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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PREJUDICE

BY

ROBERT EDWARD LAZAR

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND

RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1991

ISBN 0-315-70129-3

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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TITLE OF THESIS: The Phenomenology of Prejudice

DEGREE: Doctor of Philosophy

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1991



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Date: 

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *The Phenomenology of Prejudice* submitted by *Robert Edward Lazar* in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of *Doctor of Philosophy*.

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

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

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

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

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

P. D. Ashworth

Date: October 4 1991

I wish to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Stephanie. I hope that one day you will think it was all worthwhile.

I would also like to dedicate the thesis to those people who are affected by prejudice and who have dedicated themselves to understanding and eliminating it.

ABSTRACT

The meaning of being–prejudiced was examined phenomenologically. The California F scale, used to select subjects for interviewing, was administered to four undergraduate university classes (N = 173), from which five prejudiced subjects were selected. The subjects submitted written accounts and were interviewed about their experiences of being–prejudiced, focusing on their contact experiences with outgroup members. Protocol analysis revealed 22 aspects of the experience of being–prejudiced, from which essential and structural descriptions were derived. The structural description indicates that to be prejudiced means to rather inflexibly maintain an attitude about all outgroup members based on experience with some outgroup members. At the core of being–prejudiced is a predominantly negative emotional state that is accompanied by characteristic modes of perception, thought and action which are influenced somewhat by context factors. The results are examined in relation to existing literature concerning prejudice, and implications for further research and for education to combat prejudice are considered.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people deserve credit for getting me through this thing. First of all, I want to thank Drs. Stewin, Hague, MacKay, Abu–Laban, Snart, and Ashworth for their insight and, more important, encouragement in the preparation of this work. I would not have made it if not for your on–going support.

A special "thanks" goes to my co–researchers—Ann, Chris, Irene, Rick, and Ruth (you know who you really are)—who gave me their time and who opened themselves up to me so that I may conduct my research.

I also want to acknowledge the help of Drs. Kanchier, Beattie, Hess, and Lewis for letting me disrupt their classes to administer the F scale.

On a lighter note, I thank the entire Ed. Psych. "gang" for their friendship and support. For a while there, I didn't think I'd ever finish.

And, finally, thank you Stephanie for putting up with me and for doing most of the cooking when I was going insane. It has been an eventful year for both of us, and I look forward to an eventful life together.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Prejudice is a persistent social problem. It has claimed the attention of media, politicians, educators and social scientists alike, as well as the general public. Recognition of the need to combat prejudice, racism and discrimination is found in the United Nations (1966) declaration of March 21 as the "International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination." In 1973, the United Nations proclaimed the start of the "Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination," which was extended for another decade in 1983.

Prejudice is poorly understood despite scientific interest in the phenomenon. Social scientists in general, and psychologists in particular, have a limited understanding of the phenomenon. They formulate explanations of prejudice without first learning what it means to be prejudiced. Although numerous studies of prejudice have been conducted, meaningful results have been limited by researchers' tendency to ask *why* and seek *explanations* of prejudice rather than ask *what* and seek *understanding*. The research presented in this dissertation helps to redress this imbalance.

The phenomenon of prejudice, and the meaning of being–prejudiced and of experiencing prejudice against outgroup members, is explored in this dissertation. The research presented here answers the question: *What does it mean for individuals to be prejudiced and to experience prejudice against outgroup members* ? This study emphasizes *contact situations* and prejudiced individuals' experiences in face–to–face encounters with outgroup members. Contact situations are focused upon because a complete understanding of the phenomenon of prejudice can be obtained only by considering both prejudiced individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and the circumstances in which

those thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are aroused (Jahoda, Deutsch, & Cook, 1951).

Overview of the Dissertation

In writing the dissertation, the author followed conventions for writing research reports. Following the introduction is a review of literature pertinent to the research question. Then the method used in the study is described, the results are delineated, and the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the results. The following overview of the chapters of the dissertation expands on this synopsis.

Chapter 2

Literature on prejudice is reviewed in chapter 2 to provide a context and background for this study. Only literature relevant to this particular investigation is reviewed, that is literature involving either contact situations or interviews with prejudiced individuals. (Interested readers are referred to Blalock, 1967, or Ehrlich, 1973, for comprehensive reviews of the literature on prejudice.) In particular, the literature reviewed includes: (a) interview studies conducted with prejudiced individuals. These studies are reviewed to examine the methodologies employed; (b) investigations of contact situations, which are reviewed to determine what is known about contact; and (c) phenomenological investigations of attitude conducted along the lines of this study. In addition, the literature is critiqued and the nature of phenomenological research is examined.

The reader will notice the datedness of some references cited in chapter 2. An explanation for this is now provided. During the 1920s and 1930s researchers emphasized the measurement of prejudiced attitudes and they described differences between groups. With the rise of antisemitism in Germany prior to World War II—prejudice on a large scale—researchers concentrated on

personality dynamics and the development of theory. This emphasis lasted throughout the early 1950s. During the rest of the 1950s and the early 1960s researchers' attention focused on the effects of situational, normative, social, cultural and institutional factors on group relations, including contact situations. Cognitive approaches to the study of prejudice also emerged, as did attempts to change prejudiced attitudes. Also during the 1960s, investigators focused on the effects of prejudice on people who are targets of prejudice. The late 1960s and the 1970s ushered in a period of extensive survey research as social scientists determined the breadth of the problem. From the mid–1970s to the present researchers have emphasized the use of indirect measures of prejudice, while new theories of prejudice have also emerged (Ashmore, 1976; Fairchild & Gurin, 1978; Katz, 1976; Milner, 1983).

The reason for the datedness of some references is that this study focuses on the experiences of prejudiced individuals and, as the above historical overview demonstrates, prejudiced individuals were the focus of investigations *prior* to the mid–1960s when attention focused on individuals who are targets of prejudice. Likewise, interest in contact situations declined after the 1960s. Interview studies and investigations of contact situations became less frequent after the early 1970s. Consequently, most of the interview studies conducted with prejudiced individuals, and most of the investigations of contact situations—the primary areas of concern in this study—occurred before the end of the 1960s.

Chapter 3

In chapter 3 the methodology and procedures used to answer the research question are presented, including the way in which participants were selected, the manner in which data were gathered, and the steps used to analyze the data.

The nature of a research question determines the methodology employed to answer the question. In this study a *what* rather than a *why* question is asked, and *understanding* rather than *explanation* is sought. This suggests the use of a qualitative method. And because the *experiences* of prejudiced individuals are examined, a phenomenological method is selected (for reasons outlined in chapter 3). After the reasons for employing a phenomenological approach are presented, the five individuals who participated in the study are introduced and briefly described.

Chapter 4

The results are considered in chapter 4. First, a thorough examination of the results is presented in which the various aspects of being–prejudiced are described. Next, these aspects are synthesized into a description of the essence of being–prejudiced, from which the structure of being–prejudiced is obtained. Finally, the results are examined in relation to literature outlined in chapter 2 to see how they fit in with the results of other studies.

This study focuses on the experiences of prejudiced individuals in contact with outgroup members. Consequently, many of the results deal with contact situations. However, as data collection was not limited to a consideration of contact, various other aspects of the experiences of prejudiced individuals are also described.

Chapter 5

The results are reflected upon in chapter 5. But before this is done, limitations of the research, in both scope and methodology, are discussed. Then the results are considered in relation to existing knowledge about prejudice, and new information about the phenomenon is identified.

Implications of the results for further research are then considered. Avenues of inquiry suggested by the results are described, and examples of research to follow up this study are provided.

Are the results of the study useful? This question is answered when literature on educational programs to combat prejudice is reviewed, and implications of the results for such programs are presented.

CHAPTER 2

THE LITERATURE

What does it mean for individuals to experience prejudice against outgroup members? If the proper subject matter of psychological investigation is experience (Sherif & Sherif, 1953), then it is necessary to answer this question. The literature on prejudice is replete with theories and quantitative studies which emphasize *explanation* and do not present an *understanding* of the experiences of prejudiced individuals. Furthermore, qualitative research about prejudice is lacking, and the results of quantitative investigations are often equivocal. There also exists a plethora of diverse theories beyond unification (Allport, 1951b; von Eckartsberg, 1971). This literature review demonstrates the need for a phenomenological investigation of prejudice.

Before reviewing the literature pertinent to this research, however, it is necessary to consider several definitions.

Definitions

A prejudice is an attitude, and the study of prejudice is subsumed under the study of attitude. "An attitude is an interrelated set of propositions about an object or class of objects which are organized around cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions" (Ehrlich, 1973, p. 4).

In the vernacular, *prejudice* refers to the strong dislike of one person or group of people by another person or group of people. Prejudice may be morally wrong when it injures innocent individuals or places them at a disadvantage because of prejudgments placed upon them (Vickery & Opler, 1948). Frequently, individuals maintain prejudices more intensely than they maintain other attitudes (Vickery & Opler, 1948). Prejudices exist when individuals hold generalized or unwarranted ideas, emotions or judgments concerning entire groups based upon limited exposure to group members.

Individuals may also develop rationalizations for the ideas, emotions or judgments (Allport, 1951b; Allport, 1954; Berg, 1984). Allport (1954) defined prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (p. 9).

Stereotyping is a component of prejudice. Stereotyping exists when individuals assume that others have certain attributes solely because they belong to certain groups (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980).

A concept closely related to prejudice is *ethnocentrism* . Whereas prejudice refers to individuals' dislike of *particular* groups, ethnocentrism refers to individuals' frame of mind regarding groups *in general* . For ethnocentric individuals, ingroups (i.e., groups within which the individuals either consider themselves members or desire to become members) are objects of positive opinions and outgroups are objects of hostility (Adorno, Frenkel–Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).

Psychologists generally regard *tolerance* as the antithesis of prejudice, although Saenger (1953) argued that *cooperation* is the antithesis of prejudice because cooperation involves no underlying hostility. Tolerance, derived from the Latin *tolerantia* meaning "to put up with" or "to suffer," exists when individuals endure persons whom they dislike. Unlike cooperation, tolerance implies conflict and it exists when overtly good relations coincide with individuals' underlying prejudices.

Lastly, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the relationship between prejudice and *discrimination.* At present, the link between prejudice and discrimination is unclear. Research results are equivocal (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976). While some studies suggest attitude/behavior consistency (e.g., Campbell, 1971), many studies indicate that prejudice is a poor predictor of discrimination

(Ehrlich, 1973; Proshansky, 1966; Wicker, 1969). A possible reason for this inconsistency is that several factors additional to individuals' attitudes, such as their verbal, intellectual, and social skills, may have to be considered when predicting their behaviors (Wicker, 1969). The inconsistency may also result from researchers' difficulties in measuring individuals' prejudices: Only when individuals' prejudices are accurately assessed will they provide reliable predictions of behavior. Ehrlich (1973) suggested that the attitude/behavior inconsistency results from researchers' naïveté at phenomenological analysis, "that is, our inability to ascertain the intentional meaning of an actor's verbal and nonverbal acts" (p. 10).

Interview Studies

Social psychological research on prejudice is mainly quantitative in nature. Correlational studies predominate (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) while surveys are also common. Many so–called qualitative studies—which are rare—are really descriptive studies in which researchers utilize interview material. Few studies involve in–depth interviews with prejudiced individuals. It is worthwhile to briefly consider three influential *depth* studies, as they are called, so that contrasts between them and the present research can be drawn.

The findings of these studies are not presented here because they are not germane to the purpose of this review. The methods used in these investigations are reviewed so that contrasts with the methodology employed in the present study (described in the next chapter) can be made. This review is undertaken to demonstrate that this study is not a replication of previous research.

The Authoritarian Personality

In their ground–breaking study, *The Authoritarian Personality*, Adorno et al. (1950) studied the economic, social and political convictions of "potentially

fascistic" individuals. In addition to developing attitude scales for measuring ethnocentrism and political–economic conservatism, they also interviewed numerous prejudiced individuals in order to draw a psychological profile of the prejudiced individual.

Utilizing psychodynamic theory as a framework for interpreting their subjects' answers to standardized interview questions, they sought "a phenomenology based on theoretical formulations" that would further differentiate the theoretical concepts (p. 603). They emphasized theory rather than experience, and they used interviews rather than questionnaires because of the advantages provided by the richness and concreteness of "live" interviews. Their aim was not to study antiminority prejudice per se, "but rather to examine the relation of antiminority prejudice to broader ideological and characterological patterns" (p. 605).

Opinions and Personality

In *Opinions and Personality*, Smith, Bruner, and White (1964) analyzed 10 men to trace the development of the men's opinions. They did this as a test of their theoretical model of the opinion process. The authors began with theory (not experience), and they studied the subjects to test theory rather than to generate data.

The investigators utilized 28 procedures that the subjects completed in 15 weekly 2–hour sessions. The procedures included interviews, standard tests, and tests specifically devised for the purposes of the study. Interviews were on such topics as childhood memories, family background, ideals, education, occupation, health, sex and abilities. Tests included the Rorschach, Wechsler–Bellevue Test of Adult Intelligence, Thematic Apperception Test, and word association. The focus of the study was an open–ended interview on Russia.

Dynamics of Prejudice

Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964) sought to answer the question "what factors are associated with antisemitism and are these factors also associated with anti–Negro attitudes?" In *Dynamics of Prejudice* they tested numerous hypotheses, based on Freudian theory, about the intrapsychic mechanisms involved in hostility toward outgroups. They employed psychoanalytic theory as a framework for analyzing their subjects' responses to interview questions.

Bettelheim and Janowitz interviewed demobilized soldiers, who they chose as subjects for historical reasons: Because the main promoters and followers of the antisemitic movement in Germany following World War I were former soldiers unable to integrate into society, Bettelheim and Janowitz felt that demobilized soldiers would be at risk for developing prejudice if ethnic intolerance was to approach critical limits again for reasons similar to those that accounted for its development in Germany. They studied a random sample of 150 veterans of World War II residing in Chicago (excluding officers). The subjects were mostly from the lower and lower–middle classes—the same classes that supported antisemitic parties in Germany preceding the second World War. Negro, Jewish, Chinese, Japanese and Mexican veterans were excluded because they are members of groups toward which hostility is directed.

Beside their datedness, several differences exist between these three studies and the research in this dissertation. Interview material was analyzed according to some theoretical framework in these investigations. Because the data were used to test theory, themes were not drawn from the data. Furthermore, the studies did not focus on the experiences of prejudiced individuals, and contact situations were largely ignored. The authors utilized psychological tests and attitude inventories to help construct psychological

profiles of prejudiced individuals. Hence, the qualitative nature of the studies was compromised by the researchers' use of quantitative measures.

The researchers did not describe their subjects' attitudes phenomenologically because they substituted characterizations of the attitudes that were meaningful to the subjects with their own explanations of their subjects' attitudes (Romanyshyn, 1971). Briefly, they substituted explanation for description. For example, Smith et al. (1964) hypothesized that attitudes serve three functions—object appraisal, social adjustment, and externalization—and they applied these categories to their data. The categories reflect their own view of attitudes and not the views of their subjects.

These investigators improved upon traditional studies by examining the experiential side of attitudes. Nevertheless, the studies are not phenomenological. The researchers mistakenly assumed that a phenomenological approach simply requires the collection of experiential data. The researchers did not adequately examine the meaning of attitudes to the attitude holders (Romanyshyn, 1971).

As this review indicates, none of these researchers employed a phenomenological approach to examine the experience of being–prejudiced, nor did any of them attempt to discern the essence of this experience in the interview material. This differs from the present study in which a description of the essential experience of being–prejudiced is derived from data gathered in phenomenological interviews with prejudiced individuals.

Contact Situations

This study focuses on the experiences of prejudiced individuals in face–to–face encounters with outgroup members. Because of this it is necessary to examine literature on contact situations and to assess understanding in this area.

Amir (1969) concluded from his review of research on contact situations that prejudiced individuals generally avoid contacts with outgroup members whenever possible because they dislike and distrust outgroup members, and furthermore they maintain unfavorable stereotypes when contacts are made. Allport (1954) maintained, on the other hand, that even though prejudiced individuals may hate outgroups in the abstract, they nevertheless act fairly when in contact with outgroup members. Allport's reason for this attitude/behavior inconsistency is that groups are easier to attack than individuals because groups are more abstract and impersonal.

Amir (1976) identified context and other factors involved in contact situations between ingroup and outgroup members (e.g., statuses of the interacting individuals, casual vs. intimate contact, etc.), and he synthesized the results of investigations of contact situations into the following generalizations: (a) It is difficult to make people interact with outgroup members because they prefer to interact with ingroup members; (b) highly prejudiced individuals avoid contacts with outgroup members more strongly than less prejudiced individuals, and once contacts are established their attitudes generally become more negative while the attitudes of less prejudiced individuals become more positive; (c) persons interacting in contact situations eventually accept the situations as well as outgroup members; (d) once contacts are established they produce changes in the attitudes of members of the interacting groups; (e) the conditions under which contacts occur largely determine the direction of attitude change—*favorable* conditions (e.g., intimate contact between equals in the pursuit of common goals) reduce prejudice whereas *unfavorable* conditions (e.g., competitive or involuntary contact between low status outgroup members and high status ingroup members) increase intergroup tensions; (f) change does not necessarily occur in the direction of attitudes but may occur in attitudes' intensity

or salience (i.e., their importance to individuals); (g) when attitude changes due to contacts do occur, the changes are often limited to the specific contact situations and do not generalize to other situations; and (h) experiments—the research methodology employed in most studies that report favorable findings due to contacts—are artificial and conducive to positive results: It is doubtful that most real world contact situations reduce people's prejudices because favorable conditions are unlikely to prevail in those situations.

Research on contact situations has a number of problems and limitations (Amir, 1976). First, the attitudes of interacting individuals toward contacts have been largely ignored. Individuals' attitudes toward contacts may be different from their general attitudes toward outgroups. For example, self–proclaimed liberals who express favorable attitudes toward other groups may still wish to avoid contacts with outgroup members. Second, research on the role that the personality characteristics of interacting individuals play in contact situations is lacking. Third, the results of numerous contact studies may not be generalizable because the studies involved relations between blacks and whites in the United States, that is they involved interactions between predominantly high status majority and low status minority group members. (This problem of generalization affects much research on prejudice, not just research concerning contact, because many studies of prejudice have been conducted with blacks and whites in the United States.) Fourth, researchers lack a theoretical understanding of what contacts involve as agents of change, nor are they knowledgeable about the underlying processes involved. Some researchers assume that interpersonal contacts disrupt outgroup stereotypes by producing cognitive dissonance. Finally, some of the terminology that social psychologists employ in the language of intergroup contact is vague and ill–defined. For instance, when researchers state that participants in contact situations are of

"equal status," they may be referring to (a) the equal status in society at large of the groups that the individuals belong to, (b) the equal status of the specific individuals involved, or (c) the equal status of the groups as determined by an outside agency (e.g., the researchers). These ways of defining equal status may not be equivalent.

In sum, the study of intergroup contacts lacks a theoretical orientation to facilitate understanding of basic phenomena and to guide researchers in conducting studies systematically (Amir, 1976). Research has been conducted in a piecemeal manner, making general conclusions hazardous to draw.

Theories of Prejudice

It is worthwhile to briefly overview some theories of prejudice to provide a context within which the facts of prejudice may be, and have been, interpreted. Many of these theories are stated in terms of black/white relations because they have been elucidated to explain white prejudice toward blacks. Emphasis is placed on recently formulated or currently popular theories in this overview because extensive reviews of traditional theories may be found elsewhere (e.g., Allport, 1954). Nevertheless, two classical theories—the scapegoat and normative theories—are considered here as representatives of traditional modes of theorizing about prejudice in both psychology and sociology.

Theories of prejudice are frequently, though not always, divided into psychological or individual level explanations and sociological or societal level explanations. Psychological theories emphasize "human nature," self–interest and other personality variables in explaining how particular individuals in particular cultures acquire prejudices. Sociological explanations, on the other hand, emphasize faulty human institutions, societal norms, and relations between groups in determining how individuals' prejudices are shaped (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976; Blalock, 1982).

Individual level explanations of prejudice may be divided into those which stress intraperson factors and those based on interpersonal relations. Stimulated by Freudian theory, many psychological explanations are formulated in terms of personality variables. These theories assume that prejudice can be explained by basic cognitive, affective, and motivational processes. Termed "symptom theories," they trace prejudice to intrapsychic conflict. Conversely, explanations focusing on interpersonal factors assume that prejudice is acquired in the same way as other attitudes, namely through interaction with the social environment (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976).

The *scapegoat theory*, premised on the frustration/aggression hypothesis, was a popular theory of prejudice in the psychological literature. According to this theory, prejudice is a reaction to internal frustration and is not the result of an external stimulus (although the frustration may be provoked by external events). Frustrating experiences generate aggression as they accumulate. This aggression seeks an outlet, and the need for a scapegoat is born. The choice of a particular scapegoat is explained by cultural tradition. Usually those persons who are too weak or defenseless to strike back are selected as scapegoats. Frequently an entire group—a minority—becomes the object of hostility. The displacement of hostility from its original cause to a minority results in prejudice. But the displacement must be rationalized, and the simplest rationalization is to blame minority group members for causing one's frustrations and failures. Furthermore, using stereotypes allows one to rationalize hatred against an entire group rather than just an individual (e.g., since "they" are all alike, "they" all deserve antipathy).

This theory has been highly criticized for several reasons. It explains the need for a scapegoat but not the choice of a particular scapegoat. It also suffers from many of the same difficulties as the frustration/aggression hypothesis,

upon which it is based. For example, frustration does not always produce aggression, frustration is not always displaced, and when it is displaced the target is not always a safe one as the theory implies (e.g., black prejudice toward whites). Furthermore, contrary to the theory's pretensions, displacement does not actually relieve frustration because the frustrating agent is still present. Also, the theory does not explain why only some individuals become prejudiced, and some evidence suggests that prejudiced individuals are no more aggressive than non–prejudiced individuals. In addition, tests of the theory are inadequate because they are based almost exclusively on subhuman subjects, and when humans are used the experimental designs rarely allow for responses other than aggression. Finally, the theory is unfalsifiable because any aggressive act may be considered the result of a frustrating experience if delayed reactions, subtle forms of aggression, and displacement are allowed for (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1982; Ehrlich, 1973; Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Zawadzki, 1948).

Two more recently formulated psychological theories of prejudice are discussed by Abrams and Hogg (1988). The *self–esteem hypothesis* (SEH) maintains that prejudice is motivated by an individual's desire to enhance positive self–esteem. Specifically, one's self–image as a group member is enhanced by making the ingroup positively distinctive psychologically from outgroups. The SEH is problematic because the self–esteem construct can be operationalized in numerous ways, and self–esteem may be considered both a dependent and an independent variable in relation to intergroup behavior. That is, self–esteem may be a product of specific forms of intergroup behavior or a motivating force for those behaviors. Furthermore, studies of the SEH have produced conflicting results. To overcome some of these difficulties the authors suggest that a desire for *cognitive coherence* or *good structure* may be a

motivating force behind prejudice. According to this view, stereotyping and prejudice preserve the integrity and coherence of cognitions and the self–image.

The *normative theory* of prejudice has been an influential sociological theory. According to this theory, "prejudice is built into the culture in the form of normative precepts—that is, notions of 'ought to be'—which define the ways in which members of the group ought to behave in relation to the members of selected outgroups" (Westie, 1964, pp. 583–584). The theory maintains that all groups develop particular styles of living with certain beliefs, standards, and "enemies" to suit their needs, and various pressures operate to keep individual members in line. The members adopt the group values and norms as a way of regulating experience and behavior. Support for this theory is provided by social distance studies which demonstrate that geographically and temporally separated samples rank various ethnic groups similarly on social distance scales, by public opinion polls which provide evidence of norms of intergroup relations, and by studies of the development of prejudice in children which show that children are not born with prejudices by develop them systematically (Allport, 1954; Westie, 1964).

A number of limitations of the normative theory have been raised. Allport (1954) argued that the theory is unnecessarily collectivistic: Prejudices, he maintained, are ultimately matters of individual formation. Ashmore and DelBoca (1976) observed that much of the data in support of the theory is correlational, and there are conflicting research results (e.g., regarding the role of parents). Consequently, it is not clear how individuals form prejudices from cultural patterns, nor is the importance of socialization agents such as parents, peers, and television known. Finally, Duckitt (1988) derived a number of propositions from the theory, such as differential exposure to normative

pressure is an important determinant of prejudice in highly prejudiced groups. He tested the propositions on a sample of South Africans and was unable to find support for any of the propositions. He concluded that his findings seriously challenge the normative theory, and he argued that the theory is highly cited because conformity pressures do influence behaviors and beliefs under certain conditions.

The *middleman minority model* of ethnic antagonism focuses on middle class ethnic minority group members who operate as middlemen in providing goods and services to fellow minority group members (Turner, 1986). According to this view, minority group members who settle in ethnic enclaves and who create economic and social support systems for other minority group members not only foster group distinctiveness, they also threaten the indigenous population (e.g., by increasing competition in the market). In response, the indigenous population (the majority) adopts discriminatory practices which are legitimized by stigmatizing beliefs about the minority group members.

Brewer (1984) described a sociological theory entitled *common sense racism*. Common sense racism is construed in two ways. First, it is construed as a set of ideas and beliefs which exclude and degrade blacks. These ideas form a racist ideology which functions to structure the working class racially and thereby maintain the hegemony of the ruling bloc. These ideas and beliefs about blacks are rooted in the experiences and knowledge of everyday life of white working class individuals. These ideas and beliefs (e.g., black blood is different than white blood, blacks are inferior to whites) transcend individuals to constitute a general set of ideas and beliefs. Second, common sense racism consists of a finite set of vague and often contradictory beliefs and ideas about blacks, and a process of reasoning by which "everyday" people construct their social world. It is through such common sense reasoning that people arrive at

their common sense knowledge. To form such ideas and beliefs, people draw on their own past experiences as well as socially transmitted and shared categories. That is, common sense knowledge is a product of each person and not of everyday life generally. This means that a person's common sense knowledge contains both unique and shared ingredients. What is uniform across individuals is the process of reasoning by which common sense knowledge is constructed. According to this view, "common sense knowledge" is not common. What is common in the process of reasoning is the *assumption* that one's own ideas and beliefs are general and shared. Brewer argued that it is a matter for empirical research to determine which of these views of common sense racism (if either) is correct, and whether or not racist ideas and beliefs are in fact a part of each person's common sense knowledge.

There is an ongoing debate in the literature on prejudice between proponents of *realistic group conflict theory* and proponents of *symbolic racism theory*, though emphasis has been placed on the latter theory. The realistic group conflict theory states that prejudice results when whites perceive that blacks pose a real threat to their personal lives (e.g., by demanding a larger share of "the good life"). According to this theory, the origins of prejudice lie in competition between blacks and whites for the same resources (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Such competition produces hostility toward members of the threatening group. In short, social attitudes reflect private interests.

Symbolic racism, on the other hand, is defined as "the expression [by suburban whites] in terms of abstract ideological symbols and symbolic behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo" (McConahay & Hough, 1976, p. 38). Attitudinally, symbolic racism represents a set of abstract moral assertions concerning blacks' behavior and what "ought" to be done with

them. Behaviorally, it represents certain acts, such as opposition to affirmative action, which maintain the racial status quo but which are justified or rationalized on a nonracial basis.

Symbolic racism theory arose from the commonly held belief that racism has apparently changed recently from blatant expressions of black inferiority to opposition to symbolic issues (e.g., affirmative action) which is justified by the belief that blacks collectively violate traditional values, such as the work ethic. This new racism is endorsed by mainstream values such as individualism, and is not the result of actual personal experience (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986b; Weigel & Howes, 1985). While evidence has been adduced in support of the theory (see Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976), this evidence has been highly criticized along with the theory itself (see Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986b; Weigel & Howes, 1985).

This concludes the overview of theories of prejudice. A few comments are now in order. Each theory has its strengths and weakness, and evidence and counterevidence can be presented for the various theories. No resolution of their differences seems forthcoming, and no unified theory of prejudice currently exists. (This view was also expressed by Allport [1951b] during the heyday of theorizing about prejudice.) Furthermore, "empirical confrontations" between competing theories would enhance understanding of prejudice, but such confrontations are rare (Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Lastly, most existing theories do not encompass all, or even most, of the factors involved in prejudice. Chesler (1976) argued that there are few fully developed perspectives, that is few comprehensive theories that encompass the full range of individual and systemic variables involved in prejudice.

Critique of the Literature

Before critiquing the literature, it is necessary to emphasize the complementary nature of quantitative and qualitative research. The two approaches are not antagonistic in purpose: Each is appropriate for answering a particular type of question. Nevertheless, this critique focuses on the limitations of traditional social psychology in order to emphasize the need for this study.

The study of attitudes and prejudices falls within the realm of social psychology. Consequently, many of the criticisms levelled against social psychology or attitude study apply to the study of prejudice. This critique examines social psychology as a whole and the specific study of attitudes and prejudices.

von Eckartsberg (1971) argued that social psychology is experientially meaningless because of a gap between the *science* of social psychology and the *living* of social psychology. There is little dialogue between the scientific study of social psychological phenomena and individuals' experiences with the phenomena. For example, Milner (1983) contended that prejudice has been reified and examined independently of individuals' experiences.

Part of the reason for this gap is the assumptions upon which social psychology rests. For instance, social psychologists tend to explain individuals' present states in terms of their past conditions (the *genetic bias*), thereby obscuring the effects of the present and future on attitudes (MacLeod, 1947). In *Opinions and Personality*, for example, Smith et al. (1964) stated that the psychological approach to the study of opinion must answer the "genetic question," namely "how did an opinion develop?"

Social psychologists also tend to accept, as the true causes of individuals' social behaviors and experiences, the reified social structures and processes

defined by sociologists instead of these structures and processes as apprehended by experiencing individuals (the *sociological bias*) (MacLeod, 1947). This bias is evident in the normative theory of prejudice, according to which prejudice is lockstitched into the cultural fabric of a society and conformity pressures (e.g., from socialization agents such as parents, peers and the media) operate to keep individual group members in line. This theory assumes that conformity pressures operate in much the same way on all members of society, thereby overlooking the possibility that differences may exist in the manner in which individuals experience such pressures. (For a further consideration of the assumptions or biases governing social psychological thought, see MacLeod [1947] and Romanyshyn [1971].)

These assumptions apply to social psychology as a whole. Social psychologists make other assumptions specifically in research on attitudes and prejudices (Ehrlich, 1973). The first assumption involves the isomorphism of attitude structure across targets. It is assumed that the targets of individuals' attitudes have no impact on the structure of the attitudes. That is, individuals' attitudes have the same structure toward all social objects. For example, individuals' attitudes toward blacks and their attitudes toward Jews share the same structure. This assumption overlooks the possibility that the structure of attitudes may vary according to their targets.

Social psychologists also assume the isomorphism of attitude structure across individuals, that is they assume that attitudes toward a given target have essentially the same structure across individuals. This assumption negates the possibility that different individuals may experience the same social objects differently. For instance, the dominance of attitude components (cognitive, affective, behavioral) may vary across individuals, resulting in different attitude structures.

The intentional aspect of attitudes is generally ignored by social psychologists even though the very concept of attitudes includes their intentional character, that is the relation of attitudes to objects (Romanyshyn, 1971). It is usually the *content* of attitudes that is studied. Emphasis on the content of attitudes resulted in the construction of attitude scales and the measurement of attitudes, leading Allport (cited in Romanyshyn, 1971) to claim that attitudes are more successfully measured than they are defined.

The context in which individuals form and express their attitudes is also largely ignored (Romanyshyn, 1971). Ironically, while investigating attitudes, researchers generally bracket out individuals' participation in experimental situations and the effects of the situations on attitudes. Furthermore, MacLeod (1947) contended that attitudes are not a state of the self as traditionally thought, but are a state of the *field* of which the self is a part. For example, prejudice is a state of the field of intergroup relations wherein individuals regard their dislike of outgroup members as being caused by and not as causing the properties of outgroup members. According to MacLeod (1947), the study of attitudes requires a descriptive analysis of the *objective field* which is unbiased by conventional attitude categories or hypotheses about deeper motivation.

There are also difficulties with the approaches and methods used to study attitudes. Researchers generally utilize a detached observer approach to study attitudes and they neglect the experiential point of view, producing a one–sided and inadequate understanding of attitudes. Researchers employ a detached observer approach because it is a traditional method to study attitudes and it is convenient to use (Sherif, 1966). As a result, the variables that are investigated are easily manipulated, although they may not be the most important variables for describing a phenomenon. Furthermore, many research methods—including surveys, which have been the most common way to measure prejudice (Crosby

et al., 1980)—force data into previously defined categories that overlook subtleties in the organization and experience of prejudice. Because the data do not speak for themselves, there is little correspondence between the concept of prejudice and its operational definition (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969).

This critical appraisal of the social psychological study of attitudes and prejudices emphasizes the limitations of the traditional approach because the strengths of the phenomenological approach rest, by and large, on the limitations of the traditional approach. From a phenomenological perspective, the traditional approach is wanting in its foundation (as evidenced by a gap between experience and the "scientific" study of phenomena), in its emphasis on content to the virtual exclusion of context and relational factors, and in its methods and overall approach (which has produced a limited array of data). The need for this study is suggested by these limitations of the traditional approach to the study of prejudice, and such a study would complement existing social psychological research in this area.

The Nature of Phenomenological Research

Given that many of the above criticisms are based on phenomenological thought, it is timely to overview the nature of phenomenological research and its relation to existing research practices.

Psychology adopted the natural scientific approach, that is it adopted positivistic and empirical philosophical views, at the time of its birth (Giorgi, 1986). As a result, psychologists emphasize observable aspects of physical or material things or events that, in principle, can be perceived in the same way by many people. In other words, only variables that can be controlled and perceived by the senses are of concern (Kruger, 1986). Furthermore, speculation is dismissed, and the aim of research—which consists of

repeatable experiments with observers who are independent of investigated phenomena—is to uncover laws that enable prediction. This is accomplished by reducing phenomena into elements and analyzing relationships among the elements (Kruger, 1986). Briefly, psychologists adopted the Cartesian dualism (i.e., the subject/object split) of natural science, which led to a differentiation between observable, objective aspects of individuals (their behavior) and subjective, experiential aspects of individuals. To be considered scientific, psychology focused on the behavior pole of the behavior–experience polarity (Valle & King, 1978).

Phenomenological researchers study things as they appear to consciousness or are given in experience (Giorgi, 1986). Phenomenological research is radical, returning to the roots of phenomena to search out the *givens* in experience (Polkinghorne, 1981a). Phenomenological researchers observe and describe the world of *phenomena* in all of its essential characteristics. Phenomenology is concerned with phenomena in the strict sense: "that is, how things and events are for the consciousness that beholds them and not how they are in themselves. Whatever presents itself in experience is to be understood precisely as it presents itself" (Giorgi, 1986, p. 6). Whatever appears in the uninterpreted world of direct and immediate experience is phenomenal. This realm of pure phenomena, of "naïve experience," is called the *Lebenswelt* or life–world (Valle & King, 1978). The Lebenswelt is not an external entity: It is the world as lived by the person. It is pre–reflective in nature, giving rise to reflective awareness.

Any object is a phenomenon if viewed in a particular way, recommended by the slogan "Zu den Sachen!" (Schmitt, 1972). This is Husserl's call "back to the things themselves," and it is a rejection of natural science. For Husserl, everything is to be conceived in its original true integrity, free of all

presuppositions (Roche, 1973). Basically, phenomenologists examine and describe phenomena in an unprejudiced manner, which is not to say that unexamined assumptions are not operating, only that such assumptions are unnecessary (Schmitt, 1972).

By eschewing the assumptions of natural science, phenomenologists uncovered an essential feature of consciousness that differentiates consciousness or experience from things, namely *intentionality*. Brentano observed that consciousness is always consciousness–of something, thereby countering the presupposition of natural science psychology that consciousness can be understood apart from that which it intends or is conscious of. Intentionality refers to the fact that consciousness is activity constituted in relations between active subjects and objects that people are conscious of. That is, consciousness always has an object, it is directional or pointing toward something—to be conscious is to be "conscious–of" (Roche, 1973).

Giorgi (1986) discussed intentionality and its relationship to phenomenological (as opposed to natural scientific) inquiry:

> To say that experience is intentional is to say that it is essentially directed toward the givens of experience. These givens may be internal or external to consciousness but they always transcend the acts in which they appear. In other words, creatures possessing this characteristic enjoy a direct openness to things or events that transcend them and consequently *they themselves cannot be sheer material things in the same sense that the objects of physics and chemistry are material* [italics added]. We may note in passing therefore that to use the sensory–perceptual givenness of a material object as a criterion for psychological reality is to falsify the latter. It does not mean that the object of psychology is not given perceptually, it simply means

> that the object of perception is not necessarily exhausted by its material aspects... The genuine object of psychology...can never be reduced to simple materiality because it is always relational, and as relational, requires non–sensory aspects as well as sensuous givens to make up a whole. (pp. 7–8)

Because people are not "sheer material things in the same sense that the objects of physics and chemistry are material," researchers who employ the methods of natural science psychology (viz., hypothesis–formation and experimentation, which are based on the model of linear causality) are incapable of understanding them (Valle & King, 1978). People must be investigated with procedures able to examine how objects are given in experience. Giorgi (1986) contended that *description* is necessary to ascertain the fullness of experience. Phenomenological analysis utilizes descriptions as data because descriptions convey meanings of situations as they are experienced by individuals: Words and sentences are conscious expressions of individuals' pre–reflective presences to the world. In addition, sensory–perceptual givens, which are the focus of the positivist–empiricist approach, are but one aspect of a complete system that includes the labor of consciousness and language (Giorgi, 1986), and to focus on one aspect is to render an incomplete understanding of the entire system.

Furthermore, because phenomenology also seeks meanings of experiences rather than just their facts, phenomenological psychology differs from natural science psychology in its endeavor to clarify meaning. "Thus, a phenomenologically grounded science uses a descriptive approach in order to obtain the facts of a given experience in order to clarify their meaning" (Giorgi, 1986, p. 8).

Phenomenology is concerned with *essences* and comprehension of the essential nature of reality (Jennings, 1986). Essences are necessary and invariant features of phenomena without which phenomena could not be what they are (Schmitt, 1972). To observe and describe essences of phenomena requires an attitude of disciplined naïveté wherein investigators deliberately suspend assumptions that might bias observation (e.g., regarding the underlying mechanisms of observed phenomena). Phenomenologists find out *what* something is before finding out *why* it is (MacLeod, 1947).

Phenomenological researchers' goal is the production of presuppositionless, structural descriptions of the givens of experience, where "the structure of a phenomenon is...the commonality running through the many diverse appearances of the phenomenon" (Valle & King, 1978, pp. 16–17). Researchers accomplish this goal by using methods—presented in the next chapter—that direct attention to these givens, that free them from prejudgments about phenomena, and that bring to view structural components through which experiences are formed (Polkinghorne, 1981b). Regarding prejudice, phenomenological research requires a descriptive analysis of the field that is unbiased by assumptions of deeper motivation (MacLeod, 1947). Researchers must determine, without regard to conventional attitudinal categories, what structures with what properties exist for prejudiced individuals.

In sum, phenomenological researchers return to the meaning and structure of phenomena as phenomena are lived and experienced (Van Kaam, 1966; Valle & King, 1978). Phenomenological researchers want to understand—not explain, predict or control—phenomena in their perceived immediacy. To do this they utilize descriptive techniques to explicate the meaning and structure of human experience and behavior (Needleman, 1972; Valle & King, 1978).

The Phenomenology of Attitude

In contrast to numerous quantitative studies of attitudes, there is little qualitative research on the topic. In order to explicate the structure and intentional quality of attitudes, Romanyshyn (unpublished dissertation cited in Romanyshyn, 1971) used a phenomenological method to study the attitudes of a white and a black subject. During the reflection he observed that "an attitude was an *intentional and situational phenomenon which related an individual to some aspects of his own history, to other people and to a project unfolding in time*" (Romanyshyn, 1971, p. 174). Results of the study exemplified this structure of attitudes.

Similarly, Ashworth (1985) conducted a phenomenological study of social attitude. He stated that researchers should describe the essence of attitude that preserves attitude as intentional relatedness to the world. (The essential structure of attitude is not analyzed in traditional attitude studies.)

Ashworth conducted a meaning unit analysis of his co–researchers' written accounts of *attitude situations* to determine the *situated structure* of attitude. He followed this with lengthy, taped interviews with his co–researchers to obtain further description. The goal of the research was to determine the meaning of the co–researchers' attitudes within the text itself. The attitude situations were regarded as factual sources of variation on the essential structure of attitude.

The following description of the structure of social attitude resulted (Ashworth, 1985, p. 91):

> Attitudinal awareness is an *intentional* phenomenon, which has an object or "*figural concern*," and structures the *field of consciousness* in a primarily *affective* manner (any one of a *gamut of emotions* being candidates for the affective element of the field). *Conation* is an essential component, though the implication for action may be *null*.

Neither Romanyshyn's nor Ashworth's study deals specifically with prejudice. A phenomenological study of prejudice would enhance understanding of the phenomenon. The need for such a study was suggested by Adorno et al. (1950), who observed that some of their subjects described feelings, such as tightness all over, in the presence of outgroup members. "The concrete aspects of this [feeling] in social contacts needs further elucidation... This whole complex should be followed up most closely in future research" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 626).

CHAPTER 3

METHOD AND PROCEDURES

Most research on prejudice is quantitative in nature, providing information to formulate explanations of the phenomenon. Phenomenological analysis is required to (a) complement existing, quantitative research; and (b) provide experientially meaningful, descriptive data. As Allport (cited in Jahoda et al., 1951) stated, "if we want to know how people feel: what they experience and what they remember, what their emotions and motives are like, and the reasons for acting as they do—why not ask them?" (p. 152). This is rarely done in the study of prejudice.

Before describing the method and procedures used in the study, the reasons for conducting a phenomenological psychological study of prejudice are examined.

The Phenomenological Psychological Study of Prejudice

To answer the question "what does it mean for individuals to be prejudiced and to experience prejudice against outgroup members?," an approach other than that which is usually taken to examine psychological phenomena must be employed. The question demands an approach that focuses on experience and that provides qualitatively different data than that which is usually produced in psychological research: The question requires descriptive data.

The experiential aspect of prejudice is largely ignored by researchers who fail to examine the meaning of prejudice for prejudiced individuals. By focusing on the content of individuals' attitudes, researchers neglect the intentional aspect of attitudes. Interestingly, though, while researchers fail to collect qualitative data, they nevertheless derive qualitative statements from their data, that is statements which describe the nature of the investigated phenomenon. de Koning (1986) pointed out that although researchers view the experiences of

subjects as irrelevant at best or, at worst, as disturbing factors in controlled experimental situations, once the research is done they "... make qualitative statements and are all of a sudden competent in fields which they have dismissed as unscientific from the start" (p. ix).

For example, in an experiment designed to test the hypothesis that reverse discrimination by whites (i.e., more favorable behavior by whites toward minority group members than toward other whites) results when whites observe cues of prejudice in their own behavior, Dutton and Lake (1973) used false physiological feedback to lead a group of self–proclaimed unprejudiced white university students to believe that they had displayed physiological responses indicative of prejudice. Following the laboratory session, the students were panhandled by either a black or a white confederate of the experimenter. The researchers found that students who were led to believe that they had displayed physiological signs of prejudice gave more money to black than to white panhandlers. Dutton and Lake concluded that "if a white can re–establish his egalitarian self–image quickly and easily by giving money to a black panhandler he may not have to face the fact that he is doing little else to alleviate racial problems" (p. 99). Although the behavior of the subjects provided little information about the subjects' self–images, Dutton and Lake nevertheless made a qualitative statement about the subjects' self–images based on the behavior. If the researchers wanted to know the reasons for the subjects' behavior, or if the researchers wanted to know about the subjects' self–images, then they should have asked the subjects.

Clearly, qualitative research methods must be used to provide qualitative information. Psychological research is generated from limited perspectives, mainly cognitive and behavioral, that produce isolated bits of information. A detached observer approach, and methods that quantify data and do not allow

data to speak for themselves, accompany these perspectives. These perspectives emphasize explanation rather than understanding which, when it comes to prejudice, has resulted in an inadequate understanding of the phenomenon.

Qualitative information cannot be gathered by substituting one *method* for another within mainstream natural scientific approaches. Rather, a fundamentally different *approach* must be taken. According to de Koning (1986), psychologists uncritically maintain certain assumptions and presuppositions because they imitate the methods of natural science. Method has assumed a privileged position in psychology, preceding approach and content (Kruger, 1986). But quantitative methods are only useful when questions demand quantitative data. Such methods produce trivialities when questions require qualitative data (de Koning, 1986). As a result of its emphasis on quantitative methodology, psychological study reveals little about experience:

> Dealing with experience and their meanings cannot be done with methods which are not suitable and certainly should not lead to the dismissal of research which attempts to come to grips with meaning in order to increase knowledge of human phenomena. In order to do justice to the phenomena as they are experienced by human beings, one has to approach the matter in a certain way and apply methods consistent with the approach as well as the content. (de Koning, 1986, p. ix)

Phenomenology provides an appropriate approach for understanding experience and meaning (Giorgi, 1986). Giorgi (1986) contends that the phenomenological approach surpasses the mainstream (positivistic empirical) approach in its pursuit of scientific rigor and psychological reality.

The purpose of a *methodology* is to clarify something, such as a text, that is unclear. But the process of clarification, and the "something" to be clarified (i.e., the something that is regarded as the appropriate object of study), depend upon a pre–existing stance or *fore–understanding* that determine not only what is considered important, but also how it is to be viewed. This fore–understanding is the *approach* that an interpreter takes toward the object of study, and it specifies the technique for lending clarity to the "text" (Ashworth, 1986). Discussion of appropriate methodology must not be restricted to a consideration of technique per se but must be made at the level of approach: "Sticking purely to the technical level misses the point. It is at the level of approach that the argument for qualitative methods must be made. Technique must not be abstracted from the total context of methodology" (Ashworth, 1987, p. 277).

An examination of the fore–understandings of natural scientific psychology reveals the inappropriateness of mainstream approaches for answering the research question. The primary perspectives of natural scientific psychology are the cognitive–dispositional and the behavioristic–probabilistic, which emphasize the "self" pole and the "world" pole of the self/world relationship, respectively. Being–prejudiced involves a relationship between self and world (i.e., between self and others who are the objects of prejudice), making it necessary to examine the self/world relationship itself and not just one pole of the relationship. Also, by viewing people as objects that are influenced by external variables, and by seeking to discover interactions among these variables, natural scientific approaches ignore the meaning of situations to people (Ashworth, 1986). For these reasons, natural scientific approaches are incapable of answering the research question. In fact, Ashworth (1986) suggested that psychological phenomena are not well understood because of the inappropriateness of natural scientific approaches "At this level, qualitative

methods provide ways of allowing clarification to appear which supersede the results obtained by quantitative methods" (p. 280).

Unlike natural scientific (positivistic empirical) approaches, "the phenomenological approach to research is characterized by an attitude of openness for whatever is significant for the proper understanding of the phenomenon" (Kruger, 1986, p. 202). Because the phenomenological approach views prejudice as intentional, and because it utilizes description to uncover the essence and meaning of the phenomenon, it represents an appropriate approach for answering the research question. Quantitative techniques, and the approaches upon which they are based, are inadequate when meaning and experience are focused upon (Ashworth, 1986).

Briefly, then, psychologists emphasize the detached observer approach in formulating explanations rather than descriptions of prejudice, and they overlook the understanding that can be gained by examining the experiential aspect of prejudice. Employing a phenomenological approach to describe the experience of being–prejudiced should enhance understanding of the phenomenon.

The Reduction

The first step of phenomenological research is the *reduction* or *epoché*. During this step researchers *bracket* the *natural attitude* in order to understand phenomena as they are given in direct, naïve experience (Jennings, 1986). The natural attitude refers to individuals' largely unchallenged assumptions about the world (e.g., that the world exists "out there," providing the same reality for all people [Jennings, 1986]). Bracketing means that "I become aware of the possibility that something which I believed to exist does not exist as I thought it did... Once I have become aware of that possibility, I am ready to reflect" (Schmitt, 1972, p. 143). Bracketing enables researchers to engage in reflective

thought. In bracketing, researchers' belief in the world of the natural attitude is suspended; the actual existence of the world is not bracketed, only the natural attitude is (Jennings, 1986). Briefly, "the reduction is strictly a *methodological move* to temporarily strip the world of the multitude of implicit presumptions about its existence as 'real,' thereby allowing aspects of the world to recur as 'pure phenomena' for consciousness" (Jennings, 1986, p. 1237). The epoché allows researchers to better understand the data of investigations (Hamrick, 1980).

While reflecting on material presented by Hamrick (1980) and Romanyshyn (1971), the author became aware of several personal beliefs about prejudice that required bracketing. These include beliefs about the motives for prejudice (e.g., that disparaging outgroup members enhances the self–esteem of prejudiced individuals), and the moral and sociopolitical significance of prejudice. The author also became aware of his belief that everyday life is largely *pre*–reflective. This awareness required bracketing the assumption that attitudes are primarily acted upon and secondarily thought about. That is, attitudes are brought to awareness and expressed only when they are focused upon, as when individuals fill out questionnaires or answer interview questions.

Reflection also revealed that researchers cannot be totally objective while examining prejudice because the study of prejudice, as well as prejudice itself, is an intergroup phenomenon (Berg, 1984). That is, researchers' group memberships influence their perceptions of reality, which affect research results. Traditional research methods minimize personal bias or *individual level subjectivity* but leave *group level subjectivity* largely untouched (Berg, 1984). Briefly, the assumption that researchers can be totally objective while conducting a study was bracketed. Researchers bring to a study several beliefs acquired from personal experience and formal training.

Method and Procedures

None of the techniques traditionally used to investigate intergroup attitudes are phenomenological, and the ones that require descriptive data also employ categories and structure determined a priori, often for the purposes of quantification and statistical analysis (Deri, Dinnerstein, Harding, & Pepitone, 1948). The data are not allowed to speak for themselves. In this study the data speak for themselves.

The F Scale

Co–researchers were selected on the basis of their scores on the California F scale, developed by Adorno et al. (1950). (A copy of the F scale used in this study, along with instructions for its administration and scoring, is provided in Appendix A.) This scale has traditionally been used in studies of prejudice (Newcomb, 1953).

Before developing the F scale, however, Adorno et al. (1950) developed an Ethnocentrism (E) scale to measure individuals' readiness to accept or oppose ethnocentric ideology as a whole. The E scale, which contains items dealing with blacks, other minorities, and patriotism, provides a quantified measure of prejudice. Validity for the E scale was found in its ability to differentiate between prejudiced and non–prejudiced subjects, as revealed in the subjects' interviews and in their responses to projective techniques (e.g., the Thematic Apperception Test) (Adorno et al., 1950).

Adorno et al. (1950) developed the F scale to (a) measure prejudice without mentioning minority groups by name, and (b) provide a valid measure of prejudice by circumventing some of the defenses that people employ when discussing race issues. The questions on the scale involve variables which reflect central personality characteristics (e.g., conventionalism, anti–intraception) that manifest themselves as prejudice.

Adorno et al. (1950) reported an average reliability correlation coefficient of r = .90 (range: .81 to .97) across samples for the F scale. As a measure of concurrent validity, Adorno et al. (1950) found an average correlation between mean scores on the F and E scales across samples of $r_{F,E}$ = .77 (range: .62 to .87). Furthermore, the F scale successfully differentiated between high and low prejudiced subjects, as evidenced in Adorno et al.'s (1950) interviews with the subjects. (The fact that the F scale successfully identified prejudiced co–researchers in this study provides further validation for the scale.)

Of the numerous scales that exist to measure prejudice, the author chose the F scale because it is an indirect measure of prejudice. Because co–researchers were selected for interviewing based on their scale scores, the author deemed it undesirable for students completing the scale to know the precise subject matter being investigated until after they submitted the finished scale. The reason is that knowledge of the subject matter being investigated might have affected the veridicality of their responses (e.g., social desirability may have influenced their answers).

Basically, the scale was used as a means of selecting participants for interviewing. The precise scale used was immaterial provided that it is a reasonable predictor of prejudice, and the F scale meets this criterion (Blalock, 1982). It is important to emphasize that the F scale was used solely as a selection device. Although it was used as a tool, it was nevertheless an integral part of the study.

Co–Researcher Selection

Subjects in phenomenological investigations are termed *co–researchers* because they are actively involved in the research process. Unlike subjects in quantitative studies, who assume a passive role (e.g., filling out questionnaires), co–researchers actively discuss the phenomenon under investigation.

Individuals who (a) have salient experiences of the phenomenon under study in their everyday worlds, (b) are verbally articulate, and (c) are willing to discuss their experiences, are selected as co–researchers (Polkinghorne, 1981b). These criteria were met in this study by selecting as co–researchers undergraduate students who scored high on the F scale and who were willing to put into words their experiences of being–prejudiced.

Co–researcher selection began when the F scale was administered to four undergraduate Educational Psychology classes at the University of Alberta (N = 173). The five highest scorers were then contacted. The study was explained to these individuals and their participation was solicited. (All five individuals agreed to be co–researchers.)

There are no strict guidelines for determining the number of co–researchers required in a phenomenological investigation. The author decided to use 5 co–researchers in this study because the F scale scores of these five individuals are noticeably higher than the F scale scores of their classmates. While the scores range from 7 to 121, the mean F scale score for the 5 co–researchers is 111.8 (of a total possible 168), whereas the overall mean F scale score for the sample of 173 students is 64.4 (standard deviation = 21.7). On average, the co–researchers scored almost 2.2 standard deviations above the overall mean for the sample, placing them in about the top 1½% of the sample in terms of F scale scores.

Although university students represent an atypical group (e.g., they are mostly from the middle– or upper–classes), and in fact many quantitative studies are criticized for using students as subjects, there are nevertheless reasons why students are used as co–researchers in this study:

1. Students are familiar with the methods and goals of scientific research, making them less likely than non–students to feel that they are being evaluated.

Similarly, Sheatsley (1951) argued that people find it easiest to answer to their own kind—an advantage the author might not have if non–students are interviewed.

2. Students are usually co–operative and verbally fluent. In addition, they are likely to understand the questions being asked, and they are often important through family connections and their prospective leadership in society (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976; Hartley, 1969).

Data Collection

Most of the data obtained in this study were gathered in phenomenological interviews, which are interviews conducted to gather descriptions of interviewees' life–worlds with respect to interpreting the meanings of described phenomena (Kvale, 1986). In actuality, three types of interviews were used in this study.

The Orienting Interview

The first interviews were used to establish rapport with the co–researchers and to familiarize them with the research objectives. The nature of the study and the structure and purpose of the interviews were explained to the co–researchers, and any questions that they asked were answered. They then signed informed consent forms. (Appendix B contains the script followed during the orienting interviews as well as a copy of the informed consent form.)

During the orienting interviews, the co–researchers were asked to submit written accounts of their experiences of being–prejudiced. These *prejudice situations* were analyzed and questions for the first data gathering interviews were derived from them. This procedure is in keeping with Bogdan and Biklen's (1982) claim that "the qualitative researcher plans to use part of the study to learn what the important questions are. He or she does not assume that enough is known to recognize important concerns before undertaking the research" (p.

29). That is, the qualitative researcher does not go into a study with hypotheses to test or specific questions to answer: The researcher discovers what the significant questions are during data collection. (Copies of the written descriptions submitted by the co–researchers are in Appendix C.)

The Data Gathering Interviews

Two data gathering interviews were conducted with each of the co–researchers. These interviews were audio–taped in order to make transcripts for protocol analysis. During these interviews, the co–researchers discussed their experiences of being–prejudiced. These interviews were half–structured: They did not follow a standardized questionnaire nor were they free–flowing conversations. Rather, they proceeded according to the aim of the research (Giorgi, 1975), which is to describe the experience of being–prejudiced.

Questions for the first data gathering interviews were derived from both the literature and the co–researchers' written descriptions. (These questions are provided in Appendix D.) The co–researchers did not answer *only* these questions, although the author ensured that these questions were answered. These interviews lasted approximately 50 minutes each, and they concluded when the co–researchers had said all that they could about their experiences of being–prejudiced.

The second data gathering interviews were used mainly to touch–up loose ends left over from the first interviews. (The questions asked during the second data gathering interviews are in Appendix E.) Much of the material discussed in these interviews had been covered during the first data gathering interviews. These interviews averaged approximately 20 minutes in length. These interviews ended when the researcher anticipated what the co–researchers would say and he felt that he understood the experience of being–prejudiced.

The Validation Interview

The final interviews were used to validate the results. The co–researchers read the *essential description* of being–prejudiced (presented in the next chapter), after which they were asked to indicate if the description included all of the aspects of being–prejudiced that they expressed (during the interviews and in their written descriptions) and did not include anything else.

This method of confirming results, wherein co–researchers read an investigator's final description of a phenomenon and indicate if the phenomenon has been accurately described, is a test of internal validity (Wertz, 1984). Basically, co–researchers determine to what extent a researcher's description of a phenomenon expresses the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of the phenomenon as it is lived by them.

All of the co–researchers in this study indicated that the essential description of being–prejudiced is a thorough and adequate reflection of their experiences. Several of the co–researchers made statements similar to Ann's statement: "Now you know *exactly* how I feel."

Data Analysis

The following steps, similar to those delineated by Colaizzi (1978), were used to analyze the written descriptions and interview protocols (hereafter collectively referred to as "the protocols"):

1. The author read the protocols to get acquainted with the data.

2. *Significant statements* (i.e., statements pertaining to the phenomenon under investigation) were extracted from the protocols. In addition, the significant statements were reformulated from their specificity in the protocols (e.g., referring to particular outgroups) into general terms. For instance, Ann's statement "I don't even like the word 'homo'" was generalized to "Dislike of the word denoting the outgroup."

3. *Meanings* were formulated for the significant statements. During this step an attempt is made to understand the meanings of the significant statements for the co–researchers. According to Colaizzi (1978), this step involves the "creative insight" of the researcher who "must leap from what his subjects say to what they mean" (p. 59). For example, the meaning attributed to Ann's statement above is "A negative experience accompanies perception of the outgroup name or label."

4. The significant statements and meanings were grouped according to their *themes*. Themes refer to different aspects of a phenomenon. Some of the themes were suggested by the questions asked during the data gathering interviews (e.g., that there is a reaction to perceiving the outgroup name) while others emerged from the data (e.g., that there is a context dimension to the experience of being–prejudiced).

5. The significant statements and meanings comprising each theme were organized into *elements*. Just as themes refer to different aspects of a phenomenon, elements refer to different aspects of themes. For instance, all of the co–researchers discussed their contact experiences. Hence, one of the themes in the study is "the contact experience." But the contact experience is composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions, as well as context factors. These reactions and context factors are the elements of the contact experience theme.

Common threads running through the significant statements comprising the elements were then expounded to produce an *exhaustive description* of the experience of being–prejudiced, where "a description is the use of language to articulate the objects of experience" (Giorgi, 1986, p. 4). As the themes were delineated they were concurrently validated by referring them back to the

protocols and ensuring that they did not contain anything that was not present or implied in the protocols themselves.

6. Relationships between the themes were noted, such as overlaps between the elements of the themes. The themes were then organized into an *essential description* of being–prejudiced based on these relationships. An essential description is a description of the essence of a phenomenon, that is a description of those aspects of a phenomenon without which the phenomenon would not be what it is.

7. A description of the *structure* of being–prejudiced was then derived from the essential description. A structural description is a *"description of the investigated phenomenon in as unequivocal a statement of identification of its fundamental structure as possible"* (Colaizzi, 1978, p. 61). Unlike the essential description, which depicts the lived–experience of being–prejudiced, the structural description reveals the structural components of being–prejudiced rather than being–prejudiced per se. That is, the structural description relates the structure of the experiences described in the co–researchers' protocols in general terms (i.e., without reference to specific content), yet it remains faithful to and exhaustively describes the content of the protocols.

8. The co–researchers validated the essential and structural descriptions. They indicated that nothing of relevance had been omitted from the descriptions and nothing extraneous had been added to them.

(Appendix F provides an example of how these steps were applied to the protocols. Utilizing excerpts from a co–researcher's first data gathering interview for illustration, the author demonstrates how the exhaustive description was generated from the raw material.)

The Co–researchers

Now that the method and procedures used in the study have been explicated, it is time to introduce the 5 co–researchers.

Ann

Ann, whose score on the F scale is 119, is 34 years old. Born and raised in the West Bank, she went to university in Iraq, where she received a degree in English Literature. She taught in Iraq for 1½ years before moving to Edmonton, where she has lived for the past 11 years with her two children. She hopes to become a junior high school English teacher.

Ann's prejudice is directed toward homosexuals. She believes that her background is partly responsible for this prejudice. She was raised in a "very conservative society" where homosexuality is not discussed and in which religion plays a very important part (and according to which homosexuality is a sin). Also, because of her background she feels that she had a negative attitude toward homosexuals before she ever met one. For instance, she recounted the following episode that occurred when she was in grade four:

> Once I asked my father..."what's the meaning of homosexuality?" And I will never forget the expression on his face. "Where did you learn this word? Don't repeat it again!" It's like...I'd been conditioned that this, you know, it's, this word, so I've been careful since then. I can't mention it... And, um, at school we don't talk about these things, and, mind you, back home the schools were very strict... It's like a shame to go and talk about it in public.

Ann has a primarily affective reaction toward homosexuals. She indicated during the first interview that she has trouble putting into words the way that she feels about homosexuals. However, she gestured a lot while describing her feelings about homosexuals. For example, she frequently clenched her fists and made a wringing motion with her hands—like wringing out a wet towel—when

describing her feelings of being in contact with homosexuals, suggesting that she feels uncomfortable around them.

Although Ann's background is undoubtedly a factor in her prejudice toward homosexuals, personal encounters with homosexuals are the most significant influence on her attitude toward them. For example, she frequently referred to an ex–boyfriend who she discovered to be homosexual some time after their relationship started, and who she believed had deceived her by keeping his sexuality a secret. She stated in no uncertain terms, on several occasions, that "I *hated* him." She also recalled her first encounter with a homosexual, which she described as traumatic: She was in an all–girl high school when a classmate attempted to force a physical relationship. She felt repulsed and confused by the experience.

Ann is a mature and (as she described herself) "very social" individual whose prejudice toward homosexuals is based on a combination of factors, although the most important ones are her background and her negative personal encounters with homosexuals.

Chris

At the time of the orienting interview, Chris, whose score on the F scale is 121, was completing his final semester in Secondary Education. He was majoring in mathematics and minoring in Italian. Since that time he has graduated and become a substitute teacher, and he is currently looking for a full–time teaching position.

Chris's parents left Italy for Canada in 1966, settling in the Italian community in Edmonton. Chris was born shortly thereafter and is now 24 years old. He lives with his family in Edmonton.

Chris is prejudiced against native Indians. He adheres to stereotyped ideas regarding natives (e.g., "I think generally they're lazy"). Chris's prejudice

resulted from a combination of (a) what others told him about natives, (b) personal experiences with natives (including his observations of natives), and (c) negative media portrayals of natives. For example, during the first data gathering interview Chris stated that "I had a [native] classmate beat up one of my friends. I think it started there... It also started from my grandparents living beside them, always having problems." Regarding media portrayals of natives, Chris stated that "the norm right now in society for natives, you know, they're bums. That's how I see it, how they portray it in the newspapers."

Chris evidences a characteristic common to several of the co–researchers: He assumes that others share his prejudice. For instance, he made several comments like "that's why *people* get that negative image of them" instead of "that's why *I* get that negative image of them." In other words, several of the co–researchers *assume* that their prejudices are widely held. This observation supports common sense racism theory (see Brewer, 1984), which maintains that prejudiced individuals assume that others share their prejudices. According to this theory, individuals develop vague and often contradictory beliefs about outgroup members, based on personal experiences as well as socially transmitted and shared ideas, through a process of "common sense reasoning" that involves the *assumption* that others share their ideas and beliefs.

Chris developed ideas and beliefs about natives based on his experiences with them. These ideas and beliefs then directed his attitudes and behavior toward them.

Irene

Irene, a 27 year old Secondary Education student, scored 113 on the F scale. She was born and raised in Newfoundland. Her parents are successful professionals. She lived in Newfoundland until 1980, when she moved to Edmonton. After working for a while she went back to school, enrolling in

Physical Education at university before transferring into Education. When she graduates she hopes to teach high school Drama and English.

Of the 5 co–researchers who participated in the study, Irene is the most ethnocentric. The reason is that her prejudices are directed toward a variety of apparently unrelated groups—including homosexuals, Orientals, Italians, and "Head Bangers"—and she has diverse reasons to explain her negative attitudes. However, a common thread running through her prejudices is that all of the groups toward which she expresses prejudice violate, in some way, her "conservative" beliefs. For instance, she is prejudiced against Orientals because she feels that they are encroaching upon certain institutions that should remain "Canadian." In other words, Irene has a *generalized* negative attitude toward groups that threaten her view of the status quo.

Irene's conservativeness, and its relation to her prejudices, may be understood by considering her upbringing. She was raised by strict parents in a conservative community. For example, while discussing her prejudice toward homosexuals, she stated that "it was never talked about much. I grew up in a small town, it was a strong Catholic, and it was something that was never brought up." When asked if she had a negative attitude toward homosexuals before ever meeting one, she said "probably, because that's the way I was taught."

Irene also described her first encounter with prejudice:

> My first encounter with prejudice was with my father. He was very prejudiced against blacks, very prejudiced against blacks. And, um, in our home town, I think there were only two people, two families that were actually black. And one particular person was a very, very good friend of mine... I had to hide my friendship with this person, because if I was ever caught talking to this person I would have been whipped.

Irene's prejudices are rooted in specific, personal experiences with outgroup members. For instance, her prejudice toward Italians developed because of her negative experiences with three Italian co–workers (viz., they were constantly running down other races, "especially 'blacks'," and this made her angry). Prior to these experiences she "never really thought about [them]. They were just another person, they were just there... Because they never did anything to really hurt me, or to make me feel negative against them." After these experiences, however, she stated that "I feel resentful. Isn't that stupid? All of it based on—everybody. That's it, one experience and that's what you do, just lost my heart... It just takes one little thing they say to really tick me off... And now I judge everybody on it."

The most important aspects of Irene's prejudices are that (a) they are applied to seemingly disparate outgroups, that is they are generalized; and (b) they are rooted in personal experiences with outgroup members.

Rick

Rick is 34 years old and married. His score on the F scale is 103. He lived in Vancouver, British Columbia until he was 22 years old, when he moved to Edmonton in search of a job. A cabinet maker by trade, he became dissatisfied with economic pressures in the construction industry. He decided to upgrade his education in order to guarantee himself a financially secure future. Although he is currently a Physical Education student, he might obtain a second degree in Education.

Rick is a third generation Canadian whose ancestry is Swedish and Dutch. He has met many individuals in his world travels. When Rick was contacted and asked to participate in the study, he said that he would "have no problem" participating because his experiences with different ethnic groups in his travels

have provided him with the opportunity to develop attitudes about various groups.

Rick's attitudes about ethnic groups are very rational. In fact, during the first data gathering interview he indicated that he frequently thinks about ethnic groups and his attitudes toward them. Generally, he displays a cognitive (as opposed to affective) approach to his prejudices. His prejudices are rooted primarily in detached observations of the characteristics and behavior of outgroup members rather than direct, personal encounters with outgroup members. Nevertheless, he frequently refers to his personal experiences to support his observations.

Rick's prejudices are mainly directed toward ethnic groups who "stay to themselves clinging to their homeland's culture when living in a westernized country." In his written description he mentions the Chinese and the Italians "of any westernized city." The detached–observer nature of Rick's attitudes is evident in his prejudices toward Chinese and Italians. His prejudices toward these groups are based on his observation that they stay in their own enclaves for economic gain (e.g., Italians living in Italian districts supporting each others' businesses). In this way Rick's prejudices support the middleman minority model of ethnic antagonism (see Turner, 1986), according to which ethnic group members who settle in their own enclaves and who create economic and social support systems alienate and threaten the majority population (e.g., by increasing competition in the marketplace). In response the majority population adopts discriminatory practices that are legitimized by stigmatizing beliefs about the ethnic group.

Rick also advocates "token ethnicity," which is the belief that although other cultures are interesting and should be displayed on token occasions (e.g., Heritage Days), ethnic groups should nevertheless adopt western ways to

function in society. He wrote, for instance, that "some assimilation of our countrys westernization must be taken on by these other ethnic groups and they should be prepared to teach them to their children." In other words, Rick's attitude is "become western, but retain enough of your heritage to show off every now and then."

Briefly, Rick's prejudices are based on detached observations of the qualities and behaviors of outgroup members.

Ruth

The final co–researcher is Ruth, whose score on the F scale is 103. At 19 years of age she is a second year Elementary Education student who wants to teach grades 4 to 6 when she graduates.

Ruth was born in England and moved to Canada when she was 2 years old. Her parents, both of them teachers, were born in India. Her mother's descendents were tea planters and her father's parents were missionaries. Both her mother and father were raised in English boarding schools. Ruth lives with her parents and younger brother in Edmonton.

In her written description, Ruth stated "I don't think of myself as prejudice[d] but...I can see myself as being perhaps prejudice[d]...when it comes to...homosexuals." Other co–researchers made similar statements. According to Allport (1954), statements such as "I don't think of myself as being prejudiced, but..." result when prejudices collide with deep–seated, antithetical values and beliefs (e.g., that all people are equal). This form of expressing prejudice is common because people like to think of themselves as democratic and accepting, and admitting their prejudices would lower their self–esteem (Adorno et al., 1950).

Ruth's prejudice toward homosexuals is based on the following factors:

1. Homosexuality violates her moral and religious beliefs. In her written description she wrote that "when it comes to gays, I see it from a Christian [point] of view... I think homosexuality is wrong morally & I can't condone what they're doing."

2. She reacts negatively when observing events involving homosexuals. For example, during the first data gathering interview she indicated that she was "bothered" by events sponsored by a group called "Gays and Lesbians on Campus."

3. She has had negative experiences in personal encounters with homosexuals. During the first data gathering interview she frequently referred to encounters she has had with homosexuals and how, for example, she found it "disgusting" when they "flaunted" their homosexuality.

In sum, Ruth's prejudice toward homosexuals is based on a combination of different factors (as are the prejudices of the other co–researchers). Overall, the most important influence on the development and maintenance of prejudice appears to be personal experience with outgroup members.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The results of the study are now presented. First, 22 themes extracted from the co–researchers' protocols are delineated to produce an exhaustive description of being–prejudiced. Literature relating to the themes is considered as the themes are delineated. Second, the essential description of being–prejudiced, the one that results when the contents of the 22 themes are organized, is presented. This description was validated by the co–researchers. The co–researchers also validated a description of the structure of being–prejudiced. Finally, the results are discussed in relation to literature considered in chapter two, particularly Ashworth's (1985) and Romanyshyn's (1971) studies of attitude.

The Exhaustive Description

The author identified twenty–two themes in the co–researchers' protocols. These themes are delineated below to produce an exhaustive description of being–prejudiced.

Recall that themes refer to different aspects of a phenomenon. The co–researchers' written descriptions suggested themes that were followed–up in the interviews, while other themes emerged from the interview data itself. Themes are uncovered by identifying the various aspects of a phenomenon to which co–researchers' statements refer. Each significant statement made by co–researchers in the present study refers to one or more aspects of being–prejudiced. Co–researchers' statements that relate to a particular aspect of a phenomenon are grouped to form a theme.

Some themes are composed of elements. For example, the theme "reaction to the disliked qualities of outgroup members" is composed of (a) a negative emotional reaction, (b) focusing attention on the outgroupness of outgroup

members, and (c) a belief that prejudice follows from the disliked qualities of outgroup members. The exhaustive description results when the elements of the themes are delineated.

It is important to remember that "the subject can confirm or deny that a description embodies his experience but neither he nor the researcher can certify that his experience has been exhaustively revealed" (Kruger, 1986, p. 211). In other words, there may be more to the experience of being–prejudiced than is uncovered here: This description is exhaustive in that it exhaustively describes the protocol material.

The 22 themes identified in the co–researchers' protocols are now considered. They are described from the perspective of prejudiced individuals.

1. *Reaction to the outgroup name.* The outgroup name or label often evokes a negative reaction either because (a) it symbolizes an aspect(s) of outgroup members that one dislikes (e.g., the abnormality of homosexuals), or (b) it leads to one's recollection of negative experiences with outgroup members.

2. *Others' reactions to one's prejudice.* Despite believing that others may share one's prejudice, one does not usually express one's prejudice to others in order to avoid adverse consequences, such as disapproval. Nevertheless, others usually validate one's prejudice when it is disclosed. (However, this may be a function of the people to whom one expresses one's attitude rather than an indication that one's attitude is widely held. That is, one may reveal one's prejudice only to people whom one believes have the same prejudice.)

3. *Reaction to the disliked qualities of outgroup members.* Aspects of outgroup members that one dislikes, and that one may consider unusual or abnormal, elicit a negative emotional reaction, expressed by such words as "uncomfortable," "uneasy," and "disgusting."

Qualities—especially behaviors—of outgroup members that make them more noticeable than, or that set them apart from, non–outgroup members are focused upon (e.g., homosexuals "flaunting" themselves). That is, one focuses on the "outgroupness" of outgroup members. An inability or unwillingness to see beyond disliked outgroup members' qualities may accompany this focus of attention. This limits one's understanding of outgroup members, who are expected to be different than non–outgroup members and who are categorized on the basis of their group membership. Similarly, Tajfel (1969) noted that prejudiced individuals assign outgroup members those characteristics which they use to differentiate between outgroup and non–outgroup members (i.e., prejudiced individuals are more likely to find supporting rather than contradictory evidence for assumed outgroup characteristics). Nevertheless, one may have a limited understanding or acceptance of disliked outgroup members' qualities.

Disliked behaviors of outgroup members make one feel "hate" and "bothered" because one considers them "disgusting" or "unacceptable." One believes that one's prejudice follows naturally from the actions of outgroup members. As Chris stated, "what they do leads us to prejudice." One usually avoids outgroup members, although one may feel pressured into a confrontation with them because of one's negative reaction to their behavior.

4. *Influences on the formation of one's prejudice.* Influences that may play a role in the formation of one's prejudice toward outgroup members include: (a) one's religion; (b) the beliefs, experiences or expectations of one's friends and relatives; and (c) negative media portrayals of outgroup members. However, the most important factor in the formation of one's prejudice is personal experience(s) with outgroup members (evidenced by the co–researchers' recollection of episodes with outgroup members). Ann, for instance, stated "I

think most of it is because I had a personal experience... I think that's what really made me turn against them."

This finding is supported by an abundance of research results. For example, based on her studies with nursery school children, Goodman (1952) delineated a number of factors that play a part in determining outgroup awareness and orientation in children, including the frequency and type of intergroup contacts and the presence or absence of models who exhibit certain "race ways." Her findings support the position of Harding et al. (1969) in their review of the literature on prejudice and ethnic relations that prejudice is learned and multicausally determined.

Regarding the role of personal experience with outgroup members in the formation of prejudice, Allport and Kramer (1946) found that prejudiced individuals have unpleasant childhood memories of outgroup members. Allport and Kramer contended that this reflects either the importance of early experience with outgroup members in the formation of prejudice, or a tendency for individuals to justify their present prejudices by selectively referring to past events (or perhaps inventing past events). Likewise, in his review of the literature on the social psychology of prejudice, Ehrlich (1973) concluded that highly prejudiced individuals generally report initial negative experiences with outgroup members. These early experiences form the anchor onto which prejudiced individuals code and evaluate subsequent information about outgroup members. Ehrlich formalized this conclusion in his *principle of cognitive anchoring:* "Initial intergroup experiences are crucial in establishing a strategy of coding and the direction in which ethnic attitudes may develop" (p. 162).

5. *Contact experiences.* Contact experiences may be considered in affective, cognitive, and behavioral terms. Affectively, negative reactions, expressed by

such words as "uncomfortable," "bothered," and "tense," usually accompany one's contacts with outgroup members. These emotional reactions result when one focuses on the outgroupness of outgroup members.

Cognitively, one remains aware of the outgroupness of outgroup members during contact situations. This is often coupled with an expectation that outgroup members will conform to one's image of outgroup members.

Behaviorally, one tries to limit or avoid contacts with outgroup members because one experiences contacts negatively. However, one tries to behave in a civil manner when contacts cannot be avoided.

Furthermore, there is a difference between one's contact experiences with outgroup members and one's contact experiences with non–outgroup members. For example, one generally feels more uncomfortable with outgroup members.

One's contact experiences also involve a context dimension. Under certain circumstances, such as pre–arranged or casual contact (i.e., when one has been forewarned of a contact encounter, or when contact is brief or superficial), one may, for example, react with indifference or ambivalence. Therefore, to fully understand contact experiences, contextual factors must be accounted for. (Context factors are considered in more detail in the seventh theme below.)

6. *Reaction to the possibility of contact.* Although one does not dislike the possibility of encountering outgroup members, one believes that contact situations will be experienced negatively based on one's previous contacts.

7. *Behavior toward outgroup members.* One the basis of one's (a) moral or religious convictions, (b) belief that all people should be granted fair and equal treatment, or (c) desire to avoid conflict, one believes that outgroup members *should not* be treated differently than non–outgroup members are treated. In practice, however, one is frequently less friendly toward outgroup members

than toward non–outgroup members, or one avoids contacts with outgroup members but not with non–outgroup members. Concurrently, one believes that one *does not* usually treat outgroup members differently than one treats non–outgroup members.

There is a discrepancy regarding one's behavior toward outgroup members and whether or not one treats outgroup members the same way one treats non–outgroup members. Context factors may account for part of this discrepancy. How one behaves toward outgroup members depends on such factors as: (a) the physical and psychological distance between oneself and outgroup members; (b) the length of time of contacts; (c) whether contacts involve individual outgroup members or groups of outgroup members; (d) whether one has been prepared for the contacts in some way (e.g., a pre–arranged meeting through mutual friends) or they occur spontaneously; and (e) whether one has been (or one feels that one has been) provoked into *re* acting against outgroup members (e.g., Irene reacting to her Italian co–workers) or one is acting on one's own initiative. In general, one avoids outgroup members, or one behaves more negatively toward them than toward non–outgroup members, when (a) contacts between oneself and outgroup members are more close than distant; (b) contacts are more prolonged or sustained than brief (Harding et al., 1969, likewise point out that prejudices play a minimal role in short–lived relationships and are maximally determinant in intimate and long lasting relationships); (c) contacts occur between oneself and groups of outgroup members rather than between oneself and individual outgroup members; (d) contacts occur spontaneously, that is they have not been pre–arranged and one is not prepared for them; or (e) one is provoked into acting against outgroup members.

8. *Understanding outgroup members.* By "stepping into the shoes" of outgroup individuals and assuming their perspective, one not only gains an understanding of the situation faced by outgroup individuals as minority group members, one also gains an understanding of factors that influence their attitudes and behaviors. As a result, one feels somewhat sympathetic toward them. However, one's sympathy is tempered by one's belief that, although several factors may contribute to one's negative view of outgroup members (e.g., the influences of various social processes and institutions, such as stereotyped portrayals of outgroup members in the media), outgroup members themselves are ultimately responsible for their negative status. This view is akin to *victim blaming* theories of prejudice that find the causes of prejudice in outgroup members themselves (Levin & Levin, 1982; Rose, 1948). Also, one has an intellectual curiosity about outgroup members (e.g., Ann stated "I'm interested in knowing about that, how people become like this [homosexual]").

9. *Observation of outgroup members.* Outgroup members' characteristics (e.g., appearance, behavior) that set outgroup members apart from non–outgroup members, and that make identification of outgroup members easy, are focused upon. A negative reaction may accompany this focus of attention (e.g., Ruth stated that she is bothered by seeing homosexual behavior in public).

10. *Outgroup–member/human–being distinction.* One distinguishes between outgroup individuals' membership in the outgroup and their inclusion with all persons in a common humanity. That is, one differentiates between outgroup members *as* outgroup members and outgroup members as human beings. For instance, one may accept outgroup members as unique individuals and at the same time reject them because they are members of the outgroup (e.g., referring to homosexuals, Ruth wrote "accept them—yes! Accept what they're doing—no!"). One knows that outgroup members are unique human beings, yet

one expects them to possess certain qualities that one believes are shared by outgroup members. Despite one's negative view of outgroup members, one also recognizes that—as Rick stated—outgroup members "undoubtedly" have positive qualities because *all* people do.

This finding supports Billig's (1985) contention that there is no straightforward equation of prejudice with categorization and tolerance with particularization. (*Particularization,* the opposite of categorization, "refers to the process by which a particular stimulus is distinguished from a general category or from other stimuli" [Billig, 1985, p. 82].) One categorizes and rejects outgroup individuals based on their group membership while one particularizes and accepts them as unique human beings.

This finding may also be viewed in relation to Harding et al.'s (1969) definition of prejudice as an attitude that departs from one or more ideal norms. Harding et al. (1969) suggested that individuals who accept others as unique human beings while they simultaneously reject others as outgroup members violate the *norm of human heartedness* or brotherly love. This norm involves individuals' acceptance, expressed in both feeling and action, of *all* people because of their common humanity. Deviation from this norm results in intolerance (Harding et al., 1969).

11. *Generalized reaction to outgroup members.* One rejects *all* outgroup members because of (a) a single negative contact experience with either an individual outgroup member or several outgroup members (the initial encounter is particularly important), (b) consistently negative contact experiences with outgroup members, (c) one's observations of outgroup members, or (d) one's religious or moral convictions.

There is also an expectation that outgroup individuals will conform to an outgroup stereotype or to one's image of a typical outgroup member. If outgroup

individuals possess a single outgroup characteristic, then one assumes that they will possess many outgroup characteristics.

One's rejection of outgroup members may generalize to include all persons who resemble outgroup members (e.g., physically or behaviorally). Social psychologists have repeatedly observed that individuals tend to react similarly toward members of all outgroups (Harding et al., 1969). For example, on the basis of their research evidence, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that prejudice is only superficially, if at all, related to its object, and prejudice can be switched from one object (outgroup) to another.

The cognitive process of *categorization* allows one to reject all outgroup members. Categorization simplifies what is otherwise complex (Tajfel, 1969). For example, when one assumes that outgroup members conform to an outgroup stereotype, one reduces the amount of information that has to be processed to understand them.

12. *Reaction to groups of outgroup members.* One generally has a stronger negative reaction to groups of outgroup members than to individual outgroup members. Also, one may not behave differently in groups of outgroup members than in groups of non–outgroup members, but one has a negative emotional reaction to the former and not the latter. This negative emotional reaction may motivate one to avoid outgroup members.

13. *Reaction to outgroup members' behavior.* One reacts negatively to some of the behavior of outgroup members, which one considers unusual or uncommon compared with the behavior of non–outgroup members. One feels "uncomfortable" and "angry" because one finds the behavior "unacceptable," "unfriendly," or "unattractive." Furthermore, one is aware that one's prejudice is partially based on outgroup members' behavior. For example, Chris wrote "I do not like them [natives] because of who they are but *what* they do. Their

behavior is so unorthodox to ordinary citizens that one cannot help to feel a little prejudice towards them." Later, he stated that "what they do leads us to prejudice... That's why people get the negative image of them, because of what they do."

Despite one's negative reaction to outgroup members' behavior, one does not usually confront them about the behavior. This may be because (a) one accepts the behavior to a point. For instance, one accepts the behavior provided it does not affect oneself (e.g., Ruth stated "that's okay, just leave me alone"); (b) one understands that for outgroup members the behavior may be desirable; and (c) one does not want to "start a war" with outgroup members.

One may also develop certain beliefs about the behavior of outgroup members. These include beliefs that outgroup members naturally behave unusually (e.g., homosexuality is "in the blood"), and that perhaps outgroup members' behavior is a reaction to non–outgroup members' treatment of them.

14. *Fostering better intergroup relationships.* While one acknowledges that everybody should try to improve relations between outgroup and non–outgroup individuals (e.g., Irene stated that "everybody should be more tolerant... If we can all treat everybody equal, we wouldn't hear it so much, we wouldn't hear this prejudice"), one believes that the primary responsibility for doing so rests with outgroup members. Outgroup members should behave like "ordinary citizens" (Chris) and "take the initiative to get along better with others" (Irene). Ruth stated that "it's up to the individual [outgroup] person... If each person just made an effort with the people they came in contact with, when they got a negative response to try to get rid of that negative response." However, one believes that improvements in intergroup relations will not be seen for a long time, mainly because outgroup members must change before they can foster better relationships with non–outgroup members.

15. *Rigidity of one's prejudice.* One maintains a fairly rigid attitude regarding outgroup members. This is despite acknowledging that one *should* be open to change in one's attitudes, and recognizing that "there's always exceptions" to one's beliefs (Rick). For example, Irene stated that "I wish I can let it [prejudice] go, but I can't," and Ann stated "I don't think I will ever change my opinion." Briefly, one's prejudice is strongly maintained.

16. *Acceptance of a stereotype.* One accepts a stereotype of outgroup members or one believes that most outgroup members conform to an image of a typical outgroup member, although one recognizes that there is occasionally an exception. For instance, referring to an encounter with a native individual, Chris wrote "he seemed to be very typical of his ethnicity." This belief that most outgroup members are basically alike leads one to anticipate certain qualities in outgroup members that one encounters. If one meets an outgroup individual who possesses a characteristic that one associates with outgroup members, then one may expect the person to possess many of these characteristics. Cognitively, one ascribes characteristics of their outgroup membership to outgroup individuals, and then one sees those characteristics in the individuals (Tajfel, 1969).

17. *Factors affecting outgroup members.* One is aware of factors largely independent of the control of outgroup members that influence one's attitude toward them. As a result, one realizes that outgroup members' characteristics are not the only cause of one's prejudice. Influences largely independent of outgroup members include: (a) innate predisposition (e.g., homosexuality is "in the blood"); (b) various social structures and processes (e.g., by giving natives welfare money, governments promote an image of natives as lazy); (c) the treatment of outgroup individuals by non–outgroup individuals (i.e., outgroup members' behavior is determined partly by the treatment of outgroup individuals

by prejudiced non–outgroup members, and outgroup members' behavior influences one's attitude toward them); and (d) portrayals of outgroup members by others and the media.

18. *Improving outgroup members' condition.* One acknowledges that non–outgroup individuals have to play a role in improving the condition of outgroup members, that is in altering the negative perception of outgroup members by some non–outgroup individuals. Nevertheless, one believes that outgroup members themselves are primarily responsible for improving their condition (e.g., by changing their behavior). One also realizes that outgroup members may find it difficult to improve their condition substantially because of the influence of factors beyond their control (discussed in the previous paragraph). That is, outgroup members have little control over such influences which are partly responsible for determining their condition, and therefore they may not be able to improve their condition significantly.

19. *Ideation about outgroup members.* One often thinks about outgroup members—about their personal qualities and behaviors, about their condition and what can be done to improve group relations, et cetera. For example, Irene stated that, despite finding it difficult to think about homosexuality because doing so makes her feel angry and nauseated, she considers it "weird" that "a day does not go by where I don't think about it." Such ideation frequently follows contact with outgroup members, but it may occur for no apparent reason at all. However, outgroup members are "not really" (Irene) thought about prior to encountering them. That is, one thinks about outgroup members only after one has experience with them.

20. *Sympathy for outgroup members.* One sympathizes with outgroup members either because one is (or has been) an object of prejudice, or one imagines how it feels to be an object of prejudice. However, feeling sympathetic

toward outgroup members has little effect on one's attitude or behavior toward them (e.g., the extent of one's prejudice is not thereby diminished).

21. *Context dimension.* Context is a factor in contact situations: How one behaves toward and perceives outgroup members depends on situational factors during contacts (e.g., the length of time of contacts, the social setting in which contacts occur, etc.) (Context factors are considered in greater detail in the seventh theme, above.) Occasionally, one is aware of the importance of context factors. For instance, regarding her anticipated reaction to contact with outgroup members, Irene stated that "it depends on the situation. It would depend on the circumstances at the time I'm meeting them." Likewise, Rick stated that "I'd have to look at situational factors."

Romanyshyn (1971) observed that investigators usually ignore the context in which attitudes are formed and expressed. Nevertheless, the importance of situational factors has been disclosed in some quantitative research. For example, in their study of prejudice and interracial contact among students in either segregated or integrated schools, Moore, Hauck, and Denne (1984) found that prejudice is situationally specific: White students are more prejudiced than black students in situations of prolonged interracial contact, but there is no difference in prejudice between black and white students when interracial contact is less intimate and occurs over a short period of time.

22. *Awareness of prejudice in oneself.* Although one does not usually think of oneself as being–prejudiced, or one maintains an open attitude about outgroup members, one is nevertheless aware that some of one's attitudes and behaviors indicate that one is prejudiced. One regards one's prejudice(s) as a "natural" reaction (Chris) to the qualities of outgroup members. Sometimes one explicitly acknowledges oneself as being–prejudiced. For example, when

discussing his attitude toward natives, Chris stated "I don't know, I may be prejudiced about it" and "what they do leads us to prejudice."

The Essential Description

The exhaustive description spells out in detail the contents of the themes. It is an extensive description that is sometimes redundant because of overlaps in the elements of the themes (e.g., several themes include a negative emotional reaction). The results can be described in a more concise form by reducing such redundancies. Relationships between the themes become apparent when common elements among the themes are noted. These relationships can be used to organize a succinct description of the findings. What results is a description, presented in as simple a form as possible, of the essence of being–prejudiced, that is a description of the characteristics of the phenomenon of being–prejudiced that define the phenomenon and make the phenomenon what it is.

An example may clarify this. A negative affective state is an element of several themes. In particular, prejudiced individuals display negative emotional reactions to: (a) perceiving the outgroup name (theme 1); (b) observing disliked outgroup members' qualities, especially behaviors (themes 3, 9, and 13); and (c) contacts with outgroup members (theme 5). Because these themes all contain the element of a negative emotional reaction, it is possible to organize some of the research results around this element by fleshing out relationships between themes containing this element. A succinct presentation of information contained in some of the themes results. The first paragraph of the essential description (presented below) organizes and summarizes the information contained in the themes that relates to a negative emotional state in the experience of prejudice.

It is now possible to answer the question "what are the essential aspects of being–prejudiced?" The essential aspects of being–prejudiced are presented in the following essential description:

A negative emotional state accompanies one or more of the following: (a) one's perception of disliked aspects of outgroup members (e.g., appearance, behavior) which one considers uncommon or different from similar attributes of non–outgroup members, which one believes all outgroup members possess, and which focus one's attention on the outgroupness of outgroup members, thereby making them more noticeable than non–outgroup members; (b) contacts with either individual outgroup members or groups of outgroup members (although one usually has stronger negative reactions to groups of outgroup members than to individual outgroup members), which one experiences more negatively than contacts with non–outgroup members; and (c) one's perception of the outgroup name, which either symbolizes disliked aspects of outgroup members or leads to the recollection of negative experiences with them.

One may react negatively to outgroup members' behavior, although one tries to avoid conflict with outgroup members and one does not usually discriminate against them. Instead, one avoids outgroup members, or one minimizes contacts with and exposure to them. When contacts with outgroup members cannot be avoided one is frequently less friendly toward them than toward non–outgroup members, even though one believes that one *should not* behave more negatively toward outgroup members and that one *does not* treat them differently than one treats non–outgroup members. Context factors present during contacts (e.g., physical and psychological distance between oneself and outgroup members, length of time of contacts, etc.) may account for some of the inconsistencies in one's behavior toward or perception of outgroup members.

Context factors may also account for differences between one's behavior toward outgroup members and one's perception of non–prejudiced individuals' behavior toward them: One views one's treatment of outgroup members similarly to non–prejudiced individuals' treatment of outgroup members except under certain circumstances. (The nature of the circumstances leading to differential treatment of outgroup members, and the nature of the differential treatment itself, varies from one prejudiced individual to another).

One's experiences with outgroup members is the most significant of all factors (including one's upbringing and one's religious or moral beliefs) influencing one's attitude toward outgroup members. One develops an intellectual curiosity about outgroup members and one pays more attention to them than to non–outgroup members because of one's experiences with them. Also, as a result of negative contact experiences, one focuses on the outgroupness of outgroup members. This focus of attention hinders a complete understanding of outgroup members as one expects them to be different than non–outgroup members and one categorizes them on the basis of their group membership. One also believes that most outgroup members conform to a stereotype. An image of a typical outgroup member leads one to anticipate certain qualities in all outgroup members. One also differentiates between outgroup members as outgroup members and outgroup members as unique individuals—they are simultaneously accepted as unique individuals (as all people are) and rejected as outgroup members. In addition, based on exposure to only some outgroup members one's attitude generalizes to all outgroup members, and one's attitude, though not inflexible, is rigidly maintained.

One understands the condition of outgroup members (i.e., that some non–outgroup individuals perceive them negatively) and one feels somewhat sympathetic toward them either because one can assume their perspective or

because one knows what it is like to be an object of prejudice (because one is or has been an object of somebody's prejudice). However, this understanding and sympathy have little effect on one's attitude or behavior toward outgroup members because one believes that outgroup members are responsible for their condition, even though some factors beyond their control (e.g., their portrayal in the media) influence their condition and the view of non–outgroup individuals toward them. Likewise, one believes that outgroup members are ultimately responsible for, and they should take the initiative in, improving both their condition and intergroup relations, even though all people should be involved.

One regards one's prejudice as a natural reaction to the qualities of outgroup members, and therefore one does not usually think of oneself as being–prejudiced. Nevertheless, one is aware that one's attitude toward outgroup members may be construed as prejudiced. One rarely expresses one's attitude about outgroup members to others in order to avoid adverse reactions, although one's attitude is usually validated by those to whom it is disclosed.

The Structural Description

The essential description was validated by the co–researchers. The following description of the structure of being–prejudiced, derived from the essential description, was also validated by the co–researchers:

Being–prejudiced means to rather inflexibly maintain an attitude about all outgroup members based on experience with some outgroup members. At the core of being–prejudiced is a predominantly negative emotional state that is accompanied by characteristic modes of perception, thought and action which are influenced somewhat by context factors.

Whereas the essential description illuminates the lived–experience of being–prejudiced, the structural description relates the structural components of being–prejudiced rather than being–prejudiced per se. The structural description reveals, in general terms (i.e., without reference to specific content), the structure of the experiences described in the co–researchers' protocols. Although it is stated in general terms, the structural description remains faithful to and exhaustively describes the content of the protocols. It is based on the specific content of the protocols although it does not contain any of that content.

Examination of the essential description reveals that a combination of factors define being–prejudiced. These factors are (a) negative emotional reactions, (b) perceptions of outgroup members (e.g., focusing on their outgroupness), (c) experiences with outgroup members (e.g., in contact situations), (d) behaviors toward outgroup members (e.g., avoidance), (e) beliefs and other thoughts regarding outgroup members (e.g., that outgroup members conform to a stereotype), and (f) context factors. The structural description was formulated by organizing these factors into a concise account of the phenomenon of being–prejudiced. Briefly, with regard to the structural description, "the intention is to give a description of the whole of the experience to be described, but in a reduced form representing the...structure of the experience" (Svensson, 1986, p. 44).

The Literature Reconsidered

The results are now examined in relation to some of the literature discussed in chapter 2. Contact situations are considered first.

The results support Amir's (1969) conclusion that prejudiced individuals avoid contacts with outgroup members whenever possible and maintain stereotypes when contacts are made. The results also support Allport's (1954) contention that prejudiced individuals, even though they hate outgroups in the

abstract, generally act kindly when they are in contact with outgroup members. Specifically, the results indicate that, in addition to maintaining a stereotyped image of outgroup members (theme 16), prejudiced individuals avoid contacts with outgroup members but behave in a civil manner when contacts are made (theme 5).

Amir (1976) formulated a number of generalizations based on his review of research concerning contact situations. Some of these generalizations are now reviewed in relation to the results of this study. First, Amir concluded that it is difficult to make prejudiced individuals interact with outgroup members because they prefer to interact with ingroup members. This conclusion is supported by the findings of this study that (a) prejudiced individuals may be reluctant to encounter outgroup members because previous encounters have been experienced negatively (theme 6); and (b) they try to avoid outgroup members (theme 7), partly due to their negative reactions to outgroup members' behavior (theme 13). (Furthermore, both Rick and Chris mentioned that individuals prefer to associate with their own kind, that is with ingroup members.)

Second, Amir concluded that when prejudiced individuals interact with outgroup members in contact situations, they eventually accept the situations as well as outgroup members. The results of this study, although they do not bear directly upon this conclusion, suggest that this is one of several possible outcomes. In particular, the outcomes of contact situations depend upon context factors (themes 5, 7, and 21). Also, given that prejudiced individuals generally try to avoid encounters with outgroup members (themes 5 and 7), and their attitudes are quite rigidly maintained (theme 15), it is unlikely that contacts will necessarily alter their attitudes toward outgroup members.

Lastly, Amir concluded that conditions under which contacts occur largely determine the direction of attitude change. Results on the role of context factors

in determining prejudiced individuals' perceptions of and behaviors toward outgroup members (themes 5, 7, and 21) suggest that context factors may also play a role in attitude change.

The results also have implications for assumptions that govern social psychological thought. For example, the importance of context factors in determining individuals' perceptions of and behaviors toward social objects (viz., outgroup members) demonstrates the fallacy of explaining individuals' present states in terms of past conditions (the genetic bias).

Finally, it is time to consider the results in relation to the descriptions of attitude structure provided by Romanyshyn (1971) and Ashworth (1985). Romanyshyn and Ashworth revealed the following components of attitude structure, presented here in conjunction with the relevant findings of this study:

1. Attitudes are intentional phenomena that relate individuals to other people. By focusing on a particular attitude object or figural concern, namely outgroup members, these aspects of attitude structure are built into the design of the study. Because the attitude object is other people (viz., outgroup members), the study involves the relation of prejudiced individuals to others.

2. Attitudes are situational phenomena. The finding that context factors play a role in determining prejudiced individuals' perceptions of and behaviors toward outgroup members reveals the situational component of attitudes.

3. Attitudes relate people to their history. The importance of early life (e.g., religious upbringing) and other influences, especially personal encounters with outgroup members, in the formation of prejudice reveals the role of individuals' life–histories in prejudice.

4. Attitudes relate people to a project unfolding in time. The obverse of the historical element of attitudes, this aspect of attitudes leads people into the future. That being–prejudiced has implications for individuals' behaviors toward

and perceptions of outgroup members, as well as their involvement in both fostering better intergroup relations and improving the condition of outgroup members, suggests that prejudice functions to orient individuals toward the future.

5. Attitudes structure the field of consciousness in a primarily affective manner. Likewise, a fundamental component of prejudice is a negative emotional state that influences prejudiced individuals' perceptions, thoughts, and actions.

6. Conation is an essential component of attitudes, though the implication for action may be null. The results similarly indicate that being–prejudiced has implications for individuals' behaviors toward outgroup members, and frequently the implication is to avoid outgroup members.

In sum, the results of this phenomenological study of prejudice are congruent with the findings of previous phenomenological studies of attitude. Furthermore, not only does prejudice share the same components as attitudes in general, it also encompasses a number of unique aspects. This is not unexpected: Certain aspects of an attitude will be determined by the unique nature of the attitude object.

This last exercise (viz., considering the results in relation to the literature) was conducted to examine the way in which the results either support or question some of the findings and assumptions in the literature on prejudice. Literature on prejudice is also examined in the next chapter when implications of the results are considered, particularly for further research.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This study was undertaken to examine the meaning of being–prejudiced and to increase understanding of the experiences of prejudiced individuals. It was the author's intention to provide experientially meaningful, descriptive data on the psychology of prejudice. The research question demanded an approach that required, as data, prejudiced individuals' descriptions of their own experiences—it demanded a phenomenological approach.

Now that the study has been described, from the origins of the research question to the results, it is time to reflect upon the research. This chapter presents the author's reflections on both the methodology employed to answer the research question, and the results of the research.

Of the approaches and methodologies available to answer research questions, researchers must choose the ones which are best suited to answer their questions. Although the particular approaches taken may be the best ones available to answer the research questions, the approaches may still have their limitations. It is important for researchers to critically appraise their work, to recognize potential limitations and to acknowledge what their research has not set out to do (i.e., to establish the boundaries of the research). The first part of this chapter addresses these concerns.

In addition to concerns about the approaches and methodologies employed, researchers should reflect upon the research results. What new knowledge has been gained? Where does the study lead? What are its implications for further research and for practical application? These questions are answered in this chapter when the author discusses the results in relation to existing literature. In so doing he points out new knowledge that has been acquired about the psychology of prejudice, and he makes several recommendations about

continued study in this area. Finally, educational programs aimed at the elimination of prejudice are briefly reviewed, and the implications of the results of this study for such programs are considered.

Limitations of the Research

This study focused on the experiences of prejudiced individuals. It did not examine the experiences of individuals who are the objects of prejudice. By explaining why the experiences of individuals who are the objects of prejudice were not also examined, the author demarcates the boundaries of the study.

The author chose a phenomenological approach to answer the research question for reasons outlined previously. This, however, does not mean that there are no concerns with the use of this approach. A potential limitation of the phenomenological approach is discussed here.

Boundaries of the Study

A legitimate question to ask is "why not conduct a more comprehensive study by also examining the experiences of individuals who are the targets of prejudice?" In addition to the extra time that it would take to study the experiences of such individuals—essentially a doubling of the current study—it was pointed out in chapter one that during the 1960s investigators focused on the effects of prejudice on individuals who are the targets of prejudice (Ashmore, 1970; Fairchild & Gurin, 1978; Milner, 1983). Consequently, the experiences of individuals who are the targets of prejudice have already been examined.

Although a phenomenological study of the experiences of individuals who are targets of prejudice has not been conducted, there are nevertheless numerous reports of such individuals' experiences in both the scientific and popular literature. For example, the book *White Man/ Black Man* (Keating & Watson, 1974) is an autobiographical account of the lives of two men—one a

successful white journalist, the other a black drug dealer—and their relationship to each other. The book, in describing their experiences, dramatizes the differences in quality of life between affluent whites and poor blacks in the United States.

Perhaps the most famous book dealing with the experiences of individuals who are targets of prejudice is John Howard Griffin's (1976) *Black Like Me.* Griffin, a white American writer, passed himself off as a black man in the American deep South. A first–hand account of the plight of blacks as second–class citizens, *Black Like Me* vividly depicts the experiences of blacks who are objects to whites' prejudices.

Briefly, then, the experiences of individuals who are targets of others' prejudices have not been studied here because of time constraints and because they have already been documented. However, a phenomenological study of such individuals' experiences has not been conducted, and such a study would complement the research reported here.

Methodological Considerations

What follows is a discussion of the author's concern with the use of the phenomenological method, particularly its reliance on the verbal expression of meaning and experience that only results from an act of reflection.

During the reflection (in chapter 3) the author stated his belief that everyday life is largely pre–reflective, and that attitudes are primarily acted upon and secondarily thought about. If attitudes are largely pre–reflective, then this raises a question about the appropriateness of the phenomenological method for answering the research question: If prejudices (and other attitudes) are largely pre–reflective, then does reflecting on them (e.g., discussing them in interviews) alter them? In particular, has the essence of prejudice been altered in this study

by discussing prejudices at a reflective level if they are of a pre–reflective nature?

Although the author became concerned with this question during the course of the study, it should be noted that other scholars and researchers have expressed similar concerns. For example, Allport (1951, 1954) contended that the phenomenological approach is insufficient to fully understand prejudice because it only deals with conscious meanings, and some of the processes involved in prejudice are likely unconscious. In other words, people can only relate information that is available to reflection and they cannot say anything about those aspects of prejudice that are beyond reflection.

Similarly, MacLeod (1947) observed that the phenomenological approach is limited by its reliance on the use of language, because words can indicate but never completely represent phenomena. Hence, the phenomenon of prejudice cannot be apprehended fully in linguistic terms. "Our almost paradoxical task is, while of necessity using language in our analysis, to penetrate through language to real psychological structures, yet all the while recognizing that some linguistic artifacts are psychologically real" (p. 205).

Giorgi (1986) argued that one must engage in a conscious act of reflection in order to apprehend the meaning of something that is experienced pre–reflectively. He contended that "linguistic meaning, a mode of conscious expression, presupposes and extends the labor of consciousness begun by prelinguistic presences" (p. 19). It is his thesis that even though people are generally pre–reflectively—and hence pre–linguistically—present to the world, they must engage in a conscious act of reflection in order to apprehend the meaning of what is given pre–reflectively, and furthermore that such meaning is best expressed through the use of description since words and sentences are capable of depicting a situation (and its meaning) as it is experienced.

Ashworth (1985, 1986) expressed a similar position. He argued that people are present to attitude objects unreflectively, although they may become aware of attitude situations or of themselves as attitude holders through reflection. He adduced a typology involving three levels of self–awareness in attitude situations. The first level is pre–reflective. At this level individuals experience situations but they do not reflect upon the situations or the role of the self. At the second level individuals are reflectively aware of the attitudinal nature of the situations, while at the third level the focus of attention is on the self–as–attitude–holder. If attitudes are pre–reflective, then the question becomes "does studying prejudice at Ashworth's levels two or three—which is done in interview studies—affect the essence or the structure of the attitude if the attitude is normally experienced at level one?" Ashworth (1986) himself stated "now, strictly, the first level of attitude structuring does not enter into the descriptions which provide our data. They are necessarily based on occasions of reflective awareness of attitudes" (p. 259).

The point being made is that there are concerns with the use of the phenomenological method. In sum, the method relies upon dialogue to ascertain the meaning and structure of phenomena that may normally be experienced pre–reflectively, even though dialoguing about phenomena necessarily involves reflection that may alter the structure and meaning of the phenomena. Nevertheless, the phenomenological method is still the best method available to answer questions concerning experience and meaning. Edwards (1987) summarized this concern as follows: "All conversation is reflective. Once we put words to our experience we begin to move out of the direct experiencing. It is through language that we begin to ascribe meaning and can communicate understanding. It is a means of reflecting on our reality" (p. 54).

Before considering the results of the research, a further concern with the use of the phenomenological method is presented.

If attitudes are pre–reflective, and the structure and essence of attitudes are revealed in reflection, then is it possible for individuals to reflect upon attitudes differently at different times, thereby leading to different descriptions of the structure or essence of attitudes? This concern is akin to the quantitative problem of generalization: Just as it may be inappropriate to generalize the results of a study from a particular experimental context (time, place, circumstances, etc.) to other contexts, it may also be inappropriate to generalize the results of this study to all prejudiced individuals, not because of the limited number of people interviewed but because interviews are short–lived [illegible]iances requiring reflection on attitudes that may not normally be reflected [illegible]he attitudes (prejudices) may be reflected upon differently at different [illegible]s. And attitudes themselves are changeable. (Indeed, in the short space of time between the first and second data gathering interviews—approximately six months—some of the co–researchers mentioned that their attitudes toward outgroups had already changed: Some participants became more tolerant [apparently due to increased knowledge of the outgroups] and others became less tolerant [apparently due to negative personal experiences with the outgroups' members].) Consequently, the same questions asked to the same individuals on different occasions may elicit different responses, leading to different research results (e.g., different themes associated with the phenomenon).

If the above analysis is correct, that people reflect upon their attitudes differently at different times and that attitudes themselves change over time, then, in order to ensure the generalizability of the results of interview studies of attitude, it might be necessary to conduct prolonged and extensive (e.g., over a

period of several years) interviews with numerous individuals, so as to guarantee that the structure of the phenomenon remains relatively intact over a period of time. Furthermore, if attitudes are experienced at a predominantly pre–verbal level and they are primarily acted upon and secondarily thought about, then while interviews might be a useful first step in the process of uncovering the nature of attitudes, perhaps the best way to study attitudes is through prolonged and extensive *observation* of individuals in action with attitude objects. In essence, observations are more valuable than interviews if "actions speak louder than words."

It is important to point out that the above concerns with the use of the phenomenological method are based on the author's belief that attitudes are predominantly pre–reflective. If attitudes are largely pre–reflective, then the above concerns should be addressed by all researchers who investigate attitudes phenomenologically. These concerns have been presented here in order to stimulate discussion. It is not the author's intention to provide answers for the questions raised here, for even if answers are available they would require a detailed consideration of philosophical and methodological issues that are beyond the scope of this text.

New Research Findings

Because the purpose of research is to generate data about the phenomenon of concern, it is timely to ask "what new knowledge has been gained in this study?" In answering this question it is necessary to point out that the essential description and the description of the structure of prejudice are completely new. They have not been formulated previously because a phenomenological study of prejudice has not hitherto been conducted.

Furthermore, based on his knowledge of literature on the psychology of prejudice, it is the author's contention that some of the 22 themes described in

the previous chapter present new knowledge about the phenomenon of prejudice (i.e., information that has not thus far been explicated), while some of the findings have been implied or examined superficially in the literature but have not been fully uncovered.

Before considering what new information is contained in the 22 themes, it should be noted that much of the information contained in the themes has previously been explicated. This was pointed out in chapter four when the themes were described and literature relating to the themes was discussed. For example, that prejudiced individuals are influenced in their attitudes by the beliefs and expectations of significant others and by personal experiences with outgroup members (theme 4) has been noted in several developmental and correlational studies (e.g., Allport & Kramer, 1946; Goodman, 1952). Likewise, studies of the cognitive processes of prejudiced individuals (e.g., Rokeach, 1948, 1951; Tajfel, 1969) indicate the generalized nature of prejudiced individuals' reactions to outgroup members (theme 11) as well as the rigidity of their attitudes (theme 15). Finally, the holding of stereotypes by prejudiced individuals (theme 16) has been documented in the literature (e.g., Saenger & Flowerman, 1954).

It is now time to consider the findings that present new information about the phenomenon of prejudice. The first piece of information concerns theme 1, "reaction to the outgroup name." Although researchers have not focused their attention on this particular aspect of prejudice, they have nevertheless assumed that people react to group labels. In fact, in their classic study of racial stereotypes, Katz and Braly (1933) stated that "attitudes toward racial and national groups are in good part attitudes toward race names" (p. 280). This assumption is evident in questionnaire studies wherein the only information about outgroups provided to respondents are their names. The Bogardus

Social Distance Scale, for example, requires individuals to indicate the degree to which they would form relationships with members of various groups, ranging from "to close kinship by marriage" to "would exclude from my country" (see Deri et al., 1948, p. 261). The assumption apparent in these studies, that prejudiced individuals react to outgroup labels, is confirmed here.

That prejudiced individuals are reluctant to discuss their prejudices for fear of others' reactions (theme 2) has been intimated in the literature. Some of Smith et al.'s (1964) subjects, for instance, indicated that they appreciated the opportunity to express themselves without fear of others' reactions. It has been noted that many prejudiced individuals express their prejudices "pseudodemocratically" (Adorno et al., 1950) or with compunction (Allport, 1954), wherein prejudices are couched in terms of a compromise with democratic ideals. This is usually interpreted to indicate that individuals' prejudices collide with deep–seated, antithetical values such as democracy. However, such expression may also result because prejudiced individuals anticipate negative reactions from others, and they therefore expresses seemingly democratic views in order to appear open minded.

As noted repeatedly in the literature (and as summarized by Ehrlich, 1973), prejudiced individuals display negative emotional reactions to outgroup members (theme 3). However, the reason for these negative emotional reactions has not been explicated. Themes 3, 9, and 13 suggest that the reactions result when prejudiced individuals focus on the "outgroupness" of outgroup members, that is they focus on those characteristics—especially behaviors—of outgroup members that set outgroup members apart from non–outgroup members. Theme 13, in particular, emphasizes the importance to prejudiced individuals of outgroup members' behavior.

Although contact experiences (theme 5) have been a focus of sustained research, there has been little research comparing prejudiced individuals' experiences in contacts with outgroup members to their experiences in contacts with non–outgroup members. For example, when he synthesized the results of intergroup contact studies, Amir (1976) did not compare prejudiced individuals' contact experiences with outgroup members to their contact experiences with non–outgroup members. It appears to be assumed that prejudiced individuals' contact experiences with outgroup members suffice to characterize, e contrario, their contact experiences with non–outgroup members. Theme 5 states that prejudiced individuals do, in fact, experience contacts with outgroup members differently than they experience contacts with non–outgroup members.

Prejudiced individuals' reactions to the possibility of contact (theme 6) have not been explored. Amir (1976) identified this as a limitation of the literature, noting that individuals' attitudes about contact with outgroup member may be different than their general attitudes toward outgroups. Theme 6 indicates that prejudiced individuals expect contact encounters with outgroup members to be experienced negatively (because of their previous contact experiences), although they do not dislike the possibility of contact.

Despite prejudiced individuals' belief that they do not treat outgroup members differently than they treat non–outgroup members, in actuality they behave more negatively toward outgroup members than toward non–outgroup members (theme 7). This finding calls into question Allport's (1954) contention that prejudiced individuals hate outgroups in the abstract but nevertheless behave fairly when contacts with outgroup members are established. As noted in chapter four, context factors account for at least part of the discrepancy between what prejudiced individuals say (and believe) and what they actually do. Likewise, other authors (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Ehrlich, 1973) have pointed out

that various factors, such as power potential, must be taken into consideration when predicting prejudiced individuals' behaviors from their attitudes.

That prejudiced individuals differentiate between outgroup members as outgroup members and outgroup members as human beings (theme 10) reveals an aspect of their thinking that has not been examined previously. Although the cognitive processes of prejudiced individuals have been examined extensively (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bierly, 1985; Ehrlich, 1973; Kutner, 1958; Pettigrew, 1979; Tajfel, 1969), and other differentiations in their thinking have been identified (e.g., between the characteristics of ingroup and outgroup members), this particular differentiation represents a new finding. Allport's (1954) notion of "refencing," wherein prejudiced individuals admit exceptions to their categories in order to preserve the categories (e.g., "I know some nice Orientals, but generally..."), represents a similar structure.

Social scientists emphasize certain factors in the development and maintenance of prejudice (e.g., parental home environment, stereotyped portrayals of outgroup members by the media, etc.). However, that prejudiced individuals are aware of these influences (theme 17) is largely ignored. Developmentalists in particular (e.g., Allport, 1954; Goodman, 1952; Milner, 1983) discuss the "regeneration" (rather than the transmission) of prejudice through personal and social materials, but they do not discuss the specific processes through which regeneration occurs. They posit a "black box" to explain how individuals develop prejudices toward particular outgroups based upon such influences as role models, contact experiences, and media images of outgroup members, suggesting that prejudiced individuals themselves are largely unaware of being influenced by such factors. Nevertheless, that prejudiced individuals are aware of factors beyond the control of outgroup members that influence their attitudes about outgroup members (theme 17) has

been implied. For example, Pettigrew (1979) noted that prejudiced individuals overestimate the role of internal, dispositional characteristics in outgroup members (e.g., a racist justifying his hatred of blacks by saying that they are naturally inferior), suggesting an awareness of factors affecting their attitudes toward outgroup members that are beyond the control of outgroup members (in this case, innate predisposition).

Finally, that prejudiced individuals think about outgroup members only after experience with outgroup members (Theme 19) represents new information about the phenomenon of prejudice. Even though subjects in previous studies—particularly interview studies (e.g., Smith et al., 1964)—discussed their thoughts about outgroup members, researchers failed to mention whether or not their subjects thought about outgroup members prior to being interviewed, and if so then whether their subjects thought about outgroup members only as a result of personal experiences with outgroup members. Theme 19 suggests that prejudiced individuals often think about outgroup members, but only after they have had experiences with outgroup members.

In sum, the research findings provide some new insights into the phenomenon of prejudice. These new findings could be followed up in further studies. For example, themes 3, 9, and 13 indicate that prejudiced individuals focus on the outgroupness of outgroup individuals (particularly their behavior), and that this leads to negative emotional reactions. A reasonable question for further study would be why prejudiced individuals focus on the outgroupness of outgroup members (i.e., why they concentrate on the differences rather than the similarities between outgroup members and themselves), and why this leads to negative reactions. At present these questions remain unanswered. (Further examples of research to follow up this study are considered in the next section.)

Implications for Further Research

Just as a good theory stimulates research and the discovery of knowledge (Thomas, 1985), so too should a good study lead to further research. The research presented here, and the results obtained, suggest additional avenues of investigation. Implications for quantitative and qualitative research to follow up and complement the present study are now considered.

To begin with, the present study can be replicated and the results thereby verified or challenged. More fruitful, however, may be to use the same methods and procedures with co–researchers who are prejudiced against other groups than those represented here (e.g., women, the elderly, the disabled) to see if the same themes are identified, and if not then what the differences are. If this study has been successful in describing the essence of prejudice, then similar results should be obtained in a replication study. However, some of the specific themes identified may be unique to the nature of the outgroups that are the targets of prejudice. (This is considered in more detail below.)

In critiquing the literature provided in chapter two, the author discussed a number of assumptions that social psychologists make in research on prejudice. One of these involves the isomorphism of attitude structure across targets (i.e., the targets of individuals' attitudes have no impact on the structure of the attitudes) (Ehrlich, 1973). Replicating this study with several groups of co–researchers, wherein each group of co–researchers is prejudiced against only a particular outgroup (e.g., one group is prejudiced against homosexuals, another group is prejudiced against landed immigrants), and comparing the structure of the prejudices for each group of co–researchers would shed light on the validity of this assumption. Finding that the structure is the same for all prejudices would provide evidence in support of this assumption. The present study, which found commonalities among prejudices directed toward various

outgroups, suggests that there may be certain characteristics unique to prejudices directed toward different outgroups (i.e., certain characteristics may be determined by the nature of the attitude objects). For example, both Rick and Chris mentioned the importance of government programs for ethnic groups, while Ann, Irene, and Ruth all mentioned the "sickness" of homosexuals. In sum, while there are commonalities to many (if not all) forms of prejudice (as this study demonstrates), there may also be characteristics unique to prejudices directed toward specific outgroups. In the same vein, Harding et al. (1969) stated it is probably true, though there is little direct evidence to back up the assertion, that different ethnic groups evoke different emotional responses, and furthermore that this is expected when there are different stereotypes for different groups.

Just as the isomorphism of attitude structure across targets has been assumed, so too has the isomorphism of attitude structure across individuals (Ehrlich, 1973). As noted in chapter two, the assumption that attitudes toward given targets have essentially the same structure across individuals denies the possibility that different individuals experience the same social objects differently (e.g., individuals may vary in the degree to which cognitive, affective, and behavioral attitude components are dominant). An observation made by the author bears upon this assumption. The author noted what appeared to be the dominance of particular attitude components in some of the co-researchers. For example, while Ann reacts in a primarily affective manner toward homosexuals, Rick's attitudes about ethnic groups are very cognitive (e.g., they are based on detached observations of the characteristics of outgroup members). This suggests that individuals' prejudices may be rooted in particular attitude components: They may be rooted in primarily affective reactions toward outgroup members, or cognitive appraisals of the qualities of outgroup

members, or tendencies to behave in particular ways toward outgroup members. If this is true, then prejudices directed toward particular outgroups may have different structures for different individuals. A study could be designed to test this assumption wherein the dominant attitude components of individuals prejudiced against the same outgroup are determined to see if this factor affects the structure of the attitudes. Such a study would shed light on the assumption of the isomorphism of attitude structure across individuals.

Lastly, some of the results obtained in this study could be validated quantitatively. For instance, the finding that prejudiced individuals react to outgroup names (theme 1) can be tested by administering a scale to measure prejudice (e.g., the F scale) to a sample of individuals, and at the same time distributing a form on which the respondents indicate their reactions to various group labels. The labels would include those which denote groups that are frequently targets of prejudice (e.g., homosexuals, Jews, natives) as well as more neutral names (e.g., Caucasian, Canadian). A Likert type scale could be used wherein respondents indicate their reactions to the labels (where +3 = a strong positive reaction, 0 = a neutral reaction, and -3 = a strong negative reaction), or an open–ended question could be asked, such as "briefly describe your reaction to each of the following labels." The respondents could then be divided into those who are prejudiced and those who are not (based on the scale scores), and their responses to the group labels could be analyzed to see if there are any systematic differences between prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals in terms of their reactions to perceiving outgroup names.

The above section is intended only to provide examples of the types of research, both qualitative and quantitative, that can be conducted to follow up or complement the present study. No attempt has been made to delineate all of the implications for further research that are suggested by this study.

Implications for Education

Implications of the results for educational programs to eliminate prejudice are now considered. Before this is done, however, it should be pointed out that because this study was not designed to formulate specific educational objectives, none can be recommended here. To formulate specific educational objectives would overextend the utility of the approach and methodology used in the study. Nevertheless, the results do suggest some general directions for such programs, and a consideration of these general directions is presented below.

Before considering the implications of the results for education to eliminate prejudice, however, the principles and strategies of existing programs are briefly reviewed in order to compare the implications of this research with what has already been done.

Existing Educational Programs

Existing educational programs to eliminate prejudice are reviewed here in terms of the principles underlying such programs, and particular techniques that are employed. In addition, a critique of the programs is presented before the implications of the present study are considered. As it is not the author's intention to provide an in–depth review of such programs, interested readers are referred to Lynch (1987).

Underlying Principles

Multidimensionality. Since prejudice is multidimensional, programs aimed at eliminating it must be as well. Some of the dimensions of prejudice are the informational (e.g., involving stereotypes of outgroup members), the conformity (to social norms condoning prejudice), the status, and the emotional (Chein, 1946; Smith et al., 1964). Any program to "correct for prejudice" must take into consideration four major influences: personality, social structure, culture, and

environment (Lynch, 1987). At the individual level, programs must attend to and change the total personality (Gough, Harris, Martin, & Edwards, 1950). They must, for instance, address all three attitude components (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) simultaneously (Harding et al., 1969; Katz, 1976; Lynch, 1987; Saenger, 1953).

Regarding educational programs, the entire school situation must be focused upon before prejudice reduction can occur (Lynch, 1987). This includes school policy, staff composition (which should reflect the composition of society at large), school culture, the hidden curriculum, community participation, and extra–curricular activities. Two aspects of the school situation—school policy, and the classroom and school environment—are now given a closer look.

School policy. It is imperative that a commitment to eradicating prejudice be included in the school policy, for "if the values of the school as a whole do not reflect a commitment to prejudice reduction, individual teachers are hardly likely to succeed" (Lynch, 1987, p. 26). School policy must, for example, include provisions for confronting and challenging prejudice whenever and where ever it occurs (Pine & Hilliard, 1990; Sonnenschein, 1988).

Classroom and school environment. The classroom and school environment must be conducive to prejudice reduction. If it is not, minority group members can affect change by applying pressure on teachers and administrators (the "gatekeepers" of prejudice and discrimination in the schools) to make changes. Teachers and administrators who are committed to prejudice reduction may affect others with their views (e.g., a teacher may influence the views of popular students, who may then influence the views of other students).

A proper school atmosphere, one that is prejudice–free, is required (Sonnenschein, 1988). Such an atmosphere includes rapport between non–prejudiced teachers and their students (Harding et al., 1969), non–segregated

seating assignments (Pate, 1988), the equal treatment of outgroup and non–outgroup members (Kovel, 1970), and norms favorable to the acceptance of outgroup members with which students identify so that they become "psychologically related" to a reference group that values tolerance and cooperation (Lynch, 1987; Proshansky, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1953).

Techniques

Contact. Regarding techniques of prejudice reduction, one of the first to be considered by educators and psychologists was contact. The belief that prejudice results from ignorance engendered by isolation, combined with the belief that contact (i.e., simply bringing prejudiced individuals and outgroup members together) will provide the knowledge and experience necessary to eliminate prejudice, formed the basis of desegregation in American schools in the 1950s. It was soon realized, however, that desegregation does not equal true integration, and that contact per se is not sufficient to eliminate prejudice (Jackman & Crane, 1986; Proshansky, 1966). Certain conditions must prevail in order for contact to decrease prejudice (Amir, 1976). These conditions were examined by Sherif (1966), who found that prejudice is reduced when ingroup and outgroup members focus on external, common (or at least compatible) goals that can only be achieved through cooperation, combined with social norms that support self–dignity and the equality of all people.

Sherif's findings formed the foundation for cooperative learning techniques in the classroom. Such techniques as the Jigsaw classroom are based on the principle that cooperation and acceptance of others are enhanced in groups whose members depend on one another for the successful completion of a task. In the Jigsaw technique, for example, a group of about five or six students is given the responsibility for learning a particular lesson. The lesson is divided into a number of sections, and each student is responsible for teaching his/her

section to the other members of the group and for learning the material taught by the other members. Each member of the group contributes a piece of the entire lesson. The students must cooperate to learn the lesson and to receive good grades. Such techniques, therefore, involve contact under certain, specified conditions, and an abundance of research points to the efficacy of such techniques in reducing prejudice (Byrnes, 1988; DeVries, Edwards, & Slavin, 1978; Pate, 1988; Sharan, 1980; Slavin, 1979; Sonnenschein, 1988).

Role playing. Role playing can be an effective technique for reducing prejudice (Culbertson, 1957; Weissbach, 1976). Lynch (1987) contended that role playing may be effective because it evokes empathy, while Proshansky (1966) and Harding et al. (1969) argued that role playing is effective because it utilizes two ingredients necessary for prejudice reduction: self–consistency of attitudes and actions, and personal involvement. That role playing requires personal involvement is self–evident. In addition, role playing "tolerance" may create cognitive dissonance if the actor's attitudes (prejudices) are not in accord with his or her behaviors, in which case the actor may be motivated to alter his or her attitudes to achieve attitude/behavior consistency.

Developing cognitive sophistication. Developing the cognitive sophistication of students so that they form intelligent, objective attitudes and ideas based on a critical appraisal of available information, thereby making them less prone to acquiring prejudice, is effective in reducing prejudice (Byrnes, 1988; Pate, 1988; Sonnenschein, 1988). Critical thinking skills include intellectual curiosity, objectivity, open mindedness, flexibility, intellectual skepticism, a respect for other viewpoints, and self–awareness (Gabelko, 1988; Saenger, 1953; Walsh, 1988; Weissbach, 1976).

An extensive examination of the development of cognitive sophistication in the reduction of prejudice was performed by Gabelko and Michaelis (1981).

They conducted a two year project on reducing prejudice in secondary school students via the development of critical thinking skills. Strategies aimed at growth in cognitive sophistication were incorporated into the basic curriculum (i.e., they were not add–ons to the core curriculum). The results supported the hypothesis that the development of cognitive sophistication in students reduces the amount of their prejudices.

Increasing self–esteem. Research suggests that strategies which increase the self–esteem and self–acceptance of prejudiced individuals reduce the levels of their prejudice (Byrnes, 1988; Pine & Hilliard, 1990; Rubin, 1967). The reason may be that individuals with positive self–esteem do not have to acquire self–worth at the expense of others. In any case, there is a negative correlation between the amount of prejudice displayed by individuals and their levels of self–esteem. Furthermore, "research tells us that children have higher self–esteem in school environments that foster security, acceptance, independence, and responsibility and where warmth, praise, and appropriate limits are consistently present" (Byrnes, 1988, p. 269).

Increasing empathy. Although there is little evidence to support the position, numerous scholars have suggested that increasing prejudiced individuals' empathy for and understanding of outgroup members may reduce their levels of prejudice (e.g., Byrnes, 1988), possibly by creating cognitive dissonance (Lynch, 1987). Materials that put prejudiced individuals in the place of outgroup members, such as books, films, and plays that recount case histories of persons suffering from prejudice, may facilitate the development of empathy and lead to a reduction of prejudice (Byrnes, 1988; Lynch, 1987; Memmi, 1968).

Therapy. Some research suggests that group therapy may be effective in reducing prejudice (Weissbach, 1976). Similarly, Allport (1951a) discovered that providing prejudiced individuals with the opportunity to talk about their

prejudices may be a beneficial first step in prejudice reduction. With the release of frustrations, prejudiced individuals are susceptible to the influence of other prejudice reduction strategies.

Direct teaching. Although insufficient by itself to eliminate prejudice, direct teaching must be used to present students with information about prejudice, such as the harm done to minority group members and the costs of prejudice (e.g., prejudice may cause delinquency, for which society as a whole pays) (Saenger, 1953; Sonnenschein, 1988). Direct instruction can also be used to make students aware of values, such as tolerance, respect, and cooperation, that are antithetical to prejudiced values, and to encourage their identification with such values (Proshansky, 1966).

Instruction in the history, purposes, and dynamics of prejudice (e.g., stereotyping) may be beneficial (Pine & Hilliard, 1990), although it may be harmful to tell students how minorities are persecuted or how much prejudice there is because doing so may strengthen the feelings and beliefs of prejudiced individuals (Saenger, 1953).

Finally, the differences between ingroup and outgroup members should be examined in order to help students understand them (Lynch, 1987), although it is generally better to focus on the similarities of group members (Taeuber, 1969). Students should be taught to accept group differences while they simultaneously ignore such differences when judging others and when establishing relations with them (Proshansky, 1966).

Critique

Educational programs to eliminate prejudice focus on two groups of students. For students who are already prejudiced, educational programs seek to purge them of their prejudices (rehabilitation). For students who are not prejudiced, educational programs aim to ensure that they do not develop

prejudices (prevention). There are special problems associated with these educational programs as they relate to the first group of students.

Sartre (1946) warned that it is difficult to educate against prejudice because prejudiced individuals are afraid of looking bad in front of others, and consequently they view attempts to change their attitudes as a game not to be taken seriously. Likewise, Rothbart (1976) pointed out that prejudiced individuals resist efforts to change because (a) prejudice and discrimination are not apparent to them, (b) they see the victims of prejudice as bringing on their own misfortunes, (c) they see little benefit for themselves, and (d) they fear change.

There are also problems associated with existing programs themselves. To begin with, the objectives of many of these programs are stated in terms of vague abstractions to tolerance and they are not concretely defined (Petegorsky, 1951), which they must be if results are to be measured. By espousing aims such as "reduce prejudice," these programs minimize all that is involved in combating prejudice. Furthermore, many educational campaigns try to eliminate prejudice but they do not attempt to replace "unhealthy" attitudes with "healthy" ones (Lynch, 1987). In addition, many of these programs are inadequate because (a) they fight prejudice on purely rational grounds, and (b) they do not motivate people to adopt non–prejudiced attitudes. Rational appeals are misguided because prejudice itself is "unreasonable," and people's apathy must be countered by providing them with incentives for adopting tolerant attitudes (Fanon, 1967; Kovel, 1970). Finally, many intervention strategies are short–sighted and piecemeal, and they do not focus on the long–term effects of prejudice (Lynch, 1987).

The author observed an additional limitation with many of these educational campaigns. Many of these programs focus on changing the behaviors and

attitudes of prejudiced individuals, and they ignore the contribution that minority group members can make in improving intergroup relations. The co–researchers in the present study indicated that it is the responsibility of outgroup members to improve intergroup relations (theme 14), suggesting that outgroup members should play a bigger role in improving intergroup relations, or that it must at least appear that way to prejudiced individuals.

Lastly, educational programs by themselves are insufficient to eliminate prejudice. This is because prejudice is rooted in social structures and processes as well as within individuals. That is, prejudice has passed beyond the scope of individuals and is maintained by the inertia of impersonal factors (Kovel, 1970; Memmi, 1968). As a result, efforts to eliminate prejudice must be both educational and political. They must focus on social structures and processes, such as poverty and "bureaucratic inhumanity," as well as individuals (Benedict, 1957; Kovel, 1970; Levin & Levin, 1982; Memmi, 1968; Petegorsky, 1951). Rose (1951), for instance, contended that legislation must be passed and major social problems must be solved before prejudice can be eliminated. These social structures and processes have made their way into the classroom. According to Levin and Levin (1982), the emphasis that society places on competitiveness, coupled with its lack of consistent reinforcement for cooperative behavior, helps to perpetuate prejudice and discrimination by pitting ingroup and outgroup members against each other. They suggest that the content of educational programs is not as important as the structure, which should be cooperative and not competitive.

In sum, many existing educational programs to eliminate prejudice suffer from a number of difficulties which limit their effectiveness. Not only are such programs limited in scope, but the programs themselves are flawed in design, and the targets of the programs pose additional problems.

Implications of the Research Results

Unlike the goals and techniques of many educational programs to eliminate prejudice, which have been determined largely a priori by social scientists, educators, and researchers, the implications of these research results are derived from an understanding of the experiences of prejudiced individuals. These implications are now considered.

To begin with, it is sound pedagogic practice to *create an accepting classroom atmosphere* in which open discussion is encouraged and in which students do not feel that they are being judged by others. Such a classroom environment may help overcome prejudiced individuals' reluctance to discuss their prejudices for fear of others' reactions (theme 2). This would seem to be a necessary first step in an educational program to eliminate prejudice.

Contact experiences are an important aspect of being–prejudiced (themes 4–6). The importance of personal experiences suggests that by *arranging for pleasant experiences between prejudiced individuals and outgroup members* according to the criteria for effective prejudice–reducing contact delineated by Amir (1976), prejudice may be reduced. Likewise, theme 21 emphasizes the importance of context factors in contact situations. The implication for education for prejudice reduction is that if prejudiced individuals do not experience contacts negatively under certain conditions, then contacts between prejudiced individuals and outgroup members established under these conditions may increase prejudiced individuals' acceptance of outgroup members. Once this happens, contacts under other circumstances can be initiated until prejudiced individuals no longer experience contacts negatively and they accept outgroup members. (This is akin to systematic desensitization.)

Themes 14 and 18 indicate that prejudiced individuals believe that it is primarily the responsibility of outgroup members to improve intergroup relations

and to lessen the amount of prejudice directed toward outgroup members. This suggests that *highlighting the efforts of outgroup members in establishing better intergroup relations* may lead to a reduction in prejudiced individuals' levels of prejudice. For example, representatives of minority group associations can be invited to speak to students about their associations' efforts to improve relationships with other groups. In any case, upon discussing what outgroup members are doing to eliminate prejudice, students can be challenged to indicate what they will do to improve intergroup relations.

Emphasizing the similarities rather than the differences between outgroup and non–outgroup members —a suggestion previously implied by Taeuber (1969)—may serve several useful functions. Not only could it help to counter prejudiced individuals' tendency to focus on the outgroupness of outgroup members (themes 3 and 9), it might also help to minimize the deleterious effect of outgroup labels on prejudiced individuals (theme 1) by refocusing their attention on the positive rather than the negative aspects of outgroup members. Furthermore, emphasizing the common humanity of outgroup members and diminishing the importance of their outgroupness, as suggested by theme 10, may increase prejudiced individuals' understanding of and sympathy for outgroup members (themes 8 and 20). This suggestion is in keeping with the assumption, held by many scholars (e.g., Byrnes, 1988; Lynch, 1987; Memmi, 1968), that increasing prejudiced individuals' sympathy for outgroup members will produce a corresponding reduction in the amount of prejudice they display.

Finally, some of the themes indicate inconsistencies in prejudiced individuals' thoughts and behaviors. Theme 7, for instance, points to a discrepancy between how prejudiced individuals *think* they behave toward outgroup members and how they *actually* behave toward outgroup members, while theme 15 states that prejudiced individuals rigidly maintain attitudes

about outgroup members despite (a) knowing that they should be open to change in their prejudices, and (b) admitting that their beliefs do not apply to all outgroup members. As *self–consistency and self–awareness training* are important ingredients of prejudice reduction strategies (Harding et al., 1969; Proshansky, 1966; Saenger, 1953), it may be useful to have students undergo such training in order that they become aware of and overcome such inconsistencies in their own thoughts and behaviors.

The above implications for educational programs to eliminate prejudice are derived from an understanding of the experiences of prejudiced individuals. While most of the above suggestions already appear in educational programs to eliminate prejudice, some of them have been largely ignored (e.g., that outgroup members themselves may play an active role in reducing prejudice). In sum, educational campaigns that implement these suggestions may prove beneficial in reducing prejudice.

Conclusion

This research grew out of the author's desire to answer the question "what does it mean for individuals to be prejudiced and to experience prejudice against outgroup members?" By asking a *what* instead of a *why* question, emphasis was on understanding the experiences of prejudiced individuals rather than trying to explain prejudice. This required the use of a phenomenological approach, as such an approach is suitable for answering questions concerning understanding and meaning.

The research uncovered many aspects of prejudiced individuals' experiences of prejudice. Yet there is no assurance that these experiences have been fully described and that the meaning of being–prejudiced is completely explicated. Future research and reflection may reveal more about the phenomenon of prejudice than is described here. The results of the study,

and the understanding of the experience of being–prejudiced that they engender, suggest new questions which, when answered, will lead to still greater understanding of prejudice.

Finally, it is worthwhile to ask "what is the significance of the study?" The final chapter, in considering what new knowledge about prejudice has been gained in the study as well as the study's implications for future research and for education for prejudice reduction, represents a partial answer to this question. Yet there is one more result that should be mentioned: The research demanded the author's on–going involvement with both the data and the co–researchers as he attempted to understand the experiences of prejudiced individuals. This understanding and personal involvement resulted in the author's adoption of an unprejudiced attitude toward prejudiced individuals. It is the author's hope that individuals who read this dissertation will grow in their understanding of prejudiced individuals and will, as a result, be less judgmental and more accepting of them.

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APPENDIX A

The California F Scale

The following script, derived from *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950, pp. 24–25), was read to each class *before* administering the F scale:

"Good morning. My name is Rob Lazar and I'm a Ph.D. student in the Department of Educational Psychology. Dr. [course instructor's name] has given me permission to administer to this class the following survey as part of my doctoral research. This research project has been cleared by the Department of Educational Psychology's ethics review committee.

"The survey consists of 28 questions involving various social issues. It is important to point out that this is *not* an intelligence test nor is it an information test. There are no *right* or *wrong* answers. The best answer is *your personal opinion.* You can be sure that, whatever your opinion may be on a certain issue, there will be many people who agree and many who disagree. And this is what I want to find out: How is opinion really divided on each of these topics?

"The purpose of this survey is to cover a great many points of view. You will probably find yourself agreeing strongly with some statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and being perhaps more neutral about still others.

"We don't want to take up too much of your time. All that we ask is that you: (a) Read each statement carefully and mark it according to your first reaction. It isn't necessary to take a lot of time for any one question; (b) *answer every question.* The results of the survey are useless unless every question is answered; (c) *give your personal point of view.* Don't talk the questions over with anybody until after you have finished; and (d) be as *sincere, accurate* and *complete* as possible in the limited time available.

"On the first page you are also asked to provide your student identification number, age, sex, year of program/year of university, education route

(elementary, secondary, etc.), and major and minor area of study. Although this information is required *your anonymity will be maintained at all times.* Only *I* will have direct access to this information. The surveys will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and destroyed upon completion of the research project. Your student identification number is required in order that a few of you may be contacted at a later date and asked to participate in interviews on material related to the survey. If you would rather not provide your identification number, you may write down your first name and telephone number. The important point is that I be able to contact you somehow. The other information is required in order that descriptive information may be compiled and descriptive statistics calculated, such as the mean score for men compared with the mean score for women.

"If you do not wish to participate you may either (a) leave the classroom right now, or (b) hand in a blank survey. However, I ask that you do not take the survey out of the classroom with you.

"My assistants and I will now distribute the survey. It should take you approximately 10 or 15 minutes to complete. When you are finished please sit quietly in your seat and wait until the rest of the class has completed the survey. At that time I will ask you to hand your survey to the person in the aisle seat for collection."

The following script was read *after* the surveys were returned:

"First of all, I would like to thank you for taking the time to complete the survey.

"Now, I must tell you that the survey you have just done is called the California F scale, and it is a disguised measure of prejudice. That is, it measures prejudice without mentioning ethnic groups by name and without appearing to have the aim of measuring prejudice. It has traditionally been used

in investigations of prejudice, and has been shown to reliably differentiate between prejudiced and non–prejudiced groups.

"As I mentioned earlier, you have been asked to provide your student identification number in order that some of you may be contacted later for interviewing. Selection of subjects for interviewing will be based on the survey results. The interviews will be about prejudice. The exact nature of the interviews will be specified to those asked to participate in them. Those of you who are contacted for interviewing may refuse to be interviewed. You may find it interesting to know that the California F scale has been used as a means of selecting prejudiced individuals for interviewing in other studies. If you would prefer to withdraw your response sheet at this time, please let me know your student identification number and I will destroy your survey immediately.

"This completes my business here. Thank you once again for participating in this research project."

To *score* the surveys: +3 is added to each item in order to avoid negative numbers. The total scale score for an individual is the sum of the scores obtained by that individual on all items, for a total possible score of 6 X 28 items = 168. The higher the score, the more prejudiced the person is.

Student Identification Number: _____

Age: _____

Sex: _____

Year of Program/Year of University: _____ / _____

Education Route: _____

Major Area of Study: _____

Minor Area of Study: _____

Please be sure to: (a) Read each statement carefully and mark it according to your first reaction. It isn't necessary to take a lot of time for any one question; (b) *answer every question.* The results of the survey are useless unless every question is answered; (c) *give your personal point of view.* Don't talk the questions over with anybody until after you have finished; and (d) be as *sincere*, *accurate* and *complete* as possible in the limited time available.

Mark each statement in the margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case:

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE	-1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE	-2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH	-3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

___ 1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

___ 2. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

___ 3. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

___ 4. The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.

___ 5. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.

___ 6. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

___ 7. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

___ 8. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

___ 9. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.

___ 10. What the youth needs is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

___ 11. An insult to our honor should always be punished.

___ 12. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

___ 13. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

___ 14. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.

___ 15. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

___ 16. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but keep busy with more cheerful things.

___ 17. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decision he obeys without question.

___ 18. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places.

___ 19. People can be divided into two distinct classes; the weak and the strong.

___ 20. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.

___ 21. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended with an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

___ 22. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power.

___ 23. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

___ 24. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.

___ 25. Familiarity breeds contempt.

___ 26. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.

___ 27. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.

___ 28. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings–on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.

APPENDIX B

The Orienting Interview and Consent Form

The orienting interviews were similar for all of the co–researchers (e.g., there were minor differences in questions the co–researchers asked). The orienting interviews went much like this:

"First of all, I would like to thank you for coming here to listen to what I have to say.

"As you may recall, the survey that you filled–out for me in class is called the California F scale, and it measures predisposition to prejudice rather than prejudice per se. In other words, it measures personality characteristics that are correlated with prejudice. Results suggest that, compared to your classmates, you may be more highly prejudiced. What that means is that you probably hold your attitudes more strongly than other people do.

"Before we go on, there are a few of things I have to say. First, the scale is not 100% valid, that is it does not mean that all high scorers are necessarily highly prejudiced. It's just that usually that's the case. So, from here on I'm going to assume that you have prejudices against some group.

"Second, the term prejudice has negative connotations. I want to assure you that I am not here to judge you, to condemn or condone your attitudes. I am here to study your attitudes as objectively as possible.

"Third, it is conservatively estimated that 80% of all people have prejudices. Many experts believe that *all* people have prejudices of one kind or another. So, theoretically I could interview almost anybody for this study. I've used the F scale as a means of weeding out people who may be more suited for this study than others.

"The study itself consists of at least three interviews. The first interview is called the orienting interview, and that's what we're doing now. Basically, the

purpose of this interview is to explain to you the nature of the study, to tell you why you've been selected as a possible participant, to answer any questions you may have, and to solicit your participation.

"The second interview is called the data gathering interview, and it's really the crux of the study. It's an open ended interview, that is it does not follow any standardized questionnaire, but is more free–flowing. This interview, which should last no longer than about one to one and a half hours, will be tape recorded in order that it may be transcribed for protocol analysis. This interview will focus on your contact experiences with a member of a group that you are prejudiced against.

"Briefly, prejudice has traditionally been studied in terms of cognitive (thinking), affective (feeling), and behavioral components. The experiential aspect has been almost totally neglected, mainly, I think, because the traditional scientific method is unable to study it. With the advent of more recent qualitative techniques, like the one I will be using, we can now study the experiential aspect of prejudice, and I think it's about time that we did so in order to get a fuller picture of the phenomenon called prejudice. Most of the data for this study will be gathered in this interview.

"The third interview is called the validation interview. I am going to be interviewing five people. After I analyze all of the interview data, what I will end up with is a brief (2 or 3 pages) description of the essential aspects of the experience of prejudice. At that time I will give you my final description in order that you may tell me whether or not you think it sounds right, that is if I have everything there or if maybe I included something that shouldn't be there.

"Now, sometimes a researcher has to double–back to data gathering. This is necessary if either one of two things happens. First, the initial data analysis of the interview material suggests the need to. During the interview I will try to pick

up on everything you say and follow all leads to their conclusion. However, I may miss something in the interview that I will pick up while analyzing the protocols, in which case I will want to call you in order that I may ask you a few more questions. Second, the other interviewees may bring up points that didn't come up in your interview but that I would like to talk about with you, in which case I will again call you.

"Basically, that's the gist of my study. At this time I want to stress that your anonymity will be maintained at all times. Only I will have direct access to this material. You will be assigned a pseudonym so that nobody will know the real names of the people involved in the study, and the tapes and transcripts will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and destroyed upon completion of the study, that is after I have finished my final oral defense.

"If you agree to participate in this study, there's only one other thing that I would like you to do. Some time within the next few weeks I would like you to write down your experiences of being in a contact situation with a member of an outgroup. It can be anything from passing somebody on the street to being in a fight with somebody. If nothing happens to you in the next little while then try to remember a contact situation as best you can. The written description doesn't have to be that long, only about a page or so. Describe what happened, how you felt, what you thought, how you acted, and that sort of thing. The reason I'm asking you to do this is to provide me with some information for initial analysis and to suggest some questions that I may be able to ask during the data gathering interview, that is to help provide some structure to the data gathering interview.

"What I'm looking for from you, if you agree to participate in this study, is complete honesty—there's no reason why you shouldn't be—and a sincere attempt to verbally describe your experiences. As you probably know, it's not

that easy to put into words what you experience, and that's exactly what I'm asking you to do.

"That's about all I have to say. I'm now ready to answer any questions that you may have. I've tried to anticipate a few of them. First, 'why do you want to study prejudice?' I think there are two reasons. First, it's something that I see around me all of the time and I don't understand it. I always ask myself 'what goes on inside him to make him like that?' when I see somebody who is prejudiced. Second, I have my own prejudices, and by studying others I'm also trying to learn about myself.

"A second question is 'why this type of study?' As I mentioned before, the experiential aspect of prejudice has been almost totally neglected by researchers, mainly because of inadequate research methods. Some researchers have noted in passing that their subjects experienced certain feelings, such as a tightness all over, when in the presence of outgroup members. I want to flesh this out more, find out what this tightness really is.

"Well, that's all that I have to say, except that you may, of course, refuse to participate, and if you do participate you may refuse to answer any question, and you may drop out of the study at any time. I'm now ready to answer any questions that you may have."

At this time all of the co–researchers' questions (mostly involving clarifications of what was said above) were answered, and then they signed the consent form. All of the individuals that were contacted agreed to participate in the study.

University of Alberta
Department of Educational Psychology

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Project Title: The Phenomenology of Prejudice.
Investigator: Robert E. Lazar, M.Ed. (Office: 6–141E, Education North)

The goal of this research project is to increase psychological knowledge of prejudice. The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of the experience of the prejudiced individual when he or she is engaged in a face–to–face contact situation with an outgroup member. You have been selected as a possible participant because your score on the California F scale, previously administered by the investigator to one of your classes, suggests that you are one of the more highly prejudiced individuals compared to your classmates.

The research will be conducted via at least three interviews per person. During these interviews you will be asked about your experiences (e.g., your thoughts and feelings) of intergroup, interpersonal contact. You will be asked to visualize, remember and imagine specific face–to–face contact situations with outgroup members. These interviews will be audio–taped and later transcribed. In order to protect your anonymity, the tapes and their associated transcripts will be assigned an identification number and stored in a locked filing cabinet. During the third interview, the information gained from your participation will be made available to you, so that you may comment on the accuracy of the investigator's interpretation of your data.

The final research report, including anonymous quotations, will be available to all participants, and will be presented as a Doctoral Dissertation.

Although there may be no direct benefits to participants in the study, the research findings from this study may further scientific knowledge.

This is to certify that I, _____ (print name) Hereby agree to participate as a volunteer in the aforementioned research project.

I understand that there should be no health risks to me resulting from my participation in this research. The potential benefits of this research to me include increased self–knowledge. However, I recognize that there are potential risks involved when discussing personal issues (e.g., feelings of embarrassment).

I hereby give permission to be interviewed, and for these interviews to be recorded on audio–tape. I understand that at the completion of the research (i.e., after the investigator's final oral defense of his dissertation), the tapes will be erased. I understand that the information may be published, but that my name will not be associated with the research.

I understand that I am free to refuse to answer questions during the interviews. I also understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and terminate my participation in this project at any time without penalty. I have been given the opportunity to ask whatever questions I desire, and they have all been answered to my satisfaction.

Signed.

_____ _____

Participant Researcher

_____

Date

APPENDIX C

The Written Descriptions

The co–researchers provided the following written descriptions, which were requested during the orienting interviews. They are reproduced here exactly as submitted.

Ann: "Robert—one day, in one of my classes the teacher asked the students how will you answer one of your students if he/she asked about your opinion of 'homosexuality.' So I was the first one to answer her question, by saying, that I don't even like the word 'homo' and I said exactly how I feel towards them. after I finish, I can tell that all of the students in the class were not happy with what I said, and I remember my teacher telling me, not to express myself like this again, but I felt that, this is my opinion and I have the right to say it."

Chris: "I came across an individual when I was walking downtown on a certain day. He was a native and he seemed to be very typical of his ethnicity. He asked me if I had any spare change. I asked him (as I usually do) why he wanted this change and he responded that he wanted to buy a cup of coffee with it. I always get a funny feeling because I know they or some do not tell the truth. He Replied rudely 'Thank you for nothing.' I kind of believe that people are expected to give them money when they ask. This bothers me a little. His appearance (i.e., smell) and his manners also offended me. I can't help to think why these people seem to be so lazy or why these people don't get the same opportunities as let's say English, Italians etc. I get frustrated at times when people like this come and ask a citizen for money when they do not put any effort in finding a job or even willing to do any kind of menial work to support themselves. I also got the feeling that these people try to take advantage of ordinary citizens by saying they want money for one thing but use it for stupid things like buying liquor or Lysol. I also have grandparents who live by these

people and they tell me they are rude, they do not take care of their property, drink almost every night and do not respect others properties and their own for that matter. I do not like them because of who they are but what they do. Their behavior is so unorthodox to ordinary citizens that one cannot help to feel a little prejudice towards them. I also feel that people prejudice towards these people are not all because of their wrongdoings (behavior) but because of the government. I believe the government should make these people work. Even if they have to 'Clean up streets.' Anyone can clean up streets. I believe the government doesn't care about these peoples well being. I sympathize with them since most are homeless and poor but I believe every citizen should get an equal chance to work in this province. I admit there are some natives who are hardworking, dedicated individuals but most of them are lazy, and this is what the government must change in them. Give them any work. Get them started. Let them know how it feels to have their hands on money and Let them knew how it feels to survive in their own country. All they need is a CHANCE. I believe government assistance programs like the Welfare system destroys natives aspirations to lead a normal life. Maybe it's their own fault since they take advantage of these programs."

Irene: "We went out for supper with some friends, and two of them were gay. One of them (gay) insulted me for most of the night. He never said one nice thing to me all night. What makes me mad is I never say anything to him about it.

"—I went to Jasper for a day and I got really upset walking into most of the gift shops and seeing that most of them were owned by Orientals.

"—Three of the people I work with are Italian. All three immagrated here from Italy. They don't have anything nice to say about another race especially 'blacks.' When I see an Italian now I think that there all rotten, and I feel some dislike towards them.

"—I never did like or respect men with long hair. Every time I see a person (man) with long hair I really feel a hate inside. (I don't know if this one is a prejudice)."

Rick: "Robert—I really dug deep and came up with this, keeping in mind you needed something meaty to start on. Also don't forget this is all in the name of Science and I'm helping you get to where you are going. Please bring this material to interview.

"In response to the question at hand, my feelings, as stated before, towards other ethnic groups or individuals of those groups are mostly approached with an open mind.

"Upon having many contacts with other ethnic group individuals it came to my attention, that possibly my perceived prejudice comes from the fact that they seem to stay together in their own groups. This is apparent both in China town & the Italian districts of any westernized city, providing they have the #'s to create small concentrations. A good example of this is the high concentration of East Indians in Millwoods, not to pick on any one group in particular.

"These groups promote their culture & language throughout the generations within their families. This is not anyone's fault, but may appear to be a fault when the minority ethnic group stays to themselves clinging to their homeland's culture when living in a westernized country. Obviously, this stems from the fact that our government in searching for an answer to the underpopulation problem of this large country, opened it's doors to other commonwealth country's people.

"When one considers how shaky the economy of some of these countries is, and the fact these people migrate to Canada to improve their standard of living, it's no wonder they are lined–up on our doorsteps. These people can see a good social service system and may end up abusing it eg: welfare & U.I.C.. This

is not to say that there are not other landed imigrants who like to abuse the system also.

"This factor, along with how these groups stick together and can make you feel unwelcome in your own country, does not show positive interethnic friendships.

"The multicultural status of Canada creates a country where people of all races must get along within a multitude of activities. Therefore some assimilation of our countrys westernization must be taken on by these other ethnic groups and they should be prepared to teach them to their children. In segregating themselves these groups are conveying a message of 'we like your country & it's standard of living but we want to keep our way of life.' This does not facilitate a friendly atmosphere in my mind."

Ruth: "I find other cultures interesting and I've done quite a bit of international travel in Europe and Asia. I have friends from all 'ethnic/racial' parts and never thought about them as being 'Indian,' 'black' or the many other titles they've unfairly been called. I don't think of myself as prejudice but the survey says I rated high. I can see myself being perhaps prejudice or narrow minded when it comes to criminals or homosexuals however. I may be prejudice to criminals (more so to murderers than shoplifters probably) because they have interfered w/ someone elses life and hurt them. If that murder was committed in cold blood, there is no excuse for that murderer. He should reap what he sows. Everyone does. For example if you cheat & get caught you get a zero. —fair is fair! When it comes to gays, I see it from a Christian pt of view. I've never found myself directly discriminat/g against gays but I don't approve or have a very positive attitude when it comes to their alternative lifestyle. I think homosexuality is wrong morally & I can't condone what they're doing. However, I don't think they should be treated like criminals, etc. On the other hand, if they

want to live that way—fine—but don't ask us to accept their lifestyle. Accept them—yes! Accept what they're doing—no."

APPENDIX D

Data Gathering Interview #1: Questions

The co–researchers were asked the following questions during the first data gathering interviews: (It is important to point out that the interviews were not limited to these questions, although it was ensured that these questions were answered.)

1. (The following question derives from Amir's, 1976, suggestion that it is worthwhile to check individuals' initial attitudes to contact itself.)

What do you experience at the thought of coming into contact with a(n) _____? That is, what is your attitude toward contact with a(n) _____? Do you dislike the idea? Are you indifferent? How is this different (if at all) from coming into contact with someone who is not a(n) _____?

2. (The following question derives from Polkinghorne's, 1981b, suggestion that it is helpful to have individuals visualize events in order for them to focus on the concrete experience rather than respond according to what they think should be experienced.)

Picture the last time you remember being in a situation with a(n) _____. Tell me anything you can about the situation. How did you feel? What did you do or say?

(The following questions are based upon analyses of the written descriptions—requested during the orienting interviews—provided by the co–researchers.)

3. Does the word denoting the group that you have expressed prejudice against evoke a reaction, and if so what is the reaction?

4. How do others react when they find out about your prejudices? (If the co–researcher's prejudices are kept secret, then ask how he/she *thinks* others would react.) How do you (or would you) react to them?

5. Think of your experiences of being in contact with a(n) _____. Do you have the same or similar experiences with others (i.e., with a non–_____), or only with _____? If yes, then with whom, and in what way is the experience the same/different?

6. You seem to have a fairly negative image of _____. Do _____ have any positive qualities, and if so what are they? What would your reaction be to meeting or seeing a(n) _____ who does not fit the negative image you have of _____? How is this different from your reaction to the "average" _____?

7. Since I am primarily interested in the contact experience, I would like you to answer the following questions:

A. You're walking down the street. Coming the other way are a group of people, one of whom is a _____ (or you think is a _____). Does the _____ stand out in the crowd, that is do you focus your attention on him/her? What is your reaction? What are you thinking and feeling? What do you do (i.e., how do you behave)?

B. You're at a social function, such as a party, when a friend introduces you to a _____ acquaintance of his/hers. What is your reaction this time? How is it different (if at all) from seeing a _____ on the street?

8. Many times an individual's prejudices are rooted in, or at least are strengthened by, particular experiences with members of the group that the individual is prejudiced against. Do you remember the first time you had a negative reaction to a(n) _____? Do any particular instances of being in contact with a(n) _____ stand out in your mind? Please describe them in as much detail as possible (e.g., what were you thinking, doing, and feeling?).

9. Some people have mentioned that part of the reason why they are prejudiced against the group(s) that they are prejudiced against, is that

members of the group(s) stick together instead of associate with others. This makes them feel uncomfortable. Do you find that this is the case, and if so then how do you react to seeing a group of these individuals? Is your reaction different when you see them in a group than when you meet them or see them one–on–one? Explain how it is the same/different. What do you think these groups can do or should do to foster better relations with others?

10. Sometimes a negative opinion of a group and its members goes hand–in–hand with negative actions toward the group and its members. How should _____ be treated? Should they be treated differently than others are treated? Do you treat them differently than you treat others?

11. Is there anything else that you can think of? Perhaps there's something that I've missed that you feel is relevant?

APPENDIX E

Data Gathering Interview #2: Questions

The co–researchers were asked the following questions—based upon analyses of the first interview protocols—during the second data gathering interviews: (It is important to point out once again that the interviews were not limited to these questions, although it was ensured that these questions were answered.)

1. Do you think that you treat outgroup members differently than other (non–prejudiced) people treat outgroup members? If so, then how?

2. Have you ever been the object of prejudice? How did it make you feel? Does this have any relationship to or affect on your own prejudices?

3. Regarding your reaction to individual outgroup members versus a group of outgroup members:

*A. (Asked of Ann) Do you have a different reaction to being in contact with a group of homosexuals than an individual homosexual? Explain.

*B. (Asked of all co–researchers except Chris) Do you have (or do you think that you would have) a different reaction to a group of _____ than to a group of non–_____? Explain.

*C. (Asked of Ann, Irene, and Rick) Would you want to leave the situation if you were in contact with a group of _____? Why or why not?

4. Is there anything else that you can think of? Perhaps there's something that I've missed that you feel is relevant?

*These questions were asked only of the co–researchers indicated because the other co–researchers had answered them during the first data gathering interviews.

APPENDIX F

Data Analysis Exemplified

A discussion of the process by which the exhaustive description was obtained is now provided. Excerpts from Ann's first data gathering interview are reproduced below, along with a consideration of the steps by which the author generated the exhaustive description from the raw data.

Protocol Excerpts

Robert: Now, does the term homosexual evoke a reaction in you? If I say that word do you feel something in particular?

Ann: Yes. It's something that's not normal. That is how I feel.

R: It makes you uneasy?

A: Ya.

R: Anything else?

A: I don't know. This word will, you know? I think it has to come with the way I was raised, because I come from a very conservative society. I'm sure we have some people like this but it's not...

R: It's not talked about?

A: No. And no one will dare say "I'm a homo" or "I'm a lesbian," so I think it also has something to do with my background and my religion also.

R: The very word makes you uneasy. Does it make you tense or anything else?

A: Maybe if I know that I'm talking to a person like this, you know, I don't think I would be able to cope....

R: What is your attitude toward coming into contact with a homosexual?

A: I won't feel comfortable at all, especially knowing that he or she is a homo. I will focus on the idea that they are like this. Maybe they will turn out to be a very nice person, forgetting about their, you know, homosexuality, but I think this will put a gap between us.

R: So, it's always somewhere in your mind that this person is homosexual?

A: Ya. And actually, I'm talking out of experience, because I've been [involved personally]. I'm not sure about this, but, like I've never confronted him, but sometimes you can tell. So, maybe I overreacted because I've been involved personally....

R: You apparently have a negative image of homosexuals. Do you think they have any positive qualities?

A: Oh ya, like I told you, they might turn to be very nice people, very good friends, but I can't imagine myself having friends like this.

R: Because it makes you very uncomfortable?

A: Yes. Oh ya, they might be even wonderful friends. It's not like they are evil or everything is bad about them. This is the way they chose, and maybe they can't help it, because I read something about homosexuality. It's not something you choose. Sometimes it's, um...

R: You're born with it?

A: That's what I read. Because some people don't like it, they are like this. So, if they don't like it, it means it's not their, you know. Actually, I'm interested in knowing about that, how people become like this. But, it doesn't mean they are not good people, or they are certain persons. Maybe they are better than I am.

R: So, they are no different than anybody else except...

A: Except sex–wise.

R: And that makes you uncomfortable, that part of it?

A: Ya, exactly....

R: Do you think you could work with somebody who is homosexual?

A: If it's not, like I couldn't be a secretary for a person who is like this. But, suppose there is a teacher like this. I can't just go and quit because he's like this.

R: Would you try and not talk with him?

A: It might be just, you know, if I had to talk to him. And, you never know, maybe by that time he would turn out to be nice and I would forget about that thing.

R: So, at first you would be uncomfortable, but after you got to know him and he was a nice guy, you might begin to forget?

A: Not forget, but at least I can be with him, professional–wise.

R: You could accept him?

A: No, I won't accept him.

R: Not his homosexuality, but you would accept him?

A: Exactly.

Analysis of Protocol Excerpts

After reading through the protocols, the author extracted significant statements and passages from the protocols. Significant statements are statements which pertain to the phenomenon under investigation. The passages extracted from the above protocol excerpts are listed below. Beneath the passage is a generalization of the material contained in the passage, that is

a reformulation of the passage in general terms (e.g., Ann's statements about homosexuals are restated in terms of "outgroup members"). And beneath the generalization is the researcher's formulation of the meaning of the passage for the co–researcher. (A detailed consideration of how each co–researcher's protocol was analyzed would be impractical because altogether hundreds of passages and significant statements were extracted from the co–researchers' protocols. Instead, these excerpts from Ann's first data gathering interview are provided here to illustrate the process of data analysis.)

1. Passage or "significant statement": Feels that homosexuality is not normal, and this makes her uneasy.
Generalization: Negative reaction to outgroup behavior.
Meaning: One finds outgroup members' behavior unnatural and disturbing.

2. Passage: "I think it has to come with the way I was raised, because I come from a very conservative society.... It also has something to do with my background and religion."
Generalization: Background partly determines attitude toward outgroup.
Meaning: One is aware of the importance of background factors, such as upbringing and religion, in the formation of prejudice.

3. Passage: "If I know that I'm talking to a person like this, you know, I don't think I would be able to cope."
Generalization: Difficulty associating with outgroup member.
Meaning: Contact with outgroup member makes one feel anxious and uneasy.

4. Passage: "I won't feel comfortable at all [being in contact with a homosexual], especially knowing that he or she is a homo. I will focus on the idea that they are like this."
Generalization: Negative reaction and focus on outgroupness when in contact with outgroup member.
Meaning: In contact with an outgroup member one is constantly aware that the person belongs to the outgroup, and this makes one uncomfortable.

5. Passage: "Maybe they will turn out to be a very nice person, forgetting about their, you know, homosexuality, but I think this will put a gap between us."
Generalization: Difficulty seeing beyond outgroupness of outgroup member.
Meaning: One would find it difficult to get to know an outgroup member as somebody more than an outgroup member—even though he or she might be a nice person— because one cannot forget that he or she belongs to the outgroup (i.e., characteristics associated with outgroup membership hinder one from understanding the person as a person).

6. Passage: "I'm talking out of experience, because I've been [involved personally]."
Generalization: Attitude based on personal experience.
Meaning: One's prejudice is based on first–hand experience with outgroup members, and is not merely taken over from others.

7. Passage: "They might turn to be very nice people, very good friends, but I can't imagine myself having friends like this."
Generalization: Difficulty befriending outgroup members.
Meaning: Negative reaction to outgroup members leads to avoidance of close contact with outgroup members despite what they might be like as persons.

8. Passage: "This is the way they chose, and maybe they can't help it, because I read something about homosexuality. It's not something you choose. [You're born with it.] Because some people don't like it, they are like this."
Generalization: Inclusion in outgroup independent of individual's choice.
Meaning: A belief that outgroup members cannot help being outgroup members leads to some understanding of them.

9. Passage: "I'm interested in knowing about that, how people become like this."
Generalization: Intellectual curiosity about outgroup.
Meaning: Curiosity to understand why outgroup members are the way they are.

10. Passage: "It doesn't mean they are not good people, or they are certain persons." They are no different than anybody else except sex–wise, and that makes her uncomfortable.

Generalization: Outgroup members similar to non–outgroup members except in certain respects that cause unease.
Meaning: Negative attitude toward outgroup members based on specific aspects of outgroup members and not a generalized negative reaction.

11. Passage: "I couldn't be a secretary for a person who is like this."
Generalization: Inability to maintain physical closeness to outgroup members.
Meaning: Sustained proximity to outgroup members causes unease.

12. Passage: Although not being able to forget that an individual is a homosexual and accept the person as such, after a while she could be with the person professionally.
Generalization: Ability to maintain formal relationship with outgroup member without accepting or forgetting individual's outgroupness.
Meaning: Although able to establish formal ties with an outgroup member after prolonged contact, one remains cognizant of the outgroup member's outgroupness.

13. Passage: Although unable to accept or forget an individual's homosexuality, after a while she might be able to accept the individual as a person.
Generalization: Acceptance of outgroup member as a person but not as an outgroup member.
Meaning: Ability to go beyond the outgroup characteristic(s) of an individual and accept the individual as a person independent of his or her outgroup affiliation.

Derivation of the Exhaustive Description

Once the significant statements were extracted from the protocols, and generalizations and meanings formulated for them, the passages and meanings were then grouped into themes. Themes refer to different aspects of a phenomenon, and they are disclosed by identifying to what a given statement refers. For instance, the first passage extracted from the excerpts from Ann's protocol (above), that she considers homosexuality abnormal and that this makes here uneasy, suggests a theme such as "reaction to the disliked qualities

of outgroup members." Once a theme was identified like this, the remaining significant statements and meanings extracted from all of the co–researchers' protocols were examined to determine whether or not any other passages in the protocols suggested a similar theme. For example, the fourth, fifth, and tenth statements extracted from the excerpts from Ann's protocol (above) also involve a reaction to the dislike qualities of outgroup members (viz., in the fourth and tenth statements Ann states that she feels "uncomfortable" around homosexuals, while in the fifth statement she indicates that somebody's homosexuality would "put a gap between us"). Only those themes were retained in which at least one passage from each of the co–researchers' protocols referred to the same facet of being–prejudiced.

When all of the passages indicating a particular theme were identified, and all of the themes thereby elucidated, commonalities among the passages were noted and the exhaustive description was then formulated. The essential and structural descriptions were then derived from the exhaustive description in the manner indicated in the text of the dissertation.