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THREE SOLITUDES RECONCILED:
Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarian Bridge to the Idealist, Realist, and
Grotian Paradigms

BY

GUNHILD HOOGENSEN-BROWN ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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
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
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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Three Solitudes Reconciled: Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarian Bridge to the Idealist, Realist, and Grotian Paradigms submitted by Gunhild Hoogensen-Brown in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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To Jeff

Abstract

Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of international relations bridges some of the key paradigmatic gaps of the international relations theory traditions: Realism, Idealism, Rationalism. This conclusion is based upon the difficulty scholars have had in providing Bentham with one of the paradigmatic designations. This paper explores some of the distinct characteristics of each paradigm, as well as providing a comprehensive introduction to Bentham's theory of international relations. After introducing the reader to the thesis of the paper and the rationale behind it, the general characteristics of each of the three paradigms, Realism, Rationalism, and Idealism are provided. This is followed by Bentham's theory of international relations, primarily focusing on the elements relevant to the previous elucidation of the three traditions. Finally, all the key characteristics identified in each paradigm and Bentham's theory are compared for their similarities and differences. Based on this examination, it is argued that Bentham is not easily designated within one particular paradigm because he is able to combine important features of each paradigm, bridging the gaps of the discipline instead of contributing to the gulfs that exist.

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And we should not forget about Jeremy Bentham, who, I believe, has provided us with a great deal of entertainment and stimulation!

Chapter One

Introduction

The discipline of international relations theory presents itself as one which is schizophrenic. A quick perusal of the literature would suggest that certain dominant and/or popular theories do exist, but one will discover that agreement on the fundamental characteristics of the paradigmatic definitions is difficult to find.[1] Many, if not most scholars disagree on some element(s) that a colleague or group of colleagues have developed; what constitutes one tradition for one scholar, might very well constitute something completely different for another. Somewhere in the ocean of theories that exist today, there must exist an already discovered[2] process or set of processes (since it need not be solved by only one position), which does more than widen the gaps between an increasingly confusing disarray of interpretive scholarly work.

Many of the theories thus far developed are not capable of accommodating the ideas of others, one large reason being that certain theories premise themselves upon conceptions of human nature which are generally not recognized by the others. Thus, for this reason as well as others, it is helpful to use the categorization of theoretical traditions or paradigms. Although there may be many approaches in

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[1] K. J. Holsti, **The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory.** (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 1; and Martin Wight, "Why is there no International Theory" in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds), **Diplomatic Investigations,** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 17 - 34.

[2] Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations.** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 4.

determining what ought to constitute a paradigm, at least three well established traditions are dominantly used in the discipline.[3] It is primarily the Realist, the Grotian/Rationalist, and the Idealist traditions which frequent the international relations theory debate. But even then, the variety of theories that are considered to compose these popular traditions is amazing. On top of this, the three traditions themselves span a wide spectrum, each potentially moving from conflict based concepts to those more cooperative. It is very difficult to determine any concrete generalizations about international relations theory, if each theorist applies what she or he considers to be relevant criteria differently.

When proceeding with discussions about international relations theories, it is rare that a particular view regarding state behaviour is not raised. Whether implicitly or explicitly, persons partaking in such discussions are generally inclined to espouse views of either the Idealist, Realist, and/or the Rationalist paradigms,[4] whether they realize it or not, but this tendency is inherent in their perspectives of human nature and human relations. These theories, which fall into the various traditions, are presented in an attempt to explain past and present international behaviour, and predict what is to come. They are grounded on the values, and correlatively the institutions, which are considered to play roles internationally. As well, the theories of international relations attempt to address the very grounds upon which these particular values are maintained. No matter what the theories promise or offer, based on particular characteristics, they can be placed in the groups or families of theories which have similarities; hence the three traditions. Although the

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[3]Holsti, p. 130.

[4]On the one hand, focusing on these traditions may be considered rather Euro/America centric, and according to some scholars may not allow for the differing theories emanating from other parts of the world. To some extent this may be true, but due to the unmanageable magnitude this paper would take if all theories were considered, as well as the fact that the above mentioned paradigms do tend to still dominate throughout the discipline, it can be considered justified to focus on these three traditions. It should be kept in mind however, that since these traditions are defined in such a diverse manner, it is possible to find an interpretation that can include most if not all of the major theories being proposed worldwide.

traditions differ with regard to their conceptions of the units of analysis (state versus individual and/or other organizations), the nature of conflict, or the roles played by intervention, balance of power, and power in general, these ideas root themselves within what is perceived to be the essence of human nature according to each paradigm. Therefore a main basis of distinction, and one that can be considered at the core of political theory, is that of human nature.[5] Human nature determines what happens, either domestically or internationally, and what can happen.

Here again enters the schizophrenic characteristics, in that international theorists have such remarkably different outlooks concerning the capabilities of humans, and thus how humanity behaves under a variety of circumstances. As will be seen further on, some theories propose that human nature is inherently evil and corrupt; the outlook is bleak if not for the strength of particular institutions that can keep humans, either morally or physically, from harming one another. Other theories suggest that humans are generally good, albeit recognizing the human capability for evil, and base their assumptions upon this positive element which logically presents an entirely different framework to create the moral and just society. And then there are others, who see the same elements in human nature, but arrive at still different conclusions as to how to hopefully solve, or at least explain, the dilemmas of international relations.

At any rate, it seems that human nature, and especially how it is perceived, is at the root of theories of international relations, as well as political theory in general.[6] It is not hard to determine how it is possible to arrive at this conclusion; all one needs to ask is why one is a Realist, Idealist, or a Rationalist/Grotian. An

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[5]Martin Wight, **International Theory: The Three Traditions** (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 25-29, 99.
[6]Ibid.

answer might include ideas such as perceptions of power, whereby power behaves in such and such a manner, but the fundamental issue is dependent upon one's perception of human nature. Why is *might* the only solution in international affairs? Because force and harm are the best and most effective, if not the only, ways to ensure success. Why is this the case? It is in keeping with the negative and evil view of human nature. This therefore includes any and all perceptions of human rationality and/or irrationality, which correlatively determines the procedures of law and order in the theoretical view of the good, just, society (international or otherwise). Thus perceptions of human nature underlie theories of international relations.

Based on the various perceptions of human nature, a number of theories have been derived.[7] Some scholars automatically exclude certain perceptions of human nature due to the narrow parameters of their own theory, whereas some others provide broader characteristics that allow for greater inclusion. Nevertheless, in many cases it cannot be denied that strong differences can and do exist between the traditions or paradigms. If one were to regularly read articles espousing one tradition over another, one would readily get the impression that, in many cases, an intellectual animosity (for lack of a better term) exists between the proponents of the various positions. In reality, these scholars are not in the 'ivory towers' but in the 'ivory trenches'.[8] Instead of attempting to find similarities in the traditions whereby certain axioms can hopefully be discovered, a battle ensues.

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[7]The various paradigms that will be discussed in this paper will be elucidated in chapter 2.

[8]Chris Kukucha, University of Alberta (Political Science 561). A very good point which needed to be printed and credited. Granted, Keohane and Nye claim to attempt to link realism/neorealism with "liberal concerns" (R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 247.), but they seem to be the local anomalies; many other authors just rake the adversarial paradigms over the coals (see Stanley Hoffmann, "Liberalism and International Affairs"; J. E. Thomson and St. D. Krasner, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty", in **Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges** (Lexington Books, 1989); J. Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism", **International Organization**, 42, 3, Summer 1988; Alan James, "The realism of Realism: the state and the

Therefore part of the difficulty is that many of the scholars purporting one tradition or paradigm over another are narrowly concerned with the few distinguishing characteristics which might explain *certain* elements regularly observed in international politics, and which differentiate their theories from others, rather than also acknowledging the insights present in alternative theories that are able to explain contradictory phenomena more succinctly. Of course, this is not to suggest that all individuals in the discipline behave in this manner, but as noted above, it is prevalent.

It is interesting that when reading and learning about each paradigmatic position and the related method of analysis, each argument can be equally compelling, at least to some degree. It is possible, if not probable and logical, that most of the key elements submitted as distinguishing characteristics of each paradigm may have rings of truth surrounding them. One question that arrives at such a conclusion is why so many individuals would bother spending so much time on such differing perspectives if they did not think that they had discovered, or *re-discovered* as the case may be, something quite illuminating and effective as a tool to discuss international politics. They must, one assumes, see these elements pervading reality. This would not be the case in the circumstance that just *one* paradigm understood the truth, and all of the other scholars were blindly meandering their way in the dark. Thus, is it valid to ask why so many intelligent people are apparently unaware of the actual circumstances of international relations and the correlative international opportunities available (in terms of what one, as a state or otherwise, is able to do) in the international sphere, since only a select few scholars know the answers? If not, in this light the battle between the traditions does not seem to make sense. Unless most individuals in the discipline are greatly

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study of International Relations", **Review of International Studies** (1989); to name only a few.)

deceived, it is highly unlikely that a chosen few are able to accurately discuss international issues, and that the rest of academia are really, quite pathetically, wasting their time and energy.

So what can be derived from this argument? At least one important factor springs to mind, which is that it is very helpful, if not essential, to draw some of the various, and currently separate, paradigmatic characteristics together, instead of requiring them to be mutually exclusive. It must be possible to present a balance of ideas, deciding which elements warrant less or more attention, and produce a dynamic theory which would be capable of functioning even under the ever changing directions of international relations: thus moving with the particular nuances of the time while still representing the hard-core, unchanging truths of human nature.

Of course, since perceptions of human nature differ, and therefore some of these truths may differ, one might think that not all of the assumptions and conclusions of the various paradigms can be logically included. To a substantial extent this is true, but perhaps there is also a vision of human nature that recognizes the complexity of humanity, and therefore does not "pigeon-hole" human actions into *only* one or another type of characteristic. At any rate, it does seem logical, to this author anyway, that an attempt to discover a theory that is capable of bridging some of the paradigmatic gaps is a worthwhile endeavour.

So how is this to be done? One option would be to develop an entirely new, or perceived to be new, theory of international relations. It is hard to believe that this is possible though, since much of what is currently produced, although insightful and perhaps able to discover new interpretations with some modifications, seems based on the primary materials already developed by previous theorists. Therefore if possible, it is necessary to try to avoid *reinventing or*

redescribing the wheel (in this case of international relations theory).[9] Although it is probably not possible to find or derive a theory which encompasses most if not all of the characteristics of all the differing paradigms, there is at least one theorist who has offered an image of international politics and its potential direction in such a way that many of the characteristics that have been previously segregated are able to function within the same paradigm.

These characteristics are found in Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) utilitarian theory of international relations. In general, Bentham's theory is considered to be one of the Idealist perspectives, and in many respects this designation is justified, as will be seen below. But there exist difficulties in that Bentham has also been categorized within other paradigms, and if not he, than at least the theory of utilitarianism itself. Again, part of this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that many scholars define the traditions differently, and what may be included within the particular interpretation of one scholar may not be included by another. Still, even beyond the many overlaps and vague distinctions between the traditions, certain characteristics can be said to be fundamental to each. Yet this still does not seem to eliminate the problem of correctly allotting Bentham and/or utilitarianism within the structure of the traditions.

For most authors, as stated before, it seems Bentham is a classic Idealist. This designation will become clearer after understanding what Idealism suggests, and comparing it to Bentham's theory. He is the proponent, if not the instigator of the use of liberal virtues, and sees the potential for human improvement.[10] In many respects these authors are right, since Bentham does not despair in thinking that humanity is doomed to wallow in its unchanging features. At the same time

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[9]"Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect". Morgenthau, p. 4.
[10]F. H. Hinsley, H. Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, to name a few.

though, other scholars[11] fit Bentham with ease into the Rationalist or Grotian paradigm (albeit not as frequently as he is considered Idealist). And here too, many arguments can be presented as to why Bentham is so suited for the distinction. Needless to say the role of international law is integral, and of course both have certain expectations which are dependent upon the rational human being. Finally, and granted a bit more indirect, is the distinction that utilitarianism is a theory of Realism.[12] If one considers Bentham to be a utilitarian (which he is), he must also be a Realist. Generally it is only the term 'utilitarian' which suggests some sort of Realist quality, but since Bentham was a utilitarian, this classification cannot be discounted. Again, in many instances it can been seen why this would be the case, especially since the theory of utilitarianism revolves and survives around the concept of self-interest. Moral elements derived from elements external to self-interest are not primary, and consideration for the self, and in this case the national, interest prevails. It is actually this difficulty of placing Bentham that can lead one to the realization, and thus the thesis, of Benthamic utilitarianism acting as the bridge between paradigms.

Therefore, as well as attempting to provide a comprehensive as well as accurate account of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of international politics, it will be shown that Bentham's theory, although predominantly relegated to the Idealist camp, has important elements of *all three* of the dominant paradigms within his single approach. The relevance of this would be that Bentham's utilitarianism is capable of combining these elements to work towards an academically useful theory which bridges the chasms in understanding international politics.

To present this line of argumentation as clearly as possible, the second chapter will identify the elements fundamental to each tradition, again allowing for

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[11]Martin Wight, Michael Donelan, K. J. Holsti are examples.

[12]Meinecke, Stanley Hoffmann; these examples will be detailed in Chapter 4.

broad description since the definitions span such a large variety of views in themselves. Following this, the third chapter will be devoted to Jeremy Bentham's theory of international relations. If the reader finds the elucidation of Bentham's theory of international politics rather detailed (if not long-winded), this is not without reason. Generally there are few problems with summaries and brief accounts of what certain theories propose, but in Bentham's case this sort of thing has been done rather unfairly and to his disadvantage. By not *explicitly* stating what in fact Bentham said, certain assumptions are made which are frequently incorrect. This is of course not always the case, but it does occur more often than not. Especially since the characteristics of utilitarianism itself are so often unclear, blanket interpretations should be avoided. Therefore, much of what is stated here comes directly from the source, and although the selections are still at this author's discretion, as good an attempt as any has been made to take into account most, if not all, of Bentham's available key writings on the subject. Thus, this paper will attempt to provide a maximum amount of material from the original source (within the confines of this paper of course), so that the reader has the option to interpret the essence of the work for her or himself, if and when the reader is unclear of the intentions of the argument.[13]

Along with trying to elucidate as accurate an interpretation as possible of Bentham's theory, emphasis will also be placed on the particular variables already identified within the three traditions. In doing so, it will be easier to make the significant comparisons and contrasts in chapter four. Finally, the fourth chapter

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[13] In other words, do not take my word for it - read it yourself. In cases where authors have tended to misquote a source, it would have been worthwhile to have the text available for inspection, instead of assuming that the reader would just take for granted that the true essence of the thought had been revealed. While researching this topic, I came across some interpretations of Bentham's thought which did not make sense, especially in light of what I had read previously *by Bentham* himself. This was due to an apparent misuse of the original text, wherein the author makes a claim, with only the reference to the original text, which was incorrect. In light of these adventures, I hope to offer the reader a 'head start' in clarification by *including* the original text to support the argument of this paper, instead of just making reference to it.

concludes by briefly discussing why this exploration warrants any significance, and what potential uses such a theory has in international politics.

Chapter Two

The Realist, Idealist, and Rationalist Paradigms

Before examining where and how Bentham contributes to the international theory debate, one must obtain an understanding of the general traits which characterize each of the three paradigms. Because there are so many theoretical perspectives within each of the traditions themselves, it would be defeatist to try to identify *all* of the elements which can be said to compose each. Besides, the argument that Bentham is able to combine various components will not be useful, and instead will be irrelevant, if the comparison is based on a few specific and particular points. It is therefore most useful to gain an understanding of the *general* and *overall ingredients* which appear to differentiate the Idealists, Realists, and Rationalists (or Grotians). Although each tradition has its own wide range of nuances, it is possible to identify particular characteristics intrinsic to each.

Unfortunately, such an elucidation is not an easy task. To begin with, many scholars would argue, and accurately, that more international theories exist that these three predominantly 'Western' traditions recognize. Of course, this depends on one's definition of a 'Western tradition', but essentially it refers to those traditions developed within the Euro-American context. K. J. Holsti examines the perceived differences between the Euro-centric doctrines, and those theories and theorists which fall outside of this geographical distinction. Holsti believes that the three traditions which the Western world is most familiar with, the Realist, Rationalist, and Idealist, revolve around his three criteria which concentrate

on the causes of war and the conditions of peace/security/order, the essential actors/units of analysis, and the images of the world/system/society of states.[14] According to Holsti, these criteria exclude those trying to provide international theory alternatives, such as the World Order Model Project and Dependencia theorists.

Holsti provides an interesting analysis into the use and dominance of the *classical* theories (those that meet his criteria) and their relationships to the alternatives. Again, this examination is dependent on a particular view of what these theories actually entail, and what the three traditions hold as their relevant characteristics. This is certainly the case if one compares views of different authors, since for example, Martin Wight seems able to include these alternatives *within* his view of the three traditions, viewing the traditions more as general classifications based on perceptions of human nature[15] and rationality/irrationality, instead of requiring that all three traditions focus on certain criteria as opposed to others.

Because of this difficulty in determining the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of these three traditions, it seems important that one make very clear one's own position when trying to define what each tradition encompasses. For the purposes of this paper, Martin Wight's presentation most adequately meets the requirements. It cannot be denied that this elucidation is a feat in itself when trying to give the most accurate view of each tradition. This difficulty can be seen even within the

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[14]K.J. Holsti, **The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory** (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 8. His criteria are as follows (to be included within the *classical framework*):- The set of question or problems which set the boundaries as well as the core of theory of international relations are determined by:
1) the causes of war and the conditions of peace/security/order; an essential subsidiary problem is the nature of power;
2) the essential actors and/or units of analysis;
3) images of the world/system/society of states.

[15]Martin Wight, **International Theory: The Three Traditions.** (Leicester: Leicester University Press), 1991. P. 25.

nomenclature used in the international theory discipline: Realists can be considered synonymous with Hobbesians and Machiavellians, Rationalists with Grotians, and Idealists with Revolutionists and Kantians. The elements of each tradition do not necessarily need to be 'pigeon-holed' within a particular theorist or narrow set of ideas; it suffices to state that within each school there exist a few overriding and important similarities that enable each paradigm to represent a variety of views while still maintaining the essence of each thought itself. Using Martin Wight's general definitions of the three traditions assists such an endeavour, since he recognizes a broader spectrum of elements that can be included within each paradigm.

The first paradigm to be examined is that of Realism, also known as the Hobbesian and/or Machiavellian tradition. It appears to be the dominant, if not somewhat unshakable paradigm, since it represents a view that is easy to uphold considering much of the international situation. It is the one paradigm that seems to hold its own relatively well, while the other two traditions try to illuminate Realism's shortcomings. This is not to suggest that the Realist perspective is entirely correct; it is just that when relations seem tenuous in the world, and they frequently do, the Realist tradition seems to have the most 'cushions' to fall back upon. Alternate theories propose somewhat different approaches to international relations based on opposite views of human nature. Considering Realism's peculiar attractiveness, it is important to provide a well-rounded definition.

In general, Realism can be understood by Joseph Grieco's effective definition of the term:

> For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions. . . .

> [it is not necessary to] distinguish between realism and "neorealism," because on crucial issues -- the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states, and the problem of cooperation -- modern realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical realists like Carr, Aron, and Morganthau.[16]

As Martin Wight states in an even more succinct manner:

> [The Realists are those who concentrate upon the element of] *International Anarchy*: a multiplicity of independent sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose relationships are ultimately regulated by warfare.[17]

Realism, in the terms described above, is the paradigm which has such a basic, primary structure, that its foundation can be understood with a minimum of words: *anarchy*, *power politics*, and *warfare*.[18]

The Realists have had a long history--perhaps the longest on record of all the traditions. Thucydides, the author of **The Peloponnesian War**, presented humanity, for the most part, in a depressing light, but nonetheless attractive to his successors. He recognized, as one of the first *Realists*, that certain elements in human nature were unchanging; human beings are able to behave themselves within the constraints of the law while in conditions of stability, but under conditions of instability, and then war, humans are brought down to the basest of levels, where the greed and lust for power is apparent. War reveals the evil inherent in all human beings.

It is not surprising that Thucydides was very attractive to Hobbes, because war, which becomes anarchical, disorderly and absent of rule as described by Thucydides, becomes the Hobbesian *state of nature*. It is conflictual, never cooperative, and humans are easily prone to reach their lowest of levels in the initial interest of self-preservation:

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[16]J. M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism", **International Organization** (42, 3, Summer 1988), p. 485. The second section of the above quote comes from the first footnote of the article.

[17]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 7.

[18]Ibid., p. 15.

> Hobbes's doctrine of the three great motives of war—gain, fear, and glory—is an amplification of the account given by Thucydides. . . fear—not in the sense of an unreasoning emotion, but rather in the sense of the rational apprehension of future insecurity—[i]s the prime motive, a motive that affects not only some states some of the time, but all states all of the time . . . that inclines mankind toward 'a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.'"[19]

The rationality identified by the Idealists and Rationalists is not recognized, let alone applicable, to the Realist paradigm.[20] Under conditions of war, human beings are prone to act quite irrationally; violence is capable of going beyond the need for self-preservation and becomes gratuitous. Features of this irrationality include envy and hubris, the former created by jealousy and desire for revenge, the latter created through excessive pride and lack of prudence, both passionate reactions that easily lead to the destruction of all things previously honoured and revered.[21]

Does this mean that the Realists do not have a rational approach to international politics? Do they function without any regard for their reasonable faculties? Definitely not. The Thucydidean acknowledgment of humanity's irrational side does not suggest that humanity always behaves as such, but indicates that human nature is not positive, and will not hold back due to moral restraints. As a matter of fact, the Realist's approach is very rational, but it *does not* presuppose that the concept of rational is correlatively linked with the concept of good. According to Martin Wight, the Realist arrives at her or his conclusions by describing what *is*.[22] Rationality, used in the Realist context, does not lead the Realist to any particular prescriptive, inevitably moral, conclusions condoned by the Idealists or Rationalists. At best, morality is the expression of state interest.

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[19]Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy", Social Research, Vol. 48, 1981, p. 721-2.
[20]These differences will be discussed further along in the chapter.
[21]Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.77-78, 3.81, 3.84, 3.82, 4.21-22, 4.108, 4.132.
[22]Wight, International Theory, p. 21.

Again, this was illustrated by Thucydides in the *Melian Dialogue*. The Athenian representatives did not behave the way they did through the compulsion of irrationality. Instead they acted in the manner they thought was the most prudent to follow. According to the Athenians, they could only behave in the manner required by them, and if the Melians did not accede to the Athenian demands, the Athenians would have to use force. The Melians argued in favour of justice, and doing what would be considered *right*, but this argument could not play a role in power politics: ". . . you force us to leave justice out of account and to confine ourselves to self-interest . . ."[23] International relations is only a power struggle, and is therefore based on the desire for power, blended with, even more importantly, the *perception* of power.

The rational description and resigned acceptance of the irrational element in human nature, illustrated by Thucydides, is not the only interpretation of Realism; Machiavelli also contributed to the thought, although with a more calculated approach. He first realized the true nature of *raison d'état*,[24] a concept which is rooted in strict, empirical rationality. *Raison d'état* is a sound expression of one of the more distinguishing characteristics of Realism. As Machiavelli stated:

> It being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been seen and known, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.[25]

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[23]Thud., 5.82

[24]Friedrich Meinecke, **Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and its Place in Modern History.** (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1957., p. 41.

[25]Machiavelli, **The Prince,** ch. xv. Noted by E. H. Carr, **The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919 - 1939.** (London: MacMillan, 1966), p. 63. Also in Wight, **International Theory,** p. 17.

The focus rests on description rather than prescription, and this approach plays a hand in all the features of Real·

Hans J. Morgenthau also contributes to the Realist paradigm, with his six principles of political realism: 1) Realism is based on the objective laws governed by human nature--understand the objective laws and a rational theory, consisting of a rational outline, will develop; 2) Realism is based on interest defined in terms of power--due to the element of power, politics must be dealt with as an autonomous sphere, and all arguments regarding motives and ideological preferences are rendered insignificant; 3) Realism is not based on the unchanging nature of interest, as it does recognize the potential for change--but change is bound by actual forces which shape the past as well as the future, instead of forces concerned with the ideal or abstract; 4) Realism is aware of morality, and the tension which exists between morality and necessary state behaviour: "Realism, then, considers prudence--the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions--to be the supreme virtue in politics";[27] 5) Realism differentiates between morality of state and universal morality; and 6) Realism is distinct from all other forms of thought.[28]

Morgenthau provides a broader vision of the paradigm, yet he still does not differ drastically from Realism's fundamental characteristics. Power is still the dominant feature, self or national interest develop with power, and morality is solely dependent on the necessary actions of the state. Finally, and although Morgenthau seems to recognize in humanity more than a brute harshness, his requirement that Realism focuses on just the political sphere compels him to make the same harsh value judgments:

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[26]Wight, International Theory, p. 19. Referring to such things as balance of power, etc.
[27]Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 10.
[28]Ibid.

> Real man is a composite of "economic man," "political man," "moral man," "religious man," etc. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a *beast*, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but "moral man" would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but "religious man" would be a saint, for he would be completely lacking in worldly desires.[29] (italics added)

By eliminating all spheres other than the political, and therefore the other than political elements which make up the "real man", Morgenthau's Realism deals with only the *"beast"* cf humanity, which is similar if not identical to the concepts of Realism presented by other scholars.

The Realist paradigm revolves around what *is*, and does not pass the fine but distinct line, into what *ought*. It is "a frank acceptance of the disagreeable aspects of life."[30] E. H. Carr, the modern Hobbesian,[31] does not recognize morality and law without the foundation of conflictual power within politics.[32] Machiavelli, so often the brunt of criticism that his name presents an insult to any politician if labeled with it, only opted to explicitly express what it was that he saw happening in politics: "Bacon was one of the first to praise him for 'saying openly and without hypocrisy what men are in the habit of doing, not what they ought to dc. "[33] There is no balance between politics and morality, since they exist on different levels. Morality exists within the realm of utopia, whereas reality, and hence politics, exists in the realm of power.[34] These two realms exist in parallel and will therefore never meet. Morality can never be the guiding element within politics, so if any action which takes place resembles moral principles to any degree, it is solely the result of politics/power that is so.

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[29]Ibid., p. 13.

[30]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 16.

[31]Ibid., p. 17.

[32]"Morality is the product of power". Carr, p. 64.

[33]Ibid. (Carr quoted Bacon passage from: Bacon, **On the Advancement of Learning**. vii, ch. 2.).

[34]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 16.

Thus morality can be seen to stem from such Realist principles as *raison d'état*, in that anything done to preserve the health and strength of the State[35] is appropriate, legitimate, and justifiable. An important question develops from this statement, in that one might wish to know why such actions would be justifiable. Essentially, it is because the state reigns supreme in the Realist tradition. Individuals are certainly not regarded as international actors, as they function only at the domestic level. Of course, persons do act on the behalf of states, but that is just the point; those actions are on the *behalf* of the state which does not acknowledge any distinct role for the person involved. Therefore, only the state is capable of taking action internationally, primarily because it is the highest authority at the domestic and international level, and nothing exists to regulate behaviour above and beyond that condoned within the state. In Hobbesian terms, the relations among states take place "in a state of nature which is a state of war."[36] The *buck stops* with the state. As such, the state must be primarily concerned with its own preservation, since it is competing in an arena which is devoid of enforced, or even enforceable, laws. *Raison d'état* remains both general and unique at the same time; general in that it is inherent in the nature of state to use it, and unique in that each decision made by the each state is particular to its own character and environment.[37]

Here too, develops the pessimistic[38] nature of the Realist paradigm, since *raison d'état* suggests more than just the necessary actions of a state. These actions, in keeping with the power-oriented nature of this tradition, are not bound by moral behaviour, they are bound by what is considered to be necessary:

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[35]Meinecke, p. 1.
[36]Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy", **Social Research**, Vol. 48, 1981, p. 720.
[37]Ibid.
[38]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 25.

> But it is in fact an essential part of the spirit of *raison d'état* that it must always be smearing itself by offending against ethics and law; if in no other way, then only by the very fact of war—a means which is apparently so indispensable to it, and which (despite all the legal forms in which it is dressed up) does signalize the breaking down of cultural standards and a re-establishing of the state of nature. . . .the State—although it is the very guardian of law, and although it is just as dependent as any other kind of community on an absolute validity of ethics and law, is yet unable to abide by these in its own behaviour.[39]

The state interacts with others within a lawless, meaning devoid of all coercive or enforced law, condition; it must behave, out of the necessity to survive, in a manner consistent with such a surrounding condition. Individuals who live within state boundaries are restricted by enforced and coercive laws, which prevents, or attempts to prevent each individual from harming another. Because these laws do not exist internationally, states perpetually experience freedom without limits.

There is a basis for this frame of thought. If humanity revealed itself to be entirely, or at least predominantly good, one might assume that, in an environment without legal recourse or a higher, coercive authority, any sort of aggressive behaviour would not occur. Instead, "Realists tend to be pessimistic about human nature, or rather, if 'pessimism' suggests a regret about the badness of what is recognized to be bad, the consistent Realist has no regrets; he sees human nature as plain bad."[40] Thus, without coercive law, the *law of nature* applies. The law of nature expresses itself through human nature, in that human beings, by this definition, require a coercive authority to eliminate harm. Therefore one conclusion could suggest that on the international stage, whatever is considered to be international law, is really the same as Hobbes's law of nature, and is certainly not perceived to be of the same power or stature as municipal or national law.[41] As well, the Hobbesian version of natural law does not express any inherent natural

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[39]Meinecke, p. 12-3.
[40]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 25.
[41]Bull, **Social Research**, p. 723.

code, which all beings are compelled to respect, or at least address. It only dictates the "prudential rules of survival"[42] which does not include any value system to determine what is right or wrong; at least beyond that which is considered harmful to the state.

Any values or morals to be gleaned in Hobbes world are derived from natural right, whereby, "the right of nature . . . [is] the liberty each man has to do whatever is necessary to preserve himself from death or injury, and in the state of nature for an individual man this liberty is entirely without limit."[43] Morality is derived from self-interest, the primary interest being that of self-preservation. It is exactly for this reason that Hobbes's individuals enter the Leviathan. There is great debate concerning whether or not Hobbes would extend this suggestion to the international realm, so that all states would enter a *Grand* Leviathan, to escape the state of nature. But whether this would be the recommended option or not, it is important to realize that all action predicates itself on the self-interest of either the individual or the state.

Thus the crux of this wide range of thought revolves around: 1) the state is the most important actor; 2) the differentiation between the international condition of anarchy and the domestic condition of coercive law; and 3) relations which constitute a struggle for power and peace.[44] Realism is rooted in anarchy, emphasizing the conflictual nature of politics with the element of opposing interests, and views progression in a negative sense, only allowing for pessimistic rhetoric. Realism is power based, survival-oriented, self-interested,[45] and, *nasty, brutish, and short.*

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[42]Ibid.
[43]Ibid.
[44]Alan James, "The realism of Realism: the state and the study of International Relations", Review of International Studies (1989), p. 216-7.
[45]A great example of the Realist self-interest is found in the Melian dialogue of Thucydides work, The Peloponnesian War. The Athenians thought in terms of self-interest; they felt that

Idealism finds its foothold at the other end of the spectrum, wherein progress is looked upon positively; human beings will improve as we progress through time. Of course, this progress is looked upon differently depending upon how one chooses to view humanity and its rational or irrational behaviour. This paradigm includes the notion of human perfectibility, and any conflict that occurs is not due to the inherent *badness* of humans (something that Realists would suggest), but from imperfect political arrangements which will be eradicated as humanity evolves.[46] Cooperation is the key to this vision, and can be realized on an anarchical or cosmopolitan level. Much emphasis is placed on the ability to educate public opinion, thus increasing global understanding. Anarchy can exist in all three traditions, but it is the nature of the anarchy which is the key. At any rate, Idealism perceives an inevitable, evolutionary progress which is and will continue to occur to the advantage and moral betterment of society.

Martin Wight produces a broad definition for this Idealist paradigm and generally refers to it as *Revolutionism*, although he still does use such terminology as *Kantian* and *Idealist*, albeit to a lesser degree. Wight's perception of Revolutionism would allow for peripheral (in other words, not 'classical' as defined by K. J. Holsti)[47] theories such as *Dependencia*, gender theory, and *World Order Model Project* . Since his elucidation does so, without detracting from the core particulars of the paradigm, his presentation serves the purpose of this thesis very well. As well, and as Wight also mentioned, most theories *can* be placed within the three described traditions themselves.[48]

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overcoming the Melians had to be in their interest to maintain their power. Alternatively, the Melians thought primarily in terms of justice, which unfortunately played no role in the determination of the outcome.

[46]Michael Smith, "The Idealist Provocateurs", **Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger** (LSU Press), p. 55.

[47]Holsti, p.8.

[48]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 7.

The Idealist paradigm is frequently referred to as the Kantian paradigm, since it is Immanuel Kant's thought, especially *Perpetual Peace*, which provides a detailed account of the Idealist position to which many scholars have been attracted. Since Jeremy Bentham is frequently compared with Immanuel Kant,[49] a specific elucidation of Kant's writings on international relations is necessary. Two of the more popularly known articles by Kant on this subject are **Perpetual Peace** (1795), and **Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose** (1784), which are frequently drawn upon to determine elements of the Kantian paradigm. In general, Kant proposed that perpetual peace could be established and maintained through a variety of principles, detailed by his preliminary articles and definitive articles contained within **Perpetual Peace**. These include: 1) the elimination of secrecy in treaties of peace with regard to armament "stockpiling"; 2) prohibited acquisition of states through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation; 3) eventual abolition of standing armies; 4) prohibition of national debt accumulation through external affairs; 5) mutual non-intervention at the constitutional/administrative level; 6) elimination of gratuitous violence while at war, so as to preserve future mutual confidence. The above consists of the preliminary articles, whereby some articles (# 1, 5, 6) requires immediate enforcement, while other articles should be subject to some delay, ensuring effectiveness.[50] Following this, Kant elucidates his perception of human nature, which is somewhat indicative of the general perceptions of the Revolutionist tradition. Essentially, Kant believes that human nature is drawn toward evil, and in keeping with Hobbes, the state of nature is basically a state of war.[51] But like the

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[49]ie: F. H. Hinsley included Bentham within his chapter where the Internationalist theorists were discussed, which included Kant, Rousseau (to the extent that he could apply), and others considered to be proponents of the Idealist tradition.

[50]**Perpetual Peace**, in Hans Reiss, ed. **Kant: Political Writings**. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1970. pp. 93-7.

[51]Ibid., p. 98.

Revolutionist optimist, Kant also believes that humans, although evil, are bound by Nature to progress towards good. Essentially, Kant is very optimistic about humanity in that positive progress is inevitable.

To Kant, the realization of perpetual peace is more than just the absence of war. Instead it must be guaranteed through law in the form of a concord among people.[52] To achieve this goal, each and every nation state must be republican, wherein all individuals live with freedom and equality, dependent upon republican legislation. This places decision-making power, especially with regard to war, in the citizen's responsible hands.[53] On an international level, these republican states can, and are drawn to, constitute a federation.

Much confusion arises as to whether or not Kant believes in a more cosmopolitan arrangement, or if he instead strongly recognizes the existence, if not the worth, of the *anarchical* state system. Some authors, such as F. H. Hinsley suggest that Kant definitely does not advocate the implementation of a world government, and at best recognizes international societal interests. Others argue, however,[54] that since Kant openly idealizes a cosmopolitan situation, and although he might recognize the immediate futility of such an attempt, this ideal proposal can be attributed to Kantian thought.[55] Needless to say, much debate can take place over the contradictions found in Kant's writings and the various interpretations of

[52]Ibid., p. 108.

[53]Ibid., p. 100. As Kant further elaborates, republicanism does not necessarily mean democratic. Democracy has the tendency to produce the evil of tyranny over the majority, whereas Republicanism separates the executive power from the legislative. In actuality, the monarchy is best suited for this system, since the fewer individuals in executive power the better.

[54]Andrew Hurrell ("Kant and the Kantian paradigm in international relations". **Review of International Studies.** 1990, 16, p. 183-205) emphasizes the cosmopolitan side to some degree, and to a greater extent so does Martin Wight and Hedley Bull.

[55]For a good part, Hurrell predominantly makes a case for the 'statist' view of Kant. Although his argument is quite accurate in that Kant is very statist in many respects, and that he has a respectful recognition of the independence of states, there still seems to be more of a cosmopolitan nature within Kant's writings than Hurrell is willing to admit. Perhaps Bull and Wight view Kant too much to the cosmopolitan extreme, but to a large extent they have a valid point.

the same. For the purposes of this paper, Martin Wight's perspective will be maintained, in that Kant advocates an element of uniformity, and viewed history in a teleological manner; closely linked to what Wight describes as the next step, the *Cosmopolis*.[56] It is true that Kant recognizes the desire for equal rights and sovereignty within and between states.[57] But even if one were to argue that Kant seeks no more than a community atmosphere through a loose *federation* of states, this desire suggests that if possible, a tighter solution like world government would not be unpalatable. This can further be seen in Kant's desire for appropriate republican states, whereby the best alternative would be to have a monarchy, where executive power rests in the least number of hands, rather than in an oligarchy or democracy. Why would this not pertain to the international level? The worst case scenarios which would, as Kant believes, exist within a democratic establishment, must be relevant at the international level if all states have equal powers within the federation. Since Kant does speak of a State of Nations as the ideal, this paper will assume that to be one of his key, albeit self-recognized impractical, objectives.

Without government, "the depravity of human nature is displayed without disguise in the unrestrained relations which obtain between the various nations."[58] Human beings seem capable of doing very little, at least in a positive and productive sense, if left to their own devices. As a matter of fact, humans only seem to contribute on a negative level. It is an 'outside' force which provides the motivation for our good behaviour and moral development. Philosophers "cannot assume that mankind follows any rational *purpose of its own* in its collective action, [therefore it] is for him to attempt to discover a *purpose in nature* behind this

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[56]Martin Wight, "An Anatomy of International Thought". **Review of International Studies.** 1987, 13, p. 225-6).
[57]Perpetual Peace, Reiss, p. 102-3.
[58]Ibid., p. 103.

senseless course of human events. . ."[59] Fortunately, the inherent badness which

exists within humanity does work to our benefit, in that:

> Without these asocial qualities (far from admirable in themselves)
> which cause the resistance inevitably encountered by each individual
> as he furthers his self-seeking pretensions, man would live an
> Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and
> mutual love. But all human talents would remain hidden for ever in
> a dormant state, and men, as good-natured as the sheep they tended,
> would scarcely render their existence more valuable than that of their
> animals. The end for which they were created, their rational nature,
> would be an unfilled void.[60]

Thus humans have evil tendencies in order to give us the ability to develop our

good side. But even with this fortunate benefit, human beings must subordinate the

domestic or national requirements to the international realm, again due to that evil

nature which pervades the human character:

> *The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is*
> *subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship*
> *with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also*
> *solved.* . . . Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely
> the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced
> them into a law-governed civil state. . . . a federation of peoples in
> which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its
> security and rights not from its own power or its own legal
> judgment, but solely from the great federation (*Foedus*
> *Amphictyonum*), from a united power and the law-governed
> decisions of a united will. However wild and fanciful this idea may
> appear - and it has been ridiculed as such when put forward by the
> Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau (perhaps because they thought that its
> realisation was so imminent) - it is nonetheless the inevitable
> outcome.[61]

Much of what Kant writes suggests something more than just the desire for a

recognition of communal interests articulated through his *federation*; it seems as if

power should come predominantly from such an institution, and taken away from

the individual states themselves.

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[59]**Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose**, Reiss, p. 42.
[60]Ibid., p. 45.
[61]Ibid., p. 47-8.

Kant therefore argues that without some form of government, the concept of rights seems futile if not ridiculous. Justification of international action is not possible without the higher authority of a binding code of law. The moral driving force behind all of this activity, which compels humanity to respect and convey rights, over a period of time will overcome the evil of human nature.[62] To overcome this at the international level, and thus overcome the current protection/implementation of rights through war, a *covenant of peace* is required which seeks to put an end to war forever, not merely postpone the next one. This would not be based on any motivation for power, but would exist for security reasons:

> [Humanity's evils have a] beneficial effect. For they compel our species to discover a law of equilibrium to regulate the essentially healthy hostility which prevails among the states and is produced by their freedom. Men are compelled to reinforce this law by introducing a system of untied power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security.[63]

Coercive law would not be required to uphold the covenant, since the states themselves, republican and therefore strongly inclined toward perpetual peace, will desire to form a federation (obviously based on their like values - uniformity) to secure each freedom:

> For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which by its nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, this securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.[64]

This federation therefore will almost automatically expand due to its attractive features and benefits. As well:

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[62]Ibid., p. 41. Not only is humanity compelled, but we are "unwittingly guided in [our] advance along a course intended by nature".

[63]Ibid., p. 49.

[64]Ibid., p. 104.

There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. *Just like individual men* (italics added), they must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an *international state (civitas gentium)*, which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth. But since this is not the will of the nations, according to their present conception of international right (so that they reject *in hypothesi* what is true *in thesi*), the positive idea of a *world republic* cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding *federation* likely to prevent war. The latter may check the current of man's inclination to defy the law and antagonize his fellows, although there will always be a risk of it bursting forth anew.[65]

This united and internationalist approach is furthered through the rights of individuals to be treated hospitably when visiting foreign lands, and if such individuals do not pose an outward or inward threat to the host nation, such communication (travel, commerce) has the potential to bring "the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution."[66]

So what can all of this mean? Kant, although he begins with the idea that human nature is inherently evil, arrives at a very different conclusion than his Realist colleagues. Kant's concept of human nature begins somewhat similarly as Hobbes, but he still envisions correlative elements which compel humankind to behave differently in the end. Instead of viewing human nature as bad and with no future for change, Kant perceives the potential, if not the inevitability, of change. Nature, which is the driving force behind reason, compels human beings to move towards moral ends. Reason supplies humanity with a deductive process, in that it (through Nature according to the Kantian tradition) tells us what we *ought* to do beyond what we already know exists. Reason provides us with this prescriptive ability which is capable of telling us what the best course of action is, and what is morally appropriate.[67] Nature has provided human beings, and all those creatures

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[65]Ibid., p. 105.
[66]Ibid., p. 106.
[67]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 21-2.

bound by nature, with a historical process which makes humanity become increasingly morally aware and active as time goes on.[68] This occurs regardless of the human will to have it occur or not.[69] And as much as war is to be abhorred, Nature has included it as part of the process, albeit at a *primitive* stage, for this historical development[70] (very similar to Marxism and the requirement to experience the negative historical processes, such as capitalism, to get to the good).

Thus "Nature comes to the aid of the universal and rational human will";[71] better yet Nature "irresistibly wills"[72] human beings to place rights and morality *a priori* over evils. And states will be willed naturally to come together as principles among them, linguistic and religious, will blend leading to mutual understanding and peace.[73] So what conclusions can be made? In general, it can be said that although Kant recognizes the dominant role of the state, he is still capable, via his theory, to transcend the state system. As will be seen, Kant fits quite readily into the Revolutionist paradigm in many respects. Revolutionism has a missionary character which impinges ideological foundations on the society, domestic or international, undergoing development.[74] This is in keeping with Kant, who allows for nothing but republican formed states to participate, and initiate, perpetual peace. His theory transcends the state system at this point, as Revolutionism does, by his demands, which occur naturally, for common interests. These of course are articulated through mutual understanding *dependent* on a common value system. This requirement is implicitly indicated through the desire for only republican states in **Perpetual Peace** and their eventual inclination towards a federation.

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[68]Ibid., p. 108.
[69]Ibid., p. 110.
[70]Ibid., p. 110-12.
[71]Ibid.
[72]Ibid., p. 113.
[73]Ibid., p. 114.
[74]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 9.

As well, Kant emphasizes the role of the individual, not always above the state, but at least as an influential player. "The impulse for progress toward perpetual peace comes largely from the individual: from the moral outrage at the destructiveness of war, from the ability to learn from experience, and from the gradual moral improvement of mankind."[75] This too is in keeping with the Revolutionist train of thought, in that the individual is important if not paramount. Revolutionism, in its broad definition, is capable of encompassing those theories which deny the state-centric analyses, by instead focusing on individual capabilities and responsibilities. A recognition of the individual's role does not necessarily suggest a coup over the state as the primary actor of analysis, but what it does do is allow for different organizations of individuals, such as class or gender, as analytical tools.[76] Such theories that fall into this category would include Marxism,[77] and more specifically the dependency theory which concentrates on classes and not states.

Wight's broad (yet relevant) definitions allow for this as opposed to Holsti's denial of placement due to his narrow research criteria.[78] Historical, dialectical progression; ideologically driven goals; and individual orientation,

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[75]Hurrell, p. 202.

[76]It also includes Feminism, radical to moderate, which entails discussions concerning the female population and its role, perspective, and contributions. However relevant these theories may be perceived to be to the international realm, it would prove to be worthwhile to include them within the paradigms under discussion. See Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (eds), Gender and International Relations. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1991.; Andrew Webster, Introduction to the Sociology of Development. (London: MacMillan Education Ltd.); and M. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World. (New York: Longman Inc.), 1989.

[77]Wight, International Theory, p. 10, 46, 105.

[78]Holsti, p. 8. Although the debate as to the validity of this criteria could constitute another paper in itself, Holsti's vision is relatively narrow for the purposes of this paper, and some of his conclusions could be sufficiently debated that I am willing to pass beyond what he considers to constitute the three traditions. It should also be mentioned that the theories which are, for the most part, not included within Holsti's definition are not necessarily devoid of any consideration of war and peace, etc., but that to be considered valid by Holsti a theory must meet all three criteria, and generally those he excludes do not (See Holsti, p. 8 - 10).

especially regarding rights and freedoms (encompassing a variety of perspectives therefore, be it class or gender or whatever); are all characteristics of Revolutionism. "And this encourages the hope that, after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of nature, a universal *cosmopolitan existence*, will at last be realized as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop."[79] Rationality/reason seems to be driven by the historical process, in that Kant saw it as naturally inevitable (nature compels humanity to use their reason toward a moral goal), and likewise with Revolutionism as a whole, in that the rational is linked with historical development (which is also linked to the ideological aspect - the ideological dictating the appropriate rational path). In general therefore, Revolutionism is:

> *The concept of a society of states, or family of nations*: although there is no political superior, nevertheless recognition that the multiplicity of sovereign states forms a moral and cultural whole, which imposes certain moral and psychological and possibly even legal (according to some theories of law) obligation-even if not political ones. As Burke observed: "The writers on public law have often called this *aggregate* of nations a commonwealth.[80]

In keeping with this thought, especially the moral and psychological element, the action of non-intervention is not, in theory anyway, a sacred principle. Especially if a state exists devoid of the proper ideological stance, intervention would be justified to *liberate* those unfortunate citizens. Kant does not favour this approach for the most part, as he declared this would be in violation of a perpetual peace. But since his requirements for such a peace are so strict, it would be interesting to know how far he would go to ensure that *his* version of perpetual peace would be upheld and maintained.

Overall, from the statist Kantian, to the cosmopolitan Kantian, to Martin Wight's Revolutionism, the *ideal* situation is paramount. All of these theories

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[79]**Idea for a Universal History**, Reiss, p. 51.
[80]Wight, **International Theory**. p. 7.

prescribe what *ought* to be done and what *ought* to happen.[81] Since this is the case, the most general term to describe the entire group can be *Idealism*, which will be the term of choice for the duration of the thesis. The Ideal is inevitable, and that which drives the inevitable is missionary in character.

The final dominant paradigm to be considered, the Grotian or Rationalist tradition, plays a somewhat 'middle of the road' role. In general, the term Rationalist refers to a broader conception of this tradition than does confining the definition to Hugo Grotius's contribution to the paradigm. For the purposes of this paper, the two terms will be considered interchangeable. A broad definition of the paradigm is provided by Martin Wight, whereby Rationalism consists of: *"Diplomacy and commerce*: continuous and organized intercourse between these sovereign states in the pacific intervals: international and institutionalized intercourse."[82] The Rationalists do not have high or radical expectations about the potential of international relations, but nor do they believe that all is lost:

> There is a third way between Utopianism and despair. That is to take the world as it is and to improve it; to have faith without a creed, hope without illusions, love without God. The Western

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[81]Some might argue that any theory which discusses what ought to occur rather than discuss what actually does occur, goes beyond the definition of a theory. In such a case, it is best to make understood what one means by theory so that the context is not lost in the above discussion. A definition can be stated as such:

> We can . . . distinguish three kinds of efforts to which the word "theory" applies: (1) *"normative"* or "value" theory, defined by Kenneth Thompson in his essay reproduced below as the study of politics "in terms of ethical desiderata"--the kind of theory produced by political philosophy. A good example would be Kant's theory of perpetual peace in a world federation of representative republics; (2) *"empirical"* or "causal" theory, which tries to analyze actual political behaviour and to identify the main variables, such as the theory of the balance of power offered as the key to eighteenth and nineteenth century international relations; (3) *"policy* science: or theory as a set of recipes for action as systematic advice on statecraft. . . . collecting facts is not enough and . . . it is not helpful to gather answers when no questions have been asked.
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> S. Hoffmann, **Contemporary Theory in International Relations.** (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1960) p. 8 - 9.

[82]Ibid., p. 7.

> world is committed to the proposition that rational man will in the
> end prove stronger and more successful than irrational man.[83]

The complexity of human nature does not allow for a 'pigeon-holing' of human actions and behaviour, therefore a dominant optimism or pessimism does not exist within the precepts of this tradition. The human being, "although manifestly a sinful and bloodthirsty creature, is also rational";[84] the Rationalist vision of human nature essentially lies in between those of the Realists and the Idealists.

Likewise the Rationalist approaches reason and/or rationality in a combination of the approaches taken on by the two other paradigms. Whereas the Realists only *describe* what *is*, and the Idealists only *prescribe* what *ought* to be, the Rationalists opt to arrive at their conclusions by *describing* what they believe is the *essence* of what *is*. "[T]he characteristic statement of a Rationalist about international relations is a descriptive statement. . ."[85] Rationalists intend to discover what lies behind the actual circumstances of international politics.

One conclusion that arises from this process of analysis is the concept of a *society of states*. The condition of international anarchy is recognized as predominant, but this does not exclude the active intercourse that occurs among nations. An international society exists when:

> a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. If states today form an international society . . . , this is because, recognizing certain common interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they should respect one anothers claims to independence, that they should honour agreements into which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain limitations in exercising force against on another. At the same time they cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of

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[83]A. J. P. Taylor, **Rumours of Wars** (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952), p. 262. In Wight, **International Theory**, p. 29.

[84]Ibid., p. 13.

[85]Ibid., p. 21.

diplomacy and general international organization, and the customs
and conventions of war.[86]

To actually gain a *societal* status, there must be an acknowledgment of common
interests, and better yet, values.[87] A Realist might shrug this off as an
impossibility based on cultural relativism, in that those with dissimilar cultural and
value systems will never find common interests, let alone identify common values.
But this need not be the case, especially since it has occurred already. As Hedley
Bull noted, many nations not included within the European geographical and/or
cultural context have been capable of identifying common interests and interacting
on a community or societal level with their European neighbours:

> Turkey, China, Japan, Korea, and Siam, for example, were part of
> the European-dominated international system before they were part
> of the European-dominated international society. That is to say,
> they were in contact with European powers, and interacted
> significantly with them in war and commerce, before they and the
> European powers came to recognise common interests or values, to
> regard each other as subject to the same set of rules and as co-
> operating in the working of common institutions.[88]

This is above and beyond the also important communication through envoys,
and/or agreements concerning trade or war and peace. Shared and common
interests play the dominant role to constitute a society.

When establishing the existence of an international society, it is important to
include the identification of any goals which are likely and worthwhile to develop
within the international environment. Hedley Bull identifies three such goals, the
first being the preservation of the society and system of states themselves.[89] It
should be noted that the system of states plays a very important role, since although

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[86]Hedley Bull, **The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics**
(London: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1977), p. 13.

[87]This solidardist attitude is not necessarily Grotian; it is more a tendency found in Martin Wight
and Hedley Bull. Still, Grotius implicitly expressed this principle in his writings and "they may
be seen as an implicit concomitant of most early concepts of international society". Hedley Bull,
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, (eds), **Hugo Grotius and International Relations**
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 8.

[88]Bull, **Anarchical Society.**, p. 14.

[89]Ibid., p. 16.

the international society has its recognized benefits, it does not and will not transcend the state system. The primary actors in international relations are still the states. Therefore, both elements required attention.

A second goal consists of "maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states."[90] This recognition is mutual and all-pervasive. Internal policy and behaviour is not the concern of others. The non-intervention of the Realists receives respect from the Rationalists as well. Preservation of the states is paramount. But while the state has maintained this level of importance, at least in the writings of Grotius there is "some scope for an international society of greater depth--a society which might be described as having matured into an international community--in which states and other international entities are the dominant but not the only participants."[91] Thus there is still some room for a broader sphere of international actors if need be.

Finally, the third goal of the society of states is peace. It is nice to know that this exists as one of the goals, but it certainly does not take the priority role.[92] Permanent peace is not the ideal since the "maintenance of peace [is only] in the sense of the absence of war among member states of international society as the normal condition of their relationship, to be breached only in special circumstances and according to principles that are generally accepted."[93] This goal does not take precedence over the first two, but still remains an obvious common interest to the society of states in that the absence of war would constitute the standard international condition.

One of the strongest reputations that Rationalism, and more specifically the Grotian tradition, has obtained is in the area of international law:

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[90]Ibid., p. 17.
[91]Bull, et. al. **Hugo Grotius**, p. 12.
[92]Bull, **Anarchical Society.**, p. 18.
[93]Ibid.

'Grotius seems to have been the first who attempted to give the world anything like a regular system of natural jurisprudence, and *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most complete work on the subject.'[94]

Its foundations lying partially within the *law of nature* (different from that of Hobbes or even Kant), international law plays a dominant role in the relations among states. The natural law of Grotius or the Rationalists is not to be equated with that of Hobbes, since Grotian natural law is premised on the concept of social strength and cohesion, whereas Hobbes concentrates on anarchical liberty.[95] As well, the Rationalist tradition perceives a duality in international law, in that it does not consist solely of natural law, nor does it consist solely of positivist law (strictly custom and treaty); the Rationalists concede to both.

Generally, the natural law of which Grotius or the Rationalists speak, is a positive knowledge of behaviour and understanding inherent in all beings with reason. It is the rational side of humanity which is subject to natural law. This is the case primarily because, although states are the dominant actors in the international arena, states and their rulers are all composed of persons and all persons are subject to natural law.[96] Natural law is "the belief in a cosmic, moral constitution, appropriate to all created things including mankind; a system of eternal and immutable principles radiating from a source that transcends earthly power (either God or nature)."[97] Human beings are automatically capable of understanding natural law due to their rational faculties, and it is the rational element which impinges a 'moral' awareness upon humanity.

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[94]Adam Smith, **Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms** (C. 1762-3), ed. E. Cannan (Oxford, 1978). p. I. In Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, (eds), **Hugo Grotius and International Relations**, p. 3.

[95]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 14.

[96]Bull, et. al. **Hugo Grotius**, p. 78.

[97]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 14.

Grotian international politics includes the idea of a *society of states*, wherein international law is crucial to the society's maintenance.[98] As well, this international society ultimately consists of individuals, although the role of the state is duly recognized. War is considered to be acceptable only if it is just; a just war consists of those wars which involve defense, recovery of property, or punishment.[99] These just causes would be recognized by international law, as well as determined by international law. The basis of this determination (albeit not direct, since Grotius takes pains to distinguish *natural law* from the *Law of Nations*), and therefore of international law, is the *Law of Nature, or natural law*, which was derived from the conservation of society.[100] It is natural law which is the motivation of human beings to act cordially in society, and care for their fellow person. Therefore treaties and compacts, which are conformable to natural law, are the logical course for international affairs.[101]

It should be noted that again, due to the multiplicity of definitions which surround each paradigm (the inherent schizophrenia), what determines one person's Realism, could very well be another person's Rationalism, and vice versa. When trying to compare paradigms, it is difficult not to present them in a 'pigeon-hole' fashion, since a line must be inevitably drawn at some point to determine what characteristics belong with which tradition. This does not mean that each paradigm is considered to be so simplistic that the traditions fall with ease within specific parameters. If nothing else, this attempt to determine the particular characteristics of each tradition has this author convinced that the lines between each of the traditions can be *very* fine indeed.

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[98] H. Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", p. 53.
[99] Ibid., p. 55.
[100] Hugo Grotius, "Preliminary Remarks," **The Law of War and Peace**, p. xxv.
[101] Ibid., p. xxvii.

Each of the paradigms have been followed with a brief summary of what each entails, but so that the main points of comparison might remain fresh in the reader's memory, those characteristics consist of the following;

Realism:

Politics revolves around power, articulated through self-interest. The emphasis remains on the negative aspects of human nature, whether any positive aspects are recognized or not. Morality is expressed through the needs of the state, and those needs, in turn, reflect the only rational options. These rational choices are based upon the fact that the international realm is conflictual, competitive, and negatively anarchical. It is a system devoid of all coercive and authoritative law. The absence of law does not necessarily mean that the international realm is perpetually in a state of war, but the possibility is ever present, and thus political options are limited. Finally, Realism is only concerned with what *is* and not with what *ought* to be[102].

Idealism:

Principles of behaviour precede actions. Based on a negative perception of human nature, the i. ists still present an optimistic future for international relations. Peace must and will be achieved, with or without the aid of humanity. Human beings are compelled by Nature to achieve a state of perpetual peace. Nature provides humanity with the ability to reason, which is the driving force toward the goal of peace. The process is teleological and historical. This peace entails far more than just the absence of war, but requires a covenant among peoples to agree to peaceful relations. The principles which precede the development of such a peace are ideological in nature; either with regard to the characteristics of states involved, or to the international players (classes instead of state entities). An

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[102]Although one might argue that Realism does dictate what *ought* to be, since morality can be seen to devolve from state interest, the *ought* is only compatible with what is, and that a state must or *ought* to act in accordance with what already *is*, in that what the state *ought* to do is essentially what it would naturally do based on its own interest.

element of cosmopolitanism can also be detected in the literature of the Idealists. A uniform quality, whereby all states, classes, and/or recognized international players must develop similar value systems and interests, and advocate the same ideology is discernible. The uniformity is attractive and compels others to adopt similar qualities. This potentially leads to such organizations as a federation, if not a complete Cosmopolis. Idealism focuses on what *ought* to be rather than solely on what *is*.

Rationalism:

This is the "middle-of-the-road" theory. Human nature is neither exceptionably good nor exceptionably bad; it is just very complex. Although the negative aspects of human nature are duly recognized, the Rationalists believe that there is always the potential for improvement. This improvement is based on the rational capacity of humanity, which allows human beings to understand the laws of nature, and which, in turn, dictates the laws of morality. The high expectations of a federation are not present in this paradigm, yet there is room for positive international intercourse. Anarchy still prevails, but it is not threatening. What exists is a *society of states*, which respects international law, and is based on a combination of natural and positive law. The state still remains the primary actor in international affairs and its survival remains the top priority. Still, peaceful relations are possible through the identification of common interests, which assist in the primary goal of state preservation. Rationalism does not only describe what *is*, nor only prescribe what *ought* to be, but instead tries to discover what is behind what *is*, and determine from that a theory of international relations.

It is important to keep in mind the foundations of all of the paradigms, since these basic elements provide the point of departure for comparison when examining their connections to Bentham's utilitarian theory of international politics.

Chapter Three

Jeremy Bentham's Theory of International Relations

When one thinks of, or tries to make use of, the theory of utilitarianism,[103] it is usually in reference to issues concerning governments and their own national communities. One gets the impression that the theory limits itself predominantly to relations of an intrastate level, especially when reading the works of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), such as the *Constitutional Code, A Fragment on Government*, or *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. In actuality though, the utilitarian perspective has great potential for application on an international level as well. And as far as Bentham was concerned, much was happening on the international scene that warranted a utilitarian look. Unfortunately, few scholars[104] have focused on a Benthamic theory of international politics, one reason probably being that Bentham's thought on the matter is scattered throughout the masses of his work, and takes a bit of weeding to explain the essence of the thought. Even so, another attempt will be made here, by

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[103]For the purposes of this paper, utilitarianism will refer to the theory of Jeremy Bentham. Any other versions of the thought will not be included, unless explicitly noted.

[104]This point is noted in Conway, S., "Bentham on Peace and War," Utilitas 2: 82-101. Of the few who have tackled this subject; included in the group and used as invaluable sources in this paper are Stephen Conway of the *Bentham Project* at University College London, UK; David Baumgardt, **Bentham and the Ethics of Today** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952); Georg Schwarzenberger in "Bentham's Contribution to International Law and Organization", **Jeremy Bentham and the Law**, ed. G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger, (London, 1948): 152-84; and F. H. Hinsley, **Power and the Pursuit of Peace**, (Cambridge, 1963): 81-91.

examining Bentham's theory of international politics on a broader level than what has generally been offered.

To begin the process of understanding Bentham's theory of international politics, one has to have a correct understanding of the principle of utility, or rather, the Greatest Happiness principle.[105] It is generally well understood about the principle wherein its premise states that:

> [n]ature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.[106]

It follows that:

> The *principle of utility* recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. . . . By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.[107]

For some this may be stating the obvious, but for others not. Perhaps it is this misunderstanding that has precipitated the difficulty which has arisen as to how this principle is or ought to be applied. Since the principle functions on the basis of

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[105]Bentham changed the principle's name from the principle of utility to the Greatest Happiness principle for sake of accuracy - it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number which prevails.

[106]Jeremy Bentham, **An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,** ed. by J. H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London: Methuen, 1982), 11. (Cited from here on as 'IPML').

[107]Ibid.

pain and pleasure and how the individual pursues the latter and not the former, the heart of the principle relies on self-interest.

Since this principle applies to government as well as to the individual, debate is raised as to how one would account for all the self-interest of the individuals who comprise the community which is being governed. Does one, as the legislator, sacrifice one's self-interest for the interest of the community at large when determining what constitutes the best legislation for all? Or is the legislator's self-interest also taken into account, in conjunction with the self-interests of the other individuals of the community? In other words, the debate examines the question of *aggregate* happiness (where some minority, such as the legislator, must sacrifice self-interest to the benefit of the majority), versus the greatest happiness of the greatest number which includes the minority (this would include the self-interest or happiness of the legislator, but would account for, in addition to that, the happiness of the others in the community).

The answer to this question is simple. Bentham's utilitarianism does not expect some members of a community to sacrifice their self-interest to those others of the community. This would be completely out of keeping with the whole point of the principle! As stated in the passage above, which claims that humans are bound to seek their self-interest, humanity cannot but help it to follow the principle of utility in this regard. Again, "every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it."[108] Therefore, it would be impossible, according to Bentham, to expect anyone to sacrifice their self-interest.

This is further confirmed when examining the role of the legislator, who, according to many scholars, is required to transcend her or his self-interest for the

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[108]Ibid.

happiness of the community. Bentham requires sacrifice only in such a way that it would meet the greater demands of the individuals who must perform it: "Society is held together only by the sacrifices that men can be induced to make of the gratifications they demand."[109] According to Allison Dube, *A Table of the Springs of Action* further explain Bentham's position:

> But explanations in the *Table* illuminate what Bentham means by "sacrifice". "'Sacrifice, as I do, interest to duty' says the hypocrite. 'Duty can not be made to coincide with interest.'" "Per utilitarianism" however, "Cause duty and interest to coincide. If you trust a man's acting against his interests you will be deceived." Sacrifices of interest to duty are not consistently possible in Bentham's universe. Those he calls for must be, then, the sacrifice of one part of self-interest to another potentially greater part.[110]

Thus it is not a sacrifice of self-interest that the legislator makes, if she or he makes any sacrifice at all, it is only a sacrifice of a relatively immediate interest to something that has potentially far greater worth to her or his self-interest in the long run. Bentham would be more inclined to refer to this as *expanding interest* (obtained through the process of velleity) which takes into consideration more factors.[111] Besides, as far as Bentham was concerned, the legislator could in no way be considered exceptional as a human being, and could therefore not create ideal and immutable laws. As well, "the legislator's unique and powerful situation requires that he devote more time to the 'considerations by which it is expedient [he] should suffer himself to be governed, rather than to any laws which it is expedient he should make for the government of those committed to his care."[112]

What is the point of addressing this issue, if we are only concerned about international politics, and not politics at the national level? Because the same

[109]W. Stark, (ed). **Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings**, Vol. 3, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd) 431. (cited from here on as 'Stark')

[110]A. Dube, **The Theme of Aquisitiveness in Bentham's Political Thought** (London: Garland, 1991), 109.

[111]Ibid., p. 107.

[112]Dube, A, "The Tree of Utility in India: *Panace* or Weed?" (Unpublished paper, University of Calgary, 1991), 11.

principle, the principle of utility, is applied to states. There is a big difference between expecting some states to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the majority, and expecting that all states have interests which would and should be expressed equally. Any sacrifices made by some or all states should not be against their self or national interest but in conjunction with that interest. Of course, it is now important to define what is meant by national interest, because this is what is at stake at the international level, as opposed to self-interest on the individual level. It shouldn't be an overwhelming shock that the two do not differ in the least, except with regard to quantity. A nation constitutes a community, and the community is composed of individuals. As Bentham states:

> 4. The interest of the community [alternatively the nation] is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community is, what?--the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.
> 5. It is vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.[113]

A nation's true interest, therefore, consists of the sum of interests of the individuals who make up that community in the first place.[114] There would be no such thing as a national interest, or for that matter a nation, were it not for those very individuals who compose it. It should also be noted, that frequently the national

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[113]IPML, p. 12.

[114]The citizens of a nation have for their primary concern their safety and security. It is Bentham's wish that the legislator guarantee securities above all else. This can be considered a Realist perspective; Kenneth Waltz concurs on this very point: "Similarly, to say that a country acts according to its national interest means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them. That is simple; it is also important. . . The appropriate state action is calculated according to the situation in which the state finds itself. . . . To choose effectively requires considering the ends of the state in relation to its situation." (K. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, New York: Random House, 1979, p. 134. This position is in no way different to what Bentham advocates; the interest of the nation comes first, and security is of top priority.

interests expressed by various governments are in reality not the national interest, but a sinister interest generated by the ruling few.[115]

Knowing the position from where Bentham starts his analysis, it is possible to detail the important elements of Bentham's theory of international politics. Upon reading even a few of the articles in which Bentham mentions international relations, his emphasis on *international law* and its role becomes all-pervasive. To begin with, the appropriate terminology was important to Bentham and he introduced the term 'international law' into mainstream discussion, to replace the former and inaccurate term of 'Law of Nations' (which presented the *image* of the laws *within* rather than *between* nations).[116] As far as Bentham was concerned, national law held private persons within its jurisdiction, and any sovereign would be bound by the national laws of any state, if that sovereign was dealing with the private persons of said state. Only through mutual transactions between sovereigns does international law apply. The sovereigns constitute the international persons, acting on behalf of the state, which are bound by law, therefore they are the actors at the state level since the sovereign indicates the highest organ or group.

One important aspect of international law, and its ability to function, is the place of treaties. According to Georg Schwarzenberger, treaties play a major and beneficial role in Bentham's international law. This strikes one as an odd conclusion, since in *Colonies and Navy,*[117] *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual*

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[115]A 'sinister interest' is defined as: "*Sinister*, any interest, in so far as the tendency of it is to operate in a sinister *direction*— in a course opposite to any prescribed by utility, whatsoever be the species of interest, pleasure, pain, etc. . . . Sinister *direction*. . . . Any the effect or tendency of which is to serve a less at the expense of a *more* extensive interest;" (Dube, A., **Theme of Aquisitiveness**, p. 105). This is noted because Bentham recognized that governments will express interests that only reflect what he called the sinister interests of particular groups, predominantly those who wield their advantages already, and expect the government to continue to show favouritism to that interest's cause. One must be able to determine what constitutes the actual national interest of a nation, and what is mere folly.

[116]Green, L., **Is There a Universal International Law Today?** (Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1985), p. 3. (Bentham's decision to use this term is found in *An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chp. 17, s. 25, note x)

[117]Stark, i, 211-218.

Peace,[118] and even the very source from which Schwarzenberger claims to derive this conclusion,[119] Bentham does not advocate the use of treaties. At best he recognizes a secondary role for these agreements. He wishes to emphasize that international law ought to focus its attention to the purposes *behind* the treaties, rather than on the treaties themselves. In his letter to Jabez Henry, Bentham does not give "pride of place to treaties."[120] Instead, he differentiates between what currently passes for international law, and what it *ought* to include. Bentham states:

> *International law as it ought to be,--leading principle, the greatest happiness principle.* . . . Of international law *as it is,* the principal part of the matter is composed of treaties between State and State; of *what it is supposed to be,* the matter is composed of deductions from these *"written instruments",* and from the operation of the several States in relation to one another.[121] (italics added).

This can be confirmed by examining his earlier writings, in which he thought that it was not in the interest of nations[122] to enter into any treaties of: 1) alliance, offensive or defensive; and 2) advantage in trade to the exclusion of any other nation.[123] The only instance where treaties might be useful would be in the *preservation of peace,* but this again is qualified by the statement that the purposes behind the treaties are more important, and should receive more attention, than the treaties themselves.[124]

[118]The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, vol. 2, **Principles of International Law** (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1962), 535-71. (Cited as 'Bowring' from here on)

[119]Ibid., vol. 11, 34.

[120]Schwarzenberger, G., "Bentham's Contribution to International Law", chap. 8 in G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger (eds), **Jeremy Bentham and the Law** (London: 1948), p. 155.

[121]Bowring, vol. 11, 34.

[122]In these cases of Bentham's writings (*Colonies and Navy,* and *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*)he was referring to Great Britain and France specifically, but it is not all that drastic a leap to apply this frame of thought to nations as a whole, since Bentham writes about what would be most beneficial to a national interest in general.

[123]Bowring, vol. 2, 546.

[124]Ibid., 550.

Treaties were not the only things to lead a questionable existence in international law. The ever popular 'Law of Nature' was another bone of contention, and in this instance Bentham would not even give it an ounce of credit. Bentham was not convinced by the natural law argument which was advocated by Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel. He criticized the tendency of "the pretended law of nature"[125] to lack distinction between the 'is' and the 'ought' of international law, blurring any proposals from reality, therefore falling prey to methodological errors. The difficulty was that "[t]he ambiguous connotations of the phrase *'natural law'* suggest that something contrary to nature cannot physically take place. But that will hardly do in a political context where, as Bentham noted, the main *complaint* is that the 'impossible' [. . .] *has* been and *is* being done, and that violations of natural law *are* being committed."[126] And further: "Committing oneself to general principles as fundamental laws in *advance* of a detailed investigation is so contrary to reason, Bentham suggests, as to betray much darker motives than any genuine concern for human welfare."[127]

Étienne Dumont, a Genevan jurist and colleague of Bentham, studied Bentham's theory of international relations and the principle of utility, developing a comprehensive outline of what the theory entails, and further elaboration upon Bentham's view of natural law. "Les Droits entre les citoyens d'un même Stat, sont le produit des loix es seulement des loix. . . . Soins de droits san les loix, poins de droit contraires aux loix, poins de droits avant les loix. Sans toute avant l'existance de loix, il y avait des raisons [préférable] pour souhaiter qu'il y eux des loix: mais une raison pour souhaiter une loi n'est pas une loi. Un besoin et le

[125]Jeremy Bentham, **A Fragment on Government**, ed. by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 94.

[126]Waldron, **Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man.**, p.38.

[127]Ibid., p. 43.

moyen de pouvoir à ce besoin sont des choses très differéntes. Confondre l'un avec l'autre, c'est raisonner comme si l'on disoit, tout le monde est sujet à la faim, donc tout le monde a dequoi manger."[128] Thus, natural law does not guarantee certain rights or benefits to individuals or states, and is meaningless without the actions of an obliging party (such as a government or another state).

'Natural' or not, Bentham recognized the relative weakness of international law as compared to national law. The difference lies in the social background since under national law, persons live in a community or state of political society which makes habit of paying obedience to a person or group of persons as the governing body. On the other hand, "International society, however, is primarily a negative conception of--what Bentham would call a natural--society."[129] According to Bentham:

> When a number of persons (whom we may style *subjects*) are supposed to be in the *habit* of paying *obedience* to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a known and certain description (whom we may call *governor* or *governors*) such persons altogether (*subjects* and *governors*) are said to be in a state of *political* SOCIETY.
> 11. The idea of a state of *natural* SOCIETY is, as we have said, a *negative* one. When a number of persons are supposed to be in the habit of *conversing* with each other, at the same time that they are not in any such habit as mentioned above, they are said to be in a state of *natural* SOCIETY.[130]

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[128]Étienne Dumont, Matériaux pour un traité de droit international, MS Dumont 60, Catalogue des Manuscrits, Bibliothèque de Genève, Genève. This quote has been taken from the original manuscripts written by Étienne Dumont, written in approximately January 1820. Because of the age of the document, the limited time available, and the lack of previous translations of this work, a few of the words are possibly incorrect. However, all possible attempts were made to ensure as accurate a reading as possible, and the statement is still in keeping with the overall argument. Many thanks to the Edmonton Consular Ball Scholarship for the opportunity to view and use the material researched in Geneva, Switzerland.

[129]Schwarzenberger, p. 158. Actually, Schwarzenberger misunderstood in what way international society was negative. As can be seen from the following excerpt, international society is considered negative and is *therefore* a natural society. It is not a *negative conception* of natural society.

[130]A **Fragment on Government**, p. 95.

Some may assume that Bentham describes the Hobbesian state of nature, since there does not exist a *habit of obedience* at the natural society (and therefore international) level. But this is not necessarily so, since "the term *conversing* is significant, in the first place *because* it is very general [. . .] and because, opposite to what Hume suggests, the term implies *not* a Hobbesian state of nature, but a climate wherein language is used as a tool for social purposes, including the reconciliation of differences. *Conversancy*, it will be suggested, is an important standard in Bentham's writings; and his use of the term to describe natural society would indicate that individuals therein have adopted this standard without the aid of a legislator."[131] Bentham does not view these two levels of relations as incompatible; they exist at the same time and can do so without conflict.

One large difference between the political and natural society is that the community in the political society can benefit from *complete* law, wherein the law is coercive. Still, even though this generally applies to all members of the community, difficulties arise when dealing with the sovereign power since the laws become precautionary and indirect and are therefore incomplete laws. Sovereignty itself is an interesting concept, and can obviously be defined in a number of ways. For Bentham, "[t]he sovereignty is in *the people*. It is reserved by and to them. It is exercised, by the exercise of the constitutive authority."[132] Bentham does not disguise his desire for state power to be expressed through the citizens of the state, in whom the true national interest is expressed. Since the state only consists of the sum of the individuals which compose it, the state interest is the sum of the interests of those individuals. In this way Bentham felt the true national interest would be expressed.

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[131]Dube, **Theme of Acquisitiveness**, p. 109.

[132]Rosen, F., (ed) **The Constitutional Code**, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 25.

Therefore international law is in a more precarious position within the natural society since the law is incomplete, as described above; this accounts for the difference in binding force between treaties and contracts.[133] The binding essence of the law changes. This becomes even more tenuous with customary international law. According to Bentham, the happiness of human beings would be complete if both forms of international law could be raised to complete and organized law.[134]

But even in its incomplete form international law can be effective in that a state will abide by the laws *if it is in that state's interest to do so*. And this would be found in t'.e *common utility* of all nations, which would be "the direction towards which the conduct of all nations would tend—in which their common efforts would find least resistance—in which they would operate with the greatest force—and in which the equilibrium once established, would be maintained with the least difficulty."[135] This is in the interest of all nations, since equity is synonymous with common utility.[136] The point is to make international and national law interactive; international law can be upheld by being sanctioned by the national laws which are in the interest of the states. This is the utility of international law, wherein a reciprocal character is found between international and national law. International law draws from national law, becoming the interest of the states, and transforming commitments made in international law to national law and obliging nations to obey.[137] The Law of Reciprocity has inherent within it the element of sanctions, which aid in the enforcement of international law. The

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[133]Bowring, vol. 3, p. 162.
[134]Schwarzenberger, p. 158 from Bowring, vol. 3, p. 162.
[135]Bowring, vol. 2, p. 537.
[136]Ibid.
[137]Schwarzenberger, p. 159.

problem of sanctions in international law is reduced because the sanctions exist at the national level as well.[138]

An important and unavoidable part of international relations is the aspect of war. Bentham's views on war are much better detailed in Stephen Conway's article, "Bentham on Peace and War", but a few of the key points should be presented here. To begin with, Bentham was not a pacifist as some may have assumed him to be due to his diatribes advocating disarmament and the cessation of war. He did agree with the principle of disarmament as noted in his discussion of the same topic in *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*,[139] but he saw war as a fact of real life, which would be entered into on conditions of self-defense: "in spite of his highly idealistic love for peace, Bentham wishes to be a realist; and therefore he does not deny the possibility of a moral justification of war in certain, very exceptional cases.[140] Since Bentham does not believe that war would just disappear, especially soon, he developed 'laws for war' for the interim period, while also planning for the elimination of war; the idea being to smooth the process as best as possible. The object of war is to overcome the resistance of the enemy state, but without interfering with the non-combatants. One must protect civilians by granting more powers to the authorities but at the same time make the authorities solely responsible for anything excessive that may occur. War is an exclusive relation between states, but the state of war does affect the status of enemy subjects; foreign friends become foreign enemies. Bentham suggests 'war residents' to ensure that proper behaviour is maintained and to prevent violations of war, as well as provide for the prisoners of war.

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[138]Ibid.

[139]Bowring, vol. 2., p. 550. Bentham also seemed to have a yen for the military, as shown by Stephen Conway in his article.

[140]David Baumgardt, **Bentham and the Ethics of Today** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 161.

This was realized somewhat through First World War ad hoc arrangements between belligerents, and through the "right of inspection' in the Geneva Convention regarding Prisoners of War (1929).[141] Atrocities promote aggression and postpone peace, therefore one should do all that is possible to avoid atrocities. To do so, neutrals should be kept out of the enemy camp (which is in the interests of the belligerents), and treat them in such a way to contribute to this end. Lastly, Bentham recommended that a reward for capture ought to deliver twice the gain as that for the destruction of anything considered to be a prize.

Although Bentham's views on war are, so far, quite humanitarian in nature, "his criticisms [. . .] were also economic and constitutional."[142] He argued against the idea that war brought economic benefits, due to the expanded tax revenue which only benefited the 'Corrupter General and Co.', and that increasing wealth did not increase faster or better due to hostilities:

> Such is the general confusion of ideas--such the power of the imagination--such the force of prejudice--that I verily believe the persuasion is not an uncommon one;--so clear in their notions are many worthy gentlemen, that they look upon war, if successful, as a cause of opulence and prosperity. With equal justice might they look upon the loss of a leg as a cause of swiftness.[143]

The deterrent to war, therefore, is to keep the claims of the belligerents in front of them as the object of their struggle.

The crux of the argument then, is that the authorities are ultimately responsible for any and all atrocities occurring. Individuals of the state are primarily innocent and are pawns used by the state. This position attempts to emphasize the need for individual guilt as a prerequisite for criminal responsibility, and prevents the currently obscure and ill-defined criminal responsibility in

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[141]Schwarzenberger, p. 162.
[142]Stephen Conway, "Bentham on Peace and War", Utilitas, vol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 89.
[143]Bowring, vol. 2, p. 559.

international law. Bentham is no friend of collective criminal responsibility of nations (as distinct from leaders), and tries to pin-point responsibility and make it less vague.

The guiding principle applied to the codification and inauguration of international law is, of course, the principle of utility. This requires that one has the 'greatest and common utility of all states taken together';[144] it is the common and equal utility of all states. One can recognize the difficulties that could arise wherein states could agree on the essence of law, but the application would differ, or where certain states would be inclined to decide upon short-range interests as a priority over long-range interests such as the common good. Bentham himself recognized these problems in *An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation*:

> Now of the infinite variety of nations there are upon the earth, there are no two which agree exactly in their laws: certainly not in the whole; perhaps not even in any single article; and let them agree today, they would disagree to-morrow. This is evident enough with regard to the *substance* of laws: and it would be still more extraordinary if they agreed in point of *form*; that is, if they were conceived in precisely the same strings of wards. What is more, as the languages of nations are commonly different, as well as their laws, it is seldom that, strictly speaking, they have so much as a single *word* in common. However, among the words that are appropriated to the subject of law, there are some that in all languages are pretty exactly correspondent to one another: which come to the same thing nearly as if they were the same. Of this stamp, for example, are those which correspond to the words *power, right, obligation, liberty,* and many others.
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> . . . .
> It is in the censorial line that there is the greatest room for disquisitions that apply to the circumstances of all nations alike: and in this line what regards the substance of the laws in question is as susceptible of an universal application, as what regards the words. That the laws of all nations, or even of any two nations, should coincide in all points, would be as ineligible as it is impossible: some leading points however, there seem to be, in respect of which the laws of all civilized nations might, without inconvenience, be the same.[145]

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[144]Ibid, p. 537.
[145]IPML, p. 295.

Bentham would argue that was the whole point of international law; to make understood what was in all states 'enlightened' interests, and which would hopefully minimize conflict on these levels. At any rate, the principle of utility is a good tool to gauge international action since it directs the legislator to the consequences of proposed change.

The key to utility is reciprocity in interstate relations. This means that one state must do the greatest good to others, or rather, not injure them as long as it is conducive to the state's own well being.[146] Thus peace is transformed from a negative condition of absence of war to the positive condition of good will. This positive condition would be based on the equality of all members and a principle of toleration of one anothers forms of government, religions, customs, and opinions. One might raise the argument that toleration can exist for only so long, especially in instances such as the regime of Saddam Hussein, or the Iranian regime under the Ayatollah Khomeini, but Bentham does not deny the fact that such regimes exist. Instead, he recognizes that leadership frequently does not act in the community interest, but pursues instead a sinister interest that should be eliminated: "[b]ut however dishonest the intention of their chiefs may be, the subjects are always honest."[147] The point is that the community itself, composed of all the

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[146]Ibid. This relates back to the discussion presented earlier, wherein the legislator of each state expands the national interest to be a complement to, rather than conflicting against, international law. This need for understanding of other states, and the behaviour of one state to another is explained in Chapter 7 of the Constitutional Code (Rosen, ed., 1983), whereby the legislator of one state must observe the same strict justice and impartiality as he or she would in the home state; must not add to the opulence or power at home at the expense of others; that war is to be made only for self-defense, preventative measures (if no other recourse is available), and/or compensation for pecuniary damage (although compensation must be sought first through other means such as arbitration); must not seek recognition of superiority to other states (factitious honour); work towards 'positive good offices' with foreign states, but not at the expense of the home or other states; and never use force, intimidation, prohibition or obstruction to prevent citizens from improving their lot -- "asylum to all: a prison to none." (Rosen, F., **Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code**, Oxford: Clarendon press, 1983, p. 207). Why would Bentham advise this as appropriate behaviour to all states? Because it is likely to be in their interest to do so, since the reciprocal treatment would be appreciated from foreign states to one's home state, instead of any aggressive tendencies.
[147]Ibid. p. 539.

individuals, should be tolerated, and if they advocate the type of government that exists for their state, it too should be tolerated.[148]

Finally, how about the role of an international organization, if any? What would be the point of an international organization? To assist in the prevention of war. This organization is not meant to do anything else except be a forum for nations to come to when disagreements need to be reconciled or solved.[149] This is *not* be a proposal for world government or federation.[150] Again, self-interest is be the driving force behind the initiation of such an organization. As stated by Schwarzenberger, "self-interest, and not justice, is the guiding principle of 'national morality.'"[151] This is for the most part true. Although Bentham actually does not deny justice[152] its place in international affairs, he does recognize that its role tends

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[148]Schwarzenberger, p. 162.

[149]Bowring, vol. 2, p. 554. "Such a Congress or Diet [referring to the court of judicature] might be constituted by each power sending two deputies to the place of meeting: one of these to be the principal, the other to act as an occasional substitute.
  The proceedings of such Congress or Diet should be all public.
  Its power would consist, --1. In reporting its opinion;
  2. In causing that opinion to be circulated in the dominions of each state."

[150]This point will be made more clear in the following paragraphs, but the idea that Bentham would advocate the creation of a world government would not be in keeping with his overall train of thought, in that government itself should be limited to allow for maximum liberty of individuals: "Whatever is *sponte actum* on the part of the individuals, fall thereby into the class of *non-agenda* on the part of the government. Coercion, the inseparable accompaniment, precedent, concomitant, or subsequent, of every act of government, is itself an evil: to be any thing better than a pure evil, it requires to be followed by some more than equivalent good. Spontaneous action excludes it: action, on the part of government, and by impulse from the government, supposes it." (Stark, iii. 341). This is in direct contrast to the views of John Stuart Mill, in that for Mill, "one criterion of the goodness of government is the extent to which it fosters in the people certain qualities opens the doors to a kind of paternalism which in the *Code* Bentham avoids." (Rosen, F., **Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code** p. 187). As stated further by Allison Dube, " the greatest happiness is less the goal of government action, than the ultimate *justification* for it. . . . Bentham clearly leaves the maximization of wealth to the individual; and, that most of his practical proposals seek to *minimize* governmental (and other) interference with this process. . . . Bentham thought the hand of government tended to restrict individual liberty to form and pursue expectations. It is worth noting that while government action generally restricts human *motion*, the two areas Bentham regards as suitable for government involvement eliminate impediments to it" (Dube, A., **The Theme of Acquisitiveness in Bentham's Political Thought**, p. 226-7, 252). Logically, if Bentham felt this way about government in general, it would be a good guess that a world government would not be on the top of his agenda.

[151]Schwarzenberger, p. 173.

[152]Justice is, of course, the ideal solution, and Bentham would not ignore it as an important aspect of international affairs. When he speaks of respect in the international realm, his hope is

to be minor, and that one must look to other methods to design an effective mea~ of preventing war under current circumstances.

When proposing the optimum direction for his own state (England) to take vis à vis colonies and disputes regarding other states, Bentham explicitly declares that individuals have yet to make justice their priority, at least at the international level. As he notes, "[t]he moral feelings of men in matters of national morality are still so far short of perfection, that in the scale of estimation, justice has not yet gained the ascendancy over force. . . . men have not yet learned to tune their feelings in unison with the voice of morality in these points. They felt more pride in being accounted strong, than resentment at being called unjust: . . . if *I*, listed as I am as the professed and hitherto the only advocate in my own country in the cause of justice, set a less value on justice than is its due, what can I expect from the general run of men?"[153] As a result, Bentham suggested a 'court of judicature', which would be:

> . . . for the decision of differences between several nations, although such a court were not to be armed with any coercive powers. . . . [Since] no nation ought to yield any evident point of justice to another. . . [, and] no nation is to give up anything of what it looks upon as its rights--no nation is to make any concessions. Wherever there is any difference of opinion between the negotiators of two nations, war is to be the consequence.
> While there is no common tribunal, something might be said for this. . . .
> Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from difference of opinion. . . .
> . . . 1. It is the interest of the parties concerned.
> 2. They are already sensible of that interest.
> 3. The situation it would place them in is no new one, nor any other than the original situation they set out from. . . .
> . . . it is from ignorance and weakness that men deviate from the path of rectitude, more frequently than from selfishness and malevolence. This is fortunate;--for the power of information and

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for change, but he realizes the current predicament: "Respect is a term I shall beg leave to change; respect is a mix·u.·r of fear and esteem, but for constituting esteem, force is not the instrument, but justice." (Bo..ring, vol. 2, p. 559). What occurs in realty can not be denied to exist, but justice will not and cannot be forgotten.

[153]Bowring, Vol. 2, p. 552.

reason, over error and ignorance is much greater and much surer than that of exhortation, and all the modes of rhetoric, over selfishness and malevolence.

It is because we do not know what strong motives other nations have to be just, what strong indications they have given of the disposition to be so, how often we ourselves have deviated from the rules of justice,--that we take for granted, as an indisputable truth, that the principles of injustice are in a manner interwoven into the very essence of the hearts of other men.[154]

It was not in opposition to reality that Bentham wished to work, but in conjunction with it, using what he felt to be the essence of how humanity functioned, and show how this trait, which was of course self-interest, could work in our favour as cooperation instead as something breeding only conflict. He was not unaware of the usual international practices, which is obvious in virtually all of his writings on international law and relations.[155]

Perhaps even now one might see fault or have argument with some of the elements important to Bentham's theory of international politics. That would not be surprising, and the purpose of this paper was not to gain converts; instead, the objective is met if the reader is able to *recognize* that this perspective presents a *viable*, if not faultless, alternate theory. Schwarzenberger chose Hans J. Morganthau as an exemplary critic of the utilitarian perspective, and, since he is also an international theorist, his general view will also be presented here.

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[154]Ibid. Note that this suggests anything but a world government-type organization. Bentham saw the use of coercion as a privilege of the national and municipal governments, in that force could be used to ensure a habit of obedience - in other words, the citizens of a nation would be inclined to obey if for no other reason than for self-preservation due to the restrictions a government could impose on one as a requirement to belong to that society. This type of coercion does not, and without a higher authority like a world sovereign cannot, exist on the international level.

[155]Bentham frequently notes what was (and still is) the current international practices of aggression and misunderstanding, power politics, and the regular use of force: "Actions are the test of words. . . . justice and humanity have no place in cabinets. It is for weak states to suffer injuries: it is for strong ones to inflict them. *Do as you would be done by,* a rule of gold for individuals, is a rule of glass for nations. The duty of a king to his subjects and to the world, is to compass war, by any means, and at any price; and the less the profit or pretense, the greater is the glory. To do mischief is *honour:* to do it slily, darkly, and securely, is *policy.* The number of troops a nation is able to bring into the field, gives the measure of its power: the number of unprovoked and unrequited injuries it has been able to inflict, gives the measure of its virtue. The true contest among kings is, who with the least smart to himself shall give the hardest blow." (Schwarzenberger, p. 173 - taken from Bowring, Vol. 10 *Letters of Anti-Machiavel,* p. 205-6.)

Morganthau viewed utilitarianism's scientific method as destructive since, according to him, it distorts the moral side of men.[156] Utilitarianism reduces moral problems and conflict to trivial levels, when there is at best a rational doubt as to the best action. It is dangerous that ethics, through rational calculation, become indistinguishable from science (although this is not what true utilitarianism does). Moral philosophy becomes replaced by propaganda, whereby utilitarianism melds traditional ethics with practical (educated) ethics. This takes away from the traditions of the Christian-Judeo (religious) standard which only receives lip-service now.

The question is: should these *religious* traditions play a large role in our defining ethics instead of basing ethics on human nature itself which is more universal? According to Morganthau ethical conflicts are better solved by non-utilitarian strategies: "under extreme conditions even modern man acts in accordance with traditional ethics and against his own 'better knowledge.'"[157] But does Morganthau examine just why that might be the case? This could be due to a ritualistic habit, or due to fear of acting in accordance with her or his own interest since that philosophy is not predominantly advocated by traditional ethics. Should this sort of behaviour be lauded or praised because an individual is suppressing her or his own interests to those of the ruling few (either in government or in religion)? To relate this back to international cases, the same thing applies - why should states compel themselves to behave in a particular moral fashion when in actuality it would be much easier, and make much more sense, to base actions on the 'morals' of human nature?

Morganthau believes that personal ethics and utilitarian ethics are incompatible; that this would require a person to choose between two extremes.

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[156]Morganthau, H.J., **Scientific Man versus Power Politics**, p. 168.
[157]Ibid.

This too is an odd argument since utilitarian 'ethics' would naturally advocate the use of personal ethics, if one were to understand personal ethics as those derived from one's own perspective or interest. Therefore they are entirely compatible.

Morganthau's critique operates on a basic level of ethics, which for many constitute an important element in political theory. But it is just that 'ethic' that Morganthau wishes to preserve, that Bentham has the difficulty with: "If 'the import of all words, especially of all words belonging to the field of Ethics, including the field of politics,. . . should one day become fixed . . . what a source of perplexity, of error, of discord and even of bloodshed would be dried up!"[158] So frequently our traditional ethics have caused us more trouble than they are definitely worth; the problem is that most of the time individuals do not understand that their clashes are instigated by standards which expect human beings to behave in ways that cause pain and suffering.[159] Bentham prefers the practical, and definitely easier route of deriving standards and 'ethics' from the basic elements inherent in human nature.

The point of presenting Morganthau's critical view is to show that frequently the complaints made against utilitarian thought (in this case with regard to international politics) are either unsubstantiated due to, or mislead by, inaccurate interpretations of the theory. Of course, Morganthau's critiques, as well as that of other scholars, could be based on interpretations of the other, various sects of utilitarianism; but even so, the critique reflects on the Benthamite position and should therefore be clarified. This brings us back to the point made at the beginning of this paper, and again states why this rather detailed account of Bentham's theory was needed. One needs to know the accurate position of the

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[158]Baumgardt, p. 475.

[159]Examples of these requirements would be celibacy for religious orders, or sacrificing a person's wellbeing for the good of an intangible being or ethic.

theory to be able to adequately critique or better yet, to implement some or all of the elements into international politics.

Chapter Four

Bentham's Utilitarian Bridge to the Realist, Idealist, and Rationalist Paradigms

Thus far one can already discern some of the arguments to be made in this chapter; there are some obvious points that can be presented to show how Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of international relations can relate, on a variety of levels, to all three paradigms. As stated before, the realization that this thesis could be developed stems from the fact scholars do not place Bentham in any one particular tradition. Instead he can be found quite comfortably in both the Idealist and Rationalist paradigms, and the theory of utilitarianism[160] has been seen occasionally to take up residence with the Realists.

This chapter will begin with a few examples which demonstrate the difficulty, or confusion, that is evident when designating Bentham within a particular paradigm. Following this, it will be illustrated how Bentham's theory of international relations is capable of bridging the three paradigms discussed in this thesis; those of Realism, Idealism, and Rationalism. A few issues relevant to international relations theory have been chosen for comparison: human nature, state interest, international law, and public opinion and education.

Since much has been made of the element of human nature and the important role it plays in determining paradigmatic characteristics, it is only

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[160]As far as this paper is concerned, the theory of utilitarianism is that with which Bentham is undeniably associated.

appropriate to address this issue first. In doing so, it is possible to determine Bentham's approach to international relations, the links he already begins to make with each of the paradigms, and how he reconciles the *is* with the *ought*.

Based on human nature, another important issue of international relations is state interest. This too will be discussed in light of the Realist, Idealist, and Rationalist paradigms, whereby Bentham will be shown to use the basic precepts of the Realist tradition to arrive at conclusions concurrent with some of the elements within the Rationalist and Idealist traditions. Discussion will revolve around the importance of state interest and the moral context, if any; the recognition or lack thereof of international actors other than states; and the role of international society or federation.

The discussion then moves into the realm of international law and how it relates to the preceding issues, as well as how Bentham again bridges some of the paradigmatic gaps through his vision of international law. This, in turn, leads to the issue of public opinion and education and the commonalties and differences Bentham has with each of the paradigms based on his approaches and conclusions. Finally, in summarizing the main arguments of the four stage discussion, the conclusion will examine in what way this effort can contribute to international rel ions theory, and moreover, why Bentham constitutes a worthwhile study for students of the discipline.

As stated at the beginning of the thesis, there has been an difficulty in determining the appropriate paradigm for Jeremy Bentham's theory of international relations. In general, Bentham is most often associated with the Idealists. Examples of this can be found most frequently whenever international relations scholars mention Bentham's role in international theory. Authors such as Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, F. H. Hinsley, Arnold Wolfers, J. W.

Burton all argue[161] that Bentham is part of the Idealist tradition. In **The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs**, Wolfers and co-author L. W. Martin focus on Bentham's perceived pacifist nature and general inclination toward peace, who along with "Sully, Kant, [and] Penn, . . . had proposed schemes of international organization for peace and could thus qualify as precursors of the new prophets."[162] Hinsley too includes Bentham among those he refers to as the Internationalists; essentially those individuals who propose methods to prevent, if not eliminate, war and are relatively cosmopolitan in nature.[163] Bentham is frequently associated with those who were considered to be bound by an apparently false impression of utopianism, especially before World War I (Woodrow Wilson et. al.), in that an international organization theoretically devoid of secrecy, such as the League of Nations, would bring peace to the world.[164]

Other authors, although less in number, who tend to place Bentham in the Rationalist setting are the likes of Martin Wight, K. J. Holsti, Michael Donelan, Brian Porter, and to some extent Stanley Hoffmann (his position will become more detailed further ahead in the argument).[165] Bentham makes some strong

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[161]Although frequently scholars merely indicate, rather than argue, this distinction Bentham is often times mentioned so briefly that there is not much room for argument. Apart from a few scholars such as F. H. Hinsley, Bentham usually receives acknowledgment in a sentence or two, as an example of Idealist thought. To illustrate the case, all one needs to do is select a number of texts (which refer to Bentham at some point) and see how elaborately his theories are discussed.

[162]A. Wolfers and L. W. Martin, **The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs** (New York: Yale University Press, 1956), in S. Hoffmann, **Contemporary Theory in International Relations** (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 241.

[163]F. H. Hinsley, **Power and the Pursuit of Peace**, p. 81. It should be noted however, that by the time Hinsley begins his discussion of Bentham's theory of international relations, the general trend towards the development and/or implementation of a great international structure (Cosmopolis, federation, etc) becomes increasingly subdued, if not completely irradicated. Penn, Bellers and St. Pierre, as well as Kant, had more of a disposition towards these type of institutions than did Bentham. As Hinsley states: "For Bentham international integration was not so much unattainable and undesirable as utterly unnecessary . . . "

[164]E. H. Carr, **The Twenty Years Crisis**, p. 22-40.

[165]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 217, 270; Holsti, **Dividing Discipline**, p. 27; Donelan, X; Brian Porter, "Patterns of Thought and Practice: Matin Wight's 'International Theory'" in M. Donelan (ed), **The Reason of States** (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 66; S. Hoffmann, **Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics** (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981). See pp. 13, 41, etc.

connections with the paradigm in question in terms of international law and perception of human nature.

Finally, one will occasionally notice the theory of utilitarianism associated with the Realist paradigm. The peculiar position of Stanley Hoffmann comes to mind in this instance; he refers to utilitarianism[166] predominantly in a Rationalist light, yet he also presents an uncomfortable resignation concerning the theory, in that it is cold and calculated, and unfortunately more a method of justification rather than a guide to actual moral development:

> Utilitarianism is better at giving one a good conscience than at providing a compass. . . . The morality of international relations will simply have to be a mix of commands and of utilitarian calculations. The commands cannot be followed at any cost:; "Thou shalt not kill" or "Thou shalt not lie" can never be pushed so far that the cost clearly becomes a massive disutility to the national interest . . .[167]

Hoffmann is not the only one to arrive at this conclusion. Meinecke contrasts utilitarian approaches with the Idealist: "If he [the statesman] acts out of consideration for the well-being of the State--that is to say, from *raison d'état*--then there at once arise the very obscure question of how far he is guided in doing so by a utilitarian and how far by an idealistic point of view."[168] Even more to the point, ". . . the advantage of the State is always at the same time blended too with the advantage of the rulers. So *raison d'état* is continually in danger of becoming a merely utilitarian instrument without ethical application, in danger of sinking back again from wisdom to mere cunning, and of restraining the superficial passions merely in order to satisfy passions and egoisms which lie deeper and are more completely hidden."[169] Utilitarianism appears as the "dispassionate" approach,

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[166]Hoffmann, **Duties Beyond Borders**, pp. 13, 41.

[167]Ibid., p. 43.

[168]Meinecke, **Machiavellism**, p. 3.

[169]Ibid., p. 7.

which determines the "usefulness and effectiveness" of action.[170] The moral element is not at issue in this interpretation of the thought.

Of course it is not Bentham who is mentioned in these passages discussing Realism, but the connection is unavoidable. Although others have provided variations of the theory of utilitarianism to political theory, if not international theory, the fact remains that Jeremy Bentham is the "founder of the utilitarian school."[171] The basic premises of utilitarianism were developed by Bentham. Therefore it is this connection that Bentham also has with the Realist paradigm. Morality devolves from state interest, and actions are carried out only if they are in the interest of the state.

The first issue to be addressed for comparison is human nature. Many of the differences between these particular doctrines, Idealism, Realism, and Rationalism, revolve around their views of human nature, and whether it is inherently good, bad, or both. As stated at the very beginning of this paper, human nature, and the perceptions thereof, play a great part in the theory of international relations. Based on each perception associated with the three paradigms discussed, certain conclusions have been derived and maintained. Both the Idealists and Realists[172] begin with a similar view of human nature in that, for the most part, it is negative and harsh. Each, of course, arrives at a very different conclusion than the other about the potential of humanity, but they begin with the same premise nonetheless. The Realists, as per our definition, believe in a predominantly

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[170]Ibid., p. 4.

[171]Morgenthau, p. 598.

[172]The definition of Realism chosen for this thesis might be considered narrow, as compared with other versions of the tradition. The fact that this is the case is certainly acknowledged, but a more restrictive interpretation is not without its benefits. Since Bentham is least of all associated with the Realist tradition, other than through the theory of utilitarianism on occasion, a comparison of Bentham with a narrower view of Realism could prove more effective than with one that is of a broader scope. For if Bentham can be found within a tradition provided with restrictive parameters, the case is furthered strengthened.

unchanging element within humanity. Although persons are capable of behaving in a civil manner towards each other during times of stability, this can easily break down once conditions have become unstable.

The Realist perspective is frequently an attractive choice, as it essentially recognizes the strongly competitive elements within the international realm, but based on such competition, it sees no hope for improvement. This does not mean that Realists perceive human beings to be inherently irrational, although it is recognized that humanity is very capable of exhibiting such a side. If one examines this apparently negative, unchanging trend, a strong image develops. What is this unchanging nature based upon? People behave aggressively or not, depending on the needs of their self-interest. The underlying factor is that individuals will behave in such a manner as will serve their self-interest, which is prone to cause negative results when interests clash. Any rational action, based on this perception, can be considered those which are in concert with self-interest. It would be unreasonable or irrational to do anything else.

The Idealists, although beginning with the same, relatively negative perspective as the Realists, arrive at considerably different conclusions. Although human nature is predominantly negative, it is driven to improve. Actually the Idealist's perception of human nature does not, and cannot, require an extensive discussion. Apart from the fact that human beings are inherently evil (for lack of a better term), human nature does very little to affect human behaviour. This is because an outside source, such as Nature, is responsible for the actions of humanity via the gift of reason, compelling humans to behave in such a manner that is destined to improve. In this sense humanity has a very optimistic future. It is no wonder that the concept of self-interest is not considered to be an important factor in this tradition, since humanity plays no role in its development. Recall that

according to the general precepts associated with Idealism,[173] we are prone to develop in a certain direction regardless of our desires or impressions of the direction. Humanity is driven to progress via an ethereal source.

Rationalism, on the other hand, is neither exceptionally optimistic nor pessimistic. Based on the root of international theory, human nature, Rationalism is seen to exist between the two other traditions. Rationalists recognize the human tendency towards the bad and the good, but they are still optimistic enough to envision some sort of potential for improvement. The impetus for this improvement stems from natural law, which individuals comprehend based on the fact that we are capable of reason. Again, it is a force outside of humanity which compels individuals to be good. This behaviour is not derived from an individual's *need* to behave in a civil manner (in that it would be in her or his interest to do so), but from the fact that an individual realizes, through reason, that a known but unseen code dictates that certain forms of behaviour are condoned, whereas other forms of behaviour are not.

Bentham's perception of human nature is somewhat in accordance with Rationalist rhetoric, in that he recognizes the complexity of humanity, and that our nature does not confine us to one position or another; human nature consists of the good and the bad. His perception does not suggest that there is some sort of inevitable progress which will be our salvation, and certainly not in the international realm, it just suggests that there is no need to necessarily jump to the conclusion that without a higher authority, there can be no semblance of a relationship. There is nothing teleological or specifically historical about progress as suggested by the Idealists. Reason or rationality does not stem from an element which is beyond our control, and supposed to exist on an apparently different level from ourselves. As

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[173]Such as that derived from Kant, and the Revolutionists such as Marx.

far as Bentham is concerned, human beings do progress, and progress reflects a certain understanding, whereby humanity begins to realize that certain actions do not seem to be very productive when attempting to preserve what is considered valuable. It is education; learning from our mistakes. And it is very slow, since Bentham recognizes that mistakes are frequently repeated. Humanity is not particularly bad, nor particularly good; humanity is capable of both, ergo sinister interest as compared to enlightened interest.

Therefore, as much as Bentham agrees with the Rationalist perspective on the complexity of human nature, he differs substantially on the impetus for humanity's good behaviour. Both the Rationalists and Idealists believe in some sort of external determinant which either forces individuals to act in an agreeable fashion, or at the very least decrees right from wrong discernible through reason. Bentham does not espouse either view. He does not advocate the belief that something other than humanity itself decides what is correct and what is not. Thus his first and strongest association with the Realists manifests itself here. Often the philosophy of utilitarianism is included within the Realist perspective, as the utilitarian focuses on self interest, and self interest is considered to be the basis for the existing competition. Thus in Bentham's case, the only driving force behind an individual's decision to behave one way as opposed to another is based on self-interest. Of course human beings are rational creatures; if they were not, actions would be based on instinct rather than a distinct self-interest. Self-interest is determined through a rational process. Bentham thinks that negative behaviour, such as harming another individual in some way, is generally due to passion rather than a concerted effort of rational thought, but both occur with some sort of rational process, be it immediate or more carefully analyzed.

This is the reason that Bentham believes that humanity is capable of improvement, in that individuals *can* think more thoroughly about their actions to

determine what would be best in their interest, as opposed to less analyzed decisions.[174] In this sense reason or rationality is capable of leading individuals towards a progressive path which has an optimistic future. Essentially Bentham already begins to span the three traditions, in that his perception of human nature is based on the Realist trait of self-interest, yet he recognizes the Rationalist complexity of this nature, both the good and the bad, seeing room for improvement which leads to an Idealist's general optimism about the future.

This brings the discussion back from Chapter Two to the *is* and the *ought*. The distinctions between Idealism, which focuses on the *ought*, and Realism, which focuses on the *is*, and Rationalism, which focuses on what lies behind the *is*, lead one to ask where Bentham would fall. He does deal with the *ought*, only in the sense that what *ought* to be done is based on the fact that it *can* be done. It is based on the *is*. This is the Rationalist approach, examining the essence of what *is*, and in this sense the Rationalists too span the paradigms, since this approach is really a mixture of those of the Idealists and Realists.

With the links between Bentham and the paradigms within the context of human nature kept in mind, the second issue to be addressed is state interest and its role as determined by Bentham and the three paradigms. Based on human nature, each paradigm has developed certain characteristics perceived to be particular to the international realm. One such characteristic is the concept of state interest, and its role in international relations. How important this concept is, depends on how each tradition treats the concept of interests in general, either as the basis for morality, or as a negative entity which one desires to transcend.

Bentham does not look for morality outside of human nature, rather, if the behaviour is what one refers to as moral, it is because it is in one's self-interest to

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[174]Albeit still rationalized decisions.

behave that way. For many theorists in the Realist tradition, self-interest breeds competition, and in many respects this is true, self interest does cause individuals to compete amongst themselves to gain the advantage. Unfortunately though, this view of self interest has only been presented in a negative light, suggesting that individuals are inherently bad, and that cooperation and care among individuals is not possible. Bentham used the notion of self interest to work for the community at large, instead of solely for the individual or group of individuals concerned. Bentham recognizes the Realist position in that he believed all individuals are motivated through self interest, but he tried to *expand* on that train of thought, by suggesting that individuals will recognize that it is also in their self interest to cooperate, above engaging in competition and conflict.

Bentham's theory of utilitarianism is based upon the observation that all individuals act in their own self-interest, maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This is not restricted to only physical sensations; it applies to *whatever gives us pleasure*. This includes emotional, religious, and political, as well as physical.[175] When referring to the state, which is the sum of the individuals within it, the interest of the state is absolute. Whatever is considered to be in a particular state's interest is the basis upon which it will act. International morality is not dictated by an external code, but rather by state interests. Does this sound familiar? *Raison d'état*? In a sense this is exactly Bentham's approach. Meinecke recognized the utilitarian connection to *raison d'état*, yet he interpreted utilitarianism as a strictly rational and expedient approach, devoid of ethical considerations.[176] This is actually a common perception of utilitarianism, especially Bentham's, in political

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[175]These are the four sanctions with which Bentham had determined pleasure and pain occur--for the best description of what these sanctions entail see **Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation**, Chapter 4. Essentially these sanctions are categories which encompass all the possible ways in which humanity feels pleasure or pain, according to Bentham.
[176]Meinecke, p. 6-7.

theory in general: "The difficulty here center[s] on a conflict between the logic of hedonism and some commonly held beliefs on matters of value. . . On moral grounds utilitarianism provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for justifying either state action or any of the institutions of government. . . . [some] criticized Bentham for ignoring moral rules, particularly rules for the distribution of happiness, and rules that protect individual rights."[177] Morality is considered to be nonexistent, and self-interest is equated with egoistic hedonism,[178] whereby ethical consideration for others does not enter into Bentham's *hedonic calculus*.

It is actually quite interesting to note that in political theory Bentham is perceived one way, essentially unethical and calculating, and in theory of international relations he is dominantly placed in an idealistic setting, which is heavily laden with values. Both cases point at the extremism inherent in the interpretation of Bentham's writings. He does not exclude moral behaviour from human action, and therefore state action, but he does not see morality emanating from anything else *but* human action. Thus morality at the international level does not exist *except* as that indicated by state action. Ergo the association with *raison d'état*.

This does not mean that states ought to behave perpetually as if in a 'state of war'. Realists acknowledge the existence of peaceful relations, but as per the definition chosen here, there is a competitive nature in a negatively anarchical

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[177]Norman Bowie and Robert Simon, **The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy** (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977) p. 33-37. Also see R. Stewart (ed), **Readings in Social and Political Philosophy** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[178]The theory that all human actions should be motivated by the desire to secure one's own pleasure, and by the desire to avoid pain to oneself, even if the pleasure or good of others has to sacrificed [Peter Angeles, **Dictionary of Philosophy** (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981) p. 114.

system, where power is frequently the mode of discourse.[179] Bentham is not strictly power based, other than power manifests itself in different ways for Bentham, not necessarily in a zero-sum approach (power to one takes power away from another), but he is willing to take the best advantages as do the Realists. According to Bentham, what is advantageous for one state might very well be advantageous for another. Or for that matter, an alternative approach may not derive the immediate advantage perceived by a state, but will, by *also* enhancing the advantage of others, be the best method in preserving the state. Bentham appeals to the Rationalists at this point, in that they recognize a greater potential for intercourse, which is more cooperative than conflictual, although it still does not exclude the Realists entirely. Cooperation is equally active in the Realist perception, yet in this case the potential for reliability is lower. Rousseau's *Stag Hunt* analogy comes to mind here, in that although states might cooperate to pursue a common goal, the chances are always present that one or more states will 'mutiny' and pursue alternate interests at the detriment of the cooperating states. Therefore what is the point of cooperating in the first place?

Bentham argues that cooperation is more likely to be in the interest of all states, and that the fear of the *Stag Hunt* should not occur, since in reality, actions which harm other states will be detrimental to the acting state in question in the future. This future detriment would be expressed by the fact that states could no longer have the *advantage* of cooperation in pursuing and securing interests. This is identical to the individual level, whereby it is really not in the interest of an individual to harm another, since harm has a greater potential to rebound back to the first person.

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[179]Power can be expressed in a variety of ways, not only in through war. It is just that the Realists articulate self-interest through power, so it is recognized as the primary means of discourse.

Like the Rationalists and the Realists, Bentham agrees that the state is the primary actor in international relations, but this is not difficult for him to do, since the state is only the sum of the individuals which compose it. Therefore state interest is just the sum of individual interests of the state. Without individuals, there would be no state interest, let alone a state. Bentham, the Rationalists, and Idealists believe the individual can be an influence, in Bentham's case for the reason outlined above, but since a world government or similar type mechanism is not recommended, the state remains the priority, parting company with the Idealists. Likewise a state's preservation is priority, since what has been achieved at the state level is not to be given up for the sake of something not yet developed, such as coercive institutions at the international level. This is different from the Idealist conception, which wishes to transcend the state and enter into agreements which apparently are above and beyond the interests of the state. What Idealism suggests is that common interests and values should and will develop between nations, so that the particular interests of states will be less important to the common values shared worldwide. These common values will exist based on the fact that the nations which are capable of developing a peaceful arrangement will adopt similar, if not identical, government systems.

The uniformity and ideological approach inherent in this requirement for a particular type of state, in Kant's case a republican state, in Marx's[180] case a state controlled by the proletariat , would not be found in Bentham's writings. As stated earlier, although Bentham believes in a particular form of government, he does not require all other states to abide by it before any action toward peace can progress. It is one thing to find common interests among states, it is something entirely different to expect all states to behave in such a carbon-copy type manner. Likewise with

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[180]Wight, **International Theory.** Wight includes Marx as part of the Idealist tradition.

regard to a federation, Kant expects that states, once converted to republican way of life, will also be drawn towards some sort of federation. Idealists in general perceive there to be the possibility that all states can progress toward some sort of moral, cultural, and perhaps even legal, whole. They envision a bond between states that transcends national boundaries. Kant displays a sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit tendency towards this global atmosphere as well. A federation suggests a value for something above and beyond the parameters of the state.

This in turn illustrates the emphasis placed on individual influence in international relations. Since Bentham believes that a state is only that which its members make of it, then the individual does have a role in influencing state behaviour. The extent of the participation of individuals all depends on the nature of each state's government, since enough governments prefer to take the decision making-role solely upon themselves, without allowing the rest of the citizens any input. Such a situation is common enough, and it is true that Bentham did have an opinion on what constituted the most effective government, which was a representative democracy. If all states enjoyed this form of government, the citizens of each states would have a far greater opportunity to participate in the decision-making process with regard to their own state's actions. But Bentham did not suggest that this form of government had to be a specific requirement to initiate any sort of peaceful relations.

At any rate, even with the hope of a world federation, anarchy exists as an element of international relations in all the traditions; Bentham's view being that anarchy is not all that bad (hence the natural society as opposed to the Hobbesian state of nature), but he does recognize the difficulties and conflicts that arise under such conditions. Still, he is very much in tune with the Rationalist position, that intercourse exists, and therefore some semblance of a society exists as well.

In the international realm, both Bentham and the Rationalists believe that positive relations are possible without any sort of federation or world government. It is a situation where states are *conversing*.[181] As such, the international society is recognized to exist. Bentham does not even go so far as to suggest that this society has strictly common interests or goals, since that would be difficult to discern. What he sees is that states are not perpetually at war, and although they have the tendency to break relations and proceed in a warlike manner, for the most part relations remain civil. This does not mean that conditions are conflict free, but conflict can be dealt with in a number of ways and not always with war.[182]

Bentham does not explicitly require that for the international society to exist, there must be an explicit statement of common interests and values as the Rationalists believe. By explicit is meant the overt recognition that common values exist even beyond the general topics of agreement. His 'natural society' would be satisfied with the nature of communication which exists through the envoys and discussions/agreements concerning trade, peace, and war. This type of interaction is very important, and need not be qualified by the confirmation of common interests. If states find room for agreement, the interests are probably common (although not necessarily alike). Common interests, according to Bentham, are more particularly expressed in international law (as they are for the Rationalists as well). Legal agreements in the international realm would be considered to be in the *common utility* of all states, based on the fact that it would only be agreed to if it was in the interest of the said states participating in the endeavour.

Here enters the third issue, concerning the role of international law and the basis for its agreements according to Bentham. Although he has much in common

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[181]Recall the difference between a political society in which individuals are in the habit of obeying, and the natural society in which individuals are in the habit of conversing.

[182]In general, the Realists do not really differ. But based on the definition provided in this paper regarding the Realists, they are the most prone to resort to war-like action.

with the Rationalists in that he is a great advocate of the use of international law, and he envisions the existence of some sort of international society (albeit one that places the importance of the state paramount), and he recognizes that humanity has the capacity to improve its lot and not be perpetually evil. Bentham differs greatly on the perceived impetus behind the desire for international law and internationally 'moral' behaviour.

For the Rationalists, international law is predicated upon a combination of *natural law* and positivist law. Bentham's approach acknowledges the use of positivist law, although his emphasis would again be placed upon what lies behind the treaties to which nations agreed, rather than the treaties themselves. But Bentham does not use the concept of an external[183] body of law, *natural* or otherwise. This is a significant departure from the Rationalist tradition, in that natural law is considered to provide the basis for morality, which is therefore understood by rational human beings. Human behaviour is curtailed by humanity's inherent inclination toward natural law, which provides us, as a "cosmic, moral constitution,"[184] with the ability to discern right from wrong. This is articulated at the international level through international law.

Nor would there exist any sort of *covenant of peace*, since for the same reasons above, Bentham prefers to explore and build international law based on the interests behind such agreements[185] rather than enter into such agreements themselves, since they can be broken as easily as they were entered into. The Idealists believe that some ethereal source, be it Nature or History, drives progress beyond the control of human beings, and provides humanity with the ability to reason, which is the basis of morality. In other words, it is that element which is

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[183]Meaning apart from humanity.
[184]Wight, **International Theory**, p. 14.
[185]Recall the issue of treaties in Chapter 3.

external to human beings which compels us to be good even though we are naturally quite bad. Morality stems from an external source, yet expresses itself through humanity in international law. Bentham does not recognize this as the driving force behind the respect for international law, just as he would not accept it as the impetus behind morality itself.

Like the Realists, which takes the argument back to the important concept of state interest, Bentham found international law to be effective and desirable in the sense that such law was in the interest of the states. This is no different from his directions for national government, in that law which is not in the interest of individuals should not be tolerated or perpetuated; likewise at the international level. Why would a state, especially if the law is not coercive, abide by law which it finds not to be in keeping with state interests? Such behaviour would not make sense unless the interests of the states were observed, therefore Bentham looks to what concerns are expressed at the state level, and binds these concerns in law, which would be common to all states within international law. Again the question arises as to what necessarily constitutes a state's interest, and here lies a difficulty between what is *perceived* to be in a state's interest, and what is *actually* in a state's interest. Not that these two always differ, but it is just this difficulty which creates the sometime negative atmosphere in international relations.

Finally, there is the issue of public opinion and education. Bentham does not stop at international law, resigning himself to the follies of states which prefer, based on state interest, to cause difficulty or harm to other states. To a great extent Bentham does possess an optimism about the nature of international politics that allows for positive development and cooperation. An obvious connection between Bentham and Idealism, more specifically Kant, would be the emphasis placed on

public opinion. Both agree that if all secrecy were to be avoided,[186] therefore resulting in all agreements among states being openly publicized, that this educational process would provide a check/balance system on what sort of actions are decided upon in the international realm. For Bentham, ignorance and misunderstanding play a large role in the problems experienced between states, and this would be solved to at least some degree by making all proposed actions known to the citizens of the nations concerned.

Bentham thought that if agreements were internationally disclosed, there would be greater understanding as to what was considered to be in each state's interest. Following this line of thought, Bentham also advocates the use of a Public Opinion Tribunal at the international level, which would assist states which have disagreements. This is as close, however, as Bentham gets to an international organization, and it has no coercive power whatsoever. Any binding force would be in the form of public opinion, as well as in the form of the international law which each state involved would have voluntarily agreed to in the first place as they saw it in their interest to do so.

Of course the tendency to rely heavily on public opinion and education should not be shrugged off, as these elements are strong factors in Bentham's theory of international relations. In this sense, there is no doubt that Bentham exhibits a strong, Idealist position. But there is much within the Idealist tradition, and more specifically in Kant (wi h whom Bentham is most frequently compared), which Bentham would not find palatable or logical. The imposition of a specific type of government prior to the initiation of any sort of peace would not be in keeping with Bentham's philosophy. One state does not have the 'right' to dictate

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[186]The elimination of secrecy would not necessarily involve the situation Woodrow Wilson proposed, whereby all agreements would be openly *arrived a* . as well as publicized once agreement was reached.

to another how its internal affairs must be organized. If there is any sort of advising on the part of one or more states to another, it would be in the form of the Public Opinion Tribunal, the composition of which all states concerned would have agreed, and based on a 'legal' system to which all states would have already agreed. Therefore internal politics would not be an issue of concern.

In sum, Bentham develops a very Idealist structure, from a Realist basis of human nature involving self-interest, and a Rationalist perception of international society. Thus Bentham reveals a strong proclivity towards Idealism, yet there are enough fundamental differences between his theory and those of other Idealists that the fit is in some respects accurate, yet not as comfortable as it first appears in this paradigm. This would explain Bentham's connection with the Rationalists, since he has just about as much in common with this paradigm as he does with the Idealists. His connection with Realism becomes increasingly clear upon analysis, and the need to refer to the theory of utilitarianism can be substituted with references to Bentham himself. The difference is that while Bentham believes that the true interest of the state is its preservation, as do the Realists, he also believes that this will be maintained more effectively through *educational* mechanisms, such as public opinion and the Public Opinion Tribunal, more often than not. His suggestion for the Public Opinion Tribunal is based on this consideration of *state interest*, likewise his recommended formulation of international law, as well as his beliefs in free trade, emancipating all colonies, restricting abuses of and in war (as best as possible), and exhibiting a tolerance (if not acceptance) for the variety of different nations making up the international community.

As with regard to Rationalism, both Bentham and the Rationalists are strong advocates of international law, and see that this institution plays the dominant role of enforcement and mediation in international relations. The initial premise that each uses is certainly different; as far as natural law is concerned, one could not

find two more differing opinions. But the final conclusion is the same. The suggestion of a *society of states* is also a bridging factor, since the anarchical element of the absence of a higher sovereign still exists, but there is the recognition of some sort of relationship. This would suggest that Rationalists and the Realists are not that different in their conceptions of the international realm; perhaps seen in this light they are not.

Regarding Bentham's association with the Idealists; there is no doubt that this paradigm mirrors some of Bentham's strongest tendencies. He sees the potential for cooperation between and among states, and emphasizes the education of the public as a method of improving international relations. War is not favoured to any extent, and when it is, the circumstances are very limited. But one cannot get away from the fact that he arrives at these conclusions based on a *very Realist* premise: individuals behave in a manner that serves their own self-interest. Bentham, it could be argued, and in this case it is being argued, actually *uses reality* and attempts to show what would be the *most real* of actions. Why do states behave in the manner that they currently do? Because it is in their *perceived interest* (which is sometimes their true interest) to do so. Why would states behave in the manner advocated by Bentham? Because it is more often in their *real interest* to do so. It is true that only each state knows what is in their best interest, but Bentham's theory of international politics provides the insight as to how a state, and more specifically how the people of the state, can come to determine their own interests accurately. A common standard is not necessarily required to determine utility, but the effort can be based on the minimization or reduction of pain. It is up to the people of the state to determine how to maximize their pleasure.

Based on the difficulties scholars have apparently had in identifying a niche for Bentham, and upon closer examination, Bentham's utilitarian theory of international relations contains elements of all three paradigms. His common

ground broadens with the Idealists and Rationalists, but there is also a broad and concrete similarity between Bentham and the Realists. Bentham has been able to anticipate, if not recognize, the possibilities and limitations which are dominantly and for the most part exclusively characteristics of each tradition. From an academic perspective Bentham has been able to make use of these different characteristics in such a way that each depends upon the other, and can develop from one other.

The purpose of this paper was to find the similarities between Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of international relations, and three dominant paradigms of the international theory field: Idealism, Realism, and Rationalism. In doing so, it is suggested that Bentham is capable of bridging some of the paradigmatic gaps which currently exist, harmonizing some of the conflictual characteristics and bridging some of the chasms in understanding international politics. The basis for the thesis was the notable difficulty and confusion with which Bentham, or the theory of utilitarianism, had been categorized in the past.

Bentham uses the very *real* element of human nature -- self-interest -- to determine what actions are most probable when dealing with individuals or states. He does not *deny* the conditions that the more pessimistic Realists present, rather, he attempts to work with such conditions. He recognizes the anarchical nature of the international realm and does not wish to change it. He even conceives of a position that closely resembled the Hobbesian 'state of nature', yet he modified it only a bit (changing the nature of the relations to that of conversing,[187] instead of perpetual conflict) to present what could be considered an accurate representation of relations today. As well, the state remains the primary actor in both Realist and Rationalist, if not Idealist modes of thought. Since the state consists only of the

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[187]*Conversing* does not exclude the element of conflict, it just presents it from a different perspective which acknowledges that reconciliation *can* be made.

sum of individuals which make up that state, with a delegated sovereign, the state becomes the primary actor on the international stage. This is the same actor which the Realists acknowledge as being first and foremost. These factors of self-interest, the state as the primary actor, and anarchy (albeit a relatively idealistic view of anarchy), show the links that Bentham has made with the Realist paradigm.

It is one thing to illustrate that Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theory of international relations is capable of bridging the *paradigmatic gaps* of the international theory disc line, but there is little relevance to this conclusion unless one understands what importance this would have to international theory studies. As stated in the introductory chapter, the discipline of international relations theory is schizophrenic and, for the most part, intellectually antagonistic. It is difficult enough trying to understand what each tradition entails when the definitions of such differ to the degree that they do. This difficulty was obviously experienced within this paper. For example, what has been defined here as Realist, might be considered far too narrow a definition, and if said definition was broadened, another might argue that it sounds too Rationalist.

Based on what seemed to be the most *common* and *general* of characteristics, the definitions used in Chapter Two were found. But that has not eliminated the persistent thought that there is something to be said about the difficulty encountered in attempting to find the lines, fine as they are, between the paradigms. This is not to say that there are not very distinct differences between the paradigms, but some of the difficulty must stem from the fact that many of the characteristics of each paradigm are quite capable of complementing each other, rather than working in opposition. If this is the case, then one should ask why not derive a theory which is capable of exactly that; combining these characteristics as best as they are able, instead of regularly focusing on the differences.

When studying the three paradigms in either a either a teacher/student setting, or within the confines of a variety of text books, the distinctions between the three are frequently made. But while becoming familiar with these traditions, it is possible to identify areas of overlap, or bridges, with Bentham's theory of international relations. It was exactly this sort of perusal through the literature which leads to the thesis of this paper. The inclination towards producing or developing a *new* theory of international relations is not really necessary, since it has already been achieved. Jeremy Bentham, who generally receives only minor attention in international theory, has developed a theory, based on his principle of utility, which is capable of bridging, or in other words linking, some of the paradigmatic gaps in the discipline.

It would be a unique perspective if international theorists opted to examine international relations based on what all three traditions had to offer, and how each characteristic might relate to one another. As an introductory step, or as a comprehensive contribution, Jeremy Bentham and his theory of international relations ought to be included when making such an attempt towards this new possible direction in the discipline. It provides a very interesting perspective to see some of these elements work in concert, and understand the arguments relating to why these elements would logically do so. The fact that Bentham has already done this with respect to many of the distinct paradigmatic characteristics should not be overlooked.

And here enters the final, but very important point. In most cases in international theory, Bentham is overlooked. When he is mentioned in the literature, it is frequently brief, and does not do much to discuss the nuances of Bentham's theory. This is not the case in *all* literature, but it is predominant. In doing so, the general trend is to make blanket statements about Bentham's contribution instead of investigating what in actuality that contribution is.

Obviously not all theorists who have written about international relations theory can receive appropriate or adequate exposure as do others, especially since the contributions of each do vary, and some are more significant than others. But Bentham is mentioned frequently enough in the literature to realize that authors feel at least a need to mention his name, but wish to pursue his thought no further. Therefore one automatically associates Bentham with the Idealists because of his Public Opinion Tribunal, or with the Rationalists because of his link to international law. To the best of my knowledge, it has not yet been appropriately recognized that Bentham also has a strong association with the Realists via self and state interest.

The discipline of international relations theory is bypassing a richly complex theory that is capable of providing perspectives not yet enjoyed. The discipline may have chosen to do this either because it is not necessarily a choice, but just overlooked it due to the amount of material that pervades the discipline already, or because since Bentham's day, utilitarianism has received a great deal of criticism, sometimes valid, sometimes not, and therefore his approach would not be taken as seriously or be given its due. Apart from any contested validity concerning utilitarianism in general, at the very least Bentham's theory of international relations has much to offer international theorists when discussing and comparing international relation theories.

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