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AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF A SELF-ESTEEM PROGRAM UPON ADULT SELF-ESTEEM LEVELS

by

© DENNIS H. BROWN

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

The object of this research was to evaluate the impact of self-esteem workshops on self-esteem levels of participants. Forty-two people who applied to attend a public course entitled "Building Self-Esteem--Your Own and Others" and who volunteered to be part of this study were assigned to one of two treatment groups or a control group depending on their date of application. An experiential training program, of approximately 20 hours in duration, in which participants learned the theoretical components of self-esteem and engaged in experiential learning exercises, was employed. In addition to subjective reports, two instruments, the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale were administered to directly measure self-esteem levels. The IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire was used both as a measure of anxiety and as an indirect measure of self-esteem. The results indicate that there was a significant increase in self-esteem among participants in one treatment group but not in the other. It was concluded that the value of the program for raising self-esteem levels was encouraging, but not conclusive. Recommendations for both refining the methods used to measure self-esteem in this program and for alternate ways of measuring self-esteem in future programs were suggested.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study was to determine whether a program for building self-esteem could significantly enhance the development of self-esteem. Since correlations between self-esteem and anxiety have been suggested by several writers (Branden, 1969; Coopersmith, 1967; Crandall, 1973; Felker, 1974; Samuels, 1977), a secondary and more limited purpose was to examine whether the course could significantly decrease anxiety levels. To substantiate whether these goals were achieved, both subjective and objective measures were taken. However, one of the purposes of the literature review is to demonstrate that this is not the seemingly easy task it might appear to be.

The Problem

The problem under investigation was how to conduct an evaluation of a program for building self-esteem in order to determine its effectiveness. One way to do this was to determine whether self-

esteem increased. It seems logical that if self-esteem increases significantly in a workshop, then the teaching/learning model employed is a viable one. It also seems logical that if a variable such as anxiety which has been suggested as being inversely correlated with self-esteem decreases, there is some likelihood that self-esteem has increased. To aid in this evaluation, this study attempted to answer the following questions:

1. Does a course on building self-esteem significantly enhance the development of self-esteem?

2. Is there a corresponding decrease in the level of anxiety?

Need for the Study

Probably since the earliest of times, people have believed that the way a person thinks and feels about himself, influences the way he behaves. Elkin (1978) offers an engaging selection of quotes handed down through the centuries which reflect man's thoughts about the importance of this valuing and evaluating process. With the birth of modern psychology, these observations and speculations, these prescientific notions, gradually began to be shaped into testable hypotheses.

At first, a variety of terms were used to describe the processes and structures involved in this evaluative, judgmental, affective aspect of a person's self-reflexive activity. Besides the term self-esteem, early writers used phrases such as self-regard, self-

acceptance, self-satisfaction, self-evaluation, self-judgment, self-respect, self-worth, self-confidence, and self-ideal congruence. While there may have been different shades of meaning intended, for the most part the writers seemed to be addressing the same phenomenon. Indeed, Wylie (1961) said that many of these "terms are so intertwined and overlapping in the literature that the constructs must be discussed as a group" (p. 40).

With time though, the term self-esteem seemed to gain the most acceptance for describing the process whereby some cognitive and affective evaluation of the self is made (Calhoun & Morse, 1977; Weiler & Marwell, 1976). However, because of the differing theoretical approaches, the exact components and descriptions of this process are still being lively debated, with the result that at present there is still no standard operational definition of self-esteem (Calhoun & Morse, 1977; Crandall, 1973).

This lack of clear definition has created problems because self-esteem is a popular term these days. There are books, theories, courses and workshops being offered to the general public to help them understand, improve, maintain, enhance or develop their self-esteem. In addition to the popular psychology materials, self-esteem is used extensively in various theories of psychotherapy and child development, such approaches being based upon the old adage "You can't like other people if you don't like yourself". Its use is not

limited to just the "self" psychologies but it is employed for any theory which is even slightly cognitive in nature and contains some description of processes by which people evaluate themselves and by which such evaluations affect subsequent behavior (Wells & Marwell, 1976). Today, references to self-esteem can be found in almost all theories except the most staunchly behavioristic ones. However, the liberal use of this construct which has not been adequately defined theoretically, has led to many problems and criticisms and even some suggestions that until the concept is adequately defined in operational terms, its use would be better abandoned.

To give some idea of the term's wide usage when it comes to specific research, self-esteem, as a variable of interest, has been studied in such diverse content areas as group attraction (Dittes, 1959), marital relations (Luckey, 1961), ethnic stereotypes (Dworkin, 1964), the occurrence of delinquent behavior (Chapman, 1966), attitude change and persuasibility (Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1966), conformity (Gergen & Bauer, 1967), equity maintenance (Pepitone et al., 1964), reactions to stress or threat (Schalon, 1968), dishonest behavior (Aronson & Mettee, 1968), social affects of physical defects (Meadow, 1969), social participation (Coombs, 1969), helping and seeking behavior (McMillen & Reynolds, 1969), competitive behavior (Graf & Hearne, 1970), causal attribution (Fitch, 1970), cognitive dissonance (Cooper & Duncan, 1971), identities (Heiss & Owens,

1972), interpersonal attraction (Leonard, 1973), and educational achievements (Felice, 1973), to name but a few.

However, most of these studies have been interested either in the effects of differing self-esteem levels upon consequent behavior or self-esteem as the independent variable. As Coopersmith (1967) noted some years ago, and which still seems true today, surprisingly few studies have been interested in the conditions that produce or enhance self-esteem, perhaps because of the theoretical and methodological problems involved (p. 19). While this may be the case, it would seem that if self-esteem is such an important factor in determining human behavior, then despite the methodological difficulties, studies designed to determine its antecedent requirements or how it might be enhanced are certainly warranted. As indicated earlier, while there are numerous theories and speculations about self-esteem, few have been subjected to critical empirical analysis and investigation. Therefore, while there are several options to choose from regardin the conditions that produce and enhance self-esteem, because of the lack of empirical research, there is little basis on which to determine their validity or to select between competing claims.

Significance of the Study

It was with some of the above statements about the importance of self-esteem in mind that the Mental Health Division of the City of Edmonton Health Department decided to first conduct and then evaluate

workshops on building self-esteem. The Mental Health Division is an agency whose chief purpose is the promotion and enhancement of mental health within the City of Edmonton. While it is also involved in direct treatment, its main involvement is in the area of prevention. In a public health or preventive model of mental health, one is continually struggling with the problem of how to employ limited resources for the greatest good. One is also faced with the problem of where along the continuum between "normalcy" and "crisis" one should intervene in a preventive way.

One possible solution is to intervene by using a combined adult education and laboratory learning model (Mill & Porter, 1972; Seashore, 1968). Teaching a mentally healthy public how to maintain and promote its health is less costly in many ways than treatment of disturbances.

Partly as a result of this rationale, the Mental Health Division has in the past offered various courses to the public dealing with some aspect of mental health. Of particular concern for this study are the courses they offered on building self-esteem. Response was enthusiastic with classes filling quickly and many people being turned away. At least ostensibly, the courses were fulfilling some need in the general public.

Although the courses' popularity was obvious, several questions still remained, for example--were such courses effective in promoting

mental health, could such courses significantly increase self-esteem in a lasting way or were the results merely temporary? In light of these and other questions, it was decided that some research on the value and effectiveness of these public courses was needed.

As an aside, it is noted that while the primary purpose of the program was to enhance the self-esteem of the individual participants, the workshop was also designed to give people a conceptual and experiential understanding of the processes involved, an understanding of the role their self-esteem plays in building the self-esteem of others, and ideas on ways they could enhance the esteem of others. However, the evaluation of these other goals was not formally investigated in this study.

Limitations

The major limitations in this study are the difficulty in truly measuring the construct of self-esteem, and in a sensitive enough manner that changes in self-esteem levels can be detected. Also, the fact that participants were volunteers created problems with random selection and sample size. Lastly, the nature of this study meant that the way participants and leaders interacted would influence the effectiveness of the workshop.

Plan of the Report

The evidence presented here and in Chapter II substantiates the need for programs on building self-esteem. Chapter II also examines

the theoretical background, crucial terms, and issues that are necessary to have an understanding of self-esteem. The difficulties in defining and measuring the construct are also discussed. Chapter III describes how the problem of measurement was handled in this study. Chapter IV describes the results of this study, while Chapter V discusses these results and concludes with comments and recommendations for future programs designed to build or enhance self-esteem.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH

Introduction

In this chapter, the chief goals will be:

1. To examine some of the issues and problems that have been raised in discussions on self-esteem as well as the more inclusive terms "self" and "self-concept".

2. To examine some of the thinking and research that has resulted from these discussions.

Wells and Marwell (1976) note four features about the use of self-esteem today. They state that:

1. Self-esteem is very popular today and is used to explain a variety of behavioral phenomena. They would agree with Wylie (1974) who says that self-esteem has been linked to almost every variable at one time or another.

2. As a conceptual tool, self-esteem has been employed by a wide range of theoretical perspectives and is a key idea in many of

these approaches.

3. Behavioral phenomena are involved which are presumably measurable, and perhaps manipulatable, thereby permitting particular descriptions of it amenable to empirical confirmation or rejection.

4. Lastly, as noted earlier, self-esteem is a deceptively slippery concept about which there is a good deal of confusion and disagreement. It was this last feature which prompted Wells and Marwell to undertake their literature review, and one with which the writer also will wrestle with in this chapter.

As Crandall (1976) notes, there is no standard operational definition of self-esteem. Therefore, before examining the research on self-esteem, some of the discussions on self-esteem will be examined in an attempt to identify important issues and clarify and determine what is being talked about. As the various theoretical approaches are examined, an attempt to isolate common conceptual threads will be made.

One can start by saying that self-esteem is generally considered a hypothetical construct that is a sub-component of the larger term "self-concept" which, in turn, is one aspect of "self", both of which are also hypothetical constructs (Wells & Marwell, 1976; Wylie, 1974). Thus, a discussion of self-esteem presupposes an understanding of both self and self-concept if one is to understand how the term has evolved to its use today. Another way of viewing it would be to say

that many of the issues first raised in discussions on the self and self-concept have affected current views of self-esteem.

As a substantial portion of this chapter will focus on these discussions, which trace the evolution and use of these three terms and which illustrate the similarities and differences in the theoretical approaches taken to them over the years, readers familiar with these discussions may wish to omit this section or only examine the summary on p. 71 before moving on to the section entitled "Self-Esteem--Further Observations" p. 78, or the empirical research on raising adult self-esteem levels on p. 101.

Seeing self-esteem as a subset of self-conception raises two main questions: 1) What is the nature of self and self-concept?, and 2) What part of self-concept is self-esteem? Again, as with self-esteem, there is no standard definition of self. While later, some of the more prominent theorists and viewpoints will be examined to illustrate the different approaches taken to these terms, some preliminary points can now be made.

Wells and Marwell (1976) note that self seems to be one of those words which because of its ubiquity and indispensibility, is virtually impossible either to discard or specify unambiguously. They believe that part of the confusion with the word comes from everyday use of self as a frequent synonym for person, personality and sometimes body, and with this layman's blurring of definition spilling over onto psycho-

logy as well. To help cope with this confusion, Gordon Allport's (1961) classic definition is useful for providing some perspective. He says:

> The self is something of which we are immediately aware. We think of it as the warm, private region of our life. As such it plays a critical part in our consciousness (a concept broader than self), in our personality (a concept broader than consciousness), and in our organism (a concept broader than personality). Thus it is some kind of core in our being. And yet it is not a constant core. (p. 110)

Another more technical view is taken by Wells and Marwell (1976) who propose that self be seen as a specialized cognitive or behavioral subset of "personality", which consists of reflexive or self-conscious cognitions and behaviors. Stemming from James' (1890) views of the self-as-agent and self-as-object, they propose that the basic properties ascribed to the self would be that it is a reflexive, social, and symbolic process. Aside from these basic properties, however, they concede that the conceptualization of self can vary in a number of ways.

While this is not the place to review in detail the writings that have taken place down the years on the self and self-concept, an overview tracing the evolution of these terms might be helpful. Before beginning this overview, first some of the issues that have been surfaced in discussions of these terms will be mentioned so that they can be kept in mind as the different theorists are examined.

Some Key Issues

Some of the issues which have separated theorists on self-esteem

into rival camps are ones such as what is meant by self, self-concept, and self-esteem; what is the difference between ego and self; what are the components involved in these terms; why are these terms considered an important object of psychological study; what questions about them might be put to scientific investigation today; can self-esteem be affected and if so, how?; and can this effect be measured. Other issues which have caused much controversy in discussions about the self and which, therefore, affect self-esteem, are whether the self is a fact or fiction; whether we should view the self as the knower or the known, as a structure or as a process; and, lastly, whether we should consider the self as a single or global entity, or as something that is fragmented, disconnected and multiple. Rather than discussing all of these issues in depth at this time, they are presented to stimulate the examination of the more prominent theorists. While most of them will be dealt with more directly later in this report, some need to be referred to now.

Gergen (1971) probably summarizes the four main reasons for a study of self (and by implication self-concept and self-esteem) as well as anyone. The first of these is identity. Stemming from the ancient dictum, "Know thyself", Gergen argues that the way a man conceives of himself influences both what he chooses to do and what he expects of life. Furthermore, for one to know his identity is to grasp the meaning of his past and the potential for his future.

The second reason has to do with self-evaluation, which invites the questions of what feelings a person should have about himself and how he should value himself. Gergen notes that over the centuries, the pendulum has swung back and forth between those who would denounce self-love and those who believe it to be crucial to human happiness. Most of the research on self-esteem has been based on the premise that the person's evaluation or esteem of himself plays a key role in determining his behavior. Much of what a person does, and the manner in which he does it is presumed to be dependent upon his self-esteem (Gergen, 1971). This reason is the one with which this author is most concerned but Gergen's other two reasons for studying self will be noted in passing.

The third reason, he says, can be traced to the long standing feeling of basic conflict between self and society. On the one hand there is a wide spread commitment to self-integrity, acting independently of one's fellow man; on the other hand, there is the view that one should behave flexibly and be careful about his public appearance.

The last reason for studying self is not for its positive value but for the restrictions and limitations it imposes, for the way it interferes with growth and spontaneity. While there are probably other reasons as well, these are the main ones. They in turn have sparked those people interested in understanding the processes of mental health and adjustment and of human social interaction to pursue study in these areas.

Before examining the other issues, the manner in which these terms have been employed and developed by some of the more prominent theorists will now be examined. Initially, the main focus will be on the two terms, self and self-concept, later the focus shifts to self-esteem.

Historical and Theoretical Background

Brief Overview

The notion of a "psychic" agent which regulates, guides and controls our behavior has long been of interest to man. Centuries ago, the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, distinguished between the physical and non-physical aspects of the human being (Gergen, 1971). Central to the notion of the non-physical existence was the "soul". Though not precisely defined, this notion had much in common with what later theorists meant by "self". However, when the concept of soul was taken over by Christian theology, its use in scientific thinking gradually declined.

Some 2,000 years after Aristotle, Rene Descartes' famous dictum "I think, therefore I am" introduced the concept of I, the thinking, knowing, cognizing entity which became one direct predecessor of the concept of self in psychology. Later, problems such as the distinction between mind and body, understanding the existence of mind, the nature of human experience, and the nature of experiencing oneself became central to the philosophical thinking of such people as Berkely,

Leibnitz, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, Kant, and James and John Stuart Mill (Gergen, 1971). The early psychology which grew out of this evolving philosophical tradition was mainly a psychology of personal experience based on self-reports or introspection.

For the "introspectionists", the notion of self referred mainly to the person's experience of his own body. However, with the influential theorizing of William James (1890, 1892) at the turn of the century, this restricted view was abandoned (Gergen, 1971). James is generally regarded as the earliest self psychologist and his views along with C.A. Cooley, both of whom we shall discuss later, enjoyed wide popularity until the rise of the behaviorists in the early 1900's. The domination of psychology by the behaviorists until the 1930's caused interest in mental phenomena to wane. Later though when clinical psychologists found the behavioristic model too limiting to account for the phenomena they observed, and Freudian, neo-Freudian and Gestalt theories became more popular, interest in the self began to be revived and many theories and approaches were developed.

Today, while not all theorists find it necessary to discuss the notion of self or self-concept (Evans, 1968), for many theorists if the view or perception the individual has of himself is not the single most important human attribute, it is at least a very critical variable. Such people see the self-viewing process as often being the key to understanding the numerous puzzling behavioral events displayed by

any single person (Hall & Lindsey, 1970).

While it is beyond the mandate of this summary to review all the theorists who deal with the self and self-concept, by choosing some of the more prominent theorists, an understanding both of the evolution of the terms and a notion of their uses today may be obtained in order to gain a better understanding of self-esteem. Therefore, the following section will examine the evolution of the modern views and usages of these terms a little more closely, beginning with William James, the first of the modern self psychologists.

William James

William James said that, "In its widest possible sense...a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his" (James, 1890, p. 291). He divided this self into three parts relating respectively to a) its constituents, b) the feelings and emotions they arouse--self-feelings, and c) the actions which they prompt--self-seeking and self-preservation. The constituents, in turn, could be further divided into 1) the Empirical Self (the Me) consisting of a) the material self, b) the social self, and c) the spiritual self, and 2) what James called the Pure Ego, (the I) (James, 1890, p. 292).

The material Me referred to the person's body, his possessions, his family, and all material things with which he might feel a sense of unity (by possession, empathy or whatever). The social Me referred to the recognition which the person received from other people. The

spiritual Me is somewhat vague, but seems to refer to the individual's awareness of his own mental processes as perceived by the person himself, "To think ourselves as thinkers" (James, 1890, p. 296). The Pure Ego is what the philosophers refer to as that "pure principal of personal identity" (James,1890, p. 330).

The two main aspects of self which James identified, the Pure Ego and the Empirical Self, have been given a variety of names by others, the most common ones being "the knower" and "the known". Theorists both before and after James have tended to focus on only one or the other of these aspects (Gergen, 1971). James acknowledged the dichotomy but said these two phenomena were really not separate but belonged to a single phenomena, the "stream of consciousness", in which images, emotions, and sensations constantly flowed (James, 1890). One could view this stream of consciousness in different ways though.

On the one hand, one could choose to study the person's attitudes and feelings about himself, as he experienced them. This was termed the self as known, self as object, the empirical self, or in shortened form, the object pronoun me, since it denotes the person's attitudes, feelings, perceptions and evaluations of himself as an object. In this sense, the self is what the person thinks of himself.

On the other hand, the self could be regarded as a group of psychological processes which govern behavior and adjustment. One could

investigate this stream of consciousness by searching for laws or principles governing its generation from moment to moment. Mental process could thus be seen as self as knower, self as process, the judging thought or thinker, or more simply, the subject pronoun I. However, for James, although he saw the dichotomy, he considered these as discriminated aspects of the same phenomenon, the stream of consciousness (Gergen, 1971; Hall & Lindzey, 1970).

Modern writers still acknowledge this dichotomy. Hall and Lindzey (1970) suggest that, as these two views of self are completely different, it would be better to have separate terms for them, perhaps something like "self" and "ego". However, they note that while in fact this has been done, the use of terms is so inconsistent that there is still much confusion today (p. 516).

With regard to self-esteem, for James (1890), the extent to which people experienced successes determined their self-esteem, although this was not described as some sort of stable self-evaluation, but rather as a barometer which "rises and falls from one day to another" (James, 1890, p. 307).

Charles Cooley

After James, the next major figure to deal with the self was Charles Cooley (1902). He wrote from a more sociological perspective, focusing on that aspect of the self which James had labelled the Social Me--the relationship between the self and the social environment.

This notion of the "looking glass self" suggested that a person's feelings about himself were seen largely as perceptions of his relations with others. This self-perception seemed to involve three principal elements: "the imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling" (Cooley, 1902, pp. 151-152). This sense of self then always involved a sense of other people, whether it was distinct and particular or vague and general.

However, Cooley did not attempt to define the concept of self and in fact, specified that any

> formal definition of self-feeling, or indeed, of any sort of feeling must be as hollow as a formal definition of the taste of salt, or the color red; we can expect to know what it is only by experiencing it. There can be no final test of the self except the way we feel; it is that toward which we have the "my" attitude. (p. 40)

For Cooley, the self was a kind of instinct which served to unify and stimulate the person's behavior. Self-appreciation was an innate motive which was useful for the person's survival as a human being. He did not specifically examine self-esteem, but his notion of self-feeling as an aspect of the looking glass self seems similar to self-esteem. He viewed the idea of self, as did James, as a conscious process and did not include unconscious phenomena, although he did speak of preconscious or habitual kinds of behavior.

George Herbert Mead

Technically speaking, G. H. Mead (1934, 1956) should follow the behaviorists whom we shall discuss next because he and his writings did not become well known until after his death in 1931. He was a student of James and a contemporary of Cooley and today is regarded as one of the elder statesmen of sociology.

While interest in the self and related constructs in psychology was diminishing, this was not the case in other disciplines. Mead, a sociologist, wrote what is considered today by some to be the most cogent and systematic statement of the development of self (Wells & Marwell, 1976). Agreeing with James, Mead saw the essence of the self in the I-Me distinction, the process by which the person became an object to himself. Following Cooley, Mead saw the self as a social phenomenon, a product of interactions in which the person experienced himself as reflected in the behavior of the other. However, Mead went a step further. He suggested that, in addition to the above points, it is the usage of symbols which differentiates human behavior from other forms of interaction. Intelligent, rational or "human" behavior coincides with the appearance of self. It is self-conscious and becomes possible when the person can take the role of another and see him or herself as an object, a process made possible only through the use of significant symbols. Language, then, is a critical part of the development and operation of the self. While he acknowledged habitual, non-reflective behavior, for Mead, any behavior which required a <u>mind</u>

(in the uniquely human sense), always required a conscious self.

Mead's view of the symbolic nature of self led to another of his contributions, the "generalized other". His view was that children take on the attitudes towards themselves of significant others in their world, those on whom they depend and who control them. He called this social group that gave individuals their unity of self and against which they evaluated themselves, "the generalized other". For him the self was an object of awareness rather than a system of processes (Samuels, 1977) and the group served as a reference point for the individual.

Mead did not deal directly with self-esteem because he was concerned mainly with the process by which the self was developed. However, he did discuss the effects of self-evaluation. Like James and Cooley, he postulated a tendency of people towards "self-realization". However, this drive was not just for self-enhancement but for superiority. Being a sociologist, he saw this enhancement as relative to other people implying not only a self-evaluation but a social comparison process.

The Behaviorists

Before examining other viewpoints on self and self-esteem, a few words need to be said about the behaviorist and functional psychologies. As Wylie (1974) notes, while these theories were dominating the scene during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th decades of the 20th century,

constructs concerning the self did not receive much attention. She refers to Hilgarde (1949) who pointed out that "mentalistic" constructs such as self-concept were anathema to most behaviorists.

The behaviorists were initially quite persuasive. In contrast to the myriad of conflicting opinions about the nature of experience, they offered statistical results from highly controlled laboratory conditions that could be duplicated from one laboratory to the next with the same outcome. Instead of struggling to create a terminology for the subjective world, they concentrated on the manipulation and control of external stimuli and methods for precisely measuring observable behavior.

However, when the clinicians began to have difficulties explaining phenomena they observed, other theories began to be explored. As Wylie (1974) notes, this mixing of approaches implied the possibility of fusing general psychological theories of cognition and motivation with the psychoanalytic or psychodynamic theories originating in the clinic. Thus, while it is true as Hall and Lindzey (1970) state that most theoretical issues in psychology have been debated within the framework of learning theory, it is also true that within the last three decades, almost all the theories of personality that have been put forth assign importance to a phenomenal and/or self-concept with cognitive and motivational attributes (Wylie, 1974).

Psychoanalytic Theory--Sigmund Freud

One of the major roots of self theory was the writings of Freud, the first of the psychoanalytic theorists. Although writing at about the same time as James and Cooley, his impact in America was initially delayed because of the influence of the behaviorists. However, by the late 1920's, Freud and psychoanalytic theory were quite well established in America.

Although in his earlier works he did not write much specifically about the term self, it does seem that he viewed it differently than other contemporary writers. For him, the self included conscious and unconscious aspects, which he preferred to discuss under the subheadings of id, ego, and super-ego. He saw self feelings as arising mainly in the id, thus implying that the unconscious determinants of the self-concept are more powerful than the conscious ones.

He saw the ego as a mediational structure which was learned as a result of contact with social reality and was largely, though not completely, a conscious phenomenon. Its integrative and defensive mechanisms stabilized the person and protected him from excessive anxiety, conflict, stress, and frustration. It functioned as an inner agency that screened the id's impulses, deciding which ones should be kept from consciousness and, if necessary, distorting the true picture of self (Samuels, 1977).

In ascribing an unconscious aspect to the self, Freud sparked a dilemma with which theorists still have problems (Wylie, 1974).

Briefly, the difficulty centers around the degree to which self theorists wish to be and can fruitfully be phenomenological, that is, can be concerned only with the conscious aspect of self. Wylie (1974), after examining some of the writings of some phenomenological self theorists, particularly Carl Rogers, concludes that the problems and limitations of phenomenological theorizing have not been faced squarely by these theorists. This problem will be returned to later in this chapter.

Freud did not deal directly with self-esteem. He described the process of self-evaluation not as a result of repeated reinforcements, or as a history of successes and failures, but as a result of identification with the ego-ideal, a very different kind of process (Wells & Marwell, 1976, p. 19).

Social Psychological Theories

Although Freud's impact on psychological thought was dramatic, almost immediately his deterministic, biological view of man began to cause problems with those people who were initially attracted to his theories. A number of followers of Freud who became dissatisfied with what they considered to be his myopia regarding the social conditioners of personality, withdrew their allegiance from classical psychoanalysis and began to refashion psychoanalytic theory along paths suggested by the developing social sciences. In America, the most famous exponents of these breakaway viewpoints were Alfred Adler,

Karen Horney, Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan. Although all of these people were highly influenced by Freud, and their theories included the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious processes within the self, because of their interest in the social aspect of man, Hall and Lindzey (1970) refer to them as social psychological theorists. Elsewhere they have been referred to as neo-Freudians (Wells & Marwell, 1976) and as humanistic social psychologists (Hamachek, 1971).

Alfred Adler. Adler (1927) was the first prominent Freudian to break away from Freud. Unlike Freud who made the unconscious the centre of personality, Adler stressed consciousness as the center. Also, instead of ascribing the importance to sexuality that Freud did, he stressed both the social side of man and man's striving for superiority (a striving to overcome perceived personal defects). However, as his writings evolved through the years, the essential pillar of his theory was his conception of the "life plan" or "life style". This was the purpose, the goal, the "end in view" which determined the behavior of the person.

For Adler, every person had the same goal--superiority, but there were many different "life styles" for achieving that goal. Any one individual's life style was largely determined by the specific inferiorities either imagined or real, that he had. The stuttering young Greek, Demosthenes, who became the great orator is the classic example of an individual who set up a certain "life plan" to either overcome

his defect or compensate for it.

For Adler, setting up of a goal or direction in life gave meaning to events which might not otherwise make sense. Adler's self, then, was a highly personalized, subjective system through which a person interpreted and gave meaning to his experiences. By emphasizing the person's perception of the defect, he suggested a reflexive process very much akin to the idea of self-esteem (Wells & Marwell, 1976). Also, by viewing personality the way he did, he implied that man can be the master, not the victim, of his fate.

Karen Horney. Like Adler, Karen Horney (1939) also reacted to Freud's deterministic viewpoint. "My conviction, expressed in a nut-shell, is that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology" (Horney, 1939, p. 8).

Her ideas sprang from her primary concept of basic anxiety which she defined as "...the feeling a child has of being isolated and helpless in a potentially hostile world" (Horney, 1945, p. 41). She said that a wide range of adverse environmental factors could cause this insecurity which in turn could result in neurotic needs. Later she developed a list of 10 neurotic needs which she classified under three headings: a) moving towards people, b) moving away from people, and c) moving against people (Horney, 1945). For her, the difference between a normal and neurotic conflict was one of degree. In other words, we all have these conflicts, some people unfortunately possess theirs in

exaggerated form.

Another basic assumption in her theory was that the individual needed to value him or herself and to be valued by others. This led to possibilities of self-esteem or self-alienation. Tied in with this was her distinction between idealized, potential and actual states. She referred to the potential qualities in the person as the "real self" as opposed to his actual qualities or "actual self". The "idealized self" referred to a fantasy self created by neurotic adjustment. This contrasted with the "self ideal" which served as a guide for a normal person's actions. For Horney, a growth in the discrepancy between the real self and the actual self could lead to self-alienation.

Erich Fromm. Like Sullivan, who shall be discussed shortly, Fromm (1939) took a more sociological perspective. He saw the family as particularly crucial to a person's development. He argued that parents transmit to their children the spirit prevalent in their society and class and therefore are "the psychic agent of society" (Fromm, 1939, p. 515).

Fromm also stressed the close relationship between a person's self-regard and the way he is able to deal with other people. He believed that when individuals dislike themselves, they are apt to criticize themselves, feel stupid, unattractive, or attribute to themselves other negative inferiority feelings.

His association with the concept of self-esteem is familiar as the

idea of self-love. A basic theme of his theory is that self-love is a prerequisite for the ability to love others. Viewed another way, hatred turned against oneself becomes inseparable from hatred directed against others (Fromm, 1939).

Harry Stack Sullivan. Sullivan (1953) was the most "social" of the social psychological theorists. He was influenced in developing his theory, which has come to be called the interpersonal theory of personality development, by both Freud and the Chicago School of Sociology of which George Mead was a member. His description of the self was entirely interpersonal and symbolization was critical to its development.

As he saw it, from the first day of life, the newborn was immersed in a continual stream of interpersonal situations in which he was the recipient of a never-ending flow of "reflected appraisals" (Sullivan, 1953). By assimilating these reflected appraisals, he came to develop expectations and attitudes towards himself which could be categorized into one of three divisions—the "good me", "bad me", or "not me". This categorizing developed as a result of need satisfaction or anxiety production by the parent, usually after the child had done something that pleased or displeased the parent. From this process, the self system developed as "an organization of educative experience called into being by the necessity to avoid or to minimize incidents of anxiety" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 165), and as a process of self-evaluation which constitutes self-esteem.

Sullivan was among the first to emphasize the importance of the empathic bond between mother and child. For him, it was these early mother-child interactions which brought about the differentiations into "good me" and "bad me". What is particularly interesting about his theory is that "judgments" involving the self and others are made before language can adequately define anxiety-provoking situations (Sullivan, 1953). It was because of these pre-verbal judgments that early mother-child experiences were so critical to the child's development and also why such "bad me" self-judgments were so difficult to deal with in later life.

In summary, all of these neo-Freudian, social psychological theories included the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious processes within the self. By contrast, most other self theories tend to focus mainly on the conscious processes and, hence, are called phenomenological theories.

Gordon Allport

While it might be possible to argue that Allport should be considered an "ego psychologist" or alternatively, a "self psychologist", it is probably better to recognize that his theory is (just as he emphasized individuals are) in its own way, unique. In his book, Becoming: Basic Consideration for a Psychology of Personality, after reviewing the many meanings of ego and of self in psychological writings, he finally asks the key question, "Is the concept of self necessary?"

(Allport, 1955, p. 36). His answer is qualified. In an attempt to avoid the confusion and different connotations of these terms (and, perhaps, in an attempt to get at the overlying unity that James was talking about), he suggested that all of the self or ego-functions that have been described be called "propriate" functions of the personality. He used the term "proprium" to describe those aspects of personality which seem central to our existence, that which is warm and important to us, and what we regard as peculiarly ours. For him, the proprium included all aspects of personality that make for inward unity (Allport, 1955). The proprium was not innate but developed over time and there were several key aspects to it.

Besides contributing to a sense of inward unity, the proprium allowed for an awareness of bodily self, a sense of continuity over time, a need for self-esteem (self-enhancement), identification of the self beyond body borders (ego extension), the synthesis of inner needs with outer reality (rational process), the perception and evaluation of the person (self-image), and the knowing self (in James' terms). It also provided the motivation to decrease tensions, expand awareness, and to formulate intentions, long-range purposes and distant goals (propriate strivings). For Allport, the chief characteristic of propriate striving was its resistance to equilibrium; tension was maintained rather than reduced. Together, all these aspects constituted the proprium.

By approaching the riddle of the self in this manner, Allport hoped

to avoid the dilemma of viewing the self or ego as a homunculus, "a man within the breast", who administers the personality system. While he believed that self and ego might be used adjectivally to indicate the propriate functions, one could not say that there was ego or self that functioned as an entity distinct from the remainder of personality (Allport, 1955).

Phenomenological Theory

Snygg and Combs. Although there are a number of theorists that could be examined under this heading, the theories of Snygg and Combs and Carl Rogers are probably the most influential (Wells & Marwell, 1976; Samuels, 1977).

Snygg and Combs (1949) believe that "all behavior, without exception, is completely determined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field of the behaving organism" (p. 15). This phenomenal field consists of the totality of experiences of which the person is aware at any moment. They believe that, while awareness may vary between a high or low level, it never becomes completely unconscious. Furthermore, awareness becomes a cause of behavior. Thus, for them, what a person thinks and feels determines what he will do.

Within this phenomenal field, a "phenomenal self" gradually differentiates. This phenomenal self "includes all those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual experiences as part or characteristics of himself" (Snygg & Combs, 1949, p. 58). Hall and Lindzey (1970)

point out that for Snygg and Combs, the self is both object and process at one and the same time.

Carl Rogers. Carl Rogers, whose "client-centered therapy" has substantially influenced self and self-esteem theory, is also primarily phenomenological, however, he does make some allowance for unconscious processes (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). As with other phenomenologists, Rogers believes that how people behave depends upon the phenomenal field (subjective reality) and not upon the stimulating conditions (external reality).

It should be noted at the start that Rogers' main emphasis has been on understanding how and why individuals develop and change their personalities, particularly when in the process of therapy. He has been less concerned with the development of theory but rather has let it grow naturally out of the testing of hypotheses which he and his colleagues formed from their experience with clients (Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Meador & Rogers, 1973). Thus through the years, his theory has evolved and changed as new experiences and research have dictated.

While Rogers does not appear to emphasize structural constructs, there are two such constructs which are of fundamental importance to his theory and which are important to our discussions on self. These are the organism and the self. It is easier to understand how Rogers sees the self by first discussing his view of the organism.

The organism. For Rogers, the organism is the focus of all

experience. Experience includes all that is potentially available to awareness that is going on within the organism at any one time. This totality of experience constitutes the "phenomenal field". This field becomes the individual's frame of reference and can only be completely known to the person himself although it can be known imperfectly through empathic understanding (Rogers, 1959).

The individual's field is made up on conscious (symbolized) and unconscious (unsymbolized) experiences. The organism may, however, discriminate and react to an experience which is not symbolized. Following McLeary and Lazarus (1949), Rogers calls this subception.

Experience may be correctly or incorrectly symbolized, tested, untested, or inadequately tested, which in turn may cause a person to behave unrealistically and in ways harmful to himself. This leads to the problem of determining "true reality" and the problem of how to separate fact from fiction in one's subjective world. Hall and Lindzey (1970) refer to this as the "great paradox of phenomenology" (p. 528). According to them, Rogers resolves this paradox by leaving the conceptual framework of pure phenomenology and says that what a person experiences or thinks is actually not reality for the person but is merely a tentative hypothesis until he puts it to the test. The test is done by checking less certain information against more direct knowledge. A simple example is seeing some white particles, guessing that they are salt, then tasting them to be

sure. However, problems for the individual can arise when the situation is not so simple (as will be seen in a moment).

The self. Initially, Rogers believed that the self was not a very meaningful term. However, he eventually came to recognize that:

> ...when clients were given the opportunity to express their problems and their attitudes in their own terms, without any guidance or interpretation, they tended to talk in terms of the self... It seemed clear...that the self was an important element in the experience of the client and that in some odd sense his goal was to become his 'real self' (Rogers, 1959, pp. 200-201).

Thereafter, as he developed his theory, self assumed a central place in his writings. In 1950, he stated "The central construct of our theory would be the concept of self, or the self as perceived object in the phenomenal field" (Rogers, 1950, p. 379). Like Snygg and Combs, he believed the self developed by gradually becoming differentiated from the phenomenal field. For him the self (or self-concept) denotes:

> the organized, consistent conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the "I" or "me" and the perceptions of the relationships of the "I" or "me" to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions. It is a gestalt which is available to awareness though not necessarily in awareness. It is a fluid and changing gestalt but at any given moment, it is a specific entity (Rogers, 1959, p. 200).

In addition to this self as it is (the self structure), there is an ideal self which is what the person would like to be.

For Rogers, the development of the self or self-concept is a

dynamic process, closely tied in with the individual's perception of his experiences in his environment. Among other things, this perception of experiences is influenced by one's need for positive regard which Rogers says is a pervasive, persistent, universal need in people. He believes the individual's need for positive regard can only be satisfied by others and one's need for positive regard from significant others is particularly potent.

Based on his experiences in attempting to meet his need for positive regard, the individual develops a sense of self-regard which is a learned sense of self based on his perception of the regard he has received from others. In turn, this sense of self-regard becomes a pervasive construct, influencing the behavior of the whole organism. It develops a life of its own which is independent of actual experiences of regard from others (Meador & Rogers, 1973).

From the research Rogers and his colleagues conducted on self-concept came a major theoretical formulation concerning personality change. Rogers said "We came to see the troubled or neurotic individual as one whose self-concept had become structured in ways incongruent with his organismic experience" (Meador & Rogers, 1973, p. 123). It is in the discussion of congruence and incongruence between the self as perceived and the actual experience of the organism that the significance of his concepts of organism and self become clear.

When the symbolized experiences that make up the self accurately mirror the experiences of the organism the person will be psychologically well adjusted. Such a person accepts all of his organismic experience without threat or anxiety. He is able to think realistically. Whenever an individual's perception of his experience is distorted or denied, a state of incongruence exists between self and experience and there is psychological maladjustment and vulnerability Rogers, 1959). Incongruence between self and organism makes the individual feel threatened, leads to constricted, rigid thinking and defensive behavior.

Returning to Rogers' view of self-regard, we find that self-regard does not quite constitute self-esteem for Rogers (Wells & Marwell, 1976). The important self-esteem concept is that of "self-acceptance". As he describes it, a self-regarding attitude seemed to have three major aspects: there is the specific content of the attitude (a cognitive dimension); some judgment about that content relative to some standards (an evaluative dimension); and some feeling attached to that judgment (an affective dimension). Self-acceptance (and self-esteem) applies to this last dimension--the affective one. Wells and Marwell (1976) argue that Rogers' definition of self-acceptance is essentially the same as many popular definitions of self-esteem and they consider the two as equivalent concepts.

Existential Psychology

Existential psychology is derived from existentialism, one of the most powerful philosophical approaches developed within the last century. Existential psychology may be defined as an empirical science of human existence which employs the method of phenomenological analysis, whose aim is to make the articulated structure of the human being transparent (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). To make some of the concepts of existential psychology clearer, its base, existentialism, will be examined a little more closely.

Barrett (1962) considers Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers to be the founders of existential philosophy in this century. These men synthesized Max Scheler's notion of problematic man, Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard's expressions of individuality, and their own creative thinking to lay the foundation for this modern philosophy (Barrett, 1962; Johnson, 1967). Their writings, plus those of Camus and Sartre, helped propel it into the public eye, while the writings of the Swiss psychiatrists, Binswanger and Boss, were particularly important for psychologists (Hall & Lindzey, 1970).

In modern times, existentialism has come to be known as a philosophy that is concerned with the search for identity in times when selfhood is threatened by theoretical systems, mass reactions, mechanistic and technological production, exploitive mass media, and industrial and governmental hierarchial organizations. This philosophy

is characterized by several themes that permeate certain modern European philosophies. It is concerned with such themes as alienation, self-estrangement, transcendence, self-assertion, meaning in life, authentic living, existence in the fact of death (Johnson, 1967; Samuels, 1977).

One basic characteristic of this philosophy is that it places existence prior to essence. "Essence" which refers to the substance of things that are permanent and unchangeable, has been sought by the natural sciences. "Existence" on the other hand, refers merely to the apparent fact of "being there". Existence, according to Sartre (1947), is simply "to be" (although "to be" refers more to "standing out", "emerging", "becoming", than just "a state of being" (Johnson, 1967)). Existence is not created by man and it cannot be analyzed comprehensively through logical systems or complete rational thinking. Thus, man's thinking does not create his existence as Descartes would have it. The existentialists say that man exists first and then he speculates and contemplates his existence, and as a result of personal choice, creates his own unique essence.

By stressing existence, existentialism undercuts the dichotomy between subject and object. One central theme in existentialism is that man is a being-in-the-world (the hyphens are used to indicate the connectedness of man and his world). Being-in-the-world or Dasein, is man's existence. Dasein is not a property or attribute of man; it

is the whole of man's existence. Dasein, a German word, meaning "to be" (sein), "there" (da), is a state of being in the world in which man's whole existence that is and has to be can appear and become present and be present. When Boss uses the term "Daseinanalysis", he means careful elucidation of the specific nature of man's existence or being-in-the-world.

Therefore, in existentialism, man does not exist as a self or a subject in relation to an external world; nor is he a thing or object or body interacting with other things that make up his world. Man has his existence by being-in-the-world and the world has its existence because there is a Being to disclose it. Being and world are one. Thus, existentialism tends not to focus on just one aspect of man such as self--but continually aims for the larger gestalt--man as a whole person. To do this, the existentialists have chosen the method of phenomenology: a process by which they describe the data of immediate experience rather than analyzing or examining different parts of man. It therefore appears that existentialists use phenomenology in a slightly different sense than does Rogers (Johnson, 1967). Hall and Lindzey (1970) describe them as seeking to understand rather than explain phenomena.

Existentialists object to the carrying over of the concept of causality from the natural sciences into psychology. For them, there are no cause-effect relationships in human existence. In their view, the

subjective self would be in unity with the objective self. In such a synthesis, the self structure could never become an autonomous determinent of perception but would be inseparably linked with an active or becoming self.

Another way to illuminate some of the characteristics of existentialism is to compare it to Rogers' self theory. Both self theory and existentialism emphasize man's movement toward self-actualization. However, Rogers takes a more deterministic treatment of this directional tendency. For him, it appears to be a natural law that applies to all living things. "The directional trend we are endeavouring to describe is evident in the life of the individual organism from conception to maturity, at whatever level of organic complexity" (Rogers, 1951, p. 488). The implication here is that striving is innate and based upon organic evaluation.

The existentialists, on the other hand, view self-actualization as a goal toward which the person could choose to strive. However, it is the responsibility of the person to make of himself what he might—to shrug this responsibility is to dwell in inauthentic existence. Plans, purposes, and goals are strictly human creations and when man makes them and acts on them his being becomes unique and distinct from that of the other objects and organisms in the world.

Rogers' adherence to lawfulness follows the American trend toward predictability and exactitude. This "determinism" not only rests

on the assumption that the directional tendency motivates all behavior but also upon the proposition that if behavior is "determined by the phenomenal field then, of course, he has no choice and he can hardly be held "responsible" for his actions" (Arbuckle, 1965, p. 560).

While Rogers' self structure (phenomenal self) is the most influential aspect of the field in determining perceptual selectivity and defense, the goals of client-centered therapy appear to be aimed at freeing the individual from these influences so that he can choose experiences that had previously been denied. Stated another way, the goal is to help an individual gain a fuller grasp of reality so that he may become less determined by inaccurate perceptions of himself. Thus, there is a movement of a phenomenal self toward an existential self, or the movement from an ideal of perceived reality to one that actually exists. Rogers' view of the fully functioning person is similar to the view of the existential self. He states that "...the self and personality would emerge from experience, rather than experience being truncated or twisted to fit the preconceived self-structure" (Rogers, 1951, p. 90).

Similarly, one existentialist, Karl Jaspers, defines the goals of therapeutic process as the increasing ability of the patient to experience his existence as real--to become more fully aware of his existence and all the potentialities and possibilities that emerge from it (Johnson, 1967). In a more descriptive manner, Rollo May says that the characteristic of the neurotic is that "his existence has become

'darkened', blurred, easily threatened and clouded over, and gives no sanction to his acts; the task of therapy is to illuminate the existence" (May, et al., 1958, p. 398).

In summary, the existential self differs from the phenomenal self in that it is less deterministic and it functions in the "true" reality of existence rather than in a perceived reality. Thus, in order to achieve existential selfhood, the individual must constantly redefine himself, revise his goals and revise his possibilities.

Abraham Maslow

Maslow is similar to Kurt Goldstein and Andras Angyal (Hall & Lindzey, 1970), in that he also subscribes to an organismistic viewpoint (Maslow, 1954). Maslow differs from them because he has chosen the more direct course of studying healthy creative people whose wholeness and unity of personality are more readily apparent than those who are brain-damaged or mentally disturbed.

Maslow is probably best known for his theory of human motivation which differentiates between basic needs and metaneeds. The basic needs are listed under five major headings; physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, self-esteem needs, and self-actualization needs (Maslow, 1943; 1954). Metaneeds are values such as justice, goodness, beauty, order, or unity which behave like needs (Maslow, 1971). The basic needs are deficiency needs whereas the metaneeds are growth needs (Maslow, 1971). The basic needs are pre-

potent over the metaneeds in most cases and tend to be heirarchially ordered although this does not mean, for example, that all of the physiological needs must be met before security needs can be (Maslow, 1954).

The metaneeds have no hierarchy—they are equally potent--and can be fairly easily substituted for one another. However, they are as instinctive or inherent as basic needs and when they are not fulfilled, the person may become unhealthy. These metapathologies consist of such states as alienation, anguish, apathy, and cynicism.

For our purposes, it is interesting to note that Maslow assigned self-esteem needs on the rung just below self-actualization. Although in his early writings, Maslow (1942) equated self-esteem with dominance feeling needs, later he equated self-esteem with self-respect and classified it into two subsidiary sets (Maslow, 1954). The first is the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom (Maslow, 1954, p. 90). The second is the desire for reputation or prestige—this means respect or esteem from others. Other synonyms could be status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention and importance, dignity, or appreciation (Maslow, 1954, p. 90).

Satisfaction of self-esteem needs, Maslow said, would lead to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability, adequacy, and

of being useful and necessary in the world. Thwarting of these needs would lead to feelings of inferiority, weakness and helplessness, which in turn would lead to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends.

Reference Group Theory

The term "reference group" was first used by Hyman (1942) to mean the group with which individuals compare themselves. Hyman distinguished between the group to which an individual belongs (the membership group) and the group an individual uses to compare himself for self-appraisal (the reference group). The membership group may or may not be the reference group.

Kelly (1952) expanded Hyman's definition by adding that the reference group is in a position to award or withhold recognition to the person while Sherif and Sherif (1966) suggested that reference group standards are internalized in individuals as part of the ego and that they may not be conscious of these standards.

Samuels (1977) reviewed several studies relating self-esteem to economic class position and quoted one, Yancey, et al. (1972), which indicated that such variables as place of residence, education and marital stress may be more significant in determining an individual's self-evaluation than either race or social position.

Rosenberg (1968; 1972) argued that individuals do not always accept society's evaluation of their ethnic group as part of their self-image.

Based on his studies of adolescents, Rosenberg suggested that self-esteem may be more a function of one's position within a group than the rank of the group in relation to other groups.

Nobles (1973) suggested that there is a "we" self that must be taken into account when looking at self-concept. One example of this "we" self might be the "African reality" of black people living in America. This approach suggests that there is an awareness of a historical reference group which transcends the inferior status a group might hold in the present.

Samuels (1977), after reviewing several articles examining reference groups, concluded that the reference groups to which individuals compare themselves may affect their role behavior and self-concept. However, she also suggests that our place in society is only one factor that acts in combination with other variables such as parental attitudes and expectations, sex-role identification, and peer and teacher expectations.

Experimental Social Psychology

Probably the largest section of contemporary literature which uses self-esteem as a variable of interest is that of experimental social psychology. While the research has been very diverse, the subject of "attitude change" has been the most popular. This research has broadened from earlier persuasibility research where the emphasis was on individual tendencies to be persuaded to the dynamics of the whole

persuasion process. Research in this area tends to be disjointed and the literature might best be described as a large and diverse "collection of research findings" (Wells & Marwell, 1976, p. 25).

Within the attitude - change literature, one recent trend has investigated self-esteem as an important characteristic of the receiver. A number of researchers see self-esteem as an important personality variable in explaining individual variation in the tendency to change as a result of a persuasive appeal (McGuire, 1968; Nisbet & Gordon, 1967; Silverman et al., 1966).

Another area of the attitude - change literature focuses on change in self-attitudes (self-concept). Here self-esteem has served as the dependent variable in studies by Johnson (1966), Eagley and Acksen (1971), Eagley and Whitehead (1972). Self-esteem has also been involved in the study of interpersonal attraction. One viewpoint suggests that a person will be attracted to another similar to himself only if he likes himself (Hendrick & Page, 1970; Leonard, 1973). Extending a "matching model" of attraction where one person is attracted to another whom she "deserves" in some way, self-esteem has also been employed to calculate equitable outcomes (Jacobs et al., 1971; Walster, 1970).

Self-esteem has also been used in group dynamics as an explanatory variable in suggesting personality factors in group behavior (Faucheux & Moscovici, 1968; Gergen & Bauer, 1967) and as a dependent variable in studying the impact of groups on members (Kipnis, 1972;

Wood et al., 1973; Zander et al., 1960).

Self-esteem has also been employed to help explain the dynamics of "moral" behavior, generally from dissonance and equity perspectives. It has also been used to explain moral or immoral behavior itself, for example, the tendency to cheat or act dishonestly (Aronson & Mettee, 1968; Graf, 1971; Jacobson et al., 1969), helping or altruistic behavior (Rudestam et al., 1971; Tessler & Schwartz, 1972), and resistance to temptation (Eisen, 1972). The way in which self-esteem functions as a mediator or qualifier on task performances has been studied by several writers. For example, self-esteem has been an important variable in experiences of failure (Perez, 1973; Ryckman et al., 1971; Schalon, 1968), in experiences of success (Maracek & Mettee, 1972), in sensory deprivation experiences (Hewitt & Rule, 1968), and in audience effects (Shrauger, 1972).

In addition to the specific experimental studies, self-esteem is an important element in some theoretical perspectives. For example, in equity theory, self-esteem is involved in calculating "equitable" outcomes (Pepitone et al., 1967). In attribution theory, consideration of self-conception and self-evaluation are requisite concerns for the attribution of the outcomes of one's own behavior (Ossorio & Davis, 1968). In the area of self-perception theory in attribution, some developments there have strong similarities with more behavioral descriptions of self-evaluation and self-esteem (compare Bem, 1972; Nisbett & Valins,

1972; with Diggory, 1966). Lastly, self-esteem has also played an important role in some research that has been tied with cognitive dissonance theory (Aronson, 1968; Bramel, 1962).

Self-Consistency Theory

Self-consistency theorists argue that individuals' receptivity to outside information is [illegible]affected by their need to create and maintain a consistent state in self-evaluation. The tendency is to interact only with those whose behavior validates their self-concept. If there is an inconsistency in their relations with others, the individual might change his conception of himself, his own action, or attempt to change the action of the other person or he might terminate his relationship with the other person.

Self-consistency theory has a long history. William James (1893) was among the first to write about its importance. Lewin (1935), taking a psychological perspective, viewed the self as a central and relatively permanent organization that gives consistency to the personality while Stagner (1951) felt that homeostasis, as a general biological law, could be applied to some extent to the psychology of personality and that similarly the individual seeks to maintain constancy with regard to self-perception.

Samuels (1977) reviewed several prominent theorists such as Adler, Rogers, Sullivan, Allport, Combs and Snygg, who all stressed the idea that the self strives for consistency and that the stability of the pheno-

menal self makes change difficult because the self either ignores inconsistent data or selects perceptions in such a way as to confirm self-concepts we already possess.

Festinger (1957) generated a great deal of research when he theorized that "the human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values. That is, there is drive towards consonance among cognitions" (Festinger, 1957, p. 260). His cognitive dissonance theory as it came to be known suggested that if there is "dissonance" (which occurs when an individual has feelings, ideas, or perceptions that are in opposition to one another), he tends to find ways to gain cognitive consistency and to reduce dissonance. Individuals may misperceive evaluations which are inconsistent with already existing feelings and perceptions in order to prevent themselves from becoming psychologically uncomfortable as a result of contradictions of conflicting perceptions.

Felker (1974), in suggesting a threefold role of self-concept, said that the first task was to maintain an inner consistency which predisposed people to action in ways consistent with the views they have of themselves. This consistency inclined people to interpret their new experiences in terms of previous experiences which made it hard to change, and lastly self-concept leads to a set of expectations that create conditions that determine how others will treat us. Such a viewpoint might explain how children who have been conditioned to think poorly of them-

selves expect and then act in such a way to invite negative reactions from others. Often they will "egg on" new others until they get the expected negative reactions or they misinterpret the reactions to meet their expectations. This most certainly can make it difficult for teachers to change self-feelings and indeed may often require additional help.

Self-Esteem Theory

Although this theory could be left until self-esteem is examined more closely, because it is often compared to self-consistency theory, it is included here. What is referred to in the literature as self-esteem theory is more specific in that it postulates that people have a need for positive self-esteem, which is satisfied by the approval they receive from others and is frustrated by their disapproval. This theory differs from self-consistency in that it suggests that a person will emphasize (even though this may be unconscious) gaining self-esteem rather than achieving self-consistency. These two different viewpoints have generated lively debate (see Jones, 1973). Self-esteem theory would suggest that if low self-esteem needs are met, the low self-esteem person will respond to others (Samuels, 1977). For example, looking at schools again, this theory suggests that if teachers can provide experiences to enhance self-esteem for those children who lack it, the children will respond and presumably gain more positive self-feelings.

Jones (1973) compared self-consistency theory with self-esteem theory by critically evaluating studies that supported both theories.

His articles suggest that self-esteem theory is more useful. He also extended self-esteem theory to include interpretations of self-consistency studies. He suggested that some apparently self-consistent responses can be viewed in terms of people forfeiting immediate gratification of esteem needs in anticipation of more enhancing or less self-derogatory experiences in the future. Krauss and Critchfield (1975) conducted some experiments based on some of Jones' suggestions. In their research, they initially hypothesized that self-esteem theory would be supported in those situations in which the subject was the target of evaluative action and that consistency theory would hold in those contexts in which the subject observed others interacting but was not evaluated directly by them. However, they found that self-esteem theory alone accounted adequately for the data. This would tend to support Jones' (1973) earlier conclusion that cognitive consistency theories may be somewhat overworked as explanatory frameworks for the study of social evaluations. However, Regan and Wells (1976) argue that reconciliation of the two theories is possible by careful articulation of the situation to which each applies.

While acknowledging the limitations of consistency theory, perhaps one could say that there is an inner consistency that is needed to maintain constancy. Self-concept begins to stabilize and become resistant to change early in life. Furthermore, the "core" concepts that are learned early become central to the individual and are the most resistant

to change. However, because there is also a striving toward positive self-evaluation, change can become possible particularly in new experiences with new significant others.

Symbolic Interactionist Perspectives

While the focus of this approach is mainly on the process of self-conceptualization, this viewpoint also probably represents the theoretical setting where self-esteem is most firmly rooted in a broader conceptual structure (Wells & Marwell, 1976). A theoretical descendent of Mead and Cooley, this approach sees self-conception (the process of responding to oneself as an object) as necessary for the occurrence of "human" behavior; and that this process is necessarily social, involving the medium of language. The concern is mainly with the process of self-conception, but the self-evaluation aspect of self-esteem is also stressed.

Today there are basically two groups operating under the symbolic interaction theory umbrella (Wells & Marwell, 1976). One, the Chicago school, emphasizes the "situated" nature of social events, emphasizing the necessity of observing ongoing behavior and rejects traditional ideas of measurement or operationalization (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959). The Iowa school on the other hand, represents a more operational-empirical approach. Researchers in this school of thought have attempted to operationalize the self-concept and subject the basic propositions of the theory to direct empirical tests. This group has pro-

duced papers testing the Mead-Cooley premise that self-concept is the result of reflected appraisals by others (Kemper, 1966; Mannheim, 1966; Miyamoto & Dornbusch, 1956; Sherwood, 1965, Videbeck, 1960). Also, rather than just observing the self "in-process", this tradition sees the discovery of the structure and content of the self-concept as a basic task. The methodological division between the two traditions is often seen in terms of "participant observation" (Chicago) versus the "Twenty Statements Test" (Iowa). Perhaps because of its emphasis upon measuring and studying the self-concept in traditional ways, the Iowa tradition has produced much more literature on the self-concept and self-esteem.

Theories of Self-Esteem

While most of the theorists and theories mentioned earlier have employed the concept of self-esteem to some degree, it has usually not been the pivotal point of their theories. By contrast, the following writers represent explicit attempts to develop theories in which self-esteem plays the central role. All of these theories, with the exception of Nathaniel Branden's, are based on empirical studies of self-esteem and its correlates. However, while there are overlaps in their thinking, they do not all hold the same viewpoints.

Morris Rosenberg. Rosenberg (1965) describes his research as an attempt to specify the bearing of certain social factors on self-esteem and to indicate the influence of self-esteem on socially significant atti-

tudes. In his work he has tended to take a more sociological approach than the other self-esteem writers.

Most of his writings derive from research conducted with adolescents based upon analyzing their attitudes towards themselves. He believes that people have attitudes towards all kinds of objects and that the self is simply one of those objects towards which one has attitudes. However, while similar in many respects, he does point out that there are some quantitative differences between self-attitudes and the kinds of attitudes one has towards other objects (Rosenberg, 1965). He sees self-esteem as a kind of evaluative attitude.

He defines self-esteem by contrasting low and high esteem. High self-esteem means that the individual respects himself, considers himself worthy; he does not consider himself better than others but definitely does not consider himself worse; he does not feel that he is the ultimate in perfection but on the contrary, recognizes his limitations and expects to grow and improve. By contrast, low self-esteem implies self-rejection, self-dissatisfaction, self-contempt. The individual lacks respect for the self he observes. The self picture is disagreeable and he wishes it were otherwise.

According to Rosenberg, all self-attitudes have an evaluative dimension which produces a "self-estimation" of the attitude object--"how the individual actually rates himself with regard to a particular characteristic" (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 246). All self-estimates are

not equally important but vary according to the self-value of the attitude--"how much he cares about the quality" (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 246). By weighing each self-estimate with its corresponding self-value, and then engaging in a kind of psychological summation of the specific weighted evaluations, the person's overall self-esteem is determined.

This research suggests that people with high self-esteem tend to have higher aspirations and expectations for success than low self-esteem individuals. Low self-esteem people also exhibit more personality characteristics indicating generally neurotic tendencies and report greater difficulty and hesitation in social interaction.

Stanley Coopersmith. Coopersmith (1959; 1967) has been particularly interested in the evaluative aspect of self-esteem and the antecedents or early development of self-esteem. Much of his research data comes from research with pre and early adolescent children. Self-esteem for Coopersmith (1967) refers to

> the evaluation which the individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval and indicates the extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy. (It) is a personal judgment of worthiness that is expressed in the attitudes the individual holds toward himself. (p. 4)

Coopersmith's research then has been specifically concerned with the evaluative attitude which the individual holds toward himself as an object. He has developed a composite index to describe a person's

self-esteem. One part deals with subjective expression (the individual's self-perception and self-description), the other part with behavioral expression (behavioral manifestations of the individual's self-esteem as seen by outside observers). In this way, he feels he can differentiate between true self-esteem and defensive self-esteem--a point which Wells and Marwell (1976) suggest is debatable.

Coopersmith suggests that the specific, determining variables of self-esteem can be subsumed under the four concepts of successes, values, aspirations, and defenses. According to him

> the process of self-judgment derives from a subjective judgment of success with that appraisal weighted according to the values placed upon different areas of capacity and performance, measured against a person's personal goals and standards and filtered through his capacity to defend himself against presumed or actual occurrences of failure. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 242)

In order to achieve a positive evaluation, the individual has to reach a level of performance in valued areas that meet or exceed his aspirations, and he has to be able to diminish and reject the derogatory implications of any differences and deficiencies.

In addition to these four groups of variables, Coopersmith also suggested that with the children he studied, three conditions on the part of the parents seemed to be strongly conducive for promoting self-esteem, namely: (1) acceptance of the children, (2) enforcement of clearly defined limits, and (3) respect for individual initiative and latitude within these limits.

William Fitts. In his research, William Fitts (1971, 1972) was originally interested in the rehabilitation of individuals. However, he now believes that the term rehabilitation is a less appropriate term and believes that self-actualization may be a more descriptive label. He sees self-actualization as the process of making actual or real, of implementing or putting into motion, the potential resources of an individual (Fitts, 1971, p. 5). Virtually equating rehabilitation with self-actualization, he says rehabilitation can be conceptualized as a multifaceted process aimed at facilitating the self-actualization of individuals (Fitts, 1971, p. 5).

For Fitts, if a person is interested in rehabilitation, it would be useful to know if there is something about a person that summarizes all that he is and that serves as a supramoderator of his functioning. Fitts believes that the self-concept fulfills this function (1971, p. 2). "The self-concept is seen as a means of understanding the individual from his own frame of reference and as a resource for better planning and assistance by those who would help him toward rehabilitation and/or self-actualization" (Fitts, 1972, p. 5). By "self-concept", Fitts usually means the positiveness of the self-concept (self-esteem) but, his writings also include discussion of its other aspects such as structure, consistency, components, etc. While he acknowledges that the actual self-perceptions are important, he sees them as secondary to the emotional tone, or the esteem value of the perception (Fitts, 1971, p. 23).

In keeping with self-actualization theory, Fitts' conceptual model is phrased in terms of interpersonal relationships and interpersonal competence. Wells and Marwell (1976) see Fitts' "Wheel Model" metaphor as more of an analogy for explaining therapy than as an outline for research. However, they do concede that Fitts and his colleagues have conducted considerable empirical research, mainly consisting of correlational studies.

Fitts is particularly important to this study because one of the instruments he developed to measure self-esteem, the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, was used as one of the objective measures of self-esteem. More about this instrument will be said in Chapter III.

Robert Ziller. For Ziller (1973), it is fruitless to talk of the individual alone. To study the self as separate from others he says is like an ecologist trying to study the habits of birds whose wings have been removed for purposes of experimentation (Ziller, 1973, p. xiv). Thus, Ziller suggests that if one is to study the self and self-esteem properly, a social approach must be taken.

Ziller says that the individual in a social setting is required to make a series of decisions to guide his behavior under conditions of rapid presentation of social events. To facilitate decision making, people find it expedient to develop schemata which will aid in the processing of social information.

For example, a person may use the schema of his self-ranking among

other group members to help him decide whether or not to speak or how often he should speak (Ziller, 1973).

In Ziller's framework, social adaptation is presumed to be mediated by self-other concepts of which self-esteem is one such concept. He suggests that social stimuli are screened and translated into personal meaning through crude mapping of the self in relation to significant others. He differs from the behaviorists in that he believes the organism intervenes between the stimulus and the response and acts as a controlling agent rather than being controlled by the stimulus (social stimuli -- self-other schemata -- social response). Following Brunswik (1956), he suggests that stimuli are selected and organized according to the needs of the organizer and in terms of some system which reduces the information to be stored and facilitates information retrieval and general utility.

In terms of interpersonal perception, he says social stimuli are mediated by schemata which chart the relationship of self and other. With the aid of these mappings of self and other, decision-making for interpersonal behavior becomes easier in new situations. The self-other concepts make for stability in changing social situations and also function to some degree as defense or control mechanisms, enabling the person to better regulate or stabilize his environment. The self-other concepts facilitate interpersonal adaptation.

When it comes to specifically discussing self-esteem, Ziller notes

that self-esteem is usually concerned with the individual's perception of his worth, particularly along an evalua[redacted]mension (Ziller, 1973, p. 6). However, he believes that because most research has largely avoided the social context of self-esteem, the effectiveness of these theories in predicting social behavior may have been severely limited. Therefore, he proposes that the self-concept be seen as a mediating agent between the organism and the environment and that self-esteem be seen as that component of the self system which is associated with the consistency of the organism's response to the environment (Ziller, 1973, p. 6). The self-esteem concept can be thought of as a conceptual buffer for evaluative stimuli. When the person's social environment changes, self-esteem determines the resulting changes in self-evaluation. Self-esteem is linked to the concept of personality integration relative to the person's ability to react to a variety of incoming stimuli.

Following this viewpoint, Ziller sees people with high self-esteem as being somewhat insulated from the environment. They are not victims of events nor are they compelled to accommodate the self to the situation (an S-O-R model of learning). Events are assimilated within the self system.

By contrast, individuals with low self-esteem, lacking a well developed conceptual buffer, tend to be field dependent. He believes their adaptation system may be characterized as an S-R

model of learning. Another way of viewing it is to say that the person with low self-esteem is required to monitor the behavior of many others before making a decision to act, whereas a person with high self-esteem only monitors the behavior of a few others before making a decision to act (Ziller, 1973).

One criticism of Ziller's discussion and utilization of social self-esteem made by Wells and Marwell (1976), is that it appears he equates only self-evaluation with an explicit social comparison process. Instead of judging oneself with respect to some internalized standard or ideal, Ziller's process only involves social ranking--how the person ranks himself against some collection of specific others.

Nathaniel Branden. While Branden (1969; 1970) is not usually included in most references to self-esteem, he will be mentioned here for several reasons. First, the facilitators of the self-esteem workshops to be examined later draw substantially upon Branden for their conceptualization of self-esteem. Second, Branden's association with the philosopher Ayn Rand (who also contributed to some of Abraham Maslow's thinking (Maslow, 1971), has added some dimensions not often mentioned by other self-esteem theorists and researchers. Third, Branden's experience as a practicing clinician has enabled him to make some personal observations which add a practical viewpoint that is sometimes lacking in other theoretical formulations. However, one

criticism that needs to be made of Branden's writings is that he seldom cites the sources of his thought. It may be that for the most part they are original but when they resemble other theorists, it is difficult to tell if his work is paralleling other researchers and he has not yet acquainted himself with their works or he has simply chosen not to cite his sources. However, in spite of this, his writings (Branden, 1969; 1970) make extensive use of the notion of self-esteem and therefore, for the above reasons, will be examined in some detail.

To understand the importance of self-esteem to Branden's system of thought, it is necessary to back up and look at some other key elements in his framework. Branden starts by looking at the notions of what is health and mental health with respect to mankind. He also spends some time showing how man is different from other animals and concludes that one of the differentiating characteristics is that man's consciousness is different from that of other animals in that he can reason. Man is able to extend the range of his awareness beyond the perceptual concretes immediately confronting him, to abstract, to integrate, to grasp principles, to apprehend reality on the conceptual level of consciousness (Branden, 1969, p. 5). Man is a being whose distinctive form of consciousness is <u>conceptual.</u> The basic function of man's consciousness is cognition, ie. awareness and knowledge of the facts of reality which then enables him to evaluate and regulate his

actions (Branden, 1969, p. 97).

Just as an organism is physically healthy to the degree its organs function efficiently in maintaining the life of the organism, so a human is mentally healthy to the extent that his mind performs its biological function efficiently--namely cognition, evaluation, and regulation of action. In order to evaluate and therefore regulate his actions appropriately, man's mind (and therefore man) has to operate efficaciously when dealing with reality.

This in turn has led Branden to explore the method by which the mind functions, or man's psycho-espistemology, a term coined by Barbara Branden, one of Ayn Rand's contemporaries in the mid-1950s. Psycho-espistemology is defined by Branden (1969) as the "study of the nature of, and the relationship between the conscious, goal-setting, self-regulatory operations of the mind and the sub-conscious, automatic operations" (p. 99).

Branden says that a man's psycho-espistemological processes may be directed by the goal of cognition, ie. awareness, therefore, reality-oriented, or they may be ruled by goals that entail the subversion of his cognitive apparatus--reality-avoidance. This, he says, is the alternative at the root of the issue of mental health. As indicated earlier, mental health is the unobstructed capacity for reality-bound cognitive functioning and the exercise of this capacity. Mental illness is the sustained impairment of this capacity (Branden, 1969, p. 101).

Mental illness, for Branden, is fundamentally psycho-espistemological. A mental disorder is a thinking disorder (Branden, 1962, p. 102). Conversely, mental health is unobstructed cognitive efficacy which for Branden requires and entails intellectual independence. He believes that intellectual independence is unlikely to happen unless a person possesses healthy self-esteem.

Nature and source of self-esteem. According to Branden, there is no value-judgment more important to man--no factor more decisive in his psychological development and motivation--than the estimate he passes on himself (Branden, 1969, p. 109). This estimate is not usually experienced in the form of a conscious, verbalized judgment but in the form of a feeling which is the product of an evaluation about one's competence to live and one's worthiness to live. Stated another way, Branden says that self-esteem is the integrated sum of self-confidence and self-respect. He claims that the desire for self-esteem, the desire for a positive view of oneself is such a basic need that one might evade, repress, distort or even disintegrate one's mind to avoid facts that might adversely affect one's self-appraisal.

Why does Branden see self-esteem as so important? The answer is contained in two statements (which Branden asserts as facts) about man's nature. Firstly, he says reason is man's basic means of survival; secondly, the exercise of man's rational faculty is volitional. These beliefs lead him to the observation that man must be able to

direct his mental functioning which in turn means that he must be able to discriminate between a state of mental focus and a state of mental fog, and to choose one state or the other.

Since reality confronts man with constant alternatives, he must choose his goals and his actions. His life and happiness require that his method of choosing and making decisions be right in principle, be appropriate to reality. If man's consciousness was automatic, there would be no problem, but because man's is volitional, there can be no more urgent concern and here is where self-esteem becomes so important.

If man chooses his goals and actions, his life and happiness require that he be right. While he cannot expect to be infallible, he needs to believe that his method of choosing and making decisions is right in principle, appropriate to reality. To the extent that he typically makes the right choices in these issues, he experiences a sense of control over his existence--the control of a mind in proper relationship to reality. This leads to self-confidence in one's mind, in it's reliability as a tool of cognition. Man needs this self-confidence because to doubt the efficacy of his tool of survival is to be stopped, paralyzed and condemned to anxiety and helplessness (Branden, 1969, p. 112).

In addition to self-confidence (the sense of efficacy or competence), man also needs self-respect (the sense of worthiness). Branden [illegible] that there is no way for man to exempt himself from the realm o[illegible]

values and value-judgments (Branden, 1969, p. 114). Whether the values by which he judges himself are conscious or subconscious, rational or irrational, consistent or contradictory, life-serving or life-negating--every human being judges himself by some standard. To the extent that he fails to satisfy that standard, his sense of personal worth and his self-respect suffer accordingly.

Man needs self-respect because he has to act to achieve values and in order to act, he needs to value the beneficiary of his action. In order to seek values, man must consider himself worthy of enjoying them. In order to fight for his happiness, he must consider himself worthy of happiness.

These two aspects of self-esteem--self-confidence and self-respect --can be isolated conceptually but are actually inseparable in a man's psychology. Man makes himself worthy of living by making himself competent to live. For Branden, the roots of both aspects of self-esteem are psycho-espistemological.

Basic conditions for achieving self-esteem. In order to achieve and maintain self-esteem, certain requirements must be met according to Branden. The first is that the person preserve an indomitable will to understand (Branden, 1969, p. 114). This desire to identify and integrate that which falls within his range of awareness, is the guardian of man's mental health and the motor of his intellectual growth.

Unfortunately, he says, this attitude is often relinquished or

breached early in a person's life. Sometimes this is due to volitional default on the part of the child, but often the causes are more complex, for example when a child encounters human irrationality with which he does not know how to cope. Even more tragic is the case when after a number of unsuccessful attempts to understand the actions of such adults, the child gives up and takes the blame for his feelings of helplessness. Branden calls this accepting an unearned guilt. In turn, guilt subdues self-assertiveness. A guilt-ridden mind is less inclined to critical, independent judgment and is more susceptible to indoctrination and intellectual manipulation.

If as a person matures, he maintains the will to understand, he will be led necessarily to the policy of conceptualizing--of looking for and thinking in terms of principles. Without a process of integration, understanding is impossible--and without concepts and principles, integration is impossible. The policy of conceptualizing is the basic characteristic of psychological maturity for Branden, and as such is an invariable concomitant of a fully achieved self-esteem.

Another requirement necessary for the achievement of self-esteem is that the person must develop the ability to distinguish between knowledge and feelings. The person must learn that emotions are not adequate guides for actions. Branden maintains that one must develop cognitive self-assertiveness. He says that to sacrifice one's mind in favor of feelings one cannot rationally justify or defend is to subvert

one's self-esteem. This is not to say that one represses or dismisses emotions as unimportant but to recognize that emotions are effects--the consequences of value-judgments. The proper course is to know the nature of those judgments and the degree of their validity in a given context.

Paradoxically, he notes that rational self-regulation is more conducive to healthy emotional spontaneity because a policy of unbridled emotionalism usually leads to disasters, thereby causing a person to fear his emotions as sources of danger and guilt (Branden, 1969, p. 118). In dealing with emotions, the attitude one develops towards dealing with fear is one of the most important for Branden.

Rejecting one's mind under the pressure of fear is psychologically disastrous. If, for example, a young person ventures an independent opinion in the presence of a parent who proceeds to behave threateningly and irrationally, and if the person then decides that he must be wrong and surrenders to the desire to escape this frightening situation by suspending his independent judgment, then fear will gain a greater hold over him and each subsequent surrender will more and more affect his sense of personal efficacy.

If a person passively allows his values to be attacked through fear of "not belonging" or not "being accepted", or if he prefers safety through fear of failure or of making mistakes, he will experience a profound loss of self-esteem. Thus, if a person is to maintain his

"will to efficacy", he must never resign himself to living with uncontested fear.

The basic choice for both the will to understand and the will to efficacy is: to think or not to think. However, for knowledge to be one's own knowledge, a process of independent thought is required. The necessity of intellectual independence is implicit in the will to understand. To relinquish independent thought is to relinquish self-esteem. The result will be a sense of alienation from reality--a sense of being "a stranger and afraid, in a world I never made" (Branden, 1969, p. 124).

So important is the need for self-esteem, Branden asserts that if a person can't have genuine self-esteem, he will fake it and manufacture pseudo-self-esteem. He says that to the extent a person fails to attain authentic self-esteem, the consequence will be a feeling of anxiety, insecurity, self-doubt, the sense of being unfit for reality, and inadequate for existence. To cope with these feelings, a person will develop pseudo-self-esteem to diminish anxiety and to provide a spurious sense of security--to assuage a need of authentic self-esteem while allowing the real causes of its lack to be evaded.

Pseudo-self-esteem is maintained by two means, essentially by: evading, repressing, rationalizing or otherwise denying ideas and feelings that could affect his self-appraisal adversely; and by seeking to derive his sense of competence and worth from something other than

rationality--some alternative or value which he experiences as less demanding or more easily attainable. Branden notes that the characteristic response to any potential assault on pseudo-self-esteem is the suspension of consciousness.

The distinction between authentic self-esteem and pseudo-self-esteem led Branden to other indexes of mental health. For him, a man is psychologically healthy to the extent that there is no clash in him between perceiving reality and preserving his self-esteem; the degree to which such a clash exists is a degree of his mental illness. Furthermore, a man is psychologically healthy to the extent that he functions on the principle of motivation by confidence; the degree of his motivation by fear is a degree of mental illness.

In summary, Branden says that to understand the nature and form of a person's self-esteem, whether authentic or false, is to understand the mainsprings of his actions. Understanding a man's self-esteem is the key to understanding man's motivation.

Summary

After briefly introducing the three terms, self, self-concept, and self-esteem, this section identified the important issues that have been raised in discussions about these terms. Most of these issues were not discussed at this time, but were raised to stimulate the examination of the more prominent theorists who have written about these terms. While all three terms have been around for some time, it was

seen that initial discussions focused more on self and self-concept than on self-esteem. It was also observed that initially speculations on these terms, particularly self-esteem, were general and vague; later they became more refined and became incorporated into specific theories. Modern day theories specifically dealing with self-esteem such as Rosenberg's, Coopersmith's, Fitts', Ziller's, and Branden's were examined.

An examination of these and the other theorists clearly illustrates that different viewpoints still exist today with regard to the three terms and indicates that many of the issues raised at the beginning of this chapter are not yet resolved. Although the debates will continue for some time, the issues involving the self will now be re-examined so that a summary of the current thinking about them can be provided, which in turn will further understanding of self-esteem.

Drawing mainly from Gergen (1971), Gordon and Gergen (1968), Wells and Marwell (1976), and Wylie (1968; 1974), the next section briefly examines the main points involved with the issues of: whether the self is a fact or fiction, whether it is the knower or the known, whether it is a single or fragmented entity, whether it is only concerned with conscious behavior, how stable it is, and whether it is something innate or something created by other processes.

The Self: A Review of the Issues Involved

The Self as a Hypothetical Construct

No writer mentioned in this thesis has considered the self to be directly observable as an objective entity. Instead, it is almost universally considered to be a hypothetical construct--an abstraction from specific attitudes and behaviors--which is inferred or construed from observable events and which may be useful in predicting behavior but does not necessarily refer to real-world objects. Viewed in this way, the self is much like a "fiction", that is, the notion of self is used as if it refers to a fact.

Such constructs elicit two basic questions: 1) the "reality" of the construct (whether it is a property of the world or of the explanation), and 2) its necessity (can we do as well without it?). While both of these questions are still being debated, writers such as Gergen (1971), Wells and Marwell (1976), and Wylie (1961; 1974), conclude that the concept is a helpful one but that it should be used cautiously particularly since it is very easy to reify the concept thereby leading to the creation of an homunculus, a "little man inside the head", a position that has little scientific value.

The Self as Knower versus Known

One of the recurring problems in self-conceptualization is the self-as-agent of behavior rather than merely as object of behavior--James' familiar I-Me dichotomy, with the experiencing agent opposed to the contents of experience. In terms of phenomenal processes,

the distinction is between the self as perceiver and as the object(s) of perception or in the perception itself. Discussion around this issue has led to so much confusion that in practice most theorists have either abandoned or ignored it. Allport eventually revised his earlier work on the proprium deciding that the self as knower (perceptual agent) is not the province of psychology and should be consigned to the field of philosophy (Gordon & Gergen, 1968). Gergen (1971) says that we have little way of assessing the raw experience of self, but this need not be a great handicap and that we can get along quite well by focusing on the way in which people interpret themselves, their actions, or their sensory inputs. For him, the concern should be with the concept of self rather than with the experience.

The Self as Structure versus Process

Another issue which is the subject of vigorous debate is whether to view the self as a structure or as a process. The term structure implies a stable entity (hypothetical) which by analogy might function like a part in a machine. Taking this viewpoint, the concept of self is seen as if it were a thing, having structural properties that give it stability over time.

By contrast, a view of self as process would entail discussing principles of operation of forces at play. To continue the analogy, rather than concentrating on the particular parts of the machine, like

pistons and valves, this approach would examine the underlying laws, like the principles of combustion.

The structure metaphor is associated with consistency and phenomenological theories such as Rosenberg (1965) or Rogers (1950; 1959), while the process viewpoint is represented by people like Mead (1934) and Diggory (1966). Gergen (1971) sees little reason to labor this distinction because the processes need not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as complimentary ways of exploring the same subject matter.

The Self as a Unitary Concept

The term "self" implies a single or global entity, yet there are strong arguments against this position of singular conceptualization of self. Spitzer et al. (1971) incorporate both views when they note that the world in terms of a Me-Not Me division treats the self as a single object despite the multiple identities within the Me.

> The self then is both a social object and a set of social objects. It is a social object as it is differentiated from all other objects and is viewed as a unitary phenomenon. It is a set of social objects as individuals classify and identify themselves in a variety of ways (Spitzer et al., 1971, p. 7).

While most writers agree that the self is both a unitary and a multiplex phenomenon, different conceptual approaches tend to emphasize one or the other. Process models usually postulate a multiplicity of selves, each of which is emergent in a particular situation involving a particular social relation and context. Structural

approaches tend to describe a unitary sense of self in terms of the organization of self-cognitions or self-images, with individual cognitions being parts or structural components of the total self.

Cognitive versus Behavioral Models of Self

Traditionally, the self has been defined as a component of the personality--subjective, private and not directly observable. Thus most usages describe the self in terms of self-concepts which are "inside" the person (Jourard, 1957; McCandless, 1961; Rogers, 1959; Rosenberg, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1969; White, 1963). However, some writers have defined the self in terms of observable behavior (Brim, 1960; Diggory, 1966; Mead, 1954; Secord, 1968). Thus one can see that while concepts involving the self and self-processes generally involve cognitive theories, description of the self is not limited to cognitive or phenomenological perspectives. Wells and Marwell (1976) suggest that whichever viewpoint is taken, "reflexive behavior" is always involved. What seems to be requisite in using the self as an analytic instrument is the assertion that such reflexive behavior is qualitatively or at least quantitatively different from nonreflexive behavior (Wells & Marwell, 1976, p. 49).

The Self as Conscious Behavior

While the phenomenal self is the product of a completely conscious perceptual process, the psychoanalytic model recognizes different levels of consciousness within the personality and the self,

thereby introducing a "conscious versus unconscious" dimension. This unconscious aspect of self is different than the preconscious or subconscious processes of other "self" theories.

The idea of an unconscious aspect to self creates many problems but it is particularly important when it comes to the issue of defensive behavior. As Wells and Marwell (1976) note, the idea of defensive behavior has strong implications when it comes to the task of observing or operationalizing the self-concept. If the behavior of interest can be distorted by operating defenses, the theory must describe the relationship between that which is observed and that which is hidden yet presumed to be "real". To date, they suggest that this relationship has not been very well described and is often not described at all.

Self-Consistency versus Inconsistency

If one takes the view that it is possible to have multiple concepts of self, do these multiple views remain fragmented and inconsistent or do they tend to move toward harmony and compatibility? While Gergen (1971) notes that society tends to push for consistency, he says that for psychologists, the issue really is not what "should" be, but what best accounts for "what is". He cites evidence that suggests that the more typical state is one in which incompatibility reigns yet also notes that Festinger's work on dissonance reduction suggests that inconsistent cognitions or thoughts are intolerable for human

being and that there is therefore a tendency to reduce inconsistency. Although antagonistic, Gergen says the amount of conflict generated will depend on the individual's awareness of the inconsistency, the functional value of the concepts at stake, and the amount of training he has had in avoiding inconsistency. Thus, if the amount of conflict generated is not too much, the individual can probably tolerate the inconsistency (Gergen, 1971, p. 22).

The Self as an Innate Structure

Although most conceptions of the self and its development are in terms of social learning processes, many of these descriptions also involve a variety of related "innate" tendencies. For example, some variant of "self-enhancement" is found in almost every theory--meaning that there is some kind of self-motive which promotes behavior that leads to either the increased self-evaluation or enhanced self-consistency. This motive is often called the self-esteem motive and is considered to be crucial for self-preservation (Branden, 1969; Wells & Marwell, 1976).

In addition to self-enhancement, the idea of innate self-capacities is common in the literature. In Freudian psychology, the ego capacities and ego instincts which enable one to acquire this structure are presumed to be inherent. In self theories, the capacity to learn, affiliative tendencies, or the capacity to symbolize are seen as inherent capacities which underline self-conception (Allport, 1955). Some

other theories presume the existence of innate drives. Horney's (1950) "real self" represents a person's inborn potential and the normal process of self-realization is one in which the person's actual self is driven to achieve congruence with this self-potential. The innate self is also described by people like Rogers, Allport, Maslow and Fitts as assuring a drive to self-actualization. As McCall (1963) describes it, "Behind and sustaining all particular human motives, there is an "elan to maximize not merely to maintain life--though this purpose is basic to the enterprise of maximization--but to live it as fully as possible" (p. 302).

These are the major issues that have been discussed in relation to self (and by implication self-concept). As the next section deals with self-esteem, it might seem appropriate to now state this writer's conception of the terms self and self-concept. However, this will be delayed until self-esteem has been examined more closely, then the conceptual definitions of these terms will be stated together.

Self-Esteem: Further Observations

Having examined some of the various theoretical perspectives and having looked at the notion of self and the issues involved there, what can we now say about the notion of self-esteem? Why is its study important? What kind of processes are involved? As a component of self-concept, what is its specific nature? Can it be measured, affected and influenced?

In response to the second question, the usual reason given for its attention is the presumed motivational significance of the valuation a person places on himself. It is assumed by most writers that the person's evaluation of himself plays a critical role in determining his behavior (Branden, 1969; Felker, 1974; Gergen, 1971; Wells & Marwell, 1976; Wylie, 1974).

While the other questions are important, it seems impossible to answer them definitively, mainly because as mentioned earlier, there is no universal definition of self-esteem. This is due to the fact that the meaning of such a construct is derivable only in terms of a larger more comprehensive theory of human behavior and is, therefore, necessarily relative to that theoretical perspective (Wells & Marwell, 1976). The best one can hope to do then is to identify the common threads and highlight the differences among the various theoretical approaches and such will be the intent of this section.

Dimensions and Processes

Wells and Marwell (1976) suggest that of the variety of terms or synonyms associates with self-esteem, three of them, each of which reflects a different theoretical thrust, dominate the literature. The terms are, 1) self-love, 2) self-acceptance, and 3) a sense of competence.

These terms are primarily distinguishable by the manner in which

they emphasize what Wells and Marwell consider to be the two main underlying processes of self-esteem--affection and evaluation. They suggest that the way each writer sees and emphasizes the relationship between these two processes affects his definitions, descriptions, explanations and measurement of self-esteem.

Another factor affecting the description of self-esteem is the way in which each writer stresses the cognitive, affective, or behavioral concomitants of self-evaluations. Stressing one of these components over the others led Wells and Marwell to classify existing definitions of self-esteem as falling into one of four categories; 1) attitudes, 2) relations between attitudes or selves, 3) psychological responses, or 4) as a personality function.

The last factor that separates theorists is their view of the optimal level of self-esteem vis-a-vis effective personal functioning. Each of these points will now be examined more closely.

Starting with the three main ways self-esteem terms have been used, we see that while both of the terms self-love and self-acceptance involve affection, self-acceptance is seen as a more phenomenal judgment and the causal mechanisms are thought to be the structure and directions of attitudes, as in some of the neo-Freudians and the phenomenological "client-centered perspectives" (Wells & Marwell; 1976). By contrast, self-love is usually seen as a deeper, perhaps more mystical process, involving instinctual drives and energies (in

psychoanalytic theories) and basic "ontological insecurities" (in existential psychological theories).

In competence descriptions of self-esteem, evaluation is stressed. An object or event is compared with some standard, success or failure is experienced and then some sense of competence is arrived at. In self-acceptance definitions, attitudes are also evaluated but the emphasis is on the feeling attached to the evaluation.

Underlying these three approaches are two processes at work--evaluation and affection (Wells & Marwell, 1976). Branden (1969) also sees two processes, competence and worth, which seem similar to Wells and Marwell's processes. With the exception of Felker (1974), who sees the development of a sense of feeling of belonging as a third process, most other writers see just two processes at work (Gecas, 1971; Hollender, 1972; McCandless, 1961; Symonds, 1951; White, 1959, 1963).

While the separation of evaluation and affection may be problematic, as Branden (1969) suggests, Wells and Marwell argue that emphasizing one or the other term leads to different forms of definition, description, explanation and sometimes measurement. They suggest that stressing self-evaluation leads to more mechanistic, causal descriptions which tend to emphasize instrumentality--the assignment of some judgment of good-bad on the basis of an object's usefulness. In Diggory's (1966) terms, "man then might be viewed as a purposive

instrument, and might evaluate himself in quite the same terms as he evaluates any other instrument (p. 418). For example, man might evaluate himself in terms of competence (White, 1959); mastery of the environment (Woodworth, 1958); control over reward contingencies (Ziller et al., 1969); sense of social adequacy (Janis & Field, 1959); interpersonal competence (Fitts, 1970); or social desirability (McCandless, 1961). Most descriptions of self-evaluation of an attitudinal nature or process involve "cognitive comparisons". The attitudinal object (in particular, oneself), is compared with some evaluative standard and a judgment of value is made.

By contrast, if self-affection is emphasized instead of self-evaluation, the conceptualizations tend to be more "humanistic" and stress the emotional and behavioral accompaniments of self-evaluation. It is not the evaluation which is stressed but the cathectic response. For example, self-affection processes have been described as "emotionalized self-attitudes" (Rogers, 1950) or the "emotional connotations" of self-attitudes (Gordon, 1968), or as "emotional reactions" to self-conceptions (Rosenberg & Simons, 1971). Self-affection or self-acceptance is seen here as involving a person's ability to function adequately in spite of his self-evaluation. McCandless suggests that self-accepting persons are "those who can regard themselves accurately, who can face the fact that they are not all they would like to be ... yet who can live happily and creatively with this awareness"

(1961, p. 203).

Extending this viewpoint, some writers would see self-evaluation and self-affection as at least potentially independent. For example, in client-centered therapy, the person is supposed to accept and value himself after recognizing his weaknesses as well as his strengths.

In summary, as Wells and Marwell note, descriptions of self-esteem as self-affection or self-acceptance frequently involve the notion of personal moral or existential worth, as opposed to descriptions stressing self-evaluation which emphasize pragmatic or instrumental value. Stressing the self-evaluation [redacted] results in more mechanistic, causal descriptions which tend to emphasize instrumentality while stressing self-affection processes tends to elicit more "humanistic" conceptualizations of behavior.

Ways of Defining Self-Esteem

Having looked at some of the descriptions, components and processes, some of the ways self-esteem has been defined can now be examined. It is first noted that many writers have not made their definitions of self-esteem explicit, perhaps agreeing with McGuire (1968) who suggests that overconcern with definitions may be counterproductive. In fact, many writers seem to rely entirely upon implicit or systemic meaning, eg. McCandless (1961), McGuire (1968), Shrauger and Rosenberg (1970), and Deaux (1972).

Our concern here will be only with those definitions which strive to define self-esteem explicitly.

Self-Esteem as Attitudes. Other than the psychoanalytic viewpoints, self-esteem has usually been defined in terms of reflexive attitudes or sets of attitudes. Typically, the term is used to describe a more or less phenomenal process in which the person perceives characteristics of himself and reacts to those characteristics emotionally or behaviorally. This approach uses the idea of attitudes. In its simplest aspects, self-esteem is seen as a particular kind of attitude or as an attitude about a particular object. For example, Rosenberg says "by self-esteem we refer to the evaluation which the individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval" (1965, p. 5). Additionally, some writers see self-esteem as an aspect of all self-attitudes. For example, Allport (1937) says "self-esteem...enters into all sentiments and traits" (p. 171), while others often define it as "the evaluative component of self-conception" (Felker, 1974; Gecas, 1972; Gergen, 1971).

Self-esteem as an attitude has been viewed both specifically and globally. A person has many different qualities to which evaluations are attached; these may also be summed to form some overall evaluation. For some the summation is simply a "collection" of [redacted] attitudes (Diggory, 1966; James, 1890), for others, it has a more

unified singular status (McCandless, 1961; Rosenberg, 1965; Sherwood, 1965).

Self-Esteem as Relations between Attitudes or Selves. Self-esteem has also been defined as a psychological relation between different sets of attitudes. The classic example is James' statement that "our self-feeling...is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities...thus self-esteem = success/pretensions" (James, 1890, p. 310).

Other writers also use discrepancy or disparity-based definitions (although they are not usually expressed in a ratio). For example, Cohen (1959) defines self-esteem as "the degree of correspondence between an individual's ideal and actual concept of himself". These and other discrepancy descriptions are usually talked about in terms of a relation between different selves. How the person actually conceptualizes himself is often termed the real self (or sometimes the self-concept), while the way he would like to be is often called the ideal self. Terms such as self-satisfaction, self-acceptance, or personal adjustment, have been used to point to these discrepancies. Wells and Marwell suggest that the major difference between attitudinal and disparity descriptions is found in the ways that they are translated into empirical operations attempting to measure self-esteem.

Self-Esteem as Psychological Responses. For some writers,

particularly those favouring a client-centered approach, self-esteem is not seen as the discrepancy itself nor as the content of the person's attitudes, but as the person's effective response to this content (Berger, 1955; Rogers, 1960; Silber & Tippett, 1965). It is the feeling attached to the discrepancy which is important. Generally, this means the degree of self-acceptance--the feeling that one is good enough, worthy, valued, (Brownfain, 1952; Rosenberg, 1965). While the difference may seem slight, it becomes important when one examines different research approaches. For example, Bills' Index of Adjustment and Values (Bills et al., 1951) involves three forms of administration of a set of self-descriptive adjectives: 1) a real self (or self-concept) where the respondent rates himself honestly, 2) an ideal self score where the person rates his ideal on that description, and 3) a self-satisfaction score where the respondent supplies his feelings about his rating on that item. Strictly attitudinal descriptions would regard 1) as the appropriate self-esteem measure. Discrepancy definitions deal with the difference scores between 1) and 2), while self-acceptance descriptions would regard 3) as the most suitable measurement.

Self-Esteem as a Personality Function. One other definition of self-esteem, quite different from the others, is Ziller's (1973). His field-theoretic description defines self-esteem in a functional manner relative to a larger psychological gestalt of behaviors. He defines

self-esteem as that "component of the self-system which is involved in the regulation of the extent to which the self-system is maintained under conditions of strain, such as during the processing of new information concerning the self" (Ziller, 1973, p. 6).

Ziller's description is strongly criticized by Wells and Marwell mainly because of the way he proceeds to index self-esteem and because his concepts do not seem to be specific enough to conduct empirical research.

Self-Esteem and Adjustment

Although there are differing viewpoints, most definitions of self-esteem overlap with one another and it is suggested that they are concerned with similar themes. However, because of this dependence upon their theoretical contexts, even almost identical definitions of self-esteem may lead to different behavioral predictions. Linked with each particular definition is some assumption about what an optimal self-esteem level, vis-a-vis effective personal functioning is.

For example, the most widely accepted position is that high self-esteem is positively related to "healthy" behavior. It is a "the more, the better" position that is supposed to result in more pleasure, "good adjustment" and self-acceptance. This viewpoint is taken by most of the writers we have examined as well as most writers in the experimental literature. Following this line of thought, a low self-esteem person would supposedly be more likely to lack self-confidence,

be more dependent upon others, be shy, nonexplorative, and guarded and use defensive facades (Rosenberg, 1965); be unimaginative, conforming, nonreflective and use repressive defenses (Linton & Graham, 1959); be less creative and less flexible (Coopersmith, 1967); be more authoritarian (Boshier, 1969); and more self-derogative and disposed toward various forms of deviance or criminality (Fitts, 1972; Kardiner & Ovesy, 1951; Rickless & Dinitz, 1967).

In contrast to the above, there is a position which in some respects does see possessing a low level of self-esteem as being more functional than possessing a high level of self-esteem. That is, it postulates an inverse relationship between the level of self-esteem and the occurrence of "desirable" behaviors. The most familiar version of the position compares self-esteem with defensive styles. For example, Cohen (1959) says that the ego defenses of high self-esteem people make them less "open to change" because they help to repress, deny or ignore challenging and conflicting impulses. By contrast, because low self-esteem people tend to use projective or expressive defensives, they tend to seek out, reflect on and incorporate such negative information. Similarly, Byrne (1961) contradicts some of the "high" position predictions by describing low self-esteem people as more flexible, more given to self-analysis, more able to admit weakness and shortcomings, less likely to use a facade and less authoritarian. Other writers, such as Achenbach

and Zigler (1963) and Katz and Zigler (1967), suggest that self-esteem (as reflected in the real-ideal self discrepancy) has an inverse relationship to social competence and developmental level (in terms of maturity and cognitive differentiation). Lastly, Neuringer and Wandke (1966) suggest that high self-esteem tends to make for less interpersonal stability than does low self-esteem.

In addition to the "high" and "low" positions, not surprisingly there is also a moderate position which holds that some medium amount of self-esteem is optimum for healthy personality functioning. This idea of a "normal discrepancy" described by Cole et al. (1967), or a "medium" position by Block and Thomas (1955), Combs et al. (1963), Weissman and Ritter (1970), and Worchel and McCormick (1963), suggests that the relationship between self-esteem and adjustment is curvilinear. High self-esteem is associated with narcissism and defensive facades and low self-esteem with self-loathing or self-rejection. To be healthy, a person must be aware of his weaknesses, accept them and be willing to change and improve. Stewart (1968) says that much of the confusion about the relationship between self-esteem and attitude change can be resolved by using a curvilinear relation between self-esteem and persuasibility. Silverman (1964) says that the moderate self-esteem group is the most "socially adjusted" as a result of a trade-off between sensitivity and stability.

Guiding Definitions for the Present Study

As the different positions taken with regard to various issues illustrate, there is no consensus about the descriptions of the terms self, self-concept and self-esteem, or the processes involved. While it would be presumptious to imagine that after the struggle prominent writers have had with these terms, answers can be definitely established, it seems an appropriate time to state this author's conception of these three terms. Given the caveat that trying to objectively describe these terms, with which each person has had so much subjective experience, is as Cooley (1902) pointed out, like trying to objectively describe the taste of salt, or the color red, the conceptual definition used to guide the present study will be now described and discussed leaving the operational definitions until later. In this area, the views of Branden (1969), Coopersmith (1967), Fitts (1971), Mead (1934), and Wells and Marwell (1976), have been the most influential for this author.

It is proposed that the self be defined as: a hypothetical construct used to refer to that selected portion of the personality which consists of three kinds of reflexive attitudes—cognitions, affections, and behaviors.

Self-concept here is defined as: a hypothetical construct used to refer to an individual's perception of that selected portion of his or her own personality which consists of three kinds of reflexive attitudes—

cognitions, affections, and behaviors.

In light of what Branden says about the importance of competence and worth to the concept of self-esteem, self-esteem is defined here as: the value-judgment made about one's self-concept, particularly about one's competence to live and worthiness of living.

While these definitions are satisfactory to this author from an objective stance, they do not seem to either adequately convey the subjective experiences associated with these terms or explain the processes involved. To aid further understanding, it is suggested that the self can be seen as an abstraction an individual forms about his or her own essence through interaction with the environment, particularly as a result of reflexive, social and symbolic processes. Environment here is interpreted in a field-theory sense à la Lewin (1935). Coopersmith's (1967) definition further illustrates the term. He says the self is "an abstraction that an individual develops about the attributes, capacities, objects, and activities which he possesses and pursues" (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 20). As Cooley (1902) has said, the self is symbolized by the pronouns of the first person singular, "I, Me, Mine and Myself" (p. 168). The symbol "me" is especially important for Coopersmith (1967) because he says it represents "a person's idea of himself to himself" (p. 20).

It is suggested that the differences between "self" and "self-concept" are due to vantage point and level of specificity. When

speaking in the more general sense about that portion of anyone's personality which consists of reflexive attitudes, the term "self" is used. When speaking more specifically about a person's perception of that portion of his own personality which consists of reflexive attitudes etc., the term self-concept is used. Simply put, the self-concept is the perception one has of him or herself.

Coopersmith (1971) aptly describes the formation of the concept of self when he says it is formed in the course of experience by the same process of abstraction involved in other areas of experience. Directed toward external experiences, abstractions are made about the physical and social world; directed toward self-referent experiences, abstractions are made about the self. The self exists as a result of personal experiences. There is no material object which exists apart from these experiences, which must be "found" if the individual is to "know" himself. He calls the object of observation and appraisal, the person, which differs from the "self" which consists of the abstractions about that object. The abstractions are based on the individual's observations of his own behavior, and the way other individuals respond to his attitudes, appearance and performance.

Initially with children, these abstractions are rather vague and simple, later they become more refined and elaborate, resulting in a multidimensional concept. Selectivity occurs with certain attributes being excluded and others being overemphasized. Once established,

the "object" apparently provides a sense of similarity and continuity over time and space and is defended against alteration, diminution and insult (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 21). Also, over time, feelings and values become attached to or directed towards this object. It is this affective component of the reflexive process that constitutes self-esteem, and which is often considered to be motivationally the most important component.

Measurement of Self-Esteem

Before moving on to examine some of the studies pertinent to our particular problem, one last area needs mentioning--the problem of measuring self-esteem. It is easy to see that if there are no universal conceptual definitions of self, self-concept, and self-esteem, then the measurements of these constructs will also be controversial.

Wylie (1974) believes that the theoretical and methodological problems in measuring self-referent constructs, including self-esteem, have become quite serious. She says that despite the relative lack of refinement and elaboration of purportedly scientific personality theories invoking these constructs, it has recently become widely fashionable and acceptable to write about such hypothetical constructs as self-concept and self-esteem without seriously attempting to define terms and without referring the assertion to any particular theory.

Many authors, she says, seem to have gratuitously assumed that many of the items with which socially concerned citizens and profes-

sionals are concerned influence self-referent constructs (for example, parental treatment, socio-economic status, race, teaching methods). Too many people, she says, are willing to make sweeping assertions along these lines without even hinting that such statements require the backing of research evidence, evidence that is often missing, uninterpretable, or controversial (emphasis mine) (Wylie, 1974, pp. 316-317).

Wylie (1961; 1974) thoroughly examines the theoretical and methodological problems in the measurement of self-concept and self-esteem while Wells and Marwell (1976), and Crandall (1973), focus particularly on the problem of measuring self-esteem. While their writings will not be reviewed in detail, a few points are worth noting.

Wylie (1974) says that given the present status of theory and research methods, there are only two defensible alternatives--either abandon theorizing and research involving self-referent constructs (including self-esteem), or make whatever theoretical and methodological improvements are needed to put such work on a more respectable scientific base. Wylie, as do the other authors, suggests opting for the latter alternative.

Wells and Marwell make an analogy between the measurement of self-esteem and intelligence. In spite of the fact that there is a tremendous amount of amassed research on intelligence, the topic still remains controversial and uncertain. Yet, few social scientists would question that the concept of intelligence or mental capacity has substantial social scientific appeal and/or merit. So, they suggest, is

the case with self-esteem. How people think of and evaluate themselves both as a consequence of basic social conditions and as a predisposition for subsequent behaviors, is an essential behavioral construct for interpreting human conduct. Moreover, if, as Wylie points out, self-esteem seems to be emerging as one of the key "social indicators" in current analysis of social growth and progress, why not conduct research to verify these statements?

If Wylie's second alternative is the one opted for and improvements are sought, the first step is identify the problem areas. It appears that all authors believe that there is a snowballing process going on. Wylie says that the persisting primitive state of the theories involved has been a factor in determining the methodological problems, while in turn the inadequate, unvalidated or poorly validated instrument and flawed research designs have made the problem of measurement even worse.

The first major problem area then is due to the limitation of the theories currently employed. For example, theorists have not always adequately defined their terms, making any attempt to operationalize them very difficult. There is a lack of clarity in basic construct definitions. Furthermore, the constructs have been stretched to cover so many inferred cognitive and motivational processes that their utility for analytic and predictive purposes has greatly diminished.

Wylie challenges those theories which see a particular self-referent

as a supramoderator of a person's functioning. She wonders if it is possible that behavior is not determined by such broad-range behavior-determining inferred states such as "global" self-esteem but instead by a larger number of more restricted inferred states (Wylie, 1974, p. 320). However, Wells and Marwell suggest that if the trend is to believing that the theoretically most meaningful use of the concept "self-esteem" applies to a global, persistent, if not immutable, characteristic of the individual, then the development of some commonly agreed upon operationalizations of the concept would probably be useful to the discipline.

Another major criticism Wylie makes of present theories is their internal inconsistency regarding phenomenal and nonphenomenal factors which influence self-referent constructs. Many writers (she cites Carl Rogers as an example), claim to be phenomenological yet tacitly seem to assume the existence of drives, unconscious motivation, repression and denial without ever specifying how these nonphenomenological constructs are to be integrated into the theoretical system (Wylie, 1974, p. 10).

In addition to the lack of conceptual explicitness, the next major area of problems in measuring self-esteem is due to the methodological problems involved. Since no theory considers self-esteem to be directly observable, the existence of the construct must be inferred from observations. Observations to be helpful (to allow comparisons

among descriptions) should be standardized (comparable across respondents), objective (comparable across administrations and administrators), and quantitative (numerically expressible in terms of the amount of self-esteem reflected) (Wells & Marwell, 1976, p. 336). However, since there are several possible conceptual/operational approaches depending on one's theoretical stance, there has been no agreement on a simple determinant way to infer the existence of the construct. The result has been that the different measurement approaches have spawned a myriad of measurement methods. The problem is further compounded because the methods have rarely been compared to each other.

Kindred (1976) says that while over 2,000 studies have been conducted on the self-concept in the last 40 years, the majority of which have been concerned with self-esteem, very few studies have provided useful information concerning the similarities and differences found among the many measures used.

The central problems faced in the area of measurement are developing instruments with acceptable levels of construct validity and reliability. Can variance in the scores be confidently interpreted as self-esteem differences? How much confidence can one have in the instrument as a self-esteem indicator?

Despite some progress in the area, Wylie still accuses prestigious journals of publishing studies based on unvalidated instruments and

flawed research designs. All four authors mentioned above are unanimous in the agreement on the need for: 1) more and continuing work on construct validation, 2) developing and using instruments with acceptable levels of reliability and construct validity, and 3) qualifying one's conclusions in light of the limitations of the measuring instruments used.

Wylie concludes, after a thorough overview of published research on the more fully studied instruments, that in light of modern methodological standards and such evidence as is available that most of the instruments should be abandoned. Even the most thoroughly studied instruments are characterized by two outstanding shortcomings she says. Either the instruments lack clarity in the establishment of the basic construct definitions and/or they have failed to use multitrait-multimethod analyses and other techniques for establishing discriminant validity. She finds that no one instrument intended to measure self-concept variables (including self-esteem) has been developed by the process of beginning with close attention to stating rigorous conceptual definitions; followed by item building or item selection relevant to the conceptual definitions; and followed, finally, by the application of all appropriate modern procedures for refining a purported index of a construct and establishing its construct validity.

Accordingly she calls for the creation of some new instruments which will give much more careful thought about the constructs that

are being included and more thought about the sorts of behavior which would be appropriate to the respective constructs. She suggests that those instruments presently in use which have received the most empirical attention might serve as springboards for the creation of new instruments or directs revision of present ones. Crandall (1970) similarly suggests that [illegible] are introduced which are supported by extensive validation and if usage is concentrated on a few scales allowing the gradual accumulation of validity data.

In summary, all authors seem to prefer the alternative of continuing the empirical study of self-esteem, provided that more commitment is given to the conceptual and methodological rigors required of scientific work.

While the chapter on methodology will deal in more detail with methods employed to measure self-esteem, a few points will be made now. No instrument initially examined by this writer seemed to adequately measure both competence and worth, the two dimensions of self-esteem most interested in. To solve this problem, two instruments were adopted. While it was presumed they would overlap, one instrument, the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, was chosen because it appeared to offer the possibility of particularly measuring the competence dimension. The other instrument employed, the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, seemed to be especially concerned with

the aspect of worth.

Two operational definitions of self-esteem are thus proposed: 1) self-esteem is the value judgment made about oneself as measured by the Total Positive (Total P) score of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, and 2) self-esteem is the value-judgment made about oneself as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale.

Having discussed the theoretical foundations upon which this study is based, some of the research concerned with self-esteem enhancement will now be examined.

Raising Adult Self-Esteem Levels

For a number of years now, the notion of self-esteem enhancement has been of considerable interest to members of the general public, educators, the "helping" professions, and academic researchers. The usual rationale given for its study is that self-esteem is seen as a critical variable in determining one's personal experience and interpersonal behavior (Coopersmith, 1967; Felker, 1974; Wells & Marwell, 1976; Wylie, 1974). While Kindred (1976) reported that in the last 40 years, there have been over 2,000 studies of various aspects of the self-concept, the majority of which were concerned with self-esteem, most of these appear to be concerned with self-esteem as an independent variable. However, self-esteem has also been studied and used both as a dependent and as a correlated variable (Wylie, 1974).

While the workshop upon which the present study was based was

concerned with the influence of self-esteem upon consequent behavior after the workshop, the objective measurements involved were only directed towards determining the effect of the workshop upon self-esteem (and anxiety) levels. Thus, the primary concern of this study is with self-esteem as a dependent variable. Specifically, the workshop was designed to help people enhance and raise their self-esteem levels.

Before examining the relevant literature, some boundaries need to be clarified. Many of the studies interested in enhancing self-esteem are concerned with children or adolescents (Coopersmith, 1967; Felker, 1974; Rosenberg, 1965). This review will not examine those studies but will only be concerned with adults, regardless of sex, from the college-age level upwards. Furthermore, while self-esteem has often been blurred with other terms such as self-acceptance, self-confidence, self-concept enhancement, self-regard etc., this review will examine only those studies which refer to self-esteem or equate self-esteem with one of the other terms. For example, if a study discusses enhancing self-concept and then later talks of how self-esteem was enhanced, then that study would be examined whereas a study which spoke only of self-concept enhancement would not be.

One criticism of present research that cannot be emphasized too strongly refers to the caveats made earlier by Crandall (1973), Wells and Marwell (1976), and Wylie (1974) about the methodological inade-

quacies of most of the studies. It can be assumed that most, if not all, of the studies about to be examined suffer from theoretical and methodological weaknesses but unless the flaws are particularly glaring, they will not be commented on. Another particular weakness noticed by this writer is that studies often fail to specify the types of self-esteem measures being applied but instead simply report that such measures were given to the subject or that self-esteem seems to have improved (eg. Berzon, 1966; Schonbar, 1973).

Before turning to the research, it is noted that most of the studies involving self-esteem enhancement have involved the testing of some particular approach to working with groups, for example, testing the effectiveness of a T-group approach for enhancing self-esteem. While a few studies have looked at particular variables within the larger group format, for example testing the effects of different leadership styles in T-groups, the fact that most studies are concerned with just grosser variables like treatment format has made it difficult to determine what the critical components to a successful workshop are. This point is probably best illustrated by examining some of the research.

Approaches taken to Raise Self-Esteem Levels

In a Doctoral thesis study by Street (1976) which was specifically described as a self-esteem building workshop, (length of workshop was not reported) and which tried to measure changes in self-esteem

(based on Fitts' 1971 model), dependency, and depression as a result of participation in the workshop, no significant changes were found on any of the variables on a two-month posttest.

A study by Mills (1976) which was designed to assess the effects of a modified interpersonal communication skill training program upon specific attitudes and behaviors of correctional employees, found that even though there was a significant difference in the ability of employees to communicate empathy, respect, and genuineness, there was no corresponding change in the level of self-acceptance as measured by the California Psychological Inventory. However, in a four week, 12 hour course in marital communication skills training, a significant increase in participants' self-reported levels of self-esteem was found (Dillon, 1976).

Dye (1974) reported a study with nursing students in which five groups, three of which were treatment groups, were each either exposed to a different style of training or were used as controls. In none of the treatment groups (including a leaderless structured group, a sensitivity training group, and a communications training group) was a significant change in self-esteem (as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, hereafter called the TSCS) found to have occurred when compared with the two control groups. Dye suggested that perhaps one reason for the insignificant change might have been the shortness of the training groups (1½ hours per week for seven weeks).

In those groups that have a more therapeutic bent, Barrett (1978) reported that in a therapeutic group intervention for widows, regardless of the type of group--self-help, "confidant" or consciousness-raising--subjectively reported self-esteem levels increased. In a study by Wong (1976) on the effectiveness of a therapeutic community/token economy work development program for chronic schizophrenic after-care patients, it was found that the work program did have a significant effect on self-esteem levels as measured by the TSCS. Similarly, Caldwell et al., (1976) found that intensive group psychotherapy over an eight month period positively affected self-concept as measured by the TSCS. Mackeen (1974) reported that in a group counselling program involving three separate groups of women, one group had a significant change in self-esteem level. It was suggested that in contrast to the other two groups, this group perceived a need for change, yet was relatively stable both maritally and financially.

After researching a form of therapy called direct-decision therapy, Cohen (1975) concluded that there was a significant increase in the level of self-acceptance by members of the treatment group as measured by the Acceptance of Self and Others Scale.

Miller (1975) conducted a preliminary study based on some of Albert Ellis' (1973) work, which was designed to measure the effectiveness of two different approaches to the problem of self-evaluation with reference to Social-Evaluative Anxiety experienced by college

students. According to Miller, Ellis believes that the typical view of self-esteem places people in the position of trying to achieve unrealistic goals, which because of this irrationality, guarantees that they will experience decreased self-esteem. He suggests, therefore, that because humans are too complex to rate accurately, it is more logical to just accept them and refuse to try to rate them. He goes on to suggest that those psychotherapists who employ the concept of self-esteem are clearly misguided.

In Miller's study, both treatment groups received an initial baseline procedure of Rational Emotive Therapy. They then were exposed to either the self-acceptance (SA) condition described above or to a "more realistic" self-esteem (SE) condition (realistic in that the requirements for viewing oneself as worthwhile were less stringent and therefore more easily attainable). While the SA condition was found to be more effective than the SE condition in reducing Social-Evaluative Anxiety, the results of the study were not seen as offering support for Ellis' contention that those psychotherapists who employ the concept of self-esteem are clearly misguided.

In another form of therapy called Axiotherapy which stresses the acceptance of man's positive and negative sides, Tobin (1973) found that when compared to a control group, an experimental group that underwent a weekend workshop in Axiotherapy showed significant differences in self-esteem levels as measured by the Self-Esteem Inventory.

Directional but not significant changes were also shown on the POI and CPI tests.

A variety of other formats have also been used. Follingstead et al. (1977) reported they were successful in raising self-esteem when using a conscious-raising format. However, a study by Scott (1975) which examined other formats (Assertiveness Training, Encounter, and TORI) in addition to one group using a consciousness-raising style, found that while all the groups were somewhat effective, none brought about significant change.

T-groups have had particularly mixed results. In a T-group specifically designed to increase acceptance of gender identity, it was found that the self-esteem level of participants as measured by the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) increased as a result of the workshop experience (Hirsch, 1975). However, in another T-group experience designed to assess the effects of different leadership styles on a number of variables including self-esteem (as measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale), no significant relationship was found (Robbins, 1975). Perry (1976) reported similar results in a T-group for community caregivers, however, Hurley and Force (1973) found that an intensive eight day T-group experience did significantly increase participants' self-acceptance levels.

In those groups similar to T-groups, such as encounter groups, interaction groups, and sensitivity training groups, again conflicting

results have been found. Scott (1975), mentioned earlier, found no change in self-esteem following an encounter group, however, in another encounter group experience (Shoemaker, 1973) designed to assess the effects of different types of facilitator interaction, it was found that when the facilitator emphasized self-exploration and minimized "interpersonal" interventions, participants reported more gain in self-satisfaction than did a group in which the facilitator gave or stimulated feedback frequently. However, members of the latter group gave each other more feedback, showed increased rating between self-ratings, and the "averaged others" ratings of them, and reported most frequently that they had learned about themselves through feedback from others, so it would appear that both types of leadership style have some advantages.

In a German study by Tausch et al.(1975), two encounter groups which were comprised of prisoners, judges, psychotherapy clients, and psychologists, both reported changes in self-confidence and self-acceptance levels. Martin and Fischer (1976) examined four separate encounter groups and found improvement in both self-concept and self-confidence with no corresponding change in a group of matched controls over the same period. In another study by Yoshioka and Wu (1975), preliminary impressions indicated that a group encounter method was superior over a combination lecture and independent group project for increasing self-esteem.

Hewitt and Kraft (1973) reported that a statistical analysis of a variety of self-report measures of participants in a weekend encounter group indicated that the experience as compared with a control group experience, produced an improvement in self-concept. Participants also believed that they had improved in their ability to relate to others outside the group and rated themselves as feeling very close to other group members. However, based on observations made by outside observers, Hewitt and Kraft concluded that although an encounter group experience may be seen as desirable by participants, there was no evidence to show that it led to improvements that could be seen by outsiders.

In some similar types of groups, Addy (1974) found that interaction experiences during an eight week training program were found to have a significant effect in changing self-regard (as measured by the Berger Scale of Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others) as compared to a control group. Lastly, a sensitivity-training lab format was not found to increase self-esteem as measured by the TSCS self-esteem scale among female college students (Scherz, 1972).

Transactional Analysis (TA) and Gestalt Therapy have also been popular vehicles to increase personal functioning. Among those groups which have been studied, Addesso et al. (1974) found that the number of positive self-references given by experimental subjects in a Gestalt-oriented personal growth group significantly increased as compared

with controls. However, in another study by Goodstein (1972) designed to assess the effectiveness of both TA and Gestalt along a number of personality variables, it was found that while there was some change along some dimensions, self-esteem as measured by the Q sort did not significantly change in either group.

Another study in the area of "human relations" workshops conducted by Haygood (1974), found that a Human Development Instruction workshop did not increase self-acceptance as measured by the POI.

Another training format which has received attention in the literature is assertion training. Frey (1976) found that in an assertion training workshop designed to improve a number of "assertive" behaviors, self-esteem was positively correlated with strong assertive responding. Carlson (1976) also found that participants in an eight week, 1½ hour assertion training course also experienced a significant increase in self-concept as measured by the TSCS. Percell (1974) found that increasing assertive behavior also increased self-esteem (as measured by a series of self-report measures) and decreased anxiety. In other studies by Percell he found that assertive training resulted in an increase in self-acceptance (1973; 1974) and that there was a significant positive correlation between assertiveness and self-acceptance, and a significant negative correlation between assertiveness and anxiety (1973).

However, not all studies have shown assertion training to be this successful. Williams (1977) designed a study to determine whether a change in cognitive variables co-varied with a change in behavior. He found no change in self-esteem as measured by the TSCS following an eight week training program. Another study by Scott (1975) mentioned earlier, also reported no change in self-esteem levels following an assertion training workshop.

Alternate teaching formats have also been studied. In a study by Bibbins (1976), it was postulated that an experiential approach to teaching and learning in an introductory psychology course would improve both personal development and reading comprehension. Personal development in this study was equated with growth in self-esteem as measured by the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory. It was concluded that this method was significantly superior for bringing about changes on both dimensions to a traditional didactic approach. It was also concluded that the extent of improvement in these areas was influenced significantly by the initial level of competency in those areas.

In another experiential counsellor-training program that was designed to simultaneously encourage black students to design one or more counsellor theories that reflected their philosophy and life/cultural experiences and simultaneously enhance their self-concept as measured by the TSCS, it was found that the students' level of self-esteem significantly increased (Washington, 1977).

By contrast though, in a Rogerian student-centered (non-directed) counsellor-training program, no significant improvement in self-esteem was found to have occurred in the participants when compared to a control group (Ruffins, 1978). Furthermore, a study by Walter and Miles (1974) on task groups which learned by receiving video-feedback, the suggestion was made that it might well be that given the ambiguous nature of T-groups, that increased self-acceptance scores reflect group members finding something to like about themselves in the group rather than primarily experiencing personal growth through developed awareness.

Lastly, in a study that took a different kind of tack than the others, it was found by Folkins (1976) that while participation in a physical fitness group resulted in improvement on mood measures for anxiety and depression, for those who improved in physical fitness, no corresponding increase in self-confidence was found.

Other Important Factors

In addition to the particular types of group approach being used, some other factors affecting self-esteem enhancement have been suggested besides the experimental ones in which self-esteem is temporarily or artificially altered by falsely supplying feedback about subject's personalities on their task competence (Wells & Marwell, 1976). One factor alluded to earlier and suggested as possibly being important is the personal effect of the leader upon the group (including the sex of

the trainer) (Hurley, 1976; Rabbins, 1975; Sanford, 1976; Shoemaker, 1973). Length of time spent in the group has also been suggested as variable by Dye (1974), Faulds (1976), and Peterson (1974).

The type of group member involved is also seen as an important variable. Indeed, Archer (1974) suggests that groups do not have uniformly positive or negative effects on group members--but that both occur systematically in groups as a function of specifiable and measurable aspects of each individual's experiences. Mackeen (1974), mentioned earlier, suggests that participants have to see a need for change yet be relatively stable. Scott (1975), also mentioned earlier, suggests that one possibld reason no significant difference existed between her treatment groups and control groups was for the reasons given by Lieberman, Yallom and Miles (1973). Being students, both groups may have already been so affected by the larger change process that was happening to them, that the effects of the specific experiences might not be discernible. The study by Cornbleth et al. (1974), in which volunteers gained but conscripts lost in areas of self-acceptance, would suggest the value of working with voluntary participants. Lastly, the study by Bibbins (1976) seems to indicate that the initial level of self-esteem is an important factor in determining how much gain could be made during the treatment condition.

Concluding Statements

Having examined the theoretical foundations, the important issues

and problems associated with them, and the research relevant to this study, some concluding comments can be made. It appears that compared to the number of studies that have employed self-esteem as an independent variable, relatively few have been concerned with it as a dependent variable, and that even fewer have been interested in determining how self-esteem levels can be enhanced. It is suggested that most of the workshops which have studied their effect upon self-esteem have been more concerned with proving the value of the workshop than with the construct of self-esteem. Self-esteem has often been only one of the variables studied and if no change is shown on this variable, rather than criticizing the treatment format, the call is often for "more of the same". The study by Perry (1976) is but one example of an investigation in which all the hypotheses are rejected, yet the author states that he believes further research will bear out the usefulness of the group strategy employed (in this case T-groups). Another criticism of the studies examined, made earlier, is that the methodology and research designs are often flawed, with the result being that the conclusions are based on flimsy evidence.

Therefore, it would seem that if self-esteem is an important construct and if it does have the possibility of being a critical determinant of future behavior, that workshops specifically designed to enhance self-esteem could have both practical and experimental value provided they are methodologically sound. The present study is designed to

determine whether the workshop under examination has this potential.

Given the conceptual definition that self-esteem is the value-judgment made about the perception of oneself--particularly about one's competence to live and worthiness of living--two operational definitions have been proposed. The first states that self-esteem is the value-judgment made about one's perception of oneself as measured by the Total P score of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. The second states that self-esteem is the value-judgment made about oneself as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. Because other writers have suggested an inverse correlation between anxiety and self-esteem, it has also been suggested that an indirect way to measure change in self-esteem is to measure change in anxiety. The operational definition employed here is anxiety is the degree of apprehension and tension as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire.

As indicated in Chapter I, the premise on which this study is based is that if mean self-esteem levels significantly increase in a workshop designed to enhance self-esteem, then the workshop is viable. The questions designed to determine the truth of this premise are:

Question 1: Will a group's mean self-esteem scores as measured by the Total P score of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale significantly increase following participation in a self-esteem course?

Question 2: Will a group's mean self-esteem scores as measured by

the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale significantly increase following participation in a self-esteem course?

Question 3: Will a group's mean anxiety scores as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire significantly decrease following participation in a self-esteem course?

It is anticipated that if the workshop is successful, self-esteem as measured by the two self-esteem instruments will stgnificantly increase while anxiety as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale will significantly decrease. The next chapter will examine in more detail the design and methodological procedure employed to answer these questions.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The focus of this chapter is upon the composition of the treatment groups, the sampling procedure, research design and the subjective and objective measures used in this study. Initially, the sampling procedure used to select the treatment groups is discussed. Then the research design is presented. Next, the measuring instruments are discussed. Statistical hypotheses are then generated from the measures given and the procedures used to determine change are described. A brief description of the treatment program is also included.

Treatment Group Composition

There were two treatment groups and one control group involved in this study. The first treatment group consisted of individuals who had registered in a workshop offered through the University Faculty of Extension's Program. After receiving notification of their registration, the individuals in the first treatment group were contacted by phone and were asked if they would be willing to volunteer their parti-

cipation in this study.

Members of the control group were drawn from the waiting list of individuals who had registered for the first workshop but who were not able to be included in the workshop due to space limitations. They were similarly contacted by phone and their co-operation solicited.

The offering of a second workshop permitted the measuring of another treatment group. This second treatment group was similarly contacted prior to the second workshop, however, several members of the original control group also participated in the second workshop thus the second workshop consisted of the second treatment group and several other people.

The selection process was not truly random, therefore, and biasing may have resulted. Accordingly, appropriate statistical measures were used. Furthermore, as participation was voluntary, some individuals changed their minds and elected to not participate in the testing process. In one case, this was prior to the initial pre-test, in several others, it was prior to the final follow-up test.

Research Design

Figure 1 illustrates the research design employed in this study. Two weeks prior to the beginning of the workshop, members of the first treatment group and members of the control group were mailed copies of the objective tests (the pre-tests) that will be discussed later. The treatment group participated in the workshop for five days. Treatment group members were tested and as well, were given

Figure 1

Research Design



a subjective measure immediately following the workshop while control group members were mailed copies of the test instrument (the post-tests) and requested (as had been earlier asked) to complete and return them quickly. Approximately 2½ months later, shortly before the beginning of the second workshop, members of the first treatment group and the control group were mailed the follow-up tests. The treatment group also received another subjective measure.

At the same time, members of the second treatment group received their objective pre-tests. Like the first treatment group, they then participated in the workshop and received the subjective and objective posttests immediately after the workshop and approximately 2½ months later, they received the follow-up tests.

The pre--post--follow-up design with control and experimental groups was used to assure that any changes that occurred were not attributable to the normal passage of time or sampling error.

The 2½ months between testing occasions was seen as being adequate to assess whether there were any carry-over effects from the workshop.

Instrumentation

Subjective Measures

In order to determine whether the participants found the course useful and enjoyable and to also provide some feedback for the workshop leaders about the design of the course and their own leadership effectiveness, two subjective measures were devised. The first one

(see Appendix A) was administered immediately following the workshop. The second measure (see Appendix B) was administered at the same time as the objective follow-up instruments.

Objectives Measures

Two instruments were chosen to assess change in self-esteem in the participants; Fitts' Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (1965), and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (1959). One instrument was chosen to assess change in anxiety levels; Cattell's IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire (1957; 1976).

The self-esteem instruments chosen were picked for two main reasons. Firstly, they were the scales recommended by Crandall (1973) as among the best of the currently available instruments for measuring self-esteem. Secondly, it seemed possible that the two scales together might tap the dimensions mentioned earlier as most associated with self-esteem, namely, evaluation and affection.

Fitts (1971) suggests the self can be seen as consisting of three major subselves--Identity Self, Behavioral Self, and Judging Self. The Judging Self's main function is evaluation of the Identity Self (what I am), and the Behavioral Self (what I do) (Fitts, 1971). Thus, because the TSCS scale is concerned with judgment of behavior it might also be seen as tapping the competence component of self-esteem.

While there would certainly seem to be an overlap, the Janis-

Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale appears to be particularly concerned with how the person feels about himself--the affection or worth dimension (Janis & Field, 1959). Thus, between the two scales, it was hoped that the major theoretical components of self-esteem would be assured of being measured.

The IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire was chosen because of its well-accepted and popular usage (McReynolds, 1978). Numerous authors have pointed to a correlation between self-esteem and anxiety (Branden, 1969; Coopersmith, 1967; Crandall, 1973; Fitts, 1965; Lanyon, 1978), consequently, it was another indirect means of assessing whether self-esteem increased.

The scales will now be examined in more detail.

Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS) was developed to meet "the need for a scale which is simple for the subject, widely applicable, well-standardized, and multi-dimensional in its description of the self-concept" (Fitts, Manual, 1965).

Fitts believes that the self-concept is an important means of studying and understanding human behavior. A primary component of the self-concept is self-esteem. He cites Coopersmith (1967) and says that "the evaluative tendency of the self is a primary component self-perception, and it provides the material or sustenance for esteem, which is a primary concern for most people" (Fitts, 197

p. 17). Later he says that while actual self-perceptions are important, they are probably secondary to the emotional tone or esteem value of the perception (Fitts, 1971, p. 23).

On the basis of these statements, Fitts developed an instrument which attempted to measure components of self-concept, and relate them to the overall level of self-esteem. The most important single score on the scale is the Total P score which reflects the overall level of self-esteem. Persons with high scores tend to like themselves, feel that they are persons of value and worth, have confidence in themselves and act accordingly. People with low scores doubt their own worth, see themselves as undesirable, often feel anxious, depressed and unhappy, and have little faith in themselves (Fitts, 1965).

Fitts developed two forms of the test, a counselling form and a clinical and research form. Both forms have the same test items and answer sheet; only the scoring procedures are different. This study used the counselling form which is appropriate for individual feedback.

The scale itself is an objective-Likert-type instrument which has five response categories running from completely false (1) to completely true (5). It yields scores for three internal and five external dimensions of self-concept as well as the Total P score. It was developed from a larger item pool derived from other scales and open-ended statements. The 90 statements retained were classified by seven clinical psychologists into 15 categories and positive and negative

content with perfect agreement. The items were grouped according to a phenomenological system on the basis of what they seemed to be saying. The classification system evolved from a three-stage process of assigning each item to a dimension on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The positive or negative position of the statement relative to self-esteem.

2. The position of the statement within the following set of three categories constituting an internal frame of reference: Identity, Self-satisfaction, and Behavior.

3. The position of the statement within a set of five categories of the external frame of reference: Physical Self, Moral-Ethical Self, Personal Self, Family Self, and Social Self.

The three-stage classification evolved into a dimensional scheme represented as a 3 x 5 grid with the three internal subscale referents constituting one of the dimensions and the five subscale categories of external referents making up the second dimension. With each of the resulting 15 intersecting categories, there are an equal number of positive and negative items. The total positive scores for the 90 items comprise the overall self-esteem measurement. In addition to the 90 items, 10 items taken from the MMPI lie scale are also used.

Besides the social, family, physical, personal and moral-ethical

scores, a self-acceptance score across the five areas is available along with a variability score reflecting differences in esteem across areas. Crandall (1973) suggests that the scale provides a thorough clinical profile of a person's self-concept and contains a useful variability index.

The scale is normed and is based on a sample of 626 people, male and female, black and white, ranging from ages 12 to 68. Fitts claims that "the effects of such demographic variables as sex, age, education, and intelligence on the scores of this scale are quite negligible" (Fitts, 1965, p. 13).

While one criticism of the scale is that no data on internal consistency is reported, the Manual reports a test-retest reliability coefficient for the Total P score over two weeks of .92. Congdon (1958) used a shortened version of this scale and still obtained a reliability coefficient of .88 for the Total P score.

The Manual indicates construct validity is demonstrated in studies of psychiatric patients, delinquents, juvenile repeat offenders, alcoholics, unwed mothers, and those scoring low on personality integration. The Manual also cites studies by Gividen (1959), Fitts (unpublished), and Aschcroft and Fitts (1964) to support the scale's predictive ability.

Compared to other measures, Leake (1970) reported that scale correlated -.61 with the Butler-Haigh Q sort. It correlated -.70

with Total P with the Taylor manifest anxiety scale, -.56 with the Cornell Medical Index, and .64 with an unpublished Inventory of Feelings. It also has correlations in the .50's and .60's for various MMPI scales. Bentler, in reviewing the TSCS in Buros (1972), states that "general scores from the scale have remarkably high correlations with other measures of personality functioning" (p. 366) and believes it is "safe to conclude that the scale overlaps sufficiently with well-known measures to consider it a possible alternative for these measures" (p. 366). Bentler criticizes the scale in two areas. He says a) no information is presented on the internal consistency of the scale, or on any of the scale subscores, and b) there is a high degree of interpretation, relative to the data base, that is made regarding various aspects of data involving the scale.

Suin, also reviewing in Buros (1972), finds that validation data supports the test's usefulness in differentiating among various groups such as normals, psychotics, neurotics, personality disorders, defensive position subjects and personality integration subjects. In terms of measuring self-concept variability, he also sees the results as supportive, although in one case which may have implications for the present study, he notes sensitivity training did not lead to significant changes. Suin, like Bentler, calls for more validation studies but concludes that "the TSCS ranks among the better measures combining group discrimination with self-concept information" (p. 369).

Wylie (1974) and Crites (1966) are both quite critical of the TSCS believing that it is "incumbent upon the author to demonstrate that his scale is 'simpler for the subject, more widely applicable, better standardized, etc.' than other measuring devices" (Crites, 1966, p. 331). Both authors believe that Fitts has not done this adequately enough to justify replacing existing instruments or ones to be prepared in the future. Wylie certainly has some valid criticisms about the scale particularly in relation to construct validity, however, in terms of popularity, Crandall (1973) cites it as one of the most widely used self-esteem instruments today. Buros (1978) cites over 580 studies that have used the scale.

Most of the other studies that have criticized the TSCS have been on the basis that it lacks construct validity or the individual row and column scores. The few existing factor analytic studies have suggested that there are really only a few major factors involved. Rentz and White (1967) found only two, self-esteem (Tot. P) and conflict integration. Vacchianno and Straus (1968) found some validity for the five column scores involving the self--the physical self, moral-ethical self, personal self, family self and social self. Gable et al. (1973) also found construct validity for the columns but not the rows. Pound et al. (1977) using an Alpha Factor Analysis found only one apparent General Factor which accounted for the majority of explainable variance within the subscales. They concluded that this General Factor

was best represented by the overall level of self-esteem (Total P score).

However, despite some criticisms about the rows and columns of the scale, all these studies support the total positive (Tot. P) score as a measure of a factor. As this was the only score that was used from 'this' instrument, it seems reasonable to believe that the instrument can be useful for measuring self-esteem.

Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. This non-commercial scale was originally part of a personality inventory designed to assess anxiety level, self-esteem, hostility, richness of fantasy, and some other related variables (Janis & Field, 1959, p. 57). One component of the inventory entitled "feelings of inadequacy" (which asked subjects to give self-ratings on anxiety in social situations, self-consciousness and feelings of personal worthlessness), was eventually used as a measure in its own right to determine self-esteem scores (Janis & Rife, 1959, p. 127). Due to importance in early persuasibility research (Hovland & Janis, 1959), it has seen wide usage and has generated a variety of similar scales (Berger, 1968; Eagly, 1967; League & Jackson, 1964; Rosenbaum & DeCharms, 1960). However, perhaps because it is non-commercial, it has not received much psychometric attention.

The scale consists of 23 items of which all but two are keyed in the same direction and are answered on a five-point Likert type scale.

The scale is scored such that high scores reflect high self-esteem (ie. few feelings of inadequacy).

Janis and Field (1959) reported split-half reliability of .83. Skolnick and Shaw (1970) reported an average interitem correlation of about .30 with the exception of items 3 and 4 which did not correlate well with the rest of the scale.

With regard to convergent validity, Hamilton (1971) reported the scale correlated .67 with the CPI esteem scale and .60 with self-rating of esteem. It was also reported to correlate significantly with test anxiety in the original study (Hovland & Janis, 1959), while Larsen and Schwendiman (1969) reported that it correlated .45 with Barron ego strength and .41 with a discrepancy measure.

Hamilton (1971) suggested there was discriminant validity because of low correlations found with self-ratings of dominance and open-mindedness. Greenbaum (1966) found a correlation of only .35 with the Marlowe-Crowe social desirability scale.

In light of these relatively few validity studies, one obvious criticism is that little thorough psychometric attention has been paid to this scale. However, Crandall indicates that this is not unusual given the current lack of concern for measurement in the self-esteem field and suggests that all things considered, it is one of the better instruments existing at the present time. He also suggest it has great potential for a future scale, particularly one relating to

social self-esteem.

The IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire. The IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire (also referred to as the ASQ, the IPAT Anxiety Scale and the IPAT Self-Analysis Form, and hereafter called the IPAT), is a 40 item inventory intended to measure manifest anxiety level, whether it is situationally determined or relatively independent of the immediate situation (Cattell & Scheier, 1963). The test was developed in 1957 and minimally revised in 1976 (language was updated, and response options moved closer to item stems). While the reported reliability, validity and normative data is based on the 1957 edition, the manual compares mean scores of the 1957 and 1976 editions to show that the change has had no effect on existing norm tables.

The test is an extension of earlier work by Cattell (1956; 1957) on personality traits. Using factor analysis, he derived 16 personality factors from 4,000 to 5,000 items constituting all known personality questionnaires then in use. Five of these 16 personality dimensions seemed to form a cluster and be related to the psychiatric evaluation of anxiety (Cattell & Schei··, 1961; Levitt & Persky, 1962).

These five anxiety measuring factors were then used to form a scale consisting of 40 questions, each a statement with three possible answers. The questions were further classified into two 20-item subscales (overt or conscious anxiety and covert or unconscious anxiety).

Lanyon, reviewing in Buros (1978), reports that a number of studies have reported satisfactory reliability for the total score (mean .86). Reliabilities of the separate covert and overt halves are somewhat lower but adequate with the latter the higher of the two (McReynolds, 1978).

Three kinds of validity are summarized in the handbook. Firstly, correlations between the IPAT total score and measures of the pure anxiety trait are quite high. Secondly, correlations between the IPAT and clinical ratings of anxiety range from .17 to .95. This is quite remarkable given the considerable discrepancy between the individual diagnostic pronouncements of clinicians (Cattell & Scheier, 1963, p. 8). They also say "this consensus of psychiatric diagnosis as to anxiety level correlates higher with scores on this anxiety test factor than any other known personality factor" (p. 8). Lastly, convergent validity of .70 with the Taylor scale and .76 with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is reported. McReynolds says that because there are a number of studies which provide meaningful construct validity data that taken together they strongly reinforce the assumption that the IPAT yields a valid and useful measure of anxiety.

Questions To Be Answered And Related Hypotheses

Chapter I outlined the purpose of this study and the premise upon which the general questions were based. In Chapter II, these general questions were refined into three specific questions. These specific

questions along with the hypotheses they generated are as follows.

Question 1. Will a group's mean self-esteem scores as measured by the Total P score of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale significantly increase following participation in a self-esteem course? Significance here and in the following questions is defined as the probability of change at the .05 level.

Hypothesis #1. There will be no difference among the pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of self-esteem as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale.

Question 2. Will a group's mean self-esteem scores as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale significantly increase following participation in a self-esteem course?

Hypothesis #2. There will be no difference among the pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale.

Question 3. Will a group's mean anxiety scores as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire significantly decrease following participation in a self-esteem course?

Hypothesis #3. There will be no difference among pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of anxiety as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire.

As mentioned earlier, inverse correlations between anxiety and self-esteem have been suggested by several writers. To check this assumption, the following ancillary hypothesis was also generated.

Hypothesis #4. There will be no significant correlation between either measure of self-esteem and the measure of anxiety on the pre-test scores of three treatment groups.

Statistical Procedures

The data collected in this study was initially analyzed by employing a two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on one factor. The two factors or independent variables are 1) treatment groups (two experimental groups and one control), and 2) time (pre-treatment, post-treatment and follow-up treatment). The dependent variables being studied were self-esteem and anxiety. Figure 1 illustrates the research design. A correlational matrix was also created by using the pre-test scores on all instruments of the three treatment groups to determine correlations between the instruments.

Treatment Program

Information in this section comes from personal communications with the two course instructors, Carol Ganam, Ph.D., and Gary Ford, Ph.D., from the planning and design notes of the workshop, and from observations made by the author. Given that it is always difficult to convey the true flavor of any course that has a heavy experiential content, perhaps by describing the constituents, a sense of the course can

be obtained.

Pre-Treatment Planning

Prior to the actual beginning of the treatment program, several hours were spent designing "the intended flow" of the course. The design was based both on some assumptions about learning that are common to experiential workshops and the instructors' own learning experiences, plus the key elements of Branden's (1969) theory about self-esteem mentioned earlier. The assumptions upon which the design was based were that man learns mainly by expanding his awareness and that the experiential/laboratory learning model is a viable teaching method. The experiential training model emphasizes five key phases to learning: experiencing, publishing (sharing reactions and observations), processing (integrating), generalizing, and applying (Pfeiffer & Jones, 1977). The laboratory training model overlaps substantially with the experiential model stressing that the necessary conditions for goal achievement are: opportunities for presentation of self (to reveal to oneself the way one sees and does things), feedback, an atmosphere of trust and nondefensiveness, experimentation with new behavior, practice, application to back-home situations, relearning how to learn experientially, and obtaining relevant cognitive maps (Mill & Porter, 1972, p. 1).

With these assumptions in mind, and after drawing on previous experiences, brainstorming some possible ideas, and debating some

alternate scenarios of how the course might be conducted, a workshop design was created which was used for both treatment groups. It was decided to organize the course around some interconnected themes, with each session focusing on a particular theme. A time frame of four successive evening sessions starting on a Tuesday night followed by a full day Saturday session was also chosen (approximately 20 hours in total). The themes were organized to move from having the individual participants describe and present themselves (who am I), to examining how they got to where they are today, to examining the two main theoretical components of self-esteem--competence and worth, to assessing their own competence and worth, to lastly learning how they do and could enhance both their own and others' self-esteem.

It was also decided, as was earlier discussed, to mail the pretests to participants just prior to the beginning of the course. Before discussing the content, some definition of terms may help to provide some clarity.

structured experience - a design that implements an experiential model (experiencing, publishing, processing, generalizing, applying) for focusing on particular learning goals.

theory input - a brief presentation of theory relevant to the immediate experience. Used synonymously here with mini-lecture or lecturette.

reflection time - time to ponder, think about, or integrate an experience that just happened, or to think about memories that were triggered by the experience.

Tuesday Evening Theme: Who Am I?

The course began with a short introductory and clarification session, in which the leaders and the author introduced themselves and very briefly described the course. Participants were asked to write down their expectations of the course (what do you hope happens?, what do you hope does not happen?) and told that they would soon discuss them. Then some 'housekeeping' items were raised.

Three items in particular were emphasized. First, the instructors introduced and explained "the invitation rule" that would be operating throughout the course which emphasized that each person would be invited to participate in the course's activities and discussions, but that each person could choose whether or not they wished to participate and the manner in which they wanted to. Second, the instructors began the process of encouraging participants to give feedback to each other by inviting people to comment on the instructors' behavior. Third, the group was given the ongoing task of enhancing each others' self-esteem with the specific suggestion to "give feedback when someone is affecting you".

Following some exercises designed to learn each other's names and a little personal information, "support groups" were formed. These sub-groups initially served as a vehicle to anonymously surface workshop expectations, then later functioned as a "home base" within the larger group. Over the course of the workshop, participants

periodically returned to these smaller groups to participate in structured activities or to process the workshop experience.

After this slow and careful beginning which was designed to help participants feel safer and more comfortable with each other, the rest of the session revolved around the evening's theme, who am I? By using some structured experiences combined with time for individual, small and large group reflection, participants compiled some written information about how they saw themselves as people. They explored their identity "labels", their feelings about themselves, and the adjectives and adverbs they use to describe themselves.

Next the key elements of Branden's theory of self-esteem were presented and an overview of how the rest of the course would proceed was outlined. The evening closed with a "check out", a brief summary by each participant of what they thought or felt about the evening.

Wednesday Evening Theme: Awareness of My Self-Esteem--How I Got to Where I Am

The evening started with an initial "check in" to deal with questions and comments that might have surfaced since the previous session. Then, again using a combination of structured experiences, theory input, individual reflection time, and small and large group discussions, participants were helped to assess themselves in terms of their own competence and worth and to make a single statement about themselves which would include both dimensions. Individuals

then participated in a regression fantasy which was designed to help trace this "decision" statement back to an earlier childhood experience. Subsequently, participants were invited to share in small groups the context in which they learned this self-statement and to discuss how the statement "made sense" at the time. Each person was invited to examine the internal and external forces that were still operating today to reinforce this attitude or feeling about their competence and worth. The session closed by having each member briefly describe his or her feelings about the evening.

Thursday Evening Theme: My Sense of Competence

This evening was designed to particularly focus on the competence aspect of self-esteem. After the check in, participants were asked to "free associate" and complete the sentence stems a) I can, b) I can't.

A mini lecture (also called lecturette) describing how the statements people make about what they can and can not do are either general or specific and the importance this plays in determining their belief structure about their own competence, was presented. For example, "I can be a good secretary" or "I can't make friends" are general statements while statements like "I can type 90 words a minute" and "I can't start a conversation with a stranger" are more specific statements.

Each individual was then asked to select one "I can't" statement from their list. In small groups they examined first the disadvantages,

then the advantages or "payoffs" of believing this statement. More theoretical input was then provided on the consequences of having a basic belief orientation of "I can" or "I can't". The last exercise of the evening, before the check out, was an individual fantasy experience. It was designed both to help individuals recall and relearn from an experience when they felt accepted for who they were, and to set the tone for the following night.

Friday Evening Theme: My Sense of Worth

After the check in, Claude Steiner's (1974) "warm fuzzy" story was read. Participants were then given permission to, and encouraged to, perform the seemingly foolish task of giving each other "warm fuzzies" (a cottonball plus a verbal or non-verbal statement of appreciation) during the duration of the workshop. This ongoing playful activity seemed to help concretize and encourage people to either experiment with new behaviors or pleasantly reinforce old behaviors associated with giving and receiving compliments.

Following this, by using structured activities and metaphorical exercises (such as imagine being your favorite fairy tale character) the rest of the evening was spent helping participants examine how they presently enhance their own sense of worth and what they could do in the future to continue the process of building their self-esteem.

Saturday Theme: Integration--Taking Care of My Own Self-Esteem and Enhancing the Self-Esteem of Others

After a check in, this day-long session started by having the group brainstorm together the behaviors people do that "diminish" the self-esteem of others. Using role-plays, the group then examined the impact of these behaviors and also discussed and practiced different ways of dealing with these diminishing behaviors. The morning concluded with a behavior rehearsal fantasy in which each person imagined themselves meeting a "significant other" who did something diminishing to their (the participant's) self-esteem. They were then instructed to imagine themselves handling this situation in an ideal self-enhancing way.

After a group lunch, the final afternoon was spent focusing on the ways the participants enhanced the self-esteem of other people, particularly "significant others". Participants engaged in a series of activities designed to give them feedback about the kind of messages (enhancing or diminishing, specific or general) they typically sent to other people. The session then closed with a "windup" whereby members had an opportunity to say goodbye to each other as well as give any final self-esteem messages they wanted to.

Immediately following the completion of the workshop, participants were given the posttest questionnaires. They were also reminded of the follow-up testing which would come later. One final point needs mentioning. While the design was the same for both treatment groups, the application ("flow") as might be expected varied between the groups, in that the two groups spent different amounts of time on the different exercises and activities.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

In Chapter IV, the results of the subjective evaluation of the treatment program will be shown first. Then the objective results will be presented along with some post hoc analyses of the objective data.

Results from Subjective Measures

Table 1

Satisfaction with Total Program (immediately following workshop)
(N=38)

Liked what they got	Not at All 0	1	2	3	4	Very Much 5
No. of Participants						
Workshop #1	-	1	-	1	6	10
Workshop #2	-	-	1	-	7	12

Immediately following the workshop participants were asked to complete a questionnaire (see Appendix A) which was designed to help the course instructors assess theirs and the workshop's effectiveness.

In response to the question "Did you like what you got?", Table 1 shows that the majority of participants were clearly satisfied with what they got from the workshop.

Table 2

Evaluation of course 2½ months later (N=27)

Course was of little or no value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Valuable
No. of Participants								
Workshop #1	-	1	-	-	4	6	4	
Workshop #2	-	-	1.	2	1	4	4	

Two and one-half months after the workshop, participants were mailed a second questionnaire (see Appendix B). One of the questions asked participants, how they would rate the course in terms of its value to themselves. Among those who replied, Table 2 shows that while enthusiasm for the course may have tapered off slightly with the passage of time, satisfaction with the course was still quite high.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 were also prepared from the data collected with the second questionnaire. The varying N's in these and following tables will be discussed in Chapter V.

Table 3

Subjective Assessment of Effect of Course on Self-Esteem (asked 2½ months later) (N=27)

Not At All	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Much
No. of Participants								
Workshop #1	-	-	1	1	4	7	2	
Workshop #2	-	-	2	2	-	6	2	

Table 3 illustrates the responses given to the questions "Looking back on this course, how did this course affect your self-esteem?". While the majority of both groups reported that the course had a favorable effect on their self-esteem, it appears some of the participants in Workshop #2 were less satisfied with the effects of the workshop than were the participants in the first workshop.

Table 4

Change in Participants, Spontaneously Reported to Participants by Friends, Relatives (N=27)

	YES (have observed positive change)	NO (have not observed change)
No. of Participants		
Workshop #1	7	6
Workshop #2	2	12

One direct way of seeing whether the workshop affected not only self-esteem but also behavior, was to ask participants whether their friends or relatives had told them that they had seen a change in them (the participants) since they took the course. The results in Table 4 indicate that for the participants in the first workshop, slightly more than 50% had been told that positive changes had been noticed while slightly less than 50% reported that no changes (either positive or negative) had been reported. By contrast, a large majority in the second workshop reported that no changes had been observed by either friends or relatives.

Table 5

Participants Willingness to Recommend Course to Friends (N=26)

	Yes (would recommend)	No (would not recommend)
No. of Participants		
Workshop #1	13	1
Workshop #2	12	-

As another means of finding out whether the course was useful, participants were asked whether they would be willing to recommend the course to a friend. Table 5 shows that with one exception, all participants were quite willing to recommend the course.

Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis #1

There will be no difference among the pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of self-esteem as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale.

Findings. A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on one factor was performed on the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 2. Only subjects with complete data were included (Exp. Group 1 (n=15), Exp. Group 2 (n=6), Control Group (n=8). There was no significant interaction between time and group ($F(4,52)=1.975$); no group main effect ($F(2,26)=2.143$); and no time effect ($F(2,52)=.118$). Therefore, Hypothesis #1 was not rejected as no F scores were significant at the .05 level.

Conclusions. No effects due to either treatment or time, or their

Table 6

Treatment Groups (Exp. 1, 2 and Control) X Time (Pre, Post and Follow-up) and Interaction Scores

Exp. 1 (n=8) Mean Scores			Exp. 2 (n=6) Mean Scores			Control (n=8) Mean Scores			Grps.	Time	Inter-action
Pre-test	Post-test	Follow-up	Pre-Test	Post-test	Follow-up	Pre-test	Post-test	Follow-up	F(2,26)	F(2,52)	F(4,52)
Instrument: TSCS (Norm Group (N=626), $\bar{X}$=345.57, S.D.= 30.70)+											
337.267	351.933	354.467	318.333	315.333	304.337	340.375	336.000	340.075	2.143	.118	1.975
Instrument: Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (No Norms Available)											
71.867	82.867	82.400	62.667	65.500	67.833	73.250	73.000	74.125	2.091	3.264*	1.237
Instrument: IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire (Norm Group (N=935), $\bar{X}$=27.1, S.D.=11.4)++											
36.933	31.600	30.667	37.000	37.500	36.167	37.500	36.000	35.750	.267	1.249	.526

* $p < .05$

+ American norms (TSCS Manual, 1965)

++ American norms (IPAT Manual, 1963)

Figure 2



□ Experimental Group 1 (n=15)

△ Experimental Group 2 (n=6)

○ Control Group (n=8)

(no significant differences on groups, time or interaction)

Pre, Post and Follow-up Score Means for the

Tennessee Self-Concept Scale

interaction were found among the experimental and control groups although Exp. 1 approached significance for both groups and interaction (p=.10 and .11 respectively).

Hypothesis #2

There will be no difference among the pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale.

Findings. Again, a two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on one factor was performed. The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 3. Only subjects with complete data were included (Exp. Group 1 (n=15), Exp. Group 2 (n=6), Control Group (n=8)). There was no significant interaction between time and group ($F(4,52)=1.237$); no group main effect ($F(2,26)=2.091$); however, there was a time effect ($F(2,52)=3.264$). Therefore, Hypothesis #2 was rejected at this time as the F score for the time effect was significant.

Conclusions. No effects due to either treatment or the interaction of time and treatment were found among the experimental and the control groups. There was, however, an effect due to time of treatment.

Hypothesis #3

There will be no difference among the pre, post and follow-up test score means of the experimental and control groups on measures of anxiety as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire.

Figure 3



□ Experimental Group 1 (n=15)

△ Experimental Group 2 (n=6)

○ Control Group (n=8)

(time effect is significant)

Pre, Post and Follow-up Score Means for the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale

Findings. A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on one factor was performed. The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 4. Again, only subjects with complete data were included (Exp. Group 1 (n=15), Exp. Group 2 (n=6), Control Group (n=8)). There was no significant interaction between time and group ($F(4,52)=.526$); no group main effect ($F(2,26)=.267$); and no time effect ($F(2,52)=1.249$). Therefore, Hypothesis #3 was not rejected.

Conclusions. No effects due to either treatment or time, or their interaction were found among the experimental and control groups.

Hypothesis #4

There will be no significant correlation between either measure of self-esteem and the measure of anxiety on the pre-test scores of the three treatment groups.

Findings. Correlations were calculated among the pre-test scores of all the instruments (Table 7). A correlation of .664 was found between the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. Correlations of -.654 were found between the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire and the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and -.656 between the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. Therefore, Hypothesis #4 was rejected as all of these correlations were significant at the .001 levels.

Conclusions. There is a significant positive correlation between

Figure 4



Experimental Group 1 (n =15)

Experimental Group 2 (n =6)

Control Group (n =8)

(no significant difference in groups, time or interaction)

Pre, Post and Follow-up Score Means for the

IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire

the two measures of self-esteem and significant negative correlations between the self-esteem measures and the measure of anxiety.

Table 7

Correlations between the Three Instruments Employed

	TSCS	Janis-Field	IPAT-Anxiety
TSCS	1.000	.664*	-.654*
Janis-Field	.664*	1.000	-.656*
IPAT Anxiety	-.654*	-.656*	1.000

*$p < .001$

Post Hoc Analysis of the Pre and Post Score Means of the Treatment Groups

Due to the small "n" obtained for the second experimental group when only subjects having complete data on all three measurements at the pre, post and follow-up measurements were used, questions were raised about the significance that might exist among only pre and post-test score means which were based on larger "n's". Accordingly, a two-way analysis with repeated measures on one factor was performed on the measures of self-esteem and anxiety. Table 8 and Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the results for this analysis. Significant interaction was found between time and group ($F(2,39)=3.155$) using measures of self-esteem as measured by the TSCS; between time and group ($F(2,39)=5.432$) using measures of self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, as well as effects due to time ($F(1,39)=$

Table 8

Treatment Groups (Exp. 1, 2 and Control) X Time (Pre and Post Only) and Interaction Scores

Exp. 1 (n =18) Mean Scores		Exp. 2 (n=13) Mean Scores		Control (n=11) Mean Scores		Grps. F Scores	Time F Scores	Inter-action F Scores
Pre-test	Posttest	Pre-test	Posttest	Pre-test	Posttest			
Instrument: TSCS								
337.611	352.111	333.769	336.231	348.000	343.454	0.402	1.718	3.155*
Instrument: Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale								
69.667	80.944	69.692	69.923	73.545	74.000	0.517	6.505*	5.432
Instrument: IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire								
35.389	30.667	34.923	35.462	34.545	34.455	0.125	0.902	1.224

* $p < .05$

Figure 5



⊡ Experimental Group 1 (n=18)

△ Experimental Group 2 (n=13)

⊙ Control Group (n=11)

(interaction effect is significant)

Pre and Post Score Means for the

Tennessee Self-Concept Scale

Figure 6



□ Experimental Group 1 (n=18)

△ Experimental Group 2 (n=13)

○ Control Group (n=11)

(interaction effect is significant, time effect is significant)

Pre and Post Score Means for the

Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale

Figure 7



▣ Experimental Group 1 (n =18)

▲ Experimental Group 2 (n=13)

⊙ Control Group (n=1

(no significant affects)

Pre and Post Score Means for the

IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire

6.506) using the Janis-Field scale. No effects for the measures of anxiety were found to be significant.

Following tests of main effects, further post hoc analyses were carried out using Scheffé tests. Using this test, further analysis of the pre, post and follow-up score means of Experimental Group 1 and Control Group (n=15, n=8) on measures of self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field scale were performed. When the pre and follow-up score means of Experimental Group 1 (the experimental group with the greatest increase in self-esteem levels) and the Control Group were compared, there was no significance at the .05 level ($F(2,52)=4.94$). Therefore, the significant difference that was found using the two-way analysis of variance treatment was not due to a difference between the experimental and control groups.

Using only pre and posttest score means for Experimental Group 1 and the Control Group (n=18, n=11), a Scheffé test was again conducted. Significant differences ($F(2,39)=0.04$ and $F(2,39)=0.53$) were obtained for measures of self-esteem using the TSCS and Janis-Field scales respectively. Thus, the difference between the gain in self-esteem made by Experimental Group 1 and the Control Group on both measures of self-esteem were found to be significant. A Scheffé test performed on the pre and posttest score means of Experimental Group 1 and the Control Group showed no significant difference ($F(2,39)=.003$ and $F(2,39)=.84$) in gain in self-esteem between the two groups.

Therefore, it would seem that by using the larger "n's" available when comparing only pre and posttest scores, one could say that a significant gain in self-esteem occurred in Experimental Group 1 but not in Experimental Group 2 when compared to a Control Group which received no treatment. For Experimental Group 1, the workshop did have a significant effect.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Discussion of Results

The original problem under investigation was to evaluate the efficacy of a self-esteem workshop. As one of the goals of the program was to help participants build their self-esteem, one way to determine its effectiveness would be to see whether a workshop on building self-esteem would, indeed, result in an increase in participants' self-esteem levels. Thus, a premise of this study was that a significant increase in self-esteem would indicate that the program was effective.

This raised the problem of first defining, then sensitively measuring self-esteem. In addition to asking participants for their subjective impressions, the problem of objective measurement led to the adoption of two direct ways of measuring self-esteem by using acceptable self-esteem instruments and one indirect way--by measuring

anxiety, which was suggested as being highly inversely correlated with self-esteem. The two self-esteem instruments were, in fact, found to correlate quite highly with each other and highly but inversely with the anxiety measure.

Looking at the results more closely, the subjective measures indicate that, on the whole, this course certainly had a positive effect on the participants of both workshops, both in terms of how they enjoyed the course and how they felt it affected their level of self-esteem. However, it is more difficult to make inferences from the results of the objective measures.

In response to the two original questions (from which the specific questions and the hypotheses were developed), namely: 1) Does a course on building self-esteem significantly enhance the development of self-esteem?, and 2) Is there a corresponding decrease in the level of anxiety?--the results indicate that the answers would be "possibly" to the first question, and "no" to the second.

With regard to the first question, while Experimental Group 1 did experience a significant change in self-esteem levels as a result of the workshop, Experimental Group 2 did not, although the recorded change, with one exception, was in the anticipated direction. Thus, the results are encouraging but not conclusive. In response to the second question, neither group showed any significant decrease in anxiety, although the trend for Experimental Group 1 was in the anti-

cipated direction.

Examining the specific hypotheses, Hypothesis #1 stated in the null form proposed that there would be no difference among pre, post and follow-up score means of self-esteem as measured by the TSCS. This, indeed, was the case. However, when only pre and posttest score means were used, a post hoc analysis indicated there was a significant interaction effect and that Experimental Group 1 did show a significant gain in self-esteem but Experimental Group 2 did not. Possible reasons for this will be discussed later.

Hypothesis #2 proposed that there would be no difference among pre, post and follow-up scores of self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale. This hypothesis was initially rejected because there was a significant effect due to time. However, further post hoc analysis revealed that while Experimental Group 1 changed significantly immediately following the workshop when compared to its own pre-test mean scores, when compared to the Control Group mean scores the gain was not significant.

When only pre and posttest score means of the Janis-Field Scale were used, the results indicated that there was a significant interaction effect between time and treatment condition. Further analysis showed that, once again, Experimental Group 1 showed a significant change after treatment while Experimental Group 2 did not. Possible reasons for this will be discussed shortly.

Hypotheses #3 and #4 are examined here together. Hypothesis #3 proposed that there would be no difference among pre, post and follow-up score means on measures of anxiety as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire. This hypothesis was accepted. Post hoc analysis using only pre and posttest score means also found no significant differences although the change in Experimental Group 1 was in the anticipated direction.

Hypothesis #4, an ancillary hypothesis, proposed that there would be no correlation between either measure of self-esteem and the measure of anxiety on the pre-test scores of the three treatment groups. This hypothesis was rejected as correlations among the three instruments were quite high. Thus, it would seem that while there is definitely a strong correlation between self-esteem and anxiety, either the instrument employed was not sensitive enough to detect subsequent changes in anxiety or a change in self-esteem does not always mean that there has to be a corresponding change in anxiety.

Moving back to examining the change in self-esteem, the obvious question is why the difference in gain in self-esteem between the two experimental groups? Answers are not clearly discernible and reasons for the different findings can only be suggested. From the viewpoint of this writer, as the course content and application was essentially the same, it seems likely the differences stemmed in some way from the nature of the participants or their interaction

among themselves and with the instructors.

Although as Table 8 and Figures 5, 6, and 7 show, the initial pre-test scores did not indicate much difference between the two treatment groups, it seems clear that after an intervention period of only one week, the average self-esteem level of Experimental Group 1 participants significantly increased while those in the second group did not. There is always the possibility that the workshop really had no effect on Group 1, that a type 1 error accounted for the difference. Assuming that this is not the case, some reasons for the difference can be suggested.

Outside of the fact that Group 2 may have differed in some way, and given that the two groups were not dissimilar in terms of initial self-esteem levels, it was first thought by this writer that the difference in gain might have been due to participant expectations and motivations. From personal observations made by this writer it was noticed that in the second workshop several participants were involved in the "helping" professions. As the workshop was advertised as dealing with one's own and others' self-esteem, it seemed possible that several participants may have come with the expectation of only learning how to build the esteem of others rather than their own and, consequently, might not have been as personally involved or motivated as participants who had come with the intent of building their own self-esteem.

However, a questionnaire (see Appendix C), which had been mailed to participants in Experimental Group 2 prior to the workshop and which asked the general questions of why they were coming and what they hoped to get out of the course, revealed that most were coming with the intent of both improving their own self-esteem and learning how to positively affect other people. Only three out of the 13 respondents were coming only to learn how to improve others' self-esteem. Therefore, the suggestion that because participants were "helpers" interested only in changing others' self-esteem did not appear to be supported from the responses to the questionnaire.

Another possibility is that even though the "helpers" came to learn how to enhance their own self-esteem having most likely received similar training somewhere in their career, they may have been more demanding and less easily impressed by the instructors. In a sense, being "workshop-wise", they might have stayed more reserved and held themselves back from participating fully. A self-fulfilling prophecy would be created. By holding back on some level, they would indeed experientially learn less--and be less impacted by the workshop--and probably enjoy it less. The fact that some of the participants in the second workshop did see the course as less valuable and less impactful than members in the first workshop, as illustrated by Tables 2 and 3, may lend support to this hypothesis.

Moving on to Group 2 specifically, a difference within this g

warrants comment. The subjects in Experimental Group 2 who did not complete the follow-up questionnaire had, on the average, higher self-esteem levels at posttest time than those who went on to complete the final questionnaire. Comparing Tables 6 and 8, one sees that in Experimental Group 2 when only subjects who were tested at all three measurement periods were used (n=6), mean scores on both self-esteem instruments were lower than the mean scores of subjects who completed only pre and posttests (n=13).

Furthermore, in Experimental Group 2, when n=6, there was a steady but insignificant gain in self-esteem as measured by the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale and a rather dramatic decrease in self-esteem as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale. This was the only instance where these two instruments did not correlate positively with each other. As the reasons for this are obscure, the scores of the missing subjects would have been most helpful for further clarifying the impact the workshop had on this group as a whole.

In summary, because of the ambiguity caused by the conflicting results between Experimental Groups 1 and 2, it seems clear that it would be premature to talk conclusively about the effectiveness of this workshop. The results are encouraging but not conclusive.

Discussion of Instrumentation Employed

First the self-esteem instruments will be discussed and then the instrument for measuring anxiety will be disoussed.

The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale and the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale had high correlations with each other. The two instruments also correlated highly with the anxiety measure (-.654 and -.656 respectively).

With one major exception, an increase in a group's mean self-esteem level as measured by one instrument corresponded with a similar increase in the other instrument (see Tables 6 and 8). The exception was on one occasion when Experimental Group 2 showed a decrease in self-esteem over time as measured by the TSCS but showed an increase over time as measured by the Janis-Field Scale. This may have been due to the small n (n=6) employed here, as measurements using only pre and post scores (which resulted in an n of 13) did not show this dissimilarity.

As noted earlier, while it was suggested that there would be an overlap between the two instruments, both were used to increase the chances of measuring the two critical components of self-esteem--evaluation and affection. Given the high correlations found in this study, either could probably be used alone as a measure of self-esteem which would measure both the dimensions of evaluation and affection. The choice of which to use in the future would depend on the circumstances involved and the purposes intended. The Janis-Field Scale is faster to administrate and quicker to score. For a quick overall level of self-esteem, it seems the better choice. If one had more

time to administer the TSCS scale and score it, it is possible that the more detailed information offered by the other components of this scale might make it the better choice.

With regard to the anxiety instrument employed, the IPAT Anxiety Scale Questionnaire, while it was chosen because of its accepted usage and wide popularity, may not have been an appropriate choice. Some writers have stated that it is only useful as a measure of trait anxiety (McReynolds, 1978). While correlations between self-esteem and anxiety were initially found in this study, anxiety did not significantly decrease. Perhaps if an instrument which measured both state and trait anxiety had been used, the impact of the workshop upon anxiety would have been clearer.

Conclusions

The results of this study, while not definite, are certainly positive enough to encourage further and more refined research. Although the results were not conclusive, there are indications that the workshop method employed in this study is viable for enhancing self-esteem in a way that holds over time. If this is true, it would seem that a program approximately 20 hours in length holds the possibility of helping people to increase their self-esteem.

Recommendations and Suggestions

In this section, recommendations and suggestions are made both for refining the evaluation procedure in the present study and for some

alternate ways of measuring changes in self-esteem.

Refining the Present Study

The following suggestions are made for refining the format of the present study:

1. At least three treatment groups and a control group, all with 16 to 20 members, be used so that the dilemma of deciding whether change really took place would be minimized.

2. Participants be assigned to groups randomly rather than by date of application. It is conjectured that there may be a relationship between time of application and interest in the course.

3. Demographic data be collected from participants so that it would be possible to randomly stratify the groups, ie., by age, sex, satisfaction with life, number of close friends.

4. An anxiety measure that measures both state and trait anxiety be employed.

5. Components of the workshop be examined more closely for their subjective impact upon participants.

6. Videotape portions of each workshop be taken and then shown to objective raters to ensure similarity of course application among workshops.

Alternate Ways of Measuring Change in Self-Esteem

This study relied primarily upon self-report instruments for measuring self-esteem. Another way of measuring self-esteem might be

to measure behaviors. This could be done in a variety of ways. Associates of the participants could be asked for impressions or even to actually observe and count identified behaviors. Independent observers could be asked to rate behaviors from interviews or videotapes of the participants, eg., the numbers of positive self-referent statements a person made during selected test intervals. By measuring changes in actual behavior, a more accurate picture of how the program affected self-esteem could be obtained. Furthermore, if self-report methods were also used this method would also enable both the examination of the basic premise that self-esteem affects behavior and the determination of correlations between self-reports and actual behaviors.

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APPENDIX A

Assessment of Self-Esteem Workshop
Faculty of Extension

1. Write out a List of all the things that stand out in your memory about this workshop, eg., ideas, feelings, new learnings, etc.

_____ ( )

_____ ( )

_____ ( )

_____ ( )

2. Indicate after each item you listed whether your memory has a positive or negative association to it.

3. Did you get what you wanted? (Circle one)

Not At All					Everything
0	1	2	3	4	5

4. Did you like what you got? (Circle one)

Not At All					Everything
0	1	2	3	4	5

5. Did you get introduced to any new ideas? (Circle one)

None					Many
0	1	2	3	4	5

6. Do you think what you learned will be useful to you in your job?

Not At All					Very Much
0	1	2	3	4	5

7. How highly motivated do you think Gary and Carol were in delivering this workshop? (Circle one)

Not At All					Very Motivated
0	1	2	3	4	5

8. How effective do you think they were in delivering this workshop?

Not At All					Very Effective
0	1	2	3	4	5

Additional Comments: _____

_____

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire #4

1. Looking back on this course, how did this course affect your self-esteem?

Very Negative Effect						Very Positive Effect
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. What do you remember most about this course? (Please indicate what effect this had on you.)

3. What did you like best about this course?

4. What did you like least about this course?

5. Have any of your friends, relatives, etc. told you that they've noticed a change in you since you took this course?

6. Looking back, on a scale of 1 to 7, how would you now rate this course?

Course was of little or no value to me						Course was very valuable to me
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. Would you recommend this course to a friend?

8. Any additional comments you have would be appreciated.

APPENDIX C

Questionnaire #4: Reasons for Coming

The following questions are designed to help us determine what brings people to these courses. Your answers will be confidential.

1. Why did you decide to take this course?

2. What are you hoping to get out of this course?

3. Any other comments you may wish to make?