Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Programs and Reconciliation: A Case Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina

by
Emrah Keskin

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

© Emrah Keskin, 2022

Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) programs have become a common means of peacebuilding following civil war, alongside re-structuring political institutions, transitional justice initiatives and refugee return. Psychology research suggests that MHPSS programs are beneficial to individuals who have been exposed to civil war, reducing their trauma symptoms and transforming their attitudes towards reconciliation initiatives. Building on these findings, I investigate whether MHPSS programs' work with individual participants leads to a larger resonance at the social and political level, especially in terms of reconciliation. To understand the socio-political impact of such psychological work, I have conducted a case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina, interviewing project managers, administrators, and counselors who administer MHPSS programs across the country. My findings suggest that MHPSS programs help participants overcome the anger, fear, and mistrust borne out of the traumatic war experiences. However, my research also shows that negative emotions are still prevalent among Bosnians who have traumatic experiences of war. Moreover, nationalist parties exploit these negative emotions, undermining the work of MHPSS programs and thwarting social and national reconciliation efforts. Despite more than 25 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, there has been little progress towards reconciliation at the national level as ethnic polarization continues to dominate national politics. Based on four months of fieldwork, 21 semi-structured interviews and desk research, I argue that MHPSS holds the potential to transform Bosnian society and instill reconciliation at the individual, social, and national level. However, the current socio-political structures, in which the major political parties perpetuate ethnic division and impede individual and societal healing, counter the MHPSS efforts and hamper their ability to help advance the process of reconciliation.

1 Preface

This dissertation is an original work by Emrah Keskin. The research project, of which this dissertation is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name “Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Programs and Reconciliation After Civil War: A Case Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Study ID: Pro00060451, May 10th, 2016.

Dedicated to the loving memory of

Dicle Koğacıoğlu (1972-2009)

and

Emir Gönel (1984-2012)

Your ideals have stayed with us and will live on.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without:

… the unwavering love and support of my dad, Miktat Keskin, and my brother, Emre Keskin;
… the guidance and encouragement of my supervisor, Dr. Siobhan Byrne;
… the care and love of my wife, the love of my life, Chenoa Sly;
… the and the joy that was brought to my life by my son, Aleks Keskin.

I would like to thank:

My committee members Dr. Greg Anderson, Dr. Lori Thorlakson, and Prof. Duncan Saunders for their ideas and advice;
Prof. Roger Epp for his continued mentorship throughout my doctoral studies;
The great community of scholars at the Department of Political Science whom I have had the honor of working with, including Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi, Dr. Malinda Smith, Dr. Patrick von Maravić, Dr. Julian Castro-Rea, Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, and Dr. Ian Urquhart;
My colleagues in the graduate program, including, Michael Burton, Chad Cowie, Justin Leifso, Owuraku Kusi-Ampofo, Mariam Georgis, Leigh Spanner, Kristjana Lopston, Mia Tulli, Kathi Kapfinger, Geoff Salomons, Nisha Nath and many others, for the supportive community they have helped to form;
My professors at the University of South Florida (USF), where this journey began, including Dr. Bernd Reiter, Dr. Scott Solomon, Prof. Mark Amen and Dr. Steven Roach; and my USF colleagues Brandon Huson and Rahi Dayerizadeh;
Dr. Srdja Pavlović for helping me with my questions about Yugoslav history;
Sabiha Kadri and Jelena Buljan for providing translation services; Nedžad Alić and Oliver Rogić for providing accommodations during my field research;
Anja Maksić for offering her friendship and guidance during my stay in Sarajevo;
My interviewees, who I unfortunately cannot name, for their kindness and the eagerness with which they have shared their experience;
And the mothers of Srebrenica, for their generous spirit.

This research was generously funded by:

The State of Kuwait, the University of Alberta Department of Political Science, the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research (FGSR), and the University of Alberta International (UAI).

Table of Contents

Abstract ii

1 Preface iii

Acknowledgements v

Table of Contents vi

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND PHOTOS ix

List of Tables ..... *ix*

List of Figures ..... *ix*

List of Photos ..... *ix*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... *x*
Health and Psychological Terminology: x
Bosnia and Herzegovina: x
Others: x

BOSNIAN/CROATIAN/SERBIAN PRONOUNCIATION GUIDE xii

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Research Question, Hypothesis, and the Case *5*

1.2 Organization of Chapters *8*

2 LITERATURE REVIEW 12

2.1 Contributions to the Literature *12*
2.1.1 Beyond the Institutional Focus 12
2.1.2 Other Contributions 17

2.2 Mental Health and Reconciliation *18*
2.2.1 The Literature on Reconciliation as it Relates to MHPSS Programs 18
2.2.2 Previous Research on Mental Health Issues and Reconciliation 21

2.3 Theories of Social Mobilization Prior to Civil War *33*
2.3.1 Social Mobilization in BiH: Theory and Practice 35
2.3.2 A Social Psychology Model on Social Mobilization 37
2.3.3 Socio-Psychological Infrastructure of Conflict 39
2.3.4 The question of social de-mobilization: Accommodation or Paradigm Shift? 40
2.3.5 Operationalizing Social Reconciliation 44

2.4 Relevant Scholarly Debates *45*
2.4.1 What Constitutes a “Psychosocial Intervention”? 45
2.4.2 Criticisms: Do MHPSS Programs Impose Western Norms? 49
2.4.3 The Contentious Debate on PTSD 51

2.5 Conclusions *53*

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 55

3.1 Goals of the Analysis *55*

3.2 Design and Method Choices *57*

3.3 Where are the Women in this Study? *60*

3.4 The Sample of Interviewees *61*

3.5 Building the Analysis *65*

3.6 Ethical and Practical Challenges *77*

4 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 81

4.1 Pre-War: Social Mobilization of Ethnic Groups *82*

4.1.1 Nationalism Sweeps Belgrade 82

4.1.2 A Political Tool for 'Greater Serbia' 87

4.1.3 Mass Propaganda and Nationalist Social Mobilization of Serbian People 89

4.1.4 1.4 Pillars of Serbian Mobilization: Narratives of Victimization and Exclusive Identity 93

4.1.5 Bosniak and Croat Mobilizations 95

4.2 The War *98*

4.3 Dayton Peace Accords *101*

4.4 Post Dayton-Era *105*

4.4.1 The Ethnic Divide 105

4.4.2 Variant Histories of Heroism and Victimization 106

4.4.3 Continued Domination of Nationalist Politics 107

4.4.4 Continued Socio-economic Problems 108

4.5 Conclusion *109*

5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAUMA AND RECONCILIATION IN BiH 111

5.1 Introduction *111*

5.2 Negative Emotions *112*

5.2.1 Anger 113

5.2.2 Fear 117

5.2.3 Mistrust 120

5.2.4 Adaptive or Maladaptive? 122

5.3 Narratives of Collective Victimhood *123*

5.4 Transgenerational Transfer of Trauma *129*

5.4.1 Mechanisms of Transmission 130

5.4.2 A Vicious Cycle of Transmission 132

5.5 Conclusions *133*

6 MHPSS WORK, HEALING AND RECONCILIATION 136

6.1 Introduction *136*

6.2 Trauma Healing *138*

6.2.1 Acknowledging and Healing Trauma 138

6.2.2 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation 141

6.3 Fostering Relationships *144*

6.3.1 Fostering Relationships: Approaches 146

6.3.2 Fostering Relationships and Reconciliation 150

6.3.3 Lessons from the Literature on Cross-Community Initiatives 153

6.4 Shifting the Narratives *155*

6.5 Women's Micro Level Roles and Care Work *159*

6.6 Conclusions *164*

7 STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO HEALING AND RECONCILIATION: POLITICS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AND THE "PSYCHOSOCIAL GAP" **166**

7.1 Introduction *166*

7.2 Political Influence *168*

7.2.1 Overview of Political Issues in BiH: Institutions, Elite-level Antagonism and "Shadow Economy" 168

7.2.2 Continuation of Nationalist Narratives 172

7.2.3 Manipulation of Fear 174

7.2.4 Patronage 178

7.2.5 Ineptness, Lack of Interest, and Sabotage 179

7.2.6 What If It Was All Different? 181

7.3 Socio-economic Conditions *184*

7.3.1 Poverty as Additional Trauma 186

7.3.2 Poverty as a Unifier 188

7.3.3 Socio-economic Conditions and MHPSS Goals 190

7.3.4 "Psychosocial Gap" 191

7.4 Conclusions *193*

8 CONCLUSIONS **195**

8.1 Suggestions of Findings vis-à-vis Research Questions *195*

8.2 Contributions to Scholarly Literature *199*

8.3 Bringing 'Bottom-up' and 'Top-Down' Approaches Together *202*

8.4 Recommendations for Policymakers and MHPSS Programs *208*

8.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research *212*

9 APPENDIX: List of Interview Questions **215**

10 REFERENCES **216**

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND PHOTOS

List of Tables

Table 1: List of Interviewees 63-64

List of Figures

Figure 1 The Coding Tree 70
Figure 2: "Trauma" Branch of the Coding Tree 71
Figure 3: "MHPSS Work" Branch 72
Figure 4: Top: Political Influence Branch. Bottom: Socio-economic Conditions Branch 75

List of Photos

Photo 1: Unnamed Serb Monument, situated by a dirt road near Sanski Most 125

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Health and Psychological Terminology:

MHPSS – Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

MD – Major Depression

WHO – World Health Organization

DSM – Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

Bosnia and Herzegovina:

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina)

FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine)

RS – Republika Srpska

OHR – Office of the High Representative

SDA – Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratska Akcija)

HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica)

SDS – Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka)

SNSD – Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata)

SDP – Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska Partija)

SKS – League of Communists Serbia (Savez Komunista Srbija)

VRS – Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republika Srpska)

ARBiH – Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine)

HVO – Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Objane)

JNA – Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija)

SFR Yugoslavia – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistična Federativna Republika Jugoslavija)

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement

Others:

EU – European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UN – United Nations

WWI – World War One

WWII – World War Two

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

BOSNIAN/CROATIAN/SERBIAN PRONOUNCIATION GUIDE

c is “ts” as in “cats”

č is “ch” as in “arch”

ć is “tch” as in “latch”

dj is “j” as in “judge”

dž is “dg” as in “edge”

j is “y” as in “you”

lj is “l” as in “lure”

nj is “n” as in “onion”

š is “sh” as in “sharp”

ž is “zh” as in “pleasure”

Pronunciations of the remaining letters are about the same as they would be in English

1 INTRODUCTION

Photojournalist Ron Haviv, who captured some of the most compelling images of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina[1] (1992-1995), remarked in an interview that the country is "still trapped in the traumas inflicted by the war" (Djikoli 2015). He suggested that the psychological wounds of the war remain acute: "[a]s soon as you scratch a little bit below the surface, you see that the war is still present" (ibid.). Haviv's observations are corroborated by Bosnian government data, which shows that nearly one in three Bosnians suffer from stress-induced disorders attributable to the war (Barker 2015). The prevalence of trauma potentially has socio-political consequence, as research in the discipline of Psychology suggests that conflict survivors who suffer from mental health ailments such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Major Depression (MD) are more likely to favor violent revenge over peaceful reconciliation efforts (Pham et al. 2004; Vinck et al. 2005; Bayer et al. 2007).

In this research, using the case study of BiH, through fieldwork interviews and drawing on conflict resolution and social psychology literatures, I detail how traumas of war complicate social and national reconciliation. I show that the traumatic experiences of war and daily stressors of a post-conflict era (such as displacement, poverty, loss of social connections) negatively impact individuals and compromise their social relations. I also show how war related trauma can continue for decades when socio-economic and political conditions remain unfavorable, and may even transfer across generations, potentially increasing the likelihood of future conflict. Then, I elaborate how ethno-nationalist politicians in BiH exploit the traumas of their constituents to keep their hold on power. Based on these observations, I argue that scholars and practitioners of national reconciliation should take the problem of trauma seriously, as individual and collective traumas are intimately related to the socio-political goals of conflict transformation, including building a tolerant, democratic society that can resolve its conflicts in a non-violent manner. In my conclusion, I make two principle recommendations – one for practice and one for theory of national reconciliation – to take trauma seriously and improve the prospects for inter-communal reconciliation: integrating Mental Health and

[1] "BiH" hereafter, using the local language acronym.

Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) programs with official, national-level reconciliation initiatives and more engagement with scholarship and practice in Peace Psychology (e.g., the incorporation of its theories and findings as well as engaging in interdisciplinary collaboration).

Mental health researchers, through the advent of Peace Psychology scholarship[2], have highlighted the connection between traumatic experiences of war and the prospect of reconciliation. However, their findings have yet to permeate political and legal works on reconciliation which often focus on institutional challenges such as re-figuring the structure of governance (e.g., McGarry and O'Leary 2013; Reilly 2012) official tribunals and memorialization projects (e.g., Nagy 2004; Kritz 2009; Hayner 2010; Fischer 2011; Manning 2012; Fletcher and Weinstein 2015; Kerr 2017) and economic development (e.g., Krause and Jütersonke 2005; MacGinty and Sanghera 2012). In this project, through a case study of MHPSS programs in BiH, I explore the connections between individual experiences of trauma with social and political levels of reconciliation and suggest how scholars and policymakers can link efforts aimed at each level. The main goal of this project is to use Peace Psychology's insights into the connection between trauma and both social and national levels of reconciliation to inform the theory and practice of peacebuilding that focus on institutions.

After the Bosnian War, Conflict Resolution scholars and international policy experts have examined and made recommendations for the reconstruction of BiH's political institutions and civil society; trials of war criminals; and the creation of a record of the war. Much of this work follows what Fletcher and Weinstein (2015:193) term "the dominant paradigm of transitional justice" that includes "a menu of interventions to promote justice, political stability, and human rights", and is ultimately directed towards the goal of reconciliation. In this project, reconciliation is defined as "a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviors into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace" (Brouneus 2008:294) that occurs on individual, social, and national levels (ibid.:292). In differentiating the levels in which reconciliation takes place, Brouneus (2008:294) suggests the following:

[2] See, *inter alia*, Martin-Baro (1996); Volkan (1999); Silove (2000); Christie (2006); Hamber (2009).

> *The focus at the individual level may, for example, be on trauma and how victims experience participating in a truth-telling process for reconciliation; at the social level, the focus may be on how former enemy groups perceive each other before, during, and after such a process; at the national level, the focus may be on how governments and rebel groups act for reconciliation.*

In this project, I examine post-war MHPSS programs addressing war-related trauma in BiH to understand how such programs contribute to the goal of reconciliation following the civil war. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guideline on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings defines these programs as "any type of local or outside support that aims to protect or promote psychosocial well-being and/or prevent or treat mental disorder" (2007:1). They can range from community involvement programs to specialized support and therapy. As I discuss below, MHPSS programs have recently become a common part of peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict settings.

According to Mary Kaldor (2007:2) intrastate wars – such as the civil wars in Rwanda (1990-1994), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Nepal (1996-2006), and Syria (2011-present), among others – have become the most common type of violent conflict globally after the Cold War (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2007; Anderson 2019). These types of conflicts often have an intimate influence on civilian life, more so than combat between traditional armies. In intrastate wars, warring parties often recruit among civilian populations, turning neighbours into enemies. Combatants in these "new wars" are more likely than their traditional counterparts to target civilians and institutions (like hospitals and schools that are core to day-to-day collective functioning) to terrorize and control civilian populations (Kaldor 2007:3-13).

In the context of these new wars, civilians are more likely to be traumatized than they were in inter-state wars of the past. They may have witnessed and/or been subjected to events like shootings, forced displacement, or torture (Roberts et al. 2009; Pham et al. 2009; Tol et al. 2011a). In BiH, civilian populations went through traumatic experiences such as the siege of Sarajevo; being forced out of their homes in places like Bijeljina, Foča, Zvornik, or Ilidža; being imprisoned in concentration camps like Omarska; experiencing perceived betrayal by their neighbors from the other side; getting injured or

losing loved ones in conflict or targeted killings such as the Markale Massacres or Srebrenica Genocide. Moreover, as Hamber (2009:25) argues, political trauma is different than the trauma of accidents or natural disasters. According to Hamber (ibid.:23), being the target of political violence "tells victims how others value (or devalue) them as human beings," undermining an individual's sense of belonging in a society, leading to mistrust and the erosion of social relations. After the cessation of hostilities, former enemies go back to living side-by-side, but with the bonds between them broken.

From the mid-1990s on, MHPSS programs, which aim to address clinical mental health ailments and psychosocial impacts of traumatic experiences of war or other humanitarian emergencies, became a common part of peacebuilding initiatives to assist post-conflict transformations. Meyer (2013:21) traces the advent of MHPSS programs in the context of conflict and other humanitarian emergencies to the 1960s, spurred on by reports detailing the mental health problems of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in camps in Thailand. With the addition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to DSM-III in the 1980s as a mental health condition that arises following a traumatic event, mental health researchers "focused on identifying rates of PTSD and other common mental disorders" in humanitarian settings (Tol et al. 2011b:1582). According to Meyer (2013:23), this line of research produced "Multiple studies […] amongst conflict-affected populations [that] have found a strong association between exposure to trauma and mental health symptoms," resulting in the inclusion of MHPSS programs as part of the response during and after complex humanitarian emergencies.

Post-conflict BiH was ground zero for the widespread application of MHPSS programs seeking to address war-related trauma and lack of social trust (Agger 2001). Due in part to its proximity to Western Europe, several European NGOs initiated and/or financed projects in BiH, including MHPSS programs. In a 1995 survey, Agger, Vuk, and Mimica (1995) documented 185 MHPSS projects across BiH and Croatia, conducted by 117 organizations. Arcel (1998) suggests that BiH saw more MHPSS programs than any other post-conflict setting up to that point. Since then, such programs have become commonplace (Tol et al. 2011b:1581), applied in diverse settings such as Angola

(Wessels and Monterio 2006), Guatemala (Anckermann et al. 2005), Nepal (Tol et al. 2009), and Liberia and Sierra Leone (Stepakoff et al. 2003), among others.

Funding agencies have also been willing to devote significant resources to MHPSS programs in response to humanitarian emergencies such as natural disasters or conflict. A financial analysis commissioned by Tol et al. (2011b:1583) indicates that "countries affected by humanitarian crises between 2007 and 2009, received US$224.3 billion in funding (at 2008 values). At least $226.1 million was provided for programmes that included MHPSS activities." In BiH, after the flurry of MHPSS initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the war, the external funding and assistance for MHPSS programs waned during the 2000s. However, there has been renewed interest in the 2010s, led by a US$ 10.1 million grant from USAID and Catholic Relief Services for a series of peacebuilding projects that entail trauma counseling and psychosocial support components.

On the individual level of reconciliation, there is some indication that interventions by MHPSS programs can be helpful in reducing trauma symptoms and/or prejudice towards former enemies, though the empirical base of support for such interventions still needs strengthening as program evaluation has long taken a backseat to program delivery in the face of limited resources (Tol et al. 2011b:1582). The under-representation of MHPSS programs in research is more pronounced in regard to their potential role in the social and national levels of reconciliation, despite research indicating that mental health and psychosocial issues have a detrimental effect on the desire and ability to participate in reconciliation processes and on social trust (Martin-Baro 1989; Pham et al. 2004; Bayer et al. 2007; Hamber 2009). Trust can facilitate inter-group reconciliation through increasing "information exchange, cooperative behavior and conciliatory strategies" (Hewstone et al. 2005:212) and is also indispensable in developing healthy relationships that can facilitate the reconciliation process (Govier and Verwoerd 2002:183).

1.1 Research Question, Hypothesis, and the Case

This research project aims to highlight the connection between war related trauma and reconciliation, and asks, "What are the effects of war related mental and psychosocial distress on reconciliation following intrastate wars?", and "How does the work of

MHPSS programs implemented following intrastate wars contribute to the social dimension of reconciliation?" According to Brouneus' (2010:294) definition of reconciliation, "at the social level, the focus may be on how former enemy groups perceive each other."

Based on research and theory from Peace Psychology, I argue that war related mental and psychosocial distress presents roadblocks for reconciliation, including traumatic memories, weakened social connections and negative emotions such as anger, fear, and mistrust. I hypothesize that MHPSS programs can positively influence social reconciliation initiatives through tackling these challenges as part of their work to help their clients.

This project focuses on the case of BiH, where hundreds of MHPSS programs have been implemented after the Bosnian War (1992-1995) that led to more than 100,000 deaths (Agger, Vuk, and Mimica 1995). In the case of BiH, reconciliation primarily refers to the reconciliation of the three constituent peoples of the country: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. National reconciliation in BiH is based on a complicated power-sharing system. It has been a contentious process at the level of national politics, producing mixed results.[3] Research on social reconciliation in BiH also presents a mixed picture. Kostić's (2008) research, which utilized surveys and interviews, indicates that citizens of BiH believe in the possibility of peaceful coexistence but are still in disagreement about the past. In Kostić's surveys, overwhelming majorities of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs each claimed that their side fought "defensive" wars and claimed the others were the "aggressors." Stefansson's (2010) ethnographic work in Banja Luka, the *de facto* Serb capital, suggests that, while Bosniak Muslim returnees managed to resettle, they lead socially isolated lives and have little contact with Serb neighbors. On the individual level, a number of MHPSS programs have shown positive results in decreasing trauma symptoms and lowering prejudice against rival groups among their participants, including a large-scale program implemented by Doctors Without Borders (Mooren et al. 2003). Despite the psychology research that suggests a connection between trauma, desire for vengeance and willingness to participate in reconciliation initiatives, there is

---

[3] Power-sharing in BiH has been extensively studied in the literature (see for instance: Hartzel and Hoddie 2003; Bieber 2005; Bieber and Keil 2009; McGrattan 2012; McEvoy 2015).

little research that examines the individual level and how widespread trauma in BiH relates to efforts towards reconciliation at the social and national level (for an exception see Biro et al. 2004).

Given the psychology research that suggests a connection between traumatic experiences of war and individual attitudes about vengeance and reconciliation, MHPSS programs are ideal settings to observe how individual and social level reconciliation interact, and how national reconciliation initiatives (or lack thereof) are reflected at the individual and social levels.

By bridging disciplinary boundaries, this study provides a new perspective on the intersections between each level and the ways in which they influence one another, providing insight for peacebuilding theory and practice that has mostly been focused on institutions. The focus on institutions has led to a blind spot when it comes to micro-, interpersonal-level relationships and processes in the context of new wars and their aftermath. Such a blind spot may result in researchers and practitioners drawing an incomplete picture of the situation on the ground and designing interventions that are ineffective, or even counterproductive. A striking example in the context of BiH is the refugee return process following the war. Despite significant international investment such as the OHR's mostly successful efforts to provide restitution of property and the involvement of the UNHCR (Porobic 2017:195-6), sustainable return has been difficult to achieve, particularly for those who sought to return in the immediate aftermath of the war (Porobic 2017:200; Mlinarevic, Porobic-Isakovic, and Rees 2015: 36). Even when they were able to restore their titles, many refugees sold their property instead of returning to towns/cities as they had lost their social contacts and feared living as members of a minority ethnic group (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005:657; Heimerl 2005). In some cases, even if the older family members returned to where they grew up, younger generations never did or left as soon as they could, because they did not want to live in social isolation (Stefansson 2010). Porobić (2017) argues that early returnees who live as a minority group in their localities face discrimination and "ghettoization." She further suggests that sustainable return in BiH has been "closely inter-linked with the construction of the complex micro-social structures buffering against the unpredictable macro-social context of post-Dayton BiH," as opposed to "being propelled by formal and

assisted return programmes" (ibid.:192). The achievements and the shortcomings of the refugee-return process in BiH is a striking example of how micro level issues such as building new social relationships and transforming the traumas of war are at the foundation of macro level issues such as facilitating sustainable refugee return that formal institutions seek to address.

1.2 Organization of Chapters

This dissertation is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 is a literature review. In that chapter, I engage with the literature on reconciliation as it pertains to mental health issues and MHPSS programs. I show that the goal of reconciliation and MHPSS programs are tied to each other through their two common goals, 'dealing with the past' and "re-weaving the social fabric." I then summarize previous research that explored the connections between mental health issues and reconciliation. The first section concludes with a discussion of research that shows that mental health is a social issue with serious implications for public health, as opposed to being a mere individual ailment. The second section of this chapter includes a discussion of what social mobilization in the lead up to a conflict entails and how to achieve "social de-mobilization" after the conflict, in order to settle on a theoretical framework on the social level of reconciliation. I analyze scholarly debates on what motivates social mobilization. Through this analysis, I put forward the reasons why I adopt Daniel Bar-Tal and Sabina Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) theory of social mobilization, which posits that exclusive identity and narratives of collective victimhood are the pillars of social mobilization, as my theoretical framework. At the end of this section, I lay out the criteria of social reconciliation that I used in this research, based on the theoretical framework I have chosen. Finally, in the third section, I summarize three pertinent scholarly debates regarding the interplay of trauma, MHPSS programs, and reconciliation. First, I analyze the literature on what constitutes a "psychosocial intervention." I then develop my own position as to the kind of interventions that would qualify as "psychosocial" in my research in the context of BiH, based on the position that what qualifies an intervention as "psychosocial" is its ability to address the relevant social issues that are at the root of psychosocial problems (Williams and Robinson 2006; Hamber et al. 2015). I argue that the root causes of psychosocial problems in BiH are the inter-ethnic disagreements about the past, continued animosity

between former enemies, socio-economic anxiety, and gender-based discrimination and violence. Therefore, I argue that in order to qualify as an MHPSS intervention in the context of post-conflict BiH, a program must explicitly tackle at least one of these four issues. Second, I engage with critical International Relations (IR) scholars and psychologists who argue that MHPSS interventions are a form of imperialism that impose Western standards of mental wellness and coping methods on non-Western peoples. I discuss how MHPSS researchers and practitioners have become more context-sensitive and grounded in a human rights approach, effectively answering such criticism. Finally, I summarize the contentious debate about the validity and usefulness of PTSD as a diagnostic tool. In doing so, I explain why I choose to consider and utilize research that indicate a connection between the incidence of PTSD in post-conflict settings and negative attitudes toward peaceful reconciliation while avoiding an over-reliance on the concept.

Chapter 3 lays out the research design and methods. I detail and justify the choices I have made in the design of the study, case selection, and methodology. I also discuss how the sample of interviewees were selected and provide information about their background, i.e., their gender, their roles within the MHPSS programs in which they have worked, and the areas of BiH they have been active in. I detail my codes and coding process as part of my qualitative analysis. Finally, I talk about the ethical and practical challenges I have encountered while conducting this research project. I explain how I navigated these challenges and provide recommendations to future researchers who may face similar issues as part of their fieldwork.

Chapter 4 is the “Background and Context” chapter. In this chapter, I offer a short history of the Bosnian War, including the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia and the lead-up to the Bosnian War, the war period and a brief summary of current political and socio-economic conditions. I focus on the rapid and violent transformation of the social and political ties between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in BiH. In doing so, I highlight the link between the social mobilization in the lead-up to the conflict, war-related traumas, and continued animosities that impede post-conflict reconciliation.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 make up the main body of this dissertation. Chapter 5 focuses on the reasons why the traumatic experiences of war in BiH are consequential to

reconciliation. Based on my field research, I put forward three reasons. First, I show how negative emotions – namely anger, fear and mistrust – are still prevalent in BiH. As a result, members of different groups are suspicious of one another and communities remain isolated. Violence, while not overtly displayed, remains a part of Bosnian society. Under such conditions, establishing new relationships that could transcend the broken ones of the past (Lederach 1997) is difficult. Second, I show that narratives of collective victimhood are still prevalent amongst the ethnic groups of BiH. These narratives often portray one's own group as having been victimized by the rival group throughout history. They minimize or ignore crimes committed by members of one's own group. As a result, they serve to justify aggression against rival groups, as it would constitute defending one's own group. Persistence of these narratives and ignorance about the stories of others complicates the task of 'dealing with the past' and could potentially serve as a socio-psychological basis for renewed conflict. Finally, transgenerational transfer of trauma, through the family environment, socialization, and epigenetics, mean that traumas of the past can have implications for the future, potentially setting off a vicious cycle.

Chapter 6 focuses on how MHPSS programs respond to the challenges laid out in Chapter 5. First, I describe their work on trauma healing, particularly in getting their participants to acknowledge their own trauma. I also discuss how trauma healing contributes to reconciliation. I then provide an analysis of the MHPSS work that aims to foster new relationships through cross-community initiatives, including the variant approaches to cross-community work and their implications for reconciliation. I then focus on MHPSS work that aims to familiarize their participants to the histories and experiences that members of other groups have of the war period and how such initiatives help to get participants to reconsider the narratives of collective victimhood that they abide by. Finally, I show how the relational aspect of MHPSS work enables and highlights women's critical role in maintaining social relations and care work, which are often ignored in national level analyses and policymaking.

Chapter 7 addresses a question that arises out of Chapter 6. If MHPSS programs, in their efforts to address their participants' traumatic experiences of war, can effectively address negative emotions, counter narratives of collective victimhood, and foster new relationships, why have they not had a larger influence in terms of reconciliation? In

other words, if MHPSS programs have achieved their purported goals, why does ethnic division and mistrust persist in contemporary BiH? In Chapter 7, I show that there are structural reasons why traumas of war are reproduced in BiH. I argue that nationalist elites, who continue to be unchallenged in terms of their political and economic power, have a vested interest in the continuation of traumas of war and narratives of collective victimhood. I argue that they are engaged in a counter-effort with the MHPSS programs, actively seeking to undo MHPSS work on helping participants to deal with their traumatic experiences, shift dominant narratives and foster new relationships. Putting forth this line of argument, I offer a criticism of the post-war institution building process that enabled the nationalist monopoly on political power, which has not broken in the face of deep unpopularity of local politicians. I also discuss how the difficult socio-economic conditions in BiH interact with trauma and how continued poverty in the country can at times unite people across the ethnic divides but can also serve to perpetuate or re-trigger traumas. Finally, I discuss the uneven nature of international aid and attention to MHPSS programs and issues that arise as a result.

Together, Chapter 6 and 7 identify BiH's continued divisions as a structural problem. Chapter 6 shows that at the micro, interpersonal level, MHPSS programs have managed to achieve fundamental transformation amongst their participants. Chapter 7 shows how nationalist elites continue to hold the levers of power and seek to lock their constituents in the traumatic experiences of the past. Their hold on power continues despite their deep unpopularity. Therefore, I argue, ethnic division in contemporary BiH is, at its core, a problem of institutions and political actors.

Chapter 8 considers the findings of this research project and offers answers to the initial research questions. I then summarize the study's contributions to the relevant lines of scholarly research. I conclude the dissertation with policy recommendations on post-conflict transformation and how to effectively incorporate MHPSS programs into the process, as well as a discussion of suggested directions for future research.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review scholarly literature and debates relevant to the development and the framing of my research project. I begin with identifying this research project's contributions to the literature. In doing so, I will articulate the target audience for this study. Then, I examine how reconciliation and MHPSS programs relate to one another, theories of social mobilization, the definition of the term "psychosocial," the criticism that MHPSS programs amount to an exercise of bio-power and the dubiousness of PTSD as a diagnostic tool.

2.1 Contributions to the Literature

2.1.1 Beyond the Institutional Focus

In their examination of the scholarly debates on peacebuilding, Charbonneau and Parent (2012:7) argue that these debates "often obscure […] the local dynamics of healing, and thus the local possibilities for peace." Instead, they suggest that debates on peacebuilding focus on external interventions (ibid.). These external interventions – often undertaken by IGOs, foreign NGOs, and Western government agencies – have been based on the framework of "liberal peace" (see, for instance, Paris 2002; MacGinty 2008; Eriksen 2009; Donais and Knorr 2013). According to Stein Eriksen (2009:662), the end goal of liberal peace is "to create [a] liberal state (with rule of law, protection of human rights, good governance, market economy), and the means employed are: establishing a government of national unity, capacity-building, training of officials, financial support and human resources."

As a result of the focus on external initiatives and the liberal peace framework, these debates on peacebuilding maintain an institutionalist perspective. For instance, following Lijphart's (1985) attempts to promote consociationalism as an alternative to the Apartheid regime in South Africa, Comparative Politics scholars have come to focus on post-conflict institution building as a means of preventing further conflict. Since then, these debates have become a staple of the subfield Comparative Politics; such post-conflict institution building has been implemented in countries such as BiH, Iraq, Fiji, and Northern Ireland (for example, see: Horowitz 2004; McGarry and O'Leary 2007; McCulloch 2009; Reilly 2012; Taylor 2009). A similar instutionalist focus is evident in IR scholarship on themes related to international intervention and peacebuilding. IR

scholars who focus on international intervention sought to devise appropriate methods of potential intervention to secure peace in countries that have suffered or are still suffering from violent internal conflict, such as the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine (ICISS 2001; Bellamy 2008; Evans 2009; Thakur and Weiss 2009). IR scholars who focus on peacebuilding have made the study of legal tribunals, truth commissions, and official transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives a primary focus in their work (see among others: Teitel 2000; Kritz 2009; Hayner 2010; Fischer 2011; Fletcher and Weinstein 2015; Kerr 2017). Until recently, reconciliation initiatives at the social level were mostly ignored in the literature on peacebuilding. Such institutional focus, which emerged out of the liberal peace framework, has led to a lack of attention to "the local dynamics of healing, and […] the local possibilities for peace," as Charbonneau and Parent (2012:7) argue.

As the liberal peace framework failed to achieve its goals in places like BiH, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Afghanistan, criticism mounted that a liberal peace framework amounted to an imposition of Western institutions and values to societies that might be skeptical of them. This criticism was first elucidated by post-colonial IR scholars (e.g., Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Fanthorpe 2005) and came to be widely adopted in the literature on peacebuilding (see, for instance, Paris 2002; Eriksen 2009; MacGinty 2012; Donais and Knorr 2013). As Donais and Knorr (2013:55) sum it up, "the liberal peacebuilding project – dominated by an institution-building agenda and a broad normative commitment to human rights, free markets, democracy and the rule of law – has been variously accused of being authoritarian, imperialistic, elitist and aloof from the very populations in whose name it ostensibly acts."

The criticism of the liberal peace framework, according to Moore (2013:30), is more about "institutional centralism rather than liberalism." Accordingly, social processes and relationships have recently come back to focus on the scholarship on peacebuilding through the criticism of the liberal peace framework, with the goal of promoting greater inclusivity and local ownership of the peacebuilding processes (Donais and McCandless 2017). As part of this shift in the study of peacebuilding, Roberts (2011) and MacGinty (2014) call for a focus on "everyday peace," which is defined as "the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to

avoid and minimise conflict" (Jackson 2018:7). According to MacGinty (2014:551), a deeper understanding of everyday peace may allow peacebuilding initiatives to go beyond the "shallow forms of ownership, in which 'local ownership' amounts to local acceptance of schemes conceived, funded and managed from the outside." Similarly, Donais and Knorr (2013:56) argue that grassroots peacebuilding initiatives can be complementary to the institutional ones through their ability "to respond to the requirements of everyday life and relate to local actors in their own cultural contexts."

This research project aims to build on the literature that focuses on social level peacebuilding initiatives and how they relate to the institutional ones. In accordance with the goal of highlighting the social level, this research project incorporates contributions from the field of Peace Psychology into the scholarly debate on peacebuilding. By focusing on the individual while also paying attention to the context in which people make meaning in their lives, Peace Psychology provides unique insights as to how the individual, social, and national levels of reconciliation are tied to one another. As Charbonneau and Parent (2012:16) argue, "The violence of conflict has profound and lasting emotional and psychological effects of trauma that are intertwined with practical consequences of social disruption," and therefore, "an integration of 'peace psychology,' broadly understood, to common policy analyses of peacebuilding" is needed (ibid.:16). Following Charbonneau and Parent's (ibid.) recommendation, this project utilizes peace psychology's insight into the connection between traumas at the micro level and national level reconciliation to inform theory and practice on institutional approaches to peacebuilding.

While bringing social level peacebuilding initiatives into focus, this research highlights that the institutionalized reconciliation mechanisms and social level efforts of healing and mending community relations are intimately connected to one another, and that they are best thought of as an interconnected whole. Drawing on his mental health work and research during and after The Troubles in Northern Ireland (1968-1998), David Bolton (2017) presents two main reasons why trauma is linked to the "big politics" of national reconciliation. First, according to Bolton (ibid.:2), "[t]he mental health and related consequences of conflict can limit community engagement, participation and belonging in the emerging post-conflict community," since the trauma that stems from

conflict is linked to narratives that are "laden with fearful, aggressive or sectarian sentiments" (ibid.:92). Therefore, Bolton argues (quoted in Moriarty 2017), that unresolved trauma and chronic mental health ailments may lead to continued dissemination of such narratives, serving to "amplify senses of grievance and injustice rather than try to resolve them," complicating the goal of reconciliation and potentially sowing the seeds of renewed violence. Second, the political debates around who the "victims" and "aggressors" of the conflict were and who deserves remembrance and justice complicate the task of building structures and mechanisms to assist those who suffer due to their traumatic experiences. As Bolton (2017:3) explains in the context of Northern Ireland, "whilst the dead of our civil conflicts are held sacred by one side or another (seldom by all), the suffering survivors run the risk of being abandoned because we cannot politically agree on how they ought to be helped."

Furthermore, mental health research and practitioners have found that "daily stressors" of the post-conflict environment "are important influences on mental health status, if not more important and pressing than the impact of trauma" (Meyer 2013:23). While they were initially focused on the prevalence of mental health disorders in complex humanitarian emergencies, mental health researchers have come to recognize the "effect of deteriorated environmental conditions on mental health and wellbeing […], including undermined social support networks, opportunities for generating income, and respect for human rights" (Tol et al. 2011b:1582). As a result, mental health practitioners and researchers began to shift their focus from individual symptomology to the long-term societal impact of trauma in the context of humanitarian emergencies (Tawil 2013:29). Therefore, MHPSS programs are not merely concerned with addressing individual pathologies but are designed with socio-political concerns in mind. As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) guidelines on MHPSS support in emergency settings suggest, "[t]he psychological and social impacts of emergencies may be acute in the short term, but they can also undermine the long-term mental health and psychosocial well-being of the affected population. These impacts may threaten peace, human rights, and development. One of the priorities in emergencies is thus to protect and improve people's mental health and psychosocial well-being" (IASC 2007:1).

The recognition of the wider implications of traumas that disasters and conflicts bring about has led to a proliferation of MHPSS programs and their integration into humanitarian assistance initiatives. Writing for the Bulletin of the WHO, Ventevogel et al. (2015:666) suggest that among mental health professionals, there is "consensus that humanitarian assistance should address mental health and psychosocial issues through intersectoral action." However, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various forms of MHPSS interventions has been sparse, as MHPSS practitioners have prioritized program implementation over program evaluation (IASC 2007:2; Tol et al. 2011b:1582; Bangpan et al. 2017:5). Yet, MHPSS programs continue to operate from a framework that presumes a link between trauma and national reconciliation.

MHPSS practitioners interviewed for this research were keenly aware of the interdependent relationship between their work and both the social and national dimensions of reconciliation. Similarly, funding agencies have adopted the position that MHPSS programs are peacebuilding initiatives as well as public health ones. For instance, in describing the projects it funds in BiH, USAID (2017) suggests:

> *"[I]f people adopt new, positive attitudes and change their behavior toward each other, social trust will emerge. If citizens begin to trust each other's intentions, they will be able to engage and collaborate on issues of common concern. In the resulting atmosphere of solidarity and consensus, they will begin holding their political leaders accountable for fostering stability – political, economic and social – in their communities."*

While MHPSS programs presume impact on institutions, the scholarly literature on peacebuilding, long focused on formal institutions, has yet to take the role of MHPSS programs seriously. Therefore, a lack of attention to MHPSS work from the perspective of the scholarship on national reconciliation represents a gap in the literature. Incorporating the insights of Peace Psychology would provide a strong basis for the renewed interest in exploring micro level initiatives and practices of 'everyday peace' and how they relate to the macro level.

This case study of post-conflict BiH explores how MHPSS programs, geared towards transforming traumas at the micro level, relate to national reconciliation efforts. Specifically, one of the main findings of this study is that in the case of BiH, failures of

political reconciliation have complicated the efforts of MHPSS programs towards healing, transforming traumas, and mending relations. I argue that it is necessary for scholars and peacebuilders to find ways to link 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches in both scholarship and policymaking; I suggest ways to do so in my conclusion. Therefore, the main audience of this project are scholars who are looking to complement the long-standing institutionalist focus in the study of peacebuilding through incorporating local, everyday perspectives and initiatives on peace and reconciliation (see: Donais and Knorr (2013) and MacGinty (2014)).

2.1.2 Other Contributions

In addition to calling for a robust linkage between social and state-level institutional reconciliation in peace-building theory and practice, this research makes two other contributions. First, the lack of a social level analysis means that women's contributions to reconciliation – such as rebuilding social relations and engaging in care work – are less visible in the literature, as women and women's concerns are often underrepresented in institutional processes such as peace negotiations, the rebuilding of political institutions, and trials. Feminist IR and peace studies scholars, motivated with the question of "Where are the women in IR?" (Enloe 1990), have been at the forefront of social level analysis, including in post-conflict settings (see, *inter alia*, Cockburn 1998; Korac 2006; Clark 2010; Byrne 2014). As this project engages with the traumatic experiences, emotions and interpersonal relationships of MHPSS participants in BiH, Feminist IR will inform my analysis throughout, as its has long investigated the links between emotions, experiences, and war. In doing so, this research project highlights the unique contributions of women and women's organizations to transformation of trauma and 'reweaving the social fabric' as well as the unique and pressing issues that women face in post-war BiH.

Second, this research project will be useful in refining the evaluation of MHPSS programs as a policy tool in post-conflict reconstructions. Documenting the extent to which the work of MHPSS programs following intrastate conflicts is reflected at a social level (as well as an individual one) would help local and international policy-makers to better understand the potential costs and benefits of implementing these programs. As post-conflict policy initiatives are often undertaken with scarce resources, a more robust

understanding of how the work of MHPSS programs can shift social attitudes towards reconciliation can be instructive as to how to implement them more efficiently. Furthermore, this research will help create an impetus for the designers and administrators of MHPSS programs to give more consideration to the socio-political implications of their work.

2.2 Mental Health and Reconciliation

As stated in the introduction, a key goal of this research project is to contribute to bridging the gap between the institutionalist perspectives on peacebuilding and local initiatives of reconciliation. In order to clarify how MHPSS programs reflect local initiatives on reconciliation, I show how reconciliation relates to the MHPSS programs via two common goals that I have identified, 'dealing with the past' and 're-weaving the social fabric.' I discuss how the scholarly research on war-related trauma relates to the theoretical and practical work on reconciliation.

2.2.1 The Literature on Reconciliation as it Relates to MHPSS Programs

Reconciliation is one of the most debated and contested terms in the Conflict Resolution field, one for which an agreed-upon definition does not exist. I use Brouneus' (2008) definition that was stated in the introduction, because, as she points out, despite the disagreements on its scope, there is near-consensus in the literature that "mutual acknowledgement of past suffering," "the changing of destructive patterns of interaction between former enemies into constructive relationships," and the "process towards sustainable peace" are fundamental elements of reconciliation. The first two of these elements are commonly referred to in Conflict Resolution scholarship with the terms 'dealing with the past' (a.o., Huyse 1995; Bell 2003; Rolston 2006; Subotic 2009; Austin 2017) and 'reweaving the social fabric' (a.o., Weinstein and Fletcher 2002; Bleeker 2006; Anckermann et al. 2005; Reilly 2009; Svard 2010:48).

MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings share the reconciliation goals of 'dealing with the past' and 're-weaving the social fabric.' First, reconciliation necessarily involves dealing with past trauma in order to set up a dialogue for the future (Lederach 1997:27; Bloomfield 2006:10; Parlevliet 2000; Fischer 2011:422-4). For instance, Akrivoulis (2017:379) argues that as the memory of past suffering persists amongst survivors, their demand for justice supersedes what transitional justice institutions can

deliver: "When memory calls for justice, it often demands the recognition of a responsibility that includes (but also reaches beyond) individual accountability. It demands that the members of the political community recognize a form of co-responsibility, even if they are not legally accountable." According to Fischer (2011:422), "[t]here is consensus among scholars and practitioners that societies that have gone through violent conflict need to deal with the legacies of the past in order to prevent a relapse into violence or repression." The most common methods of dealing with the past in the practice of reconciliation involve establishing a record of the atrocities committed during the period of oppression and violence through transitional justice initiatives such as truth commissions, trials, reparations, and memorialization and education projects.

Second, reconciliation necessitates the re-establishment of social relations following a protracted civil conflict. Protracted intrastate conflicts like the Bosnian War often have an adverse effect on civilian life and social relationships. Social and civilian institutions are deliberately targeted and the line between civilians and combatants blur as neighbors become enemies (Lederach 1997:23). Even after the cessation of violence, lack of social cohesion, fractured relationships, and mistrust define these communities (Lederach 1997; Staub 2006; Hamber 2009:23). Furthermore, as Fischer (2011:418) argues, "[p]oor relationships between groups are all too often a trigger for conflict, and remain a critical hindrance to peacebuilding." Therefore, aside from national level initiatives such as power-sharing agreements, facilitation of refugee return, and democratization, reconciliation following protracted civil conflict requires a social dimension as well. For a critical mass of scholars, reconciliation has an important relational aspect: it is a process through which new relationships are established out of the fractures of the past (see, for instance, among others: Galtung 1969; Govier and Verwoed 2002; Hamber and Kelly 2004; Lederach 2001; McCandless 2001; Fischer 2011). As Saunders (1999) argues, "only governments can write peace treaties but only people can transform conflictual relationships between people into peaceful ones." And as Stefansson (2010) points out, economic development, new political institutions, and refugee return do not necessarily amount to social reconciliation. Hence, while political aspects of reconciliation are more commonly studied in the literature, as they more readily relate to practical work (Bloomfield 2006:11), the social dimension – sometimes

described through the term "thick reconciliation" (Stefansson 2010; Helms 2010; Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010) – deserves further attention and study.

The above discussion shows that national reconciliation processes and MHPSS programs are each targeting the same problems of dealing with the past and reweaving the social fabric. As they aim to help their participants deal with their traumatic experiences of violent conflict, MHPSS programs can be considered as policy tools that serve the goal of 'dealing with the past' (Gutlove and Thompson 2003:13). In dealing with anger, and in promoting social skills and communication to re-establish community links, these programs constitute part of the effort of reweaving the social fabric (Weinstein and Fletcher 2002:631-2; Anckermann et al. 2005:143-9; Gutlove 2008:225-7). Yet, they do not get the kind of attention in literature as other policy tools geared towards these same reconciliation goals, such as truth commissions or trials. Therefore, an investigation into the relationship between national reconciliation processes and MHPSS programs is needed to identify the MHPSS programs' potential to contribute to reconciliation.

Re-establishment of social connections and trust, core elements of 'reweaving the social fabric,' is one of the key goals of psychosocial support programs. Their work towards this goal is based on the conviction that "victims of violence and rape cannot just walk back into everyday life as if nothing happened" (Bonino as quoted in Agger, Vuk, and Mimica 1995) and hence such programs aim to restore social cohesion and alleviate social mistrust. While there are some case studies that examine psychosocial support programs' impact on reduction of individuals' psychological symptoms (Stepakoff et al. 2006; Mooren et al. 2003) or negative attitudes towards former enemies (Staub 2006; Woodside, Santa Barbara, and Benner 2007) the evidence base for psychosocial support programs remains scant (Tol et al. 2011a), especially with regard to their social implications.

My project aims to address a gap in the Conflict Resolution literature by considering the contributions of MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings. Doing so requires interdisciplinary engagement with the field of Psychology – and the subfield of Peace Psychology, in particular – in a way that the field of Conflict Resolution has not yet attempted. Through my research, I engage the Conflict Resolution literature to

address two main issues of the debate on reconciliation – 'dealing with the past' and 're-weaving the social fabric.' While doing so, I contribute another perspective to the discipline of Psychology, providing more qualitative insights on the implementation of MHPSS interventions in divided post-conflict societies.

2.2.2 Previous Research on Mental Health Issues and Reconciliation

My project's goal of assessing how MHPSS programs relate to post-conflict reconciliation adds to the literature in the fields of Conflict Resolution, Peace Psychology, and Public Health that suggests a connection between past trauma due to conflict and the prospect of reconciliation. In particular, it builds upon the previous research that sought to understand the potential impact of war-related psychological issues on the prospects of post-conflict reconciliation. In this part of my literature review, I summarize the relevant findings that provided the impetus for pursuing my research question, which links trauma, the work of MHPSS programs and reconciliation.

2.2.2.1 Psychological Interventions in Post-Conflict Settings

Quantitative psychological research suggests a correlation between psychological ailments such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depression (MD), and negative attitudes towards reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Pham et al.'s (2004) research in Rwanda showed that PTSD sufferers were less likely to support the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Rwandan national courts, and the local *Gacaca* courts. They were also less likely to approve of interdependence with other ethnic groups. Vinck et al. (2005) found that in Uganda, those who suffered from PTSD were more likely to favor violent revenge over peaceful reconciliation. Bayer et al. (2007) found a similar relationship among the former child soldiers in Uganda who suffered from PTSD and MD. This line of research also suggests a significantly increased prevalence of both PTSD and mood disorders following a conflict. Tol et al. (2011b:1582) conducted a survey of psychological surveys in post-conflict settings and reported "average prevalences of 15.4% (30 studies) for PSTD and of 17.3 % (26 studies) for depression," which are "substantially higher than the average 7.6% (any anxiety disorder, including PTSD) and 5.3% (any mood disorder, including major depressive disorder), reported in 17 general populations participating in the World Mental Health Survey."

Qualitative psychological research, while questioning the validity of the PTSD diagnosis in non-Western settings (more on this debate later in this chapter), has also found that the psychological impacts of civil war have a significant influence on the prospects of reconciliation after the active hostilities cease. Such research highlights the erosion of social connections and social trust, leading to both individual and collective trauma (Hamber 2009; Lykes 2000; Lykes and Sibley 2014; Anckermann et al. 2005). Thus, improving the wellbeing of the victims in post-conflict settings is dependent upon both mending the individual and their connections to society: normalizing social relations, re-establishing connections, and getting to a sense of normalcy. Accordingly, this line of thought is more involved in – and advocates for – psychosocial support programs.

There is also quantitative work that highlights the importance of psychosocial support. Miller and Rasmussen (2010), for instance, found that the psychological distress of Afghan refugees is better predicted by their social connections and status where they have resettled than by wartime trauma. Similarly, Mooren et al. (2003:67), working in BiH from 1995 to 1999, found that average intake scores of their patients were actually higher – indicating higher levels of psychological distress – after the war than during the war due to "disappointment with the post-war developments," such as socio-economic hardship and broken social bonds. Despite these findings that suggest a possible connection, there are relatively few studies that detail how mental and psychosocial health influence the process of reconciliation.[4]

Several case studies regarding the design and implementation of MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings have been published in academic journals (see for instance: Mooren et al. 2003; Anckermann et al. 2005; Wessels and Monterio 2006; Stepakoff et al. 2006). As a result of financial and time constraints affecting NGO work in post-conflict settings, exhaustive evaluations of the impact of such programs are rare

[4] One of those few, a working paper derived from an MA thesis by Königstein (2013), employs a grounded theory approach in Lebanon to examine how the mental health situation in that country had affected the process of reconciliation after the civil war (1975-1990). He concluded that war trauma, coupled with an inadequate mental health system and social stigma, had led to disturbances of basic cognitive skills and an erosion of social trust, which has had a negative impact on reconciliation. Hence, Königstein (ibid.) called for greater accessibility of mental health resources, which could be achieved through a cooperation of local leaders, international organizations, and national authorities.

(Tol et al. 2011b). When such evaluations are done, they are typically focused on shifts in individual attitudes and symptomology (for instance, Mooren et al. 2003; Woodside, Santa Barbara, and Benner 2007), or personal reflections of the participants (for instance, Anckermann et al. 2005; Wessels and Monterio 2006). Therefore, such evaluations are not adequate in tracing the potential social impact of MHPSS programs. This is despite a general acceptance in peace psychology literature that psychosocial work can potentially help re-establish lost social bonds and trust that eroded during civil war, which can eventually help re-establish a democratic discourse (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004:631-2; Maynard 1997:208-10).

As MHPSS programs became more common, early practitioners seem to have assumed that their work would have positive implications at the social level by default, including for the processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation. For instance, Agger, Vuk, and Mimica (1995:28), writing in the last moments of the Bosnian War, suggest that "Interventions at the social and psychological levels can also play an important role in peace-making and reconciliation after the war has stopped" without fully explicating such connection. Gutlove and Thompson (2003:13) attempted to provide a basis for such arguments when they suggested that "Trauma healing is closely related to peacebuilding efforts; both are ultimately about developing or restoring healthy human relationships." However, their account also fell short of explicitly connecting trauma healing and peacebuilding and reconciliation. Later, Staub (2006:880), while maintaining the assumption that psychological interventions would have a positive influence on the process of reconciliation, called for a more detailed understanding of how psychological work would relate to other aspects of reconciliation. He argued that "[r]econciliation must take place at various levels, the psychological, political, institutional/structural, and cultural. The contribution of each is crucial, but interconnected […] Their relative contribution is difficult to identify, but in future work the way they interrelate will be important to further specify." Similarly, in Tol et al.'s (2012) investigation of the MHPSS research priorities among scholars and practitioners, one of the research questions they have identified was "How can we highlight the results that occur through interventions in the community?" pointing to an assumption that MHPSS work has "results" at the community level but an awareness as to the need to explicitly show them.

The early practitioners highlighted the fact that MHPSS programs shared common goals with peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives. However, the fact that they work towards common goals does not necessarily mean that MHPSS work was reflected in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, let alone had positive contributions (Allden et al. 2009). Therefore, not only is this assumption worth challenging, but there is also scholarly and practical benefit to explicating the mechanisms through which MHPSS initiatives could make an impact at the social level.

In more recent literature, researchers began to challenge such assumptions. Psychologists who research and/or undertake MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings became more interested in how psychological interventions relate to the social context. In particular, mental health practitioners and researchers who favor more community-driven approaches – as opposed to more clinical interventions – have come to consider how their work is reflected at a social as well as an individual level. Hence, more than two decades after MHPSS programs became commonplace in post-conflict settings, the field of psychology has finally begun to consider how such interventions are reflected at a social level.

The prime example of such considerations is an edited collection by Hamber and Gallagher (2015), titled *Psychosocial Perspectives on Peacebuilding*. The collection brings together seven case studies from a variety of settings such as Northern Ireland, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone. The editors asked the researchers in each case to detail how the psychosocial interventions they have conducted and/or studied were related to social transformation, peacebuilding, and development, whether by design or not. The collection represents a new focus and an important turning point in psychology literature on MHPSS interventions. However, the analyses of the intersections between such interventions and wider social processes featured in the collection are neither deep (no more than a few pages, in most cases) nor systematic. In one of the few scholarly articles that focus on psychosocial programs in relation to social change, *Psychosocial Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Approaches to Relational and Social Change*, Barry Hart and Edita Čolo (2014) describe how some of the participants in their programs in BiH went on to initiate peacebuilding projects themselves.

Hence, there is an opportunity to contribute to an interdisciplinary agenda on post-conflict MHPSS interventions research. The liberal peace paradigm has provided a wealth of knowledge about institutional approaches to development, peacebuilding, and reconciliation. As psychology researchers – who are more inclined to understand war-trauma as a social phenomenon – become more interested in considering MHPSS programs and their work at a larger scale, incorporating such macro level and institutional scholarship can lead to important contributions. My goal in this project is to contribute to the emerging line of research on how post-conflict MHPSS programs relate to wider social processes – in this case, to reconciliation.

Furthermore, examining Tol and colleagues' (2011:3) survey on the MHPSS research priorities among scholars and practitioners, it is evident that finding ways how MHPSS programs can be improved and evaluated remains at the top of the research agenda. Asked to identify the top ten research priorities regarding MHPSS initiatives, the researchers who participated in the survey ranked the question, "What are appropriate indicators to use when monitoring and evaluating the results of mental health and psychosocial support in humanitarian settings?" as number four. Three other questions (ranked 5th, 6th, and 8th) among the top ten were directly relevant to improving MHPSS program implementation, in regard to adaptability to social context, and assessing the effectiveness of family or school-based interventions.

2.2.2.2 Trauma as a Political Issue in Post-Conflict Settings

In order to explore how MHPSS programs' work relates to reconciliation, I shall consider how war-related trauma is relevant to reconciliation in the first place. As discussed in earlier in this chapter, the study of peacebuilding has long had an institutional focus and, as a result, trauma rarely comes into its focus. While the focus on trauma inevitably involves a micro level focus on individual experience and interpersonal relationships, the institutional focus in the study of peacebuilding led to an emphasis on macro level issues, processes, and institutions, such as elite level peace negotiations, rebuilding of new political institutions, or trials of war criminals. The theme of trauma rarely comes up in such scholarship. Therefore, in order to achieve its main effort of understanding how MHPSS initiatives relate to reconciliation, this project also explores,

to put it simply, why trauma matters when it comes to reconciliation after an intrastate war, based on the case study of BiH.

Since the 1990s, scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding paid significant attention to BiH, producing a vast amount of research. In particular, the scholarly attention focused on macro level concerns such as post-conflict statecraft (e.g., Cox 2001; Bieber and Keil 2009; Moore 2013; McEvoy 2015; Bennett 2016),[5] transitional justice initiatives – ICTY in particular – (e.g., Humphrey 2003; Orentlichler 2010) and rebuilding of civil society (Chandler 1998; Belloni 2001; Bieber 2002; Fagan 2005). However, despite such overwhelming scholarly attention, there are only a handful of studies that incorporated emotional experiences and attitudes of individual Bosnians as well (see, for instance, Clark [2010]; Hoogenboom and Vieille [2010]).

The scholarship on transitional justice lays bare the assumptions about the individual and social levels and their relationship with national level processes in peacebuilding scholarship that focuses on institutions. According to Fischer (2011:407), in contemporary scholarship and practice, the concept of transitional justice refers to "the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, lustration of state administrations, settlement on reparations, and also political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, reconciliation and cultures of remembrance." Kerr (2017:176) suggests that transitional justice has become "a vital 'tool' in the UN's peacebuilding kit," part of the institutionalist framework of liberal peace. Advocates of transitional justice, such as Neil Kritz and Priscilla Hayner argue that initiatives such as establishing a record of atrocities through truth commissions and holding war criminals accountable also contributes to reconciliation. They argue that establishing a common truth about the war helps to dispel nationalist myths, forces members of former enemy groups to acknowledge the crimes of their own groups and helps to start a national dialogue (Hayner 2001:154; Kritz 2009:18). Trials, proponents suggest, can serve to establish the criminal responsibility of individuals as opposed to entire groups, quell the desire for revenge, and marginalize the divisive rhetoric of those convicted (Minow 1998; Akhavan 2001). However, Thoms, Ron, and Paris (2010), through an empirical review of the literature, failed to find any correlation between the application of various transitional justice mechanisms and

[5] This line of literature is further discussed later in Chapter 7.

increased respect for rule of law or decreased political violence. Mendeloff (2009), through a review of studies on the mental health of survivors who took part in transitional justice, similarly found no indication that their participation resulted in improved mental health outcomes. Despite the lack of conclusive empirical evidence for the claims about the benefits of transitional justice, they show the conviction of advocates and practitioners of transitional justice that these macro level initiatives can promote reconciliation at the micro level.

Therefore, it is evident that however much attention and effort is given to macro level goals and issues of post-conflict transformation, they alone cannot get people to be able to trust their neighbors and form a healthy community with them. Reconciliation requires a dialogue to repair and re-structure the relations between former enemies in order to bring about new connections that would transcend the broken ones of the past (Lederach 1997; Fischer 2011:418). Continued mistrust towards the members of the rival groups represents a roadblock to both starting a dialogue and re-structuring relationships. Hence, following Clark's (2010) argument that inter-ethnic mistrust at the interpersonal level can have consequences for the prospects of reconciliation, attention to the micro level is just as important to achieving the goal of reconciliation as attention to the macro level. Little (2017:204-205) argues: "While formal institutional processes can sometimes provide forms of closure or means of coping with loss for individual victims, they can never deal with all of the ways in which conflict permeates everyday life over the course of time."

Furthermore, attention to the micro level would also shine a light on women's perspectives on reconciliation processes. In BiH, since women had been absent from the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) (not one signatory or high-level negotiator for any of the sides was a woman [UNIFEM 2012]) that set the blueprint of the country's new institutions and high-politics in post-war BiH have been dominated by men (Björkdahl 2012), a macro level approach does not capture the roles, contributions and ideas of women in post-conflict transformation. As Goldblatt (1997) argues, transitional justice processes focus on violations of individual rights as opposed to "systematic destruction of communities through the denial of socio-economic rights and poverty," and therefore the work of truth and reconciliation commissions can end up overlooking violations that

disproportionately affected women. Yet, many Political Scientists who study conflict resolution, transitional justice, and reconciliation mostly focus on the national level processes and issues. Hence, the insights and experiences of psychology on war trauma and MHPSS work in post-conflict settings provide an ideal window for us to understand the work of women and women's organizations towards peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Even though the Conflict Resolution literature on post-conflict transformation and reconciliation tend to focus on institutional level issues and processes, Feminist IR scholarship helps to make the case for studying war as an emotional phenomenon. Feminist IR has been adept at studying individual experiences that affect or are affected by international politics. When Cynthia Enloe (1990) noted women's relative absence from the "high-level" state, military, and diplomatic decision-making, she was compelled to ask, "Where are the women in IR?" To answer this question, Enloe's book "Bananas, Beaches and Bases" delved into experiences of women within the realm of IR in various roles such as military wives, guerillas, migrant workers, missionaries or victims of sex trafficking. Her work highlights the various roles in which women participate in and/or are affected by international phenomena such as war, securitization, or international political economy. Enloe's (ibid.) work highlighted the fact that women participate in international affairs in various ways, including as peacemakers, perpetrators of violence, victims, activists, and so on.[6] The example of "Bananas, Beaches and Bases" brought about an experiential focus in Feminist IR scholarship (e.g. Cockburn 1998; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Alison 2009; Clark 2009), setting it apart from the rest of the field.

Based on Feminist IR's focus on experience, scholars such as Christine Sylvester (2012; 2013a; 2013b) argue that the field of IR has long failed to study social, bodily, and emotional experiences of war. Sylvester (2012: 483) further suggests that Feminist IR "challenges International Relations to turn its view of war around and start not with states, militaries, strategies, conventional security issues or weapons, and not with the common main aim of establishing causes of war." Sylvester (ibid.) issues this challenge

---

[6] As Sjoberg and Gentry (2013) argue, contrary to the stereotypical view of "women as peacemakers," it is important to take "the violent women of international relations and the international relations of violent women" seriously in the Feminist study of IR. One of the examples they highlight is Biljana Plavsić, who was the Vice-President of RS during the war and was later convicted of war crimes by the ICTY.

because she argues that "war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people." In this sense, ordinary people can have tremendous effects on international relations – such as the contributions of civil society movements to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, Sylvester (2013b:4) criticizes mainstream IR for "treating war at a higher level of analysis, focusing very often on causes and correlates of war, on war strategies, weapons systems, national security interests, and the like because such framework "makes injury into a lamentable and regrettable consequence of the 'normal' violence of war." She argues "injury is the content of the war and not the consequence of it" (ibid.). Therefore, it is important to study the experience of violence, as well as that of the resulting injuries and traumas, as part of the study of war and post-conflict peacebuilding.

In calling for the study of war as an "experience," Sylvester (ibid.:5) defines experience as "the physical and emotional connections with war that people live – with their bodies and their minds and as social creatures in specific situations." The social and emotional experience of war is one of the main foci of this research project. Addressing negative emotions that arise due to the traumatic experiences of war, such as anger, fear and mistrust, represent one of the primary preoccupations of MHPSS programs and a key component of achieving the reconciliation goal of reweaving the social fabric. This research project follows Sylvester in giving primacy to the Bosnians' experiences of the war, the emotions evoked through those experiences and how these emotions are relevant in the larger understanding of the conflict and the post-conflict process. War, especially among once intertwined societies as the three main ethnic groups of BiH once were, inevitably evokes strong emotions. Such strong emotions can take root in a society, influence how it functions during and after the conflict and shape the nature of inter-group relationships (Čehajić-Clancy et al. 2017). It is imperative for practitioners and researchers who work on Conflict Resolution to pay attention to such emotions. Achieving this goal necessitates an on-the-ground approach due to the micro level lens needed to capture bodies, emotions, and attitudes of ordinary citizens, as Sylvester (2013a:620) argues. Political Scientist Janine Natalya Clark (2010) acknowledges that such micro level focus can be met with scrutiny from the researchers who adopt macro level lenses. Presenting her research in BiH about the families of missing people and their

attitudes towards reconciliation, she argues: “Feelings of mistrust on the part of families of the missing might be cynically dismissed as relatively unimportant, on the basis that they hardly threaten BiH’s political stability.” However, she defends her micro level focus, suggesting that “[i]t is at this lower level that inter-ethnic mistrust fuelled by the issue of missing persons has potentially significant implications for reconciliation” (ibid.:433).

2.2.2.3 Mental Health as a Social Issue

Practical and academic work on psychosocial distress due to conflict and the range of measures to address it often draw inspiration from the work of Ignacio Martin-Baro who is credited with developing ‘liberation psychology.’ Martin-Baro (1989) criticized the positivist approach of psychological work on post-conflict healing and reconciliation for insisting on “not taking sides” and, therefore, becoming ahistorical, non-reflexive, and individualized. Writing in the midst of the Civil War in his native El Salvador (1980-1992), Martin-Baro (1989:18-19) argued that psychotherapy would be an insufficient course of action as long as the social relations that perpetuated social polarization remained in place.

Instead, Martin-Baro developed ‘liberation psychology’ as an alternative, drawing inspiration from the Liberation Theology tradition in Catholicism (Martin-Baro was also a Jesuit priest) and critical pedagogy of Paolo Freire (1970). In criticizing the supposed “neutrality” of psychology, Martin-Baro called for taking the side of the oppressed and excluded people. Such siding would not constitute a bias, he claimed, but rather an ethical choice (Lykes 2000:384). Against the dominant understanding of mental trauma as an individual pathology, Martin-Baro (1996:14) argued that “(a) the injury that affects people has been produced socially (…), (b) its very nature is nourished and maintained in the relationship between individual and society […].” He highlighted the dialectical character of psychosocial trauma, suggesting that how trauma influences people is determined by their social situation and background, as opposed to a universal response that can be captured by diagnostic manuals (1996:123). Criticizing the non-reflexivity of the field, he favored community action research and incorporation of indigenous ideas, traditions, and practices. As Lykes and Sibley (2014:211) summarize, “[a] psychology of liberation develops critically and historically contextualized psychological theories and

practices from the perspective of 'the people,' wherein marginalized voices contribute to developing a community's vision."

Liberation psychology's understanding of trauma as a social phenomenon is one of the lynchpins of this research project. I share Martin-Baro's (1996:124) view that "[s]ocial trauma affects individuals precisely in their social character; that is, as a totality, as a system." This sentiment is a key factor in my decision to explore how MHPSS programs influence post-conflict reconciliation processes at a social level. As stated in the introduction, intrastate wars are more destructive against civic institutions, community relations, and trust than combat between traditional armies (Kaldor 2007:8). Reconciliation and sustainable peace remain elusive goals as recurrence rates remain high (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Mason et al. 2011). Therefore, understanding the impact of mental and psychosocial trauma on the efforts of reconciliation and how such trauma can be mitigated is a worthy inquiry.

There also exists a well-established and influential body of research that establishes a strong connection between the level of social connections and support one has for their mental and physical well-being. Reviewing research that investigates this connection, Stansfeld (2006:148) argues: "The evidence that social support is beneficial to health and social isolation leads to ill-health is now considerable." Such research is often linked to the social determinants of health (Marmot and Wilkinson eds. 2006) literature that has gained traction in the field of Public Health over the last two decades. In Western settings, researchers have examined the effects of psychosocial support programs on vulnerable groups such as cancer patients (Spiegel et al. 1989) and patients in substance abuse rehabilitation programs (McLellan et al. 1993), pointing to a potential salutary impact. While such research is often conducted in peaceful settings of industrialized Western countries as opposed to poor and conflict-ridden ones, they inform this project in stressing the connection between social conditions and individual pathologies. Through displaying the importance of social connections and trust in overall well-being, this line of research can help to highlight the potential benefits of re-establishing trust and social connections impacted by conflict and political violence, which is at the core of psychosocial programs in post-conflict settings. This literature firmly establishes the relationship between socio-economic and political factors and

mental health, providing a ground for the kind of interdisciplinary work to which the current project aspires.

2.2.2.4 Negative Emotions

Another intersection of mental health and reconciliation is the research on the emotional responses to traumatic experience of conflict. While there is a range of emotional responses that may prevail – including sadness (Rosenchek and Thomson 1986; Papageorgiou et al. 2000; Thabet et al. 2008), resilience (Wilson and Drozdek 2004; Bethancourt and Khan 2008), anxiety (Silove et al. 1998; Neria et al. 2010), and guilt (Čehajić et al. 2017) – I will focus on anger, fear, and mistrust in this dissertation. I made this choice for two reasons: First, post-conflict societies and societies mired in intractable conflict, including BiH, are commonly characterized as being plagued with 'anger,' 'fear,' and 'mistrust' in scholarly works from the fields of both Conflict Resolution and Peace Psychology. For instance, describing their MHPSS programs in post-civil war Guatemala, Anckermann et al. (2005:145) state that "Mistrust, fear, destructive behavior, lack of identity and self-esteem emerge through the civil war and destroy the social fabric." Criticizing the peacebuilding efforts of international agents in BiH, Yordan (2003:64) suggests that the "movement toward political cooperation and social integration of Bosnia has been hampered by strong feelings of hatred, mistrust and fear among the ethno-national groups." Salvadoran psychologist Martin-Baro (1996:111) observes that war-affected peasants in his country were "hyper-vigilant and mistrusting." Mihaela (2016:7), investigating the role of emotions in transitional justice, focuses on "resentment and indignation." Keita (1998), Lake, and Rotchild (1996), Bar-Tal, Halperin, and De Rivera (2007), and Spanović et al. (2010), among others, highlight the prevalence of anger, fear and mistrust in societies mired in ethnic conflict in their studies, despite conducting their analyses in a variety of disciplines, about different settings and with different methodologies.

Second, as "collective emotional orientations" (Bar-Tal 2007), anger and fear are key components of the continuation of wartime social mobilization and mistrust impedes the restructuring of intergroup relationships. According to Bar-Tal (ibid.), anger and fear serve to sharpen the divides between groups. These emotional responses, therefore, are of utmost relevance to reconciliation. Furthermore, Clark (2010:433) argues that intergroup

mistrust "has potentially significant implications for reconciliation," because "if relationships are characterized by suspicion and mistrust, they cannot be genuinely restored and repaired" (ibid.:432). Therefore, anger, fear, and mistrust are key to our understanding of the connection between war related trauma and the social level of reconciliation.

2.3 Theories of Social Mobilization Prior to Civil War

In order to explain the relationship between MHPSS programs and social reconciliation, I will clarify what the social dimension of reconciliation entails. Doing so requires an understanding of how social groups are drawn into conflict. In this section, in order to establish a framework of the social level of reconciliation, I engage with the literature on social mobilization in the lead up to civil war and the social de-mobilization after war. In this context, I analyze the "greed versus grievance" framework that became influential through the oft-cited works of David Laitin, James Fearon, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler. I adopt a social-psychological model of social mobilization based on Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) research, because, as shown later in this chapter, their model has the most explanatory power for the case of BiH.

Until recently, the most cited research on the root causes of civil wars focused on 'greed' and 'grievance' as potential motivators of conflict. Such research views the decision to participate in a civil war as a collective action problem and seeks to understand the cost-benefit analysis that an individual would make in deciding to join a rebellion against the state. Hence, rational choice theory became the dominant paradigm guiding such research, as it is the most common approach to analyzing collective action problems in Political Science. Rational choice theory posits that – given the available options – a political actor will choose those that will maximize their utility, i.e., achieve a goal they desire (Geddes 2003:175). In this framework, 'greed' is shorthand for opportunities for success and potential material and/or political gains that a rebellion against the state may bring about for a group. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 'grievance' may refer to real or perceived political and socio-economic injustices that a group faces at the hands of another, or to ethnic/religious rivalry and hatred. In the early 2000s, 'greed' emerged as the most prevalent explanation Political Scientists used for the onset of civil wars. In two widely cited and debated articles, Fearon and Laitin (2003)

and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) used quantitative models to gauge the statistical relationship between the onset of civil war and several indicators of 'greed' and 'grievance.' Both studies found strong support for the 'greed' argument. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003:75), "[t]he factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty—which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and favors rebel recruitment—political instability, rough terrain, and large populations." Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) model, similarly, yielded the strongest correlations with factors related to greed, such as the availability of natural resources, potential for financial support (for instance, remittances or payments from other governments), or costs of recruitment. The only grievance indicator that produced a statistically significant relationship with the onset of civil war in Collier and Hoeffler's (ibid.) model was "ethnic domination through political exclusion." To put it simply, these articles suggested that masses would not mobilize for a civil war absent an expected pay-off.

While the scholarship of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) has been influential, they have faced challenges. Using the framework of "grievance and greed," Regan and Norton (2005:319) suggest that grievance is the key determinant of the onset of conflict, while greed helps to sustain the mobilization. They argue that "grievance leads to collective behavior, but defection is always a problem, so rebel leaders resort to selective benefits that tap into self-interested behavior." Criticizing Fearon and Laitin's work, Cederman, Weidman, and Gleditsch (2011) argue that "rejecting 'messy' factors, like grievances and inequalities, may lead to more elegant models that can be more easily tested, but the fact remains that some of the most intractable and damaging conflict processes in the contemporary world, including Sudan and the former Yugoslavia, are largely about political and economic injustice." Bodea and El-Badawi (2007:23) suggested that the models that downplay the importance of grievances fail to "model civil war as part of an evolving process of political violence." Scholars such as Chiba and Gleditsch (2014) criticized models that highlighted greed for using the Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality, as it would fail to show the level of inequality between the rival groups. Taydas, Enia, and James (2011:2627) criticize the

"dichotomous framework" of the scholarship on the subject, arguing that it "masks other important questions about the way that collective action is achieved in some circumstances and not others."

More recent research highlights the role of social structures in mobilization for civil war, casting doubt on the 'greed' argument. In her fieldwork about Abkhaz mobilization prior to the Georgia-Abkhazia War, Shesterinina (2016:425) focuses on the role of social structures in motivating mobilization. She questions the assumption that actors involved in civil war mobilization have access to full, neutral information that would allow them to make a calculated decision about cost and benefits of going to war. Instead, according to Shesterinina (ibid.), "threats are not given, but are rather constructed or filtered through and consolidated by the social structures that individuals interact with in daily life." For instance, in the case of Abkhazian fighters against Georgia, she found that the key to their social mobilization was the prevalent understanding of the conflict "as a threat to their collectivity," even when they had "little prospect of security or success in the war" (ibid.).

2.3.1 Social Mobilization in BiH: Theory and Practice

How much explanatory power does research about outbreaks of civil wars have in the case of the Bosnian War? First, BiH's mountainous terrain fits Fearon and Laitin's (2003) definition of a "rough terrain" which, they argue, makes civil war more likely as it gives irregular forces room to operate against regular armies. However, unlike most other civil wars, the conflict in BiH did not involve a conflict between an insurgent group and a regular army. Rather, all three sides were comprised of a mixture of a regular army (ARBiH, HVO, and VRS) and an array of paramilitary forces and volunteers. Hence, BiH's rough and mountainous terrain was not a particular factor in the outbreak of the civil war.

In regard to the dichotomous framework of 'greed' and 'grievance,' 'greed' has certainly been one of the motivators for conflict. Remittances from exiled Croat nationalists were key to the Bosnian Croat war effort (Skrbiš 2007:232-5). Looting was commonplace throughout the war and was part of the motivation for Serb paramilitary groups in the early stages of the war (Cigar 1995:83). A glaring example of a self-interested actor was Fikret Abdić, a Bosniak leader who commanded a paramilitary force

in Western Bosnia during the war and declared the territory his forces held as autonomous. Abdić and his men were transparently more interested in their personal wealth and power than any ideological commitment, and even cooperated with Bosnian Serb Forces against ARBiH to protect their fiefdom (Nation 2003:168).

However, while looters and profiteers joined in the fight, the driving force of the war effort, particularly in the initial offensive of Bosnian Serb Forces, were the hardline nationalists. As the UN's special rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1995) documented, the Bosnian Serb war effort was focused on cleansing non-Serbs from territories they deemed part of "Greater Serbia." Mazowiecki documented that Bosnian Serb Forces engaged in a consistent effort to expel non-Serbs from the territories they controlled and destroyed their religious and cultural objects. Furthermore, when international negotiators gave the Bosnian Serbs a chance to solidify their gains during peace talks in Athens in May 1993, hardline nationalists of the National Assembly of RS rejected the deal that UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and the European Community's Representative Lord Owen negotiated and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević supported. The Bosnian Serb leaders' insistence of securing all of what they viewed as Serbian homeland led them to reject a favorable deal that would have allowed them to hold on to most of the territorial gains they had made, at a time when they controlled almost 70% of BiH's territory (Silber and Little 1996:267-290). To a lesser extent, HVO and ARBiH engaged in campaigns of ethnic cleansing at different points of the war in the name of securing a homeland (ibid.:294-300). Hence, the primary motivating factors behind the Bosnian War would fall under 'grievance' in the dual framework on 'greed and grievance.' In particular, as will be further detailed in Chapter 4, the anxieties of minority Serbian populations in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo in the face of the expanded jurisdiction of the federal units they lived in paved the way for the ambition of "Greater Serbia:" an imagined Serb ethno-state which would include parts of the territories of Serbia's neighbors.

One of the most common concerns about the theorizations of the onset of civil wars based on "grievance" is that oftentimes grievances are present well before the social mobilization for war begins (Regan and Norton 2005:321). For instance, Serb grievance regarding the minority Serbian populations living under the expanded autonomy of the

federal republics of BiH and Croatia as well as the autonomous region of Kosovo go back to the constitutional changes in 1974. Therefore, by itself, the fact that one or more groups have grievances does not help to understand how social mobilization takes place. I turn to a different model from the discipline of social psychology to show how dormant grievances can be animated to drive social mobilization for civil war.

2.3.2 A Social Psychology Model on Social Mobilization

In their theory of how social mobilization takes place ahead of civil war, social psychologists Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (2014) highlight two core elements of the process: exclusive group identity and narratives of collective victimhood. Exclusive group identity, according to Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (ibid.:125), "elevates the own group above others, sharpens the differentiation between the in-groups and out-groups, and prevents people from crossing inter-group boundaries." They define collective victimhood as "a group mindset resulting from the perceived intent of another group to inflict harm on the collective. The harm also must be viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral and one that the group was not able to prevent" (ibid.:127). A narrative of collective victimhood reads the group's history as a continuous struggle against its aggressive enemies, thereby delegitimizing its rivals and justifying aggression as a pre-emptive defensive effort.

Using the lead up to the violent break-up of SFR Yugoslavia as their case study, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy argue that the ascendance of nationalism and shifts in national identity allowed nationalist elites all over the country, specifically in Croatia and Serbia, to use exclusive group identity and narratives of collective victimhood to draw masses for their cause. The process of social mobilization, according to Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (ibid.:126), is "executed through messages composed of beliefs that are relevant, are concrete, appeal to identity, are threatening and arouse strong emotions. Of special importance are the messages that attribute hostile motives and intentions to the other group (i.e., delegitimization)." For instance, in the case of the Serbs during SFR Yugoslavia's disintegration, the primary tool of social mobilization was the "chosen trauma" of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 (Volkan 1999). According to Volkan (1999:35), the trauma of this battle, which started the Ottoman domination of the region that lasted more than four centuries, was never resolved among the Serbs and was transferred from

generation to generation. In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle, Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević ceremoniously re-buried the Battle of Kosovo commander Prince Lazar in numerous Serb villages, with people mourning as if the Prince had died the day before. Volkan (1999:36) argues that due to such evocation of ancient trauma "Feelings, perceptions, and anxieties about the past event were condensed into feelings, perceptions, and anxieties pertaining to current events." Therefore, when Milošević invoked the memory of the Battle of Kosovo and the martyrdom of Prince Lazar, the fears of invasion and Muslim domination re-surfaced among the Serbs, this time in the context of being a minority community in a Republic of BiH that the majority of Bosniaks dominates. Serbian peace activist Vesna Pešić (quoted in Lake and Rotschild 1998:7) described this process as "fear of the future, lived through the past."

While the Turks no longer had a significant presence in the Western Balkans, these fears were directed mainly towards – pre-dominantly Muslim – Bosniaks, as many Serb officials, soldiers, and even common people came to refer to the Bosniaks as "Turks." As SFR Yugoslavia faced disintegration, Serb leaders – Milosevic in particular – successfully exploited their people's fear of being dominated by their neighbors. These fears gave credence to the idea of uniting all Serbs under the banner of a "Greater Serbia" through invading neighboring republics and engaging in ethnic cleansing. When violence takes hold and spreads following the mobilization of a social group, so does the sense of victimhood that feed exclusive group identities. As Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (2014:127) put it, "[i]n many cases, victimhood helps to feed the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation."

As will be explained in further detail in Chapter 4, the scholarly literature on SFR Yugoslavia's disintegration and the Bosnian War indicates that the development of exclusive group identities and narratives of collective victimhood were, in fact, key features of the pre-war social mobilization, as Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's theory would suggest. Furthermore, their social psychology perspective helps to guide the current project in navigating the connections between political violence, reconciliation, and trauma.

2.3.3 Socio-Psychological Infrastructure of Conflict

According to Bar-Tal (2007), when social mobilization is followed by conflict, groups begin to develop a "socio-psychological infrastructure" as an adaptation. Such adaptation is necessary in order for individuals and communities to deal with decreased safety, uncertainty, and fear, as well as for promoting loyalty and sacrifice in order to withstand the rival group (ibid.:1434). Thanks to such adaptation, societies can give meaning to the conflict, help cope with the stress related to conflict, justify the actions of their own group, endure tough life conditions, and motivate unity and solidarity (ibid.:1440-1443). However, as the "socio-psychological infrastructure becomes a prism through which society members construe their reality" (ibid.:1430), it produces a vicious cycle in which a conflict state of mind leads to attitudes and behavior that perpetuates the conflict.

Bar-Tal identifies three elements of socio-psychological infrastructure in intractable conflicts: collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation. Collective memory evolves over time to present a meaningful narrative of the conflict for the members of the group. This is necessary to encourage the loyalty and personal sacrifice needed to win – or at least not lose – the conflict. As these narratives serve the purpose of justifying and giving meaning to the conflict, they often present the group as victims of other groups' aggression (ibid.:1436), perpetuating the narrative of collective victimhood. "Collective emotional orientations" may develop in societies as an adaptation to conditions they face. Bar-Tal (ibid.:1439) suggests that among societies that are in intractable conflicts, the most common collective emotional orientations are anger and fear. These negative emotions are most often directed at the rival group, leading to mistrust between the groups. Ethos of conflict, according to Bar-Tal (ibid.:1438), is "the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future." In intractable conflicts, eight societal beliefs form the core of such ethos: Justness of own goals, national survival, positive collective self-image, victimhood, delegitimizing the opponents, patriotism, unity, and peace as the ultimate desire of the society (Bar-Tal 1998; 2007; 2013). They help to build a black-and-white narrative of the conflict in which one's own side is righteous and is under constant threat of 'the enemy.'

2.3.4 The question of social de-mobilization: Accommodation or Paradigm Shift?

While socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict provides necessary adaptations for a society to withstand the conflict, it also represents an impediment for social de-mobilization as it helps to sustain exclusive group identities and narratives of victimhood. Therefore, socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict has implications for rebuilding of political institutions that could sustain the peace.

As discussed above, research that focuses on how political institutions should deal with continued divisions in post-conflict settings is one of the key components of institutional approaches to peacebuilding. The literature on (re)building of political institutions in deeply divided societies is centered on the debates about the theory and practice of consociationalism and power sharing, which initially emerged from the subfield of Comparative Politics. Comparative Politics scholar Arend Lijphart formulated consociational theory in the late 1960s and 1970s, and since then it has been the primary source of inspiration in the (re)building of political institutions following intrastate conflict. As Taylor (2009:1) puts it, "consociational theory […] – through promoting a power sharing of a specific kind – promises a democratic solution to societies confronted by durable ethnic division and conflict."

Lijphart (1969) initially developed consociational theory as a critique of Almond's (1956) argument that the stability of Anglo-American and Continental European democracies was mainly due to cross-cutting political cleavages. As a response, Lijphart (1969) put forward the examples of Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium, which are all stable democracies despite socio-political heterogeneity and lack of cross-cutting cleavages. Lijphart (ibid.:211-216) argued that these countries built their stable democracies on the premise of power sharing. Consociational institutions, according to Lijphart (ibid.), produced elite cooperation through joint control of government authorities to prevent a potential deadlock of the political process due to heterogeneity of the population. Besides such grand coalitions, consociational democracies seek to foster a degree of political autonomy for each constitutive group, ensuring proportional representation of each group in the ranks of civil service and instituting mutual vetoes to prevent one group dominating the other (Lijphart 1977). These four characteristics – a) grand coalitions, b) group autonomy, c) group quotas in

civil service, and d) mutual vetoes – are key properties of a consociational institutional design.

Later, Lijphart (1977;1985) put forward consociational theory as a prescriptive theory to guide democratic development in societies that had suffered from recent conflict and/or deep divisions, recommending its implementation to end the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Since then, consociational theory has been the primary inspiration for formulation of institutions following intrastate conflicts, including in BiH (Taylor 2009:6-7; McCulloch 2014:501). In essence, consociationalism seeks to overcome conflict in heterogeneous countries through accommodating differences into the political structure. Through consociational arrangements, one group cannot dominate the other in political decision-making – even if they constitute a plurality or a majority.

Critics of consociationalism, however, argue that it is not an appropriate institutional design for post-conflict societies. Horowitz (1982), one of the most prominent critics of consociationalism, argues that consociational arrangements serve to entrench identity as the main political cleavage, thereby blocking alternative political associations from emerging. Building on this point of view, Taylor (2009:10) claims that consociationalism does not "provide critical intent to move beyond political accommodation and conflict management to integration and conflict transformation." As a result, continued dominance of nationalism and/or ethnopolitics would incentivize the governing elites to continue pursuing nationalist goals as opposed to accommodation in the type of grand coalition that consociational theory prescribes (Andeweg 2000:520). Such nationalist incentives, coupled with mutual veto rights that consociationalism prescribes, can result in political deadlock (Zahar 2005).

Responding to such criticism, the proponents of consociationalism sought to distinguish corporatist and liberal versions of consociationalism. As McGarry and O'Leary (2007:675) explain, "[a] corporate or predetermined consociation accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or religion, on the assumption that group identities are fixed and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded. This thinking indeed privileges such identities at the expense of those group identities that are not accommodated, and/or at the expense of intragroup or transgroup identities […]. A liberal or self-determined consociation, by contrast, rewards

whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities. Liberal consociations also take care to ensure that the rights of individuals as well as groups are protected."

While O'Leary and McGarry (2009:26) argue that most consociational theorists would prefer the implementation of a liberal version, McCulloch (2014) suggests that implementation of liberal consociationalism is dependent on the context and "less likely to be freely adopted" (ibid.:502). According to McCulloch (ibid.:512), "[t]he adoption of liberal rules is […] more likely to occur when the demographic balance between majority and minority is about to tip," as the majority group would be amenable to a liberal version if they think their demographic advantage will soon recede. She suggests that "If extremists are the dominant voice, they are likely to demand corporate rules." In BiH, for example, the conditions for a liberal consociational arrangement were not suitable at the end of the war. The demographic balance between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs has been steady,[7] with Bosniaks under no immediate threat of losing their majority. Furthermore, extremist parties, politicians and narratives have continued their hold on the politics in BiH, which made a corporatist arrangement more likely, per McCulloch's (ibid.) argument.

According to critics of consociationalism, post-conflict political institutions should be geared towards rewarding inter-group cooperation as opposed to institutionalizing inter-group divisions to accommodate them (Horowitz 1982). This approach is often termed as centripetalism. Centripetalist recommendations to promote moderate political voices and inter-group cooperation may range from altering electoral systems to reward parties for drawing cross-group votes (either through formation of multi-group electoral districts or the use of a preferential voting systems such as alternative vote) to promote social integration (Reichel 2000:14).

[7] According to the 1991 census, the last one conducted in SFR Yugoslavia, BiH's population was 43% Muslim, 31% Serb, 17% Croat and 5.5% identified as 'Yugoslavs.' The 2013 census suggests 50% of the population are Bosniaks, 31% are Serb and 15% Croat. Since 1971 (the first Yugoslav census in which "Muslim by ethnicity" was an option for ethnic background), Bosniaks have been the most populous group and expanded their demographic edge ever since.

At their core, both consociationalism and centripetalism aim to structure relationships. They posit that former enemies can productively cooperate within the framework of a particular incentive structure. However, both theories are elitist in their focus. The assumption behind both theories is that the transformation of the relationship between the political elites through new institutional frameworks would be mirrored in the relationships among their constituents. Hence, these Comparative Politics theories evaluate questions of peacebuilding through an institutional perspective. In inquiring about how the psychological work of MHPSS programs relate to reconciliation, this project explores not only the elite level relationships but also relationships at the interpersonal and social levels. To do so, I adopt Bar-Tal's (2007) and Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) social psychological frameworks on socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict and social mobilization and utilize them to analyze restructuring of relationships at personal, social, and national (elite) levels, and how efforts at each level relate to one another.

In adopting Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) framework on social mobilization, this study aligns more closely with the argument for diffusion of exclusive identities. Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (ibid.:127) suggest that the persistence of narratives of collective victimhood would "impede the peace process" in the post-conflict era. The experience of war can serve to further instill a sense of collective victimhood amongst the warring parties. "Groups with high sense of collective victimhood," Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy argue (ibid.:129), "reason that the in-group is allowed to do everything within its power to prevent a trauma from ever happening again," including resorting to violence. Therefore, reconciliation among social groups necessitates "de-mobilization" of each party. De-mobilization of a social group involves deflation of the narrative of collective victimhood and exclusive identity that led to the initial mobilization. To do so, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (ibid.:131) argue, rival groups "must recognise and accept their crimes, freely discuss the past conflict and take responsibility for and correct past injustices and wrongdoings." Taking these steps would allow the conflicting groups to form new relationships that could transcend the broken ones of the past and restore the humanity of the former enemy group.

In calling for a social de-mobilization that involves significant attitudinal shifts, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy put forth an argument for social-psychological paradigm shift in post-conflict settings. Therefore, their argument has implications for the prevalent debate on the design of political institutions in post-conflict settings. Whereas consociationalism maintains group autonomy with the addition of structures designed to keep one group from dominating the other(s), centripetalism argues for a more radical restructuring of the relations between the groups through incentivizing cooperation. Calling for social de-mobilization aligns Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy with centripetalism's vision of post-conflict political institutions, as they are both geared towards promoting active dialogue among rivals while simultaneously transforming the nature of their relationship.

2.3.5 Operationalizing Social Reconciliation

Adopting Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's framework on social mobilization, I refer to their argument on social de-mobilization in order to operationalize what social reconciliation entails. Therefore, to detail the contributions of MHPSS programs on social reconciliation, I look for evidence that suggests that:

a) MHPSS programs have helped participants acknowledge past crimes of their own group (acknowledgment of the past),

b) taking part in the MHPSS programs, participants became more willing to discuss the conflict than before, especially with members of the other group (free discussion of past conflict),

c) after the MHPSS programs, participants sought to accept responsibility for past injustices and/or seek to rectify them (making amends),

d) participants sought to restore connections with the members of the rival groups, even in small ways like re-connecting with an old friend from the other group or shopping from the stores of the other group (inter-communal contact).

Achievement of social reconciliation requires such restructuring of relations to be prevalent in each society and widely accepted by its members. In BiH, as the three constituent ethnic groups struggle to agree on common symbols of their country or a shared narrative about the war (Kostić 2008), this is yet to be the case. However, as Boulding (2000) reminds us, even in the midst of conflict, pockets of peace culture can

continue to exist and flourish. Moreover, as Silove (2013:238) argues, post-traumatic growth and positive change is achievable for both individuals and communities even in the most adverse contexts. In this project, I focus on whether MHPSS programs have helped to bring about positive change that creates and/or sustains pockets of peace culture in BiH, thereby making a positive contribution to the goal of social reconciliation.

2.4 Relevant Scholarly Debates

2.4.1 What Constitutes a "Psychosocial Intervention"?

Clinical programs and interventions that take place in post-conflict settings are often easily identifiable, as they are led by psychiatrists or psychologists and primarily deal with psychological ailments defined in Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals (DSM) of Mental Disorders, such as PTSD or MD. Defining the term 'psychosocial' and what constitutes a psychosocial intervention, however, has been a challenge within the literature on MHPSS programs and there have been a variety of definitions. An early definition of the term was adopted at a 1997 symposium organized by UNICEF, which suggested that "The term 'psycho-social' underlines the close relationship between the psychological and social effects of armed conflict, the one type of effect continually influencing the other" (UNICEF 1997). However, this early definition was challenged for its narrow understanding of social effects of armed conflict, which focused on frayed relationships and economic hardship but not on disruption or destruction of social institutions, cultural practices, or customs (Galappatti 2003). In 2000, scholars and humanitarian organizations that work on psychosocial interventions in complex emergencies formed the Psychosocial Working Group (PWG).[8] PWG expanded on UNICEF's earlier definition, which included traditions, norms, and culture as part of the social experience that is interlinked with the psychological experience (PWG 2003). Using PWG's expanded interpretation of social experience as a starting point, Hamber and Gallagher (2015:3) suggest "the 'psychosocial' concept emphasizes the close interrelationship and interlinking between psychological aspects of experience (thoughts, emotions and behaviour) and wider social experience (relationships, traditions, norms and culture)."

[8] More information on PWG is available at: http://www.forcedmigration.org/psychosocial/ (Accessed January 16, 2018).

Despite their differences, all of these definitions highlight that psychological and social aspects of human life are interconnected. In this sense, mental health is not merely an individual state but is a by-product of social relations (Martin-Baro 1996). For instance, in their "Thematic Issue Brief" on psychosocial well-being, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (2010) argue that "many psychosocial problems do not require clinical treatment but are rooted in stigmatisation, lost hope, chronic poverty, uprooting, inability to meet basic needs, and inability to fill normal social roles such as that of student/learner." As such, while clinical mental health interventions focus on treating individual pathologies such as PTSD or MD, the goal of psychosocial support programs is to tackle social pathologies that prevent individuals from establishing healthy and productive relationships with others.

While there is a general framework about the definition of the term psychosocial, there is a more contentious debate on what constitutes a 'psychosocial intervention' or 'psychosocial practice' in an emergency and/or post-conflict setting. This debate is interconnected with a larger, more complex one between researchers and practitioners who favor clinical approaches such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and those who emphasize community-driven methods to counter the impacts of political violence and other humanitarian emergencies. Becker (2015:4), drawing on his field experience in the Gaza Strip, argues that health and education professionals often hold the view that "mental health issues lead to specific interventions by psychiatrists and therapists, while psychosocial support is something anybody can provide and involves a lot of recreational activities." Hence, Becker (ibid.) suggests that the theories on the interconnected nature of individual and social aspects of psychological well-being is not adequately reflected in the work done on the ground. He sees a need to address this issue with a broad approach to psychosocial programs and calls for a "deeper reflection […] to create different forms of intervention […] based on an understanding of psychosocial support not as something broad and undefined but as specific activities that can stabilise or enhance well-being in a traumatising environment without recourse to medicalised models of treatment" (ibid.).

Williamson and Robinson (2006:6), on the other hand, have the opposite concern: They are wary of defining what constitutes a psychosocial program or an intervention too narrowly. They argue that "it is more useful to think in terms of interventions that

contribute towards well-being than it is to try to develop a system for determining whether a particular intervention should be considered 'psychosocial' or not." Therefore, they suggest, instead of focusing primarily on the form of the interventions and/or activities in qualifying them as "psychosocial," researchers should assess these interventions on their ability to address the relevant social issues that are at the root of psychosocial problems in a given community. Similarly, Hamber et al. (2015:9), building on Abayasek-era et al.'s (2008) work on Sri Lanka, argue that "psychosocial-ness or psychosocial sensitivity of an intervention should be determined by how an intervention was designed and implemented, rather than by the specific nature of the intervention."

In this project, I adopted the approach of Williams and Robinson (2006) and Hamber et al. (2015) to determine whether the projects I have encountered during my research constitute an MHPSS program or not. Some of my interviewees worked in programs that did not explicitly include a therapy or treatment from a psychologist or psychiatrist. However, their programs sought to address, per Williams and Robinson (2006:6), the relevant social issues at the root of the psychosocial problems that affect many Bosnians, mainly: the inter-ethnic disagreements about the past, continued animosity between former enemies, socio-economic anxiety, and gender-based discrimination and violence. In this study, to be qualified as a MHPSS intervention in the context of post-conflict BiH, a program must explicitly tackle at least one of these four issues. The first two issues are, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, primary reasons why tensions remain in BiH despite more than two decades of stable peace. Gender-based violence, rape in particular, was a prominent feature of the Bosnian War (Faber and Stiglmayer 1994; Card 1996; Nikolić-Ristanović 1996; Diken and Laustsen 2005). Traumas of gender-based violence of the war and the continuing problem of domestic violence suggest (Čopić 2004; Avdibegović and Sinanović 2006; Muftić and Bouffard 2010) that women's issues are at the forefront of psychosocial problems in BiH. The country has the fourth-lowest GDP per capita in Europe at 6031 USD and 15.9% unemployment, with youth unemployment at 34% (World Bank 2020). Poverty and unemployment have been among the most acute social problems in post-war BiH that present further traumas and hinder the healing of individuals and communities. Therefore, in selecting my interviewees, I included those who worked in programs that

aimed to tackle one or more of these issues, even if their projects did not have an explicit psychology or psychiatry dimension and/or the interviewees did not have a background as a mental health professional. Per the definition of a psychosocial intervention adapted from Williams and Robinson (2006) and Hamber et al. (2015), these projects I have studied fit the description of an MHPSS program, even without an apparent focus on mental health issues.

Hamber et al. (ibid.:10) differentiate psychosocial interventions from a more general category which they term "psychosocial practices." They argue that, while the literature often focuses on psychosocial projects that are designed by outsiders, there are significant local and community driven initiatives and practices that can address psychosocial issues of a given community. According to Hamber (2016:5), "[l]ess clinical and community-driven approaches include activities such as group sharing of problems, community dialogue, traditional healing rituals, art projects, theatre initiatives, interpersonal skills development, training on issues such as human rights and mediation, engagement in livelihood projects." Therefore, psychosocial practices include "as existing social and community processes […], as well as formal programmes and projects, no matter their content, that aim 'to improve the psychosocial well-being'" (Hamber et al. 2015:10).

While Hamber and colleagues' observation is on point, this project focuses on MHPSS interventions, i.e., initiatives that have been – at least partly – specifically designed and implemented to respond to the conflict as opposed to pre-existing local measures – for instance healing or grieving rituals. The reason for this choice is my desire to understand MHPSS programs in the context of policy initiatives following intra-state wars. As every society, as a universal response, strives to develop resources to cope with suffering and loss (Silove 2013), local psychosocial practices would always exist in a variety of contexts. Designing and implementing MHPSS programs on the other hand is a policy choice that local and international institutions (governments, NGOs, IGOs, etc.) make. Therefore, it is important to scrutinize whether they achieve their purported goals or not to inform policy decisions regarding MHPSS interventions.

2.4.2 Criticisms: Do MHPSS Programs Impose Western Norms?

While their application has become commonplace since the Bosnian War, MHPSS programs are not without critics. Summerfield (1999), for instance, criticizes MHPSS literature for pathologizing the normal distress people go through in the face of extreme traumas of war. Emphasizing that the discourse of trauma as a pathology has been articulated quite recently, as PTSD was first included in the DSM-III in 1980, Summerfield (1999:1449) argues: "The Nazi concentration camp survivors who emerged in 1945 mostly sought to rebuild their personal and work lives, and what they could of their communities, and put the war behind them. Most did not seek, nor were offered, psychological help and postwar Western society did not think of them as carrying an enduring psychological wound." To Summerfield (1999), widespread application of MHPSS programs through IGOs and international NGOs represents an imposition of the newly developed Western understanding of trauma as an individual pathology. Therefore, the programs amount to imposition of such understanding of trauma to populations that might not share it.

Coming from the IR literature, Pupovac (1998:490), similarly, argues that international psychosocial aid constitutes colonization of the mind "through the imposition of a Western therapeutic model on other societies." As does Pupovac, critical IR scholars Agathangelou and Killian (2009) argue that mental health interventions from Western countries that are implemented in post-conflict settings amount to the exercising of what Foucault (1990:141) termed "biopower," which refers to "techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies)." Hence, Aganthangelou and Killian (2009:22) suggest that "discourses of trauma could themselves also be methods of securing and making possible global-power practices," as they serve to divorce individual suffering from the political context.

Agathangelou and Killian (ibid.:51) further challenge the individualized nature of psychotherapy and claim that it fails to account for societal dynamics and resiliencies. For instance, based on their research in Cyprus, they suggest: "As described by one interviewee, a psychiatrist operating from the medical model may prescribe pills for

outward physical signs without asking about the larger familial, community, and sociohistorical contexts of the person's distress [...]. This individualisation, or atomisation, of patients/clients' experiences makes the medical model a useful epistemological tool especially in contexts and at moments when the treatment of events and approaches to civic problems becomes atomised." They go on to argue for what they call "ordinary dialogue," in which a therapist is a mere facilitator of a dialogue between the members of the former enemy groups about their experiences of conflict. According to Agathangelou and Killian (ibid.), "[w]hen people come together and engage in 'ordinary' dialogue about events and experiences – both the ordinary and extraordinary – they can begin the process of regenerating a sense of trust."

However, the scholarship and practice of MHPSS programs have undergone significant changes since their initial bloom in the 1990s. Referring specifically to her research on Palestine, Tawil (2013) points out that on the subject of conflict related issues, mental health research has moved on from the individual trauma approach that Pupovac (1998), Summerfield (1999), and Agathangelou and Killian (2009) have criticized. According to Tawil (2013:29),

> *"a trauma focused approach in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is no longer in concert with the ongoing, diverse developments in the field of mental health, which has grown well beyond the trauma model. Researchers, in acknowledging the roles of resilience, positive coping strategies and supportive environments in the mental wellbeing of Palestinians, have implemented interventions and studies focused on these factors* [...]. *Internationally, researchers and practitioners have developed guidelines that serve as international standards for effective and responsible responses to mental health needs in emergency settings, and these guidelines' core principles are firmly entrenched within a human rights framework (IASC 2007; Sphere Project 2011)."*

Tawil (ibid.) further refers to Tol et al.'s (2011a) survey on MHPSS research priorities and points out that none of the 10 priority questions identified in the survey focused on PTSD, indicating that an individualized focus does not define contemporary MHPSS research.

Hence, reviewing MHPSS literature indicates that the relevant research and practice has evolved significantly in the last two decades, becoming more sensitive to context and more grounded in a human rights approach. In doing so, MHPSS research and practice have responded to allegations of exercising biopower and adopting an individualized approach that is insensitive to socio-political context and human rights principles. As will be detailed in the later chapters, my interviewees in BiH were well aware of the context in which they had to work and were critical of the state healthcare institutions due to their pharmacological approach to mental health issues. Their programs often incorporated both psychological treatment and the kind of "ordinary dialogue" that Agathangelou and Killian (2009:51) advocate for.

2.4.3 The Contentious Debate on PTSD

One of the most important debates about MHPSS interventions in post-conflict situations is on the appropriateness and utility of PTSD as a diagnostic tool in non-Western settings – where modern conflict is most prevalent. While epidemiological studies in psychology often utilize PTSD as an indicator without extensive questioning (see for instance the above cited studies on PTSD and attitudes towards reconciliation), qualitative psychology and other social science literature (particularly in the field of Anthropology) are rife with its criticism (Batniji, van Ommeren, Saraceno 2005). As it is a widespread debate with consequences as to one's understanding of mental health trauma and appropriate responses to it, I summarize the main points of this debate and the approach I adopt towards it within the framework of the current project.

Critics argue that PTSD is a Western construct that does not necessarily capture non-Western representations of suffering (Bracken and Patty 1999; Bracken 2001; Martin-Baro 1996; Summerfield 1995; 1999; 2000). According to Bracken (2001), as an extension of its Western roots, PTSD is an individualized concept that runs the risk of pathologizing the victims and failing to capture the social dynamics that contribute to their suffering. Martin-Baro (1996), in building his liberation psychology model, sought to transcend the clinical/medical approaches in psychology and social psychology that utilize PTSD as a diagnostic tool, emphasizing the dialectical and social character of trauma. Furthermore, psychologists such as Martin-Baro (1996:110-111) and Summerfield (1997; 1999) argue that focusing on PTSD may lead to "medicalization" of

the understandable distress people go through due to experiences of war. Summerfield (1999:1450) further challenges the scientific validity of PTSD as a concept. He argues that PTSD's formulation in the US, following the return of veterans from the Vietnam War, was the result of a self-serving militaristic agenda: "PTSD offered Vietnam veterans legitimated victim-hood, moral exculpation and a disability pension through a doctor-attested sick role – a powerful combination."

While not explicitly challenging the scientific validity of PTSD, Hamber (2009; 2015) argues that the concept has led to the homogenization of variant reactions to experiences with different forms of violence like domestic violence, structural violence, torture, or war. According to Hamber (2009:22), "PTSD is wholly inadequate as a concept to capture […] the full extent of the impact of political violence," since political trauma has a different character than accidents or natural disaster. Even patients, Hamber (2015:4) suggests, adopt the medical terminology and say "I am suffering from PTSD" or "I am traumatized," instead of detailing their own experience. Such homogenization, Hamber suggests (ibid.), "strips away the meaning individuals attach to violence in different contexts. To one individual a nightmare might be immaterial, to another it might be a reason to seek medical help, and to yet another it might be the ancestors passing on a message or sign of spiritual discord."

Miller and Rasco (2011) offer a useful middle-way in this discussion. They argue that over-reliance on PTSD would, indeed, be a narrow view to adopt in studying the challenges that conflict affected populations face – such as their own research that focuses on refugees. On the other hand, they argue that epidemiological studies do yield "compelling findings," and "acknowledging the presence of trauma within individuals in no ways contradicts the idea that trauma may also occur as a psychosocial phenomenon that affects entire communities and their underlying fabric of social relationships" (2011:8). This project is informed by Miller and Rasco's approach in charting its way through this contentious debate. While motivated by an attention to the re-establishment of social fabric in the name of reconciliation – therefore adopting a more socially sensitive lens – I still consider and utilize research that indicates a connection between the incidence of PTSD in post-conflict settings and negative attitudes toward peaceful reconciliation.

2.5 Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter, I highlighted the contributions this research project makes to the scholarly literature. I identified its main contribution as providing a social level perspective to the study of peacebuilding, which has long been studied with a focus on institutions. In addition, I identified incorporation of women's roles and perspectives on peacebuilding – which are often obscured in studies that focus on institutions – and an analysis of MHPSS programs as a policy tool as other contributions of this study.

In the second section, I introduced three lines of inquiry in the scholarly literatures on reconciliation and on MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings. First was the research in Peace Psychology, which found that war-related traumas influence people's attitudes towards reconciliation. Second was the literature on the goals and work of MHPSS programs, which indicated that the goals of MHPSS programs and reconciliation overlap based on their focus on 'dealing with the past' and 'reweaving the social fabric.' Third, the review highlighted research that suggests mental health is dependent on the social contexts, which indicates the interconnected nature of top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding initiatives. Taken together, these three lines of research establish that widespread war-related trauma constitutes a social issue that is relevant for the prospects of reconciliation.

Through this literature review, I set the theoretical frameworks of this research. Adapting the social-psychological framework of social mobilization from Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) work, I identified four elements of social reconciliation: acknowledgement of the past, free discussion of past conflict, inter-communal contact, and amends-making.

Finally, I engaged with some of the points of contention in the relevant literature. First, I considered various definitions of what constitutes a psychosocial intervention. Cognizant of the scholarly debates on the topic, I defined an initiative in BiH as a psychosocial program if it sought to address one or more of the key social problems in the country that are at the root of the psychosocial distress of Bosnians – namely, the inter-ethnic disagreements about the past, continued animosity between former enemies, socio-economic anxiety, and gender-based discrimination and violence. Second, I

considered the criticism that MHPSS initiatives amount to an exercise of bio-power, imposing Western notions of individualized trauma. Through a review of the literature, I have concluded that MHPSS work has evolved to become more context sensitive and less focused on a strictly individualized paradigm of trauma and healing. Finally, I considered the debate on the validity of PTSD as a diagnostic tool. I settled on a nuanced approach that is committed to a socially sensitive position that also considers epidemiological findings gathered through PTSD diagnoses.

The review of the relevant literature in this chapter served to explain why the research question on the relationship between war-related traumas, MHPSS work to mitigate those traumas, and reconciliation is worth investigating. It also set the theoretical framework of this research project through clarifying its parameters of social reconciliation. Finally, it explored the issues of contention in the relevant literature and clarified the positions I adopted in this research.

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

In this chapter, I begin by describing the goals of my analysis. Then, I explain why I opted for a qualitative case study of BiH. I detail my main interview targets and coding practices. Then, in respond to Enloe's (1990) question, "Where are the women?", and identify how this study accounts for the experiences of women by highlighting gender-specific challenges that trauma and recovery present for women at the social level of reconciliation. Finally, I detail the practical and ethical challenges I have faced during my research, which limits the universality of the findings beyond the BiH case and may guide future research.

3.1 Goals of the Analysis

As noted in the Introduction, research in the discipline of psychology shows that individuals who have had traumatic experiences of war are less likely to support reconciliation initiatives. Therefore, in the context of peacebuilding, trauma is not merely an individual concern but has social consequences as it may impede the goal of reconciliation. Based on this knowledge, most MHPSS practitioners assume that the impact of their programs is not only individual but also social (Agger, Vuk, and Mimica, 1995:28; Gutlove and Thompson 2003:13; Staub 2006:880). They do not view their work only in terms of individual psychotherapy or trauma healing but also as peacebuilding projects. However, when they report on their activities, they can only account for the impact on individual participants – in terms of dissipation of clinical symptoms of trauma and/or changing attitudes towards members of a former enemy group. Yet, MHPSS practitioners often assume that there is a societal impact of their work, even if it is not robustly documented. Yet, as discussed in the literature review, theory and practice in peacebuilding mostly focus on institutions – trauma and its social impacts are an afterthought. Therefore, when it comes to understanding the societal consequences of traumatic experiences of war and whether MHPSS programs can counter them, there is a missing link – namely, there is a lack of robust analysis as to how MHPSS programs contribute to the social level of reconciliation. The goal of my analysis is to help close this gap.

To do so, I first need to analyze the connection between individual experiences of trauma and social level reconciliation in the case of BiH. To evaluate whether MHPSS

programs can contribute to social reconciliation, I need to understand how traumatic experiences of war hinder its prospects in the first place. Analyzing how individuals' traumatic experiences of war can have societal consequences lays the ground for an analysis of how MHPSS programs can contribute to social reconciliation in their work towards transforming the traumas of the participants. Therefore, the initial goal of my analysis is to understand what, in the context of Bosnia, the societal consequences of traumatic experiences of war are. As discussed in the Literature review, Social Psychology research on social mobilization for conflict provides a guideline on how to conduct an analysis of individual experiences of trauma and social level reconciliation. Such research has identified narratives of collective victimhood through negative emotions such as anger, fear, and mistrust as the main ways in which traumatic experiences of individuals become societal traumas. I used this line of literature to formulate the relevant questions for my interviews and analyze the responses to see which of the above themes became salient. In addition, my interviewees identified intergenerational transfer of trauma as another way in which traumatic experiences of war lead to societal consequences, providing another theme for this part of my analysis.

My next goal is to detail how MHPSS programs work to transform the traumas of their participants and whether they contribute to individual and social levels of reconciliation in the process. In doing so, I aim to gain an understanding of how MHPSS programs help their clients to transform their traumas and whether they are able to address the societal consequences of traumatic experiences of war through their individual level work, thereby contributing to social reconciliation. On the individual level, I focus on MHPSS programs' impact on ailments such as PTSD and MD (as the research on MHPSS programs' efficacy often does [Tol et al. 2011b:1582]), as well as on the participants' abilities to acknowledge their own trauma (as brought up by my interviewees). To understand MHPSS contributions to the social level of reconciliation, I focus on the common goals of MHPSS programs and reconciliation as identified in the literature review: dealing with the past and reweaving the social fabric.

Finally, I incorporate the socio-economic and political conditions in BiH into my analysis to understand whether they are impeding, helping, or having no discernible

effect on the social consequences of trauma and MHPSS ability to contribute to social reconciliation.

While there is strong evidence that MHPSS programs are able to both reduce the incidence of clinical symptoms and contribute to the individual level of reconciliation (see, for instance: Pham et al. 2004; Vinck et al. 2005; Bayer et al. 2007), whether MHPSS programs can influence the broader society beyond their participants is an open question. In this research, I attempt to identify mechanisms through which the individual level impacts of MHPSS programs can contribute to the social level of reconciliation. If this case study cannot find evidence of such contributions, then it is important to understand whether it is not possible for MHPSS programs to have social level influence, or if it is possible but has not occurred in this particular case due to political and/or socio-economic conditions in the country.

3.2 Design and Method Choices

In this study, I use a case study design for three main reasons. First, the prospect of reconciliation is dependent on numerous factors such as the intensity and the nature of the war, cultural and historical factors, or the actions of local and international politicians. Therefore, untangling the effect of MHPSS programs, particularly in local as opposed to national context, necessitates an in-depth analysis. Second, as the research seeks to discover not only *what* the impacts of MHPSS programs are on reconciliation at a national level, but also *how* they influence reconciliation at the social level and how this may affect national level reconciliation, a detailed account of the processes through which MHPSS work through the case study is necessary. Unlike a large-N design, a single case study allows me to use the necessary controls to isolate the influence of MHPSS programs on the complex process of reconciliation or to identify the causal processes through which they influence reconciliation on a social level. Finally, as the research into how MHPSS work relates to socio-political factors is relatively new, a case study approach is more appropriate in building a knowledge base that can serve as a foundation for further inquiry that can incorporate comparative and large-N studies through the development of reliable measures regarding MHPSS contributions to peace writ-large.

As stated in the introduction, I focused my research on the MHPSS programs undertaken in BiH following its 1992-1995 war. There are two reasons to examine this particular case in regard to my research question. First, as a country recovering from a devastating civil war that continues to suffer from political and socio-economic problems as well as continued ethnic tension, BiH provides an ideal case where the war is over, but reconciliation is still ongoing. Thus, I have an opportunity to observe the reconciliation process firsthand and get a clear picture of it through this case.

Second, as Agger, Vuk, and Mimica (1995) and Arcel (1998) document, post-conflict BiH saw an unprecedented proliferation of MHPSS related initiatives. In a survey that Agger, Vuk, and Mimica conducted in 1995 – towards the end of the civil war – the authors identified 185 psychosocial programs implemented by 117 organizations across BiH and Croatia. BiH has been a post-conflict setting where MHPSS programs and work has been pervasive, making it an ideal case study to trace the relationship between such work and the reconciliation process.

Due to the widespread application of MHPSS programs in post-conflict BiH, it will serve as a *most-likely* case, to be utilized as a plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005:75). According to Eckstein (1991:149), "a plausibility probe into theory may simply attempt to establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, that is, that an apparent empirical instance of it can be found." Based on the previous research findings about negative impacts that trauma and psychosocial distress can have on reconciliation, I hypothesize that MHPSS programs can positively influence reconciliation initiatives. I theorize that through tackling war trauma, the frayed social connections, and negative emotions (such as anger, fear, and mistrust), MHPSS programs have a positive influence in the social and political dimensions of reconciliation efforts. Given the proliferation of MHPSS programs after the war in BiH, undertaking this particular case study helps identify whether this theory is worthy of investigation across several cases and in wider detail.

In attempting to establish an account of how MHPSS programs in BiH affected social interactions in the communities where they are implemented, I primarily relied on qualitative data. There are three reasons why achieving the goals of the analysis outlined above necessitated a qualitative approach. First, qualitative data, in contrast to

quantitative, is better suited to examine complex and multi-layered social processes and produce narratives based on them (Mack et al. 2005:3-4; Skaar 2013:99). Quantitative methods, while more appropriate for producing generalizability, do not produce the kind of rich contextual detail that qualitative methods could (Mack et al. 2005:4). Quantitative studies on MHPSS programs often rely on intake and exit surveys about attitudes and trauma symptoms of individual participants to produce quantitative data about the effects of the program [see, for instance, Mooren et al. (2003); Wessells and Monterio (2006); Woodside, Santa Barbara, and Benner (2007)]. However, collecting quantitative data focused on individual attitudes and symptomology does not show the social processes through which MHPSS programs' work relates to reconciliation. Second, qualitative methods of data collection allowed me to be more reflective about local cultural practices on punishment and forgiveness and local historical narratives. Key parts of my analysis require rich contextual detail that is best achieved through a qualitative discourse analysis. For instance, analyzing how adherence to narratives of collective victimhood impedes reconciliation requires an understanding of the various narratives that are common among the people of BiH and which segments of the society work to perpetuate these narratives. Similarly, assessing the progress towards the goal of dealing with the past would require contextual detail about competing versions of Bosnian history. Third, a qualitative approach has the advantage of providing the researcher with the perspective of the participants (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). In this research, the interviewees' (i.e., the local project designers, administrators, and counselors who have taken part in an MHPSS program) own positions on how MHPSS work in BiH have contributed to the process of social reconciliation was the best method of establishing the link between the dependent and independent variables at hand. Due to their participation in the MHPSS programs, their expertise of the relevant psychological work, and their ability to observe and understand local social dynamics, the interviewees were uniquely capable of providing information about how MHPSS programs helped to transform participants and how the attitudes and social interactions of participants changed as a result. Therefore, the interviewees were able to talk authoritatively about the relationship between MHPSS programs and reconciliation at the social level. Exploring this relationship through

quantitative data would have involved attempting to isolate several potential intervening variables.

I primarily used interviews as a data collection method. I wanted to conduct interviews because it is the most fruitful method of understanding the multi-layered processes of reconciliation (Skaar 2013:99), particularly of the “thick” kind. Through the interview method, I was able to extract information from my interviewees about the diverse ways in which MHPSS programs can transform the participants’ attitudes towards reconciliation and various ways in which these participants took an active role in the process of reconciliation. I conducted semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample (Blaike 2010:178) of locally based program designers, administrators, and counselors who took part in one or more MHPSS programs in BiH since the war. The main objective of my interviews was to find out about the interviewees’ views on reconciliation and how they think their work relates to it. While a significant number of foreign experts – affiliated with IGOs, foreign NGOs, or governments – also participated in designing and implementing MHPSS programs in post-conflict BiH, I limited my sample to locals and one foreigner with long-term experience in the country. My goal in doing so was to ensure that my interviews would elicit information on how MHPSS programs resonated with social processes on the ground and how the social interactions of the participants shifted, which might be difficult to observe for a foreigner whose stay in the country was temporary. Local interviewees, along with their psychological expertise and participation in MHPSS programs, were also in a position to accurately interpret the local social and political dynamics that provide the context for the reconciliation initiatives in BiH. I did not conduct interviews with people who sought assistance from MHPSS programs. In practical terms, I was concerned about potential ethical implications of interviewing vulnerable people (such as inadvertently triggering flashbacks or other psychological symptoms). In terms of my research goals, I was doubtful whether people who sought the help of MHPSS programs could unpack their impact on their attitudes and relationships from other influences in their lives.

3.3 Where are the Women in this Study?

Gender is a critical dimension of this study. Pham et al. (2010) found that women are more likely to suffer from mental illness due to war trauma. During the Bosnian War,

mass rape – particularly by the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) – was used as a war strategy and gender-based prosecution was one of the defining features of the war (Nikolić-Ristanović 1996). Furthermore, feminist approaches to transitional justice highlight the lack of attention to women's experiences within the practice and scholarship on peacebuilding and reconciliation, owing to a focus on institutions that are dominated by men (Bell and O'Rourke 2007; Ni Aolain 2012). Bell and O'Rourke (2007:22), asking the question, "[W]here are the women in transitional justice?" have found that "women have been largely absent from forums that settle on the nature and design of transitional justice mechanisms" because "waging wars and negotiating peace agreements are primarily male affairs" (ibid.: 25). Thus, paying attention to the social dimension of reconciliation, as I sought to do in this project, presents an opportunity to better understand the particular problems women face and the efforts they make in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. I aimed to highlight how women experience trauma differently, what MHPSS programs specifically do for women, and how women participate in the process of reconciliation at the individual and social level.

3.4 The Sample of Interviewees

I conducted 18 semi-structured interviews that involved 21 people (one interview included two interviewees and another included three) who have worked as volunteers, project designers, project managers, and consultants in several MHPSS programs designed to address war-related trauma in BiH. All but one participant – a consultant from the US who spent extensive time in BiH – were citizens of BiH. The age of the participants varied from mid-20s to late-60s, with most falling in the middle. The variance in ages reflects an array of experiences in relation to the war period and a varying extent of familiarity with the pre-war socio-political structures of BiH. Six out of 21 respondents (26%) worked for a faith-based NGO and four out of 21 (19%) worked for a women's organization.

Of the 20 participants who were citizens of BiH, four of them (20%) self declared as belonging to more than one ethnicity – a much higher proportion than the country overall. While this anomaly might simply be due to a small sample size, it might also indicate a special ability and/or willingness of Bosnians of mixed background to be involved in work related to trauma healing and reconciliation. Including those with dual

ethnicities, the sample included 13 Bosniaks, 5 Croats, 5 Serbs, and 1 non-Slav.[9] Compared to BiH's demographics (about 50% Bosniak, 31% Serb, and 17% Croat), the sample includes more Bosniaks. Given the fact that most of the wartime crimes were committed against Bosniaks (Čalić 2012), this may explain why they would be overrepresented in MHPSS work.

The sample included significantly more women than men: 16 of the 21 interviewees were female (77%). This was not by design – my initial inclination was to have a gender balance in my sample. However, when in the field, I learned that more women were involved in MHPSS work in BiH than men. More women are involved in MHPSS programs for reasons similar to why more Bosniaks are involved, including that they have been disproportionally affected by the war. Many women in BiH have suffered the trauma of losing their male relatives in the war. Some women, like those who were in Srebrenica during the war, lost all of their male family members, husbands, sons, fathers and grandsons. Rape was widely used as a weapon of war (Faber and Stiglmayer 1994; Card 1996; Nikolić-Ristanović 1996; Diken and Laustsen 2005). Furthermore, BiH is still plagued by high levels of gender inequality as the stigmatization of rape victims, domestic violence, and lack of economic prospects pose additional burdens for women. Finally, quantitative research indicates that women are more vulnerable to mental health issues such as PTSD or MD due to conflict than men (Pham et al. 2004:607).

Hence, for many organizations that utilize MHPSS programs to address war-related trauma, women are a core target group. As stated above, four interviewees belonged to a group that explicitly focused on women's issues. As Mlinarević, Isaković-Porobić, and Rees (2015:36) argue, women's NGOs have been the primary actors in the "provision of services such as medical assistance and psychosocial support" for traumatized women – particularly survivors of rape – as the focus of the Bosnian state and outside interveners has been on social welfare instead. Two other interviewees (MO and NJ) indicated that the vast majority of the participants in their organizations' MHPSS programs are women – up to 95% in MO's case – even though they did not work for women's organizations and their work was not specifically targeted towards women. In

[9] I chose not to disclose this participant's non-Slavic ethnicity, as it would have made her more easily identifiable.

fact, apart from the interviewees who worked on programs that specifically targeted veterans, only EZ stated that she had more male participants in a program than female participants.[10] Furthermore, EZ and MHA suggested that social pressure to be or appear strong and 'masculine' might make men less likely to seek psychological help. Only in MHPSS projects that explicitly focused on war veterans, more male volunteers, project designers, and administrators were involved than female ones. There are three interviewees in this sample who worked primarily with veterans, two of whom are male.

As I wanted to get a diverse account of the work of MHPSS programs in BiH, my initial plan was to interview people who took part in these programs at three different levels: program designers, administrators, and counselors. I intended to interview an equal number of people at each level. However, some of the people I interviewed spent their entire careers putting together MHPSS programs, having fulfilled all of those roles at some point. Others were forced to fulfill multiple duties at once for the programs they worked in due to a lack of financing and/or available staff. As a result, making a clear demarcation and interviewing equal numbers of program designers, administrators, and counselors proved difficult. However, my sample included experiences from all levels of MHPSS work. Overall, 15 interviewees cited experience as counselors, 8 as administrators, 8 as project managers, 3 as consultants, and 2 as volunteers.

All of the participants had either worked in both entities of BiH or were part of an organization that undertook projects across the country, serving all three main peoples of

Table 1: List of Interviewees

Alias	**Ethnicity/ Nationality**	**Gender**	**MHPSS Program Role(s)**	**Region(s) of Operation**
EZ	Bosniak	Female	Counselor/Admin	Entire Country
BH	American	Male	Consultant	Entire Country
MO	Serb	Female	Counselor/Project Manager / Admin	Entire Country

[10] EZ's program included more male participants than female participants as it was based on public speaking events. According to her, these events were less effective with female participants as their traumas were ongoing in their nature, especially in the cases of having loved ones gone missing. Male participants, most of whom were veterans, were more likely to achieve closure. The gender-based differences in the context of EZ's programs are further discussed in Chapter 5.

MHA	Bosniak	Male	Counselor	Tuzla Canton
BA	Croat	Female	Project Manager	Mostly Eastern Bosnia
ZS	Bosniak	Female	Project Manager	Entire Country
BZ	Bosniak	Female	Counselor	Sarajevo
RK	Croat/Serb	Female	Counselor	Mostly FBiH
AP	Bosniak	Female	Project Manager/ Counselor	Entire Country
SD	Bosniak	Female	Counselor/Admin	Mostly FBiH
MH	Bosniak	Female	Counselor	Sarajevo
GB	Croat	Male	Counselor/Admin	Entire Country
VO	Bosniak	Male	Project Manager/ Counselor	Western Bosnia
TG	Serb	Female	Admin/Volunteer	Western Bosnia
TC	Bosniak/Serb	Female	Counselor/Volunteer	Western Bosnia
NJ	Bosniak	Female	Counselor/ Project Manager	Entire Country
AH	Bosniak	Male	Project Manager / Admin	Entire Country
MV	Croat/Serb	Female	Counselor/ Project Manager/ Admin	Tuzla Canton/North and Eastern Bosnia
AR	Bosniak/Other	Female	Counselor	Eastern Bosnia
JT	Croat	Female	Admin	Entire Country
AMP	Bosniak	Female	Counselor	Mostly FBiH

BiH. They have worked in and/or are familiar with various regions of the country, both entities, and Bosniak, Serb, and Croat communities. Therefore, their experience helped me build an overall picture of BiH, as opposed to that of a particular region, entity, or group. The interviews took place during my fieldwork in BiH from July to September 2016, in the cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Sanski Most, Zenica, and Srebrenica.

All but one of the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. AMP did not want to be recorded, so I took detailed notes during our interview. Four interviewees, BA, NJ, MO, and TG spoke through a translator. The rest of the interviews were conducted in

English. All of the interviewees are anonymized and assigned aliases for the purposes of the research.

After each interview, I asked the interviewees if they could share documentation about the MHPSS program they currently work with, preferably an assessment prepared for either an internal audit or for an external donor. Overall, 11 interviewees shared documents with me. Five of these were publicly available documents. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, these documents were not included in the coding. Two other documents merely included a description of the MHPSS program and how many people participated. As they were not particularly useful for the purposes of this project, they were not coded. Four remaining documents were both unpublished and included relevant information such as pre and post-tests on psychological symptoms, evaluation of the project's impact on the participants and the community at large, as well as excerpts from participant interviews. I included these documents as part of the source material during the coding process, along with the interviews. They are referred to as Report 1, Report 2, Report 3, and Report 4 throughout the dissertation.

3.5 Building the Analysis

My analysis, presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, is based on the themes and research goals identified in section 1 of this chapter. In this section, I describe the process of building my analysis.

Prior to the field research, I prepared a list of 17 interview questions – the complete list is available in Appendix I. I utilized the semi-structured nature of the interviews to ask follow-up questions, inquire about examples, or skip questions if the interviewee already answered it as part of answering a prior question. In accordance with the first research question, I designed interview questions to elicit the interviewees' experience about how war related mental and psychological distress affects reconciliation and how the work that MHPSS programs do relates to social level reconciliation. In addition, I sought to find out about the interviewees' understanding of the connection between war related trauma and reconciliation at both the social and national level.

I posed questions 2 and 4 to get a detailed understanding of the interviewees' work in the MHPSS field. I asked questions 1 and 3 to learn about how the interviewee

conceptualized reconciliation, which informed my analysis on the connection between war related trauma and reconciliation.

Question 15 focused on the negative emotions that arise due to conflict. As discussed in the literature review, scholars such as Yordan (2003), Anckermann et al. (2005), and Bar-Tal (2007) have identified negative emotions such as anger, fear, and mistrust as an impediment to the reweaving of social fabric. Question 15 was designed to find out whether MHPSS programs could mitigate negative emotions among the program participants, thereby contributing to the reweaving of social fabric.

Question 16 was informed by studies that suggest those who suffer from mental health ailments such as PTSD or MD are less likely to support reconciliation initiatives and more likely to favor violent revenge instead (Pham et al. 2004; Vinck et al. 2005; Bayer et al. 2007). Through this question, I inquired about the interviewee's observations on the link between mental health ailments and attitudes towards reconciliation. Furthermore, I sought to collect information from the interviewee regarding whether MHPSS programs can impact social reconciliation through helping participants to manage ailments such as PTSD and MD.

Questions 5 through 9 were informed by the social mobilization framework I adapted from Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy (2014). I asked the interviewee whether their participants exhibited behaviors that would be consistent with social demobilization, such as inter-communal contact, acknowledgement of past crimes perpetuated by one's own group, seeking to make amends, and free discussion of the past conflict. The answers to these questions helped me understand how MHPSS programs could contribute to social reconciliation.

In questions 8, 9, and 10, I focused on what I argue to be the common goals of MHPSS program and reconciliation: dealing with the past and reweaving the social fabric. I posed questions about these goals both in relation to the interviewee's MHPSS program and Bosnian society at large. In doing so, I aimed to prompt the interviewee to consider the overlap between their goals in their MHPSS programs and reconciliation goals in the context of BiH. Therefore, their answers to these questions were crucial to my understanding of the connection between war related trauma and social reconciliation. In questions 11 and 12, I brought up this connection more explicitly to the interviewee to

learn about how they think the work of MHPSS program impacts (or could impact) social reconciliation.

I asked Question 13 to gain an understanding of how the socio-economic context impacts MHPSS work – a factor I wanted to account for due to the extremely high levels of unemployment and poverty in BiH. I anticipated that the conditions of abject poverty in BiH would have an impact on both the work of MHPSS programs and the prospects of reconciliation. Furthermore, given the high levels of corruption – as will be discussed in Chapter 7 – I anticipated this question to start a discussion about politics and political institutions in BiH as well.

I included Question 14 in accordance with the goal of highlighting the role of women in this study. As discussed above, women are more likely to suffer from mental illness due to war trauma (Pham et al. 2010), and gender-based violence was one of the central features of the Bosnian War. Therefore, I wanted to make sure that I ask all the interviewees about how the women they worked with faced unique challenges and found ways to build resilience.

Finally, I added Question 17 to elicit further comment, in case the interviewee wanted to bring up an argument, example, or theory that they had not talked about earlier.

I approached this research both deductively and inductively in order to identify key themes that became the building blocks of my analysis. I used the deductive approach to identify key themes from the relevant scholarly literature that would help to analyze my research questions. As described above, I identified themes of narratives of collective victimization, negative emotions, and inter-generational transfer of trauma from the Social Psychology research on social mobilization. Similarly, I identified dealing with the past and reweaving the social fabric as common goals of MHPSS programs and social reconciliation based on my literature review. I then used these themes to guide my research. For instance, the themes I identified as part of the deductive approach helped me build my interview questions as significant indicators in the analysis of my research questions.

I used the inductive approach to refine my analysis and extract further themes as they became salient during my research. The semi-structured interview method I employed allowed my interviewees to expand on the themes I identified from the

literature while bringing about other themes they deemed important. Some of these themes became salient as I conducted my interviews which prompted their addition to my analysis. The inductive approach allowed me to reflect and elaborate on the ways in which my interviewees thought about and discussed traumatic experiences of war, and their relevance to the goals of social reconciliation. In particular, the themes of MHPSS participants being able to acknowledge their own trauma as a measure of the success of MHPSS work and transgenerational transfer of trauma as an impediment to social reconciliation are two main elements of my analysis that emerged as part of the inductive process. More importantly, the inductive approach was critical to identifying the ways in which political institutions and discourse in BiH counteract the work of MHPSS programs.

Following my field research, I transcribed my interviews and uploaded them, along with Reports 1-4, to qualitative research software Quirkos (Quirkos Limited, Scotland). Quirkos was instrumental in building my analysis in two ways: First, Quirkos provided a platform to store, manage, and sort the textual data I had gathered, allowing me to complete the coding process. Second, I used Quirkos to build a cognitive map of my research that helped guide my analysis. Quirkos allows users to identify themes from textual data and help visualize their frequency distribution.[11] In the software's lingo, each theme is visually represented as a "quirk." A quirk is a circle, the size of which is relative to the frequency distribution of each theme. The more a certain theme is prevalent in the textual data, the bigger the circle gets. The user may add further quirks under their initial quirks, creating a visual that is akin to a traditional coding tree – but with the added visual element to display frequency distribution. Finally, Quirkos allows users to visualize how quirks overlap with one another. Each quirk has its own color assigned and the user can visualize where in the textual data the colors overlap. Therefore, Quirkos helped me build a cognitive map of my research by highlighting the connections between the themes of my research.

[11] Another consideration for my choice of software was practicality. This study does not involve a content analysis and has a relatively small data set. Therefore, the functions and capabilities of other commonly used qualitative research software such as nVivo (QSR International, Australia) would have been redundant. Quirkos, in comparison, has a simpler interface (Lewins 2016:411) and is a low-cost alternative.

Through an inductive process, I identified four main themes as anchors of my analysis, based on the main topics of discussion that had emerged out of my textual data: Trauma, MHPSS Work, Political Influence, and Socio-economic Conditions. 'Trauma' refers to the analysis of traumatic experiences of war and how these experiences transform social relationships in a way that hinders the prospects of social reconciliation, as detailed in Chapter 5. 'MHPSS Work' refers to the analysis of how MHPSS programs attempt to transform the traumatic experiences of their clients as well as social connections, as detailed in Chapter 6. 'Political Influence' and 'Socio-economic Conditions' refer to how the political and socio-economic context in BiH figure into the work of MHPSS programs and their ability to contribute to social reconciliation, as detailed in Chapter 7. Together, these themes help build a narrative that sheds light on the research questions at hand. I used Quirkos to facilitate the coding process and identify quotes from my textual data that related to each of these themes. I then went back to each theme and identified key topics of discussion under each theme and the relevant quotes from the data.

I then moved on to build a visual representation of my analysis, again using Quirkos. I inputed the four main themes cited above as quirks. I then added more quirks under these four, based on topics of discussion relevant to each main theme. As discussed on page 67, I identified some of these themes through a deductive process, based on the relevant scholarly literature; others I identified through an inductive process, based on my interviews. I then used the software to build a map of my research through these quirks, allowing me to visualize the connections between each quirk as well as their relative frequency, which helped me organize and build my analysis.

As Quirkos' visuals are interactive (i.e., the user can hover over or click on different quirks to expand or collapse different parts of the visualization of the research), it was not practical to present them as images in this dissertation – attempts to do so resulted in messy and confusing images. Instead, using the graphics editor software Graphviz (AT&T Labs, United States), I transformed the interactive map that I produced via Quirkos into a more commonplace visual of a coding tree to present to the reader. Accordingly, the elements of the coding tree are no longer referred to as 'quirks,' but as 'branches,' 'nodes,' and 'sub-nodes,' which are marked in the image and explained

below. This coding tree (as shown in Figure 1) will serve as the visual representation of my analysis throughout this dissertation.

In the visual of the coding tree, the four main themes are represented as branches. There are nodes under three of the four branches (excluding the socio-economic conditions branch) of the coding tree and some of the nodes have sub-nodes. As each branch represents a step of my overall analysis, the nodes and the sub-nodes represent the



Figure 1 The Coding Tree

topics relevant to the part of the analysis under their branch.

Under the "Trauma" branch, I included three nodes for "victimhood" (43 quotes), "negative emotions" (67 total quotes), and "transfer of trauma" (23 quotes). Under the "negative Emotions" node are three sub-nodes "anger" (24 quotes), "fear" (23 quotes), and "mistrust" (15 quotes). As discussed in the Literature Review, anger, fear, and mistrust are the three negative emotions most often associated with potential social level consequences in scholarly works from the fields of both Conflict Resolution and Peace Psychology. There were also 5 additional quotes that referred to "negative emotions" without naming the emotion in question.



Figure 2: "Trauma" Branch of the Coding Tree

Based on Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) framework of social mobilization and de-mobilization, 'dealing with the past' involves moving on from the idea of collective victimhood. Collective victimhood posits that one's own group has always been the victim at the hands of the other groups who have always been 'the aggressors.' Such attitude prevents people from acknowledging crimes members of their own group committed. Furthermore, it maintains exclusive group identities that emerged as part of the initial social mobilization. Interviewees made frequent references to victimhood attitude being prevalent among MHPSS program participants as a result of traumatic experiences of war. The interviewees identified overcoming victimhood as one of their goals. I coded the references to this particular issue under the node of "victimhood" (43 quotes). The node "Transfer of trauma" (23 quotes) came about through an inductive process, as multiple interviewees spoke about their concerns over the transgenerational transfer of trauma, and the work they do to prevent it.

Under the "MHPSS Work" branch, the nodes "Trauma Healing," "Dealing with the past," and 'reweaving the social fabric' represent three main ways the goals of MHPSS programs intersect with the goals of social reconciliation – as discussed in the Literature Review. The quotes under the node "Trauma healing" (69 quotes) are about psychological and psychiatric improvements that the interviewees observed among their participants. Such improvements include progress according to diagnostic criteria for PTSD or MD, as well as improved wellness and physical health. They signify the impact MHPSS programs have regarding their main goal of helping their participants transform their trauma in a healthy manner.



Figure 3: "MHPSS Work" Branch

Interviewees suggested that a major barrier to trauma healing in BiH is the fact that many people refuse to acknowledge that they were traumatized, even when they show obvious signs of distress. According to the interviewees, this is largely because stigma towards people with psychological issues is still common in BiH. From the interviews, it became apparent that there is also a gender aspect to stigma about psychological issues. The interviewees suggested that women, particularly women who were raped during the war, have difficulty talking about what happened to them for fear of being judged by society or subjected to victim-blaming. Meanwhile, men, especially those who fought during the war, refuse to acknowledge their trauma in an attempt to present themselves as 'tough' or as 'war heroes.' Based on these observations, I placed the sub-node "Acknowledge own trauma" (31 quotes) under "Trauma healing" (69 quotes), for one cannot begin to heal without acknowledging that one has a problem (Puljek-Shank 2007:188).

Under the node "Dealing with the past," there are two sub-nodes: "Shifting narratives" and "Empathy." These sub-nodes represent the main ways in which MHPSS programs work towards the goal of dealing with the past, which are countering narratives of collective victimization and fostering empathy for the victims on the other side. As the pre-war nationalistic parties and politicians are still active in BiH's political environment, the nationalistic narratives of 1992 continue. Furthermore, due to the ethnic divisions in the Bosnian education system, students are often taught three different versions of history, including about the 1992-1995 war, further perpetuating nationalistic narratives of the war. These narratives prevent Bosnians from assessing history and the war period from different vantage points. Several interviewees identified the continuation of nationalistic narratives through politics and educational system as an issue in their work. They suggested that part of their work is introducing their participants to alternative

narratives. The quotes that refer to such efforts are under the sub-node "Shifting narratives" (60 quotes).

The second sub-node that I categorized under 'dealing with the past' is "Empathy" (44 quotes). In the discussions about victimization, the interviewees repeatedly emphasized that moving away from the victimization paradigm required empathy for the losses, fears, and suffering of the other side. The quotes under this sub-node refer to MHPSS work that aims to help participants to transcend the victimization paradigm.

Under the node "Re-weaving the social fabric," there are four sub-nodes: "Relationships," "Rebuilding trust," "New activism," and "Sharing." The most salient among them was the sub-node "Relationships" (138 quotes), as the need for MHPSS programs' participants to build and/or revive networks, friendships, and relationships was one of the most common themes in the interviews. In particular, the interviewees alluded to the need for bringing members of separate ethno-religious groups together to simply hear each other out about their conflicting narratives about the war. As the persistence of post-war ethnic divisions continues to fuel prejudices and ethno-national hatreds, establishing new relationships is simply a pre-requisite of MHPSS work in BiH.

As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the consequences of war trauma is the prevalence of mistrust, particularly towards members of the 'other' groups. Lack of trust can cause social isolation; when it is widespread in a society, it can lead to a deterioration of the social fabric. References to MHPSS program participants transcending their mistrust towards all members of former rival group(s) are represented with the sub-node "Rebuilding trust" (17 quotes).

As MHPSS programs can only reach so many people, their work needs to be amplified in order to make a contribution to reweaving the social fabric. I identified two possible ways for such amplification to occur. One is when participants become social activists themselves, leading trauma support groups and/or peacebuilding initiatives. References to such examples are represented in the coding tree with the sub-node of "New activism" (25 quotes). Another, less active way is for participants to share their new relationships and attitudes with others, such as their family members or friends. References to such instances are represented with the sub-node "Sharing" (23 quotes).

The six nodes under the branch “Political influence” refer to the ways in which political institutions and discourse influenced MHPSS work.

“Nationalism/separation” (69 quotes) for the spread of nationalistic narratives and policies designed to enforce separation;

“Patronage” (10 quotes) for maintenance of nationalist narratives through patronage networks;

“Manipulation of fear” (24 quotes) for attempts to gain vote and support through evoking fear of a new conflict;

“Lack of will/interest” (16 quotes) for the absence of political interest or will towards reconciliation;

“Ineptness” (19 quotes) for the state’s inability to implement effective policy

“Sabotage” (7 quotes) for direct political intervention to prevent MHPSS programs from achieving their goals.

I included quotes on other observations relevant to politics and politicians in BiH under the branch “Political influence” (7 quotes) as they did not quite fit under any of the categories listed above, but were not stated frequently enough to warrant a new node.

Finally, the branch “Socio-economic situation” represents the influence of high levels of poverty and unemployment in BiH on MHPSS work. Three main storylines emerged under this branch process that spoke to ways in which abject poverty in the country relates to trauma healing and reconciliation initiatives. First, several interviewees cited the poor socio-economic conditions in BiH as an impediment to their goals. They pointed out that for those who suffered trauma due to the war, the stress of feeding themselves and their families prevents people from adequately dealing with their trauma, as survival is a more immediate need. Loss of a job or otherwise struggling to make ends meet has been cited as a trigger for trauma. Secondly, others highlighted occasions in which the struggle to survive in this tough environment has sparked new connections and opportunities. Thirdly, those who integrated a vocational training component into their programs spoke of significant improvements in terms of healing, willingness to participate in – or even lead – peacebuilding initiatives, self-confidence, and personal empowerment among their participants. I coded all of these negative and positive aspects that are borne out of the socio-economic situation in BiH under this node.



Figure 4: Top: Political Influence Branch. Bottom: Socio-economic Conditions Branch.

For each node and sub-node in my coding tree, I indicated the number of quotes as a salience indicator to show the frequency with which the interviewees brought them up. I did not explicitly include salience into my analysis, as it was somewhat guided by the interview questions (i.e., quotes about the particular node or sub-node took place because my interview questions prompted them). However, during the coding process, I noticed that under each branch, a particular node and/or sub-node became especially salient. As discussed above, each of the 4 branches of my coding tree represents a key step in my analysis. Therefore, the most salient node or sub-node under each branch represents the key issue for each corresponding step of my analysis. Identifying the most relevant topics for each branch helped focus my analysis. Under the "Trauma" branch, the most salient node is "Negative emotions" (67 total quotes accross its three sub-nodes) compared to the other nodes of "Victimhood" (43 quotes) and "Transfer of trauma" (23 quotes). The salience of this node suggests that the interviewees viewed negative emotions as the primary impediment to the goal of social reconciliation that arises due to traumatic experiences of war. Under the "MHPSS work" branch, the salience of the sub-node "relationships" (138 quotes) shows how building, repairing, and transforming individual and societal relationships is a priority of MHPSS programs in BiH. Under the "Political influence" branch, the node "Nationalism/separation" (69 quotes) indicates that the nationalist discourse and politics based on separation of BiH's ethnic groups is the most consequential political influence on MHPSS programs. Therefore, I decided to include the number of quotes for each branch, node, and sub-node in my coding tree (Figure 1) and, in parenthesis, each time they are referred to in this Chapter as well as in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

Taken as a whole, the four branches add up to a narrative about traumatic experiences of war, the efforts of MHPSS programs to transform these experiences, and

how the political and socio-economic conditions in BiH present barriers to MHPSS programs' goals. The quotes under the node "Trauma" tell the story of how the traumatic experiences of war evoked anger, fear, and mistrust towards the 'others' and led to the prevalence of narratives of victimhood. Together, such attitudes represent a barrier to reweaving the social fabric and, by extension, achieving social reconciliation. In addition, the transgenerational transfer of trauma suggests that the effects of traumatic experiences of war may continue to reverberate. These findings are presented in Chapter 5.

The quotes under the branch of "MHPSS Work" describe what MHPSS programs do to transform the traumatic experiences of war to serve the goals of reweaving the social fabric and dealing with the past. The quotes present a narrative of how MHPSS programs have enabled their participants to acknowledge their own trauma, build new relationships across ethnic lines, move away from narratives of victimhood, develop empathy, and even turn to peace activism. These findings are presented in Chapter 6.

The quotes under the branch of political influence show how the actions of politicians in BiH complicate the work of MHPSS programs and their efforts to transform traumatic experiences of war. They present a narrative of how BiH's politicians – by evoking nationalism to serve their political goals – continue to trigger the traumas of war, complicating MHPSS programs' ability to transform their participants' traumas. Therefore, BiH's government entities and politicians show a lack of interest in supporting MHPSS programs, and even actively sabotage them on some occasions. The people of BiH are reluctant to break rank with their politicians due to nationalist rhetoric, pressure from their families and social circles, and the risk of being excluded from the ethnically based patronage networks. As a result, MHPSS programs often hit roadblocks in expanding their efforts to build cross-ethnic networks based on mutual trust and shift narratives of collective victimhood. These findings are presented in Chapter 7.

The quotes under the branch "Socio-economic situation" show how the high levels of poverty and unemployment further complicate MHPSS programs' work. These quotes suggest that poverty and unemployment can often compound the trauma their participants have experiences. Furthermore, limited economic opportunities result in increased dependency on the patronage networks of nationalist parties and politicians which can discourage people from challenging narratives of victimhood and building new

relationships across ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, some MHPSS programs have been able to foster new relationships by focusing on 'bread and butter' issues that affect most BiH citizens regardless of ethnicity. These findings are also presented in Chapter 7.

The overall narrative of this study presents how traumatic experiences of war lead to the destruction of the social fabric and prevalence of narratives of collective victimhood. Building on the roadmap that Peace Psychology research provides, this study details the societal consequences of the traumatic experiences of war in the case of BiH. It shows that MHPSS programs, in their work to transform the traumas of their participants, can make progress towards the goals of reweaving the social fabric and dealing with the past. Therefore, their work holds the potential to expand from the individual level to the social level. In the case of BiH, however, persistence of nationalist politics and rhetoric, compounded by high levels of unemployment and poverty, has prevented MHPSS work from having a broader impact that could contribute to social reconciliation. The overall narrative of the study and its theoretical and practical implications for social reconciliation is detailed in the concluding chapter.

3.6 Ethical and Practical Challenges

As I set out to conduct my interviews, I was wary of the ethical challenges involved in dealing with a population who has talked about the same questions regarding the Bosnian War over and over again since the end of the war. In discussing his own field research in BiH from 2006 to 2008, Locke (2008:21) argues that the past research engagement from foreign academics – particularly those who worked in Western institutions – in BiH has had multiple issues that led some local civil society actors to sour from talking to academic researchers. Too many of them, Locke (ibid.) suggests, failed to share their results with the locals they had interviewed (which sometimes led to the interviewees being misinterpreted and misrepresented in published work), failed to establish relationships and further contact, and adopted a condescending approach towards locals' knowledge and expertise. As a result, Locke (ibid.) suggests that some NGO administrators in BiH were less willing to talk to foreign researchers. Some others were tired of talking about the war year after year with an international audience.

Aware of these challenges, I took several measures to earn my interviewees' trust. First, prior to each interview, I offered any help I could. I stressed that I did not want to

just take but also be able to give. I was inspired to do so by Cynthia Cockburn's (1998) book "Spaces Between Us," for which she conducted participatory research with women's NGOs in conflict settings such as Northern Ireland, BiH, and Israel-Palestine. Discussing the particular challenges of her participatory method, she argued that "it is always difficult to ensure that the researched have a reasonable degree of control over the research process and its products" (ibid.:2). This is especially the case when doing sensitive research in a country like BiH, where significant social, political, and economic challenges persist. Therefore, Cockburn (ibid.:4) offered to contribute to the organizations she studied to achieve an active presence and contribute to their work instead of being a burden. While my own research design was not participatory, I nevertheless tried to emulate Cockburn and tried to find ways not to be a burden. Cockburn (ibid.) argues: "[A]lthough rigour and honesty are indispensable, I believe that in all kinds of research it is more productive to acknowledge the active presence of the researcher than to wish it away."

Many of the participants declined my offer to help. Others asked for minor assistance, such as taking photos at some of their events, helping out with translation services or providing information about educational opportunities in Canada and Turkey to their youth participants. Some interviewees invited me to see their work and meet their participants. I took such opportunities whenever I could. VO, for instance, invited me to observe the youth camp he runs and suggested that the participants would also benefit from my presence and talking to me about academic pursuits. Particularly, he said that "in a lot of places in this country there are negative stereotypes about Turkish people. I think you being here helps them to think beyond the stereotypes." I benefited from observing the projects and having informal conversations with program participants, learning about their experiences and attitudes. Even though they were not officially part of my work – only a stray observation at VO's youth camp is part of my analysis – these informal interactions contributed to my research and thinking process. I had the opportunity to talk to young people (mostly university students) from all three ethnicities and all across the country, about their life in BiH, day-to-day interactions between the ethnic groups, how local politicians leverage nationalist sentiments, and how corruption and socio-economic hardship influences all aspects of their lives. Listening to the

experiences of the youth camp participants provided me with a window through which I could better understand daily life in BiH and the structural impediments to reconciliation at each level.

I stressed to my interviewees that I was primarily interested in their knowledge, experience, and expertise. Several interviewees asked, at some point of the interview, whether their answer was "right," indicating a particular type of wariness they had talking to a researcher based at a Western institution. Each time, I replied by saying – not always verbatim – "You are the expert, I am interested in what you think and experienced." Overall, I stressed that I was there to learn from them, as I did not have the kind of experience in conflict, trauma, and trauma healing that they did. I ensured that my interviewees received drafts of my writing throughout the process so that they could see the work, give their input and correct any potential misunderstandings.

Finally, I extended my interviewees professional courtesy: I kept the interviews on point and as short as possible. The typical interview lasted about 45 minutes, and the four interviews that involved translators lasted about an hour. I based the time and place arrangements of the meetings on the needs of the interviewee. Interviewees appreciated that I came to the field equipped with enough knowledge about the history and culture of the region so that they did not have to spend their time re-hashing basic knowledge. They responded positively to my attempts to use my working Bosnian language skills as much as possible.

The interviewees were interested in talking to me and telling their story. I was granted all but one of my interview requests. Several interviewees argued that after years of overbearing presence, the international community's attention has receded from BiH, particularly as the civil war in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis reached its peak. While in 2006 Locke (2008:21-22) found that several civil society actors in BiH – particularly in Sarajevo – did not want to talk to researchers, a decade later they had the opposite problem: their issues persisted but not many people listened to them anymore.

Yet still, it was obvious that my interviewees had grown tired of talking about and trying to address the challenges in BiH related to war, trauma, politics, corruption, and the increasingly difficult socio-economic conditions. Following our interview, JT asked me: "Why the war thing again?" More than two decades after the war, she wished to have

some other conversation. In several interviews, I observed frustration. AH, for instance, admitted that he was "pretty much burnt out." Several interviewees became animated with frustration at different points during the interview, lightly pounding their desks or raising their voices. Some others avoided eye contact as they talked about their personal feelings about their work, often staring into the distance. BZ, sitting by her office desk during the interview, avoided eye contact towards the end of our interview and kept opening and closing the drawers of her desk for no apparent reason. As do many Bosnians, most of my interviewees – including those who highlighted addiction problems in Bosnian society – smoked during the interviews.

Prior to the research, I had informed University of Alberta's Research Ethics Board that I had not made plans to let my interviewees know about resources they could use if they were distressed, since they were all professionals in the fields of psychology, psychotherapy, or social work and hence know the resources they can use better than I can inform them. In retrospect, I needed more of a plan to address the potential distress and frustration from my interviewees. I believe this is an issue that future researchers in the field should be especially careful about. As social traumas in BiH are not resolved and continue to compound in the face of persistent ethno-religious divide, nationalist narratives, poverty, and corruption, even the professionals – many of whom have their own personal traumatic experiences – are not immune to the frustration and distress as they talk about the daunting problems of their country and their society.

4 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Bosnian War (1992-1995) involved massive violence and destruction. Over the course of the war, more than a hundred thousand people were killed. More than two million Bosnians were displaced during the campaigns of ethnic cleansing (Bennett 2016:16). Rape was utilized as a weapon of war. Many civilians – mostly Bosniaks – were subjected to torture and imprisonment at concentration camps. Monuments with cultural significance and places of worship were damaged or destroyed. Industrial and agricultural facilities – as well as about 20 billion USD worth of infrastructure – were laid to waste (Ramet 2005a:186). Such massive losses have certainly led to psychological damage among the survivors, due to loss of loved ones, being subjected to rape and/or torture, being forced from one's home, and destruction of religious and cultural symbols. Without a doubt, many – perhaps most – Bosnians have experienced traumatic events at some point during the war.

The focus of the current study is how Bosnians' traumatic experiences and MHPSS work aimed at helping them deal with it are reflected in the social and political relationships of Bosnians, specifically among former enemy groups. As I detail in my analysis in later chapters, all of my interviewees spoke at length about how government institutions and political rhetoric in BiH influence their work – often in negative ways. The participants, including those with backgrounds in psychology and psychiatry, were aware that, in the particular context of post-conflict BiH, their work was inherently political. They understood that their efforts to address the traumas of their participants were intertwined with politics, because they were dealing with what Hamber (2008:22-25) calls "political trauma," i.e., trauma that is due to socio-political events such as conflict, repression, or systematic discrimination – and not to a random event like an accident. Working on MHPSS projects in post-war BiH, the mission of my participants was not solely about the individual healing of the participants, but was also about transforming their socio-political attitudes and relationships. Thus, their work overlaps with politics.

Therefore, to understand the political aspects of both the traumas of Bosnians and MHPSS programs' efforts to address them, it is imperative to provide the social and political context in which the traumatic events took place. To do so, I will provide a short

history of the Bosnian War that includes the lead-up to the war, the war period, and its aftermath. I will not attempt to provide a textbook account of the War. Rather, the focus of this short history will be the nature of the social and political ties among the peoples of BiH – and how they were rapidly and violently transformed in the lead-up to the war.

In this chapter, I will first detail the initial social mobilization of Serb nationalism and how it was accompanied by similar mobilizations on the Bosniak and Croat sides. I will then explain how these social mobilizations have sustained the rhetoric of the war and, in turn, were fed by the war. After offering a brief summary of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), I will demonstrate that exclusive ethnic identities remain mobilized in post-Dayton BiH, constituting a threat to reconciliation and possibly the long-term viability of the current peace. In doing so, I will show that MHPSS programs, in their attempts to help their participants transform their traumatic experiences, have to go against the politicians who have an interest in continued social mobilization of ethnic identities. As a result, I argue that MHPSS work has been inherently political in BiH and, hence, an examination of their work in relation to Political Science literature on political institutions, ideologies, and discourse in BiH is necessary.

4.1 Pre-War: Social Mobilization of Ethnic Groups

4.1.1 Nationalism Sweeps Belgrade

In the lead-up to the Bosnian War, one of the main drivers of the erosion of the social connections Bosnian Serbs had with Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats was the decision of the Serbian political leaders and intellectuals to mobilize the nationalist sentiments of Serbs in order to achieve their political goals. The social mobilization of Serb identity, which began amidst SFR Yugoslavia's political and economic crises in the second half of the 1980s, came to instill Serbians with the idea that theirs is both a heroic, strong nation and a nation that has been unfairly victimized – particularly by its neighbors – over the course of history. This mobilization set the stage for the development of exclusionary identities, the spread of narratives of collective victimization, and the erosion of social trust and connections in mixed communities such as BiH. While the Serbian nationalist mobilization was accompanied by a similar mobilization among Croats and, later, among Bosniaks (which I will also discuss later in this section), it is arguably the most consequential. As Magaš (1991) explains, Serbian nationalism had been the greatest

threat to the unity of SFR Yugoslavia "because Serbs were both the most numerous and the most dispersed nationality, […] and because of the tendency of a centralised bureaucracy to ally itself with the strongest nation." As the narratives of victimization became widespread among Serbs of Yugoslavia, Serbian populations in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo came to fear possible future victimizations at the hands of their neighbors. Those fears gave credence to the idea of uniting all Serbs under a 'Greater Serbia.' The goal of 'Greater Serbia' set Serbia on a collision course with its neighbors as the radical nationalist regime of Slobodan Milošević sought to annex parts of Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo that had large Serbian populations and/or historical significance for the Serbs. In BiH, the vision of a 'Greater Serbia' motivated Milošević and his allies to throw the men and resources of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbian nationalist paramilitary behind Bosnian Serb forces, transforming them into the formidable and deadly force that they were during much of the Bosnian War (Silber and Little 1996:217-8).

Prior to its violent break-up, SFR Yugoslavia had been relatively harmonious. Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), the WWII commander of the communist resistance of Yugoslav Partisans, the country had adopted the motto "Bratsvo i Jedintsvo" – Brotherhood and Unity. The motto informed the official policy of SFR Yugoslavia, which promoted the unity of its six federative republics (BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) based on socialism and suppression of nationalist movements. Tito was a "one man single party state," as Silber and Little (1996:29) put it, his iron-fist rule and reputation as a WWII hero serving as crucial unifiers of the Socialist Federation, leaving many observers within and outside the country wondering whether the union would live on after him (Ramet 2005:1).

Indeed, the socialist unity became fragile in the 1980s, after Tito passed away at the beginning of the decade. The economy suffered from successive crises. The resentments between the richer republics of Croatia and Slovenia and the rest of the country came to grow (Pleština 1992; Woodward 1995; Moore 2013:35). The status of Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia – which was enshrined in the 1974 SFR Yugoslavia constitution – became a source of dispute between Albanians and Serbs (Magaš 1992:35-39; Silber and Little 1996:29). Serbian minority communities in BiH, Croatia, and Kosovo came to "feel threatened by any growth of local particularism"

(Magaš 1993:37) due to the more expansive powers that the 1974 constitution granted to the federal republics and Serbia's two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. As SFR Yugoslavia appeared politically and economically unsustainable over the 1980s, nationalism came back to fore as a potential policy option (Woodward 1990; Pleština 1992; Magaš 1993; Höpken 1985; Schöpflin 2000). Whereas the communist authorities had managed to suppress the nationalist movement in Croatia in the early 1970s (known as the "Croatian Spring"), they would not be able to prevent the growth of nationalism this time around.

Amidst such difficulties in the 1980s, nationalist policy ambitions were first articulated in Serbia. In 1986, a Belgrade-based tabloid published a leaked memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). The infamous SANU memorandum, written by the leading intellectuals of Serbia, declared that the establishment of SFR Yugoslavia had delayed the resolution of the "Serbian national question." The Serbian nation, according to the memorandum, "did not get its own state like other peoples," and the Serbs "were victims of economic and political discrimination by their Croatian and Slovenian countrymen" (Silber and Little 1996:31). The solution to the national question was "the territorial unity of the Serbian people" and "the establishment of the full national integrity of the Serbian people." As the first influential expression of the idea of establishment of a 'Greater Serbia,' which would serve as one of the main motivators of the Yugoslav Wars, the SANU memorandum represents a key moment in the social mobilization of Serbian identity (ibid.). According to Cigar (1995:22) the memorandum was "a traceable catalyst to the […] events in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Furthermore, analyzing the writings and public comments of Serbian intellectuals, researchers such as Magaš (1993), Cigar (1995), Čolović (2002), and Dragović-Soso (2002) argue that Serbian scholars and intellectuals had begun to develop the Serbian nationalist agenda in the 1980s, after Tito's death. Magaš (1993:49), for instance, argues that it was the Serbian intellectuals in Belgrade who played a primary role in stoking ethnic hatred. The nationalist attention, Cigar (1995:22) claims, almost immediately focused on the Muslim communities of SFR Yugoslavia, Bosniaks, and Albanians, as their mere presence – situated between Serbian communities in BiH, Kosovo, and

Montenegro – was an impediment to the goal of "the territorial integrity of the Serbian people." Therefore, "influential figures in Serbia had begun to shape a stereotypical image of Muslims as alien, inferior and a threat to all that the Serbs held dear" (ibid.:24).

Dragović-Soso (2002:107-108), Anzulović (1999:133-4), and Cigar (1995:25) all cite Vuk Drašković's novel *The Knife* (Nož)[12] as an example of Serb intellectuals' promotion of ethnic nationalism and hatred of Muslims. Published in 1982, the novel became a bestseller, reprinted several times, and adapted into a movie in 1998. The novel's main character is a Bosniak man named Alija, who, upon researching his family history, finds out that he was actually Serbian and was stolen from his slain Serb family during WWII as a baby. Alija also learns that the lineage of the family he was stolen from and the family he was raised in coincides: they were actually the same family, but one part of the family had converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule. The storyline therefore serves the purpose of arguing that Bosniaks are not really a community but, in fact, are Serbians who converted to Islam and turned against the Serb nation in betrayal of their roots. Anzulović (1999) suggests that *The Knife* had significant influence in motivating ethnic hatreds. Both Cigar and Anzulović quote a Serbian commander who suggested that the novel puts him "in a constant stage of rage" against Bosniaks. According to Dragović-Soso (2002:107), "[a]lthough the novel contains a number of sympathetic Muslim characters [...] the borderline between victims and villains is clearly drawn." The author Drašković himself was an ardent nationalist and founded the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) in 1990. He has been a central figure of Serb nationalism ever since.

Cigar (1995) provides several other examples of ethnic nationalism and othering of Muslims emanating from Serbian intellectual circles. For instance, he cites Serbian philosopher Dragoš Kalajić who argued that Bosniaks were a "distinct semi-Arab ethnic group" that the Ottomans created through "satisfying their sexual impulses" (ibid.: 26). As a result, Kalajić suggested that Bosniaks "did not belong to the European family of nations" and "a mobilization of European energies" was necessary to fight against Muslims. Cigar (ibid.:29) also focuses on the work of University of Belgrade Political Scientist Miroljub Jevtić, who portrayed Bosniaks as the representation of the "Islamic

[12] Alternatively translated as *The Dagger* in some sources.

darkness" that supposedly threatened Serbia and Europe in general. According to MacDonald (2003:233), "Jevtić was in many ways typical of the Serbian establishment" who considered Bosniaks ethnic Serbians who betrayed their nation by converting to Islam. Therefore, Jevtić claimed, Bosniaks were responsible for the oppression that Ottoman Turks had perpetuated during their reign in the region: "Those who accepted Islam accepted the conquerors de facto as their brothers, and the crimes of the latter are their own." (Jevtić quoted in MacDonald 2003:233). Similarly, Cigar (ibid.:24-25; 27-30) argues that Orientalism, as Edward Said (1977) formulated it, had become pervasive in the Serbian academia in the 1980s, representing a "remarkably stark and implication-laden division into 'them' and 'us.'"

Magaš (1993:49), similarly, argues that "Belgrade intellectuals" have played a key role in stoking and legitimizing ethnic division and hatred. Their embrace of nationalism, according to Magaš (ibid.:117), was a "tragedy for the country (SFR Yugoslavia) as a whole." She identifies the tensions between Serbs and Albanians, starting with Albanian protests in 1981, demanding Kosovo's separation from Serbia, as the watershed event for the advent of nationalism among the Serb intelligentsia. She points to a 1986 petition that "some two hundred Belgrade intellectuals" (ibid.: 49) signed regarding the situation in Kosovo. The petition charged that Kosovo Serbians were victims of systematic crimes – including rape – and were facing genocide at the hands of the Albanians. It further suggested that inaction of the Serbian National Assembly in the face of such grave conditions was tantamount to treason. Magaš (ibid.:52) argues that the charge of genocide was "absurd," and the petition was "remarkable for its failure to relate the national tensions in Kosovo to any social or economic causes. Instead, they are viewed as part of a "supposed centuries-old feud between Serbs and Albanians presented (…) as a transcendental struggle between good and evil."

Dragović-Soso (2002:2) suggests that, while the violent break-up of SFR Yugoslavia "ha[s] been widely blamed on Serbian nationalism" which Milošević perpetuated, "most analyses […] have not examined this nationalism in the years before Milošević's rise to power, when its principal articulators were dissident [to the communist regime] intellectuals." The socio-economic and political crises of the 1980s,

she argues, have created a vacuum in Yugoslav republics that nationalist discourses came to fill. As a result, the official history of SFR Yugoslavia was abandoned, leading to "the reappraisal of the past that permeated all levels of Yugoslav scholarship, media and culture" in the 1980s. Among other things, this new scholarly and cultural direction questioned the extent of Serb-Croat conflict during WWII and led to the rehabilitation of extreme nationalist Serbian Četniks and Croat Ustaša – which the communist regime long regarded as Nazi collaborators and traitors – in the respective countries. In Serbia, the resulting new narrative – highlighting the crimes of Ustaša and the Partisans against the Serbs while sugarcoating Četnik atrocities – sought for a "de-Titoisation" of Yugoslav history and resulted in a narrative of victimization in which everybody else in the region had always been out to get the Serbs who had no choice but to defend themselves. Therefore, the nationalist discourses in both Croatia and Serbia were "centered around notions of permanent victimization" (ibid.:64-5). Parallel to such historical revisionism in Serbia, historians in Croatia sought to minimize the crimes of Ustaša and portray the Nazi-puppet regime of the Independent State of Croatia as "an expression of Croats' long held desire for sovereignty" (ibid.:110). Analyzing both Serbian and Croatian nationalist propaganda from 1986 to 1999, MacDonald (2003) argues that they both present a victim-centered reading of each nation's history. Such narratives of collective victimhood, as will be detailed later, burst from the scholarly and cultural works into the public discourse in the late 1980s and the 1990s.

4.1.2 A Political Tool for 'Greater Serbia'

Belgrade intellectuals' nationalist ambitions soon found political representation thanks to Slobodan Milošević. Milošević rose up in the ranks of SFR Yugoslavia's bureaucracy, becoming the leader of the Serbian League of Communists (SKS) in 1987. From that point onwards, Milošević adopted the Serbian nationalist cause at the behest of the socialist establishment, including his former mentor Ivan Stambolić, who was at that point President of Serbia.

Shortly after assuming the leadership of SKS, Milošević found an opportunity to propagate the nationalist message brewing in Belgrade during a visit to Kosovo in April 1987. While the population of Kosovo was about 90% Albanian, Serbs viewed Kosovo as the "cradle of their civilization" (Silber and Little 1996:34) as it hosted the diocese of the

Serbian Orthodox Church, was the center of the medieval Serbian Empire,[13] and the scene of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. Kosovo also had significant historical significance for the Albanians as the center of the Albanian national struggle prior to the Albanian independence in 1912 (Magaš 1993:21). Hence, Kosovo became a battleground for Serb and Albanian nationalisms. The autonomy that Kosovo gained through the 1974 constitution (which made local Serbs feel isolated), coupled with economic devastation as the poorest region of the country, turned Kosovo into a powder keg during the 1980s. It was under such conditions that Stambolić tasked Milošević with quelling the protests of local Serbians.

Milošević, realizing an opportunity to tap into the latent nationalist sentiments of the Serbians in order to gain political power, did the opposite. He helped set up a Serb rally outside the town hall meeting he attended together with Albanian Communist Party officials. Inside, Serbian speakers "attacked the Albanian Party leaders, calling for a state of emergency, for the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, and even the expulsion of Albanians" (Silber and Little 1996:38). Outside, Serbian protestors clashed with Albanian police, hurling rocks at them – which they had conveniently stashed in a truck parked nearby (ibid.). Milošević walked out to observe the clashes, with some protestors approaching him and complaining that the police were beating them. In response, Milošević uttered the now infamous line, "No one should dare to beat you again!" which became a Serbian nationalist rallying cry. With the help of Dušan Mitević, close friend of Milošević and the news editor at the Serbian State Television (RTS), Serbian audiences saw the clips of local Serbians getting beaten – and not the rocks they threw to ignite the clash – and Milošević's defiant declaration to protect their brethren. Nationalism had seeped into mainstream.

Soon, Milošević ousted his mentor Stambolić from the Presidency and became the most powerful man in Serbia. Subsequently, he embarked on a campaign of nationalist social mobilization of the Serbians of SFR Yugoslavia. According to Ramet (2005a:56), "Upon assuming power in Serbia, Milošević immediately transformed the language of politics, and opened a space for the convening of Serb nationalist rallies (the famous *mitinzi)* at which the participants were encouraged to make demands based on the

[13] Known as the 'Dušan Empire.'

supposition of ethnic rights." RTS became a mouthpiece for ethnic propaganda (Božić-Roberson 2004:402). Once the vision of Serbian nationalism – cultivated among Belgrade intellectuals throughout the 1980s – found a political outlet in Milošević and his allies, a mass propaganda effort to create a nationalist social mobilization among the Serbs of SFR Yugoslavia began and quickly intensified. The goal of the propaganda efforts was to provide an ideological basis for the nationalist policy ambitions devised in Belgrade and mobilize Serbs in Serbia, Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo to realize the policy of "territorial unity of Serbian nation," i.e., the creation of a 'Greater Serbia' (Oberschall 2000:983).

As Magaš (1991:18) summarizes, the intellectual development of nationalism, the promotion of nationalist social mobilization, and Milošević's pursuit of nationalist policy goals are all tied together:

> *"The second break-up of Yugoslavia is the result of Serbia's decision after 1987 to challenge the post-war Federal order in favour of its own domination – or, failing that, the creation of a Greater Serbia. For that to happen, however, Serbia itself had to be recast in an anti-democratic mould – it had to become Milošević's Serbia. And for this to happen, it was necessary to impose upon the Serb nation a sense of being surrounded by racial enemies threatening its biological survival."*

4.1.3 Mass Propaganda and Nationalist Social Mobilization of Serbian People

Several researchers and journalists, including Cigar (1995), Silber and Little (1996), Čolović (2002), Oberschall (2000), Udovićki (2000), MacDonald (2003), and Judah (2009) have detailed the mass propaganda efforts that Milošević and his political allies, Serbian state media, Serbian Orthodox Church, and Serbian artists have participated in. In this section, I will shortly examine the role of each of those actors in disseminating the mass propaganda that has led to the nationalist social mobilization of Serbs and popular adoption of a narrative of continuous victimization.

4.1.3.1 Milošević and His Allies

Examining why inter-ethnic cooperation in SFR Yugoslavia gave way to inter-ethnic conflict, Oberschall (2000:984) highlighted "ethnic manipulation by political leaders." He argued that Yugoslavs had experienced ethnic relations in two distinct

frames: a normal frame, in which the ethnic relations were neighborly, and a crisis frame. The crisis frame, according to Oberschall (2000:989), "was grounded in the experiences and memories of the Balkan wars, the first and second world wars – and other wars before that. In these crises, civilians were not distinguished from combatants. Old people, children, women, priests were not spared. Atrocities, massacres, torture, ethnic cleansing, a scorched-earth policy were the rule." He argues that nationalist politicians did not invent the crisis frame, but re-awakened it in accordance with their political goals and ambitions. As an example, he cites a statement by war time Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžic, who stated: "The Serbs are endangered again […]. [T]his nation well remembers genocide [in World War II]. Those events are still a terrible living memory. The terror has survived 50 years."

The most infamous political call for nationalist mobilization was Milošević's Gazimestan speech, delivered in Kosovo on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. As discussed in the literature review, Battle of Kosovo was the 'chosen trauma' in an effort to mobilize the Serb identity (Volkan 1999:35). In the case of the Battle of Kosovo, the memory of the historical struggle against the Ottoman Turks became a myth that served the Serbian drive for territorial unity and drove animosity towards the pre-dominantly Muslim communities of Albanians and Bosniaks – who were derogatively called "Turks" – who literally stood in the way of a 'Greater Serbia.' Milošević helped to re-animate the painful memory of the domination of Ottoman Turks to put Serbs in a crisis frame, with an eye on achieving his Serb nationalist project. As Judah (2009:xii) puts it: "When Serbian peasants from villages surrounding Sarajevo began to bombard the city, they did so confusing in their minds their former Muslim friends, neighbors and even brothers-in-law with the old Ottoman Turkish viziers and Pashas who had ruled them until 1878."

The Gazimestan speech was the culmination of the myth-building around the Battle of Kosovo. Arguing that Serbians not only defended themselves, but the peoples of Europe in 1389, Milošević delivered a clear message: "Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet." Throughout 1989, anti-Muslim slogans

became staples of nationalist rallies that Milošević organized in Serb-dominated cities all over SFR Yugoslavia, including BiH.

4.1.3.2 1.3.2 Serb State Media

According to Cigar (1995:34), "the state-controlled media was full of sensationalized massacres of Serbs by Muslim Ustaša during the WWII and emphasizing suggestions that the same threat had re-emerged." RTS also produced a documentary about the Battle of Kosovo, to coincide with the 600th anniversary, promoting the narrative that Serbs sacrificed themselves to stop the onslaught of Islam towards Europe. News reports began to speculate about radical Islam gaining a foothold among Bosniaks (ibid.: 34). As Magaš (1993:62) and Ramet (2005b:129) point out, Serb media sensationalized – untrue – stories about Albanians committing mass rapes of Serbian girls and women, further stirring the feelings of victimization and desires of vengeance among Serbians. The anti-Muslim sentiment, which had long been brewing amongst the Serb intellectuals, came to be transferred to the Serbian people through political and media discourse that strongly suggested imminent threat to Serbian survival from the Muslims.

4.1.3.3 Serbian Orthodox Church

The role of Serbian Orthodox clergy in the promotion of Serbian nationalism and hatred towards Catholics and Muslims has been well documented. Perica (2002), for instance, argues that the religious sector, particularly the Serb Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church of Croatia have played key roles in the demise of SFR Yugoslavia. In particular, he criticizes the Serbian Orthodox Church for turning Jasenovac, the WWII concentration camp that the Ustaša ran, into a site of pilgrimage and a symbol of Serbian historical experience. The Church's focus, according to Perica (2002:136-144), served to erase the memory of the Bosniak, Jewish, and Roma victims, perpetuating the narrative of Serbian victimization. Furthermore, by focusing on a site of genocide as part of the religious experience, as opposed to focusing on a site that might inspire peace and tolerance, the Church helped evoke potentially explosive emotions among its followers. Moore (2013:41) argues that the Serbian Orthodox Church sought to evoke the memory of past conflicts with Bosniaks and Croats to suggest that Serbs would be under the threat of genocide if they were to continue to live with "the enemies," and therefore need to form their own state, i.e., 'Greater Serbia.' As an example, Moore (ibid.) cites the Church's then patriarch, Pavle, who in 1991 said: "It is time to comprehend that the

victims of genocide cannot live together with their former but perhaps also their future executioners." Similarly, Cigar (1995:67) highlights the anti-Muslim rhetoric that emanated from the Church in the lead-up to the Bosnian War. For instance, he cites the then Serbian Orthodox Abbot, who criticized the Albanian practice of building walls around houses, saying "it would be an understatement to call that primitivism," and the Serbian-Orthodox metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana who "characterized Islam as aggressive" during an interview.

4.1.3.4 Arts and Culture

Another medium of nationalist propaganda was the cultural scene. According to Udovički (2000:1), "political ethno-kitsch" became fashionable in Serbia during the late 1980s. She argues that "[t]he entire popular culture became obsessed with the idea that the Serbs had been wronged by the other people's of Yugoslavia, that they were in fact 'Jews of the Balkans.'" Čolović (2002) and Dragović-Soso (2002) have extensively detailed how such "political ethno-kitsch" came to dominate cultural works such as novels, poems, and songs. Apart from the above-mentioned book *The Knife,* Dragović-Soso (2002:90-100) focuses on historical novels written by noted nationalist intellectuals such as Drago Ćosić (who later served as the President of FR Yugoslavia), Slobodan Selenić, and Danko Popović. She particularly focuses on Čosić's novel *A Time of Death* (Vreme Smrti), which details Serbian victory over the Austro-Hungarian Army during WWI. The novel presents a narrative of great heroism in a battle against a much larger army and disappointment over perceived betrayal of Croatian fighters who joined the fight against the Serbians. When part of the book was adapted into a play in 1984, it sold out for several months, paving the way for "proliferation of plays with historical and national themes for years to come" (ibid.:93). Similar to Dragović-Soso, Čolović (2002) also details how cultural works such as poems, essays, or songs have helped to promote and perpetuate what he calls "Serbian ethno-nationalistic myth" (ibid.:10) that presented Serb history from – at least – 1389 onwards as a unified narrative of tragic heroism. Echoing Volkan (1999) and Judah (2009), Čolović (2002:5) argues that this mythical past became entangled with the existing anxieties of the Serb population, creating a "direct, living connection with the past," i.e., bringing narratives of past victimization into perspectives about ongoing relationships with Muslims and Croats. Such was the

narrative that enabled the propaganda campaign against Bosniaks and Albanians by evoking the injustices that Ottoman Turks had perpetuated centuries ago.

4.1.4.4 Pillars of Serbian Mobilization: Narratives of Victimization and Exclusive Identity

The scholarly literature on SFR Yugoslavia's disintegration lays out a sequence of events that was summarized above. Ethno-nationalist mobilization of Serb identity, initially devised among the intellectual class in Belgrade as a tool of opposition to the decaying communist regime, first infected Serbian politics thanks to Milošević, then the cultural realm, and finally the public at large. The same literature also helps us to understand the tools of mobilization. These tools were exclusive identity, which stressed the many heroisms and valor of the Serbs as compared to their neighbors; and a narrative of victimization that read Serbian history as one of continuous aggressive attacks from Croats, Turks, Bosniaks, and Albanians.

Several researchers, including Cigar (1995:75-80), Čolović (2002), Dragović-Soso (2002:64), Ramet (2005b; 2007), and Oberschall (2000) argued that the dissemination of narratives of victimization was a key factor in enabling nationalist social mobilization of the Serbs that preceded the Yugoslav Wars. Oberschall (2000:990), for instance, suggests that

> *"[t]he emotion that poisons ethnic relations is fear (Lake and Rothchild 1996): fear of extinction as a group, fear of assimilation, fear of domination by another group, fear for one's life and property, fear of being a victim once more. After fear comes hate. The threatening others are demonized and dehumanized. The means of awakening and spreading such fears in Yugoslavia were through the newsmedia, politics, education, popular culture, literature, history and the arts."*

Dragović-Soso (2002:9) argued that the nationalist doctrine of Serbian intellectuals was "based on an extreme notion of victimization" that attributed genocidal intent to all of Serbia's rivals – real or perceived. Ramet (2007:42) makes a similar argument about the effects of widespread nationalist propaganda during Milošević's leadership: "While only a minority of Serbs actually perpetrated atrocities, few Serbs remained unaffected by the barrage of propaganda and the deepening culture of

victimization. *To be a Serb was, in the Milošević era, to be a victim* [emphasis added]. And this sense of victimhood aroused feelings of anger and led to the justification of Serb military operations in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo as 'self-defense', when they were patently acts of aggression." Re-animating the painful memories of past struggles such as the Battle of Kosovo, the Ottoman rule, and Jasenovac Concentration Camp, Serbian intellectuals, politicians, and clergymen served to put Serbian people into the crisis frame (Oberschall 2000:984) in order to achieve their nationalist political goals.

On the other hand, Cigar (1995:73-77) also details a narrative of Serb heroism and valor emanating from the same sources that promoted the narrative of Serb victimization. For instance, he cites a speech by Drašković, who is quoted saying: "[W]ithin the Yugoslav area, biologically we [Serbs] are the strongest nation and have the strongest roots […] we have the most intelligent people, the best writers, the best theaters and the best soldiers." Cigar also quotes Milošević's Gazimestan speech: "[T]he fact that Serbs are a great people of this region is not a Serbian sin or anything to be ashamed of. It is, rather, a privilege […]. [T]he Serbs have never used this privilege, even on their own behalf." The promotion of Serb heroism and valor is aimed at fueling the social mobilization of Serb identity by evoking ethno-national pride amongst the Serbian people, thereby giving the idea of an exclusive Serbian identity an emotional and ideological basis.

Similarly, Čolović (2002) uses several quotes from Serbian politicians and intellectuals to show that narratives of Serb superiority have been a critical component of Serb "ethno-nationalistic myth," as he calls it. In this political myth, the central claim to superiority emerges from the legend that prior to the Battle of Kosovo, Prince Lazar chose to fight the Ottoman Turks instead of capitulating to them, therefore choosing the 'Heavenly Kingdom' as opposed to continue ruling as an Ottoman vassal – i.e., the 'Earthly Kingdom.' As Čolović (2002:11) explains, Prince Lazar choosing the 'Heavenly Kingdom' is central to the narrative of Serb valor and heroism. Prince Lazar's choice, dubbed as "the Kosovo option," according to scholars such as Jevtić (quoted in Čolović 2002:11), "has fatefully determined the whole people's behavior at key moments in Serbian history" and represents, according to Lukić (quoted in Čolović 2002:11), "that

inner strength has united the nation so that it lives for liberation, holds together and is not dispersed."

Noting the seemingly countering narratives of Serb heroism and valor versus the victimization of Serbs over the course of history, Cigar (1995:78) argues that such "dualistic self- view […] can be a particularly explosive mix." When combined, "the dual-influence of Serb superiority and the alleged threat of biological Serbian extinction" served to de-humanize Muslims and justify Serbian aggression under the guise of a struggle for survival. Similarly, noting that "victim-centered propaganda" animated both Croatian and Serbian nationalism, MacDonald (2003:6) argues: "Both groups consistently held that by proving their own fall throughout history, they could legitimate the struggles necessary for Redemption." Framing their policy goals as a centuries old search for redemption, Croat and Serbian nationalists had significantly raised the stakes and provoked strong emotions among their compatriots.

4.1.4 Bosniak and Croat Mobilizations

As was the case in Serbia, nationalist parties and politicians were on the rise in BiH and Croatia during the decay of the communist rule. Croatia, as one of the two richer republics of SFR Yugoslavia (along with Slovenia) was already seeking to leave the rest of the poorer republics behind and had experienced a nationalist movement in the early 1970s. The 'Croatian Spring' movement had demanded greater cultural and political autonomy from SFR Yugoslavia. Communist authorities forcefully quashed the movement and jailed thousands of dissidents. In the first free elections in Croatia, in April and May 1990, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) emerged victorious under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, a former Croatian Spring organizer. According to Dragović-Soso (2002:234), among the parties that former Croatian Spring activists established, HDZ was the most right-wing and nationalist. She argues that HDZ "insisted on Croatia's 1000-year old 'state right,' placed considerable emphasis on Catholicism as a defining characteristic of Croatian identity and showed particular concern about the Croats' 'biological' decline" (ibid.). She further notes that, during the election campaign, Tudjman and HDZ "adopted an ambiguous stand towards the Independent State of Croatia [Nazi puppet regime of WWII era], referring to it as "not only a fascist institution but also the expression of the Croatian people's centuries old craving for an independent

state" (ibid.). As Magaš (1993) and MacDonald (2003) point out, Croatian nationalist rhetoric resembled the Serbian one in that they both built a narrative of victimization that encompassed centuries.

Croat and Serb nationalisms first collided in 1991, when the Serbians of Croatia began a rebellion against the nationalism of the HDZ government. Serbian radical nationalist politician – and later paramilitary leader under Milošević's command – Vojislav Šešelj began to organize Serb nationalist rallies in Eastern Croatia, sounding alarm bells about an impending Serb genocide at the hands of the Ustaša, just like at Jasenovac during WWII (BBC 1996). According to Silber and Little (1996:105), with the encouragement of the Serbian government in Belgrade, the "Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia consciously revived memories of the 1940s among Serbs in order to kindle hatred of Croatia." The final fuse of the rebellion was lit when the local Serb police refused to wear their new uniforms that had the Croatian red-white checkerboard flag (known as *Šahovnica*), claiming that it was a fascist symbol associated with the Nazi puppet regime in Croatia during WWII. While the Nazi puppet regime of the Independent State of Croatia also used the *Šahovnica* in its flag, the symbol had long been associated with the Croats and was depicted in the Croat coat of arms during the communist rule as well.[14] Yet the rhetoric of Serbian victimization and the constant evocation of Jasenovac led to the Serbs associating a common Croat symbol with impending fascism (Granić 1993).

The Serb rebellion and the subsequent war in Croatia served to empower the most extreme wing of HDZ. As Silber and Little (ibid.:140-144) detail, the conflict with Serbians in Eastern Croatia led to a drift amongst the Croats as well. Whereas the moderate local police chief Joseph Riehl-Kir sought to ease the tensions with dialogue, HDZ hardliner Gojko Šušak went on to organize attacks on Serbian villagers who erected barricades to keep Croat forces out. The divergent fates of Riehl-Kir and Šušak, according to Silber and Little (ibid.:144), signifies the turn towards radical nationalism among the Croats: Riehl-Kir was murdered by Croat extremists, while Šušak rose to the rank of Defense Minister in 1991. The war in Croatia ended in 1995, with an ethnic

[14] Furthermore, the WWII-era *Šahovnica* and the modern re-iteration are slightly different. Whereas the former's first square on the upper-left corner was white, the latter's first square is red.

cleansing campaign that saw hundreds of thousands of Serbians in Croatia purged (Burg and Shoup 1999:414).

In BiH, the free elections in November and December 1990 resembled an ethnic headcount. The Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and local branch of HDZ emerged victorious with a combined 80% of the vote and formed an unlikely union to keep the reformed communists out of power. As Bennett (2016:249) argues, the vote reflected Bosnians' desire to seek security amongst their ethnic group in the face of the collapse of the communist regime and the rising nationalism in Serbia and Croatia. Stojanović (2014) argues that "fear of other's nationalisms" was the main motivator of voters who flocked to their own ethnicity parties.

As the republics of Slovenia and Croatia pushed for independence, Bosniaks and Croats of BiH faced the danger of being ruled by a regime in Belgrade that was not committed to the Yugoslav Federation but to the ideal of a 'Greater Serbia.' In a 1990 speech he gave at an election rally in the Western Bosnian town of Bihać, Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović declared that "Bosnia will not stay in a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs. I will not let Bosnia to be a part of Greater Serbia" (BBC 1996). His speech articulated the pre-dominant attitude of Bosniaks, who had become wary of the increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric emanating from Belgrade that Bosnian Serbs came to echo. While Izetbegović expressed a desire to retain BiH's multinational character, nationalist sentiments continued to grow among Bosniaks as well, particularly as a response to the expressions of Serb nationalism. On March 1st, 1992, shortly before the armed clashes began, a Bosniak man – who was part of the Bosniak paramilitary group "Green Berets" – fired shots at a Serbian wedding party, allegedly because they passed through a Bosniak neighborhood with Serbian flags. The father of the groom was killed and the Serbian priest was wounded in the shooting that most Bosnian Serbs consider the beginning of the war (Judah 2009:320).

At the same time, the rising radical nationalism in Croatia came to be echoed in the BiH chapter of HDZ and among the Croats in BiH. Like the Bosniaks, Croats did not want to live in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. As Magaš (1993:24) points out, Croats had long viewed Yugoslavia (both the Kingdom [1918-1939] and the Socialist Federation) as

a vessel for Serbian domination of Croatia. Furthermore, HDZ's professed quest for Croatian independence brought about an anti-Muslim campaign as well. As early as 1991, Tudjman and Milošević had secretly agreed to carve BiH up. Their agreement included Tudjman's plan to expand Croatia's borders to include Bosnian Croats (Silber and Little 1996:306). MacDonald (2003:220) argues that in the lead-up to the war, politicians – including Tudjman and Šušak – and state-media in Croatia began to talk about the "threat of Islamic fundamentalism" in BiH. In doing so, Croat politicians and state-media mirrored their counterparts in Belgrade, encouraging anti-Muslim sentiments in order to achieve their nationalist political goals (MacDonald 2003:226-229). Similar to Serbian propaganda, Croat nationalists also sought to undercut Bosniak identity by claiming Bosniaks were actually Croats who converted and betrayed their nation (ibid.:230). Moore (2013:40) additionally highlights the role of the Franciscan Order in Herzegovina in "espousing a militant nationalist vision of a Greater Croatia encompassing much of Bosnia," which similarly resembles the rhetoric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in advocating for a "Greater Serbia."

Therefore, by April 1992, all three peoples of BiH believed that they had long been and/or might soon be victimized by their neighbors. They had anger towards their neighbors, they feared one another, and they did not trust each other. As Udovički (2000:3) points out, Yugoslavs were susceptible to the nationalist propaganda as the country lacked "a resilient web of democratic institutions." The social mobilizations of ethnic identities had helped to create a situation that was rife for war.

4.2 The War

As the masses of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs came to fear their neighbors and believe that the survival of their nation was at stake, ethnic cleansing campaigns became the primary goal of the war as opposed to an unfortunate side effect of it. Armed with the means of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and motivated by the ideals of the "territorial unity of the Serbs" in a 'Greater Serbia,' Bosnian Serb forces (including VRS and various paramilitary groups) perpetuated the most atrocious ethnic cleansing campaigns. Cigar (1995:4), detailing Bosnian Serb war effort, argues: "Ethnic cleansing was not simply the unintentional and unfortunate by-product of combat or civil war. Rather, it was a rational policy, the direct and planned consequence of conscious policy

decisions taken by the Serbian establishment in Serbia and BiH." The UN's special rapporteur in BiH also came to the same conclusion, arguing: "Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be [merely] the consequence of the war, but rather its goal" (Mazowiecki, quoted in Boyle 1996:95). Similarly, Sells (1996:25) characterizes VRS actions in BiH as an "effort to destroy Bosnian Muslim culture and Bosnia's multireligious culture and to destroy Bosnian Muslims as a people."

Bosnian Serb forces, buoyed by the support of Belgrade, were particularly vicious in their campaign of ethnic cleansing, often resorting to forced removals, concentration camps, destruction of property, rape and torture, destruction of cultural and religious symbols, and massacring of civilian populations, most infamously during the Srebrenica Genocide in 1995. According to Cigar (1995:63), such atrocities also had the – likely intended – effect of destroying any possibility of an inter-ethnic BiH, thereby leaving Bosnian Serbs no choice but to support the nationalist cause. He argues: "Using such methods would have so poisoned the intercommunal relationships as to preclude any accommodation or coexistence in the near-term, thus transforming the [Bosnian Serb] leadership's desired strategy of partition into the only legitimate political option by default." Subsequently, Karadžić used precisely such circular reasoning to argue against a unified state [of BiH], calling it "astonishing" that the "international community should want people who hate each other to the point of extermination to live together again" (ibid.).

While VRS and Serbian nationalist militias were the initial and, ultimately the most egregious offenders, all sides committed war crimes at some point during the conflict. With the backing of the increasingly extremist government in Zagreb that had designs to annex BiH even before the war, Bosnian Croats began to mark their own territory and sought to expel others. Under the radical nationalist leadership of Mate Boban, they declared the establishment of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia on August 28, 1993. Boban followed the Serb playbook of rousing anti-Muslim and anti-Bosniak sentiments to the letter. He claimed, for instance, that Bosnians were not a separate nation but, in fact, Croats who converted to Islam. Therefore, he argued, Bosnia belonged to Croatia (Silber and Little 1996:294). As noted earlier, Croat state media had already begun to broadcast sensationalized reports about the alleged threat of 'Islamic

fundamentalism' in BiH. Furthermore, the arrival of tens of thousands of Bosniak refugees escaping Bosnian Serb forces disturbed what was already a delicate balance between local Bosniak and Croat populations of Western Herzegovina, propelling Croat fears of being dominated by the Bosniak Muslims. Under Boban's leadership, HVO first began to harass local Muslims, and then went on an ethnic cleansing campaign of its own. HVO's ethnic cleansing efforts mimicked those of the Bosnian Serb forces as they expelled Bosniaks who stood in their way of uniting Croatian territory, held people in concentration camps, destructed property, and attacked cultural and religious symbols of Bosniaks, including the infamous destruction of the Ottoman era *Old Bridge* (Stari Most) in Mostar on November 9, 1993 (ibid.: 293-297).

The conflict with Croats, who previously had been allies of Bosniaks against the Serbs, coupled with the continued victimization at the hands of Bosnian Serb forces, emboldened nationalists and radical Islamists among the Bosniaks. During the Bosniak-Croat conflict, the Seventh Muslim Brigade was formed. The members of the brigade were Islamist hardliners, representing the emergence of a "strident, xenophobic Muslim nationalism" in BiH (Silber and Little 1996:300). They also committed the kind of atrocities that Croat and Serb nationalists engaged in, such as killing and deporting civilians, rape, looting, and desecrating places of worship (ibid.).

Bosniaks and Croats signed the Washington Agreement, which was brokered by the US, on March 18, 1994 to cease hostilities, and were once again allied against the Serbs. In Croatia, the Croat Army managed to take control of Krajina from rebelling Serbs, dealing a blow to the 'Greater Serbia' project. In BiH, Bosniaks and Croats were boosted by the NATO intervention on their behalf, following the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995. As Bosnian Serb forces had to retreat from Central Bosnia, Serbian civilians were often forced to follow, both by the oncoming Bosniak and Croat forces and by their own soldiers who did not want Serbians living in Bosniak-Croat territory, even if they wished to stay.[15] By the time the US-brokered Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) was signed

---

[15] The most well-known example of Serbians forcing other Serbians to leave Bosniak-Croat territory is the handover of Grbavica and Ilidža, two Sarajevo suburbs. During the handover from Serbs to Bosniaks, which was agreed-upon as part of the DPA, Serb paramilitary gangs engaged in looting and destruction of property. In the process they also forced more than 100 Serbians to leave their homes (Beelman 1996). Overall, more than 100000 Serbians left Sarajevo shortly after DPA (Kostić 2009:41)

on December 14th, 1995, to end the hostilities, civilians from all sides – mostly Bosniaks – suffered from the war, losing relatives and loved ones, being raped and tortured, being forced to move, losing their properties. In many cases, such suffering came at the hands of former friends, neighbors, colleagues, or classmates. As a result, the relationships and social connections between the peoples of BiH were poisoned.

4.3 Dayton Peace Accords

As the dynamics of the conflict shifted, the US negotiators managed to bring Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs together for peace negotiations at Dayton, Ohio on November 1st, 1995. Richard Holbrooke, the chief US diplomat at Dayton, steadfastly refused the participation of Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders due to their alleged war crimes. The Presidents of Croatia and Serbia, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosević, acted as negotiators for their co-ethnic peoples instead, with Izetbegović serving as the representative for the Bosniaks.

The DPA created two federal entities in BiH: the Bosniak-Croat Federation (FBiH) – which was further divided into 10 cantons – and Republika Srpska (RS). A decision on the status of the Brčko District in Northern Bosnia – near the borders with Croatia and Serbia – was postponed, and in 1999, Brčko was designated as a "special district." It is formally part of both entities, but is under international supervision and mostly self-governing (Geoghegan 2014).

DPA put forward a complicated power-sharing system at the federal level. The Office of the President rotates among three members of the Presidency, one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. Federal level legislature has two branches: House of the Peoples and House of Representatives. Both chambers have ethnic quotas that give equal representation to all three main peoples of BiH. The House of Peoples also reserves 7 out of its 58 seats to "others."[16] Finally, the international community is represented in the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Initially tasked with overseeing the implementation of DPA on behalf of the international community, the OHR later gained broad powers such as removing local officials who violate the terms of DPA and making binding decisions when local officials are deadlocked. These so-called "Bonn Powers"

[16] The 2013 census found that 2.73% of Bosnian citizens identified as "Others," i.e., not Bosniak, Croat, or Serb. The main non-Slavic peoples in BiH are Jews and the Roma.

were put in place in 1997 in the face of the resistance from Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs to implement an agreement in which they had very little input (Kostić 2009:53-4).

Despite the scholarly discussion about its merits for post-conflict countries, consociational theory has been a significant influence on DPA. The political system of BiH, as designed in the DPA, satisfies all four characteristics of a consociational system that Lijphart (1977) has described: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs have allocated seats for their communities in both houses of the parliament and in the three-member Presidency. Each group has veto rights, since the Presidency is obliged to make mutual decisions and the constitution dictates that a proposition that is deemed to be of "vital national interest" to Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs would have to be approved by a majority of each group's delegates in the House of Peoples (McEvoy 2015:111), and every legislation requires at least one-third support from each group (McCulloch 2014:503). Ethnic quotas in civil service are applied across the country, formally or informally, depending on the jurisdiction (Moore 2013:63-4). The entity government of RS enjoys comprehensive autonomy in Serb-dominated areas of the country while in FBiH, the cantonal governments provide autonomy to Bosniaks and Croats in their respective communities. These local governments exercise wide-ranging authority compared to the relatively weak Federal Government (McEvoy 2015:130). Most scholars of consociationalism, indeed, regard BiH as an example of consocational power-sharing (see, inter alia, Weller and Wolff 2006; O'Leary 2005; Belloni 2004; McCulloch 2014; McEvoy 2015).

While the consociational institutional design that the DPA put forward has succeeded in keeping the peace in BiH, it has not produced significant levels of inter-ethnic communication and cooperation (Simonsen 2005; McEvoy 2015:117-119). The criticisms of DPA institutions echo those about consociationalism in general. Critics of consociational theory have argued that the DPA introduced a rigid form of consociationalism that led to the further entrenchment of ethnic nationalisms in Bosnian politics and hampered the development of inter-ethnic communication. Several scholars have charged that DPA institutions have resulted in political deadlock, continuing dominance of nationalist parties and entrenchment of ethnic divides (Bieber and Keil 2009; Simonsen 2005:304; Zahar 2005; Moore 2013:77-78; Bennett 2016:279). Bennett (2016:252-3), for instance, characterizes DPA as "what could be agreed by Alija

Izetbegović, Slobodan Milosević and Franjo Tudjman and their negotiating teams in three weeks of talks after more than three-and-a-half years of fighting." Therefore, he argues, it does not provide a basis for promoting co-existence, reconciliation, and moving on from the framework of conflict, but rather serves to entrench ethnic rivalries. Hence, the "Bosnian question," as Bennett (2016:253) calls it, is still open.

Emphasizing the political deadlock of BiH's political institutions following the DPA, McCulloch (2014:507) points out that "[i]n Bosnia, only 10 laws were passed in the first year after the adoption of the Dayton Peace Accords and an average of five per year were passed between 1998 and 2000." In one of the most infamous examples of the dysfunction of BiH's political institutions, the law regarding the issue of national ID numbers lapsed in February 2013 while politicians debated whether the 13-digit ID numbers should include a label identifying which entity issued the ID. As a result, babies born in BiH after the law expired could not be issued ID numbers, preventing them from getting health insurance or travel documents. The controversy, which contributed to the death of a baby who could not travel to Germany to get specialized treatment, led to the first large-scale protests in post-war BiH, which the local press dubbed as the "Baby Revolution" (Armakolas and Maksimovic 2013). At the local level, the federal government's inefficiency ends up empowering local governments, which are often dominated by nationalists of the majority ethnic-group in the area. Such situations often lead to one ethnic group dominating local politics and alienating others, which in turn discourages refugee return (Kostić 2009:57).

Critics of the consociational experience in BiH suggest that the country is in need of a paradigm shift – a re-definition of inter-ethnic relations and the conduct of politics (Moore 2013; Baker 2015; Bennett 2016). Such a paradigm shift, according to Bennett (2016:252-3), "requires moving beyond the consociational structures that have failed to function in the absence of the necessary consensus. And it means, in particular, addressing the consequences of the country's ethno-democracy. That is, the contradiction between the demos and the ethnos that generates ethno-national conflict, as well as developing a framework for co-existence, building in a process of reconciliation and thereby changing the logic of Bosnian politics." Inter-ethnic civil society efforts and protests, such as the above-cited "Baby Revolution" and 2014 protests over high

unemployment and poverty, led some observers to believe that the makings of such a paradigm shift currently exist in BiH (Baker 2015:97). More recently, the protests demanding an investigation into the suspicious death of David Dragičević, a 21-year-old man from Banja Luka, has become a spark for inter-ethnic protests against corruption and incompetence of BiH politicians (Kovačević 2018). In 2020 local elections, opposition candidates achieved victory in key municipalities, including Sarajevo and Banja Luka, breaking the dominance of BiH's traditional nationalist parties (Latal 2020). In particular, 27-year old opposition candidate Draško Stanivuković's winning campaign in Banja Luka focused on the corruption and nepotism of the ruling SNSD and became emblematic of the frustrations of Bosnian youth – both in RS and FBiH (ibid.). Therefore, the 2020 local elections represent yet another sign that a different paradigm of politics is possible in BiH.

Two other lines of criticism against the DPA are also worth noting in providing the necessary background for this research project. First, several scholars criticized the outsized and opaque role of the external actors during the negotiations and implementation after the signing of the accords (Chandler 2005; Gizelis and Kosek 2005; Kostić 2009; Bieber 2011). For instance, Kostić (2009:13) charges that these external actors imposed their own models and ignored "local practices of power-sharing and societal organization that traditionally served as pillars of peaceful inter-group coexistence." In particular, Kostić (2009:56-7) argues that Holbrooke ignored the suggestions from Bosnians about the power-sharing system of the socialist era, where decision-making at any level of government was based on consensus regardless of the size of the ethnic group. Instead, the externally devised system introduced a more complicated power-sharing arrangement at the federal level and allowed the majority ethnic group of each locality to dominate at the lower levels of government. Kostić (2009:57) cites the lack of power-sharing at the local level as a major reason why many Bosnians left or chose not to return to towns and cities where they would be ethnic minorities under a municipal and/or canton government dominated by their former enemies (ibid.). The continued mandate and broad powers of OHR means that external actors have continued to wield significant political power in BiH.

Second, feminist activists and scholars criticized the DPA for ignoring the specific challenges and issues women faced as a result of the conflict. Chinkin and Paradine (2001:105), for instance, argue that "the focus upon ethnic identity and security at Dayton obscured issues of gender in the process of reconstruction." As a result, they claim, that in the early stages of BiH's post-conflict reconstruction, "gender concerns were largely invisible," and were only brought forth through the efforts of women's NGOs. Thus, they question whether the DPA considered women as citizens of BiH. Focusing on the female survivors' recovery process, Dolgopol (1999) argues that in the name of sustaining a fragile peace, the DPA failed to include provisions as to the Bosnian state's responsibility to assist the recovery of victims of emotional and physical abuse during the war. As a result, she suggests, the new government in Bosnia could ignore these survivors. She goes on the argue that the survivors will not foster any sense of belonging in a state "where their needs are not being addressed by their own government. And if there is no collective sense of belonging, then the peace may not be an enduring one." The feminist perspective on the DPA, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6, informs Bosnian women's NGOs approach to MHPSS work.

4.4 Post Dayton-Era

While the violence has ended, the mobilization of Serb identity – and the corresponding mobilizations of Bosniak and Croat identities – have not ceased. In this section, I will detail four contemporary issues, which indicate that social mobilizations in BiH still persist. These are (1) the ethnic divide, (2) variant histories of the war adopted by each ethnic group, (3) the continued influence of nationalist politicians in the country, and (4) the continued socio-economic insecurities.

4.4.1 The Ethnic Divide

Years of ethnic cleansing campaigns created sharp ethnic divides in what was once a multi-ethnic country, further compounding the divide between the communities that came about during the initial rise of nationalism(s). According to the 2013 census, 82.5% of the population of RS is Serbian. More than 99% of the Serbs of BiH live in RS, with only 56,550 remaining in FBiH out of a total population of more than one million. Similarly, less than 5% of Bosniaks and 2% of Croats in BiH live in RS. Several formerly mixed cities and towns came to be dominated by one ethnic group or the other, as many

refugees did not return, and residents moved – either forcibly or by choice. For instance, the percentage of Serbian population in Sarajevo declined from 25.50% in 1991 to 3.78% in 2013, and the Bosniak population in Banja Luka fell from 14.59% to 4.15% in the same period. Even in mixed towns of FBiH, such as Mostar or Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje (which has one Bosniak and one Croat name), local Bosniak and Croat communities live in *de facto* segregation, attending different schools, frequenting different cafes, supporting different soccer clubs, and rarely even crossing over to parts of town where the other group is dominant (Clark 2012:826-7; Moore 2013:1-4). Simply put, the ethnic divides that the war created remain in place. They make it difficult to re-establish social connections and trust between the communities of BiH, as they decrease the opportunities and avenues for dialogue and cooperation (Clark 2009:365-6).

4.4.2 Variant Histories of Heroism and Victimization

As detailed above, a "dualistic self-view" (Cigar 1995:78-80) arose amongst the peoples of BiH as a result of the social mobilization of ethnic identities. A dualistic self-view suggests that one's nation is simultaneously heroic and victimized through history – and faces extinction at the hands of the enemies. As it promotes both exclusive ethnic identity and a narrative of victimization, the perpetuation of the dualistic self-view serves social mobilization.

The conditions of the brutal war period provided new material for stories of heroism and victimization for all groups, which enable continued social mobilization. According to Kostić's (2008) survey research, members of each ethnic group identify the other groups as aggressors and their own side as the defensive forces. For instance, when asked whether they agreed with the statement "My people only fought wars of defense," 89% of Bosniaks, 80% of Serbs, and 73% of Croats said they "totally agree" (ibid.:395) with an additional 9%, 15%, and 19%, respectively, suggesting they "somewhat agree."[17] Each group deems wartime commanders on their side national heroes and those on the other side war criminals. For instance, when Serbian general Ratko Mladić was arrested due to war crimes – including the genocide in Srebrenica – Serbs rallied in Banja Luka in

[17] Kostić's (2008) survey is somewhat dated. However, given the very strong sentiment that emanated from the particular survey question (over 90% of respondents from each group suggesting their people only fought defensive wars) and the absence of massive social or political shifts in BiH since then, it is safe to assume that the indications of the survey would still hold.

protest, with many holding banners and posters with Mladić's picture which said "Serbian hero," despite his notoriety as a war criminal among Bosniaks and Croats. Similarly, wartime ARBiH commanders such as Naser Orić or Jovan Divjak are revered among Bosniaks and reviled by the Serbs – and are sought by Serbia for war crimes. As will be further detailed in Chapter 5, war memorials on each side reflect a narrative of victimization and "ignore or even deny the suffering of others" (Franović 2015:224).

The Bosnian War created new stories of heroisms, new villains, and new victimizations for each group, providing material to help sustain social mobilizations. To further complicate matters, one group's hero is another's villain, and each group firmly believes that they fought the honorable fight and were victimized by their neighbours. Therefore, there are three distinct versions of the history of the Bosnian War among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs that are prevalent today which perpetuate animosity and fear among Bosnians from each ethnic group even in the absence of violent conflict, thereby maintaining the social mobilization that took place in the lead-up to the war.

The persistence of variant histories of the Bosnian War indicates that there has not been significant progress towards the reconciliation goal of 'dealing with the past.' Each group's narratives of the War highlight their own victimization and paint the other groups as aggressors, ignoring victimization on the other sides and aggression from one's own side. Hence, the narratives about the war are in many ways extensions of the narratives that spread in the lead up to the war, contributing to the continuation of the same kind of nationalist politics – as discussed below. Therefore, I argue that MHPSS efforts to help individuals and communities to 'deal with the past' and get Bosnians to hear stories of trauma from the members of other ethnic groups is not merely about individual or social psychology. They constitute a political intervention that seeks to eradicate the kind of nationalist politics that utilizes narratives of victimization to evoke anger, fear, and mistrust towards out-group(s) and promote in-group solidarity based on these negative emotions.

4.4.3 Continued Domination of Nationalist Politics

As Moore (2013:24) argues, fear and violence of the war has led to a political mobilization around the nationalist parties of each group in BiH, strengthening nationalist movements and marginalizing alternative ones. SDA, HDZ, and SDS became "national

movements" according to Moore (ibid.) with members of the ethnic groups feeling like "they had to join, or at least nominally ally, with the parties in order to defend themselves." Bennett (2016:xviii) argues that, politically, the "zero-sum politics" that the 1990 elections brought about continues to dominate, even though Bosnians are unhappy about the political situation in their country, evidenced by an approval rating of 8% in Gallup's (2014) "Global States of Mind" study.

Andjelić (2012:120-122) also argues that political mobilization in BiH is still based on rivaling Bosniak, Croat, and Serb nationalisms and "there is no universal political mobilization on the level of the entire state" (ibid.:121). Even the Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP), which presents itself as a multi-ethnic, non-nationalist party, follows a Bosniak nationalist agenda, Andjelić (ibid.) argues, and has hardly any non-Bosniak members beyond the select few in party leadership. As a result, nationalist elites often manage to get control of the levers of the state, but consistently work to undermine it to shift governance to the local level where a single ethnicity group can dominate decision making (ibid.:124; Moore 2013:78; McEvoy 2015:117; Bennett 2016:17). Hence, a non-violent form of ethnic rivalry continues in BiH over which constituent group gets to make decisions at different levels of the state (local, cantonal, entity-level, or federal), making it impossible to rebuild trust between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs (Andjelić 2012:129).

Summing up the current political climate in BiH, Bennett (2016:266) suggests that "Bosnia […] is unable to move on. The issue of relations among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs crowds out all others. Many of the same politicians continue to use the same provocative, insensitive and irresponsible rhetoric." The country, according to Bennett (2016:xviii), has been stuck in a "cycle of fear, insecurity and loathing."

4.4.4 Continued Socio-economic Problems

During the 1970s and 1980s, SFR Yugoslavia suffered from economic stagnation, balance of payment crises, high inflation, and rising unemployment. Several scholars of Yugoslav politics and history have explicitly linked the worsening socio-economic conditions to the collapse of SFR Yugoslavia (see, for instance: Pleština 1992; Magaš 1993; Woodward 1995; Moore 2013). Furthermore, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found a statistically significant relationship between eruption of civil wars with low levels of

economic growth and low levels of income. In the specific case of BiH, Moore (2013:24) argues that socio-economic problems and disparities have led to local level conflicts over land and resources, which came to be entangled with disputes at the "top level." As a result, the nationalist rhetoric at the elite level is transferred to the local level conflicts due to socio-economic hardships and inequalities.

As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the War dealt a significant blow to the Bosnian economy. More than two decades later, BiH continues to suffer from high levels of unemployment and very high youth unemployment (15.9% and 34%, respectively, according to latest World Bank [2020] data). The GDP per capita stands at 4197 US Dollars, the third lowest in Europe. As nationalist parties continue to control the state and its resources, the poor socio-economic conditions force many Bosnians to continue to follow the party line to access these resources. As will be further detailed in Chapter 7, such patronage networks help maintain the nationalist rhetoric and therefore the social mobilization of ethnic identities.

4.5 Conclusion

Drawing on seminal research on SFR Yugoslavia's break-up, this chapter has detailed how exclusive nationalism, which began as an elite project during the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia, permeated the masses through propaganda efforts of nationalist politicians, scholars, artists, and clergy. This propaganda relied on evoking past horrors, conflicts, and traumas through a one-sided narrative of victimization, suggesting that the very survival of 'the nation' was in danger. According to such narrative(s), 'the nation' has always been a tragic hero, defending itself against aggression since time immemorial. Lacking a "resilient web of democratic institutions," (Udovički 2000:3) and suffering from socio-economic pressures, the peoples of SFR Yugoslavia were susceptible to the lure of such propaganda. Eventually, they harbored anger towards their neighbors as they were constantly reminded of 'chosen traumas' (Volkan 1999) such as the Battle of Kosovo or Jasenovac concentration camp. They were fearful and suspicious that another such attack would take place soon. Such a collective mental state ended up motivating peoples of BiH to perpetuate violence against one another (Cigar 1995; Čolović 2002).

The Bosnian War brought on new traumas and narratives of victimization, further sharpening the divide between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Nationalist politics in BiH, still dominant, relies on exploiting past traumas to promote narratives of victimization and exclusive identities. It is their goal to keep their constituents in what Oberschall (2000:984) calls "the crisis frame," and Bosnians who have not been able to deal with traumas of the war remain particularly susceptible to such political manipulation. Hence, MHPSS work in BiH is not merely psychological or socio-psychological work; it is also political work that needs to be examined and understood alongside research on political institutions, ideologies and rhetoric in BiH, because they seek to diffuse the exclusive identities and narratives of collective victimhood that keep nationalist political leaders in power.

Finally, this chapter has also shown that narratives of victimization and exclusive identities have been a key aspect of social mobilization(s) in the lead up to the Bosnian War. Therefore, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) framework on social mobilization, which identifies the promotion of narratives of collective victimhood and exclusive identity as key elements of the process, emerges as an ideal framework for this research project, and will be utilized to build the argument.

5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAUMA AND RECONCILIATION IN BiH

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, the scholars and practitioners of MHPSS programs have made a set of assumptions as to how their local level work might matter for social level reconciliation. On the other hand, MHPSS work has not received much attention from scholarship and practice that subscribed to the liberal peacebuilding paradigm that brought about an institutional focus. As Charbonneau and Parent (2012:1) argue, "[t]here is relatively little [scholarly research] on the relationship between individual and social psychological effects of war and violent conflict and what these effects mean for the possibilities of political reconciliation." Closing this gap, as this research aims to do, would first require an investigation into how war-related traumatic experiences of individual survivors affect the prospects of reconciliation.

In this chapter, I explore the connection between individual traumas, local level relationships and social level reconciliation in the case of BiH. I focus on detailing the lingering negative emotions, narratives of collective victimhood and transgenerational transfer of trauma that my interviewees observed during their work with survivors of the Bosnian War and their implications for the prospects of social reconciliation. This part of my analysis is represented as the "trauma" branch of my coding tree and all the quotes cited in this chapter are from the nodes and sub-nodes under it (See Figure 2: Trauma Branch of the Coding Tree).



Figure 2: Trauma Branch of the Coding Tree

In analyzing the interplay between traumatic experiences of individuals and social level of reconciliation, I follow Clark's (2010) argument that micro-level processes, issues, and relations can have significant implications for reconciliation. I also take up

Sylvester's (2013a:620) challenge to IR scholars to study war "up from the people." The data I present in this chapter shows that these negative emotions and narratives of collective victimhood have been and continue to be prevalent in post-conflict in BiH. No amount of macro level initiatives can bring about reconciliation when anger is still prevalent, fear and mistrust define relationships, and narratives of collective victimhood shape people's attitudes towards members of the rival group(s).

In discussing the negative emotions of anger, fear, mistrust and the narratives of collective victimhood that permeates Bosnian society, I refer to Bar-Tal's (2007) theoretical framework on the "socio-psychological infrastructure" of societies in intractable conflicts. Bar-Tal's framework helps explain how negative emotions and narratives of collective victimhood, which prevail in the lead up to the conflict, persist during and after the period of violence. As detailed in the Literature Review, Bar-Tal (ibid.) identifies three elements of socio-psychological infrastructure in intractable conflicts: collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation. In this chapter, I adopt Bar-Tal's descriptions of each element to explain how negative emotions and narratives of collective victimhood, which are still prevalent among Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities, have helped to bring about and later sustain social mobilization against rival group(s).

This chapter is organized as follows: using the data I have collected and supplementary data from the scholarly literature, I first discuss the prevalence of negative emotions in post-conflict BiH and how the persistence of these emotions complicates reconciliation. I then focus on the narratives of collective victimhood, detailing how they are sustained in contemporary BiH and their influence on individuals and society overall. Finally, I discuss the mechanisms through which trauma transfers transgenerationally, creating a vicious cycle. Through this analysis I demonstrate how traumas of war present challenges for the process of reconciliation and the maintenance of political stability. Understanding these challenges will set the stage for exploring the MHPSS efforts to address them and finding out how MHPSS work relates to reconciliation.

5.2 Negative Emotions

In this section, I will detail the prevalence of anger, fear, and mistrust in Bosnian society, and how they are manifested, based on the observations of my interviewees. I

will then discuss the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of these emotional responses to traumatic experiences. Throughout this discussion, I show the relevance of these negative emotions to reconciliation. I use the quotes under the "Negative emotions" node in my coding tree (67 quotes), which includes the sub-nodes of "Anger" (24 quotes), "Fear" (23 quotes), and "Mistrust" (15 quotes) under it.

5.2.1 Anger

During my field research, anger was a prevalent theme. Several interviewees attested to having observed angry behavior from the participants of their MHPSS programs. Interviewee NJ, who is a psychotherapist, observed anger in some of her participants: "At times, I saw moments of very severe and open rage. At one seminar, one woman told me, 'I am going to tell negative things about Muslims to my children throughout their lives.'" RK, also a psychotherapist, suggested that it is difficult to work with patients with PTSD because "[t]hey have a lot of anger in them."[18] What, then, are the consequences of such anger for people with trauma and Bosnian society in general?

Since the end of the war, revenge attacks and inter-ethnic violence in general has been minimal in BiH (Clark 2009:471). According to a report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), there were 147 incidents of hate crime in BiH in 2017 (OSCE 2018). However, the feelings of anger that arise due to trauma lead to other forms of violence in the society. For instance, the interviewees frequently cited domestic violence as a consequence of anger borne out of trauma. MHA suggested: "In many domestic abuse cases, it has been possible for us to track the root of such behavior to trauma that has not been adequately treated." ZS argued that domestic violence was a growing problem in BiH, signifying the continuation of violence within the Bosnian society: "Violence still exists in Bosnia, but it is now mostly directed inside. Domestic violence is the most common representation of the ongoing role of violence in our society."

[18] A significant amount of psychological research suggests that there is a clear link between PTSD and anger related issues. In their meta-analytic review of the literature, Olatunji, Ciesielski, and Tolin (2010:93) found that "a diagnosis of PTSD was associated with significantly greater difficulties with anger than was any other anxiety disorder diagnosis." Studies that focused on combat veterans (mainly US veterans) yielded similar findings (see, *inter alia*, Chemtob et al. 1994; Beckham et al. 2002; Jakupcak et al. 2007).

Academic research corroborates my interviewees' statements about the pervasiveness of domestic violence in BiH. In a 2006 study that took place in Tuzla Canton, Avdibegović and Sinanović surveyed three groups of women – refugees, psychiatry outpatients, and domiciles of Tuzla – and found that of their entire sample of 283 women, 75.9% reported having been subjected to physical or psychological abuse. The same study found that 66% of the refugees, 78.9% domiciles, and 82% of outpatients were physically abused. Muftić and Bouffard (2010) found similarly high levels of self-reported domestic abuse in their study in Mostar. Of the 43 Bosniak women they surveyed, 76.7% reported psychological abuse, 30.2% reported physical abuse, 14% reported physical abuse that resulted in an injury, and 74.4% reported having ever been sexually abused by an intimate male partner. In her survey of 542 women in Zenica, Čopić (2004:82) found that

> *"23% of women were exposed to physical violence by their partners; 77% of these were cases of repeated violence, whereas 24% reported violent acts over a longer period of time (continual violence). One woman in five (20%) reported violent threats from their husband or partner, which were repetitive in more than two-thirds of the cases."*

The findings of these studies are limited in terms of representativeness and generalizability. They depend on self-reporting of abuse, and abuse victims may not always report it due to fear or shame (McFarlane et al. 1991). Each study focused on a particular locale, so the generalizability of these studies to the country level can be questioned. Furthermore, Avdibegović and Sinanović's (2006) study drew two-thirds of its sample from vulnerable populations – refugees and psychiatry outpatients. Yet, despite their issues, these studies indicate that domestic violence is pervasive in contemporary Bosnian society.

High rates of domestic violence mean that more children in BiH grow up in unstable family environments. After explaining that war veterans with PTSD can become quick to anger and direct that anger at their families, psychologist SD argued that such violence could easily continue and multiply. Speaking of a hypothetical Bosnian child who might grow up in such a family setting, she said, "What kind of family idea this child might have as to what a family should look like? So they go out with such distorted

picture of what a family is. Then they form a family with this distorted picture, then this family will be distorted again." As a result, even when there is no direct violence between the former enemies, violence remains a part of Bosnian society, and can potentially manifest as conflict in the future. Arguing that having a family member afflicted with PTSD can affect entire families, BZ stated that her organization strives to not just help patients who suffer from PTSD, but also to "buffer the influence PTSD can have on the whole family." According to her, "even to have one less unstable family is a contribution to peace and reconciliation in this country."

The argument that there is a connection between PTSD and domestic violence has similarly been put forward in academic works in other contexts. In their study, Oehme, Donnelly, and Martin (2012) found that law enforcement officers in the US who suffer from PTSD or alcohol addiction are four times more likely to self-report having committed domestic abuse than those who do not suffer from such ailments. Several studies conducted among US veterans and active military personnel suggest that the incidences of domestic violence among these populations are up to three times more frequent than civilian populations (see, for instance: Klostermann et al. 2012; Teten et al. 2010; Taft et al. 2009), suggesting a connection between high stress, increased incidences of trauma, and domestic violence. In their research in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, Catani and colleagues (2008) found that mass trauma due to the war is strongly correlated with higher incidences of domestic violence, suggesting a connection between the two.

More directly in terms of reconciliation, anger can also cause people to reject reconciliation initiatives and hold on to the desire for revenge. AH, who primarily works with veterans, spoke about how many veterans continue to harbor anger and a vengefulness, "considering the trauma, history or the experience, for instance, if they lost somebody – family members – it's understandable that they might be skeptical towards peacebuilding or reconciliation, or even seek revenge." NJ also argued that trauma can lead to anger and "when the anger is directed outside, we see a desire for revenge." AP, too, observed similar initial reactions from her program participants: "The people just simply come with that anger, with that wish to revenge [sic]." MHA spoke of patients who came to his psychiatric practice and admitted to having urges of wanting to kill

someone. When there is a continued desire for revenge, even if not acted upon, people will remain skeptical of reconciliation initiatives, and be less likely to participate in them.

Even if not accompanied with an express wish to exact revenge, anger can still curb the potential for communications and/or tolerance between former enemy groups. EZ, for instance, spoke of a program participant she worked with, who initially "hated everybody and everyone. It was horrible." Similarly, GB mentioned a Croat participant in one of his programs who "would throw you out of his café if you ordered with the wrong accent, if you asked for kafa [Serbian accent] instead of kava [Croatian accent]. He hated everyone, he had Nazi photos in the café." Fueling intolerance and hatred, anger makes it difficult for new lines of communication and constructive relationships to emerge. BA, for instance, said she had come across cases in which the anger among the relatives of wartime rape victims had given way to what she termed "negative nationalist feelings." As a result, she suggested, these people came to be "more conflict-oriented and less tolerant." Similarly, AP suggested that there is a link between anger and intolerance, arguing that participants with anger issues also have "presumption and prejudice about how others are." Research in other conflict setting suggests that anger can indeed be a barrier for renewal of relationships between former enemy groups. For instance, Tam et al.'s (2007) study on intergroup emotions and forgiveness in Northern Ireland suggests that anger towards the rival group undercuts the possibility of negotiation and forgiveness, therefore hindering the prospects of reconciliation.

Anger can have consequences when directed towards the self. In the interviews, addiction – alcoholism in particular – was brought up as a major problem borne out of anger being directed to the self in contemporary Bosnian society. NJ suggested that "we have major increases in addiction and addiction related issues like heart disease, diabetes, mental diseases." BZ also identified addiction as a complication of untreated PTSD. Four more interviewees (MHA, RK, MV, and AMP) suggested that drug and alcohol addiction is a major problem in BiH.

Academic studies support these observations about the addiction problem in BiH. Mehić-Basara and Čerić (2012), using official data from the Institute for Alcoholism and Substance Abuse of Sarajevo Canton and the Federal Health Ministry, suggest that alcoholism and drug addiction have been on the rise in BiH since the late 1980s, when

the collapse of socialism was in sight. They further claim that as many as 50% of the patients treated in hospitals for addiction problems also suffered from anxiety and depression, PTSD and psychoses, suggesting a connection between war trauma and addiction, as the interviewees argued. Similarly, in their study among veterans of the Bosnian war, Pavlović et al. (2013) found that those with severe PTSD symptoms were more prone to alcoholism.

Furthermore, interviewees associated anger with sadness and anti-social behavior, which can hamper the desire and ability to participate in reconciliation initiatives. MHA mentioned paranoia and social isolation as consequences of self-directed anger, as well as addiction. MV stated that one of her goals in therapy is to teach her patients "that hate and aggressive behavior are bad for them." She said she does so because "if you have a lot of hate, you are not good, you aren't satisfied, you are unhappy."

5.2.2 Fear

Another negative emotion that can emerge from traumatic experiences and hinder reconciliation is fear. As with anger, fear was a frequent subject in my interviews. Attesting to the commonality of fear after a period of intense violence, a number of interviewees admitted that, in their early work, they had to overcome fear themselves. The first project GB ever organized aimed to put together youth meetings across central Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, which became part of RS after the war. He recalled that he (a Croat) dreaded going to the predominantly Serbian East Sarajevo: "It was very difficult for me to go to East Sarajevo, [I thought] 'God, Četniks are living there, these are horrible people.'" AMP recalled that the first time she went to Banja Luka – the de facto capital of RS – for a project, she considered wearing a hat to conceal her headscarf, as she did not want to openly display her identity as a Muslim in a Serbian-majority area. She ultimately decided not to do so. AP, who spent the entire war period in besieged Sarajevo, said she had a difficult time when she first went to RS after the war, particularly when she traveled through the hills that surround Sarajevo, where VRS was stationed during the 4-year siege: "I was shelled all the time from these hills, when I saw these hills from the other side I started trembling, like someone was going to shoot again."

All of my interviewees agreed that, more than two decades after the war, fear still reigns in BiH. RK, for instance, gave a dramatic description of the hold fear continues to have over Bosnian society:

> *"I think all of us live in fear, some kind of fear. You can see here, people think everything is okay as long as there is no more shooting. That's not normal 20 years after the war. We live by that. If there is no war, everything is okay. Fear remains at the conscious and the subconscious level."*

JT shared RK's observation that many Bosnians remain scared and just wish that there would be "no more shooting and no more war." She said that she frequently observed such attitudes among the participants of the program she managed. She argued that it is a counter-productive attitude: "If you're just staying in your house and be scared of war and everything's okay as long as there's no more war, it will not be okay." Several interviewees – and many ordinary citizens I had day-to-day interactions with – reminded me that the region had seen a war every 50 years or so: the Balkan Wars and WWI in the 1910s, WWII in the 1940s, and the wars of the 1990s. The continuation of this cycle, i.e. another war in 20 to 30 years, is a major preoccupation of Bosnians.

JT and RK's observations about the fear they see among their participants indicate that their fear leads to isolation as opposed to being open to the challenge of building new relationships. Hence, the interviewees described persistence of fear in society as a hindrance to reconciliation. Most significantly, fear was cited among the main reasons why new relationships between the peoples of BiH are slow to develop. JT, for instance, said of her participants: "In the beginning, when we start to work with them, they are […] not open minded. It's hard, because there's fear." AR, referring to the Bosnian custom of neighbors getting together to drink coffee, put it directly: "People who are afraid won't sit with you and drink coffee." Therefore, the interviewees cited overcoming fear as a necessity for Bosnians to be able to talk to each other, before they could be able to share their stories of the war and begin the process of 'dealing with the past.' ZS articulated this argument, suggesting that "you are not ready to heal yourself and then reconcile with somebody if you are not ready to face your own fears and your own negative emotions."

RK also identified fear as a barrier to reconciliation, arguing that "[f]ear and lack of knowledge [about other groups] prevents new connections and reconciliation."

The interviewees' observations about fear and reconciliation resemble the findings of Gormley-Heenan, Byrne, and Robinson (2013) in their research in Northern Ireland. The authors found that fear, specifically fear of violence and fear of being overtaken by the rival group, has been a key driver of the segregation of Catholic and Protestant communities, hampering inter-group communication.

Interviewees argued that fear prevents people from being able to talk about reconciliation. Especially for people with clinical mental health issues (such as PTSD or MD) that are not adequately treated, their fear grows to the point that they cannot deal with their own traumatic experiences. As a result, they remain stuck in their state of mind and do not want to even talk about the possibility of reconciliation. AMP put forward such an argument, stating:

> *"Many people who have depression don't want to talk about reconciliation, because they don't want to put their emotions on surface* [sic]*. They lose their will to live, they have addictions, and they bury their emotions. They don't want to speak about any difficult thoughts, trauma most foremost."*

MV made a similar point about people who suffer from PTSD. She argued that "people are still very afraid, especially people who were in bad situations during the war, people with PTSD. They didn't work on their own trauma. They're still in an entrenched situation."

The continued presence of fear, according to the interviewees, prevents Bosnians from establishing the minimal contact necessary to discuss the past to come to a mutual acknowledgement of suffering of each group. Furthermore, fear was identified as one of the main reasons why people do not want to talk about reconciliation in the first place – let alone having the courage to take steps towards it. Hence, fear represents a roadblock for individuals and communities to work towards both of the main reconciliation goals of 'reweaving the social fabric' and 'dealing with the past.'

5.2.3 Mistrust

Of the negative emotions discussed in this section, mistrust has been the most frequently discussed in Comparative Politics scholarship, most prominently in research about social capital. The best-known example of such research is Putnam's (2000) classic work "Bowling Alone." According to Putnam (2000:19), social capital refers to "the connections among individuals' social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them." Voluntary associations among people help build social capital. Mistrust is a barrier to the kind of associational life that underpins voluntary associations among people, and therefore leads to a decline in social capital. Hence, if MHPSS programs can help to address mistrust that arises due to the traumatic experiences of war with their participants, they can contribute to rebuilding the civil society (Baingana, Bannon, and Thomas 2005:10), a goal that has been central to policy initiatives in post-conflict settings (Pouligny 2005; Sterland 2006; Brahm 2006; Donais 2009; List and Doerner 2012, among others), including in BiH.[19]

In the case of BiH, the interviewees highlighted that they often had trouble gaining the trust of their clinical patients, MHPSS program participants, and the members of the communities they worked in. Moreover, when they attempted to get members of different ethnic groups in the same room through their work, mistrust between them, at least initially, was evident. The interviewees argued that prejudices and negative stereotypes about other groups still endure. Mistrust is a negative influence on rival groups' ability to communicate with one another to freely discuss past conflict and eventually move on to establishing new relationships. It is, therefore, a barrier to overcome in order to engage in social de-mobilization and progress towards the reconciliation goals of 'dealing with the past' and 'reweaving the social fabric.'

ZS and AP both articulated the difficulties they face each time they first approach a community in Bosnia. ZS highlighted that many Bosnians do not trust anyone at all, saying, "when you approach for the first time to [sic] people they are all angry, terrified, anxious… They don't trust you, they don't trust anybody because they think everybody is

[19] In BiH, the scholarly consensus is that the EU-led efforts to rebuild civil society through supporting the formation of new NGOs has been a failure, as these efforts were geared towards satisfying the donors' vision of what civil society looked like as opposed to fostering organic forms of civil association in BiH (Chandler 1998; Belloni 2001; Bieber 2002; Fagan 2005; Locke 2008).

coming to just to [sic] take something from them or to convince them to do something they don't want to do, to manipulate them."

Such feelings keep people from being willing to participate in reconciliation initiatives such as organized meetings with survivors from the other side. When BA tried to organize a 'reconciliation trip,' to Banja Luka to have her MHPSS participants meet with Serbian survivors there, she faced some initial resistance. Her program participants, mostly Bosniak women from Eastern Bosnia, did not want to have contact with Serbs. She explained the reason behind mistrust and the resistance by arguing that "they saw them as people who have done all these things to them, thought that all the suffering they have gone through [was] because of them." NJ talked about how she, a Bosniak, was subjected to prejudice, even anger, by her patients during therapy sessions: "I had a group of Catholics who were in concentration camps, they were imprisoned by ARBiH. So for them, ARBiH equals all Muslims. Then, I was the representative of the army [to them]. I used to see anger, even rage, directed towards me."

As to why mistrust and persistence of stereotypes are barriers to reconciliation, AR gave an eloquent explanation:

> *"To be able, in the end, to come to reconciliation, it is really very imperative to do trauma work. People must cleanse themselves from their pain, from their depression, from their suspicion, their prejudices against the other side – only then they can even consider to sit* [sic] *with you around the same table."*

Existing research supports the observation that mistrust which arose during the war persists in BiH. The World Values Survey, a worldwide research project inspired by social capital theory, suggests that mistrust has indeed been prevalent in post-war BiH. In survey data from 2001 (the most recent available for BiH), when asked whether most people can be trusted or one needs to be very careful in dealing with people, only 15.6% of the respondents (n=1200) agreed that most people can be trusted, while 83.2% said they need to be very careful in dealing with people, the 8th highest percentage out of 41 countries in which the survey took place. In the same survey, 66.1% of the respondents stated that most people try to take advantage of them, the fifth highest percentage.

5.2.4 Adaptive or Maladaptive?

In the scholarly research about war trauma and responses to it, one of the prevailing debates is about distinguishing between 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive' responses to the experience of war. Summerfield (1997), for instance, warned that Western practitioners' pre-occupation with PTSD runs the risk of characterizing normal responses to abnormal situations of war and destruction as pathologies. For a survivor of war, persecution, or genocide, responses such as anger, fear, or mistrust are 'normal' responses, especially during and immediately after such events. Martin-Baro (1996:111), for instance, describes how his diagnoses of the mental states of displaced Salvadoran peasants that he met during the Civil War was transformed as he listened to their stories:

> *"I felt much of their behavior showed aspects of paranoid delirium. They were constantly alert and hyper-vigilant, they mistrusted anyone they didn't know. They were suspicious about anyone who approached them, scrutinizing gestures and words, looking for possible danger. And yet, when I learned about what had happened to them and the real dangers still preying on them, as well as their defenselessness and impotence against any type of attack, I quickly began to understand that their hyper-mistrust and vigilance were not signs of a persecution delirium borne out of their anxiety but the most realistic response to their life situation."*

As Martin-Baro recognized during his encounter with displaced Salvadoran peasants, behaviors that an outside observer might recognize as maladaptive may actually be adaptive in a particular context. As Silove (2013:238) argues, "[t]he boundary between normative and maladaptive psychological response is indistinct and fluid, varying in time, context, and culture."

As did the Salvadoran peasants Martin-Baro spoke with, many Bosnians developed fear and mistrust during the Bosnian War. As with their Salvadoran counterparts, the Bosnian survivors' responses are indeed realistic given their life situation at the time. However, as detailed above, the interviewees suggested that fear and mistrust continue to have a hold in Bosnian society more than two decades after the violence has ceased. Even though fear and mistrust initially arose as adaptive reactions,

today they represent a barrier to the healthy functioning of Bosnian society, the reweaving of the social fabric and hence the ultimate goal of reconciliation.

Adaptive responses to a conflict situation help one to minimize and/or avoid the threats that conflict presents. Evocation of traumatic memories is a cue to avoid similar dangerous situations in the future (Silove 1998). Hyper-vigilance "prepare[s] the person to mount defensive flight or fight responses" (Silove 2013:241). However, at times, these responses become 'dysregulated,' prompting responses to situations that are not inherently threatening (ibid.). To explain this phenomenon, BH used an example from a personal story I had told him before our interview about how I developed a fear of even the slightest ocean waves after dislocating my shoulder in an accident in extremely wavy conditions: "The adaptive response would have been to avoid extreme waves, since you were hurt the last time you faced such conditions. The maladaptive response is to be scared of a slightly wavy ocean, which is not threatening." In the case of BiH, as the adaptations that individuals and communities made to survive the war continue into the post-conflict era, they later became dysregulated and came to represent maladaptive responses. As several interviewees explained, many Bosnians still live in fear of war, leading them to isolation and continued mistrust towards members of other groups, even after more than two decades of peace. While my avoidance of wavy oceans does not significantly affect my quality of life, fear, anger, and distrust towards one's fellow citizens have more severe consequences – both for the individuals and for society at large. When these feelings remain prevalent in a society, significant progress towards reconciliation is unlikely.

5.3 Narratives of Collective Victimhood

Narratives of collective victimhood are major contributors to the social mobilization that precedes conflict between social groups (Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy 2014:127). Such narratives involve black and white depictions of past conflict, in which one's own social group has always been victimized by other social groups that have always been the aggressors (ibid; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhardt 2012; Halperin, Schori-Eyal, and Bar-Tal 2014). As discussed in Chapter 4, the dissemination of narratives of collective victimhood – primarily among Serbs, but also among Bosniaks and Croats – was one of the key components of the social mobilizations that led to the Bosnian war. In

this section, using the quotes under the node "Victimhood" (43 quotes), I demonstrate the persistence of narratives of collective victimhood in BiH and the forces that sustain them to this day.

When narratives of collective victimhood take hold in a society, they serve to deny or minimize the fact that there have been victims on the other side(s) and that there have been aggressors among one's own group (Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy 2014:127-129). The prevalence of these narratives therefore makes the task of dealing with the past more difficult, as former enemies fail to recognize each other's suffering and continue to hold onto the belief that their group's past actions were merely defensive, and therefore justified.

As a result, narratives of collective victimhood may feed the rhetoric of another war, as they create a perception that the aggressors can target one's own group at any time and that they have to be ready to defend themselves at all times. For instance, AP described an encounter she had with a Bosniak woman when AP told her about a project she was organizing that aimed to bring Bosniak, Croat, and Serb children together to meet each other. The woman got furious with AP, saying: "How can you do that to children? They committed genocide against us. You shouldn't teach them that, they will trust them and they will do that again!" Even her own brother, AP said, reacted to her work in a similar way, saying: "You do your peacebuilding thing, but we Muslims have to be ready and strong."

In BiH, it is possible to observe competing narratives of collective victimhood in the commemorative monuments that are dedicated to suffering of particular ethno-religious groups. As Franović (2016:219-221) documents, several memorials built in BiH after 1995 commemorate not only those who fell in the latest war, but also those who died in WWI and WWII. Some such monuments, according to Franović (2016:220), even commemorate WWII victims of the same ethnicity who actually fought against one another; for instance those who fought with the Yugoslav Partisans and those who were part of the extreme-nationalist Ustaša or Četnik movements. Conversely, the memory of the victims from other ethnic group(s), who also fought against the Axis powers in the region, is erased, as they are now "enemies" (ibid.). Therefore, these monuments put forward a simplified narrative of collective victimhood of an ethnic group that went on

throughout history and could plausibly continue in the future. Documenting and examining 85 monuments all over BiH with her colleagues, Franović (2016:224) concludes that "the country's cultures of remembering [are] opposing, one-sided, ethno-centric; they indicate the divisions in BiH society; they reflect collective victimization; and if they do not outright deny, they at least ignore the suffering of others." In our interview, AH came to a similar conclusion: "What we have today here, it's a very hostile understandings of history, especially about 1990s [sic]. You have monuments all around this region, mostly ethnically oriented, 'Our heroes, our civilians who suffered…' victimizations going on." RK also argued that Bosnians "commemorate the past in a way that reinforces divisions." In BiH, it is possible to observe Renan's (1992 [1882]) argument that "[g]etting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation."

Photo 1: *Unnamed Serb Monument, situated by a dirt road near Sanski Most. The monument commemorates local Serbs who fought and died during WWII (listed on the left side) and Bosnian War (listed on the right side). The inscription reads "For Glory and Honor."*

Traveling in BiH during my fieldwork, I saw many monuments around the country. My observations also collaborate Franović's and AH's assessment that most monuments in BiH reflect collective victimization and social division. I came across two monuments that commemorated WWII victims along with the victims of the Bosnian War: Kovači Cemetery in Sarajevo (where Alija Izetbegović is buried) and an unnamed Serb monument near Sanski Most (see Photo 1).

Collective memory, one of the elements that underpin the socio-psychological infrastructure of a society in intractable conflict according to Bar-Tal (2007:1436), evolves over time in order to present a meaningful narrative of the conflict for the members of the group. This is necessary to encourage the loyalty and personal sacrifice needed to win – or at least not

lose – the conflict. Collective memory of groups in intractable conflicts is not meant to present an objective history of the conflict but rather to "create a socially constructed narrative that has some basis in actual events but is biased, selective, and distorted in ways that meet the society's […] needs. They omit certain facts, add doubtful ones, change the accounts of events and offer a purposive interpretation of the events that took place" (ibid.). Over time, these narratives are disseminated among the members of a society as the truthful account of the conflict and may come to overlap with the 'official history' that governments and political leaders purport through propaganda or education. As these narratives serve the purpose of justifying and giving meaning to the conflict, they often present the group as victims of other groups' aggressions (ibid.). As a result, they lead to communities denying or minimizing crimes that their side perpetuated on the rival group, complicating the processes related to 'dealing with the past.'

In post-Dayton BiH, narratives of collective victimhood continue to thrive – now with added material from the most recent war. The prevalence of such narratives is compounded by (a) the fact that many Bosnian citizens now live in ethnic enclaves and have little or no opportunity to engage with the historical perspectives of the other groups and (b) the fact that nationalist politics and politicians of the 1990s continue to hold significant power in BiH.[20] As AH explains, "[a] lot of people don't have the opportunity [to] examine other perspectives, they live in some conservative environment, without even the opportunity to meet with people from the other side, and they are just listening to just one side of the story." Furthermore, as will be further detailed in the next section, the interviewees argued that competing narratives of collective victimhood are also officially perpetuated through nationalist political rhetoric and school curricula.

Together with collective memory, ethos of conflict – the third element of socio-psychological infrastructure of a society in intractable conflict (Bar-Tal 2007:1430) – forms the 'epistemic basis' for the sustained antagonism towards the rival group. As described in the Literature Review, ethos of conflict is "a set of social beliefs that provide a particular collective orientation" (ibid.:1438). In intractable conflicts, eight societal

[20] The wartime Bosniak Party SDA and Croat Party HDZ-BiH continued to have significant voter support after the war and currently hold the Bosniak and Croat seats in the BiH presidency. While Karadžic's SDS has receded, the SNSD, the current ruling party in Republika Srpska, continues to govern with a nationalist platform, including actively calling for Bosnian Serbs' independence.

beliefs form the core of such ethos: justness of own goals, national survival, positive collective self-image, victimhood, de-legitimization of the opponents, patriotism, unity, and peace as the ultimate desire of the society (ibid.). These societal beliefs help to build a black-and-white narrative of the conflict in which one's own side is righteous and is under constant threat from 'the enemy.' Hence, when the 'epistemic basis' of a conflict takes hold in a society, it perpetuates the conflict.

The societal beliefs about justness of own goals and victimhood are particularly relevant in BiH. The belief in the justness of own goals serves to minimize and/or justify the crimes that members of one's own group committed, even egregious ones such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. For instance, AH and GB (a Bosniak and a Croat, respectively), both spoke of facing pressure from their own communities for speaking out about the crimes of their own group as part of their work and being charged with 'relativizing' the crimes of other groups. Bosniak communities are especially wary of 'relativization,' given that Bosniaks suffered far more civilian casualties during the war than Croats and Serbs (Čalić 2012). AH and GB both disagreed with the criticism that they were engaging in relativization when they highlighted the fact that each community in BiH committed crimes. AH argued: "It's not relativization, that's not possible, VRS committed 80% of the war crimes, it is a fact." GB elaborated that his purpose is not to claim that the crimes committed were equal on each side, but to highlight the suffering of the individuals – regardless of their ethnicity: "Saying 'all three sides did things' could mean it was all equal. No, it wasn't equal, that wasn't our intention. To be clear, I can say it now, 80% of the crimes were committed against Bosniaks. This is reality. But [what] we were doing on our work was just focusing on [the] individual level. 'What happened to you, not to your nation, what happened to you individually? What have you survived and could you connect with others who survived the same thing?' That was the focus of our work."

A societal belief in victimhood perpetuates anger towards rival group(s) and the fear that there will be another war in which "they [the other groups] will try to destroy them again," as GB put it, because "they have tried to destroy them in the past." Together with a societal belief on the justness of own goals, they perpetuate narratives of collective victimhood and hinder the two central goals of reconciliation: 'dealing with the past' and

'reweaving the social fabric.' As members of rival groups continue to deny or minimize the crimes of their own group, they will have variant, indeed hostile, narratives of the conflict that will prevent them from dealing with the past.

Furthermore, narratives of collective victimhood perpetuate anger, fear, and mistrust towards members of the rival group, since they are portrayed as people who are determined to extinguish one's own group. When the dominant narrative in the society tells an individual that the other group has tried to destroy their group and will likely do so again, anger and hatred are expectable reactions. As anger, fear, and mistrust continue to cast a shadow on the inter-communal relationships between the members of the rival groups, (re)-establishing robust bonds and networks is a near impossibility. This research indicates that this is still the case in BiH.

Societal beliefs of patriotism and unity also continue to be prevalent in BiH, in conjunction with the persistence of nationalist political parties, organizations, and rhetoric – including narratives of collective victimization. During the conflict, these societal beliefs acted as an adaption for the group to withstand outside pressure and attacks as a united front, increasing their chances of survival. After the conflict, however, these societal beliefs serve to prevent people from being willing to engage in reconciliation initiatives with the members of the rival groups. USAID researchers, in their evaluation of the MHPSS programs that their organization is funding, noted that participants in programs that profess peacebuilding and reconciliation related goals often face pressure from their own community members or local party/government officials to "drop out" (USAID 2014:241). In my research, interviewees suggested similar external pressures were applied to their participants. These are further detailed in Chapter 7.

The persistence of narratives of collective victimhood, which are built and sustained as part of the 'socio-psychological infrastructure' of communities in intractable conflict, represents an impediment to reconciliation. As each of the communities involved develops their own narratives of conflict, they inevitably lead to variant versions of the past. As a result, the question of 'dealing with the past' is bound to become more complicated. As these narratives take hold in a society, they perpetuate the view that the other group(s) have been and always will be out to destroy them. Such perceptions evoke and sustain anger, fear, and mistrust towards members of rival group(s). The

reconciliation goal of 'reweaving the social fabric' becomes more difficult when members of each group collectively hold such negative emotions towards the other group(s).

5.4 Transgenerational Transfer of Trauma

The possibility of transgenerational transfer of trauma emerged as a source of concern during my field research, which led me to add a node named "Transfer of Trauma" in my coding tree (23 quotes). Several of my interviewees spoke about observing the transfer of trauma to the generation born right after the war who are now taking their first steps into adulthood. Moreover, some of the interviewees expressed concern that the unresolved traumas of WWI and WWII had had a direct influence on the eruption of the conflicts in the region in the 1990s.

The interviewees stated that the prejudices, anger, and hatred that had grown during the war period are evident in the attitudes of the generations born after the war, perhaps even more so than in their parents. Specifically referring to the internally displaced populations she works with, BA articulated this problem as follows: "Young boys who came with their mothers had to deal with transgenerational trauma that was transferred from their mothers and we need to work especially with these children, especially now, because their trauma is even worse than that of their mothers."

A program participant who was quoted in Report 1 expressed a similar concern, suggesting that MHPSS work should also include a focus on children: "It is terrifying how much anger is transferred on [sic] the children who were not even born during the latest war. It would be good to recognize the critic [sic] masses and to work with them." Studies about the transgenerational transmission of war-related trauma mostly focus on Holocaust survivors and their families, due to the immense suffering that millions of survivors went through in Nazi concentration camps. According to Kellermann (2003), over 400 papers on transmission of trauma from Holocaust survivors to their children were published between the 1950s to 1990s. Reviewing empirical studies that focused on the families of Holocaust survivors, Kellermann (2000) could not confirm the hypothesis that the children of survivors would have increased rates of psychological ailments. However, he argues that the literature does point to a decreased ability to deal with stress and vulnerability to PTSD among these populations. Dekel and Goldblatt (2008)

conducted a review of the literature on transfer of trauma from war veterans to their kin and reached the same conclusion.

5.4.1 Mechanisms of Transmission

In their review of psychological research about transmission of trauma from war veterans to their children, Dekel and Goldblatt (ibid.) identify three main mechanisms through which such transmission occurs: psycho-dynamics (i.e., parents projecting their severe emotions onto their children, causing the children to identify with these emotions and making them their own), genetics, and family functioning. Kellermann (2003) adds a fourth mechanism that he calls "socio-cultural." This mechanism, according to Kellermann (2003:7), works through "how children of survivors form their own images through their parents' childrearing behavior, for example their various prohibitions, taboos and fears."

The interviewees explained the ways in which such transfer occurred in Bosnian society. NJ and AP spoke of teachers and their influence on the children they teach. AP, who works closely with religious educators, observed "a lot of the religious teachers lost somebody during the war. And they would transmit that hate against others onto the children." NJ, speaking of teachers in general, made a similar argument: "Teachers are especially important because they create the mindset of coming generations. If the teacher hasn't dealt with his/her traumatic experiences, consciously or unconsciously he/she will transfer his/her attitudes and opinions to the children." In this way, transgenerational transfer of trauma serves to perpetuate the collective emotional orientation that emerged as part of the socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict.

Furthermore, the curricula in middle and high school history classes (which vary for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) contribute to the transmission of trauma. The divergent curricula serve to perpetuate narratives of collective victimhood, which in turn instill animosity towards the 'other' groups to pupils from a young age. VO expressed his concern about the education system in BiH in a powerful way: "The government spends millions of dollars to fill the heads of our children with ethno-nationalist narratives and to raise fascists." Just as the traumas of war are often transferred to the coming generations in BiH, so are the narratives – through the educational system and the continuation of nationalism in the socio-political realm. As MH explained: "[Y]oung people, probably

because [of] globalization, internet and all, they try not [to] deal with so much what [sic] has happened 20 years ago. But if they are continuously bombarded from all sides, from their parents, from their local society, from television, from media, I don't know if these efforts we are trying would be useful." Expressing a similar view, GB argued: "We are willing and teaching our children to start another war." Segregated schooling and variant nationalist curricula mean that the social divisions in the country and the disagreements of the interpretations of the history will persist among the coming generations, making the task of reconciliation more difficult.[21] Therefore, schools serve to perpetuate the ethos of conflict amongst the coming generations, even in the absence of active conflict.

Other interviewees identified family dynamics as the main mechanism of transgenerational transfer of trauma. As detailed above, several of them suggested a connection between trauma and domestic violence, which led to unhealthy family dynamics. Apart from domestic violence, another way in which trauma is transferred within the family is through the reproduction of ethno-nationalist narratives. Report 1 cited an MHPSS program consultant on the subject, who argued that "[i]t has been twenty years since the war ended, when you look at the today's generation, there is a great deal of misunderstanding and non acceptance among them, because of the stories they receive in their homes." Interviewee MO also identified that children's upbringing can cement negative thinking, stating: "People of Bosnia have developed negative stereotypes and prejudice about each other. Unfortunately, young generations have been raised in a way that instilled that way of thinking in them and now this also needs long term work again." According to MO, MHPSS work in BiH now – more than 20 years after the war – must consider how the negative emotions and prejudices of parents, which stemmed from living through the conflict, will be reflected in the children who never experienced the war.

BH, using a veteran's son he met recently as an example, pointed out that feelings of anger could also be transferred across generations in family settings: "I could see that he was holding so much, about his father being rejected, and transferring some of that pain and frustration, anger, to the family." MHA said that in his own research, he found

[21] For in-depth research about history education in BiH's segregated schools and their impact, see Torsti (2003; 2007; 2009) and Subotić (2012).

that wives of veterans with PTSD are also at significant risk of suffering from PTSD symptoms, which put their children at high risk for transfer of trauma. These children, he said, "grow up in ill social conditions." He suggested that schools could counter the trauma that is passed on to the children, but "they have no relevant programs."

Based on this research, it is possible to observe psycho-dynamics, family functioning and socio-cultural mechanisms of transgenerational transmission of trauma at work. The fourth, genetic transmission, falls beyond the purview of this study as well as my interviewees' expertise. My interviewees in BiH identified family functioning as the main mechanism of transmission that they observed, highlighting that the children whose parents had been traumatized by the war have themselves, as SD put it, "a broken view of what a family should look like," and replicate such dysfunction when they form their own families. The interviewees further suggested that the socio-cultural mechanism has also been prevalent in BiH. For instance, the "private histories," as GB termed it, recounted in family settings made children wary of other groups since they were told that the other group once tried to destroy them. Responses about how anger is transferred from parents to children suggest that the psycho-dynamics mechanism has been a factor.

5.4.2 A Vicious Cycle of Transmission

Some of the interviewees pointed out that the transgenerational transfer of trauma is not a new phenomenon in the Balkans. The region, BiH in particular, was the scene of vicious wars in the 1910s (Balkan Wars and WWI) and the 1940s (WWII). As stated above, wherever one travels in BiH, whether in FBiH or in RS, people on the street often repeat the truism that there has been a war in Bosnia about every 50 years or so. Many Bosnians, including a few of my interviewees, feel as if this vicious cycle is bound to continue and there will be another war once it completes its circle again. They say this not because they are eager for another war, but because they do not see a way out of the cycle in which they feel they are stuck. According to my interviewees, the unresolved traumas of the previous wars were of significant influence on the 1992-1995 war. NJ, for instance, argued that there is a direct link between the wars earlier in the 20th century and the latest one: "This war in Bosnia was used to get revenge for certain events that transpired in [the] First and Second World Wars. These were not properly processed. So

new traumas keep developing and we are generating those traumas." She stated that she thinks these new traumas would eventually lead to a new war.

GB and RK implicitly criticized the post-WWII policy of Socialist Yugoslavia – dubbed as "Brotherhood and Unity" – to sweep the infighting among the people of the region during the war under the rug by deleting it from the official history. As RK explains:

> *"After WWII we had a similar situation. We had the Četniks, the Ustaša, and people who fought against them. After that, no one ever talked about those war crimes, a lot of people got away with those crimes or they left the country. We felt at the time that everything was okay, we could move on. But in this last war, you could see that we have never resolved the trauma of our grandparents, from that war."*

RK, like NJ, stated that she expects the unresolved traumas of the war to be transferred to the next generation and eventually lead to another war.

GB argued that while the socialist government promoted the vision of "Brotherhood and Unity," the private histories of families varied. People from the region, GB argued, continued to remember that their neighbors once attempted to destroy them and were still suspicious that they might try again. According to GB, such fears were transferred across generations, culminating in the latest war: "From WWII, all our private history taught us that we are different. They didn't reconcile, even with this older history." Transgenerational transfer of trauma is identified as both a source of the tensions that led to the war in the first place and as a potential complication to preventing a new war and to ultimately achieving sustainable peace and reconciliation. The transfer of traumas from previous wars is also significant in the sense that the trauma helps to build and perpetuate narratives of collective victimhood, as the stories of past traumas serve as a warning for future victimization, as in the case of the private histories of WWII.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, I detailed that the negative emotions that were evoked by the traumatic experiences of war remain prevalent in Bosnian society, more than two decades after the signing of the DPA. I showed that narratives of collective victimhood persist

among all three ethnic groups of BiH, in both official and social memories. The 'socio-psychological infrastructure' of conflict, which consists of collective emotional orientation, collective memory, and ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal 2007) remains firmly in place in BiH.

The negative emotions that were identified and detailed here can all potentially hinder the reconciliation goal of 're-weaving the social fabric.' As shown in the case of BiH, anger can breed intolerance and hatred, fuel a desire for revenge, lead to other types of violence such as domestic abuse, or manifest itself in self-destructive behavior. Fear can prevent communities from establishing lines of communication, expect the worst from one another, and live in fear of another war. Mistrust can keep individuals and communities apart, preventing them from hearing each other out. Altogether, they impede the reconstruction of social ties and re-establishment of associational life, instead giving way to further isolation and entrenchment of rival camps.

Furthermore, narratives of collective victimization, which arise as a means of social mobilization and are sustained as an adaptation to the conflict situation, could also hinder reconciliation efforts. As they lead to alternative histories that often omit certain events and magnify the significance of others, they complicate the task of freely debating the past and working towards a common understanding of what happened – i.e., 'dealing with the past.' As these narratives persist and are transmitted to new generations, they help sustain the above-mentioned negative emotions. When individuals are repeatedly told in their community, their schools and their family that their neighbors have tried to destroy them in the past, it is expectable that they harbour anger towards, fear, and mistrust their neighbors. When relationships are clouded with such feelings, it would be almost unthinkable, as AR put it, to even sit down for a cup of Bosnian coffee with one's neighbor.

Finally, this chapter showed that the traumatic experiences of war and the emotions that arose out of them are transmitted to the next generation of Bosnians, through their families, societies, and schools. Therefore the work of post-conflict reconciliation in BiH now has to include those who have not personally experienced the war.

In providing a detailed account of the relationship between traumas of war and post-conflict reconciliation in BiH, this chapter elicits two further questions. First, what can MHPSS programs do to tackle the trauma of war, help people through their negative emotions, minimize the amount of trauma transmitted to the next generation, and contribute to the ultimate goal of reconciliation? Second, why do the main elements of the 'socio-psychological infrastructure,' developed to deal with the experience of conflict, persist in BiH more than two decades after the war? These questions will be the topic of inquiry in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively. The next chapter will focus on describing how MHPSS programs attempt to counter the negative emotions and narratives of collective victimhood described in this chapter.

6 MHPSS WORK, HEALING AND RECONCILIATION

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter sought to show that traumatic experiences of war, through evoking negative emotions and helping to flourish narratives of victimization, have serious implications for the survivors' attitudes towards possible reconciliation at the social and national level. In this chapter, I detail the work that MHPSS programs do in BiH to counter the effects of war trauma among their participants. This part of my analysis is represented as the "MHPSS Work" branch of my coding tree. All the quotes cited in this chapter are from the nodes and sub-nodes under it (See Figure 3: "MHPSS Work" Branch of the Coding Tree)



Figure 3: "MHPSS Work" Branch of the Coding Tree

Examining traumatic experiences of war and the MHPSS work on trauma in relation to reconciliation is unfamiliar territory for scholars who focus on institutions, even for those scholars who conduct research on post-conflict transformation and reconciliation. The rarity of collaboration between psychology and the institutional scholarship on peacebuilding suggest that scholars who focus on the latter view trauma of war and MHPSS initiatives as issues that belong primarily to the field of Public Health.

As a result, there is a knowledge gap in the relevant literature as to what MHPSS programs set out to do and how their work on trauma relates to those of reconciliation. Bosnian psychologist Amela Puljek-Shank (2007:194) argues: "Most people assume that working on trauma and reconciliation means sugar coating the pain and suffering, bypassing the truth, being nice to each other pretending as if nothing happened." Such an effort, she notes, would be fruitless in making any progress towards reconciliation, as it would fail to help people to deal with the past or to renew social ties with their former neighbors: "In this case both sides end up being very civil and pleasant with one another

and continue to live side by side but not with each other – not together. We basically end up in a corner where, yes we know what the other side did to us or our group throughout the centuries, and yes we will never forget and as soon as we sense the possible danger we are all up and in arms (verbally and literally) defending ourselves and everything [that is] dear to us."

Hence, the goal of the MHPSS initiatives is not to have participants ignore or forget their trauma. Rather, as this chapter will demonstrate, it is to help their participants accept traumatic experiences as part of who they are and to transform from passive victims to survivors who can take control of their lives, despite what has happened to them in the past. It is also to recognize "that our enemy is after all a human being who deeply suffers and feels the pain and hurt as we do" (ibid.: 195), and to challenge the narratives of victimization that emanate from nationalist leaders and parties. As the reader will recognize, achieving these goals would lead towards reconciliation through fostering the empathy that is necessary to 'reweave the social fabric' and dispelling the narratives of victimization that impede 'dealing with the past.' Hence, the relationship between MHPSS work and reconciliation is significant enough to warrant inquiry.

In this chapter, I detail how MHPSS initiatives relate to reconciliation as they strive to heal from trauma, re-establish the social bonds and networks of their participants and challenge narratives of victimization. I discuss three specific areas of MHPSS work that are most relevant to the reconciliation goals of 'dealing with the past' and 'reweaving the social fabric.' These are trauma healing, fostering new relationships and shifting narratives. Finally, I will also discuss the prominent roles women and women's organizations play in MHPSS initiatives and micro level reconciliation, and I consider the implications of gender roles in post-conflict transformation of BiH. In conclusion, I will argue that MHPSS work has helped transform individuals who participated in these initiatives and helped to begin the reconciliation process at an individual level. These findings will set the stage for questioning whether the individual level work of MHPSS programs resonates at the social and national levels of reconciliation and why. Throughout this chapter, I will utilize Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) work on social mobilization and de-mobilization, as detailed in the Literature Review, as the main theoretical framework.

6.2 Trauma Healing

6.2.1 Acknowledging and Healing Trauma

In the simplest terms, the primary goal of MHPSS programs is to address participants' trauma and help them heal. There are plenty of data and studies indicating that MHPSS programs often manage to reduce clinical symptoms of trauma. For instance, Dybdahl (2001) found that a 5-month psychosocial program for war-affected mothers and children in BiH has helped improve the mental health of both groups, reducing "restlessness, distractibility, clinginess, and drastic mood changes" (ibid.:1224). After undertaking a trauma healing program with Liberian and Sierra-Leonean refugees in Guinea, researchers from Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) found "significant reductions in trauma symptoms and increases in measures of daily functioning and social support during and after participation in groups" (Stepakoff et al. 2003). These and other examples (Mooren et al. 2003; Layne et al. 2001; Anckermann et al. 2003; Save the Children 2004; Wessels and Monterio 2006), suggest that MHPSS programs, whether through clinical interventions or psychosocial programs, help reduce trauma symptoms of their participants.

The textual data I have collected in BiH, which is represented as the "Trauma healing" (100 quotes) node in my coding tree, indicates that the MHPSS programs that my interviewees organized and/or designed achieve similar success. In terms of psychotherapy, Report 2 suggests that in the MHPSS program it evaluates, "72,8% of the participants report positive behavioural changes related to their psychotherapy goals." Report 1 suggests that the participants, based on their answers on a questionnaire, left the program with increased knowledge about trauma. In the same questionnaire, when asked to rate whether the training helps them acknowledge and deal with their own painful traumatic experiences, on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree), the respondents averaged a 3 (75%).

In the qualitative interviews I conducted, interviewees suggested that their work had helped the participants in regard to trauma healing. For instance, referring to an MHPSS program he has worked with that focused on women, GB argued: "People, women who survived, they have changed. Through psychosocial support they were strengthened […]. Now we have women who are, I don't want to say healed, but

strengthened and now they are economically independent. So this was a huge change, huge support for all the society." EZ also shared her conviction that the participants she had worked with made progress in terms of trauma healing: "I think [the project] has helped, but I cannot prove it yet. Because, for example, our participants, even if they aren't in a completely different place, but they are in a better place. And I'm completely aware it's because of the project and people who were involved in the project." AP offered a comparative perspective, arguing: "I have worked now as a peacebuilder in different contexts, like in Kosovo and Ukraine. I can tell you, when you compare with those situations, so much has been achieved in Bosnia. So many people were helped mentally. They were instructed on how to survive, they have so many possibilities."

In the case of BiH, the interviewees suggested that a particular contribution of MHPSS programs has been to help participants acknowledge their own traumas. This particular aspect of trauma healing is represented in my coding tree with the sub-node "Acknowledge own trauma" (31 quotes). Puljek-Shank (2007:191), in explaining the importance of acknowledging their own trauma for the survivors, argues: "Accepting the traumatic experience does not mean we are forgetting it. It is the acknowledgement of its existence and horridness that we cannot forget – and we should not forget, but what we are doing in this process is choosing how we are going to remember it and what are we going to do with these life experiences." When trauma is unacknowledged and untreated, trauma experience can feed a cycle of aggression, as Botchorova (2001) suggests, as it would feed anger, desire for revenge, a narrative of victimhood and finally, renewed aggression. Acknowledging one's trauma, according to Puljek-Shank (2007:188-190), is a crucial step towards breaking out of this cycle and utilize one's traumatic experiences for a different, productive purpose.

Based on my interviewees, I have found that gender roles are the most significant impediments for victims to acknowledge their own trauma, especially in the case of women who were subjected to abuse and rape. While it is widely known that rape has been used as a weapon during the Bosnian War (Faber and Stiglmayer 1994; Card 1996; Nikolić-Ristanović 1996; Diken and Laustsen 2005), the interviewees suggested that very few survivors actually spoke to anyone – including family members – about their traumatic experience. The interviewees attested the survivors' unwillingness to speak

about their trauma to the patriarchal nature of Bosnian society. GB, for instance, argued that victim blaming was a major issue: "We have a number of examples of girls and women who were raped, who are denying that. Everybody knows they were raped. But they say 'no, no, no it didn't happen.' […] We are a patriarchal society. So if you are raped it was your fault." TC also pointed to lack of legal protections as a factor in the unwillingness of survivors to acknowledge their own trauma, arguing: "A lot of women and girls suffered during the war and that is now very difficult to prove. Because there's no adequate legal framework in this country. A lot of them never talk about their suffering, they don't want to talk about it."

MV, a psychotherapist who primarily works with refugee women from Eastern Bosnia, argued that it was impossible for the women to deal with their trauma without acknowledging it. That is why, she said, "I was professionally satisfied when one of my young patients, she was 15 when the war began – as my son was –, when she said 'I'm E… [name withdrawn] and I was raped during the war several times.'" Inability to acknowledge one's own trauma, GB suggests, prevents survivors from finding effective methods to cope with their suffering or being able to receive help in doing so. Speaking of rape victims, GB said: "So many of them, especially the women of Srebrenica, they didn't want any of this psychological support. 'No, we are tough women, we know what to do, we are dealing with this our way…' They didn't deal with it and… they can't move forward, they are not moving forward, they are stuck in the past." As social forces and gender roles prevent them from being able to acknowledge and potentially transform their own trauma, rape survivors continue to be stuck in a cycle of aggression (Botchorova 2001). As a result, they would be unable to take steps towards individual level reconciliation or transform their anger, fear, and mistrust.

In their work with rape victims, GB, BA, and MV all suggested that they have managed to help some women to recount their experiences and acknowledge their own trauma. However, according to GB, despite MHPSS programs' efforts, there are "very few of them who speak publicly," and MV argues, "a lot of women who were raped during the war, because of the situation in this society, they'll never talk about it."

While most interviewees' focus was on women, some interviewees also spoke of how gender roles prevent men from acknowledging their own trauma and seeking help.

MHA and MH, for instance, both argued that men face a societal pressure to be – or at least to appear – tough, causing them to suppress their struggles with trauma. MHA further argued that the rhetoric of RS's political leaders denies the suffering of their veterans: "[T]hey [politicians] are pretending and say they [veterans] have no PTSD, they are heroes, Serb heroes or something like that. They force them to deny that they have PTSD. It is political, it is stigma."

For MHPSS programs, countering the effects of such stigma is an uphill battle. AR, TC, VO, and MV all indicated that providing a safe space for the participants is the first step in helping them with their trauma. However, creating a safe environment as part of the MHPSS program is just the first step. As AR explains, "[w]hen you have enough security in a therapy room, people want to open but they will not open up outside. Because they are not safe." TC also indicated that the Bosnian state has failed to help and protect female survivors, rape survivors in particular.

To counter the insecurities outside the therapy room, the interviewees and the organizations they belong to often work to raise awareness through public campaigns, lobbying and education. For instance, MV said that her organization, which provided mental health support and psychotherapy to women during and immediately after the war has lately transformed into a "center for women's rights." She said this change took place because "[i]n BiH, we don't have laws that protects [sic] women who were raped during the war. This is our mission here, to push our authorities to pass laws to protect these women. Through these laws, we would like to have psychosocial support, medical support, financial support, and to have some kind of support of the society." A psychotherapist by training, MV ended up venturing into activism and lobbying to be able to provide support to her participants.

6.2.2 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation

Now that I have detailed how the MHPSS programs in BiH worked towards healing of their participants' trauma, the main research question of how trauma healing relates to reconciliation needs to be addressed. For ZS and AP, it was a question of individual attitude that tied trauma healing and reconciliation together. AP was particularly adamant about this point, arguing: "You need to build people from the inside first." Therefore, according to AP: "You need to understand what trauma is in order to

talk about reconciliation. Reconciliation requires training and knowledge about trauma." ZS also argued that of the different levels of reconciliation, the most important is the individual level and trauma healing is a major part of individual level reconciliation. The rest, she suggested, would follow: "[W]hen you understand that you are ready to accept what has happened, to understand what has happened, and not to get over it but to accept it as part of your own life, then [you can] be ready to continue with your life, basically to transform your own trauma and difficult experiences to be ready to continue with your life." As opposed to being stuck, as GB suggested the women who could not deal with their trauma are, being able to transform one's trauma is a step towards "continuing with life," as ZS describes.

NJ put forward a similar argument from the perspective of a psychotherapist. She argued that while most people who suffered trauma expect to become the same person they used to be once more, this is not possible. According to NJ, people who suffered trauma need to understand how trauma affects them and understand that they have to transform to move forward. That, she argued, is the way a victim becomes a survivor: "[T]he victim is helpless but a traumatized person can survive, can fight and continue with their lives." In one of the most interesting incidences in my field interviews, the translator who helped me with the interview (a professional who had never met NJ before the interview) interjected at that point to say that her experience with trauma was exactly the same as NJ described. Describing the same process, Bartsch (1996) argues that the transformation from being a victim to become a survivor involves telling the story of trauma and integrating the trauma into one's life, i.e., taking control of one's traumatic experience and how they use that experience in their lives. SD also stressed the importance of educating participants about how trauma affects them. She argued that not talking about their traumatic experiences, due to factors such as fear or stigma, adds to the psychological distress of people who suffer from trauma. Therefore, she suggested, "just helping people to recognize what they are feeling and helping them deal with their emotions contributes [to reconciliation]."

Per the above arguments and experiences, MHPSS programs, through educating participants about trauma and helping them with trauma healing, can help individuals to become 'unstuck,' take them out of the cycle of aggression, and be able to go on, move

forward with their lives. Thereby, they help put the participants in a position from which they can effectively deal with the past. VO, who is not a psychotherapist, talked of a parallel process on the national level. Similar to a personal desire to return to the pre-trauma state of mind, VO suggested that, for a long time, he imagined that BiH would return to being the country it used to be. Now, he said, "it is not my dream anymore. Because I see that this is a new reality. But I want to believe that we can still love each other, believe in the same country, work towards its progress, improve our lives' quality, make us all happier."

Furthermore, the interviewees also spoke about how trauma healing relates to reconciliation at not just an individual, but at a social level. According to SD, trauma can undermine social relations: "When you are not feeling well, you aren't good for yourself, you are not good for your family members, you aren't good for anybody around, you cannot contribute to the society in any way." BA made a similar argument in which she also highlighted a link with social level reconciliation, suggesting: "If you have people with existing trauma that caused personality changes, then you'll have a bad situation in the whole country, then we will not be able to talk about reconciliation in the future." According to BA, trauma healing would therefore help to promote "greater understanding and enough will to contact."

In connection with this argument, several interviewees pointed out that when an individual manages to transform their trauma, there are social benefits since those individuals can have healthier and more productive interactions with people around them. Report 2 makes such connection explicit:

> *"Personal empowerment requires accomplishing goals set during therapy sessions, combined with accompanying behavioral changes and more connections with friends and family. Individuals are then able to deal positively with the challenges of everyday life, restore one's personal dignity and ensure one's human rights."*

MO made a similar argument, suggesting: "One of our goals is that people can work on their own traumas so they can be more functional in the community and help the people around them."

MHPSS work towards helping participants to acknowledge their trauma, to be able to take control of their traumatic experiences, and healing clinical symptoms of trauma does not directly contribute to any of the determinants of social de-mobilization derived from Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) theoretical framework, However, as MHPSS programs help break the cycle of aggression and help their participants take control of their own past traumatic experiences, they set the stage for social de-mobilization. As the participants move out of the cycle of aggression, they are better able to renew their social networks and re-establish connections with the members of the former enemy group. As they acknowledge and take control of their own traumatic experiences, they can better empathize with the similar traumas on the other side. These changes open up the possibility of social de-mobilization through setting up the groundwork for "inter-communal contact" and "acknowledgement of the past." In the next two sections, I will detail MHPSS efforts that are directly relevant to the determinants of social mobilization.

6.3 Fostering Relationships

As Hamber (2009:22-25) explains, political trauma is different from the trauma of accidents or natural disasters as it undermines the individuals' sense of belonging in a society, leading to mistrust and erosion of the social fabric. The previous chapter's discussion on anger, fear, and mistrust showed that such has been the case in post-war BiH, impeding reconciliation efforts.

Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) framework of social de-mobilization calls for members of rival social groups to "freely discuss past conflict," which requires at least a basic set of relationships to emerge and serve as a basis for a productive discussion. The framework also suggests that 'making amends' for past crimes of one's group is one of the conditions of social de-mobilization, which similarly requires a renewed and productive relationship between former enemy groups to emerge, i.e., the establishment of 'inter-communal contact' that can grow into a more robust relationship as social de-mobilization continues. Furthermore, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy (ibid.:132) suggest based on social psychology research that "promoting positive inter-group experiences characterised by trust, cooperation and tolerance might lay the ground for greater acknowledgement and future reconciliation."

The groups need not become friends for reconciliation to take place, but they do need to re-humanize and respect one another, moving on from their anger, fear, and mistrust (Puljek-Shank 2007:196). Former enemy groups renewing their ties would help to achieve such transformation as members of the groups get a chance to get to know one another and hear each others' stories. Therefore, MHPSS work that aims to help restore the relationships between such groups would help directly towards establishing 'inter-communal contact' and 'free discussion on past conflict,' which can then set the stage for 'making amends.' Progress towards social de-mobilization and eventual reconciliation requires a conscious effort to renew social connections between former enemy groups. Accordingly, in all of the interviews, the interviewees expressed their preoccupations about helping the participants of their MHPSS programs foster new social contacts and/or be able to re-kindle old ones. In my coding tree, such efforts are represented through the "Reweaving the social fabric" node, which includes four sub-nodes titled "Relationships" (138 quotes), "Sharing" (23 quotes), "New activism" (25 quotes), and "Rebuilding trust" (17 quotes). The sub-node "Relationships" ended up being especially salient, which signals that the focus on rebuilding relationships indicates that creating or rebuilding relationships across the ethnic divides is a priority of MHPSS programs in BiH.

In the particular case of BiH, the trauma of the war undermined the trust and understanding between the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat peoples of the country (Hakansson and Sjoholm 2007). Moreover, since the end of the war, many regions, cities, and towns in BiH, through ethnic cleansing and migration, have transformed from being multi-ethnic communities to mostly single ethnicity ones (Ibreljić et al. 2006), further eroding inter-ethnic connections. This situation has led to, as JT, NJ, AP, RK, and MH all explained in similar terms, the generation raised after the war in BiH not having any knowledge about the other groups in the country, and not even meeting anyone from the other group all their lives. Thus, the post-war generation has become susceptible to the narratives of collective victimhood that emanate from nationalist leaders and parties. Therefore, JT argued, trying to bring groups together and educate them about each other's customs is of utmost importance for peacebuilding in BiH, because "people just fear the 'unknown' […] and that's reinforced by the borders we have between people here."

All of the MHPSS programs that my interviewees have taken part in explicitly aimed, in one way or another, at getting people from different groups in BiH to meet, talk to each other, and foster relationships. All of the interviewees claimed to have some degree of success in achieving this goal and said that new relationships blossomed through their work. How, then, did they manage to help their participants build relationships and how do those relationships relate to the process of reconciliation?

6.3.1 Fostering Relationships: Approaches

While they all aimed at helping their participants build relationships and be able to talk with the members of rival groups, the interviewees laid out variant approaches towards this goal. Four different approaches emerged out of the interviews and reports. These can be summarized as a) direct encounters, b) managed encounters, c) network encounters, and d) curated encounters.

Some of the programs my interviewees worked in began with the explicit aim of bringing people together and facilitating direct encounters in which people share their experiences. The quotes about such programs are coded under “Sharing” (23 quotes). VO, who primarily works with youth, described an approach that seeks to bring members of different groups together from the beginning: “For individual reconciliation, what I have learned in the last 13 years, is that we need a space, people from opposite sides, and good coffee. So, meaning a good opportunity for the people to really exchange their life stories and to re-humanize each other. After that everything gets much easier.” JT also cited a similar approach in programs she manages. Both VO and JT described a similar process that goes on in their programs. They suggested that, at first, the participants stick with members of their own ethnic group. As the program continues, VO and JT claimed, those who have similar experiences and/or interests cross the ethnic divide and come together. JT described this process as follows:

> *“In the first few meetings it’s hard, they [the participants] just stay in their comfort zones, they keep to their own groups. After two or three meetings, you can see how this changes. For instance you have people who smoke, they start to group together, it doesn’t matter who they are [laughs] and those who are drinking coffee or want to go to walk somewhere and those who have same vocational interest… And that’s it. That’s the beginning of friendships and*

> *working together, when they get out of their comfort zones. But at the beginning, you have to find ways on how to do it."*

Others, especially psychotherapists, adopted a more cautious approach that is carefully managed. MO suggested that in her programs she holds "basic" and "advanced" seminars. While the basic seminars only include members of one ethnic group, "[i]n advanced seminars, people from different ethnic groups have opportunities to meet one another." RK put forward a similar philosophy in a more direct and explicit way: "We didn't just put people together and said, 'talk about this or that.'" Instead, RK said, her organization sought to offer psychotherapy sessions and seminars to their participants first. In explaining the reasoning of her organization to adopt a managed approach, BZ suggested that psychotherapy could influence people's ability to form relationships, arguing that "you have cases in which therapy influences your personal growth and you feel more personally empowered; empowered to reach out to your old friends or have new connections." Report 2 supported BZ's argument, documenting that of the participants of a psychotherapy program it assessed, "70.58% feel more connected to their environment, friends, and family and 88.23% of project participants have more social contacts."

The third approach to fostering relationships that came out of my interviews was the network encounter approach. This method was particularly prominent among women's organizations that undertake MHPSS work. The MHPSS programs which used this approach sought to first establish connections and form a network among their participants from a single community, and then tried to bring them together with similar networks from the other side. For instance, after working separately with local women's organizations from a Bosniak village and a Serb village in the Srebrenica area, AR's organization eventually managed to get Bosniak and Serb women to meet one another, share their stories, and talk about their experiences of the conflict. According to AR, the meetings, alternately held in one of the villages every other week, took place despite objections and suspicions from some community members in both villages, particularly the men. AR described her and her colleagues' role in the creation of this small network as follows: "We swim between them and we make connections. What they do with it is up to them but we facilitate it." MV also spoke of helping establish a network among a

Serb women's organization from Bratunac and returnee Bosniak women in neighboring Srebrenica. The women from Bratunac provided essential help and social connections to the returnees in the network, according to MV.

Similarly, after years of working with returnee women from Srebrenica, BA decided to arrange 'reconciliation trips,' through which her participants met female survivors from Krajina, Vukovar, and Kosovo – three places in the region where Serb, Croat, and Albanian women similarly experienced trauma, loss, and suffering. She aimed at organizing the trips "in a way that victims from all sides can talk about their traumatic experiences." ZS also described a similar process that took place through her programs in a border region between FBiH and RS. However, ZS suggested the process in her case was organic: "When we help them [Bosniak women] to get an education, to even start their businesses and their farms, their own initiatives was [sic] to start peacebuilding processes with their pre-war neighbors on the other side of the border." When they did cross the border, the women found, according to ZS, that "there was also pain, suffering, misery on the other side, and in most of the cases, their pre-war neighbors welcomed that initiative."

NJ and AR suggested that the experience of dealing with trauma and PTSD could also be used as a mutual issue to establish connections between communities. NJ argued: "They understand each other perfectly." AR pointed out that PTSD support organizations around the region of Former Yugoslavia have been in contact with one another and cooperate: "So they have found one another under the roof of PTSD [*laughs*], and they are together!"

Finally, curated approaches were also used in some of the MHPSS programs that my interviewees talked about. These approaches involve public speaking engagements by trauma survivors who went through rehabilitation and therapy through an MHPSS program. These public speaking events often involve war veterans and former war prisoners from each group going to different towns all over the country, talking about their experiences, thoughts, and transformations. As NJ and AH explained in similar terms, the individuals with first hand experience of the war – veterans in particular – command deeper credibility and respect from the community than a psychotherapist or an NGO activist. Therefore, their stories of transformation and messages of peace and

reconciliation have more resonance in the community. Through these public speaking events, people can also get a first-hand introduction to the stories and experiences of members of other groups, facilitating greater understanding between them.

For EZ, the most important aspect of such an approach is that the participants in the audience should see a transformation on the part of the speakers, so that they can believe that they and the country can transform in a similar way. That is why, EZ said, she preferred to work with veterans and former concentration camp prisoners rather than people who lost their loved ones during the war. She explained:

> *"For those who haven't found their beloved ones, it's very difficult because the trauma goes on and on and on. Every time they get a call from [a] missing persons agency, they're stressed again. They're thinking, 'Did they find them?' 'What should I do now?' 'Do I have to arrange their funeral?' 'Can I ever organize a funeral?' So I noticed that these stories were not so effective on the public because they still felt the need to say they are victims. And ex war camp prisoners, they really were able to say they are survivors, and they are now peace activists."*

For this reason, EZ said most of the public speakers she works with are men. Her program, apart from two others that specifically served war veterans, was the only one that had more male participants than female ones, as indicated in the interviews, in the reports, and in the publicly available material about the programs.

Almost all of the interviewees claimed that friendships, networks and relationships established through their programs survive afterwards. MO, MH, and RK all suggested that social media, Facebook in particular, has been an important facilitator of keeping these relationships going, particularly among younger participants. Even between the unlikeliest participants, such as veterans who were on either side of the trenches during the war, friendships blossomed and went on. RK, for instance, offered this almost improbable story from one of her group sessions:

> *"We had these two guys, one from ARBiH, another was in VRS, and for the entire war, they were on the same front but on the opposite sides. We figured out during our discussions they were in the same place and they were shooting at each other. One of them said, "22 years ago we were shooting at each other and now we talk!" Yes,*

> *great! It was like an "A-ha!" moment. I was really impressed by that. And they talk today, they are friends, they didn't fall apart after our project."*

6.3.2 Fostering Relationships and Reconciliation

How, then, do these new relationships fostered through MHPSS work relate to reconciliation? BA argued that she considers the 'reconciliation trips' she organized and the relationships that came out of them as a service to peace and understanding in the region. She claimed that her program achieved an "understanding of problems of others and we expanded our minds to achieve tolerance that is needed for peace of us and of our children." GB suggested that simply having a platform to talk to one another transforms people: "Just putting people together in a normal environment, giving them the chance to see these other people, people normally change, you have to change. We were working with 220 people approximately. About two thirds of them were changed, positively."

In addition to the benefits to the individuals who take part in the MHPSS programs, the interviewees also argued that the relationships that blossom in their programs expand to the general community as well, as these relationships help to develop trust between different communities. I coded these quotes under the node "Rebuilding trust" (17 quotes). VO, whose primary work takes place in a border region in Western Bosnia, argued that his organization's work helped make the region transform "from being a closed community to a very open community. We still have our own problems in the local community, but compared to where it was 10 years ago, it's to the point where you can't compare." This transformation, according to VO, took place because "[w]e have people who are ready to talk to each other, who are really ready to face the others, which wasn't the case before." Similarly, MO suggested that building new relationships based on trust is key to reconciliation: "For us, reconciliation is an ongoing work on understanding and accepting different people […]. It means learning from each other and developing trust."

Furthermore, AH suggested that hearing stories from the other side can help people share their newfound insights with others and become ambassadors of a message of peace: "In the trainings [sic], they are also working on themselves and most of them meet with the enemy for the first time and talk deeply about the issues related to war.

Sometimes, it's really cathartic for them. Most of them, after a while, want to be part of our story." EZ makes a similar observation about the participants in her public speaking events, arguing: "If you have something that touches you at a public speaking event, you are more likely to have the courage to share that experience." As former participants become activists in their own right, MHPSS programs become more likely to have a larger, societal impact. Quotes about participants are coded under the node "New activism" (23 quotes). AP, VO, MO, GB, and AMP all said that some of their former participants later became peace activists. VO interpreted this as the measure of his program's success: "It's not always easy to measure success in terms of how much our programs help people to transform, but we have several cases in which people who were in our programs are now leading figures in their local communities in peacebuilding work."

AR suggested that once new relationships are established and members of rival groups come together, the idea spreads as people begin to see the possibilities. Speaking about the Serb and Bosniak women's groups from Bratunac and Srebrenica that her organization brought into contact, she argued that "when you have those women, two years around one table, and they are talking about all their pain, loss of their children, their husbands, it gives a connection and that connection is still continuing and it is broadening, other people get the same ideas."

MHA, who was involved in a program that brought high-school students from each group in the country together, also saw a social benefit to such meeting opportunities:

> *"I think if they established such program* [sic] *as mandatory in every school, they partner schools up and bring children together for a week just to do this, it would diminish the enmity, they can make people understand that they are the same people, they have the same problems, they can understand each other, regardless of name, faith, ethnicity, everything... [They can understand] that there is no reason to divide people."*

Evaluating the work of Sarajevo-based NGO Center for Nonviolent Action (Center za Nenasilje Akcija – CNA), Fischer (2001:45) also finds that, when given a platform to share their stories and hear others' experiences of the war, participants have

"learned to […] recognize and deal with their own prejudices and accept other people's position (empathy skills)." Fischer's (2001) work evaluates a youth program of CNA that aimed at training war-affected youth in non-violent communication and establish cross-community networks among them. Doing so, according to Fisher (2001:12), required overcoming "the widespread resignation and apathy evident throughout BiH […] which are caused by the traumas of war, refugee experience and expulsion, as well as the loss of an ideological frame of reference." Therefore, even though it was not explicitly designed with an MHPSS focus, CNA's project was geared towards addressing the traumas of war.

Fischer's (2001) evaluative interviews with the participants who completed the program show that CNA's work helped participants develop empathy. For instance, a participant tells Fischer (2001:31): "Talking about these themes [related to the experience of the war] revived memories of events from the war. This gave rise to moments of insecurity, when people felt very uncomfortable. But it also helped people to recognize that in reality, they have all endured bad experiences in their lives." Another participant recounts (ibid.:34):

> *"I realized that I had previously lived in a kind of blockade. You live in your own environment, you don't meet anyone from other parts of Yugoslavia. […] If you live in this kind of blockade, you have no idea of what is happening on the other side. But then suddenly you start working with these people and you get on really well and work well together, as if you had been working together for years."*

In Fischer's interviews, several participants suggest that they continue to be in contact and even work together with some of their fellow participants from other ethnicities, even though Fischer (2001:40) notes that the political climate at the time (the program had taken place during the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo) presented barriers to further communication and cooperation. In a more recent evaluation of CNA's non-violent communication workshops with war veterans from the region, Schweitzer (2012:6) suggested that the program "largely achieved four main outcomes: 1. Attitudes are changed 2. Knowledge and skills have been acquired 3. Networks are being formed 4. Participants feel empowered to use their skills in a) their private context, and /or b) their professional context, and /or c) as political activists."

Despite the general optimism of the interviewees about the new relationships established through MHPSS programs, MH expressed skepticism as to the long-term viability of these relationships. She argued that while in the context of MHPSS programs members of different groups could effectively communicate, when they go back to their communities, these new relationships do not translate into social bonds due to social and political pressures, as will be detailed in Chapter 7.

6.3.3 Lessons from the Literature on Cross-Community Initiatives

Cross-community initiatives to foster relationships among the members of rival groups have been widely applied in various other conflict and post-conflict contexts, such as Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and Sri Lanka (see, *inter alia*, McWilliams 1995; Lister 1998; Cockburn 1998; Maoz 2004; Power 2005; Xavier 2011). These programs bring together people from either side, such as women, youth, or veterans, and aim to foster connections based on commonality of their respective experiences. The goal of these initiatives is to provide a forum in which members of each group can learn about the perspectives and experiences of one another, challenge narratives of collective victimhood, and make new connections across the social divide. The new connections, in turn, can help the participants humanize one another, build trust, and form a new community. For instance, evaluating three local social work initiatives in Sri Lanka that focused on bringing local Tamil and Sinhalese communities together, Xavier (2011) finds that the initiatives helped build trust and eventually led to inter-group cooperation on local issues. She shows that the newly built trust allowed the three villages she observed to achieve economic and political goals such as forming a farming cooperative, securing the release of three teenagers whom the army falsely accused of being militants, and peacefully resolving a hostage situation.

However, not all cross-community initiatives produce trust and cooperation, and attempts at dialogue may fail, especially when there is a power imbalance between the groups. For instance, Byrne (2014:118-9) finds that the dialogue between trade unionist women in Israel and Palestine collapsed as a result of the power imbalance between the two groups, as the Palestinian women felt like their Israeli counterparts looked down upon them and eventually chose not to initiate further dialogue. Furthermore, drawing upon her fieldwork in both Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, Byrne (ibid.) suggests

that cross-community dialogue may end up being "limited to issues which are likely to generate consensus."

Feminist peace scholarship offers a significant amount of research about such cross-community initiatives. This is primarily due to Feminist peace scholarship's desire to capture the experience of war (Sylvester 2012; 2013), focus on the community level to understand women's role in peacebuilding (as women are often excluded from formal peace negotiations), and the heavy involvement of women's organizations in such projects. Such research often refers to Yuval-Davis' (1992) theory on "transversal politics." In her theory, Yuval-Davis (1999:94) sought to overcome "assimilationist 'universalistic' politics of the Left on the one hand, and to identity politics on the other hand." In the context of bringing communities together in post-conflict or intractable conflict settings, transversal dialogue aims at simultaneously not denying the differences of each group while also highlighting commonalities. Therefore, transversal dialogue offers an alternative to narrow identity politics while not denying the identity of each party.

Cockburn's (1998) book "The Space Between Us," examines the cross-community works of three women's organizations in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and BiH. In particular, Cockburn (ibid.) seeks to detail how these organizations sought to foster inter-group communication and peace while negotiating the contentious identities of their members and participants. Therefore, Cockburn's work helps summarize the opportunities and challenges of cross-community initiatives: they can help form new connections, but the contentious nature of questions of identity continues to cast a shadow that cannot be ignored. For instance, in the BiH part of her fieldwork, Cockburn (ibid.:192-3) details how the ethnic Serbian translator of Medica Women's Therapy Center in Zenica – the organization Cockburn focused on – had to grapple with her Serbian identity. As an overwhelming number of Bosniak women who were raped and/or abused by Serbian forces sought Medica's help, the translator felt angry about what her co-ethnics had done and was hurt that many Bosniaks in town came to lump all Serbians together with the soldiers who committed these crimes.

While a significant power difference between groups – as in the example of Israel and Palestine – does not exist in BiH, challenges of identity politics are paramount. The

interviews indicate that in the face of these challenges, MHPSS programs sought to highlight the commonalities of their participants, especially the traumatic experience of war and continued economic hardship. Hence, their work fits Yuval-Davis's (1992;1999) conception of transversal politics, as they did not deny the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb identities of their participants but also sought to highlight what is common amongst them.

In fostering new relationships through their programs, MHPSS programs help to build a platform for communication amongst the members of former enemy groups. The establishment of this platform enabled the participants of MHPSS programs to hear the experiences of the other groups. Being able to engage with the other group and hearing their experiences, the ethno-nationalist narratives of each side come to be challenged. Once a participant begins to question the official narrative of his/her own group, they are in a position to take concrete steps forward towards reconciliation.

6.4 Shifting the Narratives

In this section, I will detail how MHPSS programs in BiH tried to shift the dominant narratives that are filled with exclusive nationalism and collective victimhood. Countering such narratives, I will argue, would be essential to lay the ground for reconciliation at the social level. Both the reconciliation goal of 'dealing with the past' and social de-mobilization determinants of 'acknowledgment of the past' and 'free discussion on past conflict' depend upon people of former enemy groups to be able to challenge the narratives of victimhood and have an opportunity to hear the other side(s) of the story. Therefore, MHPSS work that aims at disturbing these narratives are of the utmost significance in relation to reconciliation.

Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have detailed that narratives of collective victimhood are prevalent among all three main ethnic groups of BiH. The relevant discussion further showed that such narratives have been part of the Bosnian society for a long time and were transmitted across generations, with added material from each war at least since WWI. The prevalence of narratives of collective victimhood continues to feed the anger, fear, and mistrust that MHPSS programs desire to address. As a result, all of the interviewees spoke of the need to present alternative narratives to the participants of their MHPSS programs. This goal of shifting narratives of history is also closely related to the reconciliation goal of 'dealing with the past,' as social groups that continue to

demonize one another cannot conceivably achieve reconciliation. Furthermore, Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy's (2014) theory of social de-mobilization also emphasizes that the former enemy groups "must recognize and accept their crimes" and also "make amends" for them. Therefore, when inquiring about the relationship between MHPSS programs' work and the process of reconciliation, one of my main foci was the effort to shift narratives. In this section, I will detail how MHPSS programs in BiH have worked towards shifting narratives of victimhood and fostering empathy among their participants. In my coding tree, such efforts are visually represented with the node "Dealing with the past," and the two sub-nodes under it: "Shifting narratives" (60 quotes) and "Empathy" (44 quotes).

The interviewees were acutely aware of the continued shadow that competing narratives of victimhood cast on Bosnian society. All of them talked about their efforts to introduce their participants to narratives other than the dominant one among their ethno-religious group, through activities such as storytelling, public speaking events, group therapy, workshops, and seminars. BZ thought of the goal of shifting narratives as her key potential contribution to peace and reconciliation in BiH. She argued that "reconciliation for me means that we have a sense of what really happened and how people can be manipulated during the war. And if we know that, we can make an informative [sic] decision not to be part of it or to change it." Similarly, EZ identified introducing her participants to new narratives as the main goal of her work. When asked if she thought her program has been a success, she did not hesitate to reply affirmatively, "because we went to different parts of BiH, where people haven't even heard about people having victimized others and been convicted for that from their side."

However, MHPSS programs' efforts to shift narratives and help their participants move on from victimhood can also be met with resistance. ZS and BA, who both work with female survivors of the war, described encountering initial resistance from their participants. ZS suggested that "to accept and recognize the pain of others is hard for them. This is really something you need to spend a lot of time to work with them to understand [that] the pain of [one] mother from the other side is the same pain the mother in your community is facing." BA's description of her participants meeting Croatian women who survived the war in Vukovar in one of her first 'reconciliation trips' drew a

more vivid picture: "In their mind and in their soul, there was no space to hear information that it happened somewhere else, too. And they couldn't accept that it was real, that also in Vukovar something terrible has happened. They felt 'I can't understand you and your story because I have so much suffering in my soul.'" MO also said that she faced resistance from her participants as they were introduced to alternative narratives. However, she was not overly worried about it, arguing: "It is normal to expect resistance because for some of them it is the first time for them to hear some different story, to hear something different than what they are used to think [sic]."

Yet, interviewees also suggested that they have been able to break through such resistances. Several interviewees argued that establishing relationships with the members of other ethnic groups and hearing their stories of the war period helped their participants to question the narratives of victimization they had long adhered to. This process can be daunting and cathartic for the participants, as GB described in one example from his work: "There was this Bosniak guy, big guy, perhaps 150 kilos, he was crying like a baby. He was crying 'I can't believe my nation did this to you.' It was acknowledging crimes committed against other nations. We are really happy for this, how this happens, acknowledging, accepting war crimes." AP also talked of a very emotional process: "[W]hen people start crying, […] usually it means they are ready to accept other kind[s] of things. If that didn't happen, my work wouldn't have a sense. It happens because of people who finally look at things from the other perspective."

In general, GB said, his work was successful in shifting narratives: "People connected. There were still some people who denied. 'It didn't happen, my nation suffered more.' But [the] huge majority accepted that crimes happened on all three sides." AP suggested that several of her past participants were encouraged to re-contact their old friends from the other side after her programs because "[t]hey were able to understand how those people think or used to think." A participant quoted in Report 1 spoke to the importance of being presented a new perspective and hearing others tell their stories:

"I was a child during the war and I thought that only me [sic] have lived through that experience. When you see that other person [sic] had the same experience as you, when I

hear someone else speaks about it, then we realize that the pain is the same. And when you accept that in your head and share the experience... that is liberating."

Interviewees with a background in psychotherapy also spoke of the role of therapy in fostering the kind of empathy one needs to understand the suffering of others. NJ, for instance, argued that reconciliation and forgiveness could only come about through adopting a different view of the conflict and to be able to do so, "we also have to understand why the other group did what they did. So we are helping them [participants] to empathize, not for the behavior of the perpetrator but for the needs." She had a measured confidence in the success of her approach, suggesting: "I cannot guarantee how many people went through this transformation from self-victimization in a positive way. However, I am confident that they have this signal, this light in their heads and that is what's most important. It means that they start thinking."

The work towards challenging narratives of victimization and introducing alternative sides of the story of the war to MHPSS program participants also contributes to the national level transitional justice initiatives. As Ford (2012) shows based on surveys on Bosnians' opinions about ICTY verdicts, respondents were more likely to agree with the decisions of the court if they confirmed the narrative of their own ethnic group. Conversely, when ICTY's decisions challenged the story of a given group, they were considered biased and false, which potentially can add to the narrative of victimization. Therefore, in order for transitional justice initiatives to be welcomed and accepted among the societies of each former enemy, challenging narratives of victimization on all sides is essential.

Despite the optimism because they were able to get their participants to adopt a critical view, the interviewees admitted that shifting narratives is a long and often complicated process. Both EZ (Bosniak) and TG (Serb), for instance, said that they have difficulty explaining even to some of their family members that there are victims on the other side. As discussed in the previous chapter, MHPSS programs that work towards shifting narratives occasionally faced criticism from some community members, on the grounds that they 'relativized' the crimes of the other group(s). AH argued: "A significant part our society [is] not ready to deal with the past and move on from victimhood" due to continued trauma and persistence of victimhood narratives in politics

and society. AMP suggested that many people resist MHPSS efforts to shift narratives because "[they] hide behind the past. Victimhood is often used as a cover for not to go on [sic]." NJ doubted the extent to which her work helps foster the level of empathy necessary for reconciliation: "If someone we reach starts thinking differently, then it's good. But it's very difficult. It's work towards reconciliation, 'I understand you, you understand me, let's talk,' but it's not deep enough for deeper understanding."

Based on the field research, MHPSS programs in BiH have managed, at least to a certain extent, to challenge the competing narratives of victimhood among the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities. Their participants, through public speaking events, cross-community meetings, and 'reconciliation trips,' have had the opportunity to hear the stories of the other side and have their stories heard. At least some of these participants have taken it upon themselves to examine the past and show remorse for the actions of their own ethnic groups. Despite resistances and criticisms they have faced, MHPSS programs have managed to facilitate 'acknowledgment of the past' and 'making amends' among their participants through their work. Therefore, it is possible to argue that they have made a positive contribution to social de-mobilization and the reconciliation goal of 'dealing with the past.'

6.5 Women's Micro Level Roles and Care Work

In peace processes, women are often excluded from key negotiating and decision-making bodies, and peace agreements rarely include a "gender perspective" (Bell 2015). As noted earlier, not a single woman participated in the negotiations for DPA, which set up the post-war structure of BiH (UNIFEM 2012). In turn, women are usually more involved in maintaining social relations such as connections with family members, neighbors, and local communities (Anderlini 2007). Such gendered division of labor provides unique opportunities for women to take up peacebuilding and reconciliation at the local, micro level – even when macro level processes are not favorable – but also renders them more vulnerable to the loss/disruption of social contacts. Proposing a feminist approach to peace psychology, Mazurana and McKay (1999:344) argue that from a feminist position, peace psychologists should question the extent to which various actors such as states, international organizations, and grassroots organizations engage in "human processes" such as "restoration of relationships and reconciliation."

However, the scholarship on transitional justice and reconciliation tends to focus on institutional level processes and actors as opposed to the micro level 'human processes.' Examining 58 comparative studies on transitional justice initiatives, Backer (2009) found that analyses of these research projects focused on policy-making processes, regime stability, and democratization. He concludes that this line of literature has "too little concern for assessing the extent to which these processes affect people" (ibid.:66). Furthermore, as Clark (2010:433) suggests, micro level focus can be met with scrutiny from the researchers who adopt macro level lenses. However, given women's absence in macro level decision-making and the gendered division labor that tasks them with micro level issues such as care work and maintenance of social relations, the focus on macro level means women's issues and contributions are largely overlooked, both by scholars in theorization and by elites in decision-making. As a result, inadequate bureaucratic schemes are put forward to address problems that actually require care work and relationships, such as re-establishment of social relations and trust or addressing traumas of war.

Research concerning the prevalence of trauma in conflict settings suggests that women are more vulnerable to trauma related ailments such as PTSD (Pham et al. 2007). Particularly in ethnic/racial conflicts, including in BiH, rape has been utilized as a weapon of war, compounding the traumatic experiences of the survivor. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, in patriarchal societies, women may be reluctant to admit that they have been raped and do not even want to acknowledge that they may have been traumatized, let alone seek support to deal with their trauma. Women are also more likely to suffer from continuous trauma as a result of not being able to locate the remains of their loved ones who are presumed dead.

Hence, MHPSS programs offer unique opportunities for women both as participants and facilitators. Their services in trauma healing are of significant use for women who suffered rape and/or loss of loved ones during the war. Their goal of restoring social networks of participants gives women and women's organizations opportunities to participate as facilitators of social connections, even when male dominated political elites remain stuck in the ethos of conflict. Therefore, in discussing the relationship between MHPSS programs' work and reconciliation, it is important to

make special note of the implications of women's participation in MHPSS programs. Doing so will reveal how social gender roles and gender relations manifest in MHPSS work, which is an understudied topic in relevant psychology and peacebuilding literature.

In the case of BiH, Spahić-Šiljak (2014:xix) observes a delineation of roles along the gender lines in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes: "Women are the ones who work on peace issues at the grassroots level, while men handle the negotiations related to such matters at higher decision-making levels. Although women tend to be the key players and peace workers in their local communities, […] they still do not have the power to bring their perspectives to the decision-making table, and they remain marginal in public life." While marginalization prevents women from having their voices heard in key decision-making processes, it nevertheless opens up different opportunities, Slapšak (2001:181) argues, by enabling women to be "more ready to communicate, reconcile, and help and create networks of support." This delineation has resulted in mostly male macro level decision makers ignoring issues at the grassroots level, to the detriment of reconciliation goals.

For instance, Mlinarević, Isaković-Porobić, and Rees (2015:36) point out that while the international negotiators and local politicians focused on restoring property rights to facilitate the return of the refugees, it was local women's organizations who sought to restore social connections so that the return would be sustainable. As discussed in the introduction, most early returnees were not able to return sustainably as they faced discrimination, isolation and socio-economic difficulty. Among later returnees, who voluntarily returned from 2010 onwards, sustainable return has been "closely inter-linked with the construction of the complex micro-social structures buffering against the unpredictable macro-social context of post-Dayton BiH," as opposed to "being propelled by formal and assisted return programmes" (Porobic 2017:192). For those who returned, women's organizations have become the primary actors in re-establishing social contacts and relations between different communities, as AR and ZS both argued. Therefore, in BiH, it is primarily the work of women's organizations that undertake the task of 'reweaving the social fabric' and engage in "human processes," as Mazurana and McKay (1999:344) put it, particularly in areas where different communities still live side by side. The failures of the refugee return process in BiH highlights the shortcomings of elite

level peace negotiations and how women's work and perspectives can be invaluable for social healing and reconciliation.

Similarly, in terms of trauma healing, particularly for survivors of rape, the solution from the government and most of the outside actors was social welfare, which forced women's NGOs in BiH to undertake "provision of services such as medical assistance and psychosocial support" (Mlinarević, Isaković-Porobić, and Rees, 2015:36). As a result, women's organizations are among the primary agents of MHPSS work in BiH. Four of my interviewees worked for a women's organization, managing and administering MHPSS programs. Even in MHPSS programs that other NGOs run – excluding those that specifically target veterans – the majority of the participants are women. For instance, MO suggested that up to 95% of the participants in her program (which a Catholic faith-based NGO facilitates) are women. JT and BZ also indicated that the majority of their participants are women. Apart from the interviewees who worked on programs that specifically targeted veterans, only EZ stated that she had more male participants in a program than female ones – for reasons explained in the previous chapter.

The Bosnian state's disregard of care work is also observable in its policies on juvenile crime. NJ, for instance, argued that BiH has an increased problem of juvenile crime, in part due to transgenerational transfer of trauma. She criticized the official response to this emerging issue: "[The] Government's answer is to build more detention centers. But we don't have a systematic approach. These kids are from broken homes, their parents have suffered from trauma, and the trauma transferred transgenerationally... We are just treating the symptoms and not the disease."

Furthermore, as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7, the interviewees have also suggested that the state healthcare system in BiH has relied on a pharmacological approach to mental healthcare, without much attention to the social and economic context the patients live in.

Feminist scholarship, particularly care ethics, can contribute a vital perspective to address such lack of care work. Ethics of care suggests that there is a fundamental moral significance in relationships and dependencies that helps sustain people's lives. The emergence of care ethics as a moral theory is attributed to the works of psychologist

Carol Gilligan and philosopher Nel Noddings in the 1980s. As a moral theory, ethics of care was developed because traditional moral theories "are deficient to the degree they lack, ignore, trivialize, or demean values and virtues culturally associated with women" (Tong and Williams 2016). Following the emergence of ethics of care as a moral theory, several scholars developed frameworks on how focusing on relationships of care can inform social policy on issues such as healthcare (Hankivsky 2004) or homelessness (Noddings 2002). Later, a number of theorists – including Held (1995) and political scientists such as Tronto (2008) and Robinson (2011) – attempted to adapt the principles of care ethics in global socio-political relations and problems. Held (1995:132) summarizes the global vision of ethics of care when she argues: "At the levels of global society and of our own communities, we should develop frameworks of caring about and for one another as human beings." In the realm of social policy, Hankivsky (2004) suggests that ethics of care makes three core contributions. First is "contextual sensitivity" because from the perspective of ethics of care, "people are shaped by their contexts, including their social, economic, political, historical, and geographical circumstances" (ibid.:33). Secondly responsiveness, encouraging approaches to social policy that are designed to serve the needs of the participants as opposed to applying standardized procedures. Third is "consequences of choice," as an ethics of care "is concerned expressly with the actual outcomes and practical and material effects on people's lives of making certain choices and decisions" (ibid.: 38).

Where the macro level actors in BiH such as the Federal and entity level governments, the OHR, the external peacebuilders, and various IGOs have responded to challenges of refugee return, war trauma, or juvenile crime with impersonal bureaucratic solutions such as devising benefit schemes or building detention centers, a care ethics perspective could help emphasize the restoration of social relationships, particularly those that involve care. Such vision can help situate vulnerable populations such as refugees or traumatized women and children as humans in need of care relationships as opposed to clients of a bureaucratic entity such as a government, IGO or an international NGO. MHPSS programs can provide unique opportunities to establish and cultivate care relationships as they strive to create safe spaces for trauma healing and restoration of

social connections. In turn, healing and renewal of networks would contribute to reconciliation, as explained above.

6.6 Conclusions

In this chapter I have summarized, based on my findings, how MHPSS programs engage in reconciliation. They do so, as described above, in three ways: a) by providing support and safety to their participants to acknowledge and work through their trauma, b) by encouraging their participants to engage in a conversation with their former enemies and helping them re-establish relationships, and c) by challenging narratives of victimization and helping all sides of the story of the war to be heard by everyone. These efforts help to achieve progress in regard to the elements of social de-mobilization by encouraging their participants to discuss the past with their former enemies, acknowledge past crimes of their group, make amends, and renew relationships. Working towards these goals, MHPSS programs also make contributions towards both reconciliation goals of 'dealing with the past' and 'reweaving the social fabric.'

In doing so, MHPSS programs have managed to touch some of their individual participants, transforming their hate and willful ignorance into forgiveness and reflectiveness. The Croat café owner who would kick people with Serb accents out of his establishment, according to GB, shifted his attitudes as he began to participate in public speaking events where he heard stories about people of other nations suffering during the war. "He is now married to a [Serb]-Orthodox woman" GB said, to indicate the dramatic change this particular participant went through. The participant (a Serb) who EZ said "hated everyone" when she first participated in her program, later gave a speech at the annual commemoration event at Srebrenica Genocide Memorial. These individuals, and many others that my interviewees spoke of, were changed, profoundly so, because they were able to understand and transform their trauma, because they had a chance to hear stories from the other side that challenged their narratives of victimization and because they were given an opportunity to build new relationships. They dealt with their anger, fear, and mistrust, they developed empathy for the suffering of individuals from the other side(s), and they found the courage to build new relationships, even intimate ones, across the ethnic divide. Utilizing the micro level lens adopted in this project, it is possible to see that MHPSS work can indeed transform individuals whose trauma may have rendered

them more inclined to not participate in reconciliation initiatives and hold on to a desire for revenge. As a result of the MHPSS efforts, these people have begun their individual level process of reconciliation. Their transformation signifies the positive contribution that MHPSS programs have made in terms of reconciliation at a micro level.

Yet, it is doubtful whether MHPSS initiatives have made contributions to reconciliation beyond the micro level. A USAID (2014) study evaluated 6 grassroots peace initiatives (5 of which either involved a psychosocial component or were classified as an MHPSS program) in BiH that the agency funded from 2008 to 2014. The researchers concluded that their "overall reconciliation results […] have been modest. Small glimmers of improved trust and engagement at the individual level and in limited pockets at the community level in the various projects are noted and commended— but these have only sometimes resulted in meaningful reconciliation even though there is ample evidence that suggests that reconciliation is indeed possible in this context. There was no substantive evidence observed by the evaluation team that suggested that these project efforts have had a higher-level impact on 'Peace Writ Large' in Bosnia" (ibid.:232). The USAID researchers cited the continuance of the patronage networks of ethno-nationalist politicians and political parties as one of the primary reasons why a "higher level impact" was not achieved (ibid.). As argued earlier in this chapter, the persistence of ethno-nationalist politics, politicians and parties of the 1990s in contemporary BiH is one of the major reasons why narratives of victimhood continue to resonate among the peoples of BiH – Bosniak, Serb, and Croat alike. While my semi-structured interviews were not intended to draw information about politics in BiH, the subject came up in every single interview without prompt. Moreover, the poor socio-economic conditions in BiH permeate every facet of Bosnian life, including dealing with trauma and reconciliation. The sporadic nature of foreign assistance for the MHPSS programs meant that for some participants the healing process was interrupted. In the following chapter, I will detail how these structural issues in BiH disturb the MHPSS efforts in the country.

7 STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO HEALING AND RECONCILIATION: POLITICS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AND THE "PSYCHOSOCIAL GAP"

7.1 Introduction

In the preceding two chapters, I have shown that traumatic experiences of war are consequential for the process of social reconciliation, and that MHPSS programs, through their initiatives, can set their individual participants on the path towards social reconciliation. However, despite widespread MHPSS work immediately after the war and in the 2010s with the USAID funding, it is not possible to observe a larger scale impact (USAID 2014:232). Overall, social reconciliation in BiH has been painfully slow, as evidenced by lack of agreement on the effects of transitional justice initiatives (Ford 2012) or the shared symbols of the country (Kostić 2008). In this chapter, I will examine some of the potential reasons why MHPSS programs' work has not resonated far beyond the individual level.

Social psychologist Derrick Silove (2013) argues that in the post-conflict period, individuals and communities strive to adapt, survive, and restore the socio-psychological pillars of a healthy society. Such drive to adapt, according to Silove (2000:341), stems from the universal human instinct of survival, even though its manifestations can take different forms across contexts. Silove (2013:238) further argues that "when progress in this recovery process is slow or obstructed, the reasons are often structural, rather than inherent to the individual, group or culture."

The data collected from the field for this study suggest that the process of socio-psychological recovery in BiH has, indeed, been obstructed. The reasons, as Silove's argument would suggest, are structural. In this chapter, I consider three of the most influential structural problems that MHPSS programs face in their efforts to help facilitate socio-psychological recovery. First, I discuss how the political climate in BiH complicates MHPSS work. I will argue that the persistence of nationalism in Bosnian politics presents a direct opposition to the goals of MHPSS programs. Where MHPSS initiatives seek to transform trauma, shift narratives of victimization, and establish cross-community relations, nationalist politicians aim to trigger trauma, preserve exclusionary narratives, and isolate their communities. Nationalist mobilization remains the key

method of garnering support for the main political parties in BiH, and therefore, their efforts are diametrically opposed to the efforts towards social de-mobilization.

Second, I will discuss how poor socio-economic conditions, poverty, and high unemployment in particular also present challenges to MHPSS programs, as they cause participants to feel unsafe, therefore unable to talk about their trauma, and lead the participants to the patronage networks of the nationalists.

As a final structural problem, I will also discuss the role of international funding and assistance in MHPSS programs' ability to reach out and help individuals who struggle with the traumatic experiences of war. In particular, I will consider how the gap in international support, between the immediate aftermath of the war and 2011 when USAID began to offer funding again, has factored in the work and capabilities of MHPSS programs.

This part of my analysis is represented as the "Political Influence" and "Socio-economic Conditions" branches of my coding tree. Quotes under section 3 of this chapter are those coded under the "Socio-economic Conditions" branch and quotes in the rest of the chapter are those coded under the "Political Influence" branch and its nodes (see Figure 4: Top: Political Influence Branch. Bottom: Socio-economic Conditions Branch.).



Figure 4: Top: Political Influence Branch. Bottom: Socioeconomic Conditions Branch.

In conclusion, I will argue that these structural issues are the primary reasons why the socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict, as discussed in Chapter 5, remains in place. MHPSS programs, by themselves, cannot overcome the impediments that these issues present for their work. Under such conditions, they will inevitably struggle to effectively reach beyond the individual level.

7.2 Political Influence

7.2.1 Overview of Political Issues in BiH: Institutions, Elite-level Antagonism and "Shadow Economy"

Contemporary politicians and political parties in BiH continue to disseminate the nationalist narratives and rhetoric of the 1990s (Bennett 2016:xix). The nationalist parties of the 1990s, who were at the forefront of the war, continue to be influential. The Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HZD-BiH) continue to be influential and hold the Bosniak and Croat seats in the Bosnian Presidency at the time of writing. Radovan Karadžić's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is currently the second biggest party in RS. The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) has been the leading party in RS since 2006 and continues to govern from a nationalist platform, including actively calling for RS's secession. In the 2016 municipal elections, Fikret Abdić, who was convicted of war crimes committed in Western Bosnia by a Croatian court and served 10 years in prison, was elected as the mayor of the town of Velika Kladuša. Other war criminals such as Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić continue to be heralded as nationalist heroes (Ramet 2007; Steflja 2018). The arrests of Karadžić (in 2008) and Mladić (in 2011) led to large protests in towns and cities across RS. AH attested that in his visits to veterans' organizations across the country, he commonly encounters portraits of convicted war criminals on the walls, deemed "heroes of the nation."

In such a polarized environment, vital government responsibilities can be hampered. For instance, due to disagreements among ethno-nationalist parties, an official census had not been carried out in BiH until 2013. Official results of the census were only published in June 2016 and disputed by the government of RS (Toe 2016). As a result, for two decades after the war, the government did not possess accurate data of its citizens' demographics and needs, preventing it from effectively addressing socio-economic problems in the country, including healthcare delivery. The fact that the last official census during the SFR Yugoslavia era was undertaken in 1991 also makes the task of getting accurate healthcare related statistics very difficult, as the WHO still lacks post-1991 health data from BiH in its database. According to Report 3, lack of census data also means that there are no reliable figures for the number of refugee and returnee

populations, providing an opportunity for funds allocated for these populations to be manipulated.

The large, convoluted, and ethnically divided bureaucratic structures of BiH, as designed in the DPA, contribute both to the ethno-religious divides in the country and to the prevalence of corruption. Per the consociational design of DPA, the country is divided into two separate entities (RS and FBiH) and a special district under international supervision (Brčko District). FBiH is further divided into 10 Cantons, 7 of them being majority Bosniak and 3 being majority Croat. The Office of the President rotates among three members of the Presidency, one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. Federal level legislature has two branches, the House of the Peoples and House of Representatives. Both chambers have ethnic quotas that give equal representation to all three main peoples of BiH. The House of Peoples also reserves 7 out of its 58 seats for 'others.' FBiH and RS also have their own Presidents, Parliaments, Prime Ministers, and Cabinets. Overall, there are 136 ministries in BiH between federal, entity, and canton levels. Finally, the international community is represented in the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which has broad powers such as removing local officials who violate the terms of the DPA and make decisions when local governments are deadlocked.[22] The rather broad powers of OHR mean that BiH essentially remains an international protectorate more than 25 years after the war.

Academic researchers who study consociational theory and/or politics of BiH have produced several theories as to why consociationalism has not led to greater inter-ethnic communication and cooperation in BiH. Bennett (2016:180) argued that consociationalism did not function in BiH because "overarching loyalties to the state and a tradition of elite accommodation did not exist in Bosnia," which prevented the kind of consensus that consociationalism is supposed to be based on. Moore (2013:78), focusing on the local governance structures of the divided city of Mostar (which he describes as "a microcosm of Bosnia overall") argues that consociationalism in BiH was doomed due to its ethno-territorial character. Granting group autonomy through division of territory based on ethnicity, according to Moore (ibid.), resulted in reproducing the political power

---

[22] For more information on the mandate of the OHR, see http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1161 (Accessed Feb 28th, 2017).

of nationalist parties in BiH as it "insulate[d] them from genuine electoral competition by creating a safe demographic margin and restrict[ed] political participation by defining 'legitimate' politics within an exclusively ethnic framework." As a result, Moore (ibid.) argues, nationalist elites had the opportunity to "keep people in a continual state of fear by invoking threats to their own territorial-political autonomy or highlighting the discrimination that coethnics face in other ethnocratic spaces in Bosnia" – i.e., the continuation of a narrative of collective victimhood.

Other scholars find fault in the corporatist nature of the DPA's consociational institutional design as opposed to a liberal one (Belloni 2004; Bieber and Keil 2009; Sebastian 2007). The "rigid consociationalism" (Belloni 2004:346) in BiH, according to critics, has resulted in political immobilism due to "ethnic vetoes" built into the constitution (Bieber and Keil 2009; Zahar 2005), entrenchment of ethnic interests as the primary vassal of politics (Sebastian 2007; Moore 2013; Bennett 2016:252-3), and violation of the rights of BiH's citizens who are not Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs – such as their right to run for the office of Presidency (Bochsler 2012:79).[23]

Offering a somewhat variant viewpoint, McEvoy (2015) focuses less on institutions and more on the actors involved. She argues that BiH's stalemate has less to do with the institutional design and more to do with the nature of the intervention of external actors in setting up the Dayton institutions and the character and choices of BiH's leaders. The externally imposed DPA failed to accommodate the divergent political goals of Serbs and Bosniaks, as the former wants to bolster its own entity (RS) and the latter seeks further centralization of the country (ibid.:155). As a result, antagonism became electorally advantageous over accommodation. Therefore, McEvoy (ibid.) suggests: "The experience of power sharing in Bosnia highlights the limitations of institutional rules in deeply divided places. Such rules […] cannot do much to foster inter-ethnic cooperation when elites are unwilling to operate them effectively."

[23] A rare liberal opening in Bosnian consociationalism is the presidential ballots in FBiH. Bosniaks and Croats can vote for either a Bosniak or Croat member of the Presidency, as both are listed on the ballots in FBiH. In the 2006, 2010, and 2018 elections, SDP's Željko Komsić, a Croat, got elected as the Croat member of the Presidency in part due to the support of Bosniak voters who supported him as opposed to voting for one of the candidates for the Bosniak member of the Presidency (Berglund 2013:501). However, Komsić's election also prompted Croat nationalist parties and politicians to allege that he was not the legitimate President representing the Croat people (ibid.).

Moreover, BiH continues to be one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. BiH's score of 39 in Transparency International's (2016) Corruption Perception Index (0 being the most corrupt and 100 being the least) puts it ahead of only four other countries in Europe (Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova and Ukraine). The EU's progress report on BiH's membership application (2015:5) also highlights corruption as a major issue in the country, arguing that "[c]orruption continues to be widespread and the political commitment on this issue has not translated into concrete results." Divjak and Pugh (2008:375) argue that corruption in post-conflict BiH has "become endemic at all levels, from ministries to local offices, in the granting of licences, concessions and permissions, notably building permits, usually on a clientelistic and highly discriminatory basis." The prevalence of corruption in BiH is in part due to the outsized bureaucracy that came about as part of the DPA. The costs of this bureaucracy serve to strain the already scarce resources of BiH, consuming a lot of the country's wealth and making it difficult for businesses to thrive (Pugh 2002; Hirt and Ortlieb 2012). The convoluted bureaucracy also fosters a culture of bribery, as even the most minor bureaucratic tasks take a lot of time and effort, incentivizing the proverbial greasing of the wheels (Divjak and Pugh 2008; Džafić et al. 2011).

Furthermore, Belloni and Strazzari (2014:857-8) argue that the informal 'shadow' economy that flourished during the war is still prevalent and has implicitly been sanctioned by "external state builders." They argue that the external actors' focus on securing 'stability' has led them to tolerate the shadow economy which nationalists control, along with corruption and clientelism. As Divjak and Pugh (2008:375) suggest, "[e]thno-nationalist parties penetrated and controlled industries and enterprises, whether state-owned or recently privatized." Therefore, as Belloni and Strazzari (2014:858) put it, the external actors (mainly the EU, the US, and the OHR) are "paying for peace," if not explicitly "bribing the peace." However, the continued hold of ethno-nationalist parties on the economy enables the patronage networks that many ordinary Bosnians depend on. These networks simultaneously perpetuate the ethno-nationalist ideology of exclusive nationalism and narratives of victimhood. Therefore, "paying for peace" actually serves to impede reconciliation, for the sake of short-term stability.

In the face of an unproductive political environment, persistence of corruption and clientelism, and the complicated state structure that made BiH, according to Bennett (2016:247), "as dysfunctional as a country can be," I expected that my interviewees would cite politics in BiH as a hindrance to their efforts. Still, I was surprised by how central a theme politics became in every single interview and was highlighted as the main source of the problems that MHPSS programs face. I was even more surprised that no specific politician or party (except for one reference to the SDA from BZ, a Bosniak) captured the ire of the interviewees. Instead, they decried the actions of all the politicians, bureaucrats, and parties in the entire country, from the lowest-level bureaucrats to the main political parties. They spared no one, including the nationality parties of their own people and/or region. Moreover, when I was observing VO's youth camp activities at his invitation, at one point, he asked the participants to come up with a list of detractors and supporters of peacebuilding among the influential organizations and people in their region of BiH. Every single one of the nearly 30 youth camp participants, hailing from all corners of the country, listed either "politicians" or the names of the main political parties active in their region as "detractors."

In the remainder of this section, I will present the difficulties MHPSS programs faced because of politics and politicians in the country. In doing so, I will be detailing how politics disturb MHPSS work and diminish their potential to contribute to reconciliation. Through my research, I identified six main reasons why politics in BiH represents a negative force against MHPSS programs' work, all of which are represented by a sub-node under the node "Political Influence." These are a) continuation of nationalist narratives (69 quotes), b) manipulation of fear (24 quotes), c) patronage (10 quotes), d) ineptness (19 quotes), e) lack of will and interest (16 quotes), and sabotage (7 quotes).

7.2.2 Continuation of Nationalist Narratives

As explained in the previous chapter, MHPSS programs in BiH have taken it upon themselves to shift the dominant narratives, particularly those related to collective victimhood of one people, among their participants and the society. However, nationalist parties and politicians in BiH continue to gather their political strength from divisive and nationalistic narratives. In the face of high unemployment, poverty, and bureaucratic

gridlock, tapping into nationalist sentiments remains the most effective way of gathering support from the electorate. “They abuse nationalism to get power or to stay in power,” AH suggested. It is easy to observe how they do so, he said, for instance, “[w]henever elections are near, inter-ethnic relations get strained, you can notice.” As a result, ZS argued, “the war and the ideologies that started the war are still very much alive.”

Therefore, in MHPSS programs' efforts to promote alternative narratives, which were described in the previous chapter, politicians are their greatest foes, as they continue to promote nationalism and narratives of victimhood. As EZ explains, “our great enemy is this horrible politic [sic], based on nationalistic rhetoric supporting and promoting divisions among people in BiH, that is so strong that you don’t know how to deal with [it]. We are working with people, for many years, and [give] a lot of support, but if just one politician says something on the TV that is, like, the predominant narrative, that touches them, they are always then questioning their ideas.” EZ's sentiment was common among the interviewees. MV, for instance, also identified “nationality parties” as the “worst enemy” of MHPSS work. NJ argued that, due to the political climate in BiH, it was extremely difficult for MHPSS work to influence reconciliation beyond the individual level: “How much have we contributed to peace and reconciliation? At some personal levels, we have. However, nationally it is almost impossible. Because our politicians are not for forgiveness, don’t show respect to the victims. They show [a] completely wrong attitude.”

Just as the MHPSS programs' efforts to establish new relationships and shifting narratives of victimhood go hand in hand, the nationalist politicians' efforts to keep the flames of nationalism stoked are tied together with a concerted effort to block people of different groups from establishing new relationships. AR, for instance, complained that not only do politicians not work towards or even speak of mending the broken social connections in BiH, but “they separate people even more.” BA and MHA also argued that the continuity of nationalist narratives prevent people from being able to establish new bonds. BA suggested that “if not for these constant conflicts between parties and politicians, these dirty minds, new bonds could be made. The survivors could have empathy and could find ways to talk to each other.” MHA argued that it would be impossible for MHPSS programs to make a significant contribution to reconciliation on a

national level as long as "[current] political leaders want to continue by political means the aims of 1992 political leaders, because they don't allow these people to exchange relations and networks."

7.2.3 Manipulation of Fear

While Conflict Resolution research, until recently, has largely failed to incorporate the role of emotions in politics (Petersen and Zukerman 2010), the term 'politics of fear' is often cited in scholarly (and journalistic) work as one of the primary reasons why ideologies such as nationalism and populism find following (see, for instance, Yavuz 2002; Gale 2004; Neocosmos 2008; Anand 2011; Wodak 2015; Thorleifsson 2015). Such work often suggests that real or imagined fears of socio-economic hardship, terrorism, minorities, immigrants, or refugees (or 'the Others' in general) help boost movements based on exclusive identities. For instance, in explaining the roots of radical nationalist right-wing movements in Western Europe, Betz (1998) argues that "the success of the radical populist right thus reflects to a large extent the psychological strain associated with uncertainties produced by large-scale socio-economic and sociocultural changes." These movements play up such fears and promise their followers 'protection' in the form of discriminatory policies such as building border walls, displacing minorities, or detaining refugees.

In the case of protracted conflicts, politics of fear feeds exclusionary identities and also sustains the rhetoric and the mindset of conflict, hampering the goal of reconciliation. For instance, comparing the attitudes of Unionists in Northern Ireland and Jewish citizens of Israel, Newman (2014) suggests that fear of violence is a strong indicator as to whether the survey respondents would support or oppose political compromise to secure peace. Fear, he found, made people less likely to support compromise in the name of peace.

As previously detailed, fear remains prevalent in BiH. Traumatic experiences of the past can lead to people living in fear of another conflict and fearing their neighbors. The poor socio-economic situation in contemporary BiH (to be explored in the next section) also adds new dimensions to the existing fears, i.e., fear of not being able to provide for one's self or family. As ZS explains, "[f]ear is the most powerful emotion here. It dictates everything. Fear to lose your job, fear not to have enough to provide for

your family, fear of being judged by your own community, your own family, fear from everything."

The interviewees were of the opinion that in the face of a dysfunctional state structure and overwhelming socio-economic issues, political parties in BiH often resort to manipulating people's fears to gain voters and support rather than campaigning on reform, prosperity, or social change. NJ suggested that "as long as they can keep people separated, using the fear, they can do whatever they want to." MV argued: "They manipulate the memory of the past. In every [campaign] period before elections they call out, 'Don't forget!', 'Remember!', etc. This is their program." Similarly, MH suggested that "[t]hey [the politicians] are using fear and trauma of the people to keep doing what they want. It's not their program how to keep young people from leaving, how we'll create more jobs. It's just stupidly bringing the past situation into the present in the worst way."

Therefore, the interviewees suggested, the continued prevalence of fear in Bosnian society is to the benefit of the politicians, giving them an incentive to further stoke fears rather than trying to quell them. TC argued, "for them [the politicians], this situation is very good because we are peoples without any reason to create something better." AP shared a similar opinion: "We have professionals, we have so many people who want to do something and nothing is going on. I think that some politicians, some people in the government benefit from the country being stuck […]. I have no other explanation." As in the case of narratives, the goals of MHPSS programs face a reverse effort from politicians in BiH: Whereas the programs try to address fear among their participants, the politicians try to keep the fears of past traumatic experiences going.

Interdisciplinary work of Political Science and Psychology has previously demonstrated that politicians and policy-makers can benefit from engaging in 'emotion regulation,' i.e., to stragetically influence emotions in domestic or international settings to achieve their political goals (Gross 2014; Maor and Gross 2015). Maor and Gross (the former is a political scientist, the latter is a psychologist) claim that one method of 'emotion regulation' is "situation selection," which "consists of efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to modify the political or policy situation members of the public and/or policymakers encounter in order to increase or decrease the likelihood that certain

emotions will arise" (2015:8). My interviewees' argument that ethno-nationalist politicians in BiH aim to stoke animosity between the ethnic groups suggest that these politicians utilize the strategy of situation selection in order to evoke the fear of a new war, which consodilates nationalist mobilization that is the basis of their voter support. In other words, it is in the interest of the leading politicians and political parties in BiH to keep communities apart and sustain the narratives of victimization in an effort to cultivate fear among their constituents. Conversely, Čehajić-Clancy and colleauges (2016) frame MHPSS interventions as an attempt at emotion regulation as well. In this framework, MHPSS programs are interpreted as attempts at cultivating emotional responses that would contribute to reconciliation. Therefore, in BiH, MHPSS programs and ethno-nationalist politicians are engaged in a similar process of emotion regulation with adverse goals.

The continued prevalence of fear runs afoul of the reconciliation goals of dealing with the past and reweaving the social fabric. As AH argued, fear keeps Bosnians from effectively dealing with the past: "[T]he conflict is still in the minds of the people. Political establishment abuses that constantly. Today, the country is still stuck, politically and symbolically, in the past." Furthermore, ICTY's spokesperson Refik Hodžić (2007:138) suggested that an inability to deal with the past is a major reason why political manipulation is often successful, arguing: "The worst is the fact that without dealing with the past, all of it is on some sort of abstract level, the notion of guilt, the notion of responsibility and the notion of truth. It is within some sort of relativity which opens a huge space for manipulation, … be it politics, be it crime or something else that's harming every one of us, as well as society." Fear, according to BA, is also an impediment to social healing. She argued that "the constant rhetoric of hate and manipulation of victims who are treated like commodities and the freezing of people's thoughts, minds and common sense is making harder to have a process of healing of the social body."

The interviewees also suggested that trauma related ailments – such as PTSD or MD – and traumatic experiences are major reasons why politicians in BIH can continue to gather support and exert control over people. "People can see that politicians are trying to manipulate us with the same rhetoric" MH argued, "but we still fall for it because we

still haven't finished processing those experiences [of war]." BZ gave the most eloquent description of how trauma makes people more prone to being manipulated based on their fears, which is worth quoting at length:

> *"Well, socially it is a mechanism of controlling people. If you are asking yourself how it is possible for people in Bosnia not to react, to be so passive on all things that you can hear about our politicians, that they are corrupted, that they are lazy, they are only working for their own interests… I believe that one very important reason is manipulation by fear that something similar* [traumatic] *can happen to you again.* […] *So PTSD and MD are connected with that. It gives the ground for this manipulation.* […] *There was, maybe 10 years after* [the] *war, an ad for a political party, SDA, the main Bosniak party. They had this ad video, which lasted for several minutes. It looked like someone actually prepared the videos and picked scenes specifically to be used as a trigger for trauma. They used people without legs, trying to walk on the street, they used mothers who cried for their lost sons, they used pain and fear in an ad 10 or more years after the war to invite people to vote for them on, I thought it was local municipality elections. No words about water, children, playgrounds, medical services, education, which is really important if you are living in one community, no words of that. Only fear and pain and you see those faces, you know, in awful conditions, like several minutes of it.* […] *So the only reaction you can have is, 'really, those people, they will try to save me in the next exodus so I will ignore all the questions that I have about where I live and how I live in order to be like only keep living, for a while.'"*

A parallel can be drawn from BZ's description of the SDA campaign to Likud's campaign during the 2015 elections in Israel. Likud's campaign message was centered on stoking the fears of Israelis, who have experienced protracted conflict with Palestinians all their lives, over the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in the region. One Likud ad featured IS fighters asking directions to Israel to a passer-by, who replies, "to the left." The voice-over then adds that "the left" would leave Israel vulnerable to an attack from IS. Another featured Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu as a babysitter (who calls himself a "Bibi-sitter," a word play on his nickname "Bibi") who goes on to suggest that the election would be about "who will take care of our children." In the end, after a close election,

Likud managed to retain its status as the leading party in the Knesset and Netanyahu remained the Prime Minister. The parallels with the Israeli example suggest that manipulation of fear by 'emotion regulators' can, indeed, be a useful political strategy to exploit fears that arise out of protracted conflicts. Whereas MHPSS programs seek to counter fear so that their participants can once again form healthy relationships and build social networks, nationalist politicians seek to keep fear alive to mobilize their voters.

7.2.4 Patronage

As detailed earlier, ethno-nationalist parties continue to control key enterprises in BiH and corruption is widespread. Coupled with poverty and high unemployment, corruption entraps Bosnian citizens in patronage networks that the ethno-national political parties tightly control. Finding a job, especially in the state bureaucracy where most jobs in BiH are, is dependent on belonging to a party and following the official party line (Hirt and Ortlieb 2012).

As nationalist narratives still persist in the political rhetoric in BiH, becoming part of a patronage network discourages Bosnians from adopting a more conciliatory tone and approach towards former enemy groups. As GB explained, "[w]ith us, they [participants] will speak language of peace, reconciliation, but officially, publicly for these events they were using the language of hate. Because they were paid for [by] political parties or the governments. They are giving them money for their survival. And they were dependent to them." MO similarly pointed out how patronage incentives a nationalist group-think, arguing: "Young people go into different political parties and just follow their leaders. They don't have support to think differently because if you think differently, it's not going to be good for you, for your status, etc."

To maintain these patronage networks, actors embedded in them also spread nationalist propaganda, which often stokes the anger, fear, and mistrust that arose from the war and perpetuates narratives of collective victimhood. Due to the depth and the scale of patronage, such propaganda permeates almost all levels of the society, bombarding all Bosnians in one way or another. As EZ argued, "[y]ou have a lot of media influence and you have a lot of political influence. And most of these people are members of some political party. Their job, their security are deeply connected to their

loyalty to the political parties. So we also have really strong groups that promote violence and divisions, not just on [a] political level but also on [a] local level – ordinary people."

Therefore, patronage is one of the key reasons why socio-psychological infrastructure of the conflict largely remains in place, despite the efforts of local and international activists towards peacebuilding and reconciliation. Such infrastructure is maintained through a socio-economic dependency of many Bosnians on ethno-nationalist patronage networks, which primarily involves politicians but includes figures from media and religious authorities as well. While the interviewees suggested that in their MHPSS work, they often act as social workers as well – further detailed in the discussion about socio-economic issues – they do not have the resources to offer an alternative to the means powerful political actors in the country can provide through patronage.

7.2.5 Ineptness, Lack of Interest, and Sabotage

The size of and the numerous divisions within BiH's bureaucracy means that governance structures in the country are not adaptive or responsive to the needs of the society. When it comes to healthcare delivery, these problems are compounded by the country's post-socialist transition from socialized healthcare to a two-tiered system. Several interviewees criticized the public health system in BiH and deemed it ineffective in regard to mental health. They also criticized lawmakers in the country for failing to devise an effective framework for addressing the widespread trauma-related issues among Bosnian citizens. Finally, the interviewees complained that there was almost no interest or support for MHPSS work from anyone in the government.

Public health delivery in BiH still runs on socialist era infrastructure. Many Bosnians continue to rely on municipal healthcare clinics called "Dom Zdrave" (House of Health) as in the socialist period. Even though there was an effort, driven by civil society organizations, to integrate community mental health care workers into Houses of Health around the country, this project was discontinued as the funds from international donors dried up (Locke 2011:3). The interviewees suggested that mental healthcare in BiH today is inefficient and mostly relies on pharmacotherapy. BZ described her work as "trying to catch people who fell through the cracks of the system for different reasons," since "Bosnia is a very inefficient country in many senses." AR criticized the government for not doing its part on raising awareness about mental health and trauma: "[M]ore people

would seek our help if there was more public awareness-raising about mental health. It happens sometimes when there are some mental health days but that's mostly psychiatry. And psychiatry today, they're only giving medicines." GB and RK also expressed their disappointment that mental healthcare in BiH often amounted to merely prescribing pills. This is often useless, MO argued, because the patients are in dire need of social and economic support. Therefore, she suggested: "We need a different approach, a contextual approach, like a center for social work, or different levels of state."

In regard to the legal framework in which the mental healthcare system operates in BiH, two particular legal issues drew the ire of the interviewees with psychology and psychotherapy background. One was the 1999 law that recognized PTSD as a war injury but decreed that only those who received their diagnosis before December 1997 would be eligible for benefits. The time limit was established to prevent an abuse of the disability system, yet it also failed those who showed symptoms later on or those who needed time and encouragement to be able to acknowledge their own trauma. "This law infuriates me," NJ said, "because it means that someone in the government has established this stupid provision and it shows that this person does not know anything about trauma or PTSD. No one can know when one will show symptoms of PTSD."

The other legal issue that frustrated psychotherapists in BiH was that they did not have licensing laws that allowed them to obtain a license to practice psychotherapy in BiH. Those who practice psychotherapy do so with licenses obtained from one of the neighboring countries or Malta. RK explained the difficulty psychotherapists face in BiH due to the fact that the Bosnian state does not issue psychotherapy licenses: "No license means I don't have no one behind me, no law to support me, no board or organization, no ethical guide."

Finally, interviewees also expressed frustration that the state had little interest in undertaking MHPSS work or supporting the organizations that do so. "When it comes to psychosocial health and mental health, our authorities are really deaf," MV said with an angry tone. She continued: "There are so many people in this country who need trauma support but most of that burden falls to NGOs." MH claimed that efforts to seek the support of state authorities are often fruitless. One of her projects, which involved veterans from all sides talking about their experiences to high-school children, was not

even allowed into the schools under the control of the RS Ministry of Education, which led to the project being undertaken only in FBiH and Brčko District. VO argued: "We are working on something governments should be working on and doing it with a budget of 20,000 dollars and in that 20,000, there is not one cent from the Federal or Entity Government."

In rare cases, interviewees suggested that elected public officials actively sought to prevent their work. One of RK's organization's projects, in which former soldiers were to speak to high-school students about their experience with war and trauma, was not allowed to take place in RS schools due to objections of the entity's Ministry of Education. In NJ's case, local officials in her canton took measures to make her work impossible. As she describes the situation:

> *"In this canton* [Zenica-Doboj], *we have the 'two-schools one roof'*[24] *system in some schools. For years, we used to work in a nearby village that had one such school. After couple of years of working there with teachers, staff, and kids, they have achieved progress, kids were making friendships, teachers started to help each other. Soon after, these schools were physically separated. Because that is certainly not a good thing for our politicians."*

While refraining from giving specific examples, AP echoed NJ's sentiment and argued that politicians constantly engage in "intentional re-traumatization," rendering MHPSS work "against the current."

7.2.6 What If It Was All Different?

As the responses about how politics, politicians, and bureaucracy hamper MHPSS work in BiH began to pile on, an interesting pattern began to emerge: all of the interviewees were confident that they created change and contributed to reconciliation at an individual or small community level. Yet when the conversation shifted to talking about Bosnian society in general, a sense of hopelessness emerged, mainly due to the political – and to some extent socio-economic – situation in the country. In later

[24] The "two schools one roof" schools are ones in which students from different ethnicities attend school in the same building, but are taught different curricula by a different set of teachers and even enter the building from separate doors. Despite a Supreme Court of BiH decision in 2014 that deemed them unconstitutional, it is estimated that 50 such schools continued to operate (Toe 2016), mostly in FBiH with Bosniak and Croat students.

interviews, I began to point out this disparity to the interviewees. I also asked them whether they believed that if the political environment was different and was closer to an 'ideal' they might imagine, their work would resonate beyond the individuals they are helping. GB's response encompassed the main themes that emerged from this line of inquiry through the interviews, and therefore needs to be quoted at length:

> *"I'm also blaming ourselves. We didn't fight sufficiently with politicians, with the parties. Usually, we are focusing on this individual level. It's much easier for us to work with traumatized women in Srebrenica than with politicians. Of course, if the political system was more favorable for this kind of work it would be much easier for us. But again, I'm blaming us: if you don't work with politicians much more, pushing them much more to accept these issues, to push them to put it among their priorities, lobby the international community to push them... It was our fault, to push to EU, to tell them 'if you want to join the EU you must fulfill this and this criteria.'* [...] *It was our fault that we didn't push it and we should be doing this. The effect of our programs would go much beyond the individual level. But the goal of our politicians is to keep the fear going."*

For MH, a more favorable political environment would be one in which MHPSS programs can help people deal with the past: "Where there's political will, you can put all the effort, all the institutions into helping people overcome what has happened and to go on […;] if the politicians helped us, if they conveyed the message as to the importance of reconciliation, I believe that we could contribute to reconciliation." As she continued, she summed up the collective sentiment of the interviewees, saying, "I am optimistic that it could happen. I am not so optimistic that it would happen."

Despite their frustration over the divisiveness and corruption of the political system in BiH, interviewees with inclinations towards political activism continued to see openings. When the youth participants of VO's camp listed "politicians" as main detractors of peacebuilding in BiH, he told them – quoting with his permission – "nevertheless, we need to keep engaging them, keep lobbying them, try and turn them into our allies." He echoed this sentiment in our interview as well, arguing that "reconciliation on a national level definitely needs to be not necessarily always initiated

but supported by the government, and for now we don't have any support or any kind of reconciliation on a national level. What I am hoping through our work we will be able to create [is] a critical mass and we will start requesting that from the government." VO still does not get any funding from federal, entity, or canton governments in BiH, but he did manage to secure a small amount of support from the municipal government in his area. "Ten years ago, they wouldn't even respond to our letters" he said, with a smile. He figured it was a good start.

The question of whether the MHPSS programs would have a larger resonance and greater contributions to reconciliation in a different political environment ties the inquiry of this research project to the institutional focus of Comparative Politics scholarship in post-conflict settings. Is the design of DPA institutions to blame for MHPSS programs' modest success in terms of contributing to social reconciliation, despite their successes at the individual level? Would a different approach to institution building in BiH, one that did not explicitly institutionalize ethnic divisions as much as corporatist consociationalism, have enabled MHPSS programs to amplify their work on the social and national levels?

In regard to Bosnian political institutions, I am persuaded by McEvoy's (2015:155) assessment that the elite-level antagonism is the main reason for lack of inter-ethnic cooperation as opposed to the post-Dayton institutional design, is partially correct. As she suggests, institutional rules cannot foster cooperation when elite actors are unwilling to operate them and remain antagonistic. Under such conditions Bosnian politics remain "stuck" (Milijevic 2012), "immobile" (Bieber and Keil 2009; Zahar 2005), and "dysfunctional" (Bennett 2016). However, the institutional rules have been a major contributing factor in the continuation of the elite-level antagonism in post-war BiH. As the institutional power-sharing arrangement of DPA allowed them to follow their ethno-nationalist agendas at regional levels of government, BiH's ethno-national leaders had little interest or incentive to engage in cooperation at the federal level. Furthermore, since the external peacebuilders chose to "pay for peace," the ethno-nationalist elite continued its control over both the official and the shadow economy (Belloni and Strazzari 2014). Through such political and economic sway, ethno-nationalist leaders had the opportunity and incentive to continue with their rhetoric from

the 1990s. As a result, they can continue to hold on to power and get elected despite low approval ratings (Bennett 2016:xviii). As Bennett (ibid.:269) summarizes, "the injection of vast resources as if Bosnia had experienced a natural disaster, combined with failure to reform the political system, had the effect of reinforcing the power bases of the ethno-national parties, enabling them to develop and finance patronage networks, thereby aggravating the underlying illness."

Hence, contrary to McEvoy's (2015:155) argument, elite level antagonism is not a result of it being electorally advantageous. Rather, it is the flawed institutional design in BiH that helps support the antagonism at that level, which is in turn sustained through patronage networks, despite the unpopularity of the country's politicians. To put it another way, antagonistic leaders possess electoral advantages in BiH, not as a function of their antagonism but due to the control they exert on BiH's institutions and economy. While the proponents of consociationalism suggest that the case of BiH constitutes a corporatist arrangement inferior to liberal consociationalism (McGarry and O'Leary 2009:72), the implementation of the latter is dependent on the context, as McCulloch (2014) finds. Through examining individual level work of MHPSS programs, the previous chapter has shown that such antagonism is not an immobile feature of the Bosnian society and does not necessarily reflect the way in which citizens make meaning in their lives. The work of MHPSS programs shows that a paradigm shift, i.e., moving away from the ethno-nationalist framework, has been possible at the individual level. However, as the external peacebuilders sought short-term stability in BiH, they helped etch the ethno-nationalist paradigm of Bosnian politics into DPA's consociational institutions, rendering a paradigm-shift at the elite-level near impossible.

7.3 Socio-economic Conditions

The difficult socio-economic conditions in BiH permeate every aspect of life. According to the latest available statistics from the World Bank, in 2020, the unemployment rate in BiH stood at 15.9%. The youth unemployment rate in 2020 was at 34%, one of the highest in Europe. GDP per capita in 2017 was 6031 US Dollars, sixth lowest in Europe – only above Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, North Macedonia and Albania. In one survey, researchers from the University of Sarajevo found that 49.2% of the youth population in BiH wanted to leave the country and that of those who want to

leave, 82.4% cited socio-economic factors (higher living standards and better chances of employment) as their primary reason for wanting to emigrate (Žiga et al. 2015:69).

When it comes to socio-economic matters, BiH is best analyzed as a post-socialist as well as a post-conflict country. The destructiveness of the Bosnian War was certainly a huge blow to BiH's economy. While BiH was the industrial heartland of SFR Yugoslavia, many of its factories were damaged, destroyed, or shut down during the war (Bisogno and Chong 2002). After the nightmare of the war, BiH woke up to the reality of a post Cold War world, in which its former economic structures were no longer viable. As a result, post-conflict transformation in BiH coincided with post-socialist transformation. Manufacturing, once BiH's economic backbone, never recovered after the war, many public assets were privatized, and social welfare programs dismantled (Donais 2005). Political difficulties such as corruption and clogged bureaucracy further hamper BiH's economic recovery (Hirt and Ortlieb 2012). For many Bosnians, their pre-war skills did not translate into the new economy and the once strong safety net of the socialist past was no more (Donais 2003).

In the face of such difficulties, the socio-economic situation in BiH was a prevalent topic during my field research. Figuring that everyday stressors due to socio-economic issues could compound war related traumas, I specifically put among the prepared set of questions one that explores such possible relationships. From the research, three main storylines emerged as to how the abject poverty in the country relates to trauma healing and reconciliation initiatives. First, several interviewees cited the poor socio-economic conditions in BiH as an impediment to their goals. They pointed out that the stress of feeding themselves and their families prevents people from adequately dealing with their trauma, as survival is a more immediate need. Loss of a job or otherwise struggling to make ends meet has been cited as a trigger for trauma. Others, however, highlighted occasions in which the struggle to survive in such a tough environment has helped spark new connections and opportunities. Finally, those who integrated a vocational training component into their programs spoke of significant improvements in terms of healing, willingness to participate in – or even lead – peacebuilding initiatives, self-confidence, and personal empowerment among their participants.

7.3.1 Poverty as Additional Trauma

Most of the interviewees expressed that the socio-economic conditions in BiH present additional hardship for people affected by trauma. ZS and MHA, for instance, both argued that the additional daily stressors such as job security or providing for family prevent people from healing, may actually make their trauma symptoms worse as a result. According to MHA, "[p]eople with low social standards became very disappointed, and this increased reasons for PTSD and continued changes of character that become permanent." ZS suggested that "[y]ou cannot heal, you cannot feel better, you cannot do anything properly if you are constantly fighting to provide for your family and you are insecure, you don't know if you are going to have a job or not." The precariousness of poverty, coupled with the damage to one's sense of self over not being able to help one's family can further compound the fear and anger that can arise out of traumatic experiences of war. Furthermore, RK argued that socio-economic difficulties might serve as a trigger that sparks repressed traumas: "In my own experience in therapy, I saw that after people lose their jobs, or after stuff like divorce, these are triggers for them to develop and show symptoms. Then, everything they have repressed comes out." EZ argued that when her participants speak of their trauma, they "always connect their story with the very difficult society and the very difficult situation – economically, politically – they discuss that." While it was the majority opinion that war related trauma and daily stressors due to socio-economic conditions went hand-in-hand, AP disagreed. She argued: "I think the socio-economic situation and lack of jobs are very often used as excuses not to move on. People need to govern their own lives and not defer responsibility."

While none of them overtly said so, some interviewees implied that poor socio-economic conditions impeded their ability to address trauma through MHPSS programs. BH, for instance, argued that "people have these everyday high stresses of unemployment, of hopelessness, because they don't have an education, they don't see a future, the politics and the oppression, all of these are factors that has impacted them. And now we are asking them questions about their 'trauma.'" MO and RK both argued that their expertise as psychotherapists often fell short of helping people who faced day-

to-day struggles in addition to the lingering trauma of the war. MO gave the example of a particular past participant to drive her point:

> *"We have a soup kitchen here, there is this man who comes regularly. He also wanted to come to psychotherapy. When he did come and I heard his story, I realized that I couldn't work with him on psychotherapy. Because he doesn't have a place to live or an income, he is in conflict with his wife and daughter, he has PTSD that has led to permanent personality disorder. So when you see a man who can't deal with his primary needs, you can't deal with his traumatic experiences. Because he doesn't have any sort of social support."*

Furthermore, MH suggested that in the face of a struggle for survival, people might not even want to acknowledge and deal with their traumas and related psychological symptoms: "It's difficult to deal with trauma related issues when you have other issues you need to deal with like feeding your family, providing basic needs for them. It's difficult to think about 'I'm feeling anxiety' or 'I'm feeling depressed.' That is not so important when you have to provide basic food to your family, your children." EZ made a similar claim about the participants who come to listen to the public speaking events she organizes: "The participants have to be motivated to listen to these stories. Because [if] they consider it unimportant, [thinking] 'I'm unemployed, I don't have money, I haven't finished my school because my parents are not working,' it's very difficult for you to approach to [sic] those people." Report 1 put forward a similar argument: "[Participants] are in a difficult socio-economic situation so finding the material support and the safety is a priority for them while the work on themselves and their traumatic experiences is not so important." All of the interviewees came to the conclusion that psychotherapy or psychological support was not enough to help their participants, that a more holistic approach was needed. As BA put it, "if somebody is hungry and cannot support their livelihood, we can call Freud but he wouldn't be able to help." As a result, most of the interviewees strive to build such holistic approaches, often venturing beyond their fields of expertise to be able to do so. RK suggested, with a chuckle, that she is "almost like a social worker." Others incorporated vocational

training, education initiatives, and occupational therapy into their programs, as further explored below.

7.3.2 Poverty as a Unifier

Despite the issues that difficult socio-economic conditions present for trauma healing, several interviewees also pointed out that poverty, at times, forces communities to cooperate with one another to expand economic activity, creating opportunities for reconciliation. BA and AH, for instance, argued that the various communities they visit and work with all over the country are united in their concern for the future of their children: their well-being, their ability to secure a job and provide for themselves. When faced with "poverty, instability, and no vision for a better future," even nationalists "want to do something good for their society," AH argued. JT and ZS particularly stressed the opportunities in rural communities placed at entity borders or other ethnically mixed communities – particularly in FBiH. JT argued that her organization's agricultural development project in such region constituted "a major contribution to peacebuilding, because they have to cooperate, if they want to build something better for their families."

Moreover, poverty can become, interviewees argued, a shared experience through which people of former enemy groups can connect. As RK put it, "I think, this might be awful to say, people who are in awful situations right now, without jobs, resources, they are more open to experience[ing] connections from someone from the other side, those who are in similar situation. They deal with the same issues and that connects them. And there are no barriers when you don't have much." AR also argued that the economy served as a connecting factor among the ethnic groups of BiH. She further suggested that connections on the basis of work and employment flourished more commonly among women: "There, it seems the women are a little bit cleverer than men. Because men stay in this war imposed separation, but the women, they have to take care of themselves, of their children, of their men, so these two associations I have worked with [women's associations in Bratunac and Srebrenica] are very active in stipulating women to do handicraft, to have agricultural programs, all kinds of occupational programs, and they are really successful."

Aware of the challenges that poverty presents and the opportunities that arise from attempts to alleviate poverty, most MHPSS programs that the interviewees were

involved in included a socio-economic aspect. These included helping participants claim welfare benefits, soup kitchens, and other food programs, educational programs for teenagers and adults, occupational therapy, and vocational training. When this socio-economic dimension was included, MHPSS programs created new opportunities both for trauma healing and reconciliation. For instance, BA suggested that when her organization adopted occupational therapy as its central method, moving on from the Gestalt therapy approach, she observed that her participants had significant improvements in the yearly PTSD surveys her organization conducts. JT suggested that similar vocational interests sometimes serve as a catalyzer for new relationships across ethnic lines. ZS further argued that socio-economic improvements could blossom into peacebuilding initiatives. Speaking of her participants, Bosniak returnee women from an entity border area, she said:

> *"[M]ost of these returnee women are half literate or almost illiterate, which means that they have had primary school or even 4 years of primary school. So they were not desirable candidates in the market, they couldn't find a job. We were helping them to be socially included, to get jobs, to get education, vocational training, or other kinds of support, simply to help them to become integrated into the society. When we help them to get an education, to even start their businesses and their farms, their own initiatives was to start peacebuilding processes with their pre-war neighbors on the other side of the border."*

Furthermore, BZ argued that when the participants could get an education, find a job, and therefore improve their socio-economic conditions, they make immense gains in self-confidence, which is then reflected in their healing, both physically and psychologically. She recounted a former participant, a Bosniak woman in her early 20s, who migrated (possibly forced) from Srebrenica to Sarajevo. The young woman was traumatized, destitute, and illiterate when she first sought assistance from BZ's organization. The organization prioritized getting her an education and helping her find a job. As she managed to achieve those goals, her overall health markedly improved, according to BZ: "Her hair got brighter, thicker. Her skin looked better, her eyes got a

spark. She looked so different that they kicked her out the bus one day because the driver thought the picture on her student bus pass was someone else [laughs]!"

7.3.3 Socio-economic Conditions and MHPSS Goals

As such, the socio-economic conditions in BiH remain as a central problem in regards to both trauma healing and reconciliation. Focused on survival, many MHPSS participants did not have the motivation to either try to transform their trauma or to participate in reconciliation initiatives. Inability to sustain one's family adds to the anger and fear that can arise out of the traumatic experiences of war. As discussed in the previous section, lack of economic opportunities forces people into the patronage networks of nationalist parties, obliging them to fall in line with the nationalist narratives. As such, socio-economic conditions in BiH hamper the ability of MHPSS programs to counter negative emotions borne out of trauma and to shift narratives of victimhood. Without achieving these goals, MHPSS programs cannot contribute to social de-mobilization and reconciliation, as the ethos of conflict would remain in place. Yet, as argued above, the common desire to move out of poverty and build a better future for the coming generations can also help propel a unifying narrative that brings former enemies together.

Based on the interviews, people who organize and administer MHPSS programs in BiH remain acutely aware of the issues that socio-economic conditions present for their goals and try to find ways to alleviate the damaging impacts of poverty and unemployment, often having to go beyond their fields of expertise. This finding corroborates that of Locke's ethnographic work (2008:8), which displays how a Sarajevo-based NGO's MHPSS initiatives evolved in a way that had to "address trauma in the context of the socio-economic hardships and under-recognized political values of those it serves." As BA argued, "[e]verybody, no matter [their] nationality, agrees that if we had [a] new economy and a better economy, this could be a way to move on, surpass these obstacles, and build new relations." However, MHPSS programs' efforts alone cannot create such transformation.

7.3.4 "Psychosocial Gap"

Interviewees also spoke of a so-called 'psychosocial gap,' the period from 2000 to 2011 when the interest of international donors about MHPSS projects waned. In the years immediately following the war, according to Powell (2000:20), "it seemed that everything anyone ever did had to be accompanied by a psychosocial program." From 2000 onwards, however, the interest of the international donors first shifted and then waned (Locke 2013). It was only in 2011, with a 4.8 million USD grant from USAID and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) funding the new PRO-Future (Truth-Understanding-Responsibility for the Future of BIH) initiative, that MHPSS programs, psychosocial ones in particular, came back to fore. PRO-Future identifies its goal as "to restore trust and healthy relationships among the people of [BiH's] multiple ethnic and religious groups." The project incorporated several leading NGOs in BiH such as Caritas, Mozaik Foundation, and the Interreligious Dialogue Council of BiH. PRO-Future funding also supports several smaller scale local NGOs in their relevant initiatives. They have also organized public speaking events where survivors of internment camps and veterans from various communities talk about their trauma and survival to audiences across the country and public forums that bring together communities "that had been close prior to the war, but have since been divided by entity, ethnicity or other areas of conflict and disagreement" (PRO-Future 2017) to openly discuss their problems, stories, and aspirations for the future. The project claims to have reached 42,200 Bosnians in 2014 and 2015, breathing new life into the MHPSS work in BiH after a decade-long hiatus.

EZ was the first interviewee who brought up the psychosocial gap. She argued that the discontinuation of such programs after the crisis intervention period was a major mistake on the part of the state and the international donors in BiH:

> *"I think the initial psychosocial work here was a crisis intervention, and then we had 15 years of nothing, no psychosocial support. No donors, no state agency considered it important, just reconstruction, economic development, etc. And then, maybe 18 years after the conflict, boom [snaps fingers] just, now we will do psychosocial support. So that's also a problem because people were helped with these interventions and then they were left to deal with, whatever, and now again we are talking about reconciliation. It is*

> *understandable that you can talk about reconciliation many years after the conflict, but for the people it is like, 'we talked about that 18 years ago why are you bringing up that topic again?' So I think that was a mistake for international and local donors or whoever, to make that big pause."*

MV also shared EZ's assessment and sentiment about the psychosocial gap. Upon reading the letter of information I provided her for the interview, she expressed her delight that a foreign researcher took an interest into MHPSS work in BiH again. She argued: "During and right after the war, we had very good mental healthcare and psychotherapy. In one moment, people from abroad figured, 'Now it's enough.' But it wasn't enough! It wasn't even halfway of what was needed." MV further suggested that maintaining such efforts would have contributed to the stability and peace in BIH. Researchers from USAID (2014:231) confirm MV's observation: "Psycho-trauma counseling has been a feature of programming in BiH since 1996, but for the most part such programming was curtailed a few years after the conflict even though as the level of unresolved psycho-trauma within BiH still appears to be still considerable."

When asked why this gap took place, neither EZ nor MV were able to give a clear answer. Both of them figured that international donors simply lost interest in the subject before enough work had been done to become sustainable.

BH took a different view on the subject about the timing of MHPSS efforts, highlighting that sometimes people are simply not ready to talk about their trauma and traumatizing experiences right after the war:

> *"Some people who worked in this kind of projects before and after this gap, 10-12 years later, told me that there were more people ready and willing to speak to these issues.* [...] *You have to pay attention to the readiness of people. And of course a lot of that was going on when people were still in the survival mode. There was no way they were going to reflect on what happened they were just trying to put food on the table. Of course some of that is still going on."*

International organizations (both IGOs and NGOs) that strive to offer emergency assistance after conflict or disasters have long been challenged in the scholarly literature over having short attention spans that lead them to pay insufficient attention to long-term

sustainability and local ownership of their projects (see, for instance, Godfrey et al. 2002; Pfeiffer 2003; Reich 2006; McGregor 2007; Devereux 2008; Zanotti 2010). The discussion about the so-called ‘psychosocial gap’ in BiH is indicative of such issues. According to Locke (2013), foreign donors who pushed for the implementation of MHPSS programs did not encourage local ownership and did not leave behind a sustainable mental health infrastructure. Similarly, Tol and colleagues (2011:1583) find that of the funding that MHPSS programs worldwide received from 2007 to 2009, “less than 15% […] was disbursed through existing medical, social welfare, or primary education systems – thus raising concerns about the sustainability of funding through shorter-term emergency mechanisms.” As exemplified above, the interviewees expressed their disappointment over the sporadic support they have received, arguing they could have reached a lot more people if sustained support from international agencies or local governments were in place. With the perspective BH added that, at times, people are simply not ready to talk about their traumas immediately after the war, it becomes evident that timing and duration of using widespread MHPSS initiatives as a post-conflict initiative should be carefully considered, both by local and external agents. Further research about MHPSS programs in post-conflict settings should engage the concerns related to timing and long-term sustainability of these programs.

7.4 Conclusions

In its attempt to analyze the relationship between traumas of war and post-conflict reconciliation, Chapter 5 raised the question as to why the “socio-psychological infrastructure” of the war era remained in place in BiH, more than two decades after the war. This chapter provides an answer: in their attempts to hold on to political power, nationalist leaders in BiH seek to maintain the social mobilization of their people, continuing narratives of victimization and stoking anger, fear, and mistrust. Poor socio-economic conditions impede Bosnians’ ability to find alternative paths, bring about new traumas and feed nationalist patronage networks. Due to sporadic foreign support and the local government’s inability, unwillingness, and – at times – outright hostility, MHPSS programs often lack the resources and the breadth of expertise to effectively help their participants. As the fears, rhetoric, and networks of war remain largely in place, so does

the socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict. MHPSS programs in BiH simply lack the resources to counter these trends.

The current research project suggests that, at a micro level, progress has been possible. MHPSS programs hold the potential to transform participants whose trauma may have rendered them more inclined to not participate in reconciliation initiatives and hold on to a desire for revenge. They can help foster new relationships and dispel the myths of narratives of victimhood. The interviewees spoke optimistically about their ability to influence individual participants and help promote reconciliation at a micro, interpersonal level. The transformations of some of their individual participants suggest that there still exists a potential for MHPSS programs to be significant contributors to the reconciliation process. However, while they were optimistic about the potential that MHPSS programs hold, the interviewees also felt that political and socio-economic structures were constantly working against them. These structural factors, they argued, were the main reasons why their work did not resonate significantly beyond the interpersonal level. Therefore, this chapter raises a question about whether it is possible to build more favorable structures under which MHPSS work can potentially have more significant contributions to reconciliation at a social level. As such, it adds new insights to the debate on rebuilding of political institutions following a civil war, the implications of which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

8 CONCLUSIONS

In this concluding chapter, I will go back to my research questions that were stated in the Introduction and try to answer them based on the findings of my research. I will then make policy recommendations that focus on implementation of MHPSS interventions, dismantling the socio-psychological infrastructure of the war and achieving progress towards reconciliation following intrastate wars. I will then discuss the contributions of this study to the relevant scholarly literature. I will end with discussing the limitations of this study and suggestions for further research.

8.1 Suggestions of Findings vis-à-vis Research Questions

Through this study, it is evident that traumatic experiences of war and MHPSS efforts to transform these traumas are intricately bound with institutional efforts towards peacebuilding. It shows, for instance, how the post-conflict institutional design in BiH came to enable nationalist leaders to manipulate people's fears to sow continued division – which, in turn, solidifies their power. Furthermore, the study suggests that traumatic experiences of war render survivors more vulnerable to such manipulation. It also shows that negative emotions and destructive attitudes which members of rival groups hold for one another can, indeed, be transformed, thus creating a basis for the transformation of previously ominous relationships. In short, this study presents evidence that MHPSS work following intrastate wars is political work as much as it is psychological work. MHPSS goals of transforming trauma, dealing with negative emotions, challenging narratives of collective victimhood, and fostering new relationships all have social and political implications that the peacebuilding literature should be paying attention to. Therefore, peacebuilding research would be better served by analyzing MHPSS efforts. Interdisciplinary corroboration with Peace Psychology would be an ideal way of achieving this goal.

Findings of this study suggest that there is a connection between mental and psychosocial well-being of members of a society and post-conflict reconciliation. Traumatic experiences of war still manifest among Bosnians in the form of negative emotions such as anger, fear, and mistrust – as well as continued belief in narratives of collective victimhood. While the war ended more than two decades ago and revenge attacks have since been rare, anger still manifests in Bosnian society in the form of a

continued desire for revenge, family violence, and violence towards the self. Many Bosnians still live in fear of another war, the continuation of the 50-year cycle that began in the early twentieth century. Fear precludes new connections between Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities. As AR put it, neighbours who are afraid of one another will not sit down for a Bosnian coffee together. Mistrust presents itself in reluctance towards making new connections across the ethnic divide(s), and persistence of negative stereotypes. The resulting lack of social capital means that a robust civil society has not developed in BiH, leaving its citizens, as TC suggested, "peoples without any reason to create something better."

Such emotions and attitudes sustain the pillars of pre-war social mobilization. Anger, fear, and mistrust towards members of rival groups prevent inter-group dialogue and relationships from emerging, leaving loyalty to the in-group as the only salient option. As a result, exclusive identities that emerged in the lead up to the war are sustained. The continuation of narratives of collective victimhood serve to minimize the responsibility of one's own group for past atrocities and paint the rival group(s) as aggressors. Under such conditions, even in the absence of war, the socio-psychological infrastructure of the war remains in place, threatening the continuation of stable peace.

This research supports the findings of research on transgenerational transfer of trauma and finds that it is presenting problems for Bosnian youth born after the war. The traumas that their parents have not been able to deal with are transferred to the new generations in family settings. Furthermore, as the socio-psychological infrastructure of the war remains in place, up and coming generations are socialized, in their families, schools, and other social interactions, into holding negative opinions of the members of rival groups (even when they have not even met a single person from a different nationality) and believing that their nation is under constant threat.

Highlighting the connection between war related trauma and reconciliation, this case study offers an answer for the question, "What are the effects of war related mental and psychosocial distress on reconciliation following intrastate wars?" When not acknowledged and/or transformed, traumatic experiences of war can result in desire for revenge, fear of renewed aggression from the rival group, and mistrust that results in a lack of social capital, increasing the risk of a return to violence. Under such conditions,

narratives of collective victimhood, a key pillar of pre-war social mobilization, continue to thrive, preventing survivors from hearing stories from the other side or challenging the one-sided conventional wisdom of their side about the conflict. Exclusive identity, the other pillar of pre-war social mobilization, is also bolstered as negative emotions directed towards the rival group enhance in-group loyalty. Furthermore, as BZ attested to, trauma also leaves survivors more vulnerable to the manipulations of nationalist parties and politicians who have a vested interest in maintaining the socio-psychological infrastructure of war. Altogether, traumas of war posit a number of significant challenges for the process of reconciliation.

In pursuing its main research question – "How does the work of MHPSS programs implemented following intrastate wars contribute to the social dimension of reconciliation?" – this study sought to understand how the work of MHPSS programs in post-war BiH countered the negative emotions and narratives of collective victimhood described above. As discussed in Chapter 5, when war trauma goes unacknowledged, it can feed what Botchorova (2001) terms "a cycle of aggression," which consists of anger, desire for revenge, a narrative of victimhood, and, finally, renewed aggression. In their efforts to help participants acknowledge and transform their traumas, MHPSS programs help individuals to break out of this cycle. Furthermore, being able to transform their traumatic experiences also help participants to alter their negative emotions and attitudes, enabling them to engage in the reconciliation processes of 'reweaving the social fabric' and 'dealing with the past.' Finally, when individual participants are able to transform their trauma, their social relationships are also transformed, since the participants have, as BA argued, "greater understanding and enough will to contact."

MHPSS programs in BiH also make a significant effort to foster relationships across the ethnic divide and help Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs hear each other's stories and memories of war. Through these efforts, they help challenge dominant narratives of collective victimization that each side holds on to. Participants of MHPSS programs get to learn that there are stories from the war that they did not know about and there were aggressors and victims on each side. Therefore, MHPSS programs' work on fostering new relationships that assists in 'deal with the past' by enabling participants to 'freely discuss the past conflict' and acknowledge the past crimes of their own group. MHPSS

efforts to foster new relationships also serve the reconciliation goal of 'reweaving the social fabric' as communities meet each other – for the first time in the case of some youth –build new relationships, and at times, even partner up to achieve a common cause. These relationships also help the members of different groups to re-humanize one another.

The work of MHPSS programs in BiH also served to supplement the official – i.e., led by the state or external interveners – actions to remedy war-related problems such as the question of refugee return, support for survivors with PTSD, or increased juvenile crime. As discussed in the earlier chapters, official solutions to such issues often consist of non-contextual and bureaucratic schemes such as returning titles of refugees, providing money and pharmaceuticals for those who suffer from PTSD, and building detention centers for juveniles. Such solutions do not account for the need for survivors to re-build social relations, particularly those involving care. Therefore, they fall short of their intended goals. In the case of refugee return, for instance, many refugees either sold their titles and never returned (Mlinarević, Isaković-Porobić and Rees 2015:36) or suffered from "ghettoization" (Porobić 2017). As discussed in Chapter 6, it has been the building of micro-social networks, as opposed to formal assistance and programs, that facilitated sustainable return in BiH (ibid.:192). MHPSS programs, particularly those that are run for and/or by women and women's organizations, have sought to fill this gap. They strive to provide MHPSS assistance, help participants to rebuild their social relationships, and equip them with life skills through helping them get an education and/or vocational training. As a result, their participants developed empathy, built new relationships and networks, managed to go back to school, find employment and, as AP put it, "were instructed on how to survive."

However, the efforts of ethno-nationalist parties and politicians, whose goals are diametrically opposed to those of MHPSS programs, counter such MHPSS work. Ethno-nationalist leaders have a vested interest in promoting in-group loyalty to draw continued support. They aim to portray themselves as the sole defenders of their group, which is – supposedly – surrounded by eternal enemies who will destroy them given the chance. Hence, they have an interest in maintaining anger, fear, and mistrust between the rival groups as well as the continuation of narratives of collective victimhood. Accordingly,

they seek to separate communities, ethnically segregate schools, promote nationalist propaganda, and sustain and manipulate fear in their community. The dire socio-economic conditions of the country, particularly the high rates of unemployment, mean that many ordinary Bosnians depend on patronage networks that ethno-nationalists control, which further aids ethno-nationalists in achieving their goals. Lacking in resources, consistent support from external actors and a systematic approach, MHPSS programs often fail to counteract the ethno-nationalist elites.

Referring to the ability of MHPSS programs in BiH to contribute to reconciliation, MH perhaps summed up the answer to this project's main research question, stating, "I am optimistic that it could happen. I am not so optimistic that it would happen." MHPSS programs do hold the potential to contribute to reconciliation by helping participants deal with their trauma, fostering new relationships, helping to (re)build social networks, and challenging predominant narratives that spur rivalries. It *could* happen. The fact that it did not happen on a large scale in BiH, I argue, is due to structural problems that were discussed in Chapter 7, namely, the continued sway of nationalist politicians and parties, the difficult socio-economic situation and the inconsistent nature of outside support. Given such structural challenges, I share MH's pessimism as to whether it *would* happen – meaning MHPSS work is making a significant contribution to reconciliation – in BiH.

8.2 Contributions to Scholarly Literature

Following the footsteps of Feminist IR and peace scholars such as Cynthia Cockburn and Christine Sylvester, this study contributes a micro level perspective to the processes of transitional justice and reconciliation. Focusing on MHPSS programs and how their work is intertwined with reconciliation, this study shows that experiences, emotions, and relationships of individuals matter in this process. Therefore, to get a fuller picture of the reconciliation process, including both its top-down and bottom-up elements, the scholarship on peacebuilding would need to better study and understand the micro level. Owing to a long-standing institutional focus, there is still a dearth of research into the levels of individual, interpersonal and local community in terms of peacebuilding and reconciliation, despite the recent efforts to move away from the institutional focus. Incorporating insights from psychology and analyzing MHPSS work on the ground, this

research attempted to tackle this understudied line of scholarship. In doing so, this study also takes up Sylvester's (2013:5) challenges to study war "up from the people," complementing the top-down approaches that dominate the relevant literature in the discipline of Political Science. As a result, this study has also been able to highlight the role of gender in the reconciliation process and women's unique contributions and resiliency in a way that mainstream conflict resolution litearutre misses.

This project also contributes to a new approach to the study of MHPSS programs. At their outset, scholars and practitioners who sought to evaluate and identify the impact of MHPSS work focused on their individual participants. Such evaluations often took the form of interviews with individual participants and/or comparison of intake and exit surveys and/or psychological symptoms (see, *inter alia*, Mooren et al. 2003; Stepakoff et al. 2004; Wessels and Monterio 2006; Anckermann et al. 2006). In part due to time and budget constraints associated with NGO work, there has been little work on whether and how MHPSS work reverberates beyond the individual and into interpersonal relationships, family settings, and wider society. Such focus has recently arisen in relevant literature (see Hart and Colo 2014; Hamber and Gallagher 2015). The current research project, in questioning whether MHPSS programs contribute to reconciliation, continues this emerging line of research. In doing so, it also helps in extending the empirical base of evidence about the MHPSS work in post-conflict settings, as Tol and colleagues (2011b) have called for.

Through the discussion of MHPSS programs' attempts to get people from different groups in BiH to meet, talk to each other, and foster relationships, this study engaged with and contributed to the literature on cross-community initiatives in conflict settings. It adds to the research that suggests these initiatives hold the potential to establish a level of social trust, build new relationships, and help survivors learn about the suffering on the other side. It highlights the cross-community work that MHPSS programs undertake in addition to their core mission. Finally, this research categorized and described four different approaches that MHPSS programs take to cross-community initiatives, namely a) direct encounters, b) managed encounters, c) network encounters and d) curated encounters.

This study also contributes to the scholarly debate on the extent to which the dominance of ethno-nationalist politics have been based on choices of the voters or structural restraints (Bieber 2014:549; McEvoy 2015). Ethno-nationalist politicians and parties have been a dominant force in Bosnian politics since the first free elections in 1990. As discussed in the Background and Context chapter, voters in BiH backed ethno-nationalist parties in the face of the rise of rivaling nationalisms in Croatia and Serbia. Social mobilization of ethnic groups – and eventually the war – followed this wave of nationalism. The experience of war gave further credence to exclusive identities and narratives of collective victimhood among each group, further entrenching the dominance of nationalism and nationalist parties in BiH (Mujkić 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the DPA allowed ethno-nationalist leaders sway their authority at a regional level, where they hold unrivaled political and economic power, through its "ethno-territorial character" (Moore 2013:78). As a result, they have no incentive to co-operate at the federal level and can essentially render the federal government dysfunctional through "ethnic vetoes" by claiming "vital national interest" (Bieber and Keil 2009; McEvoy 2015:112; Zahar 2005)

However, there are indications that a different paradigm in Bosnian politics, at least in theory, is possible. The 'Baby Revolution' protests of 2013 and the 2014 protests against poverty and corruption put overarching concerns of Bosnian citizens into view. The Tuzla Transportation Workers' Union (TTU), whose strike sparked the 2014 protests, openly expressed their view that concerns about the socio-economic situation in BiH transcended nationalist politics. Their slogan *"Gladni smo na tri jezika"* (We are hungry in three languages) was a reference to the official policy of the state to refer to Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian as three separate languages despite being mutually understandable. BiH's political leaders achieved an approval rating of 8% in Gallup's (2014) "Global States of Mind" study, further indicating that Bosnian citizens are profoundly unhappy with their politics and politicians.

The current study contributes another piece of evidence to the argument that a paradigm shift in Bosnian politics is indeed possible. Chapter 6 has shown that MHPSS programs have had success – albeit limited – in transforming nationalist beliefs and attitudes. A number of their participants, when given a chance to transform their traumas

and hear the stories of the members of the other group, managed to build relationships, even partnerships, across the ethnic divide. The work of MHPSS programs shows that negative emotions can be transformed and narratives of collective victimhood can be challenged. BiH need not be locked into the ethno-nationalist political paradigm it has been stuck in for nearly three decades. Under the right structural conditions, another paradigm is possible.

The possibility of a paradigm shift is also relevant to this study's engagement with the scholarly literature on consociationalism and centripetalism. This research highlights the psychological assumptions that underpin each theory, which are elite-based in their design. Furthermore, it provides evidence for the argument that even in the most divided societies, the dominant paradigm of social and political interaction between rival groups can be shifted. MHPSS programs, at the individual level, managed to transcend the social and political divides that are prevalent in BiH by building cross-community networks and disrupting ethno-nationalist narratives. Therefore, findings of this research suggest that the kind of accommodation that consociationalism prescribes is not the only option for post-conflict societies and the kind of paradigm shift that centripetalism prescribes is possible.

8.3 Bringing 'Bottom-up' and 'Top-Down' Approaches Together

Criticisms of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm most often focus on its lack of attention to local level issues and initiatives at the expense of institutional efforts. For instance, Jenkins, Subedi, and Jenkins (2018:208-209) argue that the institutional focus of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm does not account for the fact that relationships at the local level remain broken: "Instead of the focus remaining on reconciliation and healing, efforts to deal with delicate emotional issues at the local level can be overlooked and substituted with national priorities that are related to placating international demands, leaving broken relationships where the harm and hurt actually occurred locally to remain inflamed and tense." Furthermore, Gawerc (2006:439) suggests that institutional efforts at reconciliation would fail to achieve significant progress as long as "the acrimonious feelings that past actions of the conflicting parties have produced" are not addressed. In other words, institutional efforts cannot be a substitute for local efforts to mend

relationships and they would be standing on fragile foundations when issues at the local level are not addressed.

In line with Gawerc's (ibid.) and Jenkins, Subedi, and Jenkins' (2018) arguments, this research indicates that local level traumas, issues, and relationships hold significance for national level reconciliation. It shows that traumatic experiences of war may lead to negative emotions such as anger, fear, and hatred among the survivors. Such sentiments hinder reconciliation efforts, as they prevent the re-establishment of social ties and instead give way to isolation. As stated in Chapter 5, anger can breed intolerance and hatred, fuel a desire for revenge, and lead to other types of violence such as domestic abuse or manifest as self-destructive behavior. Fear can keep communities from establishing lines of communication, expect the worst from one another, and live in fear of another war. Mistrust can keep individuals and communities apart, preventing them from hearing each other out. When such sentiments are prevalent among the members of each former rival group, institutional initiatives would be inadequate in promoting the reconstruction of people-to-people relationships.

This research also finds that the institutional failures in post-conflict BiH have led to the political and economic conditions that presented ethno-nationalist politicians with the opportunity to manipulate people's fears to tighten their grips on power. Ethno-nationalists in politics perpetuate narratives of collective victimhood and disseminate nationalist propaganda. In doing so, they sustain the socio-psychological infrastructure of the war and undermine, at times even sabotage, local level initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 7, people with traumatic experiences are especially vulnerable to this kind of political manipulation. As they fear the re-occurrence of another conflict in which the members of the other group would seek to destroy them, those with traumatic experiences of the war may become susceptible to the propaganda of nationalist politicians who vow to protect them. As a result, local level, 'bottom-up' approaches to peacebuilding would be difficult to sustain when the rhetoric of the conflict continues to be disseminated from the higher echelons of political power. As EZ stated, when elites resort to such rhetoric, it affects their constituents in a way that works against the goals of MHPSS programs in their local level work: "We are working with people, for many years, and [give] a lot of support, but if just one politician says something on the TV that is, like, the predominant

narrative, that touches them, they are always, then, questioning their ideas." Furthermore, lack of economic opportunities and widespread corruption in BiH have enabled nationalist parties to build extensive patronage networks, which many ordinary citizens depend on for their livelihood due to high rates of poverty and unemployment. Hence, this research shows that the shortcomings of institutional peacebuilding efforts may end up undermining the local level initiatives, including MHPSS programs.

In displaying that micro level traumas, issues, and relationships hold significance for national level reconciliation, and that the shortcomings of institutional peacebuilding efforts may undermine local level initiatives, this research highlights the mutually interdependent nature of the relationship between local and national level initiatives. Therefore, I argue that it is most fruitful to study and implement local, bottom-up, and institutional 'top-down' approaches to peacebuilding and reconciliation as parts of a whole that reinforce one another. Doing so would require efforts that focus on linking bottom-up and top-down initiatives, both in practice and research. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss what such linking would look like and how it can be achieved in practice and scholarly research, respectively.

In terms of practice, there are connections that already exist between local and national practices that can serve as a basis for bridging bottom-up and top-down approaches. For instance, as Hamber (2009:62) points out, while South African TRC employed a limited psychological focus, "[i]t is now unthinkable that there would be no victim support accompanying a truth commission," indicating that there is a greater emphasis on individual well-being as part of national initiatives. In the case of BiH, for instance, the ICTY employed a Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) that, among other things, "has trained professional staff, available on a 24 hour shift basis that can help witnesses with their psycho-social and practical needs before, during and after their testimony in The Hague" (ICTY 2018). At the other end of the spectrum, this research has shown examples of MHPSS groups actively seeking to use their work to reach out to a broader audience, in the form of "reconciliation trips," youth camps or public speaking events, in order to promote their goals of healing and reconciliation.

Strengthening and broadening these existing efforts would help to bridge the gap between local bottom-up and institutional top-down approaches to peacebuilding and

reconciliation so that they can reinforce one another. Therefore, I propose three linking strategies that would help to a) increase institutional peacebuilding initiatives' efforts towards individual healing of survivors, b) help broaden the influence of local level initiatives, including the work of MHPSS programs, and c) lend institutional support and legitimacy to local level work.

First, as Hamber (2009:70) suggests, institutional initiatives such as truth commissions may hold "healing potential," and one of the pre-conditions of maximizing this potential is to ensure the well-being of the testifiers before, during, and after their participation. To do so, Hamber (ibid.:72) suggests the testimony and/or statement taking process should be "complemented by additional supports (for example, well-trained statement takers) and, where necessary, external supports from community support mechanisms through to culturally appropriate counseling." Furthermore, he calls for long-term follow up of the survivors, and encouragement and funding for victim support groups. Such extensive support mechanisms may serve to bridge the divide between the institutional peacebuilding initiatives and the locals who are seeking to deal with the past, increasing the chances that there would be local 'buy-in' for the top-down initiatives and the resulting narratives.

Second, encouragement and increased funding of events such as 'reconciliation trips,' community meetings, or public speaking events would assist in bridging the gap between top-down and bottom-up initiatives and allow for MHPSS programs to expand on their individual/local level work. These events can serve as avenues for people to share their individual path to healing and for communities to hear stories from the other side. Therefore, they provide an ideal venue for healing, re-establishing relationships and countering narratives of collective victimhood. Furthermore, such events can be used to bring findings of truth commissions or other relevant institutions directly to the communities, when coupled with extensive victim support for the testifiers. In chapter 6, this research showed that participation in public events has helped participants build cross-community relationships and question narratives of collective victimhood – or at least acknowledge that there were victims on the other side(s) as well. Other research in BiH supports the argument that these events help the work of MHPSS programs to resonate beyond the individual level. In their assessment of six grassroots peace

initiatives (five of which either involved a psychosocial component or were an MHPSS program) in BiH, USAID (2014:233) researchers found that only one of them, a psycho-trauma support program for war camp survivors led by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), made "any significant impact beyond the immediate beneficiaries." They credited the program's "speaking tour" component for being able to expand its work, arguing:

> *"Here evidence suggests that intentional reconciliation programming combined with a systematic way of sharing these reconciliation messages outward to the larger community can yield dramatic results. This conclusion is amplified by the statements of participants of the speaking-out tour who recounted numerous emotional and powerful stories of their own personal transformation as well as numerous examples of powerful outcomes that occurred among audience members. The survivors' speaking-out tour mechanism is thus noted as a 'power tool' for 'chipping away' at the larger context and for reaching a broader set of the population, and such efforts need to be replicated and further amplified" (ibid.).*

Third, MHPSS programs can use formal support from local and international institutions. As quoted in Chapter 7, GB expressed regret over not lobbying local politicians and international institutions to support MHPSS programs. Specifically, GB wished to have lobbied the EU to mandate support for MHPSS programs as part of their criteria to open accession talks with BiH. He believed that a more favorable political environment could have emerged had the EU pressured the Bosnian politicians to support MHPSS programs across the country. Formal support for MHPSS programs could keep government officials from disrupting/sabotaging programs, encourage more people to "break the silence of the past" (Hamber 2009:72), and create a favorable environment for MHPSS practitioners to expand the scope of their work through public gatherings and events. As GB put it, "[t]he effect of our programs would go much beyond the individual level. But the goal of our politicians is to keep the fear going." Local and external peacebuilders, especially ones that can wield significant institutional power, should lobby for funding and support for MHPSS programs as they do for institutional efforts such as the establishment of truth commissions, refugee return initiatives, or tribunals.

In terms of conducting scholarly research that would help link bottom-up and top-down initiatives, I argue that peacebuilding scholarship should seek greater engagement

with scholarship and practice in Peace Psychology. There are lessons and opportunities that both scholars studying peacebuilding from an institutional perspective and Peace Psychology can draw from greater engagement with one another. First, while the liberal peacebuilding paradigm resulted in an institutional focus in the study of conflict resolution, Peace Psychology has long been interested in reconciliation between individuals and communities. As a result, Peace Psychology boasts an extensive knowledge base on peacebuilding and reconciliation at the micro level. Therefore, incorporating the insights of Peace Psychology can help balance the long-standing institutional focus in the study of peacebuilding and contextualize the renewed calls for shifting peacebuilding literature's focus away from institutionalism and towards bottom-up initiatives of 'everyday peace.'

Second, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there are assumptions in Peace Psychology about how MHPSS work might matter for national reconciliation, which are also reflected in the expressed goals of external funding agencies that support MHPSS programs. However, as this research highlights, there is a mutual interdependence between the work of MHPSS programs and institutional peacebuilding efforts, which challenges Peace Psychology's assumptions about MHPSS programs' ability to resonate beyond the micro level. This research has shown that when politicians actively seek to invoke fear among their constituents, promote narratives of collective victimhood, and actively undermine/sabotage MHPSS work, they hamper the potential of MHPSS work to resonate beyond the individual level. The successes and failures of institutional peacebuilding efforts determine whether MHPSS programs can develop the ability and scope to contribute to national reconciliation or not. Therefore, scholars, practitioners, and funders of Peace Psychology should move beyond their assumptions about how their work matters for national reconciliation and examine how their work resonates beyond the individual level under variant institutional settings. Greater engagement and collaboration with scholarship that focuses on macro level institutions would help Peace Psychology to better understand how institutional initiatives matter for their work. Then, they could advocate for institutional initiatives that would maximize the likelihood that MHPSS work could contribute to peace writ large.

8.4 Recommendations for Policymakers and MHPSS Programs

Participants in this study, through their expertise and experience on trauma and MHPSS, revealed how traumatic experiences of war change people and societies. In doing so, they helped me explore the relationship between trauma and reconciliation. During and after my field research, I came to wonder what information and recommendations I can provide through this research project. In this section, I will briefly summarize policy recommendations I would make based on what I have learned through my research.

As discussed earlier, post-Dayton institutional design of BiH played an inadvertent role in entrenching ethno-nationalism as the primary paradigm of politics, thus preserving the domination of nationalist politicians and parties. The case of BiH can be an illustrative example for future policymakers as to how to provide ground for transformation of the logic of politics following intrastate war. In BiH, two structural flaws have been critical in the entrenchment of ethno-nationalist politics. First, as part of international interveners "paying for peace" (Belloni and Strazzarri 2014), shadow economies built during the war remained in place, giving ethno-nationalist parties a significant sway on the country's economy through which they were able to build extensive patronage networks. Second, when given the opportunity to run local governments where their ethnic group is dominant, ethno-nationalists managed to render federal government dysfunctional and run their local governments as they pleased, without credible competition or any incentive to cooperate with other ethnic groups.

Therefore, peacebuilders in future cases should seek to build political institutions that can foster cooperation at a national level. Given the chance to transfer governance to local governments in ethno-territorial spaces where they can consolidate power, nationalist politicians and parties have undermined federal governance at every step, reducing incentives to cooperate with rival groups and raising the specter of eventual partition – which might lead to renewed conflict. A stronger national government could offer more incentives for cooperation, as all groups would have a stake in it, and also provide a platform for non-nationalist political movements to flourish through campaigning on overarching social problems. Furthermore, sustainable refugee return would lead to the emergence of more multi-ethnic local constituencies compared to

mono-ethnic ones, reducing the incentive to shift governance to the local level. As discussed in Chapter 6, sustainable return is dependent on the establishment of robust social networks and connections. Therefore, formal refugee return programs should develop policies that go beyond the restoration of property rights and economic assistance for the returnees, and support organizations and activities aimed at creating new social relationships.

The case of BiH also highlights the dangers of "paying for peace." As Belloni and Strazzari (2014) show, shadow economies that emerge from intrastate wars can become instruments of corruption and patronage following the war. Nationalist control over extensive patronage networks, as discussed in the previous chapter, is one of the most important reasons why socio-psychological infrastructure of the war endures. Therefore, future researchers and policymakers should pay greater attention to the question of what kind of policies can help dismantle shadow economies, or at least prevent them from taking control of large swaths of the formal economy. Paris (2004) argues that peacebuilders in the 1990s focused on economic reform and liberalization following intrastate wars, inadvertently assisting former warring parties to consolidate economic resources at their hands. To prevent such outcome, he suggests that institutional reform and statebuilding should take precedence over economic liberalization. Paris (ibid.) terms this approach "Institutionalization before liberalization (IBL)." When institutions that can reliably oversee distribution of resources are established, chances of the shadow economy overtaking the formal one would be reduced.

Given the fact that international interveners have played key roles in ending the conflict as well as negotiating and managing the peace, this study also has implications for theory and policymaking regarding international interventions in intrastate wars. As stated in the introductory chapter, IR scholarship's overwhelming focus is on military intervention – humanitarian intervention in particular. However, efforts to re-build societies following the conflict and sustaining peace deserve more attention from scholars and policymakers alike. This study has shown that socio-psychological infrastructure of the war may remain in place, even in the absence of overt violence. It also indicated that actors who seek to maintain such infrastructure many exploit the traumatic experiences of war. Therefore, future research and policy on intervention in civil wars should put further

consideration towards not just designing interventions to protect civilians from the worst aspects of the war (as R2P doctrine set out to do), but also design policy responses to help sustain the peace and set up a basis for eventual reconciliation in the aftermath of the conflict. "Responsibility to rebuild," which was outlined in R2P's original formulation (ICISS 2001), but was abandoned by the time the UN adopted R2P doctrine in 2005 World Summit, should come back to the fore. The case of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, after which the country plunged into renewed conflict and chaos, further makes the case that the focus on military intervention is inadequate for devising international interventions into intrastate wars with the goal of preserving civilian lives.

This study provides important insights into the international community's policy options regarding MHPSS programs and reconciliation. The interviewees suggested that while foreign funding has been key to their ability to implement their programs, it also resulted in a 'psychosocial gap' due to the uneven nature of the funding. The proliferation of MHPSS work in BiH in the immediate aftermath of the war soon receded, remaining sporadic until USAID funded the PRO-Future project in 2011. Several interviewees suggested that the inconsistency of the outside support and the resulting 'psychosocial gap' have been detrimental to their work. Hence, international policymakers and funding agencies should re-consider their practices regarding the funding of MHPSS work and be prepared that the work of transforming trauma, dealing with the past, and reweaving the social fabric requires a long-term commitment, as opposed to large influxes of funding separated by years of inactivity. Furthermore, the international community can – and should – take a more active role in advocating for MHPSS work. Chapter 7 has shown how politicians in BiH utilize the traumas of the population to maintain their political power and, directly or indirectly, work against MHPSS programs in the process. International institutions like the EU could pressure the government to instead support MHPSS work and incorporate it into the institutions of public health and education. Doing so would provide MHPSS programs with consistent financial resources and broaden their legitimacy. As a result, the likelihood of MHPSS work resonating beyond the individual level would increase.

To cultivate such institutional support, local and international practitioners of peace psychology should consider lobbying policymakers regarding the necessity of

MHPSS support in post-conflict settings. As quoted in Chapter 7, interviewee GB highlighted a lack of such lobbying effort as one of the primary shortcomings of MHPSS initiatives in BiH, when he said: “It’s much easier for us to work with traumatized women in Srebrenica than with politicians.” Without such lobbying, MHPSS programs will struggle to secure financial support to continue their operations and to be integrated into other relevant processes such as refugee return, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Therefore, in order to be able to fully realize their potential in terms of individual and social healing, future MHPSS programs need to, as GB prescribed, “work with politicians much more, pushing them much more to accept these issues, to push them to put it among their priorities, lobby the international community to push them.”

Furthermore, even to achieve their primary goal of helping their participants deal with their trauma, MHPSS programs need to expand their efforts to the social and political realms. As interviewees repeatedly indicated during this research project, the social, economic, and political conditions in BiH present structural barriers to healing. In the face of pervasive problems such as unemployment, gender inequality, corruption, and continuation of nationalist narratives, it is difficult for MHPSS participants to be able to transform their traumatic experiences. As MO pointed out, “when you see a man who can’t deal with his primary needs, you can’t deal with his traumatic experiences,” and as GB noted, shifting narratives of collective victimhood is difficult when political parties that want to perpetuate such narratives to control access to jobs and resources. Furthermore, under such structural conditions, it is unlikely for MHPSS work to resonate beyond the individual level. Therefore, realizing the goals of MHPSS programs requires not just a focus on the traumas of the individual participants, but an effort to shift the social structures that shape their lives.

This study presented a few MHPSS practitioners whose efforts evolved into activism – for instance, VO’s successful lobbying of the local government in his area or MV becoming a women’s rights activist in her later career. VO’s efforts brought about a greater appreciation for the work of his organization and extra financial support. MV’s activism is geared towards expanding women’s rights in BiH in order to help bring about social change that would in turn result in more favorable conditions for the healing of her participants. Future MHPSS programs will benefit from political activism and lobbying,

particularly in the early stages of peacebuilding efforts. They would be better able to secure resources, prevent the exploitation of traumatic experiences to sow fear and division, and increase the likelihood of their work with individual participants resonating at the social level.

This study has shown that MHPSS programs, beyond offering psychological and psychiatric therapy, hold the potential to make significant social, economic, and political contributions towards sustainable peace. This was especially evident with programs that adopted holistic approaches and sought to assist their participants in social issues they are facing – e.g. poverty, unemployment, and lack of social connections. Programs that sought to incorporate education and vocational training uplifted their participants in ways they could not have achieved with therapy alone. Focusing on socio-economic issues that most Bosnians face also helped bring members of different groups together, build relationships, and re-humanize one another. Additionally, public speaking programs hold a particular potential for making lasting contributions at the social level. They serve an important purpose of bringing together members of different communities and familiarizing them with the stories of each other without denying anyone's experiences and/or suffering. As such, they make important contributions towards the reconciliation goal of 'dealing with the past.' Future researchers, activists, and policymakers who study and implement MHPSS programs in the aftermath of intrastate wars should pay particular attention to programs that incorporate education, vocational training, and public speaking events.

8.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

As with any case study, this project has limitations regarding the generalizability of its findings. Case studies inevitably involve a trade-off between rich, contextual detail versus generalizability of the research findings. As discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of the topic and the research question, as well as the fact that there has not been significant inquiry into the relationship between MHPSS programs and reconciliation, necessitated a case study approach. As a result, it is difficult to gauge the generalizability of the findings of this research. Only when future researchers take up similar case studies and build the groundwork for comparative work about MHPSS programs and reconciliation, generalizable results will emerge from this line of research.

Therefore, I recommend future researchers study MHPSS programs in different cases and investigate their social and political implications in post-conflict settings. Specifically, future research should focus on whether MHPSS programs across different settings have achieved the kind of individual level change outlined in Chapter 6 and investigate the levels of 'upward dynamism' achieved under variant political settings and institutions. It would then be possible to achieve greater precision in identifying the contributions of MHPSS programs to reconciliation and the conditions under which they would be more likely to succeed. Skaar (2013:55) argued that the future challenge of reconciliation studies is to assess how different reconciliation processes (i.e., traditional or formal) at various levels (i.e., local and national) interact with one another. She recommended "a combination of rigorous comparisons and detailed in depth case studies" to achieve this goal (ibid.:102). I believe that this study rises to Skaar's (ibid.) challenge in showing how MHPSS efforts interact with political structures that came about as a result of the DPA. Doing so has helped this study to get a clearer picture on how MHPSS programs contribute to reconciliation at the social level and the extent to which political institutions of BiH hamper the prospect of reconciliation. Future studies should also take up this challenge in order to improve our understanding of various reconciliation processes and help policymakers better identify combinations of processes that would be most likely to succeed in a particular context.

As explained in Chapter 2, I decided not to interview MHPSS program participants, for both practical and ethical reasons. As a result, I had to rely on the interviewees who managed, designed, and administered these programs to tell me about the changes in the well-being and attitudes of these participants. In effect, my interviewees were intermediaries. Furthermore, while the interviewees were often frank about shortcomings of their programs, they are not impartial.

Another limitation in this study has been my position as an outsider, specifically a Turkish citizen. Turks have been major players in the region's history, having ruled over the region for four centuries. The Republic of Turkey still has a significant presence in BiH through educational institutions (two Turkish funded universities operate in Sarajevo as well as a number of "Turkish Cultural Centers" across the country) and funding for development assistance. As mentioned in the chapter on Background and Context, there

is a history of referring to Muslim Bosniaks as "Turks" as an insult in BiH. Croat and Serb nationalist narratives hold up Bosniaks' adoption of Islam during the Ottoman rule as a 'betrayal' to their brethren. Therefore, most people in BiH have an opinion of Turks and Turkey, positive or negative. Such attitudes may have influenced some participants in their interaction with me. For instance, they may have, consciously or unconsciously, thought that I have pre-conceptions favoring Bosniaks. Such a perception, especially among Croat and Serb interviewees, may have led them to highlight work that involve Bosniaks more than their other activities, potentially limiting my ability to assess the full breadth of their work.

As discussed earlier, researchers and practitioners of MHPSS work have recently begun considering the political implications of their work. The current research project aims to contribute to this emerging line of research. I believe that further research into this question is necessary to get a better grasp of MHPSS programs and their contributions. The implementation of MHPSS programs has become commonplace following wars and mass disasters based on psychology research that highlights their benefits at the individual level. However, despite their proliferation, there is not enough research that assesses the resonance of MHPSS work at the social level. The extent to which the individual level benefits of MHPSS programs can influence the benefits on the social level remains a mystery. This project, through an in-depth case study of MHPSS programs in post-war BiH, represents a first step in exploring MHPSS work as it connects the social and political levels. In doing so, it represents an entry point for further research that can provide a full assessment of MHPSS programs.

9 APPENDIX: List of Interview Questions

1) What does reconciliation mean to you?
2) What was your role in [name of the MHPSS program]?
3) How did reconciliation figure into your work?
4) What were the goals of the program? Did you consider it a success? Why?
5) Could you give me an example or a story about how your work influenced social cohesion in a community you have worked in?
6) In your experience, have the participants of your program become more likely to examine the past and take responsibility for the actions of their community?
7) In your experience, were your participants more likely to communicate with the other ethnic groups after your intervention?
8) In your opinion, how are Bosnians doing in terms of dealing with the past? How have MHPSS programs contributed to this?
9) How do you think MHPSS work in BIH contributed to the rebuilding of the social fabric and inter-ethnic cooperation?
10) How would you characterize the bonds between Bosnians today?
11) What impact do you think MHPSS programs have had on promoting reconciliation and creating sustainable peace in BIH?
12) What was your motivation in taking part in an MHPSS program? What impact did you hope to have on your participants and Bosnian society in general?
13) In your opinion, what has been the effect of the socio-economic situation in BIH for people who suffered war trauma and their families?
14) What considerations were made in [name of the MHPSS program] specifically for women/girls? What problems have women/girls faced in reintegrating into the society?
15) What impact did [name of the MHPSS program] have on negative emotions (like anger, lack of empathy, etc.) of the participants that exhibited them?
16) What are the impacts of ailments like PTSD or MD on peace and reconciliation in BIH? What have the MHPSS programs done to address them?
17) If you were to design the [name of the MHPSS program] today, what would you have done differently?

10 REFERENCES

Abeyasekera, A., Amarasuriya, H., and Ferdinando, M. (2008). Understanding well-being in Sri Lanka: A psychosocial framework. In: Abeyasekera, A. and Amarasuriya, H. (eds.) *A tool, a guide, and a framework. Introduction to a psychosocial approach to development.* Social Policy Analysis and Research Centre, University of Colombo. Pp. 11-22. url: https://www.academia.edu/2430192/Understanding_wellbeing_in_Sri_Lanka_a_psychosocial_framework (Accessed December 1, 2017).

Agathangelou, A. M. and Killian, K. D. (2009). The discourse of refugee trauma: Epistemologies of the displaced, the state, and mental health practitioners. *The Cyprus Review*, *21*(1), 19-62.

Akhavan, P. (2001). Beyond impunity: can international criminal justice prevent future atrocities?. *American Journal of International Law*, *95*(1), 7-31.

Allden, K., Jones, L., Weissbecker, I., Wessells, M., Bolton, P., Betancourt, T. S., Hijazi, Z., Galapatti, A., Yamout, R., Patel, P. and Sumathipala, A. (2009). Mental health and psychosocial support in crisis and conflict: report of the Mental Health Working Group. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, *24*(S2), s217-s227.

Almond, G. A. (1956). Comparative political systems. *The Journal of politics*, *18*(3), 391-409.

Anand, D. (2016). *Hindu nationalism in India and the politics of fear*. Springer.

Anckermann, S., Dominguez, M., Soto, N., Kjaerulf, F., Berliner, P. and Mikkelsen, E. (2005). Psycho-social support to large numbers of traumatized people in post-conflict societies: an approach to community development in Guatemala. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, *15*(2), 136-152.

Anderlini, S. N. (2007). *Women building peace: What they do, why it matters.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Anderson, N. (2019). Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly*, *63*(3), 692-706.

Andeweg, R. B. (2000). Consociational democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *3*(1), 509-536.

Andjelić, N. (2012). Citizenship versus Nationality. In: Bowman, G. and Hudson, R. (eds.) *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Anzulović, B. (1999). *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide.* New York University Press.

Agger, I. (2001). Psychosocial assistance during ethnopolitical warfare in the former Yugoslavia. In: Chirot, D. and Seligman, M. E. P. (eds.), (2001). *Ethnopolitical warfare: Causes, consequences, and possible solutions.* American Psychological Association. pp. 305-318.

Agger, I., Vuk, S. and Mimica, J. (1995). *Theory and practice of psychosocial projects under war conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.* ECHO/ECTF.

Akhavan, P. (2001). Beyond impunity: can international criminal justice prevent future atrocities?. *American Journal of International Law*, *95*(1), 7-31.

Akrivoulis, D. E. (2017). Memory, Forgiveness and Unfinished Justice in the Former Yugoslavia. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 1-22.

Arcel, L.T. (1998). *War violence, trauma, and the coping process. Armed conflict in Europe and survivor responses.* International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims/Institute of Clinical Psychology,

Armakolas, I. and Maksimović, M. (2013). 'Babylution': A Civic Awakening in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy*, (34), 3-11.

Austin, B. (2017) Dealing with the Past: Supporting people-centred "working-through" the legacies of violence. *Berghof Policy Brief 06*(February), 1-14.

Avdibegović, E. and Sinanović, O. (2006). Consequences of domestic violence on women's mental health in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Croatian medical journal*, *47*(5), 730-741.

Aybet, G. and Bieber, F. (2011). From Dayton to Brussels: the impact of EU and NATO conditionality on state building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *63*(10), 1911-1937.

Backer, D. (2009). Cross-National Comparative Analysis. In: van der Merwe, H., Baxter, V. and Chapman, A.R. (eds.). *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice. Challenges for Empirical Research.* USIP. Pp. 23-89.

Baingana, F. K., Bannon, I. and Thomas, R. (2005). *Mental health and conflicts: Conceptual framework and approaches.* World Bank.

Baker, C. (2015). *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bangpan, M., Dickson, K., Felix, L. and Chiumento, A. (2017). *The impact of mental health and psychosocial support interventions on people affected by humanitarian emergencies: A systematic review.* Humanitarian Evidence Programme. Oxford: Oxfam GB.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, *9*(1), 22-50

——— (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *50* (11), 1430-1453.

——— (2013). *Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.

Bar-Tal, D. and Čehajić-Clancy, S. (2014). From collective victimhood to social reconciliation: Outlining a conceptual framework. In: Spini, D., Elcheroth, G. and Biruski, D. C. (Eds.) *War, Community, and Social Change.* Springer. pp. 125-136.

Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E. and De Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, *63*(2), 441-460.

Barkawi, T. and Laffey, M. (1999). The imperial peace: democracy, force and globalization. *European Journal of International Relations*, *5*(4), 403-434.

Barker, N. (2015). Bosnians Still Suffering From War Trauma. *Al Jazeera English.* January 18. url: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2015/01/bosnians-still-suffering-war-trauma-201511818563216943.html (Accessed February 6th, 2016).

Bartsch, K. and Bartsch, E. (1997). *Stress and trauma healing: A manual for caregivers.* Diakonia.

Batniji, R., Van Ommeren, M. and Saraceno, B. (2006). Mental and social health in disasters: relating qualitative social science research and the Sphere standard. *Social Science and Medicine*, *62*(8), 1853-1864.

Bayer, C. P., Klasen, F. and Adam, H. (2007). Association of trauma and PTSD symptoms with openness to reconciliation and feelings of revenge among former Ugandan and Congolese child soldiers. *JAMA*, *298*(5), 555-559.

Becker, D. (2015). *Working on the Psychosocial Gap.* Berghof Foundation.

Bell, C. (2003). Dealing with the past in Northern Ireland. *Fordham International Law Journal*, *26*(4), 1095-1147.

Bell, C. (2015). Text and context: Evaluating peace agreements for their gender perspective. *Political Settlements Research Programme.*

Bell, C. and O'Rourke, C. (2007). Does feminism need a theory of transitional justice? An introductory essay. *International Journal of Transitional Justice*,*1*(1), 23-44.

Belloni, R. (2001). Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of peace Research*, *38*(2), 163-180.

——— (2004). Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, *11*(2), 334-353.

Belloni, R. and Strazzari, F. (2014). Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(5), 855-871.

Bennett, C. (2016). *Bosnia's paralysed peace*. Oxford University Press.

Betancourt, T. S. and Khan, K. T. (2008). The mental health of children affected by armed conflict: protective processes and pathways to resilience. *International review of psychiatry*, *20*(3), 317-328.

Betz, H.G. (1998). Introduction. In: Betz, H.G. and Immerfall, S. (eds.) *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies.* St. Martin's.

Bieber, F. (2002). Aid dependency in Bosnian politics and civil society: failures and successes of post-war peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Croatian International Relations Review*, *8*(26/27), 25-29.

——— (2005). Power sharing after Yugoslavia. Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power Sharing Institutions Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In: Noel, S. (ed.) *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Studies in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Queens University Press. pp. 85-103.

Bieber, F. (2014). Undermining democratic transition: the case of the 1990 founding elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14*(4), 548-555.

Bieber, F. and Keil, S. (2009). Power-sharing revisited: Lessons learned in the Balkans? *Review of Central and East European Law*, 34(4), 337-360.

Biro, M., Ajdukovic, D., Corkalo, D., Djipa, D., Milin, P. and Weinstein, H. M. (2004). Attitudes toward justice and social reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In: Stover, E. and Weinstein, H. M. (eds.). *My neighbor, my enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity*. Cambridge University Press. pp.183-205.

Bisogno, M. and Chong, A. (2002). Poverty and inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the civil war. *World development*, *30*(1), 61-75.

Björkdahl, A. (2012). A Gender-Just Peace? Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Process in Bosnia. *Peace and Change*, *37*(2), 286-317.

Blaikie, N. (2009). *Designing social research*. Polity.

Bleeker, M. (2006). Challenges to the Implementation of Transitional Justice, In: Bleeker, M. (ed.): *Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice*. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, pp. 157-163.

Bloomfield, D. (2006). *On good terms: Clarifying reconciliation*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Bochsler, D. (2012). Non-discriminatory rules and ethnic representation: The election of the Bosnian state presidency. *Ethnopolitics*, *11*(1), 66-84.

Bodea, C. and Elbadawi, I. (2007). Riots, coups and civil war: Revisiting the greed and grievance debate. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4397.*

Bolton, D. (2017). *Conflict, peace and mental health: Addressing the consequences of conflict and trauma in Northern Ireland.* Manchester University Press.

Booth, K. (2012). Critical Security Studies. In: Christie, D. (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology.* Wiley Blackwell.

Boulding, E. (2000). *Cultures of peace: The hidden side of history*. Syracuse University Press.

Boyle, F. (1996). *The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court of Justice Concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.* Aletheia Press.

Božić-Roberson, A. (2004). Words before the war: Milosevic's use of mass media band rhetoric to provoke ethnopolitical conflict in former Yugoslavia. *East European Quarterly*, *38*(4), 395-409.

Bracken, P. J. (2001). Post-modernity and post-traumatic stress disorder. *Social Science and Medicine*, *53*(6), 733-743.

Bracken, P. J. and Petty, C. (1998) Introduction. In: Bracken, P. J. and Petty, C. (eds.). *Rethinking the Trauma of War.* Free Association Books.

Brahm, E. (2006). Transitional justice, civil society, and the development of the rule of law in post-conflict societies. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, *9*(4), 62-72.

Botcharova, O. (2001). Implementation of track two diplomacy: Developing a model of forgiveness. In: Helmick, R. G. and Petersen, R.L. (eds.). *Forgiveness and reconciliation: Religion, public policy and conflict transformation*. Templeton Foundation Press. Pp. 269-294.

Brounéus, K. (2008). Analyzing reconciliation: A structured method for measuring national reconciliation initiatives. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 14(3), 291-313.

——— (2010). The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca courts on psychological health. *Journal of conflict resolution*, *54*(3), 408-437.

Burg, S. and Shoup, P. (1999) *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention.* M. E. Sharpe.

Byrne, S. (2014). Troubled Engagement in Ethnicized Conflict: Negotiating Difference among Feminist Activists in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, *16*(1), 106-126.

Card, C. (1996). Rape as a Weapon of War. *Hypatia, 11*(4), 5-18.

Catani, C., Schauer, E. and Neuner, F. (2008). Beyond individual war trauma: domestic violence against children in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy*, *34*(2), 165-176.

Cederman, L. E., Weidmann, N. B. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2011). Horizontal inequalities and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison. *American Political Science Review*, *105*(3), 478-495.

Chandler, D. (1998). Democratization in Bosnia: The limits of civil society building strategies. *Democratization*, *5*(4), 78-102.

——— (2005). From Dayton to Europe. *International Peacekeeping*, *12*(3), 336-349.

Charbonneau, B. and Parent, G. (2012). Introduction: Peacebuilding, healing, reconciliation. In: Charbonneau, B. and Parent, G. (eds.). *Peacebuilding, memory and Reconciliation: Bridging top-down and bottom-up approaches.* Routledge. Pp. 1-16.

Chiba, D. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2017). The shape of things to come? Expanding the inequality and grievance model for civil war forecasts with event data. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(2), 275-297.

Chinkin, C. and Paradine, K. (2001). Vision and reality: democracy and citizenship of women in the Dayton Peace Accords. *Yale Journal of International Law*, *26*(1), 103-176.

Christie, D. J. (2006). What is peace psychology the psychology of?. *Journal of social issues*, *62*(1), 1-17.

Cigar, N. (1995). *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing.* Texas A&M University Press.

Clark, J. N. (2009). The limits of retributive justice: Findings of an empirical study in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, *7*(3), 463-487.

——— (2010). Education in Bosnia-Hercegovina: The case for root-and-branch reform. *Journal of Human Rights*, *9*(3), 344-362.

——— (2012). Fieldwork and its ethical challenges: Reflections from research in Bosnia. *Human Rights Quarterly*, *34*(3), 823-839.

Cockburn, C. (1998). *Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict.* ZED Books.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers*, *56*(4), 563-595.

Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (2002). Understanding civil war: a new agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Cox, M. (2001). State building and post-conflict reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia. *Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations*.

Čalić, M.J. (2012). Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995. In: Ingrao, C.W.; Emmert, T. A. *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative.* Purdue University Press. Pp. 115-153.

Čehajić-Clancy, S. and Brown, R. (2014). "The burden of our times": Antecedents of group-based guilt and shame. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *20*(2), 166-170.

Čehajić-Clancy, S., Goldenberg, A., Gross, J. J. and Halperin, E. (2016). Social-psychological interventions for intergroup reconciliation: an emotion regulation perspective. *Psychological Inquiry*, *27*(2), 73-88.

Čolović, I. (2002). *The politics of symbol in Serbia: essays in political anthropology*. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers.

Ćopić, S. (2004). Wife abuse in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. *Feminist Review*, *76*(1), 46-64.

Dahlman, C. and Tuathail, G. Ó. (2005). Broken Bosnia: The localized geopolitics of displacement and return in two Bosnian places. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *95*(3), 644-662.

Daly, E. and Sarkin, J. (2011). *Reconciliation in divided societies: Finding common ground*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Dekel, R. and Goldblatt, H. (2008). Is there intergenerational transmission of trauma? The case of combat veterans' children. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *78*(3), 281.

Denzin N. and Lincoln Y. (2000). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In: Denzin N. and Lincoln Y. (eds.) (2000). *SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research.* SAGE. Pp. 1-44.

Devereux, P. (2008). International volunteering for development and sustainability: outdated paternalism or a radical response to globalisation? *Development in Practice*, *18*(3), 357-370.

Diken, B. and Laustsen, C. B. (2005). Becoming abject: Rape as a weapon of war. *Body and Society*, *11*(1), 111-128.

Divjak, B. and Pugh, M. (2008). The political economy of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, *15*(3), 373-386.

Djikoli, J. (2015). Bosnia: Snapshots of A Traumatized Society. *Balkan Insight.* October 21. url: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-snapshots-of-a-traumatised-society-10-21-2015 (Accessed February 6th, 2016).

Dolgopol, U. (1997). A feminist appraisal of the Dayton Peace accords. *Adelaide Law Review*, *19*, 59-72.

Donais, T. (2003). The political economy of stalemate: organised crime, corruption and economic deformation in post-Dayton Bosnia. *Conflict, Security and Development*, *3*(3), 359-382.

——— (2005). *The political economy of peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia*. Routledge.

——— (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes. *Peace and Change*, *34*(1), 3-26.

Donais, T. and Knorr, A. C. (2013). Peacebuilding from below vs. the liberal peace: the case of Haiti. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, *34*(1), 54-69.

Donais, T. and McCandless, E. (2017). International peace building and the emerging inclusivity norm. *Third World Quarterly*, *38*(2), 291-310.

Dragović-Soso, J. (2002). *Saviours of the nation: Serbia's intellectual opposition and the revival of nationalism*. McGill-Queen's Press.

Dybdahl, R. (2001). A psychosocial support programme for children and mothers in war. *Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, *6*(3), 425-436.

Džafić, Z., Zahirović, S., Okičić, J., and Kožarić, A. (2011). Internal and external obstacles to the development of SMEs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Croatian Economic Survey*, *13*(1), 143-171.

Eckstein, H. (1991). *Regarding politics: Essays on political theory, stability, and change*. Univ of California Press.

Eriksen, S. S. L. (2009). The liberal peace is neither: Peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(5), 652-666.

European Commission (2015). *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 Report.* European Commission. url: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-

enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf (Accessed December 7, 2017).

Faber, M. and Stiglmayer, A. (eds.) (1994). *Mass rape: The war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. University of Nebraska Press.

Fagan, A. (2005). Civil society in Bosnia ten years after Dayton. *International Peacekeeping*, *12*(3), 406-419.

Fanthorpe, R. (2005). On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone. *African affairs*, *105*(418), 27-49.

Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American political science review*, *97*(1), 75-90.

Fischer, M. (2001). *Conflict Transformation by Non-violent Action: Activities of the Centre for Non-violent Action (Sarajevo) in the Balkan Region.* Berghof Foundation.

——— (2011). *Transitional justice and reconciliation: Theory and practice.* Berghof Foundation.

Fletcher, L. E. and Weinstein, H. M. (2002). Violence and social repair: rethinking the contribution of justice to reconciliation. *Human Rights Quarterly*, *24*(3), 573-639.

Ford, S. (2013). Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments. *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation*, *39*(1), 45-113.

Foucault, M. (1990). *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction.* Vintage Books.

Franović, I. (2016). Remembrance and Reconciliation: Research on Monuments from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: Franović, I. and Vukosavljević, N. (eds.) *War of Memories: Places of suffering and remembrance of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Center for Non-violent Action. Pp. 204-229.

Frederking, B. K. (2015). Putting Transitional Justice on Trial: Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Civil War Societies. *International Social Science Review (Online)*, *91*(1).

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. *Continuum*.

Galappatti, A. (2003). What is a psychosocial intervention? Mapping the field in Sri Lanka. *The International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict*, *1*(2), 3-17.

Gallup (2008). *Balkan Monitor 2008.* European fund for the Balkans. url: http://www.compagniadisanpaolo.it/eng/content/download/3766/35278/version/1/file/BalkanMonitor-2008_Summary_of_Findings_300.pdf (Accessed December 7, 2017).

——— (2014). *Global States of Mind.* Gallup.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of peace research*, *6*(3), 167-191.

Gawerc, M. (2006). Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives. *Peace and Change*, *31*(4), 435-478.

Geoghegan, P. (2014). Welcome to Brčko, Europe's only free city and a law unto itself. *The Guardian,* May 14. url: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/may/14/brcko-bosnia-europe-only-free-city (Accessed December 5, 2017).

George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. MIT Press.

Gizelis, T. I. and Kosek, K. E. (2005). Why humanitarian interventions succeed or fail: The role of local participation. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *40*(4), 363-383.

Godfrey, M., Sophal, C., Kato, T., Piseth, L. V., Dorina, P., Saravy, T., Savora, T., and Sovannarith, S. (2002). Technical assistance and capacity development in an aid-dependent economy: The experience of Cambodia. *World Development*, *30*(3), 355-373.

Goldblatt, B. (1997) *Violence, gender and human rights - an investigation of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.* Centre for Applied Legal Studies.

Gormley-Heenan, C., Byrne, J., and Robinson, G. (2013). The Berlin walls of Belfast. *British Politics*, *8*(3), 357-382.

Govier, T. and Verwoerd, W. (2002). Trust and the problem of national reconciliation.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, *32*(2), 178-205.

Granić, S. (1993). The Croatian Coat of Arms: Historical Emblem or Controversial Symbol? *Journal of Croatian Studies*, *34*, 5-28.

Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion regulation: Conceptual and empirical foundations. In: Gross, J. J. (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation*. Guilford Press. Pp. 3-20.

Gutlove, P. (2008). Tertiary Prevention: Psychosocial healing. In: Arya, N. and Santa Barbara, J. (Eds.) *Peace Through Health: How Health Professionals Can Work for a Less Violent World.* Kumarian Press.

Gutlove, P. and Thompson, G. (2003). Psychosocial healing: A guide for practitioners. *Institute for Resource and Security Studies*.

Håkansson, P. and Sjöholm, F. (2007). Who do you trust? Ethnicity and trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *59*(6), 961-976.

Hamber, B. (2009). *Transforming societies after political violence: Truth, reconciliation, and mental health*. Springer Science and Business Media.

——— (2015). *Dealing with Painful Memories and Violent Pasts*. Berghof Foundation.

Hamber, B. and Kelly, G. (2004). A working definition of reconciliation. *Democratic Dialogue, Belfast.*

Hamber, B. and Gallagher, E. (2015). *Psychosocial perspectives on peacebuilding*. Springer International Publishing.

Hamber, B., Gallagher, E., Weine, S. M., Agger I., Bava S., Gaborit M., Murthy, R. S., and Saul, J. (2015). Exploring how Context Matters in Addressing the Impact of Armed Conflict. In: Hamber, B. and Gallagher, E. (eds.) *Psychosocial perspectives on peacebuilding*. Springer International Publishing.

Hankivsky, O. (2004). *Social Policy and Ethics of Care.* UBC Press.

Hart, B. and Čolo, E. (2014). Psychosocial peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: approaches to relational and social change. *Intervention*, *12*(1), 76-87.

Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2), 318-332.

Hayner, P. B. (2001). *Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity*. Psychology Press.

Hegre, H. and Sambanis, N. (2006). Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. *Journal of conflict resolution*, *50*(4), 508-535.

Heimerl, D. (2005). The return of refugees and internally displaced persons: From coercion to sustainability? *International Peacekeeping*, *12*(3), 377-390.

Held, V. (1995). The meshing of care and justice. *Hypatia*, *10*(2), 128-132.

Helms, E. (2010). The gender of coffee: Women and reconciliation initiatives in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Focaal*, *2010*(57), 17-32.

Herman, J. L. (1997). *Trauma and recovery*. Basic books.

Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J.B., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Hughes, J., Tam, T., Voci, A., Von Hecker, U., and Pinder, C., (2008). Stepping stones to reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup contact, forgiveness and trust. In: Nadler, A., Malloy, T., and Fisher, J. D. *The social psychology of intergroup reconciliation*. Oxford University Press. Pp.199-226.

Hirt, C. and Ortlieb, R. (2012). Cultural standards of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Empirical findings and implications for strategic human resource management. *Journal for East European Management Studies*, 205-225.

Hodžić, R. (2007). Without dealing with the past all of it is on some sort of an abstract level. In: Rill, H., Šmidling, T. And Bitoljanu, A. (eds.). *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening and Change: Peacebuilding in the Region of the Former Yugoslavia.* Center for Non-violent Action. Pp.137-146.

Hoogenboom, D. A. and Vieille, S. (2010). Rebuilding social fabric in failed states: examining transitional justice in Bosnia. *Human Rights Review*, *11*(2), 183-198.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press.

Höpken, W. (1985). Party Monopoly and Political Change: League of Communists Since Tito's Death. In: Ramet, S. P. (ed.). *Yugoslavia in the 1980s.* Westview Press. Pp. 29-55.

Humphrey, M. (2003). International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda. *Journal of Human Rights*, *2*(4), 495-505.

Huyse, L. (1995). Justice after transition: On the choices successor elites make in dealing with the past. *Law & Social Inquiry*, *20*(1), 51-78.

Ibreljić, I., Kulenović, S., Kadusić, A., and Smajić, S. (2006). Migration flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1992. Paper presented at the *46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association,* Volos, Greece.

Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). (2010). *INEE Thematic Issue Brief: Psychosocial Well-Being.* INEE. url: http://www.toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1128/INEE_Thematic_Issue_Brief_Psychosocial.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2017).

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). (2007). *IASC guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings*. Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). (2001). *The responsibility to protect: report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.* International Development Research Centre.

Jackson, R. (2018). Post-liberal peacebuilding and the pacifist state. *Peacebuilding*, *6*(1), 1-16.

Jenkins, K., Subedi, D. B. and Jenkins, B. (2018). *Reconciliation in Conflict-Affected Communities*. Springer.

Judah, T. (2009). *The Serbs: History, myth, and the destruction of Yugoslavia*. Yale University Press.

Kaldor, M. (2007). *New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era*. John Wiley & Sons.

Keita, K. (1998). Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *9*(3), 102-128.

Kellermann, N. P. (2001a). Transmission of Holocaust trauma-An integrative view. *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes*, *64*(3), 256-267.

——— (2001b). Psychopathology in children of Holocaust survivors: A review of the research literature. *The Israel journal of psychiatry and related sciences*, *38*(1), 36-46.

Kerr, R. (2017). Tyrannies of Peace and Justice? Liberal Peacebuilding and the Politics and Pragmatics of Transitional Justice. *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, *11*(1), 176-185.

Khamis, V., Macy, R., and Coignez, V. (2004). The impact of the classroom/community/camp-based intervention (CBI) program on Palestinian children. *Save the Children, USA*.

Klostermann, K., Mignone, T., Kelley, M. L., Musson, S., and Bohall, G. (2012). Intimate partner violence in the military: Treatment considerations. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, *17*(1), 53-58.

Kolind, T. (2008). *Post-war identification: everyday Muslim counterdiscourse in Bosnia Herzegovina*. Aarhus University Press.

Korac, M. (2006). Gender, conflict and peace-building: Lessons from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. *Women's Studies International Forum. 29*(5), 510-520.

Kostić, R. (2008). Nationbuilding as an instrument of peace? Exploring local attitudes towards international nationbuilding and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Civil Wars*, *10*(4), 384-412.

——— (2009). *Reconciling the Past and the Present: Evaluationg Dayton Peace Accords 1995*. United Nations and Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

Königstein, H. F. (2013). The influence of mental health on reconciliation in post-war Lebanon. Working Paper, *Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict*. 3(2).

Kritz, N. J. (2009). Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Justice. In: van der Merwe H., Baxter, V. and Chapman, A.R (eds.). *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice. Challenges for Empirical Research.* United States Institute of Peace. Pp. 13-22.

Lacina, B. and Gleditsch, N. P. (2005). Monitoring trends in global combat: A new dataset of battle deaths. *European Journal of Population/Revue Européenne de Démographie*, *21*(2-3), 145-166.

Lake, D. A. and Rothschild, D. (1996). *Ethnic fears and global engagement: The international spread and management of ethnic conflict.* UC San Diego Policy Papers, 20.

——— (1998). *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation*. Princeton University Press.

Layne, C. M., Pynoos, R. S., Saltzman, W. R., Arslanagić, B., Black, M., Savjak, N., Houston, R., Popović, T., Duraković, E., Ćampara, N., Music, M., and Djapo, N. (2001). Trauma/grief-focused group psychotherapy: School-based postwar intervention with traumatized Bosnian adolescents. *Group Dynamics: Theory, research, and practice*, *5*(4), 277-290.

Latal, S. (2020). Opposition Takes Key Cities in Bosnia's Local Elections. *Balkan Insight.* November 16. url: https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/16/opposition-take-key-cities-in-bosnia-local-elections/ (Accessed January 8, 2021).

Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. *United States Institute of Peace*.

——— (2001). Civil Society and Reconciliation. In: Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (Eds.) *Turbulent Peace: the Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. United State Institute of Peace. pp. 841-854.

Lewins, A. (2016). Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). In: Gilbert, N. and Stoneman, P. (eds.). *Researching Social Life.* Sage Publications.

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World politics*, *21*(2), 207-225.

——— (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press.

——— (1985). *Power Sharing in South Africa.* University of California Press.

List, R. A. and Dorner, W. (2012). *Civil Society, Conflict and Violence.* A&C Black.

Lister, R. (1998). Citizen in action: citizenship and community development in a Northern Ireland context. *Community Development Journal*, *33*(3), 226-235.

Little, A. (2017). Fear, hope and disappointment: The politics of reconciliation and the dynamics of conflict transformation. *International Political Science Review.*

Locke, P. (2008). Experimental Citizens: Ethical Dilemmas of Fieldwork in Post-war Sarajevo Civil Society. *Workshop on Field Research and Ethics in Post-Conflict Environments.* CUNY Graduate Center.

——— (2012). Appropriating trauma: Legacies of humanitarian psychiatry in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Intergraph: Journal of Dialogic Anthropology, 3*.

Lykes, M. B. (2000). Possible contributions of a psychology of liberation: Whither health and human rights? *Journal of Health Psychology*, *5*(3), 383-397.

Lykes, M. B. and Sibley, E. (2014). Liberation psychology and pragmatic solidarity: North–South collaborations through the Ignacio Martín-Baró fund. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *20*(3), 209-227.

MacDonald, D. B. (2010). *Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian victim centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia*. Manchester University Press.

MacGinty, R. (2008). Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace. *Cooperation and conflict*, *43*(2), 139-163.

——— (2012). Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *47*(3), 287-308.

——— (2014). Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies. *Security Dialogue*, *45*(6), 548-564.

Macginty, R. and Sanghera, G. (2012). Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development - an introduction. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, *7*(2), 3-8.

Mack, N., Woodsong, C., MacQueen, K. M., Guest, G., and Namey, E. (2011). *Qualitative research methods: a data collector's field guide.* FHI 360.

Magaš, B. (1991). Losing the War in Yugoslavia. *London Review of Books, 13*(22), 18.

——— (1993). *The destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the break-up 1980-92.* Verso.

Maor, M. and Gross, J.J. (2015). *Emotion regulation by emotional entrepreneurs: Implications for political science and international relations.* Paper presented at the 73rd annual MPSA conference, Chicago.

Maoz, I. (2004). Coexistence is in the eye of the beholder: Evaluating intergroup encounter interventions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. *Journal of Social Issues*, *60*(2), 437-452.

Marmot, M. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) (2006). *Social determinants of health*. Oxford University Press.

Martín-Baró, I. (1989). Political violence and war as causes of psychosocial trauma in El Salvador. *International Journal of Mental Health*, pp. 3-20.

——— (1996). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. Harvard University Press.

Mason, D. T., Gurses, M., Brandt, P. T., and Quinn, J. M. (2011). When civil wars recur: conditions for durable peace after civil wars. *International Studies Perspectives*, *12*(2), 171-189.

Maynard, K. A. (1997). Rebuilding community: Psychosocial healing, reintegration, and reconciliation at the grassroots level. In: Kumar, K. (ed.). *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance.* Lynne Rienner. Pp. 203-226.

McCandless, E. (2001). The Case of Land in Zimbabwe: Causes of Conflict, foundation for Sustained Peace. In: Abu-Nimer, M. (ed.): *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*. Lexington Books. pp. 209-222.

McCulloch, A. (2014). Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction. *Democratization*, *21*(3), 501-518.

McEvoy, J. (2014). *Power-sharing executives: governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

McFarlane, J., Christoffel, K., Bateman, L., Miller, V., and Bullock, L. (1991). Assessing for abuse: Self-report versus nurse interview. *Public Health Nursing*, *8*(4), 245-250.

McGrattan, C. (2012). Working through the past in Bosnia and Northern Ireland: Truth, reconciliation and the constraints of consociationalism. *JEMIE*, 11, 103-126.

McGregor, A. (2007). Development, foreign aid and post-development in Timor-Leste. *Third World Quarterly*, *28*(1), 155-170.

McKay, S. and Mazurana, D. (2001). Gendering Peacebuilding. In: Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. and Winter, D. A. (Eds.). *Peace, Conflict, and Violence:Peace Psychology for the 21st Century.* Prentice-Hall. Pp. 341-349.

McLellan, A. T., Arndt, I. O., Metzger, D. S., Woody, G. E., and O'Brien, C. P. (1993). The effects of psychosocial services in substance abuse treatment. *Addictions Nursing Network*, *5*(2), 38-47.

McWilliams, M. (1995). Struggling for peace and justice: Reflections on women's activism in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Women's History*, *7*(1), 13-39.

Mehić-Basara, N. and Cerić, I. (2012). Treatment of addicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina—Constraints and opportunities. *Psychiatria Danubina*, *24*(Suppl 3), 392-397.

Mendeloff, D. (2009). Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice. *Human Rights Quarterly*, *31*(3), 592-623.

Meyer, S. (2013). *UNHCR's Mental Health and Psychosocial Support for Persons of Concern.* United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development & Evaluation Service.

Mihaela, M. (2016). *Negative Emotions and Transitional Justice*. Columbia University Press.

Miljević, D. (2012). Bosnia and Herzegovina – future stuck in the past. *South East Europe Review (SEER) 15*(2), 253-268.

Miller, K. E. and Rasco, L.M. (2004). An Ecological Framework for Addressing the Mental Health Needs of Refugee Communities. In: Miller, K. E. and Rasco, L. M. (eds.).

The mental health of refugees: Ecological approaches to healing and adaptation. Taylor & Francis, pp: 1-64.

Miller, K. E. and Rasmussen, A. (2010). War exposure, daily stressors, and mental health in conflict and post-conflict settings: bridging the divide between trauma-focused and psychosocial frameworks. *Social science and medicine*, *70*(1), 7-16.

Minow, M. (1998). *Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and mass violence*. Beacon Press.

Mlinarević, G., Isaković-Porobić, N., and Rees, M. (2015). If women are left out of peace talks. *Forced Migration Review*, (50), 34-37.

Moore, A. (2013). *Peacebuilding in practice: Local experience in two bosnian towns*. Cornell University Press.

Mooren, T., de Jong, K., Kleber, R. J., and Ruvić, J. (2003). The efficacy of a mental health program in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Impact on coping and general health. *Journal of clinical psychology*, *59*(1), 57-69.

Moriarty, G. (2017). How the trauma of the Troubles risks being "passed on." (Interview with David Bolton). *The Irish Times,* August 7, 2017. Url: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/how-the-trauma-of-the-troubles-risks-being-passed-on-1.3178681 (Accessed December 3, 2018).

Muftic, L. R. and Bouffard, L. A. (2010). Intimate partner violence in post-conflict Bosnia: Incidence and attitudes among Muslim women. *International Public Health Journal*, *2*(1), 219-229.

Mujkić, A. (2010). Ethnic mobilization in the former Yugoslavia as a kind of structural setting and framing. *Southeastern Europe*, *34*(1), 16-37.

Nation, C. R. (2003). *War in the Balkans: 1991-2002.* Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Neocosmos, M. (2008). The politics of fear and the fear of politics: Reflections on xenophobic violence in South Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *43*(6), 586-594.

Neria, Y., Besser, A., Kiper, D., and Westphal, M. (2010). A longitudinal study of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and generalized anxiety disorder in Israeli civilians exposed to war trauma. *Journal of traumatic stress*, *23*(3), 322-330.

Newman, S. (2014). Faith and fear: Explaining Jewish and unionist attitudes toward compromise in Israel and Northern Ireland. *Peace and Change*, *39*(2), 153-189.

Ni Aolain, F. (2012) Advancing feminist positioning in the field of transitional justice. *International Journal of Transitional Justice,* 6(2): 205–228.

Nikolić-Ristanović, V. (1996). War and violence against women. In: Turpin, J. (ed.). *The Gendered New World Order: Militarism, Development and the Environment,* Routledge, pp. 195-210.

Noddings, N. (2002). Caring, social policy, and homelessness. *Theoretical medicine and bioethics*, *23*(6), 441-454.

Noor, M., Shnabel, N., Halabi, S., and Nadler, A. (2012). When suffering begets suffering: The psychology of competitive victimhood between adversarial groups in violent conflicts. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *16*(4), 351-374.

Oberschall, A. (2000). The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *23*(6), 982-1001.

Oehme, K., Donnelly, E. A., and Martin, A. (2012). Alcohol abuse, PTSD, and officer-committed domestic violence. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, *6*(4), 418-430.

O'Leary, B. (2005). Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments. In: Noel, S. (ed.). *From Power Sharing to Democracy: post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies*. McGill-Queen's University Press. Pp. 3-43.

O'Leary, B. and McGarry, J. (2007). Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, *5*(4), 670-698.

——— (2009). Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands. In: Taylor, R. (ed.). *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and Northern Ireland Conflict.* Routledge. Pp. 15-84.

Orentlicher, D. F. (2010). *That someone guilty be punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia.* International Centre for Transitional Justice.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). (2018). *Hate Crime Reporting: Bosnia and Herzegovina.* OSCE. url: http://hatecrime.osce.org/bosnia-and-herzegovina (Accessed December 3, 2018).

Papageorgiou, V., Frangou-Garunovic, A., Iordanidou, R., Yule, W., Smith, P., and Vostanis, P. (2000). War trauma and psychopathology in Bosnian refugee children. *European child and adolescent psychiatry*, *9*(2), 84-90.

Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'. *Review of international studies*, *28*(4), 637-656.

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge University Press.

Parlevliet, M. (2000). Truth Commissions in Africa: the Non-Case of Namibia and the Emerging Case of Sierra Leone. *International Law FORUM*, 2(1), 98-111.

Pavlović, S., Hasanović, M., Kravić-Prelić, N., and Pajević, I. (2013). *Alcoholic beverages abuse of war veterans during and after the Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995 war.* Paper Presented at the 21st European Congress of Psychiatry, Nice, France.

Perica, V. (2002). *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in the Yugoslav States.* Oxford University Press.

Petersen, R. and Zukerman, S. (2010). Anger, violence, and political science. In *International Handbook of Anger* (pp. 561-581). Springer New York.

Pfeiffer, J. (2003). International NGOs and primary health care in Mozambique: the need for a new model of collaboration. *Social Science and Medicine*, 56(4), 725-738.

Pham, P. N., Weinstein, H. M., and Longman, T. (2004). Trauma and PTSD symptoms in Rwanda: implications for attitudes toward justice and reconciliation. *JAMA*, *292*(5), 602-612.

Pham, P. N., Vinck, P., and Weinstein, H. M. (2010). Human rights, transitional justice, public health and social reconstruction. *Social Science and Medicine*, *70*(1), 98-105.

Pleština, D. (1992). *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure and Consequences.* Westview Press.

Psychosocial Working Group (PWG). (2003). Psychosocial intervention in complex emergencies: A conceptual framework. *Psychosocial Working Group, Edinburgh*.

Porobić, S. (2017). Daring 'life-return projects' to post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Migration, 55*(5), 192-204.

Powell, S. (2000). The psychosocial approach to the consequences of war: a critical essay. In: Powell, S. and Duraković-Belko, E. (eds.) *Sarajevo 2000: The Psychosocial Consequences of War.* proMENTE.

Pouligny, B. (2005). Civil society and post-conflict peacebuilding: Ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies. *Security dialogue*, *36*(4), 495-510.

Pugh, M. (2002). Postwar political economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The spoils of peace. *Global Governance*, *8*(4), 467-482.

Puljek-Shank, A. (2007). Trauma and Reconciliation. In: Rill, H., Šmidling, T. and Bitoljanu, A. (eds.). *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening and Change: Peacebuilding in the Region of the Former Yugoslavia.* Center for Non-violent Action. Pp. 181-204.

Pupavac, V. (2002). Pathologizing populations and colonizing minds: International psychosocial programs in Kosovo. *Alternatives*, 489-511.

Putnam, R. D. (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster.

Ramet, S. P. (2005). *Thinking about Yugoslavia: scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*. Cambridge University Press.

——— (2007). The denial syndrome and its consequences: Serbian political culture since 2000. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *40*(1), 41-58.

Ramet, S. P. and Pavlaković, V. (2005). *Serbia since 1989: Politics and society under Milošević and after*. University of Washington Press.

Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., and Woodhouse, T. (2016). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Polity.

Regan, P. M. and Norton, D. (2005). Greed, grievance, and mobilization in civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49*(3), 319-336.

Reich, H. (2006). "*Local Ownership" in Conflict Transformation Projects. Partnership, Participation or Patronage?* Berghof Foundation.

Reichel, S. (2000). *Transitional administrations in former Yugoslavia: A repetition of failures or a necessary learning process towards a universal peace-building tool after ethno-political war?* (No. P 00-305). WZB Discussion Paper.

Reilly, C. A. (2009). *Peace-building and development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland*. Macmillan.

Reilly, B. (2012). Institutional designs for diverse democracies: Consociationalism, centripetalism and communalism compared. *European Political Science*, *11*(2), 259-270.

Renan, E. (1996 [1882]). What is a Nation? In: Eley, G. and Suny R.G. (eds.). *Becoming National: A Reader.* Oxford University Press. pp. 41-55. (Translated by Martin Thom).

Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., and Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*(4), 336-353.

Roberts, D. (2011). Beyond the metropolis? Popular peace and post-conflict peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies*, *37*(5), 2535-2556.

Roberts, B., Damundu, E. Y., Lomoro, O., and Sondorp, E. (2009). Post-conflict mental health needs: a cross-sectional survey of trauma, depression and associated factors in Juba, Southern Sudan. *BMC psychiatry*, *9*(1), 7-16.

Robinson, F. (2011). *The ethics of care: A feminist approach to human security.* Temple University Press.

Rolston, B. (2006). Dealing with the past: Pro-state paramilitaries, truth and transition in Northern Ireland. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 652-675.

Sacco, J. (2000). *Safe Area Goražde.* Fantagraphics.

Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* Pantheon Books.

Saunders, H. H. (1999). *A public peace process: Sustained dialogue to transform racial and ethnic conflicts*. Macmillan.

Schori-Eyal, N., Halperin, E., and Bar-Tal, D. (2014). Three layers of collective victimhood: effects of multileveled victimhood on intergroup conflicts in the Israeli–Arab context. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *44*(12), 778-794.

Schweitzer, C. (2012). *Evaluation Report: "Work for Peace and Reconciliation in the West Balkans" of the Centre for Non-violent Action, Sarajevo and Belgrade.* Hamburg: Institut für Friedensarbeit und gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung.

Sebastian, S. (2007) Leaving Dayton Behind: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *FRIDE Working Papers, 46.*

Sells, M. A. (1996). *The bridge betrayed: Religion and genocide in Bosnia*. University of California Press.

Shesterinina, A. (2016). Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War. *American Political Science Review*, *110*(3), 411-427.

Silber, L. and Little, A. (1996). *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation.* Penguin Books.

Silove, D. (2001). A conceptual framework for mass trauma: Implications for adaptation, intervention and debriefing. In: Raphael, B. and Wilson, J.P. (Eds.). *Psychological debriefing: Theory, practice and evidence.* Cambridge University Press. Pp. 337-350.

——— (2013). The ADAPT model: a conceptual framework for mental health and psychosocial programming in post conflict settings. *Intervention*, *11*(3), 237-248.

Silove, D., Steel, Z., McGorry, P. and Mohan, P. (1998). Trauma Exposure, Post-migration stressors and symptoms of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress in Tamil asylum seekers: comparison with refugees and immigrants. *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 97*(3), 175-181.

Simonsen, S. G. (2005). Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases. *Security Dialogue*, *36*(3), 297-318.

Skrbiš, Z. (2007). Mobilised Croatian Diaspora: Its Role in Homeland Politics and War. In Smith, H. and Stares, P. (Ed.), *Diasporas in Conflict: Peacemakers or Peace Wreckers* (pp. 218-237). United Nations University Press.

Slapšak, S. (2001). The Use of Women and the Role of Women in the Yugoslav War. In: Skjelsbaek, I. and Smith, D. (eds.), *Gender, Peace, and Conflict*. Sage. Pp. 161-183.

Spahić-Šiljak, Z. (2014). *Shining Humanity: Life Stories of Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Spanović, M., Lickel, B., Denson, T. F., and Petrović, N. (2010). Fear and anger as predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression: Evidence from Serbia and Republika Srpska. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*(6), 725-739.

Spiegel, D., Kraemer, H., Bloom, J., and Gottheil, E. (1989). Effect of psychosocial treatment on survival of patients with metastatic breast cancer. *The Lancet*, *334*(8668), 888-891.

Stansfeld, S. (2006). Social Cohesion and Social Support. In: Marmot, M. and Wilkinson, R. (eds.) *Social determinants of health*. Oxford University Press. Pp. 148-171.

Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. *Political Psychology*, *27*(6), 867-894.

Stefansson, A. H. (2010). Coffee after cleansing? Co-existence, co-operation, and communication in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Focaal*, *2010*(57), 62-76.

Steflja, I. (2018). The production of the war criminal cult: Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj at The Hague. *Nationalities Papers*, *46*(1), 52-68.

Stepakoff, S., Hubbard, J., Katoh, M., Falk, E., Mikulu, J. B., Nkhoma, P., and Omagwa, Y. (2006). Trauma healing in refugee camps in Guinea: A psychosocial program for Liberian and Sierra Leonean survivors of torture and war. *American Psychologist*, *61*(8), 921-933.

Sterland, B. (2006). *Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies: The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*. International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC).

Stojanović, N. (2014). When non-nationalist voters support ethno-nationalist parties: the 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a prisoner's dilemma game. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *14*(4), 607-625.

Subotic, J. (2009). *Hijacked justice: Dealing with the past in the Balkans*. Cornell University Press.

——— (2012). The Past Is Not Yet Over: Remembrance, Justice and Security Community in the Western Balkans. *Journal of Regional Security*, *1*(2), 107-18.

Summerfield, D. (1995). Addressing human response to war and atrocity. In: Kleber, R.J., Figley, C.R., and Gersons, B. (eds.). *Beyond trauma* (pp. 17-29). Springer US.
——— (1997). The impact of war and atrocity on civilian populations. *Psychological trauma: A developmental approach*, 140-155.

——— (1999). A critique of seven assumptions behind psychological trauma programmes in war-affected areas. *Social science and medicine*, *48*(10), 1449-1462.

——— (2000). Conflict and health: War and mental health: A brief overview. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, *321*(7255), 232-235.

Svard, P. (2010). The international community and post-war reconciliation in Africa: A case study of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *10*(1), 35-62.

Sylvester, C. (2012). War experiences/war practices/war theory. *Millennium*, 40(3), 483-503.

——— (2013a). *War as experience: Contributions from international relations and feminist analysis.* Routledge.

——— (2013b). Experiencing the end and afterlives of International Relations/theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 609-626.

Taft, C. T., Weatherill, R. P., Woodward, H. E., Pinto, L. A., Watkins, L. E., Miller, M. W. and Dekel, R. (2009). Intimate partner and general aggression perpetration among combat veterans presenting to a posttraumatic stress disorder clinic. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *79*(4), 461.

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, G. and Kenworthy, J. (2007). The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*(1), 119-136.

Tawil, S. (2013). No end in sight: moving towards a social justice framework for mental health in continuous conflict settings. *Intervention*, *11*(1 Special Anniversary Issue: Part 2), 24-36.

Taydas, Z., Enia, J. and James, P. (2011). Why do civil wars occur? Another look at the theoretical dichotomy of opportunity versus grievance. *Review of international Studies*, *37*(5), 2627-2650.

Taylor, R. (2009). The Promise of Consociational Theory. In: Taylor, R. (ed.) *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict.* Routledge.

Teten, A. L., Schumacher, J. A., Taft, C. T., Stanley, M. A., Kent, T. A., Bailey, S. D., Dunn, N. J., and White, D. L. (2010). Intimate partner aggression perpetrated and sustained by male Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam veterans with and without posttraumatic stress disorder. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *25*(9), 1612-1630.

Thabet, A. A., Tawahina, A. A., El Sarraj, E., and Vostanis, P. (2008). Exposure to war trauma and PTSD among parents and children in the Gaza strip. *European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, *17*(4), 191.

Thoms, O. N., Ron, J., and Paris, R. (2010). State-level effects of transitional justice: What do we know? *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, *4*(3), 329-354.

Thorleifsson, C. M. (2015). *Nationalism and the Politics of Fear in Israel: Race and Identity on the Border with Lebanon*. IB Tauris.

Tickner, J. A. (2005). What is your research program? Some feminist answers to international relations methodological questions. *International Studies Quarterly*, *49*(1), 1-22.

Toe, R. (2016). Bosnia to Publish Census Without Serb Agreement. *Balkan Insight* (June 30th.) url: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-to-release-long-awaited-census-results-on-thursday-06-29-2016 (Accessed December 7, 2017).

Tol, W. A., Kohrt, B., Jordans, M., Thapa, S., Pettigrew J., Upadhaya, N., and de Jong, J. (2009). Political Violence and Mental Health: A multi-disciplinary review of the literature on Nepal. *Social Science and Medicine 70*(1), 35-44.

Tol, W. A., Patel, V., Tomlinson, M., Baingana, F., Galappatti. A, et al. (2011a). Research Priorities for Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Humanitarian Settings. *PLoS Med 8*(9).

Tol, W. A., Barbui, C., Galappatti, A., Silove, D., Betancourt, T. S., Souza, R., et al. (2011b). Mental health and psychosocial support in humanitarian settings: linking practice and research. *The Lancet*, *378*(9802), 1581-1591.

Tong, R. and Williams, N. (2016). Feminist Ethics. In: Zalta, E. (ed.). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition). url:

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/feminism-ethics/ (Accessed December 3, 2018).

Torsti, P. (2003). *Divergent stories, convergent attitudes: Study on the presence of history, history textbooks, and the thinking of youth in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Taifunni.

——— (2007). How to deal with a difficult past? History textbooks supporting enemy images in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, *39*(1), 77-96.

——— (2009). Segregated education and texts: A challenge to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Journal on World Peace*, 65-82.

Transparency International (2016). *Corruption Perception Index 2016.* Transparency International. url:

https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (Accessed December 7, 2017).

Tronto, J. (2008). Is peacekeeping care work? A feminist reflection on "the responsibility to protect." In: Whisnant, R. and DesAutels, P. (eds.). *Global feminist ethics.* Rowman and Littlefield. Pp. 179-200.

Udovički, J. (2000). Introduction. In: Udovički, J. and Ridgeway, J. (eds.). *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia.* Duke University Press. Pp. 1-11.

UNICEF (1997). Report: Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and Demobilisation and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa. Cape Town, South Africa. UNICEF.

UN Women (2012). *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence.* United Nations.

USAID (2014). *Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM's People-to-People Reconciliation Fund, Annual Program Statement (APS).* Social Impact Inc.

——— (2017). Fact Sheet: PRO-Future II: Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future. *USAID.* url: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-trust-understanding-responsibility-future-bosnia-and (Accessed December 28, 2017).

Vinck, P., Pham, P. N., Stover, E., and Weinstein, H. M. (2007). Exposure to war crimes and implications for peace building in northern Uganda. *Jama*, *298*(5), 543-554.

Vollhardt, J. R. (2012). Collective victimization. In: Tropp, L (ed.). *Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict*. Oxford University Press. Pp. 136-157.

Volkan, V. D. (1999). *Post-traumatic states: Beyond individual PTSD in societies ravaged by ethnic conflict*. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7(1), 27-38.

Weller, M. and Wolff, S. (2006). Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Lessons for internationalized state building. *Ethnopolitics*, *5*(1), 1-13.

Wessells, M. and Monteiro, C. (2006). Psychosocial assistance for youth: Toward reconstruction for peace in Angola. *Journal of Social Issues*, *62*(1), 121-139.

Williamson, J. and Robinson, M. (2006). Psychosocial interventions, or integrated programming for well-being? *Intervention*, *4*(1), 4-25

Wilson, J. P., and Drozdek, B. (2004). *Broken spirits: The treatment of traumatized asylum seekers, refugees and war and torture victims*. Routledge.

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. Sage.

World Values Survey Association (2001). World Values Survey 2001.

Woodside, D., Santa Barbara, J., and Benner, D. G. (1999). Psychological trauma and social healing in Croatia. *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, *15*(4), 355-367.

Woodward, S. L. (1995a). *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945-1990.* Princeton University Press.

——— (1995b). *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.* Brookings Institution Press.

World Bank (2021). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Country Profile.* url: https://data.worldbank.org/country/BA (Accessed July 31, 2021).

Xavier, A. G. (2011). Addressing social conflicts in Sri Lanka: Social Development Interventions by a People's organization. In: Lavalette, M. and Ioakimidis, V. (eds.) (2011). *Social work in extremis: Lessons for social work internationally*. Policy Press.

Ventevogel, P., Ommeren, M. V., Schilperoord, M., and Saxena, S. (2015). Improving mental health care in humanitarian emergencies. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization 93*(10), 666-667.

Yavuz, M. H. (2002). The politics of fear: The rise of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey. *The Middle East Journal*, *56*(2), 200-221.

Yordán, C. L. (2003). Society building in Bosnia: A critique of Post-Dayton peacebuilding efforts. *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 4, 59.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1999). What is 'Transversal Politics'? *Soundings, 12*(Summer), 94-98.

Zahar, M. (2005). The Dichotomy of International Mediation and Leader Intransigence: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: O'Flynn, I. and Russell, D. (eds.). *Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies.* Pluto Press. Pp. 123-137.

Zanotti, L. (2010). UN Integrated Peacekeeping Operations and NGOs: Reflections on Governmental Rationalities and Contestation in the Age of Risk. *International peacekeeping*, *17*(1), 17-31.

Žiga, J., Turčilo, L., Osmić, A., Basić, S., Džananović-Miraščija, N., Kapidžić, D., and Brkić-Šmigoc, J. (2015). *Youth Study Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).