

**Examining Print Media Coverage Leading into New Zealand and British Columbia's  
Respective November 6, 1993 and May 12, 2009 Electoral Reform Referendums**

by

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### **Abstract**

This thesis examined whether the print media of New Zealand and British Columbia, in the immediate month campaign period leading into their respective November 6, 1993 and May 12, 2009 electoral reform referendums, provided a deliberative environment for citizens to make informed ballot choices. This is vital on such a vote. Grounded in theories of deliberative democracy, I evaluate the print media of NZ and B.C., specifically the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* broadsheets, against three indicators: quantity of coverage, balance of coverage, and presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions. Based on the gathered results, I conclude that both NZ and B.C.'s print media attempted to provide a deliberative environment so that citizens could make informed ballot decisions on competing electoral system options. However, New Zealand's was stronger based on displaying a high quantity of coverage on their country's referendum between FPTP and MMP, while British Columbia's coverage was moderate on their province's FPTP vs. STV vote.

## **Preface**

This thesis is an original work by Abdullah Sinan Alzubaidi. No part of this thesis has been previously published.

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>AV</b> .....	<b>Alternative Vote</b>
<b>B.C.</b> .....	<b>British Columbia</b>
<b>BCCA</b> .....	<b>British Columbia Citizens' Assembly</b>
<b>FPTP</b> .....	<b>First-Past-The-Post</b>
<b>MMP</b> .....	<b>Mixed-Member Proportional</b>
<b>NZ</b> .....	<b>New Zealand</b>
<b>RCES</b> .....	<b>Royal Commission on the Electoral System</b>
<b>STV</b> .....	<b>Single-Transferable Vote</b>

## CHAPTER 1- Introduction

There has been a great deal of interest in the academic literature regarding the theory of deliberative democracy, and whether the mass media can provide a deliberative environment leading into an electoral reform referendum. This is an important question because an electoral system, while a key part of any democracy, is something that citizens do not regularly think of and concern themselves with, or even possess basic knowledge of (Dutil, 2016; Garnett, 2014; LeDuc, 2011; Pal, 2012). Thus, deliberation in the mass media, a communication form able to reach entire societies, is needed ahead of such a vote so that citizens can make informed ballot choices from competing electoral system options (Craig, 2004; Gibson, 2003).

Such an inquiry revolves around deliberative democratic theory, a normative theory which scholars began writing about starting in the later portion of the 20<sup>th</sup> and carrying into the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Chambers, 2003; Cohen, 1997; Fishkin, 2009; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999), to advocate how citizens in Western democracies, disaffected from their political system and unhappy their presence could only be felt around election-time, should be given the ability to deliberate and collectively make political decisions that will better serve them and their polity (Barker, McAfee, & McIvor, 2012; Bohman, 1998; LeDuc, 2006; Pilon, 2009; Rosenberg, 2007). After, scholars developed ideals on how deliberation could occur (Rosenberg, 2007). This was the first phase of deliberative democracy, with scholars advocating how deliberation must be inclusive (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil & Richards, 2013; Mansbridge et al., 2010), cooperative (Levy, 2013), open-minded (Chambers, 2003; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004), reflective (Gastil & Richards, 2013), holistic (Levy, 2013), supported with reason-giving (Dryzek, 2007; Fishkin, 2011; Mansbridge et al., 2010; Thompson, 2008a), other-regarding (Cohen, 1997; Cooke, 2000), and uncoerced (Kuyper, 2012; Levy, 2013).

This led to a second phase, where in settings called mini-publics (examples of which included juries, town halls, and citizens' assemblies) (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002; Elton, 2003; Habermas, 2006; Parkinson, 2003), these ideals were empirically tested as individuals representing the public at-large sought to deliberate, face-to-face, on issues, and make decisions on them (Chambers, 2003; Fishkin, 2009; Kuyper, 2012; Raman & Bhanot, 2008). Quickly, a scale problem with mini-publics emerged, leading some scholars to argue that, in the present-day, deliberation should be mediated and occur in the mass media (Elliott, 2015; Page, 1996).

This is relevant, because in this thesis, I explore whether the mass media can provide a deliberative environment in the campaign period before an electoral reform referendum so that citizens make informed ballot choices. Specifically, I focus on the print media because, unlike television and digital media, they can cover such a vote comprehensively, and give citizens the information they need to properly decide between competing electoral system ballot options (Craig, 2004; De Waal, Schönbach, & Lauf, 2005; Hackett & Gruneau, 2000; Norris, 2000; Roberts & Levine, 1996).

To test the print media, I utilize three indicators found in the literature of mediated deliberation developed by scholars, like Hoff (2009), LeDuc (2011), LeDuc, Bastedo, and Baquero (2008), Pilon (2009), and Renwick and Lamb (2013), to examine media coverage during referendum campaigns, modifying them slightly to be tailored for my thesis. They are: *quantity of coverage*, *balance of coverage*, and *presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions*.

These indicators were employed to assess the deliberative quality of print media coverage in my two case studies, the campaign period before New Zealand and British Columbia's electoral reform referendums on November 6, 1993 and May 12, 2009 respectively. To make this assessment, I picked two newspapers from the print media of both New Zealand and British Columbia: the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* for the former, and the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* for the latter. Using my indicators, I evaluate their deliberative environment by first measuring the quantity of coverage provided by the selected newspapers in each case, followed by their balance of coverage, and finally the presence and diversity of reasoning found in non-neutral articles to support their positional stances.

Notably, there have been some criticisms of the media's coverage in referendum campaigns. This included preceding the 2007 Ontario referendum, in which scholars found that the print media's quantity, and balance of coverage was low and weak respectively, providing very little information to allow citizens to decide between the status-quo FPTP and proposed MMP options, and being strongly opposed to electoral reform (Hoff, 2009; LeDuc, Bastedo, & Baquero, 2008; LeDuc, 2011; Pilon, 2009). These were central factors in why voters rejected changing their electoral system in the vote (Dutil, 2016; Hunter, 2016).

**Research Questions-** To investigate the coverage provided by the print media in the period before the NZ and B.C. referendums, my thesis centered around eight research questions. The first two are my overarching questions, while the next six applied to one of my three indicators:

1. Did the print media in New Zealand in the immediate month leading into their November 6, 1993 electoral reform referendum, provide a deliberative environment on the vote for citizens to make informed ballot choices?
2. Did the print media in British Columbia in the immediate month leading into their May 12, 2009 electoral reform referendum, provide a deliberative environment on the vote for citizens to make informed ballot choices?
3. What was the quantity of coverage provided by the print media of New Zealand in the lead-up to their November 6, 1993 electoral reform referendum?
4. What was the quantity of coverage provided by the print media of British Columbia in the lead-up to their May 12, 2009 electoral reform referendum?
5. What was the balance of coverage in New Zealand's print media before their November 6, 1993 referendum on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change from FPTP to MMP?
6. What was the balance of coverage in British Columbia's print media before their May 12, 2009 referendum on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change from FPTP to STV?
7. Were the non-neutral articles published in New Zealand's print media leading into their November 6, 1993 electoral reform referendum supported with or without reasons? If yes, what was the diversity of their reasoning?
8. Were the non-neutral articles published in British Columbia's print media leading into their May 12, 2009 electoral reform referendum supported with or without reasons? If yes, what was the diversity of their reasoning?

**Case Studies-** In this thesis, I use two case studies: the campaign period leading into the electoral reform referendums on November 6, 1993 in New Zealand, and May 12, 2009 in British Columbia. Specifically, the period focused on was the immediate month leading into both votes; this is because, as de Vreese and Semetko (2002) put it, "1 month prior to [a] referendum" (p. 631), "covers the hot phase of [any] referendum campaign" (p. 623) where most media coverage will take place. I chose the cases using "the most different systems design" or MDSD (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 36). The MDSD was adopted in a loose framework, to expand the range of cases across which I can evaluate the print media's deliberative potential ahead of an electoral reform

referendum (Tarrow, 2010). This is important, because most of the works in the literature on mediated deliberation have been on a single electoral reform referendum campaign (Meyer, 2001). Thus, I used the MDSD in an exploratory and heuristic way, using my two cases to theory-build, and find the conditions that are most likely to foster mediated deliberation in the print media platform before a vote of this kind (Bloemraad, 2013; Otner, 2012).

The New Zealand and British Columbia cases differ in several ways. The first is that the New Zealand case involved a national process of electoral reform, while British Columbia's was subnational (Milner, 2005). The second difference is time, with New Zealand's referendum vote having happened in the time-period of the early-1990's, and British Columbia's in the late-2000's (Geddis & Morris, 2004; Lang, 2007). Third is that while citizens, on November 6, 1993 in NZ, and May 12, 2009 in B.C., had to decide between replacing, or retaining, the existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, the change proposed in each case varied (Thompson, 2008b). In NZ, it was to mixed-member proportional (MMP), while in B.C. it was to single-transferable vote (STV) (Renwick, 2007; Ward, 2008). Fourth, New Zealand's referendum was the second stage of the country's electoral reform process, with a previous indicative vote having occurred on September 17, 1992 where, in a two-part ballot, 84.7 percent in Part A rejected FPTP, and 70.5 percent in Part B endorsed MMP (Johnson-Myers, 2017; Pilon, 2013). This led to the referendum next year, a binding vote between FPTP and MMP (Miller, 2015). On the other hand, British Columbia's was one-stage, a straight-up referendum between FPTP and STV (Canada. Parliament, 2009). The final difference between my cases was, for system change to occur in New Zealand, a simple majority (50 percent) of voters on November 6, 1993 needed to vote for MMP (Harris, 1992). As for British Columbia, on May 12, 2009, STV needed to receive super-majority support from 60 percent of voters, and a simple majority in 60 percent of the province's constituencies (Dutil, 2016).

As I detail in Chapter 6, of these five differences, one (the time-period difference) is theoretically relevant in explaining why I find a higher quantity of coverage in New Zealand's print media than British Columbia's.

**Gaps in the Academic Literature-** A gap in the literature on deliberative democracy I sought to fill is that there exist very few empirical analyses looking into media coverage in the campaigns preceding electoral reform referendums. Overall, there has been limited focus on mediated

deliberation given by those writing on deliberative democracy (Rinke, 2016). Instead, most of the literature produced by theorists have measured the level of deliberation taking place in mini-publics, small, organized groupings of people (Maia, 2012). They range from citizens' assemblies, to town hall meetings, and policy juries, and were central to the second phase of deliberative democracy (Elton, 2003; Gastil & Richards, 2013). Of importance, scholars have filled the literature on deliberative democracy with studies of them because they saw these settings as perfect to evaluate whether the ideals from phase one could be fulfilled by citizens who are participating inside them (Levy, 2013; Thompson, 2008a). But, in these settings where individuals debate issues face-to-face, the role of the mass media is impugned (Mansbridge et al., 2012). The result of the lack of media presence is a hole in the literature, one I wanted to close (Chambers, 2009).

The other gap is, of the small number of studies which examined media coverage in the campaigns prior to electoral reform referendums, most were on single cases (Leyenaar & Hazan, 2011). This includes the works by Hoff (2009) and Pilon (2009), who analyzed coverage in the campaign leading into the 2007 Ontario referendum between FPTP and MMP. Furthermore, while studies like LeDuc (2011), LeDuc et al. (2008), and Renwick and Lamb (2013) discuss other votes, their focus also was exploring media coverage before one referendum, for the first two it was the 2007 Ontario vote, while the latter the 2011 United Kingdom vote between FPTP and the alternative vote (AV) electoral systems. My thesis tried to overcome this preferred mode of research by investigating print coverage in the campaign period leading into *two* referendums, New Zealand and British Columbia's. This was done to put their coverage beside each other, and explain the deliberative environment they each provided for citizens to make informed ballot choices. Furthermore, this helps to generate implications for my data which are more concrete and defensible as it is based on what I gathered from more than one case (Bengtsson, 1999).

**Referendums and Deliberation Before an Electoral Reform Referendum-** The centerpiece of my two cases was a referendum vote, which is generally defined as “refer[ring] a proposed law or constitutional amendment to voters for their approval or rejection” (Cooper, 2003, p. 121). Specifically, they revolved around an electoral reform referendum, which proposed significant institutional reform to their respective Westminster political systems by asking citizens if they wanted to replace or retain the status-quo FPTP system (Lang, 2007; Milner, 2004; Sancton, 2013). In New Zealand, their 1956 *Electoral Act* stated that FPTP could be replaced not only through a

referendum, but if three-quarters of parliamentarians in Wellington's House of Representatives voted in favor of a change (Nagel, 2004). Meanwhile, for British Columbia, a referendum was not required to shift away from FPTP; it could have been overhauled simply through a piece of legislation passed in Victoria's Legislative Assembly (Miller, 2015; Pal, 2016). But, in the end, governments in both initiated referendums because electoral system change alters how political parties contest elections, and the governments which form (Dias, 2017). Thus, each felt citizens must state their input on such a momentous change if it was to occur (Moscrop, 2016c).

Importantly, the campaign period prior to such a vote has an important quality, as it is an ideal space where deliberation can occur and take place (LeDuc, 2015). This is important, because it has been noted that citizens possess miniscule knowledge on electoral systems, unless they are policy experts on the topic (Carty, 2005; LeDuc, 2006). As Garnett (2014, p. 65) explained: "[r]eferendums on electoral reform...[are] on an issue that most voters do not consider on a daily basis...[or] have even considered." Not only that, but the familiar cues from elections like political party names, which can be helpful for citizens because it allows them to vote according to their ideological stance, do not appear on an electoral reform referendum ballot (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b; Christin, Hug, & Sciarini, 2002). As a result, for citizens to gain the crucial knowledge needed to make informed choices between competing electoral systems on referendum day, deliberation in the media leading into these votes is required (LeDuc, 2011).

**Arguments for and against Electoral Reform-** The issue of electoral reform generates robust debate, where competing systems on a referendum ballot can be discussed according to their benefits and drawbacks (Dawood, 2016). Now, I provide some of the arguments in the academic literature both in favor of, and against FPTP, as well as the proposed alternatives in NZ and B.C., which were MMP and STV respectively. This supplies background and context for my analysis of New Zealand and British Columbia's print coverage preceding their respective referendums.

There are several arguments generally made in support of FPTP electoral systems, in the plurality/majoritarian family because it is an electoral system which requires candidates contesting election in a riding to attain a plurality or majority of votes to win (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b; Pilon, 2000). The first is that FPTP is most likely to allow political parties to form majority governments, who, because of having enough votes in parliament, can independently pass necessary legislation like supply bills that are needed to keep the jurisdiction they oversee operating

smoothly (Álvarez-Rivera, 2015; Law Commission of Canada, 2004; Weaver, 1997). Second, under FPTP, because these parties are in majorities on their own, it is simple for voters to reward them on election-day with a renewed mandate, or replace them if they are not (Warioba, 2011; Wypych, 2015). The third argument for FPTP is that it “promotes geographic representation, a strong and clear link between voters in a particular constituency, and their representative” (Law Commission of Canada, 2004, p. 65). Fourth, FPTP is very easy to be understood by voters; all that is required of them is make a single marking beside the candidate of their choice (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b; Warawa, 2016). Finally, FPTP allows for a quick tally of votes (Courtney, 1999).

Four arguments have been commonly asserted against FPTP. The first is that it manufactures parliamentary majorities out of electoral pluralities, as political parties can win elections and form a majority government, even if they did not get over fifty percent of the casted votes (Courtney, 1999; Tanguay, 2005). Secondly, at times, FPTP has allowed parties to win the most seats on election-day, and form a government, despite attaining the second-most votes (Caruana, 2013). This occurred in both New Zealand and British Columbia, as I will detail in Chapter 2 (Shugart, 2008). Third, minor political parties, whose support may be geographically diffuse, have difficulty electing representatives under FPTP, because they cannot get a plurality or majority of the vote in a constituency (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018a; Moscrop, 2016b). A final argument against FPTP is, for many citizens, their votes are wasted, which are votes that do not contribute towards the election of a candidate in a single-member constituency (Norris, 2004). The consequence is that it leads people declining to participate in the democratic exercise of voting, because they believe their casted ballots will not make an impact (Dias, 2017).

MMP is a mixed electoral system because it combines qualities of both plurality and majoritarian, such as single-member constituencies, and proportional electoral systems, like proportional voting (Moscrop, 2016a). It is used in several places around the world, including Germany and Scotland (Scott, 2016). On a general level, there are several arguments for MMP, starting with the fact that it provides individuals with two votes (Milner, 2009). The first allows citizens to vote for a candidate in a constituency, while the second is for a political party (Couture, 2014). Benefits of this second vote, known as the list vote, is that it allows parties to gain representation proportional to the votes from citizens they attained (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018a). This occurs



after the results for constituencies are tallied, and seats are allocated to parties (Reilly, 2003). As Moscrop (2016a, p. 16) explains, “[i]f a party’s share of seats is *less than* its share of the popular vote as determined by the...list vote, the party is awarded seats...and is topped up until its overall share of seats matches its [list] vote.” Regarding the party list element of MMP, there are two added advantages. One is it helps minor political parties gain representation more easily than under FPTP (Bowden, 2016). The other is it allows for higher representation of women and minorities, as parties, to gain list seats, are motivated to put forward candidates for these seats who reflect the diverse composition of an electorate (Gilling & Grey, 2010; Johnson-Myers, 2017). A final argument for MMP is that it uses single-member ridings, meaning citizens are represented by an individual for the geographically defined area in which they live (Dias, 2017; Pepall, 2011).

There are two arguments against MMP. First is that it is harder for political parties to form majority governments, because they must receive over fifty percent of the total votes cast in an election (Milner, 2009). If they want to be in power, they must form a coalition with others, something critics say slows down government due to the notion that consensus is needed to accomplish things (Dias, 2017). Last, some assert the list vote is less democratic as it allows candidates to attain seats with no connection to a constituency, and who owe their allegiance to the political party who put them on the list in the first place (Harris, 1993; Pepall, 2016).

Single-transferable vote (STV) is in the proportional family of electoral systems because it converts votes cast to seats for parties proportionally (Carty, 2005). There are three arguments cited in favor of this FPTP alternative. First is that STV, employed in Ireland, uses a ranked ballot (Moscrop, 2016a; Reilly, 2003). For many, this is advantageous because it gives citizens greater freedom than an FPTP ballot, allowing them to vote for more than one candidate, and decide on candidates who have the same party affiliation (Dias, 2017; Garry, 2016; Lang, 2007). Second, while STV uses a ranked ballot, constituencies under the electoral system are multi-member, argued by some as a positive because within them, the threshold for one to be elected is low, helping individuals from minor parties and even independents have a greater chance to win a seat than under FPTP (Pepall, 2016). The third and final argument for STV is that its counting formula known as the droop quota (the number of votes a person needs to be elected) produces, like MMP, proportional results (Moscrop, 2016a). This is because, “[f]or candidates who surpass [the quota], their surplus votes are redistributed according to voters’ [next] ranked preferences...continu[ing] until all the seats in

the multi-member constituency have been filled” (Bowden, 2016, p. 28). Every single vote contributes to the result, unlike FPTP, accused of creating wasted votes (Miljan & Jackson, 2016).

On the arguments proclaimed against STV, it is said that, to accommodate multi-member ridings, districts are much larger than under FPTP, where districts are small in size because they are constructed for representation by a single person (Law Commission of Canada, 2004). Also, STV’s counting formula is complicated to use, requiring a transfer of ballots from candidates who have passed the quota needed for election in a constituency, to voters’ next choices, a process which needs multiple rounds of counting to fill all of the allotted seats for a riding (Shahandashti, 2016). As a result, it takes longer to tally ballots cast in an STV election as compared to using FPTP rules, a central reason why Estonia only used the electoral system once in March 1990, and stopped (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b; Taagepera, 1996). The Mediterranean country of Malta uses STV, but it has not been easy for them; for example, in 1992, it took two complete days to tally all the ballots cast in their national election, and complete the counting (de Miño & Lane, 2000).

**Organization-** The remainder of my thesis is broken into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I describe the debates on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change of FPTP in NZ and B.C. from their start until the campaigns and outcomes of the referendums on November 6, 1993 and May 12, 2009. Next, in Chapter 3, I discuss the theory of deliberative democracy and its first and second phases. Also, I talk about the scale problem with mini-publics; mediated deliberation; the mass media as a deliberative environment; and show criticisms of mass media coverage in referendum campaigns. Furthermore, I explain why the print media is an ideal place to measure deliberation, and the three indicators to test this channel. Next, in Chapter 4, I detail the methodology used, how I compiled my initial and final corpus, and how I operationalized my indicators. In Chapter 5, I present the results from my evaluation of the *Herald*, the *Post*, the *Sun*, and the *Times Colonist*, and respond to research questions three to eight. Finally, in Chapter 6, I answer my two overarching questions, discuss the implications of the data I gathered, and present some concluding discussion.

## CHAPTER 2- Electoral Reform Referendums in NZ and B.C.

Before I trace the debates on FPTP in NZ and B.C. leading to the referendum campaigns I focused on, it is critical to go back in time, and highlight their history with electoral reform. Starting with New Zealand, in 1908, the New Zealand Liberal Party replaced FPTP with a two-round electoral system (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2016; Vowles, 2000). Its basics were that candidates needed majority support in a constituency to be elected (New Zealand. Parliament, 2011). But, as Law Commission of Canada (2004, p. 21) put it, “[i]f no candidate receive[d] a majority in a riding, then a second round of balloting is held, with only the top two candidates proceeding, and the winner of this round is declared elected.” However, usage of the two-round system in NZ would last only until the Reform Party reinstated first-past-the-post in 1913 (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2016). In B.C., a Liberal government instituted the AV electoral system in 1952 to prevent the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), known today as the New Democratic Party, from winning enough seats to reach power (Pepall, 2010). The difference from FPTP is that it asked citizens to rank candidates in their order of preference (Miljan & Jackson, 2016). However, instead of keeping out the CCF, AV allowed the Social Credits to gain power, who in 1953, reinstated FPTP (Jansen, 2004). In all, for New Zealand and British Columbia, once first-past-the-post was installed back, there would be no debates on this system until disproportional election outcomes occurred in both.

**New Zealand-** A critical part of any system, including FPTP, is how it converts votes cast to seat totals for a political party (Axworthy, 2016). This feature though, came under question in New Zealand after both the 1978 and 1981 national elections, as usage of FPTP in the country produced highly disproportional outcomes where the centre-right National Party won both elections, and a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, attaining fewer votes though than the centre-left Labour Party (Johnson-Myers, 2017; Vowles, 2000). Furthermore, Social Credit, considered as the third party to National and Labour, got 16 and 21 percent of the popular vote respectively, yet in the two votes, only won three seats combined (New Zealand. Parliament, 2011). Overall, the effect of this pair of elections on NZ was profound (Levine & Roberts, 1993). Not only did support for FPTP start to decrease among New Zealand citizens, but Labour, specifically through parliamentarians like Geoffrey Palmer, began to debate and consider whether a new electoral system was needed for their country (Boston, 1987; Pilon, 2002). Thus, ahead of the next election

in 1984, Labour and their leader David Lange, still stinging from the results of 1978 and 1981, made a promise (Dutil, 2016). According to Johnson-Myers (2017, p. 23), this commitment was “to appoint a royal commission to examine among others ‘whether proportional representation of some other variant from the existing first-past-the-post [system] should be introduced.’” The 1984 election would be a good one for Labour, winning a majority government and re-taking office after a six-year period (LeDuc, 2003; McRobie, 1991). Once in government, the party carried through with its commission promise (Sancton, 2013). It would be called the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, or the RCES, and was created in February 1985 by the aforementioned Geoffrey Palmer, now the Labour Minister of Justice (Caruana, 2015; Ingle, 1995; Mackerras, 1994; Pilon, 2013). The commission itself was a five-member panel led by John Wallace, and included esteemed individuals such as theorist Richard Mulgan and law professor Kenneth Keith (Lundberg, 2007). They were told to probe into “whether all or a specified number or proportion of Members of Parliament should be elected under an alternative system” (New Zealand. Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 1986, p. xiii). Following examining different electoral systems, each evaluated under ten criteria, the RCES released their report in December of 1986 (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network 2018a; Harris, 1992; Johnson-Myers, 2017). It recommended that New Zealand move away from FPTP, and adopt MMP (Pilon, 2013).

Of their 10 criteria, the RCES stated that MMP met seven (Boston, Church, & Bale, 2003; Denmark, 2003). This included being “fairer to supporters of significant *political parties*...and also has advantages in terms of *voter participation* and *legitimacy*” (New Zealand. Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 1986, p. 63). Importantly, they explained that their proposal needed to be put to voters in an electoral reform referendum (Aimer & Miller, 2002). If supported by most New Zealanders, MMP would cause the national House of Representatives to increase from 99 under FPTP to 120, with 60 riding representatives and the other 60 picked from the party list vote (Hunter, 2016). After the RCES’s recommendation of MMP, all that was left to conclude the debates on system change in NZ was to have a referendum.

Such a vote quickly appeared hard to put together because politicians, such as National leader Jim Bolger, and most of the Labour cabinet, had an unfavorable view on the Royal Commission’s MMP recommendation (Boston, 1987; Nagel, 2004). Overall, the two major parties were against replacing FPTP; this was a shift in position from Labour, who campaigned before the 1984 election

on investigating system change (Ingle, 1995). But, this opinion inside NZ's Westminster democracy was not surprising because parties and their politicians tend to favor systems which "suit their own partisan interests" (Weeks, 2013, p. 384). This "rel[ies] heavily on rational choice assumptions" (Lamare & Vowles, 1996, p. 322), where incumbent parties such as Labour and National opt for systems like FPTP that give them the opportunity to form single-party majority governments (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2002, 2006). MMP was not endorsed by them because it would shift their political system from a majoritarian to a consensual model where majorities would be tougher to attain, forcing them to enter into coalition agreements with third and minor political parties (Dunn, 2016; Knight, 1999; Pal, 2016). It was evident after the RCES released its report that their recommendation would not be supported by the country's political establishment (Seidle, 2002). Unfortunately for them, the national debate on a shift from FPTP would be sustained by the spoken words of David Lange leading into the next election in 1987 (Levine & Roberts, 1993).

Simultaneously, another dynamic was occurring, important for why the November 6, 1993 referendum materialized, and that was Labour breaking pre-election promises in government from 1984 to 1987. While the party during the 1984 election campaign promised Keynesian economic policies, after winning the election, they did the opposite (Debnam, 1992; McRobie, 1991). Led by Finance Minister Roger Douglas, Labour instead adopted market-oriented policies that included eliminating assistance to sectors like industry, promoting foreign investment and privatization, and making the public sector more efficient, the latter especially disastrous for New Zealanders as thousands lost their jobs (Catt, 1991; Debnam, 1990; Nagel, 1994a; Pilon, 2013; Vowles, 1990). The reason why Labour's actions were crucial is that they "had violated [the] most sacred aspect of New Zealand's culture of political trust: its time-honoured tradition of parliamentary parties fulfilling their election manifesto pledges" (Denemark, 1996, p. 100). This led many citizens by 1987 to endorse substituting FPTP in the hopes that an alternative would change behaviour in their Westminster democracy to one where governments and their politicians kept commitments made in election campaigns (Harris, 1992; Vowles, 2000).

Going back to the 1987 election, a crucial moment occurred during the campaign, which was David Lange promising a referendum on MMP in a nationally aired debate (Caruana, 2015; Nagel, 1994b; Pilon, 2013). Two theories have been stated on why Lange made this statement, which both "contradicted his briefing notes and Labour Party policy" (Denemark, 2003, p. 88). First is that he

attempting to outflank Jim Bolger, while the other is that he simply made a mistake (Miller, 2015; Sancton, 2013). Regardless, its impact was massive, as Lange “single-handedly firmly placed back on the political agenda an issue to which he was personally opposed” (Jackson & McRobie, 1998, p. 52). In the election, Labour was re-elected with a second straight majority (McRobie, 1991). However, between 1987 and 1990 (their second term in office), the party decided against holding a referendum on MMP, and pushed the issue of FPTP system change off to the side (Levine & Roberts, 2001; Renwick, 2009). Not only would they not follow through with the promise from their leader, but Labour shuddered at changing their economic policies that had caused so much consternation among New Zealanders (Harris, 2001; Ingle, 1995).

These developments signalled to National that Labour was out of touch with citizens (Lundberg, 2007; Vowles, 1995). During the campaign preceding the next election held in 1990, one National politician, Jim Bolger, tried to exploit this fact, promising a referendum if his party was elected into office (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2012; Renwick, 2010). But, he did so without discussing it with National first, who was just as against reform to MMP as the Labour Party itself (Vowles, 1995; Wilson, 2015). However, they did get on board, aiming to “exploit Labour’s failings and simultaneously offer voters a positive solution to their growing unhappiness with the political system” (Renwick, 2010, p. 201). They saw value in giving citizens the opportunity to decide whether FPTP (which elected politicians to office and a key piece of their Westminster democracy) should be kept, or eliminated (Dawood, 2016; Dutil, 2016; Moscrop, 2016c). Overall, the commitment was one of several by National which stuck with the electorate, who swept them into power in the 1990 election with a big majority (McRobie, 1991). With National in power, and Jim Bolger as head of the country, it would be up to them to decide if a referendum vote would happen. Due in part to Labour’s broken promises, support among citizens for system change of FPTP had increased to 65 percent by then, meaning that it would have been hard for National to back away from their own promise (Vowles, 1995).

It would have been especially difficult for National to withdraw from its referendum commitment once the party started rolling out its economic policies in its first-term back in office from 1990 to 1993. Its overall theme was a continuation of the market-oriented programme of Labour, despite the centre-right party promising not to before the election (Pilon, 2002). The policies, led by Finance Minister Ruth Richardson, included a push to downsize the welfare state, taxing retirement

earnings, and eliminating the collective bargaining system through the *Employment Contracts Act of 1991*, changing to one where sixty percent of New Zealanders following the Act's passage saw their wages stay the same or decrease (Denemark, 2003; Frezza, 2015; James, 1993; Vowles, 1995). Together, New Zealand citizens reacted vehemently to yet another party failing to uphold its pre-election promises (Levine & Roberts, 1994). After a year in power, National's popularity dropped to a paltry 22 percent (Miller & Catt, 1993). Furthermore, "the unrelenting pursuit of unpopular policies by both major parties, each violating their election promises, brought home the fact in the clearest way possible that voters had no viable electoral alternative" (Denemark, 2003, p. 83). Thus, the only tool left to have their presence felt, and bring their democracy back in line, was to push for electoral reform (Renwick, 2010). National could have ignored its commitment to hold a referendum, but they knew it was not feasible to break another made promise (Harris, 1992). Thus, an electoral reform vote would finally take place in New Zealand.

***The 1992 Electoral Reform Referendum-*** The electoral reform referendum held on Saturday September 19, 1992, was a non-binding indicative vote, with a two-part ballot where citizens had to decide in Part A if they wanted to keep or change FPTP (Harris, 1992; Pilon, 2013), and in Part B to choose from one "of four voting systems they would prefer to see run off against FP[T]P in a *binding* referendum at the time of the 1993 general election" (Temple, 1995, p. 235). National's preference was for FPTP, and they "hoped that the two-referendum plan, the first indicative and the second binding, would give the public time to cool on the idea of change" (Denemark, 2003, p. 89). They were incorrect because, in the indicative referendum on September 19, 1992, 84.7 percent of New Zealanders voted against FPTP in Part A, and in Part B, 70.5 percent voted for MMP (Catt, 2013). Overall, turnout for the referendum was 55.2 percent (Temple, 1995). This was considered low for New Zealand, where 80 percent of registered voters cast ballots in national elections, including in 1990 which attracted an 84.4 percent turnout, but not surprising considering the vote was a stand-alone (Catt, 1991; Levine & Roberts, 1993).

However, New Zealanders that went to the polls on September 19 were citizens motivated to modify their country's electoral system (Harris, 1992). They were individuals who had been worn out by Labour and National's neglected promises, along with the disproportional election outcomes of 1978 and 1981, and sought to have their voices heard through the indicative referendum, finding it with MMP, a system given a platform by the RCES (Boston, Levine, McLeay, & Roberts, 1996).

Thus, the results of the vote, and the overwhelming desire for change, forced National to schedule a binding referendum (with the next election) on Saturday November 6, 1993 between FPTP and MMP (Hayward, 2015; Pilon, 2002). Also, they passed “a new *Electoral Act* to implement MMP... [which] would automatically replace the old electoral law if the official result of the 1993 referendum showed that a majority of voters did in fact support a change” (Harris, 2001, p. 34). All was in place for the second electoral reform referendum.

***The 1993 Electoral Reform Referendum-*** Overall, the campaign before the Saturday November 6, 1993 referendum had two major themes. First was Labour and National avoiding endorsing any ballot option (Aimer & Miller, 2002). While both opposed reform, and made this position clearly stated in years prior, the high level of distrust among citizens with their political system was enough for them to avoid taking an official stance, for fear endorsing FPTP would backfire (Nagel, 1994b). While National did promise a referendum leading into the 1990 national election, it was made in part to score points with voters on Labour, who refused to hold such a vote despite a commitment from their leader David Lange that it would take place (Caruana, 2015; Pilon, 2013).

Without these party cues, an education campaign was essential if citizens were to make informed decisions on these competing system options (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b; Johnson, 2013). Fortunately, there was a strong education campaign, with a Referendum Panel put together by the National Government that created ads across all media platforms, along with sending a pamphlet to citizens’ homes, which all aimed to enlighten voters (Boston et al., 1996; Levine & Roberts, 1994). The Panel itself was composed of some of New Zealand’s top political scientists, including Alan McRobie, Nigel Roberts, and Margaret Clark, and dedicated to fairness, focused on crafting messages to voters which only presented the pros and cons of FPTP and MMP (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018a; Nagel, 1994b; Nagel, 2014; Ziemann, 2014). Ultimately, their efforts worked as “three weeks [before November 6, it] announced that polls which it had commissioned found that almost 90 percent of New Zealanders were aware of the impending referendum” (Levine & Roberts, 1994, p. 49). It also resulted in high levels of public knowledge on the issue of system change, and the effects of replacing FPTP with MMP (Nagel, 2014).

The second major theme of the referendum campaign was groups supporting the competing ballot choices. FPTP and MMP were supported respectively by “the Campaign for Better Government” (CBG) and “the Electoral Reform Coalition” (ERC) (Aimer & Miller, 2002, pp. 797 and 798). The



CBG, pushed by business interests, preferring FPTP because they felt it helped produce majorities who promoted economic stability, outspent their opponent 10 to 1 in ads across media platforms like television (Harris, 1993; Vowles, 1995). This meant that regarding the quality of deliberation on the referendum, through advertising separate from the Referendum Panel, the debate was skewed towards the side with deeper financial pockets (Nagel, 1994b; Temple, 1995).

When all was said and done, while the CBG's media buys attracted more New Zealanders back to the status-quo FPTP option, and made the contest seem like a toss-up, it could not stop the desire among a majority of citizens for system change (Caruana, 2015; Roberts, 2016). This was reflected in the results of the electoral reform referendum on Saturday November 6, 1993, as 53.9 percent of citizens who voted endorsed a move to MMP, while 46.1 percent voted for FPTP (Dutil, 2016). The overall turnout was 85.2 percent, which was not surprising as it was held with a national election (a vote which attracted the same turnout) (Catt, 2013; Levine & Roberts, 1994; Pilon, 2013). Following the referendum, the *Electoral Act of 1993* came into place, which installed the usage of MMP starting with the next national election in 1996 (Roberts, 2016).

**Conclusion-** In NZ, a host of events led to electoral reform. Most important was the unhappiness among citizens with both the disproportional election results produced by FPTP in 1978 and 1981, and parties within their Westminster democracy like Labour and National, who broke their pre-election commitments and imposed policies economically that many did not like (Seidle, 2002). This led to the first indicative referendum vote held on Saturday September 19, 1992, where voters largely threw their support around the MMP alternative to FPTP (Boston et al., 1996). Then, in the campaign before the Saturday November 6, 1993 vote, a strong public information campaign from the Referendum Panel gave New Zealanders much needed facts about MMP, which led many to feel confident enough to endorse it (Levine & Roberts, 1994; Nagel, 1994b, 2014). Together, all these events created a climate sufficient enough for system change from FPTP to MMP to occur.

However, this would not be the final vote on the country's electoral system. On November 26, 2011, New Zealanders were asked their opinion on MMP through an indicative referendum, structured on the same lines as the referendum which took place in 1992 (Hayward, 2015; Hunter, 2016). It was a vote which took place concurrent with the national election (Johnson-Myers, 2017). This time, citizens were not looking for change, as in Part A of the ballot, 56.2 percent who voted chose to retain MMP, and, interestingly, in Part B, 31.2 percent endorsed FPTP (Dutil, 2016).

Turnout for the vote 73.5 percent, a solid number (IFES, 2018). In all, the results of the referendum were clear to the National Government led by John Key, the initiators of the vote and who were re-elected to government on the same day, that MMP still had the support of voters (Geddis, 2013). Thus, it remained as the electoral system of New Zealand.

**British Columbia-** In B.C., an election in 1996 ignited debates on whether the province should continue to use FPTP (Milner, 2005). This was because it produced a disproportional result where “the British Columbia Liberals (a center-right party) gained a majority of the popular vote [but] the centre-left New Democratic Party (NDP) won the majority of seats” (Lang, 2007, p. 38). From this vote, the Liberals, and leader Gordon Campbell, took up the cause of electoral reform in the late-1990’s, having been resigned to opposition benches (Carty, 2005; Sancton, 2013). Campbell would adopt an interesting position, believing instead of his party deciding what system their province should use to decide elections, that citizens should be given power to decide on the matter (Gibson, 2005; Ratner, 2009). This led the Liberals, before the 2001 election, to promise a citizens’ assembly to investigate the issue if should they come into power (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018b). They would resoundingly, taking 77 of 79 seats, while at the same time reducing the previously governing NDP to only two (Nagel, 2014). However, the 2001 election using FPTP was also a disproportional result, with the Liberals winning nearly all the legislative seats, despite only getting 57.6 percent of the vote, while the NDP, at 21.6 percent, were vastly underrepresented (Smith, 2010). Also, the B.C. Greens (the third party), got zero seats even though they received a solid percentage of the popular vote at 12.4 (Warren, 2006).

***The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly-*** Because of the 1996 and 2001 elections, the Liberals were pressured to keep their assembly promise now that they were in government. They would retain it, asking academic Gordon Gibson in September of 2002 to construct recommendations for a citizens’ assembly tailor-made for British Columbians to investigate system change of FPTP (Carty, Blais, & Fournier, 2008; Seidle, 2002). After a few months, Gibson published a set of recommendations at year’s end in December (Pilon, 2010). Based on them, the Liberal government established in April 2003 the British Columbia’s Citizens’ Assembly, abbreviated the BCCA, and named Simon Fraser’s Jack Blaney as its chair (British Columbia. Ministry of Attorney General, 2003; French, 2012). There are three important things relevant about the BCCA to state. First, as Warren and Pearse (2008, p. 11) put it, their “task was to review and assess the province’s current

electoral system, and to recommend, if appropriate, an alternative system.” Second, the BCCA was instructed that “should [they] recommend a change, [that they] limit its recommendation to one model only that must be compatible with the Constitution of Canada and the Westminster parliamentary system” (Rainey & Rainey Jr, 2008, p. 8). Finally, if an alternative was advocated, it would be put to voters in a referendum on Tuesday May 17, 2005, the same day as the next provincial election (British Columbia. Ministry of Attorney General, 2004).

The Liberals saw value in asking citizens if they wanted to alter an important component of their Westminster democracy, FPTP (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018a; Dutil, 2016; Moscrop, 2016c). But, in building the rules for a future referendum, the Liberals stated that for electoral reform to occur, the BCCA’s recommendation needed to get majority support in 48 of 79 ridings (equivalent to 60 percent), and 60 percent across the province (Gastil & Richards, 2013; Milner, 2005). To some observers, the adoption of these two thresholds by the Liberals was a curious move, especially because Gordon Gibson himself did not advocate it (Rainey & Rainey Jr, 2008; Smith, 2009). However, just like in New Zealand, the truth in British Columbia was that incumbent parties such as the Liberals liked FPTP because it gave them an opportunity to win single-party majorities (Bowler et al., 2002, 2006). This was the opinion of Sharman (2007, p. 14 as cited in Flinders 2010, p. 52), who explained; “[Campbell] could only gain the support of his parliamentary party [the Liberals] if the acceptance of a citizens’ assembly were hedged about with procedural limits which had a good chance of guaranteeing rejection.” Gordon Campbell himself added in April 2003, as the BCCA was being pieced together, that electoral reform was “a fundamental and significant change, and we therefore have placed a double approval process in place” (Campbell, 2003, p. 6357). For others, it appeared the Liberals, forgetting the fact that though FPTP ushered them into office in 2001, also kept them out five years earlier in 1996, were constructing a higher barrier for institutional change much like National with their pair of referendums in New Zealand (Denemark, 2003; Rainey & Rainey Jr, 2008).

When all was finished, the BCCA, composed of 160 people, a man and woman from each riding, along with two people from the Nisga’a First Nation, spent 2004 studying both FPTP and a range of other electoral systems, and released their report at year’s end on December 10 (Hayward, 2014; Ratner, 2005; Warren, 2006). They did recommend an alternative to FPTP, which was STV (Pepall, 2010). In the BCCA’s opinion, the decision to recommend STV (termed as BC-STV), was made

because it rated well on local representation along with voter choice, two values governing their evaluation of all electoral systems (Caruana, 2015; Elections BC and the Legislative Library of British Columbia, 2014). Specifically, according to Craig Henschel, one of the BCCA's members, STV was picked as it "uses multiple [MLAs] in a district to represent multiple points of view...[and] STV is a preferential ballot" (Henschel, 2016, p. 3). Overall, the BCCA's endorsement meant that on the 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2005, a referendum would occur in British Columbia (British Columbia. Ministry of Attorney General, 2003).

***The 2005 Electoral Reform Referendum-*** In the electoral reform referendum on Tuesday May 17, 2005, the STV proposal by the BCCA came close to winning, achieving 57.7 percent support across the province, and majority support in every B.C. riding but Kamloops and Kamloops-North Thompson (Elections BC and the Legislative Library, 2014). Turnout for the referendum was 58.2 percent, the same as the provincial election vote which took place on the same day (Dutil, 2016).

There were two themes which characterized the campaign leading into the referendum on BC-STV. First was an avoidance of the Liberal and NDP parties in taking a stance on whether citizens should endorse, or reject electoral system change (Pilon, 2010). The Liberal position was based largely to the view of their leader Gordon Campbell, who believed provincial voters should decide on the matter on their own (Carty et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the NDP preferred to focus on winning the most seats possible in the election, having only won two in 2001 (French, 2012; Miller, 2015). The second theme was little public education on STV, unlike the case for New Zealand, where citizens were inundated with information about MMP (Canada. Parliament, 2016; Caruana, 2013; Levine & Roberts, 1994). So, what explained the strong showing for BC-STV in the May 17, 2005 vote? As the BCCA Director of Research Ken Carty put it, "the substantial support for reform in the B.C. referendum was due to the trust that voters placed in the Citizens Assembly process, rather than a deep understanding of the mechanisms of electoral system reform" (Canada. Parliament, 2016, p. 32). In all, while BC-STV met one of the "threshold[s], passing in 77 of 79 districts...it fell 2.3% short of the [province-wide] threshold" (Warren, 2006, p. 11). This meant B.C. would have no new electoral system. Even if the Liberals did not take a stance on the referendum, opposition displayed by caucus members to electoral reform in years prior, leading to the installation of these two thresholds, was enough to prevent the BCCA's recommended alternative to FPTP from winning on May 17, 2005 (Miller, 2015). However, since the results of the referendum indicated that BC-

STV was well-supported, it was up to the party, re-elected to a smaller majority government of forty-six seats that same day, to decide how to proceed on the issue (Smith, 2010).

The decision they reached in their second term from 2005 and 2009 was that another referendum was needed to settle the provincial debate on electoral reform (Cross, 2005; Dutil, 2016). It was originally scheduled for November 2008, but moved so that it would take place simultaneously with the next provincial vote on Tuesday May 12, 2009 (Canada. Parliament, 2009). Its rules would be the same as 2005, including using the same two thresholds, with the Liberal justification for this coming from their Minister of Justice, Wally Oppal, who told NDP parliamentarian (and future Premier) John Horgan on March 31, 2008, that STV is “a significant change in the way we vote. For that reason, it was thought...The intent was that we have a more-than-bare majority.” (Oppal, 2008b, p. 10640). This time though, the Liberals attempted to create a strong public education campaign, opening their Referendum Information Office that was designed to educate British Columbians on FPTP and BC-STV (Pal, 2012; Wilson, 2009). As well, the Liberals set-up an “Electoral Boundaries Commission [that] would provide the public with boundary maps indicating potential constituencies under both STV and the current [FPTP] system” (Ratner, 2008, p. 146). Finally, the government also handed a half-million dollars to both in favor, and against STV groups, appropriately called YES-STV and NO-STV (Oppal, 2008a; Pilon, 2010).

***The 2009 Electoral Reform Referendum-*** In the second referendum on Tuesday May 12, 2009, BC-STV attained only 39.1 percent of the votes cast across the province, and over 50 percent backing in just eight constituencies, all located in and around Vancouver and Victoria (Elections BC and the Legislative Library of British Columbia, 2014). Turnout for the referendum was 51 percent, same as the provincial election held concurrently (Dutil, 2016; Smith, 2010). All in all, the results from May 12, 2009 meant that, again, reform would not occur because the BCCA’s recommendation did clear the Liberal government’s two thresholds (Hunter, 2016). Several overall factors explained this referendum result. First, as Garnett (2014, p. 67) put it, “the public was less interested in electoral system change than they had been only 5 years earlier.” This was because of the reality that with the BCCA having occurred five years beforehand, many voters simply had forgotten about it and the work it accomplished (Kroll & Swann, 2015). Moreover, the provincial election of 2005, which saw the Liberals gain a majority government of forty-six seats, was not a disproportional election result as those of 1996 and 2001 (Elections BC and the Legislative Library

of British Columbia, 2014; Pilon, 2010; Warren, 2006). Second, on the referendum campaign itself, public information efforts were poorly executed, failing to educate citizens on STV, and a lack of party cues existed, with the Liberals and the NDP staying neutral, focused instead on defeating the other in the provincial election (Pal, 2012; Pilon, 2010). Last, the NO-STV group made more claims than YES-STV which resonated, including the massive growth in provincial constituencies under single-transferable vote compared to first-past-the-post (Wilson, 2009). Put together, debates on FPTP did not result in a shift to STV through the May 12, 2009 referendum, and after the Liberals were elected to a third majority, they dropped the issue entirely (Pilon, 2010; Smith, 2010).

**Conclusion-** There were a host of events leading to the failure of efforts to replace FPTP in British Columbia. It started with the 1996, and 2001 disproportional provincial elections, leading to the formation of the BCCA, who recommended STV in late-2004 (Holman, 2013; Milner, 2005). That recommendation was put to voters in two separate electoral reform referendums: one on May 17, 2005, and the other on May 12, 2009. However, in both, change did not occur because BC-STV did not reach the thresholds of support created by Campbell and the Liberals (Canada. Parliament, 2009). In the latter referendum, the reason for this was that many British Columbians did not feel an urge to vote against FPTP and for STV (Pilon, 2010). This was because “[m]emory of the Citizens’ Assembly had faded during the more than four years since it had disbanded, and the 2005 provincial election produced a more normal outcome, reducing concern about systemic failings of [first-past-the-post]” (Nagel, 2014, p. 17). It also did not help that citizens were not provided with a strong public information campaign on the STV option (Pal, 2012; Pilon, 2010). Overall, these points were central in why FPTP withstood a challenge from STV. However, with the NDP led by John Horgan taking power in 2017 through a confidence-and-supply agreement with the B.C. Greens, they have introduced plans for another electoral reform referendum. It would take place in the second half of 2018, and ask voters if they preferred keeping FPTP, or shift to one of three alternatives, including MMP (British Columbia. Ministry of Attorney General, 2018). Time will only tell the results of this vote for the province of British Columbia.

## CHAPTER 3- Deliberative Democracy and Mediated Deliberation

My thesis draws on the theory of deliberative democracy to examine the coverage provided by the print media of NZ and B.C. ahead of their referendums. This theory is relatively recent, formed by political theorists in the 1980's in response to the state of Western democracies, where there was an erosion of trust towards parties and their elected representatives (Kumar, 2018; Rosenberg, 2007). Citizens viewed their democracies as "little more than the aggregation of supposedly fixed preferences of individual voters or a space of bargaining between utility-maximizing interest groups" (Pilon, 2009, p. 3). This led scholars (ex: Cohen, 1997; Fishkin, 2009; Guttman & Thompson, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999), to develop the normative theory of deliberative democracy, explaining how these democracies should function (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Thompson, 2008a). Its core definition was "a family of views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-government" (Bohman, 1998, p. 401). The assertion was made that deliberation would enhance democracies because it allows citizens to offer input on issues concerning them (Chambers, 2003; Elton, 2003).

Once the theory was developed, it gained notoriety, and led others to construct ideals on how deliberation can best be implemented today (Rosenberg, 2007). As explained by Levy (2013), eight ideals are advocated, which are that deliberation needs to be: inclusive, cooperative, open-minded, reflective, holistic, supported with reason-giving, other-regarding, and uncoerced. The first ideal, inclusivity, explained that a "deliberation should, ideally, be open to [anyone and any perspective]...to influence the process" (Mansbridge et al., 2010, p. 65). Additionally, it was also stated that information should be given in a deliberation, one that allows deliberators to make better choices on a discussed topic (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil & Richards, 2013). Second, a deliberation required people making decisions as a collective group (not on their own) by collaborating with each other (Levy, 2013). The third discussed that individuals should keep their minds open when deliberating (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). Also, as Chambers (2003, p. 309) stated, they should be willing to change their "preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants." Fourth, scholars wrote that individuals should reflect while deliberating, and ponder what they have heard (Gastil & Richards, 2013). The fifth required a "[d]eliberation [be] holistic, accommodating or trading off diverse values, [and] costs and benefits, rather than

viewing...[choices] in isolation” (Levy, 2013, p. 8). Sixth, theorists stated if individuals have viewpoints, they should be supported with reasons that are both adequate and understandable, and given weight in a deliberation (Dryzek, 2007; Fishkin, 2011; Mansbridge et al., 2010; Thompson, 2008a). Seventh, citizens were asked to respect others and their opinions (Cohen, 1997; Cooke, 2000). The eighth ideal recommended that no one in a deliberation should be coerced to accept a resolution that they do not agree or support (Kuyper, 2012; Levy, 2013).

Critically, these ideals led to a second phase for deliberative democracy beginning in the 1990’s (Parkinson, 2003). This was where “[a]ctivists, theorists, and government officials collaborated on introducing into democratic politics many new varieties of deliberative forums” (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 25). These were called mini-publics as they consisted of small clusters of people deliberating face-to-face on important societal topics and issues (Fishkin, 2009; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). Examples included “constituent surveys, public opinion polls, town hall meetings, focus groups, policy conferences, and policy round tables” (Elton, 2003, p. 229). One instance comes from B.C., where the BCCA was created in 2003, a forum where citizens deliberated on the right electoral system for their province (Gibson, 2005; Pilon, 2009). Overall, all of these mini-publics aimed to achieve the ideals developed in phase one of deliberative democracy (Goodin, 2003). The reason is that it was thought citizen-made “decisions resulting from deliberation are likely to be more legitimate, more reasonable... and more politically viable” (Warren, 2007, p. 272). But, their effect was that it resulted in scholars undertaking empirical investigations on whether, in them, the ideals from the previous phase could be achieved (Thompson, 2008a). This was at the expense though of looking at media deliberation, creating a literature gap I aimed to fill (Chambers, 2009).

**Scale Problem with Mini-Publics and Mediated Deliberation-** There was a serious issue though with the mini-publics which formed in the second phase of deliberative democracy. It was a scale problem because, as Elliott (2015, p. 204) put it, “mini-publics are by their nature small institutions with few participants compared to the size of the total population of any polity.” Scholars wrote that mini-publics allow for deliberation to occur with small numbers of individuals but is essentially ineffective for societies at large (Parkinson, 2003; Pilon, 2009). Because of this conundrum, others began formulating theories on how deliberation could occur in the modern-day, and effect the wider public (Curato & Ong, 2014). An important one was called mediated deliberation and produced by Northwestern professor Benjamin Page in his 1996 book titled *Who Deliberates? Mass Media and*



*Modern Democracy*, who argued that deliberation in today's world should be “*mediated*, with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens talking to each other and to the public through mass media of communications” (Page, 1996, p. 1). It comprised of communicators, like newspaper writers, discussing societal matters on their media platforms, which are consumable by any citizen who has access to them (Rinke, 2016; Wessler & Schultz, 2007).

**The Mass Media as a Deliberative Environment-** My thesis takes the theory of mediated deliberation as a point of departure. I took a different turn from many, investigating if the mass (the print) media in NZ and B.C. provided a deliberative environment before their referendums. This is indeed critical before such a vote, because citizens usually regard issues like electoral system change as perplexing, and one they do not ponder daily (Christin et al., 2002; LeDuc et al., 2008). Thus, the onus is on the mass media in the campaign prior to such a referendum to ensure they have supplied a deliberative environment, and give citizens the knowledge needed to make informed ballot choices from competing options (Renwick & Lamb, 2013). The question is, how can the media provide such an environment?

First, they must provide citizens with accurate and comprehensive information on the vote (Ul-Haque & Sheikh, 1993; Vowles, 2013). Scholars have noted that the media does have the potential to be such a deliberative vehicle (Gerth & Siegert, 2012). This is because they “have developed techniques and professional procedures which enable them to collect and process large amounts of information and distribute it” (Votmer, 2000, p. 3). By functioning in this manner, the media can help citizens make informed choices on voting-day because, during the campaign, they will have learned more on the various electoral system options present on the referendum ballot (Banducci & Stevens, 2011). Second, the mass media can provide an environment of deliberation by allowing all opinions to be articulated (Müller & Wüest, 2009). Coverage must be packaged and presented to media audiences that exposes them to different positions on the referendum issue (Wessler, 2008). If this were to occur, the media can aid citizens to make informed ballot choices, as they have been given the chance to confirm their stance after absorbing various viewpoints (Maia, 2009). Last, the mass media should ensure that speakers and writers, instead of just stating their views, provide a backing through reasoning for why they have a certain positional stance on the referendum (Mansbridge et al., 2012; Rowbottom, 2013). Adopting this strategy also assists

citizens, as it presents them an opportunity, for each electoral system option on the ballot, to process “the reasons and values underlying [different] points of view” (Moy & Gastil, 2006, p. 445).

**Criticisms of Mass Media Coverage During Referendum Campaigns-** There are two criticisms regarding the coverage the mass media provides in referendum campaigns. First is that they do not provide the required information for citizens to make informed ballot choices (Fog, 2013). Second, they are one-sided in their presentation of the issues surrounding the referendum, and are negative in their tone (Garnett, 2014; Rinke, 2016). Overall, the effect of this type of coverage is it leads to people voting against change on their referendum ballots, and endorsing the option retaining the status-quo (Christin et al., 2002). Indeed, coverage resembling this was found in studies by Hoff (2009), LeDuc et al. (2008), LeDuc (2011), and Pilon (2009), who looked at the campaign before the 2007 Ontario referendum between the status-quo FPTP and proposed MMP alternative, held on the 10<sup>th</sup> of October (Stephenson & Tanguay, 2009).

These studies determined the mass media, specifically the print media’s quantity, and balance of coverage, was low and weak respectively. For quantity, Hoff (2009) explained that low coverage was evident because from “September 24 [to] October 10,” a two-and-a-half-week period, “[t]he *Globe and Mail* made no mention of the referendum on 9 days of the 17 days monitored, the *Ottawa Citizen* had 8 days with no coverage and the *Toronto Star* 4 days” (pp. 31 and 47). This lack of coverage translated into a low citizen awareness on the MMP alternative option to FPTP, one agreed with by LeDuc (2011), who provided evidence that “three-quarters of respondents in a poll taken in the first week of October indicated that they had heard ‘only a little’ or ‘nothing at all’ about the [electoral reform referendum] issue” (p. 561). Thus, LeDuc et al. (2008) stated that since the print media provided a low coverage quantity in the referendum campaign, specifically on MMP, many Ontarians did not feel comfortable enough to support it. This was why, on referendum day, 63 percent of those who voted cast ballots to FPTP (Dutil, 2016). Finally, regarding balance, Pilon (2009)’s analysis with “the *Toronto Star*, the *Globe and Mail*, the *National Post*, the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Hamilton Spectator*” saw that campaign coverage from these five broadsheets was weak and one-sided, finding that it “was unbalanced in all cases in terms of [the] editorial and columnist opinion, which were overwhelming[ly] opposed to the MMP proposal” (pp. 7 and 9).

**Print Media Deliberation Before an Electoral Reform Referendum-** To investigate deliberation before New Zealand and British Columbia’s electoral reform referendums, I examined the print

media, looking at broadsheet newspapers. In the early-1990 and late-2000's time-periods, when the country and province held their respective referendums, television was the dominant platform citizens used to gather information (Bastedo, Chu, & Hilderman, 2012; Hayward & Rudd, 2002). Also, by the end of the new millennium's first decade, digital media had become a popular way for people to learn about what is happening around them (Temple, 2008). However, both have their weaknesses. With regards to television, this included a "brevity of television news items, the need for good televisual performers or 'talent', and the dependency on good pictures" (Craig, 2004, p. 8). For digital media, "it is likely that one encounters fewer articles, and certainly fewer *complete* articles...compared to paging through a printed paper...[due to its] non-linear, layered structure" (De Waal et al., 2005, pp. 56-57). These realities made the two platforms less preferable for me to study than the print media. This platform, notably broadsheets known as the quality press, are superior at displaying comprehensive coverage on a topic like electoral system change in a referendum, one presented through the perspective of people with different opinions, that allows citizens to gain a comprehension on the matter (Hackett & Gruneau, 2000; Norris, 2000; Roberts & Levine, 1996). Also, information presented to citizens is written on paper, which helps them remember more than if they absorbed it through another medium (Vangshardt, 2009). In all, these traits made NZ and B.C.'s print media the most likely platforms to foster mediated deliberation.

**Three Indicators-** In the literature, there are three indicators developed by scholars like Hoff (2009), LeDuc (2011), LeDuc et al. (2008), Pilon (2009), and Renwick and Lamb (2013), to evaluate media coverage during referendum campaigns. An indicator is defined as "a quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to [measure or evaluate something]" (Church & Rogers, 2006, p. 44). Since I undertook a similar task as the mentioned scholars, it was natural to operationalize their indicators, but modify them slightly. In this thesis, the indicators used are: quantity of coverage, balance of coverage, and presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions. All are useful, "pick[ing] up themes that have already been pursued in similar studies of other referendum debates" (Renwick & Lamb, 2013, p. 295). Furthermore, they help to compare, and contrast results gathered from multiple cases (Hales, 2010).

*Indicator #1- Quantity of Coverage-* My first indicator is quantity of coverage. It is vital the print media cover an electoral reform referendum campaign through publishing articles on the upcoming vote (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 2009). This is because these

“[r]eferendums ask voters to offer a verdict on a particular question, not [to] choose between parties or select a government” (Jenkins & Mendelsohn, 2001, p. 218). Indeed, in NZ and B.C., citizens were asked to endorse one of two competing systems, FPTP or MMP in the former, and FPTP or STV in the latter (Renwick, 2010; Sancton, 2013). Thus, the onus goes on platforms like print to provide citizens with information so that they can understand the merits and drawbacks of each electoral option, and knowledgeably pick one of them on their ballots (Blidook, 2009; Fishkin, 2009; Smith & Tolbert, 2004). It is vital too for publications to have a strategy for when they publish articles. Per Marquis, Schaub, and Gerber (2011, p. 131), “[if] all campaign coverage takes place in a last-minute avalanche, then it is [not] likely to [help] citizens.” But, if they are provided with information over several weeks immediately before the vote, including an uptick in the final week, the height of a referendum campaign, citizens will be aided greatly to make informed ballot decisions (Claibourn, 2008; Higgins, 2006; Marquis & Bergman, 2009).

*Indicator #2- Balance of Coverage-* My second indicator is balance of coverage. It is critical print news outlets exhibit balance in an electoral referendum campaign by publishing articles both in favor, and against system change, specifically editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, who “represent one view and have the space to make reasoned appeals in support of them” (Pilon, 2009, p. 6). These is because these votes center on a binary choice (Tresch, 2012). Specifically, in NZ and B.C., citizens were asked if they either approved, or disapproved of shifting away from FPTP (Johnson-Myers, 2017; Pal, 2012). Thus, to show balanced coverage, opinion-leading sections in newspapers are “responsible to present both sides of [the] issue fairly in order to allow the voting public to decide [on the matter]” (LeDuc et al., 2008, p. 36).

Publishing neutral articles, ones that do not provide a distinct viewpoint on the issue of electoral reform, or that straddle the line by providing support and opposition, are less impactful for citizens because there is no neutral ballot choice (Johnson, 2013; Qvortrup, 2000). Instead, what publications must do so that they can help citizens make an informed judgement is present, in near equal or equal, and multiple numbers, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters, with the in favor, and against position (Jenkins & Mendelsohn, 2001; Marquis, Schaub, & Gerber, 2011; Tresch, 2012; Rowbottom, 2013). In doing so, the print media can showcase balanced coverage, one strong enough to allow citizens to process the pair of opinions they read on the topic and decide what stance to take on referendum day (Maia, 2012).

*Indicator #3- Presence and Type of Reasoning to Support Taken Positions-* My last indicator is the presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions. It is essential in the campaign preceding an electoral reform referendum that the print platform show editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, who back their non-neutral stances with reasons on the issue surrounding this vote (Ettema, 2007; Maia, 2009). This is important, as it helps citizens build a base of knowledge regarding the advantages and disadvantages to changing their electoral system (Moges, 2012; Rinke, 2016). If articles do not connect their position to a reason, citizens do not gain the foundation needed to make an informed choice on their ballots (Rinke, Wessler, Löb, & Weinmann, 2013).

Furthermore, it is not only vital that non-neutral articles back their positional stances with reasons, but use diverse forms of reasoning too (Christians et al., 2009; Gerth, Dahinden, & Siegert, 2011). To show diversity, there are four types which should appear in the print media in an electoral reform referendum campaign: the speculative, logical, evidentiary, and expert-informed (Wessler, 2008). Speculation is “[t]he forming of a theory or conjecture without firm evidence” (“Speculation”, 2018). Logic is “[r]easoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity” (“Logic”, 2018). The third, evidentiary, is a form of reasoning which uses actual evidence to support taken positions (Strandberg & Berg, 2013). Finally, expert-informed, refers to reasoning supported by experts with background on topics like electoral reform greater than most (Wessler, 2005). Overall, all four represent types which citizens can understand, and agree or disagree with (Walsh, 2007). Of the quartet, the evidentiary and expert-informed, as they are reasoning types which employ the usage of facts of knowledge, are most helpful for citizens to form an opinion on the referendum issue (Renwick & Lamb, 2013). The only downside to the expert-informed reasoning is that “experts can be biased [as t]he world in which they communicate...be deeply self-referential” (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 14). In closing, if the print media publishes articles in the three highlighted types who back their non-neutral positions on the issue of system change with reasoning, and a diversity of them, citizens gain knowledge needed to make an informed ballot choice on voting day (Habermas, 2006; Maia, 2009; Rademacher, Gerth, & Siegert, 2011).

## CHAPTER 4- Corpus and Methodology

**The Corpus-** My corpus is a compilation, from the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, of news items, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor. The general rationale behind this corpus selection is that they are all drawn from broadsheets, written in the English language, and are the four main types of articles produced by this platform (Hunston, 2006).

*News items-* The role of news items in a print media publication is to present citizens with educational and understandable information on relevant issues concerning them (Örnebring, 2007). This is done without bias, simply presenting details on these matters, without an opinion provided (Christians et al., 2009; Rademacher et al., 2011).

*Editorials-* Editorial pieces are written by the editorial board of a publication (Craig, 2004; Moldoff, 2008). They emerged in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and are vital because they reflect the position of outlets on societal matters (Orosa, Garcia, & Santorum, 2013; Tresch, 2012). On them, editorials, “marked with [a] newspaper’s masthead...offer opinion and advice to their readership on behalf of the newspaper itself, in such a way that the weight of the institution is explicitly cited to substantiate the authority of the voice” (Higgins, 2006, p. 33). Importantly, by “tak[ing] institutional stands on issues and provid[ing] a forum for the exchange of information” (Hynds, 1984, p. 639), they can influence citizens to act a certain way and to adopt specific positions (Ul Haque & Sheikh, 1993).

*Op-ed/Opinion Columns-* Op-ed/opinion columns debuted in September 1970 in the United States (Markel, 2014). From then, they have allowed writers to express their views in print publications (Song, 2004). Their dominant quality is subjectivity (Anderson, 2007). These pieces are where writers take a position and display their opinions on a matter (Sommer & Maycroft, 2008). Importantly, “[r]esearch on opinion journalism suggests that...[op-ed/opinion columns can] impact public opinion regarding important issues and potentially influence voting decisions” (Golan, 2010, p. 51). Overall, there are two types of people who write these articles: those employed in a print publication, and guest writers (Golan & Wanta, 2004). It is usual for a publication like a quality broadsheet in a referendum campaign to publish articles “commissioned on a one-off basis, from guest journalists, from interested politicians, or from accomplished literary figures” (Higgins, 2006, p. 33).

*Letters to the Editor*- Letters to the editor are the final main article type. They allow citizens to state their opinions on a topic they feel strongly on to write in about (Ul Haque & Sheikh, 1993). Furthermore, the letters section in a print publication have been confirmed by scholars as “a very visible forum for debate and [for] influencing public opinion” (Strandberg & Berg, 2013, p. 134). This is because humans are “more interested in the views of other readers than in what professional newsmen have to say” (Rosenthal, 1969, p. 114 as cited in Wahl-Jorgensen, 2004, p. 91). Many though do not think these articles represent societal opinion because employees of a print publication decide which letters will be shown (Walkosz, 2008). However, for this thesis, this gatekeeping characteristic is important as these letters to the editor, with news items, editorials, and op-ed/opinion columns, determined whether the print media of NZ and B.C. provided an environment of deliberation so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. As Gregory and Hutchins (2004, p. 188) described on letters and gatekeeping, “[i]t is this mediation process that has a fundamental effect on the content and shape of public communication” on societal issues.

**Compilation of the Initial and Final Corpus**- I followed three guidelines to compile an initial corpus of print media articles from the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*. The first guideline was that I compiled articles only if they were written in either the news, editorial, op-ed/opinion column, or letter to the editor type. Second, I included articles from these four only if they discussed the electoral reform referendum relevant to them. For the *Herald* and the *Post*, that was their country’s November 6, 1993 vote, while for the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist*, their province’s vote on May 12, 2009. Third, I collected articles only if they were written in the immediate month leading into their respective referendums.

Notably, there was a central difference in the search strategy I used to compile an initial corpus from these print publications. The difference was that articles were taken manually from the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* using microfilm reels, while articles from the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* were gathered digitally using the ProQuest database, specifically through Canadian Newstream, “which provide[s]...textual results from a finite set of [publications] from major cities in each Canadian province or territory” (Rachul, Ries, & Caulfield, 2011, p. 201). Using different search strategies to compile my initial corpus was unavoidable because no digital archives existed for the *Herald* and the *Post*. Regarding ProQuest, a limitation is that it just displays the text of published articles, and not aspects like column inches or coverage volume (British

Columbia Electronic Library Network, 2017; Chong & Druckman, 2013). This funnelled down the unit of analysis for my thesis, referring to “what is being studied [and] observed” to one thing: print media articles in their entirety (Patel, 2009, p. 2). In content analysis, it is common for a unit of analysis to be article parts like utterances, paragraphs, or sentences (Maia, 2009; Rinke, 2016; Wessler, 2005). For me however, to evaluate the broadsheets under my three indicators, and answer my eight questions, it was necessary to focus on the text of *entire articles*.

To compile articles from the New Zealand newspapers, I went through four microfilm reels of the *New Zealand Herald*, each covering a ten-day period, and two for the *Evening Post*, each covering a calendar month. Any article from the pair which met the three guidelines of my initial corpus was cropped and saved onto a USB stick.

Meanwhile, to compile articles from the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, I used the following ten search words on ProQuest’s Canadian Newstream database:

**Table 4.1-** Search Words Entered on ProQuest’s Canadian Newstream Database

1. “British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly”	6. “proportional representation”
2. “British Columbia referendum”	7. “first-past-the-post”
3. “BC-STV”	8. “electoral reform”
4. “STV”	9. “referendum”
5. “single transferable vote”	10. “voting system”

For these ten, I selected a date range representing the immediate month leading into British Columbia’s referendum, which was April 12 to May 12, 2009. After this, results were displayed for the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist*, and a PDF for each (with the assistance of ProQuest) was collected, which included compiled articles in their entirety. However, since these articles were gathered digitally, I had not read through them beforehand. This necessitated an additional step not required for my NZ case as I did a manual search using microfilm reels, allowing me to have read through the text of articles in the *Herald* and the *Post* before including any in my initial corpus. For my B.C. case, that step was reading through articles gathered digitally for the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist*, and excluding some according to my three guidelines. From the *Vancouver Sun*, I excluded five articles, two of them duplicates to pieces ProQuest had already collected for me, and three describing referendums in other regions of the world like South Sudan, Myanmar, and



Taiwan, captured because of using the search term “referendum” (ex: Manthorpe, 2009, p. D9). As for the *Victoria Times Colonist*, I excluded four articles, all explaining referendums irrelevant to the two I focused on in this thesis. One talked about a 1982 vote for a pub in the South Victoria neighborhood of Fairfield, while the remaining three described a 2002 vote to build a hockey arena in the heart of the city (ex: Cleverley, 2009, p. A1). After the exclusions were made, I now had an initial corpus of articles from the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*.

**Table 4.2-** Initial Corpus for each Print Media Publication

<b>Print Media Publication</b>	<b>Number of Articles in the Initial Corpus</b>
<b>1. The <i>New Zealand Herald</i></b>	<b>165 articles</b>
<b>2. The <i>Evening Post</i></b>	<b>144 articles</b>
<b>3. The <i>Vancouver Sun</i></b>	<b>63 articles</b>
<b>4. The <i>Victoria Times Colonist</i></b>	<b>76 articles</b>

As evidenced, each publication had a different total of initial corpus articles. The two broadsheets from New Zealand’s print media led the way, with the *New Zealand Herald* first at 165 articles, and the *Evening Post* second at 144. They were followed by the pair from B.C., with the *Victoria Times Colonist* tops with an initial corpus of 76, and then the *Vancouver Sun* at 63 articles.

Importantly, to ensure the different search strategies I used between my two cases did not affect the number of gathered articles, I went through microfilm reels of the *Sun*, and compared the results I collected manually with the digital results from ProQuest, seeing no differences in the initial corpus amount.

After compiling the initial corpus, I had to put together a final corpus. This step involved omitting print articles according to two main criteria. The first was that articles focused on matters related to their respective referendums which was unhelpful in allowing citizens to make informed ballot choices. For instance, from NZ, a November 3, 1993 article from the *New Zealand Herald* discussed matters like polls which would be taken following the country’s November 6 electoral reform referendum that would ask voters why they endorsed either FPTP or MMP (see Gleeson, 1993, p. 5). The second criteria for omission was that articles were focused on the election happening concurrently in New Zealand and British Columbia, and only provided a sentence or

two on the referendum vote between FPTP and the alternative. An example, from B.C., is a May 9, 2009 editorial from the *Victoria Times Colonist*, which spent the entire article talking about the election battle between the Liberals and the NDP, and at the end promised that the next day, they would discuss the FPTP vs. STV electoral reform referendum (see “Voting only way”, 2009, p. A16). In total, using these two criteria, I was able to omit several articles from the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, shown below:

**Table 4.3-** Omitted Articles for each Print Media Publication

<b>Print Media Publication</b>	<b>Number of Omitted Articles</b>
<b>1. The <i>New Zealand Herald</i></b>	<b>26 articles</b>
<b>2. The <i>Evening Post</i></b>	<b>6 articles</b>
<b>3. The <i>Vancouver Sun</i></b>	<b>14 articles</b>
<b>4. The <i>Victoria Times Colonist</i></b>	<b>11 articles</b>

Once the omissions were completed, I had a final corpus, which I will present in Chapter 5 as it represents the results for the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* under indicator one: quantity of coverage.

**Print Media Publications-** There were three reasons why I selected the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*. First, all served the biggest urban metropolises in their country or province during the time of their respective electoral reform referendums. In NZ, the *Herald* served Auckland, and the *Post* served Wellington (Conway, 1981). As for British Columbia, the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* were produced for Vancouver and Victoria respectively. Second, the quartet all had healthy circulation in the period the referendums relevant to them were taking place. For NZ, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* had average daily circulation numbers of 246,092 and 71,092 copies respectively around their country’s November 6, 1993 referendum (The Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd, 1993). Meanwhile, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* had an average daily circulation of 178,672 and 62,709 copies respectively around their province’s May 12, 2009 vote (Newspapers Canada, 2010). Third, all four publications are considered as daily broadsheet newspapers. This can be a reference to publication aspects like column size (Luck, 2015). For my thesis, however, the four were chosen because they are labelled as the quality press, able to provide an informative, detailed and

educational description to citizens of important political issues concerning them, like an electoral reform referendum (Malović & Vilović, 2004). In comparison, their competitor in the print media, tabloids, focus on “human interest or life style [stories]” (Richardson & Stanyer, 2011, p. 991) like the lives of movie star and television personalities (Rogers, 2018).

**Mixed Methods and Content Analysis-** I used a mixed methods research design to analyze the print media coverage from New Zealand and British Columbia. Mixed methods research refers to when a “researcher collects and analyzes both qualitative and quantitative data rigorously in response to research questions and...integrates (or mixes or combines) the two forms of data and their results” (Creswell & Piano Clark, 2018, p. 7). The basis behind this strategy is “that the use of [these two] approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone” (Creswell & Piano Clark, 2007, p. 5). In this thesis, I incorporated a mixed method research design in using both a quantitative, and qualitative content analysis.

*Indicator One- Quantity of Coverage:* My first indicator used a quantitative content analysis to measure the quantity of coverage provided by NZ and B.C.’s print media in the campaign before their referendums. Specifically, I tallied the number of news items, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor (which made it to my final corpus) published by the broadsheets I selected. The first step in doing so was to manually categorize the articles for the pair of print publications from New Zealand, as content was culled from the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* using microfilm reels. Once this task was finished, the second step was to label articles from the quartet per the calendar month, week, and day they were published.

Regarding New Zealand, the five-week period up to their referendum was:

- a) Week #1- Wednesday October 6 to Tuesday October 12
- b) Week #2- Wednesday October 13 to Tuesday October 19
- c) Week #3- Wednesday October 20 to Tuesday October 26
- d) Week #4- Wednesday October 27 to Tuesday November 2
- e) Week #5- Wednesday November 3 to Saturday November 6 (voting-day)

As for British Columbia, their five-week period was:

- a) Week #1- Sunday April 12 to Saturday April 18
- b) Week #2- Sunday April 19 to Saturday April 25

- c) Week #3- Sunday April 26 to Saturday May 2
- d) Week #4- Sunday May 3 to Saturday May 9
- e) Week #5- Sunday May 10 to Tuesday May 12 (voting-day)

Following the labelling, the final step involved counting the total number of articles published by each newspaper. After this was completed, I was able to classify the quantity of coverage provided by New Zealand and British Columbia's print media under indicator one as either low, moderate or high.

The question that emerges when operationalizing an indicator such as this is, what is considered as low, moderate or high quantity of coverage in a campaign leading into a referendum; is there evidence which could provide benchmarks? Fortunately, previous mediated deliberation studies have used a similar classification. In the work by Renwick and Lamb (2013), they found coverage was high from Italian broadsheets like *Corriere della Sera* on their country's referendum held on May 21, 2000 broken into several questions, including one asking voters what they thought about "abolish[ing] proportional representation in elections to [the] Chamber of Deputies" (Uleri, 2002, p. 866). This was because, before the vote, the Milan paper published 82 articles in four campaign weeks (Renwick & Lamb, 2013). Also, on the 2011 UK referendum, they concluded papers such as the *Guardian* showed moderate coverage in a similar length campaign period, with this one from London presenting 56 articles (Renwick & Lamb, 2013).

As I mentioned in Chapter 3, on the campaign ahead of Ontario's 2007 referendum between FPTP and MMP, scholars like Hoff (2009), LeDuc et al. (2008), LeDuc (2011), and Pilon (2009), found that print media coverage was low. Presenting more statistics from them, in Pilon's (2009) study, he found that the *Ottawa Citizen* broadsheet only published 22 articles on the vote in a campaign period from "May 1 [to] October 10" (p. 19). LeDuc et al. (2008) and LeDuc (2011) came to the same conclusion based on data from a much larger window of time. From March 28, 2006 to October 10, 2007, a year-and-a-half period, they found that the *National Post*, *Globe and Mail*, and *Toronto Star* only "ran 124 articles" on topics like "the electoral reform issue, or the referendum" (LeDuc et al., 2008, p. 36). Low coverage was evident from the *Post* and the *Globe*, who printed 26 and 39 articles respectively in this time (LeDuc et al., 2008; LeDuc, 2011).

Based on data from the studies, I was able to build benchmarks to classify the quantity of coverage provided by NZ and B.C.'s print media before their referendums. What I considered as low, moderate, and high quantity from an individual print publication in a month campaign period was:

**Table 4.4-** Classification and Benchmarks for Quantity of Coverage

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Benchmark</b>
<b>1. Low Quantity of Coverage</b>	<b>0-39 articles</b>
<b>2. Moderate Quantity of Coverage</b>	<b>40-79 articles</b>
<b>3. High Quantity of Coverage</b>	<b>80 articles and above</b>

The individual article totals from each NZ and B.C. broadsheet allowed me to make a collective determination on what level of coverage the print media they were representing displayed.

*Indicators Two and Three: Balance of Coverage, Presence and Type of Reasoning to Support Taken Positions:* In operationalizing the final two indicators, I point out that in collecting data using them, I only examined editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters. The central reason is that these articles can state a position, and offer reasons to support it, unlike news items which are meant to be objective (Higgins, 2006). Specifically, I looked at pieces in these three types which displayed non-neutral positions on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change. This was because the referendums relevant to my cases asked citizens to either vote yes to changing FPTP, or no (Sancton, 2013). Thus, to help citizens make informed ballot choices, the NZ and B.C. print media must have published a balance of in favor and against pieces that are not only supported with reasoning, but various types as well (Christians et al., 2009; LeDuc et al., 2008; Lee, 2005; Rinke, 2016).

Regarding indicator two, I used a qualitative content analysis to determine the balance of coverage in New Zealand and British Columbia's print media on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change from FPTP through their respective referendums. To accomplish this, I had to determine the position that the editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor published by each print publication displayed on the topic. This involved coding each article based on the stance it showed. If an article showed only support, or opposition, to system change from FPTP to the proposed alternative (MMP in NZ and STV in B.C.), I coded the piece with a label of "in favor," and "against" respectively. Examples of what I deemed as articles displaying the two positions are:

**Table 4.5-** Examples of In Favor and Against Articles

<b>Position</b>	<b>Example Article</b>
<b>In Favor</b>	From the <i>Vancouver Sun</i> , in a letter to the editor published on Monday April 27, 2009, Irene Giesbrecht from Richmond is in favor of electoral reform to STV saying: “As a businesswoman, I support BC-STV because it’s good for business” (Giesbrecht, 2009, p. A6).
<b>Against</b>	From the <i>Evening Post</i> , in an op-ed/opinion column published on Wednesday October 20, 1993, Ben Carey was against electoral system change to MMP, and for a retention of the status-quo, by saying: “FP[T]P is a good system: it is simple yet responsive. Let’s not throw out the baby with the bath water” (Carey, 1993, p. 7).

I also had a third code, used to label articles displaying a neutral positional stance on the issue. There were two instances when I labelled articles as “neutral”: articles which did not express a position at all, and articles that presented both in favor, and against perspectives. Examples are:

**Table 4.6-** Examples of Neutral Articles

<b>Position</b>	<b>Example Article</b>
<b>Neutral- No Position</b>	From the <i>Victoria Times Colonist</i> , in an editorial published on Tuesday May 12, 2009, no distinct position is taken on the issue of electoral reform to STV, with the article simply saying: “All the talk about election systems -- single transferable vote or first past the post or whatever else -- will seem irrelevant if most eligible voters can’t find the time to head to the polls” (“The race is done”, 2009, p. A10).
<b>Neutral- Both Perspectives</b>	From the <i>Vancouver Sun</i> , in an op-ed/opinion column published on Thursday April 30, 2009, Craig McInnes presents opinions both in favor and against a change from FPTP to STV. First, he says: “[D]o you want to switch to a system under which small parties, like the Greens, have a better chance of being represented...[i]f so, you should vote Yes” (McInnes, 2009, p. A13). However, he shows an opposite stance too, saying: “If

	you are happy with the governments we have now...you should probably vote No” (McInnes, 2009, p. A13).
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Once labelling articles for their positional stances was completed, I was able to gather data which would allow me to classify the balance of coverage provided by NZ and B.C.’s print media as weak, moderate or strong. Importantly, previous studies using this indicator provided benchmarks for me to have such a classification. As discussed in Chapter 3, some studies have found that Ontario’s print media showed a weak balance of coverage before their province’s 2007 referendum. Focusing on LeDuc et al. (2008) and LeDuc (2011), the two, using the time-frame of March 28, 2006 to October 10, 2007, came to this conclusion because their results showed that, of the 124 pieces published in the *Post*, the *Globe*, and the *Star*, 55 had the against positional stance on matters including related to provincial electoral reform, while only 23 were in favor, stark imbalances. Bringing in studies looking at other votes, Renwick and Lamb (2013) came to the same conclusion in their look at the 2011 UK referendum. These authors deemed that the balance of print coverage was weak because papers like “the *Express* and the *Sun*...[published] no articles in favour of reform [while] for the *Mirror*...none against [a change]” were produced (Renwick & Lamb, 2013, p. 301). From these studies, I was able to construct benchmarks that would enable me to classify the balance of coverage in NZ and B.C.’s print media. Specifically, what I considered as weak, moderate, and strong balance from the print media during an electoral reform referendum campaign was:

**Table 4.7-** Classification and Benchmarks for Balance of Coverage

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Benchmark</b>
<b>1. Weak Balance of Coverage</b>	<p>a) Print media does not publish any in favor, and/or against, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor</p> <p>b) Print media does not publish multiple in favor, and against, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor</p> <p>b) If multiple in favor, and against articles are published, there are stark imbalances in the times each position appears in a specific article type</p>

<b>2. Moderate Quantity of Coverage</b>	<p>a) Print media publishes multiple in favor, and against, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, but there are slight discrepancies in the times each position appears in a specific article type</p> <p>b) If there are multiple pieces published in a specific article type, one of the two positions does not appear</p>
<b>3. Strong Quantity of Coverage</b>	<p>a) Print media publishes multiple in favor, and against, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, in equal or near equal numbers</p>

Finally, as a last step in operationalizing this second indicator, to assess the validity of my results, I gave ten pieces, five with the in favor positional stance, and five with the against position to another person to label them using their own faculties. For all, they agreed with my labelling.

Moving to indicator three, it also used a qualitative content analysis to discern whether editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor published in New Zealand and British Columbia's print media had reasons to support their non-neutral positions, and if yes, the diversity of the types of reasoning used. Overall, the entire process to operationalize indicator three took two steps. First, looking at articles published in the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* that displayed non-neutral stances, I used a binary classification of whether these articles included reasons to back them, or not. In step two, articles which included reasons were classified on the type of reasoning they used to support their taken positions. This involved coding each article on whether they used the speculative, logical, evidentiary, or expert-informed types of reasoning, with multiple classifications allowed. Examples of what I considered as pieces showing each type of reasoning are:

**Table 4.8-** Examples of Articles with Each Type of Reasoning

<b>Type of Reasoning</b>	<b>Example Article</b>
<b>Speculative</b>	From the <i>Victoria Times Colonist</i> , in an op-ed/opinion column published on Friday April 17, 2009, Paul Willcocks supports his in favor position on electoral reform to STV by speculating that it "will be more representative



	and encourage MLAs to pay attention [to] their constituents, not [their] party” (Willcocks, 2009, p. A12).
<b>Logical</b>	From the <i>Vancouver Sun</i> , in a letter to the editor published on Wednesday April 29, 2009, Carol Ebenstiner supports her against positional stance on electoral system change to STV with logic by saying: “New Zealand now has 19 political parties. As the number of parties increases, the likelihood of forming a coalition government becomes more and more difficult and stability becomes less and less likely” (Ebenstiner, 2009, p. A6).
<b>Evidentiary</b>	From the <i>New Zealand Herald</i> , in an editorial published on Thursday November 4, 1993, the article supports their in favor positional stance on electoral reform to MMP by saying that it would allow for stable governments to form in New Zealand between parties on the opposing end of the political spectrum just like Germany, where “[a] party of moderate conservatism has ruled in coalition with market liberals...for most of the past 40 years” (“Fair representation”, 1993, p. 8).
<b>Expert-informed</b>	From the <i>Evening Post</i> , in an op-ed/opinion column published on Thursday October 14, 1993, Mary Varnham supports her in favor positional stance on electoral system change to MMP with reasoning from German political scientist Hans-Dieter Klingemann, who says, “under proportional representation, interests in modern society have a better chance to get into Parliament and debate the issues at hand” (Varnham, 1993, p. 8).

Once the coding was completed, I was able to compile enough data that would allow me to classify the diversity of the types of reasoning used to support taken positions in NZ and B.C.’s print media as either weak, moderate, or strong. Importantly, in constructing benchmarks for part two of indicator three, I could not rely on previous mediation studies, which only operationalized part one. One was Renwick and Lamb (2013), who found 53 percent of statements in UK newspapers supported non-neutral stances on a change from FPTP to AV with reasons in the 2011 campaign. This is unfortunate as diverse forms of reasoning in print articles help citizens to properly decide between competing electoral system options (Rademacher et al., 2011). Thus, the benchmarks I constructed were kept as simple as possible, and easily replicable by future researchers initiating a

similar mediated deliberation study. Specifically, what I deemed as weak, moderate, and strong diversity of reasoning from the non-neutral articles published in NZ and B.C.'s print media was:

**Table 4.9-** Classification and Benchmarks for Diversity of Reasoning

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Benchmark</b>
<b>1. Weak Diversity of Reasoning</b>	Print media publishes non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, which collectively support taken positions with only <i>one</i> type of reasoning
<b>2. Moderate Diversity of Reasoning</b>	Print media publishes non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, which collectively support taken positions with <i>two</i> types of reasoning
<b>3. Strong Diversity of Reasoning</b>	Print media publishes non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, which collectively support taken positions with <i>three or more</i> types of reasoning


Finally, as a last step in operationalizing part two of indicator three, to assess the validity of my results in a manner like my second indicator, I gave ten pieces, supported with different types of reasoning, to another person to code independently. For all, they agreed with my labelling.

## CHAPTER 5- Results


**Indicator #1- Quantity of Coverage-** The first indicator I employed to evaluate New Zealand and British Columbia's print media was quantity of coverage. This was used to tally the articles published by the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* before their respective referendums, allowing me to classify NZ and B.C.'s print media coverage quantity as low, moderate, or high.

### *A) 1993 New Zealand Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.1-** The *New Zealand Herald*- October 6 to November 6, 1993 Articles




**Figure 5.2-** The *Evening Post*- October 6 to November 6, 1993 Articles




The results I gathered for NZ's print media represented by the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* under the first indicator points to a strong level of coverage on their country's electoral reform referendum. As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, in the immediate month campaign period between October 6, 1993 and voting-day on November 6, 1993, the *Herald* and the *Post* collectively published 277 articles on the vote, consisting of news items, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor. Furthermore, there was near symmetry in the total number of articles the two broadsheets published, with the *New Zealand Herald* printing 139 articles, and the *Evening Post* one behind at 138. The *Herald* from Auckland had a higher count than the *Post* from Wellington on the strength of publishing seven additional news items and three more editorials. The *Post* did, however, publish five and four more op-ed/opinion columns and letters to the editor respectively. Finally, based on the data, as a sign of the strong coverage produced by both the *Herald* and the *Post*, for the days both broadsheets published, all except for the Sundays of October 10, 17, 24, and 31 of 1993, they averaged, respectively, 4.96 and 4.93 articles daily.

**Figure 5.3-** The *New Zealand Herald* Articles Published Per Week



**Figure 5.4-** The *Evening Post* Articles Published Per Week



Based on the results from Figures 5.3 and 5.4, there is a general trend of the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* attempting to provide more frequent coverage on their country's electoral reform referendum as it got closer. The strongest evidence of this pattern is that both the *Herald* and the *Post* followed a strategy where in the latter weeks of the campaign, specifically Weeks 3 to 5, the two broadsheets both published more articles week-over-week on the FPTP vs. MMP vote in particular types. Importantly, the most came in Week 5 (the final campaign week), with examples of this strategy observable looking at the *New Zealand Herald's* published letters to the editor, and both the *Evening Post's* news items and letters to the editor. Starting with the *Herald*, the paper printed 15 and 17 letters to the editor respectively in Weeks 3 to 4 encompassing Wednesday October 20 to Tuesday November 2, and increased to 20 in Week 5 from Wednesday November 3 to vote-day on Saturday November 6. Meanwhile, for the *Post*, sequencing was the same in two article types. Beginning with their news items, this publication presented five and 11 articles in Weeks 3 and 4 respectively, and went up to 13 in Week 5. This was nothing compared to the

number of letters they decided to publish. Evident in Figure 5.4, they presented respectively nine and 14 in Weeks 3 and 4, but jumped to an astounding 46 in Week 5.

*Response to Third Research Question:* From my results, I conclude that the quantity of coverage provided by the print media of NZ represented by the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* was high. I state this because each broadsheet published above 80 articles in the month-long campaign between October 6 and voting-day. This allowed me to classify them based on my benchmarks from Table 4.4 as providing a high quantity of referendum coverage. In fact, the *Herald* and the *Post* went well above that, publishing 139 and 138 articles respectively. Most of the coverage was concentrated in news items and letters, with the *New Zealand Herald* publishing 44 and 77 respectively in the two types, while the *Evening Post* showed 37 and 81. Also, in comparison to my benchmarks, and previous studies on referendum campaigns, the *Herald* and the *Post* certainly had a high quantity of coverage, publishing more articles than Ontario broadsheets like the *Citizen* preceding their province's 2007 referendum, who published 22 articles (Pilon, 2009). Furthermore, the *Herald* and the *Post* produced more articles than British papers like the *Independent* during the 2011 UK referendum campaign, who provided a moderate quantity at 46 (Renwick & Lamb, 2013).

Additionally, regarding the weeks articles were published in the two NZ broadsheets during the month campaign period, their appearance was not random. Instead, the *Herald* and the *Post* had an approach where each published more letters (with the latter following this strategy with their news items too) in the last three campaign weeks, making sure that for each successive week, the number of pieces printed was both higher than the previous, and that the highest volume came in Week 5. This is important because, bringing in something I touched on in Chapter 3, a publication cannot dump all their coverage at once right before a referendum; however, if they steadily increase the number of articles they publish over several immediate weeks before voting-day, and have an uptick in the last campaign week, they can help citizens make informed ballot choices, because information presented to them is fresh in their minds (Higgins, 2006; Marquis et al., 2011). The *New Zealand Herald* with its letters, and the *Evening Post* with both its news items and letters to the editor, were successful at doing this.


In total, I can say that the quantity of coverage provided by New Zealand's print media was high. However, I apply this classification with caution because for this thesis, as I stated in Chapter 4

citing British Columbia Electronic Library Network (2017), along with Chong and Druckman (2013), since I used ProQuest for my B.C. case which only shows text, this prevented me from noting qualities of referendum articles in the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* like column inches or coverage volume. To have symmetry, I applied the same rules to NZ's print media, analyzing just the text of the *Herald* and the *Post*. Because of these limitations, I exercise discretion in stating the coverage quantity which they offered was high.


But, based on previous mediated deliberation studies, my benchmarks, and data, I do feel comfortable with this classification.

*B) 2009 British Columbia Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.5-** The *Vancouver Sun*- April 12 to May 12, 2009 Articles




**Figure 5.6-** The *Victoria Times Colonist*- April 12 to May 12, 2009 Articles




Moving on to British Columbia's print media represented by the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, the results from indicator one point to a moderate level of coverage on their province's electoral reform referendum. As Figures 5.5 and 5.6 indicate, in the immediate month campaign period between April 12 and voting-day, the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* collectively published 114 articles, consisting of news items, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor. The *Victoria Times Colonist* published 16 more articles than the *Vancouver Sun* by a 65 to 49 margin, based on providing seven additional news items, two editorials, and nine letters. Overall, the *Sun*, in these four, only published one more op-ed/opinion column than their colleague from Vancouver Island. Importantly, the reason why I state that the coverage provided by the print media of B.C. was modest is because if you take the number of articles collectively published by the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, that total is 163 fewer than what the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* together published in a similar campaign period before their respective referendum. Also, if you just examine the B.C. broadsheet with the most published articles, the *Times Colonist*, their total of 65 articles is 73 and 74 less than what the *Herald* and the *Post* produced respectively. A final reason is, for the days the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* published, which for the former was all except the Sundays of April 12, 19, and 26, along with May 3 and 10, while the latter printed every day, they averaged 1.88 and 2.10 articles per day respectively, quite a bit lower than the averages from my two selected New Zealand broadsheets.



**Figure 5.7-** The *Vancouver Sun* Articles Published Per Week



**Figure 5.8-** The *Victoria Times Colonist* Articles Published Per Week



Based on the results from the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* regarding the week articles were published in the campaign, seen in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, there is further evidence of both providing more middling levels of coverage on their province's FPTP vs. STV vote. This is because each came close, but did not, replicate the strategy and results displayed from the *Herald* and the *Post* stated earlier, where in the last weeks before their country's referendum, the two both published more articles in specific types, and made sure most came in Week 5. Evidence from B.C.'s print media coming close is seen looking at the *Vancouver Sun*'s published letters, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*'s editorials. Starting with the *Sun*, the Vancouver broadsheet published seven letters to the editor in Week 3, and increased to eight in Week 4, encompassing Sunday April 26 to Saturday May 9. However, instead of increasing their published letters written by citizens in the final week, Week 5, spanning Sunday May 10 to vote-day on Tuesday May 12, the number of articles published by the *Sun* plateaus, and levels off at eight. Meanwhile, on the editorials produced by the *Victoria Times Colonist*, they do increase from Weeks 3 to 5, and have an uptick in the last week. But, the results do not mirror the *Herald*'s news items, and the *Post*'s published news and letters to the editor because the Victoria broadsheet published zero editorials in Week 3. To their credit though, they did go from no editorials in Week 3, to one in Week 4, and two in Week 5.


*Response to Fourth Research Question:* From my results, I conclude that the quantity of coverage provided by the print media of B.C. was moderate. I state this because the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* published 49 (1.88 per day) and 65 articles (2.10) respectively in the month-long referendum campaign. This allowed me to classify them from my benchmarks in Table 4.4 as providing a moderate coverage quantity. As well, based on these marks, and previous studies, the print coverage from the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* was not low, especially in comparison to coverage before Ontario's 2007 referendum, where broadsheets like the *National Post* and the *Globe* printed 26 and 39 articles respectively on a much longer time-frame, March 28, 2006 to October 10 of the next calendar year, as the month campaign period used in my thesis (LeDuc et al., 2008; LeDuc, 2011). But, their coverage is not high, because the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* each did not publish above 80 articles. Instead, the coverage quantity provided by them for B.C.'s print media was moderate, fitting in a tier like what was provided by the *Times* ahead of the 2011 UK referendum, with Renwick and Lamb (2013) pointing out that the newspaper published 45 articles. Importantly, like my NZ case, I make this conclusion cautiously because for the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist*, articles were collected using ProQuest, with its

limitations explained earlier. But, based on previous mediated deliberation studies, my benchmarks, and my data seen in Figures 5.5 to 5.8, I do feel comfortable with this classification.


**Indicator #2- Balance of Coverage-** The second indicator I used was balance of coverage. This was used to determine the position taken in editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor published by the broadsheets from NZ and B.C.'s print media before their referendums, both centering on a binary choice, either in favor, or against a change of FPTP (Pal, 2012; Qvortrup, 2000). Using this indicator aided me to classify their balance as weak, moderate, or strong.

*A) 1993 New Zealand Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.9-** Positional Stance of Articles in the *New Zealand Herald*



**Figure 5.10-** Positional Stance of Articles in the *Evening Post*



Regarding the data I collected for New Zealand's print media, the results are mixed. Seen in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, both the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* did good work overall in publishing multiple editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, which displayed a specific non-neutral (in favor or against) position on the issue of electoral reform from FPTP to MMP through their country's November 6, 1993 referendum. But, publishing multiple numbers of articles with a specific position is not enough. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, and based on my Table 4.7 benchmarks, to have a balance of coverage on the issue which could be deemed as strong, the print media must publish editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor where for each type, there is near equal or equal symmetry of in favor and against pieces (Marquis et al., 2011; Tresch, 2012; Rowbottom, 2013). This is where the two NZ papers struggle. Starting with their editorials, the *Herald* and the *Post* published four and two respectively; but, their issue is, for each broadsheet, only position appears. The *New Zealand Herald* printed only four in favor editorials, and no against pieces. The *Evening Post* was the opposite, as their two editorials were steadfastly against a change from FPTP to MMP, with no in favor ones appearing in the Wellington publication during the referendum campaign.

Looking at these articles, the ones which did stand out were when the *Herald* and the *Post*'s respective editorial boards endorsed an electoral system in the November 6, 1993 referendum. For

the *New Zealand Herald*, their editorial board supported MMP in a piece published on Thursday November 4. Its reasons were that it would allow for the formation of coalition governments that would both “reflect a true majority of the ballot,” and produce policies that are “bargained and considered...[and] consensual” (“Fair representation”, 1993, p. 8). As for the *Evening Post*, their editorial board, in a piece published on Friday November 5, was against New Zealand changing its system, stating that “MMP is an unsatisfactory alternative to FPTP” if people wanted change (“Faint praise”, 1993, p. 6). Overall, in multiple editorials, the two NZ print publications each showed a position on the referendum issue; but, they do not publish pieces with the opposite stance.

Moving to the op-ed/opinion columns, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* performed better under my second indicator because, per Figures 5.9 and 5.10, both papers published multiple in favor, and against articles of this type. However, the pair had slight imbalances in the number of published pieces showing the two positions. Regarding the *Herald*, it published five op-ed/opinion columns displaying the in favor stance, but only two against. On the other hand, the *Post* was the exact opposite, printing seven against columns, and four in favor.

Overall, while the *Herald* and the *Post* had slight imbalances in their op-ed/opinion columns, it was evident that the two newspapers attempted to showcase both positions. Beginning with the *New Zealand Herald*, it printed pieces both in favor of reform, like a Saturday October 16 guest op-ed/opinion column written by Rob Richie and Cynthia Terrell from the American organization called Voting and Democracy, who supported MMP by saying that “it will help to elect more women,” and articles against the notion (Richie & Terrell, 1993, p. 8). An example was a guest piece written on Saturday October 23 by Peter Shirtcliffe from the CBG, who explained that MMP would reduce “the number of MPs elected by voters [in constituencies]” (Shirtcliffe, 1993, p. 8). The *Evening Post* was the same, publishing both in favor and against op-ed/opinion columns, some even on the same day in fact like on Wednesday October 20. Here, a pro-MMP piece was written by Peter Munz from Victoria University, who believed that this proposed system would open parliament to a modicum of parties, unlike FPTP, which “freezes...[it] into a two-party institution [National and Labour]” (Munz, 1993, p. 7). The opposite position was displayed by another CBG member, Ben Carey, who wrote on October 20 that the status-quo FPTP electoral system should be kept because “it tends to deliver responsible and accountable government” (Carey, 1993, p. 7).

Together, while the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* showed both perspectives on a change to MMP in their op-ed/opinion columns multiple times, there were slight differentials.

Finally, in terms of the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post*'s published letters, both included a high volume of in favor and against articles written by citizens. But, there were also slight imbalances in the number of published pieces displaying the two perspectives. Starting with the *Herald*, the Auckland broadsheet published 39 letters in favor of MMP, compared to 28 against articles with the opposite positional stance. The *Post* from Wellington was similar, producing 39 in favor, and 23 against letters to the editor.

*Response to Fifth Research Question:* Based on the results, I conclude that the balance of coverage in NZ's print media was moderate. This is based on my benchmarks seen in Table 4.7 for what I deemed as coverage balance belonging in this classification, which is when a print media like New Zealand's collectively:

- a) publishes multiple in favor, and against, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, but there are slight discrepancies in the times each position appears in a specific article type
- b) if there are multiple pieces published in a specific article type, one of the two positions does not appear


In looking at these benchmarks, and my data, the *Herald* and the *Post* collectively published multiple in favor, and against op-ed/opinion columns, and letters, a clear indication that their balance of coverage was not weak. Furthermore, their coverage was not weak especially in comparison to previous studies like LeDuc et al. (2008) and LeDuc (2011), who found during Ontario's 2007 referendum campaign stark imbalances in the number of non-neutral pieces published in the *National Post*, the *Globe*, and the *Star*. Furthermore, Renwick and Lamb's (2013) look at the 2011 UK referendum found that citizens subscribing to publications like the *Mirror* did not even read a specific non-neutral position on the vote between the competing FPTP and AV electoral systems.

But, from on my benchmarks, the balance of coverage in the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* was not strong either, because there were slight imbalances in the number of times each in favor and against stance appeared in the broadsheets' published op-ed/opinion columns and letters to the editor, with no symmetry or near symmetry. Furthermore, the *Herald* and the *Post* both


published multiple editorials with just one non-neutral perspective. I conclude under indicator two that the balance of coverage in New Zealand's print media in the campaign ahead of their nation's November 6, 1993 electoral referendum should be in the moderate classification.

*B) 2009 British Columbia Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.11-** Positional Stance of Articles in the *Vancouver Sun*



**Figure 5.12-** Positional Stance of Articles in the *Victoria Times Colonist*



Regarding the data I collected from B.C.'s print media, the results are varied, seen in Figures 5.11 and 5.12. Overall, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* both published multiple op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor displaying an in favor or against stance on the issue of system change from FPTP to STV. However, each paper struggled a bit to provide a strong balance of coverage on this matter in the campaign period from April 12 to voting-day on May 12.

Commencing with the *Vancouver Sun*, the Lower Mainland broadsheet produced no editorials with the in favor or against positions. Instead, the only articles the *Sun* published in the campaign were neutral pieces, including one on May 12, where its editorial board wrote, “[w]e are also getting a second chance today to change the way we elect our provincial government, with a referendum on BC-STV, or single transferable vote” (“Calling all”, 2009, p. A6). However, within the article, they did not endorse, or reject it. Regarding the *Victoria Times Colonist*, while they did publish an editorial with the against stance, only one such piece was published, not multiple. In this article, published on Sunday May 10, the editorial board of the *Times Colonist* endorsed the status-quo FPTP system over STV by explaining that the former, “has been used in provincial elections since 1871 and allowed [for] a succession of stable governments” (“Cautious course”, 2009, p. D2).

Moving to the op-ed/opinion columns, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*, performed better in indicator two. This is especially true for the *Sun*, achieving what is required under this indicator by publishing, in equal or near equal, and multiple numbers, articles with a specific position. They did this by producing in the referendum campaign two in favor, and two against op-ed/opinion columns. Delving into the content of these articles, a prominent in favor piece was written by Gordon Gibson, who on Monday May 4, went over-the-top to endorse STV by saying that: “it [would] be the greatest advance in Canadian democracy in the past 100 years” (Gibson, 2009, p. A9). The next day, on Tuesday May 5, Bill Tieleman pushed back against system change, stating that based on the Electoral Boundaries Commission, “British Columbia’s 85 single-member ridings would shrink to just 20 under STV,” consequently, “tak[ing] away local accountability and responsibility of MLAs to voters” (Tieleman, 2009, p. A11).

The *Victoria Times Colonist* published multiple in favor, and against op-ed/opinion columns. However, like the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post*, there was a slight imbalance, printing seven articles supportive of STV, and three against. Out of these ten, a notable one appeared in the Friday May 8 edition of the *Times Colonist*, and was written by columnist Jody Paterson,



supportive of reform because the BCCA, “put in close to a year of research...assessing voting methods...[and t]he one they picked was STV,” adding that “if that’s the informed opinion of a diverse, apolitical citizens’ group after many months spent learning and listening, then that’s good enough for me” (Paterson, 2009, p. A10).


Finally, in terms of the two B.C. broadsheets’ published letters to the editor, their results are a near carbon copy of what was seen with their op-ed/opinion columns. Beginning with the *Sun*, they almost achieved symmetry with their published in favor and against letters to the editor, showing 12 and 11 respectively. Meanwhile, the *Times Colonist* had slight imbalances again, publishing 19 letters to the editor supportive of electoral reform, and only nine with the opposite viewpoint.


*Response to Sixth Research Question:* From my collected results, I conclude that the balance of coverage in B.C.’s print media was moderate. This is because, based on my Table 4.7 benchmarks and data first, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* did not have a balance of coverage which was weak because both published multiple in favor, and against, op-ed/opinion columns and letters regarding the issue of a shift from FPTP to STV. Furthermore, the *Vancouver Sun* offered symmetry in the number of in favor and against op-ed/opinion columns it presented, two and two. These results were nearly replicated by this publication with their published letters, showcasing 12 in favor, and 11 against pieces written by citizens. Overall, these statistics point to B.C.’s print media as not having a weak coverage balance. Moreover, it was not weak especially in comparison to other studies on referendum campaigns like Pilon (2009), who found that print coverage from Toronto, Ottawa, and Hamilton broadsheets before Ontario’s 2007 referendum was staunchly against electoral reform from FPTP. However, while I classify British Columbia’s print media coverage as not weak, it under indicator two was not strong either based on my benchmarks. Going through data from the two broadsheets, this was because the *Vancouver Sun* presented no in favor or against editorials on the referendum issue. For the *Victoria Times Colonist*, their editorial board did present the against viewpoint on STV, but that was only once. Also, while the Vancouver Island quality newspaper published multiple in favor and against op-ed/opinion columns and letters to the editor, there were slight imbalances where the former position appeared slightly more. I conclude under indicator two that the balance of coverage in British Columbia’s print media during the campaign before their May 12, 2009 referendum was moderate.

**Indicator #3- Presence and Type of Reasoning to Support Taken Positions-** The final indicator I used to evaluate NZ and B.C.'s print media was presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions. This was split into two parts. The first looked at whether editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor in the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* provided reasons to support their non-neutral positions. In part two, I evaluated all the non-neutral articles with reasons based on their diversity, specifically if they used the speculative, logical, evidentiary, or expert-informed types. By operationalizing this indicator, I could conclude if their print media fell under binary classifications of with or without reasons, and if the diversity of their reasoning was weak, moderate, or strong.

*A) 1993 New Zealand Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.13-** The *New Zealand Herald* Articles With/Without Reasons




**Figure 5.14-** The *Evening Post* Articles With/Without Reasons


Starting with part one, as seen in Figures 5.13 and 5.14, New Zealand's print media exhibited very good evidence of mediated deliberation. This is because the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* published non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters that for a majority of, used reasons to support their positions on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change.

The only small weakness came from the *New Zealand Herald*; out of 39 in favor letters published during the referendum campaign between October 6 and vote-day eight of them were not supported with reasoning. However, a clear majority, 31, were. Furthermore, all four of the *Herald's* in favor editorials, seven op-ed/opinion columns, five in favor and two against, along with 25 out of 28 against letters, used reasons to back their taken perspectives. The *Evening Post* was slightly better overall than the *New Zealand Herald*, as both their against editorials, all four in favor and five out of seven against op-ed/opinion columns, as well as 34 out of 39 in favor and all 23 against letters to the editor, contained reasoning to support non-neutral positions.

**Figure 5.15-** Type of Reasoning in the *New Zealand Herald*'s Editorials




**Figure 5.16-** Type of Reasoning in the *Evening Post*'s Editorials




As shown by Figures 5.15 and 5.16, both newspapers scored well under part two on diversity because each produced non-neutral editorials that collectively used three different types of reasoning, speculative, logical, and evidentiary, to support their views on electoral reform. Starting with the *New Zealand Herald*, their editorials displaying a strong diversity of reasoning was evident as in their four editorials, all in favor articles, the evidentiary reasoning was used as support three times, and the logical and speculative each twice. One example of the *Herald* using reasoning, specifically logic, came in a Friday October 29 article, when its editorial board supported a move to MMP by advocating that: “[t]here [were] unlikely to be “protest” parties under MMP [because

a]ll must fashion policies in the knowledge that they may have to make them work and answer for the consequences” (“Just another”, 1993, p. 8). The *Evening Post* also rated well on diversity as their two against editorials both used speculation, and logic and evidence were each used one time. An example of speculation came in a Friday November 5 article; here the editorial board of the *Post* rejected MMP by stating that this alternative to FPTP, would allow “party hacks [to be] elected automatically to Parliament under undemocratic party lists” (“Faint praise”, 1993, p. 6). Overall, both NZ print publications did a very good job of publishing editorials which had a wide range of reasoning for their taken positions.

**Figure 5.17-** Type of Reasoning in the *New Zealand Herald’s* Op-ed/Opinion Columns



**Figure 5.18-** Type of Reasoning in the *Evening Post’s* Op-ed/Opinion Columns




Moving to the op-ed/opinion columns, the two selected broadsheets also rated well on the diversity of the types of reasons used. This is because, per Figures 5.17 and 5.18, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* each published non-neutral pieces in this article type during the referendum campaign that together, used four types: the speculative, logical, evidentiary, and expert-informed.


Commencing with the *New Zealand Herald*, in their five op-ed/opinion columns with the in favor position on reform to MMP, speculation and evidence are each used four times, followed by logic at three, and experts once. Moreover, for their two columns with the against positional stance, the speculative, logical, and evidentiary reasoning appear in all. Regarding the *Herald's* published op-ed/opinion columns, an excellent usage of reasoning to back a taken position came from an article published on Tuesday October 26 by guest writer John Wallace, the chairman of the RCES, who supported his in favor viewpoint with expert-informed reasoning. In it, Wallace tried to assuage fears that this alternative to FPTP would damage the health of the national economy with a quote from University of Strathclyde academic Richard Rose, who said, “differences in economic performance cannot...be explained by differences in electoral systems...” and “[c]hanging electoral institutions...[does not] threaten economic success” (Wallace, 1993, p. 8).

Moving to the *Evening Post*, a strong diversity of reasoning is observable in their published op-ed/opinion columns with non-neutral stances. In terms of their four articles displaying the in favor position, evidence is used in all, logic is used three times, and speculation and experts each once. While in their five against columns with reasons for their taken positions, speculation and evidence are incorporated four times, and logic three. A good example from the *Post's* op-ed/opinion columns of evidence used as a supporting reason came from an article written by Mary Varnham on Thursday October 14, who was in favor of New Zealand shifting away from FPTP because, according to her, “since 1951 not one government [has] had majority support. From 1981 to 1984, the [National] government ruled with only 39 percent [popularity]” (Varnham, 1993, p. 8).

**Figure 5.19-** Type of Reasoning in the *New Zealand Herald*'s Letters to the Editor



**Figure 5.20-** Type of Reasoning in the *Evening Post*'s Letters to the Editor



Finally, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* hit a trifecta on their published letters to the editor as, like their editorials and op-ed/opinion columns, these articles too used diverse types of reasoning to support their non-neutral positions on electoral reform. This was because, per Figures 5.19 and 5.20, both the *Herald* and the *Post* published letters written by citizens which collectively used speculation, logic, evidence, and experts, to back their in favor, or against stances. Confirmation of this is seen beginning with the *New Zealand Herald*, as in the in favor 31 letters the Auckland broadsheet published in the month-long referendum campaign that used reasons, the evidentiary reasoning led the way with 16 usages, followed by the logical at 13, the speculative at 10, and then the expert-informed reasoning at one. Regarding their 25 against letters who provided

reasons, speculation was used as support the most at 15, with evidence second at 11, and logic third at eight. Going to the *Evening Post* now, the Wellington-based quality broadsheet also produced non-neutral letters with a strong diversity of reasoning, as in their 34 in favor articles penned by citizens with reasons, the evidentiary reasoning had the highest usage at 19, speculative second at 13, logic third at 11, and the expert-informed fourth at one. Last, for the *Post*'s 23 against letters, speculation was incorporated the most at 18, followed by evidence at 11, and then logic at six.

*Response to Seventh Research Question:* On part one of this question, most of the non-neutral articles published in NZ's print media were supported with reasons. From my data, for the *Herald* and the *Post*, nearly all their published in favor, and against editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, included reasoning to back taken positions on the issue of an electoral system modification from FPTP to MMP. The only stumble is from the *New Zealand Herald*, who published eight in favor letters without reasons. But, I would say this is understandable because the *Herald* and the *Post* both published such a large quantity of letters ahead of November 6, 1993 that it was inevitable some written by citizens would be included who only stated their views without backing. For the most part though, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* produced letters which did have reasons.

For part two, based on my results, I conclude that the diversity of reasoning used in non-neutral articles published by the print media of New Zealand was strong. This is based on my benchmarks from Table 4.9 for what I considered as diversity of reasoning which was strong:

a) print media publishes non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, who collectively support taken positions with *three or more* types of reasoning


In looking at these benchmarks, and my data, NZ's print media met those targets. This is because the *Herald* and the *Post* each published non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters, which collectively used four types of reasoning to support taken positions on the referendum issue: the speculative, logical, evidentiary, and expert-informed. My data supports this, as speculation, logic and evidence are used in the *Herald* and the *Post*'s non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters, with experts also brought in the last two article types for both. Interestingly, the expert-informed was the reasoning type least employed. As Maia, Laranjeira, and Mundim (2017, p. 7) put it, this is because the views of experts tend to be included more in news items than opinion pieces, as "journalists seek the assistance of experts to gain background information as




well as to interpret complex issues to build news stories on a daily basis.” However, because it was used by the *Herald* and the *Post* in their published non-neutral articles, it led me to conclude that the diversity of reasoning in New Zealand’s print media before their referendum vote was strong.

*B) 2009 British Columbia Electoral Reform Referendum*

**Figure 5.21-** The *Vancouver Sun* Articles With/Without Reasons




**Figure 5.22-** The *Victoria Times Colonist* Articles With/Without Reasons



From the data I collected under part one for B.C.'s print media, there is strong evidence of media coverage that supported mediated deliberation, seen in Figures 5.21 and 5.22. Both the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* were solid at publishing non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, which defended views on the issue of electoral reform/electoral system change from FPTP to STV with reasons. In fact, for the two publications, only one article published in the referendum campaign between April 12 and vote-day on May 12 did not include reasoning; an against op-ed/opinion column printed in the *Vancouver Sun*. But, both of the *Sun*'s in favor op-ed/opinion columns, and one other against, along with 23 letters to the editor, 12 in favor and 11 against, incorporated reasons for their taken stances. The *Victoria Times Colonist* was similar, with reasons employed as support in their one against editorial, all 10 of their op-ed/opinion columns, seven supportive of STV and three against, and their 28 letters to the editor, 19 displaying the in favor position, and nine with the opposite stance.


**Figure 5.23-** Type of Reasoning in the *Victoria Times Colonist*'s Editorials




The second part of indicator three looked at the types of reasons used. Starting with the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist*'s editorials, both publications had different results on the diversity of the types of reasons used. On the *Vancouver Sun*, as mentioned earlier, the publication did not publish a single in favor or against editorial; only neutral ones. However, the *Victoria Times Colonist* did, publishing an against article on Sunday May 10 which scored well in terms of diversity by incorporating two types of reasoning to support its taken viewpoint. In this piece, per Figure 5.23, the Victoria broadsheet's editorial board used both speculation and evidence to reject STV and endorse FPTP in the vote two days later on Tuesday May 12. The speculative reasoning

is evident when the *Victoria Times Colonist* wrote that the single-transferable vote would allow for “the election of more MLAs from small parties, [which would] make governing more difficult” (“Cautious course”, 2009, p. D2). In totality, for B.C.’s print media, because of using a pair of reasons to support their against position, the *Victoria Times Colonist*’s lone non-neutral editorial makes up slightly for the *Vancouver Sun* not publishing any non-neutral articles in this format.

**Figure 5.24-** Type of Reasoning in the *Vancouver Sun*’s Op-ed/Opinion Columns



**Figure 5.25-** Type of Reasoning in the *Victoria Times Colonist*’s Op-ed/Opinion Columns




Moving to the op-ed/opinion columns, the two British Columbia newspapers scored very high on diversity. This is because, per Figures 5.24 and 5.25, the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* published non-neutral pieces in the referendum campaign that, collectively, used four types: the speculative, logical, evidentiary, and expert-informed.


The *Vancouver Sun* made up for not publishing any non-neutral editorials, as in their two in favor op-ed/opinion columns, logic and evidence are incorporated in both, and speculation is used once. Regarding the *Sun*'s lone against article opposing a change from FPTP to STV, and had reasons, a trio of reasoning is used, the speculative, logical, and evidentiary, quite strong diversity. Overall, in all of their published articles of this type, a good instance of one backing their position with reasoning is a Friday May 8 guest piece written by Troy Lanigan and Andrew Petter. They supported their in favor view on reform with logic by telling readers that, regarding the way STV counts votes: “[I]f your first choice receives more votes than needed to be elected, the surplus value of your vote is also transferred to your next choice. As a consequence, results on election day more closely mirror voter intent” (Lanigan & Petter, 2009, p. A15).

A strong diversity of reasoning is also observable in the *Victoria Times Colonist*'s ten non-neutral op-ed/opinion columns published during the campaign before the May 12 vote. Regarding their seven articles of this type displaying the in favor position, logic and evidence each appear five times, followed by speculation at four. Meanwhile, in their three against columns with reasons, the speculative reasoning is used in all, the evidentiary twice, and the logical and expert-informed each once. An exemplar of reasoning from the *Times Colonist*'s op-ed/opinion columns is an against article from Bob Plecas, who on Sunday April 19, pointed to evidence from the Electoral Boundaries Commission for the suggested district of Cariboo-Thompson if reform did in fact occur, which he saw as too big because it “covers Quesnel to Williams Lake, east to Kamloops, down to Princeton [and] to the U.S. border” (Plecas, 2009, p. D2).

**Figure 5.26-** Type of Reasoning in the *Vancouver Sun*'s Letters to the Editor



**Figure 5.27-** Type of Reasoning in the *Victoria Times Colonist*'s Letters to the Editor



Finally, like their op-ed/opinion columns, the letters to the editor published by the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* also rated very well on the diversity of the types of reasons used. Per Tables 5.25 and 5.27, this is because both showed non-neutral letters written by citizens who used three different types, speculation, logic, and evidence, to support their opinions. Confirmation of this begins with the *Vancouver Sun*, as in their 12 in favor letters published in the campaign,

speculation was used as a supporting reason nine times, followed by logic at six, and then evidence at five. Additionally, in terms of their 11 against letters, the evidentiary reasoning led the way with nine usages, the speculative second at seven, and the logical third at five. Finally, regarding the *Victoria Times Colonist*, the Victoria-based quality broadsheet also produced non-neutral letters with a strong diversity of reasoning, as in their 19 published letters supportive of going to STV, evidence showed up 11 times, followed by speculation and logic each at nine. Lastly, in the *Times Colonist*'s nine against letters to the editor with reasons, speculation was incorporated the most at seven, and evidence and logic after at three and two uses respectively.

*Response to Eighth Research Question:* On part one of this question, nearly all the non-neutral articles published in B.C.'s print media were supported with reasons. In fact, save for one against column published in the *Sun*, both them and the *Times Colonist* published in favor, and against editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters incorporating reasoning for their taken stances.

Regarding part two, based on my results, I conclude that the diversity of reasoning used in non-neutral articles published by the print media of British Columbia was strong. Based on my Table 4.9 benchmarks, and my data, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* certainly met these requirements. This is because the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* each published non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters which together used four types of reasoning, the speculative, logical, evidentiary, and expert-informed, to support their taken positions on the issue of electoral reform from FPTP to STV. Importantly, I came to this conclusion despite the *Sun* not producing any non-neutral editorials with reasoning; this half of indicator three measured only the diversity of reasons displayed. The fact that they did not publish any editorials with either the in favor or against stance was a detriment to them on balance, and a reason why I concluded under indicator two that the balance of coverage provided by them and the *Victoria Times Colonist* was moderate. However, when it came down to just examining the types of reasons used in the broadsheets published non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters, the variety was quite impressive, with speculation, logic, evidence, and experts all brought in as support. Put all together, I conclude that the diversity of reasoning in British Columbia's print media through the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* was not weak or moderate, but strong.

## CHAPTER 6- Discussion and Conclusion

My central research questions asked whether the print media in New Zealand and British Columbia provided a deliberative environment in the month ahead of the electoral reform referendums held in these two cases. Based on my results, I conclude that the print media of NZ and B.C., *each attempted to provide a deliberative environment* leading into their referendums so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. The New Zealand print media offered a stronger deliberative environment though, because the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* showed a high quantity of coverage in the campaign period from October 6 to vote-day on November 6, 1993. In contrast, the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* in British Columbia supplied a moderate quantity of coverage between April 12 and the day of their provincial referendum on May 12, 2009.

*Indicator One:* Delving into data from this indicator, the *Herald* published 139 articles, one more than the *Post* at 138. Critically, because each published well above 80 articles during the month referendum campaign, they were classified as providing a high volume. Meanwhile, from B.C., the *Times Colonist* published 65 articles, and the *Sun* displayed 49. However, since each broadsheet published an article total between 40 and 79, they were classified as presenting a moderate volume. Furthermore, the *New Zealand Herald* and the *Evening Post* collectively published 277 articles, while the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Victoria Times Colonist* together showed only 114. Overall, I conclude that in terms of the quantity of coverage, NZ's print media offered a more enhanced deliberative environment before November 6, 1993 than B.C. ahead of May 12, 2009. Citizens in New Zealand were supplied with a greater volume of information to make informed ballot choices on FPTP and MMP (Claibourn, 2008).

There are two implications to the results gathered from the measurement of the quantity of coverage. First is, one of the differences between my cases, the different time-period in which their referendums took place, can provide a theoretically relevant explanation of why weaker mediated deliberation was observed in the B.C. case. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, NZ's referendum occurred in the early-1990's, while B.C.'s took place in the late-2000's (Dutil, 2016; Sancton, 2013). Between these periods, several events occurred in established democracies, with relevance to the print media. It starts with citizens shifting how they receive their information, from traditional platforms like print, to new ones such as digital media (Bruns, 2014; Wihbey, 2014). This includes

the Internet, carrying websites like Google and Yahoo, and social media, including Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter (Bort, 2012; Olmstead, Mitchell, & Rosenstiel, 2011; Wirtz, Schilke, & Ullrich, 2010). Per Goldstein (2014, p. 2), this was not the case during the bulk of the twentieth century, as people kept abreast on the world around them through newspapers, “a product that bundled news, opinion, entertainment, advice, guides, display advertising, and classified advertising.” But, beginning in the 1990’s and carrying into the new millennium, citizens in established democracies migrated to digital media because they saw it as better adept than the print platform at delivering content (Fenton, 2016; Schroeder, 2018). As Flanagin and Metzger (2008, p. 5) wrote, its appeal was it allowed people to get “access to almost inconceivably vast information repositories that are [easily] portable, accessible, and interactive in both delivery and formation.”

These events have devastated the print media. This is because advertising dollars shifted from them to the many digital platforms which sprung up (Price, 2015). The reason it has negatively impacted the print platform is that they relied heavily on advertising to generate a profit (Drohan, 2016). Consequently, many print publications between the early-1990’s and late-2000’s periods have had to rebuild their business models, so they could survive in the face of dwindling revenues (Besley & Roberts, 2010). The biggest change made was papers reducing their spending, specifically by decreasing the number of writers employed by them (Kirchhoff, 2010). Bringing in statistics pertinent to the time when B.C.’s referendum occurred, starting with the U.S., as Reinardy (2010, p. 2) noted, between 2006 and 2009, “13,000 full-time journalism jobs have been lost...[while] newspapers have bought out, laid off and diminished their editorial staffs by about 25 [percent].” From Canada, in November 2008, Canwest, owners of the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist*, made deep cuts to the number of personnel it employed, including 350 print jobs (Beers, 2006; CMG, 2016). The significance of all this is that, by the 2000’s, the print media and its individual publications were devoting less attention and coverage to important issues pertinent to society (Drohan, 2016). With a reduced workforce of journalists, fewer articles could be written on these matters, pieces that could intellectually enrich and deepen the knowledge base of their readers (Eisler, 2016; Hamilton, 2009).

In sum, all these points together that occurred between the early-1990’s and late-2000’s time-periods, when NZ and B.C. held their respective referendums and a key difference between my two case studies, provide an explanatory point. They help to explain why, based on the results



gathered under indicator one, New Zealand's print media offered a greater quantity of coverage in the campaign before November 6, 1993 than British Columbia's ahead of May 12, 2009.

The second implication is, while there was a difference in quantity, the coverage offered by both the NZ and B.C. print media was of a level allowing them to provide a deliberative environment before their referendums so that citizens make informed ballot choices. This is key, because these votes centered around an important issue, asking citizens if they endorsed replacing the existing FPTP system (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, 2018a; Dutil, 2016). Also, this issue is one in which voters needed knowledge to gain a comprehension on the matter (LeDuc, 2011). Thus, according to the literature on mediated deliberation, to assist them on voting-day, it was vital the print media like NZ and B.C.'s provided coverage sufficient enough to allow citizens to properly decide on competing electoral ballot options (Jenkins & Mendelsohn, 2001).

Based on my data, this was the case, as both NZ and B.C.'s print media provided to citizens at least a moderate volume of referendum coverage. This inference is strengthened when my results are compared to other studies I have mentioned like Hoff (2009), LeDuc et al. (2008), LeDuc (2011), and Pilon (2009), who found print coverage before the 2007 Ontario referendum was of such a low quantity that it impacted citizens ability to coherently pick if they were in favor, or against electoral system change. NZ and B.C.'s print media surpassed the published totals of Ontario's broadsheets, and the former even bested the coverage from Italian broadsheets like *Corriere della Serra* preceding their country's May 2000 referendum (Uleri, 2002). This was coverage which Renwick and Lamb (2013) considered as the high mark from their study. In sum, the second implication of my indicator one data is that on an issue of paramount importance to their Westminster democracies, the print media of NZ and B.C. were able to provide a deliberative environment so that citizens could make informed ballot choices (Karp & Aimer, 2002; Milner, 2009).

*Indicators Two and Three:* Another reason why I conclude that both the NZ and B.C. print media attempted to provide a deliberative environment was due to the data on the balance of coverage and presence and type of reasoning to support taken positions. Each print media provided a deliberative environment to allow citizens to make informed ballot choices specifically in their published editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor, pieces which can offer an "overtly subjective appraisal of current events or issues" (Higgins, 2006, p. 32). From my data, in two article types, columns and letters, the *Herald*, the *Post*, the *Sun*, and the *Times Colonist* each

published multiple pieces displaying either the in favor, or against position on the issue of FPTP system change. In terms of attempting to provide balanced coverage, the *Vancouver Sun* was the best, publishing two in favor, and two against op-ed/opinion columns, and 12 and 11 letters respectively with the two stances.

There are two implications to data on the balance of coverage. First is that these four news organizations presented coverage which was not one-sided in the lead-up to their referendums (Müller & Wüest, 2009). On these votes, which asked citizens to decide between FPTP and an alternative, the quartet were effective in allowing both their published op-ed/opinion columns and letters to display both non-neutral positions on the matter (Sancton, 2013). The consequence is that these outlets “enable[d] citizens to compare the relevant pros and cons and make [informed] choices [on vote-day] according to their own interests” (Voltmer, 2000, p. 4). In the literature, print publications need to display this type of balanced coverage before such a referendum so that when citizens check their ballots, they can feel confident in choosing from a couple of choices (Rademacher et al., 2011). Furthermore, in comparison to previous studies, the results from NZ and B.C. paint a more promising picture for the print media’s ability to provide a balance of coverage ahead of a referendum adequate so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. Those studies like Hoff (2009), LeDuc et al. (2008), LeDuc (2011), Pilon (2009), and Renwick and Lamb (2013) found that print coverage before the Ontario and United Kingdom referendums was slanted on the matter of replacing the FPTP system. As one study, Renwick and Lamb (2013, p. 301), put it, “[r]eaders of many newspapers received strongly biased impressions of the referendum debate[s].” Based on the academic literature, this is seen as a drawback, because when “[t]he audience of a biased newspaper...learns only half the truth [they become]...less equipped to make informed and effective choices” (Voltmer, 2010, pp. 146-147). For NZ and B.C.’s print media, the patterns which emerged from my indicator two data did not show this. Instead, they showed qualities that helped me to conclude that each offered a deliberative environment before their referendums, so citizens could make educated choices when they voted.

The second implication is that the ideal coverage before an electoral reform referendum is if the print media has allocated the same space for each non-neutral viewpoint (Hagen, 1993). In doing so, they can present coverage balance that could be classified as strong, giving citizens even more of a solid footing when they vote on referendum day (Gastil & Black, 2008; Rademacher et al.,

2011). From my results, it is true that the NZ and B.C. print media did not restrain themselves from publishing editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters to the editor that took positions either critical or supportive of FPTP, and presented to readers enough of a balance of articles to help them make knowledgeable ballot choices (Wessler & Rinke, 2014). Ultimately though, their coverage balance was moderate, not strong. In my data, a central theme was either editorials, seen with the *Herald* and the *Post*, did not display a non-neutral position, or in these publications and the *Times Colonist*, there were slight discrepancies where one stance was expressed more, this was enough to classify their balance under indicator two as belonging in the moderate tier.

For the third indicator I used, the use and diversity of reasons, the data gathered also showed that the four papers for NZ and B.C.'s print media attempted to provide a deliberative environment so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. In part one, the *Herald*, the *Post*, the *Sun*, and the *Times Colonist* published, before their referendums, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters displaying non-neutral positions, who for a clear majority, supported their stances with reasons. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, the only minor weakness came from the *Herald*, which published 39 letters in favor of a shift to MMP, and of them, eight were not backed with reasoning. Overall, the implication of the results from this first half is that the NZ and B.C. print broadsheets were not interested with publishing articles without support for a position (Ettema, 2007). Instead, they tried to show ones where "claims and assertions are backed by...understandable [reasoning]" (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002, p. 219). This was critical, as the votes in my cases gave citizens a choice to overhaul or keep FPTP (Canada. Parliament, 2009). Thus, according to the literature on mediated deliberation, it was vital that print publications show pieces to readers where writers "persuasively defend what they consider [the] "better" or "desirable" [choice on the issue] for society as a whole" (Maia, 2012, p. 126). From my results, since the NZ and B.C. print media did this, they were able to offer an environment which allowed citizens to make enlightened ballot choices (Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steiner, 2003).

This conclusion is strengthened even more based on what I gathered in operationalizing part two. Overall, the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist* published non-neutral editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters that offered a range of different types of reasoning to support stances on the issue surrounding their referendums. Specifically, they showed articles that collectively used four: the *speculative*, *logical*, *evidentiary*,

and *expert-informed*. Implications of these results are that the NZ and B.C. print media, like under the presence of reasoning, also aided readers in deciding on FPTP by presenting articles which supported perspectives with a strong diversity of “well-explained and logically presented [reasons]” (Burkart & Russmann, 2016, p. 4160). Based on the literature, editorials, op-ed/opinion columns, and letters with such an array of reasoning is vital as it presents citizens with justifications on an issue they may not have considered beforehand, and are understandable (Maia, 2009).

However, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, the four forms of reasoning are not equal, as the evidentiary and expert-informed represent more effective forms to allow citizens to make knowledgeable choices (Renwick & Lamb, 2013). Specifically, non-neutral articles with the evidentiary reasoning, which “draw on...various sorts of evidence...create conditions that allow readers to make their own independent assessment about the issue in question, regardless of the judgement of the writer” (Pilon, 2009, pp. 7 and 21). The expert-informed is also useful, as it brings in the viewpoint of an expert, who is esteemed because they have “knowledge in a specific field... [and] have a set of skills that allows them to test beliefs [and] ideas...with regard to a particular subject matter” (Maia, Laranjeira, & Mundim, 2017, p. 3). In totality, from my results, the print media of New Zealand and British Columbia were successful at managing to publish three different types of opinionated articles who not only used speculation and logic, but also incorporated the use of evidence and experts, higher-grade forms of reasoning (Strandberg & Berg, 2013). Thus, based on my benchmarks from Chapter 4, because both showed non-neutral articles that collectively supported positions with *three or more* types, I classified their diversity of reasons used as *strong*.

**Conclusion-** In this thesis, I sought to investigate the extent to which the mass media can provide a deliberative environment in a campaign period before an electoral reform referendum so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. This is a vital question because citizens generally do not think about electoral systems, or have knowledge of it (Johnson, 2013). Consequently, I undertook an exploration to find the answer, grounding my work both in the theory of deliberative democracy, and mediated deliberation indicators. I wanted to determine if NZ and B.C.’s print media, in the campaign period leading into their respective November 6, 1993 and May 12, 2009 referendums, provided a deliberative environment for citizens to make informed ballot choices. This was done by picking four broadsheets: the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Evening Post*, the *Vancouver Sun*, and the *Victoria Times Colonist*. The print media was selected because they have

been viewed as a platform that can give citizens information they need to make informed ballot choices on competing options (Andersson, 2013; Hackett & Gruneau, 2000).

Overall, following operationalizing my three indicators, and gathering data, I concluded that the print media of New Zealand and British Columbia, in the immediate month leading into their referendums, *each attempted to provide a deliberative environment* on the vote so that citizens could make informed ballot choices. However, New Zealand's was stronger because the *Herald* and the *Post* provided a high quantity of coverage, while the *Sun* and the *Times Colonist* presented a level which was moderate. Despite this, based on my first indicator results, both NZ and B.C.'s print media presented a quantity which allowed each to provide a deliberative environment. This conclusion was strengthened based on results from operationalizing indicators two and three, which showed that the four NZ and B.C. papers each published multiple op-ed/opinion columns and letters to the editor displaying either an in favor, or against position on the issue of FPTP system change. Not only that, but these four published non-neutral articles in these two types, along with editorials, who not only supported their stances with reasons, but a strong diversity.

In conclusion, while other mediated deliberation studies like Hoff (2009), LeDuc et al. (2008), LeDuc (2011), Pilon (2009), and Renwick and Lamb (2013) found that coverage in the campaigns before the 2007 Ontario and 2011 United Kingdom referendums had either low quantity, or weak balance of coverage, or both, this was not found in this thesis. Instead, what I found from my data was that the NZ and B.C. print media each sought to offer a deliberative environment so citizens could make informed ballot choices on the referendum issue surrounding both votes. Indeed, the potential is there for the mass media to present such an environment during the campaign ahead of a vote of this kind.

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## APPENDIX A

### 1. 1993 New Zealand Electoral Reform Referendum:

#### a) The New Zealand Herald News Items:

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>
1.	Saturday October 9, 1993	Staff journalist
2.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	Staff journalist
3.	Thursday October 14, 1993	Staff journalist
4.	Monday October 18, 1993	Staff journalist
5.	Monday October 18, 1993	Staff journalist
6.	Monday October 18, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
7.	Tuesday October 19, 1993	Staff journalist
8.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	Staff journalist
9.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	Joe Helm
10.	Thursday October 21, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
11.	Thursday October 21, 1993	John Armstrong
12.	Friday October 22, 1993	Staff journalist
13.	Friday October 22, 1993	Shenagh Gleeson
14.	Saturday October 23, 1993	Staff journalist
15.	Monday October 25, 1993	Bernard Orsman
16.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	Eugene Bingham
17.	Thursday October 28, 1993	Andrew Stone
18.	Thursday October 28, 1993	Staff journalist
19.	Friday October 29, 1993	John Roughan
20.	Friday October 29, 1993	John Roughan
21.	Saturday October 30, 1993	Adelia Ferguson
22.	Monday November 1, 1993	Bevan Rapson
23.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
24.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
25.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
26.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
27.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Jason Barber
28.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
29.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
30.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
31.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Patricia Herbert
32.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Staff journalist
33.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Staff journalist
34.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Tim Murphy
35.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Adelia Ferguson
36.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Audrey Young
37.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Greg Ansley
38.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Andrew Stone
39.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Geoff Senescall

40.	Friday November 5, 1993	John Armstrong
41.	Friday November 5, 1993	Adelia Ferguson
42.	Friday November 5, 1993	Adelia Ferguson
43.	Saturday November 6, 1993	Adelia Ferguson
44.	Saturday November 6, 1993	Staff journalist

**b) The New Zealand Herald Editorials:**

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Monday October 18, 1993	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
3.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	Edi. board	In Favor	Speculative
4.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
5.	Thursday October 28, 1993	Edi. board	In Favor	Evidentiary
6.	Friday October 29, 1993	Edi. board	In Favor	Logical/Evidentiary
7.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Edi. board	In Favor	Speculative/Logical/Evidentiary

**c) The New Zealand Herald Op-ed/Opinion Columns:**

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Friday October 15, 1993	Gordon McLauchlan	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
2.	Saturday October 16, 1993	Rob Richie and Cynthia Terrell	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
3.	Monday October 18, 1993	John Roughan and Adelia Ferguson	Neutral	Not applicable
4.	Tuesday October 19, 1993	John Roughan and Adelia Ferguson	Neutral	Not applicable
5.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	John Roughan and Adelia Ferguson	Neutral	Not applicable
6.	Thursday October 21, 1993	John Roughan and Adelia Ferguson	Neutral	Not applicable
7.	Saturday October 23, 1993	Peter Shirtcliffe	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
8.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	John Wallace	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi./Exp.inf.
9.	Saturday October 30, 1993	Joylon Firth	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
10.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	Martyn Finlay	In Favor	Speculative
11.	Friday November 5, 1993	Gordon McLauchlan	In Favor	Evidentiary

**d) The New Zealand Herald Letters to the Editor:**

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Wednesday October 6, 1993	M. Coxhead	Against	Evidentiary
2.	Wednesday October 6, 1993	E.P. Aimer	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
3.	Thursday October 7, 1993	J.D. Turner	In Favor	Evidentiary

4.	Thursday October 7, 1993	J. Archer	Against	No Reason
5.	Friday October 8, 1993	B. Matthew	Against	Log./Evi.
6.	Saturday October 9, 1993	N.W. Shearn	Against	Speculative
7.	Saturday October 9, 1993	J.A. Simons	In Favor	Evidentiary
8.	Saturday October 9, 1993	J. King	Neutral	Not applicable
9.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	R. Leahy	Neutral	Not applicable
10.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	F.P. Hutton	In Favor	Evidentiary
11.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	M.D. McGhie	In Favor	No Reason
12.	Wednesday October 13, 1993	W.J. Ringer	In Favor	Speculative
13.	Wednesday October 13, 1993	N. Ceramalus	In Favor	Log./Evi.
14.	Thursday October 14, 1993	E. Moyles	In Favor	Evidentiary
15.	Thursday October 14, 1993	J.A. Malloch	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
16.	Friday October 15, 1993	D.C. Dewson	In Favor	No Reason
17.	Friday October 15, 1993	T.M. Langham	In Favor	Evidentiary
18.	Saturday October 16, 1993	B.P. Morrison	Against	Speculative
19.	Saturday October 16, 1993	A.M. Turner	Neutral	Not applicable
20.	Saturday October 16, 1993	H. Roberts	Neutral	Not applicable
21.	Monday October 18, 1993	D.A. Budden	Against	Logical
22.	Monday October 18, 1993	J. Gill	Neutral	Not applicable
23.	Monday October 18, 1993	A.R. Pybus	In Favor	No Reason
24.	Tuesday October 19, 1993	A. Watson	Against	Speculative
25.	Tuesday October 19, 1993	P. Conway	In Favor	Logical
26.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	P. Allison	In Favor	No Reason
27.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	F.V. Brittain	Against	Speculative
28.	Thursday October 21, 1993	G.D. Easte	In Favor	Logical
29.	Thursday October 21, 1993	S. Brown	In Favor	Logical
30.	Thursday October 21, 1993	R. Dawson	Against	Speculative
31.	Friday October 22, 1993	K.E. and D.B. Malcolm	In Favor	Log./Evi.
32.	Friday October 22, 1993	F. Woods	Against	Speculative
33.	Friday October 22, 1993	M. Houlding	Against	Spec./Evi.
34.	Saturday October 23, 1993	J. Hall	In Favor	Speculative
35.	Saturday October 23, 1993	I. Francis	Against	Speculative
36.	Monday October 25, 1993	C. and W. Drake	In Favor	Evidentiary
37.	Monday October 25, 1993	P. Beach	In Favor	Log./Evi.
38.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	G. Sargent	Against	Spec./Log.
39.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	M. McCabe	In Favor	No Reason
40.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	D. Donovan	Against	No Reason
41.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	A.B. Greenaway	Against	Speculative
42.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	M. Shirtcliffe	Against	No Reason
43.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	H. Young	In Favor	Speculative
44.	Thursday October 28, 1993	J. O'Neill	In Favor	Log./Evi.
45.	Thursday October 28, 1993	T. Dunleavy	Against	Evidentiary

46.	Friday October 29, 1993	T. Rutledge	Against	Spec./Evi.
47.	Friday October 29, 1993	A. Balls	Neutral	Not applicable
48.	Friday October 29, 1993	M.H. Sommerville	Neutral	Not applicable
49.	Friday October 29, 1993	P.J. Zuur	In Favor	Evidentiary
50.	Saturday October 30, 1993	C.G. Rodliffe	In Favor	Log./Evi.
51.	Saturday October 30, 1993	S. Marks	In Favor	Logical
52.	Saturday October 30, 1993	R. Hart	Against	Evidentiary
53.	Saturday October 30, 1993	D. Johnson	In Favor	Speculative
54.	Monday November 1, 1993	P. Woollaston	In Favor	Logical
55.	Monday November 1, 1993	G.N. Cashmore	Against	Spec./Evi.
56.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	P. Jones	Neutral	Not applicable
57.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	B.P. Morrison	Against	Logical
58.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	M. Waring	Against	Evidentiary
59.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	M. Maxted	Against	Log./Evi.
60.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	D.G. Leybourne	Neutral	Not applicable
61.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J. Cotton	In Favor	Speculative
62.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J. Fuller	In Favor	No Reason
63.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	T. Spend	In Favor	Speculative
64.	Thursday November 4, 1993	J.H. Fletcher	Against	Logical
65.	Thursday November 4, 1993	J.S. Gunn	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
66.	Friday November 5, 1993	A.J. Veitch	In Favor	No Reason
67.	Friday November 5, 1993	J. Schiff	Against	Speculative
68.	Friday November 5, 1993	A.A. Young	Against	Log./Evi.
69.	Friday November 5, 1993	K.H.P. Kammier	In Favor	Speculative
70.	Friday November 5, 1993	J. Clark	In Favor	Logical
71.	Friday November 5, 1993	J. Vowles	In Favor	Logical
72.	Friday November 5, 1993	F.W. Soeterlk	In Favor	Evi./Exp.inf.
73.	Friday November 5, 1993	M. Donald	Against	Speculative
74.	Friday November 5, 1993	M. Driver	In Favor	Speculative
75.	Friday November 5, 1993	P. Tate	Neutral	Not applicable
76.	Friday November 5, 1993	E. Dijkstra	In Favor	No Reason
77.	Friday November 5, 1993	I. McGovern	In Favor	Log./Evi.

e) **The Evening Post News Items:**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>
1.	Wednesday October 13, 1993	Lyn Murphy
2.	Thursday October 14, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
3.	Friday October 15, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
4.	Friday October 15, 1993	Simon England [NZPA]
5.	Saturday October 16, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
6.	Saturday October 16, 1993	Staff journalist

7.	Monday October 18, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
8.	Tuesday October 19, 1993	Staff journalist
9.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	Staff journalist
10.	Saturday October 23, 1993	Eileen O'Leary
11.	Monday October 25, 1993	Staff journalist
12.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	Staff journalist
13.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	Staff journalist
14.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	Staff journalist
15.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	Staff journalist
16.	Thursday October 28, 1993	Brent Edwards
17.	Friday October 29, 1993	Eileen O'Leary
18.	Saturday October 30, 1993	Staff journalist
19.	Saturday October 30, 1993	Staff journalist
20.	Monday November 1, 1993	Staff journalist
21.	Monday November 1, 1993	Staff journalist
22.	Monday November 1, 1993	Staff journalist
23.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	Sarah Boyd
24.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	Eileen O'Leary
25.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Brent Edwards
26.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Brent Edwards
27.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
28.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
29.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
30.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Staff journalist
31.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Eileen O'Leary
32.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Staff journalist
33.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Staff journalist
34.	Thursday November 4, 1993	Staff journalist
35.	Thursday November 4, 1993	New Zealand Press Association [NZPA]
36.	Friday November 5, 1993	Staff journalist
37.	Saturday November 6, 1993	Staff journalist

**f) The Evening Post Editorials:**

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Friday October 8, 1993	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Saturday October 23, 1993	Edi. board	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
3.	Thursday October 28, 1993	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
4.	Friday November 5, 1993	Edi. board	Against	Speculative

**g) The Evening Post Op-ed/Opinion Columns:**

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Thursday October 7, 1993	Staff writer	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Monday October 11, 1993	Bob Jones	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.



3.	Thursday October 14, 1993	Mary Varnham	In Favor	Log./Evi./Exp.inf.
4.	Friday October 15, 1993	Gordon McLauchlan	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
5.	Saturday October 16, 1993	John Goulter	Neutral	Not applicable
6.	Monday October 18, 1993	Bob Jones	Against	Speculative
7.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	Ben Carey	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
8.	Wednesday October 20, 1993	Peter Munz	In Favor	Log./Evi.
9.	Thursday October 21, 1993	Fran Wilde	Neutral	Not applicable
10.	Monday October 25, 1993	Bob Jones	Against	Log./Evi.
11.	Monday November 1, 1993	Bob Jones	Against	No Reason
12.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Margaret Clark	Neutral	Not applicable
13.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	Brian Woodley	Against	Spec./Evi.
14.	Friday November 5, 1993	John Goulter	Neutral	Not applicable
15.	Friday November 5, 1993	Staff writer	Against	No Reason
16.	Friday November 5, 1993	Gordon McLauchlan	In Favor	Evidentiary

**h) The Evening Post Letters to the Editor:**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Thursday October 7, 1993	A.S. Ward	Against	Evidentiary
2.	Thursday October 7, 1993	F. Macskasy	Neutral	Not applicable
3.	Thursday October 7, 1993	A. Everton	Against	Evidentiary
4.	Saturday October 9, 1993	G.A. Harford	Against	Spec./Log.
5.	Saturday October 9, 1993	P.N. Heidenstrom	Neutral	Not applicable
6.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	R.E. Carpenter	In Favor	Logical
7.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	J. Robertson	Neutral	Not applicable
8.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	F. Macskasy	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
9.	Tuesday October 12, 1993	R.J. Angus	Against	Speculative
10.	Friday October 15, 1993	T. Jackson	In Favor	Evidentiary
11.	Friday October 15, 1993	T. Green	In Favor	Evidentiary
12.	Saturday October 16, 1993	M. Hardgrave	In Favor	Evidentiary
13.	Thursday October 21, 1993	S. Brown	In Favor	Logical
14.	Thursday October 21, 1993	I. Brody	Against	Spec./Evi.
15.	Thursday October 21, 1993	M.J. Durham	In Favor	No Reason
16.	Friday October 22, 1993	R.A. Brockway	In Favor	No Reason
17.	Friday October 22, 1993	R. Donald	In Favor	No Reason
18.	Friday October 22, 1993	H. Hartog	In Favor	Speculative
19.	Monday October 25, 1993	J. O'Donnell	Neutral	Not applicable
20.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	F. Macskasy Jr	In Favor	Evidentiary
21.	Tuesday October 26, 1993	T. Anderson	Neutral	Not applicable
22.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	B. Paynter	Neutral	Not applicable

23.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	W. Postlewaight	Neutral	Not applicable
24.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	J. Wilson	In Favor	Log./Evi.
25.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	F. Fleming	In Favor	Logical
26.	Wednesday October 27, 1993	A.J.R. Brown	Against	Speculative
27.	Thursday October 28, 1993	J. Horton	In Favor	Speculative
28.	Thursday October 28, 1993	S. Robinson	In Favor	Logical
29.	Thursday October 28, 1993	P.M. Finlay	Against	Speculative
30.	Friday October 29, 1993	N. Harrap	In Favor	No Reason
31.	Saturday October 30, 1993	D. Mills	Neutral	Not applicable
32.	Saturday October 30, 1993	P.L. Harland	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
33.	Saturday October 30, 1993	J.W. Bird	In Favor	Speculative
34.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	B. Wollerman	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
35.	Tuesday November 2, 1993	C. Crawford	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
36.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	K.E. Malcolm	In Favor	Speculative
37.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	A.W. Beasley	Against	Logical
38.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	D. Giltrap	Neutral	Not applicable
39.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	I. Sikkell	In Favor	Log./Evi.
40.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	F. Macskasy	In Favor	Evidentiary
41.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J. Pettigrew	Against	Speculative
42.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	S. McCauley	Neutral	Not applicable
43.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J. Hampton	Neutral	Not applicable
44.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	K. Bracey	In Favor	Expert-informed
45.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J. Easton	In Favor	Speculative
46.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	S. Todd	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
47.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	A.P. Quinn	In Favor	Evidentiary
48.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	F. Cook	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
49.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	M. Hardgrave	In Favor	Speculative
50.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	R. Bacchus	In Favor	Log./Evi.
51.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	W.D. Grace	Neutral	Not applicable
52.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	C.H. Jelley	In Favor	Speculative
53.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	R. Morrison	Neutral	Not applicable
54.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	M. Gee	In Favor	Speculative
55.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	G.A. Harford	Against	Speculative
56.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	R. Newlands	Against	Speculative
57.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	S. Adams	Against	Speculative
58.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	R.K. Lake	Against	Spec./Evi.
59.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	J.F. Stewart	Against	Speculative
60.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	M. Small	Neutral	Not applicable
61.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	E. Smith	Against	Spec./Evi.
62.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	D.B. Carrad	In Favor	Logical
63.	Wednesday November 3, 1993	B.M. O'Connor	Neutral	Not applicable
64.	Thursday November 4, 1993	K.R. Pullenger	Neutral	Not applicable
65.	Thursday November 4, 1993	P.B. Graham	Against	Spec./Evi.

66.	Thursday November 4, 1993	N.L. Caine	Neutral	Not applicable
67.	Thursday November 4, 1993	C. Penberthy	In Favor	Log./Evi.
68.	Thursday November 4, 1993	H. Midgley	In Favor	Evidentiary
69.	Thursday November 4, 1993	N. Lerner	In Favor	Evidentiary
70.	Thursday November 4, 1993	H. Young	Neutral	Not applicable
71.	Thursday November 4, 1993	J. Niland	Against	Speculative
72.	Thursday November 4, 1993	T. Delaney	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
73.	Friday November 5, 1993	B. Young	Against	Log./Evi.
74.	Friday November 5, 1993	L. Collier	In Favor	Speculative
75.	Friday November 5, 1993	N.N. Rodley	Against	Evidentiary
76.	Friday November 5, 1993	B. Wallace	In Favor	Log./Evi.
77.	Friday November 5, 1993	I. Williams	Neutral	Not applicable
78.	Friday November 5, 1993	K. Martin	In Favor	No Reason
79.	Friday November 5, 1993	B. Ellis	In Favor	Evidentiary
80.	Friday November 5, 1993	H. Swadling	In Favor	Evidentiary
81.	Friday November 5, 1993	M.E. Barnes	Against	Speculative

## 2. 2009 British Columbia Electoral Reform Referendum:

### a) The Vancouver Sun News Items:

	Date	Author
1.	Tuesday April 14, 2009	Staff journalist
2.	Wednesday April 15, 2009	Rob Shaw
3.	Thursday April 23, 2009	Doug Ward
4.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	Lindsay Kines
5.	Thursday April 30, 2009	Darah Hansen
6.	Monday May 4, 2009	Denise Ryan
7.	Thursday May 7, 2009	Doug Ward
8.	Saturday May 9, 2009	Neal Hall
9.	Saturday May 9, 2009	David Karp
10.	Monday May 11, 2009	Denise Ryan

### b) The Vancouver Sun Editorials:

	Date	Author	Positional Stance	Reasoning
1.	Tuesday April 14, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Saturday April 25, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
3.	Tuesday April 28, 2009	<i>The Ottawa Citizen</i> edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
4.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable

**c) The Vancouver Sun Op-ed/Opinion Columns:**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Tuesday April 28, 2009	Vaughn Palmer	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	Don Cayo	Neutral	Not applicable
3.	Thursday April 30, 2009	Vaughn Palmer	Neutral	Not applicable
4.	Thursday April 30, 2009	Craig McInnes	Neutral	Not applicable
5.	Monday May 4, 2009	Gordon Gibson	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
6.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	Bill Tieleman	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
7.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	Daphne Bramham	Neutral	Not applicable
8.	Thursday May 7, 2009	Harry Neufeld	Neutral	Not applicable
9.	Friday May 8, 2009	Troy Lanigan and Andrew Petter	In Favor	Log./Evi.
10.	Saturday May 9, 2009	Craig McInnes	Neutral	Not applicable
11.	Saturday May 9, 2009	Stephen Hume	Neutral	Not applicable
12.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Pete McMartin	Against	No Reason

**d) The Vancouver Sun Letters to the Editor:**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Monday April 27, 2009	E. Doherty	In Favor	Logical
2.	Monday April 27, 2009	I. Giesbrecht	In Favor	Spec./Log.
3.	Monday April 27, 2009	J. Baker	Against	Spec./Evi.
4.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	D. Huntley	In Favor	Evidentiary
5.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	C. Ebenstiner	Against	Log./Evi.
6.	Friday May 1, 2009	D. Carter	In Favor	Speculative
7.	Friday May 1, 2009	Y. Pearson	Against	Evidentiary
8.	Monday May 4, 2009	F. Brown	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
9.	Monday May 4, 2009	C. Worthington	Against	Spec./Evi.
10.	Monday May 4, 2009	B. Sepehri	In Favor	Spec./Log.
11.	Monday May 4, 2009	E. Dickson	Against	Spec./Evi.
12.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	N. Van Steinburg	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
13.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	D. Stocker	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
14.	Thursday May 7, 2009	S. Little	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
15.	Thursday May 7, 2009	D. Vipond	In Favor	Speculative
16.	Monday May 11, 2009	A. Watt	In Favor	Spec./Log.
17.	Monday May 11, 2009	R. Neufeld	Against	Log./Evi.
18.	Monday May 11, 2009	J. Lindsay	Against	Logical
19.	Monday May 11, 2009	B. McAllister	Against	Spec./Evi.
20.	Monday May 11, 2009	D. Sturdy	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
21.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	G. Brown	In Favor	Speculative
22.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	J. Hanson	Against	Speculative
23.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	A. Blundell	In Favor	Log./Evi.

e) ***The Victoria Times Colonist News Items:***

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>
1.	Tuesday April 14, 2009	Staff journalist
2.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Lindsay Kines and Rob Shaw
3.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Les Leyne and Lindsay Kines
4.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Lindsay Kines
5.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Rob Shaw
6.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Lindsay Kines and Rob Shaw
7.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Lindsay Kines and Rob Shaw
8.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	Judith Lavoie
9.	Wednesday April 29, 2009	Staff journalist
10.	Thursday April 30, 2009	Staff journalist
11.	Sunday May 3, 2009	Doug Ward
12.	Monday May 4, 2009	Denise Ryan
13.	Wednesday May 6, 2009	Staff journalist
14.	Saturday May 9, 2009	Neal Hall
15.	Sunday May 10, 2009	David Karp
16.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Jeff Bell
17.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Rob Shaw

f) ***The Victoria Times Colonist Editorials:***

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Tuesday April 14, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
2.	Wednesday April 15, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
3.	Monday May 4, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable
4.	Sunday May 10, 2009	Edi. board	Against	Spec./Evi.
5.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Edi. board	Neutral	Not applicable

g) ***The Victoria Times Colonist Op-ed/Opinion Columns:***

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Friday April 17, 2009	Paul Willcocks	In Favor	Speculative
2.	Saturday April 18, 2009	Iain Hunter	Against	Spec./Log./Evi.
3.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Bruce Hallsor	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
4.	Sunday April 19, 2009	Bob Plecas	Against	Spec./Evi./Exp.inf.
5.	Thursday April 23, 2009	Paul Willcocks	Neutral	Not applicable
6.	Monday April 27, 2009	Iain Hunter	Against	Speculative
7.	Friday May 1, 2009	Jody Paterson	In Favor	Speculative
8.	Thursday May 7, 2009	Paul Willcocks	In Favor	Spec./Log./Evi.
9.	Thursday May 7, 2009	Wendy Bergerud	In Favor	Log./Evi.
10.	Friday May 8, 2009	Jody Paterson	In Favor	Log./Evi.
11.	Tuesday May 12, 2009	Les Leyne	In Favor	Log./Evi.

**h) *The Victoria Times Colonist* Letters to the Editor:**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Positional Stance</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
1.	Sunday April 19, 2009	J. Gaylord	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
2.	Tuesday April 21, 2009	C. Renneberg	In Favor	Evidentiary
3.	Tuesday April 21, 2009	A. Paton	Against	Speculative
4.	Tuesday April 21, 2009	M. Wheatley	Neutral	Not applicable
5.	Tuesday April 21, 2009	D. Vipond	In Favor	Spec./Log.
6.	Tuesday April 21, 2009	M.R. Barr	Against	Logical
7.	Wednesday April 22, 2009	N. Paterson	In Favor	Speculative
8.	Wednesday April 22, 2009	S. Hurdle	In Favor	Log./Evi.
9.	Thursday April 23, 2009	C. Stevens	Against	Speculative
10.	Thursday April 23, 2009	G. Morrow	In Favor	Evidentiary
11.	Friday April 24, 2009	D. Lowther	Neutral	Not applicable
12.	Friday April 24, 2009	W. Wiebe	In Favor	Evidentiary
13.	Saturday April 25, 2009	J. Gaylord	In Favor	Spec./Evi.
14.	Sunday April 26, 2009	R.C. Le Noury	In Favor	Evidentiary
15.	Sunday April 26, 2009	J.M. Orr	Against	Evidentiary
16.	Sunday April 26, 2009	E.J. Ronse	In Favor	Log./Evi.
17.	Sunday April 26, 2009	T. Wickstrom	Against	Spec./Log.
18.	Tuesday April 28, 2009	J. Pope	In Favor	Speculative
19.	Tuesday April 28, 2009	R. Marsh	Against	Speculative
20.	Thursday April 30, 2009	G. Gardiner	In Favor	Spec./Log.
21.	Saturday May 2, 2009	A. Falconer	Neutral	Not applicable
22.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	R. Thompson	Against	Spec./Evi.
23.	Tuesday May 5, 2009	C. Simpson	In Favor	Log./Evi.
24.	Thursday May 7, 2009	S. Richter	In Favor	Log./Evi.
25.	Thursday May 7, 2009	J. Amon	Against	Spec./Evi.
26.	Thursday May 7, 2009	B. Humphrey	In Favor	Logical
27.	Thursday May 7, 2009	J. Healey	In Favor	Spec./Log.
28.	Friday May 8, 2009	P. Young	In Favor	Spec./Log.
29.	Friday May 8, 2009	P. Day	In Favor	Speculative
30.	Saturday May 9, 2009	T.B. Widdowson	Neutral	Not applicable
31.	Saturday May 9, 2009	T. Bachman	Against	Speculative
32.	Monday May 11, 2009	I. Cameron	In Favor	Evidentiary