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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A Matrix for Worlds: Genre, Intertext, World-Knowledge, and Fictional-World Semantics

By

May Charles

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AND FILM STUDIES

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Thomas Pavel, External Reader

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12 July 1994

For my family,

who never stopped believing

Abstract

The study establishes and clarifies the crucial intersection of extra- and intertextuality with fictional worlds, formulating a theoretical model on the basis of fictional-world semantic theory coupled with a semiotics of reading perspective. With emphasis on fictional characters, the model demonstrates how the textual stipulation of fictional truth is complemented with the three text-external knowledge bases of world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire, reformulating a theory of fictionality in terms of reading procedures. The initial chapters synthesize and analyse standard metaphysically-oriented arguments, suggesting supplementation of key concepts to develop an expanded model which fuses the logical/philosophical perspective with aesthetic concerns, and which is reoriented from ontological to epistemic issues. Addressing the epistemological indeterminacy of fiction, the study develops a systematic representation of the reader's role in the construction of fictional truth, describing a semiotic communication model and the role of the reader within conventional knowledge systems. The study investigates the shared, interpersonal structure of text-external knowledge, defining reading operations as the logical space of the fictional sphere--a matrix for textual reference worlds, and a codified structure which regulates the hierarchy of text-external models. The concept of reference world is developed as a reader-construct--a relatively comprehensive world postulated as pre-existing textual stipulation, fictional characters acquiring consequently more intuitively accurate existential dimensions. Each contributing knowledge base is defined, beginning with an entire range of world-knowledge potentially operative. Text-models are explored as the controlling context fundamental to the codified structure. Intertext is analyzed as a "recycling" of knowledge in which transworld identity is not problematic, once access among the worlds of various texts is defined in epistemological terms. The study produces structures for variable combinations of text-external models, beginning with the realistic generic default to world-models, continuing with a spectrum of selection procedures through dominant text-models which govern the inclusion of world-knowledge, and concluding with the

relations between intertext and world-models, and the activation of intertext in accord with (or in violation of) text-models. The study expands and applies the concepts of narrative and authorial audiences, the latter defined as a logical counterpart of the real reader, thereby suggesting a modal structure for the hierarchy of the fictional sphere.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Objectives

The central objective of this study is to establish precisely the intersection of extra- and intertextuality with fictional worlds. Without abandoning the basic assumptions of fictional-world semantics (as inspired by possible-worlds theory), I introduce additional concepts in order to develop a theoretical model flexible and inclusive enough to accommodate not only the textual but also the extra- and intertextual components involved in the comprehension/appreciation of narrative fiction. Although this project raises a number of complicated problems, and addresses broad issues of fictional truth, only those problems directly involved in the understanding of fictional character (or non-actual individuals) are foregrounded and treated in detail with examples. Quite simply, the study examines the reading processes and the underlying principles involved in the generation of fictional truths, but with an emphasis on fictional characters.

Although recent work in fictional-world semantics has provided remarkable insights on fictional truth, it is clear that the study of textual narrative strategies must be supplemented to provide a more complete account of how the reader generates fictional truth in various kinds of literary narrative. There is a great deal more involved than the words of the narration or what those words seem to establish as truth. The reader's epistemological access to the narrative involves constraints which, although imposed from within the text, relate also to factors beyond textual boundaries. Clearly, the generation of meaning in narrative fiction requires familiarity with knowledge which belongs to the world beyond the text, whether literary competence or a more general world-knowledge.

If we only consider the ***incomplete*** quality of textually constructed fictional worlds we realize at once that fictional truth cannot be so

neatly *restricted* to what is stipulated directly through narrative procedures. Fiction *cannot* altogether escape the logic, causal regularities, and background conditions of the actual world as interpreted in literary or other cultural texts. Faced with incomplete fictional worlds which are different in important ways from the possible worlds proposed in philosophy, readers must act upon those worlds in ways which do seem to threaten their autonomy. While some interpretive "completions" will result from inference dependent on textual data, others will require a cognitive foray beyond textual boundaries into other knowledge bases. Clearly no text exists in a vacuum, and it is intuitively essential to recognize that the appreciation of *any* fictional world will be dependent on factors which are not "contained" within the text.

If we consider as a parallel the work which has been done in artificial intelligence with natural language processing, we realize the important role which inference on the basis of background knowledge plays in any interpretation. Although work in artificial intelligence has been limited to primitive, short discourses--typically single sentences --the essential effort has been to show how ***context*** or a "structured knowledge base" contributes to (or determines) interpretation.

In order to extend the limits of possible-world semantics as currently applied in literary theory, it is necessary to introduce to the discussion of fictional truth socio/historical, generic, and intertextual considerations. We must account for specific socio/historical context(s) in order to determine the complex contextual relation between fictional worlds and reality--what constitutes the ***world-models*** underlying any given text. The ***world-knowledge*** brought routinely to narrative fiction is based on such socio/historical context. We need to accommodate the basic factors of generic expectations, norms, and conventions in order to project suitable ***text-models*** for that text. And we must accommodate the often troubling features of intertextuality, which provides a ***repertoire*** for the given text, and which sometimes involves the exciting questions of transworld identity and compossibility of fictional existents.

This pressing need to incorporate text-external factors into the collection of truths constituting a fictional world is the most interesting problem confronting the literary application of possible-world semantics. The fundamental difficulty is that such extra- and intertextual considerations seem to take us dangerously beyond the scope of fictional-world semantics, mainly because of the important concept (central to the theory) of fictional world autonomy through construction. If we must account for the integration ***into*** fictional worlds of "counterparts" of pre-existing elements, which cannot escape some of the constraints of modification related to their role beyond the text, then such elements may well be seen to "subvert" the autonomy of constructed fictional worlds. They do so because of their insistence on a ***wider reference*** beyond what is signified within the fictional text. Any "extra-world reference" creates serious ramifications.

In Chapters Two, Three, and Four I outline and analyse some of the work already done in fictional-world semantics which relates directly to the problem posed here. A number of the important questions which have been raised within the theory have remained without adequate solutions precisely because analysis has not expanded significantly beyond the text and its corresponding textual fictional world studied in isolation. In reading, it is routinely a question of developing a complementary perspective to augment incomplete explicit textual information. These reading operations require detailed analysis.

I believe that fundamental demarcational problems posed for fictional-world semantics ***can*** be explored through an analysis of extra- and intertextual aspects, without allowing those elements to "subvert" the autonomy of fictional worlds, and without relinquishing the authority provided by the possible-world semantics framework. This study presents a system of analysis which accommodates most relevant epistemic factors stimulated by fictional narratives, and which allows for an understanding of the variable interaction which occurs in the reading process among those elements. In this way, the intersection of extra- and intertextuality with fictional worlds is explored in a meaningful way with suitably stringent theoretical parameters. The study shows how reading operations construct textual reference worlds

where extra-world ramifications can be understood without threat to textual fictional worlds and without implying textual reference to reality as such. "Extra-world reference" understood in this way preserves an autonomous status for the fictional world itself as a "signified," while also allowing a special appreciation of reader-constructed reference worlds as an interface between fictional worlds and reality.

To develop this analysis and to alleviate the difficulties suggested from within the fictional-world semantics approach, I introduce the heuristic concept of a text-external "fictional sphere" as an interpersonal logical space of reading where the variable configurations of reference worlds are activated through reading procedures rooted in cultural context--a semiotic, rule-governed process. This concept preserves the important (and intuitively accurate) conception of autonomy for fictional worlds, but permits accurate analysis of the intersection of those worlds with extra- and intertextual factors through reading operations. It provides the means to analyse a variable co-ordination among textual and text-external contributions to fictional truth, progressing from a purely text-internal semantic approach to a co-ordination of the textual semantic with the wider semiotic, culture-bound codes necessary for the understanding/reconstruction of fictional worlds and their non-actual individuals. It is in this logical space where the interpretive strategies involving world-knowledge, genre, and intertextuality must intersect with strategies for determining fictional truth which seem to depend only on narrative technique/world structure generated textually. And since unrestricted inference and the proliferation of fictional truths has been seen as a problem in fictional-world semantics, the concept of the fictional sphere and its created reference world also leaves the textual fictional world with the reasonably small proportions which theorists demand, providing a way to understand better how readers ***actually*** appreciate fictional truth.

The goal is to build a model for the fictional sphere by demonstrating how such a logical space is structured by the interplay of world-models (world-knowledge based on socio/historical context), text-models (genre), and repertoire (intertextuality), and by representing options for

the variable intersection/configuration of these elements for any given (kind of) narrative text. To this end, it is necessary to determine a detailed range of factors involved in reading operations which condition the construction of reference worlds, and then to demonstrate how the variable co-ordination of those elements is regulated, that is, how the various mechanisms related to world-models, text-models, and repertoire function relative to one another for any given narrative text. The intent is not to produce a full structure of interpretive procedures, but to develop systematic ***options*** which do not violate our intuitive appreciation of fiction and what we know of routine interpretive procedures. By applying and supplementing possible-worlds theory, in particular with regard to the concept of textual reference world, it is possible to define the interaction of various components involved in standard reading operations for determining fictional truths about non-actual individuals. For any "grid" of reading operations there result semantic consequences for fictional characters.

Methodological Orientation

In order for any theoretical discussion to be meaningful, it must be located clearly in relation to an existing project or enterprise, which provides for the very possibility of new work. This study takes its place first of all in the context of fictional-world semantics, as developed from possible-world semantics theory in philosophy. As such, it relies on a specific theoretical framework to provide a powerful methodological focus and necessarily restrictive parameters. It proceeds from inside already extant problems of theory which have been presented without adequate solution. The goal is to ***expand*** the theory to accommodate better our intuitive experience of narrative fiction, particularly with regard to fictional characters, without abandoning the basic theoretical assumptions of fictional-world semantics. Talk about extratextual factors is not new. But it is the specific theoretical framework of possible-world semantics which provides this study with fresh insight and manageable substance.

But this study also takes its place within the larger semiotics of reading perspective, as developed through structuralist endeavors--most notably the work of Jonathan Culler. The study refines and adapts the principles of the semiotics of reading perspective, "cross-breeding" it with fictional-world semantics, in order to develop an adequate model. It provides an effective application or demonstration of the semiotics of reading approach, thereby illustrating the validity of this perspective in the particular, concrete, content-oriented context of fictional-world semantics. Chapters Three and Four present the extant problems of fictional-world semantic theory, suggesting a supplementation of concepts which is then explored in Chapter Five in terms of the explanatory value of the semiotics of reading perspective.

Through this cross-breeding of methodologies it is possible to address effectively the representational dimension of literary narrative texts. Problems of interpretation have always been important in literary criticism and theory. Although the structuralist approach has consisted (in general) in the analysis of narrative form and technique without worrying beforehand about the precise "meaning" of narratives, it is clear that narratology cannot avoid the need to develop and elaborate explicit theories/models concerned with ***content.*** It is true that once we begin to deal with the representational dimension--that is, ***what*** is represented--we become involved in complications which do not impose themselves in a discussion limited to the verbal ***means*** of representation. And much of the valuable discussion of literary conventions and semiotic system has been made possible by a certain avoidance of problems of interpretation. But now, following the initiative of the semiotics of reading approach, it is possible to exploit the insights gained about the conventions of reading to work on problems of fictional content as such, specifically, questions involving individuals in fictional worlds. The object is not to provide more interpretations, but to explain the ***processes*** involved in interpreting, to explain ***how*** interpretations are made.

It might be objected that there already exist a number of theories of narrative which discount formal elements in order to consider subject matter, normally relating to the real world and human issues. But such

approaches stress the reflection of reality found in literary narrative without attempting to discern any regularities/laws which might depend on the narrative form. It is possible to do ***both*** if we proceed through formal considerations to content. In other words, fictional narrative must not be thought of as a mere transcription of reality--a reflection of social history--nor purely in formal terms. We must demonstrate how form and content interact, or are integrated, to produce narratives with different potentials for fictional truth.

Through the fictional-world semantics approach it has been possible to understand better the important semiotic capabilities of fictional texts for the construction, preservation, and transmission/reception of fictional worlds. Formal textual procedures, which result in different qualities of fictional existence, can be studied effectively as generic expectations/constraints. In this way, the purely semantic aspects, such as demarcational problems about "distance" between fictional and actual worlds or the structure of fictional worlds, are co-ordinated with the stylistic/formal constraints routinely approached through the study of genres and conventions. Narrative techniques are fundamental to the construction of fictional worlds, and can be correlated in fact not only with story-world ontological structure, but also with reader reaction.[1] Because of these basic assumptions, this study provides a view of narrative texts and their contents which does not undervalue the referential power of fictional narrative, as occurs when theorists concentrate exclusively on the formal properties of texts. The approach deals *systematically* with matters of interpretation, allowing analysis of the variable factors involved in reading operations which determine how we understand the truths of fictional worlds. In this way, interpretation becomes more than a matter of critical opinion.[2]

Procedures: Fictional-World Semantics through the Reading Perspective

The key to this new analysis of interpretive operations is the integration of extra- and intertextual factors into the generation of

fictional truth, as introduced above. The correlation of fictional content and structure made possible through the fictional-world semantics approach requires supplementation with an account of text-external implications. Study must progress beyond the concerns of a purely internal text construction--concerns which have only peripherally accounted for extratextual elements usually designated as purely "complementary" to fictional world analysis. The logic of fictional worlds needs to be considered in relation to cultural and literary context--not as done routinely in literary criticism, but specifically with the insights of possible-world semantics and the semiotics of reading approach. Study confined to purely textual analysis will never account entirely for our actual interpretive procedures, which involve the wider semiotic codes/models which this study elucidates.

Theorists in many camps have come to realize the importance of the reading process for literary theory, and to recognize the dangers of seeing literary works as autonomous entities somehow containing their own meaning. Structuralists have agreed that:

> ...literary works are to be considered not as autonomous entities, 'organic wholes,' but as intertextual constructs: sequences which have meaning in relation to other texts which they take up, cite, parody, refute, or generally transform. A text can be read only in relation to other texts, and it is made possible by the codes which animate the discursive space of the culture.[3]

Fictional-world semantics must *also* account for such construction of meaning based on extra- and intertextual factors, or fail to account for how we really read. The focus on the procedures of reading is a crucial reorientation away from the limitations of analysis of textual discourse as world-construction.

We can begin the project by isolating a set of facts about reading operations, and then build a model to account for those facts. Particular results which obtain in practice can be explained by the "rules" we are able to develop. In this way, we work to develop a theory of reading about fictional truth by trying to be explicit about our own reading procedures, stubbornly insisting on the crucial reversal of the entire

critical perspective to focus on reading operations. The theoretical framework of fictional-world semantics provides a way to organize and develop the work of others concerned with reading operations, including structuralists committed to a semiotics of reading, and theorists indebted to phenomenology or practising rhetorical discourse analysis.

To begin to comprehend how fictional truths are generated, we must understand the interpersonal system involved in reading narrative. As Culler explains, "[r]eading is not an innocent activity. It is charged with artifice, and to refuse to study one's modes of reading is to neglect a principal source of information about literary activity."[4] We cannot discuss the confusing questions about fictional truth sensibly or accurately without coming to grips with this artifice which is involved in reading, and which has a public, interpersonal quality. Once we recognize that fictional truth can be identified completely only in the publicly generalizable structure of the reader's response, we are faced undeniably with a difficult explanatory task.

This crucial task is to isolate and detail the conditions and norms which help to generate particular fictional truths. Once focused on the operations of reading we are able to see those operations and the underlying conventions in a new light, as determinative of textual reference worlds. What might often be thought of as facts about literary texts or truths particular to the textual fictional world can be seen as reading operations or conventional practice. While this may seem initially threatening to the fictional-world semantic approach, it provides ultimately an advantageous route to an extension of the theory --an extension which will account effectively for the extra- and intertextual elements relevant to fictional worlds.

To this end, it is essential to see reading as a process governed by implicit rules--a process which ***produces*** sense or meaning. The theory developed on this basis will define the nature of literary communication by making explicit the interpretive operations and conventional knowledge involved in the activity of reading, and which serve to generate fictional truths. If we wish to understand narrative fictions as an activity of writing and reading, we must isolate and

examine the operations and conventions which underlie their production and reception.

Textual strategies remain the focus of any inquiry rooted in fictional semantics. Analysis of reading operations must be text-based, since the integration of extra- and intertextual elements within the logical space of the fictional sphere depends primarily on the structure of the text itself. Text-external factors are primarily controlled by the text in terms of relevance. If, in keeping with the fictional-world semantics approach, a fictional text is a set of instructions for recovering or re-assembling a fictional world, we must realize that within that set are included instructions which ***originate*** outside of the text, but which are ***activated*** in it, and which can be crucially relevant to our understanding of fictional truth, especially about characters. Depending on textual content and narrative technique, such instructions may not be made explicit, although they will be nonetheless required for understanding. How ***much*** "extra-text" is needed depends of course on the quality of the individual texts. But it is necessary to work from inside ***any*** text, which stimulates the extra- and intertextual factors involved, and to interrelate the external and text-internal, since the external factors are at least primarily dictated or controlled by the text itself. My analysis shows decisively how textual components assume importance through dominant text-models. In this way, the project remains consistently sensitive to actual textual phenomena, thereby ensuring adequate empirical content and procedural control, while also allowing for a systematized examination of reader operations.

In other words, the literary examples put to work in this study are largely analysed in terms of my own reading operations. That is ***not*** to say that I will seek to develop new interpretations of fictional truth in the works, but that I will try to formulate explicitly the interpretive ***operations*** involved in the generation of fictional truths, working from the individual case, but generalizing into the shared, public experience. The formulation of an explicit set of "rules" aims to accentuate everything that is public and generalizable in the reading process. As Culler points out, "[i]n attempting to make explicit the assumptions, conventions, and interpretive operations at work in one's own responses,

one casts them in a generalizable form and exposes them to judgment, both one's own and others'."[5] The point is that other readers will probably recognize large portions of their own tacit knowledge in such an account. In studying literature we gain a sense of what can be done in terms of interpretation, or to quote Culler directly, "...learning to read is an interpersonal activity: one sees how others respond, grasps intuitively or through explicit demonstration what kinds of questions and operations they deploy."[6] The common ground of this interpersonal system becomes visible as one describes the norms/operations on which one's own interpretation is based.

By deliberately introducing into text-oriented research verifiable assumptions about the importance of extra- and intertextual factors in the generation of fictional truth, it is possible to avoid the usual speculative/intuitive constructs about reading. Instead, it is possible to focus on manageable semantic questions, and to isolate options for a many-layered, variable interaction among factors of response, both those which are purely text-dependent and those which involve through textual controls the less theoretically accessible extratextual domain.

Because this study aims to identify and analyse the underlying principles at work in the routine interpretation of narrative texts, and since interpretation generally involves filling in gaps in fictional truth according to extra- and intertextual models, I incorporate also some examples of other critics' practice. (There exists an infinity of interpretations recorded in literary history which suggest an entire range of interpretive possibilities. Such interpretations could all be used effectively as source material [that is, data which come from other actual readers] to identify the principles implicit in the work of interpreters.) By describing the conventions and semiotic operations responsible for interpretations, we define the nature of literary signification. Underlying logics are revealed, which again depend on the textual strategies which prompt the conventional operations of reading responsible for constructing expanded textual reference worlds.

Readers and Reading

Since "reader" has become a very slippery term in literary criticism, defined in a number of confusing ways, it is necessary to clarify carefully my use of the term. Clearly, as outlined above, the *data* for this project comes from *actual* readers. The object of analysis is the *process* of information gathering and co-ordinating, but to define that process we must refer to the actual operations of real readers. This is far from unproblematic, because actual responses are so variable: real flesh-and-blood people read in their own individual ways. They are differentiated from other readers by such variable factors as gender, race, class, education, culture, historical situation, and personality/ability. Such a heterogeneous group would seem to deny the possibility of any accurate analysis based on real reader response. And indeed, we might be tempted to look again at the text itself, as hypostatized object, as the only genuine source of objectivity. There is a definite temptation to try to identify what the text "actually says," particularly with regard to the "construction" of fictional truth.

The solution lies first of all in how we designate actual readers as an object of study. Clearly there is no need to rush out (at least not initially) to interview real readers. As indicated above, the "real" is no further away than oneself and the readily available existing interpretations. Empirical research is certainly a desirable *final* stage of testing for the theoretical hypotheses, but it is not essential to the elaboration and analysis of common procedures of reading. The nature of such procedures can be ascertained without confronting real readers. In fact, as Culler points out, it is not individual performance which is important, but the *underlying* tacit knowledge or competence. Performance, which can be influenced by many irrelevant personal factors (such as attention, forgetfulness, private associations, and mistakes which could be corrected if pointed out), may not directly reflect competence.[7] In fact, in Culler's approach the very notion of "competence" is *needed* because such knowledge is *not* coextensive with the individual subject.

This situation points clearly to the rest of the solution for the problem of objectivity. Rather than hoping to identify a source of objectivity in the text itself, especially as has been done in fictional-world semantics with emphasis on narrative construction of fictional worlds, we must understand that the very notion of what a text "says" depends entirely on these ***common*** procedures of reading which we must seek to identify and analyse. As Culler so ably explains, "[t]he task of literary theory or poetics...is to make explicit the procedures and conventions of reading, to offer a comprehensive theory of the ways in which we go about making sense of various kinds of texts."[8] If we apply this general semiotic principle of sense-making to fictional truths about non-actual individuals, we create a viable means of discussing the extra- and intertextual factors which are the focus of this study. ***Certainly*** there are many variations in interpretation, and this is what we must try to explain. So for any fictional world presented in narrative there will be a range of interpretations about relevant fictional truths. And this range can be understood by examining the conventions of reading which are responsible. There should be no particular problem in discarding from analysis idiosyncratic responses which result from personal/isolated causes. Real effort is required, however, to develop an explicit account of the reading procedures and underlying conventions which will account for the range of ***acceptable*** readings. The bulk of this study provides this account of how reading procedures contribute to reference worlds which necessarily include extra- and intertextual knowledge.

As long as we explain both narrative structure and content from the reader's point of view, we recognize that meaning is ***produced*** through reading processes. Meaning (or more specifically, fictional truth) is the result of procedures of information gathering and co-ordination from numerous "sources" as guided by textual strategies. It is not some kind of ready-made product which we can "find" in a text. Texts are not autonomous--they provide the impetus to activate the whole reading process, but they are not meaningful only in and of themselves. This is precisely the problem encountered by fictional-world semantic theories, which insist on separating the fictional world as stipulated textually from its extra- and intertextual context.

The individual, subjective process of meaning creation is not, however, the object of this study. Operations of construction of meaning or individual concretizations, which are relevant to both phenomenological and structuralist approaches, are fundamental also to an accurate analysis of how readers construe fictional truth. But as far as this project is concerned, reading is worthy of analysis only as an *intersubjective* process. Rather than dwelling on meaning as the creation of an individual reader, I isolate the reading operations and governing conventions which are applied routinely to texts and which result in the generation of meaning. More specifically, I treat fictional truth not as an individual's creation, but rather as a result which occurs in the fictional sphere due to the application of certain operations, which are based on conventions of various kinds. So, while it will certainly be necessary to outline cognitive aspects about real readers, the emphasis remains on intersubjectivity by defining the *shared* aspects of the generation of fictional truths through shared expectations/conventions determined by both text and context. Readers themselves are admittedly, then, a source of diversity in interpretation, but it is not the differences in sets of experiences or expectations that need to be isolated here. It is rather the shared quality of interpretive conventions which result in reading operations with a *public* quality.

This insistence on the existence of public operations of reading (about which we can generalize) lies at the heart of this project, and results in the formulation of "reader" as a special abstract and interpersonal construct. It is not a question of viewing the individual reader as a source of meaning, but rather of recognizing the "one" who reads. As Culler explains, "[t]he subject who reads is constituted by a series of conventions, the grids of regularity and intersubjectivity. The empirical 'I' is dispersed among these conventions which take over from him the act of reading."[9] The term "reader" as I will use it is really a *metonymy* for reading operations, or more specifically a metonymy for information gathering and processing about the semantic dimension of texts. Reading is largely a question of strategies, conscious or unconscious, used to render literary narrative intelligible, with the result that a kind of communication takes place. My central premise is that such processing depends in many cases on extra- and intertextual

factors to provide the relevant/applicable models. The "reader" is then the "apparatus" of such processing--the *centre* in a semiotic account of literary narrative. Culler's position can be adopted here:

> The reader becomes the name of the place where the various codes can be located: a virtual site. Semiotics attempts to make explicit the implicit knowledge which enables signs to have meaning, so it needs the reader not as a person but as a function: the repository of the codes which account for the intelligibility of the text. Because literary works do have meaning for readers, semiotics undertakes to describe the systems of convention responsible for those meanings.[10]

This is a matter of discovering how literary communication occurs. The challenge for this study is to isolate a series of codes/models which involve extra- and intertextual factors and which are basic to our experience of literary narrative in terms of how we generate fictional truths about characters. These codes are *intersubjective* so that any one reader can act as what Culler calls a "local manifestation of reading." The cognitive procedures of any one reader can *illustrate* the structure of the fictional sphere which produces an intersubjective reference world for any particular fiction. We do not speak, then, of individual readers consciously following "rules," but rather of shared reading operations which *imply* certain principles which take on a public quality. As scholars, we render explicit the regularities underlying certain operations. And if the reader is envisioned as a metonymy for processing with respect to fictional truth, we can avoid the problematic concept of an "ideal" reader as the repository of what must be known implicitly in order to interpret acceptably.

Although concepts of ideal readers tend towards a disconcerting transhistorical emphasis, the reading *process* itself is in large measure atemporal, and can be studied within any historical setting. Historical factors will influence the *outcome* concerning the generation of fictional truths, but the basic processes will remain largely the same. It would be ultimately a question of determining historical *changes* in the hierarchy of interpretive codes--a suggestion for further study presented in Chapter Thirteen.

In coming to grips with the reading operations represented by the term reader, this study will apply also, through its focus on textual strategies, recent insights from narratology about kinds of fictional "readers" generated by texts. Rabinowitz' project to distinguish different "levels" on which a reader operates simultaneously will be particularly relevant. Clearly, the notion of a hypothetical or authorial audience involves questions of *actual* readers' knowledge and familiarity with conventions, and will be an important factor in the reading process. Since an image of the actual/intended reader can be inscribed in the text without becoming part of the fictional world, it is useful to envision such an image as contributing to the textual reference world created through reading operations. Within the fictional sphere the "fictional audience" becomes a centrally influential factor in the actual reception of fictional worlds and their truths. In particular, factors of distance/proximity between fictional authorial audiences and actual readers can help to co-ordinate the analysis of world-models in various generic contexts. Because of the "extra-fictional" quality of such fictional audiences who contribute to a reader-created reference world beyond the confines of the textual fictional world, they constitute a special sort of "bridge" between the narrative text and actual readers--a bridge which can be explicated by putting to work some fundamental concepts of possible-worlds theory, and by detailing the operations of the fictional sphere.

The Fictional Sphere and Reference Worlds

The reader as "apparatus of processing" or metonymy for reading operations is interdependent with the proposed heuristic concept of the fictional sphere, which requires a more precise definition here. It is necessary to juxtapose with fictional worlds factors external to those worlds--factors which originate in text-external context--because the reader belongs outside of the fictional world, exposed to a literary semiotic system. The reader *inevitably* comes to grips with factors of world-knowledge, generic expectations, and intertextuality, even though he also "experiences" the fictional world at least intuitively as an

autonomous unit. The fictional sphere is the logical space where the reader incorporates into his understanding of fictional truth the extra- and intertextual influences which are activated by the fictional text, but which are not strictly speaking part of the fictional world, and which have so far resisted analysis in terms of fictional-world semantics. This integration of various knowledge bases results in the creation of a textual reference world which is larger and more comprehensive than the fictional world stipulated textually.

By using the concept of the fictional sphere, this study by-passes the usual concerns about the reader's construction of ***textual*** meaning, to focus on the integration of textual and extra- and intertextual elements in a text-external logical space. At issue is an interpretive ***meta***-operation involving the mutual conditioning of elements explicitly provided within the text and those activated textually, but which originate in a larger-than-textual context. This operation constitutes the construction of a ***matrix*** for fictional worlds beyond the fictional world built by the text alone--a sort of ***interface*** between the fictional world and reality. The fictional sphere is a transitional meeting ground where fictional world elements ***interact*** with the larger semiotic codes activated in reading. In effect, the fictional sphere is more ***about*** fiction than identical to it, in that it produces a more comprehensive textual reference world. It is the logical space where the connections get made--where all kinds of codified knowledge is co-ordinated to produce a satisfactorily cohesive matrix. Obviously at least one of my three extra- and intertextual factors will be necessary in any situation, and different combinations will be possible, which result then in the variable interaction/hierarchy of many related elements.

As a result, even the central and troubling problems of fictional truth can be illuminated by the co-ordination/combination of information which occurs within the fictional sphere. The whole concept of fictional truth is opened up to include not only the authenticated facts presented textually, but also a treasury of extra- and intertextual information which can be co-ordinated within the reference world produced by the fictional sphere, according to shared,

interpersonal, public, and generalizable reading operations. To appropriate and adapt, then, David Lewis' concept of truth worlds, the fictional sphere becomes a matrix for fictional truth worlds or textual reference worlds--a logical space structured by the interplay of text-external knowledge bases.

This study examines to what extent possible-world semantics can be complemented to build a model for the fictional sphere as a matrix for worlds. The usual constraints on possible worlds are considered in order to determine how the essential operations of the fictional sphere can be used to expand some of the models developed in philosophy and literary theory. Chapters Two, Three, and Four are devoted to an exposition of the basic philosophical positions relevant to this study, as developed in fictional-world semantics, coupled with analysis of the limitations and suggestions for crucial supplementation. In particular, the expanded concept of textual reference world is explored as a product of the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere.

But it is necessary to clarify here the "location" of the fictional sphere proposed. The logical space of the fictional sphere is assembled by the reader as "apparatus" or metonymy for reading procedures. The goal of this project is to determine how a textual reference world is set up by the reading operations of the fictional sphere as a kind of truth world for any particular fiction. By doing so it is possible ultimately to represent possible configurations/hierarchy/interplay of the various extra- and intertextual components for different kinds of narrative texts. Consequently, it is important to distinguish this *intersubjective* logical space from actual/individual cognitive "spaces." What is required is a sense of the fictional sphere as a "standard" or *virtual* logical space, which may or may not obtain in actual practice, depending on the individual reader's competence, knowledge, and goals. Through working to distinguish the public reading operations, as introduced above, it is possible to determine at the same time the kinds of textual reference worlds applicable for any particular fictional world.

Individual differences in actual practice are of course important, but they need to be seen within the context of the program for a fictional sphere. They will correspond more or less with this interpersonal logical space depending both on the nature of the literary work itself and on individual reader differences. Actualized textual reference worlds will resemble one another more closely, for example, when generic conventions are thoroughly understood and shared by a reading public. But in more radically open narratives where the fictional world's integrity is made fragile by deliberate subversion of literary conventions and autonomy, the interaction of textual elements with extra- and intertextual ones will assume highly significant proportions and involve the likelihood of radical deviations in actual practice from any postulated interpersonal fictional sphere. The parameters of this study will not permit an extended examination of the ***differences*** in actual, individual readers' creation of meaning, the focus instead on the shared, public reading operations.

Nonetheless, the important question of the reader's individual imaginative interaction with fictional worlds is not one which can be ignored here, inasmuch as that interaction is a ***component*** of the operations of the fictional sphere and is crucial to the creation of textual reference worlds. Among other cognitive reading procedures, imagination must take its place, and since the data come from actual readers in the first place, we can hardly fail to account for the role of imagination within the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere. Chapters Three and Four establish how fictional-world semantic theory has failed to develop the more pragmatic dimension of how readers confront/construct fictional truths, because of the difficulties raised for the theory by the need to incorporate extra- and intertextual factors ***into*** fictional worlds. Yet we do wish to speak of fictional worlds as somehow constructed/imagined by the reader, and it is desirable to reconcile textual semantics with a theory of the imagination.

In order to move in that direction, this study will consider imagination as ***part*** of what happens in the reading operations which constitute the fictional sphere. Fictional-world semantics has essentially explained narrative techniques which construct through

semiotic textual procedures fictional worlds which then seem to be "in place," as a kind of "signified." There is little room in such an approach for meaningful discussion about the reader's imaginative role. But if we presume that imagination is stimulated through narrative procedures, the fictional sphere becomes the place where textual factors are brought into interaction with extra- and intertextual elements in such a way that the reader's imaginative processes take on a new significance. Beyond the world signified/constructed by textual narrative procedures, the reader creates the larger ***reference*** world which necessarily incorporates additional codes of signification through an imaginative reading process.

Beyond reference worlds as direct constructs of the fictional sphere, all kinds of individual imaginative worlds become important ***products*** of the logical space. In effect, the fictional sphere "accommodates" both the pre-existent sign systems of textual worlds (which have already been imagined and which can be referred to in terms of possible world structures) and the reader's own imaginative interaction with both text-internal and -external factors involved in the larger semiotic system--an interaction which produces the full individual worlds of the imagination. Imaginative ***processes*** thus play an important role in the special configuration of mutually influential/determining elements in the fictional sphere. It is crucial to recognize and analyse these processes, which will in turn produce various different worlds of imagination depending in part on individual reader characteristics. The matrix of the fictional sphere is thus located ***between*** the textual fictional world and worlds of the imagination.

By pursuing this approach we can see ***how*** it is that fictional worlds themselves (while boasting an internal structural autonomy) are not in fact autonomous in terms of their reading. The special circumstances of their appreciation, and the resultant generation of fictional truths about characters cannot be understood exclusively through internal textual analysis focused on a world signified. In order to identify a referent beyond the signified we must fuse fictional semantics with the important questions of the pragmatics of reading, (re)construction of fictional worlds, and imaginative interaction with those worlds. It is

the concept of the fictional sphere which allows this more systematic approach to the questions of reading, and to imagination in particular, by positing an interpersonal logical space where a special kind of reality is shared with fictional characters. This "reality" is the reference world which ***takes the place of*** actual reality for the duration of the imaginative interaction with the text. The quality of this "reality" is the main concern of this study, and will be examined at length in Chapter Four.

Why Character?

It would have been possible to focus this study effectively on the macro-semantic rules of fictional worlds, or on the representations of space/time or events/kinds of actions. Instead, I choose to concentrate all examples on the semantic dimension of individuals in fictional worlds. The project is thus to determine what the configuration of text-external factors is in various kinds of literary narrative, with regard to the status of individuals in the fictional worlds. This entails some considerations about the macro-semantic constraints of fictional worlds and the quality of events/actions, but by focusing on individuals as examples, suitably restrictive parameters can be maintained for a usefully ***focused*** analysis of the generation of fictional truth, in spite of the general problems of fictional truth addressed.

The basic theoretical unit for character adopted here is that of "non-actual individual" from possible-world semantics. Within the framework of narratology, the development of an adequate theory of character has proven very slow indeed. Where most successful, the narratological approach has focused on the communicative or speech position aspects of character, with a view to elucidating the system of narration. The story world itself has received little attention regarding the nature of characters. By using the model of the non-actual individual from possible-world semantics, it is possible to appreciate character as the totalizing force in fiction which it really is for many

readers, without explaining this away as some kind of ideological prejudice. We can study character as a fact of reading.

Intuitively, we need to speak about fictional characters as if they were real people, and possible-world semantics allows us to do that in a usefully structured way. Within this approach narrative fiction represents verbally a possible non-actual world where individuals "exist," in the sense that they can be identified as unique individuals, located in a specific space and time, and understood to possess various identifiable attributes, both physical and mental. Depending on the kind of narrative developed, they can in fact demonstrate an entire sense of "interiority," just as we expect of real persons. Our intuitive understanding of character is consequently supported by this ontological approach, which makes ***explicit*** the widely held intuitive appreciation of fictional worlds.[11]

Within the theoretical framework of possible-world semantics, individuals assume a central role, even in some cases a primary role independent of the "inhabited" worlds. The importance of individuals as possibilia is undisputed. But much of the discussion which has distilled itself into fictional-world semantics has concentrated on very technical issues about the ontological status of fictitious entities and the semantic role of names/descriptions which appear to designate them. In the next three chapters I provide summaries and critiques of the metaphysically-oriented arguments which contribute to our understanding of fictional characters as non-actual individuals.

But in addition to this logical/philosophical perspective we must adopt a more aesthetically-oriented view which allows for the examination of reading operations as outlined above. By juxtaposing factors of response with the more metaphysical questions, we develop a more satisfactory understanding of the nature of fictional truth and its generation with respect to fictional characters. Discussions in fictional-world semantics have sought for the most part to isolate the metaphysical issues from the more pragmatic aspects of reception--justifiably perhaps--in order to develop a basic theoretical model. But in order to go beyond the somewhat provisional explanations of fictional

truth about non-actual individuals provided by that model, we must now integrate the whole problem of reading as a rule-governed, sense-making set of operations. Since we do "recognize" the existence of fictitious entities, we can certainly expect an explanation of *how* we actually do so.

The main advantage of the heuristic concept of the fictional sphere is immediately apparent with respect to the study of fictional characters. First of all, we can think of the non-actual individuals of fiction as abstract objects/mental constructs which take on an intersubjective existence in the textual reference worlds built through the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere. To speak imaginatively, it is within these reference worlds that the non-actual individuals called into existence by the fictional discourse can be thought to "exist" for the reader in a kind of zone "between" worlds, which is relatively detached from the discourse which gave rise to them in the first place. Again, the difference between signified and referent is crucial. In the reference world a special kind of interaction is possible between the reader and fictional characters. Perhaps more importantly, we can explore with this concept how texts of all sorts (including those of history and social context) interact--how they "access" one another, or what the space/time "co-ordinates" are for that access. It is in this reader-created space that the transworld identity of fictional characters really "operates," as story-internal and -external elements are superimposed by the reader. Here characters assume true intertextuality, interacting with others from texts/reality and meeting (or flouting) generic expectations. Pursuing this approach it is possible to contribute to a theory of character by constructing useful hypotheses about the relation of character to extra- and intertextual factors.

Selection of Corpus

In order to develop the theoretical model, I have chosen a range of narrative fiction from different national literatures, genres, and periods. From Chapter Seven, brief analyses of works are used to expose

the various possible configurations of the extra- and intertextual components of world-knowledge, genre, and intertext which are involved in standard reading operations. These analyses are not meant to provide an accurate historical coverage of any works, but rather to illustrate concisely the theoretical issues to best advantage, particularly by showing how the reading factors are related to aspects of narrative technique routinely associated with different kinds of narrative fiction. Nor are they used to develop a complete historical typology which would expand the study beyond basic theory. Descriptive procedures are employed only to facilitate the development of an adequate theoretical model, the various (often brief) examples illustrating principles of truth generation at work, and knowledge models involved. I am less interested in the individual texts themselves than in what they reveal about reading operations and the generation of fictional truth. Within this methodological orientation, the individual narrative examples provide concrete, analysable instances of the intersection of extra- and intertextuality with fictional worlds. As such, they provide brief test cases for assessing the explanatory power of the theoretical model, and some relief from the abstract quality of philosophical arguments. Considerations of length have reduced the potential proliferation of examples.

It is ***not*** possible to chart here a general or universal structure for the fictional sphere for any narrative (sub-)genre. Such an approach would be highly intuitive/subjective and not conducive to rational intersubjective discussion. On the contrary, the literary examples have been selected with a view to developing a range of systematic ***options*** only, rather than a full structure of interpretive procedures. They have ***not*** been selected to facilitate formulating a new explanation of any specific meaning creation or interpretation, which would be an impossible task.

Selection of examples has involved the following factors. I have avoided relying on a particular text-milieu, or foregrounding unconsciously a particular narrative (sub-)genre. The realistic novel assumes an initially dominant position in order to clarify the role of world-models. But in order to talk about the variable experience of

generating fictional truth about characters I needed a fairly wide survey of *different* kinds of narrative, particularly with regard to the ontological structure of the fictional worlds and their relation to standard, accepted reality. I have chosen what seem to be appropriate works as representative of (sub-)genres, in an effort to avoid generating unsuitable paradigms. Geographically the selection is limited to the European tradition. Historically it is restricted to Roman Antiquity and more recent periods, with emphasis from the late medieval. Because of the focus on text, it excludes oral examples. In order to discuss character more meaningfully, it is limited to well-known stories. The selection also takes into account the historically variable "permeability" of narrative texts with respect to extra- and intertextual information required. These degrees of dependency are crucial for my analysis of the various kinds of narrative. Most importantly, the selection has been based on the need to begin with the development of a fundamental model which is sufficient in diverse examples, and which is then augmented with complementary factors/examples used to test the limits of that model.

Notes

[1]In my Master's thesis I developed an example of how the basic generic feature of fantastic hesitation can be explained through narrative technique, and its nature defined through possible-world semantics. May Charles, "A Possible-World Semantics Approach to World Structures and Narrative Transmission in the Fantastic Tale," thesis, University of Alberta, 1987.

[2]This particular methodology cannot usefully take into account deconstructive approaches to expansive meaning construction. The concerns of deconstruction are not ignored or invalidated, but can only be assigned marginal interest within the parameters of the proposed methodology.

[3]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 38.

[4]Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 129.

[5]Culler, *Signs* 53.

[6]Culler, *Signs* 124.

[7]Culler, *Structuralist* 123.

[8]Culler, *Signs* 125.

[9]Culler, *Structuralist* 258.

[10]Culler, *Signs* 38-9.

[11]For a more detailed appraisal of the advantages of the possible-worlds approach for the study of character see Uri Margolin, "Individuals in Narrative Worlds: An Ontological Perspective," *Poetics Today* 11.4 (Winter 1990): 844-6.

Chapter Two: Possible-World Semantics and Fictional Worlds

This chapter is designed with several goals in mind: to acquaint the reader with the relevant philosophical background, to present the main advantages of the fictional-world semantic approach inherited from philosophy, and to lay the ground work for introducing the problematic limitations of the philosophical concepts as applied in fiction. For the purposes of this study the theory of possible worlds cannot be taken as a conceptual given, but requires deliberate exposure. I outline first of all some of the basic philosophical theory, referring to the work carried out in the analytical tradition which is most relevant to an analysis of fictional characters as non-actual individuals. Here I examine the central concepts of the philosophical framework, the various definitions of possible worlds, the fundamental problem of non-existent objects and reference to them, and the logical constraints presumed.

Since work in this tradition has often been devoted to the logic and semantics of *fiction* as a productive field of investigation, it is useful to examine next how possible-worlds theory has been applied to fiction, and to recognize the main advantages of this approach. This chapter concentrates on the *advantages*, outlining how literary theory can benefit from the possible-worlds approach. The background provided is essential to appreciating how fictional character can be explored through fictional-world semantic theory. Only in Chapter Three do I problematize the approach, by considering the *differences* between possible worlds and fictional worlds, and the violations of logic routine in fiction. Chapter Three presents also the problematic existence of fictional characters, reviewing the basic philosophical positions and developing the more extreme ramifications which result. The present chapter thus provides the philosophical framework for the more extended discussions to follow.

Truth, Possibility, and Defining Abstract Possible Worlds

The fundamental concept of possible-world semantics is that of possibility as truth in *some* possible worlds. It is this central modal consideration which has proven so useful in the study of fiction, since it allows theorists to account for the problematic but evident truths supplied by fictional discourse. As a formal model developed for the purpose of defining the semantics of modal logic, possible worlds theory provides a means to examine the modal operators of possibility and necessity in a way which permits the assignment of truth and falsity to statements about entities and situations which do not exist in actuality. According to Leibniz' original views of possible worlds, a proposition is a ***necessary*** truth if it is true in ***all*** possible worlds. On the basis of this intuition, modal logic has specified formally a set of all possible worlds, and provided consequently a rigorous semantics for modal considerations. It is the concept of multiple ***worlds*** which provides modal calculus with an intuitively satisfying interpretation of necessity and possibility, since a statement is necessary if true in a whole universe or system of worlds, and possible if true in some (or at least one) world.

If, according to the propositional rules developed by Saul Kripke, possibility is truth in some possible worlds, and the truth value of a proposition is assigned separately for each possible world, it is then essential to define relations among worlds ***accessible*** to the world with respect to which we assign a truth value.[1] Unlike in Leibniz' scheme, in this kind of modal system not every possible world is accessible to every other. Different accessibility relations are set up in different modal systems, so that only accessible worlds are consulted in order to assign truth values, and it is possible to distinguish modal inferences as legitimate according to ***relative*** possibility. I show later how essential this appreciation is for fiction, pointing out in particular how Marie-Laure Ryan's work on accessibility relations has benefited from these philosophical considerations.

But how has this clarifying notion of "possible world" been defined in philosophy? Unfortunately there is no single (or simple) answer.

Some critics have assuredly dismissed the theory as a misleading way to refer to the formal devices of language, which do not raise any serious ontological questions. And in a sense there is perhaps no need to postulate their "existence," since it is possible to show that modal notions are ***prior*** to possible worlds. It is apparently not possible to replace the concepts of possibility and necessity ***entirely*** with talk of possible worlds. To be able to apply the kind of formal machinery suggested above to deal with possibility, we have to already know about possible worlds. As Nicholas Rescher explains, truths are not really necessary ***because*** they are "true in all possible worlds." On the contrary, possible worlds are possible "...***because*** they do not conflict with truths that qualify as necessary on independent grounds."[2] Setting complicated philosophical debates aside, however, it is clear that the notion of "possible world" lends a valuable clarity to modal logic, even if taken essentially as a metaphor or heuristic device. And as Michael Loux suggests, "[i]f we are to make sense of the various modal systems, we have to suppose that in some sense there really are possible worlds other than our own and ...possible objects not found in the actual world."[3]

There have been several different ways devised to ascertain in what sense possible worlds can be thought to exist. The preceding presentation of the formal, propositional account of truth conditions constitutes one fundamental approach which treats possible worlds as sets of propositions (as abstract entities). Kripkes's propositional modal system provides thus a basic formal application of the concept.[4] This kind of project explicates the meanings of propositions through truth-conditions, determining a truth status in various possible worlds. Clearly such formal specifications of truth-conditions operate on a strictly ***hypothetical*** level, and we may well desire to see such specifications applied concretely to identify a specific possible world and to determine whether some particular statement will hold true in it. Fortunately for literary studies, possible worlds have also been defined as sets of individual concepts and as sets of "concrete" individuals.

Before identifying some of the other elaborated definitions of possible worlds which are relevant for literary theory, it is important

to qualify the basic concept further in general terms. Possible worlds provide the very "subject matter" for modal discourse. As Loux suggests, the idea of possible worlds other than the actual is not difficult to accept, since it provides a good account of what we talk about when we engage in all forms of modal discourse. Within modal logic, the objects which make up the system models are simply "things plausibly thought of."[5] Possible-world semantics thus provides a way to deal with non-actual objects, actions, and events--things merely possible. As such, the idea of possible worlds is not invented by modal logicians, but is rather anchored in prephilosophical thinking about *alternate* possible objects and courses of events--things perhaps merely *envisaged* in one way or another. "Possible world" is in effect only a term for what we have understood intuitively all along. As Robert Stalnaker says, "[b]elieving in possible worlds is like speaking prose. We have been doing it all our lives."[6] But like Monsieur Jourdain in *Le Bourgeois gentilhomme* we may often ignore the ramifications of our own common sense practice.

Within the framework of possible worlds it is possible to speak clearly about all kinds of ascriptions of modality involving unrealized possibilities. These possibilities may involve things merely envisaged in the course of decision-making, such as alternate courses of action, counterfactuals as speculative hypothetical conjecture, projections for future possibilities, or intents. Or they may involve the more radical world-creating activities of imagination which often involve "unreal" situations and objects: dreams, fantasies, wishes, fears, and worries. Were such worlds of imagination to materialize, things would certainly be different. In this sense imagination shifts us to another "world," in effect producing possible worlds. Also involved in unrealized potentialities are beliefs, which involve more than purely mental constructs, having some ontological basis in actuality. In addition, possible worlds may entail knowledge about wholly fictional possibilities, including the non-actual objects and individuals from fictional worlds. The main advantage, then, for this study is this theoretical capacity to understand discourse about intentional abstract entities, in a way which will not work in a nonmodal extensionalist framework.

Possible Worlds as Real Entities, as Constructed Sets of Concepts, and as Sets of Conceptual Individuals

These kinds of considerations about the status of possible worlds take us beyond the concepts of such worlds as linguistic entities or sets of propositions. Instead, we realize that possible worlds are "entities" relative to which truth is defined. David Lewis has developed a powerfully explanatory theory of possible worlds by appealing to intuitive beliefs about how things could have been different.[7] In general, the "worlds envisaged" which have been mentioned above constitute ways things *could* have been. Such possible worlds provide a *context* for assessing the truth value of modal discourse. Prephilosophical views about modality are crucial in such an explanation of possible worlds because our intuitive formulations that things might have happened otherwise provide a means to determine truth value for sentences prefaced by modal operators. Such "worlds" of alternate ways things might have happened make possibility claims true or false. What Lewis does, however, is to focus specifically on counterfactual discourse, which is similar to modal discourse, in that counterfactual claims concern possible worlds beyond the ontology delineated in standard extensional discourse. Although there are significant differences between counterfactuals and ascriptions of modality, counterfactuals being limited to a smaller *range* of possible worlds and involving only actuality variants, Lewis has developed a realism about possible worlds on the basis of counterfactual discourse, treating such worlds as respectable entities in their own right. He has also applied this theory to the question of fictional truth with remarkable results which I consider later.

As an extreme realist, Lewis claims that possible worlds exist just like the actual world; that is, there are more things than actually exist, since there are also the ways things could have been.[8] This position is obviously problematic because it ignores any ontological difference between possible worlds and the actual world as we experience it. For Lewis, the term "actual" is indexical for each world, so that our world is not singled out for any special ontic status. We happen to inhabit the "actual world" (among many others), but the term "actual" refers *at*

any world to that world itself, just as an expression like "here" or "now" does.[9] Such a term depends for its reference on the context of utterance. Obviously this concept relates closely to the notion of truth *within* a possible world, and in fact allows Lewis to develop an illuminating approach to the whole question of truth in fiction through the concept of truth worlds (which is considered in detail in Chapter Seven as an inspiration for the concept of textual reference world). Within this scheme all possible worlds are equally real, and all objects are equally existent. But "real" and "actual" are not synonymous terms. Because "actual" is indexical for the *speaker's* world, alternative possible worlds cannot be actual for anyone located in *this* particular actual world, since we consider such unactualized possible worlds from an external perspective. But since alternative possible worlds exist absolutely, they are real and all possibilities are realized in some world.[10] It is obvious that this indexical theory provides a remarkably advantageous way to distinguish the actual from the possible. Unfortunately the loss of the privileged ontological status of the actual world seems an unacceptable consequence, which leads in fact to the counter-intuitive view of actuality which Ryan explains in terms of the non-reversible relationship between the actual world and its alternatives.[11]

Lewis' theory does provide useful insights into fictional truth about characters, in terms of the truth world concept and counterpart theory, which are applied in this study to help define how readers "relocate" to textual reference worlds. But *in general*, fictional-world semantics benefits more from a less literal understanding of the notion of possible world, since fiction does not report *strictly speaking* on extant worlds. Fictional worlds are certainly not concrete entities, but rather abstract entities or conceptual constructions, which ultimately allow for a transworld identity denied by the extreme realist position.

Lewis' view of extreme realism about many worlds is tempered by moderate realists such as Alvin Plantinga and Robert Stalnaker who focus on one world with many possible "constructions." Moderate realists accept the existence of possible worlds, but qualify "exists" to distinguish it from actuality. On this view, the concept of possible

world is basic to a correct account of how we represent the world in our propositional acts and attitudes. For Stalnaker, a possible world is not a metaphysical conception or "domain"--not a particular kind of thing or place, but rather what truth is relative to. Possible worlds are identified with total ways things might be. Stalnaker explains that the only possible worlds there are are elements of our actual world. "They obviously are not concrete objects or situations, but ***abstract objects*** whose existence is inferred or abstracted from the activities of rational agents."[12] Here the notion of an actually existent but ***unexemplified*** property is introduced, as in Plantinga's discussion of ***obtainable*** states of affairs.[13] So possible worlds all exist, but only the actual world is exemplified. For Plantinga and Stalnaker, possible worlds are actually existing ***abstract*** entities, while the actual world is instantiated. On this account, resemblance between worlds, or accessibility relations, are not crucial to the concept of possible world.

Not unrelated to this approach are the constructionalist views of Nelson Goodman, and also more generally the conceptualistic theory which is most valuable applied in fictional-world semantics. Goodman is a radical relativist, for whom everything is a construction. As an epistemologist, Goodman is concerned with ways of knowing versions of reality--worlds in the making. There is no unique truth on this view, but a diversity of right and conflicting versions. Possible worlds are not alternatives to a single unique world, but rather ***multiple*** actual worlds. Goodman examines the complicated procedures of world-making in order to demonstrate how reality is relative and subject to the creative power of understanding. He attempts to break down the ontological ramifications associated with the notion of a ***single*** reality by introducing this concept of versions created through perception or conceptualization. Existence is not autonomous outside of world-versions.[14]

Sharing some principles with Goodman's work is the approach of Rescher, who assigns a conceptualistic status to all possibilia. But Rescher, unlike Goodman, draws a clear epistemic distinction between the actual, mind-independent reality, and other merely possible worlds, where intellectual construction is decisive.[15] "Ontologically," possible

worlds are the potential products of intellectual projections made by real-world beings, an approach very much at odds with Lewis' realism, but conducive to the investigation of the cognitive processes involved in reading fictional narrative. For Rescher, the real is contingent, only one among alternative possibilities, but the one which actually happens to be realized, an idea in keeping with Leibniz' original idea of reality as the one ***selected*** possible world which God has instantiated. The actual world is ***basic*** to the constructive process, not on the same plane with "merely possible" alternatives. The actual world furnishes an inventory of individuals and a taxonomy of properties. On this account, the actual world is unique and prior to possible worlds, and there is no discrepancy between the terms real and actual. Possible worlds are constructs of the mind or intellectual projections made ***from*** the domain of the actual, which consists of facts existing actually, independent of minds.

By contrast, the facts of unactualized possible worlds exist only in a relativized manner, as the objects of intellectual processes.[16] Possibilities can exist ***for*** us, but only if they can be conceived ***by*** us. Unactualized hypothetical possibilities do not exist in the world of objective reality at all, but "exist" only insofar as they are conceived. Such existence is purely intensional--the result of mental acts. Projected by minds, unrealized possibilities exist only in a secondary sense as objects of language-deploying thought.[17] Obviously, we must consider a full range of conceptual activities/intellectual processes to which possible worlds owe their existence, such as conceiving, imagining, hypothesizing, projecting, positing, considering, supposing, fantasizing, intending, dreaming, and believing. The ***conceivable*** must be included, in its largest sense.

Non-actual individuals "exist," then, only insofar as minds can dream them up, having an ontological basis which is entirely mind-dependent. The only entry into an "unreal realm" is via cognitive processes, which ***introduce*** merely possible things. Non-actual existence is entirely mediated by minds. This view is supported fully by the fact that the states of affairs of possible worlds cannot be introduced through ostension.[18] In the real world we can introduce things by merely pointing them out, but as outsiders to possible worlds we can only

introduce their contents by way of cognitive processes such as supposition. Ostension is purely an *intra*-world process, available only to members of a world.

Obviously then, if possible individuals are not "discovered" in the real world, we must consider the capabilities of minds which produce such intellectual constructions. Rescher's theory is important for my project because conceptualistic constructions are fundamental to the public, interpersonal quality of fictional worlds. Cognitive processes are the ***crucial link*** between the texts which invoke fictional worlds and the larger reference contexts which help to define fictional truths for those worlds. We cannot appreciate the generation of fictional truth without coming to grips with the procedures introduced by readers to understand fictional beings. Certainly the connections among the sign systems of fictional narrative, thought processes, and reality are complicated, but Rescher's view of possible individuals as actual or potential ***conceptual artifacts*** with a purely mind-correlative status is a significant step in the right direction. It will prove most beneficial to apply Rescher's logical considerations to the study of reference worlds for fictional characters.[19]

While Rescher's theory begins as an abstract theory which considers possible worlds as sets of individual concepts, it has the distinct advantage of linking the conceptualistic approach to an appreciation of possible objects or individuals. Rescher elaborates a plan to deal with the level of merely potential possibilities where the focus is on generic conceivability rather than on particularized conception. But he also concerns himself with the specific ***instance*** of possibilia through mental acts. In some ways, possible worlds can only be specified by identifying the individuals said to exist in that world, and Rescher allows non-actual individuals to assume this dominant role. In this sense, his work is important to theories which are devoted to the contemplation of sets of "concrete" objects or individuals.

Non-Existent Objects and Reference

Theories of possible non-actual objects are important for the study of fictional character because they attempt to come to grips with some serious philosophical problems about reference to non-existent objects --problems which have inhibited the development of an adequate appreciation of truth generation concerning fictional characters.[20] Richard Routley's voluminous work has been centered on a theory of objects designed to facilitate quantified intensional logics and to resolve the traditional philosophical puzzles concerned with intensionality.[21] Non-actual objects are thought incoherent or contradictory in ontological terms. How can we claim that there exist things that do not (actually) exist? Routley adopts as fundamental the main point of Alexius Meinong's theory, that nonentities (including *im*possibilia) are not featureless and can have definite properties. They can be sensibly spoken about in *Sosein-* as opposed to *Sein* statements, that is, as "being existent" and having properties, rather than as "existing."[22] Obviously such an approach is useful for fictional objects since it allows us to ***distinguish*** the properties of fictional characters. It provides at least provisionally a way to get around the limiting view of truth as a ***function*** of reference, proposing instead that any inventory of properties corresponds to an object, whether existent or not. In Chapter Four's discussion of reference and character existence I present briefly the advantages of such ontological tolerance, particularly as reflected in Terence Parson's work with non-existent objects as applied to fictional contexts. In a way similar to this demand for non-existential quantifiers, Lewis' realist position specifies that "exist" must be broken into two senses (or quantifiers). An unrestricted quantifier allows reference to all possible objects, while a more restricted quantifier applies to the actual world only.

But in opposition to these approaches, most philosophers have argued that possible worlds must be included in an ontology which does ***not*** recognize quantification over non-actual objects. On the actualist view, the only things that exist are objects that exist in the actual world. Possible worlds can only be identified with actually existing objects or with constructions based on those objects--the idea of ***instantiable***

entities. The existence claim is somehow workable, then, for objects which seem to be only "more of the same" ordinary things which we find in reality. But this existence claim becomes especially troublesome for objects which have no "counterpart" in the real world, as is often the case in fiction.

The struggle has been, then, to understand ***how*** it is that we can refer to objects and individuals which in no way exist, since we certainly do so. We refer to, denote, describe, and assign properties to objects which fall out of the range of standard quantification theory because they do not exist, as in fiction. On the simplest level, we use linguistic expressions to refer to how things might have been. Meaning becomes a modal notion, which need not be restricted to extensional analysis, and which functions from words to truth values.[23] John Heintz distinguishes between ***using a term*** to refer, and referring to something that really exists. A singular referring expression certainly requires a singular referent, but not that the referent exist in the real world.[24] Such a referent can be located in a "logical space" and we will see later in Chapter Four how the concept of a textual reference world can be developed to take over this function. Joseph Margolis also insists that reference does not have ontic import.[25] Dale Jacquette explains that intentional semantics provides for ontologically ***neutral*** interpretation. Whether objects of thought are existent or non-existent, they are directly referred to and "...have the constitutive properties truly predicated of them."[26]

Out of the many struggles to square reference to non-existent objects with acceptable ontology we glean the valuable insight that language is the ***instrument*** of the calling into existence of non-actual individuals. If we can ***think*** of possible objects and refer to them with words, we can create an existence for them in a mind-dependent ontology. World-creating cognitive operations depend on the referential and descriptive use of language. Whether we create ***versions*** of the world with words, as in Goodman's philosophy, or whether we create entirely "new" world-structures from a non-actual inventory, we inevitably rely on the ***descriptive*** quality of language as an instrument. As Rescher says, "[t]he mechanisms of reference to nonexistents are an

inherent linguistic feature."[27] This foothold in language provides for non-actual possibilities an ontological basis as mind-relative objects. Whatever structured conceptual schemes we may deploy in order to construct non-actual objects, it is linguistic machinery which provides a concrete "embodiment" for those objects.[28] We will see in Chapter Four how this objectification ***in language*** becomes crucial in the case of fictional worlds and their understanding.

Logical Constraints

Beyond the basic question of how the objects/individuals of possible worlds originate or are called into existence, philosophers have considered at length the problem of logical completeness. Actual individuals are property-decisive; that is, they either have or lack any given property. Lewis would consider logical completeness possible in all worlds. Plantinga has developed the useful concept of "world-book" within his formal account, to deal with this problem. To each possible world corresponds a "book" as a set of true propositions, either containing a particular property or the denial of that property.[29] Robert Merrihew Adams has developed this concept, replacing the notion of "book" with "story," to the effect that:

> ...a world-story is a maximal consistent set of propositions...a set which has as its members one member of every pair of mutually contradictory propositions, and which is such that it is possible that all of its members be true together. ...[t]he actual world differs from the other possible worlds in that all the members of its world-story (the set of all the propositions that are true in it) are true, whereas the stories of all the other possible worlds have false propositions among their members.[30]

This kind of actualist approach to complete worlds presumes that the set of true propositions will ***include*** aspects of the real world not explicitly changed in the possible world, so that the idea of a complete or maximal set is possible, seen through standard inference procedures. I explore beginning in Chapter Three how fiction complicates this issue.

For the moment we must see that Rescher's approach will not tolerate this view of logical completeness for possible worlds. Clearly an object "thought up" will be specified as to its features, through the cognitive process. But Rescher hastens to point out that this "description," which is all we have to differentiate or individuate non-existent objects, is always ***incomplete***. Ryan explains: "[w]hen we think up a entity, we only specify a subset of its potential properties. It would take a divine mind to run through the list of all possible features and to think up an object into logical completeness."[31] This emphasis on the schematic qualities of possible worlds is consequently in opposition to the "maximal" view of logical completeness, and is very useful as a result for fictional-world semantics, where we must consider the incompleteness of fictional worlds and characters as the ***key issue*** in the generation of fictional truth. Chapter Three pursues this problem at length, after which I consider how inference procedures for fiction are structured to produce ***particular kinds*** of maximal worlds.

The other crucial logical constraint for possible worlds is consistency. The attributes of ***actual*** individuals must constitute a set of mutually compatible properties. Although inconsistent properties are not problematic in Meinong's account of non-existent objects corresponding to lists of properties, to be ***logically*** possible, properties must be compatible with one another within a consistent set. Possible worlds can only be conceived or come into existence if they are not self-contradictory in the logical sense; that is, a world which contains a square circle is not a possible world, nor is a world where an individual has and does not have the same feature, or where a certain action is and is not performed. A possible world need not be nomically compossible specifically with respect to the actual world, but it need be at least logically or conceptually compossible. Possible worlds are also collections of ***compossible individuals***. I examine in detail in Chapter Three the ramifications of this consistency constraint on the applicability of possible-world semantics for the study of fictional worlds, presenting some of the main theoretical discussions which have ensued.

Fictional Worlds and Modality

Before identifying in the next chapter some basic and crucial differences between possible worlds and fictional worlds, I want to outline briefly here the obvious ***advantages*** of the theory for the study of fictional narrative. The dilemma of the quality of descriptive, "assertive" fictional narrative discourse which presents the "content" of the fictional world, but without actually having a "referential" status, is addressed effectively through the possible-worlds approach, mainly because "content" must be propositional, even if only by implied or indirect means. All meanings derived from narrative fiction are ***ultimately*** propositional, even if we only think of them as general insights or some kind of enriching "experience." Possible-world semantics allows an appreciation of narrative discourse which does not deny its "referential" quality, and which links that quality to the construction of the meaning which we take away from texts.

On the basis of the formal models developed by logicians in order to define the semantics of modal operators, two concepts have been developed which are fruitful for fictional-world theory. The first is, of course, the metaphor of ***"world"*** as a means to describe the semantic domain projected by the text. Using this metaphor we assume that textual semiotic structures create or call into existence fictional worlds intuitively "alternative" to the actual world. By extension, such worlds are constituted by non-actual states of affairs and individuals with properties and relations. We can say at least provisionally that such individuals can be referred to through singular referring expressions, and that singular propositions which are true or false in the fictional world can be formulated about such individuals. The second concept is that of ***modality***, as a means to classify the *ways* in which objects and individuals, or states and events can be said to "exist" within the semantic domain. By applying this concept, we can develop general statements about the regularities governing fictional worlds, and formulate modal "logics" for those worlds. Such "logics" can assess ontological differences between fictional worlds and the actual world or other kinds of possible worlds--differences inherent in the logical violations to be explored in Chapter Three.

The world metaphor is not new to literary criticism, and in fact accords perfectly with our intuitive appreciation of narrative fiction. Even in narratives with the most minimal description, we tend to postulate a "world" in which the characters "live" and where events "take place." However indeterminate the features of such a world may be, we still assume such a background, which I will show is best understood as a textual reference world, although the basic concept of fictional world is assuredly a huge step in the right direction. Such are the dictates of our psychological bond with fictions. In effect, the philosophers have borrowed the term from mundane literary usage, and imbued it with new life by applying the analytical tools of philosophy. What in a purely intuitive sense we think of as a "realm" or "domain" becomes analyzable as a collection of fictional truths. The concept of modality allows for fruitful discussion of the metaphysical questions about fictional individuals and truth, as well as questions about the relations between fictional worlds and reality. Such operations become the "semantics" or theory of truth and reference for fictional worlds.

Since such questions have not been addressed effectively within the structuralist project, possible-worlds theory provides a means to expand the borders of narratology and inject new life into old problems about content and interpretation. As Thomas Pavel explains, possible-worlds theory provides the means to respond to the "...world-creating powers of imagination and account for the properties of fictional existence and worlds, their complexity, incompleteness, remoteness, and integration within the general economy of culture."[32]

The Logical Status/Construction of Fictional Worlds

In developing the concept of fictional worlds on the basis of possible worlds, it is essential to establish immediately that fictional worlds and their contents do not have any ontological status independent of their creation. There are no pre-existent fictional worlds to be understood literally. Fictional worlds cannot be identified, then, with metaphysically possible worlds, as in Lewis' theory of realism.

Fictional worlds are typically authored, satisfying the structural requirements of narrative fiction, and have no existence independent of the narrative discourse which describes them. As such, they *do* correspond with Rescher's evaluation of possible worlds as constructions through intellectual processes.

Rescher assesses accurately the dualism of ***actual*** existence--a dualism which evaporates when we speak of non-actual possibilities. In reality we find the actually existing thing or state of affairs, plus the thought or entertainment of this thing or state of affairs. In possible worlds the actual existents are altogether lacking. This difference is ***crucial***, because the second category of ***thoughts*** of things or states of affairs becomes ***determinative***; that is, nothing whatsoever remains if it is done away with.[33]

This concept of the ontological mind-dependence of possible worlds is precisely what is required to appreciate fictional worlds, where the imaginative construction of the text is all there is, at least until individual readers engage it. Fictional characters are created through textual activity and have no other actual ***ontological*** status, in spite of what semiotic connections may link them to other texts or the real world. We will ultimately need to apply such logical considerations to the whole question of reading operations which ***tie together*** the textual construction of character and the text-external factors of cognition which build textual reference worlds. But for the moment, we must concede that a fictional world is a world we merely imagine to exist on the basis of textual construction--a world which has no reality at all, since, as Margolis explains, it cannot be "detached" from the condition of thinking about it.[34]

Although it may ***seem*** so to an absorbed reader, narrative fictional texts do not report on witnessed events, but rather create those events from scratch. Because fictional worlds exist only as created, we must resist the temptation to confuse "true" fictional statements with reportage. Literary critics in the tradition of realistic interpretation often make "mimetic" claims for characters' lives which seem to imbue those lives with an independent ontological status. But, as John Woods

points out, authors do not report about established episodes in characters' lives, but rather ***establish*** the episodes in the first place.[35] In fact, a fundamental difference between fiction and non-fiction is that fictional texts establish fictional worlds and engender the truths which belong to those worlds. A non-fictional text such as history or biography does not establish ***on its own*** the truth of what it says, which is judged by correspondence with actual occurrences (although of course, history and biography may reflect more or less accurately an objective reality, and may "re-make" that reality irrevocably). Because there are no pre-existent fictional worlds, what authors fail to tell us through narrative procedures (either directly or through principles of implication which I discuss at length beginning in Chapter Six) simply does not exist.

Knowledge of fictional worlds in literary narrative is thus dependent on their textual manifestation. Such fictional possible worlds are cultural constructs, stipulated through semiotic procedures. Kripke's important concept of ***stipulation*** (rather than discovery) for possible worlds accords well with the notion of constructed fictional worlds, and has been applied most effectively in the illuminating work of Lubomír Doležel.[36] Doležel has convincingly insisted that fictional worlds are ***constructs*** of textual activity, not "discovered" anywhere, but constructed by human minds, brought into existence by texts which construct their ***own*** frame of reference. Fictional worlds are ***assigned*** fictional existence (or stipulated) through semiotic procedures, which do not describe an already existing world, but create that world through the medium of the text, bringing into existence a world which did not previously exist. Narrative procedures actually determine the structure, properties, and mode of existence of the fictional world.[37] This kind of constructional fictional-world semantics accords, then, with Rescher's theory of intellectual constructions. The fictional narrative text is really a ***medium*** for the creative act of the poetic imagination. It is a semiotic system put in place to construct a fictional world autonomous with respect to the actual world. Furthermore, the text as a semiotic medium of world construction goes beyond constructing fictional worlds, to storing and transmitting those worlds. Because fictional worlds are (permanently) available in a public sense, they can be

reconstructed through reading. On Doležel's account, the reader's role is marginalized, the text acting as a "set of instructions" with which the fictional world can be "recovered and reassembled."[38]

Obviously, as in the case of possible worlds created through intellectual processes, fictional worlds depend on an author who acts as a "god" in relation to the fictional world which he creates. As numerous philosophers explain, the author is the authority on the fictional worlds created through imaginative processes, and what he ratifies, goes. In his landmark book *The Logic of Fiction*, Woods outlines the naive concept of fictionality about statements concerning fictional characters, some of which are true while others are false. According to our conventional, intuitive wisdom, the author's "sayso" constitutes the condition of truth, along with what can be legitimately inferred on that basis.[39] Jacquette puts this succinctly: "[t]he author stipulates what is supposed to be true of the people, places, and events of the narrative, which makes it true by fiat that these fictional objects have the constitutive properties bestowed on them by their creator."[40] We need to appreciate here the *radical* quality of this intuitive appreciation of fictional worlds, which freely accepts the presentation of fictional characters and events which deviate from actual history or from the laws of nature (and even logic). We realize that purely fictional individuals, states of affairs, and events do not exist and never have. Yet we freely speak of their properties and presume that what an author indicates is true for that individual or event. And according to Routley, we go even further and incorporate such fictional truths consistently into our collections of ordinary truths.[41] It is this intuitive appreciation of fictional truth which Woods undertakes to clarify, making adjustments as necessary, and devising a semantical analysis for fictional statements.

There are, of course, limitations on what an author's "sayso" can stipulate. In no way can fictional characters be called into an *actual* existence, since it is really non-existence which provides the possibility of there being an author's "sayso" criterion in the first place.[42] Nor can real-world facts be altered by fictional statements; that is, "sayso" has no extension in the real world.[43] Furthermore, depending on the quality of narrative authentication and expectations

for the genre, statements against the laws of nature may or may not be understood as fictionally true. An elaborate analysis will be necessary later in this study to deal with the relevance of extratextual models for fictional truth generation.

The very concept of a single author's "sayso" has limited application for fictional narrative, which is not constituted by a single, originating voice. Philosophers have not generally come to grips with any analysis of narrative procedures--a fact which limits the application of their models drastically. Chapter Seven includes some discussion of the role of narrative transmission in the generation of fictional truth. But it is worth mentioning here the important distinctions which Doležel has introduced into the concept of "sayso." Doležel *separates* the introduction (construction) of fictional worlds, and their authentication, with the result that various *degrees* or modes of authenticated existence can be contemplated, including fictional worlds where existence becomes problematic or ambiguous.[44] Such work is central to all fictional truth questions.

The concept of fictional world allows us to elaborate our intuitive appreciation of fiction by defining such a world as a *domain of reference*. As Rescher explains, "[o]nce the constructive projection of a possible world is a matter of *fait accompli*, one can then assume *thereafter* the stance of cutting loose from the actual world..."[45] In a sense not alien to Lewis' conception of actual worlds, the new world becomes *hypothetically* actual, so that in the case of fiction we can indeed construe signs as referring to a particular possible world, rather than the actual one. While this concept of a domain of reference is not accurate for the actual reading process as it will be elaborated in this study, it does provide an at least provisional solution to the problem of fictional reference, freeing, as Doležel explains, "...literary theory from the sterile view that fictional texts lack reference, as well as from the embarrassing concept of self-reference."[46] In Chapter Four I show how Ryan's concept of recentering exploits to the maximum this idea of hypothetical actuality, and how the concept of a textual reference world can be expanded to provide a more complete "domain of reference" accessible from the actual world.

Fictional Worlds as Contexts for Truth

Considered for now as an independent domain of reference, the fictional world becomes a ***context*** for truth. This concept of truth ***within*** a fictional context is absolutely fundamental to the possible-worlds approach as applied in fiction. The base world where truth is assessed is transferred from the real world to fictional worlds, so that we can appreciate truths about the fictional world within a special context, exploring successfully how texts construct worlds through standard referential (and modal) mechanisms. Doležel refers to Frege's ***intensional*** semantics which accounts for components of meaning which are "...determined by the forms of expression rather than by the reference relation. Being determined by the forms of expression, the structure of the narrative world is a purely intensional object and, as such, can be freely manipulated by the text."[47] Doležel's model is thus radically opposed to mimetic approaches, which insist on a ***correspondence*** between fictional truth and reality. By working with the idea of a narrator who ***constructs*** a world, rather than referring to it, Doležel has defined in fact the autonomy of semiotic fictional worlds in relation to the actual world. "Fictional truth is strictly 'truth in/of' the constructed narrative world and its criterion is agreement or disagreement with ***authenticated*** narrative facts."[48]

Fictional existence is, then, an ***intensional*** property, which cannot be explained by the extensional concept of truth; that is, truth is not a correspondence between language and reality, but is defined internally ***within*** the fictional world. Truth is not an absolute metaphysical principle, but is instead relative to a particular discourse which creates its own world. The truth-value of propositions is not determined by any corresponding state of affairs in the world, since there *is* no extra-linguistic state of affairs with which the fictional linguistic expression can correspond. Fiction does not refer to extra-linguistic states/pre-existing worlds.[49] If a work of fiction depicts a world (or at least a part of a world), we can think of that world as "given" by the class of statements that "hold" in it. Routley explains this as a domain of items belonging together--the characters and things which the work is about.[50] In effect, fictional worlds are best understood as collections

of fictional truths--not as "realms" in which it is true that something happens. And the existence of fictional characters is an intensional property.

Obviously, this concept of fictional truth opposes the empiricist view that there are no truths of or about fiction to capture in a logic. On the empiricist view, a logic of fiction is irrelevant because all fictional statements are false. But we must be able to distinguish false statements ***about*** fiction from those which are true. Wood's main purpose is to define the logical structure of "bet-sensitive" sentences concerning fiction; that is, if certain statements about fiction are not true, how is it that they can win bets?[51] Such "evident" truths make us realize that, as Goodman insists, we cannot distinguish falsehood and fiction from truth and fact on the ground that fiction is fabricated and fact found.[52] Woods insists, then, on the need for a truth-like semantic property for fiction, which he identifies as "truth-by-convention." "[T]hat fictional individuals enter the identity relation, are countable, are individuated, and have properties and histories--all emerge as true-by-convention, and hence as perfectly open to affirmation."[53] This special kind of reference possibility distinguishes statements about fiction from others which do not seem to have a referent (such as "The present king of France is wise").

A useful approach to this special truth-like quality is Walton's development of an account of "being fictional" as a truth-like semantic property--an account which Gregory Currie also espouses. In the simplest terms, what is true (or "fictional") in fiction is what is part of the story as told, precisely because the fiction provides a "prescription" for readers to imagine the particular proposition as true.[54] As a result, there are several combinations possible for fictional truth's relation to reality: a proposition may be true in a story and not true, true in a story and true, untrue in a story and true.[55] It all depends on the "prescription" provided by the text.

The "being fictional" account is based on the widely discussed and accepted concept of a fictional operator. If we want to understand truth in fiction as a truth-like semantic property of propositions, the notion

of "being fictional" can be conceived as a function from propositions to truth values. This "function" is the propositional operator. So, like truth, being fictional is a property of propositions.[56] Propositions can be true in a world, that is, true according to an ***intensional*** operator. Within Woods' articulations of a "sayso" semantics, he discusses the introduction of a predicate "true-in-fiction" as a category separate from "true-in-reality." This idea of being "true-in-fiction" (or "being fictional" in Walton's and Currie's analyses) involves an ellipsis thesis --what Woods defines as an olim operator. For Woods, fictional sentences are semantically distinctive because they are modified by a sentence operator.[57] Such an approach obviously requires a non-standard treatment of consistency. But Woods concerns himself only with developing a quantified modal logic to cope with ***individual sentences***--an approach which is reductive for the study of narrative fiction.

Considering the inadequacy of logical models built on "micro-worlds" or statements, the efforts of some other philosophers have been directed towards the concept of a more theoretically useful ***story***-operator. Intuitively, we are comfortable with the idea that fictional truth is always relative to a ***particular*** fictional work. So we say that in a certain novel, such-and-such is true. Currie pursues this expansion from individual sentences, to see how a theory of fictional truth might be developed in terms of whole text interpretation, rather than concentrating in a misleading way on individual particular sentences and their propositional value. "No proper part of a fictional story ...is semantically independent enough to express a proposition on its own. Only the whole story expresses a proposition, for there are quantifiers that have as their scope the whole story, picking up variables along the way."[58] Castañeda explains how the ***segregation*** of the particular fiction is well represented by the story operator. "Each story corresponds to one story operator, which segregates the story in question from all other stories and from reality."[59] For Walton, such an intensional operator can be construed simply as "It is fictional that...," being (at least superficially) analogous to statements such as "It is believed that..." or "It is wished that...," that is, other kinds of intentional discourse.[60] It is clear, then, that we can usefully presume

a "totality" for fictional truth, which is not gleaned somehow sentence by sentence. As Pavel explains, "...global truth is not derived from the local truth-value of the sentences present in the text."[61] Fictional narrative texts refer as systems, and as such, they are subject to a more global sense of story-operator.

Obviously, such operators may be explicitly or implicitly acknowledged. Even on the level of sentences, Woods argues that fictional sentences are not ***structurally*** distinctive, since visible operators would destroy verisimilitude.[62] It is obvious that propositions about fictional characters display no semantic markers which stipulate the non-existence of those characters. But in ordinary talk ***about*** fictions, the operator is also often suppressed, when we know we refer to what happened in the story, that is, when there is no danger of misunderstanding. In such cases, Lewis explains that we need to regard descriptions of fictional characters as "...abbreviations for longer sentences beginning with an operator 'In such-and-such fiction...'"[63] Unprefixed statements would have to be taken as false, simply because fictional characters do not actually exist. So the operator is unavoidably ***implicit*** when we try to extract a story from a narrative text. Certainly the operator must be ***expressed*** to clarify ***which*** fiction is under discussion, if this is obscure, and to compare fiction with the real world.[64]

The intensional operator as a restricted universal quantifier over possible worlds is thus a concept which finds a workable application in fictional worlds. If we make statements about fictional, non-actual individuals we either explicitly or implicitly preface those statements with reference to a source of information. That source is the story as told, which indicates which properties can be attributed to the individual, or provides at least some basis for suitable inferences. In particular, Routley's work on the ***contextual*** approach to fictional truth has applied the concept of operator in this way to develop a multiply intensional relevant logic, beyond more rudimentary modal theories. Clearly there can be no uniform "logic of fiction," since fictional truth generation depends also on how extra- and intertextual knowledge bases are activated textually. But Routley's work does define

some crucial logical principles at work, especially in the more traditional works of fiction. By introducing the idea of separate *classes* of fictional truths, Routley is able to approximate the intuitive understanding of fictional worlds, and to account for at least some of the evident truths supplied by fictional discourse through the concept of fictional context.[65]

In applying operators to the analysis of fictional truth we must also distinguish carefully between sentences ***about*** fiction and those internal to the text. Only in this way can we preserve our intuitively accurate appreciation of the created worlds brought into existence through narrative discourse. The operator does not "work" internally, since qualifying characters' actions or motivations as "fictional" would destroy all sense of an autonomous, created world, where those characters "exist" in specific times and places. (Some narrative texts, especially postmodern ones, work specifically to create this world-annihilating effect.) We cannot, therefore, interpret a narrator's statements as subject to any fictional operator. Nor does the operator explain ***everything*** that we are likely to say ***about*** fictional characters. Walton elaborates, within his theory of make-believe, examples of how not all of what we say about fictional characters and events can be construed as prefixed by a fictional operator.[66] Nonetheless, the many philosophical attempts which rely on the fictional operator concept (to account for the evident truths supplied by fictional discourse) ***have*** had a productive impact on the appreciation of an ***internal***, autonomous "logic" for fictional worlds. Such attempts explain effectively the partial insulation of fictional worlds from extratextual contexts. As global strategy, the operator secures an at least provisional autonomy for the fictional world, permitting inferences to deviate from those expected in non-fictional contexts.

Developed Typologies

The whole fruitful development of typologies for fictional worlds depends on the basic principles outlined above concerning the quality of

textual semantic domains ***as fictional worlds.*** Joined together with the "world" metaphor, the second major concept adopted from possible-worlds theory--that of modality as a way to classify the ways in which fictional existents and events can be said to "exist"--opens up illuminating discussions about qualities/varieties of character existence and the relations between fictional worlds and reality. In effect, the concept of truth ***in*** fiction releases fictional narrative from the constraints of verisimilitude, consequently prompting the useful discussions of narrative modalities for worlds free of empirical constraints. It is not that fiction is illogical, but that there can be no ***uniform*** logic of fiction, since each work contains its own ***internal*** logic. As Routley emphasizes, there is no merging set of ***common*** logical principles.[67] Heintz phrases it thus: "[d]ifferent domains thus characteristically bring with them different means of checking the truth of statements."[68]

In other words, we need an exploration of the ***modal*** considerations which relate to various ***types*** of worlds--an exploration which has been undertaken successfully by several literary scholars, and which has been based on the following basic observations. Fictional worlds can depart, by virtue of the author's "sayso," from the laws of nature (and even of logic). Fictional worlds are independent (at least in principle) from empirical constraints, since we ***can*** imagine anything at all. Nothing is necessary as some kind of base requirement. There are no restrictions as to the ***kinds*** of worlds possible, which need not be imitations of the actual world. There is, then, a potential infinity of kinds of possible fictional worlds, each consisting of individuals, properties, and states of affairs, all subject to change and progression through time. States of affairs, including the nature of fictional characters, are variable ***depending on the nature of the work.*** Likewise, the status of events--what characters do and have happen to them--depends on the nature of that work. It is the modal operator which acts as a common denominator, holding together the propositions which form an image of the world.[69] As Ryan makes clear, "[i]n the literal sense of the term, a possible world is a set of propositions modalized by the operator of the so-called ***alethic*** system: possible, impossible, necessary."[70]

As a result of this intuitively satisfying sovereignty assigned to fictional worlds, theorists have recognized a full, unlimited ***range*** of possible fictional worlds, which can be distinguished as intensional types of worlds, determined by particular narrative procedures. Doležel's work has taken this route, through the concept of textual world stipulation.

> A fictional world is characterized by a set of its constituents, by a specific structure and by its own semantic potentials. 'Fictional world' is a macrostructural concept... [I]nterpretation of a text starts with proposing a hypothesis about the global characteristics of its fictional world. Within this global hypothesis, interpretations of particular constituents of the text's meaning are accommodated.[71]

In other words, macrostructural organizations have been seen to posit sets of compossible fictional particulars. "The possibilities of fictional worlds are what, within ***some*** formulable canon of consistency ***and*** some set of (normally complete) assumptions about a world imagined, can be judged not to violate that canon."[72] In this way, scholars have accounted for the many possible "orders" and rules of compossibility for different worlds, developing useful typologies. Doreen Maitre's work has been particularly helpful by considering a fictional world as a totality, or as a structured, coherent whole which is governed by ***inner*** constraints. Some of those constraints are in fact identical with those which govern the real world, while others differ from them.[73]

The relation of fictional worlds to reality has been a central concern from the point of view of developing fictional world typologies. Obviously, the potentially independent quality of fictional worlds, which results from the radical quality of "sayso" and the modal structure of the narrated worlds, has prompted discussion of possible deviations from the real. Fictional worlds may be bizarre and deviate enormously from the actual world, being in fact hardly comparable to anything that exists in reality. A theory of fictions must clearly deal with such deviations, which help to determine the conditions of theoretical adequacy. The logical violations typical of many fictional worlds--

violations which I consider at length in the next chapter--relate closely to this central issue of fictional worlds' "independence" from the constraints of reality. But if fictional worlds can boast "orders" ***internally*** coherent and autonomous (as well as logically incoherent ones), they also may well closely ***resemble*** actual states of affairs. Individuals and events may be closely linked with what we know of reality. In this regard, important work has been done with the principle of minimal departure or reality principle, which is of utmost importance for this study, and which is introduced in Chapter Seven, and put to work throughout the remainder of this study as required. The principle of minimal departure, which is based on the concept of maximal worlds, is a crucial adjunct to the concept of fictional world autonomy, making possible an exploration of how the text-external ***contextual*** system of inferences works for the generation of truth for fiction-specific "maximal" worlds.

Of the various typologies which have been developed, those of Maitre focus exclusively and productively on the reality/fictional world interface. By studying the relations between fictional worlds and reality, Maitre has classified fictional genres according to the possibility of their "verification" in the actual world. So, the possible non-actual worlds of fiction may be physically possible and psychologically plausible in terms of the real world; they may be not *yet* physically possible; they may be not physically possible or psychologically plausible; or, they may be logically impossible.[74] This simple classification covers the full range of variable "autonomy" of fictional worlds in relation to real-world constraints. Maitre also introduces further distinctions which involve a contrast between realistic and fantasy worlds of several kinds.[75] She then offers a third typology focused more closely on non-actual individuals. So, fictional worlds may include historical events/persons; they may present could-be-actuals; they may oscillate between the could-be-actual and the never-could-be-actual; or, they may present states of affairs and individuals which could never be actual.[76]

Although Maitre's work was conducted largely independently of philosophical debates, it is based on crucial philosophical principles

about the laws of nature, possible worlds, and fictional world possibility. Rescher, in particular, has specified clearly that "...laws and dispositions establish a dividing line between the ***genuinely*** possible (that which is ***really*** possible) and the ***merely*** possible (the sphere of purely speculative possibility), serving to separate proximate from remote possibility..."[77] For Rescher, the "nomic" possibility which relates to the real world is a kind of restriction on possibility, which may or may not be operative in a fictional world. Heintz also insists that material inferences (in many cases based either on the physical laws of nature or psychological expectations) vary from one fictional world to another, and that our determination of which inferences are valid depends on our determination of the genre to which the text belongs.[78] This crucial idea of genre as a determining factor in the semantic structure/ontology of fictional worlds is of course fundamental to this study, and will be developed at length.

The work of Félix Martínez-Bonati also relates to that of Maitre, insofar as he insists that "...events in any given literary fiction noticeably obey one or more systems of possibility, probability, and necessity, and that some of these systems ostensibly differ from real-life assumptions while others seem to conform to them."[79] One of Martínez-Bonati's main contributions is a system of distinctions between fantastic and realistic fictional worlds, which attributes considerable import to expectations/constraints of genre. He suggests in fact a typology of some forty-four possible classes of fiction (some of which have never been realized), depending on various distinctions for fictional worlds such as homogeneous/heterogeneous, pure/contaminated (contaminated either by contextual play or by intratextual collusions of systems), realistic/fantastic, and stable/unstable.[80]

Relying on the concept of modal operators, and Kripke's idea of accessibility as synonymous with possibility, Ryan has devised a remarkable semantic typology of fictional worlds, based on accessibility relations between the textual actual world and the actual world.[81] Fictional worlds are "possible" in terms of various types of accessibility relations through which they can be linked to the actual

world. In effect, Ryan treats reality factors as manifested differently in different genres, according to different combinations possible. And she is able to expand on the logical interpretation of accessibility relations to develop an analysis of "impossible" fictional worlds, which are achieved through a wider range of accessibility relations. Ryan's list of "compatibilities" between fictional worlds and reality constitutes a state-of-the-art semantic typology, and will be adapted in this study to explore the various possible relations among fictional worlds and world-models, text-models, and repertoire, from the perspective of reading operations.

As far as advantageous fictional world typologies are concerned, Doležel has focused his attention away from reality factors, and onto the investigation of text-internal narrative modalities as macrogenerators of fictional worlds, or global restrictions on fictional worlds (as to what can "happen" there). On the basis of the concept of a modal operator tying together propositions, Doležel defines effectively potential fictional worlds as sets of propositions modalized by the operator of the alethic system of the possible, the impossible, and the necessary. To this literal appreciation of possible fictional worlds Doležel has added a catalogue of three ***additional*** modal operators particularly relevant to fictional-world semantics, and which can replace the alethic as governing modality: the axiological system, constituted by the concepts of goodness, badness, and indifference; the deontic system, represented by the concepts of permission, prohibition, and obligation; and the epistemic system, which depends on the concepts of knowledge, ignorance, and belief.[82] While the operators of the alethic system clearly relate the fictional world to the actual, the other three modalities function intensionally, serving to distinguish between the actual fictional world projected by the text, and the private worlds of characters, which Ryan has explored as constitutive of a textual universe.[83] Doležel's discussion of diverse global constraints which produce a variety of world structures is particularly fruitful because the concepts prove operational and applicable in actual literary analysis. In addition, Doležel's appreciation of split ontologies has proven most valuable, and has been expanded and applied successfully by Pavel in his

exploration of the multiple subworlds and conflicting ontologies involved in any cultural context.[84]

It is obvious that the development of these various fictional-world typologies has involved, then, not only the concept of "autonomous" fictional worlds, but also the central issue of the reality factors invoked by those worlds, in accordance with the genre in question. The problems raised by such typologies need to be clarified in terms of our actual appreciation/cognition of fictional worlds. Considering the varying factors of "distance" between the actual world and fictional worlds, or (to use Pavel's term) the variable "permeability" of fictional texts/genres to extratextual factors, we see that the boundary between fictional worlds and the actual one is by no means always clear, uniform across fictions, or impervious to dispute. This study explores the variable boundaries or interface between fictional worlds and reality, first of all by positing an imagined textual reference world, and then by insisting on the semiotic perspective of "naturalization" according to relevant models, which is involved in reading procedures.

In order to understand the role of extra- and intertextuality in the generation of fictional truth, we must examine carefully not only "reality" factors as such, but the variable interpenetrations possible, which involve an intertextual exchange of elements from historical accounts, mythology, legend, other literary texts, and so on. Our appreciation of world typologies can be enhanced by this expanded account of fictional truth worlds. The questions raised by the typologies about genre/text-models are particularly crucial for this study, since clearly the function of relevant extratextual factors depends primarily on the ***kind*** of fictional world posited. The type of fictional world--a consideration inseparable from genre--will have a direct impact on what the reader does with extratextual factors, in terms of imagining a textual reference world.

Typology, Narrative Agents, and Autonomous Worlds

All considerations of the fictional world/reality interface and of text-models are enormously significant for our appreciation of fictional characters as non-actual individuals. This study analyses the problems of the interpenetration of reality and fiction, as well as the role of other literary texts, through an account of incomplete fictional worlds (Chapter Three), the elaboration of the concept of textual reference world (Chapter Four), an insistence on the semiotics of reading perspective which illuminates reading procedures (Chapter Five), an account of inference procedures/principles of implication (Chapters Six and Seven), and then subsequently as the structure of the fictional sphere is developed chapter by chapter.

But we need first of all to appreciate the importance of the concept of fictional world autonomy for fictional character, before we can explore the complementary factors of the interpenetration of reality/literary texts and fiction. I have outlined in broad terms in Chapter One the main advantages of the fictional-world semantic approach for the study of character, stressing its accordance with our intuitive appreciation of fictional character. In effect, the model represents at least in part the reader's understanding of fiction, and can be adapted to formulate more accurate representations of standard reading procedures. The fictional-world semantic insistence on the necessity to recognize "actual" fictional persons who live in specific times and places is most useful. As Doležel explains, this approach frees us from the constraints of mimetic-style criticism, by allowing us to posit fictional worlds as sets of possible states of affairs and individuals, and legitimating all story-specific, non-actualized possibles. As a result, names do not lack reference, and properties can be determinate. Description and specification of fictional particulars is possible.[85] Chapter Four explores the problems related to these advantages.

Crucial to the approach is this treatment of fictional existence as an ***intensional*** property--a treatment which permits the classification of narrative agents according to the ***kind*** of fictional world which they

inhabit. The typologies available for fictional worlds are highly relevant to our appreciation of fictional character. By positing an internal model for fictional worlds, we understand how they are populated by different ***kinds*** of fictional beings. In effect, we end up proceeding ***from individuals to worlds***, because, as Rescher explains, the sorts of individuals that exist help to delimit the sorts of laws that obtain. So individuals can alter the law-structure of a world. The sameness of properties and the sameness of laws are ***fundamentally*** connected, so that change affects both.[86]

It is intuitively clear, for example, that some non-actual individuals could belong in our actual world without necessitating modifications in its laws, while others could exist only in a completely different environment. In this way, then, when we speak of fictional worlds proximate to the actual world, we automatically understand that such worlds will include individuals "belonging to" the actual world, whether as exact alternates, or in the form of more general "types" such as found in realistic narrative. Remotely possible worlds, on the other hand, we understand will include individuals who seem more ***radically*** extra to our real-world inventory--the genuinely "supernumerary," to appropriate Rescher's term.[87]

It is also intuitively clear that in addition to a typology of characters based on world-models (or types), we also consider instinctively the role of genre in terms of literary text-models for character types. Obviously if there are no limitations on fictional worlds, and they can be varied maximally, as Doležel has shown with his analysis of modal structures, the various different "orders" will constrain which kinds of entities are admissible. Our understanding of the "orders" available is, again, inseparable from the determination of genre, which contributes fundamentally to the generation of fictional truth about characters. Beyond the role of generic conventions, we must also recognize a more text-specific intertextuality which serves to define literary models. The precise relationship between world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire must be determined in order to apply better the valuable assessments already made through fictional-world semantics.

We have seen from the preceding discussions that the concept of autonomous fictional worlds provides remarkable insights into our intuitive approach to fiction. Yet other factors of world-knowledge, genre, and intertext tend to work against that concept, threatening to undermine the efficacy of the fictional-world semantic approach. But these extratextual factors are no less a part of our intuitive appreciation of fictional worlds and their inhabitants.

In her article undertaking to define the relevance of some conceptual features of possible-world semantics for the problem of fictionality, Ruth Ronen identifies the conflict between the "frames of actuality" implied by the maximal-set concept of possible worlds and the principle of autonomy which fictional-world semantics has adopted as a central benefit of the possible-worlds approach. "Fictional worlds are not part of the total histories of the world. They are not abstract hypothetical constructs, but something else. Fictional worlds are related to the actual world, but they are not necessarily possible alternatives to this world."[88] For Ronen, this autonomy so usefully opposed to mimetic views--the autonomy which allows "impossible" situations, entities, and laws--"...works against the attempt to describe these worlds in terms of specific similarities and degrees of accessibility among worlds."[89]

Certainly standard inference procedures seem to undermine the autonomy of fictional worlds if we adhere to the models for fictional truth which have been developed on the basis of textual fictional worlds and their text-internal narrative construction. But we must not conclude incorrectly as Ronen does, that "...[o]nly when possible worlds are grasped as (to some extent) hermetic worlds in relation to which the actual world has no privilege are they likely to add explanatory power to literary theory in its dealing with worlds of fiction."[90] On the contrary, it is the concept of accessibility relations among worlds which allows us to understand how autonomous fictional worlds can be ***extended*** or made "maximal" according to a network of principles which produce through reading operations augmented textual reference worlds.

In order to understand how these extra- and intertextual considerations can be integrated meaningfully into a fictional-world semantic approach, without destroying the fundamental principles, I need to delineate next the essential ***differences*** between possible worlds and fictional worlds. It is these differences which necessitate a ***relaxation*** of some of the central concepts--a relaxation which will make the theory more useful for the study of narrative fiction. We must take only what is ***useful*** from philosophy, to provide heuristic tools, combining and adapting approaches as required. Oddly enough, many of the philosophers who rely most extensively on the concepts of possible-worlds theory reject the "idiom" of such talk. The same is often true for talk of fictional worlds, although theorists reluctantly find the term unavoidable. We shall see now why the concepts of possible worlds ***taken too literally*** are troublesome, and what is required in order to "relax" the concepts for fiction, abandoning some of the technical impeccabilities of possible worlds.

Notes

[1]Michael J. Loux, "Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics," *The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 22.

[2]Nicholas Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility. A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 5.

[3]Loux 29.

[4]The work done by Hintikka with model sets is relevant here. See, for example, Jaakko Hintikka, "The Modes of Modality," *The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 65-79. And an important predecessor to the use of "possible world" in Kripke's sense is Carnap's "state-description." In Carnap's terms a "state-description" fully satisfies a maximal set of truths expressible in a first-order language. In effect, it is a "possible world" or possible state of affairs with respect to that language. In this sense, a possible world is, even more fundamentally, simply a linguistic entity. See Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) 9, 182.

[5]Loux 30.

[6]Robert C. Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," *Inquiry* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1984) 44.

[7]David K. Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). See in particular Chapter Four, 84-95.

[8]Lewis 84.

[9]David K. Lewis, "Possible Worlds," *The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 184.

[10]Lewis, *The Possible and the Actual* 184. More detailed analyses can be found in *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[11]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 18-19.

[12]Stalnaker 50.

[13]Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) 46-8.

[14]Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1978). This approach finds an even more radical constructivistic form in the work of Siegfried Schmidt, who has elaborated on relevant work from several disciplines. For a summary, see "The Logic of Observation: An Introduction to Constructivism," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 19.3 (September 1992): 295-311.

[15]Following is a summary of Rescher's main position, as advanced in *A Theory of Possibility*.

[16]Rescher 168.

[17]Rescher 210.

[18]Rescher 203.

[19]The extent to which Rescher's work has been ignored in fictional-world semantics is astonishing. Considering the goals of this study, the clear analyses of the conceptualistic approach are most applicable to an investigation of the generation of fictional truth according to public procedures. Rescher's principles will be applied as required.

[20]A more detailed discussion of the reference dilemma is provided in Chapter Four, with only the essential issue presented here.

[21]See Richard Routley, "The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 3-30, and *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items* (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980).

[22]Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects," trans. Isaac Levi, D.B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm, *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (New York: Free Press, 1960) 81-2.

[23]Loux 35.

[24]John Heintz, "Reference and Inference in Fiction," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 88-9.

[25]Joseph Margolis, "The Logic and Structures of Fictional Narrative," *Philosophy and Literature* 7.2 (October 1983): 169.

[26]Dale Jacquette, "Intentional Semantics and the Logic of Fiction," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 29.2 (Spring 1989): 168.

[27]Rescher 207. Important work has been done by Kendall Walton which attempts to undermine the universal validity of such principles with regard to fiction. Walton's analyses are confronted in Chapter Five to demonstrate the need for a semiotics of reading augmentation for fictional-world semantics. See *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

[28]Rescher 219.

[29]Plantinga 45-6.

[30]Robert Merrihew Adams, "Theories of Actuality," *The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 204.

[31]Ryan 21. Ryan offers the example of Borges' story "The Circular Ruins," in which the narrator says that the character "...wanted to dream [a man] with minute integrity and insert him into reality."

[32]Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 10.

[33]Rescher 169.

[34]Margolis 166.

[35]John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction. A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 26.

[36]Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, revised ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) 44.

[37]Lubomír Doležel, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allén (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 235-6.

[38]Doležel 236. For the moment I will allow this model to stand unchallenged. From the end of Chapter Three I will present and develop the concept of a textual reference world--a concept which greatly enhances the appreciation of the fictional world in relation to the extra- and intertextual sources of knowledge available to the reader "recovering" fictional worlds.

[39]Woods 24.

[40]Jacquette 168.

[41]Routley, *Poetics* 22.

[42]Woods 54.

[43]This is not to say that fictional truth cannot affect the reader's perception of actuality or historical fact, provoking re-evaluation of previously accepted truths.

[44]Lubomír Doležel, "Truth and Authenticity in Narrative," *Poetics Today* 1.3 (Spring 1980): 21-3. An excellent brief summary of this theory is found in *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences* 237.

[45]Rescher 92.

[46]Lubomír Doležel, "Towards a Typology of Fictional Worlds," *Tamkang Review* 14 (1984/85): 262.

[47]Doležel, *Poetics Today* 24.

[48]Doležel, *Poetics Today* 15. We will see later in Chapter Four how the concept ignored here of a reader-imagined textual reference world can change this entire analysis, allowing for the inclusion of reference to knowledge sources beyond textual boundaries.

[49]We will see from Chapter Four, however, how a reader-constructed reference world makes a kind of "correspondence" possible. It is worth noting now that Goodman's position is most radical about truth, since beyond merely rejecting a correspondence theory between language and the world, he rejects the whole idea of singular truth through his "world versions" concept. A fictional world is one of many equally valid world versions, according to Goodman's tolerant epistemology. "...[A] statement is true, and a description or representation right, for a world it fits" (Goodman 132).

[50]Routley, *Poetics* 6.

[51]Woods 21.

[52]Goodman 91.

[53]Woods 93.

[54]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 208.

[55]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 52.

[56]A number of philosophers have worked on these principles, including Lewis, Walton, and Currie. The concept of intensional operator was developed most notably through Hintikka, Woods, and Routley.

[57]Woods 39.

[58]Currie 155. Currie is dealing here specifically with the problem of fictional names and their reference, and confines his analysis to "qualitative" worlds, with the result that his claim may not seem entirely intuitively accurate. Readers do in fact "assemble" fictional truths sequentially, in small segments, according to diverse "codes," the interaction of which depends on various generic constraints. I examine from Chapter Six the structure of principles involved in such inference procedures.

[59]Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 40.

[60]Kendall L. Walton, "How Remote are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 37 (Fall 1978): 18.

[61]Pavel 17.

[62]Woods 39.

[63]David Lewis. "Truth in Fiction," *Philosophical Papers*, 2 vols. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 1, 262.

[64]Currie 57-8.

[65]Routley, *Poetics* 3-30.

[66]Walton, *Mimesis* 204-8.

[67]Routley, *Poetics* 11.

[68]Heintz 89. For the moment I will not complicate this "internal logic" approach with the extratextual ramifications which build more comprehensive "logical" systems.

[69]Ryan 111.

[70]Ryan 111.

[71]Lubomír Doležel, "Kafka's Fictional World," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 11.1 (March 1984): 61-2.

[72]Margolis 167.

[73]Doreen Maitre, *Literature and Possible Worlds* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983) 14-15 and *passim*.

[74]Maitre 15.

[75]Maitre 68-72.

[76]Maitre 79-80.

[77]Rescher 144.

[78]Heintz 85.

[79]Félix Martínez-Bonati, "Towards a Formal Ontology of Fictional Worlds," *Philosophy and Literature* 7.2 (October 1983): 185.

[80]Martínez-Bonati 193.

[81]Ryan 31-47.

[82]Lubomír Doležel, "Narrative Worlds," *Sound, Sign and Meaning. Quinquagenary of the Prague Linguistic Circle*, ed. Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, 1976) 543.

[83]Ryan 109-23.

[84]Pavel 43-72.

[85]Doležel, *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences* 230.

[86]Rescher 160.

[87]Rescher 77.

[88]Ruth Ronen, "Possible Worlds in Literary Theory: A Game in Interdisciplinarity," *Semiotica* 80.3/4 (1990): 286.

[89]Ronen 287.

[90]Ronen 288.

Chapter Three: Logical Violations of Fictional Worlds

To see how fictional truth generation about non-actual individuals belongs within the context of more encompassing fictional truth considerations, it is essential to delineate carefully the essential *differences* between possible worlds and fictional worlds. These differences have a direct impact on the problems of understanding fictional character. I consider here the logical constraints of possible worlds in relation to the violations typical of fictional worlds. Analysis of the factors of inconsistency and incompleteness leads to a detailed discussion, in the next chapter, of the particular problem of the existence of fictional characters. The present chapter is designed to show how a theory of character must not only confront gaps in theoretical applicability, but also develop a method to put those "gaps" to productive work in order to understand reading procedures as generating fictional truth. I start by identifying which parts of the philosophical/literary debates relate to my central question. I demonstrate the *limited* solutions which have been proposed within the too stringent parameters of a textual analysis not equipped to deal with extra- and intertextual factors. The conclusion of this chapter suggests briefly a potential solution to these problems in the concept of the reader-imagined textual reference world--a concept defined as essential in the next chapter, through exposure of the reference dilemma.

Fiction and Intentional Discourse

As a formal model developed for the purpose of defining the semantics of modal operators, possible-world semantics proves inadequate for an accurate analysis of fictional worlds, *if* those worlds are considered only as constructed autonomous structures. In the first

place, we must recognize that there is no specific world-creating predicate associated with fictionality.[1] I have discussed in the last chapter the omission of the fictional operator typical of fictional discourse and frequently typical of discussions about fictional "truths." In colloquial speech, for example, there is a persistent tendency to speak of fictional characters as if they share reality with us. These omissions are a kind of shortcut which allows us to project a pseudoreality for fictional worlds where we can relate to fictional characters as if they were real people.

In fact, the omission distinguishes fictional discourse, both textual and extratextual, sharply from discourse constructed with the other intentional operators studied as "world-creating." In the linguistic creation of other genuinely alternative possible worlds, we rarely find that intentional operators are omitted. On the contrary, as Ryan points out, "[t]he presence in a sentence of a world-creating operator builds a bridge between the actual world and the alternative possible world represented by the propositions that fall under the scope of the operator."[2] In other words, if we speak of such things as wishes, fantasy, or beliefs, "[t]he subject of the world-creating predicate is located in the actual world, and the mental activity described by the verb is a historical event within this world."[3] The propositions advanced under the predicate do generate the facts of the created world, but only through the mediation of the world-creating predicate between the two spheres of the actual and created world. Ryan's analysis insists here on the maintenance in such intentional discourse of an ***external*** or extraneous perspective on the created world, since both speaker and hearer consider that world from the point of view of the actual world.[4]

In a sense, if we think of fictionality as a property of propositions, it *will* seem roughly analogous to being wished for, or fantasized, or believed. As Walton points out, this comparison of fictionality with other intentional operators does accord well with our sense of ***physical*** isolation from fictional worlds.[5] There is, of course, no physical interaction possible with things that exist only fictionally. Fictional worlds are not accessible in a physical sense from reality, and

consequently may be thought of as seen from a purely *external* perspective in this general sense.

But, as Walton also explains, the comparison of fictionality with such intentional properties as being desired or believed does very little to explain "...the disconcerting difference that seems to obtain between physical relations across worlds and psychological ones, the *impression* we have, even if it is illusory, that things known to be merely fictional are objects of our psychological attitudes."[6] It is clear that there is something "special" about fictionality which sets it apart from other intentional properties. Clearly, the belief worlds, perceptual worlds, and so on discussed by philosophers do not capture our imagination in the same *way* that fictional worlds do. "We somehow regard what only fictionally exists as being real and what only fictionally occurs as actually taking place..." as opposed to other possible worlds of desire, belief, and so on.[7] In our psychological "relations" with fictional characters we refuse to acknowledge the same kind of "distance" we readily accept for other intentional worlds. Walton undertakes to square the psychological bond which we feel to fictions--our feelings of intimacy toward fictional characters--with the obvious *physical* isolation of fictional worlds from actuality. Analyzing this "schizophrenic" attitude, he decides that the comparison of "being fictional" with "being believed," and so on is inadequate to explain our actual appreciation of fiction, instead only heightening the mystery.[8] Walton's solution is the concept of games of make-believe, which allows him to consider the more pragmatic dimensions of "worlds" beyond those of the fictional work itself. It is a useful approach which I consider intermittently in this study, in order to re-orient the discussion of fictional truth from the purely textual semantic to the more pragmatic dimension of how readers actually discover and develop fictional truth.

Walton is of course primarily concerned with our temptation to think of fictionality as a species of truth--the intuitive approach which possible-worlds theory helps to legitimate, and which he sees as potentially dangerous and misleading. For Walton, the fact that we regard our fictions as real explains our propensity to speak of fictional

worlds in the first place. He asks "[b]ut why do we think of fictions as belonging to 'worlds' at all--as though they have a place (or places) *somewhere* in reality, however remote they may be from the actual world?"[9] Taking a stance very different from that which Lewis develops through a discussion of counterfactuals, Walton suggests that we do *not* speak of other intentional operators in the same way. "What fictionally is the case is naturally thought of as being the case in a special realm, a "world," in a way in which what is claimed or believed or desired to be the case is not."[10] To Walton this conception of fictional worlds is only a "device" to cover up our confusion about whether or not fictional objects and events are real.[11]

Concerned also with the special quality of fiction as compared with other intentional worlds, Ryan takes a very different and auspicious approach based on the indexical theory of actuality developed by Lewis. She focuses on the role of *narration* as a world-creating force. Contrasting fiction with the *external* perspective of *other* intentional discourse, Ryan explains that in fiction the speaker, hearer, and speech act are located *within the created world.* "Nothing indicates a foreign perspective on the sphere focused upon, nothing records its birth in a mental event."[12] It is the lack of a visible operator within texts which is crucial here. Ryan admits that formal markers of fictionality do exist, but that in such cases the marker operates *conventionally* rather than logically. It is not a question of literal meaning, then, but stylistic connotation. "The formula 'once upon a time' has become such a marker because of its traditional use in fairy tales, not because of its reference to a remote past. The time it points to ...remains logically the past of the world in which the speech act takes place."[13] Adapting the indexical theory of actuality, Ryan argues that speech acts take place in the world actual *for their participants.* As a result, while we are immersed as readers in a work of fiction, the realm of possibilities is *recentered* around the sphere presented by the *narrator* as the actual world. "This recentering pushes the reader into a new system of actuality and possibility."[14] Here the reader discovers a new "actual" world in Lewis' sense, and also the alternate worlds which Ryan considers in her analysis of the modal structure of the textual universe.

It is this concept of *recentering* which explains best the special quality of fictionality identified by Walton, because through this idea we begin to appreciate the essential role of narration as a world-creating procedure. It explains *why* we regard fictional worlds as real and accessible psychologically. It explains the peculiar removal of "distance" between the reader's reality and the fictional world created, the distance being dissolved through the recentering process. This concept was (perhaps intuitively) fundamental to Doležel's analysis of narration as world stipulation. I provide only the briefest exploration in Chapter Seven of the ramifications of narrative procedures as world creation, and their relationship to the extra- and intertextual factors which transcend the boundaries of the textual actual world where Ryan sees readers to "relocate." I use the recentering concept more fundamentally, however, from the conclusion of this chapter, to help define the structure of the fictional sphere, as producing an imagined textual *reference world* to which readers imagine the narrator to refer.

Fictional Worlds and the Possible-World Model

Considering, then, the very basic question of intentional operators, we discover a fundamental difference between possible worlds as intentional constructs and the worlds projected by fiction. There are other equally fundamental discrepancies which require detailed exploration.

Significantly, fictional worlds can *never* be possible in the sense of being *actualizable* within reality. They can never be actualized in the way possible for beliefs, fantasies, desires, and so on. If we think of such intentional worlds as simply ways things could be, or other things of the same kind as found in the actual world, we realize that fictional worlds are very different. They are not possible of or at the actual world. They are a *new kind of thing*, as Currie explains, and become a problem if we have to add them to our ontology.[15] Purely fictional characters are, of course, different from the counterparts of

counterfactual or modal discourse. They are not alternates of an existing reality, but are purely supernumerary, in Rescher's terms. Some fictional characters are of course "related" to people who have actually existed, and consequently provoke somewhat complicated considerations to be dealt with in chapters ahead.

The abstract/hypothetical nature of possible worlds is also problematic for the analysis of fictional worlds because, unlike ***abstract*** sets construed as alternative to reality, fictional worlds take shape as ***concrete*** collections of objects/individuals. They are not so much what can be imagined, as what ***has been*** imagined and then stipulated textually. As Ronen indicates, with reference to Eco's "pregnant" fictional worlds, "[w]hereas in a philosophical framework a world has the status of a conceptual construct, in literary theory worlds are literally understood as constellations of concrete constructs."[16] To appreciate the value of the ***abstract*** conceptual model we require the extension to ***reader***-construction which this study develops.

The philosophical problem about non-existent ***objects*** is greatly exacerbated in fictional worlds. The non-actual objects/individuals of fiction are named and become associated with sets of properties. But being posited through contingent textual procedures, they can ***never*** become real individuals in spite of copious description (or even historical "correspondence"). They are ***forever*** segregated from reality in a way dissimilar to the individuals of other intentional worlds, which ***can*** be actualized. Theory about the occupants of fictional worlds requires consequently an ***internal*** perspective, such as suggested by Ryan's concept of recentering, and by the fundamental work which Doležel has done to define fictional existence according to the semiotic procedures of world construction. This internal perspective can accommodate principles of individuation and the assignment of properties, at least as a preliminary step. Eventually we must branch into more complex questions about the assignment of fictional truths about characters on the basis of additional text-external knowledge, and about identity across worlds for those characters which are implicated in extra- or intertextual "relationships." But the fundamental

impossibility of fictional characters existing in the actual world remains in any case indisputable.

Some philosophers, most notably Walton and Currie, have questioned severely the validity of the entire fictional-world concept as based on possible worlds. They admit that the possible truths of non-actual possible worlds are attractive. The temptation is great to conceive of truth in fiction as truth in a possible world. When we speak of a fictional world we speak, at least in part, about a set of fictional truths which "belong" to that world. The term provides consequently a ***convenient*** way to refer to such truths. According to Currie, since we have a "few clear principles" about possible worlds, we are tempted to see fictional truth as truth in a possible world, in order to invest fictional worlds with some respectability. He says that the prevalent use of terms such as "fictional world" or "world of the story" are "...vague and comforting metaphors that disguise the gaps in our theorizing..." and that we cannot really "account for" such phrases.[17] How can we define what kinds of entities fictional worlds are, after all? Walton is equally adamant that our pretheoretical notion of fictional worlds is dangerous, and that fictionality need not be thought of as a species of truth.[18] He tries to avoid the intuitive notion of fictional worlds as much as possible, by explaining fictionality in terms of prescriptions to imagine, and by concentrating on the worlds of games of make-believe. But he cannot escape a constant reference to fictional worlds.

Inevitably associating fictional worlds with possible worlds, we readily relate fictional worlds to the sets of propositions true in those worlds. If we ***identify*** fictional worlds with these sets of propositions, fictional worlds begin to resemble at least superficially the abstract possible worlds construed as sets of propositions.

But we cannot assimilate fictional worlds to possible worlds so neatly, or explain truth in fiction exclusively as truth in a possible world. The "few clear principles" which Currie feels regulate our thinking about possible worlds do not apply very well to fictional worlds. The ***technical*** notions of possible worlds do not correspond

with what we commonly understand about fictional worlds. Bluntly stated, fictional worlds are simply ***not*** possible worlds.

We ***can*** certainly identify worlds with sets or classes of propositions. This is not fundamentally incorrect. But the crucial point is that these sets of propositions need not be consistent or complete. Possible worlds, as we have seen in Chapter Two, are necessarily consistent logically (that is, "possible")--nothing logically impossible is true in a possible world. Such worlds must obey the law of noncontradiction. Fictional worlds are sometimes inconsistent/contradictory and even radically impossible macrostructurally. Possible worlds are necessarily complete; that is, they are determinate with respect to truth, since every proposition is either true or false in a possible world, and certainly not both at the same time. Fictional worlds are always incomplete, with more or less radical indeterminacies. Rendering fictional worlds "maximal" is much more complicated than for possible worlds, since there is no reality of which they are alternate, and from which departures are necessarily kept to a minimum. Inference can obey consequently many ***different*** laws, including, but not restricted to, real world-models.

In other words, the set of propositions which we associate with a fictional world is much more "open" than the possible-world model suggests. We will clearly need to consider ***all*** sources for the compilation of this set of propositions--sources beyond textual stipulation which involve extra- and intertextual knowledge bases. We cannot apply universally to fictional worlds the constraints of noncontradiction and completeness that govern possible worlds, in effect reducing the theory of fiction to a Kripkean theory of modality. Semantical analysis of fiction must include worlds inconsistent logically and worlds incomplete, and account for the objects/individuals involved, which are likewise possibly inconsistent and always incomplete.

But to throw out the concept of fictional world or its association with possible worlds is not necessary. We need not be frightened off by worrisome ontological extravagance, or feel threatened by the

divergences of fictional worlds from fundamental principles of possible worlds. Modal semantics must be seen as a ***remote*** model only for the theory of fiction, not fully applicable to the variety of fictional practice for which we must account. We need only explore the ***ramifications*** of the differences which defy a rigorously unified semantics, and ***augment*** fundamental concepts sufficiently to ***complement*** the explanatory value of the approach.

Inconsistency as Violation

Philosophers have felt a close kinship between possibility and fiction, using fiction as a means to check the explanatory power of their logical models. But fiction proves a very severe testing ground indeed, since its discourse admits any ***imaginable*** creation of worlds with no constraints imposed. Such rebellious properties resist the regimentation of orthodox semantics/modal logic, challenging and proving inadequate the very models being tested.

Compossibility is a key issue in the appreciation of fictional worlds and their inhabitants, precisely because of the logical violations which must be accounted for. We intuitively appreciate that a set of propositions is consistent if it is possible that all that set's members be true ***together.***[19] But in fictional worlds, we find an incredible flexibility in this regard. Fiction ***may*** be internally coherent and compossible, in spite of deviations from the laws of nature. I have examined briefly the advantages of the possible-worlds approach for the concept of autonomous worlds. But fictional worlds may also be *im*possible because they contain conceptual impossibilities, requiring a special logic to cope with the contradictories. Although the logic of most fictions is not non-standard, there exist many where the author has chosen to impose a logic beyond modal, more anarchical than that of standard possible worlds. Since in principle there are no restrictions as to types of fictional worlds possible--anything can be imagined or assumed, however bizarre, nonsensical, or inconsistent--the structure of such worlds can exceed what is tolerated by modally determined

semantics, violating the closure conditions of relevant logics.[20] In addition, then, to escaping the laws of nature, such worlds can also escape the laws of logic, setting down the violations through diverse narrative procedures, which transcend the operations of standard logic.

There are no restrictions on kinds of fictional worlds possible precisely because we can in fact ***imagine*** impossibilities. As John Heintz points out, a logic of fiction which admits contradiction is the same logic which we should use in everyday reasoning about the world--a point of view which accords with Routley's view of unrestricted imagination and assumption.[21] Meinong, after all, had no problem with inconsistent properties for non-existent objects. Even complete contradictions can be imagined, at least in the sense that a text can "instruct" readers to imagine such things. Without considering how threatening this concept of unrestricted imagination is to possible-worlds theory itself, it is assuredly fundamental to a comprehensive theory of fiction because it allows a more adequate vision of the ***boundaries*** of fiction, which far exceed those of possible worlds.

In a sense, the situation is even more drastic because, with very radical texts, things can be "possible" even if we are ***not*** able to imagine them suitably. Internal contradiction must be tolerated, whether or not those contradictions can be "resolved" in imagination or other cognitive operations outside of the text. As Ronen comments, it is not only that impossibility is ***allowed*** in fiction, but that "...the standard of possibility is not at issue."[22] If we consider reader appreciation of radical postmodern texts, we realize that contradictions do not destroy the coherence of fictional worlds in the sense that the reader ***rejects*** the worlds as incomprehensible/impossible on logical grounds. Obviously other criteria are involved.

Ryan's work on accessibility relations and a semantic typology of fiction is based on this fundamental problem about the nature of possibility in fiction.[23] Faced with the idea that there can be no such thing as an impossible fictional world, we must determine ***to what end*** we can invoke the concept of possibility as explored in possible-worlds theory. Since various creative procedures escape the powers of any

available logic, and there is no ***uniform*** logic of fiction possible, we must clearly admit non-standard, free logics somehow based on a "logic of the imagination" which admits contradiction ***in particular circumstances while not in others.*** The solution lies, of course, in a consideration of ***genre*** as controller of world-models through reader expectations.

But before introducing the role of genre as a constraint on possibility, it is necessary to evaluate briefly the ***kinds*** of logical inconsistency possible in fictional worlds. When philosophers approach this problem they are mainly concerned with the semantic impossibilities of inconsistent sets of propositions. As we have seen, according to the strictly logical definition of possibility, worlds with contradictory propositions are not possible. Orthodox semantics is bivalent, so that contradictions are false on every model. At a very innocuous level, we can speak of the fictional exploration of contradictories included *within* modal truth. Lewis' example is a dignified beggar as a literary possibility.[24] Beyond such minor inconsistencies philosophers consider nomic compossibility as the preservation of the laws of nature. This is recognized as *in*essential to consistency or noncontradiction. We must not confuse contradiction with falsehood, the latter measurable only against the background of world-knowledge, while the former can only be observed *within* the semantic system developed. Physical laws ***change***, after all, over time. If we look to physics to tell us what is possible we will not get all possible worlds.[25] The real problems start with logical compossibility and the realization that within the collections of possible individuals in fictional worlds we find entities which violate principles of compossibility sets. Such entities may not be possible objects, being either deliberately contradictory as to properties or actions performed, or simply not compossible with other members of the "community" of individuals.

This kind of "modal falsehood" involves a deliberate semantic strategy which includes such radical violations as different laws of logic concerning analytical statements and of arithmetic.[26] There may be entirely contradictory states of affairs presented, in which

characters do and do not have certain properties, or do and do not perform certain actions, or cannot be identified as one and the same from one event to the next. The logical impossibilities of science fiction are favorite examples, especially the ramifications of time travel. The contradictory implications of the narrative sentences constructing such fictional worlds result in a problematic "impossible" ontological structure, perhaps even radically disrupting the reader's expectations for the presentation of an internally consistent fictional world. The fictional existence of characters cannot be made "authentic" in Doležel's terms in such impossible worlds, where diverse modes of existence struggle for supremacy, and the most essential properties of individuals can be altered at will, the contradictions coexisting and neutralized through narrative procedures.

While some of these kinds of impossibilities may be presented in an authoritative manner by the narrator--several "versions" built and left unreconciled and juxtaposed with one another--narrative strategies may also provoke inconsistency in a more radical manner. In particular, contradictory properties and actions are routinely presented through (by now familiar) "self-voiding" narrative strategies, which produce, through playful transgression of narrative procedures, incoherent fictional worlds. Where narrative texts involve less drastic semantic strategies, the impossibility of the fictional world is concealed, since it is made to seem conceivable, however radically "different" it may be. But where self-voiding strategies prevail, the text plays open games with fictional existence, to the point where it may be impossible to decide what does and does not exist. Doležel distinguishes these disturbances of self-cancellation from the purely semantic strategies of presenting impossible world structures, speaking about the abuse of the authenticating act in *skaz* narrative, and the self-disclosing narrative of metafiction, where the authentication act is made void by being "laid bare."[27] All kinds of complications arise, of course, since not only the basic narrator may contradict himself, but also alternative character reports may conflict with provisionally established narrative facts. All kinds of factors of point of view can be involved.[28]

In principle, where the author endorses self-contradiction within the text, it becomes very difficult to appreciate how fictional sentences can have "truth." If a text establishes a fact and then "takes it back," the very rules of narrative fiction are violated, producing a kind of "anti-narrative." Yet we must account for this kind of creative, experimental fiction also, where reader expectations are deliberately frustrated, and fictional worlds are liberated from the principle of noncontradiction. Many postmodern texts routinely establish coherence, only to undermine it later, producing a "self-cancelling" fictional world. The point is that the story may ***depend*** on this inconsistency which is integral to its very structure. The whole objective may be to make the contradictions fictional. We must account also for this kind of world structure.

When Eco discusses the discursive ways to depict impossible fictional worlds he insists that for an impossible world the text does not merely ***mention*** something inconceivable. Instead it shows why a story is impossible by building up "..the very conditions of its own unconceivability."[29] This is the more radical "pragmatic" narrative strategy which Doležel identifies with metafictional texts, where the narrative discourse clearly does not attempt to conceal the impossible aspects of the story. It is a strategy quite distinct from the straightforward presentation of semantic impossibilities which we find, for example, in the "conceivable" impossible worlds of science fiction. Certainly the two categories overlap, since the more basic semantic impossibility may be effected ***through*** the more radical narrative strategies, as in the case of self-contradictory properties and actions. Both disturbances may be operative.

But how the reader comes to grips with the logical disturbances depends primarily on expectations for genre, which operates as a constraint on possibility. Clearly we cannot interpret the relation of fictional worlds to the actual world purely on the basis of a logical constraint. As Ryan points out, "[i]f we want to avoid the embarrassment of speaking about the impossible possible worlds of fiction, we must accept a much wider range of accessibility relations."[30] While the problem of logical inconsistency may not seem

initially crucial to an assessment of fictional truth according to extra- and intertextual factors, it is highly relevant because of the essential role of genre in determining how impossibilities will be construed. We all know that fairy tales provoke no astonishment about impossible occurrences, in spite of how radically the laws of nature may be transgressed. And we are not particularly alarmed by routine transgressions in science fiction, where we expect very peculiar things to occur. Neither fairy tales nor science fiction normally disobey the law of noncontradiction, although the latter may introduce impossible incongruities, especially through time travel plots. Doležel and others have identified, of course, the different "orders" which can constrain the admissibility of entities and their combinations as compossibles. What is (im)possible clearly depends on macro-semantic constraints, and genre is a crucial factor in relation to modal structures for worlds.

But we need to establish exactly ***how*** reader expectations are activated by the generic code. Both realistic novels and fairy tales obey the law of noncontradiction, yet our generic expectations are very different for each genre, and what we consider possible for each fictional world will be very different. Madame Bovary's lover turning into a frog to escape her demands will not be tolerated. We can avoid making trivial the entire model of possible-world semantics, by focusing the question of what makes a fictional world possible through the prism of genre and associated expectations. In setting up her semantic typology of fiction through the concept of accessibility relations (developed from Kripke's work), Ryan takes this kind of approach. Her exploration of the various ***kinds*** of accessibility relations linking fictional worlds to the actual world--some looser than logical laws and some more constrained--provides a sound basis for the development of theory to deal with generic constraints on possibility.[31]

It is essential for my project to see how various world-knowledge bases are ***filtered through*** generic expectations in order to determine what is ***true*** and hence ***possible*** within fictional worlds. In effect, it is because the strict constraints of possible worlds are violated in fiction that we ***must*** consider text-models and their ***associated*** world-models as determinative for possibility/truth in fiction. The

violation necessitates the wider analysis undertaken by this study, since in effect, fictional worlds are much more *inclusive* than possible worlds, in spite of their inconsistent and incomplete nature. It is the extra- and intertextual implications which gain admittance to an imagined textual reference world which contribute to this inclusive quality, rather than a purely internal fictional world structure. Certainly even radically inconsistent fictional worlds become "possible" worlds in the larger reference context particular to the fiction, and built within the framing matrix of the fictional sphere.

Incomplete Fictional Worlds

If inconsistency is a potential formal difference between fiction and other possible worlds, incompleteness is a much more universal problem which radically distinguishes fictional worlds from both reality and other intentional possible worlds. If we want to speak about what statements may be *true* of a fictional world, the problem of the incompleteness of such worlds is absolutely central.

The logical concern is focused on the Law of Excluded Middle, from which fictional worlds deviate. Real objects are complete; that is, one of every pair of contradiction-possible predicates must belong to them.[32] Any "orthodox" position maintains that the real is always maximally definite and determinate. So, regardless of what we may *know* about it, any particular object or individual must either actually have or lack any specifiable, well-defined property.[33] Possible worlds are construed in the same way, as *potentials* for reality. Leibniz' view was that possible worlds are complete, with all properties (both essential and accidental) of their individuals specified.[34] Plantinga understands possible worlds in this way, as states of affairs which do not violate the laws of logic, and which are maximal or complete.[35] According to this view of an alleged completeness for possible worlds, any such world must actually have or lack any specifiable, well-defined feature, as in reality. Things real and possible are by their very nature ontologically determinate in terms of descriptive features.[36]

It is interesting that Hintikka takes the "small worlds" view needed in probability theory, where model sets are only ***partial*** descriptions of possible worlds. These descriptions are sufficient for the purposes of modal logic, and provide "worlds" large enough to show genuine possibility.[37] In effect, fictional worlds might superficially resemble these worlds of relevant logics more closely. But such artificial microworlds provide only for a deliberate ***confining*** to a limited and incomplete descriptive apparatus, so that complete descriptions can be given ***relative to*** the incomplete terms of reference. In fiction, schematic worlds involve various degrees of epistemological indeterminacy, but admit of more complete conceptual construction on the "ontological" side. The whole point of appreciating fictional worlds is negated if we refuse to acknowledge the reader's routine ***expansion*** of such worlds to create ***larger***, more comprehensive reference worlds. I will be able to show only after a detailed summary of the problems of epistemological indeterminacy and the problematic ontological status of fictional characters how these problems can be resolved in terms of reading operations and imagined reference worlds.

For the moment, we must examine why the standard possible-worlds view of a potential ontological completeness will simply not work for textual fictional worlds. The universal and variably extensive incompleteness of fictional worlds places fiction beyond the scope of semantic theory applied strictly to worlds as created by texts. Fictional worlds are built of fragmentary and essentially incomplete individuals and states of affairs. If we make a metaphysical assumption about things in the real world, we must nonetheless realize that the semantics of fiction is inherently incomplete.[38] In the real world, we assume that there are no gaps. But in fictional-world semantics we must recognize the gaps and understand how readers deal with them.

We know intuitively that certain properties can never be determined for fictional characters, hence there are questions which are not even legitimate for dispute. Fictional objects ***are*** incomplete; that is, they possess only such properties as they are ***created*** with. Fictional worlds do not contain the answers to ***many*** questions about characters, since characteristics and relations are not specified in every detail,

even in the most realistic of texts. There are many "facts" about fictional worlds and their inhabitants which can *never* be known. There are, of course, many valid inferences made (about properties) which rely on text-external knowledge bases (which I discuss in detail in Chapter Six and beyond), but the indetermination of properties remains very different fr. n the possession of properties by real objects and the "potential" objects of possible worlds. We cannot avoid the realization that there are truth-value gaps about indeterminate properties in fictional worlds. Writers make up stories, and we agree that what they write down is the way things are, as far as the fictional world is concerned. But if the "sayso" condition is not available for a particular matter--if the text offers no information--then that matter is not decidable. On this model we must allow semantically, then, truth-value gaps for indeterminate fictional properties, apparently in accord with the Meinongian incompleteness of objects.

Since we must consider some potential statements in or about fiction as neither true nor false, the concept of ontological indeterminacy may seem attractive. It is however vague and open to intuitive speculation. Although Lewis' realist account affords remarkable clarity for the concept of possible world, it does not permit agreement with the principle that a fictional world can be indeterminate, since all worlds must be real. This is a central problem with Lewis' ontological commitment to possible worlds. If we consider carefully that fictional worlds and their occupants only exist contingently, as created constructs, we must admit that the properties of fictional characters have no independent or necessary existence, since fictional individuals/objects are *constituted* only by their described properties.

If we remember that discourse about fictional worlds is not concerned with a particular "domain" of reality, we will remember also that fictional individuals are not peculiarly "incomplete" entities with some kind of "partial" ontological existence. The Law of Excluded Middle should pose no puzzles for them. According to Walton, it is our propensity to think of fictional worlds as parts of reality which gives rise to worries about unanswerable questions.[39] We are not generally

concerned with the incompleteness of intentional worlds of belief, desire, and so on. But fictional indeterminacy poses puzzles because we think of fictionality as a kind of truth.[40] If our knowledge is blocked as to the complete or exact truth we become concerned, as if we are really denied access somehow to an "existing" realm. At least simplistically, if the "facts" are not told in the story, there is nowhere else to look for the answers. Technically, there *is* no answer--not even one which can be decided in principle. We do, of course, draw on text-external sources of information--background knowledge in various forms--to make reasonable inferences. But this "creation" of a larger reference world does not alter the fundamental ***unreality*** of the textually described fictional world, which has no ***actual*** counterpart in reality. This anti-realistic approach allows us to appreciate indeterminacy as an ***epistemological*** problem, rather than ontological--a problem which can be solved by considering (cognitive) reading procedures.

When Rescher deals with the question of epistemological indeterminacy, he suggests that suppositions introduce not a particular (individuated) world, but rather a world-schema that can be filled out in many alternative ways.[41] "A 'partially defined' possible individual (or possible world) is in effect a ***schema*** to which a plurality of definite possible individuals (or worlds) can in principle answer..."[42] Again, the Law of Excluded Middle fails to obtain. Indetermination is purely epistemological rather than ontological: "[i]t pertains not to what a world is in fact like, but simply to what we can know of it given certain descriptive data."[43]

Confined to the level of generalized schemata, we can never in fact "dream up" a total individual into ontological existence. We never in fact deal with a ***specific*** unactualized individual or world, as a fully individuated non-actual particular. And if ***one*** individual provokes such difficulty, we can only begin to fathom the problems associated with ***fully describing*** an entire fictional world or universe. The language potential of texts can only produce a very ***partial*** description of the world in question--a world which we can ***imagine*** to exist independently of the text as a textual reference world, but which in no way ***actually*** does so.

Clearly the non-actual individuals of fiction exist dependent on the descriptive mechanisms of their texts. Doležel and others have had success working within the confines of a ***constructional*** fictional semantics which treats fictional worlds as semiotic worlds called into existence through textual procedures, rather than as independent ontological entities which can be referred to. This approach has insisted on the analogy with logical semantics, but has adapted principles only very superficially to the empirical text-oriented approach. The goal has clearly been to transform theoretical systems into analytical tools and descriptive procedures, relying entirely on the principle of narrative world ***construction*** in opposition to reference and the "mimetic" concerns associated with the reference concept.

The crucial point is that it is precisely ***reading operations*** which must be given priority, in order to comprehend how readers imagine a textual reference world beyond that merely "constructed" by the narrator. Through analysis of the recuperation procedures instituted by readers we can see how the reference world is imagined as "referred to" rather than as merely "constructed" by narrators. It is not as if the reader can simply compute the sum of the meanings of a text's component sentences in order to create more complete meaning. The imagined reference world allows for "reference" to factors not explicit in the narrator's world-creating discourse. The epistemic sense of "possible" outlined above is crucial, then, for this project, as it allows an analysis of the knowledge bases necessarily involved in piecing together the deficiently delineated "possible worlds" of fiction. Those worlds, as it turns out, can never be properly understood, without the reader's efforts to construct the missing (but imaginable) reference worlds which he can imagine to correspond. Rather than being complete or maximal in and of themselves, textual fictional worlds activate all kinds of extra- and intertextual factors for the reader-constructed world to which the text is imagined to refer. While the textually constructed fictional world *is* incomplete--smaller than other possible worlds--the larger textual reference world created by the reader accommodates all relevant knowledge, or sources by which the reader compiles a more complete set of fictional truths. The incompleteness of characters can be understood as purely epistemological *if* we

consider an *imagined* ontological completeness in the textual reference world--a completeness which is not possible for the textually stipulated fictional world. It is a question of gaining "access" to the imagined world which the reader projects to pre-exist the fictional world as textually stipulated--the textual reference world which I discuss in terms of the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere. This imagined "domain" shares some of the advantages of Lewis' real worlds, but depends entirely on the reader's text-directed construction.

A tentative and limited solution to the inadequacy of the possible-worlds model of complete worlds has been developed in literary theory on the basis of the maximal sets concept as a *means* to understand "completion" potentials. On standard models for alternative possible worlds all *unchanged* properties of objects and laws of the world continue to obtain, whether or not they are made explicit in the possible-world discourse. Possible worlds are maximal sets in the sense that standard inference procedures will create complete sets of propositions, including those not explicitly asserted. This tendency to "maximize" an essential similarity to the actual world has been understood for fictional worlds also as a principle of minimal departure or reality principle.

But the situation in fiction is much more complex precisely because fictional worlds are not *alternative* to anything real. Completely maximal inferred sets would, first of all, threaten to produce absurdly huge fictional worlds full of all manner of irrelevant knowledge and individuals. We must find a way to understand the variable constraints of fictional-world inference procedures based on world-models. But more significantly, we must also account for the inference procedures which depend on text-models and repertoire. We clearly need to postulate different laws of inference for fiction than those obtaining in accounts of possible worlds. Through the concept of textual reference world we can construe a suitable "referential context"--a kind of world to which the textual fictional world *is* "alternate," and which generates "maximal" inference sets by including not only world-models but those of genre and intertext as well. Such a reference world is created by the *structure* of inference procedures I call the fictional sphere.

This concept central for my study is developed carefully in the next chapter, through the standard problems of character individuation and reference which have plagued the fictional-world semantics approach. Subsequently in Chapter Six I begin to analyse the reading operations involved in constructing the reference world. The clarification of such operations involves a ***range*** of theory, from the cognitive constructivistic account through the realist-based concept of recentering to fictional worlds.

In order to appreciate recuperation procedures for fictional worlds and their truths along these lines, we will first need to outline the analysis of the schematic structure of fiction, which has been given considerable theoretical attention. While the epistemological indeterminacy of fictional worlds is a ***logical*** deficiency, it is ***not*** an ***aesthetic*** one. It is an important feature of fiction which is identified well by using the possible-worlds model ***as a point of departure***. In so far as possible-worlds theory fails to deal with this fundamental quality of fiction, it will prove inadequate and must be supplemented with more pragmatic concerns. The fact is that readers do infer much about schematic fictional individuals which is not made explicit textually. That is how literary fictional narrative ***works***. To ignore such reading procedures is to disregard some of the most fundamental and rewarding features of fiction.

A number of scholars have worked in recent years on the incomplete quality of fictional narrative texts--most notably Wolfgang Iser and others working in the spectrum of reader-response criticism. But it is still Roman Ingarden's original formulations about the schematic nature of literary works and resultant concretization which not only provide a basis for the truth concepts of possible-world semantics, but constitute a basic guide for developing the kind of "logic of re[illegible] operations" which this study proposes. Chapter Six builds on the basic information about the incomplete nature of fictional worlds provided here, by discussing the pertinent work of Ingarden and Iser. I then put to work the concept of textual reference world as developed next in Chapter Four, to provide a systematic account of reading procedures and the generation of fictional truth. It will be possible then to develop an

account of inference and principles of implication based on the constraints of genre, world-knowledge, and intertext which are the focus of this study--an account which considers the incomplete structure of textual fictional worlds to develop an extended appreciation of the larger reference worlds built by readers in the interpersonal logical space of the fictional sphere.

Notes

[1]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 22.

[2]Ryan 22.

[3]Ryan 22.

[4]Ryan 22. Gregory Currie has charted the similarities between the logical structure of fictional truth and that of belief. See *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 74-5. This useful analysis will be put to work later in this study.

[5]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 205.

[6]Walton 205.

[7]Walton 205-6.

[8]Walton 208.

[9]Walton 206.

[10]Walton 206.

[11]Walton 206.

[12]Ryan 22.

[13]Ryan 22.

[14]Ryan 22.

[15]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 55-6.

[16]Ruth Ronen, "Possible Worlds in Literary Theory: A Game in Interdisciplinarity," *Semiotica* 80.3/4 (1990): 283.

[17]Currie 54.

[18]Walton 57.

[19]Robert C. Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," *Inquiry* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1984) 52.

[20]Richard Routley, "The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 7, 10, 15, 23.

[21]John Heintz, "Reference and Inference in Fiction," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 94.

[22]Ronen 284.

[23]See Ryan 31-47.

[24]David K.Lewis, "Truth in Fiction," *Philosophical Papers*, 2 vols. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 1, 278.

[25]David K. Lewis, "Possible Worlds," *The Possible and the Actual.. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 187.

[26]Ryan's example of the analytical is "bachelors are unmarried" being denied (32). In such worlds arithmetic may be complete, including perfect numbers and squared circles.

[27]Lubomír Doležel, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allén (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 238.

[28]In my Master's thesis I provided a detailed account of how such narrative procedures relate to world structures and reader reaction in the case of the fantastic tale. May Charles,

"A Possible-World Semantics Approach to World Structures and Narrative Transmission in the Fantastic Tale," thesis, University of Alberta, 1987.

[29]Umberto Eco, "Report on Session 3: Literature and Arts," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allen (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 353.

[30]Ryan 32.

[31]Ryan 31-47. Ryan's work will be applied as this study progresses.

[32]Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 35.

[33]Nicholas Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility. A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 101.

[34]"Possible Worlds," *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics*, gen. ed. Thomas A. Sebeok, 3 vols. (Berlin, New York, and Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 1986) 2, 750.

[35]Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) 44.

[36]Rescher 101.

[37]Jaakko Hintikka, "The Modes of Modality," *The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality*, ed. Michael J. Loux (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979) 65-78.

[38]Heintz 85.

[39]Walton 206.

[40]Walton 206.

[41]Rescher 96.

[42]Rescher 97.

[43]Rescher 96.

Chapter Four: The Problematic Existence of Fictional Characters

This chapter is designed to introduce a range of problems associated with the reader's intuitive "recognition" of fictional characters--problems which have been addressed in various ways, depending on the theorist's appreciation/application of the fictional world concept. As such, it lays the foundation for a complementation of possible-world semantic models required to analyse the fictional sphere as a matrix for truth worlds. By exposing the relevant theoretical models already developed in philosophy and literary theory, I suggest crucial supplementation to develop the more pragmatic dimension of how readers actually encounter and construct fictional truth about the non-actual individuals of fiction. The conclusion develops a solution in an adapted concept of textual reference world, showing how the most significant approaches to the reference problem are most crucially deficient. This concept, as developed here and applied to the whole analysis of reading procedures and principles of implication, provides the means to investigate how readers actually "link" fictional characters epistemically to reality, assigning them an imagined ontological status.

Character Individuation

It is obvious that the whole problem of incompleteness and indeterminacy as outlined in Chapter Three is most consequential for the understanding of how fictional characters can be thought to "exist." Incompleteness and indeterminacy are pervasive features of fictional objects/individuals--features which complicate drastically the generation of fictional truth. The author controls through "sayso" what constitutive properties his characters have. He is the primary *source* of these properties, which can be supplemented through inference

procedures. But *complete* fictional characterization is impossible. Some characters are barely "sketched" out through our cognitive operations, while others become "known" in a wealth of details. But no matter what character "description" may be employed textually, the collection of properties will always be left "open" in a way which denies the possibility of extensional completeness.

The result of this schematic formation of "individual" determinations is a very large problem of ***individuation***. Given the incompleteness of fictional characters, they cannot be fully individuated like real objects. Yet we have an intuitive need to speak of individuated fictional characters, as if they were real people. We even "recognize" distinct characters where no differentiations are provided.[1] We must find a way, then, to clarify ***how*** we produce as readers such individuated characters.

We know from Nicholas Rescher's work that we cannot actually "point out" purely fictional characters from outside of their fictional worlds. This point is crucial because even with actual individuals, only ostension can "guarantee" individuation. Even complete descriptions can fail to distinguish two distinct individuals who can (at least theoretically) share the same descriptions. If in fiction we are left with ***only*** descriptive procedures as an instrument of differentiation, we face a very big problem indeed. For given the epistemic indeterminacy produced by schematic literary texts, we may have to conclude (as Rescher does) that incomplete individual-descriptions represent only a possibility ***for*** individuals--a schema--rather than a distinct possible individual.[2] Schematic presentation makes possible ***multiple*** realizations, although indefiniteness is reduced, of course, in certain kinds of fictional worlds, depending on genre and specific textual strategies.

This confining of possibilia to the level of schematic generalities may seem unduly disconcerting if we are concerned primarily with the question of truth generation about fictional characters. We may ask, then, what there "is" in the first place about which we can generate truths. Nicholas Wolterstorff's similar assessment of fictional

individuals as abstract entities--types or kinds--is equally disconcerting.[3] Such approaches aim to explain away the specificity of fictional individuals as textual constructs, stipulating that they are not necessarily singular or individualized.

But for readers to ***conceive of*** seemingly individuated characters it is clearly not necessary to think of such entities as fully individuated through textual presentation. In Chapter Six I examine inference procedures which routinely ***convert*** the schematically structured fictional possibilities into fully "possible" non-actual individuals. In the meantime, we need only think of Ingarden's "spots of indeterminacy" in purely intentional objectivities, and the reader's option to fill. This ***process*** is the key to understanding our appreciation of fictional characters ***as if*** real, and it is not by any means restricted to the descriptive mechanisms of the text itself. Epistemic indeterminacy ***necessarily*** brings about additional, text-external epistemological processes which ultimately produce remarkably "complete" and individuated non-actual individuals, whom we can think of as inhabiting the imagined textual reference world--a world of the reader's creation. And that reference world cannot escape an assessment of the relationship of the schematic aspects of the textually introduced "individual" to actual-world knowledge bases.

It can be ***helpful***, then, to think of fictional characters as put together from a series of schematic components for individuals--both those introduced textually and those created through the reading process. Hector-Neri Castañeda's views of fictional character as a system of "thin thinkable" individuals is particularly relevant here.[4] While Castañeda focuses on the process of thinking, through which a system of thin thinkable individuals is built up in fiction-***making***, his theory is not divorced from what he sees as our appreciation of reality. He explains, however, that the fiction-making process is different from reality, in that while fiction "builds up" an individual according to laws which the author decides upon, in reality the togetherness of properties is contingent and empirical--not a "creation" by anyone.[5] The fundamental views of this approach are thus applicable for an appraisal of the ***reading*** process, relating as they do to our routine appreciation

of how traits for fictional characters are assembled and constructed into identifiable individuals. In Chapter Six I look at how these kinds of insights from possible-worlds theory can be applied to the discussions typical in narratology.[6]

The Ontological Status of Fictional Characters

Before defining epistemological problems better in terms of the reference dilemma associated with fictional characters, a brief look at the ontological status of characters as non-existent objects will be helpful, if only as a prelude to an understanding of fictionality as a mode of reading. The dubious "ontology" of fictional characters must be understood carefully in order to begin to deal with the problem of reference to things that do not exist, and the complicated processes involved in the generation of truths "about" those things. We need some grasp on what sorts of entities fictional characters are, and what systematic relations they have with real entities. Only in this way can we understand what elements are commonly "shared" with real persons, that is, how we come to treat fictional characters *as if* they were real, "existing" in a reader-imagined textual reference world.

It is no wonder that fictionality has often been understood as a specific mode of being--an ontological status belonging to certain entities. Readers do tend to regard fictional characters as ordinary existents, and are "rewarded" in realistic fiction for this "commitment" by being presented with characters which very much meet their expectations for life-like individuals. Intuitively, readers are committed to fictional individuals which are in most respects perfectly ordinary or "real," although the genre involved will alter expectations. So, while readers know full well that there are not ***actually*** any fictional characters roaming around the universe, they also know that such characters "exist" in fiction--even those with radically different properties, such as fairies and unicorns--and that intuitively they must make room for them somewhere.

Several philosophical views have been developed to accommodate this kind of pretheoretical "ontological commitment" to fictional beings, interpreting in various ways the entities involved. In order to develop a formal definition of fictionality on the basis of common, intuitive practice, it is generally decided that what does not exist objectively can be ***called*** fictional, and texts which are concerned with such entities are classified as fiction. In this sense, "fictional" is opposed to "real" or "factual." There are two ***kinds*** of entities on this model: those which exist in the real world, and those which are deprived of existence, but which are inherently "fictional." Fictional language is distinguished from non-fictional usage on the basis of the ontological status of the referent, rather than with reference to the writer's intent or the reader's mode of reception. Fiction can then be seen conveniently as true statements about imaginary beings, but historical or real-world characters present a problem. Also, other kinds of speech about non-existing entities cannot be distinguished from fiction, including all kinds of literary discussion/criticism.

Various alterations to this Russellian segregationalist-ontology approach can be found, reverting to Meinong's "Theory of Objects," which introduced a distinction between being existent (*Sosein*) and existence (*Sein*), or between what there ***is*** in terms of having properties, and what exists or is actual.[7] This view has the distinct advantage of allowing any inventory of properties to correspond to an individual/object, existent or not, consequently circumventing the limiting view of truth as a function of reference. Various positions have been adopted to construe fictional characters as different species of "existents," focusing mainly on their problematic incomplete quality, the question of possible individuation, and the definition of what ***kinds*** of properties may or may not constitute their fictional "personhood."[8]

But at issue in any ontological status-defining view is the question of ***how*** literary characters can exist without being real. If they have no actual existence but do enjoy a fictional existence, it has been convenient to think of them as existing in a fictional "realm" of some kind. The temptation to revert to some species of "segregationist" ontology is great. Castaneda, for example, insists that we must think of

fictional characters, states of affairs, and events as segregated from reality, even if the same laws govern the fictional world and reality. He qualifies the difference between fictional realms and reality as abysmal. Fictional objects remain unreal, in spite of vastly detailed description or any "correspondence" with historical accounts.[9]

While such an account assigns a superficially useful fiction-only status to historical fictional characters--a status which Doležel has capitalized on well in his theory of fictional-world stipulation--it really only papers over the reader's fundamentally contradictory appreciation of the pseudoreality of fictional characters. If ontological "respectability" depends on the relegation of characters to special realms described as fictional worlds, it will never be possible to explain the unavoidable interaction of real world-models/knowledge with these realms and their inhabitants. And it will never be possible to understand how such realms can interact with ***other*** textually stipulated worlds, with the result that characters take on larger, more comprehensive identities. Among such worlds there is no "access."

Even more fundamentally, any segregationist ontology cannot ***accurately*** account for ontologically hybrid fictional worlds, where historical individuals and real locations are present. If fiction involves ***inherently*** fictional individuals/objects, we cannot surely allow fictional characters to live in real places, or to interact with historical or contemporary persons from real life. The superficially useful view of arbitrarily assigning such individuals/objects/places a purely fictional status which will not sustain reference to the actual world does not solve the problem. We may well claim, as Doležel does, that such entities undergo a radical "transformation" at the fictional world's boundary, but this solution refuses to acknowledge the relation of such entities to their origins outside of the text, especially in terms of qualifying attributes which readers routinely assign. Such an account suggests that we not attribute fictionality to individual (isolated) entities, but to the entire fictional worlds/texts to which those entities belong. A historical character is fictional, then, because he belongs to a particular, stipulated fictional world. But the point remains that this fictional world never stands so entirely removed from

reality that its inhabitants can boast such a real world-independent status. Some kind of intermediary "realm" seems mandatory. I continue later in this chapter to consider the value of fictional worlds as "locations" for non-actual individuals, suggesting crucial supplementation. And in Chapter Eleven I explore the work which has been done with versions/counterparts, and elaborate a plan for an accurate assessment of intertextual repertoire in the generation of fictional truth.

The strategy of this study also relates to Walton's important solution to the problem of character existence through the concept of games of make-believe. For Walton, non-actual fictional objects can be ultimately dispensed with entirely, by insisting that it is purely fictional in readers' games that characters exist; that is, the claim that they possess the ordinary sort of existence is fictional.[10] Fictional works and games generate fictional truths, but not "about" non-actual objects somehow rescued from oblivion.[11] It is ***not*** that readers have imaginings only that there is an object which is not particular--a certain ***sort*** of thing.[12] Contrary to Wolterstorff's solution, statements about fictional characters seem to "have in mind" ***particular*** fictional entities. Walton's solution simply relocates fictional truths "about" fictional characters to the worlds of the appreciators' games, where (whether the objects in question are "actual" in the sense of having historical correspondences, or purely fictional) the reader imagines ***knowing*** about them. Such an account defuses the problem of real individuals/objects/places being included in fictional worlds.

But Walton's account of imagination just barely manages to hold off the demands of fictional characters for recognition. He admits to utilizing constantly standard statements which appear committed to the existence of fictional entities. And only after his entire theory has been presented through the idiom of possible worlds/non-actual individuals does he present a more linguistic account of how such standard statements are ill-formed, and why it is so difficult to avoid speaking in this way. He explains how the reader's statements which seem to refer to non-existents can be reformulated into statements which no longer imply such reference.[13] While Walton's theory is

remarkable indeed, in its ability to avoid the pitfalls of some other philosophical approaches, it does not actually solve the problematic existence dilemma of fictional characters, preferring to relegate them to linguistically indeterminate zones.

Obviously, as Thomas Pavel observes, the closeness of fictional entities to the empirical world is a problem which worries philosophers.[14] But we need more than Walton's account of make-believe, and more than the differentiated ***internal*** theory of fiction concerning fictional characters which Pavel suggests. It is not enough to define fictional characters' allowable properties and identify principles of individuation. Fictional characters are in fact ***encountered*** somewhere within experience--in the experience of ***reading***. It is within ***that process*** that fictional characters are constructed--not purely stipulated by texts as occupants of particular fictional worlds, but inferred and "completed" as mental constructs through cognitive processes which necessarily involve knowledge bases beyond the purely textual. The intellectual "artifacts" which result do not have an ontological status in a ***segregated*** realm somewhere. As Umberto Eco so aptly sums up the standard position, existence in a possible world (or fictional world) can mean "...conceivably posited by some semiotic strategy or textual activity."[15] But, in fact, the semiotic procedures of texts can never ***isolate*** fictional worlds from the reader's knowledge and cognitive strategies, which contribute also to the existence of fictional characters within a more comprehensive textual reference world imagined to pre-exist any fictional world construction. This reference world is not that of a game of make-believe (which is a subsidiary activity), but is constructed as an interface between the fictional world presented in the text and the extra- and intertextual knowledge bases which the reader activates. More complete fictional truth "about" characters is possible within the confines of this reference world, according to an inferential structure dependent on the particular interplay of knowledge sources--the factors I identify as components of an interpersonal logical space. If any "ontology" needs sorting out, it is this imagined mode of being which, far from segregating fictional characters from the real world, brings

them into close contact with readers and their real-world experience through epistemological processes.

The Reference Dilemma

The problem of reference to things that do not exist turns out to be the most controversial aspect of possible-worlds theory as applied in fiction. At least superficially, a fictional world is easily seen as a context for non-actualized possibles, where names do ***not*** lack reference, and where fictional individuals and objects can be described and specified in their diverse aspects.[16] But such an appreciation creates serious ontological problems related to the preceding discussions--problems ***outside*** of the theory in terms of acceptability, but also problems ***within*** the theory in terms of how to account best for the referential structures.

First of all, analytic philosophers who advocate a one-world ontology insist that there is only one single, actual world. As a result, any singular expressions, such as names, which do not point out or select an entity existing in the actual world do not ***refer*** to anything. The propositions containing such non-referring expressions are not, then, true or false, since there is no correspondence or non-correspondence to actual states of affairs.[17] On this view, the whole project of a special logic or semantics of fiction is a senseless one, since we cannot make assertions about truth or hold beliefs about what does not exist.[18]

But obviously, in spite of any perceived metaphysical principle insisting on a relation between language and the world, linguistic reference mechanisms are inherent, and can extend to non-actual existents. We ***do*** speak about fictional characters, objects, and places, describing them as we would ordinary, concrete, real-world particulars, that is, as if they really existed. We speak of them as though they were real, and subject to the Law of Excluded Middle, rather than as mere abstractions. As Walton points out, we speak as though characters came into existence on a particular occasion, although this cannot be when

"born," but rather when first "written."[19] Wallace Martin typically objects to the situation "...that as a result of the writing, some ghostly person, having all the attributes of people except bodily existence, has been added to the stock of the world's inhabitants."[20] But intuitively, it seems perfectly possible to refer to and to predicate properties of non-existent objects. As Woods explains,

> ...we denote, refer to, describe, and count fictional objects; we know who they are and some of what they did and suffered; we see that they are identified and individuated by certain constellations of their properties, fixed by what about them is true and what is false. ...[T]hey are strikingly accessible to ...quantification...[21]

This idea that some claims about fictional characters are true while others are not creates a huge problem for one-world ontology. It seems that characters could not be referred to as singular terms, or possess properties subject to quantification, if they did not exist *somewhere*. All of this talk about fictional characters, including serious literary criticism, cannot be written off as pure nonsense.

Clearly, fictional names and definite descriptions do not denote in our actual world. Fictional objects do not exist and therefore "...cannot, without deviation, be reckoned to fall within the range of variables bound by the standard quantifiers..."[22] Elaborate discussions have consequently ensued because of this need to "...talk objectively and quantify over items that do not in any way exist..."[23] Woods and Routley both call for the use of predicates which do not entail "exists." "Non-existential quantifiers are wanted to formalise quite familiar statements and discourse about fictional persons."[24]

Walton suggests a solution different from the non-existent objects approach, through games of make-believe, where it can be fictional "...that 'existence is a predicate,' or rather that the predicate 'exists' expresses a genuine property..."[25] Walton admits as a result that "[i]t may be fictional in an unofficial game that the universe consists of several realms, the 'real world' and various 'fictional worlds,' each with its own inhabitants."[26] This concept of pretended actuality might

almost be confused with Lewis' realist account, which depends on the division of "exist" into *two* senses or quantifiers, except that Walton carefully distinguishes pretence from *what* is pretended, avoiding a *literal* appreciation of pretended realms. This application of pretense suggests the kind of imagined pre-textual existence which I will elaborate as possible in a textual reference world, where fictional names and definite descriptions can "denote" without problem.

But even without considering the make-believe approach, we cannot discount the creative power of *discourse* which posits objects/individuals "existing" in some kind of logical space. Introducing the problem of reference briefly in Chapter Two, I suggested that "objectification" through language is the key to appreciating reference to fictional individuals. Richard Rorty insists that in fiction the idea of "talking about" as a weak semantic relation must replace the strong semantic relation between words and reality.[27] On this view, "talking about" is constituted by discourse. There is no object. Reference does not link an expression to a physical object/individual. The only "truth" which we can speak of for a reference is that determined by the "laws" of the discourse itself. This discourse-dependent truth standard is obviously crucial to the fictional-world semantic appreciation of autonomous worlds created through textual procedures, and to the text-internal analysis of *how* such "universes of discourse" can be constructed and transmitted. Moving the standard of truth away from the relation between language and the world is fundamental to the whole approach.

But more important here must be the realization that textual "talking about" *can* be imagined by the reader as referring to a world pre-existing textual "construction." In effect, there is an *imagined* relation between what is expressed in the language of the text and a textual reference world which shelters fictional individuals, which acquire through the process a remarkable degree of actuality. This is the "objectification" which can be analysed through a semiotic appreciation of reading procedures.

Since discourse plays such an important role, it is not surprising that one fundamental approach to the basic reference problem has been to provide an ontologically ***neutral*** interpretation through an intentional semantics. Various significant routes have been taken, perhaps most notably by Marie-Laure Ryan, who combines successfully a realist possible-world perspective with a phenomenological and illocutionary approach to fiction as a mode of speaking necessarily involving intent, and by Gregory Currie, who focuses on fictive intent and the reader's ***uses*** for fictional names as non-referring expressions, in an effort to replace the ontological import of reference with an intentional/linguistic appreciation. Walton provides an interesting counter-approach, "intentional-semantic" in so far as fictive intent can be seen to equal the "prescription to imagine" on which he focuses. He retains a one-world ontology while making sense of our ordinary practice as readers and critics, through the concepts of games of make-believe and ***pretended*** reference.

Another fundamental approach involves intentional semantics as well, but is by no means reluctant to introduce non-existent entities, refusing to "purify" ontology or the language used to describe it. Best exemplified in the work of Doležel and Pavel, but based on more fundamental philosophical debates, this approach accounts for our routine linguistic practices by constructing descriptive models to help us understand our use of statements about fictional characters.[28] This approach shares Walton's focus on the user's understanding of fiction, but stresses the fictional world itself as a context for appreciation, rather than an individual game of make-believe. It points more towards Ryan's conception of the way readers relate to the "reality" of fictional worlds through a recentering process. I present next the origins of these ontologically-oriented accounts, and then in the next sections, brief summaries of Currie's, Walton's, and Ryan's theories, with a view to demonstrating how the textual reference world concept as I see it can solve some of the difficulties.

Reference and Character Existence

Faced with the perceived need to deny fictional characters any sort of actual existence or being, all the while insisting that we can nevertheless refer to them and speak about them, we confront a very awkward puzzle about how to understand reference to fictional characters. As Walton points out, various approaches attempt to have it both ways, that is, "...to smuggle in the existence of fictions amidst denials of their existence."[29] Those who believe in the existence of fictional entities must admit that in many contexts we also routinely *deny* the existence of such entities. In a very real sense, there never have existed such things. Those who do not believe must account somehow for the many references to fictional characters in ordinary discourse and literary criticism. Theories on both sides have tried to paraphrase somehow the statements which cannot be taken at face value, or to offer other explanations of how such statements can be construed.[30] Regardless of which theory we favor, some intuitively correct observations about fictional characters and reference will need to be understood in non-literal or less-than-straightforward ways. "Something funny is going on in fiction, however we look at it."[31]

Looking first at the non-reference position, we must admit that fictional sentences using proper names *seem* to make (true) assertions about individuals or objects. Proper names ordinarily refer to things/individuals in the actual world. They "...pick out or direct attention of listeners or readers to specific things, places, or people."[32] We clearly cannot take descriptions of fictional characters (in sentences about them) at face value. We cannot ascribe to them the same subject-predicate form as parallel descriptions of real-life individuals.[33] "Non-referring" expressions are "disguised" somehow as definite descriptions, certainly linguistically indistinguishable from fully referring expressions.[34] Characters seem to exist because referred to and in possession of properties, but the descriptions do not denote in our world.

The non-reference position is based on Gottlob Frege's philosophy, which presumes that reference can be made only to that which exists,

that existence is identical with occurring in the real world, and that there is only one world which exists--the one accepted as real. As indicated above, this one-world ontology, espoused by Russell and others in the analytic tradition, presents a very large objection to the whole possible-worlds approach, by insisting on an explicit real-world *inventory* of individuals. On Frege's account, names have a "meaning" or "sense" which directs the listener or reader to the things to which they refer, as a "mode of presentation" of the object. In effect, the referent of the name satisfies the description offered by that meaning or sense.[35] This kind of traditional theory claims that meaning is formed by a conjunction of associated properties--an intensional set or kind of "essence" which determines the extension of the term. Superficially we might think that such an account could work fine for fiction, since characters' names seem to refer only to those characters *as described.* Description is, after all, all we have in fiction, since there is no way to point out the characters otherwise.

But we realize instead some very counterintuitive results about fictional truth. If names are only equivalent to an (intensional) set of descriptions, we are left with no way to account for the evident truths of fictional sentences about ongoing actions performed. The simplest fictional statements will appear false. On this plan, sentences about fictional entities are non-referring, and therefore automatically false (or indeterminate in a three-value system).[36] This position distinguishes fiction neatly from errors and lies, which *do* refer to existing entities, but fail as a matter of faulty predication. While reference to the object is successful for false statements, with statements about fictional entities there is a reference failure which distinguishes fiction effectively from lies or even errors. But Frege's position does nothing to help us account for the "evident" *truths* supplied by fictional discourse, which can be phrased as true observations outside of the text. Surely such a position casts a profound shadow of doubt on the whole process of literary criticism/interpretation. If the lack of referent makes *all* sentences about a fictional character false (or at least indeterminate) we have no means to distinguish between true and false statements--the "bet-sensitive" sentences with which Woods concerns himself. As Ryan

points out, "[i]f there is no logical difference between [such] statements, criticism itself cannot be truth-functional, and there is no point in debating the respective merits of conflicting interpretations."[37] Nor will the position account for the most ordinary examples of mixed uses of language, such as "Tolstoy created Anna Karenina"--statements obviously true, but which cannot be assigned a truth value according to this scheme. Such a dead end must obviously be avoided.

It would seem best, then, to abandon the claim that reference to an object presupposes its existence in our actual world, since fictional characters are most assuredly "thinkable," to use Castañeda's term, and consequently accessible to quantification. When two readers or critics discuss a particular fictional character as "Raskolnikov" they most certainly have the same specific individual in mind. Reference in this important sense is far from "blocked," demonstrating a remarkable ***shared*** quality. Before I can introduce a viable context for that sharing through the textual reference world concept, it is necessary to pursue the philosophies already developed to discuss reference to non-actual objects, individuals, and worlds.

The work of Meinong is fundamental here, and has been pursued effectively by Parsons and Routley in particular. As mentioned twice above, Meinong distinguished between what there *is* (what subsists or is existent) and what exists, so that there can *be* both existing things and non-existing things. We can and do refer to what does not exist, since any collection of properties--compatible or not--must correspond to an object, whether existent or not.[38] This strategy has an appealing simplicity which has generated intuition-compatible results. On this model, fictionality is easily defined as a mode of being or ontological status, as discussed above. What does not exist objectively we can readily call fictional.

This kind of helpful ontological tolerance is reflected in Parson's work with non-existent objects, in which he uses the distinctions of nuclear and extranuclear predicates and associated properties to sort out how we assign properties to fictional characters.[39] Put simply, the

nuclear properties are those of the objects *within* fiction, while the extranuclear ones (such as "does not exist" or "is fictional") separate the fictional objects conveniently from the real world.

These kinds of accounts which include an ontological commitment to fictional objects/individuals seem to reflect well the reader's actual understanding and appreciation of fictional characters, but they also present several problems. It is obvious that non-existent objects with radically inconsistent property sets present a basic problem for *logically* possible worlds. But specifically with regard to fiction, as Pavel points out, such accounts do not differentiate fictional individuals sufficiently from other *kinds* of non-existent entities, such as mathematical entities or "unfinanced architectural monuments."[40] It is essential to recognize the particular status of fictional characters, which really seem to share somehow in our real world existence more intimately than do other non-existent objects.

It is obvious also that the peculiar mixture of the purely fictional and "historical" characters so typical of fiction will be problematic on this account. In order to deal with the problem of real-world objects finding their way into fictional texts, Parsons distinguishes between native, immigrant, and surrogate objects.[41] This analysis will be considered as basic in Chapter Eleven where I analyse the relations of intertext, and problematize the distinction between surrogates and immigrants.

But beyond these basic problems, Currie isolates what he considers to be a "simple and devastating" objection. Using the example of Sherlock Holmes, he says that presumably Holmes *thinks* he exists--it is true in the story that he does. Currie asks, then, how we can know that *we* exist, since our epistemic situation is just like that of the character. Consciousness is not, as Descartes would have it, a guarantee of our existence, if some non-existent things are also conscious.[42] For Currie, such an implied metaphysics destroys the seriousness of this philosophical option.

Considering both Currie's objection and the problem of the inclusion in fiction of historical characters, it would seem that we do in fact need to "move" non-existent objects to worlds other than the actual--worlds where a new context provokes a change of status for the fictional individual. To understand how the logical structures of fiction can work we must envision some kind of network of ***relations*** among existent and non-existent entities. The concept of non-actual worlds can be put to work to define such a network. In order to suggest how such relations can be analysed, I need to continue to work through some of the basic philosophical positions advanced.

On Lewis' realist account, "exist" is broken into two senses (or quantifiers). A ***restricted*** quantifier applies to our actual world, while an ***unrestricted*** quantifier permits reference to all possible objects. Distinguishing thus between what exists and what is actual, Lewis has the advantage of understanding individuals to exist in worlds other that the actual, ***as*** non-actual existents. The actual non-existence of fictional characters is consequently not a problem on this model, since it is perfectly consistent with their non-actual existence in another world. Currie's problem with Holmes' "consciousness of existence" disappears now, since the character existing in his own ***indexically*** actual world has the same right to consider himself actual as we do in ***our*** actual world. Reference for "actual" depends entirely on the context of utterance, just like expressions such as "here" and "now."

Lewis' account of indexical actual worlds has come under attack from various quarters, most notably Plantinga, Kripke, Kaplan, Walton, and Currie. One of the main objections can be reformulated roughly as follows. The obvious problem with locating non-actual individuals in indexically actual worlds relates to the problem of fictional description as the ***only*** means to identify individuals, since ostension from ***outside*** worlds is not possible. How are we to "point out" Anna Karenina if she does not also exist in our actual world? We can have no means of isolating/individuating her, except by way of the descriptive mechanisms of the text--what the story stipulates, coupled with suitable inference. Reference to Anna ***from*** our world becomes

problematic, again casting suspicion on the value of the possible-worlds concept.

The crucial point here, from the reading perspective, is that if "Anna Karenina" is a genuine proper name (a directly referring expression) we do not expect it to merely "abbreviate" the descriptions stipulated by the story. Intuitively we expect an identity somehow ***prior*** to description--a means to individuate and refer to the individual from our own actual world. Somewhere we need space for a kind of "joint-occupancy" for reader and fictional character in an imagined reference world.

The simple solution which ***has*** been proposed--one not acceptable to Currie or Walton, who explore alternatives to the fictional-worlds strategy--is Kripke's proper name as "rigid designator" concept.[43] According to Kripke's theory of reference, initially a description "fixes" the reference of the name. Instead of Frege's idea of names "standing for" clusters of descriptions, Kripke proposes a causal theory of names readily applicable to fiction. The name as a "rigid designator" is just like a label, without Frege's "meanings" or "senses," not containing descriptions. Proper names refer ***independent of*** identifying descriptions. The name simply picks out objects/individuals through a kind of original "baptismal act," referring then to a given individual, whether or not a set of associated descriptions is satisfied or maintained. As Ryan explains, "[n]ames are unique, original labels, and they designate as unambiguously as social security numbers."[44] The relation between name and individual is passed on to a community of users in a kind of causal chain of communication. In the fictional context this means that characters can be named and individuated ***independently*** of any kind of description, thereby providing an "access" to their identity from our actual world. In effect, the name "attached" to a particular individual is an expression which refers to the same individual in every possible world in which it exists, including our own reality.[45]

More accurately, we will need to speak later in Chapter Eleven of the name as attached to a set of all ***counterparts*** or versions of a

particular individual in all fictional worlds. As "rigid designators" names continue to refer to individuals regardless of what changes in their properties might occur. Even if we do not construe a transworld identity, which is most problematic on the realist account, the concept of rigid designator can be adapted to work with the principle of counterparts in alternative worlds. I explore in Chapter Eleven relations of qualitative similarity, what the associated problems are, and to what extent the model can be adapted and supplemented to account for actual reading procedures, in terms of reader "relocation" to more comprehensive textual reference worlds where transworld identity can be tolerated.

For the moment, however, it is important to see that the causal theory is significant in two fundamental ways. As Ronen points out, this reference theory "...implies that meanings are not fixed paradigms of concepts; a term can refer to something if it stands in the right conventional relation to this thing; a term can fix the reference regardless of whether the essence of the thing (or any of its essential properties) is known."[46] And secondly, the theory shows that reference is determined socially and by convention. "Discursive conventions allow us to create objects through our talk, to create an object of discourse by the power of discourse itself."[47]

It is this second point which will provide ongoing ammunition for this study as I develop a viable reference world concept based on convention-based reading procedures. Through this more flexible reference framework we can appreciate better how fictional texts activate the construction of individuals, which may be individuated in spite of incompleteness, and which may be "impossible" considered in relation to actual world models or prototypes. This framework allows us to recognize the ***ramifications*** of the language-dependent status of fictional characters, which necessitate postulating ***imagined*** reference worlds where names and descriptions "attach" themselves to a context of imagined objects/individuals.

Defusing Ontology through Intentional Semantics

Having discarded Frege's assessment of names and non-reference to fictional individuals (or blocked reference), we are left nonetheless with a large problem for the theory of fictionality as a mode of being or special ontological status. If fictional characters exist in non-actual worlds and can be successfully picked out and referred to from our actual world according to a more ontologically tolerant theory of reference, they may *still* be indistinguishable as language-based constructs from the referents of ordinary lies or errors. Only Frege's distinction between non-reference and faulty predication seems to permit such discrimination. There would seem to be no way to make such distinctions without invoking the speaker's/writer's *intent*. And in this event, as Ryan points out, we must revert to a more satisfying explanation of fictionality which avoids relying too heavily on the definition of the ontological status of fictional entities, focusing instead on fictionality as a mode of speaking--"...an intent constitutive of a type of communicative act."[48] The intentional theory involves a phenomenological and illocutionary approach, stressing not that worlds are fictional because of intrinsic properties (such as purely fictional occupants--a position already subject to "violation" in historical novels), but that they are fictional because of the gesture through which they come into being and are presented to the reader. Basing her approach, then, on the work of Doležel, Pavel, and Eco, Ryan works to characterize the fictional *gesture* according to principles of modal logic and possible-world semantics.[49]

While Currie's approach also defines fiction as a mode of speaking, his much more conservative solution seeks to shelve the very concept of fictional worlds and to identify an intelligibility for reference to fictional characters without invoking a realm of non-actual fictional individuals. For Currie, literary characters are nothing but objects of discourse, or discourse referents. Thus truncating the ontological dimension, Currie essentially substitutes a "story-bound" concept, but never really escapes from the fictional-world idiom.[50] Currie's solution to the problem of reference to non-existent individuals rests on the idea of fictional proper names as ***bound variables*** within texts, assuming

purely qualitative worlds where no particular individual is "picked out," and we understand the expression as it occurs in the story, without having to assign a referent to it. He treats reference to historical characters as a non-fictive use, failing to see such characters as "transformed" fictional versions of the real individuals.

Outside of texts, Currie identifies two additional uses of fictional names. The first is the metafictional use for ordinary discourse by readers, where the scope of the "in-the-story" operator is in effect. Here names function as complex, ***abbreviated descriptions*** of what the character is and does in the story--a position at variance with Kripke's views. Fictional characters are simply created out of the stories which envelop them--have no kind of independent being--so that in ordinary discourse about them they are simply synonymous with the abbreviated description of their identity and actions in the story. On this view, it is meaningless to talk about what a character might have been or done other than described in the story, although fellow characters and readers alike are prone to such speculations. It is a view fundamentally at variance with actual reading strategies for character completion.

The second use of names outside of texts is defined as the transfictive, which takes place outside of the "in-the-story" operator, to compare characters across fictions or with actual individuals. Here Currie introduces the concept of "roles," especially to deal with the troubling question of re-identifying the "same" fictional individual across fictional worlds. "Roles," for Currie, are not "occupied" in stories, so no fictional or actual individuals can be transferred in any sense to other texts. In Chapter Eleven I suggest to what limited extent Currie's analyses are beneficial for understanding counterpart relations--limited, because Currie, being too concerned with making a "semantic mess," finds no way to deal with variations in similarity among the characters filling roles.

Throughout this account Currie insists that fictional names do not function as referring expressions--a position which legitimates his rejection of the fictional entity/world concepts. As such, the account

seeks to escape from the problems of reference to things which do not exist, *not* by qualifying a special kind of existence or mode of being, but by presenting an explanation of fictive intention and the author's role in "creating" what we are intended to think of as fictional worlds. He tries to explain our intuitive understanding of the truth values of statements involving fictional names, by presenting an illocutionary account which defines fictionality as a mode of telling/speaking including distinct uses of fictional names by readers. Unfortunately, although Currie avoids what he considers unpleasant ontological commitments, his account does not do justice to our intuitive appreciation of fictional characters and the truths generated about them. The problem is that, unlike Ryan who successfully *combines* an appreciation of our "ontological commitment" to fictional characters and worlds with an intentional semantic perspective, Currie becomes bogged down in technicalities which bear minimal relation to what readers really *do* with narrative fiction. When two readers discuss Emma Bovary and compare her with other characters, they do not (surely) think of her name as a pure "function" or "role," devoid of any imagined ontological status. As such, his account is counter-intuitive and deficient as far as the epistemological concerns of reading are involved, since he shows no real appreciation of the cognitive proced·.es which recognize fictional characters and compare them across fictions. We will see ahead how Ryan's reliance on Lewis' realist account and her concept of recentering prove much more useful.

Currie's presumption that reference and predication must be treated as an intentional/linguistic act which need not have ontological import is not faulty. It is, of course, the fundamental stance of possible-worlds theory as explored by Rescher and other constructivists. Reference to "things" that do not exist is not a problem if we agree quite simply, as Margolis does, that since we can *imagine* a fictional world, we must be able to talk about it and to refer to what is "in" it.[51] On Rescher's view, we can regard the fictional world created textually as a possible world brought about through a mental act. As such, it will most certainly lack autonomous ontological status or actuality. This view reassures us of the fundamental ontological difference which we intuitively know to exist between fictional characters created through

language, and actual human beings, accounting well for what we objectively know about fictional worlds. To complicate the whole issue with ontological concerns and the inevitable denials is really not necessary, particularly since the ***imagined*** ontological status of characters can be put to work to help us analyse the epistemological "building" of those characters.

Walton's Solution

What is important is that the imagining of a fictional world to exist ***is a real activity***--an activity very much open to analysis. This analysis is equally possible, whether we assign an ontological import to fictional entities or not. In Walton's case, his theory of make-believe is based on the concept of pretended reference, denying the existence of fictional characters and their worlds, even as possible-world constructs. He sets out to prove that what readers have to say about fictional characters, which includes an apparent reference to non-existents picked out by name and endowed with properties, can be ***reformulated*** into statements which do not imply this kind of reference. In effect, he trades off the notion of fictional entities for one of fictional truths.[52] And beyond merely paraphrasing statements which cannot be taken at face value, or indicating as others have done how they can be construed, Walton tries to explain ***why*** readers/critics express themselves in such ways.

While Currie endorses at least superficially a pretended (or make-believe) reference by author and reader, Walton explores the whole issue of fictional reference and truth ***from the perspective of*** the reader's ***imaginative*** use. Resisting the idea that a commitment to fictional entities is deeply embedded in our language and conceptual scheme, he stresses instead the fundamental importance of make-believe, and insists on the use of fictional names in a ***pretence*** which indicates no commitment to there being a referent of that name.[53] He explicates, within the pragmatics of make-believe, the reader's ***pretence*** to refer and assert--a pretence which he takes as primary. Make-believe is

fundamental to the question of what fictional characters are. They need not be "postulated" in order to make sense of readers' ordinary discourse, if we focus on the element of make-believe which Walton considers to "infect" theorizing too. To Walton, realists mistake the interested *pretence* of referring to fictional characters for genuine ontological commitment.[54]

Starting with the familiar notion of an understood intensional operator, Walton *extends* the idea through the concept of games of make-believe, which generate fictional truths in conjunction with representational works of art. Considering "ordinary statements" which appear to make reference to fictional entities--Currie's "metafictional" use of names--the recognized operator ("it is fictional that...") relieves the pressure to recognize fictional individuals since it is purely fictional that a particular character exists or possesses certain attributes. Because fictional truths can be distinguished thus from the actual, the idea of an unbridgeable gulf between fictional worlds and reality is vindicated, at least in physical terms.

In terms of the reader's psychological interaction the distance is not so great, and Walton explores the intuitive desire to recognize fictional entities as real, which is manifest in emotional responses. Our psychological bonding with fictional characters results in viewing them as a part of our reality.[55] For Walton, our propensity to talk about fictional worlds is just a way to try to distance ourselves and to "...paper over our confusion about whether or not fictions are real..."[56] Instead, it is the "pretence to assert" in our ordinary discourse about fictional entities which turns readers into actors in games of make-believe.[57]

Walton goes on to investigate in addition to "ordinary statements" the more troubling variation of discourse which he says occurs in "unofficial games" superimposed on those authorized by the work--the kinds of problems which Currie deals with as "transfictive." These factors I explore in some detail in Chapter Eleven in terms of transworld identity/counterpart relations.

The main value of Walton's theory for current purposes is his systematic union of the more technical, metaphysical issues about the ontological status of characters with a more aesthetically oriented view of the role which fictions play in readers' lives and the nature of responses. While the language-oriented theories have focused on the semantic properties of denotation and truth for fictional names and sentences respectively, attempting to separate fiction from reality somehow by stressing the language/constructivistic basis for truth-values, Walton undertakes a unified treatment of both metaphysical and aesthetic issues. Walton presumes that accounts of logical, semantic, or ontological structures can (and must) explain why there exists a fictional institution with such structures.[58] In other words, Walton is concerned with the ***point*** of fiction, and by extension with the typical emotional involvement of readers, which requires his integrated theory.

Unfortunately, in spite of developing a remarkably unified theory, Walton fails to account for how readers actually perceive fictional reference and truth. The pretence account does not explain our actual appreciation of the "reality" of fictional characters and their worlds. The focus on game worlds is very much a step in the right direction, but too ***large*** a step. The concept is too confining and restrictive, in the sense that it does not allow discussion of the ***shared*** quality of fictional truth generation, since game worlds are so highly individual and dependent on possibly ***isolated*** cognitive processes.

In a strategy not entirely dissimilar to Ryan's recentering concept, Walton claims that, while reading and imagining, the reader belongs to a fictional world himself, except that on Walton's account that world is not the world of the story, but rather the world of a game of make-believe played with the story--a game in which the story/text serves as a prop.[59] Walton feels that the character belongs in this fictional world as well, since it is ***there*** that he attains a kind of "reality" which permits the psychological interaction of interest to Walton. Imaginatively speaking, the character and the reader live together in this "world." And fictional truth belongs to the world of the game--the world which concerns the engrossed reader. ***Fictionally***, readers believe and experience feelings about characters, making fictional

worlds seem much less remote psychologically than they are physically. Since the worlds "shared" in this way by fictional characters and readers are fictional ones and not the real one, there is no need to concede that fictional characters must exist since referred to. Readers are by no means deluded as to actual character existence, at least not in "normal" circumstances.

This ingenious way out of the reference dilemma suggests that readers "move" somehow to the level of the fiction, in much the same way that Pavel speaks about the reader's fictional ego and Ryan introduces her important concept of recentering. This kind of "descent" into fiction explains the tendency to promote fictions to the status of reality, because ***from the inside*** the fictional worlds shared with characters look very much as though they are real.[60] Indeed, if we speak about fictional characters while we are "located" in a fictional game world, we contribute to the fictional truth of that world. It is not that we make a genuine assertion about a fictional world presented textually, somehow saying something, from an outside point of view, about the fictional truths that world contains. Instead, according to Walton, we pretend to describe the ***real*** world rather than actually describing a fictional one.[61] This idea is remarkably similar to the view of recentering made possible through indexical tuality, but Walton avoids any metaphysical commitment. "Insofar as statements appearing to be about fictional entities are uttered in pretense, they introduce no metaphysical mysteries."[62] Walton admits that statements sometimes do make genuine assertions, and undertakes to explain those assertions not in terms of what the sentences themselves mean, but in terms of paraphrased content which does not imply reference.

Recentering and Textual Reference Worlds

Ryan's concept of fictional recentering provides a differently oriented solution to the same problem, explaining also why we tend to regard fictional characters as part of our reality. Rather than focusing on game-worlds, Ryan considers the obvious advantages of Lewis'

concept of reality for possible worlds, appreciating the explanatory power which this theory delivers for the problem of reader "interaction" with fictional worlds and characters. On this account, readers "travel" to fictional worlds, and once there treat those worlds *as* actual, in the way made possible by the indexical theory of actuality. On the realist account it is not necessary to proceed from the position of fundamental make-believe, since the experience of being "caught up in a story" can be explained through the recentering concept. It is not necessary to consider the aesthetic experience in and of itself in order to sort out our conflicting intuitions about the status of fictional entities. Lewis' indexical theory provides an accurate explanation of how readers *relate* to fictional worlds/characters, by postulating the indexically actual existence of those worlds. According to Ronen, Lewis' view "makes sense" for fictional worlds because "[i]n fiction, although the reader is aware of the world being fictional, he is willing to grant this world a certain autonomy *vis-a-vis* reality, to commit himself epistemically to the laws of fiction, to suspend his disbelief."[63] This is precisely what Ryan describes as recentering. Readers know objectively that literary characters do not exist in reality, but once they become involved in a fiction the characters become real for the reader, their fictional world momentarily taking the place of the actual world.[64] This special "pseudoreality" which fictional characters have for the reader demonstrates effectively the emotional interaction/empathy which Walton, Currie, and countless others find so significant. The reader clearly would not experience fears, worries about antagonist's plans, hopes for outcomes, and so on, if he did not regard characters as more than mere collections of textually defined features.[65] "Real" worlds provide a context for that emotional involvement without assigning priority to pretence as fundamental.

The purpose of this extended exposition of various philosophical approaches to the reference problem has been to establish a central deficiency with all of these approaches, none of which accurately accounts for the reader's actual activity of placing fictional characters within a reality context where extra- and intertextual knowledge can be integrated into fictional truth. Walton's concept of game worlds goes too far, past the shared, public worlds of reference to fictional

characters, into essentially individual imaginative worlds. And it is clearly problematic to say that reference takes place *within* a fictional world where the reader "recenters," because the reader cannot really "access" that textually constructed world, become inscribed as a part of it, or "pick out" its individuals from the real world. We are left with the original problems raised by Currie. On Ryan's account it remains impossible to augment the constructed/stipulated world of the fictional text with extra- and intertextual knowledge bases.

The "pseudoreality" which Ryan suggests for fictional characters must be constituted in a reader-created *textual reference world*. By studying actual cognitive procedures/reading operations, we can accurately describe how readers postulate/imagine a reference world which pre-exists textual stipulation--a world where extra- and intertextual "truths" can also reside. That no such "world" actually exists we take for granted. But by postulating such a world as a mental construct, the reader can obviously "recenter" there, inscribing himself in that world, building the reference world on the basis of both textual stipulation and extra- and intertextual knowledge bases, and interacting with fictional characters on a perceived-as-equal ontological footing.

My adaptation of the concept of textual reference world must be distinguished immediately from Ryan's related concepts. Ryan speaks often of the semantic domain of a text as "...the sum of meanings suggested by a text, the set of all the valid inferences and interpretations."[66] Such a concept provides a good contrast with the more limited narrative universe concept, but it will not help to define what constitutes a valid interpretation or provide any hierarchical structure for understanding the generation of fictional truths. I use it in Chapter Six to help define reading procedures and inference. Ryan's concept of textual reference world is defined initially as "[t]he world for which the text claims facts; the world in which the propositions asserted by the text are to be valued. [Textual reference world] is the center of a system of reality comprising [alternative possible worlds]."[67] In a modal system of reality, comprised of alternate possible worlds, the textual actual world is simply the *image* of the textual reference world which the text proposes.[68] That textual

reference world is an entity "external" to the textual actual world which accurately "represents" it.[69]

This view inspires me to conceive of the textual reference world as a reader-constructed "real" world to which the fictional world is "alternate," as possible worlds are for reality. This appreciation of modal systems allows for an image of the textual reference world as a kind of "truth world" similar to Lewis' formulation--a world where the story is told as known fact.[70] Such an approach is exciting for fictional-world semantics because it frees theory from the sterile appreciation of fictional worlds as totally non-existent except as created through textual language. We are freed up to ***imagine*** such a reference world beyond textual stipulation, "existing" independently, where reference to fictional entities "actually" occurs.

Fictional worlds obviously do not have a prior existence or any real ontological status. But if we ***postulate*** a larger reference world we discover the key to assessing a totality for fictional truth. If we consider not only the "truth world" from which a story is told, but also that from which it is ***read***, we can assess accurately the totality possible for fictional truth which an intentional semantics denies.

Ryan prefers to focus her attention on textual actual worlds--the facts presented as actual by the text itself, or established as truth. She takes essentially a ***de dicto*** approach to the concept of textual actual world, rather that a ***de re*** approach which would deal with the facts of the reference world, about which the text makes predications.[71] She sees textual reference worlds as basically identical to textual actual worlds in that (unlike the cases of lies or errors) the reference world is accurately represented in the text. Therefore, it makes sense to focus narrative semantics on what is ***true in the story***, rather than on what "really happened."[72] Ryan says categorically that the concern of narratology is not with the facts of the textual reference world, "...but with their representation in [textual actual world] and its surrounding universe. ...What matters is what the text presents as fact... Whether or not the hearer accepts this information as fact in [textual reference world] stands outside the concern of narratology."[73] Ryan chooses, then,

to consider textual actual worlds and textual reference worlds as synonymous, focusing primarily on the inherent lack of discrepancy between presented story facts and "real occurrences" in a textual reference world. She consciously avoids the concept of textual reference world in her narrative semantic theory. This is a crucial limitation which presumably helps to produce the remarkable insights of Ryan's work, especially in terms of the modal structure of semantic universes projected by texts. But it also ignores the ***potential*** of the textual reference world concept which I will develop here, from the perspective of reading operations.

From Fictional Sphere to Reference World

We need to determine how the reference world is potentially larger and more complete/inclusive than the textual actual world (or simply, fictional world). In an analysis not possible for an ambiguous concept like "semantic domain," we envision the reference world as a result of inference procedures which construct larger, extended truth structures according to definable principles. While narrative facts presented textually are automatically part of the story and hence true, there is much more to reading for fictional truth than acknowledging those directly presented truths. We can analyse what ***kind*** of reader involvement builds reference or truth worlds, by activating additional sources of knowledge which the text makes available or applicable. It becomes possible to ***apply*** Ryan's principle of minimal departure in a way she does not, as part of the structure of inference procedures, developing in the process an extended analysis of the extra- and intertextual knowledge bases involved in creating reference worlds. Such worlds become crucial for the assessment/generation of fictional truth because it is there that readers ***interrelate*** both the textually established facts and those which the text invites them to integrate on the basis of additional knowledge bases. This kind of more pragmatic approach to fictional truth through reading operations depends on the idea of reference worlds "accessed" by readers through cognitive

processes. The concerns of narratology are both highly relevant to, and illuminated by, this kind of analysis.

Ryan's analysis of accessibility relations between the actual world and textual actual worlds is not sufficient for this exploration of extra- and intertextually generated fictional truth. Ryan treats world-models as ***manifested*** differently in different genres, so that the combinations possible can be organized into a very useful taxonomy. But her deliberate conflation of textual actual worlds and reference worlds restricts severely the applicability of the model. It is precisely the focus on textual reference world which permits the ***combination*** of all of the assembled factors from actual world knowledge with the other generic and intertextual sources of information. In this larger, more comprehensive reference world imagined to be ***reflected*** in the textual actual world we find the (acceptable) interplay of all of the extra- and intertextual elements relevant for any (kind of) text, and not only the relevant principles gleaned from the actual world. It is not sufficient to plot relations between the actual world and textual actual world, developing a taxonomy of genres on this basis, precisely because the ***crucial*** relations are between the reference world and text-models, world-models, and repertoire. Setting the actual world up as the prime model precludes a complete analysis. The textual reference world, as an epistemically accessible domain which "pretends" to genuine existence, accommodates the factors of genre and intertext which are otherwise marginalized in the more limited relational structure between the actual world and fictional worlds.

Considering the limitations of the concept of textual actual world (or fictional world) from this perspective, it is perhaps easier to understand the reservations of philosophers like Currie and Walton towards the idea of fictional worlds as accessible entities. In no way can such a world-concept account for what constitutes the (complete) set of fictional truths associated with any text. Any set of fictional-world truths is demonstrably subject to modification ***from the outside*** through textual structures. In terms of appreciation, there are never the impenetrable, closed worlds which some studies have suggested. No wonder, then, that Walton has insisted so rigorously on

the concept of make-believe as a means to account for a more accurate appreciation of the accumulation of fictional truths. It is most certainly in the reader's interaction with texts that truths are generated--not purely on the basis of prescriptions contained in the text, but through the process of confronting those prescriptions with extra- and intertextual knowledge.

Because our cognition of, and imaginative interaction with, fictional texts necessarily involves text-external knowledge bases activated by textual procedures, the concept of textual reference world is most crucial. This reference world is created by the reader as a kind of reality ***thought*** to pre-exist textual description/stipulation. As such, this world imagined to exist ***must*** be larger and more comprehensive than that created textually. It ***must include*** the relevant knowledge which we do not "turn off" when we open fictional texts. And it ***must reflect*** how that relevant knowledge is applied selectively or arranged according to text-models, world-models, and repertoire--the operations of the fictional sphere.

Rather than worrying about how readers can make assertions about fictional worlds from the outside, or refer to fictional characters from beyond the confines of a fictional world, we can focus on how readers "describe" a reference world where they are able to "relocate" temporarily through cognitive/imaginative processes. Through such processes the reader constructs a matrix for the fictional truth world, by contributing knowledge from text-external sources. The usual "assertions" about fictional entities are in no way divorced from such knowledge bases, which accounts for their typical ring of authenticity and undeniable bond with real-world truths. "Relocated" to the reference world, the reader lives temporarily in the best of all possible worlds, where he enjoys all the advantages of an ***inside*** perspective--in effect able to "point out" fictional individuals sharing occupancy of the reference world--but never loses touch with available relevant knowledge from actual-life experience, including the literary. This kind of truth world generates its own truths through reading procedures, in much the same way as occurs for the real world. As an imagined world thought to pre-exist the textual descriptions, it resembles reality in

that it seems to pre-exist real reference and assignment of properties. In effect, the metaphysical relationship between words and "reality" is re-established. Reference problems dissolve.

It is obvious that to refer successfully requires the individual in question to exist in some sort of ***context***, and the reference world provides an ideal explanation for that context. Names and descriptions refer in the reference world, which is separate from the actual world in that it "contains" entirely new entities, but which is not entirely isolated from the actual world because of the reader's inescapable applicable knowledge. Such knowledge constitutes a special ***access relation*** among worlds which makes reference both possible and meaningful.

This kind of multiworld access enjoyed by readers is shared in a more limited way by the characters of fiction. No longer thought of as entirely "locked in" their worlds on this approach, fictional characters take on a larger, more comprehensive existence which matches better our intuitions about their participation in reality and our emotional responses to their situations. The reference world allows us to see a larger continuity for the fictional world, which has a history and future not delineated through textual procedures, and an inventory of characters not restricted to the cast presented in the text. The reference world includes all truths activated textually: those directly asserted and those logically inferred, but also those not in any sense "told"--the vast number of untold facts which contribute to the imagining of an ontologically complete world.

It is to ***this*** world that we refer when we speak of characters as if they were ontologically complete persons, with selfhood and destiny. In this world we routinely "fill in gaps" in description and consider psychological motivation for characters' actions. Here we attribute to fictional characters an existential dimension which only membership in such an imagined "ontologically actual" world can provide. The ontological ambiguity of fictional characters--the sense of discrepancy between what we know about them and how we "relate" to them--is reduced in the reference world. In a significant way, fictional

characters "escape" their texts through our imaginative involvement with them. Whereas characters' "lives" are presented in stories as if they somehow reach a "state of rest" at the conclusion, characters may seem to go on living in the reference world long after their native stories, including possible sequels, have ended. Where finite texts end, reference worlds take over, developing the full potential of the fictional world created, making possible even "future" existence for characters, just as if they were independent, ontologically determinate entities.

In order to clarify the concept of textual reference world as I want to use it, we need to accept that there are in effect *two* story worlds in fiction. The first is the story routinely separated from discourse in classical narratology. It is the world of the "signified" created by the "signifier"/discourse. It has no independent ontological status or inherent narrative reality, and does not pre-exist the text. While nonfictional texts refer to an existing reality, fictional texts call into existence a world which is purely "signified." This is the "fictional world" routinely discussed in terms of logical violation, ontological ambiguity, and reference dilemma. The second story world is the referent *beyond* the "signified," comparable to the referent we find in reality itself. *This* is the imagined reference world, a concept which *capitalizes* on the triple relation inherent in language between signifier, signified, and referent. It is the world *construed as* an actual world existing independently from the discourse which describes the fictional world as signified. It is not, of course, an actual referent like the real world, but is imagined on that model, providing a crucial *context* for fictional reference and truth. In effect, the signified of the fictional world is an intermediary step between the signifier as discourse and the referent of the textual reference world. It is a step not needed in nonfictional discourse, which refers *directly* to the real world as referent.

The reference world *takes the place of* reality, becoming the referent for the textually signified fictional world. On this model it is consequently possible to preserve the intuitively accurate concept of autonomy for the fictional world, since it remains isolated in a significant way from reality as a referent. The reference world

assumes this important role, effectively ***replacing*** reality as a context for truth, and acting as "insulator." As a result, if we analyse the generation of fictional truth as a structured process which creates this reference world (where the reader "relocates"), we can ascertain how the textual signifier activates meaning beyond the directly signified of the fictional world, without having to subject textual actual world autonomy to any kind of correspondence with reality. In no way do we fall back into the snares of the "mimetic" approaches so scorned by Doležel. The referent of the reference world constitutes the additional "layer" of truth vital to understanding how fictional reference works. This "layer of truth" has a logical status comparable to (and modelled on) the referential truth of reality. But it is an independent mental construct which preserves the autonomy of fictional worlds, setting their "isolation" in a new truth context. The reference world depends primarily on the signified of the fictional world as a ***basis*** for fictional truth. But because the reference world is ***created by the reader***, it demands also the integration of the crucial extra- and intertextual factors which are activated through the mental juxtaposition of the signified with various other knowledge bases. In effect, we retain the autonomous signified fictional world, but recognize also a reference context where the reader assumes an ***internal*** perspective which gives him the authority to activate relevant knowledge.

The interaction of this imaginative process with knowledge bases is what I call the fictional sphere. By postulating this more total and yet insulating context for fictional truth, we can define how reading processes work. My next chapter suggests how a semiotics of reading perspective can augment this concept developed ***through*** fictional-world semantic theory. Instead of getting stuck on the level of the signified fictional world, as several important approaches have done, this analysis clarifies ***how*** readers actually proceed to construct reference/truth worlds. The approach sorts out the limitations of the semantic theory as traditionally seen, precisely by postulating the textual reference world as an imaginative stage beyond the signified fictional world.

The concept of textual reference world is fully compatible with a view of possible worlds as semiotic models or language-based constructs, while also making insightful metaphorical use of the more problematic metaphysical realist positions. Having identified in her article some of the major incompatibilities between possible-worlds theory and fictional-world semantics, Ronen finally suggests provocatively that possible worlds should be seen as ***models in a sign system***, identified with semiotic conventions of world construction, declaring that "[a]t this point the affinity between possible worlds and fictional worlds becomes apparent and productive."[74] My next chapter shows how the textual reference world is exactly this--not dependent only on a ***textual*** semiotic structure, but a model in the ***encompassing*** semiotic system, a construct dependent on culturally induced semiotic context. Focusing on the conventions of world construction ***from the reader's perspective***, this account addresses the problems of ontology by developing language- and culture-dependent epistemology.

After an exploration of the semiotics of reading perspective, I will investigate from Chapter Six how augmentation of incomplete fictional worlds is accomplished through the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere. Since the reference world is an imaginative construct modelled on reality as referent, my three factors of world-knowledge, genre, and intertext can be delineated fully in this context. Only by determining configurations of truth for the reference world can we overcome the incomplete signification of the fictional world, which ***cannot*** otherwise "include" the extra- and intertextual knowledge which we bring to our reading. We must see ***how*** our cognitive processes demand and create extended reference worlds. The imagined ***ontological*** status of characters in the reference world permits accurate analysis of the ***epistemological building*** of those characters. We must delineate the critical relation between the character imagined to exist in a reference world, and the inference procedures and principles of implication which construct that more complete character.

Notes

[1]Walton's example is our recognition of the six ***distinct*** bunnies in *The Tale of the Flopsy Bunnies*. Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 387.

[2]Nicholas Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility. A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 95.

[3]Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 143-5.

[4]Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 50.

[5]Castañeda 50.

[6]A very different view from that of schematic possibilities *for* individuals is espoused by Thomas Pavel and others--a view also valuable in the assessment of reading procedures for assembling characters. This view depends on Saul Kripke's concept of "rigid designator," and maintains that fictional characters can be named and individuated independently of any kind of description. In effect, the name "points out" the individual, defying Rescher's basic assumption about the importance of description. This view will be explored further in the section ahead on reference and character existence.

[7]Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects," trans. Isaac Levi, D.B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm, *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (New York: Free Press, 1960) 81-2, 108-9.

[8]I will consider ahead in the section on reference and character existence Terence Parson's lucid account of predicates and associated properties, from *Nonexistent Objects* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980) 22-7.

[9]Castañeda 34-5.

[10]Walton 16.

[11]Walton 130.

[12]Walton 132-5.

[13]Walton 385-419.

[14]Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 31.

[15]Umberto Eco, "Report on Session 3: Literature and Arts," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allen (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 344.

[16]Lubomír Doležel, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allen (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 230.

[17]Uri Margolin, "The Nature and Functioning of Fiction: Some Recent Views," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 19.1/2 (March/June 1992): 102.

[18]Margolin 102.

[19]Walton 387.

[20]Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 116.

[21]John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction. A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 26-7.

[22]Woods 27.

[23]Richard Routley, "The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 25.

[24]Routley 26. See also Woods 28.

[25]Walton 424.

[26]Walton 424.

[27]Richard Rorty, "Is There a Problem about Fictional Discourse?" *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 110-38.

[28]Pavel 16.

[29]Walton 386.

[30]Walton 387.

[31]Walton 387.

[32]Peter A. French and Curtis Brown, Introduction to Part IV, "Reference to Fictional Creatures," *Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Problems. A Reader for Introductory Philosophy*, eds. Peter A. French and Curtis Brown (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 159.

[33]David Lewis, "Truth in Fiction," *Philosophical Papers*, 2 vols. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 1, 261.

[34]Pavel 13.

[35]Gregory Currie, *Frege. An Introduction to his Philosophy* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982) 85-8.

[36]Currie 89-90.

[37]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 15.

[38]Meinong 81-2, 108-9.

[39]Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980) 22-7.

[40]Pavel 31.

[41]Parsons 51-60.

[42]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 132.

[43]Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, revised ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) 55-8. The following discussion summarizes Kripke's position.

[44]Ryan f270.

[45]Pavel explores the usefulness of the causal theory for fiction in his article "Fiction and the Causal Theory of Names," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 179-91, suggesting tantalizingly in conclusion (189) the possibility of "travel" among the domains of mythology, religion, and fiction. Walton's main objection to this approach is that non-entities cannot be causes, so that reference is not a relation at all (*Mimesis* 386). Currie develops a more elaborate argument based on his concern that fictional characters cannot be individuated/pointed out within the actual world. He concludes "...that no description to which we may legitimately appeal as a reference-fixing device will make "Holmes" refer to the *same* individual in all worlds" (*Nature* 136). See also 134-5.

[46]Ruth Ronen, "Possible Worlds in Literary Theory: A Game in Interdisciplinarity," *Semiotica* 80.3/4 (1990): 294.

[47]Ronen 294.

[48]Ryan 13.

[49]Ryan does define in illocutionary/intentional terms the rules constituting the fictional gesture, but this demonstration is not particularly relevant for this study. Instead, some of Ryan's very important work will be applied later to the problems of extra- and intertextuality and the generation of fictional truth--in particular, her concept of

recentering to fictional worlds (to be utilized in the next section), her analysis of relations between the actual world and the semantic domain of the fictional text, her discussion of minimal departure, and her analyses of qualities of narration.

[50]The following summary of Currie's theory is gleaned from Chapter Four, *The Nature of Fiction*, 127-80.

[51]Joseph Margolis, "The Logic and Structures of Fictional Narrative," *Philosophy and Literature* 7.2 (October 1983): 166.

[52]Kendall L. Walton, "How Remote are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 37 (Fall 1978): 16.

[53]Walton 404.

[54]Walton 390.

[55]Walton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 19.

[56]Walton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 19.

[57]Walton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 21.

[58]Walton, *Mimesis* 6.

[59]Walton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 21. The rest of this paragraph summarizes Walton's position as presented in this article.

[60]Walton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 21.

[61]Walton, *Mimesis* 392.

[62]Walton, *Mimesis* 396.

[63]Ronen 287.

[64]Ryan 21.

[65]Ryan 21.

[66]Ryan 111-12.

[67]Ryan vii.

[68]Ryan vii.

[69]Ryan 24.

[70]Lewis 266.

[71]Ryan 112.

[72]Ryan 112-13.

[73]Ryan 262.

[74]Ronen 295.

Chapter Five: Semiotic Communication, Reading Operations, and Textual Reference Worlds

Having identified the origins of the problem of extra- and intertextuality within theory by working from the basic assumptions of fictional-world semantics and adapting/refining concepts to complement the approach, it is now possible to elaborate the supplementation required to accommodate extra- and intertextual factors within the appreciation of fictional truth. To augment existing theory from a fresh perspective, I adopt a semiotics of reading perspective, such as outlined by Jonathan Culler in his early work. Relying on the concept of fictional sphere as the location of the *interplay* of world-models (world-knowledge based on socio/historical context), text-models (genre), and repertoire (intertextuality), we can begin now to appreciate how the mediating function of signs can be analysed in terms of how the known is imposed on the unknown and how order is imposed on an otherwise potentially disordered truth world. This chapter lays the foundation for an analysis of reading procedures and the principles which govern the generation of fictional truth, which follows, beginning in Chapter Six. My goals here are to identify the importance of reading strategy as defining fiction, to demonstrate how the reader functions within a semiotic communication model, and to isolate the main advantages of the fictional sphere as a codified structure regulating the creation of textual reference worlds.

Fiction as Reading Strategy

It is obvious from the preceding discussions that possible-world models help to define a distinctive quality for fiction, since the central idea of truth *within* a fictional context provides (at least superficially) the means to focus on the nature of fictional worlds and their texts. The transferal of truth assessment to the fictional context

allows us to see ***fictional truth*** as an identifying property of fiction, since by making propositions fictionally true, fiction establishes worlds at least provisionally free of empirical constraints. Non-fictional texts, on the other hand, claim truth for certain propositions, purporting to describe the ***real*** world, hence ***referring*** to that reality without constructing another world.

But clearly this rudimentary distinction of fictionality does not begin to account for the complexities involved in the reader's actual appreciation of fiction, and a more sophisticated application of possible worlds theory to the definition of fictionality is needed. In Chapter Four I have identified intentional semantic approaches which focus on fictionality as a mode of speaking necessarily involving intent. Such approaches de-fuse the ontological issue, but do not account adequately for the ***real*** reading activities involved. Although we might be tempted to view fictionality through the sender's intent for pragmatic evaluation or function, the reader will always assess such imposed criteria within a larger context of knowledge. He may even choose to ***disregard*** intent, reading, for example, an originally non-fictional myth as fiction, in the pursuit of aesthetic value. I also looked briefly at Kendall Walton's exploration of fictionality from the perspective of the reader's imaginative ***use***, particularly in terms of pretense to refer to fictional characters and make pretended assertions about them.

Considering fictional works as props in games of make-believe, Walton decisively distinguishes fiction from non-fictional texts, which do not have such a function.[1] Such a simple distinction allows Walton to construct an elaborate and insightful theory of imagination/make-believe to account for the reader's emotional interaction with fictional texts. The approach provides a fresh perspective which transcends some of the limitations of the more linguistically-oriented intentional semantic approaches, which focus on the fictional uses of language.

But it is also clear that Walton's theory is antagonistic to the view of fiction as essentially a means of communication. Having first rejected the importance of authorial intention as crucial to fiction, he also excludes from the essence of fiction communication in any sense

involving human communicators.[2] Although communication does obviously occur through fiction, Walton insists that we recognise *separately* the *primary* function of fiction as a prop in games of make-believe, whether or not the communication element is of interest or relevant.[3]

An approach which presents in this way a basic *conflict* between the view of narrative as a kind of communication and the role of imagination in relationship to fictional worlds is clearly not acceptable. We need to illuminate the whole role of imagination by thinking about it in *semiotic* terms. We must analyse the reading operations peculiar to literary fiction and to various (sub-)genres of narrative. We must understand both the "communication" of textually constructed, signified worlds, and the semiotic communication process of the reader's imaginative creation of larger reference worlds through complex reading procedures. To ignore such factors in order to develop a theory of fictionality is to limit empirical data in an unacceptably reductive way.

Realizing that reading procedures are crucial even for identifying the borders of fiction, it is not so important to define a *text* as fiction, as to identify a reading *process* as "fictional." To appreciate "access" to fictional truth, we must shift from the "objective" qualities of texts to assessing procedures of reading. Rather than focusing on what *constitutes* a fictional text from the intentional semantic perspective of authorial fictive intent, or Walton's ingenious prescriptions to imagine, we can identify fictionality from the perspective of reading operations and conventions. Readers contextualize narrative fiction within the large "genre" of literature, not only taking pleasure in the text, but also adopting appropriate strategies and modes of interpretation--becoming involved in a particular kind of *activity*.

It is generally accepted that the question of fictionality is not decided by the semantic properties of the fictional world alone, or by narrative textual procedures. A work's fictionality does not necessarily show in its words, since the identical sequence of words or sentences can, for example, constitute a novel or a biography. Certainly fictionality can be seen as an aesthetic issue, the reader deliberately

recognizing textual qualities even in texts which are strictly speaking non-fictional. But such recognized properties are by no means mandatory in fiction. In fact, if we consider the problem of distinguishing fiction from other kinds of texts--the problem of knowing where fictional worlds begin--we must recognise at once the complexity of certain reading procedures even for identifying the borders of fiction. In deciding about the status of a text, the reader routinely looks for fictional signals--aspects which indicate that a text is to be read as fiction, which sometimes take the form of obvious fictional operators. But even such "metacodal" elements do not preclude the possibility of violations or inversions, and readers cannot be presumed to "know" automatically what is fiction. Readers can be genuinely fooled, for example, in the absence of clear codes. It is often far from clear whether pseudofactual forms of writing should be read as real chronicles, letters, diaries, and so on. Although Marie-Laure Ryan develops a valuable semantic typology of fiction and accessibility relations between the actual world and textual actual worlds, she concludes that although the accessibility relations provide a fairly reliable indicator of fictionality, they do not constitute an absolute criterion. The question of fictionality involves generic expectations and the reader's knowledge of the rules of the fictional game.[4] Given the essential lack of specific world-creating predicates or visible intentional operators associated with fictionality, we must determine *how* the adopting of the ***conventions*** of fictionality becomes a constraint not only on identifying fiction, but on the more complex issue of reading for fictional truth.

By adopting a semiotics of reading perspective I accentuate the semiotic, conventional quality of reading operations, defining effectively the communication involved in fictional narrative within cultural practice--what it means culturally to read "as fiction" or as a particular literary genre. Clearly the reader experiences literary narrative against the conventions of ordinary discourse, and in terms of routine procedures for making sense of things. Readers "de-code" signs in literature at least partially as they do in other areas of their experience. But they are also conscious of the specifics of *literary* reading, as well as of expectations for particular (sub-)genres. They

become aware of how literary signs work to produce meaning. The literary context of communication must be established by readers, who then recognise particular constraints on interpretation. This context is much more complex than the pragmatic situation of spoken communication, involving a vast cognitive "environment." Literary effects ***depend*** on this historically changeable environment, including generic conventions. By analysing the culture-bound conditions of meaning involved in sense-making, interpretive operations, we demonstrate the culturally ***shared*** quality of the fictional reading process which activates truth structures. Fictional truth is consequently seen in its larger-than-textual communication context, acknowledged to have ***multiple*** origins within a cultural/semiotic system. Fictional truth is analysed not only as a construct of textual activity, but also as the ***product*** of cultural practice.

Reading any text "as fiction" is a cultural choice, relative to a particular society. Walton, Pavel, Ryan, and others have discussed the ***function*** of fiction as society-relative and changeable over time, texts being used differently in different social contexts. Traditional historicist critical approaches best recognise fictionality as an historically variable property, insisting on sensitivity to relevant cultural context. Again, the idea of original intention to produce fiction undermines recognition of such historical variability, suggesting instead a fixed determination of fictionality which ignores the importance of the reading role.

By analyzing reading operations, we also appreciate why fictionality cannot be determined by examining the relation of a text's words to the world, since fiction may be "about" real entities as well as the purely fictitious. What is important is how we ***treat*** the fictionalized characters, and what real-world facts we allow to remain attached to them. Through the reading focus we also see clearly that fictionality does not depend on the truth values of a text's sentences in relation to the real world, since fictional truths may or may not correspond to the facts of reality. The relation between what is the case in the real world and what appears in the fictional world is not even fixed once and for all by the author. The reader may view that relation in an entirely new

light as perceptions of actuality change. Such concerns, which have plagued the fictional-world semantic approach and limited its applicability, become explicable when fictionality is viewed from the perspective of reading strategies.

Communication Context: Genre, World-Knowledge, and Intertextuality

To restate potential propositions about fictional narrative discourse as procedures of reading is a fundamental reorientation which also facilitates an analysis of how we read texts *as* particular genres and sub-genres of narrative. Rather than considering genres as taxonomic classes, or special "varieties" of language, we can see them as sets of rules of sense-making, and in terms of ***expectations*** which assist the reader in understanding how various elements ***function*** in a fictional work. By considering how sets of expectations are activated, we can appreciate genres as the smaller, second-order literary systems which have interested Peter Rabinowitz.[5] Again, the basic deficiency of the fictional-world semantic approach has been to ***under-estimate*** the importance of such conventions/expectations, which constitute a text-external knowledge needed to interpret the structure of truth suitable for fictional worlds.

Generic expectations are actually the first stage in a process of converting narrative fiction into a communicative enterprise--expectations which allow the reader to "situate" narrative texts, or bring them within the realm of cultural experience. Generic conventions provide a vital *context* for the recuperation of fictional truth, as the reader makes sense of the textual information according to applicable conventions of reading. Fictional truth is ***not*** immanent in the text, but is rather ***"knowable"*** or recoverable only with respect to a system of operative conventions already assimilated by the reader, and shared by the writer in the first place. In effect, genres exist because of the shared knowledge of writers and readers. This knowledge allows authors to presuppose modes of reading which are not merely haphazard

or random, and to select particular techniques/information in order to produce certain predictable effects. By adopting modes of writing according to generic conventions, the writer does not merely assign or stipulate fictional truth, but makes possible the ***production*** of that truth through the ***mediation*** of generic expectations. We must consider, then, that genre represents a special ***context*** of (or code for) communication, which involves pragmatic factors not easy to reconcile with the concept of a purely linear communication of message.

The idea of a necessary text-external ***context*** for fictional truth is problematic for fictional-world semantic theory, since, as we have seen, such context cannot involve reference to reality. If this were the case, we would be able to solve literary disputes or answer questions about fiction by checking other sources of information. Nonetheless, I maintain that there is a kind of "extra-world" reference inherent in fiction which does in fact tie the fictional world to reality or other texts in a way disconcerting for philosophical theory, but quite natural to our appreciation of fictional narrative. In effect, the reader does "check" other sources of information by referring to this crucial extra- and intertextual context. If the fictional truths generated by such context cannot be taken ***into*** the ostensibly autonomous fictional world, they ***can*** be assessed accurately as components of the textual reference world built through convention-based reading operations which permit a ***variety*** of connections to be made. In other words, ***some*** kinds of "checking" according to context are appropriate, and this operation of the fictional sphere serves to build the suitable truth world for any fictional narrative.

As well as considering genre, then, as a special context of literary communication, we must also look at the importance of reality factors as world-knowledge. In addition to what can be easily assessed as a principle dependent on perceived authorial norms generated directly through textual narrative procedures, there is also a very important "reality principle" which has been clarified recently by Walton on the basis of earlier discussions of "minimal departure." This latter principle involves text-external factors which may be out of the writer's control and which are consequently hard to locate on a standard

rhetorical communication model. So while some fictional truths may well be implied through an authorial "control," the reality principle can *only* be understood within the *larger* context of a semiotic system, where the reader ascertains on the basis of his world-knowledge and the relevant narrative genre *which* fictional truths are to be generated.[6]

There are potentially several models of coherence which are activated in reading. But essentially expectations for fictional truth can depend on two kinds of "correspondence": that between the text and socially given reality (which can be seen itself as a text since it is represented in interpersonal discourse), or that between the text and other texts within a genre. We can speak of a fundamental, inescapable "intertextuality" as the relation of any text to other texts provided by social culture and literary genres. We must determine how these principles of integration *between texts* will be activated for various narrative (sub-)genres.

Intertextuality constitutes the third factor of context for literary communication. No fictional narrative can escape the ramifications of the intertextual code, whether that involves a precise, analyzable relationship with other texts, which provide a repertoire of applicable fictional truths, or whether we speak only of prior texts as co-contributors to a general, anonymous code--a cultural discursive space --which makes possible the generation of particular fictional truths. By considering how a work is read in connection with or against other texts, we can examine how texts "absorb" from other texts, re-forming themselves into larger truth worlds. An intertextual grid governs the "recycling" of intertextual knowledge.

No fictional narrative can escape such ramifications. Narrative texts become intelligible according to the *relevant* models of coherence, so that *particular* truths are recuperated. But it is necessary to *co-ordinate* these various factors in terms of the operations of the fictional sphere--to understand various *potentials* for the generation of fictional truth. The interplay of conventions and information sources *builds* the relevant truth world; that is, the shared meaning which becomes possible in the fictional sphere is that which the interplay of

genre, world-knowledge and intertextuality makes possible. Not dependent solely on textual stipulations, the construction of fictional truth is activated and constrained by the intersection of the various extra- and intertextual factors. Clearly fictional texts taken within cultural/literary context establish somehow the ***range*** for all plausible/possible interpretations of fictional truth. But we must define the limiting ***apparatus***, by considering first of all how outside knowledge is ***structured***, and then by determining how such knowledge is ***ordered*** for any truth world.

This is not to say that we can ignore the narrative text itself, since the integration of extra- and intertextual elements within the fictional sphere depends primarily on the structure of the text, which acts as a "trigger" mechanism. How texts ***activate*** extratextual context is really the focus of investigation. But we must avoid the kind of textual analysis which refuses to acknowledge the vital role of text-external factors in the generation of fictional truth, treating them instead as "interference" in an otherwise ***internal*** logic or modal organization. In the quest for fictional truth, the reader cannot ignore the text-external knowledge which takes him beyond the boundaries of an "autonomous" world signified textually.

Procedures of narration which are said to stipulate or construct a fictional world ***also*** call into play the more problematic factors of the semiotic system to which the narrative belongs. While valuable insights can be achieved about the quality of fictional worlds and reader reaction to them, purely by analysing narrative procedures, there will always remain factors which cannot be integrated satisfactorily into such an analysis unless we adopt a semiotic communication model. Although fictional narrative texts are usefully analyzable in terms of internal macrostructural organizations, every narrative text is in fact a semiotic exploration where even seemingly straight-forward narrative statements must be considered also in relation to text-external factors. In effect, the language of the fictional text assumes its ***own*** narrator-independent autonomous productivity in relation to the conventions of the encompassing semiotic system. Fictional truth is not some kind of "essence" activated in writing, and waiting to be discovered, as the

insistence on the narrative construction of fictional worlds suggests. Beyond the "constructed" or signified world, we must isolate the series of cognitive procedures to which world-creating discourse gives rise, producing a fuller range of fictional truths as an imagined reference world. In order to signify ***fully***, every narrative statement must activate an extratextual context.

However attractive the concept of autonomous worlds may be, texts do ***refer*** beyond themselves, at least in the sense that the reader looks beyond the narrator's world "construction" to an imagined reference world about which the narrator ***seems*** to speak. We need to see how textual narrative procedures ***activate*** the extratextual factors involved in this process--what the links are between narrative strategies/procedures and the larger semiotic codes which are inescapably invoked.

Deficiencies of the Rhetorical Communication Model

The reader does look to narrative fictions to generate fictional truths in accordance with the semantic structures of texts, which are conveniently construed as sets of instructions for the "recovery" of the fictional world. We are particularly comfortable, for example, with the rhetorical communication model, and also with identifiable procedures of narration, which remind us of standard speaker to listener communication. But it is crucial to distinguish the semiotic process of communication from other kinds of communication often presumed in fictional narrative.

Recent rhetorical criticism has constructed a communication model in which the literary work is seen as a rhetorical form conveying meaning from an implied author to reader. Writing need ***not*** be thought of in this way, yet we do find it difficult to escape the old implications of authorial intention, which is basic to our intuitive thinking about literary narrative. We are comfortable with the idea of an implied author (who may be quite different from the narrator) who presents us

with information, much as a speaker conveys a message to a listener. Obviously at least some fictional truths are generated routinely through this understood process. We are also fond of understanding narrative texts as the discourse of a narrator (explicit or otherwise), who "tells" us about what "happens" in the fictional world. Far from experiencing the fictional world only as a construct of the narration, we routinely imagine that the narrator refers to an extant, pre-existing world. In this way we convert the text into a communication about a fictional world which we then see as "situated" in relationship to a narrator and reader. The reader feels included in the narrative "situation," so that "meaning" seems to fall somewhere ***between*** narrator and reader, particularly where the text does not inscribe a narratee. This is all very comfortable.

Although this rhetorical orientation provides already important clues as to how the reader constructs reference worlds, the semiotic, culture-based communication process involved in fiction is much more complicated than the rhetorical communication model allows, and we must consider independent factors over which the author has perhaps no control. If we conceive of determinate communicative intentions as the only origin of the signs by which we recognize fictional truth, we will not appreciate fully the nature of literary communication, which does not depend on the author as an "addresser" or authoritative source of meaning to be recovered. For this reason, Roland Barthes speaks of the "voice of reading" in written texts, so that "***...in the text, only the reader speaks.***"[7] The author is not the only source of "meaning" in literary narrative. The rhetorical bias has been most evident in the intentional semantic approaches outlined above, with the result that definition of a more comprehensive fictional truth world has remained impossible. Rather than focusing on a humanized communication project, we need to formulate the larger applicable literary conventions and world-knowledge which allow the narrative to be constructed as it is. We need to look ***beyond*** authorial intention to the norms/models which influence also that intention in the first place. If we think of the writer as a ***semiotic function,*** fictional narrative communication takes on a ***codified*** form, which is easily related to extra- and intertextual concerns. We would then need to see authorial intention or

"fictive intent" as postulating the response of some kind of imagined (or model) reader who "knows" the relevant conventions. Extra- and intertextual knowledge factors become inextricably involved in the semiotic communication process.

Questions of authorial intentionality are furthermore just ***part*** of the literary system, which is ***self***-regulating, in Siegfried Schmidt's terms. We must admit even the possibility of totally ***unintended*** effects into the problem of generating fictional truths. In this sense then, authors do not "create" a textual reference world which is anywhere to be "discovered" by the reader. Authors may well have in mind (both consciously and unconsciously) extra- and intertextual factors which will interact with their texts, but they do ***not*** set up the matrix for that interaction, which is activated through the reading operations of the fictional sphere, necessarily involving the larger cultural context.

Clearly, narratological communication models are heavily indebted to the rhetorical tradition, since primarily designed to show sources of information and how the process of transfer of information works. Although such models foreground other important factors of epistemological access, such as point of view and narrative reliability, they still emphasize the role of communication through distinctions between narrator, narratee, and narrative agent. The standard charts such as provided by Seymour Chatman and Wallace Martin are ***synthetic*** representations of the various possibilities which can be actualized during the process of reading texts.[8] Such charts map configurations of the various "interchanges" among different levels (such as narratee and implied reader). They can generate valuable insights about fictional world structures and reader reaction. They do ***not*** tell us much about the actual reading process itself.

Ideally, the narratological communication model initiates the study of narrative structure and meaning by examining how the reading process functions ***in terms of textual constructs***, as opposed to a more abstract approach. The problem is that the textual constructs need to be tied to real reader operations and the actual generation of

fictional truth. This task has seemed formidable mainly because of the disconcerting tendency of narrative features to move back and forth across the fiction/reality border. Distinguishing among authors, implied authors, and narrators can be tricky enough, but the real problems involve difficult distinctions between "implied" and real readers.[9] Because it is so easy for the demarcations between text and context, and between fictional world and interpretation, to become obscured, it becomes impossible to fix "meaning" in place.

The notion of the fictional sphere suggests a means of reducing the enormity of these problems with shifting elements, allowing for a process-oriented account of reading for fictional truth which comes to grips with the activation of relevant truths ***through*** textual constructs. As I have suggested and will explore especially in Chapters Seven, Nine, and Twelve, the construct of implied reader, or authorial audience as suggested by Rabinowitz, is a particularly valuable "bridge" of this sort, between texts and real reader operations. In effect, the imagined textual reference world provides a suitable location for the interaction of textual construct with real reader expectations/knowledge.

Rhetorically-based models ***help*** us to consider narrative fiction only as a more permanent version of the communicative speech act. While they are fully compatible with intentional semantic approaches, they have also discouraged some philosophers (Walton in particular) from considering fiction as communication. To establish an accurate frame of reference for a theory of fictional truth we must remember that there are substantial ***differences*** between literary and pragmatic communication. We need ***instead*** to recognize the ***independence*** of the written narrative text, which is separated from the ***ordinary*** circuit of communication. Instead of concentrating on the author as source (or sender) and the text as object (or message), we need to focus on what Culler calls "...two correlated networks of convention: writing as an institution and reading as an activity."[10] Narrative fiction is both isolated from the routine pragmatics of other simpler sign systems and subject to its own set of contextual pragmatic conditions. Signifying processes become very complex.

Because the nature of writing provides more *open* possibilities for readers to construct meaning than models based on speech and the tradition of narrative voice suggest, narration procedures and the construct of implied author are only *part* of the process of generating fictional truth. Thought of as rhetorical communication, narrative fiction tends to string together a sometimes mind-boggling variety of "voices," some of which are not even identifiable, and which involve in any case different points of view, registers, levels of involvement or focus, etc. In the context of the fictional sphere the reader contends with such contradictory discourse by placing it into an extratextual communication context, articulating a textual reference world *on that basis.* So while rhetorical models of communication (and their narratological derivatives) may provide special insights about the generation of fictional truth, we need to analyse the implications of the *stability* and independence of literary narrative as a *different kind* of communication involving its own kind of "communicative circuit," to adopt Culler's term. The interplay of contextual factors must be organized into a communicative circuit where messages with various origins are co-ordinated to produce a cohesive totality for the fictional reference world. Not a product of the text alone, fictional communication occurs through the conjunction of textual and extratextual factors in the fictional sphere.

The Semiotic Communication Model: Convention and the Competent Reader

To appreciate, then, the *author-independent* quality of the fictional narrative text, we need a semiotic communication model. Textual features do *not* stand alone. They must accord with applicable *principles* of generation for fictional truths which are not to be found inscribed in texts, but which are activated within a larger cultural context. To come to grips with the principles in a systematic way we must understand the reading operations first in semiotic terms, as to the *means whereby* principles are activated, and then in terms of the semantic *consequences* for fictional truth.

Although we do tend to think of meaning as a property of literary works, in fact such a property only becomes evident when a text is treated *as* a literary work.[11] Meaning is ascribed to texts according to applied codes. Literary fiction has meaning because read in a particular way; that is, certain properties are actualized by the process of reading. In the *same* way, fictional truths are not purely properties of fictional worlds as "established" by texts, but depend also on contextual factors of generation. Meaning depends, then, on a certain competence in decoding and in fulfilling the role of receiver in the total semiotic package of the communication.[12]

Rather than treating literary narrative as a rhetorical form, we need to study the literary and cultural conventions at work in the generation of fictional truth. We need to determine why and how we read stories as we do. By defining how reader competence is activated--both intuitive competence and that which depends on a literary socialization process--we can determine better the quality of fictional truth for different (sub-)genres of narrative. By locating what is common in the routine procedures of reading, and mutually understood conventions, we discover what makes fictional communication possible. We must *not* diminish the role of communication in fiction, but work to catalogue the nature of the semiotic communication process, and determine a systematic interaction for the various principles which generate fictional truth, appreciating thus the author-independent quality of the fictional narrative text.

In order to show how meaning becomes possible in a textual reference world as a product of the interplay of conventional knowledge, we must clarify what is involved in the process of information gathering and co-ordinating, that is, how factors of genre, world-knowledge, and intertext ***interact*** to generate fictional truth. The truth structure for fictional worlds takes on a ***shared*** intersubjective quality which depends on reading procedures involving an implicit mastery of semiotic conventions, and recognition of a network of relations among the signs which form bridges among worlds. In this way we can speak of ***multiple origins*** for messages about fictional truth--origins within the codes of the larger semiotic system to which

any text belongs. We can analyse how fictional content is *structured* by cultural processes beyond textual boundaries.

I presume, then, that narrative fictional truth involves interpretive practices, or techniques for making sense, which it is possible to describe *accurately*. Since there is no communication without shared conventions--signs are meaningless unless we know what they signify--I presume that narrative texts activate shared codes.[13] We must proceed first by identifying the *effects* of signification, and ultimately by constructing a model of the signifying processes involved--a model which will account for the effects. To this end it is necessary to *qualify* the communication role of literary fiction which involves a semiotic participation in the *production* of meaning, through the creation of textual reference worlds.

First we must identify the nature of reading operations in semiotic terms, and then develop on the basis of possible-worlds theory the workings of a matrix for fictional worlds. Understood first in semiotic terms, the reading operations can then be analysed in terms of semantic consequences, by developing a program of configurations to represent the interaction of the extra- and intertextual elements influencing those operations. Rather than accepting an *unsystematic* quality for the principles by which fictional truths are generated, we determine the *shared* quality of that generation as an intersubjective, rule-governed process. The means by which fictional truths are generated are *not* merely contingent, but have a conventional quality which can indeed be analysed in terms of different *combinations* possible.

It is necessary to determine the unstated, underlying principles at work in interpretation, at least some of which may be presuppositions anterior to reading a particular fictional narrative. We must analyse the *combinational possibilities* for the various principles, which are not merely contingent. Interpretation can be understood thus as a cultural activity *functionally* linked to fictional meaning. The shared meaning made possible in the fictional sphere does not depend solely on textual *stipulations*, but is constrained also by the intersection of the various culture-bound extra- and intertextual factors triggered by the text.

Following a semiotic approach, we can define the ***conditions*** of meaning operative ***in*** the fictional sphere--the ***sense-making,*** interpretive operations on which the literary institution itself is based. Presuming that literary signification necessarily involves interpretive operations, we must recognize how the reading process involves an implicit mastery of semiotic conventions, that is, an ability to recognize how social and cultural phenomena ***signify*** and are defined by a network of relations. It is the system of relations among signs which allows for the production of meaning, which is not an independent "essence" to be "found" anywhere. As Culler explains, meaning is possible with respect to conventions, and in relation to the structure of the encompassing system.[14] In order to explain meaning in terms of interpersonal conventional systems, we must postulate implicit "rules" operating at an ***unconscious*** level. Again, according to Culler, we must think in terms of a structuring ***process,*** in which the reader is involved, and which is ***reflected*** in actual interpretation.[15] Narrowed down to the question of fictional truth, the otherwise unmanageable project to discover structures for meaning becomes a matter of determining the rules which govern ***combination possibilities*** within the matrix.

We must develop, then, an appreciation of the semiotic system where fictional narrative belongs, the role of the reader within that system, and ultimately an appreciation of the semantic ***consequences*** of reading operations. We must ask ***how*** it is that readers activate ***particular*** fictional truths, focusing on the extensive agreement which often prevails among interpretations. At the level of ***shared*** reading operations it is possible to develop a coherent account of the potential relationships between the complex ***principles*** of implication and fictional truths. It is not a question of readers following "rules," but rather that certain principles are ***implied*** by certain operations, which can be shown to have a shared or public quality. In defining principles, then, we consider them as ***reformulations*** of readers' ordinary judgments about fictional truth, rather than as explicit guides.

And as a result of determining a systematic interaction of principles, we can understand also the interpretive operations which

produce *disagreements*. Such disagreements depend on the activation of *different* principles, on the basis of particular conventional knowledge (including critical orientations), as well as the individual reader's literary competence to function within the semiotic system. Obviously some readers are better equipped to participate in the semiotic communication process than others, recognizing more easily and more comprehensively salient fictional truths. There is variation in the ability to *recognize* relevant textual activators of knowledge bases, and also in the "quality" of those knowledge bases themselves--how sophisticated or complete they are. But we must assume that diverse readings are nonetheless effects of signification resulting from interpretive conventions which *can* be described accurately. It is possible to formulate the *sets* of explicit principles which will account for diverse interpretations, thereby providing also a specific account of literary competence and its relationship to fictional truth generation.

In this way we appreciate the *network* of relations involved in the production of meaning. In effect, the fictional sphere becomes a system with its own order, which allows us to see how the reader makes sense of a fictional narrative text with reference to a larger context. Although the fictional world provides a good example of "constructed" meaning, it has nonetheless an inescapable particular relation to the real world and the various discourses which represent that world. Its collection of fictional truths must be completed and re-organized--brought into the reader's realm of experience, and co-ordinated with supplementary knowledge. The operations of the fictional sphere provide this link with reality, or interface between fiction and reality.

It is necessary to formulate *clearly* the internalized competence which enables narrative fictions to have the properties they do for readers. By defining this kind of conventional knowledge it is possible to understand the generation of fictional truth in a much more systematic way than philosophers have been able to propose. We can determine how potentials for fictional truth are recognized on the basis of expectations and supplementary knowledge, and ordered into particular truth worlds. Such procedures do involve a literary socialization which teaches readers to distinguish the possibilities of

literature in general, and the possibilities for fictional truth in particular. It is precisely this extrapolation from literary experience in general, and from one work to another, which requires explanation in terms of the matrix for fictional worlds, where we can appreciate the differences in procedures and resultant truths as a ***function*** of the conventions activated. However "invisible" or natural conventions may seem, they are the enabling conditions for the generation of fictional truth within reader-constructed textual reference worlds.

It is essential to determine how any text fits into and activates public interpretive schemes. We must locate fictional truth within the conventions of plausibility which our generalized, interpersonal knowledge of fictional narrative, of literature, and of the world defines. ("Competence" must be seen to include factors of world-knowledge.) What requires explanation is not so much the text in and of itself as the source of a constructed fictional world, but rather the possibility of reading/interpreting the text according to conventional standards of acceptability and plausibility, so that shared literary effects and communication are possible, in terms of reader-constructed reference worlds. In this way, we begin to deal usefully with the ***intelligibility*** of fictional narratives, by analysing the ways in which the reader makes sense of fictional characters and their actions. Texts become intelligible according to the relevant models of coherence applied. We cannot determine a full set of "mandatory" fictional truths for even the most straightforward literary narrative, but we can account for the fact that fictional narratives can generate a variety of meanings, yet not *any* meaning whatsoever. We can also account for why some fictional works seem intelligible to some readers, while others find them incoherent, and why even "mistakes" in interpretation can often be recognized when knowledge is made explicit through teaching or criticism. It is useful to focus analysis on the ***play of intelligibility*** involved in recovering fictional truths.

Once we assume that fictional truth depends on *ways* of reading and making sense, we can begin to appreciate the entire underlying system of operative conventions which contributes to the reader's tacit knowledge. Assigning fictional truth is a semiotic process in which the

reader attributes significance largely on the basis of learned cultural and literary codes which the text activates but which involve extra- and intertextual factors. The reader cannot escape from such codes when faced with a fictional world to understand. In this way, fictional truth can be dealt with as "plausible" and justifiable ***because*** determined at least in part by the reader's knowledge of the world and literature. It is not so much a text-internal logic of fiction which needs to be determined (as the philosophers seem to think), but a larger ***"logic" of reading operations*** which depends on shared notions of the acceptable or appropriate. Chapters Six and Seven provide and apply the critical/theoretical background essential to developing an accurate assessment of reading procedures and resulting truth generation.

A Codified Structure for the Fictional Sphere

It is clear that by drawing upon supplementary conventions, the reader ***converts*** fictional narrative into a kind of communication in order to understand it. He "bridges" the difference between fictional discourse and ordinary speech--***not only*** by adopting the expectations for spoken communication, but ***also*** by calling into play supplementary world- and convention-based knowledge. To use Culler's term, the activity of reading/interpretation ***naturalizes*** the fictional text by bringing it within the realm of the reader's experience.

The process of naturalization is in fact basic to cognitive operations, constituting a means of making ***anything*** signify, by producing an appropriate ***context*** for meaning.[16] Naturalization is thus an important ***global*** structuring principle for the matrix which produces comprehensive truth worlds. To ignore contextual factors by insisting on a purely autonomous structure for fictional worlds would be to disregard basic factors of cognition. Instead, we must consider naturalization as an ***inevitable*** function of reading, and develop a ***detailed structure*** for the naturalization process, identifying various potential configurations for interacting extratextual factors, which contribute to the production of textual reference worlds.

In order to bring the language of incomplete fictional narrative worlds into a context or order which will generate satisfactory meaning, the reader relies on routine procedures of naturalization. It would be absurd to think of a reader as somehow closing off access to all previous experience when opening a fictional narrative text. Even complex narratives which seem to violate all conventional expectations depend for their effect on the reader's ability to recognize the *departure* from the norm. We must determine *how* the general regularities of conventional knowledge control the generation of fictional truth, and how inference of all kinds is regulated in terms of the fictional sphere's structure.

Since there are shared interpretive strategies of naturalization, which have identifiable consequences for fictional truth, we can speak usefully of a *codified* structure for the fictional sphere. The codes are present in the narrative text only insofar as they can be *activated* by the reader; that is, they are part of the structure of the *reading process.* As the reader struggles to naturalize fictional texts he works out a meaningful system of connections or relations, assuming that the codes designate "functional spaces" in which he can *categorize* fictional truths. We must determine *how* the reader identifies the elements and classifies them according to functional categories, that is, how factors get selected, combined, and hierarchized to produce fictional truth.

To understand how we activate the full range of truths which constitute textual reference worlds, we need to isolate the series of *developments* to which textual discourse gives rise. Such developments are determined by various relations between the semantic structure of a text and the conventions of the larger semiotic system to which it belongs. In effect, the language of the written text assumes its own autonomous productivity only *in relation to* the semiotic system. Certainly fictional narrative can mean *many* things, not all of which are intended by the author, but which seem nonetheless to be *limited in range* by the conventional context. Any message about fictional truth has multiple origins in the codes of the semiotic system, which serve as originators of information. Writing itself depends on

codes which are conventional in nature. And it is through the reading process that these codes are ***activated*** as origins for meaning/truth. So, far from "containing" or stipulating the full package of fictional truth, narrative texts signal codes which the reader activates--codes which allow for a more complete generation of fictional truths on the basis of shared extra- and intertextual knowledge.

To recapitulate, then, we must identify the underlying rules according to which various extra- and intertextual factors can ***combine*** to produce meaning--the rules which govern combination possibilities and establish possible hierarchies for the components within the matrix. If we can identify the ***codes*** which make the communication of fictional truth possible, we can qualify the selection and combination of factors within the fictional sphere. We must determine how the codified structure is built for different narrative sub-genres. It is one thing to affirm the existence of systems of convention, but quite another to actually formulate the rules in question, with respect to the particular problem of fictional ***content,*** and to determine how they will be demonstrated in different circumstances. By treating the communication involved in fictional narrative as a ***codified*** form, we can understand why fictional truths ***cannot*** be simply constructed by the narrative discourse, but are rather produced through the ***processes*** of reading ***as fiction***, and the reader construction of textual reference worlds.

Advantages

Certainly the question of individual worlds of the imagination must be dealt with. Some of the approaches in philosophy such as that of Walton have stressed a basic ***conflict*** between the view of narrative as a kind of communication and the role of imagination in relationship to fictional worlds. But even games of make-believe can be effectively illuminated by thinking about them in ***semiotic*** terms, specifically by considering such worlds of the imagination as ***products*** of the intersubjective operations of the logical space of the fictional sphere.

In effect, individual worlds of the imagination can best be understood in terms of a kind of "second-order" processing or recovery of meaning ***beyond*** the routine operations of the fictional sphere. The reference or truth world created in the fictional sphere must provide the total truth context ***before*** the more personal, individual involvement can occur. My analysis focuses on the crucial ***intermediary*** factors of reading as a shared process for recovering fictional truths on the basis of the text's interaction with other elements within the larger semiotic system. The concept of fictional sphere is thus useful to clarify these intermediary reading operations which construct a textual reference world, and which form a sort of bridge between the fictional world itself and the full individual worlds of imagination developed in relationship to that fictional world.

The games of make-believe approach is based on a wonderful appreciation of a shared reality--a fictional "place" somehow separate from reality--where fictional characters and readers seem to interact. But surely such interaction is possible only ***through*** semiotic textual procedures and the reader's subsequent creation of a reference context for those characters. We must correlate the inscription of characters in fictional worlds through textual procedures with the reader's role in the creation of an imagined world which can accommodate both the textual stipulations and the relevant extra- and intertextual knowledge bases. Otherwise, we are left with a serious discrepancy between the representation of fictional entities as they appear in works, and the pretense aspect of the reader's appreciation. In an important sense, fictional characters do "exist" as constructed in their texts, and the reader understands what it means to talk about them, not ordinarily worrying about ontological problems. But the reader routinely "builds" the character far beyond its textual dimensions and discusses it in those terms. The point is that this construction/discussion cannot be limited to an individual game of pretense, since it involves the numerous extra- and intertextual factors of the structured semiotic system to which the text belongs. These factors are what make intersubjective discussion about the content of fictional worlds possible in the first place.

It is precisely this shared, public operation which makes the appreciation of narrative fiction different from imagination in general. Before we can consider the individual processes involved in personal imaginative games, we must appreciate the interpersonal construction of textual reference worlds--worlds which are publicly shared and basic to intersubjective discussion of fictional characters. Individual pretense will normally involve such truth worlds and be ***constrained*** appropriately.[17] Interaction with fictional characters is not explained adequately, then, by a pretense model which is focused entirely on individual imaginative processes. Only the concept of a fictional sphere which produces textual reference worlds can explain the vital interconnections among textual stipulation, extra- and intertextual knowledge, and the reader's personal interaction with fictional characters.

It is also clear that the semiotic perspective treats interpretations as the "completion" of a literary work. But here again, the heuristic concept of the fictional sphere can serve to alleviate a controversial problem. It is not acceptable to many critics that interpretations or responses belong to the structure of the work, and indeed, the problem of fictional truth and the fictional-world semantic insistence on the autonomy of fictional worlds has accentuated this controversy. But if we consider the fictional sphere as an interface between the fictional world and reality or social context, we have an effective means to preserve the autonomous structure of fictional world truth (or textual meaning), while also coming to grips with other important factors of reader response. The concept of the fictional sphere provides a framework for understanding interpretation as an important cultural activity ***functionally*** linked to the meaning which we think we "encounter" in fictional narratives. The fictional sphere and its resultant textual reference world thus provide a good "compromise" between approaches which insist that interpretive operations have impact on the very essence of narrative fiction, and those which study interpretation as a cultural activity only closely related to that fiction.

Using the approach suggested, we can indeed sort out the mechanics of generation of fictional truth which seems so chaotic. Working

towards a coherent theory of how people read narrative, we examine the grounds of interpretation itself, and study ***how*** narrative fiction comes to activate fictional truths. The main benefit is that extra- and intertextual factors are not seen, then, as mere "interference," as many critics like to suggest, but are instead ***crucial*** to the process of interpretation, and have a direct bearing on the rules which govern combination possibilities for fictional truth worlds. Such factors can be set up as a matrix for truth worlds--hierarchized and assembled into grids or configurations which represent methodically an otherwise apparently chaotic collection of principles.

It is crucial to approach these problems from the reader perspective, rather than to build an account of fictionality through intentional semantics or to attempt to define the "institution" as such. As Culler has explained, if we conceive of narrative forms as basically conventional, it is easier to study those conventions as the sense-making, interpretive operations performed by readers, rather than as an institutional context presumed by authors.[18] Because we can begin with the ***effects*** experienced, the reading process seems more open to observation. And an examination of the "receiving" end of the communication permits us to construct a model which will eventually illuminate the encoding processes. In this way, narrative fictional works can be seen as manifestations of a literary system which acquire meaning through the convention-based reading process. There is no use in claiming that we can somehow define ***exactly*** how the signifying process works, or even the exact nature of the semiotic system of conventions which makes fictional narrative possible. But by focusing on the more ***limited*** question of fictional truth generation, we can begin to appreciate better what readers actually ***do,*** and thereby begin to characterize literary narrative as an institution.

We could of course discuss the "rules" that govern reading according to logical categories without introducing such concepts as the fictional sphere or textual reference world. But it is one thing to provide a logical classification of possibilities, and quite another to develop a logical system which explains which of those possibilities will be actualized for a given fictional world. If we are to go beyond a kind of

arbitrary, ad hoc discussion of the conventions of reading, we must introduce a notion such as the matrix as a codified structure for fictional truth worlds. In this way, we can use the ***particulars*** of fictional content to come to grips with complicated semiotic reading procedures.

Notes

[1]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 72.

[2]Walton 89.

[3]Walton 89.

[4]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 46-7.

[5]Peter Rabinowitz develops Culler's concepts about reading as literature and as genre very well indeed in his book, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987). Later I will use his analyses to develop a clearer conception of how the generation of fictional truth about non-actual individuals is influenced by such factors.

[6]The principle of minimal departure will be delineated in Chapter Seven and used subsequently to develop world- and text-model analysis.

[7]Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 151.

[8]Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse. Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978) 267, or Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 154.

[9]Wolfgang Iser's insightful work on the various channels of communication inherent in literary works has been plagued by such "shifting elements." As a result, his theory of aesthetic response falls disconcertingly between a purely conceptual analysis of literary communication and a process-oriented account of reading. See *The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[10]Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 131.

[11]Culler 113.

[12]Probably the most useful single concept from the semiotics of reading approach which can be used to illuminate the generation of fictional truth is that of literary competence. In linguistics, Noam Chomsky used the term "competence" to mean the "...explicit representation by a system of rules or norms, of the implicit knowledge possessed by those who successfully operate within the system" (quoted in Culler's *Structuralist Poetics* 9). Such competence was distinguished from actual performance, and it was acknowledged that some rules were ***unconsciously*** known. On the basis of Chomsky's work, Culler posits literary competence as a set of reading conventions (or strategies for understanding) which a qualified reader in a certain culture possesses. Competence is thus a measurable ability to implement the conventions (*Structuralist* 114).

[13]This is not to say that signs cannot exist in literature and elsewhere which would seem to have "inherent" meaning without communicating any. The point is that where this occurs the signifying process collapses.

[14]Culler 5.

[15]Culler 30.

[16]Culler 138.

[17]There could possibly be individual games focused almost exclusively on the text and its constructed world, if we presume a textual world which is radically bizarre and resistant to supplementation through relevant knowledge. But without common grounds for imagination beyond textual stipulation, these game worlds would not be conducive to intersubjective discussion. There would be little to distinguish them from imagination in general.

[18]Culler 117.

Chapter Six: Inference and Implications for Fictional Truth

Narrative fiction obviously encourages all kinds of literary commentary and interpretation, by including advice about suitable inference, suggestions for "correct" interpretation of fictional truth, and the proposal of all manner of "intertextual" interpretations. Recognizing the futility of discovering the formal structures fundamental to stories, critics often prefer to participate in the *process* of reading stories, not concerning themselves with abstract structures, but rather exercising strategies which are fundamental to their literary competence. It is this *production* of meaning which requires analysis--the sense-making activity involved in the reader's encounter with the text and its characters, and consequent construction of a textual reference world. To speak of readers we automatically talk about meaning and interpretation, including the question of validity and the relation of meaning to various principles of implication. A relatively limited focus on fictional truth generation about characters allows us to determine what is admissible for the production of meaning within a limited context, especially in terms of access to text-external knowledge bases.

This chapter outlines the fundamental components of the fictional reading process, through summary of, and commentary on, the most relevant work accomplished concerning inference procedures. It relates insights about inference to the central problem of potential fictional truth proliferation. Naturalization and coherence-building are presented as fundamental strategies. The object here is to create a framework in which to set the discussion of specific and definable knowledge bases, and from which a codified structure for contextual inference will proceed logically.

Fundamentals of Inference through Phenomenology

Given the (pleasurably) incomplete quality of fictional worlds explored in Chapters Three and Four, it is clear that the reader must *do* things with the sentences of fictional narrative, which are not sufficient to stand alone. He must bring textual language into an ordered context which will generate satisfactory meaning, creating a codified structure for the textual reference world through routine procedures of naturalization.

We know that fictional truth about characters is either explicitly stated in textual propositions or can be derived from those propositions through logical inference. Properties are routinely assigned through such direct procedures. But on this restricted model we are left with variably large areas of residual indeterminacy. To suggest that fictional worlds can be thought of as ***indicated*** classes of propositions will never solve the problem of validity for reader inferences, which depend not only on textual "indications" but also on the activation of extra- and intertextual knowledge which takes the reader beyond direct logical inference. To reduce indeterminacy the reader routinely introduces his own individual supplementation. While some things are explicitly true in a story because the text says they are or directly implies their truth, other truths must be generated by various artful methods of inference. All kinds of fragmentary "clues" are picked up from texts and supplemented.[1] Not only does the reader complete story gaps with sentences/propositions which logically follow from those which appear in the story. He routinely introduces/generates additional fictional truths which seem mandatory in order for the story to make full and proper sense.

In this way, we can think of "meaning" and fictional truth as the adventure it really is. It is only through reader involvement in the generation of fictional truth that boredom while reading can be avoided. We read quickly though long passages of detailed realistic description, but slow down for the "gaps" or shifts in perspective, or enigmatic passages, which we treasure as a source of pleasure and literary "value." Particularly in realistic texts which make extensive use of

traditional codes, the reader finds pleasure in locating sites of indeterminacy or uncertainty. This semiotic participation in the production of meaning lies at the heart of the appreciation of fictional narrative.

This process involves the construction of an imagined textual reference world, where indeterminate truths can be ***measured*** for validity. Narrative fictions themselves provide a textual set of instructions much like stage directions, a musical score, or architect's plans. According to Dale Jacquette, literary fictions are

> ...aesthetic objects in and of themselves, but are fully realized only in another medium... in a reader's imagination. The artist usually provides just enough evocative information for us to enter imaginatively into the art work, and by an act of intentionality bring its characters and events to life.[2]

This is precisely what Roman Ingarden concerns himself with in terms of the reader's ***concretization*** of the literary work of art. It is the construction of fictional truth through reading as an ***active*** process which takes aesthetic appreciation beyond the purely passive, as demonstrated in Wolfgang Iser's understanding of the reader's relation to text. In effect, the reading experience supplants the literary work, particularly since the larger reader-constructed reference world assumes such dominance as a structure for fictional truth.

The concept of a textual reference world created through codified structure highlights the essentially pleasurable modes of ordering and sense-making intrinsic to the cognitive operations involved in routine daily life. We can appreciate better the challenge and pleasure of the *activity* of reading, in terms of cognitive operations coupled with explicitly understood conventions of reading, the benefits and drawbacks of which can be recognized.

But before exploring conventional fictional sphere structures, it is desirable to consider briefly some of the fundamental work which has been accomplished in recent years concerning the schematic structure of fiction and the activity of reading, starting with Ingarden's original

formulations about concretization and aesthetic objects--formulations which both introduce basic truth concepts for possible-world semantics and anticipate reader-response criticism. A "logic of reading operations" depends on this kind of analysis, focused on aspects of indeterminacy, and concerned fundamentally with what the reader *does* with the words of a literary text.

While Ingarden provides a descriptive analysis of the particularly problematic ontological status of the literary work of art and formal structure, he is fundamentally concerned within the phenomenological approach with the ways in which literary works are naturally experienced.[3] The essence of a literary work is encountered or phenomenologically founded in literary experience. He distinguishes between the work of art itself and the work as an aesthetic object concretized through intentional acts of reading.[4] Ingarden accounts for both the content of objective textual structure and for aspects involving the subjective conditions of the reader's access. But he carefully distinguishes the possible multiplicity of aesthetic objects (which assume "lives" of their own) from the subjective *processes* of interpretation. In no way does he equate the work of art with the mental experience of it, insisting on an *intersubjective* object conducive to scientific investigation, as opposed to purely individual psychological considerations. And in opposition to the structuralist emphasis on the formal structures of the literary text, or the typically formalist equation of poetics with linguistics, he recognizes as fundamental the structures of aesthetic consciousness which construct fictional worlds *as* intentional objects. As such, Ingarden's work focuses usefully on the creative capacity of the reader's consciousness, presuming in effect that textual structures depend in the first place on the aesthetic capacity of consciousness and resultant reading procedures.

For Ingarden, the literary work exists dependent on the intentional acts of both author and reader, but is not identical with those acts. It is constructed through mental acts and the physical signs which provide for a continued existence, as well as ideal concepts. Ingarden defines the "essential anatomy" of literary structure in terms of four

heterogeneous but interconnected strata: the verbal sound or phonetic stratum, the stratum of verbal and sentence meanings (semantic stratum), the stratum of schematized aspects as possible perceptible manifestations of represented objects, and the stratum of represented objects (as intentional correlates of the sentences). Each stratum is unique and indispensable, with its own properties and function, but all are mutually conditioned and structurally related, creating the polyphonic harmony prized by Ingarden (and typical of realistic works).

The stratum of meaning units provides the structural framework for the entire work, as an ontic basis for the other strata, projecting imaginary, purely intentional states of affairs. Here Ingarden deals with reference problems, the "quasi-judgments" of fictionality as opposed to genuine assertion, and intentional objectivities which are purely the target of intention, having no independent ontic status. Ingarden defines here the suggestive power of textual affirmations which plunge the reader into a "simulated world"--an unreal world, yet with the appearance of reality so readily definable through the possible-worlds approach. The entire concept of textual stipulation for fictional worlds is indebted to Ingarden's appreciation of meaning units as constructing states of affairs through various modes of representation.

The stratum of schematized aspects is virtual, actualized in reading, and relates to perception in the real world. The emphasis here is on the *schematic*, incomplete quality of aspects perceived, somehow "held in readiness" by the text, and "co-ordinated" by the reader to produce represented objectivities through the concretization process. The quasi-reality experienced through reading fiction is particularly illuminated by this important concept which recognizes the importance of the reading activity as world-creating. Particularly in realistic works, the presentation of mutually-supporting, interconnected aspects will facilitate the "readerly" building of a fictional world which closely resembles reality.

The stratum of represented objects is central to aesthetic perception, usually the only factor to be apprehended thematically, the first brought to the reader's attention on simple reading, and the object

of concentration for most routine literary criticism focused on content, especially that with mimetic emphasis. Here Ingarden explores the ***simulation*** of reality which necessarily includes the discontinuities, spots of indeterminacy (or gaps) foreign to reality, problems of individuality, as well as locations/objects which cannot be identified with those actually found in reality. Represented objects and space can be linked to "imaginational" objects and space in reading. Here he also introduces the quasi-stratum of "metaphysical qualities" (such as the tragic, sublime, or grotesque), which are revealed through the represented objectivities, which provide their ontic basis.[5]

The crucial feature of Ingarden's analysis of represented objects--the feature which allows for the more "scientific" approach focused on the structure of fictional worlds through the reading process--is the concept of ***spots of indeterminacy*** in purely intentional objectivities. Unlike real objects, represented objects are projected by a finite number of meaning units. As we have seen in Chapter Three, while real objects are determined in every respect, with those determinations forming a concrete unity and assuring absolute individuality, the non-existent objects of fiction enjoy no such comfortable ontology. The schematic presentation of limited information with the "selection" of features, and empty spots in the schema, all point to the need for reading operations which "complete" the represented objectivities. Obviously gaps about properties and relations must be dealt with by the reader, who must ***infer*** about schematic individuals or worlds more than is explicit in the introducing characterization offered through meaning units or a semantic stratum. Ingarden maintains that readers are not conscious of spots of indeterminacy, but proceed to "actualize," going beyond what is simply presented in the text, ***completing*** the represented objectivities. There are, then, ***many*** concretizations possible because of the schematic structure, some particularly "encouraged" by the text. Obviously the mechanisms whereby various extra- and intertextual knowledge bases are activated will be crucial in this concretization process.

What is particularly useful here is Ingarden's insistence on the independent ontic status of the concretization which is not "psychic" or

to be found in the mind of the individual reader. Certainly spots of indeterminacy are partially filled in within concretizations, so that the potentialities of aspects held in readiness and metaphysical qualities can be transformed into actualities. But concretizations also contain elements which are not really part of the work, although allowed by it. As such, concretizations involve the text-external knowledge bases which are the focus of this study, and produce the textual reference worlds on which I insist. These reference worlds do have that special ontic status which distinguishes them from purely individual imaginative worlds, through the recognition of shared epistemic factors which construct an ***imagined*** ontological status. As Ingarden explains, readers treat represented objects ***as*** fully determined, and forget that these are purely intentional objectivities. They tend to complete indeterminate areas imaginatively, just as if the individuals/objects really existed and were fully determined. This is exactly what happens in the reference world, where the reader "almost believes" in the reality of fictional characters, imagining an ontological status which ***allows for*** the epistemological building of those characters through the concretization process. Ingarden's approach encourages this kind of critical relation between the character imagined to exist in a reference world, and the inference procedures and principles activated to construct the more complete character from the schematic textual presentation.

While Ingarden sees the various strata as a cross-section of the structure of the literary work, he also considers the more longitudinal section in terms of order of sequence for reading. We can think, then, as Roland Barthes does in *S/Z*, of reading as a succession of ***units*** of comprehension. Each unit will involve ***all*** of the strata, interrelating them on an on-going basis. As such, the process of concretization is temporally extended even though all parts exist simultaneously, and we can speak of an internal dynamics for the narrative/reading process. The textual components become relative to subjective reading operations, so that we are left with the unresolved problems of later reader-response criticism, where it becomes unclear where texts and textual constructs such as "implied reader" end and real-reader concretization begins.

In Ingarden's later work, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, he shifts his attention from the mode of being and formal structure of the literary work as purely intentional object, to focus on the processes leading to the cognition of the work, and what results obtain from cognition. The work of art is treated as an object of knowledge. He is not concerned with individual psychology, but with features essential to the cognitive experience, defining varieties of cognition relevant for literary studies, according to different attitudes assumed towards the work.[6] Of particular interest is Ingarden's appreciation of the "cocreation" of active reading which projects a world, the synthesizing operation of "objectification" of states of affairs, and the dynamic structure of the reading process and the role of kinds of memory. Most important is his assessment of the possibility of intersubjectively accessible knowledge about aesthetic concretizations. In other words, the same abstract aesthetic object can be concretized by ***different*** readers, allowing of course for some "nonessential variation." It is a question of defining the tools of research which can deal with such forms of knowledge. He discusses also in this context the question of ***probable*** completion and the limitations for concretization which a work imposes. Rather than seeing concretization as a receiver's subjective experience, it is clear that at this point Ingarden recognizes concretization as a potential object of literary scholarship.

Reading for (Complete) Meaning

Inheriting Ingarden's basic model and key concepts (at least from the earlier work), Wolfgang Iser puts the phenomenological approach to work to analyse the relation between texts and individual readers.[7] He is not fundamentally concerned with the socio/historical and conventional factors of a reading public, discusses "the reader" largely as a transhistorical entity, and presents speculative concepts without any empirical verification with real readers. Yet the focus on the communication process and reader/text interaction proves fundamental to my project.

Iser focuses on the practical aspects of the reading process and comprehension, as governed by the literary text, presuming that reader involvement coincides with the production of meaning. To develop a theory of literary effects and reader response, Iser highlights the convergence of text and reader which is necessary to produce the literary work. Textual meaning is not to be ***found*** in the text, but results rather from the ***interaction*** between text and reader. Meaning is an experience, and the act of reading, a cognitive process. Seeing the artistic pole of the communication process as the author's text, and the aesthetic pole as the realization accomplished by the reader, Iser situates the work ***between*** text and concretization, as an interaction between the two. The work is thus ***virtual*** in nature, not reducible to the reality of the text or to the subjectivity of the reader. Iser works to define the dynamic structure of the interaction as textual structures affect the reader, or effects produce response.

Considering, then, that the text represents a potential effect realized in the reading process, or a "set of instructions" as in the fictional worlds approach, Iser must examine how meaning can be assembled, in terms of the mental processes of sense-making which take place. He identifies the textual mechanisms which provoke interaction, bringing into play the imaginative/perceptive faculties of the reader, then applies concepts of pattern-making and consistency-building rooted in gestalt psychology. He considers the imaging function of the creative reading process--an imagistic effect which becomes a synthesis of Ingarden's schemata, endowing meaning which is ideated into the totality of the work. In this way, meaning production invokes not only the structure of the literary text, with its schematized aspects which the reader must concretize, but also the reader's own process of consistency-building and an ideation not dependent on perception. This creative reading process depends on the textual provocation of ***active***, imaginative reader involvement, which in turn produces dynamically the "reality" of the work. Reading is an act of ***re***creation, which organizes and reorganizes the textual data, in a complicated process involving stages of anticipation, frustration, retrospection, selection, integration, and reconstruction, both on the level of individual elements and that of the coherence of the whole work.

Obviously Iser's concern with ideation is of central interest here, since a fictional world which has no existence of its own can only come into being by way of such processes. Ideation evokes the presence of something not given--something non-existent. Unfortunately Iser does not use such psychological/cognitive insights to address the ontological problems of the relation between fictional worlds and reality. Not concerned primarily with meaning or fictional truth, he focuses on the *effects* of literature--the function of literature as a means of communicating something *about* reality.

Moreover, meaning for Iser is not realized as exhaustive, with an intersubjective structure, but rather as experienced, diverse, at least in part purely subjective, and not fully definable. The interaction of the two partners in the communication process (the artistic pole or textual structure and the aesthetic pole as structured acts of comprehension) has *variable* results, producing a literary work both dynamic and virtual. No single realization will exhaust the full potential of any text.

While such an appreciation of individual reading is indisputable, it does little to facilitate the intersubjective discussion of individual interpretations. Iser never in fact establishes the primacy of the role of the reading subject, nor the contextual factors which have a direct bearing on interpretation. It remains unclear as to where the subjectivity begins, and to what extent both text and extra- and intertextual factors constrain or "program" the reader's response. Inferences are seen as based on textual strategies; that is, the immanent structure of the text triggers acts of comprehension in the reader. Yet he insists on multiple possible individual realizations. Not concerned in a structuralist way with the techniques of persuasion, with narrative devices, or with conventional context, Iser concentrates on the *open* quality of incomplete structures which encourage reader interaction.

But if each reading is a personal, "unique" experience, it is still necessary to link theory with practice, and to translate the "unique" event into *shared* knowledge. Otherwise there can be no measure of acceptable realizations. Unfortunately, Iser finds no means to

differentiate the acceptability of interpretations. He does not identify the ***shared*** quality of the reading experience which results from conventional context and shared knowledge bases. He tends in his own critical practice to a more text-oriented, less liberal version of his theoretical description of the reading process.

Of the various concepts developed to discuss the dynamic reading process as consistency-building--most notably those of schema and correction, figure and ground, theme and horizon, wandering viewpoint, and repertoire--that of "gap" is the most useful for this study. Having defined in earlier chapters the important and problematic quality of incomplete fictional worlds, we can now appreciate at once the value of Iser's focus on the incomplete quality of texts. For Iser, the textual organization ***must*** be incomplete in order to stimulate the reader's imagination. Gaps provide a fundamental asymmetry between the text and reader which gives rise to communication by stimulating a constitutive activity on the part of the reader. Iser defines various kinds of textual indeterminacy which provoke creativity by providing points at which the reader must interact with the text, bridging gaps. Gaps result in ideation and a variably "completed" work, as the reader supplies the missing links and pictures the unwritten elements.

Obviously this view is concerned with imaginative reading, the individual synthesis of given information, and ***private*** perception which is necessarily variable. Iser wants to go beyond a discussion of the rhetorical devices which influence readers, and address the important question of reader ***participation*** in meaning construction, through imaginative involvement. Although meaning is prestructured by the written text, that is, the structure of gaps controls the process of interaction, meaning finally ***materializes*** in the reader's reactions. The reading process coincides with the establishment of the ***virtual*** dimension of the fictional world. The reader formulates an unwritten text as opposed to discovering pre-formulated textual meaning. The approach does not ignore the semantic amplitude/deficiencies of the text, yet allows us to envision the role of the reader as central to the creation of a textual reference world, by emphasizing the communication process encouraged by textual gaps.

If we think of implicit textual meaning as generated by and recovered from textual semantics, and hence no less "objective" than explicit meaning, Iser's notion of gap provides a useful way to analyse reader involvement in a kind of ***reciprocal*** process of communication. Since a more complete textual content depends on the reader's involvement, and is not contained within textual structure, all kinds of textual incompleteness, fragmentation, and ambiguity can be seen as a challenge and stimulation for the reading activity of constructing reference worlds for fictional truth. Textual strategy produces reader involvement and the required ideation process related to the construction of reference worlds. By using the notion of gap we can approach the basic problem of incomplete fictional worlds, not only in terms of textual semantic indeterminacy, but also by identifying the more text-external factors of interpretation, which involve the reader's extra- and intertextual knowledge bases. As the reader is able to establish connections and construct a textual reference world, his creation of meaning is fed back into the text, producing impact on the other textual statements. Once an adequate frame of reference has been postulated, the process is one of continual revision and correction.

While it would be easy to write off the notion of gap-filling as "reductive" since based on Ingarden's admiration for polyphonic harmony and realist aesthetics, in fact Iser is careful to distinguish his views from Ingarden's understanding of concretization and "places of indeterminacy." Iser insists that a work may be concretized in different, equally valid ways, and not only according to the norms of classical aesthetics. He stresses the element of ***communication***, based on Ingarden's concept of the structure which conditions reception of literary works; that is, he places the emphasis on the ***interaction*** between text and reader, as opposed to concretization as actualization of a text's potential elements. The need for "completion" of blank areas is replaced in Iser's theory by the need for "combination," or the ***relation*** of schemata through connecting operations. Where indeterminacies block the connections of textual patterns the reader's ideation is activated, resulting in communication.

It is important to realize that Ingarden's concretization concept was a crucial break with the traditional view of art as representation--a break which is reflected also in Walton's work with games of make-believe, for which the textual fictional world is a prop. In concentrating on the psychological participation of readers Walton also takes as fundamental the text/work distinction and addresses some of the issues central to Iser's theory of aesthetic response.

But clearly the process of reading narrative fiction must involve more fundamentally a ***publicly*** definable structure which can be captured better in my concept of textual reference world, which reflects Ingarden's concretization process more accurately. For schematically presented fictional worlds the reader ***must actively construct*** the world to which the words refer, rather than merely fill in missing details by looking only at reality or at other sources of information. He must determine a ***structure*** for the viable relevance of knowledge bases. Gaps are crucial, precisely because the reader must determine what "belongs" according to a semiotic communication model.

While Iser's purpose is to account for the ***process*** of reading narrative fiction, it is only his ***basic*** framework which proves genuinely useful. The more intuitive discussion of perspectives and factors from gestalt psychology, while often insightful, do not provide a convincing total account of the reader's encounter with fictional worlds.[8] It is clear that all kinds of gaps, shifts in perspective, and textual enigmas prove a source of reading pleasure and are valued for their "literary" merit. From the point of view of fictional truth, there are more gaps than fabric--more open interstices than weft and warp. What is not narrated (for various reasons) leaves open what exists in the reference world. A comment in Raymond Chandler's *The Big Sleep* expresses the idea neatly: "It had the austere simplicity of fiction rather than the tangled woof of fact."[9] We must determine the full range of optional yarns available to fill the holes, and what selection and arrangement mechanisms govern their implementation.

Considering the entire spectrum of reader-response approaches to interpretation, from the purely subjectivist view focused on the

individual psychology of readers and their unique responses (as in the work of David Bleich and Norman Holland), to the institutional dimension as a sociology of literature (as in Pierre Bourdieu's approach), we find that the focus on comprehension factors and the interaction of text and reader constitutes a central position most conducive to the analysis of incomplete fictional worlds and the process of reading for fictional truth. The speculative work of Iser with its roots in Ingarden's phenomenological global theories is important here, as well as more empirically conducted work with discourse analysis and artificial intelligence. Complementary to this emphasis on comprehension, with its inherent dispute as to text/reader dominance, is the next stage in the spectrum, which focuses on the conventions of interpretation, as in Culler's widely structuralist approach used in Chapter Five to define this study's methodology. Stanley Fish and Steven Mailloux extend the approach to discuss communities of interpretation in an effort to define validity--an approach which, although interested in kinds of conventions, does not define successfully the nature of interpretive communities.

In the extreme positions of both subjectivism and institutionalism the important interaction between text and reader is marginalized, focusing respectively on the individual psychological factors and on institutional power and ideological structures. At the one end we find a celebration of *variable* interpretations which depend on the *personal* involvement of the reader, and a sense of the inherently unstable quality of textual meaning. At the other end we become engrossed in the sociology of literature as an institution, so that the content of the text itself also loses significance. In the more central positions we look at the process of comprehension, and how the reader's role is circumscribed by factors of conventional knowledge. The creation of fictional truth is analyzable as a *co-operative* endeavor, undertaken within a conventional context and by relying on shared knowledge and assumptions.

By focusing the fundamental concerns about inference on the specific problem of generating truth about fictional characters we appreciate the priority which must be assigned to reading operations as

constructing textual reference worlds. Individual concretizations suggest an ontological completeness for fictional characters, as if they were actual, fully determinate individuals. This is why the ***imagined*** ontological status in a reference world is so important because it represents what readers actually ***do***. The deficiently delineated worlds of fiction can only be completed through such comprehension and inference procedures which construct the missing reference worlds imagined to correspond to the textual world. Presuming an imagined ontological completeness for characters in the reference world, the reader undertakes to build epistemically through inference procedures that very completeness. The reader ***imagines*** the ontological completeness of characters in the reference world, and ***builds*** the epistemological completeness in the fictional sphere. In this way, ontological deficiencies are compensated for by conventional knowledge, including how literary narratives are produced. There is a critical relation between imagined characters and the principles of implication involved in inference procedures. The epistemological concerns of possible-worlds theory are thus illuminated usefully by the basic phenomenology of reader-response criticism.

Potential Proliferation

It is immediately obvious, however, that some concretizations or supplementations of fictional truth involve the filling in of gaps about character properties and relations with elements which, while textually ***compatible***, can remain entirely ***undecidable*** in terms of fictional truth status. If we focus primarily on the psychological ramifications of the active reader involvement we are faced with a serious problem of ***proliferation*** for fictional truths--a problem which is exacerbated most drastically in reader-response criticism concerned with individual readers, and in the strategy of Walton to focus on individual, imaginative game worlds. More generally, any kind of deconstructive readings tend also to ***enlarge*** textual gaps rather than fill them in with measurably valid or appropriate truths.

It is necessary instead to determine a structure for what is common/shared in the construction of fictional truth, as suggested in Chapter Five, in terms of the reading operations of the fictional sphere. The shared understanding and application of conventions makes analysis of textual reference worlds a viable enterprise. Certain knowledge bases are fundamental to reading operations, producing obvious continuities visible in interpretive traditions. To postulate a systematic analysis of reference worlds does not discount the possibility of diverse, even antithetical, interpretations. But the analysis must reveal underlying procedures/conventions which can account for a ***range*** of ***plausible*** interpretations. All manner of interpretations are possible, but can only be ***shared meaningfully*** by appreciating the kinds of conventional interpretive operations involved, which make the relationships among various interpretations more comprehensible, and demonstrate the foundations on which diverse interpretations are based. Fictional truth will not seem eccentric or idiosyncratic if based on the codes or principles at work which everybody knows.

In most general terms we can probably all agree with Nicholas Rescher as a point of departure, that the reader's background information is ***not*** abrogated by possible worlds. While fiction yields at least some truths or knowledge not derived more directly from experience, it will always relate in some definable ways to the reader's experience (including literary) as an unavoidable consequence of reading. Obviously the reader's knowledge is not all put into suspension by the schematic textual provision of facts, and inference will depend on a vast "encyclopedia" (in Umberto Eco's sense) of relevant knowledge. At the very most, the reader will only turn off particular world-knowledge ***selectively*** as instructed by the text itself or by text-models, re-arranging what knowledge is applicable. The reader knows, for example, many things about the real world--the way things work, how people are likely to behave in certain situations, and specifically what absolute and dispositional properties are to be expected for human beings. This latter example involves what Uri Margolin calls "generic inference," a procedure which boasts a different operational status in relation to fictional truth, since it depends on particular text-external knowledge

bases. The reader is entitled to ascribe to fictional characters those properties associated with its genus/species.[10] Emma Bovary will most assuredly possess only ***one*** stomach and will feel hunger when she neglects to eat. Yet, if Emma lived in a fictional world less governed by the conventions of literary realism (such as those of science fiction, romance, or fairy tales), things could well be radically different; that is, world-models of all kinds can be overruled by specific textual stipulation or replaced by text-models which invalidate some standard world-models. Even "generic inferences" are a function of the ***type*** of world inhabited, and its basic regularities.[11] The (competent) reader knows what to expect of literary genres, and will apply that knowledge as required, letting inference be guided by taking into account other texts in which a similar kind of fictional world is presented. She also knows how to understand all kinds of intertextuality (which can involve also the most fundamental of character properties), including satire, parody, and inversions, because she is familiar with both cultural and literary conventions. Otherwise she would miss the point of many stories entirely.

But before identifying in more detail the kinds of principles of implication available, and working towards a codified structure for such contextual inference procedures in Chapter Seven, it will be helpful to look more closely at the issue of fictional truth proliferation as fundamental problem. Clearly, individual concretizations are unlimited in number and may be undecidable as to truth status. There can be many ***alternative*** realizations of fictional character, all compatible with textual stipulation, but which ***go beyond*** textual implications in ***different*** ways. The result can be many different "completed" versions of the same character, each with partially different property sets. Since the reader's semantic encyclopedia is potentially infinite and the semiotic process is unlimited, texts seem to take on also a potentially infinite quality. The difficulty is to "limit" or judge the validity of the completions, in terms of what fictional truth a text can be seen to generate. As Eco says, a text "...can generate only those interpretations it can foresee."[12]

If we consider again Marie-Laure Ryan's somewhat open concept of ***semantic domain*** as a totality for the meanings suggested by a text--a set of valid inferences/interpretations--we have to realize that the semantic domain goes ***beyond*** outlining a system of reality as a textual actual world and its alternative possible worlds. This semantic dimension constitutes the narrative text itself. As Ryan explains so effectively, outlining the basic value of the possible world concept,

> "[n]arrativity resides in a text's ability to bring a world to life, to populate it with individuals through singular existential statements, to place this world in history through statements of events affecting its members, and to convey the feeling of its actuality, thus opposing it implicitly or explicitly to a set of merely possible worlds.[13]

The narrative universe created is built out of a collection of facts established textually for the textual actual world and its alternative possible worlds. In contrast, however, "...the semantic domain accepts any kind of meanings: statements of fact, generalizations, symbolic interpretations, subjective judgments expressed by the narrator, or formed by the reader."[14] We need, of course, to determine ***how*** the reader forms such judgments about meaning through the operations of the fictional sphere.

Approaching the proliferation of fictional truth problem from the perspective of games of make-believe, Walton feels at ease (as we have already seen) defining a story-world according to the collection of propositions whose imagining is authorized in the associated game. The content of such propositions is determined both directly by the features of the text (or the actual sentences), and indirectly by various rules of generation applied to the text--what Currie calls background assumptions. At least theoretically we can distinguish between the primary, directly-generated fictional truths and those only implied indirectly. "Propositions of the first kind are made fictional by the words of the text alone, while those of the second kind are made to hold on the basis of a core of primary truths plus principles of implication."[15] Walton hastens to point out, however, that

> [f]ictional truths on which others are based may themselves depend on still more basic ones. ...It may not be easy to find incontrovertible examples of ***primary*** fictional truths... But it will be convenient to assume, temporarily ...that there must be such, that every representation generates a core of primary fictional truths that depend on no others, and that are responsible, indirectly, for whatever other fictional truths it generates.[16]

There may be various combinations possible among primary and implied fictional truths, some depending partly on textual features and partly on other implied truths.

But obviously, given schematic construction, and the nature of reading concretization and inference procedures, any narrative world will involve many more ***implied*** than primary propositions. "Fictional truths breed like rabbits. The progeny of even a few primary ones can furnish a small world rather handsomely."[17] In other words, there are many things ***implied*** if we are not told otherwise, simply because the reader adheres to a default principle as for "maximal" possible worlds. Most crucial is to determine precisely what the default mechanism entails, however, since world-knowledge is only ***one part*** of the impetus to maximize fictional worlds, and must itself be restricted in order to constrain otherwise unmanageably large worlds.

The relationships among direct and implied fictional truths are complicated in other ways. Some implied truths may be very inconsequential or irrelevant, closely akin to the galaxy of possible "maximal-world" truths which need never be actualized. On the other hand, some of the most centrally important fictional truths may be generated only indirectly. For example, what the reader considers as standard inferences on the basis of mental, verbal, or physical actions will involve a personality definition and attribution of motives which becomes highly significant. Such implied fictional truths may assume a prominence far greater than those truths on which they depend. Primary truths may be quite insignificant apart from what they imply, and may go almost unnoticed.[18]

Since the reader often makes conclusions about a character's personality traits without realizing (or caring) which "primary" fictional truths are responsible, Walton feels that it is misleading to say that in general the reader "infers" implied truths from those on which they are based.[19] Recalling Iser's emphasis, we can easily see that the very indirectness of generation can lend a fictional truth a prominence which it would not otherwise have if generated more directly. The active concretization process depends on the reader's desire to "discover" things and make connections which produce meaning. The process involves expectations for literary reading, as to what will be significant. Because the reader's attention is focused by literature in a particular way, he expects to have to derive meaning from textual information, however scanty that may be. As a result, conclusions made on the basis of text-external knowledge bases may well assume a prominence in relation to "directly" generated textual stipulations. The text *invites* the reader to make the connections, to envision implications, and to activate suitable structures for fictional truth through *active* involvement.

Walton's view supports such an appreciation of fundamental inference procedures, since he recognizes that directly generated fictional truths are not in general more important or more obvious.[20] In effect, their "discovery" depends no less on inference. The point is that even the most seemingly "explicit" propositions in a fiction may depend on the fictional truth of propositions which are only implied or expressed "implicitly." Primary truths are not identical with those made "explicit," nor are implied truths only presented "implicitly." Indirectly generated fictional truths, for Walton, are the ones which depend on *others*, whereas primary truths do not. Seen in these terms the whole generation of fictional truth seems a very complex process indeed--one which must be understood from the reading perspective and by defining the *context* of reading, rather than by defining only kinds or qualities of textual presentation and provocation.

It is necessary, then, to determine what kinds of *principles* govern inference from different kinds of primary truths to implied truths. Such a project enables us to make *specific* the more general concept of

concretization of schematic texts, in terms of the supplementation and expansion of limited textual information. Unfortunately, although Walton eventually discusses some important principles which I will consider at length in Chapter Seven, he insists that the mechanisms of indirect generation are essentially ***disorderly***. The "principles" seem to be "...numerous, diverse in nature, and seldom explicitly formulated by readers or critics."[21] Implications are not governed by any systematic set of principles, but rather "...by a complicated and shifting and often competing array of understandings, precedents, local conventions, saliences."[22] So, in effect, the "rules" are isolated conventions which say that when something is fictionally true, something else will be true as well. According to Walton, there is no set of rules to be determined, since the reader's discovery procedures involve many sharply divergent principles depending on local need. He rejects the whole idea of a set of systematic meta-principles which would enable us to determine which principles are applicable when.

Containing Fictional Truth

Walton's position represents ***at once*** an insistence on the ***individual*** quality of reading, which will result in interpretive disagreements depending on which principles are activated, ***and*** a refusal to identify the individual cognitive processes involved in the communication situation of narrative fiction. Obviously, it is sensible to suggest that even one reader may expand potentials for "meaning" on second readings, or that ***different*** principles can be applied to the same fictional text in different readings, resulting in different sets of fictional truths for the same text. Ingarden made abundantly clear that the concretization process results in a "literary life" for the work, which varies historically according to interpretive traditions. Walton's games are clearly subject to this historical variability. Yet he refuses to consider how the ***communication*** process works between texts and individual readers. Here Ingarden's evolution in coming to view concretization as potentially dependent on intersubjectively accessible knowledge should not be ignored.

As a consequence of his de-emphasis of the role of communication in fiction, Walton is skeptical of the possibility of identifying with any accuracy the effects of signification. Presuming that the semiotic communication process (as I have outlined in Chapter Five) is too disorderly to catalogue, he focuses on the diversity of individual interpretations. The key to finding a ***systematic*** interaction of principles lies in ignoring the proliferation of interpretations, which can only function as an obstacle to an appreciation of fictional truth generation, focusing instead on what is ***shared*** in the communication process. What is ***constant*** within and between readers in individual games or reading is important: the habits and the conventions activated which depend on the reader's experience with life, literature, and narrative fiction. Essential here is the combination of what is "signified" in the process--what the effects of signification are--and what becomes the larger "referent" created by the (competent) reader.

The only way to escape both Walton's concerns with individual games and the end of the spectrum of reader-response criticism which focuses on individual subjective readings is to consider the ***intermediary*** domain of the fictional sphere, where the underlying principles based on conventional knowledge can be explained as to hierarchy, and assessed as *inter*personal norms--not as learned rules, but as reflections of routine practice. This is the kind of intersubjectively accessible knowledge which Ingarden saw as potentially analyzable. The moving of game worlds to a ***product*** position beyond the fictional sphere alleviates the rejection by Walton of semiotic/conventional factors, since his appreciation of the disorderly process almost entirely concerns these game worlds as second-order processing. In other words, he bypasses the important factors of ***shared*** reading procedures, intermediary between the fictional world and worlds of imagination, which are involved in the recovery of fictional truth. Such procedures are themselves fundamental to the more open, "unregulated" imaginative processes.

The concept of principles as ***operations*** which establish prescriptions for fictional truth is enormously useful, and is entirely compatible with the semiotic approach to the construction of meaning,

which can define a *system* for the mechanics of fictional truth generation. This system includes text-external knowledge on an *equal par* with obvious textual elements, by elaborating the complex interplay between direct and indirect generation which Walton suggests. The *means* of generating fictional truth becomes usefully the focus of analysis, defining in more concrete terms the generalities of inference procedures, not only as to authorial intent about ways to generate truths, but also as to the reader's responsibility in that truth activation process.

We can develop a methodological clarity which Walton deems impossible, by assuming the communication role for narrative fiction outlined in Chapter Five, the disorder which he suggests addressed more effectively through my concepts of fictional sphere and textual reference world. But it is necessary to develop these concepts through a discussion of already identified principles, starting with the most general, as in Culler's naturalization process and the fundamental concept of coherency-building, continuing with principles developed in possible-worlds theory (including Walton's own appraisals), and juxtaposing other relevant work such as that of Peter Rabinowitz on conventional "rules." In this way we work towards the larger set or structure of principles defined as fictional sphere.

It is worthwhile pursuing such a project precisely because the threatened "proliferation" of fictional truths does *not* routinely occur, or at least only in the most restricted way. The proliferation of inferences is by no means endless. For this reason, Thomas Pavel speaks about "[s]ome form of gradual opacity to inference, some increasing resistance to maximal structures, [which] must be at work in most fictional worlds, keeping them from expanding indefinitely along irrelevant lines."[23] Since fictional truths do *not* expand indefinitely, it must be possible to define a set of principles as a structure for that *constrained* expansion or "maximalization" of worlds.

Rather than treating interpretation as only a *product* or result which threatens to expand fictional world boundaries beyond the acceptable, we must consider the entire social context of the

intersubjective, rule-governed ***process***. We must determine what the difficulties are in going beyond the text to activate text-external knowledge bases. If we are to determine what is admissible as truth, or valid, or relevant, or required, we must see ***how*** textual suggestion activates other knowledge, that is, what ***kinds*** of textual controls can be in effect. And we must analyse the resulting ***interaction*** of fictional truths which have variously combined direct and indirect sources. If the reader avoids the potential proliferation of fictional truth, how does she decide how much information to activate? Where must inferences be restricted, as the process of gap-filling takes place? What determines the selection of any item of knowledge and its combination with all others?

These would seem to be the right kinds of questions to ask, as long as we concentrate in the answers on the ***public*** interpretive processes involved, avoiding individual psychological concerns. It is the ***synthesizing*** operations which must be analysed as fundamental before the more individual concerns of imaginative interaction can be addressed, since that involvement ***depends*** on the configuration of truth developed through the more public and intersubjective reading process. Within the codified structure of the fictional sphere, available truths are chosen and activated for the reference world, ***before*** second-order imaginative processing can take place.

While that imaginative involvement may produce many disagreements about meaning, or discrepancies of interpretation, we know that at least some of those disagreements are based on entirely individual concerns, and that a fundamental agreement is routinely presupposed as ***possible***, based on recognizably public grounds. Unless the reader wishes to "deconstruct" all available meaning, he will take agreement for granted as intrinsic to the semiotic communication process. Who would bother to undertake literary study of any sort, for example, if he did not believe that there existed public operations of reading which can be learned? As Jonathan Culler points out,

> ...any literary criticism must assume general operations of reading: all critics must make decisions about what can be taken for granted, what must be explicitly argued for, what

> will count as evidence for... [or] against... [T]he whole notion of bringing someone to see that a particular interpretation is a good one assumes shared points of departure and common notions of how to read.[24]

Even the most imaginative interpretations (or games) must be based on recognizable operations which involve common ways of reading taken for granted. Again, Culler expresses this best: "[The critic] must show his readers that the effects he notices fall within the compass of an implicit logic which they are presumed to accept, and thus he deals in his own practice with the problems which a poetics would hope to make explicit."[25] If the interpretation process is "disorderly," we try routinely nonetheless to ***create an order*** for critical practice, no matter how eccentric or fragmented our techniques may be. Even the most extravagant critic or conference participant strives to make his approach seem based on some publicly recognizable method, or "responsible" in some way to publicly accepted procedures. The generation of fictional truth cannot be understood outside of such a public context, which serves as a constraint on the proliferation of fictional truth in the imaginative, subjective context, and as a positive prohibition of that proliferation in the intersubjective and generalizable reading operations of the fictional sphere. Defining the inherent ***order*** of the reading process eradicates the proliferation threat.

Naturalizing Fictional Worlds

Culler's introduction to the general concept of naturalization or *vraisemblablisation* provides an excellent starting point and initial framework for developing the structure of principles of implication for fictional truth. Considering that verisimilitude is to fiction what truth is to reality, Culler approaches the whole issue of *vraisemblance* from the reading perspective, designating the qualities of ***reading operations***, instead of itemizing the qualities of texts or genres. By discussing reader operations as naturalization of the text according to cultural, generic, and intertextual norms and expectations, he provides a

fundamental structuring principle for the generation of truths in the fictional sphere.

For the cognitive process of naturalization Culler introduces several names, each of which contributes some clarity to the definition. The word "naturalization" itself indicates how "...the strange or deviant is brought within a discursive order and thus made to seem natural."[26] This is particularly relevant to the question of genre and the appropriate conventions/expectations which serve to generate fictional truth. The term "recuperation" sheds light by suggesting the aspect of recovery and "putting to use." While this term suggests the process of assimilation associated with theories of textual organic unity, it also provides insights into the workings of a text-external matrix for fictional worlds where fictional truths are recuperated according to contextual factors. Another term, "motivation," again derives from theory concerned with the justification of factors ***within*** texts. The Russian formalists used this term to show the comprehensibility of textual aspects in ***functional*** terms, so that no element need seem arbitrary or incoherent. Again, we can imagine the structure of the textual reference world in such a way, so that both textual and extra- and intertextual components are assigned a ***role*** within the system.

The term which is most useful here is the somewhat cumbersome *vraisemblablisation*. Here Culler stresses ***cultural*** models of the *vraisemblable* as sources of meaning and coherence. Although the concept of naturalization is introduced in terms of conventions of genre, with the development of this term Culler is able to expand the concept to include the very important wider socio/cultural context. Although he does not himself clarify the relationship among the various concepts, the categories which he is able to develop for *vraisemblance* serve effectively to extend his concept of literary competence. Instead of a concept limited to literary and generic knowledge we are able to see literary competence as including world-knowledge.

By identifying various cultural and literary models which make texts comprehensible/intelligible, Culler is able to postulate various "levels" at which naturalization or *vraisemblablisation* is carried out. "The

common denominator of these various levels and models is the notion of correspondence: to naturalize a text is to bring it into relation with a type of discourse or model which is already, in some sense, natural and legible."[27] Some of these "models" are specifically literary and consequently involve the factors of literary competence which Culler introduces as conventions, while others are rooted in the larger socio/cultural context. Culler thus approaches the question of *vraisemblance* in terms of the ***function*** of factors in the naturalization process. In this way, he is able to construe world-models not only as the repository of the *vraisemblable*, but also as a ***basis*** for other models of a more purely literary nature. At each level Culler is able to identify additional expectations for correspondence which are based on the ***fundamental demands*** of *vraisemblance*. This approach suggests powerfully the contextual quality of fictional meaning or intelligibility, that is, its dependence on a whole range of extra- and intertextual knowledge, all of which can be assessed in terms of the reading strategy of *vraisemblablisation*.

The five levels of *vraisemblance* which Culler identifies are all procedures of naturalization by which "...a text may be brought into contact with and defined in relation to another text which helps to make it intelligible."[28] The first level is a socially given text or that which is taken as the "real world." The second is "...a general cultural text: shared knowledge which would be recognized by participants as part of culture and hence subject to correction or modification but which none the less serves as a kind of 'nature.'"[29] This text corresponds with Roland Barthes' "cultural code," and relates closely to many of the factors of world-knowledge as defined in cognitive psychology. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish from the first one but involves the interesting aspect of public opinion, and relates consequently not only to world-models as reality principle, but also to the mutual belief principle to be discussed in Chapter Seven. The third level consists of the texts or conventions of genre. Here we are dealing with *vraisemblance* as an artificial, literary factor depending on tradition and reader expectations for particular genres. In other words, we can speak here of a *vraisemblance* for each (sub-)genre of narrative fiction. With the fourth level, Culler speaks of "...the natural attitude to the

artificial, where the text explicitly cites and exposes *vraisemblance* of the third kind so as to reinforce its own authority."[30] Here we can speak of a limited play with generic conventions. On the fifth level Culler places "...the complex *vraisemblance* of specific intertextualities, where one work takes another as its basis or point of departure and must be assimilated in relation to it."[31] Culler's discussion focuses here on parody and irony. These five levels provide an initial list of operations of reading which suggest a fundamental model for the recuperation of fictional truth. The cognitive procedures involved require careful analysis.

In grouping such superficially diverse factors within the single category of *vraisemblance* Culler insists on an all-encompassing principle of integration between ***texts*** of various kinds. He sees socially given reality as a text, since it is represented in the interpersonal realm of ordinary discourse. If we think of ordinary *vraisemblance* as a correspondence between the fictional world and this text of reality, it only makes sense to consider that fictional world's relation to other texts within a genre as a problem ***of the same order***, involving a fundamental intertextuality.

This approach facilitates the examination of how texts "absorb" from other texts, re-forming themselves into larger truth worlds. Culler points out that "[a] work can only be read in connection with or against other texts, which provide a grid through which it is read and structured by establishing expectations which enable one to pick out salient features and give them a structure."[32] Applied to the generation of fictional truth, the grid of intersubjective expectations becomes a basis for the reference world as structured by extra- and intertextual knowledge. If we consider naturalization as a fundamental inevitable function of reading, we recognize at once the deficiency of Walton's appraisal of the principles involved in the generation of fictional truth. The relevant models of coherence activated when the reader naturalizes at the various levels generate particular kinds of fictional truths. While Walton addresses the first and second levels in terms of the reality and mutual belief principles, he does not assess the crucial literary factors

of genre and intertext. Without that assessment the generation of fictional truth is bound to appear disorderly.

It is interesting that work in computer story generation supports this basic structure of naturalization within reading strategies. Taking as fundamental the fact that stories are not created out of nothing, Ryan outlines an algorithm for a genre-specific story generation--a kind of "utopic blueprint." Using insights from narratology and presupposing the narrative climax, she reconstitutes through a kind of backward logic a sequence of decisions or preliminary events which lead to the generation of the Little Red Riding Hood story.[33] It may seem initially trivial to suggest that artificial intelligence must be modelled on actual cognitive procedures. But the key issue here is that the story-generating system must operate from a ***bank of knowledge*** which includes world-knowledge, a set of generic conventions, and interpretive abilities. Natural text processors provide an obviously good model for the understanding process.

The program requires an extensive database of world-knowledge which includes "...stereotyped descriptions of the objects found in the narrative universe, standard scripts for the actions routinely performed by its inhabitants, and rules of inference specifying the preconditions and consequences of possible events."[34] Just as real readers rely on such knowledge, by complying with such rules the program ensures logical and pragmatic coherence for the plot. That is, the program will create a story with the aesthetic appeal and coherence of a literary narrative, which readers understand on the basis of the same kinds of knowledge. By determining the kinds of knowledge bases needed for computer programs we can better isolate what is involved in actual reading operations. Chapter Eight identifies some of the specific kinds of world-knowledge involved.

The second component of Ryan's program's knowledge--a set of generic conventions--demonstrates immediately that some knowledge must be literature-specific and conventional in nature. The genre-specific database imposes constraints on plot (for example, in fairy tales there are happy endings where good deeds are rewarded and bad

deeds punished), and specifies the possible inventory of individuals (whether or not witches are available, for example), as well as the fictional world's physical laws (whether or not objects can be turned into something else, for example).[35] It is obvious that the sense-making process of reading also involves identifying the ***kind*** of fictional world involved, as a basic naturalizing procedure to invest that world with intelligibility and a global coherence. Text-models provide alternate ways to account for data.

In addition to these two kinds of "propositional" knowledge, Ryan identifies the interpretive abilities required for the program. Such abilities involve determining an event's consequences as positive or negative for the characters, relating concrete events to abstract functional concepts (such as revenge or punishment), and assessing "...the potential of a concrete motif to fulfill a given narrative function."[36] What the reader generates as fictional truth certainly depends on how he perceives actions to correlate with such abstract functional concepts, which relate to both world- and literary knowledge. "Concrete" truths will be based in part on the relationships activated between those truths and functional categories. More generally, such abilities seem to be modelled on the kind of literary ***competence*** which results from the literary socialization of real readers.

Another lesson that we might glean immediately from the problems of artificial story generation is that we must also leave room in the scheme for at least some of the uncertainty which Walton insists upon, even within shared interpretive procedures. It is not possible to define an entirely "closed" grid or matrix for reference worlds, even concerning the limited question of truth about literary characters. Fictional narrative texts will illustrate certain problems, not all of which can be resolved. It is important only to focus the study on models of intelligibility/coherence which narrative fiction activates and/or challenges. After developing a basic model it will be useful to consider texts with more troublesome semantic uncertainties, in order to test the limitations of the model. And having once made ourselves aware of the naturalizing operations and their possible configurations, we will be in a position to recognize better how certain texts can "resist" such

operations. We will be able to understand better how the norms are *violated* by more radical narrative texts, to determine how various departures from norms can be assessed, and to judge whether there remain qualities of fictional truth which cannot be "discovered" within the matrix of the fictional sphere.

Coherence as Reading Priority

Fundamentally related to the concept of naturalization is that of consistency-building or the creation of coherence for fictional worlds.[37] Chapters Three and Four outline the serious problems posed for possible-worlds theory by inconsistency and incompleteness in fiction. On the basis of the discussion above concerning schematic texts, inference, concretization, and naturalization we can now consider the coherence of reference worlds as a reading priority. Since narrative fictions "tell" everything there is to "know" about characters, yet leave great gaps in an *imagined* ontology, the epistemic "completion" procedures which assign priority to coherence/consistency assume central importance in a workable concept of "possible world" for fiction. What is incomplete and possibly inconsistent, in terms of internal structure, can be "completed" and rendered at least partially coherent in the reading context. There is a fundamental sense in which coherence is almost unavoidable. Reflecting on Roland Barthes, Culler says, "...whatever meanings a sentence liberates, it always seems as though it ought to be telling us something simple, coherent and true, and that this initial presumption forms the basis of reading as a process of naturalization."[38]

Faced with a literary narrative, the reader intuitively tries to create a reference world which will be the "best" possible for the given text. Obviously *some* criticism is more concerned with unity and coherence than others, capitalizing on what can probably be confirmed as a basic human tendency to insist on resolution. But even when textual gaps are prized and expanded rather than filled in, as in deconstructive readings, there is a tendency to "discover" some dominant principle or theme

which governs the disjunctures, and according to which the discontinuities can become intelligible. Inconsistencies and incompleteness can be "repaired" in many ways, depending on the reader's literary competence and knowledge of conventional procedures, but also *whenever* there is sincere belief that the text presents the schema for a potentially coherent fictional world. Given the knowledge bases available, texts can only rarely resist the reader's creation of a coherence which reshapes them, often retroactively, once final "patterns" for meaning have been confirmed. What is fictionally true depends on such coherence-building.

If we restrict the appreciation of coherence to a quality of the fictional world presented--a quality not unrelated to the coherence of formal relations among textual components--we are confronted at once with an important complication. From the perspective of (aesthetic) reading operations, coherence creation routinely involves ideologies. When Currie undertakes to justify his focus on "story-meaning" as a useful point of departure, he suggests that such meaning is basic to the reader's understanding of "...other, perhaps more glamorous, kinds of meaning."[39] Confusion about fictional truth is likely to produce confusion about more extended symbolic or "metaphysical" content.[40] But while specific fictional truths generated can have a profound effect on the overall themes or significance which the reader takes away from fiction, the process works in the opposite direction as well. What is fictionally true can depend on the reader's overall assessment in terms of coherent world structure. This kind of circular reasoning is at the root of disagreements about how to determine valid interpretation. Put simply, if the reader decides that a story is "about" a certain theme and builds coherence on that basis, he will naturally construe the fictional truth about characters and events to match. Other readers may well adopt other priorities and consequently attach very different significance to actions. Such classification/naming procedures are inevitably "ideological." Patterns ostensibly "discovered" in stories are the product of the interpretation *process*, which (not unlike scientific research) *selects* acceptable data on the basis of critical orientation and other "subjective" goals. As readers/critics, we tend to find what we are looking for. As Peter Rabinowitz suggests in his

discussion of coherence as the fourth "rule" of reading, coherence "...often serves as a vehicle by which ideological biases are smuggled into literary discussions disguised as objective aesthetic qualities."[41]

The point here is that a view of coherence as ***reading strategy*** rather than textual property will inevitably involve "subjective" factors at odds with a more objective textual formalism. Reader-created reference worlds are much more complicated than fictional worlds stipulated textually, and must involve the entire critical activity, however problematic that may be. Coherence is at best a difficult concept applied to fictional worlds, as explored in Chapter Three, but viewed as a reading/critical activity it helps explain how the reader invests reference worlds with consistency whenever possible, according to text-external knowledge bases. While some of that knowledge in the form of world-models will often imply ideology, the total consistency as reading process will also depend on other crucial text-models and repertoire. By moving the focus of coherence away from intrinsic textual features seen to stipulate (hopefully) coherent worlds, to the "totalizing" tendency for the reading/interpretive process, we can recognize knowledge bases and conventional expectations fundamental to the generation of fictional truth--the factors which lead readers to look ***in the first place*** for certain textual features and organization.

It is obvious also that coherence is not viewed as a ***textual*** literary virtue, otherwise, as Rabinowitz suggests, we would prefer the most extreme examples of Barthes' totally "readerly" texts, as in Harlequin romance.[42] What we seem to value is indeed "...the activity of applying rules of coherence to works that are not evidently unified, but that can be made so through critical manipulation."[43] In the search for structures for fictional truth, the reader insists on such manipulation, addressing disjunctures and ruptures (the "gaps" of reader-response criticism) as well as all inconsistencies.

It is not that coherence as reading activity obviates the author's intention about reader-constructed coherence. Again, the sense of conventions ***shared*** between writers and readers is crucial. Writers obviously know how rules of coherence will be activated to generate

fictional truths. Certainly not all "gaps" are errors or deliberately permanent ambiguities. Following Ingarden's principles, many indeterminacies are obviously intended as opportunities to structure coherence in a textually guided way. The resultant fictional truth may well be exactly what the author had in mind, but all the more powerful or significant because ***produced*** by the reader. The reference world where such truths belong depends fundamentally on this presumption of an overall intended coherence. Only by postulating coherence can gaps and inconsistencies be put to meaning-producing work, as the reader builds the coherent reference world.

With this general skeleton for understanding inference procedures in place, I can now develop an account of the text-external knowledge bases routinely activated. Ultimately, it will be possible to elaborate a codified structure for the totality of contextual inference which depends on this fundamental framework.

Notes

[1]Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1978) 80.

[2]Dale Jacquette, "Intentional Semantics and the Logic of Fiction," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 29.2 (Spring 1989): 175.

[3]I provide here a rough summary of Ingarden's theory as developed in *The Literary Work of Art*, insofar as it proves useful to my project. See *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. G. Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[4]This idea is a familiar one, proposed also by Prague structuralist, Jan Mukarovsky, who distinguishes between artifact (text) and the aesthetic object when read. See *Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts*, trans. Mark E. Suino (Ann Arbor: Department of Languages and Literature, University of Michigan, 1970). E.D. Hirsch, Jr. also makes the basic distinction between meaning within the text and the significance which is attributed by readers. See *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

[5]Peter McCormick presents interesting observations on Ingarden's metaphysical qualities in "Literary Truths and Metaphysical Qualities," *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden. Interpretations and Assessments*, eds. Bohdan Dziemidok and Peter McCormick, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol. 27 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) 187-232. Or see Chapter Two, *Fictions, Philosophies, and the Problems of Poetics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) 78-106.

[6]Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). I provide a brief summary here only of the points which seem to lead to my project as an exploration of shared knowledge structures for fictional truth.

[7]Following is a synthesis of the essentials of Iser's work as it relates to my project. See "Interaction between Text and Reader," *The Reader in the Text. Essays on Audience and Interpretation*, eds. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); *The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); and, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

[8]The important concept of "schema" will be discussed in Chapter Eight as to how it has been developed successfully in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.

[9]This quotation is used by Peter Rabinowitz to illustrate the ***coherence*** of literary fiction which separates it from life. It is equally useful as a comment on the radical incompleteness of fiction. See *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 143.

[10]Uri Margolin, "Individuals in Narrative Worlds: An Ontological Perspective," *Poetics Today* 11.4 (Winter 1990): 848.

[11]Margolin 848.

[12]Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (London: Hutchinson and Co, Ltd., 1981) 24.

[13]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 112.

[14]Ryan 112.

[15]Uri Margolin, "The Nature and Functioning of Fiction: Some Recent Views," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 19.1/2 (March/June 1992): 109.

[16]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 141-2.

[17]Walton 142.

[18]This discussion is based on Walton 142-3.

[19]Walton 143.

[20]Walton 143. The following discussion is based on Walton's analysis.

[21]Margolin, *CRCL* 109.

[22]Walton 169.

[23]Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 95.

[24]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 125.

[25]Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 124-5.

[26]Culler, *Structuralist* 137.

[27]Culler, *Structuralist* 138.

[28]Culler, *Structuralist* 140.

[29]Culler, *Structuralist* 140.

[30]Culler, *Structuralist* 140.

[31]Culler, *Structuralist* 140.

[32]Culler, *Structuralist* 139.

[33]See Ryan, "Tellability and Story Generation" chapter, 248-57.

[34]Ryan 248. In Chapter Eight I explore these kinds of world-knowledge in detail.

[35]Ryan 248-9.

[36]Ryan 249.

[37]Iser's work relies heavily on the principle of coherence as a guide to meaning. Doreen Maitre also insists fundamentally and repeatedly on the reader's search for coherence, through generic expectations where necessary. See *Literature and Possible Worlds* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983).

[38]Culler, *Structuralist* 141.

[39]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 117-18.

[40]Currie 118.

[41]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 144.

[42]Rabinowitz 146.

[43]Rabinowitz 146.

Chapter Seven: Structuring Truth Worlds

To apply general insights about inference procedures and the fundamental principles of naturalization and coherence-building to the problems of fictional truth generation, we can adapt David Lewis' concept of truth worlds to develop a viable structure for actual reading procedures describable as the fictional sphere. To envision a complex structure of text-external knowledge bases which interact and produce variable hierarchies, we must first of all identify the components of knowledge which have already been discussed as contributors to fictional truth, and which constitute crucial ***constraints*** on the processes of inference, including naturalization and coherence-building. Lewis' truth worlds provide the most provocative ***access*** to this discussion, which is usefully focused through the realist account, and which already suggests the beginnings of the textual reference world concept and the importance of the ***reader's*** role. The clarity of analytic philosophy produces in this case a landmark in possible-worlds theory as a formulation of truth conditions for fictional discourse.[1] Lewis uses elaborate philosophical means to arrive at some intuitively accepted truths about the interpretation of literature. From the perspective of literary theory, he approaches the problem of truth in fiction "backwards," yet arrives at conclusions which can be elaborated to develop more accurate theory.

This chapter presents the problems connected with the truth-world concept, introducing and qualifying the associated reality principle, mutual belief principle, and fictional author principle as interrelated and complementary "background." Utilizing Gregory Currie's discussion of Lewis' truth worlds and related difficulties, I demonstrate how the associated principles remain deficient if factors of narration are not considered, and if the principles are applied without the context of an organizing structure based on convention and a dominant model in the form of genre.

"Possible" Truth Worlds and Minimal Departure

Within the realist account and without complicating the issue with the elaborate philosophical disputes introduced in earlier chapters, there is no insurmountable problem in postulating domains where stories are true, that is, worlds in which the characters of fiction exist. Statements, although fictional in our world, will be assuredly true in such worlds. But more accurately on Lewis' account, the worlds worthy of careful consideration are those where the fiction is told as known fact rather than fiction.[2] The act of story-telling occurs at a "truth world," where it takes the form of "truth-telling" about matters known to the teller because part of his world. Explaining the non-deceptive quality of fiction, Lewis says that "[t]he storyteller purports--normally, if not invariably--to be telling the truth about matters whereof he has knowledge. I take the actual telling of the story, in effect, as part of the story itself; ...I subsume the pretended truth of the story under the pretence of truthful telling."[3]

The effect here is to distinguish a "fictional world" from the "world of the story," which becomes a possible world in a modal semantic sense, containing many "extra" applicable truths. The worlds of Anna Karenina's story are worlds where someone knows of her family activities and shares this knowledge with others through an act of narration which produces a text lexically identical to that written by Tolstoy. Potentially ***many***, these truth worlds are similar to one another insofar as they necessarily include textually stipulated facts, but differ even radically from one another concerning all kinds of matters--both story-insignificant facts and aspects that do concern the story, but about which the text says nothing or provides only inconclusive information.

At least some of these truth worlds will include facts which violate the reader's intuitive feeling for "background" in Currie's sense. Anything not made explicit in the story will be accessible to all kinds of radically ***open*** interpretation. Obviously certain truth worlds must be "eliminated" on the basis of the reader's selected background information. The solution cannot be to reduce the content of the truth

worlds to what they have ***in common***, since this amounts to what is ***explicitly*** told as known fact. From the insightful idea of larger truth worlds we would move back to fictional worlds stipulated textually. We must direct our attention to what is ***implicit*** or indirectly generated through inference on the basis of a selected and hierarchized background invoked to produce specific truth worlds.

Lewis' own immediate solution to the problem is not the shift to ***reading*** operations which I suggest--worlds ***read*** as known fact--but represents a significant step in that direction, since the whole question of text-external knowledge becomes central. Insisting that we "read into" fiction a content not explicitly there, but dependent on a background of well-known fact, Lewis suggests that truth worlds can be ***selected*** by considering how similar they are to the real world.[4] If we consider the "distance" of story worlds from one another and from the real world, we discover a means to assign truth for propositions true in some story worlds and not in others. A proposition will be true when there is a story world in which the proposition is true, a story world which is closer to the actual world than any story world where the proposition is false.[5] This solution based on a technique invented to deal with the truth condition of counterfactuals, has the distinct advantage of limiting some fictional truths, at least by keeping departures from reality under control. Non-explicit fictional content can be subjected to the same kind of reasoning useful for counterfactuals, where a minimal departure is presumed for non-explicit aspects--a default principle which governs the selection process. At stake here is a "reality principle" which makes fictional truth the product of ***two*** factors--the story's explicit content and what is true of the real world.

Chapter Eight is devoted to the world-models crucial for the construction of textual reference worlds. Reality principle/minimal departure is delineated in detail in that context. For the moment we need only recognize that for fictional narrative, unless there are specific textual instructions to the contrary, the reader will concretize with an interpretation of content which most closely accords with reality. We will see by the end of this chapter that generic expectations

may alter or replace (entirely) this relationship ***regulating*** the activation of a reality principle. But the point is that inferences are at least partially restricted by minimal departure, since the fictional world is naturalized according to a particular background of world-knowledge. Without explicit departure indicated, textually schematic information invites the integration of such knowledge into the reference world. Inference is seen to work within a contextual ***system.***

There will remain many undecidable properties where no deviation from a reality norm can be assessed and the truth-value will remain indeterminate. No measuring of proximity to reality will tell us whether Anna Karenina has an even or odd number of hairs on her head when she jumps to her death. But such totally irrelevant indeterminacies are not problematic for the structure of story worlds.

But there is a more serious problem of the proliferation of extraneous story-facts based on minimal departure. As explained in Chapter Three, fictional worlds are ***not*** maximal in the possible-worlds sense. Without further qualification, Lewis' truth worlds presume this basic possible-worlds quality, by insisting on a similarity relation among worlds, and the basic inevitability of logical entailment. Yet, as Currie explains, there is really nothing to ***choose*** between story-worlds which differ in ways not fundamentally connected to the content of the story.[6] Story-worlds are not, then, possible worlds, and Lewis' truth-world concept does not delineate adequately what would be involved in the choice which must ***restrict*** unwarranted truth proliferation through ***relevant*** inference. Clearly there is a vast range of real-world facts available, but which need not be applied to a particular fictional world. Currie explains well how Lewis' basic idea of truth worlds can introduce ***irrelevant*** information, or facts entirely extraneous, into the story.[7] It is clearly necessary to restrict access to only ***relevant*** information from "the worlds where stories are told as true," limiting ***expanding*** inferences authorized by reality principle and the associated fundamental logical entailment. There are always more potential fictional truths "available" through inference than we need recognize. Reality is huge: if fictional worlds resemble the real world insofar as direct textual stipulation allows, those worlds will tend to include that

vast reality. The most stringently built narrative world will turn out to be vastly detailed, including a proliferation of truths which are shared with reality and other fictional worlds. In order to block this uncontrolled immigration of truths from reality, it would be necessary to develop a more restricted conception of counterfactuals, as Walton suggests, "...one such that their truth requires some significant connection between the antecedent and the consequent..."[8] But even this solution would undermine the otherwise valuable insistence on a basic similarity between the real world and fictional worlds which can be "***maximized***" where textually indeterminate details are concerned.

To suggest also the potential for a ***too-restricted*** inference, Currie offers the example of "The Turn of the Screw" to demonstrate that this view of truth worlds would yield only ***one*** interpretation of the story, instead of the two which have dominated criticism. On the basis of a minimal departure, which assumes that no real ghosts exist in the actual world, the governess must be interpreted as deranged. The text "...can be uttered as known fact without requiring any alterations to the actual world concerning the nonexistence of ghosts and the prevalence of mental disorder. So we are obliged to conclude that the governess is mad and that there are no ghosts in the story."[9] Obviously, then, there can be counterintuitive results if we insist on ***current*** society's beliefs concerning ghosts, which may be different from story-contemporary views which are more intuitively correct. The reader must decide where the story-world closest to his reality will ***prevail*** when facts have changed or are no longer interpreted in the same way.

Mutual Belief Principle

To cope with these problems of relevant inference Lewis offers another definition for fictional truth, which shifts fictional truth from the joint product of explicit content and a background of "well-known fact" about the real world as it actually is, to "...the joint product of explicit content and a background of generally prevalent beliefs."[10] The proper background "...consists of the beliefs that generally prevailed in

the community where the fiction originated: the beliefs of the author and his intended audience."[11] Refining this idea further, Lewis stipulates that the beliefs in question must be ***overt***, in the sense that almost everyone believes the "fact," and thinks that everyone else shares that belief.[12] Here the whole question of ***shared*** conventional knowledge is crucial. It is not sufficient that something be only believed widely; instead, people must be aware of a ***shared*** belief. Only in this way can the relevant fictional truths be controlled by the author in the first place, and become ***accessible*** to the reader through social context/knowledge. Literary competence necessarily involves knowledge of such shared, ***mutual*** beliefs. When Walton discusses the same concept as mutual belief principle, he adopts Lewis' formulation, but uses Stephen Schiffer's phrase "mutual belief" to replace "overt belief." "Something is 'mutually believed' in a society if, roughly, most members of the society believe it, most of them believe that most of them believe it, most believe that most believe that most believe it, and so on."[13]

In addition to explicit content or directly generated fictional truths, we can speak conveniently of truths indirectly generated through inference on the basis of a background of either real-world facts or the beliefs overt in the community of origin. Roughly analogous to "common knowledge" or maximally public knowledge, the overt belief concept allows us to fix better the parameters of valid collateral information activated by the reader. It is involved in Culler's second level of naturalization. In addition to direct textual stipulations, the (informed) reader has access to what was commonly believed in the author's community, or at least what he can reasonably attribute to the author by assuming that the author shares the common beliefs of his community. In addition, then, to the worlds where stories are told as known fact in the sense that a reality principle assumes authority, we have access to the collective, mutual belief worlds in question--stories told on the basis of mutual belief.[14] These two "sets" for fictional truth may overlap in various ways, the concept of overt belief sometimes leading to intuitively correct results about what is true in fiction.

Currie explains how a class of "belief worlds" involve the same kind of "closeness" requirement as in the proposal concerned with minimal departure. In keeping with Lewis' account of counterfactuals, recognition of overt belief systems allows the reader to *maximize* similarities between the fictional world and the real world as it was mutually believed to be in the authorial community. Currie interprets thus: "Something is true in fiction iff it would have been true were overt belief correct and the fiction told as known fact."[15] As a result, the idea of overt belief worlds gets rid of the extraneous facts from reality which are not part of overt belief. The modern reader's own knowledge/beliefs about geography, cosmology, history, and physics will not be relevant to fill in informational gaps in Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

In the case of Currie's example of "The Turn of the Screw," ambiguity of interpretation is preserved since we must consider the Victorian system of overt belief, which was "reasonably tolerant of ghosts." Or at least, the ambiguity depends on the belief that ghosts are as likely to exist as not.[16] Blatantly anachronistic valorization of world-models for character can be effectively ruled out where such models conflict with overt belief systems. However unrefined, the principle must, then, have some fundamental merit.

In discussing mutual belief principle, Walton does not develop a better formulation for the concept. But he does suggest a revised definition: "MBP can be taken to stand for a class of plausible principles according to which implications depend on one or another feature of the cognitive makeup of members of the artist's society."[17] Unless blocked by primary truths, a proposition mutually believed by the writer and the readers in his society must be accepted as fictionally true. And he does effectively contrast the principle with reality principle, arguing for the latter as the more fundamental to interpretive procedures.

Asking which principle is dominant, or which principle will most often endorse the implications inferred by the reader, Walton suggests first of all that when the implementation of reality principle yields results in accord with mutual belief principle the reader "has it both ways." If the relevant mutual beliefs are true in reality, the two

principles have the same consequences and there is no conflict. Critics employing either principle will come to the same conclusions about fictional truth.[18] This occurs typically where the reader shares the mutual beliefs of the writer's society, as for contemporary literature of the reader's own culture. And in such circumstances, Walton suggests that the reader will tend to base his interpretation on reality principle as more basic, providing "ready answers" on the basis of personal experience and knowledge.[19] Where no conflict arises, there is little ***need*** to opt for a mutual belief principle. In this way, the reality principle figures more ***importantly*** in interpretive practice, even though criticism based on mutual belief principle has a definite ***prominence***. In fact, reality principle is so automatic as to go unnoticed in many circumstances.

Where the results of applying the two principles are likely to differ (as when stories from other cultures or historical periods are involved) the reader may need to replace reality principle with mutual belief principle.[20] Obviously what we can know and believe about reality varies in time and space. It would be absurd to read medieval stories about supernatural beings according to a modern model of reality, considering narrative agents as mad or simply mistaken.[21] Thus invocation of mutual belief principle will obviously involve a less direct, less experiential "access" to available truth, as the reader redirects his attention from reality itself to another community's beliefs about reality. There is more room for error and more need for a specialized competence in this interpretive strategy, which does not involve the directly "ready answers" provided through minimal departure. Particularly problematic will be narratives long removed in time or far removed in culture.

Walton insists that even in such cases, reality principle remains relevant. By appealing to mutual belief principle the reader "...recapture[s] a way of understanding the work which members of the artist's society might have achieved using RP."[22] Obviously the reader wants to understand a story at least superficially from the historical perspective. She may not try to duplicate an exact historical readership's understanding, which may even be inaccessible in some

cases. Routinely, rather than trying to "identify" with the original audience, the reader activates more current perceptions which involve insights perhaps totally ignored by that audience. But Walton suggests astutely that readers pursue "...something of an idealization of [the original audience's] understandings..."[23] In adopting the historical point of view the reader appeals to the ***historical*** conception of reality, with whatever limitations of knowledge (by modern standards) that may entail. "The main rationale behind the employment of the Mutual Belief Principle is to reproduce results that the Reality Principle might have yielded, given the beliefs that are mutual in the artist's society."[24] Walton stresses the imaginative sharing of beliefs which allows the application of reality principle from the point of view of the author's society. "We then endorse the results of this imagined application of RP, which coincide approximately with the results of MBP; we extrapolate on the basis of the real world as we imagine taking it to be."[25]

This view of mutual belief principle as activated to augment reality principle in certain circumstances suggests effectively the kind of shared knowledge and belief involved conventionally for both writers and readers, without insisting on any kind of rhetorical communication context. In suggesting how mutual beliefs which would have constituted a reality principle in the first place are re-valorized, Walton indirectly suggests how changes in modes of reading must depend on operative conventions for different historical periods, yet involve an underlying, essentially unchanging process. The shared codes of that ***process*** are the key to a clearer appreciation of fictional truth generation. Where such codes break down and cannot be repaired or reconstituted, fictional truth implications become very complicated indeed.[26]

There are obvious difficulties in replacing the more direct reality principle with mutual belief principle. Walton considers the difficulties of assuming the role of members of another cultural community when playing the game of make-believe. Obviously if the reader must make it true of himself that he is a member of Shakespeare's community, he will have to abandon outright much of his own actual knowledge and beliefs. Participation may be less vivid or rich as a result.[27] Clearly the kind of

emphasis which instructors customarily place on the more *universal* aspects about human nature which "endure" is important in providing an adequate access for students. But more importantly, the reader *may not* acquire the knowledge about the cultural community which allows for the generation of fictional truths according to mutual belief principle. Unable to apply the principle accordingly, he may produce gross misunderstandings.[28]

The argument for reality principle as more fundamental than mutual belief principle is, however, by no means beyond challenge. Proceeding from an interest in the (reliable) control which an author can have over what is fictionally true, Currie gravitates away from reality principle, which suggests factors beyond or out of the author's control, to an emphasis on mutual belief. By seeing implications governed by mutual belief principle as subject to authorial control, Currie argues that readers can thus have "easy access" to fictional truth. It may be even easier to recognise what is mutually believed in the writer's society, than what is actually true of reality. Mutual belief principle thus accords well with a standard rhetorical communication model, supposing that fictional narratives are presented by authors as a means to guide the imaginative process. Reality principle is a problem for such a model because of the range of "extra" information readily available, over which the writer cannot exert control. Such information results in implications which cannot be readily located on the rhetorical communication model. By focusing on mutual belief principle Currie assesses how fictional truths are implied through authorial control and accessed by readers through this *directed* process.

Walton's description of mutual belief principle in terms of the artist's intention and control is most applicable to Currie's project: mutual belief principle is a conception "...according to which the artist arranges for his work to make certain propositions fictional in order to encourage appreciators to imagine them, and the appreciator endeavors to imagine what is fictional in order to imagine as the artist meant him to."[29] It is this kind of authorial *purpose* which is central in Currie's account, and which he translates into the textual construct of fictional

author. We will see ahead how this view is actually fundamental to Peter Rabinowitz' conception of authorial audience.

Obviously both principles are used by critics, although not always consciously or deliberately. The results of activating the mutual belief principle are often highly palatable, and the practice of many interpreters seems to presuppose such a principle, even when not explicitly formulated or acknowledged. Yet there is an "automatic" if inconspicuous quality to reality principle which cannot be denied. While critics ***obviously*** research social contexts, determining in the process the beliefs of the writer and her contemporaries, often spending considerable time and effort on the project, they do not normally "research" the facts of reality on which fictional truths depend. Such automatic knowledge is so conventionally shared as to go unnoticed, certainly not requiring elaborate proof or documentation. Reality principle represents well the rich and natural appreciation for fictional truth which results from actual experience, tying fictional truth to actual life in a direct, experiential way. Obviously much of what readers actually do with fictional narrative depends ***directly*** on such a principle, which I explore at length in Chapter Eight.

Currie tries in fact to co-ordinate reality principle and mutual belief principle through his concept of the fictional author's belief, which presumably ***includes*** the reality factors. This seems accurate enough from the perspective of the writing process. But this is ***not*** how ***readers*** proceed, making instead the ***direct*** reference to reality and to their own experience which Walton suggests as fundamental. I will show ahead what the limitations of Currie's account are, both in terms of its narratological foundation and its restricted exploration of the essential structure of narrative.

Fictional Authors and Belief Worlds

The consideration of overt belief worlds as a mutual belief principle leads directly to the appreciation of implied author, or in Currie's

terms, ***fictional author***, as a principle for generating fictional truth. Curric's goal is to develop a formalized account of truth conditions for narrative fiction, by isolating the influential factors involved. Confronted with fictional truth frequently indeterminate on the basis of textual indications, Currie is determined to suggest a "sophisticated" all-encompassing solution based on the idea of an implied author's ***belief***. He decides that "...working out what is true in the story is a matter of working out what the fictional author believes."[30] In other words, the reader must presume that the text is the ***expression*** of a fictional author's beliefs, in much the same way as Wayne Booth discusses the implied author as a set of norms which we can presume the text to espouse. The reader must decipher fictional truth by identifying this source. It is only against this background of assumptions that a text provides clues to fictional truth. "[W]hat is true in fiction is what the teller believes."[31] We must assess how belief sets are built up in nonarbitrary ways for fictional authors, and constructed so as to conform to what is intuitively regarded as true in the fiction.[32] Currie considers as fundamental the idea that readers make-believe that they "...are reading a narrative written by a reliable, historically situated agent (the fictional author) who wants to impart certain information."[33] I show ahead how narration is conflated with this concept, yet without taking into account the possible problematic qualities of narration, or the possibilities of reading according to ***other*** strategies. He even concludes that "[w]ith no prior assumptions about the fictional author we cannot start to interpret the text."[34]

While such conclusions seem rather drastic, and we will need to consider the limitations of such an approach, it is clear that Currie develops his concept of fictional author from the idea of overt belief worlds as supplanting truth worlds constrained only by a reality principle. He applies Lewis' concept of fictional truth as the product of text and overt belief in the author's community, but ***dilutes*** Lewis' condition of overt belief so as to include also ***less prevalent*** but nonetheless characteristic beliefs possibly crucial to fictional truth.

Walton's appreciation of mutual belief principle is highly relevant, since Currie insists on an inescapable relationship between real and

"fictional" authors, the latter depending on the "kind of person" the real author is. Currie insists that they are members of the same "community," in that the reader *assumes* a fictional author of the same period and place, except where setting differs markedly from the writer's location in time and space. A modern novel can certainly project the beliefs of an earlier period, but in general it is helpful for readers to know something about the author's community. The reader's assumption about the fictional author's place in that community will be more or less rewarded by specific textual indications, through content, of course, but also through manner of speaking, which both indicate specific kinds of outlook and knowledge.[35]

From this sense of bonding between real authorial community and the fictional author as textual construct Currie develops a notion of *informed reader* which is unconsciously indebted to Culler's concept of literary competence. Real readers obviously possess varying degrees of insight and understanding, the "informed reader" knowing what facts are relevant from the authorial community. Working out what the fictional author believes, the informed reader must come to grips with what people in the real author's community tended to believe. It is not a question of determining what was actually true in the community, but only of recognizing *patterns* of belief. Where truth is controversial or obscure, it may not even be believed.[36]

Obviously at least some extraneous real-world facts are *disqualified* as a result, such as the earth's post-Ptolemaic position in the solar system in medieval romance, or the planet Pluto's existence in otherwise realistic nineteenth-century novels. Erroneous or fact-excluding beliefs may be absolutely crucial to the story, to ignore them highly detrimental. It is essential not to wrench stories from their original contexts and to force on them interpretations which could not be shared by the author and original audience. Shared misconceptions about reality must be allowed to *direct* the reader's appreciation of fictional truth, suppressing contrived or gratuitous interpretation.

Besides typically real-world "facts" like whether the earth is flat or round, we can also consider the kinds of psychoanalytical

interpretations often foisted on narratives which pre-date any appreciation of Freud. While strict adherence to a reality principle might warrant such interpretations in keeping with the reader's knowledge of what is psychologically plausible conduct for characters, a more careful consideration of mutual belief will indicate how the authorial community was unaware of any such theory, at least *consciously*. "Unconscious" mutual beliefs become difficult to assess, and would be presumably less dominant than those held and recognized explicitly. In any case, according to Currie, the fictional author is the textual measure of all such mutual beliefs.

While Currie admits that the fictional author's beliefs may be demonstrated by the text to be unconventional, he suggests that by *assuming* conventionality the reader sets up what I like to think of as a kind of default mechanism, from which the text must explicitly deviate. In effect, he suggests what could be called a sort of "minimal departure" from authorial community belief for authorial norms. Clearly this too will depend on expectations for genre, to be explored ahead. Currie admits that inferences which involve deviations from conventionality can be very complicated, but does not suggest any rules which could substitute for a minimal departure kind of strategy.

What seems most useful in Currie's idea of fictional author is his awareness of a kind of conventional knowledge shared by writers and readers, although this awareness is formulated through an authorial-intentional approach. Since the fictional author speaks to an audience of his own time and probably culture, "...he does not need to tell us everything. He can rely upon a shared background of assumptions, telling us only those things that deviate from or supplement that background, or those things ...that he feels a need to emphasize."[37] This sense of a "maximal" set of shared beliefs relates very much to the concept of an "implied reader" as textual construct. It is this construct which "knows" the relevant conventions and codes inherent in the fictional author's beliefs--those staples of inference fundamental to real authorial intention. In Currie's terms, the fictional author as a textual construction "...has no private beliefs, no beliefs that could not reasonably be inferred from text plus background. His beliefs are not

discovered by a reading ...but ***constructed*** by it."[38] Important here is the suggestion that such beliefs are all ***public*** and shared through reading procedures.

If we presume as Iser does, an implied reader to correspond with this implied author, we recognize how any implied reader must relate to what is known by real historical readers--the informed readers in Currie's account. For example, fictional authors and their corresponding implied readers cannot be constructed for a fantastic tale of the romantic period, without access beyond the textual stipulation to the overt belief system of the contemporary cultural context. The cultural conception of dreams, for example, has a direct impact on how the dream motifs work in the stories, as representing a special kind of reality. The implied readers of such genuinely fantastic tales (in Todorov's sense) are a crucial component of the genre, which is perhaps no longer viable because of fundamental changes in real reader's beliefs, particularly about the supernatural. Modern readers ***must*** know the norms to extrapolate the accurate implied reader or play the correct role of a hesitant authorial audience, in Rabinowitz' more useful terms.

The Rhetorical Communication Framework and Authorial Audience

Currie's proposal actually depends heavily on the rhetorical communication model which I have shown in Chapter Five as inadequate. He insists on the communicative act of fiction-making, which he understands in terms of a Gricean intentional structure. He presumes that the author elicits the response of make-believe, making available the text, which will be coupled with background assumptions to generate a set of fictional truths which are then "available" for the reader to make-believe.[39] Obviously if we insist on the "truth" of the telling process the routine communication model seems adequate, and the principle of "fictional author" will seem dominant. I show in the next section how Currie in fact uses "fictional author" as a speech position, confusing it frequently with real author and narrator.

But before demonstrating the inadequacy of the argumentation of Currie's theory, we need to look at the basic narratological framework which validates this kind of reasoning about narrative communication. Taking as fundamental the rhetorical communication model, Rabinowitz develops an insightful account of authorial audience. His concepts developed about the quest for authorial views/norms/intention relate closely to Currie's insistence on the fictional author as fundamental principle for truth generation, and can be seen to *extend* Currie's concept most effectively, especially in terms of the reading operations we might expect of the "informed reader."

Although Rabinowitz tries not to valorize a type of reading involving author-reader co-operation, this is in fact his main interest, given the rhetorical emphasis fundamental to his work. Since texts are incomplete, they are put together according to principles of the reader's interpretive community, according to an "authorial reading."[40] In effect, the joint concepts of implied author/reader are seen as fundamental principles of implication for content (or fictional truth). Writers obviously try to create or define a hypothetical audience. Where authorial reading is successful--where what the author expects is in fact "found" by the reader--the author and reader are members of the same community.[41] It is obvious immediately that this "community" is approximately the same as the world of mutual belief fundamental to Currie's account of generating fictional truth--the world of the fictional author's beliefs, which must be accessed in order to activate an appropriate structure for fictional truth. Mutual belief principle concerns directly the author's society, whereas "interpretive community" reflects the reading side, where the principle takes effect.

Obviously, as in Currie's account, Rabinowitz' notion of authorial audience as a "role" for the real reader, inscribed in the text, is tied to authorial intention. Rabinowitz is not concerned, however, with individual psychological concerns about real authors, but directs his attention to the social conventions involved. Although he roots his work in the rhetorical tradition, he attempts a more semiotic appreciation of the whole conventional context of interpretation as a social practice. By determining what may be involved in a reader joining a "particular

social/interpretive community" he insists on the ***public*** quality of interpretation.[42]

Such authorial reading depends really on the concept of mutual belief world, since it involves a ***community*** agreement allowing intersubjective discussion and shared appreciation. It is through authorial "purpose" that propositions become fictional as the author encourages imagination and the reader imagines fictional truth to be as the author intended. Consistency of readings for fictional truth becomes at least theoretically possible for an authorial audience which recognizes Currie's fictional author's belief according to a mutual belief principle. Rabinowitz eventually defines the conventions which allow for disparity among ***competing*** authorial readings.

Both Rabinowitz and Currie would agree that we do not invent the concept of implied author (to use a relatively neutral term) purely for interpretive convenience. The concept is not an arbitrary convention imposed by readers, but rather one in broad social usage, shared in the first place by writers themselves. Authors obviously invite their readers to activate certain mechanisms for understanding the "reality" of their texts--mechanisms which involve conventional behaviour. To activate fictional truth successfully the reader must identify an original code or system of convention recognized initially by the author. "Intention" in this sense is highly conventional, involving mutual belief principle in a most fundamental way. Like Culler's competent reader, the "informed reader" in such an account knows what he can count as evidence, what will be obviously acceptable to other readers, and so on.

Considered as a fundamental strategy of interpretation, the recognition by authorial audience of a belief structure for the "fictional author" has obvious ramifications in actual interpretive practice. Where there is real-life uncertainty about the assignment of fictional truth, such a procedure ***can*** solve problems. Where readers can successfully identify the overt belief of the authorial community, assuming the role of authorial audience, many potential disputes about fictional truth can be solved. Rather than trying to identify the author's ***intention*** directly, it is a matter of judging what is fictionally true

according to what would constitute a community belief structure which would make any postulated intention viable.[43]

The concept of authorial audience as a convention-influenced reading role inscribed in texts is thus a very useful extension for Currie's idea of an "informed reader." The informed reader who works out the relevant belief system on the basis of mutual belief principle, and consequently make-believes the fictional author's beliefs as fictional truth, must have acquired the competence necessary to the conventional context. He must be able to ***apply*** that competence to the generation of fictional truth.

The reader must recognize overt belief worlds, or the fictional author's beliefs, in order to share the characteristics of Rabinowitz' authorial audience. Otherwise the narrative text cannot be experienced as the author wished. "Reading as authorial audience ...involves a kind of distancing from the actual audience, from one's own immediate needs and interests."[44] Yet Rabinowitz hastens to add that authorial reading does ***not*** escape presuppositions which are fundamental to the reading process.[45] It is necessary as authorial audience to ***apply*** knowledge of the world and of interpretive conventions within the context of the belief structure presented by the text. According to Rabinowitz, authorial audiences, however distanced from real readers, have their own engagements, commitment, prejudices, beliefs, and so on. "To join the authorial audience, then, you should not ask what a ***pure*** reading of a given text would be. Rather, you need to ask what sort of ***corrupted*** reader this particular author wrote for..."[46] This is what identifying a fictional author's belief and make-believing fictional truth on that basis is all about. Rabinowitz uses a concept very similar to Currie's fictional author, but insists on the reading side, not in terms of make-believe, which he would relegate to the role of "narrative audience," but in terms of the presumed structure of authorial audience.

The inherent mechanisms of reading as authorial audience Rabinowitz views as fundamental, not because of any moral imperative to grasp authorial intention, but for two other reasons. Firstly, the special status of authorial reading seems justified by the frequency of its

implementation. Readers do not "normally" try to "deconstruct" narrative fiction or deliberately search for underlying semiotic codes.[47] Teaching and scholarly writing seem to be largely based on authorial reading. Secondly, "...reading as authorial audience provides the foundation for many other types of reading."[48] Rabinowitz demonstrates how more specialized critical approaches, for example of a feminist or political nature, rely on a foundation of authorial reading, suggesting that "...while authorial reading without further critique is often incomplete, so is a critical reading without an understanding of the authorial audience as its base."[49] Authorial reading is a kind of norm or point of orientation.

We might immediately object that some texts provide no real access to an implied author's norms--a problem which I discuss ahead for Currie's analysis. In some kinds of texts, no imaginative or cognitive effort can recover an accurate authorial audience. Rabinowitz suggests that this problem results from a "split" between the actual audience and the authorial one. The actual audience ***differs*** from the authorial audience in the knowledge and belief which it brings to the text.[50] (The actual audience may not "fit" the audience postulated by the author, and may even enjoy the text more as a result.) Currie's idea of an ***informed*** reader who recognizes the fictional author's belief in order to identify fictional truth is most relevant here. But the question is to what extent the necessary competence can be increased in order to correct the deficiencies and close the gap between audiences.[51]

Some ***kinds*** of knowledge can also produce a similarly disastrous effect by becoming an undesirable ***surplus*** which also distances the audiences. "[S]ometimes actual readers can respond to a text as authorial audience only by ***not*** knowing something that they in fact know..."[52] In other words, world-knowledge generated on the basis of reality principle may not be admissible as part of the mutual belief system, as we have seen from the work in philosophy. The reader must ***substitute*** the relevant beliefs in such cases.

But given the ever-changing quality of the real world and beliefs about it, and the entire history of interpretive traditions, it may be very

difficult indeed to "get back" to the relevant belief system in question. For this reason, the concepts of authorial audience, mutual belief, and fictional authorial belief have a ***limited*** role to play as ***one*** of several principles. Reading necessarily involves ***many*** kinds of knowledge, including a reality principle which may well override mutual belief principle, especially (and thankfully) where moral issues are concerned.[53]

Even where implied authors are not entirely invisible (or inaudible) the problem of textual ambiguity remains a problem because of differences in interpretive communities and the reading strategies involved. Rabinowitz is careful to focus on the presuppositions which readers bring to texts--presuppositions which affect how any textual directions for interpretation will work. Readers use texts for different ***ends***, "finding" different truths, and calling upon different kinds of evidence to support claims.[54] They use different ***means***, so that meanings can be found which "...subvert the meaning apparently intended by the author."[55] For example, the entire notion of intentionality based on the idea of a central human subject is put insistently into question by deconstruction.[56] Authors themselves may intend to communicate ambiguity itself, as in postmodern texts, so that consistent readings across an interpretive community may be impossible. Rabinowitz concludes that even where critical methodologies are shared, disagreements are inevitable because "...interpretation depends radically on the reader's starting point ...presupposed by the text, not contained in it."[57]

Rabinowitz decides that texts offer some directions (to a variable extent) for their own decoding, but require the text-external knowledge and tools which the reader brings, and without which the textual directions cannot work. He asks about what is "automatic" in the application of rules of interpretation, and how we can know what rules are in place for applying rules.[58] Oddly, this insistence on presuppositions plays down the text as dominant, in effect also reducing the efficacy of the textual construct of implied author presumed basic.

As a result, where Rabinowitz' account becomes really *useful*, but ironically problematic for the authorial audience account, is his detailed analysis of conventions/rules of reading. Since the authorial audience is aware that the story is a fiction and reads with that knowledge, recognizing the synthetic, constructed quality of the fictional world, all kinds of factors become relevant which would not be so in a simple game of make-believe. Not part of the fictional world, this audience shares implicitly with the author the understanding that the story being told is a ***fiction*** and not fact. Given this understanding, which transcends Currie's appreciation of the informed reader's recognition of the fictional author's belief world, it is possible to incorporate ***into*** our appreciation of fictional truth the difficult text-external factors of knowledge which plague Currie's and Lewis' accounts. The typical concerns of the make-believe account would be dealt with in terms of "narrative audience." I show ahead how Currie's account suffers from the absence of this two-part system.

Rabinowitz actually examines the "...kinds of conventions on which ***competing*** authorial readings are apt to be based."[59] He asks how conventions inform reading in complex ways, offering a four-part classification to illuminate relationships among "rules." He takes as fundamental Culler's appreciation of convention and reading strategy, and a kind of assumed "contract" between author and reader on the basis of convention. The rules "...specify the grounds on which the intended reading should take place."[60] Such rules he admits are socially constructed and hence variable according to history, culture, genre, and specific texts. Although the rules may be misapplied according to what the author intended, some will always be applied in our culture from each of the four categories.[61]

But Rabinowitz' point of departure through authorial audience proves essentially inadequate, just as we will see for Currie's theory based on fictional authorial belief. Inevitably, the kinds of conventional knowledge which Rabinowitz identifies involve principles ***more fundamental*** than that of implied author/reader or authorial audience. Rabinowitz presumes that the author's choices are based upon ***assumptions*** about the knowledge of a projected or hypothetical

audience--assumptions about the reader's knowledge, beliefs, and familiarity with conventions. The text is designed rhetorically for the more or less specific hypothetical audience.[62] It follows that such assumptions (conscious or not) will result in varying degrees of overlap between the actual and authorial audience, or variable "success" in creating the authorial audience.[63] Or, to approach the problem from the opposite perspective, the belief world must be constructed in such a way that it can be ***recognized*** by an informed reader who knows the "rules." The "hypothetical" audience is the one who recognizes the belief world. This appreciation of shared conventions between authors and readers is not invalid. The problem is that the perspective of ***writing*** is well-served by such analysis, while ***reading*** procedures do not receive an accurate or complete analysis.

Considering more straightforward interpretive procedures, in particular the relatively simple matter of the location of known buildings in a fictional London setting, Currie concludes that the fictional author's ***belief*** allows for the inclusion of such knowledge within the body of fictional truth.[64] The fictional author is presumed to have knowledge of the city--his "beliefs" about such details can be interpreted by an authorial audience as fictional truth. Such an indirect appreciation of fictional truth generation by subsuming reality principle under mutual belief principle is counter-intuitive, refusing to acknowledge the ***direct*** influence of reality principle.

As soon as Rabinowitz introduces the assumptions made about reader's knowledge, he begins to talk about similar elements of world-knowledge or reality principle, although certainly not using those terms. He points to standard kinds of information which is accessible to audiences but which has little to do with the kind of mutual belief which we can associate with the authorial audience. Proceeding as Currie does, he incorporates reality principle within authorial audience or the recognition of a fictional author's beliefs, failing to recognize the more fundamental quality of reality principle as a point of departure in reading. This kind of account is consequently not accurate of how readers proceed and of how basic reality principle is to inference procedures.

Admittedly inferences based on principles other than fictional authorial belief may not be sufficient to generate a complete or accurate authorial reading, but they may be nonetheless essential for the development of accurate fictional truth. Reality factors are not really under the writer's control, yet depending on textual stipulation, they may be crucially important. They will ***not*** be recognized by the reader through fictional author/authorial audience concepts, but will be accessed much more directly through the personal, experiential process identified by Walton. The sheer infinity of the ***range*** of "assumptions" an author could make points to the need to see the process from the experience of the ***reader***, from which perspective reality principle becomes at least a tentative ***limitation*** on fictional truth. The ***shared*** responses will be ***finite*** in number.

The entire concept of truth world on which Currie bases his principle is founded inadequately on the rhetorical communication model, through its emphasis on ***telling***. Clearly in ***some*** cases, the author's expectations for the reader are inscribed in the text in such a way that particular text-external knowledge is invoked ***through*** this process. But the fundamental problem with Currie's solution for the generation of fictional truth is that it identifies only ***one*** set of factors by focusing on the fictional author/make-believe juncture.

In order to improve Lewis' analysis of truth worlds, Currie applies Walton's concepts about make-believe. He clarifies in the process the idea of "worlds where the story is told as true" by insisting on the reader's perception of a fictional author's ***belief*** about what is true. In theory, such "belief worlds" seem attractive. But as we see through Rabinowitz' appreciation of the authorial audience which would be capable of recognizing such belief worlds, such an audience is in fact privy to the realization that the story is told ***as a fiction***. Currie's system will not work so neatly, and will require careful consideration of narration and the "narrative audience" which completes Rabinowitz' analysis. Due to the authorial audience's ***privileged position*** in relation to the construction of the fictional world, other text-external knowledge inevitably becomes involved through direct, experiential

means which are not illuminated by the concepts of authorial audience or fictional authorial belief.

As Culler already makes clear, this kind of reading operation is only *one* among other strategies. The fictional author, like Rabinowitz' authorial audience, is only one principle among many for fictional truth implications, and cannot be used as the magical umbrella solution which Currie proposes. Ultimately, what constitutes an "informed reader" is much more complex than the rhetorical model allows. However ingenious one's definition of authorial intention may be, the concept can never account for the full range of meaning activated by readers within the fictional sphere. The complex literary system regulates *itself* in terms of meaning generation, according to conventional procedures.

Clearly texts can "reveal" things which they do not "know" themselves--perspectives beyond those called for by the author or a textual construct of that author. "Authorial reading" may be entirely unsuccessful if the reader creates meaning which the author did not expect, but which is nonetheless viable within a context of text-external knowledge. A simple example is found in John Lennon's song "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds," which was based on a picture of a blond girl with stars which John's son brought home from school, calling it "Lucy in the Sky."[65] Within the cultural context the song became instantly identified with the drug LSD on the basis of its title and the psychedelic quality of the lyrics. No rhetorical communication model will account for such *un*intended effects which are manifest in keeping with knowledge bases beyond authorial control. While it may be argued that the song writer may have recognized what knowledge would be activated (although he claims in taped interviews that he did not), the "code" for the activation of knowledge remains strangely independent of authorial intent. The message had no "sender" and was constructed by listeners according to a code imposed from outside the text.

Only through the semiotic appreciation of fictional narrative communication can we assess the mechanisms/principles involved in the all-important background assumptions which serve to complete fictional truth sets for reference worlds. The conventional meaning

generated must be assessed as equally fundamental--*related* to intentional meaning and the textual construct of implied reader or "role" of authorial audience, but also *independent* of the "telling" constraint, as a product of diverse and interdependent *reading* operations.

Distinguishing Narrators

The fundamental problem with Currie's argument is that "fictional authorial belief" can have various bases not *all* of which will constitute sufficient grounds for inferring a corresponding fictional truth. Currie's approach does not come to grips with distinctions between real authors, implied authors, and narrators, and does not begin to address the various possible qualities of narration which influence fictional truth generation. In effect, Currie presumes the same central importance of narrative instance as speech position which is fundamental to classical narratology, but without establishing accurately which "teller" his account describes.

Currie isolates his "teller" from the real-life author "...whose beliefs presumably bear little relation to what is true in the work."[66] Already such a statement is problematic, since the whole account is based on authorial intention and the concept of shared belief in a real authorial community. But, since real authors do not really "tell" readers anything, it is not especially useful to consider communication at that level. It is more useful to discuss an *image* of the author as a projected set of norms or in Félix Martínez-Bonati's terms, as an "ideal author" objectified in the work as creative mind--one "moment" of the concrete author's self.[67] Nothing will be true in a narrative fiction simply because the *real* author intends it to be. Only the textual construct of fictional author can exercise such control. Currie correctly emphasizes the "teller" as a fictional construct. He suggests ideas from literary theory, especially the tradition of research in narrative voice beginning with Booth--ideas which concern implied, ideal, apparent, or postulated authors, but without ever defining clearly how

he appropriates and applies the concepts. The "fictional author" is simply "...that fictional character constructed within our make-believe whom we take to be telling us the story as known fact."[68]

This statement encapsulates a fundamental ambiguity in Currie's theory. He really wants to identify what Wallace Martin calls a "position" marked out by the writer, "...from which the intended reader will view the narrative."[69] Currie feels that "...the character of this figure, delineated by us as we read, enables us to make sense of the text."[70] But, quoting Jonathan Culler, who is actually speaking about *narrators* and how we read texts as verbal communication to reduce strangeness, he insists on the importance of models of plausible human attitudes and coherent personalities, totally conflating the roles of narrator and implied (or fictional) author.[71] As Martínez-Bonati points out, "[t]he objectified, ideal author is not ...the speaker of poetic sentences (as basic speaker or as a character)..."[72] If we are to consider reading for fictional truth as an exploration of the fictional author's belief structure, we must distinguish clearly between the fictional author and the narrator. We must deal with the "telling" separately, given that the implied author is not a "speech" position within the narrative. Instead, Currie insists that understanding the fictional author as we would a real person is "...a matter of making the best overall sense we can of his behaviour (and here we are limited to speech behaviour alone.)"[73]

But since the implied author is not a speech position, the reader is surely at a loss to analyse his "actions," verbal or otherwise. We most certainly build up a picture of a belief set (or the set of norms fundamental to Booth's approach), at least where texts encourage such inference, but we do not do so through the speech of such an imagined fictional "character." If the belief set of the fictional author constitutes the set of propositions that go to make up the story, as Currie insists, we must recognize a basic problem which escapes his attention. The reader is not "told" this belief set, which may never be inferred in some stories. If we were to rely on such a principle we might never determine a set of truths for these stories.

Currie really discusses (on the basis of the truth worlds concept) the function of the ***narrator***. He establishes how the belief set (of his fictional author) is constructed with the text as a primary tool, providing the only available "direct evidence" about this figure, establishing "...the character traits that distinguish him from others, and the idiosyncratic features of his mental life."[74] Obviously the text must provide some basic picture of such a construct, which has no extratextual existence. But Currie also recognizes the importance of inference procedures which contribute to the building up of the belief set, insisting on the background of assumptions which assist the reader to ***choose*** between alternative hypotheses.[75] The question of world-models is inescapable here; for example, the reader will routinely consider what a similar ***actual*** person would probably believe. Obviously the reader does proceed in this way to "identify" and individuate the narrator, whom he imagines as referring to a world--the one who "tells" what seems to really "happen." It is not nearly so clear how an image of the implied author is built up, however, since access to such a figure is much more indirect.

Qualities of Narration

By confusing the role of narrator and implied author, Currie cannot deal successfully with any of the problems of unreliable or ironic narration. He does find it possible to include within fictional truth those beliefs of the fictional author which are ***erroneous*** and not necessarily shared by the authorial community at large. Currie uses Lewis' famous example of the incorrect behaviour of the Russell's viper in the Holmes story "The Adventure of the Speckled Band," to show that since the reader can reasonably infer that the fictional author believes the snake capable of rope-climbing, this behaviour becomes true of the story world.[76] Such a conclusion seems to pose a threat to the concept of overt community belief or mutual belief principle, which becomes inoperative in such a case, functioning no longer as the background which makes it reasonable to infer the fictional author's belief. The result is surely the disturbing "intentional fallacy" which Currie refers

to elsewhere.[77] But, in effect, Currie insists here on a kind of "good judgment" of the author, who constructs his fictional world according to his own discretion, without allowing chance factors of unknown fact to mould that world. This represents again a rejection or diluting of reality principle, which reduces the author's ***control*** over fictional truth. "Mistakes" corrected by the reader according to reality principle will produce a fictional world different from what the author intended.

But however problematic this account may be, we certainly cannot accept as fictional truth ***all*** kinds of erroneous beliefs specific to the "fictional author." In many cases it will be obvious to the reader that a narrator is entirely mistaken and not trustworthy as to fictional truth. The reader may not have a problem in discerning an authorial "voice" which sets the account straight, as in many unambiguously ironic texts. Alternately, there may be ***no*** way to identify authorial norms, leaving the reader with a restricted narrative view which cannot be qualified as to fictional truth status. Some narrators are not to be believed! There must be some means, then, to distinguish a genuinely "fictional authorial" appreciation of story truth on the basis of erroneous belief, from purely incidental narrative failure to recognize the truth of situations and represent them accurately.

In showing how the account of make-believe relates to the concept of fictional truth, Currie insists on the notion of a "reliable teller" who has access to story events, and who must therefore influence the reader's strategies for working out fictional truth. Within the scope of make-believe, we know that a fictional author does not ***actually*** know about events or believe what he "says," but we agree to make-believe that the teller does believe such things, and that those beliefs are reliable.[78] At least in the role of Rabinowitz' "narrative audience," the reader infers what the reliable teller believes as part of his game of make-believe, so that what the "teller" believes, is fictionally true. Given the impression we have in fiction that the speaker and listener are relocated within a created world, as a narrator and narrative audience, it is natural to assume this basis of "known fact" and belief. As Currie himself suggests, each reader generates through the process "...a fiction larger than the fiction being read: a fiction in which the

reader plays the role of one in touch with the events of the story and whose business it is to determine, in a rough-and-ready way, what those events are and against what background they take place."[79]

Yet what the "teller" believes may have very little to do with what actually happens in the story told by an ***unreliable*** narrator, or one where there is a general tone of irony, understatement, or exaggeration. To appreciate both ironic and unreliably narrated texts we require a sophisticated appreciation of the difference between narrator and implied author. Access to the worlds of "known fact" is mediated through a narration which does not directly supply accurate fictional truth. The operation of identifying a "voice" beyond that of the narrator becomes a crucial step in the generation of that truth. From the reading point of view, the role of "listening" for the authorial "voice" which "tells" the story as fiction must not be confused with the appreciation of narration as telling of known fact. Simultaneous reading roles must be distinguished.

Currie begins to address the problem through his discussion of intentional and conventional meaning, as applied to the question of irony, where conventional (or literal) and intentional meaning come apart.[80] If we think of conventional meaning as produced by sentences, beyond this meaning we can identify the ***utterances*** of the sentences as primary vehicles of intentional meaning. In straightforward discourse, both kinds of meaning coincide. But in ironic discourse, for example, the speaker's intention is such that both conventional meaning and the departure from conventional meaning be recognized.[81] The ***disparity*** between meanings must be recognized, and this would apply even in cases of ambiguous irony where the "final" message remains unclear.

Currie discusses "story-meaning" or fictional truth as an ***extended*** meaning dependent partly on conventional meaning, since the words of the text directly influence fictional truth. But he explains that the ***other*** component of story-meaning is not what the real author intended by his words (as in a standard speech model), but rather the intentional meaning which we can attribute to the fictional author--what the

fictional author believes.[82] If the text is taken as an expression of such beliefs, we obviously cannot always assume that it expresses *literally* those beliefs. Here Currie suggests that the reader make-believes that the fictional author expresses himself "...by using language in the way a real person does: sometimes literally and sometimes not."[83]

Again, the conflation of narrator and implied author concepts undermines the efficacy of Currie's account, since the key factor here is the discrepancy between the actual words of the narrator and the intended meaning which the reader can attribute to an implied author. Only by appreciating this kind of ***mediation*** of "worlds where the story is told as true" can we understand the complications posed for fictional truth generation by ironic or unreliable forms of narration. In order to get beyond this provisional narrated truth world the reader must assume the role of authorial audience and identify the more encompassing implied authorial "voice" which "tells" the story ***as fiction***. The ***indirect*** process provides the ***reader*** with an interpretive technique capable of tackling difficult problems about fictional truth. Irony, for example, can be seen, then, in Culler's terms as an interpretive operation available to readers when they encounter problems which it may solve.[84]

By fusing the truth-world concept with an appreciation of make-believe, Currie gives priority to the rhetorically-based understanding of both narration and implied author, insisting that the reader make-believes "...that the text is an account of events that have actually occurred."[85] The make-believe process necessitates a view of the text as related in a ***particular*** way to the events, "...as the product of someone who has knowledge of those events."[86] On Currie's account it is not only the reader's make-believe that the narrated events occurred, but also that he is told about those events by someone who knows about them. The reader imagines a "contact" with the characters and actions through a "channel" of ***reliable*** information. Again, "[t]o make-believe a fictional story is not merely to make-believe that the story is true, but ***that it is told as known fact.***"[87] This application of the truth-world concept allows Currie to explore the insightful notion of fictional authorial belief and to make a step towards a better appreciation of the

entire "telling" process and the often ***indirect*** generation of fictional truth through various qualities of authorial "voice."

But unfortunately, the fundamental assessment on which the account is based is too restricted to permit a complete understanding of principles of implication for fictional truth. The truth-world concept turns out to be ***most*** useful when thought of in terms of the reader "relocating" there, since it is actually the reader who builds such worlds. Rabinowitz' concept of the reader's role as narrative audience is relevant here. It is essential in assessing fictional truth generation that we consider variations in "distance" between real authors and real readers, implied authors and implied readers, and narrators and narratees. The experience of narrative depends on such distinctions, as Booth has shown.[88] Currie's analysis needs the distinction of narrative audience to clarify how the make-believe process works. Martin makes a fundamental point worth applying: "As members of the 'narrative audience' ...we read as if the story were true, in the sense that we grant existence to the characters and events. Within this world we distinguish facts from lies, and credible from unreliable points of view."[89] Through joining the narrative audience the reader can identify with characters or reject them, just as the narrator can.[90]

Obviously the truth or belief world accessed by the narrative audience cannot be simply conflated with the world projected by the "fictional author" as Currie does, confusing the "location" of make-believe and "worlds told as known fact or belief." We must ask ***which*** audience experiences the problems of ambiguous story content--or what reading ***role*** is involved in deciphering the ways in which fictional truth is activated. The real reading process includes ***both*** roles: the reading of the fiction as a world told as true, and as a world known to be constructed as fiction, with all of the text-external knowledge and conventional context which that procedure automatically invokes.

In effect, possible-worlds approaches stressing textual stipulation of worlds have addressed the fictional truth issue largely in terms of the response of the narrative audience, relegating the troubling text-external factors to a peripheral position only uneasily addressed in

terms of reality principle and potentially "maximal" worlds. Within the fictional sphere we must assess the interplay of reading roles which creates (complete) reference worlds able to co-ordinate all relevant information. In effect, the range of information accessible (through make-believe) to the narrative audience is only one ***part*** of the experience--one part of the "message" contained in the larger semiotic communication defined in the fictional sphere.

The reader does not, of course, assume the role of narrative audience to appreciate the ***qualities*** of narration, for which he requires a knowledge of genre and associated conventions. But he does need to make a fundamental distinction between narrator and implied author in order to begin to appreciate how fictional worlds can be perceived alternately as "told" as known fact/belief, or as fiction.

To presume a narrator (of a particular kind) is ultimately not essential to the truth generating process, although this is in fact the comfortable stance often taken by readers, which I have already identified. And when this kind of naturalizing process occurs, it is only the ***beginning*** of a more elaborate process involving the suggested semiotic strategies. In other words, the limited truth world created through narration is only at best provisional and subject to supplementation. So, while it is true that the reader is concerned with narration which reminds her of standard speech communication, and may well identify an additional authorial "voice" through the same naturalizing tendency, the total semiotic process is much more complex. Only analysis of the interrelated text-external knowledge bases will yield the total matrix for fictional truth, which otherwise escapes full definition.

Imagining a world to which the narrator seems to "refer," reliably or not, the reader must ***take over*** the completion of that reference world. What the narrator puts into that world through direct and indirect suggestion is only ***one part*** of fictional truth. It is the ***reader*** who creates the reference world imagined as referred to by the narrator. The reader constructs the reference world by activating all available and relevant knowledge, putting into that world the truth that belongs

there. For this reason, truth worlds are better thought of as worlds where the story is *read* as known fact. When the reader "relocates" to a truth world he brings with him everything he needs to construct that world as known fact.

To insist on the imagining of a *reliable* narration according to known fact and in keeping with fictional authorial belief is counter-intuitive. As Ryan comments, "...the expression 'told as known fact' disregards the problem of the teller, and suggests an unproblematic relation between the text and the facts of [textual actual world] and [textual reference world]."[91] In many cases the reader is encouraged to read the story as *faulty* in its telling, told from a too-limited perspective, *restricted* in knowledge, unreliable in terms of judgements about what happens, ironic, etc. Make-believe and the more fundamental construction of reference worlds may well involve an appreciation (by the narrative audience) of the narrator as *anything but* reliable. Such a distorted truth world is not that of the "fictional author" which Currie tries to define, and makes visible the discrepancy with authorial norms.

Currie's concept of "fictional author" will thus yield only a small *part* of fictional truth generated, since the reader infers in many different ways beyond this pretense about a "teller" who knows what is going on. The reader takes over the construction of fictional truth in ways which Currie's account does not begin to address. The account will be reasonably accurate for highly realistic fiction where authorial norms become evident through narration, no matter how "transparent" that narration may be. It will be marginally workable by extension where irony is readily perceived as a discrepancy between narration and authorial stance. But it will not work where narration is so covert as to produce the effect of a "non-narrated" story without evidence of an implied author. Nor will it work where there is no authorial "voice" discernible beyond potentially unreliable narration. In this case, Booth's concerns about immoral fiction and the absence of discernible authorial values will be relevant.

A very large issue of the reader's treatment of moral issues surfaces--an issue which casts further light on the limitations of Currie's theory and his treatment of reality principle. As Walton points out, it is not obvious that any variant of mutual belief principle usually takes precedence over reality principle, especially when fictional truths having to do with morality are at stake.[92] In such cases reality principle may play a more fundamental role. "Perhaps we are to go by something like the mutual beliefs of the artist's society in tracing implications concerning 'factual' matters but by the truth insofar as we can ascertain it when it comes to matters of morality."[93] Walton goes so far as to suggest a "convention" rooted in the problem of imagining perverse moral doctrines as truth--a convention which makes a kind of reality principle operative.[94] In other words, to avoid becoming part of the authorial audience and sharing mutual belief, the reader can revert to reality principle.

The point is that the reader does not really "accept" the perverse or vicious ideas expressed by a narrator, whether they can be attributed also to an implied author or not. He judges such ideas against the independent standards of real life, refusing to set aside his own moral convictions in order to appreciate either idiosyncratic narrative views or the mutual beliefs of the authorial community. As Rabinowitz suggests, the reader can only read impersonally as authorial audience in a *limited* way, since some knowledge and beliefs of the authorial audience may not be shared by the real reader--may be "extrapersonal." And some knowledge and beliefs may be "extracommunal"--not shared by any community of real readers.[95] Here reality principle takes over from authorial audience, since the values of that audience are not acceptable. Fortunately, books have a limited power to "...take readers out of themselves."[96]

We may feel that a work does not "address" us, especially if we can reject the values of an implied author outright. As Martin explains, in refusing to consider himself a member of the authorial audience the reader may even refuse to *read* the book. But he may also accept a place in the authorial audience in spite of disagreement with the implied author, providing the story is *interesting* enough.[97] Walton would

agree that although moral perversity can destroy aesthetic appeal, the quality of the fictional world need not be destroyed totally by an obnoxious (or indeterminate) implied author.

Whether or not the story is ruined may depend on factors of narration and point of view. Unreliable narration is easily tolerated, while blatantly perverse and "audible" authorial norms may prove insurmountable. Where an implied author's beliefs may be imagined to mesh with reality principle, as different from those of the unreliable narrator, the reader may be happy with the result. The unreliable narrator's expression of "truth" in such cases is restricted to something which seems to pass ***superficially*** as a mutual belief principle, but which is readily detected as false. Obviously such moral considerations can have serious consequences for fictional truth about characters, and are only marginally addressed in Currie's scheme.

In addition to the problem of immoral fiction, we must also consider as a problem for Currie's theory the potential for a more fundamental loss of recognition of "purpose" or overall meaning which can undermine interpretive inference procedures. In the extreme, the reader may be unable even to understand what "happens"--may have difficulty piecing together the fictional world as such, fitting the characters, actions, and motives together into a cohesive whole. In extremely contradictory worlds, fictional authors perform a strange role indeed.

Contradictory Truth Worlds

Part of Currie's project with the beliefs of a fictional author is focused on the problem of inconsistent, contradictory worlds--worlds where Lewis' concept of fictional truth proves problematic. We must obviously consider what happens to fictional truth when there are ***no*** worlds at which an inconsistent story can be told as "known fact."[98] The problem is not so severe where inconsistencies result from what seem to be minor oversights. Lewis suggests a viable procedure involving the consideration of various possible stories which eliminate

the inconsistency without diverging from the original otherwise. We then say that what is true in the original is not everything but rather what is true in all these revisions.[99] In other words, we *limit* what we can "know" about fictional truth. Currie's account provides another simple solution for minor inconsistencies: we assume that when an occassional contradictory fact is offered, the larger number of consistent textual references are what the fictional author believes, and hence what is fictionally true.[100]

But more radically inconsistent fictions present more serious difficulties for any approach based on "truth worlds," provoking a special kind of proliferation of fictional truths. If inconsistent fictions are treated directly on this model, everything turns out to be indiscriminately true. Where inconsistent statements and their implications are jointly asserted, the truth-world becomes a contradiction from which anything can follow. As Walton explains, "...a contradiction entails everything ...a proposition counterfactually implies whatever it entails. ...It is hard to avoid the conclusion that everything is fictional in any work in which contradictory propositions are fictional, whether they are primary or not."[101] What Lewis suggests as the only possibility to prevent entirely vacuous truth is that we must extract the several consistent fictions (or segments) and then say that what is true in the story is what is true in any such segment.[102] Unlike the intersection concept suggested for minor inconsistencies, this idea of a "union" to produce truth preserves more of what we can know about fictional worlds. In other words, there is nothing inconsistent about the contradictory facts if taken ***individually***, so that both or all can be "verified" in some logically possible world. Currie objects that there may not be "consistent segments" evident, that the new solution is purely ad hoc and designed to solve the problem of inconsistent stories without illuminating any other aspect of fictional truth, and that the proposal would not accommodate the minor inconsistencies resulting from authorial oversight.[103]

Lewis proposes such a solution only in order to circumvent the problem of ***vacuous*** truth in impossible fictions--fictions where there *is* no world where the story is told as known fact rather than fiction.

Trapped within the constraints of possible-worlds theory, Lewis can only conclude that radically central contradictions which defy logic threaten the very notion of fictional truth. He asks what interesting application such a trivial concept of truth can have. Focused entirely on the fictionality of propositions as a species of truth, Lewis does not see what other factors of reading make fictional worlds different from the possible worlds he proposes.[104] Even where there is no higher-level, coherent possible world in which contradictory aspects can be reconciled or integrated, there still exists the process of writing itself and its attendant reading strategies. The reader will always try to find a story-world somewhere under the incoherencies, building a reference world to accommodate the most bizarre set of fictional truths.

Currie's solution to radical inconsistency demonstrates the wider limitations of his approach, which ignores the semiotics of the reading process. Speaking of central impossibilities which cannot be removed without destroying the story, Currie suggests that the fictional author must be presumed to believe the contradictory thing.[105] Belief becomes the illuminating central concept here because, as in real life situations, we can attribute to people beliefs of this kind without also attributing to them a belief in the explicit contradictions which follow. In effect, nothing manifestly contradictory is then true in the story.[106] This is an important qualification to the possible-worlds approach, which questions "...whether the consequences of fictional truths *are* likewise fictional truths, whether the property of being a truth in fiction is closed under consequence..."[107] Meinong would have it that fictional truths are sometimes cut off from the consequences they ought to imply, especially where real-world information creates a conflict. Certainly if the reader pursues the consequences of radical deviations from world-models in non-realistic genres incoherence will result. Currie's discussion of this problem in terms of a similarity between fictional logic and the logic of belief is helpful. It constitutes, in effect, admission of another aspect of knowledge from reality which can guide interpretive procedures.

Currie realizes that stories *may* contain those kinds of *explicit* contradictions which *are* irremediable, suggesting time-travel stories

in which an event does and does not occur at a certain time, with other events depending on both being the case.[108] In such a case, the reader infers that the fictional author believes the event occurred and that he believes it did not. Contradictory propositions are thus true, but again, without assigning truth to everything indiscriminately.[109] This insistence on strong connections between the way belief is figured out in actual life and strategies for deciphering fictional truth serves Currie's purpose well. Through this approach, he circumvents the need to construe counterfactuals otherwise, so that all with contradictory antecedents turn out to be true. Nor does he need to make radical revisions to the reality principle which provokes the unsuitable implications.

Convention and Genre

But a theory so minutely focused on the belief of a fictional author and the attached intentional meaning which the reader must recognize in order to make-believe suitably, is not sufficient to address the complexities of fictional truth generation. Absolutely fundamental must be an understanding of the nature of ***convention*** as meaning--as a kind of "automatic" intention not captured on a rhetorical communication model. Currie does speak about Lewis' appreciation of convention as "...a regularity of behaviour within a group where the regularity solves ...a recurrent problem ...that members of the group face, and where the regularity is continued because it is known to solve the problem."[110] Such conventions are often arbitrary in the sense that the behaviour continued is no more intrinsically desirable than any other, but is simply agreed upon, such as driving on the right side in Canada. Currie also sees that conventions ***of meaning*** need be analysed, recognizing that some kind of regularity in the use of signs must be in effect, "...so as to avoid having to start from scratch every time we try to communicate."[111]

Just as in language a regularity of use is sustained--a regularity which becomes a convention--in fictional narrative we also find

meaning based on such conventional processes. It should be obvious that the presumed background knowledge/agreement is "economical" for the writer. In effect, much of fictional truth is "intended" purely automatically and made available to the reader through the same automatic conventional structure. It is precisely this kind of encompassing semiotic system which demonstrates the importance of ***genre*** for the implication of fictional truth through conventions of reading and writing.

Given Lewis' interest in convention, it is not surprising that he recognizes genre as a serious complication for fictional truth. Not important for counterfactuals, generic conventions are hence not part of Lewis' essential structure for truth worlds based on explicit textual content and a background of either facts about reality or the alternative/complementary overt beliefs of the authorial community. But Lewis identifies a third source for fictional truth as a "...carry-over from other truth in fiction," citing both intra-fictional and inter-fictional carry-over.[112] Intra-fictional carry-over allows the reader to complete some of the unspecified qualities of characters in accordance with related facts presented in the same text. Obviously much of standard inference and gap-filling works in this way.

Inter-fictional carry-over is much more interesting. Lewis offers the example of the dragon Scrulch who appears along with a beautiful princess and bold knight in a "stylized genre." Scrulch is not specified as breathing fire, but according to Lewis the reader will presume he does so, in accordance with "...inter-fictional carry-over from what is true of dragons in other stories."[113] Obviously this involves the kind of *vraisemblance* which Culler identifies as intertextual--a process of naturalization which depends on knowledge of genre and other texts. Lewis hints here at the importance of the oeuvre of an author, as well as imitations and adaptations which necessarily depend on truths which the reader will consider basic to fictional truth in the new text.

Currie predictably tries to bring this insight about "carry-over" into accord with his theory of fictional authorial belief by suggesting that if what is true in one fiction can depend on what is true in a different

fiction, rather than on what is true in reality or believed to be true, the carry-over must nonetheless operate only via inferences about the fictional author's beliefs. Talking about beliefs as influenced by myth or legend, Currie insists that it is reasonable to infer that the fictional author believes that Scrulch breathes fire, hence this is true in the story.[114] This argument in no way reflects how the reader would actually arrive at such a conclusion. Currie fails to see the importance of genre itself as a generator of principles which are not necessarily related to fictional authors. The "informed reader" in this case has access to knowledge beyond fictional authorial belief--knowledge which is at least as fundamental as any reality principle, and which *determines* how fictional truth is generated.

Lewis actually takes a significant step in qualifying this kind of reading strategy by applying Walton's concept of make-believe. The storyteller's pretence of truth and knowledge is only the beginning of a solution, since "[t]here is a cooperative game of make-believe, governed by conventional understandings, with players in (at least) two roles. The storytellers pretend to pass on historical information to their audience; the audience pretends to learn from their words and to respond accordingly."[115] Lewis finds significant the ***broad*** aspect of the game of make-believe which involves make-believedly learning from ***numerous*** sources (or storytellers), and ***combining*** information in order to determine what is fictionally true, or what otherwise indeterminate properties characters might have. The other stories of the same genre as Scrulch's story are part of that make-believe game, their information becoming necessarily relevant.[116]

It is significant that Lewis still focuses here on information *told* through other stories, rather than identifying a more open semiotic communication process as building the reader's knowledge bases. The crucial point here is that the dominant text-model must be considered as a component of the fictional sphere building reference worlds. It is not the make-believe as such (as a second-order operation) which is so crucial, but the inference procedures which *activate* genre as dominant for the reference world structure created by the reader. The semiotic factors of communication, being more basic than "telling" appreciation

--more multiple in source or origin--place such text-models beyond the role of "storyteller" in a game of make-believe.

Currie expands on Lewis' tentative correlation of truth worlds and make-believe operations. His whole theory is based on such a view. But, unlike Lewis, he insists usefully on ***separating*** the make-believe from the constraints of genre. He approaches the whole question of genre through authorial intention, however, insisting that such intentions influence interpretive strategies, in effect opening up the fictional text to a "broader view."[117] Genre "membership" he considers as at least in part a matter of authorial intention, since it is intended that the reader recognize features as significant in a particular way.[118] Quite correctly, then, Currie sees genre as involving the kind of "automatic intention" I have discussed--expectations for reading which the author is aware of in the first place, projecting a hypothetical reader familiar with the appropriate conventions. A fictional narrative's membership in a genre does not depend merely on the characteristic typological features, but includes systematic reading expectations and operations. Currie offers as proof of this kind of authorial intention the way in which critics often concentrate on "...questions about the work's genre, its symbolic elements, its underlying moral and aesthetic vision."[119]

While he admits that he has no theoretical framework developed to deal with these things, and does not assign in fact the dominance to genre which it deserves, he does recognize that a great deal of inference is not analyzable in terms of make-believe. He suggests that "[t]he response to fiction is a complex product of make-believe and judgments about the work that do not occur within the scope of make-believe at all."[120] The reader's "response" to a fictional narrative depends "...not only on the structure of the story but upon the ***purpose*** we perceive that structure to have, upon our ***expectations*** about the way in which the story will develop as we read, and upon our perception of certain elements as having a certain kind of ***salience*** within the story."[121] In keeping with Rabinowitz' concept of authorial audience, Currie *implicitly* acknowledges the semiotic quality of reading procedures involved in this role, which takes the reader beyond the pretence of

worlds told as known fact. Explicitly he insists only upon the crucial assumptions made about the author's intentions. The decision on that basis that the work belongs to a certain genre influences expectations for plot development and recognition of the salience of particular elements.[122]

Currie offers the example of a detective novel where the reader can expect that the least likely suspect is guilty, or that the apparently least relevant fact may turn out to be the most vital clue. We cannot "know" these things without recourse to generic context. Such expectations are not "produced" within the framework of make-believe. Currie defends this view by reminding that if the reader make-believes that the text is assertively uttered as known fact or a "report" of known events (as his theory takes as fundamental), it is not possible within that same make-believe to "...suspect the least likely character *just because* he is the least likely one."[123] Such a view would be ridiculous. Considering the same problem, Rabinowitz further identifies the importance of genre as conventional context. If we know to eliminate obvious suspects, it is "...not because of some *systematic* understanding of possible literary types, but rather because it is the *conventional* thing to do in that kind of book."[124]

Currie's plan thus preserves the integrity of the fictional authorial belief concept by *limiting* it to the make-believe context where he says genre expectations do not operate. This view is already a step away from Walton's exclusive focus on game worlds which cannot adequately account for the complexity of inference procedures and principles of implication. But it is built inadequately on the fundamental conflation discussed above between fictional author and narrator, and between reading roles.

Genre as Dominant Model

What is required instead is a clearer view of *how* conventional knowledge can take *priority* within the construction of reference

worlds, over make-believe operations which construct the full imaginative worlds in which readers ultimately indulge. These kinds of interpretive strategies are fundamental--more basic than make-believe, involving the shared conventional knowledge which cannot be avoided in the construction of fictional truth, and which Currie's "informed reader" will not be able to ignore. If the reader's appreciation of fictional truth were nothing more than a make-believe interaction with the text, perhaps as an imagined belief set of the fictional author, there would be no place for generic and intertextual knowledge to be integrated. It is the semiotic system of communication which ***allows*** this kind of complex generation of fictional truth which needs analysis, rather than Currie's limited focus on intention and belief systems.

Recognizing genre expectations as ***prior decisions*** we must also realize that all factors of the literary competence of an "informed reader" take on great significance. The application of the correct generic code (or one of several "correct" generic codes) is crucial, if a reasonably accurate truth structure is to be built. Even how the reader assesses the quality of narrative technique depends on such prior decisions and the complex cognitive procedures which result. When Currie speaks about "The Turn of the Screw" as interpreted either in accord with a reality principle as a psychological story, or in accord with an authorial belief system, as a ghost story, he is really unwittingly assigning this kind of essential priority to genre as a means to qualify fictional truth. Generic considerations obviously ***mediate*** the other knowledge bases.[125]

Nobody would seriously deny that narrative fictional texts provide directions for the construction of fictional truth. But to appreciate the procedures activated by texts, we must analyse the kinds of knowledge which the reader brings to the text, in effect "embodying" the applicable rules of reading or principles of implication viable for inference. Such presupposed knowledge is not "developed" somehow by text-internal codes, as analysts like Iser would insist, but must be taken as a fundamental text-external knowledge base which ***allows*** the text-internal codes to work in the first place. The conventions are not discovered within texts, but are brought to those texts as part of

reading operations. Different kinds of texts require different kinds of knowledge or presupposition, that is, different ***approaches*** to the text, according to models recognized and activated. Such conventional knowledge produces specific consequences for the process of interpretation and inferences for fictional truth. Granted, many texts offer varying degrees of "explicit" guidance, in effect ***activating*** or triggering the relevant codes. But even then, the reader must be able to ***recognize*** that guidance, set it in an appropriate context, and select the appropriate text-external knowledge on that basis. The reader brings to narrative fiction an implicit understanding of (or set of expectations for) this kind of discourse in general, and for the particular genre in question. She is "guided" by such knowledge, in no way ruling out or disregarding such preconceptions. The best we can do is to ***pretend*** in our analyses that the reader is "blank," and determine what the text "directs," in terms of relevant extra- and intertext.

It is this internalized "grammar" of literature which Culler discusses in terms of literary competence as equivalent to a set of conventions for reading.[126] The concept seems superficially to play down the author's "conscious" production of meaning, but is by no means antithetical to authorial intention in that, as we have seen, such intention necessarily involves postulating the hypothetical audience which has assimilated the relevant conventions.

The interpersonal system of knowledge must of course be ***learned*** through a literary socialization process involving the experience and mastery of narrative fiction. Exposure to a range of narrative (sub)-genres and training produces the competent or "informed" reader, who knows then what questions are relevant and what criteria for fictional truth are applicable--literally what "possibilities" can be distinguished. The learned conventions literally ***become*** the interpretive operations, since reading is not a "natural" activity, but rather a separately learned conventional activity which includes the ***arbitrary*** quality of assigned significance which Lewis appreciates. No amount of insistence on the operations of make-believe will accommodate the reading operations involved in this learned process.

The acquisition of this "grammar" for the construction of fictional truth is largely ***unconscious***. If we can postulate a set of "rules" governing the generation of fictional truth, we do not also claim that an entire complex and systematic set of rules is actively learned and then systematically ***applied*** by readers in particular cases. As explained in Chapter Five, we simply extrapolate the "rules" on the basis of common practice, presuming that the reading operations ***imply*** the principles in effect. The developed principles are not explicit "guides," but reformulate readers' routine judgments about fictional truth. In order to act in accordance with contextual and conventional principles, the reader need not have learned ***about*** those principles through any conscious effort.

Although the assimilation involved is often implicit, it is precisely this tacit knowledge which allows for recognition of "acceptable" interpretations. Such interpretations have the probable advantage of corresponding with authorial intention, since the conventional knowledge is shared by author and reader. But more importantly, they have the publicly shareable, interpersonal quality which only such reading operations can guarantee.

The extrapolation of fictional truth on the basis of literary competence must be accounted for first of all in semiotic terms, by analysing reading procedures and the distinctions applied to texts on the basis of interpersonal norms, shared points of departure, and routine cognitive operations. Only then can we apply the account of competence to the complex problems of fictional truth generation. Making explicit all of the factors implicitly involved in a competence for constructing fictional truth, such as the reality principle, mutual belief principle, and fictional author/authorial audience already introduced, we must also recognize text-models as the dominant regulating factor for the organization of the matrix of the fictional sphere. We must keep the theoretical account faithful to what readers ***actually do***, rather than imposing a single principle to channel diverse problems into a synthetic solution such as make-believe worlds or authorial reading. Through genre as dominant model it is possible to demonstrate ***ranges*** of truth generation governed by the ***choice*** of conventional knowledge, or the

reader's implicit appeal to particular norms which are built into a set or configuration of principles of implication. We appreciate the differences in interpretive procedures as a function of the particular conventions activated.

There will always be an available ***context*** for fictional truth generation, depending on the ***choice*** of text-model which regulates how text-external knowledge bases are activated and co-ordinated within the matrix for fictional truth. The truth-world concept is fundamental to appreciating choice and context, but must be extended to a more complete understanding of how textual reference worlds are created by readers. Lewis really wants to identify a reference world which ***encompasses*** the fictional world, and which constitutes a frame into which the truths of the fictional world must fit. This larger reference world as I see it is more or less "accessible" or visible depending on the ***kind*** of narration involved in the all-important "telling." Since this virtual reference world ***must*** be envisioned in order to create a structure of acceptable truth for the fictional world, narration becomes inevitably important to genre and the reader's knowledge of conventions.

Inference procedures are much more complex than the truth-world model allows, but involve nonetheless analyzable semiotic factors. The truth-world concept thus leads to my understanding of reference worlds, but requires an appreciation of genre as dominant structuring element for the variable integration of principles of implication. The selection of relevant truth is not in the least disorderly when understood as regulated by genre and associated conventional knowledge--both that related to specific text-models and that which constitutes our understanding of reality.

It is necessary to develop the reference world concept through genre considered as dominant model--a model even more fundamental than reality principle. Before developing this argument, however, the next chapter demonstrates in which ways actual-world models are more fundamental to fictional truth generation than the aspects of belief worlds and authorial reading discussed already at length. After presenting the framework of world-models as a standard default

mechanism available automatically, it will be possible to show how the activation of such models is ultimately dependent on regulating text-models.

Notes

[1]See David Lewis' famous "Truth in Fiction" article, available in *Philosophical Papers*, 2 vols. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 1, 261-80.

[2]Lewis 266.

[3]Lewis, Postscript 276.

[4]Lewis 268-9.

[5]This argument from Lewis' *Counterfactuals* is explained by Gregory Currie in *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 63.

[6]Currie 55.

[7]Gregory Currie, "Fictional Truth," *Philosophical Studies* 50 (1986): 197.

[8]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 148.

[9]Currie, *Nature* 65-6.

[10]Lewis 272.

[11]Lewis 272.

[12]Lewis 272.

[13]Walton 152. Reference is to Lewis' formula and to Stephen Schiffer, *Meaning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 30-42. In a similar way, Wolterstorff also bases implications for fictional truth on what the author assumes the bulk of his "intended audience" believes about the real world. See *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 123-4.

[14]Obviously truths based on mutual belief principle which contradict what we now know to be true of reality (for example, that the earth is flat) are purely intensional, and can never change extensional, empirical truth about reality.

[15]Currie, *Nature* 67.

[16]Currie, *Nature* 67.

[17]Walton 153.

[18]Walton 156-7.

[19]Walton 157. In Chapter Eight I show just how "automatic" some world-knowledge is.

[20]Walton 157-8.

[21]Uri Margolin, "The Nature and Functioning of Fiction: Some Recent Views," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 19.1/2 (March/June 1992): 109.

[22]Walton 158.

[23]Walton 158.

[24]Walton 158.

[25]Walton 158.

[26]Some of the recent explorations into post-colonial intertextuality demonstrate this kind of "breakdown."

[27]Margolin 110.

[28]Highly relevant to this kind of discussion is the work undertaken by Hans Robert Jauss, who considers the aesthetics of reception and impact. See *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). Jauss' appraisal of a "horizon of expectations" which provides a frame of reference within which experiences and observations can have meaning is obviously related to the notion of reconstructing a reality principle ***through*** an appreciation of mutual belief. According to a

standard and accepted principle of the historical and cultural relativism of interpretation. Jauss undertakes to analyse particular reading publics, by reconstructing the horizons of expectations responsible for responses. By fusing his "horizon" with that of the author's community, the reader is able to reconstruct such complex cultural ideas as, for example, the "medieval mind" or the Elizabethan "world picture." Obviously, in order to describe reception explicitly in relation to a system of expectations, Jauss must rely on a strong sense of shared, conventional knowledge involving poetic language, but also genre and intertextuality.

[29]Walton 153.

[30]Currie, *Nature* 116.

[31]Currie, *Nature* 75.

[32]Currie, *Nature* 76-7.

[33]Currie, *Nature* 80.

[34]Currie, *Nature* 78.

[35]Currie, *Nature* 78. I show just below how Currie conflates the role of implied author and narrator in this account.

[36]Currie, *Nature* 79.

[37]Currie, *Nature* 80.

[38]Currie, *Nature* 80.

[39]Currie, *Nature* 70.

[40]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 27-8.

[41]Rabinowitz 27-8.

[42]Rabinowitz 22.

[43]It may not always be clear as to whether a certain belief can be counted as sufficiently "prevalent" in an authorial community, and hence attributable to a fictional author. But Currie insists that the vagueness of the very notion of belief prevalence is not a disadvantage in exploring a notion as vague as fictional truth. See *Nature* 89.

[44]Rabinowitz 25.

[45]Rabinowitz 26.

[46]Rabinowitz 26.

[47]Rabinowitz 30.

[48]Rabinowitz 30.

[49]Rabinowitz 32.

[50]Rabinowitz 33.

[51]Obviously if the authorial audience is markedly "invented," Rabinowitz suggests that footnotes or extra explanations will be required in order for the text to work (98). Mutual belief or authorial belief community can sometimes only be accessed through such textual procedures.

[52]Rabinowitz 33.

[53]In Chapter Nine I discuss the relation of reality principle (or world-models) to the concept of authorial audience.

[54]Rabinowitz 36-7.

[55]Rabinowitz 37.

[56]Robert Newsom, *A Likely Story. Probability and Play in Fiction* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1988) 176.

[57]Rabinowitz 37.

[58]Rabinowitz 37-8.

[59]Rabinowitz 42, my emphasis.

[60]Rabinowitz 43.

[61]Rabinowitz 43. I will use Rabinowitz' classifications later in this study to clarify the interplay of principles of implication for fictional truth.

[62]Rabinowitz 21.

[63]Rabinowitz 21.

[64]Currie, *Nature* 83.

[65]Yolande Flesch, *Julian Lennon* (Philadelphia: Running Press, 1985) 15.

[66]Currie, *Nature* 75.

[67]Félix Martínez-Bonati, *Fictive Discourse and the Structures of Literature: A Phenomenological Approach*, trans. Philip W. Silver (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) 87.

[68]Currie, *Nature* 76.

[69]Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 171.

[70]Currie, *Nature* 76.

[71]Currie, *Nature* 76.

[72]Martínez-Bonati 87.

[73]Currie, *Nature* 76.

[74]Currie, *Nature* 77.

[75]Currie, *Nature* 77.

[76]Currie, *Nature* 84-5.

[77]Currie, *Nature* 109-10.

[78]Currie, *Nature* 73.

[79]Currie, *Nature* 72-3.

[80]Currie, *Nature* 114.

[81]Currie refers on *Nature* 115 to Steven Knapp's and Walter Benn Michael's defense of authorial intention in "Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction," *Critical Inquiry* 14 (1987): 49-68.

[82]Currie, *Nature* 116.

[83]Currie, *Nature* 116.

[84]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 72. Culler's discussion of irony and levels of *vraisemblance* is relevant here. See *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 154-8.

[85]Currie, *Nature* 73.

[86]Currie, *Nature* 73.

[87]Currie, *Nature* 73.

[88]Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 155-9.

[89]Martin 159.

[90]Martin 159.

[91]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 49.

[92]Walton 154.

[93]Walton 154.

[94]Walton 155.

[95]Rabinowitz 26.

[96]Rabinowitz 34-5. Rabinowitz insists, of course, that even where the reader does not share the response of the authorial audience, he can profit from the experience of *understanding* those values (36).

[97]Martin 159.

[98]Currie, *Nature* 68.

[99]Lewis 275.

[100]Currie, *Nature* 87.

[101]Walton 147.

[102]Lewis, Postscript 277.

[103]Currie, *Nature* 69.

[104]Lewis does begin to move in this direction with his appreciation for genre and his interest in Walton's account of make-believe, as demonstrated in the "Postscript," 276.

[105]Currie's example is that of a Godel-refuter as character. See *Nature* 87.

[106]Currie, *Nature* 87-8.

[107]John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction. A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 60-1.

[108]His examples are Ray Bradbury's "A Sound of Thunder" and William Tenn's "Brooklyn Project."

[109]Currie, *Nature* 88.

[110]Currie, *Nature* 112, about Lewis' *Convention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), especially Chapter One.

[111]Currie, *Nature* 113.

[112]Lewis 274.

[113]Lewis 274.

[114]Currie, *Nature* 86.

[115]Lewis, Postscript 276.

[116]Lewis, Postscript 276.

[117]Currie, *Nature* 117.

[118]Currie, *Nature* 119.

[119]Currie, *Nature* 117.

[120]Currie, *Nature* 119.

[121]Currie, *Nature* 118.

[122]Currie, *Nature* 118.

[123]Currie, *Nature* 119.

[124]Rabinowitz 28. Such convention presumably depends on the context/origin of oral riddles which offer false solutions in order to delay recognition of the truth.

[125]In addition, of course, to such ***alternate*** choices of genre to apply, we need also consider for this story the fantastic, as a permanently ambiguous mode which refuses to validate *either* knowledge base in the final analysis.

[126]My discussion of literary competence is generally indebted to Culler's account in *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 113-30. Mircea Marghescou also discusses briefly the notion of specific literary competence through socialization, using the idea of "un regime litteraire" as a semantic perspective for competence, in *Le Concept de littérarité* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 48-9, 55, and 112-14.

Chapter Eight: World-Models for Fictional Character

The question of actual-world models emerges directly from discussions of the *indirect* generation of fictional truth.[1] World-models are a first concern, involving an "automatic" and fundamental naturalization process within inference. Some of the most basic fictional truths depend on the imagined relationship between the fictional and actual world. Given the incomplete quality of the representation of fictional worlds, it is primarily through the recognition of world-models that the reader can build a reasonably comprehensive structure for the textual reference world. The writing of narrative fiction is usefully thought of as an empirical act analogous to the coming into existence of actual objects--a process of stipulating fictional worlds. But the process does not occur in a vacuum, depending rather on the arrangement of available conceptual components from reality. As the philosophers explain, the descriptive mechanisms for the specification of fictional objects and their properties must originate within the actual world. In Nelson Goodman's more general discussion of "re-makes" he says that "[w]orldmaking begins with one version and ends with another."[2] The descriptive make-up of a fictional world depends crucially on the qualities of the real world; that is, the properties which a writer can attribute to characters are either the same ones available in the real world, or accord with real-world beliefs, as for example, about the "other-worldly." Faced with the impossibility of describing a complete world, the writer relies on a shared background knowledge of the world which becomes indispensable to the descriptive enterprise. In the absence of providing explicit instructions to the contrary, the writer can reasonably expect the reader to fill gaps or augment a character's constitutive properties according to knowledge gleaned through empirical experience with similar "people." An understanding of the world is mandatory in order to expand on what is explicitly stated. Inge Crosman Wimmers expresses well the generally accepted need to recognize world-knowledge as a kind of reader-constructed "text": "What authors

presuppose, then, is a certain competence based on previous knowledge--knowledge from *outside* the novel. Readers for whom books are written are not blank pages to be filled during a reading, but rather they carry within, like another text, the knowledge of cultural conventions and the memory of other texts."[3]

This chapter outlines the reading procedures which construct the reference world through the activation of world-models. As a special default mechanism, world-models exert a momentous force in the generation of fictional truth, particularly where text-models waive the privilege to alter or restrict the influence of such models. My purpose here is to demonstrate the *range* of world-knowledge which becomes operative in the fictional sphere.

Defining Minimal Departure

To avoid defining the interpretation of fictional narrative "messages" only in terms of the restricted semantic entailments provided by the text, we must acknowledge a principle of minimal departure from what we know of the real world. Routine pragmatic inferences are not only possible, but unavoidable. Developed through David Lewis' accounts of counterfactuals and truth conditions for fiction, the concept of minimal departure allows us to take into account how *relatively similar* fictional worlds are to the actual world.

If we take as fundamental the acceptable idea that counterfactuals do not create alternative possible worlds gratuitously disconnected from the actual world, we see at once the importance of relative similarity between worlds. Counterfactuals make some kind of point *about* the real world, otherwise we would have no interest in creating such statements. I have considered in Chapter Seven Lewis' conception of truth worlds and relative differences from the actual world. Lewis effectively extends the analysis of counterfactuals to fiction, regarding statements of truth in fiction *as* counterfactuals. Within this view, "[t]he facts yielded by the fictional text are implicitly cast in the role

of the antecedent, and the interpretive statement functions as consequent."[4]

As a result of such considerations it becomes obvious that since the reader thinks of the real world of his experience as ***ordinary***, he will not tend to make gratuitous changes from that knowledge in his interpretation of the fictional world. Unless explicitly prescribed by the text, any departure from such norms would constitute what Marie-Laure Ryan calls "...a gratuitous increase of the distance between the textual universe and our own system of reality."[5]

The principle of minimal departure reflects, then, what routinely occurs in reading narrative fiction. Ryan presents the "law" thus: "...we reconstrue the central world of a textual universe in the same way we reconstrue the alternative possible worlds of nonfactual statements: as conforming as far as possible to our representation of [the actual world]."[6] Everything we know about reality we will integrate into fictional worlds, except where the text dictates necessary changes.[7] Because of the background against which fiction is read, which includes all kinds of factual premisses, departures from reality are effectively kept under control.

The principle depends on the assumption that the author "...speaks up to his maximum," and will declare all departures from the normal.[8] Unless the writer indicates otherwise, standard inference procedures are retained, with the result that fictional characters are assumed to be normal cases of their kinds.[9] The real-world facts are not made *explicitly* true in the fictional world, but become true since there is nothing else indicated which would make them false.

Obviously this principle is crucially important for the phenomenology of reading outlined in Chapter Six. Many would-be "gaps" magically disappear precisely because of these elements of world-knowledge which insidiously infiltrate the textual reference world. The reader construes a reference world for the text, into which the models of the actual world are integrated. The question is at least superficially what reference world is implied by the "consequent" of the interpretive

statement. If inference depended *only* on such a principle, interpretation would be a relatively easy matter. But as I have begun to demonstrate in Chapter Seven and will pursue, the construction of the reference world depends also (and even primarily) on expectations for genre. I elaborate in Chapters Nine and Ten the *selection process* which activates particular truths.

Reading According to Reality Principle

The notion of minimal departure or reality principle is a way to codify the basic reading strategy which allows fictional worlds to retain the truths of the real world insofar as the "primary" textually presented fictional truths permit. Given some core of primary truths, reality principle will determine indirect implication for fleshing out a more complete reference world. Obviously the core of primary truths is intimately connected to the constraints of genre and there will be a complicated interplay with generic norms, except in texts with exclusively realistic content. But the fact remains that the reader will construe things to be like reality unless primary truths alert him to other more appropriate alternatives. Propositions true in the actual world will be true in the fiction, if not negated by primary truths.

The obvious corollary of reality principle, as Kendall Walton points out, "...is that implications follow the lines of what would be legitimate inference in the real world."[10] Fictional truths imply one another as real-world facts do. "The interpreter is to ask what the real world would be like if the propositions whose fictionality is generated directly were true: what else would be true if they were?"[11] This is precisely the reference world, where the answers to the question construct an entire context of truth--the propositions *implied* as true by more primary fictional truths.

We must take care to realize, as Nicholas Wolterstorff insists, that implications according to reality principle depend not on one or several primary fictional truths *selectively*, but rather on the whole *body* of

such truths.[12] "A particular fictional truth is rarely if ever sufficient by itself to establish the fictionality of any other proposition; its expected implications can be cancelled or defeated by other fictional truths."[13] Again, Currie's conception of whole-story operators is useful here. That stories can be decomposed into sentential elements as Barthes does in *S/Z* is really only an illusion. If codes appear to be invoked for short segments, what is crucial is to show how the various codes interact within the total framework. Any reference world is determined, then, by the patterns of configuration developed through inference procedures which generate a particular *set* of implied fictional truths.

Reality principle as reading strategy is by no means the concern solely of fictional-world semantics. As we have seen, when Jonathan Culler surveys the structuralist approach to verisimilitude and naturalization procedures, the first level of *vraisemblance* he identifies is that of the "real" as "...a discourse which requires no justification because it seems to derive directly from the structure of the world."[14] Here he alludes to the facts carried over to fiction from real life: "...the whole range of facts and processes that are part of nature ...can enter into narrative as part of its irreducible factuality."[15] These are the more "realistic" conventions and techniques which lend credibility to narratives by activating the reader's world-knowledge. When Wallace Martin explains Culler's views, he speaks as if the "naturalizing" were done by the literary work through the use of conventions. But it is the reading process which constructs the "real" as part of the reference world. Reflecting the "natural attitude," the text acquires *vraisemblance* in the process of reading through standard inference according to world-models. As Walton emphasizes, the vast familiarity with world-knowledge goes largely unrecognized, functioning automatically to generate fictional truths.

Culler's second level of cultural *vraisemblance* also falls within the scope of reality principle, as "...a range of cultural stereotypes or accepted knowledge which a work may use but which do not enjoy the same privileged status as elements of the first type, in that the culture itself recognizes them as generalizations."[16] Corresponding with

Roland Barthes' "cultural code" and Umberto Eco's "encyclopedia," Culler's concept is concerned with general regularities presumed about life--the world-knowledge which the reader supplies in the absence of explicit information provided textually. Envisioning the cultural codes as a collective but anonymous "Voice of Science" Barthes insists on the role of general human knowledge as a kind of citation within the text.[17] Obviously, what we traditionally conceive of as *vraisemblance* depends on the activation of such knowledge, otherwise we could not begin to assess such things as the "plausibility" of characters' motivation, or discuss the "probability" of events. As Culler explains, "[c]iting this general social discourse is a way of grounding a work in reality, of establishing a relationship between words and world which serves as guarantee of intelligibility..."[18] Various kinds of world-knowledge reassure the reader about the authenticity of fictional worlds, making them "life-like." Such knowledge stimulates interpretation--provides the opportunity to put interpretive skills to work by ***applying*** learned facts and conventions.

Without invoking possible-world semantics, Peter Rabinowitz also formulates a rule of realism as a component of his "rules of signification" for reading. Having in mind the same kind of cultural knowledge important to Culler and Barthes, Rabinowitz phrases his argument in terms of the two levels of reading discussed above in Chapter Seven:

> No matter how fantastic a novel's premises, no matter how unrealistic the setting, the authorial audience and the narrative audience must share some beliefs about reality in order for the situations and actions to have the consequences they do and for the plot to get from point A to point B.[19]

As we know from fictional-worlds theory, the world can be re-made fictionally according to various plans, but no fictional world can be created entirely from nothing. Inevitably, fictional worlds pick up pre-existing sets of properties from the real world. As Eco insists, the reader is invited to "refer" to the real world as a world of reference.[20] The relevant background knowledge identified by Rabinowitz (and countless others) provides for an inevitable ***coincidence*** between

fiction and reality. Even predominantly fantastic (or unrealistic) worlds provoke inferences which depend on the reader's experience of reality. No fictional world can ever be totally autonomous, inasmuch as the fictional text will "abundantly overlap" the world of the reader's "encyclopedia."[21]

Rabinowitz furthermore identifies minimal departure in his own terms. "[I]t is appropriate to assume that any novel is realistic ...unless there is evidence to the contrary. ...[A]ll fiction is at heart realistic ***except insofar as it signals us to respond in some other fashion.***"[22] Rabinowitz not only recognizes the important default mechanism, but also works to identify a systematic way in which "disagreements" between the knowledge of narrative and authorial audiences can be explained. I consider in Chapter Nine arguments about the potential congruence between audiences, in terms of the selection process and the role of generic expectation.

Reading according to reality principle would seem to have general acceptance as a standard procedure, considered natural and productive by most readers, or at least unconsciously adopted. When Walton suggests reality principle as more fundamental than mutual belief principle (as I have outlined in Chapter Seven), he explains also a basic advantage of consciously basing interpretation on reality principle. Using the make-believe game model, Walton suggests that an important part of participation is the pretended ***investigation*** of "reality." "The process of discovering what is fictional in the work makes it fictional of [the appreciator] in the game that he discovers what is true. [Reality principle] is especially conducive to such participation, since investigations of fictional worlds in accordance with it mirror investigations of the real world."[23] This point is absolutely crucial to understanding the persistent attachment of readers to reality principle and the appeal of texts which can be broadly categorized as realistic. The "investigation" which Walton describes is the most routine kind of naturalization process, easily incorporating the kinds of knowledge discussed as real and cultural *vraisemblance.* Using reality principle the reader can "research" real facts in order to apply those facts to the fictional character's situation--for example, psychological factors

which then seem to be the cause of the character's behaviour. This kind of investigation into causes allows the reader to transpose much of what is true of herself into the reference world, in a way which mutual belief principle does not allow.

Reality principle suggests to the reader conformity of fictional truth to the reality which exists outside of the fiction. The key to an accurate assessment of the reading strategies involved is, however, the concept of a constructed reference world, which takes on an *intermediary* role. As I have shown in Chapter Four, the reference world replaces reality as referent, with the result that the reading of fiction can involve aspects which the reader normally associates with non-fictional texts which refer to the actual world. All texts rely on this reference structure, depending on particular selection mechanisms according to genre, with realistic texts insisting on the close relation of the reference world to reality. But the ***illusion*** of reference to reality (or mimesis) is best explained as reference to the world-modelled, reader-constructed reference world. This reference world concept provides a framework for assessment of the various kinds of world-models activated through shared reading procedures.

World-Knowledge as Comprehension Context

Presuming that what the reader can understand about fictional truth depends on his world- and literary knowledge, we can appropriate Roger Schank's and Robert Abelson's fundamental insight about text processing: "What you know is what you can understand."[24] World-knowledge is an important term in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence--the new domain of cognitive science which struggles to produce a theory of knowledge systems. Artificial intelligence in particular is vitally concerned with inference and the role of all kinds of background knowledge in the process, as my example in Chapter Six of Ryan's work with story generation demonstrates. The concern is with the often highly ***structured*** real-world knowledge very often applied in understanding. A major thrust of work in artificial intelligence has

been the exploration of natural-language processing in order to discover precisely *how* context, represented as a structured knowledge base contributes to the process of determining interpretations. The overlap of the discipline with linguistics has proven inadequate in the sense that linguistics ignores the central question of how human understanding works,[25] just as formalist accounts of narrative texts generally fail to reflect important pragmatic reading concerns. Artificial intelligence must produce an accurate picture of natural language understanding--must know how a human text processor understands--in order to determine how a computer can be made to understand. Discourse analysis must hinge on what the reader *does* with texts. Using the model of the human text processor, artificial intelligence can be developed to "correspond." It is a question of identifying predictable structures for knowledge and its implementation --how knowledge is assigned, narrowed down within a range of possibilities, chosen from the larger framework, ranked, and so on.

Obviously the focus of this study resembles this kind of work, and it will be possible to apply some of the basic terms and distinctions which have been developed in cognitive science, especially as related to reality principle. But artificial intelligence has been very much limited to the level of primitive, short discourses without finally producing more extensive models/programs. The very vastness of the required knowledge base has prevented development of sophisticated programs. Moreover, the emphasis has been on seeking finite or *closed* rule systems--systems not conducive to understanding the complexity of what a reader of complicated narrative fiction actually does.

What is most important for this study is that artificial intelligence accepts *context* as an overwhelming problem in cognitive text processing. As Schank and Abelson explain, "[t]he appropriate ingredients for extracting the meaning of a sentence ...are often nowhere to be found within the sentence."[26] This insistence on implicit inference is crucial for fictional truth generation. It is the concern for "pragmatics" which takes us beyond the relatively "clean," but limited-in-capabilities strategies of textual semantics.

As we have seen, fictional-world semantics has not ignored entirely the actual-world models which provide a structure for fictional worlds, both in terms of some kind of "transfer" of individual or "brute" facts, or of a more generalized knowledge. Even Lubomír Doležel, with his fundamental insistence on fictional world autonomy, admits that fictional worlds must be accessed from the actual world through semiotic channels, by means of information processing.[27] But while Doležel tolerates the idea of an information transfer from the real world, he also insists that "...the actual material has to undergo a substantial transformation at the world boundary..."[28] Seen in this way, the autonomous fictional world includes real-world knowledge only in the sense of envisioning non-actual possibles which are constrained by an ontological/logical/semantical framework. The autonomous world is observed and experienced by the reader, who processes information through the semiotic mediation provided by *the* text.

This view does not accurately account for the integration into fictional worlds of world-knowledge as presupposed by and revokable only through the control of genre. Rather than envisioning a reader-constructed reference world, Doležel presumes through this "transformation" idea that the signifier of the discourse produces directly a signified with no further referent. On this limiting view, counterparts of pre-existing elements, whether concretely actual or only more generalized, cannot be integrated accurately into the body of fictional truth. Only by recognizing this kind of troublesome "wider" reference as belonging to a reference world rather than reality itself can we successfully "separate" reality from fictional worlds without losing all relevant knowledge structures.

Reality must be seen as a kind of *second text*--the property of readers--which renders the artificial boundary between the fictional world and the actual more permeable and less absolute than is comfortable for many scholars. As Wimmers points out (without even the benefit of Hector-Neri Castañeda's insights about consciousness) there is "...no insurmountable barrier between the fictional and the actual, since both are intimately linked to our experience as a whole."[29] We cannot ignore what she calls the "powerful will to truth" in our

culture--an emphasis on verisimilitude, referential illusion, and reality effect in an extended sense.[30] It is this very emphasis which J.P. Stern identifies with his elaboration of the "middle distance" typical of realistic texts. Stern considers determination of "middle distance" one of the most familiar functions of literature: "...the fictional creation of ***people***, of individual characters and lives informed by what in any one age is agreed to constitute a certain integrity and coherence."[31] If the "middle distance" is an optic which allows the reader to "see" fictional characters as she does ***people*** in the ordinary process of living, it depends fundamentally on the kind of *vraisemblablisation* which Culler identifies as cultural. Characters are endowed with the routine attributes of people according to the world-knowledge which the reader supplies about the way things work in reality. Obviously this process works best where the realistic text refuses to undermine the apparently representational relation to reality. As Culler points out in considering Stern's view, "...most literary effects, particularly in narrative prose, depend on the fact that readers will try to relate what the text tells them to a level of ordinary human concerns..."[32] Naturally characters' actions and reactions will be understood in a way which insistently erases the border line between the real and fictional world.

Given the fact that comprehension of fictional discourse is constrained by the conditions which affect (imaginative) reading processes, it is really impossible to escape the conceptual categories imposed by reality--the conditions of coherence which Margolis identifies as logic, causal regularities, and assumed background conditions of the actual world.[33] It is essential to determine how the reader's appreciation of fictional truth depends on what Nicholas Rescher calls for possible world construction "...hypothetical alteration in the characterization of the real within the limits of admissibility."[34]

Because of the practical limitations of artificial intelligence programing, cognitive psychologists have not been concerned much to define different ***kinds*** of world-knowledge. But surely only by tackling this issue can the ambitious goal be reached of making artificial text processing accord with natural models. For fictional-world theory we certainly must outline models of intelligibility for inference which

accord with empirically determined constraints. If we define the contextual *system* of inferences related to world-knowledge--the *various* ways in which textual data are related to a cultural framework --we can see how ordinary principles of inference are *not* abandoned for fictional narrative, and how socially shared world-models are *selected* and co-ordinated for the textual reference world. Meaning is "internal" to fictional worlds only in the sense that it is recovered *through* the public knowledge which makes up both language and culture. It is impossible to make all the kinds of world-knowledge into "internal" meaning on the standard fictional-world model. But by defining the various types of knowledge applicable we reveal the most basic operations of the fictional sphere which serve to construct appropriate reference worlds.

The "Actual" as World-Knowledge

It will be helpful to divide world-knowledge into three general categories of actual or brute facts, general knowledge, and scripts/frames as specific socially constructed units of reality. Of the three categories, brute facts as what might be called "historical knowledge" seem the most obvious for fictional worlds. The reader can scarcely ignore the textual introduction of specific real-world locations, objects, people, events, and dates. This kind of "anchoring" of fictional worlds in reality involves typically the kind of public knowledge which is rudimentary to existence in the real world: an awareness of the location of cities and perhaps even famous buildings or notable geography within those cities, knowledge of the main attributes of famous persons from history and contemporary social context, some awareness of specific historical events which may be integral to the story and even tied to exact dates from real time. Fictional texts often "assume" such specific kinds of extratextual knowledge and will not be well-understood where such details escape the reader's attention. The significance of the purely fictional events may depend on such reader-activated context which can contribute to a sense of impending doom or expectancy. Some texts rely less on specific/local facts, but depend

nonetheless on a larger scheme of historical fact as components of a familiar world history, for example, about social/cultural trends.

The activation of such historical fact serves several literary functions. Obviously it is used routinely (especially in realistic texts) to create the "real" structure of a fictional world--to authenticate that world by "establishing" it within a known context. To go ***beyond*** the introduction of realistic details by incorporating historical facts, the author brings the fictional world from a potentially distant and abstract location (as in fairy tales) to a close and concrete location known as real by the reader. Such facts indicate to the reader that the text is best construed as realistic. And the more specificity included, the more the reader can justifiably relate her store of historical/actual knowledge to the fictional world. In the absence of contrary textual indications, she may assume a general coincidence between historical fact and fictional truth. Such an assumption is reinforced by the feeling highly realistic texts provoke, that the reader could actually "look up" the facts in a history book or a newspaper.[35]

The result of such technique is that the reader cannot readily dismiss what happens in the fictional world as "pure fiction." History seems to become a major "frame of reference." The story is likely to take on, as a result, an interest or validity which the purely fictional might not. A story may well prove more exciting when the reader understands it as essentially accurate concerning real-world events. "Realism" has been so popular at least partly because of this encouragement to imaginative involvement. Except where didactic texts seek to ***inform*** the reader, the realistic writer carefully researches historical setting, events, and characters more specifically in order to provide for the imaginative energy which results from a strong sense of actuality. The history of the novel at least from *La Princesse de Clèves* is full of examples of characters difficult to dismiss as pure fictions, because of the reality structure of the fictional world they inhabit. When fictional "reference" includes particulars known to exist, the saturation effect of such details cannot fail to attach itself also to purely invented characters with no versions in reality. Such characters "absorb" from the historical context, taking on a special kind of

allegiance to the real--an allegiance which renders them more relevant to real human concerns and more memorable as authentic, life-like characters.

Even where such realistic techniques are not in force, we can speak of a kind of special *Weltanschauung* developed wherever historical context is firmly established. Historical novels may be far from realistic in their narrative technique and depiction of real-world conditions, but still rely heavily on exact real-world knowledge about historical events. While the world view created for the historical setting may be more or less accurate, and may become confused with the author's own later milieu, the reader is still likely to "believe" at least superficially in the "reality" of the fictional world created, especially where the publicly known elements from history are dominant. It is common knowledge that historical novels routinely strive to appear "accurate" where the more public figures are concerned, taking more liberties in the depiction of minor or purely invented characters.

In effect, the adherence to the brute facts of history in such novels constitutes an important kind of ***limitation*** on creativity--a relinquishing of control over areas of the fictional world which seem to "exist" independently of the imagination. The very choice to produce a historical novel brings with it a limited range of options for fictional truth. Knowing how the informed reader will respond, the author turns over the control of certain historically compatible portions of the fictional world to the reader, who has as much access to the relevant historical context as the author does. Comparing fictional worlds with counterfactuals, Ryan suggests that the required "consistent environment" is that of actual history, since the consequent need not depart from history in a ***gratuitous*** way.[36] Gratuitous departures from the facts of history are really counter-intuitive since the reader can be expected to "transfer" into the reference world whatever is true of real-world locations, persons, and events. Once those entities (or versions of them) are introduced, a measure of control is inevitably lost. In a general sense, the author knows how the referential ***illusion*** will take over, as soon as historical/geographical detail is allowed to evoke an image of the real world. Precisely because cultural connotations can

become so dominant in the reader's appreciation of fictional truth, *stated* historical facts take on a status different from inference in general.

There will be, of course, *subsidiary* inference resulting from the more directly implied truths built by historical fact. *Associated* truths are inevitable. Once the reader recognizes the appropriate historical background, he will fill in the details which are not made explicit. If late nineteenth-century London is the setting, that *one* stipulated fictional truth will imply a host of others about the city's geography/layout, about the reign of queen Victoria, about Britain's status as an industrial power, about the traditions of the British empire, and so on. There is no particular threat of truth proliferation if such facts are not allowed to expand *indefinitely* and without regard for the historical context. In order to prevent the "invasion" of unwanted species and individuals, Ryan suggests the importance of existential propositions.

> A proposition of the type 'x's exist,' where x refers to a species, will be transferable from [the actual world] to [the textual reference world] if: 1. x's existed in [the actual world] in the stage of its historical development that corresponds to the stage at which [the textual actual world] is shown, and 2. the appropriate environment for x's is set up in [the textual actual world].[37]

In this way propositions about individuals and places get "transferred" to the fictional world. Ryan stipulates only that the text must name as a member of the fictional world "...at least one individual or geographic location belonging to [the actual world].[38] Obviously there can be no computers in fairy tales which build no environment for them. Genre will most assuredly play a large role in controlling/restricting the selection of world-models available. But where world-members are clearly held in common as in realistic and/or historical texts, there is no reason not to accept the entire actual-world inventory in the fictional world.[39] The reader is not entitled to create a "subset" of the actual world's population, unless directed by the text and text-models.

Obviously this kind of "actual" world-knowledge is not unrelated to the specific scripts of socially constructed reality which are considered ahead. Nor can it be separated resolutely from the more generalized knowledge to be discussed now as a second category of world-knowledge. In order to appreciate the tremendous impact of great realistic novels, we must recognize how the "actual" is displaced by general knowledge. Although Tolstoy did not know Napoleon personally, he was able to create in *War and Peace* a fictional character permeated by a supposed personality and the public knowledge of what this kind of human being should be like. In order to create war scenes, Tolstoy not only consulted history books about the Napoleonic Wars, but also relied on battlefield experience in Crimea. His portrayal consequently creates an image of war ***in general*** which necessarily activates all kinds of knowledge about what can be expected of such experiences.

General Knowledge: Analytically and Empirically Universal

To be accurate in speaking about generalized world-knowledge we must first consider as fundamental the logic of reality, which holds for fictional worlds if not contradicted textually. Without rehearsing again the problems posed by inconsistent and incomplete fictional worlds, we must admit that the laws of compossibility expected for the real world form a basic knowledge at least theoretically inescapable. As John Heintz points out, when we make inferences about the characters who populate fictional worlds there is no need to abandon ***any*** of our ordinary principles of inference, in particular with regard to the familiar logic of quantification.[40]

In an attempt to define some of the world-knowledge of cognitive psychology, Bernhard Lindemann suggests "analytically universal knowledge" as the most fundamental type.[41] Such knowledge is not subject to change while dealing with human reasoning and language, and would presumably remain in effect in all fictional worlds adhering at least to a rudimentary realism. This knowledge is "...not so much knowledge ***of the world*** but rather a kind of ***meta-knowledge*** which

guarantees an adequate handling of elementary logical and linguistic operations."[42] Obviously this kind of knowledge has a "low profile" in actual text processing. For non-contradictory fictional worlds the activation of such knowledge can only seem trivial and not productive of useful information worthy of notice in the reference world. Inferences drawn on this basis are so imperceptible as to be entirely overlooked.

Of much more interest is the empirically universal knowledge identified by Lindemann as the second type of world-knowledge.[43] On this basis the reader makes a type of judgement the truth or falsehood of which is "a matter of the world." In other words, we are not concerned here with contradiction in a logical sense, but with ***falsehood*** as seen against the background of empirical world-knowledge. This knowledge depends on empirical observation as to natural and cultural laws, and can be used consequently to form true or false statements.

Obviously the application of this kind of empirical knowledge in narrative fiction is more complex than for non-fictional texts, and will be governed by generic constraints. As we have seen at length, truth and falsehood in fiction do not depend directly on real-world structures, which can be violated in many different ways depending on the created macrostructure and global restrictions of the fictional world.

But the fact remains that narrative incompleteness encourages inference and specifically the filling of gaps according to "the way things are" in reality, unless the text directs otherwise. In keeping with minimal departure, the reader chooses the most ordinary, routine explanation cognitively available. Culler's first level of *vraisemblance* is relevant here: "...the text of the natural attitude, whose items are justified by the simple observation, 'but x's are like that.'"[44] But Culler's second level of ***cultural*** *vraisemblance* also falls into this category. This is the kind of knowledge Teun van Dijk and others refer to as "prototypical"--an appreciation for how things usually are, ***including*** complex social phenomena. As Schank and Abelson point out, "...more is at issue than 'semantics.' It is 'pragmatics,' the way things usually work--not how they might conceivably work--which most often

impels the reader toward an interpretation."[45] This is exactly what my stance has been with regard to fictional truth: however conceivable a textually structured fictional (possible) world may be, it will never escape entirely the context of knowledge in which it is embedded.

Schank and Abelson make a neat division between this kind of general knowledge by which the reader interprets actions in a human world-context (thinking in terms of general needs and the resultant actions), and what they define as the ***specific*** knowledge of scripts based on personal experience.[46] In effect, schema theory provides a way to examine the more specific structure of socially constructed ***units*** of reality, which provide precise and analyzable models for comprehension. I treat scripts on this basis ahead, indicating also how the more general knowledge is "scripted" in comprehension procedures.

But it is worth noting that the strict division of empirically universal knowledge and scripts is not entirely practical. Lindemann in fact ***equates*** the two in terms of required knowledge.[47] But he points out carefully the ***gradation*** in general knowledge which relates also to frames. Some knowledge/frames involve the universally valid in terms of ***natural*** laws, while others "...although certainly not bound to a ***specific*** cultural background, presuppose rather 'cultural' than 'natural' knowledge..."[48] I will keep this fundamental distinction in mind ***throughout*** my discussion of types of general knowledge, rather than relegating it to the specific context of frames/scripts.

In creating meaning from fictional narratives the reader relies on many ***kinds*** of generalizations about reality and human behaviour in particular. To understand what happens in a fictional world the reader must presume general "laws" which can serve as connections between events. This is not only a matter of causality, as I discuss ahead, but of a more general interrelationship visible on the basis of what is known about the real world. Obviously many of these presuppositions are virtually imperceptible (almost like the analytically universal knowledge of logic) and do not produce clearly "informative" or non-trivial consequences for fictional truth. The reader will not perceive a crucial fictional truth in the fact that in Raskolnikov's world hunger

leads people to eat. "Hunger" (and poverty) *will* be recognized, however, as contributors to social action of much greater permanent consequence. Many things "go without saying," while others scream for attention and demand a highly perceptible inclusion in the reference world's set of truths. Discussing James Meehan's computer program TALE-SPIN, Ryan explains the importance to internal data of inference rules which represent the practical knowledge of characters.[49] I would insist that the reader must share this knowledge also at some rudimentary level. In other words, very basic generalized knowledge (such as, that unsupported objects fall to the ground or that one must open one's mouth to sing) will not be abrogated even in the fable-world of the fox and crow-with-cheese story. If such inference rules enable a computer program to simulate how characters will reason and elaborate plans for solutions, they also allow human readers to "compute" a background of "untold" facts (however trivial) which are necessary to understand the actions of characters in a fictional world.

Involved in this level of very basic general knowledge is what is called the "threshold of functional relevance." Clearly it is not necessary to tell *all* in fictional narrative, in the sense that some sequences of action are non-narratable because taken for granted. A certain level of generality is necessary if a narrative is not to degenerate into too specific sequences of action.[50] The "untold" actions are part of fictional truth, but involve referential entailments which are genuinely automatic.

The reference world automatically includes such referential entailments, which form an imperceptible web of fact on the basis of general world-knowledge. When we are told that Anna Karenina's child is asleep when she arrives home to visit him, we are expected to presuppose not only that Anna has a child and is related to him in the usual maternal relationship, but that children exist in general and that they sleep. One simple statement automatically evokes a whole network of fundamental fictional truths, without ever actually naming them. The facts are not asserted, but become "verifiable" according to world-models. Functioning in a way not unlike Barthes' "reality effects" (which I discuss in Chapter Nine), even a small number of such

statements will generate a kind of "totalized" reality for the reference world which accommodates the whole range of truths associated. The effect is thus one of a reconstructed reality very much like the reader's own, even where more obvious differences exist in keeping with less realistic generic models.

In discussing this kind of general world-knowledge, which he dubs "realemes," Itamar Even-Zohar demonstrates how things *as signifieds* are selected according to social systems of signification.[51] He shows how what exists actually in the real world becomes interpreted in texts according to a variable cultural repertory, which is governed by a structured system of relations. The system constrains the process of inserting the general knowledge into narrative.[52] I consider ahead how social context can generate culturally specific knowledge, putting Even-Zohar's idea of a selection of repertoires constrained by convention into that context.

We need first to consider some of the ***kinds*** of law-like connections which can be involved in such general knowledge, some of which may seem to produce conflicts for interpretation, but all of which involve what Barthes explores as a ***cultural code*** embodied in a huge "Book of Science" or manual of knowledge.[53] Identifying the "voice of science" as an anonymous book of both empirical observation and wisdom, Barthes speaks about seven or eight "handbooks" which can be thought to correspond to the didactic material "mobilized" in the narrative text.[54] These handbooks are at the disposal of the author, and are presumed "...accessible to a diligent student in the classical bourgeois educational system..." and include histories of literature, art, and Europe, which provide sets of cultural references and a repertoire of types for the reader to recognize.[55] Also included are a handbook of practical medicine, a rudimentary psychological treatise, a compendium of Christian and Stoic ethics, a logic, a rhetoric, and an anthology of maxims and proverbs about life.[56] In other words, this is "information" which comes from other *texts*, but which is accepted by the reader as founded in reality, and hence conducive to the construction of a "realistic" reference world. The reference world requires the inclusion of such "books" of knowledge. Such knowledge constitutes, for Barthes,

a referential *code* to which the (realistic) text insistently refers, and which endows the text with a kind of scientific and moral authority.[57]

> The code is a perspective of quotations, a mirage of structures; the units which have resulted from it (those we inventory) are themselves, always, ventures out of the text, the mark, the sign of a virtual digression toward the remainder of a catalogue (*The Kidnapping* refers to every kidnapping ever written); they are so many fragments of something that has always been *already* read, seen, done, experienced; the code is the wake of that *already*.[58]

Obviously there must be presumed a kind of overlap between the author's resources and the reader's general knowledge for the code to work and the appropriately complete reference world to be built--something perhaps along the line of Rabinowitz' overlap between narrative and authorial audiences and their sharing of beliefs about reality.[59]

Barthes' cultural code is based, of course, on an inductive text-based approach which is theoretically very limited. The cultural code seems to represent a classified conventional context--something constituted by a general and cultural background to which the text refers. The code is a general semantic model which allows the reader to make connections between apparent fictional truths and functional categories which originate outside of the text. As such, the approach is superficially conducive to the appreciation of a reader-constructed reference world which must include such contextual information. But Barthes' technique for picking out specific references to cultural/conventional knowledge by no means allows for a complete comprehension of how world-knowledge is integrated into reference worlds. It is necessary to specify how this kind of "naturalization" process occurs, always keeping in mind Culler's fundamental work with models of the *vraisemblable* which I have outlined in Chapter Six. The fictional communication "contract" which the reader recognizes and validates in building a reference world involves an entire structure of conventions which cannot be dismissed so simply (and facetiously), and which must be examined in the context of how such prior codified knowledge is applied within particular genres. In effect, Barthes' semic code (which he sees as providing models which allow the reader to

assemble semantic features for characters) needs also to be related closely to the cultural/referential code.

More importantly for present purposes, Barthes' cultural code is so broad as to include not only the empirically universal knowledge under discussion, but also the next category of more culturally specific knowledge. The enormous storehouse of knowledge so problematic for artificial intelligence and which allows the reader to "automatically" interpret according to everyday experience cannot be restricted obviously to the former kind of knowledge. But it *is* necessary to distinguish different ***categories*** of knowledge rather than lumping them under one umbrella "code."

Before considering how Barthes' cultural code overlaps with ***culturally*** specific knowledge/social rules, I present now some of the ramifications of the ***natural*** laws which ***are*** included in his code, as well as indicate how standard psychology (again one of his "books") can be invoked in the reference world. His "Logic" has already been dealt with as a more fundamental analytically universal knowledge.

Natural laws of physics and biology are so "natural" in fictional narrative as to be taken for granted and routinely ignored. The kind of typologies of worlds prepared by Doreen Maitre (outlined in Chapter Two) depend on this kind of fundamental general knowledge, and seem consequently at least superficially trivial. Aspects of the physical world constitute "automatic" background conditions which few readers bother to analyse, except of course where the text makes such conditions problematic or even denies them. Where minimal departure is overruled, physical and biological laws become visible and subject to re-evaluation in the reference world. The reader must then consider other more or less radical possibilities, as well as the ***changeability*** of real-world "laws" ***over time*** and the relation of that change to deviant fictional worlds. He must also consider in this regard the importance of mutual belief structures which influence how natural laws must be activated for specific fictional worlds.

Biological laws are particularly crucial with respect to the physiology of fictional characters thought of as human beings. Again, presuming a relation between fictional worlds and reality such as for counterfactuals and actual history, it is only natural to apply the knowledge of biological laws to characters. Part of the reader's general assumptions about nature will be the construal of typically ***human*** qualities for characters (unless of course directed otherwise). This involves the "generic" inference mentioned in Chapter Six; that is, whatever feature belongs to the species will belong also to fictional characters designated as "human." So characters will have two legs, blood in their veins, and all of the generally regular features of human beings. If they are said to begin to cry or laugh, the reader knows that according to how reality "works," that crying or laughter will eventually stop, whether mentioned or not. Most of these attributes will have no particular interest or informative value, but constitute nonetheless an essential ***foundation*** for the truth structure of the reference world, providing a rudimentary inherent intelligibility against which more complicated truths can be assessed.

In addition to having bodies and feeling pain, fictional characters will also think, imagine, and experience all kinds of emotions and psychological needs. If the reader is not to increase gratuitously the distance between the fictional world and reality, she will need to consider characters as consistent with routine psychological "laws." Inferences and resulting interpretations must be "accurate" in the sense that they would be correct of real persons, given the same available information. In effect, the reader projects a more complete reality for characters on the basis of what she knows about the psychology of real people. Barthes' rudimentary psychology manual becomes a component of the general knowledge which informs the reference world.

The excesses of psychoanalytical studies make this a very tricky issue, since technically, fictional characters do not have an ontological status which permits such analysis. They are non-existent objects which we only imagine to assume mental properties. We certainly cannot take them in a similar way to the general practitioner to see if

they might be suffering from a liver condition. How "legitimate" can psychoanalytical analysis be?

But philosophers consider psychological plausibility as equally fundamental to world-models as physical laws. Certainly, where there is no textual stipulation of an alternate psychological system, statements *within* fiction about human psychology have a truth value dependent on factors of a text-external nature. But clearly similar context-dependent truths can be inferred without any such direct statements. Often the most interesting aspect of a narrative is what we know about people. We need only think of Balzac's insistent references to "one of those people who..." to realize that, at least for realistic works, the reader is expected to recognize a congruence between real people's psychology and what he can expect for fictional characters. Literary narratives are inescapably a reflection of psychological reality in the sense that expectations "from life" shape how characters will be imagined to "live" in the reference world. The reader's inferential capacity must include a "recognition" of human traits where such a procedure is not expressly discouraged. In many cases psychological generalities will be construed as true in the reference world, in spite of a lack of explicit textual support, purely in order to *make sense* of the fictional world and its events. Sense-making procedures *depend* on this kind of inescapable background knowledge.

Clearly the reality principle associated with this kind of general world-knowledge tends to encourage even psychoanalytical explanations of a character's "behaviour." I have already presented Walton's view of reality principle as conducive to life-like "investigations" into fictional truth. Part of the "researching" often involves the discovery of real-world facts which help then to "diagnose" a fictional character's mental condition.[60] I look ahead at action models which constitute the same kind of basis for the investigation of reality factors which can be then incorporated into reference worlds.

In considering characters as psychologically human, the reader inevitably relies on his own appreciation of reality. Ryan demonstrates

remarkably well the complex *inner* semantic structures among the diversified domains of narrative agents. But this semantic unhomogeneity has served to demonstrate the modal structural autonomy of fictional universes, without defining accurately how character worlds must be seen ***as compared with*** expectations for real people who exist in a world more or less similar to the textual actual world. In the pure fantastic (in Todorov's sense) we can see that the thematized dualisms in stories suggest a merging of supernatural ontological zones with secondary (character) levels of reality, with the result that the authenticity of the hybrid narrative worlds becomes a function of the exposure and treatment of secondary levels of reality.[61] Such a process is textually induced, but relates closely to the ***external*** rationality of the reader when faced with the indeterminate status of story events as presented through the procedures typical of fantastic narrative transmission. Action models from real life are at least ***potentially*** accurate, depending on the reader's tentative (and permanently hesitant) decision to consult general world-knowledge about human psychology. He may of course seek out ***alternative*** world-models which involve a different kind of ontology, on the basis of textual clues and a sense of authorial belief.

Since reality principle and such general knowledge does not apply uniformly or to the same degree of specification across all fictional worlds, we must consider *types* of fictional worlds and text-models in order to recognize where these kinds of inference should stop. Obviously some such inferences are more convincing than others, depending most notably on the realistic content of the text. It makes little sense to endow a fairy-tale princess with the ***full range*** of human psychology appropriate for Anna Karenina. And genre constraints must also be considered in relation to mutual belief principle, which can radically restrict the application of standard psychoanalysis, especially for works of the fantastic sort just mentioned, or where modern theories are blatantly anachronistic (unless invoked as "unconsciously" in effect).

We must accept that taking rudimentary psychology out of literary criticism would eradicate much of routine interpretation, which has

traditionally relied on characters having psychologies which can be inferred from their actions. Very ordinary questions of "motivation" depend upon treating characters as human beings with psychological complexities, needs, responses, and so on, similar to the reader's own. There would be little point in reading a realistic novel such as *La Regenta* if the reader were to discard the standard psychology according to which the text invites her to judge conduct. The point is that psychological implications have long been considered acceptable in fictional narrative, or at least in the modern novel, where notions of the individual, of standards of behaviour, and of a common-sense understanding of "human nature" seem to be firmly entrenched. New Criticism in particular presents the fictional "individual" as coextensive with real-world experience. "Our judgment of probability and our notion of credibility in general are based firmly upon the way in which the human mind works and upon the experience that we have had as human beings."[62] Coherence is not just structured from such a perspective, but involves a vision of ***content*** saturated by the expectations of general knowledge which become "rules" for characters' behaviour.

General Knowledge: Culturally Specific and Belief Systems

From standard psychology as a kind of empirically universal knowledge (although certainly not having the same independent status as physiological laws), we move to another category of world-knowledge identified by Lindemann as ***culturally specific knowledge***. This kind of knowledge can be hard to separate from the empirically universal variety, but is identifiably different in that "standard" ***social*** behaviour is changeable depending on social context, or social "rules." "Normal" behaviour for characters can only be determined ***within*** standard social situations. Lindemann suggests the following distinction: "...ask whether a knowledge system can be triggered only against the background of a specific culture or not ...whether the knowledge the text processor must be equipped with is accepted and valid in a particular culture or not."[63]

Cultural systems are at stake here, both specific and unspecific. Some of Barthes' "books" represent this kind of knowledge, as does Culler's (second) level of cultural *vraisemblance*. Such concrete things as less universally known places and events fall into this category--the kinds of things that a "History of Europe" might contain as part of socio/historical context. Culturally specific factual knowledge might include information about likely means of transport or the fact that skydivers wear two parachutes. The whole system of a culture's tradition is relevant, and the social institutions which belong in that tradition. To appreciate the absurdity of Joseph K's ordeal in *The Trial*, the reader must know something about how the legal system ***really*** works in this culture. Otherwise, there is no standard by which to assess the hero's plight. Satire depends crucially on this kind of social or culturally specific knowledge. Religion and philosophy may play important roles. But in a more general sense we can identify a whole set of cultural "maxims" including ethical rules, rules of proper social conduct for various social positions/situations, cultural conventions and taboos, proverbial expressions, accepted prejudices, and so on--a kind of rough and ready "ideology" or vision of the world and its appropriate system of values.

All of this knowledge is involved in deciding what might be ***customary action*** in a fictional world. Such general knowledge explains the particular behaviour of fictional characters, providing reference to the culture-specific facts or to the accepted set of "maxims," which take on the role of ***causes*** in the reference world. It is the reader who must assemble the "causes" on the basis of this kind of general knowledge, making the fictional character's behaviour relevant to this knowledge. This kind of intelligibility for the reference world ranges from the more factual elements which we associate with reality principle, to the more ideological elements which involve belief systems and mutual belief principle. The entire sense of what is "believable" in fiction changes according to social context. We must define more clearly, then, what role such cultural knowledge plays in selecting appropriate "normal" behaviour for fictional characters.

It would not be far-fetched to explore a ***modal*** structure for the reference world which would take into account the alethic component of the possible, the impossible, and the necessary, particularly in terms of empirically universal knowledge, but also the deontic component concerned with permission, prohibition, and obligation, and the axiological, concerned with goodness, badness, and indifference, all determined through culturally specific knowledge. The epistemic component, depending on knowledge, ignorance and belief, would involve all knowledge bases. Obviously cultural assumptions and values are very important to fictional worlds where the reader must determine what is important or trivial, what is good or bad, what is required and prohibited, what is fortunate or tragic, all on the basis of those text-external values. Aristotle recognized long ago this kind of fundamental human interest which makes literature into a special reflection of life. While Aristotle was concerned with the emotional response of the audience, it is not hard to see how all of the questions of probability, recognition, and qualities of character can be correlated with fictional truth generation. Even the macro-semantic constraints identified by Dolezel for fictional worlds (and presented in Chapter Two) are really rooted in reality and the reader's organization of conventional knowledge bases. It is quite impossible to escape the underlying structure for human action which has far-reaching consequences for fictional truth.

But in a less abstract way, we must realize the ways in which fictional truth depends on a ***particular*** cultural context and its ***familiar*** conventions. While reader-response criticism has dealt extensively with ***individual*** differences in readers, even such factors are influenced fundamentally by membership in a particular group or culture. The values which make reference worlds intelligible belong within a social context. As Even-Zohar explains with his concept of realemes, whether a realeme can be inserted into a text depends on the available heterogeneous repertory of realemes which exist, expressed differently in different cultures. Selection from the repertories is constrained by convention and according to the model presumed by the text.[64] While fictional narratives sometimes seem to affirm social values and even provide an index of social change in relation to fictional

characters' behaviour, it is also obvious that social values are often ***confronted*** in fiction, certain ***kinds*** of actions becoming more salient set against the relevant social models. Culturally specific knowledge can serve to make certain fictional actions seem highly narratable, noteworthy, and significant.[65]

Cultural stereotypes are the more routine result, however, depending entirely on socio/cultural reference. If literature provides a repertoire of types easily recognizable, the reader must look with frequency also to his culturally specific knowledge for character models. The cultural types ***embody*** the values accepted/rejected within the cultural context. Several critics have commented on eighteenth-century verisimilitude, which depended very much on whether characters' thoughts and feelings could be considered appropriate to their position in life in terms of sex, age, and social class. In effect, to be believable, all characters had to be "typical" in the sense of conforming to the social rules generally accepted. The "typical" relates closely to Culler's cultural *vraisemblance* in the sense that stereotypes are based on shared cultural attitudes. The writer is then thought to present character "as it really is."

It is ***not*** that such stereotypes cannot be open to question within culture, but that their inclusion in a fictional world will necessarily be related by the reader to the standard or accepted view. The reader knows perhaps that the stereotype is only ***one*** possibility--that the character could well be otherwise--but in the search for fictional truth the most obviously acceptable truth will be that which conforms with the cultural stereotype.[66] Culler insists that most elements of cultural *vraisemblance* function in this way; that is, "...one is aware of them as generalizations or cultural categories which may oversimplify but which at least make the world initially intelligible and consequently serve as a target language in the process of naturalization."[67] Barthes refers to the same phenomenon as a "stalking" of replete literature by the "army of stereotypes" it contains. "'Life' then, in the classic text, becomes a nauseating mixture of common opinions, a smothering layer of received ideas..."[68]

I have been speaking of culturally specific knowledge as if the reader somehow automatically shares that of the writer, or that of the fictional work's presumed context. We know that these three contexts are normally ***different*** from one another, except for contemporary works with current settings. The ***appropriate*** culturally specific knowledge may require a special effort to access, and may be absolutely essential to a correct generation of fictional truth. If readers bring social norms to texts, those of their own experience must not ***preclude*** those which must be recognized for the culture "represented" fictionally.

The need for accurate culturally specific knowledge is widely recognized and occupies a substantial part of the literature teacher's time in class. Texts often cannot be understood completely without awareness of cultural prototexts (as in Greek tragedy where such prototexts are lost) or without awareness of particular mythological structures which inform narrative character. That the snake is a symbol of evil in the Judeo/Christian tradition does not mean that he must be relegated to that role in African cultures! The ***relevant*** myths and belief structures must be known to comprehend a character's behaviour. Many folk stories are entirely incomprehensible without a knowledge of the cultural and social practices involved.[69] Violation of a cultural taboo will be a salient feature only if the reader ***recognizes*** the taboo, which may be variable from one culture to another. Rather than adhering to what he thinks of as universally public values such as justice, courage, or honesty, the reader must accept that concepts can vary according to cultural context. The reader must understand, for example, the concept of "honour" effective in *Le Cid* (or other neoclassical plays) otherwise the story is absurd. In oral stories, even the circumstances ***of the telling*** may produce changes in meaning. ***Significance*** varies from culture to culture, and may not be signalled directly in the text.

Obviously cultural frames of reference do ***change*** over time. We cannot treat the codes (as Barthes does) as fixed and unchanging. World-modelling systems (from religion, philosophy, and the natural sciences, for example) vary in time and space, with the result that cultural and interpretive conventions are never static. While the

relevant background knowledge is essential to any accurate interpretation, *classic* narratives survive because they also allow for plural, *changing* appreciation and interpretation. If we consider again Ingarden's view of the "life" of a literary work, we realize that *new* meanings and relevance to text-external context must be possible, if a work is not to perish. Classic narratives are renewed through *re*interpretation. The reader benefits from the connection with the past, but also appreciates how the classic accommodates itself to her current concerns. Presumably, as Frank Kermode suggests, the disappearance of relevant fact and the interpretive conventions tying classics to their cultural context allow the reader to take a more active part in the production of meaning.[70] In effect, new conventions or "codes" are invented to create sense viable in a new cultural context.[71]

Borges' Pierre Menard carries this idea to the extreme, undertaking to compose some chapters of *Don Quixote* which are identical to the original, but which, because of the changed quality of reality as context, are not a mere copy. The attempt is to reach the *Quixote* through the experiences of Menard as reader. Because of the implications of the changed historical context, there results additional significance when the text is "written" later. Although the words are all the *same* as the original, new ideas are generated and even the style is perceived differently, as archaic rather than contemporary. Presumably the "new" text projects a different implied reader, or requires a new authorial audience.

While the reader's "prior" knowledge of relevant social norms seems crucial in many cases, one of the ways in which a text *can* teach the reader about cultural context is through what has been discussed already at length as mutual belief principle and implied authorial norms. In effect, the belief systems relevant to texts become another *kind* of general world-knowledge, which allows for the *interpreting* of changeable social rules. Belief representation is very important in artificial intelligence, which recognizes also the *mutuality* of belief systems as outlined by David Lewis, and the dependence on point of view and reciprocal bias. Lindemann identifies a fourth type of general knowledge as "belief systems," mainly distinguishable from the others

in that although such "knowledge" is entirely natural and consistent to the user, it may not be *true*.[72] Walton's view of the reader as somehow "getting back" to an original reality principle *through* mutual belief principle is most relevant here. In effect, the reader must *produce* as authorial audience the relevant "maxims" of a cultural belief context in order to comprehend characters' behaviour. As a particular *kind* of general knowledge, mutual belief provides a "screen" on world-models which renders that knowledge not only culturally specific, but also dependent on ideology, point of view, bias, and prejudice. The "intended" meaning the reader often derives from texts, about race, sex, nationality, and religion, depends on the representation of particular mutual belief structures. And the ambiguous structure of fantastic narrative likewise depends on controversial opinions about the existence of supernatural phenomena. The relevant "maxims" may be offered explicitly in the text, as a kind of textually structured naturalization. Fielding and Balzac glory in the explicit citation of "maxims," providing an entire context of social knowledge, offered in order to render characters and their actions entirely intelligible. But often the "maxims" are assumed implicitly only, as what is normal or natural within the cultural context. In these cases the identification of the elusive implied (or fictional) author becomes crucial to an accurate generation of fictional truth for the reference world.

Beyond belief systems, Lindemann introduces a final kind of general knowledge as "transitory." This knowledge "...forms a trigger-able system for a certain span of time only..." before it begins to decay and disintegrate.[73] All kinds of cultural fads, transient cultural stereotypes, and temporary terminology would come into this category, destined eventually to *impede* the act of processing rather than supply valuable essential knowledge. Some footnotes certainly supply *this* kind of transitory knowledge.

Lindemann also points out that items of knowledge may be alternatively referable under *different* types, involving then different sorts of knowledge in processing. As a result, "...a certain knowledge space, which is triggered by one and the same surface key, may take

considerably different shapes depending on which type of knowledge has been brought to bear in its processing."[74]

Action Models and Causality

The crucial feature which all of these various kinds of general world-knowledge have in common is that actions can be interpreted accordingly. Lindemann stresses the importance of world-knowledge in answering the question "what happens?" As readers, we are likely to ask, "What type, what phase of an action am I confronted with, who are the actors, what roles do they perform, in what intensity/mode do actions develop?"[75] Insisting that cognitive strategies are more fundamental in such cases than generic conventions, Lindemann shows how frames/schemas are triggered by surface clues which provide access to "various bases of prototypical knowledge." Particularly where textual vagueness dominates, readers "reconstruct" absent information from the surface clues.[76] Discussing "virtual" strings of events in narrative, Ryan identifies several examples of this kind of knowledge: "...narrative themes of such common occurrence across cultures, periods, and genres as unsuccessful action, broken promises, violated interdictions, mistaken interpretation, and double as well as single deception."[77] These patterns do not depend so much on text-models as on underlying world-knowledge.

Culler isolates exactly the interpretive operations permitted by the "books" of knowledge:

> When a character in a novel performs an action, the reader can give it a meaning by drawing upon this fund of human knowledge which establishes connections between action and motive, behaviour and personality. Naturalization proceeds on the assumption that action is intelligible, and cultural codes specify the forms of intelligibility.[78]

It is not of course only knowledge of psychology which contributes to such interpretive operations, but also the range of culturally specific

knowledge and belief systems outlined above. Typically in interpretation, the reader finds what Culler aptly calls the "context of coherence" which allows him to infer character from action and approve of the way in which action accords with character.[79] To make such customary tautology work, the reader must invoke the cultural and psychological stereotypes made available through the context of coherence for textual data. He does not "receive" fictional truths in a vacuum, but rather builds the context which permits assembling a coherent set of truths, the one generating the other, and at the same time being reinforced by the newly developed truth.

This procedure is exactly what is involved in ***rationality heuristic*** as a device to understand characterization. As a particular psychological approach, rationality heuristic relates closely to social rules and belief systems, and represents a kind of investigation of reality analogous to the "investigations" into psychology licensed by reality principle.[80] Involved are purposive realizations of goals and the consequent need to piece together the rationality of the narrative agent. Obviously cultural context may be the ***only*** way to comprehend action as purposive activity related to a pragmatic context of background beliefs. Models of agency thus provide extra knowledge needed to naturalize properly. The comprehension of the logic of actions is a basic knowledge brought to narrative fiction in order to understand the actions of characters.

Without relating the question to the pragmatics of reading comprehension or the importance of minimal departure/reality principle, Ryan discusses actions ***as textual structure.***[81] Ryan's work with the dynamics of plot is relevant for my work because it demonstrates "...the potential complexity of the network of mental constructs that underlie human action in general and narrative action in particular."[82] We clearly need this knowledge about human action in order to understand the actions/plans of characters, thereby assigning fictional truth. Applying this particular kind of world-knowledge as a requirement of minimal departure from world-models, the reader can attribute the appropriate human qualities to characters.

Schank's and Abelson's well-known work in cognitive psychology is really fundamental here.[83] Schank and Abelson point out that goals may not be important in stories, especially since minor characters' actions may be assigned arbitrary goals or none at all.

> However, in stories with a lot of contextual information about the main character, and in well developed belief systems about the world, there are many expectations about likely events ...based on detailed knowledge of the genesis and nature of particular goals. [W]e must know what kinds of goals there are and how they interact with each other in order to formulate expectations. ...[W]e need to know how to recognize when a goal exists for an actor and how to predict (and thus understand) his future actions from that goal.[84]

This is the knowledge fundamental to Ryan's work with actions as textual structure. Recognizing that goals are not always transparent in speech within narrative, since characters may deliberately misrepresent their goals, Schank and Abelson suggest that goal inferences should be based primarily on actions.[85] Without rehearsing their "modest taxonomy of goals" we can easily agree that the reader must recognize what goals he can assume a character to have where no explicit indications are provided. Definitely a part of minimal departure/reality principle, goals and reactions can be predicted according to what the reader expects of human beings in particular situations.[86] To provide one concrete example, we know how to assess the roles of "heroes" and "villains" in stories simply by understanding how their goals are incompatible. The reader has no problem recognizing on the basis of action models that there must be some kind of ***rivalry*** between the two characters, and that the one character's goal will be blocked in some way by the interfering actions of the other.

If we must deal with the huge questions of praxeology in fictional narrative, we are also faced with a vast concept of causality, to which literature has been routinely subjected. Causality is one of the most important ***mechanisms*** by which the reader integrates world-knowledge into the reference world. In effect, any inference from event to event or from behaviour to presumed psychology involves the reader's culturally shared assumptions about causality. Characters--especially

realistic ones--are supposed to act in accordance with those assumptions, as real people do. If the "causal syntax" for the physical world is that actions can result in state changes, and states can enable actions, as Schank and Abelson say,[87] we can only expect the same kinds of syntax to hold for fictional worlds.

The notion of "motivation" for action has been identified in the formalist/structuralist tradition as typically realistic technique which involves accounting for the motivated action in terms of natural causality. In fact, the history of the realistic novel has always been closely associated with causality and motivation, presuming that the events of realistic fictional worlds entail one another or form a causative chain or sequence. Again, in keeping with the tendency to both infer character from action and then delight in the way in which action accords with character, the reader not only deploys his knowledge of causation to move from cause to effect (seeing the future course of events), but also thinks in the opposite direction, from effect to cause, in order to sort out why the state of affairs exists and why the characters act as they do. The extreme case of the former process would be the ability to generate future plot "artificially" *from* character, as in popular romance or soap operas. It is the kinds of general world-knowledge discussed above which make these operations possible. Although life itself is not always fully explicable in terms of causes for events, we do try persistently to pair "effects" with causes, and we will do the same for narrative worlds.[88] Fictional truth determined through such procedures seems highly "evident" and easily accessible.

Sometimes narrative texts do not take for granted this kind of world-knowledge activation, preferring to provide explicit guidance about causal relations which either may not occur in reality, or which differ from those which the author could expect to find in the reader's experience.[89] In such cases, *vraisemblance* may require this kind of reinforced presentation of causal relations. Rather than relying on the reader to identify the correct text-external codes, the text makes explicit which world-knowledge is relevant. The generalizations most

typical are perhaps those about standard psychology, but may also include statements about the differences between historical periods.[90]

Where explicit guidance about causality is not provided, the reader must apply reality principles. According to minimal departure, what he knows of causal connections assumed to hold in the real world must be applied to the fictional world situation. He supplies any missing or unspecified links in the causal chain, in order to establish the reasons for action, thereby creating the kind of "web" of character and circumstance identified by the formalists. Unlike purely factual reports such as potentially found in newspapers, narrative fiction depends on the ***creation*** of the "web of circumstance," either through direct authorial intervention, or by the reader's activation of text-external knowledge about causality.

Obviously the notion of "gap" is important to the causality question, in that it is the reader who must make the implicit connections as to causality relationships. According to minimal departure the reader fills in gaps by assuming that they contain the events which are most likely to produce the effects visible in the text. There can of course be ***several*** explanations possible, as in the fantastic, but generally speaking causality can seem very clear indeed. Rabinowitz cites another kind of "rule" which concerns causality: the general rule of inertia. He says that although we expect inertial situations to change in narrative, "...we generally expect their undermining to be noted explicitly in the text. Thus we assume, unless we are given reason to believe otherwise, that events in the blank spots continue along the same path as the events preceding them."[91] This too is a kind of minimal departure which ties the fictional world to reality as a model.

In addition to minimal departure as a rule about causality, there is an additional kind of "rule" which readers apply, which is purely literary and not generally applicable in reality--what Rabinowitz calls the "rule of temporal causation."[92] Here I will make brief reference only to the famous debate about the logical fallacy denounced as *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. What is purely ***consecutive*** in reality, is allowed to become ***consequence*** in literature, endowing the simplest narrative

with a systematic causal structure foreign to reality, where what follows is not necessarily caused by what went before. In effect, techniques of narrative reading create a plot where one would not otherwise exist, as in E.M. Forster's famous example of "The king died, then the queen died." What is really a chronicle without plot becomes a narrative if the two events are connected through causal relations, the reader inferring that the queen died of grief. This reading strategy would not be relevant to the discussion of world-knowledge, except that the information needed to recognize the potential for a causal chain of temporally connected events is gleaned from the reader's prior knowledge of how things might work in reality. So even if the "rule" is purely literary, the justification must come from world-knowledge. In the famous example, the inferring of the mental event of grief is based on world-knowledge, the claim to narrative potential relying on the text-external knowledge base. The statement becomes narrative only because extratextual knowedge is activated.[93]

Scripts as Specific World-Knowledge

Through the elaboration of many different kinds of general world-knowledge it becomes obvious that the reader has access to a large repertoire of knowledge structures which make understanding possible. By applying the tradition of "schema" in social psychology, it has been possible for cognitive scientists to develop the concept of frames, schemata, or *scripts* as an ***organization*** of knowledge. Rooted in gestalt psychology and a fundamental interest in the phenomenology of mental life, the idea of "schema" has been represented in numerous theories over the past fifty years. Central is the concept of "structured ideational kernels" as a means to grasp the process of seeing how the world is organized. We need only think of Wolfgang Iser's work (outlined in Chapter Six) to appreciate where such a fundamental concept can lead. The concept has been used in all kinds of discourse analysis and text processing theory, as in the work of Teun van Dijk and Robert de Beaugrande. Since the mid-1970's cognitive psychologists have been showing how people actually *use* scripts to produce and understand

stories in particular, but other texts as well. Artificial intelligence uses the script/frame concept to design programs to cope with problems of understanding and inference, as well as other cognitive tasks like skimming, summarizing, extending, and translating.

Scripts, as developed by Schank and Abelson, become the class of *specific* knowledge, as opposed to the general, discussed above. Passages of text can literally be understood in terms of a script which can "account for" them, or provide the necessary frame in which understanding is possible. Scripts or frames are socially constructed *units* of reality about what it means to perform particular tasks or become involved in particular social situations--all of the practices that make up our social world, or "rules" for practical life. They are socially shared world-models for comprehension, depending on causal connections. Inferences are made according to common frames, according to a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation. As knowledge representations, scripts enable people to perceive, and to comprehend language and actions.

In view of the vast number of general knowledge bases, Schank and Abelson examine the procedures for *applying* past knowledge. By taking a *pragmatic* view, they are able to show how reality is understandable according to *expectations* for particular situations--a view highly useful for the examination of fictional truth generation. Using story fragments to pose issues, Schank and Abelson insist usefully on the need to specify the *details* of the most appropriate structures which dominate the understanding process; that is, "...a knowledge structure theory must make a commitment to particular content schemas."[94]

The scripts outlined are about *actions*--all kinds of human purposive action sequences involving intentions, dispositions, and relationships. As such, they relate closely to the discussion above concerning theory of action and rationality heuristic, as well as fundamental concepts of causality. Standard interpretive operations concerned with action and motivation relate not only to general knowledge, but depend also on specific scripts for action. Whether we are dealing with a fragment of behaviour found in real life or in a

fictional narrative, we will imagine a script which can account for that behaviour. Putting rationality heuristic to work in this way to create categories of action, we ***may*** make an error, especially if the narrative undertakes in the postmodern style to confute such operations, but there is really no other way to make sense of the behaviour. As Schank and Abelson explain, to understand situations people ***match*** actions "...to pre-stored groupings of actions that they have already experienced. New information is understood in terms of old information."[95] Fictional worlds are also ***matched*** to the real world in this way, since the process of reading involves very much the idea of understanding only what has been previously understood.[96] Particularly for realistic narratives, conventional patterns of social behaviour constitute an organizational pattern of meaning which cannot be ignored. As Martin points out, such organization is often crucial to plot, since many narratives are often built from action sequences or scripts.[97] Barthes' action or proairetic code involves precisely such scripts for action, including conventions and social formulae. Realistic novels like *Anna Karenina* or *La Regenta* are full of such social scenes, adhering closely to the sequential structure of recognized social practices which imbue the fictional world with a particularly life-like quality.

Scripts, then, are really a form of naturalization according to social context--the more ***specific*** reading procedure which puts general knowledge (and even the "actual" knowledge discussed initially) to work in a more concrete way. Lindemann's development of kinds of text processing helps to show how various kinds of general knowledge clusters can be scripted differently within the knowledge system. Lindemann indicates that the five kinds of knowledge identified are analogous to scripts in that they are trigger-able (via key words), and do not result from the processing of the text ***at hand***, but are rather "...amassed ***prior to*** the actual reading of a text."[98] Such a fundamental idea cannot be ignored for the generation of fictional truth. In effect, all such elements as the psychology of empirically universal knowledge, the social rules of culturally specific knowledge, and belief systems and ideologies can become workable scripts for comprehension, and the construction of reference worlds.

In setting up their theoretical entity of script, Schank and Abelson stress the importance of episodic memory for knowledge structures--the kind of memory which is not used much to store "book knowledge," but which is needed to recognize repeated or similar sequences from real life.[99] As a method of filling in gaps in understanding, such memory is different, then, from a more "semantic" memory which we could associate with intertextual knowledge. The script is the "economy measure" which allows similar ***episodes*** to be stored and remembered as a "standardized generalized episode." Only the ***differences*** for a single episode are stored separately in memory.[100] Again, the principle of default or minimal departure is fundamental. Inferences are possible because the reader is equipped with a script which provides for automatic default to world-models where there are textual gaps.[101]

The script as standard event sequence operates as an organizing mechanism, providing a reference context. Stories reference scripts; hence, there is no ***need*** to tell all the details, which would be boring.[102] It is obvious how essential this concept is, then, to the fact of incomplete fictional worlds and the appropriate reference world created by readers through shared knowledge structures. If "...scripts are responsible for filling in the obvious information that has been left out of a story..."[103] what an advantage they can be for the comprehension of more complicated narrative fiction. Much in fiction can be classified as everyday situations. A structure which therefore "...describes appropriate sequences of actions in a particular context...," which is "...made up of slots and requirements about what can fill those slots...," and which is an "interconnected whole" in that what fits in one slot affects what is possible in another,[104] proves most applicable to fiction, at least for relatively straightforward (and possibly trivial) fictional truths. The predetermined, stereotyped quality applies to much routine fictional truth generation. Obviously a fictional text can evoke such action sequences simply by citing one or two of their elements, relying on the reader to recognize the combination of causally necessary and socially conventional behaviour as part of his vast store of world-knowledge. The reader then fills in the missing elements by inference, treating them ***as if*** they had been explicitly stated.[105] Such "fill-in" is perhaps equally "objective" as the surrounding explicit

statements, and deserves an equal truth status in the reference world. What fits into the publicly shared known scripts will be routinely acceptable as fictional truth, as opposed to the more highly personalized elements typical of totalized imaginative worlds. And where known patterns are supported, the reader will naturalize with great ease, relying in this *concrete* way on cultural *vraisemblance*. Situational scripts are perhaps the most fundamental variety, related as they are to general knowledge. But personal scripts also relate to the important work done by Ryan concerning characters' goals, plans, and actions. Such scripts also come about through shared knowledge of goals and means of reaching them, but involve a wider range of alternative courses of action which contribute to interesting development of plot.

Even situational scripts do not provide the apparatus for handling entirely *new* situations.[106] In other words, the concept of script will not help the reader with left-out "abnormal" events which the narrator may omit for various reasons. Script-based understanding depends on the reader having been "in" a given situation before. Generating fictional truth is certainly knowledge-based in this way. The actions of characters make sense only against a pattern of actions known to the reader, experienced either in real life or in other literature. But deviations from such standard patterns can be handled only with much more difficulty, as for postmodern novels which defy such patterns.[107] Eventually the reader of all avant-garde texts learns to adapt, however, just as people do in understanding unfamiliar real-life situations.

Having demonstrated the *range* of world-knowledge operative in the fictional sphere, it is now possible to propose a view of the *selection* processes available, beginning with the generic default to world-models typical of realistic texts. Text-models can be evaluated in their dominant role as organizers for the construction of reference worlds, dictating how meaning must be "built up," not only in terms of world-knowledge but according to expectations for narrative genres. While generic *discourse*-models inevitably surface in the discussion of controlling text-models, it is not possible within the confines of this study to integrate a meaningful discussion of discourse-models as specific kinds of world-knowledge. Discourse-models influence what is

integrated into reference worlds as fundamental activators of knowledge bases, but do not find a place *within* those worlds. Belonging to the realm of narration, they present a different *class* of problem, which is best assessed elsewhere in terms of discourse strategies.

Notes

[1]Whenever I refer henceforth to world-models the reader must presume that actual-world models are at issue.

[2]Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1978) 97.

[3]inge Crosman Wimmers, *Poetics of Reading. Approaches to the Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) xvi.

[4]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 49. Ryan's example is the following: "When we say 'Sherlock Holmes was definitely not a ladies' man" we mean something like "If Sherlock Holmes existed, and the plot of the story were enacted in [the actual world], then Sherlock Holmes would definitely not be a ladies' man.' If we accept this statement as a whole in [the actual world], we implicitly accept its consequent as true in the textual universe" (49).

[5]Ryan 51.

[6]Ryan 51.

[7]Ryan's important work in accessibility relations, which I consider in Chapter Ten in detail, depends on this principle.

[8]John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction. A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 64.

[9]Woods 25 and 64.

[10]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 145.

[11]Walton 145.

[12]See Nicholas Wolterstorff's analysis, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 128-9.

[13]Walton 146.

[14]Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 140.

[15]Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 67.

[16]Culler 141.

[17]Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 20-1.

[18]Culler 142.

[19]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 100.

[20]Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1981) 221.

[21]Eco 221.

[22]Rabinowitz 102.

[23]Walton 159.

[24]Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding. An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977) 237.

[25]Schank 8.

[26]Schank 9.

[27]Lubomír Doležel, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allén (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 232.

[28]Doležel 232.

[29]Wimmers 20.

[30]Wimmers 15-16.

[31]J.P. Stern, *On Realism* (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) 121.

[32]Culler 144.

[33]Joseph Margolis, "The Logic and Structures of Fictional Narrative," *Philosophy and Literature* 7.2 (October 1983): 167.

[34]Nicholas Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility. A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 192.

[35]Radical violations of such a "trust" are of course possible through a kind of textual subversion of the actual, but depend also for effect on knowledge of the accurate history in the first place. The whole question of ***alternate versions*** and violation of historical fact/events/persons is dealt with ahead in Chapters Eleven and Twelve in terms of ***intertextual*** relations, since reality itself and all of its historical representations can be accessible to us considered ***as text***.

[36]Ryan 50-1.

[37]Ryan 53.

[38]Ryan 53.

[39]Ryan 53.

[40]John Heintz, "Reference and Inference in Fiction," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 87 and 93. The point remains, however, that the suppression of knowledge of basic logic leads to contradictions within the language system--the kinds of contradictions typical of incoherent fictional worlds, where contradictions must be seen against the background of the rest of the textual language-based world. Actual "falsehood," on the other hand, must invoive the ***empirical*** structure of universal knowledge rather than the fundamentally analytical.

[41]Bernhard Lindemann, "What Knowledge Does it Take to Read a Newspaper?" *Journal of Literary Semantics* 18.1 (April 1989): 51. Lindemann sets up a "tentative typology" which presents a gradated spectrum from virtually unchangeable to transitory knowledge. I use his categories to help guide my own explorations into kinds of world-knowledge.

[42]Lindemann 51. Lindemann cites such things as logical identities, tautologies, logical truths, equations, Carnap's linguistic "meaning postulates," and hyponymic implications.

[43]Lindemann 52. I summarize Lindemann's position briefly here, as presented on 52-3.

[44]Culler 141.

[45]Schank 9-10.

[46]Schank 37. Wallace Martin also adopts this strategy to further differentiate Culler's second level of cultural *vraisemblance*, 67-8.

[47]Lindemann 53.

[48]Lindemann 53.

[49]Ryan 243.

[50]The usual example is that of walking. To narrate the details of movement would produce a fragmented, defamiliarized action sequence which no longer corresponds to the level at which the reader engages with the real world.

[51]Itamar Even-Zohar, "Constraints on Realeme Insertability in Narrative," *Poetics Today* 1.3 (Spring 1980): 67.

[52]Even-Zohar 67 and 69.

[53]Barthes 205-6.

[54]Barthes 205-6.

[55]Barthes 205.

[56]Barthes 205-6.

[57]Barthes 18.

[58]Barthes 20.

[59]In Chapter Twelve I explore the concept of authorial audience as a counterpart of the real reader which governs the activation of knowledge.

[60]Walton 159.

[61]May Charles, "A Possible-World Semantics Approach to World Structures and Narrative Transmission in the Fantastic Tale," thesis, University of Alberta, 1987.

[62]Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, *Understanding Fiction*, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959) 27.

[63]Lindemann 54.

[64]Even-Zohar 72.

[65]Wimmers includes a chapter on *La Princesse de Cleves* (24-56) where she comments with considerable insight on the lack of *vraisemblance* of Mme. de Cleves' confession and the resultant effect on early readers, whose conventional expectations were challenged. The same effect can be produced through text-models, as we shall see in Chapter Twelve for *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*.

[66]This argument is based on Culler's discussion of Balzac's use of stereotypes, 142.

[67]Culler 142.

[68]Barthes 206.

[69]I identify in the next section how rationality heuristic relates to these kinds of culturally specific knowledge.

[70]Frank Kermode, discussed in Martin 166.

[71]As Martin suggests, there is an interplay also between social, cultural, and literary change. Their combination tends to produce new kinds of narrative and new ways to interpret (161).

[72]Lindemann 56.

[73]Lindemann 60.

[74]Lindemann 60. Lindemann uses the example of the surface key "woman" to demonstrate how the first four types of knowledge are all relevant.

[75]Bernhard Lindemann, "Settings: Some Cognitive Issues in the Theory of Genres," *Journal of Literary Semantics* 17.1 (April 1988): 10-11.

[76]Lindemann, *JLS* 1988, 11.

[77]Ryan 158.

[78]Culler 142-3.

[79]Culler 143.

[80]I will not develop a detailed account here of theory of action, but base my comments only on a paper given at Edmonton 23 November 1990 by Paisley Livingston, entitled "Narrative Characterization and Models of Agency."

[81]Ryan 124-47. Ryan develops an account of how actions are motivated by the setting of a goal and the elaboration of a plan, and outlines categories involved in evaluating actions as meaningful.

[82]Ryan 147.

[83]I will refer here briefly to *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding* only as directly useful in explicating the importance of knowledge of human action models for generating truths about fictional characters. See 101-119 about goals, and 69-100 about plans.

[84]Schank 102.

[85]Schank 108.

[86]Schank and Abelson also discuss plans as the general mechanism underlying *scripts*, which are the most specific organization structure for knowledge. Obviously the interpretive operations for action/motivation involve ***both*** the extended level of general knowledge and more specific scripts as socially constructed units. I present the rudiments of script/schema theory in the next section.

[87]Schank 25.

[88]At the very least, we will expect realistic fiction to highlight the complex ***random*** quality of life--the delusion of man's futile attempt to make everything understandable.

[89]Rabinowitz discusses the use of "maxims or other kinds of general statements" to guide readers in historical periods where shared conceptions of reality are breaking down, or where reference is to historical periods presumed unfamiliar to the reader, 105.

[90]Rabinowitz 107. Rabinowitz provides some interesting distinctions for the "maxims" as offered by reliable narrators versus characters, and the variable effects on verisimilitude, providing in effect a specific example of the workings of Ryan's modal structure for narrative universes.

[91]Rabinowitz 151.

[92]Rabinowitz 107.

[93]The context of genre would constitute an ultimate test of viable inference by determining what ***particular*** kinds of world-knowledge need be selected: queens are likely to die of grief in fairytales, while in a more realistic text the reader might well look for a common source of disease as contagion! Such issues are discussed ahead in Chapters Nine and Ten.

[94]Schank 10.

[95]Schank 67.

[96]Schank and Abelson insist that man is "...a processor that only understands what it has previously understood," human understanding being mostly script-based, involving thousands of scripts used almost without thinking (67-8).

[97]Martin 99.

[98]Lindemann, *JLS* 1989, 50-1.

[99]Schank 18.

[100]Schank 19.

[101]While some detail may get lost in this process, it is clear that artificial intelligence requires this kind of script-based memory to enable computers to understand without loading the data-base with so much information that search time becomes impossibly long. See Schank 19.

[102]Schank 38.

[103]Schank 41.

[104]Schank 41.

[105]On 48 Schank and Abelson say something similar about the "steps" of instantiated scripts.

[106]Schank 41.

[107]Schank's and Abelson's chapter on "plans" deals with situations never encountered, but I will resist the temptation to digress any further into cognitive psychology.

Chapter Nine: Genre and the Application of World-Models

Trained since early childhood in the conventions of storytelling, the reader tries to determine *as much as possible* about fictional worlds encountered. Realistic texts which make considerable use of text-external knowledge make the process easy. It is not difficult to determine what is "happening" when fictional worlds seem to *share* the truths of routine reality. Where fictional truths are at odds with his concept of reality, the reader must struggle to identify the appropriate context for truth, and an awareness of genre will influence substantially the reader's expectations. Since meaning comes into existence through the process of reading, it is obvious that this process must be informed by a certain conventional knowledge about particular genres. This is not to say that the reader must be consciously aware of complex "rules" of genre, but that he must understand the fundamentals of the genre's "language" as an easily identifiable code. Authors not only assume this kind of conventional knowledge, but also work to establish the reader's "competence" textually, deploying particular narrative strategies.

While philosophers have difficulty dealing with deviations from standard world-models, literary scholars routinely attack the problem. Minimal departure is tempered by the larger issue of determining what is valid or relevant within an appropriate generic context. Not all world-models can be acceptably integrated into all reference worlds. *All* information about reality is potentially "there." The question is what from this latent knowledge is activated by the text. The reader has expectations for literature in general, for literary narrative, for the particular genre, and finally expectations raised by the text itself which are filtered through the others. A "representation" can only be correct insofar as it relates to a particular system or framework. In this sense, even realism is relative to an acknowledged context, and reality principle is inadequate alone as a theory of narrative meaning, since it

generates paradoxes and can be demonstrably fallacious in certain circumstances. Reality principle is by no means the only way to know truth, and must be interrelated with other components of meaning creation.

This chapter does not discuss any of the text-models developed by others. It presents first of all how realistic fictional worlds are structured by a textual default to world-models through a refusal to specify departures from reality. The default mechanism is shown to work through realistic narrative technique. I suggest then how reading "roles," as components of the fictional sphere, relate to both world- and text-models, the latter assuming the dominant function. The concept of accessibility relations is presented as potentially able to assess how reading operations proceed through text-models to a selection of world-models. To set the stage for the detailed analyses of text-models in Chapter Ten, the role of genre is examined in relation to minimal departure, and in terms of customary expectations.

Realism as Default: Appropriating World-Knowledge

The easiest way to assess the default to world-models is to examine the techniques of nineteenth-century realism, by now considered characteristic of *vraisemblance*. By looking at a novel like *La Regenta* as the perfect epigon of the realistic novel, we can see how the illusion of reality is created through an automatic default to world-models.[1] *La Regenta* is a culmination of the realistic novel as it had evolved--a maximal combination of the narrative procedures and themes now understood as archetypally "realistic." As such, it not only demonstrates the ***kinds*** of world-models at issue, but can be used to show how the ***selection*** of those world-models is governed by the generic default mechanism. The reference world which ***replaces*** reality retains all of the world-models at the reader's disposal, except where there are specific textual measures taken to arrest the default mechanism.

The much-discussed concept of verisimilitude depends on a notion of *similarity* to a represented object. Historically, authors working in the realistic tradition have always recognized the importance of verisimilitude in terms of credibility required. Eighteenth-century novels, which do not depend on the archetypally realistic narrative techniques which evolved later, nonetheless insist on the "historical" quality of their narratives. When authors assume the role of historian they are concerned with the ***appearance*** of truth so that the reader will accept the novel ***as if*** it were true history. Material is routinely "drawn from life" to facilitate this process. In the nineteenth century, verisimilitude becomes closely associated with the desire to "tell it like it is," revealing the truth about society, in all its sordid details. It is not that the realistic text refuses to provide reading pleasure, but that the didactic insistence also provides an indirect message about reality, meant to inform readers, to raise awareness levels, and possibly even to influence action. We now valorize realism according to this claim to depict life as it really is, distinguishing it neatly as a genre from categories of fantasy, escapism, or even idealism, which are seen as "false" in comparison.[2]

World-models are essential, of course, to produce this effect. If a story is worthy of being told ***because*** it resembles what exists or happens in the actual world, it must portray the norms of reality accurately and in detail. Fictional character is crucial in any novel which justifies its telling in terms of verisimilitude, plausibility, or a sense of typicality with respect to real-world people or situations. Nineteenth-century realistic novels typically depict a historical period or particular social milieu, usually bringing to light real-world problems and describing the human types embroiled in those problems. *La Regenta* typically provides this kind of transformation of reality by a structured realistic code, in which all events and characters are selected for their novelistic story relevance, and individual events and characters are endowed with universal significance. The narrative mechanisms transform real life into a totally captivating narrative world--a tangible, palpable world which seems "objective" enough to reflect faithfully social history. Because of the creation of a direct impression of life as complex and intense, the reader "encounters" a

world of "people," who seem to be involved in a real process of life. Because the reader looks into a world much ***like*** his own, it is only natural that he interpret what happens much as he does in ordinary life, construing all of the world-knowledge identified in the last chapter. Nothing tells him to shut that knowledge off.

Realistic description of fictional worlds depends on the kind of unity of consciousness of properties expressed in both factual and fictional discourse upon which Hector-Neri Castañeda insists.[3] This "homogeneity of consciousness" in the reader's total experience, whether that involves fictions, hallucinations, or realities, suggests a very basic kind of minimal departure. It seems to me that realism ***exploits*** this human tendency, discouraging the reader from distinguishing among "real" and purely fictional properties. So when Balzac asks the reader to understand the ***kind*** of person a character is as "one of those people" he is referring to ***real*** people whom the reader is presumed to know, and not to other literary characters. It is assumed that the fictional world will be exactly ***like*** the real world in this respect. As a result, for this kind of realistic work, the reference world becomes exactly like the real world as far as such descriptions are concerned, which must be acknowledged as "fact." When Tolstoy opens *Anna Karenina* with the sentence "All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion"[4] the reader ***must*** call into play his knowledge about real people and families, openly accepting real-world knowledge and beliefs into the reference world. And where irony is involved as in Austen's opener in *Pride and Prejudice* about wealthy bachelors and marriage, only world-knowledge can ensure that the irony is understood.[5] Mrs. Bennett's world is just like our own, and not some aberration where the statement which constitutes her view would actually be true.

Realistic fiction does not rest only on such readerly cooperation, however, preferring to take great pains to ***establish*** a real-world accuracy. Realistic narrative demonstrates a kind of "research" accomplished by the author into cultural/historical setting. When Wallace Martin speaks about the reading experience of realism he says that "[i]f we believe (whether or not consciously) that a story might

well have happened, we are absorbed in it in a special way."[6] This absorption involves the activation of the full range of world-knowledge about causal connections, motivation, belief systems, and all of the culturally specific and general empirically universal knowledge which produce an awareness of "the real." Within this kind of "true reflection" of the world, what happens in the story will seem ***inevitable***. Obviously the truth to experience can be overwhelming for readers. The publication of *La Regenta* in 1884 produced enormous scandal. The novel was violently ***rejected*** by readers, who saw Oviedo and their ***own*** reflections in the novel's social criticism.

All of this realist confidence in the ability to ***represent*** reality results in the apparent reference ***to*** reality--a reference to what is the case in the real world. Reading procedures construct this reference on the basis of world-models and the resulting ability to know the applicable truths. Because of the default mechanism, the realistic text need only signal in the direction of the world, and the reader will assemble whatever knowledge is required. Even where more copious information is inscribed textually, as with Balzac or in *La Regenta*, the text demonstrates an enormous confidence in the capacity to represent reality ***in cooperation with*** the reader.

The boundaries of a purely fictional world are transgressed by such apparent reference, unless we assume that the reader constructs her own reference world to ***replace*** reality. To understand the text is to recognize what kind of reference world must be built, and which components of text-external knowledge must be activated in it. The realist's insistence on reference to reality ***presumes*** this kind of naturalization process of recognizing the world which must serve as a point of reference, and the incorporation of all applicable real-world truths into that reference world.

La Regenta relies on this naturalization process to achieve its moral purpose through social criticism. As a typical realistic novel, *La Regenta* seems to contain an inner truth which reflects both contemporary life and features of human psychology which seem eternally valid. Textual strategies evoke an image of reality as a

"message" which corresponds to human expectations about life. Detailed description not only builds a logical, coherent, and "complete" narrative world, but increases verisimilitude by apparent reference to external reality. Social background and environment are connected "referentially" to the narrative world. The narrative world is entirely ***consistent with*** world-knowledge, so that the reader can freely augment textually inscribed "meaning" with that knowledge, including generally prevalent values and beliefs. Characters are "representative" in the sense that they are identifiable as social types through the reader's own experience--a process not without discomfort for the residents of Oviedo! When Alas undertakes his exposure of social problems he has no doubts that his readers will be able to construe the correct reference world where those problems figure prominently.

La Regenta is structured according to the "natural causality" outlined in Chapter Eight--the causality involved in the course of real life, and which accords with Hegel's conceptions of reality. As opposed to submission to chance, fate, or providence, the characters are involved in choices which depend on their role in a total social, economic, and political reality, depicted in concrete terms and as in a process of constant evolution. Social issues are not consequently merely inserted into the plot, which is actually ***designed*** to reveal the social problems within both main and secondary actions. Given that causal connections are supposed to work as they do in reality, the reader "underwrites" the credibility of Ana Ozores' world by providing that model from reality for the reference world.

In avoiding the implication of an inevitable "external" causality, Alas shows how outer and inner (or universal and individual) forces are ***united*** in character--imposed from society and human nature. Environment (and the weather) is both causal and symbolic. That is, it implies causality for events, including the most trivial, so that the described milieu is a collective ***actant*** or force which provokes or motivates action, as the characters struggle within a network of concrete forces. But such description also mirrors or duplicates symbolically the characters' own psychological motivation.

Adequate (and very modern) psychological motivation is provided for all actions, so that things "happen" as they do in real life, without the reduction typical of naturalism. As a deliberate realist, Alas recognizes that if causality is shown to operate inexorably, with characters somehow "caught up" in events beyond their control, the reader will lose that sensation of realism so carefully encouraged through mimetic procedures. Causality is not only "believable" in *La Regenta*, but hinges on the importance of human will, intentions, plans, and actions. Were the characters to lose the capacity to make choices as in real life, the reader would have to find another text-model to help organize the reference world.

Potentially in opposition to this kind of causality/motivation is the inclusion of seemingly irrelevant and insignificant detail which Barthes identifies as "reality effect."[7] In keeping with formalist ideas about the realistic inclusion of reportorial detail not essential to story progression or character development, Barthes defines reality effect as produced by including such superfluous descriptive items. "[T]his very absence of meaning enables them to anchor the story in the real by signifying, this is reality. ...[T]he world is simply there and can thus best be denoted by objects whose sole function is to be there."[8] An illusion is thereby created of an "existing" reality, as if what is simply signified is indicative of a much more ***extensive*** referent. On the basis of the description, the rest of routine reality can be inferred--whatever else "belongs" in the reference world. All kinds of world-knowledge is called into play, especially as particulars which are known to exist and which are hence difficult to dismiss as mere fictions. The story seems to include "evidence" of a concrete nature that it "really happened."

As Barthes describes reality effect, it is similar in function to the introduction of larger historical facts as unalterable truths. When a narrative world is invested with such details, it demonstrates an automatic fidelity to reality. As one part of the default mechanism, reality effect creates the same kind of "network" effect as for referential entailments in general (as discussed in Chapter Eight). Within the schematically described fictional world, these small

completions of gaps imply whole *ranges* of truths which need not be described, but which the reader is fully entitled to infer.

Superficially, reality effect seems to be at cross purposes with causality as discussed above for *La Regenta*. ***Inessential*** detail seems to undermine the cause and effect relationships fundamental to realistic narrative. Given such trivial details, how is the reader to incorporate them into causal chains? In terms of text-models, how is the reader to ignore the convention which tells him that everything said must be meaningful? The search for "significance" is baffled by such textual strategy.

While Barthes' insights are not invalid, they tend to write off realistic description as only a "signifier" of reality, without assessing the frequently integral function of description as part of the novel's action/plot. In *La Regenta*, description builds an entire representational system modelled on that of reality. The elements of the fictional environment are used to "produce" characters through an exhaustive description of milieu. The relation between individual characters and the described situation/environment constitutes a ***total*** picture of reality, at least once the reader has activated the appropriate knowledge bases. Far from threatening causality, detailed description retains the "essential" quality which allows the reader to construct causal chains.

Because Alas attempts to encompass all socio-physical reality, the external characteristics of society are depicted in concrete terms to create the illusion of reality. This typically realistic preoccupation with the appearance of things, particularities, and social behaviour results in the usual physical density of realism--substantial data provided about situations. *La Regenta* abounds in detailed reportage about the environment, landscapes, city streets, actual buildings, and interiors--all physical settings. These material substances do ***imply*** an unquestionable reality which the realistic writer is able to describe. But all details do relate closely to the main story progression--they are never gratuitous. Descriptive detail is thus ***both*** "excessive" and welcome to the reader. It serves the function of enclosing the narrated

statements within the great social perspective of realism, which attempts to reach the *essence* of social conditions through description which is ultimately never superficial.

Material reality is shown as perceptible through the senses, just as in real life. In keeping with the realistic interest in sensuality, space is humanized, seen in terms of the characters' sensations. Description is made functional within the story, since it is mainly offered from the points of view of the characters, and serves to further define those characters.

Alas employs references to and description of ***real world places*** to generate a sense of material "reality" and coherence for the fictional world. Public buildings such as the cathedral, the casino, the Vegallana's palace and country estate, and the theatre are described in detail in order to reinforce the dominant theme of social collapse. Since the (contemporary) reader is already familiar with these locations, their "reference" is semantically stable and produces an inescapable verisimilitude. By "referring" to the real world, their descriptions are difficult to dismiss as pure fiction.

Alas provides within this physical description of his Vetusta a panoramic vision of all levels of society including places and events based on real life experience. Conversation, fashion, entertainment--all of the commonplace "events"--are based on the author's social observations. Novelistic material is constituted by Alas' society in all its typical *un*eventfulness and mediocrity.

Scripted scenes as discussed in Chapter Eight play an important role in this regard, relying on the reader's models of comprehension, and reinforcing the social message. Although the protagonists are both frequently shown alone, character existence in *La Regenta* is highly social. Social scenes, such as religious ceremonies, dinner parties, or a day in the country are used to create a redundant text, where characters are qualified within the social context and retain that qualification for the remainder of the story. This technique builds character authenticity by insisting on particular units of applicable reality. Character roles

are taken from real life (the priests, the gentlemen who frequent the casino, etc.) and generate realistic effect as "known" social entities. Characters are seen within their environment and in suitable conditions which relate to their social position. The social roles of characters are illustrated as socio-professional milieus, which do not divorce the individual characters from their working environment; for example, Fermin de Pas is described saying mass and performing his duties as vicar general. Those actions provide a permanent qualification of his character. Along with his other professional activities, and coupled with other means of characterization, those actions serve the purposes of verisimilitude by making the individual character believable within his social role.

Because there are so many scenes of everyday life, often played out by secondary characters, the ***locations*** also become "venues" where human behaviour can be observed and understood according to real-world frames/scripts. Such scenes explain the complex interrelationships of characters and serve a more specific function of "explaining" the behaviour of the protagonists. Described social scenes become indispensable to the understanding of how the main events fall into place

By presenting material drawn from real life, and reporting authentically on observable reality, Alas assumes the metaphorical role of an historian and exposes in minute detail the stagnation of life in a Spanish provincial capital. The typical realistic tendency to see characters and places within their social organizations allows Alas not only to expose social conflict, but also to provide a penetrating analysis of the social context with which the reader is familiar. Called a document of Spanish history, *La Regenta* provides a genuine testimony of concrete social history in its totality at a precise period. The "Spain" which must find its way into the reference world is ideologically and religiously divided, lacking morality, thoroughly corrupt, stagnating in decadence, with no vision for the future--just as Restoration Spain was.

As such, *La Regenta* demonstrates the attitude toward the world typical of realism--what is generally thought of as a philosophical

commitment to the *un*ideal in reality as social *truth*. As superb critical realism, the novel exposes general ignorance, superficiality, pervasive moral degradation, and the corruption of Church and government. Obviously, since the desire is for social change, a certain amount of didacticism is involved in such realistic works--what Culler, speaking of Balzac, calls an "immense pedagogic confidence" and "faith in intelligibility."[9] The novel becomes an instrument of truth by presenting life without distortion from a "true" point of view which recognizes the process of historical change *as* a fictional truth.

Like all realistic texts, *La Regenta* involves a circulation of knowledge as authoritative, concerning the fictional world, but also by claiming reference to the real world. The typically dominant communication function is evident, as Alas demonstrates the realistic preoccupation with the reader and the moral consequences of reading. He displays the usual epistemological concern: an emphasis on the process of having the reader know reality through the communication of authoritative knowledge. Alas observes his society in a state of degradation, and undertakes to transmit information about that world--information which he expects his readers to believe or accept as *representative*. By postulating a reader placed within the novel's system of values--an authorial audience--he hopes to make his text seem truthful and be educationally effective for real readers.

As a result, Alas does present the inner lives of characters, but he also displays a formidable talent for revealing social classes and institutions. Since it is important within the realistic tradition for the process of historical change to be revealed in the story, characters typically become representative of social groups. Alas creates characters as representatives for entire groups or classes: Mesía as the elegant libertine, Fermín de Pas as the priest without true vocation, Bermudez as the erudite scholar, Redondo and Ronzal as the nouveaux riches, and so on. As representatives of many possible social manifestations, the characters' experiences are intensified. Individual fates are not seen in isolation, but include the social dimension and depend on social conditions. Social tendencies can be seen in characters' behaviour, and they can be catalogued into social types

within a social structure. Highly individualized and particularized, they nonetheless also embody the universal and generalizable.

The human situation of the characters is made interesting *within* the visible system of social institutions, which are not presented as mere background setting. Alas exposes the relationship between the characters and social institutions. The characters are embedded in a social reality which includes social behaviour, political practices, factors of economy, clerical influence--various factors of social evolution, and a fund of world-knowledge which Alas relies on his readers to possess. Because social awareness is made central in *La Regenta*, Alas encourages the observation of the ***malfunctioning*** of social institutions. In conformance with J.P. Stern's concept of "middle distance,"[10] Alas is able to portray the human situation within social context, and without an arbitrary limitation of focus on either the individual psychology or the factors of milieu.[11]

Recognizable social setting is not only integral to the structure of the story-world, then, but the main plot is also representative of an extended real-world social corruption. This congruity creates the profoundly realistic impact of the novel, where all inscribed details serve the same ***double*** communication about story and social statement about reality. Personal degeneration becomes universal, as the deterioration of the characters represents the saturating evil and decay of the text-external enclosing society. In the degeneration of Ana and Fermín can be seen the collapse of moral centre and governing spiritual principles.

Default through Realistic Narrative Technique

Because the central ties of the realistic novel are with experience and reality, the result is an incredibly ***dense*** activation of meaning. The realistic novel becomes a kind of model by which reality ***itself*** can be understood, as if the world articulated textually can ***interact*** somehow with the real world. It is the reader who is invited to assume

responsibility for that "interaction," by integrating as much of the real world as he can into the reference world.

Given the realistic desire to present a meaningful illusion of life in concrete terms, language is used to transcend language--to expose a reality independent of words. The realistic novel appears to describe reality, without overt mediation, and to make accessible a world of experience beyond words. The moral quest for the world "out there," beyond language, dictates an identification or correspondence between word and object, and the creation of an illusion of reality through mimetic process. As Culler suggests,

> [w]ords must be composed in such a way that through the activity of reading there will emerge a model of the social world, models of the individual personality, of the relations between the individual and society, and, perhaps most important, of the kind of significance which these aspects of the world can bear.[12]

This process relies on the reader's implementation of the full range of world-models available. A ***human*** world charged with meaning is the result--a world like that of *La Regenta*, which makes more intelligible the reader's own reality.

Absolutely crucial to this creation of a coherent, tightly-woven reference world are narrative strategies which induce the reader to believe that the fictional world conforms to reality rather than to its own set of laws. Verisimilitude depends on this concealing act which masquerades as a relation with reality. It may seem paradoxical that the realistic novel insists on presenting life "as it really is" when it is after all only ***fiction***. It can never ***actually*** have sufficient "authority" to do that. But what it does to compensate is to hide its own fictionality through a "transparent" narrative technique. Less realistic texts often deliberately reveal that a story is illusion, ***baring*** any devices that would make it seem real. If attention is drawn to the fictionality of the text, all referential illusion is destroyed.

As opposed to works of fantasy, extreme subjectivity, or (in the extreme) radical metafiction which entirely defeats the reader's expectations that a world will be produced, the realistic novel proceeds as if there were no illusion at issue. This kind of mimetic realism which purports to draw material from life ***can*** seem objectionable if we recognize the falsity of a form which uses every trick available in order to ***appear*** to be true. While more fanciful genres often admit openly the fictional status of their forms, the realistic novel always remains intent on deception--intent on concealing the truth that this is only illusion after all.

The main technique for removing the reader's attention from the fictionality of the story is the ostensibly "invisible" covert narration typical of later nineteenth-century texts. The realist typically desires to present things "as they are" without authorial commentary or other forms of intrusion, and with the use of focalized character perceptions. Purporting to show life as it is, and not as it is conventionally represented in other genres, the realistic novel avoids all hints of narrative mediation. Without identifiable conventions for reading and obvious literary artifice, the realistic novel presents events which then seem to "happen" as they would in real life.

But, as several structuralist critics have shown, realistic procedures become themselves conventions which ***underlie*** representation. Realistic narratives only ***appear*** to avoid conventions, because the reader is ***accustomed*** to the procedures. In effect, the claim to present reality without mediation is undermined by the realization that realism ***does*** have identifiable technical characteristics. It is not sufficient, then, to discuss realism only in terms of how accurately it depicts reality.

But if realism is just another literary convention, it remains important to appreciate the crucial role of "transparent" narrative procedures for the activation of world-models. ***Because*** the genre is presented as "transparent," the default to world-models takes effect. World-knowledge can augment textual data because there is (apparently, at least) no generic intervention or mediation. Since the "invisible"

generic norms are presumed to "match" reality exactly, world-knowledge assumes a dominant role in the configuration of the fictional sphere.

In effect, the (invisible) conventions of verisimilitude provide authenticity for the reference world by deferring to the reader's authority. Suppressing evidence of narrative conventions, realistic texts do mount an effective ***disguise*** for their control of reader involvement in the generation of fictional truth. If the reader does not feel manipulated by overt narrative techniques, she can become "absorbed" in the "reality" of the fictional world. But the "control" exerted by realistic texts is not perhaps as extreme as Barthes and other structuralists suggest. Very "writerly" in terms of world-knowledge supplementation, such texts invite the reader to assume control of world-models, functioning as a kind of interpreter of story-world reality. It is the "transparent" narrative technique which allows the reader to assume such a dominant role in activating world-models.

Considering the illusion of stories telling themselves, unmediated, we might well be concerned about what happens to the idea of truth-worlds as "stories told as true." If we cannot look to an effaced teller, where are we to identify the source of fictional truth? Obviously, conventionally realistic texts do not rely on the "telling" mechanism, rejecting the presence of an author/narrator who addresses the reader or admits to the imaginary status of characters. But these texts convey ***nonetheless*** vast quantities of fictional truth. They also endow the reader with control over large amounts of complementary truths (often trivial, but sometimes of great import) which she integrates in the reference world, as a world where the story is ***read*** as true.

Where such recuperative strategies are encouraged, the result is extraordinarily life-like characters which cannot be confined to hermetically sealed fictional worlds. Structuralists have been unsuccessful in dealing with character, failing to see it as a fact of reading and inference procedures. Opposing the phenomenological subject with an emphasis on interpersonal and conventional systems seems to lead to a rejection of life-like fictional character. If we think

of the human individual as the meeting place of various external forces rather than as a fully individuated essence, we are not likely to accept traditional views of fictional character as "complete" and "living" entities. But realistic characters *are* what Culler describes as "...richly delineated autonomous wholes, clearly distinguished from others by physical and psychological characteristics."[13] These kinds of characters are alive and well in realistic fiction, and cannot be simply written off as some kind of ideological bias.

The key to understanding such character existence is the inference procedures which create the "completed" character. Rich and autonomous characters "exist" because the realistic text mandates the recuperative strategies which activate extensive world-models. Given the structure of the realistic text, the reader's world-knowledge is unavoidably activated. The life-like characters often maligned by structuralists are thus ***products*** of the fictional sphere, dependent on the reader's determination to build them. It is not enough to say that life-like "portraits" depend on the artifice of the realistic writer, who ultimately employs arbitrary conventions to create expected effects. Reading involves the same kind of artifice, shared with the writer. Recuperative strategies involve the interpersonal and conventional systems so important to the structuralist approach. Fictional characters depend for their "completed" existence on those conventional knowledge systems. While realistic texts insist on a default to world-models, other genres rely just as insistently on various ***combinations*** of knowledge through text-models. And even where texts radically undermine coherent, life-like fictional character, traditional expectations inform the reader's appreciation of those deviations from learned models/modes of reading. There is no way, then, to avoid world-models entirely, but we must take into account the numerous ways in which they can be activated and assigned variably limited roles in the reference world.

Frames of Reference for Selection: Reading Roles

If a representation is to be "correct" it must activate fictional truth in relation to a particular system or framework. Reading takes place within complex, multiple, interlocking frames of reference which involve not only highly personal preferences/beliefs, but also the more conventional knowledge of world-models, as governed by generic context and specific textual procedures. The cultural context *is* crucial in shaping reading and directing the generation of fictional truth. But that context must be defined always ***through*** text-models. Since there is no unmediated access to fictional worlds, the reader can only see such worlds through conventional, conceptual frameworks which allow him to recognize how the descriptive system works. While archetypally realistic texts mask that descriptive system, pretending to a direct portrayal of reality, other kinds of texts make more clear the kind of repertoire (in Iser's sense) upon which the text relies. What the reader finds within the text as familiar ground provides the basis for the necessary interaction with the text and the generation of fictional truth. The convergence of frames of reference results in the constructive reading process of the fictional sphere--a process able to select truths and establish hierarchical relationships among text-external models.

The process of building a reference world beyond the borders of the text results in a world which takes on the dimensions of the real, far beyond textual stipulation, and dependent on the knowledge-context of the reading. How the various frames of reference ***intersect*** in accordance with particular text-models determines the make-up of the literary referent as reference world. Through complex systems of inference, meaning is built up as the referent develops--guided by textual stipulation, but organized as a totality by the active reading process.

Inherent in this reading process is a troubling fundamental duality of perspective which a number of theorists have addressed in different ways. Obviously, since traditional fictional narratives are read *disguised* as true accounts, told from a "world" where they are true,

the reader must face the dilemma of seeing the narrated events as both true and untrue simultaneously. The reader must assume a ***dual perspective*** in order to cope with the nature of narrative fiction. Not using this term, Rabinowitz phrases the problem thus: "...the aesthetic experience of such works exists on two levels at once. We cannot treat the work either as what it is or as what it appears to be; we must be aware simultaneously of both aspects."[14] That is, we cannot "check out" Ana Ozores in the real world, as if she were a historical human being. But neither can we dismiss her and her dilemma as mere fiction, refusing as a result to fear for her safety or to sympathize with her undeserved fate. In effect, because of the sense of "actuality" attached to fictional narratives--especially the more realistic ones--the reader must believe and not believe ***at the same time***.

Walton accepts the dual perspective as a fundamental feature of the appreciation of fiction, and is able to find a solution to the problem in terms of games of make-believe.

> [Appreciators] both participate in their games and observe them. They attend to the propositions that are fictional, and also to the fact that they are fictional and the means by which their fictionality is generated, noting which features of the props are responsible and, sometimes, what principles of generation are operative.[15]

Walton is able to assure us, then, that readers are not really deluded about the existence of fictional characters, no matter how involved they may become emotionally in their situations.[16] When readers become "fictional" they do not cease to ***be*** actual, so that their standpoint ***must*** be dual. They see characters both from ***inside*** the story world and from ***outside*** of it, simultaneously. In this way they can be frightened by, or have any kind of feelings about fictional characters, knowing full well at the same time that they never existed and are technically not worthy of such concern.[17]

Working independently on the same problem, Robert Newsom identifies some of the disconcerting features of "pretending" as a term applied to the reading activity.[18] Newsom works to develop an

explanation of what he calls the antinomy of literary probability--the logical oddity involved in ascribing probability to fiction, where there exist no actual facts to warrant probabilistic thinking.[19] The dual reading perspective about belief turns out to be responsible for the antinomy. Finding both speech-act theory and Walton's account inadequate, he insists on the doubleness of reading as a division within the reader himself, who conflates two worlds, even entertaining in the process contradictory opinions or views. The dual standpoint of make-believe permits contradictory things to be simultaneously true.[20]

This kind of reading on two different levels, or with two different perspectives, is dealt with most effectively (without psychological complications) by Rabinowitz, in terms of the two different "audiences" or reading roles discussed in Chapter Seven. Defining his third rule of signification as the "Rule of Realism," Rabinowitz introduces the "narrative audience" as distinct from the authorial audience, and as a way to break down the idea of "implied author" into a more workable concept.[21] Viewing the narrator as an "imitation" of an author in the sense that a novel imitates a non-fictional form such as history or biography, Rabinowitz concludes that the narrator writes for an imitation audience, which he calls the narrative audience. This audience possesses particular knowledge. Since the narrator may appear to be an historian, for example, he writes for an audience which knows the historical facts, but *also* believes that the purely fictional characters really existed and that the narrated events really took place. The successful reader does more than join the authorial audience, since at the same time he must (whether consciously or not) "...pretend to be a member of the imaginary narrative audience for which the narrator is writing."[22] Rabinowitz is anxious to distinguish his narrative audience from Gerald Prince's "narratee" as the person to whom the narrator addresses himself. "The narratee is perceived by the reader as 'out there,' a separate person who often serves as a mediator between narrator and reader. The 'narrative audience,' in contrast is a role which the text forces the reader to take on."[23]

Rabinowitz' distinction represents a most useful explanation of the pretense involved in Walton's view of participation in games of make-

believe, the "fictionalization" of readers, attention to fictional propositions, and the appreciation of characters from "inside" their world. Rabinowitz' insights about the narrative audience as truly a ***fiction*** accord perfectly with Walton's views of the curious dual perspective. Rabinowitz explains in terms of authorial intention:

> ...the author not only knows that the narrative audience is different from the actual and authorial audiences, but rejoices in this fact and expects his or her actual audience to rejoice as well. For it is this difference that makes fiction fiction, and makes the double-leveled aesthetic experience possible.[24]

The difference in fact makes fictional ***truth worlds*** possible, in terms of the reader's temporary "relocation." Remembering the discussions of authorial audience in Chapter Seven, and the relation of the concept to Currie's evaluation of the fictional author's belief, it is obvious that while the authorial audience reads in a "told as fiction" mode, the narrative audience reads the story "told as fact." This pretense role for the real reader thus allows for the ***recognition*** of truth worlds--Lewis' worlds where the story is told as true. Rabinowitz says that, "[o]ne way to determine the characteristics of the narrative audience is to ask, 'What sort of reader would I have to pretend to be--what would I have to know and believe--if I wanted to take this work of fiction as real?'"[25] This is exactly what is involved in recognizing a world where the story is told as true. All of the problems raised by Walton about the psychological interaction with fictional characters and the reader's routine desire to accept the "real" existence of fictional entities are thus illuminated by this reading role of narrative audience, as a temporary, pretended relocation.

While the concept of narrative audience as a fictional role played by readers is enormously useful, Rabinowitz' application of the concept of authorial audience is too limited to use effectively to develop the structure of textual reference worlds. For Rabinowitz, the authorial audience is hypothetical, relating closely (as shown in Chapter Seven) to mutual belief principle and authorial belief worlds. He insists that authors generally try to ***approximate*** the actual audience, keeping the

gap between authorial and actual audiences to a minimum.[26] The basic problem with his account is that, although he initially discusses the importance of the conventional knowledge shared by author and authorial audience--sets up, indeed, the authorial audience as knowing the same conventions as the author--in his assessment of the interplay between authorial and narrative audiences he stresses only the kinds of *world*-knowledge accessible to the authorial audience. This incorporation of "reality principle" ***within*** authorial audience provides one means of appreciating the importance of world-knowledge, without reflecting entirely accurately how such knowledge is activated. But more crucially here, the authorial audience must ***also*** be familiar with kinds of text-models. To read a story ***as fiction***, without considering the fictional world to be real, the authorial audience must know which literary conventions are relevant (and presupposed by the author in the first place.) In accordance with Walton's views of the dual perspective, the narrative audience attends to the fictional propositions as truth, while the authorial audience recognizes their fictionality and how it has been generated. As long as the concept is consistently ***expanded*** in this way to incorporate a fuller range of extra- and intertextual knowledge, it becomes possible to see how the role of authorial audience ***augments*** that of narrative audience in the construction of the reference world. These terms become useful tools for assessing the semiotic "communication" process of the fictional sphere.

The dual perspective is best accounted for in terms of potential structure for the textual reference world. Without reference to Newsom or Walton, Rabinowitz explains that his concept of pretence is close to Coleridge's "willing suspension of disbelief," except that disbelief is not merely suspended, but is "...both suspended and not suspended at the same time."[27] That is, as Walton insists, characters are seen both from "inside" and "outside" their world simultaneously. The fictional sphere provides exactly this kind of "intermediary domain" where the reader no longer need be thought of as ***either*** imaginatively caught up in the fictional world, ***or*** as viewing that world from a distanced position in reality. ***Both*** reading roles can be integrated within the operations of the fictional sphere.

In order for the reference world to be accurate, or ***read as true***, both reading roles ***must*** be operative. The more limited idea of worlds where the story is ***told*** as true is not sufficient precisely because the pretense involved in joining the narrative audience is only ***one component*** of the fictional sphere. Just as Walton's game of make-believe is only ***one part*** of the entire semiotic process, the pretense role as narrative audience is only one part of the solution to constructing relevant reference worlds. Reading operations involve not only this relocation by narrative audience, but also the timely application of the knowledge only accessible to the authorial audience. The building of fictional truth in the reference world is thus a ***joint operation*** involving ***both*** reading roles.

Dual Audience and Text Models

Genre turns out to be the governing factor as to how the two component roles will be co-ordinated within the operations of the fictional sphere, in order to produce accurate reference worlds. We can begin to show how the reading processes are organized by putting Rabinowitz' account to work, but with the provision that text-models assume the dominant function.

Rabinowitz uses his distinction between authorial and narrative audiences primarily to elaborate a "rule of realism," insisting that there is a close proximity between the two audiences in fiction commonly thought realistic.[28] Concentrating totally on mutual beliefs as to world-models, without concern for the text-models also integral to the authorial audience's knowledge, Rabinowitz says that in realistic texts "...the narrative audience is asked to accept very little beyond the beliefs of the authorial audience and virtually nothing that seriously contradicts those beliefs."[29] This is another way to look at the realistic default to world-models. That the narrative audience believes in the existence of Ana Ozores does ***not conflict*** with the world-knowledge of the authorial audience. As discussed at length in the first section above, realistic characters are highly "probable" in the sense

that according to world-knowledge they could easily exist and act as they do. Rabinowitz stresses precisely that the assumptions about reality are shared in realistic works between the authorial and narrative audiences, matching the author's assumptions. Because the writer depends on the reader to make inferences about characters and actions, in order for those inferences to be ***possible***, there must be "...at least some points at which the novel's inner world--the world of the narrative audience--is congruent with the world of the authorial audience."[30]

Treating realism as a "tendency"--something which remains constant through historical change--Rabinowitz appreciates all novels as at least to some extent realistic in his sense of reflecting the beliefs of their authorial audience.[31] This "tendency" depends on the potential default to world-models, but Rabinowitz' focus on "audience" clarifies the processes of reading involved in the default mechanism.

Rabinowitz' "rule of realism" dictates that the authorial audience is aware of the fictional status, while the narrative audience believes in the truth/reality of the story, and that "...in all other respects the narrative audience shares the beliefs, prejudices, desires, fears, and expectations of the authorial audience, except where there is some evidence to the contrary, either in the text or in literary conventions."[32] This means that there is a minimal departure on the part of the narrative audience from the world-knowledge of the authorial audience. As a reading role this then involves relatively simple tasks: "...we temporarily take on certain minimal beliefs in addition to those we already hold."[33] The "reality" of the fictional world can easily include characters which seem to really exist, and their actions, all supplemented by world-models.

But in less realistic works the selection of fictional truths becomes much more complex. Where the congruence between the knowledge of narrative and authorial audiences is reduced, or even minimal, a reference world more or less radically different from assumed world-models is the result. It is not that the underlying world-models disappear, but that, depending on the generic context, text-models

assume a more dominant role and negate the realistic default mechanism. In Rabinowitz' terms, assuming the role of narrative audience, the reader may have to "...pretend to abandon [his] real beliefs and accept in their stead 'facts' and beliefs that... fundamentally contradict [his] perceptions of reality."[34] All kinds of world-knowledge can be negated. The second part of Rabinowitz' "rule of realism" is that "...there is a more or less systematic way in which the areas of disagreement are mapped out."[35] In other words, the characteristics of the narrative audience which distinguish it from the authorial audience are marked in a systematic way which both author and reader understand.[36]

The crucial point here, which Rabinowitz does not explore, is that the "disagreements" depend on the degree to which world-models are supplemented or replaced by text-models. Obviously, to avoid ***invalid*** interpretations the reader ***must*** assume the role of a narrative audience which shares the authorial audience's recognition of genre-dependent ***alternative*** facts. The reader must pretend that such facts are accurate for the fictional world, regardless of deviation from world-models, and in accord with known text-models. Such "genre-shift," to apply Doreen Maitre's term, is essential, otherwise some very perverse interpretations may result.

Using the example of "Cinderella," Rabinowitz says that the narrative audience accepts the existence of fairy godmothers, while the authorial audience does not share this belief. Otherwise Cinderella will be seen as "...a psychotic young woman subject to hallucinations."[37] The limitation of the authorial audience's knowledge to that of world-models creates a fundamental problem for Rabinowitz' account here, which is surely not accurate for the authorial audience. Remembering Currie's analyses of the ambiguity of "The Turn of the Screw," which tolerates two possible text-models, we must realize that the authorial audience of "Cinderella" will replace the standard world-model with what is appropriate for the genre of fairy tale. Even restricting the authorial audience to an appreciation of the fictional author's beliefs will yield this result. The implied or fictional author certainly believes in fairy godmothers. But more importantly, as I have discussed in the

last section above, Rabinowitz fails to apply here the authorial audience's knowledge of text-models. The authorial audience must be thought of consistently as a convention-influenced reading role. In this case, the authorial audience knows how fairy-tale worlds are structured, and which conventions are relevant. While the narrative audience ignores the conventions, and accepts the truth blindly through a kind of pretense about the truth of the narrative, the authorial audience recognizes how such fictionality is generated.

This is the key to seeing how text-models dominate in the fictional sphere. It is not merely that fictional truths can be generated ***either*** through make-believe ***or*** through generic conventions/expectations, but that the various reading roles or operations take place ***at the same time***, supporting one another. For the Cinderella story, the reader must approach the text as authorial audience, placing it in a generic context which assigns particular values to various components of world-knowledge, allowing some to remain unchallenged, while others are ruled out as invalid. Reading the story ***as fiction***, the authorial audience must recognize the constraints of genre in effect. As a result, Cinderella is ***not*** psychotic. Such a reading role clearly assumes priority, in spite of Walton's elegant defence of make-believe as fundamental. Reading the story ***as fact***, the narrative audience relocates to the truth world, ***apparently*** oblivious of text-models, and intent on appreciating the heroine's situation, feeling sorry for her, becoming excited with her--relating to her problems more or less as if she were a real person. (Her "humanity" is by no means as complete as that of any realistic novel's heroine, but it will require complex analysis in Chapter Ten to clarify those kinds of distinctions.)

The text-models known by the authorial audience are no more problematic than world-models, in the sense that the narrative audience can share them and put them to use. Augmenting and replacing world-models, text-models can produce a different ***sort*** of congruence between the two audiences. The literary generic conventions are "invisible" to the narrative audience in the same way in which world-knowledge is. While the reader as narrative audience accepts unquestioningly the fictional truths, the authorial audience recognizes

the underlying conventions which are responsible for the generation of those truths. Just as in the case of world-models demonstrated by Rabinowitz, there is a minimal departure on the part of the narrative audience from the literary knowledge/expectations of the authorial audience. Reading a science fiction story, the reader will replace in ***both*** roles some world-models with text-models. The authorial audience will recognize the selected knowledge as conventional/learned and applicable within a particular generic ***context***. The narrative audience will treat that same knowledge as "real" or integral to the story-world experience, without considering its source or origin. In this way, Rabinowitz' distinctions are adapted to show how genre becomes dominant as organizing principle for the operations of the fictional sphere.

Accessibility via World-Models

One of the most interesting insights to result from the dual audience structure is that the beliefs of narrative audiences must "match" the ***type*** of narrative world; that is, in the role of narrative audience, the reader will be called upon to believe according to the ontological structure of the fictional world in question, regardless of how different it may be from the real world. This realization provides a ***reader-oriented*** way to discuss accessibility relations between reality and fictional worlds. Whereas such relations are routinely addressed in fictional-world semantics in terms of the distance or difference between various fictional worlds and reality, these relations can be considered as ***between reading roles***, in effect. The knowledge and expectations of the authorial audience become the fictional truths which the narrative audience ***appears*** to generate directly and automatically in accordance with story-world ontology. We can thus understand better the naturalizing process of reading by which global coherence for the story is achieved by deciphering the ***kind*** of world involved. As long as the authorial audience is presumed to know text-models in addition to world-models, the account demonstrates how story-world ontology is bound to considerations of genre.

Without rehearsing, but bearing in mind, the developed typologies identified in Chapter Two, we need to look at world macrostructures and relations to reality in terms of how the reader *activates* and incorporates the relevant information which becomes fictional truth. Maitre's analysis of relations possible between reality and fictional worlds, and her classification of genres according to how fictional worlds can be corroborated in the real world are most fundamental, especially since she *is* concerned with reader response and the role of imagination. She does insist that plausibility and intelligibility for a fictional state of affairs depend on the genre in question, as do the coherence criteria relevant to a fictional world.[38] She suggests that the nature of the reader's "reference" to the actual world depends on the genre in question, which determines the type of possible non-actual world possible.[39] She also discusses "genre-shift" as a reading procedure which allows the reader to replace

> ...coherence and plausibility expectations appropriate to one type of world by those of another type... That is, he shifts from what he can expect in terms of coherence and plausibility of one genre (positing one type of [possible non-actual world]) to a different set of expectations applicable to another genre...[40]

Obviously, expectations for what should "happen" in a fictional world depend fundamentally on genre. The reader is not surprised by the most bizarre events in fairy tales, where they are in fact *ordinary* because of generic context. He would be surprised if a *violation* occurred which flouted text-models. In other words, there is an unbreakable link between what the narrative audience accepts "automatically" as ontologically correct and what the authorial audience knows about the relevant genre. The value of typologies of relations among worlds is thus indisputable, since they demonstrate that a particular textual reference world will automatically include particular kinds of knowledge and expectations which are valid for the whole *set* of similar worlds governed by the same text-models.

Whether we see genre as determined *by* the reader's reaction, or more in terms of properties of texts which *induce* particular

responses, it is most useful to appreciate the reader's role in "defining" genre and corresponding story-world ontology. Tzvetan Todorov's convincing approach to the fantastic is based on the fundamental distinctions which readers apply to texts, so that the fantastic can be defined as a genre based on particular operations of reading.[41] The crucial points to recognize, however, are that the response of the narrative audience is determined by what is found in the text about the fictional world, but also that the interpretive direction of that audience's response depends on the knowledge of the ***authorial*** audience about genre. Otherwise the elements of the fictional world could not have the significance that they do. (Make-believe about fictional worlds is not the independent activity which Walton suggests.) Remembering again Currie's analysis of "The Turn of the Screw," there can be no doubt that different interpretations depend on what genre is taken as context, and visa versa. The story will turn out to be either a ghost story, a psychological (realistic) story, or a fantastic story which refuses to render a decisive verdict as to the world's ontological structure. As discussed in Chapter Seven, there are only so many ways in which the identifiable features of a fictional world can be addressed. By invoking reality principle it is possible to provide a naturalistic explanation, whereas a supernatural explanation is equally possible through imagining an alternative belief system where ghosts are tolerated. In either case, or in the refusal to choose between the explanations, the narrative audience is guided ***not directly*** by story-world presentation, but rather by the knowledge of the authorial audience. That knowledge determines how the textual details will be identified and arranged in the reference world constructed by the real reader who assumes both reading roles.

When Culler thinks about these kinds of reading operations, he does not have the methodology of fictional-world semantics available, yet he immediately proposes a model which depends on a fundamental appreciation of accessibility relations among worlds, or through world-models.[42] To discuss all kinds of "fantasy" literature, he makes, in effect, the same kind of fundamental distinctions made later by Maitre in her typologies, identifying differences in reading strategies involved in fantasy fiction. Wanting to ***relate*** fantasy worlds to reality, he

adopts Jakobson's use of metaphor and metonymy. "[A] metaphorical world is separate but analogous, a member of a paradigm of conceivable worlds, while a metonymical world is contiguous with or part of our own, unexplored but governed by the same laws."[43] While this model is too simplistic to account accurately for accessibility relations, it is remarkable in its intuitive appreciation of variable "distance" or freedom from real-world constraints and the related reading strategies. Fantasy worlds are read "literally" as descriptions of metaphorical worlds. The reader accepts, then, ontological differences as fact, judging the fantasy world by its own standard, preserving the distance between that world and reality.[44] In fantasy worlds the reader accepts the strange and unnatural as "...another nature, whose laws may be set forth in a coherence of detail to rival a Balzacian universe."[45] In effect, Culler recognizes the special, artificial logic of fictional worlds which create their own macrosemantic constraints and standards for assessing verisimilitude. Propositions become literally true in metaphorical worlds. For realistic fiction, Culler insists that "reference" is made to the reader's own world, rather than to another.[46] While this explanation is much too simplistic, he is obviously on the right track.

What is useful in Culler's pre-theoretical appreciation of accessibility relations is not the rudimentary taxonomy of worlds/genres, but rather the potential for a description of ***interpretive procedures*** as ***dependent on*** kinds of fictional worlds and their relevant generic contexts. The links between world typology, conventional reading processes, and resultant interpretations are crucial. It is not sufficient to show how world-models are manifested differently in different genres, as Marie-Laure Ryan does in showing different possible ***combinations*** as accessibility relations between worlds.[47] We must turn her model around to see how reading operations proceed ***through*** genre to a ***selection*** of appropriate world-models; that is, how the reading role of the narrative audience is governed by what the authorial audience knows about world- and text-models. What is "valid" in interpretation will naturally depend on ***this*** kind of accessibility.

When we ask how possible worlds can be defined, or what their mode of existence is, it seems necessary to involve in the discussion the difference between the real world and those worlds which are merely possible. In other words, we want to know about ***relations*** between worlds in terms of ***accessibility***. Ryan's semantic typology of accessibility relations hinges on Kripke's equation of possibility with accessibility. But while philosophers conceive of the accessibility relation as ***logical***, as discussed in Chapter Three, it is necessary to avoid the dilemma of ***impossible*** possible worlds of fiction by accepting additional accessibility relations beyond logic. This is what Ryan does in developing her remarkable semantic typology of accessibility relations, some of which are even more constrained than logical laws, while others depend on a less restrictive relationship. She uses various kinds of world-knowledge to set up the typology, considering to what extent the various kinds of knowledge are invoked for a particular genre. If logical compatibility were the only relation, it would not be possible to distinguish between historical novels and other genres which also obey the law of non-contradiction, such as science fiction or fairy tales.[48] Obviously historical novels have much more in common with reality than analytically universal knowledge, introducing also a whole range of empirically universal and culturally specific knowledge, as outlined in Chapter Eight. It is the hierarchies among the various kinds of knowledge which interest Ryan and which must determine also the basic structure of a matrix for fictional truth generation ***by readers***.

The typology allows us to see how the degrees of resemblance between the fictional world and real world-models must be appreciated as ***filtered through*** generic expectations. The narrative audience encountering a fictional world can only recognize truth claims as valid by consulting the knowledge of the authorial audience. If we consider only the question of how world-knowledge is applied, we can identify various kinds of specific signals which produce an "overlap" between narrative and authorial audiences. Rabinowitz suggests that generally "...the more potentially verifiable (by the authorial audience) the narrative audience's facts seem to be, the greater the overlap we should assume."[49] In other words, if there are realistic details in the

beginning of the story, a close relationship will be established between world-models known to the authorial audience, and the fictional-world structure which the narrative audience takes as "actual." This accessibility relation ***between audiences*** is the key issue in assessing interpretive procedures. Any fantastic elements which might subsequently turn up in this realistic fictional world would be assessed by both narrative and authorial audience as radically incongruous.[50] The extreme case would be realistically presented worlds which include immediately historically true details, locations, persons, dates--the kinds of "actual" facts discussed in Chapter Eight. The fictional world inventory will include in such cases a whole range of real-world elements, whether or not explicitly mentioned.

Rabinowitz points out that if, on the other hand, a story is set in nonspecific or nonexistent times and places, such as with fairy-tale openings of "once upon a time," or "long, long ago in a distant kingdom," the reader is "...justified, other things being equal, in assuming a high degree of nonrealism."[51] In this case, if we consider the authorial audience's knowledge as limited to world-knowledge as Rabinowitz does, there are "...no real links between the worlds of the authorial and narrative audiences..."[52] This kind of story operator signals in fact that the facts of the story-world may well *not* resemble reality, and that the narrative audience need not look to the authorial audience's knowledge of the real world for verification. As Ryan suggests of such conventional openings, the telling seems to emanate from a story-internal location, as if both speaker and hearer are located within the fictional world.[53] The narrative audience is not prompted to consult the world-knowledge of the authorial audience. Knowledge of the appropriate *text-models* assumes priority and will govern the generation of fictional truths in the reference world.

The key is then to determine what "constraints" there are on possibility *for* particular genres. We must ask what can be easily accepted as fictional truth by the narrative audience, given the knowledge of genres available to the authorial audience. Principles become available to the narrative audience which govern how implications can be assessed and assigned truth values. Ryan's

semantic classification of accessibility relations not only provides the framework for a theory of genre, as she suggests, but also suggests strategies for developing the concept of accessibility between reading roles/audiences.

Ryan's typology takes into account various kinds of world-knowledge, but in contrast to my outline in Chapter Eight, her categories descend in an ever more ***restricted*** relation to world-models, so that analytically universal knowledge finds its place near the very bottom. Worlds are accessible to one another if the relation in question holds. Ryan starts at the top with the most ***stringent*** accessibility relation as an ***identity of properties*** between the fictional and actual worlds. The fictional world is accessible from the actual world if objects common to both have the ***same*** properties.[54] Second is an ***identity of inventory***; that is, worlds are accessible when "furnished" by the same objects. These first two categories between themselves entail all of the relations to follow. Third is ***compatibility of inventory***, which means that the fictional world is accessible from the actual if its inventory "...includes all the members of [the actual world], as well as some native members."[55] Obviously this relation involves the principle of minimal departure, since one particular real-world fact (such as a location or person) will entail all sorts of other similar items which exist in the real world and which must then be transferred to the fictional world. No real-world entities can be excluded from the fictional world (without textual stipulation) without postulating a gratuitous departure from the real world. Fourth is ***chronological compatibility*** which means that the fictional world is accessible from the actual world "...if it takes no temporal relocation for a member of [the actual world] to contemplate the entire history of [the textual actual world.]"[56] The fictional world cannot be older than the actual world, for this relation to hold; that is, "...its present is not posterior in absolute time to [the actual world's] present."[57] Fifth is ***physical compatibility*** as a sharing between worlds of natural laws. Sixth is ***taxonomic compatibility*** which means that both worlds include the same species, which are characterized by the same properties. This might involve both natural species and manufactured objects. Seventh is ***logical compatibility***, as when both worlds respect the principles

of noncontradiction and of excluded middle. Eighth is ***analytical compatibility***, Ryan's example being that objects designated by the same words would have the same essential properties--bachelors would still be unmarried males. Ninth is ***linguistic compatibility***, so that the language describing the fictional world is understood in the actual world.

Reviewing her typology, Ryan found the need to introduce four additional accessibility relations, which relate closely to the categories of world-knowledge outlined in Chapter Eight.[58] The first is ***historical coherence***, which means that the fictional world is accessible from the actual if it ***not only*** includes the actual world's population, but also contains no anachronisms with respect to the actual world. Standard historical narratives and what Ryan calls "historical fabulation" (alternate histories) can thus be distinguished from more radical works which allow characters, objects, and "preoccupations" from different periods to meet in a story-world. Second is ***psychological credibility***, by which the fictional world is accessible from the actual if the reader believes that the mental properties of the characters could be those of real-world people. Discussed at length in Chapter Eight as a kind of empirically universal knowledge, human psychology allows the reader to look upon characters as complete human beings to whom she can "relate," as is typically the case with highly realistic novels. Third is ***socio-economic compatibility*** as a sharing in both worlds of economic laws and social structure. This relation, which belongs to the category of culturally specific knowledge already discussed, introduces the possibility of distinguishing the worlds of broadly realistic works from pastoral romance (or, to introduce a different example, from a genre such as medieval romance where the social structure is seen through the eyes of an aristocracy). Fourth is ***categorial compatibility*** which involves the respect for distinctions between basic logical categories. Here Ryan wants to explain the semantic difference between fictional worlds which include allegorical characters such as Death and Beauty and those which do not. "Insofar as an allegory is the incarnation of an abstract idea, it transgresses the categorial distinction between particulars and universals."[59]

Obviously this extended typology of accessibility relations ***between worlds*** has much in common with the kinds of world-knowledge (explored in Chapter Eight) which ***readers*** bring to texts, or which we can consider as knowledge accessible to the authorial audience. Whether the narrative audience will eventually incorporate such knowledge into the reference world depends on the structure of the fictional world presented, and its generic context. In Chapter Ten I look at Ryan's application of her typology to genres, but in terms of the relation between the two audiences as one of "accessibility" which depends on the available text-models. Because the accessibility relations all involve world-knowledge bases, it is desirable to investigate from the reader's perspective how such constraints are activated according to various generic contexts, with the result that particular fictional truths are generated. Before developing this discussion in terms of particular ***kinds*** of deviations from world-models, it is profitable to examine the role of genre in relation to minimal departure. The present chapter is then completed with a generalized discussion of expectations for genre. But we must ***keep in mind*** from now on the structure of Ryan's typology, which enhances the appreciation of world-models as a fundamental constraint from which genres depart in various ways.

Genre and Minimal Departure

Genre is necessarily related to the semantic structure/ontology of fictional worlds, in the sense that all kinds of material inferences vary from work to work, depending on generic context. In order to determine which inferences are valid, the reader must determine the genre to which the work belongs. How world-models are applied differently in different genres is the issue, that is, how ***much*** knowledge becomes relevant in the constructed reference world. If the operations of the fictional sphere produce a reference world for a fiction, then the configuration of truth developed must vary according to the priorities imposed by genres. As we have seen, the realistic text will insist on a truth world which systematically integrates world-knowledge. But the

radically marvelous work will involve less world-knowledge (as we can see immediately from Ryan's typology), and more dominantly, factors generated through the knowledge of genre. The context of world-knowledge is replaced in part by expectations for genre. The fundamental (counterfactual-inspired) concept of "truth worlds" as those closest tc reality in no way accommodates the powerful influence of genre. It must be possible to see how specific text-models can supersede world-models, creating in effect another kind of "world" beyond the actual, where "reference" takes place--a kind of "generic landscape" as we will see ahead.

The principle of minimal departure *seems* to impose world-models as the only *standard* from which fictional worlds can deviate. Ryan's typology is certainly based on the perspective of real-world structure. Becausc the reader's knowledge of reality is inevitably involved in the notion of minimal departure, text-models seem to be relegated to a relatively insignificant role. The default to world-models typical of realistic texts certainly reinforces this impression.

But we must be able to see how the "horizon of expectations" created through genre not only influences the generation of fictional truth, but, as Ryan suggests of "intertextuality" in general, "...replaces [the actual world] with the written word as frame of reference of the reading process."[60] Ryan argues that the two principles of minimal departure and "intertextuality" are not incompatible but rather *complementary*, the functioning of each depending on the functioning of the other.[61] Put into my terms, Ryan would agree that like world-models, text-models also demonstrate how fictional worlds are not created *ex nihilo*, and that fictional truth does not result from a self-enclosed system.[62]

Realizing perhaps that her approach through the relations of actual world and textual actual world does not *encourage* an *intertextual* view of the relations between fictional texts and all *other* kinds of texts, including those of reality, Ryan suggests that "[t]he dependency of minimal departure on texts takes two forms, one general and one particular."[63] She presents an argument for how we can see "reality"

as represented or interpreted in various forms of ***discourse***. This important aspect of a fundamental sense of intertextuality I relegate to Chapter Eleven, which addresses the question of intertextual repertoire.

Much more to the point now is Ryan's appreciation of "generic landscapes" as a source of fictional truth ***complementary*** to minimal departure. Using Ryan's excellent examples, it is possible to demonstrate how generic landscapes and minimal departure both contribute to the reader's construction of a reference world. We need the principle of minimal departure in order to talk sensibly about truth in fiction, and to pretend ***usefully*** that fictional characters ***are*** ontologically complete. But we also need a notion such as "generic landscape" to be able to determine what ***salience*** or significance any particular element must be given in a specific reference world--whether in fact that element will be allowed entry.

We start, then, by accepting that a fictional world is not inhabited by the individuals/objects found in the actual world, but by "...the creatures characteristic of what may be called a 'generic landscape.'"[64] In the case of a realistic novel, these would be similar to actual-world individuals. But in a fairy tale the reader expects not only some individuals similar to those encountered in the actual world, but also ***changes*** in those individuals in terms of attributes and behaviour, plus extra individuals entirely supernumerary to the actual world's inventory. Ryan describes the fairy tale situation succinctly:

> ...we know right away that we may find dragons and flying horses, foxes and frogs, but no catfish, mosquitoes or sparrows. People will not suffer from diseases... We expect some animals to be able to talk... we regard as a law in effect the possibility of metamorphosis. [W]e expect some suspension of the real world laws of human psychology: the princess and the hero... are free from the urges of sexuality. Marital infidelity is as incongruous in the world of fairy tales as it is *de rigueur* in the world of the soap opera.[65]

In addition to a different world-inventory, then, we find that all kinds of empirically universal and culturally specific knowledge is "violated," including physical and psychological laws and social rules/standard

practices. World-models will ***not*** suffice in order to comprehend this kind of world. The accessibility relations of natural laws, taxonomic compatibility, and compatibility of inventory are broken. Often the opening line indicates the violation of this last relation, confirming immediately the non-realistic status of the fictional world.

But not all appreciation of the generic landscape is rendered so effortless. Ryan says that "[g]eneric landscapes solidify through a process of filtration: we gather their elements from the themes and objects characteristic of a certain corpus."[66] This "process of filtration" is what I define in semiotic terms as reading/interpretive operations which involve the more or less competent implementation of knowledge about conventions. Only the reader's knowledge of text-models will allow him to ***expect*** metamorphosis in fairy tales. In Culler's familiar terms, the reader places the action in a different kind of world, "...providing a context which makes the text intelligible by making it *vraisemblable*."[67] It remains, of course, to determine what factors are involved in the selection process which co-ordinates elements dependent on minimal departure with those dependent on a particular generic landscape. Chapter Ten addresses these problems. In the meantime we need to see how there is a kind of "minimal departure" expected ***for*** particular genres, which is definable through the idea of *vraisemblance* for particular genres.

Expectations for Genre

In addition to naturalizing fictional texts in terms of an author's imagined world which the reader intuitively accepts as ***possibly*** very different from reality, considerations of genre are fundamental to the process of making sense of fiction. Within his third level of *vraisemblance* Culler identifies the models of a genre, which involve "...a specifically literary intelligibility: a set of literary norms to which texts may be related and by virtue of which they become meaningful and coherent."[68] Aristotle would have been the first to agree that "...each genre constitutes a special *vraisemblance* of its own."[69] Although

Culler has in fact little to say about genre, he does insist usefully that genre conventions "...establish a contract between writer and reader so as to make certain relevant *expectations* operative..."[70] In this way genre becomes a text-model for intelligibility, since narrative statements will be "taken differently" depending on what the generic context provokes. Fictional truth generation depends on the kind of pattern provided by the text-model. Considering genres as Culler does, not as taxonomic classes which embody observable similarities, but as groups of expectations which allow the reader to make elements intelligible and to categorize them, we can examine better how fictional truths depend on text-models. In effect, genre theory contributes to a theory of interpretation, as Gary Morson suggests:

> Texts are... classified according to what I shall call their 'semiotic nature,' which is to say, the conventions acknowledged to be appropriate for interpreting them. ...[I]n this system interpretive conventions rather than formal features determine a work's genre, genre is not manifest in the work itself.[71]

In effect, text-models show how fictional truths *function* in relation to expectations about genre which are inevitably brought to texts. Interpretation and genre are inseparable.

Traditionally we have perhaps thought of genre as a mode of writing which an author adopts, in the sense that the composition of the fictional text takes place within a set of (institutional) conventions. But the context of *reading* is more interesting and more open to exploration. There are quite simply *different ways* in which texts must be read--as Culler suggests, "...different contracts which the institution of literature makes available."[72] Certainly historical periods play an important role, but also differences among genres for any period. The context of reading fiction is a "...frame of reference [which] sets up from the start a certain kind of communication with the reader, based on genre rules and conventions of reading."[73]

If genre provides a definite boundary for reading, in that relevant expectations "condition and circumscribe" reading,[74] this is so because

readers habitually categorize texts (whether fictional or not) into types or kinds. This deliberate ***choice*** establishes the frame of reference and shapes the reading through expectations raised. What we find when reading (or the reference world we succeed in constructing) depends heavily on what we are looking for and how we conduct our "search." Patterns which do not fit the structure of the search are very difficult to perceive. To read a text ***as*** a particular genre is to assign it "...a framework which allows order and complexity to appear."[75] Even ***calling*** something a novel (or a romance) dictates a certain "program" for reading, invoking conventions, and establishing parameters through automatically generated expectations. As Martin points out, many readers enjoy readily identifiable literary kinds such as the detective story or romance, resenting any deviation from the ***expected*** conventions.[76] The comfortable "read" depends on ***known*** genre expectations.

In a sense all three factors of extra- and intertextual knowledge which this study addresses have some claim to a dominant status. Intertextuality is technically fundamental as a relation between texts of ***all*** sorts, including those of the social and historical real-world context. Reality is really only "known" as represented in texts. But this approach would be much too simple and could not account accurately for reading procedures. We have seen also how world-models are fundamentally inescapable, represented in a reality principle with tremendous explanatory power. But text-models constitute the real ***controlling*** mechanism, determining the extent to which world-models are applicable. We must now determine how the selection process works through text-models.

This task can be accomplished in part by demonstrating how various macrostructures of fictional worlds relate to text-models and their attendant expectations. Adapting insights about world typologies, accessibility relations, and generic landscapes, we can emphasize the reader's construction of reference worlds according to available models. Rather than defining the properties ***of*** worlds, as if explicable outside of a reading context, we can explore the reading procedures which integrate and co-ordinate available truths within the reference world.

Notes

[1]All reference will be to Leopoldo Alas, *La Regenta* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1969).

[2]Great philosophical idealism is of course often defended as providing access to truths ***beyond*** the commonplace.

[3]Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 42-3.

[4]Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenin* (London: Penguin Books, 1978) 13.

[5]See Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice* (London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1963) 1. ("It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.")

[6]Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 57.

[7]Roland Barthes, "L'effet de réel," *Communications* 11 (1968): 84-9.

[8]Barthes 87, as discussed in Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 159.

[9]Culler 262.

[10]J.P. Stern, *On Realism* (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) 113-28.

[11]I have indicated above how social environment is both causal and symbolic of inner motivation.

[12]Culler 189.

[13]Culler 230.

[14]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 94.

[15]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 49-50.

[16]See Walton, Chapter Seven, "Psychological Participation," 240-89, summarized ***briefly*** here.

[17]Gregory Currie develops an account of "quasi-emotions" which largely parallels that of Walton, although he takes make-believe more as an ***attitude*** than as an operator. See Chapter Five, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 182-216.

[18]Robert Newsom, *A Likely Story. Probability and Play in Fiction* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1988) 107-43.

[19]Newsom 8-9.

[20]Newsom 139 and 144.

[21]Rabinowitz 95. I summarize Rabinowitz' argument here.

[22]Rabinowitz 95.

[23]Rabinowitz 95.

[24]Rabinowitz 98-9.

[25]Rabinowitz 96.

[26]Rabinowitz 98.

[27]Rabinowitz 95.

[28]Rabinowitz 99.

[29]Rabinowitz 99.

[30]Rabinowitz 101.

[31]Rabinowitz 100.

[32]Rabinowitz 100.

[33]Rabinowitz 96.

[34]Rabinowitz 96. Rabinowitz uses the example of *Frankenstein* where "...the narrative audience accepts what the authorial audience knows to be false scientific doctrine" (96).

[35]Rabinowitz 100.

[36]Rabinowitz 101-2.

[37]Rabinowitz 96.

[38]Doreen Maitre, *Literature and Possible Worlds* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983) 14, 29, and 37.

[39]Maitre 36.

[40]Maitre 80-1.

[41]Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fantastic. A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973).

[42]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 59-62.

[43]Culler, *Signs* 60.

[44]Culler, *Signs* 60.

[45]Culler, *Signs* 61.

[46]Culler, *Signs* 60.

[47]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 31-47.

[48]Ryan 32.

[49]Rabinowitz 102.

[50]An interesting variation on this structure is that of Kafka's *Metamorphosis*, where a radically marvelous fact is introduced in the first sentence, only to be followed by the development of an otherwise entirely normal and realistic world. *Metamorphosis* is discussed further in Chapter Ten.

[51]Rabinowitz 102.

[52]Rabinowitz 102.

[53]Ryan 22.

[54]I provide here a brief summary of Ryan's typology (32-3), which I use in Chapter Ten to inform a more pragmatic reader-oriented account. In Ryan's examples (to be explored in Chapter Ten) she assesses the *whole* range of relations for each genre analyzed, computing the various combinations possible.

[55]Ryan 32.

[56]Ryan 32.

[57]Ryan 32.

[58]I summarize briefly Ryan's additions to the catalogue (45-6).

[59]Ryan 46. This possibly explains the more pleasing effect of allegories such as the *Divine Comedy*, where a character like Virgil is given a determinate, particular identity.

[60]Ryan 54.

[61]Ryan 54.

[62]On page 55 Ryan says something similar.

[63]Ryan 54.

[64]Ryan 55.

[65]Ryan 55.

[66]Ryan 55.

[67]Culler, *Structuralist* 141.

[68]Culler, *Structuralist* 145.

[69]Culler, *Structuralist* 147.

[70]Culler, *Structuralist* 147, my emphasis.

[71]Gary Saul Morson, *The Boundaries of Genre. Dostoevsky's* Diary of a Writer *and the Traditions of Literary Utopia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) viii.

[72]Culler, *Structuralist* 135.

[73]Inge Crosman Wimmers, *Poetics of Reading. Approaches to the Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 13.

[74]Wimmers xiv.

[75]Culler, *Structuralist* 136.

[76]Martin 58.

Chapter Ten: Selection through Text-Models

The most insidious problem in recognizing world-models as informing fictional truth generation is that such models imply a naturalistic bias for interpretation. When fictional worlds are seen to attract by some kind of fundamental "gravity" the facts and structure of reality, there is clearly a danger that such worlds can be somehow *reduced* to the *constraints* of ordinary reality. How are the radically "impossible" worlds of much fiction to be usefully jammed into such small moulds? Imaginative processes assuredly exceed such arbitrary boundaries. It is crucial, then, to determine how fictional worlds are "controlled" by a reality principle, but are also capable, with the reader's co-operation, of *challenging* the control mechanisms. Reality principle can be subverted (or at least frustrated) in accordance with available text-models--an extra layer of conventions beyond those of standard models of reality. While realistic texts, satires, philosophical novels, and all those with "encyclopedic" tendencies necessitate the dominance of world-models, others will be much less "permeable" (in Thomas Pavel's terms) to extratextual information. Many fictional worlds concentrate much more exclusively on their own logic, pushing the empirical world away.[1] The concept of a reference world as the world where a story is *read* as true facilitates analysis of the kinds of *differences* from world-models possible. The deviations from world-models, or actuality variations, depend not only on the authentication procedures of the fictional text itself, but also on text-models as the dominant "authority" for fictional truth.

This chapter is designed around the idea that what we can and must *do* with available world-models depends on genre, and explores how genre functions as a conventional intertextual control for reference worlds, providing the most fundamental principles for fictional truth generation in the form of text-models. Accessibility relations are considered from the reader's perspective, relating taxonomic categories closely to interpretive possibilities for truth in the reference world. Other factors in the guided implementation of world-models are

considered, developing an analysis of *how* reading operations proceed through text-models to a selection of appropriate world-models. The genres of the fantastic and magical realism are assessed briefly as requiring acknowledgment of belief systems as world-models. Some of the consequences of the dominance of text-models are outlined in conclusion, suggesting particular complications possible in the reading process which constructs reference worlds.

Genre as Conventional Intertextual Control

Presuming that fictional truth is not generated only in accordance with world-models, as if fictional worlds automatically "represented" the actual world, we must examine to what extent those models can be supplanted by text-models of a more dominant nature. Obviously some fictional worlds insist on a greater freedom from the "text" of the real. But it is not sufficient to examine only fictional world-structures in order to appreciate how various genres establish their standing in relation to reality, and what the ramifications may be in terms of typical fictional world ontology. Because fictional works stand within what Félix Martínez-Bonati calls a "traditional system of fictional reality,"[2] we need, instead, to emphasize the reading process, appreciating the constitutive force of conventions of genre as bound together with the most basic reading/interpretive strategies. Relying always on Jonathan Culler's fundamental explorations, it becomes clear that the competent reader will shift appropriately from reality principle to generic expectations, as specific fictional worlds require. The reading process depends on genre; that is, we cannot fault the characters of medieval romance for an incongruity which violates the doctrines of realistic novels. The reader must think instead of such incongruity as acceptable within the context of the genre, as did the original readers/auditors.

The important process of building coherence for fictional worlds (as introduced in Chapter Six) can only be understood in terms of how the reader names and assembles the often apparently disparate elements of

those worlds. Text-models allow the reader to develop a reference world which reflects accurately the ***whole*** truth structure applicable. By placing the fictional narrative within a particular generic category, the reader attaches a name and significance to the work which cannot but influence how he will generate fictional truths. Such "classification" of texts becomes possible because the reader of literary fiction knows/assumes that such an activity is encouraged by the text. Speaking of coherence as a reading strategy, Peter Rabinowitz says that "...the process of naming serves to take the complex or unfamiliar and make it manageable by putting it into a category, increasing its apparent coherence by stressing some features and downplaying others."[3] As a general comprehension strategy applied to the problem of reading literary narrative fiction, the procedure works very well. The reader assigns a generic context, within which various textual features are easily seen as related to a known text-model. Where many important features are accommodated within the recognized text-model, the reader happily creates a coherent reference world, regardless of how deviant from world-models that world may be.

Considering factors of narration and conditions for the existence, individuality, distinctness, and simultaneous unity of traits for fictional characters, Uri Margolin evaluates the reading operations involved, distinguishing eventually two types of textual sources for property attribution: the explicit or direct source of narration, and the indirect or implicit sources.[4] Some of the indirect sources clearly relate to world-models in the sense that the reader attributes properties to fictional characters on the basis of verbal, physical, and mental actions, much as she would for individuals encountered in real life. As we have seen, factors of world-knowledge are not easily ignored. But Margolin identifies also several indirect sources which are valid only because of semiotic/artistic conventions. Specifically these are spatial attributes of physical and man-made ambience, formal relations like analogy, parallelism, and contrast in relation to world-mates, and intratextual patterns such as repetition, gradation, parallel plots, and embedded stories.[5] For this the reader needs the knowledge of literature on which Culler insists, and which Rabinowitz formulates as sets of reading "rules." From the question of indirect individuation

Margolin develops necessary substantive rules of inference for character individuation, stressing the dependence of inference on recognition of the laws of the projected world, which he suggests are mostly ***different*** from those of the real world.[6]

> If the underlying regularities of a textual world seem to be highly specific to this text or to the oeuvre of its author ...so will its rules of inference. Significant typological similarity to works by other authors would motivate an intertextual transfer of rules of inference from them to the work under study.[7]

In other words, necessary inference may not conform to that called into play by the world-models accessible to the reader. "Rules of inference, especially of the mentalistic or psychological kind, can be borrowed from any actual-world model of readers only if the text world coincides with it in its broader outline or is at least compatible with it."[8] While Margolin does not stress here the dominance of genre, his emphasis on textual world-structures implies the fundamental importance of the text-models which in fact circumscribe all fictional-world macrostructures.

A prime illustration of the need to recognize genre as dominant model and to select world-models ***accordingly***, is Don Quixote's discussion with the innkeeper about whether knights errant carry money or not.[9] Confronted with the implication that he should ***pay*** for his lodgings, Don Quixote responds that he has never read in his romances that a knight errant must carry money. Martínez-Bonati summarizes the predicament thus:

> The author will not write it, explains the innkeeper, because it is taken for granted that they do. Don Quixote accepts this argument (and promises to take money with him in the future), but we may doubt it. Do knights errant carry money to pay for services such as lodging? It belongs to the style of the genre that this question is undecidable. If we say that they do not carry money, we incur a precision that cuts off the deliberately nebulous, and shortens and unduly clarifies that world. If we say that they carry money, we add a detail (an 'effet du reel') that goes against the style of swift,

> powerful and marvelous action. Certain imprecisions are essential to this world--not just to the manner of its presentation or to its actualized aspects.[10]

By insisting on the potential ***ontological*** imprecisions of fictional worlds, as opposed to purely epistemic deficiencies, Martínez-Bonati can explain in straightforward terms why the unrestricted application of world-models will not be acceptable in many narrative genres.

But we need to see that Don Quixote's own view of the matter is perhaps a bit more complex, suggesting more complicated reading/inference procedures. Ryan points out that Don Quixote, as a "textual fundamentalist," reconstructs incrementally the textual universe of chivalric romances. "Starting from a blank system of reality, he populates it with facts and objects, as ...introduced by the text."[11] The innkeeper, however, "[a]s an adherent to the principle of minimal departure, ...proceeds both substitutionally and incrementally, starting from a preconceived image of a full universe, and amending it or adding to its population according to textual directions."[12] In other words, the innkeeper produces a textual reference world ***larger*** than the fictional worlds on which Don Quixote depends for intertextual information or a repertoire of facts. But the crucial point is that the innkeeper does not build an ***accurate*** reference world, since, unlike Don Quixote who actually relies on text-models through his focus on various specific fictional worlds, the innkeeper is not knowledgeable about the genre, and applies indiscriminately his world-knowledge. He applies world-models by a default mechanism, without the ***guiding structure*** of text-models. If the imagined world is made more "complete" through this process, it is nonetheless not correct.

Whether the imagined world is violated in terms of the imposition of a more complete ***ontology*** (as Martínez-Bonati suggests) is not so clear. Ryan also insists on the undecidability of certain questions because of the ***ontological*** incompleteness seen from Don Quixote's point of view. "When [knights errant] are not busy rescuing damsels or defeating enemies, [they] live in a vacuum in which they neither sleep nor eat nor find use for money."[13] Don Quixote himself does ***not*** live in such a vacuum, and it is debatable to what extent he concerns himself

with such an ontological incompleteness. He *does* recognize the withdrawal of *information* typical of the genre. While the innkeeper only sees an *epistemic* deficiency in terms of withdrawn information, and applies the principle of minimal departure to fill in the gaps of unspecified facts, Don Quixote would seem to *extend* the appreciation of epistemic deficiency in a most significant way. Unlike the innkeeper, who fails to recognize text-models, Don Quixote realizes that such facts based on world-knowledge are not *relevant* to the genre, and hence "disappear" or are not activated in the reading process. Whether they belong "ontologically" in an imagined world based on such text-models is a secondary issue. What is important is the *epistemic* building of the reference world through reading procedures which ultimately allow for the imagination of ontological (in)completeness. What we cannot build epistemically, we cannot imagine "ontologically." Don Quixote in fact constructs the more accurate reference world--more *restricted* than that of the innkeeper, but more faithful to the constraints of genre.

If further rationale is needed for the acceptance of genre as dominant model/conventional intertextual control, we need only look briefly at Kendall Walton's counterexamples to reality- and mutual belief principles. Walton identifies seven specific cases in which inference (or the implication of fictional truths by others) is not sanctioned by either principle.[14] He recognizes that reality principle and mutual belief principle "...leave huge portions of accepted critical practice unaccounted for," not constituting as a result a systematic or comprehensive account of the "mechanics of implication."[15] The interesting examples which Walton cites demonstrate in various ways how the two principles fail to accommodate the implications which do in fact become fictional truths.

Throughout his discussion Walton struggles with factors of both intertextual repertoire and text-models, but without openly acknowledging the importance of such factors as specific *literary* competence. He does not come to grips with the concept of text-models as the dominant component in rule-governed interpretive processes. Aware of generic conventions and the particular "salience" which some implications can have as a result, he does not recognize that these kinds

of reading procedures even exert control over how world-models can be activated. He does not see that what the reader *does* with available world-models depends on genre. The conventions which develop through literary traditions result in a reader competence which can no longer be viewed simplistically through the prism of reality principle.

Readers can in fact recognize all kinds of purely *literary* manipulation of fictional truths on the basis of their expectations for literature and for particular narrative genres. Most notable perhaps is the rule of significance in literature which insists that the reader acknowledge connections (including causal effects), expecting details to be significant, in a way in which they would not be in real life. Walton speaks usefully about the kinds of slim "evidence relations" involved in some implications, suggesting that it is not the *strength* of the evidence which matters, but rather its salience in terms of *obviousness.*[16] Implications grounded on such conspicuous evidence depend on text-models for context. Even where implications involve *no* evidence relation, the dominant text-model will be responsible for the generation of fictional truths which depend on specific conventional codes. The literary *competence* of the reader allows him to recognize all kinds of potentials for fictional truth which do not depend on world-models, but rather on the literary manipulations possible.

Walton does suggest an interesting replacement of mutual belief principle with conventional knowledge of genre, again, without capitalizing on his insight. He suggests that while mutual belief principle allows writers to direct reader's imaginings better than does reality principle (as we have seen in Chapter Seven), it is not the only means to this end, which can be achieved in more straightforward ways. "All that is needed are clear understandings shared by artist and appreciator as to what features of the work generate what fictional truths... There is no particular reason why anyone's beliefs about the real world should come into play."[17] This appreciation of conventions as a controlling context for fictional truth highlights not only the semiotic means available to the author to "communicate," but also the important role of the reader as a de-coder of recognizable signs in that communication process. The *conspicuous* connections among signifier

and signified are what underlie much of fictional truth generation--connections which depend on learned codes and competence. Particularly where grounds for the generation of fictional truth are not "reasonable" in Walton's terms, literary competence comes into play.

Whereas Walton laments that participation in games of make-believe is not enriched by implications based on principles unlike reality- or mutual belief principle, I would suggest that there are procedures dependent on literary competence which enrich in their own *specific* way the appreciator's participation in a game of make-believe.[18] The process made possible by literary competence is akin to the imagination-sustaining extrapolations based on world-knowledge or mutual beliefs. Text-models (and for that matter, intertextual repertoire) constitute a similar force, and serve to generate truths through procedures analogous to real-world investigation or exploration of an overt belief community. In other words, there may be "reasonable grounds" for certain such inferences if text-models are allowed to assume the priority they deserve. The "reasoning" process associated with real-world investigation can also occur within the context of literary norms and regularities. The game of make-believe is not "diminished" through such processes, but may of course be augmented or complemented by the generation of fictional truths which do *not* belong *within* make-believe, as discussed in Chapter Four. Game worlds may seem somehow "less complete" where strategies for truth generation circumvent reality principle and bar world-models and the resultant inference procedures from integration into those game worlds, *and yet* be augmented admirably by the more primary structure of the reading operations of the fictional sphere. It is a question of where we focus our attention as theorists.

No fictional world exists outside of a set of text-external literary norms, which provoke the more difficult interpretive strategies which trouble Walton. Only genre membership can determine the appropriate context for these more troubling kinds of inference procedures, alerting the reader to the appropriate background, usefully thought of as a "generic landscape." Since different norms characterize different *kinds* of narratives, an appraisal of world-models will yield only *part*

of the background knowledge valid, and except where there is an obvious default to world-models, will require fundamental supplementation or orientation by the selected text-model. None of the principles explained in Chapter Seven can function independently of a generic context. Any work must be read against a specific conventional intertextual control, otherwise what is ***different*** from world-models ***cannot*** be assessed as to fictional truth value.

Accessibility Relations from the Reader's Perspective

The generation of fictional truth depends on a ***selection*** process for the world-models which belong in the textual reference world. The reader cannot arbitrarily infer that a fictional world corresponds in all details with world-models at his disposal. Faced with the incompleteness/indeterminacy of fictional worlds, he may seem to be "...caught in a web of interlocking frames of reference,"[19] only some of which originate in the context of reality as such. The very ***incompleteness*** of fictional worlds (as logically defined in Chapter Three and explored in terms of inference procedures in Chapter Six) ***necessitates*** a selection process informed by text-models. At least some unspecified properties must be selected purely on the basis of text-models. In order to formulate an accurate reference world, the reader must make ***choices***, depending on the priorities and hierarchies invoked by available text-models. If the reader is to choose or activate enough attributes for fictional characters in order to "insert" them into the created "reality" of the reference world, he ***must*** determine a hierarchy of world- and text-models available to that special "reality."

Although, as Pavel points out, the ontology of fictional worlds is not necessarily combinatorialist in terms of elements taken from reality,[20] it is helpful to presume world-models as basic knowledge, and to delineate various kinds of generic deviation from that knowledge.[21] At least in more traditional narratives, text-models will activate ***some*** world-knowledge, contributing to the codified structure of naturalization procedures suggested in Chapter Five. How world-models

are integrated into the reference world depends on the governing text-models which control the various degrees of contact which the fictional world has with reality, or the different "weight" which world-knowledge can be assigned. The "gravity" of the fictional world which attracts various kinds of knowledge depends on a context of genre.

The reader obviously distinguishes ***degrees*** of realism according to genre, recognizing how the correspondence with reality is reinforced fully in some types of works, while only to various lesser extents in others. We must determine how different kinds of world-knowledge are de-activated in different genres. Human psychology, for example, will not be undermined in the fantastic or in science fiction, in spite of drastic changes in physical laws either implied or explicitly proclaimed; whereas, in the equally radical worlds of fairy tales--radical in terms of physical laws--many psychological considerations must be drastically de-activated. We must explore how the reader knows ***which*** factors must lose priority, so that ordinary implications are blocked.

In effect, the reader does not look at any particular potential fictional truth in isolation, but assigns instead a truth value only within the context of the reference world, where that particular truth can be related to all of the other implied truths ***which result.*** The reader imports into that reference world ***selectively*** only what is relevant within the available text-model, acknowledging always that "standard" reality will be ***more or less*** applicable.

Ryan's typology of accessibility relations provides a framework in which to discuss the dominance of text-models, by providing a list of the kinds of deviations possible from world-models. She explores the various alternate emphases, by assessing the whole range of relations for each genre analyzed. In effect, she develops a list of genres by treating the accessibility relations as a selection of various ***combinations*** of world-models. In an analysis much clearer than what others have proposed for logical contradictions and other difficult narrative truths, Ryan establishes clear ***categories*** of violations of world-knowledge, and combinations of relations. Within the typology she only considers the relation between fictional worlds and the actual

world, however, not putting to use her concept of generic landscape, which is in fact the controlling mechanism dictating the selection and combination of the various relations. The typology does not show, then, any ***intersection*** of world- and text-models. In other words, Ryan shows what principles are ***in effect*** in various genres, but she does not show how the reader comes to activate the principles as a result of generic ***expectations***. Her concerns are not primarily pragmatic or reader-oriented.

It is necessary only to extend her analysis to incorporate the reader's point of view, showing why certain world-models will be activated and others not--what ***kinds*** of fictional truths the reader will generate as a consequence of accessibility relations. The taxonomy must be transformed into what the reader ***does***, in terms of isolating the limitations and subversions of world-models according to expectations for genre. Here the concept of ***roles*** of reading introduced in Chapter Nine is most helpful, in that accessibility can be thought of as ***between audiences***. This accessibility relation pertains to world-models and how text-models ***constrain*** that knowledge. The authorial audience "transmits" the particular combination to the truth world appreciated "automatically" by the narrative audience. By working out the constraints on world-models, the reader gains "***access***" to the appropriate reference world. There is no possible access other than that afforded by text-models.

By approaching the categories of violations and their combination in terms of the reading operations involved, we determine what the unavoidable consequences are for the assembly of fictional truth in the reference world. Different kinds of violation of or deviation from world-knowledge depend on genre, and result in different selection procedures. We must look beyond fictional world structures as such, in order to pin down the kinds of emphasis/selection mechanisms which the reader has at his disposal. Only by determining the relation of text-models to the various ***categories*** of world-knowledge can we see what truths the reader can and cannot legitimately activate. Any applicable constraints belong in the reference world, activated through reading procedures which take as dominant the available text-models. In this

way, the taxonomic categories are related effectively to interpretive possibilities and what the reader "takes from" reality to the reference world.

Taxonomic Categories and Interpretive Possibilities

Ryan begins her typology with the combination of relations of identity of properties and identity of inventory, which together entail all of the other relations, and which produce a textual universe identical with our actual system of reality.[22] Non-fictional texts such as history, biography, and journalism exploit this absolute compatibility with reality in order to produce maximal information, treating the actual world as the ***referent*** of the textual actual world. I would add that the "characters" are actual representations of real historical people.

Ryan points out that it is impossible for these two principles to hold ***in fiction***, if only because the intent and action of creating the fiction is a fact of the actual world which cannot be incorporated in the textual reference world. In all ***other*** respects, a fictional text may present an "exact reproduction of reality."[23] In terms of reading roles, the authorial audience is hampered by no considerations of literary genre, able to transmit all world-models to the narrative audience. The reference world is ***equivalent*** with the real world.

"True fiction" Ryan identifies as sharing the same complete set of accessibility relations, since the fictional universe is "...conceived and presented as an accurate image of reality."[24] Non-fiction novels, dramatized histories, and romanced biographies represent worlds technically distinct from reality but very similar to it. Without actually ***referring*** to reality, a novel like Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* presents a story about true facts, but using the techniques of narrative fiction.[25] This kind of fiction fills in informational gaps in the reader's knowledge of reality with "...unverified but credible facts for which the author takes no responsibility (as would be the case in historiography.)[26] Not really an exact reproduction of reality, as Ryan

suggests, the reference world nonetheless must include everything the authorial audience knows about reality, the characters all having origins in the actual world. Involving much more than the empirically universal and culturally specific knowledge identified in Chapter Eight, this kind of fiction depends on the "actual" also discussed there as world-knowledge. It insists on a most extreme form of the default to world-models identified in Chapter Nine for realistic texts. All historical information about the characters belongs in the reference world, supplemented only by undocumented extra information in the form of conversations and private thoughts, which the authorial audience can readily accept as fictional truth since it does not conflict with the rest of the reality framework. These kinds of technically unverifiable facts are easily integrated into the reference world as fictional truths on an equal footing with the more historical facts. The story is conjectural, supplemented history, sitting on the border between fact and fiction, but assuring the reader that however indeterminate the truth value of the supplemented facts may be, these "facts" are genuine possibilities for truth in the real world. As Ryan admits, such undocumented facts exclude a strict application of the principle of identity of properties.[27] And of course, where the principle of the identity of properties is relaxed while maintaining the same inventory, there then result *imaginary* stories about real people, such as Washington and the cutting of the cherry tree.[28]

Ryan identifies realistic and historical fiction interestingly as a case *converse* to imaginary stories about real people, in that the identity of properties is maintained as far as logically possible, but the inventory is *expanded*.[29] *Some* of the actual world's inventory is maintained, even to the point of incorporating the same geography, but with the *addition* of individuals who have no counterpart in the actual world. In effect, Ryan makes Nicholas Rescher's "supernumerary" characters into the *additions* to an already "existing" kind of possible world. The authorial audience accepts that the properties of the "common members" are the same for the reference world as for the actual world. In this way, there can be no gratuitous departure from world-models, for which the automatic default discussed in Chapter Nine is in effect. Again, the "actual" as world-knowledge is crucial, so

that real-world facts about the characters' historical counterparts, or about locations and social structures, are not violated. Obviously, much more is involved in archetypal realistic texts than the principles under discussion here. Not only do the rest of Ryan's relations hold, but also her ***additional*** relations of historical coherence, psychological credibility, socio-economic compatibility, and categorial compatibility. Within this kind of text-model, the entire range of world-knowledge remains applicable, as I have shown for *La Regenta*. As Ryan points out, even where such facts are not terribly relevant to the story, "...they play an oblique role in assessing the truth value of interpretations, since all valid statements about the textual universe must be compatible with them."[30] Under no circumstance can the authorial audience who recognizes this type of text-model ignore the world-models activated, but must "transmit" them to the narrative audience. Ryan explains that logically speaking, the combination of identity of properties and compatibility of expanded inventory make the actual world a ***subset*** of the textual actual world: "...all the propositions true in AW are also true in TAW, but the propositions concerning individuals specific to TAW are indeterminate in AW (or false, in a two-value system)."[31] This view demonstrates clearly the extent to which world-models can be invoked through a text-model, becoming an inviolable source for the generation of fictional truths.

It is precisely this dependence on world-knowledge to create further compatible fictional truths, which is violated in alternate histories. Speaking of "historical fabulation," Ryan shows the difference from historical/realistic fiction as an open transgression of the identity of properties. Although the inventory of the fictional world includes that of the actual world, "...the properties of the common members differ in ways not necessarily connected with their involvement with noncommon members..."[32] So facts of history are altered--Napoleon escapes, or Hitler wins the war. Ryan's additional relation of historical coherence helps to distinguish the more radical forms, in which fanciful unions of people and anachronistic activities from different times occur.[33]

From the reading perspective, if we "feed back" an intertextual character reference in an alternate history through world-models as

"actual" fact, the interpretation process jams. The character who belongs in both actual and fictional world inventories can no longer be identified with conviction as one and the same individual. It is not that ***all*** factors of world-knowledge will be invalidated. The rest of Ryan's relations, including the additional ones, will hold, for example. But the authorial audience will need to consult the text-model to be able to determine which implications from world-models can be retained and which must be discarded. Unlike the historical novel, which adheres to actual world-knowledge, the alternate history alters that knowledge at will, calling into question its source and authenticity. Actual factors from reality assume a ***new position***: they lose dominance and authority, yet they must be known by the authorial audience, who cannot understand the significance of the new fictional truths without knowing the standard version. A full range of possibilities exist as text-models. The more limited case is that of "unofficial" historical novels with radically internally focalized perspectives through participating characters, as in Rudy Wiebe's *The Temptations of Big Bear*. In such novels the essential facts are maintained, but seen from the different, unofficial point of view, so that the source of text-book history is called into question. The novel thereby creates a new interpretation of reality demonstrably more faithful to ***actual*** events. In effect, for *Big Bear*, the world-models available from standard history do not suffice, and are set aside in favour of a re-interpretation of actual events though the new fictional perspective, which selects more appropriate world-models, in the form of "actual" world-knowledge, culturally specific knowledge, and belief systems. The object of this kind of narrative procedure is to offer the reader a new way of perceiving historical reality. In the more "historiographic metafiction" described by scholars like Linda Hutcheon and Brian McHale, the standard historical content is juxtaposed with the "visible tissue of fabrication" of metafiction. Perhaps the most radical form is found in Carlos Fuentes' *Terra nostra*, where Ryan's extreme of historical fantasy flouting historical coherence prevails.[34]

Dropping in addition to identity of properties and inventory also the relation of ***compatibility*** of inventory, we are left with what Ryan classifies as realistic fiction in a geographic and historical no-man's-

land.[35] The rest of the relations hold, creating the eerie effect of a reference world which includes all kinds of world-knowledge as for standard realistic texts, but with the fundamental provision that the representatives of ***classes*** of objects from the actual world are ***different*** individuals, entirely foreign to the structure of reality. As a result of such "supernumerary" inclusions (in Rescher's sense), the proper names of the actual world have no reference in the fictional world.[36] Ryan's examples are Kafka's *The Trial* and *The Castle*, where taxonomy is ordinary yet absolutely foreign. The authorial audience will need to activate a range of world-knowledge as for realistic texts, but will be thwarted by the text-model in the ***practical*** application of that knowledge in the reference world. It is as if the world-models were somehow held in a state of readiness, yet never allowed to assume authority.

When the relation of chronological compatibility is broken, either anticipation or science fiction results, depending on which other relations are maintained.[37] With anticipation novels, all relations other than identity of inventory and chronological compatibility must hold, in order for the message about the possible fate of the actual world to be convincing.[38] Because science fiction proper focuses on technological advances and the resulting changes, and technology must respect mathematical and natural laws, the relations of physical compatibility, taxonomic compatibility of natural species, and logical, analytical, and linguistic compatibility must hold, while all others are severed.[39] Ryan points out also the case of interplanetary travel, where although the planet Earth maintains the taxonomic repertory of the actual world, other planets which are part of the same fictional world may contain extra-terrestrial beings. This situation breaks the taxonomic compatibility relation in spite of the observance of physical compatibility as natural laws.[40]

The crucial point about science fiction as a text-model is that the authorial audience is not in the slightest confused by any flouting of accessibility relations. As opposed to the narrative technique of the pure fantastic, instead of doubt or hesitation about possibly very radical ontologies, only credibility is generated. The artificial construction of

a fictional world deviant from world-models is so deliberately "hidden" that the authorial audience accepts automatically the presented ontological conditions, allowing them to supersede easily the would-be applicable world-models. The highly salient text-model assumes priority in the assembly of the reference world, ruling out categorically the automatic default to world-models typical of realistic texts.[41]

It is interesting also that Doreen Maitre qualifies science fiction as the "not yet possible," suggesting a ***changing*** relationship between world-models and deviations from them. Scientific ad ancements mean that what is now impossible may be soon part of everyday reality, as with Jules Verne's adventures.[42] The role of authorial audience depends on this changeable status and is not assigned once and for all in terms of how world-knowledge is violated.

In contrast with science fiction considered strictly as circumventing taxonomic compatibility while adhering to natural laws, Ryan cites an opposite generic category of "realistic fantasy" as a world where the characters are apparently ordinary human beings in terms of taxonomic compatibility, belonging to a recognizable species, yet have abilities which flout natural laws.[43] So the hero in Marcel Aymé's *Le Passe-Muraille* is not only engaged in familiar, everyday pursuits, but can also walk through wails. Or Kafka's hero in *The Metamorphosis* can discover casually one morning that he has been metamorphosed into another unspecified but ordinary species--some kind of repulsive insect.[44] What is "realistic" in these kinds of fictional worlds no longer implies acceptance of physical compatibility between the actual and fictional world.[45] The concentration on everyday life belongs in the tradition of realism, but the elements of the marvelous must be allowed to retain the significance demanded by the text-model.

Ryan's designation of "realistic fantasy" is an insightful way to describe this kind of narrative, which falls outside of the range of the fantastic and cannot be treated within the confines of the marvelous either. The matter-of-fact opening of *The Metamorphosis* asks the narrative audience to accept ***both*** a realistic world where the world-knowledge of the authorial audience must automatically take effect,

and to accept at the same time and without surprise a drastic ***modification*** of that world. It is the realistic framework which gives *The Metamorphosis* its unusually powerful quality. Probabilistic emphasis ***narrows*** the world-content to the everyday and routine, making the radical inclusion of the one bizarre event all the more extraordinary as a result. The authorial audience must develop a text-model which accepts as fact an impossible event, but also insists that the event be integrated into an entirely ***probable*** structure of everyday "reality" otherwise consonant with world-models. The "transmission" of this particular combination of knowledge to the narrative audience allows the acceptance in that role of the bizarre story fact, demanding a very unusual narrative audience indeed. The reality of the unprecedented event is ***never*** called into question by any of the story participants, who treat it as a simple fact of reality. It is a bizarre deviation from the norms of their otherwise realistic world, which remains the same as before the incident, in all respects other than Gregor's development and deterioration.

While the premise of Gregor's transformation may seem marvelous, the reader is never asked to assume the role of narrative audience suitable for fairy tales. The authorial audience's experience with the text-model of fairy tale is not adequate, requiring even ***inversion*** to account for the new text. Not only is the world-structure different from that of fairy tales, demanding activation of all routine world-models except as regards the transformation, but in addition, this realistic world of *The Metamorphosis* denies also the possibility of any magic solution which might rectify the bizarre predicament. While the initial event belongs more properly in the realm of the marvelous, the rest of the realistic context precludes any reversal of the situation by marvelous means. As a would-be fairy tale, this story is entirely ***inverted***, so that no redemption is ever possible. Nor is the hybrid quality of the fictional world identical with that of Gogol's "The Nose," where narrative discourse ***directs*** the reader to anticipate strange events. The narrative audience of *The Metamorphosis* has no benefit of such warning, and must rely on the directives of the authorial audience which identifies a radically different text-model to account for the hybrid structure. The appropriate reference world must accommodate

that peculiar structure. No amount of allegorizing or symbolic interpretation will alter the disturbing structure of fictional truth.

The fairy tale proper Ryan identifies as characterized by a fictional world linked to the actual world only by logical, analytical, and linguistic compatibility, with chronological compatibility applicable for traditional fairy tales set in a mythical past.[46] As introduced in Chapter Nine, Ryan explains that when taxonomic compatibility is lifted, such entities as fairies, dragons, and unicorns can be introduced. And when natural laws are suspended, it becomes "...possible for animals to talk, people to fly, and princes to be turned into frogs."[47] The authorial audience who knows the text-model is not in the least surprised by the strange inventory of individuals, nor by the supernatural occurrences. Ryan points out further that when natural laws and taxonomic compatibility are suspended, so is usually compatibility of inventory, with the result that fairy tales have their *own* geography and population.[48] Again, the authorial audience recognizes this "otherness" of the domains of fairy tales, which have been praised for many years by scholars who value the easily ac ed marvelous world of the genre which remains unreal and separate rom reality, generating no surprise, and where the supernatural is accepted so spontaneously, on equal footing with the natural. Because of a *Selbstverständlichkeit* generated through narrative technique, story actuality in fact takes on "acceptable" dimensions which are documented according to the text-model, and not in terms of real-life experience. In the special worlds of fairy tales there are no conditions on knowledge and no doubts as to what happens: things are exactly as the narrative audience expects them to be, given the information transmitted by the authorial audience.

One of the Grimm's tales, "The Companionship of the Cat and the Mouse," demonstrates perfectly the special *Selbstverständlichkeit* by *violating* the text-model. The cat and mouse live together in perfect harmony until an abrupt switch from the routine text-model occurs in the conclusion. The cat pounces on the mouse and devours her, the narrator commenting only, "You see, that's the way of the world."[49] What world? Certainly the usual world of fairy tales does not always

include such natural facts. The reader must accept a sudden revision of the status of world-knowledge.

In her discussion of story generation Ryan identifies another important aesthetic principle at work in fairy tales which forbids events without consequences: "...every episode, every detail should have a bearing on the final outcome. If the hero receives three magical agents, he should later on encounter three dangers, so that he can find use for each of the three gifts."[50] Clearly the authorial audience will not tolerate the inclusion of superfluous "reality effects" in such fictional worlds, identifying the more appropriate aesthetic principle through the text-model.

Ryan points out an important exception to the lifting of compatibility of inventory in what she calls "legend."[51] Although her specific example is that of the tall tale, she speaks usefully of fictional worlds where "...supernatural beings roam ...and miracles are common occurrences, but the main characters or locations have counterparts in [the actual world]."[52] Again, traditional research into forms of folk literature is relevant here. The kinds of knowledge available to the authorial audience could be described accurately by examining such research to define the appropriate text-models. Precisely what is reassuring in fairy tales in terms of an "alien" distance from reality is undermined in legend, which integrates the supernatural disconcertingly into what the reader knows of world-models.

Ryan's particular sense of "legend" relates also to magical realism, as does her next category of "fantastic realism." As opposed to fairy tales, then, "[a] similar inclusion of the geography and population of [the actual world] is found in some fantastic tales such as *Frankenstein*, whose hero was born ...in Geneva."[53] Ryan does not undertake in this identification of "fantastic realism" to deal with the problems of the pure fantastic, commenting later on undecidable relations. But the special combination outlined here is significant not only for the special worlds of magical realism which are akin to legend, but also for the quality of reader hesitation typical of the pure fantastic, in that the combination highlights the alternate and contradictory explanations for

unusual events, since those events are integrated into the ordinary realistic world similar to the actual. Both magical realism and the fantastic I treat briefly ahead as particularly interesting cases of selection procedures according to text-models which necessarily involve the reader's awareness of belief systems.

Ryan also accounts for "nonsense" and much of postmodern fiction, by specifying the release of the logical compatibility relation.[54] Rejecting the law of noncontradiction, nonsense admits that any proposition can be both true and not true within the fictional world. Not only found in children's folklore, but also in postmodern novels where characters can be both alive and dead simultaneously, or the setting is and is not a particular city, or it is and is not raining, such transgressions are not presented merely as contradictory statements which are equally possible, but represent a radical break with the laws of logic. The problems outlined in Chapter Three run rampant. Obviously any critical apparatus developed for realistic texts will not work with such texts. The authorial audience must substitute the radically different text-model, where even the most rudimentary forms of world-knowledge are challenged.[55]

The final category in Ryan's original taxonomy is that of the obliteration of linguistic compatibility, so that the fictional world and the actual no longer follow the same linguistic conventions.[56] The authorial audience is not granted access to any measure of fictional truth, in effect, since the text might just as well be written in a foreign language. In the more radical forms where there is no taxonomic overlap between the actual and the fictional world, there can result no semantic content. Most radically, all connections are severed in sound poems. "With the last linguistic connection to [the actual world] vanishes the possibility of knowing and saying anything about [the textual actual world]. Vanishing with this possibility is the very notion of textual universe."[57] This is a crucial point, because the reader requires at least *some* connection to world-models. Where the text-model makes inoperative *all* world-knowledge, no communication can take place. The authorial audience will identify the conventions of a text-model, but

will not be able to assign those conventions with any authority for the generation of fictional truth. No reference world will be built.

Further Guides for Implementing World-Models

Ryan's typology of accessibility relations provides a list of kinds of deviations from world-models which must be addressed by the authorial audience through text-models. The alternate emphases outlined do not represent a complete picture of available world-models, however, and Ryan herself develops the four additions to the repertory introduced in Chapter Nine: historical coherence, psychological credibility, socio-economic compatibility, and categorial compatibility. Although Ryan does not integrate the new categories into the typology, they are of central importance in understanding how interpretive processes involve world-models to varying degrees according to text-models. In particular, the relations of psychological credibility and socio-economic compatibility help to distinguish actual genres from one another and suggest the need for more extensive analysis of ***selection procedures***. Seen from the perspective of the reader's knowledge, these categories illuminate interpretive practice, showing how the text-model which respects psychological credibility, for example, ***validates*** interpretations which rely on the particular knowledge of psychology or psychoanalysis. Only recognition of the appropriate text-model will allow the application of particular interpretive theories, then, which would be ludicrous applied in the wrong generic context. Interpretation depends on these underlying principles activated through text-models. There is no use psychoanalysing fairy-tale princesses, allegorical figures, or (as Ryan points out) the uniformly mad creatures of absurd worlds,[58] or applying Marxist socio-economic doctrine to the world of courtly romance. In such cases, ***potentially*** available world-models are de-activated by the text-model.

It is not, of course, that entire world-models are de-activated in totality. In many cases certain ***degrees*** of psychology will remain relevant, while others become insignificant within the text-model.

Fairy-tale princesses will share the physical structure of the female characters in Zola's novels, and at least *some* of their psychology. But they will not be subject to the same kind of sexual appetite, which is at best an indeterminate attribute in the context of their fictional world and its encompassing text-model. That text-model is the mechanism which allows the authorial audience to recognize the difference.

The same mechanism allows the reader to recognize that a ***sketchily portrayed*** psychology does not rob characters of psychological "depth" within some generic contexts. Some text-models provide the context necessary to recognize the ***potential*** for revelation of full human psychology, even where that psychology is poorly defined textually. As a result, technically two-dimensional characters in realistic fiction are not written off as pure allegories, but are understood in terms of the principles activated by the text-model. Although the reader may not be ***told*** of their complexities, they are allowed to retain a potential which the parsimonious text cannot eradicate. Fictional truth generation will still hinge on psychological credibility, regardless of how limited the narrative development of the character's inner life may be. Psychological credibility becomes a kind of default element in such cases, so that the reader would need to identify a ***particular departure*** through a text-model before she could ascertain that such world-knowledge would be ineffectual.

Ryan's further addition of three ***principles*** relates directly to this kind of interpretive mechanism dependent on text-models. Suggesting a deficiency in her own typology, Ryan addresses the problem of differentiating genres according to generic ***labels*** which do not always correspond to the taxonomic classes yielded by computing the various combinations of accessibility relations possible, since the labels can be narrower or wider. Obviously many works (like Ryan's example of pastoral romance) can be reached through the same accessibility relations as a work like *La Jalousie*, yet they are not in the least "realistic." The inventory of both kinds of fictional worlds does not contain that of the actual world, but those worlds do respect the laws of physics and logic.[59] Ryan suggests that to refine the categories into a taxonomy which corresponds to accepted generic labels--the ones that

my authorial audience recognizes--we must introduce three additional principles: thematic focus, stylistic filtering, and probabilistic emphasis.[60] These principles are in fact crucial to my assessment of the reader's generation of fictional truth.

Thematic focus guides the ***selection*** of specific sectors of world-models. While all broadly realistic fictions honour the relations from compatibility of inventory through linguistic compatibility, thematic focus allows the authorial audience to further ***differentiate*** "historical" from "psychological," or from "detective," and to incorporate the varying kinds of relevant world-knowledge into the reference world. Thematic focus ***presupposes*** a ***set*** of accessibility relations.

Stylistic filtering further enables this categorizing and naturalization process. Ryan suggests that generic labels such as comic, tragic, or idyllic refer to various types of stylistic filtering.[61] Obviously the authorial audience will be impressed by characters and their actions in different ways, depending on the stylistic filtering operative. When Fielding calls his works "comic" he knows full well that the informed reader will understand that, unlike tragedy, the comic fictional world will permit an escape from the past, no matter how potentially destructive or damaging to others a character's behaviour may be.[62] As Ryan points out, the pastoral romance will be distinguished from *La Jalousie* through both the thematic focus of the bucolic, and the stylistic filter of the idyllic.[63] The authorial audience must recognize these variable emphases, or risk applying the wrong text-model.

As the third principle, ***probabilistic emphasis*** concerns the matter of "...whether the text dwells on the ordinary or the marginal within the horizon of possibilities determined by the relevant accessibility relations."[64] What is crucial here is the culturally specific world-knowledge addressed in Chapter Eight. In Ryan's terms, probabilistic emphasis allows the reader to differentiate "escapist" fiction (such as historical romance or adventure thrillers) from the highly realistic fiction typical of the nineteenth century, in spite of the

fact that both kinds of fiction respect the same set of accessibility relations.

> Escapist fiction depicts glamorous lifestyles, thrilling adventures, incredible coincidences, agonizing dilemmas, burning desire, everlasting passion--all of which are logically, economically, psychologically, and physically possible in [the actual world], though highly unlikely.[65]

While, as Robert Newsom points out, there is something fundamentally absurd about talking about probability in fiction,[66] the reader clearly relies on this kind of assessment to qualify fictional truths. What is "realistic" must assuredly deal with the causality and motivation of the real world (discussed in Chapter Eight), including, then, the ordinary, routine aspects of life, and even the more sordid.

With the problem of the "realistic" label in mind, Ryan suggests that "[t]he generic labels in use in a culture may involve various ***combinations*** of the three [principles]..."[67] A label like "realism" can be thus ambiguous between two types of criteria, understood as referring to accessibility relations in that natural laws are respected, and the fictional world seems economically and psychologically possible of the actual world, ***or*** that the events portrayed fall within the statistically probable, ***or*** even that through an appreciation of thematic focus the text concentrates on aspects of everyday life.[68]

What is important to bear in mind here is that works which include "unrealistic" content can use realistic techniques too. The reader as authorial audience recognizes the accessibility relations operative when he sees a realistic text as "corresponding" with, or mirroring reality, sorting out to what ***extent*** various kinds of world-knowledge must become fictional truths. He may even apply standards of ***probability*** to assess the likelihood of the fictional truths generated in terms of their "distance" from the realm of the strictly possible. He will assess the various aspects of similarity to and difference from the real world in terms of appropriate "weight" within the text-model. An obviously "fanciful" text will clearly not allow anything near the default mechanism outlined in Chapter Nine. But the authorial audience will

also recognize that even "unrealistic" text-models can well incorporate aspects of realism, especially in terms of technique. Such fantasies as Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings*, or science fiction, can be presented with documentary clarity and entirely realistic manner. Some science fiction radio or television programs could even be ***mistaken*** as to text-model where the authorial audience has no access to (or ignores) metacodal signals, resulting in the erroneous appreciation of them as real reports, as in H.G. Well's *War of the Worlds*. Obviously also, as Walton points out, the "...most accurate and detailed portrayal of real-life events can be remote, 'unconvincing'--unrealistic. Not all realism is a matter of correspondence."[69]

Consideration of the ***manner*** of realistic discourse must lead us to realize that realism is a historical variable, which must be thought of in the final analysis as a truth to the society which produces it. What constitutes realistic manner depends on that context. As Wallace Martin points out, "[r]ealism is what is true for us, in our time."[70] The realistic novel is associated then in a most general sense with mercantile society, but the heroic epic may be similarly "realistic" in terms of the military society where it originates. In courtly romance, the reader finds a thoroughly "unrealistic" fictional world by modern standards, but one which presumably represents at least in part the world of feudal aristocracies, including conventions and beliefs.

The question is complicated by the fact that what to construe as reality factors is not always known, since some elements (such as courtly love in medieval romance) ***may*** be based on world-models, or may be simply intertextual and dependent on the text-model. Reality- or mutual belief principles may be at least in part indeterminate. In such a case, the authorial audience can perhaps only recuperate the more literary conventions of the text-model, never gaining an ***accurate*** impression of realism according to contextual world-models.

The reader is able, however, as a result of the historical variability of realism, to pick out and label as "realistic" parts of literary works (in ***addition*** to narrative techniques) which are far from realistic in any standard generic sense. Fairy tales (especially more modern ones)

can contain realism in the sense that moral messages about reality can be perceived. As Erich Auerbach so ably demonstrates, realism is possible in all periods, appearing in many different kinds of works which share an interest in the serious treatment of all types of characters and aspects of life.[71] The world-knowledge associated with realism is not, then, neatly relegated to a particular genre, but must be assessed and weighed for relevance through the text-model in question. Ryan's three principles of thematic focus, stylistic filtering, and probabilistic emphasis help to clarify such a complicated issue.

But Ryan's entire assessment of the principles which further govern the labeling of genres, beyond the matter of accessibility relations, would be fruitfully clarified/expanded by introducing some of the appreciation of mutual belief principle and considerations of fictional or implied author which this study has incorporated. Often the best way to define these kinds of variable emphasis is through such reading-oriented concepts. I assess ahead this potential in terms of kinds of selection procedures.

There is another more ***concrete*** sense in which the reader does not entirely ignore his world-knowledge even in dealing with highly unrealistic genres, selecting rather from that knowledge only what is not prohibited or negated by the text-model available. As Ryan suggests, many objects in fairy tales are "preprocessed" according to the principle of minimal departure. The reader knows that flying horses must have four legs, a mane, and a tail first of all, with the ***addition*** of the genre-specific wings.[72] In other words, there is here a ***partial*** default to world-models, with supplementation according to the text-model. Minimal departure is altered, in effect, not by textual stipulation, but by the prescription of a specific text-model. World-models are basic, but ***supplemented*** by text-models.

A more radical deviation from world-models occurs where the world-model is simply ***absent***, so that no supplementation is possible. Where there is an absence of certain features in the description of an object, Ryan points out that the principle of minimal departure will not provide assistance.[73] Her example is that of the question of sex drive in

fairy tale princesses--a feature which can only be entered as indeterminate in the "intertextual database."[74]

But Ryan makes an important point here which relates to the large issue of the ***potential*** for psychological complexity even where texts do not ***elaborate*** that complexity, as I have discussed above. Ryan focuses usefully on the ***epistemic*** problems of reading when she says:

> As an abstraction from many texts, the prototypical fairy tale princess is an incomplete entity, lacking determination on the feature of sexuality, but the princesses of ***individual*** fairy tales are ontologically normal human beings, who simply ***reveal nothing*** of their sexuality in the events shown in the text.[75]

This is important because it is ***epistemic*** problems which are at issue in my analysis of the generation of fictional truth. To create the ontologically complete character who belongs in the imagined reference world, the reader must take ***more*** into account than the indeterminacy enforced by the text-model. In the case of the individual princess, within the reference world the human sexuality factors cannot be eradicated entirely by the indeterminacy typical of the genre. Where indeterminacy prevails, the reader may not demonstrate the competence of Don Quixote regarding text-models, and may persist in a default to world-models to build the ***individual*** character. As Ryan suggests, minimal departure can operate on individuated characters, while not on the "...abstract classes of generic landscapes."[76] In the case of ***indeterminacy*** for qualities, I would conclude that the reader does not feel limited to a text-model which only allows him partial epistemic access to fictional truth, as long as a compatible world-model is immediately available ***which can solve the problem.*** With realistic text-models, the default mechanism allows for a complete ***mesh*** of the generic landscape with world-models, so that the reader is not aware of any epistemic deficiency. In the case of more indeterminacy within the text-model, the reader will be more aware of the informational augmenting process. It is not that he will discard the ***primacy*** of the text-model or fail to recognize the constraints of genre on fictional

truth. But he will address the ***indeterminate*** feature with the world-model at his disposal.

Kinds of Selection Procedures

Further elaboration of such reading procedures is required if we are to avoid some very unpleasant theoretical consequences. There are many literary conventions which innocently subvert world-models, with the result that the reader must necessarily ***disregard*** those world-models. Walton discusses some wonderful counterexamples to reality principle and mutual belief principle, as "silly questions" which the reader is not entitled to ask.[77] Without serious restrictions on the applicability of the principles, some rather absurd implications could be allowed to stand. Walton offers several examples of potential paradoxes: in English-language novels even Frenchmen speak English, opera singers die ***singing***, minimal disguises easily recognized by audiences fool other characters, non-omniscient narrators tell about events which they cannot possibly know about, and so on.[78] We might add the choice "paradox" that narrators in first-person narratives often recall the precise details of conversations from many years ago. Walton's prime example is Othello's beautiful English verse spoken with an "unbelievable natural literary flair" by a distraught Moorish general.[79] Such would be the reader's assessment if the paradox were sought out and world-models were applied. Walton points out that the reader does ***not*** notice such potential paradoxes or anomalies, distinguishing easily such artificial (or contrived) paradoxes from those which some works like Escher's prints or Flann O'Brien's *At Swim-Two-Birds* make seriously available for enjoyment.[80] Only if we insist on asking the wrong questions will reality seem to clash with fictional truths.[81]

It is necessary, then, to suppress certain questions and implications ***apparently*** justified by world-models. It is ***not*** true in the reference world for *Othello* that the Moor flaunts pompously his literary skills! "Othello's peculiarly elaborate language is demanded by the style in which the play is written and by Shakespeare's desire to provide superb

verse for the pleasure of his audience, which in this case took precedence over considerations of 'realism.'"[82] In other words, the competent reader must take into account the text-model, so that expectations for realism become inappropriate. It has long been recognized that authors have diverse artistic needs and objectives in relation to their readers. Such objectives can result in apparent anomalies or potential dissonances among fictional truths. The objective of providing access for readers to the fictional world can assuredly conflict with typically realistic goals.

In order to recognize *these* kinds of literary conventional constraints, the reader must routinely isolate fictional worlds from world-models for discourse. When he accepts the literary *conventions*, he must disregard world-models which are *obviously* no longer valid in the literary context. This "disregarding" is part of the selection process for fictional truth generation, so that the reader allows certain literary conventions to take precedence over real-world ramifications, ignoring implications for fictional truth which would be paradoxical in reality. The reader sees the literary mechanisms at work and judges the fictional world in keeping with such constraints. Real-world concerns about reception block, in effect, the eventual generation of fictional truth. Such recognition of appropriate general conventions and particular text-models depends on literary competence.[83]

Beyond questions focused through problems of discourse, we must also deal with situations where fundamental psychology must be negated as a world-model. Some works obviously do contain aesthetic defects to the effect that a character seems to act in contradiction to his "personality" as established through descriptive narrative procedures. In such cases, the reader may be entitled to call into question psychological "accuracy." But the reader is *not* permitted to ask why the wolf in "Little Red Riding Hood" does not simply eat the little girl at once when he meets her in the woods.[84] This action would most assuredly accord with world-models for standard psychology (even for wolves who can talk), but the reader cannot declare the wolf to be not "verisimilar" because he prefers to delay the feast. Ryan points out that a successful computer program would need to recognize more than

characters' goals and plans, "...understanding also the more *aesthetic* factors of how things work successfully in literary narrative."[85] While the wolf could more practically eat the child immediately, there would then be no story. Limitations on the application of world-models are thus mandated not only by the ontological structure of the fairy-tale world, but also by specific literary/generic needs, with which the reader is familiar. The structural requirement means that the reader cannot rely entirely on a plausible (human) psychology, when it does not mesh with the need for suspense or other purely *literary* requirements.

More than contemplating the reference world from the perspective of real life, as he would imagine the wolf to do, the reader must also construct that world in accordance with the aesthetic requirements of a particular kind of literary text-model. As Ryan shows, the successful *story* depends on the wolf selecting a convoluted scheme, which eventually results in the climactic situation, with its dramatic disguise scene and sudden change of fortune for the wolf.[86] To suggest that the reader ignores this kind of teleological functioning of plot structure and backwards-operating logic would be absurd. The wolf's conduct is not implausible because the text-model precludes the application of the otherwise sensible world-model. To generate appropriate fictional truth the reader must activate the general literary conventions and text-model most relevant. Programmed literary *effects* are, then, very much a part of the truth structure which the reader must identify. Beyond the more limited issue of authorial concern with the reader's *access* we must never forget the author's *aesthetic* goals. Very complex knowledge bases which include aesthetic awareness allow for this kind of competent construction of a reference world.

In addition to such conventional "subversions" of world-models, the reader must also cope with the *frustration* of those models which occurs when a text provides no "substance" on which reality principles can feed. Speaking of this situation, Ryan cites the case of *The Trial* and Lubomír Doležel's analysis of the two distinct realms, one of which is epistemically inaccessible. "The principle of minimal departure is fully operative in the visible world, but it comes up empty when it casts its net in the world of the Court."[87] The court cannot be assimilated

with familiar institutions. "We would blatantly misread *The Trial* if we filled in the gaps in the representation of the Court according to our knowledge of real world institutions..."[88] Ryan suggests also that allegorical figures, because of their categorial impossibility, resist assimilation to normal human beings. "How could one expect 'human density' and psychological verisimilitude of a creature whose very existence transgresses the logical difference between individuated existence and abstract, universal concepts?"[89] But in contrast to allegories, the diverse creatures of fairy tales "...present the ontological fullness of a real object. The universe of fairy tales may be different from everyday reality, but there is no radical otherness about its inhabitants."[90]

The difference in this readerly assessment of radical strangeness is the text-model which tells the reader what to take for granted as "real" and what knowledge is valid for completing the picture. Characters are by no means limited to the constraints of verisimilitude in relation to world-models, depending rather on systems of conventions which regulate what extent of completeness belongs in a given work according to its text-model. The reader must "produce" the completed character only in accord with the text-model available, selecting world-models and organizing all relevant knowledge according to the constraints of that model. While realistic characters do seem to be logically complete human beings with full individuation, characters in other genres demonstrate varying ***degrees*** of completeness, not necessarily seeming to participate in the same kind of complete "existence." We cannot ask all ***kinds*** of fictional characters to adhere uniformly to world-models, whether in essential physical characteristics, or with regard to action.

Ryan suggests that another way to challenge the principle of minimal departure is to "...subvert it through systematic inversion or contradiction."[91] Pavel refers to the worlds of dreams, madness, ritual, or nonsense as patterned according to "maximal" departure such that "[m]imetic principles are supplemented with antimimetic expectations."[92] In many instances, postmodern novels employ such strategies. It is clearly futile to attempt to incorporate world-knowledge into reference worlds in such cases. Any deliberate ***flouting***

of real-world norms necessitates disregarding the underlying knowledge as soon as activated, considering any tantalizing resemblance to world-models to be purely fortuitous.

In a more general sense, we must identify ***emphasis/de-emphasis*** of world-models as not only aspects of texts, but also as selection procedures particular to the fictional sphere. The reader must determine the relevant "optimal departure," to apply Pavel's term.[93] Qualities of deviation from world-models depend on what kind of emphasis/de-emphasis procedures are in force. The consequences of unavoidable world-models are easier to accept if we insist that some fictional truths are ***emphasized*** more than others. In effect, the reader can ignore some of the clutter of world-models, pushing the less significant or irrelevant into the background or periphery of the reference world. Evaluated through text-models and the connections which they mandate, central fictional truths need not correspond with what would be central in real history. Text-models ***order*** fictional truths, bringing some into sharper focus than others. For the reader to distort or disregard the relative ***emphasis*** of truths would be as irresponsible as getting the truths entirely "wrong." As we can judge from Ryan's typology, the large "backgrounds" for most literary narratives are amazingly similar--often identical--yet the works fall into different genres because they ***highlight*** different fictional truths.[94] It is not necessary to exclude unimportant potential fictional truths categorically, as Richard Routley does, by accepting only very limited sections of reality into fictional worlds without concern for text-models.[95] It is the fictional sphere which acts as a filtering process to remove the unnecessary proliferation and to focus on the essential in order to build the reference world. This world becomes a genuine interface or buffer zone between the fictional world and reality, a zone where the competent reader co-ordinates the relevant truths, "de-activating" those not required, and employing various ***degrees*** of emphasis and de-emphasis to achieve the most accurate set of relevant truths. Ryan suggests that "[t]he description of objects in the generic landscape would reflect, not so much the full range of their inherent properties, as those features which may be thematized in the texts of the genre."[96] Because of the precedence which they can take over

world-models, text-models are the key to determining in a systematic way *which* fictional truths based on world-models are important, and which are not. Text-models provide clear limitations (as shown above) as to what fictional truths can be activated.

Problematic or paradoxical fictional truths such as Walton suggests in his category of "silly questions" are to be understood as de-emphasized and not worthy of notice. To ask these kinds of questions demonstrates a lack of literary competence routinely acquired through exposure to conventions and text-models. By de-emphasizing the offending world-model, the competent reader avoids rendering the reference world unnecessarily paradoxical or inconsistent. The basic operations of consistency building do not permit the emphasis of some implications from available world-models.

Umberto Eco's discussion of semantic disclosure is relevant here--how texts manage to "blow up" or make relevant certain ***properties***, while "narcotizing" others.[97] Eco insists that the ***whole*** of the reader's world-knowledge is not activated, using the idea of textual operator or ***topic*** to show how the text directs the reading strategies which actualize the discursive structure of the text.[98] The idea of "virtual" properties socially stored and activated only when required by the text is useful. But again, the larger context of text-models is ignored.

Rabinowitz also addresses the issue of emphasis, but through the perspective of implicit "rules of notice" which allow the reader to distinguish more important details from the whole range of information offered textually, giving priority to certain kinds of details and creating a hierarchy of importance.[99] Presumably there are text-external knowledge bases which are activated in accord with this kind of textual hierarchy. While some rules of notice apply generally to literary texts (such as the privileging of titles and first and last sentences), others are more specific to the oeuvre of a particular author, or (I would add immediately) to particular genres.[100] In effect, Rabinowitz makes explicit the conventions of narrative reading involved in Culler's naturalization processes. He insists that, in opposition to a tradition of interpretation which posits that ***everything*** is significant in literary

texts, and must be incorporated no matter how seemingly irrelevant, we need to recognize the ***hierarchy*** of detail acknowledged in the tradition that texts can be abridged and extracted.[101] Important for the discussion of fictional truth generation is the idea that a text-model can be used to identify the structure of a work, allowing the reader to construct a hierarchy of ***relevance*** for textual details.[102]

Although Rabinowitz does not explore the issue, it is clearly not only textual features themselves which must be hierarchized, but all of the extra- and intertextual knowledge which the reader brings to the text, all of which figures in the choices which must be made as to where to direct attention. To allow ***all*** world-models, for example, to warrant recognition and application would result in an impossibly complex and expansive web of related knowledge and resultant fictional truth. While realistic texts aim towards this kind of expansive reading experience, clearly other genres demand more limitations on world-model application, or the kind of de-emphasis/"narcotizing" suggested above. The construction of truth in the reference world depends on the emphasis encoded by text-models and applied in the reading process. Where what is irrelevant to the text-model is allowed to assume prominence, or where crucial generic features go unnoticed, semiotic communication will fail. ***Where*** the reader focuses attention must depend on the recognized text-model. Textual stipulations themselves can only function within that context. Rather than generating fictional truths independently, textual features depend for their full effect on the known extra- and intertextual conventions.

None of the assessments of emphasis for fictional truths stress sufficiently the importance of belief systems and mutual belief principle. While Walton sees mutual belief principle as invalidated in some cases along with reality principle, Ryan omits the assessment of belief systems in her analysis of world typologies and accessibility relations.

The issue of story ontology demonstrates this deficiency best. Assessing the question of multiple relations and split ontologies, Ryan asserts that "[o]ne set of accessibility relations is not always

sufficient to categorize the actual world of a textual universe."[103] Both Pavel and Doležel consider thoroughly the potential for fictional worlds to be split into two layers of ontology or distinct domains which obey different laws. These separate layers are not, of course, alternate or peripheral character worlds, but rather central "territories" within the textual actual world. Ryan does suggest that such worlds (as in the case of medieval mystery plays) can demonstrate "...the historical relativity of the assessment of accessibility relations, and its dependency on explanatory models such as scientific theories and religious revelation."[104] She recognizes that a text may be judged at one point in history as conforming to natural laws, and at another as breaking them, suggesting that "...in the Middle Ages, a story about witches could be told as true of [the actual world]."[105] This is where the discussion of mutual belief principle developed in Chapter Seven is most obviously useful. Reading a medieval narrative about witches, the reader must construct a reference world which accommodates the beliefs of the authorial community.[106] To omit this important aspect of mutual belief from the consideration of accessibility relations leaves a gap in the assessment of "difficult" ontologies.

The Fantastic and Magical Realism: A Question of Belief Systems

Both the pure fantastic, as defined by Tzvetan Todorov, and magical realism are not well explained in Ryan's typological system, precisely because of the need for analysis of mutual belief principle. In both of these genres, it is not so crucial what ***actual*** features of the real world become integrated into the reference world, as what ***believed*** features are allowed entrance. In effect, the generation of fictional truth *reverts* to a mutual belief principle for these text-models, which do not allow world-models to stand independently of belief systems. The reader's assignment of emphasis to aspects which are alternate to reality can only be judged in terms of how reality is mediated by relevant belief systems. The generic landscapes of the fantastic and magical realism involve not only "possibilities" which do not really

belong in the actual world, but those which ***do belong*** in particular real-world belief systems.

In the pure fantastic the text generates an epistemic uncertainty as to whether natural laws are transgressed or not. Because the analysis of accessibility relations presupposes the ability to recognize a particular textual actual world, it is immediately apparent that fantastic narratives pose a special problem. Where narrative authentication procedures are insufficient to sustain an identifiably determinate world, the evaluation of accessibility relations is not practicable, those relations becoming at least partially undecidable. In fantastic narratives the fictional characters generally move from a belief in natural laws, with a consequent necessary explanation of strange occurrences in terms of natural situations such as dreams or hallucination, to a forced acceptance of the possible transgression of those laws. The story world is presumed "normal," but then requires "substitution" in order to integrate supernatural events. The accessibility relation presumed initially to hold cannot be sustained once characters hesitate between a rational and supernatural explanation of events.

Most important for the fantastic is that the reader ***shares*** the dilemma of the characters. Other than the kind of "grand, disjunctive reading" which Currie suggests, there is no way to ***decide*** between the competing/contradictory interpretations.[107] The disjunction provides no resolution, insisting in fact on the fusion of the two conflicting interpretations characteristic of the permanent hesitation typical of the text-model. There is no way to ***choose rationally*** between the conflicting interpretations, inasmuch as fictional truth becomes equally relevant to either interpretation. Faced with the fantastic text-model, the reader must resolve ***not*** to choose. The reader cannot decide which accessibility relations are in force, with the result that the evaluation of ***which*** world-models to integrate into the reference world becomes impossible. Not only must the reader consider the question of natural laws and taxonomy, but all kinds of world-knowledge about psychology, psychic phenomena, madness, dreams, and so on also demand attention as potential explanations. The entire rational knowledge base is called

into play in order to assess the status of story events, as occurrences possibly limited only to peripheral character worlds, and not part of the textual actual world. World-models thus play a ***confrontational*** role, as opposed to realistic texts where reality factors confirm and support story events. The reader's rationality becomes a central ***component*** of the permanent hesitation, as ontological zones are assessed for validity in relation to the exposure and treatment of the characters' secondary levels of reality.[108] The text-model does not permit in any case a final decision about the fictional world's relation to the actual world, which remains forever open and undecidable.

While the fantastic is very profitably addressed in terms of narrative procedures and reader response, expansion to the concepts of authorial and narrative audience as reading roles explains best the importance of belief systems for the fantastic text-model.[109] The kind of permanent hesitation engendered by narrative procedures and activated world-models does not allow the narrative audience to function with any authority, unless a recognition of belief systems also takes place in the role of authorial audience. The "world where the story is told as true" does not contain sufficient fundamental information where no access to mutual beliefs is provided.[110] There is a pressing need to consider more than accessibility to the kinds of world-models identified by Ryan, which in the final analysis defy the reader's attempt to judge their applicability. When the "shift" is made to the recognition of a different possible ontology, it is not only specific devices of narrative transmission which are involved, but also a whole range of cultural expectations and beliefs which attach to the fantastic as a genre. The narrative procedures ***obscure*** authorial norms available through mutual belief principle. It is up to the authorial audience to recognize the ***mediation*** of belief systems. The authorial audience cannot "transmit" adequate information to the narrative audience without evaluating the belief systems relevant to the authorial community.[111] To represent accurately the range of possible ontology for the fictional world, the authorial audience must ***augment*** the full range of empirically universal and culturally specific knowledge with a consideration of belief systems. The beliefs discovered must be what the narrative audience adopts as fictional truth, rather than merely

depending on the qualities of narrative transmission to ascertain that truth.

That belief systems (or mutual belief principle) are recognized, does not of course resolve the permanent hesitation as to what occurs in the fictional world. If anything, this reading procedure helps to preserve the epistemic uncertainty. While belief systems are non-confrontational in relation to the worlds of fairy tales or in medieval contexts where the supernatural is (unanimously) accepted, the fantastic relies on the ***dual*** structure of societal belief. The authorial audience remains "hesitant," never able to determine a final stance for the implied author. The role of narrative audience is constrained through appreciation of how the text-model depends on ***oppositional*** belief systems. Which factors of world-knowledge are applicable remains a controversial issue. But emphasis is shifted from oppositional world-knowledge as such, to the conflicting beliefs ***about*** that knowledge. Generic expectations for the fantastic are thus identifiable within the procedures of the fictional sphere--reading operations which depend on recognition of belief systems external to the fictional world. Fantastic hesitation is seen in terms of permanently ***unstable reference worlds.***

The generation of fictional truth for magical realism functions in much the same way, except for the lack of hesitation and questioning of the status of the supernatural ontology. Akin to "legend" as defined by Ryan, the worlds of magical realism include the supernatural within an otherwise perfectly normal world which accords with world-models. The real and unreal are juxtaposed and blurred together, so that, although historical facts are basic, the particular fictional manipulation of those facts provides a liberation from the usual view of reality. All kinds of folklore can be integrated into the fictional world on an equal footing with historical fact. Because the supernatural is presented as a fully authentic, believable part of the fictional world, the reader must look beyond routine accessibility relations and standard world-models, to the belief systems which underlie the representation. The qualities and capabilities of fictional characters can only be understood within a special belief context. While in the marvelous worlds of fairy tales

story actuality is documented according to text-models, without excessive reference to real-life experience, in the worlds of magical realism ***both*** sets of world-models and literary expectations for marvelous occurrences must be integrated. It is recognized belief systems which must co-ordinate the two sets, fusing them into a unified view of fictional-world ontology. Magical realism consequently posits fictional worlds where reality ***contains*** the magical elements as a matter of mutual belief, reality being transformed in the fiction through the special vision of that belief structure. The authorial audience must relocate (if only temporarily) to that special reality of the relevant belief system, normally re-evaluating real-world history as well in the process.[112]

Consequences of Text-Model Dominance

The entire range of selection procedures/interpretive possibilities discussed in this chapter demonstrates not only how text-models assume dominance, but what some of the consequences are for the structure of fictional worlds. Further consequences are also obvious.

The account shows decisively why a make-believe approach to fictional truth does not address some of the most fundamental interpretive practices. Wrapped up entirely in the question of the reader's make-believe--the role of narrative audience, in effect--Walton does not assess accurately the factors specific to the role of authorial audience, in terms of how text-models influence the generation of fictional truth. Refusing to make the separation between make-believe and knowledge of genre which Currie recognizes (discussed in Chapter Seven), Walton remains trapped in the consideration of only ***part*** of the reading/interpretive operation. Walton addresses the issue of suspense and surprise in terms of what is "fictionally" known (let us say, by the narrative audience), as opposed to what is known (by the authorial audience), suggesting that suspense can be just as great on second readings, after having read a review or heard a discussion, when the endings usual within the oeuvre of an

author are known, or when there is generic labelling present such as "tragedy."[113] The idea is that "fictionally" the reader learns about events "for the first time," and can hence experience surprise.[114] In effect, Walton recognizes only the narrative audience, whom the narrator can be thought to address: "In most cases it is to be understood that fictionally the speaker (narrator) is addressing an audience who does not have prior knowledge of what he says, that he is giving them new information."[115] Using this limited approach, Walton suggests that it is fictional of the spectator (or reader) that he watches (or reads) a play (or novel) for the first time (in effect without knowledge of text-models).[116]

The crucial point which Walton relegates out of his discussion is the role of authorial audience, which takes place ***outside*** of make-believe, and which influences fundamentally which fictional truths must be integrated into the reference world. Recognizing a story's probable outcome on the basis of its label of tragedy or fairy tale, the authorial audience must use the information to inform the "total" reader. Such knowledge is activated outside of the individual game of make-believe, ***before*** the game, and demands inclusion in the reference world. It may not be "fictional" for the narrative audience that Cinderella will automatically triumph, but once recognized by the authorial audience as a fairy-tale heroine, her fate is never in doubt. As this study demonstrates, there are ***all kinds*** of fictional truths which the reader does not learn "fictionally," but rather through knowledge bases entirely external to the text, and governed by the available text-models. The connection between the apparent "novelty" of what the narrative audience "knows" as truth, and what the authorial audience recognizes as conventional context is one of accessibility. Fictional truth exists outside of the limited scope of make-believe.

Although Walton emphasizes the "...independence of what we know to be fictional and what it is fictional that we know"[117] he manages only to relegate what readers know as "external" observers to a position outside of his analysis. The point is obviously to understand the role of the reader's knowledge in the generation of fictional truth, outside of the game of make-believe (and potentially within it). What the reader

knows about fictional characters is clearly not limited to what is (momentarily) fictional of them in a game. The focus on the pretence of the game does not allow the more comprehensive understanding of the complicated interplay of knowledge components. What for Walton is purely a "disorderly" process of boggling complexity is assessed more accurately in terms of reading roles in the fictional sphere. The sphere accommodates all of what the authorial audience knows to be fictional, as well as the related set of what it is fictional that the narrative audience knows. The processing factors discussed above determine the appropriate hierarchies of fictional truth within the matrix, suggesting also the kinds of obscurity, ambiguity, and undecidable relations which are also part of the literary narrative experience.

Instead of Walton's artificially limited analysis, we need to envision fictional truth as a ***combined set*** in the reference world. Only such combination will allow both world- and text-models their rightful place within fictional truth. As ***complementary*** sources of "information" about fictional worlds, ***both*** models are required to construct the reference world. The matrix must govern combination possibilities for the various knowledge bases which create the set. It is ***not*** that world-models can dominate to the extent that entities supernumerary to the actual world must be textually stipulated to qualify for inclusion in the reference world. Even David Lewis' fundamental analysis of "intertextual carry-over" will guarantee recognition of unspecified possibilities such as fire-breathing dragons. And as Ryan points out,

> If reading were wholly conditioned by generic landscapes, [the textual actual world] would accept all the objects constitutive of the landscape, whether or not they are explicitly mentioned in the text, as well as all the additional objects introduced by the text, but it would exclude the elements of reality not included in these two sets.[118]

Text-models clearly ***regulate*** the inclusion of world-models, as my analysis has shown, allowing various ***weights*** to be attached to a reality principle. As a kind of co-ordination between world- and text-models, the operations of the fictional sphere produce a coalition of the applicable sets of fictional truth which depend on both kinds of models.

Text-models will however control the activation of the world-models, assigning priorities among the different interacting knowledge bases.[119]

Clearly the truth of a reference world can only depend on available sources of evidence and interpretive methods. If the reference world is an imagined reality, it can only include what is legitimately generated through the "evidence" unearthed by those interpretive methods. Fictional truth can only depend on the co-ordination of applicable principles within rational inference procedures. As Currie says, "[i]n literary interpretation there is no truth beyond ascertainable truth."[120] Much of what is routinely accepted as fictional truth does not seem to depend on any ***particular*** interpretation, having instead a "universal" quality, whether generated through direct textual stipulation or not. There do seem to be "objective" standards by which we can choose and apply interpretations.

But it is also clear that such "standards" can run aground where texts provoke indeterminacy. Reasonable inference mechanisms are not always sufficient to determine the scope and limitations of fictional truth. As the example of the fantastic shows, some combined sets can be supplanted equally well by others, leaving the final status of fictional truth indeterminate. No "overall" interpretation may be possible, which will accommodate the conflicting truths.

As Rabinowitz points out so well, interpretive strategies must be *chosen*: given certain assumptions, the reader will insist on finding a pattern in virtually anything, whether intended or not.[121] The initial genre choice determines reading strategies. While some patterns are more ***invited*** by texts than others (and consequently less arbitrarily ***imposed*** by the reader) the distinctions of genre will always figure prominently in the assembly of a fictional truth set. As shared reading conventions, genres illuminate interpretive practices.

But a "correct" determination of genre and the attendant accessibility relations is by no means automatic. Reasonable inference alone cannot guarantee an accurate choice of text-models. Textual signals may be confusing, especially as a first reading is begun.

Rabinowitz suggests usefully that "...the attempt to read as authorial audience is ideally a process of matching presuppositions against unfolding text, and revising strategies if the text moves in unanticipated directions."[122] Here Doreen Maitre's concept of "genre-shift" is most applicable again, since the authorial audience must accommodate any change in the structure of the fictional world by re-assessing the suitability of the chosen text-model. The initial genre choice can only remain valid as long as no "surprise" elements appear within the fictional-world structure. While we might be tempted (along with the philosophers) to see ***stipulated*** fictional worlds as unable to surprise us (since exploration is possible only in terms of analysis), we must accept immediately that any changes in world-structures will most ...redly provoke surprise. Were Raskolnikov's sister to be rescued from the dangerous sexual advances of Svidrigailov by a knight in shining armour, the reader would need to make a drastic genre-shift. Such a deviation from the norms of the realistic novel could not be tolerated without re-assessing the applicable text-model, that is, choosing that model anew. To take a less ridiculous example, if the reader reads a novel from a tradition with which he is ***not*** familiar, against the norms of his known tradition, he may well be surprised by all manner of actions/events which are not expected in his native tradition.[123] The reader's experience/competence is thus crucial to reading operations and truth generation.

The question of ***appropriate*** standards looms very large. The accurate generation of fictional truth depends on applying the appropriate text-model to the text at hand. The ***choice*** of that text-model involves the kind of (sometimes intuitive) presuppositions and assumptions about appropriate rules for processing which interest Rabinowitz, who suggests sensibly that

> ...a work's ***precise*** generic placement is often unclear until we have finished reading it. But some preliminary generic judgment is always required even before we begin the process of reading. We can never interpret entirely outside of generic structures: 'reading' ...is always 'reading as.'"[124]

This question of classification is fundamental to fictional truth construction for the reference world. Text-models become names for ways of reading. If the reader reads a text *as* archetypal nineteenth-century realism, he expects to find the qualities of third-person anonymous, past-tense narration which Doležel insists produces authentic fictional truth. But in approaching many other kinds of texts, he will be mistaken to expect this convention, which does not have the universal validity which Doležel suggests, and certainly not for realistic novels which had appeared before such a convention became established. Text-models are "packages of rules" or "ready-made strategies for reading" (to appropriate Rabinowitz' terms for genre),[125] which allow the reader to assemble an accurate reference world, as long as the appropriate text-model is selected. It is not that fictional worlds are not stipulated textually as "autonomous" units with particularly defined individual structures, but that text-models provide the context for the appreciation of those structures in comparison with similar created worlds. The "package" of the text-model allows the reader to recognize ***configurations*** for truth, with the result that the fictional truth of elements which may be "missing" in the stipulated world at hand may be assigned. The resulting more complete set of truths is the textual reference world, which will be accurate only insofar as the initial recognition of text-model is correct.

Obviously text-models exist as highly specific genres, and as broad categories such as epic or tragedy. The ***specificity*** of the selected text-model must have a bearing on the regulation of fictional truth generation. The more precise the model, the more capacity it will have to regulate fictional truth. But within this potential range of specificity, we must also appreciate the way in which text-models *include* one another. Clearly a broad category like escape fiction includes such more specific genres as detective fiction, popular romance, and adventure thrillers.

But while such text-models *within* others may merely contribute incrementally to the set of fictional truths, they may also take on a more subversive function. Anne Hébert's *Les Fous de Bassan* is an excellent example of subversion of the detective genre by which the

reader is tempted to read. Within the novel, a sense of ambiguous ***communal*** guilt takes over--a multiple corruption which can never be fixed through a single agent, however available the detective text-model may be. Although the detective structure is not eradicated, it is the decay and disorder of the social context which forms the central theme of the novel, elevating it from a mere detective story to a highly poetic, metaphorical, and infinitely complex investigation of psychological, moral, and social problems not resolvable through the standard resolution mechanism of the detective genre. The limited text-model will not "contain" this kind of fictional truth.[126]

Beyond the situation of a text which "outgrows" somehow its original text-model, forcing the reader to expand/replace that model, we must also assess how the reader can apply outright the ***wrong*** text-model. Particularly where several interpretive strategies seem available, the reader may not be able to recognize a definitive text-model, or may choose (by reason of lack of literary competence or personal eccentricity) the wrong one. This kind of mistaken generation of a set of fictional truths may in fact produce a reference world which seems internally consistent enough. But it will be a reference world which relies too exclusively on the "evidence" internal to the textually stipulated fictional world, without due attention to the selection of the applicable text-model.

Choosing the wrong text-model can have disastrous results, in that the reader may reach the kind of interpretive dead end discussed by Rabinowitz, Walton, and Currie which is exemplified in James Thurber's famous story "The Macbeth Murder Mystery," where the character misreads the play as a classic detective story, with ridiculous results.[127] The elements characteristic of a murder mystery are there in the but were not intended to have the "salience" they would have in a murder mystery.[128] In the play the elements are construed within a different generic context and are consequently assigned a very different significance. The reader in Thurber's story does not recognize the necessary text-model, interpreting erroneously with the wrong code. Walton prefers to see the misreading as an indiscriminate application of reality principle, since the reader naively evaluates Macbeth's and

Macduff's behaviours in terms of psychological accuracy.[129] The point is that the American woman does not mis-apply world-models directly, but only as interpreted ***through*** the text-model of the detective genre, citing all of the conventions irrelevant in this case. The competent reader not only makes the shift from world-models to the dominant text-model, but also selects the ***right*** one, assigning the correct hierarchy of relevance to the textual elements by reading in the correct generic context.

In addition to misreadings of this sort, reading can also involve situations where ***alternative*** text-models exist, among which it is not possible to decide. Undecidable accessibility relations result, as discussed above for the fantastic. Ambiguity of text-model becomes a source of potential "misreading" in the sense that it may be possible to develop non-equivalent but equally valid fictional truth sets for the same text. As with Currie's analysis of "The Turn of the Screw," (outlined in Chapter Seven), which addresses how reality principle and mutual belief principle are activated, it is the choice of text-model which determines the pattern set up for the reference world. The application of world-models is restricted by the chosen text-model. Reading *as* different genres means that competing systems of interpretation are possible and undecidable, resulting in two possible configurations for the truth matrix. Morson speaks of "boundary works" where "...it is uncertain which of two mutually exclusive sets of conventions governs a work. ...Doubly decodable, the same text becomes, in effect, two different works."[130] While the fantastic is the most obvious example of open choices, such double decoding potential is really characteristic of a wider variety of texts, as Rabinowitz' work suggests. From the reading perspective, genre categories can overlap, so that two kinds of text-models can become equally relevant.[131] The consequences of text-model dominance can be thus complicated in terms of reading procedures, since the text-models do not always provide for unambiguous reference worlds.

Having worked to develop the reference world concept by seeing text-models as dominant, with the function of ***regulating*** world-models, it is now possible to examine the additional complicating factor

of intertext as a particular repertoire for fictional truth. The configuration of truth in the reference world must also accommodate components of knowledge which are gleaned from other texts of various kinds, and which can augment or replace fictional truths based on world- or text-models. The reading procedures of the fictional sphere must "de-segregate" fictional characters and involve any available repertoire in the building of epistemological completeness for those characters.

Notes

[1]Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 101.

[2]Félix Martínez-Bonati, "Towards a Formal Ontology of Fictional Worlds," *Philosophy and Literature* 7.2 (October 1983): 192.

[3]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 158.

[4]Uri Margolin, "Individuals in Narrative Worlds: An Ontological Perspective," *Poetics Today* 11.4 (Winter 1990): 849-52.

[5]Margolin 852.

[6]Margolin 852.

[7]Margolin 852.

[8]Margolin 853.

[9]Miguel de Cervantes, *El ingenioso hidalgo don Quixote de la Mancha* (Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, S.A., 1976) 107. This episode of the third chapter is discussed briefly by Martínez-Bonati, and then elaborated by Marie-Laure Ryan. Considering the dilemma between reading according to world-models and reading according to specific textual stipulations, Martínez-Bonati opposes the invocation of reality principle in genres not committed to realism, suggesting in effect the need for text-models as guiding principles. See Martínez-Bonati 191-2.

[10]Martínez-Bonati 191-2.

[11]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 52.

[12]Ryan 52-3.

[13]Ryan 53.

[14]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundation of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 161.

[15]Walton 163.

[16]Walton 164.

[17]Walton 166.

[18]Walton's prime example is the painting recognized (on an intertextual basis) as representing Sebastian, on grounds which he says cannot be clarified, and which do not become part of the game of make-believe.

[19]Inge Crosman Wimmers, *Poetics of Reading. Approaches to the Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 8.

[20]Pavel 96.

[21]Both Pavel and Gregory Currie (in *The Nature of Fiction* [Cambridge University Press, 1990] 160) point out that stories exist (such as Borges' "Aleph" and Frank Herbert's *Dune*) which have no apparent relation to reality, or are not tied to anything identifiable in the actual world. If we were to insist on world-models in such cases, a kind of "reference failure" would occur in the structure of the reference world.

[22]Ryan 33. Ryan's summarizing chart for the typology appears on 34.

[23]Ryan 33.

[24]Ryan 33.

[25]Ryan 34.

[26]Ryan 34.

[27]Ryan 35.

[28]Ryan 35.

[29]Ryan 35.

[30]Ryan 35.

[31]Ryan 35-6.

[32]Ryan 36.

[33]In Chapter Twelve I explore Brian McHale's assessment of different kinds of alternate history.

[34]It will take the more detailed analysis of Chapter Eleven concerning counterparts and compossibility to sort out the intertextual controls with which the authorial audience must cope in these cases. Chapter Twelve includes analysis of alternate history as a challenge to my model.

[35]Ryan 38.

[36]Ryan 38.

[37]Ryan 36.

[38]Ryan 36.

[39]Ryan 36. Most crucial to the genre is respect for taxonomic compatibility of natural species, without the inclusion of manufactured objects in that relation.

[40]Ryan 37. If space travel leads to planets where the laws of physics no longer hold, there results a kind of split ontology, which Ryan addresses as a separate problem (40), and which I assess ahead.

[41]The perfect example here is that of a textual indication of a "fresh water" tap. Confronted with a realistic world, the authorial audience would be expected to automatically contrast that water with salt water. But the science fiction text-model will suggest perhaps an entirely different opposition to some kind of water recycled for the purposes of washing only.

[42]Doreen Maitre, *Literature and Possible Worlds* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983) 69 and 74.

[43]Ryan 37.

[44]Ryan 37.

[45]Ryan 44.

[46]Ryan 37. "When [chronological compatibility] is still in force, [the textual actual world] is located in some mythical past, and its taxonomic similarity with [the actual world] will be limited to the classes of objects characteristic of preindustrial societies: cottages rather than condominiums, swords rather than guns, and horses as a primary mode of transportation. If [chronological compatibility] is lifted as well, [the textual actual world] will include computers and time-travel, robots and interplanetary vessels, and its heroes will be Spider Man and Wonder Woman rather than knights and princesses" (37).

[47]Ryan 37.

[48]Ryan 37.

[49]Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, *The Complete Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm*, trans. Jack Zipes (New York: Bantam Books, 1992) 7.

[50]Ryan 236.

[51]Ryan 37.

[52]Ryan 37.

[53]Ryan 37.

[54]Ryan 37.

[55]I reserve discussion of postmodern texts for Chapter Twelve, because of their metafictional qualities which necessarily involve questions of intertextual repertoire. Ryan identifies also other types of nonsense produced by transgressions of analytical compatibility,

denying essential properties which define a concept, so that "a young old man" can be said to sit on a "wooden stone" (38).

[56]Ryan 38.

[57]Ryan 39.

[58]Ryan 45.

[59]Ryan 43.

[60]Ryan 43-4.

[61]Ryan 43.

[62]McKillop insists on something similar in his discussion of Tom Jones' sexual encounters. See Alan Dugald McKillop, *The Early Masters of English Fiction* (Lawrence and London: University of Kansas Press, 1956) 128.

[63]Ryan 43.

[64]Ryan 44.

[65]Ryan 44.

[66]Robert Newsom, *A Likely Story. Probability and Play in Fiction* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1988) 3-15.

[67]Ryan 44, my emphasis.

[68]Ryan 44. In this latter case, natural laws may well be broken without destroying realism, as in *The Metamorphosis*. In this content-oriented analysis Ryan does not, of course, deal with the "defining" of realism according to discourse strategies. A study of the reader's role in standard nineteenth-century "transparent" narration (as hinted in Chapter Nine) could explore the important relation between narrative ***form*** and the realistic content which becomes activated in the reference world.

[69]Walton 329.

[70]Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986) 62.

[71]Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis. The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

[72]Ryan 55.

[73]Ryan 55.

[74]Any other valuation will either depart from reality without explicit textual prescription (-sexual), or will not correspond with behaviour (+sexual), with both valuations introducing inappropriately the theme of sexuality into the generic landscape (Ryan 55-6).

[75]Ryan 56, my emphasis.

[76]Ryan 56.

[77]Walton 174-83.

[78]Walton 177.

[79]Walton 175.

[80]Walton 176.

[81]Walton 179.

[82]Walton 180.

[83]It is fascinating that such "competence" was not possible in the eighteenth century as far as the reception of the new realistic novels was concerned. World-models for discourse were *not* disregarded in that context, where realism was made contingent upon the literal truth claim made possible through those models, which stood in the place of potential literary conventions not yet developed or available as reading strategy. The anomalies produced in general by artistic conventions were avoided, in effect, in order to produce the desired impact of verisimilitude and moral worth.

[84]Dealing with tellability requirements for stories generated through computer programs, Ryan introduces this example.(245).

[85]Ryan 245.

[86]Ryan 245.

[87]Ryan 57.

[88]Ryan 57. We do, however, need to know the real-world institutions in order to comprehend the full horror of what happens in *The Trial.*

[89]Ryan 57. We do, of course, allow for "human density" with figural allegories like Virgil in Dante's *Divine Comedy.*

[90]Ryan 57.

[91]Ryan 57-8.

[92]Pavel 93.

[93]Pavel 93.

[94]Ryan's discussion of the principles of thematic focus, stylistic filtering, and probabilistic emphasis (discussed in the last section above) are relevant here.

[95]Routley includes "...enough to encompass the material the work alludes to or relies upon but does not set down explicitly, enough to enable the story to be understood and avert certain misunderstandings, and no more." Logical and empirical world-knowledge is excluded where not "necessary to comprehension." See Richard Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items* (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980) 542.

[96]Ryan 56.

[97]Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1981) 23 and 228.

[98]Eco 23.

[99]Rabinowitz 43-4 and 47-75.

[100]Rabinowitz 44.

[101]Rabinowitz 47-9.

[102]Rabinowitz refers to Gary Morson's discussion of this problem in *The Boundaries of Genre. Dostoevsky's* Diary of a Writer *and the Traditions of Literary Utopia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 42.

[103]Ryan 40.

[104]Ryan 41.

[105]Ryan 41.

[106]Likewise, reading some science fiction texts, the reader must recognize that what ***no longer*** violates chronology and Ryan's narrow version of taxonomy for manufactured objects still constitutes a genuine violation of such accessibility relations ***for the authorial community***, as in the example of Jules Verne's *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea.* The compatibility of these relations for the modern reader is not sufficient for an accurate construction of the reference world. World-models involving technological change must be assigned according to the context of mutual belief, no less than those which involve the "violation" of natural laws.

[107]Currie 103. For Currie the best interpretation for *The Turn of the Screw* is "...one in which it is true in the story that either the governess really sees ghosts or she suffers delusions and does not really see them, but in which neither disjunct taken by itself is true in the story" (103).

[108]See May Charles, "A Possible-World Semantic Approach to World Structures and Narrative Transmission in the Fantastic Tale," thesis, University of Alberta, 1987, 101-4, for a discussion of the mechanisms of dual reader response and the relation of the exposure of secondary levels of reality to the reader's perception of authenticity for the second ontological zones. Space does not permit analysis here of how the concept of authorial

audience could refine the thesis, showing perhaps how narrative techniques relate through narrative audience to the more consciously "knowledgeable" role of authorial audience.

[109]For a detailed analysis of the quality and results of narrative transmission in the fantastic see Charles. In the interest of brevity I have not duplicated that analysis here.

[110]My analysis here depends on the exposition of mutual belief principle provided in Chapter Seven.

[111]The modern/recent decline in the popularity of the fantastic probably has to do with the present difficulty of locating relevant belief worlds from within a context of more cynical rejection of supernatural phenomena. It is too easy nowadays to "write off" fantastic worlds as explainable in natural terms, thereby destroying the hesitation required of the authorial audience.

[112]Another way of assessing magical realism (which is most applicable for the novels of Miguel Asturias) is to recognize two conflicting belief systems: that of the Western/European "factual" account, and that of Indian folklore, which includes the "magical" world view.

[113]Walton 263.

[114]Walton 261.

[115]Walton 264.

[116]Walton 264.

[117]Walton 264.

[118]Ryan 56.

[119]Ryan's analysis of principles of aesthetic awareness which must be incorporated into a computer program for generating stories is relevant here (249-57). This kind of aesthetic awareness really constitutes what real readers expect of particular genres, relating both to Rabinowitz' rules of notice, and Walton's discussion of deviations from reality- and mutual belief principles.

[120]Currie 102.

[121]Rabinowitz 178-9, 181.

[122]Rabinowitz 189.

[123]Rabinowitz 72. Rabinowitz further suggests that what surprises the reader may be even formulaic in the unknown tradition. And formulas vary, of course, from genre to genre (70).

[124]Rabinowitz 176.

[125]Rabinowitz 177.

[126]Anne Hébert, *Les Fous de Bassan* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982).

[127]James Thurber, "The Macbeth Murder Mystery," *The Thurber Carnival* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1931) 60-3.

[128]Currie 119.

[129]Walton 150.

[130]Gary Saul Morson, *The Boundaries of Genre. Dostoevsky's* Diary of a Writer *and the Traditions of Literary Utopia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 48.

[131]Culler's example of Flaubert's *Salammbô* as ambiguous between real or mythical world status because of a hesitation between metaphorical and metonymical reading strategies, is a good case in point. See *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 60-1.

Chapter Eleven: The Intertextual Grid as Reading Strategy

Standard philosophical positions about the "world-bound" quality of fictional characters prove remarkably ***unworkable*** for analysis of how fictional truths are generated through reading procedures. While the philosophy is ***accurate*** in semantic terms, it does not account for the reader's normal appreciation of intertextual characters. Even theories like those of Kendall Walton and Gregory Currie, which rely heavily on the reader's participation in terms of make-believe, do not reflect accurately the quality of intertextual "comparison" involved in any encounter with a fictional world. The whole idea that fictional characters are somehow "locked inside" story worlds contravenes much of literary critical practice, which openly acknowledges the role of all kinds of intertextual interaction, including such things as adaptations, parodies, the context of the oeuvre of an author, structures of myth, and a whole range of world-models which can be seen *as* intertext.[1] We need only consider a work like Dante's *Divine Comedy* to appreciate instantly that such works cannot be read as if intertextual connections do not exist. Dante's characters seem to "migrate" to his fictional world from all kinds of other cultural texts, including that of contemporary reality, necessitating the copious footnotes which allow the reader to recognize the intertextual connections. In spite of any perception of a convenient "ontological homogeneity" among all fictional characters within a story, many characters are at least "versions" of other literary or historical figures which gain entry somehow into the fictional world. While philosophers are troubled by the idea of such "ontological" access among worlds, literary scholars routinely accept a kind of intertextual "transworld identity" for characters who seem to migrate between fictional worlds, and between such worlds and reality. The "originals" which exist in other literature or in cultural/historical texts inevitably influence the reading of other versions. By assigning an autonomy to fictional worlds which segregates them from extra- and intertextual knowledge, Lubomír

Doležel and others working in fictional-world semantics have lost the ability to account for such critical practice. Fictional truth is not locked away within isolated fictional worlds, but depends on the intertextual context or repertoire which must ultimately provide a measure for what is *vraisemblable* in Jonathan Culler's terms. Even where textual evidence seems to thwart intertextual identity, the reader makes intuitive assumptions about the "continuity" of fictional characters across worlds. Only drastic, specified violations will stop the process, which depends on a kind of "default" not unlike that for world-model activation.

This chapter considers the "recycling" of ***knowledge*** as central to intertext, defining how such knowledge is different from and can interact with world- and text-models. Access among the worlds of various texts is defined in ***epistemological*** terms. I first present the actual situation of what the reader equipped with a certain "cultural baggage" does with intertext, as problematic from the perspective of how the philosophers in possible-worlds theory are willing to proceed. I define the intertextual grid, providing examples of the most fundamental kinds of intertextual knowledge routinely available as repertoire. I then define the particular problems involved with historical variants. The philosophical dilemmas of transworld identity and counterparthood I discuss for both interfictional and historical variants, establishing ***through*** the philosophical debate the necessity for analysis of epistemic issues and cognitive reading processes. In order to show the ***extent*** of usefulness of transworld identity, I outline potential kinds of change possible for intertextual characters, suggesting conditions for identity and counterparthood. In conclusion I suggest how reading procedures are governed by the intertextual operator.

Defining the Intertextual Grid

It has always been clear in literary scholarship that readers make inferences according to intertextual frames, that is, according to what

they know from other literature and from cultural texts. The (competent) reader is "programmed" to borrow from a treasury of intertextuality, recognizing ***relations*** among texts, as numerous studies have shown. The concept of intertextuality is central to several important theories of reading--not only Culler's and Peter Rabinowitz', but also those of Genette and Michael Riffaterre, to name only a few. In all of the available theories, reference is construed as not from word to fictional world, but from text to text. Seen in this way, reading for fictional truth can only occur against the background of something already written, or more accurately, already read. When the reader "recovers" other texts, he sets up a ***particular*** frame of reference through the perceived play of intertextuality, which transforms "foreign" textual material into components of fictional truth for the text at hand. For fictional truth to be generated on this basis, the reader must perceive the relationship between the text at hand and others which can serve in some way as a ***repertoire*** for truth. Theorists such as Riffaterre typically define intertext in terms of this reading ***role*** which assesses the trace of intertext available textually, insisting that intertextuality is the very "mechanism" by which readers read and produce significance beyond textually inscribed "meaning."

Obviously the idea of intertext ***as a reading operation*** is most useful to show how the reader identifies a repertoire of fictional truth ***for the reference world.*** The reader must ***choose*** the appropriate intertext in order to assess possibilities accurately. And as Rabinowitz points out, this choice is not determined only by the text at hand, but also by "...the reader's assumptions about the proper intertextual grid, assumptions made in part before even starting the book."[2] This idea of an intertextual grid enables us to see intertext as a particular reading strategy for fictional truth generation. It is not a matter of "knowing" somehow what the author intended as other texts to have in mind, but rather of ***assigning*** a work or set of works against which to judge fictional truth. Rabinowitz shows that rules of configuration, notice, and coherence all depend on the intertextual grid on which a text is placed.[3] In terms of constructing coherent truth worlds, the reading process is by no means only subjective, but relies on recognizing coherence in terms of similarity to other texts deemed to belong to the

intertextual grid. This "mapping" on an intertextual grid is thus an important part of the operations of the fictional sphere.

Some of Walton's concerns with counterexamples to reality- and mutual belief principle (as introduced in Chapter Ten) can be effectively addressed by recognizing the interpretive power of the intertextual grid. When Walton speaks about the fact that any child can draw a witch, or that we all know that unicorns are white,[4] he needs to consider the importance of ***cultural fictions*** which automatically include such non-existent entities as witches and unicorns. If the reader makes implications in many cases not sanctioned by reality- or mutual belief principle, she does so because of intertextual knowledge activated. To create a "principle" ***modelled on*** reality- or mutual belief principle will not capture the role of cultural fictions in the generation of fictional truth in such cases. The inference must be assessed in terms of the intertextual grid which sanctions it. The only way to recognize this kind of truth generation is to identify the relationship between the inferred truth and the repertoire for truth provided by the intertextual grid.

It is in fact common literary critical practice to assert the intertextual nature of all literary texts--to ask what any text presupposes. It is not so important that the text *itself* cites or transforms some prior discourse, but that standard reading operations *create* this kind of intertextuality. It is the *reader* who presupposes and assumes, in order to "reveal" fictional truth or to build a more complete structure for that truth. It is necessary then to see what has been accomplished in existing scholarship which can help to define the reading operations responsible for identifying a *repertoire* for fictional truth in the reference world.

To define the concept of intertextuality through existing scholarship we must recognize first of all the two broad categories mentioned in Chapter Five, the first being a kind of general cultural discursive space to which prior texts contribute, and the second, a precise analyzable relationship with other texts. The first makes possible the generation

of particular fictional truths according to the "anonymous code," while the second provides a more precise repertoire of applicable truths.[5]

Relying on Roland Barthes' concept of intertextual codes as an ungraspable mirage of citations and the "already read," Culler clarifies the idea of a general discursive intertextuality.[6]

> [I]n so far as it focuses on intelligibility, on meaning, 'intertextuality' lead us to consider prior texts as contributions to a code which makes possible the various effects of signification. Intertextuality thus becomes less a name for a work's relation to particular prior texts than a designation of its participation in the discursive space of a culture.[7]

In this way, Culler hopes to identify not specific intertextual relationships in terms of influences or sources, but rather "...anonymous discursive practices, codes whose origins are lost, that make possible the signifying practices of later texts."[8]

While remaining a somewhat vague concept, this kind of intertextuality does involve the kind of ***sum*** of knowledge which this study has been trying to define as determinant for the generation of fictional truth. It is this very emphasis on the intersubjectively valid or the shared acknowledgment of intertextual discursive structures which sustains the concept of fictional sphere. This sense of intertextuality suggests a general context for reading which defines the parameters of fictional truth, in a way similar to that in which a known language allows the reader to understand. The "language" suggests conventions and descriptive systems at the reader's disposal. Ideally, the interaction of knowledge bases entailed by this kind of intertextuality is definable within the fictional sphere. Unfortunately, in practice it is difficult to determine precisely what might constitute the largely undefinable cultural discursive space, or what world-models will automatically become embedded within that "space." Even considering intertextuality as a reading operation does not fully solve the problem.

Culler himself recognizes the basic difficulty in making a general discursive intertextuality the direct object of attention. "The attempt to demonstrate the importance of intertextuality leads one to focus on the other discourses identifiable in and behind a discourse and to try to specify them."[9] The broad concept leads to the more specific emphases.

The second broad category of intertextuality is, then, a more precise relationship between texts--a restriction of the concept--and is more directly useful here, in that the intertextual reading process acknowledges the importance of prior texts for fictional truth. Culler maintains that tracking down sources with precision does not constitute a suitable paradigm for the description of intertextuality, which must instead be conceived as a general discursive space which renders texts intelligible.[10] The general theory of intertextuality is put into question by the more specific interpretive procedures. In effect, intertextual analysis falls into the kinds of traditional source studies which the concept of intertextuality was designed to transcend, the particular focus imposed undermining the general concept.[11] In spite of such considerations, it is obvious that fictional worlds can never be "autonomous" given that fictional truth must depend on specific intertextual relations. What is assumed about fictional truth must involve knowledge of specific previous texts.

Routinely in literary criticism intertextuality has been discussed as particular intertextual relations (in terms of identifiable sources), such as allusion, citation, borrowing, reminiscences, stylization, negations, and so on. Or intertextuality is explored as the study of themes and motifs, or literary topoi, or composition/narrative patterns or schemes, including archetypal plots. This kind of collage of intertextual elements involves purely *formal* aspects, or relations on the level of expression, without concern for semantic content. In effect, such criticism focused on the "presence" of one text in another deals with the artefacts of real texts, analysing the ***methods*** of portrayal employed, without concern for *what* is portrayed.

Typically, artistic procedures are identified and catalogued, as exemplified by the Russian formalists. Riffaterre and others identify

how the special reference involved with literature works, in terms of how reference is not to an individual or state of affairs, but rather to other texts and the cultural descriptive systems which have evolved as a result of the intertextual connections. In terms of fictional content, then, there is no way to avoid the influence of the larger system of discourse into which the fictional text must fit.

For fictional character, intertextuality serves as a means to create cultural paradigms of human behaviour, whether that behaviour originates in literary or socio-historical texts. New versions of Faust, Don Juan, Robinson Crusoe, or Don Quixote become "naturalized" according to the prior texts in which they appear. Rather than seeing the new fictional character in terms of purely human attributes, the reader identifies a character like the Byronic hero in terms of the descriptive system available through several textual sources. In recognizing the instantiation of a pre-existing type, the reader considers all sources of information available--not only models which the narrative discourse itself may make available, but also intertextual models, both as specific, named individuals and as models of a more general nature such as the clever servant or the social parvenu. Beyond purely literary models are those specific to the larger cultural context, which belong to the reader's world-knowledge. All of these interconnections made by the reader contribute systematically to the generation of fictional truth about the character. The truth structure of the reference world must depend on how the interplay among such elements works and meshes with world- and text-models. The reader brings world-knowledge and generic expectations to bear in appreciating a Don Juan character, but also augments that knowledge with information produced through intertextuality.

Everything that we can speak about in terms of a stock of familiar details or "formulaic" elements becomes relevant, then, to the analysis of fictional truth. Deviations from such a "stock" often become highly salient, necessitating drastic reappraisals of the truth structure of the reference world. On the other hand, what adheres to the "formula" may go almost unnoticed as a fictional truth, integrated automatically into the reference world. It is a question of recognizing meaningful patterns

which become the template or intertextual grid on which fictional truth can be built. Rather than the dominant differences highlighted in deconstructive criticism, it is really the ***similarities*** which become most important for the generation of fictional truth. In his search for coherence, the reader finds many ways to name and "bundle" fictional truth, often insisting on similarity and a parallel relationship with the truths developed in other texts. The competent reader assumes that parallel intertextual elements are "obvious" to him for a reason, and that to ignore them would amount to ignoring readily available fictional truths. It is not that interpretive disputes are necessarily ruled out, but that shared processes can be identified, some crediting particular intertextual strategies more than others. And those strategies need not depend on an intertext inscribed deliberately within the text.

Emphasis on the reading role demonstrates how reading ***operations*** are intertextual, with the result that the reference world "absorbs" truths from other texts, becoming in the process a larger truth world, or one which contains a better defined structure of fictional truth. The point is that while the quality of narrative procedures can be a decisive factor in generating fictional truth, the formal intertextual connections often provoked through that narration must also produce an effect. Textual narrative techniques and related intertextuality are ***both*** means at the reader's disposal to build fictional truth. Fictional truth is thus never the individual achievement of a text in isolation. Content as such is altered through the formal procedures which identify areas of potential semantic expansion or exemplification. Fictional truths carried over intertextually can transform the structure of the reference world.

Kinds of Repertoire

In order to demonstrate how important the specific relationships between texts can be, we need to look at some basic kinds of repertoire available for fictional truth. We can look usefully at ***parody*** as one such relationship. If literary tradition provides some kind of

"independent" force in the potential for organizing fictional truth, one of its most important roles is the instigation of parody. The complexity of literary signification and the reader's role in generating fictional truth is well exemplified by examining the functioning of parody. Roger Fowler defines parody most usefully as a calculated and analytic technique which "...searches out, by means of subversive mimicry, any weakness, pretension or lack of self-awareness in its original..." whether that original is a specific text or the collective style of a group of writers.[12] Fowler's stress on analytic mimicry as the distinguishing feature, with derision or ridicule as an optional component, is most crucial. As Linda Hutcheon explains, parody "...is a form of imitation, but imitation characterized by ironic inversion, not always at the expense of the parodied text. Parody is ...repetition with critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity."[13] The reader's attention to resemblance and difference permits a special *kind* of naturalization process involving expectations for intertextuality.

The main limitation of the critical work which has been done with parody, however, is that it focuses on *style* as the vehicle, basically identifying kinds of parody in terms of various qualities of ironic distance created through definable ***procedures*** which would be available to any subsequent writer. The emphasis on the technical strategies of the expression level does not address effectively the consequences of parody for fictional content or truth structures.

Clearly, if a fictional text stipulates a world which it populates with individuals who first appeared in other texts, and creates a parodic relationship to the intertextual originals, the reader must abandon at least some of his knowledge about real persons as models, substituting what he knows of the original literary creations. In Henry Fielding's novels, for example, when literary strategies of parody and burlesque assume prominence, world-models become a less automatic default, suggesting even a deterioration of realistic effect. As Marie-Laure Ryan says of parody, "...the reader does not regard [parodied] individuals as pseudo persons but as pseudo literary creations..."[14] If we read one of the many available parodies, burlesques, or "unofficial" adventures of Sherlock Holmes, we do not look to a real-world model, but rely on the

original works by Conan Doyle for intertextual definition of the character. In other words, the "new" character stands primarily in a relation of being ***alternate*** to the original literary character, and not to a model from world-knowledge. As a result, parody is so useful in exposing the delusions of fictional characters, like Don Quixote, who pattern their behaviour on known literary conventions. In effect, the reader cannot "relocate" to a fictional world ***directly*** from her own system of reality, but must route epistemic access ***through*** the original text, juxtaposing the "orders" established in the two texts. In Culler's terms, "...the dominance of the parodist's own *vraisemblance* is temporarily asserted."[15] This extra cognitive operation complicates the processes of the fictional sphere, having an effect ultimately on the quality of the more personal imaginative operations of make-believe eventually carried out.

Rabinowitz also deals with parody briefly as part of his analysis of how new works use the audience's knowledge of the original.[16] For parody, Rabinowitz decides that the authorial audience knows the original, while the narrative audience does not. As a result, parody emphasizes the pleasurable recognition of the authorial audience, diminishing thereby the reader's involvement in the narrative level.[17] This analysis is helpful because clearly with parodic texts the narrative illusion of a fictional reality created textually is ***undermined*** by the reader's knowledge of intertextual relations. The total epistemic access of the authorial audience renders the epistemic position of the narrative audience radically incomplete.

Even more striking than the intertextual repertoire of parody is that of the oeuvre of a particular author. We need only think of Balzac, Faulkner, or Beckett to realize that while the reader routinely naturalizes a fictional world according to the macro-semantic constraints which define that world--assessing, as narrative audience, its *vraisemblance* according to that autonomous structure--he also ***extends*** the assessment of *vraisemblance* to the larger oeuvre of the author. While fictional worlds created by ***different*** authors are clearly disjoint, and hence do not seem conducive to allowing the entry of individuals from other texts, except in the form of versions of

prototypes, the case of worlds created by the same author is somewhat more complicated. The ***modern*** reader is ordinarily willing to think of the fictional character as originated ***by*** the writer, as opposed to mythological contexts. In assessing potential fictional truth the (competent) reader routinely assigns an appropriate background ***group*** of fictional works by the same author. All kinds of features, from various stylistic "formulas" to particular characters and their actions become plausible (or implausible) with respect to the norms identifiable within the oeuvre. This kind of intelligibility depends fundamentally on understood constitutive conventions, but results in particular consequences for truths about fictional characters. In effect, a kind of ***intertextual*** minimal departure allows the reader to generate particular fictional truths. Ryan suggests that when "...a fiction includes the universe of another fiction in its system of reality..." the fictional world will be construed as adhering as much as possible to the universe of the larger oeuvre.[18]

In effect, the reader presumes the same fictional "world," but a ***larger*** one, best exemplified by the case of romans-fleuve. It seems intuitively correct that in such cases the individuals existing in the separate fictional worlds amount to only partial descriptions of one "complete" individual made up of all of the descriptions, and need not be thought of in terms of a prototype and various versions. The issue of compossibility is ***expanded*** in the case of *retour de personnages* to encompass a larger, continuous "super-text" to which the individual texts belong. As long as the original and version occur within an oeuvre, and their worlds are not structurally incompatible, the reader is entirely likely to view the separate texts as partial descriptions of the same character's story. In effect, the multiple stories about the same character are "episodes" which contribute to the ***large*** story which encompasses them all, and each contain only ***partial*** specifications about the character.[19]

The kind of social universe established in Balzac's *Comedie humaine* allows the reader to appreciate not only fictional truth obviously specific to the immediate textual world, but also that which belongs to the larger set of the more "epic" social scene--that which the reader

must recognize as *applicable* within the smaller, immediate context. Fictional worlds *combine* to produce other larger super-worlds. The technique does not undermine the authenticity of the fictional constructs, but rather reinforces the basic qualities prized for realism. If anything, the recurrence of characters seems to corroborate the illusion of a "real" existence beyond words.

This reading operation is not only encouraged in large enterprises such as Balzac's *Comedie humaine*, but also in oeuvres where there are only more *incidental* references to characters from other stories. In Carlos Fuentes' preface to the collection of stories *Burnt Water*, he insists on his use of characters from his other stories--from a larger fictional super-world:

> I own an imaginary apartment house in the center of Mexico City. The penthouse is occupied by an old revolutionary turned profiteer, Artemio Cruz. In the basement lives a ghostly sorceress, Aura On the eleven intermediary floors you will find the characters of the stories that are now collected here.[20]

And within his stories, Fuentes consistently refers to other characters from previous stories, if only briefly and peripherally. He creates, in effect, a *single* large fictional world as the context for *all* of the stories, just as traditionally realistic writers like Balzac or Zola undertook to establish vast fictional universes meant to *encompass* all of the novels and include characters who can consequently appear in any of the individual fictional worlds. But in Fuentes' case no real roles are played by the intertextual characters in the new fictions.

The operations of the fictional sphere insist on the recognition of the encompassing story world of romans-fleuve. Fictional worlds are not really "paired one-to-one" with fictional stories, as Gregory Currie suggests in order to discredit the usefulness of the concept of fictional world.[21] On such a model it is impossible to show how characters "move about" in a fictional super-world, the reader becoming trapped *instead* in a convenient technical view of prototype/surrogate relations in order to preserve a technically pure view of compossibility. Multiple

origins for fictional truth ensure that there is no one-on-one relationship between truth sets and textual worlds. Not dependent only on a corresponding story, the reference world must be built from additional sources of truth which the text triggers--not only the world- and text-models already elaborated, but also the repertoire made most obvious in the case of romans-fleuve and sequels.

Because sequels by the same author imply a single, large story world, the relation among intertextual characters is not successfully conceived as a counterpart relation. A "cast" of characters recurs, most logically at a temporal phase subsequent to the earlier text, but involved in the same world, and usually preserving their most salient ir[illegible]nal properties. Margolin deals with this issue in terms of temporal extensions, where there is no ***logical*** contradiction even in property changes, because of the very possibility of change over time.[22] World-models available to the reader confirm such possibilities.

Any kind of temporal extension presupposes what the reader knows of the original character, ***as if*** the textual source were ***the same as reality***. Rabinowitz' very brief comments about ***expansions*** (and completions and sequels as variants of the technique) are important here. Rabinowitz suggests that with such works the narrative audience believes the original to be true.[23] In effect, the narrator presumes that familiarity for his narrative audience, refusing in any way to destroy that kind of illusion. As opposed to the situation of parody, where no large, encompassing super-world is recognized by the narrative audience, with sequels, the reader is ***encouraged*** to make the ***total*** commitment to the intertextual link. The result is an ***increased*** involvement on the narrative level, the illusion of the fictional world being actually ***reinforced*** by the narrative audience's awareness of intertext. The informed epistemic position of the narrative audience contributes to a more totally complete impression of the fictional world. Where such background "truths" involve ***radical*** changes, the result will not be the same.

Within contexts where inferences are made from novel to novel, the old problem of truth proliferation is also obvious. When a series of

novels are linked together involving the same characters, even closure can be "re-opened" for the subsequent novels. No individual truth need remain final, as in the case of Madame de Rochefide at the end of Balzac's *Sarrasine*--a character much too interesting to remain ***permanently*** disgusted with life and love, in spite of what she may say.[24] In many cases, characters seem to have a "future" whether they appear in later novels or not, since they exist in a world extended beyond textual stipulation, having the kind of "kinetic" quality to which Thomas Docherty alludes.[25] Where must such intertextual inferences stop? The reader must always evaluate to what extent the entire fictional super-world must be carried over from novel to novel.

A similar, but more difficult problem in terms of the temporal ordering of texts, is presented by the structure of ***myth*** into which fictional worlds must fit. Individual fictional worlds are clearly ***augmented*** by mythological context, where such context is applicable. Thomas Pavel's analysis of the changing relationships possible between myth and fiction makes clear the inescapable impact of mythological structures.[26] Myths and legends mutually recognized in the authorial community can instigate implications quite independent of world-knowledge or recognition of a text-model. Nor will a straightforward application of mutual belief principle explain adequately the effect, since a specific ***intertextual*** repertoire of truth is involved. The fictional world must take its place within a "family tree" of similar worlds, each populated with the same or similar characters, and "overlapping" with one another to varying degrees. Even the mere use of ***names*** which suggest a larger cultural context extends automatically the frame of reference for truth, showing a line of "inspiration" among stories.[27]

In spite of the post-Romantic insistence on originality in the creation of narrative, and the sense of characters often being ***originated*** by writers, the age-old reliance of writers on existing stories and myth structures persists, in the sense that writers and readers still routinely expand fictional truth on the basis of an inherited repertoire. The structural studies which have attempted to identify universal plot patterns are of little use in addressing this problem,

having been repudiated through rigorous analysis of actual narrative structures. The "open" intertextuality of ***oral*** narratives within a particular culture is in fact replaced in written narrative with a much more complex interplay of originality and available repertoire.

One main problem with mythological context is the fact that "source" worlds are temporally unordered. Where there is a cycle of stories which begin "once upon a time," there is no way to create arbitrarily a temporal alignment or chronological order. As Margolin explains, we are left with the "...quest for a generic [individual], an invariant, abstract pattern which can be extrapolated from the whole series and claimed to underlie all the stories."[28] Similarity must be crucial in such cases for both individuals and worlds, as the reader searches out a kind of "mega-prototype" whose features are collected among several possibly intermediary versions.[29]

Another problem for the construction of accurate reference worlds is the decision as to where such intertextual inference must stop, given the complexity of the intertextual interplay. To what extent can transcendent models from myth be transposed into fictional worlds without overextending the "boundaries" of those worlds? Many studies have focused on archetypal or symbolic interpretations which resist assessment of their accuracy. Such interpretations of fictional truth can in fact be produced indefinitely without any definitive "proof" of intertextual connections. In effect, much routine criticism creates ***gratuitously*** an intertextual relationship which exists in an undefinable "vacuum" rather than a publicly shareable reference world. The unsubstantiated intertextuality based on analogical or "metaphorical" interpretation only contributes to the pervasive problem of the proliferation of fictional truth, without suggesting any means to see how that proliferation can be controlled.

The basic problem in assessing necessary limitations on the intertextual repertoire for fictional truth is the confusing interplay between world-models as knowledge, and the role of intertext as a knowledge base. Intertextual "exchanges" of fictional truth frequently involve world-models which become ***intertext***. As a source of

knowledge about reality, *texts* allow the reader to build a representation of reality. Texts "transmit" reality in a form not actually available through direct personal experience. In effect, the whole of reality is divisible into various texts which substantiate and interpret it. It is not only that fictional individuals who originate in myth or history seem to become part of the structure of world-knowledge, apparently "routed" somehow through "reality" to the reference world. The problem is that specific world-knowledge (the "actual") about mythological or historical characters fits not only into the category of world-models, but also doubles as a component of actual *texts*. It is necessary, then, to assign priority to the relations among texts as potential objects of knowledge, understanding pragmatic, interpretive strategies as ***intertextual*** operations which can isolate relevant truths for the construction of the reference world. Real-world "facts" belong to actual texts which are assimilated, and then activated for the generation of fictional truth in particular contexts.

While we can speak of reality as seen through all kinds of texts, some of which are in fact "unwritten," history is perhaps the easiest to grasp. All historical "fact" appears to us in the form of texts. We need to address the issue of historical reality ***as text***, since there really is no historical context for fictional worlds other than the textual. The reader extracts models for fictional truth through the relationships among the textual documents. An ***actual*** historical reality is never really accessible outside of a more or less arbitrary representation, and is always relative to someone's more or less subjective account. Reality is created, in effect, by conventional practices--constituted (and sometimes altered) within verbal artifacts. ***Current*** information about reality in the form of news is of course similar.

A most interesting result of this fundamental sense of intertextuality among fictional and cultural texts is that fictional texts can have an impact comparable to non-fictional texts on real-world perception. In a way similar to Doreen Maitre's insistence on the reciprocity relation between fiction and reality, Ryan suggests that "[t]hrough an ***inversion*** of the principle of minimal departure, knowledge about the real world may be derived not only from texts

purporting to represent reality, but also from texts openly labeled and recognized as fiction."[30] In effect, areas of informational deficiency become construed as the closest possible to a particular fictional world.[31] Certainly Don Quixote and Emma Bovary would have no objection to this inversion of the principle of minimal departure, willfully using as they do literary characters as role-models in society.

Historical Variants

Nicholas Rescher's analysis of supernumeraries and actual-variants provides a basis for the discussion of historical variants.[32] Bearing in mind Currie's discussion of purely "fictional" characters with "empty" names, we can see the value of Rescher's evaluation of supernumeraries, as really new entities altogether different from actual ones--those which Parsons would also consider "native" to the possible world. Rescher's analysis of actual-variants likewise provides a more accurate vision than does Currie's discussion of "historical" characters.

Rescher really *differentiates* David Lewis' concept of possible worlds as the countless ways in which things could have been different, by establishing the categories of actual-variant and supernumerary as constructions built from the domain of the actual. Obviously, typically realistic fictional worlds are *proximately* possible, in that they include the taxonomic structure of the real world, and possibly even counterparts (or actual-variants) of real-world people. The knowledge bases discussed in Chapter Eight, and as involved in Ryan's taxonomy of accessibility relations, necessitate the development of this kind of proximity. Fictional characters are routinely individuated on the basis of real-world prototypes whenever the relevant world-models are not overruled by text-models. But the range of more *remotely* possible worlds explored through Ryan's typology also include the possibility of wholly "different" supernumerary individuals, as the *merely* possible. Identical with the fundamental idea of stipulation, an "hypothesis of incarnation" produces the supernumerary character, which, in the

absence of actuality prototypes, is individuated solely on the basis of description.[33]

With actual-variants the reader becomes aware of problems of compossibility, in that historical variants are not independent of their original "environment." What results when fictional and historical characters interact in a fictional world where historical facts are interpolated with purely fictional truths? To what extent must versions of actual individuals remain tied to the set of individuals and laws fundamental to the real world? In keeping with Ryan's compatibility of inventory and minimal departure, must historical characters necessarily bring with them the entire population of the real world?[34] How do we prevent such a population from assuming an active significance in the reference world? Where different laws obtain for the fictional world in terms of accessibility relations, is it still possible to integrate versions of actual individuals into the corresponding reference world? What happens when versions of historical characters are "subjected" to changed laws? The answers lie in a more detailed account of potential counterparts.

A crucial problem with fiction is, then, that it does not only include fictional entities, since it can be "about" real people or things that actually exist. It may even make statements about those people or things which are true out there in reality. Speaking about fictional characters, both inside the text and outside of it, often involves this disturbing "reference" to reality. It can be difficult to distinguish between (or separate) fictional from non-fictional statements, because of the intimate interplay of real and fictional elements within fiction.

One fundamental (if only superficially accurate) approach is again the idea of a change in ontological status for all entities as they cross the border into a fictional world. As Pavel suggests, "[f]ictional texts enjoy a certain discursive unity; for their readers, the worlds they describe are not necessarily fractured along a fictive/actual line."[35] The result is not only that fictional characters are just as "real" as historical ones, but that the historical ones assume also a fictional status. All are equally fictional rather than real. Doležel's insistence

on the ontological homogeneity among all fictional characters regardless of their historical basis provides an "easy" way out.[36] Fictional worlds are accessible from other texts, including those which represent reality, only by having the original individual or prototype assume the ***status*** within the fiction of a possible alternate.[37] In Doležel's terms, Rescher's supernumeraries would be characters which do not depend for their existence on actual prototypes, while actual-variants do, but take on a purely fictional status within the sovereign fictional world. Obviously the fictional version has a changed ontological status as actual-variant. No fictional statement about him can alter in any way the ***real*** person implicated. John Woods carefully distinguishes between true "...statements which contribute to the life or history of the object involved, and those that make no such contribution."[38] Fictionalizations of real people necessarily involve reference only to some kind of version or counterpart with a different ontological status. Creatures created purely from language owe their "existence" to creative procedures, and can only belong together in an at least ***technically*** segregated world.

The best way to demonstrate the obvious value of the view of the ontological homogeneity of fictional characters is to cite some playful ***violations*** in fiction. Woody Allen's story "The Kugelmass Episode" is an excellent case in point, in which the real does ***not*** change in status, so that a real-world person can interact physically with a purely fictional character, thereby ***conflating*** the notions of fictionality and truth.[39] While realistic texts reassure the reader that in spite of real-world "originals" all fictional characters are technically specified by the text, other texts such as Flann O'Brien's *At Swim-Two-Birds*, Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, or Part Two of *Don Quixote* prefer to show how characters can engage in activities which seem to invent the very mind to whom they owe their existence.[40] This kind of interaction between characters and their authors highlights the ontological boundaries (or necessary change in status) which are ***violated***. It also challenges the reader's usual acceptance of realistic characters as if they were real, showing how realistic texts reward such gullibility. And in the final analysis the reader does feel "protected" somehow from the ramifications of such fictional

structures, insisting stubbornly that her *own* reality cannot *really* be converted somehow to a different status.

But this perhaps fundamental appreciation of the independent ontological structure of fictional worlds does not provide any descriptive means to explain the sharing of properties among versions which readers automatically accept. Nor does it explain the sense of transworld identity which readers intuitively recognize.

A fundamentally different approach, which helps to establish the dimensions of the problem, is suggested by Currie through his account of fictional and proper *names*.[41] Currie treats historical characters as exempt from the restrictions imposed on the purely fictional ones, refusing in effect to "change their status" at the border of the fictional world. He treats historical names, as opposed to purely fictional ones, as referring and not "empty," picking out a particular individual. The use of the name is "rigid," referring to an individual in *any* world.[42] In effect, Napoleon is not a *fictional* character in *War and Peace*, because of his real-world existence. For Currie, the name "Napoleon" does not count as a fictional name since there exists an actual person "...of whom it is true in the story that 'Napoleon' is his name."[43] Rather than considering the Napoleon who appears in the novel as some kind of *variant* of the historical figure designated by a fictional name, Currie creates a special category for names with reference outside of the fictional text. Through an account of the use of names, Currie deals with Rescher's categories of actual-variant and supernumerary.

Currie is able to distinguish with this account between genuine historical characters whom the reader will recognize as such, and real persons whom authors may have in mind, but who do not assume more than a purely fictional status because of the anonymity of their name from the reader's perspective. Keeping in mind Currie's account of fictional truth as a matter of what it is reasonable to infer that the *fictional author* believes, in effect, the reader must be able to infer that the fictional author intends a name to refer to a real person, and not just that the real author does so. This observation is useful inasmuch as the reader does depend as authorial audience on common

knowledge about a historical figure--knowledge which is usefully seen as shared with an implied author. The inclusion of an obscure figure known only to the real author cannot produce the same effect, except perhaps for readers addicted to obscure biographical investigations. And even then, identifying the implied author with the real one in order to make the inference will not be a theoretically acceptable practice. As Currie usefully points out, it is true ***in the story*** that the fictional author is responsible for the text. The real author's responsibility is limited to reality.[44] In this respect, then, the concept of fictional author as tied closely to real reader expectations is again useful, as a way to distinguish among different kinds of links among fictional characters and real-world models. Because fictional texts "inscribe" readers who will have particular frames of reference available, the authorial audience can know about some real-world figures, while ignoring any potential "reference" to others.

By considering the reader's uses of fictional names, and the qualitative worlds built where there is no reference for fictional names, Currie does develop an elaborate account of the individuation possible for purely fictional characters. In effect, the reader assumes through the make-believe process that a story is about a ***particular*** group of characters. Currie is ***not*** able to deal with cases where problems of individuation and uniqueness of instantiation are deliberately created through radical narrative procedures. Nor does he begin to assess accurately what the reader routinely ***attaches*** to purely fictional characters through text-external knowledge bases, in effect endowing such characters with some of the "reference" to reality allowed for historical characters.

With regard to historical characters, Currie's reliance on rigid designation provides also an interesting solution to the serious problem of the limitation/deficiency of counterparts as based on counterfactual theory, by allowing identity to hold as we intuitively expect. This way of understanding historical characters assigns a crucial importance to the kinds of prior understanding and knowledge which I address. It does not ***obscure*** that knowledge as an approach based on ***versions*** tends to do. Distinguishing between the qualitative worlds built for purely

fictional characters and the rigid designation involved with historical characters, Currie effectively suggests a kind of transworld identity for historical characters. Identifying only the qualitative worlds of a story--worlds where ***some*** character acts--cannot explain what is involved in the use of a historical name, to which a prior understanding is attached.[45] Currie is thus happy to assert that historical characters enjoy an extratextual reference, while maintaining that purely fictional ones are individuated and tied to their texts absolutely, such that no real character can be ***accidentally*** referred to.

But unfortunately Currie's account ignores some of the most basic problematic issues, or addresses them only inaccurately. The names of real people, objects, and places ***seem*** to refer to those actual things in fiction, but do not in fact do so. Fictional characters do not walk across real bridges or travel on real trains. They cannot be encountered in such activities. Fictional sentences may seem to make assertions about real things or refer to them, but with respect to the real world no assertions are actually made. Such sentences have no ***impact*** on real things or people, and are not true of those things or people. There is in fact no genuine reference to the actual world in the use of names in fiction.

Currie's insistence on an "aboutness" relation independent of truth claims in the real world leaves unresolved large issues about variable ***differences*** from the corresponding real-world figure. The account does not address ***how*** a sentence (or story) can be "about" a figure if the individuating facts are substantially ***changed***. The notoriously problematic relation of "aboutness" provides no way to deal with variable differences. "Napoleon" may well be "about" the historical man in *War and Peace*, but what on earth are we to do with the Napoleon who shows up in *Animal Farm*?

Presuming as basic Doležel's concept of a changed status for historical characters, and relying on Rescher's distinctions, Margolin addresses these issues in terms of historical versions. He insists that "...all actuality variants become strictly surrogates, in the fictional story world, of their originals in the actual world as soon as they have as world mates story relative, fictional [individuals]."[46] This

fundamental position solves not only the problem of there being no "extension" for fictional truth in reality, about real people, but also the problem that actual individuals cannot bear relations to fictional ones who do not inhabit the real world. The very interaction of the historical character with purely fictional characters must alert the reader to the role of actuality-variant within an ***alternative*** world, since no real person can ***actually*** meet a fictional character.[47] Where, for example, there is a temporal extension offered for the life story of a historical character, and fictional world mates occur, "...there is no longer a way of joining original and version into one life history, as the two temporal phases are now located in two different worlds."[48] Margolin suggests further that

> ...the very addition of fictional world mates is enough to turn a possible actuality variant into a merely fictional one, that is, one which is no longer a real alternative with respect to the actual world. With one stroke, the potential transworld identity is replaced by the weaker relation of counterparthood.[49]

Obviously a complete range of ***changes*** can also further eradicate the semblance of identity between the actuality-variant and his original in the real-world context.[50]

Although Margolin categorizes historical characters as "extratextual," he stresses very much the importance of records and documents *as texts* which in effect mediate world-knowledge. Because the existence of actual individuals is certified by public, intersubjective discourses, the reader's knowledge of them is necessarily not a direct experience of reality, but is filtered through the texts in question, the insistence on this inherently intertextual quality for historical characters suggesting how world-models are activated. The actual, fully determinate individual is represented either in public texts such as diaries, memoires, or recorded conversations, or alternately in certifying discourses "...with institutionalized truth or fact claim, such as newspapers and history books."[51]

The essential issue is that because actual, fully determinate individuals are represented in texts which provide only a ***partial*** truth, the textual version is already incomplete in a way in which the existing person is not. To begin with, there is no certain knowledge provided in such cultural texts as to ***inner*** states, with the result that conjectures in fiction as to such states are then ***indeterminate*** as to truth value once historical characters are seen intertextually. Margolin points out that "[a]ll sources are also selective and tendentious, depending on the purpose and context of their writing."[52] Such "official" perspectives are not an ultimate authority for truth, then, and can be easily re-oriented or replaced in a fictional account. The intertextual original may be ***absolutely*** original or only analyzable in relation to other accounts. A kind of general "culturalization" may have occurred with the textual version, creating a cultural prototype more or less independent of texts. In any case, different sets of properties for an individual can be derived from different accounts. As a result, Margolin says that "...the image of the actual individual, serving as original for the creative writer, is a complex textual construct or entity, no less than any ***fictional*** [individual] serving in this capacity.[53]

Obviously the actuality-variant who shows up in the fictional text cannot be compared directly with reality, and the reader must instead establish the non-fictional texts actually utilized if he wants to discuss the relation between original and version.[54] Where historical sources are not known, the reader can compare the fictional version with a "...standard image of the original in the writer's time and place or in [his] own."[55] But in either case, hypothetical and purely typological comparisons are involved.[56]

Even if we assert in this way the intertextual quality of historical characters, there is no way to escape the role of world knowledge in their appreciation. The very concepts of reality principle and minimal departure are at stake here, because without such principles the reader could not be justified in assuming that a fictional character with the name (and at least some properties) of a historical character is a variant of that individual. Any resemblance would be purely fortuitous. Without such concepts, the intuitive creation of cultural connotations

would be impossible to explain. Umberto Eco deals with the issue, demonstrating how the name "Napoleon" denotes a well-defined "cultural unit" which finds a place in a semantic field of historical entities.[57] What "comes to mind" depends on the reader's familiarity with the historical "reference" in addition to the textual indications. While purely fictional characters (supernumeraries) are automatically, independently, and ***variably denoted*** through their textual creation (since they have no independent existence), actual-variants have a ***fixed*** denotation but also inspire additional connotations because of their text-independent status outside of the stipulated fictional world. Such connotations must vary according to cultural context and the reader's world-knowledge, in spite of the fixed denotation for the historical character in question. Given this operation of the principle of minimal departure, the idea of rigid designation seems most applicable, suggesting that a real individual is "picked out" in all possible worlds by the name "Napoleon," and that whatever is true of him is transferred into the reference world whenever the text does not stipulate otherwise.

A variant relation is thus inevitable, but requires assessment as to the kinds and amount of ***change*** permissible to preserve the relation. The constraints imposed on authors by the incorporation of historical characters are widely recognized, at least if the novel is to maintain a straightforward relation with historical documents. (Alternate histories have no problem flouting all constraints.) Margolin identifies three kinds of plausibility factors contained in certifying cultural discourse such as history texts:

> ...singular documented facts about the original's physical, mental and actional properties; ...general historical regularities of the original's period and society; universal nomic and taxonomic regularities we believe to hold in the actual world (especially physical and psychological ones).[58]

Adding or deleting properties does not put an enormous strain on the variant relationship, especially when the ***intertextual*** relation is accepted as outlined above. But Margolin suggests that whenever documented properties are ***modified*** in literary versions, the version

and original can no longer be "joined together."[59] Just as when purely fictional characters join with the historical characters to create a necessarily *alternate* possible world, the historical character must assume the status of counterpart or surrogate of the original.[60] It is necessary *then* to assess minimum conditions under which even this "weaker" relation can hold.

The concept of reference world in fact allows for a clearer understanding of how historical figures and their fictional variants interact. As the reader activates intertextual models, a refined "comparison" of fictional characters "across worlds" becomes possible, alleviating some of the difficulties presumed by David Lewis and others. Ranges of quantification are opened up, in effect, to allow for comparison among various textual worlds, both fictional and non-fictional. Since many fictional works depend on the interaction of purely fictional and historical characters within an understood historical setting, the reference world makes possible the *interpolation* of historical and purely fictional truths customarily accepted in such works. The operations of the fictional sphere not only endow historical figures with a more "complete" existence within a created reference world, but also develop a greater sense of "reality" for the purely fictional characters who interact with them, especially as the fictional characters become involved in known events from history. For the reference world, arbitrary distinctions between purely fictional characters and historical ones become more obscure and less useful, as the reader creates an integrated totality for fictional truth.

That truth structure depends fundamentally on the *experience* of the reader, which is not fractured so categorically along fictional/historical lines. As Hector-Neri Castañeda's useful work suggests, entities and their properties enjoy free access across all kinds of world borders, implying a fundamental *unity* in the reader's experience.[61] The fictional sphere necessarily involves this process of fictional *identification* with reality. In effect, whether a fictional character has a historical prototype or not is not crucial to the reader's experience, since in *either case* he will imagine "knowing" about that character. The distinctions which are important are those among the

knowledge bases which constitute that "knowing" process. Clearly readers ***learn*** from textual sources, obtaining information which coincides with particular worlds and which is ***truthful*** within a particular epistemic relation. The reference world allows assessment of this crucial epistemological dimension, defusing the more controversial ontological problems usually addressed.

Fictional Counterparts and Transworld Identity

As outlined above in the definition of the intertextual grid, beyond the problem of historical characters who find their way into fiction, we must deal with purely inter***fictional*** variants. Just as a fictional character can relate to an actual historical figure, so can it relate to an "original" existing somewhere in a previously constructed fictional world. In both cases we must deal with variants which may present different properties, and which are difficult to "identify" as one and the same, since they inhabit different possible worlds. As demonstrated above, it is clear from standard practices like parody, and from what we routinely appreciate of the oeuvre of an author, that a prior fictional world can constitute a "frame of reference" on a par for the authorial audience with that of reality. Working in a way similar to minimal departure/reality principle, a selection process for truths about fictional characters may well consult previous fiction(s), in effect suggesting the "migration" of fictional characters from a native environment into a new fictional world. In the extreme context of postmodern fiction, exceedingly bizarre encounters are staged, which effectively undermine routine appreciation of the "inviolable" boundaries of independent and autonomous fictional worlds. Only consideration of the viability of transworld identity within reference worlds will accommodate such ontological extravagances.

The notion of transworld identity has been widely criticized in philosophy as incoherent, in part because the idea is incompatible with the "Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals." There is a serious problem of how to identify an individual across worlds, given that

properties are often ***changed***. There is a fundamental difficulty in singling out an individual as persisting through ***alternate*** states of affairs. The troubling question of identity conditions for objects of quantification showing up at different worlds is what is called "the problem of transworld identity."

Moreover, the whole question of "access" among worlds is problematic. Clearly space/time co-ordinates for such access are non-existent. The possible worlds of fiction seem at least superficially to present a somewhat different problem from counterfactuals, where insistence on "identity" seems intuitively essential to the creation of the counterfactual in the first place. Obviously this concern focuses on the ontological dimension. If we say that the ***same*** individual exists in different fictional worlds, we imply that some kind of migration among different and unconnected (or disjoint) possible worlds is feasible. Serious ontological problems result where anything beyond a mere name is thought to constitute "sameness."

Lewis' work with the ***reality*** of possible worlds puts the problem in even more precisely problematic terms. If fictional worlds are conceived as "real" possible worlds, characters ***must*** be world-bound. Counterpart theory is absolutely required where alternate worlds are all indexically actual, since individuals clearly cannot "move" among such real worlds. Extreme possibilism thus rules out the intuitively sensible "migration" of fictional characters, confining them in effect to the texts which create them, and insisting on a purely counterpart relation. On this view, the tempting idea of an identity relation for characters in distinct (and disjointed) fictional worlds is ruled out by assigning a necessary world-bound status.

In effect, Lewis' counterpart theory becomes a middle course between extreme essentialism and a doctrine of transworld identity, insisting that individuals are world-bound, but can have counterparts in some other world, the relationship being based on resemblance. Essentially surrogates stand in a relation of counterparthood to prototypes, the relation being "nontransitive and asymmetrical," and "...based on overall similarity between the prototype and surrogate."[62]

Each fictional world thus conveniently consists of a certain roster of individuals, disjoint from the sets of individuals found in all other worlds. But any one individual may have a counterpart in another world. Counterpart theory thus seems to offer a more ***flexible*** way, than strict transworld identification, of solving the problem of identifying a particular individual in more than one fictional world. Qualitative similarity ***seems*** more ***useful*** than transworld identity, especially where marked changes in properties are ***not*** involved. In principle an entire community of readers can "identify" a counterpart across fictional worlds, producing the agreeable result of ***shared*** recognition of a similarity relation. The question remains as to whether that relation adequately describes what the community of readers actually experiences.

It is clear using counterpart theory that where similarity is pronounced and property sets are mutually compatible among counterparts, the reader will be able to further "complete" fictional characters. As Margolin suggests, "...one could possibly further individuate each [namesake] by a process of property transfer from the others..."[63] The reader's experience is clearly such that a "counterpart" can easily take on an expanded property set and seem to be endowed with a more complete existence as a result. Counterparts "inherit" all kinds of qualities and even action roles on the basis of similarity to a prototype.

But the flexibility and usefulness of counterpart theory becomes more questionable when we consider the reader's experience which ***includes*** more problematic counterpart relations where radical changes in properties are commonplace. The philosophical position may be accurate in ontological terms, but it is largely unworkable for fiction and the routine appreciation of intertextual characters. In the actual appreciation of fiction, characters are not sensibly world-bound--not ***confined*** to the texts which create them. If we are to understand the "migration" from text to text appreciated in the reading process, we must consider that counterpart theory may not constitute a fully viable alternative to strict transworld identification of individuals.

Fictional characters do seem to take on an independent "life" of their own, as if they really do "migrate" to other story worlds. As Castañeda usefully suggests, "...no story operator can capture the whole of the hero's 'vitality.'"[64] Just as with counterfactuals, where we are not happy with a purely counterpart relation for an alternate state of affairs about ourselves, which would not, for example, capture *actual* sentiments (let us say a sense of regret) about the counterfactual world, the counterpart relation does not capture the sense of intertextual "access" often perceived as operative between separate, disjoint fictional worlds, especially (but not exclusively) those within an author's oeuvre.[65] Just as our intuitions tell us that things may have been otherwise *for ourselves*, and not merely for some different (but similar) individual in a counterfactual world, so fictional characters cannot be seen as world-bound without losing a great deal of appeal. Pre-philosophical intuitions about possibility require transworld individuals, both for counterfactuals which involve after all *only* actual-variants, and for the complex worlds of fiction which can involve both actual-variants and supernumeraries. Fictional worlds involve a more *extensive* form of hypothetical reasoning with ascriptions of modality involving quantification over a wider range of possible worlds. World-bound counterparts will be consequently even *less* useful in fiction than in counterfactuals.

The reader does not confine characters to closed fictional worlds, allowing them access instead into a constructed reference world, from which they *can* migrate to other reference worlds. In the reference world, the smaller worlds of independent fictions can be combined, suggesting an important step beyond a mere counterpart relation to identity or sameness of character. The several texts become part of a larger *knowledge context* about the particular fictional world and character. The reference world is potentially shared among texts, in the sense that more than one text can "refer" to it as a world which the reader can imagine to "pre-exist" the text. More than counterparts, the intertextual characters belong there, having gained access through a relation of transworld identity. In this way the concept of transworld identity *can* provide the conditions for how the reader constructs fictional truth about fictional characters.

In philosophy, transworld identity is really only problematic in ***ontological*** terms, because the individuals are thought to exist in some world, with their identity subject to settlement through reference criteria. Identity conditions and quantification across worlds are thus automatically problematic. But the situation need not be seen this way. Access among possible worlds, or to the reference world as I suggest, is not "physical" as when worlds are assigned a real status.

It is not that we can deny outright the ontological problem, but that our focus must be re-directed to epistemological problems/processes. Transworld identity must be seen in terms of the mental construction of worlds and individuals as intellectual projections. The conceptual approach defuses ontological issues, releasing characters from their otherwise necessary world-bound condition. Rescher's concept of transworld identity depends on the idea that possible worlds are not "given" somehow, but are made up as products of our own devising, as Kripke's fundamental concept of stipulation also suggests. Relying on this conceptualistic appreciation, there is no problem of physical access among disjunct worlds. All kinds of variants of both historical figures and interfictional characters are thus possible within the constructivistic account, without unduly straining ontological credibility. Using this approach, even some of the deliberate ontological scandals created in postmodern texts do not resist analysis by means of epistemic procedures. But before radical transgressions can be addressed, ***some*** of which require a less stringent concept of version or counterpart, we must first consider what kinds of ***changes*** create problems for transworld identity, and how an intertextual operator can be thought to function.

Conditions for Identity and Counterparthood

The transworld identity concept supposes that a fictional character can be identified and then traced (or tracked) across worlds, quantification across worlds being seen as legitimate. Emphasis on the epistemic reading operations makes this a viable view. Given a minimal

requirement of proper name sameness, the individual can be ***tracked*** across technically disjunct worlds, whether purely fictional or involving reality.[66] Following Rescher's example, we can presume that the reader "tracks" a ***given*** individual according to initial specifications, but not in terms of ***likeness*** to the original. Transworld identity is thus resolved in terms of ***pre***-world identity (whether for the actual world or an "original" fictional world), the individual appearing in different "descriptive guises."[67] ***Similarity*** is ultimately not as crucial with ***this*** view of versions, since we recognize as fundamental the need to ***connect*** the textual individual to his or her original outside of the text regardless of how different the description may be, at least in inessential respects. Akin to Kripke's "rigid designator," initial specification means that the same individual can be specified in any context, identity "following" an individual through different fictional reference worlds. The reader's access to fictional worlds is effectively stipulative, thereby resolving questions of identity for objects of reference, which can be simply transworld ***variants*** of an individual already designated decisively in another world. The ***variant*** remains in effect identical with the old individual by an "indexical" relation, designated as part of a ***set*** of variants, but assumes new descriptive guises with which the reader must also come to grips in terms of his revision of fictional truth. The conditions of transworld identity are thus defined through concepts of stipulation, rigid designation, and tracking across worlds. Relying on such semantic strategies, we easily transcend the concept of ***identification*** of an individual in a specific immediate fictional environment where constancy can be assessed, to define the ***individuation*** required to specify that individual in terms of ***all*** of its possible alternatives across worlds. Unlike Lewis, then, we can happily admit one individual into distinct fictional worlds, using the reference world concept to appreciate better the epistemic construction involved in that special "hypothetical" conceptualistic access.

But we need to see briefly how problematic changes in properties ***have*** been assessed in terms of criteria for identity across worlds, as if similarity ***were*** the primary factor. Terence Parsons' analysis of native, immigrant, and surrogate objects suggests the potential transfer

of individual entities among worlds either with intact properties (immigrants) or as surrogates (with changed properties).[68] But the distinction between surrogates and immigrants is problematic, and requires careful analysis in terms of ***permissible change*** in the properties of itinerant individuals, in relation to their prototypes. Routley's simple solution to a criteria of identity across worlds is that "...***what controls sameness across worlds is qualified*** author ***sayso***, the qualification being that a core of features of the object must be preserved."[69] Unfortunately Routley does not explain this "core," leaving the question unsettled as to what criteria are involved for identity over time or across possible worlds. Some philosophers have obstinately insisted on assessing relations of identity and similarity across worlds. Particularly in the case of fictional worlds, since individuals routinely undergo changes from story to story, the temptation to clarify a unitary subject in roughly ontological terms is great. Admittedly, once we observe ***changes*** in the properties of an intertextual individual it becomes "difficult" to claim that we are dealing with the "same" individual, although that is our routine procedure. How can such works be "about" the same character?

The counterpart relation based on similarity, as defined by Lewis, does not define automatically how ***much*** similarity is ***required*** to establish the relation. While it is convenient to envision individuals confined to their own worlds and "united" only by bonds of similarity to their counterparts (thus ***avoiding*** the problems of individuation), it is also surely necessary to define what must be involved in that similarity. Appearing in distinct fictional worlds, characters rarely (if ever) have identical property sets. What is to determine overall qualitative similarity? How ***exacting*** must the counterpart relation be? We need only think of the character Medea in Book Seven of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, where she is no longer the exotic figure from mythology and Euripides' play, but is transformed, rather, into a typically Roman character trying to come to grips with the demands of Roman social values. She is the "same" individual living through the same story events, yet there are significant changes in her properties. There is a clear "counterparthood" involved which no (competent) reader will ignore. But were there more drastic changes involved, there would seem

to be no theoretical procedures available to show what a specific *minimal* degree of similarity would be in order to maintain the counterpart relation. As Margolin points out, the similarity relation "...may be based on match of origins (common first stage), on sameness of environment and external relations, on intrinsic properties, or even just on role and function."[70] And where only the *name* is the same, how does the reader decide whether to make parallels or not?

No answer is likely to be stipulated in the text, the reader requiring knowledge of the intertextual grid to assess the potential for a counterpart relation. Since varying *degrees* of "overlap" of properties occur, the reader can only look to the intertextual context in order to track conceptually the individuals involved. The descriptive specifications alone will suggest similarity, but will not provide a built-in measure of the "quality" of the potential counterpart relation, which depends fundamentally on initial specifications as a pre-world identity *variably* open to modification.

The only really authentic requirement for this kind of "trackable" transworld identity is that *essential* properties be maintained. The individual who "exists" through constructivistic procedures in more than one world must preserve essential attributes, hopefully recognized in a non-circular way. In effect, the name alone does not constitute identity. A variant can be different only in *in*essential respects. This means that the pig named Napoleon in *Animal Farm* does not possess the same identity as the historical emperor, lacking as he does the essential property of being human. Discussing the distinction between essential and accidental properties, Ryan explains that

> ...if only accidental properties are altered, the lines of transworld identity will not be severed. We may complete the expression 'If Napoleon...' with virtually any proposition that can be made of a human being... as long as it does not entail 'If Napoleon had not been himself,' which is a contradiction.[71]

Eco establishes the importance of maintaining essential properties for transworld identity across distinct worlds, insisting that a variant can

differ only from its prototype in accidental properties.[72] Otherwise, differences in essential properties will result in supernumeraries, in Rescher's terms--those individuals which have no prototype within the populations of other worlds. Violating essential properties may result in a mere joke, with a simple homonymy of name.[73]

But surely, as Rescher suggests, there is need to consider the "plasticity" of an individual. Where there are fewer essential properties, the individual is more plastic; that is, more hypothetical alterations can be made without ceasing to deal with ***this*** individual.[74] The main problem is how we deal with ***modal*** claims as to what different possibilities are admissible for properties and situations. Fictional characters seem to imply a more relaxed expectation for modal alterations than do real historical figures. If the reader looks for what is ***similar*** among variants he can perhaps identify successfully an interfictional character. But to deal with the modal claims involved with property changes, he will want to identify the individual according to an initial pre-world specification or designation.

That initial specification must necessarily involve the original world context. As Rescher explains, the essentialism of properties is ***relative to worlds***. Within the large question of compossibility, the issue of which properties are essential to an individual are "...a question of the nature of its world environment and is contingent upon the make-up of the ***other*** individuals to be found there."[75] It is not really important to decide how ***much*** must remain the same, but rather what ***kinds*** of change are tolerable for the "same" individual. Essential features depend on the relation between the individual and its original world mates. Just as constancy of identity within a world must involve that world's organization, so must individuation across worlds depend on how world structures correspond with one another. The reader is more or less willing to "allow" transworld identity depending on discrepancies among fictional world structures. Properties are routinely recognized within global semantic constraints. There is an unavoidable relation between the macro-semantic constraints of the encompassing world and its residents. Macro-structural world organizations are potential ***sets*** of compossible individuals--sets

which cannot be broken up and dispersed to other radically different worlds without serious ramifications for fictional truth. Obviously world structures must restrict the kinds of properties considered "essential" and available in a new fictional world, the reference world in effect created as a compossible set of individuals.

The dimension of compossibility cannot be ignored for transworld identity, since the relations among component characters are crucial, the inclusion of some necessitating the inclusion or exclusion of others. What defines an individual may depend on the configuration of the entire compossible set. This realization that fictional characters are not independent of the "environment" created for them in the reference world makes crucial the need to consider what happens when a character "migrates" to a new fictional world, leaving behind the compossible set which has in fact defined him. If the peculiar necessity of fictional worlds depends on the ***mutual*** definition of the individuals resident in those worlds, what happens when characters leave those worlds to join new ones, leaving behind their extrinsic properties?

It is not enough, however, to consider fictional world structures outside of their larger semiotic communication context. Fictional worlds are inevitably associated with particular text-models (as shown in Chapters Nine and Ten), so that all of the considerations of accessibility relations become relevant, those relations positing macro-structural reference world organizations as potential *sets* of compossible indiviuals. The nomic and taxonomic regularities governing the two story worlds are admirably clarified by Ryan's treatment of accessibility relations and the role of generic landscape. It is the reader's decision as to text-model on the basis of world structures and accessibility relations which is crucial. Dominant text-models may well suggest which properties are "essential" and which are decisively inadmissible where transworld identity is concerned. The codified structure of the fictional sphere must co-ordinate the intertextual repertoire with text-models and ultimately with the world-models relevant within the generic context. The text-model will dominate where radical changes occur in fundamental laws, creating incompatible, or ***inaccessible*** worlds. This means that the original

Emma Bovary cannot have "access" to a world where she takes on supernatural capabilities, or is described as a sleek panther. The reference world for this kind of fictional transworld transgression must be defined by knowledge which necessarily makes the intertextual "access" impossible in terms of transworld identity.

Transworld identity will also clearly not work as a conceptualistic scheme where individuals consonant with the structure of the real world are expected to be integrated into a world with modified laws. Strict identity in this case would destroy the structure of the fictional world, forcing revision of its stipulated laws. As Rescher makes clear, "[i]tem revisions entail world-revisions."[76] Any versions of real-world individuals, for example, must remain conceptually linked to the real world and its structure of laws. A variant of a real-world historical individual cannot conveniently enter a fantastic fictional world as the "same" historical individual. While narrative fiction can involve such "transgressions," transworld identity becomes less workable, even in epistemological terms, as a way to understand reading processes. It will then be necessary to define for such transgressions a less stringent concept of version or counterpart which can be used to explore the structure of the reference world.

Beyond the similarity of purely internal or intrinsic properties of individuals, we must also address, then, the issue of properties which are ***external*** to individuals. To assess any kind of counterpart relation, we must take into account the relation of the individuals to the world environment shared with other world mates. Margolin suggests considerable complexity in the assessment of counterpart relations which admit of degrees and types, problematizing the issue of criteria for sufficient similarity.[77] What is most crucial here is the role of the reader in terms of ***knowledge*** activated. The details of internal change are beyond the scope of this study, where the focus on applied models obviously necessitates more careful attention to external properties. Such properties cannot be viewed without consideration of world-structures and their related governing text-models.

We must identify not so much what is involved in the creation of new versions, but what procedures are at the reader's disposal for the assessment of those versions. Already in Parsons' account of objects which are native, immigrant, or surrogate,[78] we can appreciate the different roles of knowledge involved in the distinction between immigrant and surrogate. Since the ***degree*** to which the properties of the original object may be changed for a surrogate remains vague in Parsons' terms, the reader's activation of world- and text-models becomes crucial. For a classically realistic text, the reader is most likely to consider the object/individual as an "immigrant," presuming a very close relation with the real-world prototype as the realistic program insists through its mimetic goals. Balzac's Paris is ***the*** Paris, and Tolstoy's Napoleon is ***the*** historical emperor. Only the reader's ***informed*** transformation of those objects/individuals would turn them into surrogates, the information coming from alternate text-models which reassign priorities among world-models. Again, transworld identity involves a world-indexing requirement, just as for any modal intentional semantic model. But it is the reader who assumes responsibility for recognizing how world contexts are indexed.

The idea of an intertextual minimal departure provides a basic approach to the assessment of "tolerable" change between prototypes and variants. Assuming an intertextual application of minimal departure, the reader expects properties to hold according to the text-model, unless specifically changed. Features characteristic within a particular genre will be automatically expected in the new text. Where "violations" are specified, the reader will assess the damage done to the original world-structure and regulating text-model, relegating then the particularly troublesome individual changed in external properties to a purely surrogate/counterpart relation. A new, adapted or parodied genre may be the result. Should a particular social message be the priority of the new text--let us say a feminist view, for example--it may be necessary, then, to ***limit*** change in order not to interfere with the message.

In suggesting the ***epistemological*** identity of characters across worlds we want to recognize that even beyond the oeuvre of a particular

author, some stories produce consistent "extensions" of prototypes. Such individuals the reader understands to have been involved in the actions of the original story as well as those actions described in the new text. The classic example is George Fraser's *Flashman* stories, where the hero is understood to be the same individual described in Thomas Hughes' *Tom Brown's Schooldays*. This kind of consistent extension of role involves what Currie calls "...tightening the conditions on the character" as the new author simply does ***more*** of what the original one did.[79] Analysing the semiotic/rhetorical operations carried out by authors on property sets to create new versions, Margolin deals with this most common procedure of counterpart creation as ***addition***. "One can add elements to preexisting stages: more world mates, more properties, and more relations, provided they are consistent with those of the prototype."[80] Such additions may be just "...expansion, development, or enrichment of the original" but can also "...add whole stages to a preexisting life history," with new situations, actions, or events and even new spatial settings and world mates.[81] Intrinsic properties may or may not be changed, with a sense of temporal overlap involved.[82] It is obvious that the reader easily accepts a transworld identity for such variants.

The same is true where known characters just seem to "show up" in new stories where they do not really belong, as with Peter Schlemihl's appearance in E.T.A. Hoffmann's *Die Abenteuer der Silvester-Nacht*. Margolin deals also with this guest appearance or "transplant" effect, where

> [a]n [individual] who is native and central to one story world has his counterpart appear in a secondary role in another text world, where his intrinsic properties, both mental and physical, remain completely unchanged, while his extrinsic ones (space/time location and world mates) are all altered.[83]

Where world structures are compatible, the reader easily accepts transworld identity, at the worst plagued by a sense that an obviously *literary* character has been somehow imposed on a fictional world which purports after all to be "real." This kind of intertextuality can

deflate a sense of story-world "reality." But where the world structure of the host world is radically ***different*** from that of the original home world, the relation of transworld identity becomes impossible to sustain epistemically, necessarily substituted with a weaker counterpart relation which preserves the autonomy of the world structure.

Less critical than changes in world structures as related to external properties, but nonetheless problematic, are changes which result in startling contradictions in internal properties. Properties can be replaced with many different or alternate ones. All kinds of parodies and inversions, as well as adaptations and modernizations involve such intrinsic property changes. As Margolin suggests, the inversion of a prototype may be "...effected by replacing its central mental properties by (semantically related) opposite ones, 'opposite' being defined... as either lexical antonym or opposite according to some defined cultural model."[84] But the counterpart approach proves inadequate because inversions and parodies *work* by allowing the authorial audience to presume the character's identity to be the same, making ***possible*** the comparisons provided by the new text. The Robinsons in Defoe's and Tournier's works are certainly different in various ways, yet the transworld variant is ***epistemically*** the same individual as the prototype, no matter how inverted his properties.

Without addressing epistemic procedures directly, the problem for standard counterpart analysis is that it is difficult to decide where consistent "identity" ends and contradictory elements begin to undermine the relation of variant to prototype. Where do changes become too drastic to assume the relation? Since the relation can involve not only ***expansion*** of properties, but also their ***deletion***, or a ***substitution*** process which involves ***both*** subtraction and addition, how are we to decide on a point at which change becomes too great? Margolin identifies substitution as the most crucial procedure--one which can generate an ***alternate*** life story, where we cannot speak of the "same" individual as a variant, but must identify an ***alternate*** counterpart.[85] This latter individual is clearly more difficult to "join" to the original in order to create a hospitable reference world. But at

what point would the logical connection from version to prototype be absolutely blocked? In epistemic terms, the reader is *less* anxious to sever connections, however, focused as she is on the assembly of knowledge involved in even the most inconsistent sets of properties. Rather than assessing "closeness" as a function of the number and nature of properties changed and the semantic relations between them, as Margolin does,[86] we need to accept epistemic transworld identity as a fact of reading with a status prior to similarity relations. Margolin's classification of variant, alternate, and inversion presents a clean ontological view, but does little to illustrate the reader's routine creation of the fictional truth structure of the reference world, which involves no such arbitrary break-down.[87] Transworld identity constitutes another way to build consistency for the fictional truth of the reference world, provided no violation of fictional-world macro-structures is involved. Only in this latter case will a looser relation of counterparthood be required in order to see the hierarchy among knowledge bases invoked, and governed through text-models.[88]

Reading Procedures and the Intertextual Operator

Before we can consider the more complicated reading operations necessary to the appreciation of texts which insist on ***radical*** change among counterparts--alternate histories and metafiction, for example--we must establish fundamentally how the intertextual grid functions within the fictional sphere, contributing to the hierarchies of truth for the reference world.

Within philosophy, with its inherent reservations about accepting the existence of fictional characters in the first place, there is a wide-spread consensus that the reader's imaginative involvement with fictional characters must be bound to the ***individual*** text which "authorizes" that involvement. The routine reading habits of comparing characters across fictional worlds or with actual historical individuals are viewed with suspicion as some kind of "unofficial" operation which depends on ill-defined rules of implication. Both Walton and Currie

attempt to deal with the problem of re-identifying the "same" fictional character across fictional worlds, by invoking the reader's participation in terms of make-believe, the former discussing the issue in terms of "unofficial games," the latter as the "transfictive" use of names occurring both outside of fiction and the "in the story" operator.

Walton suggests the "unofficial" game as a larger, extended, inclusive game which encompasses the individual games which appreciators play.[89] "Comparisons between characters in different works can be thought of as contributions to unofficial games which combine in natural ways games authorized for the various works."[90] Although such games are not authorized by individual texts, they can be "inspired" by them, and can modify them.[91] The idea of a ***combination*** game allows some appreciation of how a reader can ***compare*** characters from different works, assuming that the two characters are both props in the extended game, but retain the properties attributed to them textually. So, the reader has no problem saying that Anna Karenina lacks Emma Bovary's obtuseness and insensitivity. Actually ***identifying*** two characters across fictional worlds is also possible within the context of the unofficial game.[92] Walton acknowledges the causal connection which seems to exist between texts, which encourages the reader to keep in mind aspects of character stipulated in other texts. Everything is more complicated, as we have seen, where a conflict of properties occurs, and Walton can only suggest that conflicts need not be confronted within the fragmentary unofficial game which allows the reader to identify the intertextual characters with one another.[93] The principles of generation for fictional truth are not the ***same*** as those attached to the isolated text, which Walton clarifies through his concept of "being fictional." But since Walton limits his discussion to how the participant can assert truth by "fictionally" speaking that truth, the scheme does not allow an appraisal of what the ***intertextually*** implied principles might really be. There is no exploration of ***how*** the reader moves beyond an isolated game into the more complex realm of the unofficial, extended game, or how a matrix for fictional truth is influenced by the intertextual factors. There is no provision for the "migration" of characters among distinct worlds. What Walton suggests as unofficial games must be clarified in terms of

the intertextual reading operations which are part of the fictional sphere--operations which recognize the possibility of the intertextual comparison and even identity of characters within the reference world. And that reference world must be understood in terms of how the truth structure ***modifies*** the truth naively "contained" within the purely textual stipulation.

Currie's account of the transfictive use of names as dissociated from fictional works gets us no closer to an accurate assessment of the reference world. Currie insists on the ***distinct*** quality of fictional worlds which cannot be merged into a common background which would allow for intertextual comparison of characters. For Currie, "[f]ictional characters begin their lives in fictional stories. ...[W]e can properly say that we have a fictional character only when we have a fictional story, however imprecise, that enfolds that character."[94] Without considering even which of possible worlds or individuals are primary, Currie argues against the idea that fictional characters are capable of transcending the fictions they "arrive in," by appearing in different works or media, with different authors "contributing their own perspectives."[95] Even if readers think that characters are "promiscuous" in their relations to fictional works, Currie feels that there is nothing to be learned about them "...by casting aside the stories in which they appear and searching for the characters themselves."[96] "Interfictional comparisons ...must be interpreted in such a way that the respective fictions are treated as separate entities."[97]

Insisting on the need to resist the temptation of recognizing the existence of fictional people, Currie proposes a class of theoretical entities which he calls "roles," to enable comparison among fictional characters and actual historical individuals. Being a particular character in a world is a matter of answering a description and thereby occupying the ***role*** of that character. The role is a function from possible worlds to individuals which picks out the individual in each world where it may be.[98] Because the roles are not really "occupied," there exist no people who act out or endure events, the role concept thereby supporting the non-existence position.[99] The role itself becomes the superworldly, necessarily existing entity, rather than the

fictional character. Properties are defining characteristics *of the role*, so that when comparisons are made among characters from distinct fictional worlds, the comparison expresses a judgment about the *role*, rather than about the individual itself.[100]

This elaborate scheme to complete the account of the semantics of fictional names does not explain how readers actually proceed, suggesting instead a purely theoretical ideal. The position may be irrefutable on philosophical grounds, but it does little to qualify the customary appreciation of narrative fiction. Aspiring to discuss intertextuality without ever even using that term, Currie insists on the isolation of worlds, glossing over all concerns about ranges of knowledge brought to bear in comparing or identifying characters across worlds.

What for Currie is a misguided *conflation* of fictional characters represents the central epistemic concern which must be addressed in terms of the construction of a reference world.[101] The intuitive recognition of intertextual identity is precisely what is important, and is not confined to an extended operation of make-believe. It constitutes publicly shared cognitive processes which build characters epistemically through intertextual repertoire. Any "conflation" must be understood in terms of the larger-than-textual truth worlds created by the reader. By focusing on epistemological processes, the conception of fictional characters as intellectual projections legitimates what is otherwise easily discarded as purely subjective or unreflective conflation. Since everything about fictional worlds is really a product of the reader's own devising in conjunction with textual stipulation and text-external knowledge bases, "access" among such worlds is also only legitimately an epistemic concern.

Within the textual reference world transworld identity can be epistemically defined. Into this imagined world (to which the reader presumes the text to "refer") can "migrate" all manner of intertextual characters. Here they "interact" in whatever way the reader determines is suitable. Through relevant knowledge activation the reader decides

what is available as fictional truth from other texts, putting in place an accommodating structure for the truth world.

Here the concept of intertextual operator is crucial, as based on Culler's appraisal of presupposition on the basis of the linguistic model.[102] Presupposition is not only integral to texts, but is also an epistemic operation which constructs reference worlds. Distinguishing between logical and pragmatic presuppositions, Culler defines the logical: "Presuppositions are what must be true in order that a proposition be either true or false."[103] This kind of presupposition depends on the reader, and introduces immediately a validity for intertextuality, as fictional truths are inevitably dependent on prior truths which the reader presupposes. Pre-world identity makes perfect sense in this context. Propositions asserted directly in texts are only *part* of the truth structure of the reference world, since the reader assumes responsibility for the intertextual presupposition process. Clearly, very crucial fictional truths may be relegated to the reader's activation of pre-text, identified automatically as a source of truth. In this sense many fictional truths are already "given" by intertextual repertoire, logical presupposition becoming an "intertextual operator."

The operator provides the context for truth in much the same way as a story operator, but identifying a more extensive intertext which can modify even the (ostensibly autonomous) internal structure of story truth as seen through the reference world. The kind of intertextual space made possible through presupposition may provide entirely straightforward truth parallels, or may subvert prior truths as in the case of ironic comment, parody, or inversion. Whenever a pre-world identity is invoked, the possibility of undermining or subverting that identity occurs. Whatever the final result, what is presupposed by the reader about intertextual character functions as the kind of "already read" identified by Barthes and appreciated as a semiotic factor in communication. Logical presupposition is thus a basic kind of inference procedure or hermeneutic strategy. Although the strategy is not *limited* to purely intertextual concerns and is in fact involved in the activation of world-models as well, it is highly applicable to intertextual repertoire. I assess in Chapter Twelve how presuppositions

of a literary/pragmatic/rhetorical nature are crucial also to the codified structure of the fictional sphere.

It is now possible to define a codified (and modal) structure for the fictional sphere, determining how hierarchies of knowledge and fictional truth are established through the reading process. Within such hierarchies, we can identify also some of the ways in which intertextual repertoire can function in relation to world- and text-models.

Notes

[1]Gérard Genette's *Palimpsestes* would be the ideal case in point, as a study which takes for granted the practice of "removing" fictional characters from individual texts. See Gérard Genette, *Palimpsestes: La literature au second degre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982).

[2]Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) 71.

[3]Rabinowitz 188, 216, and 227.

[4]Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundation of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990) 161.

[5]Genette has devised in *Palimpsestes* a catalogue of five types of ***trans***textual relations as intertextuality, paratextuality, metatextuality, hypertextuality, and architextuality, the last category being roughly equivalent to the discursive space, while the others define kinds of more precise analyzable relationships between texts (8). Genette's formal analysis of textual interrelations focuses on hypertextuality as a relation/operation which unites texts and transforms them.

[6]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 102-4.

[7]Culler 103.

[8]Culler 103.

[9]Culler 106.

[10]Culler 106.

[11]Culler 109 and 111.

[12]Roger Fowler, ed., *A Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms*, rev. ed. (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987) 172.

[13]Linda Hutcheon, *A Theory of Parody. The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1985) 6.

[14]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 89.

[15]Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 154.

[16]Peter Rabinowitz, "'What's Hecuba to Us?' The Audience's Experience of Literary Borrowing," *The Reader in the Text. Essays on Audience and Interpretation*, eds. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). The article sets up a scheme for the classification, interpretation, and evaluation of literary borrowing, establishing seven categories of literary recycling, which Rabinowitz explains through the roles of authorial and narrative audiences. The categories are: plagiarism, adaptation, retellings, parodies, criticism, revisions, and expansions (246-9).

[17]Rabinowitz, *Reader* 247.

[18]Ryan 54.

[19]Uri Margolin deals with this issue, pointing out that this "automatic" reading presumption is not the same for works created by ***different*** authors, although ***logically*** the situation is the same in terms of disjunct worlds. See Uri Margolin, "Characters and their Versions," manuscript, 7, based on paper presented at the conference Fictions and Worlds, University of Toronto, June 1-2, 1990.

[20]Carlos Fuentes, *Burnt Water*, trans. Margaret Sayers Peden (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980) "Author's Note," no page.

[21]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 56.

[22]Margolin 13.

[23]Rabinowitz, *Reader* 248-9.

[24]Honoré de Balzac, *Sarrasine*, in Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 253.

[25]Thomas Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character. Towards a Theory of Characterization in Fiction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 224.

[26]See Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 132 and *passim*.

[27]Not only does a title like *Absalom, Absalom!* expand a Southern American context, but even a single name like "Sarah" in *The French Lieutenant's Woman* makes an intertextual link which the competent reader can scarcely ignore.

[28]Margolin 21.

[29]Uri Margolin, "Individuals in Narrative Worlds: An Ontological Perspective," *Poetics Today* 11.4 (Winter 1990): 868.

[30]Ryan 54, emphasis mine.

[31]Ryan 54. Ryan's example is the reader's likely trust of *The Name of the Rose* as a reliable treatise of medieval theology. But more obvious, perhaps, is the frequent inclusion in fiction of all kinds of "information" about geography and history.

[32]Nicholas Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility. A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 42-51 and *passim*.

[33]Rescher 62 and 65. The idea of descriptive individuation is not, of course, without problems when applied to the context of highly schematic fiction. It may be possible for a "saturated" description to specify a particular merely possible individual, but (as discussed in Chapters Three and Four) incomplete fictional characters cannot become property-decisive through descriptive mechanisms. ***Comprehensive*** description cannot build a complete supernumerary fictional character. For that completed character to emerge, the reader must take charge of the construction of the reference world.

[34]Ryan 269.

[35]Pavel 16.

[36]Lubomír Doležel, "Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions," *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, ed. Sture Allén (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) 230-1.

[37]See Doležel 233, for a discussion of actual-world (historical) persons entering fictional worlds.

[38]John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction. A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974) 42.

[39]See Woody Allen, "The Kugelmass Episode," *Side Effects*, in *Without Feathers. Getting Even. Side Effects.* (New York: Quality Paperback Book Club, 1989) 41-55.

[40]A most interesting example of distortion of the fiction/reality distinction is the recent television commercial series, in which the 7-Up cartoon character Fido-Dido rebels as he is being drawn. The interaction between the artist and the character creates an ontological violation which undermines the viewer's usual appreciation of how a fictional world is constructed. Further shocking access between reality and fiction occurs when the cartoon character interacts with a "real" person on equal ontological terms, or "turns off" the commercial with a remote control.

[41]Currie 128-31 and 146-64.

[42]Currie 147-8.

[43]Currie 128.

[44]Currie 153.

[45]Currie 149.

[46]Margolin, manuscript 22.

[47]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 869.

[48]Margolin, manuscript 25.

[49]Margolin, manuscript 28.

[50]Margolin's treatment of these factors will be dealt with ahead.

[51]Margolin, manuscript 22-3.

[52]Margolin, manuscript 23.

[53]Margolin, manuscript 23, emphasis mine. Seen as textual constructs, historical characters are subject to the same basic categories of properties, semiotic mechanisms, and set theoretic relations as Margolin defines (discussed ahead) for intertextual characters moving among purely fictional worlds (24).

[54]Margolin, manuscript 23.

[55]Margolin, manuscript 23.

[56]Margolin, manuscript 23. Margolin also discusses temporal extension and overlap for historical characters, using the ***intertextual*** quality to solve the problem with extensions about "futures" projected for already complete life stories. For temporal overlap he stresses that through intertext complete descriptions are not possible, even though the technically complete actual individual does not allow additional fictional properties. It is possible then to add events, actions, world mates, properties, relations, and mental traits to historically documented stages of actual individuals, so that "...what is impossible in theory becomes quite possible in practice" (25-6).

[57]Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1976) 87.

[58]Margolin, manuscript 25.

[59]Margolin, manuscript 27, emphasis mine.

[60]Margolin, manuscript 27.

[61]Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 33.

[62]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 865.

[63]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 849.

[64]Castañeda 45.

[65]Lewis insists that one's ***modal*** properties depend on what one's counterparts do, so that one is ***represented*** as doing certain things. (See Currie's discussion 136.) Lewis' theory of counterfactuals is not satisfying precisely because we want to ***be*** the one who gets rich and lives in Barcelona in a counterfactual world. We want the two "I's" to refer to the *same* individual in the two different possible states of affairs.

[66]My discussion here is informed by Rescher's discussion of transworld identification, 77-110.

[67]Rescher 88.

[68]Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980) 51-60.

[69]Richard Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items* (Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980) 594. The "qualification" is also that there are category and type restrictions from reality which the author cannot transgress.

[70]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 868.

[71]Ryan 269.

[72]Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1981) 229.

[73]Eco, *Reader* 259.

[74]Rescher 39.

[75]Rescher 34.

[76]Rescher 165.

[77]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 865-6. He suggests that fictions are routinely a ***mixture*** of sameness and difference in both internal and external properties (866). Eventually Margolin discusses five kinds of set theoretic relations as total overlap, inclusion of original in version, inclusion of version in original, intersection or partial overlap, and total lack of overlap except for name (manuscript 9). He sets out a technical analysis of three groups of ***kinds*** of properties, which yield eight kinds of (dis)similarity between original and version (Toronto manuscript 10).

[78]See Parsons' account in *Nonexistent Objects*, 51-60.

[79]Currie 177.

[80]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 867.

[81]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 867.

[82]Margolin, manuscript 15-16.

[83]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 866-7.

[84]Margolin, *Poetics Today* 867. Changes in actions and interrelations will correspond.

[85]Margolin, manuscript 16.

[86]Margolin, manuscript 17.

[87]See manuscript 17 for the classification. Replacement by similar properties results in a ***variant***; replacement by different properties results in an ***alternate***; and replacement by opposite properties results in an ***inversion***. For this latter case, Margolin admits that the reader ***must*** know the original to understand, but does not admit that this epistemic connection means that the inversion is just as "attached" to the original as the "variant."

[88]It is worth noting that working within the counterpart approach, Margolin has explored at length the crucial role of the ***temporal*** dimension in property changes, showing how the property sets of the original and version are temporally indexed relative to one another. See manuscript 12-21.

[89]Walton 403. Walton interestingly suggests that the pursuit of "silly questions" (which I have addressed in Chapter Ten in terms of relevant text-models) can frequently transform an authorized game into an unofficial one (406-7).

[90]Walton 407.

[91]Walton 411.

[92]Walton 407-8.

[93]Walton 408. Walton's brief suggestions for ***pursuing*** the game do little to illuminate actual reading strategies and the construction of a reference world.

[94]Currie 127.

[95]Currie 127.

[96]Currie 127.

[97]Currie 171.

[98]Currie 172.

[99]Currie 180.

[100]Currie 173-4.

[101]Currie writes off routine appreciation in this way: "The Holmes of the reader's make-believe, the Holmes of Doyle, and the Holmes of the later author are all different characters, with different defining characteristics. But the reader may easily conflate them, by failing to distinguish what is make-believe in his game from what is true in each of the

fictions. This unreflective consolidation can give us the impression that the stories are about the same character, and say contradictory things about him" (179-80).

[102]Culler, *Signs* 111-18.

[103]Culler, *Signs* 111.

Chapter Twelve: A Codified Modal Structure for the Fictional Sphere

There is considerable advantage in getting as far as possible with simple/general constructs, rather than developing possibly gratuitous, personally intuitive details. The concept of fictional sphere as equivalent to reading operations provides an intuition-compatible way to demonstrate routine conventional practice which encompasses both textual data and text-external knowledge. By suggesting a logical space or zone, this heuristic concept implies a ***formative*** quality to the reading operations, assigning them the capacity as matrix to ***develop*** or generate the truths necessary to the reference world. The object of the preceding chapters about world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire has been to establish the quality of the ***contextual*** inference involved in the procedures of the fictional sphere. The inference system elaborated shows how textual information ***must*** be related to text-external context through available sources of knowledge. This sense of "contextual" as an external, extended context for fictional truth allows us to define the ***results*** of such contextual inference ***as*** the reference world. It is not so important to envision how various "available" truths are integrated into a reference world, as how those truths depend on the ***means*** used to generate them. In effect, the generation of fictional truth depends on a crucial initial stage only visible through the contextual network. The truths of the reference world can ensue only through the processes of valid inference which ***relate*** available truths to others. It remains to demonstrate further how truths can be selected, and how hierarchies among such truths can be established through the contextual networks recognized. Because we deal with fiction, we cannot merely adhere to a traditional association of truth with an allegiance to reality. Instead, a complex interplay of available truths suggests that fictional truth, not unlike beauty, may be more relative (and "ideal")--more "in the eyes of the beholder"--than we might initially suspect. We need ***not*** conclude that purely subjective views must dominate, but rather that the reader's construction of truth

depends on the codified structure of the fictional sphere. What the reader recognizes as ***signs*** for truth determines what shows up in the reference world. Because signs with various text-external origins are part of the process of constructing reference worlds, such worlds are ***mediated*** by the codified conventional context on which the process depends.

This chapter does not primarily summarize conclusions developed in earlier chapters. It should be considered as a conclusion in that it expands implications of the model and provides examples of particular results. I investigate some of the codified knowledge structures involved in the construction of reference worlds, suggesting then hierarchies for the components involved. In order to suggest a modal structure for reading operations, I develop the usefulness of the concept of authorial audience as counterpart for the real reader. The modal structure suggests some "rules" for the selection and combination involved in the reading process. I offer the example of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* as a problematic configuration involving complex revision of the modal structure. I then suggest some different configurations for integrating intertextual repertoire, citing the radical form of alternate history as the most potentially challenging to text-models. Finally, I consider postmodern metafiction as an ultimate problem for the model.

Reference Worlds through Codified Knowledge Structures

The concept of textual reference world as defined at the end of Chapter Four and expanded in subsequent chapters is usefully viewed as the product of the pragmatic operations of the fictional sphere. The reference world is not only the world in which textually stipulated truths must be valued, but also where all applicable text-external knowledge must be co-ordinated. In bringing the imaginary reference world into existence, the reader not only collaborates with the text, but also with text-external models for fictional truth. The reference world is arranged as if it were actual, but includes not only world-models but

also those of genre and intertext. Only by defining the ***structure*** of this special collaboration can we gain a better understanding of reference worlds.

As suggested in Chapter Five, we must show how inference based on the three models is regulated as a codified structure. The codification pre-exists the reading activity as an available semiotic communication structure, and is reflected in actual interpretive operations. The reader determines a meaningful hierarchy of relations among text-external models by assessing the relative weight of such models for the text-model at hand. ***Categorizing*** fictional truths within "functional spaces," he creates order according to the codification of knowledge publicly available.

It is not that the text itself is superseded by codified text-external knowledge, but that the ***developments*** to which textual discourse gives rise inevitably determine a larger-than-textual structure of fictional truth. "Meaning" having multiple origins in the codes of the semiotic communication system, the text itself presents those codes for the reader to activate, leaving the organization for the encompassing meaning structure to the reader's discretion.

Having explored three categories of codified knowledge which make the semiotic communication of fictional truth possible, it is now possible to isolate more of the "rules" which govern selection and combination possibilities, establishing possible hierarchies for components within the matrix of the fictional sphere. This analysis depends on a view of reading as an appropriation of a text involving an understanding/interpretation process which is not primarily subjective, but rather dependent on shared and more objective knowledge.

"Autonomous" fictional worlds do not signify independent meaning, without also being "translated" into expanded terms which the reader is unable to circumvent. Fictional worlds undergo a semantic transformation within the fictional sphere, becoming finally construed as the reader-constructed reference world. As the reader struggles to name and expand fictional truth, she produces meaning which is

"external" to the autonomous world, but which bears a clear relationship to the text and to interconnected text-external knowledge bases. The construction of the reference world "re-codes" textual stipulation, providing an expanded account of fictional truth. The re-statement/expansion of fictional truth is valid only where based on publicly shared conventional knowledge, which assigns acceptability to the expansions by imposing a codified structure dependent on the text-model. The "standards" of interpretation imposed by the codified structure produce interpersonally acceptable reference worlds. Frequently unmanageable questions about interpretation ***become*** manageable once attention is focused on characters created through contextual knowledge structures.

As I have suggested in several contexts, Kendall Walton's appreciation of make-believe worlds may conveniently escape the standard communication model, but it does not finally allow assessment of the shared, semiotic aspects of re-statements/expansions made public as reference worlds.[1] Considered as products of the codified structure of the fictional sphere, Walton's games of make-believe do not allow the flexibility of theoretical assessment possible through the reference world concept. While Walton usefully re-casts semantic problems into pragmatic terms, reorienting the entire discussion of fictionality, his functional, reader-oriented approach still does not show how reference worlds are developed. The cognitive and emotional processes of game worlds are of course socially shared and sanctioned --even constituted by conventions--but as shown throughout this study, the process of reading ***as fiction*** involves much more fundamental "first-order" operations before individualized games can even occur. We cannot dispute that the reader adopts a particular propositional attitude towards fictional truth, in effect making the make-believe process into a propositional operator. But this is certainly not the only "operator" involved. We must be able to assess the knowledge bases which interact irrevocably with fictional texts, even ***before*** those texts can be thought of as "props" in a game of make-believe, mandating even which imaginings will be fundamental in the eventual game.

Walton's fundamental insight is that the reader assumes a dual attitude towards fiction, ***knowing*** that the fictional world is a pure creation of the text and that the actual world is unique in character, but also ***pretending*** that he can interact with that fictional world in his own game, creating in effect another "actual" world based on the textual prop. Walton insists usefully on the potential infinity of ***pretended*** actual worlds. My concept of textual reference world exploits the idea only ***implied*** by Walton, that a world can be imagined to somehow "pre-exist" textual stipulation. But it is a world most profitably thought of not as an individualized game, but rather as a truth world at best only ***reflected*** in the narrative discourse and including text-external knowledge activated by that discourse. The game concept does allow appreciation of how the reader can adopt an inside-the-world view of characters as ontologically complete human beings with whom he can interact emotionally. Already characters seem to take on properties which are not merely specified by the text. But to gain a sense of characters as human beings who would have existed and acted even if there were no story told about them, we need the concept of textual reference world built through codified reading operations. The procedures of the fictional sphere show ***how*** characters acquire a "human" stature ***before*** the individualized game takes over--what bridges of knowledge are available to provide access between the textual fictional world and the completely personal game. What gets filtered through to individual worlds of make-believe is a final product of the interactions of knowledge within the fictional sphere. Characters must absorb "truth" from this interaction.

While individual readers ***can*** obviously play any sort of extravagant game they wish with a text, only those games based on the codified structure of first-order processing will have the intersubjective, shared quality which exemplifies the reference world. Intersubjectively shareable games must be subject not only to the rules of the games themselves and to the nature of the text, but also to prescriptions imposed through the codified structure of the fictional sphere. Propositions are fictional not only because there are prescriptions to imagine them within the text, but because the prescriptions have a wider, semiotic source beyond textual boundaries. The reader assumes

the responsibility for recognizing and organizing the prescriptions within the rule-governed reading process, with the result that the individualized game becomes a ***product*** of that reading process, through which imagination is constrained and moulded.

Validity of interpretation depends on ***agreement*** as some kind of social confirmation, otherwise we have ***only*** private games. The fictional sphere must take priority over game worlds, which are individual products of the codified structure, but which allow ***also*** the integration of highly personal and subjective factors. In this way, such private factors as purpose, goals, and limitations on knowledge can be accounted for in game worlds, without contaminating the whole matrix. Problematic aspects of "misreadings" are relegated to a different ***level*** of analysis, so that divergent "outcomes" need not bear upon shared reference worlds. It is not that readers create "wrong" reference worlds by introducing irrelevant text-external knowledge and beliefs, but that in failing to recognize the intersubjectively and conventionally valid, they proceed ***beyond*** the fictional sphere to a private world.

The advantage of the fictional sphere is also obvious as the "location" of all kinds of interpretive, critical activity (including abstract theorizing), which do not directly involve pretense. The duality of the ostensibly objective critical attitude which can involve also pretense--an aspect which fascinates Walton--is best analysed as an operation of the fictional sphere which brings together reality and the fictional world in a special kind of interface. Various degrees of "involvement" in the fictional world are comprehensible then, as the reader integrates available knowledge. Standard classroom discussions can consequently focus on ***real*** human tragedies, while simultaneously making observations about the fictional world in question. World-knowledge is routinely co-ordinated with textual stipulations in this way, "significance" for the real world extrapolated as a result. Such interpretive activity need not be confused with more subjective, personalized games.

Demand for Hierarchy in the Fictional Sphere

Given that the configuration of truths in the textual reference world depends on the hierarchy of knowledge bases operative in the fictional sphere, we must define the interpersonal norms responsible for the hierarchy. We can take inspiration from the resolve of artificial intelligence that meaning must be created not out of random interactions, but as "...the predictable output of definable processes operating on a variable input."[2] The task is to determine the nature of variable "input" in terms of the applicable knowledge bases with their governing principles, developing the codified structure as interpersonally shared components of knowledge--a data-base essential to the truth of the reference world. A closed, finite system as suggested by artificial intelligence is ***not*** the goal, but rather a model which shows the nature of the underlying system, without insisting on ***complete*** rules for the creation of meaning. ***Some*** "rules" can be proposed which govern selection and combination, producing hierarchies for fictional truth. The truth of a reference world is not a special ***kind*** of truth, but rather what can be generated legitimately in keeping with the text and activated knowledge. The key factor for selection is the ***relevance*** of knowledge bases, established through the reader's recognition of the dominant text-model. Relevant factors must be picked out from extensive knowledge bases, and then assigned an appropriate "weight" in the truth structure. To generate this more complete structure of truth the reader must establish a workable relationship between the text and systems of knowledge existing outside of it. By assessing admissible components, the reader imaginatively "re-locates" to the reference world, treating that world temporarily as the centre of "reality," thereby exploring fictional truth more fully, and establishing essential connections.

As I have suggested in Chapter Six, the interpretive processes at issue are both governed by rules ***and*** reductive. Considerable work in text processing and sequential reading strategies has shown that readers ***pattern*** meaning in various ways, insisting on consistency, and applying strategies to "simplify" meaning in one way or another. They emphasize, they make symbolic, they establish connections, ***expecting***

a pattern or system, they "discover" systematic relations, they "follow" Peter Rabinowitz' various rules of reading, they create a totality for meaning. Given the fundamental incompleteness of fictional worlds, theorists have fruitfully explored all kinds of pragmatic inference strategies, especially in terms of how readers progress ***through*** texts, processing and re-aligning textual information. This kind of work also demonstrates that readers also ***reduce*** the potential proliferation of fictional truth by ignoring many implications. Faced with the impossibility of keeping track of all details and all implications, readers resort to ***reductive*** strategies. The kind of hierarchy of attention and importance suggested by such work (and inspired through Gestalt psychology) must be kept in mind as we address the larger, shared semiotic issues, thereby defining the construction of the reference world as opposed to purely individual constructs.

The structuralist attention to isolating codes for meaning is a significant step in this direction, but one which requires amplification and refinement. Roland Barthes' analysis of *Sarrasine* in *S/Z* is devoted to the notion of code as shared, collective knowledge, yet sets up the text as its own independent model, merely "traversed" by codes.[3] He stresses in a traditional way the unique quality of literary texts, while still insisting on the notion of code as collective knowledge and shared norm. Filling the text with ***plural*** meaning thought to be ***grounded*** in the text, Barthes does not see that it is really the complex reading operations which ***allow*** the text to be structured as it is. In different historical contexts, the same text could not produce the same plurality of meanings. The reader produces meaning through a variety of complex appropriate procedures, according to the conventional context available.

The reading processes of the fictional sphere have less to do with carefully arranged sets of textual elements than with the preliminary structures of expectations and hypotheses, some of which require ***revision*** on reading, as studies in textual dynamics and reading strategies usefully show. In the fictional sphere the reader is an "agent," creating more complete sense by interpolating available knowledge. As the obvious problems encountered in artificial intelligence suggest, the reader brings information which cannot be

deduced directly from the language of the text itself. The text does not provide some kind of "program" for meaning which stands complete on its own. Because meaning is constructed ***through*** processing, the fictional narrative text can only provide a sort of "index" of potential meaning which the reader uses to activate the supplementary codified knowledge required to construct the reference world. Semantic structure develops through the sense-making activity, rather than residing in a text as a stable, entirely autonomous entity. As Bernhard Lindemann suggests in a critique of artificial intelligence, texts must be thought of as "...short-lived crystallizations, as ***functions*** of a momentary and partial activation and re-organization of latently active knowledge systems in the producer/recipient..."[4] Reading strategies may seem to be unreliable or "disorderly" as Walton insists, yet they function efficiently for quick and accurate processing, according to a codified structure which makes them less personal and eccentric than might first appear.

Fundamental to the hierarchy of components of the fictional sphere is the accumulation of fictional truths about narrative agents as ***character traits.*** Very little work has been done on conventional models of character. Beyond the very limiting idea of characters as roles or functions within plot, as developed by Vladimir Propp and A.J. Greimas, there has evolved a basic appreciation of character as subjects of predicates which the reader collects from the text by attaching them to the proper name. Saul Kripke's idea of rigid designation supports this kind of narratology. The idea is that the reader accumulates the traits/attributes of a character, deciding within this process on fictional truths, and formulating the picture of a more-or-less complete individual "personality." Seymour Chatman's static paradigm of traits is perhaps the most fundamental model.[5]

Barthes' elaboration of a semantic code as the "voice of the person" is also pertinent to such inference procedures. Barthes develops no comprehensive typology, but his discussion of semic code demonstrates at least in part how details are interpreted and combined in the process of reading in order to "form" characters. In effect, Barthes insists only on the relevance of world-knowledge, which allows for the derivation of

appropriate connotations which contribute to character formulation--a *totalizing* process.

By identifying a series of "semes" a particular pattern develops, a character taking shape. As with Kripke's view, the proper name assures unity or identity for the character regardless of how many traits are attached. The various assembled qualities are assuredly all related to one another, contributing to a character which seems larger (or more total) than the sum of the component parts. In effect, as Thomas Docherty also suggests with his "kinetic" character concept,[6] the character seems then to exist ***beyond*** the collected semantic features, *as if* it is not only that sum which constitutes him.

Docherty speaks provocatively about the degree of stasis or kinesis in the motivation of the text, defining the static character as "...one whose existence is entirely accounted for in the fiction: this character is simply a function in the plot or design of the whole and cannot step outside of the bounds of the fiction."[7] Purely stipulated by the text and limited to the sum of traits, such a character has no apparent/imagined ontological status independent of the text. But the kinetic character will be potentially "absent" from the text:

> ...this character's motivation extends beyond that which is merely necessary for the accomplishment of the design of the plot, and he or she 'moves' in other spheres than the one we are engaged in reading. ...In this kind of 'Realistic' kinetic character, the unity of person is assured by the integrity of the proper name, the consonance of the characteristics, and the final opacity in the character, keeping [him or her] finally unknowable, owner of a 'private' self.[8]

Alternative to such realism are of course radical forms, where "...characters change names constantly and have no seeming consistency, unity, or private self at all."[9] This analysis suggests what is involved in the ontological existence which the reader postulates/imagines for the reference world.

The selecting and combining of "semes" is governed by three principles external to the text--the models available for reference world construction. Fictional truth in the form of character traits is routinely governed by the dictates of world-models for psychological coherence, which outline what can co-exist as traits or contribute to a seemingly "whole" character without producing confusion or ambiguity. As my analysis of world-knowledge has shown, such factors are drawn from empirical experience beyond the literary which can provide an automatic structure for fictional truth, especially in more realistic texts. But trait/truth accumulation is also informed by literary conventions which stipulate, for example, stereotypes which the reader easily acknowledges in order to produce meaning. We have seen how literary types have an intertextual mobility which assigns them automatic validity as a repertoire for suitable traits. There is always room for variations in qualities for such types, but the models essentially ***facilitate*** the reader's selection and combination of traits from the particular intertextual context, providing an easy way to achieve coherence for fictional truth. Trait selection is also informed decisively by text-models which stipulate which qualities/traits "go together" traditionally, governing especially what can be applied through world-models.[10]

Hector-Neri Castañeda's views on "thin thinkable individuals" ***built up*** in fiction help to explicate this basic narratological assessment of character trait accumulation.[11] Because fictional characters are simply a subdomain of thinkable entities, routine cognitive processes are relevant. The "togetherness" of traits may not be contingent or empirically evident as in reality, but that togetherness *is* created nonetheless through the fiction and governed by the laws of the fiction's structure.[12] Characters ***can*** thus be "read" as people are in real life, according to the reader's experience. As with the concept of rigid designator, changes of properties within a fiction seem to be based on the same sort of unity and self-identity which we assign to real objects.[13] It seems logically sound at least from ***this*** philosophical perspective to insist on the epistemic operations esteemed in narratology.

But principles enumerated as models provide an incomplete view of the assembly of character traits and the consequent building of a truth structure for the reference world, ***unless*** we determine applicable hierarchies among the models. If meaning evolves through certain cognitive procedures, we must ascertain where those processes can be halted and how, for example, the activation of the instantly available world-models can be so easily ***complicated*** by text-models and intertextual repertoire. In effect, the reader is guided in the selection and combination process by expectations about particular "roles" which can be filled, depending on the text-model. We need not think of characters as filling roles as a text grammar would suggest, but rather as fitting into "slots" according to the potentials made available through the three models. In the reference world characters must be consistent, not only with life, but with text-models and repertoire as the situation may require. The reader must presume a dominant ***function*** for a character, which will depend on a particular hierarchy.

The work of Baruch Hochman demonstrates clearly how limited an assessment of fictional character can be, where ***hierarchy*** of models is not recognized.[14] As with the deficiency of Barthes' semic code which priorizes world-models, a classification of character is inadequate where text-models and intertextual repertoire are ignored in favor of world-models. Hochman's taxonomy of character includes remarkable insights and seems demonstrably complete. It works extremely well as a guide for assessing character in the traditional realistic novel. He also devotes an entire chapter to the complexity of fictional characters' similarity to real people, recognizing that different genres produce different effects.[15] Yet the taxonomy itself proves either non-productive/non-informative or downright unworkable when applied to non-realistic texts.

Without acknowledging realism categorically as his point of departure, Hochman takes an uncritical approach which does not identify the underlying principles at work. With only an informal introduction about the differences among genres, Hochman bases his typology on the qualities of realism and its typical attention to the relationship or similarity of characters to real people. By reversing only the first of

his eight descriptive categories and their antitheses, we can see immediately that the categories all generally characterize what is called realism: "naturalism" versus stylization, coherence/incoherence, wholeness/fragmentariness, literalness/symbolism, complexity/simplicity, transparency/opacity, dynamism/staticism, and closure/openness. Generally the first halves of these polar opposites are all terms considered "positive" in the qualification of realistic character. The opposites are problematic for realism, suggesting limitations which the reader does not anticipate for realistic character.

We can easily provide a logic, then, for Hochman's work, showing that the main principle at work is a fundamental insistence on world-models. By choosing ***one*** hierarchy in which world-models dominate, Hochman assigns priority to the kind of characters ***easily*** imagined as ontologically complete in the reference world. The categories of the typology ***result from*** this priorizing of world-models. As a result, Hochman's categories represent extremely well the default to world-models typical of realism, which I have assessed in Chapter Nine.[16] The literary conventional is particularly evident in the antitheses, which are set up as ***negations*** of the (desirable) realistic qualities, and which imply knowledge of particular conventions or text-models, which Hochman acknowledges but does not formally assess.

Even for realistic texts, the taxonomy presents problems. While Hochman insists on the overlap and interaction of the various categories which can be combined in characters in different ways, he does not provide any hierarchy for the reader's assembly of the elements. We cannot see ***how*** they actually intersect in different characters or groups of characters, and what the mutually ***dynamic*** influences of the various axes would be. Certainly not all texts thought of as realistic will benefit from analysis through these categories, which may discredit ***different*** qualities of realism at work.[17] Moreover, the categories can be problematic in a more general sense for ***all*** realistic texts.

To offer only one example, the category of literalism/symbolism is extremely problematic, including as it does an explanation of typicality.[18] Generally a sense of literary "type" in a realistic novel

destroys the "credibility" which the reader demands of the story, since characters are expected to have all the complexity and literalness of *real* people. The choice of *ordinary* subjects is perhaps the most central tenet of realism. The "real" must be literal, concrete, individual, and unique. Types or "stock" characters recognizable through conventions of text-models and intertextual repertoire destroy this effect. Yet the "representative" program of realism creates an immediate problem, because the "real" as based on world-models is *also* that which is common and *typical*, rather than unique. Scholars working to define realism have long argued about the problem, often insisting on some kind of *union* of the individual and the universal. Hochman sheds no light on the problem because of his uncritical priorizing of world-models. If we do not establish a *hierarchy* for the qualities gleaned from literary convention and world-models, we have no means to assess the difference between a "stock" character from intertextual repertoire and a realistic "type" who takes his typicality from world-models. Nor can we assess the related differences in reading procedures.

Based on realistic priorities, the taxonomy does not capture the reading strategies demanded for many different kinds of texts. In some genres, let us say detective stories, standard situations and stock characters are not in the least disastrous for reader interest. The same kind of character appearing in a realistic novel would produce a sense of betrayed confidence. The archetypal heroes and villains of romance also survive reading remarkably well without provoking consternation. Hochman acknowledges informally the need to identify the role of text-models or what he calls "generic signposting," even discussing differences between novelistic and romance characters.[19] But he ignores them in his typology, thereby implicitly judging the stylized/idealized characters of romance *according to* categories of characterization appropriate to the realistic novel. In terms of reading/interpretive procedures, such an approach would lack "competence" and would result in the kinds of mistakes (suggested in Chapter Ten) which occur where the reader does not recognize the text-model. Romance has its *own* conventions of characterization, and must not be faulted where it "fails" to attain realistic credibility.[20]

Certainly the categories can be *applied* for genres like medieval or historical romance, but prove remarkably uninformative about the reading strategies required by the text-models. To read accurately for fictional truth in many cases, the reader must abandon her realistic expectations. Hochman's typology does not show how the categories can be put into variable configurations *according to* dominant text-model. The strict priorizing of world-models does not allow exploration of the different criteria of character individuation which vary according to text-model.

Cognitive Processes, Reading Roles, and Modal Structure

In order to avoid this imposition of (and validation through) one particular kind of text-model, we must examine the different hierarchies which can result from dominant text-models. From the perspective of reading procedures, the typological categories based solely on expectations for realism easily lose validity. We must bear in mind (without rehearsing here) the discussion of an entire range of selection procedures and interpretive possibilities discussed in Chapter Ten, especially as emphasis/de-emphasis, hierarchy of relevance, and the *selection* of appropriate text-model as reading strategy.

Also relevant is the discussion at the end of Chapter Eleven about the hermeneutic strategy of logical presupposition as an epistemic operation which constructs reference worlds. Although intertextual repertoire figures prominently in logical presupposition, world-models are also invoked in this way. As my analyses of Chapter Eight demonstrate, all kinds of world-knowledge can be involved in such logical presuppositions. In effect, logical presuppositions are specific to a text, and produce a kind of "pre-text," whether that of other literature or the cultural texts which finally constitute reality and world-models. This textual invocation of pre-text must have considerable bearing on the reader's construction of truth worlds. Yet the extensive knowledge involved is not necessarily dominant (as I have shown) in a particular reference world, precisely because proximity or

adherence to world-models may not be the issue. Attention only to logical presupposition as world-knowledge will result in the same kind of limitations inherent in static trait accumulation models or in Hochman's typology. The context of the logically complete and consistent environment of the reference world is ***presupposed*** in order to qualify individual fictional truths and to fit them into a suitable configuration. That context cannot be assessed only in terms of distance from reality, and depends fundamentally on presuppositions ***beyond*** the logical ones involved in intertext and world-models.

Beyond logical presupposition Jonathan Culler also identifies the literary/pragmatic/rhetorical presuppositions which are dominant in the literary reading process, and which he bases on the pragmatic presupposition identified in linguistics beyond the logical.[21] It is ***these*** presuppositions which involve the all-important text-model, relating a fictional world to others in similar series. Through such presuppositions the reader adopts a particular attitude and watches for features relevant to the text-model, however perverse it may be, more or less competently identifying signals. What I have described in terms of interpretive selection procedures all hinges on this kind of literary/pragmatic presupposition. The reader presumes the text-model to provide a particular conventional context, so that the text at hand fits into a series of texts for which he already has expectations. As Culler suggests,

> [f]ocusing on the conditions of meaning in literature, [poetics] relates a literary work to a whole series of other works, treating them not as sources but as constituents of a genre, for example, whose conventions one attempts to infer. ...[T]here are no moments of authority and points of origin except those which are retrospectively designated as origins and which ...derive from the series...[22]

In effect, this kind of literary, pragmatic presupposition transcends the logical presupposition which identifies particular components through broadly intertextual connections (including those of world-models), to focus on the underlying conventions necessarily involved. Those conventions invite recognition of fictional truth not explicit in the other models, especially in terms of fictional-world macrostructure. While

text-models without attention to world-models and intertextual repertoire will not provide a complete structure for the reference world, the specific components of world-models and intertext cannot stand alone without ***qualification*** through a dominant text-model. Excluding any ***part*** of presupposition will result in an incomplete and inaccurate reference world.

Text-models involve both entrenched ***constitutive*** conventions which would be ***necessarily*** included in literary competence and involve tacit agreement as to what is expected of a genre, and what Thomas Pavel outlines as "pre-conventions" of literary narrative.[23] Many reading strategies for the collection of fictional truth rely on regularities which lack the uniformity of constitutive conventions, and which are not absolutely crucial to the reader's ability to play the literary game. In effect, there can be identified a progression from the more universally understood constitutive conventions, to the more complex localized conventions associated with sub-genres. Literary competence becomes increasingly crucial, since not all real readers will identify the particular literary codes involved, relying perhaps then on more accessible world-models. Rabinowitz' work with narrative conventions and his emphasis on what is generally "appropriate" goes a long way in understanding such processes. It would be wise to retain the refreshing openness of his down-to-earth understanding of routine reader operations. Yet only an interminable detailed analysis of the many possible examples of "pre-conventions" which govern the interpretation of character would produce an accurate taxonomy of all possible combinations involved in such semiotic practice. The fundamental concern of such analysis would need to be cognition itself.

Given that all alternate possible worlds are constructs of the human mind, we need think of the text-model as a "centre of gravity" which pulls knowledge into a cognitive "field," attracting various aspects to variable ***degrees***. The creation of a truth configuration for the reference world is parallel to the world-making activity through which we all interact with reality, shaping our world in the process. Just as we build possible worlds in general from what our minds assemble, so too the reader of literary narrative establishes cognitive categories in

which to classify both textually provided information and that which is activated from text-external knowledge bases. Reference world construction depends on the truth-functional propositions identified through mental activity--possibilities ***recognized*** for fictional truth.

At least some conventions of text-models have cognitive foundations, the model in effect setting up a cognitive landscape which the reader must explore. Lindemann asks provocatively "...to what extent are the rule systems of literary genres not only random allocations of arbitrary linguistic conventions, but rather responses to, reflections of, deeper-rooted cognitive necessities?"[24] Lindemann's idea of "cognitive map building" relates closely to reference world construction, suggesting the ***complications*** involved in the reading process--how people can "find orientation" in fictional situations, and "put themselves into the picture."[25] Obviously ***some*** of the strategies must involve world-models, but text-models would seem to be tied very closely with cognitive processes. The conventions recognized for text-models perhaps only make sense insofar as they call into play basic cognitive abilities.

Having recognized the importance of scripts or frames in the activation of world-knowledge, we can perhaps ask whether such scripts are also activated through exposure to literary genres. Given that the reader will not deviate from the expectations invoked by a script, is it not sensible to ask how text-models can also contribute to the construction of applicable scripts? What the reader incorporates as "appropriate" in the reference world is what fits into known scripts, whether dependent on world- or text-models. Not only the logical, but also the more pragmatic presupposition must be involved in scripts. Roger Schank's and Robert Abelson's discussion of episodic versus semantic memory might be useful here, the latter relevant to text-models as a potential source for scripts.[26] It seems obvious through the idea of logical presupposition that the reader not only depends on world-models to develop "episodic" memory, but also on intertextual repertoire which provides equally valid individuals and events. Presumably such intertext can be organized into "standardized generalized episodes"[27] as for real-world experience. But one might ask

exactly when the more "semantic" memory would take over, replacing world- with text-models, in a way comparable to the replacing of logical presupposition with the literary/pragmatic. While the standardized generalized episodes based on world-models and intertextual repertoire obviously involve a default mechanism--the reader will only store ***differences*** separately in memory[28]--the text-model presumably functions this way also, any particular text needing to ***specify*** the deviation from the model. More analysis would be needed to determine the cognitive foundations of text-models.[29]

In any case, an appropriate "bridge" from cognitive issues to the textually activated, conventional construction of reference worlds by a "reader" as metonymy for such operations, is the concept of ***reading roles*** applied at several points in this study. The concept of "implied reader" as textual construct provides already a way to translate purely cognitive issues into elements presumed "audible" within texts. As I have shown in Chapter Seven, the concept of "implied reader"/authorial audience is necessary in order to augment factors of narration, which do not account for the total generation of fictional truth. The concept is required to appreciate ***rhetorical*** influences which involve more text-encompassing norms than narration implies. "Implied reader" is clearly part of the encoding technique of narrative--part of the way in which the reader is introduced to the story world. As a constructive principle of the narrative text parallel to implied author, the implied reader sends the reader beyond textual boundaries, the concept relating not only to textual prescriptions, but also to the literary/social context where the real reader belongs. What can ***qualify*** as truth for the reference world depends in part on the implied reader which relates both to textual stipulation and to the real reader's experience through the cognitive processes suggested above. In effect, the peculiar interaction of textual data and contextual expectations is encouraged ***through*** the construct of implied reader/authorial audience.

Wolfgang Iser's use of the term implied reader permits by-passing the other numerous terms for abstract readers, and proves useful as distinguished from the narratee as a counterpart of the narrator, or a kind of mediator between narrator and reader.[30] Iser uses the term as a

meaning-producing element, a perspective on meaning, or a distinct kind of global interpretation which is evident in the text. The implied reader most significantly governs the subjective point of view of real readers, providing a framework for the formulation of meaning. The idea is that semantic textual factors inscribe a desirable reading attitude, implying suitable norms and values.

What is unfortunate about this account is the forcing of the term implied reader to apply to real reader operations too--the kinds of external cognitive operations which I summarized from Iser's theory in Chapter Six. The term is adopted to account for reading operations, ostensibly without reference to empirical readers, even though real operations like consistency-building and image-making are at issue. Iser's implied reader is thus a transcendental model which permits a description of structural effects, defining the role of the reader *as* textual strategy. Yet Iser also tries to describe how textual structures are transmuted through ideational activities into ***personal*** experiences. Strictly speaking, the implied reader is part of the text and matches textual predispositions and suitable global interpretation. But Iser wants the term to serve as ***both*** textual structure and a structured act --as immanent structure plus the real reader's cognitive process which results. He wishes to use the term as a ***metonymic*** characterization of the text, and as a variable embodiment of diverse interpretations. The term refers to both the potential meaning which is pre-structured in the text, and the real reader's active concretization of that potential. The implied reader is thus some kind of "transcendental possibility," not yet realized, and subject to change within the process of reading. It is fascinating that Iser wants to create this kind of dual function for the term, but the result remains an inadequate appreciation of the link between text and reading role.

If Iser's term insists disconcertingly on the real cognitive dimension, Umberto Eco's "model reader" as a means to view the relation established between textual structure and reader is perhaps too restricted to the idea of a textual construct.[31] Eco insists that the co-operative role of the reader in interpretation, and the dynamic interaction between text and reader is "foreseen" by the text and

incorporated there. The model reader is ***anticipated*** by the text as a kind of possible reader whom the author has in mind, enabling the author to set up a textual system of reference based on cultural context and codes with which the real reader deals in the business of interpretation. The model reader is an active principle of interpretation, Eco presuming that to postulate such co-operation does not "pollute" the structural, semiotic analysis with extratextual elements, since the "foreseen" interpretation is part of the generative process of the text.[32] The semiotic perspective does recognize world-knowledge as an important factor in interpretation, assuming that texts presuppose and help to build up a specific "encyclopedic" competence. Eco also usefully applies modal logic to the dynamic strategies of reading, focusing on the variably temporary possible worlds which ***readers*** create as they progress ***through*** texts. As such, his analysis of the co-operative role of the reader in interpreting signs/messages contributes usefully to the fundamentals of inference on which this study relies. But the restricted sense of model reader does not constitute a productive theoretical bridge to the context of actual reading processes outside of the text.

In order to study textual strategy accurately it is necessary to clarify better a basic distinction between that textual influence which is directed from narrator to narratee as a direct presentation of facts, and that which involves larger aesthetic requirements of the text and rhetorical strategies directed to an implied reader.[33] Rhetorical strategies depend on particular kinds of expectations which originate in knowledge bases ***outside*** of the text. While narration is concerned directly with semantics, rhetorical strategies alter the quality of that "communicative" context, forcing in most cases an at least partial revision of the fictional truth made "evident" in the narration. It is at this "extra-fictional" level that the implied reader is incorporated textually, necessitating then a response on the part of the real reader in terms of activating text-external knowledge. Beyond purely narrative signification, which establishes fictional truth and does not primarily call extra- and intertextual knowledge into play, we must identify the rhetorical requirements of texts. These requirements necessarily involve the reader's context and knowledge, and even sometimes result

in a reduction of narrative signification made possible through the reader's involvement in the generation of meaning.

Rabinowitz concept of two ***reading roles***, by shifting the focus to the actual reader, demonstrates best this essential textual ***discursive duality***, addressing the issues of narration through the reading role of narrative audience, while assessing the concerns of rhetoric through the role of authorial audience.[34] I have shown in several places the benefits of these distinctions, clarifying in Chapter Nine the interplay of the two roles in relation to dominant text-models. I want to assess here how duality of the reading concept provides a bridge to the reference worlds created by real readers. Rabinowitz does not abandon the idea of an intentional structure implied textually, nor Iser's interest in how textual structure invites response. But rather than discussing implied audiences of texts as a kind of hybrid, combined structure, Rabinowitz makes the crucial distinction between roles.

As a constructive principle of the text, implied reader is best developed from the reading perspective as authorial audience. Unlike the narrative audience, an image of authorial audience can be textually inscribed *without* becoming part of the fictional world. An "implied reader" must always be extra-fictional in that sense. In effect, the text-based construct is endowed with knowledge external to the text--the ability to move towards the external position occupied by the real reader, and to serve as a principle to co-ordinate fictional truth from all available sources, both textual and text-external. Through this "bridging" effect the authorial audience contributes prominently to the creation of the textual reference world. While the narrative audience functions on the "inside" of fictions, representing the role of the reader as absorbed in make-believe or imagination, the authorial audience bridges back to real readers in a different way, implicating the much larger frame of contextual knowledge. By considering the more encompassing role, we see how the role of narration/narrative audience becomes only *part* of the larger "message" or structure of fictional truth. What the narrative audience learns from the text must be fit into that larger structure of knowledge. The role of authorial audience

guarantees the "consistency" of the truth structure of the reference world, providing the means to co-ordinate all applicable knowledge.

In effect, the two reading roles divide my reader as metonymy for information gathering/processing/co-ordinating into two functions, allowing for greater flexibility in analyzing the operations of the fictional sphere. The narrative audience "participates" in the fictional world, believing in characters, identifying and interacting emotionally with them. The authorial audience, in effect, pulls that interaction *outside* of the fictional world, creating an overlapping truth structure for textual and text-external elements, and a larger context *into which* the familiar operations of make-believe must fit.

More importantly perhaps, the value of the authorial audience concept as a bridge to real readers and reference worlds can be demonstrated in another way. We can productively treat the authorial audience as a *counterpart* of the real reader. Just as the implied author could be considered a counterpart of the real author, so the implied reader/authorial audience can be conceived as a counterpart of the real reader. Again, the emphasis on reading role shifts attention from the relation between implied author and implied reader to the link with *real* reading operations.

Basic transworld identity is preserved between the authorial and real audience, but with different properties possible, generated on the basis of attitudes and knowledge defined in the text and its relevant context of text-external knowledge. The "original" for the counterpart will vary from reader to reader, but is brought as an identity to the reading of the text.[35] That identity is undeniably involved in the analyzable reading procedures. But those procedures nonetheless depend for selection of and access to *relevant* knowledge bases on the variably altered counterpart of authorial audience. The metonymic reader defined by the procedures must involve therefore the role of authorial audience as a principle for generating fictional truth.

Thinking of authorial audience in this way solves the fundamental problem which Iser has with the implied reader functioning as both

textual construct and representative of real reading operations. What we perceive as written *into* the text is easily correlated with real reader response. The concept of counterpart bridges effectively the difficult gap between textual construct and real readers and their constructed reference worlds. The important questions of distance and proximity between authorial audiences and real readers can be addressed in terms of counterpart relations. We can profitably question the extent to which the "fictional ego" of any real reader can merge with authorial audience. This proposal of counterparthood provides a useful extension for the concept of authorial audience, and also relates the concept closely to the construction of the reference world.

It also suggests a viable way to envision a ***modal*** structure for the hierarchy of the fictional sphere. While the narrative audience can technically only have access to a "narratorial actual world" (in Ryan's terms), as a potentially unreliable version of the fictional world, the authorial audience as counterpart of the real reader has access not only to implied authorial norms, but also to the full range of knowledge necessary to determine what is accurate in terms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. The counterpart concept demonstrates how presupposition and cognitive issues are involved in a modal structure, reference world construction depending on the counterpart's knowledge as possibilities which the real reader ***recognizes*** for fictional truth, as he would do for a counterfactual situation about himself. The epistemic world created must depend on the knowledge of the counterpart--not ***all*** knowledge available to the real reader, but only that ***selected*** through authorial audience.

If the truth of the fictional world, as a sort of "image" proposed textually for the (non-existent) textual reference world, depends on the authority of the author, that of the more complete reference world depends on the reader ***as*** authorial audience. The reference world is the centre of a modal system comprising alternative possible worlds which the reader as authorial audience does ***not*** recognize or animate through reading procedures. The alternate, inaccurate possible worlds get "ruled out" on the basis of the authorial audience's knowledge; that is, alternative reference worlds which would entail irrelevant fictional

truths are invalidated through the limitations imposed by the authorial audience. Acting as authorial audience, the reader gathers and co-ordinates fictional truth, assigning a priority position to the accurate reference world. What does not "fit" from the real reader's knowledge belongs to ***alternative*** possible worlds within a modal structure. The "truths" of those alternative worlds are ***not*** then part of the structure of the reference world, but are rather recognized as invalid alternatives through the role of authorial audience as counterpart. The cognitive procedures involved in this recognition process depend on the role assumed as authorial audience. Only by recognizing and assuming the role of the counterpart does the reader avoid creating reference worlds which are purely alternative constructs, and where irrelevant truths would proliferate.

Through the concept of authorial audience as counterpart for the real reader we can envision how modal operators of necessity, possibility, and impossibility are re-formulated in terms of knowledge, belief, and ignorance. Fictional truth in terms of the knowledge structure appropriate to the authorial audience will be ***known*** as true, ***believed*** as probable, or ***ignored*** as indeterminate. Because constructing the reference world is a matter of identifying and adopting the knowledge of the authorial audience, it is possible to ascertain the relationship of the real reader's knowledge (and beliefs) to that of the counterpart. Deficiencies, excess, and factors of "distance" become analyzably obvious. If we think of the assignment of truth value to any particular proposition considered as a candidate for the reference world, there will be three "operators" of either agreement, indeterminacy, or disagreement between the assessment made by the counterpart and that of the real reader. Very much involved here is my view of ***shared***, conventional knowledge, because agreement/proximity will prevail where the competent reader has acquired the routine conventional knowledge. The role of authorial audience can only involve such knowledge activated textually. Only particular kinds of excess knowledge or deficiencies in the real reader may result in problems for the construction of an accurate reference world. The "closer" the knowledge structure of the authorial audience is to the knowledge bases acquired by the real reader, the more easily the reference world will be

constructed. Highly realistic texts depend through the default to world-models on a very close relationship, whereas more specialized and "exotic" text-models put more strain on the reader's competence. The reader will depend in any case on a principle of minimal departure from his own knowledge, wherever specific indications to the contrary are not given. The knowledge structure of the authorial audience as counterpart will not depart gratuitously from routine, conventionally acquired knowledge.

There are various degrees, then, to which the reader will have to adjust to the knowledge structure required of the authorial audience. Where there is not an exact correspondence between the two systems of knowledge, there may be simply an ***absence*** or ignorance of information. The whole difficult question of belief becomes involved, belief being somewhere halfway between knowledge and ignorance. There may be a ***questioning*** in the face of uncertainty or indeterminacy as to what knowledge must be adopted. Or there may be an open ***conflict*** where the reader recognizes the divergence but refuses to adopt the knowledge of authorial audience--refuses to "believe" that knowledge. In this case it is not so much that the reader refuses to ***add*** knowledge, but that he refuses to ***substitute*** that knowledge for what already exists. It is not that fictional truth admits of degree, as Currie argues,[36] but that there can be degrees of commitment to the truth of any proposition on the part of the reader forced to assume the role of authorial audience. The fictional truth structure of the reference world can be explained in terms of how the reader infers and adopts the knowledge of the authorial audience.

While the authorial audience "embodies" the knowledge which regulates the structure of truth for the reference world, there are different qualities of "evidence" to support the truths involved. Some ***reasons*** are ***better*** than others for the reader to think that some things are true, depending on how such details fit into the authorial audience's knowledge structure. As my separate analyses of world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire have shown, where and how the reader as authorial audience ***locates*** knowledge is crucial. "Evidence" is registered in knowledge bases outside the text, from which the

authorial audience must make selections. Within the operations of the fictional sphere ***priorities*** among models and principles will prevail, such that particular fictional truths will be ***more reasonable*** than other possibilities. Any "reasonable inference" admits of degree and must fit into a hierarchy of operations.

But degrees of "evidence" do not result in degrees of fictional truth within the reference world. Dependent on the modal structure of the fictional sphere, the reference world is constructed *as* a determinate fictional reality, *as if* it pre-existed textual stipulation. Ontologically there is no such thing. But epistemically the reader undertakes through the role of authorial audience the building of an imagined ontological completeness which will not admit of degrees of truth. Once the reading/interpretive operations of the fictional sphere have created a reference world, the truths resident there are no longer open to dispute or subject to a scale of truth. While inference involves degrees of suitability according to a hierarchy, the resulting truths of the reference world take on an independent status. In effect, once the knowledge of the authorial audience is accepted as accurate, the reader postulates the reference world as an "actually existing state of affairs" as if it were distinct from the operations which have brought it into existence. While the operations in fact constitute the only existence there is for the reference world, the reader loses awareness of the process and deals "directly" with the truths of his constructed reference world, which he classifies from an internal perspective as "real." It is in this way that the reference world takes the place of reality as a "referent" for the textually signified fictional world, the counterpart relation between authorial audience and reader solving the truth proliferation problem.

Configurations: *Sir Gawain* as Example

Except where ambiguity/hesitation prevails, only one configuration of knowledge bases creates the textual reference world as a modally-determined centre. An alternate configuration will have a different

modal status. Because the reader as authorial audience must set up this accurate configuration--that is, the competent reader acting in accord with the "demands" of his counterpart--there results a particular interaction of the three models identified. The modal structure for the reading process depends on how the authorial audience establishes which configuration of knowledge models to activate, identifying in this way the central or "actual" reference world from among many possibilities. The authorial audience decides what is necessary, possible, and impossible by selecting the dominant model and arranging the other components in relation to it.

Text-models contribute most universally to a governing modality for the fictional sphere, but with varying importance, and permitting variable interactions among different ***sub-classes*** of knowledge. The result is a co-ordinated hierarchy in which world-models play ***variable*** roles, fictional characters assuming different functions according to how models and their sub-components of knowledge are applied. In no way does a static view of trait paradigms or Hochman's typology capture this sense of modally governed trait accumulation.

The late medieval romance *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* demonstrates very well the modal structure of reading operations through one possible configuration, showing how ***complex*** the interaction of models can be. It demonstrates how easily more than one text-model may be involved.[37] *Sir Gawain* not only demonstrates well selection procedures and the co-ordination of text-external knowledge, but also how a ***subversion*** of text-models and related intertextual repertoire can take place, forcing revision of the modal structure of reading procedures. Excessive demands are made on the reader as authorial audience in such circumstances.

Confronting the sophisticated narrative techniques of *Sir Gawain* with the tools of narratology, we discover remarkable incongruities of character which resist analysis on standard models, such as that of Hochman discussed above. Typological questions of wholeness, coherence, complexity, dynamism, stylization, and symbolism can be addressed only within a conventional literary context devoid of mimetic

authority. To appreciate the generic norms of characterization which the text presents, but ***coupled with*** their subtle erosion, the reader must ***set aside*** an implicit valorization of realistic techniques as a point of departure. Analysis of the fundamental dominant text-model and intertextual connections reveals how character is built and undermined, producing ambiguous irony. The incongruity of character, the incoherence, fragmentation, artificiality, and plurality ***can*** all be analyzed as functions of conventional, generic narrative procedures and intertextual strategies which are reflected and thematized within the romance text.

But the ***final result*** in this case is more crucial to our discussion of the reference world: an ***incongruity*** between the complex content which intertextual convention dictates and the evident desire to comment on the chivalric value system. As an interpretive procedure available ***to readers***, irony depends here on the recognition of a ***disparity*** between conventional, "agreed upon" meaning and the intentional meaning which we might attribute to an implied author. As authorial audience, the reader must work out the modally central reference world through recognition of irony. In this kind of self-parody, the hero ***emerges*** from romance as a literal construct, viable in the realm of real-life expectations. Not a point of departure, "realism" is the escape route and ***destination***.

Given this unusual treatment of character, *Sir Gawain* provides an ideal opportunity to explore the conventions/reader expectations which constitute the text-external knowledge of the authorial audience needed to interpret the structure of truth suitable for a textual reference world. The text-model provides a vital ***context*** for the recuperation of fictional truth, as the reader makes sense of the textual information according to the applicable conventions of reading. Fictional truth is not immanent in the radically ironic and self-parodic text, but is "***knowable***" or recoverable only with respect to a system of operative conventions assimilated by the authorial audience. By adopting a mode of writing which both ***accords*** with the text model and radically ***undermines*** it, the *Gawain*-poet does not merely assign or stipulate

fictional truth, but makes possible the ***production*** of that truth through the ***mediation*** of generic (and inter-generic) expectations.

The complex text-model applicable in *Sir Gawain* insists on the ontotological structure of romance worlds, and includes specific generic motifs, most notably the quest pattern of a journey which the knight undertakes alone. The quest follows a challenge, and involves the typical arming of the hero, the element of a disguised opponent and the mystery which that provokes, the typical sojourn at a strange castle, and chivalric encounters or adventure. Gawain faces all manner of typically wild beasts, men, and giants along the way, although recounted in rapid summary. The test of individual prowess is central, although transformed into an ethical test of ***total*** integrity. Elements of the supernatural figure prominently. The hunting scenes are frequent topoi of romance. Emblematic effects are central to characterization. But ***all*** of these conventions are subject to variable ***misuse*** in order to produce a self-parodic text, and subject the ideals of knightly conduct to ridicule.

Sir Gawain includes conventions from ***other*** genres, both straight and inverted, as was common in the early French romances, where discourse starts with Provencal lyric and ideology, but becomes increasingly a forum to problematize the inherent concepts of courtly love, chivalry, and adventure. Medieval romance is not a genre "fixed" according to a single text-model, since the narration routinely moves through registers, playfully preventing a stable perspective. In *Sir Gawain* we find the typically courtly tone of early romance imposed upon a basically comic mode which interweaves various generic forms into a suspenseful plot. The Beheading Game of folklore replaces the "standard" chivalric combat encounter, creating a central puzzle about Gawain's conduct by juxtaposing the heroic element with the available tradition of happy outcomes. Although courtly in tone, the Temptation Story is close to the convention of fabliau, deflating the aristocratic romance sentiments of the bedroom scenes. The Exchange of Winnings motif has origins in stories of contests between heroes or brothers, taking the form of gratuitous bets, jokes, or struggles for superiority. The courtly version in *Sir Gawain* is superficially insignificant, but like

the Temptation Story, is recognized finally for its life and death significance as the real ethical test, superseding that of the Beheading Game. Gawain fails his test before he keeps his appointment. To make the retrieval of meaning even more complex, there are other inter-generic elements, including satire, classical and biblical allusions, and liturgical intertexts. All such factors problematize the reader's construction of character, which cannot be read solely through the core conventions of courtly romance.

We must consider ***how*** such models of coherence are activated in reading. We have seen how expectations for fictional truth can depend on a kind of "correspondence" between the text and a socially given reality--the reality factors of world-knowledge. But while world-models cannot be ignored in *Sir Gawain*, and become ***finally*** central, the correspondence between text and other literary texts is of ***prime*** importance. Only after the fundamental text-models and intertextual repertoire have produced their effect and been ***undermined*** can we appreciate the real-life factors of world-models as crucial to Gawain's fate. We must understand a fundamental, initially inescapable "intertextuality."

Indeed, *Sir Gawain* illustrates ***both*** modes of intertextuality identified in Chapter Eleven, and must be read in connection with or against other texts from social culture in general, from romance, and from other medieval genres. The characterization of Gawain is enmeshed in a textual structure which has "absorbed" fictional truths from other texts, reforming itself through reading operations into a reference world much larger than explicit textual stipulations suggest.

Gawain has a complex, mixed intertextual identity brought automatically from other texts, including chronicle, legend, French courtly romance, and later English prose romance. His presentation is therefore self-consciously dependent on textual sources, his name already a sum of attributes which allow him to retain expected, typical qualities by association with prototypes. Gawain depends on ***variabl***-accounts and sometimes ***conflicting*** suggestions for attributes not without ironic implications even in the source texts, not to mention

thematizing within *Sir Gawain* itself. But he remains fundamentally a demonstration of a role, at least superficially the quintessential Arthurian knight, the representative of the court, the epitome of loyalty, courage, chivalry, and courtesy--a paragon of literary knightly virtues. Part of this intertextual identity is a dominant "literary" quality, which diminishes ideal knights, even in the earlier romances, where heroic prowess was comically and ironically treated. There really never were any "ideal" knights in romance. The Gawain-poet best ***exploits*** this conventional quality, hinting throughout not only that reality has been falsified in legend, but that the typical virtues ***always were*** more literary than real, even within the worlds of romance.

Although *Sir Gawain* demonstrates well the authorial audience's somewhat onerous responsibility to recognize meaning according to a logic external to the text, and involving principles of integration between texts, what is ***remarkable*** is the subtle ***erosion*** of the highly intertextual, "literary" hero performing conventional actions. Here the story-book hero finds his way ***out of*** the conventional, intertextual truth of medieval romance. The *Gawain*-poet confronts literary chivalry with its own nature, from ***within*** the context of an idealized, highly intertextual fictional world. In effect, the best of the unreal romance world, where illusion is itself thematized, where artificial rules constrain action, where there is no point of contact with the actual, and where no actual social context is re-stated, is confronted with an unmistakable new "realism" which converts the story-book knight into a flesh and blood "hero"--one who would feel right at home in the modern novel. And when intertextual knightly ideals no longer suffice, the world of chivalric adventure falls apart. Gawain uses the conventions of romance to inform life, with the result that chivalric ideals collapse on a "personal," individual character level. The elaborately built intertextual reputation is deflated by the conduct of the "real" man. In effect, when the ideal/artificial/literary is confronted with the actual, Gawain walks out of romance. No longer an artificially idealized hero--a criterion against which others are measured--he stands forever humanized, a model for the modern hero who ***transcends*** the artificial limitations of contemporary intertext. He is consistent with his intertextual identity only until that identity loses its relevance--until

the model is no longer adequate to deal with the contingencies of life. Through this revision and radical deflation of intertextual character, the core ideals of romance are ironized, and idealized heroism condemned.

Within the context of a textual reference world constructed by readers, Gawain's evolution depends entirely on the authorial audience's recognition of text-models and intertextual repertoire. While there are significant early indications that world-knowledge is relevant (such as hinted in Gawain's sensual impressions of the terrain and his suffering from the cold), only through depiction of the humanizing process do world-models come to dominate and dictate what is valid for fictional truth. The inexperienced student is likely to impose world-models ***immediately***, accepting fear, for example, as a valid human motivation, missing the whole point. A reader not familiar with the genre will not easily assume the role of an authorial audience who recognizes that within the text-model it is necessary to suppress fear and to not allow conduct to be influenced by it. Even more sophisticated students tend to miss the significance of fear as a "failure" in *Sir Gawain*, interpreting at once the actions in terms of normal human psychology, without identifying the problem this entails for the romance world, the ideals of which are abandoned. Here, then, a particularly difficult "distance" is likely to prevail between the real reader and the authorial audience.

In *Sir Gawain*, world-models must be applied ***retrospectively***, to re-define the character-construct once the significance of actions is revealed in human terms. There must be acknowledged a ***return*** to world-models which the text-model had made invalid. Only after this "return" does realistic default become possible. As shown in game theory, rules can be made to change in the middle, necessitating an astute authorial audience. In place of the dictates of chivalric convention and the testing through adventure, the reader recognizes that the real test of total integrity has been "framed" by that structure. The world-models for character motivation--Gawain's fear, for example--must be extricated ***from*** the conventional structure which dictates only formal, causal links and imposed, ***role***-bound action sequences. Gawain suffers in the spirit of romance, but fails until the end to recognize the serious ethical test--a test less specific to his literary role as a knight

than to his role as a human being. Gawain is "diminished," integrated into world-models which allow for human failure and growth.

While the hero himself feels the most bitter shame through this process, the reader understands (as Bercilak does) that Gawain faces defeat only within the context of conventional romance, and that world-models, once activated, provide the ***way out*** of romance. Such has been the test imposed on Arthur's court by Bercilak and company. The text-model is overruled in favour of world-models. The textual reference world as a context for truth relieves the final ambiguity inherent in the fictional world, where Gawain seems to remain trapped, returning to the court which accepts his shame as renown. Arthur's court may go on forever living by their literary code no matter how ***devalorized*** the ideals. But in the reader's constructed reference world Gawain truly escapes from that code and can never be reintegrated into that artificial domain. The ***revision*** of the modal structure of reading procedures ensures his permanent salvation.

Any desire for "realism" as a default to world-models is satisfied only retrospectively, then, as the reader ***re-evaluates*** the static figure from romance in terms of human growth, the stylized hero trapped in the isolated world of romance in terms of naturalistic expectations, and the representative symbol as a literal construct. In a progression opposite to what we expect in realistic novels, Gawain starts out as the highly symbolic, intertextual, representative hero, and becomes a ***literal***, individualized construct, very "uncharacteristic" of the genre. The romance parameters of the text-model are transgressed as the test of typical literary knighthood becomes the test of the individual man.

I do not conceive of Gawain as a great individual "set against" the world of romance, but rather as an entity whose characterization is ***inseparable from*** the textual structure of his fictional world. Rather than seeing Gawain as a metanarrative figure representing concepts, I appreciate how character construction resists removal from the text and is consequently inextricable from text-models and intertextual repertoire, which ***cannot be bypassed*** as models for the reference world. If Gawain escapes to a reference world, acquiring metafictional

import, it is only ***through*** the textually induced configuration of extra- and intertextual factors recognized. By appreciating how world-models finally become relevant and ***dominant***, the reader appreciates what really "happens" to Gawain, recognizing the ***multiple*** origins for fictional truth which he finds outside of the text, but which are ***activated*** within it. Through the reading process, a character emerges from generic convention and intertext whose literariness is his defining characteristic and who is trapped in this identity. Only by the reader's timely imposition of world-models can Gawain overcome romance as genre, illusion, and world. *Sir Gawain* is an exquisite example of a highly complex set of textual instructions for recovering/reassembling a fictional world--a set which demands reader evaluation of conduct as an ***extension*** of the axiological emphasis of the text. ***Within*** this irony-producing set the reader finds the hierarchy of extra- and intertextual factors which not only "complete" his appreciation of fictional truth, but which also make possible the invalidation and permanent transformation of that truth.

Roles of Intertext: Alternate History as Challenge

The most difficult part of assessing configurations for the fictional sphere is the role of intertext in possible hierarchies. In *Sir Gawain* intertextual repertoire functions within (or regulated by) the text-models involved, in no way threatening to subvert the authority of those models. But such is not always the case. On the basis of the previous chapters, it is necessary to set the intertextual grid in relation with world- and text-models, demonstrating some usual configurations. We need to see how the particular recycling of knowledge central to intertext relates to, overlaps with, and influences the activation of world- and text-models.

There is one important sense in which intertextual repertoire can become ***a part of*** world-knowledge, functioning ***through*** world-models. Castañeda in particular has discussed the culturalization of fictional characters which occurs when they seem to take on an independent life

beyond story operators, resulting in an odd mixture of fiction and reality.[38] Where a character like Santa Claus is not "contained" by any one story, and depends for recognition on multiple textual sources, a special ***kind*** of transworld identity occurs which results in a peculiar configuration of models in the fictional sphere. This transworld identity is a ***synthetic*** amalgam which cannot be linked to one "original" textual version. Cultural stereotypes fall into this category, as a kind of culturally shared property which readers readily acknowledge, as part of their heritage, but which they do not recognize as belonging to any one original text. Fictional truths about such characters involve a ***mixture*** of features deemed essential or salient, and are not restricted to features present in ***all*** versions. The very question of fictionality may be obscured, as the reader "believes" in the character within the scope of world-knowledge. As Castañeda points out, the mixture of fiction and reality and the reference to fictional entities across different stories seems to indicate that such fictional entities have a status ***outside*** the stories inhabited, "...***somehow*** on a par with the persons who deal with them."[39] While this is a serious problem in ontological terms, epistemically it is not threatening, and shows merely how this kind of intertextual character takes up a position ***outside of*** texts in a structure of world-models.

More usual than this movement "beyond" intertextual relations to the larger cultural context of world-models is the reader's assessment of intertext ***through*** the dominant text-model. Without rehearsing the relationships between dominant text-models and world-models discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten, we must bear in mind the important role of the reader's expectations according to text-model, and the kinds of coalitions of truths which can result. Just as world-models can be activated only as they are controlled and priorized by genre, and as accessibility relations permit, so intertextual repertoire must be co-ordinated epistemically in terms of the applicable text-model and its associated fictional-world macrostructure. The reader's choice of text-model as a dominant authority for fictional truth in the reference world determines the role which intertextual repertoire is allowed to play.

Intertextual repertoire can only be judged as fictional truth in relation to a structure of ***emphasis*** set up by the recognized text-model. We have all experienced frustration on hearing an account of thematic intertextuality invoked without the slightest concern for genre. Certainly such highly personalized, "eccentric" accounts are possible, but ***shared*** meaning becomes highly doubtful.

As long as the properties of the intertextual character can be accommodated within the text-model, a coherent reference world is created which (as I have shown in Chapter Eleven) can easily involve transworld identity. The selected text-model suggests which properties are "essential" and which are decisively inadmissible in terms of transworld identity. Just as the essentialism of properties is relative to worlds, so must the relevance of interfictional truth depend on the context of genre and related fictional-world structure. Keeping in mind my discussions of compossibility, we must see that the reader will acknowledge text-models ***as*** global semantic constraints with consequences for the admissibility of intertextual fictional truth in the reference world.

Particular intertextual traits/properties taken as fictional truth depend in part on how the text-model activates world-models. Even intertextual characters will be assessed often as to how they correspond with the behaviour of real people. Both comparing and identifying characters intertextually may involve world-knowledge. Intertextual migration among ***realistic*** worlds results in intertextual fictional truths which are entirely compatible with the realistic default to world-models. Intertextual repertoire and world-models are mutually supportive in this case, since the text of origin not only shares the same kind of world structure, but insists on the same default. Adherence to world-models supports intertextual transworld identity. On the other hand, since the reader decides about the admissibility of a property depending on what the text-model allows, a different result will obtain in less realistic works. Where world-models are restricted, as in fairy tales, intertextually generated traits which accord with the text-model will triumph over traits possible through world-models. What is not "thematized" in the genre is obviously less important in the

truth structure. In other words, world-models may well come out as less important in the hierarchy than the intertextual repertoire. No Cinderella will ever be psychotic. Such is only the case, however, where that repertoire is compatible with the text-model. Where intertext ***conflicts*** with the text-model in terms of world macrostructure, intertextual transfer is blocked, world-models possibly assuming dominance depending on the constraints of the text-model involved. A more extensive analysis could perhaps distinguish a more "direct" activation of intertext through text-models, from the more "indirect" route through world-models.

Through an ***epistemic*** view of the philosophical debate about counterparts and transworld identity, legitimating the latter as seen through epistemic concerns, I have signalled in Chapter Eleven how ***known*** intertextual repertoire can have far-reaching effects on the reference world. Transworld identity is not problematic seen in terms of how the reader puts ***known*** repertoire to work within a recognized text-model.

But as I have also suggested, there are ***limitations*** on the reader's acceptance of transworld identity, which result from the violation of text-models and their related world structures. Because transworld identity works ***except*** where laws are altered between the fictional worlds involved, the reader's dependence on text-model is even more obvious. Where radical changes occur in fundamental laws, the new world will be incompatible and hence inaccessible for the intertextual character as a transworld identity. If the intertextual character refuses to obey the laws associated with the text-model, the transgression makes access impossible in terms of transworld identity. Where such identity is destroyed, only the weaker relation of counterparthood can remain.

The counterpart will still necessitate the inclusion in the reference world of intertextual truths, but only those which contribute to a cohesive, non-contradictory reference world will uphold the fictional world structure and its related text-model. The text-model will become all the more ***obvious*** because of the violations, the counterpart having

significantly less impact on truth than the transworld variant, as the reader struggles to maintain "order." In the most extremely blatant violations (such as the most radical alternate histories and radical metafiction), the extent of ***incompatible*** truths would ultimately usurp the authority of the text-model, were the weaker relation of counterparthood not to replace that of transworld identity.

In the case of standard historical novels, intertextual repertoire is routed through world-models which are fully compatible with the realistic structure of the fictional world, the extrinsic properties of the historical variant playing a crucial role in preserving an evident transworld identity. Keeping in mind my discussion of external properties in Chapter Eleven, it is clear that such transworld variants remain conceptually linked to the real world and its structure of laws. Many changes are possible, as we have seen, without destroying the identity relation, as long as the ontological boundary between reality and fiction is successfully camouflaged. Brain McHale usefully considers three constraints on the insertion of realemes in classic historical fiction, referring to migrations across ontological boundaries.

> 'Classic' historical fiction ...tries to make this transgression as discreet, as nearly unnoticeable as possible, camouflaging the seam between historical reality and fiction ...by introducing pure fiction only in the 'dark areas' of the historical record; by avoiding anachronism; by matching the 'inner structure' of its fictional worlds to that of the real world.[40]

While modifications of singular facts without contradicting the official record, and preservation of the socio-historical regularities of time and place are significant restrictions, it is the last constraint about preserving the laws of nature and logic which is really crucial for transworld identity, tied as it is to the large issues of compossibility. It is the only "route" through world-models which ***must*** be maintained in order to preserve transworld identity.

For this reason many works of ***alternate*** history still preserve the identity relation in spite of conspicuous changes in variants' properties, both internal and external. As always, Ryan's accessibility relations as

discussed in Chapter Ten should be kept in mind. When alternate histories preserve the general regularities of the actual world, and maintain a small core of facts about the historical original, merely introducing another version of how history might have been, the violation of historical fact is not so drastic. The hypothetical changes preserve some recognized facts, perhaps initial phases of the "story," while replacing outcomes. Or the actual sequence of events may be rearranged. Or perhaps historical figures, relations among them, and their properties are simply deleted.

The divergence from publicly accepted facts can seem "drastic" only in the sense that an alternate version of part of world history is produced, calling into question the authority of standard historical documents. The reader is likely to be troubled by a feeling that a "misrepresentation" is perpetrated. But as Walton points out, while "...'matching' is *complete* correspondence between a representation and something in the world, ...[r]epresenting without matching is simply misrepresentation. ...But misrepresenting is representing nonetheless..."[41] While philosophers are anxious about consistency problems between real-world facts and the facts of the author's sayso, the violation of *these* kinds of world-models actually produces a relatively limited epistemic disruption. Certainly to understand alternate histories the reader must be acquainted with a "real" course of events outside of literature, otherwise fictional truths *could* possibly take on an historically inaccurate "actuality." But more routinely, the *authority* of texts about reality is simply called into question.

In correspondence with his three groups of changes possible for historical originals, McHale proposes three *kinds* of *alternate* histories: apocryphal history, creative anachronism, and historical fantasy.[42] All of these foreground the ontological "seam," as opposed to classic historical fiction, "...by making the transition from one realm to the other as jarring as possible."[43] But while each is more radical than the next, only the third necessitates the weaker counterpart relation according to my analysis, because of the radical subversion of fictional-world macrostructure and the corresponding text-model. *Apocryphal*

(or alternative) ***history*** visibly contradicts the public record of official history, re-interpreting the orthodox version, and parodying or violating the "dark areas" constraint.[44] ***Creative anachronism*** involves a tension between past and present, either in terms of material culture or in world-view and ideology.[45] We may recall here Ryan's criteria of historical coherence as an accessibility relation which allows her to distinguish historical fabulation (alternative history) from less constrained works of fantasy "...which allow the meeting of characters, objects, and preoccupations from different periods..."[46]

But McHale's ***historical fantasy***, which allows for the integration of history and the fantastic as historical characters are grafted into fantastic worlds, radically foregrounds ontological discrepancy in such a way that the incompatible fictional truths imposed by intertextual repertoire threaten to usurp the authority of the text-model. But in this case, transworld identity is no longer possible, since that identity would threaten the very macrostructure of the fictional world. As explored in Chapter Eleven, as a conceptualistic scheme, transworld identity breaks down where individuals compossible within real-world structure are integrated into a fictional world with modified laws. Once the laws of nature are disgarded, any number of changes become possible for the counterpart who is integrated into the new world-structure. His generic characteristics as a human being can be altered as soon as the nomic and taxonomic regularities of the real world lose validity. He can indeed take on qualities appropriate to a fantastic ontology, the historically ***real*** having been conveniently left behind with transworld identity. The weaker counterpart relation thus highlights or reinforces the new text-model, preventing havoc in the reference world, since it remains possible for the reader to create and maintain a semblance of coherent/consistent order. This is not to say that historical fantasies cannot result in instability in the reference world, such as we would expect for fantastic narrative in general--even perhaps exacerbating the hesitation factor--but that there does not result a ***total*** disorder precisely because of the weaker counterpart relation. The reader is able to successfully structure the reference world because of the less stringent counterpart relation, which admits the possibility of the most radical transgression of world-models.

Perhaps the most interesting consequence is that where change from the historical prototype is *so* drastic, meaning "about" the real world breaks down. Intertextual repertoire assumes a dominance in the hierarchy supported as it is by the new text-model, virtually totally eclipsing world-models. Once world-models lose their authoritative position, it is no longer convenient to "feed back" fictional truth into world-knowledge structures. The reader has other more "fictional" interests, and is not likely to reassess real-world truth. In other words, where social message is an author's goal, such radical procedures may not prove advantageous.

Testing the Limits: the Subversions of Postmodern Metafiction

Postmodern metafiction has often been assessed for exactly this "problem," world-models generally made marginal by intertextual play. Linda Hutcheon uses the example of J.M. Coetzee's *Foe* to show how radical metafiction seems to fall short "politically," the author distancing himself from any potential message about the real world.[47] Once perverse and contradictory intertextual repertoire usurps the centrality of world-models, to derive a meaning viable in the context of story-relevant real-world problems becomes a formidable task. Hutcheon's main concern is the sense of "*im*possibility" which contributes to this kind of limitation, however politicized the novel may be--an impossibility which she feels is not adequately accounted for through fictional-world semantics. Partly under the provocation of Hutcheon's comments, this study has undertaken to sort out many problems of text-external reference, showing that self-contradictory worlds of *all* sorts undermine world-models without substituting a different consistent order, creating thereby a disturbing sense of impossibility. We can now determine to what extent radical metafiction can be assessed *within* the model. We must keep in mind the discussion of logical violations in Chapter Three, many of which are best exemplified in radical metafiction.

Having started with a fundamental model and added complementary factors, I can now consider radical metafiction as an ultimate problem to test the limits of the model. While the techniques of metafiction have a rich traditional heritage from *Don Quixote* through *Tristram Shandy*, *Jacques le fataliste*, and all works of Romantic irony, for simplicity I will approach the problems only through the examples of postmodernism. I use "metafiction" as an umbrella category, presuming first of all the frequent inclusion of intertextual repertoire as part of the emphasis on being "about" fiction and story (re)telling.

As discussed in Chapter Eleven, intertextual repertoire may provide a grid for the construction of fictional truths which does not create formidable ontological problems when seen through an epistemic perspective. With radical metafiction a bewildering ontological scramble is often created, highlighting the problems of compossibility. Using the alternate history *Terra nostra* as example, McHale discusses the "ontological knot" of the intertextual poker game, where intertextual boundaries are violated as characters from ***other*** South American novels not written by Fuentes gather.[48] Strictly speaking, such ontologically bizarre encounters ***strain*** the usefulness of the concept of transworld identity. A novel like Hubert Aquin's *L'Antiphonaire* demonstrates an intertextuality so infinite that through its very ***disproportion*** it threatens to destroy the possibility of constructing a coherent reference world. The reader is left with a collage of "footnotes" which engulf the work, creating a sense of totally unnecessary complication and obscurity. Such procedures detract from meaning and from an appreciation of fictional world autonomy, making reference world construction excessively complex. Arguably reference worlds for *Foe* or *L'Antiphonaire* are very difficult to sustain, even where intertextual characters are afforded the benefits of transworld identity. Where such perverse intertext dominates, the actual "centre" of the hierarchy of the fictional sphere suffers distortion, straining the authority of the dominant text-model, by bringing what would normally be peripheral into a central role, and eclipsing world-models. That which the reader would not normally assign a modal centrality demands serious attention, creating a difficult authorial audience role.

But again, the problem does not assume insurmountable dimensions until the violations typical of historical fantasy are involved. Only the complete incompatibility of fictional-world structures necessitates the loss of transworld identity. Where inter*fictional* characters gain access into worlds with macrostructures different from their native fictional environment, the modified laws necessitate the weaker counterpart relation, in order to prevent outright destruction of the host world. Again, the weaker relation preserves the integrity of the new relevant text-model, allowing maintenance of ***some*** semblance of order in the reference world. Counterparthood makes possible the most radical transgressions of world boundaries in terms of altered nomic and taxonomic regularities, as found in *Terra nostra*.

This is a crucial point because of the radical ***mutations*** often involved in postmodern metafiction. It would seem that entirely constructed fictional characters (as opposed to those based on historical prototypes) would be easier to assess for changes, given that they have no independent existence, and are only endowed with a limited number of properties to begin with. But in effect, in endeavoring to create a more complete character for the reference world, the reader has a more difficult task of defining what an adequate set of individuating properties would be for the original. Deciding how they could "be" other than described originally is difficult simply because the characters can so obviously be completed in ***many other ways***. Postmodern metafiction takes advantage of this dilemma, often bringing to life borrowed characters who resist strict identification with their prototypes, foregrounding intertextuality ***as a problem***. Coetzee's *Foe* creates a new Robinson Crusoe who shares only some internal and external properties, his descriptive guise reflecting disturbingly on the original fictional hero. As McHale points out, even where an effect of *retour de personnages* is created (as in Barth's *LETTERS*) the usual realistic effect created in romans fleuve is subverted, destabilizing rather than fortifying the intertextual space of the super-text.[49] The parody involved makes the violation of ontological boundaries all the more noticeable,[50] complicating the whole idea of permissible change.

While the frequently included intertextual repertoire of postmodern metafiction creates disruptions in the operations of the fictional sphere, complicating severely the reader's maintenance of order in the reference world, the main problem is really the ***coupling*** of that intertextuality with the typical self-reflexivity of the overtly fictional texts. The very possibility of constructing a reference world is threatened through this process. All of the revelations of the writing process and foregrounding of artificial construction provide a ***critique*** of realistic fiction and the automatic default to world-models. Instead, the authenticity of the fictional world is deflated by insisting through visible fabrication on its arbitrary, contingent quality. In a technically realistic text, story components integrate automatically into truths about the real world, becoming almost indistinguishable from them, and resulting in a convincingly complete reference world. But in a self-reflexive text which draws attention to its own creation, the ***mechanisms*** whereby the reader co-ordinates among textual elements and knowledge bases are made highly visible and problematic. The self-conscious and often convoluted relations between fictional truth and reality constantly remind the reader of how ***complex*** the construction of a reference world must be. Because story components are highlighted as artificial by the text-model, an extra effort is required to allow those facts to interact with world-models.

In *Foe*, for example, the construction of the novel is thematized in the text as Foe constructs the text, with considerable "reference" to the situation of the real Daniel Defoe who shows up as character, and also to the political situation typical of empires. Yet the post-colonial perspective results only in a multiple ***potential*** for allegory, severely restricted through ironic, self-destructive narrative procedures. Likewise, a reading about women's oppression through the experience of the character Susan can never really get off the ground, the ironic stance undermining any simple/single message.

It is ***not*** that aspects of the political arena cannot be dealt with in reference world construction, as this study has shown, but that the text-model of radical metafiction deliberately ***undermines*** that reading task, or insists that it be carried out at a higher level. Where

metafictional narrative procedures are in force, it becomes necessary for the reader to construct the reference world *differently*. Self-reference means that just as world-models lose dominance, so also any potential message "about" the real world becomes very obscure, and available only through refined strategies.

The *difference* in reference world construction depends on how the metafictional text limits/inhibits the generation of fictional truth and the intensity of the reader's participation as authorial audience in that process. Metafictional procedures have long been discussed as romantic irony, breaking the illusion, involvement and detachment, or laying bare the device. Sometimes considered the very essence of art, as by the Russian formalists, from the point of view of my model these techniques represent an extreme deviation from the default to world-models typical of mimetic realism. Where "representative" elements are obscured through overt narrative technique, the reader's participation in an ostensibly real fictional world is discouraged.

Sometimes metafiction works by focusing on the *medium* of the work; that is, the physical shape and the process of producing that shape dominates over any potential generation of fictional truths. As Walton points out, wherever literary works refer to themselves (even without reminding the reader that they are only fiction), "...or discuss the telling of the story in a way that distracts from the story told..." such a focus is in effect.[51] The self-referring mechanism inherent in the *nouveau roman* works this way, generating truths about the medium/discourse but few about the fictional world ostensibly constructed.

Walton describes well another technique which discourages participation:

> Even when telling is not a subject of discussion, gratuitously flowery or alliterative or otherwise self-conscious language may take on a life of its own, calling attention to itself at the expense of the things described--even more so when a measure of near nonsense makes it unclear what sort of game is appropriate, what fictional truths are generated...[52]

Obviously much of postmodern metafiction--not to mention Beckett--thrives on this kind of play with language which ultimately thwarts identifying any referent beyond the signified.[53]

But most centrally, metafiction works by outright declaration of fictionality, either through paratextual elements, or self-reflexive narrative procedures within the discourse. If the reader is constantly (or even intermittently) made aware that the story is not a true report, she cannot easily construct a reference world about characters, who will not seem to warrant an existence as "actual" beyond the words of the text. Fictitious events described through such procedures take on no "actuality" in a reference world. Whereas realistic fiction attempts through narrative technique to ***reduce*** the sense of "story" and to build in a ***reportorial*** way a fictional world which seems to be about "actual" events--about a reference world--postmodern metafiction refuses to play this mimetic game. It is not only that the emphasis on fictionality undermines textual construction of a coherent fictional world. Several text-models routinely produce such results. But with radical metafiction, the reader's construction of a reference world is actually restrained or blocked. Archetypal realistic texts try to disguise the activity of writing and make inconspicuous the formal properties of the narrative, all with a view to increasing imaginative activity in what seems to be real. The reader automatically builds the reference world imagined to pre-exist the text, that construction role being clearly defined by the text and supported by textual procedures and information. With metafictional texts all such support is withdrawn and the whole process is undermined.

The dual role of the reader as narrative and authorial audience is again useful as a way to assess this problem. We must bear in mind the discussion of the narrative audience's direct acceptance of fictional truth and "relocation" to a fictional world, versus the authorial audience's more complete evaluation of fictional truth, and function as counterpart of the real reader. With radical metafiction, the narrative audience is reduced to a very incomplete involvement. Ryan suggests how metafictional narrative techniques can destroy the fictionality of the entire text.

> When the reader is constantly reminded that the text displays a verbal artifact and not a real world, a realm populated by constructs of the imagination and not by persons and material objects with an autonomous existence, the gesture of recentering is blocked and the reader contemplates the semantic domain ***from a foreign perspective.***[54]

The role presumed for the narrative audience in realistic texts of becoming "lost" in a fictional world is ***changed*** here to prevent "relocation." In realistic fiction the narrative audience is "absorbed" by the story, seeing the characters as real people involved in real events. Breaking the illusion prevents this kind of involvement.

Because the self-reflexive text implies a fictional operator prefixing narrative statements, the narrative audience is called upon to read the account ***as fiction*** in much the same way as the authorial audience always does. The narrative audience is denied automatic access to a fictional world which it can accept as autonomous. It becomes "aware" of the operations of the authorial audience.

That authorial audience must nonetheless assess the ramifications of all extra- and intertextually generated fictional truths. The crucial difference is that such truths are not called upon textually to support internally prescribed truths. The metafictional stance erodes the usefulness and applicability of the text-external models, including even those of intertextual repertoire. Metafiction sends the reader out in search of text-external knowledge, even insisting on greater proximity between narrative and authorial audience, but then refuses to admit the validity of the truths gathered, which cannot sort out the confusion of the provisional fictional world.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that illusion is not really ever denied ***uniformly*** throughout an entire text. The roles of narrative and authorial audience also relate to a kind of ***alternating*** participation on two levels as the reader fluctuates between taking the story as a record of actual events, and as a mere verbal artefact which he can observe without participation in a fictional world. As I have shown in Chapter Seven, the kind of observation without participation

involved in the role of authorial audience cannot be accounted for (as Currie does) by focusing only on the "record of actual events" as a story "told as known fact." In metafictional texts there is often no intent to have even the narrative audience make-believe that the story is true, or told as known fact. Instead, the very sources of the narrator's knowledge are called into question and undermined. But obviously the ***alternation*** between participation and observation is most interesting. In a work like *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, the narrative begins in a more-or-less realistic way, so that the reader can conveniently adopt the role of narrative audience, participating in the fictional world where Charles and Sarah seem real. But then the self-reflexive stance creates a violation of ontological boundaries, making obvious the fact that they are mere characters in a novel, thereby thwarting the participation of narrative audience, and forcing a more distanced observation. Eventually, there is a narrative return to a more "real" fictional world.[55]

It is obvious also that the reader inevitably seeks some distance even in realistic fiction, often willing to consider narrative form and its suitability apart from the "actuality" of the fictional world. In the role of authorial audience the reader frequently "steps back" to observe the quality of the fiction, perhaps assessing narrative techniques or authorial skill, and placing the fiction within a context of knowledge. (He may even seek to escape emotionally difficult story content by focusing more objectively on narrative qualities.) ***Part*** of that observation is usually an interest in the particular combination of fictional truths which seem to be involved in the story world--the ones which the narrative audience takes for granted. But with radical metafictional texts, the authorial audience cannot successfully ***link*** text-external knowledge to any stable set of text-generated fictional truths. Ultimately, the reader as authorial audience can really only consider the quality of narrative techniques, perhaps even taking pleasure in the measures taken to inhibit the participation of the narrative audience, without finding effective ways to co-ordinate other knowledge bases with the would-be truths of the fictional world.

While the reader expects on the basis of narrative conventions that a novel will produce a fictional world, radical metafiction violates that expectation. The reader may try to define a global intelligibility for the "impossible" fictional world, even invoking text-external knowledge in his attempt at naturalization, especially by invoking a text-model for a particular "kind" of fictional-world macrostructure which may well depart from the norms of the real world. Yet the result is that coherence and intelligibility are ***not*** obtained. Metafictional text construction results in worlds which remain self-contradictory and even self-voiding, mounting a subversive challenge to the whole idea of world creation. In its most radical form, such technique "constructs" a fictional world only to "deconstruct" it with the next sentence or paragraph. The technique is not confined to the provision of alternate endings as in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. Such self-cancellation can of course involve complicated narrative procedures designed to create different ***kinds*** of disturbances in the referential system, some involving only a modal instability as when facts are focalized through a possibly fallible narrative agent. But the usual ***conjunction*** of disparate truths creates an ***im***possible structure of truth. At the very worst the reader is left with a vision of a purely ***virtual*** fictional world--one which includes no genuine irrefutable truths, but only indications of what ***might*** have happened. The "actual" has no centrality in such a world. How then can the authorial audience identify a modal centre as reference world? Fictional characters are ostensibly introduced, but are then dismantled, such minimalism creating only ***possibilities*** for character, without allowing the characters to attain existence.[56] Rather than demanding the activation of text-external models to ***complete*** a fictional truth structure, such texts send the reader back to a text-external context but ***undermine*** that knowledge, refusing at the same time to create a different alternative self-sustaining structure. World-knowledge is invalidated, but without providing a coherent alternative account. The reader is brusquely removed from illusion and "brought back" to reality, but prohibited from employing world-models to clear up the disorder of fictional truth.

The result is the frustration of the reader's creation of a textual reference world. Although the "impossibilities" of radical metafiction

are essentially problems of ontology--the kinds which this study has discussed repeatedly--they create also radical disturbances *epistemically*. They are similar to the factors of hesitation involved in the fantastic, which produce permanently unstable reference worlds. But the problems of radical metafiction have more severe consequences epistemically, since there are not *several* reference worlds which the reader can envision as implied by the text, but really *none* at all. Not only is reality itself largely ruled out as a "referent," such fictional worlds being highly *self*-referential and incompatible with laws of nature and logic. The construction of a new "reality" as a reference world imaginatively *anterior* to the text is also made highly problematic. The scrambled ontological status of characters has a drastic impact on their epistemic "building," undermining standard operations.

A partial solution lies in remembering the dominance of text-model. The problems of the reading process occur precisely *because* of the dominant text-model, and find partial resolution through the reader's recognition of that model. The reader can deal with the impossible fictional world only through that recognition.

Bearing in mind my discussion (in Chapter Four) of the reference world as referent beyond the signified, we can see that radical metafiction destroys the triple relation inherent in language between signifier, signified, and referent. If the reference world is supposed to be construed as an actual world which exists independently of the signifying discourse, it is evident that the "destruction" of that discouse and its signified must have consequences for the reference world which can be conceived. Self-reflexivity "destroys" fictional worlds as signifieds, the "content" of such worlds being eradicated by the play of formal devices. The result is a pure relation *between signs*, with no corresponding signified. Radical metafictional worlds are *im*possible *because* there is no signified. Clearly Lubomír Doležel's semantic model for world construction cannot be applied successfully. Such radical metafiction rejects any potential for intelligibility by refusing to create a fictional world. The metafictional text becomes an opaque collection of signs which do not point beyond themselves or

signify any world, whether the real or purely imaginary. There is no intermediary step, then, between the signifier as discourse and the referent of the textual reference world. There is no signified world on which the reader can *base* the imaginative construction of a reference world. So while extra- and intertextual elements still demand integration within a reference world, the relation between the impossible "non-signified" fictional world and the reference world is so *tentative* that only the most *provisional* structure of truth can be envisioned.

That provisional structure is *accepted* by the reader because he recognizes the dominant text-model. Otherwise the entire enterprise is pure nonsense not worthy of his attention. He pays attention because he can create some intelligibility by "inventing" the appropriate generic conventions. The text-model is based on the usual shared conventions which the reader understands, and over which he has *command*, but *undermines* the tradition. The rules worthy of such destruction do not require any stipulation within the text, being the shared property of readers as I have insisted. Singled out as paramount for demolition is the core principle of the reader's required participation (both emotive and cognitive) in the generation of fictional truth. The text-model *resists* and *subverts* the standard operations of the fictional sphere, refusing to uphold standard principles, and actually *exceeding* the kind of meaning which can be developed through such reading procedures.

The text-model of radical metafiction demands that naturalization be postponed indefinitely, or ultimately carried out at a higher, more formal level. It tells the reader that he must *give up* the imagination of an ontologically complete character for the reference world, and recognize that the usual inference procedures and principles of implication which would construct the more complete character *will not suffice*. Such procedures are not nourished by the text-model. Once this is accepted, the reader can see that he must "synthesize" truths at a higher level, finding a synthesis for the "dialectical," impossible oppositions. This involves creating *new* grounds for intelligibility through reading processes, and the ability to translate

that intelligibility into a truth structure for a purely provisional reference world.

As a result, we can see that radical metafiction is perhaps not so turned in on itself, trivial, artificial, and ignorant of the important issues of human existence as is often claimed. It may be a welcome relief from the demands of more realistic texts which insist on intense participation, sometimes including what the competent reader recognizes as cheap, "sentimental" tricks. Who is to say that metafiction cannot also "connect" with the reader's life, by creating a space or distance which makes reflection more profound? The results can be valuable where standard reading procedures are inhibited and perhaps brought into a forum where they can be observed from a higher, distanced, more objective level, and critically assessed.

I have presumed that the violations of norms assessed in this chapter can be understood through investigation of the reader's role in the generation of fictional truth, and the semiotic systems of knowledge and convention which inform that role. As a result, the most defiant forms of impossible fictional worlds are assessed within an expanded fictional-world semantic theory. In my final conclusion I do not duplicate the implications developed as a conclusion here, but provide a very brief synthesizing summary of the main claims and results of this study in its totality.

Notes

[1]I refer here again to Kendall L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundation of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

[2]Marie-Laure Ryan, *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 5-6.

[3]Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974).

[4]Bernhard Lindemann, "Machine vs. Reader: On Representing Process in Discourse Description," *Journal of Literary Semantics* 14.1 (May 1985): 16. The comments in this paragraph are inspired by Lindemann's views on text processing, and the need to see the ***natural*** strategies which defy the finite systems sought in artificial intelligence.

[5]Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978) 126-31.

[6]Thomas Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character. Towards a Theory of Characterization in Fiction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 224.

[7]Docherty 224.

[8]Docherty 224.

[9]Docherty 224.

[10]As we shall see below in my analysis of *Sir Gawain*, in medieval romance a hero must ignore and overcome fear. Fear must not affect the conduct of the hero--a most unnatural expectation for human beings in terms of world-models.

[11]See Hector-Neri Castañeda, "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," *Poetics* 8.1/2 (April 1979): 50.

[12]Castañeda 50.

[13]Castañeda 36.

[14]Reference here is to Chapter Four, "Characters in their Kinds: A Taxonomy," in Baruch Hochman. *Character in Literature* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985) 86-140.

[15]See Hochman, Chapter Three, 59-85.

[16]Much of his discussions in chapters preceding the typology relate directly to my analysis.

[17]The more "panoramic" novels of Henry Fielding would be the perfect example if space permitted.

[18]Hochman 116-23.

[19]Hochman 76-9 and 81-2.

[20]If space permitted, analysis of procedures in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* would be most revealing.

[21]Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981) 114. "Pragmatic" presupposition in linguistics involves the relation not between sentences, but between utterance and the ***situation*** of utterance. Without referring to linguistic models, Peter Rabinowitz develops the idea of ***context*** to best advantage for literary interpretation, as I have shown in several places.

[22]Culler 117.

[23]Thomas G. Pavel, *Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) 124-9.

[24]Bernhard Lindemann, "Settings: Some Cognitive Issues in the Theory of Genres," *Journal of Literary Semantics* 17.1 (April 1988): 5.

[25]Lindemann, *JLS* 1988, 9.

[26]Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding. An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977) 18-19. I introduced the key concepts at the end of Chapter Eight.

[27]Schank 19.

[28]Schank 19.

[29]Such analysis obviously cannot be undertaken here, and is perhaps a suggestion for further study.

[30]For the details of [illegible] heory, on which I comment here, see Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterr[illegible] Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) and *The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[31]For the basis of this paragraph see Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1981), especially the introduction, "The Role of the Reader," most notably 7-11.

[32]Eco 11.

[33]Aesthetic textual goals I have addressed briefly in Chapter Ten as sometimes producing apparent anomalies/dissonances among fictional truths.

[34]I refer here again to Peter Rabinowitz, *Before Reading. Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[35]Pavel's discussion of "fictional ego" and the variable adjustments made by readers is relevant (85-93). His discussion of a text's "friendliness" as influential particularly suggests the value of a textual construct which really bridges to the real reader (93). Authorial audience as counterpart best explains this sense of a version or surrogate of the real reader.

[36]Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 90-1.

[37]It shows the need also to distinguish different texts "representative" of the same text-model. All reference is to *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. A New Verse Translation*, trans. Marie Borroff (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1967).

[38]Castañeda 44.

[39]Castañeda 46.

[40]Brian McHale, *Postmodernist Fiction* (New York and London: Methuen, 1987) 90.

[41]Walton 108-9.

[42]McHale 90-6.

[43]McHale 90.

[44]McHale 90. McHale discusses Carlos Fuentes' *Terra nostra* as the most grandiose postmodernist revision of official history, bridging to his discussion of creative anachronism through the "Theatre of Memory" as being really cinema. *Terra nostra* is of course also creatively anachronistic, and a "historical fantasy" in that fantastic norms govern the fictional world (92-3).

[45]McHale 93. Here McHale uses John Fowles' *The French Lieutenant's Woman* as a prime example (although it is not an alternate history) which foregrounds the temporal distance between the story and the time of narration, and John Barth's *LETTERS* as a case of anachronistic perspective penetrating the fictional world itself, turning the characters into pseudo-prophets (93-4).

[46]Ryan 45.

[47]Linda Hutcheon, "The Politics of Impossible Worlds," paper presented at the conference Fictions and Worlds, University of Toronto, June 1-2, 1990.

[48]McHale 18. McHale offers an even worse situation in Robert Coover's *The Public Burning*: "Here characters of different and incompatible ontological statuses--real-world historical figures, corporate trade-marks (eg. Betty Crocker) and national symbols (eg. Uncle Sam), purely fictional characters--have been gathered together in an impossible, heterotopian locus..." (21).

[49]McHale 57-8. In *LETTERS* the characters are even obsessed with the "recycling" of their lives, the text taking on additional metafictional qualities which I discuss ahead.

[50]McHale 58.

[51]Walton 276.

[52]Walton 276.

[53]I discuss this effect below.

[54]Ryan 95, emphasis mine.

[55]*The French Lieutenant's Woman* would be an excellent novel to analyse in detail, not only because of these effects, but also because of the remarkable interplay of world-models and historical variants with the overtly fictional technique.

[56]McHale provides interesting examples of the techniques common in postmodern texts in his Chapter Seven, "Worlds under Erasure," 99-111.

Chapter Thirteen: Conclusion

In undertaking to clarify the crucial intersection of extra- and intertextuality with fictional worlds, I have insisted first of all on the necessity of complementing the textual stipulation of fictional truth with the three text-external knowledge bases of world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire. I have traced the purely intrinsic procedures acknowledged in possible-worlds theory, analysing their theoretical limitations, and have suggested a necessary supplementation and revision based on work in the semiotics of reading and rhetorical discourse strategies. By taking into account the more "pragmatic" questions of context of use, this combination of approaches provides a systematic and satisfying overall representation of the reader's involvement in the construction of fictional truth about characters. It demonstrates in detail the essential need to recognize various kinds of text-external knowledge, and elaborates a viable model to accommodate that knowledge within an expanded fictional-world semantics.

By delineating the problems encountered by possible-worlds theory when applied to fiction, I have demonstrated the need for reorientation from ontological to epistemic concerns. Defining carefully the technical issues, I have shown that in order to account for what readers actually *do* we must resolve the technical problems of ontological status and semantic designation/reference in epistemic terms. Only the epistemic building of the textual reference world through reading procedures allows for the imagination of ontological completeness and the resolution of ontological dilemmas. Postulating the ontological completeness of characters in the reference world, the reader builds the epistemological completeness in the fictional sphere. What the reader does not build epistemically, he does not imagine "ontologically." By exploring the critical relation between the character imagined to exist in a reference world, and the inference procedures which construct that more complete character, the approach resolves some paradoxes, solves some puzzles, and unravels some ontological knots.

The epistemic concerns are explored through a semiotics of reading perspective, describing a semiotic communication model and the role of the reader within conventional knowledge systems. Beyond defining the shared, interpersonal structure of text-external knowledge, I have also identified some of the underlying "rules" according to which the diverse extra- and intertextual models combine to produce fictional truth. Coupled with insights based on phenomenology and rhetorical discourse analysis, the semiotic approach provides the ammunition to develop a codified structure for reading operations.

These operations I have defined as constituting the fictional sphere--a matrix for reference worlds. As the logical location of the interplay of world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire, the fictional sphere is explored as a codified structure which regulates the creation of any specific reference world. The concept of fictional sphere is not only a viable means of assessing conventional practice, but also suggests the formative capacity of the operations which, in combination, construct truth worlds. The ***means*** of generating fictional truths are at least as important as the truths which result. I have demonstrated how the structured process of the fictional sphere involves various selection mechanisms, re-coding textual stipulations, and producing an expanded account of fictional truth through dominant text-models which establish the relevance of available knowledge bases. I have also categorically distinguished the cognitive operations of the fictional sphere from the imaginative involvement of games of make-believe, defining full imaginative worlds as the result of second-order processing beyond the shared semiotic operations of the fictional sphere.

The codified structure of the fictional sphere regulates the hierarchy of world-models, text-models, and intertextual repertoire, that is, the three crucial factors of epistemic analysis. I have defined in turn each of the knowledge bases, outlining in detail what their ramifications are for fictional truth generation. I have insisted upon the dominance of text-models as regulators of the reader's expectations for a fictional truth structure, demonstrating how text-models provide the controlling ***context*** fundamental to the codified structure for truth. But I have also

produced structures for variable ***combinations*** of text-external models, beginning with the realistic default to world-models, continuing with various selection procedures through dominant text-models, and concluding with the relations between intertext and world-models, and the activation of intertext in accord with (or in violation of) text-models. These detailed findings are the ***substance*** of this study and cannot be synthesized in a brief conclusion.

By analyzing text-models as dominant, the concept of textual reference world is developed productively. Beginning with the realization that text-external knowledge cannot be incorporated automatically into fictional worlds without destroying their autonomy, the reference world is conceived as a reader-construct, created through the shared, interpersonal, and recognizable operations of the fictional sphere, and mediated by the codified conventional context on which the operations depend. The reference world is postulated by the reader as pre-existing textual stipulation, as if the narrative signifying discourse ***refers*** to that world. Fictional characters "exist" for the reader in the reference world, to which the reader imaginatively relocates, interacting with them on a perceived-as-equal ontological footing. Reference problems are solved within this context, which reduces the ontological ambiguity typical of fictional characters.

But because the reference world tolerates interactions among all kinds of cultural texts, text-external knowledge also finds its way easily into such a world, which takes on a satisfyingly complete structure of truth, as an interface between the textual fictional world and the extra- and intertextual knowledge bases activated. It becomes the truth world from which a story is ***read***, alleviating the problems of intentional semantics. As an epistemically accessible domain which "pretends" to actual existence, the reference world accommodates the text-models and intertextual repertoire which are otherwise marginalized in the account of accessibility between the actual and fictional world, facilitating the exploration of text-models as dominant in the truth selection process. A full range of world-models are assessed accurately through the intermediary domain of the reference

world, which can insulate the fictional world from reality in various ways through the applicable text-model.

I have expanded and applied the concepts of narrative and authorial audiences in order to provide a more accurate account of the reading procedures which construct reference worlds. Making the equation between the narrative audience role and reading *as fact*, and between the authorial audience role and reading *as fiction*, I have shown the nature of accessibility between narrative stipulation and text-external knowledge bases. The building of the reference world is a joint operation involving both reading roles and a necessary congruence between the two audiences. But the key has been to assign to the authorial audience a full range of conventional knowledge, without restricting the concept to recognition of authorial norms or world-knowledge, and to recognize the dominant function of text-models within that knowledge. The concept of authorial audience has allowed me to show how reading operations proceed through text-models to a selection of world-models and intertextual repertoire. As a principle of co-ordination for fictional truth from all available sources, the authorial audience creates an integrated truth structure for textual and text-external elements. In final analysis, I have defined the authorial audience as a counterpart of the real reader. The concept of counterpart not only bridges the difficult gap between textual construct and real readers and their reference worlds, but also suggests a ***modal*** structure for the hierarchy of the fictional sphere. The knowledge possessed by the counterpart represents possibilities for fictional truth which the reader must recognize, ***selecting*** a modally central reference world from among alternate possibilities not sanctioned by the authorial audience.

To make this analysis more complete, it would be necessary to consider in more detail the qualities of narrative technique and the related role of narrative audience. I have demonstrated that characterization procedures ***within*** fictional narration do not yield the whole character, which depends on the reader's creation of the reference world. But it would be desirable to correlate carefully the two reading roles and their environments of knowledge, defining

accessibility between the two audiences in terms of variable consequences produced by different narrative strategies and the related text-models. In particular, the reader's appreciation of more difficult story-world ontologies, such as the fantastic, could be clarified admirably through such analysis.

In order to devise a more finalized view of potential hierarchies in the fictional sphere, and perhaps even develop a ***graphic*** model, it would be necessary to process many ***different*** texts through the model, distinguishing varieties of narrative and sub-genres. Various kinds of "catalytic" reactions among sub-components of models could be assessed graphically, taking into account reciprocal relationships. Such a graph could show potential ***functions*** or purpose of the elements in truth generation, showing the relative complexity of reading operations. But in suggesting potential configurations the graph could ***not*** provide an exhaustive picture of all of the potential fictional truths "available" in any context for the reader. Obviously not all kinds of text-external knowledge can be encoded on a chart, without the detailed interactions threatening to proliferate indefinitely. But some potential semantic relations could be shown as grids into which more specific examples could fit.

One particular problem which would hopelessly complicate a graph, and which this study has only marginally addressed, is the ***historical relativity*** of the codified structure. Obviously narrative fiction only works as a semiotic mode of communication ***within*** particular historical and cultural situations. Any narrative must be seen in relation to the cultural situation of production. While the mutual belief principle augments the appreciation of world-models, and helps to show how narratives can be recognized as accurate "registers" of social situations, more clarification could be developed about the ***differences*** in interpretive conventions and procedures according to social context. A more historically oriented study could identify ***changes*** in the hierarchy of interpretive codes, for particular works or text-models, from one period to another. Here benefits could be gleaned from similar work accomplished in historiography. In this way one would avoid the danger of oversimplification in describing interpretive conventions by

examining how readers *contextualize* narratives, through the passage of time.

Moreover, close attention to historical factors would also show how *within* any given period models are never single, those "dominant" normally opposed by competing models. The complex question of *choice* in defining the interplay of text- and world-models could be addressed in more historical terms, showing how the hierarchy of the fictional sphere changes not only over time, but also within different segments of society or interpretive communities within the same period. Beyond the exploration of ostensibly universal (or atemporal) *processes* which this study has undertaken, analysis of the *variable products* which depend on model selection could be expanded through detailed evaluation of historical contexts.

The most striking example of how readers/critics generate fictional truths in accordance with *where* they make historical "access" is perhaps the problem of intertextuality between older and post-colonial texts. Here the original author and later reader no longer share all of the same codes, in spite of the socialization process involving the imperialist creation of literary canon and modes of criticism. The evolving cultural context is *not* transhistorical, the reader distinguishing between the imposed beliefs of the author's community and new codes developed for reading. Examples of fictional spheres for particular works could show such historical relativity for the codified structure, pinpointing how the structure of truth will depend on particular points of departure. Such factors are not correctly relegated to individual imaginative games, but must be understood as highly *complicated* roles of authorial audience, shared within the community of readers.

I see other particular useful applications for this theory beyond the limited question of fictional truth generation as such. Certainly as my example suggests, canonization processes could be illuminated, as well as the important role of all kinds of broadly "political" constraints in literary theory. In particular, feminist theories might find significant ammunition. The main problem with feminist approaches, it seems to

me, involves the extensive emphasis on the ***individual*** imaginative interaction, to the detriment of exposing ***shared*** operations. It is precisely those shared operations which involve the underlying myths/stories which must be changed. The feminist perspective necessarily acknowledges this need to find more valid intertextual repertoire, and even to alter world-models. It is exactly this sense of ***shared*** experience which can bring about change beyond the level of individual perception and appreciation, creating a genuine sense of community and movement.

Useful application is also possible in terms of development of the cognitive dimension. My analysis has been inspired in part by important studies into the dynamic structures of narrative, and the cognitive processes involved. Further study could isolate precisely how narrative and rhetorical strategies influence the operations of the fictional sphere, bridging more carefully to extant work in text-processing and cognitive psychology. Provocative links with artificial intelligence could be explored. A graph might even seem to capture the reader's "internalization" of the structured content of narrative texts, suggesting that actual, individual cognitive processes are pictured in the model. But such a graph would surely be unprintable. While it is tempting to suggest that the model can be tested empirically, evaluating the extent to which ***real*** reader operations would match the theoretical model, it is not clear how this could be carried out. The emphasis of empirical research has been on the "naive" interpretation of relatively simple texts, with a view to determining what factors are involved in individual interactions with texts. It is not clear to what extent my "metonymic" reader is testable in this way, the operations of the fictional sphere having as they do a defiantly abstract quality.

On a more general level, however, the link with cognitive science is perhaps more promising, since recently "narration" and "mimesis" have been explored in disciplines outside of literary theory, in order to explain how people understand life. Walton's concern with the link between cognitive/imaginative processes and mimesis exemplifies the importance which fictionality has assumed in the process of understanding how the mind functions. Work in cognitive psychology has

also tended in this direction. Fictionality, narration, and interpretive operations are no longer concepts only useful in discussing fiction, but seem to be necessary components of the understanding process in general. The conditions identified here for the generation of fictional truth are perhaps inescapable even within the larger cognitive domain--fundamental to mass culture, social interaction, and the very conception of human existence.

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