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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CO-OPERATION NOT CONFLICT: REASSESSING THE MARIAN MYTH, 1553-1558

BY

KATHRYN MICHELLE BRAMMALL

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE FO MASTER OF ARTS.

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled CO-OPERATION NOT CONFLICT: REASSESSING THE MARIAN MYTH 1553-1558 submitted by KATHRYN MICHELLE BRAMMALL in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTERS OF ARTS.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of the reign of one of England's most maligned monarchs: Mary I of England. She governed from July 1553 until her death in November 1558 and many historians have chosen to characterize this period as one of either governmental chaos or administrative sterility. However, it has recently become apparent that neither of these designations is appropriate. An examination of the Council, the Parliament, and the relations which existed between the central and the local administrations has revealed that the government was far more effective and competent than previously believed. In addition, the extant documentary evidence suggests that although the contemporary religious disputes were important issues to the sixteenth-century citizen, most governmental actions were motivated by various desires and interests including, but not exclusively, religion. This also is a new discovery within the context of the mid-Tudor era. The importance of Mary's reign has been discounted because scholars have misinterpreted the nature and productivity of Marian goverment and, therefore, have substantially ignored the reign based on the mistaken supposition that it held no lesson for posterity. This thesis was written as part of the revisionist attempt to redress the balance and supply a comprehensive account of Mary's government.

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INTRODUCTION

> The reign holds no lesson for posterity and may be dismissed as the blood stained carnival of a terrified and despairing soul.1

The above dismissal, written in 1928, is representative of the traditional and orthodox estimations of Mary's reign and offers modern scholars an explanation for the historiographical neglect which the Queen and her government have suffered. This omission is a result of the scholarly preoccupation with the lengthy reigns of her father and sister. Henry VIII and Elizabeth I were regarded as flamboyant and capable, everything Mary was not, which has led to the mistaken assumption that their reigns were the foci of all important sixteenth century political, social, administrative, and economic innovation. In fact, when Mary was not ignored completely, her reign was often described superficially and without the insight characteristic of Henrician or Elizabethan historiography. S. T. Bindoff identified certain alleged characteristics which have come to be recognized as indicative of a crisis in government during the reign.2 It was, he claimed, "politically bankrupt, spiritually impoverished, economically archaic, and intellectually enervated" and he reached this conclusion despite a studied disinterest in the reign.3 Similarly, G. R. Elton, whose main research topics have been the 1530s and the early Elizabethan era, has disparaged the reign thus:

that sterility was its conclusive note, and this is a verdict with which the dispassionate observer must agree."4 Scathing judgments of this type are common but recent research has been more thorough and has proven that such condemnation is unjustified.

Mary I came to the English throne in July 1553, the victor of the only successful rebellion between 1485 and the 1640s. She ruled for just over five years in the religiously and politically turbulent sixteenth century. Between her accession and her death in November 1558, the realm and government encountered the first Queen regnant and the first King Consort of its history, underwent the Catholic Reformation, survived a major rebellion in 1554, confronted shortage and famine in the latter half of the reign, and conducted a war against France and Scotland. Through it all Mary maintained her throne and when she died her sister, Elizabeth I, succeeded unopposed. This legacy to Elizabeth was perhaps one of the most significant of the numerous successes of Mary's brief reign.

The achievements of Mary and her government have not been acknowledged and recognized until recently because they were largely ignored by the most comprehensive contemporary source: Simon Renard, Imperial Resident Ambassador in England. In his reports to Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, Renard constantly bewailed the fact that Mary's Privy Council and Parliaments were characterized by faction and an inability to act

constructively. He believed that, given this inadequacy, neither Council nor Parliament were providing leadership or guidance to the country and, therefore, the national economy and political system were stagnant; in other words, it was he who identified the sterility of Marian leadership to which historians have alluded when attempting to prove that a crisis did exist in the Marian regime.

Historians, such as A. F. Pollard and Bindoff, largely accepted the picture as presented by Renard, which is unfortunate in light of his deficiencies. Historians have relied on Renard because he was an extremely verbose author whose reports contain much specific detail and also because he was a man influential with the Queen. They seem to have assumed that his privileged position provided him with insight and information about the inner workings of the Marian regime and that he accurately conveyed this intelligence to his superiors. However, even his own colleagues were not so optimistic about his professionalism: "I fear our ambassador's attitude has not always been wise, for from what we have been able to make out, he has taken sides for one of the parties here, and as his influence with the Queen is great, he is able to be of use to some and do serious harm to others.... The Ambassador, far from succeeding in affairs here, gets everything into a muddle."5 Furthermore, his reports often contained contradictory information; for instance on 7 April 1554 he applauded the "incredible preparations" being made for

Philip's arrival but on 14 June 1554 he complained that the English were not "doing much to get ready to welcome his Highness."6 Aside from contradicting himself, Renard could be hypocritical and inconstant which resulted in his misinforming his superiors for his own benefit. An illuminating example of such behaviour occurred during and immediately following the first Parliament of 1554. Until then Renard had regarded Paget as his closest ally; however, when accused of taking bribes from the Englishman, Renard felt that it would be judicious for him to establish distance between himself and the Councillor. As a result, he immediately started to impugn Paget's loyalty, both in his Imperial correspondence and his audiences with the Queen.7 For these reasons, historians must balance Renard's dispatches by examining the remainder of the extant primary documentation, such as the state records documented in the Foreign, Venetian, and Domestic Calendars of State Papers (CSP); the Acts of the Privy Council (APC); and the contemporary letters and chronicles.8 Renard's dispatches must never be totally ignored or dismissed, but if these other sources are used to corroborate, or discount, the data derived from the Imperial Ambassador, a much more reliable picture of the reign emerges.

Once scholarship took account of the extant documentary sources other than Renard, a small group of historians decided to test the assumptions which arose out of the previous concentration on the Henrician and Elizabethan periods.

Expanding upon Pollard's theme of sterility, J. E. Neale and Elton had described the years 1540 to 1558 as ones of crisis characterized by endemic political conflict, administrative collapse, and legislative decline;9 however, scholars such as D. E. Hoak, J. Loach, and M. A. R. Graves have found that concentrated research into the reign has provided evidence which will not support such an assessment.10 These historians have preferred to abandon the conclusions of traditional historiography and create, instead, a dependable foundation on which future scholarship can be based: "Pollard's sterile interlude has been found teeming with life, and the distance between the Cromwellian achievement on one hand and the reign of Gloriana on the other seems rather shorter than has been supposed."11

It will, it is hoped, become apparent that the evidence provided in this paper confirms that Mary's reign was indeed one of activity, not sterility nor endemic crisis. A thorough examination of the extant documentation has revealed that the major themes of sixteenth-century historiography are as applicable to Mary's reign as they are to either Henry's or Elizabeth's. First, the strength and competence of Council, although ostensibly larger than the reformed Councils of the 1530s and 1559-1603, was undermined neither by its size nor by excessive factionalism. Rather, it proved to be a body comprising capable administrators whose expertise was the foundation of Marian accomplishment. Second, the Parliaments

were not characterized by opposition which was either violent or anti-Catholic. Instead, the relations between the Members of Parliament and the Crown and Council were distinguished by a willingness to cooperate and the Houses of Parliament were satisfied to enact government initiatives so long as their own interests were not threatened. In other words, the Members became anxious about only those national policies which promised to assault the circumstances of their material existences. In addition, the picture which emerges is one of a body devoting its time and discussion to a number of differing issues and reaching its conclusions and decisions on the basis of assorted motivations including, but not exclusively, religion. And finally, the country at large was not one in which antagonism to the government and its policies was rife. Although opposition did manifest itself, the overall impression is one of a government and populace willing and able to cooperate with each other to ensure the peace and stability of the nation.

It appears that the reason such findings have not previously emerged was nothing more than the general lack of interest and lack of detective work of historians. It is hoped that the evidence presented below will convince readers that this omission has been detrimental to attempts at establishing a comprehensive understanding of the sixteenth century in that it caused scholars to misrepresent and undervalue Marian achievement.

CHAPTER ONE

During the early sixteenth century the Privy Council came to be recognized as one of the most influential policy-making institutions in Tudor government, given the correct social and political conditions. Although there were some issues on which monarchs still clung to personal prerogative, by the 1550s the Council had become the executive body which discussed and formulated policy, both extraordinary and mundane.1 It was a rare occasion on which the monarch made a decision of significance for the realm without the knowledge of the Council, especially since the Council would be responsible for enacting that policy.2 The need for a Council that was able to offer sound advice, capable of implementing the policies of government swiftly and effectively throughout the realm, and yet manageable enough to be persuaded to support even those policies which its members found disagreeable, was central to the survival of the Tudor dynasty. In the 1530s Cromwell recognized that a large Council was often cumbersome and unmanageable and, therefore, he initiated a massive reform designed to reduce the size and increase the efficiency of the Henrician Privy Council. These particular reforming activities have been regarded as the revolution which initiated the gradual transformation of English government from autocratic and despotic to conciliar and enlightened.3 This propitious

assessment has so permeated the intellects of sixteenth-century historians that when they encounter a Council which does not mirror the reformed Cromwellian model it is automatically denigrated. It has been assumed that because Mary's Council was larger than the ideal, this Council was simply unable to provide the superior advice and administrative expertise required by a Tudor monarch: "in their Council there was little wisdom and in their multitude no safety."4

Limitation of size, it has been argued, resulted in the specialization of function, the elimination of divisive forces, and the professionalization of those involved. However, this judgment is only accurate in the context of those reigns which witnessed a strong, secure monarch served by men who could be trusted implicitly with even the most treasured and controversial matters. Mary was forced to appoint a large number of Councillors because neither of these preconditions existed in July and August of 1553. The most prominent feature of Mary's past had been instability which bred insecurity and ensured that she remained politically inexperienced: "I [Renard] know the Queen to be good, easily influenced, inexpert in worldly matters and a novice all round."5 Also, there were very few men in the realm whom she felt she could trust without question or thought. Those men who had been influential Councillors in the previous reigns were all in some degree suspect, and they required time to prove themselves to their new Queen.6 The one group which Mary could trust implicitly

were local Catholic supporters or members of her personal household; however, they lacked any experience in governmental policy-making and administration.7 Furthermore, Mary lacked the time either to reassure herself about the loyalty of those with experience or to allow those upon whom she could rely to gain the necessary expertise, because she was faced with the immediate problem of naming a Council capable of controlling and governing her country according to her instructions and with the greatest efficiency possible.

As revealed in the primary documents covering these months, Mary's Council was created by a series of steps.8 The first Councillors were named by Mary in the midst of the attempted usurpation by Northumberland in the second and third weeks of July 1553.9 The men named were the first supporters of her claim to the Crown and included the trusted household servants and men who rallied to her cause for a diversity of reasons, including religion, self-interest, personal rivalries, the legitimacy of Mary's claim, and a hatred of Northumberland.10 As stated above, Mary knew this group to be trustworthy but she also realized most were not experienced enough to ensure central government efficiency or effectiveness. Mary relied on her initial supporters in the early weeks of July and even created a Council out of some of her more capable adherents;11 however, she appreciated that in order to govern an entire nation she would require the support of men with political and administrative experience - men who

understood the intricacies of domestic policy-making, foreign relations, parliamentary procedure and management, and the routines of the administrative institutions which made up the central government. Mary found these men in the former Councils of her father and brother and appointed a large number of them to her own Council late in July and in the first half of August 1553.12 These men could provide all the experience that her own retainers and local supporters lacked but, as stated above, in Mary's eyes most of them were undeserving of her complete confidence.13 Mary's decision to include these men in her Council was an exercise of necessity, not desire, and, until those with experience proved their loyalty to Mary herself, she refused to place her person and her treasured ambitions for the nation in their sole care.14 For this reason she did not dismiss the Councillors who had little practical experience but who, due to their undoubted loyalty, provided the Queen with a counterbalance against the "less trustworthy but experienced councillors she felt she had to include in her Privy Council in order to establish and maintain her rule effectively."15 In other words, Mary lacked experienced men she could trust and this fact, coupled with her own insecurity and inexperience, resulted in a Privy Council which well exceeded in number the Cromwellian ideal.

Mary's attempt to protect herself in numbers was a reasonable and understandable compromise given these circumstances and yet, contrary to the assumptions of numerous

historians, it did not constitute an impediment to the sound management of the country by the Council.16 While it must be acknowledged that Mary's Council included 50 different members during the short reign, the active working membership was much smaller.17 Of this number, 14 attended Council meetings less than 10% of the time for which they were eligible.18 A further 15 of them attended 25% or less of the meetings for which they were eligible.19 Another point which should be stressed is that only just over half were eligible to be present at every meeting of the Privy Council held during the reign.20 While no-one was dismissed from Council by Mary, members died and others were appointed after the beginning of the reign.21 It should be apparent from this information that the daily business of Council was conducted by a smaller contingent of men and, in fact, the largest number to be present at a meeting was 27, which occurred in August of 1553.22 For the remainder of the reign the attendance was generally under twenty and quite regularly fell below fifteen. The one period when this rule was consistently broken was during the last month of the reign when all Councillors were ordered to assemble in London and the attendance again climbed to above twenty on a number of different occasions.23 Appointing such a large number of men to her Council did not then imply that the Queen would be hampered by the constant attendance of 50 Councillors, all wishing to give advice and be an integral part of the central government.

Unfortunately, historians of the mid-Tudor period have traditionally misunderstood the difference between a named and an active Councillor. This may have been a problem of definition which originated during the reign itself.24 An examination of the Council records provides a glaring example of such confusion: Cardinal Reginald Pole was papal legate to England, Archbishop of Canterbury, and councillor to Mary and Philip. It is certain that he regularly gave advice to the Queen and the king appointed him to the group responsible for English government in his absence, but his name is not once mentioned in the attendance records for the Privy Council.25 Because contemporaries failed to distinguish between different councils, such as a 'Council of the Whole,' a 'Privy Council', or a 'Working or Select Council', historians have been unwilling or unable to delineate which Councillors fell into which categories. Perhaps, at least during Mary's reign, the terms Council and Privy Council were somewhat interchangeable and the majority of the 50 Privy Councillors were, in fact, Councillors of the Whole whose positions were more or less honourary:26

> it is generally thought that the Queen has admitted many more people to her Council than are necessary for the good and faithful dispatch of her affairs.... It appears, however, that for most of them the post is merely an honorary one....27

Certain others of the 50 became members of a Council of State or Working Council, without swearing a different oath or

assuming a special title.28 Although the specific membership and function of this Working Council will be discussed in detail below, it is sufficient at present to assert that the evidence supports the view that a small Council of State, rather than a large Council, operated regularly. Not only are there recorded references to this type of a Council within a Council, but the attendance patterns prove that a large number of those men referred to as Privy Councillors were barely involved with the activities of the central government.29 Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon was the earl of Bath. He made his first appearance at a meeting of Council on 17 August 1553 and attended 27 times by mid-November, but afterwards attended only eight more meetings in the entire reign. In total he attended only 3% of the Council meetings yet he was a nominal Privy Councillor for the entire reign. With a record such as this he could hardly have been influential in policy formation on a daily basis.

The second, and more valid, complaint about Mary's Council is that it was plagued by faction. This assessment, however, also requires revision and qualification. Historians have declared Mary's Council to have been unmanageable and, therefore, ineffective due to factious elements within the Council, but they have made no attempt to explain or define their allegations.30 Instead, they seem to be satisfied to accept, without question, Renard's unflattering assessments, such as that offered on 3 December 1553 when he wrote: "[The

Council] is so torn by faction ... that although they are aware of the presence of danger they make no sign of guarding against it."31 Renard's opinion was to remain substantially unchanged for at least the next six months:

> The split in the Council is so enormous and public, and the members so hostile to one another, that they forget the Queen's service in their anxiety to wreak vengeance and no business is transacted except on definite orders from the Queen.32

It must be understood that Renard's dispatches to Charles V are the most comprehensive contemporary source available to Marian historians due to his continuous presence in England from July 1553 until September 1555, his influential position as a privileged confidant of the Queen herself, and his prolific style. Other sources pale in comparison. For example, the French Ambassador, Antoine de Noailles, at no time gained Mary's and the Council's confidence and, therefore, despite his extended sojourn in England, he was never privy to the internal workings of the Council and other advisory and administrative institutions of the English government.

Scholars have been forced, or have chosen, to rely heavily on Renard, and as a result, the evaluations of the reign are questionable and biased in a number of specific ways. No attempt has been made to analyze Renard's motivation for writing such negative reports.33 The more Renard convinced Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, and the Imperial Council that he, as the only rational force in an otherwise chaotic country,

was invaluable to the Queen of England, the more his personal prestige and worth as an advisor to and agent of Charles V increased. Renard's interests were not those of Mary and England but those of his sovereign, Charles V, and himself; the Ambassador felt no compulsion to refrain from distortion of the facts if he believed the Emperor's welfare or his own self-preservation warranted or demanded such behaviour.34 Nor have scholars examined his comments in light of the sequence of events throughout the reign and, in consequence, have had to rely on sweeping generalizations about the period. For example, Renard's latter comment on internal Council hostility was made immediately after the clash between Gardiner and Paget (and their respective allies) which occurred in the House of Lords during the spring of 1554 and, therefore, should not be taken as evidence of conciliar faction throughout the reign.35 There has been similar neglect of Renard's declining influence in the wake of Philip's arrival. On 3 February 1555 he complains thus: "I am rendering no service here and have no business entrusted to me."36 Surprisingly, he continued to declare that the inner circle of the Council was disunified and, therefore, inactive.37 In addition, few historians have made an attempt to define what they mean by faction. Mary's Council undoubtedly suffered as a result of the personal rivalry endemic to Tudor politics and government but so did every Tudor Council. Nobles were constantly aware, and jealous, of the influence of their rivals and there were several of Mary's Councillors who secretly harboured antipathy,

and occasionally acted out their hostilities, towards their colleagues.38 The hostility between those Councillors who had been members of the household prior to her accession and those whose loyalty was suspect was particularly troublesome:

> discontent is rife, especially among those who stood by the Queen in the days of her adversity and trouble, who feel they have not been rewarded as they deserve, for the conspirators have been raised in authority, while they are cast off and neglected after having rendered loyal service.39

One rivalry in particular has attracted the attention and condemnation of historians: that between Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, and William, Lord Paget. These men simply did not agree and, in fact, represented what has been defined as a split between "religious zealots" and "politiques".40 Although these terms can be questioned, the point about a division existing on Council between the professional statesmen and the politically ambitious Churchmen is valid. The former were driven solely by political considerations and had little regard for matters of conscience so long as such issues did not interfere with governmental efficiency. In contrast, the latter were men whose motivation was religious as well as political and, unlike their colleagues, they occasionally subordinated political necessities to religious requirements if faced with a conflict between the two. Gardiner was a religious conservative who had gained political experience under Henry VIII but whose loyalty was divided between the Crown and the Catholic Church. Paget, on the other hand, was

the consummate statesman; he had possessed political influence in two previous reigns under at least three different regimes, and had survived the perilous reversals of Tudor power, politics, and religion.41 His religious persuasion has proved difficult to define because the evidence is ambiguous; while he supported the reforms of Henry VIII and the Protector Somerset, his sons were Catholic recusants under Elizabeth.42 He, like Pembroke, Paulet, and other Tudor statesmen, was probably "not an unbeliever but a moderate who could without embarrassment accommodate and adjust to altered circumstances."43 Superimposed on this difference in ideological outlook (which was enough to create extreme tension44) there was a severe personal enmity between the two which prevented any kind of meaningful reconciliation.45

However detrimental this antagonism appears, it was by no means as destructive and pervasive as indicated by past scholarship. First, these two men were professional in attitude and knew their duty to their Queen and, with one glaring lapse which will be discussed below, never allowed their hostility towards each other to affect their efficiency as Councillors or administrators.46 But, more importantly, their conflict never, as is claimed, developed into a force which paralyzed the Council. Though both Paget and Gardiner had factional support which remained steadfast, most of the Councillors were moderate and self-interested in their allegiances and, therefore, inflexible battle-lines did not

develop and immutable alliances were not the result. For example, Gardiner could usually count on the support of the more conservative Councillors such as Rochester, Walgrave, and Southwell, while Petre and Arundel almost exclusively backed Paget.47 Still, the majority of Councillors were either moderators by inclination, such as Nicholas Heath,48 or, like Paulet, were "made of pliable willow, not of the stubborne oake [sic]" and were flexible enough to ensure self-preservation.49 Given that the disagreement centered upon Paget and Gardiner themselves, it did not survive Gardiner's death in November 1555 and, in fact, those historians who point to faction as a debilitating force between 1553 and 1558 base their arguments almost exclusively on the first two years of the reign. References in the extant documentation to crippling faction still occur during the years 1556 to 1558 but are much reduced and some of the writers produced far more positive reports about the English Council.50 It cannot be denied that, at times, the feud between Paget and Gardiner created serious problems for the Council, especially given the precarious nature of Mary's accession, the opposition resulting in Wyatt's rebellion, the controversial legislative measures introduced into the Parliaments of 1554, and Mary's own political inexperience. Faction in the Marian Council should not and cannot be denied but it was not debilitating to the exercise of efficient governance during the whole reign.

An analysis of the Council in this period reveals that,

despite the 'handicaps' of size and rivalry, much was achieved on policy issues. The feud between Paget and Gardiner was an embarrassment and a disability to the Council at certain times yet the Council was managed in such a way that its size was exploited to the government's advantage. Contrary to the assumptions of such scholars such as Froude and Pollard, the size of Mary's Council did not become an encumbrance to the central government because the majority of the men appointed to it were more active in the various regions of England than they were on the central Council board. In fact, at certain times Councillors had to be ordered to London to discharge their official duties.51 As noted above, a large number of the men appointed to the Council during July were local officials and magnates who supported Mary's cause with men and arms. Although their experience in central government was negligible, they were more proficient in local administration and it was in this capacity that a majority of the more inexperienced Councillors were eventually employed.52 For example, various members were deployed as military and administrative officials to Ireland, the Scottish border, and the French Pale.53 Others were sent on judicial commissions, diplomatic missions, or to their estates as wardens or local officials responsible for keeping the peace.54 Some of these men were assigned official titles, such as President of the Northern Council or Warden of the Cinque Ports,55 but many of them returned to their own homes to continue in their capacities as leaders in the provincial communities.56 There was a significant difference between the

previous roles of these local magnates and their status after 1553, in that they took with them the added prestige of being Privy Councillors.57 They had more direct access to the monarch (and obviously Council) than ordinary local officials and, therefore, secured the ties between Crown, Council, and the regions. These men still had the right to attend Council meetings, and occasionally did, but their greatest value to the Queen was as decentralized representatives of the Crown in areas such as Suffolk, Wales, and the border counties.58 These ties were further cemented by the familial relationships which existed between a number of Councillors and certain powerful local magnates and officials. For example, Sir Thomas Wharton who was rewarded for being one of Mary's earliest and most ardent supporters in July 1553 was the son of Lord Wharton who held several vital and prestigious posts along the Scottish border at various times throughout the sixteenth-century.59 Sir Richard Southwell also declared for Mary in July 1553 and his brother, Robert, remained a prominent local official in Kent throughout the reign.60

With so large a part of the Council away from Court it seems fair to assume that a smaller 'Working Council' must have operated on a daily basis.61 In fact, this assumption can be verified using the extant documentary evidence. Not only are there specific Councillors who appear in the Council register more frequently but there are, in the APC and the various State Papers, very detailed references to the specialization of

duties and the formal establishment of such a mechanism.62 One of the most striking facts in analysing these records is that it is those Councillors with expertise in the intricacies of court politics and central administration, who are named as members of the proposed Working Councils.63 It has been erroneously assumed that Mary's inexperienced 'favourites' were active in Council and were responsible for even the most delicate subjects.64 Perhaps too great a reliance on Renard and his colleagues is again the cause for this misinterpretation: "the said Council does not seem to us, after mature consideration, to be composed of experienced men endowed with the necessary qualities to conduct the administration and government of the kingdom."65 The Council had barely been formed by the time this analysis was forwarded to Charles V, and it does not even admit the possibility that, given time, the Councillors' performance might improve. Nor does it acknowledge the vast experience gained by certain Councillors, such as Paulet, Gardiner, Paget, Riche, and Masone, in the previous reigns.66 However, the professionals were neither outnumbered nor neglected in Council; rather they formed the backbone of the Marian administration. Mary's reign has been attacked on the basis of the false presumption of conciliar incompetence because of a failure to examine in detail the records of the Councillors either during or prior to her reign. The result has been the mislabelling of the Marian Council as sterile, unmanageable, and quarrelsome.

Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that the transformation into an institution of exhaustive specialization was secured without challenge, obstruction, or interruption. The Council was well aware of the need for the specialization of tasks in order to increase the efficiency and power of the central government, but the first attempt to attain this goal was abortive.67 It was launched in the spring of 1554 at the instigation of Paget, Petre, and Renard and attempted to create a Council of State comprised of Paget, Gardiner, Arundel, Thirlby, Rochester, and Petre; all other Councillors were to be sent into the provinces "with various charges."68 This proposal came under attack immediately because the "old," conservative Councillors continued to be jealous of the "new," pragmatic Councillors who had profitted from rapid promotion despite the fact that they had "rebelled against and resisted the Queen."69 The proposal was also very restrictive in that it denied the majority of Councillors the right to attend meetings of the 'Working Council' except by special order or summons.70 In essence, it stripped those not named in the proposal of their special and prestigious status as Privy Councillors, a matter not likely to go unchallenged by those "old" Councillors who were already trying desperately to maintain their influence. Finally, this first attempt was also a victim of bad timing.71 It was conceived in the early part of 1554 and was to be implemented in March and April. However, during this time most of the Councillors were in London for Parliament and a great many of those members who were supposed

to be excluded from the Working Council were attending the meetings of Council as well as of Parliament. Those Councillors promoting the proposal found it impossible to translate policy into practice in the face of the entrenched and very immediate opposition of those who considered the generators of the plan, rivals and usurpers.

It was not until late 1555 that one proposal, formulated with king Philip's knowledge and approval upon the eve of his departure from England, was implemented on a more permanent basis.72

> On the king's departure ... he and the Queen had ordained a new form of Council, almost in the fashion of a Council of State, to exclude from it any sort of members who had seats in the old and ordinary one, persons, who, although of noble birth and true to the Queen, were, however, not adapted to state affairs, or capable of treating them.73

The documents are unclear regarding the precise size of this Council, some indicating six and others eight, but it seems that Gardiner, Paget, Rochester, Petre, Thirlby, and Paulet were assigned to it. It is also probable that one or more of Pole, Arundel, and Pembroke were also named to the body. These men were made responsible for all important matters of English government including provision of justice, management of Parliament, control of governmental finances, and formation of all national social and economic policy. They were to meet at least three times per week and inform the larger Council of their decision at a fourth session.74 Again this experiment

involved the selection of a small number of the most able Councillors to be charged with the majority of government policy-making but permitted the rest to be intimately involved in the administration of policy once formulated.75 This allowed those Councillors not named as Select Councillors to maintain their reputation and simultaneously eliminated confusion about responsibility and any overlap in function. The reduction resulted in a cohesive and effective Council composed mainly of well-informed, qualified men.

The two most powerful members of Mary's Council were Paget and Gardiner, both of whom were exceptionally able administrators with long records of royal service. Gardiner had obtained advanced degrees in both civil and canon law and, on the strength of his education, had entered public life under Henry VIII. He was sent on numerous diplomatic missions by the King and advanced rapidly but Henry was always cautious regarding Gardiner because the King felt that he could only be managed by a forceful hand.76 For this reason he was not appointed to the regency Council responsible for policy during Edward's minority and during the reign itself was imprisoned by Somerset because of his influence and religious conservatism.77 Mary released him and immediately appointed him to her Council as Lord Chancellor.78 It must be admitted that his actions were often quite precipitous in matters of religion,79 but he also "brought to his duties the authority of a commanding presence, a driving energy, and a conscientious attention to

business."80

Paget's early career owed a great deal to Gardiner's patronage and, in fact, he entered Henry VIII's service on the bishop's recommendation. He also gained the confidence of the King, was named to the Privy Council in 1541, and became, in the latter years of the reign, one of, if not the, most trusted of Henry's advisors. During his career he held such offices as Master of Posts, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire and Middlesex. Although he had been readmitted to Edward's Council in early July 1553, Mary appointed him to her own Council after her victory against Northumberland.81 He quickly gained the trust and respect of Philip and came to be highly valued by the Imperial government: on 14 August 1554 Mary of Hungary declared that Paget should receive a reward from Philip, despite the anger of Queen Mary of England, "for whatever religion or leanings he may be, there is no denying that he has been too valuable a servant in the past to be turned so lightly away."82 In the latter days of the reign, his opinion was so esteemed by the other Marian Councillors that he when he failed to obey a summons due to illness the Council made arrangements to wait on him in his home.83

William Paulet, Marquis of Winchester, was also an outstandingly capable and, due to his amazing longevity, experienced administrator at the commencement of Mary's reign.

He had been named to Henry VIII's Council in 1525 and had held a string of offices unmatched by his colleagues: Comptroller (1532), Treasurer of the Household (1537-39), first Master of the Court of Wards and Liveries (1540), Lord Chamberlain (1543), Lord Steward (1545-50), Lord President of the Council (1546), Keeper of the Seal (1547), and Lord Treasurer (1550-72). He held this last office during three reigns, including Mary's, and gave it up only at his death. In his capacity as Lord Treasurer he was the moving force behind the most positive reform of the reign: joining the Courts of Augmentations and First Fruits and Tenths to the Exchequer in 1554.84 This move restored the dominance of the Exchequer in financial administration and earned Paulet the admiration of Mary who "thoroughly appreciated his care and vigilance in the management of her Exchequer."85

Sir Richard Southwell's experience was of a different sort to that of Gardiner, Paget, and Paulet; even though he had been a member of Henry VIII's Privy Council, he was particularly expert in local administration and military command. In the 1530s he had been sheriff of, and MP for, Norfolk, had helped suppress the Pilgrimage of Grace, and had been a Receiver for the Court of Augmentations. In the next decade he received a commission at Berwick in 1542, negotiated with the Scottish for the release of English prisoners in the following year, and was appointed as Councillor to Edward by Henry VIII. He was a regular attender of Council meetings during Edward's reign, yet

declared for Mary immediately after the young king's death. He justified Mary's faith in him and proved to be a loyal, active, and competent member of her own Privy Council.

With men of such competence represented on Council it is not surprising that its actions were far more productive than historians have traditionally acknowledged. Upon examination of the evidence it becomes obvious that the Council provided the means of control and direction in a variety of essential administrative fields. It became adept at governing matters of money management, including the standardization of the value of currency and the auditing of accounts; local administration, especially through the personal involvement of Councillors as provincial officials and commissioners; peace keeping, on land and sea; the settlement of private disputes; delivery of justice, encompassing the punishment of those responsible for the publication and spread of seditious books; foreign negotiations, particularly those resulting in the treaty for the match between Mary and Philip; and international trade. Contrary to traditional opinion, the Marian government was not utterly preoccupied with Spanish interests or the Catholic reformation; undoubtedly these were important issues but they did not dominate the Council's time or energies. There were several occasions on which the Imperial representatives complained that the Council was either not informing the Ambassadors of its plans or was acting irrationally (ie. against Imperial interests).86 Mary's government was cognizant

of and responsive to the needs of England above all else.

The financial distress in which Mary and her Council found England upon her accession was one of the most pervasive issues of the reign and, contrary to Renard's claims, one to which the Councillors were continually responsive.87 Mary succeeded to a Crown plagued by debt, mismanagement, and procedural confusion. When Edward died he left a debt in excess of 260,0001.88 Mary and her Council examined the records of these debts and decided that some would be repaid but that the claims of certain creditors were not valid.89 Those debts they deemed reasonable were paid back throughout the latter half of 1553 with the aid of the Merchant Adventurers of London,90 and the result was that Mary's reputation and credit worthiness within the European credit market were strengthened.91 Once her credit was assured the Council took measures to guarantee that Mary would not lose this valuable asset. Regular payments of her debts were made or arrangements were negotiated with the lenders for extensions based on equitable and fair agreements.92

Even though it must be admitted that on 15 March 1556 Thomas Gresham, Mary's Chief Factor in Antwerp, did have occasion to remind Mary and the Council of their responsibilities: the Queen "will do very well to put the Council in remembrance sometime for the better payment of her debts"; he was concerned about the Crown losing money due to

excessive interest rates, not any arbitrary and unilateral decision to renege on England's debts.93 The result of these measures was that Mary's financial standing was perhaps greater than any other contemporary European monarch: "No prince living can go out of his own dominions and obtain such credit as she has, and may have always if the thing be looked to, and this has stood her majesty in her necessity in no small stead."94 This was a particularly valuable asset at a time when Charles V, Philip, and Henri II were all suffering severe financial distress.95 In fact, on at least one occasion (August 1555) Philip borrowed money from the English on the agreement that he would reimburse the lenders with interest.96

The Queen and her Council also took measures to determine and stabilize the value of currency tenable in the realm. Within the first two months of her reign, Mary's Council had drawn up a schedule to fix the values of various coins.97 On 21 January 1554 the Council undertook a very thorough examination of currency designed to provide information about the coinage within the countries of origin and obtain as much advice as possible about how the foreign coins should stand in England.98 On the basis of the information gained by these efforts, the coins were revalued on 20 March 1554 and 26 December 1554.99 There were also proposals to recall the English coins in order to purify and reissue them, but these goals were shelved when it became obvious that any attempt to do so would cause panic in the citizenry and severe damage to

the economy.100 Feria, Philip's representative in England, reported on 15 August 1557 that measures were "shortly to be taken to reform the currency, which has fallen into such a state that it may almost be said that all coin in circulation is false" but the proposed reform did not take place until the next reign.101 The attempt to maintain the value of money was a continuing theme throughout the reign and, in the absence of full scale reform, the Council continued to monitor and fix the value of the impure coins.

Not only did Mary and her Council have to be concerned with the national debt and the depreciation of the currency but it was imperative that they make some practical inroads into the problem of reducing government spending; a necessity of which Mary's advisors were well aware. Peter Vannes, the Queen's ambassador at Venice commented on the state of England's finances thus:

> [The] country having been by evil ministers very much indebted, and her treasures greatly wasted and spoiled, besides her great liberality towards her subjects in pardoning the large subsidy lately granted to her brother ... requires her ministers to look well to her rights and revenues.102

Her Councillors strongly advised her to be cautious with her spending, especially on 'non-essential' items such as pensions:

> [Trust] as such pieces [ie pensions] fall back into the Queen's hands, she will let them die and not bestow them again, considering the estate she stands in, until she be at least out of debt and able to satisfy her poor servants and answer her ordinary and

necessary charges.103

Although strict economy was not always observed, in general, cost cutting measures were implemented.104 For example, in times of peace (or at least when the danger of attack was lessened somewhat, such as in winter) the garrisons of strongholds along the Scottish border and in the French Pale were reduced.105 There was also an attempt to send unnecessary personnel back to their own homes in order to reduce court and household expenses.106 Such attempts were not always successful but those responsible might be reprimanded for their reluctance to follow the Council's orders, as Lord Conyers was on 23 June 1554 for ignoring the previously issued instruction regarding the reduction of costs in the North.107 In an attempt to improve the collection procedures and establish a centralized, and therefore a more easily monitored, body for dispersing the nation's funds, the Exchequer was restructured. The result was a more manageable and efficient financial organization which collected more of what was due to the government and lost less through corruption. Although Mary's regime benefitted somewhat, the full effect of the advancement was delayed until Elizabeth's reign.108 Also, concern over expenditure might result in an audit. In fact, various Councillors were regularly ordered to examine the books of provincial jurisdictions, including the County Palatinate of Durham, the Duchy of Lancaster, and the country of Ireland; certain castles, such as Calais, Guisnes, and Berwick; and

offices, like the Treasurer of the Mint.109

Another of the endemic problems which faced the Marian regime was that of discontent, which manifested itself in murmuring, seditious writing, and, occasionally, conspiracy or full-fledged rebellion. None of the sixteenth century reigns was free of unrest but historians have singled out the mid-Tudor period, and particularly Mary's reign, as one of conciliar paralysis in the face of a recalcitrant citizenry. The evidence simply does not support such a contention; rather, the Council was active in the face of each disturbance, whether it be local agitation or a full-scale rebellion. On 22 August 1554 the Council was informed of a "seditious conspiracy" by the bailiffs of Ipswich which they promptly investigated; on the basis of their findings they decided that certain of those involved deserved punishment which was authorized on 2 September.110 In this case the Council was neither paralyzed nor dilatory. There are other examples of conciliar action in response to discontent at a local or provincial level, such as the investigation of an unlawful assembly on 15 April 1555,111 the punishment of conspirators in July of 1555,112 and the continual actions against seditious writing and preaching.113

The Council was as vigilant regarding the control of its citizens outside the realm as it was when attempting to maintain peace within. When Masone, Ambassador to the Imperial Court, complained of certain young Englishmen at Antwerp who

"use their talk very wildly" in opposition to the changes in religion and Mary's proposed marriage to Spain, he suggested that his colleagues take some action to ensure that the culprits "receive some threatening lesson as should teach them hereafter how to temper their tongues."114 However, the remainder of the Council took a more moderate approach to this matter and an order was issued for Masone to examine the affairs of Englishmen resident in the Netherlands who were not reporting to him and whom he had cause to suspect. 115 The upshot of this activity was that on 26 September 1554, Masone assigned a clerk to monitor the actions and words of certain English citizens to determine if they were responsible for the spread of any libel.116 The Council was as well informed about Englishmen in France; however, the activities of those exiles who flew to France were rarely restricted to the spreading of seditious rumours. Instead, with the support of Henri II, King of France, they were far more bold. On more than one occasion they planned or attempted to attack and capture English strongholds;117 fortunately for Mary and the Council all except one of their plans proved to be abortive.118 With some notable exceptions, which are examined below, the Council was faced not with rebellion but discontent and, contrary to orthodox historiography, the Council was informed and proved to be willing, prepared, and able to answer the challenges of unrest in England.

The provision of justice throughout the country on a daily

basis was perhaps a more essential element for the effective maintenance of law and order in Marian England than was crisis management. In its administration of the former the Council was even more diligent than it was in the latter. The Council took the standard measures to ensure that common law prevailed by sending Commissions of the Peace, Oyer and Terminer, and Gaol Delivery in the various provinces throughout the reign.119 They also tried to ensure the quality of the membership on these commissions and there was almost invariably at least one Privy Councillor represented and usually his attendance was required for a quorum. For example, on 18 February 1554, 41 Commissions of the Peace were created and sent to 35 counties. All but six of the Privy Councillors were named to at least one of these commissions and many sat on two or more.120 For example, Sarjeant Morgan, whose area of expertise was the law (Mary appointed him Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas), sat on ten of these commissions.121 Of the six Councillors who were not appointed to commissions in February, two were assigned to Commissions of Oyer and Terminer on 2 May 1554 and three, Bishop Gardiner, the Earl of Bedford, and Paulet, the Marquis of Winchester, held offices which might have prevented their sitting on commissions outside of London.122

In addition, the Marian Council felt so compelled to ensure that criminals received the correct punishment that the Councillors took an active interest in many ongoing investigations and procedures. The specific instances are far

too numerous to detail but include cases of murder, burglary, enclosure, and forgery.123 The Council also ensured that Commissions of Gaol Delivery were undertaken regularly and, if the need arose, would request a specific gaol to complete an inventory of prisoners.124 The Councillors frequently ordered the transfer of prisoners to ensure criminals were tried within the appropriate jurisdiction and, in a number of other cases, the Council actually summoned the plaintiffs and defendents to appear before them in order to guarantee that the measures taken were suitable and enforced.125 The Council was particularly vigilant if the charge against a prisoner was counterfeiting, sedition, or heresy.126

Regardless of the demands domestic policy and security put on the time of the Council, its members were also thoroughly involved in all foreign negotiations undertaken between 1553 and 1558. In fact, certain men on the Council, specifically Sir John Masone and Dr. Nicholas Wotton, demonstrated particular expertise in this field. Masone had been active on diplomatic missions in Spain, France, Italy, and the Low Countries since 1532 and Wotton was

> one of the ablest and most experienced diplomatists. His dexterity, wariness, and wisdom, constantly referred to in the diplomatic correspondence of the time, were combined with a tenacity and courage in maintaining his country's interests that secured him the confidence of four successive sovereigns.127

Other Councillors, such as Paget, Thirlby, and Arundel, also

had overseas experience and their abilities complemented those of the resident ambassadors. Contrary to the opinions expressed in the traditional historiography, the Queen and Council did not deliberately subordinate the requisite interests of England to the hostile will of a foreign ruler. Mary and her advisors followed a traditional pattern of alliance, one practised by Mary's father and grandfather, when they allied themselves with the Imperial and Spanish Hapsburgs against the militant coalition of France and Scotland.128 In fact, as Loach points out, it was Elizabeth, not Mary, who abandoned the conventional alliance network.129 It was natural and understandable that Mary would turn to the Hapsburgs when faced with the genuine threat from France and Scotland. It was Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, who supported Mary's claims to legitimacy throughout her adolescence and young adulthood, when Henry maintained that his marriage with Catharine of Aragon had been a sinful, and consequently void, union. It was Charles who demanded more civil and humane treatment for Mary and her mother when they were discarded by the king. It was Charles who secretly corresponded with Mary and sustained her courage which enabled her to resist the extreme pressure to renounce both her religion and status as princess.130 In other words, Mary was persuaded by tradition and personal inclination to negotiate a treaty with the Hapsburgs in 1554.

Nevertheless, those Councillors involved in the negotiating process never at any time forgot their loyalty and

duty to England. They managed to contract an agreement which clearly offered the majority of benefits to the English. First, Philip's power in England was valid only as long as the marriage lasted. Second, England was to be governed by English laws "without interference from Imperial or Spanish domains." Third, Philip was forced to relinquish "all claim to dispose of offices, posts and benefices in the kingdom, which shall be bestowed upon its natives." One of the main intentions of the agreement was to unite England and the Netherlands in economic and defence matters and the clauses regarding the succession represent an attempt to ensure the endurance of such an arrangement. Don Carlos, Philip's son and heir by his first marriage, was to rule in Spain but would have no claim to England and would only rule in the Low Countries if Mary and Philip failed to produce an heir. Any male offspring of the marriage would succeed to the throne in both England and the Netherlands and the same would apply to a daughter as long as she did not marry outside England or Lower Germany without her half-brother's consent. In addition, should Don Carlos' line fail, Mary and Philip's children would succeed to the Spanish throne as well. Finally, the treaty reiterated the necessity for "whole-hearted and sincere fraternity, union and confederation between the Emperor, his heirs and dominions, and the Queen and her dominions" which had been part of the alliance concluded between Henry VIII and Charles V in 1542.131

It is true that Charles hoped the strict sense of the

treaty would be ignored to the advantage of his son and that Philip pressed Mary to disregard certain clauses in the treaty, and thereby enhance his actual authority within England; but Mary refused to consider the issue if it threatened her own authority: "if he wished to encroach in the government of the kingdom she would be unable to permit it, nor if he attempted to fill posts and offices with strangers, for the country itself would never stand such interference."132 In addition to the treaty which secured the alliance between England and the Hapsburgs, the English mediated peace conferences between the Empire and France, and negotiated with France on their own behalf in 1558. In these negotiations, the English representatives, Thirlby, Wotton, and Arundel, were steadfast in their demands, which included the return of Calais. Their claims were well documented by the standards of the time and they managed to convince the Imperial negotiators that no peace could be concluded if it would involve a betrayal of English interests.133 In fact, the Marian Council and its representatives at the bargaining table were so adamant about obtaining satisfaction of England's claims that it was not until after Mary's death that the claim to Calais was finally abandoned on orders from Elizabeth and her Council.134

The Council was no less diligent in matters of foreign trade, and the economic survival of England, particularly in an expanding European market economy, was also a topic to which Councillors devoted a great deal of energy. Negotiations with

the Hanse were an ongoing part of Council business. The first meeting took place on 4 September 1553 at which time the foreign envoys put forward their requests for the continuance of their economic privileges.135 Their privileges were confirmed on 24 October 1553136 but, in subsequent years, the Council gradually reduced the advantages offered to the Hanseatic merchants because it became apparent that English merchants were being harmed by existing policy.137 Negotiations continued, however, and several attempts were made to establish a compromise which both merchant organizations would obey. Several proposals were made and occasionally restrictions were lifted and exemptions granted but no conclusive agreements were reached.138 Still, neither delegation ever ordered that the trade lines between England and the Baltic be abandoned; although the tensions and frustrations of the Hanseatic ambassadors, over the lack of English cooperation, was enormous by 1558, the merchants continued to trade with each other.139 Anglo-Spanish trade also flourished during Mary's reign and the advantages to English merchants were largely a result of the close ties established between the two governments by the marriage alliance.140

The Council also took an interest in the wares being traded, particularly wool, cloth, grain and wine, and took measures to ensure that English interests were being served.141 For example, the Council decided to remove the restrictive injunctions on the tin trade on 30 July 1553,142 and in June of

the following year examined a wool export license in order to determine if it was detrimental to English interests.143 Efforts were also made to ensure that English merchants in foreign localities were treated fairly. The documented correspondence of Queen and Council with foreign monarchs and ambassadors, especially that directed to France, is replete with requests for action and justice for mistreated English merchants.144 Piracy, smuggling, and illegal export were also issues of great concern to the Council.145 The documents are revealing in that they prove the extent of the problem but they also indicate the activity of the Council in response to the problem: while punitive measures could not fully deter those attempting to avoid the customs officials, there are regular accounts of the apprehension and punishment of offenders. The Council was less successful in preventing the English from carrying on illegal trade with other countries. For example, though Mary and the Council repeatedly forbade the trade with the Portuguese Indies, certain English merchants were still dealing with the Portuguese settlements in February 1558.146

Mary's Council was much more successful when it was attempting to open up trade lines than when it was trying to close them down. Perhaps the most significant trading achievement of the reign was the signing of a commercial treaty with Ivan IV, Tsar of All the Russias, in April 1557.147 The first Englishmen to reach Russia had done so in 1553 when one of the three ships sent, by Edward VI, to locate a northeast

passage to the Orient, put in at Archangel. The Muscovy Company was chartered in 1555 and immediately sent a fresh expedition to establish formal trading relations with the Tsar.148 A Russian envoy returned with this company in 1556 and negotiations began between the two Crowns. The resulting treaty was generous to the Muscovy Company in that it was given a monopoly of the trade between England and Russia, was guaranteed protection and swift justice by the Russian legal system, and was exempted from the trade duties, tolls, impositions and subsidies customarily exacted by the Russian government.149 The next English trading mission returned on 10 October 1558 carrying tallow, flax, wax, hides, corn, fish, furs, and oil and was acclaimed a great success.150

Having disclosed the diversity of conciliar activity on other issues, it is now necessary to return to the focal point of traditional historiography: religion.151 Though religion was not the overriding concern of the Council at all times, certain religious topics were handled in Council. For example, the survey of Church goods was undertaken throughout England on the orders of Council and, when an adequate picture of the current situation was provided to them, the Councillors subsequently demanded the recovery of Church property, including roods, crucifixes, and images.152 The Council was also anxious about the prevalence of seditious preaching and 'prophesizing' in Marian England and took steps to ensure the punishment of those responsible.153 But these were small

matters usually dealt with on an individual basis. Of more general impact was the government's successful plan to reunify England with Rome; a matter for which the Council was largely responsible. A committee of the Council drew up the bills which reintroduced the heresy laws to England and accomplished the English submission to the Pope.154 They also took steps to guarantee the obedience of the English people to the religious settlement once in place.155 And, perhaps most importantly to contemporaries, the Council ensured that the proposed reunification with Rome would do nothing to harm the interests of those Englishmen who had profitted during the dissolution of the monasteries in 1536.156

The Councillors were no more obsessed with the persecution of heretics than they were with the unqualified reunification with Rome. Nevertheless, the elimination of heresy was discussed in Council and, although many Councillors were opposed to the persecutions, the Council was responsible for ensuring that execution orders were carried out.157 What must be understood is that this type of government command was only a small percentage of the Council's business. Contemporary Protestant propaganda exaggerated these heretical persecutions for effect, and even the cautionary advice of the Imperial ambassadors was overstated (and hypocritical given the contemporary record of Charles V in the Netherlands and Spain).158 Very often those bewailing the plight of the persecuted could not blame the government at all; many heretics

were caught and tried as the result of the enthusiasm of local officials and commissioners - not in response to government encouragement.159 It cannot be denied that religion was a treasured interest of the Queen and a topic which was responsible for much of the tension and disturbance symptomatic of the mid-Tudor regimes, and the sixteenth- century in general; however, the restoration of the Catholic faith and the punishment of stubborn Protestants was rarely the preponderant subject of discussion or debate at the Council meetings.

The evidence suggests that the Marian Council was an extremely active and effective body incapacitated neither by size nor faction. Its members, with the early exception of Paget and Gardiner, managed to coordinate their actions and provide able leadership and management in a troubled country. The excessive number of Councillors, which created confusion and evoked some complaints early in the reign, was remedied and a unified, professional working Council became the customary, if informal, core of Marian government. This Council was never dominated by religious zealots nor did it ignore crucial government business in an insane attempt to purge the country of Protestants. Instead, despite its reputed handicaps, the Council managed to ensure the survival of the government, implement the Queen's and Parliament's commands, and attempt to remedy some of England's most obtrusive administrative and financial disabilities. Any Council which could accomplish even the first of these achievements in the turbulent sixteenth

even the first of these achievements in the turbulent sixteenth century was indeed effective.

CHAPTER TWO

Parliament, like the Privy Council, underwent some transformations during the sixteenth century including a steady regularization and formalization of procedure and an increase in acknowledged jurisdiction and influence over the formulation of both policy and formal legislation. It is now generally accepted that, prior to the reign of Henry VII and, more importantly, during that of Henry VIII, Parliament was merely a tool of the Crown and the nobility.1 It is further assumed that during the first half of the century this began to change and Parliament, particularly the House of Commons, began to be a more effective partner in the process of legislation.2 The Lower Chamber superseded the House of Lords in authority and as a representative of the nation because it was a truly representative body. Its members were elected and historians, biased by the twentieth-century abhorrence of non-democratic institutions, have singled it out as the natural parliamentary leader. The Upper Chamber was shown to be dominated by and universally supportive of Crown interests or it was completely ignored. In either case, historians ascribed this superior performance to a vocal and unrestrained Commons. It was this independence of mind, attributed to the Lower Chamber, which became the central focus of scholarship on sixteenth-century parliamentary development. It has been theorized that, given

the overwhelmingly unified opposition to certain of the Crown's initiatives during the Stuart Parliaments of the seventeenth century, it followed that the sixteenth century witnessed the genesis of an organized parliamentary opposition which attempted to wrest control of parliamentary business from the government in order to uphold, promote, and protect the rights of the average citizen against the unconscionable demands of the Crown and nobility.3 Once the initiative was secured for the Commons, opposition in Parliament became an alternative to rebellion.4 Thus, historians have traditionally viewed the sixteenth century as a period of the birth of 'modern' parliamentary procedure and tradition.

Without question, a growth in the status and power of the two Houses of Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons, would have been at the expense of the Crown. For that reason, traditional historiography has attributed the growth of sustained and effective opposition to be the result of weak or ineffective control from the throne. In this context, historians have characterized two of the Tudor reigns as disturbed enough to have presented opportunities for considerable growth of parliamentary authority: that of Edward VI and that of Mary I. However, there has been a preference in scholarship for saying that Mary's government witnessed the greatest encroachment upon Crown authority. Pollard, and following in his wake, Neale, declared that it was during her reign that a formal opposition party, in the modern

interpretation of the concept, first emerged.5 They alleged that the opposition was constant and powerful and that the same Members of Parliament could always be identified as comprising this group.6 Mary's detractors have attributed the successful consolidation of discontent into a vocal, unified parliamentary opposition to the weakness of Mary and her Council, the unpopularity of the Crown's legislative agenda, and the lack of understanding exhibited by the central government toward regional needs and problems.7 Depending upon the interpretation followed, Mary's reign came to be regarded as either the nadir of Tudor royal power or the birth of a tradition which would eventually lead to democratic rule. However, a few recent studies have raised doubts as to the real extent and cohesion of opposition in the five Parliaments of Mary's reign.8 "[T]he reign was marked by far less resistance to formal proposals put forward by the government than has traditionally been supposed: ... when there was such resistance it was not very successful."9 This revision, in addition to the scholarly rehabilitation of her central government and the House of Lords, has done much to destroy the traditional picture of her reign. It now appears that while opposition was manifest during her Parliaments, it was by no means as rigid, integrated, or orchestrated as previously contended.10 Neither was opposition to official proposals the strict monopoly of the House of Commons; the House of Lords was also willing to oppose royal business but this resistance was rather less confrontational than that usually attributed to the Commons.11

Finally, the central government appears to have been as confident about its ability to control Parliament as was the government during any other reign, perhaps even more so; as a result, Mary never exercised her right to veto legislation as her father, her brother, and her sister did.12

Loach, in Parliament and Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor, has presented a most comprehensive study of Mary's Parliaments and the relationships of the central government with the House of Commons and it is her judgment that opposition of the type described by Pollard and Neale did not manifest itself between July 1553 and November 1558. In fact, Loach maintains that the "Parliaments of Mary witnessed no sudden and spectacular change in the nature of parliamentary opposition because the issues raised were of concern to the whole parliament."13 Nor has she found any evidence which supports the theory that the rise of an effective opposition within Parliament was inversely proportionate to the occurrence of violent rebellion.14 The Queen and Council summoned five Parliaments in a reign of five years and four months which translates into the highest meeting rate of any reign of the Tudor dynasty.15 Granted the meetings tended to be of a shorter average duration,16 but if the Parliaments were the occasion of such recalcitrant opposition to her policies, it does not seem rational to believe that Mary would resort to them with such regularity. It is important for historians to remember that during the sixteenth century it was the monarch, with the advice of the Council, who determined the

necessity to summon Parliament.17 Of course, it was generally recognized that representatives of the shires and boroughs had a right to be consulted on and approve of government plans to levy a general tax or subsidy.18 In addition, there were certain topics which were recognized to be sufficiently entrenched in custom to prevent their alteration even if parliamentary consent was sought: these were the succession, the importance attached by Tudor subjects to royal coronation, and the sovereign rights of the Crown. Loach believes these restrictions to have been fundamental and asserts that "these principles mark a real limit to royal power in the mid-sixteenth century, for the crown could violate them only at the expense of that tacit compact with the property-owning classes on which the whole structure of Tudor government rested."19 Still, in order to ensure that England be governed efficiently, it was essential that the Crown and Council possess and employ certain methods of enacting policy which did not necessitate the summoning of Parliament.

Mary and her Council followed the lead of her father and brother when responding to matters of state which required an immediate response: they issued royal proclamations which invoked prerogative power. Frederic Youngs declared that royal proclamations

> exemplified the power of the prerogative when they framed temporary legislation in areas not already defined in the law, and because so many of the proclamations were occasioned by extraordinary

> problems ... they provide an opportunity to measure the degree to which the government was willing to innovate.20

As this quotation implies, proclamations could, and often did, enact law in instances when it was impossible for Parliament to fulfill this function but the main characteristics of such temporary 'legislation' were that it was temporary, limited, and inferior to parliamentary legislation.21 These measures were temporary because in most cases the decisions taken were given statutory authority in the next session of Parliament.22 Nevertheless, royal commands issued in this format were not limited to a specific length of time and, therefore, did not lose authority even if the formal parliamentary approval and incorporation into legislation was a number of years coming. However, since such orders fell solely within the jurisdiction of royal prerogative, the Council might find them difficult to enforce because they were, in effect, quasijudicial and, therefore, cases had to be heard by extraordinary commissions or in Star Chamber as opposed to the ordinary courts. It must also be admitted that enforcement was not so much the aim of proclamations as was the defence of royal honour and this was the major reason that the Tudor governments did not perfect a method for ensuring the enforcement of proclamations of great duration.23 The frequency of Mary's Parliaments lessened the need for rule by prerogative government but it certainly would not have been unusual, given sixteenth-century practice, for the Queen to have employed her executive powers, had the

occasion arisen. She and her government were certainly not averse to employing prerogative in the short term and, had she been faced with recalcitrant parliamentary opposition to her legislative programme, there is no reason to doubt that she would have used her executive powers as extensively as her sister did later, especially in view of the fact that only two of Mary's five Parliaments were summoned to provide subsidies to the Crown.24

The above must not be mistaken for an argument against the existence of opposition for such a position would be folly; Mary's government met opposition over a number of the bills it introduced into Parliament. What must be recognized, however, is the varying composition and strength of this opposition. Loach's research has shown that the opposition varied, both in makeup and power, with each bill and many of the bills passed both Houses easily because they simply were not controversial.25 It has become apparent that an opposition party with steadfast membership did not develop and even patronage ties, which are a traditional measure of parliamentary connection, were no guarantee of the stand an individual member might take in parliamentary deliberation and debate.26 The documentary evidence indicates that the infrequent opposition was the result of general antagonism to a proposal rather than the hostility of an identifiable coalition of Members and was determined by the specific issue under discussion rather than by any perceived party allegiance.27

During Mary's reign there were three issues which invariably engendered vigourous debate: property rights, the succession, and Crown rights.28 Of these three, property proved the most divisive of the reign. The Members of Parliament were perpetually opposed to any bill which they felt would threaten the validity of their title to property in their possession and their anxiety was voiced in debates over the heresy bill of spring 1554, the exiles bill of 1555, and the reunification bill of winter 1554-1555. The Members of Parliament and Council were so adamant that their right to keep former Church land be acknowledged in statute, that Cardinal Pole was forced to request a papal dispensation and then allow it to be encompassed in the legislation itself before the necessary act would be passed.29

Graves has also done a great deal of research on the Marian Parliaments but his main interest has been the House of Lords. Prior to Graves' study the Upper Chamber had been relegated to a position of executive impotence within the traditional historiography; the Lords were described as puppets of the Crown who never voiced even the slightest dissent and, therefore, were ineffective figureheads formed in much the same mould as the Upper Houses of modern parliamentary systems. In other words, it was the House of Commons which was the most potent element of the bicameral system because it vocalized the opposition which the whole populace felt towards Mary's government. In his work The House of Lords in the Parliaments

of Edward VI and Mary I: An Institutional Study, Graves has disproved most of these assumptions. First, the House of Lords was no cypher; rather it had the organization and procedure best suited to the cogent consideration of proposed legislation.30 Second, the educational background of the Members sitting in the Lords, especially the bishops, was superior to that of most of their colleagues in the Commons.31 Third, those who sat in the Lords comprised the class of English society most intimately involved in national affairs; they were the customary councillors of the monarch, they served at court or as provincial or diplomatic officials, and they had the capacity to influence large numbers of men as a consequence of their wealth.32 And, most importantly, the experience and activity of medieval Parliaments had provided the legacy of procedural forms to the Houses of the sixteenth century, but it was the Lords, not the Commons, which benefitted from this heritage.33 The Lords could call upon the expertise of legal advisors who attended their meetings whenever they were confused about a point of law or if they wished bills redrafted in a more acceptable manner. Such advisors could not speak in debate unless requested to offer their opinion and possessed no vote, but even Pollard, who was not sympathetic to the role of the Upper House, admitted that they proved invaluable to the efficient progress of the Lords' business.34 In addition, the limited size of the Upper Chamber's membership allowed for much freer and more extensive debate; while it was becoming the accepted rule of Commons that a member could speak to a bill

only once a day, the Peers were unconstrained by such restrictions and, therefore, debate was often more comprehensive and effective.35 As a result of the prevailing conditions, it was the Lords, not the Commons, which dominated relations between the two bodies. A common institutional device of the sixteenth century was the appointment of committees made up of members of both Houses and an investigation of the workings of such committees indicates that they were dominated by the representatives of the Lords, whose social prestige and educational background seems to have frequently overawed those representing the Lower Chamber.36 Even when the two Houses came into contact outside the formally constituted committees, the Lords predominated. For instance, there are occasions when the Upper Chamber unilaterally demanded the attendance of members of the Commons.37 Even when representatives of the Lords intruded upon the business of the Commons, as they did in November 1558, their superior status was acknowledged and they assumed the premiere seats in the Chamber.38 Obviously, the procedural organization and the intellectual prowess of members of the House of Lords afforded it a great deal more leverage and influence in parliamentary business than has previously been understood or conceded.

Given the real and potential power of the Lords, it is easy to imagine that if the Upper House chose to disagree with the bills brought before it for consideration, it could pose a very effective threat.39 It is true that during Edward VI's

reign the effectiveness of the House of Lords had been somewhat undermined by factional strife,40 but by Mary's reign this characteristic of the Lord's activity had been corrected and the Members' concerns centered mainly on their own private interests, which might be the balance of power at court or "the rights and privileges of their estate."41 Consequently, there were many issues over which they felt it imperative to question Crown policy. Two examples occurred during the Parliament of 12 November 1554 to 16 January 1555. The first occurred when the Peers (as well as the Commons) demanded that their titles to previously acquired Church land be guaranteed in Statute prior to the formal reunification with Rome. The Papal Legate, Cardinal Pole, was strictly opposed to such a move because he felt that any assurances about property could be offered only after the union was complete; otherwise, it would appear that the Pope had purchased English obedience. The Cardinal was forced to acquiesce and the papal dispensation was included within the text of the statute.42 The second episode of resistance occurred when the Lords had to discuss the bill which proposed to extend the protection of the treason laws to the king and delineate the conditions which would govern Philip's regency in the event of a minority. The Lords were very concerned to maintain their traditional right to appoint a Protector and the bill which was originally introduced into the Lords in mid-November allowed for this. However, sometime between 17 and 20 December, the Commons redrafted the bill and the new proposal included a provision for an advisory Council

but denied the members of that Council the right to name the Protector; instead Philip was to be the premier guardian of the realm and the monarch.43. Certain members of the Upper House were unwilling to support this bill and made their opposition known to the Commons which resulted in another redraft. Although many Members of the Lords were still unsatisfied with the bill, they decided to "practise the politics of discretion" and quietly withdraw from Parliament rather than come into dramatic conflict with their Queen the way they had in the previous session of Parliament.44 When the Upper House found its interest to be divergent from those of the Crown, the Lords ably voiced its concerns and possessed the power to revise bills to its satisfaction or, in extreme cases, to defeat the measure in question. The best example of the Lords defeating a bill occurred in the Parliament of April-May of 1554 when the government attempted to reintroduce the medieval heresy laws. Because certain Peers believed that the bill had been introduced ostensibly to authorize the seizure of former church property, they rejected it.45

This was the most serious challenge to Mary's legislative programme because it was well known that the reintroduction of Catholicism was the treasured goal of the Lord Chancellor, Gardiner, and the Queen herself. This defeat was a matter of extreme concern to the Queen because this opposition to royal policy had been mounted and directed by one of her own senior Privy Councillors, Paget. His actions seem to have been a

direct attack on his arch rival Bishop Gardiner who was the initiator and prime supporter of the contentious bills. It was Gardiner's intention to reintroduce the medieval heresy laws and strengthen the sagging Church administration, particularly the administrative competence of the Bishops.46 The problem arose because he ignored a decision of the Council to limit the objectives of the proposed legislation; it had been decided that, in the wake of Wyatt's rebellion, any attempt to promote the rapid and aggressive reinstitutionalization of Catholicism would present too great a threat to stability and peace in the realm.47 Gardiner opposed this resolution and, without consulting or informing his colleagues, he drafted unauthorized religious measures which sought to conclude the reunification with Rome and reinstate the Church's administrative machinery at its former level of power, influence, and efficiency.48 When the remainder of Council was unable to convince Gardiner to delay the introduction of his programme into Parliament, Paget and others felt they had no choice but to oppose him in Parliament.49 In this light, the attempt to defeat the heresy bill must be regarded as understandable, although negligent and irresponsible, but the Queen failed to acknowledge the concerns of her Councillors and saw the reversal as a personal attack on herself and her religion.50 This was the only instance in which conciliar faction was allowed to become a public, and exceedingly embarrassing, affair.51 Nevertheless, it is this example to which traditional historians, such as Pollard and Neale, point when they proclaim the irrepressible parliamentary

opposition to Mary's legislative agenda.

The events of April-May 1554 have been exaggerated somewhat in an attempt to prove the complete breakdown of Mary's government, but what this incident does prove is that without a unified Council working to [illegible] agreed legislative agenda, government business could [illegible] to negotiate its way through Parliament. It was [illegible] imperative that the Queen and Council employ every resource available to them to ensure the government's ability to manage Parliament. The size of Mary's Council proved to be a significant asset which was used to advantage during her Parliaments because a Council nominally comprising 50 members had more men available for duty in Parliament than did the smaller Councils of Henry and Elizabeth. Mary's five Parliaments were attended by 33, 32, 32, 23, and 27 Councillors respectively. Of these men, the ratio of Members of Lords to Commons was 15:18 in 1553, 15:17 in April 1554, 15:17 in November 1554, 13:10 in 1555, and 14:13 in January of 1558.52 The ties of patronage and the Queen's personal influence could also be effective in ensuring a compliant assembly because Councillors with large parliamentary followings could pressure their clients to support government initiatives.53 The Marian regime was also fortunate in that it exploited the skills one of the most able parliamentary managers of the sixteenth century: Bishop Gardiner. Despite his impetuous and incautious behaviour in matters of religion, his death certainly left a "managerial vacuum" in Parliament.54

The opposition of 1554 cannot be discounted; it was a devastating breakdown in conciliar government and resulted in inadequate parliamentary management. Nevertheless, as Loach points out, "the Council soon resolved its difficulties and the episode was not repeated."55 The Marian Councillors never again allowed their duty as managers in Parliament to suffer such blatant neglect. In fact, in all other sessions of Parliament (and even while debating most business in that particular Parliament), those Councillors who sat in either of the Houses, or were summoned to assist as legal council to the Lords, were extremely adept at ensuring the success of government bills.50 This is true of even those bills dealing with controversial issues which traditional historiography has identified as being the major sources of opposition: the Catholic reformation and the Spanish marriage. For instance, the statutes dealing with the religious settlements of Henry VIII (after 1529) and Edward VI were repealed with little resistance in Mary's first Parliament; the second Parliament quickly accepted the marriage treaty and encompassed it into statute; after having been rejected in the second Parliament, an identical bill to reinstate the heresy laws was passed after only cursory examination in the third Parliament; after negotiation with Cardinal Pole both Houses had little objection to passing the bill which brought England back under Papal authority; and, despite resistance in both Houses, the government managed to engineer Parliamentary approval for the

treason and regency bill.57

The government's ability to control and manage Parliament was an essential part of survival, even if the legislative programme was not controversial, because of the sheer volume and diversity of business brought before the Lords and the Commons. It must be remembered that although the monarch summoned Parliament and the Queen and her advisors defined what official business would be introduced,58 the Members were elected to represent the interests of their shires or their boroughs and each of them was interested in issues which were, in the main, confined to personal, local, or regional significance.59 These representatives were often instructed to introduce bills of consequence to those who had sent them to London but had received no indication of the position they should take on national affairs.60 Historians have often misunderstood the priorities of MPs and have automatically assumed that those issues deemed to be significant in late twentieth-century historiography were similarly regarded by contemporaries; however, recent studies have shown that, more often than not, MPs approached Parliament as a means of attaining their own legislative agendas which might have had nothing in common with that of the Crown.61 In fact, it is only because the Council managed Parliament so well that government business received the attention it did; the legislative programme could quite easily have been overwhelmed had it been abandoned to chance and forced to compete for the

Members' time against the huge number of private bills. Still, a sizable proportion of the discussion was devoted to those issues, introduced by individuals, which were of localized or regionalized importance and many of the statutes passed during the reign answered the demands of private interest groups.62 An illustrative example is that of "an Acte touching thincorporations of the Phisitions in London [sic]" passed during Mary's first Parliament. This act confirmed the incorporation of the physicians as laid out by Parliament in the reign of her father but also increased the powers of the President of the College of Physicians to examine and punish offenders who caused the "divers Enormities happening to the Commonwelthe by the evill and undue administration of Phisick [sic]." This statute was obviously of greater importance to the said physicians and President than it could possibly have been to the government.63

The Crown's motive for calling a Parliament was the passing of legislation but contemporaries would definitely not have considered a Parliament to have been effective if only Crown business received attention. Members of both Chambers of Parliament assumed that the issues of importance to private individuals, the localities, and the regions would be as thoroughly examined and discussed as those bills with official sanction. The Crown and Council ignored such expectations at their peril. Therefore, it was imperative that the government control the business of Parliament in such a way as to

guarantee that official measures were introduced first but also dealt with quickly and efficiently in order that at least some of the private bills might be debated and either passed or rejected.

Conciliar management was not the only method the government had of controlling Parliament; it could also take certain steps to ensure those who attended Parliament were sympathetic to the Crown's position. There were a number of ways to manipulate the membership of the Upper Chamber, including the granting of licenses of absence to certain unruly lords, the deprivation of bishops who did not support the monarch's religious policies (followed by their replacement with others who did), and the imprisonment of political enemies.64 Mary, like all the other Tudors, made use of these techniques when it was necessary. For example, when Edward Courtenay, the earl of Devon, became a focus for political discontent and a rallying point for hostility to Mary herself, she imprisoned and then exiled him.65 During his incarceration and enforced absence he did not receive the writs directing his attendance in the House of Lords. Also in 1553 and 1554, several Bishops who were regarded by the Queen as radical Protestants (including Latimer, Ridley, and Cranmer who were subsequently persecuted and burned as heretics) were deprived of their sees and their seats in Parliament. The vacancies were, quite logically, filled with churchmen more amenable to the proposed Catholic reformation and took their seats in

Parliament as supporters of Mary's religious policies.66

Similarly, Mary had certain means at her disposal for shaping Commons membership to her liking. She and king Philip could, and did on two occasions, send despatches to the sheriffs who were responsible for holding local elections, encouraging them to ensure that those elected be good Catholic men.67 These were very general and somewhat vague orders for cooperation, but a monarch could be much more forceful and order the officials or local members of the nobility to provide a particular candidate with active support in an election over which they possessed influence.68 Finally, if all other measures failed, a monarch could simply veto the election of a member and refuse to grant him permission to attend. It should be considered a measure of the government's confidence in its ability to control both Houses of Parliament that the Marian regime exercised most of these prerogatives with moderation and sagacity and at no time actually vetoed the election of a Member of the Commons.69

In fact, temperance and moderation were the hallmarks of the relationship between Mary's government and her Parliaments. Almost every action of the Councillors in Parliament was well considered and effectively implemented. One of the first activities undertaken by the new Councillors in 1553 was to define the business for which they would be responsible. A list was drawn up, and subsequently revised and enlarged, which

detailed the most serious problems facing the regime.70 This schedule was the basis on which the Council operated and, as a result, its members were rarely unaware of where their duty lay. It has been shown above that Paget and some colleagues lost sight of their obligations to Mary and acted irresponsibly in the first Parliament of 1554, but throughout the remainder of the reign the Council diligently pursued the legislative objectives as set forth by themselves and Mary.71 The Council was aware of the potential for parliamentary obstruction to government proposals and tried at all costs to minimize the danger by being fully prepared before the commencement of each sitting. Various Councillors were assigned to committees which then undertook the drafting of legislation.72 The main purpose of such committees was to formulate a cohesive plan of action regarding the upcoming sitting of Parliament. Obviously, discussion and debate were inevitable but opposition was something best avoided. If the Crown's proposals were too controversial to expect a reasonably easy passage, the Councillors had to compose the bills in a manner that would limit, or avoid if possible, the opposition in principle of Members. Word changes could be achieved with little or no difficulty, but a theoretical or ideological disagreement might prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. Such was the case in 1555 when the Crown attempted to enact a bill confiscating the property of exiles. Its ostensible purpose was to provide the government with a method of securing the lands of those subjects in exile who ignored the Queen's orders to return

home, but the Members of both Houses feared that it could be applied to any subject residing outside of England, including students, merchants, debtors, and those in exile with the tacit, if informal, approval of the Crown. The Members of the Commons in particular interpreted this bill as an infringement of the traditional liberties of Englishmen and, on the basis of this assumption, rejected the bill on 6 December 1555.73

Because it recognized the importance of avoiding parliamentary defeat, such as the one which greeted the exiles bill, the government was extremely conscious of the need to facilitate the passage of bills and, therefore, introduced each bill into the House of Parliament which seemed to promise the surest success or the easiest journey into statute. Often the Council's choice depended on the strength of the conciliar representation within the House, and Loach has suggested that the government was willing to introduce important official initiatives into the Commons because of the large number of Privy Councillors in the ranks of the Lower Chamber.74 Graves, on the other hand, suggested that the majority of important official bills, with the exception of requests for taxation, were introduced into the Lords, at least during the first three Marian Parliaments. He attributes this to the general recognition that the Upper House possessed the greater capacity for efficient and effective deliberation and because the chief officers of the Crown, including the Lord Chancellor, the Privy Seal, and the Lord Treasurer, all sat in the Lords.75 However,

he also admitted that the predominance of the Upper Chamber in the introduction of and responsibility for official business was abrogated during the reign due to the disloyalty of Paget and other Members of the Lords (and Privy Council). This difference of interpretation is as yet unresolved in current scholarship. It does appear that the Queen lost confidence in the ability of the Upper Chamber as a result of the first Parliament of 1554 and the Lords was unable to regain her complete trust. The result was that a greater proportion of the government's proposed legislation was introduced into the Lower Chamber than had ever before been the case.76 This does not mean that the House of Lords degenerated into the parliamentary backwater described in orthodox historiography, nor does it imply that the regression was permanent;77 what is certain, however, is that the Queen and Council were discriminating in their choice of which House to entrust with the responsibility for guiding the government legislation through the perils of parliamentary debate.

In addition to being flexible when choosing the safest route for a particular bill, the government was also willing to compromise when such was necessary to ensure the passage of proposed legislation. The final forms of the regency and treason bill of early 1556 and the two subsidy bills were the result of mutual concessions worked out in Parliament.78 As shown above, the nobility was antagonistic to any bill which took away their traditional right to name the Protector in a

minority but they allowed Philip to be appointed in return for a reaffirmation that he would be subject to the conditions of the marriage treaty during his tenure as regent.79 Because Parliament opposed the subsidy bill of 1555 on the grounds that it taxed the poor and needy to an excessive extent, the Queen agreed to reduce the amount of the request and in 1558 the Commons offered the government a subsidy which was less than requested and again the Queen agreed to the reduction. In both cases the subsidy bills were both passed and the second was described by the Privy Council as the largest ever granted to a monarch in the history of the realm.80

In addition to a willingness to compromise, and contrary to the opinions expressed in traditional histories, the government at no time introduced measures which it felt would encounter opposition strong enough to cause its defeat. Proof of this contention is the fact that despite Mary's desire to crown her husband, neither she nor her Council introduced or attempted to get parliamentary approval for the coronation because they correctly assessed the negative mood of the two Chambers regarding this sensitive issue.81 Of course the government was defeated on certain issues but it must be understood that those measures which were rejected by Parliament were the victims of the anomalous behaviour of a minority of the Members of Parliament. For example, the bill to reinstitute the medieval heresy laws was only defeated in the second Marian Parliament because Paget rallied the

resistance of certain Peers to Gardiner's unilateral actions and, in the following Parliament, when the same motivations did not exist, the Lords passed the same bill without a murmur.82 The exiles bill was similarly the victim of unusual tactics. When it came up for third reading, a vocal Member of the Commons, Sir Anthony Kingston, who opposed this controversial bill, quickly assessed the allegiances of those Members present and, upon calculating that the opposition was more strongly represented, he barred the door and immediately called for the question to be voted upon. He had appraised the situation correctly, for the bill was defeated, but he was later arrested for his audacious behaviour.83

The picture which is emerging is one of a Parliament effectively managed, but not completely dominated, by the Marian Council. There was sufficient cooperation to ensure that the majority of the government's business was discussed and passed, in some form, as law. The proof can be found in the statute books where the Marian laws on such national concerns and problems as sedition, counterfeiting, treason, defense, and judicial procedure are reprinted.84 These books also hold the proof that Parliament discussed issues which were significant on an individual, local, or county level, rather than at a national level. For example, legislation was passed during the first two Parliaments of the reign that repairs were to be made to certain "decayed highways" at or near "Shierbourne [sic]" and between Bristol and Gloucester and

these upgrades were to be paid for by those subjects who resided near the affected thoroughfares.85 In Mary's second Parliament, clothmakers who had not been formally apprenticed but were in business prior to 1552 were allowed to continue in their profession despite the Edwardian law to the contrary. This was allowed because

> dyvers and many good clothiers ... have been forced to leave off and clearly discontynewe their clothe making, to their great Impoverishment and to the utter undoing of a great nomber of poore people and handycrafteamen whiche dayly hadd their lyving by the said clothiers .... [sic]86

Later in the same session, Parliament agreed to repeal an act passed during the reign of Edward VI because it had not resulted in an improvement of quality of cloth but had caused the impoverishment of artisans.87 Parliament's interest in unofficial bills becomes even more apparent upon an examination of the statutes passed in the Parliament which sat from November 1555 to January 1556. The majority of the laws passed during this particular session touched on issues of less than national scope and must be regarded as evidence that Parliament can be seen as active even when the discussion is not dominated by government policy.88

The previous examples focus on laws which very neatly fit into the categories of either national, and thus official, or local, and thus private, interest but the distinction between the two was not always clear. For instance, the statute

touching clothmaking in Norwich which was passed in the Parliament which commenced in November 1554 seems, at first glance, to be of strictly local significance.89 But a closer examination reveals that it may in fact have been an attempt to replace the decaying foreign clothmaking industry with a more energetic domestic one. Those laws which dealt with trade and illegal export were enforced on a local level, but were definitely of importance to the financial well-being of the central government.90 Likewise the law enacted, during Mary's last Parliament, to confirm the letters patent issued throughout the reign had the dual effect of securing individual fortune and ensuring the continuation of Marian policies, at least temporarily.91

It is very difficult to determine who introduced such bills and, therefore, it has proved almost impossible to categorize every example of legislation as either official or unofficial but, in the final analysis, this may not be an integral part of determining the effectiveness of Parliament as a whole. Even though traditional scholarship has declared that the predominant characteristics of the Parliaments between July 1553 and November 1558 were antagonism and opposition to government policy initiatives, it appears that 'cooperative and efficient' might be a more appropriate description. Frustration did occasionally result in opposition to government motions but the legislative record of the Parliaments was such that Crown objectives were attained and at least a segment of the

unofficial demands were addressed. There is little more that can be asked of any Parliament and if legislative record is granted to be the measure of effectiveness, the Marian Parliaments, it must be admitted, achieved more notable accomplishments than either their medieval antecedents or their Stuart successors.

CHAPTER THREE

In the previous two chapters it has been shown how the Privy Council and Parliament functioned well within the existing constitutional framework, contradicting some of the assumptions evident in the orthodox historiography of Mary's reign. Nevertheless, an important measure of the success of any sixteenth-century government was the way in which the policies of the monarch and Councillors were received by the people of England. Rebellion and a certain level of public discontent were a part of life for the Tudor monarchs;1 still, the extent of displeasure and the frequency with which it manifested itself in actual rebellion were consequences of the understanding and cooperation, or lack thereof, which existed between the central government and the regions. Elton has declared that "stability is the product of moderate contentment: it is preserved if the operations of government are thought to conduce to order and justice, and if they succeed in taking account of the claims to power entertained by inferior authorities."2 In the historical assessment to date of local relations in the years between 1553 and 1558, Mary's government has again suffered in comparison to the records of her predecessors and her heiress. The reason for this is the designation of her reign as one dominated by crises.3 Historians have, without examining the reign in any detail, declared that the Council and Mary herself were out of touch

with the needs and aspirations of local men.4 Statements of contemporary officials or chroniclers are quoted as evidence of animosity between the central government and the country in general, but a reliance on such individuals was not always valid.5 It has further been claimed that the alleged enmity intensified into aggressive hostility in the face of central government preoccupation with particular policies identified as obnoxious to the English. More specifically, relations between the center and the provinces were impaired due to the needs of the country being overshadowed by the Crown's and Council's obsession with a despised religion and an injurious foreign alliance.

Recent research has questioned this interpretation of Mary's reign and has found it to be lacking in a variety of ways. First, it is difficult to view the disturbances of Mary's reign as significantly different or more dangerous than those which occurred during the other Tudor reigns. Second, most of the country proved loyal to Mary in times of 'crisis' whether the populace approved of her religion and the choice of Philip as Consort or not. And, perhaps most important, the documentary evidence does not support the conclusion that issues of importance to England, either general or local, were superseded in Council business by religious or Spanish interests; rather, the opposite seems to be the case.

Perhaps the reason that orthodox historians have viewed

this reign as one of such crisis is the same over-reliance on Simon Renard, Imperial Ambassador, which is noted above. Imminent rebellion was his constant theme in official reports and at certain times he linked this with local disaffection: on 18 September 1554 he wrote to his Imperial master, in this very manner, declaring that rebellion was impending due to Mary and her Council being "neither respected, obeyed, nor feared" which, he believed, would cause the people to ally themselves with the nobility.6 Later in the same despatch he seems to contradict himself but then quickly qualifies when he declares that the rumours of conspiracy and rebellious motives are "trifling matters, and some of them are untrue; but these insular and barbarous people are ready to seize upon the flimsiest pretexts for a disturbance." Historians appear to have placed full confidence in quotations such as these and ignored more positive assessments of other Spanish officials.7

The most famous uprising of the reign was that led by Thomas Wyatt, a citizen of Kent, during January and February 1554. Due to premature discovery of the plans by Bishop Gardiner, Lord Chancellor, the conspirators were forced to put their plan into action before originally intended and, therefore, the uprising threatened more than it achieved; nevertheless, the extent of the uprising was a serious menace to government security and stability in the form which eventually emerged.8 The conspirators were compelled to act precipitately or risk not being able to act at all; as a

result, only one of the four demonstrations originally contemplated was executed successfully in January 1554: that led by Thomas Wyatt in Kent.9 The Kentishmen moved towards London and gathered recruits and momentum. By 3 February the demonstrators had reached the outskirts of London and appeared to be on the verge of victory.10 However, for some mysterious reason the advance halted for two days in Southwark in the face of a locked gate into London.11 By the time Wyatt's force moved towards another gate Mary had managed to rally the Londoners around her and the Council had been given time to improve its defence plans.12 Wyatt and his supporters were defeated by the earl of Pembroke's forces while trying to enter London on 7 February.

Many historians have said that the government was taken completely by surprise by this uprising and displayed a total lack of ability in dealing with the threat it posed.13 Again Renard is the likely source of this unflattering assessment: he and his colleagues believed some Councillors to be traitors due to "the lack of unison among them, their neglect of public affairs and the Queen's personal safety and the fact that the decisions they come to are not carried out."14 These are amazing accusations given the fact that two days earlier the Ambassadors had complained that the Council had not informed them about the state of affairs.15 It is true that normal conciliar activity did cease; however, a careful examination of the extant documentary evidence indicates that the Council was

making preparations to defeat the rebels, defend the Queen, and ensure the loyalty (or at least tranquility) of the rest of England by mid-January.16 The Council was somewhat hindered by Gardiner's efforts to protect Edward Courtenay, earl of Devon; it appears that upon learning of the plot, the Chancellor became aware of Courtenay's involvement and tried to shield him as much as possible, which resulted in Gardiner's attempt to conceal some of the facts from his colleagues.17 Nevertheless, the Council did levy troops, despatch the Duke of Norfolk against the rebels, and order the capture and seizure of the Duke of Suffolk and Sir Peter Carew, both of whom were leading conspirators who failed to rally supporters.18 The Queen showed the bravery and tenacity characteristic of her sister and father in this crisis by refusing to follow the counsel of her more timid advisors who suggested she abandon London.19 Instead, with the advice and assistance of her Council, she made herself visible to Londoners and issued two proclamations: the first outlawing the rebels and the second granting Wyatt's supporters safe conduct if they wished to join the rebel leader, thus eliminating a fifth column within London.20

It cannot be denied that Mary and the Council did not have the initiative during this uprising and reacted from a position of weakness, but this does not imply that they were totally ineffective as certain historians suggest: Loades declared that "the government had, by its ineptitude, presented Wyatt

with a magnificent opportunity" and only the rebel's weakness prevented his taking advantage of the opening thus provided.21 Rather, the evidence suggests that their actions were those of a government not certain of its support and inexperienced in handling such matters. It must be remembered that Mary had succeeded to the throne barely six months before this disturbance occurred and during that time the Councillors had been responsible for managing two sessions of Parliament, negotiating a marriage treaty, and stabilizing the finances of a debt-ridden nation, in addition to establishing a working relationship with each other on Council, despite jealousies and differing ideologies. It is not surprising that this relationship did not function meticulously in the face of such a potent danger. What must also be acknowledged, however, is that, in the final analysis, the Councillors did engineer the defeat of Wyatt and guaranteed the safety of London and the Queen.

Another episode of rebellion occurred in 1557 when Thomas Stafford and other rebels captured Scarborough castle. Those involved were exiles disaffected with the reign in general and the attack was ostensibly motivated by the desire of the attackers to put pressure on the central government to prevent the increase of Spanish influence and power within England. The conquerors were quickly defeated by the earl of Westmorland and his local levies and the castle retaken but the episode was particularly sinister given the involvement of the King of

France, Henri II.22 The Council had been cautioned by Dr. Nicholas Wotton, England's Resident Ambassador in France, that some exiles were contemplating an attack on either Hull, Plymouth, or Scarborough and had promised to deliver the prize to Henri but there is some question as to whether his despatch arrived in London in time to be of use.23 The news had reached Wotton early in April and he had transmitted it to the Council immediately but even so the information was not conclusive and similar plots had previously proven abortive; therefore, assuming that the Council had been forewarned, it could do little but wait.24 Still, it is possible, although the documents do not indicate such, that the Council had advised their officials around Scarborough of the possibility of an attack because the response of Westmorland was immediate and within a few weeks of Stafford's apparent victory all those responsible were in custody and a thorough investigation was underway.25 Even though the conspirators were more successful than Wyatt, this episode proved far less ominous for the government because the Council was neither caught unaware nor unprepared, no immediate threat to the Queen or London was posed, and Council's response was far more unified than it had been in February of 1554.

Although there were no other actual rebellions during the brief reign, there were examples of discontent and conspiracy.26 Most were minor occurrences quickly discovered and suppressed by the government and, therefore, generally

neglected in the accounts of Mary's reign, but one conspiracy deserves particular attention: Dudley's conspiracy.27 In the latter half of 1555 and early 1556 Dudley and other French exiles were planning an invasion of England with the expressed purpose of deposing Mary in favour of Elizabeth. In contrast to Wyatt and his colleagues, Dudley understood that he could expect limited popular support unless he was assured of victory. Therefore, he and his fellow conspirators determined to arrive in England with a military force, fully equipped and armed, of adequate size to gain their objectives regardless of the response of Mary's subjects. Obviously such a plan required substantial financial support and the plotters were relying on the French king to supply this need. However, their hopes were disappointed on 12 February 1556 and they were forced to fall back upon an alternate source: the English Exchequer.28 It was the intention of the conspirators to steal silver bullion and have English coins minted in France for which purpose a special mint had been established in Normandy.29 It is the opinion of Loades that had the plans of Dudley and his cohorts ever been put into practice the result might have been disastrous for Mary and her Council because of the extent of the network the conspirators had established.30 However, once again the Councillors became aware of the plot and arrests were ordered on 18 March 1556 before a date for action had even been fixed.31 Although Loades contends that the conspiracy was not immediately defeated by these arrests, he admits that the subsequent investigation nullified any

residual threat.32

The three incidents discussed above were, without doubt, evidence of discontent with Mary and her government's policies but they were no more demonstrative of such antagonism and definitely no more threatening than were the Pilrimage of Grace in 1536, Kett's rebellion in 1549, and the Northern Rebellion in 1569. The Queen and Council have been attacked as incompetent in the face of these threats and yet the reign continued and the evidence proves they were not inactive. Perhaps they can be criticized for allowing the rebels to take the initiative in 1554, but the Queen and Council had not yet established a working relationship which accommodated differences in political outlook and policy; their inexperience manifested itself in an uncertainty regarding the most effectual method of suppressing the outburst. Even so, the government did wrest the advantage from the rebels and successfully defended against the outburst. The outbreaks of popular discontent were no more successful, and perhaps less so, than any of those which occurred under the other Tudors.33

A common theme emerges when the accounts of these disturbances within the traditional historiography are examined: they were all alleged to be the result of local dissatisfaction with central policies, as they related to religion and Philip.34 While it must be admitted that Wyatt and his associates were opposed to the impending marriage and

Stafford's attack was supported by the French in order to harass the English and convince them that the Imperial alliance was detrimental to England's safety, the attitudes of those in active rebellion against the Crown must not be taken as illustrative of universal opposition to Mary's rule.35 There were large areas of the realm which were opposed neither to the Catholic reformation nor to the match with Philip, and indeed some which actively endorsed central government policies. For example, there were particular areas of Wales and the Northern counties which were reported to be happy at Mary's victory and the subsequent restoration of Catholicism and certainly not dissatisfied with the prospect of having Philip marry Mary.36 There were also citizens of southern England who were supportive of the government's religious policy and in a few cases their enthusiasm even outstripped that of their superiors.37 And, although the documentary evidence is not conclusive on this subject, it would be reasonable to expect that those port cities whose business would be enhanced by an alliance with Imperial dominions and the attendant relaxation of trade barriers, would be especially eager to see the marriage celebrated. The documents do indicate that trade between the ports of southwest England and Spain flourished in this period which might be taken as indicative of their approval, or at least exploitation, of the association.38

Even if the citizens of a particular locality or county were not particularly supportive of national policy, they did

not automatically break into open rebellion and were often convinced to support the Crown in spite of their doubts. For instance, although the citizenry of Ipswich was probably 'reformed' in religious allegiance, men acceptable to, and even in agreement with, Mary were chosen during the elections of local officials and representatives for Parliament throughout the reign.39 The citizens obviously felt that the Queen's benevolence was more essential to their survival and prosperity than Protestant doctrine and practice. Another good example of a province showing its allegiance to Mary, despite the opposition of certain residents to a policy, occurred during Wyatt's rebellion. Even though many favoured an Imperial and Catholic alliance, there were a number of Welshmen who were opposed to the proposed marriage with Philip and were involved in Wyatt's plan to wed Courtenay to Mary instead.40 In fact, Wales was one of the four centers for which a rising was planned;41 however, when the Kentish rebellion commenced prematurely, the Welsh conspirators, led by Sir James Croftes, failed to gather support and the plan was aborted.42 When levying troops to defend London and the Queen, it was to his home territory of Wales that the earl of Pembroke turned and it was Welshmen who were responsible for Wyatt's final defeat.43 A thorough consideration of the extant documentation simply does not support the conclusion that all of Mary's subjects were opposed to the government plans regarding religion and the Queen's marriage and even if they were, they were not necessarily willing to convert their discontent into concrete

rebellion. It is obvious that the traditional perceptions about Mary's reign as one of crisis manifested in continual local opposition to national policy require re-evaluation; prevalent societal attitudes need to be redefined and re-analysed to determine if religion and Spain were the predominant concerns of the average citizen of mid-Tudor Britain as historians have assumed. Rather, the evidence suggests that the populace of the realm had a diversity of interests and that, as with Council and Parliament, religion and the marriage did not absorb the citizens to the exclusion of all other matters.

However, it cannot be denied that Mary was a devout and committed Roman Catholic and her most treasured goal was to witness and execute the return of her country to what she considered to be the only true religion. From the first moment of her success against Northumberland she intended to do whatever was necessary to ensure the salvation of her people, including the renewal of papal obedience and the punishment of recalcitrant heretics.44 Although she proceeded cautiously at first,45 she believed that reunification with Rome was part of God's design in bringing her to the throne and was also the desire of the majority of her subjects but most historians have, until recently, interpreted the contemporary evidence differently.46 Scholars such as Froude, Pollard, and Neale have taken a retrospective view of Tudor religious history and have assumed that the Protestant reformation was successful

because the citizenry was, by and large, of reformed religious inclination and, therefore, vehemently opposed to enforced obedience to the Pope or 'superstitious' trappings of the Mass.47 Risings such as Wyatt's were evidence of the irrepressible opposition of a Protestant nation to the plans of a popish Queen.

Upon a more thorough examination of the available evidence it becomes harder to accept the traditional representation of a Catholic monarch universally opposed by a Protestant country. First, it is difficult to be sure that the framework within which this debate takes place and the terms and definitions used to inform this debate are adequate. It has yet to be proven that contemporaries defined and considered their religious allegiances in a manner that can be appropriately explained by modern conceptions of catholicism, protestantism, and even religion.48 This paper cannot possibly provide a definitive answer to such a complex problem; even historians who have spent years researching this topic are still unsure. Certain historians have made the distinction between a Catholic extreme on one side, a Protestant extreme on the other, and a huge majority of 'neuters' in the middle.49 But even this model does not explain the complexity of the issue adequately. What of the gradations within each category? Other historians, particularly Christopher Haigh, are attempting to present a clear picture of the English Reformation and many new theories are being aired but if the limitations of current understanding

are to be overcome, it is essential to discover how contemporaries viewed their religious differences and how they carried out their daily existences in light of the consequent discord.50

One thing is certain, the country was definitely not one inhabited exclusively by Protestants. The contemporary chronicles and official papers are full of references to Catholics.51 Catholicism enjoyed support all over the country and its leaders were often more determined than the Councillors to ensure the survival of the Catholic faith. Indeed, if heretics were to be punished at all, the cooperation of the citizenry was necessary: "[p]ersecution depended not only on the numbers of heretics but also on the retributory zeal of laymen and clerics."52 This zeal was sometimes lacking, even in those areas believed to have been religiously loyal, such as the north and the southwest, and the Council occasionally had to remind the leaders in the localities of their duty.53 It was also common for the Council to order a number of powerful local men and officials or even Councillors to appear at the execution of a heretic to demonstrate official sanction for these actions and to ensure that the observers remained peaceful and quiet.54 However, there are many similar instances in which no such orders were necessary.55

Just as the English have been defined generally as anti-Catholic within traditional historiography, they have also

been construed as anti-Spanish. It has been suggested that any foreign king would have been viewed without favour by Mary's subjects due to the general xenophobia of the English people; Philip's religion and nationality simply reinforced these antagonisms.56 It cannot be denied that some subjects were hostile to the king: as William Gibbes declared in February 1554 "yf any man woold not stande to defende the Kynge of Spayne for his entri ynto thys realme, because they woold ravyshe ther wyves and daughters and robbe and spoile the commons, that then thyr throtte shold be cutte [sic]."57 Moreover, the early chroniclers and historians followed Renard's lead, even though the Ambassador's evidence was often contradicted by that of his own contemporaries.58 The most notable of the early historians was John Foxe; however, he made no attempt to hide his bias and chose sources which concurred with his own attitudes.59 Unfortunately for scholarship, much of the more recent historiography has been based largely on Foxe; in consequence, Mary's reign has been regarded, almost invariably, as an unfortunate relapse in an otherwise unblemished progress towards a modernism typified by many achievements, the most glorious being Protestantism.60 Because of this emphasis, the Philip of the 1550s came to be regarded in the same light as the Philip of the 1580s. This man was the religious fanatic, totally dedicated to the destruction of Protestantism - both within his own dominions and throughout the world - who devoted a great deal of time and energy to plotting the destruction of Elizabethan England.61 Philip's

perverse religious ambitions, it has been claimed, were enough to unleash the opposition of the reformed English nation but the antagonism was futher compounded by Philip's reputation as a tyrant throughout his other realms, particularly Naples.62 Philip had rarely travelled outside Spain and his expeditions to his father's other domains undertaken prior to 1553 had not been gloriously successful.63 In fact, he and his courtiers had earned a reputation for unrestrained arrogance.64 What has been ignored is the evidence that proves Philip made every effort to be conciliatory to the English upon his arrival. Perhaps the best example of his attempts to attract the loyalty of his wife's subjects occurred when he permitted Mary and the Council to appoint a household staff, including a Privy Chamber, comprised entirely of Englishmen.65 He also issued orders for his Spanish retainers to resist involving themselves in altercations with the English, and on those occasions when his warnings were ignored he ensured that his countrymen were adequately punished for their insolence.66 His attempts to appease the English were greatly enhanced by his moderate approach to the English heretics as he advised the Queen to be lenient towards the stubborn dissenters and approach the proposed religious changes with caution and circumspection.67

Nevertheless, historians have claimed that English citizens believed that, without a doubt, alliance with the Imperial powers, and specifically Philip, would lead to Spanish governmental domination and the rape of English resources for

the benefit of foreigners.68 What has generally been ignored is that Mary followed in the footsteps of her father and grandfather by allying with the Spanish Crown, and, therefore, the arrangement was not a new one to Englishmen with the exception that never before had they been faced with the prospect of a foreign king.69 It has been shown above that the Council successfully negotiated a guarantee that Philip would not involve England in any activity without the approval of Council and would appoint no foreigners to English offices.70 Even the threat posed by a foreign king, therefore, was substantially abrogated. Even so, it has been claimed that Mary's alleged emotional subservience to Philip negated the work of Council because it caused her to abandon English interests to those of her husband.71 The evidence used to support this contention comes from several entries in the Spanish State Papers which state that Mary would agree to whatever Charles, and by implication Philip, felt was in her [illegible]erest. The Imperial Ambassadors declared that "she [illegible] submit herself to your majesty's decision as to her marriage and in all other matters" when they wrote to Charles V on 2 August 1553.72 Such subservience would have created a situation very detrimental to English interests given Charles' and Philip's preoccupation with Imperial affairs.73 However, it is highly probable that Mary's declarations were often no more than was expected in the diplomatic language of the time and it is certain that neither she nor her Councillors felt compelled to consult with or receive the sanction of Imperial

representatives on every decision they made.74

When the documentary evidence is thoroughly examined it becomes clear that many of the assumptions about central government policy with respect to Philip are simply not supportable and that the presumptions about anti-Spanish feeling have been exaggerated. There were the obvious exceptions, but, generally, the English were more interested in survival and the retention of wealth and personal or political influence than they were in the vagaries of international relations and the complexities of religious practice. Most of Mary's subjects were affected by xenophobia to the extent that they would oppose foreign domination of England but rarely, in this or any other reign, were such feelings important enough to them that they would actually risk rebellion against their monarch: the leaders of society were more interested in the preservation of the local and central "fabric of authority" and in the maintenance of their own economic, social, and political welfare than they were in political or religious dogma.75

The Queen and Council must have been aware of this attitude and it is misleading for scholars to assert that the government was either uninformed or simply ignored matters of local significance, resulting in a complete preoccupation with religious issues and Spanish interests. Such views represent a tremendous oversimplification. It would be more accurate to conclude that the government also wanted to preserve the

authoritative structure of society and, in addition to those policies which they initiated and considered to be of national importance, the Queen and Council were extremely knowledgeable about the needs of the various regions of the country and did their utmost to meet these concerns with policy initiatives. The most effective way for the Council to obtain accurate information regarding the state of the realm was for local officials to supply it to them and, therefore, reports were ordered prepared and sent to Council on a number of occasions. For example, on 21 December 1553 the Councillors received and examined the report of the Northern Commissioners in order to apprise themselves of any unusual factors and immediate requirements relating to the borders and the distant northern communities.76 On 23 December 1555 the Council decided that it needed to examine the state of Essex in order to determine if a Commission of Oyer and Terminer should be appointed for the county and, therefore, took measures to ensure that the requisite information be forwarded to the Council.77 While the Council made efforts to become informed of such county affairs, it also kept abreast of the situation in small localities within the realm. On 24 June 1556 the Council examined a report which informed its members about the "state" of the town of Hartlepool.78

Another means by which the Council could gather information about the state of the nation was by appointing Commissions of Sewers. The purpose of such bodies was to

"survey walls, streams, ditches ... and to repair same according to statutes provided therfor [sic]."79 At first it would appear that a group of men with a commission of this type would have little interest in the general state of the nation; however, the delegations surveying areas like whole counties often included at least one Privy Councillor and, therefore, it is quite possible that information of a more general applicability and use was obtained at the same time as infrastructure improvements were authorized and implemented.80 Possibly the most comprehensive attempt to gather information was the order to sheriffs that they make monthly reports on the state of the shires; the sheriffs were responsible for areas small enough to eliminate excessive generality in the reports and yet large enough that the Council could thoroughly examine such reports on a regular basis.81 Many of the Council's orders regarding the specific problems and concerns of localities must have been responses to the intelligence provided in reports of this type.

Much of the government's involvement in local affairs was carried out by Privy Councillors who had either been appointed as local officials on a permanent basis or simply exercised their influence as landholders in local affairs. As shown above, the size of the Council allowed Mary to deploy some of her most trusted advisors in the different regions of the country. Not only were most Councillors employed upon Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, Gaol Delivery, and Sewers,

but many had a personal power in provincial affairs which was separate from, but enhanced by, their positions as the Queen's advisors. One excellent example was William Herbert, first Earl of Pembroke of the second creation (c1507-1570). He was a man of similar conscience and personal outlook as Councillors such as Paget and Paulet and, as Sil pointed out, "his moderation and readiness to adjust enabled him to survive the political vicissitudes of four Tudor regimes."82 He entered court life during the reign of Henry VIII and during that time and the subsequent reign proved a valuable military leader and administrator to the government, particularly in his home of South Wales. He was a central figure in Northumberland's plot to reject Mary's claim to the throne and yet she felt compelled to include him in her own government because he was influential in Wales and his ability to secure military backing within the region made him too powerful, and potentially dangerous, to ignore.83 His membership on Council, especially once he had been appointed to the Presidency of the Council of Wales, must have greatly assisted communication and cooperation between Welsh officials and central government given his fluency in Welsh; although it was required that all Welsh official possess the ability to speak English, this provision was not always enforceable and, therefore, a Councillor able to speak the native tongue of these representatives of the Crown would be absolutely invaluable.84 It was not only the Crown which found Pembroke to be an asset; certain of the communities within his sphere of influence benefitted from his position on the Privy

Council and his political leverage in Parliament. He managed to arrange the incorporation of Chippenham in Wiltshire and the restoration of the charters and liberties of two Welsh towns which greatly enhanced their social and economic prospects; obviously in the case of Pembroke both the central government and the Welsh region benefitted from the arrangement in which Councillors were used to maintain peaceful and cooperative internal relations.85

Anthony St. Leger was another Councillor who served the Queen's interests in the provinces, specifically in Ireland and the French Pale. He had also entered royal service under Henry VIII and was appointed to a commission responsible for strengthening the defences of the French pale in 1535.86 From that point, on his service, with the brief exception of 1539 when he was sheriff of Kent, kept him either in Calais or Ireland. His first experience in Ireland as a Crown official was as head of a commission in July 1537 which was followed by an assignment as Lord Deputy in 1540.87 He held this position intermittently for the next sixteen years and has been acclaimed as the "only deputy out of a long succession who appreciated the good and bad points of Irish character ... the only deputy who managed to make the revenues of Ireland suffice to meet the expenses of its government."88 Obviously a man of such competence was invaluable to Mary's Irish policy. He was removed from his position in Ireland when the Council was forced to examine complaints regarding the alleged financial

mismanagement of Ireland; but he was quickly reassigned to assist Wentworth in Calais.89

As valuable to Mary as Pembroke was in Wales and St. Leger was in Ireland, Francis Talbot, the 5th earl of Shrewsbury, was equally, if not more, invaluable in the North. Shrewsbury had started his public career under Henry VIII with an appointment as Chamberlain of the Exchequer in 1527.90 But he spent the greater part of his life on the Scottish borders and this first office was followed by inclusion on the Commission of the Peace for the counties of Derbyshire, Staffordshire, and the North Riding of Yorkshire in 1532. He was Lieutenant General of the North in 1554-55; Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, and Nottinghamshire in 1547; and President of Nothern Council under both Edward and Mary. His experience was mainly military and he was a commander of armies in such crises as the Pilgrimage of Grace. Despite his frequent absence from meetings, he was a Privy Councillor for Mary and her father, brother, and sister.91

These Councillors, and others in similar positions or possessing comparable local influence, were responsible for ensuring the implementation of Crown policy at a local and a county (or regional) level but were also in a position to communicate the local problems and concerns to the central government. Such an arrangement was essential for a government

attempting to control a nation which included areas of extremely differing needs. The Council in London was ultimately responsible for the maintenance of peace throughout Ireland; the defence of the northern border from Scottish incursion; the support of Calais, Guisnes, and various other French outposts; and the ongoing assimilation of Wales. All of this was maintained in addition to the reversal of religious policy, the salvation of a distressed financial situation, and the ensurance of economic survival and prosperity (among other things) within England itself. Dependable information and a trustworthy conduit for communication was an essential prerequisite to coordination between the localities or regions and the central government and in many cases Councillors were used to fill this need.

The government obviously could not and did not rely solely upon Councillors to provide the necessary governance and, therefore, the Council monitored the quality and loyalty of other local officials. Justices of the Peace and Sheriffs were the local representatives of the Crown and it was in the interest of the government to ensure that the men holding such positions remained honest and diligent while carrying out their orders. One method employed was to dictate who should be elected to certain positions. On 15 August 1556 the Council wrote to the 'maiour and jurates' of Rye specifying that a George Reynoldes was to be chosen as the mayor 'for the benefit of the commonwelthe [sic]' and the town itself. His

performance so impressed the Council that in the following year the Councillors requested that he be re-elected.92 If the Council was displeased with a particular choice of official, an order would be sent to hold another election as occurred on 10 August 1557 when the Councillors decided that the new mayor of Calais was unsuitable.93 On certain occasions the Council was forced to order the arrest and replacement of certain office holders who were derelict or mercenary in their duties. For example, one of the most common complaints of citizens was the corruption of auditors and on 24 August 1553 the man holding that office in Southampton, Wiltshire, and Gloucester was replaced and arrested.94 On 7 December 1555 the Council sent a commission to the Sheriff of Somerset to apprehend and imprison Pembroke's Receivour who was guilty of embezzlement.95 At other times the Council felt that a reminder would be sufficient to ensure the continued implementation of Crown policy by lax officials. On 15 August 1554 the Sussex Justices of the Peace were ordered to increase their vigilance when searching out and punishing religious offences and on 6 May 1556 the mayor of Pembrokeshire was summoned to appear before Council to explain the slackness with which he was approaching his duties.96

The examples just provided are illustrative of Council's efforts to ensure that the central government's interests were attended to, but there are as many examples of the Council's attention being directed to matters of strictly local, as

opposed to national, significance. On 6 June 1554 the Council approved repairs to certain bridges and wharves in Greenwich in an attempt to improve access for ships.97 The port of Dover also received similar attention; on 13 October 1553 an examination into the state of repair of its facilities was ordered to determine if any alteration was required.98 Obviously some problems were identified and orders were issued for their correction because on 23 February 1555 the Council requested a report on the progress of the repairs ongoing at Dover.99 Such attention was not restricted to places with access to water; the state of repair of defences was always of premium importance and even castles and houses were repaired on the instructions of Council.100

The economic viability and prosperity of the English provinces was of vital importance to the Crown and Council and, if required, they would intervene to ensure that the welfare of a town or county not be jeopardized. The Council's interest in and efforts on behalf of Southampton provide a revealing example. Throughout the reign the Venetians tried to avoid a particular restriction relating to the wine trade which stipulated that wine could only be imported through Southampton. On several occasions the Venetian merchants bypassed the town and attempted to offload elsewhere. On one such occasion the Council allowed the deviation from policy, due to the disrepair of the ship transporting the wine, but forced the Venetians to pay a stiff fine, fifty percent of

which was given to the town of Southampton.101 Each of the other Venetian applications for exemption were met with refusal and the ships were forced to unload at the specified port.102 The Crown and Council were equally diligent in encouraging the economic growth of the mines in Cornwall.103 Granted the discovery of a rich deposit of silver would have greatly improved governmental finances, in that it would have provided the government with a new source of income and would have enabled it to issue pure currency, but the mines were also a source of employment for the residents of Cornwall at a time of general famine.104 At various times the Council also issued instructions regarding the rules of employment on Thames barges, the reclamation of certain marshes, the unfair dismissal of workers causing excessive unemployment in Leicester, and the practices of London bakers.105

The Council also did what it could to limit the destructiveness of local rivalries which erupted into feuds and disputes. The Council investigated the rival claims, made decisions based on the information acquired, and attempted to enforce their resolution in a variety of sensitive cases.106 For example, a dispute occurred in Stafford as a result of a tenant's refusal to pay rents which he deemed excessive. The landlord seized his renter's cattle as payment and the situation threatened to deteriorate further until the Council intervened in its judicial capacity and arranged an acceptable settlement.107 On at least one occasion the Council felt

impelled to intrude upon and settle a family quarrel to ensure the liberty and well-being of a subject.108 Perhaps the dispute which posed the most serious threat to security was that between Lord Wharton and the earl of Cumberland which had also been a concern of Henry VIII's and Edward VI's regimes. Both Cumberland and Wharton were officials and commanders along the Scottish border but their ongoing jealousy of each other's power and influence threatened to create a defensive breach along the northern perimeter. The Council was compelled to undertake an investigation and examine the complaints of both parties in this dispute in an attempt to create a harmony and cooperation sufficient for the continued security of the border defences.109

Certain issues were of national concern but each separate occurrence of the problem was dealt with on an individual basis at the local level. One such problem was the depletion and destruction of England's forests. In March of 1555 the Council was forced to order a halt to the cutting down of Wyer wood in order to assure its survival.110 Later in the same year the Council became aware of waste in certain forests and took action to prevent further occurrences of a similarly ruinous character.111 On 26 March 1556 the Council ordered that the illegal sale of wood cease and that the man responsible be detained and questioned.112 These actions were prompted by a general concern to preserve the resources of the nation and yet the consequent orders did much to preserve the stability of

local agricultural economies which often depended on the continued, but generally small-scale, exploitation of the forest products.

Vagabondage was another problem that was manifested throughout England but was counteracted at a local level. The Council was particularly interested in preventing the growth of idleness and poverty because it was aware of the propensity for vagabonds to congregate which often resulted in an increase in discontent and sedition.113 The Councillors occasionally became so anxious about the effects of vagabondage they ordered the cancellation of certain local festivals they felt would attract "idle" people. The May games of 1555 were cancelled in Kent due to the propensity for transients to cause trouble at the event and the performance of a play, particularly if it was unauthorized, was regarded by the government as a magnet for trouble.114 Even if a local festival was not cancelled the Council might issue instructions regarding the precautions to be taken in the event that problems did erupt. One of the Council's favourite methods of ensuring that a fair remained peaceful was to demand that Justices of the Peace be in attendance and any violators not punished by local authorities could be summoned before the Council itself.115

Enclosure was another worry which Mary's government, and every other sixteenth-century administration, had to address with regularity and care. The English gentry of the sixteenth

century, realizing the potential for profit in the sale of wool, had increased their sheep flocks enormously over the first half of the century. Such flocks required large tracts of enclosed land for grazing but the traditional pattern of English agriculture could not accommodate itself to this need and, therefore, landlords were enclosing land to the detriment of the small farmers making it difficult or impossible for them to survive.116 Parliament did attempt to resolve the problem by prohibiting enclosure in a Statute but this was not sufficient to guarantee the complete compliance of Mary's subjects; therefore, the Council issued orders intended to enforce implementation of that Statute.117 On 23 December 1555 Lord Wharton was given responsibility for executing the statute along the border and the Council continued to issue orders regarding enclosure until the war overshadowed all other concerns, at least in the North.118

In addition to addressing local issues in an ad hoc manner, Mary and her Council paid particular attention to, and pursued certain definable policies in, those areas of the realm which were either the source of administrative problems, such as Ireland and Wales, or were militarily essential to the preservation of English security, such as the northern counties and the French Pale. Ireland had been an administrative nightmare for Mary's father and those nobles running her brother's administration and it continued to be so between 1553 and 1558. However, under Mary, some advances were made and

some innovative administrative experiments attempted.119 The trouble was the result of the opposition of the native Irish to English attempts to govern peacefully; during Mary's reign the majority of Ireland remained under the control of native born Irish aristocrats whose main activity seems to have been internecine warfare with rival clans and even those areas under nominal English control were frequently in rebellion due to the lack of adequate English representation.120 The standard attempts to reduce the disruption (it proved impossible to eliminate it) involved the establishment of conciliatory alliances with particular powerful Irish leaders but during Edward's reign in particular, "the military resources of the deputies were steadily increased and ... the use of force to secure short-term objectives [became] more and more attractive."121 The difficulty with such a policy was that it incurred ever greater expenditure and still a comprehensive military conquest proved to be an impossibility.122

When Mary succeeded to the throne she and her Councillors did everything they could to ensure that they did nothing to cause more serious disruptions. They reappointed the very experienced Anthony St. Leger, dismissed none of the council in Dublin, and continued to supply the necessary funds and equipment.123 They did order the restoration of Roman Catholicism but this policy seems to have been enthusiastically received and implemented in many parts of Ireland.124 However, there were no Irish persecutions and Church land in the hands

of private individuals was not restored to its previous owners.125 Perhaps the most radical and innovative policy of the Marian government was the proposed colonization of Leix and Offaly which, although only of limited success (financial and otherwise), "was the forerunner of a new departure in the English management of Ireland."126 It was the government's intention to extend the pale around Dublin to encompass those areas of Ireland which had proved the greatest threat to the English holdings by depriving those Irish rebels and replacing them with trustworthy, peaceful English settlers.127 The colonists would be responsible for the establishment and defence of their economy which would be one based upon "sturdy agricultural communities" but they would also provide economical supplies to the English garrisons which had been established in midland Ireland over the years, thereby reducing the expense of the military establishment in Ireland.128 The Irish Parliament of 1557 legislated that the establishment of the English system of local organisation and law enforcement would commence throughout the region subject to colonization, which greatly enhanced the potential power of the Crown.129 In other words, the inspiration for Elizabeth's Irish policy was Marian innovation.

Wales presented administrative difficulties of a lesser but still significant type. For instance, in contrast to the continual interclan warfare and the hostility of the native Irish leaders to English intervention in Ireland, the threat of

Welsh rebellion was rarely of concern to the Council. The one exception which must be noted was the intention of certain Welshmen, most notably Sir James Croftes, to join Wyatt in demonstrating their disaffection for the Crown's foreign policy in 1554.130 However, it must be remembered that this instance of disloyalty was not an articulation only of localized Welsh discontent but merely one segment of that antagonism evident in various parts of the realm. However, Welsh administration was still not totally assimilated to that of England itself and there continued to be a separate Council and President of Wales which governed the Welsh Marches.131 During Mary's reign this Council was dominated by the Earl of Pembroke and through his involvement in Welsh affairs the government ensured that the area remained peaceful, that the administration of justice endured without interruption, that the economy of Wales continued to be strong and viable, and that the changes to the official religion were implemented with as much vigour as they were in English territory.132

Though conciliar interest in Ireland and Wales was that of a government trying to increase the efficiency and extension of civilian administration, the Council's preoccupation with the northern counties and Calais and Guisnes was substantially military.133 It was feared that weakness on either of these frontiers would result in a foreign invasion, and possibly conquest, of the realm. The attention paid to these areas spanned the reign but became particularly intense after the

declaration of war with France in 1557. Still, even in the early years of the reign, the flow of money, men and supplies northward toward Berwick and southward across the Channel was a constant drain on the resources of the Crown.134 The Council was responsible for ensuring that 'the pieces' were adequately maintained but also had to be aware of the necessity to economize. On 27 August 1556 the Council thoroughly examined and itemized the expenses of the garrisons in France in order that efficient measures could be undertaken to reduce the costs.135 Even after war was declared with France regular audits of the accounts of military 'pieces' were ordered and the need to economize was considered to be imperative; although the Council authorized the repair and defence of Tilbury Castle on 1 April 1558, the charges were to be as "smale as may be [sic]."136 Nevertheless, the Council made every effort to provide the necessary material which is evidence of the care with which the Council approached the issue of national defence.

Mary and her government are often attacked for the loss of Calais and Guisnes during January of 1558 because of an alleged neglect of its duty to provide supplies, but the evidence suggests that the Council was diligent in its attention to the requests of Calais and Guisnes.137 A careful examination of the extant documentation indicates that it was environmental forces and distance, not conciliar ineptitude, which prevented the necessary troops and supplies from arriving in time to

relieve the distressed outposts.138 What is particularly interesting about the documents, however, is that they reveal the Council's perception that the greatest threat to England originated in the north and, therefore, English resources were concentrated on the defence of the land border with Scotland.139 In fact, after the loss of the French outposts, the Imperial representatives found it nearly impossible to convince the English to commit any money, soldiers, or supplies whatsoever to the European front.140 The evidence reveals a Council fully cognizant of the sources of the greatest danger and willing to ignore the interests of its king in order to guarantee the security of English borders.

The picture which emerges is not one of a government out of touch with the regions. Rather the Queen, through her Council, seems to have been extremely aware and concerned about all of her people. Although it cannot be denied that the Catholic reformation and the Spanish marriage were paramount concerns of the central government and the resulting policies may have created some disaffection, there were many other issues which were perceived as equally important and allowed appropriate time and attention in Council. Those Englishmen who disapproved of governmental attitudes toward religion and Spain might strongly endorse the stance taken by the Council on other issues; active opposition is not likely to be undertaken by those who prosper from national or local economic policies nor is it the normal activity of those whose political or

social influence is guaranteed and enhanced by governmental support. Therefore, it appears that too much emphasis has been placed upon the alleged English xenophobia and religious antagonism to the policies of Queen and Council. The evidence suggests that, in spite of the opposition of certain elements of society, the government and populace were capable of remarkable cooperation. Historians need to re-evaluate the documentary record of the Marian era in order to escape the traditional assumptions about the reign which appear to have been unnecessarily coloured with whig and martyr history. There were examples of latent discontent and even actual outbursts antagonistic to the government but these were effectively controlled. The Council was able to manage England and assure the Queen of the loyalty of her subjects because it did not form an isolated clique of uninformed and uninterested men; rather its members took steps to ascertain the needs and desires of Mary's subjects and attempted to satisfy the demands of individuals or groups whenever it was in the general interest of the Queen and country to do so.

CONCLUSION

In the previous three chapters evidence was provided which suggests that Mary's reign was neither the "sterile interlude" portrayed by Pollard nor the "crisis" evoked by Neale and Elton. Rather, it was a five year period during which the English witnessed administrative and political advancement, social and economic innovation, and intergovernmental cooperation. It is an indisputable fact that the reign was also marked by certain crises both within the government and throughout the country, but one of the true measures of the effectiveness of any government must be the productivity of its daily employments. If such are the guidelines, the records of the Marian Council, Parliaments, and Crown-county relations were as laudable and worthy of study as those of any other English monarch.

It has been shown that the Council, traditionally dismissed as too large and overly-factious, was in actuality a source of administrative strength to the government. First, its size did not prove to be such an affliction to the efficient management of government affairs because most positions were honourary. The members of Council with previous experience in national policy formation and as leaders of central administrative institutions were assigned to a compact,

effective Council which introduced extensive specialization of function into Mary's government. Those lacking political and administrative skill in a national context maintained their prestigious titles but were deployed away from the capital and greatly enhanced the viability of the link between the local and the central governments. Second, although personal rivalry between Councillors was a feature of the Marian government, it was not a trait unique to this particular Council and it did not become as destructive as Renard or the historians who relied on him claimed. The professionalism of the men involved and the neutrality of the majority of the Council ensured that it was rarely delinquent as regards the control and management of essential administrative fields.

What the evidence does suggest is that the Council, served by a number of exceptionally qualified and intelligent men, was more than able to meet the challenge facing it between 1553 and 1558. The evidence of this claim is the record of conciliar success. One of the most celebrated achievements of the reign was in the field of financial management. Not only did Mary's government stabilize the currency and pay her debts, as well as those of her predecessors, promptly, but the Council also improved the efficiency of the financial machinery and reduced government expenses. It was also to the credit and advantage of the Marian regime that the Council took an active interest in the maintenance of law and order throughout the realm. In addition to these domestic concerns the Council ensured the

prosperity of England in a European context, both through trade negotiations and when concluding the marriage alliance between Mary and Philip. All this was accomplished at the same time and by the same administrators who were addressing the issues of national famine, international war, and religious modification.

The records of Mary's Parliaments are also a measure of the activity of the English government in reigns other that those of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I. A comprehensive analysis of the evidence makes it impossible to accept Neale's conclusion that the Parliament of 1555 witnessed the first example of an identifiable opposition party, but it does suggest that the parliamentarians, including the Members of the Upper Chamber, were extremely active and at times vocal. Parliament at no time manifested itself as a Protestant body uniformly opposed to a Catholic government, and, for that reason, the government and representatives in attendance worked together to satisfy the demands of both parties. The legislative accomplishments of the Marian Parliaments included statutes touching religious, social, economic, defensive, judicial, and property issues. Moreover, the meetings were generally well-managed and the Queen and Council must have been satisfied with their legislative success. Perhaps more importantly, the Commons had cause for pleasure because the sessions were handled in such a way as to allow for the discussion and debate of private, local, and county bills. It

is very likely that the size of the Marian Council was largely responsible for this efficient management of Parliament. It must also be stressed that, although it is true that certain government proposals were defeated, the majority of bills were accepted by the Members without excessive opposition. Debate was an accepted part of parliamentary procedure and the compromises which were achieved in this reign are not evidence of administrative weakness but, rather, they are a signal of governmental responsiveness.

The Council was as vigilant in matters of Crown-county relations as it was when attempting to manage Parliament because its members recognized that local order and contentment was a prerequisite of a stable and peaceful nation. The stability of every Tudor regime depended upon the willingness of the property-owning gentry to cooperate and had the Marian government been unconcerned or out of touch with local needs the result would have been disastrous. However, the evidence supports the contention that Mary and her Councillors made every attempt to identify and address local concerns whenever possible. The Council became involved whether or not the issue was one which might have national implications, such as vagabondage, enclosure, or the state of a defensive 'piece', or was of strictly local significance, such as the incorporation of a borough or a local property dispute. This priority was at no time overshadowed by either the demands of the Catholic Reformation or king Philip and, therefore, the country cannot

be viewed as one alienated by a government actively pursuing policies it recognized to be obnoxious to the English. Furthermore, it must not be assumed that Mary's hold on the loyalty of her subjects was so precarious that they would rebel if other avenues of communication and opposition were available. Rebellion against a legitimate monarch was a proposition which threatened to undermine the fabric of the society which had provided great advantages, at least to the gentry and nobility who were the politically powerful elite. Most members of the gentry would have jeopardized a great deal if they had become involved in an unsuccessful revolt. It appears that, for the majority, the risks far outweighed the potential benefits of such action.

In the final analysis, Mary and her Council, Parliaments, and localities appear to have been capable of remarkable accommodation and unison. Her government weathered the crises which presented themselves between 1553 and 1558 and, more importantly, it prospered despite the difficulties. The administration flourished and improved, the Parliaments approved the principal official measures and managed to satisfy the local and private interests of its members in the process, and the counties and boroughs remained loyal to the Crown despite the occasional outbursts of antagonism toward national policy. Furthermore, Mary's legacy to her sister was to provide Elizabeth with a luxury which Mary herself had not been afforded: a peaceful succession enhanced by the existence of a

stable and secure administrative apparatus. For any monarch, but particularly a Queen whose reign has been dismissed as providing no lesson to posterity, these were remarkable accomplishments.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1) A. Fitsroy, History of Privy Council (London, 1928), 63.

2) W. R. D. Jones, The Mid-Tudor Crisis (London, 1973), passim; G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors (New York, 1974), ch. 8; and D. M. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies (Cambridge, 1965), 10 and ch. 6.

3) S. T. Bindoff, Tudor England (London, 1950), 182.

4) Elton, England Under the Tudors, 214.

5) CSP Sp. XIII. 35.

6) CSP Sp. XII. 214, 276. See also CSP Sp. XI. 116, 265-72, 308, 329.

7) CSP Sp. XI. 231, 251. Other examples of inconstancy and hypocrisy may be found throughout Renard's correspondence. See also F. A. Mumby, The Girlhood of Queen Elizabeth: A Narrative in Contemporary Letters (London, 1909), xix.

8) There is a large amount of primary source material available from contemporary chroniclers: The Chronicle of Queen Jane and of Two Years of Queen Mary, ed. J. G. Nichols (Camden Society, OS, XLVIII, 1849); A Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London, ed. J. G. Nichols (Camden Society, OS, LIII, 1851); A. de Guaras, The Accession of Queen Mary: the contemporary narrative of Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish merchant resident in London, ed. R. Garnett (London, 1892); H. Machyn, The Diary of Henry Machyn, ed. J. G. Nichols (Camden Society, OS, XLII, 1848); and C. Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England During the Reigns of the Tudors, ed. W. D. Hamilton (Camden Society, NS, XI, XX, 1875 and 1877).

9) J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559-1581 (London, 1953). Neale focused on the cooperation between Crown and Parliament during Elizabeth's reign and compared it to the reign of her predecessor. He viewed the relationship between Mary and her Parliaments to be one characterized by friction and lack of productivity. G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1557 (London, 1977), 298 and 341.

10) D. E. Hoak, The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI (Cambridge, 1976) and 'Two Revolutions in Tudor Government', in Revolution Reassessed, ed. C. Coleman and D. Starkey (Oxford, 1986), 87-116. J. Loach, Parliament and the Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor (Oxford, 1986); 'Conservatism and Consent in Parliament, 1547-59', in The Mid-Tudor Polity c1540-1560, ed. J. Loach and R. Tittler (London, 1980); and 'Parliament: A 'New Air'?', in Revolution Reassessed. M. A. R. Graves, The House of Lords in the Parliaments of Edward VI and Queen Mary I: An Institutional Study (Cambridge, 1981); 'Proctorial Representation in the House of Lords in the Reign of Edward VI: A Reassessment', Journal of British Studies, X

(1971); and 'The House of Lords and the Politics of Opposition, April-May 1554', in W. P. Morrell: A Tribute, ed. G. A. Wood and P. S. O'Connor (Dunedin, 1973). Elton's later work illustrates his change of opinion on this matter and might also be placed among that of the revisionists; although his assessment of the Queen and chief ministers has altered only partially, he now acknowledges the administrative improvements and accomplishments which occurred between 1553 and 1558. In his interpretation, the reign marks a continuation of the Tudor 'revolution', in that the reforms initiated in the 1530s were carried through into the 1540s and 1550s and, therefore, the collapse of government was not as pronounced as he previously contended. For this reassessment see G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation (London, 1977).

11) J. Loach and R. Tittler, 'Introduction', in Mid-Tudor Polity, 8.

CHAPTER ONE

1) These were defined as 'matters of state' and included: the Church, foreign affairs, marriage and succession, and the conduct of war. This was changing during the sixteenth century, yet in the 1550s it was still valid for Mary to decline to discuss such matters by claiming they fell within the jurisdiction of her personal prerogative. CSP Sp. XI. 364.

2) A. Weikel, 'Crown and Council: A Study of Mary Tudor and her Privy Council' (Yale Ph.D. thesis, 1966), 4.

3) G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (Cambridge, 1952).

4) A. F. Pollard, The History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth 1547-1603 (New York, 1919), 95. See also his 'The Privy Council', English Historical Review, XXXVIII (1923), 38. Elton's change of opinion is only on size not faction; nevertheless, he does acknowledge that certain of the Councillors worked hard at improving government.

5) CSP Sp. XI. 228.

6) Of the 43 Councillors appointed by October 1553, 21 had been members of at least one previous Council. The Duke of Norfolk and three of the bishops (Gardiner, Heath, and Tunstall) had been members of Henry VIII's Council in the 1530s and 1540s but had been removed by either Somerset or the Duke of Northumberland during Edward's reign. These men had supported Henry's religious reforms but had demurred at Edward's which resulted in their exclusion. Because they had resisted Somerset's and Northumberland's radical religious programmes, Mary considered them the most trustworthy of the experienced Councillors. One of the Edwardians might safely be included in this group also; Bishop Thirlby was at no time deprived of his seat on Council but he managed to avoid religiously sensitive issues because of his absence from

England as the English Ambassador to the Low Countries. In Mary's reign he demonstrated full support for the Catholic Reformation.

The earls of Derby, Arundel, Bedford, Shrewsbury, Sussex, and Pembroke, as well as Paget, Gage, Southwell, Riche, Cheyney, Petre, E. Peckham, Baker, and Paulet, were all members of Edward's Privy Council and, therefore, had supported the radical Protestant religious policy. Moreover, with the exception of Southwell, they had all signed Edward's 'devise' which meant that they offered at least nominal support to Northumberland's plan to exclude Mary from the throne.

7) This includes men such as Rochester, Walgrave, and Inglefield. They had proven their loyalty to Mary during her trials of the previous reigns. Rochester and Walgrave had even been imprisoned when they refused to prevent her from hearing mass. See J. Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, II (London, 1721), i. 435-9.

8) Particularly the APC and CSP Sp., but see also the CPR, 'The "Vita Mariae Angliae Reginae" of Robert Wingfied of Brantham', ed. D. MacCulloch, Camden Miscellany XXVIII (Camden Fourth Series, 29, 1984), and the chronicles mentioned above (Introduction, note 8, page 111).

9) APC IV. 293-309, passim, 'Vita', passim, and Hoak, 'Two Revolutions', passim.

10) The nature of the coup in July 1553 remains somewhat of a mystery because traditional scholarship has been unable to provide an adequate explanation for Mary's victory over Northumberland. However, research is continuing. See R. C. Braddock, 'The Duke of Northumberland's Army Reconsidered', Albion (1987); W. J. Tighe, 'The Gentlemen Pensioners, the Duke of Northumberland, and the Attempted Coup of July 1553', Albion (1987); R. Tittler and S. Battley, 'The Local Community and the Crown in 1553: the Accession of Mary Tudor Revisited', Bulletin of Historical Research LVII (1984); and Hoak, 'Two Revolutions'.

11) In this early period the acts are those of a 'war council'; they issue instructions regarding soldiers; their arms and food; the stability and loyalty of towns; and the capture and imprisonment of enemies. APC IV. 293-309, passim.

12) See above (Chapter One, note 6, page 113).

13) CSP Sp. XI. 154, 252. But it is also true that Mary grew to trust her Councillors and that much of the anxiety was Renard's not Mary's. For instance, when Mary was asked to secure letters of Paget and Masone she agreed but only because "she [was] of the opinion that if some of these letters could be seen they would put an end to [the Emperor's] misgivings." CSP Sp. XII. 289 and see also CSP Sp. XI. 290.

14) CSP Sp. XI. 151, 200-1. This is the opinion of G. A. Lemasters, 'The Privy Council in the Reign of Queen Mary I' (Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1971) and Weikel, 'Crown and Council'. The situation was complicated by the actions of the Imperial Ambassadors who encouraged Mary to put her confidence in them alone and to distrust all others. CSP Sp. XI. 252-3.

15) Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 60.

16) It must be understood that Mary was following medieval and early Henrician practice when this Council was appointed and when compared to pre-1530 Councils, the number of Marian Councillors is by no means excessive. Moreover, even Elton admits that large Councils enhance stability because they "satisfy individual ambition by permitting widespread participation" and they are "a means for holding the social order together throughout the realm." G. R. Elton, 'Tudor Government: The Points of Contact. II: The Council', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (hereafter cited as TRHS), Fifth Series, XXV (1975), 201.

17) See Appendix I. These men are also identified in Hoak, 'Two Revolutions', 114-5; Weikel, 'Crown and Council', passim; and Lemasters, 'Privy Council', passim. The largest number of Councillors at any one time was 44 and the smallest was 37.

18) The earl of Derby (7%); the earl of Bath (3%); Tunstall, Bishop of Durham (8%); Lord Riche (5%); Lord Wentworth (3%); Sir Richard Morgan (1%); Sir Edmund Peckham (9%); Sir John Mordaunt (9%); Sir Nicholas Hare (7%); Sir William Drury (6%); Sir John Shelton (5%); and Sir Clement Heigham (4%). In addition, Sir Thomas West (Lord de la Ware) attended only two meetings and Sir Anthony St. Leger was present only at a single one.

Members were eligible to attend Council from the day they were appointed by the monarch until they were either dismissed or died. The Councillors were not all appointed at the beginning of the reign and, therefore, some were not eligible to attend every meeting of Council.

19) The earl of Shrewsbury (15%), the earl of Pembroke (23%), Sir Thomas Cheyney (17%), Sir Richard Southwell (22%), Sir Robert Peckham (12%), Sir Edward Hastings (25%), Sir John Baker (25%), Sir Richard Freston (12%), Sir John Huddleston (22%), Sir Francis Inglefield (17%), Sir John Masone (16%), Robert Strelley (11%), Lord Clinton (24%), Dr. Nicholas Wotton (15%), and Sir Thomas Cornwallis (19%).

20) William Paulet, the Marquis of Winchester; Lord Paget; the earl of Arundel; the earl of Bath; the earl of Pembroke; Tunstall, Bishop of Durham; Riche; Wentworth; Sir Edward Hastings; Sir Henry Jerningham; Sir William Petre; Sir John Bourne; Cheyney; Cornwallis; Southwell; E. Peckham; R. Peckham; Sir Thomas Wharton; Masone; Shelton; and St. Leger.

21) The fourteen Councillors who died during the reign were Strelley (1553 or 54), de la Ware (1554), the Duke of Norfolk (1554), the earl of Bedford (1555), Gardiner (1555), Sir John Gage (1556), Morgan (1556 or 57), Sir Robert Rochester (1557), Freston (1557), the earl of Sussex (1557), Hare (1557), Drury (1557), Huddleston (1557), and Baker (1558).

Those who were appointed after the first month of the reign were Heath, Bishop of Worcester (and later Archbishop of York); Thirlby, Bishop of Norwich (and later Ely); Lord Howard; Dr. John Boxoll; Sir Anthony Brown, Viscount Montague; Lord

Clinton; Dr. Nicholas Wotton; and William Cordell. For the dates on which they were appointed see Appendix I.

22) APC IV. 323.

23) APC VI. 390.

24) Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 120-1.

25) For Pole's role as an advisor see CSP Ven. VI. i, ii, and iii, passim but see especially VI. i. 218 and ii. 1015, 1056, 1070, 1071. For references to his appointment to the Select Council see CSP Ven. VI. i. 178, 211 and ii. 1068. The attendance records can be found in APC IV-VI. passim. In fact, his name is mentioned only four times throughout. APC V. 83; VI. 7, 113, 327. For more complete information about the Cardinal see W. Schenk , Reginald Pole (London, 1950).

26) Council was a general term which often referred to the 'Great Council' which included most of the nobility. However, in Mary's reign it seems to have referred to the Privy Council, although there is evidence that a larger council still existed. For example, on 23 September 1556 Dr. Boxoll was appointed to the 'King and Queen's Council at large' but was not appointed to the Privy Council until 21 December 1556. APC V. 359. For a brief explanation of the various Councils of Henry VII and VIII see A. F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament (London, 1926), 284 and the various works of Elton.

27) CSP Sp. XI. 216. See also CSP Ven. VI. ii. 1004.

28) Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 122.

29) CSP Sp. XII. 168-9. CSP Ven. VI. i. 183, 211, 246. ii. 1004, 1068. CSP Dom. I. 73-4. Also see below (Chapter One, page 19).

30) Pollard, The History of England, 114. J. Froude, The History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, V. 267-8, 282, 301, 306, 366. Bindoff, Tudor England, 182. W. P. M. Kennedy, Studies in Tudor History (London, 1916), 124. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, (Oxford, 1952), 531-2 is somewhat more moderate.

31) CSP Sp. XI. 411.

32) CSP Sp. XII. 261.

33) See Lemasters, 'Privy Council', ch. 2 and Elton, 'Points of Contact: II', 205.

34) For example by February 1555 he wanted to be recalled and he claimed that he was the target of an assasination plot in order to invent a reasonable excuse for his request. CSP Sp. XIII. 140.

35) See below (Chapter Two, pages 54-56).

36) CSP Sp. XIII. 138.

37) CSP Sp. XIII. 139.

38) Competition for official positions was always fierce as they promised increased power and prestige to the recipient. Such competition became more virulent during the sixteenth century, especially given Henry VIII's propensity to reward skill instead of stature. His practice of ennobling men of low birth created severe jealousy and antagonism in the older established families. The earl of Pembroke in the West and Lord Wharton in the North were parvenues and their local rival

resented their success. See Graves, House of Lords, 109-124.

39) CSP Sp. XI. 1772.

40) CSP Sp. XI. 189. Renard identified the source of the hostility as jealousy. The terms 'politiques' and 'zealots' are Pollard's. See Pollard, History of England, xii, 114; Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 173; and N. P. Sil, 'Sir William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke (c1507-70): in Search of a Personality', Welsh History Review, XI (1982), 92.

41) He had been a protege of Cromwell but survived his mentor's fall and remained powerful until Henry VIII's death. He was appointed by Henry to the regency Council and quickly allied himself with Somerset. He managed to maintain his position after the Protector's first defeat but was dismissed by Northumberland in October 1551 and was not readmitted to the Council until Edward's death in 1553.

42) Weikel, 'Crown and Council'. 11.

43) Sil, 'Sir William Herbert', 100.

44) As early as 27 July 1553 (CSP Sp. XI. 120.) Gardiner was taking steps to retrieve property which had been alienated from his former bishopric. Renard indicated that "several persons consider this unwise, and too hasty, for the matter is a ticklish one, especially where Church property is concerned." Given that Paget was in possession of Church land himself, he was undoubtedly opposed to Gardiner as vehemently in July as he was later in the reign and would have resisted any precipitate action on this matter. See also CSP Sp. XI. 323.

45) Paget had at one time been a member of Gardiner's personal household but had abandoned this service to associate himself with Gardiner's rival Thomas Cromwell. This action, in addition to Paget's testimony against the Bishop during the reign of Edward VI, caused Gardiner to hold great animosity towards Paget.

46) CSP Sp. XI. 337-8, 342.

47) Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 177-8.

48) Weikel, 'Crown and Council,' 102-3, 252, 275. For a positive assessment of Heath by a contemporary see CSP Ven. VI. i. 309.

49) R. Naunton, Fragmentia Regalia (London, 1870).

50) Renard had been recalled by 1556 and no-one replaced him until late 1557 and so the records are more fragmentary. Nevertheless, the Venetian Ambassadors and the later Spaniards do appear to have been less negative regarding England and the Council in particular: the Councillors "have been in very close consultation, assembling every day at 6am, ... until the dinner hour, and after noon until 6pm .... This proceeding is unusual, and Lord Paget having been confined to the house by indisposition for upwards of a month, they urged him on no account to absent himself from the Council board, and although he apologized as being in a state to be unable to go abroad, I understand that what he could not do by word of mouth in their presence was done by him in writing and that he gave his opinion about what had been asked him at full length." CSP Ven. VI. ii. 808.

51) APC V. 297.

52) A perfect example was Sir Edward Walgrave who had no official experience in central government although he had been a loyal and valuable servant to Mary prior to 1553. He was appointed Receiver General of the duchy of Cornwall on 4 November 1553. CSP Dom. I. 55. CPR I. 206.

53) Sir Anthony St. Leger was reassigned as Lord Deputy of Ireland in 1553. The earl of Shrewsbury; Tunstall, Bishop of Durham; and Sir Thomas Cornwallis were all sent to the Scottish border at least once during the reign. Lord Wentworth was Governor of Calais throughout the reign and St. Leger was sent to assist in the French Pale after his replacement in Ireland.

54) Sir Edward Hastings; Heath, Archbishop of York; Sir John Huddleston; Sir Richard Morgan; and Sir William Drury were all members of one or more judicial commissions. Thirlby, Bishop of Norwich and later Ely; Sir John Masone; and Dr. Nicholas Wotton were sent on permanent or extended foreign missions and the earl of Arundel; the earl of Bedford; Lord Paget; Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester; and the earl of Pembroke were dispatched on business of a shorter duration. Sir Thomas Cheyney, Sir Henry Jerningham, the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Riche, Sir Thomas Cornwallis, Sir John Baker, and Sir William Drury were appointed to Commissions of the Peace.

55) The earl of Shrewsbury was President of the Northern Council and Sir Thomas Cheyney was Warden as well as the Treasurer of the Household.

56) Because of his advanced age and deteriorating health, Richard, Lord Riche acted mainly as a private individual during this reign, depite his estimable administrative experience and record. He was a great asset to the government functioning in this capacity, particulary in times of unrest. See APC IV. 393, 396; V. 173, 234, 237, 247; VI. 93, 149, 150, 237, 245. For further examples see CSP Sp. XI-XIII. passim; CSP Dom. I. passim; and APC IV-VI. passim.

57) Elton, 'Points of Contact: II', 25 and Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 123.

58) See Appendix I.

59) He was appointed Warden of the Middle March on 30 July 1555 (CPR III. 27.) and Captain of Berwick and Warden of the East March on 16 December 1555 (CPR III. 182-3.) He was reappointed as Captain of Berwick on 16 August 1556 (CPR III. 547.) and his offices within the Marches were reaffirmed on 2 August 1557 (CPR IV. 194.) He was also appointed to various commissions during the reign (CPR I. 18, 22, 25, 26; II. 110; III. 54, 372.) and was awarded several grants (CPR IV. 203-4.). Lemasters identifies Lord Wharton as the Marian Privy Councillor but this is clearly incorrect as Thomas Wharton had been in close enough proximity to Mary to offer personal support during July 1553. At this date, Lord Wharton had been resident on the Northern border. Sir Thomas succeeded his father as the second Baron Wharton but not until 1568.

60) For Sir Robert Southwell's commissions and grants see CPR I. 121; II. 68, 92, 302, 311; III. 24, 43-4, 181, 191,

535-7; IV. 220-1.

61) Even Elton seems to have become convinced that such was the case. Elton, 'Points of Contact: II', 206.

62) CSP Sp. XII. 168-9. CSP Ven. VI. i. 178, 183, 211; ii. 1052, 1068. Pollard, History of England, 143. Also, see above (Chapter One, note 29, page 117).

63) The CSP Sp. identifies Gardiner, Arundel, Thirlby, Rochester, Paget, and Petre as composing the Select Council (CSP Sp. XII. 169.) but the CSP Ven. also includes Pembroke, Paulet, and Pole (CSP Ven. VI. i. 183.) With the exception of Rochester and Pole all these men had previous administrative experience. Rochester had gained experience as Comptroller of Mary's household and was her most favoured Councillor and it is uncertain exactly what Pole's relationship to the Queen and Council entailed.

64) Pollard, History of England, 95-6. Froude, History of England, 220. Bindoff, Tudor England, 167 and 181. These scholars contend that because the experienced Councillors were 'traitors' to Mary, she relied primarily on her 'favourites'.

65) CSP Sp. XI. 189.

66) Full biographies of the majority of Councillors can be obtained from the DNB. For biographical information on Paulet, Gardiner, Paget, and Masone see below.

67) The Council addressed the need for a division of labour as early as 23 February 1554 when a minute of Council appointed committees for conducting public business regarding debt, Calais, the Borders, Ireland, and the Navy. CSP Dom. I. 61. The proposal to reduce Council entirely was first mentioned by Renard on 22 March 1554. CSP Sp. XII. 168-9.

68) CSP Sp. XII. 169.

69) CSP Sp. XIII. 101. See also CSP Sp. XII. 220-1.

70) CSP Sp. XII. 169. Only the Councillors of State were to be given chambers at court and it was hoped that this restriction would discourage that other Councillors from remaining at Court.

71) Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 139-40.

72) The Council of State which was formed at this time appears to have been operating as late as 27 October 1558. CSP Dom. I. 108.

73) CSP Ven. VI. ii. 1068.

74) APC V. 296.

75) CSP Ven. VI. ii. 1004. If Lemasters thesis is considered to be correct, and the evidence seems to suggest that it is, it appears that most of the remainder of Council was active upon various types of administrative commissions and that it was these bodies which implemented Council policy throughout the realm. Lemasters, 'Privy Council', passim.

76) A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (London, 1964), 195. Much of the information contained in this and following paragraphs is derived from the DNB.

77) Graves, House of Lords, 27, 31-2, and 91. See also APC II. 131-2, 157-8, 208-10; III. 213-14.

78) APC IV. 329.

79) CSP Sp. XI. 323, 331; XII. 120, 151, 221; XIII. 46.

80) Graves, House of Lords, 190.

81) There is no record in the APC of his being readmitted to Edward's or Jane's Privy Council but his debt (the reason he was ostensibly disqualified) was paid on 15 January 1553 (APC IV. 203.) and in the CSP Sp. of 19 July 1553 he is identified as being a member of Jane's Council but it is implied that he had only just been summoned. (CSP Sp. XI. 95.) The only modern biography of Paget is S. R. Gammon, Statesman and schemer: William, first Lord Paget, Tudor minister (Newton Abbot, 1973).

82) CSP Sp. XII. 27. For further evidence of the regard in which Philip and his father held Paget see CSP Sp. XII. 295; XIII. 74, 87-92.

83) APC VI. 400, 409, 412, 422. CSP Ven. VI. ii. 808.

84) For a detailed account of this incorporation see W. C. Richardson, History of the Court of Augmentations 1534-1554 (Baton Rouge, 1961) and C. Coleman, 'Artifice or Accident? The Reorganization of the Exchequer of Receipt, c1554-1572', in Revolution Reassessed. See also F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance, 1485-1558 (Urbana, 1921).

85) DNB XV. 538.

86) CSP Sp XII. 52; XIII. 437-8.

87) CSP Sp. XII. 99, 225.

88) CSP For. 49. The debt was also variously calculated at 500,0001. (CSP Sp. XI. 193.), 64,000 caroline florens (APC IV. 345.), and 122,560 florens (APC IV. 376.).

89) CSP Dom. I. 55. CSP Sp. XI. 196. APC IV. 422-4.

90) APC IV. 334, 344, 376. CSP Sp. The Merchant Adventurers were also repaid on 14 December 1553. See APC IV. 378.

91) Charles V declared on 4 February 1554 that "it seems to us that she must have credit at Antwerp on the strength of having paid the debts of her late brother King Edward, and that if she sent someone thither to borrow a goodly sum she would find bankers ready to listen." CSP Sp. XII. 101

92) APC V. 149, 190, 193, 244, 269, 285-6; VI. 23, 35-6, 94. One of these (8 May 1556, APC V. 269.) was repaid early. CSP For. 165-6, 193, 195, 216. CSP Dom. I. 101.

93) CSP For. 216.

94) CSP For. 181.

95) For references to Charles' and Philip's difficulties see CSP Sp. XIII. 207, 223, 242, 243, 248 and for Henri II of France's shortages see CSP Sp. XIII. 153, 280 and CSP For. 41, 47.

96) CSP Sp. XIII. 247-8. CSP For. 319, 363.

97) CSP For. 49-50. CSP Sp. XI. 192, 214-5. APC IV. 406-7, 410; V. 87.

98) CSP For. 49-50.

99) APC IV. 410; V. 87.

100) CSP Dom. I. 114. APC VI. 12, 14.

101) CSP Sp. XIII. 317.

102) CSP For. 26.

103) CSP For. 219. See also CSP For. 3, 16, 402. APC IV. 387.

104) This was particularly true of the latter half of 1553 and October to November 1558. See CPR I and IV. passim. CSP Dom. I. 106. APC V. 44.

105) APC IV 365-6; V. 49, 64, 220-1, 361.

106) APC IV-VI, passim. Froude, History of England, 229; Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 38; D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor: Politics, government, and religion in England 1553-1558 (London, 1979), ch.6; and Elton, Reform and Reformation, 390.

107) APC V. 44. See also APC VI. 136-7.

108) See above (Chapter One, note 84, page 122).

109) APC V. 4, 43, 192, 210, 267, 323; VI. 70, 173-4, 387, 413, 416. CSP Dom. I. 74.

110) APC V. 70.

111) APC V. 115.

112) APC V. 155, 157, 159, 165.

113) APC IV.383; V. 18, 19-20, 84-5, 88, 90, 110, 122, 169-70. CSP For. 138. For punishments see APC V. 27, 33, 50, 52, 64, 141.

114) CSP For. 32.

115) APC V. 27-8.

116) CSP For. 121, 170-1.

117) CSP For. 67, 79, 82, 230, 231, 284, 293, 294-5. There were also subsequent plots see CSP For. 306.

118) For a brief account of Stafford's temporary victory at Scarborough see below (Chapter Three, note 24, page 135). For a more comprehensive analysis see Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, chs, 8 and 9. There is also an unpublished thesis on this issue: S. C. Newton, 'Thomas Stafford's attack on Scarborough Castle, 1557' as cited in Loades, Mary Tudor, 495.

119) CPR I. 27-9.

120) Gardiner, Paulet, Bedford, Arundel, Derby, and R. Peckham.

121Morgan sat on the commissions sent to the counties of Bedford, Buckingham, Cambridge, Glocester, Hereford, Huntingdon, Norfolk, Shropshire, Suffolk, and Worcester.

122) Arundel and R. Peckham were the two subsequently appointed and Gardiner was the Lord Chancellor, the earl of Bedford was the Lord Privy Seal, and Paulet was the Lord Treasurer of the Exchequer.

123) APC V. 40, 68, 100-1, 136-7, 185-6, 211, 216, 231, 277; VI. 6, 209, 254.

124) Commissions of gaol delivery were created between February and June of 1554 (CPR. I. 30-5) and between October 1554 and June 1555 (CPR II. 104-6) APC V. 103. The minutes regarding inventories of gaols can be found in APC V. 59, 91, 144.

125) APC IV. 393; V. 71, 85, 106, 120, 134, 138, 141, 142-3, 243, 245, 287, 291, 294, 338; VI. 50, 78, 129-30, 194, 251, 334.

126) APC IV-VI. passim.
127) DNB XXI. 975.
128) "The Quene hath given this daye a great almose, and given that away that should have paid us our wages; she hath undone us and hath undone this realm to, for she loveth another realm better than this [sic]." APC V. 265 and Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 38. Pollard, History of England, 160; Elton, Reform and Reformation, 381 and 395; Kennedy, Studies, 137.
129) J. Loach, Parliament and Crown, 234. Even a quick examination of the marriage treaty proves this claim because it makes specific reference to the Anglo-Spanish alliance of 1542. CSP Sp. XII. 4.
130) APC II. 291-2; III. 333. CSP For. 1547-50 137.
131) CSP Sp. XI. 388-9. XII. 2-3.
132) CSP Sp. XI. 290.
133) During the negotiations the Imperial negotiators declared that "our duty impels us once more to emphasise that the English are in the right, and the French are doing them great wrong.... We do not see how your Majesty could make peace with the French without incurring shame and reproach.... [sic]" CSP Sp. XIII. 439. For a full account of the negotiations between the English and the French and the arguments put forward in support of the English claim to Calais, see CSP Sp. XIII. 420-34.
134) CSP Sp. XIII. 439.
135) CSP Sp. XI. 203. APC. V. 115-6.
136) CSP Sp. XI. 315.
137) APC VI. 33-5, 378-9. CSP Sp. XI. 347-8.
138) APC VI. 81, 340-2, 377; V. 252-7; VI. 73-4 CSP Sp. XIII. 405-6. On 30 August 1558 the Council ordered that additional information regarding the dispute be compiled to help in the formulation of an agreement. APC VI. 387.
139) CSP Sp. XIII. 405-6.
140) APC VI. 145, 416.
141) APC IV-VI. passim.
142) APC IV. 307. See also CSP Dom. I. 62.
143) APC V. 34. See also APC VI. 218-9.
144) CSP For. 9-10, 51-2, 303. CSP Dom. 64-5. CSP Sp. XIII. 100. APC IV. 385-6; V. 98.
145) APC IV. 373; V. 42, 54, 55-6, 58, 61, 81, 102-3, 116, 198, 214, 228, 231, 272-3.
146) CSP Sp. XIII. 351. See also APC V. 305, 315, 322.
147) CSP For. 300.
148) CSP Dom. I. 65.
149) For a comprehensive study of the early Muscovy trade see T. S. Willan, The Muscovy Merchants of 1555 (Manchester, 1953) and The Early History of the Russia Company (Manchester, 1956). See also D. B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan, England's Sea Empire, 1550-1642 (London, 1983).
150) CSP Sp. XIII. 414.
151) Elton, England Under the Tudors, 215-20 and Reform and Reformation, 382-9. Pollard devotes two of the four chapters (Chapters 7 and 8) on Mary to religion in History of

England. Froude, History of England, V. 227, 230, chs. 22 and 23.

152) APC IV. 344, 354-5, 360, 361, 371, 376; V. 104, 112, 201.

153) APC V. 17. Also see above (Chapter One, page 34).

154) APC IV. 398.

155) APC V. 30, 94-101; VI. 216, 276. See also R. Hutton, 'The local impact of the Tudor Reformations', in The English Reformation Revised, ed. C. Haigh (Cambridge, 1987), 118 and G. Alexander, 'Bonner and the Marian persecutions', in The English Reformation Revised, 161 and 175.

156) CSP Sp. XIII. 22-3, 46.

157) The 'politiques' of Council continually advised caution when the persecution of heretics was the topic of discussion. In fact, the Queen and government proceeded with caution when advancing religious change and despite the pressure exerted upon them by certain Spanish officials never allowed the rigorous Jesuits into England to initiate an inquisition against heretics. CSP Sp. XIII. 370. Still executions were ordered and monitored by the Council. APC V. 104, 135, 141, 147, 158, 224; VI. 135, 361.

158) Renard's advice ran thus: "Haste in religious matters ought to be avoided. Cruel punishments are not the best way; moderation and kindness are required. The Church has always proceeded thus in order to lead her people out of error. Doctrine and preaching will suffice except in the most scandalous case, without having recourse to chastisement so severe that it may alienate the people's hearts. Measures of reform are necessary in order that good examples may be set by Churchmen." CSP Sp. XII. 152. See also CSP Sp. XI. 122, 161; XIII. 139.

159) For example, on 27 June 1555 men from Essex "came of themselves" to help with the execution of heretics. APC V. 153.

CHAPTER TWO

1) Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament (London, 1926), 286. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, I, Introduction.

2) Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, 160, 296, and ch. 16. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, I, 22 and Elizabethan House of Commons (London, 1949), 15.

3) Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, I, Introduction. See also W. Notestein, 'The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons', Proceedings of the British Academy XI (1926, reprint 1959).

4) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 242-3.

5) Neale is the leading proponent of this theory; in Elizabeth I and her Parliaments he uses the term 'opposition group' (I, 26) and in Elizabeth I (London, 1952), he refers to a 'party' and 'the opposition'. See also C. Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (London, 1955), 107-8.

Pollard appears to have assessed the situation similarly but his description of the opposition is somewhat less compelling than that of Neale. Pollard, History of England, 144. See also J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors 1485-1558 (Oxford, 1966), 532.

6) "[A] novelty of 1555, if novelty it was ... lay in the planning of opposition tactics." Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, I, 24; see also 23 and 26 and Elizabeth I, 56. Read, Cecil and Elizabeth, 107-8.

7) Pollard, History of England, 150. Elton, Reform and Reformation, 395. Froude, History of England, 266, 290, 317, 400. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, I, 22.

8) Loach, Parliament and Crown and Graves, House of Lords.

9) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 231.

10) For an analysis of the opposition see below (Chapter Two, page 47) and see Loach, Parliament and Crown, 147-9 regarding its cohesiveness.

11) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 207 and Graves, House of Lords, 2.

12) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 230.

13) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 223.

14) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 149 and 224.

15) Henry VIII called 9 Parliaments which sat for 26 sessions in 38 years and Edward VI and his advisors called 2 Parliaments which sat for 5 sessions in 6 years.

16) Graves, House of Lords, 177.

17) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 15 and Graves, House of Lords, 146.

18) This is true particularly of the House of Commons, although Graves points out that the Upper Chamber was no cypher even on this matter. Graves, House of Lords, 177.

19) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 199-200. See also Graves, House of Lords, 159.

20) F. A. Youngs, The Proclamations of the Tudor Queens (Cambridge, 1976), 4.

21) Youngs, Proclamations, 54.

22) Youngs, Proclamations, 54.

23) Youngs, Proclamations, 250.

24) Youngs, Proclamations, passim. The longest period for which a proclamation was in force without being introduced as a bill into Parliament was six years. Youngs, Proclamations, 54.

25) For a detailed account of the debate over each bill see Loach, Parliament and Crown, passim. See also Loach, Parliament and Crown, 124.

26) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 207. Opposition party is a term which Loach uses but she is refuting the existence of such a phenomenon. Graves, House of Lords, 141-2, 143, 199.

27) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 201.

28) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 231.

29) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c8. See also CSP Sp. XIII. 23, 46.

30) Graves, House of Lords, 120-3, 132-40, 177, and chs. 6 and 7, passim.

31) Graves, House of Lords, 42-54.

32) Graves, House of Lords, ch. 3.

33) Graves, House of Lords, ch. 6.

34) Pollard, Evolution of Parliament, 292-3.

35) Graves, House of Lords, 143-6 and 150-2.

36) Graves, House of Lords, 170-2.

37) Commons Journal I. 47.

38) Commons Journal I. 51.

39) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 104 and 204; Graves, House of Lords, 178, 180, 183, 194.

40) Graves, House of Lords, 61, 88-9, 181, 182.

41) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 204, 207.

42) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c8. See above (Chapter Two, page 51 and note 29, page 129).

43) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 117-21 and Graves, House of Lords, 195-8.

44) Graves, House of Lords, 190-5, 197; Loach, Parliament and Crown, ch. 5; and see below (Chapter Two, pages 54-56).

45) CSP Sp. XII. 251.

46) CSP Sp. XII. 240.

47) CSP Sp. XII. 220, 221.

48) CSP Sp. XII. 151, 170, 216, 221.

49) Paget declared that it was Riche who had originally raised the concern regarding property (CSP Sp. XII. 251) but there were many Peers who opposed this measure as a result of their anxiety to protect their possessions. See also CSP Sp. XII. 220, 230, 238.

50) Renard declared that "he [Paget] thus acted without regard for his duty as the Queen's subject, servant, and councillor.... He gave no thought to the Queen's reputation, the quiet of her realm, or His Higness' coming, but allowed himself to be led by his hatred of the Chancellor and spite at not having been consulted about the measure...." CSP Sp. XII. 238. Weikel, 'Crown and Council', 246. The Councillors' actions are also described as "gross negligence and dereliction of duty" by Graves, House of Lords, 186.

51) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 205.

52) Commons Journal and Lords Journal. The second session of the 1558 Parliament is not included because it was interrupted by Mary's death before any business was transacted.

53) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 62 and Graves, House of Lords, 144, 170-2, 177, 200.

54) Graves, House of Lords, 199. It is interesting to note that it was immediately following Gardiner's death in November 1555 that both the Houses of Parliament exhibited the most unruly conduct of the reign. See also CSP Ven. VI. 256; Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 181 and 184; and Loach, Parliament and Crown, 51 and 53. On Gardiner's religious zeal see above (Chapter One, page 24 and note 79, page 122) and CSP Sp. XII. 151, 221.

55) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 205.

56) Many of the legal assistants and clerks were eligible to sit in the Commons but attended the Lords in their official capacity. The secretaries (Bourne, Petre, and Boxoll) were also occasionally summoned before the Lords but they usually attended the meetings of Commons. Commons Journal and Graves, House of Lords, 128.

57) 1 Mary 2: c2; 1 Mary 3: c2; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c6; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c8; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c10.

58) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 15 and Graves, House of Lords, 146.

59) G. R. Elton, 'Tudor Government: Points of Contact. I: Parliament', TRHS, Fifth Series, XXIV (1974), 191 and 200; Loach, Parliament and Crown, 36-9; and Graves, House of Lords. 3, 142, 146.

60) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 39 and Elton, 'Points of Contact. I', 191.

61) Graves, House of Lords, 3, 142, 146 and Loach, Parliament and Crown, 73.

62) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 1, 235; Statutes of the Realm, A. Luders, et al, ed. (London: 1810-28), passim; and Graves, House of Lords, 142 and 174.

63) 1 Mary 2: c9. See also the statute on seasands at Glamorgan (1 Mary 3: c11) and that touching the raising of cows rather than sheep (2&3 Philip and Mary: c3).

64) Graves, House of Lords, 22-6.

65) CSP Dom. I. 65-74 passim. CSP For. 60, 167, 168, 169, 181, 200, 229, 238, 245, 255. CSP Sp. XII. 94-6, 106-7, 267. XIII. 207, 247, 251, 259, 279.

66) Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 72. Nevertheless, it seems that these were primarily religious, rather than political appointments and the extent and quality of their learning was impressive. Their performance in the first Elizabethan Parliament caused one Member to complain that they "rule as sole monarch in the midst of ignorant and weak men, and easily overreach our little party, either by their numbers, or their reputation for learning." The Zurich Letters, ed. H. Robinson (London, 1842), 10. See also Loach, Parliament and Crown, 223 and Graves, House of Lords, 52-3.

67) CSP Sp. XIII. 67. Philip suggested that the same should be done in November 1555 but there is no record of official letters being sent. CSP Sp. XIII. 239. CSP Dom. I. 96.

68) See below (Chapter Three, note 92, page 140).

69) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 32.

70) CSP Dom. I. 54. Loach, Parliament and Crown, 74.

71) See above (Chapter Two, page 56).

72) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 32-3. CSP Sp. XI. 270; XII. 158. Graves, House of Lords, 154 and 190.

73) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 138-43. It is clear that the government's motivation when pursuing this bill was a desire to acquire, if only temporarily, the vast holdings of Charles Brandon's Protestant widow, the Dowager Duchess of Suffolk, who was in voluntary exile on the Continent for a

great part of the reign. To prepare for the anticipated appropriation the Privy Council first inventoried her land (APC V. 180) and then examined the nature of her leases (APC V. 283).

74) Loach, Parliament and Crown, 61. For a discussion of the House of Origin and its importance in parliamentary procedure in general see Graves, House of Lords, passim.

75) Graves, House of Lords, 129.

76) Graves, House of Lords, 190-202 and Loach, Parliament and Crown, 61.

77) Graves, House of Lords, 200-2.

78) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c10; 2&3 Philip and Mary: c25; 4&5 Philip and Mary: c16.

79) The treaty itself was given statutory authority when it was engrossed as part of 1 Mary 3: c2.

80) CSP Sp. XII. 355-6.

81) P. F. Tytler, England Under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary (London, 1839). CSP Ven. VI. i. 253, 299-300.

82) See above (Chapter Two, pages 55-56). 1&2 Philip and Mary: c6.

83) This occurred during debate over the so-called 'exiles' bill. See above (Chapter Two, note 73, page 132).

84) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c1; 1 Mary 2: c6; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c11; 1 Mary 1: c1; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c10; 2&3 Philip and Mary: c1; 4&5 Philip and Mary: c1, c2, c6; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c13; 2&3 Philip and Mary: c10.

85) 1 Mary 2: c32; 1 Mary 3: c5 and c6.

86) 1 Mary 3: c7.

87) 1 Mary 3: c8.

88) For a complete listing of the statutes passed during Mary's reign see Statutes of the Realm.

89) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c14.

90) 1 Mary 2: c18; 1&2 Philip and Mary: c5.

91) 4&5 Philip and Mary: c1.

CHAPTER THREE

1) Any general history of the Tudor dynasty will provide information on the rebellions which occurred between 1485 and 1603; the major examples were those launched in favour of Lambert Simnel (1486-7) and Perkin Warbeck (1491-7), the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536), Kett's Rebellion (1549), Wyatt's Rebellion (1554), and the Northern Rebellion (1569-70).

2) Elton, 'Points of Contact: I', 184.

3) See above (Introduction, note 2, page 111).

4) See Introduction and also see below (Chapter Three, note 34, page 136).

5) CSP Sp. XIII. 49. Renard saw any local disturbance as action against governmental policy. CSP Sp. XI-XIII. passim.

6) CSP Sp. XIII. 49.

7) CSP Sp. XIII. 81, 106, 316-7.

8) CSP Sp. XII. 52. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies,

94-5.

9) It was originally planned that four counties would rise simultaneously under the personal direction of one or more of the conspirators. Sir James Croftes was to gather support in Herefordshire, Sir Thomas Wyatt was to organize the Kentish revolt, Sir Peter Carew and Edward Courtenay, the earl of Devon, were to lead the discontented in Devon, and the Duke of Suffolk was to rally troops in Leceistershire. Only Wyatt was successful. For a full account of this rebellion see Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies. Wyatt and his supporters took action as early as 20 or 21 January 1554. CSP Sp. XII. 51. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 53.

10) The Imperial Ambassadors were very negative about Mary's chances for victory and declared that she was "likely to succumb" on 27 January 1554. CSP Sp. XII. 52. See also the Ambassadors' reports of 27 January (CSP Sp. XI. 51-3.), 29 January (CSP Sp. XII. 53-7.), 31 January (CSP Sp. XII. 63-6.), 3 February (CSP Sp. XII. 69-70.) and Renard's reports of 5 February (CSP Sp. XII. 77-82.) and 8 February (CSP Sp. XII. 85-8.)

11) It is possible that Wyatt was giving his supporters an opportunity to rest and gather food. However, it seems most likely that the rebels had expected unqualified support from the Londoners and were shocked, therefore, to find the gates locked and securely defended.

12) On 2 February 1554 Mary appeared publicly and gave an eloquent speech which arroused the loyalty and support of the assembled Londoners. CSP Sp. XII. 79. ; J Proctor, The historie of Wyatts rebellion (London, January 1555), 77; The Diary of Henry Machyn, 53; Grey Friars Chronicle, 86; Guaras, The Accession of Queen Mary, 111 and 114.

13) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 63-71 and 74-6.

14) CSP Sp. XII. 54. See also XII. 64, 77.

15) CSP Sp. XII. 52.

16) The Council only met once between 24 January and 12 February 1554; this meeting occurred on 1 February. APC IV. 394. The Council's actions included the summoning of Sir Peter Carew to London (APC IV. 382, 385 and CSP Sp. XII. 31); issuing a proclamation detailing the marriage article in an attempt to diffuse anxiety (CSP Sp. XII. 55); ordering the Lord Justices of certain counties to apprehend known rebels (CSP Dom. I. 56); and raising troops and gathering supplies with which to outfit them (CSP Sp. XII. 52). A complete chronology of the preparations can be found in the CSP Dom. I. 56-9. and see Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 36-48.

17) CSP Sp. XII. 151, 231. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 24.

18) CSP Dom. I. 56, 58. CSP Sp. XII. 31, 38, 52, 55. APC IV. 382, 385. A large number of these troops subsequently defected to Wyatt and it is Loades' contention that their allegiance had already been secured by the rebels before they left London. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 60.

19) These included Gardiner and some of her former

household advisers. CSP Sp. XII. 64, 86. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 66.

20) 26 January 1554 (CSP Dom. I. 57) and 31 January 1554 (Youngs, Proclamations, 62).

21) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 63.

22) CSP Sp. XIII. 291. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 123-4. For a survey of the French king's involvement in plots against the English government see Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, ch. 7. See also CSP For. 222, 273, 275, 276.

23) Wotton seems to have forwarded a despatch to the Council before 14 April 1557 (CSP For. 293, 294, 295) but Loades makes no mention of it and he identifies Wotton's communication of 27 April 1557 (CSP For. 298-9) as being the first including information on the proposed invasion. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 173.

24) CSP Dom. I. 76, 86, 88. CSP For. 285, 275, 276.

25) APC VI. 86, 181.

26) Ipswich (APC V. 141-2); Wadhurst, Sussex (APC V. 155, 157); Cornwall (APC V. 171); Westminster (APC V, 319); see also APC VI. 129-30, 265.

27) Exception being Loades who analyzes a number of these minor plots in Two Tudor Conspiracies, ch. 6. He also provides a full explanation of Dudley's conspiracy and its consequences and aftermath in Two Tudor Conspiracies, ch. 8 and 9. See also Loach, Parliament and Crown, 212-230, passim.

28) CSP For. 222. The refusal was temporary but the rebels were in immediate need of financing.

29) It was later closed as a result of English pressure on the French king. CSP For. 244.

30) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, ch. 8 and 9 passim.

31) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 196.

32) Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 197.

33) Mary and her government made no concessions to the rebels who were less destructive than those which opposed other regimes.

34) Pollard, History of England, 122, 135, 160, 172 and ch. 9. Elton, England Under the Tudors, 214 and Reform and Reformation, 381 and 395. See also Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 561 which is less negative.

35) Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 36. The government attempted to convince the population that Wyatt's real motive was religious discontent and issued a proclamation to this effect. CSP Sp. XII. 55. The French hoped that Stafford's invasion would sufficiently harass the English forces to ensure that they remained out of the war or even to cause a break in the alliance by replacing the Queen. CSP Sp. XIII. 372.

36) CSP Sp. XII. 88, 115. Guaras, Accession of Queen Mary, 111 and 113. Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 11-12. Grey Friars Chronicle, 80. The Diary of Henry Machyn, 37.

37) D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors (Oxford, 1986), 173, 233.

38) APC VI. 145, 416.

39) MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, 80, 81. This is

surprising given that Ipswich was always a religious and secular worry to the goverment. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, 175.

40) G. Williams, 'Wales and the Reign of Queen Mary I', Welsh History Review, X (1981), 338. Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 40, 63, 69, 75-6.

41) See above (Chapter Three, page 72 and note 9, page 133-134).

42) CSP Dom. I. 60. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 15-6, 18, 21, 42, 50, 57, 92.

43) G. Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 339.

44) CSP Sp. XI. 228.

45) CSP Sp. XI. 131, 157-9. The Imperial Ambassadors were advising caution and moderation at this time. CSP Sp. XI. 110, 117-9, 130, 194.

46) She believed that reunification with Rome was not only desirable but possible. However, historians have disagreed because they have viewed the events in retrospect. Neale described Mary's attempts as 'crass folly' in Queen Elizabeth, 39. See also Kennedy, Studies, 123. In turn, revisionists have questioned this assessment. Loach, Parliament and Crown, 10; Hutton, 'Local impact', 137-8.

47) A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (London, 1964). C. Cross, Church and People, 1450-1660 (London, 1976). Elton, Reform and Reformation.

48) Haigh, The English Reformation Revised, 179. Palliser, 'Popular reactions', 113.

49) Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 346, 348. Palliser, 'Popular reactions', 113.

50) Haigh, The English Reformation Revised, Introduction and ch. 1. In addition, the revisionists see the process of Reformation as being much slower and the reforming activites of the Marian episcopate as much more positive and effective. Haigh, The English Reformation Revised, 31, 209; Elton, Reform and Reformation, 385; and R. H. Pogson, 'Revival and reform in Mary Tudor's Church: a question of money', in The English Reformation Revised, 140.

51) H. Clifford, Life of Jane Dormer, Duchess of Feria (London, 1887), 38-9. Even Renard and his colleagues occasionally acknowledged that England was not dominated by heretics. CSP Sp. XI. 198.

52) Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 352. D. M. Palliser, 'Popular reactions to the Reformation during the years of uncertainty, 1530-70', in The English Reformation Revised, 109. Haigh, The English Reformation Revised, 210.

53) A proclamation was issued in May 1555 to spur the diligence of local officials. P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, II (London, 1969), 35. G. Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 352. Also see Alexander, 'Bonner', 167.

54) APC. V. 104, 141.

55) On 27 June 1555 the Council required Lord Riche "on the King and Quenes Highnes' behalf to rendre thankes unto Edward Bery, gentleman and dyverse other[s] ... for comyng so

honestly and of themselfes ... and assisting the shrief at the said execucions [sic]." APC V. 153.

56) CSP Sp. XI. 246; XII. 144, 150; XIII. 4, 49. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 20.

57) As cited in Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, 37.

58) CSP Sp. XII. 96; XIII. 5, 26, 43, 52. The Spanish officials who accompanied Philip to England in 1554 indicated that their reception had been friendly. CSP Sp. XIII. 2, 5-6.

59) J. Foxe, Acts and Monuments, (London, 1877).

60) Pollard, Evolution of Parliament, 216.

61) P. Pierson, Philip II of Spain (London, 1975), 176-86 and G. Parker, Philip II (London, 1979), 118, 131, 132, 152-3.

62) A warnyng for Englande conteynyng the horrible practises of the Kyng of Spayne in the Kyngedom of Naples ... (Unknown, 1555). M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire (Cambridge, 1988) and K. Brandi, Charles V (London, 1939).

63) Pierson, Philip II, 26; Parker, Philip II, 20-1.

64) CSP Sp. XI. 425..

65) CSP Sp. XIII. 2, 5, 67, 95. Philip was not pleased with this arrangement because he, following contemporary European custom, had brought his own Spanish household to England. Nevertheless, rather than alienate the English and exasperate the tensions he decided to combine the two bodies. He and his Spanish servants were still try to rectify the confusion and repetition this solution created in January 1558 (CSP Sp. XIII. 356, 361.)

66) CSP Sp. XIII. 95.

67) CSP Sp. XIII. 23, 39, 93, 125.

68) Elton, England Under the Tudors, 221. Neale, Elizabeth I, 51. Bindoff, Tudor England, 171.

69) See above (Chapter One, page 35).

70) See above (Chapter One, page 36-7).

71) Pollard, History of England, 159 and 174.

72) The Imperial ambassadors declared that "she would submit herself to your majesty's decision as to her marriage and in all other matters" when they wrote to Charles V on 2 August 1553. CSP Sp. XI. 132. See also CSP Sp. XI. 252, 328-9.

73) CSP Sp. XI. 161 and 247. See also CSP Sp. XI. 117. There are other instances when the Emperor desired his ambassadors in England to prevent others (such as his own brother) to propose things to Mary and her Council that he himself intends to suggest. CSP Sp. XI. 163-4, 233.

74) CSP Sp. XII. 52.

75) Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 357. Graves, House of Lords, 193. Palliser, 'Popular Reactions', 107.

76) APC IV. 381.

77) APC V. 207.

78) APC V. 293.

79) CPR I. 32.

80) CPR I. 35-7; II. 107-11. For further examples of Councillors appearing on various types of commissions see CPR

I-IV. passim.

81) APC V. 161. This was a repetition of a previous order but there is no surviving record of the antecedent.

82) Sil, 'Sir William Herbert', 102.

83) Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', 334.

84) DNB IX. 671-4. He had previously held the office from 8 April 1550 until 1553 under Edward VI but had not been immediately reappointed by Mary because of his extensive complicity in Northumberland's attempted coup. However, he was reassigned in 1555 and held the position until 1558 when he was discharged in order that he could go to France and command the defences around Calais. On Pembroke's ability to communicate in the Welsh language see Sil, 'Sir William Herbert', 96.

85) CPR. I. 103-5; III. 3, 76-81, 174, 360.

86) Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII IX. 79.

87) CSP Ireland I. 27.

88) DNB XVII. 656.

89) APC VI. 70, 173-4.

90) DNB XIX. 311-3.

91) Shrewsbury attended 15% of the Council meetings for which he was eligible. Elton has shown that "Francis Talbot, by the way, recalls one of the more curious facts about the Privy Council: for something like 180 years, almost none seems to have been reckoned complete without the current earl of Shrewsbury, very few of whom actually ever attended." Elton, 'Points of Contact: II', 205.

92) APC V. 327; VI. 112 See also APC IV. 344; V. 61, 218.

93) APC VI. 147-8.

94) APC IV. 330-1.

95) APC V. 198-9. See also APC VI. 885; V. 182, 207; VI. 77-8.

96) APC V.. 61, 268. See also APC IV. 372, 373; V. 146, 207-8, 216-7, 326; VI. 134, 152-3, 363.

97) APC V. 34.

98) APC IV. 356-7.

99) APC V. 99. See also APC V. 249, 350; VI. 13.

100) APC IV. 303-4, 339-40, 371, 389; V. 5-7, 24, 25-6, 39, 55, 67, 74, 77, 79, 99-100, 148, 339-43, VI. 109, 138-9. CSP Sp. XIII. 316. CSP For. 311, 325.

101) APC V. 311.

102) APC VI. 39.

103) Not only did the Council issue a licence for exploration and mining on 28 December 1555 but the members also ordered the Justices of the Peace, the Mayors, and the Sheriffs to "see hym ayded and furnished with victualles, carriages and all other necessaries that may serve for thadvauncement of his enterprise, at reasonable prises [sic]." APC V. 211-3. See also APC VI. 89, 109, 118, 226.

104) The European harvests failed in the latter years of Mary's reign and England was hard hit. Elton, Reform and Reformation, 393; Loades, Mary Tudor, 298-9, 374, 452, 471; P.

Williams, The Tudor Regime (Oxford, 1979); and F. J. Fisher, 'Influenza and inflation in Tudor England', Economic History Review, 2nd series, XVIII (1965).

105) APC V. 124, 218-9; VI. 9, 421.

106) APC V. 67, 81, 96, 128-9, 163, 193, 207, 276, 297-9; VI. 67-8, 72, 77, 105. These make up only a small sample of the examples, for a complete list see APC IV-VI. passim.

107) APC V. 177-8.

108) The Council ordered John Philip Morgan to release his brother and sister-in-law and allow them to "depart at their pleasure." APC V. 196.

109) APC V. 43; VI. 291. Similarly the Council was forced to become involved in a dispute between Lord Dacre and his son Thomas because it threatened to disrupt the northern defences. APC VI. 4, 13-4, 121.

110) APC V. 104.

111) APC V. 161.

112) APC V. 257. See also APC VI. 11, 29, 282.

113) APC V. 23, 155. See also the Council's actions against 'Egiptians' (ie. Gypsies) APC V. 185, 231.

114) APC V. 151, 163, 237-8; VI. 102, 118-9, 168, 169. CSP Dom. I. 82.

115) APC V. 162, 333-4. See also 1&2 Philip and Mary: c4.

116) APC IV. 377-8. Guaras, Queen Jane and Queen Mary, 18. See also J. Thirsk, Tudor Enclosures (Historical Association General Series, XLI, 1959); R. H. Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1912); and M. Turner, English Parliamentary Enclosure (Folkestone, 1980).

117) APC V. 208, 209; VI. 4.

118) APC V 208-9, 211, 239, 355. CSP Dom. I. 74.

119) On 22 September 1555 the Privy Council issued a commission giving certain men the right to travel within the rebellious parts of Ireland and establish fortified positions in order to oppose the rebels, but they were forbidden to attack or harm the lawful (ie. peaceful) inhabitants. Moreover, they were requested to catch a pirate and were allowed to keep the spoils if they succeeded. APC V. 183.

120) Accounts of the internecine clan warfare can be found in any Irish history. R. Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, I (London, 1885), 393. T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne eds., Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691 (Oxford, 1976), 78.

121) Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 73.

122) APC IV. 338, 353; V. 164, 177; VI. 287-8, 290.

123) APC IV. 338, 353, 355, 358-9, 378, 406, 407-8; V. 36, 77, 164, 177; VI. 15, 206, 283, 287, 301, 308, 422. The Council even authorized the supply of lumber for windmills. APC V. 189. On St. Leger see above (Chapter Three, notes 99 and 100, page 140). See also Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 76.

124) Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, 386; Moody, Early Modern Ireland,/75.

125) Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 76 and Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, 386 and 413. See also APC VI. 289.

126) Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 77 and 79.

127) Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 78.
128) Moody, Early Modern Ireland, 78.
129) APC V. 180; VI. 174, 344.
130) See above (Chapter Three, note 9, page 134).
131) 1&2 Philip and Mary: c15. APC IV. 328, 369, 371, 396; V. 242, 362; VI, 6.
132) APC V. 112, 125, 164; VI. 6, 51, 61, 153, 175, 236, 333, 350, 427. Williams, 'Wales and Mary I', passim.
133) Calais and Guisnes were the main English strongholds in France but there were a number of others, including Ham, Newenham Bridge, and Rhese Bank.
134) APC IV. 303-4, 340, 355-6, 365-6, 411; V. 6, 14-5, 21-2, 95, 98. An extensive investigation of defensive costs of the French Pale was ordered on 27 August 1556 and the defences were directed to be improved and extended on 27 and 30 May 1557. APC V. 339-43; VI. 91, 92-3. The requests for information and the provision of supplies became continuous after the declaration of war with France and Scotland in June 1557. APC VI. 99-429, passim.
135) Philip was requested to inspect the defences and determine if the 'extraordinary' gunners at Newenham Bridge and 'Rice Banke' and the 'extraordinary' footmen at Guisnes were necessary or not; in addition, the size of the garrisons at 'Bootes Bulwarke' and 'Ballingham's Bulwarke' were fixed at a specified number and an enlargement of the Calais contingent was approved. APC V. 339-43. See also APC V. 280.
136) APC VI. 299. The accounts were ordered on various occasions before the war began (APC V. 52, 56 are but two examples), but the need for control became more imperative after the declaration of war with France. On 12 April 1558 the Council ordered that the accounts of Berwick be submitted monthly. APC VI. 302-3. For further examples see APC VI. 217, 334, 359. For orders regarding continued economy whenever feasible see APC VI. 217, 301, 303.
137) Even the Imperial commanders claimed that the English government and the English officers in France had been negligent. CSP Sp. XIII. 330-1. They also accused the Privy Councillors of treason without evidence. CSP Sp. XIII. 339. However, see CSP Sp. XIII. 316. CSP Dom. I. 97.
138) CSP Dom. I. 98. CSP Sp. XIII. 342. CSP For. 360.
139) APC VI. 99-429, passim.
140) CSP Sp. XII. 386, 389.

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APPENDIX I

Name (date of first appearance)	1553 - month A	S	O
Stephen Gardiner (14 August 1553)	12	17	7
Nicholas Heath (25 October 1553)	--	--	2
Sir William Paulet (17 August 1553)	9	10	3
Earl of Bedford (17 August 1553)	1	7	4
Earl of Arundel (17 August 1553)	10	16	7
Duke of Norfolk (14 August 1553)	13	12	7
Sir William Howard (4 January 1554)	--	--	--
Sir John Gage (13 August 1553)	4	10	6
Earl of Shrewsbury (17 August 1553)	7	--	5
Earl of Derby (17 August 1553)	6	14	5
Earl of Sussex (17 August 1553)	8	15	5
Earl of Bath (17 August 1553)	9	11	6
Earl of Pembroke (17 August 1553)	1	--	--
Cuthbert Tunstall (21 August 1553)	10	16	7
Sir Thomas West (17 August 1553)	2	died	
Richard Lord Riche (13 August 1553)	5	1	3
William Lord Paget (13 August 1553)	11	15	7
Sir Richard Rochester (21 August 1553)	6	7	2
Sir Edward Hastings (23 August 1553)	6	8	5
Sir Henry Jerningham (24 August 1553)	3	5	6
Sir William Petre (13 August 1553)	13	15	7
Sir John Bourne (21 August 1553)	9	14	7
Sir Thomas Cheyney (5 September 1553)	--	1	6
Sir Thomas Cornwallis (15 August 1553)	1	--	6
Sir Richard Southwell (13 August 1553)	13	--	--
Sir Edmund Peckham (13 August 1553)	4	--	--
Sir Robert Peckham (22 August 1553)	4	5	5
Sir Thomas Wharton (21 August 1553)	9	7	5
Sir Henry Bedingfeld (13 August 1553)	7	--	2
Sir John Baker (13 August 1553)	6	--	2
Sir Richard Preston (21 August 1553)	6	3	--
Sir John Huddleston (21 August 1553)	2	--	3
Sir Francis Inglefield (13 August 1553)	5	2	--
Sir Edward Walgrave (13 August 1553)	5	2	2
Sir John Mordaunt (22 August 1553)	7	4	3
Sir John Masone (17 August 1553)	7	3	--
Sir Nicholas Hare (21 August 1553)	8	--	2
Serjeant Morgan (15 August 1553)	3	--	3
Sir John Shelton (21 August 1553)	6	12	3
Sir William Drury (21 August 1553)	6	--	2
Sir Anthony St. Leger (28 August 1553)	1	none after	
Sir Clement Heigham (19 April 1554)	--	--	--

	1553		
	A	S	O
Dr. John Boxoll (21 December 1556)	--	--	--
Viscount Montague (28 April 1557)	--	--	--
William Thirlby (28 October 1553)	--	--	2
Robert Strelley (23 August 1553)	4	2	died
Edward Lord Clinton (28 April 1557)	--	--	--
Sir William Cordell (5 December 1557)	--	--	--
Thomas Lord Wentworth (21 August 1553)	6	1	3
Dr. Nicholas Wotton (2 August 1557)	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	15	17	7

The monthly totals represent the number of Council meetings held each month. However, there were a certain number of meetings for which attendance records were not kept. These include all the meetings held during July 1553 and the following months:

September 1553	1 meeting attendance not taken
October 1553	7 meetings attendance not taken
May 1554	1 meeting attendance not taken
July 1554	1 meeting attendance not taken
September 1555	1 meeting attendance not taken
July 1557	3 meetings attendance not taken
August 1557	1 meeting attendance not taken
September 1557	1 meeting attendance not taken
January 1558	1 meeting attendance not taken
February 1558	1 meeting attendance not taken
September 1558	1 meeting attendance not taken
October 1558	1 meeting attendance not taken

When calculating the percentage of the total number of Council meetings which each Councillor attended, the meetings for which attendance was not recorded were not included.

The total number of Council meetings held during the reign for which attendance records are preserved was 1044 and there was a further 20 when the attendance was either not recorded or has not survived.

	1553					1554			
	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J
Gardiner	17	12	15	13	14	16	14	16	7
Heath	5	--	--	--	--	1	3	--	--
Paulet	8	1	6	2	15	4	15	1	3
Bedford	6	11	15	4	9	--	--	--	3
Arundel	15	11	3	1	18	15	15	20	10
Norfolk	13	13	5	3	6	10	3	--	--
Howard	--	--	6	12	5	--	--	--	3
Gage	3	13	15	13	11	--	17	25	6
Shrewsbury	12	8	--	--	--	11	9	--	--
Derby	4	8	2	1	--	6	2	--	7
Sussex	10	1	10	3	17	8	15	--	--
Bath	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pembroke	7	9	2	1	4	9	--	17	--
Tunstall	15	9	9	--	1	--	4	1	--
Thirlby	11	8	--	--	--	--	7	14	6
Riche	9	8	--	--	--	10	--	--	--
wentworth	7	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Paget	12	3	12	2	16	5	15	17	10
Rochester	4	13	11	14	13	13	10	15	6
Hastings	5	9	13	3	1	7	10	22	10
Jerningham	4	11	7	5	13	15	14	26	5
Petre	13	12	16	14	15	14	13	20	10
Bourne	15	11	6	13	17	8	9	9	5
Cheyney	7	--	8	9	--	--	--	9	6
Cornwallis	--	--	--	1	11	7	3	--	--
Southwell	8	8	--	10	16	8	3	--	--
E. Peckham	4	9	6	3	--	3	3	--	--
R. Peckham	3	1	8	--	--	14	3	--	--
Wharton	1	1	13	13	12	5	6	11	8
Bedingfeld	4	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	--
Baker	4	--	1	9	--	4	5	--	--
Preston	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	4	--
Huddleston	2	9	--	--	--	6	7	1	--
Inglefield	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--
Walgrave	1	8	8	--	--	6	8	--	--
Mordaunt	6	8	5	4	11	3	--	6	3
Masone	--	--	--	2	1	3	--	--	--
Hare	5	8	--	--	--	1	1	--	--
Morgan	no more appearances at Council meetings								
Shelton	1	--	13	3	--	--	--	--	--
Drury	--	--	--	--	--	4	9	--	--
Heigham	--	--	--	--	--	1	6	--	--
Wotton	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montague	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Boxoll	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Clinton	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cordell	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	17	14	18	16	17	27	10	27	10

	1554						1555			
	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M
Gardiner	17	14	3	6	7	5	11	9	13	3
Heath	--	--	-	5	7	7	5	2	--	--
Paulet	12	6	4	3	1	6	5	6	7	1
Bedford	17	11	5	6	6	1		died		
Arundel	11	11	5	5	4	-	7	1	5	2
Norfolk	--	--	died							
Howard	8	11	5	6	6	5	6	9	12	13
Gage	14	7	3	-	-	5	6	6	9	19
Shrewsbury	--	--	-	6	7	3	--	--	2	13
Derby	6	--	-	2	-	1	3	--	--	--
Sussex	2	--	-	-	1	-	--	--	--	--
Bath	--	--	-	-	1	2	--	--	--	--
Pembroke	4	--	-	3	1	-	--	--	--	14
Tunstall	4	--	1	-	-	1	2	--	--	--
Thirlby	19	14	6	2	1	6	6	--	--	--
Riche	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Wentworth	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Paget	7	--	2	-	1	5	6	7	1	1
Rochester	18	14	6	3	6	3	3	6	10	17
Hastings	11	7	1	-	-	-	6	4	8	6
Jerningham	12	7	2	-	-	3	5	5	11	14
Petre	13	7	6	6	7	4	8	11	12	21
Bourne	18	13	6	3	1	8	10	9	9	9
Cheyney	--	--	2	2	-	-	--	--	--	15
Cornwallis	--	--	-	-	-	-	11	3	3	--
Southwell	3	--	2	2	-	5	2	--	1	14
E. Peckham	7	--	3	-	1	4	--	--	--	1
R. Peckham	7	--	-	-	-	2	--	--	--	1
Wharton	12	7	-	3	-	4	10	6	12	21
Bedingfeld	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	1	17
Baker	--	--	-	2	-	3	--	--	--	--
Freston	5	4	-	-	-	2	3	--	4	2
Huddleston	7	6	3	2	-	1	6	1	--	19
Inglefield	8	--	5	3	6	2	5	8	9	3
Walgrave	8	--	5	3	6	2	3	5	8	15
Mordaunt	4	--	-	-	-	2	3	3	--	2
Masone	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Hare	--	--	-	-	-	2	2	2	--	--
Shelton	4	--	-	2	-	-	--	--	--	--
Drury	--	--	-	3	7	1	--	--	--	--
Heigham	--	--	-	-	-	2	9	--	--	--
Wotton	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Montague	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Boxoll	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Clinton	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Cordell	--	--	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	23	14	6	7	7	8	11	11	13	28

	1555						1556		
	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F
Gardiner	5	19	7	9	died				
Heath	--	--	--	-	--	--	2	12	10
Paulet	10	3	3	6	6	9	14	14	7
Arundel	5	10	5	-	7	4	10	--	3
Howard	16	13	--	-	8	1	3	1	2
Gage	7	12	8	died					
Shrewsbury	16	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Derby	--	--	--	-	--	1	1	--	--
Sussex	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	4
Bath	--	--	--	-	--	--	1	--	--
Pembroke	9	1	--	-	9	8	14	15	9
Tunstall	--	--	--	-	--	2	2	none	after
Thirlby	--	--	3	8	6	4	16	13	8
Riche	3	2	--	-	--	--	2	--	--
Wentworth	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Paget	4	7	1	6	4	7	14	11	7
Rochester	20	21	11	9	6	4	12	13	6
Hastings	--	--	1	7	6	3	3	8	9
Jerningham	12	11	5	7	5	6	11	12	8
Petre	20	16	11	8	8	10	16	13	7
Bourne	10	16	10	-	8	8	9	14	9
Cheyney	9	--	--	-	--	1	6	9	6
Cornwallis	--	--	--	-	--	1	2	--	--
Southwell	14	8	4	-	3	4	1	--	--
E. Peckham	8	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
R. Peckham	8	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Wharton	18	--	2	2	8	5	12	12	9
Bedingfeld	16	4	5	8	6	7	4	5	--
Baker	--	7	7	-	--	1	--	--	2
Freston	12	--	4	-	4	4	--	4	1
Huddleston	14	18	4	-	--	--	--	--	--
Inglefield	15	5	11	1	1	--	2	--	2
Walgrave	19	14	6	-	--	2	9	--	5
Mordaunt	4	3	--	-	--	2	1	--	1
Masone	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Hare	--	--	--	-	--	4	2	--	--
Shelton	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	4
Drury	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Heigham	--	--	--	-	--	2	--	--	--
Wotton	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Montague	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Boxoll	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Clinton	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
Cordell	--	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	20	21	11	9	10	11	18	19	12

1556

	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N
Heath	18	12	14	17	17	25	19	14	16
Paulet	4	4	9	10	5	9	9	6	12
Arundel	11	11	10	11	12	2	3	13	12
Howard	3	3	3	--	1	3	--	3	8
Shrewsbury	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	8
Derby	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1
Sussex	2	7	10	15	6	died			
Bath	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	3	--
Pembroke	14	3	3	11	2	--	3	15	7
Thirlby	13	7	13	16	16	21	19	15	15
Riche	--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	3
Wentworth	2	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--
Paget	5	1	3	11	4	12	14	5	--
Rochester	10	--	2	6	17	20	15	4	11
Hastings	7	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Jerningham	8	1	3	7	9	15	6	3	6
Petre	11	2	13	8	15	10	7	10	10
Bourne	12	8	9	14	16	21	14	9	14
Cheyney	--	4	--	2	3	--	--	--	--
Cornwallis	--	--	--	--	--	8	1	--	--
Southwell	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
E. Peckham	5	--	6	2	1	--	--	--	--
R. Peckham	5	--	8	9	1	--	--	1	--
Wharton	8	7	9	14	6	--	6	14	11
Bedingfeld	3	4	6	5	4	--	8	2	2
Baker	--	--	2	10	6	18	4	6	8
Preston	--	--	1	2	2	2	--	--	--
Huddleston	--	--	1	--	2	died			
Inglefield	--	--	--	4	4	4	--	1	6
Walgrave	5	--	1	5	5	--	--	--	5
Mordaunt	--	--	2	2	--	--	--	2	1
Masone	--	--	--	--	--	3	1	4	7
Hare	--	--	4	3	--	--	--	--	--
Shelton	2	no more appearances at Council meetings							
Drury	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	6
Heigham	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6
Wotton	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montague	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Boxoll	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Clinton	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cordell	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	18	12	14	18	17	30	19	15	17

	1556					1557			
	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A
Heath	10	11	12	17	12	15	18	23	28
Paulet	8	8	5	10	7	8	3	11	24
Arundel	9	7	8	5	11	7	9	15	7
Howard	--	5	5	4	7	4	--	8	10
Shrewsbury	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Derby	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bath	no more appearances at Council meetings								
Pembroke	--	--	--	2	5	9	4	--	--
Thirlby	13	9	10	17	7	14	17	23	28
Riche	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--
Wentworth	--	--	--	--	--	3	none after		
Paget	--	--	9	11	5	1	11	1	--
Rochester	1	--	--	1	died				
Hastings	--	--	--	--	--	5	5	--	13
Jerningham	3	--	1	11	4	5	5	11	25
Petre	10	6	6	14	9	8	12	21	17
Bourne	11	9	11	13	8	12	14	22	26
Cheyney	--	--	--	--	--	1	4	6	14
Cornwallis	--	1	--	--	--	--	6	--	--
Southwell	--	--	4	1	4	2	7	12	10
E. Peckham	--	--	--	2	--	3	--	--	--
R. Peckham	--	--	--	3	--	7	2	5	--
Wharton	11	9	10	13	5	7	11	8	--
Bedingfeld	4	--	8	5	--	--	--	--	--
Baker	4	--	7	--	2	2	1	14	25
Freston	1	1	4	4	--	2	1	4	--
Inglefield	2	--	5	4	2	2	2	12	13
Walgrave	5	9	6	5	5	1	6	17	26
Mordaunt	1	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--
Masone	5	1	5	10	1	8	3	11	13
Hare	2	--	--	2	died				
Drury		died							
Heigham	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wotton	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	13
Montague	--	--	--	--	--	13	9	1	--
Boxoll	2	9	5	10	2	11	16	16	10
Clinton	--	--	--	--	--	10	6	--	--
Cordell	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MONTHLY TOTALS	14	11	12	17	12	15	18	23	28

	1557				1558				
	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M
Heath	23	24	21	18	25	21	19	12	13
Paulet	7	14	9	3	6	6	4	7	9
Arundel	--	--	--	--	17	10	1	--	--
Howard	5	1	11	--	21	7	16	4	--
Shrewsbury	--	--	--	4	16	19	4	--	--
Derby	--	--	--	--	2	4	none after		
Pembroke	--	--	--	--	8	7	2	--	--
Thirlby	23	23	17	14	24	16	9	11	13
Riche	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--
Paget	2	8	7	--	9	c	1	1	8
Hastings	6	10	16	6	18	4	6	6	13
Jerningham	16	11	13	8	13	7	9	--	--
Petre	18	16	5	7	18	12	12	8	1
Bourne	22	23	21	18	17	8	7	3	--
Cheyney	11	8	4	7	4	--	9	1	--
Cornwallis	--	--	--	7	14	13	17	10	11
Southwell	14	7	4	4	8	4	3	--	2
E. Peckham	1	4	7	--	--	--	--	--	--
R. Peckham	--	9	3	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wharton	--	--	11	13	23	18	12	8	--
Bedingfeld	--	--	--	13	19	13	15	11	10
Baker	--	8	13	5	9	4	1	2	7
Freston	1	4	died						
Inglefield	--	--	3	--	5	1	--	--	2
Walgrave	14	4	7	8	15	8	5	4	8
Mordaunt	--	--	--	2	none after				
Masone	2	13	8	3	11	10	7	--	7
Heigham	--	--	--	--	5	3	--	--	--
Wotton	--	--	4	--	6	4	3	--	--
Montague	--	1	21	12	19	13	11	--	--
Boxoll	--	--	12	17	20	21	18	11	9
Clinton	--	--	9	--	14	13	12	9	2
Cordell	--	--	--	5	15	2	1	6	10
MONTHLY TOTALS	23	24	21	19	25	21	20	12	13