University of Alberta

One Nation under God: Christian Zionism and American Societal Security

by

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Abstract

Societal security, as opposed to physical security, is the primary driver of contemporary international relations.   The American nation is bound together, not by ethnic ties, but by values, which have evolved from the US's historical roots in Western, Protestant society. The 'special relationship' with the State of Israel is part of the US's global strategy aimed at protecting its societal security. Americans view Israelis as exhibiting shared values; therefore they identify with them in the conflict. While historically, politicians viewed Christian Zionists as extremists, tolerated only for electoral success; today, Christians United for Israel has softened its approach and appeals to Christian American values as the basis of support for Israel. This approach has changed the way Americans think about Israel and the popular discourse employed.

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Introduction

I leaned into the podium, feeling as confident – and as earnest – as if I were addressing my Cornerstone congregation. "I want to say this as clearly and plainly as I possibly can: Israel, you are not alone. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a new day in America. The sleeping giant of Christian Zionism has awakened. Fifty million Christians are standing up and applauding the State of Israel" (Hagee 2007, 2).

On July 18, 2011, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, addressed an audience of American Evangelical Christians.   He warned them of the perils of a Palestinian unilateral declaration of statehood, encouraging the audience to demand that their government cut off all funding to the UN, if that were to happen. He warned them of the threat of a nuclear Iran, exhorting them to continue to apply pressure to intensify sanctions against the Islamic Republic:

> What is the acceptable compromise position we could reach with Iran? . . . The American position is: we don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons. The Iranian position is: we want to have nuclear weapons. What's the compromise? Iran has a small nuclear weapons program?!?[1]

Bolton received multiple standing ovations and two days later, five thousand Christian supporters of Israel descended upon Capitol Hill to lobby their congressmen and senators.

Why does the US give three billion dollars a year in aid to Israel? Why does the US unconditionally back the tiny state at the United Nations and other

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[1] Christians United for Israel Washington DC summit 18 July, 2011. Bolton's address to Chairman's Club dinner, heard first-hand and available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwsyPOJO1Kc, accessed 4th August, 2011.

international forums? Why does the prime minister of Israel receive multiple standing ovations from both sides of the House when addressing a joint session of the US Congress? In short, why does America support Israel?

In their widely-acclaimed work, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*[2], International Relations scholars, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, assert that the answer is due to the incredible power of the Jewish[3] lobby in America. This lobby supposedly exerts undue influence on foreign policymakers, producing formidable results for Israel. At the same time, however, this lobby is sacrificing the US national interest, both domestically (by expending resources that could have been put to better use, such as healthcare and public works) and internationally (by compromising America's relationship with other Arab and Muslim countries).   While there is no doubting the major successes of the Jewish lobby, this thesis argues that the lobby is only one part of the story.

This thesis inquires into the nature of the American people, arguing that the US supports Israel for reasons more fundamental than mere advocacy efforts. Sharing a Western and biblical heritage and value system, Americans identify with the State of Israel over its neighbours and see it as an ally in its struggle for the security of the American way of life. While such an attitude is exemplified by the Christian Evangelical pro-Israel lobby, it is similarly held by

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[2] Whilst originally in 2006, this publication was a shorter article, they published their work as a book in 2007.

[3] Whilst they claim that they are not referring specifically to Jews, they are ambiguous in their description of the pro-Israel lobby (as I shall explore in chapter five). And throughout their book, the Jewish America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is the largest pro-Israel lobby, bears the brunt of their criticism.

ordinary Americans, who 'do not need much convincing' to remain steadfast in their support for Israel. Thus, the rationale for America's unwavering support for Israel is multidimensional, being due to efforts of the Jewish lobby (as per Mearsheimer and Walt's assertion); the Christian lobby (especially with the recent meteoric rise of Christians United for Israel); and, the American nation, whose perceived shared values with Israel have resulted in the unique bond between the two countries.

An appreciation of the role American nationalism plays in the US-Israel relationship requires an understanding of the importance of states in the international system and the relationship between nations and states. Why have states been the bedrock of International Relations?[4] From Classical Realism to Neorealism to Constructivism, states have occupied a reified role of primacy and centrality in International Relations. In a globalizing world, however, where multinational corporations are often wealthier than many countries, nongovernmental organizations drive international socio-political activity, and global non-state networks wage 'new wars' on domestic societies (see Kaldor 2007), many scholars have predicted the slow death of the 'state' as the major actor in global politics, with an ultimate transition to what has been coined the "post-international" world (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; Ferguson and Mansbach 2007; Hobbs 2002; Rosneau 1990).

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[4] Throughout this thesis, I employ the common practice of referring to the academic field as "International Relations" or "IR" (upper case), as opposed to the actual daily business of foreign affairs between states as "international relations" (lower case).

From an IR perspective, it is impossible to understand the current international system, unless there is a theoretical basis for the state as the most important actor in that system. Why do states matter? The continuing relevance of states is justifiable solely given the existence of something that is unique to states and qualitatively distinguishes them from any other actor in the international arena. In addition, their stated relevance must differentiate states from one another, such that they are each uniquely important and therefore not vulnerable to subsumption into one another or into a globalized system. In other words, why do we need micro-governance by states when we could all abdicate our authority to a world government? And what makes the French state different to the British state and yet different to the German state, such that they need remain separate entities? Are states thus historical anachronisms or ever-relevant and important actors in the globalized world?

This thesis examines this question through the lens of America's relationship with Israel and concludes that nationalism – and its manifestation in the 'nation-state' – is the logic behind the enduring relevance of the state. States are the most important force in the foreseeable future, not for physical security, but for the protection of nationalist identities, or 'societal security.' International relations take place when states perceive an external threat to their nations. In other words, states matter internally because they protect their domestic societies, and from an IR perspective, states matter externally

because they are the bridge between nations and the world and strive to protect their national societies in the international system.

While there is no doubt that, due to its multiethnic nature, American nationalism is complex and multifaceted, this paper nevertheless hones in on some of the overarching themes of the American people, deriving historically from their Protestant and Western liberal origins and embodied in certain unique American notions such as *American Exceptionalism* and *Manifest Destiny.* A penchant for Israel is particularly pronounced amongst American Evangelical Christians. While certainly not representative of the American people as a whole, this segment of the population has been imputed with impacting foreign affairs, specifically the role of the United States in the Middle East. This thesis argues that without a rudimentary understanding of American nationalism, one cannot understand the important role that Evangelicals have played in shaping US foreign policy and particularly, the incredible American support for the State of Israel.

From a traditional International Relations perspective, the notion of a domestic group impacting the international behaviour of the US is troubling. Realist IR scholars focus solely upon the unitary, rational state actor, which aims to maximize power, either willingly (Morgenthau 1948), or simply in order to survive in the anarchic international system (Waltz 1979). According to Mearsheimer, states aim to maximize power in order to achieve hegemony, the greatest form of security (2001). Any domestic influence that does not work to

maximize state power is an aberration that states should strive to curtail (Morgenthau 2006, 7; Waltz 1986a, 60). In this regard, a focus on states in International Relations theory at the exclusion of all other actors, while not perfectly reflecting the real world (according to most scholars, with the notable exception being Mearsheimer 2001) is the most useful, because in order to create a theory of international relations, one must "single out the strongest propelling forces" (Waltz 1986a, 56).

Nevertheless, the meaning of the maximization of power and security is far from uncontested. Does security refer simply to physical security of the state and its inhabitants? Bary Buzan and Ole Wæver argue in fact that the "gravest security problems will have, at least in the foreseeable future, "society" as opposed to state, their referent. Society is mostly about identity . . . and in the present historical epoch, identity is mostly about national, ethnic, and religious loyalties" (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, 117). This thesis explores the nature of the state and the relationship between society and state. Similarly, Mary Kaldor asserts that the "new wars" of the twenty-first century have as their root cause, the backlash of identity politics against an increasingly cosmopolitan, globalizing world (Kaldor 2007).

How has this manifested itself in the US? The response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 certainly showed that Americans are equally susceptible to societal security threats. What is American society and identity? Americans issue from multiple backgrounds and origins, but what binds them is "not

ethnicity but a commitment to liberal political principles . . . Whatever one's ancestry or background, to be an American one [has] only to adhere to a set of ideals: liberty, individualism, popular sovereignty, and egalitarianism defined as equality of opportunity and respect" (Citrin et al 1994). The attacks of September 11 were directed towards the symbols of American identity: the World Trade Center representing American capitalism; the Pentagon, American security. On that day, Americans felt that not only were they attacked physically, they were attacked societally. In the words of President Bush, the attacks were a "threat to our way of life" (September 20, 2001).

The notion of American identity and society based on Western ideals alone would suffice to explain the allegedly inordinate response to the attacks, the consequences of which we are still dealing with over a decade later, with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the religious identity of America is an additional factor driving national societal insecurity and thus the international response. The US is unique among Western countries as having a deeply religious culture that persists in its religious symbolism and rhetoric. Banknotes have religious inscriptions, the Constitution is replete with religious references, and presidential candidates are assessed according to their religious affinities. But this devotion is not indicative of just 'any' religion. Despite those who argue for the concept of an American non-denominational 'civil religion' (Bellah 1967), this thesis shows that America is a country with deep Christian roots and an ongoing fealty to Christian nationalism. While it is true

that in some segments of the population this Christian nationalism is more overt than in others, nevertheless it is manifest in a large portion of the American people. Adding to this American Christian nationalism, foreign policy activists, who hold the belief that, on account of perceived contemporary prophetic unfolding, war in the Middle East and support for Israel is one's biblical duty, makes for a potent mix of political fervor and passion.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the origins of the state and in its role in International Relations theory. I show that the right of a state to autonomy is fundamental and hence, the persistence of states in a globalizing world is due to their desire to remain autonomous, that is, unique and independent. This autonomy is synonymous with the state's obligation to provide *societal* security, the protection of the identity of the people therein, which thus forms the basis of the term "nation-state" and the concept of Inter-"national" relations. Later, I show that support for Israel is due predominantly to the need to maximize not physical security, but societal security.

Chapter 2 examines competing theories of nationalism and assesses their application to the American people, concluding that American nationalism, whilst avoiding description by classic ethnicity-based theories of nationalism, is well-formulated by modern and postmodern theories of nationalism. Such theories posit a concept of nationalism based upon an elite-driven, top-down 'imagined' differentiation between 'us' and the 'other.' In America's case, the 'us' is liberal, Western and democratic; and in a significant portion of American

society – Christian.   This American identity is what motivates identification with Israel in its conflict with its neighbours.

Chapter 3 traces the history of the theology and motivations behind Christian Zionism.   Christianity has harboured an historic animus towards Judaism and only recently have relations improved.   A novel understanding, based on a reading of the Bible called *Premillenial Dispensationalism,* forms the basis for Christian Zionist thought and practice.   Nevertheless, while Christian Zionism is based on a theologically narrow understanding of the Bible, contemporary Christian Zionists point to a broad range of motives for supporting Israel.   This expanded agenda may account for the wide support exhibited by Americans for Israel.

Chapter 4 investigates the rise of the Christian Right and support for Israel in American politics and concludes that American politicians in recent history from both major parties have been supportive of Israel.   The common parlance in this regard is not support due to strategic concerns, nor is it support due to particular theological imperatives.   Rather, the language employed speaks overwhelmingly of common values shared by the US and Israel.   What is the connection between the rise of the Christian right and changed attitudes towards Israel generally?

Chapter 5 reviews interest group theory, in order to determine the power of the pro-Israel lobby in positively influencing US foreign policy in the Middle East.   Studies have shown, however, that advocacy groups, for the most part, are

not involved in attempting to convince politicians to change their minds. Rather, they are most effective when they 'preach to the choir,' that is, when they lobby to an attentive audience and strive to present their positions as cogently as possible. This thesis argues that the success of the pro-Israel lobby, and particularly the Christian Zionist lobby, is due to the eagerness of Christian lawmakers to pay it heed.

This symbiotic relationship between lobbyist and elected official is based primarily on a Christian American sense of identification with Israel and its common values. This attitude has accelerated over the last decade, due to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, which has led to American societal insecurity and the need to provide an adequate response to the American people. The Evangelical pro-Israel lobby group, Christians United for Israel, under the leadership of John Hagee, has capitalized on these societal fears and has endeavoured to advocate on behalf of Israel to as wide a Christian American audience as possible. Thus, whilst its raison d'être is rooted in Christian Zionist Premillenial Dispensationalist theology, its modus operandi is to convince Americans to identify with Israel and the Jewish people based on shared Western values and biblical origins. To this end, most of the public rhetoric and political advocacy language employed is couched in universal American national themes, in order to unify Christian Americans in support of Israel.

While undoubtedly members of the Christian Zionist lobby have endeavoured to achieve their goals by means of hard work – building

relationships with politicians and appealing to their Christian sentiments – the change that they have effected over time in American political discourse is astonishing. Politicians of all stripes, as well as laypeople, talk of 'shared Judeo-Christian values'[5] and of the 'special relationship with Israel.' This new discourse is due to an ongoing campaign by Christian Zionists to change the way people think about the relationships between Christianity and Judaism, and Christianity and Islam.   The former, they present as an historical alliance; the latter, as an historical clash. Gramsci referred to such an attempt to change the way people think about their culture as a 'counter-hegemonic' struggle to create a new 'historical bloc' (Gramsci 1971, 181).

International relations today are concerned first and foremost with the protection of societal security. The story of US support for Israel is an integral part of the story of American societal security. While the pro-Israel lobby is certainly strong, any attempt to understand the US-Israel relationship cannot ignore the lobby's Christian American audience. A significant number of American Christians identify with Israel, due to the perception of shared biblical and Western values. The pro-Israel lobby, and particularly the Christian Zionist lobby, has directed its advocacy efforts toward these American Christians. In an effort to sustain the image of the American nation and its role as a nation-state in the international arena, they have tapped into fears for societal security. They

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[5] This peculiar term only began to appear in the 1950s!

have thereby succeeded in achieving unconditional support for the Jewish state

in its challenging relations with its neighbours.

Chapter 1 – Toward an International Theory of the State

> *America is a cause, not a nation, with a mission to convert the rest of the world to the American dream and to rid the world of enemies* (Kaldor 2007, 154)

Classical International Relations is the study of the interaction between states. What are states, where did they come from, and why are they important? This chapter will explore the origin and historical significance of the state as a means of protection of its inhabitants' physical security. It then will investigate the enduring importance of the state in an age of globalization, concluding that the main purpose of states today is not physical, but societal security – the protection of nationalistic identities, that which differentiates one state from another.

International Relations theory minimizes the role of domestic politics, which considers states as unitary rational actors with the sole purpose of protecting their inhabitants. The problem, however, with this approach is that when one shifts the focus from mere physical protection to societal security, how is the state's role then defined in the international arena? While Mearsheimer and Walt's assertion that the favourable international interaction between the US and Israel is due to domestic political activity and is therefore an aberration of IR theory, it is based on their classical IR assumption that the state aims to maximize physical security. What they fail to comprehend is that states are equally, if not more so, committed to societal security and this commitment

would account for apparent strategic irregularities in the behaviour of the US internationally.

In this chapter, I review the origins of the state and show that the original purpose of the state was in order to protect the physical security of its inhabitants. This then forms the basis for classic International Relations theory, whereby states are assumed to act primarily for the purposes of the protection of the physical security of their inhabitants in the international arena. In light of this, no internal domestic workings of the state should be relevant to IR theory, since every external action must be security-driven. Any domestic political activity should have no impact on the international level. Nevertheless, constructivist scholars critique this position as fatalistic, inasmuch as the theory assumes a Hobbesian state of affairs and thereby implies that states will forever be in competition with one another, with no hope for an eventual utopian, global society, where every global citizen's physical security is guaranteed.

If then, the physical security of all the world's inhabitants is the eventual goal, what is the impediment to such a globalized, international order? Wendtian constructivism asks states to reflect upon their interests and identities and strive to work in concert with one another, instead of in competition with each other. And yet, why does Wendt hesitate to ask states to reflect upon their essential existence and conclude that the time has come to 'close up shop' and make way for the 'post-international' global system of governance?

Wendt explains that there are certain interests that a state must reflect upon and conclude (he hopes) that such interests are not essential. Indeed, such interests serve as impediments to world peace and thus the physical security of its inhabitants. There are nonetheless four *objective* interests that make the state what it is. To remove these would be to remove the entire foundation of the state; and states, Wendt concedes, would not be prepared to reconsider and reject their essential existence. The most significant of these objective interests is "autonomy."

Why would states refuse to reject autonomy? The state's purpose has evolved from its earlier role as mere provider for the physical security of its inhabitants.   The contemporary state is the *nation-state* and state autonomy refers to the uniqueness that each state has in its particular culture and society. Thus, the role of the contemporary state is to protect not just the physical security of its inhabitants, but the societal security of its nation. A good example of this dualism is the European Union – while its member-states are united under one umbrella for the purposes of security and economic activity, each country is steadfast in its commitment to maintaining the autonomy of its national identity.

The trend in in international relations today is increasingly, less about physical security and more about societal security. It is about wars due to threats to identity, society and nationality.   This thesis explores the US-Israel relationship as a case study for America's concern for the protection of its

identity in a world that threatens Americanism and this chapter forms the theoretical basis for such an understanding of the American nation-state.

The Origins of the State

While the precise origins and reasons for the evolution of states are not known, there are a number of popular theories. According to Rousseau, the state began with the concept of the *Social Contract*, whereby individuals gave up a portion of their personal liberty to the sovereign 'state' in exchange for common public goods, such as physical protection:

> Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole… At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of *city*, and now takes that of *Republic* or *body politic*; it is called by its members *State* when passive, *Sovereign* when active, and *Power* when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of *people*, and severally are called *citizens*, as sharing in the sovereign power, and *subjects*, as being under the laws of the State (Rousseau 1762, 1:6)

Thus, Rousseau contends that the meaning and origin of the state is that we are prepared to voluntarily surrender part of our individual freedom, in exchange for communal protection.

V. Gordon Childe advanced a similar theory, proposing that the invention of agriculture brought about a surplus of food, enabling people to divorce themselves from the field and engage in artisan activity. This new division of labour resulted in a social network which brought previously distinct individuals and communities into an integrated political system (1936, 82). Nevertheless, scholars criticize such 'voluntaristic' theories as unlikely, suggesting that force and coercion are likelier propellants of state growth than enlightened self-interest (Carneiro 1970; Oppenheimer 1926; Spencer 1967). They explain the growth of the state as being due to the conquests of powerful rulers, who expanded their territory by invading neighbouring communities, adding them to their dominion. This expanded territory demanded an apparatus of bureaucratic capacity and similarly, provided the inhabitants of the new 'state' with military protection against further invasion. Thus, according to both voluntaristic and coercive theories of state origin, an integral purpose of the state was to provide for the physical security of its inhabitants, who in turn would pay tribute or taxes to the sovereign. At this early stage of the evolution of the state, the notion of societal protection was not yet applicable, as states were made up of multiple identities, basically consisting of conquered communities, and thus the notion of the "nation-state" had yet to evolve into its present-day concept.

The Role of States and their Contested Primacy in International Relations

Whilst in theory, ruling authorities were obligated to protect the physical security of their inhabitants, the Thirty Years' War of the early seventeenth century showed that absent clearly defined boundaries and legally defined sovereign territories, physical security was still not a reality. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established a number of key ideas that would remedy this lack of security and facilitate the primacy of states in the global system. States acquired their status as independent actors, such that governments of countries became sovereign within their own borders and other states could not meddle in their internal domestic affairs (Morgenthau 2006, 294). Thus, due to this elevated status, the traditional focus of classic International Relations studies has been the interaction of states. In today's world, however, of multinational corporations with budgets larger than many countries, nongovernmental organizations with agendas that are moving those of states and international bodies that govern and address global affairs, the primacy of states in the study of International Relations would appear to be an outdated method of enquiry. In order to understand the continued relevance of states and the rationale for their ongoing focus, this chapter will proceed with a review of the role of states in IR.

States and Domestic Actors as the Primary Force in International Relations

The father of modern IR theory is Hans Morgenthau. Political Realism is defined by Morgenthau as reflecting six principles. First, the theoretical legal framework of politics has, as its determinant, an objective system of laws. Second, the ultimate interest of nation-states is power and thus the rational approach to foreign policymaking is the maximization of power. Third, the definition of power is not confined to military might. It refers to anything that establishes and maintains the control of one country over another. Fourth, while moral objectives are praiseworthy on an individual level, states have the obligation to place national survival above all moral action. Fifth, God does not take sides, i.e. no nation has the right to impose its moral proclivities on another, viewing these ideas as universal. Sixth, one must consider the political sphere autonomously – independent of other variables, including economics, religion, and morals (2006, 4-16).

What role do domestic politics play in Classical Realism? According to Morgenthau, "the contingent elements of personality, prejudice and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will that flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course" (2006, 7). He thus argues that "political realism contains not only a theoretical but also a normative element," such that states should strive towards rationality as the basis for foreign policy. Thus, according to Morgenthau, domestic politicking pursuing anything but power is an aberration which statesmen must avoid, and by

implication, the question of the maximization of power is an uncontested objective reality that foreign policymakers would all agree upon. Therefore, at its rational ideal, Realism is all about states, and the domestic becomes irrelevant to IR theory. The strongest anti-domestic Classical Realist position is expressed by John Mearsheimer, who contends that Realism is not simply a normative prescription; it actually reflects the real world of policymaking. Mearsheimer asserts that despite the public postulations of foreign policy elites regarding 'moral' and 'liberal' goals, "behind closed doors, [policy is discussed] mostly [in] the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic" (2001, 25). Thus, Mearsheimer confirms the centrality and sole importance of states in IR theory.

Neorealism strengthens this state-centric view even further. According to Kenneth Waltz, theories that resort to the internal behaviour of states fail to be theories of international relations, for "low-level explanations are repeatedly defeated" as similar international outcomes are the result of variations in the attributes and interactions of the agents that cause them. Rather, he argues for a top-down approach that analyzes the international anarchic structure in which all states find themselves. Waltz argues that the structure of international anarchy leads to self-help on the part of states, which must maximize their security positions simply in order to survive. Thus, according to Waltz, states do

not choose to maximize their power; rather they are forced to balance against the power of other states in the international system (Waltz 1986a, 53-5).

Does this reflect the real world of international politics? Likening his theory to one of the market, Waltz contends that market theory shows how firms are pressed by the market to act in a certain way to maximize their efficiency. Whether or not they actually do, will depend upon the internal efficiency of the firm. Similarly, international theory will produce an expected ideal outcome of states in the system. Whether or not they in fact act to maximize efficiency will depend upon the efficiency of their foreign policies (Waltz 1986a, 60). Thus, for Waltz too, his theory of structural realism is the foundation for the ideal scenario, but not necessarily reflective of the real world, which is subject to many other variables within the domain of domestic politicking. Nevertheless, he is committed to the statist model, because in order to create a theory of international relations, one must "single out the strongest propelling forces" (Waltz 1986a, 56).

Who Determines How to Maximize Power?

The overarching question that remains to be addressed by the classical realist and neorealist camps is who determines the definition of power and security, absent an examination of domestic politics. In other words, classical realism assumes that national security is an uncontested abstract notion. If this were the case, there would indeed be no need for a theory of domestic foreign

policy, as everyone would agree on the definition of security and power and how to maximize it. As history has shown, this is not the case and this gap in IR theory is the subject of study of Neoclassical Realists. In the words of Gideon Rose:

> Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and state structure (1998, 171).

In other words, we cannot ignore the domestic determinants of international relations, because the key question is "who speaks for the nation and perceives increases and decreases in its power and security?" (Zakaria 1998, 24). In fact, even Waltz himself was acutely aware of the subjectivity of foreign policymakers in making such determinations, writing, "Any theory of international politics requires also a theory of domestic politics, since states affect the system's structure even as it affects them" (Waltz 1986b, 331). Thus, implicit in a realist understanding that states aim to maximize power is the concession that real domestic actors are determining how to maximize state power.

Liberal IR Theory

For the bulk of the twentieth century, Realism's major competitor was Liberalism or Idealism. While Realists believe in a Hobbesian natural order, arguing that states strive to maximise their relative positions, Idealists believe

that when states work together they can achieve absolute gains for all. Nonetheless, late twentieth century Liberal theorists modified their initial optimism. Liberal Institutionalists maintain that while states cooperate, their behaviour is primarily due to selfish motivations; and, the entire notion of *cooperation* implies a lack of natural harmony (Keohane 1984, 12). This is a modified Realism.

Liberal Interdependence theory contends that we live in a complex world that is more interconnected than mere military alliances, the primary bond being economic ties. This is the greatest deterrent to conflict. In addition, these theorists point to a large segment of international affairs taking place independent of official state foreign policy apparati, including NGOs, multinational corporations, and bureaucrats who work together from different countries (Keohane and Nye 2001, 22). Thus, according to Liberal IR theory, while the state plays a role in international relations, there is no doubt that domestic players are equally important and must be analysed. The result is that for Liberal IR theorists, who acknowledge non-state actors, it is even more pressing to explain the ongoing relevance of the state.

The Constructivist Problem with the Reification of States

Richard Ashley criticizes Neorealism for its *a priori* commitment to statism, inasmuch as "the state-as-actor assumption is a metaphysical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism. . . .

[N]eorealism immunizes its statist commitments from any form of falsification"

(Ashley 1986, 270).   His two predominant concerns with statism are that it

unquestioningly legitimizes "precarious rule" by "dominant classes" and that in a

structural framework, one cannot assume the status of units prior to the system

(1986, 273).   The ultimate concern is that the incontestable treatment of the

system as statist combined with a utilitarian understanding of international

society allows for the status quo to persist which then justifies the innate

inequality produced by dominating behaviour among hegemonic great powers as

the means to generating world order (Ashley 1986, 279).   An historical view of

the system of states would acknowledge that the current arrangement is a

relatively recent construction and that international transformation towards

greater world order might be achieved only with the dissolution of the

preferential treatment accorded states (Ashley 1986, 290).

A Constructivist Commitment to Statism

Despite claiming the mantle of Constructivism, Alexander Wendt utilizes

the theoretical framework of the current statist condition, because "in the

medium run sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the

international system" (Wendt 1992, 424).   Working thus within a Waltzian

framework of structural international anarchy, Wendt questions Waltz's

privileging of structure over process. In that vein, he argues that the notion of

self-help is one of process, not structure; in fact self-help itself is an institution,

not a constitutive feature of anarchy. The problem with realism's assumption of the Hobbesian international state of nature, according to Wendt, is that it assumes the worst in relationships, an approach not taken in civil society, where one will assume that on the balance of probabilities other people are naturally good and kind. So why should we assume the worst on an international level? Thus Wendt argues that being that all meanings are constructed and the only meaning is the intersubjective meaning, the institution of self-help as a result of anarchy is true as long as states believe that is the only result. Wendt's suggestion is for states to redefine their interests in terms of cooperation, as opposed to competition, which he asserts will ultimately result in the changing identities of states. In place of Hobbesian states of war, there could be Kantian states of collaboration, which leads to the ultimate condition of national and international security (Wendt 1992; 1999).

Wendt offers Gorbachev as an example of this shift in identity. Gorbachev sought to "engage the West in far-reaching cooperation." In order to achieve this engagement, he needed to reject the Leninist teaching that ideologically placed capitalism and socialism in stark opposition to one another and recognize the role the Soviets had played in sustaining the conflict (Wendt 1992, 421). Similarly, in order for states to achieve cooperation as a medium to achieve security, it entails a critical examination of the ideas of self and other and the structures of interaction through which these ideas have taken shape. In a period of relative stability, however, ideas and identities become naturalized

and reified. In order to effect change, such perceptions of self and other's identities must be "denaturalized," by constantly questioning the perceived unassailability of one's position and ideology (Wendt 1992, 420). Thus, Wendt offers a normative prescription for the evolution of international security and cooperation – introspection on the part of state actors to determine their current states of (subjective) interests and identities, along with a greater investigation into the interests and identities of 'enemies' and 'rivals' (Wendt 1999, 279-301), and to transform these interests and identities, in an effort to promote greater security and stability for all states.

What is the role of domestic politics according to Wendt? Although he claims to work within the neorealist structural framework (Wendt 1992, 396), and would contend that domestic politics is not his concern, his theory implicitly relies on domestic politics. Since he asserts that states are the primary focus of enquiry in the current international system, how does he believe that states' conceptions of *ego* and *alter* (Wendt 1999, 328) will change without serious internal debate as to the wisdom and efficacy of such change? His Gorbachev example reflects the ultimate speciousness of his theory of identity change.

Firstly, his commendation of Gorbachev's abdication of Leninism in favour of détente is rather US-centric, in that the onus fell upon the Soviet enemy to alter *their* interests and identities. Secondly, did Gorbachev act alone without domestic consultation? If he was able to act unilaterally as the embodiment of the state, then would this be the case in a democratic state,

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where checks and balances are in place to block such unilateral action? Thirdly, while his actions certainly ended the Cold War, his subsequent removal from office challenges the notion that he truly represented the will of the Soviet state. Fourthly, what if there were interests that ran much deeper than competing twentieth century economic ideologies?   It is therefore impossible to achieve Wendt's aspiration of identity transformation without an appeal to the domestic. Thus, he too claims to focus on states in the international system, while letting the domestic 'do all the work.'   Nevertheless, despite not addressing this problem directly, Wendt would presumably respond in the same manner as Morgenthau and Waltz. Earlier in this chapter, I quoted them as acknowledging their theoretical framework as the ideal scenario; in other words, a normative prescription.   Likewise, Wendt's prescription is clearly normatively instructive with the aim of maximizing state efficiency in the international system and the international system as a whole. When states as units reflect on their interests and identities, this will achieve the most desirable security outcome in the system as they will not need to waste resources on futile power plays.

Why States are Here to Stay

A final critique of Wendt questions the entire foundation of his theory. If his thesis calls for states to reflect upon their interests and identities with the goal of transformation, why does he not require them to question statism itself? Applying the same criteria of identity transformation to the very essence of the

state would thus move seamlessly away from the antiquated particularism of states. Wendt responds to this charge, explaining that any transition to globalism will be "path dependent" upon the concept of the "sovereign state" (Wendt 1992, 424).[6] As I shall explain, there is something about states that runs much deeper than simply the possibility of self-reflection leading to self-negation, which Wendt recognizes as a major impediment to the dissolution of states in the global system.

What is the basic constitution of the state to which Wendt commits his theoretical framework? Wendt[7] delineates four "objective" interests of the state, i.e. national interests that are basic constitutive interests of all states that are not up for consideration in terms of his concept of identity transformation. The first is Waltz's singular objective interest, *physical survival*. This state interest does not imply the survival of individuals, since they may be sacrificed in military duty for the sake of country; rather it refers to survival of the state itself.[8] Unlike Waltz, survival also does not mean the maximization/balancing of power, because he contends that survival is better achieved via cooperation. The second and third objective interests are added by George and Keohane and are *autonomy* and *economic wellbeing.* As a group, these cover "life, liberty and property." According to George and Keohane, autonomy is the ability of a state

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[6] To such an extent, he is comfortable with the moniker "statist" and "realist," although in reality he clarifies that he is merely working within the contemporary framework and not expressing a normative position.

[7] Based on George and Keohane 1980.

[8] He refers to this system as the "state-society complex". I shall elucidate this notion further.

to allocate control over its resources. Choice of government and economic wellbeing refer to property rights, which on a state level refer to the mode of production in a society. The fourth 'objective' interest is articulated by Wendt, who adds to the mix *collective self-esteem.* He explains that whereas in the Hobbesian world, states achieve self-esteem by the pursuit of 'glory' and 'power;' in a Lockean world, one aspires to 'virtue' and being a 'good global citizen.' This self-esteem is aided by recognition and legitimation by other states, which propels states to behave according to a certain standard expected of legitimate world countries. Any other 'national interests,' including the pursuit of power, are subjective or intersubjective, and therefore states must reconsider or "denaturalize" such interests towards his goal of identity transformation (Wendt 1999, 234-7).

Post-internationalists contend that a globalized, post-statist world could govern via a central body with equality of law for all citizens of the world, without the legal differentiation that currently exists between citizens of different states. The end of statehood and the transition to a globalized world is dependent upon the surrender of autonomy by individual states. Why does Wendt believe that state autonomy is a fixed, objective interest, and not a malleable interest? The reason Wendt believes autonomy is a fixed interest and that states will not surrender their autonomy is that *autonomy* is the very definition of the sovereign state. As long as one commits to working within a framework of statism (to which Wendt commits himself) – whether in the world

of international relations or the study of International Relations – one must be committed to state autonomy, by definition. Thus, Wendt is committed to states, because states are committed to themselves and never would contemplate the kind of self-reflection needed to turn over their sovereignty to a world government. Why is this so? If states can recognize that their interests are flawed, then why would they not concede that statism itself is utterly flawed, as Ashley has suggested?

What is State Autonomy?

In a critique of Waltz's understanding of structural differentiation, John Gerard Ruggie explicates the notion of state autonomy, based on its roots in the mediaeval notion of the social contract. As opposed to George and Keohane (and Wendt), Ruggie explains that the state interest of 'autonomy' was never meant to denote the complete internal legal authority and independence that is generally ascribed to 'sovereign' states. Rather, autonomy simply refers to financial independence ('property rights') and that is all that should be accorded states in an international society of states, i.e., "private property rights and sovereignty may be viewed as being analogous concepts." As an illustration of this definition of autonomy, he points out that liberal interdependence theorists who call for the relinquishment of states over their economic control fail to grasp that individual property rights are a valid, integral 'objective interest,' as determined in mediaeval society (Ruggie 1986, 145-7). In other words,

according to Ruggie, states submit to the world system in the same way that individuals submit to the state system. They commit themselves to a collective authority, but do not relinquish property rights or financial independence.

Ruggie's definition of autonomy is what George and Keohane refer to as "economic wellbeing," their third "objective interest" of the state; and thus their second objective interest of "liberty" is not an innate attribute of the state according to Ruggie. Ergo, if the matter of state autonomy is contested, then why are George, Keohane, and Wendt committed to liberty (or for that matter, any of their other so-called objective interests) as an innate objective state interest? The answer lies in an understanding of what liberty entails. Liberty on a personal level means individualism – the ability to have one's own identity, without fear of state coercion (see Brown 1993; Locke 1690). On a state level, liberty refers to the identity of a particular society or nation, as distinct from another. According to these scholars, autonomy means the ability of a nation to maintain its unique identity. In a globalizing world, societies and national identities have the potential to blend into one another, as individual cultures are assimilated into a global culture. The only rationale to fear loss of state autonomy is because I fear that my societal identity will just blend into global society and my national identity will disappear, utterly subsumed by global sameness.[9]

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[9] Wendt's commitment to the fixed notion of identity here should not be confused with his general discussion of identity transformation. His regular meaning of 'identity' is the

This innate state interest is what Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver call *societal security* (Wæver et al 1993), arguing that the "gravest security problems will have, at least in the foreseeable future, "society" as opposed to state, as their referent. Society is mostly about identity . . . and in the present historical epoch, identity is mostly about national, ethnic, and religious loyalties" (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, 117).   Instead of the state facing the security threat of sovereignty, Buzan and Wæver contend that society faces the existential threat of the loss of identity (Buzan and Wæver 1997, 242).

Lapid and Kratochwil (1996, 120) and McSweeney (1996) criticize Buzan and Wæver for reifying the concept of national identity, which, according to many scholars, is a socially constructed myth (Billig 1995; Brass 1991; Breuilly 1982; Hobsbawm 1992; Nairn 1981; Nairn and James 2005; Ozkirimli 2010). Buzan and Wæver respond:

> To take identity as a possible object of securitization, one has only to assume that it holds a social power that makes it efficient to invoke it, and that it has a form which makes security discourse possible (i.e., it has a claim to survival as well as a clear image of what non-survival would mean). Usually this demands that the referent has become relatively stabilized in social practice. This is our view. The state is not a constant either, yet there is a lot of security policy to defend it (1997, 241).

What they are saying is that they are not reifying society/identity, rather theorizing within the, albeit constructed, real world discourse of nationalism to determine what would cause people to "securitize" their agenda. This comment

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notion of Hobbes vs. Locke vs. Kant – whether states fight, compete or cooperate, i.e. their intersubjective identities (see e.g. Wendt 1996, 51).

is akin to Wendt's rationalization for working within a statist framework – not because he believes in its eternality, but because this is the contemporary reality.

Given the perceived threat to societal security, how then is society protected? Wendt defines the two "conceptual requirements for being a society." The first is that "complex societies all have states;" the second is "that it have boundaries." Therefore he asserts that "states and societies are internally related in a state-society complex [meaning] that not only is the state constituted by its relationship to society, but so is society constituted by the state" (Wendt 1999, 210). Now, since societies are inextricably bound to the state and the state has the monopoly on violence, the strongest protector of society is therefore the state. Thus, states are the apparatus to protect societal security.

This is why the post-Cold War era witnessed a renewed 'hypernationalism,' whereby nations who were formerly part of the Soviet Union sought territorial state recognition and demarcation. Mearsheimer points to this quest for statehood as proof of the primacy of the state as the "principal actor in international politics for a long time to come" (1992, 217) and hence, the enduring authority of Realism (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, 112; Mearsheimer 1990, 132).

These are the meanings of the terms 'nation-state' and inter-'national' relations. States are simply the vehicle that organizes the nation on a domestic

level; and on the global level, states are the media for nations to interact with one another. The problem, however, with such a conceptualization of the 'nation-state' is that oftentimes a state may be home to more than a single nationality or ethnic group, and instead of the state protecting the identities of all nationalities within its borders, it chooses to align with a particular society at the expense of all others, leading to cultural, and in the extreme case physical, genocide.

The State in IR theory

Realist scholars above described the international activity of states as all about the maximization of power. If everyone agrees that power is synonymous with physical security, then all parties can agree on how to maximize such power; and ergo, the state fits the definition of unitary rational actor with the sole purpose of power maximization. Earlier in the chapter, I showed that neoclassical realists and even Kenneth Waltz acknowledge that this is not so simple, as we are dealing with statespersons who are real people; and on a domestic level, these real people may contest the ideal approach to power maximization. This thesis argues that if states are not merely protecting physical security, but additionally and more significantly protecting societal security, then the question of how this is achieved becomes even less clear. The role of the state does not change – it still must maximize security in the international

system. But the question of what constitutes security maximization as societal security is taken into account becomes all the more a contested matter.

Why the US Invaded Iraq in 2003

An examination of America's *Global War on Terror* and specifically the question of the Iraq invasion in 2003 illustrate this concept of societal insecurity as opposed to physical insecurity as the propellant of state power maximization. This invasion was a matter of fierce debate in the US and around the world, being that from a strict realist perspective, it was strategically questionable. Viewed through the lens of societal insecurity, however, the matter becomes clearer.   Nevertheless, as the following discussion of Mary Kaldor's *New & Old Wars* shall show, the matter of what constitutes societal insecurity and thus legitimate state activity internationally is a matter of interpretation and contention.

In *New & Old Wars,* Mary Kaldor describes the "new" warfare of the twenty-first century, arguing that globalization has brought an opposing force of particularization which forms the basis of most contemporary conflict (Kaldor 2007).   Whereas the world as a whole is going the way of cosmopolitanism, there are particularistic forces set on reviving "backward-looking" nationalistic fervours, in the name of preserving and promoting particular identities.   Kaldor defines cosmopolitanism as "a celebration of the diversity of global identities, acceptance and indeed, enthusiasm for multiple overlapping identities, and, at

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the same time, a commitment to the equality of all human beings and to respect for human dignity" (2007, 92). She further notes that this *weltanschauung* is "more widespread in the West and less widespread in the East and South" (2007, 94).

Based, however, on the understanding of the demarcation of nations by state borders, I contend that the "new wars" are not between the proponents of cosmopolitanism and its opponents. Rather, the new wars are between the 'haves' and 'have-nots.' Societies (for example, American society) whose identities are protected by the state are more amenable to the forces of globalization, since their identities are not being threatened; whereas those who lack state protection of their societies and identities (such as the Palestinians or Kurds), or those who feel that their state sovereignty has been violated in the name of globalization or cosmopolitanism (such as the Saudi terrorists of 9/11) will revolt in the age of "new wars."

The further problem with Kaldor's distinction between 'old warfare' and 'new warfare' is that "it takes two to tango"[10] – any war, by definition, has at least two parties. While the 'instigators' of much contemporary conflict may be non-state actors whose conduct exhibits *new war* approaches, the respondents often are states, whom Kaldor acknowledges have countered with conventional

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[10] This phrase was employed in this context by Ronald Reagan discussing the USSR. "Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs," *New York Times,* November 12, 1982.

old warfare (2007, 151).   Ironically, Kaldor criticizes such 'old warfare' response, condemning the US for its invasion of Iraq:

> The war was . . . portrayed as a powerful moral crusade. There was always an idealist strain in American Cold War thinking. Bush's 'Axis of Evil' echoes Ronald Reagan's 'Evil Empire'. The argument is that America is a cause, not a nation, with a mission to convert the rest of the world to the American dream and to rid the world of enemies. The war in Iraq was represented as one victory in the 'War on Terror' – a global conflict as far-reaching and ambitious as was the Cold War, designed to establish a new world order (Kaldor 2007, 154).

Kaldor makes two arguments here.   Firstly, the American *cause* was the motivation behind the war in Iraq. Secondly, there is an American *dream* that they seek to export. She does not explain these two grand assertions, because her presentation neither understands that what she calls *cause* is in fact American *nationalism*; nor does it recognize, that to a large extent, she herself subscribes to the American *dream,* as I shall show in the next chapter*.*

In terms of the first argument, contrary to Kaldor's assertion, America was not motivated to attack Iraq by some altruistic *cause*.   President Bush framed the Global War on Terror in terms of the threat to the identity of America. Kaldor is correct that the attack of the September 11 terrorists was *new war* behaviour motivated by particularistic actors, who felt that their identity was at stake on account of US foreign policy in the Middle East.   But what she has failed to grasp is that the response was not an "old" reaction based on traditional concerns for physical security – such an understanding cannot

explain the subsequent military and civilian deaths of thousands more on both sides of the conflict on the other side of the world.

Rather, America's response was equally motivated by societal insecurity – American citizens viewed the attacks of September 11 as an attack on American identity. And as Buzan and Wæver have shown, the threat to identity is the greatest perceived threat in today's world. It was that sense of peril that motivated the US to act as it did and therefore all measures had to be taken to root out those who were plotting to destroy 'Americanism.' Indeed, that is why the *old war* response in terms of invading Afghanistan and Iraq was of doubtful logic in a *new war* struggle. Likewise, this societal insecurity is why America continues to be so indescribably terrified of a nuclear Iran. After all, there are many countries with nuclear weapons, and Iran has no good reason to invade America from a geopolitical, strategic perspective. Viewed in terms of societal security, however, Americans feel particularly threatened by a nuclear Iran – the leaders of Iran constantly refer to America as "The Great Satan," clearly an attack on American*ism*, not just America, as a country.

What is the American dream to which Kaldor refers? Why do Americans want to protect their dream and why would they want to export it? An understanding of the American people's commitment to their 'dream' requires a prior explanation of what it means to be American.   This is a matter of great debate and is the subject of the next chapter.

To summarize the question of the state in International Relations: classical theory views the state as a unitary actor that aims to maximize its physical security in the international system. This narrow (and antiquated) approach to the understanding of international relations fails to account for much of the conflict in the world today. The vast majority of contemporary international conflicts are not driven by the threat of physical security; rather, they are founded upon the threat to societal security. Realists, who only acknowledge and examine the matter of physical security, fail to grasp why the US invaded Iraq, supports Israel, or seeks to isolate Iran. My investigation into the question of American identity in the next chapter will shed some light upon this matter.

Chapter 2 - American Nationalism

> *Let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own* (JFK inaugural presidential address, January 20, 1961)

In the previous chapter, I showed that International Relations must consider *societal security* as an important factor in explaining state activity in the global arena. A commitment to societal security means not only protecting the physical bodies of its citizenry, but also protecting the unique identity of the nation within its borders. What does this commitment mean for the United States of America? In this chapter, I will first establish a broad typology of American nationhood; and, based upon that framework, I will then show how the US-Israel relationship is framed as a key part of the strategy to protect American societal security.

What does it mean to be an 'American'? Clearly, as a relatively new nation, Americans lack the familial bonds traditionally associated with ethnic nationhood. Thus, is there a concept of American nationalism and if so, what constitutes that typology? An understanding of American nationalism requires a basic understanding of the concept of nationalism in general.

Primordialism and Multiculturalism

What is nationalism? What defines a nation? Whilst state formation occurred early in history and was cemented in the Peace of Westphalia,[11] the notion of nationhood – the definition of a delineated ethnic group within the borders of a state – only came to the fore as a societal concern in the nineteenth century. While it is true that well-defined nations certainly existed prior to this time; nevertheless, nationalism as a field of scholarly inquiry began in the nineteenth century, culminating in the twentieth century explanations that follow hence.

The culturist approach originates in the works of Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, who taught that nationalistic drive is primordial. Shils speaks of modern society, which is "held together by an infinity of personal attachments." Similarly, "tradition is not the dead hand of the past but rather the hand of the gardener which nourishes and elicits tendencies of judgement" (1957, 131). Geertz takes this approach (1971), asserting that one is bound to one's kinsman by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import (Eller and Coughlan 1993, 259).

The problem with primordialist theory, clearly, is that according to this definition of nationalism, there can be no such thing as an American nation. The US is a heterogeneous immigrant society and the United States is comprised of multiple primordial ethnicities. Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that *this* is the definition of American nationalism – multiculturalism (Olneck 1990; Citrin et

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[11] The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties made in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War of the Holy Roman Empire.

al 1994).   Others have pointed out that the US reflects "pluralistic multiculturalism," a.k.a. "the melting pot" – unlike say Canada or Australia, which reflect "particularistic multiculturalism" (Ravitch 1990) – which effectively calls for public cultural homogeneity: being an Irish-American means being Irish at home and American in the street (Song 2009, 35). Thus, on a national level, one has forsaken one's original ethnicity in favour of American nationalism, ultimately making the notion of multiculturalism scarcely meaningful, at least in the public sphere.

Cosmopolitan Liberalism

Modernist theories of nationalism suggest that nations and nationalism are products of the modern world and are responses to industrialization, urbanization, and other modern social phenomena. According to John Breuilly, nationalism is the result of state-manufacturers' efforts to coordinate common interests amongst elites, mobilize the masses in support of the state, and legitimate state coercion and use of force domestically and internationally (1982).   Paul R. Brass calls this idea 'instrumentalism' (1991), whereby nationalism is an elitist tool to generate mass support (Brass 1991). Similarly, Eric J. Hobsbawm argues that both nations and nationalism are products of 'social engineering' designed to inculcate certain values, and imply continuity with the past (Hobsbawm 1992). Smith, however, critiques these modernist theories for being top-down, and therefore unable to account for millions of

people who have been prepared to sacrifice their lives for their nations (A.D. Smith, 1995).

Beginning with his seminal work *Thought and Change* (1964) and concluding posthumously with *Nationalism* (1997), Ernest Gellner espoused the high-culture modernist theory of nationalism. Gellner taught that while institutions were the glue in agro-literate society, in an age of widespread literacy, culture replaced structure as the tie that binds. Benedict Anderson similarly posits that 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being (1983, 12). It is an imagined community, because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1983, 6). This deep sense of community makes it possible for millions to sacrifice their lives for a nation of people, the majority of whom the individual has never met. Nonetheless, Smith critiques Anderson for not adequately explaining why this 'imagined community' should come into being (A.D. Smith, 1998).

Applying modernist theories of nationalism to the American case, US elites over the centuries employed instrumentalism in the form of 'patriotism,' specifically due to the lack of ethnic bonds to unite the people. So what ties the American nation together? Constitutional patriots claim that:

> Not ethnicity but a commitment to liberal political principles was
> held out by the founding elite as the leaven of American identity.

> Whatever one's ancestry or background, to be an American one had only to adhere to a set of ideals: liberty, individualism, popular sovereignty, and egalitarianism defined as equality of opportunity and respect (Citrin et al 1994).

This theory of American nationalism is called *Cosmopolitan Liberalism* (Hartz 1955; Huntington 1981; Kohn 1957; Lipset 1964; Pole 1967); and on an international level, it has been coined *Wilsoniasm or Jeffersoniasm* (Lieven 2004; Mead 2001). Kateb and others, none the less, criticize this method of top-down instrumentalist creation of patriotism as "excessive" (Kateb 2006). Similarly, Citrin maintains that this patriotism is "imagined," insofar as it has whitewashed inequalities amongst women, blacks, and native Americans (Citrin et al 1994).

In contrast to constitutional patriots, liberal nationalists recognize that the instrumentalism that has taken place has not been culturally neutral, nor is it ever, even in those countries that proclaim the banner of particularistic multiculturalism (such as Canada and Australia), because there are certain aspects of the hegemonic culture that determine the nationalistic bent of the new country, such as language (English/French/Spanish) and even religion, as reflected in matters such as public statutory holidays (Song 2009, 35).

Smith conceptualizes this idea of nationalism with his theory of *Ethnosymbolism*. He has written extensively on the subject, beginning with *Theories of Nationalism* (1971) and as recently as *Nationalism* (2010). Building on the work of John A. Armstrong's *Nations before Nationalism* (1982), Smith argues for a third-way that sees nationalism neither as primordial nor a modern invention. He begins by pointing out that in order to discuss nationalism, we

need a working definition of nation, which he suggests as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members." Ethnosymbolism then asserts that modern nations are based on pre-existing ethnic components, including memories and elements of culture and alleged ancestry, which they seek to revive (1986, 17).

In the US, despite the claimed adherence merely to a set of ideals and values in order to be an American, the arrival of massive numbers of non-English speaking and non-Protestant immigrants triggered feelings of exclusivity and incited demands for a more restrictive definition of American nationality (Citrin et al 1994). To quote Samuel Huntington, America is a country "committed [not only] to the the principles of the Creed, [but moreover] . . . a deeply religious and primarily Christian country, encompassing several religious minorities, adhering to Anglo-Protestant values, speaking English [and] maintaining its European cultural heritage" (2004: 20, 31). This form of American nationalism is termed *Nativism* (Citrin et al 1994; Higham 1985; R.M. Smith 1988); and on the international level, it is best equated with the foreign policy approach known as *Jacksonianism* (Mead 2001; Lieven 2004).[12]

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[12] I will explain the foreign policy approach of Jacksoniasm further in the chapter.

'Us' Versus 'Them' and American Exceptionalism

There are various post-classical theories of nationalism. Michael Billig claims that nationalism is defined by 'who is in and who is out.' In other words, nationalism is defined only in terms of being "relatively specific in its opposition to others." Similarly, the national community cannot be imagined without also imagining communities of foreigners, which make 'our' culture unique: there can be no 'us' without a 'them,' and the politicians continue to contribute to such thinking, with their focus on patriotic rhetoric (1995, 78). Umut Ozkirimli takes this post-classical thinking a step further, building on Foucauldian and Gramscian frameworks of analysis. He describes the nationalism project as a function of discourse, claiming that nationalism makes three claims. Firstly, it claims identity – it is about 'us' and 'them.' Secondly, it makes temporal claims, that is, nationalist elites adopt a certain view of linear national history, often while promoting social amnesia regarding problematic historical connections. Thirdly, it makes spatial claims – there is a fixation on territory, the quest for a 'home' (Ozkirimli 2010).

Billig's notion of 'banal nationalism' is profoundly evident in the notion of *American Exceptionalism*, "the conviction that the United States is qualitatively different from – and better than – other states" (McCartney 2004). From the nation's inception, Americans have seen their country as unique, such as Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop's description of the 'Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people (are) upon us' (quoted in McDougall 1997, 17). Similarly,

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contemporary scholars continue to expound this notion – for example, Seymour Martin Lipset explicates the uniqueness of the US in his book *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, describing the country's specialness, for example insofar as it evinces the greatest instance of political populism (1996, 43).[13]   Thus, *American Exceptionalism* clearly cultivates the stark contrast between the 'us' and the 'them.'

So what then is American nationalism?

In practice, how do average Americans see themselves and how are all these theories to be reconciled?   This question is not merely conceptually perplexing, but likewise practically speaking.   Using the 1992 National Election Studies survey, Citrin has shown that "the conception of national identity held by many ordinary citizens simultaneously incorporates important tenets of the cosmopolitan liberal creed and exclusionary beliefs with nativist overtones" (1994, 11).   How are these seemingly contradictory notions combined in the American identity of self: cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and nativism on the other?

Walter Russel Mead captures the dichotomy between America's liberal cosmopolitanism and its nativism in his exposition on US foreign policy.   Mead examines the various ideological strands in foreign policy, referred to generally

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[13] For discussion and refutation of such assertions, see Bookman, *The Mythology of American Politics.*

as *Wilsoniasm*, *Jeffersoniasm* and *Jacksonianism*. Whereas adherents to the worldview of Wilson and Jefferson believe in the universality of the Enlightenment ideals, Jacksonians are more *Isolationist* in their foreign policy aspirations. Nonetheless, when they feel that their community is under attack, they are the first to 'bear arms' and fight for their country. Similarly, whereas Wilsonians and Jeffersonians see a lot of grey in the world, Jacksonians see things very sharply in black and white terms, viewing the world through the lens of the Bible, and often a very literal (fundamentalist) reading of it (Mead 1999; Mead 2001, 240).

The Dichotomy of Bush Doctrine

A good example of the tension that is ever-present in American nationalism and the way that it manifests itself internationally was evident during the presidency of George W. Bush, who began his term committed to strengthening the US domestically with apparently scant interest in the international arena. When the attacks of September 11 happened, however, he suddenly transformed into the "Jacksonian warrior," bent on eradicating the forces of evil that had dared to attack his nation (Leffler 2011, 33).

Bush doctrine is interesting inasmuch as it evolved over his presidency from initially fighting to destroy the forces of evil, to eventually becoming all about spreading democracy, much akin to Jeffersoniasm (Leffler 2011). Bush recognized the need for wider domestic support, and – having satisfied his

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Jacksonian constituency – moved on to gain acceptance by the wider American community. He announced in his second Inaugural Address, "The survival of liberty in our land depends on the success of liberty in other lands." And since the US was built on Enlightenment ideals, Americans viewed their ideological conceptions of liberal cosmopolitanism and western democracy as universal (McCartney 2004).

This analysis of American nationalism and foreign policy exposes the irony of Mary Kaldor's above-quoted criticism of the US. Kaldor praises the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism, expressing her view that the world is headed in the direction of universal acceptance, having begun in the West; and yet criticizes the US "that America is a cause, not a nation, with a mission to convert the rest of the world to the American dream" (Kaldor 2007, 154). This American cause/dream is in fact the cosmopolitanism to which she hopes the world aspires!

Moreover, as explained in the preceding chapter, states aim to maximize societal security. Viewed through this lens, the dichotomy between *Jacksonianism* and *Jeffersoniasm* melts away. Americans want to preserve their liberal democratic ideals and when they feel that these are threatened, they will lash out to defend the values of Americanism that they deem sacred. Sometimes this goal of protecting American liberties means the spreading of these ideals abroad. In fact, according to Walter MacDougall, therefore no tension exists between the two abovementioned approaches. Americans will tend towards

Isolationism unless their 'city on a hill' is threatened, at which point they will fight for their ideals and 'spread the good word' in an effort to safeguard their domestic freedoms and values (1998, 36). This explanation would account for the first part of the transformation of W. Bush doctrine (Leffler 2011, 36).

Who is In and Who is Out

Let us now turn to the post-classical question of banal nationalism – 'who is in and who is out.' While originally having strong roots in white Anglo-Saxon (frontier) Protestantism, the Jacksonian community has expanded over time, such that "the bulk of American Jacksonian opinion has increasingly moved to recognize the right of code-honoring members of minority groups to receive the rights and protections due to members of the [Jacksonian] folk community" (Mead 1999). This expansion means that despite the fact that Jacksonians are nativist, over time they have extended their acceptance of who belongs within the community to include anyone who is willing to commit to their 'code of honour.' Mead writes:

> The military institutions have moved from strict segregation to a concerted attack on racism in fifty years. In civilian life, the belief that color is no bar to membership in the Jacksonian community of honor is rapidly replacing earlier beliefs. Just as Southerners whose grandfathers burned crosses against the Catholic Church now work very well with Catholics on all kinds of social, cultural and even religious endeavors, so we are seeing a steady erosion of the racial barriers (Mead 1999).

Thus, Americans of colour who adhere to biblical ideals, strong family values, and libertarianism have become accepted members of this American folk community. Now, granted, this expanded folk community does not extend to the entire American people; nevertheless, "Jacksonian politics and folk feeling have become a basic element in American consciousness that can be found from one end of the country to the other" (Mead 2001, 227).

America as a Christian Nation

The final element of American nationalism that requires analysis is the Christian character of the American people and the biblical lens through which they view their country and the world. The vast majority – a staggering eight out of ten – of Americans self-identify as Christians.[14] The United States of America has deep Christian roots, beginning with the escape by the early settlers from European religious persecution, making America into "the Great Frontier of Western Christendom in 1492" (Ahlstrom 1972, 17). The Mayflower Compact stated:

> 'In the name of God, Amen. . . . Having undertaken, for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern parts of Virginia; do by these presents, solemnly and mutually in the Presence of God and one of another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends

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[14] www.gallup.com/poll/151760/Christianity-Remains-Dominant-Religion-United-States.aspx?utm_source=tagrss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=syndication, accessed 6/26/12.

aforesaid; And by Virtue hereof to enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and Offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the General good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due submission and obedience' (cited in Winslow and Bradford 1865, 6).

This early American governing document clearly frames the new colony as a Christian colony. Similarly, countless reports of the early settlement in America attributed the unfolding of events to an overtly Christian narrative, including such famed works as Alexander Whitaker's *Good Newes from Virginia* (1613)*,* Edward Johnson's *Wonder Working Providence of Sion's Saviour* (1867), Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana* or "Christ's Great Deeds in America" (1702) and Jonathan Edwards' *Thoughts on the Revival in New England*:

> 'Tis not unlikely that this work of God's Spirit, that is so extraordinary and wonderful, is the dawning, or at least a prelude, of that glorious work of God so often foretold in Scripture, which in the progress and issue of it shall renew the world of mankind. . . . And there are many things that make it probable that this work will begin in America (1879, 3:13).

Here we see how Edwards views the story of America as not only divinely ordained, but a fulfillment of biblical prophecy. Likewise, George Bancroft writes in his *History of the United States*:

> It is the object of the present work to explain how the change in the condition of our land has been brought about; and, as the fortunes of a nation are not under the control of blind destiny, to follow the steps by which a favoring Providence, calling our institutions into being, has conducted the country to its present happiness and glory (1852, 1:3).

Incredibly, in this work, Bancroft unabashedly sets out to explain history through a theistic lens. While this may seem strange to the contemporary reader of history, one must remember that the major institutions of higher learning, including Harvard University, were founded by Christian theologians (Ahlstrom 1972, 149).

These narratives became so woven into the fabric of American society until they developed into unique American themes, such as America as the Promised Land (or *New Israel*), American *Manifest Destiny*, which encouraged expansion of the frontier of European settlement in the name of God, and the formation of entire branches of Christianity based on American revelation, such as Mormonism (Ahlstrom 1972; Cherry 1998; Noll et al 1983). In fact, even the US Constitution, despite protecting religious liberties, contains references reflecting a fealty to Christianity, such as:

> If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law *(The Constitution of the United States of America,* Article 1, Section 7).

Similarly, the Declaration of Independence states:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . . . And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, We mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

And Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story explicated such an understanding of Christianity as fundamental to America:

> Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the First Amendment to it . . . the general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private religious rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation. . . . The real object of the amendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government (1905, 593).

Thus, America is a society with deep Christian roots, to the extent that many Americans would unwittingly associate the basic foundations of their identity with Christian values and ideals. And the Founding Fathers wove these Christian values into the fabric of the American people, thereby constituting them as fundamentals of American nationalism.

Civil Religion

While, America has deep Christian roots, no established religion exists in the United States. And yet, the religious language and symbolism continues with "God bless America" uttered regularly by presidents and political leaders, "In God We Trust" inscribed on the banknotes, and even lapses into overtly Christian

rhetoric, such as Bush's reference to Crusade, following 9/11. Is this Christian America speaking and if so, which doctrine thereof?

Robert Bellah introduced the concept of *civil religion* to the study of the sociology of religion in America. Pointing out that when presidents speak of God, such as Kennedy's address above, they are vague in their depiction and avoid any reference that would pigeonhole them into a particular religious doctrine. He argued that the distinctive Protestant, Catholic and Jewish traditions have blended neatly into a nondescript 'American' religion.   Thus, Americans proudly carry the banner of religious nationalism, capitalizing on the strength of the implied ambiguity and glossing over the confrontational, divisive aspects of their distinctive religious beliefs (Bellah 1967).

Banal Nationalism and Civil Religion

The issue with such a notion of civil religion, however, is that while it accounts for the three major religions in America in the early centuries of the nation's history, it effectively excludes and ignores the religiously diverse landscape of America of the twenty-first century. Civil religion speaks about God and the Bible, thereby placating the various Christian and Jewish denominations and ironically, even those otherwise accused of heresy by the mainstream, the Mormons! But to Moslems and others who refer to Allah and the Koran or even polytheists such as Hindus, the civil religious language is completely foreign, thus essentially excluding them from the American people, rather than including

them (Haddad and Lumis 1987). This framing of the civil religion of America does not imply a compromise of the Constitutionally-guaranteed rights of all people to freedom of religion; rather it is merely a statement regarding the reality of civil religious public language. In other words, while the notion of American civil religion claims the banner of all-inclusiveness, it ultimately excludes a huge proportion of the American people. This exclusivity is important to acknowledge, because it extends the banal nationalism (the problem of 'us versus them') from the nativist, predominantly Protestant community to Christian Americans in general; and furthermore to Jews i.e., those adhering to the so-called "Judeo-Christian" tradition.

What is American Nationalism?

In summation, what is American nationalism? To be American is to commit to a set of values. These values derive from a combination of cosmopolitan Kantianism and biblical Christianity:

> Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political institutions. . . . The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive of the one without the other (de Tocqueville 1840, XVII).

Clearly, De Tocqueville understood that the Americans were committed to the values of the Enlightenment through the prism of their Christianity.

The imagery constructed by the early settlers – from the Pilgrims and the Preachers to the Founding Fathers and the political elite – surrounding the concept of America as the 'New World' and the 'Promised Land', both physically and philosophically, has elicited in Americans a feeling of *Exceptionalism* – the belief that America and Americans are more 'enlightened' than the rest of the world. When the societal security of America comes under fire and threatens these values, however, Americans are swift to lash out against those who wish to 'threaten our way of life.'[15]

Such an approach to American nationalism and societal security in large part explains the warm relationship between America and Israel. As I shall elucidate further in the thesis, statements made over the years by American presidents suggest that the US supports Israel due to their common values. But what difference should values make to strategic considerations?   This thesis argues that Americans, especially post-9/11, view Israel as part of their 'community,' based on shared biblical ideals and liberal values; in contrast with the Arab/Moslem world, that Americans view starkly as the 'other.' In other words, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Americans 'identify' with Israel over its neighbours/enemies, due to the perception of shared biblical and western values.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the suggestion of shared "Judeo-Christian" values, such widely-held attitudes and perceptions do not evolve in a

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[15] Here I am paraphrasing the introductory quote from President Bush.

vacuum. From where does such a non-strategic, values-oriented support for Israel evolve? While Mearsheimer and Walt are correct in their assertion that the Jewish lobby has been instrumental in promoting US support for Israel, the story is much more complex than their simplified account. Although Americans and particularly Christians identify with Israel in the conflict, an element in Christian America promotes the unconditional, at-all-costs support of the Jewish state. These ultra-nationalist Christian Americans have been successful in moving the international activity of the US more and more in line with their agenda, especially over the last decade. Who these people are and how they have achieved their goals form the story of Christian Zionism that I shall explore in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 – Christians and Israel, History & Theology

Christians and Jews

The history of Jewish-Christian relations has been fraught with tension and peril. From the Crusades of the Middle Ages, to the Spanish Inquisition, to the various expulsions from Christian countries, including Spain, Portugal, France and England; and, culminating in the perpetration of the ultimate display of Christian anti-Semitism, the Holocaust; the Church has been no friend of the Jewish people. And yet, today, Christian America is the greatest ally and friend of the Jewish State and people in the world. How has this happened? What changed? And how has this played out into International Relations? This chapter will trace the history of Christian support for Israel, from its roots in the British Isles to its flowering in America. Support for Israel is a priority to many on the Christian Right, particularly Evangelicals, and their rise in Republican political power has seen a similar rise in the support for Israel by the US. Nevertheless, support for Israel seems to have now taken on a life of its own, and the US-Israel relationship would appear to be rock solid, independent of which party is elected to the White House.

Early Catholicism and the Jewish Establishment

The Jewish people lived in the Land of Israel for over a thousand years during the first and second millennia BCE. During that tenure, there were

periods of political stability and unrest, periods of independence and tribute-paying to foreign states. Towards the end of the second Temple era (end of the first century BCE), the Romans took control of Israel, and the state of affairs went from relative autonomous Jewish rule, as a Roman colony, to the eventual destruction of the Jewish Temple and the dispersion of the Jewish inhabitants from the country.

Jewish tradition had an age-old tradition of messianism, i.e., the hope that one day a redeemer would arise who would cast off the yoke of foreign rule and fear and free Israel from the shackles of its enemies. Throughout Jewish history, many claimed the messianic title, but few stood out as real potential candidates for the position. The most famous of all was Jesus.

Jesus appeared at a most perilous time for the Jewish people when it had become eminently clear that the end of the Jewish people's sojourn in the land of Israel was nigh. This ray of hope caused a tremendous groundswell of support for the newly-proclaimed messiah and it was not before too long that Jesus had a sizable following. Members of the rabbinic establishment, however, were not admirers. They denounced Jesus' ways, for many reasons, including a feeling that the time was not yet ripe for messianic redemption, to practical fear of the Roman reprisal due to Jewish messianic revolt. Eventually, they handed him over to the Romans for sentencing – his martyrdom ultimately becoming the greatest propellant for his brand of messianic Judaism and fuel for his adherents to continue his teachings (Boteach 2012; Klinghoffer 2006).

While Christianity began as a messianic sect of Judaism, with the advent of the New Testament, the early Church leaders began to adopt radically new ideas, including the proselytizing of Gentiles and the negation of the Old Testament's commandments. As Christianity and Judaism began to part ways, the leaders of the new religion began to preach Supersessionism, whereby the adherents of Christianity had now superseded Israel, who had previously been 'chosen' by God (Justin Martyr, cited Roberts 1994a, 1:200). Over time, this doctrine also became known as Replacement Theology. St. Augustine expanded on this idea, which included addressing the awkward issue of the continued existence of the Jewish people, despite their no longer being chosen (Roberts 1994b, 2:389).

The Protestant Reformation – *Sola Scriptura*

In 1517, Martin Luther posted his famous 95 Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences, wherein he challenged many of the Catholic Church's established notions of Christianity. Thus began the Protestant Reformation, a process that challenged many of the previous axiomatically accepted traditions of the Church. From this period, five new fundamental tenets of Protestantism arose, known as the Five *Solas*. One of these *solas* is *Sola Scriptura* – "by Scripture alone," which states that "Scripture alone is our authority" and "the Roman Church is a false church for adding human traditions to the Word of God" (Johnson 2004).

This tenet opened up a whole new door to interpretation of the Bible. No longer did one need to take the opinions of Justin Martyr and St. Augustine as divine. One could read the Bible and draw one's own conclusions, if one felt one's personal interpretation to be closer to the literal meaning of the text. Luther himself did not depart from the Church's classic animosity towards Judaism (Luther 1543/1957, 4:138). A student of Calvinism, however, Theodore Beza, was the first to question, albeit indirectly, the axiom of Replacement Theology, already in the sixteenth century, suggesting "that the words 'Israel' and 'Zion' always and everywhere in the Bible referred literally to the Jewish people or their physical homeland." Similarly, Beza wrote explicitly 'to remember the debt the Gentiles owe to the Jews,' a recurring theme in Christian Zionism today. Although King James banned Beza's commentary in his official 1611 version of the Bible, the latter's influence still was widespread. In the seventeenth century, a Puritan mother and son, Joanna and Ebenezer Cartwright, wrote to Oliver Cromwell "begging him to speed England's divine rehabilitation by making her the first and the readiest to transport Israel's sons and daughters in their ships to the Land promised to their forefathers" (Clark 2007, 34). Similar thoughts abounded throughout seventeenth-century England. The most compelling early Christian Zionist works were by Sir Henry Finch, a former Member of Parliament, entitled *The World's Great Restauration* (1621), and by Thomas Brightman, entitled *Shall They Return to Jerusalem Again?*

(1615). During the eighteenth century, over fifty more books on the subject of the Jews' return to Palestine were published (Clark 2007, 30-59).

The first political repercussions of this new interpretation of Christianity began in 1838, when Lord Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, convinced his step-father-in-law, the then English Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, to send a British consul to Jerusalem. Cooper was an ardent Restorationist and president of the London Jews' Society, an organization formed for the purpose of evangelizing to Jews (Clark 2007, 67; Wolffe 2004, 67). And in 1842, the United Church of England and Ireland appointed Michael Solomon Alexander as bishop of Jerusalem, a position that had not existed for almost two millennia (Clark 2007, 70; Perry 2004, 89). Palmerston, however, did not need too much convincing, because the idea of establishing a British consulate in the region made political sense to him as an means of counteracting creeping French and Russian influence in the Ottoman-ruled Holy Land (Clark 2007, 67).

Premillenial Dispensationalism

The father of modern-day Christian Zionism was an Irish theologian, John Nelson Darby (1800-1882), who, in the mid-nineteenth century popularized[16] the concept of Dispensationalism (also known as Premillenial Dispensationalism) (Campolo 2005, 19; Clark 2007, 61; Spector 2009, 13). This new conception

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[16] How much of the theology was his own reading and how much he simply took from the Plymouth Brethren and popularized is a matter of scholarly debate.

presented an ideology whereby God never repudiated the Jewish people. Rather, with the introduction of the Church, God divided His plan between an earthly kingdom of reward for Jews and a heavenly kingdom of reward for Christians. His notion of Dispensationalism divides history into a number of eras or 'dispensations,' with the final 'dispensation' taking place at the end of days, when the Jews will gather together in Jerusalem and worship in their temple. Shortly thereafter, however, the Antichrist will rise up and provoke the Battle of Armageddon. Those Jews who convert to Christianity will join other good Christians in being whisked away to heaven in the Rapture, while those who do not will perish, together with the other heathens (Clark 2005, 62; Spector 2009, 18). He thus entirely refuted the fundamental Christian tenet of Replacement Theology, providing a positive place for the Jewish people in the divine plan. Yaakov Ariel points out that Dispensationalism is the first religious ideology to necessitate the role of another religion in order to fulfill its outcomes, i.e. in order for the Rapture to take place, the Jews must first gather in the Land of Israel (Ariel 2006, 57).

Dispensationalism Arrives in America

By the time Darby had committed to making seven long missions to the United States and Canada between 1862 and 1877 to preach his Premillenial Dispensationalist ideology, a flurry of Christian Restorationist activity already had begun to take place (Clark 2007, 80). In 1844, George Bush (not only a

namesake, but a cousin of the later presidents), an ordained minister and professor of Hebrew at New York University, called for "elevating the Jews to a rank of honourable repute among the nations of the earth by recreating their state in Palestine" (Oren 2007, 142). During one of Darby's visits to America, he preached at the Walnut Street Church in St Louis, ministered to by James H. Brookes. During this period, Brookes published *Marantha*, a Premillenial Dispensationalist work, which introduced the now-famous Christian Zionist theme of God's blessing those who bless the seed of Abraham and cursing those who curse his progeny.

A student of Brookes, Cyrus I. Scofield (1843-1921), was the individual responsible for bringing his and Darby's message to the masses of American evangelicals. In 1909, Scofield published the *Scofield Reference Bible*, which exposed Dispensationalism and love for Israel to a wider American audience. Selling over three million copies by 1937 and being utilized by half of all American evangelical groups by the 1950s, it paved the way for contemporary political Christian Zionism (Clark 2007, 86-92).

Zionism

Returning to late nineteenth century Europe, the Jewish Zionist movement was beginning to take shape. Although the Jewish people had prayed for the return to Zion for two millennia, a secular Jewish journalist, Theodore Herzl (1860-1904), was the first to propose and advocate politically for a Jewish

autonomous country. One of his early admirers was the Anglican chaplain to the British embassy in Vienna, one William Hechler (1845-1931), an ardent Christian Restorationist. Diplomatically well-connected, he utilized his political associations to introduce Herzl to many important figures in Europe. Nevertheless, while these introductions were perhaps valuable to the big picture of spreading an awareness of the Zionist cause, they were fruitless in their practical outcomes (Clark 2007, 108).

Nonetheless, in the early twentieth century, momentum began to pick up in England regarding the expediency of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. According to Clark and Shlaim, the Balfour Declaration in 1917 was a result primarily of Balfour's Christian beliefs (Clark 2005, 115; Shlaim 2005, 251). Clark quotes Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an early (Jewish) Zionist leader, as writing "Men like Balfour, Churchill, Lloyd George, were deeply religious and believed in the Bible, to them the return of the Jewish people to Palestine was a reality, so that we Zionists represented to them a great tradition" (Clark 2007, 116). One of the major deciding factors, however, in US support for the UN partition plan of 1947, was President Truman's adviser on Palestinian affairs, one Clark Clifford, a Christian Zionist who quoted the Book of Deuteronomy in support of the Jews' right to their state (Benson 1997, 156), with Truman later referring to himself as the twentieth century 'incarnation' of the biblical Cyrus (Wanston & Maoz 1981, 84).

Motivations for Contemporary Christian Zionism

The ideology of Premillenial Dispensationalism has been discussed above and that is certainly the origin of Christian Zionist beliefs. Contemporary Christian support for Israel, however, has evolved from the purely theological realm to include sociological and political dimensions. When asked to explain his support for Israel, former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay responded '[It's] about expanding democracy and fighting the War on Terror. Jesus Christ was a Jew. The Jewish People were God's chosen people. He has a covenant with them' (Delay, quoted in Kiely 2003, 1). David Brog, Executive Director of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), uses this comment as a platform to summarize the reasons for Christian Zionism, as follows (2006, 68).

Firstly, Christian Zionism is about theology. The Bible states that God chose the Jewish people and gave them the Land of Israel. For fundamentalist readers of the Bible, who believe that everything is to be understood literally, this gift of the Land was never rescinded. The events of the region – from the massive waves of Jewish immigration back to the Land of Israel since the nineteenth century to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 to the victory of Israel over its neighbours in 1967 – are clear manifestations to Bible-believing Christians of the fulfillment of God's ancient promise to the Jewish people and an unfolding of biblical prophecy.

Secondly, Christian Zionism is about the debt of gratitude that Christians owe to the Jewish people, due to the fact that Christianity stems from Judaism.

John Hagee (born April 12, 1940), CUFI founder, takes this idea further, explaining that Christians not only are indebted to the Jewish people for giving them the Old Testament, Jesus and Christianity, but also they must be grateful for all of the contributions that the Jews have made to society and the world, including everything from funding the American Revolution to Hershey's chocolate! (Hagee 2007, 100-110). Thirdly, Christian Zionism is about the clash of civilizations. Many Christian Americans see Israel and the Jewish people as standing on the front lines of the war against radical Islam, which (in their view) poses an existential threat to liberal western democratic values. And fourthly, Christian Zionism is about the geopolitical special relationship. Americans view Israel as an integral strategic democratic ally in the Middle East.[17]

John Hagee adds further reasons for Christians to support Israel. He believes that Christians need to understand the roots of Christianity. In the words of Hagee:

> Those who say that Jesus did not practice traditional Judaism have no knowledge of history or Scripture. The fact is, Judaism was the only faith on the face of the earth during the life of Jesus that believed in a single omnipotent Supreme Being. The only theology God ever created was Judaism! (Hagee 2007, 96)

Similarly, Ralph Reed (born June 24, 1961), founder of *Stand for Israel* and former executive director of the *Christian Coalition* claims:

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[17] Mearsheimer and Walt, of course, disagree with this assertion.

> For many, there is no greater proof of God's sovereignty in the world today than the survival of the Jews and the existence of Israel. . . . Regardless of one's eschatology – and there are as many theological strains as denominations – there is an undeniable and powerful spiritual connection between Israel and the Christian faith. It is where Jesus was born and where he conducted his ministry (Brownfield 2002, 71).

These Christian Zionist leaders believe that one's Christian belief and practice are, in a certain way, deficient, absent an acknowledgment of the roots of the religion – Judaism, the Jewish people, and the State of Israel.

Another reason of Hagee's (indeed the most oft-quoted reason) to support Israel is God's promise to Abraham "Those who bless you, I shall bless and those who curse you I shall curse" (Genesis 12:3). Falwell was quoted above as saying that "God has been good to America because America has been good to the Jews." Hagee describes this phenomenon in detail, beginning with Egypt's receipt of blessing through Joseph (Genesis 39-42; Hagee 2007, 111-119). Spector agrees that "this verse is by far the most prominent reason that evangelicals cite for their backing of the state of Israel" and shows that this interpretation originates in the 1909 *Scofield Reference Bible* (Spector 2009, 23). A final reason suggested by Hagee is the need to repent past Christian misdeeds to the Jewish people. For example, he writes:

> As Christians we should ask God's forgiveness and ask the Jewish people for forgiveness of every act of anti-Semitism in our past. The Crusades. The Spanish Inquisition. Martin Luther's "Concerning the Jews and Their Lies." The Final Solution of Adolf Hitler, which was carried out by baptized Christians in good standing with their church (Hagee 2007, 5).

This reason is particularly noteworthy, because here Hagee is exhorting Evangelicals to take responsibility for Christian misdeeds throughout the centuries, even though they are of a different creed, having rejected classic Replacement theology.

These are the primary motives for Christian backing of Israel. They support the country for biblical reasons; out of a sense of gratitude to the Jewish people for their contributions to Christianity and the world; due to shared values; for geopolitical strategic reasons; because Jesus was a Jew; in order to receive God's blessing; and, to repent past Christian misdeeds. These contemporary reasons are much more universal and palatable to Christians in general than traditional Evangelical Dispensationalism. They speak broadly to the American Christian community, avoiding denominational differences and these reasons place the US-Israel relationship on an entirely different platform to Mearsheimer and Walt's narrow realist understanding of international relations. Brog and Hagee's motivations make a strictly realist argument against support for Israel mostly irrelevant.

Extremist Elements within the Christian Zionist Camp

Nevertheless, undeniably elements thrive within the Christian Zionist camp with more extreme religious motivations. David Brog of CUFI addresses the issue of *Armageddon* as the oft-quoted 'ulterior motive' of Christian Zionism.

He explains that while "the media have conjured up a more sinister motive behind Christian Zionism," this is simply not true. He argues that, if it were true that Evangelical Christians are trying to hasten the *Second Coming*, then they "should be opening up abortion clinics, brothels, and casinos. Instead, dispensationalists have been at the forefront of fighting to restore traditional morality to America" (Brog 2006, 68-85). This defense of the movement, however, employs sleight of hand, as the issue of *Armageddon* is not domestic, rather is related directly to Christian Zionist activity in Israel. And while it may be true that Christians United for Israel does not support Israel for End-Times reasons, certainly those who do will stop at nothing to achieve their aims. In the words of Stephen Sizer:

> [Christian Zionism is] a theology which, in my opinion, defends racism and apartheid on biblical grounds, is directly implicated in the denial of basic human rights, is complicit in the destruction of the indigenous Christian community in Israel/Palestine and is fuelling the fire that may ignite into an apocalyptic war between Islam and the West.[18]

Sizer, a Presbyterian minister, is a staunch critic of both Christian Zionism and the State of Israel. While he generally tends to be alarmist, his concerns are none the less true of an extremist element within the Christian Zionist camp.

Stephen Spector further elucidates this matter, asserting that "the real origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict, according to many Christian Zionist writers, does not reside in nationalist or economic factors but in the opposing spiritual

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[18] http://www.christianzionism.org/Article/Sizer08.asp, accessed 6/26/12.

forces" (2009, 88). He quotes Pat Robertson as saying that the confrontation with the Arabs is not about money or ancient customs versus modernity, rather "the struggle is whether Hubal, the Moon god of Mecca, known as Allah is supreme, or whether the Judeo-Christian Jehovah god of the Bible is supreme" (2009, 89). This clash is much more extreme than the third reason offered by Brog. It is not simply about Western values; it is about Christianity versus Islam. Fundamentalist Christians who feel this way do not differentiate between radical and non-radical Moslems. They are all part of the opposing spiritual force to Christianity and their global spread must be stopped, because in their mind, Islam is evil. As Spector explains:

> Just as evangelicals' political support for Israel comports with their religious convictions, so too is their opposition to Israel's enemies embedded in theology. It is an ancient enmity, rooted in deep spiritual conflict. The struggle, for Christian Zionists, goes beyond terrorism and the wars between Israel and its Arab and Muslim neighbors, and is even more than a clash of civilizations. It is a contest between God and Allah: the Lord God of Judaism and Christianity versus what they view as the dubious supernatural being that Muslims worship. For many evangelical Zionists, this is the divine conflict behind the earthly hostilities in the Middle East. It is the other half of the picture, complementing their scripturally based alliance with the Jewish state. Several of the most prominent American evangelicals have denounced not just Islamic radicals but Islam itself and the Prophet Mohammad. After September 11, 2001, Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, called Islam a "very evil and wicked religion." Jerry Falwell, on 60 Minutes, denounced Mohammad as a terrorist. Jerry Vines, former president of the Southern Baptist Convention, called Islam's founder a "demon-possessed pedophile," and Pat Robertson called Mohammad "a robber and a brigand" (Spector 2009, 76).

Thus, there is no doubt that – just like any movement and belief system – there exist extreme elements, which tend to be vociferous in their positions and with which people tend to identify the movement as a whole. Christians United for Israel, the largest Christian pro-Israel lobby, has gone to great lengths to distance itself from such positions, in its attempts to reflect as broad an American Christian consensus as possible.

What Difference do a Few Million Evangelical Christians Make?

This chapter has explained the new place of the Jewish people and Israel in the belief system of many Christians. But in the great scheme of things, what effect should a few million Evangelicals have on the national decisions of a nation of over three hundred million? Christians United for Israel with their one million members is certainly not sufficiently numerous to have any significant impact. But even if this agenda represents twelve million Evangelical Christians (Spector 2009, 10), or fifty million (Hagee 2007, 2), it still does not explain the international activity of the United States in the Middle East. The following chapter will discuss the rise in power of Evangelicals in American politics, the broadening of their influence in America, and the effect this had on the US-Israel relationship. It will become abundantly evident that much more is behind US support for Israel than Evangelical theology or even Evangelicals themselves. It is in the blood of Christian Americans, and Evangelicals have been successful at appealing to this natural proclivity.

Chapter 4 – The Politics of Evangelicals, America, and Israel

This chapter will examine the rise of Evangelicals and the Christian Right in America. Early on, Israel recognized the importance of forging an alliance with this group, and today this is clearly the case, as evinced by the Israeli prime minister taking time to address the annual Christians United for Israel convention. With their rising prominence, the Republicans also recognized the importance of Evangelicals and began to court them and align their policies with those of the Christian Right.   Nevertheless, the imputation of increased US support for Israel to the Evangelicals cannot account for presidents on both sides of the House, who have been unequivocal supporters of the Jewish state.

The Christian Right as an American Political Force

An understanding of the contemporary political power of Christian Zionism requires a preliminary examination of the development of the Christian Right as an American political force. Fundamentalist Christians gained their appellation in the early twentieth century, when in 1906, in response to biblical criticism and Darwinism that were beginning to enter American thought, Milton and Lyman Stewart published a series of twelve pamphlets entitled *The Fundamentals*. These booklets outlined the doctrines that are 'fundamental' to conservative evangelical Christianity, including the inerrancy of Scripture and literal understanding of the Bible (El-Faizy 2006, 62). That was the same year

that Fundamentalist Premillenial Dispensationalist Cyrus Scofield published his aforementioned *Reference Bible*.

Christian Fundamentalists first arrived on the American political scene in the 1920s, when conservative Protestants attempted unsuccessfully to mobilize the Democratic Party in defense of Prohibition and when three-time Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan led a national campaign against evolution. The Fundamentalist "movement" emerged in opposition to theological liberalism. It attempted to "use politics to restore the nation's Christian identity," on the one hand defending by the 'fundamentals' of the faith – including (as mentioned) biblical inerrancy – and on the other hand, the growth of Catholic political influence. Unsuccessful in this initial attempt at political engagement (since the Democrats nominated Al Smith, a Catholic, as their presidential candidate in 1928), the Fundamentalists all but disappeared from the political scene until the 1940s, when the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) was established as a Washington lobbying organization. This mobilization was the first stage of their alliance with the Republican Party.

During the 1940s through the 1960s, Fundamentalists identified with the GOP as the anticommunist, moral-order party. During this stage, they developed close alliances with Republican leaders, albeit failing to influence the GOP in any major way (Williams 2010, 2-3). During the 1950s, however, a major ideological split occurred amongst conservative Protestants. The NAE, headed by Billy Graham, attempted to soften its fundamentalist image. To that end, it first

shifted to the less pejorative-sounding 'Evangelical,' a term originally employed by Martin Luther denoting 'believer in [spreading] the gospel' (Luo 2006; Mead 2006).

The Evangelicals began cooperating with Mainline Protestants on many issues, notwithstanding the Mainlines' lack of belief in biblical inerrancy. But the major sticking issue that led to the breaking away of hardline Fundamentalists, including Bob Jones Jr.[19] and Jerry Falwell, was racial integration. While Evangelicals such as Graham took a moderate position on issues of race, giving cautious support to civil rights legislation, southern Fundamentalists lambasted the civil rights movement as a Communist plot (Martin 2005, 33; Williams 2010, 4). The ideological and political differences between Fundamentalists and Evangelicals became immaterial for most of the 1960s, as they ended up positioning themselves outside of the sphere of political influence, having been united against President Kennedy's election, due to his Catholicism (Martin 2005, 47). This disenfranchisement changed in the late 1960s, when they began to redefine their notion of Christian America, viewing secularism, not Catholicism, as the new enemy. During this second stage, conservative Protestants began to change the agenda of the Republican Party. This time they focused more on the culture wars than the Cold War, mobilizing against feminism, abortion, pornography, and gay rights. The end of the civil rights movement saw the formation of the new Christian Right – now that the bridge of racial integration

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[19] Robert Reynolds Jones, Jr. (1911-1997) was the second president and chancellor of Bob Jones University.

had been crossed, the culture wars trumped denominational differences (Williams 2010, 3-6).

Changing demographics were also responsible for the rise of Christian right power. Evangelicals began wielding serious political power due to the closing of the wealth gap and the rise of the Sunbelt. Over the years of the politicization of Evangelicals, they created many organizations to galvanize the Christian Right, including Jerry Falwell's *Moral Majority*, Billy Graham's *National Association of Evangelicals*, James Dobson's *Focus on the Family* and Bev LaHaye's *Concerned Women for America*. One of the most successful groups coming off the heels of Pat Robertson's presidential run was the *Christian Coalition,* headed by Ralph Reed, who made it all the way to the front cover of *Time Magazine* in his crusade against American liberalism (Marsden 2008, 34; Martin 2005, 301). These organizations were important both in terms of the role that they played in strengthening the Christian Right's ability to 'do politics' and insofar as many of the key players in the Christian Zionist political movement also have occupied prominent roles in the general political mobilization of the Christian Right. Such characters include leaders such as Falwell, Reed, and Gary Bauer (born May 4, 1946), director of *American Values* and also *The Emergency Committee for Israel*.

Israel and the American Christian Right

Important to note is that early on, Israel quickly recognized the military-strategic support for the Jewish state that stood to be gained from an alliance with the Christian Right in America. According to folklore, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was the first to establish political ties with Christian Zionists, after being treated for a heart-attack by an Evangelical, one Dr. Larry Samuels, who later went on to become one of the founders of the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (Spector 2009, 143). In truth, however, the political alliance between the Israeli government and American Evangelicals did not suffer a hiatus of three decades between the founding of the State of Israel and the premiership of Begin. Already the first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, courted American Christian Zionists receiving VIPs including W.A. Criswell, president of the Southern Baptist Convention and Oral Roberts (Spector 2009, 144). In the early 1960s, the government established a Department of Christian Affairs to galvanize Christian Evangelical support and in 1967, Israel dispatched a young scholar by the name of Yona Malachy to the US to study Christian attitudes towards Israel. The Hebrew University published his findings, entitled *American Fundamentalism and Israel: The Relation of Fundamentalist Churches to Zionism and the State of Israel* (Spector 2009, 145). In 1971, Ben-Gurion addressed the 1400 Christian Zionist attendees of the Jerusalem Conference on Bible Prophecy and interestingly, when he died, Hal Lindsey's *The Late Great Planet Earth* (1970) – a Dispensationalist work connecting biblical

prophecies to current world events – was found on his bedside table (Spector 2009, 146).

The first Christian Right group that formally adopted a foreign policy position and placed Israel on its agenda was Falwell's Moral Majority. In *Listen, America!,* a book outlining the purpose of the organization, Falwell summed it up as "pro-life, pro-family, pro-moral, pro-American . . . and pro-Israel" (Falwell 1981). The Government of Israel saw the Moral Majority as a strategic partner and began a long-term tactic of wooing this new group, including Israel-sponsored visits to the country, being honoured in New York with the Jabotinsky Centennial Medal, and the gift of a Learjet by Israeli Prime Minister Begin to Falwell (Haija 2006, 75; Weber 2004, 48). According to Spector (2009, 146), however, the Learjet story is a myth. Haija none the less concedes that from Falwell's perspective, these machinations were sincere. In fact, Falwell often would say, "God has been good to America because America has been good to the Jews" (Brownfield 2002, 71).

According to Brownfield, the first major consequence of this new relationship was the support requested by Israel from Falwell following the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7th, 1981 (Brownfield 2002, 72). Haija goes on to examine certain major achievements of the Christian Zionists over the next few years, including the blockage of F-15 and AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia by the US and the repeal of UN Resolution 3379, "Zionism is racism" (Haija 2006, 79), to the extent that Haija feels "that the Christian Zionists rather

than Congress deserve the credit for repealing the resolution" (2006, 80). Whether or not the Christian Zionist lobby was in fact responsible for all these achievements imputed to it, is a subject of debate, which I shall address below.

For the most part, other Christian Right organizations did not adopt foreign policy positions until many years later. Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition, for example, publicly expressed his positive personal views on Israel in a 1995 AIPAC debate with David Saperstein of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism. Nevertheless, upon being asked to commit his organization to the pro-Israel agenda, he was silent.[20] Following his departure from the Christian Coalition, however, he later formed *Stand for Israel,* together with Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein, which aimed to mobilize the evangelical grassroots in support of the Jewish state (Firestone 2002). Similarly, the Christian Coalition itself (what is left of an organization that has fallen on tough times) generally takes a pro-Israel position, despite foreign policy not being the focus of the organization.

The Christian Right and the Grand Old Party

By the end of the 1970s, the GOP had acknowledged the importance of the Christian right constituency and started to address their policy concerns directly. Thus, in 1980, Evangelicals threw their support behind Ronald Reagan, who believed that America was a "divinely chosen nation in a battle for freedom" (Williams 2010, 188). In 1984, Reagan received an even greater share

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[20] http://rac.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=635&pge_prg_id=7037, accessed 1/30/12.

of the 'white Protestant' vote (Martin 2005, 236). Reagan ended up being one of

the friendliest presidents Israel had ever seen. As a "born-again Christian,"[21] he

viewed Israel through the lens of the Bible:

> 'You know I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old
> Testament and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find
> myself wondering if we're the generation that's going to see
> that come about. I don't know if you've noted any of those
> prophecies lately, but, believe me, they certainly describe the
> times we're going through' (Reagan, quoted in Blitzer 1985,
> 240).

Nevertheless, despite his powerful rhetoric here, Reagan was generally quite

reserved about his religious views.

Reagan was the first president to formally authorize an enhanced

strategic cooperation agreement with Israel. For many years, there had been

close US-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation. Reagan, however, brought

it "out of the closet. In the process, he demonstrated that he was prepared to

risk upsetting the Arabs" (Blitzer 1985, 240). Even before his presidency, Reagan

had attended rallies in support of Israel and Reagan went so far as to say, 'Israel

is not only a nation, it is a symbol. In defending Israel's right to exist, we defend

the very values upon which our nation is built' (Blitzer 1985, 244).

This is the beginning of the solidification of US support for Israel based on

common values, as opposed to strategic concerns. Reagan's words speak to the

issue of societal security, which an alliance with Israel fortifies. Despite being in

the midst of the Cold War, Reagan presented the alliance in terms of societal, as

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[21] www.reaganfoundation.org/programs/lc/reagan_facts.asp, accessed 2/26/12.

opposed to mere physical, security. And later in his memoirs, he described his

administration's support for Israel in terms of moral, as opposed to strategic,

reasons (Reagan 1990, 410).

Christian Zionism Enters the White House

Campolo (2005), Haija (2006), and Wagner (2003) cite myriad examples

of the infiltration of Christian Zionist ideology into the walls of Congress and the

White House during this period. For instance, Reagan's Secretary of the Interior,

James Watt, was a Dispensationalist.   As explained above, Dispensationalism

ultimately believes in the Rapture, which is the time when all the 'believers' are

whisked away to heaven, while Armageddon happens on earth, which will occur

once the Jewish People return to the Land of Israel. Since this return is occurring

en masse for the first time in nearly two thousand years, Dispensationalists

believe that the Rapture is imminent. And so as a Dispensationalist who believed

in the imminent Rapture, Watt saw no reason to be concerned about drilling for

oil in natural parks and other environmental matters, on the basis that long-term

planning was irrelevant. Campolo explains that Reagan was so taken by this

theology "fed to him by televangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson" that one

of his priorities was to "promote a military buildup so America would be ready

for the battle of Armageddon" (2005, 20).

Nevertheless, despite the conviction of these writers, it is important to

put this alleged influence into perspective. According to Cannon, Reagan

generally kept his religious beliefs private. At times, however, he surprised

listeners with apocalyptic pronouncements, such as 'For the first time ever,

everything is in place for the battle of Armageddon and the Second Coming of

Christ' (Reagan, quoted in Cannon 2000, 248).

George H.W. Bush, Realist

During the decade following the Reagan administration, Evangelical

Christians' influence in the White House waned. Despite their support for his

presidential campaign (following his victory in the Republican primaries over the

Evangelical candidates), President Bush showed them scant regard during his

tenure (Martin 2005, 288; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004, 99), and thus the

State of Israel suffered likewise during his tenure. Bush was a Realist and the

administration's approach to world affairs was based on a state-centric balance

of power system. In fact, according to Elizabeth Stephens, Bush "often saw the

Israelis as more of a strategic irritant than a strategic asset" (Stephens 2006,

208).

An Evangelical Pro-Israel Democrat

The next administration stood in ironic contrast to the discussion thus far

of the growing alliance between the Christian Right and the GOP, with one of the

objectives being Israel. Notwithstanding the Southern Baptist (Evangelical)

Clinton/Gore Democratic ticket in 1992, Evangelicals once again supported the

incumbent Republican president (Williams 2010, 243). Clinton, however, ended

up being the best friend Israel had ever had in the White House, throughout the

duration of his two terms, as the following statements show:

> Our commitment to Israel's security is unshakable. . . . The security of Israel is going to be one of the main pillars of America's defense commitments, and one of the main things we'll be concerned about as we move through the peace process. . . . We have made an explicit policy commitment, which has been carried through under presidents of both parties, to maintain the qualitative and technological edge . . . that Israel needs to guarantee its security. I would certainly never countenance an agreement that I thought undermined Israel's security. We've made clear to all that our commitment to the security and well-being of the Jewish state is absolutely unwavering and will continue to be. There will be no peace, and no peace agreement, unless the Israeli people have lasting security guarantees. . . . So my parameters rely on . . . a non-militarized Palestine (AIPAC 2008, 14).

Why did Clinton support Israel? Was it due to his personal religious

convictions? It was certainly not due to Republican Evangelicals, who

showed him no support.   Pursuant to my assessment of further

presidential foreign policies, I shall elaborate upon this question below.

Israel's Best Friend

In 2000, Evangelical Christians showed their huge support for Republican

Evangelical presidential candidate George W. Bush, who won in spite of four

million evangelical voters who stayed home, having felt betrayed by the former

Bush. This Bush, however, was different. Another born-again Christian, he too viewed the world through the lens of the Bible and felt, especially after 9/11, that he had been 'called' to the presidency (Mansfield 2003). In 2004, he became the undisputed candidate of the Christian Right, winning by a significantly greater margin than his first victory (Williams 2010, 251). He was unfaltering in his support for Israel and never wavered in his backing of the Jewish state, as his following statements over the years demonstrate:

> America's commitment to Israel's security is strong, enduring and unshakable. At my first meeting of the National Security, I [said] that a top foreign policy priority of my administration is the safety and security of Israel. My administration will be steadfast in supporting Israel against terrorism and violence. . . . I am strongly committed to Israel's security and viability as a Jewish state and to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge. . . . The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats. . . . Israel is a close friend and ally of the United States, and in the event of any attack on Israel, the United States will come to Israel's aid. . . . The United States will keep its commitment to the security of Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for the Jewish people. . . . The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders (AIPAC 2008, 13-20).

While this is a collection of public statements, Bush was an even stronger supporter of Israel behind closed doors.[22]

While Campolo is uncertain as to "how much this dispensationalist eschatology . . . permeated the thinking of President George W. Bush," he does

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[22] I heard this from a number of my associates who met with the president at events such as the annual White House Chanukah party.

note that Bush's "spiritual advisors" included Falwell, Robertson, and Franklin Graham (Campolo 2005, 20). According to Wagner and Haija, however, he certainly paid heed to the politicking of the Christian Zionist lobby. For example, in 2002, following a suicide attack on Passover dinner, Israel entered the West Bank and proceeded to raze the homes of the terrorists involved. Israel received harsh condemnations from around the world, including from President Bush. Yet, Wagner asserts, "The Pro-Israel lobby, in coordination with the Christian-Right, mobilized over 100,000 email messages, calls, and visits urging the President to avoid restraining Israel. The tactic worked. The president uttered not another word of criticism or caution, and Sharon continued the offensive" (Wagner 2003, 20).

Similarly, in 2003, Congressman Jim Moran was forced to resign his position as House Democratic regional whip as a result of comments he provided insinuating that the US had entered Iraq at the behest of the pro-Israel lobby. Haija states that while the Jewish backlash was inevitably anticipated, "in the ensuing days the Christian Zionist leadership followed suit with rhetoric similar to that of the Jewish organizations, and Moran soon became ostracised from his party" (Haija 2006, 91). Finally, also in 2003, President Bush arranged to act as mediator between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the *Roadmap*.[23] Yet, Haija claims that after receiving 50,000 postcards and letters, the administration

[23] The *Roadmap* was an attempt at a comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

began to rethink the timing of its *Roadmap* endorsement, proffering that the Christian Right's deep aversion to the *Roadmap* worried President Bush's closest advisors, and the administration preferred not to apply any further pressure to the peace process until after the 2004 elections (Haija 2006, 92).

Assessing the Impact of Premillenial Dispensationalism on US Foreign Policy

Despite the claims made by Campolo (2005), Clark (2007), Haija (2006), Sizer (2002; 2004), Wagner (2003), and others, the evidence cited for pro-Israel foreign policy decisions made by the various administrations above due to Christian Zionist activity is not particularly strong. For example, the quoted numbers of email and mail respondents garnered for the campaigns are not overwhelming in the large scheme of American politics. Even regarding President George W. Bush, the so-called evangelical president, according to Michael Lindsey, "conservative biblical prophecy on the Middle East is completely foreign to Bush and his approach toward Israel and Palestine;" and he quotes Campolo as telling him that "the president's groundbreaking position on Palestine has elicited scorn and derision among many of his fellow evangelicals" (Lindsey 2007, 51).

In fact, despite their imputation of great influence to the pro-Israel lobby, even Mearsheimer and Walt are not impressed with the impact of the Christian Zionist lobby (2007, 138). And according to Ribuffo, "although religious interest groups at home and religious issues abroad have affected foreign policy, no

major diplomatic decision has turned on religious issues alone." He maintains that "serious religious ideas have had at most an indirect impact on policymakers – far less, for example, than strategic, economic, or political considerations, perceptions of public opinion, and the constraints of office," noting that Scriptural texts can lead to divergent interpretations (Ribuffo 1998, 50). Hastedt, who quotes Ribuffo, draws this conclusion, when addressing the impact of the Christian right (Hastedt 2009, 143).

The Christian Zionist Lobby

For many years, following the demise of the Moral Majority (and Falwell's flagging interest in Israel), groups such as *Stand for Israel* orchestrated advocacy efforts and campaigns at a grassroots level – albeit often prodded by the largest Jewish pro-Israel lobby, the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) – but lacking any formal structure. In 2006, however, Pastor John Hagee of San Antonio, Texas, formed Christians United for Israel (CUFI), a group that – unlike its predecessor Christian Right advocacy groups – aims to lobby the government specifically on Israel issues. Hagee formed the group with the participation of four hundred Christian leaders, comprised of megachurches, television ministries, and other high-profile preachers. Officially, the group makes no public reference to theology (Wood 2007, 80).

Its public policy includes electronic rapid response alerts that generate "millions of phone calls and emails" from CUFI members to the executive and

legislative branches of federal and state government (Wood 2007, 81); as well as the congressional report card, first pioneered by Christian Voice, which rates members of congress according to their voting record (Marsden 2008, 37). In 2007, CUFI's second annual forum attracted over four thousand participants and was modeled on the annual AIPAC conference. At this conference, Hagee praised the "divine timing" of the first, which had coincided with the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah, permitting CUFI to make its voice heard "loud and clear," while having a "significant impact" on the US government's strong support for Israel (Wood 2007, 82). One of the highlights of the conference was a surprise appearance by Senator and then-presidential candidate John McCain who received seven standing ovations in the fifteen minutes he was present. He opened his address with "It's hard doing the Lord's work in the city of Satan." McCain then thanked Hagee for his spiritual guidance over the years and made pleas for the US to defend Israel and for the military to remain in Iraq (Wood 2007, 83).

Since its inception, CUFI has mastered the art of political advocacy, despite not being an official lobbying group (and thereby maintaining charitable tax status). In addition to its advocacy efforts, CUFI rallies its members with dozens of annual nationwide 'Nights to Honor Israel,' a spiritually-moving experience, replete with prayer and song; and missions to the Holy Land, in an effort to emotionally move its constituency to mobilize in support of Israel.

Today, the organization boasts over one million members[24] and the annual Washington DC summit attracts over five thousand participants. The summit includes seminars on Israel, advocacy training, prayer, and song, and culminates in a formidable force of five thousand Christian Evangelicals descending upon Capitol Hill to lobby their congressmen and senators. Today, CUFI is the undeniable leader in the Christian Zionist movement. But what tangible impact has the group made on American politics?

Mainline Protestant President Obama

In 2008, the Republicans lost the presidential race for many reasons. Americans were tired of Bush's Middle East policies and the domestic economy was suffering. The new generation of Evangelicals also was not as united as it had been during previous elections, as demonstrated by megachurch pastor Rick Warren's support of Democrat Barack Obama. Warren invited Obama to address his congregation, and Obama later responded in kind by inviting Warren to offer the invocation at his inauguration. In addition, those Evangelicals (still the vast majority) who stuck by the Republican Party, split their primary vote between McCain and Huckabee, enabling the Democrats to reach out to Evangelicals and capitalize on their lack of political unity (Williams 2010, 273-5). Even McCain's pick of a pro-life Evangelical, Sarah Palin, could not help him secure the presidency.

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[24] From their web-site, www.cufi.org, accessed 31/5/12.

Nevertheless, despite claims to the contrary by those who wish to vilify him, President Obama has continued the strong relationship between the US and Israel. For example, the current administration has stepped up military and security cooperation between the two countries (Levinson 2010). Secretary of State Clinton has said, "We are two democracies whose alliance is forged in our common values." And President Obama has stated that "Israel has turned out to be not just a friend who shares our values, but a critically important strategic ally who brings stability and balance to a volatile region."[25] Thus, while the strategic rationale remains, it is clearly much more than that. Both the president and secretary of state talk about shared values. How do we understand such pronouncements? Here is a Democrat president, who is unquestionably non-Evangelical, and yet supports Israel due to shared values. This commitment to Israel is certainly not due to Premillenial Dispensationalism, nor is it due to an Evangelical constituency. What then is driving his convictions?

Bipartisan Support for Israel

In May 2011, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressed both houses of the US Congress regarding the issue of building on disputed land in Jerusalem, and received over twenty standing ovations from both sides of the House. Such a reception of a foreign head of state was unheard of in the history of the USA, let alone the State of Israel's. Is this the work of

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[25] www.aipac.org, accessed 1/27/12.

Evangelicals? Is it the work of the Jewish lobby? What motivates the lawmakers of the greatest nation on the planet to stand up for the head of a tiny little state on the other side of the world?

GOP Primaries 2012

The Republican primaries in 2012 showed that the question of the Christian right's influence remains timely. Of the four final candidates, three were passionately pro-Israel and unabashedly Christian.   Mitt Romney, the eventual victor, stated that "Obama threw Israel under the bus;" Newt Gingrich proclaimed that "the Palestinians are an invented people" (Elis 2012); and, not wanting to be outdone, Rick Santorum declared that "there are no Palestinians living in the West Bank and this is Israeli land" (Kessler 2012).   These positions were astonishing and one might have been tempted to attribute them to extremist Evangelicals.   And yet not only were none of these candidates Evangelical, they were not even Protestant! Romney was Mormon and the other two were Roman Catholic!   Why then were they so pro-Israel?   Clearly, such powerful rhetoric cannot simply be attributed to base politicking in order to garner support from their Evangelical constituents. Similarly, it is a far stretch to blame the power of the Jewish lobby on such extreme statements 'of faith' concerning Israel.   The Jewish lobby itself is far tamer in its language and behaviour, and moreover, has much stronger ties to the Democrats.

Understanding the Power of the Christian Zionist Lobby

American support for Israel would seem to be unassailable. The US-Israel alliance is stronger than it has ever been. From Republicans to Democrats, Evangelicals to Catholics to Mormons and everything in between, American presidents, congressmen, senators and political candidates have almost without exception gone to great lengths for the Jewish state over the last two decades. Such incredible all-round support may not merely be imputed to Evangelical theological musings. Rather, what is driving the United States's support for the State of Israel is America's identity as a Christian nation. No matter what brand of Christianity one adheres to, the common denominator is biblical values. No matter which church one chooses to attend, the story of the *New Israel* comports with the story of the ancient and modern Israel.

While this feeling is not true of all Christians,[26] recent US political history has shown that it is true for an overwhelming number of Americans, evidenced by a simple survey of the language employed regarding shared values and aspirations.[27] And whilst one can never know the true personal convictions of politicians – after all, they are driven by the need to be elected and re-elected – they are clearly responding to the sentiments of their constituents throughout the nation. *Christian America* identifies with *Israel* due to the perception of *shared values*.

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[26] Some American Christian groups, including the Presbyterians and the Methodists, have had major internal debates over this issue.
[27] I shall quote further survey material of the American people to support this assertion in the next chapter.

If American Christians naturally identify with the Israelis in the conflict, what then is the role of the Christian Zionist lobby? Or even the Jewish lobby for that matter?   And what does Christians United for Israel seek to achieve? On the one hand, they are undeniably Evangelical. On the other hand, unlike some of the more radical elements within the Evangelical camp, CUFI does not publicly discuss theology, neither does it subscribe to an End-Times agenda, nor does it demean Islam. Its raison d'être is simply to support Israel, even if that means negotiations and territorial compromise, a position never before taken by Dispensationalists! So why are they necessary? If Christian Americans naturally identify with and support Israel, then is CUFI redundant? In order to understand this enigma and ultimately shed light on the assertions of Mearsheimer and Walt, the following chapter will discuss the role of domestic lobbying in general, applying this to the question of the US-Israel relationship.

Chapter 5 – The Christian pro-Israel Lobby

In 2006, prominent IR scholars, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, published a scathing criticism of the pro-Israel lobby, ascribing to it unparalleled power and accusing its adherents of working to undermine the best interests of America. What exactly is the pro-Israel lobby?   While their exact meaning and object of reproof is somewhat unclear, these lobbyists presumably would include the largest Christian pro-Israel advocacy group, Christians United for Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt, however, choose to minimize the impact of this camp, asserting that the majority of blame lies with the Jewish lobby. This chapter critiques their reasoning for such exclusion, arguing that the Christian pro-Israel lobby wields great power, as far as advocacy groups go. How powerful lobbies actually are is the real question. This chapter will investigate why people join interest groups and how they achieve success. The domestic politics literature suggests that, contrary to the contentions of these IR scholars, lobbyists prefer to 'preach to the choir.' In other words, they mostly do not seek to change people's minds on an issue; rather they seek likeminded politicians to whom to present the issue as cogently as possible. In the case of the Christian Zionist lobby, their goals are to present to American Christian politicians the importance of supporting Israel due to shared values and the protection of US societal security. By doing so, they hope to ensure that these officials continue to identify with Israel.

Whom Exactly are Mearsheimer and Walt Criticizing?

Critics of Mearsheimer and Walt have pointed to their over-generalizations and lack of clarity regarding whom they are criticizing (Indyk 2006; Mead 2007), by including "anyone who works actively to preserve America's special relationship with the Jewish state" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 114). Would this criticism include, for example, the dovish J-Street advocacy group that touts itself as "pro-Israel, pro-Peace"[28] and regularly sides with the Palestinians, often vociferously opposing Israel's actions and America's unconditional support for such? Would it include members of the legislative branch who are staunchly pro-Israel and whose votes on any Israel-related matter are entirely predictable?

Martin Indyk has suggested that critique would be of greater value if limited to the major pro-Israel advocacy group, the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) (2006). Despite its name, AIPAC is not a PAC (Political Action Committee), i.e. it does not fund election campaigns; its mission rather is "to strengthen the ties between the United States and its ally Israel. As America's leading pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC works with Democrats, Republicans, and Independents to enact public policy that enhances the U.S.-Israel relationship."[29] No one will deny that AIPAC is the most visible pro-Israel player, with its annual DC convention garnering over ten thousand attendees, including seventy US senators and 270 members of the House (Rosenblatt 2011). In addition, many

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[28] From their web-site, accessed 11/13/11.
[29] From their web-site, accessed 11/13/11.

years, including 2012, the President of the United States (as well as the Prime Minister of Israel) addressed the convention. This thesis adds to this focus on the pro-Israel lobby the parallel rising star, Christians United for Israel (CUFI), which, as mentioned earlier, boasts over a million members and is the recipient of an annual address by the Prime Minister of Israel.   They too do not operate as a formal PAC, rather "the purpose of Christians United for Israel (CUFI) is to provide a national association through which every pro-Israel church, parachurch organization, ministry or individual in America can speak and act with one voice in support of Israel in matters related to Biblical issues".[30]

Mearsheimer and Walt and the Christian Zionist Lobby

Although Mearsheimer and Walt recognize the power of the Christian pro-Israel lobby, they none the less believe that the influence of Christian Zionists is "overstated" for a number of reasons, including:

1.   Evangelicals care about many social issues. Israel is just one issue amongst many for which they are lobbying.
2.   Israel is relatively low on the agenda, because the number of Evangelicals who care deeply about Israel is a minority.
3.   Christian Zionists lack the organizational capacity to analyze foreign policy the way that Jewish Israel lobby groups can.
4.   Christians have competing moral obligations. Love for the Jewish people is overridden by "love thy neighbor as thyself." Thus support for Israel cannot come at the expense of the Palestinian people.
5.   Christian Zionists lack the financial power and media presence of Jewish lobby groups (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 138-9).

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[30] From their web-site, accessed 11/13/11.

This thesis argues that Mearsheimer and Walt underestimate the strength of the Christian pro-Israel lobby, due to many specific reasons, but ultimately due to the fact that lobbies are only as good as their audiences, as I am about to argue.[31]

In terms of their specific claims, firstly, the notion of Evangelicals caring about many social issues is a relatively new phenomenon. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Christian right cared politically about a relatively narrow range of issues, those being the classic right causes of anti-abortion, anti-homosexuality, and the like. The *Moral Majority*, was "pro-life, pro-family, pro-moral, pro-American . . . and pro-Israel" (Falwell 1981). The widening of the evangelical agenda, to include social activism and environmentalism, is a twenty-first century phenomenon. President Obama's inaugural invocation choice Rick Warren is famous for saying, "Jesus' agenda is far bigger than one or two issues," precisely because such concern for social issues was unheard of previously in Evangelical circles (Williams 2010, 275). Nevertheless, despite this traditionally narrow agenda, the Christian Right has not hesitated to prioritize the issue of Israel. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Begin had a close relationship with *Moral Majority* leader Jerry Falwell and 'Israel' was one of the agenda items of the organization; Ralph Reed of the *Christian Coalition* went on to head *Stand for Israel*; and a contemporary example is Gary Bauer, president of *American Values*,

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[31] Scholars, coming from various perspectives, have critiqued *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (see e.g., Chomsky 2006, Foxman 2007, Zune 2006). In my review of the literature, however, I have not found any prior critique specifically addressing their discussion of the Christian Zionist lobby.

who also sits on the executive board of CUFI and the *Emergency Committee for Israel*.

Secondly, many Evangelical groups are dedicated solely to the cause of Christian Zionism, including *Christians United for Israel, Christians for Israel (CUFI), Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, Bridges for Peace, On Eagles' Wings* and many more. While it is true that most of these groups are not political advocacy groups per se, they have engaged in political activity. For example, Rev. John Tweedie, chairman of *Christians For Israel* (Canada and International), shipped the remains of an Israeli bus, which a suicide bomber had destroyed, to the Hague. He then protested outside the ICC against the "war-crimes" trial of Ariel Sharon (Spector 2009, 318). Nevertheless, the last six years has seen the rise of CUFI, which represents thousands of churches, and hundreds of thousands, if not millions[32] of Evangelicals, dedicated to positioning Israel as *the most important* issue on the political agenda. While CUFI founder John Hagee has been active on Israel for many decades, the rise in resonance of the Israel agenda over the last few years is due largely to the increased fears for societal security that Americans have felt subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

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[32] It is important to note that their self-reported numbers are grossly inaccurate. They claim over a million "official" members and millions more Evangelicals that they are representing. And yet even their official membership count is hyper-inflated, because they include as a member anyone who signs up to receive their emails. I, for one, am two members, because I receive their email at two different addresses!

Thirdly, Mearsheimer and Walt contend that the number of Evangelicals who care deeply about Israel is a minority. Whether or not this contention is true is of little import, because what CUFI does is to shift the focus away from Premillenial Dispensationalist theological motives for support of Israel, to American societal security motivations. CUFI argues that 'If you are concerned for American values and identity, then Israel must be supported.' Thus, it is no longer a question of how many Evangelicals care about Israel or even how many Evangelicals exist; rather CUFI targets the soul of America. CUFI's strategy is to meet with individual politicians and advocate for Israel by appealing to their Christian values (Kupferberg 2009, 5). Therefore, despite the relatively small numbers of Evangelicals who may care deeply about Israel, the minority is vocal and influential and they, like many lobby groups, 'punch above their weight.'

Fourthly, while the Christian Zionist lobby itself may lack the ability to formally analyze foreign policy, CUFI has aligned themselves with the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) (who bear the brunt of Mearsheimer and Walt's critique) and do not necessarily need to generate their own analysis. For example, Randy Neal, CUFI's western coordinator formerly worked for AIPAC as coordinator of outreach to Christians. John Hagee's address above in the preamble is to AIPAC. Thus, much ongoing communication takes place between the two groups. In other words, the ability to lobby is not dependent upon possessing the wherewithal to analyze, since there is an abundance of information readily available.

Fifth, Mearsheimer and Walt's contention concerning competing moral obligations is a peculiar approach from an IR Realist perspective. Their general thesis is not that Israel is an immoral country, such that support for Israel would necessitate moral prioritization on the part of a good Jew or Christian. The foundation of their argument purports not to question the morality of Israel, rather to show that blind American support for Israel's actions is not in the 'American interest' (and possibly not even in Israel's ultimate interest either). Mearsheimer and Walt do not examine the (Jewish) 'Lobby' regarding moral persuasion; rather, they present the 'Lobby' as a given. It is merely America's response to the 'Lobby' that Mearsheimer and Walt ask the reader to question. To remain constant, they similarly should not question the motivations of the Christian Zionist lobby. Instead, they should challenge the reader regarding America's response, despite whatever "competing moral obligations" brought the Christian Zionists to advocate on behalf of Israel. Moreover, this argument is troubling because it implies that only Christians are committed to the moral obligation of "Love thy neighbour." The implication is that Jews, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, would not be morally vexed by the difficult decisions with which the State of Israel is often forced to grapple.

And finally, Mearsheimer and Walt's concern for the lack of media and financial backing clearly predates CUFI. Televangelist John Hagee is broadcast on *Trinity Broadcasting Network* in the United States and *Miracle Channel* in Canada, making him a familiar media personality. *John Hagee Ministries* raises

over ten million dollars a year for Israel and is responsible for bringing thousands to Washington DC and Jerusalem annually, with significant media exposure (*Jewish Herald-Voice* 2009). Hagee's newest alliance is with Mormon radio personality, Glenn Beck, who has spoken at CUFI events and himself rallied Americans in support of Israel.

Thus, Mearsheimer and Walt's assertion that the Christian Zionist lobby is not a formidable force is highly debatable. While there is no doubt that it has not reached the visible strength of the Jewish lobby (AIPAC), its power lies not in its conspicuousness, but in its ability to communicate an unambiguous resonating message to Christian Americans, from elected officials to political candidates to laypersons. As the following discussion shows, the key to understanding the influence of interest groups lies less in an appreciation of the interest group and more in understanding of who the audience is. To that end, the impact of the Christian Zionist lobby cannot be overstated, since their audience is so much greater than any Jewish lobby could dream of.

Understanding the Power of Interest Groups

Why do people join the pro-Israel lobby? Mancur Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action* (1968) explains that people will join an advocacy group if they perceive that they will receive a selective benefit in return. He makes this assertion in opposition to David Truman, who had argued that people will form a group in response to some 'disturbance' that has occurred (1951). In the case of

the Christian Zionist lobby, both ideas hold true. The perceived benefit perceived by the devout Evangelical for advocating on behalf of the Jewish state is the belief in divine blessing s/he will receive in return, as per God's promise to Abraham of "those who bless you I shall bless" (Genesis 12:3). In Falwell's words, 'God has been good to America, because America has been good to the Jews.' The disturbance that has occurred is the feeling of societal insecurity, engendered by the attacks of September 11, the threat posed by a nuclear Iran, and the general global rise of Islam – in particular, radical Islam.

How successful are interest groups at affecting policy outcomes? Despite being a two billion dollar annual industry, Baumgartner and Leech (1998) and their more recent work together with Berry, Hojnacki and Kimball (2009) show, using a number of case studies, that lobbying has not changed policy outcomes significantly. While the Christian Zionist lobby is yet in its infancy and scant evidence exists of its track record, in terms of the pro-Israel lobby in general, David Verbeeten assesses the major battles of AIPAC over the 1970s and 1980s. He argues that the lobby has had fairly limited success in affecting policy outcomes, as figure 1 shows (2006).

Event	Degree of Influence/Congruence				
	5 (high)	4	3	2	1 (low)
1973 Yom Kippur War	♦				
Kissinger Shuttle Diplomacy	♦				
Post-War Arab Boycott	♦				
1978 Camp David Diplomacy				♦	
1978 F-15s Arms Deal					♦
1981 AWACS Arms Deal					♦
1982 Lebanon War				♦	
1987 Palestinian *Intifida*				♦	

Figure 1

Like any lobby group, 'you win some, you lose some.' This table proves that AIPAC has had its fair share of losses. In most of their attempts, they did not achieve their policy objectives, and did not influence major foreign policy decisions.

Similarly, Dan Fleshler examines the purported successes of AIPAC in affecting the successes of electoral candidates, and contends that the impact of the lobby is, for the most part, inconclusive, because in each case of candidates winning or losing, various contributory factors also were at play. He furthermore asserts that generally the achievements of AIPAC are grossly overstated for the purposes of marketing and self-aggrandizement – what he calls the "puff factor" (2009). This general lack of provability of pro-Israel lobby success supports the

literature which suggests generally that interest groups have not enjoyed much success in changing policy outcomes.

The Purpose of Lobbying

So why lobby? Why invest billions of dollars a year into the enterprise if results are far from guaranteed?   Despite the general inconclusiveness concerning interest group success, a more recent body of literature suggests that lobbying is not about changing the minds of elected officials. Instead, the aim of lobbyists is to appeal to politicians who already favour their agenda, and therefore that is in fact upon whom successful lobbyists will concentrate their efforts (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Hall and Deardoff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). In other words, lobbyists do not try to convert their audience rather they seek to 'preach to the choir.'   Their goal is to present their issue as cogently and succinctly as possible, in order that the willing audience will act upon their advice.

The Pro-Israel Choir

Who then are the 'friends' of the pro-Israel lobby, towards whom it is directing its advocacy efforts? Chapter two concluded that a strong element of American nationalism is defined by Kantian and biblical values, a belief in the universality of these notions and an 'othering' of those outside the 'community.'

I suggested that Americanism, as relating to values over and above primordial ethnic ties, could promote the inclusion of those with similar values and beliefs. Herein lies the natural affiliation felt by Americans towards Israel. A substantial portion of the American people always has felt that Israel is not just a strategic ally, but shares the same 'Judeo-Christian' values. The European leadership of the State of Israel came from the same Kantian milieu as the intellectual and political elite of America. The biblical language employed in the civil religion of America is the same biblical language employed in the civil religion of Israel. And Israel is a secular, democratic country, which permits freedom of religion and other personal liberties, just like America – an anomaly in the Middle East.

Empirically speaking, the following data by Pew (figure 2) and Gallup (figure 3) show that Americans have been consistently well-disposed to Israel over the last number of decades, by virtue of the fact that they overwhelmingly sympathize with Israel over the Palestinians in the conflict. Tellingly, the results of both polls demonstrate that even when Americans have tempered their sympathy for the Israelis, they have not transferred this sympathy to the Palestinians. Instead, the respondents have simply abstained from 'voting'. This shows that most Americans are in a love-hate relationship with Israel, and will increase or decrease their level of sympathy depending on Israel's actions. The majority of respondents are ambivalent in their attitudes towards the Palestinians, with whom they do not identify whatsoever. And as Tuomela has

shown, sympathizing with some person or group of people is due to

identification with them and ultimately reflects trust in them (2002, 43).

In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israel or the Palestinians?

|	Israel	Palestinians	Both (VOL.)	Neither (VOL.)	Don't know Refused
May, 2006	48	13	4	14	21
October, 2005	43	17	5	16	19
July, 2005	37	12	5	19	27
July, 2004	40	13	7	18	22
February, 2004	46	12	8	15	19
July, 2003	41	13	8	18	20
April, 2002	41	13	6	21	19
October, 2001	47	10	8	18	17
September, 2001	40	17	6	23	14
September, 1997	48	13	5	16	18
September, 1993	45	21	3	18	12

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press/Pew Global Attitudes Project

Figure 2

Middle East Sympathies, Full Trend

In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?

GALLUP

Figure 3

This identification with Israel explains why presidents and presidential candidates from both parties have been pro-Israel. Whether in fact this is a true presentation of their personal feelings or they are merely attempting, as politicians, to reflect the sentiments of the electorate, it is clear that when analyzing the domestic impact of the pro-Israel lobby, one must first recognize the pro-Israel identification of the average American. Only once one acknowledges this proclivity may one then grapple with the methods that the pro-Israel lobby employs. The pro-Israel lobby strives to present Israel in the most seemly light to an audience that is seeking to favour that country.

The Role of Christians United for Israel

Chapter 4 examined the history of Christians and Israel and noted that the classic theological basis for supporting Israel is the doctrine of Dispensational Premillenialism, the belief that God never abandoned his covenant with the Jewish people and that their return to the Land of Israel is a prerequisite for the Second Coming. Despite their popularity amongst Evangelical Christians, such beliefs are not true in the theological framework of most Christians. Therefore, the basis for their support of Israel is not theological, to the extent that not until the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s did traditional Christianity even recognized the State of Israel! Thus, in the past, when the Christian Zionist lobby focused exclusively on dispensationalist motives for support of Israel, most

Christian Americans viewed it as radical and extreme. This categorization would include Falwell and Robertson and others of their ilk.

Contrast this approach with the modus operandi of Christians United for Israel, which proclaims no theological motivation. John Hagee understands that the ideal way to 'lobby' is to minimize theological issues and be as inclusive as possible. In his rhetoric, he emphasizes issues of identification with Israel and societal security, and he constantly focuses on Israel's shared values with America and the threat to American values by the forces of radical Islam. Thus, he has managed to forge powerful alliances with non-Evangelicals, such as radio and television personality Glenn Beck. Despite being Mormon, Beck is a featured speaker at CUFI rallies and conventions. And he is typical of the wider American Christian audience whom Hagee is targeting, from the plebeian voter to presidents and congressmen. Hagee's approach is to make common cause with other Christians – even those that he would not accept as 'believers', such as Mormons – and mobilize them in support of Israel.

CUFI's primary approach to political advocacy involves appealing to politicians' Christian sentiments (Kupferberg 2009, 5). This method includes personally meeting with politicians; letter writing and email campaigns; and, placing Christian interns and congressional staffers in elected officials' offices (Marsden 2008, 43). Most striking, however, is the change that they have effected over time in American political discourse. Elected officials across the political spectrum, as well as laypeople, talk of 'shared Judeo-Christian values'

and of the 'special relationship with Israel.' According to Marsden, Christian

Zionist advocates repeat "emotive phraseology . . . [lodging it] in the

subconscious mind, whence [it] will be recalled and become part of the

representative's own thought process" (2008, 39).

This advocacy approach is not a simple campaign in support of the State

of Israel. Christian Zionists, and particularly Hagee, are changing the political

discourse of America. They are seeking to influence the way people think about

the relationships between Christianity and Judaism, and Christianity and Islam.

The former, they present as an historical 'Judeo-Christian' alliance; the latter, as

an historical 'clash of civilizations.' Gramsci referred to such an attempt to

change the way people think about their culture as a 'counter-hegemonic

struggle' to create a new 'historical bloc.' How does one galvanize various

interests in support of one's cause?

> One becomes aware that one's own corporate interests in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become "party", come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups (Gramsci 1971, 181-2).

While Gramsci is talking primarily in terms of economic struggle, I apply his theory here to explain how Hagee has mobilized support for Israel. By appealing to Christian values and sensibilities, along with the threat to American societal security, Hagee's interests (i.e., support for Israel) "become the interests of other (subordinate) groups too. . . . thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental[ist][33] social group."

The following chart of causality (figure 4) demonstrates this relationship and the impact of the Christian Zionist lobby. The chart evinces four directions of flow:

1. The pro-Israel lobby works to influence US foreign policy in the Middle East.

2. American nationalism provides for a willing audience in the American people, for the framing of the cause by the pro-Israel lobby. This willingness is due to the understanding of shared values and the perception of a major threat to societal security.

3. American nationalism itself is a cause for the special relationship. Special relationships similarly exist with other countries with which Americans identify as 'the same'. These countries include: the UK, Canada and Australia.

4. The pro-Israel lobby continues to nurture American nationalism to reflect such sentiment. In order to achieve this ongoing nurturing, the pro-Israel

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[33] Pardon the play on words here.

lobby's methods include the CUFI campaign "Defend America, Vote Israel," annual Washington DC summits, and appealing to politicians' Christianity as a basis for supporting Israel.

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┌─────────────────┐                    ┌─────────────────┐
│   Pro-Israel    │ ─────────────────> │   US foreign    │
│     lobby       │                    │  policy in the  │
│                 │                    │   Middle East   │
└─────────────────┘                    └─────────────────┘
         ↕                                      ↗
              ┌─────────────────┐
              │    American     │
              │   nationalism   │
              └─────────────────┘
```

Figure 4

Conclusion

International relations today are driven primarily by societal security. The field of IR is only just beginning to recognize the importance of societal security. States are committed to protecting their nations. Previously, scholars commonly had believed that states would make way for 'postinternationalism' – a globalized world where all citizens enjoy equal rights and privileges. Recent history, however, has proven otherwise. Nations are vehemently protecting their state autonomy. We have witnessed this phenomenon, from the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, to the present economic turmoil that threatens to tear asunder the European Union.

Many would like to believe that America is different. The United States – a land of immigrants – is home to many ethnicities, religions, and languages. Certain scholars of American nationalism, however, point to a civic nationalism, based upon liberal, Western values. Other scholars take the idea of American nationalism even further, pointing to America's Protestant roots, as the basis for understanding the American people. This 'Americanism' manifests itself not only in the symbols of American life, including the banknotes and national anthem, but also in the US's commitment to protecting its societal security from foreign threats.

Why does America support Israel? America supports Israel for multiple reasons. As Realists, Mearsheimer and Walt believe that it should be all about geopolitical strategic considerations. And from this perspective, they are correct.

If it were, in fact, all about Realism, then these scholars would be absolutely accurate in their critique. From a military and economic perspective, the decisions made by the US in the Middle East have been questionable. Therefore, one is forced to conclude that the pro-Israel lobby has peddled its incredible influence to impact such determinations. The lobbying factor, however, is only part of the story of the America-Israel relationship, because for a lobbyist to be successful, s/he requires a willing audience.

The reason that the US supports Israel is that Americans identify with Israel in a nationalistic sense. This feeling of identification has been true for many decades. Since September 11, 2001, however, Americans have become particularly concerned for their societal security. Many Americans view Israel as the bulwark against the spread of radical Islam and anti-Americanism. These reasons are the deeper causes of American support for Israel.

Christians United for Israel is the major non-Jewish pro-Israel advocacy group. John Hagee, the founder of CUFI, believes in premillenial dispensationalism. He believes that the Jewish people and Israel are the objects of divine blessing and has dedicated his life to helping them. As a dispensationalist, he also believes that Jesus will return only once the Jews return to Israel. Therefore, he is steadfast in his commitment to this cause. Unlike previous Christian Zionist lobbyists, however, Hagee is careful to couch his rhetoric in terms of the benefits that accrue to America when it supports Israel. Thus, societal security – not the theological issue – is the primary focus of such

discussion. If America supports Israel, according to Hagee, American values will be protected.

The current discourse of American presidents and presidential candidates indicates that the more such parlance (that of the alliance being due to shared values and societal security) becomes part of the accepted political discourse, the more it becomes woven into the culture of America.   And in Gramscian terms, a new historical bloc has been created, one that views the US-Israel alliance as integral to protecting American societal security.

The 'hegemonic national myth' in the US today is that while Israel needs America, America likewise needs Israel. Israel needs America both for economic and military support, as well as protector and guarantor of its legitimacy on the international stage. America needs Israel as a sister nation that shares the same 'American' values and stands on the front lines of its battle for societal security. Would all Americans agree with this assessment? Certainly not. But as long as a substantial proportion of the American people identify with the State of Israel over its neighbours, the pro-Israel Christian lobby will be successful in its advocacy efforts on behalf of the Jewish state.

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