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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE
WRITINGS OF MAX WEBER

by

 TAK HIM ERICH LEUNG

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1988

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ABSTRACT

This essay is to serve a modest purpose: to furnish an interpretation of Weber's methodological statements with a view to grasping the logical and conceptual unity of his historical-sociological writing under a new light, in spite of various inconsistencies in his work. It is thus an inquiry into the logic of interpretation. Accordingly, it has absolutely no intention of evaluating Weber's methodological standpoint in terms of an ideal of research practice. Rather, the following essay will engage in laying bare the *a priori* conditions of historical-cultural inquiry, throwing light upon the logical principles which make his text intelligible. It sees in the constitutive principles of historical-cultural knowledge -- the very form of discourse Weber's inquiry takes, the very possibility, and thus also limits, of his historical vision of the cultural world. These principles constitute the logical unity of his writings, unifying every part of it into a text as a whole. For they inform every step of his interpretation of historical observation. This argument is established through a reflection upon (1) the distinct, logical character of knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena, in contradistinction to knowledge of natural phenomena, and knowledge of ideas, (2) the *a priori* categories of such knowledge, (3) the hermeneutic employment of the formal concepts, conceptual generalizations, and the category of causation in historical-cultural inquiry, and the employment of pure-types in the "ideal"-typical interpretation, and (4) the synthetic principle of historical-cultural knowledge in the employment of the interpretive points of view and the synthetic ideas about the historical individuals. In the conclusion, the essay brings its focal point of interpretation back to the text as a whole; it suggests a conceptual unity of Weber's historical and theoretical writings as resting in the inner-unified meaning of his object of inquiry, modern (rational) capitalism. At the end of this essay is a postscript, which compares this interpretation with those rendered by Parsons, Schutz, Winch, Hekman, and Outhwaite; its sole purpose is to make explicit some of the logical consequences of the interpretive standpoint taken in this inquiry for understanding Weber's writings.

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Table of Contents

Chapter		Page
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1	THE INTENTION OF THE ESSAY: TO READ THE WRITING OF MAX WEBER AS A MASTERPIECE IN THE FIELD OF HISTORICAL-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE.	1
1.2	THE PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY: TO BUILD A WAY OF INTERPRETATION WHEREBY THE TEXT MAY BE ADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD.	3
1.2.1	The Logic of Text and Its Interpretation.	3
1.2.2	The Claim of Adequacy vis-a-vis the Claim of Correctness of an Interpretation.	3
1.3	THE METHOD OF THE INQUIRY: EXPOSITION OF THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EMPLOYMENT IN THE TEXT.	10
1.4	THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS ESSAY IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.	18
2.	THE GENERAL, LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.	23
2.1	THE LOGICAL CONDITION FOR THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL: THE STANDPOINT OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTERPRETATION.	25
2.2	THE INNER-UNIFIED MEANING OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL PHENOMENA AND HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.	30
2.2.1	THE DICHOTOMY OF "HUMAN PHENOMENA" AND "PHYSICAL PHENOMENA": A DISTINCTION IN TERMS OF THE CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE.	30
2.2.2	THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL PHENOMENA AND HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.	32
2.2.3	THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE AND CULTURE.	34
2.3	THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF NATURAL PHENOMENA.	42
2.4	THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA AND KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS	43
2.5	THE CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE.	46
2.5.1	The Logical Category of Empathetic Understanding: Personality	51
2.5.2	The Formal Categories of Historical- Cultural Consciousness: Historical Temporality, Historical Significance and Historicity.	53

2.5.3 The Object of Historical- Cultural Knowledge: Historical Individuality.	57
2.6 CONCLUSION	60
2.7 A NOTE ON "CONCEPT-FORMATION".	62
3. THE LOGICAL AND SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLES OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL WRITING.	67
3.1 INTRODUCTION	67
3.2 THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY.	71
3.2.1 The Hermeneutic Employment of the Formal Concepts in Weber's Historical-Cultural Sociology.	73
3.2.2 The Hermeneutic Employment of the Category of Causation from the Historical-Cultural Standpoint in Weber's Writing.	76
3.2.3 The Hermeneutic Employment of Conceptual Generalization from the Historical-Cultural Standpoint in Weber's Writing.	80
3.2.4 Pure- Typical Interpretation: The Employment of Pure-typical Constructs in Weber's Historical- Cultural Sociology.	86
3.3 THE LOGICAL CONDITION FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONCEPTUAL UNITY IN WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY.	94
3.4 THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT "RATIONAL": HOW THE INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY ARE EMPLOYED.	99
3.4.1 The Logical Character of "Rational": Formal Concept <i>par Excellence</i>	99
3.4.2 The Inner- Unified Meaning of "Being Rational": A Glimpse of the Synthetic Significance of the Interpretive Points of View in Historical- Cultural Sociology.	104
4. SEARCHING FOR THE CONCEPTUAL UNITY OF THE TEXT: THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL INQUIRY.	116
4.1 THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM.	119
4.2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS IN THE HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION.	122
4.3 THE HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE NORMATIVE AND <i>DE FACTO</i> POWERS: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY.	131
4.4 THE GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY.	137
4.5 CONCLUSION.	143

5. POSTSCRIPT: INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES AT VARIANCE.	149
5.1 THE DISTINCT POSITION OF THE ESSAY: ITS STANDPOINT OF INTERPRETATION.	152
5.2 WHEN THE SANCTUARY OF EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE IS RAISED, IT WILL HAVE	155
5.3 WHEN THE SANCTUARY OF GENERAL, EXPLANATORY THEORY IS RAISED, IT WILL HAVE	167
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	184

1. INTRODUCTION.

1.1 THE INTENTION OF THE ESSAY: TO READ THE WRITING OF MAX WEBER AS A MASTERPIECE IN THE FIELD OF HISTORICAL-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE.

This essay is written in a course of reflecting the historical-cultural experience of the generations who have been being confronted and bewildered by the tempestuous transformations of the inner and outer relationships of human beings in the world, the transformations they experience in the multivarious situations of their personal lives. Reflection of this kind will sooner or later stumble onto the masterpieces of those enthusiastic years of new insights into human destiny.

That was the heroic years of Reason. Sigmund Freud threw a plumbing line of medical-therapeutic as well as biographical- and historical-hermeneutic knowledge over the water of Unconscious, directing the sensitive hearts to the echoes of the traumas with no release, the longing with no fulfillment, and the guilt with no redemption from the track of birth and growth in the apparently deserted past, yet ever haunting the suffering ego, ever churning in the dark chamber of the human soul. Karl Marx drew different currents of thought in Europe of his time together, composing a theme of human emancipation, a theme ever reverberating through generations after him. He struck a tone accenting the discontent and indignation of his tumultuous times, when the lust for power over the world had recoiled on humanity. His critique of classical political economy reveals the yoke of Capital -- the historical conditions that turn humanity into commodity -- over all those who are forced to work with no fulfillment and to live with no dignity, under the light of new values and new attitudes proclaimed for a world with no alienation and no domination. Emerging from the historiographical tradition of his own nation, Max Weber beat a new track to an uncultivated field of knowledge. During the two decades before his death, this erudite scholar in the history of law, religion and economy laboured in the virgin soil of historical-cultural sociology. With his sight gliding up and down from spheres to spheres of life, Weber saw in the ruthless pursuit of

economic efficiency for the sake of profit, and in the rivalry for political dominance in the modern state the impulse of culture, where the bastions of spiritual and intellectual ideals and freedom collapsed. The drama fills the hearts of his audience with grief and racks their nerve with premonitions as it is approaching its denouement, that is the demise of spiritual awareness and creativity of human souls wound up in the iron-cage of rational civilizations. Those who have become bitterly conscious of the dilemmas and restlessness of being human will find in the writings of Max Weber, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and many others a point of departure for knowledge of their situation with at least some redemptive power. The following pages, understanding themselves as only on small, and indeed very small, step in pressing forward to a possible fulfillment on such a course of intellectual quest, intend to seek a refreshing light on only one of these masterpieces, the historical and theoretical writing of Max Weber.

A masterpiece is charming; but charming is not necessarily this or that conclusion. Shinning through the text is a vision, an intellectual vision of fundamental conditions of being human, a vision that belongs essentially to a field of knowledge. A field of vision is necessarily and essentially opened up from a particular standpoint and in a particular way of viewing, both of which are peculiar to and constitutive of a field of knowledge with all its possibilities and limits. This essay intends to grasp the standpoint and the way of viewing that constitute the logical form of Weber's historical and theoretical writing as a whole. Yet believing in no such an idea as that the fundamental issues of intellectual inquiry may have a final conclusion, and deceived by no such an illusion as that a profound understanding of the long standing controversies about the logic of inquiry may be brought out over night, the present author is content in this inquiry with a very modest purpose: to secure a ground for an adequate interpretation of the *oeuvre* of Max Weber. However dim and flickering it is, the light sought here may show a way of reading Weber's writings as a masterpiece in the field of historical-cultural knowledge, a reading that may allow seeing the logical unity of the

text, and a reading that may show making the inner-unified meaning of the text more intelligible.

1.2 THE PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY: TO BUILD A WAY OF INTERPRETATION WHEREBY THE TEXT MAY BE ADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD.

1.2.1 The Logic of a Text and Its Interpretation.

A text is an inner-unified context of meaning. A context of meaning finds the conditions for its intelligibility qua relevancy, i.e., its relatedness to what it means, in that which is given from the external to the text¹ but in relation to which the author(s) and those who interpret the text have to take a stand in view of some human interests, intellectual or otherwise. These conditions give rise to the external logic of knowledge, the way of determining how adequate an account it is for that which the text relates itself to. Any single context, however self-contained it may appear to be, can never have its meaning adequately determined apart from the text as a whole. For a text, being so constituted for a particular purpose of interpretation and thus treated accordingly in the hermeneutical practice, contains in itself the internal unity of meaning, the inner-unified meaning which holds together every context into one text. This inner-unified meaning, when viewed from the standpoint of hermeneutical practice, reveals itself only in and through an interpretation of the text. Though being a formal condition for the possibility of a text and thus of its interpretation, the presence of an inner-unified meaning, whatever meaning it may be, in a text advances no such a claim of prestige as the text being free from any inconsistency. To the contrary, inconsistency can be shown among statements or contexts in the text only by virtue of the inner-unified meaning as grasped in an interpretation. The inner-unified meaning of a text

¹That which is external to the text may have been somehow constituted long before the text and any of its interpretations are made possible and is also far extensive beyond the bounds they may reach; it may have been somehow given in the experience of life to the author(s) or anyone who interprets the text; or it may be given in many other ways from the external.

contains in itself the internal logic of understanding; the way wherein every act of creating meaning is unified in one understanding as a text. An interpretation has to claim, be it implicit or explicit, a logic of this kind for its text, as one of its own internal condition for the possibility of knowledge.

Only in the internal logic of knowledge in Weber's historical and theoretical writing does this essay take an interest. However, even a brief account for such a unity is beyond the scope of the essay and the knowledge of its author. Pertinent to the discussion that follows is only an *a priori* condition, that comes to constitute the inner-unified meaning of Weber's historical and theoretical writing, when viewed as a text. For the purpose of this inquiry, the idea of the logical unity of the text is taken in a very narrow sense, meaning (1) those *a priori* categories of knowledge that come to constitute the object of knowledge in the text and (2) the specific way that cultural values, with their distinctive point of view of the world, and the problems the author of the text is always concerned with, come to constitute the conceptual unity² in the text. This constitutive condition for the possibility of knowledge is *a priori*; for it is internal to understanding yet standing beyond the world of experience *qua* fact. Beyond the reach of observation on the world of facts is this synthetic-constitutive condition for knowledge, that brings order to the world of experience; but so is the value judgement which makes human being being-in-the-world. Only returning to itself can Reason reveal its own logical condition and thereby grasp itself for itself. The following essay, understanding itself as a reflection of this kind, indeed renders nothing of great value other than only a few insights into the internal logic of the text, the text constituted in

²This inquiry, though being concerned with the logical and conceptual unity of Weber's historical and theoretical writings, never conceives even for a moment his writings as being free from any inconsistency. Rather than to conceal the inconsistencies, which may be found throughout the text, indeed, it may help to open up a new possibility of understanding the inconsistencies and inadequacy of the text. For, as mentioned in the foregoing, only by virtue of its interpretive idea about the inner-unified meaning, as well as the internal logic of the text can an interpretation throw light upon the inconsistencies and the inadequacy of the text.

this inquiry.

Every reading furnishes for itself a logical condition. Reading the logical conditions for a particular field of knowledge out of a masterpiece in the field contains in itself two standpoints: viz., the standpoint of the text as its content, and the standpoint of reading the text as its own logic. Laying bare the intellectual vision expressed in a masterpiece in a field of knowledge keeps in touch with two ways of viewing: viz., the way of viewing the world, that makes the text as a consummate expression of a vision, as its content, and the way of reading the text, that makes the text intelligible; usually in one of the many ways, as its own logic. For the fulfillment of its interest, reading finds its own logic; the logic makes the reading possible. By the purpose of reading, this logic is determined; the purpose informs the reading why it is meaningful. The purpose of this inquiry, which has been hinted at though not yet made clear, is to secure an adequate interpretation of Weber's writing, as a masterpiece of historical-cultural knowledge. Following through its logic in each step henceforth, the reading is guided by the ever revealing knowledge of the text. Its sight is fixed by the ever deepening self-knowledge of its own purpose, and the problem about the text it is so concerned with.

1.2.2 The Claim of Adequacy vis-a-vis the Claim of Correctness of an Interpretation.

Vision seeks its own form. A masterpiece in a field of knowledge is an intellectual vision in its most pregnant form. The stature of a masterpiece raises itself far above the mere text, the mere subjects and predicates, the mere premises and implications, as well as the mere arguments and conclusions, resting itself upon the inspirational power of expression. In reading, this power realizes itself. Before such an intellectual monument, a person pays homage to the history of spiritual and intellectual quest of humankind, that constitutes his or her own being. Those who are not too hurried to leave before they can think through what is confronting them will sooner or

later see their way lying beyond in the very depth of their contemplation. For reading a masterpiece opens new possibilities of reflecting upon the discontent and sorrow of the time by virtue of a new way laid for pondering upon the meaning of being human -- the meaningful relationships between human being and the world. This coming and returning to a masterpiece draws inspiration and lends hope for the meandrous course out there upon the intellectual and spiritual morass before the searching souls. Going beyond is the very meaning of inspiration -- the very meaning of paying homage to the nurturing power of the history that raises each of us to the spiritual and intellectual adulthood. Going beyond is the destiny of coming and returning to a masterpiece.

An interpretation finds its criteria of adequacy in the internal, logical consistency of its interpretive principles and statements and the external consistency of the interpretation with its text. An interpretation may claim external consistency, even if it is confronted with inconsistent statements, when it is of such a standpoint of interpretation which allows it to show logically and tenably that these inconsistent statements belong to the text itself and the responsibility for the inconsistency belongs to the author of the text being interpreted, and which also allows it to make intelligible the inconsistency, i.e., why it is created and how it is created. This, as a matter of course, and as shown in the foregoing, would not be possible if apart from the inner-unified meaning as claimed for the text in the interpretation. In practice, however, it is never feasible to bring an interpretation, however revealing its principles and method may be, all the way through. An interpretation has to stop at some point, ceasing to go any further. No pure or absolute adequacy is in the world of hermeneutical practice. Pure or absolute adequacy is only a normative, limiting idea, in the light of which any interpretation is to be judged. Above all, both the choice of principles and method, and the concluding point of interpretation are essentially determined by the purpose of the interpretation, the problems it is concerned with and the destination it is directed to. In the case of interpreting a masterpiece, as having been touched upon in

the foregoing, this choice is informed by the whole destiny of the reading, the direction in which the inspiring power of the text is fulfilled -- that is, the reason for which one comes upon the text and the destination to which one goes once beyond the text. In any case, the adequacy of an interpretation is thus judged according to its purpose and in particular the problems it is concerned with.

An adequate interpretation, with no exception, works itself out within the bounds of equivocity allowed by the text itself, and by the historical and intellectual background of the text as well as the biographical background of the author(s). The text being read supplies the external condition for the judgement of adequacy on an interpretation by virtue of these bounds, the bounds of interpretability of the text. However, the text, as well as the background of the text and its author(s), provides no criterion for the correctness and truth of an interpretation, within the limits of its interpretability. For the correctness and truth of an interpretation is essentially determined by its principles of interpretation and its interpretive-unified idea of the text. The correctness and truth of an interpretation can be judged only in terms of one and more theoretical or extra-theoretical standpoint -- in one word, the logic of reading. From the point of view of hermeneutical practice, this essay holds any claim that there is only one single correct and true interpretation of a text to be dubious. The issue goes even deeper in the case of interpreting a masterpiece in a field of knowledge. On one hand, the meaning and significance of a masterpiece is constituted not only by its author(s) alone, but also communally as a historical legacy by the community of contemplative and creative minds. On the other hand, as mentioned in the foregoing, going beyond is the destiny of interpreting and re-interpreting a masterpiece. Coming and returning to a masterpiece, when viewed from the side of the thinking person, is as a matter of course a personal, intellectual or spiritual venture. Yet it is, when viewed from the side of historical community, part of the historical-communally shared world picture -- in the depth of which is the self-knowledge of human being and the ideas about the world for human

being. The full content of meaning in the text, that reveals itself only in reading, transforms itself with every alternation, however minute it may be, of the world for the community of thinking beings, that stands before the text and constantly comes and returns to it for inspiration.

Equivocity in a text is a hermeneutic phenomenon. The bounds of the interpretability -- i.e., the susceptibility of a text to a different way of interpretation -- and all too often even the limit of the interpretableness -- that is, how far the text is capable to be interpreted as well as how much is allowed to read out of the text -- of a text, especially a masterpiece in a field of knowledge, are however historical phenomena.³ The history of literary interpretation and criticism bears out a shared

³Hermeneutical practice has its own historicity. Only in returning upon itself can hermeneutical consciousness come to grasp the full meaning and consequences of its own historical being. Modern hermeneutics arises at the time when the historical inquiry seeks for itself a hermeneutical foundation. How is it possible to reconstruct the world of the author(s) of a text, a world which may be foreign to those who interpret it, is its central problem. A text, for Dilthey, is an expression of life. Such an idea opens a new possibility for the hermeneutical consciousness to go beyond and dive deep beneath the authorial intention. Interpretive gaze is guided to the full context of the vital relationships of human being to its world, the context that constitutes the meaning and significance of life, which seeks its own expression. Despite this idea, interpretation remains a method, an art, or a technique of understanding. The traditional dichotomy of object and subject, as well as the one of method and truth, remains the cornerstone of hermeneutics. The self-understanding of hermeneutical practice remains tinged with the enigma of psychological reconstruction of the author's mind. The overcoming of these dichotomies and the psychologism of the hermeneutical consciousness is first made possible in phenomenology. The condition for the possibility of hermeneutical practice is disclosed in the fundamental ontology of Dasein, the being which understands Being. The historicity of hermeneutical practice is thus found in the historical finitude of human being qua Dasein. Hermeneutical experience, in its highest form, as Gadamer points out, constitutes the openness to tradition, -- an opening up of the new historical possibilities of understanding the vital relationships of human being to its world ~~by~~ effective-historical consciousness. This is the historical challenge for the hermeneutical practice which seeks its way to the truth for humankind. Precisely from such a point of view does this essay understand its own possibility. Hermeneutical experience has its own possibility; yet at the same time, it has its own bounds. The masterpieces of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud offer new insights into the historical and biographical limits of hermeneutical experience, and thus also open up new possibilities for hermeneutical practice. Each of them brings into light in his own way a logic of hermeneutical experience, that conceals some vital needs and interests of human beings under a symbolic guise. Following their lead, Habermas seeks to show how communication may be systematically distorted under the historical

opinion about hermeneutical practice: that is, the ever-increasing, creative power of interpretation unceasingly bursts the given boundaries of interpretability of our masterpieces; the ever-penetrating, empathetic power of hermeneutical inquiry pushes further and further the given boundaries of interpretability of our masterpieces to new frontiers of understanding.

All the same, standing in no position that may allow at this point of inquiry even a tiny step beyond the text, and claiming no honor of creativity of such a kind that may allow even a pretense of opening a frontier of understanding, the following pages will stay content with a modest purpose: that is, to build a way of interpretation, whereby the text may be adequately understood. Above all, in order to render the logical form of Weber's historical and theoretical writing adequately clear, as to a methodical reading of the text, this essay will follow through his statements about the logic of historical-cultural knowledge with a conscious effort throughout to keep intact the intention and purpose of argument with which as well as the context of discussion in which these statements were made. Insights into the purpose and the problems which concern the author of an inquiry belongs to the self-knowledge, being a privilege of a thinking being, and thus being constantly sought by one who is in quest, who is interested in the problem of the inquiry, who is concerned with the meaning of the inquiry and who is thinking through them. Knowledge of this sort should be stated explicitly before any other issue to avoid misunderstanding that might be created by the individual contexts of discussion later on, if these contexts were interpreted in isolation from other contexts, and from the purpose and the problems of the inquiry as a whole. In discharge this duty,

³(cont'd) situations of power and domination. Bultmann reveals the existential meaning of Bible for the modern men and women with his method of demythologization. Ricoeur unfolds the drama of human life under the semantic structures of ancient myths. Hermeneutics of such a kind brings under a fresh light the historicity of hermeneutical experience. Above all, it discloses the concealing forces of the traditions and the historical situations of hermeneutical practice. By understanding these forces, it seeks to defeat them. This is, however, beyond the scope of this inquiry. For this issue, the readers are referred to Howard, R. J. (1982) Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding. Berkeley: University of California Press.

greater clarity may be attained for the essay as a whole; for as noted, the purpose of inquiry has to find its way to the choice on the internal logic, and it never fails to assert itself in every step of the inquiry. Entertained in the foregoing is no intention other than presenting a clear view how the author of this essay comes to understand his own inquiry; for such a view has a direct bearing on each step of the inquiry and the inquiry as a whole. By so doing, the purpose of the inquiry and the problem its author is concerned with are thus defined.

1.3 THE METHOD OF THE INQUIRY: EXPOSITION OF THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL-CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EMPLOYMENT IN THE TEXT.

The interest of interpreting Weber's historical and theoretical writing in building a way to the inner-unified meaning of the text will inform the inquiry throughout. The following essay, however, takes only one step on the way: viz., to render an exposition of the logic of historical-cultural knowledge as being read out of Weber's writing in this inquiry. Some expectation may have been invited as to what should be or in fact will be undertaken: say, to expound the major arguments, to elucidate the logical structure of these arguments, to explicate the interpretive ideas of his writing, and many other tasks. Despite this general idea of exposition, not much is told about the method of the inquiry. Part of the reason is that apart from the logic of interpretation, such a general idea of exposition merely suggests a whole range of possibilities of interpretation, each of which will lend to a quite distinctive character of inquiry, content of discussion as well as conclusions about the text if such a path has been taken. Those, say, concerned with comparing and contrasting different schools of thought, may read the text in relations to the others, trying to disentangle the shared themes of concern as well as the distinctive problems discussed in the text. Those concerned with theoretical synthesis in their mind may see an exposition, and treat it accordingly, as only a methodical step on the way of bringing together many different currents of thought into a more adequate picture of the reality. Or those who have other interests may render different insights.

of value into the same text. Thus, the distinctive character of this exposition, and the distinctive way taken in this inquiry, whereby the text is constituted and interpreted, must be made explicit.

Weber's *oeuvre* will be treated as a self-containing text, a more or less coherent expression of an active mind, which is posing for itself questions, pondering upon them, and searching for an answer, on its own latitude, in its own depth, and with its own limits and limitations. Belonging to such a text are some explicit statements the author makes about the logic of inquiry. By focusing itself more or less on these statements this inquiry will open an access to the internal logic⁴ of his historical and theoretical writings. Yet access to a destination is never the destination itself. Theory is categorically distinct from practice⁵. And indeed, Weber does not build up a system of theory, concerning the internal logic of his own inquiry. These statements are never intended to be a comprehensive account for the method of inquiry, but rather, each of these statements, with only a few exceptions, addresses a particular problem concerning one or more specific methodical steps in historical-cultural inquiry in a context of argument to the defense of its author's points of view on the problem in issue against the opinion of some prominent scholars in the field of his time.

The forces of argumentation, whether now a bold whack or now a tactical defense, always move together to pursue their victims to their bitter conclusions, to hold them in ridicule, to drain their vitality, and to bring home the trophy for victory. But the fate of misfortune brought upon its victims will somehow come to pay a visit to its hero. Standing apart from his historical and theoretical writing, as far as the style of expression is concerned, fierce a polemic as they are, these statements about the logic of inquiry acquire for themselves the force of argumentation with a capacity to bring into relief the most distinctive characters of historical-cultural inquiry as well as those

⁴For the internal logic of a text, see the discussion in the foregoing

⁵This statement does not deny the claim that theory and practice always inter-penetrate each other in the total situation of life. Nevertheless, they are categorically distinct.

irreconcilable or at least the not yet reconciled points of view involved in the controversy. However precise it may be, having its purpose being fulfilled in a fight, fighting as a matter of course in the honour of Truth against Untruth, polemic always begets misunderstanding, especially in those who are concerned with the dispute but nevertheless standing outside the warring parties. Paying back for the forcefulness of argumentation in this case is by having the full picture of the author's vision being concealed or sometimes obscured.

Brought upon his horseback, leaping with him up and down, in one battle after another, those who strain themselves to grasp what Weber fights for have to keep a discerning eye and to stay vigilant in the midst of a storm of bewilderment. But, this may lend a protecting hand, keeping those who are engrossed and carried away by his force of argumentation from falling into the abyss of mere propositions of methodology, upon which the author of the text puts so limited value, and constantly throwing them back, as his horse is galloping and heaving, to the full context of his historical-cultural inquiry -- that is, the context in which the author's ideas about inquiry is put into practice. Only from the full context of his practice do these statements acquire for themselves meaning. However revealing they may be, of showing the inner-unified meaning of the text, these statements are lacking of a consistent context of meaning, if apart from a methodical reading of the text as a whole. In some sense that is true of this inquiry: each of these statements has to be read in one and the same time as the text as a whole is read. What these statements are all about, as well as what the text is all about dawn upon the present author only in the moment when those statements about the internal logic of his inquiry and those statements in and through which he posits a world as if external to his mind inter-penetrate one another and come together into one, one context of meaning, thus, one text. The very concluding moment of reading the text renders the very point of departure for the following exposition. No rare experience, though, is the starting point vis-a-vis the concluding point of understanding coming into

one in hermeneutical practice. For the inner-unified meaning of a text does not simply come out of its concealment in this or that point of reading, but flows from moment to moment, in every moment throughout the interpretation as a whole.

The exposition that follows is not a brief replication of what Weber has said. Exposition of such a kind is not possible for the reasons that have been mentioned in the foregoing. Yet, were a replication feasible, it would not be meaningful. Is it not better off to return to Weber's original writing and to read it? The distinctive character of this exposition is essentially determined by its own purpose. It seeks to open up the full context of meaning of the text. In order to grasp the fullness and the richness of the text, it has to go beyond the mere propositions, the mere words and lines and the mere arguments and conclusions down to the fundamental standpoints and the way of viewing that come to constitute the vision of the text. Only by standing at a higher altitude can a person disclose the vision of the author in the inner-unified meaning of the text, the internal unity on which every single statement in the text is predicated on. Such an exposition may serve itself as a promising way to the internal logic of the text; thereby, misgivings in the text may be illuminated; and the limitation of its author's inquiry may also be brought out under light.

Consider the following problems, some of the problems which may arise in understanding Weber's writing. During the decade precedent his death, Weber was labouring on his treatise entitled *Economy and Society*. The second part of the book, deluges its readers with a blizzard of specific problems of historical-cultural sociology -- problems of all kind such as those concerning the organization of production, the separation of household from enterprise, the distinction of religion from magic, the meaning of God and salvation, the organization of religion, the distinction between church and sect, the mystical and the ascetic path to salvation, the distinction between exemplary and missionary prophecy, this-worldly and other-worldly religious ethos, the relations between religious practice and the formation of personality, the origins of legal

norms, the administration of justice, the codification and rationalization of law, the formal and substantial rationality of law, the contribution of canon law and the ecclesiastical court to the rational legal practice, the significance of reception of Roman Law, the relations between modern (rational) law and the modern state, market and market rationality, the emergence of the ethos from or the imposition of ethical norms upon market situation; the distinction between status contact and purposive contact, charismatic leadership and its routinization, the pure-typical character of feudalism and bureaucracy, the emergence of the modern state and its officialdom, city states and many other problems.

In this cauldron of facts and interpretation, those who follow the arguments from page to page, have to strain themselves throughout their reading to look for a prop, be it a guess about the author's intention of writing all these pages, or a clue to the unified theme holding these pages together. The book might be (seen as) a general treatise on universal history. Yet obvious enough is that the author is very selective in choosing his object of inquiry, concerning only several phenomena and indeed a particular facet of each of these phenomena. A purpose much more specific than a general treatise is guiding the choice. Economy and society devotes a relatively short section on economy. No detail is spelled out about, for instance, the financial system, such as credit system, insurance, banking or other financial institutes, or financial crises, all of which are important chapters in economic history. The discussion, however, recurrently comes back to the problem about economic conduct. The author time and again lays an emphasis on some apparently less important issue in the economic history, such as alms. Had this erudite economic historian lost his interest in economic problems during the time when he wrote the book? Or a cultural historian's concern with economic situations had been occupying the author throughout his inquiry? Weber presents his readers one after another pure-typical structure of power and domination. The reason is obvious: these phenomena bears notable significance in the history of

civilization. Unfortunate historical situations created in the conflicts between human beings have been mercilessly weighting down upon humankind. But many historical phenomena of this kind with no little significance in history are indeed left out without even being mentioned. Were the book intended to be a general treatise on universal history, some omissions would be striking. To demonstrate this point, one example will be suffice. Marianne Weber (Schnitzges) was an advocate for the women's liberation movement in Germany. She was always grateful for Weber's sympathy and support for her cause as well as his advice and encouragement for her inquiry into the history of women and family. However, his book has little room for the domination of (almost) one half of humanity over the other half -- an evil coeval with the civilization in history.

The book starts with a formal definition of interpretive sociology, revealing an unique character of the text in a general way, yet too general if by the definition itself to get a view of the definite content of this character. What kind of interpretive sociology is it? It may probably be a systematic account for the normative structure of society as observed in the history of civilization. Weber, as the later parts of this essay will show, has taken a quite negative view about systematic theory. Is there a fundamental split in the logic of inquiry, that marks off *Economy and Society* from his all other writing? Was this to be true, this essay would have two or more texts, rather than one, to be interpreted. The book is indeed very systematic, but only so as to the style of presentation. The normative structures of society that concern Weber, for some reasons yet to be understood, somehow stand beyond all those which constitute science and technology, education and academic traditions, social and intellectual movements, wars and diplomatic relations, art and literature, music and dance, family and kinship, public opinions and folklore, and many other cultural phenomena. Those who read the book as a general and systematic theory of society, even when they concern themselves with only a particular section of the book, may be confronted with the puzzles of this kind. Why does the author lay a special emphasis on city states, but not on cities in

general? Why does a general and systematic theory of law ignore the whole range of problems about crime and punishment? Why does a general and systematic treatise on religion have to discuss in some detail some minor sermons given in some local parishes but offer little about the Sermon on the Mount, the principle of which Weber held to be as important as Kant's categorical imperatives in his personal, ethical judgement? And why does such a theory of religion pay so little attention to such an important phenomena as Greek mythology, vedic myths, the primitive Christian cults, the religious missions or wars, schism and auto-da-fe, and many others.

Weber devotes some three hundred pages⁶ to a systematic elaboration of his concepts, and he gives a schematic discussion of the structures of economic and political action. He introduces a formal scheme of concepts -- from as simple a concept as sociology or action to as complex as capitalism or bureaucracy, and elucidates various formal structures of social action, social relationships, social organizations, and power and domination including a detailed discussion of different forms of capitalism as well as their formal and substantial conditions in various contexts. How is it fitted into the rest of the book, and with no less importance, into his writing as a whole? Weber expressly states his constant skepticism toward systematic theory and his caution of the limits of 'generalized statements' in historical-cultural inquiry. This self-containing and apparently complete scheme of concepts is however before long dissolving in the rest of the book into only a device for capturing some significant moments of the transforming world; but in itself it is only a shadow of the world which is "flashing on." The structure of action turns out to be some hypostatized impressions about the reality; the reality is in an ever anew becoming. The generalised statements and the schemata are not employed as the general conditions under which observations are subsumed.

⁶This number is only applied to the English edition of the book.

⁷For the logical character of generalized statements and their employment in historical-cultural knowledge and in particular in Weber's writing, see "The Employment of Conceptual Generalization from the Historical-Cultural Standpoint in the Text."

Curiously enough is that Weber juxtaposes all kind of cases which do not correspond to or even run into direct contradiction to these general statements, concepts and examples? What is the logical principle underlying their employment?

The first part of the book has an air of inaugurating a special genre of interpretive sociology somehow based upon a scheme of formal structures of social action between individuals; but throughout its second part, however, the author has put every effort to trace the historical origin and the transformation of some 'trans-personal' structures of the society, one after another. How is this possible? Are there inextricable connections or is there discrepancy? Was this to be true, even *Economy and Society* itself would not be one text, but a collection of different texts. The piecemeal English translation of the book before 1968 indeed inadvertently reinforces such an impression. Those factors containing in itself cultural meaning and value ideas, such as religiosity, legality, polity, rationality, and the like always stand out in his writing as prominent historical factors. These factors work themselves out in a factual context, and they meet their own factual consequences. Causal explanation is never dispensable for Weber in his inquiry. What is idea? What is fact? What is cause? What is culture? What is history? How do they penetrate in and out each other? Holding fast on to his methods of inquiry, in and out of series and series of historical observations, Weber interprets. Weber presents the *Geist* of modern (rational) capitalism and its historical significance vividly to his readers before their intellectual gaze. For two decades, Weber had pondered on this problem and worked out its implications. He had returned to it again and again until the end of his career. The meaning of the concept transforms itself. Weber elevated his understanding onto a higher altitude and drew its implications in a much wider historical latitude than he could have ever conceived at the start. *Geist* has many meanings: intellect, spirit, mind and many others. Which one is employed in Weber's historical and theoretical writing? Does it refer to an individual soul? Does it connote a general mind, like an epoch or even

Brahman? Or does it mean both and more than both? The answer all depends on how the text as whole is interpreted. To understand a word is to understand the text as a whole.

The text as a whole is not what it is, but what it is interpreted to be. All these questions and all others of the same kind, if being thought through, will come to show: interpretation, being a method of understanding a text, is not an instrument of understanding; it is the being of understanding. Method -- to be precise, the way of understanding -- is contained in the content of understanding as one of its moments. The most important logical principle of this inquiry is thus brought home: hermeneutical practice is a methodical way of understanding a text. A text, as it is understood, is however the unity of the content -- what is to be understood -- and the method -- how it is to be understood -- of interpretation. That which in and through the text speaks. That which in and through the text is speaking in the midst of silence. Which will raise its voice and which will fall into silence have not not been definitely determined. They have not been determined until they are listened to. They are determined only by virtue of how they are listened to. Content and method, in the province of Knowledge and Understanding, belong essentially to each other. Paying heed to the text, so conceived as a masterpiece in a field of knowledge, is to disclose the full context of its meaning by the way the vehicle of understanding has been carried to her first destination, but the real value of the interpretation may lie beyond this first destination in bringing understanding further and raising it higher than it has ever been.

1.4 THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS ESSAY IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.

The focus will shift in the following chapters to the statements of Weber about the method of inquiry. For the interest of interpretation remains, until the conclusion of this essay, in the conceptual unity of the text and the logical conditions for this unity; and the exposition remains one methodical step on the way to an adequate and more complete understanding of the text as a whole; these statements will be read, as

belonging essentially to the text. Nevertheless, exposition of such a kind belongs to the province of knowledge of ideas¹; and it takes on a very specific logical form: a transcendental interpretation of knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena and the hermeneutical employment of the general forms of thought from the standpoint of historical- cultural knowledge in the text to be interpreted. Transcendental interpretation is not the only way of reflection, whereby a thinking being come to understand its primordial relationships with the world. Nevertheless, in view of the very modest purpose of this inquiry as to seek a light upon the way wherein *a priori* principles and categories of historical- cultural knowledge come to constitute the object of knowledge, and wherein the equally *a priori* points of view come to make possible the conceptual unity of the text, a transcendental interpretation serves itself as a promising course of inquiry for such a purpose to be fulfilled. For a transcendental interpretation may open an access to one of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, namely the logical *a priori* conditions for the possibility of knowledge, and in this sense, historical- cultural knowledge in particular.

Knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena is a form of knowledge. Knowledge of such a form is only one of the possibilities that the world for humankind may allow itself to be revealed. Thus, it claims no more and no less intellectual worth than any other forms of knowledge, but each serves one or more interests and purpose of the intellect. Knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena finds its own possibility in its logically *a priori* principles and synthetic-constitutive categories. With a distinctive, logical character, historical- cultural knowledge stands within the province of knowledge. From a particular standpoint of knowledge, it finds its own logic. In this regard, knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena shares the same transcendental conditions for knowledge with all other forms of knowledge in the "brotherhood" of Reason and

¹For "knowledge of ideas," see the section, "The Logical Distinction Between Knowledge of Historical- Cultural Phenomena and Knowledge of Ideas" in the following chapter.

Passion for Truth, thought the specific content of these conditions are distinct for each form of knowledge. For by virtue of this distinctness in the content of these conditions, knowledge finds its own forms, and interests of knowledge find their own fulfillment.

The problem concerning the constitutive standpoint and the constitutive-synthetic categories of historical-cultural knowledge belongs to the second chapter of this essay. Historical- cultural knowledge will occupy a preponderant position in the following chapters, for no other reason but one: that is, throughout this inquiry, the fundamental standpoint of the text and the central problem which concerns its author are conceived as essentially historical- cultural. Thus, the inner-unified meaning of the text is not to be found in the conventional dichotomy of "social" vis-a-vis "physical" phenomena simply on account of some formal characters of the content of knowledge; neither is the author's statements about the method of inquiry to be presented as the logical consequence of a general methodology of "social sciences" or as a conclusion followed from some conceptual picture of knowledge; but rather, they are, as Weiss points out when he comments on the author's ideas of pure-type, 'oriented to the practice of concrete historical and social science research.' (Weiss, 1981:45) Indeed sociology, being a branch of knowledge, dedicating itself to understanding social life, and the cause and consequence of social behaviors, serves a whole range of different interests and purposes of knowledge and takes on a multivarious forms of knowledge. Historical-cultural knowledge is one of these logical forms. The text is conceived in this essay as a masterpiece in the field. Was it to be read as simply a general theory of action, an analysis of everyday interaction, or a theoretical elaboration of social structures, the internal logical unity of the text would be immediately falling apart. In one way or other, historical individuals would be turned either to be some concrete, individual objects or into some "individualized" concepts; historical meaning and significance would become either a bare form of normative orders or the subjective, intended meaning of action; and pure-typical interpretation would be either merely a general and formal typical

analysis or simply a commonsense understanding of other peoples as alter egos in an everyday situation. The distinctness of the interpretive ideas this essay entertains about the inner-unified meaning of the text reveals itself in its fullness only in the moment when they meet the alternative conceptions of the text, and in particular their polar opposites. But bringing these interpretive ideas to face their others is beyond the scope of this introduction; and this cannot be done, if such a comparison has to be intelligible at all, without the transcendental reflection of the logical unity of the text being brought to its conclusion. Thus, in the concluding postscript, some other interpretive ideas about the inner-unified meaning of the text and their logical consequence for the interpretation of the author's writing will be briefly discussed. Yet it is not a comprehensive or a critical survey of the literature, but a comment on the distinct position of this exposition in relation to its polar opposites.

Historical- cultural inquiry is concerned with the historicity of the full context of historical- cultural experience communally shared by the historical personalities in a multiplicity of historical situations, now persisting and now transforming. It seeks to unfold the full context of historical meaning and significance in those events, historically given and historically observed. This full context of experience, being itself synthetically constituted in and through a web of interpretive principles and ideas, is not simply there in itself, but emerges essentially out of the horizon of interpretation in the historical consciousness. This is the logical ground for any historical- cultural knowledge. The following interpretation is to show how the text gnarls its roots in this ground, which gives it vitality and brings to it foliage and fruits.

But the author's historical and theoretical writing is not simply a logical consequence of these principles of knowledge. For it is essentially a text to be interpreted rather than merely a concept. The text is thus to be grasped in the full context of the hermeneutical employment of the general form of thought and interpretive ideas form the point of view of a particular historical problem, waiting for

an adequate solution. The third chapter, as well as the concluding chapter of the essay, with its focus almost exclusively on the internal unity of the text, will concern itself with not so much the constitutive principles and categories of historical-cultural knowledge in themselves as their employment to a particular course of inquiry into a specific problem of the text. Obvious enough is the impossibility of any adequate understanding of the employment of the principles and categories, if without a thoroughly interpretation of these principles and categories. The exposition therefore starts itself from the transcendental interpretation of knowledge in general and the logical distinction of knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena from some of the polar forms of knowledge -- such as knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of ideas -- in order to lay bare the distinctive, logical character of historical-cultural knowledge as one of the many forms of knowledge.

2. THE GENERAL, LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.

That which is known seeks to grasp itself, and that which interprets is to be interpreted. This is the moment of reflection. It is the essential meaning of this inquiry. The following pages are concerned with one problem: how may Max Weber's historical and theoretical writing be adequately interpreted? And in particular, is it possible for its inner-unified meaning to be adequately grasped from the historical- cultural standpoint? Interpretation has its way (one way or other), a way leading to an inner-unified meaning of the text. By this internal unity, the full context of meaning in the text is unfolded. The inquiry that follows is to ponder upon a way of interpretation, seeking to show the logical unity of Weber's writing via a transcendental interpretation of the logical form of historical- cultural sociology. In the vision of historical- cultural knowledge, the inner-unified meaning of the text is apprehended and to be unfolded. How a text may be interpreted from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge? This is the problem of interpretation. But standing at the gate of such an interpretation is its own reflection: how is such an interpretation possible in the first place? Problems of this kind is to be raised in this and the following chapter. By moving its focus onto its author's statements about the method, i.e., the internal logic of inquiry, these two chapters will open up a way of inquiry, a way leading to an adequate solution to the problems. This chapter is to lay bare the internal logic as well as the essential meaning of historical- cultural knowledge; and the next one is to show from the purely logical point of view how it is possible for a piece of sociological writing, such as Weber's historical and theoretical writing to be a vehicle for the vision of historical- cultural knowledge; and how historical- cultural sociology is possible in the first place.

The central problem is raised; it is raised in a particular way. All along this way, the text is to be grasped in the form of historical-cultural knowledge. Every single statement -- or to be precise and truthful, the interpretation of each statement -- in the text is predicated on these principles. These principles, in spite of and also in virtue of

their all-pervailing presence, and their constitutive character, necessarily lie beneath all explicitly articulated statements deep in the logic of knowledge and understanding -- i.e., the way of grasping the intelligibility of the world. Clearing the ground for the internal unity to be adequately grasped is the purpose of the following interpretation. Gaining an access to the ground is its point of departure. The ground of knowledge is contained in knowledge itself. The access to its ground is its own reflection, the transcendental interpretation of knowledge.

Belonging to the text are the statements of the author about the method, i.e., the internal logic of inquiry. These statements lend evidence to the fact that he was always in a state of reflection upon his own way of inquiry. He was very much aware of these principles and was always sensitive to and concerned with their logical consequences for his inquiry. Certainly, his statements, as mentioned in the foregoing, address to one or more methodical problems encountered in the historical-cultural inquiry. Yet, the interpretive ideas and principles employed through out his discussion undoubtedly come from the transcendental interpretation of knowledge as well as the author's insights into the experience of historical-cultural inquiry. The work of Dilthey, Simmel, and Rickert, among many other prominent figures whose labour bears fruits over the soil of the transcendental interpretation of historical-cultural knowledge, as the author's statements and his explicit acknowledgement show, stamps a far reaching and lasting impact on the self-knowledge of his inquiry. Thus in and through an adequate interpretation of these statements, the internal logic of the text as a whole is allowed to be illumined under the light of the author's self understanding of his own inquiry.

In the following two chapters, these statements will be interpreted in a particular way. On one hand, as mentioned in the foregoing, their inner-unified meaning is made intelligible only in the full context of the text, as an essential part of the latter. The interpretive relationships of the essential meaning of these statements with the full context of the text may not be systematically stated in this essay, due to the limit of its

length. They are nevertheless an essential, logical and methodical condition for the exposition presented in the following pages. On the other hand, these statements, alongside with the other context of the text, will be interpreted from the standpoint of transcendental interpretation. For such a standpoint of knowledge allows this inquiry step by step to penetrate into the logical conditions for the possibility of historical-cultural knowledge and to show the internal unity of the text as a whole. Though a thorough interpretation of the literature, and a comprehensive account for the intimate relationships of human being and the historical-cultural world is beyond the scope of this inquiry, this essay will draw many of the fundamental and essential ideas of transcendental interpretation about these relationships into discussion. Under the light of these ideas, Weber's statements about the logic of inquiry is put back to the intellectual tradition into which these statements are ingrained. In this way, the general, logical characters of historical-cultural knowledge is to be shown in the following sections in this chapter.

2.1 THE LOGICAL CONDITION FOR THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL: THE STANDPOINT OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTERPRETATION.

Knowledge implies reality. Every clearly articulated, well elaborated, logical consistent, and coherent body of knowledge reveals a reality. Every idea carries in itself a conception of reality as its logical condition and a reality as its own content. No part of knowledge does not contain in itself an idea of reality. Reality *pe se*, viewed from the logical point of view, arises essentially from the vital relationships between that which knows and that which is known. Confronted by that which is to be known, that which is to know grasps this other as its object, the object of knowledge. But from the moment when that knows return upon itself to grasp itself for itself -- when that which knows also comes to be known -- the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, i.e., a self-reflective, methodical interpretation of and account for the conditions for the

objective possibility of knowledge -- arises. The transcendental interpretation completely undermines the conventional ideas about the unconditional independency and autonomy of reality from knowledge, of objects from subjects and of that which is known from that which knows. It comes to grasp the internal unity of knowledge in the relationships between that which is to know and that which is to be known, yet without collapsing any one into the other. For the two poles of knowledge, when viewed from the standpoint of transcendental interpretation, if knowledge is to be possible at all, never cease to stand in one and at the same time in opposite. By virtue of this unity in tension, the problem about the internal logical of knowledge is possible to be raised, and the vital relationships between human being and the world is possible to be known.

The following section, a few paragraphs, will be devoted to draw some implications on the question -- about the logical character of reality in general -- from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The 'Copernican Revolution', claimed in this book, alters the whole conception of knowledge. For this reason, it gives rise to a totally new way of understanding the inner relations between that which is to known and that which is to be known. The course of reflection upon knowledge itself inevitably concludes with an uncompromising denial of the time-honored idea of things-in-themselves. This conclusion will be discussed briefly in the ensuing. The conditions for the objective possibility of knowledge in general -- i.e., the conditions for the objectivity of knowledge, regardless of its content -- is thereby to be found, if any objectivity of knowledge is possible at all, in the logical conditions of the knowing subjects. As it has to be admitted, Kant confines his subject matter of this book within a very limited bound of knowledge -- for him, that means attaining theoretical knowledge of external events in time and space. In some sense, he naively conceives his own project as to give the final account for the ultimate and timeless conditions for theoretical knowledge by elevating understanding to the abstract and logical realm of knowing subject as such and to the equally abstract and almost lifeless realm of knowledge-in-general. In spite of and

also by virtue of these limits -- which must be seen as the ineluctable restriction on the intellectual horizon of the time that has to be borne by even such an eccentric thinker as Immanuel Kant -- a total alteration in the self-understanding of human beings is made possible. It is this new image that implicitly contains the ground for any transcendental, self-reflective understanding of human beings, their knowledge and their world.

The transcendental interpretation of knowledge starts with two principles: (1) that all knowledge, in contradistinction to pure thought, logically starts from that which is given (or that which is for the subject to know), and (2) that knowledge does not and is not possible at all to rest solely upon it. The conventional wisdom is wont to see the content of knowledge as objects-in-themselves, i.e. objects with an unconditionally independent existence outside the knowing subject, be it an individual mind or a community of individual minds; consequently, irresolvable paradoxes or skepticism will be inevitably resulted. From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, however, they are not unconditionally, directly given to the knowing subject. They are posited before the subject in the synthetic acts of interpretation by the employment of some *a priori* principles. These constitutive principles find their origin not in the objects in themselves but in the spontaneity of understanding and the unifying power of reason; these principles have their source that are different and independent from that which is given and from the passive, receptive faculties of the human mind -- i.e. that to which something is given. That which is given does not give an object; it does not have the constitutive capacity in itself. Rather, it is, by means of the concepts, categories, principles, schemata, rules, and ideas which are given a priori, moulded in such a way that an object is constituted and thereupon being represented. From the logical standpoint, knowledge in its genuine sense, arises out of these synthetic acts. In this way, knowledge finds its form in the formal principles of understanding, and attains its objective validity in the employment of these principles to that which is given. In one word, knowing is not a moment of reception of the mind, but a self-movement of the

knowing subject.

This new conception of knowledge brings forth a radical and total revolution in the intellectual tradition, a tradition with its earliest and refined articulation in ancient Greek thought. It prescribes a new meaning to every idea about knowledge, but without nullifying their validity. Not only has the tension between the subjective and objective pole of knowledge not in any way been weakened, but their unity is, for the first time, brought out of oblivions under the light. This unity is in the constitutive conditions for human understanding. In its origin, the tradition of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge rests in a creative synthesis of empiricism and rationalism; as its implication, a formidable blow is struck upon logical realism. This conception renders the characters and the activities of human subjectivity transparent, without retreating altogether back into subjectivity -- otherwise, knowledge is turned, in an opposite but equally misleading way, into a matter of 'abstract subjectivity', an empty notion which abstracts human subjectivity out of the necessary and objective conditions for its own possibilities. It surpasses the intellectual standpoint which obscures the ultimate conditions for knowledge, and brings into sight the vital relationships of human being in the world. The objective conditions for, and thus the objectivity of knowledge in general, cannot be found in anywhere other than the homogeneous characters of knowing subject, i.e., the homogeneity and the uniformities contained in cognitive acts of human beings. No independent source of our representation -- i.e., the independent source of that which is taken by the passive, receptive faculties of mind as their content -- is allowed to be denied, since that which is given already logically implies an independent source which gives. All the same, no object can be known and for the same reason, no existence of any object can be meaningfully spoken of, apart from the mediation of the *a priori* forms of knowledge and understanding. Objects-in-themselves, if taken as something existent unconditionally independent from the subject, is only an empty concept abstracted from the self-movement of human subjectivity in its primordial relations with

its external conditions. Although a concept with no precept never extends the bound of our knowledge, it is not necessarily empty in its logical consequence. 'Objects-in-themselves' never ceases to be an important concept in the self-understanding of human mind, as it, if understood from the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, expresses itself as an important image which stands for the non-reconcilable tension between the form of knowledge and the content of knowledge, as well as the equally non-reconcilable tension between the subject and the object. The discussion is leading to the point where implications have to be brought home on the logical character of reality in general. Knowing and the known is one. Reality is what the knowing subject present to itself. In the synthetic acts, an unified picture of that which is given is represented in one consciousness according to the category of the appreciation of the epistemic 'I'. Knowing is the cognitive acts which constitute the objects of knowledge, and posit an unified reality as the world for the subject.

Thus, knowledge is what is known; and that which is known is absolutely determined by how it is known. For there are different ways of knowledge and understanding, the account for the logical conditions for 'knowledge in general', if by itself, is not able to describe any knowledge in particular. Once different bodies of knowledge stand side by side in tension on their own particular, and not only general, constitutive conditions, and acquire for themselves an autonomous claim for truth as well as the distinct characters, 'knowledge in general' serves as only an image which stands for the total or the sum of all bodies of knowledge, heretofor developed and preserved. For theoretical purpose, it is always logically possible to develop some criteria, in terms of its logical character, conceptual apparatus, focal point of interest or many others, by, and also for, comparing or classifying different bodies of knowledge. Thereby, the identity, in terms of these distinct and exclusive characters, of different types of knowledge is constituted. If the criteria are of their logical character, forms of

knowledge are rendered. Any account for a form of knowledge is to clarify the distinctive, logical characters, and to lay bare the logical foundation of all those bodies of knowledge that assume the form. So far, intention is directed upon the ultimate ground for knowledge in general by way of a self-reflective account for knowing, as reality- and world- constitutive activities. In order to understand Weber's work, this inquiry will proceed step by step to illuminate the way whereby the unity of the text may be grasped.

2.2 THE INNER-UNIFIED MEANING OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL PHENOMENA AND HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.

2.2.1 THE DICHOTOMY OF "HUMAN PHENOMENA" AND "PHYSICAL PHENOMENA": A DISTINCTION IN TERMS OF THE CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE.

Practical, everyday wisdom renders us a very useful dichotomy of reality -- namely, the 'human phenomenon' and the 'physical phenomenon' -- for our everyday dealing. According to this view, a phenomenon is said to be 'human', in contrast to 'physical' by virtue of its relations with human beings. 'Human phenomena', in its literal sense, refers to those events which involve human beings, those events which is not possible without the participation, or at least the presence of human beings, or those events which happen to human beings. 'Social phenomena', used in the specific sense by sociologists, then occupies a sub-class of 'human phenomena'. The former is those events which contain some social elements -- which include the interactions of human beings, the structures or the uniformities of these interactions, and the cause and consequence of these interactions. 'Physical phenomena', viewed in terms of this dichotomy, on the other hand, is those events which are external to or occur independent of human beings. This distinction of two classes of phenomena are so familiar as if it was made according to some necessary, inevitable and self-evident properties being inherent and intrinsic in these phenomena in themselves. If the distinction is so externally given, it cannot be otherwise. The conception of the world,

which is contained in this dichotomy, may be extremely helpful for us in our daily practice; it may also guide our theoretical sight as a reference to some focal points of interest. It is in this definite sense that knowledge of 'physical phenomena' and the one of 'human or social phenomena' are two branches of knowledge with different focal point of interest of inquiry. Since such a division of knowledge is not made on a logical ground, phenomena with totally different logical forms may be brought within the same class. For practical reasons, it may serve the exchange of ideas and further cooperations in the community of thinking persons. However, branches of knowledge must not be mistaken as forms of knowledge; different focal points of interest must not be mistaken as logical difference. Otherwise, the distinctions between the form of knowledge and the content of the knowledge will be confounded. Our interpretive attention will be misled away from the logical principles of knowledge, and to some groundless view of the 'nature' of the reality.

From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, a 'human phenomenon' or a 'social phenomenon' may be constituted by various, constitutive principles of knowledge; thereby they acquire for themselves different logical forms, they belong to a totally different realm of reality, and acquire totally different meaning for itself. A distinction, based not on the constitutive principles of knowledge, do not serve well our interpretive interest in understanding the logical distinction between different forms of reality; and such a dichotomy does not render any insight into the problems concerning how the reality can be understood or what can be understood. For the logical purposes, a more comprehensive and precise distinction of reality are called for. From the standpoint of transcendental interpretation, the logical distinction between different forms of reality has to be found in the particular way wherein the reality is understood. Every phenomenon is constituted from a definite standpoint of knowledge; these constitutive principles of knowledge determines the logical form and also the intelligibility of the phenomenon as reality. Weber's work may be understood logically in

terms of the tension between the polar forms of knowledge, such as knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena.

2.2.2 THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL PHENOMENA AND HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA.

Human beings or the events involving human beings may be understood from the naturalistic standpoint, from the historical- cultural standpoint, or from many other different standpoints. They may be natural phenomena, historical- cultural phenomena, or many other kinds of phenomena. These standpoints are equally legitimate ways of understanding human beings or any events which involve human beings according to different theoretical interests and extra-theoretical purposes. No doubt will arise for the fact that virus, and therefore cancer -- the fatal disease resulted from malignant metamorphose in the genetic formation of the human body that is currently known to be caused by some type of virus -- are natural phenomena. Then, neurological diseases of a human brain can be nothing but natural phenomena. Similarly, the competitive behaviors and the war-like dispositions of a man(or woman), of a community of men and women, or of mankind as a whole, if conceived and explained exclusively in terms of genetic, biological or pathological theories, are natural phenomena. The whole market phenomenon, if understood as emerging consequences of some collective, random forces operating actively in the same way as gas molecules do in a jar, can be nothing but a natural phenomenon. From the logical standpoint, and also from the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, the identity of natural phenomena lies not in their external properties but in their inner characters --i.e., in the way herewith they are constituted as an object of knowledge.

Similarly, historical- cultural phenomena are not characterized by their exclusion of any 'non-human' element from themselves. The exclusion is impossible, rather they find their identity in the logical standpoint of human understanding. Consider the following example. In the first century A.D., an immense conflagration was spread over

Rome. A chain of chemical reactions got underway. The temperature rose; and the blaze was reflected in the reddened sky. Water suppressed the flame at one end of the city; while the tongues of the fire were thrown up to the sky at the other end. The roofs crashed over the dying bodies; the walls split in the seams; and the building fell to the ground. Carbon was dancing with the wind. Then, the temperature dropped; the whole city was under an all-encompassing, black shadow. Those alive were prostrating over the burnt bodies of those dead; the tears came to their eyes; every fiber in the living bodies were shivering to its end; and the neurons in the working brains were releasing and receiving the neuro-transmitters in their synapses in an extraordinarily intensive and irregular fashions. Everything had its causes and effects; everything had its necessary conditions; everything had its sufficient explanations. Is burning a 'natural' phenomenon? The answer is obviously positive. Is such a fire a 'human' phenomenon? Is it a 'social' phenomenon? Yes, it is both. Is that described so far a historical- cultural phenomenon? It is however not yet. Only when the sorrow and lament over the death of the beloved, the fear and anger in the bleeding hearts, and the misgivings in the mind are captured in an intellectual gaze; only when the hope to rebuild the city, the aspiration to restore the glory of the capital, and the need to make sense of all the suffering inflicted by the irrationality of the event are comprehended in an intellectual gaze; and only when the various ways for those alive to express their feeling, to fulfill their hope, to relieve their fear and anger, to interpret their situations, and to decide what should be done and how it would be done are known and understood in an intellectual gaze; the fire is no longer a natural phenomenon, but cultural. Only when the fire is not any other fire but the one which burnt down Rome in that particular time; only when the fire created a situation for some Roman citizens to burden upon a religious community as the scapegoat the responsibility for the fire; only when the fire, the need to find a scapegoat, the decisions about whom to be blamed, the procedures of bringing the blamed to their persecution, the martyrdom of the faithful and many other acts and

events are brought together to be an important episode in the history of pristine christianity; and only when the history of christianity as a religion has many ramifications in the occidental culture up to our time, the fire is a historical phenomenon. This example serves to make the point clear:

... nature is the domain of the 'meaningless.' Or, more precisely, an item becomes a part of 'nature' if we cannot arise the question: what is its 'meaning'? Therefore it is self-evident that the polar antithesis of 'nature' as the meaningless is not 'social life' but rather the 'meaningful.' (Weber, 1977:110-111)

The identity of historical- cultural phenomena lies exclusively in their being culturally meaningful and historically significant.

2.2.3 THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE AND CULTURE.

The dichotomy of human and non-human (or physical) phenomena is practical and traditional. For it serves well many practical purposes of everyday life; and it contains in itself a time-honored history, standing at the very base of the self-identity and self knowledge of humankind. In contrast, the distinction of nature and culture is logical and not traditional. For they, as the following pages will show, can be intelligibly delimited never in terms of what has been seen, but rather on account of how it has been seen, though practical wisdom, prone to forget logic at the very time it is employed, may suggest the otherwise. Indeed, the full context of meaning in the distinction, as much as any other important concept in the world picture of the present day, has underwent a transformation since the dawn of the modern history. More interesting, however, for the purpose of the exposition, is the inner-unified meaning of nature and culture, that stay intact throughout the history. By "nature" is meant to be the order and the constitution of the universe. It shares with the words, like "native" and "nation", a common etymological root in Latin, "*natura*", meaning birth and the laws of things in general. Nature is thus the recurrent structure of things, that is, the universe into which human beings are thrown in their birth. Over the Middle Ages, at least until the fifteenth

century, nature was conceived as essentially the divine creation, belonged to which were also the inborn or innate temperaments, characters, qualities, states, and attributes of men and women; but at the same time, it was the the ineluctable forces, which sometimes as hostile and horrible as stormy weather, every man (or woman) had to experience throughout his (or her) life since the birth. In any case, nature is governed by law; and natural law is 'the norms of human experience and the basis of probability,' (M.E.D., 1954:854) From the logical point of view, nature is the recurrent, orderly, and thus explicable structures of and in the things as constituted in experience and yet conceived as being able to stand apart from all those who experience.

That which is cultural is meaningful; for it is cultivated by humankind. This is the original meaning of the term, "culture". The idea of culture as being meaningful has its history far way back to Latin, in the metaphorical usage of the word, "*cultura*". "*Cultus*" means labour, care, and worship, and "*cultura*" is refer to those activities such as to till the soil, to bestow labour upon the land, to breed the animals, and to grow the plants. From this point of view, culture is all those goods which are put under an intensive care of human beings, in view of a possible fulfillment of their needs, interests, and purposes. This is precisely the criterion for Rickert to distinguish culture from nature:

... nature is the embodiment of whatever comes to pass of itself, of what is "born" and left to its own "growth". Culture, on the other hand, comprises whatever is either produced directly by man acting according to valued ends or if it is already in existence, whatever is at least *fostered* intentionally for the sake of the *values* attaching to it. (Rickert, 1962:18-19)

A similar view may sometimes be found in some textbooks, which define culture as the totality of artifacts, in the sense, everything made or worked on by human beings. Or as Rickert's expressly put it, culture is 'the totality of real objects to which attach generally acknowledged *values* or complexes of meaning constituted by values and which are *fostered* for these values.' (Rickert, 1962:28-29) According to this point of view, the fundamental distinction rests 'on the basis of the material difference in the nature of [the] object [of experience].' (Rickert, 1962:13) Certainly such a distinction may be

correct for many purposes of knowledge and classification, such as in the case of Rickert, who intends to draw a demarcation line in terms of some polar difference between "natural sciences" and "historical sciences".

Yet, only one moment of reflection is sufficient to see that: the distinction, when viewed from this point of view, as a material difference in the things and events, neither encompasses the full extension of the concept in its present-day sense, nor is able to bring out the inner-unified meaning of the idea, so essential to historical-cultural knowledge. For the communities sharing a common historical identity in the Judaic-Christian (and probably including Islamic) tradition, Mount of Sinai is cultural significant. But did any person build it? Or did any one foster its growth? Certainly, it would not become a meaningful object of historical-cultural experience of these communities until some one came to, or at least came to know it? Yet, over centuries, many people might have stepped on it, climbed over it, or rambled around it, nevertheless they have not enhanced or diminished the significance of Mount Sinai, as a holy place for these communities. For its significance comes from a particular historical situation, where the twelve tribes of Israelite, after they had regained the freedom from the bondage to Egyptians, entered into the first Covenant with their God, Yahweh, on Mount Sinai, through the man called Moses. Thereafter, the event subsequently became the historical and religious foundation of the self-identity of the community which see themselves as God's chosen people and of all other communities which strive for spiritual salvation through the faith in the same God. Consider another example. Water is usually not a product from the hand of humankind, however, butter is. Anybody who does not want to attain the second best for the mortals -- to die soon -- has to drink water and consume butter in order to maintain their lives. They are of human significance. Whenever someone draws water or reaches one's hand to a piece of butter, for some purpose, one has stood in a purposeful relationship with them. But, does this create a fundamental, material difference in the water drawn and in the butter fetched in

comparision to the water flowing along a no man's land, or to a piece of butter left behind by an explorer who never returned? The former may be subjectively meaningful, but they are not yet culturally meaningful, unless one is wont to define whatever come into human experience to be cultural. In this case, one does not draw a distinction of culture from nature, but absolve nature into the category of culture, with the latter being made coterminious with the "object of experience" or the "object of action". Water and butter, however essential to human life they may be, will not become an object of interest from any cultural point of view or standpoint of cultural knowledge until they are elevated historically to such a significance that they come to moor and anchor the vital relationships of being human in the world to a particular context of communally shared experience. An example will be the place of water and butter in determining the caste position in India. According to Weber, Indian history would be left in darkness if without Hinduism and without the caste system being understood. Caste system, for him, is a not quite fixed hierarchical order of social ranks with its historical root in the sib or clan charisma. Caste position can be determined only in terms of the *de facto* distance from the Brahman Caste, in accordance with some ritualistic and thus magical criteria: like, whether a Brahman can in principle and will in practice accept water or butter from the members of the caste under consideration; or whether the latter may cook their food with water or with butter. Under this context, water and butter cease to be a physical object or a barely-useful object in the context of an act, but a historical-cultural phenomon. In any way, these examples come back to the same problem: what is the inner-unified meaning of culture, in the present-day sense, yet being kept intact through many transformations in the history of the idea.

Rickert sees the distinctive character of historical- cultural knowledge in terms of two lines of demarcation: the material difference between nature and culture, and the logical distinction between nature and history. Such a two-folded difference -- and in particular the former -- in many ways creates confusions rather than solves problems.

Nevertheless, he has not gone far astray in his conception of culture in contradistinction to nature, and indeed, notwithstanding his system of terminology and elaboration, he does capture some essential differences between them. His catchword is 'for the sake of values attaching to it,' (Rickert, 1962:19) once again despite the ambiguity contained in the expression, "attaching to it." According to him, 'apart from the value attaching to

Weber's anchoring his view of history and historical-cultural sociology on the ground of transcendental interpretation knowledge is, to a very large extent, owing to the influence of Rickert. The expression, "attaching value to", attests their close relationships. And the same expression bears also the witness for the traces of empiricism in their work. For the present discussion, this is not a problem of correctness about empiricism; and indeed it raises no general criticism against empiricism. But rather, it is very much concerned with the logical consequences for the reflection upon the logic of different forms of knowledge. The image of attaching some values to some objects, indeed, implies the primacy of facts as natural objects over all other realms of experience. It has already gone, though in an implicit and probably "unintended" way, beyond a demarcation between different form of knowledge on the way to a hierarchy of different realms of experience. Different realms of reality is not seen to be standing side by side with each other by virtue of the purpose and standpoint of knowledge, but they are created on the basis of some primal reality by successively attaching some other attributes, characters or meanings to it. This idea of reality is indeed the mirror image of the world picture of logical realism, for which, one primal, deep-seated, and usually simpler realm of reality, observable or not, underlying the multitude of things. Such an image breaks down in precisely the cases, Rickert puts so much emphasis on, that is the production of a useful object, i.e., goods, 'according to value ends' in the context of "instrumental" action. Seldom is there any reasonable doubt about the fact, which Karl Marx has made very clear, that is, humankind creates an object through his labour in accordance with an image -- or to be precise, an idea about what they are going to make or to do -- in their mind. Precisely in this way are humankind able to produce 'according to their value ends.' Standing before the object being there is the object of ideas and values, at least in this case, and in terms of the logical relation. Contained in the object being there is these ideas and value ends since the time it is being brought there and until its cessation of being there. Even long after its being abandoned as trash, a cup is still a cup -- an old cup, an abandoned cup, a broken cup, or a useless cup -- in the eye of a human being, and not a lump of clay being there. There is no building, before its construction; and indeed no object is being there. For every part of the building is brought there in construction from a very different source of material. Is it not more reasonable to say, according to their logic, that the building is a natural object because someone has attached the value of natural sciences to the artifact rather than the other way round? In either way, such an image is not to be entertained in this essay. In any case, a cultural object is coterminous with the full context of its meaning in the relationships between human being and the world; and it is possible only by virtue of the standpoint of knowledge -- that belongs essentially to the way wherein human beings relate themselves to the world. The standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge, as well as the very capacity of having the historical-cultural purposes of experience and of taking the

[an object] every real cultural phenomenon must also be capable of being regarded as connected with nature and even as a part of nature.' (Rickert, 1962: 19) Obviously, attaching some values to an object will never create any material difference in it. For value is no thing; it belongs essentially to the province of reason qua judgement, arising from the vital relationships of human beings in the world. Value -- or meaning -- may be "attached" to an object in many different ways; but in any rate, "attaching" the value or meaning to an object is an act of judgement. Ultimately, it is an act of relating oneself to the world. Such an act may be understood from many different points of view. When viewed in relation to the problem, concerning the objective conditions for the possibility of culture to be the object of experience, however, acts of this kind can only be logical, in one specific sense, that is, they could never give rise any cultural object if apart from the internal logic of cultural experience, the logic which bestows them the intellectual and spiritual capacity of creating and grasping meaning and value in the world through its constitutive and unifying power. "Attaching the value" may be very pictorial, but such an ambiguous expression does not solve the problem. The problem is always there, ever haunting those who seek to grasp the distinct characters and the inner-unified meaning of culture *pre se*. Certainly, by striking the plough onto the soil and pushing the plow along the furrow, one cultivate the land. Yet, by the act itself would not turn the soil any more human --not to say historical- cultural -- or any less natural. Neither the act of labor, however meaningful and purposive an act it may be, nor that which is labored upon bears the essential distinction of culture in relation to nature. This distinction must lie upon somewhere else. According to the Medieval world picture, nature is the creation of God; and so are men and women. It is a place to which the fallen souls are thrown. Confronted by nature, men and women are stranger -- the "other". Settling on

⁹(cont'd) historical- cultural interest in and toward the world, is the first and foremost logical condition which allows human being to be a cultural being and a historical consciousness. To some extent, the idea of material distinction between nature and culture is created out of this (logical) realist image in Rickert's interpretation, though this problem does not cloud his sight into the essential character of historical- cultural knowledge.

the land, humankind till the soil. They make home in the world; they strike out their destiny; they cease to be a vagabond. Making home on the land, humankind is in no way turning God's creation less divine; for it is beyond their reach. But henceforth, the mortals is able to stand face-to-face to God on their own ground. Towering upon the essential meaning of the distinction between nature and culture is this tension: the creation of God *v/s-a-v/s* the creation of humankind. Contained in the idea of culture is its own history. Deep in this history is the ultimate ²- i.e., primordial -- meaning found in its Indo-European root, "*kwel*", meaning 'to resolve, move around, sojourn, dwell.' (Purkinton, 1982:26) "Culture" shares the base word in Latin, *colere* -- 'to dwell in a place' -- with the suffix *colous* -- habitat, that is, to dwell on or amongst -- such as maricolous, arenicolous, saxicolous, or others. (Purkerton, 1982:290) Derived from the same root, "*kwel*" is also the Greek, *telos* -- meaning 'completion of a cycle, consummation' -- and *telos* -- 'complete, finished.' (Purkinton, 1982:291) Keeping intact through history is thus this essential meaning, that is, dwelling in the world. Culture is the way wherein men and women make home in the world and dwell with each other as a community. History is the record of past; it means learning, wisdom and story. History of culture is the story of humankind, i.e., the course of being human, in and through which men and women create a context of meaningful relationships with the world in a multiplicity of now persisting and now transforming situations. Culture is distinct from nature, not on account of what stand before humankind, but to the contrary, in virtue of how humankind stands face-to-face to them. Nature is the order of things; it is the structure of the universe. Nature is everything, when viewed from the standpoint of a man or a woman as the other who are being thrown into it, who are striving to survive at the mercy of it, and who are trying to control it. Culture is the abode of humankind. It is the reason for their joy and sorrow, their repose and anguish, their hope and fear, their love and hatred, their godlikeness and devilishness and their action and otherwise. Culture is everywhere, when viewed from the standpoint of a man and woman as the

one who makes home in the world, who is striking out one's destiny on the land, and who seeks to fulfill and understand the meaning and the worth of being human. A view from a different position has a different logic. Yet, no material difference is found in its content. Everything has its law; and every event has its definite course. That which has happened would not alter itself for any one, just because they stand in a different position in relation to it. Yet, knowledge has different purpose and interest; and humankind has different reason to experience and to understand. By virtue of different standpoint, knowledge finds for itself different forms and experience for itself different realm of reality. That which has happened thereby has different inner-unified meaning for humankind. And thus there is nature, and there is culture.

Once those obscurities implicated in our practical wisdom were removed, the inner-unified meaning of the problem is then revealed. It is the logical characters of a body of knowledge is at issue, and not the otherwise. In many cases, practical purposes are served by a body of knowledge, in spite of the fact that its logic has not yet clarified, or in spite of the fact that it is even misconceived, although a price has to be paid. Consider an example. If psychoanalysis was from its very beginning understood as a hermeneutic discipline, as some analysts do, rather than a biologically and psychically grounded knowledge, then many criticism levelled against its validity would not arise in the first place. All the same, psychoanalysis is serving the community of mankind as a therapeutic device. But it is not the same for the case of Weber's writing, as well as an interpretation of his writing. They serve no practical purpose but theoretical interests. Every act of understanding and every step of interpretation contain not only a logical standpoint of knowledge but also the self-understanding of this logical standpoint behind themselves. Misconceiving the logical foundation means misunderstanding every part and the whole. Once the ground splits, nothing can stand but everything falls.

2.3 THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE OF NATURAL PHENOMENA.

A standpoint of knowledge determines what is known, as it is the way how its is known. The theoretical purpose of knowledge of natural phenomena is to explain the phenomena. It is interested in the general conditions (or sometimes may be called generalized conditions) under which some events or some facts are inevitably, necessarily or probably brought forth. Every form of knowledge -- in fact, every body of knowledge -- has its constitutive categories. The constitutive, i.e., the essential concepts in this form of knowledge are totally indifferent to any individual and particular event or object, which, if having any role in this form of knowledge at all, serves as only an example for the general rules. These concepts are thus remote from the everyday reality. They stand to each other according to the general rules, which represent the general, universal and usually timeless conditions for that which is to be explained. The unity of knowledge in this form is the primary order, the one principle, or if not possible then a few principles, from which the multiplicity of phenomena is derived. In the present state of art, in theoretical physics, the ideal example of this form of knowledge, the primary order of physical phenomena is brought out by unifying the four primary or basic cosmic forces -- the strong force, the weak force, the electromagnetic force and the gravitational force -- in the model of quantum superstring. The universe is represented as a homogeneous field of vibrating energy with the curvature of its deci-dimensional space-time. The inner-most character of this form of knowledge, when viewed in terms of the distinction in issue, lies in its special form of objectivity -- i.e., that the truth of knowledge is conceived as totally separated from any subjective elements, i.e. the conditions from which it comes into being. Posited in this way is a particular form of reality, a reality with an independent existence, a reality with autonomous status, and a reality with its own determinate principles or conditions outside human reason. By virtue of its success in unifying and in anticipating experimental results -- that means the outcomes of the experimental operations of the

43

instruments-- and by virtue of the applicability of this form of knowledge to the control of the external processes in the technological-industrial or managerial environment, the reality is grasped in a material, or at least substantial form. From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, it is the condition for the objective possibility for one form of truth, the form of truth that serves some of our theoretical and practical interests which cannot be fulfilled in other way. This way of grasping the reality is called the naturalistic standpoint, in contrast to the historical-cultural standpoint. The latter is the logical foundation of historical- cultural knowledge and it will be the subject matter of the discussion in the rest of the chapter. This discussion will elucidate some of the important principles of this form of knowledge; thereby it will throw a light on the understanding of Weber's historical and theoretical writing in this inquiry.

2.4 THE LOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL PHENOMENA AND KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS

Historical- cultural knowledge contains in itself a reflective standpoint. From this standpoint, a reflective account is given for human experience; thus, human being, in the full content of its personality, and in its lowest depth of its historicity, is posited as an object of knowledge. The purpose of this form of knowledge is not so much to explain as to comprehend and as to understand the fullness and the richness of human experience. Apart from those particular, theoretical and non-theoretical interests which serve as the constitutive part of an individual body of knowledge, the pure or general theoretical interest of this form of knowledge is in nothing but deepening the insight and broadening the horizon of the vision of a person in his(her) own self-understanding as a species being -- if I am allowed to borrow a term from Karl Marx. This is the logical starting point of Weber's writing. 'Nothing should be more sharply emphasized than the proposition that', as Weber states explicitly, 'the knowledge of the *cultural significance of concrete historical events and patterns* is exclusively and solely the final end which, among other means, concept-construction and the criticism of constructs

also seek to serve.' (Weber, 1949:111) It is therefore not an accident for him to bring to the forefront the problems about the interpretive adequacy at the level of meaning in his writing. His methodological claims cannot be seen as a purely personal opinion on what an ideal cultural studies should look like. They are the necessary implications of the logical foundation of the form of knowledge, the form which his work shares, on the course of his inquiry. Only from this point of view does this essay understand why Rickert insists so hard that the category of value is the essential, constitutive and demarcating principles of the conceptual representation, which he calls 'concept-formation'¹⁰, of the objects of historical- cultural knowledge. For this same reason, Weber is so much concerned with the significance of empathetic understanding to historical- cultural knowledge. The important point has to be brought home: It is the logical standpoint that gives the distinct character to this form of knowledge. The object of knowledge is no more a fact, but an unified context of meaning contained in a fact. This is in all respects true of the interpretation and the understanding of Weber's writing in this inquiry.

The knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena concerns itself with human experience; by virtue of this, it stands out on its own logical conditions as a polar opposite to knowledge of natural phenomena. However, this distinction by itself is not enough to bring the distinctness in the logical form of historical- cultural knowledge into relief. For this purpose, another distinction has to be immediately made. Historical- cultural knowledge has to be distinguished from another polar form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of ideas. Knowledge of ideas is also concerned with human experience; and the latter is methodically expressed in the form of a system of ideas or notions. For these two forms of knowledge share similar, theoretical interests in human experience, they usually come to aid each other in their methodical procedure of inquiry; and it is not isolated cases that the conclusions of knowledge in one form come to be

¹⁰For the meaning of the term, see the note at the end of this chapter.

the constitutive part of the conceptual representation in knowledge of the other form. In this sense, they are inter-related with and inter-penetrated in and out of each other. Yet, they contain within themselves a totally different standpoint, and such that, they possess their own distinct, logical conditions and characters as different forms of knowledge. Confounding these differences will nevertheless obscure the distinct, logical foundation of these forms of knowledge. Some harmful consequences to the advance of these two forms of knowledge, then, follow. Being blind of one's conditions and limits will ineluctably impair its ability to appreciate other's worth and to develop some healthy relationships with others; unnecessary and injurious tension as well as hostilities will be created between each other. It will be clear in the ensuing that the intention of Weber's methodological polemics, especially the one against Stammler, is to clarify the distinctive criteria of validity and the different roles of ideas and values in historical-cultural knowledge in contradistinction to those in knowledge of natural sciences, such as jurisprudence in the case of Stammler. This distinction also lies in the heart of Weber's painstaking effort to remind his readers the logical character of empathetic understanding in his writing as to reveal the full context of meaning in a course of historical-cultural events and not to pass a judgement on the objective validity of this meaning. The logical unity of his writing will receive a systematic discussion in the following chapter.

Such as jurisprudence in contrast to legal history, aesthetics in contrast to art history, doctrinal theology in contrast to historical theology as well as logics, mathematics, ethics, linguistics, metaphysics, epistemology, methodology and the like, they are all concerned with the objective meaning and the objective validity of a system of ideas or with the formal principles of the intellectual activities of human beings. The content of human experience is elevated to the realm of ideas and notions; knowledge in this form renders universal truth for human beings beyond time and space. As a necessary, logical condition, this form of knowledge bears an act of suspension and separation within itself; it has to suspend, although presuppose, an individual subject; it

has also to separate the whole content of experience from all of its objective, i.e., external and factual, conditions in time and space. The object of knowledge in this form, if in terms of its logical character, is disembodied spirit -- the objective mind, pure and simple. It is at this point that the direct contrast between knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena and knowledge of ideas lies:

2.5 THE CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE.

Knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena does not simply presuppose an individual subject, but put it in the center and make it a synthetic principle, the principle by which every context of experience are held together. Historical- cultural knowledge strives to understand human being in its full context. Human being is thus not understood as merely a knowing subject -- an abstract, logical form of knowledge -- which contains within itself nothing but ideas and notions. Such an abstraction is only a lifeless form; it finds no blood flowing along in its veins. From the historical- cultural standpoint, each individual is a soul in the flesh; he or she exists in a diverse relationships to the world. Human beings find themselves being there against a multiplicity of factual conditions; these are the states of reality which, although alterable, are not able to be eliminated, ignored, or changed by them at will; these states of reality -- upon which they act, of which they feel, and about which they think -- are the conditions for their own possibilities, the conditions for fulfilling their needs and interests, and the conditions for realizing their hopes and expectations; these states of reality are, however, also their limitations, the conditions which frustrate their desire and wishes, the conditions which threaten their own existence, and thus the conditions which they want to overcome. Upon all these conditions, they find themselves being there along with other human beings who shares the similar conditions of existence. Out of this identity of species being, relationships of a different character spring out. Their interests are so served as they communicate with each other, as they understand each other, as they deceive each other, as they love each other, as they are longing for each other, as they hate each

other, as they satisfy each other's needs, as they share the joy and sorrow with each other, as they work with each other, as they hurt each other, as they use each other, as they fight and kill each other, and as they treat each other in many other different ways. The multifarious relationships are weaved together in and out each other into a web with its center in the subjective conditions of the individual by the self-movement of the subject in itself and for itself. These relationships are given to the subject in the immediacy of experience. Life ¹¹ is the self-movement of the subject in the totality and the context of these relationships. Experience brings into itself this multiplicity of relationships as its content; on the other hand, the context of these vital relationships serves as the objective conditions for any possible experience. Life and experience come to each other and belongs to each other. Experience is only a moment of life. Life is the ultimate root of all historical- cultural phenomena.

Life, as a stream of experience, contains in itself the manifold relationships of the subject to its world. The subject reaches out to the conditions which are external to itself, and at the same time, it returns upon itself; it posits the 'I' to itself. Only in this primordial unity of the subject and its world does experience finds its expressions.

...experience constitutes a response of our total existence to the existence of thing -- a respond which arises from much more extensive and quite fundamental strata. Experience is our perspective of the relationship between an object and the totality or unity of our being.

Experience is the expression of our initial primary relationship to the world. (Simmel, 1980:146)

In every moment of experience, life asserts its vital -- i.e., creative and transforming -- force; in every act of experience, life posits these relationships ever anew in its own spatial and temporal dimensions -- that is, the inner, subjective space and time in experience. Each intentional -- and also teleological -- act contains in itself a judgment;

¹¹ Diltthey conceives life as the vital relationships of an individual to his or her world. What is said so far is only another way or a similar way to explicate the same conception of life. For a more detailed discussion of the subject matter in this section, readers are referred to Diltthey's essay, 'The construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies.' (Diltthey, 1976:168-245)

each of these vital relationships contains in itself an attitude of the subject to its world. From the standpoint of its self-identity, the subject posits 'distance' to its object; and it posits the 'distance' to the object ever anew in every moment of life. It colors 'the panorama of life with positive and negative attitudes -- pleasure, liking, approval or satisfaction.' (Dilthey, 1976:242) In every moment of life, light is shed from the standpoint of 'I' through the landscape of existence. The shines and shades are falling upon the landscape; and they are ever altering their positions according to the rhythm of life. The realm of personal and subjective attitudes is thereby rising above the horizon of ontic objects. 'Value is the abstract expression for the attitude described.' (Dilthey, 1976, 242) The never ceasing rhythm of life is arrested; it is objectified, externalized and projected onto the universal, objective, autonomous, and timeless realm of ideas, or what Weber calls value-ideas or value-concepts, for a community of subjects. Nevertheless, the rhythm of life is preserved and contained in the realm of values. In virtue of this, a world of significance -- that is, the context of relationships of the subject to its objects in its multiplicity of subjective distance and coloration -- is posited. Meaning is the abstract expression for this context. It is this fact to which Weber refers when he claims that all meaning implies values. Life is an ever transforming thrust. Past experience -- i.e., all the relationships of the subject to its world that a person has lived out -- may be brought back and held together in recollections, memories or the like as the present experience. Similarly, experience may reach out to the reality which is not yet as in imagination, expectations, hopes, will or the like. In the present moment of life -- i.e., the existing -- the subject prescribes significance to every moment of experience anew. All relationships of the subject to its world in the past is vitalized and revived in the inner, subjective temporality of life. In every moment of experience, the subject, by standing to its past and future in various 'distance' and coloration, grasps its own life in the unity of meaning. In and out of this unified context of meaning in experience, the subject finds its own being and the being of the world. This unity of meaning is the

conditions for any possible experience. This context of meaning is the expression of the totality of the vital relationships of the subject to its world. This context of meaning itself is embodied in the objective, cultural form. The theoretical interest in understanding historical-cultural phenomena is to grasp the totality of the vital relationships of the subject to the world -- i.e., to grasp the human being in its full context.

Personal experience contains in itself inter-subjective, i.e., trans-personal, objective structures of meaning and significance. Individuals, thereby, find their experience secure, from the standpoints of various practical and theoretical purposes, by virtue of the reliable structures of experience. These structures are shared, and its reliability is affirmed and reaffirmed by the community -- be it a tribe, a society, a nation, a culture, mankind as a whole, or any other kinds of community of human beings. This is the logical conditions for the possibility of experience. Those questions -- such as, which one, the personal or trans-personal structures of meaning comes first? how these trans-personal structures of meaning come into existence? How do they relate to each other? and many other legitimate questions concerning their ultimate roots and the relations between them -- lie beyond the scope of this inquiry. They will be relegated to studies in intellectual history and philosophical anthropology. This inquiry is concerned with only the logical significance of these structures for historical-cultural knowledge in general and for an adequate interpretation of Weber's historical and theoretical writing in particular. The latter will be brought into light in the following chapter. These inter-subjective (or trans-personal) structures of meaning and significance serve as the objective conditions for any possible experience. From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, the objectivity of experience secures itself by virtue of the homogeneity in the subjective conditions of knowledge. From the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge, however, this homogeneity and uniformity in the subjective conditions of experience rest much deeper beneath the general,

abstract form of cognitive acts upon the totality of the vital relationships of not merely an individual subject, but of a community of subjects, to its world. These vital relationships are shared by the community; and at the same time, they are the forces which constitute the community itself. Outside this totality, no human being is possible; and outside this totality, no human essence, i.e., the truth of human being, can be possibly conceived. Each individual receives his or her destiny from this communal reality, i.e., a communally constituted reality, as man is condemned to be a communal being.

These inter-subjective structures of meaning and significance never confine themselves in the realm of abstract ideas and values, but with the mediation of symbols and ideas, they find their expression in all forms of signs and signifiers, from a gesture to a system of language, a work of art or a piece of music. It is also objectified and embodied in the discursive structures of conduct -- in the form of economic structures, religious ethos, classes and status groups, legal institutions, political processes, power relationships, and many others; and most important, in the course of its realization or actualization, all kinds of forces come into play, and they create a multiplicity of factual conditions for life -- i.e., the *de facto* conditions for the continuation and for the transformation of a community. Upon these conditions do all cultural phenomena rest. For this reason,

the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value concept. Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and in so far as we relate it to value-idea. (Weber, 1949:76)

All the same, a cultural phenomenon acquires its own form, and it attains its own complexity. Subject is turned into object; life takes a form as a fact. The communal context of life possesses its own facticity. Reigning through the landscape of communal existence upon the individual subject, this context constitutes itself as a realm of objective, independent, autonomous reality, as a cultural reality. In this totality of cultural

relationships, inexhaustible potentiality of becoming is contained; it is plastic, to various degree, that it is susceptible to a wide range of possibilities of transformation, although how much and in what direction will a cultural alter itself in a particular time cannot be put in a general statement; they are always interesting problems for cultural inquiry. However, cultural reality rests on its own conditions, and it is not alterable for and by any single individual at will. In and out of this totality, the transforming thrust of life, and the arresting and inertial power of the fact set up the arena for human drama. This conception of cultural reality has an important bearing on the interpretation of Weber's writing. It informs the way how his idea of cultural transformation is understood in the essay. This problem will receive a systematic discussion in the following chapter, and the implications of this conception will be found everywhere, but especially in the interpretive category of rationalization, in his historical account for modern (rational) capitalism and occidental culture.

2.5.1 The Logical Category of Empathetic Understanding: Personality

Historical- cultural phenomena takes as its subject matter -- i.e., the object of knowledge -- the actuality of cultural reality. This standpoint offers the form of knowledge its self-identity, an identity which marks itself off from both knowledge of ideas and knowledge of natural phenomena. Every standpoint of knowledge renders its own categories, the constitutive principles of the form of knowledge. The object of historical- cultural knowledge is constituted in the empathetic understanding according to the category of personality. In the hermeneutic acts -- i.e., the acts of methodical interpretation -- a context of meaning is grasped in terms of ideas, values, and significance. This context of meaning, along with our understanding of the factual conditions, are brought together in the synthetic acts to render an integral totality of the vital experience of an individual subject, under its own subjective and objective conditions. Contrary to the expectations of epistemological and historical realism, this

unity of hermeneutic acts and synthetic acts contains no intention to duplicate the original experience of the individual, but rather the intention to bring light upon the significance of this experience in the full context of an individual subject, according to the particular interest of a body of knowledge. It is the fundamental principles for historical-cultural knowledge that cultural values and ideas can actualize itself in nowhere but in the vital context of human life, as an individual in a community. 'Culture phenomena,' as Rickert wrote, 'really have to be considered not only with respect to a value, but at the same time also with respect to a psychic being who value them, because it is only psychical being who have regard for value.' (Rickert, 1962:26) And thus, human being qua psychical being is no longer a physical being for the historical-cultural standpoint, but rather the spiritual unity of a cultural conscious being as a person. Personality is the category for understanding human beings, that 'the peculiar fashion in which ideas -- the content of which is given -- are united in one consciousness.' (Simmel, 1977:89) Objective mind -- in the sense of the objectified and abstract realm of ideas and cultural norms -- never exists in itself; personality must be present as its logical and necessary condition. Apart from a lively soul in a living body, objective mind, as a realm of ideas, ideals, values and norms, by itself constitutes no, absolutely no reality, and stamps no impacts whatsoever on the destiny of human beings. It is revitalized and revived in the living experience of human being, the experience which contains in itself the totality of the vital relationships of the subject -- in its multiplicity of personal distance and with its own coloration -- to its world, in spite of how deep the communal, i.e. cultural, characters are stamped on them. It is from this definite standpoint that the following claim is understood in this essay:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. (Weber, 1946:280)

This statement, as understood in this essay, refers not so much to the tension between

material interests and ideals as to the general conditions for mankind as cultural being in history. Material interests and ideal interests, in the concrete situation of human beings in history, is necessarily inter-penetrating each other, and interweaving in and out each other to render a fiber of human life. No material interest contains in itself no ideas, ideals, values and norms, and is therefore not colored by them. On the other hand, no ideal interests can purify itself from, and therefore stand upon a void of material conditions. Such a dichotomy, with its origin in formal, abstract thinking, may serve research as a device for collecting data or for defining its focal point of interest. However, apart from a well-defined theoretical context, it loses all precision in its connotation. In spite of this problem, Weber's standpoint may be clarified when the following is read:

It is of course easily overlooked that however important the significance ever of the purely logically persuasive force of ideas nevertheless empirical-historical events occurring in men's mind must be understood as primarily psychological and not logical conditioned. (Weber, 1949:96)

Only under this interpretive context is the logical character and significance of social action in Weber's historical and theoretical writing fully disclosed. This will be brought under light in the following chapter. At this point, the last task has to be accomplished before a light can be brought upon the employment of the interpretive principles in Weber's historical and theoretical writing. In the rest of this chapter, a definite meaning of historicity is to be clarified from the standpoint of historical- cultural knowledge; for the logical form of Weber's historical- cultural sociology rests precisely on this conception of history.

2.5.2 The Formal Categories of Historical- Cultural Consciousness: Historical Temporality, Historical Significance and Historicity.

Historicity contains as its own condition temporality. Time, as Kant shows, is no thing but the *a priori* form of inner intuition. That which is given in our external sense is only the determination of time in our internal sense. According to the synthetic

categories, events are constituted in a time sequence. The highest unity in the order of events is thus allowed to be expressed in the general, i.e. universal, law of natural cosmos. In this sense, all general (or generalized) conditions for a natural event must contain in itself a category of time, one of which is causality. Sun rises and sun sets. An embryo develops into an animal, and then the organism disintegrates itself in its own death. One season, with its definite period, follows the other. However, this uniformity in the recurrence of events bears no historicity, as it is no historical- cultural temporality. For, as Rickert points out, '[h]istory is not to be understood as referring to what *recurs* any number of times, like the developement of the chicken in the egg.' (Rickert, 1962:94) Neither is it 'to be conceived [as simply] a series of successively changing stages completely indifferent to values.' (Rickert, 1962:94) But rather, it is essentially the 'unceasingly restless *becoming* of reality.' (Rickert, 1962:95) Cultural reality, on the other hand, in virtue of being the totality of the vital relationships of the subject to its world, contains in itself every moment from which it comes into being and also every moment to which it reaches out in its imagination, will or hope. In every moment, the past and the future is contained as the conditions of the reality in the unity of meaning and values of the experience in the present. Each moment of cultural reality thus finds the integrity in its becoming; and every moment acquires its significance from this unity. Some moments are rising to the crest of historical significance, and the other is receding into oblivion. Historical temporality, from the historical- cultural standpoint, does not reside in the abstract realm of ideas or norms; nor is it contained in the self-movement of the abstraction -- some disembodied spirit. Rather, from the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, historical temporality serves as the category -- the inner-unified conception -- for the historical mind in its self-understanding. Out of the tension between the subjective and the objective conditions of life, the subject transforms itself in the historical consciousness -- as well as by virtue of the historical consciousness -- as the self- consciousness of the

communal being. In this self-consciousness, the subject returns upon itself which is no longer an abstract, isolated, fixed, and formal object of knowledge; but rather, in spite of all kinds of tension it bears in its life and in virtue of this tension, it is vitalized; it attains in its life the unity of individual and community in the totality of subjective and objective conditions; and at the same time, it attains in its experience the unity of the past and the future in the present, the swift moment of existence. Facticity of the cultural reality in its own way enters into human destiny; and the factual conditions of life -- i.e. the unalterable reality of our body and our environment -- in its own way define the outer bound of human possibility. Nevertheless, experience transforms itself; it enriches itself, and it extends itself. From this point of view, this inquiry understands why Weber keeps on telling his readers that history, especially an understanding of the experience of the great historical personalities, serves to extend our intellectual horizon and to widen our vision of human potentialities in our self-understanding. In short, neither the logical development of ideas or norms, nor the lawful behaviors of natural phenomena possess this character of existence. The ultimate root of historical temporality finds itself in the vital -- i.e. creative and transforming -- characters of life. Human beings seek their self-understanding in the total context of their being; and they strive to overcome every obstacle to realize their own being. A cultural reality is both the conditions for and the consequences of the transformation of the community of subjects. The self-understanding of the destiny of a community -- in spite of and by virtue of all kinds of difference, inconsistency, conflicts and antagonism among its members -- will find its expression in the historical consciousness. Historicity is 'the properties of the event which can only be explained historically.' (Weber, 1975: 244, fn.30) In the historical consciousness, historicity of human beings is first found.

The historicity of the cultural reality arises out of a standpoint. Every trace of mankind -- in its various forms, such as documents, art forms, artifacts, relics or others -- is conceived as being embodied with historical meaning. Events are thereby

constituted in the acts of interpreting these traces as 'the vehicle for the realization of historical content.' (Simmel, 1977:202, fn.1) The trails are reconstructed in reference to the milestones and especially the monuments that have left behind. From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, the past -- as that which actualized itself, as that which evanesced, and as which vanished -- in itself possesses no constitutive power so as to become history. Rather, 'every history is written from the standpoint of the value-interests of the present'(Weber, 1949:157). The past is prescribed different historical meaning and colored by different historical significance ever anew, as 'every present situation poses or can pose new questions to the data of history because its interests, guided by value-ideas, changes'(Weber, 1949:157). Under the light of the present experience --with the totality of its meaning and values, the meaning and values which are precipitated into the particular, theoretical and extra-theoretical interests in the historical understanding -- significance is revealed in the historical temporality of the events. Relations and connections are interpolated among each other according to the causal, teleological and axiological categories of historical-cultural knowledge. The external, factual conditions of historical personalities are conceived 'both as a motive and as a product of the "mental life" of the bearers of historical action.' (Weber, 1975:136) The historical significance of an event is revealed in all its ramifications through time up to the present. The historical meaning of the event lies in its impacts on the later generations as both the potentialities and limitations --that is, the condition for experience -- of the present. A reality, in its full depth of historical temporality, is thus posited, and absolutely not re-enacted, in the historical mind -- be it a historian or the reader and audience of a historian. History offers no representation of the past moment of the reality; it "produces something new out of its raw material, data that are accessible to intuitive recreation, something that the material itself, does not yet constituted.' (Simmel, 1971:78) In the hermeneutic and synthetic acts, according to the categories of historical-cultural knowledge, the historicity -- i.e., the

understanding in a different way and therefore the meaning of the different order -- of our experience arises out of the content of the experience of human beings in the past. A reality is so posited that it 'is often not what the "heros" of history meant or intended at all.' (Simmel, 1977:78) It is this theoretical interest in historical- cultural knowledge that works out itself in the threefold method in Weber's historical and theoretical writing -- namely, the historical interpretation of his object of inquiry on the basis of the empathetic understanding of the content of the historical material and the causal explanation of the events with the aid of heuristic devices. These interpretive principles of his inquiry will be under a more systematic discussion in the following chapter.

2.5.3 The Object of Historical- Cultural Knowledge: Historical Individuality.

The peculiar, logical characters of historical- cultural knowledge lies in its historical standpoint. Logically speaking, this form of knowledge is essentially particular in character. First of all, a historical-cultural phenomenon 'always means the non-repeatable, individual course of an event.' (Rickert, 1962:60) It is constituted as the historical meaning unfolding itself in the living experience of a community of historical personalities under their particular conditions, both subjective and objective. In its historical temporality,

[m]eaningfulness naturally does not coincide with laws as such, and more general the law less the coincidence. For the specific meaning which a phenomenon has for us is naturally *not to* be found in those relationships which it shares with many other phenomena. (Weber, 1949:76-77)

From this standpoint, no logical status other than the one as heuristic device is recognized of the general (or generalized) laws of historical transformation, and of the general (or generalized) theories of a class of historical action. The intimate relationships between the personality and its world, with the mediation of the cultural meaning and values, is the nexuses through which the forces of human destiny weave in and out each other in different directions with different potency into the web of reality. The reality,

viewed from the standpoint of historical- cultural knowledge, is constituted by the unique, particular, and actual(or actualized) contexts of historical-cultural relationships. The only criterion of truth in historical- cultural knowledge is therefore its 'success in revealing concrete cultural phenomena in their interdependence, their causal conditions and their significance.' (Weber, 1949:92) For this reason, it is the task for the transcendental interpretation of knowledge to resist the obstinate advance into historical- cultural knowledge of psychologism -- which, in this case, misconceives psychology as the foundation of historical- cultural knowledge in the same way as mathematics is for theoretical physics, and therefore confounds the logical distinction between two forms of knowledge, namely knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena.

On the other hand, historical- cultural knowledge is also particular in the second sense. It presents the reality from a particular point of view. From the standpoint of the transcendental interpretation of knowledge, the subject returns upon itself in the historical consciousness; in this very moment of reflection, the flow of life is arrested. Out of the web of experience, a fiber is brought into relief and presented as a course of events wherein history unfolds. In the immediacy of experience, i.e. the vital relationships of the subject with its world, all aspects of life are necessarily interpenetrating each other in different directions and into different depth; any subsequent stage can only be a result of all the simultaneous consequences of all other sequences. (Simmel, 1977:19) However, historical- cultural standpoint necessarily goes beyond the immediacy of experience; the mediation of the interpretive concepts and ideas of a historical- cultural inquiry renders its own form; each historical sequence, so constituted, is represented as an independent and autonomous course of cultural transformation. Only in a few points along the historical frame of time, a seemingly converging direction of transformation among some of these fibers can be conceived in a cross-section. For this reason, Simmel points out that there are different histories of

cultural reality and no total history of mankind.

Although there are only partial and specialized histories, but no history as such, there is, nevertheless, an "idea" of "history in general" that transcends all these fragmentary histories. The idea provides a synthesis of the spatio-temporal interrelations of all these sequences. "History as such" is a unified entity that we cannot grasp directly; however, the idea of this entity prevents our construct of history from collapsing into incoherent splinters and fragments. (Simmel, 1977:187)

Thus the exclusive object of historical- cultural knowledge is 'only certain general ... aspects ... and not the totality.' (Weber, 1975:243-4,fn.30) All the same, the objects of historical- cultural knowledge is one particular context of human experience that 'are "valued", it might be said "for their own sake" in their concrete uniqueness' (Weber, 1949:155); for its impacts and ramifications can be felt in many aspects of our cultural life. It is posited in the historical mind by a conceptual representation¹², which is called 'historical individuality'. 'Historical individuality', in its methodological sense, is 'not restricted to individual person', but 'it refers to all unique and qualitatively determined singular constructs.' (Simmel, 1977:214,fn.17) Its distinct, logical character is determined essentially by the purpose of historical- cultural knowledge, a 'that of representing precisely what is non-repeatable, particular, and individual.' (Rickert, 1962:56) Yet, one should not fall victim to the 'erroneous view that the particular as such, is the subject matter of history.' (Weber, 1949:130) Historical individuality is never 'identical with the concrete singularity of everything real,' but rather 'constituted as a real expression of complexes of meaning.' (Rickert, 1962:83-4) Shinning through a historical individual, such as the *Geist* of capitalism in Weber's writing, is the historical meaning and significance revealed in a multiplicity of the now persisting and now transforming situations of the historical personality from a particular interpretive point of view in an inquiry. Under the light of the interpretive ideas, a track of historical past is raised out of the flow of time. The historical- cultural phenomena finds its individuality in the web of historical meaning and significance, and the

¹²See the note at the end of this chapter.

historical-cultural consciousness finds its vehicle for human being as a communal-historical being.

2.6 CONCLUSION

The discussion leads its way along a long and winding route, a long and winding path traverses the inner universe of knowledge. This chapter is coming to its close as it is pressing near to its destination. The brief outline of the distinctive, formal principles of historical-cultural knowledge contains in itself the light, the light is to be casted on the logical and conceptual unity of Weber's historical and theoretical writing. The task of illuminating the inner-core of his writing is to be accomplished in the following chapters. The first principle of this inquiry has been systematically elucidated in the foregoing discussion. It will recur behind every step in this inquiry. That which is known and understood is absolutely determined by the way how it is known and understood. The object of knowledge and knowledge is one; they are two moments of consciousness, and they are contained in consciousness itself. The world is that in which we are able to know, to think, and to understand; and at the same time, it is that which for us to know, to think and to understand. Knowledge is that which we know by the way herewith it comes to be known. To understand a text is therefore to grasp the unity of the method -- the way to know -- and the content -- what is thereby to be known. The definite character of the content -- i.e. the innermost meaning of the knowledge of its object -- absolutely rests on the standpoint from which the content is constituted. The concept of a 'human phenomenon' or a 'social phenomenon' refers to any course of events that, from a certain altitude of preception, is with some relations with human beings; however, an event which involves human beings or their social interactions may belong to a totally different realm of reality. It depends on the formal principles and the interests of knowledge. In spite of the similar content implicated in its conceptual representation, the phenomenon, i.e. the object of knowledge may be a totally different

reality. Such an event may be a natural phenomenon, if it is conceived as a case, or even an exceptional case for a general (or generalized) condition for the constant recurrence of its similar kind according to the criteria of knowledge. Such an event may be a historical-cultural phenomenon, if it is conceived as a course of human experience under some unique, non-repeatable, and particular context of cultural experience in its historical temporality with its historical meaning and significance. Such an event may be also a phenomenon of other kinds. With no standpoint, no knowledge is possible. With different standpoint, different truth will be revealed in seemingly the same events or objects. Different realm of reality and different unified picture of the world are thereby posited. In this essay, Weber's historical and theoretical writing will be interpreted from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge. The logical unity of his work is therefore to be understood in terms of the distinctive characters of this form of knowledge. The inner-most meaning and significance of his writing will be revealed in the full context of its central problem from its interpretive point of view, that will be discussed in some details in the following. The minimum amount of knowledge of these principles -- that this part of the chapter intends to present -- therefore lies not in the outskirts of the domain of an interpretation of Weber's historical and theoretical writing. It is not the exclusive subject matter of the methodology for empirical research. Rather, it dwells in the inner-most core of a methodical interpretation of Weber's writing. The torch is lit; this study will proceed to cast light on the hermeneutic employment of the interpretive principles of inquiry from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge in his writing.

2.7 A NOTE ON "CONCEPT-FORMATION".

Ever and again, criticism has been raised against the idea of an individualized method of forming concepts in historical- cultural knowledge -- a concept which is usually misleadingly abbreviated as individualized concept-formation. The idea is furnished by Heinrich Rickert and shared by Max Weber. Like Weber, Rickert is interested in the logical distinction between different forms of knowledge, and for him, in particular, the one between knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena. Despite many profound insight into the problem, Rickert's account is never free from confusion and far from being precise. For one reason, he simply "condenses", if not abridges, the whole logic of knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena into one catchword, "the individualized method", and the logic of knowledge of natural phenomena into another, "the generalized method", in concept-formation. Such a economy of language too often brings blame rather than praise to the author, being criticized for an atomic conception of theoretical language in historical- cultural knowledge. The confusion about this contentious dichotomy arises from the inner-unified meaning of his interpretive idea, concept-formation, on which the following few pages is going to comment.

The logical distinction between knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena, according to Rickert, is found in their distinct concept-formation, or "*Begriffsbildung*." "*Begriff*" means idea, notion, or concept; and "*Bildung*" is usually taken to be formation, shape, structure, or organization. Accordingly, "*Begriffsbildung*" is the formation of concept; but it has another meaning, abstraction or simply concept. In any case, at stake is the logical character of concept *per se*. Concept is that which is conceived in the mind. It may be 'a general mental image abstracted from percept', 'a theoretical construct', or 'an idea comprehending the essential attributes of a class or logical species.' (N.I.D., 1982, 469) Despite the controversies in the history of the idea, its essential attribute is clear and beyond doubt.

In contradistinction to percept, concept is universal. All concepts are general and generic. It is impossible for any one to transform a general and generic form of thought into an "individual" one -- in the sense, as belonging and peculiar to only an individual entity in observation -- without violating the fundamental logic of reasoning.

Concerning the problem of concept, peculiar statements are never absent in the passing throughout his *History and Science*. 'According to the traditional view,' Rickert wrote, 'the primary aim of all the theoretical constructions of science is in the formation of general concepts, under which various particular phenomena can be subsumed as typical "specimen".' (Rickert, 1962:40) Bewildering is not his reference to "general concepts" or its definition, but the meaning of the statement, as a whole. Certainly, knowledge is dedicated to understanding the world. Understanding would be impossible if without the employment of some concepts. Yet, it would be very baffling for any one, when informed about the purpose of all theoretical construction being the formation of some concepts, if in the sense mentioned in the foregoing. Later on, when discussing the ultimate limit of concept-formation in knowledge of natural phenomena, Rickert wrote, '[s]ometimes, ... scientific concepts have to be *formed* from but a single actual specimen, but even in such cases we should be on our guard against concluding that these concepts ... are valid exclusively for this one specimen.' (Rickert, 1962:46) In this case, even in natural sciences, a "general concept" may be "formed from one single specimen, but for the whole species. How is it possible for a generic concept to be conceived on the basis of one single specimen? Even the simplest formal concept would not be possible if without comparison and contrast. Are these statements and many others simply some rhapsody, the author improvised in a fit of excitement? Or should one allow a possibility for the author to have a different meaning for his statements than the one is assumed?

One moment of empathetical reading may be well enough to see different way of interpretation. It may be of Rickert's opinion that a phenomenon may be theoretically

described on the basis of one methodical, well controlled observation on a single specimen; nevertheless, from the standpoint of knowledge of natural phenomena, such a description should not be understood as "true" of only the observed case, but rather, it is revealing the "truth", i.e., the theoretically significant relationships of the phenomena, in and through the description or interpretation of one observation. And the truth and falsity of the description or interpretation, if it has to be of any value to the purpose of knowledge of natural phenomena, in theory can be and in practice is to be determined by the equally methodical and much better controlled observation on other members of the same species. Thus by concept may be meant for him a theoretical description, that is, a conceptual picture of the object of knowledge. It is, as a matter of fact, quite reasonable to say that the aim of the theoretical constructions of natural sciences is to furnish one or more adequate conceptual pictures of the reality, as to the purposes, the points of view, and the central problem of the inquiry.

Indeed, the essential meaning of the concept, "concept", for Rickert, has to be understood in terms of his distinction between the ultimate element of concept and the ultimate concept of knowledge. While the concept of knowledge may be generalised or individualized, the ultimate element of concept is not.

The *ultimate* elements of scientific concept-formation are general under all circumstances. A concept can be formed out of general elements only because the words science uses must have general meanings in order to be intelligible to all. Consequently, no formal differences in the methods of the science can exist with regard to their ultimate *conceptual elements*. (Rickert, 1962:41)

No trouble is for Rickert to see the words science uses as being general under all circumstances. A concept, in the sense of the general and generic form of thought, however for him is the conceptual elements, i.e., the ultimate elements of "concepts" in their formation. In and through a "concept"-formation, a conceptual picture of the reality is depicted from a particular standpoint of knowledge. Depending on the standpoint, the conceptual picture of the object of knowledge is rendered in a particular way. One may

take a shot through a electronic microscope of a diamond in order to show the molecular structure of the mineral; or one may shoot a picture through a wide angle lense of the Rocky Mountain in order to capture its grace and beauty. In any case, one would not be able to describe the object of experience in the picture if without the employment of some concepts, the general and generic form of thought, such as "carbon", "molecule", "atom", "mineral", "crystal structure", "isometric system", "bond", "pattern", "octahedron", "dodecahedron", and others in one case, and "range", "mountain", "impasse", "river", "lake", "peak", "valley", "cliff", and others in the other case.

Rickert indeed in one place explicitly distinguishes these two different meanings of the term. At the end of his discussion of the logical relations between concept and reality, Rickert expressly states:

we must add a few words concerning our use of the term "concept". In the context in which our problem is set there can certainly be no objection to our using this term here to refer to the cognitive products of scientific activity. At the same time, however, we also speak of the "concept" of some aspect of reality when we mean to refer to *everything* about it included in the content of science in order to grasp it conceptually. Thus we make no terminological distinction between the content of a scientific *theory* in general and the content of its constituent *concepts*...

As is well known, [a fixed tradition in terminology] is completely lacking precisely with respect to the word "concept", which is employed both for the "ultimate elements" of scientific propositions i.e. those not further reducible, and for the most complicated scientific constructs, in which many such elements are combined.

Because this distinction is important for methodology, we do want to separate here the *elementary* or "simple" concepts, which are ultimate and indefinable, from scientific concepts proper, which are *complexes* of such elements and which first come into being as a result of scientific activity. Then a boundary can obviously no longer be drawn in essential principle between "concepts" and theoretical "representation *by means* of concepts." Therefore, it is only logical, and not at all arbitrary, for us also to speak of the "concept" of some aspect of reality when we mean to refer to the *conceptual complex* included in the content of scientific knowledge about it. (Rickert, 1962:37-8)

The inner-unified meaning of the term, as employed in Rickert's logical writing, is thus kept beyond any reasonable doubt. "Concept", for Rickert, is in some sense, also an abbreviation; it stands for the idea, 'conceptual picture of the object of knowledge', or in Rickert's own terminology, 'theoretical representation by means of concepts.' Only

upon the logical form of the "theoretical representation by means of concepts", and not the general form of concept, is the distinction between different forms of knowledge resting. Concerning the concept-formation, the way wherein the conceptual picture of the object of knowledge is logically constituted from a particular standpoint of knowledge, Rickert wrote:

Scientific concepts [in the sense, the theoretical representation by means of concepts] can ... be either complex of indefinable conceptual elements or complexes of defined scientific concepts which, in comparison to the complex concept they constitute, then have to be considered as their elements. The formal principle determining how the concept of an object that is to be cognized is to be formed is expressed, on this presupposition, only in the *manner* in which the conceptual elements are *assembled* into the concept of the object concerned, not in the primary conceptual elements themselves; and this principle must coincide with the scientific *representation* of the object.

By *conceptual-formation* is always to be understood the joining of elements, no matter whether these elements are or are not themselves already concepts. Our only concern is to demonstrate the principles of concept-formation understood in *this* senses. For in it alone, and not in the concepts employed as "elements" can the essential, logical differences among the empirical sciences of the real world come to light. (Rickert, 1962:39)

Thus Rickert defines the central problem for the transcendental interpretation of historical- cultural knowledge, as concerning the logical distinctive characters of the particular employment of the logical principles from the standpoint historical- cultural knowledge in comparison to that from the other standpoints of knowledge

3. THE LOGICAL AND SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLES OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL WRITING.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Historical-cultural knowledge finds its own distinct, formal characters in the interpretive standpoint. It seeks to grasp the historical meaning and significance of human experience in the full context of vital relationships of the historical personalities¹³ to their world. The meaningful content of the reality transforms itself in historical consciousness. The historicity of life is rising out of the immediate and singular contexts of everyday experience; it is constituted as the object of knowledge according to the historical-cultural categories and principles. Historical reflection thus takes an unique logical form. All these have been discussed in some details in the foregoing. In short, this standpoint and the general, logical principles, as the constitutive conditions of knowledge are contained in the form of knowledge. However, the historical-cultural reality contains in itself a multiplicity of objects and events; and each of them may be understood from many distinct, though sometime related, points of view. The masterpiece of Michelangelo is, for an art historian, undubitably an expression of a genius, yet, the work of art may become a totally different phenomenon in many ways, for instance, when a social historian has been able to reveal in it the relationships to the larger social world in the time of the artist or before him. From the focal point of historical-cultural sociological interest, Weber seeks to bring light on some of the prominent characters of the historical-cultural life that has become prevailing in many parts of Europe and North America since the last century. He devises a conceptual scheme of concepts, ideas, and types in order to furnish a more or less unambiguous expression for his historical-cultural interpretation. Throughout his works, the historical-cultural standpoint and his personal interpretive points of view intertwined with

¹³The readers are referred to the section, "The Logical Category of Empathetic Understanding: Personality," in the preceding chapter.

each other, as the general principles of historical-cultural knowledge and his theoretical-interpretive ideas, concepts and types are employed consistently in a specific way. Thus, the full meaning of his writing might elude comprehension, if it was not interpreted according to the peculiar way wherein he furnishes his interpretive ideas and types and the way how he employs the formal principles and categories in his actual practice of inquiry. In many cases, not much does his final conclusion as his theoretical-interpretive way of understanding the historical-cultural world make his work a classic contribution to historical-cultural sociology. As the general principles have been made explicit, to lay bare this particular, and not the general, way of understanding comes to be the pivotal step in the actual practice of methodical interpretation.

A methodical interpretation of a text has to meet the challenges in every step along the way with determination to resist the temptation to extract inconsistent patches of meaning out of the text in some capricious or dilettantish manner. From the logical point of view, the adequacy of interpretation relies essentially on the principles of interpretation and the interpretive idea about the text. From the point of view of hermeneutical practice, that which is meant by the text does not stem from some so called "pre-conceived" notions; but rather, it is necessarily emerging on the very way of interpretation wherein the inner-unified meaning of the text is being sought. The meaning of the text is ever transforming itself as different parts of the text are coming to be read. The different focal points of interest and points of view interplay with one another. A methodical interpretation is bound to ponder, in a constant state of reflection, upon a possible unity of interpretation, in and through which the inner-unified meaning of the text may be disclosed from one or more adequate as well as satisfactory vantage points of interpretation, as to the purpose and interest of inquiry. Interpretation is ever on its way to that which is meant by the text. Hermeneutical practice is ever seeking for the internal unity of the text in its constant contemplation of meaning through a self-reflection upon its own steps, struck out ever since. By "unity" is here

intended not to be one or more statements which are regarded as more crucial or evaluated as more significant to the interpretation, but rather to be the way of interpretation which makes the text as a whole intelligible, at least from the point of view of the purpose and interest of interpretation. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to show a way -- one of the possible ways -- how the inner-unified meaning of Weber's historical and theoretical writing may be adequately conceived, as well as how his vision of the historical-cultural world for humankind may be grasped. The following pages are to secure a ground for reading the text, a reading which is entitled to the claim of adequacy of interpretation and of freedom from any inconsistency in the interpretation without being aware. The way of reading leading to the world disclosed is interpretation. The way expresses itself first and foremost in the inner-unified idea about the object of interpretation. Contained in this idea are the formal principles which anchor each proposition and concept securely in an unified context of meaning of the text. With each step being informed by this idea, the way is followed through to that which is meant by the text.

The inner-unified idea about a text contains in itself the theoretical interest of interpretation. The meaning of a text may be construed according to some logical principles totally foreign to the author. Coherent meaning may be read into a text according to some interpretive principles, as in the case of various interpretations of the Gospel without reference to the historical Jesus or the authors of the books. A text may also be made intelligible according to some explanative principles, like the various psychoanalytic interpretations of literary works. Insofar as a text is rendered consistently according to some principles, the interpretation can be said to be methodical. Thus, a text can be interpreted in many different ways; some of these ways or all of them may be equally legitimate in view of their own distinct theoretical or extra-theoretical interests. The intention of this inquiry, however, as it has been stated in its very beginning, is to grasp in its richness the meaning expressed in the text with

reference to the author's standpoint, which is explicitly stated in his statements about the logic of inquiry and methodically read out of his historical and theoretical writing. Its inner-unified idea about the text -- that is, the way in which it will understand the text -- from which every principle of interpretation is derived, could never depart from but is keep in touch with the author's intention of inquiry, his vision of the world, and his principles of inquiry. Necessary is therefore the task to bring light upon the logical unity of the text as they are conceived and understood in this inquiry. By doing so, the way of interpretation in this inquiry may be rendered explicit. In virtue of such a reflection on the interpretive principles, the interpretation of the text from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge may be also made intelligible in the course of inquiry. The intention of this chapter is thus stated.

The focus of inquiry is now brought down from the general form of historical-cultural knowledge on to the particular principles of interpretation as employed in the text. The following sections in this chapter will consign to themselves the task as to discern the logical unity of the text in the very way wherein the conceptual generalization and the category of causation are employed in the pure-typical interpretation in accordance with the synthetic ideas about the central problem and the interpretive points of view of the inquiry. By virtue of this unity, the principles of inquiry can be conceived as being weaved in and out each other so as to constitute an unified context of meaning, with every part of the text under consideration pieced together as a whole, in their employment in Weber's writing from the historical-cultural standpoint. In particular, this unity would be beyond our grasp if apart from the theoretical-interpretive way -- the way of how he employs the formal principles, categories and concepts -- that Weber follows in his inquiry as he conceives his synthetic ideas and constructs his types. For all these belong essentially to the internal logic -- that is to say, the way of interpretation -- of the text in this inquiry. The task is so set in order to guide each step of grasping the intelligibility of the text in a

methodical way that is appropriate and compatible to the intention of the inquiry.

3.2 THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY.

For the time being, this inquiry is to direct its attention at the peculiar way wherein Weber understands historical-cultural phenomena. By such a way is he allowed to look into the historical transformations of various civilizations, occidental as well as oriental, since their formation for their different ramifications beneath various facets of social conduct under the historical-cultural conditions for modern cultures and societies in Europe, Asia, North America or even somewhere beyond. Modern (rational) capitalism, as it will be shown, are so constituted and so rendered intelligible as an important historical individuals¹⁴ in his writing. It is essentially a conceptual synthesis of a multiplicity of different contexts of historical-cultural experience, containing the intricate webs of vital relationships of various communities of historical personalities, cross national and cultural boundaries in a time span of several centuries up to the time when the first ray was glimmering upon the land of the Old World --i.e., some part of Western Europe -- at the dawn of the then new economic and social order in the nineteenth century. Out of the primal contexts of life -- the contexts shun through under the light of the value and interests of the historical personalities -- some clusters of relationships are elevated from the standpoint of historical interest; some patterns of experience are construed as historical significant or historical effective; they are transformed and posited as some interpretable, and thus understandable "contents" of the historical reality; these meaningful "contents" are captured and expressed more or less vividly and relatively unambiguous by his synthetic ideas of interpretation; these ideas also furnish the particular points of views, the focal points of interpretation which informs the construction of conceptual types according to some formal principles of conceptual synthesis. Contained in these interpretation is the logical unity of his

¹⁴The readers are referred to the section 'The Object of Historical-Cultural Knowledge: Historical Individuality' in the preceding chapter.

historical-cultural sociology.

The logical principles employed in Weber's historical and theoretical writing arise out of the tension in his historical-cultural sociology between its conceptual formation¹⁵ -- that is to say, the way of representing its object of knowledge -- and its peculiar, interpretive standpoint -- the way of understanding the reality. Historical-cultural knowledge¹⁶, as discussed in some details in the foregoing, being concerned with the full context of reality; its object of knowledge is constituted as a particular context of vital relationships of the historical personalities to their world in its individuality and historicity. Accordingly, it has to be represented in such a way that its historical-cultural meaning and significance can be grasped in its richness and uniqueness from the interpretive points of view of inquiry. In short, any course of inquiry has to represent the reality as its object of knowledge in a way compatible to its ultimate interest -- and not simply this or that immediate intention -- of the interpretation. This unity of how to understand and how to represent the reality from the historical-cultural standpoint is the constitutive condition for any historical-cultural phenomenon, if such a phenomenon is possible to be an object of knowledge at all. This tension works itself out in every act of interpretation in Weber's historical-cultural sociology in and through his devices of representation, the devices employed to communicate vividly the deep, inner-most meaning and significance of the historical individuals of his inquiry. Indeed, an historical-cultural account for a phenomenon -- or more accurately speaking, a complex of phenomena -- of such a universal significance, such as modern (rational) capitalism will inevitably meet the exceptionally bitter challenges of how to render its object intelligible, yet without its full context of individuality and historicity being unduly effaced. For the particular meaning and significance of the historical individuals are brought into light by

¹⁵For the meaning of "concept-formation", see the brief comment "A Note on 'Conceptual-Formation'" at the end of the preceding chapter.

¹⁶For the theoretical standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge, the readers are referred to the second half of the preceding chapter, 'The Constitutive Principles of Historical-Cultural Knowledge.'

comparison with other selective -- and usually polar opposite -- phenomena from his particular theoretical-interpretive point of view. In the actual practice, however, such a task can only be accomplished by constructing some general types with a view to capture the universal significance of some prominent characteristics of these phenomena. Such an effort is to furnish a conceptual unity for a multiplicity of vital relationships in the flow of historical becoming with some more or less precise and relatively unambiguous expression of thought in order to elevate understanding beyond the singularity of the isolated, immediate historical observations. Yet it has also to strive in all directions to preserve the meaningful contents of the phenomena; for its ultimate theoretical interest will be threatened in every step by the danger of dissolving the fullness and richness of an individual context of historical-cultural reality into a mere form. Only from this point of view can this inquiry understand why Weber has to employ the synthetic principles and categories of interpretation in such a complicated way, so complicated that the logical relationships of the representation to the reality is so easily obscured. An adequate interpretation has to follow closely his peculiar way of employing the synthetic principles and categories in order to render the inner-unified meaning of the text intelligible. Yet, what this meaning of the text is will be pre-dominantly determined by how this logical unity is conceived.

3.2.1 The Hermeneutic Employment of the Formal Concepts in Weber's Historical-Cultural Sociology

The following sections will be devoted to lay bare the employment of the formal principles of interpretation in Weber's historical and theoretical writing. This is an important move towards an methodical interpretation. For, recalling the first principle of interpretation in this essay, what can be understood is absolutely determined by how it is understood. This move will bring to the light the distinct, logical characters of his writing. This distinctiveness may be understood in terms of the synthetic ideas and concepts of Weber's inquiry. For contained in the synthetic ideas of interpretation is the

inner-unified vision of the reality, the points of view from which meaning and significance are furnished for what can be and in fact have been observed. Obvious is the fact that: how to conceive the reality, and accordingly how to employ concepts are ultimately determined by the theoretical standpoint. The peculiar logical characters of the employment of concepts for knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena may be brought into relief if they are put in contradistinction to the one for its polar opposite, namely, knowledge of natural phenomena. The naturalist standpoint¹⁷ is concerned with the generalized conditions for the necessary emergence of a class of objects or events. The content of a phenomenon -- that is, its significance as being a particular individual¹⁸ and the particular context of meaning belonging to a individual course of events -- is of no theoretical interest. In short, a particular event does not constitute an object of knowledge; at most, it serves itself as an instance of the general concept in the methodical procedure of the investigation. The reality so construed from such a standpoint of knowledge can be adequately represented by some formal concepts. The employment of formal concepts from the naturalistic standpoint contains in itself an act of suspension and elimination. It suspends the immediate context of reality in which a phenomenon is found and thus its meaning is informed; and it eliminates logically all the perceptible contents of a particular phenomenon. In this way, the generalized and formal relations of the cosmos, constituted from a theoretical standpoint so indifferent to the individuality and the meaningful contents of the phenomena, then find their most adequate expression in the generic concepts, employed in an absolutely formal fashion. By virtue of the generality and formality of representation, the generalized conditions for an observation, and the formal relations conceived from it, may be posited as the ultimate reality, the object of knowledge. This is an objective condition for the

¹⁷For knowledge of natural phenomena, the readers are referred to the section 'The Logical Principle of Knowledge of Natural Phenomena' in the preceding chapter.

¹⁸'Individual' is used in its logical sense without being restricted to a person. The readers are referred to the section 'The Object of Historical-Cultural Knowledge: Historical Individuality' in the preceding chapter.

possible knowledge of natural phenomena.

Historical-cultural knowledge concerns itself with the historical-cultural meaning and significance of a non-repeatable course of events, instead of the generic properties of a class of objects or the generalized conditions for a class of events. Although knowledge of the latter -- and in fact, knowledge of any kind -- may be employed to enhance our understanding, the historical individuality is an inner-unified image of a phenomena -- a particular context of historical-cultural relationships in a unique course of events -- constituted in reference to one or more historical-cultural problems, raised from a particular point of view. Its individuality and historicity defy all forms of methodical generalization; the richness in meaning and the uniqueness in significance of historical-cultural experience is beyond the expression of methodical formalization. Of course, the historical-cultural standpoint can never alter the logical character of concepts, as the general and formal vehicle of expression of thought, in any significant way. For, this logical character is the objective condition for the possibility of any shared experience. Yet, the ultimate interest of historical-cultural knowledge demands the concepts to be employed in its own way; thus, it is able to prescribe to the form its meaningful contents, synthesized by the historical-cultural imagination yet in a methodical manner. Such an employment of concepts in constituting the objects of knowledge contains in itself an act of interpretation. In each act of understanding, the hermeneutic sight pierces through the configuration of concepts into the interpretable, and thus understandably, meaningful context of experience of the historical personalities in a multiplicity of vital relationships to their world; in and out of this particular context, the storming sea of meaning and values of life is roaring along. A concept, so employed, is no longer self-identical in different contexts of reality. Meaning transforms itself in and out a particular context of reality in its ever renewing and becoming. The hermeneutic employment of concepts allows the fullness of individuality of a historical phenomenon coming out into light. This constitutive principle of knowledge is pivotal in the

interpretation of Weber's historical-cultural sociology.

3.2.2 The Hermeneutic Employment of the Category of Causation from the Historical-Cultural Standpoint in Weber's Writing.

So pivotal is the employment of the category of causation in Weber's historical-cultural inquiry -- and it is true of historical-cultural knowledge in general -- that any methodical interpretation of his writing has to take it into account. Indeed, the synthetic category of causation is indispensable to all forms of observation. Yet, an unique, inner-unified meaning is imparted to the category from a particular standpoint of knowledge in its very employment in an inquiry. Thus, any assumption of how Weber employs the category will inevitably suggest a particular way of interpreting his work as a whole. The employment of the category in the text, as it is conceived in this inquiry, is to be rendered explicit in the following section.

The conception of causation is usually equivocal, in spite of but also by virtue of the universal value of this category for knowledge; for it is employed in so many different contexts of knowledge from so many different, theoretical and practical standpoints. "Cause," in its primeval meaning according to the Aristotelian tradition, is fourfold, namely, formal cause, material cause, effective cause, and final cause. The multiplicity of the causal terms¹⁹ -- such as "cause and effect", "cause and consequence", "condition", "lead to", "the result of", "because of", "create", "generate", and the like -- serve no logical equivalence, even in the everyday conversation, without saying the methodical discourse, such as historical-cultural interpretations or legal arguments in the court. The linguistic substitution of one for the other will necessarily create incongruity in expression. Nevertheless, a widely-adopted interpretation of the category in theoretical inquiry and modern philosophy has been instituted since the time of David Hume and John Stuart Mill. Invariant succession of events is conceived as the fundamental, logical content of the category. Such a conception of causation plays an

¹⁹ Cf. Hart, N.L.A. & Honore, A.M. (1959) *Causation in Law*. London: Oxford University Press.

important part in the advance of knowledge from the naturalistic standpoint; for the generalized conditions for the natural events can be thus posited in the causal terms as the law of nature. Kant also sees, from the standpoint of transcendental interpretation of knowledge²⁰, the identity of an object of knowledge in its invariant relations with other events in the temporal direction according to the category of causation. Thus causal relations cannot be spoken of intelligibly, according to this tradition, apart from the concept of causal generalization.

In no significant way is this conception altered in Weber's writing. Causation²¹, as Weber conceived, contains in itself essentially the idea of generalization; a temporal relations between events, which can be spelled out in the form of a rule, is indispensable to any causal interpretation for historical- cultural knowledge. Yet, he imparts a particular, theoretical content to the idea of effect. An effect to a cause, for him, is 'the dynamic bond between phenomena qualitatively different from one another.' (Weber, 1975:195) Not simply a difference, but a transformation in the context of meaning constitutes the inner-most significance of the category. This is what is meant, for Weber, as it is conceived in this inquiry, by "qualitative difference" and "dynamic bond" between phenomena. Immediately following his account for this conception of causation, Weber makes his standpoint explicit that 'quantified abstraction' of knowledge from the naturalistic standpoint is interested in the 'purely spatial causal relations'; such an interest evacuates 'all meaning' from the category of causation. (Weber, 1975:195) Causal generalization, thus, has to serve historical- cultural inquiry in a totally different way.

Notwithstanding this conception of effect, misgivings would ceaselessly arise in the interpretation of Weber's work if his causal language was understood with no

²⁰The readers are referred to the section "The Logical Condition for the Objective Possibility of Knowledge in General: the Standpoint of Transcendental Interpretation" in the preceding chapter.

²¹Weber used the term "cause" instead of "causation". For the consistency in expression, this essay will use the latter term throughout.

reference to its employment. For Weber turns away decisively from the naturalistic standpoint not in his conception but in his employment of the category of causation. In his work, causal generalization is neither the ultimate goal of inquiry nor the ideal form of expression. He is not satisfied by mere establishing a relation between the action and a purely empirical generalization. (Weber, 1949: 128) A causal generalization, with the character of nomological regularities by reference to some laws, is 'intrinsically of absolutely no "significance" for the interpretation of "action".' (Weber, 1949: 128) Rather, the category of causation is so employed in his writings as to understand the adequate ground for a particular course of cultural events to be historically effective. Such an adequate ground contains in itself (1) the purpose or interest of the action -- i.e., 'what was really sought' by the historical personalities -- (2) the reason for such an action -- i.e., why it was sought -- and finally (3) the conditions for such an action to be historically effective -- i.e., how it is transformed in their significance by the concatenation of historical destinies. (Weber, 1949: 123) From a specific, theoretical point of view, they are conceived as the conditions for a particular course of events, that had come to play their part in the destiny over a community of historical personalities; an intricate concatenation of events is thus posited as being adequate -- rather than necessary -- for what had happened. By virtue of the category of adequate causation, the relationship of certain complexes of "conditions" may be isolated and 'synthesized into a unity of historical reflection.' (Weber, 1949: 184) These conditions are looked upon as adequate for an effect -- or rather a complex of effects -- insofar as it would lead to the historical consequence in a 'preponderantly great majority of instance given even the co-presence in that constellation of other possible condition,' while other outcome, in respect to the question in issue, may seem 'to be probable' yet appear 'as relatively very limited' (Weber, 1949: 184) case. The subjective conditions of the historical personalities -- their feeling, their thought, their attitude, their interest, their aspiration, and the like -- are thus being captured in a methodical way from the focal

point of interest of inquiry and made them shining through the full context of their action under the light of the historical meaning and significance of the situation. Nomological generalization (or regularities), in such a case, is of so limited value in itself as it represents only an island within the sea of "vulgar psychological" everyday experience employed in historical explanation²²; (Weber, 1975:174) for *causa aequat effectum* has no bearing upon human action; instead, axiological relationships are conceived as the essential causal efficacy of historical action. Only from such a point of view can this inquiry understand why Weber insistently equates causal relations with axiological relationships. His intention, as conceived in this inquiry, can not be interpreted as to deflate the axiological and teleological characters of the historical-cultural reality into some nomological regularities; on the contrary, he has to elevate causal relationships to an axiological and teleological context.

Such an employment of the category of causality is essentially hermeneutical. Only in the full context of the everyday experience of historical personalities can a course of historical-cultural events be rendered intelligible. Yet, it is only a decisive move on the way to the ultimate goal of Weber's inquiry. In the end, he strives in all his might to grasp in its fullness the meaning and significance of the peculiar way that the historical personalities in a multiplicity of situations struck out the destiny for themselves and the generations was to come. The historical significance of what was happening in the past would be passing away to a vanishing horizon, was it not obstinately expressing itself time and again in many historical-cultural phenomena of modern time. Many painstaking efforts are made in Weber's inquiry to bring out into light the 'after-life' of the historical-cultural reality (or other realities) -- which is seemingly fading out and yet has come to dominate the destiny over many communities of his contemporaries. He had not accomplished his task; yet he pressed step by step close to his goal. Ultimately, this

²²Explanation, for Weber, is an understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning. (Weber, 1968:8)

theoretical interest is underlying his hermeneutic employment of the category of causation -- and in fact, the employment of every formal principle -- in his work. In this specific sense, causal interpretation, with his hermeneutic employment of the category of causation with a view to fulfill his particular, theoretical interest, stamps a general logical characters on his historical-cultural sociology.

3.2.3 The Hermeneutic Employment of Conceptual Generalization from the Historical-Cultural Standpoint in Weber's Writing.

The logical relations of conceptual generalization and the object of knowledge alter itself with the theoretical standpoint of knowledge. From the naturalistic standpoint, for instance, conceptual generalization represents the ultimate reality -- i.e., the last differentiable and reducible structure of the natural cosmos. Generalization in the form of symbolic or mathematical abstraction is conceived as the ideal form of knowledge. The multifarious phenomena within the reach of human mind finds their permanent unity in the homogeneity and the self-sameness of the content of the synthetic concepts, the expression peculiar to the form of knowledge. A particular event or a particular course of events serves itself as only a demonstrative observation for verifying or falsifying the conceptual generalization or its logical -- i.e., symbolic or mathematical -- transformation. The absolute certainty of the truth of knowledge, from this standpoint, lies in the uniformity and inevitability of the emergence of the phenomena in the methodical observation once their generalized conditions has been given. Falling upon the immediate experience with its manifoldness is the pall of generic properties and generalized relations. Undeniable is the fact: Any inquiry into a particular, non-repeatable historical individual in its full context of meaning and significance must abandon such a theoretical standpoint. Conceptual generalization ceases to be the ultimate reality -- i.e. the object of knowledge -- any more but acts as a heuristic device insofar as the meaning and significance of the historical individual can be so made comprehensible with its aid. Weber's historical and theoretical writing, as this inquiry has tried to show,

follows very close the basic logic of inquiry of the latter type form the historical-cultural standpoint according to his particular points of view. In the actual practice of interpreting his writing, understanding, and misunderstanding is hanging precariously upon one point: what are the logical relations of the conceptual generalization to the historical-cultural reality and how conceptual generalization is employed in his inquiry.

The thrust of Weber's writing is sprung out from its inner-unified vision of historical-cultural reality. Arising from this vision is a logical distinction, a distinction weaving throughout his account for various historical-cultural situation. The account has its focus shifting in and out of two logically distinctive categories of historical interpretation -- the category of historical effectiveness and the category of conceptual type. Precisely from one category is the other usually -- and indeed, in many pivotal points of his inquiry -- receiving for itself the unique meaning and significance under a particular context of interpretation. The logical distinction between these categories, and also the distinction in the intention of using them in different contexts of interpretation in Weber's writing are in many ways obscurely concealed in the general form of causal interpretation.

[Yet, these distinctions] are absolutely fundamental logical distinctions and they will always remain so. And however much these two absolutely distinct standpoints become intertwined in the practice of the student of culture no one will ever succeed in understanding the logical character of history if he is unable to make this distinction in a clearcut manner. (Weber, 1949: 136)

Undubitable is also the fact that the historical account, by a student of culture who bears this caution in all his seriousness on his readers of these distinctions, has to be interpreted in the like manner. For every step in the interpretation, hereafter, will be guided implicitly in reference to these distinctions, it is absolutely necessary to render the most general characters of the distinctions explicit at this point.

These logical distinctions take their root firmly in the theoretical interest of historical-cultural knowledge. For whoever lose their sight of the inner-most meaning of

the theoretical standpoint of the interpretation in his inquiry. -- the standpoint which has already been outlined briefly in the preceding chapter -- they will look down upon these distinctions as some erudite taxonomies of minor importance with no essential logical consequence for the actual practice of interpretation; they will also on this account mistake the inner-most meaning of not this or that argument but the text as a whole. The task for Weber, as it is conceived in this inquiry, is to render the historical significance of what has happened in order to disclose the historical meaning of what is happening. Both the significance of some past events and the meaning of some present situations can be revealed in nothing but a consideration of historical-cultural transformations; the individuality of the present situation can be understood in part in terms of the unique 'after-life' of the peculiar contents of those past events leading to them; and it is highlighted by comparison with some distinct, and usually polar opposite phenomena in respect to some "cross-section" of the reality according to his focal points of interest and his particular points of view. In both cases, intelligibility and objectivity are conferred to the interpretation only by way of the employment of some types of the historical situations in question. These constructs may contain in itself some nomological generalization of different forms and different branches of knowledge, some rules of 'the "vulgar psychological" everyday experience,' (Weber, 1975:174) some regularities of human response to some well-defined situations, some technical or *de facto* restrictions of human behavior in some well-defined periods of time, some general patterns of mental and spiritual attitude in a well-defined cultural milieu, some elaborated and well articulated systems of ideas or thought, or some structures of historical action in a well-defined epoch. Typical constructs of this sort is absolutely indispensable to Weber's historical inquiry, yet as a heuristic means of historical-cultural interpretation.

However illuminating is the torch of the *ratio cognoscendi* over the flow of history; it can play its part no more than throwing different light upon the waves and troughs of historical transformations. The destiny, hovering above the crew of a vessel

falling and rising in the roaring sea, will appear to be more intelligible to these people if they had ridden a little boat over a sea. Yet, neither in this experience, though still vividly living in their mind, nor in the generic properties of a boat, the general behavior of a sea or their general relationships can they find the very meaning of their destiny. Rather, effective in their destiny is the undercurrent beneath, the storm above, the waves beyond, the sails on the spars, the hull on their feet, the ropes in their hands, the strength in their bodies, the fear in their hearts, the worry in their mind and the will twinkling in their eyes. From the historical-cultural standpoint, however important or even indispensable to historical interpretation is the conceptual generalization of typical constructs being integrated into the causal complexes, reality is constituted only by the concrete and particular. (Weber, 1949:129?) A typical construct contains in itself no intrinsic relationships beyond the structure of logical transformation. Conceptual generalization with such a formal structure is instrumental to rendering the historical-cultural effectiveness of a particular course of events, which is synthesized out of the otherwise seemingly isolated observation, conceivable to a historical mind. Yet, in no circumstance can this significance of conceptual generalization alter the fact that: the object of historical-cultural knowledge -- that is to say, the real historical nexus -- is a totally different thing from a conceptual, heuristic type.

Consider the emergence of various Indian states²³. If the course of transformation had been in one way or other demonstrated to be the typical way in which a state would arise, and if these observations had been formulated into some typical constructs, these constructs, which quite apart from their value for conceptualization of the theory of the state, could at least be applied as heuristic devices in the causal interpretation of other historical development. (Weber, 1949:133) Notwithstanding of such a 'validity ... of almost universal significance,' these observations in themselves are of 'extra-ordinarily slight, significant for the causal nexus of world history.'

²³This example is taken up from Weber's article "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences." (Weber, 1949:132-133)

(Weber, 1949:132) They are as much significant and relevant to understanding of any historical-cultural events outside these Indian states as the X-rays flashing from the screen in a laboratory to the cosmic real causes²⁴. 'Only real -- that is to say, concrete -- objects, insofar as they have a concrete structure constitute *real* causes.' (Weber, 1975:239) Only in the concrete and particular course of transformation can the historical effective forces thrusting forward in their own courses with their own efficaciousness, and thus can they lay upon the scene of history a manifold and ever-altering nuance of meaning and significance.

Weber sees the peculiar way of life in modern (rational) capitalism in the methodical conduct in production and acquisition. And he spells out some of the typical conditions for this historical phenomenon in some details in his writing. In spite of the fact that his account has been drawn with great care on the basis of numerous, keen observations of what has been constantly going on within a very well-defined historical-cultural boundaries in a strictly defined period of time, such an account, in its typical character, if apart from its significance as a heuristic device, stands for very little of any concrete, particular, and thus real context of historical reality, neither for instance the transformation of English society in the 16th century nor the inner-most meaning in the suffering of the working people of the same society just one hundred years later. Those typical constructs that Weber furnishes of the phenomenon may bring a new light on the historical significance in the outcry of the anxiety and spiritual isolation for salvation from the heart of one generation; they may also cast a spotlight into the "workshop" of madness, suffering, and death in the "purgatory of labouring people on the earth" in London one century after. Undubitable is their value for bringing into relief the historical-cultural 'after-life' of these periods in some otherwise senseless phenomena of the present time; or absolutely necessary may be these ideas for those who want to compare the experience of these different generations. Yet, the full

²⁴The readers are referred to the same article. (Weber, 1949:133-134)

context of meaning of experience, as the objective and subjective conditions of the historical personalities had been altered, also underwent a fundamental transformation in and out a seemingly never altered "structure of conduct", a conceptually fixed type in representation; neither could the historical significance of these two periods essentially be the same.

All too easy are the heuristic types -- that is to say the ideational forms -- being mistaken to be the ultimate reality of history because of our forgetfulness -- for too many reasons will suggest us to forget the fundamental distinction between the two standpoints, the distinction which a student of culture, as Weber has put it, can never confuse for one moment. Only a "distance" of historical perception will allow a person to imagine "freely" and naively the same water running the same course; for his (or her) telescope of causal generalization is so indifferent to the historical undercurrent, in their variations of meaning and significance, that are pushing its way forward in all directions. Yet the whole problem has to be considered carefully with all its facets in the right proportion. However insensitive is the heuristic instrument to the nuance of meaning in the historical-cultural reality, it renders an important service for historical-cultural inquiry by bringing out some essential, although very general, aspects of the problem in hand. Such a methodical step of inquiry is usually crucial, and sometimes is irreplaceable.

On the other hand, those regularly recurring features in the chain of events which constitutes historical destiny could alter the extensional and intensional "meaning" of action beyond recognition. It is precisely these last cases of historical *variations* in meaning that arouse our historical interest to the greatest extent. It follows that the specific historical task of the [historical-cultural knowledge]²⁵ is profoundly antithetical to the aims of all disciplines which attempt to reduce phenomena to causal equivalence. (Weber, 1975: 104)

For such a sober attention to the ultimate goal -- that is to say, this "historical interest" -- of his inquiry, Weber devotes much time to sharpen his heuristic instruments. Some

²⁵Weber uses "cultural science" in this quotation. The change is made for the consistency in the terminology of this essay. As far as I understand it, there is no essential difference in the meaning of these two terms under this context of discussion.

specialized devices are so constructed as to "probe" a special "way of life" in a strictly defined historical-cultural community of humankind in a well-defined period of time for a particular purpose of historical interpretation from a specific point of view. Given its intention of inquiry, this study has to comprehend very clearly the peculiarity of Weber's interpretation. In the following section, this peculiarity is to be comprehended in terms of one fact: Weber fulfills his historical interest to the greatest extent by distancing himself from the historical reality to the same extent. This conceptual distancing comes to be the pulsating force of his interpretation, a force working itself out in the pure-typical interpretation in his inquiry.

3.2.4 Pure- Typical Interpretation: The Employment of Pure-typical Constructs in Weber's Historical- Cultural Sociology.

The employment of pure-type²⁴ contains in itself an act of grasping the reality, an act of grasping the historical-cultural reality by way of methodically distancing the conceptual representation from what is to be conceptually grasped. Such a conceptual distancing is undertaken deliberately with the precaution against any forgetfulness -- the all too powerful tendency of forgetting such a distancing that has been in fact carried out as well as all the logical consequences of such a distancing for historical- cultural interpretation -- on the part of the author and, as it is of no less and usually of more importance, on the part of the readers. Conceptual distancing is, so to speak, cresting in the halfway up to the heaven, whereupon generalization breaks itself up into numerous drops of ideational images hanging high in the air of conceptual thinking over the sea of historical observation in its richness and manifoldness. In pure-type, one or more one-sidedly emphasized points of view find their 'precisely and unambiguously definable' (Weber, 1949:92) expression. With the employment of pure-type, historical

sometimes uses "ideal-type" and "pure-type" interchangeably. However, our habit of thinking, as well as the conventional rules of language, usually attribute a moral or (subjective) evaluative sense into the terms "ideal". In order to avoid any misconception of the term, this essay will use "pure-type" instead of "idea-type" consistently in the following discussion.

understanding elevates itself 'beyond the bare establishment of the concrete relationships' (Weber, 1949:92) in isolated observations. Numerous observations of the similar phenomena are superimposed upon one another; 'a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena' (Weber, 1949:90) are thus synthesized into an unified image of a historical type from the specific points of view. In its conceptual purity, the full implications of these points of view can be consistently drawn. According to these one-sidedly emphasized points of view, the logical consequences for the typical structure of the phenomena can thus be brought into relief. Yet, the *ratio cognoscendi* in such a purity 'cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality'.²⁷ (Weber, 1949:90) It describes no reality; for it is not intended to be a conceptual equivalence to the reality in any concrete case; yet it may be so constructed as to serve a precise expression for describing the reality. It offers no hypothesis; for it does not intend any invariant relationships; yet it may be so employed as to help formulating or testing a hypothesis. It represents no average -- that is to say, statistical generalization -- of the multiplicity of observations on the phenomena in question; for it is not intended to claim general validity in the sense that a generalization will have from the naturalistic standpoint; but rather, it is constituted as to attain 'a level of explicit awareness of the viewpoint from which the events in question get their significance'.²⁸ (Weber, 1949:107) Pure-type, which bears upon itself all the logical consequences of the viewpoints in their one-sidedly emphases and conceptual purity, is towering upon the landscape of historical observation. Being projected on the landscape, the pure-typical images are rotating with the theoretical-interpretive gaze with

²⁷Pure-type, in Weber's work, is usually constructed from the norms, value-ideas and ideal-concepts of the patterns of thought and conduct in question. 'It is a *utopia*.' (Weber, 1949:90) In this case, pure-type is conceptually ideal, as evaluatively imperative in its objective and not in its subjective sense.

²⁸I am very much aware that this quotation is referred by Weber to the conceptual representation in historical-cultural knowledge, or in Weber's own terminology, cultural science, in general and not referred specifically to pure-type. However, so far as I can understand, it is the primary reason for Weber to construct pure-type in his work.

a view to search for one or more dimensions that they can measure and to check constantly how well they can accomplish the task.

The usefulness of pure-type as a heuristic device reveals itself in the very act of comparison, a methodical comparison of a pure-typical representation with the particular, concrete, and thus real course of historical events in question. For, the theoretical-interpretative interest of historical-cultural knowledge will be fulfilled to its greatest extent insofar as such a comparison can disclose some unique components of the phenomena or some peculiar fibres of historical-cultural meaning and significance in the full context of the reality that are not captured in the pure-type, or in its ideal case, that will defy any formal or even typical representation. How much is the one-sidedly emphasized points of view and the resulted pure-typical images inadequate to understanding the full context of experience in its manifoldness and richness of historical observation? How much is the historically real different from the conceptually pure? In what way are they different from each other? To what extent does the individual phenomenon observed in the history depart markedly and significantly -- of course in terms of the points of view and the problems in the actual inquiry -- from the typical constructs? What meaning and significance of the particular context of historical reality in question can be disclosed in the discrepancies between the observations and the type. In short, a pure-typical construct is posited as only a 'limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for explication of certain of its significant components.' (Weber, 1949:93) The very significance of such a limiting concept is nevertheless sprung from being a heuristic instrument, a very "specialized" heuristic instrument for a course of inquiry with its particular interest of knowledge in the light of its specific, theoretical-interpretive viewpoints.

Consider Weber's "modern bureaucracy", an important pure-typical construct in his writing. "Modern bureaucracy", for him, represents the technically, most superior principles of organization in history. According to its one-sidedly emphasized point of

view, that is the purposive rationality of vocational life under a legal-rational hierarchy of authority, these principles of administration, if operated in a conceptually pure "situation", will shape the society and all of its historical-cultural relationships in a very specific ways. This rational type of administration would possess an irresistible force over the destiny of historical personalities; the 'last man' of Nietzsche might be brought into being, a historical being. In terms of a pure-type of rational action, his account throws light onto some pre-eminent characters of the everyday life in some modern societies. Yet, the theoretical value of such an account, as it is put in foregoing, can realize itself insofar as it is employed in a legitimate way. This polar star of pure-typical image, shining from the remote heaven of conceptual purity, guides the way in the voyage over the sea of historical observation on the ever-renewing, the ever-altering and the ever-transforming reality. In many cases, only from the viewpoints of the construct can the otherwise concealed historical significance of the practical attitude of "matter-of-factness", the accountability of the administrative order, the red-tapes, the career life and many other on-going reality be brought to light, or at least to a different light. Yet, by virtue of the fact that it is not a general description of the reality, just because of its conceptual purity, this same construct is able to direct our attention to some historical currents, that cannot be rendered intelligible from the theoretical viewpoints, which have been one-sidedly emphasized in the construct, behind the scene of history. This is one of the reasons for Weber to construct pure-type in his one-sided manner. And this one-sided emphasis of one or more points of view makes pure-type a construct and not an idea. No student of culture is allowed to forget the real world and lose himself or herself in a conceptually constructed one. In this real world, there are everywhere bungling bureaucracy, underhandedness and scandals of administration, political gift and patronage as well as many other on-going reality beyond the representation of the type. Furthermore, more vividly does this construct represent the all-powerful, rational forces of this type of administration that would weight down upon

the historical personalities who lived in it or with it, better we can understand the historical meaning in the outcry for the ultimate meaning of life, the torment of a senseless world, the protest against an impersonal order, and the tragic expression of the creative beings from the deep-bottom of the sensitive hearts of our time. The pure-typical phenomena Weber so deliberately constructed can be found nowhere in the reality, since, as he makes himself very clear, in the *Economy and Society*, no historical-cultural phenomenon can be understood in terms of one single principle from one point of view -- without saying that this point of view has been one-sidedly emphasized and thus that this principle itself is pure-typical.

This exposition of Max Weber's logical vision of his own inquiry is accumulating to one of the most pivotal principles of interpretation in the essay, and the other one will be brought forward in the next section in this chapter. This pivotal principle of interpretation is to be driven home:

Nothing, however, is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself first in the belief that that "true" content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procuration bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such "ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind the passage of events and which work itself in history. (Weber, 1949:94)

Weber takes great pain to remind his readers that this 'latter danger'²⁹ is especially great since we are also, indeed primarily, accustomed to understand by the "ideas" of such an epoch thoughts and ideals which dominated the mass or at least an historically decisive number of the persons living in that epoch itself, and who were therefore significant as components of its culture.' (Weber, 1949:94-95) These dangers, indeed, can be felt whenever his account for modern (rational) capitalism is interpreted. Not only is these

²⁹The readers are referred to the section "The Logical Category of Empathetic Understanding" in the preceding chapter. For this danger would appear to be trivial, if the logical relations between ideas and historical reality could not fully grasped from the historical-cultural standpoint. The rest of this chapter will be also helpful for understanding this point.

phenomena peculiar to an epoch which is still dominating 'the mass or at least an historical decisive number of people' who are contemporaneous with Weber, those who interpret his work and their readers, but also his account for such an epoch is encompassed by the "omnipresence" of pure-typical constructs³⁰: the pure-typical phenomena, the pure-typical courses of transformation, and the pure-typical patterns of thought and ideas. Upon this formal relation of heuristic devices and the reality is the tension³¹ between the typical representation and the ultimate, theoretical interest of inquiry resting. Also upon this relation is the all-too elusive line between the legitimate employment of theory to understanding the history and the 'confusion of theory and history.' (Weber, 1949:94) hanging precariously. Imagine how dangerous it is! What kind of destiny a vessel of historical mind might have, if it mistook the polar-star of pure-type as their destination? Is any mistake more tragic than this one? Is there any?

The logical principles, as elucidated in the foregoing, are interlocked inextricably in and out the pure-typical structure in Weber's historical and theoretical writing, to render a logical form of expression, a form which is adequate to representing the reality, the historical-cultural reality so constituted with the fullness and richness of meaning in historical observation. The heuristic device can only be constructed and employed in conformity with the ultimate goal of inquiry. Pure-type in Weber's work -- as it is conceived in this essay -- contains, in the very way wherein it is constructed and how it is employed, the intention of interpreting 'historical unique configurations or their individual components by means of generic concepts.' (Weber, 1949:93) The historical-cultural meaning revealed in the configurations requires an adequate expression -- to such an extent that the inquiry can fulfill its theoretical interest -- beyond the formal homogeneity and uniformity in the connotation of the concepts. Thus, the

³⁰For a detailed discussion of these constructs, the readers are referred to Weber's "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy. (Weber, 1949:49-112), especially pp. 900-106.

³¹The readers are referred to the introduction to this section "The Logical Principles of Weber's Historical-Cultural Sociology".

inexhaustible possibilities and the multifarious variants in meaning and significance of the historical individual can be brought out from the darkness by comparison with the genetic pure-type. 'Indeed, the inexhaustibility of its "contents" as regards possible focal points for our interest is what is characteristic of the historical individual of the "highest" order.' (Weber, 1949: 151) Yet, the "contents" of the historical individuals, which are in no way being given from outside of the historical mind³², but must be in the first place brought forth in the synthetic act of historical observation, an act containing in itself an interpretation from the focal point of *possible* "evaluative" attitudes which the segment of reality in question discloses and in consequence of which it claims a more or less universal "meaning" -- which is to be sharply distinguished from causal significance.' (Weber, 1949: 150) The pure-typical structure of Weber's historical-cultural interpretation is indeed built with the attenuation of the manifoldness of the reality in the multiplicity of particular and concrete phenomena by the one-sided accentuation of his focal point of interpretation. These two synthetic acts -- that act of attenuation and the act of accentuation -- interplay with one another in this typical structure of interpretation to render the universal significance of the historical individuals in its conceptual purity. Yet, the ultimate interest constantly sets the whole inquiry to outreach beyond its pure-typical structure to drive at the inner-depth of the historicity in the "contents" of the phenomena, that is significant for its unique individuality.' (Weber, 1976: 47) The historical-cultural imagination, taking the form of pure-type, must be judged, sooner or later, from numerous observations in all their keenness on the real course of history according to the category of objective possibility.

The pure-typical structure, with its distinct, heuristic architecture, of Weber's historical-cultural sociology is built up with a sober attention to the course of events

³²The readers are referred to the sections "The Logical Conditions for the Objective Possibility of Knowledge in General: The Standpoint of Transcendental Interpretation", and "The Formal Categories of Historical-Cultural Consciousness, Historical Temporality, Historical significance and Historicity" in the preceding chapter.

which acquire meaning and significance in view of the historical individuals. Inquiry with such a structure is not interested in a general "psychological" analysis of "personality", undertaken with help of some sort of peculiar theoretical device, (Weber, 1975:188) but rather it is concerned with a historical-cultural interpretation, from one or more one-sidedly emphasized points of view, of the typical historical situations of a given complex of phenomena, employing nomological knowledge and genetic concepts. From the particular focal point of theoretical interest, which guides the historical selectivity of his inquiry, pure-type is able to spell out the structures of motivation for some courses of historical action as well as the historical-cultural limitations and restrictions forbidding the others. The conditions for the historical-cultural possibilities and those of impossibilities interplay with one another to constitute a historical situation, a plurality of probability the personalities would count on to strike out their course of destiny. Only with the mediation of the sense of reality in everyday experience with different degree of practical acumen in the light of value-ideas and ideal-concepts can the *de facto* conditions for a course of historical action -- the conditions so *de facto* for the historical personalities as they are condemned to be bound by these conditions in multifarious ways with different degree of intelligibility and these conditions of which their causal significance are so self-evident to the observers that they are the indubitable reason for the choices of the historical personalities -- take their shapes as historical forces with various degree of irresistibility in its influence on the conduct of the historical personalities. The historical events in question can be rendered intelligible only by reference to the content of the norm (Weber, 1977:121) -- that is to say, the complex of meaning that is significant for the course of action according to the category of adequate causation. The rules of practical reasoning -- such as the generalization of everyday observations for some practical purposes or the norms or maxims of the actual conduct of the historical personalities with various degree of elaboration and precision, may be employed as pure-typical construct in order to

establish causal knowledge' (Weber, 1977:123) of the events. Such a construction, distinctive in the pure-typical structure of Weber's historical-cultural sociology, is brought to bear on the observations with a view to furnish an adequate answer to the questions: 'What are the empirical causes responsible for the person's conduct, and to what extent does this conduct approximate' (Weber, 1977:121) to and how does it derivate from this typical representation. In any case, the pure-typical structures of Weber's inquiry are very carefully built from a specific focal points of interest with a view to make pragmatically clear and understandable the characteristic features of the historical situations, the situations which interlock with one another and penetrate each other to constitute the historical-cultural phenomena, the historical individuals. With such a structure of inquiry, with the pure-type and historical observations intertwined with one another, he prepares his students to look beyond the conceptual type into the reality for the "after-life" of the past in the present situations of the well-defined, historical communities with which they are all deeply concerned.

3.3 THE LOGICAL CONDITION FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONCEPTUAL UNITY IN WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY.

The methodical employment of the logical principles of inquiry is a way, a way to grasp the world as a particular form of meaning and significance. In the foregoing, this essay has shown how the conceptual representation of the historical individual is possible. Yet, these logical principles discussed thus far possess no, absolutely no power in themselves to furnish any historical meaning and significance -- and indeed, meaning and significance of any kind other than the logical one -- upon any observation. The ultimate synthetic principles -- that is the logical condition for the conceptual unity -- of Weber's historical-cultural sociology is yet to be understood. Historical observation, as much as any other kind of methodical observation, finds its point of departure and its inner-unified meaning in the interpretive-synthetic ideas of the central problem at issue. Contained in these ideas is the point of view from which the problem is raised and from

which the solution to the problem is to be sought. The synthetic ideas and the interpretive points of view guides the sight along the roaring sea of the historical transformations, as to where one should observe, what is to be sought and how it is to be interpreted. For this reason, 'knowledge of cultural reality,' as Weber states, 'is always knowledge from *particular points of view*.' (Weber, 1949:81) In historical-cultural inquiry, the possibility for the object of knowledge -- i.e., the historical individual -- to have meaning and significance 'is bound up with the remitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized nature which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas.' (Weber, 1949:81) Significant to the synthetic principle of historical-cultural inquiry, these inner-unified ideas of the historical individual and these interpretive points of view is never brought about through an empirical generalization of facts or acquired in a vain and restless pursuit of new ideas and new points of view for their own sake. But rather, they anchor themselves essentially in the full context of the vital relationships between human being and the world. The former in its capacity as historical consciousness is bound to take an interpretive attitude to its experience in the present and at the same time to stand in a particular way from a particular distance to the past. Rising from this attitude is the web of interpretive relations of the historical observation to the value ideas. Only in and through this web of value relations can the historical individual acquires for itself the full context of historical meaning and significance and a historical-cultural interpretation finds for itself conceptual unity.

The judgement from the particular points of view informs an inquiry in every steps how to attach significance to a event historically observed. From such an act of judgement, the meaningfulness of the inquiry hereafter emerges. From such a point of view, a definite context of historical-cultural meaning is imparted to each of the concept and categories employed. Apart from this point of view, even the apparently most simplest, and ephemeral events would elude any description -- not to mention the

interpretation of historical meaning and significance. For, when viewed from side of the practice of historical-cultural inquiry, 'every "comparison" in the historical sphere presupposes that a selection has already been made through reference to cultural "significance" and that this selection positively determines the goal and direction of the attribution of causal agency.' (Weber, 1949:130) For this reason, any 'systematic science of culture, even only in the sense of a definite, objectively valid, systematic fixation of the problems which it should treat' (Weber, 1949:84) would not be in itself meaningful from the historical-cultural standpoint. Any idea that conceives the goal of historical-cultural inquiry as to 'construct a closed system of concepts, in which reality is synthesized in some sort of permanently and universally valid classification and from which it can again be deduced,' (Weber, 1949:84) would be, for Weber, equally senseless. Any pretension to elaborate a systematic scheme of historical-cultural relationships from a seeming all-purpose, all-embracing and all-too general "perspective", however timelessly valid it would claim for the scheme, could only produce a hybrid representation of reality, a representation superimposed on which different images from 'numerous, specifically particularized, heterogenous and disparate viewpoints.' (Weber, 1949:84) Rather, the pure-typical structure, and each of its constitutive construct, which Weber has built for his inquiry, are 'formed by the one-sided *accentation* of one or more points of view.' (Weber, 1949:90) In the absence of these points of view, no pure-typical interpretation -- without saying the ultimate goal of the inquiry as to unfold the full context of meaning and significance of the historical individual -- is possible at all. Without reference to the decisive points of view, causal analysis would have to regress back into the history, yet so aimlessly and meaninglessly as losing the sense of direction that could tell whence it was coming and where it would move forward or return. For any historical observation can acquire definite significance as causal relevant only from its axiological or causal relationships to the "contents" of the historical individuals. Both of these relationships and the "contents" of the historical

individuals are conceived from the particular points of view. Each of these historical individuals is constituted by bringing a complex of historical-cultural relationships into a unified image, a phenomenon is of some value that it is meaningful to be understood for its own sake from the standpoint of cultural significance. Such a individual is necessarily emerging from the historical-cultural reflection on the relationships of a complex of objects, ideas and events to values. Indeed, Weber makes the point very explicitly that: 'when I pass from the stage of the actual evaluation of an object into the stage of theoretical-interpretative reflection on *possible* relevance to values, in other words, when I construct "historical individuals" from the objects, it means that I am making explicit to myself and to others in an *interpretive* way the concrete, individual, and on that account, in the last analysis, unique form in which [value-ideas]³³ are "incorporated" into or "work themselves out" (Weber, 1949:150) in the political structures, the historical personalities, the literary product or many other phenomena in question. Built from the focal point of interest, the inextricable structure of axiological relationships to these ideas, ideals, norms or maxims, whether in the form of pure-type or not, is essential to delimit the historical individuals. The theoretical-interpretative judgement³⁴, or in Weber's terminology, the historical "evaluation", as the constitutive condition for a historical individual, includes not primarily, and only, the immediate valuation of the "attitude-speaking subject" -- rather is its essential content, as we have seen, a "knowledge" of the object's *possible* relations to value.' (Weber, 1949:158) Such a judgement constitutes the starting point of any historical-cultural inquiry; and its focal points of interest and the points of view prescribe meaning and significance to every part of the interpretation. However, theoretical-interpretative judgement of this kind always presupposes a capacity for change in the 'attitude' toward the object, at least

³³The part replaced here is "ideas" -- to employ for once a metaphysical usage

³⁴For the logical, distinctive character of the employment of value judgment in historical-cultural knowledge, see the brief comment, "A Note on 'Freedom from Practical Evaluation'", at the end of this chapter.

theoretically. (Weber, 1949:158) Once a new point of view emerges, new observations will become possible, and new relationships among observations will be established and become historically important. Thus, an historical-cultural inquiry "must become objective" towards an experience before it "belongs to history as an object". (Weber, 1949:158) Nevertheless, the particular focal points of interest, and indeed, only these points of view, can furnish a unified meaning to the content of the inquiry as a whole. For historical-cultural knowledge as such is essentially conditioned by its focal points of interest, which are oriented to values in the light of which historical observations acquire for themselves meaning and significance. Arising out of the theoretical-interpretive judgement from the particular points of view is the inner-unified meaning of the historical individual -- the full "content" of the object of knowledge which is significant for its own sake. Only in terms of this "valued" individual can the historically effective forces be identified, and therefore their significance can also be evaluated according to the category of adequate causation.

The most important principle of interpretation is thus brought home. In the case of historical-cultural knowledge, of which Weber's work is one, the inner-unified meaning -- that is to say the historical-cultural content -- of the historical individual contains in itself the conceptual unity of the text. This inner-unified meaning is essentially emerging out of the unity of the goal of inquiry, the interpretive-synthetic ideas, the logical principles of knowledge in methodical observation and theoretical-interpretive judgement of a particular course of inquiry. This conceptual unity raises historical observation and interpretation out of the indeterminate abundance of "empathy", the bare empathy. In and out of such a unity, the logical principles weave through one another to render an adequate form of expression. This conceptual unity furnishes the form of representation with historical meaning and significance from the particular, focal point of theoretical interest. By virtue of such a unity, every seemingly isolated context of meaning in the inquiry belongs to each other and penetrates each other essentially. Were

not the theoretical-interpretive judgement, attending to the ultimate goal of the inquiry to disclose the historical meaning and significance of the historical individuals, being made in every step of the inquiry from the definite points of view, any attempt to render intelligible what had happened and what is happening would be totally in vain, absolutely pretentious. Were not every principle, every category, every statement, and every concept firmly rooted ultimately in the inner-unified meaning of the historical individual, none of these formal conditions of knowledge would bear any meaning, would have any value to the fulfillment of the ultimate interest of the inquiry. Indeed, this theoretical-interpretive, or in Weber's terminology, historically "evaluative", characters of Weber's historical and theoretical writing determine the hermeneutic employment of the formal principles, formal concepts, categories and types, that has been discussed so far.

3.4 THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT "RATIONAL": HOW THE INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY ARE EMPLOYED.

3.4.1 The Logical Character of "Rational": Formal Concept *par Excellence*.

From the purely logical point of view, this synthetic principle is certainly the single most pivotal condition for the possibility of the conceptual unity in historical-cultural knowledge. Despite but also by virtue of its all prevailing presence, a systematic exposition of the text from context to context is not necessary, if for the sole purpose of demonstrating the logical significance of this principle. Indeed, one revealing example will be suffice. Which example will be more revealing that the concept "rational", as employed in Weber's historical and theoretical writing? By following the way of interpretation wherein "rational" is employed in Weber's writing, the rest of this chapter³³ will show the way how the historical- cultural purpose may be made possible

³³For many different reasons, the concept "rational", as well as its linguistic derivatives, such as "rationality", "rationalism", "rationalist", and the like, has been the object of discussion. The following interpretation will be purely logical in character. Logical interpretation is, by virtue of its purpose, distinct from a

and fulfilled in the hermeneutic employment of the interpretive points of view and synthetic ideas to the historical observation.

Weber, since *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, had embarked, on a course of inquiry which seeks to grasp the historical-cultural experience of the historical personalities under the historical conditions of various civilizations, the historical conditions which, according to him, had come to amount to the historical fate over different historical-cultural communities. He looks in the course of historical transformations, some of which far back to the antiquity, down to the modern period, for the historical causes of the phenomena he is concerned with. By constructing different types of rationality, he reveals the inextricable structures of the axiological relationships of social action to the cultural values and the world views. Thereby, he is able to highlight the distinct characters of these societies. Notwithstanding its essential position in Weber's inquiry, the meaning of the concept, as much as its significance,

³³(cont'd) theoretical one. In general, an interpretation or exegesis of a concept, from a theoretical point of view is to elucidate the theoretical content of the concept, or to show its theoretical significance for a particular type of inquiry. With a different theoretical problem, however, the concept may be conceived in a quite different way. The concept "rational" may sometimes be brought back to its intellectual history. Kolegar, for example, suggests that [w]ith Tonnies and other German writers, Weber shares, on the whole, the negative evaluation of rationalization, which is rather rare in countries with a strong tradition of the Enlightenment. (Kolegar, 1964:366) A systematic and comprehensive typology of Weber's use of the notion has been sought. Schluchter suggests three different meanings of rationalism, as employed by Weber -- namely, 'scientific-technological rationalism', 'metaphysical-ethical rationalism', and 'practical rationalism'. (Schluchter, 1979:15) In accordance with the problems of inquiry, theoretical implications may be drawn from Weber's writing Marcuse, for example, like many of Weber's critics, sees the concept of 'capitalism rationality' to be 'a critical concept -- critical in the sense not only of "pure-science", but also of an evaluative goal-positing critique of reification.' (Marcuse, 1968:207-8) Many other ways of interpretation can yet be listed. Nevertheless, this essay has no concern with these problems. For clarifying the theoretical intent of the notion is not the intention of the following interpretation. Its sole purpose, being purely logical in character, seeks only to demonstrate the significance of the interpretative point of view and synthetic ideas for a historical-cultural inquiry. To this end, the following section will show the logical character of the concept, as a purely formal concept, and the way of its employment, how the interpretive points of view and the synthetic ideas furnish the essential meaning for the claim as some phenomena being rational or irrational. No one step will this interpretation take beyond this bounds of logical inquiry into the concept "rational".

remains a controversial issue. For they transform themselves with the point of view and the purpose of interpretation. Such a hermeneutical phenomenon¹⁶, indeed, bears out the logical significance, as brought out in the foregoing, of the synthetic ideas and the interpretive points of view for not only the inquiry into some historical- cultural phenomena, but also any adequate interpretation of historical- cultural knowledge, such as Weber's historical and theoretical writing.

The meaning and significance of any claim, as that some phenomena are deemed to be rational or irrational, are never bound by the formal definition of the concept, "rational", but determined essentially by the whole context of interpretation wherein the concept is employed according to the synthetic ideas and the points of view, by virtue of which such a claim can be made at all. Concept of such a kind has its own logic, the

¹⁶Weber's historical and theoretical writing may be read in many different ways. Accordingly, the logical character and the essential meaning of a rational phenomenon in his writing may be grasped from different points of view. In accordance with the focal point of interest, as well as the problems of interpretation, rational may be a general system or a particular course of action, a society, a culture, a civilization or many others. "Rationality" may be read as, for example, 'systematic ordering ("according to a plan") and methodical attainment of a definitely given end by calculation of adequate means.' (Kolegar, 1964:361). But, as a matter of logic, the logic of hermeneutical practice, one formal definition, as much as the other, is in no way to keep the essential meaning of the concept from transforming itself with the context and the point of view of its employment. "Systematic ordering and methodical conduct" may be found with a generalized, and self-same, normative structure of voluntaristic action. The course of becoming increasingly systematic and methodical in conduct of life may be conceived as 'an inherent tendency of universal history.' (Kolegar, 1964:361) or it may be taken as 'the key to the understanding of modernity in general, and its source in Western Civilization in particular.' (Glassman, 1983:241) Yet, it may also be 'not a single process but a multiplicity of distinct though interrelated processes arising from different historical sources, proceeding at different rates, and furthering different interests and values,' even though, 'these various processes ... have notable structural similarities.' (Brubaker, 1984:9) The significance of this systematicness and methodicalness in ordering everyday life or a particular sphere of life may be grasped in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the goal-directed and goal-seeking behaviors; or it may be understood in relation to the sense of alienation and disenchantment experienced in a particular context of "systematic ordering and methodical conduct." In any case, "rationality" contains in itself a quite different context of meaning by virtue of its logical, interpretive relationship with the problem in issue -- and in particular, the purpose and interest of knowledge to be fulfilled through interpreting Weber's historical and theoretical writing.

logic of its hermeneutical employment. It will bedevil anyone who are blind of its presence. That is not a rare case; one and the same phenomenon is deemed to be rational and irrational at the same time. For the interpretive gaze is on the prowl, shifting its point of view from one to another. Consider an example, say, orthodox Hinduism. Indian religiosity, according to Weber, is completely otherworldly; the abnegation of this world is sought. Religious ethos of a particular type has been consistently elaborated; the means to the salvation from this world has been increasingly perfected. Indeed, Weber writes, 'it was perhaps from India that this rationalization set out on its historical way throughout the world at large.' (Weber, 1946:323) Corresponding to this religiosity, the holy technique, or to be precise, the technique for salvation from this world, has been worked out. Yoga, for centuries, has been serving itself as the technical foundation for almost all sects of Indian religion. From the point of view of mystical holy seeking, classical Yoga is deemed to be 'a rationally systematized form of methodical emotional asceticism.' (Weber, 1958a:165) To experience the feelings with the greatest consciousness, 'the sentiments of friendship (to God), sympathy (for creatures), beauty, and, finally, indifference (toward the world) were planfully and rationally pursued in the self through meditative exercise.' (Weber, 1958a:165) Yet, Yoga is at the same time a form of 'irrational asceticism' from the gnostic, intellectual point of view. For Yoga, however systematic and methodical a mental exercise it may be, seeks no more than the psychic experience of being one with the holy; it strains to remove in a highly methodical way the last snip of 'rational, demonstrative knowledge' (Weber, 1958a:164) from the consciousness. Such a personal emotional experience, when viewed from the interest of rational knowledge, is irrational. For this very reason, contemplation is 'more rational with regard to the intended "set", namely, knowledge, not feeling, were sought,' even though the systematization of classical Yoga stands on 'a level of rationalization superior to that of contemplation.' (Weber, 1958a:165)

The same logic is found in Weber's interpretation of the Hindu world picture. From the point of view of theodicy, Indian religious doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of Karma, furnishes one of the three ³⁷ 'rationally satisfactory answers to the questioning for the basis of the incongruity between destiny and merit.' (Weber, 1946:2275). However, a Christian, ethical point of view can transform the same phenomenon into a totally irrational one. The world picture of eternal cycle of rebirth and the idea of ethical compensation, close off all the possibility of a rational ethic and the ethical integrity. '[S]in and conscience could not be the source of holy seeking.' (Weber, 1958a:170). Owing to its "organic" relativism, on the other hand, the Hindu world picture furnishes 'no "universal" ethic, but only 'a status- and psychologically- differentiated dharma according to the cast.' (Weber, 1958a:172). Indeed, the list of examples, as to this problem, can go on, with no end. From the purely logical point of view, the inner-unified meaning of "being rational (or irrational)" is kept intact by virtue of the web of interpretative relationships with the synthetic ideas, the points of view and the problem of inquiry. For this web of interpretation is co-terminious with this inner-unified meaning. The formal definition of the concept may furnish a very broad condition -- i.e., a number of formal characters -- for a phenomenon to be rational before the interpretive gaze. Despite its formal definition, its being rational would still not be intelligible at all, if apart from the full context of interpretation in which the concept is employed. One and the same phenomenon may be at the same time rational and irrational, as shown in the foregoing. Was one out of touch with the point of view from which the concept is employed, "being rational", however revealing a concept it could otherwise be, would be standing only aloof in a void of meaning and significance, as to any purpose and interest of knowledge. Having different meaning, though still within the bound of some formal characters, in different situations according to different points of view, as Weber has mentioned not just for once, but repeatedly, is the essential, logical character of the

³⁷The other two is given by Zoroastrian dualism and the predistination decree of the *deus* in Christianity.

concept, "rational". And such an intimate, indelible, and ineradicable relationship with the interpretive point of view and the central problem addressed is the distinct, logical character of the hermeneutical employment of a purely formal concept in historical-cultural knowledge.³⁸

3.4.2 The Inner- Unified Meaning of "Being Rational": A Glimpse of the Synthetic Significance of the Interpretive Points of View in Historical- Cultural Sociology.

"Rationality", being a formal concept of attitude of life, and by virtue of being a formal concept, may contain in itself a whole world of different phenomena. Yet, it signifies a formal character of "intellectual-theoretical or practical-ethical attitude," (Weber, 1946:324)³⁹ namely, the methodicalness of the conduct in one or more departments of life of whether a single or a community of historical personalities. Any pattern of conduct or thought may be regarded as being methodical insofar as the conduct or thought is consistently regulated or organized according to one or more

³⁸"Rational" is a purely formal concept; such a logical character has been recognized in many different ways of reading Weber's historical and theoretical writing. "Rationality," for Brubaker, though central to Weber's historical-cultural sociology is 'neither easily accessible, nor easily understandable.' (Brubaker, 1984:7) With a schematic summary of Weber's historical-cultural account for modern (rational) capitalism, he, nevertheless, delimits the content of the concept by sixteen characters: namely, 'deliberate, systemic, calculable, impersonal, instrumental, exact, quantitative, rule-governed, predictable, methodical, purposeful, sober, scrupulous, efficacious, intelligible, and consistent.' (Brubaker, 1984:2) All these characters are formal. Eisen indeed indentify only six formal component elements in Weber's 'variegated usage of the word' (Eisen, 1978:57) -- that is, purpose, calculation, control, logicity, universality, and systematicness. He succinctly states: 'An examination of Weber's basic categories of social action, set forth at the start of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, and of the historical survey which introduces the series on *Religionssoziologie*, reveals that the concept "rationality" is composed of a half dozen component elements, which reappear consistently in the usage of the term throughout Weber's monumental scholarship. Each of these interdependent building block ...is intended to contribute to the overall concept when anyone (or more) is used as the locus of primary meaning, just as in the historical outline each application of the term adds its shape to the parent idea, thereby enriching all future application. What is lost in precision through use of the single term is repaid in added meaning for each application.' (Eisen, 1978:58) The logic of the employment of the purely formal concept is alluded, though with a rather vague and ambiguous form of expression.

³⁹This quotation is from his article "Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions."

principles. These principles may be elaborated into an abstract scheme of concepts and ideas, or codified into a unified system of rules, with different degree of precision, completeness, closeness and internal consistency. "To give an account for what one has done" is indeed the apothegm of rationalism. The destiny of being rational may be leading inward in the heart, or outward in the mundane world. The kingdom may be of this world or of the other world. The goal may be a ultimate value or a practical purpose. Nevertheless, one or more formal principle of judgement is essential to any methodical and consistent, i.e., rational, organization of life.

Only on account of the final principle of judgement is a person able to follow perseveringly a rational path to the highest possible fulfillment of the ultimate value. Behind all religious rationalism, according to Weber, 'always lies a stand towards something in the actual world which is experienced as specifically "senseless."' (Weber, 1946:281) This senselessness, when viewed in terms of the formal definition of "rational", is experienced insofar as the multitude of phenomena in its transience and ephemerality is thrown out of any context of relationships with the ultimate value of life. That is the stand of rationalism; 'the world order in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful "cosmos".' (Weber, 1946:281) The non-rational psychic drives must be tamed; conduct and thought has to be disciplined. Life is organized in such a way that this ultimate meaning can be pursued methodically, consistently and systematically. A rational mind is always ready to inure to the suffering of life and the imperfection of the world. Yet, it is in no circumstance to allow a free rein for the pure chance over the experience of humankind. Out to the final cause of the universe, however impossible it may seem to be, does a rational mind reach. For the ultimate reason, the final principle which made possible a rational account for the imperfection of the world and intelligible the apocalyptic fulfillment of the ultimate meaning of life, does a rational mind search. Indeed, Weber's idea of giving himself 'an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct' (Weber, 1946:152) is precisely the demand of

ethical rationalism. Conduct dedicating to the ultimate values, and the ultimate values alone, according to Weber, asks no consequences. But never on this account is it condemned to be irrational. In contradistinction to imprincipled opportunism, conduct of such a kind follows steadfastly its own maxim: One 'does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord.' (Weber, 1946:120) Its kingdom is of the other world; and its final principle, the ultimate reason, reveals itself only in the temple of God, as the heaven is open. Indeed, any person who follows an ethic of responsibility, with a sober awareness of the consequences of his (or her) action, will sometime and somewhere 'reaches the point where he [or she] says, "Here I stand; I can do no other."' (Weber, 1946:127) Certainly, for Weber, the 'proponent of an ethic of absolute ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world.' (Weber, 1946:122) Yet precisely not to him, but to the world is this irrationality belonging. 'He is a cosmos-ethical "rationalist".' (Weber, 1946, 122) He is a rationalist. For standing behind his conduct and thought is his final principle of judgement to be upheld and his intellectual or ethical integrity of personality to be defended at all time and at all price.

Likewise, only on account of the fundamental principles of conduct is a person able, to pursue methodically, consistently and systematically his (or her) interest in a possible achievement of one or more practical purposes. The idea that conceives the best way of acting and thinking as to conform to well-elaborated and well-defined rules, and the maxim that obliged oneself to behave in this way are essentially expressions of methodical attitude. However impossible it seems to anyone, a "methodical mind" strives in all direction to transform life as well as the world in order to attain these characters. According to these principles, a number of procedures and different plans may be devised with a different degree of efficacy in one way or other to bring forth some intended results and to attain a definite goal or purpose of some kind. These procedures and plans are put under constant and methodical -- i.e. systematic -- evaluation in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency to the final attainment of the goal, taking into

consideration with all the immediate circumstances relevant to the execution of the plan; The evaluation may attain some precision with the employment of some kinds of formal procedures or mathematical calculation. Alternative methods can be thus compared from time to time with a view to the best choice for the purpose in hand. No methodical conduct or thinking accepts blind faith on its principles. The goals or purposes of a course of conduct or thought will attain explicit awareness to a very great extent for those who implement them. The methodical principles of conduct and thinking are subject to constant reflection. The conceptual schemes and the system of rules are put under constant review. The practice is brought under a close examination and methodical evaluation in order to determine how close a course of conduct or thought conforms to the rules, and to see how well it follows the procedures or plans step by step. Improvements will be made whenever it is necessary with a view to the attainment of the goals and purposes with the highest possible effectiveness and efficiency. In this specific sense, "rational" conduct is teleologically consistent, and "rational" thought is logically consistent. These characters cannot be acquired without some schooling of self-discipline and self-control. Indeed, the sober attention to the final goals and the systematic and regulated way to attaining the goals of methodical conduct come to a direct contrast to the "almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli" (Weber, 1968:25) of traditional action. Traditional attitude, according to Weber, is largely dominated by "ingrained habituation." (Weber, 1968:25) Indeed, "rational" -- in the sense of methodical -- conduct distinguishes itself from all other forms of action by this attitude, an attitude being most self-conscious to its own goal -- whether a tangible object, a state of reality or the realization of an abstract value-idea in its various forms -- and an attitude striving in all directions to impose regulation upon both the subjective as well as the objective conditions of life in order to reach the goal.

Concept of such a kind is never a value idea⁴⁰. Being rational is neither good nor

⁴⁰ Yet, this essay has no intention to deny this possibility for those who attempt to employ the concept, "rational", or any of its linguistic derivatives as

evil. Being irrational, as some totally unpredictable behavior, or some completely whimsical fancy, may arouse disdain or even abhorrence. Yet, sexual love, being 'the greatest irrational force of life,' (Weber, 1946:343) has been the wellspring of life-fostering power and ecstasy; and aesthetic experience, being the this-worldly force, 'whose character is essentially non-rational or basically anti-rational,' (Weber, 1946:341) has always been a source of inspiration in the moment of the sublime beauty. 'It provide [an inner-worldly, irrational] *salvation* from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical and practical rationalism.' (Weber, 1946:342) On the other hand, was conduct and thought never subject to rational regulation and organization, civilization would not be possible, and human being could not be able to step beyond its most primitive state of animal life. Greek philosophy, Hebrew religion and Roman law have been and still are the glory of the occidental rationalism. bureaucracy is its latest triumph. It is the most rational way of organization even known in the history of humankind. However, "[i]n union with the dead machine, it is laboring to produce the cage of the bondage of the future to which one day powerless men will be forced to submit like the fellabeen of ancient Egypt.' (Mitzman, 1970:4;fn.)⁴¹ Indeed, for Weber, the 'passion for bureaucratization ... is enough to drive one to despair.' (Mitzman, 1970:178)⁴² As much as the historical-cultural meaning and significance of "being rational" is determined by a particular interpretive point of view, and synthetic idea, the value of "being rational" can be judged only in the light of a particular, evaluative point of view and value idea. Nevertheless, according to Weber, the latter stands beyond the object of historical-cultural sociology.

⁴⁰(cont'd) a value idea. However, in Weber's historical and theoretical writing, these terms are employed as a formal concept, and they are not value ideas.

⁴¹Cited from Weber's essay, "*Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland*", in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*. Munchen: Drei MasfenBerlag; pp. 151.

⁴²Cited from the *Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Soziologie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. Turbingen: J.C.B. Mohr; pp.414.

"Rationality" -- in the sense of methodical attitude of routine life -- expresses itself power over the historical personalities in almost any time cross the boundaries of culture and civilization. For the regulative principles of reason -- the *ratio* -- as Kant has shown, are one of the objective conditions for any unified experience. The earliest attempts to establish rules -- that is to say, to introduce norms⁴³ to the everyday conduct -- ushered mankind into the dawn of civilization. Hereafter, "rationality", in the sense of teleological and logical consistency of thought and conduct, 'has and always has had power over man, however limited and unstable this power is and always has been in the face of other forces of historical life.' (Weber, 1946:324) "Rational" conduct and thought, in the history, are not unique to a particular or a few particular communities of civilized human beings, but they are found in every civilized society, a society which is built according to some principles of organization and regulation with at least some complexities in its structure of social relationships, and a society which rests its integrity on one or more types of *raison d'être* for its organization and regulation. Discipline and regulation of such a kind in various departments of life have always been an indispensable condition for the advancement of civilization. Conspicuous types of rationality -- like the one of ancient Greek thought, Judaism, Indian Hinduism, Chinese Confucianism, Medieval theology, modern science, Jewish Law, Roman Law, Islamic Law, Canon Law, Common Law, French Civil Code, modern law, Egyptian administration, Roman administration, Chinese administration, modern bureaucratic administration, military discipline, monasticism, ascetic sects, the organization of market and labour in modern capitalism, occidental music, Renaissance painting, Gothic architecture, and so on and so forth -- is so strikingly distinct from each other as to the point of view from

⁴³At the point when Weber discusses the meaning of "rules" and the "rule-governed", he points out : 'a norm,' as a rule, is 'the expression of a logical, ethical or asethetic *prescription*,' in contradistinction to a general propositions of observational regularities. A norm embodies in itself, a *value-judgement* which serves as a standard by reference to which present, past or future events are "measured". Thus the validity of these rules 'is constituted by a general imperative,' and 'the content of this imperative is norm itself.' (Weber, 1977:98-99)

which they can be deemed to be rational in the first place, and as to their ramifications, each of which has come to be a unique course of historical current. For a historical-cultural inquiry is interested in a particular configuration of historical-cultural phenomena; not so much will it be concerned with the general form of attitude of life as it is pondering upon the historical-cultural meaning and significance of a particular type of rationality, a type of rationality which has come to be an effective force in a unique course of events in issue. At this point, the hermeneutic employment of formal concepts in constructing types and in furnishing synthetic ideas, that has been painstakingly made explicit in the foregoing sections, should be recalled. Weber, in his historical and theoretical writing, constructs different types of rationality. For he intends to bring out from different contexts of historical reality 'the complexity of the only superficially simple concept of the rational.' (Weber, 1958: 194)⁴⁴ To bring this intention, out of the light, this inquiry is bound to pierce through his use of this formal concept into the logic of its hermeneutical employment.

A historical-cultural type of rationality is constructed in Weber's work from a particular point of view for discerning the axiological structures of some typical situations in history. It is so employed in the hermeneutic-synthetic context of historical-cultural interpretation as to bring out the universal significance of some characteristic patterns of conduct or thought in a particular course of historical-cultural events. In the concept of methodicalness, means and ends belong to each other essentially; it is inconceivable to have a method without an end, that which a method may serve. However consistent and well-organized it may be, a system could never be methodical if it is good for nothing. That which is said to be methodically organized or regulated would be absolutely senseless, was not such an endeavor orienting itself towards a goal and some ultimate values, implicit or explicit. Thus, without a standpoint of theoretical-interpretative judgement, that can relate the relevant historical observations

⁴⁴Ch. II, fn. 9.

to some objective -- that is to say, intersubjectively accepted and ~~then~~ historically effective -- value-ideas and ideal-concepts, it is in no way for any sound mind to speak meaningfully of a phenomenon, in distinction to other phenomena, as rational or irrational. For a 'thing is never [rational or] irrational in itself, but only from a particular rational point of view!' (Weber, 1958:194) Only with a given point of view can a pure-type of rationality be constructed; and only against this pure-typical criteria can the degree of rationality been measured. A context of conduct or thought may acquire for itself different degree of (formal) rationality" -- as to its formal relation to the goal being sought, and in particular to how adequate the method is to its ends -- in terms of some "purely formal and relatively unambiguous" (Weber, 1968:85)⁴³ criteria, such as consistency, accountability, calculability, or others, of a given type of rationality. The same context may be measured, on the other hand, in terms of its meaningful content along the value scales of some ultimate ends according to the type of (substantive) rationality. Yet, whatever criteria of evaluation may be chosen, any measurement and any form of rationality can never alter the logical relationship of the concept to the context of its employment. That which is rational or not must be 'measured with respect to its particular basic value.' (Weber, 1958:194) The criteria of measurement ultimately finds its meaning in these values, which give historical- cultural meaning to a type. For the axiological relationships of the historical personalities to their ultimate values and ends in their methodically organized and regulated conduct, and only these relationships alone, constitute essentially the meaningful content of a type of rationality. Thus, a superficially simple concept may attend a very high degree of complexity in its internal meaning as it has been employed in constructing a unique type of historical-cultural attitude.

Whenever a society is inextricably organized, it will be differentiated into different spheres of life -- like, economic, political, ethical, intellectual, religious, aesthetic, or personal one. Each of these departments may furnish for itself some

⁴³fn. 3.

distinct, ultimate values and goals of life. Consider only "formal rationality" -- that is to say, rationality measured in terms of the formal criteria according to the type. Law making and law finding are formally irrational, according to the point of view of modern jurisprudence, if they 'cannot be controlled by the intellect, for instance when recourse is had to oracles or substitutes therefore.' (Weber, 1968:856) In the case of modern bureaucracy, according to Weber's pure-type, conformity to the intellect is however not so much relevant to its "formal rationality" as its strict adherence to the rules of legal and administrative regulation, according to the principles of the hierarchical organization of administration that strictly delimit both the authority and the duty for each well defined official jurisdictional area. From the modern economic point of view, a system of economic action is formally rational in yet another sense, according to the degree of 'quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied.' (Weber, 1968:85) All these differences in terms of only "formal rationality" would be inexplicable if without reference to the ultimate ends of these departments of life. Law making and law finding concern themselves with social justice according to some legal traditions -- that is, the validity of the norms of legal judgment and legal decision, the internal meaning of the rules, the internal consistency and completeness of a given system of legal rules, and the rules governing the application of these norms in the administration of justice. Bureaucracy is interested in the continuous and regular implementation of their task in the most effective, efficient, impersonal, and stable way. According to Weber, 'the provision for needs ... is essential to every rational economy.' (Weber, 1968:85)

Beyond the formal criteria, 'each of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends.' (Weber, 1976:26) A economic system, taking as an example, may be organized with a view to promote totally different ends, such as utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian, capitalistic, socialistic, communistic, or many others. It is totally legitimate to say that "modern rational capitalism" has attained the

highest degree of market-rationality; however, not to be forgotten is the point of view that made modern capitalism rational; "rationality" here means 'force which promotes the orientation of the economic activity of strata interested in purchase and sales of goods on the market to the market situation.' (Weber, 1968:84) In "modern rational capitalism", rationality of the regulation of market 'has been historically associated with the growth of formal market freedom and the extension of marketability of goods.' (Weber, 1968:83) The inner-unified meaning of such a rationality would never be intelligible without at the same time realizing the spell of profit over the economic conduct on the market in the light of its axiological relationships expressed vividly in the *Geist* of modern (rational) capitalism. Yet, the rationality of economic conduct may be also evaluated in terms of many other different ultimate ends. From the point of view of these other ends, the modern capitalistic system may be absolutely irrational, or even unintelligible. For 'what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another.' (Weber, 1976:26) This whole way of interpreting rationality, be it formal or not, as always within the context of the axiological relationships of the historical-cultural experience, is not only applicable to the market, but also to the organization of labour, administration, legal system, pattern of thought and world views, and in fact to any phenomenon conceived as rational or irrational. Such an methodical exercise of historical-cultural interpretation will be practiced again and again throughout any adequate interpretation of Weber's historical and theoretical writing, whenever rationality of some types comes to the forefront of the discussion. To attain explicit awareness of the point of view from which a type of rationality is constructed and thus only from which the full meaning of the type of rationality can be comprehended is pivotal to any theoretical-interpretive judgement on the historical significance of the rational structures of any phenomenon or events in question, whether for the sake of its own or for its causal relationships to some historical individuals. The fundamental principle of interpretation employed in this study is once again brought home: Any historical-cultural

concept or phenomenon can be rendered intelligible only from the point of view of the inner-unified meaning in the unique context of axiological relationships of the historical individuals in the inquiry.

Weber sees the latest triumph of the occidental rationalism in modern (rational) capitalism, which rests upon, as its historical- cultural conditions, the impersonal form of enterprise, the rational law, the calculable administration, and finally, the methodical life conduct. Being no exception, its claim for being rational would be otherwise implausible, and Weber's account for it would appear to be a chaos of numerous pieces of meaning, if without reference to the "value-content" of this historical individual. The axiological relationships, which primarily constitute this phenomenon, will become intelligible only in the light of Weber's synthetic ideas of the *Geist* of capitalism. By these ideas is intended the 'ethical coloured maxim for the conduct of life.' (Weber, 1958:54) Contained in this *Geist* is the attitude of vocational life. The maxim of vocational life, despite of many variation in its content, essentially assumes 'an obligation which the [historical personality]⁴⁶ is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his professional activity.' (Weber, 1958:54) The inner-worldly calling from heaven has tragically turned into its historical opposite, following a unique course of historical-cultural transformations in modern history. This will be briefly discussed in next chapter. At this point of inquiry, however, an important principle of interpretation has to be stress: no pure- type, if apart from the full context of interpretation, could capture the full context of historical- cultural experience in the multiplicity of widely different situations. In no circumstance can any pure- type of rationality or rational action defile this logic, the logic of historical- cultural knowledge. From the logical point of view, by virtue of the 'preeminent factual significance of ... "consciously purpose" action in empirical reality, "teleological" rationalization could be used as a constructive device for the development of conceptual schemes.' (Weber, 1975:188) Yet, his

⁴⁶Weber uses "individual" in the original quotation. It is changed for the consistency in expression in this study.

"rational" point of view of interpretation does not mean that those irrational elements (according to the viewpoint) does not exist, and in nowhere has Weber ever denied that they are not practically important. Indeed, his account for the rise of modern (rational) capitalism offers the most markedly example for both the causal and axiological significance of the non-rational and irrational aspects of life. And the significance of these forces are not distinctive to modern (rational) capitalism. The various great ways of leading a rational and methodical life have been characterized by irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as "given" and which have been incorporated into such ways of life. (Weber, 1946:281) In any case, Weber's employment of "rational" point of view in his inquiry is with a sober awareness of its own logic that firstly, "irrational" phenomena are usually beyond conceptual representation; secondly, the significance of these elements will be brought into light whenever the historical observations of a phenomenon deviate markedly and significantly from the rational type, provided that we do not confuse the type with the history, and that we do in fact compare the two in order to understand the latter, and thus thirdly, the rational type is an one-sided accentuation of the rational point of view in relation to the value-content of the phenomena in question, therefore, the rational constructs are only of extraordinarily heuristic value for historical-cultural understanding.

D

4. SEARCHING FOR THE CONCEPTUAL UNITY OF THE TEXT: THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF WEBER'S HISTORICAL- CULTURAL INQUIRY.

The internal unity of a text is determined essentially by how it is interpreted, though a cursory glance may suggest the otherwise. For the latter, the unity is obvious enough insofar as one has located that particular preposition where the central problem of the text is stated. Truly, the internal logic of a text is determined essentially by the purpose and interest of knowledge. This purpose and interest, when viewed from the side of the interpreted, fully testify themselves in that which concerns the author. For the author feelingly understood himself (or herself) being confronted by one and more problems, so much significant and so much meaningful for him (or her) to think through them and to engage in a quest for a solution. The author is obliged to take a particular standpoint of knowledge, and to grasp the world for observation and understanding from a particular point of view in the full context of the problem(s) at issue. For this reason, every part of the text -- whether it stands in a direct or indirect relation to its purpose of knowledge, and whether it stands in long or shorter a distance, conceptual and methodical, to the problem -- belongs essentially to one inner-unified meaning, and thus one text. The purpose of knowledge leads the author(s) step by step in the inquiry, breaking through a way to the solution for the problem. The central problem expresses itself in the text as the centripetal force in and through which every logical and conceptual principles are embroidered. Out of this embroidery of principles of knowledge, an inner vision of the world and an inner-unified idea about the object of knowledge arise. In this vision and in this idea, the internal unity and the intelligibility of the text as a whole lie.

But, this problem, as well as its solution, when viewed from the side of interpretation, is not self-evident. They are not directly and immediately apprehensible at all. For the full context of meaning of the problem, which belongs essentially to the internal logic of the text, reveals itself only in and through an adequate interpretation of the text. Certainly, the biographers of the author and the historians of his (or her) time

may render some very important descriptions about different facets of the author's life in its total situation. These descriptions are essential to an adequate interpretation of the text. For they offer some vivid pictures of the circumstances in which the text was composed. The author's impression about these external circumstances would somehow color or cloud his (or her) interpretation. Their intimate relationships with the author in his (or her) life would come to inform the interpretive interests and the interpretive ideas of his (or her) inquiry. From the point of view of hermeneutical practice, these pictures may throw light upon the nuance of meaning in the text. All the same, the internal logic of the text, as well as the essential meaning of the central problem, is essentially a logical problem of interpretation. They cannot be interpreted adequately simply on account of this or that preposition in the text. They would not be made any more intelligible simply on account of this or that fact about the external circumstances. They are determined essentially by the synthetic ideas and the constitutive principles of an interpretation. For the prepositions and the facts do not speak for themselves, but rather, have themselves to be interpreted in accordance with these principles and ideas; and their significant relation with the text is determined essentially in the interpretation. A text may explicitly state its central interest as in the trial of Socrates. But the trial is not in any rate significant; it is meaningful in some particular ways and not others. Its significance is determined essentially by the standpoints of knowledge -- the ways how it is understood as well as the reason why it has to be understood. Certainly, the trial is interesting for a historian, but it would be still significant yet in a quite different way, was the historian to be a jurist, a philosopher, an ethicist, or others. Those who had lived through the anguished experience of the Second World War would be confronted by the events throughout their life as a bewildering problem. The war may be a central theme of their writings; but it may have quite distinct meaning for different authors, depending on the interpretive point of view, as of a military strategist, a politician, a diplomat, a jurist, a historian, a philosophy, a playwright, or others.

In any case, the inner-unified meaning of the text may be revealed only in a web of the interpretive relationships of synthetic ideas and principles of inquiry. Yet, holding this web together is, on the other hand, precisely the central problem addressed in the text. From the purely logical point of view, the interpretive principles are determined essentially by the problem. For standing behind the interpretation in each of its steps is the ultimate reason of interpretation -- why the interpretation is meaningful at all; why the object of interpretation is interesting at all; and above all, why the object of knowledge is worthy to be known at all. This ultimate interest of knowledge is contained in the central problem of the text; and likewise, every thread in the web goes back to it. Now, time is coming; this intimate relationship is to be brought out in clarity. Thus, every side of this relationship has to put back to its own context, the context of hermeneutical practice. In reading, the essential meaning of the central problem of the text and the internal logic of knowledge belong essential to one another. Upon the full context of the employment of the constitutive principles of knowledge and the methodical principles of interpretation from a particular point of view, they stand in unity. In every moment of reading, they contain in themselves one another; and transform their meaning and significance with one another. They are grasped in one and the same time; and they are intelligible for one and the same reason -- the way of interpretation by which the text is read. The intelligibility of the text is never being there, but essentially constituted. For this reason, the inner-unified meaning of the text transforms itself with the interpretive points of view. From a distinct interpretive point of view, Weber's historical and theoretical writing is read in this inquiry, as a masterpiece of historical-cultural knowledge. Accordingly, its central problem cannot be of any other character, but essentially historical-cultural. The problem is what this essay is now turning to. With the close of the preceding chapter, the task of this essay, as to show the internal logic of the text, has been largely completed. The discussion in the following pages will amount to no more than a suggestion, pointing to a possible way of reading Weber's historical-

cultural sociology, a way which may allow one to make the inner- unified meaning of the text intelligible, and to interpret the text adequately. That must be noted; the following interpretation until its conclusion remains logical in character. For it addresses no theoretical problem or controversy about Weber's historical and theoretical writing; but rather it is concerned with the conceptual unity of the text. The problem of this chapter remains that: Is it possible to read Weber's historical writing as a text? In other word, is it possible to see in Weber's historical writing a unity, a unity not only in its form, but also in its content?

4.1 THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM.

Throughout the text a web of interpretive ideas and messages from its author is bounding and rebounding. The web has its threads weaving in and out a theme the author is always concerned with -- that is a bewildering problem for those who are confronted by modern (rational) capitalism. The text starts itself with the synthetic idea of the *Geist* of modern (rational) capitalism. As the author claims, in his writing on the logic of historical- cultural knowledge, a historical individual⁴⁷ is constituted essentially from the standpoint of cultural values. The "*Geist* of capitalism" is constituted from the standpoint of a historical- cultural problem, a problem concerning the meaning and the unique character of being human in modern (rational) capitalism.

With *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*, the author broke ground for his subsequent historical-cultural inquiry, though intermittently interrupted by his health problems, his trips abroad, and his political activities, until his death in 1920. For the first time in the text, he unfolds the full content of the problem. He shows why it is meaningful for him to confront in a course of historical- cultural inquiry with the problem. The web of historical- cultural interpretation is laid open; and the ground for his subsequent inquiry is thus laid bare. This essay raises a very specific problem about

⁴⁷ For the meaning and the logical character of historical individuals, see the section "The Object of historical-Cultural Knowledge: Historical Individuality."

the historical meaning of the idea of vocation. The transformation of the idea in the reformation when various doctrines of Protestantism were derived and became popular brought a very specific historical impacts on the ethical qualities of individual experience and life style, that is historically and culturally significant to the advent and the subsequent transformation of modern (rational) capitalism. The *Geist* of capitalism, as a historical individual, is introduced, but "definition of the many characteristics contained in the complex concept ... was not done and [he has explained] why, if [he was] not to rape history, it could not be done." (Weber, 1978:1111) For a historical individual is essentially a synthetic idea, that belongs to the province of historical-cultural knowledge. Statistical correlation between modern business practice and religious affiliation would mean nothing, absolutely nothing, if apart from historical knowledge about the thought and the deeds of the then new generations, the life experience of which was stamped with the unique character of their religious faith as well as practice and of the historical conditions for capitalism. Neither can the impact of these "religion-psychological relations" on the conduct of practical life be empirically verified from the treatises on dogmatics or theoretical treatises on ethics (Weber, 1978:1123); nor can it be conceived as "an acceleration of an already existing psychological disposition." (Weber, 1978:1124) Rather, the genesis of the *Geist* is shown in the final triumph of rational conduct of practical life over the romanticism of economic adventures in its heroic fight against all kind of economic traditionalism⁴. Such a triumph brought about a new economic order. It was raised upon 'the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition; with irresistible force.' (Weber, 1958:181) Yet, this would have not possible, had asceticism not left its monastic cells and come to hold sway over everyday life. As if historical fate had played its magic, Protestant asceticism which, for the author,

⁴See Weber, 1958:56-65, and Weber, 1978:1129.

'reject not only the joyful of 'reposing' among one's possession but also the striving for possessions for their own sake.' (Weber, 1978:1211) turned into a *Geist* which knows no other value but profit and sees no bound for pursuing it. The spirit of the pious fell into the ethos of eternal pursuit for worldly gain; the *Geist* of capitalism it is called.

The *Geist* (of capitalism) is not this or that thing standing somewhere inside or outside life; but a distinctive spirit which has penetrated the entire life. It 'takes on the character of an ethically coloured maxim for the conduct of life.' (Weber, 1976:51-2) Contained in this spirit is a structure of vital relationships between human being and the world. The structure, with a distinctive, historical-cultural character, that makes the *Geist* modern and rational, gives form to experience and meaning to conduct of everyday life. 'The penetration of the entire life by [this] spirit,' as noted in the foregoing, 'was a particularly significant prerequisite for modern (rational) capitalism to take root.' (Weber, 1978:1119) Henceforth, the *Geist* expresses itself in an adequate life style which allows individuals to live up to the demand of modern (rational) capitalism, and through this life-style, modern (rational) capitalism gains an upper hand over the life and destiny of the communities of historical personalities⁴⁹ that find themselves in a historical situation of modern (rational) capitalism. The days has long been over, when the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.'⁵⁰ (Weber, 1958:181) The time has come, when the cloak has become an iron cage; in no highest spiritual and cultural values can humanity fulfill themselves. 'No one knows,' the author confesses, 'who will live in this stage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self importance.

⁴⁹ For the meaning and the logical character of 'historical personality,' see the section 'The Logical Category of Empathetic Understanding: Personality.'

⁵⁰ Weber cites from Richard Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest*.

(Weber, 1958:181) With a sepulchral tone, as if the Angel of Death reads out the decree to humanity, the author speaks: "For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 'specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.' (Weber, 1958:182) The image is horrific; and the view is bleak. It is the predicament, as the author sees it, of the historical personalities in a civilization of vocation. It is what the problem is all about. Standing with human being is the history of being human. Yet, lying beyond the history is nothing inevitable but death; coming face to face with human being is freedom and anxiety as well as hope and despair. Beseaching from heaven a word about the destiny of humankind 'brings us to the world of judgement of value and of faith' (Weber, 1958:182) beyond the province of historical-cultural knowledge and thus beyond the bound of the text. Yet, historical-cultural knowledge has its own claim. The text is to speak for its own vision. For so much a part⁵¹ of human being is doomed to put on a cloak weighting upon them day in and day out; the author is entitled to exact an answer for what the cloak it is. For an iron cage is within them; the author is entitled to understand from where the iron cage acquire such a power to bound their experience and bound their possibilities.

4.2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS IN THE HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION.

For a decade and a half, on his meandrous course of inquiry, the author has been looking over the landscape of the history of civilization and pondering upon the same problem in his year of torment. *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* is indeed for him the point of departure, from which an access is gained to a course of inquiry into the historical significance of the practice ethos for the advent of (rational) capitalism; their relationship is sought in the confluence of different spheres of life, and in particular, the religious and the economic life, in different parts of the world.

⁵¹It is not that the rest of humanity does not have a cloak to put on, but rather, each has his(or her) own.

The *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* amounts to no less than a universal history of culture. History of such a kind, for the author, is bound to ask itself 'to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (or we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.' (Weber, 1976:13) Has one ever felt uneasy under 'the most fateful force in our modern life, capitalism,' (Weber, 1976:17) one should not slight over the historical meaning and significance of such a line of development. For only from these circumstances, in a peculiar combination as distinctive to Western Civilization, can modern (rational) capitalism come on the scene of history.

This universal history of culture covers a very wide range of historical- cultural phenomena; some of them can be found among the historical personalities of great many different communities; and some of them are historically and culturally distinctive to a particular culture or civilization. Despite of such a stretch of historical observation, its focal point of interest is laid upon five 'religiously determined systems of life regulation' (Weber, 1946:267) -- namely, Christianity, and in particular, Protestantism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Ancient Judaism. They are drawn into a face-to-face confrontation -- qua comparison and contrast -- with one another. And thus, their distinct, historical characters are thrown into relief. Several essays are devoted to a detailed interpretation of their practical ethos and *Weltanschauungen*. Each of them starts from the distinct, historical conditions which set the stage for the advent and the subsequent transformation of one and more of these religions. The author follows through the historical path, and interprets in each steps how a particular ethos had been brought about in the distinct, 'psychological and pragmatic contexts' (Weber, 1946:267) of each of these religions and how the ethos had come to give meaning to everyday experience as well as to bound everyday conduct. According to the author, practical ethos has never determined solely by religion; but rather, it

always stands in a very complicated and many sided relation to the total situation in history. Likewise, religion is never merely a product of social situation; neither is religious ethos a merely "reflection" of a stratum's material or ideal interest-situation.' (Weber, 1946:270) However incisive or even sometimes decisive it may be, the influence of other spheres of life upon a religious ethos is in any case secondary. For a religious ethos 'receives its stamp primarily from religious sources, and, first of all, from the content of its annunciation and its promise.' (Weber, 1946:270) To this interpretative point of view any idea about 'the unity of the group mind and its reducibility to a single formula' (Weber, 1958:284; fn.118) is unacceptable. Neither one-sided spiritualistic nor equally one-sided materialistic causal interpretation of cultural history can be plausible. 'Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplished equally little in the interest of historical truth.' (Weber, 1958:183) This is indeed his last words in *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* -- the first chapter of his universal history.

Religious and practical life, however distinct they may seem to be in abstraction of some kind, rest essentially upon one and the same context of life-experience. They inter-penetrate each other; and they stand in tension to one another. They flow into each other in many different ways; and each of them rushes away from each other for its own destiny in many different directions. But in view of his central problem of inquiry, the author brings into relief only a particular direction of this confluence. He shows interest not so much in the religious doctrines or theological elaborations as in the distinct, historical-cultural meaning and significance of the religious ethos. Upon 'the social strata which have most strongly influenced the practical ethic of their respective religious' (Weber, 1946:268) the light is shed. Of these religious ethoses, their far reaching influence upon the life-experience and life-conduct of various heterogeneous strata in the communities are revealed. Above all, the central theme running throughout his historical-cultural sociology of religion remains to be the historical-cultural

conditions for the possibility of methodical life-conduct among the plebeian strata. His problem stays the same as: how modern (rational) capitalism is historically and culturally possible; and what is the historical-cultural meaning and significance of this historical individual.

His inquiry commences with *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*. This essay, as noted in the foregoing, uncovers the "spiritual root" of modern (rational) capitalism. The author, in his last years, was still working on the same problem. His death, however, did not allow him to complete his inquiry into the ancient Judaism, especially, his interpretation of Psalms, the Book of Job, Talmudic Jewry, early Christianity, and Islam. Judaism stands in a distinct position in his historical-cultural sociology of religion. World religion, except Islam, had long been the focus of his inquiry, before he came to ancient Judaism. By world religion is meant, 'the five religions or religiously determined systems of life-regulation which have known how to gather multitude of confessors around them.' (Weber, 1946:267)³² Ancient Judaism, being historically the religion of a pariah people, is kept out of the province of world religion by both its religious character and its historical destiny. Yet, its inclusion into the author's focal point of interest is for a good reason. Not only is ancient Judaism methodically decisive for understanding other world religions, such as Christianity and Islam; but also, (that is the most important reason for its inclusion) it has a 'historic and autonomous significance for the development of the modern economic ethic of the Occident.' (Weber, 1946:267) Its historical significance, at least as to the occidental rationalism and in particular to the historical possibility of modern (rational) capitalism, is unequalled by any cultural phenomenon ever seen in history -- save 'the development of Hellenic intellectual culture, ... the development of Roman law and of the Roman Catholic church resting on the Roman concept of office; the medieval order of estates; and finally, ... Protestantism.' (Weber, 1952:5) According to the author, distinctive to Judaism

³² According to the author, they are Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Islam.

is its promise for salvation; the day will come, as it is promised, when the social order will eventually turned into its the opposition in the future. Standing behind this promise is the rational God; and sprung out from it is thus a highly rational ethos which is free from any magic and irrational quest for salvation of soul. The kingdom is of the other world, yet for this world. The rational God demands his children, through their covenants, and his prophets, live out an ethical and law- binding life in the history of salvation unto their final redemption. 'The whole attitude toward life of ancient Jewry was determined by his concept of a future God guided political and social salvation.' (Weber, 1952:4) And such a doctrine of salvation, after its breaking from the 'self- created ghetto' (Weber, 1952: 5) of Israelite in the Pauline mission, has come to constitute the core of the Christian rationalism and the Christian ethos. Stretching his sight into the historical source of the occidental rationalism, the author brings into light the intellectual and spiritual condition which allows modern (rational) capitalism to be raised upon the land of the Christian West and to thrive there:

Upon the historical meaning and significance of modern (rational) capitalism, the author throws light; and he throws light from not only one side but also the other. Why capitalism of the modern, rational form suffers a "miscarriage" upon the soil of Asia? That has to be answered; and it is answered in his essays about Asiatic religion -- the *Confucianism and Taoism* (which is titled as *The Religion of China* in its English edition) and the *Hinduism and Buddhism* (which is titled as *The Religion of India* in its English edition). These two peoples, each under its particular, historical circumstances, as the author shows in these two essays, had not been able to shatter the power of sibs over the life- conduct and life- chance of their members; neither could they break loose the bondage of traditionalism their life- experience was chained to. In contrast to the Christian West, their high cultures were remarkably gnostic in character; not deeds, but knowledge was for them the path to salvation of soul. Inner- worldly rationalism as Confucianism, on one hand, knew 'only unconditional affirmation of and adjustment to

the world.' (Weber, 1951:229) Other-worldly religion as Hinduism and Buddhism, each in its own way, on the other hand, was completely indifferent to the mundane life. In any case, being essential a status ethos, be it of the educated, or of the religious virtuous, neither of them was able to bring the illiterate, plebeian strata a vocational ethos and lead them to a methodical life-style. Indeed, though for a quite different reason, they left the life-conduct of the masses completely out of any rational and moral control, and simply gave them up to the power of traditionalism and irrationalism, even from the point of view of Brahman, Buddhist monks, or Confucians, such as folk cults and magic.

In China, modern(rational) capitalism failed to occur. Yet, this is the most striking phenomena of the epoch, for the author:

despite the astounding population increase and the material welfare of the population, Chinese intellectual life remained completely static, and despite seemingly favorable conditions modern capitalist developments simply did not appear. (Weber, 1951:55)

It is indeed the central problem of the essay 'to explain all these striking phenomena.' (Weber, 1951:55) Certainly, the most important conditions for modern (rational) capitalism to take root in the Christian West seem to have been observed in China; yet these historical forms contain in themselves a completely different historical meaning and significance. No civic strata gained political autonomy in this country of large cities. Built with a huge bureaucracy, she created neither rational law nor rational and calculable administration. Capitalism, various forms of which were present even during the centuries before the Christian era, found for itself no rational foundation; both the rational form of enterprise and the separation of the firms from the households, and in particular, from the sib associations were totally lacking. Above all, Confucianism, despite its sober, inner-worldly rationalism, closed off all the possibilities of rational, vocational ethos. Confucians, being a stratum of prebendaries, men with literary education, sought no salvation of soul, but the social ideal of an orderly administration and the honor for its own stratum. The propriety of gentlemen was

irrelevant to everyday life; and indeed, the plebeian strata, bound by their historical circumstances, were unable to live out a life of such a ritualistic and ceremonial style. These illiterate, plebeian strata could only lose themselves to the folk cults and the Taoist magical world. Late Taoism, being completely irrational, according to the author, knew no ethics but the power of magic over the human fate. Confucianism and Taoism eventually joined the united front, which put a total brake upon any attempt at rationalization and drove it on the path to the magical garden. In this historical situation, the plebeian strata could never break loose the chains of traditionalism in any sphere of life, and neither could they break away from the bondage of the sib associations and the police state.

The relentlessly and religiously systematized utilitarianism peculiar to rational asceticism, to live "in" the world and yet not "of" it, has helped to produce superior rational aptitudes and therewith the spirit of the vocational man which, in the last analysis, was denied to Confucianism. That is to say, the Confucian way of life was rational but was determined unlike Puritanism, from without rather than from within. The contrast can teach us that mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth were far from representing and far from releasing the "capitalist spirit," in the sense that this found in the vocational man of the modern economy. (Weber, 1951:247)

Upon the great plain of China, the *Geist* of modern (rational) capitalism is out of sight.

This is the conclusion of the *Confucianism and Taoism*.

His second essays about Asiatic religion carries the same problem, as to the fate of modern (rational) capitalism in Asia, to the soil of spiritual wisdom -- India. 'India is the land of intellectual struggle and alone for a *Weltanschauung*, in the particular sense of the word, for the 'significance' of life and the world.' (Weber, 1958a:331) The need for rational consistency was experienced in almost every sphere of life. In India, rational sciences, such as mathematics and grammar, were cultivated. Indeed, therefrom comes the contemporary rational number system, the technical basis for all kind of calculation, and in particular, for modern bookkeeping and accounting. Various legal forms which could have served the purpose of capitalistic pursuit had been created. Yet, modern

(rational) capitalism could not flourish there. That is the problem the author addresses in *Hinduism and Buddhism*. 'Here we shall inquire,' the author states, 'as to the manner in which Indian religion, as one factor among many, may have prevented capitalistic development (in the occidental sense).' (Weber, 1958a:4) In general, the soteriology of Indian promised either a better rebirth or the cessation of birth and death. The yoke of Karma heavily weighted upon the "immortals". Following the eternal cycle of rebirth, life was totally devoid of meaning; and so was the world. The caste system, with its peculiarly rational idea of ethical compensation, relativized all ethics. Not one rational, universal ethos but a multitude of different status ethoses, each of which for a particular caste, had been created. In this spiritual homeland of Asia, only the religious virtuous were the subject of religious quest; the illiterate laity were not; they were either the givers of alms, or the objects of ritualistic regulation. Confronting the plebeian strata was an ethically irrational world, presided by functional gods and permeated with magic power. Idolatry, hagiolatry, and devotion to their gurus as living saviors, but not rational conduct remained for them the last path to salvation. In India, as in other part of Asia, the ritual rights and duties threw these strata to the bondage of traditionalism. The inner-formation of personality lacked its intellectual and spiritual ground. A rational, vocational ethos was out of the question. In Asia, the author wrote at the conclusion of "The General Character of Asiatic Religion":

The social world was divided into the strata of the wise and educated and the uncultivated plebeian masses. The factual inner order of the real world of nature as of art, ethics and of economics remained concealed to the distinguished strata because this was so barren for its particular interests. Their life conduct was oriented to striving for the extraordinary, for example, in finding throughout its point of gravity in exemplary prophecy or wisdom. However, for the plebeian strata no ethic of everyday life derived from its rationally formed missionary prophecy. The appearance of such in the Occident, however -- borne with it, was conditioned by highly particular historical constellations without which, despite differences of natural conditions, development there could easily have taken the course typical of Asia, particularly of India. (Weber, 1958a:343)

The historical meaning and significance of the vocational ethos of modern (rational)

capitalism is thus brought under a full light of the historical destiny distinctive to the Christian West.

His course is indeed meandrous; those who fail⁵³ to follow him through may lose their way. A panorama of the history of civilization is indeed enticing; those are so lost to this or that scenery on the faraway horizon on their way may be distracted from the central problem of his historical-cultural sociology of religion. The author, in the introduction to his universal history of religion, lays special emphasis and thereby draws attention to this central problem from which the history of culture is read and to which that which is read will return. This is the problem the author has always been concerned with.

Now ... the occident has developed capitalism both to a quantitative extent, and (carrying this quantitative development) in types, forms, and directions which have never existed elsewhere. (20)

And just as, or rather because, the world has known no rational organization of labour outside the modern Occident, it has known no rational socialism. (23)

Hence in a universal history of culture the central problem for us is not, in the last analysis, even from a purely economic viewpoint, the development of capitalistic activity as such, differing in different cultures only in form: the adventure type, or capitalism in trade, war, politics, or administration as source of gain. It is rather the origin of this sober bourgeois capitalism with its rational organization of free labour. Or in terms of cultural history, the problem is that of the origin of the Western bourgeois class and of its peculiarities... (23-24) (Weber, 1976:20-24)

Fundamental is this theme, around which the course of historical-cultural interpretation, however meandrous a course it may be, twines: Fundamental is this point of view, from which the whole panorama of the history of culture, however spectacular a panorama it may be, is unfolded. The problem is always one. How an ethos of everyday life and its *Weltanschauung*, containing in themselves a whole structure of vital relationships between human being and the world, yet being itself conditioned by some very particular

⁵³Some readers may be interested in one or more books of the author, and therefore not intend to follow him through. This is by no means mistakes of some kind; for every reading has its own purpose. However, this does not alter the fact that only following the author through his work step by step can offer, or at least secure, a better and more adequate view of his text as a whole.

historical conditions, come to make historically possible 'the emergence of world-transforming capitalism in the Christian West rather than elsewhere in the world.' (Collins, 1980:926) The same theme, the same idea, and the same problem echoing and resounding throughout the text just as the web of interpretive relationships is bounding and rebounding throughout the text.

4.3 THE HISTORICAL- CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE NORMATIVE AND *DE FACTO* POWERS: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY.

But when the *Economy and Society* comes to unfold the history of civilization, beyond religion and ethos, the echoes appear to be dying out; the web appears to stand still. Upon the way, the light turns dim. Though following their author earnestly, many are able to see the way no more. They take the place where they find themselves as their destination; and the whole project as simply 'a business of elaborating a systematic formal sociological language in terms of which comparisons could be made between one sociological system and another.' (Rex, 1971:34) In view of some interests of knowledge, that rather than following the author through his way, as far as a person is able to discover such a language and employ it, he (or she) may see in 'the elaboration of that language and its formal sociological concept ... Weber's most lasting contribution to sociology.' (Rex, 1971:34) Yet shunting aside the author's statements, however incomplete they may be, about the method of inquiry, and going ahead to suggest that the author 'tried to reduce the language of comparative sociology to its action elements and, in the course of so doing, did actually try to operationalized the conceptions which had used so that the way in which they could be ultimately tested could be established at least in principle' (Rex, 1971:34) are too daring. As much as taking a text to be a dictionary for no reason but that its opening chapter offers a working definition for its concepts, such a view is lacking secure ground.

The interpretive sociology, in the *Economy and Society*, is of no general kind, but of a particular type, a type of interpretation belonging to the province of historical-cultural

knowledge, and a particular type of interpretation with its own problems to be solved. The intentions of the work, *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers*⁵⁴, as stated by the author in his letter to the medievalist Georg von Bellow, just before the publication of the work, 'are absolutely in accord that history showed establish what is specific to [a historical-cultural phenomenon], say, the medieval city; but this is possible only if we first find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic)' (Roth, 1978: LXIV)⁵⁵ For the interest of historical-cultural knowledge, as the author stated, historical-cultural sociology 'can perform [a] very modest preparatory work' -- as to 'find a causal explanation'⁵⁶ for these specific traits.' (Roth, 1978: LXIV)⁵⁷ Upon the land of historical-cultural knowledge, the author is turning the soil and clearing the ground for a solution to his problem. He put up pillars after pillars of pure types concerning different ways that life might become rationally organized or might fail to do so. However, 'the work is not primarily a study in the rationalization and the "disenchantment" of the world,' as one of the editors and the translators of the English edition of *Economy and Society* points out (Roth, 1978: LXXI), but rather, 'the substantive theme that runs through all of *Economy and Society* [is] the preconditions and the rise of modern (rational)

⁵⁴*The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers* is the original title for the second part -- which is indeed the main -- of the book, *Economy and Society*. This second part of the book is intended to be a self-containing treatise, which stands in its own right. Only five years after he had started this part between 1910 and 1914, during and after the Empire's collapse, Weber turned to the terminological summary. (Roth and Wittich, 1968: C) As a matter of fact, the first part was published under the same title, that is, the one of the second part, in the first edition of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Henceforth, simply for the convenience of presentation, this essay will intend *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers* to be the second part of the book, while *Economy and Society* will be referred to be the book as a whole.

⁵⁵Cited from Below, Georg von, *Der Deutsche Staat des Mittelalters*. The origin context of this statement is like this: Weber informed Bellow about his preparation for the publication of *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers* and communicated to him, probably as a response to the latter's opinion about his inquiry, that they are in accord in the view about their discipline, namely, history.

⁵⁶For the specific logical character and content of causal explanation in historical-cultural knowledge, and in particular its employment in the text, see the section, "The Hermeneutic Employment of the Category of Causation from the Historical-Cultural standpoint in the Text."

⁵⁷Cited from Weber's letter to Bellow.

capitalism.' (Roth, 1978:LXXI) Indeed, apart from the standpoint of historical- cultural knowledge, and in particular the problem of the author's inquiry, the methodical steps of sinking one pure-typical constructs after another, the constructs with only heuristic value, into the very ground these steps are intended to clear, would be totally senseless. For the 'problem of historical[- cultural] knowledge determines the structure of Weber's theory of social action' (Zaret, 1980:1188); As suggested in the author's statements about the method of inquiry and in particular about the logic of pure-types, 'his structures on theory, stressing its heuristic and mutable nature, are direct result of his concern with the problem of historical knowledge.' (Zaret, 1980:1188) Between echoes, time is there, for those who are willing to think through the message. Between bounds and rebounds, the web is there, ready for striking a new movement with much greater power.

Still begging an answer is the question: had the echoes been sent to the distance so far as they would never return? Had the web, which still holds all other writing of the author together, been unravelled since this book once and for all? Had the light gone out and left the way in darkness? But indeed, upon the gate of his "universal history" of religion, the author has already shed light on the way. The author, according to the introduction to his sociology of religion, is obliged to ask himself how cultural phenomena in Western civilization 'lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.' (Weber, 1976:13) Which 'line of development' is the author concerned with, and to be specific, in *Economy and Society*? What 'significance and value' has the author seen in this 'line of development'? 'Only in the West,' the author claims 'does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize to-day as valid.' (Weber, 1976:13) It is also true, as the author sees it, of historical scholarship, political thought, art, architecture, 'rational, systematic and specialized pursuit of science, with trained and specialized personnel,' and 'even the feudal state of *rex et regnum* in the Western sense.' (Weber, 1976:15-16) Nevertheless, no special interest is

found, on the part of the author, in a historical-cultural account for these phenomena which are peculiar to Western civilization, as far as *Economy and Society* is concerned. *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers* starts itself with economic relationships; but as mentioned in the foregoing, the author concern himself with a very narrow range of problem -- indeed almost no problem other than the organization of household and enterprise. Is this not the reason?

...in modern time the occident has developed ... a very different form of capitalism which has appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labour.

The modern (rational) organizations of the capitalistic enterprise would not have been possible without ... the separation of business [that means, enterprise] from the household, which completely dominated modern economic life, and closely connected with it, national bookkeeping. (Weber, 1976:21-22)

Yet the book is not limited to this; it is about to bring its readers going beyond the bounds of economic life.

The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers is a pure-typical edifice built up from the standpoint of a particular problem. Upon the province of law, religion and politics, this edifice stands high and thus offers a particular view of historical-cultural transformation in Western civilization. The author may bring his readers swimming up the stream of time, sometime even to the immemorial past, for no nostalgic reason, but a better point of view to understand the present. His interpretation always returns to the problems about the transformation of modern (rational) law, about the emergence of the modern (rational) state and its highly rationally organized officialdom, and about different types of religious faith and practice, charismatic leadership and its routinization, and ethos of life. A moment of retrospection is suffice. Do not these problems sound familiar? Is it not the echo from a far side, resounding everywhere time and again?

Now the peculiar modern Western form of capitalism has been, at first sight, strongly influenced by the development of technical possibilities. ...the technical utilization of scientific knowledge ... was certainly encouraged by

economic considerations... But this encouragement was derived from the peculiarities of the social structure of the Occident.. (Weber, 1976:24-25)

Among those of undoubted importance are the rational structure of law and of administration. For modern rational capitalism has had, not only of the technical means of production, but of a calculable legal system and of administration in terms of formal rules. Without it ... no rational enterprise under individual initiative, with fixed capital and certainty of calculations [is possible] (Weber, 1976:25)

For though the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law, it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain type of practical rational conduct ... The magical and religion, forces and the ethical ideas of important formative influence on conduct. (Weber, 1976: 26-27)

In the long run, no religious-ethical conviction is capable of barring the way to the entry of capitalism, when it stands in full armor before the gate; but the fact that it is able to leap over magical barriers does not prove that genuine [modern (rational)] capitalism could have originated in circumstances where magic play such a role. (Weber, 1927:361;fn.4)

Though systematically organizing his book in terms of some pure-types, the author always come back to these claims when he concludes his discussion about each of these spheres of life.

However, *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers* comes to no conclusion -- that means, no concluding chapter has ever been written for the book as a whole. For the author has not yet finished either part of the book. Compared with the table of contents that the author projected for *The Economy and the Normative and De Facto Powers*, the book has at least the chapter on market and the "last two sections on the modern state and the modern political parties remained unwritten." (Roth, 1978:LXVI) But, the author adds to his book another chapter, the last chapter which appears in *Economy and Society*. He gives a historical-cultural account for the city states, especially those in the Southern Europe of the late middle ages. Was the phenomenon taken to be a particular type of *de facto* powers, as the title of the chapter, "The City (Non-Legitimate Domination)," suggests, a discussion of such a length would be totally out of proportion. Indeed, the phenomenon would be otherwise trivial, if apart from the web of the interpretive relationships with the problem the author is always concerned with. The thread is quivering vibrantly; and the web is bounding.

But although there have everywhere been civic market privileges, companies, guilds, and all sorts of legal differences between town and country, the concept of the citizen has been existed outside the modern Occident.

[T]he problem ... of the origin of the Western bourgeois class and of its peculiarities ... is certainly closely connected with that of the origin of the capitalistic organization of labour, but is not quite the same thing. (Weber, 1976:23) For the bourgeois as a class existed prior to the development of a peculiar modern [rational] form of capitalism, though, it is true only in the Western hemisphere. (Weber, 1976:24)

Thus, *Economy and Society* clears the ground for the solution to the central problem of the "universal history of culture", about the sober bourgeois capitalism and the Western bourgeois class.

Echoes are resounding, and the web bounds. Yet, the message may fall into silence, and silence will prevail as long as and as much as those who meditate upon their own problems willingly close themselves to the gale blasting along in order to listen to that which is for them of higher intellectual and spiritual values. But for such a modest purpose as to secure an adequate interpretation of the text, one shall listen to the text, as long as the author is still speaking in and through it. The author is no wanderer; he does not ramble around in search for an eternal order of things outside the cave. The intellectual concern of the author is always historical-cultural; it is always with a fundamental issue of his time. 'Most of Weber's methodological critique [have] prepared the way for the positive formulation of his [historical- cultural] sociology in *Economy and Society*.' (Roth & Wittich, 1977:XXX)¹⁴ Likewise, the conceptual exposition in the first part of the book is 'nothing more than a clarification of his own terms.' (Roth, 1978:C) For the author expected that "People will shake their heads" because of 'his redefining of well known historical, economic, legal and theological terms for his [historical- cultural,] sociological purposes.' (Roth, 1978:C) 'An adequate understanding of *Economy and Society*,' as his translator and editor of the English edition of the book suggests, 'should encompass Weber's previous research and writings and perceive the close link.' (Roth, 1978:XXXIX) And indeed, the author has never faltered in his quest for

¹⁴The "Preface to the 1978 Re-issue" in the English edition of the book.

the solution for his problem about 'the most fateful force in our modern life, [modern (rational)] capitalism.' (Weber, 1978:17) until his last moment. The general introduction to his "universal history of religion" attests this; yet the most terse expression is to be found in his last lecture. In that winter, the last one in his life, the author expressly pointed out that the solution to the problem can only be found in the historicity³⁹ of modern (rational) capitalism. His last completed lecture concludes itself with the *Geist* of capitalism. Returning to his own starting point, the author stretches his understanding of the problem -- what the cloak is and why the iron cage can bound the experience and the possibilities of human beings -- into the very depth of the historicity of the distinctive way of being human from the standpoint of the "universal history" of world civilization.

4.4 THE GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY.

Death snatched Weber from his intellectual quest. Time did not allow him to finish *Economy and Society*. He bade his farewell to Eternal Truth on his death bed in the June of 1920 with his last soliloquy: *Das Wahre ist die Wahrheit*. (Weber(Schnitzges), 1975:698) The author was thus gone. His work nevertheless stays. The text of this inquiry concludes itself with Weber's last completed lecture, which he delivered in his last winter⁴⁰. About this lecture, Weber left behind nothing more than 'a bundle of sheets with notes little more than catchwords set down in a handwriting hardly eligible even to those accustomed to it.' (Weber, 1927:xvii) Thanks to the patient effort of his editors, the lecture was restored from notes by students, who willingly made their notebooks available for several months.' (Weber, 1927:xvii), and published under the title "General Economic History" at 1923 with a premissions from Frau Weber after much hesitation. For Weber, 'regarded the works as an improvisation with thousand defects,

³⁹For the meaning of "historicity", see the section, "The Formal Categories of Historical- Cultural Consciousness: Historical Temporality, Historical Significance and Historicity." in the following chapter.

⁴⁰ See the preface in the German edition of *General Economic History*. (Weber, 1927:xvii)

which had been forced upon him.' (Weber, 1927:xvii) The author's 'forceful, dramatic mode of expression' has been lost entirely and forever in the restoration, as his editors admitted. (Weber, 1927,xvii) In spite of all these problems -- which though press a much heavier burden upon any cautious and critical reading of the text -- this book allows a last glimpse of Weber's 'mature [view] of the development of capitalism' (Collins, 1980:925) 'The significance of the work,' as his editors, Hellmann and Palyi, suggests, 'lies, not in the detailed content -- [for] Max Weber was not a specialists, and specialists will find enough in the book to take exception to -- but in the penetration of the conception according to which a scheme of analysis of economic life is fitted to the exposition of the preparation for and development of modern capitalism, and in the masterly skill with which the results of the investigation are utilized in the service of this idea.' (Weber, 1927:xvii) The advice of Frank Knight, who translated the book into English, echoes the same point: 'the significance of the book lies in its interpretive brilliancy rather than accuracy of detail.' (Weber, 1927:xvi) Though never being able to free from the worries created by those problems mentioned in the foregoing, those who have followed Weber to his last year, and yet are still pondering upon why he has trodden on such a path will find some comfort in these advises. For this or that argument, this or that fact or this or that conclusion is now not so important as the text itself, being the last chance for them to penetrate into the internal unity of its author's writing as a whole.

Being addressed to a class of students in a winter semester, the lecture does not seek, as *Economy and Society* does, to build a conceptual foundation with methodically devised pure-types for a historical-cultural interpretation, but it is a historical-cultural account itself, on the same line of inquiry, as that of author's historical- cultural

⁴This inquiry agrees with Collins' comment on the significance of the lecture, however, it fails to see that a theory of capitalism is hidden under the historical account for the economic transformation in this universal social and economy history, as Collins' statement seems to suggest. For this reason, "view" is used to substitute "theory" in the above quotation.

sociology of religion and ancient civilization. It is intended to be "outlines of universal social and economy history" -- the original title of the lecture -- that cover the last two millennia of now persisting and now transforming modes of economic and social life, from the primitive agrarian communism to the dawn of modern (rational) capitalism. Though arranged in almost independent parts, each of which is concerned with a special topics such as the agrarian organization, the industry and mining or the commerce and exchange down to the beginning of capitalism, or the rise of modern (rational) capitalism, the book devotes more than half of its length to the periods immediately precedent to the advent of modern (rational) capitalism. The focus is on those transformations in the economic history, that is especially related to the emergence and extension of the then new business practice or to the subsequent alteration of the institutional framework of economic order. A careful reading -- or a restropection at the earlier chapters -- will expect a web of interpretive relationships bounding and rebounding throughout the book. For many of the transformations which the book gives a fairly detailed discussion is only barely observable and indeed otherwise trivial, if apart from the web which always supplies a linkage between these events and the latter triumph of rational capitalism. But this unified theme of the book has not come into focus until its last part.

The last part of the book gives a historical-cultural account for the rise of modern (rational) capitalism during its long nascent period from the sixteenth to the turn of the nineteenth century. Obsessive with conceptual clarity and precision as he is, Weber recapitulates the relevant sections in the first part of *Economy and Society*, in order to mark off the formal limits of the concept, modern (rational) capitalism. When logically and methodically bracketed off its historical-cultural content for the purpose of a formal definition, capitalism in general can be seen as being 'present whenever the industrial provision for the needs of a human group is carried out by the method of enterprise, irrespective of what need is involved.' (Weber, 1927:275) And a modern (rational), capitalistic establishment, on the other hand, is 'one which determines its

income yielding power by calculation according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a balance.' (Weber, 1927:275) To lay bare the specific content of this formal definition, the author reiterates the first part of *Economy and Society* about the most general conditions of existence, and the distinctive formal characters of "modern (rational) capitalism": (1) the appropriation of the physical means of production, (2) freedom of the market, (3) rational technology, (4) calculable law, (5) free labour, and (6) the commercialization of the economic life⁶². But neither in the *Economy and Society* nor in the *General Economic History* does the author conclude his interpretation about modern (rational) capitalism with merely a formal definition. Far from being concluded, his interpretation has just been brought to its point of departure. For the author is not interested in barely the meaning, however precise it may be, of a formal definition. Neither can he be content with only a bundle of formal characters of what the concept refers to. For, however distinctive they may be, these formal characters are meaningful only insofar as they come to guide his sight to what the idea is disclosing, and not to what the concept itself is. The *General Economic History* concludes itself with a claim, a claim which has been echoing itself throughout the text.

While capitalism of various forms is met with in all period of history, the provision of the everyday wants by [rational.] capitalistic of the occident alone and even here has been the inevitable method only since the middle of the 19th century. (Weber, 1927:276)

Once again, the author comes back to the problem about how modern (rational) capitalism is possible and why it takes root in the Christian West.

The author may take up too meandrous a course of inquiry; he may pick up too many different problems; but staying with him step by step throughout this course is a theme he is very much concerned with -- an intellectual concern which is still obsessing

⁶²See Weber, 1927:276-278. Except rational technology and the commercialization of the economic life which is concerned with the legal form of securities and shares of modern capitalistic enterprise, these formal conditions are discussed in some details but in a different context in the first part of *Economy and Society*.

many sensitive hearts of the generations after his death, and an intellectual concern which will not be slightly tarnished in its significance for humanity in at least some generations to come. Death did not allow him to reach that promise land of Truth, but neither has any one, after generations following his demise, arrived at that soil of Wisdom. Indeed, no masterpiece in any field of knowledge has ever planted itself on the summits of Understanding, but each of these masterpieces raises humanity in its own way to a higher consummation. For each of them shows a way to the summits, the fulfillment of Reason. By beating his path, the author shows his way. His way is to a light, a light which can illumine the experience of all those who are confronted by modern (rational) capitalism. He is to kindle the light; but the light will not be glittering until he has brought the past wherein the experience of the present has been historically and culturally constituted out of the darkness. He is obliged to find the root, the historical-cultural root of modern (rational) capitalism. Thus he claims:

If [the historical transformation which leads to modern (rational) capitalism] took place only to the occident the reason is to be found in the special features of its general cultural evolution which are peculiar to it. Only the occident knows the state in the modern sense, with a professional administration, specialized officialdom, and law based on the concept of citizenship. Beginning of this institution in antiquity and in the orient were never able to develop. Only the occident know rational law, made by jurists and rationally interpreted and applied, and only in the occident is found the concept of citizen (*civis Romanus, citoyen, bourgeois*) because only in the occident again are these cities in the specific sense. Furthermore, only the occident possesses science in the present-day sense of the word. Theology, philosophy, reflection on the ultimate problem of life, were known to the Chinese and the Hindu, perhaps even of a depth unreached by the European but a rational science and in connection with it a rational technology remained unknown to those civilizations³. Finally, Western civilization is further distinguished from every other by the presence of men with a rational ethic for the conduct of life. Magic and religion are found everywhere; but a religious basis for the ordering of life which consistently followed out must lead to explicit rationalism, is again peculiar to Western civilization. (Weber, 1927:313-314)

³***** 'The first foundation of modern natural science emanated from Catholic regions and Catholic minds. However, the first attempt to apply science methodically to practical objectives is primarily Protestant. Likewise, it seems that certain conceptual principles which are important for the regulation of conduct have a kind of affinity to the Protestant way of thought.' (Weber, 1978:1129)

This is the most revealing statement the author has ever made about what has brought him to such a variety of problems on such a meandrous way.

For the last time Weber could mount himself onto a rostrum to complete a lecture; in the middle of his next course, on politics and the general theory of the state, which began in the summer semester of 1920, he was removed by death. (Weber, 1927:XVII) But wonder can move a searching soul to take earnestly its own chance and plough its own way into the land of Unknown on the morass of intellectual and spiritual bewilderment. Life has its own conclusion; and the track left behind the searching soul has its own end, where it is once again lost to the morass. Yet unto its last moment does *anima* stand in defiance to *Thanatos*. Reason recognizes no bound for itself. Though with little time to stay and with little strength to drag on, Weber stretched his sight at that moment across the range of historical-cultural truth. He saw his way winding upon the morass just as Michelangelo saw David leaping out from his rock. His writing is a monument on the way. The general introduction he wrote and the lecture he delivered in his last year throw light onto the way ahead. For those who come to his work, he lends wing to their imagination flying upon the summit of understanding. The light shows the way he saw; the way is yet to be followed.

Only from this point of view does the following essay see the conceptual unity of the text; and only from the full context of this problem, the central problem of the cultural history for the author, can this essay understand his historical-cultural sociology being not only 'the articulated problematic of reality itself,' but also 'a diagnosis of our situation on the basis of his socio-economic, political, and social-cultural analysis of [modern (rational)] capitalism and of occidental rationalism,' and a diagnosis 'which presents to modern society a problem not only of management but also of meaning.' (Schluchter, 1979:13) As this conceptual unity, with the full content of the problem which concerns the author, is rising itself out of the text, every context of meaning transforms itself. Not only his statements about the methods of inquiry, but also his

conceptual scheme and formal definitions cease to have a lofty appearance and return to the text as part of it. For only from the text can these statements find their meaning, and only in the text can their purposes be fulfilled. How well such "a diagnosis of time" is determined by an adequate and truthful interpretation and critique of the world of experience. In this essay, the problems is, however, of a different character. They are not about the world, but rather about the text. How is the conceptual unity of the text logically constituted? How may a solution to the problem of the author, if his way is followed and there is a solution to the problem, be possible? And how may the interest of the author be logically fulfilled?

4.5 CONCLUSION.

But, the discussion in the foregoing is certainly not a way to say that one interest, one purpose or one idea, pure and simple, had taken hold the author in every moment when he pondered his problems, formulated his arguments, drew his conclusions, and composed his text. The author was not simply unfolding a grand plan somehow taken into the author's head at the moment when he started. No rationalism of such a kind is to be entertained in this essay. *Economy and Society* has never been finished, but neither did it come out according to the plan which the author projected many years before, as mentioned in the foregoing. The suggestions⁶⁴ at the conclusion of *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* have never been born fruits in his meandrous course of inquiry. He left the historical treatment of Protestantism to ...

⁶⁴'The next task would be ... to show the significance of ascetic rationalism, which has only been touched in the foregoing sketch, for the content of practical social ethics, thus for the types of organization and the functions of social groups from the conventicle to the state. Then its relations to humanistic rationalism, its ideals of life and cultural influence; further to the development of philosophical and scientific empiricism, to technical development and to spiritual ideals would have to be analysed. Then its historical development from the medieval beginnings of worldly asceticism to its dissolution into pure utilitarianism would have to be traced and through all the areas of ascetic religion. Only then could the quantitative cultural significance of asceticism in its relation to the other plastic elements of modern culture be estimated.' --- (Weber, 1958:183)

Ernst Troeltsch, who was then working on the *Social Teaching of the Christian Church and Sects*. (Roth, 1978:LXXVII) He himself turns to a inquiry into the universal history of religion, bringing into relief the distinctive character of the *Geist* of capitalism.

Besides, various concerns and interests may indeed intrude into the author's thought sometimes without his knowledge and for the most of the cases, beyond his control, and thus insidiously find their way into the text. An intellectual historian may have tenable reasons to claim that the author's inquiry 'has always had, a complex emotional significance for him.' (Mitzman, 1970:1969) His statements about the methods of inquiry may, as the intellectual historian sees it, be 'a defence against the implication of his earlier naive joining of science and value.' (Mitzman, 1970:169) *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism* and even all other statements about Protestantism may constitute 'a chapter in Weber's own "genealogy of morals."' (Mitzman, 1970:175) When 'recognized the ascetic mien of his mother as well as the bureaucratic spirit of his father was a threat to his autonomy,' this restive son in his parent's house and at the same time a unfortunately powerless citizen under the bureaucratic rule of his own nation focused 'his intellect on his own experience in order both to liberate himself from it and to interpret the history of the modern world; he was perceiving the historical dimension of his personal dilemma.' (Mitzman, 1970:174) Certainly, the author was not only a thinking being, pure and simple, but also a person who was thrown into the world and being in the world. He had reason as well as passion. No intellectual life might be adequately understood, when being put in isolation from the total situation of life. It is particularly true of such a life which was coloured by his consionable and passionate involvement in the practical affairs and such a life which was wearied by his own and others' frustrating and very often tragic experience as the one of the author. And indeed, even his pure intellectual interest and purpose might have its content transformed with the transitory circumstances in which the author found himself. Some of his ideas may have a trace only in those almost unreadable manuscripts or letters still

buried in his archive; and many might have never been confided to any person but the author himself who had brought them to his grave. Or, his text may be read as a history of rationalization. For only from such a point of view, according to the intellectual historian, can one see the affinities of the text with other masterpieces such that of Marx and Neitzche. A fundamental and intensive concern of their time may thereby disclosed in the work of these men who saw rationalization 'as leading to an unparalleled reification of institutions and value and a corresponding destruction of essential aspects of human personality: grace, dignity, personal creativity, spontaneity, ultimate meaningless.' (Mitzman, 1970: 187) Such a point of view, as a matter of fact, has already employed by many intellectual historians, and their inquiry does ripe a harvest. Undoubtedly, all these problems are indeed fundamentally important for the intellectual history of the text and that of its time. Inquiry of this kind is of very great value in the province of knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena and knowledge of ideas.

These problems are, however, beyond the scope of this essay. For its sole purpose is only an adequate interpretation of the text, a text so constituted that it stands and falls with its own logic -- i.e., the way to a solution for its own problems -- and that it has a value in its own right, rather than an intellectual biography of the author or an intellectual history of the text or its time. This inquiry has to find in the text its conceptual unity, which in any case has to be more than a common author and his personality. This conceptual unity has thus to be found in the internal logic of the text, and the web of interpretive relationships in the text -- which, from the standpoint of hermenutical practice, stand beyond all the transitory circumstances of the author's life, even though the latter may very often be a light upon this unity. The problem in issue, as mentioned in the foregoing, is not about the 'true' reading of the author's mind, but rather a possibility of an adequate interpretation of the text, which stays and keeps itself intact as much as it has ever been, even after its author has unfortunately long been gone. Without a conceptual unity, no comprehensive understanding of the text is

possible. The text would be broken down into pieces of thought, each of which may acquire some coherent meaning, but each of which is found being juxtaposed with each other in an unintelligible fashion. This chaos of understanding is not allowed in hermeneutical practice. Interpretation implies the highest unity in one understanding. An adequate interpretation will not gloss the minutiae in this or that context of thought but leave the unity of the whole untouched. Rather, the conceptual as well as its logical unity has to be read out of the text in the first place as its own starting point. The discussion in the foregoing, given its length and purpose, though, has not given a point after point interpretation of the text, did show how its individual contexts are related to one another. Elucidated in the foregoing were some tenable reasons for this essay to see the unity of the text as described. It attempted to demonstrate how the text may be logically held together as one unified context of meaning by one central problem the author may be concerned with throughout his inquiry.

Interpretation is distinct from that which is for interpretation, not only in latitude and in depth, but also in content and in form. A claim of a conceptual unity for a text does not show what the text is but rather how it is to be interpreted. The purpose of this essay will have been well served, if it is able to throw a light upon the specific way of interpretation which allows the text to be read adequately. For this light will guide each step of interpretation on the way to the inner unified meaning of the text. Standing behind each step of interpretation is a judgement. Contained in each judgement is a distinction -- a distinction between one and the other, relevance and irrelevance, or truth and untruth. In order to grasp some juxtaposed contexts of meaning as a unified whole from a particular point of view, an interpretation shunts aside all other possibilities for these contexts to have a unity as well as those for each of these contexts to have a different meaning, that are allowed by reading the text from other points of view, and keeps in silence every context of meaning that is deemed to be irrelevant or not quite relevant according to its own conception of the text and its purpose of interpretation.

By shunting aside other possibilities which are in many cases alternative ways of reading the text adequately, it defines its own bounds and claims value for itself. By keeping in silence all those contexts of meaning, that it is always aware of but nevertheless holds them to be less relevant to the inner-unified meaning of the text than some other contexts, an interpretation defines the text; it defines the bounds of the text and claims a particular significance for the text. An interpretation, be it adequate or not, is bound by this judgement. A text, be it a masterpiece in a field of knowledge or not, can never be completely read as long as it can have another reading -- or to be precise, another way of reading it adequately. Nevertheless, only coming face-to-face with the other, an interpretation finds itself. Only holding fast to its logical principles, an interpretation can make consistently the distinction between relevancy and irrelevancy, and the distinction between meaning and nonsense throughout. Thereby, it acquires for itself the power to transform every context of meaning down to the individual concepts in the text by virtue of its idea about the text. This judgement is fundamental. For it defines the distinctive character of the interpretation. For this reason, and this reason alone, this essay has to laid bare the specific content of the judgement which made the reading, as described in the foregoing, possible and which allow the purpose of such a reading to be fulfilled. Yet, being addressed in the foregoing pages is indeed no more than a problem concerning with the specific standpoint and the specific way of understanding in the province of historical-cultural knowledge. Such a reflection is indeed of no greater value than piling up a slab of rock on the ground. One more slab of rock does not make one stand much higher to see what the text is all about. Yet, it helps to win a better position to have a better view of the text, and if fate allows, it helps to gain a better chance to look beyond the text over the great plain of intellectual and spiritual freedom in the historical-cultural truth. One more slab is still so low on the ground that one may even not be able to have a view of the summit of Truth in the midst of the fleeting clouds. Nevertheless, such a step is part of the way, the way to the summit. If fate

allows, it may help to keep alive a hope, that one day someone may be able to cross over the rope to that Summit, however short a visit it may be, and have a glimpse of the grace and beauty of Truth.

5. POSTSCRIPT: INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES AT VARIANCE.

This discussion is neither a comprehensive nor a critical survey of the literature. The literature is voluminous, and each person may have a different idea about Weber's writing. A general and systematic exposition is obviously beyond the scope and intention of this inquiry. A few authors are chosen for discussion. For their interpretations stand as the polar opposites, each in its own way, to the present inquiry on some issues about how to understand Weber's statements about the method of inquiry. Yet, no intention is lurking behind this discussion, as to controvert with these authors or to pass a final judgement on their work. The only purpose of this essay is to lay bare the logical conditions for the possibility of historical- cultural knowledge in the internal unity of the text as a masterpiece of historical- cultural sociology. the purpose of this discussion is to stake off the distinct position of this essay, on the issue about the inner-unified meaning and the logical form of the text. It should be read as a brief comment on the logical consequences of suspending the constitutive principles of historical- cultural knowledge for the conception of the inner-unified meaning of the text.

The edifice of transcendental interpretation rests itself upon one problem: the possibility of knowledge. It stands upon the province of logical reflection upon knowledge in a very distinct position, in relation to all those which are concerned with the external conditions of the certainty and the possible falsifiability of knowledge. For the solution to the problem of transcendental interpretation lies essentially in the internal conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Interpretation of such a kind does not have a reality to begin with. It determines to penetrate its sight through this or that reality into the internal logic of knowledge above and beneath this reality. Interpretation of such

a kind is bound to take a particular standpoint, the standpoint of knowledge, which allows the problem about reality *per se* to be raised at all. It takes no reality merely in itself being immediately there outside or inside that which is confronted by reality -- i.e., that which knows. Rather the reality is only possible in the internal, primordial relationships between that which knows -- the knowing -- and that which is known -- the known -- in one moment -- the moment of understanding. Knowledge is impossible, even from a purely logical point of view, without that which is given; but that which is given does not have such an intellectual and spiritual capacity to give a reality. That which is given, as being merely given, is only an immediate "Here" and "Now", not here and now as a universal, but this here and this now, ever vanishing and ever forsaking humankind. The truth of that which is given is its immediacy, but no knowledge. Knowledge is impossible, even from the purely logical point of view, without that which knows; but that which knows stands nowhere beyond that which is known. Knowledge *per se* is a context of the vital relationships between that which is to know and which is to be known in the flow of intellectual and spiritual creation, the creation of meaning. For the purpose of the following discussion, as to bring into relief the distinct position of this essay, however, it is suffice to say that: reality is not given from anywhere, but it is constituted in and through experience, essentially with some *a priori* principles of knowledge. Instead of coming from that which is given, these principles belong to that which is to know. In order to know, that which is to know has to employ these principles to that which is given, being itself so given only in and through a highly selective and creative reception. No interest or purpose of knowledge can be fulfilled beyond a particular employment of its constitutive principles to that which is given -- or to be precise, that which is received. If tearing itself from that which is given and indulging itself in a pure thought, that which is to know would pull itself out of the vital relationships of knowledge, and thereby go beyond its own bounds. It thinks but does not know, in the sense Kant suggests. It transforms itself for the purpose of thinking. If

moving only a tiny step away from the employment of the constitutive principles of knowledge, that which is to know would pull itself out of the vital relationships of knowledge, and thereby go beyond its own bounds. It is given but does not know. It transforms itself to be no more than a direct and immediate consciousness, in the sense Hegel suggests. Knowledge is constituted from a particular standpoint of knowledge; and it has to be grasped accordingly. If deserting the way whereby its text is constituted, an interpretation would sap its vitality, and drag it out of its own bounds. Beyond its own bounds, one turns into other; light turns into darkness, meaning turns into nonsense, and truth turns into untruth. That which is to know may not see itself; it may not see its own bounds; it may not see its own ground. It may gain the whole world but lose itself. Only by way of returning, returning upon itself for itself, can that which is to know find itself. Knowledge of such a kind belongs essentially to the transcendental reflection; and transcendental knowledge is reflection *par excellence*.

Knowledge seeks its own form. An interest or purpose of knowledge seeks its own standpoint. For the world reveals itself to humankind in many distinct ways; it may reveal in one or other way by virtue of some particular standpoint of knowledge. Contained in a particular standpoint of knowledge are its constitutive principles of knowledge. In and through the employment of these principles to whatsoever is deemed to be relevant to the purpose of knowledge, that which are given -- being merely given in the senses, or being somehow constituted either from some other standpoint or with some other point of view of knowledge and somehow given in history as facts of some kind -- are transformed into a particular logical form and bound by a particular inner-unified meaning. From this particular standpoint of knowledge, a phenomenon of a particular form emerges out of the horizon of interpretation into the world. The object of knowledge is constituted. In its object, knowledge finds its fulfilment. Insofar as the forms of knowledge allow, however, that which is to know may indulge itself in whatever way it likes to be drawn toward that which is to be known, and to bracket off

their primordial relationships with one another. Yet, for those who are interested in precisely these primordial relationships of knowledge, indulgence of such a kind is obviously impossible. From the standpoint of transcendental interpretation, no phenomenon is merely being there. Merely being there is the primordial relationships of knowledge, the relationships in which that which is to know finds itself as well as that which is to be known. Any phenomenon in the world belongs essentially to knowledge of a particular form.

5.1 THE DISTINCT POSITION OF THE ESSAY: ITS STANDPOINT OF INTERPRETATION.

That which is interpreted is meaning. An unified context of meaning is a text. The inner- unified meaning of the text arises essentially out of the primordial relationships of knowledge qua interpretation between that which is to interpret and that which is for interpretation. That which is to be interpreted is determined essentially by how it is interpreted. Be it explicit or not, an interpretation employs some particular logical principles of interpretation; and the text is grasped as a particular form of knowledge. In accordance with the interests and purposes of interpretation, these principles are employed to that which is to be read; and a particular logical unity of the text is then rendered. The discussion in the foregoing has already laid bare the way of interpretation, wherein the text is interpreted in this essay. The text is deemed to be a masterpiece in the field of historical-cultural knowledge; and it is to be interpreted accordingly. Knowledge of historical- cultural knowledge, as mentioned in the foregoing, is a form of knowledge. By virtue of its standpoint, it stands in a distinct position in relation to all other forms of knowledge; and precisely for the same reason, like any other form of knowledge, it contributes no self-evident, no inevitable, and no omniscient point of view about the world. This remains true even within the bounds of those phenomena that involve humankind. It is not the only way that any inquiry into phenomena of social

interactions has to follow. "Social phenomenon", being a formal concept, means nothing more than group behaviour in general -- which applicable to human beings and non-human animals alike. For those who dedicate themselves to understanding human beings, "social phenomenon" indicates for them the presence of human beings and their interactions. Any one who is interested in Weber's writing will not miss his formal definition of social action: 'Action is "social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.' (Weber, 1968: 4) Phenomenon of such a kind -- or to be precise, action with some social characters -- may be interpreted from many different standpoints of knowledge. All these interpretations may be deemed to be equally fruitful, though each serves its own interest and purpose of knowledge and demands its contributions to be judged accordingly.

That which is meaningful is cultural. Culture can be in one way or other deemed to be historical. Yet, meaningful events contains in themselves no historical-cultural character until they are brought together to constitute a historical individual from the standpoint of historical-- cultural knowledge. Knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena, is interested not so much in the subjective and objective meaning in general or in the general or factual structure, that is embodied in the meaningful events, as some forms of knowledge do. In and through a historical- cultural phenomenon, the historical-cultural meaning and significance of a full context of experience communally shared by the historical personalities in a multiplicity of the historical given and transforming situations are revealed from a particular historical- cultural point of view. The historical- cultural meaning and significance are not simply there. For they are given neither by the event nor in the event, however meaningful it may be, itself being brought to constitute the historical individual. They are very often beyond the knowledge of the historical personalities involved in the event. They are possible by virtue of a particular, well-defined historical- cultural problem, a problem which is meaningful to be raised at all; and they would be absolutely impossible if apart from a historical- cultural

interpretation. The historical-cultural phenomenon is grasped in its individuality qua uniqueness and unrepeatability in regard only to the historical-cultural meaning and significance of the historical individual and not to those meaningful events brought to constitute the historical individual themselves or any of their characteristics. Whether an object of knowledge is unique or not is not, absolutely not determined by that which is given, even though the latter has already been meaningful before or when it is given for interpretation. It is absolutely a matter of interpretation.

Indeed, a meaningful event may allow itself to be interpreted equally well from a very different standpoint, though for a very different purpose of knowledge, in terms of some general characters or otherwise. That which is meaningful may be grasped as a mere form of experience from the standpoint of knowledge of natural phenomena; its sole content is henceforth to be the formal elements of acts, physical or mental. That which is meaningful may be grasped as an expression of the universal truth from the standpoint of knowledge of ideas; its sole content is henceforth the truth about self-same relationships of the ideas and the ultimate reality of the ethical and cultural ideals. Indeed, that which is meaningful may also be grasped from many other standpoints of knowledge. That which is meaningful comes out to be a very different phenomenon -- to be precise, phenomenon of a very different form. It is meaningful for a very different reason. Being concerned with the logical unity of the text, and seeing itself as a methodical step on the way to an adequate interpretation of Weber's historical and theoretical writing, this inquiry has penetrated its sight into the internally logical characters of the text via a transcendental interpretation of the logical, constitutive conditions for historical-cultural knowledge. Knowledge is constituted with a logical form, and it has to be grasped accordingly, if an adequate interpretation is the purpose. The logical characters of a form of knowledge, being distinct from all other forms of knowledge, are to be found in the internal possibility of knowledge. The distinctness in the form of knowledge stands apart from the external difference in

the content of knowledge. From the point of view of hermeneutical practice, the incompatibility between interpretations, in many cases, takes root in the difference of how the logical unity of the text is conceived and therefore of how the inner-unified meaning of the text is to be interpreted.

5.2 WHEN THE SANCTUARY OF EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE IS RAISED, IT WILL HAVE

No knowledge is without a form; no one may know without a standpoint. One is delighted with knowledge. For the world is grasped in such a way that one's interest of knowledge is fulfilled. Yet many is not quite ready to see the logical distinctions between different forms of knowledge. The distinctive characters of a body of knowledge, for them, belong only to that which is given, rather than to the internal logic of knowledge. "Human phenomena," when viewed from this point of view, are distinct from other phenomena insofar as they 'are not given ... in the same way.' The former have already 'partially interpreted in the ordinary language of everyday life.' (Outhwaite, 1975:16) Their intellectual and social character 'depends on their belonging in a certain way to a system of ideas or mode of living.' (Winch, 1958:108) For those who interpret human phenomena, 'it is these rules,' according to which everyday experience may have meaning, 'rather than those which govern the sociologist's investigation, which specify what is to count as "doing the same kind of thing," that is the same phenomenon.' (Winch, 1958:57) Hermeneutical practice, on one hand, turns into a merely exegesis of everyday experience or forms of life. 'Social scientific concepts,' as Outhwaite observes with alarm in his latter work, 'are [made] parasitic in important way on those used by actors in the "*Lebenswelt*."' (Outhwaite, 1983:11) So close are they to the territory of knowledge of ideas that one daring step is enough to bring them across the boundaries. 'Understanding,' according to Winch, 'is grasping the *point* or *meaning* of what is being done or said.' It is far away from any statistical and causal regularities and close to the realm of discourse and to the internal relations that link the parts of a realm.

of discourse.' (Winch, 1958:115) Thus "causation", according to this point of view, is relevant to no other purpose of knowledge than prediction; and it is banished once and for all, out of the world of hermeneutical practice. With his employment of the category, Weber, in Winch's opinion, simply suggests that the *Verstehen* is something which is logically incomplete and needs supplementary by a different method altogether, namely the collection of statistics.' (Winch, 1958:113) When he discusses Eduard Meyer's theory of the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Platea, Weber does say that '[i]n many cases, of historical interpretation which seem highly plausible, however, there is not even a possibility of the order of verification which was feasible in this case. Where this is true the interpretation must necessarily remain a hypothesis.' (Weber, 1968:11) This statement seems to bear out Winch's interpretation; yet once it is sent back to its context of discussion, the intention of the argument will have transformed itself. The statement comes from a comment Weber makes on the concept of "subjective meaning" in his formal definition of social action, being only one of the eleven parts of the comment. This comment, including in itself also Weber's statements about the adequacy of interpretation on the level of causal relationships as well as meaning, and about the pure-type of social action, according to his translator and editor, 'apparently were not intended to be "read" in the ordinary sense, but rather serve as reference material for the clarification and systematization of the theoretical concepts and their implication.' (Weber, 1968:57;fn.4) By referring to Meyer's theory as an example, Weber addresses to a problem within a very limited length of the comment: that is, one of the distinct characters of historical-cultural inquiry is to be found in the essential unity of the causal interpretation and hermeneutical practice. Just three paragraphs later, Weber draws his conclusion that 'formulations of a rational course of subjectively understandable action constitute sociological types of empirical process only when they can be empirically observed with a significant degree of approximation;' and at the same time, 'only when the phenomena are meaningful do we speak of sociological statistics.' (Weber, 1968:12)

Staking out the domain of historical-cultural knowledge beyond the territory of knowledge of natural phenomena and that of knowledge of ideas is precisely this unity of causation and hermeneutical practice, and precisely not their mutual supplementarity or even incompatibility. Winch, as well as those who concur with him at this point, seems to have no idea how the same category has been employed in many different ways, beyond the bounds of knowledge of natural phenomena, in the courtroom, in journalism, in different kinds of analysis, or even in everyday life. Even less does he understand that no historical meaning and significance is possible without a hermeneutical employment of the category of causation that unifies the generalized statements, statistical regularities, historical observations and interpretive ideas in one understanding from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge.

On the other hand, hermeneutical practice, according to this point of view, is turned into an analysis of everyday situations. The purpose is to understand other people in as much the same way as in everyday interaction, in terms of the "physical" facts about them, 'their states of minds,' 'what they are doing,' and 'why they are doing.' (Outhwaite, 1975:13) Weber, when understood in this way, 'tries[s] to bring psychological or motivational understanding, at least, within the pale of science.' (Outhwaite, 1975:46) He is thus able to identify a course of action by interpreting subjective meaning and also to understand the "complex intellectual structure." (Outhwaite, 1975:52) And at the same time, '*Verstehen* becomes a way of generating causal *hypotheses* about human behavior; those hypotheses can then be tested.'⁶⁵ (Outhwaite, 1975:28) Yet, being kept in deep

⁶⁵This argument finds its support once again in the comment mentioned in the foregoing. Indeed, many of his critics or interpreters for some reasons prefer this comment to his much more detailed discussions on the issue of the method. Weber happens to say that '[e]very interpretation attempts to attain clarity and certainty, but no matter how clear an interpretation as such appears to be from the point of view of meaning, it cannot on this account claim to be the causally valid interpretation. On this level it must remain only a peculiarly plausible hypothesis.' (Weber, 1968:9) But, still a long way to go before Weber might come to the view that the purpose of hermeneutical practice in historical-cultural knowledge is to generate hypothesis. Rather, Weber is insisting that an interpretation, as long as it is concerned with the historical-cultural experience of the historical personalities, rather than with merely some ideas, is not

silence is that on one hand, Weber's interpretation, be it about some historical personalities or intellectual structures, never stands apart from the historical-cultural interpretation of historical situations, the full context of which, rather than this or that course of action or this or that intellectual structure, constitutes the object of historical-cultural knowledge, and that on the other hand, hermeneutical practice and causal interpretation belongs to one and the same essentially in historical-cultural inquiry. In one way or in other, Weber's ideas and practice of historical-cultural inquiry are understood as being 'directed to the following problem; under what conditions and within what limits can a judgement found on understanding be said to be universally valid, that is, true.'⁶⁶ (Outhwaite, 1975:47) And the logical distinctions, that Weber so constantly emphasizes, both in purpose and in form of interpretation are simply dismissed. Knowledge is an iceberg; it submerges and it floats; it rests and it moves. Navigators may not take the apex of content of knowledge to be its whole. Those who are at the helm in the sea of facts and ideas, directing themselves to the historical-cultural truth, may not take comfort in leaving the form of knowledge out their sight and the standpoint of hermeneutical practice out their consideration. Otherwise, logic will bring them to meet their inevitable conclusions, with no mercy. Ships may wreck.

Once the sanctuary of everyday experience is raised on the land of knowledge; the multivarious purpose and standpoint of hermeneutical practice will have exiled. Historical-cultural knowledge, along with many other forms of knowledge, is cast out of the reflection upon the logic of hermeneutical practice, if not yet the practice itself. Its sinew is sapped. Either its constitutive parts are said to be conflicting one another, or they are put into service of some purpose which is not quite familiar to them. Weber's

⁶⁵(cont'd) allowed to be indifferent to the actual events ever observed in the past or learned in the present. Indeed, 'without the demonstration that what can ... be assumed to be a theoretically adequate interpretation also is in some degree relevant to an actual course of action,' Weber points out, such an interpretation, 'no matter how fully demonstrated theoretically, would be worthless for the understanding of action in the real world.' (Weber, 1968:11)

⁶⁶Cited from Raymond Aron's *Le Philosophie Critique de l'histoire*.

historical and theoretical writing is certainly one of these victims; and pure-typical interpretation is definitely a miserable one. Historical-cultural knowledge seeks to understand the history of culture. Historical meaning and significance reveals itself in, and only in, a multiplicity of situations, now persisting and now transforming, of historical-cultural life of the historical personalities, each in his (or her) own context of experience. Historical individual is essentially synthetic. To the final disclosure of its full meaning, pure-typical interpretation strikes out one methodical step. "Pure-type," according to Weber, understanding it from the standpoint of his own inquiry, is a methodical, heuristic device for historical or historical-cultural sociological inquiry. It furnishes a conceptual recreation in the historical consciousness of a course of action, events or situations, the interpretive relationships -- i.e., the typical structures -- of which are deemed from a particular point of view to be compatible and comparable to that which was observed in the past. This is the essential, logical character of pure-types; but this is not the purpose of pure-typical interpretation. The latter is the hermeneutical employment of pure-types to that which is historically given and observed in and through an interpretive confrontation qua comparison of the construct with the reality in view of the problem at hand from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge. The purpose of such an employment is to portray the historical situation on an intellectual and spiritual canvass by virtue of an interpretation of the historical meaning and significance in the historical observations through the eyes of the portraitist from a particular point of view with one or more interpretive ideas. Canvasses are in the world, but it is not the world itself. Portraits stand apart from the reality; despite and indeed by virtue this standing apart, it reveals the truth of the reality. A pure-typical interpretation reveals truth about the historical reality, when and only when it is able to unfold the historical-cultural situation in the full context of historical meaning and significance before the historical consciousness through a comparison of the portrait -- that which is to disclose -- with the historical observations -- that which is for disclosure. Then

emerging in the historical consciousness, with the employment of pure-types in and through a historical-cultural interpretation is a world, the world which is framed by the historical meaning and significance -- that which is to be disclosed -- as much as the world of Paul is framed by the word of God.

Hermeneutical practice holds the scepter of life and death over the realm of how knowledge is grasped. Sometimes, like a wrathful God withdraws his blessing and spells out his curse, hermeneutical practice may mercilessly strike upon the logical integrity of knowledge. Interpretation, for its own sake, according to its own standpoint, may choke up the ground of other forms of knowledge. When bracketed off its constitutive standpoint, the interpretive sociology of Weber is simply 'to study social behavior by interpreting its subjective meaning as found in the intentions of individuals.' (Schutz, 1968:6) The 'other self is grasped,' according to Schutz, 'as ideal-pure.' (Schutz, 1968:9) Thus, through an "ideal-typical" interpretation, 'the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts.' (Schutz, 1968:7) This is the methodical way wherein 'the structure of the social world can be disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meaning.' (Schutz, 1968:7) This is not an untruthful interpretation of Weber. It indeed rests itself on some ambiguous statements Weber has made about "meaning." Again they are found in the comment mentioned in the foregoing. The term, "meaning", Weber does write, 'may refer first to the actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor, or to the average or approximate meaning in the given concrete plurality of actors; or secondly to the theoretically conceived *pure-type* of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a given type of action.' (Weber, 1968:4) Yet, he is not furnishing a general account of "meaning" of some kind; neither is he describing the object of his inquiry; but rather he is trying to insist the logical distinction -- a distinction he never forgets to emphasize in the form of meaning as well as in the purpose of interpretation -- between subjective meaning and 'objective "correct" meaning

or one which is "true" in some metaphysical sense.' (Weber, 1968:4) It is under this context that Weber draws his highly ambiguous distinction between "empirical sciences of action" and "dogmatic disciplines", and that he vaguely defines history and historical-cultural sociology as the former. Thus only in terms of this distinction, in view of his intention as to emphasize the intimate relations of historical-cultural knowledge with the actually observed events, does this inquiry understand his claim that history and historical-cultural sociology are concerned with subjective meaning of action rather than with some objective meaning of the world. Even in this context, the "theoretical conceived" pure-type of subjective meaning is distinct from the meaning, be it "actual existing" or "average approximate," that belongs to the everyday experience.

The pure-type, even the simplest one, the one of subjective meaning of social action, is an interpretation; it is "theoretical conceived" from a particular interpretive point of view. The heuristic values of a pure-type can realize themselves when and only when it is employed to the historical observations in a historical interpretation of the historical individual essentially from the standpoint of historical-cultural standpoint in accordance with the point of view of the problem at hand. About this employment, the statement does not have much to say. For it is not the purpose of the statement. But for this employment, Weber's historical and theoretical writings as well as his statements about the method of inquiry bear full witness. Beyond this employment, the historical-cultural interpretation of the *Geist* of capitalism is impossible. For the *Geist* is distinct from the pure-type of Protestant ascetic psychology -- or to be precise, of the "subjective meaning-complex" of everyday conduct of Protestant -- and they are not allowed to be confused. But once the logical, distinctive character of pure-types and its hermeneutical employment from the standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge are kept in the darkness, the pure-typical interpretation, as employed in Weber's writing, will have been severed from its own logical form of knowledge and dragged away from its own standpoint of knowledge. Yet, pure-typical interpretation of that kind as found in

Weber's inquiry is a methodical step specific to the purpose of historical- cultural knowledge. Once it is put in the service of other purpose, its prominent, logical characters will have been fallen to the ground. 'If one follows Weber in defining action by the presence in the actor's mind of an "intended meaning" (*gemeinter Sinn*), thus meaning ... may either be empirical present in the specifically present in the specific case under investigation or be merely attributed to the actor in an ideal-typical way.' Indeed, under this light, "pure-typical interpretation" is hermeneutically transformed into that which, as Outhwaite suggests in his early work, 'is what we usually do when we are concerned to find out "what is going on" in a social situation.' (Outhwaite, 1975:14) Historical consciousness is thrown by the magical power of hermeneutical practice into the bondage to the everyday experience and its practical standpoint.

Historical- cultural knowledge as much as any other form of knowledge, may be sacked, but it will never succumb. According to some, it has already laid in ruin; yet on its ground it stands. It raises a storm of irresolvable riddles about their interpretations; the storm rages; it is raging against those who are 'to render the final verdict on the proper subject matter and methodology of interpretive sociology' (Schutz, 1968:15) without a hearing of its defense. Once the content is wrung out of the form of historical- cultural knowledge, the essential meaning of "individuality" will have been devastated in its total. "Individuality" is either understood as a formal concept of particularity of a thing in contrast to the generality or commonality of some characteristics or properties of things, or found in the general "form" of concept. In the latter case, "individual concepts" are obscurely set opposite to the 'general concepts of the natural scientists.' (Hekman, 1983:25) This is indeed an obsession of the illusion that only knowledge of natural phenomena will employ, may employ, and should employ general concepts. Such an illusion simply inflates itself and reflects its own pallor upon others. Rickert draws the logical distinction between different forms of knowledge, in particular for him, knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of cultural phenomena. This distinction

in the internal logic of knowledge is found in the conceptual picture (or conceptual formation)⁴⁷ of the object of knowledge. In and through a web of interpretive ideas and synthetic principles of knowledge, the full context of the inner-unified meaning of the object of knowledge is unfolded. Being an logical conditions of the form of knowledge, concept formation is logically distinct from concept as a general form of thought. Of this, it has no idea at all. Thus, it images that [r]estricting the conceptualization of social science to the examination of "historical individuals," ... [is] unacceptable for Weber." And it also thinks that it is 'likewise unacceptable to assume that when social scientists depart from such individual concepts, their only course is to the general concepts of the natural science.' (Hekman, 1983:25) Hekman understands that the "social scientist" is interested in the 'characteristic traits,' the 'cultural significance', and the 'meaningful relationships' of facts. (Hekman, 1983:25) Yet, when viewed from a standpoint of knowledge, other than historical-cultural, the interpretive sociology of Weber is concerned with no other reality but simply a 'concrete cultural reality;' (Hekman, 1983:35) and "historical individual" is therefore simply an "individual concept." Logic has its own conclusion. 'Thus Weber,' according to Hekman, was forced to create a concept that was neither individual nor general in order to legitimize the conceptual activity of the social scientist.' (Hekman, 1983:25) And this "neither individual nor general" concept, for her, is pure-type. Hekman seems to have no idea that "individual concept" is a *adjectivio contradictio*. Concept is universal; all concepts are general and generic; there is no exception. Weber has made this point very clearly. It is logically impossible to have an individual concept; and it is absolutely not possible to create a "neither individual nor general" concept. It is not the form of concept, but the employment of concepts from the particular standpoint of knowledge, that marks off one logical distinction between different forms of knowledge. Individuality, as mentioned in the

⁴⁷For the meaning of conceptual formation, and the distinction between conceptual formation (as conceptual picture) and concept, see the second chapter of this essay.

foregoing, is not to be found anywhere other than the historical-cultural meaning and significance of historical individuals. Historical individuals, like the *Geist* of capitalism, are neither some impossible and unimaginable "individual concepts" nor some proper nouns.

A historical individual is, as Weber expressly states, a synthetic idea, constituted essentially form a unifying point of veiwing, that captures the historical meaning and significance of a multiplicity of historical-cultural situations. Only in this context of

historical meaning and significance does any historical event, situation, or transformation find its individuality and uniqueness. Hekman has already come to the fringe of the territory of historical-cultural knowledge; yet, peering through the barriers across the boundaries, she still lacks a clear view of the land. She fails to advance only one more step, but she misses the essential. She is left there by the barriers, laminating in confusion. 'Weber is not always clear as he should be on the nature of the "reality" from which the ideal type is drawn and to which it is compared.' (Hekman, 1983:34) Was

⁶Though from the point of view of this essay, Hekman has not yet fully grasped Weber's idea of pure-type, she should not bear the full responsibility for such a confusion. 'The theoretical concepts of sociology,' Weber writes, 'are ideal-types not only from the objective point of view, but also in their application to subjective processes.' (Weber, 1968:21) How is it possible to have a "pure-typical concept"? Defining reality is concept; and that which is true is true to the concept. By virtue of the theoretical concept of energy, theoretical physicists can have a physical reality, that all matter are trapped energy. They may have different models of sub-atomic structures; but beyond this concept, there will have no truth about energy-matter transformation of the cosmos. By virtue of the theoretical concept of economic profit and economic rationalism, Weber himself can have the historical-cultural, sociological reality of modern (rational) capitalism. Different models of rational conduct in the pursuit of profit may be contrived; and indeed, his interpretive construct of rational action has a fundamental different logic, in comparison with the model of rational action in the mirco-ecomonic theory. Yet beyond this concept, there will have no truth in his account of modern (rational) capitalism; for modern (rational) capitalism will have been unintelligible at all. By virtue of concepts and ideas, human beings can have reality. And only by virtue of theoretical concepts is any construct, model, analysis, or interpretation possible at all. How can a concept approximate a reality which is defined by itself? And how can a concept which defines the reality compare with the reality? Were the theoretical concepts of sociology are pure-types, there would have no sociological reality at all. For there would have no theoretical reality of sociology. Sociologists would have to consult God for his divine vison of reality in order to compare their "concept" which is an ideal type with the "reality". Even from a purely logical point of view, the theoretical concepts of sociology are not, and can not be ideal types. In order to understand how did Weber make such a claim, one has to go back to the text

pure type a concept of the reality, rather than a conceptual construct of some historical-cultural situations, it would be absolutely impossible for it to be compared with the reality -- which being itself defined by the concept.

Weber's inquiry indeed fails to fulfill the purpose of interpreting everyday experience and forms of life. Not only is his writing far away from furnishing a final method for the interpretation of such a kind; but also it has not given thought for even a moment of the fundamental issues and central problems about how everyday life may be understood. According to some, the purpose of Weber's sociology is 'to interpret the action of individual in the social world and the ways in which individuals give meaning to social phenomena.' (Schutz, 1968:6) But, Weber has hopelessly missed the central problem, that is, about the way 'in which the other self is meaningfully given to us,' (Schutz, 1968:19) and disappointingly failed to 'answer the question of whether the meaning which the action has for an actor is identical with what appears to the latter to be his motive.' (Schutz, 1968:28) Yet, at stake is that: does Weber simply presuppose, as Schutz suggests, 'the meaningful existence of the other self as something simply given in [those] cases where he speaks of the interpretation of the behavior of others?' (Schutz, 1968:20) Or is he interested not so much in the subjective meaning or behaviors of others as in the historical meaning and significance of the historical situations? Are not the former deemed to be relevant only insofar as they can be brought to constitute the historical individuals? Is not his sight stretched across the raging flow of historical transformations of two millenium, yet seldom beyond the end of eighteenth century and never to the one after? And is not he, as a historical-cultural sociologist, confronted by

“(cont'd) itself. In the original text, Weber only said that '*Idealtypisch sind aber die Konstruktive Begriffe der Soziologie*' He did not refer to "*die Theoretisch Begriffe der Sociologie*", but rather to "constructive concept". In English, there is no constructive concept; concept is conceived and not constructed. By that term Weber probably meant conceptual construct, and Parsons translates it as theoretical concepts. If this happens to be true, then ideal types will be conceptual pictures of interpretation or if one likes, theoretical constructs or theoretical models of sociology. Indeed, Weber's other statements about pure-types do bear out this interpretation.

no living person, whosoever to be an other self, wielding an axe or lecturing on "2x2=4," in any historical observation, but rather by only some artifacts or texts, which the historical personalities left behind for historical- cultural interpretation?

Certainly, the painstaking labour of those who reflect upon everyday experience does bear succulent fruits of new ideas about and new insight into human beings and their intimate relationships with the world. These fruits may not be even possible at all over the soil of historical- cultural knowledge. Nevertheless they seem to have overlooked the fact that the fullness and richness of living content of everyday experience can only be preserved within the bounds of everyday life. Once beyond its bounds, this experience is destined to be transformed in accordance with some other standpoint of knowledge. It is a simple truth: if 'wrapped up in [one single] way of making things intelligible to the exclusion of all others,' (Winch, 1958:102) knowledge simply creates disasters for itself. For the very nature of the human world, as Winch suggests, 'is to consist in different and competing way of life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of things.'⁶⁹ (Winch, 1958:103) Is not historical consciousness precisely one of these way of life? Life is enriched and intellect is

⁶⁹The original text runs as following: 'Science, unlike philosophy, is wrapped up in its own way of making things intelligible to the exclusion of all others. Or rather it applies its criteria unself-consciously; for to be self-conscious about such matter /is to be philosophical. This nonphilosophical unself-consciousness is for the most part right and proper in the investigation of nature ..., but it is disastrous in the investigation of a human society, whose very nature is to consist in different and competing ways of life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of thing.' (Winch, 1958:102-103) But it is the standpoint of this essay that this "self- unconsciousness" is simply disastrous to knowledge, any kind of knowledge alike. Winch himself admits that this "self- unconsciousness" is not quite right or not quite proper even in the inquiry into natural phenomena 'at such critical times as that gone through by Einstein prior to the formulation of the Special Theory of Relativity.' (Winch, 1958:103) But it is precisely the ground breaking period of inquiry that counts. Does not Einstein's intellectual biography bear this out? This great theoretical physicist and the father of modern theoretical physics was forbidden from the truth of quantum physics by no one but his 'own way of making things intelligible,' according to which God does not and will not play dice. If Bohr and other quantum physicists shared his view and wrapped themselves up in his way of making things intelligible, modern physics, modern chemistry, modern biology and all other branches of knowledge built upon them would have remained in a not much different state of art from that in the first decade of this century.

delighted precisely in and through the transforming power of knowledge, creating new meaning and new significance out of that which is given, however meaningful it may have already been, from different standpoints of knowledge. As a matter of logic, as Winch suggests, 'the nature of ... knowledge [of "social phenomena" may] be very different from the nature of knowledge of physical regularities.' (Winch, 1958:88) Yet, by virtue of its logical character, this difference cannot be found simply in that which is given and received or simply in some rules rested on the social context of investigators' activity. Logic is universal and inexorable, standing above all transitory circumstances. The essential distinction between different forms of knowledge is first and foremost determined by the purpose and standpoint of knowledge. Even everyday experience is never merely being there; it is the abode of the "reality of life" by virtue of its mundane practical purpose and everyday commonsense standpoint. The simply formal distinction between "social phenomena" and "physical phenomena, as Parsons points out, does not stand between different forms of knowledge, serving no barrier which prohibits trespass of those who have not yet put away the standpoint belonged to the territory they depart and pick up the one of the land they are about to arrive. Indeed, lying there over the province of knowledge is a vast territory, where knowledge of "social phenomena" and knowledge of "physical phenomena" share some common logical forms of knowledge. Towering upon there is a standpoint of knowledge, which reveals the fact that "human reality" is also natural. Over there, all phenomena are in the flow of nature.

5.3 WHEN THE SANCTUARY OF GENERAL, EXPLANATORY THEORY IS RAISED, IT WILL HAVE

Nature is categorically distinct from culture. Conventional wisdom is wont to see this distinction in terms of the content of knowledge and one step further, the content of knowledge in terms of that which is being there, as if being there in itself. On the other hand, transcendental interpretations hold a quite different point of view. That

which is without meaning is nature. But, that which, according to the practical wisdom, is meaningful may be logically transformed into nature, insofar as meaning is made dead. "Making meaning dead" is not a pejorative usage of language. It is a logical condition for the possible of knowledge of a particular form. This form of knowledge has been brought to serve various interest of humankind, and has been employed to preserve their life. All the same, meaning is made dead whence the living content of the meaning of human experience and the situations of being human in the world is bracketed off, and only the form of meaning stays behind. From the logical point of view, the distinction between knowledge of historical- cultural phenomena and knowledge of natural phenomena cannot be fully grasp, in the way as Parsons believes that he can, in the specific character of the structural and variable elements and the laws governing these elements, in the character of empirical evidence for their application or in the degree of organicism of the concrete ... individuals with which they have to deal with.' (Parsons, 1949:623) Fixating too close on the external particularity of the object under inquiry may leave the logical form of the phenomena completely out of sight and the issue concerning the methodical way wherein a particular body of knowledge about the phenomena may be adequately grasped out of consideration. Parsons is able to see that the 'basic distinction between historical and analytical is not to be identified with that between the natural and the social science.' (Parsons, 1949:599) But such a distinction as between "historical and analytical science" is nevertheless a necessary consequence of the belief in a general methodology common to all empirical explanatory science. (Parsons, 1949:590)⁷⁰ As long as the logical form of knowledge is not a problem, worthy for him to ponder upon, he would go all the way to the view that 'in a purely logical aspect there is no difference whatever' and that 'the difference all lies on a

⁷⁰ Pareto ... laid down a general methodological outline common to all empirical explanatory science natural and social. But to make natural science methodology applicable to social subject matter it was necessary for him to divest it of certain positivistic-empiricist implications of earlier methodologies. Weber has come to the same element from the otherside, and has seen the same implications for the natural science.' (Parsons, 1949:590)

substantial level.' (Parsons, 1949:595) The final verdict on knowledge is thus passed down: no other logic but only external logic of knowledge should be honoured; no other logic but only formal logic of inference should be obeyed.

A sanctuary of general, explanatory theory is raised on the ground of knowledge, whence all other standpoints of knowledge is not paid a due respect. Meaningful are then only the elaborate systems of formal relationships between some self-same concepts. Parsons cannot agree with the 'deep-seated view that the progress of scientific knowledge consists essentially in the cumulative piling up "discoveries" of fact.' (Parsons, 1949:6) He intends to speak for the truth. The '*scientific* importance of a change in knowledge of facts consists precisely in its having consequences for a system of theory.' (Parson, 1949:9) The purpose of knowledge is then to seek a "logically closed" system of some theoretical, 'interrelated propositions which involve reference to empirical observations.' (Parsons, 1949:9) Observations of the world of experience find in themselves no unique meaning and significance -- not to mention the historical individuality of historical-cultural phenomena. An observation, 'however true and however interesting for other reason,' is absolutely, 'scientifically unimportant' as far as it 'has no consequences for a system of theory with which scientists in that field are concerned.' (Parsons, 1949:9) The incorrect point of view is thus thrown up-side down; but the wrong has not been put right. Parsons observes that 'the direction of interest in empirical fact will be canalized by the logical structure of the theoretical system;' (Parsons, 1949:9) what he does not see is that this is true only within the bounds of knowledge of natural phenomena. When bursting its own bound, any standpoint of knowledge can only make itself look crass and other grotesque. Hermeneutic practice, according to the point of view, is to explain human phenomena in terms of the values of some analytical elements and a combination of the formal relationships of human acts. A phenomenon is meaningful whensoever it is able to be described in terms of a frame of reference 'that all the essential properties of a

concrete entity are included.' (Parsons, 1949:615) Despite and by virtue of his willingness to recognize and his emphases of the "normative structures" of human society, under his scalpel of explanatory, analytical and scientific analysis, human experience has its living content being methodically removed, with only its formal structures still standing on the ground. According to his own logic, "physical phenomena" are obviously as meaningful as any other kind of phenomena, as far as a scheme of formal relationships is available. The significance of Weber's statement about the methods of inquiry, for him, is no more than his separating out the substantive difference of the order of fact from consideration of the logical character of scientific theory.' (Parsons, 1949:591) For those who has convinced themselves of this point of view, no one is able to hold them back from seeking the truth of general theoretical analysis of human society insofar as they are willing to pay the price. In the case of interpreting Weber, they simply break down his historical individuals and tear apart their historical-cultural meaning and significance in order to examine the structures of symbolic meaning of action in general and in details.

A generalized statement about social action is possible when the historical context, along with many other contexts, of life and experience has been wrenched off. The general forms of action stands, and stands solitarily by itself, when the historical-cultural meaning and significance of the historical situations, as well as meaning and significance of many other types, have drained away. Analysis of such a kind furnishes new truth of and new insight into humankind. It claims for itself intellectual worth. Yet, once historical-cultural knowledge is grasped from the standpoint of general theory of action, its distinctive, logical characters will have found themselves being pressed uneasily between slates of sedimentary rock of interpretation. The interpretive ideas of historical-cultural knowledge will have been denuded, on one hand, of their constitutive standpoint which discloses the context of experience and its transformations as being essentially historical-cultural, and on the other hand, of their constitutive point of view

which reveals the intellectually and spiritually significant relationships between the past and the present as well as the indispensable bond of that which is of historical-cultural significance to the historical consciousness. The logically *a priori*, constitutive character of value judgement will have been then violated. Despite his keen recognition of the logical distinction of knowledge from that which is given, he calls it "raw experience." Parsons sees in Weber's idea of "relevance of value" no more than a merely "direction of interest" which 'constitutes the selective organizing principle for the empirical material of the social sciences.' (Parsons, 1949:593) He is not quite willing to admit one simple truth; interpretation is impossible without value judgement. Weber never hesitates to make himself clear that historical-cultural knowledge rests itself essentially upon value judgement, and at the same time and indeed everytime when he make this point, he never fails to emphasize the hermeneutic employment of value judgement from the historical-cultural standpoint, the employment which makes value judgement in knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena distinct from that in knowledge of ideas. Either Parsons has missed the point Weber constantly emphasizes or he chooses to keep it in deep silence for his own reasons. In any case, he can only reluctantly allow value judgement to stand by the gate of knowledge. 'Even though a value element enters into the selection of the material of science, once this material is given,' Parsons writes, 'it is possible to come to objectively valid conclusions about the cause and consequence of given phenomena free of value judgment and hence binding on anyone who wishes to attain truth, regardless of what other subjective values he may hold.' (Parsons, 1949:594) The blood stream of internal logic of historical-cultural knowledge is occluded. The content of knowledge appears to him having an intellectual capacity to be self-constituted. Historical individuality loses its essential meaning; and only the shadow is falling over a wavy sea. The most prominent interpretive category of historical-cultural knowledge, in Parson's opinion, is simply the singularities of some concrete individual phenomena in contrast to the "abstract generality" of some classes of

phenomena. Between knowledge of natural phenomena and knowledge of historical-cultural phenomena stands a fundamental distinction in interest and purpose of intellect. Weber constantly emphasizes this. Parsons never denies his having done so, but he interprets Weber's statements in his own way. In Parsons' eye, this distinction is no more than a formal one as between abstract generality and individual particularity. And he comes to meet his own logical inevitable conclusion. Only because of the "nonscientific motive of cognitive interest" which may be called "a disinterested value attitude," the element of concrete individuality become most prominent and that principle of value relevance as formulated by Weber is applicable. (Parsons, 1949:595-596) Still, Parsons sees no reason to deny that this element is quantitatively much more important in the social situation. (Parsons, 1949:595) Interpretation has its thaumaturgic power. The logical condition for revealing historical-cultural meaning and significance is turned into a minor, quantitative difference in "nonscientific" dealing with things.

Interpretation has its own standpoint. It may stand precariously on its own toes, looking over the barriers over the territory of other forms of knowledge from its own standpoint. Knowledge then becomes one; and interpretation may rejoice in the sameness of standpoint. In the field of voluntary theory of action, Parsons contribution is beyond reasonable doubt. He translated Weber and introduced him to his American audience; his merits are beyond question. Weber is lent a welcome hand and received to his own fold. But, he also has to take the oath and put on their habit. Weber starts from the positions, according to Parsons, which 'were of a thoroughly empirical character.' (Parsons, 1949:610) His main purpose of engaging in the polemic concerning the method of inquiry is simply 'to vindicate the logical necessity of the use at all of general concepts in explanatory science.' (Parsons, 1949:610) His discussion about "causation" simply 'concerned immediately the questions, how is it possible to prove the existence of a [formal] causal relation between certain features of a given historical individual,

which Parsons conceives it as the thing to be described, 'and certain empirical facts which have existed prior to it?' (Parsons, 1949:610) The truthfulness of Parsons' interpretation is unquestionable. He is fair enough to maintain Weber's positing as concerning "concrete phenomena" as he see it; and the problem of Weber's causal interpretation is not about simply a general relationships between classes of things, but rather 'the consequence for the ensuing course of events arising from the existence of these facts at the time and place that they existed, in the given? total circumstance.' (Parson, 1949:611) But, under the bridle of his own view, Parsons will see no difference between *the fact that* Julius Caesar crossed Rubicon and *the fact that* a young mother, whoever she may be, had a dispute with her cook. They are logically the same: 'the only way is which to arrive at a judgement of the causal significance of a factor is to ask what would have happened if the factor in question had not been present or had been altered.' (Parsons, 1949:612) For Parsons, it is as matter of course, 'nothing in principle, but the logic of experiment,' be it in the laboratory or in the mind. (Parsons, 1949:612) The "given total circumstances" are isolated from the historical situation. The circumstances are total, but they are not historical- cultural. "Causation" is thus dislocated completely from the historical-cultural interpretation. The distinctive, logical character of causal interpretation in historical- cultural knowledge is removed; only the bare form of logic stays. Hanging itself over one and only one standpoint, an interpretation will be totally blind of the employment of the general forms of logic. The general forms of thought -- be it general concepts, categories or other -- are employed from a particular standpoint; or they are not employed at all. Of this, Parsons has no idea at all.

Once the wedlock which holds "causation" to its interpretive ideas is broken down, logical integrity of pure-typical interpretation will have been in peril. Weber's pure-types are in effect though not in name dismissed altogether. "Pure-types," according to Parsons, are merely general types employed for some explanatory purposes. A pure-type, for Weber, may never been intended or even pretended to be a hypothesis.

Parsons has made this point quite clear. But a "pure-type," according to him, is nevertheless 'a hypothetically concrete reality, a state of affairs or a process or a unit in one of these; it is a construction with a fictitious simplification and exaggeration of certain features.' (Parsons, 1949:615) Thus, there is no significant difference between "pure-types" and formal concepts, like "triangle" or "parallel line". 'The ideal-type universal,' Parsons states, 'is a true universal and is thus applicable to an indefinitely plurality of particular case.' (Parsons, 1949:610) 'Pure-type' henceforth 'contains no concrete facts.' (Parsons, 1949:610) Thereby, he is about to complete the grandiose task to graft the form of pure-typical interpretation into the explanatory purpose of general theory.

It is not the intention of this essay to say that such a feat of hermeneutical ingenuity is futile. Neither is it the position of this inquiry that the purpose of his interpretation is illegitimate. Anyone who come to the masterpiece, is destined to go beyond it. Nevertheless, Parsons discards the logical, distinctive characters of the pure-typical interpretation of Weber's historical and theoretical writing, once and for all. The heuristic value of pure-typical interpretation is lost in oblivion. The essential purpose of methodical comparison with the historical observations in employing pure-types is kept in deep silence. Parsons is a theorist; and his interpretation of Weber is from a theorist's standpoint. A theorist should obey no authority but logic. Parsons does and he comes to his conclusion. Was pure-type a general, formal concept, it would have been employed to define and describe the reality. It would not be possible to be simply a heuristic devices methodically designated for a particular point of view. Thus Parsons sees that Weber 'tends, by hypostatization of ideal-types, to break up ... the organic unity both of concrete historical individuals and of the historical process, and to conceive 'them to be make up of disparate atoms.' (Parsons, 1949:607) The conceptual picture of the historical situation in the full context of historical-cultural meaning and significance, in Parsons's eye, beomes an engineering diagram. The interpretive

relationships of value and significance are turned into a factual structure of things. The interests and other subjective values of intellect, according to Parsons, should have no relationship, whatsoever, with knowledge, as long as the relevant elements of "raw experience" have been selected for the purpose of knowledge. Yet, Parsons' interpretation is largely guided by his own interest in general theory throughout. From a purely logical point of view, this is not, absolutely not, mistakes of some kind; but this forcefully demonstrates that the internal logic of knowledge has to play its magic; or no knowledge is possible. It is indispensable; and it will serve humankind in exactly the same way from now to the end of time, whether "scientists" like it or not.

Many other different points of view may allow knowledge of "social phenomena" to be compared with knowledge of "physical phenomena". Sometimes, both of them may be deemed to be of precisely the same logical form, or at least share the same methodical rules of inquiry, even though the two type of phenomena are said to be essentially distinct from one another. This distinction may be defined, say, like Outhwaite who follow the lead of Bhaskar in his latter work does, in terms of the structures of that which is given. These structures, according to them, are real; from them are phenomena generated. Yet distinct from "empirical" and "actual" events or experience⁷¹, real structures may not be directly given, and thus lie beyond the reach of immediate experience. The world is split into two: namely, the world of knowledge and ideas -- including 'concepts, theories, laws etc of science' all of which Outhwaite terms transitive objects -- and the world of things --- or what he calls intransitive objects, i.e., 'the real structures and mechanism of the universe.' (Outhwaite, 1983:14) The purpose of knowledge, according to Outhwaite, is to penetrate 'the complex surface ... of phenomena to a more basic simpler "real reality" which underlies them.'

⁷¹ 'The real which include mechanisms, events, and experience,' Outhwaite writes, 'must be distinguished from the actual (events or experience) and the empirical (experience alone). An event can occur without being experience, e.g., a landslide on an unknown island, and a causal mechanism may still be active when it is counteracted by another and does not therefore produce a change at the level of events.' (Outhwaite, 1983:14)

(Outhwaite, 1983:122) Thus, the distinction between "physical" and "social" phenomena has to be found in this "real reality". 'Social structures,' when conceived from this point of view, 'unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they govern; [they] do not exist independently of the agents's conception of what they are doing in their activity; [and they] may be only relatively enduring.' (Outhwaite, 1983:16) Therefore, "social sciences" are distinct from "physical sciences", in at least one regard: the former 'are internal with respect to their subject matter.' (Outhwaite, 1983:17) Thus "social sciences" enjoy a comparative advantage, though in the midst of its absolute disadvantages, in comparison to "physical sciences".

The "real definition" of the social structures is generated from a theoretical description of the form of life from one or more subjective point of views. For, according to Outhwaite, many social scientific phenomena are already identified under the description of "actors' structure and so forth." (Outhwaite, 1983:17) "Real" definitions and descriptions of social reality can be rendered by transcendental arguments from pre-scientific [i.e., everyday, commonsense] description; (Outhwaite, 1983:17) and non-arbitrary hypothesis about the "real" mechanism underneath the phenomena can then be generated. Any idea about transforming the everyday experience from some particular standpoint of knowledge, such as 'Max Weber's conception of the relation between science and pre-scientific thought,' is deemed from this point of view to be 'basically ... separatist.' (Outhwaite, 1983:59) However it may interpret the everyday experience and whatsoever reason it may have for doing so, knowledge of "social phenomena" is not allowed to be significant different from everyday experience. Yet, despite these distinctions, the logical difference between "physical sciences" and "social sciences" is deemed to be in degree rather than in kind, as to the decisiveness in testing and the possibility of accurate measurement. The central problem of inquiry into the "social" or "human" phenomena", for Outhwaite, is the possibility of comparison between theoretical systems and the explanatory power. How

well a theory can explain the efficacious, i.e. real relationships in the society is held to be the most important criterion on which any theory is to be judged. Such a view, obviously stands polar opposite to that of transcendental interpretations, of which this inquiry is one. But it is not a way to say that this view is incorrect or false because the one shared by transcendental interpretations is right or true. When viewed from a purely logical point of view, apart from any theoretical consideration, the situation is seldom that one and at most one of us can be right; even less is the case if I am right then you must be wrong. The world may reveal itself to humankind from different point of view, fulfilling different interests and purpose of knowledge. From this point of view, this inquiry interprets the text and brings itself to the conclusion. With due respect for their interests and purposes, it reads all other authors' work, be it mentioned or not in this essay.

Outhwaite, in his latter work, is interested in the way how the conceptual and theoretical elaborations of the inner-unified interpretive ideas -- that is what he calls "a priori" theory and "transcendental arguments" -- come to constitute knowledge of "social" phenomena. His concern is very often directed to the explanatory power of a theoretical description and analysis of the deep-seated -- that is, for him, "real" -- structures and mechanism underneath social phenomena, as well as the possibility, which a conceptual and theoretical framework can afford to generate 'alternative description of the world' and to furnish 'explanation in "open-system" where, because of distributing influences, one cannot identify constant conjunctions.' (Outhwaite, 1983:4) Yet standing before, in terms of the logical relationship rather than importance, and contained in any knowledge, theoretical or otherwise, is the logical, constitutive standpoint of knowledge. 'The first pre-condition of any [methodical]⁷² discussion,' as Weiss points out, 'is an adequate description of the subject matter.' (Weiss, 1981:29) And an adequate interpretation is logically impossible without the text being grasped in its own

⁷²"Methodical" is employed to replace "scientific" in the original context for the consistency in the usage of language in this essay.

form. Yet the logic of knowledge is categorical distinct from knowledge itself. A logical form of knowledge does allow an enormous amount of freedom for anyone to see the world very differently. One and the same standpoint -- with the purely logical *a priori* conditions for the possibility of knowledge, understood in the sense as in transcendental interpretations -- allows fundamentally different and even incompatible descriptions and interpretations of the world, for one simple reason, the content of the interpretive ideas as well as their interpretive relationships are not the same. Thus, as much a cultural historian as Weber, Tawney interprets the historical relationships of religion with the rise of modern (rational) capitalism largely in terms of the political situation of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. And not less a cultural historian than both of them, Thompson shows how the movement of methodism after Wesley had contributed to the misery of the working people in England of the same period. Transcendental interpretation is able to demonstrate if any of these or other interpretation is any particular form of knowledge or not, and how logical adequate it is. Yet their correctness and "truth value" of the content of the interpretation are beyond the bounds of transcendental interpretation. Outhwaite's interpretation obviously stands beyond these bounds, for it does not share with transcendental interpretations the same problem. The latter alone is not suffice to solve his problem. He hinges his whole interpretation upon the tenet of different interpretive frameworks as well as the content of their *Weltanschauungen*, rather than the purely logical form of knowledge. Though he is keenly aware of the purely logical conditions for knowledge, that he terms them epistemic constitution of knowledge, and distinguishes them from the social and practical constitutive forces, that he calls them ontological constitution of knowledge, as time goes by, Outhwaite moves the focus of his interpretation further and further away from the logical form of knowledge to the content of the theoretical frameworks as well as their social conditions. Thus, "*a priori*" and "transcendental" conditions for the possibility of knowledge for Outhwaite are more than the purely logical conditions, including all

kind of social, practical, and conceptual constitutive forces, such as "*a priori* theory", "transcendental arguments", "transcendental control" and the like, that make knowledge of "social" phenomena possible. Nevertheless, his interpretation is informed by his ideas of science: that is, the most important, if not the only, purpose of science is to explain the reality. As he pithily states, 'in principle, even if we allow incommensurability, we can rank theories in terms of their explanatory power.' (Outhwaite, 1983:18) By virtue of this interpretive principle, his interpretation may be able to render a very penetrating account for some forms of knowledge; but historical-cultural knowledge, along with many other forms of knowledge, are destined to be left out of consideration.

Upon the land of historical-cultural knowledge, structures stand; but they never stand alone, waiting for a "real" description of themselves; neither do they stand still at the service of a merely explanatory purpose of knowledge. Historical-cultural knowledge is concerned with the structure of the vital relationships in the historical-cultural context of the experience of the historical personalities. It interprets the now persisting and now transforming structures in a historical situation, their advent and their demise in the bright light of historical meaning and significance. The standpoint of historical-cultural knowledge recognizes no self-same structures, be it stamped with some historical earmarks or not, in the flow of history. It is confronted with the very historicity of the full context of human experience in the flow of historical consciousness. But once the interpretive principles of historical-cultural knowledge is suspended, these structures look pale in their shadows. According to Outhwaite in his latter work, Weber, upholds a principle that historians are and should be interested in 'the individual aspect of large scale phenomena.' (Outhwaite, 1983:127) His interpretive structures of historical-cultural inquiry is then taken to be merely those of the intended meaning of action, that the observer somehow gives to the actor. Though from a different standpoint, but on this issue for the same reason, Outhwaite are too ready to join Schutz in their united front. Weber, the former cites the latter, simply 'natively took

for granted the meaningful phenomena for the social world as a matter of *inter-subjective agreement* in precisely the same way as we all in daily life assume the existence of a lawful external world conforming to the concepts of our understanding.' (Outhwaite, 1983:126) Under this light, historical individuality has its shadow cast squarely on the territory of logical atomism. Weber's statements about historical-cultural inquiry are snatched away from its standpoint of interpretation and from the problems they address to and grafted to the view of methodological individualism that 'only people are real: groups, associations, social relations, and social structure in general, are not.' (Outhwaite, 1983:127) He seems to have forgotten the fact, among many others, that Max Weber was trained in law and legal history. The influence of jurisprudence presses its trace even on the formal definition of those concepts such as institution, endowment, and the like, in the first part of *Economy and Society*. The pure-typical interpretation of the historical situation are once again turned into 'an individualized method which isolated "individually meaningful features" and arranged them in 'universal -- but individual -- patterns.' (Outhwaite, 1983:122) The rejection of "holistic conception" becomes a constitutive principles of Weber's historical-cultural sociology. But Weber never says that cultural historians or historical-cultural sociologists should not employ "holistic concepts", but rather he simply points out that, they do not treat social collectivities 'as if they were individual persons.' (Weber, 1968:13) Indeed, for Weber, no only is a historical-cultural sociologist not allowed 'for his [or her] own purposes ... to ignore [the] collective concepts derived from other disciplines,' (Weber, 1968:14) but also, he (or she) must be keenly aware of the fact that these concepts of collective entities is significant just because they have meaning in the minds of the historical personalities. 'Actors thus in part orient their action to them, and in this role such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course of action of real individuals.' (Weber, 1968:14) Is not this idea about social collectivities compatible, at least in some respects, to Outhwaite's "a priori

conception" of the social structures, that mentioned in the foregoing. Was Weber's ideas about the logic of historical-cultural sociology based on methodological individualism, Outhwaite's conception of the "real" description of social life would not be standing much further from it.

In and through an interpretation, one creates; one creates in accordance with one's own images of the world. The world has its grace and beauty; and it reveals them to humankind in multivarious ways. Whensoever one and only one image of the world is held fast, to the exclusion of all others, hermeneutical practice lays its own curse. Janus turns its face. Brahma turns into Siva. Yahweh strikes men. Concealment is raging in every moment of disclosure. The ground of Truth is choked up. Whensoever knowledge is allowed only to be explanatory and analytical, historical-cultural knowledge, like many other forms of knowledge, is stormed out of its land, and condemned to be an untouchable in the foreign kingdom. By the feet of the explanatory, analytical, and scientific methodology, under the light shining over the content of knowledge but flickering dimly over the logical form, historical-cultural knowledge sees in its own shadow, a scrawny orphan who is faltering grotesquely everywhere, as if it has nowhere to go and as if it can go to nowhere.

This discussion is neither a comprehensive nor a critical survey of the literature. The literature is voluminous, and each person may have a different idea about Weber's writing. A general and systematic exposition is obviously beyond the scope and intention of this inquiry. A few authors are chosen for discussion. For their interpretations stand as the polar opposites, each in its own way, to the present inquiry on some issues about how to understand Weber's statements about the method of inquiry. Yet, no intention is lurking behind this discussion, as to controvert with these authors or to pass a final judgement on their work. Weber is not always consistent between his statements. His intention of clarifying himself on the issues of the method and logic of inquiry is very often defeated by his way of expression. This unfortunate situation is first and

foremost created by the polemic context of discussion, as mentioned in the foregoing. To some extent, it is a consequence of his premature death, leaving his major work unfinished. As a matter of course, his own limitation in the clarity of thought, and his mode of expression bear the largest part of the responsibility. Many controversies between interpretations indeed have their roots in these inconsistencies. Neither of them (including the present inquiry) can claim itself to be the only truthful rendition of Weber's writing. Each of them snatches on one or more statements and thereby makes a strong case for itself. However, the content and the significance of this inconsistency can be determined, in any case, only by the standpoint of an interpretation and its conception of the inner-unified meaning of the text. The reason for the present author not to engage in the dispute of great significance for sociology is first and foremost the very purpose of this inquiry. As being repeatedly emphasized in the foregoing, the labour of this inquiry is not directed to the methodological issues of how to conduct sociological research, be it an empirical investigation in the laboratory or in the field, or so-called theory construction. Neither is it interested in the intellectual history of Weber's methodological thought; nor is it concerned with the theoretical content of the text as a whole or the meaning of a particular argument. The only purpose of this essay is to lay bare the logical conditions for the possibility of historical-cultural knowledge in the internal unity of the text - masterpiece of historical-cultural sociology. On the other hand, each of these authors' writing is intended to be a treatise of methodology of social science(s), addressing to one or more problems about the method of inquiry, and the interpretation of Weber serves as only a part of its arguments. If judged apart from the very purpose of interpretation and the context of the dispute, it is addressing to, any interpretation of such a kind would be falling apart. Judging alternative interpretations in this way obviously serves no positive purpose or increases knowledge, but to gratify one's self-complacency. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to stake off the distinct position of this essay, on the issue about the

inner-unified meaning and the logical form of the text. It should be read as a brief comment on the logical consequence of "suspending the constitutive principles of historical-cultural knowledge for the conception of the inner-unified meaning of text. In the forgoing, this essay deliberately sets its own interpretive principles, in particular those concerning the logical unity of the text, against some of their opposites and one-sidedly emphasized their fundamental differences and some significant logical consequences of these differences in the practice of interpreting the text. By so doing, it has thus brought into relief the logical character and the essential content of its interpretive principles, both the interpretive ideas about the inner-unified meaning of the text and the interpretive view of its logical unity.

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