²Wearing, op. cit., p. 13.

Pearson on every move, as the leader appeared to support the party's initiative and was not concerned with jealously guarding his power.

The reasons for this kind of relationship are probably twofold: the first I noted previously, Pearson's personality. The second was that, after the devastating defeat of 1958, Pearson needed the party. This attitude, however, had not been adopted by King as he found himself in much the same position when he assumed the leadership. Although the atmosphere of the relationship was good, it is widely recognized that Pearson held a certain disdain for organizational matters and questions arise as to the seriousness which he attached to Davey's suggestions concerning the maintenance of high visibility for the party.

Joseph Wearing notes, in his discussion of the Liberals' "New Politics" of the 1960s, that: "Pearson was not one for taking immediate decisions at anytime ... and too often party matters were allowed to drift in spite of Davey's prodding and Gordon's concern that essential decisions on party organization were not being made."⁷³ The decisions Wearing refers to are things such as broadening the party's fund-raising, recruiting new membership, and the consultation of the extra-parliamentary wing on patronage decisions.

Furthermore, although Pearson maintained an amiable relationship with the NLF, ministers jealously guarded their

⁷³Ibid., p. 46.

prerogatives, especially when moves were made to involve the party in patronage matters. An example of this is found in the 1965 election. There was, as Wearing notes, inadequate liaison between party and the ministers, essentially because the ministers were not interested in discussing party matters.⁷⁴ Essentially, what was found was that the party was given little help in organizing for the election by the parliamentary wing.

Following the party's failure to gain a majority in 1965, Davey resigned as national director. Decisions of the party were left up to Senator Nichol, party president, and Allan O'Brien who succeeded Davey as national director in 1966.

Efforts were made by the caucus to give recognition to the party, when in 1966 a national meeting was held to discuss Liberal policy. Pearson worked closely with party officials to decide the format of the convention. The innovation of giving rank and file members input on policy matters was certainly revolutionary.

Nevertheless, the Pearson era, like the King-St. Laurent period, was marked by an impotent extra-parliamentary party. The relationship itself was less rocky, yet this can be attributed to the personalities involved. Again, the party and caucus were not considered to be working from the same perspective, for the same goal. They were not equal partners.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 66.

The Trudeau regime was dictated, much like the King era, by the leader's personality. Trudeau was a loner who devoted his time to solitary pursuits. He tended to isolate himself from the masses, while appreciating most the company of men he considered intellectual equals, like Michael Pitfield. Although he gave audience to Keith Davey and Jim Coutts, for reasons of electoral survival, he preferred to travel with men of superior cerebral qualities. Trudeau's notion of party participation often meant simply carefully explaining policy to the people. His notion was that "if you do not agree with me then you have to change your leader."⁷⁵

The result of the above noted traits was a distant relationship between party and leader. Trudeau spent little time conversing with the party president and even less time addressing the party as a whole. Compounding his personality traits was the fact that Trudeau had few roots and contacts in the extra-parliamentary party. As a consequence when in doubt he looked to his own group of trusted advisors rather than the party. Not only did Trudeau have no contacts in the executive in Ottawa, he also lacked connection with individuals in the provincial executives. In terms of organization this reality hurt him because he lacked sympathy for the provincial organizations and those in executive positions at that level resented him. Without contacts the gap between them grew larger and relations

⁷⁵George Radwanski, Trudeau. (Agincourt: The New American Library of Canada Limited, 1978), p. 115.

deteriorated. He isolated the provincial Liberals, thus they resented working for him at election time. His contacts with the party were limited before he was elected leader and after.

Richard Gwyn in The Northern Magus notes that Trudeau never once spoke to Senator Nichol, the party president from 1964-1968 and co-chairman of the 1968 convention organization committee.⁷⁶ Gwyn goes on to state that "the traditional intelligence gathering function of the party and of backbench MP's was usurped by the new regional desks in his own office."⁷⁷ When perusing the well documented list of Trudeau's advisors, or supergroup as they have been referred to, none were members of the party hierarchy. All can be found either in the PMO, the PCO or in one or two instances, the cabinet. Trudeau did not consult on a regular basis with the president or national directors, thus giving credence to the opinion that he cared not what they had to say.

Where an effort was made to bring the two wings together, as during the three-phase participatory experiment 1969-1970, it was a failure. Trudeau's main instrument for effecting participatory democracy was the party. Yet when the party produced various policy proposals, almost all were rejected by Trudeau and the cabinet. For example, the 1970 Liberal policy convention produced various resolutions on abortion, the guaranteed annual income and other issues. Cabinet rejected the 'Charter' produced by the convention as

⁷⁶Gwyn, op. cit., p. 90.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 90.

a whole and Trudeau put up no fight on behalf of the party. Their opinion was that those who made up the regular party were necessarily uninformed, thus their opinions were not note-worthy.

Gwyn notes further the attitude Trudeau appeared to take toward the extra-parliamentary party:

For four years, Trudeau had scarcely given the party the time of day, and not one member of it had peeped. It was malleable: during 1968-1972, as Trudeau changed beyond recognition most of the policies he inherited from Pearson, none but Walter Gordon had peeped...Trudeau though, had to work to win his party spurs. If Liberals have few opinions, they have a great many loyalties. Trudeau, 1968-1972 had not been completely unaware of them.⁷⁸

In 1972 Trudeau made an effort to stroke party egos, but once back in power with a majority in 1974 the trend towards isolation began again. By 1977 Trudeau, in Gwyn's words, "had become the Liberal Party, the government, the state."⁷⁹ He was "isolated from people. He was isolated from life. And he was isolated, now, even from ideas."⁸⁰ Unfortunately, his isolation from entities had always included an isolation from the party. His list of closest advisors included Coutts, Davey, Tom Axworthy, Kenny, Grafstein, Goldfarb, O'Hagan, Pitfield. In her book Grits, Christina McCall-Newman notes "the party was often described by both its adherents and its opponents as little more than a leader's machine driven by a small cadre on his behalf,

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 312.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

with policy made by a government bureaucracy far from the party's sight. To many Canadians, it seemed as though the Liberal Party had gone from oligarchy to oligarchy in one generation."⁸¹

Once having established the basis for the relationship, I believe it would be expedient to note some of the opinions expressed by regular party officials during Trudeau's terms:

In 1979, a former Liberal National Director, Blair Williams, described the ministers as 'irrelevant', and, in an unprecedented breach of party solidarity, blamed this on Trudeau's aloofness, insensitivity and lack of judgement.⁸²

Richard Stanbury, party president from 1968-1973, was "dismayed that the party office was regarded as no more than 'some sort of foreign agency' by many of the ministers' offices."⁸³ Stanbury goes on to note: "There is a resistance to cooperating with the Party Office in matters of opportunities, policy information, uses of the Cabinet Ministers' time - in fact in almost every aspect of Party life."⁸⁴

Rosslind Mellander, a vice-president of the Youth Commission from B.C., made a comment concerning party-caucus relations in 1975: "Since these mechanisms (policy committee, policy director) are not effective, the

⁸¹ McCall-Newman, op. cit., p. 345.

⁸² Gwyn, op. cit., p. 345.

⁸³ Wearing, op. cit., p. 148.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 152.

government is formulating policy and making decisions that neither have the advice nor reflect the views of the Party."⁸⁵

The final example I would like to draw upon in order to illustrate the state of the relationship between the two wings, is the 1979 decision to bring down the Clark government and retain Pierre Trudeau as leader through the following election. The feelings of the national executive concerning the 1979 defeat of the Conservatives have been well documented.

On the Saturday morning following the defeat earlier in the week, the Party's national executive met with MacEachen and Coutts. Jeffrey Simpson notes in Discipline of Power: "The caucus had once again ignored the party organization, and the executive was angry at being taken as a mere rubber stamp. The party organization had said repeatedly that the party was justified in its complaints."⁸⁶ The executive complained that the party was not financially secure enough to undertake an election campaign. Secondly, they were not happy about Trudeau leading their forces. Yet as has been mentioned they were not consulted.

To conclude, it is clear that during the Trudeau years, despite efforts to the contrary from 1972 to 1974, the regular party and the parliamentary party were not in constant communication, in fact more often than not they did

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 206.

⁸⁶Jeffrey Simpson, Discipline of Power. (Toronto: Personal Library, Publishers, 1980) p. 40.

not communicate at all. Decisions were made that were often very unpopular with the volunteer wing. There were none of the personality clashes that occurred during the King era. However, the relationship was not a close one either. Marc Lalonde noted in January of 1986 when speaking about the former Prime Minister: "He was a strong leader but not an organizer of people."⁸⁷ The regular party faded under Trudeau because he paid too little attention to organization.

The rhetoric of the party recently makes it clear that the Turner years should be marked by a clear attempt to improve relations between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary wings. Party leaders both elected and non-elected speak of the need for greater consultation between the two entities. Maclean's magazine reported that Turner and party president Campagnolo met on the eve of the September 4th electoral defeat in order to discuss a rebuilding program. To many Liberals this was a reassuring sign: the leader consulting with the president of the party on the future. This had been a rare event in the past. It has not been an isolated incident recently. Turner and Campagnolo meet on a regular basis in order to discuss party issues.

Changes have been instituted in party process in order to improve consultation between the two wings. For instance, it has been suggested that a member of the national

⁸⁷"Marc Lalonde reflects on Trudeau," Vancouver Sun, January 20, 1986.

executive (i.e. the President) attend various federal caucus meetings.

Furthermore, the composition of the national executive has been transformed in order to allow more caucus representation. As the authors of the Final Report of the President's Committee on Reform state: "It is felt that this may assist in strengthening the critical interface between the parliamentary and voluntary wing of the Party."⁸⁸

In addition the party established a Standing Committee on Policy Development that would increase "the participation of non-parliamentary members of the Party in the formulation of policy."⁸⁹ The Chairman of the Committee would be elected at a National Convention and the Vice-Chair would be appointed by the National Executive and not the leader. As well, the Party President was added as a committee member along with the members from each province/territory and the Women's and Youth Commissions. The Committee is accountable to the National Executive and the National Convention of the Party. Five members of the national caucus and the leader also sit on the committee, allowing for policy consultation between the two wings.

Finally, in the summary comments of the Final Report on Reform some recommendations are made and suggestions put forth which suggest that the Turner-led Liberal party believes that a close relationship between the two wings is

⁸⁸"Final Report of the President's Committee," op. cit., p.21.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 37.

essential to a revitalized party:

The Caucus should schedule sessions devoted to Party affairs from time to time, to which should be invited Party officials, as determined in consultation with the President.⁹⁰

There should be routine inclusion of Party people in the work of staff of the parliamentary wing, as appropriate.⁹¹

In fact, a healthy and productive relationship is absolutely vital to Party reconstruction both and outside Parliament.⁹²

The regular Party - parliamentary relationship is the key to long-term strength and survival.⁹³

Such changes are certainly meritorious. If they are carried out, the relationship will certainly improve. However, I have certain reservations.

First, will the parliamentary wing receive these changes readily or will they be discarded? If they are not accepted the membership will recognize their own insignificance in the Liberal machine and will once again fail to do the foot work on election day. Recent indications suggest that resistance will be afforded the invasion of regular party members. On September 5th, 1985 I interviewed Iona Campagnolo and she expressed dismay that caucus members resisted and resented her presence at caucus meetings. Furthermore, she noted that specific caucus members resented the changes or reforms she was orchestrating in the

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 69.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

72

Party.⁶⁴ She indicated that people like Keith Davey resented the changing of the guard in the party and supported the status quo. The more reforms that are made the more influence membership would have and the less influence the old guard would maintain. This is what individuals like Davey resent.

Campagnolo's comments would indicate that rhetoric for change is just that - rhetoric. If the party wants reform, the Senators and Members of Parliament must reform their thinking. They must stop resisting what they see as an invasion of their power bases. For a party that is not represented in 242 of 282 Canadian ridings it seems ludicrous for elected and non-elected members to attempt to protect so limited an area of influence.

My second reservation relates to the conclusions that can be drawn from the contents of this chapter concerning the importance of the relationship between the two wings to party success. As is evident from the preceding discussion King, St. Laurent, Pearson and Trudeau achieved electoral success either without substantial input from the national executive or with an uncomfortable relationship between the President and the leader.

King resented his non-parliamentary brethren and resisted their interference in his area of influence. There are indications that St. Laurent did not know they existed.

⁶⁴This and subsequent comments were made during an interview with the Honourable Iona Campagnolo, P.C. Party President and former Liberal cabinet minister, September 5, 1985, in Edmonton.

Pearson, although getting along with the executive, often failed to heed its advice. Finally Trudeau neither liked his non-elected counterparts nor respected them. Yet all four were elected as Prime Minister despite these realities.

To conclude, ideally the leader and caucus should take careful account of the concerns of party members. The grassroots, in my opinion, should play an important role in party operations. In reality though, the leader does not have to honour the wishes of the membership for electoral success. The sole area of concern is the perception that the grassroots are significant. Nevertheless, in reality, the leader should consider the grassroots. With the present situation the Liberal party finds itself in, electoral victory may well depend on a real interest on the part of the leader, in the grassroots, in order to engender enthusiasm among the membership. All party idealists must struggle with this dilemma, as I did while constructing the model for a successful political party.

National Executive

1. (1) The National Executive shall consist of the following members:
 - a. the Leader;
 - b. the President;
 - c. the Past President;
 - d. two Vice-Presidents, one of whom shall be English speaking, one of whom shall be French speaking;
 - e. the President of each provincial and territorial associations;
 - f. the Chair of the National Liberal Caucus;
 - g. the Chair of each regional Caucus;
 - h. the President and one elected representative of the National Women's Liberal Commission, who shall be of the other official language than the President;
 - i. the President and two elected representatives of the Commission of Young Liberals of Canada, at least one of whom shall be English speaking, one of whom shall be French speaking and one of whom shall be a woman;
 - j. the Secretary-Treasurer;
 - k. the Chair of the Standing Committee on Finance, who is also the Chief Financial Officer;
 - l. the Chair of the Revenue Committee;
 - m. the Chair of the Standing Committee on Policy Development;
 - n. the Leader of the Liberal Party in each province

and territory of Canada, as honorary
Vice-Presidents (non-voting);

o. the Chair(s) of the National Liberal Campaign
Committee (non-voting); and

p. the Secretary General (non-voting).

Party President

Massey (1932-1935)

Lambert (1935-1940)

Robertson (1943-1946)

Fogo (1946-1952)

Woodrow (1952)

MacTavish (1952-1960)

Matthews (1960-1961)

Connolly (1961-1964)

Nichol (1964-1968)

Stanbury (1968-1973)

Molgat (1973-1975)

Graham (1975-1980)

Marchand (1980-1982)

Campagnolo (1982-1986)

V. Federal-Provincial Relations

- Traditional political wisdom asserts that for a party to be successful federally it must be strong provincially. Have the Liberals been successful federally because of strong provincial parties? Joseph Wearing, in the L-Shaped Party notes that:

It had always been part of the accepted political wisdom in Canada that federal success was dependent on having a strong provincial base, not least because of the value of provincial patronage in building a party organization... Indeed, ever since 1896, a change of power federally had come in the wake of a series of victories by provincial wings of the same party.⁹⁵

In essence, what I am trying to establish is how the Liberals provincially have assisted the federal party and how this assistance implies a partisan base from which the federal party can work. I also examine the relationship between the federal and provincial wings to see if it is a productive one or a tumultuous one and if one's victories mean success for the other.

In examining the links between provincial and federal victory I tabulated the election results for the ten provincial governments for the preceding 63 years (1921-1984) (Table II). At the same time I tabulated the federal election results from 1921-1984 (Table I). Also I calculated for each party forming the federal government,

⁹⁵Wearing, op. cit., p. 13.

from election to election, how many complementing provincial parties were in power simultaneously.⁹⁶

Table 1

PARTY FORMING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1921	- Liberal (7)*
1925	- Liberal (3)
1926	- Liberal (3)
1930	- Conservative (4)
1935	- Liberal (7)
1940	- Liberal (7)
1945	- Liberal (7)
1949	- Liberal (5)
1953	- Liberal (4)
1957	- Conservative (4)
1958	- Conservative (5)
1962	- Conservative (4)
1963	- Liberal (2)
1965	- Liberal (4)
1968	- Liberal (4)
1972	- Liberal (3)
1974	- Liberal (3)
1979	- Conservative (7)
1980	- Liberal (0)
1984	- Conservative (7)

*Note that the number in brackets beside the party in power federally indicates how many provinces were ruled by the party of the same stripe at that time.

⁹⁶Included in the analysis throughout this chapter will be a comparison of percentages of popular vote results and seats won in the federal and provincial elections since 1956. These statistics were adapted from tables included in Wearing's the L-Shaped Party, pp. 82-86. For reproductions of the tables, please see Appendix I.

Table 2

PARTY FORMING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

<u>Prince Edward Island</u>	<u>Newfoundland</u>	<u>Nova Scotia</u>
1919 - Liberal		1920 - Liberal
1923 - Conservative		1925 - Conservative
1927 - Liberal		1928 - Conservative
1931 - Conservative		1933 - Liberal
1935 - Liberal		1937 - Liberal
1939 - Liberal		1941 - Liberal
1943 - Liberal		1945 - Liberal
1947 - Liberal	1949 - Liberal	1949 - Liberal
1951 - Liberal	1951 - Liberal	1953 - Liberal
1955 - Liberal	1956 - Liberal	1956 - Conservative
1959 - Conservative	1959 - Liberal	1960 - Conservative
1962 - Conservative	1962 - Liberal	1963 - Conservative
1966 - Liberal	1966 - Liberal	1967 - Conservative
1970 - Liberal	1971 - Conservative	1970 - Liberal
1974 - Liberal	1972 - Conservative	1974 - Liberal
1979 - Conservative	1975 - Conservative	1978 - Conservative
1982 - Conservative	1979 - Conservative	1981 - Conservative
1986 - Liberal	1982 - Conservative	1985 - Conservative

Table 2 (cont'd)

<u>New Brunswick</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>
1920 - Liberal	1919 - Liberal	1919 - Other
1925 - Conservative	1923 - Liberal	1923 - Conservative
1930 - Conservative	1927 - Liberal	1926 - Conservative
1935 - Liberal	1931 - Liberal	1929 - Conservative
1939 - Liberal	1935 - Liberal	1934 - Liberal
1944 - Liberal	1939 - C/UN	1937 - Liberal
1948 - Liberal	1939 - C/UN	1943 - Conservative
1952 - Conservative	1944 - C/UN	1945 - Conservative
1956 ² - Conservative	1948 - C/UN	1948 - Conservative
1958 - Liberal	1952 - C/UN	1951 - Conservative
1963 - Liberal	1956 - C/UN	1955 - Conservative
1967 - Liberal	1960 - Liberal	1959 - Conservative
1970 - Conservative	1962 - Liberal	1963 - Conservative
1974 - Conservative	1966 - C/UN	1967 - Conservative
1978 - Conservative	1970 - Liberal	1971 - Conservative
1982 - Conservative	1973 - Liberal	1975 - Conservative
	1976 - Other	1977 - Conservative
	1981 - Other	1981 - Conservative
	1985 - Liberal	1985 - Liberal

Table 2 (cont'd)

<u>Manitoba</u>	<u>Saskatchewan</u>
1920 - Liberal	1921 - Liberal
1922 - Other	1925 - Liberal
1927 - Other	1929 - Liberal
1932 - Other	1934 - Liberal
1936 - Liberal	1938 - Liberal
1941 - Liberal	1944 - Other
1945 - Coalition	1948 - Other
1949 - Coalition	1952 - Other
1953 - Liberal	1956 - Other
1958 - Conservative	1960 - Other
1959 - Conservative	1964 - Liberal
1962 - Conservative	1967 - Liberal
1966 - Conservative	1971 - Other
1969 - Other	1975 - Other
1973 - Other	1978 - Other
1977 - Conservative	1982 - Conservative
1981 - Other	
1986 - Other	

Table 2 (cont'd)Alberta

1921 - Other
 1926 - Other
 1930 - Other
 1935 - Other
 1940 - Other
 1944 - Other
 1948 - Other
 1952 - Other
 1955 - Other
 1959 - Other
 1963 - Other
 1967 - Other
 1971 - Conservative
 1975 - Conservative
 1979 - Conservative
 1982 - Conservative
 1986 - Conservative

British Columbia

1920 - Liberal
 1924 - Liberal
 1928 - Conservative
 1933 - Liberal
 1937 - Liberal
 1941 - Liberal
 1945 - L/C - coalition
 1949 - L/C - coalition
 1952 - Other
 1953 - Other
 1956 - Other
 1960 - Other
 1963 - Other
 1966 - Other
 1969 - Other
 1972 - Other
 1975 - Other
 1979 - Other
 1983 - Other

What emerges from these data is the sense that significant shifts in voter preference provincially, may imply a shift in the federal party in power. For example, in 1921 the Liberals won the federal election while they held power in seven of the nine provincial capitals. The Liberals had managed to defeat four Conservative governments in the preceding six years.

In 1930 the Conservatives gained power federally. At the same time they had managed to defeat five Liberal administrations provincially, between the years of 1921-1929, seemingly establishing a power base from which to strike at King's Liberals.

Between 1930 and 1935 the Liberals defeated five Conservative provincial governments, coming to power in 1935 federally with seven Liberal provincial administrations. Liberal provincial dominance began to slide over the next 20 years. The Conservatives, when Diefenbaker attained his majority government in 1958, were in power in five of the ten provinces; the Liberals were able to master only two. By this time third parties were in power in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. More significantly, in 1958 the Conservatives controlled Canada's two most populated provinces - Quebec and Ontario. The Liberals controlled them in 1935 and one of the two in 1921, with a third party controlling Ontario.

By 1963 the Conservatives were in power in four of the ten provinces and the Liberals were in power in four.

Therefore no significant conclusions can be drawn from this election, as the Liberals had regained power in only two provinces. However, if one were to analyze the 1968 election, the phenomenon of Trudeaumania and Expo '67 would go a long way to explain the Liberal majority victory.

The final dramatic turnabout in federal results was in 1984 when the Conservatives won 211 of 282 seats in the House of Commons. The Liberals managed only 40, a dramatic drop from the 146 they held in 1980. This turnabout is reflected in provincial results. In 1984, the Conservatives were in power in seven of Canada's ten provincial capitals; the Liberals were in power in none.

There appears to be a link between electoral victories provincially and the eventual victory of the same party in Ottawa. The drastic electoral turnabouts in 1921, 1935, 1958, 1963, and 1984 were preceded by a similar supremacy for that party provincially. In three cases it was the Liberal party which benefitted from the 'bandwagon effect'.

From the statistics one can cautiously conclude that for some reason the electorate tends to turn to one particular party provincially, slowly. Once building up momentum the same party is able to regain power in Ottawa. Thus, the Liberals need to examine the aforementioned evidence and then take a look at their current provincial situation. This would seem to be of some benefit. Then what the party should do is examine the relationship between the provincial and federal wings, to see if this relationship

can be built upon.

In the remainder of this chapter, I intend to examine past personal relationships between the leaders of the two levels in order to discover if they had any influence upon the success of the Liberal party in Ottawa. In other words, is it important that the leaders get along for the federal party to be able to build upon provincial successes?

The relationship between Ottawa and Ontario was not a particularly rocky one, except for the period marked by the King-Hepburn feud of the late 1930s and early 1940s.⁹⁷ Throughout this period Hepburn criticized the federal Liberal government as no provincial Liberal leader had done before or has done since. The federal Liberals have generally been more successful in Ontario than their provincial counterparts, the province yielding to Liberal rule only from 1934 to 1943. For example, between 1956-1984 the only period where the province came out ahead in popular support was between 1960-1962. Prior to 1930, the provincial Liberal party in Ontario was disorganized and poor. It was in that year that Mitch Hepburn, a former backbencher in Ottawa, took over the provincial leadership. Mackenzie King disliked Hepburn's lifestyle, yet the latter managed to bring the provincial party financial success and organizational security and in 1934, due to Hepburn's charismatic personality, the party gained power. At the same time Hepburn cut off the federal wing from any interference

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 108.

in Ontario affairs, yet he expected favors from Dettmer. Hepburn eventually dissociated himself from King and the feud became a full scale battle. Unfortunately for Hepburn, King held the upper hand in resources as well as strategy. Hepburn would leave a shattered provincial party in 1942.

Beyond 1940, until the 1980s, the Liberal party in Ontario was disorganized and underfinanced. Popular support for the party failed to increase beyond 35 percent during this period, while the federal vote went as high as 47 percent in 1974 and 43 percent in 1980. There were numerous changes in leadership. The provincial party attempted to cling to the coat-tails of the federal party, yet they could not restore credibility to their cause. This pattern continued until the emergence of David Peterson in the 1980s. As far as relationships go, Pearson and Trudeau gave insufficient attention to Ontario, marking an era of insensitivity. For this reason, in 1975 the Ontario Liberal party split into a federal and provincial wing with "two distinct campaign teams for the federal and provincial parties, as well as two separate offices for organization and fund raising."⁹⁸ There was not a particularly warm relationship between the two parties from King to Trudeau, thus it would seem, in this province at least, any federal success was achieved independently of the relationships at the top.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 112.

Like Ontario, the relationship between federal Liberals and their Quebec counterparts was often uncomfortable. Whitaker notes that "...indeed by the 1930s it had become apparent that the federal party's success had been built in part upon a limitation of the provincial party's potential."⁹⁹ The Liberal party provincially has seen a number of electoral disappointments yet federally Quebec success has meant electoral victory. The Liberals overwhelmingly dominated Quebec until 1984.

Until the 1950s there was no formal provincial party organization and, according to most, no apparent differentiation between federal and provincial organizers. The 1920s was marked by Liberal governments in both Ottawa and Quebec City: one organization electing both. Thus it would seem here that provincial power meant federal power. Yet at the same time Quebec resented interference from Ottawa and King was told not to enter into Quebec's business.

By 1939, however, the federal party was called upon to bail out a sinking provincial ship owing to the electoral dominance of Duplessis. Yet, federal help was half-hearted and proved to be of little assistance, when in 1948 the provincial Liberals won only eight seats. Thus, the provincial party under their newly elected leader, Georges-Emile Lapalme, set out on a course of organizational independence, despite the lack of financial stability. The

⁹⁹Whitaker, op. cit., p. 270.

federal Liberals opposed this action and thus attempted to discredit the provincial party, forcing the latter to reconsider.

Yet the tables soon turned as Lesage and the provincial Liberals were elected to office a year and a half after the 1958 debacle. The newly elected leader again struck the provincial wing out on a path of independence. Prior to that though, the Quebec Liberals did support Pearson in 1962 and 1963. "In 1964 the provincial FLQ disassociated itself from the federal party, and two years later, the founding convention of the new federal Quebec Liberal party was held."¹⁰⁰ In 1964 this was a wise choice as the provincial party held 57 percent of popular vote in Quebec while the federal party was at 46 percent.

Since 1964 the relationship between the two wings has sometimes been hostile. Neither party sees the other in a particularly complementary way. After 1972 the provincial support fell to 35 percent, while the federal party climbed to near 70 percent. As Wearing notes, "...in fact, both men's (Lesage and Bourassa) resignations followed stinging attacks on them by federal Quebec Liberals."¹⁰¹ To conclude, although provincial support may have aided federal success it is clear that federal victories were not a result of a good working relationship at the top, while popular support readings show little correlation between provincial success and federal success beyond the 1970s. The federal party's

¹⁰⁰Wearing, op. cit., p. 98.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 108.

success was independent of any provincial success.

One province that has seen a good working relationship between the two wings is New Brunswick. According to Whitaker "there has never been any important friction between the federal and provincial wings of the Liberal party."¹⁰² Both levels contribute to the other's political successes and the various leaders have spent little time attacking each other. In fact, Wearing quotes Keith Davey when he noted that "...the revival of Liberal fortunes there was due largely to the provincial Liberal victory in 1960...."¹⁰³ The province aided the federal party, and when in financial disarray the provincial wing was aided by the federal wing. The federal and provincial vote has consistently exceeded 40 percent and the federal party has generally won at least five of the ten seats. The relationship has been a close one. Thus in this case, federal success was built upon provincial success.

In Nova Scotia, meanwhile, disagreements have emerged between the two wings, however never as vocal as in Ontario. Nova Scotia would complain, and they even attempted to pursue a provincialist course. Yet the rhetoric did not lead to outright bickering. Despite the lack of heated debate, Nova Scotian politics did not influence federal Liberal success as there seems to be no discernable connection between the two. Provincial support for the Liberals exceeds federal support from 1958 to 1980 except for a brief period

¹⁰²Whitaker, op. cit., p. 389.

¹⁰³Wearing, op. cit., p. 92.

from 1962 to 1964. In fact, in 1958 when provincial support was at 50 percent the federal party won no seats. The same thing occurred in 1972 when support for the provincial party was high and the federal party won only one seat. "The Liberals did not win more than two of the eleven or twelve federal seats in Nova Scotia in any election between 1958 and 1979, except for 1963, when they won five."¹⁰⁴

Prince Edward Island is an interesting province. As Ian Stewart notes, the tiny Maritime province wishes to "elect provincial administrations of the same party stripe as the federal government...."¹⁰⁵ Thus since 1919 the Liberals have been relatively successful in Prince Edward Island. When they have not been it has not been due to poor relations between Ottawa and the provincial capital of Charlottetown, rather it has been due to a desire of the Islanders to align themselves with the Conservatives in Ottawa. For example, prior to 1958 federal support plummeted from over 50 percent in 1956 to 38 percent in 1958 when John Diefenbaker was elected in Ottawa. Then in 1959 a provincial Conservative government was elected in Prince Edward Island. Again, prior to Pearson's 1960 victory, popular support rose to 46 percent for the Liberals in Prince Edward Island and in 1966 the Islanders elected a provincial Liberal government. Relations have generally been without incident. To conclude the provincial Liberal party

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰⁵Ian Stewart, "Friends at Court: Federalism and Provincial Elections on Prince Edward Island," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XIX:1 March 1986, p. 127.

has generally benefitted from Liberal victories in Ottawa, rather than the opposite. The 1986 election of Joe Ghiz and the provincial Liberals seems to be an exception to this rule. It is difficult to read the minds of the voters but possibly they are anticipating a Liberal victory in the next federal election and wish to align themselves with John Turner's federal party.

One cannot discuss provincial politics in Newfoundland without mentioning Joey Smallwood. For the province's first 22 years in Confederation, Smallwood dominated the party in Newfoundland. He ran the province and the party autocratically. His power enabled federal Liberals to get elected, because his enthusiastic and strong grassroots threw their support to Ottawa's Liberals. However, it must be remembered that Ottawa did not interfere with the provincial leader. He ran the province his way and the federal Liberals benefitted. After Smallwood's resignation in 1971, the provincial Liberals have withered. In 1968 provincial popular support was at 60 percent and in 1972 it was at 42 percent. This failing success has been reflected in federal success in Newfoundland as they consistently won 5-7 of the possible 7 seats from 1956-1968 and from then have won between one in 1968 and five in 1980. In terms of popular support prior to Smallwood's resignation, the support was over 60 percent, but since then it has not exceeded 45 percent for the federal party.

The early years of Liberal history in British Columbia were marked by tensions between the provincial and federal leaders. In 1933, T.D. 'Duff' Pattullo was elected Liberal premier of B.C. Mackenzie King, unfortunately, disliked Pattullo and this led to federal-provincial intra-party strains. Pattullo pursued a platform of provincial independence, even during the war years, and was soon to see his demise in the party after the 1941 provincial election, owing to the fact he could not support a move to form a coalition with the Conservatives to keep the CCF from taking power. When the party endorsed a coalition he resigned and the new leader, John Hart, moved to join with the Conservatives. King surprisingly stayed out of the coalition debate to a great degree. Relations completely broke down during the 1949 provincial election as the two wings failed to work together to the benefit of the provincial party. After the breakdown of the coalition came the emergence of the Social Credit party led by W.A.C. Bennett which wiped the provincial Liberals from the map. From that point, until the federal debacle of 1958, Ottawa held the purse strings and the ultimate power in the relationship. However after 1958, neither the federal nor provincial Liberals could claim organizational strength in the province.

With the emergence of Keith Davey and the federal campaign committees the federal party tended to dominate the provincial wing in terms of organization and finance. There appeared to be harmony, yet the provincial party was in such

a state of disarray it is hard to imagine that it could have mattered much if there was not. Clearly the provincial Liberals have meant little to the fortunes of federal Liberals in B.C. For example, in 1968 federal popular support was at 41 percent while provincial support was at 19 percent. Prior to this, in 1963 federal support was at 33 percent while provincial support was below 20 percent. Trudeau won 16 of 23 possible seats in 1968 but that tapered off to zero after 1980 until Turner's victory in Vancouver-Quadra in 1984. Both provincially and federally the party appears in trouble and provincial strength has meant nothing for federal success.

The Liberal party in Alberta, since the 1920s and 1930s, has been "remarkably unpopular."¹⁰⁶ One can speculate, rather convincingly, that the Liberal party in Alberta has meant very little to federal success in that province. For example, in 1968 when the federal party won four seats, provincial support was at 11 percent. The provincial party has been the weak sister among her counterparts, while the relationship between the two parties has not been particularly warm, as struggles over patronage, provincial funding and policy brewed. The relationship came to an end in 1977, when the provincial party led by Nick Taylor set up a separate organization modelled after Ontario and Quebec. Joseph Wearing quotes Nick Taylor as saying that such a model would "rid the provincial party of the

¹⁰⁶Whitaker, op. cit., p. 359.

albatross of having to explain every asinine move Ottawa makes."¹⁰⁷ It is apparent that Liberal strength federally was not built upon strength in Alberta. However, there is renewed hope for Liberals in Alberta, as the provincial party, led by Nick Taylor, won four seats in the 1986 provincial election, and managed to achieve over 10 percent of the popular vote. Such figures should give federal hopefuls in Alberta renewed enthusiasm. As well, the possibility of federal candidates building upon provincial success is now there.

The Saskatchewan Liberal party has been the strongest of the four Western provinces. During the period of Jimmy Gardiner's rule in the province, the two wings of the party in Saskatchewan cooperated to the benefit of both. When in Ottawa as an MP, Gardiner continued to direct the Saskatchewan party much to the dismay of provincial leaders. This interference from Ottawa led to an estrangement between the two parties and a resulting drop in the popular vote for both.

During Diefenbaker's era the party, both federally and provincially, was in dire straits. A Liberal revival came provincially in 1964 under Ross Thatcher, a right wing ideologue who disagreed repeatedly with Ottawa. The federal Liberals were unable to capitalize on Thatcher's support as the provincial popular vote rose above 40 percent while the federal vote remained at just above 20 percent. This was

¹⁰⁷Wearing, op. cit., p. 138.

largely due to the ideological divisions within the party. Until his death on July 23, 1971 Thatcher was barely on speaking terms with Ottawa, thus support was not forthcoming from his province.

Once Thatcher was gone, cooperation between the two levels returned. Unfortunately for both, however, their support was weak in the province, (30 percent for both in 1976) and no level of intra-party camaraderie was going to change this. To conclude, during Gardiner's time the federal party may have benefitted from provincial support but after that the provincial party was not an important ally.

The federal Liberal party has had trouble aligning itself with the Manitoba Liberal party owing to the latter's propensity to "co-operate with everything else that moved politically in the province."¹⁰⁸ The Liberal Progressive Conservative coalition of the 1930s and early 1940s meant that cooperation was very difficult. The federal Liberal party and the provincial Liberals in Manitoba were ideologically divided during those times thus it would be difficult to discern any value emanating from cooperation.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the federal party support exceeded 40 percent yet the provincial vote dropped below 30 percent. However, federal support dropped to 30 percent in 1974. Although cooperation has increased between the two levels in recent times, neither has seemed to benefit.

¹⁰⁸Whitaker, op. cit., p. 351.

According to Donald Smiley in Canada in Question: Federalism In The Eighties, there is evidence to support a bandwagon effect in Canadian elections: "that a party's success at one level of the federal system contributes to its chances at the other level."¹⁰⁹ And according to Roger Gibbins and William Reeves, this effect runs from provincial to federal politics. Turner must be elated when he looks at the success of his provincial brethren:

Ontario - Minority Liberal government under David Peterson.

Quebec - Majority Liberal government under Robert Bourassa.

PEI - Majority Liberal government under Joe Ghiz.

Alberta - Four seats in 1986.

Manitoba - Leader Sharon Carstairs elected in 1986.

Clearly the party is making gains provincially. Although no one is convinced that this provincial success will carry over federally, certainly the party cannot make gains in Ottawa without a sprinkling of provincial strength. What we are seeing in 1986 is a rainstorm of provincial support, partially due to dissatisfaction with Mulroney's government, partially due to strengthened Liberal organizations in the aforementioned provinces, and partially due to dissatisfaction with long-running provincial governments, whether Conservative or Parti Quebecois.

¹⁰⁹D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism In The Eighties. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, Third Edition, 1980), p. 123.

Furthermore it is up to John Turner to at least maintain an appearance of good faith between himself and the provincial leaders, unlike Pierre Trudeau who appeared to be carrying on constant wars with provincial leaders. Trudeau had no contacts in the provincial arena and failed to sympathize with their plight. It was difficult to build a bond when communications broke down. With such a bond the Liberals federally would have a chance to build upon provincial gains. So far it would seem he has followed this agenda as he, Bourassa and Peterson appear, at least on the surface, to be towing one line and not two or three. This will provide the party the opportunity to capitalize on the strength portrayed in the aforementioned five areas.

To conclude, what is clear from the figures contained in Table II is that although provincial strength does not necessarily mean federal strength, the federal popular vote rarely exceeds that of the provincial vote, except in British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario.

The personal relationships between the two levels of the party throughout history, have not been particularly satisfying. Thus it is apparent that at times Ottawa could not expect much help in terms of campaigning from individuals like Hepburn and Thatcher. Yet what is apparent is that there is much cross-over between elements of the grassroots of the party, and for Ottawa to be successful the provincial level must be working for the feds. One can assume then, for the federal party to be strong, there must

be a sense of activity in the provinces and the people at the grassroots must be working towards a common goal.

VI: Leadership

George Perlin, in The Tory Syndrome, refers to the importance of leadership for party success:

Party strategists clearly agree that the personality of the leader has an important effect in federal politics. They all direct their research at the study of the impact of the personal attributes of leaders and devise their campaign plans in response to their analyses of strengths and weaknesses in the personal images of the rival leaders. ¹¹⁰

Perlin also discusses the effect of leader images on voting behavior: "In a national survey in 1968, John Meisel found that when voters were asked what party aspect was most important in their voting choice, the largest number (42 percent) said it was the party leader."¹¹¹ Both the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals are leader-centred parties.

Therefore, the most important factor in party success is leadership. Within the notion of leadership, however, are two different aspects: stability and quality. By stability I mean the longevity of leaders and the extent of conflict over leadership.

The second point is the quality of leadership. Important here are the ability of the leader to spark loyalty among followers, to bring people into the party and keep them there, and to surround himself with capable advisors.

¹¹⁰Perlin, op. cit., p. 13.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

In this chapter I intend to use the Liberal party as a blueprint for the success of leadership and contrast that with the leadership of the Conservative party in order to portray the differences between the two parties. From there I intend to speculate on what this means for party success.

Consistency in leadership has long been a trademark of the Liberal party, and a problem for Conservatives. The following comparison of leaders and their careers illustrates the essential differences between the two parties:

Liberals

1. Mackenzie King 1919-1948
2. St. Laurent 1948-1958
3. Pearson 1958-1968
4. Trudeau 1968-1984
5. Turner 1984-Present

Conservatives

1. Borden 1900-1920
2. Meighen 1920-1926
3. Guthrie 1926-1927
4. Bennett 1927-1938
5. Manion 1938-1940
6. Hanson 1940-1941 (Interim)
7. Meighen 1941-1942
8. Bracken 1942-1948
9. Drew 1948-1956
10. Diefenbaker 1956-1967
11. Stanfield 1967-1976
12. Clark 1976-1983
13. Mulroney 1983-Present

The Liberal party has had five leaders in 66 years, while the Conservatives have had 13 leaders in the same time. Clearly there is instability in the position at the top of the Conservative party. The Liberals, however, have managed to maintain consistent leadership, through periods of turmoil and stability.

The Liberals' longest serving leader was Mackenzie King, who ruled for 29 years whilst the senior Tory leader, Robert Borden, lasted 20 years. Pierre Trudeau was leader for 16 years marking the second longest tenure as leader,

whereas the second longest tenure for the Conservatives was John Diefenbaker at eleven years. And other than John Turner, no Liberal leader has stood at the top for less than ten years. Meanwhile, excluding Brian Mulroney, ten Tory leaders have ruled nine years or less and four have only been elected for one year terms.

In its recent paper on reform the Liberal party notes various responsibilities of the leader, formal and informal:

1. The leader has effective control of party policy.
2. Effective control over money.
3. Legal control over all candidates.
4. Effective control over the parliamentary party.
5. He initiates or approves hundreds of appointments of a political nature in the party.¹¹²

The authors of the paper also note: "Without question, the position of leader is the first position in the party, and to such an extent that there is really no second and no third."¹¹³ Perlin, in his discussion of the Conservative Party in The Tory Syndrome, parallels much of what is said in the "Discussion Paper". He notes that "the leader's authority has its most important manifestation in his exclusive right to declare party policy."¹¹⁴ On page 10 he notes that, "... the leader is viewed as the authoritative voice of the party in Parliament."¹¹⁵ He further remarks that "a second manifestation of the leader's authority is

¹¹²"Discussion Paper on Reform", op. cit., p. 20.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 21.

¹¹⁴Perlin, op. cit., p. 15.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 16.

the unlimited prerogative of appointment."¹¹⁶ Further on in the book he discusses the leader's... control over the allocation of party resources."¹¹⁷ And finally he recognizes, on page 18, the leader's right to reject a candidate.

Clearly the responsibilities of the leaders of both parties are parallel. With inconsistent and oft-changing leadership it is difficult to perceive how these responsibilities could be carried out adequately.

For instance, both the Liberal and Conservative leaders have authority over party policy. If a party is constantly attempting to adapt its policies to those most preferred by its leader there is no consistency in terms of policy output and this makes it very difficult for the party executive or the people at the grassroots to appease a leader who may be centre-oriented or right of centre or left of centre oriented.

Furthermore, a party often organizes its campaign around its leader. If you have one leader through three or four campaigns, then the people at the grassroots can accustom themselves to his routine and can make adjustments from campaign to campaign. The leader's flaws are known and are subsequently disguised from the public.

A rapid turnover of leaders in a political party implies instability. It is apparent to the electorate that the party is in trouble, and that it is unable to take care

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 17.

of its own problems and thus will be unable to cope with the problems faced by the entire nation.

Another responsibility of a leader is the appointment of party insiders: people who will work with him and for him. With turnover the new leader has a tendency to appoint his own followers. Not only does this create uncertainty among the rank and file, but it exposes the new leader to the suspicions of those left around him who were appointed by a previous leader. Back stabbing and bickering are the necessary results of such changes.

A leader who remains in office for an extended period has a chance to earn the loyalty of his party, to devise policy and to see it implemented. Leaders who remain in office for only one election have little time to grasp the intricacies of leadership or to make a personal mark on the party.

Aside from consistency, the personal qualities of the man declared leader of a political party are immeasurably important to the success of that organization. It is difficult to outline all those qualities that make up a successful leader so I will outline a few which I believe are the most important, as drawn from the writings of George Perlin,³ Reginald Whitaker and Joseph Wearing:

1. Vote winning ability.
2. Ability to mobilize grassroots.
3. Ability to surround himself with astute organizers.
4. Ability to dominate others.
5. Trustworthiness.

There must be no question that to be a successful leader one must possess most of these qualities.

Many superlatives and some other things as well, have been applied to Mackenzie King. All of them would be applicable to a strong leader. In his book The Government Party, Whitaker, when describing the electoral hopes of the Liberal and Conservative parties in the 1920s and 1930s, notes: "The better hand could not win, however, without a skilled and well-situated leader to play it. William Lyon Mackenzie King was such."¹¹⁸ H. Blair Neatby, who authored a biography of King covering the years 1924-1932, declares:

Mackenzie King had no misgivings about his own capacity for leadership. He might deplore his ignorance of parliamentary procedure and administration, but he never questioned his own judgement of political strategy. He sensed which issues could affect the strength of his government or his party and formed his own conclusions as to what must be done. He was always respectful and tactful with his senior colleagues and was more cautious if they disagreed with him but he never submitted unwillingly to their point of view.¹¹⁹

King was a conciliator who was able to bring all factions of the party together especially during his early term as leader when the party was divided.

King also had the ability to impress upon others his own opinion on specific issues:

By 1932 King could dominate his followers when he chose to. Liquor clearances had been abolished because King had decided to abolish them. Bennett's

¹¹⁸Whitaker, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹⁹H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King. Volume Two: The Lonely Heights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pages 4-5.

campaign promises had been denounced in the special session in spite of the misgivings of his colleagues.¹²⁰

In other words, King could get what he wanted when he wanted it, through astute leadership.

Whitaker often refers to King's ability to surround himself with astute organizers although he jealously guarded his own power. For example, King held a certain disdain for organization, yet he knew it was necessary. As a consequence he went after the best man for the job, Vincent Massey, a man known for his wealth and respectability. Although King and Massey had an often rocky relationship King recognized the importance of Massey's presence within the party organization.

Also, King possessed two invaluable attributes: vote-winning ability and a reputation as a winner. About the former, Neatby, on the first page of his book, notes: "As Mackenzie King grew old in office, his compatriots marvelled at his political longevity and puzzled over the secret of his success."¹²¹ It was not obvious how King managed to stay in power considering his evident lack of personal magnetism, yet they all acknowledged that he had a talent for acquiring votes. Through his gift for politics, not possessed by competitors, he gained his reputation as a winner, and, as Neatby notes, "[T]he reputation for winning is as useful for politicians as for generals."¹²² People like to be

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 4.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 3.

¹²²Ibid.

associated with a winner and will stand by him despite shortcomings. King possessed numerous shortcomings, like "indecisiveness and procrastination."¹²³ Yet his other leadership qualities dominated.

King's successor, Louis St. Laurent, was a very different man, yet he too had unique leadership qualities which kept him in office. More than anything else, St. Laurent was trustworthy. Also, he was considered a friend by most of his Liberal colleagues. Jack Pickersgill, in My Years With Louis St. Laurent, notes many fond memories of his time with the Prime Minister: "I realized once more that St. Laurent had the happy faculty of treating his advisers as equals and their advice with respect, even when he did not accept it."¹²⁴ Pickersgill goes on to note that he "liked especially the care he showed for the feelings of others and the loyalty he inspired in those who worked with him."¹²⁵ Clearly, St. Laurent's greatest asset was his ability to get along with others. The Liberal party admired him and enjoyed working for him and this translated into vote-winning ability.

St. Laurent was also very knowledgeable about the affairs of the House and could adequately direct its business:

As I watched St. Laurent in action every day, I

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴J.W. Pickersgill, My Years With Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 36.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 36.

soon realized what a thorough mastery he had of every subject which was to come before Cabinet. I also spent a good deal of time in the gallery of the House of Commons and began to appreciate his capacity to manage the business of Parliament.¹²⁶

St. Laurent also had the ability to surround himself with competent people. Before assuming the leadership he made sure qualified people remained in office:

Before deciding to be a candidate, St. Laurent wanted to be certain that C.D. Howe would stay in the government. He told King that Howe would stay only if he was given an important peacetime portfolio and King made Howe Minister of Trade and Commerce early in 1948.¹²⁷

C.D. Howe had always been a leading member of the government, especially during war time. It was certainly to St. Laurent's benefit to have a man of Howe's experience in his cabinet.

Unfortunately, St. Laurent was past his prime and he often seemed overcome by the job of Prime Minister. He failed to pay adequate attention to the party and the membership, thus allowing his electoral machine to disintegrate. St. Laurent suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the popular John Diefenbaker. His successor was, once again, a man of unique qualities, some well suited to leadership.

Like St. Laurent, Pearson had been pre-ordained by the former regime, as he was perceived by many to be the man to rebuild a broken party. Pearson's greatest asset in leadership was his "unpretentious good nature, and his

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 46.

willingness to compromise."¹²⁸

In Grits, McCall-Newman makes reference to a former staffer in King's office who noted that Pearson "appeared to respect power, yet stood apart from it as if he didn't want it for himself."¹²⁹ This endeared him to those above him and allowed him to study the office of Prime Minister from a distance. But there is no question that the admiration he gained from his peers made him an adequate leader.

He admitted people of quality into his inner circle, like Walter Gordon, the Cell 13 group in Ontario led by Keith Davey, and Jack Pickersgill. Pearson knew little of party work and parliamentary procedure and he turned to these men for assistance.

Pearson was also able to soothe rifts that emerged within the party, owing to his experience as a diplomat. As McCall-Newman notes: "He was always anxious to conciliate between Liberal factions, to charm dissidents with his decency, to make peace at all costs."¹³⁰ He was a 'father-figure'¹³¹ to English Canadians; thus, no matter what the problem, Canadians still cared for him.

Pearson set out to create a French presence in Ottawa. He was sympathetic to Quebec and tried to allow it more influence in the capital. As Jean Chretien notes in Straight From The Heart, "[H]e laid the foundation for the French fact in Ottawa that many people later attributed entirely to

¹²⁸McCall-Newman, op. cit., p. 30.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 31.

¹³⁰Ibid. 31.

¹³¹Ibid.

Pierre Trudeau." ¹³²

Finally, Pearson was an astute politician. He knew what he wanted in cabinet and how to get it:

He had his own views, and most of the time he just did what he wanted to do. There would be great storms in cabinet, with ministers pounding the table and raging at each other. Then Pearson would say in the middle of the mess, 'It's time to go to lunch, so I'll take care of the matter'. Few people would realize that he was accomplishing exactly what he wanted. ¹³³

Pearson was also an adequate manager.

Unfortunately, Pearson's cabinet fought in the press from time to time, leaving the picture of poor management. Also, Pearson grew tired of party matters. Another problem Pearson experienced was posed by the era in which he ruled. Various divisive issues arose like bilingualism, which split the nation. The flag debate was another controversial issue. As well, Pearson was forced to rule in a minority situation, against a strong leader, John Diefenbaker, who pulled no punches in attacking Pearson and his cabinet. Pearson announced his retirement on December 14, 1967 and the Liberal leadership race began. Pearson had simply grown tired of the 'battles of the decade'. ¹³⁴

There has never been any questions concerning Trudeau's qualities as an intellectual. Norman Snider describes him well in his book, The Changing Of The Guard:

¹³²Jean Chretien, Straight From The Heart. (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1985), p. 28.

¹³³Ibid., p. 53.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 56.

Since the war, with the exception of Marshall McLuhan, he had been the country's only great man, but nobody could ever make up their mind whether he was a force for good or bad. He had been the most unexpected, exceptional entity ever to arrive on our national scene.... He was a hothouse exotic in a land that prized the mundane. He was a lone virtuoso, who practised a mass art.¹³⁵

Snider goes on to note that "Trudeau has run the country for close to two decades by the sheer force of his personality."¹³⁶ The sheer force of Trudeau as a man maintained him as party leader for almost twenty years. What has been questioned, though, are Trudeau's qualities of leadership. Yet of those before only King, and prior to 1919, Wilfrid Laurier, possessed qualities equal to Trudeau's. Richard Gwyn described him as 'Canada's Single Combat warrior': "As Prime Minister, like all solitary champions, Trudeau has assumed a role in which he either wins all for his people or loses all for himself."¹³⁷ Trudeau fought many battles on behalf of Canadians and he rarely lost. As well, Canadians could transfer to him their collective burden,¹³⁸ as he was larger than life and could be a scapegoat for our hostilities:

He used the media to his best advantage. His style was suitable for television and he was able to communicate with Canadians: "For television's masque, Trudeau's own mask is precisely right. The right voice, the right gestures, the

¹³⁵Norman Snider, The Changing Of The Guard: How The Liberals Fell from Grace and the Tories Rose to Power. (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Denny's Limited, 1985), p. 81.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 82.

¹³⁷Gwyn, op. cit., p. 21.

¹³⁸Ibid.

right eyes."¹³⁹

Furthermore, "Trudeau's mind is the finest of all our Prime Ministers."¹⁴⁰ His colleagues and those in his staff admired him for his mind: "Pearson was merely one of us", Mitchell Sharp has said, "whereas Trudeau was not - he was someone extraordinary."¹⁴¹ A former aide, himself uncommonly intelligent, says: "I love him for that marvellous, marvellous mind."¹⁴²

At first Trudeau had the ability to surround himself with more than competent individuals. At the beginning of his political career he spent time with fellow Quebecers Jean Marchand and Gerard Pelletier. Both men were knowledgeable and well respected French Canadians.

Once in power, Trudeau consulted a shrewd political advisor in Jim Coutts, a party man with numerous political connections in Keith Davey, an intellectual who, although out of touch with the public, knew government processes and the business world, in Michael Pitfield. He also relied on two members of parliament with vast knowledge, Marc Lalonde and Allan MacEachen. Lalonde ran Quebec with an iron fist and made sure that province got a great share of the patronage. MacEachen on the other hand was a wise parliamentarian who could advise Trudeau on the processes of government and issues prevalent in the Maritimes. Despite the fact that they isolated the Prime Minister from the

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

grassroots, their combined knowledge virtually ran the Liberal machine for Trudeau and their help was invaluable.

Former Trudeau cabinet ministers have echoed Trudeau's ability to compromise. Both Iona Campagnolo in a personal interview and Jean Chretien in Straight From The Heart reflect upon his ability to change his mind on issues if he was in the minority. To quote Chretien:

But I never subscribed to the notion that Trudeau was a dictator.... Often knowing what he thought, I saw him accepting the views of his ministers despite his own wishes. He was extraordinarily patient, he let everyone have a say, and he listened attentively. ¹⁴³

Also, Trudeau had an eviable vote-winning ability in Ontario and Quebec. No one can argue with his electoral success as leader of the Liberal party. Trudeau, according to Chretien, had the unique qualities necessary for a good leader - "knowledge of government, labour and business and a strong personality."¹⁴⁴ This combination obviously attracted the voters to him.

Unfortunately Trudeau had one major flaw: he was an elitist and an isolationist. As Richard Gwyn notes in The Northern Magus, "he didn't know anything about what John Nichol called, "psychic patronage", the art of keeping his supporters happy and involved by personal contact....For other people he had very little time, no matter how important they were or had once been to the Liberal

¹⁴³Chretien, op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 76.

Party."¹⁴⁵ He trusted only his closest advisors. This inability to relate reflects Trudeau's greatest drawback.

John Turner, Trudeau's successor, is an enigma. In 1980, in The Northern Magus, Gwyn describes Turner in glowing terms. He describes Turner's "extraordinary popularity";¹⁴⁶ "his flamboyant good looks";¹⁴⁷ "his political skill."¹⁴⁸ Turner was clearly the golden boy in the early 1970s, waiting for Trudeau's resignation. However, after a stormy departure from politics in 1975 and his long awaited return in 1984, the Turner magic has disappeared. Clearly he has suffered because of Canadians' desire for change and the need to make Turner suffer for mistakes made by the previous regime. In addition to these external pressures, Turner is experiencing open challenges to his leadership that his predecessors did not have to endure.

He has been unable to heal the rift that developed in the Party during the 1984 leadership campaign between his camp and that of his nearest rival, Jean Chretien. The Liberal party has taken to openly bickering in the press about the leader. John Nunziata, Liberal MP from York South-Weston, recently called for an open leadership convention in November and Jean Chretien resigned on January 26, 1986 because of irreconcilable differences between himself and Turner.

¹⁴⁵Gwyn, op. cit., 126.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 184.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 185.

Turner has been accused of excluding new workers from the party while continuing to court the old guard. Evidence of the problems being experienced at the top is the fact that despite the Tories' unprecedented crises in government, the Liberals are unable to dominate in opinion polls. The June 1986 poll which shows the Liberals seven points ahead of the Mulroney government would indicate this reality is changing. Unfortunately for Turner his own popularity has fallen below the party's, which as Bill Bennett of British Columbia found, often calls for a re-examining of one's future in politics.

Despite his problems, Turner deserves a great deal of credit for his work in involving the grassroots in the party again. He has travelled extensively from province to province in an attempt to arouse the interest of workers. He appears to consult the extra-parliamentary wing to a greater degree than the previous regime, as he and party president Iona Campagnolo attempt to revitalize both the elected and non-elected wings of the party.

Yet his popularity is still questioned. What is clear to me is that for the Liberals to regain power and sustain their position within the Canadian political system, they must resolve the leadership issue. A leadership review will occur in November in Ottawa. If Turner is satisfied with his support and decides to stay on as leader, then his rivals must muffle their dissent and work for him. The party must avoid the 'Tory Syndrome' of rivalries and internal dissent.

This is one of the reasons why the Conservatives have been the political wilderness for most of the 20th Century. If Turner decides to step down from office, the problem is the availability of credible alternatives. No one but Chretien knows if he will return to the party if an opening at the top occurs. Beyond Chretien no apparent candidates that can carry on the leadership legacy of the Liberal party have emerged. There are no Kings or Trudeaus in the wings. Thus it might be wise for Turner to maintain his status until a successor can be groomed, as St. Laurent, Pearson and Trudeau were. The Liberal party rarely elects their leaders: they are pre-ordained by the previous leader or regime. Turner's difficulty is the fact that he was not ordained by the previous regime. For the Liberals to succeed, the membership and caucus must discard their petty grievances over leadership and direct their energies to Mulroney. They must learn the lesson of the Conservative past, that a party is second best when attacking from within rather than attacking a common political enemy.

What is clear from the preceding pages is that for the first time since the 1880s the Liberal party has failed to pre-ordain their leader. King, St. Laurent and Pearson took great care in selecting their successors. St. Laurent, unfortunately, was beyond his prime when he assumed the position and thus failed to fulfill the party's expectations. The point is, however, that Trudeau failed to consider the fate of his party before he resigned. As a

consequence the membership was deeply divided over the leadership issue and the wounds have yet to heal. In my opinion, the party must close around John Turner and avoid irreparable damage to the party structure. Because of Trudeau's neglect, for the first time since the 1880s the Liberals are vulnerable to the Tory Syndrome.

The Liberal party, it would appear, has a choice to make. It can return to the traditions established from 1919 to 1984 of uniting behind the leader or it can establish a second Tory syndrome, where persistent internal conflicts arise over the leadership. The former will rekindle the flames of credibility in the electorate's eyes while the latter will leave the party's future uncertain.

VII. Members and Elites

The preceding chapters have analyzed the various ingredients in the recipe for Liberal party's political success, as drawn from the texts of Canadian political party experts like Reginald Whitaker and Joseph Wearing. Any analysis of the current situation would be hollow without the opinions of current Liberals, both elites and the party membership, as to the problems they perceive and their remedies for the ills of the party. The purpose of this final chapter is to outline what Liberals themselves feel are the elements of success and what changes they want to see in party structure.

To this end I sent a questionnaire to two federal Edmonton ridings, Edmonton South and Edmonton East, and a slightly modified one to all Liberal Members of Parliament, national executive and senators. Copies can be found as appendices in the thesis. Due to a very poor return rate the Edmonton East questionnaires were disregarded as any conclusions drawn would have been ill-founded. The Edmonton South return rate was 27 percent and the elite return rate was 19 percent.

Various questions were posed about reform issues as well as perceived problems within the party. In many instances, interesting diversities of answers appeared between the elites and the membership and these will be scrutinized in this chapter.

An interesting debate is whether the party should concentrate on the grassroots or whether it should offer more power to the national executive and the center of the party. Various questions were posed concerning this issue. Both groups were asked whether there "should be regularization of income flows from the riding/provincial groups to the national executive?" For example, 25 percent of constituency and provincial funds would be transferred to the centre. Both groups answered the question overwhelmingly in favour of a strong centre. 55.6 percent of the constituents of Edmonton South were in favour while 22.2 percent were not, while of the elites, 79.3 percent were in favour and 10.3 percent were not.

Do you support regularization of income?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Yes	55.6	79.3
No	22.2	10.3
Don't know	22.2	10.4

Clearly there is overwhelming support for a stronger center in both groups, with the elites more enthusiastic. My argument earlier in the thesis was that the Liberals needed to increase the power of the national executive through greater funding. Clearly the party membership in Edmonton

South and the elites agree. They believe that a successful political party requires a vital centre. This does not mean a complete abandonment of power by the constituencies but it does mean allowing the national executive to carry out its duties in a professional manner.

Another issue concerns the transfer of funds from stronger to weaker provinces by the national executive. The majority of the elites (37.9) felt that the centre should have the power to transfer funds while only 20.7 percent felt the executive should be obligated to transfer funds. The membership was evenly divided between the notion of power, obligation and neither. Slightly more said the party should have the power to transfer rather than the obligation.

Should the national party have the power/
obligation to provide a transfer of funds from
stronger provinces to weaker?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Power	29.6	37.9
Obligation	25.9	20.7
Neither	25.9	34.5
Both	7.4	6.9
Don't know	11.2	0.0

Although members and elites would like to see more money transferred to the centre they do not as eagerly want the national party to be given substantial powers over the

transfer of party funds. 34 percent of the elites and 26 percent of the members dislike the notion of central control of funds while only 29.6 percent of the members and 37.9 percent of the elites see the need for the executive, in terms of power, to control money. Even fewer of the elites and members like the notion of the executive being obligated to transfer funds. It is not the executive's duty to equalize funding across the country. If there is a conclusion to be drawn here it is that a cross-section of the party is not convinced that giving more power to the centre, in terms of control of finance, is going to make a difference to the success of the party. They want to allow the centre more money so it can carry out its current responsibilities but are reluctant to accord the national executive any more powers than already exist.

One thing the two groups appear to agree on is the need for national membership lists:

The national executive is requesting membership lists from the riding associations. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Good thing	74.1	75.9
Bad thing	11.1	24.1
Don't know	14.8	0.0

It is evident from these data that the members and elites feel that the centre must have a count of the membership in order to carry out such things as a direct mailing list and membership drives. For the party to be a viable entity it must maintain an adequate membership. A centralized list would facilitate the encouragement to renew memberships and the announcement of upcoming Liberal events. It is clear that the party faithful agrees that centralized lists will make the party more viable.

One question that was asked of the elite but not the membership, because of the knowledge it would require of party operations, dealt with the compatibility of an increase in national powers with the maintenance of a federally structured party:

Is an increase in national office powers and responsibilities compatible or incompatible with maintaining the federal structure of the party?

Incompatible	27.6
Compatible	37.9
Neither	3.4
Don't know	31.1

Unfortunately 31 percent of the respondents were unable to answer the question which makes a conclusion difficult. However, looking at the results we do have, a majority believe that the party would be able to maintain its current structure with an increase in the powers of the centre. 38 percent would have no difficulty with providing the centre

with more leverage in the party.

Two other questions which were asked only of the elites also concern the distribution of power.

Should the national executive and the federal caucus dictate organizational/financial arrangements to provinces and riding organizations?

Organizational	10.3
Financial	10.3
Both	10.3
Neither	69.1

Should riding executives have total control over funds raised in their own constituencies or at least control over 50 percent?

Total	13.8
50 percent	55.2
Neither	31.0

It is clear from these data that the elite believe in a powerful grassroots/riding organization. Almost 70 percent of the respondents were against the centre dictating financial arrangements to the member organizations. Meanwhile, on the second question 69 percent felt the ridings should control at least half of their accumulated revenues.

From the preceding data it is evident that although the party would like to see increased powers at the centre (mailing lists, etc) members and elites would not want the party controlled from the centre financially. That is; they would transfer more money to the centre for party operations, but they would not strongly support the centre controlling riding money.

An indication of the difference between perception of elites and members came when they were asked if they would favour a national council of riding Presidents. This national council would become the between-conventions basis of party democracy. It would be composed of the 282 riding presidents and a select group of national executive members (i.e. President and Vice-Presidents). It would be provided with most of the powers of the national conventions. It could decide on policy, revenue distribution and give greater regional input to the executive.

Would you favour a national council of riding Presidents?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Yes	40.7	27.6
No	37.0	62.1
Don't Know	22.3	10.3

Clearly the party elites are not in favour of an additional governing body being added to the already complex arrangements of committees and organizations. They see no

need to give that extra power to the constituencies owing to the complexity and difficulty in setting up such a structure.

The members, however, cast aside these reservations, as 40.7 percent cast their vote in favour of such an organization. Clearly they ignored the difficulties involved in its construction while sensing that the Council would give the ridings a greater voice in the party. They feel that the executive would be held more accountable by a national council of Presidents.

Both sides agreed, surprisingly, with the issue of a single Liberal party. Both groups were asked two questions on this particular issue:

Should there be uniform qualifications for membership in a single Liberal party of Canada?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Yes	77.8	62.1
No	14.8	37.9
Don't know	7.4	0.0

Would you support direct individual membership in a single Liberal party of Canada?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Yes	66.7	65.5
No	22.2	34.5
Don't know	11.1	0.0

Clearly, both groups want some uniformity of membership standards across the country rather than province-by-province determination as it stands now. They believe that it is difficult to govern an organization that lacks uniform rules concerning membership.

However, what is surprising is that both groups clearly support the notion of individual membership in a single party rather than membership in a separate provincial organization. The party executive obviously agreed with these individuals as they instituted a change whereby, when purchasing a membership in the provincial organization, one automatically purchases a direct membership in the Liberal party of Canada; thus, in one way there is direct membership in the federal party. One person, one vote in national affairs is an issue that the party elite and members would like to see addressed more thoroughly.

An indication of how the respondents in both groups feel about the notion of a united party compared to a party composed of various divisions, came when I asked for their opinions on reunification:

Would you like to see the reunification
of the two wings of the Liberal party
that now exist in Ontario, Quebec
and Alberta?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Yes	59.3	58.6
No	33.3	37.9
Don't know	7.4	3.5

Approximately 59 percent of both groups support reunification which would indicate party members agree the only way back to the top is to heal divisions within the party and then take a united party to the polls. The membership of the party is growing tired of internal bickering as occurs for example between Nick Taylor and whoever happens to be at the helm of the federal party.

I asked both groups a question concerning the target area for reform within the party:

Please rate the following items from
1 to 10 in terms of the degree of
attention you believe they deserve
in a reform movement?

Caucus	Finance
Leader	National Executive
Grassroots	policy
Riding associations	Memberships
Provincial executives	National constitution

The clear winner on both sides was grassroots participation.

Percentage of first rankings

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Grassroots	59.3	41.4
Finance	11.1	20.7
Leader	7.4	6.9
Members	0.0	3.4

59 percent of the members and 41 percent of the elites felt that the grassroots was the area within the party which deserved the greatest attention. Clearly leadership was not an issue as it was ranked well below other issues. Whether they believe the leadership of the party is stable or that the issue of leadership is insignificant is difficult to discern. But when asked about their confidence in the leader to return the party to power 63 percent showed considerable confidence and 33 percent indicated little to none; so it would appear that there are some problems with the current leadership but in general terms the party is satisfied - not enthusiastic but not overly concerned.

As I have noted throughout the thesis the Liberal party returns to the grassroots in times of political turmoil. It is evident from these results that once again the party is turning to the membership to return it to power, since this is the area they regard as the primary focus for reform.

The final two major areas of the survey concerned the relationship between the two wings of the party (extra and intra-parliamentary), and the accountability of the party

elite. In the first area, the results were surprising and they deserve some attention from the party executive. Both groups were asked whether, in recent times, the two wings of the federal party were growing closer together or farther apart?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elites</u>
Closer	29.6	72.4
Farther	33.3	3.4
Same	18.5	24.1
Don't Know	18.6	0.2

Clearly the party's efforts to portray a united front between the leader and the party president are failing with the membership, at least in the West. The elites are overwhelmingly convinced that the party's components are united, but, only 30 percent of the members feel the same way. Meanwhile 33 percent of the members believe the party is growing apart. This is a serious matter, as it is important that the party membership believes the party is united. Members will work much harder for a united party than one divided and in turmoil. Party members grow tired of divisions within their party, and the executive and caucus must work on destroying the perception of division.

Finally various questions were posed, some of both elite and members and some just of the elites. There is a movement afoot to make elected members and the executive of the party more accountable to the membership. Financially

they would be made more accountable by: (1) sending an annual financial report to all members and supporters of the Liberal party; and (2) the financial officers of the party must report to the national executive with respect to their actions. Another means of accounting would be to have the national council of riding Presidents to which the national executive would be forced to account for its actions. Furthermore, options for summary preparation and reporting on party philosophy are being considered. From the results accumulated the issue is one of concern to the elite and the members.

How accountable is the national executive?

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Elite's</u>
Very	11.1	20.7
Somewhat	44.4	65.5
Not at all	29.6	10.3
Don't know	14.9	3.5

Should the national executive be more or less accountable?

	<u>Elites</u>
More	65.5
Less	0.0
Same	17.2
Don't know	17.3

Clearly the elites of the party feel that the accountability of the elite must improve while both members and elites feel that current accountability is inadequate. Other questions posed concerning the Senate and the Members of Parliament offered the same results: i.e. more accountability is necessary in both areas.

From these data we can conclude that the party efforts to increase accountability are justified. The party elite and members consider the current situation inadequate.

Finally, an isolated question was posed to the elites concerning the importance of provincial revival to the party's success:

Is provincial Liberal revival the key
to ultimate success federally?

Yes	51.7
No	41.4
Don't know	6.9

Although the results are not overwhelming, the elites, like myself, agree that for the party to win federally, provincial Liberals must make a strong showing in their own arena.

From the results provided throughout this chapter numerous conclusions can be drawn concerning the opinions of both party elites and members. Clearly they both feel the element most important to success in 1986 is grassroots revival. Leadership and finance, to these individuals, is

secondary to the involvement of the members: New members must be recruited and the grassroots offered a voice in party affairs. Egos should be stroked in the volunteer wing. Constituency organization must be restored and enthusiasm in the membership revived. If the volunteers are contented they will execute electoral duties with the necessary vigour. I pointed out early in the thesis that membership is important to revival and the respondents agree that a revival is important.

Furthermore, the party elites agree that, for the party to be successful federally, the provincial parties must be resurrected. The elites obviously believe Turner must court the support of Peterson and Bourassa in hopes their provincial volunteers will be encouraged to thrust their energies behind the federal party.

Accountability, too, is an important issue to the respondents. For the party to revive itself the elite must be answerable to the membership, on issues such as finance and policy. Although complete accountability is unrealistic, elite and members both believe the executive should be forced to at least explain its actions to the people at the grassroots.

Unlike myself, the respondents did not see leadership as a prime area of concern, as only 7 percent of members and elite rated it as the target area for reform. Clearly leadership is secondary in the eyes of the two groups. In my opinion this is a grave miscalculation on their parts

because without a leader who is respected by the membership and the electorate as a whole, any organizational reforms are hollow. The leader must be able to inspire the new recruits or the enthusiasm of the people at the grassroots will stagnate.

While members and elites are willing to concede some powers of control to the centre, they stand firmly in favour of joint control of financing and against dictation from the centre towards the satellite organizations. Thus, both groups have divided feelings about the distribution of power in the party. Although they would like to see direct membership, lists they do not want to see central control over finances. Members see the importance of a vital centre to carry out such tasks as publicity and membership recruitment. Simultaneously, however, they believe central control of finance would make the party an elite-based organization, with the membership losing control of its own fate.

One issue both groups appeared to agree upon was the establishment of some uniformity within the party. Party members and elites would like to see uniform qualifications as well the ability to become a member, directly within the party rather than merely a member of a satellite organization. For the party to be a success uniformity as well as reunification must be established. This makes sense. How can any organization operate effectively while retaining random codes for membership and operation? The party must

establish a common standard by which the member organizations can operate.

The most important result, in my opinion, was that which indicated that party elites believed that the party is united while the members believe it is growing farther apart. Until the party membership believes that they are fighting a common enemy, the Conservative party, and not each other, party electoral revival is uncertain. I have no solutions at the moment as to how this might be brought about but, if the party is to avoid the 'Tory Syndrome', it is significant that the perception of homogeneity be established. The notion of lingering divisions at the top should come as a shock to the party's leadership and must incite it to change this situation.

VIII. Conclusion

This thesis examines the Liberal party's history since 1919 with a view to discovering the elements of its success. The Liberals' success suggests that important lessons can be learned from their history. The cogency of this study is highlighted by the Liberals' stunning losses in the 1984 federal election. It is clear to those who study the Liberals that the party was suffering from serious organizational problems prior to that date. By examining the Liberal past we may be able to predict the Liberals' future.

Several components of the party's success were discovered. On the whole they set the Liberals apart from their Conservative counterparts:

Leadership. The element which clearly sets the Liberals apart from the Conservatives, and has made them such a success, is leadership. Two elements of leadership are particularly important. The first is consistency. A political party requires stable leadership behind which it can construct campaign strategy and build an appropriate personality to suit the individual at the helm.

Qualities of leadership are also important. A Liberal leader like Pierre Trudeau has inspired the electorate and those around him, while men like Mackenzie King have possessed vote-winning ability and the ability to surround themselves with astute organizers. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, their leaders could boast neither consistency nor qualities that mobilized the electorate. Of the

qualities making the difference at the polls for Canada's two major political parties, leadership was the most significant.

Grassroots enthusiasm. The appearance of a democratic organization, one that listens and responds to its membership, is a critical element in the success of a political party. The people at the grassroots must believe their interests are regarded as significant by the party's leadership. If it appears to the membership that they are insignificant they may choose not to work for the party at election time. Egos within the party must be stroked, internal harmony must be maintained and accountability instilled. People join a political party, for among other reasons, to make a contribution to his/her political system. The party must appear to be permitting individuals to make such a contribution. An elite-based organization must be avoided. A study of Liberal history would indicate the party has been unable to avoid these problems in the past.

Financial security. Common sense indicates that a financially stable party can fight its opponents better than a poor one. Financial stability allows the preparation of superior campaigns, the maintenance of a central office and the development of quality surveys and publicity materials. Without money none of these tasks will be carried out adequately. Canadian political parties, to be viable, must avoid debt and maintain an ample supply of funds for contacting potential voters through such mechanisms as

direct membership drives. If the party cannot contact the voter, victory seems unlikely.

Strong provincial wings. For a party to be successful at the federal level, it must have viable provincial wings. When a party's provincial wings are active, its electoral hopes in the federal arena are elevated. The federal party cannot ignore the fate of the provincial wings because provincial weakness eventually means federal defeat. Generally people at the grassroots cross over from one arena to the other and if they are active in the provinces, they will also be active federally. A string of defeats for a party in the provincial realm has generally meant subsequent defeat federally. Thus, while worrying about its federal responsibilities, a party must keep one eye on its provincial wings.

Membership recruitment. A blend of old and new members is an important mixture within any political organization. A party must not allow itself to become stale with a non-renewing resource of members. New, creative thinkers tend to mobilize the old guard, especially at election time and they provide energy and enthusiasm that motivates the electorate. A democratic structure for a political party is essential but people are required to fill the spaces in the party. Through a viable membership new ideas and credible candidates emerge. It is essential for any political party to search out these new people through such innovations as direct mailing lists.

Unity. The appearance of unity behind the leader and among the various wings of the party add to the success of any political party. A party cannot afford to waste its energy on internal bickering. It must concentrate its efforts on a common political enemy and cloak the inevitable factions that will emerge. Egos must be kept in check to reach the goal of electoral victory.

Unlike the Conservatives, Liberals have generally been able to maintain strength in the aforementioned six elements. Clearly not all of these alone would make a successful political party. However, a healthy combination of them has made the Liberals very successful.

Various issues were discussed and were found to mean little in terms of electoral success. The first is the personal, ongoing relationship between the leaders of the two wings of the party. Although it is important that the press and the membership perceive a modicum of unity, the reality of the relationship means little in terms of votes won or lost. For example, it is not significant to Liberal success that Campagnolo and Turner get along on a social level. Also, the terms of the relationship between the provincial and federal leaders is a secondary issue. There must be a hint of unity but the reality is insignificant.

What cannot be forgotten in this discussion is the importance of the perceptions of party members. According to Liberal party faithful polled in the summer of 1985,

grassroots participation was the issue of greatest importance to the success of a political party. Finance and leadership were secondary, but they did maintain some significance in the members' minds.

One might safely assume that a political party that has experienced the successes the Liberals have would grasp the lessons of the past and continue to put them into practice. However, another lesson that was learned in this thesis was that a successful party becomes apathetic and ignores that from which it reaped its successes. Liberal leadership, from time to time, ignored its membership, and turned inside itself, ruling as an elite-based organization.

Unfortunately for John Turner, Pierre Trudeau was more guilty than anyone of these particular failures. Turner, Trudeau's unfortunate successor, fell heir to these mistakes. In 1984, Turner was destroyed by Brian Mulroney at the polls, hanging on to only 40 seats in a 282-seat House. Turner was faced with a \$2 million debt, a depleted membership, an apathetic elite and newly created factions that appeared in public. In 1984, Turner's future as leader of the Liberal party looked bleak as opinion polls were desperately low and the Conservative party was riding a wave of enthusiasm.

In the succeeding months, Conservative blunders have opened the doors for a Liberal electoral revival. Yet the Liberals appear to have stalled in their attempts to overtake Conservative popularity. It is evident the party

must be instructed as to the proper avenues to be pursued in order to ensure victory in the next federal election. Certain guidelines, extracted from the Liberal past, may enable the party to recover from the 1984 debacle. First, let us examine the ills of the current regime and then examine the cure.

Leadership divisions. Clearly the party must avoid the trap of the Tory Syndrome. The party must unite behind John Turner, or at least give the appearance of unity, and concentrate its efforts on the Conservatives. The Liberal party must heal the divisions of the 1984 leadership campaign and reconcile itself to its current leadership. If Turner decides he does not wish to continue as leader, then the party would be well advised to groom a potential leader and follow past practices of ordaining a future leader.

Stagnant grassroots. Pierre Trudeau made the critical error of allowing the grassroots to stagnate and disappear. Although the membership in a cadre party is traditionally an electoral machine it must feel as though it is making a contribution between polling dates. Unfortunately for Turner, Trudeau did not carry on this process. Thus it is up to Turner and Campagnolo, the party president, to give the people at the grassroots a partial voice in policy formulation, stroke the egos of volunteers and make themselves accountable to the card-carrying faithful.

Membership drives. There has been no concerted membership drive. Turner and Campagnolo must encourage old

Liberals to renew their memberships and new Liberals to join the ranks. Direct mailing must be instituted and riding associations should encourage social gatherings to instill new enthusiasm. A concerted effort to recruit lost votes is necessary. From here, riding organizations will be revitalized and new, credible candidates will emerge on the scene.

Financial stability. The national executive has insufficient funding with which to carry out its appointed tasks. The party finds itself in \$2 million debt with little hope of recovery in the immediate future. Unique fundraising avenues must be pursued as well as direct mail fund raising. The Liberals will be unable to conduct a proper campaign if it remains in its current state of indebtedness. To this end a stronger executive centre is necessary in order to conduct Liberal business, and transfer funds from places of unnecessary wealth to those of unnecessary poverty. Despite what party faithful believe, it is my assertion that the party requires centralized control of its finances. The centre can establish a proper budget and allocate funds where necessary rather than have the ridings jealously guarding funds. Such financial centralization is not incompatible with active grassroots because once funds are allocated it is up to the membership to spend them to the greatest benefit of the constituency. They are not going to be without money; rather some of their money will be transferred to the centre.

Generally, the party must unite and work towards a common goal. Internal bickering must come to an end, whether it be about leadership or internal structures like the national executive. Generally the Liberal party has managed to cleanse its laundry behind closed doors, and it is essential that they return to this practice if success is to be achieved.

The party is seeing renewed enthusiasm among its members as it looks to the task of 1988. Liberals have begun to pursue a common line. John Turner's leadership, although still unstable, is less an issue of controversy and more a source of encouragement for Liberals. Provincial parties in Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island have assumed office and the parties in Alberta, Manitoba and New Brunswick are showing signs of revival.

Policy conferences, giving members a feeling of belonging, are appearing throughout the country. Grassroots revival is on its way as the party leadership continues to criss-cross the country attempting to renew enthusiasm.

The national executive, under the strong arm of Iona Campagnolo, has made the extra-parliamentary wing, once again, a critical element in the structure of the party.

Experts across the country were delivering eulogies of the Liberal party in 1984, claiming third party status for Canada's most successful political party in history. Experts were claiming second party status for the New Democratic party. Fortunately for Liberal faithful these experts

misread their crystal balls as the Liberals' showing in the latest opinion poll readings indicates the party is far from the grave. Yet the party is still far from power. The party must clean up the dirty linen it has left scattered since 1984. If adequate changes are made, the Liberals will regain the seat at the right hand of the Speaker. No one would have thought after 1984 that John Turner would ever again be sitting on the prime minister's bench. Like Pierre Trudeau's return in 1980, the thought may become reality.

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Appendix I

LIBERAL RESULTS IN SEATS AND VOTES FOR FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS BY PROVINCE (1956-80)

NEWFOUNDLAND












Chart 11b PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND



NOVA SCOTIA




NEW BRUNSWICK



QUEBEC

Federal Seats	1956		60		64		68		72		76		80	
Liberal	66	62	75	75	47	54	54	56	56	60	60	67	74	74
Total			75						74				75	




Provincial Seats	1956		60		64		68		72		76		80	
Liberal	20	20	52	52	63	50	72	102	102	26	26	26	26	26
Total	43		95		108		110		110		110		110	

Provincial Government: UN ———— LQ ———— UN ———— LQ ———— PQ

ONTARIO



Federal Seats	1956		60		64		68		72		76		80	
Liberal	51	21	15	44	52	51	64	36	36	55	55	52	52	
Total	85		85		85		85		84		85		95	






Provincial Seats	1956		60		64		68		72		76		80	
Liberal	10	21	23	23	27	20	36	36	34	34	34	34	34	
Total	40		108		117		117		117		125		125	

Provincial Government: Cans ———— Cans

MANITOBA



SASKATCHEWAN



Appendix II

ELITES

LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA

The responses you offer to this questionnaire will be compiled and then included as research material for a graduate research project being carried out at the University of Alberta on Liberal party reform. Individual replies will of course remain confidential. The overall results compiled from the questionnaires will be forwarded to the respondents if so requested. Thank you very much for your cooperation. In view of the many demands on your time, it is especially appreciated.

-
1. Age ---- Under 35 _____ 36-46 _____ 46-55 _____ 56-65 _____
66-75 _____ Over 75 _____
 2. Sex ---- Male _____ Female _____
 3. Religious Affiliation? _____
 4. What is your ethnicity? _____
 5. How long have you been a member of the Senate? _____ House of Commons? _____ National Executive? _____
 6. What province do you represent? _____
(If you think the size of your province would identify you, feel free to answer "Western" or "Atlantic").
 7. Should there be uniform qualifications for membership in a single Liberal Party of Canada? _____
 8. Would you support direct individual membership in a single Liberal Party of Canada? _____
 9. The national executive currently consists of 45 members. Should it be -
____ Larger _____ How Many
____ Smaller _____ How Many
____ Same
 10. Should the federal caucus give consideration to providing for the attendance of a representative of the national executive at least at some federal caucus meetings? _____

11. Should the national party have the power/obligation to provide a transfer of funds from stronger to weaker provinces?

Power
 Obligation
 Neither

12. Should there be a regularization of income flows from the riding/provincial groups to the national executive?

Riding
 Provincial
 Both
 Neither

13. Would you favour a national council of riding Presidents? _____

14. Should riding executives have total control over funds raised in their own constituencies or at least control over 50%?

Total
 50%
 Neither

15. The national executive is requesting membership lists from the riding associations. Do you favour this request?

Yes
 No

16. How accountable is the national executive to the membership?

Very accountable
 Somewhat accountable
 Not accountable

17. How accountable are the Liberal Senators to the membership?

Very accountable
 Somewhat accountable
 Not accountable

18. How accountable are the Liberal M.P.'s to the membership?

Very accountable
 Somewhat accountable
 Not accountable

19. Should the above three institutions be made more or less accountable to the membership?

More: _____ Executive _____ Senators _____ M.P.'s
 Less: _____ Executive _____ Senators _____ M.P.'s
 Same: _____ Executive _____ Senators _____ M.P.'s

20. Is it your impression that recently the intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings of the federal Liberal party have been growing closer together or farther apart?

_____ Closer together
 _____ Farther apart
 _____ The same

21. Joseph Wearing, in his study of the Liberal party (The L-Shaped Party) describes the difficulties that lie in a major increase in the national office's responsibilities. Such an increase, he notes, is incompatible with maintaining the federal structure of the party. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Please explain.

22. Should there be greater financial resources in the hands of the regular party at the national level? _____

23. Would you like to see the reunification of the two wings of the Liberal party that now exists in Ontario, Quebec and Alberta?

24. Please rate the following items from 1 to 10 in terms of the degree of attention you believe they deserve in a reform movement?

1 - First priority item for reform
10 - Needs least attention

<input type="checkbox"/> Federal caucus	<input type="checkbox"/> Finance
<input type="checkbox"/> Federal leader	<input type="checkbox"/> National executive
<input type="checkbox"/> Grass Roots participation	<input type="checkbox"/> Federal policy
<input type="checkbox"/> Riding Associations	<input type="checkbox"/> Membership
<input type="checkbox"/> Provincial Executives	<input type="checkbox"/> National Party Constitution

25. Of those choices you ranked from one to four, can you offer a brief description of the goals and/or objectives of any reforms you might make, in those particular categories?

1.

2.

3.

4.

26. Should the impetus for Liberal party revival come from the centre, or should it come from the riding organizations?

Centre
 Riding Organizations

27. Should the national executive and the federal caucus dictate organizational/financial arrangements to provinces and riding organizations?

Organizational
 Financial
 Both
 Neither

28. Is the provincial Liberal revival the key to ultimate success federally?

29. Should a form of the provincial advisory groups introduced by Senator Stanbury in 1968 be established, where a delegate of the federal caucus, a representative of the provincial Liberals and a member of the Ottawa party headquarters staff gather to co-ordinate party activities in the province and to gauge the pulse of the individual ridings?

Yes
 No

Please explain:

30. Do you support the continuation of campaign committees in each province which are under the direction of a local chairman appointed directly by the federal leader and responsible only to him and the national campaign committee?

Yes
 No

Please explain:

31. Would the reinstatement of regional 'barons', chosen from the federal Liberal caucus, to manage provincial affairs, have a positive or negative effect on the party?

Positive
 Negative

Please explain:

32. Should advertising decisions during election campaigns be centralized in Ottawa, or conversely should each region be responsible for its own advertising decisions?

Ottawa
 Regions

33. Are rank and file policy conventions such as the National Rally in 1961 and the three phase program of policy development in 1969-1970 important and/or feasible means to the end of revitalizing the Liberal party machine?

Important
 Feasible
 Neither

34. In your estimation, what was the most pronounced error, in terms of organization, committed by the Trudeau regime?

35. How do you hope to repair the apparent damage incurred?

Appendix III

MEMBERS

LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA IN ALBERTA

(Please Note: All questions asked apply to the federal wing of the Liberal Party in Alberta).

The responses you offer to this questionnaire will be compiled and then included as research material for a graduate research project being carried out at the University of Alberta on Liberal party reform. Individual replies will of course remain confidential. The overall results compiled from the questionnaires will be forwarded to your constituency executive and the national executive in Ottawa. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

-
1. AGE — Under 20 _____ 20-30 _____ 31-45 _____ 46-65 _____
Over 65 _____
 2. SEX — Male _____ Female _____
 3. OCCUPATION _____
 4. INCOME — Below \$10,000 _____ 10,000 - 20,000 _____
20,000 - 30,000 _____ 30,000 - 40,000 _____
40,000 - 50,000 _____ Above 50,000 _____
 5. How long have you been a member of the Liberal Party of Canada in Alberta? _____
 6. Do you hold a position on a riding executive? _____
 7. What is your religious affiliation? _____
 8. What is your ethnicity? _____
 9. Have you read the Discussion Paper on Liberal Reform?

 10. How often does your riding association hold its general meetings?

21. What, if any additional social events would you favour? _____
22. Have you received an accounting of your provincial/riding association's financial situation since the federal election on September 4, 1984?

23. Should riding executives have total control over funds raised in their own constituencies? _____
24. Should there be uniform qualifications for membership in the Liberal Party? _____
25. Would you support direct individual membership in a single Liberal Party of Canada? _____
26. What changes would you like to see in membership recruitment?

27. Would you favour a national council of riding Presidents?

28. The national executive currently consists of 45 members. Should it be —
— Larger _____ How Many _____
— Smaller _____ How Many _____
— Same _____
29. Should there be a regularization of income flows from the riding/provincial groups to the national executive? _____

30. Should the national party have the power/obligation to provide a transfer of funds from stronger provinces to weaker?

- Obligation
- Power
- Neither

31. Should the federal caucus give consideration to providing for the attendance of a representative of the national executive at least at some federal caucus meetings?

32. How often should national conventions be held? (currently - every two years)

33. How soon following the 1984 election should Liberal candidates be nominated federally?

34. Would you like to see the reunification of the two wings of the Liberal Party (federal and provincial) in Alberta?

35. Please rate the following items from 1 to 10 in terms of the degree of attention you believe they deserve in a reform movement?

1 - First priority item for reform

10 - Needs least attention

_____ Federal Caucus

_____ Federal leader

_____ Membership

_____ Federal Policy

_____ Riding Associations

_____ Provincial executive

_____ Finance

_____ Grass Roots Input

_____ National Executive

_____ National party constitution

36. Of those choices you ranked from one to four can you offer a brief description of the goals and/or objectives of any reforms you might make, in those particular categories?

1.



2.

3.

4.

37. How much confidence do you have in the federal leader and caucus to return the Liberal Party to power?

- Very great
- Considerable
- Little
- Very little
- None at all

38. Is it your impression that the intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings of the federal Liberal Party recently have been growing closer together or further apart?
- Closer together
 Further apart
 The same
39. Do you approve or disapprove of the performance of your constituency executive?
- Approve
 Disapprove
40. Do you approve or disapprove of the performance of the national executive?
- Approve
 Disapprove
41. Who is in a better financial position at this moment?
- The federal riding associations
 The national executive
42. How accountable is the national executive to the membership?
- Very accountable
 Somewhat accountable
 Not accountable
43. Can you think of a specific group in society which the Liberal party should be focusing on, in terms of membership recruitment and renewal?
44. The national executive is requesting membership lists from the riding associations. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
- Good thing
 Bad thing

45. What do you think should be the guiding principle underlying the Liberal Party's appeal to Canadians in the next federal election?

46. Considering all of the above, are there any reforms, that have not been mentioned, that might return the Liberal party to power in the next election?