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NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE Prof. F. C. ENGELMANN

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN INDIA, 1950-1974:

A STUDY IN CRISIS POLITICS

by



BHAGWAN D. DUA

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN INDIA, 1950-1974: A STUDY IN CRISIS POLITICS submitted by BHAGWAN DASS DUA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

*[Signature]*  
.....  
Supervisor

*[Signature]*  
.....

*[Signature]*  
.....

*[Signature]*  
.....  
External Examiner

Date 25 October 1976

## ABSTRACT

The study focusses on the crisis episodes at the state level in India and their resolution through the imposition of presidential rule within a broad theoretical frame of developmental politics. Adopting a macro-political approach - from an identification of system environmental settings to state crises to federal choices of dealing with them - the dissertation analyses the working of Indian federalism and within it the Central intervention through presidential rule from the perspective of over-all Indian political development during the period 1950-74. Conceptualizing state crises in four empirically-grounded categories, i.e., incumbency, congressization, structural, and systemic, the dissertation seeks to explain, through spatial and temporal comparison of crises, the federal choice in resolving state crises through the imposition of presidential rule.

Two conclusions are drawn from the study: (a) that presidential rule which was designed to preserve political unity against the threat of dysfunctional diversities manifested at the state level has increasingly been used as a means to the establishment of Central predominance in general, and of the Congress Party in particular, thereby making the Indian political system a case of pathology of federalism; and (b) that presidential rule (except for structural and systemic crises) since the Congress split of 1969, but more so after the parliamentary elections of 1971, has been used by the Central leadership as a convenient device to get rid of "undesirable" state leadership. In the process, the Central leadership has used the federal machinery even to manufacture crises at the state level in order to create conditions for the imposition of presidential rule. Before the Congress split, most of the crises originated at the state level; after the split, the Center became a party to the creation of crises.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. PRESIDENTIAL RULE - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	29
III. THE NEAR-HEGEMONIC MODEL, 1947-63	61
The Emergent Political System, 1947-50	63
The Developmental path of the Political System, 1950-63	80
Presidential Rule	95
Crises which did not culminate in Presidential Rule	156
IV. THE BARGAINING MODEL, 1964-67	190
The Emergent Political System, 1963-64	191
The Developmental path of the Political System, 1964-67	201
Presidential Rule	212
Crises which did not culminate in Presidential Rule	237
V. THE PRAETOREAN MODEL, 1967-71	249
The Emergent Political System, 1966-67	252
The Developmental path of the Political System, 1967-71	264
Presidential Rule	281
Crises which did not culminate in Presidential Rule	357
VI. THE HEGEMONIC MODEL, 1971-74	375
The Emergent Political System, 1971-74	377
Presidential Rule	392
Crises which did not culminate in Presidential Rule	432
VII. CONCLUSION	441
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	452



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1.1 AVERAGE ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN THREE DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS	20
1.2 PRESIDENTIAL RULE BY STATES DURING EACH FEDERAL LEADERSHIP ERA	22
1.3 TOTAL DURATION OF PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN DIFFERENT STATES, 1950-74	23
2.1 ANALYTICAL LINKAGES IN THE SYSTEM STATES	55
3.1 STATES UNDER PART A, B, C AND D AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION	78
3.2 ELECTORAL TRENDS IN INDIA	83
3.3 REORGANISED STATES(1963)	89
3.4 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD THE CONGRESS INCUMBENTS IN CRISES	96
3.5 SUB-SYSTEMIC CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1950-63	97
3.6 INCUMBENCY CRISES IN PUNJAB, 1947-63	103
3.7 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY CRISES IN PUNJAB, 1947-63	110
3.8 INCUMBENCY CRISES IN RAJASTHAN AND KERALA, 1951	111
3.9 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY CRISES IN RAJASTHAN, TRAVANCORE-COCHIN(KERALA) AND PUNJAB	114
3.10 CONGRESSIZATION CRISES IN KERALA AND MADRAS	113
3.11 CRISES IN KERALA, 1948-63	145
3.12 CONGRESSIZATION CRISES AND OUTCOME OF CRISES, 1948-63	157
3.13 ANALYSIS OF CRISES, BY STATES, 1948-63	158
3.14 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY CRISES IN ALL THE STATES, 1948-63	177
4.1 SUB-SYSTEMIC CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1964-67	213

TABLE	PAGE
4.2 CHIEF MINISTERS INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION CHARGES, 1964-67	238
5.1 CONGRESS STRENGTH IN THE 1967 ELECTIONS, BY STATES	262
5.2 SUB-SYSTEMIC CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1967-71	282
5.3 ELECTION RESULTS IN BIHAR, 1967 AND 1969	321
5.4 ELECTION RESULTS IN U.P., 1967 AND 1969	329
5.5 ELECTION RESULTS IN ORISSA, 1967	332
5.6 ELECTION RESULTS IN W. BENGAL, 1967 AND 1969	337
5.7 ELECTION RESULTS IN KERALA, 1967	341
5.8 NUMBER OF CRISES, BY STATES, 1967-71	347
5.9 DEVELOPMENT OF CRISES AND THEIR RESOLUTION, BY STATES, 1967-71	349
5.10 TOTAL NUMBER OF CRISES IN ALL THE STATES OF INDIA, 1967-71	357
5.11 DISCRETIONARY TREATMENT OF THE STATES BY THE CENTER AFTER THE CONGRESS SPLIT	361
6.1 STATE ELECTIONS, 1972	382
6.2 SUB-SYSTEMIC CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1971-74	393
6.3 TOTAL NUMBER OF CRISES IN ALL THE STATES OF INDIA, 1971-74	432
7.1 STATE CRISES AND THEIR RESOLUTION IN FOUR DIFFERENT PHASES OF INDIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1950-74	442
7.2 OUTCOME OF INCUMBENCY CRISES AND ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER, 1950-74	445

#### GEOGRAPHICAL MAPS

Political Map of India at the commencement of the Constitution	79
Political Map of India, 1964	90

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The dissertation focusses on the study of state crises and their resolution through the imposition of presidential rule by federal leaders in India during the period 1950-74. The basic question asked is: when and how is presidential rule declared and what pattern, if any, emerges across states and within each state. The contention of the thesis is that the frequent use of presidential rule by the federal leaders to resolve state crises perceived or made to appear as emergencies under the Indian Constitution, particularly after the Fourth General Elections of 1967 but more so after the Congress split of 1969, has brought about a fundamental change in Center-state relations - a change which deserves our scholarly attention.

Central to this dissertation is the study of the dynamics of the actions of the federal elite, which alone has the constitutional privilege to decide as to when and in which state presidential rule should or should not be declared to meet crises. Since such federal discretion is built into the constitutional framework of the system, the study of presidential rule in a way becomes a study in the determinants of federal decision-making. Being the repository of large resources, the federal leadership has many choices to resolve state crises, one of them being the imposition of presidential rule. However, whether or not it uses presidential rule or resources other than presidential rule to resolve crises at the state level depends not only on the type of crisis but also on the state of system-environmental conditions in the context of which it makes its decisions. In order, therefore, to analyse systematically such decisions and to explain the

"where, when, and how" of presidential rule, the study looks at three different levels of politics. It identifies crisis episodes at the state level, explores leadership choices at the federal level, and elaborates on the system-environmental changes in the context of which crises arise and find their resolution through the federal decisions. A conceptual frame for the study is developed and presented in the next chapter.

#### Crisis episodes and Presidential rule:

The study is concerned with those crisis episodes which arise out of the "constitutional failure" of any state machinery which is declared to be an emergency under the Constitution of India, 1950. Article 356 of the Constitution states that if the President is satisfied on receipt of a report from the Governor or otherwise that a situation has arisen in which the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, he is empowered to proclaim an emergency. As a result, he may

- (i) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the state or vest all or any of those functions in the Governor or any other executive authority;
- (ii) declare that the powers of the state legislature shall be exercisable by Parliament; and
- (iii) make any other incidental or consequential provisions necessary to give effect to the objects of the Proclamation. The President, however, cannot assume to himself any of the powers vested in a High Court (at the state level).

Herein, it may be mentioned that the President of the Republic was to be the sole judge to determine the conditions which warranted

the proclamation of emergencies. However, by parliamentary convention, he was supposed to consult the federal cabinet.. To begin with, a proclamation could last for two months and on approval by the Parliament for six months unless further extended by the Parliament up to a maximum period of three years.

Focus and arena of this study:

The focus of my study is to analyse and explain this provision for dealing with emergencies in the system now commonly termed as "presidential rule". Though the President has been given almost blanket powers to take over the administration of a state, there has to be, as article 356 makes it explicit, "a situation in which the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution" before he can act. As such, presidential rule involves two different levels of government, i.e. the Center which declares presidential rule and the state which cannot work according to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the arena of this study is the Indian federal system wherein the Center and the states interact with each other both in normal and abnormal or crisis situations..

With a "crisis" approach to the study of Indian political system, the dissertation claims to depart from the generally accepted "consensual" model of the Indian polity. There is no doubt that for any system to survive, there has to be some amount of consensus on fundamentals. However, such consensus does not imply the absence of conflict. In the context of India, for over a decade and half since Independence, the so-called "Nehruvian consensus" was so strongly moralized by scholars, both Indian and foreign, that any study of Indian politics departing from the familiar line earned the blasphemous

4

title of "prophet of gloom" in respectable academic circles.<sup>1</sup> In other words, it was highly unconventional to talk of conflicts and crises when the political system was giving enough evidence of continuity in the midst of change. It was all the more unconventional to talk of the cost to those who did not volunteer to join the chorus of "Nehruvian consensus". In regard to Center-state relations, this same straight-jacket of "Nehruvian consensus" over-shadowed any meaningful discussion of the conflicts and crises between the Center and the states.

In departing from the "consensual" model, this dissertation contends that the frequent use of presidential rule, particularly after the Fourth General Elections of 1967 but more so after the Congress split of 1969, has primarily been an attempt on the part of the Central leadership to control partisan and political dissent at the state level, resulting in the fundamental transformation of not only the Indian federal system and the Center-state relations within it but also in the very nature of the democratic political system as established by the Constitution. After the parliamentary elections of 1971, the Center, under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, used presidential rule to bludgeon the state leadership into accepting without question the dictates of the Central leadership. While presidential rule, under the Constitution, was designed to meet certain crisis situations at the state level and to bail out state governments unable to work according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Center, since the Congress split, has used it more like the Central intervention in some of the Latin American federal polities without caring for the "federal principle" as developed in the Indian Constitution.

The distinctive feature of federal political systems is that there are two levels of government, each with at least some independent

powers and some independent personnel, neither of which can dictate the decisions of the other. From a purely legal and institutional perspective, K. C. Wheare has defined federalism as "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent."<sup>2</sup> William H. Riker's definition of federalism is somewhat similar though he does not adopt as rigid a yardstick to measure federalism as the one adopted by Wheare. According to Riker, a constitution is federal if it provides for two levels of government, each of which has "some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution)" of its contained autonomy within its sphere.<sup>3</sup> The Indian Constitution, which provided for two levels of government and equipped each level with shared powers and its own elected leadership personnel, also provided adequate guarantees for provincial autonomy. The "federal principle" was elaborated by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, who said:

The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The States in our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative authority. The Centre and the States are co-equal in this matter.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, the Indian political elite of the freedom movement as represented in the dominant Congress Party had at no time suggested that the Indian system was to be anything but federal after Indian Independence. However, it was equally clear in its mind that the Center had to be strong if the unity and political integrity of the country were to be preserved. Assuring the Constituent Assembly that the "federal principle" would not be compromised in normal times, the political leadership borrowed the concept of emergency governance from the Government of India Act of 1935 and fitted it into the federal frame of the Indian Constitution.

By so combining emergency governance and a federal system, the political leadership tried to get the best of the two possible worlds though, in time, the Indian system could be alleged to have become a case of the pathology of federalism.

Presidential rule is a manifestation of emergency governance within the arena of the Indian federal system. Therefore, before we examine the intentions of the framers of the Indian Constitution regarding emergency governance under article 356 and its impact on the nature of the Indian federal system, it is appropriate to look into the concept of emergency governance in some of the Western political systems, both federal and unitary.

The concept of emergency governance in some Western political systems:

Generally speaking, "emergency" in the Western world has been conceived in terms of national crisis arising out of war or domestic insurrection which has the potential to threaten system maintenance or system equilibrium. In situations like these, even a "constitutional dictatorship", giving massive powers to the national executive, has been justified.<sup>5</sup> In fact, all political systems, unitary or federal, do make some provisions to meet emergency situations. The British, for example, had to resort to emergency measures during the two World Wars to overcome national crises. When requirements of secrecy or dispatch made Parliament unable to act, independent executive action based on the Royal prerogative was taken to meet the situation. Similarly, Article 16 of the French Constitution (Fifth Republic) laid down:

When the institution of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by these circumstances....<sup>6</sup>



Among the federal systems, the Constitution of the United States obliges the national government to guarantee to each state a republican form of government and protection against domestic insurrection. Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution reads:

The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

The Constitution does not define what is a republican form of government, but the Supreme Court has consistently held that the enforcement of this constitutional clause is the obligation of the Congress.<sup>7</sup> Congress determines whether a state has a republican form of government when it decides whether or not to allow the congressional representatives of that state to take their seats in Congress.

As for ensuring protection to the states against domestic insurrections, the Congress has delegated authority to the President to send troops to quell insurrections on the request of the proper state authorities. This gives the President the power to determine which of the contending factions is the legitimate authority in a state. President Tyler's decision "was binding on the courts when in effect he threatened to send federal troops to protect the Rhode Island government against the domestic insurrection of a rival government contending for the right to speak for the state."<sup>8</sup> A somewhat similar action was taken by President Lincoln during the Civil War in de-recognizing the state governments of the Confederacy, though he acted more by stretching the authority of his office than under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. While the fighting still raged, Lincoln had taken initiative in re-establishing loyal governments in the

seceded states. "He placed military governors over Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas in 1862 and 1863, and in December of 1863 he proclaimed the general procedures by which the Southern people could remake their governments."<sup>9</sup> More recently, when some of the extreme segregationists revived the pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions<sup>10</sup> outlawing racial discrimination in public schools and in certain other areas, Presidents have not been loath to mobilize federal troops to defend the Constitution. On September 24, 1957, President Eisenhower sent troops into Little Rock to break the resistance of the Arkansas Governor, Orval Faubus, who had openly challenged the integration policy of the federal government. Similarly, in October 1962, President Kennedy ordered federal troops into Oxford, Mississippi, to protect a Negro student in the right, assured him by the courts, to attend the University of Mississippi. Generally speaking, the federal government has been reluctant to compromise state autonomy except at the time of national crises or on issues having severe national implications.

In the Canadian confederation, the concept of an emergency has been conceived in terms of crises arising out of war or internal disturbance which might threaten the "peace, order and good Government of the Dominion". Although there is no specific provision relating to emergency governance in the British North America (BNA) Act, the Federal Parliament has, from time to time, legislated measures giving wide powers to the national executive to meet national emergencies. In re Board of Commerce Act, 1 A.C., (1922) which produced the emergency doctrine, the Privy Council conceded the right of the Federal Parliament to legislate for special circumstances "such as those of war or famine, when peace, order and good Government of the Dominion might be imperilled."<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in

Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., A.C., (1923), the Privy Council not only accepted the right of the Federal Parliament to legislate for emergencies but also left the duration of the emergencies to the determination of the Federal Parliament. Though in the case of Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, A.C., (1925), the Privy Council rejected the idea of a work stoppage or industrial dispute as meeting the "emergency" test to justify federal legislation invading provincial rights in relation to property and civil rights, Viscount Haldane, who read the decision of the Judicial Committee, recognized the right of the Federal Parliament to legislate to meet conditions arising out of war and even an epidemic of pestilence.<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that the thrust of the decisions cited here has been to define "emergency" as something to restrain the otherwise possibly fuller powers of the federal government under the "peace, order and good Government" clause of Section 91 of the British North America Act. During the two World Wars, however, Parliament conferred on the national government wide discretionary powers under the War Measures Act to meet the national crises. The Act was again applied during the Quebec crisis of 1970, when, faced with what it declared to be "apprehended insurrection", the federal government sent troops into Quebec on request of the Quebec government.<sup>13</sup>

In Germany, the Weimar Constitution obliged the state authorities to execute national laws, failing which the Reich cabinet could issue warnings and general instructions to the recalcitrant states. However, in case of differences of opinion between the Reich and a Land, the matter could be referred to the Constitutional Court. As a last resort, the national President, in exercise of powers vested in him by Article 48 of the Constitution, could force a state government to obey the national government or else suffer dismissal. Though Article 48 was<sup>14</sup>

of a general nature, it was effectively used to intervene in state politics. For example, it was used against Thuringia and Saxony (1920), Bavaria (1923) and Prussia (1932) to bring the state governments "in accord with the principle of the Constitution and the political life of the Reich."<sup>15</sup>

However, despite the failure of the Weimar Republic and the hard experiences that followed from it, the Bonn Basic Law, once again, authorizes the federal government to intervene in the administration of a Land if crises so warrant it. S. C. Dash compares Articles 37 and 91 of the Bonn Basic Law with that of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and draws a not very optimistic conclusion:

Articles 37 and 91 will serve the purpose of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution when the Federal Government might declare that "there is an imminent danger to the existence of the libertarian democratic basic order of the Federation" and "place the police forces of the other Laender under its own instructions". This can certainly be "rescinded after the elimination of the danger or at any time on the demand of the Bundesrat". But the Federal Government is to decide when the danger has been eliminated and like the National Socialists' camouflage of the Communist danger, it may never terminate.<sup>16</sup>

In Switzerland, the Confederal authority protects cantons in case of foreign aggression, internal disturbance and inter-cantonal disputes. In the case of internal disturbance, or if danger comes from another canton, the authorities of the threatened canton are to give notice to the federal executive. The Federal Council is also empowered to act on its own up to the limit of employing two thousand troops, subject to the additional condition that the troops are in action for no more than two weeks.

The concept of emergency governance in some Latin American systems:

Following the example of federal countries, particularly that of the United States, most of the federal constitutions in the Latin American world provide for federal intervention in the administration

of the provincial governments in times of crises. Thus, according to Article 76 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, express power was given to the Senate to declare when all the constitutional powers of any state have disappeared. At the same time, Article 89 authorized the President to dispose federal forces for the domestic safety and defense of the Union.

However, it is generally claimed that this power to intervene in the administration of the provincial governments has more often been abused and misused for partisan purposes. "A grave abuse of the Senate's power was the removal, in December 1935, of Callista governors in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Guanajuato, and Durango. After the break between Cardenas and Calles, the former succeeded in getting rid of pro-Calles governors by ordering the Senate to declare disappearance of powers because of seditious activities."<sup>17</sup> Referring to the working of the Brazilian Constitution of 1891, Percy Alvin Martin writes: "Two of the most striking of these shortcomings have been the blameworthy intervention of the executive power in the states for the purpose of forcing upon them the rule of factions favoured by the authorities in Rio de Janeiro, and the toleration of flagrantly unconstitutional acts by state governments enjoying the favour of the national executive."<sup>18</sup> The situation in Argentina is no different. Rosendo A. Gomez recounts 101 cases of illegitimate interventions on the part of the Argentinian federal government in the affairs of the state government between 1860 and 1930.<sup>19</sup>

The concept of emergency governance in Indian political system:

Like other political systems, the Indian political system also equipped itself to meet national crises arising out of internal disturbance or threat of war or external aggression (Article 352, 353 of the

Constitution). However, unlike any other political system, emergency governance arising out of the constitutional failure of state machinery (Article 356) followed by an imposition of presidential rule by the federal government has been something novel in the Indian Constitution, the like of which is not to be found in any other mature or recognized federal system. In the Constituent Assembly, while some members felt that the emergency governance under Article 356 was an attempt to compromise the autonomy of the state governments, others felt that the Article guaranteed the integrity and unity of the Indian Union. In order to get some clear conception of this provision in the Constitution, it is important to examine how the Indian political elite viewed federalism in the formative years, 1947-50.

Federalism as viewed in the formative years, 1947-50:

The Indian political elite of the freedom movement as represented in the dominant Congress Party had little doubt that the Indian political system had to be federal in character. In fact, neither the political history of the country nor the religious, ethnic, cultural, and regional diversities that marked the continental size of India suggested a system of government other than federal. Historically, India had rarely been governed from a single Center. Even the colonial government had created several power centers as early as 1909 and ultimately provided a federal system under the Government of India Act, 1935. The provinces, under the Act, were given a large measure of autonomy to manage their own affairs. And though the federal part of the Act could not be implemented because of the reluctance of the princely states to join, in requisite number, the proposed federal union, the grant of provincial autonomy gave a political personality to the provinces.

The Congress as a party was committed to making India a federal

union as early as 1929 when the Nehru Committee report, in its proposed federal constitution for the Commonwealth of India, said: "We have borne in mind the peculiar position of India and have provided for the development of the fullest possible provincial life compatible with national interests." <sup>20</sup> Like the Canadian BNA Act of 1867, the Committee provided in the proposed constitution a "peace, order and good government" clause to safeguard the national interest. A few months before Independence, the Congress planned to set up a loose federal union. At the time, the 550-odd princely states which had been governed indirectly (through the British resident representatives), unlike the British provinces which were governed directly, were asked to join the proposed federal union by signing instruments of accession only in respect of three subjects for the Center: Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. On July 5, 1947, barely a little over a month before Independence, Sardar Patel, Union Minister of States, in a conciliatory speech said:

The States [princely] have already accepted the basic principle that for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, they would come into the Indian Union. We ask no more of them than accession on these three subjects in which the common interests of the country are involved. In other matters, we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence.<sup>21</sup>

Political instability in the states brings Article 356:

Neither the Indian political elite nor the Congress Party changed its stand on making India a federal union after Independence. <sup>22</sup> However, the political situation that followed the attainment of freedom necessitated a greater concern for stability and system preservation at the expense of the loose federalism planned earlier. The long colonial age ended, but in chaos. The partition of the country, giving Muslims their separate homeland, Pakistan, was accompanied by unprecedented bloodshed

in which both the Muslims and the Hindus massacred each other with a vengeance. In the midst of such a chaotic environment, some of the princely rulers began giving second thoughts to the proposal of the Congress leaders inviting them to join the federal union. Badly administered as the princely states were, the Communists in the country found a safe refuge in some of them, particularly in the princely state of Hyderabad, waiting to step in when the country would disintegrate. The princely state of Travancore tightened the confrontation with New Delhi by giving itself a new constitution and proclaiming its independence from India. Hyderabad followed suit and declared its intention to exchange diplomatic representatives with Pakistan. Kashmir wanted time to decide whether to join the Indian Union but in the meanwhile declared its intention to stay independent. In October of 1947, the country was at war with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. With problems such as these arising at a time when the Indian leadership was in the midst of framing a constitution for the new-born nation, emergency governance under Article 356 found ample support in the Constituent Assembly.

The impact of emergency governance on the federal system?

With the provision for emergency governance in the Constitution, an inexhaustible debate has continued to range among scholars as to the true nature of the Indian political system. The Indian Union, some critics argue, is a pathology of federalism. K. C. Wheare, for example, has classified the Indian system as "quasi-federal".<sup>23</sup> Similarly, K. Santhanam has called the Indian Union a "Paramount Federation" in which the Center holds paramountcy powers over the states.<sup>24</sup>

On the contrary, there has been no dearth of writers who have not only classified the Indian Union as a federation but also quite a liberal federation. Alexandrowics, for example, holds that "India is



undoubtedly a federation in which the attributes of sovereignty are shared between the Centre and States", while Paul H. Appleby has called the Indian system "extremely federal".<sup>25</sup>

The controversy as to whether the Indian Union is a federation basically stems from the different conception of federalism that each one of the above authors has in mind. If one measures the Indian Union by K. C. Wheare's dualistic conception of federalism, the Indian system may not qualify to be a genuine federal system. If, on the other hand, one adopts Vile's definition of federalism - "a system of government in which neither level of government is wholly dependent on the other nor wholly independent of the other"<sup>26</sup> - the Indian system is definitely a federal system.

The Constitution provided for a division of powers on lines somewhat similar to the one provided in the Canadian BNA Act. The Center was to legislate in respect to 97 subjects, the states in respect to 66 subjects, with a concurrent jurisdiction in respect to 47 subjects. At the same time, this division was made unalterable without the consent of the states except in exceptional circumstances. With the Supreme Court being made the highest court of appeal in Center-state jurisdictional conflicts, the federal frame of the Indian system was complete. Over the years, the Court has treated the Constitution as establishing a federal system in many of its judgements.<sup>27</sup>

While it is not necessary to labour the point that emergency governance under Article 356 does not go smoothly with the federal principle, it must be stressed that the use of emergency powers was meant to be an exception rather than the rule. In normal circumstances, Center-state relations were to operate according to the federal principle.

It was only when the state governments were in crisis that the Center could take over their administration for a limited period of time and subject to the approval of the Parliament.

Now, before drawing up a conceptual frame for the study of presidential rule, it would be appropriate to examine some hopes and fears expressed in the Constituent Assembly on the subject and also some of the broad trends which seem to emerge from the actual use of presidential rule during the past quarter century.

Constituent Assembly Debates - Hopes and Fears:

The Article relating to presidential rule was thoroughly debated in the Constituent Assembly. While the members of the Drafting Committee headed by Ambedkar put up a strong defence of this Article for the sake of preserving national unity, H. V. Kamath (Congressite who was later subjected to disciplinary action by the Congress High Command - the highest policy-making organ of the Party - for his too outspoken criticism) called the Article "a foul transaction", and invoked Providence "to grant sufficient wisdom" to the members to see the "folly and stupidity of this constitutional crime." Kazi Syed Karimuddin, a Muslim member from the Central Province, was very specific in his criticism:

Suppose, for instance, in West Bengal, the Party which is in opposition to the Centre is elected; then even though the Government of West Bengal may feel that the internal disturbance in West Bengal is not sufficient for suspending the Constitution, still the will of the Centre will be imposed and the ideologies of the Centre will be imposed on the State.<sup>29</sup>

Shibban Lal Saxena declared that the provision of presidential rule reduced provincial autonomy to a farce,<sup>30</sup> while P. S. Deshmukh held that the vesting of the power in the Union to intervene was "neither in conformity with a Federation, nor would it be administratively

beneficial or practicable." <sup>31</sup> Hirday Nath Kunzru maintained that there could be a serious danger in the Center being tempted to intervene in situations where intervention could not be justified. Instead of vesting the power in the President of India, Kunzru argued, it should be vested in the electorate who alone could ensure a responsible government. He said: "If responsible government is to be maintained, then the electors must be made to feel that the power to apply the proper remedy when misgovernment occurs rests with them." <sup>32</sup>

Replying to the criticism that these Articles (356, 357) were liable to be abused, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said:

I may say that I do not altogether deny that there is a possibility of these Articles being abused and being employed for political purposes. That objection applies to every part of the Constitution wherever the Centre has been given powers to override the provinces. I share the sentiments expressed ... that the proper thing we ought to expect with regard to these Articles is that they will never be brought into operation and they will remain as a dead letter.<sup>33</sup>

Dr. Ambedkar assured the Constituent Assembly that these Articles would be used only as a last resort against a recalcitrant state. Normally, the President would first issue a warning to the state concerned and if it was not heeded, he would then order an election to allow the people of the province to settle the matter themselves. It would only be after these steps had failed that the President would be justified to intervene.

Dr. Ambedkar's assurance notwithstanding, there continued to persist a good deal of confusion as to the exact meaning of the words: "constitutional failure" (of the state machinery). During the Assembly debates, H. N. Kunzru pointedly asked Dr. Ambedkar to spell out clearly the meaning of the "failure of constitutional machinery" but Ambedkar gave a somewhat evasive reply: "When we say that the Constitution must be maintained in accordance with the provisions contained in this

Constitution we practically mean what the American Constitution means, namely that the form of the Constitution must be maintained."<sup>34</sup> However, at a later date during the debates, Ambedkar confused the issue when he said:

The expression "failure of the machinery" I find has been used in the Government of India Act, 1935. Every body must be quite familiar, therefore, with its de facto and de jure meaning. I do not think any further explanation is necessary.<sup>35</sup>

Naziruddin Ahmed, disenchanted with the lack of clarity, had this to say:

This article / 356 / says practically nothing. It says almost everything. It enables the Centre to interfere on the slightest pretext and it may enable the Centre to refuse to interfere on the gravest occasion... So carefully guarded is its vagueness, so elusive is its draftsmanship that we cannot but admire the Drafting Committee for its vagueness and evasions.<sup>36</sup>

The actual exercise:

It was ironic that only a few years after the making of the Constitution, Dr. Ambedkar, the very architect of presidential rule, regretted having incorporated this "reactionary" instrument in the Constitution. Speaking in the Rajya Sabha, the upper chamber of the Indian Parliament, on presidential rule against the United Front government of Patiala and East Punjab States' Union (PEPSU) in 1953, he characterized the action of the Central Government as "the most violent kind of rape on the constitution."<sup>37</sup> In 1959 when presidential rule was declared to dismiss the Communist government of Kerala, C. Rajagopalachari, the first Governor-General of free India and later the leader of the Swatantra Party, announced that the Congress was "laying an axe at the root of parliamentary democracy in India."<sup>38</sup> In March 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri advised the President to declare presidential rule in Kerala and dissolve the freshly elected

Legislative Assembly of the state despite the willingness of the Communist Party (Marxists) to form a coalition government. The action of the Central Government, said Professor H. N. Mukerjee, was "morally, constitutionally, politically or otherwise illegitimate and uncalled for." <sup>39</sup> Dr. Hare Krishna Mahatab, the ex-Chief Minister of Orissa (Congress) announced that the decision on Kerala "had no precedent in any other part of the world" and was "in sharp conflict with what parliamentary democracy stood for." <sup>40</sup> In 1967 when the President dismissed the United Front government and dissolved the Haryana Legislative Assembly on advice from the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Chief Minister Rao Birendra Singh protested: "We are in majority. The law and order situation is perfect. I cannot understand how they can take action under Article 356 of the Constitution." <sup>41</sup> Later on, the frustrated Chief Minister filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against the presidential proclamation which was dismissed on the ground that the President's satisfaction that conditions existed warranting presidential rule was sufficient and hence not subject to <sup>42</sup> judicial review.

Recently, the staff correspondent of the Statesman Weekly referred to the frequent use of presidential rule as "the most fatuous of manoeuvres" on the part of the Congress Party to stay in power.

correspondent further said:

The stratagem is so naive and patent as not to be worth denying; and in fact has only reinforced the Congress theme that only a Congress administration can help .... The sense of this is clear: that an electoral verdict which places a non-Congress government in power can, in effect, be negated by the Centre's executive action or non-action. There was ample reason to suspect this before. There is now no doubt that this creed is an integral part of the Congress branch of democracy. <sup>43</sup>

One recent example of the Center's inaction was its decision to

postpone elections in the state of Gujarat even after the state had been under presidential rule for over a year. It was only after Morarji Desai undertook a "fast-unto-death" that the Center agreed to hold fresh elections in the state.<sup>44</sup>

Some trends:

Between 1950-74, Presidential rule was declared forty-two times - an average of 1.75 instances per year (see Table 1.1). The average may not be so disturbing for a nation that is new and in the process of building itself, but it is worthy of our inquiry to find out why the frequency of presidential rule was very low before the Fourth General Elections of 1967, during which period it was declared only ten times, while after these elections, it was declared thirty-two times. Further, it may look surprising that the average frequency of presidential rule is not the highest for the time during which the Congress Party lost its monopoly of power in some of the states and weakened its hold in terms of its seats in the Parliament, but rather for the time period 1971-74, during which the Congress Party of Mrs. Indira Gandhi had regained its lost position both at the Centre and in the states.

TABLE 1.1

AVERAGE ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF PRESIDENTIAL  
RULE IN THREE DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS

Time periods	Total instances of presidential rule (42)	Average annual frequency (1.75)
1950-67	10	.59
1967-71	17	4.25
1971-74	15	5.00

Another interesting dimension of the use of presidential rule is the scope of its coverage in terms of the number of states involved. Among the 21 states and 9 union territories which constituted the Indian Union as of January 22, 1972, 13 states and 2 union territories experienced presidential rule at one time or the other. Some states had repeated doses of presidential rule as Table 1.2 (next page) shows.

A simple glance at Table 1.2 reveals that all the states which came under presidential rule during the Nehru-Shastri era also experienced presidential rule during the Indira era. However, the state of Kerala, which had the maximum number of presidential rules during the Nehru-Shastri era, had just one presidential rule during the Indira era.

The states which experienced no presidential rule were Madras, Assam, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Himachel Pradesh, Nagaland, and Meghalaya.

Following Table 1.2 is Table 1.3, which describes the duration of presidential rule in the different states of India for the period 1950-74. The table shows that among the four states experiencing the highest duration of presidential rule, three constitute the critical border states of India: Punjab on the northern and West Bengal and Manipur on the eastern frontiers.

These informational tables outline the scope of the problem; they do not suggest any systematic explanation for the proclamation of presidential rule. To explain the phenomenon, one needs to analyse Indian politics at three different levels: (a) at the federal level, because to proclaim or not to proclaim presidential rule is the choice of the federal leaders; (b) at the state level, because it is only when the state leadership is in crisis that the federal government gets the

TABLE 1.2  
PRESIDENTIAL RULE BY STATES  
DURING EACH FEDERAL LEADERSHIP ERA

State	Presidential rules during			Total
	Nehru era (1947-64)	Shastri era (1964-66)	Indira era (1966-74)	
Kerala	2	2	1	5
Orissa	1	-	3	4
Punjab	1	-	3	4
Uttar Pradesh	-	-	4	4
West Bengal	-	-	4	4
Bihar	-	-	3	3
Gujarat+	-	-	3	3
Manipur*	-	-	3	3
Pondicherry**	-	-	3	3
Andhra Pradesh	1	-	1	2
Mysore	-	-	2	2
Haryana***	-	-	1	1
Rajasthan	-	-	1	1
PEPSU****	1	-	-	1
Tripura*	-	-	1	1
Goa**	-	-	1	1
Total:	6	2	34	42

+The state came into existence in 1960 by the bifurcation of Bombay state.

\*The Union Territories of Manipur and Tripura given the status of full states on January 20-21, 1972 under the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganization) Act.

\*\*Pondicherry and Goa continue to be Union Territories.

\*\*\*Haryana came into existence in 1966 by the bifurcation of Punjab state.

\*\*\*\*Patiala and East Punjab States' Union (PEPSU) was merged with Punjab in 1956.



TABLE I.3

TOTAL DURATION OF PRESIDENTIAL  
RULES IN DIFFERENT STATES, 1950-74

DURATION	STATES
Less than 1 year	Rajasthan, Tripura, Harvana, Gujarat,* Mysore, Goa
Between 1-2 years	PPPSU, Andhra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Pondicherry**
Between 2-3 years	Punjab, West Bengal
3 years and above	Manipur, Kerala

\*The duration of two presidential rules in the state of Gujarat declared in 1974 has been excluded because it extended beyond 1974.

\*\*One presidential rule in the Union Territory of Pondicherry has been excluded because the Territory probably still continues to be under presidential rule. The last time Parliament extended presidential rule for the Territory for a period of six months was on March 14, 1975.

choice to intervene; and (c) at the system-environmental level, because both the federal and the state leadership interact within the given environmental settings.

All the above three levels are inter-linked, each influencing and being influenced by the other, and much of what the political leadership does or does not do can be explained in terms of the interactions of these three levels. In other words, these interactions set the stage for leadership choices and decision-making.

Presidential rules are crisis episodes at the state level in the general drama of developmental politics. The resolution of the crises through federal intervention represents the decisions of the federal leaders. However, the choices are determined not only by the type of crisis at the state level but also by the state of federal politics and the system-environmental settings. Any theoretical model which tries to explain presidential rule, therefore, must:

- a. identify crisis episodes at the state level;
- b. identify choices in decision-making at the federal level; and
- c. link the system environment to both a and b above.

However, since the system environment fluctuates over the time period 1950-74, it would be more appropriate to make a few temporal dissections of the period linking each dissected period with both a and b above.

In other words, the crisis episodes and the federal choices in decision-making during each of the dissected periods will have the system-environmental properties of that period as their parameters.

Chapter II outlines the conceptual frame for this study.

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>Among the authors who moralized "Nehruvian consensus", Rajni Kothari and W. H. Morris-Jones may be specially identified. See, Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970) and many of his articles, the latest being, "India: Opposition in a Consensual Polity," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Regimes and Opposition (New Haven: Yale, 1973). Also see, W. H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967).

It was W. H. Morris-Jones who used the phrase "prophet of gloom" for many of the critics of India, particularly for the correspondent of The Times (London), Maxwell, who predicted in January 1967 that the Fourth General Elections would be the last elections in India. Later, Rajni Kothari popularized the phrase "prophets of doom" for critics such as Selig H. Harrison, A. H. Hanson, Barrington Moore, Jr., and others.

<sup>2</sup>K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford, 1953):13.

<sup>3</sup>William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964):11.

<sup>4</sup>B. R. Ambedkar quoted from the Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. XI, II, 976, in K. R. Bombwall, The Foundations of Indian Federalism (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967):9.

<sup>5</sup>See, Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963).

<sup>6</sup>See constitutional provision in respect to emergency governance in Suzanne Berger, The French Political System (New York: Random House, 1974):156.

<sup>7</sup>See, James MacGregor Burns and J. W. Peltason, Government by the People: The Dynamics of American National Government (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1963):92. In Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), the Supreme Court held that it was a political question whether or not a state had a "republican form of government" and, as such, the decision had to be made by the Congress when seating legislators from that state. See, C. H. Pritchett, American Constitutional Issues (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962):40.

<sup>8</sup>James MacGregor Burns and J. W. Peltason, op.cit., 92.

<sup>9</sup>John M. Blum, et. al., The National Experience (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963):358.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 776-778; 787-788.

<sup>11</sup>See, Peter H. Russell, Leading Constitutional Decisions (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973):24-30, for details.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 38-45.

<sup>13</sup>There are two cases of dismissal of premiers in British Columbia around 1900 which may look like incumbency crises in India, as defined later in this dissertation. They were in fact actions of the Lieutenant-Governor without prior initiative from the federal government and thus not relevant to this study.

<sup>14</sup>Article 48 read: If public safety and order are materially disturbed or endangered, the president may take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order and, if necessary, intervene by force of arms. The best known uses of this Article occurred on the national level and resulted in the emasculation of the Reichstag in the pre-Hitler years.

<sup>15</sup>Clinton L. Rossiter, op.cit., 39-40.

<sup>16</sup>S. C. Dash, The Constitution of India: A Comparative Study (Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1968):184.

<sup>17</sup>Asher N. Christensen, ed., The Evolution of Latin American Government (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1951):368. Use of the power of direct intervention is increasingly giving place to the use of more subtle techniques of control in Mexico. However, during the first four decades after the adoption of Oueretaro constitution, the record of interventions is as follows:

1918-27:	24
1928-37:	16
1938-47:	5
1948-57:	2

See, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Latin America: A Panorama of Contemporary Politics (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971).60.

<sup>18</sup>Percy Alvin Martin in Asher N. Christensen, op.cit., 354. During the first three decades of this century, the Brazilian states enjoyed exceptional freedom of action. The national government had to face an open revolt by Sao Paulo state in 1924 and again in 1932, fielding in the later year an army of 55,000 men. See, Russell H. Fitzgibbon, op.cit., 254.

<sup>19</sup>Rosendo A. Gomez in Asher N. Christensen, op.cit., 383-384. Many pretexts for intervention have been employed, perhaps the most common of which are political violence or electoral fraud. "To no one's surprise, it was Peron who carried intervention to its ultimate lengths. Castillo had intervened in two provinces before being ousted as president; within two weeks after the coup of June 4, 1943, the new regime removed the elected governments in the remaining 12 provinces." Russell H. Fitzgibbon, op.cit., 200.

<sup>20</sup>For a resume of the Nehru Committee Report, see K. R. Bombwall, op.cit., 141-156.

<sup>21</sup>Sardar Patel quoted in K. R. Bombwall, op.cit., 261-262

<sup>22</sup>But for a few members like Brajeshwar Prasad, P. S. Deshmukh and Frank Anthony who were opposed to federalism, there was a general consensus in the Constituent Assembly that the Indian Constitution was to be federal. In fact, the consensus in the Assembly in favour of a federal polity was so over-whelming that N. V. Gadgil could declare: "I doubt whether there is a single individual here or outside, or a party here or outside, which has stood for or even stands for a completely unitary State." See, K. R. Bombwall, op.cit., 11.

As of Independence, the units of the federal system were the British-created provinces. Their boundaries reflected considerations of administrative convenience, which included some account of linguistic divisions. The joining of the princely states, the absorption of the few remaining colonies, and linguistic considerations have accounted for numerous instances of territorial reorganization during the past three decades.

<sup>23</sup>K. C. Wheare, op.cit., 28.

<sup>24</sup>K. Santhanam, Union-State Relations in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963):12-13.

<sup>25</sup>Charles H. Alexandrowicz, Constitutional Developments in India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957):1969. The author argues that the provision of emergency governance in the Constitution makes for "two-way convertibility" of the constitutional structures and in no way conflicts with the "federal principle". Also, Paul H. Appleby, Report of a Survey of Public Administration in India (New Delhi: Government of India, 1953):51.

<sup>26</sup>M. J. C. Vile, The Structure of American Federalism (London, 1961):196.

<sup>27</sup>Thus in State of West Bengal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held in its majority judgement: "The legal theory on which the Constitution was based was the withdrawal or resumption of all powers of sovereignty into the people of this country and the distribution of these powers - save those withheld from both the Union and the States by reasons of the provisions of Part III - between the Union and the States". (AIR, 1963):1252.

<sup>28</sup>

Extracts from H. V. Kamath's speech were published in the Times of India, August 4, 1949.

<sup>29</sup>Kazi Syed Karimuddin in the Times of India, August 3, 1949.

<sup>30</sup>Shibban Lal Saxena in B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1968):813.

<sup>31</sup>P. S. Deshmukh in B. Shiva Rao, ibid., 814.

<sup>32</sup>H. N. Kunzru in B. Shiva Rao, ibid., 814.

- <sup>33</sup>B. R. Ambedkar in M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (Bombay: Asia, 1965):643.
- <sup>34</sup>B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, 177, quoted in J. R. Siwach, The Indian Presidency (Delhi: Hariyana Prakashan, 1971):231.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup>Naziruddin Ahmed, ibid.
- <sup>37</sup>B. R. Ambedkar in the Times of India, September 15, 1953.
- <sup>38</sup>Extracts from C. Rajagopalachari's speech published in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 26 - October 3, 1959:17019.
- <sup>39</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, May 6, 1965, col. 13543.
- <sup>40</sup>Hare Krushna Mahatab quoted by Koya, Lok Sabha Debates, May 6, 1965, col. 13595.
- <sup>41</sup>Rao Birendra Singh quoted in Shiv Raj Nakade, "Article 356 of the Indian Constitution - Its Use and Misuse," in L. M. Singhvi, ed., Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, October-December, 1969.
- <sup>42</sup>A somewhat similar justification was given by the Orissa High Court on October 22, 1973 in the case of B. Patnaik & 73 others vs. President of India and others. For full judgement on the case, see, Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments (Varanasi:India), October-December, 1973: 249-284.
- <sup>43</sup>The Statesman Weekly, March 9, 1974.
- <sup>44</sup>Gujarat, the home state of the former Deputy Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, came under presidential rule on February 9, 1974. In view of the reluctance of the Central Government to hold elections in the state, Morarji proceeded on an indefinite fast on April 7, 1975. On April 13, Mrs. Gandhi bowed to the pressure and proceeded to hold elections in the state. See, Asian Recorder, April 23 - 29, 1975.

## CHAPTER II

### PRESIDENTIAL RULE - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The study of presidential rule is essentially a study in the area of federal bargaining and decision-making. However, to decide as to when and in which province presidential rule should be declared is the exclusive constitutional privilege of the federal leaders. Since federal discretion is built into the institutional framework of the system, the study of presidential rule in a way becomes a study in the dynamics of actions of the federal elite. At the same time, to the extent that presidential rule resolves provincial crises, which may have systemic implications, its study delves into the mechanisms of maintaining system equilibrium. To sketch a conceptual framework for such an exercise poses a difficult problem for the simple reason that there is, as yet, little consensus among political scientists as to the crucial variables which determine human choices and decision-making.<sup>1</sup> A somewhat similar lack of consensus exists among writers about the critical variables that disturb the equilibrium of a political system. However, lack of agreements on the determinants of human choices or system equilibrium notwithstanding, one needs to have some kind of a conceptual frame to organize one's material, if one is not to be lost in the maze of exhaustive descriptions. Probably, what one needs is a neat and simple frame which accommodates generalities but which, at the same time, does not sacrifice the richness and the complexity of data to an arbitrary set of pre-determined categories. Obviously, if one sticks to the rigor of the model, one may have to sacrifice the peculiarities and the uniqueness of each case of presidential rule under analysis. Obversely, if one gives precedence to the unique over the general, one risks the danger of being tied up in an uninteresting exercise.

The choice to adopt one of the above techniques of analysis is also somewhat limited by the number of cases under examination. Aggregate data involving a larger number of cases is, for example, more easily amenable to statistical analysis than a smaller number of cases which fit best in the case-by-case methodological frame. Without solving the methodological puzzle, I shall outline a brief set of categories which promise a useful way of organizing the material. This will, I hope, provide some kind of an analytical frame that would enable me to organize and compare different constellation of variables which produce situations leading to the proclamation of presidential rule.

As mentioned in the first chapter, a systematic explanation of presidential rule warrants analyses at three different levels:

- I. at the state level with a view to identifying crisis episodes;
- II. at the federal level with a view to identifying choices in decision-making; and
- III. at the system level with a view to establishing linkages between the system environment and I and II above.

I. Crisis episodes at the state level:

At this level, we need to identify some of the sources of "load" or "strain" which threaten to disturb the sub-system equilibrium. However, before we do that, it is important to mention that a "sub-system under strain" does not necessarily imply that it is in "crisis". The concept of "strain" is used to indicate all kinds of problems, pressures, tensions and conflicts which converge on the sub-system and threaten but do not necessarily disturb sub-system equilibrium. Politics being what it is, all political systems and sub-systems always experience one or the other kind of "strain" in their developmental path. A crisis, on the other hand,



indicates a breakdown in the capabilities of the sub-system to adequately meet "strain" or "load". It is a failure of the sub-system capabilities at tension-management or conflict resolution. In other words, "crisis" is a relational concept indicating a heavy "strain" in relation to the weak capabilities of the sub-system. It is only the crisis situations which warrant federal intervention.

The purpose of examining the sources of "strain" at the sub-system level is to draw from them analytical categories of crisis episodes. Since the description of the sources of "strain" is empirically grounded, our analytical categories of crises would not be simple theoretical abstractions.

Sources of "strain" at the sub-system level:

The sources of strain at the sub-system level may be internal or external or both. By internal strain I mean those conflicts, tensions and pressures which spring from within the sub-system itself. By external strain I mean stresses and pressures impinging on the sub-system but external to the sub-system. Both internal and external strains may develop at the following two levels of the sub-system:

- (i) at the elite level; and
- (ii) at the mass level.

Thus we have the following four types of strains at the sub-system level:

- A. Internal strain at the elite level;
- B. Internal strain at the mass level;
- C. External strain at the elite level; and
- D. External strain at the mass level.

All the above four categories put together delineate almost all the possible sources of "load" which can disturb the sub-system equilibrium.

A. Internal strain at the elite level:

Internal strain at the elite-level means those pressures and conflicts which threaten to split the state cabinet and break the cohesiveness of the ruling party or parties. The sources of such pressures may be multiple and may, at times, be unexplainable for want of complete information. However, in the context of Indian state politics, we may identify some of the general sources of strain at this level:

i. Personal differences:

Politics creates friends and foes alike. While some differences among the members of the cabinet may be rooted in personality and background differences and/or policy differences, other may be embedded in the very nature of political competition, of "who gets what, when and how".

ii. Non-institutionalized party system:

Some states may have a more institutionalized party system than others. In some the party loyalties may be strong; in others weak. For example, in the former princely states of India, personal loyalties were stronger than party loyalties. In fact, there was little worthy of the name of party system in the former princely states compared to the party system in the erstwhile British provinces of India. In some states, the electorate may make a clear verdict in favour of a single party; in others, it may more often make a choice in favour of multiple parties and groups which, at times, may be heterogeneous enough as to make any kind of coalitional cabinet an impossibility. In the latter group of states, the cabinets always work under a heavy strain unless there are countervailing circumstances which can hold the members together.

iii. Socio-economic configurations within the states:

Despite a highly institutionalized party system the socio-economic

configurations in each state have a strong impact on cabinet stability.<sup>2</sup> In some states, tribal, linguistic and religious cleavages may be more strongly drawn than the rural-urban or sub-regional cleavages. For example, Andhra and Kerala are as much known for their caste cleavages as Punjab for religious, and Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Haryana for sub-regional cleavages and conflicts. Whether or not these cleavages are cross-cutting, it has been the experience of the Indian states that these cleavages, at times, have been causal to the making and un-making of provincial governments. Much of the "defection politics" that followed in the wake of the 1967 General Elections was a demonstration of the fact that political parties are artificial unities which may not be able to contain cleaved politics. To a large extent, the fall of the Haryana government in 1967 represented a revolt on the part of the Ahir-Jat community against the Brahmin community. Similarly, it was the revolt of the Jat community against the Bania community in Uttar Pradesh that brought the downfall of the C. B. Gupta (Bania) government in 1967. The defections in Madhya Pradesh had a princely elegance springing from the Gwalior House - the Gwalior region is one of the foremost industrialized and urbanised regions in the state and has always been a vortex of state politics - which upset the D. P. Mishra government in July 1967.<sup>3</sup>

B. Internal strain at the mass level:

Internal strain at the mass level is reflected in frequent agitational activities on the part of certain groups, associations, and masses in general (what John R. Wood has called "populist movements")<sup>4</sup> either (a) as a reaction to the state government policies; or (b) as a means to seeking gratification of certain demands. A new trend in the seventies in the agitational politics in the states has been to "march" on the

state legislatures and government houses in pursuit of the demand for the dismissal of the state governments. It is not uncommon for the state cabinets to collapse under the weight of agitational politics unless there are countervailing rescue forces. Among the many sources causing "strain" at the mass level, the following may be identified:

5  
i. Relative deprivation:

The socio-economic configurations in the states produce cleavage politics not only at the elite level but also at the mass level. At any time, any of the groups - whatever its basis of organization - may feel a sense of relative deprivation compared to other groups in the distribution of political goods such as employment opportunities, linguistic freedom, sub-regional development, etc., and may resort to agitational politics which may include anything from simple demonstrations to bundhs (mass strike), gheraos(encirclements) and physical violence. The coercive capabilities of the sub-system may break and the government may prefer to resign.<sup>6</sup>

ii. "Saintly" political leaders:

The traditional-modern mix nature of the Indian political system gives it, what W. H. Morris-Jones calls, a saintly style of politics.<sup>7</sup> The people of India tend to be more easily mobilized by the saintly idioms of saintly leaders than by purely modern symbolism of the sophisticated leaders. Mahatma Gandhi's style of galvanizing and mobilizing the masses in the traditional symbols has continued to persist in the Indian politics. Because the state governments are closer to the more easily mobilisable rural people than to the somewhat distant federal government, the appeals of the saintly leaders and their ability to mobilize the masses have a more direct impact on the state governments than on the federal government.

Such massive mobilizations, as and when directed against the state authorities, generally bring down the fall of the state governments. The massive agitation by the octogenarian Mannath Padmanabhan (without whose knowledge, it is said, "not a leaf falls to the ground in the Nair orchard" ) brought the downfall of the Kerala government in 1959, while the "populist" movement of Jayaprakash Narayan (affectionately called J. P.) in Bihar made it almost impossible for the Bihar legislature to meet and conduct its legislative business throughout the year 1974.

C. External strain at the elite level:

External strain at the elite level stems from the subordinate position of the provinces in relation to the federal government and the immense resources of the federal elite to upset the apple-cart at the provincial level. While it is the constitutional responsibility of the provinces to obey and implement federal directions, the provincial elite must march to the tune of federal drums in order to take advantage of the facilities that the federal government offers in the field of regional economic development and planned modernization. Thus, high provincial risks are involved in challenging the authority of the federal government or even in losing the grace of the federal elite. In the ambiguous vocabulary of politics, the provincial elite must perform to the "satisfaction" of the federal elite - this is a built-in characteristic in the "quasi-federal" nature of the Indian Constitution. In the game of federal politics, the way the federal elite uses its resources - personal, institutional, psychological - can be either provincial assets or liabilities depending on what the federal elite wants to accomplish. However, it has been generally the experience of the provincial elite to work under some kind of strain when they belong to:

1. Non-Congress parties:

Irrespective of ideological or policy differences, the very act of constituting a non-Congress provincial government in the predominantly Congress party system<sup>9</sup> has been pregnant with great risks. In the twenty-five year history of India since Independence, no non-Congress provincial government has stayed in office for its full term of five years except the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government in the Tamil Nadu. Whether the federal government acted to protect the electors against themselves as in Kerala in 1959, or to save the democratic institutions from the communist attack as in West Bengal in 1967, the act of intervention was a fact accomplished. In fact, the very existence of the presidential power to take over a provincial government has an unnerving effect on the provincial elite. How the power of the federal government is perceived by the provinces is well described by Professor W. H. Morris-Jones in his essay: "India Elects for Change - And Stability". Analysing the "ripple" effects of parliamentary elections of March 1971 wherein the Congress(Ruling) under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi scored a shock-scale victory, Morris-Jones writes:

Within days of the results, a number of politicians in newly exposed positions ran quickly for cover .... In Mysore and Gujarat floor-crossing went too fast for the news flashes to keep pace with them .... The CPI loudly offered its support to Mrs. Gandhi .... Even the Akali Dal received the message and set about revitalizing the party and giving its state government a new Congress-sounding program.

The upshot of three months of readjustment was that by mid-June there were non-Congress state governments only in Tamilnad, Orissa and Punjab. The Congress(O) governments of Gujarat and Mysore, recently so strong, were ruined by defections;    and    were made over to President's Rule.<sup>10</sup>

ii. Political "circles" unacceptable to the federal elite:

While the non-Congress governments tend to be unacceptable to the Congress federal elite by the very fact of their being non-Congress, there is no dearth of cases where certain individuals, groups or factions in the Congress provincial governments have been unacceptable to the federal leaders. In the factional fight between the Organizational Congress and the Ministerialist group or within the Ministerialist group itself, the Congress Center has generally exhibited three different types of attitudes:

- (a) Neutral, when it tried to "mediate"<sup>11</sup> but refused to interfere in favour of one group against the other;
- (b) Negative, when it interfered, directly or indirectly, to displace the incumbent provincial ministerialist leadership in favour of some other group or groups; and
- (c) Positive, when it interfered to give a positive support to the incumbent ministerialist leadership against the revolting groups or factions.

One example for each of these three different attitudes of the Congress Center may be given for greater clarification:

Neutral: In the factional fight in Bihar in 1952, Prime Minister Nehru agreed to issue a unity appeal but refused to be involved in the issue.

He issued a public statement to this effect in order to ensure the competing groups that he was siding with none.

Negative: In the factional fight in Punjab in 1951, Nehru, who was negatively inclined towards the Chief Minister, Gopi Chand Bhargava, asked him to quit office. Bhargava appeared reluctant because he was still the leader of the majority faction in the state legislative Congress party and enjoyed a majority in the state Assembly. On June 14, the

Congress High Command directed him to submit his resignation and pass "no orders as Chief Minister on any file hereafter."<sup>12</sup>

Positive: In the factional fight in West Bengal in 1949 and in Madras and Uttar Pradesh in 1950, Nehru, being positively inclined towards the Chief Ministers of these states, refused to set up a judicial inquiry to investigate charges of corruption against the Chief Ministers. As a reaction to his persistent refusal, the dissidents in all the three states moved to the opposition benches in their respective state assemblies and ultimately left the Congress party.

D. External strain at the mass level:

External strain at the mass level reflected in agitational politics may spring from either of the following two sources:

1. Federal policies:

The federal government is the fulcrum of modernization and social change. As such, most of its policies have a direct impact on economic interests and social structures. Whether it is Federal legislation on land reforms, a wage and price control announcement, or a Gharibi Hatao (Banish Poverty) sermon, it is bound to invite public reactions. Since the machinery to implement federal programs and policies is, for the most part, the machinery of the states, agitations even against the federal policies affect state politics. In such situations, the state governments are between the devil and the deep sea. If they decide not to implement federal policies or directions in view of the massive agitation - as the Kerala government did in December 1968 by refusing to arrest the striking Central Government employees as directed by the federal government - they may be censured and even threatened with dismissal. If, on the contrary, they decide to implement the federal



policies, they may not only find it difficult to face the wrath of the agitators but may also risk some areas of electoral support.

Another dimension of the federal policies is the way people perceive them in each province. In some provinces, the people may feel a strong sense of relative deprivation in respect of the allotment of scarce federal resources and may resort to demonstrations and agitations. The national priorities of the federal government may turn out to be wrong political priorities within each province, resulting in mass agitation and violent disorder. Generally speaking, massive agitations have followed in some of the provinces in respect to three areas of federal discretion:

- (a) Food subsidization;
- (b) Allotment of public sector projects; and
- (c) Settlement of inter-state water and boundary disputes.

Decisions in these areas accelerated discontent in some provinces but decelerated it in a few others. At times, these decisions wrote the epitaph of some of the provincial governments. In 1968, the Chief Minister of the Communist government of Kerala himself led an agitation against the Central food policy and threatened to import rice directly from China if the Center did not come to its rescue. In March 1974, the food riots in Gujarat were instrumental in the collapse of the Gujarat government. Unable to deal with Chimanbhai Patel, the ousted Chief Minister of Gujarat, at the party level, the federal government is said to have starved the state in order to accelerate agitational activities. "I did not expect," said the frustrated Congress Chief Minister, that the Center would "carry on its politics against me on the question of foodgrains to such an extent as it did." <sup>13</sup> In 1970, the decision of the federal government to locate

three steel plants in Andhra Pradesh, Mysore and Tamil Nadu, respectively, provoked a massive bundh in the state of Orissa.<sup>14</sup> In the same year, mob violence broke out in several towns of Mysore, and the railways and other offices became the object of attack by the crowds when the federal government announced its decision on the Mysore-Maharashtra boundary dispute.

ii. Inter-state contagion:

It is not uncommon to see that an agitation in one province provokes a series of agitations in other provinces. The Hindi zealots in the North produced anti-Hindi fanatics in the South. The Shiva Sena (a para-military organization) in Maharashtra produced Anti-Shiva Sena movements in Mysore and Tamil Nadu. The fast-unto-death by Sant Fateh Singh, the Akali leader, for the inclusion of Chandigarh in Punjab led to a counter-fast by the President of the Arya Samaj, Yogiraj Suryadev, for the inclusion of Chandigarh in Haryana in 1966. The struggle for Samyukta (United) Maharashtra gave birth to the Maha Gujarat Movement (1956); the riots in Bombay provoked riots in Ahmedabad. Situations like these put the coercive capabilities of the sub-system to a severe test, more so in a country where too much use of force may be as dangerous as too little. The institutional apparatus of the state government may collapse under the weight of such agitations and movements.

Now whether the sources of strain are internal or external or both, they may culminate in crises once they cross a particular threshold of tolerance. This threshold is crossed once the Center, either on its own or on request from the state authorities, intervenes to resolve the crisis. Generally speaking, while the internal strain at the elite may lead to "incumbency" crises, the external strain at this level may give birth to "congressization" crises. At the mass level, both the internal and external strains are likely to germinate what may be conceptualized

as "structural" or "institutional" crises. These empirically grounded analytical categories of crises may be defined as follows:

(a) Incumbency crisis:

This is a challenge to the occupants of positions of authority at the ministerial level, leading to a demand for the replacement of incumbent political actors by a new set of actors. In other words, incumbency crises indicate a demand for changing the ministerial personnel and not the party complexion of the provincial government. Most often, crises of this nature are the result of internal strain at the elite level, including intra-party conflicts within the ruling party.

(b) Congressization crisis:

This is a challenge to the coalitional provincial governments to transform themselves into purely Congress governments. As such, it involves a replacement, if possible, and displacement, if necessary, not only of the incumbent political actors at the state level but also of the parties they represent. Most often, crises of this nature are the result of the desire of the Congress Party to re-establish and maintain its hegemonic character.

The concept of "congressization" has been used to maintain empirical relevance. Throughout the period under analysis, the Congress Party has been in control of the Central Government. To keep intact the predominant position of the Party all over the country, the Congress High Command (in control of the Center) through its State Congress units has invariably kept up its pressure (what we have called "external strain") on the non-Congress parties either to coalesce with the Congress or merge with the Congress organization. There has been no dearth of occasions when the State Governors - appointees of the Central Government - have disallowed the legitimate claims of the non-Congress United Fronts

to form the state governments, facilitating thereby the manoeuvres of the State Congress units to fragment and absorb the opposition parties and groups. The Center, through a careful use of its resources, has very subtly abetted in these manoeuvres. Since this pressure to fragment the opposition had, for the most part, a one-way flow because of the unbroken dominance of the Congress Party at the Center, the concept of "congressi-zation" comes very close to reality.

(c) Structural crisis:

This represents a failure, full or partial, in the capabilities of the sub-system to function according to set constitutional practices and procedures or to protect the constitutional structures in the wake of certain critical public demands or populist movements. Since such crises involve the masses, the state governments may find difficult to maintain themselves in disorderly or near-anarchic situations. Even the anticipation of a structural crisis may bring a voluntary resignation of the state leadership. However, if it is the Central Government which perceives a structural crisis in a particular province, it may ask for the resignation of the provincial government.

While all the above three types of crises may develop at the sub-system level, there is another type of crisis - more serious than any of the previous three types - which may develop at the federal-provincial level. This may be conceptualized as:

(d) Systemic crisis:

This is a challenge by the provincial authority to the federal authority which may take any of the following forms:

- (i) a challenge to the incumbents of authority roles at the federal level (for example, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited

Uttar Pradesh in 1967, some partners in the United Front government in Uttar Pradesh wanted her to be arrested and publicly impeached);

- (ii) a challenge to the constitutional frame within which the federal authority roles interact or regulate their relations with the provincial governments; and/or
- (iii) a challenge, direct or indirect, by the provincial authority involving the security of the country.

All of these crises - incumbency, congressization, structural, and systemic - may provoke federal action and as such are independent variables in our study of presidential rule. However, as a caveat, it may be mentioned that these categories of crises, though analytically distinct and separate, may, at times, overlap in the empirical world because it is in the very nature of crises to spill-over from one direction to another.

## II. Federal Choices:

Being the repository of large resources, the federal government has a wide variety of choices in resolving crises at the sub-system level. Its actions or even inactions make all the difference in converting one type of crisis into another type of crisis depending on whether it wants to be a trouble-shooter or a trouble-maker. Since choices depend on resources, we may examine those federal resources which the Center has often used in relation to the provinces:

### 1. Patronage

Patronage of high offices is one of the potential resources of the federal government. Of particular relevance to the provincial government is the appointment of the Governor, who is supposed to but does not necessarily act as a constitutional head of the state. Most often, the appointment

to this gubernatorial office has gone to ousted or retired Congress Chief Ministers partly as a reward for their loyalty to the Congress organization and partly to eliminate their potential to create incumbency crises if not transferred and settled somewhere outside the province. At times, the federal government has been able to resolve congressization and even structural crises through the appointment of strong, hard-headed Governors. When, for example, N. Kanungo was despatched as the Governor of Bihar in 1968 despite open objections from the Bihar United Front government, it was much evident to all that the ball had been set rolling to resolve a congressization crisis. In the same vein, when the Governor of Punjab, Dharam Vira, was quickly transferred from Punjab to West Bengal in 1967, it took him just a few months to dismiss the Leftist United Front government of West Bengal which was, more or less, in open confrontation with the federal government. In place of the United Front, Dharam Vira installed a Congress coalition ministry even though its support in the state legislature was doubtful.

#### ii. Investigation Commissions:

The power to set up Investigation Commissions against state ministerial corruption is another federal resource most often used to resolve incumbency and congressization crises. It may be interesting to note here that while Jawaharlal Nehru did not use this resource adequately, both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi used it as much as they could. <sup>15</sup> Shastri brought down the strongest of the Chief Ministers, Partap Singh Kairon of Punjab, by publishing the Das Commission report in 1964 (unfortunate for Kairon, he favoured Morarji Desai against Lal Bahadur Shastri in the succession crisis for national leadership) while he saved the Bihar and Mysore Chief Ministers by exonerating them and refusing to

disclose the entire contents of the reports against them in the Parliament. In 1970, Mrs. Indira Gandhi permitted the Governor of Bihar to publish the reports of two investigatory commissions which tarnished the public image of many non-Congress and dissident Congress politicians in the state. The politics in Bihar thereafter returned to normal with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress(R) forming a coalition government in the state.

iii. Discriminatory resource allotment:

As a means to the resolution of any crisis, the federal government may make discriminatory resource allotments to the provinces. Even its threat to withhold financial aid, as it did against Mysore in the Mysore-Madras Water Dispute in 1970, may bring the provincial government to its heels. More than any Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi is said to have used this technique to the fullest extent possible. During the Congress split (1969), the federal government designed special "Accommodational Grants" to help provinces favourable to the Congress(R).<sup>16</sup> "The Central Government," editorialized Economic and Political Weekly, "has never hesitated to play politics with its assistance to the states. The so-called famine relief assistance to Rajasthan and the Rs.20-odd crores [approximately \$250 million] handed out to the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu in the difficult days of the Congress split are only two recent instances."<sup>17</sup> In the national debate on food policy in 1967, all the opposition parties except the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India charged the Center with "deliberately withholding supplies as a political manoeuvre to hurt the non-Congress governments."<sup>18</sup> The United Front Chief Minister of Bihar, M. P. Sinha, condemned the decision of the federal government to withhold assistance amounting to Rs. 30 crores (approximately \$375 million) which had been promised to the earlier Congress government, and lamented the reduction

in the supply of food to the state despite the fact that there were several starvation deaths in the province.<sup>19</sup>

The dependency of ~~the~~ states on federal assistance has been increasing over the years partly because of the increasing public expenditure and partly because of the reluctance of the provincial governments to increase their annual tax revenues - taxes being political dynamite in the politics of scarcity. By 1970-71, the total debt of the state governments to the Center was about three times as high as their total annual tax revenue, including their statutory share of the Centrally levied taxes.<sup>20</sup> The net result has been that the provincial governments have become near-parasites on the federal government for their financial survival. When, therefore, Morarji Desai, then Finance and Deputy Prime Minister in Indira Gandhi's cabinet, gave notice to the state governments in 1968 to clear their overdrafts, some of the state governments, particularly the non-Congress provincial governments, rushed in to make compromises with the federal government.

#### iv. Threatened Presidential Rule:

The federal government may resort to psychological warfare and threaten the use of presidential rule in order to resolve crises. Such a threat may be latent or manifest, direct or indirect. Thus, when Indira Gandhi sent a "reconnaissance" mission of Central Ministers to the non-Congress provinces in 1967 or when some Minister Y. B. Chavan, on his visit to West Bengal to preside over the Eastern Zonal Council in 1968, expressed his sense of shock over the violence rampant in West Bengal, the threat to use presidential rule was latent and indirect. Referring to Chavan's visit, Economic and Political Weekly editorialized: "... Chavan was awfully polite and nice; but there was no mistaking his intention. He was



a Central Minister telling a Non-Congress state that the Centre was still there."<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the threat was latent when the "Home Secretary in New Delhi .... asked the Madras Chief Secretary to inform his Chief Minister that the Centre might have to move in to protect trains and railway stations if the present agitation was not dealt with strongly"<sup>22</sup> by the provincial government.

On the other hand, the threat was direct when the Congress General Secretary, Balwantrao Mehta, unable to resolve an incumbency crisis in the former state of Vindhya Pradesh in 1953, threatened the provincial elite either to bury the hatchet or else face presidential rule. The Times of India editorialized: "It is highly questionable if Mr. Mehta who has no locus standi in the Central Government can threaten the use of the President's powers...."<sup>23</sup> Similarly, in 1955, Govind Ballabh Pant, then Central Home Minister, resolved an incumbency crisis in the state of Delhi by calling a meeting of the state Congress Legislators at his residence and asking them either to resolve their differences or face suspension of the Constitution.<sup>24</sup> During the mid-term election campaign in Kerala in 1953, the Union Minister of Commerce and Industry, T. T. Krishnamachari, issued a statement that "even if Communists win the elections, we will not allow them to rule in Travancore-Cochin." The statement provoked a heated debate in the Parliament when A. K. Gopalan, leader of the Communist party in the Parliament, asked: "Why this farce of election at all?" If this is the position of the Central Government, then, it is "against the fundamentals of our Constitution and reveals a definite fascist tendency."<sup>25</sup> Nehru had to re-state what T. T. Krishnamachari meant in order to pacify the Communists.<sup>26</sup> The Communists, however, remained dis-satisfied with Nehru's statement and blamed the Congress for their electoral reverses.

v. Presidential Rule - Suspension:

Most often used to resolve congressization crises is the partial use of presidential rule whereby the provincial government is **suspended** rather than dissolved. Suspension displaces the state cabinet and stops the legislature from conducting its business. It does not dissolve the state legislature. If the crisis is resolved, the legislature is permitted to meet again and the cabinet is reconstituted; if not resolved, suspension may lead to dissolution of the legislature and mid-term polls.

Suspension gives a breathing space to the provincial legislative parties to re-adjust themselves. From the federal government's point of view, suspension is a threat to the state legislators to resolve their mutual conflicts or else face expensive mid-term polls. Suspension, therefore, often leads to the restructuring of partisan loyalties and to the politics of defection.

It is interesting to note here that neither Jawaharlal Nehru nor Lal Bahadur Shastri used the instrument of suspension even once (though it was discussed in the case of Punjab crisis in 1951). For Mrs. Indira Gandhi, suspension has been one of the major strategies adopted to resolve crises. Between April 1967 and February 1971, there were seven cases of suspension. In all cases except one, suspension either resulted in the formation of Congress governments or dissolution of the state legislatures. The exception related to the state of Uttar Pradesh where suspension had to be withdrawn on account of the massive public protest that it provoked in the state. Despite that, suspension worked to displace the provincial Chief Minister.

vi. Presidential Rule - Dissolution:

Failing to resolve crises through the use of any one or more than

one of the resources mentioned above, the federal government may dissolve the state legislature and the cabinet and assume complete control over the administration of the state. Following this, it may order mid-term polls at its own convenience within a maximum period of three years - the maximum period under Article 356 of the Constitution for which an emergency can last with the approval of the Parliament.

In the normal circumstances, if a government loses a vote of confidence in the legislature, it can seek a fresh mandate from the electorate by requesting the Governor to dissolve the legislature while it may stay on as a caretaker government. However, the Governor may refuse dissolution if an alternative ministry can be formed. Presidential rule puts a stop to this search for the alternative and the caretaking work of the provincial government is handled by the federal government. As such, presidential rule follows when;

- (a) the federal government has dismissed a provincial government while the executive still enjoyed the confidence of the legislature, as in Kerala (1959), Haryana (1967), etc. In these circumstances, there obviously could not be an alternative ministry because the ministry dismissed was the ministry still with a majority in the legislature;
- (b) the federal government, on the recommendations of the Governor, has refused to accept caretaking by the defeated ministry; and
- (c) the federal government, through the Governor, has declined to accept the alternative ministry available.

It is of interest to note that throughout the federal history of India under analysis, the federal government never accepted caretaking by any non-Congress government except once by the DMK government of

Tamil Nadu. At the same time, in the majority of cases, it imposed presidential rule when an alternative ministry was available. In 1968, presidential rule was imposed in the state of Uttar Pradesh despite the claim of the Samyukta Vidhyak Dal (SVD) that it was in a position to form an alternative ministry. In order to demonstrate its majority in the state legislature, the SVD went to the extent of parading its supporters before the President of India in New Delhi (the same way as had been done by the United Fronts of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh earlier in 1967). Similarly, on March 1, 1973, presidential rule was imposed on Orissa despite the claims of Biju Patnaik that he was in a position to form an alternative ministry. The Orissa Governor's report said: "Patnaik's ministry," if formed, "may not remain for a long time."<sup>27</sup>

### III. System environment changes:

Not only crises, but also system environment changes determine which one of the choices given above becomes the federal decision. However, before we structure system environment changes into some analytical frame, let us start with two empirical cases.

1. Gujarat case: Soon after the "Kamaraj Plan"<sup>28</sup> in 1963, Morarji Desai, one of the strong ministers kamarajed from the Central Government, was instrumental in creating an incumbency crisis in his home state of Gujarat. Dr. Jivraj Mehta, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat and a close friend of Nehru, lost a vote of confidence in the Gujarat Congress Legislative Party. Nehru felt awfully embarrassed and decided to plead Dr. Mehta's case before the Congress High Command - the highest policy-making organ of the Congress Party. At the High Command meeting, Nehru requested that Dr. Mehta, who was waiting in the adjacent room, be heard personally. At this, Morarji Desai, present in the meeting, looked toward Nehru and

said:

I am leaving the meeting and if you want to discuss anything with Dr. Jivaraj, you can do so in my absence. I shall not be present at the discussion, and if this behaviour of mine is considered against Party discipline, I shall accept any disciplinary action that the Board might take against me, but I would not like to have any discussion with Dr. Jivaraj now.<sup>29</sup>

On hearing Morarji, Nehru asked the Congress President to inform Dr. Mehta that there was no need of any discussion with him. The episode ended with the succession of Balwantrai Mehta, a close associate of Morarji, as the Chief Minister of Gujarat.

ii. Madras case: In October 1953, C. Rajagopalachari, the Chief Minister of Madras, was facing a tough time from the Congress dissidents. A petition signed by several members of the Congress Legislative Party seeking permission to convene a meeting of the Congress members to elect a new leader was sent to Nehru. In those days, C. Rajagopalachari was a "Nehru-man" who had walked into the Government by the back door - he was made Chief Minister without being elected to the Madras Legislative Assembly and had later preferred nomination to the upper chamber of the Madras legislature to being elected to the lower chamber. In reply to the petitioners, Nehru sent a strongly-worded communication:

Behave yourselves l and do not indulge in l disruptionist tactics. Any move to express no confidence in the leader of the Congress Party, Mr. Rajagopalachari, is to be deprecated as this could only result in harm to the Party, to the Congress and to the state of Madras.<sup>30</sup>

Nehru charged the petitioners with "ingratitude" and declared their move as a "gross insult" to the Constitution and its makers. The episode ended and the Rajagopalachari ministry was stabilized for quite some time to come.

The above two episodes are similar because they revolve around incumbency crises; they are dissimilar in the way the crises were resolved. The alternative scenario in the case of Madras would probably have been

the imposition of presidential rule; the alternative scenario in the case of Gujarat would probably have been a split at the Center. The decision on Madras was taken when the Center hegemonized the states; the decision on Gujarat was taken when the states were trying to hegemonize the Center. In other words, the system environment at the time when the Madras crisis was resolved was not the same system environment when the Gujarat crisis was resolved. While the antecedents of the political system of the fifties were colonial legacies, a euphoria over independence, strong Central leadership, the antecedents of the political system of the sixties were all those political developments which had taken place between the fifties and the dawn of the sixties. The Indian political system of the sixties seemed to be following an itinerary different from the one it had followed in the fifties. The environmental changes - domestic and international - were effecting a change in the changing properties of the political system which may analytically be categorized as:

- (a) Structural-functional properties, i.e. institutional infra-structures and their performance;
- (b) Party system properties; and
- (c) Leadership properties.

With a change in the environmental settings and the properties of the political system came a change in the federal decision-making.

Now, in order to analyse system-environment interaction and its impact on federal choices and decision-making, it is important to periodize the political development of India into the following four phases:

- (a) 1947-63: Period of Institutional Growth and the crystallization of the Center;
- (b) 1964-67: Period of Divergence;
- (c) 1967-71: Period of Institutional Decay; and

(d) 1971-74: Period of Re-institutionalization and Consolidation.

This division into periods is, of course, arbitrary but useful, for during each of the above period, the system environment and the properties of the political system changed markedly. For illuminating these changes, each historical period can be heuristically represented by an analytical developmental model:

- (a) Near-Hegemonic model;
- (b) Bargaining model;
- (c) Praetorian model; and
- (d) Hegemonic model.

Each of these models corresponds to one of the periods mentioned above, and represents a state in the developmental path of the political system in a particular environmental settings.

Now, most of the federal decisions in meeting sub-system crises can be explained when projected in the background of the political system developmental path. A crisis, for example, emerging at a time when the system was "hegemonic" in nature was resolved differently from the time when the system was of a "bargaining" or "praetorian" nature. Other things being equal, a "hegemonic" system makes little distinction between a legitimate and a subversive opposition for it assumes all opposition to be illegitimate. On the contrary, a "bargaining" system (which comes close to Robert A. Dahl's concept of polyarchy<sup>31</sup>) fixes thresholds of dissent and bargains consensus. A "praetorian" system is a system without consensus where, to use Rapoport's definition, "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority;    and    the role of power (i.e., wealth and force) is maximised."<sup>32</sup> A "praetorian" system, thus, represents a decay in the capacity of the institutions to enforce

the rules of the game. The opposition in such a system survives or is suppressed depending on situations and circumstances.

By now, we have identified and classified:

- (a) crises at the state level - incumbency, congressization, structural, and systemic;
- (b) choices in decision-making at the federal level in resolving crises - patronage, investigation commissions, discriminatory resource allotment, threatened presidential rule, presidential rule - suspension, and presidential rule - dissolution; and
- (c) system-environmental interaction patterns and the resultant system states - Near-Hegemonic, Bargaining, Praetorian, and Hegemonic. Though analytically separate and distinct, these system state models represent sequential but linked developmental paths of the political system.

With sub-system crises as independent variables and federal choices in decision-making as dependent variables, the various system models are suggestive of the hypotheses as to how the federal leadership would assess and resolve crises.

Table 2.1 outlines analytical linkages in the system states followed by some descriptive hypotheses on the use of presidential rule.



TABLE 2.1  
ANALYTICAL LINKAGES IN THE SYSTEM STATES

I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Emergent political system*	System-environmental properties & linked developments	Independent variables	Dependent variables	Linked developmental path System changes*	Subsequent political system
Near-Hegemonic	Domestic International 1947-50/ 1950-63	Crises	Choices - presidential rule	Domestic International 1963-64	Bargaining
Bargaining	1963-64/ 1964-67	Crises	Choices - presidential rule	1966-67	Praetorian
Praetorian	1966-67/ 1967-71	Crises	Choices - presidential rule	1971-72	Hegemonic
Hegemonic	1971-72/ 1972-74	Crises	Choices - presidential rule	1973-74	

\*The emergent political system and the system changes shall be described and analysed in terms of structural-functional, party system, and leadership properties.

I have borrowed the essentials of this frame from Gabriel A. Almond, et al, ed., Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1973). The authors call this process of going back and forth as the "iterative process at theory building". I have, however, suitably modified their frame to fit my study.

Some descriptive hypotheses:

1. In a "near-hegemonic" system state - based as it is on the domestication of dissent - all types of sub-system crises, failing resolution through means other than the use of presidential rules, are most likely to be resolved through the imposition of presidential rules.
2. In a "bargaining" system state - based as it is on fixing thresholds of dissent - only the systemic crises are most likely to be resolved through the imposition of presidential rules. In the case of all other types of crises, presidential rule may come with the consent of the state concerned.
3. In a "praetorian" system state - based as it is on overweening private ambitions and absence of the rules of the game - all types of crises are most likely to be resolved through the opportunistic imposition of presidential rules. By opportunistic I mean that the federal authorities would most often suspend the state government, watch public reactions, and then proceed to dissolution or withdrawal of suspension depending on the situation.

It is important here to distinguish system state # 1 from the system state # 3. A "near-hegemonic" system forecloses crises; it does not anticipate crises. However, as and when crises arise, it has a high potential to resolve them. On the other hand, a "praetorian" system is itself in disequilibrium with little capabilities to foreclose crises. To use an analogy, it is like a cyclist who is constantly turning left the handlebar of a rightveering bicycle.<sup>33</sup> The elite in the system is in a continuous process of learning from each incident of crisis, working according to the principle of "anticipated reactions".

4. In a "hegemonic" system state - based as it is on treating dissent as simple subversion - presidential rule is likely to be the first choice

to resolve all types of crises, unlike in the "near-hegemonic" state where presidential rule is likely to be the last choice. The essential difference between the two system-states is that of degree rather than of kind.

The chapters that follow elaborate on Table 2.1 and pursue further these descriptive hypotheses. The system-environmental changes are described and their cumulative impact on federal choices analysed. Some descriptive propositions relating to these choices are tested in the background of each system state. The sub-system crises are described in greater detail and compared both temporally and spatially. Temporally to find out why presidential rule was declared in one time and not in the other within the same time period; and spatially to find out why presidential rule was declared at one time and not the other within the same province.

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>The voluminous literature on elite studies approaches the problem of explaining choices and decision-making from several perspectives. Generally speaking, the social background of the decision-makers, their personality attributes, their perspectives on issues and policies, and the situations they are involved in have been regarded as relevant to the explanation of the decisions they make. See, Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision Makers (New York: Doubleday, 1954); Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political Studies 1:4 (January 1969); Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969); etc. For a general resume of various studies, see bibliography on elite studies in Richard L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970): 104-139.

<sup>2</sup>Often, the state party system may be institutionalized along state socio-economic configurations. Even the "catch-all" Congress Party at the state and the district level has its factions somewhat closely organized along socio-economic cleavages. See, Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in Rajasthan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Angela Sutherland Burger, Opposition in a Dominant-Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). For an impact of these cleavages on cabinet stability, see Shree Nagesh Jha, "Caste in Bihar Politics," in Economic and Political Weekly (February 14, 1970): 341-345; Editorial, "Maharashtra: Getting More Secular," Economic and Political Weekly (April 17, 1971): 823-825.

<sup>3</sup>See the role of the Gwalior House in the politics of Madhya Pradesh in Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974): 451-462.

<sup>4</sup>John R. Wood, "Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in India: A Comparative Analysis of Populist Movements in Gujarat and Bihar," unpublished manuscript presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 1975.

<sup>5</sup>Ted Gurr has demonstrated that the sense of relative deprivation (the difference between the expected and the actual benefits) has a strong causal relationship with the incidence and severity of civil violence. See, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970).

<sup>6</sup>The Nair high castes, feeling a strong sense of deprivation, spearheaded a massive agitation which almost completely paralysed the Communist government of Kerala in 1959. The crisis was resolved through the imposition of presidential rule. See, D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965); Sankar Ghosh, The Disinherited State: A Study of West Bengal 1967-70 (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1971): 84-114; Selig H. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton: Princeton University, 1960).

<sup>7</sup>The traditional-modern mix nature of the Indian politics has been idiomatically expressed in W. H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967, 2nd ed.): 60-61.

<sup>8</sup>See, D. R. Mankekar, op.cit., 32.

<sup>9</sup>Giovanni Sartori defines a "predominant party system" as "the type of party pluralism in which no alternation in office occurs over time, even though alternation is not ruled out and the political system provides all the opportunities of open and effective dissent, i.e. for opposing the predominance of the ruling party." Sartori's definition seems too liberal when applied to the Congress Party particularly in view of the presidential rules imposed on the non-Congress provincial governments. G. Sartori, "The Typology of Party Systems: Proposals for Improvement," in Erik Allard and Stein Rokkan, ed., Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970):327.

<sup>10</sup>W. H. Morris-Jones, "India Elects For Change - And Stability," Asian Survey (August 1974):719-741.

<sup>11</sup>The "mediating" role of the Congress High Command is the predominant theme of Stanley A. Kochanek's The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968).

<sup>12</sup>Extracts from the Congress High Command communication published in the Times of India, June 15, 1951.

<sup>13</sup>Full text of the Chief Minister's statement published in the Statesman Weekly, March 9, 1974.

<sup>14</sup>See, "The Politics of Steel," Economic and Political Weekly (August 8, 1970): 1326-1327.

<sup>15</sup>For Lal Bahadur Shastri's inquiries, see Keesing Contemporary Archives (November 21-28, 1964): 20427; (May 8-15, 1965): 20732-20733. The major difference between Nehru and his successors has been that while Nehru entrusted the task of investigations to the party organization, his successors relied either on the judicial inquiry commissions or the Central Bureau of Investigation.

<sup>16</sup>"States Ask For More," Economic and Political Weekly (December 12, 1970):1991-1992.

<sup>17</sup>"Any Takers?" Economic and Political Weekly (July 10, 1971):1361. Also see, Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1971):13-14.

<sup>18</sup>"Who Will Feed The Hungary?" Economic and Political Weekly (May 27, 1967):948-949.

<sup>19</sup>Economic and Political Weekly (April 22, 1967):743.

<sup>20</sup>Even the annual amount payable by the states to the Center by way of interest on loans and repayments of the principal was beginning to exceed their gross receipts from fresh loans by 1970-71. See, K. N. Raj, "Planning from Below," Economic and Political Weekly (July 1971):1609-1618.

<sup>21</sup>"A Capful of Advice," Economic and Political Weekly (May 27, 1968): 953.

<sup>22</sup>Economic and Political Weekly (January 1968):24.

<sup>23</sup>The Times of India, May 6, 1953.

<sup>24</sup>The episode was headlines by The Times of India, February 9, 1955.

<sup>25</sup>The episode alongwith A. K. Gopalan's statement in the Parliament recorded in The Times of India, November 21, 1953.

<sup>26</sup>Nehru clarified the air by assuring the electorate, on his visit to Trivandrum (Kerala) in connection with the election tour, that the Government would accept the verdict of the electorate "within the terms of the Constitution." However, he said, "It is a different matter if the Constitution is offended." Giving such a statement was, by no means, a positive assurance. See, The Times of India, February 9, 1954.

<sup>27</sup>Excerpts from the Governor's report published in the Asian Recorder (April 9-15, 1973):11324.

<sup>28</sup>The "Kamaraj Plan" emerged out of a meeting between K. Kamaraj Nadar, then Chief Minister of Madras, and Prime Minister Nehru in July 1963. The plan was designed to restore unity to the Congress organization. Under the plan, some Central Ministers and the Chief Ministers of a few states resigned to work for the Party. Some critics of Nehru viewed the whole scheme as a clever manoeuvre on the part of Nehru (whose charisma was becoming powerless about the Sino-Indian War 1962) to "purge" the Party of those party bosses who had started showing their teeth to Nehru.

<sup>29</sup>Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), Volume Two: 210.

<sup>30</sup>Full text of Nehru's letter published in The Times of India, December 8, 1953. Also see, The Times of India, November 1, 1953.

<sup>31</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale, 1971). The "bargaining" model comes close to the "public contestation" aspect of polyarchy; it has no reference to public participation, the other aspect of Dahl's polyarchy.

<sup>32</sup>David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus", (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960). The quotation occurs in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale, Fourth Print, 1970):81. Though praetorianism is now widely associated with military interventions, the concept as used in this chapter has no such connotation. The definition of Rapoport has been accepted because it comes very close to describing the empirical reality we are concerned with. However, in order to see how the army was employed by the Center particularly to over-awe the United Front government (Marxist) in West Bengal, see presidential rule in West Bengal 1968 in this thesis.

<sup>33</sup>The analogy is taken from V. Subramaniam & N. Srinivas, "The Indian Political System: Aged for New Research Angles," Economic and Political Weekly (April 24, 1971):867.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE NEAR-HEGEMONIC MODEL 1947-63

In Chapter II, I have called the years between 1947 and 1963 the period of institutional growth leading to the crystallization of the Center in the political development of India. I have also heuristically characterized the political system of this period as near-hegemonic because of its low tolerance of political dissent. Despite the fact that we are starting our analysis beginning with Indian Independence in 1947, this analysis would be incomplete without going "back and forth" in time in order to link the pre-existent colonial political system with the emergent political system. Such an iterative process is important for the simple reason that no political system starts out in a vacuum. I have thus divided this period in two parts: Part I describes the emergent political system between 1947-50 with emphasis on its linkages with the past. At this "take-off" stage of the political system, the system environmental properties have a strong impact in carrying part of the past into the present and the future. Part II describes the developmental path of the political system between 1950-63 linking it with the "take-off" stage of the political system and incorporating both continuity and change. The analytical frame adopted in describing both parts is given on the next page.

These two parts together not only delineate system-environmental interaction patterns but also explain the settings in the context of which decisions in relation to the states were taken during the period 1947-63. These contextual settings help us to hypothesize about the likely outcome.

ANALYTICAL FRAME

PART I: 1947-50

Emergent political system

System environmental properties

Linked/de-linked developmental path

PART II: 1950-63

System environmental properties

1. Structural-functional properties: the political and administrative legacies.

1. Domestic: violence.

1. Structural-functional properties: the Planning Commission.

1. Domestic: change in the midst of stability.

2. Party system properties: the Congress and its coalitional propensities.

2. International: war in Kashmir.

2. Party system properties: the Congress and its coalitional propensities.

2. International: the Sino-Indian War.

3. Leadership properties: the "duumvirate" of Nehru & Patel.

3. Leadership properties: the charismatic Nehru.



of crises at the state level. Part II, therefore, ends with some descriptive propositions.

Altogether, this chapter is divided into four parts. Besides the two parts mentioned above, Part III deals with those sub-system crises which were resolved through the imposition of presidential rule and makes both spatial and temporal comparisons. However, state crises not covered in Part III because they were not spatial nor strictly temporal are dealt with in Part IV - the idea being to examine all the crises in all the states of India in order to find a pattern of crisis resolution on an All-India basis. Part IV, therefore, is supplemental to Part III in the sense that it helps us confirm/disconfirm the trend in crisis resolution found in Part III.

#### PART I: THE EMERGENT POLITICAL SYSTEM 1947-50

##### 1. Structural-functional properties: the legacies

The attainment of Independence marked the end of the British epoch in Indian history but not the end of British political structures, traditions and styles in India. The regime changed but there was more continuity than discontinuity in this change. Noteworthy in the change-over was the continuity in the political and administrative infra-structures and their operational styles which had long been institutionalized by the British in India. On August 14, 1947, Nehru addressed the Parliament of free India and said:

A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.<sup>1</sup>

In reality, India did not quite step out from the old; it reconstructed the old by giving it new futuristic dimensions. It inherited a hegemonic political system - a system with little tolerance for the opposition - and liberalized it to a degree in the process of re-adaptation. The

years between Independence and the final adoption of the constitutional and legal structures on January 26, 1950, were the years dominated by this process of re-adaptation. During these years, the new elite managed the political system according to the Government of India Act 1935 which had provided for a federal structure with a somewhat limited provincial autonomy. The Act, on the whole, was executive-oriented; over ninety articles conferred "discretionary powers" on the Viceroy making him the center of the whole political system. In respect to the provinces, the Governors were assigned a dominant role to intervene, veto, and even legislate on their own in direct opposition to the provincial legislatures and their responsible ministers. Under Section 93 of the Act, if at any time the Governor of a province was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the government of the province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Act, he could by Proclamation take upon himself the administration of the province. This "centrism" in the Act was bitterly opposed by all sections of Indian opinion. Jawaharlal Nehru, then President of the Indian National Congress, was merciless in his criticism. He called the Act a "new charter of slavery to strengthen the bonds of imperialist domination"<sup>2</sup> through the establishment of authoritarian structures. On a different occasion, Nehru said: "It was the old constitutional conflict between an autocratic king and parliament which had so often taken place elsewhere, leading to revolutions and the suppression of the king."<sup>3</sup> Making an issue of the special powers given to the Governors, the Congress Party declined to accept office in the provinces where it had scored legislative majorities in the elections of 1937. However, after three months of negotiations, a face-saving device was found; the Congress Working Committee (hereafter referred to as the Congress High Command); the highest Party organ,

over-ruling Nehru and his Left-wing supporters, accepted an assurance from the Viceroy that the Governors would cooperate with the Ministers. Thereafter, the Congress formed governments in eight of the eleven provinces. Nehru bowed to the decision of the Congress High Command with great reluctance. "Acceptance of office," grumbled Nehru, "does not mean by an iota acceptance of the slave Constitution."<sup>4</sup>

The "provincial autonomy", as it was called under the Government of India Act 1935, worked well between 1937 and 1939. But for the World War II which intervened and disturbed its working in 1939 (the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned on their own ~~to~~ mark their protest against the British declaration of India's entrance into the War without consulting the Indian National Congress), the Congress ministers in the provinces had minimal complaints against the Governors who acted with a good deal of restraint in the use of their executive powers. However, the Congress Party, committed as it was to the establishment of a federal democratic polity after Independence, continued to protest against the emergency powers of the Viceroy and of the Governors as granted under the Government of India Act, 1935. Emergency governance, it felt, was both anti-democratic and anti-federal.

However, the chaotic situation that followed the achievement of Indian Independence in 1947 (as discussed earlier in chapter I) almost forced the new elite to adopt an institutional strategy which was not very different from that of its predecessors. The new Constitution of India republicanised the viceregal powers with minor changes. The discretionary powers of the Governors were withdrawn but handed over to the President of the Republic. In the process, an uneasy compromise was made between the "federal principle" and the "emergency governance" for the sake of preserving national unity and integrity. However, an

assurance as to the proper use of presidential powers was given by

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee:

If at all they [the emergency provisions] are brought into operation, I hope the President who is endowed with these powers, will take proper precautions before actually suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred that the things were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution. If that warning fails, the second thing for him to do will be to order an election allowing the people of the province to settle matters by themselves. It is only when these two remedies fail that he would resort to this Article .... I do not think we could then say that these Articles were imported in vain or that the President had acted wantonly.<sup>5</sup>

On the administrative side, the new elite accepted the once much-criticised "steel frame" of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) established by the British for an authoritarian governance of the country. The ICS was All-India in character; though constituted by the Central Government, its members occupied almost all the key positions in the provinces. Composed of the British and the Indian intelligentsia, it acted as the guardian of the British Empire and a much visible ruling power in the country. More feared than revered for its arbitrary powers and Anglicized outlook, it was an eye-sore to the Indian nationalists who were often in confrontation with its members during the days of freedom struggle. Referring to the experience of the Congress provincial governments during 1937-39, Nehru was harsh on the ICS and the police services:

These services, bred in a different and authoritarian tradition, disliked the new atmosphere, the assertive attitude of the public, the lessening of their own importance, and their subordination to persons whom they had been in the habit of arresting and imprisoning .... They felt as an orthodox Hindu might feel if untouchables pushed their way into the sacred precincts of his own particular temple.<sup>6</sup>

Independence and the problems that accompanied it changed the

perspective of the new elite; the emphasis, once again, was on continuity. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of free India, pleaded strongly in favour of the ICS. Being in charge of the Services, he asked the members of the Constituent Assembly to "forget the past":

You come out of the jail and then say: "These men put me in jail. Let me take revenge". That is not the Gandhian way. It is going far away from that.<sup>7</sup>

Patel was aware of Nehru's disdain for the Services. He also anticipated objections from the provincial governments which might argue that any Service, recruited by the federal government and posted in the provinces, constituted an invasion of provincial autonomy. Fore-stalling such criticism, Patel wrote a personal letter to Nehru:

Any pricking of the conscience on the score of provincial autonomy or on the need for sustaining the prestige and powers of Provincial Ministers is therefore out of place.<sup>8</sup>

While the Constituent Assembly approved the continuation of the ICS, a touch of "Indianness" was added - the Indian Civil Service was henceforth to be known as the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) without any loss to its powers, privileges and prestige.

Continuity was also assured on other fronts. The Government of India accepted almost all the rules and regulations institutionalized by the British as also the various Security Acts passed by the colonial regime. The Defence of India rules, the Public Security Measures Act, the Indian Penal Code, etc., were adopted in the name of preserving and sustaining national freedom. By February 1950, the Indian Parliament added to the list a still more severe Preventive Detention Act under which any person could be detained without cause and without trial for a limited period of time. H. V. Kamath, a member of the Parliament and a stormy petrel of the Congress Party (later a Socialist) mourned the

Act:

This is the day of shame and sorrow. May God save the Indian people.<sup>9</sup>

2. Party system properties: the Congress Party and its coalitional propensities

If political convenience or the sheer necessity of keeping the political system in "moving equilibrium" made it incumbent on the new elite to re-adapt some of the colonial structural-institutional legacies, the "lines of force" in the Indian political system tending it towards a near-hegemonic model were set by the legacies of the nationalist movement as represented in the Congress Party and its leadership. Before Independence, the Congress Party was the party - or at least it was so perceived by its leaders - deliberately all-inclusive, drawing within its fold, to use B.R. Ambedkar's sarcasm, "all fools and knaves, friends and foes, communalists and secularists, reformers and orthodoxists, capitalists and anti-capitalists."<sup>10</sup> Any person or organization outside the Congress was felt to be partially or wholly un-Indian.<sup>11</sup> In terms of inter-party relations, the Congress was uncharitable toward other political parties and exhibited little desire to coalesce with them or to work a coalitional government. After sweeping the provincial polls in 1937, the Congress behaved in the most arrogant fashion. As Michael Brecher writes:

Flushed with success the Congress adopted an imperious attitude to all other political parties, a 'Himalayan blunder', for which it was to pay dearly in the years to come. Nehru himself set the tone with his haughty remark in March 1937: 'There are only two forces in India today, British imperialism, and Indian nationalism as represented by the Congress.' Jinnah / leader of the Muslim League, later founder of Pakistan / was quick to retort: 'No, there is a third party, the Mussulmans,'. History was to bear him out.<sup>12</sup>

The capacity of the Congress to demoralize opposition was incredible. During the election campaign in 1937, it cooperated

with the Muslim League, notably in the United Provinces, because it did not expect a clear majority in the legislature. However, once the elections were over and it was in a position to form the government on its own, it ridiculed the League's offer of cooperation. The League should, said the triumphant Congress leaders, disband itself and its members in the Assembly should follow the Congress orders.

The Interim Central Government constituted on October 15, 1946, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru was a coalition of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. Though explanations differ about the breakdown of this coalition, the Congress Party is rarely cited for its charitable attitude towards the League.<sup>13</sup>

Within the Congress Party itself, the strong organizational hierarchy lubricated through the skillful mediating art of the Mahatma made it easier to domesticate dissent and achieve a confluence of different ideas and ideologies. Leadership carried the rank and file rather than the other way round and the Mahatma carried the masses to legitimize the decisions of the leadership. In its long history, the Party was "incorrigibly parliamentarian" in its working but was always dominated by one or the other 'god-father'. Thus, before Independence, Gandhi, though not a formal member of the Congress, was its acknowledged 'chieftain'; after the Independence, it was Nehru. Both respected frank differences of opinions. However, more often than not, both refused to compromise their sense of self-righteousness. In the elections to the Congress Presidency on January 29, 1939, Subhash Chandra Bose defeated Gandhi's candidate, P. Sitaramayya. Gandhi took it as a personal affront and declared, "I rejoice in this defeat." Three months later, Bose found no alternative but to submit his resignation on account of

the crisis created in the composition of the Working Committee by Gandhi.

Narrating the episode, Michael Brecher writes:

...Nehru made strenuous efforts to heal the breach between Gandhi and Bose. Bose was markedly conciliatory and he relied heavily on Nehru's advice. But Gandhi seemed determined to oust him.<sup>14</sup>

After Independence, P. D. Tandon, a conservative Hindu, was elected President of the Congress on September 1, 1950, defeating J. B. Kirpalani, much to the chagrin of Nehru. In August 1951, Nehru, in order to force Tandon out of office, resigned from the Congress Working Committee and announced:

I thought that my resignation might serve as shock treatment for the ailing Congress. I felt it might set people thinking about what is wrong with the organization and how to rectify it.<sup>15</sup>

The conflict brought forth the "middle men" of politics; Lal Bahadur Shastri, G. B. Pant (Uttar Pradesh), B. C. Roy (West Bengal), A. N. Sinha (Bihar) and many others tried to mediate but the crisis could be resolved only after Tandon resigned the Presidency in September 1951. Henceforth, Nehru himself was to lead both the Party and the Government.<sup>16</sup>

In relation to the Pradesh (Provincial) Congress Committees, the Congress High Command listened, persuaded, and compromised differences but tolerated no rebellion. It, more or less, selected the team which was to lead the provincial government and directed the provincial legislative party to formally endorse its choice. In 1946, the High Command desired C. Rajagopalachari to lead the Congress ministry in Madras, knowing full well that there were objections to his candidature from the majority of the members of the Congress provincial legislative party. Mahatma Gandhi, fore-stalling objections, wrote:



It is a clique that evidently counts in the official Congress in Madras but the masses are devoted to Rajaji .... I would be less than loyal to the organization if I did not warn them against losing the valuable services which no one can shoulder as Rajaji can at the present moment.<sup>17</sup>

An overwhelming section of the legislative party rejected Rajagopalachari's candidature and instead elected T. Prakasam. The High Command felt slighted. "If democracy chooses to go wrong," wrote Sardar Patel, "it has a right to do so. In this case, it has grievously erred .... This is the first instance in the Congress history where responsible Congressmen have failed to respond to a reasonable appeal from the leaders."<sup>18</sup> Gandhi revived an old controversy over a purse of a few thousand rupees which Prakasam had accepted as a personal gift but which the Mahatma held was a contribution to the party funds.<sup>19</sup> The differences grew with time until a year later Prakasam and his follower found themselves in the political wilderness after being voted out of office by the Madras Congress Legislative Party.

At the dawn of Independence, the mores and modes of behaviour of the Congress were set; all-inclusiveness of the pre-Independent days had become a habit with it, and the monopoly to represent national interests had become a permanent perception of its leaders. Even in 1953, Nehru was saying:

The Congress is the country and the country is the Congress.<sup>20</sup>

3. Leadership properties: the duumvirate

Independence transferred power to an identifiable and legitimized elite. Among the most powerful leaders who ruled India during the reconstruction period, 1947-50, were Nehru and Patel who together constituted the "duumvirate" - the strange alliance of contrasted opinions, tempers and ideologies. Nehru was an idealist, a socialist and a secularist;

Patel was a realist, a strong defender of capitalist and private economy, and an advocate of Hindu supremacy and traditionalism. For Nehru, Soviet-type planning was the answer to India's backwardness; for Patel, a controlled economy was anathema. Temperamentally, Nehru was "generous to a fault, sensitive and aesthetically inclined, impulsive and emotional. Patel was generally dour and ruthless, unimaginative and practical, blunt in speech and action, cool and calculating, never permitting his heart to rule his head."<sup>21</sup> Nehru was the man of the masses and the "voice of the Congress" while Patel was the man of the landlords and orthodox Hindus. Nehru disliked political intrigues; Patel rejoiced in them. Nehru had an obsession with international politics; Patel was "utterly indifferent" to it except in so far as it related to national interests. Nehru was an intellectual thrust in politics; Patel disliked intellectual flipperiness of the intelligentsia and the many things it stood for. During the final stage of the freedom struggle, Nehru was the ideologue and Patel the organiser of the Congress machine.

The dummvirate was "the decisive fact" of India's transitional politics between 1947 until the end of 1950 when Patel died. During these years, both Nehru and Patel worked together to keep the political system afloat in the midst of turbulent waters, their mutual differences notwithstanding. Each supplemented the other without crossing the other's way, and both in unison not only built and operated political institutions but also charted the developmental path for the political system. Under their guidance, Indian politics emerged in 1950 from a period of uncertainty with a pattern that set its course for the decade to come.

Before Patel died, he labored to leave an indelible print on Indian politics. His ruthlessness and "iron will" were effective

in rationalizing, for the first time in Indian history, the political map of India.<sup>22</sup> His authoritarianism and seriousness of purpose was hardly in keeping with decentralized decision-making. Hence, he became the great "centraliser" both in the Congress system and in the political system:

... the idea of separate constitutions being framed for the different constituent units of the Indian Union was a legacy of the Rulers' polity and ... in a people's polity, there was no scope for variegated constitutional patterns.<sup>23</sup>

In the days of the Constituent Assembly debates, Patel would often hold "court" during his sunrise walks to convert the dissidents in the Party. At times, he was called upon in the Assembly to "quell a rebellious House"<sup>24</sup> which he did most successfully. As a party tactician, he reinforced the hierarchical party structure, making the High Command the "alpha" and "omega" of the Congress system and whatever it symbolized.

During these years, Nehru kept a distant but watchful eye on party politics and devoted more of his time to galvanizing the masses, restructuring their identities for national goals, and manufacturing new "utopias" for a fundamental transformation of the economic and social structures of the country. His political vocabulary was distinctly modern: planning, public sector, secularism, respect for the minorities. His message was distinctly clear: national integration and modernization. He was a nationalist in a hurry who, under the influence of the Soviet and Chinese models, had an irresistible compulsion to be offensive to provincialism and regionalism. By 1952, Nehru was saying:

Both India and China have had to contend against provincialism ... [and] generally speaking, the Chinese have tried to get over it by getting rid of the provinces themselves.<sup>25</sup>

And by 1954, after his return from China, he was lamenting:

... in India, we have a Parliament in the Centre with legislatures in the states which guarantee regional autonomy. But in China any decision taken by the central government is the nation's decision and accepted all over the country.<sup>26</sup>

A great "mobilise:" at home, Nehru's major involvement in the initial years of Independence was in world politics. He was the chief architect of India's foreign policy based on "peaceful co-existence" between seemingly opposite ideological systems, nuclear arms control, non-alignment with power blocs, and aid without strings. The policy paid dividends, rich and not quite so rich, until the Sino-India War of 1962 when it failed both the nation and Nehru himself.

System environmental properties:

1. Domestic: (a) Violence

With Independence, an age ended, but in chaos. The decision to partition the country was followed by unprecedented violence, murders and riots - the estimated number of persons killed in 1947 itself was more than half a million. In January 1948, Gandhi's assassination by a Hindu fanatic shook the country and made the duumvirate impatient in dealing with communal frenzy and political anarchy. Nehru began the eulogy:

... I have a sense of utter shame both as an individual and as the head of the Government of India that we should have failed to protect the greatest treasure that we possessed.<sup>27</sup>

Within four days of the death of the Mahatma, the colonial coercive instruments of the system were re-activated. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a communal para-military organization, was banned and some 17,000 of its known leaders arrested.<sup>28</sup> Nehru mourned the tragedy, Patel faced it with tough-minded pragmatism. The communal riots stopped but they

made the impression on the new leaders - particularly at the time when the political structures were being designed and re-constructed - that the only way to manage a cleavaged society was to build an effective center in preference to decentralized accommodation.

As if the communal carnage following partition was not enough, the Communists promptly acquired Telegana (a Telugu-speaking southeast corner of the princely state of Hyderabad, now Andhra) as their territorial base of operations for guerrilla warfare against New Delhi. Between 1947-50, the Communist Party of India, Patel stated in the Parliament, <sup>29</sup> was responsible for 2,500 murders in Hyderabad state alone. Considering that the country was drastically weak, the Communists felt that the time was just ripe for "the immediate displacement of government .... Soviet writings showed fairly clearly an expectation that the country would be fragmented in the process of achieving Independence."<sup>30</sup> The

1950 manifesto of the Communist Party began like this:

Does the Constitution which is the product of the Union between national traitors and imperialist exploiters, guarantee the sovereignty of the nation? No. It does not. <sup>31</sup>

The answer to the challenge from the Central Government was clear; the Preventive Detention Act. It acted like the "hundred-handed gods of Hindu mythology" to wipe out the Communist guerrillas. Some Congress state governments went still further: they banned the Communist Party and ordered mass arrests. Between April and September 1950, the Law Minister of Madras stated <sup>32</sup> that, in the Andhra region, the number of Communists shot dead was 73, those arrested 1,772 and those tried 822.

(b) Political Integration:

If political violence was the problem of transitional politics, political fragmentation was a problem rooted in the system since time immemorial. Sir John Strachey, the historian, had said in 1888: "There

is not and never was an India, no Indian nation, no people of India."<sup>33</sup>  
 And, Sir Winston Churchill had forecast that "India will be subjected,"  
 after Independence, "not only to partition but to fragmentation and to  
 haphazard fragmentation", for she was being passed on to "men of straw,  
 of whom in a few years no trace will remain..."<sup>34</sup>

With Independence, the British paramountcy lapsed over 550-odd  
 princely states. The so-called "men of straw" invited the princes to  
 join the Indian Union. While some states gave a favourable response,  
 a few others rejected the offer. To begin with, six princely states -  
 Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Bhopal, Indore and Kashmir - refused to  
 send their representatives to the Constituent Assembly even after an  
 assurance that their participation would not mean an automatic accession  
 to the Indian Union. Travancore tightened the confrontation with New  
 Delhi by giving itself a new constitution and proclaiming its independence  
 from India. Hyderabad followed suit and declared its intention to  
 exchange diplomatic representatives with Pakistan. Kashmir wanted time  
 to decide whether or not to join the Indian Union but in the meanwhile  
 it declared its intention to stay independent. The Nawab of Bhopal tried  
 to create a 'third force' out of the princely states and was said to be  
 instigating the rulers not to accede to India.

However, by November 25, 1948, the anachronistic princely rule  
 came to an end. The magic wand of Patel and his outstanding factotum,  
 V.P. Menon, brought about the integration of the princely states with  
 the Indian Union for the first time in Indian history. On the whole,  
 it was a silent and bloodless revolution except in the case of Hyderabad.  
 The political map of India was re-drawn with 30 peculiar state-systems -  
 peculiar because the constituent units of the federation were not given

uniform status. On the declining scale of provincial autonomy, there were 10 Part A States consisting mostly of former British provinces; 8 Part B States consisting largely of the integrated princely states; 10 Part C States consisting of former Chief Commissioner's Provinces and certain other territories; and 2 Part D States - the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal - which were under the complete control of the Central Government. The name, area and population of each state as on January 26, 1950 is given in Table 3.1 along with the map of India of the time.

## 2. International: War

With military and civil administration stretched to the limit by the internal demands of law and order, India got involved with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue in the October of 1947. The two countries were at war within three months of their respective births as free nations. The hostilities came to an end with the cease-fire agreement on January 1, 1949. However, since then, Kashmir has been a constant bone of contention between the two countries.

The system-environmental-interaction between 1947 and 1950, as described above, was hardly congenial to the building and sustaining of a liberal democratic order and the fractionalization of power structures which federalism demands. The anxieties of these years were writ large in the "two-way convertible" properties of the emergent political structures which Nehru and his colleagues were to use to build a strong Center. The worst outcome of these early years was the premature death of organized opposition in the system. The ban imposed on the Communist Party of India and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh - probably the only All-India forces of dissonance - was removed in due course of time, but the stigma of illegitimacy attached to them was to stay for a long time to come.

TABLE 3.1

STATES UNDER PART A, B, C AND D AT THE  
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION


Serial number	Name of the state	Area (sq. miles)	Population
<u>PART A</u>			
1	Andhr Pradesh*	63,608	20,801,192
2	Assam	85,012	9,043,707
3	Bihar	70,330	40,225,947
4	Bombay	111,434	35,956,150
5	Madhya Pradesh	130,272	21,247,533
6	Madras	60,263	35,736,489
7	Orissa	60,136	14,645,946
8	Punjab	37,378	12,641,205
9	Uttar Pradesh	113,409	63,215,742
10	West Bengal	30,775	24,810,308
<u>PART B</u>			
1	Hyderabad	82,168	16,655,108
2	Jammu & Kashmir	92,780	4,410,000
3	Madhya Bharat	46,478	7,954,254
4	Mysore	29,489	9,074,972
5	PEPSU**	10,078	3,493,685
6	Rajasthan	130,207	15,290,797
7	Saurashtra	21,451	4,137,359
8	Travancore-Cochin	9,144	9,280,425
<u>PART C</u>			
1	Ajmer	2,417	693,372
2	Bilaspur	453	126,099
3	Bhopal	8,878	836,474
4	Coorg	1,586	229,405
5	Delhi	578	1,744,072
6	Himachel Pradesh	10,451	983,367
7	Kutch	16,742	567,606
8	Manipur	8,628	577,635
9	Tripura	4,032	639,029
10	Vindhya Pradesh	23,603	3,574,690
<u>PART D</u>			
1	The Andaman & Nicobar Islands	3,215	30,971

\*constituted in 1953.

\*\*Patiala and East Punjab States Union.

Source: M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).





Source: M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

The Communists, in particular, were declared "un-Indian" - a stain which they have found hard to wash off.

PART. II: THE DEVELOPMENT PATH OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1950-63

1. Structural-functional properties: the extra-constitutional instrumentalities

The years that followed the making of the Indian Constitution were the years of institutional expansion and the crystallization of the pre-dominant role of the Center in economy, in polity, and in the society as a whole. Taking upon itself most of the responsibilities of modernizing a traditional society, the Center developed a very powerful and effective Planning Commission for planned growth of the economy and for systematic change in social structures. However, despite the fact that a National Development Council was set up consisting of some key Central Ministers and the Chief Ministers of all the provinces for close consultation in the planning process, there was little disagreement that the Planning Commission, under the chairmanship of Nehru, consistently reduced the operational autonomy of the provinces and almost government-<sup>35</sup>alized public life through increasing public-sector investments. In fact, the planning process, over the years, got so centralized that any opposition, whether arising from the provincial elite or the public-sector elite, found very little respectability with the Center. <sup>36</sup> Nehru often streamrollered objections with his occasional outbursts: people's minds were so "engrossed in narrow sectional loyalties" that they had, to quote Nehru, "no concept of India, no concept of the progress of India" and "no concept of what the modern world is". <sup>37</sup> At the meeting of the National Development Council, September 12-13, 1960, Nehru's opening remarks were: individual states' problems should be provided. In the

past, he said, the Council had got "into the habit of hearing a long story of the States' difficulties" and that such succession of stories had often produced a very depressing effect on him. As regards the complaints of the Chief Ministers that the Third Five-Year Plan was too ambitious for the internal resources they could raise, Nehru angrily responded: "Never had there been so much riches being flaunted about in India by certain circles as today. Never so many purchases of these goods from the shops in the cities."<sup>38</sup> The Plan was approved, though somewhat grudgingly.

The three Five-Year Plans that were prepared during this period did not exhibit any lack of consultation between the Central and the state elites. On the contrary, the consultations were so frequent that the states, from the Chief Ministers downwards, had to inhabit New Delhi. That most states preferred to build huge guest houses of their own than to rent rooms in the capital's expensive hotels.<sup>39</sup> However, consultation was neither bargaining nor meant to upset "the concept of a hierarchy of policy"<sup>40</sup> with Center at the top. Each department of the Central Government had become, as Santhanam wrote, a sort of "empire" with corresponding departments at the State level as its satrapies.<sup>41</sup>

Within the over-all framework of planning, many existing institutions expanded their functional operations and a few newly-born ones enhanced the penetrative capabilities of the Center. In 1952 were set up Center-sponsored community development projects which, though managed by the State governments, symbolized the entry of the Center to "introduce the political system to the traditional rural structures". In 1956 were set up Zonal Councils by grouping neighbouring states into

five regional zones with a view to ensuring greater inter-state cooperation and understanding - the Central Home Minister was permanent Chairman of the Councils. In 1959 was introduced panchayati raj (rural local-self government) to implement community development programs primarily on the initiative of the Center and particularly of Nehru: we must have panchayati raj, he said, even if "it leads to hell."

All these extra-constitutional instrumentalities made the Center the fulcrum of the political system. The concept of provincial autonomy was so much over-shadowed that even the provincial employees - from key administrators to school teachers to junior clerks - looked to the Center rather than to their employers for succor.

2. Party system properties: the Congress Party and its coalitional propensities

During the years 1950-63, the Congress emerged as the principal political force in the country by winning a overwhelming majority of seats both at the Center and in the states in all the three General Elections (Table 3.2). However, in terms of inter-party relations, the Congress did not shed off any of its pre-Independence legacies. Its propensities to coalesce with other political parties or to work a coalitional government did not exceed the "bounds of expediency". It "sustained itself," as Hardgrave writes, "by undermining the opposition, taking over their programs, conceding basic issues, and co-opting their leadership."<sup>42</sup> It demonstrated its flexibility by stealing the "storm from the sails" of more doctrinaire communist and socialist parties through its 1955 resolution on the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society, but it stayed rigid enough not to accept the desirability of forming coalitions with these or any other parties except as a means to undercutting their strength. Thus, the political system which the Congress managed during

TABLE 3.2

ELECTORAL TRENDS IN INDIA - PERCENTAGES OF  
VOTES AND SEATS OF THE CONGRESS PARTY IN  
STATE ASSEMBLIES AND THE LOK SABHA

State Assemblies (as of 1967)	1952		1957		1962	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Andhra	31.51	34.33	41.72	61.75	47.25	59.00
Assam	43.91	72.38	52.35	67.62	48.25	75.24
Bihar	41.92	74.13	41.91	66.04	41.35	58.18
Gujarat	55.93	90.38	56.40	74.24	50.84	73.38
Haryana	40.31	83.60	45.85	70.91	40.42	57.41
Kerala	35.75	38.28	37.85	34.13	34.42	50.00
Madhya Pradesh	44.53	76.56	49.83	80.56	38.54	49.31
Madras	38.41	47.83	45.34	73.66	46.14	67.48
Maharashtra	47.14	80.79	45.31	51.52	51.23	81.44
Mysore	51.28	77.10	52.08	72.60	50.22	66.35
Orissa	38.85	47.86	38.26	40.00	43.28	58.57
Punjab	30.73	53.64	48.51	82.56	45.74	56.98
Rajasthan	39.71	53.68	45.13	67.61	39.98	50.00
Uttar Pradesh	47.93	90.70	42.42	66.52	36.33	57.90
W. Bengal	38.42	61.75	46.14	60.32	47.29	62.30
Lok Sabha	44.99	74.44	47.78	75.10	44.72	73.08

Notes: The comparative figures have been worked out keeping the present states in mind, and redistributing earlier election areas accordingly. 1957 returns for Andhra Pradesh include 1955 elections to the former Andhra state, too; 1962 returns for Kerala and Orissa assemblies pertain to 1960 and 1961 mid-term elections respectively.

Source: Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970).

these years, remained near-hegemonic; it absorbed, manipulated, and even accepted opposition so long as it (the opposition) stayed away from the treasury benches.

Within the Congress Party itself, Nehru continued as the "god-father" of the organization since his assumption of the Congress presidency in 1951. During his own three years of tenure as the Congress President (1951-54), Nehru asserted that the Government was responsible to Parliament and the electorate rather than to the party organization. In 1954, he turned over the Congress presidency to a succession of trusted persons - U. N. Dhebar, Indira Gandhi, Sanjiva Reddy, D. Sanjivayya - whose personal loyalty to him precluded any challenge to his authority. During this period, the Congress president was often described as "a glorified office boy of the Congress Central Government headed by the prime minister."<sup>43</sup> Indira, of course, was an exception in the list of these ineffective successors because the affection that Indu (as her father called her) could afford to be the Congress boss.

To establish the supremacy of the parliamentary wing of the Party over its organizational wing, Nehru restructured the Congress Working Committee (High Command), and staffed it with the most trusted Chief Ministers of the states and the key Central Ministers. Those co-opted from the organizational wing of the party were those who were politically inoffensive and generally ineffective. However, during this period, the Working Committee became, as Kochanek writes,

the sounding board by which the Prime Minister could test the acceptability of new policies as well as an important feedback mechanism by which to assess the reactions of party and state leaders.<sup>44</sup>

In its relations with the state party units, the High Command

compromised, reconciled and arbitrated differences but tolerated no revolt. Such differences ~~could~~ take the shape of competition and rivalry between the "ministerial" and the "organizational" wings of the government party; the latter, i.e. the organizational wing, most frequently creating "incumbency" crises. But, in each case, "the central High Command would intervene"<sup>45</sup> and influence the outcome. Generally speaking, the mediation by the High Command would take into account the "prevailing balance of power" in the state but somehow or the other it would ensure that the change-over precisely conformed to its own choice.

### 3. Leadership properties: the charismatic Nehru

After the death of Patel in 1950, Nehru's authority increased tremendously. And, by mid-1950s, he was the sole claimant on public affection - death having removed most of his comrades who had played roles comparable to his own in the freedom movement. As Krishan Bhanu sums up:

None could now challenge Nehru. Among the new crop of leaders many had risen with his help and needed his support to retain their perch. He dominated the party and the government, and leaders at the centre as well as in the states exercised authority in proportion to the measure of confidence Nehru reposed in them. Almost nothing of any consequence was decided without his approval .... Anything in direct conflict with Nehru's view was almost never voiced.<sup>46</sup>

By 1962, when Welles Hagen examined the question: After Nehru, what Nehru had become, according to the author, "the reluctant despot".<sup>47</sup>

He has seen, Hagen wrote, a

kind of benevolent mogul, eschewing compulsion but reserving all important decisions for himself. He has monopolized authority in New Delhi not for its own sake, but because he has always been convinced of his own pre-eminent wisdom.<sup>48</sup>

A more considerate opinion of him was that he was a "king in Parliament" from whom the Parliament learnt how to govern the country;<sup>49</sup>

a "gap-closer" in the Right and the Left wing of the Party;<sup>50</sup> a "lonely" man, frustrated with intra-party conflicts, regional parochialism and economic failures; a thinker "who would not associate others with his thinking".<sup>51</sup>

For Nehru, Congress continued to be the "agent of destiny" - the only party capable of delivering the goods to the country. As the "god-father" of the Party, he always tried to isolate himself from party factionalism and often warned party members not to rely on the increasingly-exhausted party capital accumulated during the freedom movement. More often than not, the Party "called upon him to choose the Chief Minister"<sup>52</sup> of a province and arbitrate in critical state conflicts. However, if at times certain party decisions did not conform to his choice, there were either sufficient number of people around him to read his "troubled mind" and prepare the stage for a showdown or compromise, or he accepted them as a "reluctant democrat". Nehru's technique of domesticating dissent within the Party was a novel one but it conformed to the non-violent, self-abnegating character of the freedom movement. Gandhi resorted to fasts; Nehru to "let me go". Between 1951-63, Nehru threatened to resign from his office on four occasions: in 1951, 1954, 1957, and in 1958. However, on each of these occasions, Nehru refused to tie down his threat of resignation to specific political or partisan issues. Such "waves of shocks" to his followers always reinforced his charisma and increased his indispensability to the Party.

#### System environmental properties:

##### 1. Domestic: (a) Change in the midst of stability.

Between 1950-60, political stability was punctuated with incremental social and economic changes. The indicators of social change such as



education, communication, transportation, etc., showed continued upward trends during this period.<sup>53</sup> The economic change was represented in increased agricultural and industrial production and in the vast expansion of public sector projects. At the same time, mass political mobilization increased in the wake of universal adult franchise and other structural and institutional changes. Further, to reduce disaffection and general unrest in the country, farsighted legislation in relation to land, labor, backward classes, etc., was passed to bring the newly mobilized forces within the framework of Congress consensus.

Most of the changes in the socio-economic field were centrally inspired within the frame of Five-Year Plans. The first plan (1951-55) was a spectacular success; the second (1956-61) was moderately successful; and the third plan (1961-66), as we shall see in the next chapter, was a disappointing failure. So long as Nehru lived, he kept alive the euphoria for planning despite a certain degree of failure in the achievement of projected socio-economic targets.

(b) Political Integration:

The major threat to the political integrity of the country during this period came from the expanding activities of the communists and left organizations. In September of 1954, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (CPI) made known its decision, as by E. N. S. Namboodiripad, that there was

no question of abandoning the struggle against the Congress government or revising the slogan of replacing it by a 'government of democratic unity'. The task of the democratic forces ... [was] to intensify this struggle.<sup>54</sup>

The Congress answer to the communist offensives came during the mid-term polls in Andhra Pradesh in 1955. The communists were, said Nehru, the

"professional maligners of the Indian people."<sup>55</sup> S. K. Patil, the campaign manager, drew posters and issued pamphlets blasting the communists as outright traitors.<sup>56</sup> By March-April 1958, the Communist Party of India, learning the hard way, made a dramatic gesture toward "Indianizing" the creed of the party but this "home-coming" could not mellow the Congress. On the contrary, the Congress attitude toward the communists stiffened in the wake of the Indo-China War of 1962, resulting in their mass arrests under the Preventive Detention Act.

While the communists could be given a bad name because of their linkages with foreign countries, the linguistic fanatics could not, for they had indigenous roots. The work of integrating the princely states had hardly finished when the territorial manifestations of the linguistic zealots appeared on the political scene. It all started with Andhra Pradesh and the death of Potti Sriramula in 1952 and reached its finale in the reorganization of the political map of India along linguistic lines in November of 1956. The reorganization of Bombay and Punjab along linguistic lines was withheld till violence produced sufficient pressure on the federal leaders, leading to the splitting of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960 and of Punjab into Punjab (Punjabi Suba) and Haryana in 1966. In 1961, the Central Government agreed and by 1963 formed a separate state of Nagaland in order to put an end to a gruesome war with the Naga tribal people of the north-east frontier. Thus, by 1963, India consisted of 16 states, as given in Table 3.3 along with the political map of the country.

Though the reorganization of the country did not bring the anticipated degree of turmoil, it did cause lot of anxiety and frustration. Nehru himself was badly jolted by the agitations that followed the reorganization, and C. Rajagopalachari, the first Indian Governor-General

TABLE 3.3

REORGANIZED STATES  
(as of 1963)

Serial number	Name of the state	Area (sq. miles)	Population
1	Andhra Pradesh	105,963	31,260,333
2	Assam Y*	50,043	9,043,707
3	Nagaland Y		
4	Bihar	67,164	38,784,172
5	Maharashtra Y**	190,919	48,265,221
6	Gujarat Y		
7	Jammu & Kashmir	85,861	4,021,615
8	Kerala	15,035	13,549,118
9	Madhya Pradesh	171,201	26,071,637
10	Madras	50,110	29,974,936
11	Mysore	74,326	19,401,193
12	Orissa	60,136	14,645,946
13	Punjab	47,456	16,134,890
14	Rajasthan	132,077	15,970,774
15	Uttar Pradesh	113,409	63,215,742
16	West Bengal	34,945	26,310,992

Centrally administered Territories


1	Delhi	578	1,744,072
2	Himachel Pradesh	10,904	1,109,466
3	Manipur	8,628	577,635
4	Tripura	4,032	639,029
5	Andaman & Nicobar	3,215	30,971
6	Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi Islands	10	21,035

\* Nagaland was created in 1963.

\*\*Prior to 1960, Maharashtra and Gujarat together constituted the state of Bombay.

Goa became a Union Territory after 1961.

Source: M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).



Source: M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965).

of the country, lamented:

The future is in the hands of the gods but as far as I can judge, the centrifugal forces will ultimately prevail, and ... the nation may be compelled to go through a period of political anarchy and face the risk of fascism, which is Nature's way out of disorder and misrule.<sup>57</sup>

The storm passed, leaving the dust behind. The states were reorganized, but the language controversy did not subside. While each state desired to conduct its official business in its own regional language, the controversy spilled over to the fundamental issue of national language.

For a while, it polarized the country between the pro-English South and the pro-Hindi North till better counsels prevailed in favour of a compromise formula.

Throughout this period of linguistic frenzy, the Central Government acted with exceptional understanding. It used its authority, but selectively. It accommodated regional pressures but in the process parochialized the political system; the effect of this was to unfold in the post-Nehru era.

## 2. International: War

While on the domestic front there was general stability in the midst of change, the war of nerves persisted in India's relations with its neighbouring countries. The government had no relief either from the Indo-Pakistan or the Sino-Indian border tensions except in the form of unctuous shaking of hands by the personalities involved. While Nehru tried to promote and develop a non-aligned zone of Afro-Asian nations, his leftist ally, V. K. Krishna Menon, used all the brilliance at his command to offend the Western world, particularly the United States. Though relations with China, after the mid-1950s, were deteriorating increasingly, both Nehru and Menon made tireless efforts to assure the

nation that "border skirmishes" were "minor incidents" in the otherwise cordial Sino-Indian relations. By 1959, the Chinese refused to accept the McMahon Boundary Line, because it was the "product of British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China", and claimed 40,000 square miles of Indian territory. In October of 1962, the Sino-Indian War broke out, resulting in a most humiliating defeat for India. The President of India declared a national emergency, suspending some fundamental rights, and re-activated the Defence of India Rules. In October 1963, the Constitution was amended (Sixteenth Amendment) providing for more restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully and without arms, to form associations or unions, etc.

58

The system-environmental interaction, as described above, increasingly crystallized the predominant role of the Center in the socio-economic and political development of the country. If regionalism and linguism pushed the system toward greater decentralization, the continuity of the predominant position of the Congress Party and its leadership in the political system ensured a sufficient degree of centralization. Rather, the more the inter-regional tensions and conflicts increased, the more the Center emerged as the final arbitrator of disputes. The centralized nature of the planning process, accompanied by the recurrent theme of the political leaders - if regionalism succeeds, planning fails; if planning fails, the nation fails - developed and legitimized the Central authority structures and prevented any serious or meaningful fractionalization of power. Myron Weiner's comment that during Nehru's leadership, there was "little indeed at the state level to command respect"<sup>59</sup> sums up the pivotal role of the Center. Earlier, in 1957, Weiner had described the streamrolling authority of the Center as

a kind of 'unprincipled' authoritarianism, where the ideals of a democratic, pluralistic society operate but where in reality government is centralized, leadership tends to be authoritarian, decisions are made by a relative few, and responsibility ... is weak and remote.<sup>60</sup>

The shaky and unassuring international environment further reinforced the authority of the Center. The general tendency of the federal leaders (and consequently of the Congress High Command) was to condemn opposition within the system in the name of internal and external security of the country. The common federal vocabulary was: opposition is a fissiparous extravagance which the system cannot afford. If the communists were the "professional maligners" of the Indian people", the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) leaders in Madras were "traitors" and "mad", said Nehru. At a public rally in Madras, Nehru burst out:

If the leader of the Kazagham [E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker] and his followers do not like the flag or our Constitution, they are welcome to pack up and go from India to anywhere they want.<sup>61</sup>

Thus, the system continued to be near-hegemonic with low tolerance for opposition, particularly till the end of the Sino-Indian War. The political regime did not repress opposition, except the most subversive; it fragmented the opposition and domesticated it by permitting it to masquerade as factional groupings within the predominant single ruling party. It allowed the claims of the opposition to contest public office but refused to trust them with power at any level of the political system. With Nehru at the helm of affairs, the opposition found hard the struggle for legitimacy, much less for respectability, within the political system.

From the perspective of federal-provincial relations, one can now anticipate how the Center would conduct itself in relation to the dissenting provincial governments, if any. To keep dissent within the permissible orbit of Congress tolerance, we expect that the Center would

see to it that:

- (a) all the non-Congress provincial governments would be swept away once they were involved in crisis;
- (b) all coalitional governments would be ultimately converted into Congress governments, failing which they would have to be brought under presidential rule; and
- (c) all Congress provincial governments would stay in office as long as they were submissive to the Central leadership.

In other words, the attitude of the Central leadership would be crucial to the stability/instability of the Congress provincial governments.

While (a) and (b) above are self-explanatory, (c) needs further elaboration. What is indeed being said is that the Congress provincial governments would always have to be on good terms with the Center in order to survive in crises. If they were not, they would suffer the same fate as the non-Congress governments.

Since the majority of the state governments were Congress in character during the period under analysis, we can expect that their stability in crises would be a function of Central attitudes, which may be, as discussed, in chapter II, neutral, positive or negative.

Normally, the stability of Chief Ministers and their cabinets would depend on their maintaining and sustaining a stable basis of support both in the legislature and in their provincial political party. In the case of the Congress provincial Chief Ministers, the usual support structures have been (a) the Congress Legislative Party; and (b) the Pradesh Congress Committee. Whenever incumbency crises have arisen, they have generally been manifested in the political incumbents losing the support of either (a) or (b) or both above. <sup>62</sup> However, both



(a) and (b) tell us the sources of crises, not the outcome of crises. By projecting these crises against the attitudes of the Central leadership, as in Table 3.4, we may hypothesize the outcome of the crises as the following:

Outcome of crises - some descriptive propositions:

Categories:

- #1,3,5,7: Leadership and cabinets are most likely to stay stable in the midst of crises. Leadership in category # 7 has been included on the assumption that those in the seat of power get ample opportunities to convert opposition into support structures.
- #2,4 : Leadership and cabinets are most likely to be replaced in the midst of crises.
- #6,8 : These categories include leadership and cabinets imposed on the province by the Center in situations of polarized conflicts at the provincial level. In crises, leadership in these categories has a fair chance of continuity, at least for some time.
- #9,11 : Leadership and cabinets in these categories are most likely to be unstable in the midst of crises. Failing all strategies to dispense with them, the Center is most likely to resort to presidential rule.
- #10,12 : Leadership and cabinets are most likely to be swept away by crises.

PART III: PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1950-63

There were six cases of presidential rule between 1947-63. The type of crisis, the nature of government, the duration of each presidential rule, etc., are given in Table 3.5, which follows Table 3.4.

TABLE 3.4

ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD THE CONGRESS PROVINCIAL INCUMBENTS IN CASES

Index: - No support by the dominant faction within the Leg. Party/Pradesh Congress Committee

+ Support by the dominant faction within the Leg. Party/Pradesh Congress Committee

Attitude of the Center	Support structure of the Incumbents						Total
	Leg. Party +	Leg. Party -	Leg. Party +	Leg. Party -	Leg. Party +	Leg. Party -	
NEUTRAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	12
POSITIVE	7	8	9	10	11	12	12
NEGATIVE	13	14	15	16	17	18	12

Numbers indicate categories and have been used to differentiate one category from the other. They have no other relevance.

TABLE 3.5

SUB-SYSTEM CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE  
1950-63

Type of crises	Nature of the incumbent government	Name of the state	Duration of presidential rule
Incumbency Structural	Congress	Punjab	June 16, 1951 - March 10, 1952
	non-Congress	PEPSU	March 5, 1953 - March 8, 1954
Congressization	non-Congress	Kerala	August 1, 1959 - February 22, 1960
	Congress coalition	Andhra	November 15, 1954 - March 28, 1955
	Congress coalition	Kerala	March 23, 1956 - April 5, 1957
	Congress coalition	Orissa	February 25, 1961 - June 23, 1961

INCUMBENCY CRISES:

Presidential Rule in Punjab: June 16, 1951 - March 20, 1952

The state of Punjab, lying on the northwest frontier of the subcontinent, was the first to experience presidential rule since Independence. With the partition of the country in 1947, Punjab was divided into two parts - the Muslim-majority districts of West Punjab became a part of Pakistan, while the non-Muslim majority districts of East Punjab became a part of India. This division of Punjab was followed by mass violence and a heavy cross-migration of the population.

However, with the division of Punjab, the Congress, having been the opposition party in the undivided Punjab, <sup>63</sup> became the governing party. With the merger of the Akali Dal (the Sikh regional party) with the Congress, the Congress had a strength fluctuating between 71 to 79 members in the 79-member State Legislative Assembly. Though there were several groups and factions within the Congress Legislative Party, three major factions may be identified:

- i. the Bhargava faction;
- ii. the Sachar faction; and
- iii. the Akali faction.

While the first two factions had almost an equal number of followers in their respective camps, the Akali faction consisting of about 23 members (though not very cohesive) held the balance. The Bhargava-Sachar rivalry was deep-rooted and had a long history behind it. <sup>64</sup>

Linking this rivalry to the attitude of the Central leadership, Baldev Raj Nayar observes:

It was common knowledge in political circles in the Punjab that Patel had always favoured the Bhargava group, while Nehru and Azad preferred the Satya Pal / Sachar / group. <sup>65</sup>

Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava became the Chief Minister of the state on October 18, 1947 with the main support of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then Deputy Prime Minister in Nehru's cabinet. Instead of sharing power with the Sachar faction (Nehru-supported), Bhargava accommodated the Akali faction by taking two of their representatives - Giani Kartar Singh and Ishar Singh Mujahail - into his cabinet. This multiplied the mutual irritation between the Bhargava and the Sachar factions since each was sworn to undercut the other as much as possible.

Unfortunate for Bhargava, Sardar Patel died in December 1950 and the "duumvirate" at the Center came to an end. While Nehru struggled for his supremacy in the party, which culminated in the resignation of the Congress President, Purushottamdas Tandon, in September 1951, Bhargava found it hard to establish early good relations with Nehru. Within three months of Patel's death, Bhargava lost support of the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) when Partap Singh Kairon, an adversary of Bhargava, was elected its President. On March 30, 1951, the Sachar-Kairon faction charged Bhargava with being "under the dictates of the Akali group",<sup>66</sup> thereby creating communal tension in the state. In a petition signed by 30 members of the Congress Legislative Party (CLP), the faction appealed to the Congress High Command to permit it to pass a vote of no-confidence in Bhargava's leadership. The petitioners charged that Bhargava was

responsible for the communal situation in the State, the unsatisfactory condition of law and order and lowering of the prestige of the Congress.<sup>67</sup>

On receipt of the petition, the Congress High Command asked Bhargava to reorganize his ministry so as to accommodate the Sachar-Kairon faction. As a way out, the High Command instructed him to submit a ten-man panel elected on the basis of proportional representation from

the Congress Legislative Party, out of which six would be selected by the High Command to constitute his ministry. To begin with, Bhargava protested:

... the Board has no right to dump an undemocratic formula on me. ... We will take up a stand against the Parliamentary Board / High Command / and we will not resign so long as we have a majority.<sup>68</sup>

However, later on, Bhargava accepted the formula and submitted a list of ten persons. In May 1951, the High Command announced its list of six persons, which excluded the representative of the Akali faction on whom Bhargava was so heavily dependent for his support. Bhargava refused to accept the list of suggested ministers and, on his visit to New Delhi, impressed on the High Command the need for the inclusion of his supporters, particularly in view of the fact that his group still constituted a majority in the Congress Legislative Party.<sup>69</sup> This infuriated Nehru, who asked Bhargava to resign. Sensing unwillingness on the part of Bhargava to act as directed by Nehru,<sup>70</sup> the General Secretary of the Congress Party in New Delhi, in a telephonic message on June 4, 1951, asked Bhargava to resign and "pass no orders on files as the Chief Minister"<sup>71</sup> of the state. Two days later, Bhargava and his cabinet resigned with a note to the High Command protesting against its decision "to deny the majority group its right to rule."<sup>72</sup> Since Nehru's factotum, Sachar, was in a minority, he obviously could not constitute the government after the resignation of Bhargava. Presidential rule was declared on June 16 on a formal report from the Governor of Punjab to the effect that the machinery of the government had failed to work according to the Constitution. Later, Bhargava publicly complained that "he had become the first victim of the attempt by the high command, after the death of Sardar Patel, to oust such people as were considered to have

been loyal to Patel." <sup>73</sup> In September 1951, Bhargava resigned from the primary membership of the Congress.

After the First General Elections 1952, presidential rule ended with the formation of the ministry headed by Bhim Sen Sachar.

The Parliament approved the presidential rule in mid-August 1951 after heated debates. The Home Minister pleaded that presidential rule, unlike Governor's rule under the Government of India Act 1935, was no exercise in the use of "arbitrary authority" and involved "no cessation of responsibility to democracy." In the present case, the Central Government took the step, he added, because it was "fair and necessary" to check "gross maladministration". He further assured critics that the Center would not have taken this step had the Punjab government been of a different party complexion.

Among the critics in Parliament, Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava said:

We did not fight the great fight for freedom for a government by autocracy and ordinance. <sup>74</sup>

While both Dr. S. P. Mukherjee and Professor N. G. Ranga charged that the imposition of presidential rule in the circumstances was a "bad constitutional precedent", Bhupinder Singh Mann of Punjab was unabashedly critical of the Center "for foisting this shame on Punjab." No state, he said, was free from rivalries and jealousies but, unfortunately, Simla - the capital city of Punjab - was very near Delhi and "high persons" at the Center had intrigued against Bhargava instead of trying to secure a genuine settlement of conflict between Bhargava and Sachar factions. R. Velayudhan of Kerala charged the Center for "usurping dictatorial powers" and expressed fear lest his state too should come under presidential rule.

Outside the Parliament, a prominent Punjab Congress leader,

A. N. Vidyalankar of Punjab, condemned the decision of the Center to "throttle representative democracy" in the state. However, the Times of India editorialized:

It is they [the various factions] themselves who have been primarily responsible for discrediting democracy in the Punjab .... This does not mean that the Congress Parliamentary Board has been altogether blameless in the matter .... The Board allowed opportunistic considerations to sway its judgment far too long.<sup>75</sup>

Spatial comparisons:

Between 1947 and 1963, the state of Punjab had five ministries and eight incumbency crises. Throughout this period, the Congress was the majority party in the state legislature. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced are given in Table 3.6.

A brief description of the crises mentioned in the table follows.

Incumbency crisis # 1:

Immediately after the partition of Punjab in August 1947, Gopi Chand Bhargava became the Chief Minister of the state on directive from Sardar Patel. His adversary, Bhim Sen Sachar, who was the leader of the Congress Legislative Party in the undivided Punjab legislature, became a refugee legislator because he lost his constituency which, after the partition, became part of Pakistan. However, with the decision of the Central Government to re-locate refugee legislators, Bhim Sen Sachar and his group joined the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Shortly thereafter, it was clear that the Bhargava faction was in a minority both in the Congress Legislative Party and in the Pradesh Congress Committee. In order to maintain himself in power, Bhargava - with the tacit consent of Sardar Patel who was otherwise quite uncharitable to the Akalis - attracted the Akali faction within his fold though the alliance did not last long. On



TABLE 3.6  
INCUMBENCY CRISES IN PUNJAB, 1947-63

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Gopi Chand Bhargava	1947-49	1. Incumbency (1949)	Bhargava resigns - unable to get timely help from Patel.
Bhim Sen Sachar	1949-49	2. Incumbency (1949)	High Command (Patel) - negative; Sachar resigns.
Gopi Chand Bhargava	1949-51	3. Incumbency (1950)	High Command (Patel) - positive; Bhargava continues.
		4. Incumbency (1951)	High Command (Nehru) - negative; Bhargava's reluctance to resign brings <u>presidential rule</u> .
Bhim Sen Sachar	1952-56	5. Incumbency (1953)	High Command - positive; Sachar continues.
		6. Incumbency (1956)	High Command - neutral; Sachar resigns to take up Governorship.
Partap Singh Kairon	1956-64	7. Incumbency (1958)	High Command positive; Nehru "exonerates" Kairon; Kairon continues.
		8. Incumbency (1959)	High Command - positive; Kairon continues.

April 6, 1949, the Sachar faction, now in league with the Akali faction, moved a vote of no-confidence in Bhargava's leadership. The move was too sudden for Bhargava to involve Sardar Patel in a rescue operation. Therefore, Bhargava preferred to resign rather than face the no-confidence motion. The same day, Bhim Sen Sachar was elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and appointed Chief Minister of the state.

Incumbency crisis # 2:

Bhim Sen Sachar succeeded Bhargava on April 6, 1949 despite Sardar Patel. Immediately after his assumption of office, Sachar found the sailing rough. Even before he was able to form his cabinet, he received instructions from the Congress High Command (Patel-dominated) to constitute a "composite" cabinet which he did by including Gopi Chand Bhargava as a finance minister. Known for his personal integrity, Chief Minister Sachar soon launched a strong campaign against public corruption for which he received laurels from the press<sup>76</sup> but allegations of "bad intentions" from the Bhargava faction. A charge-sheet (which accused Sachar of bad intentions) was forwarded by the Bhargava faction to the Congress High Command. Acting on this charge-sheet, the High Command ordered Sachar, "while Prime Minister Nehru was out of the country on his trip to the United States, to seek a vote of confidence on extremely short notice, giving him no opportunity to reply to the allegations or to reconstitute his ministry before such a vote."<sup>77</sup> On October 17, 1949 - the deadline fixed for getting the vote of confidence was October 18 - Sachar resigned. In his letter to the High Command, Sachar regretted that his case was not dealt with fairly<sup>78</sup> and that he should have been given an "opportunity of re-organizing his support" which he "had sacrificed at the altar of the High Command."<sup>79</sup> The

Times of India editorialized:

Logically, when the Board [High Command] received a "charge-sheet" against Mr. Sachar signed by 36 out of the 79 members of the East Punjab Assembly, it had to scrutinise the indictment before taking further action. That the Board did not do this seems obvious from the fact that, without waiting for Mr. Sachar's explanation, he was directed to obtain a vote of confidence. Like Jesting Pilate, the Board asked what was Truth, but did not wait for an answer. 80

The Sachar faction was reduced to a minority both in the Congress Legislative Party and in the Pradesh Congress Committee the day the High Command asked Sachar to seek a vote of confidence.

Incumbency crisis # 3:

On October 18, 1949, Gopi Chand Bhargava was back in the saddle once again. Before the beginning of the budget session of the Assembly in March 1950, the Sachar faction, now in league with the Akali faction, pressed their demand for the expansion of the cabinet to include the representatives of the Sikhs and Jats (landlords). Bhargava - once bitten, twice shy - directed all these demands to Sardar Patel, who warned the visiting delegation, consisting of Udham Singh Nagoke (Akali) and Partap Singh Kairon (Congress), who was in control of the Pradesh Congress Committee, of the consequences of de-stabilizing the ministry. After the budget session, Bhargava expanded his cabinet and included the representatives of the Akali faction, to the exclusion of the Sachar-Kairon faction. Though Bhargava could not acquire a hold over the Pradesh Congress Committee, he sustained himself in office on a fluid majority in the legislature by frequently expanding his cabinet. In May 1950, the Times of India commented:

Whether the merry-go-round in which partisans ascend to and descend from office to make room for others queuing up for a ride will continue to be conducted depends on how long the present jaded legislature is going to last. 81

It did not last long, but Bhargava did last while Sardar Patel stayed on the political scene.

Incumbency crisis # 4:

This crisis, as already discussed, brought presidential rule in the state.

Incumbency crisis # 5:

After the General Elections of 1952, the choice of selecting the leader of the Congress Legislative Party was left to Nehru. Despite the fact that Sachar's group was in the minority vis-a-vis the Kairon-Narain group,<sup>82</sup> he nominated Bhim Sen Sachar as the leader of the Legislative Party solely because he wanted a Hindu Chief Minister of the predominantly Sikh state. Bhim Sen Sachar formed a "composite" cabinet including both Partap Singh Kairon and Jagat Narain in his ministry.

In July 1953, about 20 members of the Congress Legislative Party (known as Sehgal-Sri Ram group) revolted against Sachar's leadership. Sri Ram Sharma, the leader of the dissident group, was a member of the Sachar cabinet. The Chief Minister asked Sri Ram Sharma to resign from the cabinet but he refused. Thereupon, the High Command allowed Sachar to submit the resignation of his entire cabinet and reconstitute the cabinet, dropping Sri Ram Sharma and his supporters. Sachar performed this ceremonial function of resigning from and accepting office again within 9 hours on July 22, 1953. On October 14, 1953, the High Command directed the Pradesh Congress Committee to expel five of the supporters of Sri Ram from the Congress Legislative Party.

Though Sachar controlled the Pradesh Congress Committee, through the Kairon-Narain faction, he was, at the time of Sehgal-Sri Ram revolt, in a minority in the Congress Legislative Party. During the crisis, as

Baldev Raj Nayar wrote, "the high command sided with Sachar" despite complaints from Sri Ram that "the Congress high command, with Maulana Azad [Union Minister of Education and a close friend of Nehru] in charge of Punjab affairs, was acting in a partisan manner."<sup>83</sup>

Incumbency crisis # 6:

Bhim Sen Sachar could not contain Partap Singh Kairon's ambition. During the years that Kairon was a minister in Sachar's cabinet, he acquired a firm control not only over his faction in the legislature but also over the Pradesh Congress Committee. At the same time, he developed a very close relationship with Nehru who started addressing him as the "lion of Punjab". In July 1955, Kairon made the best of the opportunity offered to him by the Akali agitation (for the demand of Punjabi subha) and charged Sachar with "communalism". Sachar asked the permission of the Congress High Command to drop Kairon from the cabinet. The High Command was divided. It asked Sachar to resign, which he did on January 15, 1956, and to take up a Governorship outside the state of Punjab. Partap Singh Kairon was then elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and appointed Chief Minister of the state.

Incumbency crisis # 7:

The revolt against Partap Singh Kairon began in the first week of March 1958. The Bhargava-Prabodh-Kartar Singh faction accused Kairon of corruption, despotic rule, communalism and of victimization of political rivals and opponents. A charge-sheet was framed urging the High Command to removed Kairon from the chief ministership. While Nehru advised patience,<sup>84</sup> Pandit G. B. Pant, the Home Minister in the Central Government, reminded the dissidents that it was factionalism of this type which had resulted in the imposition of presidential rule in 1951.<sup>85</sup> U. N. Dhebar,

the Congress President, promised an inquiry into the charges but advised the dissidents not to revolt.<sup>86</sup> By April 23, 1958, Kairon had lost support of the dominant faction in the Pradesh Congress Committee, though not in the Congress Legislative Party.

The High Command conducted the inquiry and exonerated the Chief Minister. The "exonerating note," wrote B. G. Verghese of the Times of India, appeared "to bear the imprint of Nehru's draftmanship."<sup>87</sup> The wording of the note was interesting: The Chief Minister was

constructively responsible for some of the improprieties which Kairon, as a person, may not be aware of.<sup>88</sup>

There was only one adverse aspect of the note; the High Command asked Kairon to seek a vote of confidence from the Congress Legislative Party. Here again, Nehru came to Kairon's rescue. Before the actual vote, Nehru addressed a press conference and in "forthright and forceful language" dismissed any charges of corruption against Kairon personally thereby "whittling down to a nullity whatever adverse remarks the Congress Parliamentary Board had thought fit to make"<sup>89</sup> against him. Kairon survived a vote of confidence, resulting in the resignation of his critics, opponents and a few others in June 1958.

#### Incumbency crisis # 8:

On April 8, 1959, some 122 dissident Congressmen, 4 Members of the Parliament and 18 Members of the Punjab Legislature, led by Giani Zail Singh and Gurmukh Singh Musafir, submitted a charge-sheet against Kairon to the Congress High Command. The charge-sheet originated with the adverse remarks the Punjab High Court had made against Kairon in a notorious murder case. Kairon, on his part, submitted a list of counter-charges against the dissidents to the Congress High Command protecting the dissidents not only as "anti-Kairon" but also "anti-Congress and anti-Nehru".

By September 1959, after the meeting of Musafir with the Congress High Command in New Delhi, it was clearer than ever before that the High Command was not likely to take any action in the matter.<sup>90</sup>

During the entire period of crisis, Kairon lost neither command of the dominant faction in the Pradesh Congress Committee and the Congress Legislative Party nor the protective hand of Nehru. Even after this crisis, demands from minority groups for his dismissal continued to be reported in the press, but Nehru simply ignored them. It was only after the Supreme Court of India indicted Kairon in another case that the Parliament forced Nehru to appoint a Judicial Commission of Inquiry (Das Commission) into charges of corruption against Kairon in November 1963. However, so long as Nehru lived, Kairon always triumphed over his adversaries. Of course, Kairon himself was one of the most capable, though ruthless, Chief Ministers that India produced since Independence.

Table 3.7 summarizes the attitude of the Center toward incumbency crises in Punjab, 1947-63. The outcome of each crisis validates, with very little variation, our descriptive propositions stated earlier. But for the negative attitude of the Center and the reluctance of Gopi Chand Bhargava in June 1951 to resign the chief ministership as directed by Nehru, there would have been no presidential rule in Punjab. As additional support to our findings, we will compare the Punjab crisis of June 1951 with all the incumbency crises in other states of India during the same time period, keeping constant, unlike in the case of spatial comparison, the "system-environmental interaction pattern".

Temporal comparison of Incumbency crises: 1951

In the year 1951, two Chief Ministers<sup>91</sup> - Hiralal Shastri of Rajasthan and T. K. N. Pillai of Travancore-Cochin (Kerala) - resigned their offices. Their tenure of office, the number of crises

TABLE 3.7  
 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY  
 CRISES IN PUNJAB 1947-63

Index: - No support by the dominant faction  
 + Support by the dominant faction

Attitude of Center	Support structure of the Incumbent Chief Ministers	Outcome of crises
	Leg. Party + PCC   Leg. Party - PCC   Leg. Party + PCC   Leg. Party - PCC	
NEUTRAL	Sachar # 6	Sachar resigns; appointed Governor.
POSITIVE	Bhargava # 1	Bhargava resigns; could not get Patel's help.
	Bhargava # 3	Bhargava continues; Patel refuses change.
	Sachar # 5	Sachar continues; Nehru-Azad refuse change.
	Kairon # 7	Kairon continues; Nehru refuses change.
	Kairon # 8	Kairon continues; Nehru drops the issue.
NEGATIVE	Sachar # 2	Sachar resigns; Patel presses change.
	Bhargava # 4	<u>PRESIDENTIAL RULE</u>

# indicate the crisis number as in Table 3.6



each faced and the outcome of crises is shown in Table 3.8.

TABLE 3.8

## INCUMBENCY CRISES IN RAJASTHAN &amp; KERALA

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Hiralal Shastri	1949-51	1. Incumbency (1949)	High Command(Patel) - positive; Shastri continues.
		2. Incumbency (1951)	High Command(Nehru) - negative; Shastri resigns.
T.K.N.Pillai	1948-51	3. Incumbency (1951)	High Command - neutral; Pillai resigns.

The 1949 crisis in relation to Hiralal Shastri (Rajasthan) is being included in the analysis as a prelude to the 1951 crisis. A brief description of the crises mentioned in the above table follows.

Incumbency crisis # 1:

Hiralal Shastri, sworn in office in February 1949, was the first Chief Minister of Rajasthan. He was nominated as the leader of the Executive Committee<sup>92</sup> of the Prantiya Sabha (which later became the Pradesh Congress Committee) by Sardar Patel despite the fact that he was heading a minority faction in the Committee. Jai Narain Vyas, who controlled the dominant faction in the Committee and who "had a reputation for the highest degree of personal integrity and had gained wide respect with the high command, particularly with Jawaharlal Nehru"<sup>93</sup> did not find favour with Sardar Patel and hence was deprived of the chief ministership of the state.

On June 11, 1949, the Prantiya Sabha (interim legislature), under the newly elected leadership of Jai Narain Vyas, passed a unanimous

resolution demanding the resignation of Shastri. Since the Prantiya Sabha was acting like a full legislative body, such a resolution was tantamount to a vote of no-confidence in Shastri's leadership. On receipt of the resolution, Sardar Patel sent the following telegram to Rajasthan:

... Pandit Hiralal Shastri is not responsible to the Prantiya Congress Committee .... He became Prime Minister / Chief Minister / not simply because he was elected ... but he was selected on my own choice. Therefore, he will continue to be Prime Minister until he loses my confidence.<sup>94</sup>

Incumbency crisis # 2:

Shastri continued to be the Chief Minister of Rajasthan as long as Patel lived. Almost a week after Patel's death, Nehru called Shastri to New Delhi and asked him to resign. After receiving these orders, Shastri left for Rajasthan but was untraceable for six days.<sup>95</sup> Since the Indian Constitution was not yet in force, presidential rule could not be declared. However, the action taken by Nehru equalled presidential rule when he dispatched a team of two Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers - C. S. Venkatachar and B. N. Jha - to relieve Shastri of his office and take over the administration of the state. On January 4, 1951, Shastri tendered his resignation and an "official" caretaker government was set up which functioned till April 26, 1951, when Jai Narain Vyas took over as the Chief Minister of the state.

Comparatively speaking, there is little difference between Shastri's removal in Rajasthan and Gopi Chand Bhargava's removal in Punjab, except for the fact that Shastri's dismissal preceded by a few months that of Bhargava under presidential rule in June 1951. Of course, Bhargava was in a slightly better position because, unlike Shastri, he still controlled a "fluid majority" in the legislature. This

difference in the position of the two Chief Ministers also made a difference in the "returns" Nehru received for his action. While in the case of Rajasthan, Nehru was able to nominate Jai Narain Vyas and the latter was able to form the government, in the case of Punjab, Nehru nominated Bhim Sen Sachar, but the latter, being in a minority position, could not form the government.

Incumbency crisis # 3;

Like Punjab and Rajasthan, the Kerala Legislative Assembly was, to a large extent, a Congress Assembly.<sup>96</sup> T. K. N. Pillai succeeded the first Chief Minister of the state, Pattom Thanu Pillai, in September 1948. On February 24, 1951, T. K. N. Pillai lost control of the dominant faction, both in the Pradesh Congress Committee and in the Congress Legislative Party, to C. Kesavan. Pending notice of no-confidence, Pillai resigned in February 1951.

The crisis passed as if unnoticed by the Congress High Command. There is at least one possible explanation for the non-involvement of the High Command: neither T. K. N. Pillai nor his successor Kesavan had any special political relations with the personalities in the Congress High Command.

Table 3.9 summarizes the attitude of the Center toward incumbency crises in Rajasthan and Kerala, and when this table is read in conjunction with Table 3.7, the explanation for presidential rule in the state of Punjab becomes very clear. Both the spatial (Table 3.7) and the temporal (Table 3.9) comparisons show that the stability of the Congress Chief Ministers involved in incumbency crises was a function of the attitude of the Central leadership, and that presidential rule followed when a Chief Minister, heading a dominant faction in the Congress Legislative Party, decided to disobey the Central directives.

TABLE 3.9  
 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY CRISES  
 IN RAJASTHAN, TRAVANCORE-COCHIN(KERALA) AND PUNJAB  
 1951\*

Index as in Table 3.7

Attitude of the Center	Support structure of the Incumbent Chief Ministers	Outcome of crises
	Leg. Party + Leg. Party + Leg. Party -	
	PCC + PCC - PCC -	
NETURAL	Pillai Kerala # 3	Pillai resigns
POSITIVE	Shastri Rajasthan # 1	Shastri continues; Patel refuses change.
NEGATIVE	Shastri Rajasthan # 2	Almost presidential rule; Nehru asks Shastri to quit.
	Bhargava Punjab	Presidential Rule - crisis # 4, Table 3.7

\* The 1949 crisis included as a prelude to 1951 crisis in Rajasthan.

## STRUCTURAL CRISES:

Presidential Rule PEPSU: March 5, 1953 - March 8, 1954

The Patiala and East Punjab States' Union (PEPSU) <sup>97</sup> was formed on July 15, 1948 by amalgamating eight princely states - Patiala, Malerkotla, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Kapurthala, Nalagar and Kalsia. <sup>98</sup> PEPSU, contiguous to the state of Punjab, had an area of 10,099 square miles and a population, predominantly Sikh in religion, of 3,424,060. After the General Elections of 1952, the party position in the Legislative Assembly was the following:

## PEPSU Assembly 1952

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	26
Akali Dal	21
Independents	6
Communist Party of India (CPI)	3
Jan Sangh	2
Kisan Muzdoor Praja Party (KMPP)	2
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>60</b>

Source: G. D. Binani, T. V. Rama Rao, India At A Glance (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1953).

As in the case of other states - Madras, Orissa, Travancore-Cochin - where the Congress could not get an absolute majority in the Elections but succeeded in forming minority governments, the Congress Party tried but was unsuccessful in forming a government in PEPSU. Instead, a United Front of all the opposition parties, i.e., non-Congress, led by the Akali Dal succeeded in forming the government on April 22, 1952.

Structural crisis:

Gian Singh Rarewala (Akali) became the Chief Minister of PEPSU. It was the first and the only non-Congress ministry since Independence. Despite the fact that the Akali Dal was factionalized on the issue of

a Sikh state,<sup>99</sup> it projected a united image of itself both to the public and to New Delhi. For a while, it postponed its demand for a separate Sikh state in order to give the Center no cause for intervention. However, since the Communists, though only three in number, controlled the balance of power in the United Front, the Akali Dal increasingly showed signs of compromising with their demands. The Communists, on their part, tried to make the best use of this opportunity in building and expanding their sphere of influence in certain areas of the state.

For the period of about a year during which the United Front ministry governed PEPSU, the Center kept a close watch over its activities, particularly because (a) the Akali Dal was ideologically committed to the creation of a separate Sikh state; and (b) the Communists, all over India, were inciting people to a violent overthrow of the Congress government.<sup>100</sup> As such, the alliance between the Akali Dal and the Communists in PEPSU was perceived by the central leaders as a threat to the political integrity of the country. The fact that the Communists had set up their own panchayats (local governments) in a number of districts of PEPSU and the law and order situation was far from satisfactory increased the apprehensions of the Center all the more.

The opportunity for a central intervention in PEPSU came when the Election Tribunal set aside the election of nine members of the Legislative Assembly, including that of the Chief Minister, in February 1953. Of the remaining 51 members of the Assembly, the re-aligned strength of the various parties was:<sup>101</sup> United Front, 25; Communists, 3; Independents, 2; and Congress, 21.

Soon after the Election Tribunal announced its verdict, the Center asked the Chief Minister to submit the ~~resignation~~ resignation of his cabinet.

Though the Chief Minister, Gian Singh Rarewala, did not refuse to resign, he rushed to New Delhi to convince the Center that the PEPSU situation did not warrant presidential rule because (a) the United Front still had a majority, since one defector from the Congress party meanwhile had joined the United Front, raising the United Front strength to 26 members in an Assembly of 51; and (b) that the United Front was willing to provide a different person for the office of Chief Ministership. Even the Rajpramukh (Governor) was reported to have argued in favour of continuing the ministry under a new leadership.<sup>102</sup> However, the Center refused to be convinced by any of these arguments. On March 4, 1953, Rarewala resigned and the Center declared presidential rule in the state the next day. Almost one year later, a new Congress ministry was formed after the mid-term polls in the state which returned Congress with a comfortable majority in the Assembly.

The presidential proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Parliament) on March 12, and by the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Parliament) on March 26, 1953.<sup>103</sup> The Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. K. N. Katju, advanced the following reasons in defence of imposing presidential rule in the state:

- i. The party position in the Assembly was extremely fluid. There were frequent floor-crossings - a practice which was "highly immoral".
- ii. The Election Tribunal had invalidated the elections of several members of the Assembly including that of the Chief Minister and many more election petitions were pending before the Tribunal. Thus, it was better to hold fresh elections than to hold several by-elections. In order for the fresh elections to be held in

a "fair and impartial" manner, it had become essential for the Center to take over the administration of the state.

- iii. The law and order machinery had broken down. "In three districts, Communists had formed 70 to 80 panchayats in opposition to established government. These parallel administrations had been collecting rent and revenue, trying cases, including murder cases ... and preventing persons from going to law courts."<sup>104</sup>
- iv. "There was no stable ministry. Nothing was being done there and the Legislature was not even functioning properly."<sup>105</sup>

Leading the opposition in the Lok Sabha, Dr. S. P. Mukherjee (Jan Sangh) blamed the Center for "arbitrary" intervention and reminded the Home Minister that the situation in Madras, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Travancore-Cochin was no different from that of PEPSU except that the former states were being administered by Congress minority governments.<sup>106</sup> Sarangadhar Das of West Cuttack referred to lawlessness in other parts of the country and asked the Home Minister why no necessity had arisen to impose presidential rule in those parts. "For instance," Das said, "in Madhya Pradesh, ... Vindhya Pradesh, ... Uttar Pradesh and in Saurashtra ... all kinds of things are happening for months and yet, the Government of India does not announce the President's rule in those States."<sup>107</sup>

In the Rajya Sabha, P. Sundarayya of the Communist Party charged the Center for pressuring the Rajpramukh (Governor) by directing him to submit a report on the constitutional failure of his government. The Home Ministry, said Sundarayya, had made up charges against the Governor and told him: "Unless you sign for the suspension of the Constitution, we are going to proceed with these charges."<sup>108</sup> J. S. Mann (Akali)



produced statistics in the House to show that the law and order situation during the United Front government was much better than under the previous Congress rule. C. G. K. Reddy told the Minister that "you wanted to create your own dummies in that state ... who could carry the so-called Congress mission."<sup>109</sup>

The presidential rule was extended for another period of six months by the Rajya Sabha on September 14, and by the Lok Sabha on September 16, 1953.<sup>110</sup> The debate in both the Houses followed the old pattern. The Center was charged by the opposition for delaying mid-term polls and imposing a dictatorial regime in the state. Home Minister Katju's reply to the debate was arrogantly blunt: In a state where

we see fathers murdering sons, brothers murdering brothers, sons murdering mothers or fathers, and what not ... the President's rule should be allowed to continue for two or three years so that we can completely solve this problem to everybody's satisfaction.<sup>111</sup>

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar quipped: "It is the most violent kind of rape on the Constitution."<sup>112</sup>

The reaction outside the Parliament to the imposition of the presidential rule was a mixed one. While the Akali Dal led a massive public demonstration in PEPSU against presidential rule, the national press welcomed the Central decision.<sup>113</sup> "The truth is," editorialized the Times of India, "that this extra-ordinary step is merely an attempt to teach him [Rarewala] and PEPSU's other political bosses how to swim"<sup>114</sup> in a democratic system.

#### Spatial and temporal comparisons:

The PEPSU case can be compared neither spatially nor temporally. Spatial comparison is ruled out because there was no case of structural crisis in PEPSU after the presidential rule of 1953. Besides, the PEPSU state itself was merged with Punjab on November 1, 1956. Temporal

comparison is not possible because there was no case of structural crisis in any of the states of the Indian Union at the time the state of PEPSU was in crisis. However, we can compare the PEPSU case with the Kerala case of 1959-60 because both are cases of structural crises.

Presidential Rule in Kerala: August 1, 1957 - February 22, 1960

One of the smaller states of the Indian Union, Kerala lies along a 360-mile coastline at the south-western extremity of the Indian peninsula. The people of Kerala are known for their mild manners, intelligence, personal cleanliness, aesthetic tastes and political awareness. However, in terms of problems, Kerala is a microcosm of India: extreme poverty, a predominantly agricultural economy, chronic deficiency in food, over-population, high unemployment, etc. With a 47 per cent literacy rate - almost double the All-India literacy rate, the problems of Kerala assume a much more political seriousness compared to the rest of the country. The politics of the state is dominated by communalism which is the product of four more or less balanced religious communities competing with each other for political power. These four communities are: the Ezhavas forming 26%, the Christians 24%, the Muslims 18%, and the Nairs 16% of the population of the state.

The results of the 1957 election in Kerala were tremendously significant. For the first time in the history of India and probably in the world, the Communists came to power through the ballot-box. The results of the election are on the next page.

## Kerala Assembly 1957

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	43
Communist Party of India (CPI)	60
Muslim League & Independents	13
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)	9
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)	0
Uncontested	1

TOTAL: 126

Source: D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965).

Immediately after the declaration of results, five Independents who were Communist-sponsored joined the Communist Party to provide it with an absolute majority in the legislature. E. M. S. Namboodripad of the Communist Party formed the ministry on April 5, 1957.

Structural crisis:

Once in power, the Kerala Communists began their assault on national unity, at least symbolically: the ministers discarded the national flag on their cars, released "comrades" from the jails, and instructed police authorities to keep their hands off labour-management disputes. In terms of federal-provincial relations, the Kerala government soon became the champion of "even those Congress state governments which were struggling for more power from the central government."<sup>115</sup> In its excessive display of ideological fanaticism, the Communist government set up party cells for the adjudication of disputes parallel to the normal judicial set up which, it felt, was dispensing "Congress-bourgeoisie justice". Its Educational Reform Bill which provided for greater regulation and control of private schools, both in respect of the recruitment of teachers and the contents of courses to be taught, offended

the powerful Nair Service Society - a Society of the upper-caste politically influential Brahmins - which petitioned the President of India to withhold his assent to the bill.<sup>116</sup> Its agrarian reforms alienated the Christian plantation owners who joined the Nairs in their protest against the government.<sup>117</sup> The Praja Socialist Party and the Muslim League jumped in to whip up the crisis. By September 1957, the Kerala Congress started giving moral support to the agitators. On February 1, 1958, A. K. Damodaran Nair, President of the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee, declared that

the Congress Steering Committee will not oppose understanding with the Praja Socialist Party in view of the special conditions ... to fight totalitarian communism.<sup>118</sup>

Nehru was reluctant to intervene<sup>119</sup> despite appeals from the agitators and the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee and its new allies, the Praja Socialist and the Muslim League. However, in 1959, politics in the Congress High Command and consequently in the Central Government took a new turn: Mrs. Gandhi was elected President of the Congress on February 8, 1959. At her very first press conference, Indira discounted any possibility of cooperating with the Communists in Kerala and declared, "I will make special efforts to win back Kerala for the Congress."<sup>120</sup> On June 12, 1959, R. Shankar of the Kerala Congress called upon Kerala people to observe "Deliverance Day" and started what is now journalistically known as the "Liberation Struggle". Before the struggle started, it was well known that while Indira was impatient and wanted to strike a blow at the Communist government, Nehru was watchful but cool. On June 6, 1959, Nehru made a categorical statement:

So far as I am concerned, I do not propose, nor intend, nor look forward to, nor expect governments falling except through democratic processes.<sup>121</sup>

However, on the same day, Indira put it differently:

I am not saying that the State government has to go, but if the people there feel aggrieved, something should be done about their grievances.<sup>122</sup>

On July 25, 1959, Indira, observing the reluctance of her father to intervene, met the President of India and told newsmen after the meeting:

It is high time for the Central Government to act in Kerala. In fact, Central action is long overdue in view of the hard facts of the situation.<sup>123</sup>

Six days later, on August 1, 1959, the President of India dismissed the Kerala government and imposed presidential rule in the state. By then, the "Liberation Struggle" had completely paralyzed the machinery of the government and Kerala was in near-anarchy. During the struggle, the police had "fired in six places, killed 15 people, and lathi-charged used sticks 248 times, injuring 1,605 persons, and arresting 149,341, including 40,000 women."<sup>124</sup>

The summary of the Kerala Governor's report, which was laid on the Table in the Lok Sabha - this was the first time that the Central Government had bowed to the persistent demand of the opposition in placing a summary report of the Governor before the Parliament - in connection with the approval of presidential rule, charged the Kerala government with releasing prisoners, creating lawlessness and insecurity of life, indoctrinating citizens through educational policies, demoralizing police and other services and weakening the financial standing of the state.<sup>125</sup> But "the crux", the Governor wrote,

of the legal and constitutional question is whether the Kerala government has lost the support of the overwhelming majority of the people and whether the allegations made of maladministration and subversion of democracy are substantially true .... The allegations made against the government are substantially true and I am convinced also that the Government has lost the support of the majority of the people.<sup>126</sup>

The Central Government faced the angry Parliament in August 1959. The

debate in both the Houses was, perhaps, stormier than any previous debate on Central intervention. For the first time, five Union Ministers including the Prime Minister himself had to come to the rescue of the Home Minister to defend Central action.<sup>127</sup> Nehru defended the action of the Center on the ground that the agitation had acquired massive support and that, even if he wanted, he could not "suddenly stop this movement [i.e. Liberation Struggle] at that stage." Moreover, he asked, "how can I condemn a movement which is people's expression?"<sup>128</sup> The Home Minister accused the Kerala government of favouring one class against another in the application of their policies and condemned the remission of sentences to "comrades", among whom there were at least "thirty four persons who had been guilty of very heinous offences of a hideous character ... for murdering policemen ...."<sup>129</sup>

S. A. Dange of the Communist Party of India had this to say:

The police is on the side of the rich, moneyed elements who just ring up the police because the police is on the tap .... The police is pitted against the people .... We defend police policy and we shall make it again.<sup>130</sup>

A. K. Gopalan (Communist) blamed Nehru for not advising disengagement of the Congress from the movement.

The proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha on August 20, and by the Rajya Sabha on August 25, 1959.

Outside the Parliament, the action of the Central Government and of the Congress Party in engineering popular upsurge was adversely commented upon by the press and by some leading statesmen, including some Congressmen. Referring to the alliance of the Kerala Congress with the Socialists, the Muslim Leaguers, and the Nair Service Society, to bring down the Kerala government, the Statesman editorialized: "Opportunist alliances will not help the Congress, but almost certainly have an

adverse reaction when it appeals again to the electorate."<sup>131</sup> Rajaji warned the Kerala Congressmen against laying "an axe at the root of parliamentary democracy", and H. N. Kunzru reminded them and the Central leaders of the "dangerous consequences" of adopting "direct methods" to oust a constitutionally-elected state government. Among the Congressmen, Feroze Gandhi - Mrs. Indira Gandhi's husband and Member of the Parliament - criticised the Central Government for having "blundered throughout", and Mahavir Tyagi warned that the Congress Party was "digging its own grave" by aligning with caste and communal forces.<sup>132</sup> N. V. Gadgil, then Governor of Punjab, publicly expressed the view that the Kerala government had the right to continue in office for its full term of five years, unless it resigned of its own accord or was voted out of office.<sup>133</sup>

#### A comparative analysis: PEPSU and Kerala

There were some marked similarities in the two cases under study: both were cases of structural crises, both involved non-Congress governments which, technically speaking, still held the confidence of their respective legislatures, and both implicated the Communists as trouble-makers. The strategy adopted by the Communists in both cases was the same: establishing party-cells in the countryside and paralyzing the normal functioning of administrative and judicial apparatus of the government. However, while in PEPSU, the Communists, holding the balance of power in the legislature, were the source of trouble for the state government, in Kerala, the Congress, in league with other parties and groups, whipped up the crisis. In PEPSU, presidential rule was declared because the "law and order machinery" had broken down; in Kerala, it was declared because the "government had lost support of the overwhelming majority of the people."

To be sure, the Central intervention in Kerala was the more serious of the two. The PEPSU government was a government with a glud majority in the legislature and represented a marriage of convenience among parties and individuals with few common programs and policies. Further, it was also admitted in many quarters <sup>134</sup> that the PEPSU ministry was corrupt and incapable of maintaining law and order in the state. As such, the Central intervention was generally welcomed by the press. On the other hand, the Kerala government had none of the failings of the PEPSU government; it had a stable majority in the legislature, an ideological commitment to certain programs and policies, and was generally incorrupt in its working. But for the popular upsurge accelerated by the moral support of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the Congress President, there was nothing to suggest that the Kerala government would not have completed its full term of office. Even on August 1, 1959, when the presidential rule was proclaimed, Nehru sent a personal letter of explanation to Kerala with "with regards" for the Chief Minister. But, for Indira, it was a "moment of triumph." <sup>135</sup>



## CONGRESSIZATION CRISES:

Presidential Rule in Andhra Pradesh: November 15, 1954 - March 28, 1955

The state of Andhra, until 1953, was a Telugu-speaking area in multilingual Madras state. In that year after Potti Sriramalu fasted to death, the Telugu-speaking districts of Madras were separated by the Central Government to form the new state of Andhra. On November 1, 1956, Andhra Pradesh was reorganized and its boundaries expanded to include nine Telegana districts of erstwhile Hyderabad state.

The politics of Andhra has been dominated by the two dominant caste groups, the Kammas and the Reddis. At the time of the formation of Andhra Pradesh, they faced each other as "titans" <sup>136</sup> While both the groups are peasant-proprietors, their mutual rivalry is accentuated by their polarized partisan loyalties. Generally speaking, the Kammas - though owning eighty percent of the fertile delta land - are Communists while the Reddis are Congressites. In the struggle for a Telegu-speaking state, the Communist Party spear-headed the demand and consequently acquired many strongholds of support, particularly in the Kamma-dominated delta region of the state.

No fresh elections were held when Andhra Pradesh was formed in 1953. The Central Government decided that all the 140 members elected to the Madras Legislative Assembly in 1952 from the Andhra area were to constitute the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly until the General Elections in 1957. The decision of the Central Government, though novel, was in conformity with the wishes of the various political parties in the Andhra region which were not prepared to face the electorate soon after the General Elections of 1952. The position of the various political parties in the Andhra Assembly, as constituted in 1953, was the

following

Andhra Assembly 1953

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Communist Party of India	41
Congress	40
Praja Socialist Party	26
Krishikar Lok Party	15
Independents & others	18
TOTAL: 140	

Source: Michael Brecher, NEHRU: A Political Biography (London: Oxford, 1959):473.

Congressization crisis:

Unable to form the government itself, the Congress opened negotiations with all other political parties and groups except the Communists. Knowing the ambitions and the popularity of T. Prakasam - he was known as the "lion of Andhra" - of the Praja Socialist Party, the Congress High Command directed N. Sanjiva Reddy to accept second position in the Prakasam cabinet. This decision was taken when the Communists announced their decision to support Prakasam for the Chief Ministership in case of a contest with the Congress candidate, Sanjiva Reddy. However, the High Command imposed one condition on Prakasam before the formation of the ministry: he must become an associate member of the Congress Party. J. B. Kripalani, then President of the Praja Socialist Party at the national level, took strong exception to this "wild" suggestion and accused "Nehru and others for fragmenting opposition parties."<sup>137</sup> On refusal from the Praja Socialist national executive to allow him to join the Congress, Prakasam resigned from the Praja Socialist Party on September 25 and became the Chief Minister of the state on October 1, 1953. It was a coalition government of the PSP, Congress,

and the Krishak Lok Party (KLP).

Within seven weeks of the formation of the ministry, it faced a congressization crisis. On November 23, 1953, cabinet minister Vishwanathan of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) was asked either to quit the cabinet or persuade his followers in the legislature to join the Congress.<sup>138</sup> The threat worked half-way; while 11 PSP members joined the Congress Legislative Party, others refused. The PSP in Andhra was, therefore, split between the pro and anti-Congress factions. Next came the pressure on cabinet minister Thimma Reddy of the KLP. However, in this case the threat did not work: Thimma Reddy, though personally willing to join the Congress, preferred to resign from the ministry when he found his followers extremely reluctant to join the Congress. But the very dialogue between Thimma Reddy and his followers on the issue of joining the Congress created some kind of disunity in the KLP whose members started voting freely in the state legislature. The over-all impact of the congressization crisis was that voting in the legislature became unpredictable: on November 24, 1953, while the KLP's candidate was elected Speaker of the Assembly, the Deputy Speakership was bagged by the Communists, defeating the government-sponsored candidate.

Unsure of its majority in the legislature, the ministry lived a precarious existence. In June 1954, two of its very important bills - one concerning taxation and the other Sri Venkateswara University - were defeated, but the ministry refused to resign. On June 8, 1954, the ministry suffered another defeat on its long-debated<sup>139</sup> Prohibition Bill, which made the Chief Minister refer the issue of the resignation of his ministry to Nehru. Nehru advised Prakasam not to resign because

the Congress would not like to fight elections on the prohibition issue. On November 6, 1954, the government was, once again, defeated on the prohibition issue, and this time it happened because two of the Congress members voted with the opposition. Prakasam submitted the resignation of his ministry to the Governor the same day, recommending dissolution of the Assembly.

Between November 6 and 15, the Governor kept the resignation of the ministry pending and got in touch with the Central Government for guidance in the matter. In the meanwhile, the Communists and the Socialists arrived at some mutual understanding and staked their claim to form an alternative government. In their demand, they were supported by some Independents and some would-be Congress defectors. Watching the Congress fragment, Sanjiva Reddy, the Deputy Chief Minister in the Prakasam cabinet, rushed to New Delhi to persuade the Central Government to impose presidential rule in Andhra. On November 10, 1954, he announced:

It would be in Congress interest to have presidential rule. We don't want to be even caretaker government.<sup>140</sup>

On November 15, 1954, presidential rule was declared in Andhra without the Governor exploring the possibilities of an alternative ministry. With the dissolution of the Assembly, many a "fence-sitter" joined the Congress Party under the influence of Prakasam's "Rejoin Congress" campaign. "I have always thought," said Prakasam in September 1954, "that the Congress was the people and the people were Congress whatever name you give to Committees or otherwise."<sup>141</sup>

The presidential rule was approved by the Lok Sabha on November 19, and by the Rajya Sabha on November 29, 1954. The Home Minister, Dr. K. N. Katju, suggested the following reasons for imposing presidential rule:

- i. The Prakasam ministry was not willing to carry on as a caretaking ministry till the mid-term elections.
- ii. There was no possibility of forming an alternative ministry which could be stable.
- iii. The presidential rule would ensure "free, fair and wholly unfettered"<sup>142</sup> mid-term elections.

The opposition attack was concentrated on two basic points:

- i. Why was Mr. Negi Reddy (CPI), leader of the opposition in the dissolved Assembly, not invited by the Governor to form an alternative ministry, particularly when he had claimed that he could do so? If the Congress could form a coalition, why not the Communists?
- ii. Why was no presidential rule declared when the Prakasam ministry was defeated twice in June 1954?

While Ashoka Mehta (PSP) warned the Central Government against playing, what he called, the "game of piracy" by causing defection in other parties,<sup>143</sup> P. Sundaravya (CPI) condemned the use of presidential rule as a threat against the opposition parties. "In fact," he said, "the government [in Andhra] would not have lasted even the thirteen months, had it not always been threatened: If you vote against us, there will be Governor's rule. We will dissolve the Assembly."<sup>144</sup>

Replying to the opposition charge that an alternative ministry was possible and that the Governor, according to parliamentary conventions, should have invited the leader of the opposition to form the government, the Home Minister said:

I have not troubled the House with any quotations from any constitutional books for the simple reason that in no Constitution do you find a section resembling our Article 356.<sup>145</sup>

Outside the Parliament, while the Communists tried to make electoral capital out of Central intervention by making public statements, the Times of India welcomed the Central decision to hold fresh elections in the state.<sup>146</sup> G. Latchanna of the KLP characterized Central intervention as the "negation of democracy ... a dictatorial act."<sup>147</sup>

Spatial and temporal comparisons:

Since Andhra Pradesh did not have any congressization crisis other than the one discussed above, we are not in a position to make spatial comparisons. However, temporal comparisons are both interesting and illuminating. During the period that the Prakasam ministry was under pressure to congressize itself and liquidate the separate identities of the coalition partners, there were two other state governments on the Indian political scene which were undergoing a similar kind of pressure, i.e., the pressure to congressize themselves. The political style to congressize the coalition partners in the two states - Kerala and Madras - was similar to the one used in Andhra but with different consequences. In Kerala, the congressization process was unsuccessful, leading to the dissolution of the legislature - the Andhra pattern except for the fact that no presidential rule was declared. In Madras, the congressization process was successful, resulting in government stability and Congress hegemony for many years to come. Table 3.10 outlines the tenure of the Chief Ministers of the two states, the type of crises they faced, and the outcome of crises.

TABLE 3.10  
CONGRESSIZATION CRISES IN KERALA & MADRAS

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
A. J. John Kerala	1952-54	1. Congressization (1953)	Legislature dissolved on September 24, 1953.
C. Rajagopalachari Madras	1952-54	2. Congressization (1954)	Government stability; coalition partners merge with the Congress
K. Kamaraj	1954-63		

A summary of the congressization crises in the two states is the following:

Congressization crisis # 1:

The party composition of the Kerala legislature after the 1952 General Elections was the following:

Kerala Assembly 1952

<u>Name of the party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	44
Communist Party of India (CPI)	was banned
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)	11
Travancore Tamil Nad Congress (TTNC)	8
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)	6
Independents & others	39*
TOTAL: 108	

\* 32 among them were supported by the CPI.

Source: D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965): 75

After Jawaharlal Nehru announced, "we will not shirk responsibility", A. J. John of the Congress formed a coalition government with the TTNC and seven other Independents. However, ever since the formation of the ministry, the Chief Minister was consistently pressuring the TTNC - partner

in the coalition - to merge with the Congress. On June 7, 1953, A. J. John issued a "merge or quit" ultimatum to the TTNC and simultaneously hinted at a new coalition with the Praja Socialist Party. The immediate reason for the showdown with the TTNC was, as the Times of India, reported, "the continued refusal of the latter party to merge with the Congress. Another issue [was] the panchayat elections in which both put up rival candidates."<sup>148</sup> Three weeks later, a bitter attack was made against the TTNC minister, Chidambaranatha Nadar.<sup>149</sup> On July 20, 1953, the Congress High Command sent its emissary (Balwantrai Mehta) to Kerala, who granted more time to the TTNC to decide. On September 13, 1953, the TTNC withdrew from the coalition, and ten days later, the ministry was voted out of office on a no confidence motion. On the recommendation of the Chief Minister, the Rajpramukh dissolved the Assembly but asked A. J. John and his cabinet to continue as a caretaker government until fresh elections were held in the state.

The leader of the opposition in the dissolved Assembly, T.V.Thomas, had earlier requested the Rajpramukh not to dissolve the Assembly and to give him a fair chance to form a stable ministry, but his request was not granted. The Communists and the Praja Socialists challenged the constitutionality of maintaining the John ministry in office after it had been defeated and the Assembly dissolved, to which P. Govinda Menon, Finance Minister in the John cabinet, quoted at length from British precedents about the privilege of the Crown to grant dissolution to a defeated ministry. However, when M. Manuran raised the issue in the Parliament, the Home Minister denied having given any advice whatever to the John ministry in respect of whether it should or should not stay in office.<sup>150</sup> He then assured the House that the elections in the state shall be "fair, unfettered and completely free" irrespective of who



did the caretaking.

In this case, the dissolution of the Assembly and the caretaking by the Congress Party made the use of presidential rule redundant.

Congressization crisis # 2:

The party composition of the Madras Legislative Assembly after the 1952 General Election was the following:

Madras Assembly 1952

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	152
CPI	59
Kisan-Mazdoor-Praja Party (KMPP)	35
Socialists	13
Krishikar Lok Party	15
Tamil Nad Toilers	19
Commonweal Party	6
Independents	63
Others	13

TOTAL: 375

Source: V. K. Narasimhan, Kamaraaj - A Study (Bombay:Manaktalas, 1967):40

The results of the election had demoralised the Congress in Madras, not because it was reduced to a minority party in the legislature, but because six of the cabinet ministers including the Chief Minister of the out-going Congress ministry had been defeated at the polls. Soon after the results of the elections, all the opposition parties, on the initiative of the Communists, formed a United Democratic Front (with T. Prakasam as its leader) and claimed the right to form the new ministry. However, Governor Sri Prakasa "discreetly avoided any talks" with the United Front leader though K. Kamaraaj, President of the Pradesh Congress Committee, did not wish to deny the United Front a chance to form the

government: As Narasimhan writes:

If Kamaraj had his way, the United Democratic Front leader may have been invited to form a Ministry. But there were several interests inside the Congress and outside which did not relish the setting up a Communist-dominated Ministry in Madras .... Sri Prakasa, who had become Governor in February 1952, did not wish to have on his hands a non-Congress Ministry, if possibly that could be prevented.<sup>151</sup>

The Congress High Command considered the Madras situation and directed the Madras Congress to take up office. "Only the largest group," declared the High Command, "in the legislature has the right to form the government."<sup>152</sup> However, since there was no leader in the Congress Legislative Party capable of fragmenting the United Front, the High Command requested C. Rajagopalachari (who had been living in retirement after a varied career since 1946 as Central Home Minister, Governor of Bengal and the first Indian Governor-General) to form the new government. C. Rajagopalachari accepted the offer on the condition that he would not be asked to get elected to the Legislative Assembly but rather nominated by the Governor to the upper chamber of the Madras legislature. On March 31, 1952, the Governor nominated Rajagopalachari (Rajaji) to the Madras Legislative Council (upper chamber) and on April 10, his ministry was sworn in office. On April 7, P. Ramamurthi of the Communist Party lost the writ of certiorari in the Madras High Court which questioned the validity of Rajagopalachari's nomination to the upper chamber.

Almost immediately after the ministry was sworn, the United Front began to break up. Besides some Independents, Rajagopalachari asked the leader of the Commonweal Party, Manickavelu Naicker, to join his ministry, which he did. With his immense personal influence buttressed by an unflinching support from the High Command, Rajagopalachari won over many supporters and isolated, even demoralized, the Communists. In the

Legislative Assembly, he burst out: "I am your enemy No. 1 and you are my enemy No. 1. That is my policy towards you from A to Z." <sup>153</sup> With his supporters fragmented, T. Prakasam, leader of the United Front, became defensive and since his major area of political support was in the Andhra region, he started directing his influence to the creation of Andhra Pradesh rather than striking against Rajagopalachari. His inoffensive opposition to the Congress paid him rich dividends when he became the first Chief Minister of Andhra in 1953.

In April 1954, K. Kamaraj succeeded C. Rajagopalachari. With the creation of Andhra Pradesh in 1953, the position of the Congress party in the Legislative Assembly had improved, though it was still not in absolute majority. It was reported to have a fluid strength of 110 - 119 members in the reorganized House of 231 members. In constituting his ministry, K. Kamaraj invited S. Ramaswami Padayachi of the Tamil Nad Toilers' Party and Manichavelu Naicker of the Commonweal Party to join his cabinet. To begin with, they were asked to become associate members of the Congress but later, as in the Andhra case, to merge their parties with the Congress. By May-June 1954, these two parties lost their separate identities and became part of the Congress monolith. <sup>154</sup>

What would have been the alternative scenario, had the Madras minor parties refused to merge with the Congress, can be anybody's guess; but if the Andhra and Kerala cases can be taken as indicative of any trend, the answer to the Madras crisis is not far off to seek. A comparative study of the three cases clearly shows that unsuccessful congressizations lead to the dissolution of Legislative Assemblies. Further, whether such dissolutions are ordered by the declaration or non-declaration of presidential rule depends on the position of the Congress in the state. If the Congress alone (as in Kerala) is going to be the caretaking government,

presidential rule becomes redundant.

Presidential Rule in Kerala: March 23, 1956 - April 5, 1957

After the fall of the Congress-coalition ministry led by A. J. John in September 1953, mid-term election to the Kerala Legislative Assembly was held in February-March, 1954. The pre-election campaign was nothing but a war of nerves between the Congress, which had decided to fight the elections all by itself, and the Leftist United Front consisting of all the leftist parties, including the Praja Socialist Party. During the election campaign, almost all the stalwarts of the Congress Party - Jawaharlal Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari (Madras), Morarji Desai (Bombay), T. T. Krishnamachari (Union Minister) - visited Kerala to condemn the "unholy alliance" among the leftist parties. Krishnamachari was reported to have said that "even if Communists win the elections, we will not allow them to rule in Travancore-Cochin [ Kerala ]." <sup>155</sup> On hearing this statement, A. K. Gopalan of the Communist Party asked in the Parliament: "Why this farce of election at all?" Later, Nehru clarified Krishnamachari's statement and assured the electorate in Kerala that the Central Government would not intervene even if the Communists won the elections. However, Nehru added, "it is a different matter if the Constitution is offended." <sup>156</sup> In December 1953, the Parliament extended the life of the Preventive Detention Act under which large number of Communists were freely arrested and detained the previous year. During the debate on this act, S. Gupta of West Bengal said: "This pernicious Act puts our country to shame before the conscience of civilized society", and the PSP leader Kripalani (one time President of the Indian National Congress) questioned the honesty of the Government. Why does the Government, he asked, "not have a forth-right and honest policy and proscribe the Communist Party?" <sup>157</sup>

The election results surprised none but the Congress. Despite

the fact that it had staked its prestige on the election, it could not secure an absolute majority in the Kerala Legislative Assembly, as the following table shows:

Mid-term poll results in Kerala  
1954

<u>Name of the party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	45
United Front	60
CPI = 23	
RSP = 9	
PSP = 19	
Ind. = 9	
Travancore Tamil Nad Congress (TTNC)	12
TOTAL: 117 (vacant: 1)	

Source: D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965): 75

With a total strength of 45 members in the legislature, the chances of Congress forming the government were bleak, more so with all the non-Congress parties openly committed to non-cooperation with the Congress. The Congress could not, as in the earlier case of Madras (1952), even resort to the "largest party" thesis for it was not the largest group in the legislature. It had some hopes of attracting the Praja Socialists but that too was gone when Pattom Thanu Pillai (PSP) announced immediately after the elections: "We will not support Congress."<sup>158</sup> However, the Congress knew the answer to its problem: instead of one, there had to be two congressization crises to form the government in the state.

Congressization crisis # 1:

On March 16, 1954, Pattom Thanu Pillai of the Praja Socialist Party withdrew from the United Front and formed the government with Congress support without the latter joining as a partner in the government.

Pillai accepted the arrangement probably under threat of Central intervention. "We formed the government to avoid presidential rule",<sup>159</sup> said Pillai at the time of forming his ministry.

Soon after, the Congress started a denigration campaign against the minority government of Pillai. It would criticise and even demoralise the government in the legislature but would vote with the government. In the budget session (1954), Pillai, fed up with Congress manoeuvres, retorted:

My colleague and I will be only too glad to go home  
if the Congress wants to withdraw its support.<sup>160</sup>

By September 1954, the Leftist United Front, having waited long enough for the return of the Praja Socialists to their fold, resorted to offensives against the government. Having thus isolated Pillai and his followers from the Front, the Congress won over the TTNC whose supporters were subjected to police firing by the government on an issue - the merger of four Tamil-speaking areas with the state of Madras - which was decided by the government with the active support of the Congress.<sup>161</sup>

When the Pillai government arrested 400 TTNC agitators in Kerala, Nehru ordered Pillai to set up an inquiry commission - a demand which was being made by the TTNC - to investigate and report on police firing and arrests. Nehru's intervention allured the TTNC to the Congress and the two together decided to form the government. In the third week of December 1954, the Congress High Command gave permission to P. Govinda Menon, leader of the Congress Legislative Party in Kerala, to topple the Pillai ministry. In its resolution of December 17, the High Command permitted the overthrow of the government subject to the proviso that

no step which might necessitate the imposition of President's rule in the state should be taken without careful consideration.<sup>162</sup>

Having faced an angry opposition in the Parliament on the presidential rule in Andhra (which was debated in November 1954), the Center seemed reluctant to get unnecessarily involved in the present Kerala case.

On February 8, 1955, the Pillai ministry was voted out of office.

On the same day, Pattom Thanu Pillai regretfully said:

I never realised at first that the Congress offer of support of the Praja Socialist Party was just to gain time to get Tamil Nad support for them. After all, I thought they had some honesty left in them as human beings.<sup>163</sup>

Though Pillai recommended dissolution of the Assembly, the Rajpramukh declined to accept the recommendation. Pillai questioned the honesty of the Rajpramukh and reminded him of his earlier decision to dissolve the Assembly on the recommendation of the defeated Congress Chief Minister, A. J. John (1953). The only difference, Pillai said, was that he was a non-Congress Chief Minister.

#### Congressization crisis # 2:

The Rajpramukh invited the Congress-TTNC coalition to form the government on February 14, 1955. At the time, the coalition had 60 supporters (Congress = 46; TTNC = 12; and defectors from the PSP = 2) in the Kerala legislature of 118 members. P. Govinda Menon of the Congress became the Chief Minister of the state.

Immediately after forming the ministry, the Congress decided to bargain for the TTNC merger with the Congress. The Central Government gratified the political demand of the TTNC by merging four Tamil-speaking areas with the state of Madras and in return, the TTNC merged with the Congress. When it was done, the Menon ministry became an all Congress ministry - an achievement hard to anticipate at the time of the election results.

However, soon thereafter, the congressization had its effect,

as in Andhra (1954), on the Kerala Congress itself: six members of the Congress Legislative Party protested against the TTNC merger and resigned from the Party. At this juncture, Menon sought the support of the PSP, but Pattom Thanu Pillai, once bitten, refused to cooperate with the Congress. On March 11, 1956, P. Govinda Menon submitted the resignation of his ministry. On the same day, Pattom Thanu Pillai met the Rajpramukh and informed him of his willingness to form an alternative government with the support of 60 members of the legislature. Between March 11 and March 23, the Rajpramukh vacillated: - a style similar to the one followed in Kerala (1953) and Andhra (1954) - and did not move even after Thanu Pillai submitted a list of 61 supporters duly signed by the members. On March 23, 1956, the Central Government took over the administration of the state and imposed presidential rule. Unlike the successful congressi- zation in Madras, the Kerala crisis followed the Andhra (1954) and Kerala (1953) pattern.

The presidential rule was debated in the Lok Sabha on March 29, and in the Rajya Sabha on April 23 and 24, 1956. In the Lok Sabha, the Union Home Minister found it hard to build any solid defense for the Central intervention. A. K. Gopalan (CPI) questioned the Home Minister and asked him if he could declare that Pattom Thanu Pillai was in a minority.

I want the Home Minister to say whether the Rajpramukh today can deny that he had not seen the signatures of 61 people. <sup>164</sup>

To this, the Home Minister replied that even though Thanu Pillai had a strength of 60 members, we should not forget that

there is a difference between a solid party of 56 / referring to the Congress strength in the Assembly / and a hotch-potch gang consisting of 5 to 10 parties with 3 or 8 or 10 from each. <sup>165</sup>

When some of the members referred to the parliamentary practice of inviting



the leader of the opposition to form an alternative government and quoted at length the precedents established in the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, etc., the Home Minister closed the discussion with a note which had an abhorrent logic. Other countries of the world, he said,

had not the foresight to have a provision of this character whereby the President can come to the aid of embarrassed states ... so that they may get the healing balm and healthy medicine and thereby regain their lost vigour.<sup>166</sup>

In the Rajya Sabha, B. N. Datar, Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs, admitted that Pattom Thanu Pillai had the support of "59 or possible 62 members" in the Assembly but the Praja Socialist Party could not be relied upon to give a stable ministry to Kerala. Besides, he said, Thanu Pillai was more of an office-monger than a reliable statesman: "Knowing as we do what Thanu Pillai did once, he naturally was not a man to decline to form a Ministry however adverse the circumstances might be."<sup>167</sup> The minister admitted that an alternative coalition ministry was possible, but it would have been undesirable to form one in view of the fact that there were "at least three parties whose ideologies were entirely different and whose way of approach of the various political problems was not one and the same."<sup>168</sup>

The life of the presidential term was extended for another period of six months by the Parliament in August-September, 1956, so that the elections in Kerala would synchronize with the General Elections scheduled to be held in early 1957. The debate on the extension of the presidential rule was, on the whole, dull and insipid. In the Lok Sabha, some members, particularly those who had their parliamentary constituencies in Kerala, wanted the Assembly to be recalled (which the minister said was constitutionally impossible even "if we wished to do so"). The Rajya Sabha was preoccupied with a debate on the allocation of more funds

to Kerala during the period that the presidential rule was to stay in force.<sup>169</sup>

Spatial comparisons:

Between 1952 and 1963, Kerala was one state in the Indian Union where the Congress Party could not establish its hegemony. The state had two presidential rules (1956, 1959) and two mid-term elections (1954, 1960) besides two General Elections (1952, 1957). The Kerala Legislative Assembly was dissolved thrice before completing its constitutional term of 5 years. It was dissolved twice under presidential rule (1956, 1959) and once without the declaration of presidential rule (1954). Table 3.11 outlines the names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the type of crisis each faced and the outcome of crises between 1948 and 1963.

Congressization crises # 1-3:

In this part of the chapter, we are only concerned with the four congressization crises (see Table 3.11), the first three of which have been already discussed in the preceding pages. To re-capture the crisis episodes briefly, the Kerala Assembly was dissolved in 1953 when A. J. John (Congress) failed to congressize the Travancore Tanil Nad Congress (TTNC) which was a coalition partner with the Congress. Pattom Thanu Pillai (PSP) was supported by the Congress in order to isolate the PSP from the Leftist United Front. However, once the Congress was able to form a coalition government with the TTNC, Pattom Thanu Pillai had no choice but to resign. P. Govinda Menon was successful in congressizing the TTNC - the coalition partner of the Congress - but failed to control the effects of congressization on his own party. When six members of the Congress Legislative Party resigned from the party, the Center imposed presidential rule and dissolved the Kerala legislature.

TABLE 3.11  
CRISES IN KERALA  
1948-63

Chief Minister (Tenure)	Type of crises (year)	Outcome of crises
T. K. N. Pillai (1948-51)	1. Incumbency (1951)	High Command - neutral; Pillai resigns (Table 3.9)
A. John (1952-54)	1. Congressization (1953)	Unsuccessful - Assembly dissolved without presidential rule.
Pattom Thanu Pillai (1954-55)	2. Congressization (1955)	Successful - Pillai (PSP) resigns.
P. Govinda Menon (1955-56)	3. Congressization (1956)	Unsuccessful - <u>presidential rule</u> .
F. M. S. Namboodripad (1957-59)	1. Structural (1959)	Government dismissed - <u>presidential rule</u> .
Pattom Thanu Pillai (1960-62)	4. Congressization (1962)	Successful - Pillai (PSP) quits Kerala politics to take up the Punjab Governorship.
R. Sankar (1962-64)		

After the General Elections of 1957, the Communists led by E. M. S. Namboodripad formed the government. Within two years, the Communists were faced with a structural crisis. The mass movement started by various political parties (including the Congress) and groups culminated, once again, in the imposition of presidential rule leading to the dismissal of the Communist government.

Thus, up to 1957, one finds a definite pattern in the attitude of the Congress leaders: destroy any ministerial structure which is not Congress. The former President of the Indian National Congress, U. N. Dhebar, made the following statement in one of his frustrating moments in March 1958:

There [in Kerala], every third year, the Congressmen pulled down the ministerial structure and set up a new one to be pulled down again after the lapse of couple of years. I have not yet found a single leader in Kerala who has not been responsible for pulling down on one occasion or the other the ministerial structure and all the advantages of this negative destructive attitude went to the Communists.<sup>170</sup>

The Communists came and went but the attitude of mind persisted. In the mid-term elections to the Kerala Legislative Assembly in January 1960, Kerala witnessed a complete polarization of politics: while all the leftist forces united with the Communists in electoral alliances, all the non-Communist forces joined hands with the Congress to form a United Congress Front. With wasteful triangular fights eliminated, the Congress came out on top at the elections without, however, scoring an absolute majority in the legislature. The Party position in the legislature was as shown in the following table:

## Kerala Assembly 1960

<u>Name of the party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
United Congress Front	104
Congress =63	
Praja Socialist Party =20	
Muslim League =11	
United Leftist Front	30
CPI =26	
Independents =3	
Revolutionary Socialists =1	
Unattached Independents	2
Nominated	1
TOTAL: 127	

Source: D. R. Mankekar: The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965): 84

Congressization crisis # 4:

Since the Congress could not get an absolute majority in the Assembly on            wn, a Congress-PSP coalition was formed with Thanu Pillai (PSP) as the Chief Minister of the state. The Muslim League, which had an electoral alliance with the Congress, was kept out of the coalition on pressure from the Congress secularists who felt that the Muslim League was too communal to be associated with the secular Congress.<sup>171</sup> However, in order to appease the Muslim League, it was allotted the Speakership of the Assembly.

Within fifteen months of the installation of the Pillai ministry, the congressization process started. In May 1961, the Muslim League Speaker of the Assembly died. Thereupon, the Congress refused another Muslim League Speaker unless the Muslim League was willing to convert itself into a non-political local organization and sever its relations with its parent body, the All India Muslim League. The Muslim League found the price too high and withdrew its support of the coalition.

The second step in the congressization process was old in the armoury of the Congress: "Merge or Quit". The Chief Minister, Pattom Thanu Pillai, faced with a "merge or quit" ultimatum from the Congress, offered to merge his organization (the local PSP) with the Congress provided he was not displaced as the Chief Minister of the state. In the meanwhile, the Central emissary, Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, visited Kerala and through the good offices of Governor V. V. Giri<sup>172</sup> (later, President of India) offered the Governorship of Punjab in lieu of the Chief Ministership to Pattom Thanu Pillai, which the latter accepted in September 1962. With Pillai's exit, the Kerala ministry became completely Congress in composition, with R. Sankar as the Chief Minister of the state,

Thus, in all the four cases of congressization crises in Kerala, the Congress followed a patent strategy: "Merge or Quit". However, the strategy did not quite succeed except in the last case, when Pattom Thanu Pillai left the Kerala stage for good. The fact that the alternative to an unsuccessful congressization was the dissolution of the Assembly - whether under presidential rule or otherwise - increased the confidence of the Kerala Congressmen to fragment and even demoralize the opposition parties. P. Govinda Menon (Congress) could succeed Pattom Thanu Pillai (PSP) as the Chief Minister of the state but the Rajpramukh would not let it happen the other way round.

#### Temporal comparisons:

It is not possible to make temporal comparisons because there was no other state in the Indian Union facing a congressization crisis at the time the Menon ministry in Kerala (1955-56), having failed to resolve the congressization crisis, brought the state under presidential rule on March 23, 1956.

Presidential Rule in Orissa: February 25, 1961 - June 23, 1961

The coastal state of Orissa in the Eastern part of India came into existence with the merger of 26 princely states in the old British province of Orissa in 1948. From 1947 to 1957, the Congress Party provided the government of the state even though it failed to secure an absolute majority in the Orissa Legislative Assembly in the 1952 elections. With 67 seats out of a total of 140 seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1952, the Congress attracted a few Independents within its fold and gave Orissa a more or less stable ministry. However, the General Elections in 1957 dealt a severe blow to the Congress and demonstrated a resurgence of the feudal elements (united together in the Ganatantra Parishad) in the politics of the state. The party position in the Orissa Assembly after the 1957 election was the following:

Orissa Assembly 1957

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
Congress	56
Ganatantra Parishad	51
Praja Socialists	11
Communist Party	9
Jharkand Party	5
Independents and others	8

TOTAL: 140

Source: F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

Congressization crisis # 1:

The Governor invited Harekrushna Mahatab of the Congress to form the government on the ground that the Congress was the "largest" single group in the Orissa Assembly. Mahatab formed a coalition government with the Jharkand Party, six Independents and one defector from the Ganatantra,

Parishad on April 1, 1957. Soon after the ministry took office, 2 more Independents, 7 Ganatantra Parishad and 1 Communist member joined the Congress on call from Mahatab, who said:

A member is not attorney of his constituency. He is to represent all the people of Orissa and he is free to act as his conscience dictates in the best interests of the state.<sup>173</sup>

Whether the defectors joined the Congress Legislative Party "dictated to by their conscience", attracted by the lure of office or under duress is a questionable issue for which no recorded evidence can be produced. However, the working of the Mahatab ministry, with arrest and detention for those who decided to withdraw support from the ministry, and subsequent statements made by the opposition leaders in the Indian Parliament, do give some indication of the fact that some of the legislators were being kept "under surveillance" by the Mahatab-loyalists.<sup>174</sup> On April 26, 1958, Anup Singh Deo, Deputy Minister in the Mahatab cabinet, decided, along with four of his supporters, to re-join the Ganatantra Parishad. Mahatab acted quickly. On April 27, the Deputy Minister, along with his supporters, was arrested. The next day, the entire opposition in the legislature walked out in protest against the Speaker's ruling disallowing a spate of adjournment motions to discuss the situation in the state. In New Delhi, the Orissa situation was discussed in both the Houses of the Parliament on April 28, 1958. The Ganatantra Parishad Member of the Parliament asked the federal government to act as "public opinion was being bludgeoned" and the "Constitution raped."<sup>175</sup> S. N. Diwedy of the Praja Socialist Party asked the Central Government to stop "political banditry" in Orissa and release the arrested legislators, while Professor Hiren Mukherjee of the Communist Party said: "Judicial processes are being prostituted for political purposes".<sup>176</sup> On April 29, the Deputy



Minister and his supporters were released in Orissa and, surprisingly, re-joined the Mahatab team. However, the roaring criticism both inside and outside of the Parliament had its effect on the Central leaders too: the Congress High Command asked Mahatab to resign.<sup>177</sup> On May 9, 1958, Mahatab resigned with the statement: "I am ready to go if that helps the Congress and Orissa."

From May 9 to May 24, the Governor (Y. N. Sukthankar, retired cabinet secretary to the Central Government) refused to make any statement as to whether he had or had not accepted the resignation of the Mahatab ministry. Despite the request of the opposition leaders in the Orissa Assembly to the President of India that they be allowed to form an alternative government, the Governor re-invited Harekrushna Mahatab to form the government on May 24, 1958, on the ground that he still "commanded a majority in the House" and that the opposition "could not form a stable government."<sup>178</sup> The Governor further made it clear that the alternative to the Mahatab ministry was the imposition of presidential rule, which he did not favour "except as a last resort."

It is rather difficult to explain the return of Mahatab to the Orissa Chief Ministership after he had been asked by the Congress High Command to resign. Did Nehru intervene to change the decision of the High Command? It may well be the case because both Harekrushna Mahatab and Partap Singh Kairon (Punjab) were facing extreme difficulties in their respective states but both were in Nehru's good books. We also know that Nehru threatened to resign his office on April 30, 1958, a threat followed by his outburst on factionalism and communalism in the Congress organization at the All Indian Congress Committee meeting held in Agra in May 1958. The explanation, however, is inferential and cannot be regarded as conclusive.

Mahatab re-formed his ministry by putting his old team together and by attracting more defectors from other parties through the offer of ministerial plums. In this process of congressization, Mahatab lost the control of his own party and a few of the Congressmen resigned from the Congress Legislative Party. From December 1958 to May 1959, the Mahatab ministry stayed in office by the skillful manipulation of parliamentary procedures. Whenever it faced a challenge in the Assembly, it got the Assembly adjourned sine die.<sup>179</sup>

Congressization crisis # 2:

To ensure a certain degree of stability in Orissa, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, then President of the Congress, asked Mahatab to explore the possibilities of entering into an alliance with the Ganatantra Parishad.<sup>180</sup> On May 22, 1959, Mahatab reconstituted his ministry as head of the Congress-Ganatantra coalition government.

Soon after the formation of the ministry, the Congress adopted its patent strategy: "Merge or Quit". There was pressure all around Mahatab to congressize the Ganatantra Parishad, though Mahatab himself was reluctant to move too fast in the matter, particularly when he had no alternative to look to, once the Ganatantra decided to withdraw from the coalition. Biju Patnaik, the Pradesh Congress President, whom Michael Brecher described as "young, handsome, wealthy, ruthless, efficient, ambitious and influential in the Inner Nehru circle",<sup>181</sup> almost gave an ultimatum to Mahatab. Patnaik asked Mahatab to initiate "an exciting industrial programme" in areas where the Congress was weak and allocate its administration to those who were willing to join the Congress or were Congressmen. He further added:

If, however, you have neither the will nor the courage for it, I must proceed in my own way ceaselessly and fearlessly to achieve the party's objective. The choice is yours. There is no midway.<sup>182</sup>

Finding Mahatab reluctant, the Orissa Pradesh Congress passed the following resolution on November 20, 1960:

... the coalition should be dissolved ... at least 8 to 10 months before the general election / and that the Chief Minister be requested / to approach the Governor for President's Rule for the period between the dissolution of the Ministry and formation of the new Ministry after the general election.<sup>183</sup>

In January 1961, the Ganatantra Parishad decided against a merger with the Congress. Thereupon, the Congress withdrew from the coalition resulting in the imposition of presidential rule in Orissa on February 25, 1961. After leading the Congress to a comfortable victory in the elections of June 1961, Biju Patnaik became the Chief Minister of the state.

Harekrushna Mahatab, frustrated with the Congress High Command and the Pradesh Congress Committee, exposed the doings and misdoings of his party in an article published in an English daily, Amrit Bazar Patrika. He wrote that the "method followed by the party was demoralising the entire body politic of the state." The Congress, he said, broke every pledge given to other political parties and was disrespectful "to the electorate" of Orissa.<sup>184</sup>

The Lok Sabha approved the presidential proclamation on March 9, and the Rajya Sabha on March 15, 1961.

In the Lok Sabha, Ashoka Mehta (PSP) pointed out that "no where has any such theory been enunciated that a coalition government must be broken upto 8 or 9 months ahead"<sup>185</sup> of elections. H. N. Mukherjee (CPI) said: "It shows a complete lack of constitutional scruples and ... moral regard for the rights of the people."<sup>186</sup> While S. Diwedy (Praja Socialist) characterized the Central action as "constitutionally untenable and politically dishonest",<sup>187</sup> P. K. Deo and Professor Ranga asked as to why the opposition was not given a chance to form an alternative government,

when Mahatab had lost his majority in the House in May 1959. The only reason which the Home Minister could give for the proclamation was that

when there [was] a feeling in the Congress Party that they should fight their independent elections ... they decided that they should end this coalition.<sup>188</sup>

In the Rajya Sabha, H. N. Kunzru felt that the "Constitution has been brought into contempt" while B. Gupta condemned "unholy alliances" on the part of the Congress.<sup>189</sup>

Spatial comparisons:

Except for the two congressizations mentioned in the preceding pages, there have been no others of this nature in Orissa during the period under analysis. In both the cases, the anxiety of the Congress to monopolize power and to hegemonize the system even at the cost of constitutional proprieties is much in evidence. Had the Congress won an absolute majority in the Orissa legislature to begin with or had it been able to congressize successfully after the elections of 1957, the state of Orissa, probably, would not have experienced presidential rule, as in the case of Madras (1954) and Kerala (1962). Crisis # 1 tends to show that the alternative to a Congress minority government is either a Congress majority government or presidential rule, but not an alternative opposition government. Crisis # 2 tends to show that the imposition of presidential rule is well-planned and well-timed in anticipation of the failure at congressization. Further, it also shows that the duration of presidential rule (it was the shortest in Orissa compared to the duration of earlier presidential rules) can be long or short depending on how the Congress perceives its chances of victory at the polls at a particular period of time. Although the General Elections were due to be held in February-March, 1962, it felt

no desire, unlike in the case of Kerala (1956), to synchronize the Orissa elections with the General Elections. The Congress High Command accepted Biju Patnaik's electoral calculations that an election held at the earliest would benefit the Congress in Orissa, and it actually did.

Temporal comparisons:

During the period in which the government in Orissa was struggling to resolve congressization crises, the only state in the Indian Union undergoing a similar crisis was the state of Kerala (see congressization crisis, 1962, involving Pattom Thanu Pillai, Table 3.11). However, while in the case of Kerala, congressization was successful - by first eliminating the Muslim League and then the Praja Socialist Party by negotiating a deal for its leader, Pattom Thanu Pillai, who left Kerala politics to become the Governor of Punjab - in Orissa congressization failed and brought presidential rule in its turn. It may be that Pattom Thanu Pillai learnt from the experience of the Orissa case - the later happened a year earlier (1961) than the Kerala case - and preferred to burn a little candle (by accepting a Governorship) than to curse the darkness. The strategy adopted by the Congress in both the cases was the same: "Merge or Quit". What would have been the alternative scenario in Kerala had Pattom Thanu Pillai hung on in Kerala politics, need hardly puzzle anyone, for all the congressization crises discussed in the preceding pages suggest a single answer and an undeviating pattern.

Summary:

To sum up, all crises - Incumbency or Structural or Congressization - and the way they were resolved tend to suggest at least one thing: the system was hegemonic with low tolerance for dissent and organized opposition. In the case of incumbency crises, presidential rule followed

when the Chief Minister exhibited some reluctance to step down from office on instructions from the Center (Punjab 1951). In the case of structural crises, presidential rule turned out to be the only Central choice even if it meant dismissing a government enjoying the confidence of the Assembly (PEPSU 1953; Kerala 1959). In the case of congressi- zation crises, presidential rule came where congressization failed (Andhra 1954; Kerala 1956; Orissa 1961), with the sole exception of Kerala (1953) where the imposition of presidential rule, as discussed, would have been redundant. Despite the fact that the success rate of congressization was not very high (out of a total eight cases - Kerala:4; Madras: 1; Orissa:2; Andhra:1 - discussed, only four were cases of successful congressization, Table 3.12) the Congress pursued it with some kind of a fanatic vigor. Perhaps, for the Party, the pursuit itself was self-rewarding because, if nothing else, it did help to fragment the opposition. The Party's starting wicket was always the "largest party" thesis and it always ended the game with all the scores on its side. This happened because the umpire (the Central Government) probably did not count the fall of wickets properly. The Orissa cases, more than any other case, show clearly that the game had no generally accepted rules to follow.

#### PART IV: CRISES WHICH DID NOT CULMINATE IN PRESIDENTIAL RULE: 1947-63

While Part III of this chapter explained where presidential rule was declared and by comparisons illustrated where it was not declared, it did not give us an all-India picture either of the crises or the way they were resolved in the different states of the Indian Union. This is so because our temporal comparisons were, more or less, time-bound - comparing crises of the same year the presidential rule was declared in

TABLE 112  
CONGRESSIZATION CRISES AND OUTCOME OF CRISES

State Government in crisis	Year	Outcome of crises
Madras	1952-54	Successful congressization - C. Rajagopalchari/Y. Kamaraj successfully congressize the Tamil Nad Toilers, Communist Party and others.
Kerala	1955	Successful congressization - P. Govinda Menon forms Government after successfully congressizing TTNC.
Orissa	1958	Successful congressization - Harekrushna uses force to congressize.
Kerala	1962	Successful congressization - Pillai quits Kerala politics; R. Sankar (Congress) in.
Travancore-Cochin (Kerala)	1953	Unsuccessful congressization - A.J. John fails to congressize the TTNC - Assembly dissolved.
Andhra Pradesh	1954	Unsuccessful congressization - Prakasam fails to bring in Socialists-Krishnikars; Presidential rule.
Kerala	1956	Unsuccessful congressization - Menon fails to keep followers together; President's rule.
Orissa	1962	Mahatab fails to congressize the Ganatantra Parishad; Presidential rule.

one or the other state. Part IV looks to crises and their resolution on an all-India level and as such is supplemental to Part III. It not only confirms, as we shall see, the trend in Center-state relations found in Part III but also provides the settings for the next developmental stage of the political system.

After the reorganization of states, the Indian Union consisted of 16 states and 6 Centrally administered territories in 1963. The types of crises and the number of crises each state experienced between 1947 and 1963 is given in Table 3.13:

TABLE 3.13  
ANALYSIS OF CRISES, BY STATES\*

State	Incumbency #	Structural #	Congressianation #	Total
Andhra Pradesh	2	0	1	3
Assam	0	0	0	0
Bihar	2	0	0	2
Bombay: Maharashtra	0	0	0	0
Gujarat	1	0	0	1
Kerala	1	1	4	6
Madhya Pradesh	2	0	0	2
Madras	2	0	1	3
Mysore	5	0	0	5
Orissa	0	0	2	2
Punjab	8	1 (PEPSU)	0	9
Rajasthan	5	0	0	5
Uttar Pradesh	4	0	0	4
West Bengal	1	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>43</b>

\* The states of Jammu & Kashmir, and Nagaland have been excluded because of their special position in the Indian Union. Similarly, the Centrally administered territories which enjoy a different status in relation to the Central Government have been excluded. The structural crisis in PEPSU has been added to Punjab because the state was merged with Punjab in 1956.

The data were collected from various books on the Indian state politics, political biographies, Asian Recorder, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, etc. However, I have heavily relied on the Times of India for detailed information.



It is interesting to note that while two structural crises and four out of eight congressization crises were resolved through the use of presidential rule, it was only in one out of a total of 33 incumbency crises that this course of action was taken.

We have already discussed all the structural and congressization crises in Part III of this chapter. Our basic concern here is to find out how the 32 of the 33 incumbency crises were resolved without the use of presidential rule. Pending analysis, a brief description of all the incumbency crises is the following. Incumbency crises in the states of Punjab and Kerala have been excluded because these have been dealt with thoroughly in the preceding part.

#### Crises in Andhra Pradesh

The state of Andhra was set up in 1953. It had a total of five ministries, two incumbency crises, and one congressization crisis. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises follows:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
T. Prakasam	1953-54	Congressization	Presidential rule; discussed.
B. Gopala Reddy	1955-56	1. Incumbency (1956)	High Command - neutral; Reddy resigns.
N. Sanjiva Reddy	1956-60		Resigned to become the Congress President.
D. Sanjivayya	1960-62	2. Incumbency (1961)	Nehru advises against change.
N. Sanjiva Reddy	1962-		

### Incumbency crisis # 1:

With the reorganization of the state (nine Telengana districts of the Hyderabad state were merged with Andhra in 1956), B. Gopala Reddy lost support of the majority faction both in the Congress Legislative Party and in the Pradesh Congress Committee. The Congress High Command permitted a fresh contest for leadership<sup>190</sup> in which N. Sanjiva Reddy defeated B. Gopala Reddy. Though B. Gopala Reddy approached the High Command for support, he could not get it. However, while the attitude of the High Command was neutral in the contest, Nehru brought B. Gopala Reddy, after his defeat, in the Central cabinet and later appointed him the Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

### Incumbency crisis # 2:

On February 3, 1961, D. Sanjivayya (a loyalist to the Nehru family) lost support both in the Congress Legislative Party (the opposition group led by K. Brahmanand Reddy and B. Gopala Reddy had a support of 148/293 in the Party) and in the Pradesh Congress Committee - K. Brahmanand Reddy was its President. On February 4, Nehru visited Andhra, talked to almost all the Congress members of the legislature and advised against change. In order to fragment opposition to the Chief Minister, Nehru appointed B. Gopala Reddy to his cabinet.<sup>191</sup> In 1962, D. Sanjivayya became the President of the Indian National Congress.

### Crises in Assam

The state of Assam out of which were later carved the smaller states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, had exceptional political stability between 1947-63. It was a crisis-free state. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office and the reasons for ministerial changes are as follows:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Reasons for change
Gopinath Bardoloi	1947-50	Died in August 1950.
Bishnuram Mehdi	1950-57	After several requests to Nehru to permit him to resign from office on account of ill-health, Nehru advised him to continue in office. On December 22, 1957, Mehdi resigned from his sick bed.
B. P. Chaliha	1957-70	

After Mehdi's resignation, there were three candidates for the office of Chief Ministership: B. P. Chaliha, President of the Pradesh Congress; Deveswar Sarma, Minister of Finance in Mehdi's cabinet, and Siddhinath Sarma, Deputy Leader of the Congress Legislative Party. Nehru's choice fell on B. P. Chaliha who, despite not being a member of the Assam legislature, was installed as the Chief Minister of the state. Nehru assured Chaliha that the Congress High Command would not oppose his selection on the basis of his being not a member of the legislature. However, Nehru refused to issue any directive to the Congress Legislative Party in Assam to vote for Chaliha.<sup>192</sup>

#### Crises in Bihar

The state of Bihar was one of the most stable states during the period 1947-63. It had a total of two incumbency crises and the Congress High Command was neutral in both of them. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of the crises are as follows:

Bihar			
Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Dr. Sri Krishna Sinha	1946-61	1. Incumbency (1952)	High Command - neutral; Sri Krishna continues.
		2. Incumbency (1957)	High Command - neutral; Sri Krishna continues.
Binonand Jha	1961-63		Sri Krishna dies in office.

#### Incumbency crisis # 1:

After the General Elections 1952, Dr. A. N. Sinha - a long time political rival of the Chief Minister with a strong foothold in the Pradesh Congress Committee - challenged the leadership of Sri Krishna Sinha. Nehru appealed for unity but refused to get involved.<sup>193</sup> A. N. Sinha, unsure of his success in a leadership contest, compromised and accepted the second position in Sri Krishna's cabinet. Nehru's non-involvement in the crisis can be explained in terms of the hand-and-glove relationship between Sri Krishna Sinha and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, then President of India, who also, incidentally, belonged to Bihar.<sup>194</sup>

#### Incumbency crisis # 2:

Following the 1957 General Elections, A. N. Sinha, once again, challenged Sri Krishna's leadership. With Nehru maintaining an 'equi-distance' from both the groups,<sup>195</sup> a contest between the two was arranged in Bihar but the ballots were counted in New Delhi. Sri Krishna won the contest but once again accommodated his rival in the cabinet.

In both the crises, Sri Krishna Sinha was in control of the majority faction in the Congress Legislative Party but not in the Pradesh Congress Committee. Sri Krishna died on January 31, 1961.

Crises in Bombay

The state of Bombay - bifurcated into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960 - had, like the state of Assam, an exceptional stability till the state was bifurcated. After the reorganization in 1960, the state of Gujarat had one incumbency crisis, but Maharashtra experienced none. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the crisis Gujarat faced and the consequences of that crisis are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
B. G. Kher	1946-52		Kher decided not to be the Chief Minister after 1952 General Elections.
Morarji Desai	1952-56		Nehru invited Desai to join his cabinet.
Y. B. Chavan (Maharashtra)	1956-62		Nehru invited Chavan to his cabinet.
M. S. Kannamwar (Maharashtra)	1962-63		Died.
V. P. Naik	1963-		
Dr. Jivraj Mehta (Gujarat)	1960-63	1. Incumbency (1963)	<u>High Command split</u> - Nehru favours Mehta while Desai against him; Mehta resigns.
Dr. Balwantraj Mehta (Gujarat)	1963-		

Incumbency crisis # 1:

As already discussed in Chapter II, the Gujarat crisis was the result of Morarji's reaction to the Kamaraj Plan in 1963. Morarji Desai had a stronghold in Gujarat and probably wanted to demonstrate his influence and power to Nehru by upsetting Nehru's close associate, Jivraj Mehta. Jivraj Mehta lost support both in the Congress Legislative Party and in the Pradesh Congress Committee.

Crises in Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh, known as the Central Province in pre-Independent India, was reorganized in 1956 when Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh, Bhopal and some other Hindi-speaking areas merged with it. For almost a decade, Ravi Shankar Shukla was the "uncrowned king" of the state. After his death in 1956, the Congress High Command alone provided stability to the state. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Ravi Shankar Shukla	1946-56	1. Incumbency (1954)	High Command - neutral; Shukla continues.
K. N. Katju	1957-62	2. Incumbency (1957-62)	High Command - positive; Katju continues.
B. R. Mandloi	1962-		

Incumbency crisis # 1: Ravi Shankar Shukla, a camp follower of Sardar Patel and never known for cordial relations with Nehru had a firm control over the Congress Legislative Party. When his rival, Sethi Govind Das, became the Pradesh Congress President, he challenged Shukla's leadership perhaps with the hope that Nehru would encourage him. On November 16, 1954, Shukla received a vote of confidence from the Congress Legislative Party. Nehru remained silent, simply ignoring all happenings in Madhya Pradesh. 196

Incumbency crisis # 2: K. N. Katju was Nehru's nominee who was asked to resign the Union Home Ministership to become the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. He neither had nor could acquire any roots in state politics. "Repeatedly, the Central Government exerted its weight

to rescue its endangered magistrate and to maintain stability in the new state." In the 1962 elections, Katju lost his seat. B. R. Mandloi, who had association with people said to be responsible for Katju's defeat,<sup>198</sup> succeeded Katju after the elections. Nehru never forgave Mandloi for his manoeuvres and, as mentioned in the following chapter, purged (kamarajed) him in 1963.

### Crises in Madras

From 1947 to 1954, Madras had unstable governments, but after 1954 Kamaraj's leadership for almost a decade brought crisis-free stability to the state. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
T. Prakasam	1946-47	1. Incumbency (1947)	High Command - negative; Prakasam quits.
Omandur R. Reddiar	1947-48		Temporary arrangement; resigns.
P.S. Kumarswami Raja	1948-52		Lost seat in 1952 elections.
C. Rajagopalachari	1952-54	2. Incumbency (1953)	Nehru snubs the dissidents; Rajagopalachari continues.
K. Kamaraj	1954-63	Congressization (1954)	Successful.

Incumbency crisis # 1: As already discussed (under "Party system properties" in this chapter), T. Prakasam became the Chief Minister of the state much against the wishes of the Congress High Command. A year after his coming into office, Gandhi and Patel's campaign against him resulted in his losing support of the Congress Legislative Party and the Pradesh Congress Committee.

Incumbency crisis # 2:

C. Rajagopalachari was Nehru's nominee to the state. With his personal influence and Nehru's support, he was able to form a Congress minority government in 1952. However, he never acquired a sound foothold in the Madras Congress. As already discussed in the preceding chapter, Nehru snubbed those Congress dissidents who wanted to pass a vote of no-confidence against the leadership of Rajagopalachari in 1953. However, in 1954, Rajagopalachari decided to resign after Nehru gave specific permission to K. Kamaraj to lead the Congress Party in the Madras legislature.

K. Kamaraj resigned from office in 1963 in order to take up the Congress Presidency.

Crises in Mysore

The state of Mysore had 5 incumbency crises. The High Command's attitude was positive in two, neutral in two and negative in one. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of the crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
K. C. Reddy	1947-52	1. Incumbency (1950)	High Command - positive; Reddy continues.
K. Hanumanthaiya	1952-56	2. Incumbency (1954)	High Command - positive; Hanumanthaiya continues.
		3. Incumbency (1956)	High Command - negative; Hanumanthaiya resigns.
K. Manjappa	1956-56		Interim arrangement.
S. Nijalingappa	1956-58	3. Incumbency (1958)	High Command - neutral; Nijalingappa resigns.
B. D. Jatti	1958-62	4. Incumbency (1962)	High Command - neutral; Jatti resigns.



Incumbency crisis # 1:

In December 1950, Reddy lost control of both the Congress Legislative Party, which passed a no-confidence motion against his leadership, and also of the Pradesh Congress Committee. However, the High Command refused to accept a change in leadership. The Times of India editorialized: "The Chief Minister's leech-like fixation for office does credit neither to him nor to the Congress." 199

Incumbency crisis # 2:

Hanumanthaiya became the Chief Minister after K. C. Reddy became a minister in the Central Government. After repeated requests from H. K. Gowda, Pradesh Congress President, Nehru asked Hanumanthaiya to seek a vote of confidence from the Congress Legislative Party. However, before the confidence vote, Nehru announced: "This business of collecting signatures for a no confidence motion against the Chief Minister is improper and undignified." 200 On December 11, 1954, Hanumanthaiya succeeded in getting the confidence vote, making Gowda resign the Pradesh Congress Presidency.

Incumbency crisis # 3:

Hanumanthaiya lost grace with Nehru when he criticised the planning priorities at a meeting of the National Development Council presided by Nehru in 1955. Within less than a year, Hanumanthaiya was in the political wilderness. S. Chenniah, the Pradesh Congress President, got permission of the High Command to move a vote of no-confidence against Hanumanthaiya. Hanumanthaiya, in the meanwhile, met the Central leaders (U. N. Dhebar, Morarji Desai, etc.), who declined to identify themselves with any group in Mysore. On July 29, 1956, Hanumanthaiya lost a confidence vote of the Congress Legislative Party and submitted his resignation. "Only Nehru or Mr. U. N. Dhebar," said

Hanumanthaiya after his resignation, "could bring about a reconciliation between himself and the State Congress President, Mr. S. Chenniah."<sup>201</sup>

Incumbency crisis # 4:

In May 1958, the Hanumanthaiya faction in the Congress Legislative Party framed some charges against S. Nijalingappa. The High Command tried to intervene and stop an anti-Nijalingappa signature campaign. However, Nijalingappa himself refused to approach the High Command for help. "If the members of the Congress Legislative Party do not want me, I am not very particular to stick on to my office,"<sup>202</sup> and he meant it. On August 8, 1958, Nijalingappa lost a confidence vote in the Legislative Party and resigned. B. G. Verghese of the Times of India regretfully wrote: "In Mysore on the other hand [comparing it with the way Nehru rescued Kairon in Punjab], a good and honest man was allowed to be ousted from office as Chief Minister."<sup>203</sup>

Incumbency crisis # 5:

Though S. Nijalingappa, then Pradesh Congress President, lost his seat in the 1962 elections, his faction was in a majority in the Congress Legislative Party. Nijalingappa nominated S. R. Kanthi who won the leadership contest against B. D. Jatti. Kanthi resigned when Nijalingappa was returned in a bye-election. The High Command did not intervene in the contest between B. D. Jatti and Nijalingappa's nominee, S. R. Kanthi.

Crises in Orissa

The state of Orissa was a fairly stable state until the elections in 1957 when the Congress Party was reduced to a position of minority in the legislature. From 1947 to 1963, it had two congressizations but no incumbency crises. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure

of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Harekrushna Mahatab	1947-50		Nehru invited him to join the Central cabinet.
Nabakrushna Chaudhry	1951-56		Resigned to join the social movement of Vinobha Bhave; He had requested Nehru several times to permit him to resign.
Harekrushna Mahatab	1956-61	1. Congressization (1958)	Successful; Mahatab continues even after having resigned once.
		2. Congressization (1961)	Unsuccessful; <u>President rule.</u>
Biju Patnaik	1961-		

Both the congressization crises have already been discussed in Part III of this chapter. To re-capture the episodes, Mahatab formed a Congress minority government in 1957 by congressizing the Jharkand Party, six Independents and a few defectors from the Ganatantra Parishad. However, when he tried to silence the dissidents by the use of force, the Congress High Command asked for his resignation. The Governor mediated between Harekrushna Mahatab and the High Command and, with Nehru's tacit influence, Mahatab re-formed his ministry. The second ministry was a coalition between the two major parties in the legislature: the Congress and the Ganatantra Parishad. By late 1960, Ganatantra Parishad refused to merge with the Congress, resulting in Congress withdrawal from the coalition and presidential rule.

#### Crises in Rajasthan

Rajasthan - an amalgam of several princely states - has been

the arena of regional conflicts. From 1947 to 1954, it was one of the unstable states in the Indian Union. However, with the selection of Sukhadia - a man no less shrewd than Kairon of Punjab - as the Chief Minister of the state, Rajasthan, experienced political stability of a rare order. The state had five incumbency crises, all of which were resolved between 1947 and 1954. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the number of crises each one of the Chief Ministers had to face and the outcome of the crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Hiralal Shastri	1949-51	1. Incumbency (1949)	High Command (Patel) - positive; Shastri continues.
		2. Incumbency (1951)	High Command (Nehru) - negative; Shastri asked to resign.
Jai Narain Vyas	1951-52		Lost his seat in the 1952 elections; resigns.
Tikaram Paliwal	1952-52	3. Incumbency (1952)	High Command - negative; Nehru asks him to resign.
Jai Narain Vyas	1952-54	4. Incumbency (1954)	High Command - positive; Vyas continues.
		5. Incumbency (1954)	High Command - neutral; Vyas resigns.
Mohanlal Sukhadia	1954-71		

#### Incumbency crises # 1 & 2:

As already discussed (Table 3.9), Shastri survived the first crisis because of Sardar Patel. In the second crisis, it was Nehru who asked him to resign.

#### Incumbency crisis # 3:

Tikaram Paliwal became the Chief Minister on the promise to

Jai Narain Vyas that he would resign the Chief Ministership if and when the latter was elected to the Assembly. However, after Vyas's election, Paliwal refused to resign. The Congress High Command sent Balwantra Mehta, "an old friend and close supporter of Vyas"<sup>204</sup> to persuade Paliwal to resign. Paliwal claimed that he was the leader of the majority faction in the Congress Legislative Party and hence had no reason to resign. In the first week of September 1952, Nehru called different groups of the Rajasthan Congress Party to New Delhi and "discussed" the issue. However, the final result of this discussion was that Vyas was elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party on October 7. Paliwal protested and later resigned from the Congress Legislative Party.<sup>205</sup> Given the negative attitude of the High Command, Paliwal had lost the majority in the Congress Legislative Party as well as in the Pradesh Congress Committee suddenly.

#### Incumbency crisis # 4:

By August 1954, Vyas had lost control over the Congress Legislative Party as well as the Pradesh Congress. However, in order to avoid a reprimand from the Congress High Command, the dissidents launched an agitation for the removal of the Speaker, a close associate of Vyas, rather than for the removal of Vyas himself. By a vote of 66 to 16 in the Congress Legislative Party, the dissidents passed a resolution to the effect that the Speaker be removed forthwith. Vyas sent the resolution to Nehru who ordained that the resolution was "highly improper" and exhibited "an extreme sense of irresponsibility."<sup>206</sup> The Speaker stayed and so did Vyas.

#### Incumbency crisis # 5:

Vyas continued to lose support in the Congress Legislative Party.

But U. N. Dhebar, the Congress President, Balwantrai Mehta and Lal Bahadur Shastri continued their open support of Vyas. On November 6, 1954, Vyas was voted out on a no-confidence motion in the Congress Legislative Party despite his having circulated a letter from Nehru bidding "good wishes" to Vyas. <sup>207</sup> However, it may be mentioned that Nehru refused to take sides - it was Nehru himself who had suggested that Vyas seek a vote of confidence. <sup>208</sup> Vyas resigned on November 11, 1954 and was succeeded by Mohanlal Sukhadia who, after some initial difficulties, established a firm personal friendship with Nehru. The secret of Sukhadia's success laid in his constantly undermining the role of the Pradesh Congress and in "interest accommodation".

#### Crises in Uttar Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh, the home state of all the three Indian Prime Ministers, had four incumbency crises between 1947 and 1963. Though the Congress Party in the Uttar Pradesh had been known for factionalism, <sup>209</sup> the various factions were so balanced during the period by the incumbent Chief Ministers and the Congress High Command as to not cause frequent ministerial turnovers. The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises are given on the following page.

#### Incumbency crisis # 1:

Dr. Sampurnanand, highly respected by his former students, one of whom was Lal Bahadur Shastri, was elected the leader of the Congress Legislative Party as a compromise candidate between the Gupta and the Gautam factions. After C. B. Gupta himself lost his seat in the Assembly elections of 1957, Dr. Sampurnanand excluded Gupta from his cabinet, which the latter took as a personal affront to him and to his faction.

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
G. B. Pant	1946-54		Pant joins Nehru's cabinet.
Sampurnanand	1955-60	1. Incumbency (1959)	High Command - positive; Sampurnanand continues.
		Incumbency (1960)	High Command - split; Nehru arbitrates; Sampurnanand resigns.
C. B. Gupta	1960-66	3. Incumbency (1961)	High Command - positive; Gupta continues.
		4. Incumbency (1963)	High Command - split; Nehru puts Gupta.

C. B. Gupta, it may be mentioned, was the "machine boss" of the Pradesh Congress and his influence extended to the High Command.

In August 1959, when the U.P. Assembly was debating a vote of no-confidence in the Congress ministry, 98 members of the Congress Legislative Party (which had a strength of 286 in the 430-member House) announced their decision to withdraw confidence in Dr. Sampurnanand. The Congress High Command immediately sent Lal Bahadur Shastri to Uttar Pradesh, and his timely intervention saved the Congress ministry (though Shastri himself lost the support of C. B. Gupta who later sided with Morarji Desai in the race for the Prime Ministership in 1964). On August 23, 1959, the High Command passed a resolution reprimanding the move of the dissidents and declaring it in "clear breach of rules and conventions." Dr. Sampurnanand, at this time, was in control of the majority faction in the Congress Legislative Party but had no control over the Pradesh Congress. The Congress ministry was, thus, saved through the active intervention of the Congress High Command.

Incumbency crisis # 2:

In the October 1960 elections to the Pradesh Congress Committee, Gupta won the Presidency, and his supporters almost every important office of the Congress Executive Committee. Dr. Sampurnanand, who had made the elections a prestigious issue and who had promised that he would resign if his candidates were defeated, felt humiliated by the results. On October 18, 1960, while the Congress High Command left the issue of Dr. Sampurnanand's resignation to the good judgement of Dr. Sampurnanand himself, Nehru sent G. B. Pant, then Home Minister in the Union Cabinet, with a personal letter which decreed Gupta to take over from Dr. Sampurnanand the same day. After the elections to the Pradesh Congress Committee, it was evident to Nehru that Dr. Sampurnanand had lost support of the majority faction in the Congress Legislative Party and that the Party might split unless he intervened.

Incumbency crisis # 3:

In January 1961, 116 members of the Congress Legislative Party abstained from attending the session of the Legislative Assembly to pressure the High Command to order Gupta to seek re-election to the leadership of the Congress Legislative Party. The High Command ordained that all those who did not attend should apologize to the Governor, which they did.<sup>211</sup> Gupta was, however, in control of the majority factions of both the wings of the Party at this time.

Incumbency crisis # 4:

In July 1963, the Gupta faction lost control of the Pradesh Congress when A. P. Jain won the Pradesh Presidency. On July 15, eight cabinet ministers resigned, charging Gupta with ruthlessness and anti-Nehru campaigning.<sup>212</sup> On August 24, 1963, Nehru purged ( kamarajed ) Gupta despite Morarji Desai's advice not to do it: "It would be a



great blunder," said Desai, and would invite personal "allegations".<sup>213</sup>

### Crises in West Bengal

One of the most stable states in the Indian Union, West Bengal had just one incumbency crisis between 1947 and 1963. Roy was the longest serving Chief Minister of all the Chief Ministers in the Indian Union during this period. Given the personal friendship of Nehru (Dr. Roy was Nehru's personal physician) and of Atulya Ghosh, the Party manager of the Pradash Congress and an influential member of the Congress High Command, B. C. Roy was never in any serious trouble.

The names of the Chief Ministers, their tenure of office, the nature of crises each faced and the outcome of crises are the following:

Chief Minister	Tenure	Crises (year)	Outcome of crises
P. C. Ghosh	1947-48	1. Incumbency (1948)	High Command (Patel) - negative; Ghosh resigns.
B. C. Roy	1948-62		Died in office.
P.C. Sen	1962-		

#### Incumbency crisis # 1:

P. C. Ghosh succeeded H. S. Suhrawardy who migrated to East Pakistan after the partition of Bengal at the time of Independence. Prior to his becoming the Chief Minister, Ghosh was a member of the Congress High Command and an ardent supporter of Gandhism. However, within six months of his forming the ministry, P. C. Ghosh lost the support of both Sardar Patel and Gandhi, who wanted him to include one of their suggested persons in his cabinet - "a Marwari - either Badridas Goenka or Khaitan".<sup>214</sup> Ghosh even threatened to resign if

he was pressed. Soon thereafter, Ghosh lost control of the Congress Legislative Party to B. C. Roy who succeeded him with the "tacit approval of Sardar Patel and of Nehru in New Delhi." 215

B. C. Roy had a crisis-free tenure from 1948 to 1962.

Table 3.14 summarizes the attitude of the Center toward incumbency crises in all the states of the Indian Union. The data in the table add substantial evidence to the fact that there would have been no presidential rule in Punjab had the attitude of the Center been positive or even neutral. Further, the data clearly suggest that the ministerial stability in the various states of India at the time of crises depended much more on the attitude of the Center than on the support structures of the incumbent Chief Ministers. If the attitude was negative, the ministries had to go. The fact that all the ministries except that of Punjab (1951) voluntarily resigned when the attitude of the Center was negative raised no occasion for the imposition of presidential rule. On the other hand, all ministries survived crises whenever the attitude of the Center was clearly positive. It was only in the case of a neutral Center that the survival rate of ministries-in-crisis was difficult to predict.

The detailed study of all the incumbency crises gives one the impression that those Chief Ministers who relied completely on their support structures for their stability were sitting on a risky perch. At times, the Center's penetration of the support structures of the incumbent Chief Ministers was so strong that a slightly disgruntled voice from New Delhi could occasion a no confidence motion in the Chief Minister. However, the Center preferred not to dabble too much in state politics on its own except on certain occasions. Mostly, the sources of crises were the internal strains in the states themselves.

TABLE 3.14  
 ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER TOWARD INCUMBENCY CRISES  
 IN ALL THE STATES  
 Index as in Table 3.7

Attitude of the Center	Leg. Party + PCC # cases	Leg. Party - + PCC # cases	Leg. Party + - PCC # cases	Leg. Party - - PCC # cases	Outcome of crises
NEUTRAL	1				Ministry resigned.
			3		Ministries stayed.
				5	Ministries resigned.
POSITIVE					Ministries stayed.
				4	Ministry stayed.
					Ministries stayed.
				6	Ministries stayed.
NEGATIVE					Presidential Rule.
				6	Ministries resigned.

Out of a total of 33 cases of incumbency crises, four have been excluded: Uttar Pradesh crises of 1960-61-1963, Gujarat crisis of 1963, and Punjab crisis of 1949 (Bhargava). In the first three cases, the Congress High Command was split while in the latter case, Bhargava could not get Patel's help in time.

At least on three occasions, the Center was split in its attitude toward incumbency crises. In 1960, Nehru overcame opposition in the Congress High Command and asked Dr. Sampurnanand to step down in favour of C. B. Gupta. The fact that Nehru himself had not much of a soft spot for C. B. Gupta but was probably acting under the pressure of political situation in Uttar Pradesh comes out definitely from the crisis episode of 1963 when Nehru purged Gupta despite Morarji's advice to the contrary. This was the second time that the High Command was clearly split. Finally, in 1963, Nehru could not stabilize Dr. Jivraj Mehta of Gujarat when faced with opposition from Morarji Desai. Instead, he had to accept Jivraj Mehta, a nominee of Morarji, as the Chief Minister of

The timing of these crises is important to note. These episodes, along with others to be discussed in the next chapter, are the shadows of the events to come. After the Sino-Indian War 1962, Nehru seemed to be more easily challengeable by the members of his own caucus, if not by the Chief Ministers themselves. The political system itself seemed to be moving out of the hegemonic stage. For the last 15 years or so, it was the Center which had hegemonized the states. Henceforth, it was to be the states which were to hegemonize the Center.

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> Nehru quoted in Michael Brecher, Nehru - A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959):355-356.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 222.

<sup>3</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: Doubleday & Company, Anchor edition, 1960):285.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Brecher, op.cit., 230.

<sup>5</sup> Ambedkar quoted in Shiv Raj Nakade, "Article 356 of the Indian Constitution - Its Use and Misuse", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (October-December 1969):81

<sup>6</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., 297.

<sup>7</sup> See, B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution (New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1968):722.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 715.

<sup>9</sup> Kamath quoted in the Times of India, February 27, 1950. The number of detenus in 1950 was 10,962 of whom over 6000 were Communists in Telegana (Andhra). See, Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966):113.

<sup>10</sup> Ambedkar quoted in Pran Chopra, Uncertain India - A Political Profile of Two Decades of Freedom (Massachusetts: MIT, 1968):121.

<sup>11</sup> See the perception of Congressmen about other political parties in Pran Chopra, op.cit., 75-76.

<sup>12</sup> Michael Brecher, op.cit., 231.

<sup>13</sup> See, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1958). The general feeling of the author is that Pakistan could have been avoided only if the Congress elite could have cooperated with the Muslim League.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Brecher, op.cit., 253.

<sup>15</sup> Nehru quoted in the Times of India, August 14, 1951.

<sup>16</sup> For details of the conflict between Nehru and Tandon, see, Stanley A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton: University, 1968).

<sup>17</sup> Mahatma Gandhi wrote this in letter form in Harijan, February 10, 1948. Quoted in V. K. Narasimhan, Kamraj - A Study (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967):34.

- <sup>18</sup>Sardar Patel in G. S. Bhargava, V. V. Giri (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1969):74-75.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., 74.
- <sup>20</sup>Nehru in W. H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967):91..
- <sup>21</sup>Michael Brecher, op.cit., 390.
- <sup>22</sup>For details of integration, see, V.P. Menon, The Integration of the Indian States (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1956).
- <sup>23</sup>Sardar Patel in Granville Austin, op.cit., 252.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., 314.
- <sup>25</sup>Nehru in Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton: University, 1960):8.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., 8.
- <sup>27</sup>Nehru in Michael Brecher, op.cit., 387.
- <sup>28</sup>Pran Chopra, op.cit., 45.
- <sup>29</sup>Sardar Patel's statement in the Parliament recorded in the Times of India, August 11, 1950.
- <sup>30</sup>See, Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958):81.
- <sup>31</sup>The Times of India, January 19, 1950.
- <sup>32</sup>The Times of India, September 9, 1950.
- <sup>33</sup>From Pran Chopra, op.cit., 1.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup>See, A. H. Hanson, The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). Hanson attributes the failure of planning to the excessive centralization in the planning process.
- <sup>36</sup>See, K. Santhanam, Union-State Relations in India(London: Asia Publishing House, 1963).
- <sup>37</sup>A. H. Hanson, op.cit., 218.
- <sup>38</sup>Ibid., 198-199.

- 39Pran Chopra, op.cit., 209-210.
- 40See, A. W. Macmahon, Federalism: Mature & Emergent (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959):16.
- 41K. Santhana, op.cit., 55-56.
- 42Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., INDIA: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970):125.
- 43Frank Moraes, India Today (New York: Macmillan, 1960):98.
- 44Stanley A. Kochanek, op.cit., 307.
- 45Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970):177.
- 46Krishan Bhatia, Indira - A Biography of Prime Minister (New York: Praeger, 1971):145.
- 47Welles Hagen, After Nehru, Who? (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1963):104.
- 48Ibid., 10-11.
- 49W. H. Morris-Jones, op.cit., 69.
- 50Michael Brecher, op.cit., 503.
- 51Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), Vol. II: 220.
- 52Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 263.
- 53Thomas E. Headrick, "Crises and Continuity: India in the Mid-1960's" in Gabriel A. Almond, et al(ed.), Crisis, Choice, and Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) gives full information about social and economic change.
- 54Nambodripad in Bhabani Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics (London: Columbia University Press, 1972):42.
- 55Nehru in the Times of India, January 16, 1955.
- 56Selia S. Harrison elaborates on the tactics adopted by the Congress Party. Harrison, op.cit., 242.
- 57C. Rajagopalachari, Our Democracy (Madras: B. G. Paul & Co., 1957):17. Also see, Joan V. Bondurant, Regionalism versus Provincialism (Berkeley: University of California, 1958), and Joytirindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development (Berkeley: University of California, 1970) for the details of language controversy.
- 58For a brief summary of the latest amendments to the Constitution, see, D. G. Gupta, Indian Government and Politics (Delhi: Vikas, 1972):41.

<sup>59</sup>Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India (Princeton: University 1968):6.

<sup>60</sup>Myron Weiner, "Some Hypotheses on the Politics of Westernization in India", in R. L. Park and I. Tinker, ed., Leadership and Political Institutions in India (Princeton: University, 1959):21.

<sup>61</sup>Nehru quoted in the Times of India, December 11, 1957.

<sup>62</sup>The conflict between the ministerial and the organizational wing of the Congress Party, has been regarded as a major source of elite circulation in the Congress system. See, Rajni Kothari, Myron Weiner, Stanley A. Kochanek, and others.

<sup>63</sup>Before the partition, the position of the parties in the Punjab legislature was: Muslim League = 75; Unionist party = 20; Congress = 51; and the Akalis = 23. Baldev Raj Nayar, "Punjab", in Weiner, ed., op.cit., 441-442.

<sup>64</sup>For the history of Bhargava-Sachar rivalry, see, Baldev Raj Nayar, op.cit., 463.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 464.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 466.

<sup>67</sup>The Times of India, March 30, 1951.

<sup>68</sup>Bhargava's protest note published in the Times of India, May 13, 1951.

<sup>69</sup>The Times of India, May 14, 1951.

<sup>70</sup>Nehru, the Times of India reported, felt impatient because he sensed a move on the part of Bhargava to break away from the Party and form a non-Congress government. The Times of India, June 12, 1951.

<sup>71</sup>See, the Times of India, June 14, 1951.

<sup>72</sup>Bhargava's statements published at full length in the Times of India, June 15-16, 1951.

<sup>73</sup>Baldev Raj Nayar, op.cit., 467.

<sup>74</sup>Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava in the Times of India, August 10, 1951. For extracts of the parliamentary debate, Times of India, August 13, 1951.

<sup>75</sup>"Escape from Chaos," The Times of India, June 14, 1951.

<sup>76</sup>See, the Times of India, September 1, 1949.

<sup>77</sup>Baldev Raj Nayar, op.cit., 465.



78 Sachar pleaded that his case should have been treated analogously to the West Bengal and Madras disputes. The Times of India, October 15, 1949.

79 The Times of India, October 19, 1949.

80 "Shift Again", The Times of India, October 19, 1949.

81 The Times of India, May 22, 1950.

82 See, Baldev Raj Nayar, op.cit., 467.

83 Ibid., 468.

84 The Times of India, April 12, 1958.

85 The Times of India, March 6, 1958.

86 The Times of India, April 9, 1958.

87 B. G. Verghese in the Times of India, May 21, 1958.

88 Ibid.

89 The Tribune (Ambala), June 9, 1958.

90 The meeting between Musafir and the Congress High Command took place on September 26, 1959. Later, Musafir was won over by Kairon.

91 The Chief Minister of PEPSU, Gian Singh Rarewala, also resigned in 1951 but he is being excluded from the analysis for the reason that there was no popularly constituted legislature in the state at that time.

92 The Executive Committee consisting of 15 members acted like a ministry immediately after the princely states were integrated to form the state of Rajasthan. See, Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in Rajasthan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972):99.

93 Ibid., 115.

94 Quoted in Sisson, op.cit., 118.

95 The Times of India, January 5, 15, 1951.

96 After the 1948 elections, there was only one Independent in the Legislative Assembly who also later joined the Congress.

97 The state of PEPSU was merged with Punjab in 1956 partly with a view to dispersing the Akali concentration in the area.

98 See, V. P. Menon, op.cit., for the integration of princely states which formed PEPSU. The Maharaja of Patiala had to be coaxed and cajoled to join the Indian Union - a fact which always stayed in the mind of Sardar Patel while dealing with PEPSU.

<sup>99</sup>See, the Times of India, March 28, 1953.

<sup>100</sup>The violent activities of the Communists were most marked in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh in these years.

<sup>101</sup>Shiv Raj Nakade, op.cit., 85.

<sup>102</sup>Gian Singh Rarewala, it may be mentioned, was a relative of the Rajpramukh.

<sup>103</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. I, No.17, Part II, March 5, 1953; Vol. II, No.4, March 12, 1953; and Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. VIII, No.21, March 25, 26, 1953.

<sup>104</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, March 12, 1953:1996.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 1895.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 1930-31.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 1935.

<sup>108</sup>Rajya Sabha Debates, March 25, 1953:2126.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., 2182.

<sup>110</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Part II, Vol. VIII, No.33, September 13, 1953, and Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. IV, No.17, September 14, 1953.

<sup>111</sup>Rajya Sabha Debates, September 14, 1953: 2204-05.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 2252.

<sup>113</sup>The Statesman, April 6, and the Times of India, April 24, 1953.

<sup>114</sup>"Stooping to Conquer", The Times of India, April 24, 1953.

<sup>115</sup>Harrison, op.cit., 195.

<sup>116</sup>The Society administers quite a number of schools in Kerala and as such was directly affected by the government measures. However, when the Educational Bill was referred to the Supreme Court of India by the President for advice, the Court ruled only certain parts of the Bill as invalid.

<sup>117</sup>The planters prepared a mercenary force known as "Christophers' militia" to fight the government. See, H. D. Malaviya, Kerala: A Report to the Nation (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1955).

<sup>118</sup>The Times of India, February 2, 1959.

<sup>119</sup>See, Uma Vasudeva, Indira Gandhi: Revolution in Restraint (Delhi: Vikas, 1974):268.

- 120 Ibid., 268.
- 121 Ibid., 273.
- 122 Ibid., 273.
- 123 Ibid., 278.
- 124 D. R. Mankekar, The Red Piddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktala's, 1965):82.
- 125 Extracts from the Governor's report published in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 26 - October 3, 1959.
- 126 Ibid., 17021.
- 127 The other Ministers who defended the presidential rule in the Parliament were: Jawaharlal Nehru, A. K. Sen (Law), B. N. Datar (Home), Abid Ali (Labour), A. V. Thomas (Food), Pandit G. B. Pant (Home).
- 128 Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XXXIII, No. II, August 19, 1959: 3141. The proclamation was debated on August 17, 19, -20, 1959.
- 129 Ibid., August 17, 1959: 2841.
- 130 Ibid., 2867.
- 131 The Statesman, May 23, 1959.
- 132 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 26 - October 3, 1959:17020.
- 133 Gadgil's statement appeared in the Tribune, July 7, 1959.
- 134 Man Singh Rarewala himself admitted later that he had to bribe his own party men to support him in the legislature. For Rarewala's statement, see, The Times of India, April 24, 1953.
- 135 Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 279.
- 136 Selig S. Harrison has dealt with the Kammas-Reddis rivalry in considerable detail. Harrison, op.cit., 106.
- 137 Kripalani's statement in the Times of India, September 16, 1953.
- 138 See, the Times of India, November 23, 1953.
- 139 See, the Times of India, June 8, 1954.
- 140 See Sanjiva Reddy's statement in the Times of India, November 10, 1954.
- 141 Prakasam's statement in the Times of India, September 15, 1954.
- 142 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. VIII, No. 5, November 19, 1954: 418.

- 143 Ibid.
- 144 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. VIII, November 29, 1954:213.
- 145 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. VIII, November 30, 1954:389.
- 146 The Times of India, November 8, 17, 1954.
- 147 The Times of India, November 15, 1954.
- 148 The Times of India, June 8, 1953.
- 149 Some allegations of corruption were levelled against the TTNC ministers. The Times of India, July 1, 1953.
- 150 See, The Times of India, December 23, 1953.
- 151 V. K. Narasimhan, op.cit., 42.
- 152 The Times of India, March 31, 1952.
- 153 The Times of India, May 9, 1952.
- 154 See, V. K. Narasimhan, op.cit., 49.
- 155 The Times of India, November 21, 1953. T. T. Krishnamachari, however, denied having made any such statement.
- 156 The Times of India, February 9, 1954, recorded Nehru's speech.
- 157 The Times of India, December 23, 1953.
- 158 The Times of India, March 15, 1954.
- 159 The Times of India, March 24, 1954.
- 160 Pillai's statement in the legislature reproduced in the Times of India, July 14, 1954.
- 161 "From Praja Socialism to Socialism", The Times of India, September 22, 1954 mentions clearly that the Congress was consulted by the government before taking the decision.
- 162 Extracts from the Resolution appeared in the Times of India, December 18, 1954.
- 163 Pillai's statement recorded in the Times of India, February 9, 1955.
- 164 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. III, March 29, 1956:3787.
- 165 Ibid., 3846-47.
- 166 Ibid., 3781.

- 167 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. III, No.1: 50,183.
- 168 Ibid., 187.
- 169 See, Lok Sabha Debates, August 31, September 1, 1956, and Rajya Sabha Debates, December 5, 1956. Most of the speakers were from the newly merged Malabar districts .
- 170 Dhebar's statement published in H. D. Malaviya, op.cit., J.
- 171 Mrs. Indira Gandhi defended Congress joining hands with the Muslim League. "I don't believe that the Muslim League is any more communal than any one else in Kerala", said Mrs. Gandhi. Welles Hangan, op.cit., 175.
- 172 See the role of Giri in G. S. Bhargava, op.cit., 102-103.
- 173 Mahatab quoted by S. Diwedy in the Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. LI, No.17, March 8, 1961:3674.
- 174 The President of the Gajam District Congress Committee admitted that some of the Members of the Legislature were being kept under surveillance of Mahatab supporters. However, under pressure, he withdrew his statement. The Times of India, May 15, 1958.
- 175 The Times of India, April 28, 1958.
- 176 Ibid.
- 177 The Times of India, May 9, 1958.
- 178 Governor's communique published in the Times of India, May 20, 1958.
- 179 The Governor adjourned the Assembly since die on December 12, 1958, when the Assembly was supposed to sit throughout the month of December. Again, the Assembly was adjourned on April 27, 1959, just two days after its sitting because Mahatab was facing a threat of defection from the Congress members.
- 180 Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 283.
- 181 Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966):16.
- 182 S. Diwedy produced copies of communication exchanged between the two leaders during the Lok Sabha debate on March 8, 1961. The rift between Mahatab and Patnaik has also been referred to by Morarji Desai, op.cit., 123.
- 183 Extracts from this confidential resolution were quoted freely in the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha Debates, March 8, 1961: 3995-3700, 3685,3674.
- 184 Ibid., 3671.

- 185 Lok Sabha Debates, March 8, 1961:3662.
- 186 Ibid., 3671.
- 187 Ibid., 3674.
- 188 Ibid., 3361.
- 189 The Times of India, March 16, 1961.
- 190 "Congress in Andhra", The Times of India, November 13, 1956 for details.
- 191 The Times of India, March 3, 1961.
- 192 The Times of India, November 25, 1957.
- 193 The Times of India, March 13, 1952.
- 194 See, Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961):437-38.
- 195 There were several attempts at mediation before the contest was organized. Among the most active mediators from the High Command were Jagjiwan Ram, Satya Narain Sinha, Dr. Syed Mohammad, and U. N. Dhebar. The Times of India, April 5, 1957.
- 196 Ravi Shankar Shukla belonged to the Patel group. After Nehru ousted Tandon as the Congress President, relations between Nehru and R. Shukla were cold. While D. P. Mishra, Deputy Chief Minister in Madhya Pradesh, resigned, warning Nehru of "dictatorial designs" and stayed in political wilderness for more than fifteen years, Shukla accepted Nehru's succession to the Congress Presidency after he had been elected by a majority vote. The Times of India, August 23, September 12, 1951, and October 10, 1954.
- 197 Wayne Wilcox, "Madhya Pradesh" in Myron Weiner, ed. State Politics, op.cit., 281.
- 198 B. R. Mandloi was associated with Moolchand Deshlehra who, as President of the Pradesh Congress, was held responsible for the Congress debacle in the Madhya Pradesh elections 1962. Soon after the elections, the Congress High Command asked Deshlehra to resign from the Pradesh Congress Presidency. Wayne Wilcox, op.cit., 153.
- 199 "Lure for Office", The Times of India, January 4, 1951.
- 200 The Times of India, June 9, 1954.
- 201 K. Hanumanthaiya's statement reproduced in the Times of India, July 30, 1956.
- 202 The Times of India, March 17, 1958 records Nijalingappa's statement. Also see, editorial "Factionalism", March 18, 1958.

203 B. G. Verghese, "The National Scene: From Kerala to Kairon," The Times of India, May 21, 1958.

204 Richard Sisson, op.cit., 221.

205 Paliwal resigned from the Congress Legislative Party after meeting both Nehru and Azad to protest against the reorganization of cabinet by Vyas. Both Nehru and Azad made it unequivocally clear to Paliwal that Vyas, as Chief Minister, had an unfettered right to reorganize his cabinet the way he liked. The Times of India, March 24, 1953.

206 The Times of India, August 19, 1954 records Nehru's reaction.

207 Richard Sisson, op.cit., 228-229.

208 The Times of India, October 12, 1954.

209 "In fact, faction is the basic unit of the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh." See; Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965):3.

210 See, B. D. Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee," in Marc J. Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968):341.

211 The Times of India, February 19, 1961.

212 See, B. D. Graham, op.cit., 349-350.

213 Morarji Desai, op.cit., 201.

214 P. C. Ghosh published Gandhi's letter in this connection in the Times of India, February 15, 1957.

215 Marcus F. Franda, "West Bengal", in Myron Weiner, ed., op.cit., 274.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BARGAINING MODEL, 1964-67

In Chapter II, I have called the years between 1964 and 1967 the period of "divergence" in the political development of India. I have also characterized the political system of this period as "bargaining" because, unlike the near-hegemonic system, it fixed thresholds of political dissent, accommodated acceptable opposition and bargained for consensus on political issues. The transition from the near-hegemonic state to the bargaining state was swift though slightly bitter. It was swift because of the peaceful succession of Lal Bahadur Shastri to the office of the Prime Ministership in 1964; it was bitter because the succession crisis shook the long-standing edifice of the Congress Party and left it permanently damaged. To a large extent, the way to this transition was paved by the Kamaraj Plan (1963) under which Nehru carried out a "bloodless purge" in the Party, and the process was completed by the succession battle of 1964. With the death of Nehru, the movement of the political system from its near-hegemonic phase to a bargaining phase was almost over.

In this chapter, the period between the Kamaraj Plan and the succession battle has been treated as the transitional phase in the developmental path of the political system. In other words, this transitional period (1963-64) represents what we may call the "take-off" stage of the political system for entry into the bargaining stage.

The chapter is divided into four parts. Part I describes the "take-off" stage and the system environmental properties of this stage. Part II describes the developmental path of the political system between



1964 and 1967, linking it with the "take-off" stage of the political system and incorporating both continuity and change. As in the preceding chapter, the analytical frame adopted in describing both the parts is given on the next page.

These two parts together provide us with the contextual settings within which the Center and the states interacted with each other and regulated their mutual relationships. These contextual settings also help us to hypothesize the probability of federal intervention in state crises. Part II, therefore, ends with two descriptive propositions.

Part III of the chapter empirically tests these two propositions. As such, it deals with those sub-system crises which were resolved through the declaration of presidential rule. Part IV, as in the preceding chapter, looks at the crisis resolution pattern on an all-India level and as such is supplemental to Part III.

#### PART I: THE EMERGENT POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1963-64

##### 1. Structural-functional properties: the extra-constitutional instrumentalities

We have already discussed the expansion in the extra-constitutional network between 1947 and 1963. During this transitional period (1963-64), there was little institution building except in the area of defence and internal security. The humiliating Sino-India War in October 1962 had diverted the attention of the entire nation to the defence of the country and to a fresh re-assessment of the political leadership in terms of its past deeds and future capabilities to re-structure the war-torn economy of the nation. During the War, a Defence Council was set up in New Delhi with Nehru as Chairman. It was somewhat like a War Cabinet consisting of prominent political figures and military generals. During the War, Nehru and his colleagues were

## ANALYTICAL FRAME

PART I: 1963-64

PART II: 1964-67

Emergent political system	System environmental properties	Linked/de-linked developmental path	System environmental properties
1. Structural-functional properties: <u>extra-constitutional instrumentalities</u>  2. Party system properties: <u>shrinking influence of Central leadership</u>  3. Leadership properties: <u>Nehru's failing charisma</u>	1. Domestic: <u>violence</u>  2. International: <u>pressures on foreign policy</u>	1. Structural-functional properties: <u>birth of Grand Council</u>  2. Party system properties: <u>fragmentation in Congress oligarchy</u>  3. Leadership properties: <u>the "Diminutive" Shastri &amp; the "Dumb Doll" Mrs. Gandhi</u>	1. Domestic: <u>Food &amp; language crises</u>  2. International: <u>Indo-Pakistan War</u>

badly shaken for having failed the nation. Among the first casualties of the public tirade against the Nehru cabinet was the Defence Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, who was forced to resign on November 7, 1962. On November 14, when Nehru was making a statement in the Parliament - "At the time India became independent we were not apprehensive about any country's aggressive designs on us" - the President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan is supposed to have said sarcastically: "Look what this man is talking about."<sup>1</sup> Even within the Defence Council, the atmosphere was tense and of fault-finding. "We wanted to make our weapons," lamented Menon, "indigenously ... but it fell through among other things on the refusal of the Finance Ministry to grant foreign exchange." At this, Morarji Desai, who was then the Minister of Finance in the Union cabinet, angrily interjected: "You could have come to me if India's defence was at stake. You have been surrendering Rs. 40 crores  $\bar{\text{₹}}$  \$375 million approximately  $\bar{\text{₹}}$  for the last five years as unspent budget."<sup>2</sup> Thus, in adversity, the cracks in the Nehru cabinet were increasingly widening.

After the War came the heaviest budget of all, for 1963-64, to recover internal resources for strengthening the defence of the country. With its novel schemes like the Gold Control Order and Compulsory Deposits, the budget invited lot of public criticism, particularly from the goldsmiths whose occupation was directly affected by the Order.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, critics attacked the "ivory tower" Planning Commission for wrong priorities and "unrealistic" planning. The Third Five-Year-Plan, which was already running into difficulties for want of more foreign exchange at the time of the Sino-India War, had to be re-tailored to conform to the new defence priorities.<sup>4</sup> The

critics also attacked Nehru's romanticism with institutions like the Community Development and Panchayati Raj which had neither generated "people's participation" in economic development nor a "socialistic pattern of society".<sup>6</sup> In fact, many of the bigger illusions of Nehru came under attack suddenly at this time.

2. Party System properties: the Congress Party and the shrinking influence of Central Leadership

After the defeat in the Sino-India War, "back-door" intrigues began in the working of the Congress Party. In the summer of 1963, the secret meeting of what later came to be known as the "syndicate" of the party bosses decided to capture the Congress Presidency in the forthcoming election to this office. The meeting was held at Tirupati in the South and was attended by the West Bengal party boss, Atulya Ghosh, and three Chief Ministers of the southern states: K. Kamaraj of Madras, N. Sanjiva Reddy of Andhra (later, a candidate for the Presidency of India), and S. Nijalingappa of Mysore. S. K. Patil of Bombay could not attend the meeting but was quickly informed about the proceedings of the meeting by Atulya Ghosh. Sensing Nehru's personal dislike for both Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil, the members decided to install Lal Bahadur Shastri, if possible, and K. Kamaraj, if necessary, as the next President of the Congress.<sup>7</sup> Soon after the meeting, the decision leaked out, which made Morarji Desai furious: "I will contest Congress Presidentship."<sup>8</sup> But Shastri remarked: "I don't know why Morarji Bhai is so keen to become the Congress President. Panditji [Nehru] does not want him."<sup>9</sup> However, on Shastri's declining the offer with a view to avoiding a contest with Morarji Desai, K. Kamaraj became the Congress President in October of 1963.

While the Congress was rapidly losing its popularity after the Chinese War - the Congress had lost all the three parliamentary bye-elections held in 1963 - internal dissensions in the Congress High Command gave the general impression that the Congress was disintegrating. Both Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil were said to have established an anti-Nehru forum and the public press seemed to be thriving on such "conspiracies". Although Nehru himself wrote a personal letter to Atulya Ghosh in order to remove misunderstandings - "I have never thought that you were 'conspiring' against me, nor indeed do I think that S. K. Patil did it" - the press was full of rumours about campaigns in the Congress against one another, particularly against Nehru.<sup>10</sup>

In terms of the relationship between the Congress High Command and the state party units, the fragmentation at the Center increasingly reduced the ability of the Central leadership to intervene in state politics. The crises in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat (1963)<sup>11</sup> forced Nehru to adjust to the new situation of potential limits on his power. The "Tirupati" meeting, along with these crises, also demonstrated to Nehru the fact that the Congress territory was now almost parcelled out among a number of lesser but powerful landlords such as Morarji Desai (Gujarat), C. B. Gupta (Uttar Pradesh), Atulya Ghosh (West Bengal), S. K. Patil (Bombay), N. Sanjiva Reddy (Andhra), S. Nijalingappa (Mysore), K. Kamaraj (Madras), B. Patnaik (Orissa), etc. All of these party bosses had acquired an all-India image during their long stay in Congress politics and a few of them entertained the ambition to capture the throne once Nehru (whose health was adversely affected because of age and Sino-Indian War) was out of the way. Obviously,

in a situation like this when the High Command itself was internally divided, it could not command the state units the way it used to in the earlier period.

### 3. Leadership properties: Nehru's failing charisma

After the demoralization at the hands of China, "Nehru," wrote Kuldip Nayar, "was like a god that had failed."<sup>12</sup> For the first time in the history of free India, the Indian Parliament debated a vote of non-confidence against the Central Government in August 1963. In the gloomy atmosphere of the Lok Sabha, the acrimonious debate lasted four days. Ram Manohar Lohia charged the Government with having betrayed the nation and asked Nehru to seek a fresh mandate from the people, who no longer held any confidence in his Government.<sup>13</sup> The most telling attack came from Acharya Kripalani who insisted that "the government should get out of the rut which Nehru admits he is in."<sup>14</sup>

Nehru's response to these attacks was an hour-long rambling speech devoid of any spirit or rigor. He pleaded with a sense of injured innocence but failed to win the sympathy of his mouth-foaming critics. The Government survived because of the large Congress majority in the Parliament, but Nehru's image as a "King in Parliament" was severely damaged.

While the opposition had the privilege to criticise the Government, Nehru found critics in his own party too. Having been forced to sacrifice Y. K. Krishna Menon by many of his own party men, Nehru wanted "to punish certain Congress leaders ... who had raised their heads against him."<sup>15</sup> On August 24, two days after the defeat of the no-confidence motion in the Parliament, Nehru accepted the resignation of six "top-ranking" Central Ministers in addition to the Chief Ministers of six states under

the Kamaraj Plan, which was, on the face of it, designed to revitalize the Congress Party by retiring a few of the leading Congress members from the government positions. Among the Central leaders, the "bloodless purge" affected Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram, Lal Bahadur Shastri, S.K. Patil, B. Gopala Reddy, and K. L. Shrimali. Among the six Chief Ministers, while K. Kamaraj of Madras retired to take up the Congress Presidency, and B. Patnaik of Orissa lodged himself next-door to Nehru's office as the latter's public relationsman, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed of Jammu and Kashmir, Binodanand Jha of Bihar, C. B. Gupta of Uttar Pradesh, and B. A. Mandloi of Madhya Pradesh were simply purged. The shake-up was both dramatic and drastic, though it failed, in the long run, to establish Nehru's control over the Party. While some of the retiring Central Ministers started attributing ulterior motives to Nehru, thereby bringing him in public disrepute, most of the Chief Ministers were successful in nullifying the effect of Kamaraj Plan by handing over control of their respective states to their factotums.<sup>16</sup> Both Morarji Desai and Lal Bahadur Shastri were aware of Nehru's design, though both preferred to remain silent in public for the time being. However, while Morarji told Nehru in private how he felt about the latter's action, Lal Bahadur deliberately kept a low profile in order to be unpleasant neither to Nehru nor to his critics. "As I am giving up office and getting out of the Cabinet," said Morarji to Nehru privately, "I should like to give you the impressions I have formed of you." Continuing, Morarji said:

Nobody is able to know what your view is about any of your colleagues and some of them, find it difficult to work freely and are afraid of you also .... Such discrimination in behaviour with colleagues is not proper, in my view .... I hope and trust you will think about this matter and change your method of work and behaviour.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, Lal Bahadur Shastri, conducting himself more diplomatically, kept his supporters posted about Nehru's next step so that they could take advantage of newly emerging situation. To his supporters in Punjab, Shastri communicated the probability of Nehru dropping the Chief Minister with the following warning:

Let us keep our fingers crossed. Kairon is Panditji's blind spot, and he might change his mind at the last minute.<sup>18</sup>

Of all the critics, S. K. Patil of Bombay was publicly most vocal and openly questioned Nehru's motives:

I am not ridiculing the Plan ... / but / if somebody uses it for his own purposes or uses it for getting rid of a minister whom he does not like, then I will say Mr. Kamaraj never intended this.<sup>19</sup>

Nehru defended the Plan and denied any motives behind his action.

However, the fact that Nehru's intentions were suspect in the eyes of some of the leading Congressmen - Desai, Patil, Jagjivan Ram, C. B. Gupta - affected Nehru's stature as a "god-father" of the Congress. After the battle for succession in 1966 was over, Desai told Michael Brecher that the Kamaraj Plan seemed "to have been motivated not only to get rid of him but also to pave the way for Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Ministership."<sup>20</sup>

#### System environmental properties:

##### 1. Domestic: Violence

During the transitional period under analysis, communal violence between the Hindus and the Muslims resulted in heavy casualties both in Srinagar (Kashmir) and in Calcutta (West Bengal). It all started when the infuriated Muslims broke into violent agitation over the theft of the most prized relic of the Prophet from a Muslim mosque on Christmas Eve, 1963. This produced a chain reaction in East Pakistan and in the West Bengal. On January 11, 1964, the police opened fire on fifty different



occasions in Calcutta. The total number of people killed was estimated at 264.<sup>21</sup> In East Pakistan, the rioting developed into a general attack on the non-Muslims who fled to the eastern states of India, particularly Assam.

On the Assam-Burma border, tension verging on violence continued between the tribal Nagas and the Government of India despite the acceptance by the Government to set up an autonomous state for the Nagas. Nagaland was created as a separate state unit in 1963 but A. Z. Phizo, a leader of the Nagas underground, continued his fight for the independence of Nagaland from the Indian Union. He even set up an exiled government of Nagaland and while in England threatened to raise the issue before the United Nations.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. International: pressures on foreign policy

The policy of non-alignment suffered a sudden reversal with the Chinese attack. The reversal was sudden because India had made no adjustments in its foreign policy even during the period when it expected Chinese aggression. The relations between India and the United States were extremely poor and irritating in the autumn of 1962, when the latter was shipping military supplies to Pakistan despite protests from India. The irritation had become all the more sharp because India had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union for the manufacture of MiGs in India as a reaction to the American policy.

The War forced India to make a sharp turn in foreign policy. With the Soviet Union divided between a non-aligned "friend" and a communist "brother", Nehru appealed to the West, particularly to the United States, to help India tide over the disaster. The appeal was obviously incongruous with the usual posture India had maintained toward

the West, but both the United States and Britain responded to it with great sympathy and understanding. The defence of India was strengthened with massive airlifts of emergency supplies from both the countries. However, this Western umbrella to India provoked angry protests from Pakistan, which started moving close to China to pressure the West to stop military assistance to India. The net result of Pakistan's agitation was that India was brought under pressure by the West to open immediate negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Both Averell Harriman (United States) and Duncan Sandys (Britain) mediated but the several meetings that followed between the representatives of India and Pakistan failed to arrive at any settlement. Rather, the talks between the two countries left behind a trail of bitterness with Pakistan's Foreign Minister announcing: "Pakistan will not be alone if she becomes the victim of any aggression. It would also involve the largest state in Asia";<sup>23</sup> and Nehru characterizing Pakistan's "wooing" of China as "one of the worst examples of blackmail" in history. Within less than 2 years, India and Pakistan were to fight another grim battle to settle what they failed to settle through the mediation of the West.

The system-environmental properties during the transitional period exposed India to many of the political and economic uncertainties and to less-than-bright future expectations. The euphoria for planning, socialism, and non-alignment seemed no longer exciting in these dark and dreary years in the nation's history.<sup>24</sup> With Nehru's decreasing influence, the Congress seemed to be giving birth to many Tammany-Hall-like bosses who were familiar more with the crudities of politics than with the "dreams of future", as Nehru was. After Nehru's death, the all-powerful Center came under the eclipse of these bosses and the country passed from Nehru's rule to a rule through "collective leadership".

PART II: THE DEVELOPMENTAL PATH OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 1964-67

1. Structural-functional properties: the extra-constitutional instrumentalities

Neither Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66) nor Mrs. Indira Gandhi (1966-67) dispensed with any of the extra-constitutional instrumentalities - Planning Commission, National Development Council, Zonal Councils, State Ministers Conferences, etc. - which had been developed and carefully nurtured by Nehru. However, there were fundamental changes in the functioning of these institutions. The most critical change was in the style of decision-making. While decisions in Nehru's times "often appeared to be imposed from above",<sup>25</sup> this was not the case in the Shastri-Indira era, where decisions were taken after a spirited exchange of ideas and with a genuine concern for consensus. Lal Bahadur Shastri opened up the political system to a wide variety of interests and pressures, partly because of the political situation he was in and partly because of his desire to be "different" from Nehru. One of the most significant developments that Shastri initiated was the establishment of an informal but supreme decision-making "Grand Council" at the Center. Unique in its membership, it represented a confluence of divergent view-points and opinions. It was composed of almost all the crucial wielders of influence both in the Congress Party and in the Central and State Governments, besides some special invitees such as V. K. Krishna Menon and U. N. Dhebar. Michael Brecher described the Grand Council as a political "court of last appeal",

where Union and State, Government and Party power constellations bargain/ed/ at the highest level. There, much more than in Parliament or Cabinet, pressure groups met/ on equal terms and resolved/ conflicts - by consensus. Seen in terms of the succession and its aftermath, the Grand Council of the Republic was/ the collective substitute for Nehru's charisma.<sup>26</sup>

In terms of economic planning, neither Shastri nor Indira tried to revive the sacredness of the Planning Commission as the "know-all House of Wisdom" as it was during Nehru's time. On the contrary, the Administrative Reforms Commission suggested and the Government agreed to "de-bureaucratize" the Planning Commission which had become an Empire unto itself. The Government also responded to critics who charged that India's meagre resources had been "dissipated in gigantic industrial exhibits, like steel plants"<sup>27</sup> to the neglect of agricultural production by according the highest priority to the latter in the Fourth-Five-Year Plan beginning 1966. In a fresh assessment of the Third-Five-Year Plan, which had run into rocks because of the Chinese aggression, Shastri pleaded for a shift from "big project" to "small-scale consumer projects" in order to bring tangible benefits to the people.<sup>28</sup> Unlike Nehru, Shastri felt no special compulsion to expand public sector projects at the cost of private sector projects. Rather, his "stronger private enterprise flavour", which Indira mistook as a conscious policy of de-Nehruization, made Indira react angrily (while she was a minister in Shastri's cabinet): "Where is non-alignment? Are our policies socialist? India has swerved from the right path!"<sup>29</sup>

## 2. Party System properties: fragmentation in the Congress oligarchy

The two succession crises in 1964 and 1966, respectively, set new institutional patterns: (a) they provincialized national politics by involving the Chief Ministers in the selection of national leaders; (b) they exposed the political (not so much ideological) polarization in the Congress High Command; and (c) they changed the cognitive image both of the opposition parties and of the masses in general about the capability of the Center to hold its own against the centrifugal forces.

With Shastri's selection as the candidate of the Syndicate (of party bosses), Morarji Desai and his supporters felt as much isolated and brow-beaten as some of the leftists in the Congress such as V. K. Krishna Menon, K. D. Malaviya, etc. On Shastri's death, the Syndicate succeeded once again in getting Mrs. Indira Gandhi elected in open opposition to Morarji Desai and this, more than ever before, created that unbridgeable gulf in the Party that could not be covered. After the succession, the Congress oligarchy, as represented in the Congress High Command was divided between the victors and the vanquished.

Both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi were helped to office by the Syndicate, particularly by K. Kamaraj, then the Congress President. However, both revolted against Kamaraj's authority once they were elected leaders of the Congress Parliamentary Party. Both Shastri and Indira tried to follow the footsteps of Nehru in making the Government independent of the Party - Shastri refused to consult K. Kamaraj in constituting his cabinet and Indira devalued the national currency despite Kamaraj's advice to the contrary<sup>30</sup> but both were largely unsuccessful. Shastri had hardly started a debate on Government-Party relationship when death took him away from the political scene, while Indira's efforts in this direction ended in confusion.

The only beneficiaries of the succession battles were the State Chief Ministers who clubbed together to influence the selection of the national leaders and thereby acquired a place of influence and prestige in the Congress Center. Once involved in Central politics, they became a part of the supreme policy-making organ at the Center, i.e., the Grand Council. Being thus brought into the Center, the Chief Ministers began to assert an increasing degree of autonomy from the Center in

connection with the governance of their respective states. The "centrism" in the Congress Party was broken and the Party obviously seemed to be moving out of the oligarchical structure to "stratarchical" structures.<sup>31</sup>

3. Leadership properties: the "Diminutive" Shastri and the "Dumb Doll" Indira Gandhi

In both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the country selected the Prime Ministers but not the leaders of the nation. Both had triumphed over the uncompromising and intractable Morarji Desai not because of their stature or political experience but because of their supposedly weak and malleable personalities. Lal Bahadur Shastri was too humble to be offensive to the Syndicate and Indira Gandhi too weak in the Party to ever assert a role independent of the party bosses. No doubt, there were certain other qualities in these new leaders but their seemingly frail personalities counted the most with the "king-makers" - at least, this was the impression gained by the nation.

Napoleonic in size, Lal Bahadur Shastri had none of the makings of Napoleon. Humble in origin and honest to the last inch, Shastri was known for his modesty and unobtrusive manners. He made very few enemies and was skillful in the art of making compromises. A political biographer of Shastri described him as

truly meek and humble, a man of the people and one of them, sweetly reasonable, devoid of malice, imperturbable of temper, non-violent in thought and speech, tolerant and persuasive.<sup>32</sup>

Professor Galbraith, the United States Ambassador in New Delhi 1961-63, described Shastri slightly differently:

There is more iron in his soul than appears on the surface. He listens to every point of view, he makes up his mind firmly, and once he has made them, his decisions stick .... He is the kind of man who is trusted.<sup>33</sup>

There is no doubt, wrote Welles Hanger in 1962, that the "little man", i.e. Shastri has been a "faithful echo of his master, Jawaharlal Nehru",

but he has "a will of his own and, what is more unusual, a conscience. Neither is transient." If selected as the Prime Minister, "he might," continued Hangen, "surprise those who chose him for his apparent pliancy. The mouse might well roar."<sup>34</sup>

While Shastri exhibited some signs of strength in the last days of his life and particularly during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, his brief tenure in office (June 2, 1964-January 11, 1966) was otherwise such a "calendar of woes" that he could hardly assert himself as the Prime Minister of the country. Over-shadowed by the living memory of Nehru and surrounded by the formidable reputation of big, silent Kamaraj and his allies, Shastri found it difficult to create a national image of himself. His cabinet consisted of persons whose enormous egos always loomed large above his head. To this was added the increasing derision of the Nehru family - Krishna Hutheesing, the younger sister of Nehru, wrote a blunt letter to Shastri saying that his living "in the same house in which the great departed leader had lived would be unpardonable presumption on his part."<sup>35</sup> Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru's other sister, launched a heavy attack against Shastri in the Parliament and contemptuously described him as being a "prisoner of indecision." With Indira Gandhi accusing him of de-Nehruization, Shastri stood completely alienated from the family which had not yet lost the respect of the nation.

In the Parliament, the Opposition discovered its power and left no opportunity to make it felt on Shastri. With the open revolt of some 100 Members of the Congress Party over the language issue, the Parliament became an arena of severe confrontation. As one political

commentator remarked:

Parliament today is faced with the crucial problem of survival as the focal point of democracy. It can be saved only by itself and not by an external authority .... A great deal is on trial in India at the moment, and the future of parliamentary democracy is one such test.<sup>36</sup>

Shastri suffered criticism; Indira humiliation. She succeeded Shastri on January 19, 1966 in an atmosphere of negotiable loyalties in the Congress. Her first year of prime ministership was a "personal ordeal" that left her increasingly shaky and nervous. Her every day in the Parliament was a day of trial with the professional hecklers. Some parliamentarians - Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Raj Narain (now of national fame because of the writ he filed against the validity of Mrs. Gandhi's 1971 election to the Parliament), etc. - taunted her, abused her and even vulgarized her appearance with their histrionic talents. Inexperienced, Indira often cut a sorry figure in the Parliament and frequently lost threads of her speech in confusion. Shy and indifferent speaker that she was, she was nicknamed a "Dumb Doll" by the Delhi newsmen.

In the composition of her first cabinet, ministers were forced on Indira both by K. Kamaraj and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, then the President of India.<sup>37</sup> However, soon thereafter, Indira began to assert her independence from the party bosses. Her decision to devalue the currency in June 1966 alienated her from the Syndicate. Kamaraj called the decision "hasty and foolish". Her dismissal of Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda (twice acting Prime Minister during the succession crises) in November 1966 in connection with the fierce agitation in the country for a total ban on cow slaughter was the proverbial last straw on the Syndicate's back. The Congress President, K. Kamaraj, who had close and friendly relations with Nanda, regarded Nanda's dismissal as a personal challenge to his



authority. With Y. B. Chavan substituting for Nanda as the Home Minister, S. K. Patil, Railway Minister and an effective member of the Syndicate, joined Kamaraj in protest not so much over the dismissal of Nanda as over the appointment of Y. B. Chavan who was a long time political competitor of Patil in their common home state of Maharashtra. The Syndicate would probably have seen to it that Indira did not become the Prime Minister after the General Elections of 1967 but for the demoralization it suffered when K. Kamaraj, S. K. Patil, and Atulya Ghosh - the three core members of the Syndicate - suffered electoral defeats in 1967.

System-environmental properties:

1. Domestic (a) Food crisis:

The country suffered one of the worst food crises in its history during the period under analysis. In July 1964, the Government anticipated food riots and requested even the Government of Pakistan for rice import. Next month, the communists threatened a countrywide food agitation. The Government arrested about 1300 of them. However, the arrests did not discourage the communists, and by December 1964 their underground activities in West Bengal and Kerala added another 700 persons to the list of arrested communists. In the meanwhile, food riots broke out in many parts of the country, damaging public property and private business houses.

Lal Bahadur Shastri held three Chief Ministers' conferences beginning November 1964, suggesting (a) statutory rationing in large cities; (b) summary trial of traders who sold foodgrains at prices higher than those fixed by the Government; and (c) revision of rice zones so as to enable the Government to transfer rice (and foodgrains) from surplus states to the deficit states. To begin with, the Chief Ministers rejected the suggestion outrightly. On the contrary, they made Shastri to agree

to the decision that each state was to be a "closed rice zone", selling rice to the deficit states only if it wished to do so. The Hindustan Times assailed the Center for yielding to the states:

The time has come for the leadership at the Centre to assume the political responsibility for an all-India policy on food and divest the local leadership of both the initiative and the responsibility for it. The interminable parleys with the Chief Ministers are a pathetic exercise in evasion.<sup>38</sup>

And the Times of India declared that

the Union Government should have the good sense and the courage to use the emergency powers with which it armed itself almost two years ago.<sup>39</sup>

The Government did have the "good sense" but obviously not the "courage" to do anything in opposition to the wishes of the state leaders. It almost took the Central Government a full year before it could extract a "gentlemen's agreement" from the Chief Ministers that they would implement statutory rationing and contribute, in case of surplus, to the newly established Central Pice Pool. Despite large shipments of foodgrains under PL 480 from the United States, the food situation in the country continued to be pathetic well into 1966-67. Indira Gandhi tried to ease the situation by establishing a National Food Council for a fair distribution of foodgrains all over the country, but her efforts ended in a fiasco. The surplus states were simply unwilling to part with surplus food in those pre-election years.

(b) Language conflict:

The food riots coincided with the language riots in the country. In January-February 1965, the South, particularly Madras, was up in arms<sup>40</sup> against the implementation of the constitutional provision to make Hindi the national language of the country effective January 26, 1965. With Morarji Desai, Jagjivan Ram and Ram Subhag Singh as Hindi protagonists on one side and K. Kamaraj, Sanjiva Reddy, S. Nijalingappa and Atulya

Ghosh as anti-Hindi spokesmen on the other, Shastri found himself in an extremely embarrassing situation. The fact that Shastri himself belonged to a state (Uttar Pradesh) which was the central arena of pro-Hindi frenzy complicated the issue for him all the more. In a nationwide broadcast, Shastri repeated Nehru's earlier assurance that both Hindi and English should continue to be the link languages and that all the states should implement the "three language formula" as decided in 1963. While this verbal assurance satisfied the South, it did not completely resolve the issue. About 100 Congress members of the Parliament from the South now insisted that fresh legislation incorporating the assurances be passed and the Constitution amended. At first, Shastri refused; but when Subramaniam and Alagesin (from Madras) resigned from his cabinet, he gave in. The assurances in the form of an amendment to the Official Languages Act became the law of the country in 1967 without, however, amending the Constitution.

## 2. International: War

For the first time since Independence, India and Pakistan fought an extensive war beginning September 1, 1965. The war started in the town of Jammu (Jammu & Kashmir) and engulfed Lahore and Sialkot on the Pakistan side and Jullundur-Amritsar on the Indian side. Both sides crossed the international frontiers and threatened to wipe out each other. Daylight air attacks on civilian targets were the common features of this war. On the ground the Chhamb-Jaurian sector made international news as the graveyard of tanks and armoured cars.

The international world witnessed the drama for a while till on September 18, the Chinese Government handed an ultimatum to the Indian envoy in Peking asking the Government of India to destroy its allegedly-built posts on Chinese territory or else face counter-action

The ultimatum came after the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister to Pakistan in the midst of war. This provoked Dean Rusk of the United States, who publicly warned China to stay out of the war. Through Tass, the Soviet Union indirectly said that no Government had the right to "add fuel to the flame" and that anyone doing it would have "a grave responsibility".<sup>41</sup>

This war brought out the best in Lal Bahadur Shastri, who inspired confidence in the armed forces and cleansed the nation's soul from the demoralization it had suffered three years ago in the Sino-Indian War. However, it put a severe burden on the already tottering economy of the country. On June 5, 1966, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was almost forced to devalue the national currency, which hurt the national pride of many of her critics and friends alike. "If we don't devalue," she said, "we don't get aid."<sup>42</sup> Since the pressure for devaluation had come from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United States, Indira faced mounting criticism more from the leftists than from the rightists in the country. To retrieve her leftist image, Indira visited the Soviet Union in the second half of 1966, and, in a joint communique, called for an immediate halt to American bombing in Vietnam. This prompted President Johnson to "foot-drag" over the already committed shipment of wheat to India at a time when India needed the quickest possible deliveries to meet the near-famine conditions.<sup>43</sup>

The system-environmental interaction, as described in the preceding pages, was least congenial to the maintenance of "centrism" in the functioning of the political system. The Grand Council was symptomatic of the change from Nehru's leadership to a collective leadership at the Center, but it was undoubtedly the state governments and the party bosses who held the keys to this Council. The decisions of

the Council were by consensus, but nothing of consequence could be decided without the consent of the Chief Ministers. In fact, the second succession, more than the first, had firmly established the hold of the Chief Ministers not only on the Central leadership but also on the Central institutions. After Shastri's death, the Chief Ministers almost stole the thunder from the Congress High Command when they started briefing Members of Parliament from their respective states as to which way they should or should not vote in the succession contest. Some of the Members even expressed public resentment against the interference of the Chief Ministers, because they felt that the Central leadership selection was the privilege of the Congress Parliamentary Party and not that of the Chief Ministers. While one Member of Parliament from Rajasthan sadly commented that "last time, at least, they [the Chief Ministers] consulted us, now they are not even doing that",<sup>44</sup> K. Santhanam was resentful:

It is strange that the voting rights of the Members of Parliament are being virtually exercised by the Chief Ministers of states who are not even voters themselves. This is a negation of democracy.<sup>45</sup>

The powers of the Chief Ministers had increased all the more with increasing cracks in the Central leadership. Neither Shastri nor Indira had Nehru's charisma or even the unflinching loyalty of the entire Congress Party. The war-torn economy at home and international pressures from abroad had created insurmountable problems for both of them, making their operational voyage rough and extremely difficult. In a situation like this, one can easily anticipate how the Center would conduct itself in relation to the state governments. It would, if possible, avoid unnecessary interference in state politics unless dictated by extraordinary circumstances. At best, it would be inactive

on issues which might upset the delicate equilibrium in state politics; at worst, it would resort to presidential rule with the consent of the state leadership in-crisis.

Some descriptive propositions:

Thus, we expect that:

- (a) the attitude of the Center - neutral, positive, negative - would make little difference to the stability/instability of the Congress provincial government-in-crisis; and
- (b) the attitude of the Center would be not to resort to presidential rule unless forced to do so by the circumstances.

In relation to the non-Congress state governments, we expect that the Center would live with them unless state crises so dictate the Center as to make the imposition of presidential rule an absolute necessity.

PART III: PRESIDENTIAL RULES 1964-67

There were only four cases of presidential rule between 1964 and 1967. The type of crises, the nature of government, the duration of presidential rules, etc., are given in Table 4.1 on the next page.

INCUMBENCY CRISES:

Presidential Rule in Kerala: September 10, 1964 - March 23, 1965

After the 1960 elections to the Kerala Assembly, the Congress, having failed to win an absolute majority, had entered into a coalition with the Prāja Socialist Party to form the government under the leadership of Pattom Thanu Pillai (Socialist). In the congressization crisis that followed, Pattom Thanu Pillai accepted the Governorship of Punjab in exchange for the Chief Ministership of Kerala which was taken over by R. Sankar of the Congress in September 1962 (see Table 3.11, crisis # 4). With Pillai's exit from Kerala, some of his followers had joined

TABLE 4.1

W-F-SYSTEM CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE  
1964-67

Type of crises	Nature of the incumbent government	State	*State machinery suspended/dissolved	Duration of presidential rule
Incumbency	Congress	Kerala	Dissolved	September 10, 1964 - March 23, 1965
Structural	Congress	Punjab	Suspended	July 5, 1966 - November 1, 1966
	Non-Congress	Goa**	Suspended	December 3, 1966 - April 5, 1966
Systemic	Anticipated Non-Congress Leftist coalition	Kerala	Dissolved	March 24, 1965 - March 6, 1967

\*During suspension, the ministry is dispensed with and the Assembly is suspended from conducting its business. On the other hand, dissolution under the presidential rule involves dissolution of the Assembly as also dispensing with the ministry. The Assembly can be revived by the Central Government if suspended but it cannot be so revived if dissolved.

\*\*Goa abbreviates Goa, Daman and Diu. Goa is a Union Territory of India.

the Congress giving, the Party an absolute majority in the Assembly. The original strength of the Congress in the Assembly was 63/127.

Incumbency crisis:

Soon after the formation of the ministry, the Congress Legislative Party split into two factions:

- i. the Sankar faction; and
- ii. the Chacko faction.

P. T. Chacko, Home Minister in the Sankar cabinet, joined hands with the Kerala Pradesh Congress President, Govindan Nair, in resurrecting charges of corruption against the Chief Minister and the Minister of Industries. At the bottom of the controversy was the hard feeling which Chacko, as the leader of the Christian community, and Govindan Nair, as the leader of the Nair community, sustained against Sankar as the leader of the backward Ezhava community.<sup>46</sup> The charges of corruption were referred to the Congress High Command, which gave Sankar a clean chit - some people alleged that it was because of Sankar's good relations with K. Kamaraj Nadar (Nadar, incidentally, is a backward caste) - on November 3, 1963.<sup>47</sup>

It was now Sankar's turn to act. On December 8, 1963, P. T. Chacko got involved in a car accident in which four persons were injured. This gave rise to the demand for his resignation from the ministry; the Opposition members in the Assembly with the support of some of the members of the Sankar faction, accused Chacko of "rash and dangerous driving" and of "hit and run" charges. On February 21, 1964, Sankar forced Chacko to resign from the ministry. Later, on April 3, when the court acquitted Chacko of the charges of dangerous driving, Sankar refused to accommodate Chacko in his ministry. This was followed by



a mutual "smear" campaign by the two factions which not only exposed the private lives of many a public men but also dragged the party's reputation into sludge.<sup>48</sup> For a while, the campaign subsided because of the succession crisis at the Center; but once the succession issue was over, it assumed its full force once again.

After Nehru's death, the Chacko faction submitted charges of corruption for the second time against the Sankar ministry and sought interviews with the Central leaders on various occasions. However, there was no definite response from the Center. While Shastri tried to postpone the issue, K. Kamaraj was said to be "indignant" over what he thought was a case of "party indiscipline".<sup>49</sup> Finally, the Chacko faction threatened to support a vote of no-confidence in the ministry in case the High Command did not investigate the charges against the ministry. "At that eleventh hour," writes Michael Brecher, "Shastri telephoned [S.K.] Patil, who was in Bombay, and asked him to proceed at once to Trivandrum [the capital city of Kerala]. Patil asked, 'do you want me to attend a political funeral?'; and Shastri replied, 'after all, the Government of India should be represented'. Patil went and secured Sankar's offer to resign, but it was too late."<sup>50</sup> The fifteen members of the Chacko faction had voted with the opposition and the motion of no-confidence was carried by 73 votes to 50. The Governor explored the possibility of forming an alternative government but failed. On September 10, 1964, the President took over the administration of the state for the fourth time (the previous three occasions were in 1953, 1956, and 1959). The Kerala Assembly was dissolved and fresh elections promised within a period of six months.

Thus, R. Sankar, despite being in control of the majority factions both in the Congress Legislative Party and in the Pradesh Congress Committee,

had to resign. The positive attitude of the Congress High Command, dominated as it was by K. Kamaraj who was all out to protect Sankar, could rescue neither the Chief Minister nor the Kerala Congress ministry.

The Lok Sabha approved presidential rule on September 23, and the Rajya Sabha on September 30, 1964. J. Isukhlal Hathi, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, defended the introduction of presidential rule on the ground that there was no possibility of forming an alternative government in the state after the defeat of the Sankar ministry and assured the Lok Sabha that "free and fair" elections to the Assembly would be held in March, 1965. In the meanwhile, the Minister announced, a parliamentary committee consisting of 30 members of the Parliament would be set up to aid and advise the President in the administration of the state.<sup>51</sup>

The Opposition in the Lok Sabha centered its attack on the "constant, perennial, perpetual pursuit" of the Congress Party to undermine the opposition parties in Kerala in order to make "a majority in the legislature, if not a majority... mandate from the people of Kerala."<sup>52</sup> N. G. Ranga indirectly brought the late Nehru into the debate and said:

Bit by bit, they [Congressmen] swallowed up the other people, demoralized some others and in the end they emerged as the single party Government, as the Congress Government. Some blame must be placed at the doors of the former Prime Minister.<sup>53</sup>

The Muslim Leaguer Koya from Kerala blamed the Congress High Command for humiliating the dissidents while Warrior (Communist) blamed Sankar for pursuing "police" and "administrative" policies against the people of Kerala.

The debate in the Lok Sabha was generally dull. The Speaker had to ring the quorum bell several times. "It does not look nice,"

said the Speaker, "that the people should listen to the quorum bell four or five times a day. It is not dignifying."<sup>54</sup>

Spatial and Temporal comparisons:

No other state of India, including Kerala, experienced any incumbency crisis during the period 1964-67. B. P. Chaliha of Assam and K. B. Sahay of Bihar had some problems with minority factions within their respective Congress Legislative Parties. However, in neither case did the tensions pose any serious threat to the incumbent Chief Ministers. The Congress High Command, on its part, appealed for stability in both the cases in view of the emergency situation in the country.<sup>55</sup> The tensions did not quite blow over but subsided till the General Elections of 1967.

In view of the fact that we do not have any other case of incumbency crisis, we cannot make any spatial or temporal comparison with the Kerala case. However, the Kerala case does show that despite the positive attitude of the Center toward R. Sankar, the Center could not help him stay in office. To begin with, the Center was reluctant to intervene in - even to mediate - the factional fight between Sankar and Chacko, and when at last it did intervene, it could not stop the political funeral that followed. The episode was obviously unfortunate for the Congress because it was for the first time since 1952 that the party was able to form a government in Kerala on its own.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the structural crises, two possible explanations for the lack of incumbency crisis in other states may be mentioned as a passing reference: (a) the uncertain state of politics at the Center; and (b) the forthcoming General Elections (1967). Both (a) and (b) seemed to have frozen intra-party conflicts at the state level.

## STRUCTURAL CRISES:

Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Punjab: July 5, 1966 - November 1, 1966

After 1959, when Bombay was bifurcated into Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking states, Punjabi was the only language out of the fourteen official Indian languages without a state of its own. The Sikhs of Punjab who speak Punjabi had been agitating for a long time for a linguistic state but the Center had always declined to submit to their demand on account of numerous economic and geographical reasons. Behind the Center's reluctance to set up a Punjabi-speaking state was the unstated fear that "acceptance of the Sikh demand would create on India's sensitive border with Pakistan a small state inhabited by a community whose religious sentiments might be exploited by Pakistan to generate political turmoil. Many in the government also believed that a Punjabi-speaking state would soon lead to a Sikh demand for secession from India."<sup>56</sup>

In the summer of 1965, the Akali Dal - the Sikhs' political organization - revived their demand for a Punjabi-speaking state. Master Tara Singh, the leader of the smaller faction in the Akali Dal, declared on August 2, 1965 that he would contact the Sikh masses and mobilize them for securing a "self-determined political status" for the Sikhs of Punjab. On August 7-8, Sant Fateh Singh, the leader of the majority faction in the Akali Dal, met Lal Bahadur Shastri, who refused to accept the demand for a Punjabi Subha (Punjabi-speaking province), whereupon Sant Fateh Singh announced that he would begin a fast on September 10 and if the demand was not conceded by then, he would burn himself to death on September 25 in the Golden Temple at Amritsar. The war with Pakistan intervened and the Sant, on appeal from the Center, postponed his fast indefinitely.

The day after the cease-fire with Pakistan was declared, the Home Minister announced in the Lok Sabha on September 23, 1965, that a Cabinet Committee would be set up to examine the issue of Punjabi Subha and that a Parliamentary Committee drawn from both the Houses, with Hukam Singh (Speaker of the Lok Sabha) as chairman, would be formed to assist the Cabinet Committee.<sup>57</sup>

With Indira's succession to the Prime Ministership, events moved fast. On February 13, 1966, Indira Gandhi set up another sub-committee of the Cabinet and only a week later there were indications that the Center would accept the demand for the Subha. The final decision was not late in coming. On March 9, with the dissenting vote of Morarji Desai, the Congress High Command adopted the following resolution:

Out of the existing State of Punjab, a State with Punjabi as the State language be formed. The Government is requested to take necessary steps for the purpose.<sup>58</sup>

The suddenness of the decision shocked the Hindu population of Punjab which constituted 45% of the total population of the state. The right-wing Hindu Jan Sangh party denounced the decision as an "abject surrender to separatism, masquerading in the garb of the demand for a linguistic State."<sup>59</sup> On March 10, 1966, Yagya Dutt Sharma, general secretary of the Punjab Jan Sangh party, began a "fast unto death" as a protest against the Central decision. On March 11, the Punjab Congress Legislative Party met under the leadership of Chief Minister Ram Kishan but adopted no resolution in respect of whether it supported or opposed the decision of the Congress High Command. Ram Kishan, however, stated after the meeting that "we accept the resolution [ ] of the High Command [ ] as loyal Congressmen."<sup>60</sup>

The riots that followed the announcement of the Central decision

were so severe that the Punjab government had not only to ban public meetings and demonstrations but also order to "shoot at sight" in some cities of Punjab, particularly Amritsar. And yet the worst happened on March 15. In the Hindu-dominant city of Panipat, students tried to force shopkeepers to observe a hartal (closing shops in protest), and when three veteran Congressmen refused to close a shop owned by one of them the mob locked them in, set fire to the shop, and stoned it to prevent them from escaping. The result was that all three of them were burnt to death. From here, the contagion spread to the Sikh-dominant cities of Ludhiana and Jullundur where shop-burning and looting went on with a vengeance. At the same time, riots broke out in Delhi, right under the nose of the Center, between the Jan Sangh and the Akali supporters, resulting in injuries to over 100 people. By March 21, the Punjab government had arrested over 2,000 people. The situation eased a while after the Central Government agreed to the creation of another Hindu-dominant state of Haryana out of the state of Punjab. On May 31, the Punjab Boundary Commission, appointed to put forward proposals for the division of the state of Punjab submitted its report to the Central Government which accepted it after certain modifications. However, the dispute arose over the capital city of Chandigarh - built in 1953, it was designed by the late M. Le Corbusier, the famous French architect, and considered to be "the world's most important examples of modern town-planning".<sup>61</sup> The majority opinion of the Punjab Boundary Commission was to include the city in Haryana while the minority opinion was to include it in Punjab. On June 7, 1966, an all-party deputation from Haryana met Mrs. Gandhi and pressed for the acceptance of the majority opinion of the Boundary Commission; the next day, three deputations from Punjab met the Central leaders and contended for the

inclusion of the city in Punjab. Master Tara Singh of the Akali Dal started agitating for a privileged position for the Punjabi Subha "with a token right to secede" despite the Home Minister's warning to the secessionists that he would not "tolerate" any such agitation and that "any talk of a self-determination status for the Sikhs was inconceivable."<sup>62</sup>

Faced with the impasse, the Central Government decided on June 9 that Chandigarh and a 10-mile area around it would be constituted into a Union Territory and would form the capital of both Punjab and Haryana for some time to come. Anticipating trouble over this decision and over the division of assets and liabilities between the two proposed new states, the Chief Minister of Punjab, Ram Kishan, tendered his cabinet's resignation to the Governor on June 22, 1966. The Chief Minister later told the Press that his resignation was meant to pave the way for "a smooth reorganization of the State."<sup>63</sup> Since no alternative government was possible, the Governor recommended to the President to take over the administration of the state during the period of reorganization. On July 5, 1966, presidential rule was declared, suspending the powers of the State legislature until the partition of the state was completed. On November 1, presidential rule was withdrawn when the reorganized Punjab Congress Legislative Party elected its new leader, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, who became the Chief Minister of the state.

The Lok Sabha approved the presidential proclamation on August 31, 1966 without much debate. "Though it was not essential," said the Home Minister in the House, "to declare presidential rule for reorganization of the state, it led to the abnormal situation when the Chief Minister resigned his office effective June 22, 1966."<sup>64</sup> The Opposition charged the Government that it misused Article 356 of

the Constitution for the reorganization of the state because it had never been so used before - not even when a major reorganization of the states was carried in 1956. Referring to the suspension of the state legislature, both Umanath and Alvares asked the Government why the Kerala State Assembly had been dissolved and not suspended in the wake of Kerala reorganization in 1956. This tends to show, they said, that suspension or dissolution depends not on national interest or on the "interests of the people of this country at large"<sup>65</sup> but on partisan interests. In Kerala, said Alvares, the Congress

did not want the opposition to form the Government and therefore, the Kerala Assembly was dissolved. In Punjab, because of the need to preserve the interests of the Congress party, President's rule / suspending the legislature / is introduced.<sup>66</sup>

However, the Statesman in its editorial regarded the entire controversy as a mere "quibbling":

It is mere quibbling to argue that since there has been no breakdown of constitutional machinery in the State it will be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution to have recourse to its emergency provisions. Though this machinery has not broken down in the literal sense and one party has a clear majority in the State Legislature, it has become extremely difficult to work it because of the impending division of Punjab into two States. Knowing that it will be soon split into two the Legislature is already a house divided against itself.<sup>67</sup>

#### Spatial and Temporal comparisons:

During the period 1964-67, the state of Punjab did not experience any crisis other than the one discussed. As such, spatial comparisons are not possible. The only other sub-system which experienced a structural crisis was the Union territory of Goa. Temporal comparison between the Punjab case and the Goa case follows after the discussion of the Goa crisis.



Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Goa: December 3, 1966 - April 5, 1967

Goa, the first Western foothold on the Indian subcontinent and the last of the colonial possessions to be relinquished, is triangular in shape and territorially about sixty-five miles long and thirty-seven miles across at its widest point. It lies some two hundred miles south of the city of Bombay and is wedged between the states of Maharashtra and Mysore. With Daman and Diu, two erstwhile tiny Portuguese settlements north of Bombay, Goa formed part of the Portuguese empire in India from 1510 until 1961, when the Indian army "liberated" it. A year later, Goa, Daman and Diu together were designated as a Union Territory by the Government of India.

The population of Goa is about six hundred and fifty thousand; one out of every three Goans is Christian. Though the mother-tongue of Goans is Konkani, about one third of the population speaks Portuguese. Most of the Goans are "European" in their style of life and generally pride themselves of being able to speak English fluently. Panjim, the capital city, is generally regarded as the whirl of excitement and fun.

In the first general elections held in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu on December 3, 1963, the Congress party suffered a heavy defeat. The distribution of seats in the Legislative Assembly was as follows:

Goa Assembly 1963

Name of the party	Seats in the Assembly
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak	14
United Goans	12
Independents	3
Congress	1
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>30</b>

The main issue in the election was the future relationship of the Territory to the Indian Union. The winning Maharashtrawadi Gomantak party had advocated immediate merger of the Territory with the neighbouring state of Maharashtra while the United Goans had demanded the establishment of a separate state of Goa within the Indian Union. The Congress had proposed that the Territory should retain its present status for some time to come; its failure to take a clear stand on the merger issue was the result of the differences between the Maharashtra and Mysore Congress leaders, both of whom wanted Goa to be merged with their own states.

Despite the defeat of the Congress party, of which Nehru said that he was "surprised and pained", the Central Government failed to take a clear position on the merger issue. On December 14, 1963, Nehru repeated his earlier statement that "Goa should continue to remain a separate entity for some time, and we should wait for some more time to finally decide the issue."<sup>68</sup> On April 7, 1964, the merger issue cropped up before the Congress High Command because of the tense feelings in Goa but, once again, no clear-cut decision was reached.

After Nehru's death, the pressure to merge Goa with Maharashtra multiplied. Both the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak party under the leadership of Goa Chief Minister, Dayanand Bandodkar, and the Congress party in Maharashtra (which had now realised its fresh potential because of the powerful position of Maharashtrian Y. B. Chavan in the Shastri cabinet) started pressuring the Center to decide the issue. On November 6, 1964, Y. B. Chavan supported the demand for the merger of Goa with Maharashtra by announcing that the victory of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak party in Goa was already "a decisive vote" in favour of the merger. Two days later, a five-member delegation headed by V. Patil, President of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee, discussed the matter with

Shastri and Kamaraj in New Delhi. However, once again, the issue was postponed.

The pressures:

Since the Congress High Command could not come out with a decision, the pressure acquired a novel texture. On January 23, 1965, the Goa Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in the midst of a noisy scene asking the Central Government to merge Goa with Maharashtra.<sup>69</sup> On March 10, the Maharashtra Legislature unanimously adopted a resolution moved by the Chief Minister, V. P. Naik, urging the Central Parliament and the Government of India to "take immediately all such measures, including an amendment of the Constitution, as are necessary to make Goa an integral part of the State of Maharashtra."<sup>70</sup> Five days later, on March 15, the Mysore Legislative Assembly came up with its resolution urging that, in accordance with Nehru's policy, the status quo in Goa should continue for a period of 10 years. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had recently overcome the language crisis (which, in a way, was a concession to the South, of which Mysore is a part as against Maharashtra which was a pro-Hindi state), found himself in a quandary. While he was dependent on the Syndicate, of which S. Nijalingappa, the Chief Minister of Mysore, was a key member for party support, he was equally obligated to Y. B. Chavan of Maharashtra who had moved the pendulum in his favour in the succession battle. Then came the Indo-Pakistan War, which helped Shastri to postpone the issue for a while.

With Mrs. Gandhi's succession, events moved fast. Given Y. B. Chavan as the Home Minister in her cabinet, the Goa issue could not be postponed any further. The decision on the creation of Punjabi Subha also had some kind of a psychological impact on the masses in terms of the returns which protest politics could bring during those years

of Indira's uncertainty.

The crisis

The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party ignited an agitation in Goa despite being the government party. This was followed by a warning from Maharashtra that all of its disputes with Mysore on boundary issues should be settled immediately. Maharashtra laid its claims on the towns of Belgaum, Nipani and Karwar on the northern border of Mysore and suggested their immediate merger with Maharashtra. On April 5, 1966, the Maharashtra Legislature, in its unanimous resolution, warned the Central Government that the

non-fulfilment of this demand ... will not only prove harmful to the interests of the State but also to the unity and integrity of the whole nation.<sup>71</sup>

With Shiva Sena - a para-military organization - using the slogan of "Maharashtra for Maharashtrians", a violent agitation against the South Indians in Maharashtra broke out under the Shiva Sena leader, Bal Thackersey. While the Chief Minister of Madras condemned the activities of the Shiva Sena as "atrocious and barbarous", the Mysore Chief Minister urged the Maharashtra Chief Minister to curb this lawlessness. In the meanwhile, the Mysoreans started their agitation against the Maharashtrians and an "anti-Shiva Sena" movement commenced in Madras.

Mrs. Gandhi acted quickly. On October 17, 1966, she appointed a one-man Boundary Commission to give its award on all the outstanding boundary disputes between Maharashtra and Mysore and between Mysore and Kerala. However, she separated the issue of Goa from the Maharashtra-Mysore boundary disputes and decided to conduct a free and fair plebiscite on the merger issue. While both Maharashtra and Mysore agreed with her suggestion, the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Government in Goa did not, for

it argued that the electoral victory of the party on the pro-merger issue was already a decisive vote of the people in favour of the merger. However, the reluctance of the Goa Government was soon broken up when the United Goans party aroused passionate anti-merger feelings expressed in demonstrations and protests all over Goa. The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak party probably realised that any suppression of the public demand was not only impossible but might well cost it a few seats in the next elections. Thus, it preferred to resign on December 3, 1966, giving a free hand to the Central Government to conduct a referendum on the merger issue. The same day, presidential rule was declared, suspending, as in the case of Punjab, the Goa Legislative Assembly.

In January 1967, about 80% of the electorate cast their vote on the merger issue, and of these 54 percent were for the continuation of Union Territory status while 43 per cent opted for the merger.<sup>72</sup> The presidential rule continued till April 5, 1967. By then, the new Assembly was elected which replaced the old Assembly.

#### Spatial and Temporal comparisons:

Goa did not experience any other structural crisis during the period under analysis. In terms of temporal comparisons, we can compare the Goa case with the Punjab case.

There are many similarities between the Punjab case and the Goa case. Both are cases of structural crises because neither the Punjab Government nor the Goa Government was in a position to hold itself against the massive agitations that preceded their resignations. In fact, the tensions preceding the reorganization of Punjab and the plebiscite in Goa had already partially paralyzed the administrative machinery of the two sub-systems. The Sikhs of Punjab had not only demonstrated at various places in Punjab but also demanded the resignation

of the Government because of its failure to protect life and property of the Sikhs in Punjab. The Chandigarh issue was still undecided and the Sikhs were psychologically prepared to march on Chandigarh if the decision was not taken in their favour. With Sikhs constituting the majority in the police force of the state, the Hindu Chief Minister Ram Kishan anticipated a lot of trouble for himself and, in fact, the events that followed the reorganization of the state proved him right.<sup>73</sup>

In Goa, Dr. Jack de Sequeira, leader of the anti-merger United Goans party (also as the leader of the Opposition in the Goa Legislative Assembly) had whipped up a huge agitation against the Maharashtrians. "Maharashtrians," he said, "are very aggressive people. They have expansionist ideas, and they think that Maharashtra is a law unto itself."<sup>74</sup> Since the Goa Government was in favour of the merger, it could not legitimately use coercive methods to control the agitation, all the more so when the Central Government was willing to hold a plebiscite on the issue. Besides, the Goa Government lost much of its standing on the issue when both the Maharashtra and the Mysore leaders agreed to the device of plebiscite.

"As far the Central Government is concerned, in neither case did it act in haste in declaring the presidential rule. In both the cases, the Governments resigned on their own and there was no possibility of forming any alternative Governments at the time of their resignations. The Legislative Assemblies of both the states were suspended and not dissolved under presidential rule. However, while the Punjab Legislative Assembly was revived on November 1, 1966, the Goa Assembly was not. The reason for the difference was quite simple. In Punjab, the Congress Legislative Party which formed the Government had taken no stand on the issue of reorganization. On the contrary, the Goa government was one

of the parties to the issue of merger, and since the anti-merger forces had won in the plebiscite, it could not legitimately reconstitute itself after the verdict of the people. Besides, the General Elections were due to take place almost a month after the plebiscite and it was more logical to keep the Assembly suspended till that time.

If we compare both the Punjab and the Goa cases with the two cases of structural crises (PEPSU 1953; Kerala 1959) during the Nehru era, we find a marked change in the attitude of the Center. Both in the case of PEPSU and Kerala, the Governments were dismissed and the Assemblies dissolved, much to the protest of Chief Ministers who claimed to be in a position to manage the administration of their respective states. The Center in both cases, unlike in the Punjab and the Goa cases, was accused of partisan interests. Neither the Government in PEPSU nor in Kerala had submitted their resignations voluntarily - the PEPSU Chief Minister was asked by the Center to resign while the Kerala Chief Minister never resigned - unlike in the Punjab and the Goa cases, where the Chief Ministers resigned on their own. In the Goa case, the Center allowed sufficient time to the non-Congress Government to deliberate on the plebiscite issue till the Government itself preferred to resign. Had the PEPSU and the Kerala Legislative Assemblies been suspended and not dissolved, the scenario, perhaps, would have been different.

While both in the case of Punjab and Goa, the Center faced protest politics, in the case of the Kerala crisis that follows, it was so scared by the violent and anti-system activities of the communists that it did not let the newly elected Kerala Legislative Assembly even hold its first session.

## SYSTEMIC CRISIS:

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Kerala: March 24, 1965 - March 6, 1967

This presidential rule in Kerala was the most atypical of the presidential rules ever introduced in the history of post-independent India. Longest in its duration, it marked the pre-natal death of the Kerala Legislative Assembly because it was introduced even before the Assembly, fresh from elections, was able to hold its first session.

In the mid-term elections held to the Kerala Legislative Assembly in March 1965, the Communist Party (Marxists) gained the largest number of seats as the following table shows:

## Kerala Assembly 1965

<u>Name of the Party</u>	<u>Seats in the Assembly</u>
CPI (Marxists)	40
Congress	36
Kerala Congress	23
Socialists	13*
Muslim League	6
CPI	3
Swatantra	1
Karshaka Thoshilali	1
Independents	10

TOTAL:133

\* The Socialists were aligned with the Marxists.

Source: D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965).

The crisis:

Soon after the results were declared, the Governor reported to the President that "it was impossible for a representative Government to come into existence as a result of the recent elections to the State Assembly". The Governor had come to the conclusion, after consulting all the parties, that it would not be possible "for the Communist Party to command a working majority even if those of its members who were in detention



were free to function / *italics mine* / as members of the Assembly."<sup>75</sup>

The President, on receipt of this report from the Governor, dissolved the Assembly without its having been convened even once and declared presidential rule in the state.

Why was the Assembly not convened? Why was presidential rule imposed so suddenly? The Congress with 36 members in an Assembly of 133 was obviously in no position to form the government, all the more so as it was badly split within. The only party capable of forming the government was the Communist Party (Marxists), which could muster support of the Socialists and a few others who were elected with its support. However, the circumstances since the Sino-Indian War of 1962 were such that the Central Government could not risk the security of the country by handing over the control of the state to a party which had given every evidence of being less than patriotic. The general feeling all over the country except, perhaps, in the minds of the electorate in Kerala was that the Marxists were not only unpatriotic but also "traitors" who had sold their national conscience, if they had one, to the cause of international communism. A brief history of the Marxists since the Sino-Indian War is relevant to an understanding of the frightful dangers they aroused in the minds of the Central leaders.

The CPI's attitude toward the Sino-Indian War of 1962 laid the seeds of its split, which was complete by 1964. To begin with, there were three different opinions in respect of the Chinese aggression within the Communist Party: the Muscovite Dange group which not only condemned the aggression but also gave a call to the people to unite "in defense of the motherland"; the centrist Namboodripad-Basu group which preferred to keep quiet till they were threatened by the masses to condemn the aggression; and the Gopalan-Sundarayya group which publicly

propagated that not only the Chinese had committed no aggression but that the major fault lay with the Indian bourgeois government. After two years, the Muscovites came to be known as the CPI (Rightists), the rest as the CPI (Marxists). The Marxists later claimed that they were not "pro-Chinese" but they persisted in their denunciation of the Indian Government in the Sino-Indian War. While the fighting was still continuing on the northern border, the Marxist B. T. Ranadive was reported in the press to have expressed publicly his disbelief in the Indian Government's version of the Chinese aggression.<sup>76</sup> In the South, P. Sundarayya declared on October 23, 1962 that a communist government could never have expansionist designs against any other country.<sup>77</sup> Similar statements were made by Hare Krishna Konar, Promode Das Gupta and others in West Bengal, with an addition that the Indian version of the aggression was "politically motivated".<sup>78</sup>

While most of the Marxists leaders were arrested and detained for almost a year following the Chinese aggression, quite a number among them had gone underground and were a source of constant nuisance for the Central Government. By 1964, the Marxists appeared to be turning "extremists" and "pro-Chinese". At the Calcutta congress in November 1964, the Marxist party expressed its skepticism of using parliamentary institutions for a fundamental transformation of the Indian society:

There are a large number of people who think that this government can be replaced by a People's Democratic Government by utilizing the parliament ushered in by the new Constitution .... Even a liberal would now feel ashamed .... Hence, the road that will lead us to freedom and peace, land and bread ...has to be found elsewhere.<sup>79</sup>

And later, the Tamil journal of the party wrote:

This government cannot be removed by parliamentary methods.... There is no doubt that our revolutionary campaign will sweep away all their tactics .... Let us follow the teachings of Mao Tse-tung. [italics mine].<sup>80</sup>

The threats of the Marxists were not simply "paper-tigers". In August 1964, the Marxists were about to lead a countrywide food agitation when the Central Government arrested about 1300 of them. In Maharashtra, they led all the Opposition parties to a one-day general strike which brought the entire public life to a stop. In December 1964, there was a severe danger to public life on account of the underground activities of the Marxists when the Central Government arrested about 700 of them in a countrywide swoop.<sup>81</sup> On January 1, 1965, Gulzarilal Nanda, the Central Home Minister, went on the national radio network to express his concern about the violent and anti-national activities of the Marxists and followed this up by placing a 45-page White Paper before the Parliament in February.<sup>82</sup> Nanda accused the Marxists of "preparing the rank and file for armed struggle and guerrilla warfare," of serving as "Peking's instrument," and of attempting to work out "an internal violent revolution to synchronize with the fresh Chinese attack." Nanda might have over-estimated the Marxist danger, but the fact that the Marxists refused to condemn the Chinese ultimatum during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (see, International environment in Part I of this chapter) does show that he was not all that wrong.

The open confrontation was yet to come. When E. M. S. Namboodripad (CPI - Marxist) put up 39 detainees as candidates for the Kerala Legislative Assembly elections in March 1965 despite the Home Minister's unequivocal declaration that the detainees would never be released even if elected, it was apparent that he was not interested in forming the government. His main object was to "expose" the Congress Government in New Delhi, drive popular frustration still deeper and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of parliamentary democracy to solve the state's main political problems. Unfortunate for the Center, 29 of the 39

detainees were elected to the Assembly. Whether the Kerala electorate made the right or the wrong choice, the Center, weakened by food and language riots, could hardly risk a systemic crisis by releasing the detainees. Since no other political party was in a position to form the government, the President took over the administration of the state on March 24, 1965.

The Lok Sabha approved the proclamation on May 7, 1965. Jaisukhlal Hathi, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, defended the proclamation on the ground that "no party had secured an absolute majority or anything approaching it and no party by itself was in a position to form a government"<sup>83</sup> with the result that presidential rule had to be declared in the state. The Congress party, he said, was willing to give "responsive cooperation" to any government that could be formed but was not willing to act in coalition with any other party.

The crux of the attack of the Opposition was that (a) Namboodripad (Marxist) was willing to form the government but that the fact that 29 of his supporters were not released tended to show the "hypocrisy" of the Central Government; and (b) it was unconstitutional to dissolve an Assembly when it had not been summoned even for the first time. This "pre-natal" death of the Assembly, said H. V. Kamath, was "illegitimate and indecent".<sup>84</sup>

Besides the attack of the Opposition that the action of the President was illegitimate "morally, constitutionally, politically or otherwise",<sup>85</sup> some of the veteran Congressmen were equally critical. K. Santhanam warned that "to resort frequently to these articles relating to emergency ... will amount to deliberate sabotage of democracy",<sup>86</sup> and Dr. Hare Krishna Mahatab, a former Chief Minister of Orissa, remarked

that "the decision on Kerala had no precedent in any other part of the world and [was] in sharp conflict with whatever parliamentary democracy stood for."<sup>87</sup> Khadlikar, another Congressman, advised the party not to undermine democracy "in the name of fighting communism."<sup>88</sup>

On November 3, the Government sought extension of the presidential rule for a further period of six months. The debate in the Lok Sabha lasted four days till the extension was approved on November 8, 1965. The Central Government based the extension argument on the Governor's new report which said:

The general opinion in the state is that, if the elections are held now, the results would be much the same as they were in the mid-term elections.... All the leaders of the parties except E. M. S. Namboodripad [Marxist] said with varying degrees of emphasis that it would not be advisable to hold elections during the emergency.<sup>89</sup>

The attack of the Opposition was along the lines of N. C. Chatterjee who said that while in the earlier cases of presidential rule, "there was a political breakdown; a Ministry was functioning, and the Ministry resigned or was defeated and no other Ministry could be formed, [in the present case] you did not allow the legislature to meet. You did not allow the single largest party leader to try to form a coalition."<sup>90</sup> Some of the Members suggested that it would be better to outlaw the Marxists than to postpone the elections.

On May 7, 1966, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Government sought another extension of the presidential rule from the Parliament. Moving the resolution, Jaisukhlal Hathi said that a further extension was necessary because:

- i. no political party had any clear chance of winning elections if they were held at this stage; and
- ii. the General Elections were due in February 1967 and to hold elections earlier in Kerala would not be "worthwhile".

The line of attack of the Opposition was that the Government was seeking an extension because the Congress had no chance of winning the elections and that this was nothing but a clever move to keep the communists out. After all, said N. G. Ranga (Swatantra), the elections were held in Orissa in late 1961 despite the fact that the General Elections were due in early 1962. H. N. Mukerjee was extremely critical of the extension and warned the Government against treating the people of Kerala as "de-facto third class citizens". He concluded his remarks by characterizing the request for extension as "utterly undignified, utterly unjustified, and utterly undemocratic."<sup>91</sup> On May 9, the Lok Sabha granted the request for extension after the Home Minister assured the House that "if any party gained majority after the elections, the Congress will be too happy to allow that party to function."<sup>92</sup>

The last and the final request for extension of presidential rule came before the Parliament on November 7, 1966, and was granted by the Lok Sabha the next day. The grounds for extension were too familiar. Since the previous extension was to expire one month before the General Elections scheduled to be held in February, 1967, the request for extension needed no defence. However, some of the Opposition Members of the Parliament used this opportunity to censure the performance of bureaucracy and police in Kerala under the presidential rule. A. K. Gopalan, now out of jail, wanted an assurance from the Home Minister that the majority verdict of the electorate in Kerala would be respected after the elections.<sup>93</sup>

As scheduled, the elections in Kerala were held in February, 1967. The results gave the Marxist United Front a working majority to form the government under the Chief Ministership of E. M. Namboodripad, though it lasted only a little over two years.

Spatial and Temporal comparisons:

There is no other case of systemic crisis during the period under analysis. As such, comparisons are not possible.

PART IV: CRISES WHICH DID NOT CULMINATE IN PRESIDENTIAL RULE: 1964-67

This section of the chapter was designed to look at crises in all the states of India in order to find a crisis-resolution pattern on an all-India basis. However, since the preceding section has virtually exhausted all the crises that emerged during the period 1964-67, this section has been modified to describe ministerial changes in all the states of India. These ministerial changes, though brought about for reasons other than the breakdown of "constitutional machinery", are important to look at because they not only supplement our analysis but also help us understand the changing style of politics after the Nehru era.

In all the states of India, the Chief Ministers of the Nehru era continued undisturbed except in cases where:

- i. the presidential rule was declared (Kerala, Punjab, Goa); and
- ii. the Center, under pressure from the opposition parties, investigated corruption charges against the Chief Ministers and found them guilty.

The names of the Chief Ministers convicted or exonerated of the corruption charges and the consequences that followed are shown in Table 4.2 on the next page.

Punjab: Partap Singh Kairon

The Das Commission submitted its report to Lal Bahadur Shastri on June 11, 1964, confirming several charges of corruption and "abuse of influence" by Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, one of the Chief Ministers who had been defended most strongly by the late Jawaharlal Nehru. Here

TABLE 4.2  
CHIEF MINISTERS INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION CHARGES  
1964-67

State	Chief Minister	Investigating Agency (year)	Consequences.
Punjab	Partap Singh Kairon	Quasi-judicial Das Commission (1964)	Guilty; resigned.
Andhra	N. Sanjiva Reddy	Supreme Court of India (1964)	Guilty; resigned.
Orissa	Biren Mitra	Central Bureau of Investi- gation(CBI) (1965)	Constructively guilty; resigned.
Mysore	S. Nijalingappa	Central Bureau of Investi- gation (1965)	Not guilty; continued as Chief Minister.
Bihar	K. B. Sahay	Central Bureau of Investi- gation (1965)	Not guilty; continued as Chief Minister.



it is interesting to compare the report of the Das Commission with that of the verdict of Nehru given in May 1958 on the activities and conduct of Sardar Kairon. The Das Commission reported:

There is no getting away from the fact that Sardar Partap Singh Kairon knew or had more than ample reason to think or suspect that his sons and relatives were allegedly exploiting his influence and power.<sup>94</sup>

And Nehru had written:

The Chief Minister Kairon is 'constructively responsible' for some of the improprieties which Kairon, as a person [*italics mine*] may not be aware of.<sup>95</sup>

On June 15, 1964, Partap Singh Kairon resigned and was replaced by Ram Kishan. In February 1965, Kairon met a tragic end when he was assassinated in broad daylight just outside Delhi.

#### Andhra Pradesh: N. Sanjiva Reddy

N. Sanjiva Reddy of Andhra - one of the key members of the Syndicate - resigned his office when the Supreme Court of India held him guilty of acting with bias in nationalizing the Kurnool district bus services. "We are constrained," said the Supreme Court judgement, "to hold that the allegations that the Chief Minister was motivated by bias and personal ill-will against the appellants stand unrebutted."<sup>96</sup> Reddy resigned on February 28, but in June 1964 he was accommodated by Lal Bahadur Shastri in his cabinet.

#### Orissa: Biren Mitra

Biren Mitra of Orissa resigned on February 1, 1965 even though the Center did not insist on his resignation. Presenting the report of the Cabinet sub-committee based on the findings of the Central Bureau of Investigation to the Parliament on February 22, Lal Bahadur Shastri

said:

The committee came to the conclusion that their examination of the material available did not reveal that Mr. Patnaik / former Chief Minister of Orissa / or Mr. Mitra had personally derived any pecuniary benefit from the various transactions in which they were concerned. The committee, however, found that in several transactions improprieties were definitely involved for which responsibility had to be borne by Mr. Patnaik and Mr. Mitra.<sup>97</sup>

Mysore: S. Nijalingappa

Bihar: K. B. Sahay

Both the Chief Ministers of Mysore and Bihar were exonerated of the charges of corruption and maladministration on the basis of the findings of the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Comments:

Though it is difficult to vouch-safe that the investigations conducted by the Shastri Government through its own agency of the Central Bureau of Investigation were without bias - both B. Patnaik and his factotum Biren Mitra of Orissa had sided with Morarji Desai in the succession crisis while Shastri was known for his closeness with K. B. Sahay (incidentally, both belonged to the Kasyastha caste) and S. Nijalingappa of Mysore (through K. Kamara) - the fact that Shastri's decisions on investigations were accepted by the persons affected without question tends to show that his investigations did not put the wrong persons in the dock. Both the press and the public in general applauded Shastri's action in cleansing "Nehru's mess". Unlike Nehru, Shastri did not show any reluctance to investigate "high-ups" whenever such investigations were pressed by the opposition parties. Again, unlike Nehru, Shastri did not entrust the investigative function to the Congress party channels. On the contrary, he always set up a Cabinet sub-committee which was aided by the Central Bureau of Investigation and not by the

Congress workers. True to his image as an incorruptible person, Shastri nationalized the issue of clean administration and psychologically prepared the public to demand the exit of Chief Ministers and others of doubtful integrity.

However, neither Shastri nor Indira tried to get unnecessarily involved in state politics. Shastri intervened in Kerala (1964) at the eleventh hour and having failed to compromise the differences, found no way except to bring the state under presidential rule. In 1965, he had, once again, to declare presidential rule in Kerala because it was a bad time to risk a systemic crisis by allowing the Marxists - with all their known activities and future designs - to form the government of the state. In this case, Shastri sided, and rightly so, with the national opinion of the time which regarded the Marxists as less than patriotic. Mrs. Indira Gandhi had little choice but to declare presidential rule in Punjab and Goa (1966) once the ministries of both the states had resigned on their own. Despite the fact that Goa, unlike Punjab, had a non-Congress ministry, the Assemblies of both the states were treated equally - both were suspended - under the presidential rule.

To be sure, neither Shastri nor Indira could have acted more vigorously if more crises had emerged at the state level during the period under analysis. With the Congress High Command projecting itself like a face in a cracked mirror, both Shastri and Indira had severe limitations in acting freely. At the same time, the power-vacuum at the Center "froze" many of the conflicts and tensions that could have resulted in sub-system crises. The Congress intra-party conflicts at the state level, which had hitherto been a major source of sub-system crises, declined all too suddenly between 1964 and early 1967, because neither the majority nor the minority factions had a clear-cut view

of the future balance of power at the Center. Shastri died too soon and too suddenly, and Indira was a "stop-gap" arrangement as the nation viewed it.<sup>98</sup> With the General Elections approaching in 1967, neither the Chief Ministers nor their adversaries wanted to pre-empt their choice of selecting the future Prime Minister of the country by committing their support to the present uncertain Prime Minister.

Though the future had started casting its shadows when the Central Election Committee of the Congress High Command began, in late 1966, its task of distributing party tickets for the forthcoming General Elections and found itself helplessly divided on the selection of a number of candidates,<sup>99</sup> the results of the Elections, followed by the Syndicate's "imposition" of Morarji Desai on Indira's cabinet as a shrewd move to check her designs, destroyed whatever little consensus existed in the Congress High Command. And, with defection politics that followed the elections, the political system moved out from its consensual phase to a praetorian phase which will be the subject of discussion in the next chapter.

## FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Major C. L. Datta, aide-de-camp to the President of India, recorded Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's reactions to Jawaharlal Nehru's speech in his book, With Two Presidents: The Inside Story (Bombay: Vikas, 1970): 115.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 131.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 131.

<sup>4</sup>For details about the new schemes and how Nehru, in the wake of opposition, watered them down after Morarji Desai's exit from the Nehru cabinet, see, Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life, Vol. II (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974): 190-196. For a critical analysis of Gold Control Order, see, Robert W. Stern, The Process of Opposition in India: Two Case Studies of How Policy Shapes Politics (Chicago: University, 1970).

<sup>5</sup>For a sympathetic assessment of the failures in India's Five Year Plans, see, Barbara Ward, India and the West: Pattern for a Common Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964): 222-230.

<sup>6</sup>Since the 1960s, voluminous literature has appeared describing the wastefulness of projects like the community development and panchayati raj. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: Wiley, 1964): 266-83; A. H. Hanson, The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans 1950-64 (London: Oxford, 1966); George Rosen, Democracy and Economic Change in India (Berkeley: University, 1967).

<sup>7</sup>See, Kuldip Nayar, Between The Lines (Bombay: Allied, 1969): 3.

<sup>8</sup>Interview recorded by Kuldip Nayar, Ibid., 3.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>10</sup>Nehru himself wrote about these rumours and conspiracies to Atulya Ghosh. "The atmosphere," wrote Nehru, "in Delhi has been tense and full of suspicion, and so everything is made to feed the suspicions of some people." A photostat copy of Nehru's letter dated October 18, 1963 is published in Atulya Ghosh, The Split in Indian National Congress (Calcutta: Jayanti, 1970): Annexure A.

<sup>11</sup>We have already referred to the Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat crises in chapter III. In both the cases, Nehru was opposed by Morarji Desai. Nehru kamarajed C. B. Gupta of U.P. contrary to the advice of Morarji Desai while Morarji managed to get Dr. Jivraj removed from the Chief Ministership of Gujarat despite Nehru's support of Mehta.

<sup>12</sup>Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 2.

<sup>13</sup>The Times of India, August 22, 1963 records part of the debate.

<sup>14</sup>See, New York Times, August 23, 1963.

<sup>15</sup>Kuldip Navar, op.cit., 3.

<sup>16</sup>Except in the case of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, the successors to the outgoing Chief Ministers were more the choice of the purged Chief Ministers than of Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, K. Kamaraj of Madras left his perch to M. Bhaktavatsalam; B. Patnaik to Biren Mitra; Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed to G. M. Sadiq (though later on, they fell out); C. B. Gupta to Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani. Only in two cases of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh was Nehru positively inclined toward the successors - K. B. Sahay (Bihar), and D. P. Mishra (Madhya Pradesh).

<sup>17</sup>Morarji Desai, op.cit., 201-202.

<sup>18</sup>Recorded by Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 6.

<sup>19</sup>Recorded by Stanley A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton: University, 1968):82.

<sup>20</sup>Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966):14.

<sup>21</sup>Pran Chopra, Uncertain India: A Political Profile of Two Decades of Freedom (Massachusetts: MIT, 1968):187.

<sup>22</sup>For a glimpse of the Nagaland politics, Ved Mehta, Portrait of India (England: Penguin, 1972):223-240.

Pran Chopra, op.cit., 185.

In this connection, it is interesting to read the lengthy resolution on "Democracy and Socialism" submitted for approval at the Bhubaneswar session of the Indian National Congress held between January 7 and January 10, 1964. The entire debate on socialism seemed empty and dull. For a brief review of the resolution, D. R. Mankekar, Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Political Biography (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966):107-110.

<sup>25</sup>Michael Brecher, op.cit., 106. Brecher explores the contrasts between the working style of Nehru and that of Lal Bahadur Shastri in relation to their respective cabinets, Congress organization, state governments, etc.

<sup>26</sup>Michael Brecher, op.cit., 123-124.

<sup>27</sup>See, Ved Mehta, op.cit., 369. Mehta records his interviews with several economists and political leaders connected with the Planning Commission.

<sup>28</sup>D. R. Mankekar, op.cit., 130.

<sup>29</sup>Interview recorded by Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 14.

- 30 Michael Brecher records K. Kamaraj as saying about Shastri's non-consultation: "this is the prerogative of the Prime Minister". In regard to devaluation, Kuldip Nayar writes: "Mrs. Gandhi seemed to have had second thoughts because of Kamaraj's strong opposition to devalue when he was consulted before the announcement. In fact, that was a watershed in relationship between him and Mrs. Gandhi and if he had had his way, he would have never been a party to making her the Prime Minister again." Michael Brecher, *op.cit.*, 107-108; Kuldip Nayar, INDIA: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1971):92.
- 31 The concept of "stratarchy" borrowed from Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1964).
- 32 D. R. Mankekar, *op.cit.*, 54.
- 33 Galbraith quoted in D. R. Mankekar, *op.cit.*, 50.
- 34 Welles Hangen, After Nehru, Who? (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963):110.
- 35 Krishna Hutheesing quoted in Krishan Bhatia, Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974):175.
- 36 Prem Bhatia, "A Political System in Grave Danger," Indian Express, April 14, 1965.
- 37 Mrs. Gandhi wanted to exclude Gulzarilal Nanda and Jagjivan Ram from her cabinet but both K. Kamaraj and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan "intervened" and made "several telephone calls" till Indira capitulated and agreed. Krishan Bhatia, *op.cit.*, 183-185.
- 38 "Grasping the Nettle," Hindustan Times, November 19, 1964.
- 39 "The Real Emergency," Times of India, November 12, 1964.
- 40 For details, see, Duncan B. Forrester, "The Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation, 1965," Pacific Affairs (Spring-Summer, 1966):19-36. Also, Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Riots in Tamilnad: Problems and Prospects of India's Language crisis," Asian Survey (August 1965):399-407. For a broad scene of the Indian language politics, see, Jyotindra Das Gupta, Language Conflicts and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India(Berkeley: University, 1970).
- 41 See, Pran Chopra, *op.cit.*, 316.
- 42 Mrs. Gandhi's interview with Blitz (Bombay), in Uma Vasudev, Indira Gandhi: Revolution in Restraint (Delhi: Vikas, 1974):370.
- 43 When Chester Bowles, United States Ambassador to India, remarked to a senior White House official that in asking for an end to U.S. Bombing of Vietnam, the Indian Prime Minister was only saying what U. Thant and the Pope had said, the official replied, "But the Pope and U Thant do not need our wheat." Recorded by Krishan Bhatia, *op.cit.*, 195.

<sup>44</sup>Interview with Michael Brecher, op.cit., 213.

<sup>45</sup>Statement of seven "prominent Opposition M.P.s" recorded by Michael Brecher, op.cit., 219-220, one of whom was K. Santhanam. On January 18, 1966, most of the leading newspapers expressed their opinions on the involvement of Chief Ministers in the selection of the Prime Minister. The Hindu ("Chief Ministers' Choice") and the Hindustan Times ("In the Wings") regarded the Chief Ministers' action as legitimate because the Prime Minister represented the nation, while the Statesman ("The Seat of Power") adopted a middle-of-the-road position.

<sup>46</sup>In an interview with Ved Mehta, Sankar attributed the fall of his government to the Nairs and the Christians. "The Nairs and the Christians," he said, "could not abide the fact that an Ezhava was the leader of their state government." Ved Mehta, op.cit., 522.

<sup>47</sup>For details, see, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1964: 204026.

<sup>48</sup>See, D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1965):86.

<sup>49</sup>See, V. K. Narasimhan, Kamaraj: A Study (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967): 125. Kamaraj even refused to see the Chacko group when the latter so requested.

<sup>50</sup>Michael Brecher, op.cit., 134-135. Italics mine.

<sup>51</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 34, No. 12, September 22, 1964: 3128.

<sup>52</sup>Nath Pai, Lok Sabha Debates, Volume 34, No.13, September 23, 1964: 3320.

<sup>53</sup>N. G. Ranga, Ibid., 3302.

<sup>54</sup>Speaker, Ibid., 3300.

<sup>55</sup>For Assam, see, V.K.Narasimhan, op.cit., 126. For Bihar, Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974): 307.

<sup>56</sup>Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 187.

<sup>57</sup>Although there is no evidence, the general feeling in Punjab was that the Sikhs in the Army who had excelled in the Indo-Pakistan War had pressured the Center to act on the Punjabi Subha demand.

<sup>58</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, April 30 - May 7, 1966: 21368.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>The majority of the people in Chandigarh (population:89,000) speak Punjabi.



<sup>62</sup>Statement of the Home Minister in the Lok Sabha on May 14, 1966. Extracts published in the Times of India, May 15, 1966.

<sup>63</sup>The Times of India, June 23, 1966.

<sup>64</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 59, August 31, 1966: 8148.

<sup>65</sup>Umanath, Ibid., 8188.

<sup>66</sup>Alvares, Ibid., 8225.

<sup>67</sup>The Statesman, June 24, 1966.

<sup>68</sup>Nehru's statement recorded in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives November 21 - 28, 1964: 20428.

<sup>69</sup>The Times of India, January 24, 1965.

<sup>70</sup>Resolution recorded in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 8 - 15, 1965: 20733.

<sup>71</sup>Resolution recorded in D. C. Gupta, Indian Government and Politics (Delhi: Vikas, 1972): 146.

<sup>72</sup>The result of the referendum is recorded in the Economic and Political Weekly, February 27, 1971: 510.

<sup>73</sup>About a month and a half after the new states were formed, Sant Fateh Singh began 'fast-unto-death' as a prelude to his threatened self-immolation, for securing the Chandigarh and Bhakra-Nangal irrigation project for the Punjabi Subha. In Haryana, Yogiraj Suryadev, a Hindu leader, began a counter-fast. When the Sant had fasted for nine days, seven of his disciplined disciples also announced that they would commit self-immolation in sympathy with their leader. All of these disciples appeared in public "brandishing kirpans" (swords) and spears, and calling out slogans. For a brief look on the issue, see, Ved Mehta, op.cit., 516.

<sup>74</sup>Interviewed by Ved Mehta, op.cit., 482.

<sup>75</sup>The Statesman, March 25, 1965 published extracts of Governor's report.

<sup>76</sup>See, D. R. Mankekar, The Red Riddle of Kerala, op.cit., 119.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

<sup>79</sup>See proceedings of this congress in Bhabani Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972): 74.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 78.

<sup>81</sup>For details, see, Pran Chopra, op.cit., 286-287.

<sup>82</sup>Extracts from Gulzarilal Nanda's broadcast appeared in the Statesman, January 2, 1965. The White Paper was entitled Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking Communists and their Preparation for Subversion and Violence (Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1965).

<sup>83</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 43, No.54, May 6, 1965 : 13516.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 13563.

<sup>85</sup>H. N. Mukerjee, Ibid., 13543.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 13532.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., 13595.

<sup>88</sup>The Times of India, March 26, 1965.

<sup>89</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 47, November 4, 1965. Extracts from the Governor's report quoted in the House by H. N. Mukerjee and Parashar:380,473.

<sup>90</sup>N. C. Chatterjee, Ibid., 399.

<sup>91</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 55, No.54, May 6, 1966: 15126.

<sup>92</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 55, No. 55, May 9, 1966: 15417.

<sup>93</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 60, No. 5, November 7, 1966: 1619.

<sup>94</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21 - 28, 1964 records the Das Commission Report.

<sup>95</sup>The Times of India, May 21, 1958.

<sup>96</sup>See, Keesing's, November 21 - 28, 1964 for judgement.

<sup>97</sup>See Shastri quoted in Keesing's, May 8 - 15, 1965: 20733.

<sup>98</sup>Indira was quite aware of the fact that she was being regarded by some as a "stop-gap" arrangement. In an interview with Kuldip Nayar, she remarked: "Some people say I am a stopgap premier of an interim administration. All I can say is that some of the people obviously aspire to become prime minister themselves." Interview quoted in Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 369.

<sup>99</sup>See the politics of ticket distribution in Stanley A. Kochanek, op.cit., 284-298.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PRAETORIAN MODEL 1967-71

In Chapter II, I have called the years between 1967 and 1971 the period of "institutional decay" in the political development of India. I have also heuristically characterized the political system of this period as "praetorian" in nature, i.e., a system without consensus where "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority; [ ] and [ ] the role of power (i.e., wealth and force) is maximized." <sup>1</sup> In other words, it is a system where the political institutions are ineffective in regulating the public conduct of the political actors whose major objective is to achieve and retain power even at the cost of national interest or public morality. Implicit in the "praetorian" model is the fragmentation of power structure and a breakdown in political values and principles. With little regard for the rules of the game, each political actor or a group of political actors kicks up the dust but blames the other for lack of visibility. Political authority and office are easily acquired through unprincipled coalitions and alliances but also easily lost because these "marriages of convenience" are by their very nature transitory. In a nutshell, a "praetorian" system is a system without game rules. Like the hegemonic system, it does not fix thresholds of dissent; but unlike the hegemonic system, it lacks the capacity to domesticate dissent. Being in a state of disequilibrium, it is always in danger of atrophy.

The transition from the "bargaining" system state to the "praetorian" system state was extremely bitter and created a "crisis of conscience" not only in the political actors but also in the press and the public. <sup>2</sup> Indira's succession to the office of the Prime Ministership in 1966 and her subsequent efforts to get out of the control of the Syndicate was the beginning of the

end of the bargaining system. The Syndicate, particularly the Congress President K. Kamaraj, accepted Mrs. Gandhi's offensives in 1966 because of the upcoming Fourth General Elections (1967), when the leadership issue was to be re-settled. In fact, it was a case of "frozen" conflict between the Syndicate and Mrs. Indira Gandhi: both were awaiting the outcome of the 1967 Elections. By September, 1966 when the politics of distributing party tickets started, it was much in evidence that the political system was moving out from its consensual phase to a praetorian phase. This period, i.e., from September 1966 to March 1967 when the results of the General Elections were announced, represents the transitional phase in the developmental path of the political system. In other words, we may call this transitional period the "take-off" stage of the political system for entry into the praetorian stage.

The chapter follows the same divisions as the previous chapters. Part I describes the "take-off" stage and the system environmental properties of this stage. Part II describes the developmental path of the political system between 1967 and 1971, linking it with the "take-off" stage of the political system and incorporating both continuity and change. The analytical frame adopted in describing both parts is given on the next page.

These two parts together provide us with the contextual settings within which the Center and the states interacted with each other and regulated their mutual relationships. These contextual settings also help us hypothesize about the probability of federal intervention in state crises. Part II, therefore, concludes with some descriptive propositions.

Part III of the chapter tests these descriptive propositions empirically. It deals with those sub-system crises which were resolved through the imposition of presidential rule and makes temporal comparisons.

ANALYTICAL FRAME

PART I: 1966-67

Emergent political system

System environmental properties

PART II: 1967-71

Linked/de-linked developmental path

System environmental properties

1. Structural-functional properties: the demise of the "Grand Council".

1. Domestic: violence.

1. Structural-functional properties: the institutional decay.

1. Domestic: violence, defections.

2. Party system properties: the Congress "split" in restraint.

2. International: "non-alignment" under pressure.

2. Party system properties: the Congress.

2. International: Soviet friendship.

3. Leadership properties: Indira re-discovers her strength.

3. Leadership: the "triumphant" Indira.

Part IV examines those sub-system crises in all the states of India between 1967 and 1971 which were resolved without the declaration of presidential rule, in order to find a crisis-resolution pattern on an all-India basis.

PART I: THE EMERGENT POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1966-67

1. Structural-functional properties: the demise of the "Grand Council"

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the most critical feature to change during the Shastri period was the style in decision-making at the Central level. The "Grand Council", composed of almost all the crucial wielders of influence, had come to occupy a position of supreme importance at the Center. It was, as Michael Brecher put it, "the collective substitute for Nehru's charisma".<sup>3</sup>

By the end of 1966, this Council had almost become defunct. With increasing distance between the Syndicate and Mrs. Gandhi, the latter came to lean on a circle of personal and family friends for consultation and advice. This small circle, then derisively called her "kitchen Cabinet", included persons like Uma Shankar Dikshit, an Uttar Pradesh Member of the Parliament and an old family friend; Dinesh Singh, another Member of the Parliament and an old family friend; and Inder Gujral, a young Delhi politician. Among the new friends who had entered this privileged circle after she became Prime Minister were C. Subramaniam, Asoka Mehta, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (all in her Cabinet), Mrs. Nandini Satpathi, a young woman Member of the Parliament from Orissa, and Dwarka Prasad Mishra, the powerful Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

The ideological diversity of the kitchen Cabinet was quite conspicuous. The political beliefs of Dikshit, Dinesh and Ahmed were "as amorphous as the party to which they belonged."<sup>4</sup> C. Subramaniam from Tamil Nadu - a counter-weight to K. Kamaraj from the same state - was often

described as a "pragmatist", and Asoka Mehta was a long-time "socialist". Mrs. Nandini Satpathi and Inder Gujral were known leftists, the former having been a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. Mishra of Madhya Pradesh had returned to active politics after more than a decade of political exile in 1963, when Indira pleaded with her father for forgiveness on his behalf, and he was so completely engrossed in the pursuit of personal power that he left people guessing if he had any political beliefs whatsoever.

Indira's increasing reliance on her kitchen Cabinet destroyed any meaningful role for the Grand Council. By late 1966, even her Cabinet ministers not included in the "inner circle" felt alienated from her, with the result that ministerial Cabinet meetings ceased to be serious events. "Cabinet ministers would sometimes stroll in late at meetings, offer a perfunctory apology, and sometimes even leave early."<sup>5</sup> The old guard in the party leadership resented Indira's tendency to lean on her kitchen Cabinet, more so because each one of its members was a "political lone wolf" without any sound base in the Congress organization. Unfortunate for the public image of Indira, her relationship with some of the younger members of her kitchen Cabinet, particularly with Dinesh Singh, came to be scandalized in public places. The atmosphere in Delhi was full of dirty rumours when, in early 1967, H. V. Kamath, leader of the Praja Socialist Party in Parliament, obliquely referred to Dinesh Singh as a "virtual de-facto assistant prime minister"<sup>6</sup> in the course of a Parliamentary debate.

## 2. Party system properties: the Congress "split" in restraint

The fact that the Congress party was almost on the verge of a split between the Indira supporters and those of the Syndicate, was much in evidence at the time of distributing party tickets for the forthcoming

General Elections. The struggle over the selection of five members to the Central Election Committee, a sub-committee of the Congress High Command which has the final authority in the selection of candidates for the state and the national legislatures, began in May 1966 when the All-India Congress Committee delegates assembled in Bombay to elect these members. Morarji Desai fielded C. B. Gupta of Uttar Pradesh, K. Kamaraj settled for Sanjiva Reddy of Andhra Pradesh, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi sponsored D. P. Mishra of Madhya Pradesh. Differences arose about the remaining two seats. After a good deal of bargaining, while K. Kamaraj made an uneasy compromise with Mrs. Indira Gandhi to support G. M. Saif of Jammu and Kashmir for the fourth seat, the fifth shifted to the open contest for the fifth seat. Two members entered the arena: K. D. Malaviya, a left-winger with known sympathies for the Indira camp, and Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, an ally of the Syndicate. In the elections, K. D. Malaviya lost the contest.

Besides being indicative of the diverse forces working within the Congress organization, the contest was perceived as a "barometer" of strength in the organization by the parties involved. With Morarji Desai's known intention to contest for the prime ministership after the 1967 General Elections, there was little doubt in the minds of the delegates that the present contest (to the Central Election Committee) was a prelude to a split in the national leadership. Referring to the selection process, Kochanek writes:

This split within the national leadership, reflected in the open contest over the C.F.C. [Central Election Committee] and intensified by the anticipation that Morarji Desai, the leader of the dissident faction, would renew his bid for the prime ministership following the General Elections, was manifest at every stage of the selection process.<sup>7</sup>

The net result of the contest was that the Central Election Committee turned out to be hopelessly divided over the selection of candidates for



both the state and the national legislatures. Instead of arbitrating conflicts, the Committee itself became an arena of open conflicts. When Mrs. Gandhi, for example, could not secure the nomination of V. K. Krishna Menon,<sup>8</sup> she sabotaged the selection of Morarji's protege, Ravindra Verma.<sup>9</sup> K. Kamaraj made repeated attempts to retain a seat for T. T. Krishnamachari,<sup>10</sup> as did many other members of the Committee for their own loyal supporters. In respect to nominations for the state legislatures, the Committee preferred not to disturb the lists of candidates recommended by the Provincial Election Committees, even though there were loud protests from some of the minority factions in the faction-ridden states of Andhra, Bihar, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, etc., to the effect that they were being ignored by the dominant factions. The Committee's peace-saving formula, that the sitting members were not to be disturbed as far as possible, obviously favoured the dominant factions and indirectly approved the continuation of the incumbent Chief Ministers after the Elections.

While the selection of the candidates was in process, the scramble over the election funds began to rock the Congress organization. Atulya Ghosh, a member of the Syndicate and Treasurer of the Congress Party, announced that the election funds collected for the forthcoming Elections were hardly ten percent of the total funds collected for the 1962 Elections and that more efforts were needed to fill the Central Election Pool for the parliamentary elections. The fact of the matter was that neither the Syndicate nor the State Chief Ministers nor the Indira supporters, having collected large funds, were willing to part with them for the Central Pool. Describing the whole situation, the Economic and Political Weekly editorialized:

But unlike in 1957 and 1962, the bulk of the funds have been pocketed by the Pradesh Congress Committees and state bosses to back their own candidates and factions. The Rs.60 lakh / \$1.4 million, approximately / purse for C. B. Gupta / the machine boss from Uttar Pradesh /, which was an election contribution under another name, is certainly not the only one example. The same pattern is to be found in all the states, whether the collections have snow-balled to one or a few party bosses or to the entire Pradesh Congress Committees.<sup>11</sup>

With virulent type factionalism sweeping throughout the organization, the Congress was, in fact, in no shape to go to the polls in 1967.

### 3. Leadership properties: Indira re-discovers her strength

Many biographers of the Nehru family have said that the Nehrus are best in crises.<sup>12</sup> Indira faced humiliation in Parliament probably because she had neither the experience as a parliamentarian nor the art of making long and eloquent speeches. Long protected by the parental banvan tree, she was never exposed to the vagaries of Indian politics. As Jawaharlal's daughter and political associate, she was probably involved in more top-level decisions than any other single member of the political elite during the Nehru era, but she always stayed in the background and shared no official responsibility for any major decision. Like her father, she clung to Fabian dialectics and romanticized socialism; but unlike him, she was hardly ever taken seriously.<sup>13</sup> Though she was associated with the Congress organization in varying capacity, the average man in the street knew her only as Nehru's daughter, charming and forbiddingly regal in her appearance.

Within less than six months of her becoming the prime minister, Indira was face to face with almost the same group of Congressmen who were the source of trouble to Nehru during his last days in office. Nehru had purged Morarji Desai, S. K. Patil, C. B. Gupta and a few others, and his dislike for Atulva Ghosh and Santiva Reddy was an open secret. Once

again, these very men - with K. Kamaraj joining the group - confronted Mrs. Gandhi. As if to avenge her father's helplessness, Indira always brought in her "father versus his adversaries" theme in her speeches whenever she felt psychologically insecure in any awkward situation. At the Bombay session of the Congress (May 1966), her natural reserve became glacial:

There are people who really respected him [Nehru], but there are also some people who neither respected him nor his policies while he was alive.<sup>14</sup>

And then she quoted the famous lines about Homer:

Nine cities claim Homer dead  
Through which the living Homer begged his bread.<sup>15</sup>

Concluding her speech she said:

Jawaharlal was the nation's leader, but he was my father, my companion. I had grown with his policies. I am familiar with every bit of his thought. Today, I am told that I do not know his views. Today his erstwhile critics have to tell me what his policies were.<sup>16</sup>

This was probably Indira's first outburst in the Congress forum. She was crossing a major mental hurdle out of her previous state of blissful silence.

Indira re-discovered her strength during the last two months of 1966 when she entered the pre-election campaign. She travelled about 35,000 miles, mostly in an open car, delivered at times three speeches a day, and shook hands with thousands of people on the way-side. To her great surprise, she saw that her ability to draw crowds was unparalleled. She did face occasional hostile shouting at certain places but, on the whole, she was well received by millions of people who thronged to catch a glimpse of her though not necessarily to heed her. To her critics, she was still "girlish", a pale imitation of her father; to the crowds,

she was the symbol of continuity, a living projection of the dead Nehru. She did not become an eloquent speaker but her shyness found a cathartic release in the contacts with the common man. Even though Uma Vasudev presents a slightly exaggerated account of how she was received by the crowds, she is still worth quoting:

Always, crowds, garlands, a shower of flowers - people touching her palloo / sari's corner, falling at her feet, pledging loyalty, swearing sacrifice, evoking associations of her father, her husband, all the crowded past. There were always the garlands, the effusive smell of marigolds, jasmines and roses; the hands eager to help; the women with wistful looks; and the shrill cries of restless children.<sup>17</sup>

As the words of her effectiveness spread, she was inundated by requests from party organizations in various states to visit them. On the other hand, her adversaries - Morarji Desai, S. K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh, Sanjiva Reddy, etc., - received very few invitations outside their own state or region to deliver campaign speeches.<sup>18</sup> More than most people, Morarji Desai was known all over the country, but his right-wing image in the public mind was regarded as a liability by the state organizations in those days of extreme scarcity. K. Kamaraj, then the Congress President, had won many laurels and had a left-of-the-center public image, but his limitation was that he could neither speak in the national language nor in English. Looking to the crowd phenomena and the limitations of her adversaries, Indira gained confidence, and perhaps a little arrogance too. In an interview with the United News of India (UNI) in December, 1966, she invited the wrath of her party colleagues when she said: "You see, there is the question of whom the party wants, and whom the people want. My position amongst the people is uncontested."<sup>19</sup>

And then came a flying stone from the crowd in Orissa which hit Indira on the nose in February 1967, and which, more than any other unsavoury incident during her election campaign, proved a blessing in

disguise for her. The next day, the nation awoke to a sense of shocked shame when her bleeding nose made the front-page headlines of almost all the newspapers. Even the opposition parties lamented the incident, sent messages of concern, and exhorted the people not show any disrespect to "the great daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru". The Hindustan Times wrote: "Mrs. Gandhi has shown an example of personal courage that will win her admiration through the country."<sup>20</sup> On her return to Delhi, when some members of her party asked her about the incident, she, in the course of her reply, said: "I am as tough as ever."<sup>21</sup>

#### System-environmental properties:

##### 1. Domestic: Violence

Beginning September 1, 1966, the country witnessed an increasing number of violent agitations, whipped up mostly by the opposition parties against the government's economic policies and rising inflation. Faced with the over-all shortage of goods and essential commodities like food and cooking oil, the angry mobs turned violent at many places in the country. In September, a contingent of 50,000 communists marched on the Parliament. Shortly thereafter, the Jana Sangh party organized massive demonstrations in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh. In November, troops were despatched to assist the civil authorities in curbing violence in Andhra Pradesh. In the same month, the Parliament building was surrounded by "Ban Cow-Slaughter" agitators who could be dispersed only by tear-gas shells, and finally by bullets. On their frenzied retreat, they set fire to private cars, vehicles, buses, public buildings and in the end to the houses of K. Raghuramiah, minister in Indira's cabinet, and of Congress President K. Kamaraj. The government's "pre-election paralysis" in controlling lawlessness in the states or at the Center invited damaging comments. Frank Moraes of the Indian Express

wrote:

It matters little to us whether her government survives or not but it matters or should matter greatly to every Indian that our country should be so exposed to the obloquy and shame that our irresponsible Minutemen, holy and unholy, rightists and leftists, young and old, have now reduced it to.<sup>22</sup>

And the Hindustan Times editorialized:

...Congress governments at the center and in the states have, by running away from their duty to preserve law and order, brought about an atmosphere in the country where the use of force is not only unchecked but is seen to pay.<sup>23</sup>

The month of January 1967 was marked by student agitations, stone-throwing incidents against Congress luminaries, and frequent bonfires of Congress flags and khadi caps.

## 2. International: "non-alignment" under pressure

After the devaluation of the Indian currency in June 1966, Indira was under heavy attack from the leftists within her party for surrendering to American pressures. The news dispatches appearing in the Russian papers expressed unhappiness by the Soviet Union over devaluation. Asoka Mehta, who was sent to Moscow in July 1966 to explain the circumstances leading to devaluation, was told by Kossygin that devaluation was a "blunder".<sup>24</sup> To retrieve her leftist image and to placate the Soviet Union which had opened a new dialogue with Pakistan on military assistance, Indira called for an immediate halt to American bombing in Vietnam, much to the annoyance of the White House. During her election campaign, Indira constantly harped on heavy industry, the public sector, socialism, an independent foreign policy and peace with honour, creating a general impression that her government was in no way under the influence of Washington and that the Russians were, at best, "fellow-travellers". Despite the "ship-to-mouth" existence which made India dependent on the Western world, the party situation at home drew Indira closer to the

Soviet Union. K. Kamaraj's visit to the Soviet Union and the East European countries immediately after the devaluation was said to be non-political in nature, but it was followed by attempts to establish a greater accommodation with the Soviet satellites, including East Germany.

The system-environmental interaction during the transitional period as described above presented such a dreary and hopeless picture about the future of the democratic set-up in the country that many prophets of gloom predicted the 1967 elections as the last elections in India.<sup>25</sup> The Congress Party was in the doldrums and, with domestic violence rampant, the opposition parties entered into all kinds of holy and unholy electoral alliances with the sole purpose of defeating the Congress. The inflammatory speeches of the so-called seasoned politicians such as Ram Manohar Lohia (Socialist) - "there would be anarchy if the Congress came back to power"<sup>26</sup>, and C. Rajagopalachari (Swatantra) - "a few communists coming into Parliament or state legislatures will not constitute any danger now, but remember, even one congressman added to the phalanx is bad"<sup>27</sup> - were hardly meant to allay the fears of the gloomy prophets. The general mood of the electorate toward the Congress was well summed up by Eric da Costa of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion who, after conducting a sample opinion poll, said:

The young, the less educated, and particularly the illiterates, the minorities and, most unpredictable of all, the lowest income groups, are all rewriting their basic loyalties. To the candidates this is, perhaps, a struggle for power. To a political scientist it is, as nearly half a century ago, the beginning of a break with the past.<sup>28</sup> It is by no means yet a revolt; but it may be in time a revolution.

The election results (Table 5.1) were shocking; the Congress lost its majority in eight of the sixteen states and in the Union Territory of Delhi. In the Lok Sabha, its strength was reduced from 361 to 284, constituting a bare majority in a house of 520 members. However, most

TABLE 5.1  
CONGRESS STRENGTH IN THE 1967 ELECTIONS, BY STATES

State	Congress strength	Total seats in the Assembly
Andhra	165	287
Assam	73	126
Bihar	128	318
Gujarat	93	168
Harvana	48	81
Jammu & Kashmir	60	75
Kerala	9	133
Madhya Pradesh	167	296
Madras	50	234
Maharashtra	203	270
Mysore	126	216
Orissa	31	140
Punjab	47	104
Rajasthan	89	184
Uttar Pradesh	199	425
West Bengal	127	280
TOTAL:	1615	3337

Source: S. C. Kashyap: The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974).



shocking of all was the ignominious defeat of the Congress stalwarts: K. Kamaraj, S. K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh, Biju Patnaik, and almost half of the union cabinet members. For Indira, the results were a mixed blessing. On the one hand, she never wished to preside over the liquidation of the Congress empire but, on the other hand, the defeat and humiliation of the Syndicate luminaries considerably strengthened her position. Her own personal victory by 91,000 votes was so prestigious as to demoralize her adversaries in the party all the more. To add insult to injury, the press made vitriolic comments on the defeat of the Syndicate men. The Indian Express editorialized:

With their heads chopped off by the electorate, the Congress high command comprising Messrs Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil are running in circles like headless chickens round a barnyard. Cocks have been known to crow from dunghills. It is from no Mount of Sinai that Delhi's headless wonders, bereft of their voices, flap their wings signalling to all and sundry that now is the time to come to the aid of the party .... Who are these headless wonders to attempt to decide at this moment not only who should be prime minister but the central government of a country which has decisively repudiated them and bundled them out of political existence?<sup>29</sup>

And Inder ~~Pr~~thotra wrote in the Statesman:

Hurt to the quick by the suggestion that rather than strut about the political stage in the capital, they should have the political decency to retire at least temporarily, some of the defeated stalwarts have been saying that their party continues to have full faith in them. Could there be a more lurid confession of the dictum: party before people and self before party?<sup>30</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi was so impressed by the anti-Syndicate feeling that she felt like dispensing with the formal procedure of selecting the leader of the Congress parliamentary party. Just two days before the party was to meet to select its leader on March 12, 1967, Mrs. Gandhi declared:

"I am the leader of the Congress parliamentary party and I am the prime minister. I continue to be a leader unless a vote of no-confidence is brought against me."<sup>31</sup>

In fact, the period between the declaration of the election results and March 12 was the period during which the Indira camp had carefully calculated its strength and arrived at the conclusion that they had a majority of ten to twenty members over the Desai camp in the Congress parliamentary party, and that the majority of the Chief Ministers were behind them. However, neither Indira nor Morarji Desai, whatever their open declarations, seemed itching for a contest. If the Indira camp feared the negotiable loyalties of its supporters, the Morarji camp entertained the genuine fear that Indira would defect from the party if defeated. Hence a compromise. Rejecting Morarji's demand for the Home portfolio which would have alienated the incumbent Home Minister, V. B. Chavan, Indira accepted Desai as the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister in her cabinet. Different groups pushed the compromise formula from different perspectives. While the Syndicate was happy having placed a "watchman" over Indira's activities, the newly emerging anti-Chavan lobby - D. P. Mishra (Madhya Pradesh), C. B. Gupta (Uttar Pradesh), S. Nijalingappa (Mysore) - saw in Desai's elevation to the Deputy Prime Ministership a status reduction for Chavan from the second to the third position in the cabinet.

32

The succession crisis was over but it was a poor consolation to the Syndicate, which had originally planned to remove Mrs. Gandhi. With Indira dropping Sanjiva Reddy from her newly constituted cabinet - much to the displeasure of K. Kamaraj - it was evident that the compromise formula was not the product of the meeting of minds but rather a simple virtue made of necessity.

## PART II: THE DEVELOPMENTAL PATH OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1967-71

### 1. Structural-functional properties: the institutional decay

The period between 1967 and 1971 was marked by national dialogues

on the constitutional set-up and on many of the extra-constitutional instrumentalities of the Nehru era. There was a general demand that the Constitution be revised and the system changed from a parliamentary to a presidential type of government which would make governmental stability independent of the Aya Ram, Gaya Ram (frequent defections) politics in the legislatures. At the same time, the opposition parties made strong demands, varying from a review of the role of provincial Governors to the re-structuring of the Center-state relations. Most of the Governors were charged with acting maliciously against the non-Congress governments [- at times miscounting party strength in the legislatures (Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, 1967); re-convening legislatures at a time when the non-Congress governments were threatened with defections (West Bengal, Punjab, 1967) but not doing so when the Congress governments were in the same uncertain position (Punjab, Haryana, 1968, Uttar Pradesh, 1969); proroguing the legislatures in the midst of no-confidence debates against the Congress governments (Madhya Pradesh, 1967, Bihar, 1968, Haryana, 1970); disallowing the non-Congress Chief Ministers to add new members to the Council of Ministers at critical times (Bihar, Punjab, 1968, Uttar Pradesh, 1970) <sup>33</sup> -] and demands were made that either the institution of Governor be altogether abolished or his appointment be made subject to the consent of the state to which he was being appointed. By 1970, the Central Government was being pressured to appoint a Committee to delineate the role of the Governors and to set up a new code of ethics for them.

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The period under consideration was also marked by the beating of the drum for States' rights. Most of the Chief Ministers, including some belonging to the Congress Party, demanded a fresh dialogue on Center-state ties, particularly in the field of financial distribution and

economic development. The Communist government of West Bengal and the Dravida Munnetra Kashagam (DMK) government of Tamil Nadu were leading other states in making such demands.<sup>34</sup> The Central Government, which had already declared a "plan holiday" - the Fourth Five-Year Plan which was due to start in 1967 was postponed for two years because of the poor economic situation at home and uncertain foreign aid - started pacifying the disgruntled states by doling out discretionary grants and allocating projects even when financial and technical wisdom advised against such a policy.<sup>35</sup>

The failure of the extra-constitutional instrumentalities in promoting anything except bitterness was a conspicuous feature of this period. Whether it was the meetings of the Chief Ministers on food and funds, or the meetings of the National Development Council on planning and priorities, there were no substantial outputs in terms of policy decisions. Rather, the participating states, most often, utilized these forums to ventilate their grievances against the Center or their neighbouring states. Commenting on the Chief Ministers' Conference in 1967, the Pioneer summed up the attitude of the participants: "To put it bluntly, it is a case of each for himself and the devil take the hindmost."<sup>36</sup> This state of mind persisted throughout 1967-71. The Chief Ministers seemed in no mood to listen to the persuasions of the Center. At the meeting of the National Development Council in 1968, the Chief Minister of the food-deficit state of Maharashtra, V. P. Naik, expressed his annoyance when he said: "Why should I produce cloth for Punjab and Andhra when they are not wanting to part with their foodgrains?"<sup>37</sup> In July 1970, when Mrs. Gandhi persuaded the Chief Ministers to implement land reforms, the response of the Chief Ministers was almost cynical. Typical was the retort of V. P. Naik: "Owning land is neither unethical nor unsocial."<sup>38</sup>

## 2. Party system properties: the Congress split

In November 1969, the in-fighting in the Congress Party finally culminated in splitting the party between the "Indicate", i.e., the supporters of Mrs. Gandhi, and the Syndicate, i.e., the supporters of S. Nijalingappa, Morarji Desai, Atulya Ghosh, S. K. Patil, K. Kamaraj and others. The Indicate later came to be addressed as the Congress(P) while the Syndicate was designated as the Congress (O).<sup>39</sup>

Before both groups started washing their dirty linen in public - after the Bangalore session of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) on July 10, 1969 - , an uneasy peace marked the relationship between the two groups. After Mrs. Indira Gandhi's succession to the prime minister-ship in 1967, the fact-finding inquiry into the Congress debacle in the elections deteriorated into a fault-finding investigation. While Mrs. Gandhi attributed the electoral reverses to the disunity in the Congress organization and suggested a fresh look at the policies of the party, the Congress President, K. Kamaraj, came out with a sharp criticism of the Government for having failed to implement the Congress policies and programs.<sup>40</sup> A ten-point program which, inter alia, included social control of the banking institutions, nationalization of general insurance, restriction on individual holdings of urban land, and the removal of special privileges of the ex-rulers of princely states, was adopted to revitalize the party. By this time, some of the leftists in the party, later known as "Young Turks", were vocal enough to point out that the program was less than revolutionary and that the party must now "fight reactionaries outside the Congress as well as inside."<sup>41</sup>

About five months later when the AICC met at Jabalpur on October 28, 1967, the Young Turks, led by Chandra Shekhar and Mohan Dharja,

launched a withering attack on the leadership for its failure to implement the ten-point program and demanded outright nationalization of banks, withdrawal of privy purses to the ex-rulers, and coalitions with the like-minded leftist parties at the state level. Both S. K. Patil, who declared that the abolition of privy purses would be "illegal, immoral and unconstitutional", and Morarji Desai, who pleaded for "social control" rather than nationalization of the banking institutions, faced menacing attacks from the Young Turks. Mrs. Gandhi, who could afford neither to displease the Syndicate nor to alienate the Young Turks, deliberately kept a low profile. In her address, she offended none: "There was no question of going back on the party's programme of socialist action", but "socialism was not aimed against any section of society." On the issue of bank nationalization, she assured the left-wingers that "if the scheme of social control was bypassed or avoided, Government would not hesitate to completely take over the banks."<sup>42</sup>

Another item on the agenda of the Jabalpur session was the choice of the next Congress President. Several names were mentioned, including that of K. Kamaraj for another term. After protracted negotiations, Mrs. Gandhi willy-nilly agreed to the nomination of S. Nijalingappa of Mysore who was a Syndicate ally but who so far had a non-controversial reputation. However, when it came to re-constituting the Congress Working Committee in January 1968, the Syndicate out-maneuvred Mrs. Gandhi, who found herself isolated, unable to exercise much influence over the nomination of candidates.<sup>43</sup>

By the time the AICC met at Faridabad on April 27-28, 1969, both sides were itching for a fight. When S. Nijalingappa, the Congress President, expressed doubts about the development of industries in the public sector "without regard to demand and the capacity to produce",

Mrs. Gandhi, who was becoming increasingly popular with her oft-repeated socialist gospels, was not slow to retort. She defended the public sector and asked if a probe into the working of the private sector, "which enjoyed immunity from any accountability to the public or Parliament, would lead to flattering conclusions."<sup>44</sup> The Young Turks seemed behind her when some of them, particularly Mohan Dharma, accused the Old Guard of preserving the citadels of vested interests and asked them to retire gracefully.

The Faridabad session also took up the question of Center-state relations. While there was a general consensus that the Center should be strong, there was some divergence of opinion in respect to the Center's relations with the non-Congress state governments. Morarji Desai was reported to hold the view that the non-Congress governments, by being non-Congress, had placed themselves in a position of opposition to the Congress Central Government and as such ought to be dealt with strictly and according to the Constitution. He was critical of the Government for having given too much rope to the left-wing governments of Kerala and West Bengal and advocated stiff constitutional measures against them.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi advised against unnecessarily hasty Central intervention and suggested that the Center must approach the whole question with understanding and patience. She reportedly held the view that the Congress must try to promote good relations with the non-Congress governments.<sup>46</sup>

Within less than a week of the Faridabad session, the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain, died of heart failure and was temporarily succeeded by the Vice-President, V. V. Giri. According to the Constitution, the President of India is elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of the Central and state legislatures and there is

no provision for an automatic succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case the latter office falls vacant on account of the death or resignation of the incumbent. From May 3, when the President died, to July 12, 1969, when the Congress made its final choice for the office, there were several meetings between Mrs. Gandhi and the individual members of the Syndicate to probe each other's mind rather than to make a final choice. However, these diplomatic manoeuvrings could not conceal the fact that the Syndicate would not let Mrs. Gandhi have her way in selecting the next President. In the meanwhile, Vice-President Giri, sensing the opposition of the Syndicate to his nomination, resigned his office and declared himself as an independent candidate for the Presidency. Immediately thereafter, the Communists, eager to see political polarisation in the country, made a tactical move by pledging their support to V. V. Giri.

In the month of June, Mrs. Gandhi visited several states in order to measure her following among the Chief Ministers. By then, her consultations with the members of the Syndicate had made it clear to her that they desired not only a "strong" President who could act against the left-wing class-creating forces,<sup>47</sup> but also an "inconvenient" President for her. The Syndicate's obvious choice was for N. Sanjiva Reddy of Andhra, then Speaker of the Lok Sabha, whom Mrs. Gandhi had declined to accept in her cabinet in 1967. Visiting the capital city of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, she reportedly told a meeting of the legislators that in the event of Reddy's election, "Uttar Pradesh might lose its distinction of holding the Prime Ministership of the country, which it had enjoyed since Independence."<sup>48</sup> And, on her return to Delhi, after assessing her strength among the Chief Ministers, she said that "the choice of a



Presidential candidate was not merely a Congress party matter."<sup>49</sup> This statement, unkind to the party bosses, provoked the Syndicate to launch an attack on Mrs. Gandhi's left-wing followers, particularly the Young Turks, who were more vocal than ever before in their tirade against the Syndicate.

In this environment of mistrust and distrust, the Congress Parliamentary Board met at Bangalore and by a majority vote decided to nominate N. Sanjiva Reddy for the Presidency, defeating Mrs. Gandhi's candidate, Jagjivan Ram. In the eight-member Board, S. K. Ratil, K. Kamaraj, V. B. Chavan, Morarji Desai, and S. N. Sinha voted for Reddy, while Mrs. Gandhi and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed supported Jagjivan Ram, who was present at the meeting. Finding herself isolated and brow-beaten by the Syndicate, she said that the decision would have "serious repercussions"<sup>50</sup> and left the meeting. What surprised and pained her most was the attitude of V. B. Chavan, Home Minister in her cabinet, who had never been known to be close to the Syndicate and yet voted for Reddy.

Mrs. Gandhi acted with amazing speed. In order to give an ideological touch to her conflict with the Syndicate, she relieved Morarji Desai of the Finance portfolio on July 16 and followed this by nationalizing fourteen major banks by a Presidential ordinance. On July 21, she outwitted the Syndicate by filing the nomination papers of Reddy for the Presidency in the office of the Election Commissioner, thereby giving the Syndicate and the nation a general feeling that her conflict with Desai was ideological and not connected with the presidential nomination. At the same time, rumours were set afloat that Mrs. Gandhi was taking away Intelligence and Center-state relations from the Home Ministry, headed by V. B. Chavan, in order to provide a clean

and stable administration to the country. The move puzzled the state governments as much as it embarrassed the Maharashtrian strong man, Chavan. On July 28, when some of the rightist parties in Parliament criticised bank nationalization and labelled her as the "satellite of Soviet dictators", Mrs. Gandhi projected herself as a "socialist crusader" being nailed for implementing welfare policies for the people. Referring to the allegations that she was joining the Communist camp, she said: "If I wanted to become a Communist, nothing could have prevented me from doing so. I am all for the Congress and its programmes and I have always been in the Congress."<sup>51</sup>

The month of August was the month of a mutual smear campaigns. On August 7, the Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted a motion to debate Madhu Limaye's charge that S. Nijalingappa had "made efforts to bring pressure and undue influence on Bihar MLAs [legislators] by promising them termination of President's rule" if the votes cast by them in favour of Reddy in the Presidential poll were equivalent to what they claimed their strength to be.<sup>52</sup> On August 8, nine leftist Members of the Parliament accused S. Nijalingappa and S. K. Patil for having accepted certain sums of money from some vested interests in 1962 and demanded an immediate investigation into the charges. On the same day, some of Mrs. Gandhi's supporters called attention to the Supreme Court's judgement which was passed against N. Sanjiva Reddy when he was the Chief Minister of Andhra. The comments of the former Attorney General, C. K. Daphtary, in respect to the judgement, at this juncture did the greatest harm to Reddy. It was, he said, a Victorian concept that "one judgement can hang a man and kill him for ever."<sup>53</sup> While Mrs. Gandhi was busy addressing the so-called "hired demonstrators" every day outside her residence and elaborating to them the virtues of bank nationalization,

the Young Turks gave a call to the Presidential electors to vote according to their conscience in the Presidential poll. In the meanwhile, both Jagjivan Ram and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed accused S. Nijalingappa of hob-nobbing with the rightist parties and seeking support for Reddy in exchange for a promise to form a coalitional government with them at the Center. On the evening of August 15, barely a few hours before the Presidential poll, Mrs. Gandhi played her trump card by announcing that the Presidential electors should vote according to their conscience. On August 20, Giri won the election defeating the Congress nominee. Though Giri was an independent candidate, hundreds of people thronged the Parliament building to congratulate Mrs. Gandhi and her team.

However, an analysis of the voting pattern demonstrated that the Syndicate was in definite control of the Congress party. About two-thirds of the total Congress electors had voted for Reddy as directed by the Congress President. In order to establish her own control over the party, Mrs. Gandhi continued her offensives against the Syndicate. Her sense of political timing and her appreciation of statecraft out-manoeuvred the Syndicate. The battle between Mrs. Gandhi's supporters and those of the Syndicate was grim and shook the conscience of the press and the public alike.<sup>54</sup> Her call to the "like-minded" parties and to the Congress defectors to join her ranks helped her survive the political battle. By November 1969, the drama of the party split was over and Mrs. Gandhi was heading a minority government dependent for its survival on a mixture of left-right parties (such as the Communist Party (R), Bharatiya Kranti Dal, Akali Dal and the Madras Party). The Syndicate, with a support of about sixty Members of the Parliament, now adorned the opposition benches under the over-all parliamentary leadership of Morarji Desai. On December 27, 1970, Mrs. Gandhi advised the President to dissolve the Parliament when the Government

bill on privy purses suffered a defeat in the Rajya Sabha.

One of the important consequences of the Congress split was that it pluralized (not polarized) the politics of the country: Like a drowning person grasping at a straw, Mrs. Gandhi was willing to accept all kinds of support from all kinds of sources, right or left, which could help her fight the battle. After the split, she was friendly with the non-Congress state governments but devastating to those state governments which were the stronghold of the Syndicate. Thus, she made a major concession to the Communists by withdrawing the Preventive Detention Act; won over the Akalis by awarding Chandigarh to Punjab; placated the DMK by allocating a steel plant and awarding a favourable decision on the Cauvery water dispute to Tamil Nadu; upset the solid Syndicate state of Mysore by decreeing a decision unfavourable to Mysore in its boundary dispute with Maharashtra; toppled the state government of Uttar Pradesh headed by the Syndicate ally, C. R. Gupta, through defections; and refused to allocate any part of the discretionary grants to Gujarat, Mysore, Orissa, and Bihar states because of their unfavourable attitude towards her. <sup>55</sup>

In order to consolidate her strength, Mrs. Gandhi took over the Home Ministry herself, transferring V. B. Chavan to the Ministry of Finance. Uncertain of her own tenure, Mrs. Gandhi wanted the state governments to fall in line with her as quickly as possible so that she had the necessary support before she could risk a parliamentary dissolution.

### 3: Leadership properties: the "triumphant" Indira

Before the split, Mrs. Gandhi conveyed the general impression of being a weak Prime Minister, incapable of reacting to the dictates of the party bosses. Despite her successful out-manoeuving of the electorally-humiliated Syndicate at the time of her succession in 1967,

she neither raised hopes among her friends nor despair among her foes because both, friends and foes, were alive to the fact that her success in the succession crisis owed much more to the anti-Desai wave than to her own inspiring image. Her successive failures to have her way in the Syndicate-dominated party forums were exasperating for her and a demoralizing to her supporters. However, she was aware that the anti-Congress wave and the politics of defection that had followed it had as much to do with the Syndicate's rigid disciplinary approach to the party organization as with the general frustration among the masses.

After about two years of confrontation with the Syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi transformed her personal conflict into an ideological conflict and imparted a national dimension. Her fight with the "dim-witted" Syndicate was full of paralyzing suspense in which she broke the backbone of the Syndicate by preaching to the party men that "conscience" was superior to party discipline. To the frustrated masses, she promised a socialist El Dorado through the magic wand of nationalization and earned in exchange an image of a socialist crusader - an image which finds ready acceptance in a society of scarcity.

Mrs. Gandhi's determination to fight the Syndicate was total. And the way she went about winning this "fight-to-the-finish" battle left one guessing as to whether her determination was the product of purely situational pressures, the mature expression of her "lonely and frustrating" childhood, or the vindication of her father's helplessness in his later years. Whatever the explanation, Mrs. Gandhi refused to compromise with the Syndicate, even for her advantage. On the contrary, each offer of a compromise made her harder and stronger in her determination to fight. In the process, she used every means - personal, institutional, non-institutional - to speed up the rout of her adversaries. Even the national

press felt the pinch of her furv - in 1969, she threatened some of the press correspondents that "she could pick up the telephone and fix their proprietors in five minutes."<sup>56</sup> Since this "five-minute-fix" threat had become quite an obsession with her - she had used this threat against the Jana Sangh and against her critics in Uttar Pradesh on earlier occasions - a wag delighted the Parliament when he "ridiculed her for saying such things by scornfully pointing out that she could not even fix her hair in five minutes."<sup>57</sup>

At each critical victory during the nerve-breaking fight with the Syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi gave the impression that the dead past continued to sit heavily on her shoulders and that she could neither forgive nor forget the last days of her father. After the Presidential poll, she addressed some Members of the Parliament from the South and said: "I know what anguish he [Nehru] suffered during the last years. He saw the Congress going in the direction in which neither he nor Gandhiji wanted it to go."<sup>58</sup> On November 8, 1969, she once again brought in the "father-theme" in her interview with the press:

It is not a new situation but one which existed even in my father's time. In fact during the last three years of his time, it was acute. And that was why the Kamaraj Plan and other things came into being. I can dilate on it but this is not the time.<sup>59</sup>

And, on November 22, 1969, when the Syndicate's rout was complete, she addressed the special session of the Congress(R) in New Delhi and was in tears when she started mentioning the "Nehru family involvement" with the Congress: how each one of them from her grandfather to father and mother had made supreme sacrifices for the Congress and how her own childhood was associated with the Congress movement.<sup>60</sup>

With Mrs. Gandhi's triumph over her adversaries, the nation received a leader whose powers, as one member of the Parliament from Mysore

put it (1970), were "equal to that of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini rolled into one."<sup>61</sup>

System-environmental properties:

1. Domestic: (a) Violence

The period between 1967 and 1971 was the worst in the history of India in terms of political unrest and public safety. There were linguistic agitations in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and separatist agitations in the hilly areas of Assam. At the same time, there were strikes of all kinds both in the public and the private sectors and by all kinds of employees for better conditions of service. In West Bengal, Assam, and Kerala, there were bandhs of all kinds, partial or complete, led by trade unions and tacitly supported by the state governments which were eager to win the sympathy of the labour force. In West Bengal, there were gheraos (encirclements) of industrial and non-industrial establishments with the open support of the leftist government of West Bengal.<sup>62</sup> In the spring of 1967, peasant rebellion broke out at Naxalbari in West Bengal and later spread to the other parts of India, noticeably to Andhra, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. While Peking hailed the Naxalbari rebellion as the "spring showers" over India,<sup>63</sup> the Central Government activated, despite protests from the non-Congress state governments, the Central Reserve Police to dig at the preachers of "guerrilla warfare". Initiated and backed by the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), an extremist splinter group of the CPI (Marxist) which parted company with the parent organization in May 1968, the Naxalite movement blazed a Maoist trail in India, making affluent farmers, state legislators, and policemen the targets of its bullets. Between 1967 and 1970, the movement claimed the lives of 45 policemen in West Bengal alone.<sup>64</sup> The army was called out at several places (West Bengal, Assam, Andhra) to assist the police in quelling riots

and in smashing underground networks. While the Naxalite movement was violent, the Land Grab Movement organized separately by the Muscovite Communist and the Socialist parties in July 1970 was non-violent. Its aim was the symbolic occupation of land in order to pressure the government to implement land reforms. The movement gained momentum in Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and caused embarrassment to political leaders (Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Y. B. Chavan, Jagjivan Ram and others) by exposing the extent of their land ownership.

(b) Political defections:

The period between 1967 and 1971 was a period of negotiable political loyalties among the state politicians. In some of the states, political loyalties were openly bought and sold for power, position, and money. In the process, political stability was the main casualty. By March 1971, more than half (52.4%) of the state legislators had changed their political affiliations at least once.<sup>65</sup> Though the Central Government set up a committee to frame certain rules to check frequent defections and counter-defections, the suggestions of the committee failed to deter defections rooted in political irresponsibility and opportunism.<sup>66</sup>

2. International: Increasing friendship with the Soviet Union

Before the Congress split in 1969, India's relations with the Soviet Union were less than cordial. Alexei Kosygin visited India in November 1967 and again in January 1968, but each time he evaded the question of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan. By September 1968, Moscow, which had acknowledged Kashmir as an integral part of India since 1955, even declared the Kashmir issue an open issue between India and Pakistan. The Soviet move was probably a reaction to India's holding out an olive branch to Peking and to her (India's) expression of "regret" over the



Soviet action in Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

After the split, Moscow hailed Mrs. Gandhi as the leader of "progressive forces" and Kosygin, on his visit to Delhi in 1969, advised the two Communist factions in India to sink their differences and work unitedly behind Mrs. Gandhi.<sup>67</sup> Later, Moscow suspended arms shipment to Pakistan, opened a dialogue with Mrs. Gandhi on "Collective Security for Asia", and on other matters of common interest. In September 1970, President Giri paid a good will visit to Moscow. In the same month, Madame Binh, the Vietcong leader, visited India, much to the embarrassment of the protesting American Ambassador.

India's increasing hob-nobbing with the Soviets effectively reduced the links between New Delhi and Washington. The United States did not write off New Delhi, but it became increasingly independent.

The system-environmental interaction, as described in the preceding pages, put the Center in a very poor position of authority in relation to the state governments. For the first five months or so, the Center was almost paralyzed, unable to act even in situations where its action was most called for. Though Mrs. Gandhi was of the opinion that the opposition parties should be given a fair chance to form state governments where the Congress had been defeated by legitimate and constitutional means,<sup>68</sup> the rival parties, probably, took it as a sign of her weakness. Soon after the elections, the opposition parties began encouraging the disgruntled Congressmen in Harvana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh to defect from the Congress. Mrs. Gandhi's inaction in checking the Congress wreckage invited vehement criticism from the Syndicate and the party rank and file. Morarji Desai, who had insisted on being the Home Minister "in view of the conditions prevailing in the different states"<sup>69</sup> at the time of joining her cabinet, saw in her inaction

"unpardonable weakness and a vindication of his original claim that she was unfit to be the leader."<sup>70</sup> Now that the Syndicate was scoring a point over her, Mrs. Gandhi could no longer be a silent spectator to the sequence of events in the states. If she did not want to project the image of a meddling Center, much less did she desire her critics to project her as a weak and ineffective leader. Accepting the challenge, Mrs. Gandhi gave a more or less free hand to the state Congress units to topple the non-Congress governments wherever possible and proceeded to recover the lost territories. With her mind set to demonstrate that the Center existed and that she was the "leader", we expect that:

Descriptive propositions  
before the split:

- (a) the attitude of the Center would be positive toward all the Congress provincial governments-in-crisis, even though such an attitude might not be very helpful to the maintenance of stability of the government in view of the politics of defections and
- (b) the attitude of the Center would be negative toward all the non-Congress provincial governments-in-crisis, resulting in the opportunistic use of presidential powers. Generally speaking, the Center would use presidential rule - suspension - if the Congress has a chance to form the government or set up a minority government of its choice but presidential rule & dissolution - if the Congress objectives could not be achieved.

After the Congress split (i.e., after June 30, 1969 when the issue of presidential nomination had become quite open), when the minority government of Mrs. Gandhi not only needed the support of the opposition parties in order to survive in the Parliament, but also wanted to build

independent party support structures to consolidate her minority government, we expect that:

Descriptive propositions  
after the split:

- (a) the attitude of the Center would be positive-neutral toward those opposition state governments which would be willing to support Mrs. Gandhi's Congress(R) in the Parliament; and
- (b) the attitude of the Center would be negative toward all those Congress state governments which did not pass the "loyalty" test of Mrs. Gandhi.

PART III: PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1967-71

There were 17 cases of presidential rule between 1967 and February 1971. Before the split, out of a total of 9 cases, 3 were cases of presidential suspensions and the remaining 6 of presidential dissolutions. After the split, out of a total of 8 cases, 4 were cases of presidential suspensions and the remaining 4 of presidential dissolutions.

The type of state crises, the nature of government, the duration of presidential rules, etc., are given in Table 5.2 (next page).

**CONGRESS CRISES BEFORE THE CONGRESS SPLIT:**

Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Rajasthan: March 13 - April 26, 1967

In the 1967 elections, the Congress failed to win an absolute majority in the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly - it secured 89 of the 184 seats. However, since Congress was the single largest group in the Assembly, the caretaking Congress Chief Minister, Mohanlal Sukhadia, staked his claim to form the government. Meanwhile, all the opposition parties formed a United Front under the leadership of Maharawal Luxman Singh (Swatantra), claimed the support of 93 members, and wrote to the

TABLE 5.2  
STATE CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE  
MARCH 1967 - FEBRUARY 1971

BEFORE THE CONGRESS SPLIT (JUNE 1969)

Type of crises	Nature of incumbent government	State	State machinery suspended/dissolved	Duration of presidential rule
Congressization	Congress	Rajasthan	suspended	March 13, 1967 - April 26, 1967
	Non-Congress	Manipur	suspended	October 25, 1967 - February 19, 1968
	Non-Congress	Haryana	dissolved	November 21, 1967 - May 21, 1968
	Non-Congress	Uttar Pradesh	suspended	February 25, 1968 - April 14, 1968
			dissolved	April 15, 1968 - February 16, 1969
	Non-Congress	Bihar	dissolved	June 29, 1968 - February 26, 1969
	Congress	Pondicherry	dissolved	September 18, 1968 - March 17, 1969

TABLE 5.2 continued:

## BEFORE THE CONGRESS SPLIT:

Structural	Congress coalition	West Bengal	dissolved	February 20, 1968 - February 21, 1969
	Congress supported	Punjab	dissolved	August 23, 1968 - February 17, 1969

Suspensions: 3  
 Dissolutions: 6

TABLE 5.2 continued:

## AFTER THE CONGRESS SPLIT:

Congressization*	Non-Congress	Bihar	suspended	July 4, 1969 - February 16, 1970
	Congress	Manipur	dissolved	October 16, 1969 - March 20, 1972
	Non-Congress	Uttar Pradesh	suspended	October 1, 1970 - October 18, 1970
	Non-Congress	Orissa	suspended	January 11, 1971 - January 22, 1971
			dissolved	January 23, 1970 - April 3, 1971
Structural	Non-Congress	West Bengal	suspended	March 19, 1970 - July 29, 1970
			dissolved	July 30, 1970 - April 2, 1971
	Non-Congress	Kerala	dissolved	August 4, 1970 - October 4, 1970

\*Congressization here stands for congressization in favour of the ruling Congress of Mrs. Gandhi, i.e., Congress(R).

Suspensions: 4

Dissolutions: 4

Governor, Dr. Sampuranand (former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and a strong Congressite) to admit the claim of the Front to form the Government.

On March 4, the Governor announced that the Congress, under the leadership of Mohanlal Sukhadia, was being invited to form the government because it was the largest single group in the legislature. Besides, he said, the United Front was not in a majority because he could not take the independent members supporting the United Front seriously, as the "people [did] not know their policies."<sup>72</sup>

The announcement by the Governor sparked off one of the worst riots in the streets of Jaipur, the capital city of Rajasthan. On March 5, the government arrested most of the leaders of the United Front including Maharawal Luxman Singh. From March 6 to March 12, Jaipur was the site of the burning of effigies of the Governor and the Chief Minister, of stone-throwing mobs, and of firing by the police. A conservative report put the estimate of those arrested at 300, those killed at 30, and those wounded at 100. On March 7, a curfew was imposed in the city and the army was called out to help maintain law and order.

On March 8, Mohanlal Sukhadia met Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi to re-emphasize the fact that he was in a majority and that he could form the government. Mrs. Gandhi was in a dilemma. She needed the support of Sukhadia as the leadership issue at the Center was still in suspense and yet she could not permit the kind of happenings in Jaipur. She appealed for peace.

I am most deeply distressed at the happenings in Jaipur in the course of which lives have been lost .... I appeal to the people and leaders of all parties and sections to help restore peaceful conditions. <sup>73</sup>

The leaders of the opposition parties at the Center and the national press put the Governor and the Central Government on the defensive. Nath

Pai, the Praja Socialist leader in the Lok Sabha, declared that he would move an amendment to the Constitution making the appointment of the Governors subject to the approval of the Parliament. He said:

With non-Congress governments functioning in some parts of the country, an arithmetical authority at the Centre should no longer distribute patronage of governorships to persons found difficult to deal with or defeated at the polls.<sup>74</sup>

A delegation of the opposition parties met President Radhakrishnan and appealed to him to stop the swearing-in ceremony of the Congress government scheduled for March 14.

The news media condemned the events in Rajasthan in varying degrees. The Patna Searchlight said: "Heavens would not have fallen if the Opposition parties had been called upon to form a Government, particularly after they had jointly declared their willingness to do so."<sup>75</sup> But for the Hindustan Times, most of the newspapers - the Pioneer (Lucknow), the Tribune (Ambala), the Hindu (Madras), and the Indian Express (New Delhi) - attributed Jaipur violence and disorder to the Governor's "singularly maladroit handling" of the constitutional controversy in Rajasthan.<sup>76</sup>

On March 13, the Governor recommended to the President the dissolution of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly on account of the failure of "democratic methods".<sup>77</sup> The same day, the Central Government decided to suspend and not dissolve the state legislature.

For the first time in the history of India, the Central Government was reluctant to get the approval of the Parliament on the suspension of an Assembly. Ultimately, the Opposition in the Parliament moved a vote of no-confidence in the Central Government on March 18 in the Lok Sabha and on March 20 in the Rajya Sabha. The Government survived the no-confidence motions but the Opposition did not leave the matter there. On April 3, the Opposition moved a motion for the withdrawal of the suspension of the



Assembly, which was the subject of heated debate in the Rajya Sabha. D. V. Patel (Gujarat) declared the presidential rule as an "atrociousness on the Constitution."<sup>78</sup> And, while A. P. Chatterjee (West Bengal) said that the Central Government, by using the presidential rule in Rajasthan, "wanted to cow down and threaten the intending rebels among the Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh",<sup>79</sup> M. C. Reddy (Mysore) questioned the constitutionality of the refusal of the Central Government in not seeking an "affirmative vote" of the Parliament at the earliest opportunity.<sup>80</sup>

The Government's answer to the debate was a "dumb silence". At the end of the debate, Home Minister V. B. Chavan had only this to say:

Sir, the purpose of not bringing up this Proclamation for the approval of Parliament is [that the Government would] not extend it beyond two months.<sup>81</sup>

The only effect of the debate was that the Central Government retired the Governor, Dr. Sampuranand, and replaced him by Sardar Hukum Singh. In the meanwhile, Sukhadia was able to draw into his fold a few independents and on April 26, 1967, he became the triumphant Chief Minister of the state.

Mohanlal Sukhadia stayed in the saddle during the entire period under analysis. At one time, he was heading the largest ministry in the country to stave off defections. He did face a threat to his ministry at the time of the Congress split, but his timely switch from the Syndicate to the Congress-R of Mrs. Gandhi enabled him to save his office.

The Rajasthan episode and the controversy it provoked made the Center wiser in the future. For almost six months after this episode, the Center refused to involve itself in the uncertainty and hurly-burly of state politics.

Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Manipur: October 25, 1967 - February 19, 1968.

At the time of the declaration of the presidential rule, Manipur

was a Union Territory struggling to achieve the status of a full state within the Indian Union.

In the 1967 elections, the Congress secured 16 of the 30 elected seats to the Manipur Assembly. The strength of the other parties was: Communist Party, 1; Samyukta Socialist Party, 4; and Independents, 9. Since under the Government of Union Territories Act, the President of India has the authority to nominate two members to the Manipur Assembly, the Congress under the leadership of Koireng Singh formed the government with the support of these two nominated members on March 19, 1967. Within days, the strength of the Congress rose to 24 (Congress, 16; Nominated, 2; Independents, 6) in a house of 32 members.

Crisis # 1:

On October 4, 1967, the Congress was voted out of office when 10 of its members defected to the recently formed United Front under the leadership of Longjam Thamban Singh. Among the defecting members were the two who had been nominated by the President. The next day, Longjam Thamban Singh, with the support of 17 members, was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Manipur by the Chief Commissioner (who acts like a Governor of a state), Baleswar Prasad.

Crisis # 2:

The United Front did not survive even a single session of the Assembly. The two nominated members were reminded that they were, of course, nominated by the President of India and that they should know where their loyalties should rest. With their return to the Congress within two weeks, the Assembly stood equally divided between the Congress (now 16 members) and the United Front. On October 23, 1967, the Chief Commissioner had to prorogue the Assembly in view of the unwillingness of either of the two groups to nominate a member to the office of the Speaker of the House. 82

To days later, the President of India suspended the Assembly and the Council of Ministers under Section 51 of the Government of Union Territories Act,

which does not require the approval of the proclamation by the Parliament.

The Assembly stayed suspended for almost four months, giving the defectors a taste of being in the political wilderness. By February 19, 1968, Koireng Singh, leader of the Congress Legislative Party, was sure of the commitment of Independents to the Congress when he was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Manipur. Presidential Rule was withdrawn the same day.

There was no noticeable criticism of the happenings in Manipur because of the status of this small territory and its special relations with the Center.

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Haryana: November 21, 1967 -  
May 21, 1968

The state of Haryana came into being on November 1, 1966 after the linguistic reorganization of the old state of Punjab. In the 1967 elections, the Congress secured an absolute majority, winning 48 of the 81 seats in the Haryana Assembly. Of the remaining seats, Jan Sangh secured 12; Swatantra, 3; Republicans, 2; and Independents, 16. Bhagwat Dayal Sharma, leader of the Congress Legislative Party, was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the state on March 10, 1967.

Crisis # 1:

Within less than two weeks, Haryana was lost to the Congress when Rao Birendra Singh and Rizak Ram defected from the Congress and formed a United Front of the opposition parties and Independents. On March 24, two days after Sharma resigned, Rao Birendra Singh, leader of the 48-member United Front, became the Chief Minister of the state. Incidentally, Haryana was the first state to initiate the politics of group defection after the Fourth General Elections.

From the day Rao formed his ministry, the see-saw battle of defections

and counter-defections continued in its most ugly form; Haryana, in fact, added to the indigenous political vocabulary of the nation when the defectors came to be called Aya Rams, Gaya Rams. It was no secret that both the local unit of the Congress Party and the Congress High Command were bent upon toppling the Rao ministry. By July, the Congress High Command was partially successful in winning over a prominent Jat leader, Devi Lal (a former Congressman of standing in the area who had been expelled from the Party for six years in 1962 for his anti-Party activities), who was promised the Chief Ministership of the state with the support of the Congress if he was successful in toppling the Rao ministry. As Kashyap writes:

Under the agreement the Congress Party promised support to a minority government under the Chief Ministership of Devi Lal if he could succeed in securing the necessary defections from the United Front to topple the Rao Ministry. The agreement was said to carry the blessings of the Congress High Command.<sup>83</sup>

Devi Lal failed to outmanoeuvre Rao Birendra Singh, who continued reshuffling and expanding his cabinet each time he was faced with a threat from the former. The maximum strength that Devi Lal and the Congress Party could muster was 38 in a house with an effective strength of 78 members.

In a sudden move, the Haryana Governor, B. N. Chakravarty, sent a report to the President of India containing a powerful indictment of the politics of defection and requesting him to take over the administration of the state. The Governor's report of November 17 was an unusual document for it not only indicted the United Front for "distributing public money lavishly" in order to maintain its supporters, but also the Congress party for having "failed to reconcile itself to its position as a responsible opposition."<sup>84</sup> The report further said that the opposition must bear some

responsibility for not having given the Government any peace or a chance to settle down to constructive work .... Allegations have been made by the Opposition that the Ministry is continuing in power through corruption, bribery, political victimisation and distribution of offices but then the Opposition is also apparently securing defections through no better means or through no cleaner methods.<sup>85</sup>

On November 21, 1967, the President dismissed the United Front ministry and dissolved the Haryana Assembly.

The Lok Sabha debated the proclamation on November 21, and the Rajya Sabha on November 22 and 27, 1967. While A. B. Vajpayee (Jan Sangh) criticised the Center for proclaiming presidential rule when, in fact, the constitutional machinery had not broken down, P. Venkatasubbaiah (Congress) justified Central intervention by saying that it was the "duty of the Governor and President to save democracy", which had been "butchered and murdered and raped in Haryana."<sup>86</sup> Y. B. Chavan, the Union Home Minister, blamed all the political parties including the Congress in Haryana for making a "mockery of democracy" and assured the House that the proclamation of presidential rule was "not meant to seize power for the Congress, but to give it back to the people."<sup>87</sup>

On the whole, the national press welcomed presidential rule. While the Times of India said that presidential rule was "long overdue", the Indian Express editorialized that "further inaction on the part of the President would have been inexcusable."<sup>88</sup> Even the Statesman, rarely soft on the Central Government, expressed approval of the Central intervention: "No tears are likely to be shed except perhaps by Rao Birendra Singh over the imposition of the President's rule in Haryana, for the decision has not come a day too soon."<sup>89</sup>

After about six months of presidential rule in the state, the Congress party formed the government under the leadership of Bansi Lal after having been returned with an absolute majority (48/82) in the

legislature in the mid-term polls held in May 1968. Though the politics of defections and counter-defections continued to intrigue the Bansi Lal ministry, the Congress survived in office by the saving grace of the Governor.<sup>90</sup>

Presidential Rule in Uttar Pradesh:

- (a) Suspension: February 25 - April 14, 1968
- (b) Dissolution: April 15, 1968 - February 16, 1969

Uttar Pradesh, the home state of all the three Prime Ministers, was lost to the Congress in the 1967 elections when the Party secured 198 of the 424 seats in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The strength of the other parties was Jan Sangh, 97; SSP, 44; Swatantra, 12; CPI, 14; CPI(Marxist), 1; Republican, 9; SP/PSP, 11; Independent and others, 38. Being one of the largest and the most populous states of the Indian Union, the loss of Uttar Pradesh humbled the prestige of the Congress and the personal pride of Mrs. Gandhi, for whom Uttar Pradesh, being her home state, had the same importance as Gujarat had for Morarji Desai, Maharashtra for Y. B. Chavan, West Bengal for Atulya Ghosh, and Tamil Nad for K. Kamaraj. Uttar Pradesh had been the political base of both Nehru and Shatri and Mrs. Gandhi could ill afford to lose it.

Crisis # 1:

As in other states where the Congress could not secure an absolute majority, Uttar Pradesh opposition parties quickly joined hands to form a United Front known as the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD). To begin with, it consisted of the Jan Sangh, SSP, Republicans, CPI, CPI(M), Swatantra and the Independents. Claiming an absolute majority in the legislature, the SVD leader, Ram Chandra Vakil, wrote to the Governor to invite him to form the government. However, after a careful verification of the written statements of a few Independents (the Governor was careful not

to repeat the Rajasthan episode in Uttar Pradesh), the Governor summoned C. B. Gupta, leader of the Congress Legislative Party and a strong ally of the Syndicate, to form the government on March 14, 1967.

Though Mrs. Gandhi wished Kamalabati Tripathi, President of the Pradesh Congress and her known ally, to be the Chief Minister of her home state in place of C. B. Gupta (even Nehru never liked him and kamarajed him despite Desai's advice to the contrary), she seemed helpless for she needed Gupta because he controlled a solid block of seats in the Parliament which Mrs. Gandhi needed in her own national leadership contest. It was on March 9, 1967, when the national leadership issue was poised for a climactic solution, that Mrs. Gandhi told Gupta to go ahead with the formation of a Congress ministry in the state, if he could. <sup>91</sup> She even sent her emissaries - Dinesh Singh and Uma Shankar Dikshit - to Uttar Pradesh to ensure the unanimous election of Gupta as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party. The challenge to C. B. Gupta's leadership had come from Charan Singh, a cabinet minister in Uttar Pradesh since 1951 and a man of enormous popularity and "awesome honesty".

Gupta formed his ministry on March 14, 1967. To the surprise of Mrs. Gandhi and her emissaries, Gupta excluded from his cabinet many top Congress leaders including Charan Singh. On April 1, a little over two weeks after the formation of the Gupta ministry, Charan Singh with 17 of his supporters crossed the floor in a rather dramatic way. The same day, an amendment to the Motion of Thanks to the Governor's address was passed by 215 to 193 votes. C. B. Gupta submitted the resignation of his ministry to the Governor the next day.

#### Crisis # 2:

Charan Singh formed an SVD ministry on April 3, 1967. For a while, the seven-parties coalition worked well. It drew up a "minimum program"

which included such items as the abolition of land revenue, release of political prisoners, a judicial enquiry into the assets of ministers and officials, etc. However, when it came to implementing the minimum program, the coalition began to crack. The Chief Minister used his threat of resignation twice in order to stop bickering among the ill-assorted constituents of the SVD. Some political partners in the SVD were so unscrupulous, Charan Singh revealed later, as to suggest that Mrs. Gandhi, on her visit to Banaras (U.P.), be "arrested and publicly impeached or at least gheraoed/encircled".<sup>92</sup> On February 17, 1968, Charan Singh submitted his personal resignation to the Governor and at the same time asked the SVD to elect a new leader in his place. The letter of resignation to the Governor was conditional: failing the SVD's efforts to elect a new leader, the Governor could dissolve the Assembly and hold mid-term polls.<sup>93</sup>

Charan Singh's resignation inspired new hopes among the "loose-foot" legislators, accelerating the pace of defections and counter-defections between the SVD and the Congress. While the SVD maintained that it was still in a majority in the Assembly and was in the process of selecting its new leader, E. B. Gupta of the Congress met the Governor, B. Gopala Reddi (a former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh) to request him that he be invited to form the government as the SVD had lost its majority. On February 23, the Governor recommended to the President the suspension of the Legislative Assembly and the Council of Ministers till such time as the "reorientation of political affiliations" emerged, making it possible to constitute a "stable, popular government."<sup>94</sup> A Presidential suspension was issued two days later.

The press was very critical of the Central action. M. B. Mathur of the Hindustan Times wrote:



President's rule in the circumstances was inevitable. That the legislature has been suspended until such time as one party or the other is able to form a stable government is, however, an open invitation for members of the Assembly to play the 'politics of defection' with gusto.<sup>95</sup>

And the Indian Express commented: "It appears that the Center, by suspension, wanted to gain time to assess the possibility of bringing Congress back to power."<sup>96</sup> The Economic and Political Weekly was more vocal:

In any case nobody can accuse Governor Gopala Reddi for not helping: he has given Gupta and Tripathi / both Congress / all the time in the world to work out arrangements between themselves and with legislators from other parties who are up for sale. And for his part the Governor can take some comfort in the experience in Rajasthan where temporary President's rule was followed by a Congress Ministry which has lasted for a year and shows no surface cracks yet.<sup>97</sup>

In the Lok Sabha, Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs, V. C. Shukla, was quite apologetic:

I am not here to defend any particular political party. I, as a representative of the Central Government, assure the House that we did not feel happy by imposing presidential rule. We did not desire it either.<sup>98</sup>

Outside the Parliament, some Opposition parties accused the Center of acting in a partisan manner. Bhupesh Gupta of the CPI(R) said that suspension of the Assembly was an attempt by the Prime Minister and the Congress Party to help the U.P. Congress to "crawl back" to power.<sup>99</sup>

The dissolution of the Assembly: The suspension of the Assembly could not help the Congress. On March 18, the SVD elected Harish Chandra Singh as its new leader. On April 3, H. C. Singh submitted a list of 229 members to the Governor in support of his claim to form the government. Later, the Governor told him that some 18 members from his list were those who had spoken to him personally, withdrawing their support from the SVD. Thereupon, Singh requested the Governor to disclose to him the names of those 18 members so that nothing would be done clandestinely; but the Governor refused to do so.

On April 15, the President dissolved the Assembly on a report from the Governor that no stable ministry was possible in the state. The report said:

I have therefore, no convincing proof to satisfy me that the Samyukta Vidhaya Dal would be able to command a stable / italics mine / majority. On the other hand, the uncertainty is clear. If it was possible to reach a conclusion that the SVD was in a minority and the Congress Party commanded a clear majority, I would have unhesitatingly called upon the Leader of the Congress Party to form the Government.<sup>100</sup>

In the Panch Sabha, the Governor's report provoked a marathon debate.

Bhupesh Gupta called the Governor's letter a bundle of "scandalous utterances" and accused him of taking "advantage of the internal difficulties in the SVD" at the behest of C. B. Gupta.<sup>101</sup> Nowhere, said

Bhupesh Gupta, did the Governor say that the SVD was in a minority in the legislature. K. P. Subramania Menon (Kerala) said:

The one characteristic which I could discern in all these changes is the effort of the ruling Congress Party at the Centre to muzzle democracy, to emasculate representative Government and to perpetuate the rule of the Congress Party and keep its hegemony all over the country.<sup>102</sup>

In August 1968, the Central Government sought an extension of the presidential rule for a period of six months on the ground that the Election Commission needed time to prepare the electoral rolls. The parliamentary debate on extension was, on the whole, dry and uninteresting. The Lok Sabha, it appeared, was not interested in listening to a long lecture by Professor N. G. Ranga on the virtues of a Swiss type of government which consumed almost the entire time of the House.<sup>103</sup>

In February of 1969, mid-term polls returned Congress with 211 seats in the 425-member Assembly, making it not very difficult for C. B. Gupta to form a Congress ministry.

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Bihar: June 29, 1968 - February 26, 1969

Bihar, one of the most backward states in the Indian Union, did

not return the Congress party with an absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly in the 1967 elections. Of the 318 seats in the Assembly, the Congress secured 128, SSP, 68; Jan Sangh, 26; CPI, 24; Jana Kranti Dal, 24; PSP, 18; Jharkhand, 9; CPI(M), 4; Swatantra, 3; Independents and others, 14. Immediately after the declaration of the election results, a United Front, called SVD, of five parties - SSP, PSP, Jan Sangh, Jana Kranti Dal (later merged with the BKD) and CPI - was formed under the leadership of Mahamaya Prasad Sinha (of the Jana Kranti Dal) and installed in office on March 5, 1967. In his 21-member cabinet, M. P. Sinha included one B. P. Mandal, member of the Parliament but not a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, who had contested elections on an SSP ticket after having been expelled by the Congress in 1965 on charges of breach of discipline.

#### Crisis # 1:

For more than three months after its formation, the Sinha ministry worked well. There were some individual defections from the 168-member SVD but not sufficient in number to cause undue alarm to M. P. Sinha. Rather, there was a general feeling that of all the coalitional ministries, Sinha's ministry would be both effective and lasting.

However, events were soon to belie the hopes of the optimists. In July, 1967, the government set up a quasi-judicial inquiry commission headed by Justice Aiyer (Aiyer Commission) to investigate charges of corruption against top Bihar Congress leaders, including some former Congress Chief Ministers. The announcement about the setting up of the commission transformed the Legislative Assembly from a venue of debate into a physical trial of strength between the SVD and the Congress legislators. The honourably legislators went to the extent of hurling shoes at

each other. On July 19, the Pradesh Congress Committee announced that it would topple the United Front,<sup>104</sup> creating incentives for the fence-sitting legislators to join the Congress.

In its search for the defectives, the Congress found in B. P. Mandal a ready ally. Under the Constitution, Mandal could not continue as a Minister in the government for more than six months without becoming a member of the Bihar legislature. This six months' period was due to expire in the first week of September. On August 27, 1967, Mandal resigned as Minister of Health from the United Front government, formed his own party - Soshit Dal - with the support of 25 members of the legislature, and began his manoeuvres to topple the United Front government, in exchange for a promise from the Congress to support him for the Chief Ministership.

Unfortunately for the Soshit Dal and for the Congress, the Governor, A. Ayyangar (a former Speaker of the Lok Sabha and a reputed constitutionalist), refused to admit Mandal's claim to the Chief Ministership on constitutional grounds. In reply to Mandal's letter that he was, with the support of the Congress, in the majority in the Bihar Assembly and that he be installed as the Chief Minister of the state, Ayyangar, on September 10, 1967, said: "I have since obtained the opinion of the Advocate-General regarding your claim to become the Chief Minister or even a Minister. He states that you are not qualified to be a Minister without becoming a member of the Legislature."<sup>105</sup> The Governor also rejected the request of the Soshit Dal-Congress to convene a special session of the Assembly to test the strength of the United Front, on the ground that there was little reason for him to suspect that the United Front ministry was in a minority in the legislature.

It was now time for the axe to fall on the Governor. On December 1, 1967, Ayyangar was replaced by a die-hard Congress man, Nityanand Kanungo

(a former federal civil servant and Governor of Punjab), as the Governor of the state. The United Front ministry protested Kanungo's appointment, but to no avail. The Central Government made it clear to the United Front government that it was the privilege of the Center to make such appointments and that consultation with the state governments in respect to such appointments was more a matter of courtesy than a matter of constitutional obligation. 106

The appointment of Kanungo was hand-writing on the wall for some partners in the United Front, who lost no time in shifting their loyalties to the Congress. On a no-confidence motion moved by the Congress, the United Front ministry was voted out of office on January 25, 1968.

Now came an instance of colossal constitutional bungling. The Congress suggested to the Governor that he invite B. P. Mandal to form the government. Kanungo was reluctant to do so in view of the ruling of the former Governor (Ayyangar) to the effect that Mandal could not become even a Minister without first becoming a member of the legislature. Under the Constitution, the Governor had the privilege to nominate Mandal to the upper house of the Bihar legislature but; by convention, such nominations were always done on the recommendations of the Chief Ministers. The Soshit Dal-Congress solved the Governor's riddle. On January 28, 1968, the Governor invited S. P. Singh, a nominee of B. P. Mandal, to become the Chief Minister of the state. The next day, the Governor nominated B. P. Mandal to the upper house of the legislature on the recommendation of Chief Minister Singh. On January 31, B. P. Mandal was installed as the Chief Minister of the state. What an awesome respect for the Constitution!

#### Crisis # 2:

The national press - Indian Express, Times of India, Hindustan Standard, Statesman - made vitriolic comments on the "murky goings-on"

in Bihar.<sup>107</sup> The Patna Searchlight editorialized: it was "doubtful if in the history of any country the indispensability of any individual had ever found expression in a more certain manner."<sup>108</sup> These comments, coupled with protests in Bihar over the installation of Mandal through the back-door, touched the conscience of some Congressmen in Bihar who, after having been refused permission by the Congress High Command to withdraw themselves from the "ignominious" coalition with the Soshit Dal, walked over to the United Front, bringing the fall of the 46-day Mandal government on March 18, 1968. The only contribution the Mandal ministry could make within such a short time was to set up another quasi-judicial inquiry commission (the Mudholkar Commission - as a counter-weight to the Aiyer Commission) to investigate charges of corruption against the erstwhile United Front (SVD) ministry.

### Crisis # 3:

After the fall of the Mandal ministry, the United Front was back in power under its new leader, Bhola Paswan Shastri, who became the Chief Minister of the state on March 22, 1968. However, after 95 days of uneasy existence in office with nine ill-assorted coalition partners, Paswan submitted the resignation of his ministry on June 25, 1968, accusing the Congress and some of his coalition partners of bringing down the government.

Now, the Bihar Congress wanted to take a chance to form the government - Mahesh P. Sinha of the Bihar Congress even rushed to New Delhi to request suspension of the Assembly - but the Center preferred to have a fresh poll. On June 29, 1969, the Center declared presidential rule, dissolving the Legislative Assembly, a decision which conformed to the over-all opinion of the national press. Neither the Statesman - the "fist-fighting" Bihar Congress cannot give the state "a decent and stable

government",<sup>109</sup> nor the Times of India - "it will make the State's cup of misery full if the Congress were now asked to form a government",<sup>110</sup> nor the Indian Express - Bihar should not be "saddled with another coalition government"<sup>111</sup> - wanted the Center to permit the Bihar Congress to form another government.

Thus, within a period of about fifteen months, Bihar had three governments; the United Front (SVD) under M. P. Sinha, the Soshit Dal-Congress under B. P. Mandal, and the United Front (SVD) under Bhola Paswan Shastri. Of all three ministries, the first United Front ministry was most durable. Had the Congress both in Bihar and at the Center (Kanungo's appointment as the Bihar Governor reflected the negative attitude of the Center) decided not to topple this ministry, the alternative might have been political stability in Bihar.

The Rajya Sabha approved presidential rule on July 22, and the Lok Sabha on July 25, 1968. While the Opposition in both the Houses accused the Center of being a party to the mis-doings of the Bihar Congress and for having introduced presidential rule after having given all the opportunities "in the world" to the state Congress to form the government, the Central Home Minister attributed the entire phenomenon of instability to political defections. In the Lok Sabha, R. K. Amin and Sezhiyan, and in the Rajya Sabha, A. P. Chatterjee and M. G. Reddy, alleged that the Center was "muzzling democracy" by encouraging defections and supporting "puppet governments" to re-establish Congress hegemony.<sup>112</sup>

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Pondicherry: September 18, 1968 - March 1/, 1969

Pondicherry, located on the Southern tip of India near Tamil Nad, was a former French colony integrated with India in 1954. It is a Union Territory with a Legislative Assembly of 30 members.

In the 1967 elections, the Congress failed to secure an absolute majority in the Assembly. The election returns were: Congress, 15; Communist Party, 4; and Independents, 11. After some initial horse-trading, M. O. H. Farook Maricar of the Congress party formed the government with the support of some Independents on April 9, 1967. Those of the Independents who did not support the Congress ministry joined with the Communists to form a United Democratic Front.

Crisis # 1:

For the almost ten months that the Maricar ministry was in office, it had a precarious existence because of the politics of defections and counter-defections. On February 19, 1968, faced with an en-bloc threat of defections from his ministry, Maricar submitted the resignation of his cabinet to Lieutenant-Governor, S. M. Salim. However, after about two weeks of mediating efforts by the Lieutenant-Governor, the Congress, now with a strength of 21 members in the Assembly, was back in power under the new leadership of V. V. Reddiar, who was sworn in office on March 6, 1968.

Crisis # 2:

Reddiar had hardly announced the formation of his cabinet when defections started affecting his ministry. After the Congress strength had risen to 21 by March 6, 1968, and that of the United Democratic Front accordingly dropped to 9, the relative figures changed thereafter to 16-14 on March 19, 17-11 on March 27, 18-12 on May 3, 19-11 on July 25, and 14-15 (excluding the 113) on August 25. Farook Maricar, who now headed the United Democratic Front, wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor on August 25, requesting that he be called upon to form a new ministry, as the Reddiar ministry had lost the majority support of the legislators.

One day before the Assembly was due to meet, the Lieutenant-Governor,



on request from Reddiar, postponed the session from August 29 to September 12, provoking a demand from the United Front to dismiss the Congress ministry. On September 11, Reddiar submitted the resignation of his cabinet after having failed to win back the defectors. Refusing to admit the claims of the United Democratic Front to form an "alternative stable ministry", President Zakir Hussain dissolved the Assembly on the recommendation of the Lieutenant-Governor and introduced President's rule on September 18, 1968. On October 12, 1968, Lieutenant-Governor S. L. Salim was replaced by a strong Congressman and a former Chief Minister of Mysore, B. D. Jatti. Jatti's appointment served twin objectives: it helped S. Nijalingappa of Mysore, a strong associate of the Syndicate, in getting rid of his rival in the state, and it helped the Center in providing a die-hard Congressman to the Territory previously lost to the Congress.

Most of what happened in Pondicherry passed unnoticed on the national political scene. Since it was a Union Territory, the action of the Central Government was not subject to the approval of the Parliament. The national press rarely reported everyday incidents in Pondicherry, much less to editorialize on them. <sup>114</sup>

In the mid-term polls on March 9, 1969, the DMK was returned as the single largest group in the Assembly. Of the 30 seats in the Assembly, DMK secured 15, Congress, 10; CPI, 3; and Independents, 2. A DMK-CPI ministry under the leadership of Farook Maricar was formed on March 17, 1969.

#### Temporal comparisons of the Congressization crises: 1967-68

Besides the four states - Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar - and the two Union Territories - Manipur and Pondicherry - the other two states involved in the Congressization crises during 1967-68 were the states of West Bengal and Punjab. In both the states,

congressization was partially successful in setting up "puppet governments" in 1967 without the formal declaration of presidential rule.

However, in 1968, both the governments got involved in structural crises, making it essential for the Center to intervene. While the congressization crises are being discussed here, the structural crises shall be discussed later.

Congressization crisis in West Bengal: November 21, 1967

In the 1967 elections, West Bengal, the home state of the key member of the Syndicate - Atulya Ghosh, failed to return the Congress to power. The Congress secured 127 of the 280 seats in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly. The results of the election were a shock to the Congress but a personal humiliation to Atulya Ghosh and his factotum, Chief Minister P. C. Sen. While Atulya Ghosh and was defeated in the parliamentary elections, P. C. Sen was defeated in the Assembly elections.

At the Assembly polls, the major parties contesting the Congress were the two leftist fronts: (i) the United Leftist Front of seven parties headed by the Marxist, Jyoti Basu; and (ii) the People's United Leftist Front of four parties headed by Ajoy Mukherjee of the Bangla Congress. 115  
There was nothing in common between the two Fronts except their desire to dethrone the dominant Congress party.

Immediately after the declaration of the election results, the two Fronts united with the sole purpose of keeping the Congress out of office. With three more small parties joining this union, the 14-party United Democratic Front, as it was named, commanded a total strength of 151 members in the state legislature. On March 2, 1967, Ajoy Mukherjee (Bangla Congress) became the Chief Minister and Jyoti Basu (Marxist) the deputy Chief Minister of the state.

As was the usual strategy of the Marxists, Jyoti Basu regarded the present coalition both as a means to govern and as an instrument for agitation. In April, the ministry issued orders asking police officers not to intervene in labour disputes without prior consultation with the minister of labour. In June, this order was replaced by another which said:

The government would like to impress upon all officers, especially those connected with maintenance of law and order, that the police must not intervene in legitimate labour movements and that, in case of any such complaint regarding unlawful activities ... The police must first investigate carefully whether the complaint has any basis in fact before proceeding to take any action under the law. 116

The order ignited unrest on many fronts. There were strikes and gheraos (encirclements) in industries, a peasant revolt at Naxalbari, and general lawlessness verging on, what some opposition leaders said, "reign of terror". The situation was growing into some kind of a systemic crisis when Chief Minister Mukherjee, after consultations with Mrs. Gandhi in July 1967, assured New Delhi that he would crack down on the Naxalbari rebels and other extremist leaders. In the meanwhile, the Central Government transferred Governor Dharam Vira of Punjab, known for his brutal toughness, to West Bengal despite protests from the Marxists.

The most interesting side of the drama was that which was being played in New Delhi. Ajoy Mukherjee, whose only ambition in life seemed to be to demoralize the machine boss Atulva Ghosh and to free the West Bengal Congress from his clutches, had held out secret assurances to Mrs. Gandhi that he, along with a contingent of 34 members of his Bangla Congress, would make a comeback to the Congress, if and when the Congress High Command was willing to suspend the West Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee, the machine of Atulva Ghosh. 117 On the other hand, Atulva Ghosh was in no sense willing to accept Ajoy Mukherjee as the Chief Minister of the Congress-supported government, and was constantly in search of some

other group which could topple the United Front and form the government with the support of the Congress.

Mrs. Gandhi moved first. From New Delhi, Gulzarilal Nanda came to Calcutta on September 19, 1967 and was immediately in parlèy with Ajoy Mukherjee and his supporters at the Governor's mansion. <sup>118</sup> The decision: Mukherjee would defect to the Congress on October 2, following the suspension of the West Bengal Congress before the end of September. On September 24, Nanda, while still in Calcutta, announced the suspension of the Pradesh Congress pending final orders by the Congress President, K. Kamaraj. To begin with, Mrs. Gandhi, Y. B. Chavan, and K. Kamaraj lauded the efforts of Nanda, but by the time Nanda reached New Delhi, the appreciation for him had evaporated. Atulya Ghosh, who was in touch with Kamaraj immediately after Nanda's announcement of suspension in Calcutta, seemed upset. Mrs. Gandhi was helpless and Mukherjee frustrated. The Central Government had even made arrangements for a stand-by army contingent and extra police force from the neighbouring states to see that the transition from the United Front to the Congress was without turmoil or bloodshed, but the whole conspiracy fizzled out. <sup>119</sup> Perceiving the vacillating mood of New Delhi, Mukherjee simply did not resign.

It was not Atulya Ghosh's turn. On November 3, he succeeded in persuading Dr. P. C. Ghosh, Minister of Food in the United Front ministry, to defect to the Congress along with 17 of his supporters. Forming a Progressive Democratic Front of his 17 followers, Dr. P. C. Ghosh met the Governor and requested him to permit him to form the government with the support of the Congress. On November 6, the Governor wrote to Mukherjee to convene the session of the Assembly not later than November 23, in order to test the strength of his government in the legislature. Both Ajoy Mukherjee and his Marxist deputy Jyoti Basu assured the Governor that

their government was in the majority, but they could not convene the session earlier than December 18 because of their preoccupations. The Governor asked them to reconsider their decision, but they seemed adamant.

By November 17, 1967, Governor Dharam Vira was in touch with the Central Government, making inquiries as to whether he could constitutionally dismiss the United Front ministry. The Center, apparently, was interested in forming a Congress government without going to the mid-term polls in those days of strong anti-Congress feelings. On November 21, the Governor dismissed the United Front ministry and within hours administered the oath of office to Dr. P. C. Ghosh. From the outset, the Congress supported the Ghosh ministry and later became a part of the ministry.

The Opposition in the Parliament strongly condemned the action of the Central Government in West Bengal. In a special motion debate on November 22 and 23, 1967, the Rajya Sabha member, Bhupesh Gupta, accused the Center of ruling West Bengal "with the gun", while N. Sen Gupta said: "There is little doubt that the military-cum-Delhi-cum-Governor was there to hatch a conspiracy to dismiss this Ministry whether it was in majority or minority. The question of majority or minority was wholly irrelevant."<sup>120</sup>

Outside the Parliament, all the opposition parties except Swatantra were critical of the Central intervention through the back door of the Governor's office. The reaction of the national press was divided. While Sham Lal of the Times of India said that the tears over the Governor's intervention "smell of glycerine",<sup>121</sup> the Statesman characterized the Governor's decision as "worse" and commented: "He [the Governor] cannot claim this to be a more democratic decision than the United Front's deplorable refusal to call the Assembly to an early session."<sup>122</sup> The Economic and Political Weekly declared that it was a "bureaucratic coup" hatched

by the Governor, in league with the West Bengal Chief Secretary, Inspector-General of Police, Union Home Ministry, Central Director of the Intelligence Bureau, and the regional army chief, which culminated in the dismissal of the United Front ministry. 123

The Congress had succeeded in capturing power in the state, but only temporarily. Within three months, Dr. P. C. Ghosh's Progressive Democratic Front had to quit office because of the "structural crisis" (to be discussed later) created by the Speaker of the Assembly, who refused to recognize the Ghosh ministry on the floor of the Assembly.

Congressization crisis in Punjab: November 22, 1967

Congressization in the case of Punjab proved easier than in West Bengal, but it was not quite smooth. In the 1967 elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, the Congress secured 47 of the 104 seats in the Assembly. The Congress Chief Minister of the state, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and a few other ministers of his cabinet, were defeated at the polls.

The initial wrangling in the Congress over the selection of a new leader of the Congress Legislative Party gave sufficient time to the opposition parties to form a United Front consisting of 53 members of the legislature: Akali Dal (Sant group), 24; CPI(M), 3; CPI, 5; Jan Sangh, 9; Akali Dal (Master Group), 2; Samyukta Socialist Party, 1; Republicans, 3; Independents, 6. Gurnam Singh of the Sant Akali Dal became the Chief Minister of the state on March 8, 1967.

Immediately after the formation of the Front, the see-saw game of defections and counter-defections began. Dharam Vira, who was then the Governor of Punjab, asked the Chief Minister to test his strength in the Assembly, and wrote a letter to the Speaker of the Assembly on April 11 - barely a month after the formation of the United Front Ministry - to

reconvene the session of the Assembly as early as possible. The Assembly was convened on May 5, but the government survived a vote of a no-confidence moved by the Congress. However, before the session, both the United Front and the Congress were busy out-bidding each other in the hot market of defection.<sup>124</sup>

On May 26, the government once again survived a motion of no-confidence moved by the Congress in the Assembly. Before the no-confidence debate, there was, as the Hindu reported, "hectic activity in the lobbies and the Legislators' hostels"<sup>125</sup> for horse trading. During the debate, Gurnam Singh alleged that the Congress supporters from Delhi, including some Members of Parliament, had come to Chandigarh and offered money and free drinks to some members in exchange for a promise to vote out his government.<sup>126</sup>

On November 22, the Congress was successful in causing a group defection in the United Front. On the very first day of the Winter Session of the Assembly, i.e., November 22, 1967, Lachhman Singh Gill, Minister of Irrigation, Power and Education in the United Front ministry, out-manoeuvered Gurnam Singh by his sudden crossing of the floor along with 16 of his supporters. The same day, Gurnam Singh submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor, alleging that the defections from the Front were the result of "the most unscrupulous conspiracy at the highest level in the country."<sup>127</sup> On November 24, Lachhman Singh Gill formed the government with the support of the Congress, despite the fact that the out-going Chief Minister had recommended to the Governor that the Assembly be dissolved and fresh elections ordered.

As in West Bengal, Gill's ministry was an all-defector ministry supported by the Congress. However, unlike in West Bengal, the Congress did not become a part of the ministry. This was probably on account of

the adverse comments from the national press on the manoeuvres of the Congress party. The Indian Express editorialized:

If the defections are part of a race for power for its own sake, the political situation in the State is bound to deteriorate, for which the major responsibility will be that of the Congress. The readiness with which the Congress Party has offered its support to a minority government led by Mr. Gill strongly suggests that it had a hand in engineering the defection from the United Front.<sup>128</sup>

Though the Hindustan Times did not comment on the role of the Congress, it lauded the decision of Gurnam Singh for not sticking "to power through purchase of political support."<sup>129</sup>

However, as in the case of West Bengal, the Congress-supported Gill ministry ran into trouble on account of the structural crisis it got involved in, in August 1969. Since the August crisis was of a different nature, it will be discussed later.

#### A Comparative Analysis of Congressization Crises: 1967-69

A comparative analysis of all the cases discussed so far, out of which seven were cases of presidential rule - Rajasthan, Manipur, Uttar Pradesh (suspension); Barwana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Pondicherry (dissolutions) - , and two - West Bengal and Punjab - were cases where presidential rule was not declared till the states ran into structural crises, tend to show the eagerness of the Congress Party to restore its lost hegemony through the use of institutional and other, more or less, legitimate means. With the opportunistic use of presidential suspensions in Rajasthan, Manipur, and Uttar Pradesh, the Congress High Command gave a much-needed breathing spell to the state party units to re-capture power. Out of these three cases of suspensions, the Congress was successful in forming the government in two, Rajasthan and Manipur. In the case of Uttar Pradesh, the suspended Assembly was dissolved when the Congress could not manufacture the necessary majority in order to come back to power.



In all cases of presidential dissolutions - Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Pondicherry -, the state Congress units were given every chance to come back to power, but they were so badly mauled by the politics of defections and intra-party rivalries that they failed to form the governments. The Haryana Congress unit was not "worth the tears", and the Uttar Pradesh politics was so closely tied to the divisive Central politics that the state Congress unit could not override its intra-party conflicts and be united enough to form the government. While the Bihar Congress unit was in a lamentable shape with casteism scoring an incisive victory over party unity, the Pondicherry Congress was a battleground of personalities, with simple political careerism overriding any commitment to party organization party cohesion.

In most cases, the Congress acquired a foothold in the rough terrain of power by supporting minority "puppet" governments of defectors from the opposition parties. The Mandal ministry in Bihar, the Ghosh ministry in West Bengal, and the Gill ministry in Punjab were all "defectors' ministries" installed by the Congress. In Haryana, Devi Lal was patronized by the Congress High Command to topple the United Front ministry and to set up a defectors' ministry under his own leadership with the support of the state Congress unit, but his bid failed. Undoubtedly, the United Fronts were houses divided within themselves and united only to the extent of keeping the Congress out of power, but the ugly haste in not only toppling them but also replacing them by defectors' governments removed even the pretensions of the Congress of being honest in its inter-party relations.

In all cases except those of Manipur and Punjab, the role of the Governors in aiding the Congress to make a comeback to power was not unimpeachable. Dr. Sampurnanand miscounted the heads in Rajasthan, B. N. Chakravarty dismissed the United Front ministry in Haryana, B. Gopala Reddi

failed in his mathematical skills and recommended President's rule in Uttar Pradesh out of confusion, N. Kanungo set up a new precedent in nominations to the upper house of the Bihar legislature,<sup>130</sup> and Dharam Vira converted his mansion into a venue for the Congressmen, army, police and bureaucracy chiefs, to get rid of the Leftist West Bengal government. These newly-acquired roles of the Governors sparked off a heated debate which preoccupied both Houses of the Parliament throughout the month of November, 1967.<sup>131</sup>

After the Rajasthan episode, which took place in March 1967, the Center was quiet on the state front for almost six months. It was during these six months that Mrs. Gandhi came under increasing attack of the Syndicate for being a "weak and unfit leader". The months of October and November were her months of counter-attack on the opposition parties to retrieve her image. The Manipur government was suspended in the last week of October and the West Bengal and Punjab states were entrusted to "puppet" governments in November, 1967. The Center, under pressure from the Syndicate, seemed to be coming to life again during these months. However, instead of directly involving the Center (the reluctance of the Center to get the approval of the presidential rule in Rajasthan is worth noting), Mrs. Gandhi preferred to use the State Governors in the process of congressization, in order to ward off, as far as she could, direct and concentrated parliamentary and public criticism against her own government.

A temporal comparison of all the cases thus tends to show that:

- (a) presidential suspension was used in cases where there was a reasonable chance for the Congress to come back to power - Rajasthan, Manipur;
- (b) presidential dissolution followed suspension where the Congress failed to come back to power - Uttar Pradesh;

- (c) presidential dissolution in cases where the Assembly was not suspended in the first instance was used where the Congress consistently failed to organize itself in order to form the government - Haryana, Bihar, Pondicherry; and
- (d) neither presidential dissolution nor suspension was used in cases where the Congress could set up minority governments of defectors and live with them - West Bengal, Punjab.

#### STRUCTURAL CRISES BEFORE THE CONGRESS SPLIT:

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in West Bengal: February 20, 1968 - February 21, 1969

With the dismissal of the United Front ministry headed by Ajoy Mukherjee on November 21, 1967, Governor Dharam Vira installed in office a Congress-supported government led by Dr. P. G. Ghosh. Ghosh's group, called the Progressive Democratic Front, had a total strength of 15 members. However, with the support of 130 members of the Congress, the Ghosh ministry had a majority in the 280-member West Bengal Legislative Assembly.

Anticipating trouble over the dismissal of the United Front ministry, the new government placed the army on an alert, troops were moved into Calcutta, and all public meetings of more than five persons were banned in the city and the surrounding industrial areas. Undaunted by these measures, the dismissed United Front leaders gave a call for a state-wide strike which brought Calcutta and many district towns to a standstill on November 22-23 and led to large-scale violence. A public meeting organized by the dismissed leaders on November 22 was forcibly broken up by mounted police using tear-gas shells and lathi(sticks) charges. A lively account of the pathetic event was published in Yugantar, a Bengali daily owned by a former Congress minister of Bengal:

Under the lathi blows, the former law minister starts bleeding profusely from the head. Arun Babu (leader of the Gandhian Lok Sevak Sangh) receives a severe blow on the arm. Biswanath Babu (former Irrigation minister and younger brother of Ajoy Mukherji) .... and other leaders are also injured. Their companions get no respite when they fall to the ground under the police blows. They are subjected to assault without respite. However, within 10 to 15 minutes the assaulting police forces leave the place.<sup>132</sup>

According to official figures two persons were killed and 41 injured during these two days, but unofficial sources put the number of casualties much higher. Altogether, about 1400 people were arrested.

On November 29, when the Assembly was to meet in session, the government made 400 preventive arrests and asked the Speaker, Bijoy Kumar Banerjee, for permission to post police guards in the House. The Speaker (an Independent elected with the support of the dismissed United Front), however, rejected the request.

When the Assembly met, the Speaker, B. K. Banerjee, ruled that the dismissal of the United Front government had been unconstitutional, and that the Assembly had been irregularly convened. Adjourning the Assembly sine die, the Speaker said:

I am prima facie satisfied that the dissolution of the Ministry headed by Mr. A. K. Mukherjee, the appointment of Dr. P. C. Ghosh as Chief Minister, and the summoning of this House on his advice is unconstitutional and invalid, since it has been effected behind the back of this House .... The only authority competent to decide whether or not a Council of Ministers should continue in office is this House....<sup>133</sup>

After the Speaker left the Chamber, physical fighting broke out in the house, during which books, ink bottles, and shoes were thrown at Dr. Ghosh. Two hours later, the Congress-dominated upper house passed a vote of confidence in the Ghosh ministry.

On November 30, Home Minister Chavan stated in the Lok Sabha that the Ghosh ministry was "lawfully constituted" and that the Governor was

competent to dissolve the previous Council of Ministers:

We are convinced that this is the correct view, and that, notwithstanding the observations made by the Speaker of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, Dr. P. C. Ghosh and his colleagues continue to function as the lawful Council of Ministers of West Bengal....<sup>134</sup>

On February 6, 1968, the Calcutta High Court, rejecting three writ petitions challenging the dismissal of the United Front ministry and the appointment of Dr. Ghosh's government, took the same position as that of the Central Government in ruling that there was no "restriction or condition upon the powers of the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister."<sup>135</sup> Despite the High Court's ruling, the Speaker, once again, adjourned the Assembly sine die when the Governor summoned it to meet on February 14. The new session of the Assembly was marked by scenes of unprecedented disorder. Even the Governor, Dharam Vira, who arrived in the Assembly to address its opening session, slightly hurt his knee when some members jostled him against a chair.

In this impossible situation, coupled with the fact that some members had already defected from the Congress, the President took over the administration of the state on February 20, 1968, as recommended by the Governor. During the period that the Ghosh ministry was in office (about 92 days), 30,000 people had been arrested and eight were officially stated to have been killed by police action.

The Lok Sabha approved presidential rule in March 1968. While the DMK member, S. Kandappa, pronounced the Governor "autocratic" who had little respect for the Constitution he was supposed to safeguard,<sup>136</sup> Jyotirmoy Basu of the Communist Party insisted that the Governor be recalled for his foul play and in the public interest.<sup>137</sup> Replying to the criticism of the Opposition, V. C. Shukla, Minister in the Ministry of

Home Affairs, denied that there was any "collusive conspiracy between the Center and the Governor" and attributed the entire episode to the irresponsible local politicians.<sup>138</sup> In the debate over the extension of presidential rule, Shukla, once again, emphasized the fact that no institutions would work in West Bengal unless the local politicians promised to act with a greater sense of responsibility. At the same time, he refused to acknowledge the doings and mis-doings of the West Bengal Congress unit by saying: "what the local politicians did in West Bengal cannot be the responsibility of the Central Government."<sup>139</sup>

Presidential rule in West Bengal continued for almost a year, during which Governor Dharam Vira added to his reputation as the toughest-of-the-tough Governor of the state. However, when the United Front (which Dharam Vira had dismissed in 1967), came to power once again after the mid-term polls in February 1969, Dharam Vira sought a voluntary retirement from his office.

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Punjab: August 23, 1968 - February 17, 1969

After Lachhman Singh Gill, with 16 of his supporters, defected from the Gurnam Singh United Front ministry on November 22, 1967, he was installed as the Chief Minister of Punjab by the Governor, Dr. D. C. Pavate, on November 25. With the support of the Congress Party, which had a strength of 43 members, Gill's group, called Janata Party, had a working majority in the 104-member Legislative Assembly. The outgoing Chief Minister, Gurnam Singh, had recommended to the Governor to dissolve the Assembly, but the Governor had refused to grant the request.<sup>140</sup>

As in West Bengal, the United Front organized an impressive demonstration on January 21, 1968, to urge the Governor to dismiss the minority government of Gill; but, unlike in West Bengal, the demonstration

- largest ever in Chandigarh - was peaceful. In a memorandum delivered to the Governor, the demonstrators requested Dr. D. C. Pavate to order mid-term polls.

The Gill ministry worked well for a while despite some rifts between the ruling Janata Party and the Congress Party. While the Congress, under the leadership of Gian Singh Rarewala, wanted to congressize the Janata Party, the Janata Party leaders were insistent on maintaining their separate identity. In this tussle for power, Gill attracted some defectors both from the Congress and the Akali Dal, thereby increasing the strength of the Janata Party in the Assembly from 16 to 20 members.

The real crisis for the Gill ministry began on March 6, 1968, when the Assembly admitted a motion of no-confidence against the Speaker of the Assembly, Joginder Singh Mann. The motion was supported by the government and the Congress Party in the Assembly. Mann had been elected Speaker with the support of the former United Front ministry and was under constant attack from the government for being weak and undiscerning.

When the Assembly met on March 7 to debate the no-confidence motion, the Speaker ruled that the motion was unconstitutional because no such motion could be moved unless at least fourteen days' notice had been given of the intention to remove the Speaker (Constitution:article 179C). Since the ruling was followed by uproarious and unruly scenes in the Assembly, Mann adjourned the Assembly for a period of two months, despite the fact that the state budget (1968-69), already on the table of the House, had to be passed before the end of March.

In this impossible situation, the Central Government advised the Governor and the latter, accordingly, prorogued the Assembly on March 11, thereby ending the session and enabling himself to summon it again. Two

days later, he issued an ordinance (Constitution: article 213) to the effect that (a) neither house of the legislature could adjourn without the majority consent of its respective members; and (b) any adjournment of either house without the completion of the financial business would be null and void.<sup>141</sup> On March 14, the Governor summoned the Assembly to meet on March 18.

Sustaining the contention of the former United Front Chief Minister, Gurnam Singh, that the prorogation of the Assembly could be effective only from the day on which the members received the gazette notification (which was March 18), the Speaker ruled that the ordinance of the Governor which could be issued only when the legislature was not in session, was null and void under the Constitution. The Speaker, then, adjourned the Assembly and left the chamber. Thereafter, what happened in the Assembly is anybody's guess, but press reporting is unanimous on the point that the Opposition was beaten, dragged out of the Assembly, and some its members locked up (by plain-clothed policemen?).<sup>142</sup> In this atmosphere of lawlessness, Baldev Singh, Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, occupied the Speaker's chair and within ten minutes certified the budget to have been passed by the Assembly.

On May 10, 1968, a Special Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in its ruling on two writ petitions filed by the opposition members of the Assembly, unanimously held that the Appropriation Acts passed by the Assembly on March 18 were invalid, and by a majority view ruled that the Governor's ordinance of March 13 was unconstitutional. The Court also rejected the government's appeal to stay the operation of the order. However, it granted the government's request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. On July 15, the Supreme Court, in its unanimous judgement, ruled that the Appropriation Acts passed by the Assembly on



March 18 were valid and that the Governor's ordinance of March 13 was reasonable and proper.

By now, the relations between the Janata Party and the Congress Party were less than cordial, if not bitter. There was a sizeable group within the Congress which held the view that the Party must withdraw its cooperation from the Gill ministry if it was not to share the mounting public criticism that was building up against the government. On August 21, S. Nijalingappa, President of the Congress Party, announced the decision of the national leadership to withdraw cooperation from the Gill ministry. The same day, Lachhman Singh Gill submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor. Recommending President's rule for Punjab, the report of the Governor said that the situation created by the formation of a minority government

was ab initio fraught with instability, as the Gill ministry consisted of and was led by legislators who were drawn together not by any ideological affinity but by a desire to gain political power. The relationship between the ministry and the Congress Legislature Party, its main supporter, did not continue to be smooth, as was originally hoped for by both parties .... The use of Government authority for political purposes affected not only the Congress Legislature Party but has had a deleterious effect on the services also .... 143

On August 23, the President dissolved the Assembly and took over the administration of the state.

The Rajya Sabha approved the proclamation on August 27, and the Lok Sabha on August 29, 1968. The general opinion in both Houses was that the Gill ministry was "indecently corrupt" and that the Congress Party should not have abetted its misrule. V. C. Shukla, Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs, admitted that "the experiment with minority governments had failed both in West Bengal and Punjab" and expressed regrets over some of the recent political developments in Punjab. 144 Earlier, Y. B. Chavan, Home Minister, had made a somewhat similar statement in the Rajya Sabha. 145

In the mid-term polls held in February 1969, the United Front, led by Gurnam Singh, came to power once again.

Temporal Comparisons of Structural Crises: 1967-68

Except for West Bengal and Punjab, there was no other state in the Indian Union which was involved in a structural crisis during the period under analysis. Hence, the scope of the comparison is restricted to only these two states.

In both states, the structural crises were the by-product of the congressization crises. Had the Congress acted with restraint and adorned the opposition benches with self-respect and dignity, the chances are that the ugly scenes in the Legislative Assemblies of the two states would not have occurred in the first place. The experiment of supporting minority governments was in fact a chance for the Congress to share power without responsibility. Such unholy marriages of convenience as were entered into by the Congress with the Progressive Democratic Front in West Bengal and with the Janata Party in Punjab could be neither dignifying nor lasting. During those years of anti-Congress sentiment, the Congress celebrated such marriages because it was simply not prepared to face the electorate for fear of being defeated.

In both states, the Speakers brought to ignominy the institution of the Speakership which, according to the institutionalized parliamentary convention as adopted in India, had been largely non-partisan and held high in public esteem. Neither Banerjee of West Bengal nor Mann of Punjab had the right to hold their respective Assemblies for ransom because of their personal or partisan objectives.

The change in the attitude of the Center from the Bengal case to the Punjab case is worth noting. While the Home Minister, Y. B. Chavan, did comment in respect to the West Bengal case that the Speaker had acted

in excess of his powers in not recognizing Ghosh's ministry on the floor of the Assembly, he sounded frustrated and withdrawing when it came to the Punjab case:

I do not hold any brief for either Mr. Gill or Mr. Gurnam Singh or the Speaker. I do not hold any brief for anybody. Some people have tried to make me a villain. I wish I were a villain.<sup>146</sup>

#### CONGRESSIZATION(R) CRISES AFTER THE CONGRESS SPLIT:

##### Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Bihar: July 4, 1969 - February 16, 1970

After about eight months of presidential rule (June 1968 - February 1969, discussed earlier), Bihar went to mid-term polls in February 1969 but, once again, the Congress failed to secure an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly. The results for 317 of the 318 seats (voting in one constituency was postponed because of the death of a candidate) were as follows:

TABLE 5.3

#### ELECTION RESULTS IN BIHAR 1967 AND 1969

Name of the Party	1967	1969
Congress	128	118
SSP	68	52
Jan Sangh	26	34
CPI	24	25
PSP	18	17
Janata	-	14
Lok Tantrik Congress	-	9
Soshit Dal	-	6
JKD/PKD	24	6
Swatantra	3	3
CPI (M)	4	3
Independents, Jharkhand & others	23	30
Total:	318	317

Source: S. C. Kashvap: The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974):346

On February 26, Harihar Singh of the Congress Party, after securing the support of the Janata Party, the Jharkhand Party, the Soshit Dal, the Swatantra Party and 6 Independents, was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the state by the Governor, N. Kanungo. He claimed a strength of 162 members in the Legislative Assembly.

Harihar Singh (70) was a factotum of the "mini-syndicate", a name given to the group consisting of K. B. Sahay (former Congress Chief Minister of Bihar), Mahesh P. Sinha, and S. N. Sinha, which was closely linked with the Congress Syndicate at the national level. Though elected on the Congress ticket in 1969, Harihar Singh had a personal background of being in and out of the Congress Party prior to the 1969 elections. As such, his selection as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party invited lot of criticism, more so because the Chavan Committee (1969) had recently recommended that defectors should not be accommodated as ministers in the state cabinets.

C. S. Pandit wrote in the Indian Express that

even if his [Harihar Singh's] case does not fall within the strict definition of a defector because he had not crossed the floor after the mid-term poll, his election strikes at the very spirit embodied in the recommendation of the (Chavan) Committee. 147

And, the PSP leader in the Parliament, Nath Pai, said:

The reported election of Harihar Singh shows the tremendous gap that divides the Congress professions and performance. At the lure of office the proclaimed determination to discard defectors for good has been thrown to the winds. 148

On March 5, Harihar Singh announced the inclusion of the Raja of Ramgarh, leader of the 14-member Janata Party who had recently been indicted by the Calcutta High Court for personal corruption, in his cabinet. This was the last step Mrs. Gandhi and her followers were willing to accept by a Syndicate-dominated provincial leadership. Whether on his own or on persuasion from Mrs. Gandhi, C. Subramaniam (a member of the Central Government from 1962 to 1967, and at this time, one of the members of

Indira's kitchen Cabinet; later, the first President of the Congress (R) of Mrs. Gandhi) strongly criticised the President of the Congress, S. Nijalingappa, for having authorized the inclusion of the Raja in the Bihar cabinet. In the meeting of the Congress Working Committee held on March 7, C. Subramaniam submitted his resignation from the Working Committee and refused to withdraw it unless the High Command changed its decision forthwith. <sup>149</sup> The Working Committee was split on the issue: those who favoured the inclusion of the Raja were S. Nijalingappa, S. K. Patil and Y. B. Chavan; those who wanted the Raja out were C. Subramaniam, Jagjivan Ram, and K. Kamaraj. When S. Nijalingappa threatened to resign on the issue, a compromise was found: the Raja was to be replaced by his nominee in the cabinet. The crisis blew over when, on March 28, the Raja resigned from the cabinet in favour his mother.

For Mrs. Gandhi, Bihar, which was represented in the Parliament by a total of 54 seats, out of which 34 were won by the Congress Party in the 1967 elections, was next in importance only to Uttar Pradesh, her home state. Though Daroga P. Rai, belonging to Mrs. Gandhi's camp, was a member of the Bihar cabinet, he was always complaining that his group was inadequately represented in the ever-expanding cabinet of Harihar Singh.

#### Crisis # 1:

By May, 1969, Harihar Singh seemed to be accommodating in his Council of Ministers almost any group that would threaten to defect from his uneasy coalition ministry. There were violent disputes between coalition partners and the rival factions inside the Congress over the distribution of portfolios. The result of such disputes was that 21 of the 33 members of the Harihar Singh cabinet had remained without portfolios for over a month. The Hindu from Madras reported on June 13:

The meetings of the Congress Legislature Party are turned into regular battlefields. . . . The administration has come to a standstill, and the State is sinking deeper into the morass of financial bankruptcy. The Government seems to have hardly any time to attend to pressing problems of State, wholly preoccupied as it is with the problem of how to keep itself in office. . . . 150

On June 19, 1969, the government was defeated in the Assembly following defections of some members belonging to the Soshit Dal and Hul Jharkhand from the coalition. The ministry had a precarious existence of 115 days, during which it accomplished nothing except to keep itself in power through the politics of defection.

#### Crisis # 2:

Bhola Paswan Shastri, leader of the 9-member Lok Tantrik Congress, tried to set up a United Front of the non-Congress parties, but his 8-day Chief Ministership from June 22 to June 30 failed to keep the partners together. In fact, Bhola Paswan Shastri had quiet sympathies for Mrs. Gandhi's camp and some bigger parties in the United Front - SSP, Jan Sangh, Communists, Praja Socialists - were willing, in view of the emerging Congress split, to support the ministry, but were unwilling to be represented in it. Probably, they wanted to keep their options open till the time when the issue of Presidential nomination was settled at the Center.

On July 4, the President suspended the Bihar Assembly in the hope that a realignment of political forces in the coming months would permit the formation of a stable government in the state without going through another mid-term poll.

The Assembly remained suspended for more than six months, during which many things happened both at the Center and in Bihar. Almost a week after the Assembly was suspended, the Syndicate out-manoeuvred Mrs. Gandhi in nominating Reddy for the Presidency on July 12, 1969.

On August 7, more than half of the Congress members in the Lok Sabha walked out of the House when S. Nijalingappa was charged with pressuring the Bihar legislators to vote for Reddy in exchange for a promise of termination of presidential rule.<sup>151</sup> On September 12, Mrs. Gandhi visited Bihar and appealed to "like-minded people and like-minded parties" to return to the Congress fold. By January 11, 1970, the Bihar Congress was split between the Congress(O) and the Congress(R) with Daroga P. Rai heading the latter Party. However, ministry-making by the 84-member Congress(R) still seemed to be a distant possibility because of the influence of the "mini-syndicate" (as already mentioned, the mini-syndicate consisted of K. B. Sahay, Mahesh P. Sinha, S. N. Sinha of Bihar - all pro-Syndicate at the national level) on some of the uncommitted members of the Bihar Congress Party. For the Congress(R), the Aivar Commission Report (the Commission, as mentioned earlier, was set up by the non-Congress government of M. P. Sinha in 1967 to investigate charges of corruption against the former Congress Chief Ministers and others) came in quite handy. On February 7, 1970, the mini-syndicate was morally destroyed by the publication of the report of the Commission. On February 16, 1970, the President of India revoked the proclamation of suspension when a six-party coalition headed by Daroga P. Rai of the Congress(R) formed the government in Bihar.

### Crisis # 3:

The Rai ministry had a short-lived existence. With the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi's government at the Center and the consequent dissolution of the Parliament in December 1970, the six-party coalition in Bihar fell like a house of cards. The Rai ministry was defeated on a vote of no-confidence on December 18, 1970. Following the resignation of Daroga P. Rai and his cabinet, a Socialist ministry led by Kapoori Thakur was formed (discussed in the next chapter) which, like the preceding Bihar

governments, failed to give stability to the state.

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) In Manipur: October 16, 1969 - March 20, 1972

The Union Territory of Manipur had already had a brief spell of presidential suspension from October 25, 1967 to February 19, 1968 (discussed earlier). The Assembly was revived when the Congress under the leadership of Koireng Singh was able to form the government by attracting six of the nine Independents to the Congress fold. According to the 1967 elections, the strength of the various parties in the 32-member Assembly was: Congress, 16; Communist Party of India, 1; Samvukta Socialist Party, 4; Independents, 9; Nominated, 2. Claiming a strength of 22-24 members in the Assembly, Koireng Singh was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Territory on February 19, 1968.

Crisis # 1:

For quite some time, Manipur had been agitating for the achievement of full statehood within the Indian Union. When a delegation representing the All-Manipur Statehood Demand Committee had met the Prime Minister on May 8, 1969, Mrs. Gandhi was said to have been sympathetic to their demands. "She even consulted her party leaders, D. P. Mishra and Jagjivan Ram, and found them on her side. Even the appointment of a Second Reorganization Commission was considered, but Chavan, then Home Minister, scotched it." <sup>152</sup> Morarji Desai's attitude against the creation of smaller states was quite well known - he had already, as Deputy Prime Minister in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet, voted against the creation of another state, Meghalaya, in the cabinet and had threatened that he would vote against the scheme even in the Parliament. <sup>153</sup>

On September 23, 1969, Mrs. Gandhi visited Manipur to assess her own position in the Territory. Unfortunately, her visit coincided with a "mini-revolution" organized by demonstrators in support of their demand



for full-fledged statehood for Manipur. Addressing the demonstrators, Mrs. Gandhi said: "I have faced bullets. The biggest army would not frighten me. Do you think your demonstrations, stone-throwing and shouting would frighten me?"

154

The next day, i.e., September 24, 1969, Koireng Singh's ministry was defeated in the Assembly when 9 of the 22 Congressmen voted with the Opposition on a vote of no-confidence in the ministry. Koireng Singh submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Chief Commissioner the same day. Five days later, the United Front, consisting of dissident Congressmen and the Opposition parties, demanded that they be asked to form the government, but the Chief Commissioner, Baleswar Prasad, recommended to the President to dissolve the Assembly and take over the administration of the Territory under his own control. On October 16, the Assembly was dissolved and presidential rule imposed on Manipur.

It is rather difficult to know, because of the inadequate reporting by the press on the whole episode, whether the nine Congressmen who brought about the fall of the ministry acted solely on their own or under pressure from demonstrators demanding statehood or on persuasion of Mrs. Gandhi. It may well be that Mrs. Gandhi had nothing to do with the un-making of the ministry, but the events at the national level that followed the episode do reveal that the Manipur Congress was more pro-Syndicate than pro-Mrs. Gandhi. During the final phase of the Congress split, Mrs. Gandhi's emissary, D. Ering, failed to get the signatures of five of the six members of the AICC from Manipur for requisitioning a special meeting of the AICC to elect a new Congress President in place of S. Nijalingappa. This happened almost within two weeks of the declaration of presidential rule in Manipur.

155

156

On November 20, 1969,

Mrs. Gandhi's camp expected only one of the six members from Manipur

to attend the special meeting scheduled for November 22 to oust S. Nijalingappa from the Congress Presidency.<sup>157</sup> However, any association between Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Manipur and the fall of the ministry needs more evidence in order to be conclusive.

Manipur remained under presidential rule till March 20, 1972. On September 3, 1970, Mrs. Gandhi announced the decision of the Center to grant full statehood to the Territory. In March 1972, elections were held to the new 60-member Manipur Assembly, which brought a non-Congress government to the state.

Presidential Rule (Suspension) in Uttar Pradesh: October 1 - 18, 1970

After the 1967 elections, the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly was suspended from February 25 to April 14, 1968 after Chief Minister Charan Singh of the SVD (United Front) submitted his personal resignation to the Governor, B. Gopala Reddi. However, since the Congress under C. B. Gupta (Syndicate) could not manufacture a majority in the Legislative Assembly, the Governor, setting aside the claim of Charan Singh's successor in the SVD to form the government, advised the President to dissolve the Assembly. President's Rule, dissolving the Assembly, was proclaimed on April 15, 1968 and continued till February 16, 1969.

In the mid-term polls held in February 1969, the party position in the Legislative Assembly was as in Table 5.4 on the next page.

On February 16, C. B. Gupta was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the state after he was successful in congressizing a few of the independents and some Swatantra members who joined the Congress because of their so-called "faith in the Party". Being an astute politician, C. B. Gupta announced that he would form his ministry by instalments which, in a way, meant dangling the carrot before all the potential defectors. On February 27, Kamalapati Tripathi of Mrs. Gandhi's camp

TABLE 5.4  
ELECTION RESULTS IN UTTAR PRADESH  
1967 AND 1969

Name of the Party	1967	1969
Congress	198	211
Jan Sangh	97	49
SSP	44	33
CPI	14	4
Swatantra	12	5
PSP	11	3
Republican	9	1
CPI (M)	1	1
BKD	-	99
Independent and others	38	19
Total:	424	425

Source: Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974): 272

joined the ministry as the Deputy Chief Minister of the state.

Crisis # 1:

From February to June 1969, floor-crossings and noisy scenes continued to mark the working of the Assembly, but the real trouble for Gupta began when Mrs. Gandhi visited Lucknow to announce that Uttar Pradesh might lose the distinction of holding the Prime Ministership if Sanjiva Reddy (of the Syndicate) was elected President of India.<sup>158</sup> On November 12, while C. B. Gupta was attending the meeting of the Congress Working Committee, presided over by S. Nijalingappa (Syndicate), his Deputy Chief Minister, Kamalapati Tripathi, was sitting, along with seven other Chief Ministers, in the drawing room of Mrs. Gandhi. Kuldip Nayar records Tripathi's meeting with Mrs. Gandhi:

Kamalapati Tripathi, a staunch Uttar Pradesh Brahmin who had come to the meeting straight from Puja (prayer), the saffron mark fresh on his forehead, was against a patchwork peace. The 'enemy' must be vanquished. But he warned Mrs. Gandhi to get prepared for a Kurukshetra (a royal battle) in U.P. 'If I don't I shall have my head chopped off,' she replied.<sup>159</sup>

C. B. Gupta read the hand writing on the wall. "I can't fight her," Gupta told Nayar, "because I am too old now and she is using money which is coming from all sources."<sup>160</sup> On February 10, 1970, Gupta resigned and requested the Governor to invite the BKD leader, Charan Singh, to form an alternative government. This was, perhaps, the last master stroke of Gupta to keep Kamalapati Tripathi out of the seat of power. Charan Singh was assured the support of Congress(O), SSP, Jan Sangh, and the Swatantra Party. However, before the Governor decided whether Charan Singh should be invited to form the government, Mrs. Gandhi moved in. She sent her emissaries - D. P. Mishra and Dinesh Singh - to entice Charan Singh to her side. On February 17, Charan Singh formed the ministry, but in coalition with the Congress(R). In return, the 10 BKD members of the Parliament assured Mrs. Gandhi of their support for her Government.

#### Crisis # 2:

On September 5, 1970, BKD members in the Rajya Sabha voted against the Government Bill on Privy Purses. Anticipating its impact on Uttar Pradesh politics, Charan Singh asked all the Congress(R) ministers, 26 out of a total of 46 in the cabinet, to submit their resignations. However, when these ministers refused to resign, Charan Singh requested the Governor to dismiss them forthwith.

The Governor, B. Gopala Reddi, seemed confused but Mrs. Gandhi showed him the way. Since the Congress(R) was a major partner in the coalition, said the Governor, it should be the minor partner, i.e., the BKD, which should resign in the event of a break-up of the coalition. In support of his argument, the Governor cited the opinion, hastily obtained, of the Attorney-General of India, who said that in a situation like this, either all the ministers should resign or else the President should take

over the administration of the state. On the other hand, Charan Singh argued on the strength of the opinion of the Attorney-General of the state (i.e. Uttar Pradesh), who took quite the opposite view in his hastily rendered advice to the Chief Minister.

Mrs. Gandhi was impatient, more so now that her Government had been defeated in the Rajya Sabha. Now that she knew that the parliamentary elections were around the corner, Uttar Pradesh under "enemy" supervision was too heavy a weight for her to bear. On September 30, she rushed a special messenger to Kiev in the Soviet Union to get the signature of the touring President of India for a presidential proclamation dismissing Charan Singh's ministry and suspending the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly effective October 1, 1970.

Once Charan Singh was dismissed, Mrs. Gandhi sent Dinesh Singh to help Tripathi in forming the government. Tripathi's bid failed and finally, as Kuldir Navar records,

he [Tripathi] rang up Mrs. Gandhi to inform her that she would have to approach members herself. She rebuked Tripathi on the phone and later told her associates that she never believed that he could have formed a Government.<sup>161</sup>

On October 18, T. N. Singh (BKD), who had formed a United Front in the meanwhile, formed the government, much to the embarrassment of Mrs. Gandhi. In all likelihood, she would have dissolved the Assembly except for the storm of public criticism against her that followed the suspension of the Assembly. The Western Times from the Syndicate-dominated town of Ahmedabad mourned this domestic tragedy in a black-bordered editorial with the tell-tale heading "RIP Democracy".<sup>162</sup> The Hindustan Times called the Central leaders, particularly the Prime Minister, "unwitting allies of Naxalites" and "undertakers" of democracy.<sup>163</sup> The Statesman accused the Prime Minister of "shabby manoeuvres" in taking a "heavy toll in political propriety,

constitutional procedure and democratic decency." <sup>164</sup> The Hitavada echoed:

The entire episode smacks of political vendetta and it would be difficult for the Congress(R) Party both in Uttar Pradesh and at the Centre to absolve itself of the blame for adopting objectionable tactics and defying the norms of constitutional democracy to deal with its adversaries. <sup>165</sup>

The Economic and Political Weekly editorialized:

None of this can, of course obscure the fact that the events of the last fortnight in the State represent yet another instance of use of brute force by the Prime Minister to achieve her political ends. From the withdrawal of Congress(P) support to the Chief Minister, Charan Singh, to the despatch of a special messenger to President Giri in the Soviet Union to get his formal assent to the imposition of President's rule, every move was deliberate and intended to make sure that Charan Singh did not continue in power with the support of Congress(O) and Jan Sangh. Every instrument - the Governor, the Attorney-General and the President himself - was bent to this purpose. <sup>166</sup>

However, when the presidential suspension was withdrawn, the Press began directing its criticism against the pitiable Governor, B. Gopala Reddi, for the political drama - or melodrama - in the state. <sup>167</sup>

Presidential Rule in Orissa: (a) Suspension: January 11 - 22, 1971

(b) Dissolution: January 23 - April 3, 1971

Of all the non-Congress coalition ministries in the states, the Orissa ministry set an example both in its stability and in its durability. After the 1967 elections, the party position in the Orissa Legislative Assembly was the following:

TABLE 5.5  
ELECTION RESULTS IN ORISSA, 1967

Name of the Party	1967
Congress	30
Swatantra	50
Jana Congress	26
PSP	21
SSP	2
CPI	7
CPI(Marxist)	1
Independents	3
Total: 140	

Source: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 24031, 1971:24721

On March 8, 1967, the Swatantra and the Jana Congress formed a coalition government under the leadership of R. N. Singh Deo (Swatantra). Pabitra Mohan Pradhan of the Jana Congress - a Party of Congress dissidents who had resigned from the Congress in 1966 - became the Deputy Chief Minister of the state.

The Swatantra-Jana Congress coalition worked with an abundant measure of mutual tolerance and understanding. The Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister constituted, as Amal Ray put it, "an excellent dumvirate".<sup>168</sup> Neither of the partners was committed to any militant ideology and both together scrupulously observed the rules of constitutional propriety. Politically inoffensive and ideologically pragmatic, the coalition government was rarely discussed in the press or in the Parliament.

The ministry came under strain with the split of the Congress Party. In October 1969, Biju Patnaik (former Chief Minister of Orissa, a close friend of the late Jawaharlal Nehru, pro-Syndicate 1966-August, 1969), who had lately joined Mrs. Gandhi's camp, began persuading her to topple the ministry. Since a great majority of the members of the Orissa Congress Legislative Party had expressed their support for Mrs. Gandhi and the Socialists were willing to join them in forming a new coalition ministry, the fall of the Singh ministry seemed immanent. By November, the Congress offensives to pull down the Swatantra-Jana Congress coalition had already begun. As the Economic and Political Weekly reported:

The Congress caucus in the State has been busy preparing the ground for a possible ministerial crisis through backstage intrigues. Offers of office and emoluments have been made to prod disgruntled elements in the ruling coalition to defect.<sup>169</sup>

However, the "toppling operation" got delayed because of the

differences that arose between Biju Patnaik and Mrs. Gandhi over the nomination of two candidates from Orissa in the Rajya Sabha biennial election. On May 16, 1970, Patnaik, along with 22 of his followers, left the Congress(P) to form a new party of his own, called Utkal Congress.

Now that a clear alignment of parties had taken place in the Parliament and the Swatantra Party had joined hands with the Congress(O) to oppose Mrs. Gandhi, a Swatantra-led ministry in Orissa was becoming quite irksome to her. Sometime in July, 1970, she sounded out Hare Krushna Mahatab (former Congress Chief Minister of Orissa) of the Jana Congress and received a cordial response. The CPI leader, Paikray, and the Congress(P) leader, Mahanti, seemed enthusiastic about entering into an alliance with the Jana Congress and the ever-ready Socialists as an alternative to the Swatantra-led ministry. <sup>170</sup>

On December 30, the Deputy Chief Minister resigned from the cabinet, and on January 5, 1971, the Jana Congress informed the Governor, Dr. S. S. Ansari, that it was withdrawing cooperation from the government. While the Chief Minister started looking for support from the other parties, Dr. Ansari ordered him, on January 7, to obtain a motion of confidence from the Assembly. On January 9, the Chief Minister resigned, and on January 11, the President suspended the Legislative Assembly.

Between January 11 and January 22, the proposed alliance between the Congress(R), the CPI, and the Socialists was re-discussed by the Jana Congress leaders and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and the general consensus was that such an alliance would not be able to provide a stable ministry in Orissa. On January 21, some members of the Jana Congress, including Hare Krushna Mahatab and Banamali Patnaik, decided



to join the Congress(R). Two days later, the Assembly was dissolved under presidential rule.

Except for murmurs from the Swatantra Party, there was no criticism of the presidential rule. The press and the political parties, perhaps, were too involved with the parliamentary elections.

Temporal Comparisons of Congressization Crises: 1969-71

To an extent, almost all the states in the Indian Union were under strain on account of the Congress split, though congressization crises materialized only in four of them - Bihar, Manipur, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa - till the parliamentary elections in March 1971. Mrs. Gandhi had, since the split, set up, to use the expression of a brilliant cartoonist, "TOPPLERS UNLTD: Wholesale dealers in Defections - Branch Offices in Gujarat, Orissa, Mysore...." with salesman Jagjivan Ram announcing to the perspective clients, "See? We do believe in free enterprise too!"<sup>171</sup> and, given the resources of the Center, it would not be long before the market grew bullish.

Mrs. Gandhi's concern to acquire a firm foothold in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh was quite understandable, for both were large Hindi-speaking states and had large representations in the Parliament. Besides, Uttar Pradesh was the home state of Mrs. Gandhi and she could ill afford to lose it. Manipur came handy to her because of the status of the Territory, and Orissa fell quite softly in her lap without much ado.

Unlike before the split, Mrs. Gandhi no longer seemed interested in setting up "puppet" governments. She now meant business. Either the state governments were on her side or they were against her. If Harihar Singh of Bihar was pro-Syndicate, or C. B. Gupta of Uttar Pradesh was a villain since the days of her father, both of them had to quit. With

presidential suspensions in both states, she tried, though unsuccessfully, to set up her own men to run their affairs. The Orissa alliance was perfectly drawn to topple the Swatantra-led ministry, and presidential suspension might have enabled Mrs. Gandhi to install the government of the alliance; but, probably, she had little trust in the lieutenants of the alliance. The political background of Mahatab or of Patel could hardly inspire confidence in anyone, much less in Mrs. Gandhi. In fact, she had too severe a "loyalty" test which none of the incumbent leaders in Bihar, Manipur, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa could pass to her satisfaction.

#### STRUCTURAL CRISES AFTER THE SPLIT:

Presidential Rule in West Bengal: (a) Suspension: March 19 - July 29, 1970

(b) Dissolution: July 30, 1970 - April 2, 1971

West Bengal, which had been under presidential rule since February 20, 1968, due to the structural crisis created by the Speaker of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, went to mid-term polls on February 9, 1969. The results of the election stunned the Congress Party; it could secure only 55 seats in the 280-member Assembly while the Leftist United Front (which had been dismissed by Governor Dharam Vira in 1967) returned with a thumping majority of 210 seats. The party position in the Assembly is given in Table 5.6 on the next page.

On February 25, 1969, the United Front, led by Ajoy Mukherjee (Bangla Congress) as the Chief Minister and Jyoti Basu (Marxist) as the Deputy Chief Minister, formed the government, much to the embarrassment of Governor Dharam Vira.

Now that the Marxists constituted the largest group in the Assembly, it was natural for the United Front to inaugurate its functioning with a rhetoric and style that would be distinctly militant. Immediately after the

TABLE 5.6  
ELECTION RESULTS IN WEST BENGAL  
1967 AND 1969

Name of the Party	1967	1969
United Front -	-	<u>210</u>
CPI (Marxist)	43	80
Banala Congress	34	33
CPI	16	30
Forward Bloc	13	21
Revolutionary Socialists	5	12
Samyukta Socialists	7	9
Socialist Unity Centre	2	7
Others	3	18
Other Parties -	-	<u>70</u>
Congress	127	55
Praja Socialists	7	5
Lok Sevak Sangh	4	4
Others	19	6
Total:	280	280

Source: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, April 19-26, 1969:23308

ministry was sworn into office, the government announced the release of Naxalbari prisoners and granted them the status of "political prisoners", symbolising the legitimacy of their cause. On February 26, the government wrote to the Center to recall Governor Dharam Vira before the budget session of the Assembly, scheduled to begin on March 6. On March 3, Home Minister V. B. Chavan stated in the Lok Sabha that the Governor was appointed for a period of five years and held office during the pleasure of the President. This, he said, was the constitutional position.

On March 6, Bijoy Kumar Banerjee, who was instrumental in creating crisis in 1968 and who, as Speaker of the Assembly, had ruled the dismissal of the then United Front government by Dharam Vira was unconstitutional,

was, once again, elected Speaker of the new Assembly. The same day, Dharam Vira opened the session of the Assembly and omitted two paragraphs from the address prepared by the government which referred to "the peremptory and unconstitutional manner in which the popularly elected United Front government was thrown out on November 21, 1967."<sup>172</sup> On March 7, Mrs. Gandhi avoided confrontation with the ministry by asking the United Front leaders to suggest alternative names for the Governor of the state. On April 1, Dharam Vira was granted leave preparatory to retirement.

After the Governor issue was settled, Jyoti Basu adopted the Marxists' tactics of "taking the hands of its allies only as a preliminary to taking them by the throats."<sup>173</sup> Making the best use of the opportunities available now, Basu started expanding the support structure of his party through large-scale mass mobilization in the countryside, thereby undermining the support basis of other coalition partners. In the process, West Bengal, once again, became a state where fear and personal insecurity brought normal life to a standstill. On July 31, the police demonstrated and stormed the Assembly - some of them entered the Assembly, then in session, and started smashing furniture - to record their protest against the victimization of policemen by the Marxists. Jyoti Basu telephoned the Inspector-General of Police for help, but he took his own time to arrive at the scene of lawlessness.<sup>174</sup>

In the field of land and labour, the Marxists advance was marked with strikes, gheraos (encirclements) and forcible occupation of land. By July 1969, there were 281 cases of gheraos in industry, 34 in educational institutions, and 48 in the social sphere.<sup>175</sup> In this situation of increasing lawlessness, the Chief Minister, Ajoy Mukherjee expressed his sense of frustration with the activities of the Marxists. While his physical self was with the United Front, his soul still longed for a re-union with the

Congress, if only the latter could get rid of the "coterie rule by the Syndicate". The Marxists knew Mukherjee's predilections for the Congress Party - he had been willing to join the Congress in 1967 too - and regarded the Bangla Congress as the Achilles' heel of the United Front. Thus, for the Marxists, a split in the Congress Party was fraught with the possibility of the Bangla Congress withdrawing from the United Front to form an alternative government with the support of, or in coalition with, the Congress and other non-Marxist parties.

The inevitable happened. Each step by Mrs. Gandhi to get rid of the Syndicate brought the Bangla Congress a step closer to her. On September 13, 1969, she visited Calcutta to appeal to honest Congressmen to return to her Congress Party. On October 7, Ajoy Mukherjee presided over the meeting of the Bangla Congress which adopted a political resolution warning the Marxists to stop their lawlessness. The resolution further said that "If such clashes and lawlessness were not stopped immediately, the Bangla Congress would be compelled to build up a resistance movement on Gandhian lines to end this intolerable situation."<sup>176</sup> The same day, the Marxists condemned the Bangla Congress resolution as "slanderous" and saw in it an attempt to return to the "path of 1967".<sup>177</sup>

On November 7, Ajoy Mukherjee decided to launch a state-wide satvagraha and civil resistance movement against, what he said was, the "uncivilized and barbarous" government of which he himself was still a leader.<sup>178</sup> On December 1, the Chief Minister started his satvagraha a three-day fast. In January, Mukherjee cancelled a few orders by Jyoti Basu and the whole month passed in acrimonious correspondence between the two leaders.<sup>179</sup> In February 1970, Mukherjee repeated his earlier description of his own government as "uncivilized and barbarous" in the Legislative Assembly and on March 16, submitted the resignation of his cabinet to

to Governor S. S. Dhawan.

With the resignation of the government, the United Front split into two groups: (a) Congress(R), Banerla Congress, Communist Party of India, and the Forward Bloc; and (b) Marxists and eight other leftist parties. Since neither of the two groups had a clear majority in the Assembly, the President suspended the Legislative Assembly on March 19, 1970.

The Assembly remained suspended from March 19 to July 29, 1970, during which a large number of arrests were made by the authorities in an effort to bring life back to normal in the state. However, since the party position continued to remain fluid, the President dissolved the Assembly on July 30, 1970.

While the Hindu(Madras) welcomed presidential rule, the Tribune (Chandigarh) attributed the entire crisis to the "toppling" game of the Congress(R). The editorial comments of the Hindu were:

To the benighted people subjected to a prolonged nightmare of unbridled lawlessness and violence, President's Rule will bring some hope of a minimum security of person and property. 180

And the Tribune editorialized:

Though all the regulation steps of the constitutional drill were scrupulously gone through before imposing President's rule in West Bengal, the name of the game there also is toppling. And the villain of the piece is neither the much maligned Jyoti Basu nor the long-suffering Ajoy Mukherjee but the Congress. 181

Despite the fact that the Tribune's antipathy to communists of all kinds was well known, the sting of the editorial deserves notice:

If, on the other hand, the Communist Party(Marxist) is regarded as nothing short of a national disaster, the Government of India must ban it. That would be not only logical but also lunatic. 182

After the fresh elections to the Bengal Legislative Assembly held in 1971, Ajoy Mukherjee became the Chief Minister of the state for the third time since 1967, but this time with the support and participation of the Congress(R).

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Kerala: August 4, 1970 -  
October 4, 1970

After the 1967 elections, the party position in the Kerala Legislative Assembly was the following:

TABLE 5.7  
 ELECTION RESULTS IN KERALA, 1967

Name of the Party	1967
United Front -	118
CPI (Marxist)	52
CPI	19
Samyukta Socialist	19
Revolutionary Socialist	6
Kerala Socialist	1
Karshka Party	2
Kerala Congress*	5
Muslim League	14
Congress	9
Independents	6
Total:	133

\*These parties joined the United Front after the election.  
 Source: Journal of the Society for the Study of State Government (January-June, 1968):85

On March 6, the CPI (Marxist) leader, E. M. S. Namboodripad, formed the United Front government after a long spell of presidential rule (imposed on September 10, 1964, see chapter IV) in the state.

Soon after the formation of the ministry, differences among the partners, particularly between the CPI (Marxist) and the CPI in respect to implementing electoral promises, began to surface in the public. In fact, the very conception of the Marxists of the working of the United Front was different from those of its coalition partners. For the Marxists, the United Front was, as Rhabani S. Gupta writes, "an

instrument of twin struggle: first and foremost against the central government, amounting to an assault on the political system from within and, second, against the antiworking class and antipoor-peasant policies of the non-Marxist partners of the coalition."<sup>183</sup> In the struggle of the first type, i.e., against the Central Government, the Marxists received the unwilling cooperation of their partners - neither the CPI nor the other parties were willing to go beyond clamouring for more material gains from the Center; and, in the struggle of the second type, i.e., jolting others out of their bases, the Marxists doomed the United Front government.

The United Front government tried to bring the Center into the arena of conflict on innumerable occasions - it accused the Center of discriminating against the state in rice allocations and grants-in-aid, protested against the use of Central Reserve Police, and refused to arrest striking Central Government employees as directed by the Center in 1968 -, but the Center avoided unnecessary confrontation with the United Front.<sup>184</sup> With the Congress Party having suffered a crushing defeat in Kerala, the Center played the diplomatic game of "stick and carrot" with care and caution.

Crisis # 1:

However, when it came to encroaching on one another's political bases, Kerala became a playground of Senas (para-military organizations) whose mutual clashes not only made life insecure but also destroyed the artificial unity of the United Front. In their haste to protect, reinforce and expand their spheres of influence, the Marxists organized "Gopala Sena" of about 5,000 volunteers. The Sena became a law unto itself, searching, seizing, looting, and burning the assets of political opponents. While the CPI protested and tried to drive the Marxists out of its political acres, it could not, locked as it was with the Marxists



in some kind of a "conflict-cooperation-conflict" relationship, outmanoeuvre the Maoist strategy of the Marxists. The other coalition partners were also sick and tired of the Marxists and had organized senas in "self-defence", but they seemed more eager to exploit the conflict between the CPI and the Marxists than to take a definite stand against the latter.

The gulf between the Marxists and the rest of the coalition partners widened with time. While the CPI and others accused the Health Minister, B. Wellington (Karshka Party, pro-Marxist) of corruption and demanded an inquiry; the Marxists retaliated by charging six other Ministers belonging to the CPI, Muslim League, and Socialist parties with corrupt practices. On October 17, 1969, the Chief Minister, E. M. S. Namboodripad, declined to set up an inquiry commission to investigate charges of corruption and declared that he would resign if a vote against him, either on a no-confidence motion or "any other motion" was passed in the Assembly. On October 24, 1969, the Chief Minister submitted the resignation of his cabinet when the Assembly adopted a resolution moved by the CPI member, T. A. Majid, calling for a probe into the charges of corruption against some of the Ministers.

There is little evidence to suggest that Mrs. Gandhi was in any way involved in bringing about the downfall of the Marxist-dominated United Front. However, the fact that she was relatively closer to the non-extremist CPI than to the ultra-leftist CPI(M) - she was supported by both the parties in the Parliament in her fight against what all the Communists called "Congress reactionaries" - she was accused by the Marxists of pulling down the United Front.

On November 1, 1969, C. Achutta Menon of the CPI formed a coalition with the non-Marxist parties and became the Chief Minister of the state.

The Congress Party offered to support the coalition without, however, joining the ministry.

Crisis # 2:

The very day the ministry was sworn in, the Marxists observed "betrayal day" in the state. On December 1, they organized demonstrations and on December 9, made people observe "Anti-repression Day" which resulted in large-scale violence and police firings. In January, 1970, they converted the Legislative Assembly into a kind of battle-field. Though the government survived on a vote of no-confidence on January 16, Menon preferred to resign on August 4, 1970 while he was still in a majority. It was, as the Economic and Political Weekly put it, a "clever manoeuvre" on the part of Menon, for he "opened up the possibility that the next election might be held with his Government still in effective power";<sup>185</sup> but the Center, apparently, did not want him to serve as a caretaker government during the election period and declared President's rule in the state from August 4 to October 4, 1970.

Temporal Comparisons of Structural Crises: 1969-71

In the case of both West Bengal and Kerala, Mrs. Gandhi had a hard choice to make. She was dependent on the support of the Communists in the Parliament - the Marxist had 23 while the CPI had 21 seats - who had supported her all through her fight with the Syndicate. However, though both parties desired political polarization in the country, the Marxists were more aggressive and violently impatient - Dange announced in November 1969 that the Marxists would not support Mrs. Gandhi if she compromised with the Congress(O) - which ill suited her situation (she was equally dependent on such somewhat rightist parties as the Akali Dal, the DMK, and the BKD, etc. in the Parliament) or the political temperament of some of her followers. On the other hand, the CPI was less violent,

willing to work within the parliamentary frame, and more appreciative of Mrs. Gandhi's measures, such as Bank Nationalization and the Abolition of Privy Purses. It believed that Mrs. Gandhi was leading a team of "progressive" Congressmen and that measures such as Bank Nationalization, etc., were a beginning to a new end. As such, the CPI was closer to Mrs. Gandhi than the CPI(Marxist).

In both West Bengal and Kerala, Mrs. Gandhi acted very carefully. She, like the bee that sucks the honey without injuring the flower, pulled down the governments of both the states through tactfully supporting one coalition partner against the other. To some extent, she was aware that the Marxists could not withdraw their support from her because of the logic of their own ideology: How could they refused to support her on such progressive measures as bank nationalization or the abolition of privy purses which they themselves had been fighting for? Despite that, she wanted to look inoffensive, and she was largely successful in that. Though the Marxists criticised her for pluralizing rather than polarizing the politics of the country, she was never disowned by them in the Parliament.

#### Spatial developments and comparisons: 1967-71

Table 5.9 outlines a spatial development of the crises by states and their outcomes for the period 1967-71. Altogether, eight states - Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Punjab, Kerala, and two Union Territories of Manipur and Pondicherry - were involved either in congressization or structural (or both types) crises at one time or the other. But for Manipur (where mid-term elections were postponed till 1972, pending a change in the status of the Territory) and Rajasthan (where the Congress ministry of Sukhadia stabilized after a brief spell of suspension of the Assembly), all the rest of the states had at least one (West Bengal had two) mid-term election between 1967-71.

Almost all the crises had their origin in the tussle for power between the Congress Party and the Opposition parties. Despite being in a legislative minority in all the above states except Madhya Pradesh (in Madhya Pradesh, the Congress strength was 16/30, and in Pondicherry, 15/30), the Congress was eager to form the governments, and that too, as generally in the past, without entering into coalitions with other political parties or groups. Immediately after the 1967 elections, the Congress President, K. Kamaraj, announced that the Governors ought to invite the leaders of the "largest" group in the legislature to form the government, a position which obviously was to the benefit of the Congress Party. At the same time, the Congress set the guidelines for the state units telling them to welcome support from those parties or groups in the legislature which were willing to join or merge with the Party. Coalition-making was simply ruled out. Such a policy, a heritage of the past, failed to pay dividends at a time when the country, generally speaking, was in the midst of an "anti-Congress" wave. Having lost initiative in forming the governments where it could, in meaningful coalition with other parties, the Congress found a new political technology of supporting "minority" governments so that it could (a) demolish the uneasy structures of the opposition parties and (b) share power without sharing any responsibilities. After the Congress split, the Congress(R) was willing to coalesce with other parties, but in order to do that, the Opposition edifice had to be destroyed either by creating crises or through other means.

The net result of the tussle for power was that there was an element of continual instability in almost all the states of the Indian Union. In all the states discussed, there were 26 governments which came and went, each one of them collapsing in the wake of one or the other type of crisis, during the period 1967-71. There were 17 cases of

presidential rule, and their number would have perhaps been larger but for the discretionary powers that the Governors used without involving the President. Altogether, there were 28 crises that brought the downfall of 26 governments (two survived - Rajasthan, Andhra) during the period 1967-71 as summarized in table 5.8:

TABLE 5.8  
NUMBER OF CRISES, BY STATES  
1967-71

State	Congressization crises #	Structural crises #	Incumbency* crises #	Total crises #
Rajasthan	1			1
Manipur	3			3
Haryana	1			2
Uttar Pradesh	4		1	4
Bihar	6			6
Pondicherry	2			2
Orissa	1			1
West Bengal	1	2		3
Punjab	1	1		2
Kerala		2		2
Madhya Pradesh			1	1
Andhra			1	1
Total:	20	5	3	28

\*Incumbency crises discussed later.

A spatial comparison of congressization crises during this period tends to show that the over-all pattern found during the Nehru era (unsuccessful congressization always brought presidential rule) persisted during Mrs. Gandhi's time too, except that the process of congressization was different: Congress, being in a minority position, had to go down the long winding road (establishing minority governments, using Governors, Presidential suspensions, etc.) before it could accomplish its ultimate objectives.

Of all the states, Bihar had the maximum number of crises, followed

by Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The fact that these three states together have 178 seats (Uttar Pradesh, 85; Bihar, 53; West Bengal, 40) in the 520-member Lok Sabha leaves little margin for guesswork as to how New Delhi might act when all three of them are lost to the Opposition.

TABLE 5.9  
DEVELOPMENT OF CRISES & THEIR RESOLUTION BY STATES, 1967-71

State	Chief Minister/ Tenure/party	Congressization crises (year)	Outcome of crises
Rajasthan	M.L. Sukhadia 1967-71 Congress	1967	<u>Suspension</u> - 1967; Congress (89/184) able to manufacture majority in the Assembly; Sukhadia in office, 1967-71.
Manipur	Koireng Singh 19.3.67- 4.10.67 Congress	1967	Koireng Singh formed government by Congressizing a few Independents; original Congress strength: 16/30; Congressization fails resulting in the formation of a United Front government.
	Longjam T. Singh 13.10.67- 23.10.67 United Front	1967	<u>Suspension</u> - 1967-68; Congress able to manufacture a majority once again after about four months of suspension; Koireng Singh forms government.
	Koireng Singh 19.2.68- 24.9.69 Congress	1969	Mrs. Gandhi visits Manipur on 23.9.69; faces violent demonstrations in support of demand for full status of statehood to Manipur; government falls on 24.9.69. <u>Dissolution: 16.10.69-20.3.72.</u>

TABLE 5.9 continued:

Harvana	Rao B. Singh 24.3.67- 21.11.67 United Front	1968	Non-Congress Devi Lal Group in the Assembly was promised the Chief Ministership in return for toppling the United Front but the bid failed. Thereafter, the Governor dismissed the ministry while still in majority - <u>President's rule - dissolution; mid-term polls in 1968.</u>
Uttar Pradesh	C. B. Gupta 14.3.67- 1.4.67 Congress	1967	Congress strength after the mid-term polls: 48/82; Ransi Lal who became the Chief Minister lost majority in the legislature several times but the Governor B. N. Chakravarty prorogued the Assembly in time to save the Congress government; misuse of powers by the Governor debated in the Lok Sabha on December 10, 1968. Ransi Lal survived the Congress split because he was pro-Mrs. Gandhi.
	Charan Singh 3.4.67- 17.2.68 United Front	1968	Congressization fails; Gupta resigns; Original strength of the Congress in the Assembly: 198/424; Mrs. Gandhi would have not allowed Gupta to form the government but for the solid block of seats he controlled in the Parliament at the time of national leadership selection in 1967.  While Charan Singh resigns to make room for his successor to lead the United Front, Governor Reddy gets the Assembly suspended on 25.2.68. Since the Congress fails to make a majority in the Assembly, the Governor gets the Assembly dissolved on 15.4.68, the United Front's claim to be able to form the government notwithstanding. Mid-term polls, 1969.



TABLE 3.9 continued

Bihar	C. P. Gupta	1970	The pro-Syndicate Gupta saw the hand-writing on the wall and resigned.
Bihar	Chetan Singh	1970	Mrs. Gandhi sends a special messenger to the yard where the President is on tour to get the suspension orders signed in order to dismiss Chetan Singh whose party - BMD - votes against the Government Bill on Privy Purses in the Parliament.
Bihar	M. P. Sinha	1968	However, the suspension misfires; T.V. Sinha of the United Front forms Government instead of the Congress (R) as planned.
Bihar	B. P. Mandal	1968	The appointment of B. Mandal unnerves the Sinha Ministry; defections lead to the fall of the government.
Bihar	Congress-supported United Front	1968	S. P. Sinha, nominee of Mandal, appointed Chief Minister to recommend the nomination of Mandal to the upper house of the Bihar legislature. However, this constitutional manipulation runs counter to the conscience of some of the Bihar Congressmen, who resign from the Congress. The Mandal ministry falls on March 12, 1968.

TABLE 5.9 continued:

Bihar	1968	Probably, Shastri would have not been allowed to form the government but for the criticism: if the Congress can set a "puppet" government, why can't the United Front be given a chance to form the government? However, Shastri, anticipating the fall of his government because of defections in the Congress, resigned. The Governor asks the Congress to step in but the High Command advises against it, leading to Presidential rule - dissolution on 29.6.68; mid-term polls in 1969.
Bhola P. Shastri 22.3.68- 25.6.68 United Front	1968	
Harihar Singh 26.2.69- 20.6.69 Congress- coalition	1969	Harihar Singh - pro-Syndicate; Nijalingappa, Congress President, recruits Harihar Singh to coalesce with other parties including the controversial Pata of Patna to form the government, but Subramanian & S. Gandhi's camp resigns on the issue of Pata's inclusion in the Bihar Cabinet. A compromise between the two is reached but it causes a split in the Bihar coalition resulting in the defeat of the Harihar Singh's government.
Bhola P. Shastri 22.6.69- 1.7.69 United Front	1969	Shastri fails to form a stable government; Assembly suspended. However, suspension was revoked on 16.7.70 - just before the Budget session of the Parliament, and when the Congress(?) was in a position to form the government.

TABLE 5.9 continued:

Bihar	Daroga P. Pai 16.2.70- 17.12.70 Congress (R) coalition	1970	The defeat of Mrs. Gandhi's government in the Parliament resulted in the realignment of parties in Bihar: government fell on 16.12.70. Kapoori Thakur of the Socialist party formed the government on 22.12.70.
Pondicherry	M. G. H. Farook Maricar 9.4.67- 19.2.68 Congress	1968	Farook had to congregate a few Independents in order to form the government. However, congressization failed and the government fell.
	V. V. Reddiar 6.3.68- 11.9.68 Congress	1968	Congressization failed - Presidential rule - dissolution of mid-term polls in 1969. After the polls, DMK-CPI formed the government under the leadership of Farook. However, since both the DMK and the CPI were friendly parties to Mrs. Gandhi, no effort was made to upset the ministry.
Orissa	R. Singh Deb 8.3.67 9.1.71 Swatantra-Jana coalition	1970	Mrs. Gandhi causes defections from the Jana Congress and promises to instal a coalition of the Congress (R), the Jana Congress, the PSP, and the CPI. The Assembly <u>suspended</u> for the same reason. However, since the alliance looks unworkable on second thought, the Assembly is dissolved after twelve days of suspension from 11.1.71 to 22.1.71.

TABLE 5.9 continued:

West Bengal	Ajoy Mukherjee 2.3.67- 21.11.67 Leftist United Front (Marxist)	1967	Governor Dharam Vira dismissed the United Front ministry failing Mrs. Gandhi's effort to congressize Ajoy Mukherjee and his party, the Bangla Congress. The agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Mukherjee could not materialize because of the opposition of the Syndicate, particularly that of the West Bengal machine boss, Atulya Ghosh.
Punjab	Gurnam Singh 8.3.67- 22.11.67 United Front	1967	The ministry fell when Lachman Singh Gill with his 16 supporters defected from the United Front in exchange for the Congress promise to support him for the Chief Ministership.
West Bengal	P. C. Ghosh 21.11.67- 20.2.67 Congress-Progressive Front coalition	1968	Speaker Banerjee refused to recognize the Ghosh ministry on the floor of the Assembly and twice adjourned the Assembly on the ground that the Ghosh ministry was constituted through unconstitutional means. <u>Presidential rule - dissolution; mid-term polls in 1969.</u>
	Ajoy Mukherjee 21.2.69- 16.3.70 Leftist United Front	1970	Defections from the Front to the Congress(R) leads to the fall of the ministry; Assembly suspended from March 19 to July 29, 1970. However, since the party position stays fluid, the Assembly <u>dissolved on July 30, 1970.</u>

STRUCTURAL  
CRISES

TABLE 5.9 continued:

		<u>STRUCTURAL CRISES</u>	
Punjab	Lachhman Singh Gill 25.11.67- 21.8.68 Congress supported Janta Party	1968	Speaker Mann does not allow the Assembly to function. He adjourned the Assembly twice, once <u>since die</u> when a motion of no-confidence was moved against him in the Assembly and secondly, to challenge the Governor's ordinance. In such an impossible situation, the Assembly was <u>dissolved</u> .
Kerala	E.M.S.Namboodripad 6.3.67- 24.10.69 Leftist United Front (Marxist)	1969	Non-Marxist parties withdraw from the coalition because of the violent activities of the Marxists. The Ministry falls.
	C. Achutta Menon 1.11.69- 4.8.70 CPI and the non-Marxist parties coalition	1970	Marxist do not allow the ministry to work. Assembly <u>dissolved</u> ; mid-term polls in 1970.

TABLE 5.9 continued:

<u>INCUMBENCY</u>		
<u>CRISES</u>		
Haryana	R. D. Sharma 10.3.67- 22.3.67 Congress	1967  Sharma resigns after the Congress was reduced to a minority in the Assembly on account of defections led by Rao Birendra Singh. The Congress High Command failed to reconcile the differences between Sharma and Rao.
Madhya Pradesh	D. P. Mishra 8.3.67- 29.7.67 Congress	1967  Mishra resigned after the Congress was reduced to a minority in the Assembly on account of group defections. The Congress High Command failed to mediate the conflict between Mishra and Verma.
Andhra Pradesh	K. B. Reddy 1967-71 Congress	1969  The Telengana members of the Andhra Assembly threatened to withdraw their support to the ministry unless the Central Government agreed to create a new state of Telengana. However, Mrs. Gandhi's positive support to Reddy, the revolting group was appeased by granting several concessions to the Telengana region and the ministry was saved.

Total number of crises: Congressization, 20; Structural, 5; Incumbency, 3.

## PART IV: CRISES WHICH DID NOT CULMINATE IN PRESIDENTIAL RULE: 1967-71

While Part III of this chapter explained where presidential rule was declared and where the same objective was achieved through methods other than the formal use of presidential rule, it did not give us an all-India picture either of the crises or the way they were resolved. Part IV looks to this aspect and as such is supplemental to Part III. The total number of crises in all the states of India is shown in Table 5.10:

TABLE 5.10

TOTAL NUMBER OF CRISES IN ALL  
THE STATES OF INDIA  
1967-71

Nature of crises*	Number of crises
Congressization	20*
Structural	5
Incumbency	3
Total:	28

\*Refer Table 5.8.

After the 1967 elections, the Congress secured legislative majorities in Andhra (165/287), Assam (73/125), Gujarat (93/168), Haryana (48/81), Himachel Pradesh - a Union Territory (34/59), Jammu and Kashmir (61/75), Madhya Pradesh (167/296), Maharashtra (203/270), Mysore (126/216), and Tripura - a Union Territory (27/33). Besides the 20 congressization and 5 structural crises discussed in the preceding section, there were three incumbency crises - one each in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra - before the Congress split. After the split, almost all the states felt the tremors in the form of congressization

crises, but the effect of such tremors shall be analysed in the next chapter. However, the three incumbency crises before the split tend to show that the Center, unlike in the past, could not just move people in and out of office.

1. Incumbency crisis in Harvana:

B. D. Sharma was unanimously elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party at the "intervention" of the Congress High Command which rejected the claim of his rival, Rao Birendra Singh. Sharma formed the Congress government on March 10, 1967, but his government fell twelve days later when Rao Birendra Singh led his group out of the Congress and joined with the Opposition to form a government of his own. Though the Center ultimately dismissed the Rao ministry under presidential rule, it could not, as in the past, mediate and make its decision acceptable to the rival factions within the framework of the Congress organization.

2. Incumbency crisis in Madhya Pradesh:

D. P. Mishra formed the government on March 8, 1967. By nature and temperament, Mishra was said to be a very rude person. Having come very close to Mrs. Gandhi by being the chief architect of her strategy during the national leadership contest in 1967, Mishra was also said to have become authoritarian in his dealings with his colleagues. Despite the fact that he had formed a cabinet which was non-composite by ignoring regional and other interests and there was seething discontent in the Congress Legislative Party, the High Command did nothing to mediate among the rival factions. On July 19, 1967, there was a group defection of 36 members from the Congress. D. P. Mishra approached the Congress High Command about presidential rule, but the High Command was split: K. Kamaraj



and Mrs. Gandhi were in favour of a mid-term poll, while Y. B. Chavan and Morarji Desai were not so enthusiastic about it.<sup>186</sup> Having lost the initiative in mediating the conflict between D. P. Mishra and Brij Lal Verma, leader of the defecting group, the Congress High Command witnessed the fall of the Mishra ministry on July 20, 1967. The next day, Govind Narain Singh of the United Front was invited by the Governor to form an alternative government.

On March 12, 1969, G. N. Singh was replaced by Raja Naresh Chandra Singh as the leader of the United Front; and on March 26, 1969, the Congress formed the government under the leadership of Shyama Charan Shukla, who was elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party in place of D. P. Mishra, whose election was set aside by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on grounds of corrupt practices.

### 3. Incumbency crisis in Andhra:

K. Brahmanand Reddy, the Chief Minister of Andhra and a strong supporter of Mrs. Gandhi, faced an incumbency crisis when about 35 members of the Congress Legislative Party decided to withdraw their support from the government in support of their demand for a separate Telengana state in April 1969. All of these 35 members represented the Telengana region in Andhra Pradesh and had formed a Telengana Praja Samiti to fight for their demand. Reddy survived the crisis when Mrs. Gandhi actively intervened and appeased the Telengana separatists by granting them major concessions. However, she refused to divide Andhra Pradesh. Reddy continued in office till 1972 when Mrs. Gandhi brought him in the Central cabinet to make room for a Telengana person to replace him in Andhra.

The three cases mentioned above are more or less similar except that they are not contemporaneous. Neither in Haryana nor in Madhya Pradesh was the Congress able to regulate incumbency crises because

(a) it lacked image and influence; and (b) it could not repeat the Rajasthan episode (March, 1967), still fresh in the public mind, in these states. However, by the time the Andhra case came up (1969), Mrs. Gandhi's revolt against the Syndicate was a well-known fact, and since K. Brahmaiah Reddy was a definite and reliable supporter of her government, she intervened actively to assist Reddy in the crisis. Besides, K. B. Reddy was a good counter-weight to N. Sanjiva Reddy (a former Chief Minister of Andhra, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and later, nominee of the Syndicate for the Presidency), and Mrs. Gandhi could not let his government go to pieces.

After the Congress split, all state governments which did not toe Mrs. Gandhi's line came under severe strain. However, while it was easier for her to topple coalition governments (or penetrate states where the Congress was in a legislative minority) and replace them either by Congress(R) coalitions or by Presidential rule (as discussed in Part III), the same was not the case where the Congress was in a legislative majority and fully entrenched in power. In fact, she had a twin task to accomplish: (a) to protect those state governments which supported her from the penetration of the Syndicate; and (b) to displace leadership in those states which were the strongholds of the Syndicate. In order to do so, Mrs. Gandhi used the resources of the Center in such a way that she was able to accomplish, at least partially, her twin objectives. Table 5.11 outlines some of the crucial decisions she made in order to consolidate her following.

TABLE 5.11  
DISCRETIONARY TREATMENT OF THE STATES BY THE CENTER AFTER CONGRESS SPLIT

State/ Chief Minister/ Party	Central decisions, January-December, 1970		Comments
	Boundary disputes	Location of projects	
Punjab Gurnam Singh Akali Dal	Awarded Chandigarh 8.2.1970	Financial assistance	Chandigarh, the capital city of Punjab, was awarded to Punjab (Punjabi Suba) to main- tain Akali support.
Maharashtra V. P. Naik Congress-R	Decision on the Mahajan Commission Report postponed 18 2.1970		Maharashtra, linked to Mrs. Gandhi through Y. B. Chavan, became jubilant over Mrs. Gandhi's decision not to accept the Mahajan Commission Report until approved by the Parliament. This wiped up a severe crisis for the pro-Syndicate V. Patil's government in Mysore.
Andhra K.R. Reddy Congress-R	Powers of Telengana Regional Committees enlarged 7.3.1970	Allotted Rs.45 crores for Telengana development	Satisfied the revolting Telengana Region to stabilize Reddy's government.
		A steel plant at Visakhapatnam allotted 8.8.1970 A fertilizer plant at Ramagudam, Telengana region allotted 7.11.1970	

TABLE 5.11 continued:

Tamil Nadu Karunanidhi DMK	Awarded favourable decision on Cauvery Water Dispute 7.4.1970	Allotted a steel plant at Saleem 7.4.1970	Adhoc grants of Rs. 17 crores.	The Cauvery Water Dispute Award by Mrs. Gandhi accelerated the crisis in Mysore which was adversely affected by the Award.
Assam B.P.Chaliha Congress-R (Uncertain)	Allotted an Oil Refinery 8.10.1970	Adhoc grants for flood relief	Adhoc grants for flood relief	Mrs. Gandhi won over Chaliha and stabilized his government by decelerating protest for an Oil Refinery in the state.
Uttar Pradesh T. N. Singh SVD supported by Cong(O)	Refused	Refused special accommodational grants December, 1970	Refused special accommodational grants December, 1970	Allotted special accommodational grants to Assam, Andhra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu.
Orissa R.N.Singh Deo Swatantra-Jana Congress	Refused a steel plant 8.8.1970	No accommodational grants	No accommodational grants	Despite the earlier recommendation by a Techno-economic study that a steel plant in Orissa would be both viable and economical (the decision was also approved by the Planning Commission and the Central Steel Ministry), Mrs. Gandhi's refusal to allot the project provoked a massive <u>bundh</u> (strike) in the state.

Basic data collected from: Economic and Political Weekly; Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years (New Delhi: Vikas, 1971); D. C. Gupta, Indian Government and Politics (New Delhi: Vikas, 1972); The Times of India, New Delhi.

Though Mrs. Gandhi was being applauded by the public for her quick decision-making capacity, she was upsetting the equilibrium in quite a number of states. Natindra Desai in Gujarat, Virendra Patil in Mysore, M. L. Sukhadia in Rajasthan, C. B. Gupta in Uttar Pradesh were all under heavy pressure from her onward marching forces, which seemed to stop nowhere. She was emerging as "the leader" of the nation, and the system was moving out from a disorderly praetorian stage to a completely hegemonic stage under her personal leadership. In January 1971, just a month before the parliamentary elections, Rajinder Puri concluded his book, India 1969: A Crisis of Conscience, and had the foresight to say:

It [the public] could vote back Indira to office and thereby give implicit approval to her actions since 1969. The implications of this would be clear. In the expectation of quick, easy prosperity for the masses raised by Indira, the public would have chosen to overlook the political immorality of her government. It would, in that case, be opting for the material rewards contained in her promises and discarding the code of conduct sanctioned by its culture. In effect, the public would have voted for the whimsical morality of a dictator within the disciplined framework of democracy. The result of this would be inevitable. Democracy, without a fight, would very soon give way to dictatorship. What second thoughts the public may entertain within the iron bars of a totalitarian regime are irrelevant to this essay.<sup>187</sup>

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus", (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960). The quotation occurs in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale, Fourth Print, 1970): 81. As mentioned in chapter II, our use of the concept "praetorian" has no reference to military interventions.

<sup>2</sup>See, Rajinder Puri, India 1969: A Crisis of Conscience New Delhi: Rajinder Puri, A-422 Defence Colony, 1971). Of specific interest are the two chapters in the book: "The Conscience of the Press" and "The Conscience of the Public".

<sup>3</sup>Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966):124.

<sup>4</sup>Krishan Bhatia, Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister Gandhi (New York: Praeger, 1974):191.

<sup>5</sup>Uma Vasudev, Indira Gandhi: Revolution in Restraint(Delhi: Vikas, 1974):504.

<sup>6</sup>Lok Sabha, February 23, 1966. The Hindustan Times, February 24, 1966.

<sup>7</sup>Stanley A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton, 1968):288.

<sup>8</sup>The Hindustan Times, December 15, 1966.

<sup>9</sup>The Statesman, December 22, 1966.

<sup>10</sup>The Times of India, January 5, 1967. Also see, Ramashray Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates," Economic and Political Weekly(December 31, 1966):833-840.

<sup>11</sup>"Syndicate Breaking Up," Economic and Political Weekly (February 11, 1967):356.

<sup>12</sup>See, Krishan Bhatia, op.cit; Uma Vasudeva, op.cit; Khawja Ahmad Abbas, Indira Gandhi: Return of the Red Rose (Bombay: Popular, 1966); S. S. Sahota, Indira Gandhi: A Political Biography(Jullundur, New Academic, 1972), and many other biographies of the Nehru family.

<sup>13</sup>Of Indira, Welles Hagen wrote: she is a case of "arrested ideological development". A former minister in Nehru's cabinet even told Hagen; "If you include her in your book, you will be reduced to saying polite things." See, Welles Hagen, After Nehru, Who? (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963):161.

<sup>14</sup>Indira quoted in Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 369.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

- 17 Ibid , 387-388.
- 18 Krishan Bhatta, op.cit., 198-199.
- 19 Reported in The Hindustan Times, December 26, 1966.
- 20 The Hindustan Times, February 9, 1967.
- 21 The Hindustan Times, February 10, 1967.
- 22 The Indian Express, November 8, 1966.
- 23 The Hindustan Times, November 8, 1967.
- 24 The Russian reaction to devaluation is summarized in Kuldip Navar, Between the Lines (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1969):88.
- 25 See controversy between Maxwell, W. H. Morris-Jones, and A. H. Hanson in The Sunday Times (London), March 19, 1967.
- 26 Kam Manohar Lohia reported in The Indian Express, December 22, 1966.
- 27 C. Rajagopalachari quoted in Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 428.
- 28 Eric da Costa in The Times of India, January 30, 1967.
- 29 Frank Moraes, The Indian Express, March 10, 1967.
- 30 Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary," The Statesman, March 11, 1967.
- 31 Mrs. Gandhi reported in The Indian Express, March 11, 1967.
- 32 See, Michael Brecher, "Succession in India 1967: The Routinization of Political Change," in Henry S. Albinski, ed., Asian Political Processes (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971):279-300.
- 33 Information pieced together from various newspapers and journals. For a few states, see Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974). The "constitutional precedent" section of the Journal of the Society for Study of State Government (Varanasi) was used as the primary source for collecting this data.
- 34 See, The Times of India, March 22, 1969; Sham Lal, "The National Scene," The Times of India, April 8, 1969; "Central Aid to States," The Economic and Political Weekly (July 20, 1968); "Checks without Balances," The Economic and Political Weekly (October 5, 1968); Press reaction to the State Autonomy Conference held in Tamil Nadu, The Economic and Political Weekly (October 10, 1970):1685.
- 35 See, "The Politics of Steel," The Economic and Political Weekly (August 8, 1970); Kuldip Navar, India: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1971): 98-112.
- 36 The Pioneer quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (April 22, 1967):754.

37 V. P. Naik in Kuldip Navar, India: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1971): 104.

38 Ibid. For a general summation of the response of various Chief Ministers, see "Chief Ministers' 'No' to Land Reforms," The Economic and Political Weekly (October 3, 1970).

39 'R' stands for Ruling; 'O' for organization or Opposition.

40 The Congress Working Committee, in its week-long session from May 7 to 13 recorded a sharp criticism of the Government for its failure to implement the Congress policies and programmes. It desired that the Government ought to be answerable to the Congress Working Committee so that there is no misunderstanding between the Party and the Government. See, Basant Chatterjee, The Congress Split (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1974): 93-94.

41 H. D. Malaviva's address to the Congress Forum for Socialist Action, April 8, 1967 represented the voice of the "Young Turks". See, Basant Chatterjee, Ibid.

42 Basant Chatterjee records Mrs. Indira Gandhi's comments; Ibid.: 58.

43 In the 21-member Congress Working Committee including the President, there were 15 members who were either Syndicate nominees or its allies - S. Nijalingappa, S. K. Patil, Sadig Ali, Rama Rao, S. Shrinani, K. Kamaraj, Morarji Desai, V. B. Chavan, Atulya Ghosh, Ram Subhaskar, G. B. Gupta, Hatindra Desai, M. L. Sukhadia, V. P. Naik, and K. C. Damodaram. The rest of the members belonged to Mrs. Gandhi's camp with varying degrees of commitments to her - Jagjivan Ram, C. Subramaniam, K. Brahamananda Reddy, U.S. Dikshit, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and the Prime Minister herself.

44 For a brief summary of the dialogue between Nijalingappa and Mrs. Gandhi, see Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 58.

45 See Desai's point of view in Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 216-217; and Mrs. Gandhi's point of view in Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 76.

46 Ibid.

47 Mrs. Gandhi's dialogue with Morarji Desai that Reddy could be an "inconvenient President" referred to by Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 100.

48 Quoted by Chatterjee, op.cit., 106.

49 Ibid., 101.

50 For Mrs. Gandhi's comments and the reaction of the Board, see Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life (Delhi: MacMillan, 1974) Vol. 11: 286-287.

51 Mrs. Gandhi quoted in Chatterjee, op.cit., 152.

52 Chatterjee records extracts from the Parliamentary Debate; op.cit.,



53 Chatterjee, op.cit., 158.

54 It was during these days that the press and the news media came under the severe pressure of the Government. In the public, many stories about the personal life histories of "people" received rich circulation. For some glimpses of these happenings, see Rajinder Puri, op.cit.

55 Data collected from several sources but primarily from the Economic and Political Weekly (1969/71). See Table 5.11 for a summary of various decisions.

56 Rajinder Puri, op.cit., 109. Also see Puri's cartoon wherein Mrs. Gandhi faces the shadow of a man with "National Press" bag in his hand. The placard in Mrs. Gandhi's hand reads: "I am amazed at the manner in which the major newspapers criticize me when 95% of the people support my policies." To this, the man with the bag answers: "But Madam, the Press is still national - not nationalized." 152.

57 Ibid., 109.

58 Mrs. Gandhi quoted in Chatterjee, op.cit., 208.

59 Ibid., 318.

60 See Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 516. Mrs. Gandhi said similar things at November 13 meeting of the Congress Working Committee. The Times of India, November 14, 1969.

61 Rajinder Puri quotes, op.cit..

62 For a statistical computation of gheraos, strikes, etc. see Nitish R. De, "Gheraos as a technique for Social Intervention," The Economics and Political Weekly (January 1970): 261-70. Also see, Sankar Ghosh, The Disinherited State: A Study of West Bengal 1967-70 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1971): 96; 155-180.

63 See Annexure 2 in Sankar Ghosh, op.cit., for a text of Peking Radio broadcast on June 28, 1967 on the Revolutionary Armed Struggle of the Indian People.

64 Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years, op.cit., 242.

65 See, Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: Nation, 1974): 14.

66 For a summary of the recommendations of the committee on defections, see Kashyap, ibid.: chapter 4.

67 Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years, op.cit., 162.

68 See Mrs. Gandhi's point of view in Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 459.

69 "It is necessary that this Ministry [Home] should be with me if I am to be useful to you in view of the conditions prevailing in the different states." Morarji Desai, op.cit., 237.

- 70 Krishan Bhatta, op.cit., 217.
- 71 The United Front consisted of the Swatantra, Jan Sangh, SSP, and Janta parties supported by the Independents and the Communists.
- 72 Extracts from the Governor's statement in Subhash C. Kashyap, op.cit., 138.
- 73 Mrs. Gandhi's statement in the Statesman, March 8, 1967.
- 74 Nath Pal's statement in the Hindustan Times, March 7, 1967.
- 75 Quoted in Economic and Political Weekly (March 18, 1967): 546.
- 76 The editorial comments of all these newspapers extracted in the Economic and Political Weekly ibid.
- 77 A copy of the Governor's letter to the President of India is cited in Subhash C. Kashyap, op.cit., Append. II.
- 78 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 59, April 4, 1967: 1963.
- 79 Ibid., 1996.
- 80 Ibid., 1956.
- 81 Ibid., 2108.
- 82 The Indian Express, October 26, 1967.
- 83 Subhash C. Kashyap, op.cit., 167.
- 84 Governor's report at Append. 5, in Kashyap, ibid.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. IX, November 21, 1967.
- 87 Ibid. - see, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 62, No. 3, November 22, 1967: 595-700.
- 88 The Indian Express, November 22, 1967. Also, the Times of India of the same date.
- 89 The Statesman, November 22, 1967.
- 90 On many occasions, the Governor prorogued the Assembly to save the Bansilal government. Arrest of opposition members of the Assembly was also reported several times. The Governor refused to grant the request of the Opposition to convene special sessions of the Assembly in order to test the strength of the government on September 20, October 27, and December 9, 1968.
- 91 See Mrs. Gandhi's predicament in Uma Vasudeva, op.cit., 475.

- <sup>92</sup> See footnote in Kashyap, op.cit., 257.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid., 255-256. Charan Singh also raised several important issues with the coalition partners concerning the powers of the Chief Minister in a coalition government.
- <sup>94</sup> Lengthy extracts from the Governor's report were quoted by Z. A. Khan in the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XIV, No. 29, March 25, 1968:3050-3052.
- <sup>95</sup> B. M. Mathur, "End of Foredoomed Ministry," The Hindustan Times, March 4, 1968.
- <sup>96</sup> The Indian Express, February 26, 1968.
- <sup>97</sup> The Economic and Political Weekly (March 2, 1968):379.
- <sup>98</sup> Lok Sabha Debates, March 25, 1968:3134, (translated from Hindi).
- <sup>99</sup> Bhupesh Gupta in the Hindu, February 26, 1968.
- <sup>100</sup> Bhupesh Gupta quotes at length the Governor's report in the Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. LXIV, No. 8, May 8, 1968:1825.
- <sup>101</sup> Bhupesh Gupta, ibid:1825-1835.
- <sup>102</sup> Menon, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. LXIV, No. 9, May 9, 1968:2017.
- <sup>103</sup> Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XX, No. 25, August 27, 1968:2217-2284.
- <sup>104</sup> See Kashyap for the resolution of the Pradesh Congress Committee, op.cit., 311.
- <sup>105</sup> Ayyangar's statement in Kashyap, ibid:318.
- <sup>106</sup> Ibid. The fact that the Governors were under the pressure of the Central Government into doing certain things came out clearly from the farewell address of the retiring Governor Ayyangar who deplored the growing "addition" to the imposition of President's rule and the tendency "in certain quarters" to make use of the Governor as "an instrument of central dictatorship." See, Journal of the Society for the Study of State Governments (January - June, 1968):82.
- <sup>107</sup> See a summation of newspapers' editorials in the Economic and Political Weekly (February 17, 1968):321.
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>109</sup> The Statesman, June 26, 1968.
- <sup>110</sup> The Times of India, June 26, 1968.
- <sup>111</sup> The Indian Express, June 27, 1968.

112 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XVIII, No.4, July 25, 1968:1554-1555; 1562-1563; Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. LXV, No.1, July 22, 1968:160-162; 167. For the extension of presidential rule, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. LXVI, No.17, December 10, 1968; Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XXIII, No.30, December 19, 1968. The debate on extension was uninteresting with Y. B. Chavan, Minister of Home Affairs, expressing the pious hope that the "political leadership in Bihar will rise to the occasion and give a stable, able, clean administration to the people of Bihar."

113 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 12-19, 1968:22966.

114 In collecting the material on Pondicherry, I have primarily relied on Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1968-69); "Main Events:1969" in the Journal of the Society for the Study of State Governments (1968-69); Asian Recorder (1969).

115 The United Leftist Front consisted of CP(Marxist), RSP, SSP, SUC, Workers' Party, PCPI, and the Marxist Forward Bloc. The Peoples' United Leftist Front consisted of the CPI, Bangla Congress, Forward Block, and the Bolshevik Party.

116 The government order quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972):214.

117 See Subhan C. Kashvan, op.cit., 520-530 for an understanding between Mrs. Gandhi and Mukherji.

118 Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., 233, describes the episode as it happened. He writes: "At this juncture, the initiative to scuttle the coalition shifted to the Congress high command in New Delhi and to the governor's mansion in Calcutta .... From Delhi, Wanda came to Calcutta in September with a plan to replace the provincial Congress committee by an "ad hoc" committee. The real objective of his plan was to bring Ajoy K. Mukherji back to the Congress fold. Governor Dharam Vira arranged a meeting between himself, Mukherji, Kabir, and Bengal's defeated Congress chief minister, Prafulla Sen. At this meeting Mukherji was offered chief ministership of a Congress-led coalition that would exclude the Marxists, if not the CPI also."

119 For an interesting account of where the plan went wrong, see the Times of India, October 7 & 9, 1967.

120 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 62, No.4, November 23, 1967:931. For Bhupesh Gupta's comments, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 62, No.3, November 22, 1967:613.

121 Sham Lal quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (December 9, 1967):2118.

122 The Statesman editorial quoted in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 30, 1967 - January 6, 1968:22440.

123 See Fibbertigibbet's comments, and Romesh Thaper, "Congress moves to recover lost territories," in the Economic and Political Weekly (December 2, 1967):2076, 2080.

- 124 See Subhash C. Kashyap, op.cit., 389.
- 125 The Hindu, June 4, 1967.
- 126 One of my own former students who was then a member of the Akali Legislative Party gave this information to me.
- 127 Gurnam's statement quoted in Kashyap, op.cit., 397.
- 128 The Indian Express, November 24, 1967.
- 129 The Hindustan Times, November 24, 1967.
- 130 Though C. Rajagopalachari had also become Chief Minister of Madras in 1952 after being nominated by the Governor to the upper chamber of the Madras legislature, Rajagopalachari's nomination was quite different from that of Mandal's nomination. For one thing, Rajagopalachari was never recommended by a temporary chief minister nor was he installed in office in opposition to the desire of the Governor. In Mandal's case, even the Governor who felt that Mandal's back door entry was morally wrong was replaced.
- 131 The Lok Sabha discussed the role of Governors on November 15-16, 22-24, 1967, and the Rajya Sabha on November 20, 1967. A brief summary of the discussion is recorded in the Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 30, 1967 - January 6, 1968:22443-22444. The entire issue of the Journal of the Society for Study of State Governments (July-December 1971) is devoted to a discussion of the role of Governors.
- 132 Yugantar quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (December 2, 1968):2082.
- 133 Speaker's ruling recorded in the Keesing's, December 30, 1967 - January 6, 1968:22440.
- 134 Ibid.
- 135 An extract from the High Court's judgement appears in Keesing's, June 29 - July 6, 1968:2780.
- 136 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XIV, No.27, March 21, 1968:2260.
- 137 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XIV, No. 28, March 22, 1968:2633.
- 138 Ibid.: 2631-2632.
- 139 Lok Sabha Debates (on extension), Vol. XX, No 25, August 27, 1968: 2298. Also see, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XX, No.26, August 28, 1968; and the Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. LXV, No.15, August 12, 1968:2888-2951.
- 140 But Governor Parate stated: "As long as it is possible to form a Government, it should be formed.... Ordering new elections would only be a waste of money..." See Keesing's, January 6, 1968:22443.

- 141 The contents of the Ordinance quoted in Subhash C. Kashyap, op.cit., 411.
- 142 See, The Hindustan Times, March 20, 1968; The Statesman, March 21, 1968.
- 143 The Governor's report quoted in the Keesing's, October 12-19, 1969:22966. Goval also quoted at length the report of the Governor in the Lok Sabha on August 29, 1968. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XX, No.27, August 29, 1968:3063.
- 144 Lok Sabha Debates, ibid: 2290-91.
- 145 Chavan's statement in the Rajya Sabha summed up in the Keesing's, October 12-19, 1968:22900.
- 146 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XIV, No.27, March 21, 1968:2386.
- 147 The Indian Express, February 23, 1969.
- 148 Nath Pal in Kashyap, op.cit., footnote:347.
- 149 For Subramaniam's press statement, see, Keesing's, April 19-26, 3072.
- 150 The Hindu, June 13, 1969.
- 151 Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 155.
- 152 Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years, op.cit., 229.
- 153 Ibid.
- 154 Mrs. Gandhi quoted in Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 253.
- 155 Information on Manipur is extremely limited and, at times, different sources report different data on the subject. The present information is based on the Keesing's, November 1970:23817; Asian Recorder, May 21-27, 1973:11398-11440.
- 156 See, The Times of India, October 30, 1969.
- 157 Krishan Kant of Mrs. Gandhi camp announced the state-wise figures to the press. The Times of India, November 21, 1969. However, two members from Manipur attended the plenary session of the Congress(R) in January 1970. The Times of India, January 6, 1970.
- 158 See, Basant Chatterjee, op.cit., 106.
- 159 Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years, op.cit., 5.
- 160 Ibid: 252.
- 161 Ibid: 254.

162 The Western Times quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (October 17, 1970):1734.

163 The Hindustan Times. ibid.

164 The Statesman, October 8, 1970.

165 The Hitavada quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (October 17, 1970):1734.

166 The Economic and Political Weekly (October 3, 1970) editorial, "Much Buried Corpse".

167 Nireekshak, "Exercised about Liberty," Economic and Political Weekly (November 7, 1970):1799-1800.

168 Amal Ray, "Coalition Government in Orissa," Economic and Political Weekly (January 9, 1971):86-87.

169 Editor, "Orissa", Economic and Political Weekly (November 22, 1969).

170 Amal Ray, op.cit., for details.

171 See Rajinder Puri's cartoon, op.cit., 189.

172 See Keesing's, April 26, 1969:23309. For the details of the episode and comments, Journals of the Society for the Study of State Governments (January-March 1969):38-41.

173 The Tribune, March 21, 1970.

174 See, "Counter-revolution in Khaki," Economic and Political Weekly (August 9, 1969):1297.

175 The Statesman, July 26, 1969.

176 The Statesman, October 8, 1969. Also see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., 258-259.

177 Ibid.

178 The Hindustan Times, November 20, 1969 re-quotes Mukherji's earlier speech.

179 Extracts from the correspondence between Mukherji and Basu appear in Keesing's, July 25 - August 1, 1970:24105.

180 The Hindu, March 21, 1970.

181 The Tribune, March 21, 1970.

182 Ibid. For a summation of various editorial comments, see the Economic and Political Weekly (April 4, 1970):586-587.

183 Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., 267.

184 See, G. P. Srivastava, "The Indian President and the States: A Neglected Dimension of their Relationship," Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (October-December, 1969). Also see, Economic and Political Weekly (June 24, 1967) for some of the tensions in the Kerala-New Delhi relations.

185 Editorial, "CPI in New Clothes", and Mohit Sen, "Confidence in Kerala," Economic and Political Weekly (July 4, March 28, 1970).

186 The Hindustan Times, July 23, 1967. D.P. Mishra, incidentally, was on awfully bad terms with Chavan.

187 Rajinder Puri, op.cit., 204.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE HEGEMONIC MODEL 1971

In Chapter II, I labeled the years between 1971 and 1974 as the period of "re-institutionalization and consolidation" of the Center in the political development of India. I have also heuristically characterized the political system of this period as "hegemonic", i.e., a system which treats political dissent as some kind of a political subversion. Unlike the "near-hegemonic" system of the Nehru era which was based on the domestication of dissent (or the absorption of dissent), a hegemonic system wrecks the structure of dissent in the interest of monolithicism. Though "power" in both the systems is concentrated in varying degree, a hegemonic system invokes fear and demands a total loyalty, nay submission, to the political authority. In such a system, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the press, the intelligentsia, and other interest groups are partially or completely governmentalized and directed to support the authoritative policies of the regime.

The transition from the "praetorian" state of the political system to the hegemonic state was gradual but systematic. It began with the landslide victory of the Congress(R) headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi in the parliamentary elections of 1971, continued with yet another resounding victory of the Party in the elections to the State Assemblies in 1972, and it finally culminated in the imposition of the National Emergency in June 1975. However, since this chapter is concerned only with the period 1971-74, I shall treat this entire period as one stage, combining both the "take-off" and the "developmental path" of the political system, in order to keep it independent of the developments in 1975. In fact, the parliamentary victory in 1971 had set the hegemonic style of governance

and these developments simply sharpened and institutionalized this style.

This chapter is, therefore, divided into three parts. Part I describes the 1971 system stage and the system environmental properties of this stage in the same analytical frame as I have followed in the preceding chapters:

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ANALYTICAL FRAME

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PART I

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Emergent political system

System environmental properties

1. Structural-functional properties: the extra-constitutional instrumentalities.
2. Party system properties: the consolidation of the Congress (R).
3. Leadership properties: Indira - the "Empress of India".

1. Domestic protest politics, political corruption.
2. International Alliance with the Soviet Union.

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Part I, therefore, describes the contextual settings within which the Center and the states interacted with each other and helps us hypothesize the probability of federal intervention in state crises.

Part II empirically tests some of the descriptive propositions drawn from Part I. As such, it deals with those sub-system crises which were resolved through the imposition of presidential rule. Part III examines those sub-system crises in all the states of India between 1971 and 1974 which were resolved without the declaration of presidential rule, in order to find a crisis-resolution pattern on an all-India basis.

37

PART I: THE EMERGENT POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1971-74

1. Structural-functional properties: the extra-constitutional instrumentalities

The period between 1971 and 1974 was marked by constitutional amendments which changed the basic character of the Constitution, particularly with respect to the fundamental rights of the citizens. Responding to the challenge of the Supreme Court of India which had declared both the Bank Nationalization Act and the Privy Purses Ordinance as invalid because they abridged the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of the citizens, the Parliament enacted three amendments, one after another, in 1971. By the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Parliament arrogated to itself the power to amend the fundamental rights, a power which was specifically denied to the Parliament according to the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Golak Nath v. State of Punjab. The Twenty-fifth Amendment compromised the fundamental right to property, while the Twenty-sixth Amendment de-recognized the princes and abolished their privy purses. The Preventive Detention Act, which was allowed to lapse in 1969 because of the Communists' pressure on the Government, was re-enacted under a different title - Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) - in 1971.

While the above changes were meant to remove the burdens in the way toward socialism, the Center revived the Nehruvian euphoria of "progress through planning", almost with a vengeance, when the Planning Commission, much weakened since Nehru's death, not only received a fresh lease of life under the Deputy Chairmanship of the progressive D. P. Dhar, later of P. N. Haksar, but also began attempting to impose its ivory-tower planning targets on the Central and State ministries. By the end of 1972, the Planning Commission was well on its way to putting into final shape

the Fifth Five-Year Plan(1974-79) with a total outlay of Rs.511.65 million, out of which Rs.355.95 million was to be invested in the public sector. The Plan gave top priority to investment in heavy industry despite a persistent tight situation on the food front. The objections raised by the various ministries,<sup>2</sup> that the Plan had an air of unreality surrounding its estimates and targeted growth rate, were declared as "conservative" voices in the progressive march toward socialism. As part of Mrs. Gandhi's Garibi Hatao(Banish Poverty) slogan to the nation, the Government demonstrated "socialism, here and now" by nationalizing general insurance companies, coking coal mines and coke-oven plants immediately after the parliamentary elections. By October 1972, the Government seemed to be pursuing the policy of nationalization so relentlessly that it nationalized even the wholesale trade in wheat - a step which had to be reversed, because of the immense problems, including large-scale unemployment, it created, to "smoothen" the path toward socialism. Whether nationalization per se was good or bad for the economy as a whole may be an irrelevant question in the present context, but the depressing aspect of it was that it was - at least allegedly - used to whittle down political sentiment originating with the private sector. "At times," writes Krishan Mehta, "ministers deliberately talked publicly about nonexistent government plans to nationalize or regulate a particular industry or trade with the intention of creating nervousness among the people concerned."<sup>3</sup>

While the Planning Commission, once again, became the symbol of progress and prosperity, the meetings of the National Development Council and of the Central ministers with their counterparts in the state governments became more regular and smooth. In the September of 1972, the Center succeeded in "knocking the Chief Ministers' heads together and,

for once, getting them to agree to the procurement prices<sup>4</sup> recommended by the Agricultural Prices Commission. Those of the Chief Ministers who tried to point out that it was beyond them to procure the requisite quantum of foodgrains at such low prices were "brusquely brushed aside" and advised to take recourse to "appropriate instrumentalities such as a levy on traders, a levy on millers, or a levy on surplus producers", with "selective cordoning of areas and restrictions on the movement of grains on private account", in order to achieve the targeted procurement.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Party system properties: the consolidation of the Congress(R)

After the Congress split of 1969, the Congress(R) began building itself into a kind of a monolithic organization around the leadership of the Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi's call to the defectors to join her party in order to bring about fundamental societal change had a good response even before the parliamentary elections of 1971. However, Mrs. Gandhi was shrewd enough to understand that she could trust the defectors neither for loyalty nor for the party funds so urgently needed for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The problem of funds came first but it was solved too abruptly. The Party, so it was claimed, did not beg for donations; it simply "extorted" them. As Krishan Bhatia writes:

Since 1970, however, such "donations" have reportedly been more like extortions: The money that Indira's senior Cabinet colleagues collected for the parliamentary elections in 1971 and state elections the following year allegedly amounted to tens of millions of rupees and usually changed hands on the basis of a clear quid pro quo .... And allegedly the ruling Congress Party itself has become one of the largest hoarders in the country of undeclared cash.<sup>6</sup>

Kuldip Nayar explained the process of collecting contributions in 1970:

Once she [Mrs. Gandhi] made up her mind about the mid-term polls, she focussed all attention on the collecting of funds, workers, jeeps, loudspeakers and publicity material. Ministers, party leaders and all those who had any influence were asked to collect funds. And they did with a vengeance. Quotas of scarce raw materials were allotted; licences for new industrial plants issued; import permits granted, tax evasions condoned, all in return for contributions to her party's election funds .... Foreign powers joined the black money [unaccounted money] racket - many of them sent large amounts to their "supporters" through diplomatic bags.<sup>7</sup>

The massive victory of the Congress(R) - it secured 350 seats in the 518-member Lok Sabha - was, in many ways, a personal triumph for Mrs. Gandhi. Over-night, Indira became a phenomenon like Mao, with her newly manufactured myths and legends.

Now that Mrs. Gandhi was no longer under the pressure of building her image, she turned her attention to the reorganization of her Party. By January 1972, i.e., two months before the elections to the State Assemblies, she had disbanded some of the ill-assorted Pradesh Congress Committees and replaced them by ad hoc Committees, undermined some of the strongest entrenched state bosses, and shaken up the State Assemblies by asking some of the members, particularly the old ones, to bow out to make room for "new blood".<sup>8</sup> Her announcement that the Central Election Committee in New Delhi alone would finalize the distribution of party tickets to the members for the forthcoming state elections showed her determination to clean the Congress stables of all the muck that had accumulated since the split. Power was now "terrifyingly" concentrated and a durbari (kingly courts) psychosis prevailed in the Capital's political circles.<sup>9</sup> Writing about the political environment in New Delhi at the time of distributing party tickets, Romesh Thapar commented:

- Our potential political leadership, old faces and new faces, is prepared to do anything 'on the ground' to get an 'Indira Ticket'. One has only to witness the scenes around the power centres in the Capital to realise that politics is perhaps an older profession than prostitution. Exclusive ministerial homes look like employment exchanges with mobs of 'candidates' swarming around.<sup>10</sup>

The election results declared in March 1972 proved neither the myths nor the legends surrounding Mrs. Gandhi as false or fictitious. The Congress(R) swept the polls (Table 6.1), with each successful candidate, like a devotee, attributing his success to the cult of the "The Leader". Mrs. Gandhi was, her biographers repeated, the Joan of Arc she had dreamed to be in her childhood.<sup>11</sup> She was Shakti, some exclaimed, the goddess of success of the Indian mythology.

### 3. Leadership properties: Indira / the "Empress of India"

There have been various assessments, kind and unkind, of Mrs. Gandhi's personality. However, neither her admirers nor her critics have ever disagreed that she is a tough and resolute person. Writing about her as early as 1962, Welles Hangen had said:

Indira Gandhi, Nehru's dearest and most trusted disciple, aspires to put his gospel into practice. If she succeeds, she could become the most powerful woman in the world today. If she fails, she will join the ranks of the anonymous offspring of famous fathers.<sup>12</sup>

Indira succeeded and stole a headline in the London Sunday Times in 1973: "The Most Powerful Woman in the World". The long article described Mrs. Gandhi as "the supreme and silken autocrat" who had taken decisions that her father would not have dared to take.<sup>13</sup> Earlier, Aubrey Menen, writing about her in the New York Times Sunday Magazine (December 31, 1972), had described her as a "sort of the De Gaulle of India". She was referred to (with awe or irony?) as the "Empress of India" by the Toronto Star when she paid a state visit to Canada in the summer of 1973.

TABLE 6.1

Name of the State	Total seats	STATE ELECTIONS, 1972					CPI	CPI(M)	Soc.	Others	Independents
		Congress (R)	Congress (O)	Swat.	Jan Sangh	Congress					
Andhra	287	219	-	2	-	7	1	-	5	53	
Maharashtra	270	222	-	5	-	2	1	3	12	25	
Mysore	216	165	24	-	-	3	-	3	6	15	
Gujarat	168	139	16	3	3	1	-	-	-	9	
Goa	30	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Delhi	56	44	2	-	-	3	-	-	28	1	
Himachal Pradesh	65	51	-	5	5	3	-	-	1	1	
Bihar	318	167	30	2	26	35	1	33	13	7	
Haryana	81	52	12	-	2	10	1	7	4	12	
Punjab	104	66	-	-	-	3	-	24	4	11	
Madhya Pradesh	296	220	1	11	48	3	7	3	18	3	
Rajasthan	184	145	1	1	8	4	4	4	11	11	
Assam	114	95	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	
Manipur	60	17	1	1	-	5	-	6	6	5	
Meghalaya	60	9	-	-	-	-	-	3	18	16	
West Bengal	280	216	2	-	-	35	14	3	32	19	
Tripura	60	41	-	-	-	1	16	-	8	5	
Jammu & Kashmir	75	57	-	3	-	-	-	-	5	2	
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2724</b>	<b>1926</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>223</b>	

Source: S. S. Sahota, Indira Garhji (Jullundur: New Academic, 1972)..



However, at home, while her devotees increasingly referred to her as Mataji (The Mother Saviour), her critics described her in derisive terms - Morarji Desai remarked in 1973 that "she is not a communist, she is a fascist."<sup>14</sup> And, a few others contemptuously commented: Mrs. Gandhi - the "only Man" in the Central Cabinet, or the "only Mantri among the santries", i.e., the only Minister among the sentinels. Warnings against some kind of a "dangerous monolithicism", both from home and abroad, were not late in coming. Romesh Thapar wrote in February 1972:

Wherever one goes in Delhi, one can sense the crystallizing of a new fear. Power is getting concentrated. It must be more widely diffused in our continental system.<sup>15</sup>

A month later, he re-emphasized:

Power is now terrifyingly concentrated - indeed, so concentrated that even the few independent voices which could make themselves heard in the vicinity of the Prime Minister may be stilled. Indira Gandhi should watch this growing silence with apprehension.<sup>16</sup>

In the summer of 1973, the Illustrated Weekly of India, a widely respected journal, repeated Thapar's theme and worrisomely commented about the "excessive concentration" of power in the hands of Mrs. Gandhi.<sup>17</sup> From abroad, A. H. Hanson and Janet Douglas (1972) wrote of the "ominous tendency of Mrs. Gandhi's government to treat the Constitution as something that can be, and ought to be, manipulated for party-political advantage, rather than as a set of rules which all must obey."<sup>18</sup>

Whether it was in pursuit of the "total revolution" she had promised to the nation or the sheer absoluteness of power that has the tendency to make the powerful paranoid, Mrs. Gandhi tried to liquidate all sources of dissent, honest or dishonest, real or imaginary, in the name of discipline, orderliness and decorum so essential to a nation which was well on its way to a revolution. After the parliamentary elections,

Mrs. Gandhi included in her cabinet such ex-communists (of the CPI) and leftists as Mohan Kumaramangalam, Nandini Satpathi, D. P. Dhar, Raghunatha Reddy, Ganesh, Khadilkar, etc., who were probably much better versed in Marxist literature than in the teaching of Gandhi, Nehru and Shastri. These late-comers to the Congress(R) were invited by Mrs. Gandhi to manufacture a new public ethos and impart a new "meaning" to the promised land of revolution.

During the Congress split, Mrs. Gandhi had often complained that the national press was uncooperative with the Government. While she had increasingly relied on the All-India Radio(AIR) for conveying her message to the people ever since the split (some people had complained that the Akashvani - the Hindi name of the AIR which, when literally translated, means the "Voice from the Sky" - had become Sarkarvani, the "Voice of the Government"), she was quite upset with the "liberties" some of the editors took in criticising her or her Government. Since the ownership of the newspapers, Mrs. Gandhi felt, was in the hands of "vested interests", she asked her Information and Broadcasting Minister, Inder Gujral, to open a dialogue with the "press barons" with the object of diffusing ownership, in order to protect the independence of editors and working journalists. While Inder Gujral set the ball rolling over the ownership issue sometime in November 1971, the Government, in another move, came out with the suggestion that the maximum size of a daily newspaper should not exceed ten pages because of the short supply of news-print material. But for the National Herald, a newspaper owned by the Nehrus at one time, almost all the leading newspapers - the Indian Express, the Statesman, the Hindustan Times - protested against the Government's suggestion and appealed (as if they had read between the lines) for an "open dialogue" on the role of the press in the context of the national interest. The

Deccan Chronicle regarded the size restriction as a "cruel joke on big and small newspapers alike", and the Times of India said ominously: "This country will soon cease to have any newspaper capable of providing a competent service."<sup>21</sup>

By September 1972, while Kuldip Nayar, editor of the Statesman, was in a difficult situation for his earlier editorials, B. G. Verghese of the Hindustan Times was under enormous pressure not to err on the wrong side. On September 16, the Chief Minister of West Bengal had sent for Birla, one of the proprietors of the Hindustan Times, to discuss issues relating to some editorials concerning the state government. On September 30, B. G. Verghese stood up to his proprietors. Describing the episode as a "threat to the press", Verghese editorialized that such threats will not

deflect us from continuing to function objectively and professionally .... Here is yet another example of a highly placed politician openly and unashamedly - but unsuccessfully - seeking proprietorial interference to muzzle an independent paper. The cynicism underlying this petty manoeuvre by a pillar of a party that advocates 'diffusion' of press ownership, allegedly to save helpless editors and journalists from the tyranny of 'monopoly' owners, is the outstanding feature of this shabby episode. We propose to treat it with the contempt it deserves.<sup>22</sup>

Verghese was dismissed by the owners in August 1974.

If the national press was unfriendly, the Supreme Court of India - which had an "awesome reputation" for impartiality - had been troublesome to Mrs. Gandhi after the Congress split. In the case of both Bank Nationalization and Privy Purses, the Court had given evidence of being the "guardian of the Constitution" and the "protector" of fundamental rights. But to Mrs. Gandhi and her followers, the Court's decisions smacked of "conservatism"; Justice J. S. Shah, some of Mrs. Gandhi's followers pleaded, ought to be sacked and impeached (Shah presided over

the bench that struck down, by a vote of 11 to 1, the Bank Nationalization Act in 1970). In 1971, S. M. Sikri was appointed the Chief Justice of the Court according to the seniority rule - a rule which had been institutionalized since Independence - but he too refused to see eye to eye with Mrs. Gandhi's "progressive view" of the Constitution. On Sikri's retirement in 1973, Mrs. Gandhi, who, for quite some time since 1971, had been propagating the concept of a "committed judiciary" (a use of communist jargon), hand-picked A. N. Ray over three senior judges and appointed him as the Chief Justice of the Court. The appointment caused a furore all around - in the Parliament, in the Press, and in the enlightened public. Even some of Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet colleagues, who were not consulted over Ray's appointment, felt unhappy and let down.<sup>23</sup> While Mohan Kumaramangalam (ex-communist), who was then the Minister of Steel in the Central Government, vehemently defended the Government's choice - "we had to take into account what a Judge's basic outlook is in life"<sup>24</sup> - the retiring Justice Sikri saw in Ray's appointment "a big blow to the independence of the judiciary."<sup>25</sup> To Jayaprakash Narayan, a Gandhian leader of massive popularity, who had criticised the decision, Mrs. Gandhi wrote,

The experience of other nations with an independent judiciary also proves that although the judiciary is generally on the side of the status quo / the Marxists had said it several times /, it does not respond to change in social needs .... The various pronouncements regarding property by our own courts have been so confusing that many people, who do not believe that property is a sacrosanct fundamental right, would wish our judiciary to take a more modern view of the matter.<sup>26</sup>

Having dealt with the media and the Supreme Court, Mrs. Gandhi, sure of her power but uncertain of the loyalty of her "devotees" and critics, expanded the Prime Minister's Secretariat and set up within it a strong division known as Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) headed by a trusted friend, R. N. Kao, who was given the status of an ex-officio

Secretary (the equivalent rank in Canada would be Deputy Minister), despite protests from the civil servants he superseded. Although there was a general feeling, though somewhat exaggerated, that Mrs. Gandhi, through the Wing, had a "complete dossier" on anyone of any importance in the country, there was no doubt that the Wing had the capability of collecting whatever information it was asked to collect. The RAW had, as Kuldip Nayar writes:

its own network in the country, its own radio monitoring stations, its own experts in economics and other fields. It kept dossiers on every minister at the Centre and the states, and kept surveillance on brigadiers and above and equivalent ranks in the airforce and the navy. The organization which started with a budget of 5 crore rupees / 50 million rupees / reached Rs.100 crores and played a vital part to keep Mrs. Gandhi posted of men and matters.<sup>27</sup>

Kuldip Nayar's book, India After Nehru, from which the above information has been taken, was written before the declaration of National Emergency in June 1975. Marcus F. Franda, though writing after the emergency (December 1975), somewhat confirms Nayar's information:

Over the years the Prime Minister's Secretariat and the Home Ministry had prepared a number of different strategy manuals for meeting different types of "internal disturbances." These ranged from rather light and liberal actions that might be taken to meet less threatening contingencies, to more severe measures designed to cope with serious law and order problems.<sup>28</sup>

The Prime Minister's Secretariat, in fact, had become so powerful that even its secretarial staff was revered (or feared?) by the Central and the state ministers alike. Romesh Thapar of the Economic and Political Weekly, who seemed to be consistently reminding the Prime Minister that "sceptre and crown, all tumble down", wrote in December 1972:

What have we reduced ourselves to! Chief Ministers wait for audience in the homes of influential stenographers and secretarial assistants. Cabinet Ministers seek favours of powerful bureaucrats. Juniors in the system find their godfathers and godmothers .... At the top of this shaky structure of graft and opportunism sits the Prime Minister. An unenviable perch; for, after a while, it may become difficult to get down.<sup>29</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi had her finger in almost every pie. Structurally, the system was still decentralised but functionally, to borrow the saying in respect of the office of the French Prefect, if the Prime Minister sneezed, the whole of the country caught cold. Mrs. Gandhi made sure that the appointments she made, whether of Governors, of Chief Ministers or of judges, were of persons who had no weight of their own and who were willing to carry her fatwa (dictates) without question or objection.

System-environmental properties:

1. Domestic: (a) Protest politics:

The persistence of the chronic food shortage, the zero percent growth rate of the economy (1972), the enormous inflation (approximately 30% in 1972) and the concomitant rising cost of living, the Malthusian geometric rate of population progression, and the foreign aid blockade because of the Bangladesh war, created insurmountable problems for the regime which had mobilized the masses and raised their hopes on a Garibi Hatao platform. There were protests, demonstrations, and strikes by various services for increased wages and salaries to fight inflation. The college students whose teachers went on strike made common cause with the strikers - Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat educational institutions were the worst affected - and created a rebellious environment. The army quelled the police mutiny in Uttar Pradesh (1973).<sup>30</sup> The Railway Minister, Lalit Narayan Mishra (later killed in a bomb blast in Bihar), dismissed 10,000 employees and threatened 800 to 900 thousand workers with a break in service (which means losing seniority, pension and other benefits) in order to break the Railwaymen's strike (1974). After 20 days of grim struggle with the authorities, the National Coördination Committee for Railwaymen's Struggle (NCCRS) withdrew its demands "unconditionally", begging the Government to be merciful. Even President

V. V. Giri, who came to politics from the trade union movement, asked the Government to be "magnanimous in victory", but Mrs. Gandhi "refused to issue a blanket order to condone the strikers' absence from duty."<sup>31</sup>

(b) Political corruption:

In the parliamentary and state elections of 1971 and 1972, reports suggested that most of the "donations" were made through black money (i.e., unaccounted money). After the elections, the black money market boomed - a conservative estimate of the black money was that it constituted one-half of the total money in circulation. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971), which was designed to crack down on the black-marketeters both in currency and in commodities, tried to check the evil but, on the whole, the conditions did not improve. On the other hand, some critics of Mrs. Gandhi began pillorying her for both the Nagarwala case and the Maruti car project (1971-72). By 1973-74, these cases came to be known as "India's Watergates" (the Nagarwala case exposed the hoarded, unaccounted, funds of the Congress(R) while the Maruti involved Mrs. Gandhi's son, Sanjay, who had started a small car project, allegedly with a lot of favours from various quarters), in order to malign the image of Mrs. Gandhi. In Punjab, the Harchand Singh Committee (1973) exposed many Congress(R) ministers and top civil servants for having purchased land on favourable terms, but the matter had to be hushed up on intervention from the Center.<sup>32</sup> In Bihar, L. N. Mishra (then Minister of Railways) and his family were reportedly involved in certain government contracts, and this issue became the subject of debate in the Parliament in 1973.<sup>33</sup> The actors changed but the story remained the same in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, etc. By the beginning of 1974, Jayaprakash Narayan - a follower of Mahatma Gandhi, a compeer of Nehru and Patel, a nationalist listened to with respect both in political

circles and by the public - was emerging as a Messiah, after almost two decades of voluntary exile from politics, making people ready for a struggle against political corruption.<sup>35</sup>

## 2. International: Alliance with the Soviet Union:

After having failed to get the United States and other European powers to mediate the Bangladesh problem, India acquired the shield of the Soviet Union through the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship concluded in New Delhi on August 9, 1971. In November 1971, while there were about nine to ten million refugees who had moved from East Pakistan to West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, Mrs. Gandhi visited Paris, Bonn, London and Washington in search of effective mediators to solve the problem. She was listened to with sympathy and understanding but sensed no desire on the part of the Western world to actively intervene in the emerging conflict. The Nixon administration advised her not to precipitate a war and pull back Indian forces from the borders with Pakistan.<sup>36</sup>

The two-week war with Pakistan in December 1971 was grim and total, resulting in the birth of a new nation - Bangladesh. While the Nixon administration tried to bully New Delhi by ordering its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, the Soviet nuclear submarines and missile ships tailed the US armada in accordance with Article 9 of the Indo-USSR Friendship Treaty. The cooperation which the Soviet Union exhibited during the war and also in the Security Council, where George Bush, the US delegate, made repeated attempts to accuse India of being the aggressor, brought Moscow extremely close to India. This new friendship was followed by increasing trade and economic agreements and cultural exchanges. At home, the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India felt so close to Mrs. Gandhi that it lost many of its leaders to the Congress(R).



The deterioration of Indo-US relations continued for quite some time (India's plan to elevate the Hanoi consulate to an embassy level was dropped when Washington declared it an "unfriendly" act; similarly, West Germany's threat to cut off aid made India drop its proposal of giving de jure recognition to East Germany) till Henry Kissinger visited India in October 1974 in an effort to normalize relations.

The system-environmental interaction, as described in the preceding pages, leaves nothing to doubt as to what type of relationships would exist between the Center and the states or how the Center would solve provincial crises. After the parliamentary elections of 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was "the leader" of the nation, talking to the people over and above the heads of party bosses, if any. The Party needed her; she did not need the Party - she was in a situation in which she could hand-pick any "dark horse" and depute him as the Chief Minister of any province. The Bangladesh war almost "immortalized" Mrs. Gandhi - all the members of the Lok Sabha, including her old colleagues of the Syndicate camp, gave her a standing ovation when she first announced the surrender of the Pakistani army, and all kinds of people, from school children to the aged from rural India, swarmed to her residence to catch a glimpse of her.

However, there were still many non-Congress state governments (Mysore, Gujarat, Punjab, West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa - remnants of the old order) which either had to be congressized or brought under presidential rule before the state elections, due in 1972: Given the fact that the country was in the grip of the "Indira wave", as was evident from the parliamentary elections, we expect that

Some descriptive propositions:

- (a) the attitude of the Center would be to declare presidential

- rule in all the non-Congress and Syndicate-dominated provinces in order to reap the fruit of the "Indira wave" in the election to the State Assemblies; and
- (b) the attitude of the Center would be positive toward all those Congress(R) state governments whose leadership owed a total "loyalty" to Mrs. Gandhi.

#### PART II - PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1971-74

There were 15 cases of presidential rule between March 1971 and March 1974, out of which four were cases of presidential suspension of the Assemblies. The type of crisis, the nature of government, the duration of presidential rules, etc., are given in Table 6.2 on the next page.

#### CONGRESSIZATION CRISES:

Presidential Rule in Mysore: (a) Suspension: Mar. 27 - April 14, 1971

(b) Dissolution: April 14, 1971 - March 20, 1972

After the 1967 elections, the Congress Party, which had secured 126 of the 216 seats in the Mysore Assembly, was firmly in power under the leadership of S. Nijalingappa. In 1968, Nijalingappa became the President of the All-India Congress, leaving the Chief Ministership of Mysore to his loyal supporter, Virendra Patil.

In the period during which the Congress was in the process of splitting (1969), Mrs. Gandhi tried to win over Virendra Patil (Patil, it was reported at one time, had arrived at a secret understanding with Mrs. Gandhi that he would move over to her side after Nijalingappa was removed as the Congress President), but Patil was not willing to come out in the open and rebel against the Congress(O). Later on, Mrs. Gandhi tried to elbow him out by her decisions on the Mysore-Maharashtra Boundary

TABLE 6.2  
SUB-SYSTEM CRISES LEADING TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE  
MARCH 1971 - MARCH 1974

Type of crisis	Nature of incumbent government	State	State machinery suspended/dissolved	Duration of presidential rule
Congressization (R)	Non-Congress*	Mysore	suspended dissolved	March 27 - April 14, 1971
	Non-Congress	Gujarat	dissolved	April 14, 1971 - March 20, 1972
	Non-Congress	Punjab	dissolved	May 13, 1971 - March 17, 1972
	Congress (R) coalition	W. Bengal	dissolved	June 15, 1971 - March 15, 1972
	Congress (R) coalition	Bihar	dissolved	June 29, 1971 - March 17, 1972
	Congress (R)	Orissa	dissolved	January 9, 1972 - March 19, 1972
	Non-Congress	Manipur	dissolved	March 3, 1973 - March 6, 1974
	Non-Congress	Pondicherry	dissolved	March 28, 1973 - March 4, 1974
	Non-Congress	Pondicherry	dissolved	January 3 - March 6, 1974
	Non-Congress	Pondicherry	dissolved	March 28, 1974 -

\*Non-Congress includes the Syndicate-dominated Congress(O).

Table 6.2 continued:

Structural	Congress(R)	Tripura	dissolved	November 1, 1971 - March 27, 1972
	Congress(R)	Andhra	suspended	January 18 - December 10, 1973
	Congress(R)	Uttar Pradesh	suspended	June 13 - November 8, 1973
Incumbency	Congress(R)	Gujarat	suspended	February 9 - March 15, 1974
			dissolved	March 15, 1974 -

Total number of suspensions: 4  
Total number of dissolutions: 11

and Mysore-Tamil Nadu Water disputes (see Table 5.7 in the preceding chapter), but was unsuccessful.

The Patil ministry fell like a house of cards after the 1971 Lok Sabha elections in which the Congress(R) won every parliamentary seat in Mysore. On March 17, 1971, three cabinet ministers resigned from the Patil ministry to join the Congress(R) and the next day, Patil, reading the writing on the wall, submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor.

The Government's resignation was followed by what Patil described as a "gold rush" of the Congress(O) members to join the Congress(R). While on March 15, the strength of the Congress(R) was 57 members, it swelled to 120 members on March 22, 1971. The Governor invited H. Siddaveerappa, leader of the Congress(R) Legislative Party, to explore the possibility of forming an alternative government.

The Central Parliamentary Board of the Congress(R) met in New Delhi on March 22 to decide the future course of action in Mysore. It found that, while Siddaveerappa was anxious to form the government, Devaraj Urs of the Mysore Pradesh Congress(R) Committee was critical of Siddaveerappa for having encouraged defections by "horse-trading", and suggested immediate elections to the Assembly.<sup>38</sup> The Board, after these hearings, was reported divided over whether the Party should or should not form the government. Under the circumstances, the Central Government decided to suspend the Legislative Assembly on March 27, 1971.

On April 9, the Congress(R) leadership in New Delhi decided not to form the government in Mysore and accordingly advised Siddaveerappa to stop his efforts to keep the "opportunists" together.<sup>39</sup> On April 14, the President dissolved the Assembly ~~by~~ a report from the Governor to the effect that no stable ministry was possible in Mysore.

There was hardly any critical voice against the President's action in Mysore. The Hindu, as usual, pondered:

It is hardly surprising that the Congress(R) seeks to cash in on its popularity at present, by relentlessly pressing on the erstwhile citadels of its rival. And with many of our politicians only too eager to get on the bandwagon, the outcome of these efforts is not hard to foresee, though the degree of resistance of the onslaught may differ from State to State.<sup>40</sup>

Mysore remained under President's Rule for almost a year. In the fresh elections held in March 1972, the Congress(R) won 165 of the 216 seats in the Assembly. The Congress(O) which had, at one time, such a strong hold over Mysore, could secure a bare 24 seats; many of its top leaders, including Virendra Patil, were defeated.

On March 20, 1972, Devaraj Urs, President of the Pradesh Congress Committee, was hand-picked by Mrs. Gandhi as the Chief Minister of the state despite the fact that he was not even a member of the Legislative Assembly. Mrs. Gandhi, it was reported, made the choice when the state Congress legislators asked for it. Later on, however, Devaraj was returned to the Assembly in a by-election.

The President's Rule was withdrawn on March 20. Throughout the period 1972-74, the Devaraj ministry, supported as it was by Mrs. Gandhi, remained stable in the state.

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Gujarat: May 13, 1971 - March 17, 1972

After the 1967 elections, the Congress had secured 92 of the 168 seats in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly and formed the government under the leadership of Hatindra Desai, a loyal supporter of Morarji Desai. During the Congress split, the Congress(R) made some half-hearted efforts to win over Hatindra Desai but it was completely unsuccessful in doing so. Gujarat, then, was such a stronghold of Morarji Desai that no member of

Mrs. Gandhi's camp could approach any of the Congress legislators there with any degree of confidence.

In March 1971 when the results of the parliamentary elections were still coming in, many of the followers of Hatindra Desai ran for cover. On March 30, his ministry lost its majority in the legislature, but within a week it regained its strength with the support of the Swatantra legislative group. The Swatantra Party had a strength of 64 members after the 1967 elections.

A new crisis for the ministry began when Jagjivan Ram, the first President of the Congress(R), visited Gujarat sometime in April-May 1971 and "openly assured his party's support to the rightist Swatantra to bring down the government of Hatindra Desai."<sup>41</sup> On May 10, seven Congress(O) members joined the Congress(R), and further defections in the next two days reduced the strength of the Congress(O) to 68 members. The same day, Hatindra Desai submitted the resignation of his cabinet and recommended to the Governor, Shriman Narayan (at one time, Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee), to dissolve the Assembly and hold elections while his ministry, Desai suggested, would remain in office as a caretaker government. The Governor refused to accept caretaking by the Hatindra Desai ministry during the elections and advised the President to take over the administration of the state. On May 13, 1971, presidential rule was declared and the Assembly dissolved.

Referring to the spectacle of Congress(O) governments falling one after another in Mysore and Gujarat (and in Uttar Pradesh too - discussed later), the Tribune exclaimed: "Congress (Oh!). It was "defection by instalments in Gujarat and elsewhere", it said, "with the traffic strictly one way". The shock of the general election, the Tribune reasoned, had been so great that the dominoes had begun to fall. And, the paper concluded:

"No wonder that Mr. S. K. Patil <sup>42</sup> [one of the leading members of the Syndicate] advocates vanaprasta [political exile in the woods - a reference to Indian mythology] for himself and his esteemed colleagues of the Syndicate." The Deccan Herald advised the Congress(R) against forming ministries in both Mysore and Gujarat and commented:

There is evident scope for the Congress(R) to form Ministries though whether it should form one in each of these States is a different question .... [Obviously], no Ministry in any of these States can be formed without the support of flat-footed floor-crossers, and though to a limited extent they [the floor-crossers] may be said to have performed a progressive role, the fact of their having defected only after the election results were announced suggests that the motivation was expediency and not principle, and no premium must be put on expedience.<sup>43</sup>

With the exception of Kuldip Nayar, who called the Gujarat crisis the consequence of Mrs. Gandhi's "toppling game",<sup>44</sup> and of the editor of the Economic and Political Weekly, who, agreeing with Nayar, commented that the Congress High Command of Mrs. Gandhi had used Chimanbhai Patel to lure defectors "on the promise of rich rewards",<sup>45</sup> there was not much criticism against President's Rule in Mysore.

Gujarat remained under presidential rule till March 1972. In the fresh elections, the Congress(R) was returned with a thumping majority of 139 in the 168-member Gujarat Assembly. On March 17, President's Rule was withdrawn when Ghanshyam Oza, the Union Minister of State for Industrial Development, was nominated by Mrs. Gandhi to be the Chief Minister of the state. Ghanshyam Oza was not at the time a member of the Gujarat Assembly, and he was elected to the Assembly, after becoming the Chief Minister, from a constituency in which the polling had been postponed.

Unlike in the case of Mysore, the Oza ministry did not last long. Ghanshyam Oza had no political base of his own in Gujarat and the net result was that there was an incumbency crisis in the state leading to his resignation on June 29, 1973. This crisis has been discussed in this



chapter under the category of "incumbency crises".

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Punjab: June 15, 1971 - March 15, 1972

After the 1967 elections, Punjab had four non-Congress ministries and one presidential dissolution. The first United Front ministry, headed by Gurnam Singh, was brought down by the Congress on November 22, 1967. This was followed by a Janata ministry headed by Lachhman Singh Gill and supported by the Congress (which had a strength of 47 members in the 104-member Punjab Legislative Assembly). The "puppet" government (as it was called) of Gill resigned on August 21, 1968 when the Congress withdrew its support from the ministry, thereby paving the way for the presidential rule which was declared on August 21, 1968. In the mid-term elections to the Assembly (February 1969), the Congress failed to secure a majority of seats (38/104), making it possible for the United Front headed by Gurnam Singh to form the government on February 17, 1969. On March 26, 1970, Gurnam Singh and some of his followers (Akali Dal) were disowned by their own party organization for hob-nobbing with the Congress(R). The next day, the Governor invited Prakash Singh Badal, the newly-elected leader of the Akali Dal, to form the government. The Badal ministry - an inconvenient partnership between the Akali Dal and the Jan Sangh - had a very precarious existence throughout its stay in office on account of frequent defections and counter-defections.

After the parliamentary elections, in which the Congress(R) won 10 of the 11 parliamentary seats from Punjab, the Badal ministry began wooing the Center and its leader, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In this politics of survival, Badal even refurbished the old conservative image of the Akali Dal in order to bring his party in line with the Congress(R) programs and policies.<sup>46</sup> However, on June 1, 1971, some members of the Akali Dal headed by Gurnam Singh defected from the Badal ministry and formed a

party of their own - Shiromani Akali Dal. On June 13, Prakash Singh Badal, realising that he was in a minority in the Assembly, requested the Governor, Dr. D. C. Pavate, to dissolve the Assembly. Two days later, the Governor dissolved the Assembly and thereafter advised the President to take over the administration of the state. President's Rule was proclaimed on June 15, 1971.

The action of the Governor in dissolving the Assembly on his own and later presenting the President with a fait accompli was the subject of debate in the press. While both the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Punjab Congress(R) said many unsavoury things about the Governor for having denied them the chance to form an alternative government,<sup>47</sup> the Searchlight pronounced Dr. D. C. Pavate as "an honest governor" who had taken a "constitutionally very correct step" even at the risk of hurting New Delhi. "A few Governors of Mr. Pavate's stature", said the paper, "and there would be much less of defections and buying and selling of legislators."<sup>48</sup>

However, the Searchlight's view was not shared by the Deccan Chronicle which declared that the Governor had "clearly acted in a hurry" and that it was a clear case "for the President to set aside the Governor's dissolution order." The paper further said that "if Governors are to act unconstitutionally, by presenting the President with a fait accompli, it will amount to undercutting the President's powers."<sup>49</sup>

In the fresh elections held in March 1972, the Congress(R) secured 66 of the 104 seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. On March 15, President's Rule was revoked when Giani Zail Singh was elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and invited by the Governor to form the government.

Giani Zail Singh, a close associate of Mrs. Gandhi since the Congress split, had a smooth sailing during the period 1972-74.

Presidential Rule(Dissolution) in W. Bengal: June 29, 1971 - March 17, 1972

West Bengal, the hot-bed of Marxists, had three ministries and three presidential rules between 1967 and 1970. The background of these three ministries and the type of crisis they were involved in is the following:

Chief Minister Tenure Party	Crises	Consequences
Ajoy Mukherji March-November, 1967 United Front (Leftist)	Congressization	Governor Dharam Vira dismissed the ministry and installed Dr. P. C. Ghosh (of the Progressive Democratic Front) as the Chief Minister of the state.
Dr. P. C. Ghosh November, 1967 - February, 1968 Progressive Democratic Front and the Congress	Structural	Presidential Rule (Dissolution) proclaimed on February 20, 1968 because of the structural crisis created by the Speaker of the Assembly.
Ajoy Mukherji February 1969 - March 1970 United Front (Leftist)	Structural	Presidential Rule (Suspension) proclaimed on March 19, followed by dissolution of the Assembly on July 30, 1970 under presidential rule because of the structural crisis created by the violent activities of the Marxists.

The Central Government decided to hold elections to the West Bengal State Assembly along with the parliamentary elections in March 1971. The Congress Party, which had secured 127 seats in 1967 and 55 seats in 1969 (mid-term elections) in the 280-member West Bengal Assembly, considerably improved its position in the 1971 elections but failed to secure a majority

in the Legislative Assembly. The party position in the Assembly was the following:

West Bengal Election Results  
1971

Name of the Party	Strength in the Assembly
Congress(R)	106
Congress(O)	2
United Front (Marxist)	125
United Front (Democratic Leftist, i.e., CPI, Forward Bloc, etc.)	25
Moslem League	7
Bangla Congress	5
Praja Socialists	3
Revolutionary Socialists	3
Others	4
Total:	280

Source: Kessing's Contemporary Archives, July 21-31, 1971:24723

On April 2, 1971, Ajoy Mukherji of the Bangla Congress formed a "Democratic coalition" government consisting of almost all the non-Marxist parties. B. S. Nahar of the Congress(R) became the Deputy Chief Minister in the Mukherji cabinet. In inviting Mukherji, the Governor, S. S. Dhawan, had rejected the claim of Jyoti Basu (Marxist) who had asked the Governor to invite him to form the government because his group constituted the "largest" group in the Assembly.

By June 1971, the ill-assorted "Democratic coalition" began disintegrating. On June 6, three of the five members of the Bangla Congress formed an independent group in the Assembly and, by June 14, the strength of the coalition was reduced to 140 members in the 280-member Assembly. Anticipating the danger of Marxists forming the government with the support of defectors, both the Governor and the Deputy

Chief Minister visited New Delhi for consultation and advice. On June 25, the Governor dissolved the Assembly and on June 29 - barely three months after the elections - the President took over the administration of the state.

The secrecy and the haste in dissolving the Assembly and in imposing presidential rule without exploring the possibility of an alternative government was critically documented by the Economic and Political Weekly:

The extreme haste and total secrecy with which New Delhi had the formal procedure for dissolving the State Assembly completed within a few hours, between dusk and midnight of June 25, betray the nervousness of the Grand Mughuls / Mughuls were the Emperors of India prior to the British / lest the subah / province / of West Bengal pass back to a Left coalition headed by CP(M). By the evening Eoing flight, an apparently ailing Governor Dnawan, with a physician in attendance, was despatched from New Delhi to Calcutta to sign the requisite document. Union Education Minister S. S. Ray was made to accompany the State's Deputy Chief Minister B. S. Nahar, in order to persuade Ajoy Mukherji to sign on the dotted line the letter to the Governor 'advising' him to dissolve the Assembly.<sup>50</sup>

West Bengal remained under presidential rule till March 17, 1972. In the elections to the State Assembly held in March 1972, the Congress(R) swept the polls by securing 216 of the 280 seats in the Assembly. The elections wrote the epitaph of the Marxists, who could secure a bare 14 seats. Mrs. Gandhi nominated S. S. Ray, the Union Minister of Education and Bengal Affairs, as the Chief Minister of the state. Being a confidant of Mrs. Gandhi, S. S. Ray was firmly in the saddle during the period under analysis.

Presidential Rule(Dissolution) in Bihar: January 9 - March 19, 1972

After the 1967 elections, Bihar had six ministries and two presidential rules by December 1970. The background of these ministries and

the type of crisis they were involved in is the following:

Chief Minister Tenure Party	Crises	Consequences
Mahamaya P. Sinha March 1967 - January 1968 United Front	Congressization	Congress sets up a "puppet" government under the leadership of B. P. Mandal.
B. P. Mandal February 1968 - March 1968 United Front (Congress-supported)	Congressization	Mandal's ministry falls on account of the rift in the Congress Party.
Bhola P. Shastri March 1968 - June 1968 United Front	Congressization	Shastri resigns in the wake of defections to the Congress. <u>President's Rule (Dissolution)</u> on 29.6.68.
Harihar Singh February 1969 - June 1969 Congress coalition	Congressization	Harihar Singh's ministry falls.
Bhola P. Shastri June 1969 - July 1969 United Front	Congressization	Shastri resigned because of the problems over cabinet formation; <u>President's Rule (Suspension)</u> on 4.7.69.
Daroga P. Rai February 1970 - December 1970 (Congress(R) coalition	Congressization	Mrs. Gandhi's Government defeated in the Parliament, leading to fall of the Rai ministry on 18.12.70.

On December 22, 1970, a United Front of 11 parties headed by Kapoori Thakur (of the Samyukta Socialist Party) formed the government. With Congress(R) gaining 39 of the 53 seats from Bihar in the parliamentary elections, the pace of defections from the Thakur ministry to the Congress(R) accelerated and the ministry fell on June 1, 1971. Nine days later, a Congress(R) coalition of eight parties headed by Bhola P. Shastri

(Independent) formed the government. The opportunity was given to Shastri because (a) the Congress(R) was still weak in the Assembly (84/318); and (b) Mrs. Gandhi did not have any specific, trustworthy, group or leader in Bihar to rely on.

In the last week of December 1971 Mrs. Gandhi summoned Bhola P. Shastri to New Delhi and asked him to resign. Shastri, Economic and Political Weekly commented,

was left no choice. Shastri returned to Patna, somewhat crestfallen, convened an emergency meeting of the Cabinet and having done his bit to assuage the temper of his colleagues, rushed to the Raj Bhawan / Governor's House to hand in his resignation ... Like the Bourbons the Congress High Command cared little for constitutional niceties.<sup>51</sup>

On December 27, the Shastri ministry resigned and on January 9, 1972, the President took over the administration of the state. But for some protests from the Bihar opposition leaders - one legislator of the Socialist Party filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court praying that the Governor be restrained from acting on the "illegal and unconstitutional" advice of the Chief Minister, but the petition was rejected - who characterized the resignation of the Chief Minister as "action under duress", there was no serious criticism of the Governor's or President's action.

In March 1972, elections to the 318-member Bihar Legislative Assembly returned the Congress(R) with 167 seats. As the state leadership of the Congress(R) was divided on the choice of Chief Minister, the question was referred to Mrs. Gandhi, who nominated Kedar Pande to lead the Party. On March 19, President's Rule was withdrawn and the Pande ministry was sworn into office.

However, Kedar Pande ran into an incumbency crisis in July 1973 and was replaced by Abdul Ghafoor. The crisis has been discussed in this chapter under the category of "incumbency crises".

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Orissa: March 3, 1973 - March 6, 1974

After the 1967 elections, a Swatantra-Jana Congress coalition ministry under the leadership of R. N. Singh Deo stayed in office till January 9, 1971. Two days later, the Assembly was suspended and on January 22 dissolved when the proposed alliance between the Congress(R) and a few other parties failed to materialize.

The elections to the Orissa Legislative Assembly was held along with the parliamentary elections in March 1971. The party position in the Assembly after the elections was the following:

Orissa Election Results, 1971

Name of the Party	Strength in the Assembly
Congress(R)	52
Congress(O)	1
Utkal Congress	32
Swatantra	36
CPI	4
Jharkhand	4
PSP	4
CP(Marxist)	2
Others	5

Total: 140

Source: Kessing's Contemporary Archives, July 24-31, 1971: 24721

On March 21, 1971, the Governor, Dr. S. S. Ansari, invited Harekrushna Mahatab (a former Congress Chief Minister, 1956-61) of the Congress(R) to form the government, but Mahatab failed to do so because he could not congressize the Utkal Congress, which was willing to enter into a coalition but unwilling to merge with the Congress(R). Thereafter, the Utkal Congress formed a United Front with the Swatantra and the Jharkhand parties. On April 3, Biswanath Das, who was not a member of



any Party or of the Assembly, was elected leader of the United Front and invited by the Governor to form the government.

The Biswanath ministry worked well for over a year but defections from the ministry started after the "Indira wave" swept the polls in the elections to the State Assemblies in March 1972. On June 9, 1972, the Utkal Congress withdrew from the United Front on the promise from New Delhi that it would be absorbed in the Congress(R). The same day, B. Das submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor. On June 14, the Congress(R), whose strength in the Assembly had risen to 94 members, formed the government under the leadership of Mrs. Nandini Satpathi. Mrs. Satpathi (a former card-carrying member of the Communist Party) was the Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting and was nominated by Mrs. Gandhi to the post.

After the formation of the government, the Congress(R) refused to admit six of the 32 members of the Utkal Congress. Among those who were refused admission to the Congress(R) was the leader of the Utkal Congress, Biju Patnaik (a former Chief Minister of Orissa, 1961-63; co-author of the Kamaraj Plan; and, at one time, very close to Nehru). By November 1972, Biju Patnaik formed a Pragti (Progressive) Front and asked the Utkal Congress and other parties to join the Front in order to dislodge the Congress(R) from power. Mrs. Satpathi, who had no political base in the state, was also finding it difficult to control some of the members of the Congress(R) Legislative Party, particularly Hare Krushna Mahatab. In fact, each time Mahatab exhibited some non-cooperation with Mrs. Satpathi, the government threatened him with action on the basis of Justice Sarjoo Prasad's inquiry report which had confirmed charges of corruption against Mahatab while he was the Chief Minister of the state.

By March 1, 1973, the Satpathi ministry lost its majority to the Pragti Front which claimed a strength of 72 members in the Assembly which then had an effective strength of 139 members. However, before the Assembly was to meet on March 1, to consider the Appropriation Bill for 1972-73, the Governor prorogued it and wrote to the President to take over the administration of the state. A presidential proclamation dissolving the Assembly was issued on March 3, 1973.

In his report to the President, the Governor accepted the contention of Biju Patnaik that he commanded the support of 70 to 72 members of the Legislative Assembly but said:

Looking to the previous history of the legislators in this State and also the history of the legislators after the General Elections in 1971, it is very clear that there is no guarantee that the present majority claimed by Shri Biju Patnaik and his supporters will remain stable, and if a Ministry is allowed to be formed under the leadership of Shri Patnaik, the said Ministry may not remain for a long time.<sup>53</sup>

On a writ petition filed by Biju Patnaik and 73 others against the presidential proclamation, the Orissa High Court, in its judgement on October 22, 1973, dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not "justiciable" under the Constitution.<sup>54</sup>

In the fresh elections to the State Assembly held on February 22-26, 1974, the Congress(R) secured 69 of the 140 seats in the Assembly. Although no party had an absolute majority, the Governor, B. D. Jatti (a former Chief Minister of Mysore), invited Mrs. Nandini Satpathi to form the government, which she did with the support of the 7-member Communist Party of India on March 6, 1974. Presidential rule, which was in force since March 3, 1973, was revoked the same day.

The first session of the Assembly opened with unprecedented brick-bats when some members of the Pragti Front - a coalition of Utkal Congress, Swatantra, and the SSP with a total strength of 57 members in the Assembly -

shouted down the Governor's address as a protest against his action in inviting Mrs. Satpathi to form the government. The Governor read only the first paragraph of his address and "slipped" away from the "tumultuous" Assembly. <sup>55</sup>

Presidential Rule (Dissolution) in Manipur: March 28, 1973 - March 4, 1974

Manipur, a Union Territory, was granted the status of full statehood by the 27th Amendment to the Indian Constitution in December 1971. Between 1967 and 1971, Manipur had experienced two presidential rules. The 30-member Manipur Assembly was suspended for about four months in October 1967, but the suspension was revoked when the Congress returned to power in February 1968. In October 1969, the Congress ministry fell and the Assembly was dissolved by a presidential proclamation.

In the fresh elections to the 60-member Legislative Assembly in March 1972, the party-position in the Assembly was: Congress(R), 17; Manipur People's Party (MPP), 15; CPI, 5; Socialists, 3; United Naga Integration Council (UNIC), 3; Congress(O), 1; Independents, 16.

On March 20, Mohammed Alimuddin (of the MPP) formed the government in coalition with all the non-Congress(R) parties and Independents. President's Rule, which had been in force since October 16, 1969, was withdrawn the same day.

The Alimuddin ministry stayed in office for almost a year. On March 15, 1973, nine of the 16 independent members of the Assembly joined hands with the Congress(R) and the CPI under the leadership of A. Dai Ho of the Congress(R) to displace the Alimuddin ministry. On March 26, Alimuddin submitted the resignation of his cabinet while the Assembly was debating a vote of no-confidence in his government. While A. Dai Ho was making frantic efforts to keep the nine independent members together,

the Governor, B. K. Nehru, advised the President to suspend and not dissolve the Assembly in view of the "strong desire of the people" of Manipur. At the same time, the Governor said, "the history of Manipur does not encourage the hope that fresh elections will prove to be a solution to our ills" <sup>56</sup> if the Assembly is dissolved under President's rule.

However, on March 28, 1973, the President, instead of suspending the Assembly, dissolved it on the ground that Manipur was a border state where any instability would be dangerous.

Manipur remained under presidential rule for almost a year. In the mid-term polls held on February 18-23, 1974, the Congress(R), once again, sustained a stinging defeat. The position of the various parties in the Assembly was:

#### Manipur Election Results, 1974

Name of the Party	Strength in the Assembly
Manipur People's Party (MPP)	20
Manipur Hills Union (MHU)	12
Kuki National Assembly (KNA)	2
Congress (R)	13
CPI	6
Socialists	2
Independents	5
Total: 60	

Source: Kessing's Contemporary Archives, April 22-28, 1974: 26480.

On March 4, 1974, Mohammed Alimuddin (MPP) formed the government in coalition with the MHU and the KNA. These three parties, i.e., the MPP, the MHU, and the KNA, had concluded an electoral alliance for the elections of 1974.

On July 8, 1974, the Alimuddin ministry resigned after the MHU withdrew from the coalition to join the Progressive Democratic Front

constituted by the Congress(R) and the CPI. Two days later, the Front formed the government under the leadership of Yangmaso Shaiza(MHU).

However, the Congress(R) was unhappy with the Front for having been given inadequate representation in the Council of Ministers. On December 1, 1974, the Congress(R) withdrew from the Front and formed a coalition government with the MPP and the CPI under the leadership of Rajkumar Dorendra Singh of the Congress(R).<sup>57</sup> Rajkumar D. Singh was sworn in office on December 6, 1974.

Thus, Manipur, which started out with the opposition parties in power in March 1974, came under the rule of the Congress(R) before the year was out.

Presidential Rule(Dissolution) in Pondicherry: January 3 - March 6, 1974

The Union Territory of Pondicherry had experienced one presidential rule since 1967. The Congress which was returned with a strength of 15 members in the 30-member Pondicherry Assembly in the 1967 elections remained in office under the leadership of M.O.H. Farook Maricar, later of V. V. Reddiar, till September 11, 1968. On September 18, the Assembly was dissolved under a presidential proclamation when the Congress ministry lost the majority in the Assembly.

In the mid-term polls held on March 9, 1969, the DMK, which secured 15 seats, formed a coalition government with the 3-member CPI under the leadership of M.O.H. Farook Maricar(DMK) on March 17, 1969. There were two Independents and ten Congressmen who formed the opposition in the 30-member Assembly.

The Maricar ministry worked well for almost five years. Both the DMK and the CPI were pro-Mrs. Gandhi since the Congress split with the result that the Center simply did not care to meddle in the Pondicherry politics. There was some element of strain on the ministry when the only

Communist Minister, V. K. Subbiah(Health), resigned from office on March 26, 1973, but the ministry survived with the firm support of the Independent members.<sup>58</sup>

On December 28, 1973, three members of the DMK, including two ministers, withdrew their support to the ministry and formed an independent group in the Assembly known as Annadurai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam(ADMK). Two days later, the Chief Minister submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Lieutenant-Governor with the request that the Assembly be dissolved and fresh elections held. On January 3, 1974, President's Rule was introduced in Pondicherry after New Delhi rejected the request of M.O.H. Farook Maricar to stay on as a caretaking Chief Minister during the forthcoming elections in the Territory.

It is rather difficult to know whether the three members who withdrew their support from the Maricar ministry acted on their own or on persuasion from other groups or parties. It may well be that the split in the Tamil Nadu DMK had a contagion effect on the DMK in Pondicherry. However, the rejection of Maricar's request to continue as the caretaking Chief Minister was quite in line with New Delhi's policy not to accept caretaking by the non-Congress parties during elections.<sup>59</sup>

Presidential Rule(Dissolution) in Pondicherry: March 28, 1974 -

After the resignation of the Maricar ministry and the dissolution of the Assembly under a presidential proclamation on January 3, 1974, Pondicherry went to the polls on February 24, 1974. The result of the elections was: ADMK, 12; Congress(R), 7; Congress(O), 5; DMK, 2; CPI, 2; CPI(Marxist), 1; and Independent, 1.

On March 6, 1974, S. Ramaswamy of the ADMK formed a coalition government with the CPI and the CPI(Marxist) while one Independent member joined the ADMK. Presidential rule, which was in force since January 3, 1974,

was revoked the same day.

The Ramaswamy ministry, with a total strength of 16 members in the 30-member Assembly, had a precarious existence for the 21 days that it was in office. On March 21, Ramaswamy appointed the only Marxist to his Council of Ministers. This resulted not only in the withdrawal of the only Independent member from his group but also in the uniting of the Congress(R), the Congress(O), and the DMK in a bid to overthrow the government. On March 27, the Ramaswamy ministry was defeated by one vote while the Assembly was debating the annual budget. The Government resigned the same day and President's Rule, dissolving the Assembly, followed the next day. <sup>60</sup>

No elections were held to the Pondicherry Assembly till the end of 1974.

Temporal comparisons of Congressization crises: 1971-74

"Mend or End" was the message which New Delhi seemed to have conveyed to the non-Congress(R) state governments after the parliamentary elections of 1971. The Mysore and Gujarat governments, the bastions of Congress(O), were too late to mend themselves and as such had to be ended. While in Mysore, the psychological fear of the "Indira wave" drove the Congress(O) into disarray, in Gujarat the Congress(R), with all its leftist image, was willing to support even the Swatantra Party - a Party with a conservative and rightist outlook - to dismantle Hatindra Desai's Congress(O) ministry. President's Rule was imposed in both states within two months of the declaration of returns of parliamentary elections.

In Punjab, the Badal ministry resigned when some members of his Akali Dal, led by Gurnam Singh, withdrew their support to the ministry, but the Congress(R) abetted in the fall of the ministry by supporting Gurnam Singh for the Chief Ministership. If the Governor, Dr. D. C. Pavate, acted

in haste in dissolving the Assembly without giving a chance to Gurnam Singh to form the government, Gurnam Singh was amply rewarded by New Delhi with an ambassadorial appointment, though he died in an air crash before he could take up his new assignment.

Both in the case of West Bengal and Bihar, New Delhi got the resignations of the ministries on asking. The New Delhi emissary, S. S. Ray, accompanied the Governor and the Deputy Chief Minister from New Delhi to Calcutta to make the West Bengal Chief Minister, Ajoy Mukherji, sign on the dotted line and, in the case of Bihar, the Chief Minister, Bhola Paswan Shastri, had simply to be called to New Delhi to be told to return to Patna to submit the resignation of his ministry.

The crises in Orissa, Manipur, and Pondicherry occurred after the Congress(R) swept the state polls in 1972. In Orissa, the United Front ministry led by Bishwanath was brought down in June 1972 when the Congress (R) formed the government by congressizing the Utkal Congress. However, Mrs. Nandini Satpathi could hold back neither the adventurous Biju Patnaik nor the ambitious Hare Krushna Mahatab by constantly threatening to expose their corrupt practices before the public. While the excited Biju Patnaik and his newly formed Pragti Party awaited a call from the Governor when the Satpathi ministry lost its majority in the Assembly on March 1, 1973, he, along with 73 of his supporters, ended up petitioning the Orissa High Court against the presidential proclamation of March 3, 1973. Once again, the message from New Delhi was: "Mend or End".

Manipur was a problem state for the Congress(R) after the Congress split. Even after having been granted the status of full statehood in December 1971, the people of Manipur did not return the Congress(R) to a majority in the Assembly elections of 1972. By March 1973, the Congress(R)



brought the downfall of the Alimuddin ministry (non-Congress coalition) and President's Rule was declared to dissolve the Assembly, contrary to the advice of the Governor, B. K. Nehru, who had pleaded for the suspension of the Assembly. The Alimuddin ministry came to power, once again, after the mid-term polls in 1974 but within four months it could not survive the onslaught of the Congress(R). The process of congressization was gradual - from Alimuddin to Shaiza to Singh of the Congress(R) - but systematic and certain.

In Pondicherry, the DMK-CPI Maricar ministry had come to power after the mid-term elections to the Assembly in 1969. A little over one month before the elections were due to take place in 1974, New Delhi refused to accept Maricar as the caretaking Chief Minister during the election period and declared President's Rule in the Territory on January 3, 1974. However, since the Congress(R) failed to form the government after the elections, it cooperated even with the Congress(O) to bring down the 21-day old Ramaswamy ministry. President's Rule was declared, once more, on March 28, 1974 and the Assembly was dissolved.

In all ten cases of presidential rule, involving seven states - Mysore, Gujarat, Punjab, West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Manipur - and the Union Territory of Pondicherry, the emphasis was on dissolving rather than suspending the Assemblies (the Mysore Assembly was the only one suspended for a while). The Congress(R) in New Delhi seemed to be in no mood to compromise with or cajole the opposition parties, because it was reasonably certain of its victory at the polls after the Assemblies were dissolved. It could have, for example, formed the government in Orissa after the 1971 elections to the State Assembly but refused to coalesce with the Utkal Congress. The Utkal Congress, New Delhi suggested,

must dissolve itself and become a part of the Congress(R) - a condition the former accepted a year later. Manipur, perhaps, was the only state where the Congress(R) accepted the cushion of the non-Congress parties to come to power after two successive elections in 1972 and 1974 had failed to return the Congress(R) in a majority position in the Assembly. Generally speaking, the preceding era (1967-71), which was marked by congressization through the winding process - using "puppet" governments, presidential suspensions, State Governors, etc. - seemed to be over the day the parliamentary election results were out. If the long arm of New Delhi did not touch the Congress(R)-CPI coalition in Kerala or the DMK government in Tamil Nadu, it was because of the special relations that existed between the CPI, DMK and New Delhi. 61

Congressization in other states:

While the governments in the seven states and in Pondicherry were ended or mended, the United Front government in Uttar Pradesh, which had come to power on October 18, 1970 under the leadership of T. N. Singh, virtually "melted away" within hours of the declaration of parliamentary election results, making it possible for Kamalapati Tripathi, the trusted lieutenant of Mrs. Gandhi, to form a Congress(R) ministry. Had Tripathi not been in a position to form the government, the alternative scenario probably would have been no different from what we noted in the case of the seven states. In 1972, New Delhi asked Tripathi if he would like to hold a mid-term poll in the state (elections were due in March 1974) in order to benefit from the "Indira Halwa" (a typical Indian sweet dish which, in the present context, signified success for all those who were served this dish by Mrs. Gandhi); but Tripathi, then firmly in the saddle after a long and frustrating wait and fight with the Congress(O) in the state,

declined the offer.

Thus, generally speaking, the attitude of the Center toward all the non-Congress state governments except Tamil Nadu and Kerala was negative. In fact, the "Indira wave" was so strong that it would have been politically naive for the Congress(R) not to take advantage of it. In the process of change-over from the non-Congress state governments to the Congress(R) governments, those of the non-Congress parties which refused to read the writing on the wall were brought down and placed under President's Rule.

#### STRUCTURAL CRISES:

#### Presidential Rule(Dissolution) in Tripura: November 1, 1971 - March 25, 1972

Tripura, an area of 4,000 square miles with a population of 160,000, bulges out from the foothold of Assam into Bangladesh and as such has been of great strategic importance to the Center. A former princely state, Tripura had been governed as a Union Territory since 1957. In December 1971, the Territory was granted the status of full statehood along with Meghalaya and Manipur.

After the 1967 elections, the party-position in the 30-member Tripura Assembly was: Congress, 27; CPI 1; CPI(Marxist), 2. Sukhamoy Sengupta was elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Territory after the elections.

Since the summer of 1970, Tripura was said to be in the grip of terrorist activities allegedly incited and supported by East Pakistan. In July 1970, the border security forces captured 31 and killed six saboteurs who had entered the Territory from East Pakistan and attacked three border villages. "Documents seized from those captured were reported to have revealed that they had received specific instructions from the Pakistan authorities to sabotage road communications, blow up bridges, ambush army

convoys and stimulate the moribund secessionist movement." Despite a protest from the Government of India to the Government of Pakistan, the Naga and Mizo rebels continued to receive training in sabotage and jungle warfare from across the border in East Pakistan.

The problem of maintaining law and order in the Territory increased with the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan in September-October, 1971. With the civil administration unable to control the situation and the army needing a free hand in anticipation of the war with Pakistan, the Center asked the Sengupta ministry to resign, which it did on November 1, 1971. President's Rule was introduced the same day.

On March 27, 1973, Sukhamoy Sengupta became the Chief Minister of the state after the Congress secured 41 seats in the re-elected 60-member Legislative Assembly. The strength of the other parties was: CPI(Marist), 16; CPI, 1; and Independent, 2.

Presidential Rule(Suspension) in Andhra: January 18 - December 10, 1973

The state of Andhra came into existence in 1953 by separating eleven Telugu-speaking districts from Madras. In 1956, nine Telengana districts of Hyderabad - a princely state governed by a Muslim Nizam(Ruler) - were merged with Andhra Pradesh under the Reorganization of States Act 1956. Under the Mulki(native) Rules 1919 framed by the then Nizam, government posts and admissions to the educational institutions in Hyderabad were reserved for persons who had been born in the princely state or had been in residence for a period of 15 years. With the merger of Hyderabad with Andhra Pradesh, these rules were retained in a modified form.

Though the residents of the Telengana districts of Hyderabad had been agitating since 1968 against the non-implementation of Mulki Rules, their agitation was generally peaceful and non-violent. In 1969, demands were made for the separation of Telengana districts from the Andhra Pradesh

and their constitution into an independent state within the Indian Union, but Mrs. Gandhi, in the midst of problems associated with the Congress split, pacified the separatists by giving their region handsome loans and grants from the Center.<sup>64</sup>

After the parliamentary elections in 1971, the separatists, once again, pressed their demand for a separate Telengana state. A Committee known as Telengana Praja Samiti, consisting of, among others, 28 members of the Congress Legislative Party and 10 members of the Parliament from the Telengana region, began negotiating with the Center on the issue. In September 1971, Mrs. Gandhi fragmented their demand when she (a) nominated P. V. Narasimha Rao of the Telengana region as the Chief Minister of the state in place of K. Brahmananda Reddy, who was later brought into the Union Cabinet as a Minister of Home Affairs; and (b) moderated and modified the Mulki Rules so as to make their application restricted only to the non-gazetted and junior posts. With compromises all worked out, Andhra returned the Congress(R) with an absolute majority of 165 members in the 287-member Legislative Assembly in the state elections of 1972.

After the elections, the Telengana Praja Samiti revived its demand for an independent Telengana state within the Indian Union. It was now up to the Andhra region to react. In November 1972, the students in the Andhra region began their agitation for the abolition of Mulki Rules which, they feared, limited their employment opportunities. A general strike, observed in almost all the towns in the Andhra region on November 21, was accompanied by violent attacks on railway property. The police opened fire in three towns, killing 12 people. Two days later, the Telengana region went on a strike, resulting in disturbances which the army alone could control. In this violent environment nine members of the Narasimha cabinet from the Andhra region asked the permission of the

Congress(R) President to resign from the cabinet. On December 9, 1972, all nine ministers, except one who died, resigned contrary to the advice from New Deputy Prime Minister Y. B. Chavan, then Finance Minister in the Union Cabinet, who deplored the participation of Congress members either for or against "regional and parochial movements."<sup>65</sup>

On December 31, 1972, a conference attended by 11 Congress members of the Parliament and 97 members of the Andhra Legislative Assembly formed an Andhra Action Committee to work for the separation of Andhra from the Telengana region, and called on the people to paralyze the government by refusing to pay taxes, etc. From January 6 to January 17, 1973, a conservative estimate put the number of those killed by police fire at 35. The army was called out to maintain law and order but, despite dawn to dusk curfew in many towns, power and water connections were sabotaged and all the business came to a standstill. In view of the total breakdown of administration, the Chief Minister submitted the resignation of his cabinet on January 17. Presidential Rule, suspending the Assembly, was declared in the state the next day.

Though disturbances continued in the state till the end of March 1973, Mrs. Gandhi refused to accede to the demand of dividing Andhra Pradesh. On December 10, 1973, the presidential suspension was withdrawn and J. Vengal Rao, another nominee of Mrs. Gandhi, formed the government after a six-point formula was accepted by both the Andhra and the Telengana regional leaders.

#### Presidential Rule(Suspension) in Uttar Pradesh: June 13 - November 8, 1973

The country witnessed "the most determined act of insurrection" on the part of the Provincial Armed Constabulary(PAC) in Uttar Pradesh on May 22-24, 1973, in support of their demand for higher salaries. Earlier in March, the PAC had insisted on forming a trade union of constables, but

the Uttar Pradesh government had refused permission to the PAC to unionise the constabulary. The PAC in Uttar Pradesh has a total strength of 40,000 constables and its armouries are located in big cities and towns all over the state. Originally, the British had created this para-military force to combat robberies but the force was now mainly used to assist the police authorities in suppressing serious riots.

On May 14, some 1,000 constables belonging to the PAC were posted on the campus of Lucknow University to protect the University buildings and staff from the students' violence. A week later, the PAC demanded to be withdrawn from the campus and staged a joint demonstration with the students, who had already burned down several of the University buildings. The army moved in when the PAC refused to guard the buildings.

In anticipation of the insurrection on the part of the PAC, the army attempted to take over all the PAC armouries in Uttar Pradesh on May 22. Though the army did not meet with any resistance at most of these places, gun battles were fought between the army and the PAC in Kanpur, Ramnagar, Lucknow, Gorakhpur, and Jehangirabad. It was officially stated that 20 PAC men had been killed, 379 arrested, and that 600 deserters were missing.

While the national press, generally speaking, deplored the deterioration in the law and order situation in the country, the Economic and Political Weekly warned:

It would be naive to think that the police and the para-military forces are not aware of their enhanced importance to the political authorities .... They may not have read Marx or Mao, but they do have a general idea of what is at stake when the political rulers tell them to kill off half a dozen young men / probably, reference to the Lucknow University students / in such a manner as to make it appear like an 'encounter' between the police and the young men.<sup>67</sup>

The Lucknow riots and the PAC mutiny led to demands from dissident sections of the Congress Legislative Party for the resignation of the government. Though Kamalapati Tripathi, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh,

stated on May 31 that the law and order situation in the state was normal, a series of meetings between the Congress dissidents and Mrs. Gandhi convinced the latter that the government had to go in order to re-establish the credibility of her Party - more so when the elections to the State Assembly were due to take place in February 1974 - as a united and cohesive force in the state. After Mrs. Gandhi told Tripathi to resign and ask for presidential rule (suspension), Tripathi submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor on June 12, 1973. In his letter of resignation, Tripathi said:

We feel that the requirements of the situation would be better served if this responsibility is undertaken by the Centre which can achieve the desired results more quickly and effectively with its greater resources and expertise. The sharp psychological change which direct Central involvement should bring about will help in the speedy cleansing of the remaining cobwebs of indiscipline.<sup>68</sup>

On June 13, the Assembly was suspended. However, on November 8, 1973, the presidential proclamation of suspension was withdrawn when Mrs. Gandhi nominated H. N. Bahugana, Union Minister of Communication, to be the Chief Minister of the state. Kamalapati Tripathi was later accommodated by Mrs. Gandhi in her own Cabinet as the Minister of Shipping and Transport.

The elections to the State Assembly held in February 1974 returned the Congress(R) with 215 seats in the 425-member Assembly. H. N. Bahugana continued to be the Chief Minister of the state after the elections.

#### Temporal comparisons of Structural crises: 1971-74

A comparative study of all the three cases of structural crises tends to show that the presidential intervention was a matter of necessity in each case. In the Union Territory of Tripura, the Center had to dissolve the Assembly in anticipation of the Bangladesh war. Besides the fact that



the Territory was contiguous to East Pakistan, it was already in the grip of terrorist activities which had increased all the more with the influx of a large number of refugees from across the border. The Assembly was dissolved and not suspended because (a) New Delhi could not probably calculate with any amount of exactness how long the war was likely to last or what kinds of problems were likely to crop up both during and after the war; and (b) the elections to the Assembly were in any case due in four months' time, i.e., in March 1972 when the Assembly had to be dissolved and re-elected.

In the case of Andhra Pradesh, the presidential suspension came not a day too early. The Andhra administrative machinery was completely paralyzed because of the separatist movement, first in Telengana and then in the Andhra region, and there was little hope for the Narasimha ministry to survive the crisis, more so when some of the Congress(R) members of the Andhra Legislature were privy to the movement. The suspension of the ministry and the Assembly not only enabled the Center to restore law and order in the state but also to seal off intra-party conflicts. Had the Assembly been dissolved and not suspended, the chances are that the Congress(R) in Andhra would have split between the Telengana legislators (who, in all probability would have joined the Congress(O) which was agitating for a separate Telengana) and the Andhra legislators.

The situation in the Uttar Pradesh was bad but, here again, presidential suspension, as in the case of Andhra Pradesh, served the twin objectives of (a) restoring law and order in the state; and (b) freezing the intra-party conflicts. By nominating H. N. Bahugana in place of Kamalapati Tripathi as the Chief Minister of the state, Mrs. Gandhi was able to re-unite the various factions within the Uttar Pradesh Congress

so that her Party could present a united picture in the forthcoming elections to the State Assembly due in February 1974.

Thus, presidential suspension both in the case of Andhra and Uttar Pradesh was used primarily to resolve structural crises, but in the process of resolution the Center could also settle intra-party conflicts. Suspension brought the discontented legislators from each state to New Delhi (the dissolution of the Assemblies would have sent them to the Electorate), which made the task of reconciling the warring factions easier for Mrs. Gandhi. The net advantage that accrued to Mrs. Gandhi was that she was able not only to re-establish her Party in each of the states but also to replace the Chief Ministers by her own nominees: J. Vengal Rao in Andhra and H. N. Bahugana in Uttar Pradesh.

#### INCUMBENCY CRISES:

Presidential Rule in Gujarat: (a) Suspension: February 9 - March 15, 1974

(b) Dissolution: March 15, 1974 -

Gujarat, the home state of Morarji Desai, had already experienced President's Rule on May 13, 1971 when the Congress(O) ministry led by Hatindra Desai was dissolved due to a congressization crisis. In the fresh elections to the Assembly held in March 1972, the Congress(R) returned with a strong majority of 139 in the 168-member Assembly. On March 17, 1972, presidential rule was revoked when Ghanshyam Oza, the Union Minister of State for Industrial Development, formed the government after having been nominated by Mrs. Gandhi as the Chief Minister of the state.

In nominating Ghanshyam Oza, Mrs. Gandhi had tactfully subverted the move on the part of three factional leaders in the Gujarat Congress Legislative Party - Chimanbhai Patel, Ratubhai Adani, and Kantilal Ghia -

to hold an open contest for the office of the Chief Ministership. However, by doing so, Mrs. Gandhi could not hold back the ambitious Chimanbhai Patel, who had done everything and anything "on the ground" since his entry into politics to become the Chief Minister of the state. Morarji Desai had used Patel to bring down the Jivraj Mehta ministry in 1963 much to the embarrassment of Nehru (chapter II, pp. 50-51), but Patel was denied the fruit of his labour when Dr. Balwantrao Mehta became the Chief Minister of the state. In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi had used Patel to dismantle the Hatindra Desai ministry but, once again, he was deprived of the opportunity to lead the government when Mrs. Gandhi nominated Ghanshyam Oza to head the new government.

Enough was enough. In June 1973, 70 members of the Congress Legislative Party led by Chimanbhai Patel announced their opposition to the continuation of Ghanshyam Oza as the leader of the Congress Legislative Party. "They had been assembled by Patel", as John R. Wood described, "at the luxurious Panchayati farm, owned by a rich businessman-farmer about 15 miles from Ahmedabad. It was widely rumoured that the average price of defection for dissident M.L.As. was Rs.75,000 / \$10,000 approximately <sup>69</sup> 7." Even before this June revolt, Ghanshyam Oza, who was keeping New Delhi informed about the party squabbles, had requested Mrs. Gandhi to permit him to resign from office as early as March 1973 but the Prime Minister had refused to concede to his request. Now that the Patel faction was out to get Oza, the Chief Minister submitted the resignation of his cabinet on June 29. Explaining the reasons for his resignation, Oza said:

I am indebted to my friends in the Gujarat Congress Legislative party who invited me here unanimously on the suggestion of the Prime Minister .... I had expressed my desire to resign as Chief Minister in writing to the Congress Parliamentary Board as far back as March 20 last when the intra-party quarrels had deepened, but I did not get the consent of the High Command.<sup>70</sup>

On July 18, Chimanbhai Patel became the Chief Minister of the state despite Mrs. Gandhi.

The jubilant Chimanbhai tried to win over Mrs. Gandhi - he was rumoured to have collected about forty million rupees to help Mrs. Gandhi finance the upcoming elections in her home state, i.e., Uttar Pradesh<sup>71</sup> - but she was never to forgive him for forcing out her nominee, Ghanshyam Oza. While the storm was gathering against the Chimanbhai ministry on charges of corruption, New Delhi spared no time in accelerating a massive discontent among the Gujarati people by cutting off substantial food allotments to the already food-deficit state. The monthly instalment of grains from the Center to the state fell from 105,000 tons in June 1973 to about 35,000 tons in November 1973.<sup>72</sup> Chimanbhai Patel resigned on February 9, 1974 after a seventy-three-day agitation marked by food riots which left 103 people dead, 310 injured, and 8,237 arrested. Explaining the reasons for his resignation, Chimanbhai said that New Delhi wanted persons who would "toe its line. It had no consideration for the wishes of the majority." New Delhi, Chimanbhai continued, had not been reconciled to his becoming the Chief Minister of the state but

I did not expect it to carry on its politics against me on the question of foodgrains to such extent as it did .... The foodgrains for which I was harassed so much, is being dumped in Gujarat after the resignation of my Government. 73.

On February 9, 1974, the Assembly was suspended under a presidential proclamation.

However, it was easy for the Center to create a crisis in Gujarat but much more difficult to resolve it. The Chimanbhai ministry left but the Center could not constitute another ministry in its place. In those days of high inflation and political protests, the Gujarat agitation transformed itself into some kind of a violent movement. A week after the Assembly was suspended, the hostile constituents approached, gheroed (encircled), and attacked members of the Gujarat legislature, making them resign their seats in the Assembly. Several Congressmen were publicly

beaten and a few were stripped naked, painted in black, and made to ride on donkeys. By the second week of March, 95 members had resigned from the Assembly. Neither the police nor the army could control the orgy of violence. On March 11, Morarji Desai began his "fast-unto-death" in order to stop violence and to pressure the Center to dissolve the Assembly. Four days later, the President dissolved the Assembly and the violence gradually died out. The surrender of the Center both to the people of Gujarat and to Morarji Desai was unprecedented.

Temporal comparisons of Incumbency crises: 1971-74

Between 1971 and 1974, there were two other state governments - Madhya Pradesh and Bihar - which were involved in incumbency crises in addition to the already discussed Gujarat government. These crises, which were resolved without the formal declaration of presidential rule, may be briefly summed up as follows:

Incumbency crisis in Madhya Pradesh: July 1973

After the 1972 elections, the Congress(R) returned with 220 seats in the 296-member Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Mrs. Gandhi nominated P. C. Sethi, Union Minister of State for Petroleum and Chemicals, to lead the new government in the state.

With no support base of his own, P. C. Sethi clung to office with the support of New Delhi. After a month-long factional fight in the Congress Legislative Party, five ministers in the Sethi ministry expressed their resentment against the blind support of New Delhi for Sethi by resigning from the ministry on July 14, 1973. These five ministers were: C. P. Tiwari(Planning), P. Patel(Industries), B. Mahant(Labour), T. Lal (Law and Jail), and J. Bhedia(Revenue). A signature campaign was also started against the Chief Minister by some Congress legislators who wanted to demonstrate to Mrs. Gandhi that P. C. Sethi had little support

among the Madhya Pradesh Congressmen. These dissident Congressmen were quite hopeful of being heard in New Delhi, particularly at this time of the year when Mrs. Gandhi had already seen the forced exit of Ghanshyam Oza (Oza resigned on June 29, 1973) in Gujarat.

On July 21, all the five ministers withdrew their resignations after consultation with Mrs. Gandhi, D. P. Mishra, and Uma Shankar Dikshit, the Union Home Minister. After the resignations were withdrawn, P. C. Sethi stated that these ministers were not part of the campaign to unseat him and that he had no grudge against any of them. At the same time, he said:

I am also grateful to the Prime Minister and other members of the High Command who had reposed confidence in me. I hope this cabinet will now function in a homogenous manner. <sup>74</sup>

#### Incumbency crisis in Bihar: July 1973

In March 1972, elections to the 318-member Bihar Legislative Assembly returned the Congress(R) with 167 seats. As the state leadership of the Congress(R) was divided over the choice of Chief Minister, Mrs. Gandhi nominated Kedar Pande to lead the new government.

Kedar Pande was a local politician who was backed by Jagjivan Ram (Ram belongs to Bihar and is the national leader of the untouchables), the first Congress(R) President and a Union Minister since soon after Independence except for a few intervals. For about 15 months, the Pande ministry faced no notable problems. However, in June 1973, the Gujarat episode had a contagion effect on Bihar. On June 22, 24 of the 40 members of the Council of Ministers submitted their resignations in a bid to precipitate the ministerial crisis. Two days later, the Chief Minister lost a vote of confidence in the specially convened meeting of the Congress Legislative Party. Pande submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the Governor the same day.

Unlike in the cases of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, Mrs. Gandhi accepted the exit of Kedar Pande because the move to unseat him was initiated by one of her powerful cabinet ministers, L. N. Mishra, Minister of Railways. Besides, Pande was Jagjivan Ram's factotum who had established good relations with the private secretary of the Prime Minister, Yaspal Kapur (Mrs. Gandhi was indicted in June 1975 for using Kapur during her election in 1971), rather than directly with the Prime Minister herself. <sup>75</sup> L. N. Mishra, a Bihari, who wanted to reduce the political influence of Jagjivan Ram in Bihar, was shrewd enough to dismantle the Pande ministry but not to reconstitute the ministry till Mrs. Gandhi returned from her tour abroad. On June 27, 1973, Mrs. Gandhi returned to the Capital and nominated a dark horse, Abdul Ghafoor, as the Chief Minister of the state. In doing so, she did not let Mishra have his cake and eat it too. Given a free hand, Mishra's choice for the Chief Ministership would probably have rested either on his own brother, Dr. Jagannath Mishra, or Chandra Shekhar Singh who had led the revolt against Pande.

On July 2, 1973, Abdul Ghafoor was sworn-in as the Chief Minister of the state without having been formally elected as the leader by the Bihar Congress Legislative Party. The Economic and Political Weekly lamented the death of time-honoured institutionalized procedure of formally electing the leader when it editorialized:

Perhaps, a written Constitution is an irrelevance ....  
 On the morning of July 2, Abdul Ghafoor, whom the Prime Minister was pleased to choose the previous day as Bihar's new Chief Minister, alighted at the airport at Patna and directly proceeded to Raj Bhavan to be sworn in by the Governor. Not one piece of paper was produced to prove that he had been duly elected as the leader of the Congress legislature party. In fact, such a piece of paper could not have been produced, as the legislature party had not met at all to elect Ghafoor.<sup>76</sup>

The Ghafoor ministry ran into heavy water on account of the "populist" movement started by Jayaprakash Narayan (J.P) demanding the dismissal of the ministry.<sup>77</sup> The political violence which had brought down the Gujarat ministry of Chimanbhai Patel in February 1974 had a spill-over effect on Bihar. By March 23, 1974, the Bihar administration was completely paralyzed, but Mrs. Gandhi, despite increasing violence, refused to submit to the demands of the agitators till the end of 1974. She probably made it a prestigious issue and was not willing to budge an inch from her stand.

A comparative analysis:

A comparative analysis of all three cases of incumbency crises tends to show how irrelevant the state party units had become as means of choosing and sustaining the Chief Ministers in-crisis. Chimanbhai Patel was virtually hounded out of office despite the fact that he was elected and supported by the majority in the Gujarat Congress Legislative Party. The episode was reminiscent of the Punjab scene (1951) when the Chief Minister, Gopi Chand Bhargava, was forced out of office by Jawaharlal Nehru. President's Rule was imposed in Punjab despite the fact that the Chief Minister commanded a majority in the Punjab Legislative Party. However, this was the only case when Nehru acted with impatience.

P. C. Sethi survived the crisis despite the fact that he had no support structure of his own in Madhya Pradesh. Kedar Pande was never Mrs. Gandhi's candidate even though she had nominated him to lead the government in Bihar. In the crisis that led to Pande's resignation, Mrs. Gandhi was, more or less, neutralized by divergent pressures from Jagjivan Ram and L. N. Mishra and hence acquiesced in the change. However, had Pande been Mrs. Gandhi's protege, like Ghanshyam Oza (Gujarat) or P. C. Sethi (Madhya Pradesh), the chances are that either he would have survived



the crisis as P. C. Sethi did, or else the state of Bihar would have been under presidential rule sooner or later.

Was the Nehru era repeating itself? The answer probably is both yes and no. It is yes because no Chief Minister who did not enjoy the confidence of Nehru ever survived for a long time. In fact, it was rare, if it ever happened, for any person to become the Chief Minister of a state without the prior approval of Nehru. However, for Nehru, approval was not nomination in the sense Mrs. Gandhi thought it was, nor was it an opportunity to superimpose his own personal factotums to the utter neglect of state party units. He did send Rajagopalachari to Madras (1952) and K. N. Katju to Madhya Pradesh (1956), directed Gopi Chand Bhargava of Punjab to step down (1951) and Hiralal Shastri of Rajasthan to quit (1955), but such instances were rare in the lengthy period of his rule and were generally dictated by party rather than purely personal considerations. Even when he defended some Chief Ministers in-crisis beyond certain limits, such as Partap Singh Kairon of Punjab, he often acted with the self-restraint of a constitutionalist and in a style which largely inoffensive. Except for the Kamaraj Plan (1963), the strongest artillery Nehru ever used to settle party squabbles was the threat of his own personal resignation from the Government. Even in the case of the Kamaraj Plan, Nehru got rid of certain people but took little interest in nominating their substitutes at the state level. He was, as we described him, a "reluctant democrat".

For Mrs. Gandhi, the self-restraint of Nehru were the weaknesses of the Nehru era. Her excessive sense of insecurity (or righteousness born out of her triumphant victory in the parliamentary and state elections) led her to dictate her own loyalists as Chief Ministers in most of the states irrespective of the wishes of the state party units. Having seen

the days of the Congress split and the negotiable loyalties of state bosses, she was over-cautious, as anyone in her position would be. As for her methods of maintaining her personal hegemony over state politics, one wonders if Nehru would have approved of the way Chimanbhai Patel (Gujarat) was forced out of office. He might have - and this is quite speculative - used his personal influence to straighten out the situation, unlike Mrs. Gandhi who used the system - food blockade - to exile Patel to a political no-man's-land.

PART III: CRISES WHICH DID NOT CULMINATE IN PRESIDENTIAL RULE, 1971-74:

In Part II of this chapter, we discussed 10 cases of congressi- zation crises involving the states of Mysore, Gujarat, Punjab, West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Manipur, Pondicherry (twice), and Uttar Pradesh. Except for Uttar Pradesh, all of these states were brought under presidential rule during the congressization process. We also discussed three cases of structural crises involving the states of Tripura, Andhra, and Uttar Pradesh which were also resolved through the imposition of presidential rule. Among the three incumbency crises involving the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar, only Gujarat experienced presidential rule. Thus, Part II examined politics in 10 of the 21 states of India and also in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Altogether, there were 16 crises (as discussed in the preceding section) during the period 1971-74 as shown in Table 6.3:

TABLE 6.3  
TOTAL NUMBER OF CRISES IN  
ALL THE STATES OF INDIA  
1971-74

Nature of crises	Number of crises
Congressization	10
Structural	3
Incumbency	3
<b>Total:</b>	<b>16</b>

Among the rest of the 11 states, only three had non-Congress governments, i.e., Tamil Nadu, Meghalaya, and Nagaland. The Karunanidhi ministry (DMK) in Tamil Nadu was not disturbed because of the special understanding<sup>78</sup> between Mrs. Gandhi and the DMK, though there were occasions when the Center could exploit the strains on the ministry and step on it.<sup>79</sup> Both Meghalaya (a state created in 1972) and Nagaland were border states and were under the constant surveillance of the Center. Besides, the Congress(R) was very weak in these small tribal states and it would have served no useful purpose of the Center if New Delhi were to have dismantled the Williamson Sangma (APHLC) ministry in Meghalaya or the Vizol ministry (UDF) in Nagaland.<sup>80</sup>

Among the remaining eight states, six had pro-Mrs. Gandhi governments: the Bansi Lal ministry in Haryana, the Parmar ministry in Himachel Pradesh, the Mir Quasim ministry in Jammu & Kashmir, the Naik ministry in Maharashtra, the Ray ministry in West Bengal, and the Achutha Menon ministry (Congress(R) and CPI coalition) in Kerala. No effort was made to congressize the Kerala ministry because of the thin partition that divided the Congress(R) and the CPI.

#### Purges:

In the remaining two states of Assam and Rajasthan, the Chief Ministers, whose loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi was suspect, were simply "purged" and the "top off, all gone" principle worked well. Thus, Sarat Chandra Sinha, Mrs. Gandhi's nominee, was directed to take over from M. M. Chaudhury of Assam in January 1972 despite the fact that the latter continued to enjoy the confidence of the majority faction in the Assam Congress Legislative Party. Similarly, in Rajasthan, Barkatullah Khan, another of Mrs. Gandhi's proteges, replaced Mohanlal Sukhadia - Chief Minister of the state since 1954 - in July 1971, simply because Sukhadia, at one time, had

hob-nobbed with the Syndicate. As in Assam and Rajasthan, Mrs. Gandhi asked S. C. Shukla of Madhya Pradesh to bow out in favour of P. C. Sethi, a member of Mrs. Gandhi's Central Cabinet. In fact, Mrs. Gandhi, after the parliamentary elections of 1971, had set the shape of things in such a way that only three pre-1971 Congress Chief Ministers survived in office during the period 1971-74: V. P. Naik of Maharashtra, because of Y. B. Chavan's influence; Bansilal of Haryana, because of his "down to earth" loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi (Bansilal was appointed as the Defence Minister in the Central Government after the 1975 Emergency); and Y. S. Parmar of Himachel Pradesh, because of his life-long loyalty to the Nehru family.

Crises or not, Mrs. Gandhi had done the reshuffling at the state level firmly and effectively. As Trever Drieberg wrote (1972):

The men whom she [Mrs. Gandhi] had marked for political liquidation were summoned to New Delhi and quietly, but ruthlessly, advised to resign. Their protests, if any, were cut short and they were summarily sent back to their state capitals to perform their separate acts of renunciation.<sup>81</sup>

If Mrs. Gandhi had only purged the unwanted Chief Ministers, her action would have been classified along with the Kamara Plan of 1967, designed by her father. Even in that case, it would have been a classification with overstated similarities: the ruthlessness in Mrs. Gandhi's action was conspicuously absent in Nehru's action under the Kamara Plan. But, Mrs. Gandhi went far beyond the amara Plan for she not only nominated her own men as the Chief Ministers of the states but also saw to it that her nominees had no deep roots in the states to which they were appointed, so that they would continue to look constantly to New Delhi for support.

As the Hindu editorialized (1972):

A significant feature of this shake-up in the States is that the new prototype politician that is emerging as Chief Minister is essentially one without local roots, who in the majority of cases will have to look to the Centre for support and guidance. In other words, the Prime Minister is assuming the responsibility of not only appointing Governors, but also nominating Chief Ministers and reorganizing the party units in the States, which makes the Centre the fount of all political power in the country .... 82

And the Guardian summed up (1972):

Indian politics has thus come full circle since Mr. Nehru's death. From then until Mrs. Gandhi's rise to supreme power State Chief Ministers twice chose the Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi's critics will perhaps blame her for wanting to co-opt her favourites and yes-men on the States. But she remembers her father's helplessness against State leaders who did everything in their power to frustrate his economic and social policies. 83

The Guardian's analysis was certainly illuminating but it said nothing about the change in the nucleus of the Center. As Mrs. Gandhi herself said: "My father was a saint who strayed into politics ... but I am not of the same stuff." 84

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

- 1 "We declare," read the Supreme Court judgement, "that Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision - February 27, 1967 - to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein." See, D. C. Gupta, Indian Government and Politics (Delhi: Vikas, 1972):45-46.
- 2 Objections to the ivory-tower planning were raised by the Ministries of Petroleum, Labour, and Industry but they were set aside on the ground that "welfarism" was not the same thing as "socialism". The Economist, B. S. Minhas, even resigned from the Planning Commission in protest. See, Kuldip Nayar, India After Nehru (Delhi: Vikas, 1975):223-227. Also see, "What is happening to the Plan," Economic and Political Weekly (July 7, 1973).
- 3 Krishan Bhatia, Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister Gandhi (New York: Praeger, 1974):267..
- 4 "Procurement without Tears," Economic and Political Weekly (December 9, 1972). Also see, "The Show goes on," in October 7, 1972 of the Weekly.
- 5 Editorial, Economic and Political Weekly (December 9, 1972).
- 6 Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 267.
- 7 Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 167.
- 8 "Sharpening the Style," Economic and Political Weekly (January 22, 1972):129.
- 9 Romesh Thapar, "No More Excuses," Economic and Political Weekly (March 18, 1972):608.
- 10 Romesh Thapar, "After the Elation," Annual Number, Economic and Political Weekly (February 1972):192A.
- 11 See the large number of biographies written of Mrs. Gandhi by now, particularly Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 55, and Uma Vasudeva, Indira Gandhi: Revolution in Restraint (Delhi: Vikas, 1974):59-60.
- 12 Welles Hagen, After Nehru, Who? (New York: Harcourt, 1963):159.
- 13 Quoted in Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 204, 235.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Romesh Thapar, "After the Elation," op.cit., 193.
- 16 The Economic and Political Weekly (March 18, 1972):608.
- 17 Illustrated Weekly quoted in Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 235.
- 18 A. H. Hanson and Janet Douglas, India's Democracy (Delhi: Vikas, 1972):49.

<sup>19</sup> Marcus F. Franda, "All India Radio: Akashvani or Sarkarvani?" American Universities Field Staff, Inc. (South Asia Series, Vol. XIX, No.7, 1975).

<sup>20</sup> See summation of newspapers' editorials in "Strained Relations," Economic and Political Weekly (January 22, 1972):155.

<sup>21</sup> The Times of India, ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (October 7, 1972):2048-2049, under title, "Of Editors - Petulant and Proud". For details of the conflict between the media and the Government, see Economic and Political Weekly (September 16, 1972, July 7, 1973, September 22, 1973). The July 7 article "To Manage a Willing Press", and September 22 article, "All is Forgiven" make interesting readings.

<sup>23</sup> Marcus F. Franda, "India's Double Emergency Democracy: Part II - Reactions and Adaptations," American Universities Field Staff (South Asia Series, Vol. XIX, No.18, 1975):4 discusses the way Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet colleagues felt about this appointment to the Supreme Court.

<sup>24</sup> Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 215.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid:94. The Indian Parliament debated the activities and the budgetary allocations for the RAW on March 26, 1975. One of the members criticised the government for withholding from Parliament information on RAW, and said the government was not the sole custodian of "public interest". Parliament should know about RAW when it provides funds for it. See, The Times of India, March 27, 1975.

<sup>28</sup> Marcus F. Franda, "India's Double Emergency Democracy: Part I - Transformations," American Universities Field Staff (South Asia Series, Vol. XIX, No.17, 1975).

<sup>29</sup> "Restoring Perspectives," Economic and Political Weekly (December 9, 1972).

<sup>30</sup> See, Economic and Political Weekly (May 26, June 2, 1973).

<sup>31</sup> Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 247-248.

<sup>32</sup> While Nagarwala had died of heart failure under mysterious circumstances in 1972 and the case against him could not be pursued further, Sanjay's purchase of land allegedly on favourable terms from the Haryana government became the subject of cabinet inquiry whose findings exonerated Chief Minister Bansilal of Haryana. See, Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., 198; Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 269.

<sup>33</sup> See, "Clean Chit for All," Economic and Political Weekly (September 22, 1973):1714.

<sup>34</sup>"River of Scandal," Economic and Political Weekly (September 15, 1973):1673.

<sup>35</sup>See, John R. Wood, "Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in India: A Comparative Analysis of Populist Movements in Gujarat and Bihar," (unpublished) - a paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association, 1975.

<sup>36</sup>See, Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 251-254. While President Nixon announced that no arms were being shipped to Pakistan, New York Times disclosed that arms were on their way to Pakistan. The U. S. Embassy in Pakistan failed to contact Mujib in jail but the announcement was made that U. S. Ambassador, Joseph Farland, had met him. Such revelations worsened the relations between Washington and New Delhi.

<sup>37</sup>Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1971):254.

<sup>38</sup>See, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 21-31, 1971:24721.

<sup>39</sup>Kuldip Nayar, India After Nehru, op.cit., 157 writes that though the Congress(R) was in a position to form the government, some of Mrs. Gandhi's followers "stayed her hands on grounds of morality".

<sup>40</sup>The Hindu quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (April 17, 1971):827.

<sup>41</sup>Kuldip Nayar, India After Nehru, op.cit., 157.

<sup>42</sup>The Tribune quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (April 17, 1971):827

<sup>43</sup>The Deccan Herald, ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Kuldip Nayar, After Nehru, op.cit., 157.

<sup>45</sup>See, "Young Turks Take a Hand," Economic and Political Weekly (August 28, 1971):1852-1853.

<sup>46</sup>See, Subhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Power (Delhi: National, 1974): 442-443.

<sup>47</sup>Among the many unsavoury things said about the honest (to my knowledge Governor was that he had accepted 'kick backs' from Badal in accepting his advice.

<sup>48</sup>The Searchlight quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly (July 3, 1971):1326.

<sup>49</sup>The Deccan Chronicle, ibid.

<sup>50</sup>"The New Offensive," Economic and Political Weekly (July 3, 1971):1319.

<sup>51</sup>"Congress Hopes & Fears", Econ. and Pol. Weekly (January 15, 1972):102.



<sup>52</sup>Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 269-270. Harekrushna Mahatab was found guilty of having accepted bribe of Rs.600,000 from an industry.

<sup>53</sup>Excerpts from the Governor's report appear in the Journal of the Society for the Study of State Government (October-December 1973):264.

<sup>54</sup>The entire proceedings of the Court are summarized in the above Journal:249-284.

<sup>55</sup>What happened in the Assembly was described by the Statesman Weekly, March 30, 1974. For a summary and comments, see Keesing's, April 22-28, 1974:26480.

<sup>56</sup>Excerpts from the Governor's report appear in the Asian Recorder, May 21-27, 1973:11398-11400.

<sup>57</sup>For details, see Keesing's, February 17-23, 1975:26978.

<sup>58</sup>Keesing's, December 10 - 16, 1973:26244.

<sup>59</sup>The only exception made was in the case of the DMK in Tamil Nadu in 1971. This happened because of the 1971 alliance between the Congress (R) and the DMK.

<sup>60</sup>Keesing's, April 22-28, 1974:26480.

<sup>61</sup>The Congress(R) Center did not disturb the CPI in Kerala nor tried to upset DMK in the Tamil Nadu. The only non-Congress states, besides these two, were Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland on June 15, 1972. Manipur came under President's Rule in March 1973, while the other two states were always under the constant surveillance of the Center because of their strategic positions.

<sup>62</sup>Keesing's, May 13-20, 1972:25254.

<sup>63</sup>See, H. D. Suteri, "Regional Autonomy or Small States?", Journal of the Society for the Study of State Governments (July-September, 1970) for a brief resume of the activities of the separatists in Telengana.

<sup>64</sup>"Through Politics or Plants?", Econ. and Pol. Weekly (November 7, 1970):1808.

<sup>65</sup>See, Keesing's, May 21-27, 1973:25901.

<sup>66</sup>Keesing's, August 20-26, 1973:26050.

<sup>67</sup>"The Third Variant," Econ. and Pol. Weekly (May 26, 1973):917. Also see, "Doing without Parties," (June 16, 1973); "Flabby Heartlands," (June 16, 1973) in the Weekly.

<sup>68</sup>Excerpts from the resignation letter appear in the Asian Recorder, July 30-August 5, 1973:11521.

<sup>69</sup>John R. Wood, op.cit.: 7

<sup>70</sup>Oza's statement appears in the Asian Recorder, August 27-September 2, 1973:11568.

<sup>71</sup>John R. Wood, op.cit.: 7.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>The Statesman Weekly, March 9, 1974 records Chimabhai's statement.

<sup>74</sup>Sethi's statement recorded in the Asian Recorder, August 27-September 2, 1973:11568.

<sup>75</sup>See, Romesh Thapar, "A Messy Transition," Econ. and Pol. Weekly (July 14, 1973):1219.

<sup>76</sup>Editorial, "The Unwritten Constitution," ibid:1210.

<sup>77</sup>See, John R. Wood, op.cit.

<sup>78</sup>The "electoral understanding" by which Mrs. Gandhi traded not to contest the Assembly elections provided the DMK gave her a free hand in the parliamentary election 1971 led to the development of good relations between the Congress(R) and the DMK. Besides, the DMK always sided with Mrs. Gandhi during the Congress split. It was a double consolation to Mrs. Gandhi. For one thing, it brought support to her in the Parliament, and for another, it demoralised K. Kamaraj.

<sup>79</sup>There were at least two occasions when the Center could accelerate crises: (a) October 1972 when the DMK split in the midst of violence; and (b) December 1972 when the Speaker, K. A. Mathialagan, was removed from office. See, Keesing's, May 21-27, 1973:25902.

<sup>80</sup>Despite, Nagaland came under President's Rule in March 1975. See, The Times of India, March 23, 1975.

<sup>81</sup>Trevor Drieberg, Indira Gandhi: A Profile in Courage (Delhi: Vikas, 1972):170.

<sup>82</sup>The Hindu, January 29, 1972.

<sup>83</sup>The Guardian, January 30, 1972.

<sup>84</sup>Krishan Bhatia, op.cit., 233.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

Within a broad theoretical frame of developmental politics, this study has focussed on the crisis episodes at the state level in India and their resolution through the imposition of presidential rule. In the process, the dissertation explored federal decision-making in situations of state crises in four different environmental settings, each one of which, with its own problems and prospects, set the style and the ethos of politics in the context of which federal leaders interacted and regulated their relations with the state leaders. Through this macro-political approach - from an identification of system-environment settings to state crises to federal choices in dealing with them - we analysed the working of Indian federalism and within it the Central intervention in state crises from the perspective of over-all Indian political development during the past twenty-five years. With state crises as independent variables and federal choices as dependent variables, we tried, through spatial and temporal comparisons, to find crisis resolution patterns in each of the four different phases of the Indian political development.

Mapping the political history of a complex country like India over a quarter century with the aid of a few concepts has indeed been a difficult exercise. Most of the concepts used in this exploratory study were "data-containing" concepts to keep them, as far as possible, empirically relevant. However, as we moved into and out of the grooves of history, we found a fundamental transformation of the system, particularly after the Congress split of 1969. And, by 1971-72, the transformation was complete and almost total, rendering useless a search for

continuity in political styles and traditions.

The patterns of crisis resolution:

Table 7.1 summarizes the total number of state crises and their resolution during each of the phases of Indian political development. The resolution of a total of 91 crises involved 29 presidential dissolutions and 13 presidential suspensions. Whereas all the structural crises and the one systemic crisis was resolved through the imposition of presidential rule only four out of a total of 40 incumbency crises were resolved in this way. Since all of these incumbency crises involved Congress state governments, the smaller number of cases of presidential rule shows that the Central Government preferred to use resources other than the formal use of the President's powers to resolve such crises. However, each of the four crises resolved through the imposition of presidential rule in four different contextual settings not only provided us with a fresh insight into the working of the Congress system but also, in many ways, distilled politics within the Indian political system.

In phase I, 1950-63, among the 33 incumbency crises, only the Punjab crisis (1951) was resolved through the imposition of presidential rule. In the rest of the 32 cases, all, with the exception of four (Table 3.14), were resolved to the satisfaction of the Center. With Jawaharlal Nehru, in whose personality was combined the charisma of an Avtar (prophet) and the liberal authoritarianism of the Mahatma, incumbency crises simply found resolution once it was known what kind of crisis outcome Nehru had in his mind. It was only Chief Minister Gopi Chand Bhargava of Punjab who refused to accept Nehru's decision and thus was dismissed under presidential rule. It may be risky to speculate as to what would have been the alternative scenario had the rest of the Chief Ministers in incumbency crises defied Nehru's resolution, but the fact

TABLE 7.1  
STATE CRISES AND THEIR RESOLUTION IN FOUR  
DIFFERENT PHASES OF INDIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT  
1950-74

PHASES	Incumbency/ presidential rule	Structural/ presidential rule	Congressization/ presidential rule	Systemic/ presidential rule	Total crises/ presidential rule
Phase I : 1950-63	33/1	2/2	8/3	-	43/6
Phase II : 1964-67	1/1	2/2	-	1/1	4/4
Phase III: 1967-71	3/0	5/5	20/12	-	28/17
Phase IV : 1971-74	3/2	3/3	10/10	-	16/15
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>40/4</b>	<b>12/12</b>	<b>38/25</b>	<b>1/1</b>	<b>91/42*</b>

\* Suspensions : 13  
Dissolutions: 29

that Nehru used the Kamaraj Plan(1963) to purge some of the "undesirable" Chief Ministers within the Congress system shows that he could be quite impatient with people who had forgotten the Bhargava episode.

In phase II, 1964-67, there was only one incumbency crisis during the entire period, the one involving the Sankar government (Congress) of Kerala. The changed system-environmental settings kept Lal Bahadur Shastri from intervening in the crisis actively. He declared presidential rule only as a matter of necessity.

In phase III, 1967-71, there were three incumbency crises, in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. Of the three, Mrs. Gandhi was able to stabilize only the government of Andhra Pradesh and that only by awarding a major concession to the Telegana separatists. She might have proclaimed presidential rule in the other two states except for opposition within her cabinet and fear of alienating public opinion.

In phase IV, 1971-74, there were three incumbency crises, involving the state governments of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Gujarat. In the new system environment which crystallized the powers of Mrs. Gandhi as the leader of the nation, the Madhya Pradesh government stabilized itself while the Bihar leadership was replaced with her consent. The Gujarat crisis was the only crisis which was resolved through a presidential suspension followed by a presidential dissolution of the Assembly. In Gujarat, after Mrs. Gandhi's nominee was displaced by Chimanbhai Patel, she used, for the first time in an incumbency crisis, her discretionary power to allot food to get rid of him. Never before had an incumbency crisis been resolved in this way. However, throughout the period, the attitude of the Center toward incumbency

crises was crucial to the outcome of crises (Table 7.2).

While the incumbency crises arose because of the intra-party conflicts within the Congress system, the structural crises, for the most part, were the product of conditions such as widespread violence, public disorder, populist movements, etc. at the state level. Such conditions either paralyzed the administration of the state or rendered the preservation of peace, order and good government difficult, if not impossible, at the state level. As such there was a single broad pattern in the resolution of structural crises. All of them were resolved through the imposition of presidential rule. Similarly, the one systemic crisis which represented a challenge to the federal authorities was resolved through the proclamation of presidential rule. In all these cases, the action of the federal government was more than justified and conformed to the assurances held out by the political leadership in respect to the use of presidential rule to the members of the Constituent Assembly. However, an interesting point to note was that no Congress government involved in a structural crisis was ever so unceremoniously dismissed as was the Communist government of Kerala in 1959 or the Leftist United Front government of Mukherjee-Basu in West Bengal in 1967. Perhaps the only period when both Congress and non-Congress state governments-in-crisis were treated equally was the period between 1964 and 1967 when Mrs. Gandhi suspended rather than dissolved the Punjab (Congress) and the Goa (non-Congress: Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party) legislatures with the consent of the state governments involved.

The maximum use of presidential rule was made to resolve congressization crises, where a total of 38 crises led to 23 uses of presidential rule. The fact that all of these crises involved non-Congress

TABLE 7.2  
 OUTCOME OF INCUMBENCY CRISES  
 AND ATTITUDE OF THE CENTER  
 1950-74

Outcome	Neutral # cases	Negative # cases	Positive # cases	Total
Presidential rule	1	2*	3	3
Ministries resigned	7	6	2	15
Ministries stayed	3		15	18
TOTAL:	11	8	17	36**

\* Two presidential rules for one crisis, i.e., suspension and dissolution.

\*\*Four cases excluded as in Table 3.14



or Congress-coalition governments shows how the Congress Center used its resources. There is no denying the fact that the opposition parties were for the most part in no position to compete with the massive Congress machinery; but the manner in which the Congress Party, both in the states and at the Center, tried to fragment them with a view to undercutting their strength and stifling their growth, makes it look as if the Congress never learnt to be a party among other parties. There never was a single Congress coalition government throughout the long, eventful history of India which did not end up either in a complete Congress government or in the dissolution of the coalition under presidential rule or otherwise. The justification changed from the "largest party" thesis - that only the largest group in the legislature should be allowed to form the government (Madras 1952) - to the "stability" thesis - that the non-Congress coalitions could not provide stable governments, but the purpose basically remained the same.

During phase I, there were eight congressization crises, four of which were resolved successfully when the Congress coalition partners agreed to liquidate their separate identities and merge with the Congress. In the remaining four cases, the refusal of the partners to be swallowed up by the Congress brought dissolution of the Assemblies - three through the use of presidential rule and one without it.

In phase II, 1964-67, there was no case of congressization crisis because there was no non-Congress State government except in Goa, a tiny Union Territory, and Nagaland. Hence, we do not know how Lal Bahadur Shastri would have resolved such crises had any occurred during his tenure in office.

In phase III, 1967-71, there were 20 cases of congressization

crises, most of which were resolved through the use of varied federal resources. The system environmental settings of this period were such as to impose severe limitations on the formal use of presidential rule, which was becoming increasingly unpopular. The very first presidential rule after the Fourth General Elections of 1967, in connection with the congressization crisis in Rajasthan, provoked such an adverse reaction that the Central Government was loathe even to get the presidential rule approved by the Parliament. However, under the Syndicate's pressure, a roundabout way of toppling the non-Congress governments through means such as activating the otherwise nominal Governors, setting up "puppet" governments, allocating federal resources with discrimination, etc., was developed to resolve the congressization crises. After the Congress split of 1969, Mrs. Gandhi, whose minority government depended on the support of some opposition parties in the Parliament, used the federal authority highly selectively to demolish the Syndicate-dominated state governments. During the period 1967-71, presidential rule was used twelve times to resolve congressization crises.

In the final phase, 1971-74, all ten congressization crises were resolved through the use of presidential rule. With the Congress(R) landslide victory in the parliamentary elections of 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was no longer interested in making compromises with or concessions to any state government whose leadership was not completely loyal to her. Having seen the pliable loyalties of the politicians both before and after the Congress split, she desired a total overhaul of state politics, with her own trustworthy people in charge. This could be done only by demolishing leadership structures at the state level. Congressization

no longer meant just absorbing dissent as was the case in the Nehru era; it meant dispensing with dissent. The rest is history.

In fact, the increasing use of presidential rule since the Fourth General Elections of 1967 but more so after the Congress split of 1969 settled the most fundamental question that was raised on the death of Nehru: who governs India? During the lifetime of Nehru, the answer to the question was so evident that the question itself was thought to be irrelevant. Nehru was the leader of the nation and his tremendous popularity among the masses precluded any challenge to his authority from within the Congress Party or from among the Chief Ministers of the various provinces. The two succession crises that followed his death brought both the party bosses and the Chief Ministers of the various states into the national leadership selection processes, thereby making the Central leadership dependent both on the Party bosses and the Chief Ministers of the states. While Lal Bahadur Shastri reconciled himself to this dependency during his short tenure in office, Mrs. Gandhi tried to dispense with such a dependency by struggling out of the control of party bosses and Chief Ministers. In fact, having seen the crucial role that the party bosses and the Chief Ministers played during the first succession crisis, Mrs. Gandhi worked to control both the Party and the state governments in order to stabilize her leadership. In the process, presidential rule conveniently helped her settle the question: who governs? With the increasing use of this instrument, she was successful in her objectives but she reduced provincial autonomy to a farce and made the Indian system a case of the pathology of federalism.

The Congress split of 1969, as mentioned earlier, was in fact the turning point in the history of independent India. The shift in politics, at this point, was fundamental and may be summarized as

follows:

- (a) while before the Congress split of 1969, most of the crises originated at the state level in the form of inter-party or intra-party conflicts or popular discontent with the state leadership, after the split, the Center itself became a party to the creation of crises. From 1971-72 on, most of the crises originated with the Center, and their solutions were always the Center's; and
- (b) while all three Prime Ministers created a place for themselves in the annals of history, both Nehru and Shastri were part of the Center, which crystallized in its functioning during their tenure in office. With Mrs. Gandhi's victory in the parliamentary elections of 1971, followed by additional resounding victories in the Bangladesh war and in the state elections of 1972, she in fact became independent of the Center and of the Center and of the Party she represented. This emasculated the powers both of the Center and the Party, and she concentrated these powers in her own person. Being a child of politics and having lived through the last uneasy years of her father's life, and of her own life during the Congress split, Mrs. Gandhi used her victories to "ring out the old and to ring in the new".

On account of these changes, even the vertical type of federalism that developed and was carefully nurtured by Nehru virtually came to an end. Presidential rule which was designed as a "rescue operation" for state governments in trouble was turned against the state governments for

partisan and personal ends with the result that the type of Center-state relations envisaged in the Constitution simply ceased to exist.

The fact of the matter is that if we leave aside the Shastri era, which was a parenthesis in history in which institutions like the Grand Council appeared to open up the political system to the state governments and the party influentials and thus to develop a bargaining style of decision-making, the entire period under analysis becomes one of a dominant and increasingly hostile attitude (though in varying degree) of the Congress Center toward the opposition parties. Contrary to the promises held out to the Constituent Assembly (1948-49), that presidential rule would be the last of the instruments the Center would use against a recalcitrant state, presidential rule, instead, in the majority of cases and increasingly, turned out to be a partisan instrument to maintain and sustain the hegemonic position of the Congress Party. After the Congress split, but more markedly after the 1971 parliamentary elections, presidential rule became not only the first choice of the federal leaders but also the normal choice to ruin dissident state governments.

Though the study of presidential rule is the study of one aspect of the Center-state relations, this dissertation looked into the problem from a very wide perspective of system analysis. In the process, the study highlighted the importance of presidential rule not only as a means to an understanding of the Indian federal system and its development over time but also of the Indian political system within which this federal system worked. Thus, it illuminated some of the critical aspects of the working of the Indian polity, thereby providing a fresh insight into the developmental politics of India. Neither the Congress Party nor its leadership came out with any credit in the proper

use of the Constitution but that was how it was to be.

Presidential rule was designed to preserve political unity against the threat of dysfunctional diversities. After a quarter of a century, it has become the means of establishing Central predominance.

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